Nuclear power and weapons -- explaining the connections
Nuclear power and weapons
Indirect links between power and weapons
Alternative reactor types and alternative fuel cycles
Case studies - nuclear power and weapons
This webpage discusses the numerous methods by which civil nuclear programs can – and do – contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, with emphasis on the links between nuclear power and weapons.
According to Ian Hore-Lacy from the Uranium Information Centre (2000): "Happily, proliferation is only a fraction of what had been feared when the NPT was set up, and none of the problem arises from the civil nuclear cycle." Sadly, Hore-Lacy's statement could hardly be further from the truth.
Ostensibly civil nuclear materials and facilities can be used in support of nuclear weapons programs in many ways:
* Production of plutonium in reactors followed by separation of plutonium from irradiated material in reprocessing facilities (or smaller facilities, sometimes called hot cells).
* Production of radionuclides other than plutonium for use in weapons, e.g. tritium, used to initiate or boost nuclear weapons.
* Diversion of fresh highly enriched uranium (HEU) research reactor fuel or extraction of HEU from spent fuel.
* Nuclear weapons-related research.
* Development of expertise for parallel or later use in a weapons program.
* Justifying the acquisition of other facilities capable of being used in support of a nuclear weapons program, such as enrichment or reprocessing facilities.
* Establishment or strengthening of a political constituency for nuclear weapons production (a 'bomb lobby').
These are not just hypothetical risks. On the contrary, the use of civil facilities and materials in nuclear weapons research or systematic weapons programs has been commonplace (Nuclear Weapon Archive, n.d.; Institute for Science and International Security, n.d.). It has occurred in the following countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Syria, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia. A few other countries could arguably be added to the list e.g. Burma's suspected nuclear program, or Canada (because of its use of research reactors to produce plutonium for US and British nuclear weapons).
Overall, civil nuclear facilities and materials have been used for weapons R&D in about one third of all the countries with a nuclear industry of any significance, i.e. with power and/or research reactors. The Institute for Science and International Security (n.d.) collates information on nuclear programs and concludes that about 30 countries have sought nuclear weapons and ten succeeded – a similar strike rate of about one in three.
In a number of the countries in which civil materials and facilities have been used in support of military objectives, the weapons-related work was short-lived and fell short of the determined pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, civil programs provided the basis for the full-scale production of nuclear weapons in Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and North Korea. In other cases – with Iraq from the 1970s until 1991 being the most striking example – substantial progress had been made towards a weapons capability under cover of a civil program before the weapons program was terminated.
Civil and military nuclear programs also overlap to a greater or lesser degree in the five 'declared' weapons states – the US, the UK, Russia, China and France.
There are three methods of using the cover of a civil nuclear program for the acquisition of HEU for weapons production:
* Diversion of imported HEU. An example was the (abandoned) 'crash program' in Iraq in 1991 to build a nuclear weapon using imported HEU. The US alone has exported over 25 tonnes of HEU.
* Extraction of HEU from spent research reactor fuel. HEU has been used in many research reactors but power reactors use low enriched uranium or in some cases natural uranium.
* A nuclear power program or a uranium mining and export industry can be used to justify the development of enrichment facilities.
The acquisition of enrichment technology and expertise – ostensibly for civil programs – enabled South Africa and Pakistan to produce HEU which has been used for their HEU weapons arsenals.
The nuclear black market centred around the 'father' of the Pakistani bomb Abdul Qadeer Khan involved the transfer of enrichment know-how and/or facilities to North Korea, Iran and Libya.
An expansion of nuclear power would most likely result in the spread (horizontal proliferation) of enrichment technologies, justified by requirements and markets for low-enriched uranium for power reactors but also capable of being used to produce HEU for weapons.
Technical developments in the field of enrichment technology – such as the development of laser enrichment technology by the Silex company at Lucas Heights in Australia – could worsen the situation. Silex will potentially provide proliferators with an ideal enrichment capability as it is expected to have relatively low capital cost and low power consumption, and it is based on relatively simple and practical separation modules. (Greenpeace, 2004; Boureston and Ferguson, 2005.)
An Australian Strategic Policy Institute report released in August 2006 notes that an enrichment industry would give Australia "a potential 'break-out' capability whether that was our intention or not" and that this point is "unlikely to be missed by other countries, especially those in Australia's region." (Davies, 2006.)
Former Australian Prime Minister John Howard drew a parallel between exporting unprocessed uranium and unprocessed wool and argued for value-adding processing in both cases. But there is a differerence between uranium and wool. The Lucas Heights nuclear agency once embarked on a secret uranium enrichment program; there was never a secret knitting program.
NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
John Carlson (2000) from the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office states that "... in some of the countries having nuclear weapons, nuclear power remains insignificant or non-existent." Carlson's attempt to absolve civil nuclear programs from the proliferation problem ignores the well-documented use of civil nuclear facilities and materials in weapons programs as well as the important political 'cover' civil programs provide for military programs. It also ignores the more specific links between nuclear power and weapons proliferation.
Of the ten states known to have produced nuclear weapons:
* eight have nuclear power reactors.
* North Korea has no operating power reactors but an 'Experimental Power Reactor' is believed to have been the source of the fissile material (plutonium) used in the October 2006 nuclear bomb test, and North Korea has power reactors partly constructed under the Joint Framework Agreement.
* Israel has no power reactors, though the pretence of an interest in the development of nuclear power helped to justify nuclear transfers to Israel.
Power reactors are certainly used in support of India's nuclear weapons program. This has long been suspected (Albright and Hibbs, 1992) and is no longer in doubt since India is refusing to subject numerous power reactors to safeguards under the US/India nuclear agreement.
The US has used a power reactor to produce tritium for use in nuclear weapons (in the 1990s)
The 1962 test of sub-weapon-grade plutonium by the US may have used plutonium from a power reactor.
Pakistan may be using power reactor/s in support of its nuclear weapons program.
North Korea's October 2006 weapon test used plutonium from an 'Experimental Power Reactor'.
Former Australian Prime Minister John Gorton certainly had military ambitions for the power reactor he pushed to have constructed at Jervis bay in NSW in the late 1960s – he later admitted that the agenda was to produce both electricity as well as plutonium for potential use in weapons.
According to Matthew Bunn, in France, "material for the weapons program [was] sometimes produced in power reactors".
So there are a handful of cases of nuclear power reactors being used directly in support of weapons production. But the indirect links between nuclear power and weapons - discussed below - are by far the larger part of the problem.
The nuclear industry and its supporters claim that reprocessing is a 'sensitive' nuclear technology but power reactors are not. But of course they are part of the same problem. The existence of a reprocessing plant poses no proliferation risk in the absence of reactor-irradiated nuclear materials. Reactors pose no proliferation risk in the absence a reprocessing facility to separate fissile material from irradiated materials. Put reactors and reprocessing together and you have the capacity to produce and separate plutonium.
In short, the attempt to distance nuclear power programs from weapons proliferation is disingenuous. While currently-serving politicians and bureaucrats (and others) are prone to obfuscation on this point, several retired politicians have noted the link between power and weapons:
* Former US Vice President Al Gore said in 2006: "For eight years in the White House, every weapons-proliferation problem we dealt with was connected to a civilian reactor program. And if we ever got to the point where we wanted to use nuclear reactors to back out a lot of coal ... then we'd have to put them in so many places we'd run that proliferation risk right off the reasonability scale." (<www.grist.org/news/maindish/2006/05/09/roberts>)
* Former US President Bill Clinton said in 2006: "The push to bring back nuclear power as an antidote to global warming is a big problem. If you build more nuclear power plants we have toxic waste at least, bomb-making at worse." (Clinton Global Initiative, September 2006.)
* Former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating said in 2006: "Any country with a nuclear power program "ipso facto ends up with a nuclear weapons capability". (AAP, October 16, 2006.)
INDIRECT LINKS BETWEEN POWER AND WEAPONS
Nuclear power reactors per sé need not be directly involved in weapons research/production in order for a nuclear power program to provide cover and support for a weapons program.
The claim that power reactors have not become entangled in weapons programs ignores the pool of expertise required to run a nuclear power program and the actual and potential use of that expertise in military programs. For example, it is no coincidence that the five declared nuclear weapons states - the USA, Russia, China, France and the UK - all have nuclear power reactors and they account for 57% of global nuclear power output (203/370 gigawatts as at September 2006). Specific examples of power-weapons links – such as the use of a power reactor to produce tritium for weapons in the US – are of less importance than the broad pattern of civil programs providing a large pool of nuclear expertise from which military programs can draw.
The nuclear weapons programs in South Africa and Pakistan were clearly outgrowths of their power programs although enrichment plants, not power reactors, produced the fissile material for use in weapons.
Claims made about power reactors also ignore the fact that research and training reactors, ostensibly acquired in support of a power program or for other civil purposes, have been the plutonium source in India and Israel. Small volumes of plutonium have been produced in 'civil' research reactors then separated from irradiated materials in a number of countries suspected of or known to be interested in the development of a nuclear weapons capability - including Iraq, Iran, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan, Yugoslavia, and possibly Romania. Pakistan announced in 1998 that a powerful 'research' reactor had begun operation at Khusab; if so, the reactor can produce unsafeguarded plutonium. (The links between research reactor programs and nuclear weapons are addressed in detail in Green, 2002.)
So nuclear power programs can facilitate weapons programs and weapons production even if power reactors per se are not used to produce fissile material for weapons.
Furthermore, nuclear power programs can facilitate weapons programs and weapons production even if power reactors are not actually built. Iraq provides a clear illustration of this point. While Iraq's nuclear research program provided much cover for the weapons program, stated interest in developing nuclear power was also significant. According to Khidhir Hamza (1998), a senior nuclear scientist involved in Iraq's weapons program: "Acquiring nuclear technology within the IAEA safeguards system was the first step in establishing the infrastructure necessary to develop nuclear weapons. In 1973, we decided to acquire a 40-megawatt research reactor, a fuel manufacturing plant, and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, all under cover of acquiring the expertise needed to eventually build and operate nuclear power plants and produce and recycle nuclear fuel. Our hidden agenda was to clandestinely develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to produce weapon-grade plutonium."
Carlson (2000) says: "If we look to the history of nuclear weapons development, we can see that those countries with nuclear weapons developed them before they developed nuclear power programs." However, ostensibly civil nuclear programs clearly preceded and facilitated the successful development of nuclear weapons in India, Pakistan, and in the former nuclear weapons state South Africa.
Carlson (2006) states: "I have pointed out on numerous occasions that nuclear power as such is not a proliferation problem – rather the problem is with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies ..." The claim is false, no matter how many times Carlson makes it:
* Power reactors have been used directly in weapons programs.
* Power programs have facilitated and provided cover for weapons programs even without direct use of power reactor/s in the weapons program.
* And power reactors produce large volumes of weapons-useable plutonium and can be operated on a short irradiation cycle to produce large volumes of weapon-grade plutonium.
No-one disputes that 'reactor-grade' plutonium can be used in nuclear weapons but there is debate about the difficulty of so doing, and the likely cost in terms of reliability and yield.
Moreover, there is no dispute that power reactors can produce weapon-grade plutonium. This could hardly be simpler - all that needs to be done is to shorten the irradiation time, thereby maximising the production of plutonium-239 relative to other, unwanted plutonium isotopes. Indeed low burn-up, weapon-grade plutonium is produced in the normal course of operation of a power reactor, although in the normal course of operation it becomes fuel-grade then reactor-grade plutonium.
(The issue of plutonium grades is discussed in detail in the paper posted at: <www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/nfc/power-weapons/rgpu>.
Power reactors have been responsible for the production of a vast quantity of weapons-useable plutonium. Adding to the proliferation risk is the growing stockpile of separated plutonium, as reprocessing outstrips the use of plutonium in MOX (mixed oxide fuel containing plutonium and uranium).
A typical power reactor (1000 MWe) produces about 300 kilograms of plutonium each year. Total global production of plutonium in power reactors is about 70 tonnes per year. As at the end of 2003, power reactors had produced an estimated 1,600 tonnes of plutonium (Institute for Science and International Security, 2004).
Using the above figures, and assuming that 10 kilograms of (reactor-grade) plutonium is required to produce a weapon with a destructive power comparable to that of the plutonium weapon dropped on Nagasaki in 1945:
* The plutonium produced in a single reactor each year is sufficient for 30 weapons.
* Total global plutonium production in power reactors each year is sufficient to produce 7,000 weapons.
* Total accumulated 'civil' plutonium is sufficient for 160,000 weapons.
The production of vast amounts of plutonium in power reactors is problem enough, but the problem is greatly exacerbated by the separation of plutonium in reprocessing plants. Whereas separation of plutonium from spent fuel requires a reprocessing capability and is potentially hazardous because of the radioactivity of spent fuel, the use of separated plutonium for weapons production is far less complicated.
The problem is further exacerbated by ongoing plutonium separation in excess of its limited re-use in MOX. According to the Uranium Information Centre (2002), only about one third of separated plutonium has been used in MOX over the last 30 years. Thus the stockpile of separated plutonium continues to grow – about 15-20 tonnes of plutonium are separated from spent fuel each year but only 10-15 tonnes are fabricated into MOX fuel. (Albright and Kramer, 2004.)
Hence there is a growing stockpile of plutonium in unirradiated forms (separated or in MOX), currently amounting to about 240 tonnes.
What would it take to address this problem of growing stockpiles of unirradiated / separated plutonium? All that would need to be done is to slow or suspend reprocessing until the stockpile was drawn down. That the nuclear industry refuses to do this shows how little it cares about the WMD proliferation risks it creates.
(The politics of waste and reprocessing are discussed in a paper posted at:
ALTERNATIVE REACTOR TYPES AND ALTERNATIVE FUEL CYCLES
Proliferation-resistant technologies are the subject of much discussion and some research (a number of examples are discussed in Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, n.d.)
However, there is little reason to believe that minimising proliferation risks will be a priority in the evolution of nuclear power technology. The growing stockpiles of unirradiated plutonium provide compelling evidence of the low priority given to non-proliferation initiatives compared to commercial and political (and sometime military) imperatives. Further, a number of the 'advanced' reactor concepts being studied involve the large-scale use of plutonium and the operation of fast breeder reactors (Burnie, 2005).
Plutonium breeder reactors rely on plutonium as the primary fuel. There are various possible configurations of breeder systems. Most rely on irradiation of a natural or depleted uranium blanket which produces plutonium which can be separated and used as fuel. Breeder reactors can potentially produce more plutonium than they consume, and the use of uranium is only a tiny fraction of that consumed in conventional reactors. (Hirsch et al., 2005, pp.33-35; von Hippel and Jones, 1997.) Breeder technology is highly problematic in relation to proliferation because it involves the large-scale production and separation of plutonium (although separation is not required in some proposed configurations). (Feiveson, 2001.) The proliferation of reprocessing capabilities is a likely outcome.
Fast neutron or fast spectrum reactors can be 'breeders' (producing more fissile material than they consume) or burners or they can produce as much fissile material as they consume. Burner reactor concepts (e.g. integral fast reactors) have some obvious attractions from a non-proliferation standpoint but the claims made about the proliferation resistance of these reactor concepts has been grossly overblown. Those issues are discussed in more detail at: http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/nfc/power-weapons/g4nw
Like conventional reactors, proposed 'Pebble Bed' reactors are based on uranium fission. The nature of the fuel pebbles may make it somewhat more difficult to separate plutonium from irradiated fuel. However, uranium (or depleted uranium) targets could be inserted to produce weapon-grade plutonium for weapons. The enriched uranium fuel could be further enriched for HEU weapons - particularly since the proposed enrichment level of 9.6% uranium-235 is about twice the level of conventional reactor fuel. The reliance on enriched uranium will encourage the use and perhaps proliferation of enrichment plants, which can be used to produce HEU for weapons. (Harding, 2004.)
Fusion power systems remain a distant dream, and fusion also poses a number of weapons proliferation risks including the following:
* The production or supply of tritium which can be diverted for use in boosted nuclear weapons. (As mentioned above, the USA used a power reactor to produce tritium for weapons in the 1990s.)
* Using neutron radiation to bombard a uranium blanket (leading to the production of fissile plutonium) or a thorium blanket (leading to the production of fissile uranium-233).
* Research in support of a (thermonuclear) weapon program. (Gsponer and Hurni, 2004; WISE/NIRS, 2004; Hirsch et al., 2005.)
The use of thorium-232 as a reactor fuel is sometimes suggested as a long-term energy source, partly because of its relative abundance compared to uranium. No thorium-based power system would negate proliferation risks altogether (Friedman, 1997; Feiveson, 2001). Neutron bombardment of thorium (indirectly) produces uranium-233, a fissile material which is subject to the same safeguards requirements as uranium-235. The possible use of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to initiate a thorium-232/uranium-233 reaction is a further proliferation concern. Most proposed thorium fuel cycles require reprocessing with the attendant proliferation risks. More information on the proliferation risks associated with thorium is posted at: http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/nfc/power-weapons/thorium
