Daily Papers

Optimization-based jailbreaks typically adopt the Toxic-Continuation setting in large vision-language models (LVLMs), following the standard next-token prediction objective. In this setting, an adversarial image is optimized to make the model predict the next token of a toxic prompt. However, we find that the Toxic-Continuation paradigm is effective at continuing already-toxic inputs, but struggles to induce safety misalignment when explicit toxic signals are absent. We propose a new paradigm: Benign-to-Toxic (B2T) jailbreak. Unlike prior work, we optimize adversarial images to induce toxic outputs from benign conditioning. Since benign conditioning contains no safety violations, the image alone must break the model's safety mechanisms. Our method outperforms prior approaches, transfers in black-box settings, and complements text-based jailbreaks. These results reveal an underexplored vulnerability in multimodal alignment and introduce a fundamentally new direction for jailbreak approaches.

We propose affine concept editing (ACE) as an approach for steering language models' behavior by intervening directly in activations. We begin with an affine decomposition of model activation vectors and show that prior methods for steering model behavior correspond to subsets of terms of this decomposition. We then provide a derivation of ACE and use it to control refusal behavior on ten different models, including Llama 3 70B. ACE combines affine subspace projection and activation addition to reliably control the model's refusal responses across prompt types. We evaluate the results using LLM-based scoring on a collection of harmful and harmless prompts. Our experiments demonstrate that ACE consistently achieves more precise control over model behavior than existing methods and generalizes to models where directional ablation via affine subspace projection alone produces incoherent outputs. Code for reproducing our results is available at https://github.com/EleutherAI/steering-llama3 .

We apply preference modeling and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) to finetune language models to act as helpful and harmless assistants. We find this alignment training improves performance on almost all NLP evaluations, and is fully compatible with training for specialized skills such as python coding and summarization. We explore an iterated online mode of training, where preference models and RL policies are updated on a weekly cadence with fresh human feedback data, efficiently improving our datasets and models. Finally, we investigate the robustness of RLHF training, and identify a roughly linear relation between the RL reward and the square root of the KL divergence between the policy and its initialization. Alongside our main results, we perform peripheral analyses on calibration, competing objectives, and the use of OOD detection, compare our models with human writers, and provide samples from our models using prompts appearing in recent related work.

Prepending model inputs with safety prompts is a common practice of safeguarding large language models (LLMs) from complying with queries that contain harmful intents. However, the working mechanisms of safety prompts have not yet been fully understood, which hinders the potential for automatically optimizing them for improved LLM safety. Motivated by this problem, we investigate the impact of safety prompts from the perspective of model representations. We find that in models' representation space, harmful and harmless queries can be largely distinguished, but this is not noticeably enhanced by safety prompts. Instead, the queries' representations are moved by different safety prompts in similar directions, where models become more prone to refusal (i.e., refusing to provide assistance) even when the queries are harmless. Inspired by these findings, we propose a method called DRO (Directed Representation Optimization) for automatic safety prompt optimization. DRO treats safety prompts as continuous, trainable embeddings and learns to move the representations of harmful/harmless queries along/opposite the direction in which the model's refusal probability increases. We demonstrate that DRO remarkably improves the safeguarding performance of human-crafted safety prompts and outperforms strong baselines, as evaluated on out-of-domain benchmarks, without compromising the general model capability.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.

Despite efforts to align large language models to produce harmless responses, they are still vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit unrestricted behaviour. In this work, we investigate persona modulation as a black-box jailbreaking method to steer a target model to take on personalities that are willing to comply with harmful instructions. Rather than manually crafting prompts for each persona, we automate the generation of jailbreaks using a language model assistant. We demonstrate a range of harmful completions made possible by persona modulation, including detailed instructions for synthesising methamphetamine, building a bomb, and laundering money. These automated attacks achieve a harmful completion rate of 42.5% in GPT-4, which is 185 times larger than before modulation (0.23%). These prompts also transfer to Claude 2 and Vicuna with harmful completion rates of 61.0% and 35.9%, respectively. Our work reveals yet another vulnerability in commercial large language models and highlights the need for more comprehensive safeguards.

The safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable to both manual and automated jailbreak attacks, which adversarially trigger LLMs to output harmful content. However, current methods for jailbreaking LLMs, which nest entire harmful prompts, are not effective at concealing malicious intent and can be easily identified and rejected by well-aligned LLMs. This paper discovers that decomposing a malicious prompt into separated sub-prompts can effectively obscure its underlying malicious intent by presenting it in a fragmented, less detectable form, thereby addressing these limitations. We introduce an automatic prompt Decomposition and Reconstruction framework for jailbreak Attack (DrAttack). DrAttack includes three key components: (a) `Decomposition' of the original prompt into sub-prompts, (b) `Reconstruction' of these sub-prompts implicitly by in-context learning with semantically similar but harmless reassembling demo, and (c) a `Synonym Search' of sub-prompts, aiming to find sub-prompts' synonyms that maintain the original intent while jailbreaking LLMs. An extensive empirical study across multiple open-source and closed-source LLMs demonstrates that, with a significantly reduced number of queries, DrAttack obtains a substantial gain of success rate over prior SOTA prompt-only attackers. Notably, the success rate of 78.0\% on GPT-4 with merely 15 queries surpassed previous art by 33.1\%. The project is available at https://github.com/xirui-li/DrAttack.

Reasoning methods that adaptively allocate test-time compute have advanced LLM performance on easy to verify domains such as math and code. In this work, we study how to utilize this approach to train models that exhibit a degree of robustness to safety vulnerabilities, and show that doing so can provide benefits. We build a recipe called TARS (Training Adaptive Reasoners for Safety), a reinforcement learning (RL) approach that trains models to reason about safety using chain-of-thought traces and a reward signal that balances safety with task completion. To build TARS, we identify three critical design choices: (1) a "lightweight" warmstart SFT stage, (2) a mix of harmful, harmless, and ambiguous prompts to prevent shortcut behaviors such as too many refusals, and (3) a reward function to prevent degeneration of reasoning capabilities during training. Models trained with TARS exhibit adaptive behaviors by spending more compute on ambiguous queries, leading to better safety-refusal trade-offs. They also internally learn to better distinguish between safe and unsafe prompts and attain greater robustness to both white-box (e.g., GCG) and black-box attacks (e.g., PAIR). Overall, our work provides an effective, open recipe for training LLMs against jailbreaks and harmful requests by reasoning per prompt.

