Daily Papers

Group-Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is a key technique for training large reasoning models, yet it suffers from a critical vulnerability: the Think-Answer Mismatch, where noisy reward signals corrupt the learning process. This problem is most severe in unbalanced response groups, paradoxically degrading the signal precisely when it should be most informative. To address this challenge, we propose Stable Group-Relative Policy Optimization (S-GRPO), a principled enhancement that derives optimal, noise-aware advantage weights to stabilize training. Our comprehensive experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate S-GRPO's effectiveness and robustness. On various models, S-GRPO significantly outperforms DR. GRPO, achieving performance gains of +2.5% on Qwen-Math-7B-Base, +2.2% on Llama-3.2-3B-Base, and +2.4% on Qwen-Math-1.5B-Instruct. Most critically, while standard GRPO fails to learn under 20% synthetic reward noise, S-GRPO maintains stable learning progress. These results highlight S-GRPO's potential for more robust and effective training of large-scale reasoning models. \footnote{Code and data are available at: https://github.com/shenpeijun0212/S-GRPO

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

Multiple choice questions (MCQs) are commonly used to evaluate the capabilities of large language models (LLMs). One common way to evaluate the model response is to rank the candidate answers based on the log probability of the first token prediction. An alternative way is to examine the text output. Prior work has shown that first token probabilities lack robustness to changes in MCQ phrasing, and that first token probabilities do not match text answers for instruction-tuned models. Therefore, in this paper, we investigate the robustness of text answers. We show that the text answers are more robust to question perturbations than the first token probabilities, when the first token answers mismatch the text answers. The difference in robustness increases as the mismatch rate becomes greater. As the mismatch reaches over 50\%, the text answer is more robust to option order changes than the debiased first token probabilities using state-of-the-art debiasing methods such as PriDe. Our findings provide further evidence for the benefits of text answer evaluation over first token probability evaluation.

Reasoning quality in large language models depends not only on producing correct answers but also on generating valid intermediate steps. We study this through multiple-choice question answering (MCQA), which provides a controlled setting with fixed answer options. Our analysis shows that when questions are effectively unsolvable for a model, spurious chains of thought (CoTs) are more likely to appear, leading to false positives. By estimating the solvability of each question, we uncover an intermediate regime where learning is most effective. Building on this insight, we adapt outcome-supervised reward models and reinforcement learning with group-relative advantage to incorporate solvability into their objectives. Across experiments on math and multimodal datasets, these modifications consistently yield higher rates of process-correct reasoning and, in reinforcement learning, improved answer accuracy as well. Our results highlight solvability as a key factor for reducing hallucinations and increasing reliability in CoT reasoning.

This paper introduces MalAlgoQA, a novel dataset designed to evaluate the counterfactual reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) through a pedagogical approach. The dataset comprises mathematics and reading comprehension questions, each accompanied by four answer choices and their corresponding rationales. At the heart of MalAlgoQA are ``malgorithms'' - rationales behind incorrect answer choices that represent flawed yet logically coherent reasoning paths. These malgorithms serve as counterfactual scenarios, allowing us to assess an LLM's ability to identify and analyze flawed reasoning patterns. We propose the Malgorithm Identification task, where LLMs are assessed based on their ability to identify corresponding malgorithm given an incorrect answer choice. To evaluate the model performance, we introduce two metrics: Algorithm Identification Accuracy (AIA) for correct answer rationale identification, and Malgorithm Identification Accuracy (MIA) for incorrect answer rationale identification. Our experiments reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs exhibit significant performance drops in MIA compared to AIA, highlighting the challenges in counterfactual reasoning. Surprisingly, we find that the chain-of-thought prompting technique not only fails to consistently enhance MIA but can sometimes lead to underperformance compared to simple prompting. These findings have important implications for developing LLMs with improved counterfactual reasoning, particularly relevant for AI-powered tutoring systems, where identifying and addressing student misconceptions is essential. MalAlgoQA dataset is available https://github.com/luffycodes/MalAlgoQA-Dataset{here}.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Large Language Models (LLMs) leverage step-by-step reasoning to solve complex problems. Standard evaluation practice involves generating a complete reasoning trace and assessing the correctness of the final answer presented at its conclusion. In this paper, we challenge the reliance on the final answer by posing the following two questions: Does the final answer reliably represent the model's optimal conclusion? Can alternative reasoning paths yield different results? To answer these questions, we analyze intermediate reasoning steps, termed subthoughts, and propose a method based on our findings. Our approach involves segmenting a reasoning trace into sequential subthoughts based on linguistic cues. We start by prompting the model to generate continuations from the end-point of each intermediate subthought. We extract a potential answer from every completed continuation originating from different subthoughts. We find that aggregating these answers by selecting the most frequent one (the mode) often yields significantly higher accuracy compared to relying solely on the answer derived from the original complete trace. Analyzing the consistency among the answers derived from different subthoughts reveals characteristics that correlate with the model's confidence and correctness, suggesting potential for identifying less reliable answers. Our experiments across various LLMs and challenging mathematical reasoning datasets (AIME2024 and AIME2025) show consistent accuracy improvements, with gains reaching up to 13\% and 10\% respectively. Implementation is available at: https://github.com/hammoudhasan/SubthoughtReasoner.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Reasoning models have achieved remarkable performance on tasks like math and logical reasoning thanks to their ability to search during reasoning. However, they still suffer from overthinking, often performing unnecessary reasoning steps even after reaching the correct answer. This raises the question: can models evaluate the correctness of their intermediate answers during reasoning? In this work, we study whether reasoning models encode information about answer correctness through probing the model's hidden states. The resulting probe can verify intermediate answers with high accuracy and produces highly calibrated scores. Additionally, we find models' hidden states encode correctness of future answers, enabling early prediction of the correctness before the intermediate answer is fully formulated. We then use the probe as a verifier to decide whether to exit reasoning at intermediate answers during inference, reducing the number of inference tokens by 24\% without compromising performance. These findings confirm that reasoning models do encode a notion of correctness yet fail to exploit it, revealing substantial untapped potential to enhance their efficiency.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

Reasoning large language models (RLLMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable capabilities through structured and multi-step reasoning. While prior research has primarily focused on improving their training and inference strategies, their potential for in-context learning (ICL) remains largely underexplored. To fill this gap, we propose Thinking with Nothinking Calibration (JointThinking), a new ICL paradigm that leverages the structured difference between two reasoning modes, i.e., Thinking and Nothinking, to improve reasoning accuracy. Specifically, our method prompts the model to generate two answers in parallel: one in Thinking mode and the other in Nothinking mode. A second round of Thinking is triggered only when the two initial responses are inconsistent, using a single prompt that incorporates the original question and both candidate answers. Since such disagreement occurs infrequently (e.g., only 6\% in GSM8K), our method performs just one round of reasoning in most cases, resulting in minimal latency overhead. Extensive experiments across multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that JointThinking significantly outperforms few-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) and majority voting with improved answer robustness. Moreover, It achieves comparable in-distribution performance to training-based SOTA method, while substantially outperforming on out-of-distribution tasks. We further conduct a systematic analysis of the calibration mechanism, showing that leveraging different reasoning modes consistently lowers the error rate and highlights the value of structural thinking diversity. Additionally, we observe that the performance gap between actual and ideal reasoning narrows as model size increases in the second round of thinking, indicating the strong scalability of our approach. Finally, we discuss current limitations and outline promising directions for future ICL research in RLLMs.

Recently, techniques such as explicit structured reasoning have demonstrated strong test-time scaling behavior by enforcing a separation between the model's internal "thinking" process and the final response. A key factor influencing answer quality in this setting is the length of the thinking stage. When the reasoning is too short, the model may fail to capture the complexity of the task. Conversely, when it is too long, the model may overthink, leading to unnecessary computation and degraded performance. This paper explores and exploits the underlying mechanisms by which LLMs understand and regulate the length of their reasoning during explicit thought processes. First, we show that LLMs encode their progress through the reasoning process and introduce an interactive progress bar visualization, which is then used to reveal insights on the model's planning dynamics. Second, we manipulate the internal progress encoding during inference to reduce unnecessary steps and generate a more concise and decisive chain of thoughts. Our empirical results demonstrate that this "overclocking" method mitigates overthinking, improves answer accuracy, and reduces inference latency. Our code is publicly available.

While recent success of large reasoning models (LRMs) significantly advanced LLMs' reasoning capability by optimizing the final answer accuracy using reinforcement learning, they may also drastically increase the output length due to overthinking, characterized by unnecessarily complex reasoning paths that waste computation and potentially degrade the performance. We hypothesize that such inefficiencies stem from LRMs' limited capability to dynamically select the proper modular reasoning strategies, termed thinking patterns at the right position. To investigate this hypothesis, we propose a dynamic optimization framework that segments model-generated reasoning paths into distinct thinking patterns, systematically identifying and promoting beneficial patterns that improve the answer while removing detrimental ones. Empirical analysis confirms that our optimized thinking paths yield more concise yet sufficiently informative trajectories, enhancing reasoning efficiency by reducing attention FLOPs by up to 47% while maintaining accuracy for originally correct responses. Moreover, a non-trivial portion of originally incorrect responses are transformed into correct ones, achieving a 15.6% accuracy improvement with reduced length. Motivated by the improvement brought by the optimized thinking paths, we apply a preference optimization technique supported by a pairwise dataset contrasting suboptimal and optimal reasoning paths. Experimental evaluations across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks reveal that our method notably reduces computational overhead while simultaneously improving reasoning accuracy, achieving up to a 12% accuracy improvement and reducing token usage from approximately 5,000 to 3,000 tokens.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

Learning from mistakes is a fundamental feature of human intelligence. Previous work has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can also learn from incorrect answers when provided with a comprehensive rationale detailing why an answer is wrong or how to correct it. In this work, we examine whether LLMs can learn from mistakes in mathematical reasoning tasks when these explanations are not provided. We investigate if LLMs are able to implicitly infer such rationales simply from observing both incorrect and correct answers. Surprisingly, we find that LLMs perform better, on average, when rationales are eliminated from the context and incorrect answers are simply shown alongside correct ones. This approach also substantially outperforms chain-of-thought prompting in our evaluations. We show that these results are consistent across LLMs of different sizes and varying reasoning abilities. Further, we carry out an in-depth analysis, and show that prompting with both wrong and correct answers leads to greater performance and better generalisation than introducing additional, more diverse question-answer pairs into the context. Finally, we show that new rationales generated by models that have only observed incorrect and correct answers are scored equally as highly by humans as those produced with the aid of exemplar rationales. Our results demonstrate that LLMs are indeed capable of in-context implicit learning.

Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI's o1 have demonstrated remarkable abilities in complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute and exhibiting human-like deep thinking. However, we identify a phenomenon we term underthinking, where o1-like LLMs frequently switch between different reasoning thoughts without sufficiently exploring promising paths to reach a correct solution. This behavior leads to inadequate depth of reasoning and decreased performance, particularly on challenging mathematical problems. To systematically analyze this issue, we conduct experiments on three challenging test sets and two representative open-source o1-like models, revealing that frequent thought switching correlates with incorrect responses. We introduce a novel metric to quantify underthinking by measuring token efficiency in incorrect answers. To address underthinking, we propose a decoding strategy with thought switching penalty TIP that discourages premature transitions between thoughts, encouraging deeper exploration of each reasoning path. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach improves accuracy across challenging datasets without requiring model fine-tuning. Our findings contribute to understanding reasoning inefficiencies in o1-like LLMs and offer a practical solution to enhance their problem-solving capabilities.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly optimized for long reasoning, under the assumption that more reasoning leads to better performance. However, emerging evidence suggests that longer responses can sometimes degrade accuracy rather than improve it. In this paper, we conduct a systematic empirical study of the relationship between reasoning length and answer correctness. We find that LLMs tend to overthink simple problems, generating unnecessarily long outputs, and underthink harder ones, failing to extend their reasoning when it is most needed. This indicates that models might misjudge problem difficulty and fail to calibrate their response length appropriately. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of length reduction with a preference optimization algorithm when simply preferring the shorter responses regardless of answer correctness. Experiments show that the generation length can be significantly reduced while maintaining acceptable accuracy. Our findings highlight generation length as a meaningful signal for reasoning behavior and motivate further exploration into LLMs' self-awareness in reasoning length adaptation.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

Recent years have witnessed significant progress in large language models' (LLMs) reasoning, which is largely due to the chain-of-thought (CoT) approaches, allowing models to generate intermediate reasoning steps before reaching the final answer. Building on these advances, state-of-the-art LLMs are instruction-tuned to provide long and detailed CoT pathways when responding to reasoning-related questions. However, human beings are naturally cognitive misers and will prompt language models to give rather short responses, thus raising a significant conflict with CoT reasoning. In this paper, we delve into how LLMs' reasoning performance changes when users provide short-path prompts. The results and analysis reveal that language models can reason effectively and robustly without explicit CoT prompts, while under short-path prompting, LLMs' reasoning ability drops significantly and becomes unstable, even on grade-school problems. To address this issue, we propose two approaches: an instruction-guided approach and a fine-tuning approach, both designed to effectively manage the conflict. Experimental results show that both methods achieve high accuracy, providing insights into the trade-off between instruction adherence and reasoning accuracy in current models.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated that reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) can significantly enhance reasoning abilities by directly optimizing correctness, rather than relying solely on supervised imitation. This paradigm has been extended to multimodal LLMs for complex video and image understanding tasks. However, while outcome-driven RL improves answer accuracy, it can inadvertently decouple the reasoning chain from the final answer, leading to situations where models produce inconsistency between the reasoning trace and final answer. In our experiments on multiple-choice visual question-answering tasks, the standard GRPO method yields only 79.7\% consistency on MMVU between the reasoning steps and the chosen answers, indicating frequent mismatches between answers and reasoning. To this end, we propose Answer-Consistent Reinforcement Learning (ACRE) that modifies the GRPO algorithm with an auxiliary consistency check. After the model generates a chain of thought and an initial answer for a given question, we shuffle the answer options and prompt the model again with the same reasoning trace to predict a second answer. We design a consistency-verification reward that grants a high reward only if both the original and the post-shuffle answers agree and are correct; otherwise, a lower reward is assigned accordingly. This mechanism penalizes reasoning-answer misalignment and discourages the model from relying on spurious patterns, such as option ordering biases. We evaluate ACRE on challenging Video Reasoning benchmarks and multimodal math reasoning benchmarks, achieving an average 2.2\% and 1.5\% improvement for Video Reasoning and Math Reasoning tasks over the GRPO baseline.

Large language models (LLMs) can correctly answer "When was Einstein born?" yet fail to provide the same date when writing about Einstein's life revealing a fundamental inconsistency in how models access factual knowledge across task complexities. While models display impressive accuracy on factual question-answering benchmarks, the reliability gap between simple and complex queries remains poorly understood, eroding their trustworthiness. In this work, we introduce Short-Long Form Alignment for Factual Question Answering (SLAQ), a controlled evaluation framework that compares LLMs' answers to the same factual questions asked (a) in isolation (short) vs. (b) integrated into complex queries (long). Looking at 16 LLMs across 600 queries, we find a systematic misalignment of answers to the corresponding short and long queries. We further uncover position-dependent accuracy loss and momentum effects where consecutive correct or incorrect answers create self-reinforcing patterns. Through mechanistic analysis, we find that aligned facts activate overlapping model internals, and that metrics based on mechanistic similarity can predict short-long answer alignment with up to 78% accuracy. Our work establishes factual consistency over query complexity as an important aspect of LLMs' trustworthiness and challenges current evaluation practices, which implicitly assume that good performance for simple factual queries implies reliability in more complex knowledge-seeking tasks too.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) with thinking traces have shown strong performance on English reasoning tasks. However, their ability to think in other languages is less studied. This capability is as important as answer accuracy for real world applications because users may find the reasoning trace useful for oversight only when it is expressed in their own language. We comprehensively evaluate two leading families of LRMs on our XReasoning benchmark and find that even the most advanced models often revert to English or produce fragmented reasoning in other languages, revealing a substantial gap in multilingual reasoning. Prompt based interventions that force models to reason in the users language improve readability and oversight but reduce answer accuracy, exposing an important trade off. We further show that targeted post training on just 100 examples mitigates this mismatch, though some accuracy loss remains. Our results highlight the limited multilingual reasoning capabilities of current LRMs and outline directions for future work. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Betswish/mCoT-XReasoning.

Recent reasoning LLMs (RLMs), especially those trained with verifier-based reinforcement learning, often perform worse with few-shot CoT than with direct answering. We revisit this paradox using high-quality reasoning traces from DeepSeek-R1 as demonstrations and find that adding more exemplars consistently degrades accuracy, even when demonstrations are optimal. A detailed analysis reveals two mechanisms behind this decline: (i) semantic misguidance, where high textual similarity leads the model to treat the target as the same as the exemplar and to copy intermediate steps verbatim; and (ii) strategy transfer failure, where the model struggles to extract useful reasoning strategies and apply them to target questions. Guided by these, we introduce Insight-to-Solve (I2S), a sequential test-time procedure that turns demonstrations into explicit, reusable insights and derives a target-specific reasoning trace; optionally, the reasoning is self-refined for coherence and correctness (I2S+). Extensive experiments on diverse benchmarks show that I2S and I2S+ consistently outperform both direct answering and test-time scaling baselines across open- and closed-source models. Even for GPT models, our method helps: on AIME'25, GPT-4.1 rises by +14.0%, and o1-mini improves by +2.7% on AIME and +1.7% on GPQA, indicating that in-context demonstrations can be harnessed effectively via insight-refine-solve framework.

This paper investigates the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) using 50 newly constructed high-school-level word problems. Unlike prior studies that focus solely on answer correctness, we rigorously analyze both final answers and solution steps to identify reasoning failures. Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models - including Mixtral, Llama, Gemini, GPT-4o, and OpenAI's o1 variants - we find that while newer models (e.g., o3-mini, deepseek-r1) achieve higher accuracy, all models exhibit errors in spatial reasoning, strategic planning, and arithmetic, sometimes producing correct answers through flawed logic. Common failure modes include unwarranted assumptions, over-reliance on numerical patterns, and difficulty translating physical intuition into mathematical steps. Manual analysis reveals that models struggle with problems requiring multi-step deduction or real-world knowledge, despite possessing broad mathematical knowledge. Our results underscore the importance of evaluating reasoning processes, not just answers, and caution against overestimating LLMs' problem-solving proficiency. The study highlights persistent gaps in LLMs' generalization abilities, emphasizing the need for targeted improvements in structured reasoning and constraint handling.

Recent thinking models solve complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute, but this scaling must be allocated in line with task difficulty. On one hand, short reasoning (underthinking) leads to errors on harder problems that require extended reasoning steps; but, excessively long reasoning (overthinking) can be token-inefficient, generating unnecessary steps even after reaching a correct intermediate solution. We refer to this as under-adaptivity, where the model fails to modulate its response length appropriately given problems of varying difficulty. To address under-adaptivity and strike a balance between under- and overthinking, we propose TRAAC (Think Right with Adaptive, Attentive Compression), an online post-training RL method that leverages the model's self-attention over a long reasoning trajectory to identify important steps and prune redundant ones. TRAAC also estimates difficulty and incorporates it into training rewards, thereby learning to allocate reasoning budget commensurate with example difficulty. Our approach improves accuracy, reduces reasoning steps, and enables adaptive thinking compared to base models and other RL baselines. Across a variety of tasks (AIME, AMC, GPQA-D, BBEH), TRAAC (Qwen3-4B) achieves an average absolute accuracy gain of 8.4% with a relative reduction in reasoning length of 36.8% compared to the base model, and a 7.9% accuracy gain paired with a 29.4% length drop compared to the best RL baseline. TRAAC also shows strong generalization: although our models are trained on math datasets, they show accuracy and efficiency gains on out-of-distribution non-math datasets like GPQA-D, BBEH, and OptimalThinkingBench. Our analysis further verifies that TRAAC provides fine-grained adjustments to thinking budget based on difficulty and that a combination of task-difficulty calibration and attention-based compression yields gains across diverse tasks.

We investigate whether synthetic question-answer (QA) data generated by large language models (LLMs) can serve as an effective proxy for human-labeled benchmarks when such data is unavailable. We assess the reliability of synthetic benchmarks across two experiments: one varying retriever parameters while keeping the generator fixed, and another varying the generator with fixed retriever parameters. Across four datasets, of which two open-domain and two proprietary, we find that synthetic benchmarks reliably rank the RAGs varying in terms of retriever configuration, aligning well with human-labeled benchmark baselines. However, they fail to produce consistent RAG rankings when comparing generator architectures. The breakdown possibly arises from a combination of task mismatch between the synthetic and human benchmarks, and stylistic bias favoring certain generators.

Language models are known to absorb biases from their training data, leading to predictions driven by statistical regularities rather than semantic relevance. We investigate the impact of these biases on answer choice preferences in the Massive Multi-Task Language Understanding (MMLU) task. Our findings reveal that differences in learned regularities across answer options are predictive of model preferences and mirror human test-taking strategies. To address this issue, we introduce two novel methods: Counterfactual Prompting with Chain of Thought (CoT) and Counterfactual Prompting with Agnostically Primed CoT (APriCoT). We demonstrate that while Counterfactual Prompting with CoT alone is insufficient to mitigate bias, our novel Primed Counterfactual Prompting with CoT approach effectively reduces the influence of base-rate probabilities while improving overall accuracy. Our results suggest that mitigating bias requires a "System-2" like process and that CoT reasoning is susceptible to confirmation bias under some prompting methodologies. Our contributions offer practical solutions for developing more robust and fair language models.

Recent video question answering benchmarks indicate that state-of-the-art models struggle to answer compositional questions. However, it remains unclear which types of compositional reasoning cause models to mispredict. Furthermore, it is difficult to discern whether models arrive at answers using compositional reasoning or by leveraging data biases. In this paper, we develop a question decomposition engine that programmatically deconstructs a compositional question into a directed acyclic graph of sub-questions. The graph is designed such that each parent question is a composition of its children. We present AGQA-Decomp, a benchmark containing 2.3M question graphs, with an average of 11.49 sub-questions per graph, and 4.55M total new sub-questions. Using question graphs, we evaluate three state-of-the-art models with a suite of novel compositional consistency metrics. We find that models either cannot reason correctly through most compositions or are reliant on incorrect reasoning to reach answers, frequently contradicting themselves or achieving high accuracies when failing at intermediate reasoning steps.

Given questions regarding some prototypical situation such as Name something that people usually do before they leave the house for work? a human can easily answer them via acquired experiences. There can be multiple right answers for such questions, with some more common for a situation than others. This paper introduces a new question answering dataset for training and evaluating common sense reasoning capabilities of artificial intelligence systems in such prototypical situations. The training set is gathered from an existing set of questions played in a long-running international game show FAMILY- FEUD. The hidden evaluation set is created by gathering answers for each question from 100 crowd-workers. We also propose a generative evaluation task where a model has to output a ranked list of answers, ideally covering all prototypical answers for a question. After presenting multiple competitive baseline models, we find that human performance still exceeds model scores on all evaluation metrics with a meaningful gap, supporting the challenging nature of the task.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting in large language models (LLMs) has shown promising performance on mathematical reasoning tasks. Recently, Self-Consistency samples a diverse set of reasoning chains with different answers and chooses the answer by majority voting. Though effective, its performance cannot be further improved by sampling more reasoning chains. To address this problem, we propose to integrate backward reasoning into answer verification. We first mask a number in the question by {bf x}. The LLM is then asked to predict the masked number with a candidate answer A embedded in the template: ``If we know the answer to the above question is {A}, what is the value of unknown variable {bf x}?'' The LLM is expected to predict the masked number successfully if the provided candidate answer is correct. To further improve performance, we propose FOBAR (FOrward-BAckward Reasoning) to combine forward and backward reasoning for verifying candidate answers. Experiments are performed on six standard mathematical data sets and three LLMs (text-davinci-003, GPT-3.5-Turbo, GPT-4). Results show that FOBAR achieves state-of-the-art performance. In particular, FOBAR outperforms Self-Consistency which uses forward reasoning alone, demonstrating that combining forward and forward reasoning is better. It also outperforms existing verification methods, verifying the effectiveness of using the simple template in backward reasoning and the proposed combination.

