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The Commerce Clause describes an enumerated power listed in the United States Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3). The clause states that the United States Congress shall have power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Courts and commentators have tended to discuss each of these three areas of commerce as a separate power granted to Congress.[1] It is common to see the individual components of the Commerce Clause referred to under specific terms: the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Interstate Commerce Clause,[2] and the Indian Commerce Clause.
Dispute exists within the courts as to the range of powers granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause. As noted below, it is often paired with the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the combination used to take a broad, expansive perspective of these powers. However, the effect of the Commerce Clause has varied significantly depending on the US Supreme Court's interpretation.
During the Marshall Court era (1801 to 1835), Commerce Clause interpretation empowered Congress to gain jurisdiction over numerous aspects of intrastate and interstate commerce as well as non-commerce. During the post-1937 era, the use of the Commerce Clause by Congress to authorize federal control of economic matters became effectively unlimited. Since the latter half of the Rehnquist Court era, congressional use of the Commerce Clause has become slightly restricted again, being limited only to matters of trade or any other form of restricted area (whether interstate or not) and production (whether commercial or not).
The Commerce Clause is the source of federal drug prohibition laws under the Controlled Substances Act. In a recent medical marijuana case, Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the ban on growing medical marijuana for personal use exceeded Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause. Even if no goods were sold or transported across state lines, the Court found that there could be an indirect effect on interstate commerce. The Court relied heavily on a New Deal case, Wickard v. Filburn, which held that the government may regulate personal cultivation and consumption of crops because the aggregate effect of individual consumption could have an indirect effect on interstate commerce.
Text and pairing
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3:[3]
[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

The significance of the Commerce Clause is described in the Supreme Court's opinion in Gonzales v. Raich, 545U.S.(2005):[4][5]
The Commerce Clause emerged as the Framers' response to the central problem giving rise to the Constitution itself: the absence of any federal commerce power under the Articles of Confederation. For the first century of our history, the primary use of the Clause was to preclude the kind of discriminatory state legislation that had once been permissible. Then, in response to rapid industrial development and an increasingly interdependent national economy, Congress "ushered in a new era of federal regulation under the commerce power," beginning with the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.

The Commerce Clause represents one of the most fundamental powers delegated to the Congress by the founders. The outer limits of the Interstate Commerce Clause power have been the subject of long, intense political controversy. Interpretation of the sixteen words of the Commerce Clause has helped define the balance of power between the federal government and the states and the balance of power between the two elected branches of the federal government and the Judiciary. As such, it directly affects the lives of American citizens.
Significance – federal rights in navigable waters
The commerce clause provides comprehensive powers to the United States over navigable waters. These powers are critical to understanding the rights of landowners adjoining or exercising what would otherwise be riparian rights under the common law. The Commerce Clause confers a unique position upon the Government in connection with navigable waters. "The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States ... For this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress." United States v. Rands, 389U.S.(1967). The Rands decision continues:
This power to regulate navigation confers upon the United States a dominant servitude, FPC v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954), which extends to the entire stream and the stream bed below ordinary high-water mark. The proper exercise of this power is not an invasion of any private property rights in the stream or the lands underlying it, for the damage sustained does not result from taking property from riparian owners within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment but from the lawful exercise of a power to which the interests of riparian owners have always been subject. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U.S. 592, 596–597 (1941); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 275–276 (1897). Thus, without being constitutionally obligated to pay compensation, the United States may change the course of a navigable stream, South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876), or otherwise impair or destroy a riparian owner's access to navigable waters, Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945), even though the market value of the riparian owner's land is substantially diminished.
Other scholars, such as Robert H. Bork and Daniel E. Troy, argue that prior to 1887, the Commerce Clause was rarely invoked by Congress, and thus a broad interpretation of the word "commerce" was clearly never intended by the Founders. In support of this claim, they argue that the word "commerce", as used in the Constitutional Convention and the Federalist Papers, can be substituted with either "trade" or "exchange" interchangeably while preserving the meaning of the statements.  They also point to Madison's statement in an 1828 letter that the "Constitution vests in Congress expressly ... 'the power to regulate trade'."[6][7]
Examining contemporaneous dictionaries does not neatly resolve the matter. For instance, the 1792 edition of Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Language defines the noun "commerce" narrowly as "[e]xchange of one thing for another; interchange of any thing; trade; traffick", but it defines the corresponding verb "to commerce" more broadly as "[t]o hold intercourse."[8] The word "intercourse" also had a different and wider meaning back in 1792 than it does now.
Early years (1800s–1830s)
Chief Justice John Marshall ruled in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) that the power to regulate interstate commerce also included the power to regulate interstate navigation: "Commerce, undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something more—it is intercourse ... [A] power to regulate navigation is as expressly granted, as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce' ... [T]he power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several states. It would be a very useless power if it could not pass those lines." The Court's decision contains language supporting one important line of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the idea that the electoral process of representative government represents the primary limitation on the exercise of the Commerce Clause powers:
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments...
In Gibbons, the Court struck down New York's attempt to grant a steamboat monopoly to Robert Fulton, which he had then ultimately franchised to Ogden. Ogden claimed river traffic was not "commerce" under the Commerce Clause and further that Congress could not interfere with New York State's grant of an exclusive monopoly within its own borders. Ogden's assertion was untenable: he contended New York could control river traffic within New York all the way to the border with New Jersey, that New Jersey could control river traffic within New Jersey all the way to the border with New York, leaving Congress with the power to control the traffic as it crossed the state line.
Thus, Ogden contended, Congress could not invalidate his monopoly as long as he only transported passengers within New York. The Supreme Court, however, found that Congress could invalidate his monopoly since it was operational on an interstate channel of navigation.
In its decision, the Court assumed interstate commerce required movement of the subject of regulation across state borders. The decision contains the following principles, some of which have since been altered by subsequent decisions:
Commerce is "intercourse, all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."
Commerce among the states cannot stop at the external boundary-line of each state, but may be introduced into the interior ... Comprehensive as the word "among" is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more states than one."
The Commerce power is the power to regulate, that is "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed" which "may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution."
Additionally, the Marshall Court limited the extent of federal maritime and admiralty jurisdiction to tidewaters in The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson.[9]
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30U.S.(1831), the Supreme Court addressed whether the Cherokee nation is a foreign state in the sense in which that term is used in the constitution. The Court provided a definition of Indian tribe that clearly made the rights of tribes far inferior to those of foreign states. In part the court said:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile, they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence

As explained in United States v. Lopez, 514U.S.(1995), "For nearly a century thereafter (that is, after Gibbons), the Court's Commerce Clause decisions dealt but rarely with the extent of Congress' power, and almost entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state legislation that discriminated against interstate commerce.[10] Under this line of precedent, the Court held that certain categories of activity such as "exhibitions", "production", "manufacturing", and "mining" were within the province of state governments, and thus were beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. When Congress began to engage in economic regulation on a national scale, the Court's dormant Commerce Clause decisions influenced its approach to Congressional regulation.
In this context, the Court took a formalistic approach, which distinguished between services and commerce, manufacturing and commerce, direct and indirect effects on commerce, and local and national activities. See concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy in United States v. Lopez. ("One approach the Court used to inquire into the lawfulness of state authority was to draw content-based or subject-matter distinctions, thus defining by semantic or formalistic categories those activities that were commerce and those that were not.")  The Dormant Commerce Clause formalisms spilled over into its Article I jurisprudence. While Congress had the power to regulate commerce, it could not regulate manufacturing, which was seen as being entirely local. In Kidd v. Pearson, 128U.S.(1888), the Court struck a federal law which prohibited the manufacture of liquor for shipment across state lines. Similar decisions were issued with regard to agriculture, mining, oil production, and generation of electricity. In Swift v. United States, 196U.S.(1905), the Court ruled that the clause covered meatpackers; although their activity was geographically "local", they had an important effect on the "current of commerce", and thus could be regulated under the Commerce Clause. The Court's decision halted price fixing. Stafford v. Wallace (1922) upheld a federal law (the Packers and Stockyards Act) regulating the Chicago meatpacking industry, because the industry was part of the interstate commerce of beef from ranchers to dinner tables. The stockyards "are but a throat through which the current [of commerce] flows," Chief Justice Taft wrote, referring to the stockyards as "great national public utilities." As Justice Kennedy wrote: (in a concurring opinion to United States v. Lopez), "Though that [formalistic] approach likely would not have survived even if confined to the question of a State's authority to enact legislation, it was not at all propitious when applied to the quite different question of what subjects were within the reach of the national power when Congress chose to exercise it."
Similarly, the court excluded most services by distinguishing them from commerce. In Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), which was later upheld in Toolson v. New York Yankees (1953) and Flood v. Kuhn (1973), the court excluded nonproduction-related services, such as live entertainment, from the definition of commerce:
That to which it is incident, the exhibition, although made for money, would not be called trade of commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words. As it is put by defendant, personal effort not related to production is not a subject of commerce.