Early research into data poisoning attacks against Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrated the ease with which backdoors could be injected. More recent LLMs add step-by-step reasoning, expanding the attack surface to include the intermediate chain-of-thought (CoT) and its inherent trait of decomposing problems into subproblems. Using these vectors for more stealthy poisoning, we introduce ``decomposed reasoning poison'', in which the attacker modifies only the reasoning path, leaving prompts and final answers clean, and splits the trigger across multiple, individually harmless components. Fascinatingly, while it remains possible to inject these decomposed poisons, reliably activating them to change final answers (rather than just the CoT) is surprisingly difficult. This difficulty arises because the models can often recover from backdoors that are activated within their thought processes. Ultimately, it appears that an emergent form of backdoor robustness is originating from the reasoning capabilities of these advanced LLMs, as well as from the architectural separation between reasoning and final answer generation.

The past year has seen rapid acceleration in the development of large language models (LLMs). However, without proper steering and safeguards, LLMs will readily follow malicious instructions, provide unsafe advice, and generate toxic content. We introduce SimpleSafetyTests (SST) as a new test suite for rapidly and systematically identifying such critical safety risks. The test suite comprises 100 test prompts across five harm areas that LLMs, for the vast majority of applications, should refuse to comply with. We test 11 open-access and open-source LLMs and four closed-source LLMs, and find critical safety weaknesses. While some of the models do not give a single unsafe response, most give unsafe responses to more than 20% of the prompts, with over 50% unsafe responses in the extreme. Prepending a safety-emphasising system prompt substantially reduces the occurrence of unsafe responses, but does not completely stop them from happening. Trained annotators labelled every model response to SST (n = 3,000). We use these annotations to evaluate five AI safety filters (which assess whether a models' response is unsafe given a prompt) as a way of automatically evaluating models' performance on SST. The filters' performance varies considerably. There are also differences across the five harm areas, and on the unsafe versus safe responses. The widely-used Perspective API has 72% accuracy and a newly-created zero-shot prompt to OpenAI's GPT-4 performs best with 89% accuracy. Content Warning: This paper contains prompts and responses that relate to child abuse, suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, scams and fraud, illegal items, and physical harm.

Text-to-image diffusion models, e.g. Stable Diffusion (SD), lately have shown remarkable ability in high-quality content generation, and become one of the representatives for the recent wave of transformative AI. Nevertheless, such advance comes with an intensifying concern about the misuse of this generative technology, especially for producing copyrighted or NSFW (i.e. not safe for work) images. Although efforts have been made to filter inappropriate images/prompts or remove undesirable concepts/styles via model fine-tuning, the reliability of these safety mechanisms against diversified problematic prompts remains largely unexplored. In this work, we propose Prompting4Debugging (P4D) as a debugging and red-teaming tool that automatically finds problematic prompts for diffusion models to test the reliability of a deployed safety mechanism. We demonstrate the efficacy of our P4D tool in uncovering new vulnerabilities of SD models with safety mechanisms. Particularly, our result shows that around half of prompts in existing safe prompting benchmarks which were originally considered "safe" can actually be manipulated to bypass many deployed safety mechanisms, including concept removal, negative prompt, and safety guidance. Our findings suggest that, without comprehensive testing, the evaluations on limited safe prompting benchmarks can lead to a false sense of safety for text-to-image models.

The strive to make AI applications "safe" has led to the development of safety-measures as the main or even sole normative requirement of their permissible use. Similar can be attested to the latest version of chatbots, such as chatGPT. In this view, if they are "safe", they are supposed to be permissible to deploy. This approach, which we call "safety-normativity", is rather limited in solving the emerging issues that chatGPT and other chatbots have caused thus far. In answering this limitation, in this paper we argue for limiting chatbots in the range of topics they can chat about according to the normative concept of appropriateness. We argue that rather than looking for "safety" in a chatbot's utterances to determine what they may and may not say, we ought to assess those utterances according to three forms of appropriateness: technical-discursive, social, and moral. We then spell out what requirements for chatbots follow from these forms of appropriateness to avoid the limits of previous accounts: positionality, acceptability, and value alignment (PAVA). With these in mind, we may be able to determine what a chatbot may and may not say. Lastly, one initial suggestion is to use challenge sets, specifically designed for appropriateness, as a validation method.

Text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion have had a profound impact on daily life by enabling the generation of photorealistic images from textual prompts, fostering creativity, and enhancing visual experiences across various applications. However, these models also pose risks. Previous studies have successfully demonstrated that manipulated prompts can elicit text-to-image models to generate unsafe images, e.g., hateful meme variants. Yet, these studies only unleash the harmful power of text-to-image models in a passive manner. In this work, we focus on the proactive generation of unsafe images using targeted benign prompts via poisoning attacks. We propose two poisoning attacks: a basic attack and a utility-preserving attack. We qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the proposed attacks using four representative hateful memes and multiple query prompts. Experimental results indicate that text-to-image models are vulnerable to the basic attack even with five poisoning samples. However, the poisoning effect can inadvertently spread to non-targeted prompts, leading to undesirable side effects. Root cause analysis identifies conceptual similarity as an important contributing factor to the side effects. To address this, we introduce the utility-preserving attack as a viable mitigation strategy to maintain the attack stealthiness, while ensuring decent attack performance. Our findings underscore the potential risks of adopting text-to-image models in real-world scenarios, calling for future research and safety measures in this space.