Chain-of-thought (COT) prompting can help large language models (LLMs) reason toward correct answers, but its efficacy in reasoning toward incorrect answers is unexplored. This process of elimination (PoE), when used with COT, can enhance self-consistency, interpretability, and tasks such as medical diagnoses of exclusion. Thus, we propose PoE with COT, where LLMs must reason toward incorrect options on multiple-choice questions. We evaluate the ability of GPT-3.5, LLaMA-2, and Falcon to perform PoE with COT on a total of four commonsense and scientific reasoning datasets. We find that the strategy of PoE always underperforms the strategy of choosing the correct answer. The agreement of these strategies is also lower than the self-consistency of each strategy. To study these issues further, we conduct error analyses and give suggestions for future work.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

Reasoning large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated superior capacities in solving complicated problems by generating long chain-of-thoughts (CoT), but such a lengthy CoT incurs high inference costs. In this study, we introduce ES-CoT, an inference-time method that shortens CoT generation by detecting answer convergence and stopping early with minimal performance loss. At the end of each reasoning step, we prompt the LLM to output its current final answer, denoted as a step answer. We then track the run length of consecutive identical step answers as a measure of answer convergence. Once the run length exhibits a sharp increase and exceeds a minimum threshold, the generation is terminated. We provide both empirical and theoretical support for this heuristic: step answers steadily converge to the final answer, and large run-length jumps reliably mark this convergence. Experiments on five reasoning datasets across three LLMs show that ES-CoT reduces the number of inference tokens by about 41\% on average while maintaining accuracy comparable to standard CoT. Further, ES-CoT integrates seamlessly with self-consistency prompting and remains robust across hyperparameter choices, highlighting it as a practical and effective approach for efficient reasoning.

We evaluate how well Large Language Models (LLMs) latently recall and compose facts to answer multi-hop queries like "In the year Scarlett Johansson was born, the Summer Olympics were hosted in the country of". One major challenge in evaluating this ability is that LLMs may have developed shortcuts by encounters of the head entity "Scarlett Johansson" and the answer entity "United States" in the same training sequences or merely guess the answer based on frequency-based priors. To prevent shortcuts, we exclude test queries where the head and answer entities co-appear in pretraining corpora. Through careful selection of relations and facts and systematic removal of cases where models might guess answers or exploit partial matches, we construct an evaluation dataset SOCRATES (ShOrtCut-fRee lATent rEaSoning). We observe that LLMs demonstrate promising latent multi-hop reasoning abilities without exploiting shortcuts, but only for certain types of queries. For queries requiring latent recall of countries as the intermediate answer, the best models achieve 80% latent composability, but this drops to just 5% for the recall of years. Comparisons with Chain-of-Thought composability highlight a significant gap between the ability of models to reason latently versus explicitly. Analysis reveals that latent representations of the intermediate answer are constructed more often in queries with higher latent composability, and shows the emergence of latent multi-hop reasoning during pretraining.

Large language models have recently demonstrated significant gains in reasoning ability, often attributed to their capacity to generate longer chains of thought and engage in reflective reasoning. However, the contribution of reflections to performance improvement remains unclear. In this paper, we systematically analyze the rollouts of eight reasoning models on five mathematical datasets. We focus on reflective behaviours where the model has already produced an answer but continues reflecting before finalizing its output. Our analysis reveals that reflections are predominantly confirmatory and rarely alter the model's initial answer, a pattern consistent across models and datasets. To understand the role of reflections in training, we construct supervised fine-tuning (SFT) datasets with varying amounts of reflection steps. We observe that training models on rollouts with more reflection steps primarily enhances first-answer correctness rather than the ability to correct initially wrong answers through reflections. This motivates us to propose a question-aware early-stopping method that enhances inference-time token efficiency by stopping the reasoning process once a few plausible candidate answers are generated, thereby reducing unnecessary reflection steps. Motivated by this, we further propose to dynamically truncate the reflections after a candidate answer has appeared during generation, which reduces reasoning tokens by 24.5% across five mathematical datasets, within a 2.9% drop in accuracy.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) are increasingly applied to scientific research, yet it remains unclear whether they can reliably understand and reason over the multimodal complexity of papers. A central challenge lies in detecting and resolving inconsistencies across text, figures, tables, and equations, issues that are often subtle, domain-specific, and ultimately undermine clarity, reproducibility, and trust. Existing benchmarks overlook this issue, either isolating single modalities or relying on synthetic errors that fail to capture real-world complexity. We introduce PRISMM-Bench (Peer-Review-sourced Inconsistency Set for Multimodal Models), the first benchmark grounded in real reviewer-flagged inconsistencies in scientific papers. Through a multi-stage pipeline of review mining, LLM-assisted filtering and human verification, we curate 262 inconsistencies from 242 papers. Based on this set, we design three tasks, namely inconsistency identification, remedy and pair matching, which assess a model's capacity to detect, correct, and reason over inconsistencies across different modalities. Furthermore, to address the notorious problem of choice-only shortcuts in multiple-choice evaluation, where models exploit answer patterns without truly understanding the question, we further introduce structured JSON-based answer representations that minimize linguistic biases by reducing reliance on superficial stylistic cues. We benchmark 21 leading LMMs, including large open-weight models (GLM-4.5V 106B, InternVL3 78B) and proprietary models (Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-5 with high reasoning). Results reveal strikingly low performance (26.1-54.2%), underscoring the challenge of multimodal scientific reasoning and motivating progress towards trustworthy scientific assistants.

Large language models (LLMs) are prone to hallucinations in question-answering (QA) tasks when faced with ambiguous questions. Users often assume that LLMs share their cognitive alignment, a mutual understanding of context, intent, and implicit details, leading them to omit critical information in the queries. However, LLMs generate responses based on assumptions that can misalign with user intent, which may be perceived as hallucinations if they misalign with the user's intent. Therefore, identifying those implicit assumptions is crucial to resolve ambiguities in QA. Prior work, such as AmbigQA, reduces ambiguity in queries via human-annotated clarifications, which is not feasible in real application. Meanwhile, ASQA compiles AmbigQA's short answers into long-form responses but inherits human biases and fails capture explicit logical distinctions that differentiates the answers. We introduce Conditional Ambiguous Question-Answering (CondAmbigQA), a benchmark with 200 ambiguous queries and condition-aware evaluation metrics. Our study pioneers the concept of ``conditions'' in ambiguous QA tasks, where conditions stand for contextual constraints or assumptions that resolve ambiguities. The retrieval-based annotation strategy uses retrieved Wikipedia fragments to identify possible interpretations for a given query as its conditions and annotate the answers through those conditions. Such a strategy minimizes human bias introduced by different knowledge levels among annotators. By fixing retrieval results, CondAmbigQA evaluates how RAG systems leverage conditions to resolve ambiguities. Experiments show that models considering conditions before answering improve performance by 20%, with an additional 5% gain when conditions are explicitly provided. These results underscore the value of conditional reasoning in QA, offering researchers tools to rigorously evaluate ambiguity resolution.

Ambiguous questions are a challenge for Question Answering models, as they require answers that cover multiple interpretations of the original query. To this end, these models are required to generate long-form answers that often combine conflicting pieces of information. Although recent advances in the field have shown strong capabilities in generating fluent responses, certain research questions remain unanswered. Does model/data scaling improve the answers' quality? Do automated metrics align with human judgment? To what extent do these models ground their answers in evidence? In this study, we aim to thoroughly investigate these aspects, and provide valuable insights into the limitations of the current approaches. To aid in reproducibility and further extension of our work, we open-source our code at https://github.com/din0s/ambig_lfqa.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

The open-ended nature of language generation makes the evaluation of autoregressive large language models (LLMs) challenging. One common evaluation approach uses multiple-choice questions (MCQ) to limit the response space. The model is then evaluated by ranking the candidate answers by the log probability of the first token prediction. However, first-tokens may not consistently reflect the final response output, due to model's diverse response styles such as starting with "Sure" or refusing to answer. Consequently, MCQ evaluation is not indicative of model behaviour when interacting with users. But by how much? We evaluate how aligned first-token evaluation is with the text output along several dimensions, namely final option choice, refusal rate, choice distribution and robustness under prompt perturbation. Our results show that the two approaches are severely misaligned on all dimensions, reaching mismatch rates over 60%. Models heavily fine-tuned on conversational or safety data are especially impacted. Crucially, models remain misaligned even when we increasingly constrain prompts, i.e., force them to start with an option letter or example template. Our findings i) underscore the importance of inspecting the text output as well and ii) caution against relying solely on first-token evaluation.

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are criticized for the excessively lengthy Chain-of-Thought (CoT) to derive the final answer, suffering from high first-token and overall latency. Typically, the CoT of LRMs mixes multiple thinking units; each unit attempts to produce a candidate answer to the original query. Hence, a natural idea to improve efficiency is to reduce the unit number. Yet, the fact that the thinking units in vanilla CoT cannot be explicitly managed renders doing so challenging. This paper introduces Multi-Turn Decomposition (MinD) to decode conventional CoT into a sequence of explicit, structured, and turn-wise interactions to bridge the gap. In MinD, the model provides a multi-turn response to the query, where each turn embraces a thinking unit and yields a corresponding answer. The subsequent turns can reflect, verify, revise, or explore alternative approaches to both the thinking and answer parts of earlier ones. This not only makes the answer delivered more swiftly, but also enables explicit controls over the iterative reasoning process (i.e., users may halt or continue at any turn). We follow a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) then reinforcement learning (RL) paradigm to realize MinD. We first rephrase the outputs of an LRM into multi-turn formats by prompting another LLM, and then tune the LRM with such data. Observing that the tuned model tends to consume even more tokens than the original one (probably due to that the multi-turn formats introduce additional answer tokens), we advocate leveraging RL algorithms like GRPO to prioritize correct outputs with fewer turns. Trained on the MATH dataset using R1-Distill models, MinD can achieve up to ~70% reduction in both output token usage and time to first token (TTFT), while maintaining competitive performance on reasoning benchmarks such as MATH-500, AIME24, AMC23, and GPQA-Diamond.

Misunderstandings arise not only in interpersonal communication but also between humans and Large Language Models (LLMs). Such discrepancies can make LLMs interpret seemingly unambiguous questions in unexpected ways, yielding incorrect responses. While it is widely acknowledged that the quality of a prompt, such as a question, significantly impacts the quality of the response provided by LLMs, a systematic method for crafting questions that LLMs can better comprehend is still underdeveloped. In this paper, we present a method named `Rephrase and Respond' (RaR), which allows LLMs to rephrase and expand questions posed by humans and provide responses in a single prompt. This approach serves as a simple yet effective prompting method for improving performance. We also introduce a two-step variant of RaR, where a rephrasing LLM first rephrases the question and then passes the original and rephrased questions together to a different responding LLM. This facilitates the effective utilization of rephrased questions generated by one LLM with another. Our experiments demonstrate that our methods significantly improve the performance of different models across a wide range to tasks. We further provide a comprehensive comparison between RaR and the popular Chain-of-Thought (CoT) methods, both theoretically and empirically. We show that RaR is complementary to CoT and can be combined with CoT to achieve even better performance. Our work not only contributes to enhancing LLM performance efficiently and effectively but also sheds light on a fair evaluation of LLM capabilities. Data and codes are available at https://github.com/uclaml/Rephrase-and-Respond.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled automatic generation of chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, leading to strong performance on tasks such as math and code. However, when reasoning steps reflect social stereotypes (e.g., those related to gender, race or age), they can reinforce harmful associations and lead to misleading conclusions. We present the first systematic evaluation of social bias within LLM-generated reasoning, using the BBQ dataset to analyze both prediction accuracy and bias. Our study spans a wide range of mainstream reasoning models, including instruction-tuned and CoT-augmented variants of DeepSeek-R1 (8B/32B), ChatGPT, and other open-source LLMs. We quantify how biased reasoning steps correlate with incorrect predictions and often lead to stereotype expression. To mitigate reasoning-induced bias, we propose Answer Distribution as Bias Proxy (ADBP), a lightweight mitigation method that detects bias by tracking how model predictions change across incremental reasoning steps. ADBP outperforms a stereotype-free baseline in most cases, mitigating bias and improving the accuracy of LLM outputs. Code will be released upon paper acceptance.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

The emergence of reasoning models and their integration into practical AI chat bots has led to breakthroughs in solving advanced math, deep search, and extractive question answering problems that requires a complex and multi-step thought process. Yet, a complete understanding of why these models hallucinate more than general purpose language models is missing. In this investigative study, we systematicallyexplore reasoning failures of contemporary language models on multi-hop question answering tasks. We introduce a novel, nuanced error categorization framework that examines failures across three critical dimensions: the diversity and uniqueness of source documents involved ("hops"), completeness in capturing relevant information ("coverage"), and cognitive inefficiency ("overthinking"). Through rigorous hu-man annotation, supported by complementary automated metrics, our exploration uncovers intricate error patterns often hidden by accuracy-centric evaluations. This investigative approach provides deeper insights into the cognitive limitations of current models and offers actionable guidance toward enhancing reasoning fidelity, transparency, and robustness in future language modeling efforts.

