At present I am not disposed to deal with the ground of this delight, connected, as it is, with a representation in which we would least of all look for it a representation, namely, that lets us see its own inadequacy, and consequently its subjective lack of purposiveness for our judgement in the estimation of magnitude but confine myself to the remark that if the aesthetic judgement is to be pure (unmixed with any teleological judgement which, as such, belongs to reason), and if we are to give a suitable example of it for the critique of aesthetic judgement, we must not point to the sublime in works of art, eg buildings, statues and the like, where a human end determines the form as well as the magnitude, nor yet in things of nature, that in their very concept import a determinate end, eg animals of a recognized natural order, but in raw nature merely as involving magnitude (and only in this so far as it does not convey any charm or any emotion arising from actual danger).