Vulnerable Youth: Federal Mentoring Programs and Issues

Summary: Youth mentoring refers to a relationship between youth—particularly those most at risk of experiencing negative outcomes in adolescence and adulthood—and the adults who support and guide them. The origin of the modern youth mentoring concept is credited to the efforts of charity groups that formed during the Progressive era of the early 1900s to provide practical assistance to poor and juvenile justice-involved youth, including help with finding employment.

Summary: Approximately 4.5 million youth today are involved in formal mentoring relationships through organizations such as Big Brothers Big Sisters (BBBS) of America. Contemporary mentoring programs seek to improve outcomes and reduce risks among vulnerable youth by providing positive role models who regularly meet with the youth in community or school settings. Some programs have broad youth development goals, while others focus more narrowly on a particular outcome. Evaluations of the BBBS program and studies of other mentoring programs demonstrate an association between mentoring and some positive outcomes, but the impact of mentoring and the ability for mentored youth to sustain gains over time are less certain.

Summary: There is no single overarching federal policy on mentoring or an entity that coordinates mentoring supports across the federal government. The Federal Mentoring Council had served as a resource on mentoring issues for the federal government from 2006 to 2008 and is no longer active. Currently, the federal government provides funding for mentoring primarily through a grant program with annual appropriations for the program of about $78 million to $90 million in recent years. This grant is administered by the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) within the Office of Justice Programs. Program funding has been used for research and direct mentoring services to select populations of youth, such as those involved or at risk of being involved in the juvenile justice system. Other federal agencies provide or are authorized to support mentoring as one aspect of a larger program. For example, select programs carried out by the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) can provide mentoring, among other services. Youth ChalleNGe, an educational and leadership program for at-risk youth administered by the Department of Defense's (DOD's) National Guard, includes mentoring as an aspect of its program. Federal agencies also coordinate on federal mentoring issues.

Summary: Two other federal programs—the Mentoring Children of Prisoners (MCP) program and Safe and Drug-Free Schools (SDFS) Mentoring program—provided a significant source of federal funding for mentoring services. However, the programs were short-lived: funding for the MCP program was discontinued beginning with FY2011, and funding for the SDFS program was discontinued beginning with FY2010. The MCP program was created in response to the growing number of children under age 18 with at least one parent incarcerated in a federal or state correctional facility. The program was intended, in part, to reduce the chance that mentored youth would use drugs and skip school. Similarly, the SDFS Mentoring program provided school-based mentoring to reduce school dropout and improve relationships for youth at risk of educational failure and with other risk factors. As part of its FY2010 budget justifications, the Obama Administration had proposed eliminating the program because of an evaluation showing that it did not have an impact on students overall in terms of interpersonal relationships, academic outcomes, and delinquent behaviors.

Summary: Issues relevant to the federal role in mentoring include the limitations of research on outcomes for mentored youth, the quality of mentoring programs, and the potential need for additional mentors.

The purpose of contemporary, structured mentoring programs is to reduce risks by supplementing (but not supplanting) a youth's relationship with his or her parents. These programs are administered by mostly adult volunteers who are recruited by youth-serving organizations, faith-based organizations, schools, and after-school programs. Some of these programs have broad youth development goals, while others focus more narrowly on a particular outcome such as reducing gang activity or substance abuse, or improving grades. Research has shown that mentoring programs have been associated with some positive youth outcomes, but that the long-term ability of mentoring to produce particular outcomes and the ability for mentored youth to sustain gains over time are less certain.

Since the mid-1990s, Congress supported mentoring programs for the most vulnerable youth. The Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Juvenile Mentoring Program (JUMP), the first such program, was implemented in 1994 to provide mentoring services for at-risk youth ages 5 to 20. Although there is no single overarching policy today on mentoring, the federal government has supported multiple mentoring efforts for vulnerable youth since JUMP was discontinued in FY2003. Previously, two mentoring programs—the Mentoring Children of Prisoners (MCP) program and Safe and Drug Free Schools (SDFS) Mentoring program—provided a significant source of federal funding for mentoring services. However, the programs were short-lived: the MCP was administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) from FY2003 through FY2011 and the SDFS program was administered by the Department of Education (ED) from FY2002 through FY2010.

The federal government currently funds mentoring efforts through short-term grants and initiatives, primarily carried out by DOJ. DOJ has allocated funding for multiple initiatives through its Mentoring program, including mentoring for certain vulnerable youth and research on mentoring. In addition, the federal government has provided funding to programs with vulnerable youth that have a strong, but not exclusive, mentoring component. Youth ChalleNGe, an educational and leadership program for at-risk youth administered by the Department of Defense (DOD), helps to engage youth in work and school, and leadership opportunities. Adult mentors assist enrolled youth with their transition from the program for at least one year. Finally, federal agencies coordinate on mentoring issues. The Federal Mentoring Council was created in 2006 to address the ways agencies can combine resources and training and technical assistance to federally administered mentoring programs, and to serve as a clearinghouse on mentoring issues for the federal government. The council has been inactive since 2008.

This report begins with an overview of the goals of mentoring, including a brief discussion on research of structured mentoring programs. The report then describes the evolution of federal policies on mentoring since the early 1990s. The report provides an overview of the federal mentoring initiatives that are currently funded. While additional federal programs and policies authorize funding for mentoring activities, among multiple other activities and services, such programs are not discussed in this report. The report concludes with an overview of issues that may be of interest to Congress. These issues include the limitations of research on outcomes for mentored youth, the quality of mentoring programs, and the potential need for additional mentors.

Mentoring refers to a relationship between two or more individuals in which at least one of those individuals provides guidance to the other. In the context of this report, mentoring refers to the relationship between a youth and an adult who supports, guides, and assists the youth. Youth can receive mentoring through informal and formal relationships with adults. Informal relationships are those that develop from a young person's existing social network of teachers, coaches, and family friends. This report focuses on formal mentoring relationships for vulnerable youth. These relationships are cultivated through structured programs sponsored by youth-serving organizations, faith-based organizations, schools, and after-school programs. Approximately 4.5 million youth are in structured mentoring relationships. Volunteers in structured programs are recruited from communities, religious organizations, and the workplace, and undergo an intensive screening process. Youth eligible for services through structured mentoring programs are often identified as at "high risk" of certain negative outcomes.

The goal of modern structured mentoring programs is to reduce risks by supplementing, but not replacing, a youth's relationship with his or her parents. Some programs have broad youth development goals, while others focus more narrowly on a particular outcome such as reducing gang activity or substance abuse, or improving grades. Structured mentoring programs are often community based , meaning that mentored youth and adults engage in community activities (e.g., going to the museum and the park, playing sports, playing a board game, and spending time together outside of work and school). Other programs are characterized as school based because they take place on school grounds or some other set location, like a community center. The co-location of mentoring programs in schools facilitates relationships with teachers, who can meet with mentors and refer youth to the programs. Mentors provide academic assistance and recreational opportunities and expose youth to opportunities that promote their cognitive and emotional development.

Origins of Contemporary Mentoring Programs

The origin of today's structured mentoring programs is credited to the efforts of charity groups that formed during the Progressive Movement of the early 1900s. These groups sought adult volunteers for vulnerable youth—defined at the time as youth who were poor or had become involved in the juvenile court system. These early organizations provided practical assistance to youth, including help with finding employment, and created recreational outlets. The most prominent mentoring organization at the time, Big Brothers (now known as Big Brothers Big Sisters of America), continues today as the oldest mentoring organization in the country.

The contemporary youth mentoring movement began in the late 1980s with the support of foundations and corporations, including Fannie Mae, Commonwealth Fund, United Way of America, Chrysler, Procter & Gamble, and the National Urban League. In addition, nongovernmental organizations such as One to One in Philadelphia and Project RAISE in Baltimore were established by entrepreneurs seeking to expand mentoring services to vulnerable youth.

