What is Central Asia to do with American Afghan refugees?
Peter Akopov  Moscows attention is shifting to the east, to Central Asia . We are closely following what is happening in Afghanistan , where the situation is tending to a rapid deterioration, including in the context of the hasty withdrawal of American and other NATO troops, Minister Sergei Lavrov said a few hours ago . The Foreign Minister noted that President Putin is in contact with the heads of the countries of the region. Indeed, in recent days, Vladimir Putin spoke with four of the five leaders of the Central Asian republics. Last week he called the President of Turkmenistan, then received Nursultan Nazarbayev in Sochi, and on Monday spoke on the phone with the heads of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan . The leader of the fifth Central Asian republic, Kyrgyzstan , visited Putin at the end of May. With all the variety of topics discussed, there is one common one, which is becoming more and more hot and important every day. This is Afghanistan, in which, against the background of the withdrawal (already completed by 90 percent) of American troops, active hostilities have resumed between the Taliban who previously ruled the country and the army of the current Kabul government. Three out of five Central Asian republics not only border on Afghanistan  the same Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen live in the belligerent country as in the republics of the same name. In recent days alone, thousands of Afghan border guards, under the pressure of the Taliban, crossed into Tajikistan, and hundreds tried to hide in Uzbekistan. And if (more precisely, when) the Taliban establish control over most of the country and become power in Kabul , the issue of security of the southern post-Soviet borders will become a major topic not only for these republics, but also for Russia . That is why Putin is already discussing security issues with Central Asian leaders  from strengthening borders to delivering our weapons. Three out of five countries in the region ( Kazakhstan , Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) are part of the CSTO  that is, Russias military allies, but of the three countries bordering Afghanistan, only one is in the CSTO. Turkmenistan, with its eternal neutrality, has never entered this organization, and Uzbeki-stan has suspended its participation several times (most recently in 2012). This does not mean that Moscow will not provide assistance to Ashgabat and Tashkent  and it is clear that, if necessary, they will ask for it. The only question is what kind of threats we are talking about. The current stage of the Afghan crisis is giving rise to several types of threats. The simplest and most understandable is an attempt to transfer hostilities on the territory of the Central Asian republics. And not because of the aggression of the Taliban, but as a result of the defeat or displacement of various armed formations from the northern provinces. These provinces populated mostly Tajiks and Uzbeks  and they are in the ranks, as the government army and the Taliban, as well as in the units, sworn al-Qaeda or LIH*. On Afghan territory, there are also many radical Islamists who fled from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, including those in pro-ISIL groups, some of whom dream of igniting the flame of jihad in their homeland. As the power of the Taliban expands, the power of the forces controlling the northern provinces will diminish  and radical groups will also be squeezed out. Across the border  to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Naturally, the authorities of these republics are preparing for a similar scenario  and for a meeting of uninvited guests. But this threat is understandable  and it is clear how to deal with it. As a last resort, Russia will help. But there are other threats as well, which are not so obvious. These include the issue of further American presence in the region. And there are several levels. Initially, the Americans wanted to place small bases in any of the neighboring countries  for action on Afghanistan on a remote basis. Last week in Washington, talks were held on this topic with the foreign ministers of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Although there are no official statements so far, it is almost impossible that Dushanbe and Ashgabat would agree to let the Americans in. After 2001, the same Uzbekistan (as well as Kyrgyzstan) had the experience of accommodating Americans  but in 2006 the American presence was curtailed by order of the republics authorities. There is no reason to let them into the country now. But there are more than enough arguments against. Firstly, American bases in Tajikistan or Uzbekistan would cause hostility from the Taliban, who in any case will soon become the Afghan government (or its most important part). Secondly, the American bases would cause sharp discontent with Russia (with which the Central Asian countries have allied relations) and China . Thirdly, the local population would react negatively to them  and the independence of the country hosting the bases will not be added. There is, however, anot-her level of threat  much less obvious than in the ca-se of bases. We are talking about a request from Wash-ington to accept Afghans who worked for the Amer-ican invaders. The United States is asking Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to temporarily host nine thousand Afghan citizens who fear revenge from the Taliban. T-hey do not want to  al-though formally they say that they do not have time. But nine thousand is only a fraction of potential fugitives. 18,000 Afghans have already filed for a special immigration visa, and 70,0-00 are being recruited with their wives and children. So they are trying to at-tach them to Central Asia  promising to issue visas la-ter, but for now they will finance their stay. Only partly. Because the Taliban are not going to kill collaborators  they will only have to repent of working for the Americans. It is clear that the same Tajikistan will accept (and is already accepting) refugees from Afghanistan  but this is not about ordinary refugees. And about the political cadres trained to work for the occupation regime  the presence of which in neighboring countries will be perceived by the new Kabul authorities, to put it mildly, without enthusiasm.   It will be very difficult for the new Taliban authorities to answer such questions. And most importantly, there are internal risks for the Central Asian republics themselves, especially for Uzbekistan, which the Americans have long regarded as the key to Central Asia. Having admitted several thousand American clients to itself, Tashkent will open its do-ors not only for specially tr-ained and well-trained Am-erican employees, people who will work for the Un-ited States, and not for Uz-bekistan. Together with th-em, Tashkent will receive all the attendant consequ-ences  from American and international human rights NGOs (and who will monitor the living conditions of American Afghans?) And ending with all kinds of democracy funds. For a country going through a period of reforms, revival and a policy of openness, pursued for the fifth year by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the potential risks from such penetration may be too high. For American friends the interests of the 40 million people are of no interest  if they feel that it is possible to shake the situation, they will not hesitate for a minute. Because they, unlike Russia, have nothing to do with Central Asia  and they do not feel any responsibility for its safety and well-being. The example of Afghanistan is more than illustrative. But simply hoping for Russia is not enough  Uzbekistan, which recently became an observer in the Eurasian Economic Union , needs to restore its participation in the CSTO, that is, to make an informed choice. For multi-vector and non-aligned games  no matter how well intentioned they may be  now is clearly not the right time. And its not just about time. The example of Ukraine until 2014, when Viktor Yanukovych tried to simultaneously be in the EU and the Eurasian Union , and with Russia and the West  before everyones eyes. One can hope and even receive multibillion-dollar American investments  but in the end, the main one will be several thousand American Afghans. And the risk of losing independence.