General Oversight Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA): Requirements and Related Issues

Summary: In the wake of a rapidly deteriorating economic picture and year-long recession that the Congressional Budget Office has called the most severe since World War II, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5). This report discusses ARRA's "general oversight provisions" and several related issues for Congress. For purposes of this report, the term "general oversight provision" means an oversight-related provision that addresses multiple programs, agencies, or appropriations accounts. Provisions that are specific to a single program or appropriation (e.g., appropriations set-asides and reporting requirements) are excluded from the report's scope.

Summary: The report includes tabular presentations of ARRA's general oversight provisions. The provisions provide for, among other things, establishment of a Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, numerous reporting and evaluation requirements, and increased resources for agency Inspectors General (IGs) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

Summary: Even before considering experience with implementation, several broad issues related to ARRA oversight may be of interest to Congress. These include assessments of ARRA's role in achieving economic objectives. Typical objectives of a fiscal stimulus policy relate to increasing economic activity in the short term, compared to what would have happened without a stimulus. In addition, some stakeholders have emphasized that stimulating the economy in the short term alone is not a sufficient definition of "success." From this perspective, the manner in which spending, tax, and other public policies are implemented, and also the impacts of these policies, may be important.

Summary: All of these perspectives appear to have been included among the law's explicit purposes and "general principles concerning use of funds." Given ARRA's direction to "commenc[e] expenditures and activities as quickly as possible consistent with prudent management," difficult trade-offs among goals may be inevitable. Over time, Congress may consider whether existing management and oversight mechanisms, in combination with ARRA's additional provisions, adequately support effective management and oversight of ARRA implementation. The experience with ARRA also may offer lessons learned for the "normal," non-ARRA systems of oversight.

Summary: Beyond the immediate situation, additional oversight issues for Congress may relate to longer-term questions. These include how to build and monitor capacity within agencies to respond effectively to crises. Questions also may arise regarding how to build and monitor capacity in agencies and government overall to anticipate crises, mitigate their risks, and avoid preventable crises. This report analyzes these and other issues after reviewing how the oversight provisions were developed and providing an overview of the enacted provisions themselves, including related appropriations and reporting requirements.

Summary: The topic of subsequent implementation of the oversight provisions, including actions by executive agencies and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is not included in the scope of this report. This report will be updated as events warrant.

In the wake of a rapidly deteriorating economic picture and year-long recession that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has called the most severe since World War II, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). This report discusses ARRA's "general oversight provisions" and several related issues for Congress. For purposes of this report, the term "general oversight provision" means an oversight-related provision that addresses multiple programs, agencies, or appropriations accounts. Provisions that are specific to a single program or appropriation (e.g., appropriations set-asides and reporting requirements) are excluded from the report's scope. The provisions provide for, among other things, establishment of a Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, numerous reporting and evaluation requirements, and increased resources for agency Inspectors General (IGs).

The topic of subsequent implementation of the oversight provisions, including actions by executive agencies and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is not included in the scope of this report. Nevertheless, even before considering experience with implementation, several broad issues related to ARRA oversight may be of interest to Congress. These include assessments of ARRA's role in achieving economic objectives. Typical objectives of a fiscal stimulus policy relate to increasing economic activity in the short term, compared to what would have happened without a stimulus. In addition, some stakeholders have emphasized that stimulating the economy in the short term alone is not a sufficient definition of "success." From this perspective, the manner in which spending, tax, and other public policies are implemented, and also the impacts of these policies, may be important. All of these perspectives appear to have been included among the law's explicit purposes and "general principles."

Given ARRA's direction to "commenc[e] expenditures and activities as quickly as possible consistent with prudent management" ( P.L. 111-5 , Section 3), difficult trade-offs among goals may be inevitable. Over time, Congress may consider whether existing management and oversight mechanisms, in combination with ARRA's additional provisions, adequately support effective management and oversight of ARRA implementation. The experience with ARRA also may offer lessons learned for the "normal" systems of oversight that correspond to non-ARRA-related funding and operations. Beyond the immediate situation, additional oversight issues for Congress may relate to longer-term questions. These include how to build capacity within agencies to respond effectively to crises. Questions also may arise regarding how to build capacity in agencies and government overall to anticipate crises, mitigate their risks, and avoid preventable crises. This report analyzes these and other issues after reviewing how the oversight provisions were developed and providing an overview of the enacted provisions themselves, including related appropriations and reporting requirements.

Development of ARRA's Oversight Provisions

Examination of how ARRA and its general oversight provisions were developed may provide perspectives on congressional objectives associated with the legislation. In addition, reflection on the development of the provisions may suggest opportunities to make enhancements in ARRA's existing oversight provisions or to address any perceived gaps in the provisions' coverage of significant matters.

Obama Transition Planning for Fiscal Stimulus and Oversight

On November 7, 2008, then President-elect Barack Obama held his first news conference since the presidential election. In view of continued monthly job losses, he called for a "fiscal stimulus plan that will jump-start economic growth." In response to a question about the prospect that "a stimulus package may be in trouble" during the remainder of the 110 th Congress, the President-elect said "[i]f it does not get done in the lame-duck session, it will be the first thing I get done as President of the United States." Later that month, he announced he had directed his transition "economic team to come up with an Economic Recovery Plan." On December 23, 2008, Vice President-elect Joe Biden said "there will be no earmarks in this economic recovery plan." After the holidays, President-elect Obama referred to the plan as an "American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan." He reiterated on January 6, 2009, that under the economic recovery plan, "[w]e are going to ban all earmarks." He also said that the plan "will set a new higher standard of accountability, transparency, and oversight."

Legislative Action in the 111th Congress on Stimulus and Oversight

Planning for Stimulus Legislation and Related Oversight Provisions

In the wake of a rapidly deteriorating economic picture, CBO released an economic forecast on January 7, 2009. CBO issued the forecast "several weeks earlier than usual to aid the new [111 th ] Congress in its deliberations." The Senate Budget Committee held a hearing on the forecast the next day. In the forecast, CBO said that a "downturn in housing markets across the country, which undermined the solvency of major financial institutions and severely disrupted the functioning of financial markets, has led the United States into a recession that will probably be the longest and the deepest since World War II."

To help establish a basis for Congress to consider alternative courses of action, the forecast was done under an assumption that current laws and policies regarding federal spending and taxation would remain the same. CBO noted, for example, that the forecast did not include "the effects of a possible fiscal stimulus package." CBO anticipated that the recession, which began in December 2007, would last until the second half of 2009. Economic output over the next two years, CBO estimated, would average "6.8 percent below its potential—that is, the level of output that would be produced if the economy's resources were fully employed." CBO explained that this gap in gross domestic product (GDP)—a "GDP gap"—is "the difference between real (inflation-adjusted) gross domestic product and its estimated potential level (which corresponds to a high level of resource—labor and capital—use)." In accompanying testimony, CBO's acting director said that "[m]any economists believe that a stimulative fiscal policy (that is, an increase in spending or reduction in taxes designed to foster faster economic growth in the short run) is desirable under the current economic conditions."

Congress soon considered legislation intended to diminish this GDP gap and, in the process of doing so, to bolster employment and address perceptions of other economic and policy problems. An early version of the legislation reportedly was drafted by then President-elect Barack Obama's transition team working with Members of the House Committee on Appropriations.

On January 14, 2009, then OMB Director-designate Peter Orszag appeared before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs for a confirmation hearing. Among other things, he was asked about his plans for oversight of the economic stimulus package that was anticipated to be considered at the beginning of the 111 th Congress. Director-designate Orszag said the incoming Administration would favor creating a special oversight board. The board would be composed of relevant IGs and chaired by a newly established White House position of Chief Performance Officer (CPO). The board "would review problems and ... would conduct regular meetings to examine specific problems that might be identified." Director-designate Orszag also said the Administration planned "to create a website that will contain information about the contracts and include PDFs [of] contracts themselves."

Soon after President Obama was inaugurated, the Obama Administration established a website called Recovery.gov in anticipation of enactment of stimulus legislation. The home page explained the Administration's future intentions for the website: "Check back after the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to see how and where your tax dollars are spent. An oversight board will routinely update this site as part of an unprecedented effort to root out waste, inefficiency, and unnecessary spending in our government."