New Deal

In 1935 the Supreme Court of the United States, in Schecter Poultry Corporation v. United States, invalidated regulations of the poultry industry according to the nondelegation doctrine and as an invalid use of Congress's power under the commerce clause. This was a unanimous decision that rendered the National Industrial Recovery Act, a main component of President Roosevelt's New Deal, unconstitutional.  Again in 1936, in Carter v. Carter Coal Company,[11] the Supreme Court struck down a key element of the New Deal's regulation of the mining industry, on the grounds that mining was not "commerce." In the preceding decades, the Court had struck down a laundry list of Progressive legislation – minimum-wage laws, child labor laws, agricultural relief laws, and virtually every element of the New Deal legislation that had come before it. After winning re-election in 1936, Roosevelt proposed the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill, wherein the President could appoint an additional Justice for each sitting Justice over age 70. Given the age of the current Justices, this allowed a Supreme Court size of up to 15 Justices. Roosevelt claimed that this was intended to lessen the load on the older Justices, rather than being an attempt to achieve a majority that would cease to strike his New Deal acts.
Ultimately, there was widespread opposition to this "court packing" plan and in the end Roosevelt abandoned it. However, in what became known as "the switch in time that saved nine", shortly after the "court packing" plan was proposed, Justice Owen Roberts  joined the 5-4 majority opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937). The majority narrowly upheld a Washington state minimum wage law, abandoning prior jurisprudence, ending the Lochner era. This essentially marked the beginning of the end of Supreme Court opposition to the New Deal, obviating the "court packing" scheme as well.
In United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (1941), the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act which regulated the production of goods shipped across state lines. The Court stated that the Tenth Amendment "is but a truism" and was not considered to be an independent limitation on Congressional power.[12]
In United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co. (1942) the Court upheld federal price regulation of intrastate milk commerce, stating:
The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce. ... The power of Congress over interstate commerce is plenary and complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution. ... It follows that no form of state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress. Hence, the reach of that power extends to those intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power.[13]
In Wickard v. Filburn (1942) the Court upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which sought to stabilize wide fluctuations in the market price for wheat. The Court found that Congress could apply national quotas to wheat grown on one's own land, for one's own consumption, because the total of such local production and consumption could potentially be sufficiently large as to affect the overall national goal of stabilizing prices. The Court cited its recent Wrightwood decision and decided that "[w]hether the subject of the regulation in question was "production," "consumption," or "marketing" is, therefore, not material for purposes of deciding the question of federal power before us." The Court re-iterated Marshall's decision in Gibbons: "He made emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of this power by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political, rather than from judicial, processes." The Court also stated that "[t]he conflicts of economic interest between the regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left under our system to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and responsible legislative process. Such conflicts rarely lend themselves to judicial determination. And with the wisdom, workability, or fairness, of the plan of regulation, we have nothing to do."[14]
Thereafter, the Court began to defer to the Congress on the theory that determining whether legislation affected commerce appropriately was a political and legislative, not a judicial, decision. This overall change in the Court's jurisprudence, beginning with Parrish, is often referred to as the Constitutional Revolution of 1937,[15] in which the Court shifted from exercising judicial review of legislative acts to protect economic rights, to a paradigm which focused most strongly on protecting civil liberties.[16]
It was not until United States v. Lopez (1995) decision, after nearly 60 years of leaving any restraint on the use of the Commerce Clause to political means only, that the Court again ruled that a regulation enacted under the Clause was unconstitutional.
Civil rights
The wide interpretation of the scope of the Commerce Clause continued following the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which aimed to prevent business from discriminating against black customers. The United States Supreme Court issued several opinions which supported this use of the Commerce Clause. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379U.S.(1964), ruled that Congress could regulate a business that served mostly interstate travelers. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), ruled that the federal government could regulate a recreational facility because three out of the four items sold at its snack bar were purchased from outside the state.
The Rehnquist Court
The Rehnquist Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence restored limits to the Interstate Commerce Clause that were removed in post-New Deal decisions, based primarily on concerns of federalism and encroachment by Congress on the several States' police powers. It upheld Congress's plenary authority to legislate in Indian affairs that was derived from the Worcester decision's interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause, but modified Worcester by giving the several states some jurisdiction over Indian affairs beyond what had been granted to them by Congress. Another view is that the Court was compelled to define limits to address Congressional legislation which sought to use the Interstate Commerce Clause power in new and unprecedented ways. In United States v. Lopez, the Court confronted the conviction of a 12th Grade student for carrying a concealed handgun into school in violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(1)(A). The Gun-Free School Zones Act made it a federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe is a school zone. The legislation posed several challenging problems for Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Education is a traditionally local government activity, and while education undoubtedly has an economic aspect, the nexus between regulating gun violence and the Commerce Clause power to regulate interstate commerce seems particularly strained. In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court ruled Congress was exercising its Commerce Clause power to regulate local economic activity in ways that the States were powerless to regulate, because only the federal government could effectively control the national wheat supply. The Court reasoned that if Wickard could be applied to acts of gun violence, simply because crime impaired education, Congress might conclude that crime in schools substantially affects commerce, and may be regulated. Under this logic, all police power could be nationalized and local police and criminal courts eliminated on the theory that all crime affects commerce.
As the majority explained:
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.  Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
The opinion pointed out that prior decisions had identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce;[17]
Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in Interstate Commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities;[18]
Finally, Congress's commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce (i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce).[19]
Thus the federal government did not have the power to regulate relatively unrelated things such as the possession of firearms near schools, as in Lopez. This was the first time in sixty years, since the conflict with President Roosevelt in 1936–37, that the Court had overturned a putative regulation on interstate commerce because it exceeded Congress's commerce power. Justice Clarence Thomas, in a separate concurring opinion, argued that allowing Congress to regulate intrastate, noncommercial activity under the Commerce Clause would confer on Congress a general "police power" over the entire nation.
The Lopez decision was clarified in United States v. Morrison, 529U.S.(2000), in which the Supreme Court invalidated §40302 of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"). The VAWA created civil liability for the commission of a gender-based violent crime, but without any jurisdictional requirement of a connection to Interstate Commerce or commercial activity. 42 U.S.C. §13981(c). Once again, the Court was presented with a Congressional attempt to criminalize traditional local criminal conduct. As in Lopez, it could not be argued that State regulation alone would be ineffective to protect the aggregate effects of local violence. The Court explained that in both Lopez and Morrison "the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision." Furthermore, the Court pointed out that in neither case was there an "'express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach (to those instances that) have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.'" Id. at 1751. In both cases, Congress criminalized activity that was not commercial in nature without including a jurisdictional element establishing the necessary connection between the criminalized activity and Interstate Commerce.
The Court found in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517U.S.(1996) that, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause does not give the federal government the power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states.
Many described the Rehnquist Court's Commerce Clause cases as a doctrine of "New Federalism". The outer limits of that doctrine were delineated by Gonzales v. Raich, in which Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy departed from their previous positions as parts of the Lopez and Morrison majorities to uphold a federal law regarding marijuana. The Court found the federal law valid, although the marijuana in question had been grown and consumed within a single state, and had never entered Interstate Commerce. The court held Congress may regulate an intrastate economic good if it does so as part of a complete scheme of legislation designed to regulate Interstate Commerce.
During the Rehnquist court and to present, the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution has played an integral part in the Court's view of the Commerce Clause.  The Tenth Amendment states that the federal government has only the powers specifically delegated to it by the Constitution while other powers are reserved to the states, or to the people.  The Commerce Clause is an important source of those powers delegated to Congress,  and therefore its interpretation is very important in determining the scope of federal power in controlling innumerable aspects of American life.   The Commerce Clause has been the most broadly interpreted clause in the Constitution, making way for many laws which, some argue,  contradict the original intended meaning of the Constitution.  Justice Clarence Thomas has gone so far as to state in his dissent to Gonzales,
Respondents Diane Monson and Angel Raich use marijuana that has never been bought or sold, that has never crossed state lines, and that has had no demonstrable effect on the national market for marijuana.  If Congress can regulate this under the Commerce Clause, then it can regulate virtually anything – and the federal Government is no longer one of limited and enumerated powers.[20]