Recent studies show that the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) can be improved by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) to question-answering (QA) tasks in areas such as math and coding. With a long context length, LLMs may learn to perform search, as indicated by the self-correction behavior observed in DeepSeek R1. However, this search behavior is often imprecise and lacks confidence, resulting in long, redundant responses and highlighting deficiencies in intuition and verification. Inspired by the Dual Process Theory in psychology, we introduce a simple modification to the QA task that includes four stages: Fast Thinking, where the LLM must answer within a strict token budget; Verification, where the model evaluates its initial response; Slow Thinking, where it refines the initial response with more deliberation; and Summarization, where it distills the refinement from the previous stage into precise steps. Our proposed task improves average accuracy from 24.9% to 27.9% for Qwen2.5-1.5B, and from 45.9% to 49.8% for DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-1.5B. Notably, for Qwen2.5-1.5B, the Fast Thinking mode alone achieves 26.8% accuracy using fewer than 1000 tokens, demonstrating substantial inference efficiency gains. These findings suggest that intuition and deliberative reasoning are distinct, complementary systems benefiting from targeted training.

Much recent work seeks to evaluate values and opinions in large language models (LLMs) using multiple-choice surveys and questionnaires. Most of this work is motivated by concerns around real-world LLM applications. For example, politically-biased LLMs may subtly influence society when they are used by millions of people. Such real-world concerns, however, stand in stark contrast to the artificiality of current evaluations: real users do not typically ask LLMs survey questions. Motivated by this discrepancy, we challenge the prevailing constrained evaluation paradigm for values and opinions in LLMs and explore more realistic unconstrained evaluations. As a case study, we focus on the popular Political Compass Test (PCT). In a systematic review, we find that most prior work using the PCT forces models to comply with the PCT's multiple-choice format. We show that models give substantively different answers when not forced; that answers change depending on how models are forced; and that answers lack paraphrase robustness. Then, we demonstrate that models give different answers yet again in a more realistic open-ended answer setting. We distill these findings into recommendations and open challenges in evaluating values and opinions in LLMs.

ARC Challenge appears more difficult than ARC Easy for modern LLMs primarily due to an evaluation setup that prevents direct comparison of answer choices rather than inherent complexity. Although some researchers have quietly shifted to a more appropriate scheme over the last year, the implications of this change have yet to be widely acknowledged. We highlight this overlooked shift, show how similar evaluation practices falsely imply reasoning deficits in other benchmarks, and demonstrate that fairer methods dramatically reduce performance gaps (e.g. on SIQA) and even yield superhuman results (OpenBookQA). In doing so, we reveal how evaluation shapes perceived difficulty and offer guidelines to ensure that multiple-choice evaluations accurately reflect actual model capabilities.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

Test-time scaling has proven effective in further enhancing the performance of pretrained Large Language Models (LLMs). However, mainstream post-training methods (i.e., reinforcement learning (RL) with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning) often incur substantial computational overhead due to auxiliary models and overthinking. In this paper, we empirically reveal that the incorrect answers partially stem from verbose reasoning processes lacking correct self-fix, where errors accumulate across multiple reasoning steps. To this end, we propose Self-traced Step-wise Preference Optimization (SSPO), a pluggable RL process supervision framework that enables fine-grained optimization of each reasoning step. Specifically, SSPO requires neither auxiliary models nor stepwise manual annotations. Instead, it leverages step-wise preference signals generated by the model itself to guide the optimization process for reasoning compression. Experiments demonstrate that the generated reasoning sequences from SSPO are both accurate and succinct, effectively mitigating overthinking behaviors without compromising model performance across diverse domains and languages.

Large LMs such as GPT-3 are powerful, but can commit mistakes that are obvious to humans. For example, GPT-3 would mistakenly interpret "What word is similar to good?" to mean a homophone, while the user intended a synonym. Our goal is to effectively correct such errors via user interactions with the system but without retraining, which will be prohibitively costly. We pair GPT-3 with a growing memory of recorded cases where the model misunderstood the user's intents, along with user feedback for clarification. Such a memory allows our system to produce enhanced prompts for any new query based on the user feedback for error correction on similar cases in the past. On four tasks (two lexical tasks, two advanced ethical reasoning tasks), we show how a (simulated) user can interactively teach a deployed GPT-3, substantially increasing its accuracy over the queries with different kinds of misunderstandings by the GPT-3. Our approach is a step towards the low-cost utility enhancement for very large pre-trained LMs. Code, data, and instructions to implement MEMPROMPT for a new task at https://www.memprompt.com/.

Reasoning models enhance performance by tackling problems in a step-by-step manner, decomposing them into sub-problems and exploring long chains of thought before producing an answer. However, applying extended reasoning to every step introduces substantial redundancy, as sub-problems vary widely in difficulty and complexity: a small number of pivotal steps are genuinely challenging and decisive for the final answer, while many others only involve straightforward revisions or simple computations. Therefore, a natural idea is to endow reasoning models with the ability to adaptively respond to this variation, rather than treating all steps with the same level of elaboration. To this end, we propose MixReasoning, a framework that dynamically adjusts the depth of reasoning within a single response. The resulting chain of thought then becomes a mixture of detailed reasoning on difficult steps and concise inference on simpler ones. Experiments on GSM8K, MATH-500, and AIME show that MixReasoning shortens reasoning length and substantially improves efficiency without compromising accuracy.

Reasoning large language models (LLMs) heavily rely on scaling test-time compute to perform complex reasoning tasks by generating extensive "thinking" chains. While demonstrating impressive results, this approach incurs significant computational costs and inference time. In this work, we challenge the assumption that long thinking chains results in better reasoning capabilities. We first demonstrate that shorter reasoning chains within individual questions are significantly more likely to yield correct answers - up to 34.5% more accurate than the longest chain sampled for the same question. Based on these results, we suggest short-m@k, a novel reasoning LLM inference method. Our method executes k independent generations in parallel and halts computation once the first m thinking processes are done. The final answer is chosen using majority voting among these m chains. Basic short-1@k demonstrates similar or even superior performance over standard majority voting in low-compute settings - using up to 40% fewer thinking tokens. short-3@k, while slightly less efficient than short-1@k, consistently surpasses majority voting across all compute budgets, while still being substantially faster (up to 33% wall time reduction). Inspired by our results, we finetune an LLM using short, long, and randomly selected reasoning chains. We then observe that training on the shorter ones leads to better performance. Our findings suggest rethinking current methods of test-time compute in reasoning LLMs, emphasizing that longer "thinking" does not necessarily translate to improved performance and can, counter-intuitively, lead to degraded results.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1, have demonstrated the significant effectiveness of test-time scaling, achieving substantial performance gains across various benchmarks. These advanced models utilize deliberate "thinking" steps to systematically enhance answer quality. In this paper, we propose leveraging these high-quality outputs generated by reasoning-intensive models to improve less computationally demanding, non-reasoning models. We explore and compare methodologies for utilizing the answers produced by reasoning models to train and improve non-reasoning models. Through straightforward Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) experiments on established benchmarks, we demonstrate consistent improvements across various benchmarks, underscoring the potential of this approach for advancing the ability of models to answer questions directly.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

LLMs are typically trained to answer user questions or follow instructions similarly to how human experts respond. However, in the standard alignment framework they lack the basic ability of explicit thinking before answering. Thinking is important for complex questions that require reasoning and planning -- but can be applied to any task. We propose a training method for equipping existing LLMs with such thinking abilities for general instruction following without use of additional human data. We achieve this by an iterative search and optimization procedure that explores the space of possible thought generations, allowing the model to learn how to think without direct supervision. For each instruction, the thought candidates are scored using a judge model to evaluate their responses only, and then optimized via preference optimization. We show that this procedure leads to superior performance on AlpacaEval and Arena-Hard, and shows gains from thinking on non-reasoning categories such as marketing, health and general knowledge, in addition to more traditional reasoning & problem-solving tasks.

The recent progress in large language models (LLMs), especially the invention of chain-of-thoughts (CoT) prompting, makes it possible to solve reasoning problems. However, even the strongest LLMs are still struggling with more complicated problems that require non-linear thinking and multi-step reasoning. In this work, we explore whether LLMs have the ability to recognize their own errors, without resorting to external resources. In particular, we investigate whether they can be used to identify individual errors within a step-by-step reasoning. To this end, we propose a zero-shot verification scheme to recognize such errors. We then use this verification scheme to improve question-answering performance, by using it to perform weighted voting on different generated answers. We test the method on three math datasets-GSM8K, MathQA, and MATH-and find that it successfully recognizes errors and, in turn, increases final predictive performance.

Large Reasoning Models like DeepSeek-R1 mark a fundamental shift in how LLMs approach complex problems. Instead of directly producing an answer for a given input, DeepSeek-R1 creates detailed multi-step reasoning chains, seemingly "thinking" about a problem before providing an answer. This reasoning process is publicly available to the user, creating endless opportunities for studying the reasoning behaviour of the model and opening up the field of Thoughtology. Starting from a taxonomy of DeepSeek-R1's basic building blocks of reasoning, our analyses on DeepSeek-R1 investigate the impact and controllability of thought length, management of long or confusing contexts, cultural and safety concerns, and the status of DeepSeek-R1 vis-\`a-vis cognitive phenomena, such as human-like language processing and world modelling. Our findings paint a nuanced picture. Notably, we show DeepSeek-R1 has a 'sweet spot' of reasoning, where extra inference time can impair model performance. Furthermore, we find a tendency for DeepSeek-R1 to persistently ruminate on previously explored problem formulations, obstructing further exploration. We also note strong safety vulnerabilities of DeepSeek-R1 compared to its non-reasoning counterpart, which can also compromise safety-aligned LLMs.

Recent observations have underscored a disparity between the inflated benchmark scores and the actual performance of LLMs, raising concerns about potential contamination of evaluation benchmarks. This issue is especially critical for closed-source models and certain open-source models where training data transparency is lacking. In this paper we study data contamination by proposing two methods tailored for both open-source and proprietary LLMs. We first introduce a retrieval-based system to explore potential overlaps between evaluation benchmarks and pretraining corpora. We further present a novel investigation protocol named Testset Slot Guessing (TS-Guessing), applicable to both open and proprietary models. This approach entails masking a wrong answer in a multiple-choice question and prompting the model to fill in the gap. Additionally, it involves obscuring an unlikely word in an evaluation example and asking the model to produce it. We find that certain commercial LLMs could surprisingly guess the missing option in various test sets. Specifically, in the TruthfulQA benchmark, we find that LLMs exhibit notable performance improvement when provided with additional metadata in the benchmark. Further, in the MMLU benchmark, ChatGPT and GPT-4 demonstrated an exact match rate of 52\% and 57\%, respectively, in guessing the missing options in benchmark test data. We hope these results underscore the need for more robust evaluation methodologies and benchmarks in the field.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are revolutionizing information retrieval, with chatbots becoming an important source for answering user queries. As by their design, LLMs prioritize generating correct answers, the value of highly plausible yet incorrect answers (candidate answers) tends to be overlooked. However, such answers can still prove useful, for example, they can play a crucial role in tasks like Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) and QA Robustness Assessment (QARA). Existing QA datasets primarily focus on correct answers without explicit consideration of the plausibility of other candidate answers, limiting opportunity for more nuanced evaluations of models. To address this gap, we introduce PlausibleQA, a large-scale dataset comprising 10,000 questions and 100,000 candidate answers, each annotated with plausibility scores and justifications for their selection. Additionally, the dataset includes 900,000 justifications for pairwise comparisons between candidate answers, further refining plausibility assessments. We evaluate PlausibleQA through human assessments and empirical experiments, demonstrating its utility in MCQA and QARA analysis. Our findings show that plausibility-aware approaches are effective for MCQA distractor generation and QARA. We release PlausibleQA as a resource for advancing QA research and enhancing LLM performance in distinguishing plausible distractors from correct answers.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

A major risk of using language models in practical applications is their tendency to hallucinate incorrect statements. Hallucinations are often attributed to knowledge gaps in LMs, but we hypothesize that in some cases, when justifying previously generated hallucinations, LMs output false claims that they can separately recognize as incorrect. We construct three question-answering datasets where ChatGPT and GPT-4 often state an incorrect answer and offer an explanation with at least one incorrect claim. Crucially, we find that ChatGPT and GPT-4 can identify 67% and 87% of their own mistakes, respectively. We refer to this phenomenon as hallucination snowballing: an LM over-commits to early mistakes, leading to more mistakes that it otherwise would not make.