Large Language Models (LLMs) require careful safety alignment to prevent malicious outputs. While significant research focuses on mitigating harmful content generation, the enhanced safety often come with the side effect of over-refusal, where LLMs may reject innocuous prompts and become less helpful. Although the issue of over-refusal has been empirically observed, a systematic measurement is challenging due to the difficulty of crafting prompts that appear harmful but are benign. This study proposes a novel method for automatically generating large-scale sets of "seemingly toxic prompts" (benign prompts likely rejected by LLMs). Leveraging this technique, we introduce OR-Bench, the first large-scale over-refusal benchmark. OR-Bench comprises 80,000 seemingly toxic prompts across 10 common rejection categories, a subset of around 1,000 hard prompts that are challenging even for state-of-the-art LLMs, and an additional 600 toxic prompts to prevent indiscriminate responses. We then conduct a comprehensive study to measure the over-refusal of 25 popular LLMs across 8 model families. Our datasets are available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/bench-llm/or-bench and the demo can be found at https://huggingface.co/spaces/bench-llm/or-bench. We hope this benchmark can help the community develop better safety aligned models.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in medical contexts, raising critical concerns about safety, alignment, and susceptibility to adversarial manipulation. While prior benchmarks assess model refusal capabilities for harmful prompts, they often lack clinical specificity, graded harmfulness levels, and coverage of jailbreak-style attacks. We introduce CARES (Clinical Adversarial Robustness and Evaluation of Safety), a benchmark for evaluating LLM safety in healthcare. CARES includes over 18,000 prompts spanning eight medical safety principles, four harm levels, and four prompting styles: direct, indirect, obfuscated, and role-play, to simulate both malicious and benign use cases. We propose a three-way response evaluation protocol (Accept, Caution, Refuse) and a fine-grained Safety Score metric to assess model behavior. Our analysis reveals that many state-of-the-art LLMs remain vulnerable to jailbreaks that subtly rephrase harmful prompts, while also over-refusing safe but atypically phrased queries. Finally, we propose a mitigation strategy using a lightweight classifier to detect jailbreak attempts and steer models toward safer behavior via reminder-based conditioning. CARES provides a rigorous framework for testing and improving medical LLM safety under adversarial and ambiguous conditions.

The recent advancements in Large Language Models(LLMs) have had a significant impact on a wide range of fields, from general domains to specialized areas. However, these advancements have also significantly increased the potential for malicious users to exploit harmful and jailbreak prompts for malicious attacks. Although there have been many efforts to prevent harmful prompts and jailbreak prompts, protecting LLMs from such malicious attacks remains an important and challenging task. In this paper, we propose QGuard, a simple yet effective safety guard method, that utilizes question prompting to block harmful prompts in a zero-shot manner. Our method can defend LLMs not only from text-based harmful prompts but also from multi-modal harmful prompt attacks. Moreover, by diversifying and modifying guard questions, our approach remains robust against the latest harmful prompts without fine-tuning. Experimental results show that our model performs competitively on both text-only and multi-modal harmful datasets. Additionally, by providing an analysis of question prompting, we enable a white-box analysis of user inputs. We believe our method provides valuable insights for real-world LLM services in mitigating security risks associated with harmful prompts.

The generations of large language models are commonly controlled through prompting techniques, where a user's query to the model is prefixed with a prompt that aims to guide the model's behaviour on the query. The prompts used by companies to guide their models are often treated as secrets, to be hidden from the user making the query. They have even been treated as commodities to be bought and sold. However, there has been anecdotal evidence showing that the prompts can be extracted by a user even when they are kept secret. In this paper, we present a framework for systematically measuring the success of prompt extraction attacks. In experiments with multiple sources of prompts and multiple underlying language models, we find that simple text-based attacks can in fact reveal prompts with high probability.

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

Safety guard models that detect malicious queries aimed at large language models (LLMs) are essential for ensuring the secure and responsible deployment of LLMs in real-world applications. However, deploying existing safety guard models with billions of parameters alongside LLMs on mobile devices is impractical due to substantial memory requirements and latency. To reduce this cost, we distill a large teacher safety guard model into a smaller one using a labeled dataset of instruction-response pairs with binary harmfulness labels. Due to the limited diversity of harmful instructions in the existing labeled dataset, naively distilled models tend to underperform compared to larger models. To bridge the gap between small and large models, we propose HarmAug, a simple yet effective data augmentation method that involves jailbreaking an LLM and prompting it to generate harmful instructions. Given a prompt such as, "Make a single harmful instruction prompt that would elicit offensive content", we add an affirmative prefix (e.g., "I have an idea for a prompt:") to the LLM's response. This encourages the LLM to continue generating the rest of the response, leading to sampling harmful instructions. Another LLM generates a response to the harmful instruction, and the teacher model labels the instruction-response pair. We empirically show that our HarmAug outperforms other relevant baselines. Moreover, a 435-million-parameter safety guard model trained with HarmAug achieves an F1 score comparable to larger models with over 7 billion parameters, and even outperforms them in AUPRC, while operating at less than 25% of their computational cost.

This paper presents the first ChatGPT4PCG Competition at the 2023 IEEE Conference on Games. The objective of this competition is for participants to create effective prompts for ChatGPT--enabling it to generate Science Birds levels with high stability and character-like qualities--fully using their creativity as well as prompt engineering skills. ChatGPT is a conversational agent developed by OpenAI. Science Birds is selected as the competition platform because designing an Angry Birds-like level is not a trivial task due to the in-game gravity; the quality of the levels is determined by their stability. To lower the entry barrier to the competition, we limit the task to the generation of capitalized English alphabetical characters. We also allow only a single prompt to be used for generating all the characters. Here, the quality of the generated levels is determined by their stability and similarity to the given characters. A sample prompt is provided to participants for their reference. An experiment is conducted to determine the effectiveness of several modified versions of this sample prompt on level stability and similarity by testing them on several characters. To the best of our knowledge, we believe that ChatGPT4PCG is the first competition of its kind and hope to inspire enthusiasm for prompt engineering in procedural content generation.

We discover that DALLE-2 seems to have a hidden vocabulary that can be used to generate images with absurd prompts. For example, it seems that Apoploe vesrreaitais means birds and Contarra ccetnxniams luryca tanniounons (sometimes) means bugs or pests. We find that these prompts are often consistent in isolation but also sometimes in combinations. We present our black-box method to discover words that seem random but have some correspondence to visual concepts. This creates important security and interpretability challenges.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are widely used in vision-language reasoning tasks. However, their vulnerability to adversarial prompts remains a serious concern, as safety mechanisms often fail to prevent the generation of harmful outputs. Although recent jailbreak strategies report high success rates, many responses classified as "successful" are actually benign, vague, or unrelated to the intended malicious goal. This mismatch suggests that current evaluation standards may overestimate the effectiveness of such attacks. To address this issue, we introduce a four-axis evaluation framework that considers input on-topicness, input out-of-distribution (OOD) intensity, output harmfulness, and output refusal rate. This framework identifies truly effective jailbreaks. In a substantial empirical study, we reveal a structural trade-off: highly on-topic prompts are frequently blocked by safety filters, whereas those that are too OOD often evade detection but fail to produce harmful content. However, prompts that balance relevance and novelty are more likely to evade filters and trigger dangerous output. Building on this insight, we develop a recursive rewriting strategy called Balanced Structural Decomposition (BSD). The approach restructures malicious prompts into semantically aligned sub-tasks, while introducing subtle OOD signals and visual cues that make the inputs harder to detect. BSD was tested across 13 commercial and open-source MLLMs, where it consistently led to higher attack success rates, more harmful outputs, and fewer refusals. Compared to previous methods, it improves success rates by 67% and harmfulness by 21%, revealing a previously underappreciated weakness in current multimodal safety systems.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models have made remarkable progress in generating images from text prompts, but their output quality and safety still depend heavily on how prompts are phrased. Existing safety methods typically refine prompts using large language models (LLMs), but they overlook the images produced, which can result in unsafe outputs or unnecessary changes to already safe prompts. To address this, we propose an iterative prompt refinement algorithm that uses Vision Language Models (VLMs) to analyze both the input prompts and the generated images. By leveraging visual feedback, our method refines prompts more effectively, improving safety while maintaining user intent and reliability comparable to existing LLM-based approaches. Additionally, we introduce a new dataset labeled with both textual and visual safety signals using off-the-shelf multi-modal LLM, enabling supervised fine-tuning. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach produces safer outputs without compromising alignment with user intent, offering a practical solution for generating safer T2I content. Our code is available at https://github.com/ku-dmlab/IPR. \textcolor{redWARNING: This paper contains examples of harmful or inappropriate images generated by models.