Themes
Rational basis review
The evolving level of scrutiny applied by Federal courts to Commerce Clause cases should be considered in the context of rational basis review.  The idea behind rational basis review is that the judiciary must show deference to the elected representatives of the people.  A respect for the democratic process requires that the Courts uphold legislation if there are rational facts and reasons that could support Congressional judgment, even if the Justices would come to different conclusions.  Throughout the 20th century, in a variety of contexts, courts sought to avoid second guessing the legislative branch, and Commerce Clause jurisprudence can be seen as a part of this trend.  Lawrence Tribe states:
Since 1937, in applying the factual test in Jones & Laughlin to hold a broad range of activities sufficiently related to interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has exercised little independent judgment, choosing instead to defer to the expressed or implied findings of Congress to the effect that regulated activities have the requisite "economic effect". Such findings have been upheld whenever they could be said to rest upon some rational basis.[21] (Citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v United States (1964).)
Justice Rehnquist echoed this point in his opinion in  United States v. Lopez,  stating: "Since [Wickard], the Court has ... undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.  See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264, 276–280 (1981);[22] Perez v. United States,  402 U.S. 146, 155–156 (1971);[23] Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252–253 (1964)."[24]
Rational basis review  begins with establishing the factual predicate upon which the exercise of Congressional power is based.  This factual basis might come from a variety of sources.  It might come from factual determinations made by Congress,  passed in the legislation itself,  or found in the Congressional Reports issued to accompany the legislation.  It might come from the record of testimony compiled in Committee Hearings.  It might come from facts posited by proponents in their briefs in support of the legislation.  For example,  the Court referenced extensive testimony presented in hearings in support of the conclusion that discrimination in public accommodations reduces interstate commerce.  The Court wrote:
Of course, the mere fact that Congress has said when particular activity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude further examination by this Court. But where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end.
Similarly, in Gonzales v. Raich the Court upheld a ban on growing marijuana intended for medical use on the grounds that Congress could rationally conclude that such cultivation might make enforcement of drug laws more difficult by creating an otherwise lawful source of marijuana that could be diverted into the illicit market:
In assessing the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause,  we stress that the task before us is a modest one.  We need not determine whether respondents' activities,  taken in the aggregate,  substantially affect interstate commerce in fact,  but only whether a "rational basis" exists for so concluding.  Given the enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere,  21 U.S.C. § 801(5),  and concerns about diversion into illicit channels,  we have no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA.
Role of the political process
Since its decision in Gibbons, the Supreme Court has held that Congress may regulate only those activities within a state that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction and that, viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce.  Since judicial interpretations of constitutional limitations on Congressional exercise of its Commerce Clause powers represent an invasion of the democratic process which may not be overturned through ordinary democratic means, the Court has continued to assert that the primary limitation on the unwise exercise of Congressional Commerce Clause power by Congress must be found at the ballot box.  Thus in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469U.S.(1985), the Court stated:
Of course, we continue to recognize that the States occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional system and that the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect that position.  But the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action—the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated.
Debate over applicability to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Questions over the range and applicability of the Commerce Clause have arisen in debate over the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA"). The debate centers around whether Congress is authorized to require citizens to purchase health insurance from the private market, known as the individual mandate. Congress claims authority from the Commerce Clause. However, many opponents of the PPACA have claimed that the individual mandate exceeds Congress's authority thereunder, primarily on the position that the law attempts to define the non-purchase of insurance as "commerce".
Twenty-six state attorneys general filed a lawsuit against the federal government claiming the insurance mandate is unconstitutional. On June 8, 2011, a panel of three judges from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta held hearings on the issue.[25] On August 12, 2011. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the Individual Mandate portion unconstitutional, stating that Congress had exceeded its authority by requiring Americans to buy coverage.[26]
Differing court opinions have clashed over the question of whether failure to purchase insurance can be considered an economic activity that affects interstate commerce. In Virginia v. Sebelius, Judge Henry Hudson overturned the law, claiming that failure to purchase health insurance coverage could not be considered economic activity, being rather economic "inactivity". In Liberty University v. Geithner, Judge Norman Moon upheld the law, countering:
Far from 'inactivity,' by choosing to forgo insurance, Plaintiffs are making an economic decision to try to pay for health care services later, out of pocket, rather than now, through the purchase of insurance.

Similarly, in Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, judge George Steeh ruled that such decisions have "a documented impact on interstate commerce.[27]
In response to the Virginia decision, Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the appeal immediately, rather than going through the Fourth Circuit. On November 14, 2011, the Supreme Court announced it would hear the case in the spring of 2012.[28]  The Supreme Court heard arguments on March 26–28, 2012.  Its majority opinion agreed that upholding the PPACA under the commerce clause "would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority"  and that "the power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated".[29]  The Court held that Congress did not have authority under the Commerce Clause to require citizens to purchase health insurance, but still upheld the law's "individual mandate" provision under Congress' taxing authority.[30]
See also
Australian commerce clause
Dual federalism
National Recovery Administration
Section 51(i) of the Constitution of Australia
Section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (Canadian Constitution)

Further reading
"." Harvard Law Review. Volume 119, No. 8, June 2006, p.2612-2619. Available at JSTOR.

 FindLaw

 Madison, P.A.

Where in the Constitution is the Commerce Clause?


George Peter Metesky (November 2, 1903 – May 23, 1994), better known as the Mad Bomber, was an American electrician and mechanic who terrorized New York City for 16 years in the 1940s and 1950s with explosives that he planted in theaters, terminals, libraries, and offices. Bombs were left in phone booths, storage lockers, and restrooms in public buildings, including Grand Central Terminal, Pennsylvania Station, Radio City Music Hall, the New York Public Library, the Port Authority Bus Terminal and the RCA Building, and in the New York City Subway.  Metesky also bombed movie theaters, where he cut into seat upholstery and slipped his explosive devices inside.[1]
Angry and resentful about events surrounding a workplace injury suffered years earlier, Metesky planted at least 33 bombs, of which 22 exploded, injuring 15 people.[2]
The hunt for the bomber enlisted an early use of offender profiling. He was apprehended based on clues given in letters he wrote to a newspaper.  He was found legally insane and committed to a state mental hospital.[3][4]

Industrial injury
Following World War I, Metesky joined the U.S. Marines, serving as a specialist electrician at the United States Consulate in Shanghai.  Returning home, he went to work as a mechanic for a subsidiary of the Consolidated Edison utility company and lived in Waterbury, Connecticut, with his two unmarried sisters.  In 1931, Metesky was working as a generator wiper at the company's Hell Gate generating plant when a boiler backfire produced a blast of hot gases. The blast knocked Metesky down and the fumes filled his lungs, choking him. The accident left him disabled and, after collecting 26 weeks of sick pay, he lost his job.  According to claims disputed by Consolidated Edison, the accident led to pneumonia that in turn developed into tuberculosis.  A claim for workers' compensation was denied because he waited too long to file it.  Three appeals of the denial were also rejected, the last in 1936.  He developed a hatred for the company's attorneys and for the three co-workers whose testimony in his compensation case he believed was perjured in favor of the company.[5][6][7][8]
He planted his first bomb on November 16, 1940, leaving it on a window sill at the Consolidated Edison power plant at 170 West 64th Street in Manhattan.[1]
Bombs

His first two bombs drew little attention, but the string of random bombings that began in 1951 frayed the city's nerves and taxed the resources of the New York City Police Department (NYPD).  Metesky often placed warning calls to the buildings where he had planted bombs, but would not specify the bomb's exact location; he wrote to newspapers warning that he planned to plant more.
Some bombs came with notes, but the note never revealed a motive, or a reason for choosing that particular location.[8][9]
Metesky's bombs were gunpowder-filled pipe bombs, ranging in size from 4–10 inches (10–25cm) long and from 0.5–2 inches (1–5cm) in diameter.  Most used timers constructed from flashlight batteries and cheap pocket watches.  Investigators at bomb sites learned to look for a wool sock – Metesky used these to transport the bombs and sometimes to hang them from a rail or projection.[3]
Between 1940 and 1956, Metesky planted at least 33 bombs, of which 22 exploded, injuring 15 people.[2]
1940–1941
Metesky's first bomb was crude, a short length of brass pipe filled with gunpowder,[10] with an ignition mechanism made of sugar and flashlight batteries.  Enclosed in a wooden toolbox and left on a Consolidated Edison power plant window sill, it was found before it could go off.  It was wrapped in a note written in distinctive block letters and signed "F.P.", stating
CON EDISON CROOKS – THIS IS FOR YOU.