Action on Legislation and Oversight Provisions

Numerous oversight provisions subsequently were included in economic stimulus legislation considered by the House and Senate. On January 21, 2009, after mark-up of a draft bill by the House Committee on Appropriations, the committee issued a press release that characterized the stimulus as providing "unprecedented accountability" (see Box 1 ).

On January 26, 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( H.R. 1 , 111 th Congress) was introduced in the House. Shortly before introduction, the White House reportedly had released a document describing several goals of the legislation, both in terms of economic stimulus and achievement of various public policy objectives relating to energy, health care, education, infrastructure, tax policy, income maintenance, and accountability. On January 28, the House passed an amended version of the measure by 244-188. Senate versions of components of ARRA were introduced and reported on January 27 ( S. 336 , with written report) and January 29 ( S. 350 ).

At the same time, general concerns had been expressed about the capacity of agencies and "a depleted contracting workforce" to spend funds rapidly "while also improving competition and oversight." In addition, the question had been raised whether IGs and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have sufficient resources to conduct oversight of the stimulus legislation. Situated in the context of these concerns, however, many observers felt quick action on the stimulus legislation was critical. According to one press report, "[w]hile economists remain divided on the role of government generally, an overwhelming number from both parties are saying that a government stimulus package—even a flawed one—is urgently needed to help prevent a steeper slide in the economy."

The Senate amended the House version and passed an amendment in the nature of a substitute on February 10, 2009, by a vote of 61-37. A conference report, which included a joint explanatory statement, was filed on February 12, 2009, stating that it contained no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits. The conference report was agreed to in the House on February 13, 2009, by a vote of 246-183, with one Member voting present. On the same day, the Senate agreed to the conference report by a vote of 60-38, clearing the measure for presentment to the President. President Obama signed the measure into law on February 17, 2009.

Context in Which Oversight Provisions Will Operate

Several aspects of ARRA establish the context in which the legislation's general oversight provisions will operate. These include the structure of the legislation, the legislation's explicit purposes and "general principles," and the scale of the oversight task at hand.

ARRA was enacted in two divisions. Division A, titled "Appropriations Provisions," included many discretionary appropriations provisions in 16 titles. Some of the appropriations were provided for IGs and other oversight-related institutions. Division A also included substantive legislative provisions in some titles. These included provisions to, among other things, promote health information technology (Title XIII), establish a State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (Title XIV), and create a variety of mechanisms and entities focused on oversight (Title XV). A title containing general provisions for Division A focused on oversight (Title XVI). Division B, titled "Tax, Unemployment, Health, State Fiscal Relief, and Other Provisions," included seven titles. Titles in Division B appeared to contain very few general oversight provisions, as discussed later.

References to "the Act" within ARRA generally refer to either Division A or Division B, not to the entire law. Therefore, most of ARRA's substantive general oversight provisions that are located in Titles XV and XVI of Division A appear to cover activities and provisions associated with Division A rather than the entire law. Many, but not all, oversight-related appropriations also focused on oversight of funding provided by Division A, as opposed to the entire law.

ARRA's Purposes and "General Principles"

A conventional approach for oversight is to assess a program, agency, or law in terms of its purposes and related objectives. ARRA identified several explicit purposes and "general principles concerning use of funds," which are excerpted in Box 2 .

As discussed later in this report, the purposes and principles might be thought of as falling roughly into three categories:

macroeconomic objectives related to recovery from the recession; discrete programmatic, microeconomic, and other policy objectives; and process objectives, which include balancing speed (to address macroeconomic objectives) with "prudent management" (e.g., to minimize waste and fraud).

Many of ARRA's specific appropriations and nonfunding provisions, which concern myriad policy areas, might be viewed as falling roughly into these categories, as well.

In some cases, there may be ambiguity around, or disagreement about, the specific purposes and objectives of a law and how to define "success" in its implementation. To the extent these phenomena may be evident, stakeholders may believe other criteria are important to consider when overseeing or evaluating a program, agency, or law. Unintended consequences also may be of interest or concern.

Scale of Oversight Task: CBO Estimates of ARRA Impacts

In response to a congressional request, CBO prepared a year-by-year estimate of the short-term economic impacts of ARRA. In addition, CBO included tables that showed estimated economic "multipliers" corresponding to many provisions, and, in addition, the agency's cost estimate for the conference agreement on H.R. 1 . In the letter, CBO estimated that ARRA would increase the federal government's budget deficit by an overall total of $787.2 billion over 11 years. CBO also broke down the legislation's estimated fiscal impacts on spending and revenues.

With regard to spending, CBO estimated that Division A of the legislation would increase discretionary spending by $308.3 billion over the 11-year period from FY2009 through FY2019. Nearly half of the total amount would be spent by the end of FY2010 (September 30, 2010), and nearly 72% would be spent by the end of FY2011 (September 30, 2011). CBO estimated that Division B would increase direct spending by $267.0 billion over the same 11-year period. Nearly 73% of this total would be spent by the end of FY2010, and over 91% would be spent by the end of FY2011. Overall, spending from the perspective of the federal government's unified budget was estimated to total $575.3 billion from FY2009 through FY2019.

CBO estimated that Division A would decrease revenues by $0.1 billion over 11 years. Division B would decrease net revenues by $211.8 billion over 11 years, with $244.9 billion in revenue reductions occurring by the end of FY2010. The tax provisions of Division B's Title I accounted for the vast majority of these estimated decreases. The total revenue decrease would be $211.9 billion over 11 years.

Two Categories of General Oversight Provisions

ARRA's general oversight provisions might be grouped into two categories:

nonfunding provisions, which established federal agencies, required agencies to undertake certain tasks, established procedures that must be followed, etc.; and funding provisions, which provided appropriations to oversight-related entities including IGs, GAO, and the newly established Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board.

General oversight provisions that fall within each category are discussed in the sections below.

Nonfunding general oversight provisions appeared to be included only in Division A, chiefly in Titles XV and XVI. Nevertheless, they were included in considerable variety. Among other things, these substantive provisions established new oversight-oriented entities like the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board (RATB), enumerated diverse reporting requirements for federal agencies and nonfederal recipients of funds, and tasked RATB, IGs, and GAO with numerous duties. Some highlights of these statutory provisions and related reporting requirements are summarized in bulleted form, below. A more comprehensive tabular presentation of provisions, their ARRA citations, and related reporting requirements, including when ARRA requires specific information to be posted on the Recovery.gov website, is provided in Table B -1 , in Appendix B .

IGs are required to review "any concerns raised by the public about specific investments using funds made available in [Division A]" and relay findings to agency heads. (Title XV, Sections 1514 and 1515). The Comptroller General is required to conduct bimonthly reviews on the use of funds made available in Division A by selected states and localities. (Title IX, Sections 901 and 902).

Recipients of funds are required to report certain information within 180 days of ARRA's enactment, where recipient is defined as a state or any entity "other than an individual" that receives funds directly from the federal government from appropriations in Division A. (Title XV, Section 1512(c)). Federal agencies are required to publicly report information submitted by funding recipients to the agency. (Title XV, Section 1512(d)). State and local governments' reporting and recordkeeping may be funded, at least in part, by flexibility granted to federal agencies to adjust applicable limits on administrative expenditures for federal awards. (Title XV, Section 1552).

Chief executives of state and local governments are required to certify that infrastructure investments have "received the full review and vetting required by law and that the chief executive accepts responsibility that the infrastructure investment is an appropriate use of taxpayer dollars." (Title XV, Section 1511).