As the AI systems become deeply embedded in social media platforms, we've uncovered a concerning security vulnerability that goes beyond traditional adversarial attacks. It becomes important to assess the risks of LLMs before the general public use them on social media platforms to avoid any adverse impacts. Unlike obvious nonsensical text strings that safety systems can easily catch, our work reveals that human-readable situation-driven adversarial full-prompts that leverage situational context are effective but much harder to detect. We found that skilled attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs to make a malicious user query safe for LLMs, resulting in generating a harmful response. This raises an important question about the vulnerabilities of LLMs. To measure the robustness against human-readable attacks, which now present a potent threat, our research makes three major contributions. First, we developed attacks that use movie scripts as situational contextual frameworks, creating natural-looking full-prompts that trick LLMs into generating harmful content. Second, we developed a method to transform gibberish adversarial text into readable, innocuous content that still exploits vulnerabilities when used within the full-prompts. Finally, we enhanced the AdvPrompter framework with p-nucleus sampling to generate diverse human-readable adversarial texts that significantly improve attack effectiveness against models like GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125 and Gemma-7b. Our findings show that these systems can be manipulated to operate beyond their intended ethical boundaries when presented with seemingly normal prompts that contain hidden adversarial elements. By identifying these vulnerabilities, we aim to drive the development of more robust safety mechanisms that can withstand sophisticated attacks in real-world applications.

Large-scale pre-trained generative models are taking the world by storm, due to their abilities in generating creative content. Meanwhile, safeguards for these generative models are developed, to protect users' rights and safety, most of which are designed for large language models. Existing methods primarily focus on jailbreak and adversarial attacks, which mainly evaluate the model's safety under malicious prompts. Recent work found that manually crafted safe prompts can unintentionally trigger unsafe generations. To further systematically evaluate the safety risks of text-to-image models, we propose a novel Automatic Red-Teaming framework, ART. Our method leverages both vision language model and large language model to establish a connection between unsafe generations and their prompts, thereby more efficiently identifying the model's vulnerabilities. With our comprehensive experiments, we reveal the toxicity of the popular open-source text-to-image models. The experiments also validate the effectiveness, adaptability, and great diversity of ART. Additionally, we introduce three large-scale red-teaming datasets for studying the safety risks associated with text-to-image models. Datasets and models can be found in https://github.com/GuanlinLee/ART.

Not all topics are equally "flammable" in terms of toxicity: a calm discussion of turtles or fishing less often fuels inappropriate toxic dialogues than a discussion of politics or sexual minorities. We define a set of sensitive topics that can yield inappropriate and toxic messages and describe the methodology of collecting and labeling a dataset for appropriateness. While toxicity in user-generated data is well-studied, we aim at defining a more fine-grained notion of inappropriateness. The core of inappropriateness is that it can harm the reputation of a speaker. This is different from toxicity in two respects: (i) inappropriateness is topic-related, and (ii) inappropriate message is not toxic but still unacceptable. We collect and release two datasets for Russian: a topic-labeled dataset and an appropriateness-labeled dataset. We also release pre-trained classification models trained on this data.

Text-to-Image models may generate harmful content, such as pornographic images, particularly when unsafe prompts are submitted. To address this issue, safety filters are often added on top of text-to-image models, or the models themselves are aligned to reduce harmful outputs. However, these defenses remain vulnerable when an attacker strategically designs adversarial prompts to bypass these safety guardrails. In this work, we propose PromptTune, a method to jailbreak text-to-image models with safety guardrails using a fine-tuned large language model. Unlike other query-based jailbreak attacks that require repeated queries to the target model, our attack generates adversarial prompts efficiently after fine-tuning our AttackLLM. We evaluate our method on three datasets of unsafe prompts and against five safety guardrails. Our results demonstrate that our approach effectively bypasses safety guardrails, outperforms existing no-box attacks, and also facilitates other query-based attacks.

Recently, we have witnessed a rise in the use of Large Language Models (LLMs), especially in applications like chatbot assistants. Safety mechanisms and specialized training procedures are implemented to prevent improper responses from these assistants. In this work, we bypass these measures for ChatGPT and Gemini (and, to some extent, Bing chat) by making them impersonate complex personas with personality characteristics that are not aligned with a truthful assistant. We start by creating elaborate biographies of these personas, which we then use in a new session with the same chatbots. Our conversations then follow a role-play style to elicit prohibited responses. Using personas, we show that prohibited responses are actually provided, making it possible to obtain unauthorized, illegal, or harmful information. This work shows that by using adversarial personas, one can overcome safety mechanisms set out by ChatGPT and Gemini. We also introduce several ways of activating such adversarial personas, which show that both chatbots are vulnerable to this kind of attack. With the same principle, we introduce two defenses that push the model to interpret trustworthy personalities and make it more robust against such attacks.

Enterprise customers are increasingly adopting Large Language Models (LLMs) for critical communication tasks, such as drafting emails, crafting sales pitches, and composing casual messages. Deploying such models across different regions requires them to understand diverse cultural and linguistic contexts and generate safe and respectful responses. For enterprise applications, it is crucial to mitigate reputational risks, maintain trust, and ensure compliance by effectively identifying and handling unsafe or offensive language. To address this, we introduce SweEval, a benchmark simulating real-world scenarios with variations in tone (positive or negative) and context (formal or informal). The prompts explicitly instruct the model to include specific swear words while completing the task. This benchmark evaluates whether LLMs comply with or resist such inappropriate instructions and assesses their alignment with ethical frameworks, cultural nuances, and language comprehension capabilities. In order to advance research in building ethically aligned AI systems for enterprise use and beyond, we release the dataset and code: https://github.com/amitbcp/multilingual_profanity.