Some investigators wondered if the bomb was an intentional dud, since if it had exploded the note would have been obliterated.
In September 1941, a bomb with a similar ignition mechanism was found lying in the street about five blocks away from the Consolidated Edison headquarters building at 4 Irving Place.  This one had no note, and was also a dud. Police theorized that the bomber might have spotted a police officer and dropped the bomb without setting its fuse.[3][10]
Shortly after the United States entered World War II in December 1941, the police received a letter in block capital letters:[10]
I WILL MAKE NO MORE BOMB UNITS FOR THE DURATION OF THE WAR – MY PATRIOTIC FEELINGS HAVE MADE ME DECIDE THIS – LATER I WILL BRING THE CON EDISON TO JUSTICE – THEY WILL PAY FOR THEIR DASTARDLY DEEDS... F.P.

1951–1956
True to his word, Metesky planted no bombs between 1941 and 1951, choosing instead to send crank letters and postcards to police stations, newspapers, private citizens and Con Edison.  Investigators studying the penciled, block-lettered messages noted that the letters G and Y had an odd shape, possibly indicating a European education.[3] The long hiatus since the last bomb and the improved construction techniques of the first new bomb led investigators to believe that the bomber had served in the military.
For his new wave of bombings, Metesky mainly chose public buildings as targets, bombing several of them multiple times.  Bombs were left in phone booths, storage lockers and restrooms in public buildings including Grand Central Terminal (five times), Pennsylvania Station (five times), Radio City Music Hall (three times), the New York Public Library (twice), the Port Authority Bus Terminal (twice) and the RCA Building, as well as in the New York City Subway. Metesky also bombed movie theaters, where he cut into seat upholstery and slipped his explosive devices inside.[1]
1951
On March 29, the first Metesky bomb of the new wave, and also the first Metesky bomb to explode, startled commuters in Grand Central Terminal but injured no one.  It had been dropped into a sand urn near the Grand Central Oyster Bar & Restaurant on the terminal's lower level.[11] In April, Metesky's next bomb exploded without injury in a telephone booth in the New York Public Library; in August a phone-booth bomb exploded without injury at Grand Central.[12]
Police dismissed the event as the work of "boys or pranksters." The New York Times reported the event in the following day's issue, though only with a three-paragraph brief at the bottom of page 24.[13]
Metesky next planted a bomb that exploded without injury in a phone booth at the Consolidated Edison headquarters building at 4 Irving Place.  He also mailed one bomb, which did not explode, to Consolidated Edison from White Plains, New York.[2][14]
On October 22, the New York Herald Tribune received a letter in penciled block letters, stating
BOMBS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY IS BROUGHT TO JUSTICE FOR THEIR DASTARDLY ACTS AGAINST ME. I HAVE EXHAUSTED ALL OTHER MEANS. I INTEND WITH BOMBS TO CAUSE OTHERS TO CRY OUT FOR JUSTICE FOR ME.

The letter directed police to the Paramount Theater in Times Square, where a bomb was discovered and disabled, and to a telephone booth at Pennsylvania Station where nothing was found.[15]

On November 28, a coin-operated locker at the IRT 14th Street subway station was bombed, without injury. Near the end of the year, the Herald Tribune received another letter, warning:[10]HAVE YOU NOTICED THE BOMBS IN YOUR CITY – IF YOU ARE WORRIED, I AM SORRY – AND ALSO IF ANYONE IS INJURED. BUT IT CANNOT BE HELPED – FOR JUSTICE WILL BE SERVED. I AM NOT WELL, AND FOR THIS I WILL MAKE THE CON EDISON SORRY – YES, THEY WILL REGRET THEIR DASTARDLY DEEDS – I WILL BRING THEM BEFORE THE BAR OF JUSTICE – PUBLIC OPINION WILL CONDEMN THEM – FOR BEWARE, I WILL PLACE MORE UNITS UNDER THEATER SEATS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. F.P.

1952
On March 19, a bomb exploded in a phone booth at the Port Authority Bus Terminal without causing injury. In June and again in December bombs exploded in seats at the Lexington Avenue Loew's theater.  The December bombing injured one person, and was the first Metesky bomb to cause injury.  Police had asked the newspapers not to print any of the bomber's letters and to play down earlier bombings, but by now the public was becoming aware that a "Mad Bomber" was on the loose.
1953
Bombs exploded in seats at Radio City Music Hall and at the Capitol Theater, with no injuries.  A bomb again exploded near the Oyster Bar in Grand Central Terminal, this time in a coin-operated rental locker, again with no injuries.  Police described this bomb as the homemade product of a "publicity-seeking jerk".[16]  An unexploded bomb was found in a rental locker at Pennsylvania Station.
1954
A bomb wedged behind a sink in a Grand Central Terminal men's room exploded in March, slightly injuring three men.[17]
A bomb planted in a phone booth at the Port Authority Bus Terminal exploded with no injuries.  Another bomb was discovered in a phone booth that was removed from Pennsylvania Station for repair.
As a capacity Radio City Music Hall audience of 6,200 watched Bing Crosby's White Christmas on November 7, a bomb stuffed into the bottom cushion of a seat in the 15th row exploded, injuring four patrons.  The explosion was muffled by the heavy upholstery, and only those nearby heard it.  While the film continued, the injured were escorted to the facility's first-aid room and about 50 people in the immediate area were moved to the back of the theater.  After the film and the following stage show concluded an hour-and-a-half later, the police roped off 150 seats in the area of the explosion and began the search for evidence.[18]
1955
A bomb exploded without injuries on the platform at the IRT Sutter Avenue subway station in Brooklyn. A bomb hung beneath a phone booth shelf exploded on the main floor of Macy's department store, with no injuries.[19] Two bombs exploded without injuries at Pennsylvania Station, one in a rental locker and one in a phone booth.  A bomb was found at Radio City Music Hall after a warning phone call.
At the Roxy Theater, a bomb dropped out of a slashed seat onto an upholsterer's workbench without exploding.[20]  A seat bomb exploded at the Paramount Theater; one patron was struck on the shoe by bomb fragments but disclaimed injury.  Investigators discovered a small penknife pushed inside the seat, one of several found at theater seat bombings.  They theorized that the bomber left his knives behind in case he was stopped and questioned.[21]  In December, a bomb exploded without injuries in a Grand Central men's-room stall.[22]
1956
A 74-year-old men's-room attendant at Pennsylvania Station was seriously injured when a bomb in a toilet bowl exploded.  A young man had reported an obstruction and the attendant tried to clear it using a plunger.  Among the porcelain fragments, investigators found a watch frame and a wool sock.[23]
A guard at the RCA Building in Rockefeller Center discovered a piece of pipe about five inches long in a telephone booth.  A second guard thought it might be useful in a plumbing project and took it home on the bus to New Jersey, where it exploded on his kitchen table early the next morning.  No one was injured.[24]
A December 2 bombing at the Paramount Theater in Brooklyn left six of the theater's 1,500 occupants injured, one seriously, and drew tremendous news coverage and editorial attention.  The next day, Police Commissioner Stephen P. Kennedy ordered what he called the "greatest manhunt in the history of the Police Department."[1][25]