RATB is established "to coordinate and conduct oversight of covered funds to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse." RATB's membership is to consist of at least 10 IGs, including, or in addition to, a chairperson, who may be designated or appointed by the President according to certain criteria (Title XV, Sections 1521 and 1522). RATB has several enumerated functions, including to review whether reporting for contracts and grants "meets applicable standards" and "specifies the purpose of the contract or grant and measures of performance." The board also is required to coordinate oversight activities with the Comptroller General and state auditors. RATB is tasked with four categories of reporting requirements. (Title XV, Sections 1523 and 1528). RATB is required to make recommendations to agencies "on measures to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse relating to covered funds." An agency that receives a RATB recommendation is required to submit a "responsive report" to the President, the congressional committees of jurisdiction, and RATB within 30 days of receipt. (Title XV, Section 1523). RATB is required to conduct audits and reviews, and in doing so, may issue subpoenas to compel testimony from nonfederal officers and employees. RATB is authorized to hold public hearings and may enter into certain contracts. RATB has authority to transfer up to 100% of its appropriated funds to any office of inspector general, OMB, the General Services Administration, and an independent advisory panel established by Section 1541 of Title XV. (Title XV, Section 1524). RATB is required to establish a website. (The website was established by the Obama Administration as Recovery.gov in anticipation of enactment of ARRA.) As agencies implement ARRA, the website is to contain, among many other things, considerable information about how funds are allocated and used. Fifteen specific requirements for the website are identified in one provision of Title XV, and other provisions in Division A describe additional information that is required to be posted on, or linked to, the RATB website. (Title XV, Section 1526). IGs are instructed that nothing in the provisions related to RATB shall affect the independent authority of an IG "to determine whether to conduct an audit or investigation of covered funds." An IG's decision "shall be final." (Title XV, Section 1527).

Contracts funded under Division A are required to be awarded as fixed-price contracts through the use of competitive procedures "to the maximum extent possible," and exceptions are required to be posted on RATB's website. (Title XV, Section 1554). The Council of Economic Advisers, an entity in the Executive Office of the President, is required to submit quarterly reports to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees that "detail the impact of programs funded through covered funds on employment, estimated economic growth, and other key economic indicators." (Title XV, Section 1513). Employees of nonfederal employers receiving funds are granted certain whistleblower protections when disclosing certain information to RATB, an IG, the Comptroller General, a Member of Congress, or other specified entities and persons. (Title XV, Section 1553).

Funding Provisions with Appropriations for IGs, GAO, and RATB

Appropriations to IGs, GAO, and RATB were included predominately in Division A. In total, the appropriations provided to these oversight-oriented entities summed to $363.75 million. Highlights of these appropriations are discussed here. A more comprehensive listing of the various oversight entities for which ARRA provided funds is presented in Table C -1 , located in Appendix C .

Twenty-three IGs received $254.75 million in 25 separate appropriations. Sixteen IGs in all 15 executive departments received appropriations, ranging from a single appropriation of $1 million for the Department of Veterans Affairs to two appropriations totaling $48.25 million for the Department of Health and Human Services. IGs in an additional seven independent agencies also received appropriations.

ARRA provided the funding with widely varying periods of availability. For the IG at the Department of State, for example, funds are available until the end of FY2010. Other IGs variously have funds available until the end of FY2011, FY2012, FY2013, or "until expended" (i.e., "no-year" funds). GAO received $25 million, available through the end of FY2010, and RATB received $84 million, available through the end of FY2011.

Some of the appropriations were designated for specific purposes, chief among them oversight of programs, grants, and projects funded by ARRA. Other appropriations were essentially supplemental increases without a restrictive specification of purpose. RATB has authority to transfer up to 100% of its funds to any office of inspector general, OMB, the General Services Administration, and an advisory panel for RATB that ARRA established.

With enactment of ARRA, a flurry of activity commenced in executive agencies and the Executive Office of the President. Further requirements and guidance concerning ARRA implementation were forthcoming from the White House and OMB. These documents focused especially on issues related to oversight, accountability, and transparency. Some of the requirements also went beyond ARRA's statutory requirements.

On February 18, 2009, OMB issued to agencies "initial implementing guidance" regarding ARRA, including numerous reporting requirements, in a 62-page document. Some of the required information is to be posted on Recovery.gov and agency-specific ARRA-related websites. A month later, President Obama issued a presidential memorandum entitled "Ensuring Responsible Spending of Recovery Act Funds." The memorandum directed agencies in how to use "available discretion" when allocating and spending certain ARRA-related funding. The memorandum also directed agencies to disclose certain communications with federally registered lobbyists. On April 3, 2009, OMB issued "updated implementing guidance" to agencies in a 175-page document. Further guidance from OMB and RATB is expected.

In addition, the White House announced the designation of RATB's chairperson (Department of the Interior IG Earl E. Devaney) and the board's full membership in February and March 2009, respectively. The Obama Administration also identified a number of leadership roles for purposes of ARRA implementation (e.g., the appointment of Mr. Edward DeSeve to a White House coordination role for ARRA implementation). Several congressional committees have incorporated ARRA into their oversight agendas and convened hearings.

Based on experience with ARRA implementation and other emerging developments, Congress may revisit the structure and contents of ARRA's general oversight provisions. Even before considering experience with implementation, however, several broad issues related to ARRA oversight may be of interest to Congress.

Oversight and Crises: Short- and Long-Term Perspectives

In the event of a crisis to which Congress, the President, and federal agencies feel compelled to respond, several challenges may present themselves. Some challenges might be characterized as relatively short term. Others may involve a longer-term orientation.

Among the short-term challenges, in the present context, is the question of how to balance speed (to address macroeconomic objectives) with "prudent management" (e.g., to minimize waste and fraud). Other challenges in formulating a response to a crisis occur when allocating funding during budget execution. When allocating resources to specific projects and priorities, how should the federal government reconcile values of accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, public participation, fairness, and equity? Oftentimes in such circumstances, values "trade off" against each other. In making these judgments, agencies and policy makers typically have little time for planning or reflection.

For purposes of oversight, prioritization likely will be necessary. The need to prioritize raises a number of difficult questions. Which policy areas (e.g., transportation, health care information technology) or processes (e.g., contracting, grant management) should receive initial attention? Which should receive the most attention? Also, what types of oversight activity will be most effective at preventing future problems, catching current problems when changes still may be made, or identifying problems after the fact? Some of these shorter-term issues are explored in greater detail under subsequent headings.

Some longer-term issues include questions of how to build the capacity of federal agencies, Congress, and the President to better prepare for and respond to crises. For example, concerns have been expressed by some observers for years about the adequacy of agency capabilities and workforces in areas such as contract management and program evaluation. To address longer-term issues like these, Congress might explore advantages and disadvantages of options for assessing (or grading) the adequacy of agency management capabilities, both under "normal" circumstances and for contingencies. If Congress wished to consider related options, Congress might explore how systematic, periodic, and transparent such assessments could be.

In addition, and arguably no less significant, questions arise of how to anticipate, avoid, and mitigate preventable crises. For example, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, generally known as the 9-11 Commission, described an aspect of this capability as "institutionalizing imagination." Organizational, procedural, and system-related options might be explored to address any of these questions.

Overseeing Extent to Which ARRA Meets Objectives

A typical purpose of oversight is to assess the extent to which an agency, program, or law is meeting its objectives. Through a variety of tools and approaches, Congress may learn what seems to be working well or not well, where more study may be necessary, and about consequences that may not have been intended. Furthermore, both oversight activity and the prospect of scrutiny may prompt behavior changes by agencies and nonfederal actors to address areas of concern.

As noted earlier, ARRA specified several explicit purposes and "general principles concerning use of funds" (see Box 2 , earlier in this report). These purposes and principles might be thought of as falling into three general categories:

macroeconomic objectives (e.g., creating or saving jobs; other indicators of economic activity affected by a reduction of the GDP gap, compared to situation without stimulus); programmatic, microeconomic, and other discrete policy objectives (e.g., impact on public policy outcomes in myriad policy areas addressed by ARRA); and process objectives (e.g., quick action; transparency; prudent management; low levels of waste, fraud, error, and abuse).

ARRA also could be examined through the lens of additional or different criteria, which may be based on corresponding views about the proper goals of public policy. For example, alternative criteria could be used if an observer perceived the law's specified purposes as not being sufficiently comprehensive. Certain non-governmental and non-ARRA activities, such as scams perpetrated on the public by impersonators of federal agencies and personnel, also may be of concern for oversight purposes.

For objectives related to the first two general categories, many quantitative and qualitative data may be informative, including data from metrics, studies, and program evaluations. For example, in testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, CBO identified three criteria for judging the effectiveness of a fiscal stimulus policy: timeliness (i.e., the increase in aggregate demand caused by a stimulus should match the period when there is a GDP gap); cost-effectiveness (i.e., for a given budgetary cost, the increase in aggregate demand should be maximized, in order to bring real GDP as close as possible to potential GDP and thereby diminish the GDP gap); and consistency with long-term budget objectives (i.e., a short-term stimulus should not significantly exacerbate the nation's long-run fiscal imbalance).