Multiple choice benchmarks have long been the workhorse of language model evaluation because grading multiple choice is objective and easy to automate. However, we show multiple choice questions from popular benchmarks can often be answered without even seeing the question. These shortcuts arise from a fundamental limitation of discriminative evaluation not shared by evaluations of the model's free-form, generative answers. Until recently, there appeared to be no viable, scalable alternative to multiple choice--but, we show that this has changed. We consider generative evaluation via what we call answer matching: Give the candidate model the question without the options, have it generate a free-form response, then use a modern language model with the reference answer to determine if the response matches the reference. To compare the validity of different evaluation strategies, we annotate MMLU-Pro and GPQA-Diamond to obtain human grading data, and measure the agreement of each evaluation approach. We find answer matching using recent models--even small ones--achieves near-perfect agreement, in the range of inter-annotator agreement. In contrast, both multiple choice evaluation and using LLM-as-a-judge without reference answers aligns poorly with human grading. Improving evaluations via answer matching is not merely a conceptual concern: the rankings of several models change significantly when evaluating their free-form responses with answer matching. In light of these findings, we discuss how to move the evaluation ecosystem from multiple choice to answer matching.

We investigate the ability of language models to perform compositional reasoning tasks where the overall solution depends on correctly composing the answers to sub-problems. We measure how often models can correctly answer all sub-problems but not generate the overall solution, a ratio we call the compositionality gap. We evaluate this ratio by asking multi-hop questions with answers that require composing multiple facts unlikely to have been observed together during pretraining. In the GPT-3 family of models, as model size increases we show that the single-hop question answering performance improves faster than the multi-hop performance does, therefore the compositionality gap does not decrease. This surprising result suggests that while more powerful models memorize and recall more factual knowledge, they show no corresponding improvement in their ability to perform this kind of compositional reasoning. We then demonstrate how elicitive prompting (such as chain of thought) narrows the compositionality gap by reasoning explicitly instead of implicitly. We present a new method, self-ask, that further improves on chain of thought. In our method, the model explicitly asks itself (and then answers) follow-up questions before answering the initial question. We finally show that self-ask's structured prompting lets us easily plug in a search engine to answer the follow-up questions, which additionally improves accuracy.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to hallucinations-outputs that are ungrounded, factually incorrect, or inconsistent with prior generations. We focus on close-book Question Answering (CBQA), where previous work has not fully addressed the distinction between two possible kinds of hallucinations, namely, whether the model (1) does not hold the correct answer in its parameters or (2) answers incorrectly despite having the required knowledge. We argue that distinguishing these cases is crucial for detecting and mitigating hallucinations. Specifically, case (2) may be mitigated by intervening in the model's internal computation, as the knowledge resides within the model's parameters. In contrast, in case (1) there is no parametric knowledge to leverage for mitigation, so it should be addressed by resorting to an external knowledge source or abstaining. To help distinguish between the two cases, we introduce Wrong Answer despite having Correct Knowledge (WACK), an approach for constructing model-specific datasets for the second hallucination type. Our probing experiments indicate that the two kinds of hallucinations are represented differently in the model's inner states. Next, we show that datasets constructed using WACK exhibit variations across models, demonstrating that even when models share knowledge of certain facts, they still vary in the specific examples that lead to hallucinations. Finally, we show that training a probe on our WACK datasets leads to better hallucination detection of case (2) hallucinations than using the common generic one-size-fits-all datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/hallucination-mitigation .

When people answer questions about a specific situation, e.g., "I cheated on my mid-term exam last week. Was that wrong?", cognitive science suggests that they form a mental picture of that situation before answering. While we do not know how language models (LMs) answer such questions, we conjecture that they may answer more accurately if they are also provided with additional details about the question situation, elaborating the "scene". To test this conjecture, we train a new model, DREAM, to answer questions that elaborate the scenes that situated questions are about, and then provide those elaborations as additional context to a question-answering (QA) model. We find that DREAM is able to create better scene elaborations (more accurate, useful, and consistent) than a representative state-of-the-art, zero-shot model (Macaw). We also find that using the scene elaborations as additional context improves the answer accuracy of a downstream QA system, including beyond that obtainable by simply further finetuning the QA system on DREAM's training data. These results suggest that adding focused elaborations about a situation can improve a system's reasoning about it, and may serve as an effective way of injecting new scenario based knowledge into QA models. Finally, our approach is dataset-neutral; we observe improved QA performance across different models, with even bigger gains on models with fewer parameters. We make our dataset and model publicly available at https://github.com/allenai/dream.

This paper presents a systematic study on enabling medical reasoning models (MRMs) to generate ranked lists of answers for open-ended questions. Clinical decision-making rarely relies on a single answer but instead considers multiple options, reducing the risks of narrow perspectives. Yet current MRMs are typically trained to produce only one answer, even in open-ended settings. We propose an alternative format: ranked lists and investigate two approaches: prompting and fine-tuning. While prompting is a cost-effective way to steer an MRM's response, not all MRMs generalize well across different answer formats: choice, short text, and list answers. Based on our prompting findings, we train and evaluate MRMs using supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT). SFT teaches a model to imitate annotated responses, and RFT incentivizes exploration through the responses that maximize a reward. We propose new reward functions targeted at ranked-list answer formats, and conduct ablation studies for RFT. Our results show that while some SFT models generalize to certain answer formats, models trained with RFT are more robust across multiple formats. We also present a case study on a modified MedQA with multiple valid answers, finding that although MRMs might fail to select the benchmark's preferred ground truth, they can recognize valid answers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic investigation of approaches for enabling MRMs to generate answers as ranked lists. We hope this work provides a first step toward developing alternative answer formats that are beneficial beyond single answers in medical domains.

There is a substantial body of literature examining the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), particularly their performance on precise arithmetic operations in autoregressive architectures. However, their ability to perform approximate reasoning in informal, fast-paced mathematical operations has received far less attention, especially among non-autoregressive decoder models. Our work addresses this gap by introducing StreetMath, a benchmark designed to evaluate models' approximation abilities under real-world approximation scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations across different LLM architectures: Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507, Qwen3-4B-Thinking-2507, Dream-v0-Instruct-7B, Falcon-Mamba-7B-Instruct, and Mamba-GPT-3B. Furthermore, we apply mechanistic interpretability techniques to probe their internal computational states. Our analysis reveals that LLMs generally attempt to compute exact values or invoke external tools even in tasks that call for approximation. Moreover, while models sometimes reach the correct answer in early layers or steps, they still consume more tokens when solving approximation tasks. Additional experiments indicate that exact and approximate arithmetic operations rely on largely separate neural components. Drawing upon research on cognitive psychology, we argue that LLMs do not exhibit cognitive miserliness in the same way humans do in street math settings. We open source our work https://github.com/ctseng777/StreetMath

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting enhances reasoning in large language models (LLMs) but often leads to verbose and redundant outputs, thus increasing inference cost. We hypothesize that many reasoning steps are unnecessary for producing correct answers. To investigate this, we start with a systematic study to examine what is the minimum reasoning required for a model to reach a stable decision. We find that on math reasoning tasks like math, models typically converge to their final answers after 60\% of the reasoning steps, suggesting substantial redundancy in the remaining content. Based on these insights, we propose three inference-time strategies to improve efficiency: (1) early stopping via answer consistency, (2) boosting the probability of generating end-of-reasoning signals, and (3) a supervised method that learns when to stop based on internal activations. Experiments across five benchmarks and five open-weights LLMs show that our methods significantly reduce token usage with little or no accuracy drop. In particular, on NaturalQuestions, Answer Consistency reduces tokens by over 40\% while further improving accuracy. Our work underscores the importance of cost-effective reasoning methods that operate at inference time, offering practical benefits for real-world applications.

Language models have demonstrated remarkable performance in solving reasoning tasks; however, even the strongest models still occasionally make reasoning mistakes. Recently, there has been active research aimed at improving reasoning accuracy, particularly by using pretrained language models to "self-correct" their mistakes via multi-round prompting. In this paper, we follow this line of work but focus on understanding the usefulness of incorporating "error-correction" data directly into the pretraining stage. This data consists of erroneous solution steps immediately followed by their corrections. Using a synthetic math dataset, we show promising results: this type of pretrain data can help language models achieve higher reasoning accuracy directly (i.e., through simple auto-regression, without multi-round prompting) compared to pretraining on the same amount of error-free data. We also delve into many details, such as (1) how this approach differs from beam search, (2) how such data can be prepared, (3) whether masking is needed on the erroneous tokens, (4) the amount of error required, (5) whether such data can be deferred to the fine-tuning stage, and many others.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) augmented with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning demonstrate impressive problem-solving abilities. However, in this work, we identify a recurring issue where these models occasionally generate overly short reasoning, leading to degraded performance on even simple mathematical problems. Specifically, we investigate how reasoning length is embedded in the hidden representations of reasoning models and its impact on accuracy. Our analysis reveals that reasoning length is governed by a linear direction in the representation space, allowing us to induce overly short reasoning by steering the model along this direction. Building on this insight, we introduce ThinkEdit, a simple yet effective weight-editing approach to mitigate the issue of overly short reasoning. We first identify a small subset of attention heads (approximately 2%) that predominantly drive short reasoning behavior. We then edit the output projection weights of these heads to suppress the short reasoning direction. With changes to only 0.1% of the model's parameters, ThinkEdit effectively reduces overly short reasoning and yields notable accuracy gains for short reasoning outputs (+5.44%), along with an overall improvement across multiple math benchmarks (+2.43%). Our findings provide new mechanistic insights into how reasoning length is controlled within LLMs and highlight the potential of fine-grained model interventions to improve reasoning quality. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/ThinkEdit

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) has been a go-to and effective method for enhancing long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning in relatively small LLMs by fine-tuning them with long CoT responses from larger LLMs. To continually improve reasoning abilities, we can either collect new high-quality long CoT reasoning SFT data or repeatedly train on existing SFT datasets. However, acquiring new long CoT SFT data is costly and limited, while repeated training often results in a performance plateau or decline. To further boost the performance with the SFT data, we propose Thinking Preference Optimization (ThinkPO), a simple yet effective post-SFT method that enhances long CoT reasoning without requiring new long CoT responses. Instead, ThinkPO utilizes readily available or easily obtainable short CoT reasoning responses as rejected answers and long CoT responses as chosen answers for the same question. It then applies direct preference optimization to encourage the model to favor longer reasoning outputs. Experiments show that ThinkPO further improves the reasoning performance of SFT-ed models, e.g. it increases math reasoning accuracy of SFT-ed models by 8.6% and output length by 25.9%. Notably, ThinkPO is capable of continually boosting the performance of the publicly distilled SFT model, e.g., increasing the official DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B's performance on MATH500 from 87.4% to 91.2%.