On December 24, a New York Public Library clerk using a phone booth dropped a coin. Looking up after he retrieved it, he saw a maroon-colored sock held to the underside of the shelf by a magnet.  The sock contained an iron pipe with a threaded cap on each end.  After consulting with other employees, he threw the device out a window into Bryant Park, bringing the bomb squad and more than 60 NYPD police officers and detectives to the scene.[26]
In a letter to the New York Journal American the next month, Metesky said that the Public Library bomb, as well as one discovered later the same week inside a seat at the Times Square Paramount, had been planted months before.[27]
1957 discovery
Eight months after Metesky's January 1957 arrest, a bomb not found in several police searches was discovered at the Lexington Avenue Loew's Theater by an upholsterer repairing a recently vandalized seat.  It was the last of the three bombs Metesky said he had planted there.  The first two had exploded, one in June 1952 and one in December 1952, with the December explosion resulting in one injury.  As of the Loew's discovery, only two of the dozens of bombs that Metesky claimed to have planted remained unaccounted for: one at a Con Edison site on the East River, the other at the Embassy Theater at 7th Avenue and 47th Street.
With the finding of the third Loew's bomb, police closed their "Mad Bomber" case, saying that their searches of the two remaining locations had been so thorough that they were satisfied that the bombs were no longer there, if indeed they ever had been.[28]
Search
Throughout the investigation, the prevailing theory was that the bomber was a former Con Edison employee with a grudge against the company.  Con Edison employment records were reviewed, but there were hundreds of other leads, tips and crank letters to be followed up on.  Detectives ranged far and wide, checking lawsuit records, mental hospital admissions, vocational schools where bomb parts might be made.  Citizens turned in neighbors who behaved oddly, and co-workers who seemed to know too much about bombs.  A new group, the Bomb Investigation Unit, was formed to work on nothing but bomber leads.[3]
In April 1956, the department issued a multi-state alert for a person described as a skilled mechanic, with access to a drill press or lathe (for its ability to thread pipe), who posted mail from White Plains, was over 40, and had a "deep-seated hatred of the Consolidated Edison Company".[29] A warning circular picturing a homemade pipe bomb similar to the bomber's was distributed.[30] Police distributed samples of the bomber's distinctive printing and asked anyone who might recognize it to notify them.[31]  A review of drivers' license applications in White Plains, the city favored by the bomber for posting his mail, found similarities in 500 of them to the bomber's printing; the names were forwarded to the NYPD for investigation.[27]
The December 2, 1956 bombing of the Brooklyn Paramount drew tremendous news coverage and editorial attention.  The following day, Police Commissioner Stephen P. Kennedy met with commanders of every NYPD division and ordered what he called the "greatest manhunt in the history of the Police Department." Calling the bomber's activities "an outrage that cannot be tolerated", he promised "an immediate good promotion" to whoever arrested the bomber, and directed commanders to alert every member of the force to the absolute necessity of a capture.[25]
On December 27, 1956, the New York City Board of Estimate and the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association posted $26,000 in rewards for the bomber's apprehension.[32]
Distractions
Throughout the search, simulated bombs and false bomb reports wasted police resources and frightened an already nervous public.
Around 1951 Frederick Eberhardt, 56 years old and like Metesky a former Con Edison employee with a grudge, sent a simulated pipe bomb filled with sugar to the company's personnel director at 4 Irving Place.  Eberhardt was charged with sending threatening material through the mails.  At his arraignment in November, an assistant district attorney told the judge, "This defendant is a particular source of annoyance to the New York City police.  We are firmly convinced that he is not of sound mind.  He has been sending simulated bombs around the city the past few months.  Hundreds of police have been called out at all hours of the day and night to investigate because of his actions."  Eberhardt was sent to Bellevue Hospital for psychiatric examination.  Several months later the case was dismissed after Eberhardt's lawyer argued successfully that the package contained no "written threats", as the law required.[33][34]
In October 1951, the main waiting room at Grand Central Terminal was emptied and 3,000 lockers were searched after a telephoned bomb warning.  The search involved more than 35 NYPD personnel, and took three hours because 1,500 of the lockers were in use and only one master key was available.  As each locker was opened, the head of the bomb squad palpated its contents, keeping a portable fluoroscope at the ready.[35]
On December 29, 1956, at the height of false bomb reports from theaters, department stores, schools and offices, a note left in a phone booth at Grand Central Terminal reported that a bomb had been placed at the Empire State Building, requiring a search of all 102 floors of the landmark.  A 63-year-old railroad worker picked up at Grand Central as a suspect died of a heart attack while being questioned at the East 35th Street station house.  Later investigation eliminated him as a suspect.[36]
Profile
Fingerprint experts, handwriting experts, the bomb investigation unit and other NYPD groups worked with dedication but made little progress.  With traditional police methods seemingly useless against Metesky's erratic bombing campaign, police captain John Cronin approached his friend James A. Brussel, a criminologist, psychiatrist, and assistant commissioner of the New York State Commission for Mental Hygiene.  Captain Cronin asked Brussel to meet with Inspector Howard E. Finney, head of the NYPD's Crime Laboratory.
In his office with Finney and two detectives, Brussel examined the crime-scene photos and letters and discussed the bomber's metal-working and electrical skills.  As he talked with the police, Brussel developed what he called a kind of "portrait" of the bomber, what would now be called an offender profile. The bomber's belief that he had been wronged by Consolidated Edison and by others acting in concert with Consolidated Edison seemed to dominate his thoughts, leading Brussel to conclude that the bomber was suffering from paranoia, a condition he describes as "a chronic disorder of insidious development, characterized by persistent, unalterable, systematized, logically constructed delusions." Based on the evidence and his own experience dealing with psychotic criminals, Brussel put forth a number of theories beyond the obvious grudge against Consolidated Edison:[10]
Male, as historically most bombers were male. Well proportioned and of average build, based on studies of hospitalized mental patients. Forty to fifty years old, as paranoia develops slowly. Precise, neat and tidy, based on his letters and the workmanship of his bombs. An exemplary employee, on time and well-behaved. A Slav, because bombs were favored in Middle Europe. A Catholic, because most Slavs were Catholic. Courteous but not friendly.

Has a good education but probably not college.  Foreign-born or living in a community of the foreign-born – the formal tone and old-fashioned phrasing of the letters sounded to Brussel as if they had been written or thought out in a foreign language and then translated into English.  Based on the rounded letter "w's" of the handwriting, believed to represent breasts, and the slashing and stuffing of theater seats, Brussel thought something about sex was troubling the bomber, possible an oedipus complex – loving his mother and hating his father and other authority figures.

A loner, no friends, little interest in women, possibly a virgin.  Unmarried, perhaps living with an older female relative. Probably lives in Connecticut, as Connecticut has high concentrations of Slavs, and many of the bomber's letters were posted in Westchester County, midway between Connecticut and New York City.

Brussel additionally predicted to his visitors that when the bomber was caught, he would be wearing a double-breasted suit, buttoned.
Although the police policy had been to keep the bomber investigation low-key, Brussel convinced them to heavily publicize the profile, predicting that any wrong assumption made in it would prod the bomber to respond.  Under the headline "16-Year Search for a Madman", the New York Times version of the profile summarized the major predictions:[3]
Single man, between 40 and 50 years old, introvert.  Unsocial but not anti-social.  Skilled mechanic.  Cunning.  Neat with tools.  Egotistical of mechanical skill.  Contemptuous of other people.  Resentful of criticism of his work but probably conceals resentment.  Moral.  Honest.  Not interested in women.  High school graduate.  Expert in civil or military ordnance.  Religious.  Might flare up violently at work when criticized.  Possible motive: discharge or reprimand.  Feels superior to critics.  Resentment keeps growing.  Present or former Consolidated Edison worker.  Probably case of progressive paranoia.

Newspapers published the profile on December 25, 1956, alongside the story of the so-called "Christmas Eve" bomb discovered in the Public Library.  By the end of the month, bomb hoaxes and false confessions had risen to epidemic proportions.  At the peak of the hysteria on December 28, police received over 50 false bomb alarms, over 20 the next day.[32][36]
Journal-American letters
The day after the profile was published, the New York Journal-American published an open letter, prepared in cooperation with the police, urging the bomber to give himself up.  The newspaper promised a "fair trial" and offered to publish his grievances.  Metesky wrote back the next day, signing his letter "F.P.".  He said that he would not be giving himself up, and revealed a wish to "bring the Con. Edison to justice".  He listed all the locations where he had placed bombs that year, and seemed concerned that perhaps not all  had been discovered.  Later in the letter he said
My days on earth are numbered – most of my adult life has been spent in bed – my one consolation is – that I can strike back – even from my grave – for the dastardly acts against me.

After some editing by the police, the newspaper published Metesky's letter on January 10, along with another open letter asking him for more information about his grievances.[27]
Metesky's second letter provided some details about the materials used in the bombs (he favored pistol powder, as "shotgun powder has very little power"), promised a bombing "truce" until at least March 1, and wrote "I was injured on job at Consolidated Edison plant – as a result I am adjudged – totally and permanently disabled", going on to say that he had to pay his own medical bills and that Consolidated Edison had blocked his workers' compensation case.  He also said
When a motorist injures a dog – he must report it – not so with an injured workman – he rates less than a dog – I tried to get my story to the press – I tried hundreds of others – I typed tens of thousands of words (about 800,000) – nobody cared –  [...]  – I determined to make these dastardly acts known – I have had plenty of time to think – I decided on bombs.