For the third general category, relating to process objectives, a typical inference is that effective implementation (e.g., balancing speed with prudent management) increases the probability of achieving objectives associated with the first two categories. Nevertheless, some aspects of speed or prudent management may prove to be more important than others, or to trade off against each other (see related discussion further below). Experience with implementation may yield corresponding "lessons learned."

In assessing the extent to which ARRA meets its objectives, several related considerations likely will be significant. For example, a frequent challenge with metrics and evaluations is estimating the impact of a policy. That is, did a policy intervention such as ARRA (or one of its constituent parts) change the state of affairs for the better, compared to what would have happened without the policy intervention? The task of validly estimating an answer to this question may require grappling with another, related question: to what extent are observed outcomes due to the policy intervention, as opposed to other factors? In order to estimate ARRA's impact, it therefore may be necessary to make comparisons between observed data, on one hand, and estimates of what would have happened in the absence of ARRA, on the other.

From a macroeconomic perspective, for example, what impact is ARRA having on GDP, employment, and other indicators of economic activity, compared to what would have happened without a fiscal stimulus? What often makes this evaluation difficult is that experience without a fiscal stimulus, under identical conditions, is not observed. In addition, other factors unrelated to the stimulus may affect macroeconomic results or modify the stimulus' potential impact. For example, CBO cited the importance of an assumption in its March 2009 economic forecast, which included the estimated impact of ARRA. Specifically, the forecast assumed "that financial markets will begin to function more normally and that the housing market will stabilize by early next year. The possibility that financial markets might not stabilize represents a major source of downside risk to the forecast." Because a number of such factors may influence overall economic results, some level of uncertainty arguably is unavoidable in making any estimates of ARRA's impact.

Another potential consideration relates to trade-offs among ARRA's multiple objectives. A frequent complication of multidimensional goals (e.g., speed, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, fairness, and accountability) is that some goals may trade off against each other. For example, the use of speed in the obligation of funds has been seen as essential for economic recovery. Greater speed may promote economic stimulus, but at a cost of some efficiency in the use of tax dollars to achieve public policy outcomes in discrete areas. Speed also may increase the risk of waste or fraud, particularly when agency capacities to handle a sudden infusion of funding may be in question. On the other hand, greater scrutiny and accountability may diminish speed and therefore economic stimulus. They also may increase or decrease efficiency and effectiveness, depending on whether the nature and level of scrutiny are adequately calibrated. When governmental decision makers evaluate policy options and make choices, they implicitly make trade-offs. Decision making regarding ARRA most likely will be no exception. The reconciliation of trade-offs in decision making may be informed by policy analysis and management of risks. Ultimately, however, judgments about trade-offs arguably always are informed by an observer's priorities, beliefs, values, and ethics.

A third consideration relates to assessing what is realistically achievable in the short to medium term for each of the three general categories of objectives that were outlined above (i.e., macroeconomic, policy-specific, and process). With respect to process objectives, for example, a subject of considerable attention has been how to build the capability of the Recovery.gov website to provide full transparency for federal funds. Data availability, however, hinges on a number of complex factors, including legacy information technology systems, disparate state and federal systems and data definitions, uneven data quality, and a need for effective project management across a variety of jurisdictions. In that light, it is unclear how much capability may be realistically achievable by the end of FY2010, at which point CBO estimated nearly half of ARRA's discretionary spending will have been spent. In building the capacity of Recovery.gov, the experience of implementing the USASpending.gov website may in some ways be instructive with regard to data availability and quality.

Assessing Oversight Systems, Coverage, and Objectives

Potential Questions Regarding ARRA Oversight

An Obama Administration official has called ARRA "the largest peacetime economic expansion program in the country's history." The Administration and Congress negotiated numerous general oversight provisions for inclusion in the legislation. ARRA's oversight provisions—a collection of new institutions, processes, systems, and resources—supplement the federal government's existing systems of oversight in numerous respects. Some of ARRA's provisions cover all government operations funded by Division A (e.g., many provisions in Title XV). Others operate in specific policy areas (e.g., specific appropriations set-asides). Over time, Congress may consider whether existing management and oversight mechanisms, in combination with ARRA's additional provisions, adequately support effective management and oversight of ARRA implementation. In so doing, several topics and questions that are specific to ARRA might be examined.

Does the combination of existing and new oversight mechanisms adequately address ARRA's objectives and risks? Are there some potential oversight topics that are not explicitly addressed in ARRA? Does the combination of new and existing oversight systems leave gaps? Is there a point at which oversight efforts and scrutiny become counterproductive? If so, in what sense(s)? How are competing imperatives (transparency, accountability, flexibility, cost, etc.) to be reconciled? Are some approaches to oversight more helpful than others? Do some approaches produce unintended consequences? Does the experience with ARRA offer lessons learned for the "normal" systems of oversight? If so, are some changes in the "normal" system of oversight advisable? What approaches to oversight work well in a separation of powers system, in which federal government branches compete for control over public policy, and in a federal system, in which the federal government and states have potentially overlapping lines of authority?

If Congress wishes to assess the overall oversight framework for ARRA, several overarching considerations about federal oversight may be relevant to assessing questions like the foregoing. A number of these considerations are analyzed below.

Federal Oversight Systems and Objectives

As a threshold matter, the federal government might be viewed as embodying a system of "nested" oversight. That is, multiple entities engage in simultaneous and multi-tiered oversight activities. For example, Congress oversees the President, EOP (including OMB), agencies, and nonfederal entities. Furthermore, Congress has established, structured, and funded executive agencies to allow for oversight of agency actions. Congress also has passed a variety of "general management laws" for executive agencies to establish procedures that may be overseen. At the same time, IGs and congressional support agencies such as GAO provide assistance to Congress, agencies, and the President with oversight. Within the executive branch, OMB has a statutory responsibility to provide management leadership for many agencies, including monitoring and oversight of their activities. Agencies oversee their own activities, the activities of regulated entities, and the activities of recipients of federal funds. Agencies undertake these tasks through a variety of organizational and procedural arrangements, often as Congress has mandated via statute. When state governments receive federal dollars, they may oversee the activities of local governments. All of the foregoing entities also oversee in many respects the activities of industries, firms, and other nongovernmental actors.

Viewed together, for example, GAO may attempt to oversee OMB's oversight of an agency's oversight of a state agency, which in turn attempts to oversee the use of funds it made available via contract or grant to a firm, local government, or nonprofit organization. Throughout, tools such as monitoring, analysis, and evaluation may be utilized.

In assessing and potentially considering how to modify an oversight framework, there also are multiple perspectives on the potential objectives of oversight. These include the following:

compliance with applicable laws and regulations (e.g., adherence to legal requirements and avoidance of fraud); implementation that is faithful with congressional intent, when an agency or the President exercises discretion; avoidance of mismanagement (e.g., adherence to sound management practices); avoidance of undesired bias in funding allocations and policy execution (e.g., fair allocation of resources and fair implementation of policy, with intended equity); effectiveness of funded activities (e.g., achievement of programmatic missions and purposes); and efficiency of funded activities (e.g., minimization of avoidable "waste" and unnecessary redundancy).

The ways in which RATB, IGs, GAO, OMB, implementing agencies, and nonfederal recipients of funds (e.g., state governments) approach these perspectives on oversight, in the context of ARRA, may reveal lessons learned and patterns over time.

Topics Not Explicitly Addressed by General Oversight Provisions in ARRA

Assessments of ARRA's implementation and oversight framework likely will be informed by an observer's values, short- versus long-term orientation, and perspectives on the proper structure and objectives of oversight. Nonetheless, as a point of departure, some initial observations still might be made regarding topics that do not appear to be explicitly addressed by general oversight provisions in ARRA.

Almost all of ARRA's general oversight provisions apply to provisions included in Division A of the legislation. Very few appear to apply explicitly to Division B (e.g., regarding tax expenditures). At the same time, however, some provisions in Division B are subject to study or oversight in specific cases. In addition, although some appropriations to IGs in Division A specified that funds were to be used for oversight of activities related to Division A (thereby restricting their use to that purpose), other appropriations to IGs and GAO did not contain a specification of purpose related only to Division A. Therefore, some appropriations presumably could be used for oversight of activities and funding associated with Division B.