Why do thinking language models like DeepSeek R1 outperform their base counterparts? Despite consistent performance gains, it remains unclear to what extent thinking models learn entirely new reasoning capabilities or repurpose pre-existing base model ones. In this work, we propose a hybrid model where we activate reasoning mechanisms in base models at the right time to elicit thinking-model-level reasoning chains, implying that thinking models exploit already existing capabilities. To ground our analysis, we introduce an unsupervised, bottom-up approach for uncovering human-interpretable reasoning behaviors in thinking models. This approach provides an unbiased method to discover reasoning behaviors without imposing manual or LLM-derived assumptions. Across three base and four thinking models, using GSM8K and MATH500, our hybrid model recovers up to 91% of the performance gap to thinking models without any weight updates while steering only 12% of tokens. Concretely, our empirical setup provides a simple, causal way to test the effectiveness of existing reasoning mechanisms in base models by invoking them directly and measuring the resulting task performance. More broadly, these results reframe our understanding of how thinking models are trained: pre-training is when models acquire most of their reasoning mechanisms, and post-training teaches efficient deployment of these mechanisms at the right time, enabling efficient use of their inference-time compute.

Recently, large reasoning models have achieved impressive performance on various tasks by employing human-like deep thinking. However, the lengthy thinking process substantially increases inference overhead, making efficiency a critical bottleneck. In this work, we first demonstrate that NoThinking, which prompts the reasoning model to skip thinking and directly generate the final solution, is a better choice for relatively simple tasks in terms of both performance and efficiency. Motivated by this, we propose AdaptThink, a novel RL algorithm to teach reasoning models to choose the optimal thinking mode adaptively based on problem difficulty. Specifically, AdaptThink features two core components: (1) a constrained optimization objective that encourages the model to choose NoThinking while maintaining the overall performance; (2) an importance sampling strategy that balances Thinking and NoThinking samples during on-policy training, thereby enabling cold start and allowing the model to explore and exploit both thinking modes throughout the training process. Our experiments indicate that AdaptThink significantly reduces the inference costs while further enhancing performance. Notably, on three math datasets, AdaptThink reduces the average response length of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B by 53% and improves its accuracy by 2.4%, highlighting the promise of adaptive thinking-mode selection for optimizing the balance between reasoning quality and efficiency. Our codes and models are available at https://github.com/THU-KEG/AdaptThink.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance in question answering (QA) tasks. However, Multi-Answer Question Answering (MAQA), where a question may have several valid answers, remains challenging. Traditional QA settings often assume consistency across evidences, but MAQA can involve conflicting answers. Constructing datasets that reflect such conflicts is costly and labor-intensive, while existing benchmarks often rely on synthetic data, restrict the task to yes/no questions, or apply unverified automated annotation. To advance research in this area, we extend the conflict-aware MAQA setting to require models not only to identify all valid answers, but also to detect specific conflicting answer pairs, if any. To support this task, we introduce a novel cost-effective methodology for leveraging fact-checking datasets to construct NATCONFQA, a new benchmark for realistic, conflict-aware MAQA, enriched with detailed conflict labels, for all answer pairs. We evaluate eight high-end LLMs on NATCONFQA, revealing their fragility in handling various types of conflicts and the flawed strategies they employ to resolve them.

Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS) enhance personalized learning by predicting student answers to provide immediate and customized instruction. However, recent research has primarily focused on the correctness of the answer rather than the student's performance on specific answer choices, limiting insights into students' thought processes and potential misconceptions. To address this gap, we present MCQStudentBert, an answer forecasting model that leverages the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) to integrate contextual understanding of students' answering history along with the text of the questions and answers. By predicting the specific answer choices students are likely to make, practitioners can easily extend the model to new answer choices or remove answer choices for the same multiple-choice question (MCQ) without retraining the model. In particular, we compare MLP, LSTM, BERT, and Mistral 7B architectures to generate embeddings from students' past interactions, which are then incorporated into a finetuned BERT's answer-forecasting mechanism. We apply our pipeline to a dataset of language learning MCQ, gathered from an ITS with over 10,000 students to explore the predictive accuracy of MCQStudentBert, which incorporates student interaction patterns, in comparison to correct answer prediction and traditional mastery-learning feature-based approaches. This work opens the door to more personalized content, modularization, and granular support.

Do large language models (LLMs) anticipate when they will answer correctly? To study this, we extract activations after a question is read but before any tokens are generated, and train linear probes to predict whether the model's forthcoming answer will be correct. Across three open-source model families ranging from 7 to 70 billion parameters, projections on this "in-advance correctness direction" trained on generic trivia questions predict success in distribution and on diverse out-of-distribution knowledge datasets, outperforming black-box baselines and verbalised predicted confidence. Predictive power saturates in intermediate layers, suggesting that self-assessment emerges mid-computation. Notably, generalisation falters on questions requiring mathematical reasoning. Moreover, for models responding "I don't know", doing so strongly correlates with the probe score, indicating that the same direction also captures confidence. By complementing previous results on truthfulness and other behaviours obtained with probes and sparse auto-encoders, our work contributes essential findings to elucidate LLM internals.

Multiple choice question answering (MCQA) is popular for LLM evaluation due to its simplicity and human-like testing, but we argue for its reform. We first reveal flaws in MCQA's format, as it struggles to: 1) test generation/subjectivity; 2) match LLM use cases; and 3) fully test knowledge. We instead advocate for generative formats based on human testing-where LLMs construct and explain answers-better capturing user needs and knowledge while remaining easy to score. We then show even when MCQA is a useful format, its datasets suffer from: leakage; unanswerability; shortcuts; and saturation. In each issue, we give fixes from education, like rubrics to guide MCQ writing; scoring methods to bridle guessing; and Item Response Theory to build harder MCQs. Lastly, we discuss LLM errors in MCQA-robustness, biases, and unfaithful explanations-showing how our prior solutions better measure or address these issues. While we do not need to desert MCQA, we encourage more efforts in refining the task based on educational testing, advancing evaluations.

We introduce Seed1.5-Thinking, capable of reasoning through thinking before responding, resulting in improved performance on a wide range of benchmarks. Seed1.5-Thinking achieves 86.7 on AIME 2024, 55.0 on Codeforces and 77.3 on GPQA, demonstrating excellent reasoning abilities in STEM and coding. Beyond reasoning tasks, the method demonstrates notable generalization across diverse domains. For instance, it surpasses DeepSeek R1 by 8% in win rate on non-reasoning tasks, indicating its broader applicability. Compared to other state-of-the-art reasoning models, Seed1.5-Thinking is a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model with a relatively small size, featuring 20B activated and 200B total parameters. As part of our effort to assess generalized reasoning, we develop two internal benchmarks, BeyondAIME and Codeforces, both of which will be publicly released to support future research. Model trial link: https://www.volcengine.com/experience/ark.

The recent explosion of question answering (QA) datasets and models has increased the interest in the generalization of models across multiple domains and formats by either training on multiple datasets or by combining multiple models. Despite the promising results of multi-dataset models, some domains or QA formats may require specific architectures, and thus the adaptability of these models might be limited. In addition, current approaches for combining models disregard cues such as question-answer compatibility. In this work, we propose to combine expert agents with a novel, flexible, and training-efficient architecture that considers questions, answer predictions, and answer-prediction confidence scores to select the best answer among a list of answer candidates. Through quantitative and qualitative experiments we show that our model i) creates a collaboration between agents that outperforms previous multi-agent and multi-dataset approaches in both in-domain and out-of-domain scenarios, ii) is highly data-efficient to train, and iii) can be adapted to any QA format. We release our code and a dataset of answer predictions from expert agents for 16 QA datasets to foster future developments of multi-agent systems on https://github.com/UKPLab/MetaQA.

Recent progress, such as DeepSeek-R1, has shown that the GRPO algorithm, a Reinforcement Learning (RL) approach, can effectively train Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs). In this paper, we analyze three challenges of GRPO: gradient coupling between thoughts and answers, sparse reward signals caused by limited parallel sampling, and unstable advantage estimation. To mitigate these challenges, we propose GRPO-MA, a simple yet theoretically grounded method that leverages multi-answer generation from each thought process, enabling more robust and efficient optimization. Theoretically, we show that the variance of thought advantage decreases as the number of answers per thought increases. Empirically, our gradient analysis confirms this effect, showing that GRPO-MA reduces gradient spikes compared to GRPO. Experiments on math, code, and diverse multimodal tasks demonstrate that GRPO-MA substantially improves performance and training efficiency. Our ablation studies further reveal that increasing the number of answers per thought consistently enhances model performance.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced complex reasoning capabilities, particularly through extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning that incorporates mechanisms such as backtracking, self-reflection and self-correction. Despite these developments, the self-correction abilities of LLMs during long CoT reasoning remain underexplored. And recent findings on overthinking suggest that such models often engage in unnecessarily redundant reasoning. In this work, we empirically show that the first reasoning step exerts a disproportionately large influence on the final prediction - errors introduced at this stage can substantially degrade subsequent reasoning quality. This phenomenon is consistently observed across two state-of-the-art open-source reasoning model families: DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3. To address this, we propose an efficient sampling strategy that leverages a reward model to identify and retain high-quality first reasoning steps while discarding suboptimal ones, achieving up to a 70% reduction in inference cost without sacrificing accuracy. Finally, we introduce a new benchmark specifically constructed with deliberately flawed first reasoning steps to systematically evaluate model self-correction capabilities, offering a foundation for future research on robust reasoning in LLMs.

Recent studies on transformer-based language models show that they can answer questions by reasoning over knowledge provided as part of the context (i.e., in-context reasoning). However, since the available knowledge is often not filtered for a particular question, in-context reasoning can be sensitive to distractor facts, additional content that is irrelevant to a question but that may be relevant for a different question (i.e., not necessarily random noise). In these situations, the model fails to distinguish the knowledge that is necessary to answer the question, leading to spurious reasoning and degraded performance. This reasoning failure contrasts with the model's apparent ability to distinguish its contextual knowledge from all the knowledge it has memorized during pre-training. Following this observation, we propose teaching the model to reason more robustly by folding the provided contextual knowledge into the model's parameters before presenting it with a question. Our method, RECKONING, is a bi-level learning algorithm that teaches language models to reason by updating their parametric knowledge through back-propagation, allowing them to then answer questions using the updated parameters. During training, the inner loop rapidly adapts a copy of the model weights to encode contextual knowledge into its parameters. In the outer loop, the model learns to use the updated weights to reproduce and answer reasoning questions about the memorized knowledge. Our experiments on two multi-hop reasoning datasets show that RECKONING's performance improves over the in-context reasoning baseline (by up to 4.5%). We also find that compared to in-context reasoning, RECKONING generalizes better to longer reasoning chains unseen during training, is more robust to distractors in the context, and is more computationally efficient when multiple questions are asked about the same knowledge.

Many challenging reasoning tasks require not just rapid, intuitive responses, but a more deliberate, multi-step approach. Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) highlights an important shift from the "System 1" way of quick reactions to the "System 2" style of reflection-and-correction problem solving. However, current benchmarks heavily rely on the final-answer accuracy, leaving much of a model's intermediate reasoning steps unexamined. This fails to assess the model's ability to reflect and rectify mistakes within the reasoning process. To bridge this gap, we introduce FINEREASON, a logic-puzzle benchmark for fine-grained evaluation of LLMs' reasoning capabilities. Each puzzle can be decomposed into atomic steps, making it ideal for rigorous validation of intermediate correctness. Building on this, we introduce two tasks: state checking, and state transition, for a comprehensive evaluation of how models assess the current situation and plan the next move. To support broader research, we also provide a puzzle training set aimed at enhancing performance on general mathematical tasks. We show that models trained on our state checking and transition data demonstrate gains in math reasoning by up to 5.1% on GSM8K.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated the effectiveness of scaling test-time computation to enhance reasoning capabilities in multiple tasks. However, LRMs typically suffer from "overthinking" problems, where models generate significantly redundant reasoning steps while bringing limited performance gains. Existing work relies on fine-tuning to mitigate overthinking, which requires additional data, unconventional training setups, risky safety misalignment, and poor generalization. Through empirical analysis, we reveal an important characteristic of LRM behaviors that placing external CoTs generated by smaller models between the thinking token (<think> and </think>) can effectively manipulate the model to generate fewer thoughts. Building on these insights, we propose a simple yet efficient pipeline, ThoughtMani, to enable LRMs to bypass unnecessary intermediate steps and reduce computational costs significantly. We conduct extensive experiments to validate the utility and efficiency of ThoughtMani. For instance, when applied to QwQ-32B on the LiveBench/Code dataset, ThoughtMani keeps the original performance and reduces output token counts by approximately 30%, with little overhead from the CoT generator. Furthermore, we find that ThoughtMani enhances safety alignment by an average of 10%. Since model vendors typically serve models of different sizes simultaneously, ThoughtMani provides an effective way to construct more efficient and accessible LRMs for real-world applications.