After police editing, the newspaper published his letter on January 15 and asked the bomber for "further details and dates" about his compensation case so that a new and fair hearing could be held.
Metesky's third letter was received by the newspaper on Saturday, January 19.  The letter complained of lying unnoticed for hours on "cold concrete" after his injury without any first aid being rendered, then developing pneumonia and later tuberculosis. The letter added details about his lost compensation case and the "perjury" of his co-workers, and gave the date of his injury, September 5, 1931.  The letter suggested that if he did not have a family that would be "branded" by his giving himself up, he might consider doing so to get his compensation case reopened.
He thanked the Journal-American for publicizing his case and said "the bombings will never be resumed."  This letter was published Tuesday, the day after Metesky was arrested.[5][8]
Identification
Con Edison clerk Alice Kelly had for days been scouring company workers' compensation files for employees with a serious health problem. On Friday, January 18, 1957, while searching the final batch of "troublesome" worker's compensation case files – those where threats were made or implied – she found a file marked in red with the words "injustice" and "permanent disability", words that had been printed in the Journal-American.  The file indicated that one George Metesky, an employee from 1929 to 1931, had been injured in a plant accident on September 5, 1931.  Several letters from Metesky in the file used wording similar to the letters in the Journal-American, including the phrase "dastardly deeds".  The police were notified shortly before 5:00 that evening.  They initially treated the notification as just "one of a number" of leads they were working on, but asked Waterbury police to do a "discreet check" on George Metesky and the house at 17 Fourth Street.[5][7][37]
After Metesky's arrest, early police statements credited the finding of his file to an NYPD detective.  Later, a report developed in a reward investigation conceded that Alice Kelly had found the file, and explained the misplaced credit as due to a misunderstanding of the file being "picked up" by the detective (at the Con Edison offices on Monday morning) as meaning that the file was "picked out" (of many). Although the NYPD did officially credit Kelly with turning up the clue that led to Metesky's arrest, she declined to claim the $26,000 in rewards, saying she had merely been doing her job.  Consolidated Edison's board of directors also declined to file for the reward, prompting a group of shareholders to file as representatives of Kelly and the company.[38][39]
Police investigators who later reviewed the path that led them to Metesky said that Con Edison had impeded the investigation for almost two years by repeatedly telling them that the records of employees whose services were terminated prior to 1940, the group Metesky was in, had been destroyed.  The investigators said that they had learned of the records' existence only on January 14, through a confidential tip, and that even in the face of police demands and formal requests Con Edison stalled, declaring that the papers were legal documents and that the company's legal department would have to be consulted before granting access.  A statement by the president of Consolidated Edison said this was due to a "misunderstanding".[9][38]
Arrest
Accompanied by Waterbury police, four NYPD detectives arrived at Metesky's home with a search warrant shortly before midnight on Monday, January 21, 1957.  They asked him for a handwriting sample, and to make a letter G.  He made the G, looked up and said, "I know why you fellows are here. You think I'm the Mad Bomber."[40] The detectives asked what "F.P." stood for, and he responded, "F.P. stands for Fair Play."[41]
He led them to the garage workshop, where they found his lathe. Back in the house they found pipes and connectors suitable for bombs hidden in the pantry, as well as three cheap pocket watches, flashlight batteries, brass terminal knobs, and unmatched wool socks of the type used to transport the bombs.[42][43] Metesky had answered the door in pajamas; after he was ordered to get dressed for the trip to Waterbury Police Headquarters, he reappeared wearing a double-breasted suit, buttoned.[44]
Interrogation
Metesky told the arresting officers that he had been "gassed" in the Con Edison accident, had contracted tuberculosis as a result, and started planting bombs because he "got a bum deal". Going over a police list of 32 bomb locations, but never using the word "bomb", he remembered the exact date where each "unit" had been placed, and its size.  He then added to the police list the size, date and location of 15 early bombs the police had not known about – all left at Con Edison locations, and apparently never reported.  When his Con Edison bombs  were not mentioned in the newspapers, he started planting bombs in public places to gain publicity for what he termed the "injustices" done him.[6] He also confirmed the reason no bombs were planted during the United States' involvement in World War II – the former Marine had abstained "for patriotic reasons".[45]
In their search, police found parts for a bomb that would have been larger than any of the others.  Metesky explained that it was intended for the New York Coliseum.[6]
Indictment
Metesky admitted to placing 32 bombs.  After a grand jury heard testimony from 35 witnesses including police experts and those injured, he was indicted on 47 charges – of attempted murder, damaging a building by explosion, maliciously endangering life, and violation of New York State's Sullivan Law by carrying concealed weapons, the bombs.  Seven counts of attempted murder were charged, based on the seven persons injured in the preceding five years, the statute of limitations in the case.  Metesky was brought to the courtroom to hear the charges from Manhattan's Bellevue Hospital, where he had been undergoing psychiatric examination.[46]
Commitment to Matteawan
After hearing from psychiatric experts, Judge Samuel S. Liebowitz declared the tubercular Metesky a paranoid schizophrenic, "hopeless and incurable both mentally and physically", and found him legally insane and incompetent to stand trial.  On April 18, 1957, Judge Liebowitz committed Metesky to the Matteawan Hospital for the Criminally Insane at Beacon, New York.[4]
Expected to live only a few weeks due to his advanced tuberculosis, Metesky had to be carried into the hospital.  After a year and a half of treatment, his health had improved, and a newspaper article written fourteen years later described the 68-year-old Metesky as "vigorous and healthy looking".
While he was at Matteawan, the Journal-American hired a leading workers' compensation attorney Bartholomew James O'Rourke to appeal his disallowed claim for the 1931 injury, on the grounds that Metesky was mentally incompetent at the time and did not know his rights.  The appeal was denied.[47]
Metesky was unresponsive to psychiatric therapy, but was a model inmate and caused no trouble.  He was visited regularly by his sisters and occasionally by Brussel, to whom he would point out that he had deliberately built his bombs not to kill anyone.[10]
Release
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a mentally ill defendant cannot be committed to a hospital operated by the New York State Department of Correctional Services unless a jury finds him dangerous.  Since Metesky had been committed to Matteawan without a jury trial, he was transferred to the Creedmoor Psychiatric Center, a state hospital outside the correctional system.[48]
Doctors determined that he was harmless, and because he had already served two-thirds of the 25-year maximum sentence he would have received at trial, Metesky was released on December 13, 1973.  The single condition was that he make regular visits to a Connecticut Department of Mental Hygiene clinic near his home.
Interviewed by a reporter upon his release, he said that he had forsworn violence, but reaffirmed his anger and resentment toward Consolidated Edison.  He also stated that before he began planting his bombs,
I wrote 900 letters to the Mayor, to the Police Commissioner, to the newspapers, and I never even got a penny postcard back.  Then I went to the newspapers to try to buy advertising space, but all of them turned me down.  I was compelled to bring my story to the public.

Metesky returned to his home in Waterbury, where he died 20 years later at the age of 90.[49]

Further reading
The Mad Bomber of New York, The Extraordinary True Story of the Manhunt that Paralyzed a City. Greenburg, Michael M., Union Square Press, 2011. ISBN1-4027-7434-6
Incendiary: The Psychiatrist, The Mad Bomber and the Invention of Criminal Profiling. Cannell, Michael, Minotaur Books, 2017. ISBN978-1250048943

 Newsreel 11 February 1957, Spanish Film Institute files. (video from 04:12, audio in Spanish)


Sundiata Keita (Mandinka, Malinke, Bambara: [sʊndʒæta keɪta]) (c. 1217– c. 1255[8]) (also known as Manding Diara, Lion of Mali, Sogolon Djata, son of Sogolon, Nare Maghan and Sogo Sogo Simbon Salaba) was a puissant prince and founder of the Mali Empire. The famous Malian ruler Mansa Musa, who made a pilgrimage to Mecca, was his grandnephew.[9][10]
Written sources augment the Mande oral histories, with the Moroccan traveller Muhammad ibn Battúta (1304–1368) and the Tunisian historian Abu Zayd 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldun al-Hadrami (1332–1406) both having travelled to Mali in the century after Sundiata’s death, and providing independent verification of his existence. The semi-historical but legendary Epic of Sundiata by the Malinké/Maninka people centers on his life. The epic poem is primarily known through oral tradition, transmitted by generations of Maninka griots (djeli or jeliw).[11]
Epic of Sundiata