The International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system is seriously flawed and under-resourced. IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei has described the IAEA's basic inspection rights as "fairly limited", complained about "half-hearted" efforts to improve the system, and expressed concern that the safeguards system operates on a "shoestring budget ... comparable to a local police department". (El Baradei, n.d.)
There is serious concern that the NPT/IAEA safeguards system could collapse. For example, the UN Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) noted: "We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."
CASE STUDIES - NUCLEAR POWER & WEAPONS
A civil/military nuclear program was pursued by Argentina from the 1950s. After a military junta seized power in 1976, and motivated in part by Brazil's 1975 deal with West Germany to obtain extensive nuclear fuel cycle facilities, Argentina's nuclear program expanded and the military objective became more pronounced. By the late 1960s, Argentina had developed the infrastructure to support a nuclear power plant, and in 1968 it purchased a 320 MW(e) power reactor from the West German firm Siemens. One military option considered from the late 1960s to the early 1980s included a plan to build a 70 MW(th) research reactor which could produce unsafeguarded plutonium. Another option was diversion of plutonium from safeguarded power reactors.
In the late 1960s, Argentina, possibly with assistance from an Italian firm, built a laboratory scale reprocessing facility at Ezeiza. This facility was closed in 1973 after intermittent operation and the extraction of less than one kilogram of plutonium. In 1978, the Argentine nuclear agency CNEA began construction of a second reprocessing facility at Ezeiza that had a design capacity of 10-20 kilograms of plutonium per year. The stated intention was to reprocess spent fuel from power reactors and to use plutonium in the same reactors or in breeder reactors which were (ostensibly) under consideration. Due to economic constraints, and political pressure from the US, construction on the second Ezeiza reprocessing plant was halted in 1990.
In 1962, the federal Cabinet approved an increase in the staff of the AAEC from 950 to 1050 because, in the words of the Minister of National Development William Spooner, "a body of nuclear scientists and engineer skilled in nuclear energy represents a positive asset which would be available at any time if the government decided to develop a nuclear defence potential."
In 1969, Australia signed a secret nuclear cooperation agreement with France. The Sydney Morning Herald (June 18, 1969) reported that the agreement covered cooperation in the field of fast breeder power reactors (which produce more plutonium than they consume). A split table critical facility built in 1972 at Lucas Heights was connected to the interest in fast breeder reactors and was possibly connected to the interest in weapons production. The facility was supplied by France.
In 1968, government officials and AAEC scientists studied and reported on the costs of a nuclear weapons program. They outlined two possible programs: a power reactor program capable of producing enough weapon grade plutonium for 30 fission weapons annually; and a uranium enrichment program capable of producing enough uranium-235 for the initiators of at least 10 thermonuclear weapons per year.
In 1969, federal Cabinet approved a plan to build a power reactor at Jervis Bay on the south coast of New South Wales. There is a wealth of evidence – some of it contained in Cabinet documents – revealing that the Jervis Bay project was motivated, in part, by a desire to bring Australia closer to a weapons capability. Then Prime Minister John Gorton later acknowledged: "We were interested in this thing [a planned nuclear power reactor at Jervis Bay] because it could provide electricity to everybody and it could, if you decided later on, it could make an atomic bomb." After Gorton was replaced as leader of the Liberal Party by William McMahon in 1971, the Jervis Bay project was reassessed and deferred and the Labor government, elected in 1972, did nothing to revive the Jervis Bay project.
In 1975 a highly controversial agreement was concluded under which Germany would have supplied Brazil with a full closed fuel cycle, consisting of several nuclear power plants, an enrichment facility, and a reprocessing plant for civilian purposes. Brazil's interest in nuclear weapons was an open secret. While the deal was later substantially scaled back under US pressure, Brazil secretly engaged in an unsafeguarded parallel military program, with the army being responsible for the plutonium path and the navy pursuing uranium enrichment. Both used personnel trained in the civilian program and are believed to have used technology supplied for the civilian program in unsafeguarded enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Brazil's military nuclear program was ended in parallel with Argentina's. Brazil joined the NPT in the 1990s. (Otfried Nassauer, 2005, "Nuclear Energy and Proliferation", <www.boell.de/ecology/climate/climate-energy-1350.html>.)
An excerpt from a Nuclear Threat Initiative analysis (www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/index.html)
James Walsh, who has perhaps written the most in-depth study of Egypt's nuclear program to date, concludes: "...it is fair to say that Egypt's most intensive efforts to acquire nuclear weapons (or the capability to produce them) occurred during this phase — that is, just after the disclosure of the Dimona reactor, but before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war." ... Indeed, during this period, the Egyptian government dramatically increased its investment and research into nuclear technologies. It attempted quite persistently, for example, to acquire a sizeable power reactor—and was notably insistent that it be a natural uranium fueled heavy water-moderated reactor rather than a light water reactor.
In the declared nuclear weapons states – the US, Russia, China, France and the UK – there are varying degrees of overlap between civil and military programs, e.g. routine transfer of personnel, and presumably there are more than a few links in Russia and China where the civil and military nuclear sectors remain fairly closely connected.
Of the five declared weapons states, France was the only one where a civil nuclear program played any significant role in the initial development of nuclear weapons. Matthew Bunn writes: "France's initially civilian nuclear program provided the base of expertise (and some key advocates) for its later dedicated military program (which had substantial interconnections with the civilian program, with both under the Commissariat de L’Energie Atomique, and material for the weapons program sometimes produced in power reactors)." (Matthew Bunn, 2001, "Civilian Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Programs: The Record", <http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Nuclear-Engineering/22-812JSpring2004/DA....)
India's nuclear research and power programs laid the foundation for its 1974 nuclear test explosion. The test explosion used plutonium produced in the 40 MW(th) research reactor known as Cirus (Canada-India-Reactor-United-States), which was supplied by Canada (construction began in 1955, first criticality was achieved in 1960).
India has a number of unsafeguarded power reactors. These are thought to have supplied only a small fraction of the plutonium for India's weapons program to date, with the majority produced by the Cirus and Dhruva research reactors. However, at least as much plutonium is contained in the spent fuel of unsafeguarded power reactors as has been produced by Cirus and Dhruva.
India's stated interest in using plutonium for power production, and the development of facilities such as a fast breeder test reactor and a mixed uranium-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication plant, have provided further civil cover for India's military plutonium program. The ostensibly civil plutonium program has also been used to justify the development of reprocessing facilities.
India's refusal to allow safeguards on eight of of 22 (existing or under-construction) power reactors under the US-India agreement strongly indicates that power reactors play a direct role in India's nuclear weapons program.
A civil research reactor program, plus plans to develop nuclear power, facilitated a covert weapons development program in Iraq from the early 1970s to the early 1990s which employed thousands of people spread across numerous sites.
While Iraq's nuclear research program provided much cover for the weapons program, stated interest in developing nuclear power was also significant. According to Khidhir Hamza, a senior nuclear scientist involved in Iraq's weapons program: "Acquiring nuclear technology within the IAEA safeguards system was the first step in establishing the infrastructure necessary to develop nuclear weapons. In 1973, we decided to acquire a 40-megawatt research reactor, a fuel manufacturing plant, and nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, all under cover of acquiring the expertise needed to eventually build and operate nuclear power plants and produce and recycle nuclear fuel. Our hidden agenda was to clandestinely develop the expertise and infrastructure needed to produce weapon-grade plutonium. ... Under cover of safeguarded civil nuclear programs, Iraq managed to purchase the basic components of plutonium production, with full training included, despite the risk that the technology could be replicated or misused."
Professed interest in developing fusion technology was also useful, as discussed by Hamza: "Iraq took full advantage of the IAEA's recommendation in the mid 1980s to start a plasma physics program for "peaceful" fusion research. We thought that buying a plasma focus device ... would provide an excellent cover for buying and learning about fast electronics technology, which could be used to trigger atomic bombs."
North Korea's covert weapons development program proceeded under cover of a planned nuclear power program in the 1980s following the acquisition of research reactors in the 1960s and 1970s. The plutonium used in North Korea's 2006 weapons tests was produced in a so-called 'Experimental Power Reactor'.
While there have been ongoing efforts to develop plutonium production and separation capabilities, the emphasis of Pakistan's covert weapons program has been on uranium enrichment. In 1978 France broke off an agreement to supply an enrichment plant, but a large scale gas centrifuge enrichment plant was built at Kahuta nonetheless, using stolen European (Urenco) designs.
In the 1970s, Pakistan planned to use power reactor/s to produce plutonium for weapons. However in 1978 France pulled out of an agreement to build a reprocessing plant because of the weapons implications. Efforts to complete the plant without further French assistance struck insurmountable obstacles.
Pakistan's power reactors, which are subject to IAEA safeguards, have had little or no direct connection to the weapons program in terms of plutonium production. However one possible source of heavy water for the Khushab reactor is diversion of heavy water supplied by China for the Kanupp power reactor.
The purpose of Urenco's enrichment technology was to enrich uranium for power reactors, thus providing an indirect power-weapons link in the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability.
South Africa initially had a civilian nuclear program to which a military one was later added. Much of the technology was indigenous with substantial secret outside help, especially from West Germany. HEU-enrichment in South Africa was based on a German technology (Becker nozzle process) officially supplied for the civilian nuclear energy program. The South African nuclear program resulted in a uranium weapon. (Otfried Nassauer, 2005, "Nuclear Energy and Proliferation", <www.boell.de/ecology/climate/climate-energy-1350.html>.)
South Korea began a secret nuclear weapon program when it began to construct its first nuclear power plants in the early 1970s. When the United States threatened to withdraw its military support for South Korea, Seoul agreed to end the program and to join the NPT in 1975. Since the 1980s, South Korea has launched several attempts to initiate a reprocessing program but has backed off when pressured by the United States. (Otfried Nassauer, 2005, "Nuclear Energy and Proliferation", <www.boell.de/ecology/climate/climate-energy-1350.html>.)
Matthew Bunn writes:
"Sweden’s nuclear program was originally an integrated program for both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, based on plutonium production in heavy-water reactors. R&D on nuclear weapons was carried out in the 1950s, while the public civilian program pursued development of the heavy-water reactors. Delays in the heavy-water reactors, combined with a U.S. offer of safeguarded LWR technology and fuel, led Sweden’s industry to drop its support for the heavy-water option, leaving continued development with no civilian rationale. By the mid-1960s, the weapons program had been dropped, because of lack of domestic political support. (Matthew Bunn, 2001, "Civilian Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Programs: The Record", <http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Nuclear-Engineering/22-812JSpring2004/DA....)
Johansson writes: "The possibility of developing a nuclear weapons potential under the cover of a civilian nuclear power program was illustrated by Sweden between the early 1950s and 1968. Indeed, this case shows that the development and use of nuclear power and the nuclear weapons proliferation problem are inextricably linked." (Johansson, Thomas B., 1986, "Sweden's abortive nuclear weapons project", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.42(3), pp.31-34.)
Comments from the NTI website: <www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Syria/Nuclear/index.html>
Why did Damascus suddenly embark on a nuclear program in the 1970s? On the one hand, Syria's rapidly increasing domestic energy demand during that decade provided it with incentives to consider nuclear energy. But Damascus may also have been pursuing a hedging strategy, as it could no longer afford total military dependence on the Soviet Union. ...
... In 2003, Syria signed a $2 billion nuclear deal with Russia that included a nuclear power plant and a nuclear seawater desalination facility. The announcement of the deal was originally placed on the Russian Foreign Ministry website and received a considerable amount of negative attention. The Foreign Ministry spokesman quickly refuted claims that any such discussion had taken place.
A push towards a nuclear weapons capability began in 1974. The covert weapons program was pursued despite Yugoslavia's formal accession to the NPT in 1970. It was decided to pursue weapons under the cover of an expanded nuclear power program. Two parallel nuclear programs were pursued – one military, one civil. The program dedicated to weapons included projects into the nuclear explosive components for weapons including a neutron source to initiate the chain reaction, computer modelling, and exploratory studies of aspects of underground nuclear testing. The "peaceful" program involved 11 projects. Its major activities were clearly related to the weapons program, including the design of a plutonium production reactor (referred to as an experimental research reactor), uranium metal production, development of an expanded plutonium reprocessing capability, design and construction of a zero power fast breeder reactor, and heavy water production. The nuclear weapons program was effectively terminated in 1987 for reasons which remain unclear. The extent of the progress made between 1974-87 also remains unclear.
Country case studies
* Case Studies: Civil Nuclear Programs and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
* Nuclear Threat Initiative: <www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/index.html>.
* Institute for Science and International Security, "Nuclear Weapons Programs Worldwide: An Historical Overview", <http://isis-online.org/nuclear-weapons-programs>.
* Nuclear Weapon Archive, "Nuclear Weapon Nations and Arsenals", <nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq7.html>.
* GlobalSecurity.org <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/index.html>
General discussions on the interconnections between civil and military nuclear programs:
* Friends of the Earth <www.foe.org.au/campaigns/anti-nuclear/issues/nfc/power-weapons>.
* Steven E. Miller & Scott D. Sagan, Nuclear power without nuclear proliferation?, Daedalus, Fall 2009, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22659/Sagan_Nuclear_power_without_nuclea...
* Victor Gilinsky, A call to resist the nuclear revival, 27 January 2009, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
* EnergyScience Briefing Papers inc #9, 11, 15 and 17 <www.energyscience.org.au/factsheets.html>
* Paul Leventhal, 2002, Sharon Tanzer, Steven Dolley (eds), Nuclear power and the spread of nuclear weapons: can we have one without the other?, order online e.g. at Amazon.
Albright, David, and Mark Hibbs, September 1992, "India's silent bomb", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.48, No.07, pp.27-31, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=sep92albright>.
Albright, David, and Kimberly Kramer, November/December 2004, "Fissile material: Stockpiles still growing", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.60, No.6, pp.14-16, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd04albright_016>.
Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, n.d., "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: An overview of Institutional & Technical Issues", <www.asno.dfat.gov.au/nuclear_safeguards.html>.
Boureston, Jack, and Charles D. Ferguson, March/April 2005, "Laser enrichment: Separation anxiety", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.61, No.2, pp.14-18, <www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ma05boureston>.
Burnie, Shaun, April 2005, "Proliferation Report: sensitive nuclear technology and plutonium technologies in the Republic of Korea and Japan", Greenpeace report, <www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/Proliferation-Korea-Japan>.
Carlson, John, 2000, "Nuclear Energy and Non-proliferation – Issues and Challenges: An Australian Perspective", Paper prepared for JAIF Symposium on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, Tokyo, 9-10 March 2000.
Carlson, John, November 27, 2006, supplementary submission 30.2 to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Inquiry into Uranium Sales To China, <www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/ jsct/8august2006/subs2/sub30_2.pdf>.
Davies, Andrew, 2006, Australian uranium exports and security: Preventing proliferation. Australian Strategic Policy Institute . <www.aspi.org.au/publications.cfm?pubID=98>.
El Baradei, Mohamed, n.d., various speeches and papers available at <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/index.html>.
Feiveson, Harold, 2001, "The Search for Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Power", The Journal of the Federation of American Scientists, September/October 2001, Volume 54, Number 5, <www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n5/nuclear.htm>.
Friedman, John S., 1997, "More power to thorium?", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No.5, September/October .
Green, Jim, 2002, "Research Reactors and Nuclear Weapons", paper prepared for the Medical Association for the Prevention of War, <http://www.foe.org.au/campaigns/anti-nuclear/issues/power-weapons/Peacef....
Greenpeace, 2004, "Secrets, Lies and Uranium Enrichment: The Classified Silex Project at Lucas Heights", <www.greenpeace.org.au/frontpage/pdf/silex_report.pdf>.
Gsponer, A., and J-P. Hurni, 2004 "ITER: The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and the Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Implications of Thermonuclear-Fusion Energy Systems", Independent Scientific Research Institute report number ISRI-04-01, <http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0401110>.
Harding, Jim, 2004, "Pebble Bed Modular Reactors—Status and Prospects",
Hirsch, Helmut, Oda Becker, Mycle Schneider and Antony Froggatt, April 2005, "Nuclear Reactor Hazards: Ongoing Dangers of Operating Nuclear Technology in the 21st Century", Report prepared for Greenpeace International, <www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/nuclearreactorhazards>.
Hore-Lacy, Ian, 2000, "The Future of Nuclear Energy", <www.uic.com.au/opinion6.html>.
ISIS - Institute for Science and International Security, n.d., "Nuclear Weapons Programs Worldwide: An Historical Overview", <www.isis-online.org/mapproject/introduction.html>.
ISIS - Institute for Science and International Security, 2004, "Civil Plutonium Produced in Power Reactors", <www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/civil_pu.html>.
Nuclear Weapon Archive, n.d., "Nuclear Weapon Nations and Arsenals", <nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq7.html>.
UN Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility", November 2004, <www.un.org/secureworld>.
Uranium Information Centre, 2002, "Plutonium", Nuclear Issues Briefing Paper 18, <www.uic.com.au/nip18.htm>.
von Hippel, Frank, and Suzanne Jones, 1997, "The slow death of the fast breeder", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.53, No.5, September/October.
WISE/NIRS, February 13, 2004, "The Proliferation Risks of ITER", WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor, #603, <www.antenna.nl/wise/603/index.php>.