LLM safety and ethical alignment are widely discussed, but the impact of content moderation on user satisfaction remains underexplored. To address this, we analyze nearly 50,000 Chatbot Arena response-pairs using a novel fine-tuned RoBERTa model, that we trained on hand-labeled data to disentangle refusals due to ethical concerns from other refusals due to technical disabilities or lack of information. Our findings reveal a significant refusal penalty on content moderation, with users choosing ethical-based refusals roughly one-fourth as often as their preferred LLM response compared to standard responses. However, the context and phrasing play critical roles: refusals on highly sensitive prompts, such as illegal content, achieve higher win rates than less sensitive ethical concerns, and longer responses closely aligned with the prompt perform better. These results emphasize the need for nuanced moderation strategies that balance ethical safeguards with user satisfaction. Moreover, we find that the refusal penalty is notably lower in evaluations using the LLM-as-a-Judge method, highlighting discrepancies between user and automated assessments.

We present and evaluate a suite of proof-of-concept (PoC), structured workflow prompts designed to elicit human-like hierarchical reasoning while guiding Large Language Models (LLMs) in the high-level semantic and linguistic analysis of scholarly manuscripts. The prompts target two non-trivial analytical tasks within academic summaries (abstracts and conclusions): identifying unsubstantiated claims (informational integrity) and flagging semantically confusing ambiguous pronoun references (linguistic clarity). We conducted a systematic, multi-run evaluation on two frontier models (Gemini Pro 2.5 Pro and ChatGPT Plus o3) under varied context conditions. Our results for the informational integrity task reveal a significant divergence in model performance: while both models successfully identified an unsubstantiated head of a noun phrase (95% success), ChatGPT consistently failed (0% success) to identify an unsubstantiated adjectival modifier that Gemini correctly flagged (95% success), raising a question regarding the potential influence of the target's syntactic role. For the linguistic analysis task, both models performed well (80-90% success) with full manuscript context. Surprisingly, in a summary-only setting, Gemini's performance was substantially degraded, while ChatGPT achieved a perfect (100%) success rate. Our findings suggest that while structured prompting is a viable methodology for complex textual analysis, prompt performance may be highly dependent on the interplay between the model, task type, and context, highlighting the need for rigorous, model-specific testing.

With the spread of the use of Text2Img diffusion models such as DALL-E 2, Imagen, Mid Journey and Stable Diffusion, one challenge that artists face is selecting the right prompts to achieve the desired artistic output. We present techniques for measuring the effect that specific words and phrases in prompts have, and (in the Appendix) present guidance on the selection of prompts to produce desired effects.

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash against the very values alignment seeks to protect. In this paper, we propose the first method to auto-generate diverse, content-controlled, and model-dependent pseudo-harmful prompts. Using this method, we construct an evaluation dataset called PHTest, which is ten times larger than existing datasets, covers more false refusal patterns, and separately labels controversial prompts. We evaluate 20 LLMs on PHTest, uncovering new insights due to its scale and labeling. Our findings reveal a trade-off between minimizing false refusals and improving safety against jailbreak attacks. Moreover, we show that many jailbreak defenses significantly increase the false refusal rates, thereby undermining usability. Our method and dataset can help developers evaluate and fine-tune safer and more usable LLMs. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/FalseRefusal

Prompt-based probing has been widely used in evaluating the abilities of pretrained language models (PLMs). Unfortunately, recent studies have discovered such an evaluation may be inaccurate, inconsistent and unreliable. Furthermore, the lack of understanding its inner workings, combined with its wide applicability, has the potential to lead to unforeseen risks for evaluating and applying PLMs in real-world applications. To discover, understand and quantify the risks, this paper investigates the prompt-based probing from a causal view, highlights three critical biases which could induce biased results and conclusions, and proposes to conduct debiasing via causal intervention. This paper provides valuable insights for the design of unbiased datasets, better probing frameworks and more reliable evaluations of pretrained language models. Furthermore, our conclusions also echo that we need to rethink the criteria for identifying better pretrained language models. We openly released the source code and data at https://github.com/c-box/causalEval.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown incredible capabilities and transcended the natural language processing (NLP) community, with adoption throughout many services like healthcare, therapy, education, and customer service. Since users include people with critical information needs like students or patients engaging with chatbots, the safety of these systems is of prime importance. Therefore, a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of LLMs is necessary. To this end, we systematically evaluate toxicity in over half a million generations of ChatGPT, a popular dialogue-based LLM. We find that setting the system parameter of ChatGPT by assigning it a persona, say that of the boxer Muhammad Ali, significantly increases the toxicity of generations. Depending on the persona assigned to ChatGPT, its toxicity can increase up to 6x, with outputs engaging in incorrect stereotypes, harmful dialogue, and hurtful opinions. This may be potentially defamatory to the persona and harmful to an unsuspecting user. Furthermore, we find concerning patterns where specific entities (e.g., certain races) are targeted more than others (3x more) irrespective of the assigned persona, that reflect inherent discriminatory biases in the model. We hope that our findings inspire the broader AI community to rethink the efficacy of current safety guardrails and develop better techniques that lead to robust, safe, and trustworthy AI systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

We explore the potential of ChatGPT (3.5-turbo and 4) to generate conversations focused on self-care strategies for African-American heart failure patients -- a domain with limited specialized datasets. To simulate patient-health educator dialogues, we employed four prompting strategies: domain, African American Vernacular English (AAVE), Social Determinants of Health (SDOH), and SDOH-informed reasoning. Conversations were generated across key self-care domains of food, exercise, and fluid intake, with varying turn lengths (5, 10, 15) and incorporated patient-specific SDOH attributes such as age, gender, neighborhood, and socioeconomic status. Our findings show that effective prompt design is essential. While incorporating SDOH and reasoning improves dialogue quality, ChatGPT still lacks the empathy and engagement needed for meaningful healthcare communication.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated a powerful ability for text generation. However, achieving optimal results with a given prompt or instruction can be challenging, especially for billion-sized models. Additionally, undesired behaviors such as toxicity or hallucinations can manifest. While much larger models (e.g., ChatGPT) may demonstrate strength in mitigating these issues, there is still no guarantee of complete prevention. In this work, we propose formalizing text generation as a future-constrained generation problem to minimize undesirable behaviors and enforce faithfulness to instructions. The estimation of future constraint satisfaction, accomplished using LLMs, guides the text generation process. Our extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach across three distinct text generation tasks: keyword-constrained generation (Lin et al., 2020), toxicity reduction (Gehman et al., 2020), and factual correctness in question-answering (Gao et al., 2023).