The federal government has supported structured mentoring programs and initiatives since the beginning of the contemporary mentoring movement. At that time, mentoring was becoming increasingly recognized by the government as a promising strategy to enrich the lives of youth, address the isolation of youth from adult contact, and provide one-to-one support for the most vulnerable youth, particularly those living in poverty. Among the first projects undertaken by the federal government was a youth mentoring initiative in the early 1990s implemented by the newly created Points of Light Foundation, a federally-funded nonprofit organization that promotes volunteering. Then-Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole made the case for mentoring as a way to improve the lives of youth and prepare them for the workforce. Other early initiatives included the Juvenile Mentoring Program, or JUMP. The federal government also signaled the importance of mentoring during the 1997 Presidents' Summit, which was convened by the living Presidents (at the time) to pledge their support for policies that assist youth. The Presidents and other national leaders called for adults to volunteer as mentors for over 2 million vulnerable youth.

Characteristics of Successful Mentoring Programs

Studies of structured mentoring programs, including those that have received federal funding, indicate that the programs are most successful when they include a strong infrastructure and facilitate caring relationships. Infrastructure refers to a number of activities including identifying the youth population to be served and the activities to be undertaken, screening and training mentors, supporting and supervising mentoring relationships, collecting data on youth outcomes, and creating sustainability strategies. The mentor screening process provides programs with an opportunity to select those adults most likely to be successful as mentors by seeking volunteers who can keep their time commitments and value the importance of trust. Further, these studies assert that orientation and training ensure youth and mentors share a common understanding of the adult's role and help mentors develop realistic expectations of what they can accomplish.

Ongoing support and supervision of the matches assist mentored pairs in negotiating challenges. Staff can help the pairs maintain a relationship over the desired period (generally a year or more), and assist them in bringing the match to a close in a way that affirms the contributions to the relationship of both the mentor and youth. According to the research literature, successful programs are known to employ strategies to retain the support of current funders and garner financial backing from new sources. Finally, the studies demonstrate that successful programs attempt to measure any effects of mentoring services on the participating youth. Programs can then disseminate these findings to potential funders and participants.

Characteristics of Successful Mentoring Relationships

Research on youth mentoring demonstrates that mentoring relationships are likely to promote positive outcomes for youth and avoid harm when they are close, consistent, and enduring. Closeness refers to a bond that forms between the youth and mentor, and has been found to have benefits for the youth. Mentor characteristics—such as prior experience in helping roles or occupations, an ability to appreciate salient socioeconomic and cultural influences, and a sense of efficacy for mentoring youth—appear to facilitate close mentoring relationships. Consistency refers to the amount of time mentors and youth spend together. Regular contact has been linked to positive youth outcomes, and relationships tend to be strong if they last one year or longer. Youth in relationships that lasted less than six months showed declines in functioning relative to their non-mentored peers.

A 2011 analysis assessed findings from 73 mentoring evaluations to determine the effectiveness of mentoring generally. The analysis reviewed evaluations, published between 1999 and 2010, of mentoring programs that were intended to promote positive youth outcomes through relationships between children and youth under age 18 and adults (or older youth) serving as mentors. The analysis examined programs that used various formats and strategies—including those that used paid mentors, older mentors, and group formats—and took place for a relatively brief period (e.g., a few months) through a longer period. Each of the evaluations included a comparison group of youth who were not mentored. In some programs, the youth were randomly assigned to participate in the comparison group, while in other programs the comparison group consisted of youth who did not participate in the mentoring program. There is wide consensus that using random assignment allows researchers to best estimate the impact of an intervention such as mentoring.

The researchers found that overall, the programs resulted in modest gains for youth. According to the analysis, the programs tended to have positive effects on outcomes across multiple categories, including academics and education, attitudes and motivation, social skills and interpersonal relationships, and psychological and emotional status, among other categories. Seven of the studies included follow-up assessment of youth outcomes after they had completed the program, with an average follow-up period of about two years. The studies showed an enduring positive effect of participating in the programs that were evaluated. Further, the analysis pointed to factors that influence the effectiveness of mentoring programs. These include whether (1) participating youth have preexisting difficulties, such as delinquent behavior, or are exposed to significant environmental risk (not defined, but presumably referring to the home and community in which the youth resides); (2) programs serve greater proportions of males; (3) mentors' educational or occupational backgrounds are well matched to the goals of the program; (4) mentors and youth are paired based on mutual interests, such as career interests; and (5) mentors serve as advocates and teachers to provide guidance to youth and to help ensure their overall welfare.

The analysis ultimately found that a broad range of mentoring programs can benefit youth across a number of domains. At the same time, it raised other considerations. For example, few evaluations assessed key outcomes that are of interest to policymakers, such as educational attainment, juvenile offending, and obesity prevention. In addition, few evaluations addressed whether youth sustained the gains they made in the program at later points in their development. The researchers point out that despite the positive effect of the programs overall, the effect is small.

Examples of the Positive Effects of Mentoring

Some studies have shown strong gains for youth who are mentored. A study in 1995 of the Big Brothers Big Sisters of America program compared outcomes of eligible youth who were randomly selected to receive mentoring services. The study found that 18 months after the youth were assigned to their groups, the mentored youth skipped half as many days of school. In addition, the mentored youth were 46% less likely than their control group counterparts to use drugs, 27% less likely to initiate alcohol use, and almost one-third less likely to hit someone.

A 2002 review of studies of major community-based programs (the 1995 Big Brothers Big Sisters evaluation and evaluations of Across Ages, Project BELONG, and Buddy System, among others) with an experimental design found that certain outcomes for youth with a mentor were better than outcomes for their counterparts without a mentor. These outcomes included the following:

Improved educational outcomes: Youth in the year-long Across Ages mentoring program showed a gain of more than a week of class attendance. Evaluations of the program also showed that mentored youth had better attitudes toward school than non-mentored youth. Reduction in some negative behaviors: All studies that examined delinquency showed evidence of reducing some, but not all, of the tracked negative behaviors. Mentored youth in the BELONG program committed fewer misdemeanors and felonies than non-mentored youth. In the Buddy System program, youth with a prior history of criminal behavior were less likely to commit a major offense compared to their non-mentored counterparts with a prior history. Improved social and emotional development: Youth in the Across Ages program had significantly more positive attitudes toward the elderly, the future, and helping behaviors than non-mentored youth. Participants in the Big Brothers Big Sisters program felt that they trusted their parents more and communicated better with them, compared to their non-mentored peers.

Similarly, a 2007 study of Big Brothers Big Sisters school-based mentoring programs, with adults serving as mentors, demonstrated some positive results. This study—among the most rigorous scientific evaluations of a school-based mentoring program—found that mentored youth (randomly selected into the treatment group) made improvements in their first year in overall academic performance, feeling more competent about school, and skipping school less, among other areas, compared to their non-mentored counterparts (randomly selected into the control group).

Some Outcomes Do Not Improve or Are Short-Lived

Although research has documented some benefits of mentoring, findings from some studies show that mentoring is limited in improving all youth outcomes. The 2002 review of mentoring program evaluations found that programs did not always make a strong improvement in grades and that some negative behaviors—stealing or damaging property within the last year—were unaffected by whether the youth was in a mentoring program. In the 2007 Big Brothers Big Sisters school-based mentoring evaluation, the non-school related outcomes, including substance use and self-worth, did not improve.

Research has also indicated that mentored youth make small gains or do not sustain positive gains over time. The 2007 Big Brothers Big Sisters school-based mentoring evaluation found that, in the second year of the program, none of the academic gains were maintained (however, mentored youth were less likely to skip school, and more likely to feel that they would start and finish college). The evaluation also pointed to weaknesses in the program's design, such as high attrition (due likely to the transitioning for some youth to middle school, or high school), limited contact with mentors and youth over the summer, and delays in beginning the program at the start of the school year. A 2008 study of Big Brothers Big Sisters school-based mentoring that used high school students as mentors and drew on data used for the 2007 study, found that while the mentored students experienced gains on some outcomes, the improvements were not sustained for students who ended their involvement in the program after one school year (the minimum time commitment). Similarly, an evaluation of the discontinued federal school-based mentoring program (funded from FY2002 through FY2009) demonstrated that the program did not have an impact on students overall in terms of interpersonal relationships, academic outcomes, and delinquent behaviors.

The remainder of this report provides an overview of federal efforts to support mentoring, as well as a discussion of mentoring issues. The federal government does not have an overarching strategy or coordinated approach to mentoring, and the major mentoring program is administered by DOJ.