The oral traditions relating to Sundiata Keita were passed down generation after generation by the local griots (djeli or jeliw), until eventually their stories were put into writing. Sundiata was the son of Naré Maghann Konaté (variation: Maghan Konfara) and Sogolon Condé (variations: "Sogolon Kolonkan" or "Sogolon Kédjou", the daughter of the "buffalo woman", so called because of her ugliness and hunchback).[14] Sundiata was crippled from childhood and his mother (Sogolon) was the subject of ridicule among her co-wives. She was constantly teased and ridiculed openly for her son's disability. This significantly affected Sundiata and he was determined to do everything he possibly could in order to walk like his peers. Through this determination, he one day miraculously got up and walked. Among his peers, he became a leader. His paternal half-brother, Dankaran Touman, and Dankaran's mother, Sassouma Bereté, were cruel and resentful of Sundiata and his mother. Their cruelty escalated after the death of Naré Maghann (the king and father of Sundiata). To escape persecution and threats on her son's life, Sogolon took her children, Sundiata and his sisters, into exile. This exile lasted for many years and took them to different countries within the Ghana Empire and eventually to Mema where the king of Mema granted them asylum. Sundiata was admired by the King of Mema for his courage and tenacity. As such, he was given a senior position within the kingdom. When King Soumaoro Kanté of Sosso conquered the Mandinka people, messengers were sent to go and look for Sogolon and her children, as Sundiata was destined to be a great leader according to prophecy. Upon finding him in Mema, they persuaded him to come back in order to liberate the Mandinkas and their homeland. On his return, he was accompanied by an army given to him by the King of Mema. The warlords of Mali at the time who were his age group included: Tabon Wana, Kamadia Kamara (or Kamadia Camara), Faony Condé, Siara Kuman Konaté and Tiramakhan Traore (many variations: "Trimaghan" or "Tiramaghan", future conqueror of Kaabu). It was on the plain of Siby (var: Sibi) where they formed a pact brotherhood in order to liberate their country and people from the powerful Sosso king. At The Battle of Kirina, Sundiata and his allies defeated the Sosso king and became the first Emperor of the Mali Empire. He was the first of the Mandinka line of kings to adopt the royal title Mansa (king or emperor in the Mandinka language).[15][16][17][18][19][20]
The Mandinka epic does not give us dates, but Arab and North African writers who visited the area about a century after the epic's events documented on paper some of the information, including dates and a genealogy. Conversely, the written sources left out other pieces of information that the oral tradition includes.[21]
Sogolon Djata
Sundjata Keyita
Mari Djata or "Mārī-Djāta" (according to Ibn Khaldun in the late 14th century)[22]
The Lion King[23]
The proper English spelling of Sundiata's name is Sunjata, pronounced soon-jah-ta, approaching the actual pronunciation in the original Mandinka. The name Sogolon derives from his mother and Jata means lion. It is the traditional way of praising someone in some West African societies (Gambia, Senegal, Mali and Guinea in particular). The name Sundiata praises him through his mother which means "the lion of Sogolon" or "Sogolon's lion". The name Jata derives from Jara (lion). Jara and many of its variations such as jata, jala or jada are merely regional variations, from Gambia, Guinea or Mali, for instance. Sundiata's name is thus a derivation of his mother's name Songolon (Son or its variation Sun) and Jata (lion).[24][25]
Soumaoro Kante
Soumaoro Kante was the king of the Sosso people in the 13th-century and the antagonist to Djata, or Sundiata’s, legacy as king of Mali. He, Soumaoro, was known as the sorcerer king, for he was adept in the magical arts, though he used them to propel his tyrannical schemes. With great magical ability, a mighty army of blacksmiths, and a dictators character, any place under his rule despised him. He was especially known as a notoriously cruel leader, stealing wives and queens from their (royal) families, pillaging conquered territories, and killing anyone who opposed his rule. He would soon conquer nine kingdoms in the Ghana Empire before conquering the Mandinka people of Mali, Sundiata’s home, and Balla Fasseke, Sundiata’s lost griot. His crudeness was not spared in Mali either, and he ruled with an iron fist. Upon knowledge of Sundiata returning to Mali from his asylum in Mema, Soumaoro, too busy fighting off Fakoli, sent his son, Sosso Balla. Moreover, Sosso, who was around the same age as Sundiata, was to intercept and relinquish Sundiata’s army before they reached Tabon, a pivotal location on Sundiata’s journey to Mali. This was a grave mistake by Soumaoro, however, for Sundiata’s force was much too overwhelming for Sosso Balla and his leadership, leading to their eventual destruction at the hands of Sundiata at this battle, almost killing Sosso Balla in the process. Sosso Balla, in shame for dishonoring his father with failure, came back in defeat to his father’s dismay. Fakoli Koroma, who Soumaoro was busy fighting instead of Sundiata, was the insurgent nephew of Soumaoro, who rebelled against his uncle when Soumaoro took his wife. Moreover, this happened soon after Sundiata and Soumaoro’s first encounter in which Fakoli, Soumaoro’s general at the time, defeated Sundiata. After all Fakoli did for Soumaoro, this angered him deeply and Fakoli soon fought against Soumaoro, eventually fighting side by side with Sundiata’s forces against the common enemy, the sorcerer king. At the battle of Krina, Soumaoro was finally defeated by an enchanted arrow thrown from Sundiata, that is said to have weakened his magical shield, and an overwhelming military front by Sundiata’s generals. Soumaoro did not die instantly from this arrow, but he would soon die hobbling to the insides of a cave.
Surname (Keita or Konaté?)

Some Bambaras and Mandinkas have proposed that the name Keita actually means inheritor (heir-apparent) in the Mandinka language, and that Sundiata's real surname is Konaté (French spelling in Mali) or Konateh, variations: Konate, Conateh (English spelling in the Gambia where the Mandinkas make up the largest ethnic group). It is proposed that Sundiata Keita's father, Naré Maghann Konaté, took the real family name Konaté while his successors were "Keitas in waiting" (heirs to the throne).[24] The name Keita is a clan name rather than a surname.[26] Although in some West African societies a clan can be similar to the family name (see Joof family), such similarities do not exist between the names Keita and Konaté. Both points of contention agree that Keita is not a real surname, but rather a royal name, in spite of the fact that Sundiata is referred to as Sundiata Keita in many scholarly works. At present, there is no consensus among the scholars regarding the name Sundiata Konaté.
Battle of Kirina