The not so secret Dimona nuclear plant in Israel is a taboo subject [AFP]
The deal hammered out between Iran and the United States, France, Germany, Britain, China and Russia stipulates that Tehran will halt progress on enrichment capacity, stop developing its heavy water reactor at Arak, and open access to international weapons inspection. While this deal paves the way for Iran's reintegration into the family of Western nations, and can therefore be conceived as a real milestone, in terms of the Middle East nuclear problem, any robust agreement,however, will have to include Israel.
Within Israel, speaking about the nuclear programme in Dimona is taboo. Mysteriously, however, there is also a broad-based agreement to keep silent about it in Washington and in most European capitals. Despite claims made by independent analysts that Israel likely has around 80 warheads, and is believed to be the only state in the region that has produced separated plutonium, and possibly highly enriched uranium, the two key ingredients in nuclear weapons. Indeed, it may now have enough plutonium, including the plutonium already in weapons, for up to 200 nuclear warheads.
Creating a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East is actually not a new idea. Ironically, it was first proposed in the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 by no other than the major 'culprit' in the recent fray
|photograph of some nuclear device that Vanunu supplied|
Neve Gordon is the author of Israel's Occupation and can be reached through his website.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Source: Al Jazeera


An air rifle can be used for fun and recreation, if you like target shooting but don't like the danger of real bullets. They're also commonly used for pest control around farms and large yards, as the pellets can kill or scare away rodents and small animals.
While air guns may not be as dangerous as real guns, you still need to consider the best choice for your own home. They come in a wide range of styles and powers, and not all of them will suit your needs. Note a few facts to remember when you're in the market for an air gun or air rifle.
1. Choosing power
It's easy to think that you want the most powerful air gun or air rifle available, but remember that the more power offered by a gun, the more expensive it will be. If you're choosing a gun just for target practice or to have fun in the backyard, you may need one with far less power. If you're shooting at pests and rodents, you'll need one that can easily deliver a pellet while you stand at a safe distance.
Less powerful guns will have a softer recoil so there is less chance of getting injured by the blowback; this is good for children who may be using the gun. More powerful guns area also typically louder, so you need to consider if your neighbors will hear you shooting in the backyard. Opt for a gun that offers just the amount of power you need but don't assume that you need the most powerful air gun on the market.
2. Trigger quality
The weight that needs to be applied to the trigger before the gun fires also needs to be considered. For children, you will want a trigger with a small pull. However, to keep children protected from using your gun, choose one with a very strong trigger pull as these will require more weight and effort before they actually fire.
If you're buying an air gun to practice shooting a real gun, you'll want something with the same fit and weight as your real gun. This will ensure you get accustomed to the feeling of the real gun in your hands. The shape of the stock and curve of the trigger may not seem important, but it's vital that you get accustomed to every part of your gun when using an air gun for training and practice.