As noted previously, DOJ is the first federal department to have funded a structured mentoring program. The 1992 amendments ( P.L. 102-586 ) to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) added Part G to the act, authorizing the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to establish a mentoring program, which came to be known as the Juvenile Mentoring Program (JUMP). The program was created in response to the perception that youth in high-crime areas would benefit from one-on-one adult relationships. The objectives of JUMP were to reduce juvenile delinquent behavior and improve scholastic performance, with an emphasis on reducing school dropout. From FY1994 through FY2003, Congress appropriated a total of $104 million to the program. Annual funding ranged from $4 million to $15.8 million.

JUMP was repealed by the 21 st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act ( P.L. 107-273 ). This law incorporated the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2001 ( H.R. 1900 ) from the 107 th Congress, which eliminated several juvenile justice programs, including Part G (Mentoring), and replaced it with a block grant program under a new Part C (Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Block Grant Program, to be used for activities designed to prevent juvenile delinquency). The act also created a new Part E (Developing, Testing, and Demonstrating Promising New Initiatives and Programs). According to the accompanying report for H.R. 1900 , the relatively small amount of funding appropriated for JUMP may have been a factor in its elimination. The report states: "In creating this block grant, the [Senate Judiciary] Committee has eliminated separate categorical programs under current law.... Funding for the Part E—State Challenge Activities and Part G—Mentoring Program received minimal funding." The report goes on to say that the committee does not discourage mentoring activities under Part C.

After the JUMP program was discontinued with the end of FY2003, the Bush Administration requested funding for mentoring under Part C and Part E of the JJDPA. However, in the years since JUMP's discontinuation, Congress has appropriated mentoring funds under a separate mentoring line item titled "Mentoring Part G," "Mentoring," or "Mentoring Grants"; the line item does not specify under which part of the JJDPA the funding is authorized.

The JUMP Program ended in FY2003 and Congress resumed funding for DOJ mentoring in FY2005. Table 1 shows funding from FY2008 through FY2017; Congress has provided $70.0 million to $102.8 million annually in these years.

The FY2017 appropriation for the DOJ Mentoring program totaled $80 million. Of this amount, $66.4 million was available for the program, and another $13.6 million was used for other purposes within the Office of Justice Programs (management and administration, peer review, research set-aside, and tribal set-aside). The program funds were used as follows: $61.7 million for grants to provide mentoring services to youth; $778,503 for research activities; and $4.0 million for training and technical assistance, including the Mentoring Resource Center. Table 2 summarizes the purpose, goals, and funding levels for the grants that totaled $61.7 million. The table includes funding for mentoring by organizations with programs that have a national presence (National Mentoring Programs), operate in multiple states (Multi-State Mentoring Initiative), operate locally in collaboration with other mentoring providers (Collaborative Mentoring Programs), or serve specific groups of youth who are at risk (Mentoring for Child Victims of Commercial Sexual Exploitation and Domestic Sex Trafficking Program and Practitioner-Researcher Partnership in Cognitive Behavioral Mentoring Program).

Corporation for National and Community Service

The Corporation for National and Community Service (CNS) is an independent federal agency that administers programs to support volunteer services. CNS is authorized by two statutes: the National and Community Service Act (NCSA, P.L. 101-610 ) of 1990, as amended, and the Domestic Volunteer Service Act (DVSA, P.L. 93-113 ) of 1973, as amended. Though CNS does not administer a program explicitly for mentoring, the agency has provided funding for mentoring, among other purposes, through two of its volunteer organizations, AmeriCorps and SeniorCorps. AmeriCorps members serve directly as mentors (through the AmeriCorps State and National program) or focus their efforts on building the capacity of mentoring organizations to increase the number of children they serve (through the AmeriCorps Vista program). SeniorCorps, through its RSVP and Foster Grandparents programs, provides mentoring to children and youth from disadvantaged backgrounds, including children of prisoners. CNS also leads federal efforts to promote National Mentoring Month, which is intended to raise awareness of mentoring, recruit individuals to mentor, and promote the growth of mentoring by recruiting organizations to engage their constituents in mentoring.

The Serve America Act ( P.L. 111-13 ), which amended NCSA and DVSA, authorizes funding for programs in which mentoring is a permissible activity, among several other activities. For example, the law provides that AmeriCorps can fund new programs—including the Education Corps, Clean Energy Services Corps, and Veterans Corps—that can be used for mentoring, among other activities. In addition, the law authorizes the program to fund initiatives that seek to expand the number of mentors for disadvantaged youth, as defined under the act.

Separately, CNS hosts a website ( http://www.nationalservice.gov/mentor ) to connect potential mentors with mentoring programs. The website is operated by the nonprofit organization MENTOR: The National Mentoring Partnership.

The Youth ChalleNGe Program is a quasi-military training program administered by the Army National Guard to improve outcomes for youth who have dropped out of school or have been expelled. Mentoring is a major and required component of the program. Youth ChalleNGe was established as a pilot program under the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1993 ( P.L. 102-484 ), and Congress permanently authorized the program under the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1998 ( P.L. 105-85 ). Congress has since provided an annual appropriation for the program as part of the Department of Defense authorization acts. Currently, 40 sites operate in 29 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. See Table 3 for further funding information.

Youth are eligible for the ChalleNGe program if they are ages 16 to 18 and enroll prior to their 19 th birthday; have dropped out of school or been expelled; are unemployed; are not currently on parole or probation for anything other than juvenile status offenses and not serving time or awaiting sentencing; and are drug free. In recent years, nearly 9,000 cadets (students) have graduated annually. The program consists of three phases: a two-week pre-program residential phase where applicants are assessed to determine their potential for completing the program; a 20-week residential phase; and a 12-month post-residential phase.

During the residential phase, cadets work toward their high school diploma or General Equivalency Diploma (GED) and develop life-coping, job, and leadership skills. They also participate in activities to improve their physical well-being, and they engage in community service. Youth develop a "Post-Residential Action Plan (P-RAP)" that sets forth their goals, as well as the tasks and objectives to meet those goals. The post-residential phase begins when graduates return to their communities, continue in higher education, or enter the military. The goal of this phase is for graduates to build on the gains made during the residential phase and to continue to develop and implement their P-RAP. Within six months of graduation, nearly three-quarters of graduates in 2015 went on to additional education, work, military service, or a combination of these activities.

A core component of the post-residential phase is mentoring in which a cadet works with a mentor to meet his or her goals set forth in the P-RAP. Parents and youth are asked to nominate at least one prospective mentor prior to acceptance into the program. They are advised to identify an individual who is respected by the youth and would be a good role model. Cadets tend to know their mentors before enrolling in the program; however, members of an applicant's immediate family or household and ChalleNGe staff members and their spouses are not eligible to become mentors. By week 13 of the residential phase, and prior to the formal matching of a cadet and a mentor, programs are required to use a National Guard-approved curriculum to train the mentors and the cadets for their roles and responsibilities during the formal mentoring relationship.

Mentors must be at least 21 years old, of the same gender as the youth (unless otherwise approved by the director of the program), and within reasonable geographic proximity. Mentors must also undergo a background check that includes two reference checks, an interview, and a criminal background investigation. In some programs, the mentors are required to initiate the background investigation and have the results provided to the program prior to their acceptance as a mentor. Mentors and cadets begin weekly contact during the last two months of the residential phase and maintain monthly contacts during the post-residential phase. They are encouraged to participate in community service activities or job placement activities. Although the program prefers that the pair meet in person, contact may be made by telephone calls or letters.

Mentors report each month during the post-residential phase about the cadets' placement activities, progress toward achieving their goals, and the activities associated with the mentoring relationship. Some programs also require the cadets to report monthly about their progress. At the end of the post-residential phase, an exit interview is conducted between program staff and the mentor, and the match is formally concluded.

Youth ChalleNGe was evaluated by Manpower Development Research Corporation (MDRC), a social policy research organization. The evaluation began in 2005, when 12 state ChalleNGe sites agreed to participate in the evaluation. The evaluation used a random assignment research design, whereby youth were randomly selected to receive the treatment (i.e., to participate in the program) or to a control group that did not participate in the program. The results of the evaluation are based on a survey administered about nine months, 21 months, and three years after the members of the program and control groups entered the study.