Consideration of the extent to which ARRA's general oversight provisions cover Division B may raise questions. For implementation purposes, will Division B receive the same level of oversight as Division A? Will existing oversight mechanisms provide adequate oversight for all of ARRA's provisions, notwithstanding the focus of ARRA's general oversight provisions on Division A?

Funding for, and Capacity of, State and Local Oversight Entities

State and local governments will receive a surge of many billions of dollars under ARRA, raising the potential issue of whether these governments will have capacity to effectively manage the influx of funds. ARRA authorized agencies that receive funds under Division A to "reasonably adjust applicable limits on administrative expenditures for Federal awards to help award recipients defray the costs of data collection requirements initiated pursuant to [Division A]" (Division A, Title XV, Section 1552). However, it is not clear if state and local oversight entities (e.g., state-level auditors general) will have access to increased resources, if they are needed in order to accommodate a surge in activities funded by ARRA. To what extent might this be an issue that state and local governments confront?

Transparency Regarding Agency and OMB Decision Making

In addition, many of the general oversight provisions in Division A focus on transparency regarding final allocations of funds and the outcomes of expenditures. However, not as much attention in ARRA appears to focus on the process within executive agencies for deciding how to allocate funds in the first place. When early versions of ARRA were being developed, then President-elect Obama and Vice President-elect Biden indicated an Obama Administration position that ARRA should contain no congressionally originated earmarks. The President later made a policy statement on the general subject of congressionally originated earmarks, outside the context of ARRA. He said that "on occasion, ... [p]rojects have been inserted [in legislation and report language] at the 11 th hour, without review, and sometimes without merit, in order to satisfy the political and personal agendas of a given legislator, rather than the public interest."

Some of the same concerns, however, might be raised in the context of OMB and agency decision making during budget execution under ARRA. Agencies frequently are granted considerable discretion during budget execution. Given this discretion, to what extent might political appointees within agencies cause certain projects to be funded, without substantial review or merit? Similar concerns about "presidential earmarking" and "executive earmarking" sometimes have been raised. At the same time, the Obama Administration has issued presidential memoranda regarding agency use of discretion under ARRA and in contracting. Experience with ARRA's implementation may indicate what level of transparency regarding executive agency and OMB decision making ultimately will be forthcoming.

Appendix A. CBO January 2009 Estimate of GDP Gap, Without Enactment of ARRA

Graphical displays may assist with visualizing the concept of a GDP gap. CBO's January 2009 testimony before the Senate Budget Committee included such a graphic, showing an estimate of the GDP gap without enactment of a stimulus law. Based on CBO's economic forecast, which assumed no changes in policy, CBO projected "that the economy will produce about $1 trillion less output per year than its estimated potential in each of 2009 and 2010 and significantly less than its potential in 2011 and 2012 as well." See Figure A -1 .

Appendix B. Table of Selected ARRA General Oversight Provisions

Appendix C. Detail of ARRA Appropriations to IGs, GAO, and RATB

IGs are listed in alphabetical order of their parent departments, followed by IGs located within independent agencies. GAO and RATB are listed at the table's end. The table indicates the division and title of ARRA in which the appropriation was included, the funding amount, the period of availability for the funds, and, in the last column, whether appropriations language specified that resources be used only for the purpose of overseeing ARRA-provided funds.

Appendix D. Early CBO Estimates of GDP Gap, Including Impact of ARRA

Congress required in ARRA's Division A that the law's impact on economic indicators be evaluated (Title XV, Section 1513). Congress may conduct oversight over the federal government's attempts to diminish the recession's GDP gap and ARRA's contribution to the effort. Graphical displays may assist with visualizing the concept. After ARRA was enacted, CBO prepared a year-by-year estimate of the short-term economic impacts of the law. CBO noted that "[t]he macroeconomic impacts of any economic stimulus program are very uncertain," and that "[e]conomic theories differ in their predictions about the effectiveness of stimulus." Nonetheless, CBO developed a range of estimates of the impacts of ARRA "that encompasses a majority of economists' views." CBO's letter included a graphic that showed the estimated impact of ARRA on actual GDP.

CBO explained that the previous figure "shows three different projections of the economy's actual output: CBO's January baseline projection of GDP (which does not include the effects of ARRA), GDP using CBO's high estimate of the effects of the legislation; and GDP using CBO's low estimate of the effects of the legislation."

CBO subsequently updated its economic forecast of the GDP gap in its analysis of the Obama Administration's preliminary budget proposals for FY2010. In two graphics, CBO showed "the middle of the range of the agency's [March 2009] estimates of ARRA's impact on GDP and employment."

In brief, CBO estimated ARRA likely would contribute to helping end the recession, in concert with actions by the Federal Reserve and Department of the Treasury.

The current recession, which began in December 2007, took a sudden and severe turn for the worse late last year. Of the 4.4 million jobs lost since the recession began, more than half have been lost in just the past four months. According to the Congressional Budget Office's economic projections, the economy will continue to deteriorate for some time, although the adoption of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and very aggressive actions by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury will help end the recession this fall.

CBO performed similar analysis regarding the unemployment rate. See Figure D -3 , below.

CBO noted, however, that the range of estimates of ARRA's impact "is quite large," and that CBO's "current [economic] forecast, particularly for the near term, is subject to a greater than normal degree of uncertainty."

Question: Under what circumstances did Congress pass ARRA?

Answer: In the wake of a rapidly deteriorating economic picture and year-long recession that the Congressional Budget Office has called the most severe since World War II, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5).

Question: What does this report cover?

Answer: This report discusses ARRA's "general oversight provisions" and several related issues for Congress.

Question: What is "general oversight provision"?

Answer: For purposes of this report, the term "general oversight provision" means an oversight-related provision that addresses multiple programs, agencies, or appropriations accounts.

Question: What provisions were excluded for this report?

Answer: Provisions that are specific to a single program or appropriation (e.g., appropriations set-asides and reporting requirements) are excluded from the report's scope.

Development of ARRA's Oversight Provisions

Legislative Action in the 111th Congress on Stimulus and Oversight

Action on Legislation and Oversight Provisions

Two Categories of General Oversight Provisions

Question: What issues related to ARRA might be of Congressional interest?

Answer: These include assessments of ARRA's role in achieving economic objectives.

Question: What are typical objectives of fiscal stimulus policies?

Answer: Typical objectives of a fiscal stimulus policy relate to increasing economic activity in the short term, compared to what would have happened without a stimulus.

Question: To what extent is short-term economic stimulus a measure of success?

Answer: In addition, some stakeholders have emphasized that stimulating the economy in the short term alone is not a sufficient definition of "success."

Question: How does this affect the manner in which policies are implemented?

Answer: From this perspective, the manner in which spending, tax, and other public policies are implemented, and also the impacts of these policies, may be important.

Oversight and Crises: Short- and Long-Term Perspectives

Overseeing Extent to Which ARRA Meets Objectives

Question: How were these perspectives considered in the law?

Answer: All of these perspectives appear to have been included among the law's explicit purposes and "general principles concerning use of funds."

Question: How will Congress assess the effectiveness of ARRA's additional provisions?

Answer: Over time, Congress may consider whether existing management and oversight mechanisms, in combination with ARRA's additional provisions, adequately support effective management and oversight of ARRA implementation.

Question: To what extent are lessons learned from ARRA generalizable?

Answer: The experience with ARRA also may offer lessons learned for the "normal," non-ARRA systems of oversight.

Assessing Oversight Systems, Coverage, and Objectives

Potential Questions Regarding ARRA Oversight

Question: What oversight issues will Congress face?

Answer: Beyond the immediate situation, additional oversight issues for Congress may relate to longer-term questions. These include how to build and monitor capacity within agencies to respond effectively to crises.

Question: What questions will be important to consider?

Answer: Questions also may arise regarding how to build and monitor capacity in agencies and government overall to anticipate crises, mitigate their risks, and avoid preventable crises.

Question: What does this report address?