Mysterious SDI defense program deaths beg frightening question – how far will a government go to protect its secrets?
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as the “Star Wars project”, was first proposed by United States President Ronald Reagan in 1983 . Its stated mission was simple: create a space-based system to protect the United States and its allies from attack by enemy strategic nuclear ballistic missiles. After four years of study, it was announced that a global space-based shield was impossible using existing technology. By then, the world had begun to recognize that dozens of British scientists who worked its projects had begun to die mysterious deaths.


Before pilots can hop into the cockpit of the latest variation of the F-35 Lightning II or F/A -18 Super Hornet, they need to get more flight time in an actual jet. That’s accomplished through the Northrup T-38 Talon. According to the United States Air Force, the T-38 is used to train not only fighter jet pilots but also perspective pilots for the Rockwell B-1 Lancer strategic bomber and the Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II ground-attack jet (also called the “Warthog.”
The Talon is quite the leap from the Texan. It carries all of the latest and greatest avionics and targeting systems with the added benefit of a top speed of 812 mph. In the cockpit of the Talon, pilots can learn how to fly in formation and at night. In addition to aerobatics, the T-38 is equipped with practice weapons that allow trainees to learn how to use guns or bombs without expending any munitions.
While the actual jet a pilot will be serving with is the best way to get acclimated to whatever mission a pilot is going on, the T-38 accomplishes the majority of the high-speed training. It’s where the “training wheels” are kicked off.


There are few sounds better to my ears than the sounds of a child’s voice, full of eagerness, excitement, awe, and confidence when he tells me “I hit it DAD! I can’t miss!” I have to thank my Dad for finding some steel rimfire targets that I long forgot were still in his garage. I soon opened up the vault to dig out some of the .22 Long Rifle cartridges that I am forced to ration because of the current ammunition hoarding climate. It had been a while since I let them shoot since the rimfires were almost as valuable as my duty loads. But it was time again.
I taught my oldest the sitting position to make the best use of the valuable ammunition and time, an important marksmanship shooting fundamental. I let my youngest get some time in with the M&P 1522 since the Aimpoint greatly increases his ability to make hits on the targets until he is physically ready to work with open sights and a conventional stock. In the meantime, he hit the steel in prone more often than he missed, and he began to catch on that when he took his time he made great hits.
My oldest got lessons with the .22 pistol, and between that and the M&P he began to do the repetitions of taking the safety off and putting it back on that his single shot rifle can’t give him. It was a valuable time for all of us, and I wished my middle son was also there to share in it as he shows as much marksmanship promise as my youngest.
My times shooting as a child are some of the ones I consider some of my most valuable memories. They were always good times, and I learned many lessons from them. The days of inexpensive ammunition are over though, and I’m trying to always find ways to pass on some of those lessons to my children. Times are definitely different, with differing priorities amongst each generation from the last couple, more and more developments and fewer and fewer ranges that are easily accessible. Attitudes towards firearms and their uses are changing, and efforts to limit new generations exposures to shooting sports are always getting started. Can you imagine what our lives would be like today if we hadn’t gotten the chance to be exposed to shooting? I don’t want to, but the scary reality is that very thing is occurring to countless members of the new generations. Hunting is on the decline everywhere, and while other shooting sports are on the increase, it doesn’t take much for legislation to reverse that trend and more people who don’t see the need for guns to outnumber those of us that still shoot.
Take the time to introduce shooting and marksmanship to someone. Be it a child, a spouse who’s been on the fence about guns, or someone who’s always wanted to know how to be safe around them, even if they really aren’t interested in firing them. They might turn into someone that grows to get enjoyment from shooting, and we need those people. Take the time to show gun safety to kids, satisfy their curiosity about what a gun looks like so that they won’t want to try looking for it when you aren’t around. And take the time to teach our youth how to shoot. We used to be a Rifleman culture, and the mindsets that it took to be that also were the mindsets that made our Citizens capable of doing the things that made our country strong and great.
And we really need that again right now.