MDRC issued reports after each survey wave. The reports issued following the first two waves found that youth in the program group had higher education attainment and a stronger work history than the control group. The report issued following the third wave showed that these favorable outcomes persisted at the three-year mark. Those who enrolled in Youth ChalleNGe were significantly more likely to have earned a GED (but not necessarily a high school diploma), to have earned any college credit, to be employed, to have higher earnings, and to be working. Although the earlier reports found positive impacts on criminal justice involvement and health, these impacts faded over time. At the three-year survey, about half of youth in both the program and control groups reported ever having been arrested and about two-thirds of each group reported being in good or excellent health. Further, on some outcomes, there were few statistically significant differences between the treatment and control groups or the outcomes were worse for the treatment group, including that that they were more likely to not use birth control or had tried illegal drugs other than marijuana.

The RAND Corporation, a nonprofit policy think tank, is examining the extent to which the ChalleNGe program can develop metrics to measure longer-term outcomes—beyond three years—to determine how the program impacts both individuals and communities. RAND separately conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the program between 2005 and 2008. This analysis looked at 10 ChalleNGe sites in 10 states. This report concluded that the program generates labor market earnings and other benefits of $2.66 for every dollar expended on the program and an estimated return on investment of 166%.

Issues that may be relevant to any discussions around the federal role in mentoring include the limitations of research on outcomes for mentored youth and the potential need for additional mentors, particularly for vulnerable populations.

A few positive evaluations of mentoring programs may provide justification for federal support of these programs. The study of community-based mentoring programs at select Big Brothers and Big Sisters chapters found that mentored youth were less likely than their non-mentored counterparts to use drugs and alcohol, hit someone, and skip school, among other outcomes. The evaluation of the Big Brothers Big Sisters school-based mentoring program found similar results for mentored youth. Nonetheless, findings from these and other studies show that mentoring did not improve some academic and other tracked outcomes.

The long-term influence of mentoring for youth is unknown. The 1995 study tracked youth for 18 months, which is among the longest periods of time mentored youth have been studied. No study appears to address issues around how well youth transition to adulthood, such as whether they attend college or secure employment. Further, studies of mentoring programs have shown that some gains made by mentored youth, compared to their non-mentored counterparts, were short-lived and that mentored youth did not improve in certain areas. Still, these improvements, albeit temporary and limited to certain outcomes, may be a worthwhile public policy goal.

A related issue is the design of mentoring evaluations. For example, concerns have been raised about the methodology used in the evaluation of the federal Safe and Drug-Free Schools mentoring program. One concern was that grantees were not randomly selected. As noted, random selection can help researchers determine whether an intervention, such as mentoring, leads to any differences in outcomes between those who receive the intervention and those who do not. Grantees involved in the study "reported being less focused on improving students' academic outcomes and on teaching risk avoidance" than grantees generally, even though these domains were the focus of the evaluation. The grantees selected for the evaluation were more likely to serve females and more Asian, Latino, and Pacific Islander students but fewer white students than grantees overall. The grantees were also more likely to be school districts, compared to nonprofit or community-based organizations. They also tended to have more years of experience running school mentoring and serving more students. These differences may in fact have led to outcomes that were not representative of the entire pool of grantees nationally.

Further, some mentored youth in the SDFS mentoring program did not receive certain services that were tied to the outcomes of the study. For example, 43% of the mentored students reported working frequently with their mentors on academics while 21% never worked on academics. Still, it is unclear whether school-based mentoring programs should be tasked with improving both academic outcomes and certain other outcomes, like reducing involvement in gangs and other risky behaviors. Another possible limitation of the SDFS mentoring evaluation was its design. Although the SDFS mentoring evaluation used random assignment, whereby youth were randomly assigned to the treatment (i.e., SDFS mentoring) or the control group (no SDFS mentoring), over one-third of the control group received mentoring, either from the SDFS grantee or from other organizations in the community. This finding raises questions about the extent to which the evaluation could have assessed the true effects of the program, since the outcomes for the control group may have been influenced by the participation of some of the youth in mentoring programs. According to the study, this may have "led to some dilution of the impacts on students compared to expectations."

The program delivery for the SDFS mentoring program also did not appear to have adhered to certain established best practices in mentoring, such as matches that lasted one year or more and ongoing training for mentoring. The average length of the mentoring relationship for students surveyed was 5.8 months, and on average, students were not assigned their mentor until about five weeks after they were randomly assigned to the treatment group. Ongoing training did not appear to be widely available. Approximately 41% of mentors reported that ongoing training was available after they begun meeting regularly with their students. This is in contrast to recommendations by researchers in mentoring that mentors receive support and ongoing training after matches have been established. Still, nearly all mentors received pre-match training or orientation and talked with their program supervisor about how things were going with their mentoring relationship. Most mentors (62.3%) reported having access to social workers or staff when they needed support.

In a similar vein, one of the researchers of the SDFS mentoring evaluation raised questions about the extent of technical assistance available to grantees about implementing the program: "The legislation ... and the program guidance ... said to focus on the academic and social needs of students. Beyond that, there weren't any prescriptive protocols for how people were going to conduct their mentoring activities, or how they were going to supervise their mentors, or how they were going to train their mentors." Nonetheless, the Department of Education (ED) reported that training and technical assistance was provided by a contractor and ED staff.

A 2010 analysis of three major school-based mentoring programs, including the SDFS mentoring program, suggests that the effects of these programs are small but are in a range that "makes their interpretation subject to underlying perspectives and priorities." Similarly, a 2011 analysis assessed findings from 73 mentoring programs and found that despite the positive effect of the programs overall, the effect is small. In other words, some stakeholders may have reason to be skeptical of the findings from the SDFS mentoring program and other mentoring programs, while others may argue that these findings are promising and should lead to further efforts to improve mentoring interventions.

The number of mentoring programs appears to have grown in recent years, likely due to a variety of reasons, including federal attention to mentoring as an intervention for at-risk youth and promising associations between mentoring and multiple outcomes. These programs have different formats and serve specific populations of youth. For example, in FY2017, DOJ provided funding to mentoring organizations that serve youth who are victims of commercial sexual exploitation, or are at risk of such victimization.

In light of this perceived expansion, researchers and other stakeholders caution that administrators should carefully implement mentoring programs while adhering to core practices of effective mentoring that have been informed by research. The Obama and Trump Administrations have allocated funding for grants to research on mentoring for at-risk youth.

MENTOR: A National Mentoring Partnership, a national mentoring organization, estimated that 9.4 million young people who are at-risk youth need a mentor. Recruiting and retaining volunteers appears to be a major challenge for mentoring organizations, including those funded through federal mentoring programs. In its 2004 report of the Safe and Drug Free Schools Mentoring program, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that new grantees had more difficulty than established grantees in recruiting and supporting mentors. Similarly, HHS reports that some mentors in organizations that received Mentoring Children of Prisoners' funding (which was funded from FY2003 through FY2010) had dropped out before being matched with a youth because of the time and energy commitment mentoring entails. While research on mentor recruitment and retention is nascent, it reveals that mentoring organizations tend to attract individuals who are middle aged, educated, and have children in their household, and that word of mouth is among the top strategies for recruiting new volunteers. Further, individuals are likely to remain in formal mentoring programs if they feel adequately prepared to serve as mentors. According to the research on mentoring, retention may be high when programs continually monitor mentoring relationships for effectiveness and respond to the needs of mentors.

A related issue is that the mentoring gap may be wider for special populations. Mentoring programs primarily serve youth ages 9 through 11 who come to the attention of a parent or teacher, rather than the most at-risk populations, which include, but are not limited to, older youth, runaway and homeless youth, and youth in foster care or the juvenile justice system. Recent efforts to recruit volunteers to mentor vulnerable populations have been under way, as evidenced by DOJ mentoring grants in recent years for selected youth populations. Nonetheless, potential mentors may still be discouraged from working with youth facing serious personal difficulties and challenges in their communities.

Question: How prevalent is participation in formal mentoring organizations?

Answer: Approximately 4.5 million youth today are involved in formal mentoring relationships through organizations such as Big Brothers Big Sisters (BBBS) of America.

Question: What do these programs aim to achieve?

