Is the United States too lenient on Assad?
Seeking to restore the Iran nuclear deal and reduce US involvement in the Middle East, the Biden administration appears to be lenient with Syrian President Bashar Assad, potentially opening the door to US rivals. US President Joe Biden appears to be following his predecessor Barack Obama in sacrificing US interests for higher priority concerns. Desperate to make sure nothing derails the US-Iranian Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) talks, Obama ignored Irans support for Assad as the regime slaughtered thousands of Syrian civilians, as well as Tehrans continued support for Assad. Worse yet, less than a year after Obama established the use of chemical weapons as a red line, his administration has essentially stood idly by after the Assad regime killed more than 1,000 of its own citizens. during a sarin gas attack in Eastern Ghouta. Now Biden can follow the same path with the nuclear deal again a top priority. However, the recent election of hardline Ebrahim Raisi could complicate efforts further. The White House is already failing to fully enforce Caesars law in an attempt to appease Assads main supporter, Iran. House Republicans last week announced an inquiry into the matter. This was followed by the US Treasurys decision to lift sanctions on two companies owned by Samer Foz, a Syrian businessman with close ties to Assad. It is unfortunately not surprising that the Biden administration chooses not to demand responsibility for crimes against humanity from Assad, Mariam Memarsadeghi, senior researcher at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute told Al-Monitor. Now that the Biden administration is seeking to reinstate [the nuclear] Okay, he signals a soft line to the regime in a variety of ways, including removing pressure and control over its proxies. cnxps.cmd.push (function () {cnxps ({playerId: 36af7c51-0caf-4741-9824-2c941fc6c17b}). render (4c4d856e0e6f4e3d808bbc1715e132f6);});  if (window.location.pathname.indexOf (656089)! = -1) {console.log (hedva connatix); document.getElementsByClassName (divConnatix)[0].style.display = none;}  US policy in Syria hinges on a small troop presence in the northeast plus the supposed pressure of Caesar-law sanctions against Assad. Bidens steps to end the waiver extension to a U.S. oil company operating in northeast Syria and cut funding to the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) suggest the administration could seek to withdraw its troops and end its partnership with the SDF in exchange for Russian concessions on the reopening of humanitarian corridors. The UN Security Councils mandate for Bab al-Hawa, the last border post between Turkey and Syria, expires next month. Russian President Vladimir Putin refusing to commit to renewing UN cross-border aid to northwestern Syria at the last Biden-Poutin summit in Geneva, the White House could find itself thwarted. American passivity prompted the Gulf states to push the boundaries with Assad. Under Trump, the United States has taken a clear stand on countries seeking to move closer to Syria. AFTER the UAE and Bahrain reopened their embassies in Damascus in 2018, James Jeffrey, the State Departments special envoy for Syria, warned states against assisting the Syrian regime, using the threat of sanctions as a deterrent. Trump no longer holding the line, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan criticized US sanctions in March for undermining regional rapprochement efforts, and Saudi and Syrian intelligence chiefs recently met for the first time since the start of the conflict. If the United States continues to scale back its role, China and the Gulf states could expand their engagement and influence in Syria. China recently congratulated Assad on his electoral victory and has so far played a low-key role behind the scenes, maintaining diplomatic ties and using his veto with Russia in the UN Security Council to protect the Syrian regime . With more than a third of the countrys infrastructure destroyed during the conflict and Assad desperate for reconstruction assistance, China could invest in the country, confident that the United States will not apply sanctions. Last June, Assad said the government had entered into discussions with a number of Chinese companies experienced in reconstruction. The United Arab Emirates have been one of the main supporters of the Gulf states rapprochement with Damascus, notably by lobbying aggressively for Syrias return to the Arab League. Real tensions could develop between the United States and its Gulf allies. Abu Dhabi is not deterred by the threat of sanctions and it is a real problem for Washington, said Charles Lister, senior researcher and director of Syria and counterterrorism and extremism programs at the Middle East Institute. As US law, the Caesar Act is not going to go away, and if the White House does not enforce it, there will be an uproar in Congress.  Syrias imminent reintegration into the Arab League will increase pressure on the United States to withdraw its troops  a move that would further reduce its regional influence. Reduced aid or a reduced footprint in the northeast could lead to a resurgence of ISIS and increased instability, especially given the existence of ISIS sleeper cells in detention camps run by ISIS. SDS. The SDF depends on the support and financial assistance of the United States for its very survival. The United States and its allies must stand firm and persist, ideally by strengthening our military presence in the northeast to deal with the resurgence of ISIS and increasing our investment in diplomatic efforts to negotiate a resolution. , Lister said. US-Turkey cooperation could put pressure on Russia, especially in light of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Bidens successful meeting last week at the NATO summit. On Iran, the Biden administration should not sacrifice elements of its Syrian policy in exchange for progress on nuclear talks. US sanctions, while problematic, remain an important source of leverage against one of Assads main backers. If Biden continues to prioritize the deal with Iran, it could leave the Gulf states, Russia, Iran and China to compete for influence in Syria. The author is a London-based writer and researcher on gun violence and foreign affairs.