Delafosse previously proposed that, Soumaoro Kanté's grandfather with the help of his army and the Sosso nobility of Kaniaga captured what was left of the sacked Ghana Empire, and by 1180, Diara Kanté (var: Jara Kante), Soumaoro's father gained control of Koumbi Saleh, dethroned a Muslim dynasty and continued the Diarisso Dynasty (variation: Jariso or Jarisso) whose son (Soumaoro) went on to succeed him and launched an offensive against the Mandinkas.[28][29] Delafosse's original work has been refuted and discarded by many scholars including Monteil, Cornevin, etc. There was no Diara Kanté in the oral sources. That was an addition by Delafosee which was contrary to the original sources.[30]
The consensus is, in c. 1235, Sundiata who had survived one of Soumaoro's earlier raids went to war with the help of his allies against King Soumaoro of Sosso. Although a valiant warrior, Soumaoro was defeated at The Battle of Kirina (c. 1235).[31] Soumaoro is regarded as one of the true champions of the Traditional African religion. According to Fyle, Soumaoro was the inventor of the balafon and the dan (a four-string guitar used by the hunters and griots).[32] After his victory at Kirina, Sundiata took control of the former conquered states of the Sosso and appropriated privileges among those who participated in the defeat of Soumaoro. The former allies of Soumaoro were also later defeated, in particular the king of Jolof. Serer oral tradition speaks of a Serer king of Jolof, involved in the occult (just as Soumaoro), who was later defeated by Tiramakhan Traore (one of the generals of Sundiata) after Sundiata sent his men to buy horses in Jolof. It is reported that, when Sundiata sent his men to Jolof to buy horses in a caravan loaded with gold, the king of Jolof took all the gold and horses– known among some as "the robbery of the horses". In a revenge attack, Sundiata sent his general to Jolof to assassinate the king.[33] It is believed that, it was probably this king of Jolof (known as Mansa Jolofing or Jolofing Mansa) who sided with Soumaoro at The Battle of Kirina[34] and possibly belongs to the Ngom Dynasty of Jolof, the predecessors of the Diaw and Ndiaye Dynasties of Jolof.[35] At present, little is known about the Ngom Dynasty of Jolof.
Niane has advanced the claim that, the Jolofing Mansa sided with Sumaguru [or Soumaoro] because "like him, he was hostile to Islam." He went on to state that:
"He [the King of Jolof] confiscated Diata's [Sundiata's] horses and sent him a skin, saying that he should make shoes out of it since he was neither a hunter nor a king worthy to mount a horse."[36]
Religion
Niane alludes to Sundiata being a Muslim. According to Fage, there is nothing in the original epos that supports the claim. Sundiata is regarded as a great hunter and magician whose subjects predominantly adhered to traditional beliefs, as did Sundiata.[3][4][5] Others claim that Sundiata most likely practiced a syncretic form of his ancestral religion, which had absorbed some Islamic concepts from their geographical proximity to their Muslim neighbors. According to these scholars, it was his descendants who officially converted to Islam, and it later became a religion associated with the nobility.[37][38]
Regardless, many of Sundiata's successors were Muslim, with Mansa Musa Keita being one of the most widely known.[39]
In the epic of Sundiata, Sundiata claims "an ancestral origin among the companions of Muhammad in Mecca" (namely, Bilal Ibn Rabah)[40] and speaks of himself as a successor to Dhu al-Qarnayn, a conqueror and king mentioned in the Quran, commonly regarded as a reference to Alexander the Great.[41] In exile, Sundiata learns about Islam when he travels to the city of the Cissés, and returns wearing Muslim robes. It is mentioned that there was "only one mosque" in Niani,[42] Sundiata’s hometown, but we can also see the invocation of "Allah Almighty" by Sundiata’s mother,[43] indicating that Islamic terms, at least, were known. Although it is unknown whether Sundiata was actually Muslim, it is clear that the epic of Sundiata was affected by what Ralph Austen calls "Islamicate" culture—that is, the integration of Islamic and Arab culture by inhabitants of the region, whether they are Muslim or not.[41]
Imperial Mali

After his victory at Kirina, Mansa Sundiata established his capital at Niani, near the present-day Malian border with Guinea.[45] Assisted by his generals, Tiramakhan being one of the most prominent, he went on to conquer other states. The lands of the old Ghana Empire were conquered. The king of Jolof was defeated by Tiramakhan and his kingdom reduced to a vassal state. After defeating the former ally of Soumaoro, Tiramakhan ventured deep into present-day Senegal, the Gambia and Guinea Bissau and conquered them. Tiramakhan was responsible for the conquest of the Senegambia.[46] In Kaabu (part of present-day Guinea Bissau), he defeated the last great Bainuk king (King Kikikor) and annexed his state. The great Kikikor was killed and his kingdom was renamed Kaabu.[47][48] Sundiata was responsible for the conquest of Diafunu and Kita.[46] Although the conquered states were answerable to the Mansa (king) of Mali, Sundiata was not an absolute monarch despite what the title implies. Though he probably wielded popular authority, the Mali Empire was reportedly run like a federation with each tribe having a chief representative at the court.[49] The first tribes were Mandinka clans of Traore, Kamara, Koroma, Konde (or Conde), and of course Keita. The Great Gbara Assembly was in charge of checking the Mansa's power, enforcing his edicts among their people, and selecting the successor (usually the Mansa's son, brother or sister's son).[50] The Empire flourished from the 13th to the late 14th century[11] but began to decline as some vassal states threw away the yoke of Mali and regained their independence. Some of these former vassals went on to form empires of their own.[51]
Death
Mansa Sundiata Keita died in c. 1255. This is generally the accepted year of death.[5][52] There is however very little information regarding his cause of death. Not only are there different versions, mainly modern, but Mandinka tradition forbids disclosing the burial ground of their great kings.[53][54] According to some, he died of drowning while trying to cross the Sankarani River, near Niani.[53][55] If one is to believe Delafosse, he was "accidentally killed by an arrow during a ceremony."[56] Others have maintained that, he was assassinated at a public demonstration.[55] At present, the generally accepted cause of death is drowning in the Sankarani River, where a shrine that bears his name still remains today (Sundiata-dun meaning Sundiata's deep water).[53] His three sons (Mansa Wali Keita, Mansa Ouati Keita and Mansa Khalifa Keita) went on to succeed him as Mansas of the Empire. The famous West African and ostentatious[57] ruler Mansa Musa was his grandnephew.[9]
Legacy

A strong army was a major contributor to the success of Imperial Mali during the reign of Mansa Sundiata Keita.[46] Credit to Mali's conquests cannot all be attributed to Sundiata Keita but equally shared among his generals, and in this, Tiramakhan Traore stood out as one of the elite generals and warlords of Sundiata's Imperial Mali.[46] However, in a wider perspective of 13th century West African military history, Sundiata stood out as a great leader who was able to command the loyalties of his generals and army.[46][58]
It was during his reign that Mali first began to become an economic power, a trend continued by his successors an improved on thanks to the ground work set by Sundiata, who controlled the region's trade routes and gold fields.[45] The social and political constitution of Mali were first being codified during the reign of Mansa Sundiata Keita. Known as the Gbara and the Kouroukan Fouga, although not written and even subject to alterations in retelling and when they were first recorded in written form, they were part of the social and political norms of Mali. Many of these laws have been incorporated into the constitution of modern-day Mali.[49]

"By unifying the military force of 12 states, Sundiata becomes an emperor known as the Lion King of Mali, who controls tribes from the Niger River west to the Atlantic Ocean. Walt Disney Studios reprised the story of Sundiata in 1994 as an animated film, The Lion King, with animals substituting for the humans of Mali legend."
Ellen Snodgrass[59]

Sundiata Keita was not merely a conqueror who was able to rule over a large empire with different tribes and languages, but also developed Mali's mechanisms for agriculture, and is reported to have introduced cotton and weaving in Mali.[60] Towards the end of his reign, "absolute security" is reported to have "prevailed throughout his dominion."[60]
From a global perspective, the Epic of Sundiata and the Mali Empire is taught in many schools, colleges and universities, not just in West Africa but in many parts of the World.[12][61][62] Some scholars such as Ellen Snodgrass, and others have observed similarities with the 13th-century Epic of Sundiata to Walt Disney's 1994 animated film, "The Lion King" (the inspiration behind The Lion King's franchises such as Lion King, the musical, etc.).[59] Disney has maintained that the film was inspired by William Shakespeare's Hamlet.[63]
1995 Burkinabe movie Keïta! l'Héritage du griot tells the legend of Sundiata Keita.[64]
See also

The empire
Mali Empire
The dynasty
Keita Dynasty
The battle and warlords
Battle of Kirina
Tiramakhan Traore
Soumaoro Kante
The griot
Balla Fasséké

The people
Mandinka people
Sosso people

The region
West Africa
Present-day countries
History of Mali
History of Senegal
History of the Gambia
History of Guinea-Bissau
Guinea Conakry

Notes

Bibliography
Snodgrass, Mary Ellen, Encyclopedia of the Literature of Empire, p.77, Infobase Publishing, 2009, ISBN1-4381-1906-2.
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Further reading
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Johnson, John William. 1992. The Epic of Son-Jara: A West African Tradition. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
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Newton, Robert C. 2006. Of Dangerous Energy and Transformations: Nyamakalaya and the Sunjata Phenomenon. Research in African Literatures Vol. 37, No. 2: 15-33.
. One of the first publications presenting a version of the Sundiata Epic.
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Published translations of the epic include D. T. Niane's prose version, Sundiata: An Epic of Old Mali (Harlow: Longman, 2006, 1994, c.1965: ISBN1-4058-4942-8), Fa-Digi Sisoko's oral version, Son-Jara: The Mande Epic (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2003), Issiaka Diakite-Kaba's French-English diglot dramatized version Soundjata, Le Leon/Sunjata, The Lion (Denver: Outskirts Press and Paris: Les Editions l'Harmattan, 2010).

, by D.T. Niane (Trans. G.D. Pickett)

 The Mande Peoples, History and Civilization (mostly in French)
 by Janice Siegel

 Sections include Geography, Religion, Society & Politics
 With reference to Sundiata and his successors.

How long did Sundiata Keita rule over the Mali Empire?