Answer: Contemporary mentoring programs seek to improve outcomes and reduce risks among vulnerable youth by providing positive role models who regularly meet with the youth in community or school settings.

Question: More specifically, what is the ultimate goal of these programs?

Answer: Some programs have broad youth development goals, while others focus more narrowly on a particular outcome.

Question: To what extent do these programs show long-term positive accomplishments?

Answer: Evaluations of the BBBS program and studies of other mentoring programs demonstrate an association between mentoring and some positive outcomes, but the impact of mentoring and the ability for mentored youth to sustain gains over time are less certain.

Origins of Contemporary Mentoring Programs

Federal Issues in Mentoring
Limitations of Research on Mentoring

Question: To what extent is the federal government involved in mentoring programs?

Answer: There is no single overarching federal policy on mentoring or an entity that coordinates mentoring supports across the federal government.

Question: How (if at all) were federal resources involved in the past?

Answer: The Federal Mentoring Council had served as a resource on mentoring issues for the federal government from 2006 to 2008 and is no longer active.

Question: How is the federal government helping these programs?

Answer: Currently, the federal government provides funding for mentoring primarily through a grant program with annual appropriations for the program of about $78 million to $90 million in recent years. This grant is administered by the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) within the Office of Justice Programs.

Question: How is federal funding used in these programs?

Answer: Program funding has been used for research and direct mentoring services to select populations of youth, such as those involved or at risk of being involved in the juvenile justice system.

Question: How are federal agencies indirectly involved with the mentoring programs?

Answer: Other federal agencies provide or are authorized to support mentoring as one aspect of a larger program. For example, select programs carried out by the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) can provide mentoring, among other services. Youth ChalleNGe, an educational and leadership program for at-risk youth administered by the Department of Defense's (DOD's) National Guard, includes mentoring as an aspect of its program.

Question: To what extent do these agencies coordinate and share assets?

Answer: Federal agencies also coordinate on federal mentoring issues.

Some Outcomes Do Not Improve or Are Short-Lived

Overview and Purpose of Mentoring
Department of Justice Mentoring Program
Overview

Corporation for National and Community Service

Federal Issues in Mentoring
Focusing on Quality of Programs

Question: How does the federal government provide funding for mentoring services?

Answer: Two other federal programs—the Mentoring Children of Prisoners (MCP) program and Safe and Drug-Free Schools (SDFS) Mentoring program—provided a significant source of federal funding for mentoring services.

Question: How long-lived were these programs?

Answer: However, the programs were short-lived: funding for the MCP program was discontinued beginning with FY2011, and funding for the SDFS program was discontinued beginning with FY2010.

Question: Why were these programs initialized?

Answer: The MCP program was created in response to the growing number of children under age 18 with at least one parent incarcerated in a federal or state correctional facility. The program was intended, in part, to reduce the chance that mentored youth would use drugs and skip school. Similarly, the SDFS Mentoring program provided school-based mentoring to reduce school dropout and improve relationships for youth at risk of educational failure and with other risk factors.

Question: Why were these programs dropped?

Answer: As part of its FY2010 budget justifications, the Obama Administration had proposed eliminating the program because of an evaluation showing that it did not have an impact on students overall in terms of interpersonal relationships, academic outcomes, and delinquent behaviors.


Army Corps Supplemental Appropriations: History, Trends, and Policy Issues

Summary: Congress directs the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to plan and build water resource facilities through the agency's civil works program. The Corps also has a prominent role in responding to natural disasters, especially floods, in U.S. states and territories. In recent years through supplemental appropriations, Congress also has funded the agency to study and construct projects that reduce flood risks in areas recently affected by some hurricanes and floods. The 115th Congress is considering possible responses to various natural disasters in 2017. H.R. 4667—Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements, 2017 (as passed by the House)—proposes $12.09 billion for the agency's activities associated with response, repair, and recovery from natural disasters including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.

Summary: Policy Considerations. A common issue for Congress after a flood-related disaster is whether to provide supplemental funds directly to the Corps and, if so, how much and for which Corps activities. During its deliberations on recent supplemental appropriations bills, Congress also has considered whether to maintain requirements for nonfederal cost sharing, what requirements to include regarding reporting to Congress and public transparency associated with supplemental funds, and what type of flood damage-reduction efforts to support (e.g., repair of existing infrastructure, construction of new infrastructure). Supplemental Corps funding debates also may raise broader questions for policymakers. These include, for example, the effectiveness and efficiency of processes such as those for postdisaster supplemental appropriations and Corps annual budget development, especially in regard to identifying and supporting priority investments in reducing the nation's flood risk. Supporters of supplemental appropriations for the construction of Corps flood-risk reduction projects in natural disaster-affected areas view these projects as part of the broader recovery effort and as means to improve flood resilience of the affected areas. Other stakeholders would prefer more attention and funding that supports other programs and measures to reduce the nation's flood risks.

Summary: Supplemental Funds. From 2005 to 2016, Congress appropriated $31.4 billion in supplemental funding to the Corps; these funds amounted to almost half of the agency's annual discretionary appropriations over that same period. Of the $31.4 billion, $27.2 billion (87%) was for responding to flooding and other natural disasters. The majority of this funding related to Hurricane Katrina and other 2005 storms (approximately $16 billion) and to Hurricane Sandy in 2012 ($5.3 billion).

Summary: Supplemental bills most frequently fund two Corps accounts: Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies (FCCE; i.e., flood fighting, repairs to damaged nonfederal flood-control projects) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M; i.e., repairs to existing Corps projects). In some instances, principally since 2005, Congress also has provided supplemental funding for other Corps accounts, such as the Construction account. Of the supplemental funds that Congress provided to the Corps for Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, 31% and 66%, respectively, were for construction activities. Of the $12.1 billion that H.R. 4667 would provide, $10.48 billion would be for activities in the agency's Construction account—$55 million for repairs to Corps construction projects damaged by natural disasters, and $10.425 billion for expedited construction of flood control and storm damage reduction projects in areas affected by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. That is, 86% of the funding for the Corps in H.R. 4667 would be for construction. For comparison, that amount would exceed the agency's $9.1 billion total discretionary spending appropriations for flood-related construction for the decade FY2008 to FY2017.

Summary: Conditions Applicable to Supplemental Funds. In supplemental appropriations bills, Congress has at times maintained, and at other times waived, local cost-sharing requirements for Corps flood-risk reduction construction projects. The standard nonfederal cost shares range from 35% to 50%, depending on the activity. H.R. 4667 would waive the nonfederal cost share for studies and ongoing construction funded through the bill. The bill also would provide the Secretary of the Army with the authority to use funds from the bill, subject to approval by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, to initiate construction on projects that have completed the agency's multistep project development process without project-specific congressional construction authorization.

Under its civil works program, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) plans, builds, operates, and maintains a wide range of water resource facilities. The Corps also undertakes flood-fighting activities and other natural disaster response activities. These emergency activities have been authorized by Congress and generally have been funded by supplemental appropriations, which have been significant relative to Corps discretionary appropriations since 2005.

From 1987 to 2016, Congress has appropriated approximately $33.2 billion in Corps supplemental appropriations. Of this total, Congress provided $31.4 billion from 2005 to 2016, which was significant relative to the agency's regular (i.e., nonsupplemental) annual discretionary appropriations over that period (approximately $63.8 billion for FY2005 through FY2016).

If supplemental bills provide funds to the Corps, they most frequently fund two accounts: Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies (FCCE; i.e., flood fighting, repairs to damaged nonfederal flood-control projects) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M; i.e., repairs to existing Corps projects). In some instances, principally since 2005, Congress also has provided supplemental funding for other Corps accounts, such as the Mississippi River and Tributaries (MR&T) account and the Construction account. Of the supplemental funds that Congress provided to the Corps for Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, 31% and 66%, respectively, were for construction activities. Congress also provided the agency with $4.6 billion as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ).