Answer: This report analyzes these and other issues after reviewing how the oversight provisions were developed and providing an overview of the enacted provisions themselves, including related appropriations and reporting requirements.


Inauguration Security: Operations, Appropriations, and Issues for Congress

Summary: Every four years, on January 20, the President-elect is sworn in as President of the United States. Presidential inauguration ceremonies are unique public events in the District of Columbia. The inauguration ceremonies are public and, like the President's State of the Union address, they are events in which a significant proportion of the American political leadership is in attendance. Consequently, the inauguration is designated as a National Special Security Event (NSSE) by the Department of Homeland Security. NSSEs are events that require significant security, in part because of the attendance of U.S. and foreign dignitaries and the event's public or official nature.

Summary: Funding for inauguration security operations is provided from the U.S. Secret Service's National Special Security Event general account, though information on the amount provided is not publicly available. In limited circumstances, however, Congress has also provided supplemental appropriations to reimburse local jurisdictions for inauguration-related activities. Other inauguration spending is less easily identifiable because it is indirect and a part of typical annual appropriations to the relevant agencies. Because of the absence of specificity, substantive policy analysis on costs associated with inauguration security may be limited.

Summary: In addition to Congress's responsibility for funding inauguration security operations, Congress also conducts oversight of the security operations. Criticisms of past inauguration security operations and practices generated congressional concern. An example of this criticism includes reports that some 2009 presidential inauguration ticket holders were unable to reach their designated seating areas due to security checkpoint contestation. Congressional, interest group, and media criticism appears to be specifically focused on 2009 inauguration security operations instead of general observations or criticism. There appears to have been no criticism of the 2013 inauguration's security.

Summary: This report provides information on inauguration security operations and inauguration security appropriations, and it discusses potential policy issues associated with inauguration security operations. It also identifies some policy issues associated with inauguration security operations, including some past inauguration security operations criticisms and inauguration security operation appropriations. Options are provided for congressional consideration for future inauguration and inauguration security planning.

Summary: Congressional interest in inauguration security may be based on various factors and determinates, including its roles in appropriating funds for inaugurations, oversight of law enforcement and first responder entities with inauguration security responsibilities, and hosting the swearing-in ceremony, as well as the heightened interest in post-9/11 security operations. Congress may wish to consider past criticisms of both inauguration security operations and appropriations.

At noon on January 20 of each year following a presidential election, the President-elect is sworn in as President of the United States. In 2017, the President- and Vice President-elect will be officially sworn on Friday, January 20. Presidential inaugurations are public events that are conducted primarily at the U.S. Capitol and on the grounds of the National Mall. Additionally, presidential inaugurations are ceremonies that are attended by a significant portion of the American political leadership. Due to safety and security concerns for the public and the American political leadership, the inauguration ceremony is designated a National Security Special Event (NSSE). NSSEs are high profile, and usually public, events that require significant security because of the attendance of U.S. and foreign dignitaries and the event's public or official nature. The United States Secret Service (USSS) is designated as the primary federal entity responsible for NSSE security. The USSS, however, is not the only law enforcement or first responder agency that has inauguration security responsibilities. The United States Capitol Police (USCP), the Metropolitan DC Police Department (MPD), the U.S. Park Police (USPP), and other law enforcement and first responder entities often assist the USSS and provide security for the swearing-in ceremony and other inaugural events.

Congress appropriates funds for inauguration security. This funding is not always specifically identified for presidential inauguration security. Instead, inauguration security funding is expected to be provided from the USSS general NSSE account. In limited circumstances, Congress has provided supplemental appropriations to "reimburse" local jurisdictions for inauguration related activities. Not only does Congress provide funding for security operations, it also typically conducts oversight hearings following inaugurations to review these operations for future improvements.

Criticism of past inauguration security operations and practices has generated congressional concern. For example, during the 2009 inauguration of President Barack Obama, some ticket holders were unable to reach their designated seating areas, while others were stuck in a tunnel leading to the National Mall. In a statement following the ceremony, Senator Dianne Feinstein, chair of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, asked for a review of inauguration security operations.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (IG) completed a review for Congress and released its findings in October 2009. The IG's review focused on "the adequacy of security ... and how well the Secret Service managed its after-action review." The report recommended that the USSS address areas identified for improvement and inform the IG's office when changes are implemented. Areas identified for improvement in the USSS after-action review, and reported on by the IG, included improving security planning, using new communications technology, and conducting additional after-action reports in an effort to improve logistics for off-site staging for future events. Due to what was reported to be successful security operations, the DHS IG was not asked to review the 2013 inauguration.

This report provides information on inauguration security operations and inauguration security appropriations, and discusses potential policy issues associated with inauguration security operations. It also identifies some policy issues associated with inauguration security operations, including some past inauguration security operations criticisms and inauguration security operation appropriations. Options are provided for congressional consideration for future inauguration and inauguration security planning. Congressional interest in inauguration security may be based on various factors and determinates including its roles in appropriating funds for inaugurations, oversight of law enforcement and first responder entities with inauguration security responsibilities, and hosting the swearing-in ceremony, and the heightened interest in post-9/11 security operations. Congress may wish to consider past criticisms of both inauguration security operations and appropriations.

Presidential inauguration ceremonies are unique public events in the District of Columbia (DC). Due to the momentous nature of the ceremonies, it is one of the few times that the American government's leadership is all present at the same time in the same location. Consequently, the inauguration is designated as an NSSE by DHS. The USSS is the lead federal agency responsible for securing the public inaugural events.

Inaugural events, pursuant to public law, include "the day on which the Presidential inaugural ceremony is held, the 5 calendar days immediately preceding that day, and the 4 calendar days immediately following that day." While the swearing-in ceremony is the only constitutionally required event, other events have become part of the inaugural festivities. These include the inaugural luncheon, the inaugural parade, and the inaugural balls. Two major inaugural events are held at the U.S. Capitol and hosted by the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies (JCCIC): the swearing-in ceremony and the inaugural luncheon. Following the swearing-in ceremony and luncheon, there is an inaugural parade and numerous inaugural balls. All of these events require special security operations.

Inaugurations are designated as National Special Security Events (NSSEs) due to their importance, the portion of national leadership in attendance, and the public nature of the ceremony. NSSE designation factors include

anticipated attendance by U.S. officials and foreign dignitaries; the size of the event; and the significance of the event.

Recent NSSEs include the 2013 inauguration of President Barack Obama, and the 2016 presidential nominating conventions. The 2017 inauguration has been designated as an NSSE.

NSSEs were created on May 22, 1998, when President William J. Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62—Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas. PDD 62 established a framework for federal department and agency counter-terrorism programs, which addressed terrorist apprehension and prosecution, increased transportation security, and enhanced emergency response and cybersecurity. PDD 62 also designated specific federal departments and agencies as the lead agencies in the event of terrorist attacks. USSS was designated as the lead agency with the leadership role in the planning, implementation, and coordination of operational security for events of national significance—as designated by the President. Other lead agencies for counter terrorism activities included the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

On December 19, 2000, Congress enacted P.L. 106-544 , the Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000, which authorized USSS—when directed by the President—to plan, coordinate, and implement security operations at special events of national significance. Some NSSEs, other than inauguration ceremonies, include major international summits held in the United States, major sporting events, and presidential nominating conventions. Prior to the establishment of DHS in January 2003, the President determined which events of national significance were designated as NSSEs. Since the establishment of the department, the DHS Secretary—as the President's representative—has had the responsibility to designate NSSEs.

When an event is designated an NSSE, USSS becomes the lead federal agency in developing, exercising, and implementing security operations. The goal of these security operations is to "develop and implement a seamless security plan that will create a safe and secure environment for the general public, event participants, Secret Service protectees, and other dignitaries."

The USSS's Major Events Division (MED) is responsible for NSSE planning and coordinates with other USSS headquarters and field offices. Some of the coordination includes advance planning and liaison for venue and air space security, training, communications, and security credentialing. Additionally, MED coordinates and conducts liaisons with other federal, state, and local agencies—primarily law enforcement entities.

NSSE security is planned, exercised, and implemented through a unified command model that is comprised of representatives of participating federal, state, and local agencies with NSSE responsibilities. During the NSSE's planning phase, each participating agency is tasked according to its expertise or jurisdictional responsibility. USSS states that, "with the support of hundreds of federal, state, and local law enforcement and public safety organizations, each of these events has successfully concluded without any major incidents."

