Who decides Irans presidential elections?
Since many leading political personalities and organisations have directly or indirectly called for the boycott of the election on 18 June, turnout will most likely be limited to those who see their interests in one way or another aligned with the deep state. With the expected victory of a hard-line candidate, the deep state will be in direct control of all three branches of government for the first time in the Islamic Republics 42-year history. This means that it can no longer pass the buck but must take direct responsibility for any possible future national calamities. Under such a scenario, Ayatollah Khamenei will have to perform multiple acts of heroic flexibility (a term he invented to justify his own climb-down in 2013 in allowing the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] negotiations to begin). This means that the government will either achieve an acceptable compromise with the US to remove sanctions, or Khamenei will once again find himself vetoing any further talks. In either event, in the absence of any contractors, the Ayatollah will be solely accountable to the Iranian people, and he will have to explain why he and his followers are powerless or incapable of meeting the basic needs of a nation straining under Covid-19 and other challenges. Either way, what little is left of Khameneis credibility will come under unprecedented close scrutiny, not just by the suffering masses in Iran but also the global community. Gradual ascent  The election victory in June 1997 of Mohammad Khatami over Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, the hand-picked candidate of the Supreme Leader, heralded the start of the reform era. More importantly, it exposed the divisions within the ruling establishment, which over time had also alienated the general public. Iranians had become increasingly resentful of the way the country was being led and administered. Many saw the election of Mohammad Khatami as a turning point and the beginning of a new chapter in relations between the people and the state, a trend that was briefly evident. However, the Supreme Leader made use of this reform movement by riding on its popular wave. Various reformist advocates, knowingly or unwittingly, allowed themselves to be used as contractors in the service of the deep state. It soon became clear that talk of reform would be permitted so long as it did not infringe upon any domains retained exclusively for the deep state. Today, hardliners, conservative principlists or the hard core of the regime, control all the key political and economic levers. Under the pretext of militant anti-Americanism, they have gradually directed the nations leanings towards Russia and China. Yet they represent only a small fraction of the constituency that brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power in 1979. Over time, the influence of many high profile insiders has declined, due to widening differences with the behind the scenes figures running the deep state. A simple glance at the fate of two previous presidents of the Islamic Republic, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (whose children have alleged that their fathers death was not due to natural causes) and Mohammad Khatami (who was banned from public ceremonies in 2017), point to this reality. Even Ali Larijani (former Speaker of Majles or parliament) was humiliatingly disqualified from participating in the 2021 presidential election. Another previous Speaker, Mehdi Karroubi, and a former prime minister, Mir Hossein Mousavi, have been held under house arrest without trial for more than 10 years. All this points to a high level of dissent within the ruling establishment.