In the wake of major flooding and other natural disasters, Congress often considers whether to provide supplemental appropriations to the Corps and other agencies. Proponents of providing supplemental funding for the Corps argue that these investments are significant for recovery efforts and improve flood resilience of the affected areas. Congress may provide these funds with special considerations (e.g., designated as emergency funding and not requiring budgetary offsets; waiving nonfederal cost-share requirements). Others argue that the annual appropriations process is the more appropriate forum for deciding on significant federal flood-damage reduction investments, contending that postdisaster investments should be subject to the same project-development and cost-sharing requirements as other similar Corps projects and should compete in the agency's annual budget-development process. Other stakeholders would prefer more attention and funding that supports other programs and measures to reduce the nation's flood risks. (For an overview of federal flood-related assistance programs, see CRS Report R45017, Flood-Risk Reduction and Resilience: Federal Assistance and Programs , by [author name scrubbed] et al.)

This report analyzes Corps supplemental funding. The report focuses on supplemental funding provided directly to the Corps from 1987 to 2016, as well as recently proposed supplemental funding in H.R. 4667 —Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements, 2017 (as passed by the House). The report does not include extensive analysis of annual Corps discretionary appropriations or supplemental appropriations for other agencies. Apart from Corps disaster response, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has extensive authority to assist and coordinate disaster response actions under the National Response Framework, and FEMA receives significant regular and supplemental appropriations for this work. Although the Corps performs work under some mission assignments for FEMA (i.e., funded by FEMA, under direction of the President and FEMA), that work is not addressed in this report.

The majority of natural disaster-related supplemental appropriations generally are placed into one of the following four Corps budget accounts based on the type of activity funded.

Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies Account

The FCCE account is the primary account through which the Corps funds disaster-related activities. The primary activities funded under FCCE are flood fighting (e.g., sandbagging), emergency preparedness and response, and repair of damaged nonfederal flood and hurricane protection projects. Congress authorized the Corps in the Flood Control Act of 1941 (33 U.S.C. §701n) to assist in flood fighting and flood response. The Corps can assist in flood fighting at the discretion of its Chief of Engineers to protect life and property, principally when state resources are overwhelmed. Congress also authorized the Corps to operate the Rehabilitation and Inspection Program (RIP, also known as the P.L. 84-99 program) to fund the repair of participating nonfederal flood-control works (e.g., levees, dams, dunes) damaged by natural events. Repairs under this program are funded by the agency's FCCE account. Congress also has directed the Corps to use supplemental funds to repair and rebuild federally owned flood-control and other projects (e.g., navigation projects) through the agency's O&M and Construction accounts.

In the event of an emergency, Congress has given the Secretary of the Army (generally delegated to the Assistant Secretary of the Army [Civil Works]) discretion to transfer from existing appropriations the monies necessary for the emergency work referenced above, until funds become available in the applicable account through supplemental appropriations or other avenues. In recent floods, the Corps has exercised this authority to transfer regular annual appropriations from ongoing projects (i.e., projects funded by annual appropriations) to pay for emergency actions. The Corps has then internally reimbursed itself for this funding once supplemental appropriations have become available.

The O&M account funds activities related to existing Corps projects, including upkeep of physical infrastructure and other activities (i.e., dredging of ports and waterways). Common disaster activities funded under this account include repair of damaged federally operated flood and hurricane protection projects (e.g., dams, levees, floodwalls) and dredging of authorized federal navigation channels.

Mississippi River and Tributaries Account

The MR&T account consists of flood-control and navigation projects for the lower Mississippi River Valley. Supplemental expenditures under this account consist primarily of repair to damaged MR&T levees, floodways, and other project features.

The Construction account funds new project construction and major upgrades to existing projects (e.g., significant dam repairs). Supplemental construction funding has been used at times to improve existing Corps coastal and riverine flood-risk reduction projects and for new Corps construction projects to reduce flood risks.

Analysis of Corps Supplemental Appropriations

Congress previously has provided the Corps with approximately $33.2 billion (nominal dollars) in supplemental funding in 26 laws enacted between 1987 and 2016. It is considering legislation, principally H.R. 4667 , that would provide the Corps an additional $12.09 billion in supplemental appropriations for the agency's activities associated with response, repair, and recovery from natural disasters including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. This section discusses enacted Corps supplemental appropriations, as well as Corps supplemental funding proposed in H.R. 4667 in the 115 th Congress. It also discusses common issues that policymakers consider in deliberating on these supplemental appropriations bills.

Table 1 shows account-level funding in enacted Corps supplemental appropriations bills and in H.R. 4667 . Of the $33.2 billion in enacted supplemental appropriations legislation, most of this amount ($31.4 billion) was provided in 12 appropriations laws enacted between 2005 and 2016. Adjusting prior-year appropriations for inflation, Congress provided the Corps with approximately $38 billion (in 2016 dollars) in supplemental appropriations between 1987 and 2016. Of this total, 92% was provided between 2006 and 2016. Enacted Corps supplemental appropriations and H.R. 4667 also are shown by year in Figure 1 .

The discussion below differentiates between five primary types of supplemental funding that the Corps received or the 115 th Congress is considering:

funding for the 2005 hurricanes; funding for Hurricane Sandy response and recovery; funding for "all other" floods, hurricanes, and other natural disasters; funding for other nondisaster purposes, such as economic recovery and facility security; and funding proposed in H.R. 4667 (as passed by the House) for natural disasters including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.

Separately, the Appendix lists the disaster events that were explicitly referenced in enacted Corps supplemental appropriations from 2003 to 2016 and in H.R. 4667 .

As noted above, the 2005 hurricanes (primarily Hurricane Katrina) account for much of Corps supplemental appropriations since 2003. The $16 billion received for these storms is more than three times the size of the agency's annual civil works budget. These appropriations were provided in six separate supplemental appropriations bills passed between 2005 and 2009, and most of these funds were designated for rebuilding and in some cases significantly strengthening Corps facilities, principally in Southeast Louisiana. Approximately 94% of the supplemental funds appropriated for Corps hurricane response and recovery went to activities in Louisiana, including $14.5 billion for protective measures in Southeast Louisiana. These funds were used for significant repair and strengthening of 350 miles of levees and floodwalls in New Orleans and new surge-protection barriers, including the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal Surge Barrier, which is one of the largest surge barriers in the world.

Although the federal government funded 100% of the costs of FCCE and O&M infrastructure in Southeast Louisiana, most of the supplemental funds for construction projects were subject to federal-nonfederal cost-sharing requirements (generally a 65/35 federal/nonfederal split). That is, the state of Louisiana is contributing $1.7 billion, consisting of $0.2 billion for real estate acquisition and $1.5 billion for the state's cash-share contribution, for its share of the $5.0 billion in improvements funded through supplemental appropriations to the Corps Construction account. Under a specially negotiated arrangement, Louisiana's cash contribution initially was provided through federal appropriations and is being repaid over 30 years.

Hurricane Katrina significantly damaged the Mississippi coast. In contrast to the congressional response to fund hurricane-protection construction through supplemental appropriations for Southeast Louisiana, Congress directed the Corps to develop a plan for how to protect coastal Mississippi. As part of a supplemental appropriations bill for the Corps ( P.L. 109-148 ), Congress directed the Corps to design comprehensive improvements and modifications to Mississippi coastal counties to provide hurricane protection, prevent erosion, preserve fish and wildlife habitat, and achieve other purposes. This effort is known as the Mississippi Coastal Improvements Program (MsCIP). In a 2009 supplemental bill ( P.L. 111-32 ), Congress authorized and funded $439 million in Corps FCCE activities under this program. The agency's final MsCIP plan was submitted to Congress for authorization in January 2010. Congress in the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-121 ) authorized an additional $1.07 billion in MsCIP activities based on the final plan. These projects were planned in compliance with the standard 65% federal and 35% nonfederal cost share for this type of Corps construction project. Because Congress designated most of these funds for Hurricane Katrina recovery, the funds are generally not available to other projects or emergencies.

The second-largest enacted supplemental appropriation for the Corps was through the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-2 ), for response and recovery related to Hurricane Sandy's 2012 landfall. The act provided $5.35 billion in supplemental appropriations to address damages caused by Hurricane Sandy and to reduce future flood risks in the areas impacted by the storm. Generally, funding under the O&M and FCCE accounts ($821 million and $1.008 billion, respectively) was to "address the consequences" of Hurricane Sandy. The majority of funding appropriated to the Construction account ($2.9 billion of $3.4 billion in this account) was set aside to "reduce future flood risks in ways that will support the long-term sustainability of the coastal ecosystem and communities and reduce the economic costs and risks associated with large-scale flood and storm events ... within the boundaries of the North Atlantic Division of the Corps that were affected by Hurricane Sandy."