NSSE operational plans include the use of physical infrastructure security fencing, barricades, special access accreditation badges, K-9 teams, and other security technologies. To ensure consequence management, DHS prepositions Domestic Emergency Support Teams, Urban Search and Rescue Teams, national Emergency Response Teams, Nuclear Incident Response Teams, and the Strategic National Stockpile and Mobile Emergency Response System. Specific teams and groupings of teams are designed for each event based on unique characteristics of each event, coordination with other federal entities, state and local jurisdictions, available local resources, and mutual aid agreements. Additionally, USSS sponsors training seminars for command-level federal, state, and local law enforcement and public safety officials to provide principles for managing security at major events and strategies for reducing vulnerabilities related to terrorism. The seminars also discuss key strategies and lessons learned from past NSSEs.

Inauguration security includes ticketed security check points for those attending the ceremonies and who have assigned seats in close proximity to the swearing-in location. The security border for the inauguration is expanded to the general vicinity of downtown Washington, DC, and the National Mall. For 2013 inauguration planning purposes, the USSS Office of Protective Operations/Dignitary Protective Division and the USSS Washington Field Office convened an initial planning meeting with federal, state, and local law enforcement entities. It can be presumed the same entities convened for the 2017 inauguration planning. These law enforcement entities included

U.S. Capitol Police (USCP); Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, DC (MPD); U.S. Park Police (USPP); Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Virginia State Police; Maryland State Police; Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Police (WMATA); Federal Protective Service (FPS); Arlington, Virginia, Police Department; Alexandria, Virginia, Police Department; Prince George's County, Maryland, Police Department; Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department; and U.S. Military District of Washington.

Past inauguration security planning included the creation of the Law Enforcement Executive Steering Committee (ESC) and 24 operational subcommittees focusing on securing the inauguration. In conjunction with USSS, the FBI is the lead agency for intelligence and counterterrorism, while FEMA is the lead agency for coordinating emergency response.

Inauguration security is focused on physical screening of the audience and protection of officials. For example, during past inaugurations, DHS and additional federal law enforcement agencies provided personnel and equipment, including screening magnetometers. In total, USSS received security assistance in the form of approximately 30,000 law enforcement officers from 58 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies for multiple inaugural events. Additionally, USSS partnered with the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies and the Presidential Inaugural Committee (PIC) to plan logistics and security. The USSS uses JCCIC and PIC seating plans and projected audience size to plan security; however, the USSS does not receive a list of ticketed attendees by name. The following section provides information on appropriations that provide funding to these entities for inauguration security. An NSSE Executive Steering Committee met to coordinate overall 2017 inauguration planning. This steering committee included:

U.S. Secret Service (Chair); Federal Bureau of Investigation (Co-Chair); Federal Emergency Management Agency (Co-Chair); DC Fire Department; DC Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency; DC National Guard General Services Administration; Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies; National Park Service; U.S. Attorney's Office; U.S. Capitol Police; U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Department of Defense—Joint Forces Headquarters; U.S. Department of Defense—Joint Staff; U.S. Department of Defense—Northern Command; U.S. Department of Defense—Office of the Secretary of Defense; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Military District of Washington; U.S. Park Police; Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Police; Washington Metropolitan Police Department; and White House Military Office.

Inauguration Ceremony Security Appropriations

In general, agencies involved in inauguration security often do not receive specific account-level appropriations for inauguration security operations. Instead, inauguration security costs are included in regular fiscal year planning and budget requests. In recent years, however, Congress has appropriated additional funds to reimburse some local governments and federal agencies for inauguration related expenses and has provided appropriations to the USSS for "unanticipated costs related to security operations for National Special Security Events," which could be used for inauguration related activities. Limited, and identified, appropriations for NSSE and the absence of specific inauguration security operations appropriations limits the ability to conduct substantive policy analysis on the costs associated with inaugurations generally, and inauguration security operations specifically.

Since the 2001 inauguration of President George W. Bush, Congress has specifically appropriated funds to reimburse state and local entities for security costs associated with the inauguration. The appropriations ranged from approximately $6 million in 2001, to reimburse the District of Columbia, to a total of $22 million in 2009 to reimburse the National Park Service and state and local governments, including the District of Columbia, "for extraordinary costs associated with the 2009 Presidential Inauguration." For the 2013 inauguration, Congress appropriated $9.8 million to the District of Columbia for "emergency planning and security costs ... associated with the Presidential Inauguration," and for the 2017 inauguration, Congress appropriated $19.995 million for emergency planning and security costs in the District of Columbia. For the 2017 inauguration, Congress directly appropriated $4.2 million to the National Park Service "for the security and visitor safety activities related to the Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies."

Besides direct appropriations, other funds are used to support inauguration security operations. For example, by designating the inauguration an NSSE, DHS allows the USSS to use funds specifically appropriated for NSSEs. For the 2001, 2005, and 2009 inaugurations, appropriations for all NSSEs remained consistent at $1 million per year. In both FY2005 and FY2009, however, additional appropriations of $5 million and $1 million were provided to the USSS for NSSE operations, respectively.

In addition to regular appropriations, NSSE reimbursements for inauguration security activities could be provided from the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011 and Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012. For both FY2011 and FY2012, $7.5 million in two-year funds was appropriated and could be allocated for NSSE security cost reimbursements to state and local governments based on the recommendation of the FEMA Administrator. Potential amounts for reimbursement 2017 inauguration security costs are undetermined at this time.

Congressional interest in inauguration security may be based on various factors and determinates including its roles in appropriating funds for inaugurations, oversight of law enforcement and first responder entities with inauguration security responsibilities, and hosting the swearing-in ceremony, and the heightened interest in post-9/11 security operations. Congress may wish to consider past criticisms of both inauguration security operations and funding. The following issues are primarily addressed due to the criticism of the 2009 inauguration security operations. There seemed to be no major issues or criticism of the 2013 inauguration security, and CRS did not identify any issues for the upcoming 2017 presidential inauguration as of the date of this report.

In the past, there has been criticism of inauguration security operations. Security operations for the 2009 inauguration were evaluated as generally positive, with two exceptions. The most widely cited exception and criticism was the inability of some ticketed attendees to gain access to viewing areas. The DHS IG determined this problem to be the result of inadequate communications and crowd management. Immediately following the inauguration, the USSS, USCP, MPD, and the USPP conducted a joint investigation and issued a report on March 17, 2009. This report identified crowd management and communication weaknesses, and made 38 recommendations to improve inauguration security operations; these are not, however, detailed in the publicly available report. The report provided recommendations such as establishing enhanced real time cell phone or Internet communications between security officials and the public and ticket holders. The other, less-publicized criticism appeared in a Washington Post article that cited six named and additional unnamed campaign donors who stated that security at the inauguration seemed lax. The Washington Post article, which was cited by the DHS IG, mentioned six concerns, including accounts that VIPs were not asked to show identification to receive tickets; public and ticketed attendees mingled among non-screened attendees and then returned to the screened ticketed area without re-screening; and VIPs leaned on the President-elect's limousine.

Several options are available to Congress, should it decide that future inauguration security operations need to be addressed. These include increasing coordination among federal, state, and local law enforcement and first responder entities; amending USSS authority specifically to address security operations related to presidential inaugurations; and maintaining present inauguration security operations with continued USSS leadership.

Due to the large and complex nature of securing an inauguration, Congress may wish to address issues that were identified following the 2009 presidential swearing in. As stated earlier, these issues included identified weaknesses in crowd management and law enforcement communications.

Congress may require the USSS to provide an in-depth briefing to the JCCIC prior to the inauguration to ensure these past issues are addressed. The JCCIC would likely receive regular updates on inauguration security planning from the USSS, as the USSS reports that it works with the JCCIC on logistic and security planning.

In order to ensure inauguration security and the safety of its statutorily designated protectees, Congress could amend the Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000 and specifically address security operations related to presidential inaugurations. For example, Congress may wish to statutorily require specific USSS inauguration security operations. This may assist in ensuring that past criticisms or future security concerns or issues are addressed. Additionally, this option may increase the level of federal, state, and local law enforcement coordination by identifying, in statute, required USSS inauguration activities.