Recent advances in large vision-language models (LVLMs) have revealed an overthinking phenomenon, where models generate verbose reasoning across all tasks regardless of questions. To address this issue, we present FAST, a novel Fast-Slow Thinking framework that dynamically adapts reasoning depth based on question characteristics. Through empirical analysis, we establish the feasibility of fast-slow thinking in LVLMs by investigating how response length and data distribution affect performance. We develop FAST-GRPO with three components: model-based metrics for question characterization, an adaptive thinking reward mechanism, and difficulty-aware KL regularization. Experiments across seven reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that FAST achieves state-of-the-art accuracy with over 10\% relative improvement compared to the base model, while reducing token usage by 32.7-67.3\% compared to previous slow-thinking approaches, effectively balancing reasoning length and accuracy.

We propose a benchmark to measure whether a language model is truthful in generating answers to questions. The benchmark comprises 817 questions that span 38 categories, including health, law, finance and politics. We crafted questions that some humans would answer falsely due to a false belief or misconception. To perform well, models must avoid generating false answers learned from imitating human texts. We tested GPT-3, GPT-Neo/J, GPT-2 and a T5-based model. The best model was truthful on 58% of questions, while human performance was 94%. Models generated many false answers that mimic popular misconceptions and have the potential to deceive humans. The largest models were generally the least truthful. This contrasts with other NLP tasks, where performance improves with model size. However, this result is expected if false answers are learned from the training distribution. We suggest that scaling up models alone is less promising for improving truthfulness than fine-tuning using training objectives other than imitation of text from the web.

Multi-step reasoning is essential for large language models (LLMs), yet multilingual performance remains challenging. While Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting improves reasoning, it struggles with non-English languages due to the entanglement of reasoning and execution. Program-of-Thought (PoT) prompting separates reasoning from execution, offering a promising alternative but shifting the challenge to generating programs from non-English questions. We propose a framework to evaluate PoT by separating multilingual reasoning from code execution to examine (i) the impact of fine-tuning on question-reasoning alignment and (ii) how reasoning quality affects answer correctness. Our findings demonstrate that PoT fine-tuning substantially enhances multilingual reasoning, outperforming CoT fine-tuned models. We further demonstrate a strong correlation between reasoning quality (measured through code quality) and answer accuracy, highlighting its potential as a test-time performance improvement heuristic.

The remarkable advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have not rendered them immune to challenges, particularly in the context of handling deceptive information in prompts, thus producing hallucinated responses under such conditions. To quantitatively assess this vulnerability, we present MAD-Bench, a carefully curated benchmark that contains 850 test samples divided into 6 categories, such as non-existent objects, count of objects, spatial relationship, and visual confusion. We provide a comprehensive analysis of popular MLLMs, ranging from GPT-4V, Gemini-Pro, to open-sourced models, such as LLaVA-1.5 and CogVLM. Empirically, we observe significant performance gaps between GPT-4V and other models; and previous robust instruction-tuned models, such as LRV-Instruction and LLaVA-RLHF, are not effective on this new benchmark. While GPT-4V achieves 75.02% accuracy on MAD-Bench, the accuracy of any other model in our experiments ranges from 5% to 35%. We further propose a remedy that adds an additional paragraph to the deceptive prompts to encourage models to think twice before answering the question. Surprisingly, this simple method can even double the accuracy; however, the absolute numbers are still too low to be satisfactory. We hope MAD-Bench can serve as a valuable benchmark to stimulate further research to enhance models' resilience against deceptive prompts.

Transferring reasoning capabilities from larger language models to smaller ones through supervised fine-tuning often fails counterintuitively, with performance degrading despite access to high-quality teacher demonstrations. We identify that this failure stems from distributional misalignment: reasoning traces from larger models contain tokens that are low probability under the student's distribution, exceeding the internal representation capacity of smaller architectures and creating learning barriers rather than helpful guidance. We propose Reverse Speculative Decoding (RSD), a mechanism for generating student-friendly reasoning traces in which the teacher model proposes candidate tokens but the student model determines acceptance based on its own probability distributions, filtering low probability tokens. When applied to Qwen3-0.6B, direct distillation of s1K-1.1 reasoning trace data degrades average performance across major reasoning benchmarks by 20.5\%, while the same model trained on RSD-generated reasoning traces achieves meaningful improvements of 4.9\%. Our analysis reveals that low probability tokens constitute the critical bottleneck in reasoning ability transfer. However, cross-model experiments demonstrate that RSD traces are model-specific rather than universally applicable, indicating that distributional alignment must be tailored for each student architecture's unique internal representation.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

We present Twin Answer Sentences Attack (TASA), an adversarial attack method for question answering (QA) models that produces fluent and grammatical adversarial contexts while maintaining gold answers. Despite phenomenal progress on general adversarial attacks, few works have investigated the vulnerability and attack specifically for QA models. In this work, we first explore the biases in the existing models and discover that they mainly rely on keyword matching between the question and context, and ignore the relevant contextual relations for answer prediction. Based on two biases above, TASA attacks the target model in two folds: (1) lowering the model's confidence on the gold answer with a perturbed answer sentence; (2) misguiding the model towards a wrong answer with a distracting answer sentence. Equipped with designed beam search and filtering methods, TASA can generate more effective attacks than existing textual attack methods while sustaining the quality of contexts, in extensive experiments on five QA datasets and human evaluations.

When language models correctly parse "The cat that the dog chased meowed," are they analyzing syntax or simply familiar with dogs chasing cats? Despite extensive benchmarking, we lack methods to distinguish structural understanding from semantic pattern matching. We introduce CenterBench, a dataset of 9,720 comprehension questions on center-embedded sentences (like "The cat [that the dog chased] meowed") where relative clauses nest recursively, creating processing demands from simple to deeply nested structures. Each sentence has a syntactically identical but semantically implausible counterpart (e.g., mailmen prescribe medicine, doctors deliver mail) and six comprehension questions testing surface understanding, syntactic dependencies, and causal reasoning. Testing six models reveals that performance gaps between plausible and implausible sentences widen systematically with complexity, with models showing median gaps up to 26.8 percentage points, quantifying when they abandon structural analysis for semantic associations. Notably, semantic plausibility harms performance on questions about resulting actions, where following causal relationships matters more than semantic coherence. Reasoning models improve accuracy but their traces show semantic shortcuts, overthinking, and answer refusal. Unlike models whose plausibility advantage systematically widens with complexity, humans shows variable semantic effects. CenterBench provides the first framework to identify when models shift from structural analysis to pattern matching.

Common evaluation paradigms for language models focus on scoring single responses through accuracy metrics or proper scoring rules, failing to capture the full richness of a model's belief state. Recent work illustrates that language models hallucinate in-part because they are optimised to be good test-takers under binary scoring schemes that reward any answer over abstention. While this insight naturally leads to penalty-based approaches, they ignore crucial distinctions in how models distribute uncertainty, for example between hedging toward incorrect answers versus hedging toward "I don't know" responses. A novel evaluation metric, the Distributional Correctness Score (DCS), is introduced to solve this problem, i.e., of not considering a model's entire probability distribution over answer choices. DCS naturally distinguishes between harmful overconfidence in wrong answers and uncertainty expressed through abstention, providing scores in an interpretable default range. Through theoretical analysis and illustrative examples, DCS is demonstrated to offer a more nuanced and aligned evaluation paradigm that incentivises models to express genuine uncertainty rather than guessing. Adapting 12 existing evaluation benchmarks to DCS's variants and measuring performance on six language models reveals that for half of the tested benchmarks scores are negative across all tested models, indicating significant tendencies towards hallucination.

Although counterfactual reasoning is a fundamental aspect of intelligence, the lack of large-scale counterfactual open-domain question-answering (QA) benchmarks makes it difficult to evaluate and improve models on this ability. To address this void, we introduce the first such dataset, named IfQA, where each question is based on a counterfactual presupposition via an "if" clause. For example, if Los Angeles was on the east coast of the U.S., what would be the time difference between Los Angeles and Paris? Such questions require models to go beyond retrieving direct factual knowledge from the Web: they must identify the right information to retrieve and reason about an imagined situation that may even go against the facts built into their parameters. The IfQA dataset contains over 3,800 questions that were annotated annotated by crowdworkers on relevant Wikipedia passages. Empirical analysis reveals that the IfQA dataset is highly challenging for existing open-domain QA methods, including supervised retrieve-then-read pipeline methods (EM score 36.2), as well as recent few-shot approaches such as chain-of-thought prompting with GPT-3 (EM score 27.4). The unique challenges posed by the IfQA benchmark will push open-domain QA research on both retrieval and counterfactual reasoning fronts.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

The capacity of Large Language Models (LLMs) to reason is fundamental to their application in complex, knowledge-intensive domains. In real-world scenarios, LLMs are often augmented with external information that can be helpful, irrelevant, or even misleading. This paper investigates the causal impact of such auxiliary information on the reasoning process of LLMs with explicit step-by-step thinking capabilities. We introduce SciAux, a new dataset derived from ScienceQA, to systematically test the robustness of the model against these types of information. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability: the model's deliberative "thinking mode" is a double-edged sword. While helpful context improves accuracy, misleading information causes a catastrophic drop in performance, which is amplified by the thinking process. Instead of conferring robustness, thinking reinforces the degree of error when provided with misinformation. This highlights that the challenge is not merely to make models "think", but to endow them with the critical faculty to evaluate the information upon which their reasoning is based. The SciAux dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/billhdzhao/SciAux.

We conduct a systematic audit of three widely used reasoning benchmarks, SocialIQa, FauxPas-EAI, and ToMi, and uncover pervasive flaws in both benchmark items and evaluation methodology. Using five LLMs (GPT-{3, 3.5, 4, o1}, and LLaMA 3.1) as diagnostic tools, we identify structural, semantic, and pragmatic issues in benchmark design (e.g., duplicated items, ambiguous wording, and implausible answers), as well as scoring procedures that prioritize output form over reasoning process. Through systematic human annotation and re-evaluation on cleaned benchmark subsets, we find that model scores often improve not due to due to erratic surface wording variations and not to improved reasoning. Infact, further analyses show that model performance is highly sensitive to minor input variations such as context availability and phrasing, revealing that high scores may reflect alignment with format-specific cues rather than consistent inference based on the input. These findings challenge the validity of current benchmark-based claims about reasoning in LLMs, and highlight the need for evaluation protocols that assess reasoning as a process of drawing inference from available information, rather than as static output selection. We release audited data and evaluation tools to support more interpretable and diagnostic assessments of model reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved impressive performance across various mathematical reasoning benchmarks. However, there are increasing debates regarding whether these models truly understand and apply mathematical knowledge or merely rely on shortcuts for mathematical reasoning. One essential and frequently occurring evidence is that when the math questions are slightly changed, LLMs can behave incorrectly. This motivates us to evaluate the robustness of LLMs' math reasoning capability by testing a wide range of question variations. We introduce the adversarial grade school math (\datasetname) dataset, an extension of GSM8K augmented with various mathematical perturbations. Our experiments on 25 LLMs and 4 prompting techniques show that while LLMs exhibit different levels of math reasoning abilities, their performances are far from robust. In particular, even for problems that have been solved in GSM8K, LLMs can make mistakes when new statements are added or the question targets are altered. We also explore whether more robust performance can be achieved by composing existing prompting methods, in which we try an iterative method that generates and verifies each intermediate thought based on its reasoning goal and calculation result. Code and data are available at https://github.com/qtli/GSM-Plus.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