Among other things, P.L. 113-2 allowed for the repair of damaged projects to prestorm conditions and for the restoration of some projects to their authorized "design profiles" (i.e., their original construction designs). Additionally, Congress made available funding in the Construction account for new construction projects (i.e., projects that were undergoing study or authorized for construction prior to the storm) but made release of this funding dependent on the Corps publishing certain interim reports also required under the legislation. Finally, the legislation waived cost-sharing requirements for ongoing construction projects (although it provided no such waiver for the aforementioned new construction projects).

Outside of the aforementioned three sections (funding for response and repair related to the 2005 hurricane season, the 2013 landfall of Hurricane Sandy, and other nondisaster supplemental appropriations), between 1987 and 2016 Congress provided the Corps with approximately $7.1 billion to respond to various other natural disasters (e.g., riverine and coastal flooding). The vast majority of this funding was provided between 2005 and 2016.

A considerable portion of the funding for these other flood events was for Corps actions under the O&M account and the FCCE account (38% and 40%, respectively); the MR&T account received roughly 17% of these appropriations, as shown in Figure 2 . Other than funding for Hurricane Sandy, the other most recent supplemental appropriation for the Corps ( P.L. 114-254 ), passed in December 2016, is included in this category. That appropriation focused on repair to Corps facilities in response to flooding in Louisiana and in Florida (although neither state was explicitly referenced in the enacted legislation); the majority of these funds were for the MR&T and O&M accounts (specific account totals are available in Observations on Corps Supplemental Funding).

Other Supplemental Appropriations: ARRA and Facility Security

The Corps also has received supplemental funds for maintenance and facility upgrades. Specifically, the Corps received funding for facility security upgrades in 2002 and 2003 following the terrorist attacks of 2001. It also received funding for facility upgrades (including more than $2 billion in the O&M account) and new project construction ($2 billion in the Construction account) under ARRA. A combined breakdown of this non-natural-disaster-related supplemental funding is provided in Figure 2 .

H.R. 4667: Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, 2017

Other than the combined total appropriations to support response, repair, and recovery from the 2005 hurricanes, H.R. 4667 , if enacted, would provide the largest supplemental appropriation for the Corps. Further, it would be the largest appropriation for the Corps in a single bill in the history of the agency. This funding, if provided, would go toward response and repair activities for natural disasters and for study and construction work on reducing flood risks in the areas impacted by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The bill would provide the Corps $12.09 billion in supplemental appropriations. Like most supplemental appropriation bills with direct appropriations for the Corps, the bill would fund the agency's emergency response activities and repair of damage to flood-control works and other Corps civil works projects (e.g., navigation); these response and repair activities would be funded as follows: $537 million for natural disasters through the FCCE account, $608 million for natural disaster-related repairs through the O&M account, $370 million for natural disasters through the MR&T account, and $55 million for natural disaster-related repairs to Corps construction projects through the Construction account. H.R. 4667 would allow for the Construction account funds to be used not only for the repair of damaged projects to prestorm conditions but also for the restoration of some projects to their authorized "design profiles" (i.e., their original construction designs).

The majority of the Corps funding in H.R. 4667 —$10.425 billion (86% of the $12.09 billion)—would be for construction of Corps flood-control and storm-damage reduction projects in the areas affected by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. For comparison, Congress directed 31% and 65% of the Corps supplemental funding for Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy to Corps construction of flood-risk reduction projects. While the Corps repair funding is for natural disasters broadly, the $10.425 billion and the $75 million for Corps studies in the Investigations account are limited to the areas affected by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The studies and the ongoing Corps construction projects that would receive funds from the Construction account through the bill would proceed at full federal expense (i.e., no nonfederal cost-share requirement).

The standard process for Corps projects is that after the completion of a multistep project development process (which includes, among other measures. a completed feasibility study and environmental documentation and a report by the agency's Chief of Engineers known as a Chief's Report), Congress authorizes the project's construction in a Water Resources Development act. H.R. 4667 would provide the Secretary of the Army authority to use funds from the bill to initiate construction on projects that have completed the agency's multistep project development process without obtaining project-specific congressional construction authorization, subject to approval by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Similar authority was provided to the Secretary for the use of the Corps funds from the Hurricane Sandy supplemental appropriation. The granting of this authority provides for a project to be initiated without project-specific congressional authorization.

Common Considerations Related to Corps Supplemental Funding

Given current federal fiscal constraints and the multiple natural disasters that have occurred in recent years, the enactment of and reliance on emergency supplemental funding is receiving more attention. For Corps natural disaster supplemental funding, some of the topics receiving attention include the following:

transparency of natural disaster funding; use of supplemental bills for postdisaster infrastructure improvements; and nonfederal cost sharing of natural disaster repair and recovery.

Each of these topics is discussed below.

Transparency of Natural Disaster Funding

After the initial appropriation, public reporting on Corps expenditure of supplemental funding has generally been limited. There are very few overarching requirements for public reporting on Corps supplemental expenditures, including the amount and extent of transfers from annual discretionary appropriations to initially cover emergency response and repairs and the project-level descriptions and funding data on expenditures of supplemental appropriations. In some of the early post-Katrina supplemental bills and in the Sandy supplemental appropriations bill, Congress set reporting requirements for Corps appropriations, including regular reports to the Committee on Appropriations. For annual discretionary appropriations, project-level data are available through congressional reports and in recent years through agency work plans that follow shortly after enacted appropriations.

Additionally, as noted above, Congress conditioned release of some of the Corps construction funding in the Sandy supplemental bill on the Corps completing and releasing information on projects that qualified for these funds. However, outside these reports and ARRA spending (which was tracked through a public website), detailed data on Corps expenditures of supplemental appropriations have not been required or widely available in the same manner as the annual budget.

Congress is faced with deciding whether to use Corps supplemental funding for improving flood protection in impacted areas to reduce future flood risk. Congress funded Corps infrastructure investments to improve hurricane storm protection infrastructure for Southeast Louisiana in post-Katrina supplemental bills. Also 65% of the $5.3 billion in supplemental funding provided to the Corps for Hurricane Sandy recovery was designated for new or ongoing construction to reduce flood risks. However, Congress did not use supplemental Corps construction funds for such improvement for the 2008 Hurricane Ike-impacted Texas coast, the Midwest areas impacted by the 2011 and 1993 floods, or the 1992 Hurricane Andrew-impacted areas.

Proponents of supplemental construction funds for flood-impacted areas argue that these investments are significant to the recovery effort and that flooding events often bring to light flood risks warranting attention. Others argue that the annual appropriations process is the appropriate forum for identifying national priorities for federal flood-infrastructure investments. The Corps has a backlog of authorized flood and storm damage-reduction projects across the country; these authorized projects compete for the less than $1 billion typically provided for flood-damage reduction activities in the annual discretionary budget process. Over the decade from FY2008 to FY2017, discretionary appropriations for Corps flood-related construction activities averaged $907 million annually; total funding for the decade was $9.1 billion. Figure 3 provides data on flood-related construction spending using annual appropriations. A portion of the spending shown is for major rehabilitation activities of existing Corps facilities, such as dam repair. Therefore, the discretionary appropriations spent on new construction over the FY2008-FY2017 decade would be lower than $9.1 billion.

Nonfederal Cost Sharing of Natural Disaster Repair and Recovery

Although many Corps civil works activities are cost shared with nonfederal sponsors, much of the supplemental appropriations for flood fighting and repair of damaged infrastructure and projects have not been subject to significant cost sharing. In addition to these activities, Congress occasionally has provided funding for upgrades and construction of new infrastructure in supplemental appropriations. Congress provided supplemental appropriations for construction activities to improve infrastructure in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina, particularly in Louisiana. These construction activities generally have been cost shared either at the standard nonfederal cost shares shown in Table 2 or consistent with the cost-sharing arrangement for the original Corps project. For supplemental appropriations related to Hurricane Sandy, cost-sharing requirements were waived for ongoing construction projects but not for new construction.