This option, however, may result in the need for further legislation that requires specificity on other NSSEs, such as presidential nominating conventions and sporting events. To address this, Congress may wish to refine USSS NSSE authority instead of specifically identifying actions related to presidential inaugurations.

In 2009, the DHS IG's review found that overall inaugural security was "reasonable" and that the USSS was actively engaged in inauguration threat assessment. Additionally, DHS IG found that the 2009 inauguration security operations

were a combination of past experience of security operations with flexibility related to specific 2009 Presidential Inauguration security issues; included USSS coordination with other law enforcement and first responder entities despite a continuously evolving security situation; did not include any unaddressed security breaches; were adequate based on USSS protective security plans; were managed as required by USSS; and were reviewed and improved by USSS internal evaluations for the 2013 inauguration.

Based on the DHS IG's report, Congress may choose not to make significant changes in law or practice regarding operational planning and execution of future USSS inauguration security. Instead, Congress may choose to rely upon the USSS to continue executing its protective mission. Congress, however, may wish to conduct oversight hearings and investigations following future inaugurations to ensure that the USSS continues to effectively protect its designated protectees at inaugurations and other NSSEs.

While the amount of funding and the mechanisms for funding inauguration security have not been identified as problematic, several options are available to Congress, should it decide to make changes. These include providing supplemental federal appropriations as necessary, providing specially targeted appropriations, or allowing privately raised funds to pay for inauguration security.

As has been done in the past, Congress could choose to provide supplemental appropriations to cover security related inauguration costs. One option would be to create a disaster-relief type grant or assistance program that would allow local jurisdictions to apply for assistance in the event an NSSE is declared. Once an NSSE has been declared and the USSS establishes its needs for event security, state and local governments could request funds to help offset costs associated with assisting the USSS with event security.

Use of a reimbursement program, which is based on FEMA's protocols for disaster assistance, could standardize the USSS process for deciding whether to grant reimbursements to local jurisdictions for security services. While presidential and vice-presidential visits are not NSSEs, local governments routinely ask for reimbursement for security and emergency service costs for these events. For example, in 2007, in preparation for Vice President Dick Cheney's visit to Coeur D'Alene, Idaho, the USSS requested ambulance and paramedic services for the Vice President's motorcade from the Northern Lakes Fire Protection District. Subsequently, it was reported that the fire district sought "$2,087.79 for overtime costs and the expense of ambulances and fire trucks that had to remain on standby during the visit." While the fire district presumably could have declined to provide service, creating a standard reimbursement plan for presidential travel or an NSSE may provide an incentive for state and local jurisdictions. Further, having a procedure in place for reimbursement application would require the District of Columbia and other National Capital area jurisdictions to apply for inauguration related funds like any other local jurisdiction.

Opponents of such a reimbursement program could cite issues in the evaluation of requests and deciding how to divide potentially limited funds. Each year, the President and Vice President attend many events. Providing reimbursement to every local jurisdiction could be expensive. Additionally, the quadrennial inauguration poses unique challenges for the National Capital Region. Lumping inauguration related security expenses with other speeches, rallies, town hall meetings, and events could disproportionally provide funds to non-inauguration related events.

Since 2001, NSSE appropriations have been consistent and have not been raised during years in which inaugurations have been held. The current approach limits congressional oversight due to the absence of detailed information about expenses related to inauguration security operations. Should Congress want to provide additional appropriations to the USSS and other federal law enforcement agencies for inauguration activities, it could provide additional appropriations during inauguration years. Providing additional appropriations for NSSEs during inaugural years, however, would potentially require Congress to specifically designate the funds for inauguration security. In most years, NSSE appropriations are for all NSSE events, and the USSS decides how to divide the funds. Providing additional funds for inauguration security probably would require Congress to direct USSS to spend the additional funds only on the inauguration, not other potential NSSEs.

Beyond past reimbursement to the District of Columbia and other local jurisdictions, Congress has not generally provided specific inauguration security funding in appropriations bills. Should Congress decide to provide an additional level of specificity, legislative language could be included in future inauguration year appropriations bills that specifically mention the inauguration and congressional intent for utilizing funds. Additional specificity would allow Congress to more closely monitor inauguration security spending. Providing detailed instructions, however, could also limit choices available to the USSS and other agencies that assist with inauguration security. Additional specificity could also raise concerns about the disclosure of detailed security arrangements to the public, potentially decreasing overall security. The current system allows the USSS to use money as necessary, without having to spend on specific items or programs.

For many inaugural events, including inaugural balls, the Presidential Inauguration Committee (PIC) raises money from private sources. To assist in offsetting costs associated with securing inaugural events, Congress could require that security costs for some events be covered partially or in full by PIC or another private entity. For example, since inaugural balls are ticketed events and not open to the public, Congress could require the event organizer or PIC to reimburse the government for the cost of security arrangements, in a similar arrangement to other presidential events. Securing the events in this manner could reduce the overall appropriations necessary for inauguration security. Requiring private funding of event security, however, could also be problematic. If the private entity is unable to raise sufficient funds, event security could become a liability. It could also result in fewer inauguration events and fewer locations for the USSS to secure. Additionally, since the USSS provides presidential protective services whenever the President attends an event, his attendance would require the USSS to be involved in security arrangements and the use of federal funds.

Every four years, the President- and Vice President-elect are sworn in at an inauguration ceremony. This ceremony is designated as an NSSE, and the USSS is the lead federal agency responsible for the security operations. Security operations for the 56 th presidential inauguration in 2009 have been criticized on several grounds. Following the 2009 inauguration, Congress held hearings and the DHS IG and USSS conducted investigations and after-action reviews to address these criticisms. Additionally, Congress has, at different times, appropriated specific amounts to fund inauguration security operations. Continued federal, state, and local law enforcement and first responder entity coordination may result in safe and secure inaugurations. Congressional oversight regarding security and funding may add to this continued record of safe and secure inaugurations.

Appendix. Terms and Agency Names and Acronyms

Table A-1 provides a list of terms and agencies referred to in this report and their acronyms.

Question: What happens on January 20 every fourth year in the United States?

Answer: Every four years, on January 20, the President-elect is sworn in as President of the United States.

Question: How do presidential inauguration ceremonies compare to other public events?

Answer: Presidential inauguration ceremonies are unique public events in the District of Columbia. The inauguration ceremonies are public and, like the President's State of the Union address, they are events in which a significant proportion of the American political leadership is in attendance.

Question: How does this change the inauguration's designation by DHS?

Answer: Consequently, the inauguration is designated as a National Special Security Event (NSSE) by the Department of Homeland Security.

Question: What are NSSEs?

Answer: NSSEs are events that require significant security, in part because of the attendance of U.S. and foreign dignitaries and the event's public or official nature.

Background
National Special Security Events

Question: How are inauguration security operations funded?

Answer: Funding for inauguration security operations is provided from the U.S. Secret Service's National Special Security Event general account, though information on the amount provided is not publicly available.

Question: How might Congress supplement the security funding?

Answer: In limited circumstances, however, Congress has also provided supplemental appropriations to reimburse local jurisdictions for inauguration-related activities.

Question: How easily identifiable is inauguration spending?

Answer: Other inauguration spending is less easily identifiable because it is indirect and a part of typical annual appropriations to the relevant agencies.

Question: How does this affect any policy analysis regarding inauguration security?

Answer: Because of the absence of specificity, substantive policy analysis on costs associated with inauguration security may be limited.

Question: What role does Congress play in inauguration security operations?

Answer: In addition to Congress's responsibility for funding inauguration security operations, Congress also conducts oversight of the security operations.

Question: What criticisms of past inauguration operations have been raised?

Answer: An example of this criticism includes reports that some 2009 presidential inauguration ticket holders were unable to reach their designated seating areas due to security checkpoint contestation.

Question: To what extent was the criticism generalizable to other inauguration operations?

Answer: Congressional, interest group, and media criticism appears to be specifically focused on 2009 inauguration security operations instead of general observations or criticism.

Question: How does this compare to criticism of the 2013 inauguration's security?

Answer: There appears to have been no criticism of the 2013 inauguration's security.