Daily Papers

Unequal access to costly datasets essential for empirical research has long hindered researchers from disadvantaged institutions, limiting their ability to contribute to their fields and advance their careers. Recent breakthroughs in Large Language Models (LLMs) have the potential to democratize data access by automating data collection from unstructured sources. We develop and evaluate a novel methodology using GPT-4o-mini within a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) framework to collect data from corporate disclosures. Our approach achieves human-level accuracy in collecting CEO pay ratios from approximately 10,000 proxy statements and Critical Audit Matters (CAMs) from more than 12,000 10-K filings, with LLM processing times of 9 and 40 minutes respectively, each at a cost under $10. This stands in stark contrast to the hundreds of hours needed for manual collection or the thousands of dollars required for commercial database subscriptions. To foster a more inclusive research community by empowering researchers with limited resources to explore new avenues of inquiry, we share our methodology and the resulting datasets.

Based on principal-agent theory and optimal contract theory, companies use the method of increasing executives' shareholding to stimulate collaborative innovation. However, from the aspect of agency costs between management and shareholders (i.e. the first type) and between major shareholders and minority shareholders (i.e. the second type), the interests of management, shareholders and creditors will be unbalanced with the change of the marginal utility of executive equity incentives.In order to establish the correlation between the proportion of shares held by executives and investments in corporate innovation, we have chosen a range of publicly listed companies within China's A-share market as the focus of our study. Employing a multi-variable linear regression model, we aim to analyze this relationship thoroughly.The following models were developed: (1) the impact model of executive shareholding on corporate innovation investment; (2) the impact model of executive shareholding on two types of agency costs; (3)The model is employed to examine the mediating influence of the two categories of agency costs. Following both correlation and regression analyses, the findings confirm a meaningful and positive correlation between executives' shareholding and the augmentation of corporate innovation investments. Additionally, the results indicate that executive shareholding contributes to the reduction of the first type of agency cost, thereby fostering corporate innovation investment. However, simultaneously, it leads to an escalation in the second type of agency cost, thus impeding corporate innovation investment.