Iran has unveiled its first homemade fighter jet, Kowsar, this morning with President Hassan Rohani in the cockpit.
The aircraft can be used for “short aerial support missions” and is equipped with systems that “promote precision targeting,” according to state media.
This debutante warplane is a product of the work of the specialists of the Organization of the Aerial Industry of the Iranian Ministry of Defense, counts on the advanced avionics system and the fire-fighting system taking advantage of the military digital data networks.
Kowsar is a fourth-generation fighter aircraft with multifunction displays, ballistic computers, and mobile smart mapping systems. The aircraft is capable of flying at an altitude of 45,000 feet and with the speed of Mach 1.2, Mach 1 would be equal to the speed of sound.
It is also equipped with a modern radar to detect enemy targets and a front display screen for precise guidance. It will be manufactured in two versions, single-seater, and two-seater, the latter for the training of military pilots.
It can participate in missions of close air support and is manufactured entirely by Iranian experts who have achieved in recent years great progress in the manufacture of a wide range of national quality equipment, which makes the Armed Forces are self-sufficient in various arms areas.
The construction of the Kowsar fighter plane allows Iran to be among the few countries that have the technology of designing and manufacturing fighter aircraft with the avionics system and fourth generation fire control.
The Iranian President, Hasan Rohani, Iran’s Defense Minister, Brigadier General Amir Hatami, and several senior military officers attended the ceremony, which was held on the occasion of the Defensive Industry Day.
Rohani has ensured that Iran’s defensive capability poses no threat to other countries. He denounced the Iranian campaign that the US and its allies have launched against Tehran after the victory of the Islamic Revolution some 40 years ago.


The name is Jai Baan. It’s a really big cannon located at Jaigarh Fort in Jaipur. To put the size in perspective, the top of the wheels are 9 feet high. It was supposed to be able to shoot a cannon ball 35 kilometers, about 20 miles. The cannon, or the fort, were never captured by the enemy. It’s supposed to be the world’s largest non-mechanized cannon.


The truth is that I don’t love guns. I appreciate guns. I am pleased to discuss guns. I enjoy competing and training with guns. Guns have a crucial place in my defense of myself and my family. But the gun qua gun, the gun as an object, doesn’t much move me.
I am no kind of collector. Plenty of fellows have safes full of interesting specimens. Me? I own one each of two kinds of rifle, a single shotgun and several handguns, nearly all of which look more or less like this object of beauty:
But you protest that this is no beauty? You say you see a brute, industrial hunk of black plastic and metal? When I said beautiful, you had something else in mind? This perhaps:
What makes a firearm beautiful to me, what I admire above all other qualities, is reliability – the weapon's ability to function as it is supposed to function tens of thousands of times in a row without a single failure. Certainly a firearm ought to fire a caliber useful to the task; and of course I need to be able to shoot that firearm accurately enough to put rounds into a useful part of the target. But if a gun will only do that 999 times out of thousand, it’s of no use to me. That weapon might belong in some collection, but it doesn’t belong in my holster.
Thus, my relationship to firearms is a utilitarian one. Their possession serves an essential, but narrow purpose. They exist to accomplish a task. They are the necessary tool for a job I hope not to have to do. One might as well speak of a pretty life insurance policy. For me, collecting guns would make the same sense as collecting hammers, or circular saws, or snow tires. Like some hoplophilic disciple of Louis Henry Sullivan, I demand that, and am pleased when, a gun’s form follows its function to the essential exclusion of all other aesthetics.
The function at issue is defense of life in gravest extreme. If such defense of your life and the lives of others is a God-given natural right -- and it is -- then your choice of the tools you employ in that exercise is necessarily a matter of great moment. To be clear, it's not even slightly as important as having the right mindset or sufficient training. But tools do matter, and among the tools I choose is the ugly black pistol pictured above, a Glock 19.
The Glock 19 is a slightly more compact version of Austrian gunmaker Gaston Glock’s genius innovation, the Glock 17. The Glock 19 fires a 9mm round, which means the bullet that leaves the barrel is, near as makes no difference, 9 millimeters in diameter.* In usual practice, those bullets weigh from 115 to 124 grains** (with heavier weights available for special purposes).
The Glock 19 is a semi-automatic pistol: After the user loads and cocks it by inserting a magazine and racking the slide (pulling the slide back and releasing it) the pistol will fire one round each time the trigger is pulled. Instead of an external hammer, the Glock 19 has an internal striker to impact the primer in the base of the cartridge.*** The recoil from each fired round operates the slide, strips the next cartridge off of the magazine stack, loads the round into the chamber and cocks the striker, so that the next pull of the trigger will release the striker, ignite the chambered round and start the cycle all over again. Here is a nifty video animation of what this all looks like.
I have a Glock 19 from the year they were released in the United States, a so-called “first generation” version. With the occasional replacement of springs over the past 21 years, this pistol has undergone the described firing sequence in excess of 40,000 times without a single failure. I don’t love guns, but you have to love a machine that has worked just as it should 40,000 times in a row. The newer Glock 19 that I carry every day is a later generation, and so far only has 10,000 or so rounds through it without a failure. But I have ultimate confidence that the next time I pull the trigger, it will do exactly what it is supposed to do.
Robert’s Rule states that “Simplicity is Murphy’s only natural enemy.” At the core of what makes this pistol reliable (which is to say beautiful) is that it is about as simple as a pistol can be. It takes perhaps two minutes to learn how to “field strip” the Glock 19 – that is, to disassemble it into its major components for cleaning and maintenance. Each time after that initial tutorial, field stripping and reassembly take about 12 seconds each. No tool is necessary to accomplish this. Beyond that, the pistol can be completely disassembled into its only 35 parts with a simple punch in perhaps a minute.That's kind of lovable, too.
Another of Robert’s Rules holds that “Only a fool tries to say better what has already been said perfectly.” Better, like a good reporter, to quote with full attribution:
"I do not love the bright sword for its sharpness, nor the arrow for its swiftness, nor the warrior for his glory. I love only that which they defend" J.R.R. Tolkien, via Faramir, in The Two Towers.
* Most handgun rounds are described first by diameter, either by “caliber,” as in .38 caliber, which is the diameter in decimal inches; or by millimeters, as in the 9mm. This can get a little arcane as the 9mm is close to .38 caliber, there is another round called the .380, which is the same diameter as the 9mm but, shorter – and called the 9mm kurz in Germany, and so on. Common calibers in modern defensive handguns include: .38 Special, .357 Magnum (actually the same diameter as the .38), 9mm, 357Sig, .40 S&W, and .45ACP.
** Grains are units that measure the weight of the bullet – the projectile – only. There are 438 grains in an ounce; 7,000 grains in a pound.
*** A cartridge is an assembled “round” of ammunition, with a case containing gunpowder, holding a bullet (the projectile which leaves the barrel) at the front and a primer (a small, pressure sensitive disc that ignites when struck).


the gun had been identified, French Navy divers secured it with nylon straps.
Air bags were used to make a succession of lifts that brought the gun from the
bottom to approximately 60 feet. From that depth, a winch on the research vessel
Vulcain was used to raise the cannon to the surface. It was then shipped to Charleston,
South Carolina in order to undergo conservation treatment.


