Can Afghan forces hold the Taliban after US troops leave?
MORE MORE than a month after its final phase began, the pace of American military withdrawal from Afghanistan is accelerating. President Joe Biden has stated that all US troops will be out by September. It now seems possible that they will disappear as soon as July. The generals think the packaging and delivery is almost half done. Violence from the Taliban-led insurgency is mounting, but Biden is unable to delay. He has long been a critic of Americas involvement in Afghanistan, and the sooner the troops leave, the fewer casualties America will suffer (though, in fact, they are already very low). The vast Kandahar air base, once home to many planes, helicopters and drones, is deserted. The equally large Bagram air base near Kabul is the next to be handed over to the Afghan government. Other NATO forces are leading the Americans to the exit. The Afghan army will have to face the Taliban on its own. For Atiqullah Amarkhel, this is a familiar feeling. The former general was a commander in the Afghan Air Force when Soviet troops withdrew in 1989. The government they left behind, led by the hard-line communist president Muhammad Najibullah, was expected to collapse within weeks in the face of US-backed Islamic guerrilla mujahedeen. and Pakistan. In fact Mr. Amarkhel and his comrades held the militants for three years, even when the Mujahideen launched a series of costly and unsuccessful offensives in cities such as Jalalabad, near the border with Pakistan. Only later, when Russia stopped paying the bills, Najibullah fell and the country fell into anarchy. In a country where the horrors of the past four decades depend heavily, the echoes of history have a way of being heard. Afghans are debating what the parallels may be for the government of Ashraf Ghani, the president, as it faces a resurgent Taliban. Mr Amarkhel believes the outgoing Russians left him and his comrades better equipped to hold the militants than the Americans leaving his modern-day counterparts. I never for a moment thought we could not succeed, he says. The army we had built then was much stronger than what the Americans left behind. In particular, he says, the fleet of aircraft he commanded was larger and better equipped than the air force the Americans were leaving behind. One of his enemies from that time agrees. As the leader of the Hezb-e-Islami Mujahideen faction, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar received most of the CIA and Saudi aid sent through the Pakistani army in the 1980s. Sitting in his office near the Afghan parliament, he says the army that the Soviet Union left behind to fight it was undoubtedly stronger than what NATO worked to set up. As the Russians withdrew, they built a conventional Afghan army complete with tanks and heavy armor, artillery, and an air force. In contrast, in the last two decades, NATO and America have amassed only one lightly armed internal security force, created to quell an insurgency. Yet comparing the strengths of Afghan forces then and now is just one element in predicting what will come next, says Jonathan Schroden of CNA, a military think-tank. The guerrillas of the 1980s received sensational support of the Cold War which extended to Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. The Taliban may still have paradise in Pakistan, and at least look more united than the rare Mujahideen, but they are also a smaller fighting force. Militarily, I think Ghani is in a somewhat better position than Najibullah, said Mr. Schroden. The pace of American withdrawal however seems to have encouraged Taliban leaders, who believe they have a chance at a military victory. Americas efforts to get both sides to sit down and negotiate a solution have stalled. The military balance between the opponents now looks set to be determined in a summer of fighting, with the Taliban trying to put pressure on Kabul by seizing territory and cities. Somewhere between half and 70% of the village is contested or under Taliban control, according to a UN estimate published on June 1st. Police and rank-and-file soldiers who make up the bulk of the Afghan forces have been repeatedly merged into rural offensives in recent months. Even better-equipped NATO forces fought against Taliban guerrilla tactics to use homemade ambushes and mines. But Afghan police posts are also often unpaid and short of food and ammunition, say tribal elders in districts outside Kandahar. When the Taliban measure up against them, they have little stomach to fight. Their delivery is sometimes quick and negotiated through locals. Sher Mohammad, a farmer in Panjwai district, recalls being pressured into service by a local Taliban commander during an attack late last year. He was ordered to knock on the door of a local base and give the troops an ultimatum to leave. I shouted and there was no answer. I stepped in and found it desolate. The soldiers were already gone, he says. That was before the Americans left. Dozens of small posts and bases have changed hands like this in recent months. With regular police and army fighting, the government increasingly relies on its well-trained special forces units. These commandos have often worked closely with NATO forces and, although thinly spaced, they have consistently proven capable of defeating insurgents. They rotate from hotspot to hotspots, repelling militant attacks and retaking districts. The death toll on both sides and among civilians is high. The Taliban are also putting pressure on major cities, but so far have been unable to capture them, or hold territory against counterattacks coordinated by special forces. Most analysts expect this to continue because the Taliban do not have the numbers or equipment to dominate. U.S. generals say they are eager not to repeat Russias mistake by cutting funding prematurely. However, exactly what support they will provide once they are left is unclear. The Pentagon said on June 2 only that its support would be primarily financial to help pay the salaries of security forces with some maintenance of aircraft thrown inside. After the departure of the Soviet Union, Najibullahs sudden longevity was not only due to his army and their money. He also proved a surprisingly flexible and smart politician, whom Russia gave a largely free hand to do what was necessary to survive, says Mr Schroden. Here Mr. Ghani may be in a more precarious position. He must unite the opportunistic factions and quarrels of the Afghan state, all the time under pressure from the Americans to terminate an agreement with the Taliban. His main task in the next few months will be to keep Afghanistan complete and prevent it from splitting into competing fiefdoms. With the Taliban and predictions from Washington seemingly bleak, military morale can be crucial. It is mostly psychological now. If we can overcome the pressure this summer, then we will be fine, says an Afghan diplomat. Mr. Amarkhel agrees: If our forces can last for two months, they can survive.