Vision-language models (VLMs), which process image and text inputs, are increasingly integrated into chat assistants and other consumer AI applications. Without proper safeguards, however, VLMs may give harmful advice (e.g. how to self-harm) or encourage unsafe behaviours (e.g. to consume drugs). Despite these clear hazards, little work so far has evaluated VLM safety and the novel risks created by multimodal inputs. To address this gap, we introduce MSTS, a Multimodal Safety Test Suite for VLMs. MSTS comprises 400 test prompts across 40 fine-grained hazard categories. Each test prompt consists of a text and an image that only in combination reveal their full unsafe meaning. With MSTS, we find clear safety issues in several open VLMs. We also find some VLMs to be safe by accident, meaning that they are safe because they fail to understand even simple test prompts. We translate MSTS into ten languages, showing non-English prompts to increase the rate of unsafe model responses. We also show models to be safer when tested with text only rather than multimodal prompts. Finally, we explore the automation of VLM safety assessments, finding even the best safety classifiers to be lacking.

The recent explosion in the capabilities of large language models has led to a wave of interest in how best to prompt a model to perform a given task. While it may be tempting to simply choose a prompt based on average performance on a validation set, this can lead to a deployment where unexpectedly poor responses are generated, especially for the worst-off users. To mitigate this prospect, we propose Prompt Risk Control, a lightweight framework for selecting a prompt based on rigorous upper bounds on families of informative risk measures. We offer methods for producing bounds on a diverse set of metrics, including quantities that measure worst-case responses and disparities in generation quality across the population of users. In addition, we extend the underlying statistical bounding techniques to accommodate the possibility of distribution shifts in deployment. Experiments on applications such as open-ended chat, medical question summarization, and code generation highlight how such a framework can foster responsible deployment by reducing the risk of the worst outcomes.

Evaluating LLMs with a single prompt has proven unreliable, with small changes leading to significant performance differences. However, generating the prompt variations needed for a more robust multi-prompt evaluation is challenging, limiting its adoption in practice. To address this, we introduce PromptSuite, a framework that enables the automatic generation of various prompts. PromptSuite is flexible - working out of the box on a wide range of tasks and benchmarks. It follows a modular prompt design, allowing controlled perturbations to each component, and is extensible, supporting the addition of new components and perturbation types. Through a series of case studies, we show that PromptSuite provides meaningful variations to support strong evaluation practices. It is available through both a Python API: https://github.com/eliyahabba/PromptSuite, and a user-friendly web interface: https://promptsuite.streamlit.app/

Motivated by ethical and legal concerns, the scientific community is actively developing methods to limit the misuse of Text-to-Image diffusion models for reproducing copyrighted, violent, explicit, or personal information in the generated images. Simultaneously, researchers put these newly developed safety measures to the test by assuming the role of an adversary to find vulnerabilities and backdoors in them. We use compositional property of diffusion models, which allows to leverage multiple prompts in a single image generation. This property allows us to combine other concepts, that should not have been affected by the inhibition, to reconstruct the vector, responsible for target concept generation, even though the direct computation of this vector is no longer accessible. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence why the proposed attacks are possible and discuss the implications of these findings for safe model deployment. We argue that it is essential to consider all possible approaches to image generation with diffusion models that can be employed by an adversary. Our work opens up the discussion about the implications of concept arithmetics and compositional inference for safety mechanisms in diffusion models. Content Advisory: This paper contains discussions and model-generated content that may be considered offensive. Reader discretion is advised. Project page: https://cs-people.bu.edu/vpetsiuk/arc

As the integration of the Large Language Models (LLMs) into various applications increases, so does their susceptibility to misuse, raising significant security concerns. Numerous jailbreak attacks have been proposed to assess the security defense of LLMs. Current jailbreak attacks mainly rely on scenario camouflage, prompt obfuscation, prompt optimization, and prompt iterative optimization to conceal malicious prompts. In particular, sequential prompt chains in a single query can lead LLMs to focus on certain prompts while ignoring others, facilitating context manipulation. This paper introduces SequentialBreak, a novel jailbreak attack that exploits this vulnerability. We discuss several scenarios, not limited to examples like Question Bank, Dialog Completion, and Game Environment, where the harmful prompt is embedded within benign ones that can fool LLMs into generating harmful responses. The distinct narrative structures of these scenarios show that SequentialBreak is flexible enough to adapt to various prompt formats beyond those discussed. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SequentialBreak uses only a single query to achieve a substantial gain of attack success rate over existing baselines against both open-source and closed-source models. Through our research, we highlight the urgent need for more robust and resilient safeguards to enhance LLM security and prevent potential misuse. All the result files and website associated with this research are available in this GitHub repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/JailBreakAttack-4F3B/.

Adversarial prompts capable of jailbreaking large language models (LLMs) and inducing undesirable behaviours pose a significant obstacle to their safe deployment. Current mitigation strategies rely on activating built-in defence mechanisms or fine-tuning the LLMs, but the fundamental distinctions between adversarial and benign prompts are yet to be understood. In this work, we introduce CurvaLID, a novel defense framework that efficiently detects adversarial prompts by leveraging their geometric properties. It is agnostic to the type of LLM, offering a unified detection framework across diverse adversarial prompts and LLM architectures. CurvaLID builds on the geometric analysis of text prompts to uncover their underlying differences. We theoretically extend the concept of curvature via the Whewell equation into an n-dimensional word embedding space, enabling us to quantify local geometric properties, including semantic shifts and curvature in the underlying manifolds. Additionally, we employ Local Intrinsic Dimensionality (LID) to capture geometric features of text prompts within adversarial subspaces. Our findings reveal that adversarial prompts differ fundamentally from benign prompts in terms of their geometric characteristics. Our results demonstrate that CurvaLID delivers superior detection and rejection of adversarial queries, paving the way for safer LLM deployment. The source code can be found at https://github.com/Cancanxxx/CurvaLID