The Lethal Automated Weapons Systems (LAWS) works without the intervention of humans, such is the advancement of technology in the present day world. They are weapons capable of selecting by using sensors, recognition of image and software for the target locking and also for the means of attack. A group of NGOs have started a coalition to ban the use of LAWS called as’ campaign to stop killer robots’ recently in 2012 calling for complete ban on them. Indeed, these automated weapons were termed ‘Killer Robots’ as it can potentially destroy the mankind. It is a modern cold war between the two super powers of the world, U.S and Russia.. UN has also agreed to consider and review the controls around the use of such technology in automated weapons. The use of these weapons even to test may violate certain humanitarian principles and UN needs to act quickly in order to ban them.
1. History and Technology
The technological advanced countries like Russia, U.S and U.K, have started the use of LAWS in their defence forces. One of the common known examples will be the drones which are unmanned and work according to commands received through signals operated from stations and used in air, land, water or in space. The defence sectors have started to accommodate the artificial intelligence machines to combat their military relations. In 2018, the US Defence Department Report has mentioned that Russia has developed the new intercontinental, nuclear armed, powered and undersea autonomous torpedo. It has the capacity to launch on U.S coastal targets and military bases. It is completely unmanned and works on itself right from setting target. The concerns have been raised by US in the report and Russia has not revealed any details.
2. 1 Automated Submarines
The Australian submarine in the Indian Ocean was called as a collins class where they are extremely efficient in use. It is also expensive and have literally sunk many U.S navy submarines, destroyers. The Royal Australian Navy has thought of replacing submariners with Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUV) which will replace crew members in the submarines. It is further understood that these machines are effective only for the short-range and transporting signals will be hard under the ocean. In regard and support of this, being unveiled a prototype autonomous submarine with long range, which is named as Echo Voyager. It can be used to stand for long hours and not just for a short time where the design of this submarine is such that it can work autonomously for months long. It shows the development of autonomous technology and it can be a standing example to the idea of having automated submarines for long distance programs.
2.2 Automated Drones
The automated drones are the ones which operate without human intervention. These drones are highly automated with artificial intelligence technology where they can learn and self develop to the challenges. Presently, there is testing of ‘swarms of drones’ which can follow other drones to take task from them and work on it. U.S has been testing it and has named them as “Loyal Wingman’. The development is that the unmanned drones being dispatched from the manned aircrafts which can function independently for the main one. The use of this technology will be aided for surgical causing damages and can be used inside buildings and hideouts also. This can bring so many advantages that there are possibilities for marine and ground drone as researched in U.S .
3. Humanitarian Issues
The basic questions of humanitarian law are evoked whenever LAWS is utilised. The questions as to fixation of the target that the LAWS are not capable of distinguishing the combat soldiers and civilians still lies unanswered. Further, there are questions as to whether the LAWS possess qualities to assess the individuals’ mind when it is comes to attacking. The calls and demands for human intervention when such technology has been increasing and alarming. In the lead to such calls and ban these vehicles, the ‘campaign to stop killer robots’ was started in the year 2012. Presently, a group of 116 specialists from robotics and artificial intelligence pioneers have called for ban of these killer robots led by Tesla ’s chief Elon Musk and Alphabet’s chief Mustafa Suleyman calling it humanity’s threat.
3.1 Geneva Convention
The consensus that there must be a human involvement in the automation technology has triggered question of whether the robots can respect the International Humanitarian Laws (IHL). At the present hour, there is lies no question if they can respect IHL. Both the sides have filed to prove that argument in their favour. United States has contented that there are no norms blocking the development of autonomy and IHL does not prevent the development of autonomy. France on the other hand has concluded that the development of LAWS cannot be regarded as contrary to IHL and prevention will be early as its in the infancy stage. There is an obligation and interest to verify the envisaged weapons conform to the IHL under the Geneva Convention Protocol as per Article 36. In other words, whenever new development, means or method in warfare, it is mandated that they have comply to the protocol or other international laws and must not be prohibited.
3.2 Martens Clause
The Martens Clause in the Preamble of the Hague Conventions states that when there are no regulations made, the subjects are protected under principles of International Law. The same can be applied to the automation technology of LAWS where the conditions in the present scenario is similar. LAWS does not have a regulation for the automation. It is significant to address the question of whether these machines which can kill human beings without any intervention would violate human rights. The laws of humanity is protected under the Martens clause, where the convention is clear that civilised nations forcing such force is required to see under the public conscience and laws of humanity. In the present scenario, it is considered bad for automation machines to kill without human intervention.
4. United Nations and LAWS
The Lethal Automated Weapons Systems are presently developed in drones, submarines etc. Automation and Robotics are concepts which can be developed and utilized in any areas. There are possibilities of automation in the nuclear sector also. For e.g. Russia has developed nuclear underwater drone which can function automatically. Each and every sector of defence keeps developing automation leading to a threat in future. The generally concern is not build automation weapons of war and they can pose a security threats for the countries. In this regard, over 100 CEOs of A.I firms have signed letters to the UN. They say even missile and high speed rockets can be built.
The United Nations first acted in the year 2013 for the ‘Campaign to Stop Killer robots’ when it stated that in 2014 an informal meeting was scheduled. The talks between the nations could not yield any result, in the following years- 2015, 2016, it was highly contemplated by the UN Disarmament Board, its chairman Mr. Amandeep Gill has pointed that robots won’t take charge. The meeting was held on 13th November 2017, the fact to be appreciated is that this was the first official step. India lead the talks on these issues when its representative to the Conference on Disarmament mentioned the focus to have increased systemic controls.
The LAWS is a kind of force which causes destruction and possess a threat to mankind in warfare. The idea behind condemning and to regulate or ban them is that it violates humanitarian principles. LAWS are in the infancy stage and with developments, it would be a potential threat in warfare where civilians or militants are to be treated with basic rights and principles. LAWS in the present scenario needs to be regulated by the United Nations because the developed countries have developed and tested LAWS. LAWS being used in warfare must be banned and United Nations has only initiated discussions with its members. The idea behind banning LAWS would be to avoid States using these technologies from violating humanitarian principles.
4th Year, BA.LLB (Hons.) at Tamil Nadu National Law University


This timely book, published in advance of 2010’s inter-governmental Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, makes available for the first time newly declassified government correspondence from David Owen’s tenure as Foreign Secretary. Nuclear Papers gives new insight into the work of, and response to, the last major strategic nuclear study of the UK’s nuclear needs, which was undertaken in 1978. The book demonstrates sustained dialogue between the Callaghan and Carter administrations on the one hand but also the internal disputes and concerns of the UK government as the Cold War and a bleak economic outlook exerted equal pressures, in much the same way as recent foreign policy and the economic downturn have challenged the current government. Owen skilfully ties the events of 30 years ago to the present, highlighting Barack Obama’s determination to “show the world that America believes in its existing commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to work ultimately to eliminate all nuclear arms”. As ever, David Owen is at the forefront of debate, arguing convincingly that momentum should be established towards the elimination of nuclear weapons by all five of the existing declared nuclear weapon states before the 2010 NPT Review Conference gets underway. This book, then, is an attempt to rejuvenate and expand discussions of the future of the world’s nuclear weapons by exploring the classified and highly sensitive debates of the past. It will be required reading for anyone interested in UK and US nuclear policy.
• An explosive mixture of Owen’s recently declassified papers relating to the UK’s last review of nuclear weapons policy and a forceful polemic on the past, present and future of government nuclear policy. • A fascinating insight into the culture of secrecy in the upper echelons of government. Owen’s papers show how ministers, including the Chancellor, were deliberately cut out of discussions. • Published in advance of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons .
As UK foreign secretary from 1977 to 1979, Owen was deeply involved in the last major strategic study of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent in 1978. In this volume he presents newly declassified government papers from that period and calls for nuclear abolition before the 2010 NPT Review Conference.


Na sprzedaż oferujemy zaprojektowany i wydrukowany w całości przez nasz zespół model Laffly TOE
- Żywica fotoutwardzalna
- rozmiar 82x33x43
- Wyprodukowany w Polsce
- model składa się z 5 elementów, figurka nie jest częścią zestawu
Laffly was a civilian truck manufacturer founded in 1912 at Billancourt near Paris. It was renown for its firetrucks and 4x4 vehicles both designed for civilian use and for the French Army, like the 4WD V15 artillery tractor and the S15 6WD. Both models were characterized by excellent off-road capabilities and specific trench-crossing features provided by extra rollers, uncommon for armoured cars in general at the time. By some aspects these vehicle recalled the german Krupp-Protze 6x6 light truck and their chassis proved equally versatile and reliable.
Laffly TOE was based on the same chassis, this vehicle was given fully armoured with 7 mm steel plates riveted on a central frame. The vehicle was characterized by the absence of central rollers due to their intended colonial theater of operation : TOE litteraly meant "Théatre d\'Operations Extérieur" or External Operation Theater. It was tested in 1934 in Africa, then ordered in 1936 and delivered in 1938-39. Both the driver and commander seated in the cab, could see through folding up armoured shutters and sight slits when closed.
Just behind was located the machine-gunner, which operated a Reibel 7.5 mm light machine gun protected inside an hemispheric turret or a simple open air mount that allowed anti-aircraft fire. Access was granted by lateral doors, and there was a small utility cargo bay at the rear, between the twin axle. Hinged observation ports were also located at the rear. 45 vehicles were provided by Laffly until 1939.


Today’s China Daily features an article on how military technology can improve (civilian) people’s lives. The article mentions two specific technologies, all developed by the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT). The first technology is an advanced control technology originally developed for the military by the university, but now to be applied in the medium-low-speed maglev (operating speed 1t 120 km/h) that is planned for Beijing. Second is a autonomous vehicle control system using lasers, videocameras and radar sensors to detect the environment. NUDT is working together with China’s First Auto Works for applications in commercial vehicles.


Established in 1992 – STREIT Group is one of the world’s leading, privately owned armored vehicles manufacturers with state-of-the-art production facilities and Global offices worldwide.
More than 30 years of operating in challenging environments made STREIT Group one of the most trusted and reliable manufacturers of armored vehicles.
We produce a large variety of Armored Personnel Carriers, MRAP’s, Cash-in-Transit, Luxury, Bespoke Luxury and Security vehicles which are designed to provide effective protection in high-risk situations.
All our vehicles undergo internationally recognized ballistics and impact tests, with STANAG 3 certification for military tactical vehicles and VPAM BRV 2009 VR7 for luxury and special purpose vehicles.
We are a leading provider of security solutions with a proven safety record; our vehicles are deployed by armed forces all over the world. We take no chances when it comes to saving lives.
Armored vehicle products manufactured by STREIT Group range from luxury security vehicles to armored Personnel Carriers and MRAP’s.
As a leading privately owned armored vehicles manufacturer with over 2 million sq. feet of production floor, we operate state-of-the-art production facilities around the world with capability to produce more than 500 vehicles per month.
All our production facilities are ISO 9001, ISO 14001, OHSAS 18001, 2008 certified with the latest armoring technology equipment and in-house engineering design and prototyping professionals.
Comprising vehicle test tracks, specialized CNC (Computer Numerically Controlled) laser –cutting technology and automated and semi-automated production lines, we have the capabilities to meet the most demanding orders in firm timeframes.
To find out more please visit: www.armored-cars.com