The appropriate cost share for Corps construction activities has been the subject of debate, with proposals ranging from standard cost shares to requirements for the federal government to handle most or all of a project's costs. Some also have proposed relaxing cost-sharing requirements for specific project types (e.g., cost-sharing waivers for ongoing construction projects, as noted above) and changing what costs should be counted toward the nonfederal share.

Various justifications for altering the standard arrangement have been advanced, including the potentially limited ability of many communities impacted by disasters to pay the standard nonfederal share. Assuming some sort of nonfederal cost share is required, another issue is who is responsible for the nonfederal share and the time period over which that share will be repaid. In the case of Louisiana, Congress required that Louisiana create a single state or quasistate entity to act as its nonfederal construction partner for post-Katrina Corps repairs and improvements and allowed the entity 30 years to repay its share of the construction costs (which was covered by the federal government with funds provided in P.L. 109-148 ).

The status of other existing cost-sharing requirements, such as those that apply to navigation projects, as they relate to supplemental funding also is common issue. Although certain categories of funding for federal navigation projects normally require cost sharing from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF) and the Inland Waterway Trust Fund (IWTF), similar cost-sharing arrangements generally have not been required for supplemental funding for natural disasters. That is, neither of these two trust funds has been responsible for navigation-related natural disaster response and recovery costs funded in supplemental appropriations over the last decade. However, a few supplemental appropriations bills in the late 1990s required cost sharing from the HMTF. H.R. 4667 would require that HMTF funds (rather than the funds derived from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury) be used for the federal costs associated with HMTF-eligible activities; the bill does not mention any similar requirement for the use of IWTF funds.

For its part, the Corps Rehabilitation and Inspection Program (RIP) essentially functions as an insurance program for many nonfederal flood-control and coastal-protection projects and is active in addressing postdisaster repairs and rehabilitation. Approximately 14,000 miles of levees participate in RIP: 2,250 miles of locally constructed and operated levees; 9,650 miles of Corps-constructed, locally operated levees; and 2,100 miles of federally operated levees. For locally constructed projects, 80% of the cost to repair the damage is paid using federal funds and 20% is paid by the levee owner. For federally constructed projects, the repair cost is entirely a federal responsibility (except for the cost of obtaining the sand or other material used in the repair). For damage to be repaired, the Corps must determine that repair has a favorable benefit-cost ratio. There is no annual cost or premium for participating in the RIP program beyond maintaining the project to RIP standards.

The 115 th Congress is considering possible responses to various natural disasters in 2017. In recent years through supplemental appropriations, Congress not only has funded the emergency response and repair activities of the Corps but also has provided the Corps with funding to study and construct projects that reduce flood risks in areas recently affected by some hurricanes and floods. That is, supplemental appropriations in response to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy supported new investments in flood-risk reduction infrastructure projects in affected areas to a much greater extent than Congress has provided for other flood events. H.R. 4667 proposes $12.09 billion for the agency's activities associated with response, repair, and recovery from natural disasters including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria; of the $12.09 billion total, $10.425 billion would be for new construction of Corps flood-risk reduction projects in areas affected by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.

During its deliberations on Corps supplemental appropriations, Congress often considers various issues and special considerations associated with the provision of these funds. These include the role of Congress in the authorization of construction of Corps projects that receive supplemental funds, whether to maintain requirements for nonfederal cost sharing, and what requirements to include regarding reporting to Congress and public transparency associated with supplemental funds. Supplemental Corps funding debates also raise broader questions for policymakers, such as the effectiveness and efficiency of processes such as those for postdisaster supplemental appropriations and Corps annual budget development, especially in regard to identifying and supporting priority investments in reducing the nation's flood risk.

Appendix. Table of Supplemental Appropriations by Event

Question: What role does the US Army Corps of Engineers play in civil works projects?

Answer: Congress directs the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to plan and build water resource facilities through the agency's civil works program.

Question: How does the Corps aid in natural disaster scenarios?

Answer: The Corps also has a prominent role in responding to natural disasters, especially floods, in U.S. states and territories.

Question: How are the Corps using preventative methods with regards to natural disasters?

Answer: In recent years through supplemental appropriations, Congress also has funded the agency to study and construct projects that reduce flood risks in areas recently affected by some hurricanes and floods.

Question: How well-funded has the Corps been in light of recent disasters?

Answer: The 115th Congress is considering possible responses to various natural disasters in 2017. H.R. 4667—Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements, 2017 (as passed by the House)—proposes $12.09 billion for the agency's activities associated with response, repair, and recovery from natural disasters including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.

Question: What is an issue with funds appropriations during natural disaster responses?

Answer: A common issue for Congress after a flood-related disaster is whether to provide supplemental funds directly to the Corps and, if so, how much and for which Corps activities.

Question: How does Congress aim to regulate the Corps in their disaster relief duties?

Answer: During its deliberations on recent supplemental appropriations bills, Congress also has considered whether to maintain requirements for nonfederal cost sharing, what requirements to include regarding reporting to Congress and public transparency associated with supplemental funds, and what type of flood damage-reduction efforts to support (e.g., repair of existing infrastructure, construction of new infrastructure).

Question: To what extent are these funding debates limited to the Corps disaster response funding?

Answer: Supplemental Corps funding debates also may raise broader questions for policymakers. These include, for example, the effectiveness and efficiency of processes such as those for postdisaster supplemental appropriations and Corps annual budget development, especially in regard to identifying and supporting priority investments in reducing the nation's flood risk.

Question: What is an alternative suggestion for the use of funding currently appropriated for the Corps?

Answer: Other stakeholders would prefer more attention and funding that supports other programs and measures to reduce the nation's flood risks.

Question: How large is the Corps supplementary funding (with regard to its normal funding)?

Answer: From 2005 to 2016, Congress appropriated $31.4 billion in supplemental funding to the Corps; these funds amounted to almost half of the agency's annual discretionary appropriations over that same period.

Question: How was the supplementary funding divided between disaster relief and other reasons?

Answer: Of the $31.4 billion, $27.2 billion (87%) was for responding to flooding and other natural disasters.

Question: How did superstorms affect the use of the Corps funding?

Answer: The majority of this funding related to Hurricane Katrina and other 2005 storms (approximately $16 billion) and to Hurricane Sandy in 2012 ($5.3 billion).

Analysis of Corps Supplemental Appropriations

Question: How are the supplemental funds disbursed within the Corps?

Answer: Supplemental bills most frequently fund two Corps accounts: Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies (FCCE; i.e., flood fighting, repairs to damaged nonfederal flood-control projects) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M; i.e., repairs to existing Corps projects). In some instances, principally since 2005, Congress also has provided supplemental funding for other Corps accounts, such as the Construction account.

Question: How are the supplemental funds primarily used?

Answer: Of the supplemental funds that Congress provided to the Corps for Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, 31% and 66%, respectively, were for construction activities. Of the $12.1 billion that H.R. 4667 would provide, $10.48 billion would be for activities in the agency's Construction account—$55 million for repairs to Corps construction projects damaged by natural disasters, and $10.425 billion for expedited construction of flood control and storm damage reduction projects in areas affected by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. That is, 86% of the funding for the Corps in H.R. 4667 would be for construction.

Question: How does this compare to historical funding?

Answer: For comparison, that amount would exceed the agency's $9.1 billion total discretionary spending appropriations for flood-related construction for the decade FY2008 to FY2017.

H.R. 4667: Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, 2017

Question: How consistent are cost-sharing requirements for the Corps?

Answer: In supplemental appropriations bills, Congress has at times maintained, and at other times waived, local cost-sharing requirements for Corps flood-risk reduction construction projects.

Question: When used, what is the standard nonfederal cost?

Answer: The standard nonfederal cost shares range from 35% to 50%, depending on the activity.

Question: How are local cost-sharing requirements waived?

Answer: H.R. 4667 would waive the nonfederal cost share for studies and ongoing construction funded through the bill.

Question: How would this bill facilitate the use of funds for construction projects?

Answer: The bill also would provide the Secretary of the Army with the authority to use funds from the bill, subject to approval by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, to initiate construction on projects that have completed the agency's multistep project development process without project-specific congressional construction authorization.