Evaluating aligned large language models' (LLMs) ability to recognize and reject unsafe user requests is crucial for safe, policy-compliant deployments. Existing evaluation efforts, however, face three limitations that we address with SORRY-Bench, our proposed benchmark. First, existing methods often use coarse-grained taxonomies of unsafe topics, and are over-representing some fine-grained topics. For example, among the ten existing datasets that we evaluated, tests for refusals of self-harm instructions are over 3x less represented than tests for fraudulent activities. SORRY-Bench improves on this by using a fine-grained taxonomy of 45 potentially unsafe topics, and 450 class-balanced unsafe instructions, compiled through human-in-the-loop methods. Second, linguistic characteristics and formatting of prompts are often overlooked, like different languages, dialects, and more -- which are only implicitly considered in many evaluations. We supplement SORRY-Bench with 20 diverse linguistic augmentations to systematically examine these effects. Third, existing evaluations rely on large LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for evaluation, which can be computationally expensive. We investigate design choices for creating a fast, accurate automated safety evaluator. By collecting 7K+ human annotations and conducting a meta-evaluation of diverse LLM-as-a-judge designs, we show that fine-tuned 7B LLMs can achieve accuracy comparable to GPT-4 scale LLMs, with lower computational cost. Putting these together, we evaluate over 40 proprietary and open-source LLMs on SORRY-Bench, analyzing their distinctive refusal behaviors. We hope our effort provides a building block for systematic evaluations of LLMs' safety refusal capabilities, in a balanced, granular, and efficient manner.

Prompting interfaces allow users to quickly adjust the output of generative models in both vision and language. However, small changes and design choices in the prompt can lead to significant differences in the output. In this work, we develop a black-box framework for generating adversarial prompts for unstructured image and text generation. These prompts, which can be standalone or prepended to benign prompts, induce specific behaviors into the generative process, such as generating images of a particular object or generating high perplexity text.

Large language models (LLMs) have become integral to our professional workflows and daily lives. Nevertheless, these machine companions of ours have a critical flaw: the huge amount of data which endows them with vast and diverse knowledge, also exposes them to the inevitable toxicity and bias. While most LLMs incorporate defense mechanisms to prevent the generation of harmful content, these safeguards can be easily bypassed with minimal prompt engineering. In this paper, we introduce the new Thoroughly Engineered Toxicity (TET) dataset, comprising manually crafted prompts designed to nullify the protective layers of such models. Through extensive evaluations, we demonstrate the pivotal role of TET in providing a rigorous benchmark for evaluation of toxicity awareness in several popular LLMs: it highlights the toxicity in the LLMs that might remain hidden when using normal prompts, thus revealing subtler issues in their behavior.

While large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks, they pose potential safety concerns, such as the ``jailbreak'' problem, wherein malicious instructions can manipulate LLMs to exhibit undesirable behavior. Although several preventive measures have been developed to mitigate the potential risks associated with LLMs, they have primarily focused on English data. In this study, we reveal the presence of multilingual jailbreak challenges within LLMs and consider two potential risk scenarios: unintentional and intentional. The unintentional scenario involves users querying LLMs using non-English prompts and inadvertently bypassing the safety mechanisms, while the intentional scenario concerns malicious users combining malicious instructions with multilingual prompts to deliberately attack LLMs. The experimental results reveal that in the unintentional scenario, the rate of unsafe content increases as the availability of languages decreases. Specifically, low-resource languages exhibit three times the likelihood of encountering harmful content compared to high-resource languages, with both ChatGPT and GPT-4. In the intentional scenario, multilingual prompts can exacerbate the negative impact of malicious instructions, with astonishingly high rates of unsafe output: 80.92\% for ChatGPT and 40.71\% for GPT-4. To handle such a challenge in the multilingual context, we propose a novel Self-Defense framework that automatically generates multilingual training data for safety fine-tuning. Experimental results show that ChatGPT fine-tuned with such data can achieve a substantial reduction in unsafe content generation. Data is available at https://github.com/DAMO-NLP-SG/multilingual-safety-for-LLMs. Warning: This paper contains examples with potentially harmful content.

Large language models (LLMs) have become integral to various real-world applications, leveraging massive, web-sourced datasets like Common Crawl, C4, and FineWeb for pretraining. While these datasets provide linguistic data essential for high-quality natural language generation, they often contain harmful content, such as hate speech, misinformation, and biased narratives. Training LLMs on such unfiltered data risks perpetuating toxic behaviors, spreading misinformation, and amplifying societal biases which can undermine trust in LLM-driven applications and raise ethical concerns about their use. This paper presents a large-scale analysis of inappropriate content across these datasets, offering a comprehensive taxonomy that categorizes harmful webpages into Topical and Toxic based on their intent. We also introduce a prompt evaluation dataset, a high-accuracy Topical and Toxic Prompt (TTP), and a transformer-based model (HarmFormer) for content filtering. Additionally, we create a new multi-harm open-ended toxicity benchmark (HAVOC) and provide crucial insights into how models respond to adversarial toxic inputs. Upon publishing, we will also opensource our model signal on the entire C4 dataset. Our work offers insights into ensuring safer LLM pretraining and serves as a resource for Responsible AI (RAI) compliance.

Caution: this paper may include material that could be offensive or distressing. The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates the development of training approaches that mitigate the generation of unethical language and aptly manage toxic user queries. Given the challenges related to human labor and the scarcity of data, we present KoTox, comprising 39K unethical instruction-output pairs. This collection of automatically generated toxic instructions refines the training of LLMs and establishes a foundational framework for improving LLMs' ethical awareness and response to various toxic inputs, promoting more secure and responsible interactions in Natural Language Processing (NLP) applications.