Following the lead of my hero, OldNFO, here’s some specifications for your ponderage (new word).
The L1A1 is the British variant of the Fabrique Nationale FN-FAL rifle. The original FN-FAL was based on metric measurements. Of course, the British Empire would have none of that, and modified the rifle to comply with their Inch Pattern. During the original FN-FAL design, there were a number of calibers tested, including .270 and .280, but finally settling on the 7.62×51 NATO round.
My rifle (this is my rifle, this is my gun…) is a bastardized Century Arms model made mumble-years ago. Century Arms was not known at that time to put together a great set of parts, and mine is one of those. I’ve gotten it pretty well beaten into shape and enjoy pushing a large round downrange semi-automatically. The action soaks up a large amount of the recoil, unlike a bolt-action rifle, and makes for a pleasant firing. Now, if there were a better trigger…
OK. The specs, courtesy of Blake Stevens’ “UK and Commonwealth FALS” (Collector Grade Publications, 1987):
Calibre: 7.62mm (.30 in)
Length of Rifle (with normal butt): 1143 mm (45 in)
Length of barrel 533.4 mm (21 in)
Number of grooves: 6
Pitch of rifling: 1 turn in 304.8 mm (12 in)
Twist of rifling: right hand
Type of operation: Gas
Rifle only: 4337.4 gm (9.56 lb)
Rifle and full magazine: 5074.4 gm (11.19 lb)
Magazine full: 737 gm (1.6 lb)
Magazine empty: 255 gm (9 oz)
Magazine capacity: 20 rds (standard)
Fitted, Rear: Aperature
Sight Range: 200-600 m
Sight Radius: 55.37 cm (21.8 in)
Ammunition: (source Wikipedia 7.62×51 NATO)
|Parent case||.308 Winchester (derived from the .300 Savage)|
|Case type||Rimless, Bottleneck|
|Bullet diameter||0.308 in (7.82 mm)|
|Neck diameter||0.345 in (8.8 mm)|
|Shoulder diameter||0.454 in (11.5 mm)|
|Base diameter||0.470 in (11.9 mm)|
|Rim diameter||0.473 in (12.0 mm)|
|Rim thickness||0.050 in (1.3 mm)|
|Case length||2.015 in (51.2 mm)|
|Overall length||2.750 in (69.9 mm)|
|Rifling twist||1 in 12 in (30 cm)|
|Primer type||Large Rifle|
|Maximum pressure||60,191 psi (415.00 MPa)|
|Test barrel length: 24 inches (61 cm)
Source(s): M80: Slickguns, M118 Long Range: U.S. Armorment
Next up, MSAR STG-556 (if I can find the specs). If not, then the Steyr AUG that the MSAR was cloned from.
Suck it, ITAR!
Enjoy, and see y’all at the range!


Prosecutors are seeking further testing on the gun that Alec Baldwin was handling on the “Rust” film set when it fired and killed the cinematographer Halyna Hutchins, as they work to decide whether to revive a criminal case against the actor.
Mr. Baldwin was initially charged with involuntary manslaughter, but prosecutors in New Mexico dismissed the case against him last month. They withdrew the charges after being presented with evidence suggesting that the gun Mr. Baldwin had been rehearsing with that day had been modified, which potentially made an unintentional discharge easier.
The old-fashioned revolver at the center of the case has already been examined by the F.B.I., but on Wednesday, the prosecutors, Kari T. Morrissey and Jason J. Lewis, sought court approval to have it tested by an outside ballistics expert. They wrote in court papers that they had learned during their investigation that the hammer of the gun may have been intentionally modified.
“The modification appears to be related to the notches on the internal portion of the hammer for full-cock, half-cock and quarter cock positions,” the prosecutors wrote in court papers. “It appears that these notches may have been partially removed or ground down so that they are less prominent.”
The ballistics expert, Lucien Haag, who has worked as a consultant for prosecutors and defense lawyers, would also be asked to determine whether other firearms that had been on the set had also been modified “possibly for ease of use by actors,” the prosecutors wrote. Live and inert ammunition found at the scene, as well as powder residue left on Ms. Hutchins’s clothing, would be submitted for testing as well.
Mr. Baldwin has long denied responsibility for the fatal shooting of Ms. Hutchins in 2021, asserting that he had been told the gun did not contain live ammunition and that he had not pulled the trigger before it went off. He said that the gun fired after he had pulled its hammer back and let it go.
A lawyer for Mr. Baldwin did not immediately comment on the request for further testing.
The prosecutors who filed the charges against Mr. Baldwin had maintained that based on F.B.I. testing of the gun, it could not have fired without the trigger having been depressed. But any modifications to the gun that would have made it easier to go off would complicate a prosecutor’s argument that Mr. Baldwin had behaved negligently on set.
The involuntary manslaughter charges against the movie’s armorer, Hannah Gutierrez-Reed, still stand. A lawyer representing her, Jason Bowles, has said she plans to plead not guilty. Mr. Bowles said on Wednesday that he welcomed the continued investigation into the source of the live rounds that were found on the set and into the functionality of the firearm.


The MHL recently received a new model hull for fundamental research. This hull shape was created by the Office of Naval Research to allow academic and foreign institutes to conduct fundamental research on a Naval Combatant, and is loosely based on the Navy’s Zumwalt class destroyer. The hull shape is unique in that it is the first modern vessel to have the hull above the waterline curve back toward the center of the ship, known as tumblehome.
Tumblehome was quite common in naval ships up until the early 20th century, as the inward curvature encouraged projectiles to glance off of the vessel. The drawback to tumblehome is that it reduces the seakeeping characteristics of the vessel, as there is less buoyancy as the vessel rolls. As naval powering technology advanced and refueling stations spread across the world, naval vessels started plying the open ocean for longer periods of time, encountering larger and more dangerous waves. This coupled with the advances in naval ordinances which made virtually all armor susceptible to penetration, caused tumblehome to largely be viewed as a weakness.
The renewed interest in tumblehome comes from its inherent ability to deflect radar up and away from the source, thus vastly reducing the radar signature of the vessel. This makes detection and accurate identification of a naval vessel much harder.
The MHL’s new ONR Tumblehome model will be utilized in academic laboratory classes as well as cutting edge academic research. Stay tuned for more videos of the model being tested by the MHL staff and NAME students.


Kanshou and Bakuya are twin swords forged from the same ore that were originally owned by Second Prince Seien but given to Sixth Prince Ryuuki when Seien was exiled from the palace.
Years later, the sword Kanshou was given to Shi Seiran to protect Kou Shuurei and To Eigetsu when Seiran is ordered to escort the pair to Sa Province as the new governors.
- ↑ Saiunkoku Monogatari, Season 1, Episode 19
Ad blocker interference detected!
Wikia is a free-to-use site that makes money from advertising. We have a modified experience for viewers using ad blockers
Wikia is not accessible if you’ve made further modifications. Remove the custom ad blocker rule(s) and the page will load as expected.


Hot from SHOT SHOW 2018!
This is the gun from the US Military Handgun System (MHS) Pistol Competition. Ideal for a concealed carry firearm, Glock's 19X combines the best features of two of its most popular and most trusted field-tested platforms. The full-size Glock 17 frame and the compact Glock 19 slide have joined forces for the ideal pistol for all conditions and all situations. The shorter overall length and full size grip allows it to hold 19+1 rounds of 9mm ammunition. Currently available in Coyote color, it has many of the features of the new Generation 5 line including the new marksman barrel, ambidextrous slide stop and the new ergonomic grip design.
Available Today for $649.00
Save $100 Off MSRP
We run monthly Florida State Concealed Weapon Classes for our customers. We have spent time finding the best instructors, and we run a "real" class that will make you safe with your pistol and competent enough to use it to defend yourself. Unlike those others, that "take you out back and have you fire one round into a bucket," our instructors will work with you on the range to ensure you are confident and safe in the handling of your firearm. Cost is $75.00 per student (this includes refreshments, range fees, use of personal protection equipment, use of instructors firearms and .22 caliber ammunition). We do request a $20.00 deposit to hold your seat.
Twilight Firearms is now a Glock stocking dealer. This will ensure that we can provide our customers with the latest information, newest models, and best prices available. Come check out our extensive display of Glock Pistols and Parts.
Sign up to hear from us about specials, sales, and events.


Thursday, April 6, 2017
An Ancient Super Weapon: The Iron Hand of Archimedes
The words "super weapon" bring to mind gigantic and terrifying weapons of destructive power. That, or super villain-esque contraptions that sounds like something from the pages of a comic book. But, super weapons do not need to be either gigantic or sound like bad science fiction to be effective. Any weapon could be a super weapon if your enemies possess it and you don’t. In fact, one super weapon from the ancient world was relatively simple in its construction, but very deadly in application.
This weapon was called the Iron Hand, but it is better known today as Archimedes Claw. , the ancient genius did make his share of contributions to the killing arts. He was put in charge of the defense of ancient Syracuse, his home city, and set to work applying his engineering knowledge to making the city walls as impenetrable as possible. These improvements were put to good use when the Romans came calling with both a large fleet and a land army in 214 BC. The Iron Hand of Archimedes helped Syracuse stand against one of the strongest powers in the region for three long years.
So what sort of weapon could terrify the Romans, never known for their cowardice, so much that they would opt to starve out an enemy rather than simply storm the city walls? The answer is surprisingly simple. It was a crane.
At least, the Iron Hand was a lot like a crane. The weapon consisted of a long wooden arm, a rope with a grappling hook on the end, a lead counterweight on the short end, and a wooden sub structure that could act as a pivot point. Several of these contraptions were placed on the seaward walls of Syracuse. When not in use, they were likely concealed by positioning them parallel to the walls, but when Roman ships approached the operators would swing the arm around and dangle the grappling hook over the opposing ship. They would then dip the grapple down, and snag the ship either on its front or side. When they released the lead counterweight, the grapple hook shot upwards with enough force to either capsize the ship. A well-placed grapple could pluck a ship clean out of the water. Then the operators could shake the ship or smash it against the rocks at the base of the wall.
Mind you, we aren’t talking about rowboats here. The Romans employed sixty quinquiremes during the siege of Syracuse. These were the largest battle ships of their day, capable of holding 420 men and even of being platforms for catapults and other artillery. Fully loaded, a quinquireme could weight as much as 100 tons. The Iron Hand could take such a ship and lift it clear out of the water. Was it any wonder that the Romans were terrified of the thing?
What is even more amazing about the Iron Hand is that it utilized relatively simple physics: the Law of Levers and the Law of Buoyancy, both of which were discovered by Archimedes. By utilizing the principle of the lever, Archimedes was able to design a machine that could lift 100 plus tons, no easy feat even today. And the principle of buoyancy revealed an Achilles Heel in the Roman’s deadliest ship; while they were stable on the move, they were unstable when still. Using a grapple hook to apply a little extra force to one side could flip the whole ship over.
In The End, It Was Not Enough
As devastating as the Iron Hand was, it could not fend off the Romans forever. After three long years of war, the Syracusan defenses collapsed and the Romans stormed the city. Archimedes was killed by a Roman soldier, despite orders that the genius of Syracuse be taken alive.