Current question-answering benchmarks predominantly focus on accuracy in realizable prediction tasks. Conditioned on a question and answer-key, does the most likely token match the ground truth? Such benchmarks necessarily fail to evaluate LLMs' ability to quantify ground-truth outcome uncertainty. In this work, we focus on the use of LLMs as risk scores for unrealizable prediction tasks. We introduce folktexts, a software package to systematically generate risk scores using LLMs, and evaluate them against US Census data products. A flexible API enables the use of different prompting schemes, local or web-hosted models, and diverse census columns that can be used to compose custom prediction tasks. We evaluate 17 recent LLMs across five proposed benchmark tasks. We find that zero-shot risk scores produced by multiple-choice question-answering have high predictive signal but are widely miscalibrated. Base models consistently overestimate outcome uncertainty, while instruction-tuned models underestimate uncertainty and produce over-confident risk scores. In fact, instruction-tuning polarizes answer distribution regardless of true underlying data uncertainty. This reveals a general inability of instruction-tuned LLMs to express data uncertainty using multiple-choice answers. A separate experiment using verbalized chat-style risk queries yields substantially improved calibration across instruction-tuned models. These differences in ability to quantify data uncertainty cannot be revealed in realizable settings, and highlight a blind-spot in the current evaluation ecosystem that folktexts covers.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Thinking LLMs solve complex tasks at the expense of increased compute and overthinking on simpler problems, while non-thinking LLMs are faster and cheaper but underthink on harder reasoning problems. This has led to the development of separate thinking and non-thinking LLM variants, leaving the onus of selecting the optimal model for each query on the end user. In this work, we introduce OptimalThinkingBench, a unified benchmark that jointly evaluates overthinking and underthinking in LLMs and also encourages the development of optimally-thinking models that balance performance and efficiency. Our benchmark comprises two sub-benchmarks: OverthinkingBench, featuring simple queries in 72 domains, and UnderthinkingBench, containing 11 challenging reasoning tasks. Using novel thinking-adjusted accuracy metrics, we perform extensive evaluation of 33 different thinking and non-thinking models and show that no model is able to optimally think on our benchmark. Thinking models often overthink for hundreds of tokens on the simplest user queries without improving performance. In contrast, large non-thinking models underthink, often falling short of much smaller thinking models. We further explore several methods to encourage optimal thinking, but find that these approaches often improve on one sub-benchmark at the expense of the other, highlighting the need for better unified and optimal models in the future.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have shown indications of mathematical reasoning ability. However it has not been clear how they would fare on more challenging competition-level problems. And while self-generated verbalizations of intermediate reasoning steps (i.e., chain-of-thought prompting) have been shown to be helpful, whether LLMs can make use of helpful side information such as problem-specific hints has not been investigated before. In this paper, we propose a challenging benchmark dataset for enabling such analyses. The Concept and Hint-Annotated Math Problems (CHAMP) consists of high school math competition problems, annotated with concepts, or general math facts, and hints, or problem-specific tricks. These annotations allow us to explore the effects of additional information, such as relevant hints, misleading concepts, or related problems. This benchmark is difficult, with the best model only scoring 58.1% in standard settings. With concepts and hints, performance sometimes improves, indicating that some models can make use of such side information. We further annotate model-generated solutions for their correctness. Using this corpus, we find that models often arrive at the correct final answer through wrong reasoning steps. In addition, we test whether models are able to verify these solutions, and find that most models struggle. The dataset and code are available on the project website.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated on single-answer multiple-choice tasks, yet many real-world problems require identifying all correct answers from a set of options. This capability remains underexplored. We introduce SATA-BENCH, the first dedicated benchmark for evaluating LLMs on Select All That Apply (SATA) questions across diverse domains, including reading comprehension, law, and biomedicine. Our evaluation of 27 open-source and proprietary models reveals a significant gap: even the strongest model achieves only 41.8% exact match, exposing LLMs' inability to reliably identify all correct answers. We find that this weakness stems from two core challenges: selection bias - models favor certain choices regardless of content, and count bias - models fail to predict the correct number of answers. To address these issues, we propose Choice Funnel, a decoding strategy that combines token debiasing with adaptive thresholding to guide models toward complete and accurate selections. Choice Funnel achieves up to 29% higher exact match than competitive baselines while reducing inference cost by over 64%. Our findings expose fundamental limitations in current LLMs and introduce a new framework for diagnosing and improving multi-answer reasoning. We release SATA-BENCH and Choice Funnel to promote LLM development for robust decision-making in realistic, multi-answer applications.

Most existing multi-hop datasets are extractive answer datasets, where the answers to the questions can be extracted directly from the provided context. This often leads models to use heuristics or shortcuts instead of performing true multi-hop reasoning. In this paper, we propose a new multi-hop dataset, MoreHopQA, which shifts from extractive to generative answers. Our dataset is created by utilizing three existing multi-hop datasets: HotpotQA, 2WikiMultihopQA, and MuSiQue. Instead of relying solely on factual reasoning, we enhance the existing multi-hop questions by adding another layer of questioning that involves one, two, or all three of the following types of reasoning: commonsense, arithmetic, and symbolic. Our dataset is created through a semi-automated process, resulting in a dataset with 1,118 samples that have undergone human verification. We then use our dataset to evaluate five different large language models: Mistral 7B, Gemma 7B, Llama 3 (8B and 70B), and GPT-4. We also design various cases to analyze the reasoning steps in the question-answering process. Our results show that models perform well on initial multi-hop questions but struggle with our extended questions, indicating that our dataset is more challenging than previous ones. Our analysis of question decomposition reveals that although models can correctly answer questions, only a portion - 38.7% for GPT-4 and 33.4% for Llama3-70B - achieve perfect reasoning, where all corresponding sub-questions are answered correctly. Evaluation code and data are available at https://github.com/Alab-NII/morehopqa

Large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 have exhibited remarkable performance in a variety of tasks, but this strong performance often comes with the high expense of using paid API services. In this paper, we are motivated to study building an LLM cascade to save the cost of using LLMs, particularly for performing reasoning (e.g., mathematical, causal) tasks. Our cascade pipeline follows the intuition that simpler questions can be addressed by a weaker but more affordable LLM, whereas only the challenging questions necessitate the stronger and more expensive LLM. To realize this decision-making, we consider the "answer consistency" of the weaker LLM as a signal of the question difficulty and propose several methods for the answer sampling and consistency checking, including one leveraging a mixture of two thought representations (i.e., Chain-of-Thought and Program-of-Thought). Through experiments on six reasoning benchmark datasets, with GPT-3.5-turbo and GPT-4 being the weaker and stronger LLMs, respectively, we demonstrate that our proposed LLM cascades can achieve performance comparable to using solely the stronger LLM but require only 40% of its cost.

Large language models (LLMs) are capable of answering knowledge-intensive complex questions with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. However, they tend to generate factually incorrect reasoning steps when the required knowledge is not available or up-to-date in models' parameters. Recent works turn to retrieving external knowledge to augment CoT reasoning. Despite being promising, these chain-based methods suffer from: 1) Negative retrieval. Unnecessary or incorrect retrieval may mislead the reasoning; 2) Limited sight. Lacking the ability to look backward or forward, a local error in one step will propagate along the chain. In this paper, we propose a novel approach: Probabilistic Tree-of-thought Reasoning (ProbTree). First, LLMs translate a complex question into a query tree, in which each non-root node denotes a sub-question of its parent node. Then, probabilistic reasoning is conducted over the tree, by solving questions from leaf to root considering the confidence of both question decomposing and answering. During reasoning, for leaf nodes, LLMs choose a more confident answer from Closed-book QA that employs parametric knowledge and Open-book QA that employs retrieved external knowledge, thus eliminating the negative retrieval problem. For non-leaf nodes, with the hierarchical structure, LLMs have broader sights and are able to globally reason with the information from child nodes, thus recovering from local errors. The experiments on three Complex QA datasets under the open-domain setting show that our approach outperforms SOTA methods significantly, demonstrating the effect of probabilistic tree-of-thought reasoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have attained human-level accuracy on medical question-answer (QA) benchmarks. However, their limitations in navigating open-ended clinical scenarios have recently been shown, raising concerns about the robustness and generalizability of LLM reasoning across diverse, real-world medical tasks. To probe potential LLM failure modes in clinical problem-solving, we present the medical abstraction and reasoning corpus (M-ARC). M-ARC assesses clinical reasoning through scenarios designed to exploit the Einstellung effect -- the fixation of thought arising from prior experience, targeting LLM inductive biases toward inflexible pattern matching from their training data rather than engaging in flexible reasoning. We find that LLMs, including current state-of-the-art o1 and Gemini models, perform poorly compared to physicians on M-ARC, often demonstrating lack of commonsense medical reasoning and a propensity to hallucinate. In addition, uncertainty estimation analyses indicate that LLMs exhibit overconfidence in their answers, despite their limited accuracy. The failure modes revealed by M-ARC in LLM medical reasoning underscore the need to exercise caution when deploying these models in clinical settings.

Cloze testing is a common method for measuring the behavior of large language models on a number of benchmark tasks. Using the MMLU dataset, we show that the base-rate probability (BRP) differences across answer tokens are significant and affect task performance ie. guess A if uncertain. We find that counterfactual prompting does sufficiently mitigate the BRP effect. The BRP effect is found to have a similar effect to test taking strategies employed by humans leading to the conflation of task performance and test-taking ability. We propose the Nvr-X-MMLU task, a variation of MMLU, which helps to disambiguate test-taking ability from task performance and reports the latter.

We study the depth of grade-school math (GSM) problem-solving capabilities of LLMs. To this end, we evaluate their performance on pairs of existing math word problems together so that the answer to the second problem depends on correctly answering the first problem. Our findings reveal a significant reasoning gap in most LLMs, that is performance difference between solving the compositional pairs and solving each question independently. This gap is more pronounced in smaller, more cost-efficient, and math-specialized models. Moreover, instruction-tuning recipes and code generation have varying effects across LLM sizes, while finetuning on GSM can lead to task overfitting. Our analysis indicates that large reasoning gaps are not because of test-set leakage, but due to distraction from additional context and poor second-hop reasoning. Overall, LLMs exhibit systematic differences in their reasoning abilities, despite what their performance on standard benchmarks indicates.

Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) highlights the power of scaling test-time compute to achieve strong performance on complex tasks, such as mathematical reasoning and code generation. This raises a critical question: how should model training be modified to optimize performance under a subsequent test-time compute strategy and budget? To explore this, we focus on pass@N, a simple test-time strategy that searches for a correct answer in N independent samples. We show, surprisingly, that training with cross-entropy (CE) loss can be {it misaligned} with pass@N in that pass@N accuracy {it decreases} with longer training. We explain the origins of this misalignment in terms of model overconfidence induced by CE, and experimentally verify our prediction of overconfidence as an impediment to scaling test-time compute via pass@N. Furthermore we suggest a principled, modified training loss that is better aligned to pass@N by limiting model confidence and rescuing pass@N test performance. Our algorithm demonstrates improved mathematical reasoning on MATH and MiniF2F benchmarks under several scenarios: (1) providing answers to math questions; and (2) proving theorems by searching over proof trees of varying shapes. Overall our work underscores the importance of co-designing two traditionally separate phases of LLM development: training-time protocols and test-time search and reasoning strategies.

Recent advances in Multi-Modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have enabled unified processing of language, vision, and structured inputs, opening the door to complex tasks such as logical deduction, spatial reasoning, and scientific analysis. Despite their promise, the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs, particularly those augmented with intermediate thinking traces (MLLMs-T), remain poorly understood and lack standardized evaluation benchmarks. Existing work focuses primarily on perception or final answer correctness, offering limited insight into how models reason or fail across modalities. To address this gap, we introduce the MMMR, a new benchmark designed to rigorously evaluate multi-modal reasoning with explicit thinking. The MMMR comprises 1) a high-difficulty dataset of 1,083 questions spanning six diverse reasoning types with symbolic depth and multi-hop demands and 2) a modular Reasoning Trace Evaluation Pipeline (RTEP) for assessing reasoning quality beyond accuracy through metrics like relevance, consistency, and structured error annotations. Empirical results show that MLLMs-T overall outperform non-thinking counterparts, but even top models like Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5 Pro suffer from reasoning pathologies such as inconsistency and overthinking. This benchmark reveals persistent gaps between accuracy and reasoning quality and provides an actionable evaluation pipeline for future model development. Overall, the MMMR offers a scalable foundation for evaluating, comparing, and improving the next generation of multi-modal reasoning systems.