This article needs additional citations for verification. (June 2010) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)
|Products||Artillery, munitions, military vehicles, tanks, electronics|
The Nexter group is divided in several smaller entities, with the main one being Nexter Systems. The other sub-companies are:
- Nexter Munitions
- Nexter Mechanics
- Nexter Electronics
- Nexter Robotics
- Nexter Training
- NBC Sys
- Simmel Difesa
The GIAT group was founded in 1973 by combining the industrial assets of the technical direction of Army weapons of the French Ministry of Defense. The company was nationalized in 1991. On 22 September 2006 GIAT became the core of the new company Nexter.
For many years GIAT struggled to turn a profit. The company was operated at a loss. A 2001 report by the Cour des Comptes and a 2002 report by the National Assembly described the situation as critical. Not until April 2004 did the board of directors present the public with a financial statement showing a profit of several hundred million Euros. This was mainly due to increased export sales, and the modernization of the Leclerc Main Battle Tank (MBT) and several other armored platforms. Sales to the UAE however were accomplished with the payment of $200 million to intermediaries.
Nexter continues to produce several former GIAT small arms, cannon, and anti-armour weapons. One such weapon is the Wasp 58, a low cost, one man antiarmour/assault weapon system.
Merger with KMW
In 2015, Nexter and Krauss-Maffei merged under a single structure. The new KNDS – KMW+Nexter Defense Systems -- will be the European leader of terrestrial defense with more than 6,000 employees. The supervisory board appointed the new CEO of Nexter Systems, Stéphane Mayer, and the chairman of the executive board of KMW, Frank Haun, as CEOs of the holding company.
- The Véhicule de l'Avant Blindé (VAB) armoured personnel carrier;
- The Nexter Aravis - Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle;
- The Nexter Titus wheeled and mine protected vehicle;
The company also acquired a large influence in the field of combat and artillery vehicles thanks to the development of several large caliber canons:
- The Leclerc main battle tank;
- The CAESAR - 155 mm wheeled self-propelled howitzer;
- The VBCI (Véhicule blindé de combat d'infanterie) wheeled armoured infantry fighting vehicle;
- The LG1 Mark II 105 mm towed howitzer;
- The TRF1 155 mm towed howitzer
- The GCT 155mm self-propelled gun
And several types of munitions for medium and large-calibre weapons:
- 120 mm ammunitions
- 155 mm ammunitions
- Tank ammunitions
- 40 mm ammunitions
Nexter/Giat also manufactures various weapons:
- The FAMAS assault rifle;
- The M621 cannon
- The FR F2 sniper rifle;
- The 20 mm modèle F2 gun;
- The APILAS anti-tank rocket launcher;
- The Wasp 58 Light Anti-Armour Weapon;
- The Armes de Défense Rapprochée personal defence weapon;
- The GIAT 30 aircraft-mounted revolver cannon;
- History of the Nexter company Archived 2007-07-02 at the Wayback Machine
- Les industries d'armement: rapport au Président de la République suivis des réponses des administrations et des organismes concernés Archived 2019-01-17 at the Wayback Machine, Cour des Comptes, La Documentation Française, 2001
- Rapport d'information déposé par la commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées sur la situation de Giat Industries, "Report from the defense and armed forces commission on the situation of Giat Industries", presented by Yves Fromion and Jean Diébold, French National Assembly, 2002
- The Shadowy Arms Trade - A Look Back at a Questionable Tank Deal "An intermediary received a commission of almost $200 million for the sale of battle tanks to United Arab Emirates. Some of that money, though, may have been used to bribe government officials."
- "Missile Mirage", Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 1, 2007.
- Nexter Systems and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann have completed their association Archived 2017-12-01 at the Wayback Machine. nexter-group.fr. Retrieved 10 June 2016
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to |
- Official website—(in English)


Hello there, I decided to write this after I prepared a short ten minute segment on rocket technology for a podcast. In this article, I will be writing about the basic physics that underlie rocket propulsion and will also elaborate upon some of the basic types of rocket engines.
The Physics of Rocket Propulsion
The physics of rocket propulsion are actually quite simple and are based on Newton’s laws of motion, the third one in particular. That one states that for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction in a kinematic context. Rocket engines are propelled by means of a reaction to rapidly moving, large volume jet of gas in the opposite direction. This jet of gas is produced by the chemical process of combustion in most cases.
This is in fact very similar to how jet engines work, but the difference is that jet engines can only work when there is an external oxygen supply, while rockets can work anywhere due to having an onboard supply of oxidiser.
The combination of oxidiser and fuel and the combustion that follows is the main mechanism by which rocket engines produce that all-important propulsive jet. Some of the arrangements by which rocket engines achieve this will be discussed later.
A brief history of Rocketry.
Now while Newton was the first one to place the law of action and reaction in a mathematically rigorous framework I think it is important to note that the idea of jets of gaseous substances as means of propulsion goes back a long long way. I, personally, see Hero of Alexandria’s rotating steam powered device, called the Aelophile, which used jets of steam to drive a solid body around an axis.
It may be possible to procure a classroom model of this device and see it in action.
The first true rockets (as in containing their own oxidizer) were built by the Chinese before the tenth century BC and were powered by Gunpowder. There are reports of rockets being used in combat not only by the Chinese but also the Mongol hordes of Ghengis Khan who took the technology with them on their conquests.
Rocket technology reached Europe in the middle ages thanks to the Mongolians and later the Ottoman Empire. It was incorporated into artillery practises of the era. Iron-cased rockets were first successfully employed by the kingdom of Mysore against the soldiers of the English East India Company in the Anglo-Mysore Wars of the late Seventeen Nineties. This kind of rocket was further developed by William Congreve, the Comptoller of the Royal Arsenal in London; he developed long stabilizing tail-poles to improve accuracy and developed stronger rockets and new propellant mixtures to improve range.
Congreve Rockets look like this.
William Hale came up with the idea of slightly vectored thrust which improved control of direction further. This negated the need for a tail-pole and thus contributed to rockets being lighter and more aerodynamic.
As with so many other things in science, science fiction was where the idea of space travel using rockets first began to take root; Jules Verne’s classic novel “From the Earth to the Moon” comes to mind.
Scientists like Konstantin Tsiolkovsky in Russia/the USSR, Herman Oberth in Germany and Robert Goddard in the USA worked to provide the science of racketeering a rigorous footing, eventually it was Robert Goddard who built a very successful rocket (for the standards of its day, in any case) based on design principles such as a dedicated combustion chamber for solid fuelled rockets and the use of an asymmetrical hourglass shaped nozzle to accelerate propulsive gases to beyond supersonic speed. He and Tsiolkovsky also speculated about the idea of multi-stage rockets, which basically have multiple, self-contained rocket engines.
To go on a little tangent here, multistage rockets enable range to be extended and the ability to discard spent units make it progressively easier to accelerate the payload to ever increasing velocities. This is critical in achieving the velocity required to escape the Earth’s gravity, which eventually made space exploration using rockets possible.
Robert Goddard launched the world’s first liquid fuelled rocket in 1926, several companies around the world started to dabble in rocketry and there was some significant activity until the second world war broke out, including advances in the design of various engine components and methods to implement the principles of rocketry.
The photograph above is of Goddard and his liquid fuelled rocket.
In World War II, advances were made in the military deployment of rocket technology, including large unguided rockets like the Soviet Katyusha and sophisticated guided missiles like the German V-Two. Messerschmitt also built a rocket plane called the Me-163 Komet, which by all accounts was a pretty unsafe machine to handle, given unstable propellant components which had a tendency to explode.
Following the war, rocket development, while still being focussed on the military use of rockets, found offshoots in space exploration programmes, the Redstone rocket programme in the USA and the R7 derivatives of the V2 in the USSR laid the foundations for propelling objects into space. The solving of the problems of atmospheric re-entry made space flight a reality, finally.
The space age had arrived.
Types of Rocket Engines – A Brief Introduction
Right, as mentioned earlier, there are several extant ways by which rocket propulsion may be achieved, and I am now going to try and offer very brief explanations of the defining features of each.
Solid-propellant rockets use a solid state combination of fuel and oxidizer called the grain, this fuel does not spontaneously combust and therefore must be ignited by other means, such as a small powder charge. Obviously it is difficult to stop and start the combustion of solid propellants when required and they also produce less thrust than other types of rocket engine and are therefore not as efficient, however, they can be stored for long periods of time and without too many safety risks.
Liquid propellant rockets bring together oxidizer and fuel in liquid form, either through the use of pumps or using pressurized gases. Some fuel-oxidizer mixtures ignite spontaneously when formed, and rockets that use these kinds of fuels don’t need a dedicated ignition system, if one is needed, however, electric sparks or a small amount of solid propellant can be used. These rockets offer more thrust and control, at the cost of increased rocket complexity and storage concerns.
Electric rockets use electricity to produce thrust, they are not as powerful as the other two types of rocket engines that have been described yet and therefore, as far as I’m aware, is restricted to propulsion after a spacecraft has already managed to escape the earth’s gravity. These use things like ions, jets of plasma and the control of electric and magnetic fields to accelerate gas that is conducive to manipulation by such fields.
One other kind of rocket that’s been envisaged uses heat from a nuclear reactor to heat liquid hydrogen to extremely high temperatures, producing a rapidly expanding gas jet that can produce a lot of thrust.
I guess that is it for this article, I hope you enjoyed reading it. You could always peruse wikipedia or Encyclopaedia Britannica for more information, it is quite an addictive thing to read about 😉
That is it from me.
-Ankur ‘Exploreable’ Chakravarthy