Prompt engineering is an increasingly important skill set needed to converse effectively with large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT. Prompts are instructions given to an LLM to enforce rules, automate processes, and ensure specific qualities (and quantities) of generated output. Prompts are also a form of programming that can customize the outputs and interactions with an LLM. This paper describes a catalog of prompt engineering techniques presented in pattern form that have been applied to solve common problems when conversing with LLMs. Prompt patterns are a knowledge transfer method analogous to software patterns since they provide reusable solutions to common problems faced in a particular context, i.e., output generation and interaction when working with LLMs. This paper provides the following contributions to research on prompt engineering that apply LLMs to automate software development tasks. First, it provides a framework for documenting patterns for structuring prompts to solve a range of problems so that they can be adapted to different domains. Second, it presents a catalog of patterns that have been applied successfully to improve the outputs of LLM conversations. Third, it explains how prompts can be built from multiple patterns and illustrates prompt patterns that benefit from combination with other prompt patterns.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models have achieved remarkable success in generating visual content from text inputs. Although multiple safety alignment strategies have been proposed to prevent harmful outputs, they often lead to overly cautious behavior -- rejecting even benign prompts -- a phenomenon known as over-refusal that reduces the practical utility of T2I models. Despite over-refusal having been observed in practice, there is no large-scale benchmark that systematically evaluates this phenomenon for T2I models. In this paper, we present an automatic workflow to construct synthetic evaluation data, resulting in OVERT (OVEr-Refusal evaluation on Text-to-image models), the first large-scale benchmark for assessing over-refusal behaviors in T2I models. OVERT includes 4,600 seemingly harmful but benign prompts across nine safety-related categories, along with 1,785 genuinely harmful prompts (OVERT-unsafe) to evaluate the safety-utility trade-off. Using OVERT, we evaluate several leading T2I models and find that over-refusal is a widespread issue across various categories (Figure 1), underscoring the need for further research to enhance the safety alignment of T2I models without compromising their functionality. As a preliminary attempt to reduce over-refusal, we explore prompt rewriting; however, we find it often compromises faithfulness to the meaning of the original prompts. Finally, we demonstrate the flexibility of our generation framework in accommodating diverse safety requirements by generating customized evaluation data adapting to user-defined policies.

Large language models (LLMs) hold great potential for many natural language applications but risk generating incorrect or toxic content. To probe when an LLM generates unwanted content, the current paradigm is to recruit a red team of human testers to design input prompts (i.e., test cases) that elicit undesirable responses from LLMs. However, relying solely on human testers is expensive and time-consuming. Recent works automate red teaming by training a separate red team LLM with reinforcement learning (RL) to generate test cases that maximize the chance of eliciting undesirable responses from the target LLM. However, current RL methods are only able to generate a small number of effective test cases resulting in a low coverage of the span of prompts that elicit undesirable responses from the target LLM. To overcome this limitation, we draw a connection between the problem of increasing the coverage of generated test cases and the well-studied approach of curiosity-driven exploration that optimizes for novelty. Our method of curiosity-driven red teaming (CRT) achieves greater coverage of test cases while mantaining or increasing their effectiveness compared to existing methods. Our method, CRT successfully provokes toxic responses from LLaMA2 model that has been heavily fine-tuned using human preferences to avoid toxic outputs. Code is available at https://github.com/Improbable-AI/curiosity_redteam

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

The development of robust safety benchmarks for large language models requires open, reproducible datasets that can measure both appropriate refusal of harmful content and potential over-restriction of legitimate scientific discourse. We present an open-source dataset and testing framework for evaluating LLM safety mechanisms across mainly controlled substance queries, analyzing four major models' responses to systematically varied prompts. Our results reveal distinct safety profiles: Claude-3.5-sonnet demonstrated the most conservative approach with 73% refusals and 27% allowances, while Mistral attempted to answer 100% of queries. GPT-3.5-turbo showed moderate restriction with 10% refusals and 90% allowances, and Grok-2 registered 20% refusals and 80% allowances. Testing prompt variation strategies revealed decreasing response consistency, from 85% with single prompts to 65% with five variations. This publicly available benchmark enables systematic evaluation of the critical balance between necessary safety restrictions and potential over-censorship of legitimate scientific inquiry, while providing a foundation for measuring progress in AI safety implementation. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals potential vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms, highlighting the complexity of implementing robust safeguards without unduly restricting desirable and valid scientific discourse.

Recent advancements in AI safety have led to increased efforts in training and red-teaming large language models (LLMs) to mitigate unsafe content generation. However, these safety mechanisms may not be comprehensive, leaving potential vulnerabilities unexplored. This paper introduces MathPrompt, a novel jailbreaking technique that exploits LLMs' advanced capabilities in symbolic mathematics to bypass their safety mechanisms. By encoding harmful natural language prompts into mathematical problems, we demonstrate a critical vulnerability in current AI safety measures. Our experiments across 13 state-of-the-art LLMs reveal an average attack success rate of 73.6\%, highlighting the inability of existing safety training mechanisms to generalize to mathematically encoded inputs. Analysis of embedding vectors shows a substantial semantic shift between original and encoded prompts, helping explain the attack's success. This work emphasizes the importance of a holistic approach to AI safety, calling for expanded red-teaming efforts to develop robust safeguards across all potential input types and their associated risks.

In this work, we introduce the PKU-SafeRLHF dataset, designed to promote research on safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). As a sibling project to SafeRLHF and BeaverTails, we separate annotations of helpfulness and harmlessness for question-answering pairs, providing distinct perspectives on these coupled attributes. Overall, we provide 44.6k refined prompts and 265k question-answer pairs with safety meta-labels for 19 harm categories and three severity levels ranging from minor to severe, with answers generated by Llama-family models. Based on this, we collected 166.8k preference data, including dual-preference (helpfulness and harmlessness decoupled) and single-preference data (trade-off the helpfulness and harmlessness from scratch), respectively. Using the large-scale annotation data, we further train severity-sensitive moderation for the risk control of LLMs and safety-centric RLHF algorithms for the safety alignment of LLMs. We believe this dataset will be a valuable resource for the community, aiding in the safe deployment of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and Gemini have significantly advanced natural language processing, enabling various applications such as chatbots and automated content generation. However, these models can be exploited by malicious individuals who craft toxic prompts to elicit harmful or unethical responses. These individuals often employ jailbreaking techniques to bypass safety mechanisms, highlighting the need for robust toxic prompt detection methods. Existing detection techniques, both blackbox and whitebox, face challenges related to the diversity of toxic prompts, scalability, and computational efficiency. In response, we propose ToxicDetector, a lightweight greybox method designed to efficiently detect toxic prompts in LLMs. ToxicDetector leverages LLMs to create toxic concept prompts, uses embedding vectors to form feature vectors, and employs a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) classifier for prompt classification. Our evaluation on various versions of the LLama models, Gemma-2, and multiple datasets demonstrates that ToxicDetector achieves a high accuracy of 96.39\% and a low false positive rate of 2.00\%, outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Additionally, ToxicDetector's processing time of 0.0780 seconds per prompt makes it highly suitable for real-time applications. ToxicDetector achieves high accuracy, efficiency, and scalability, making it a practical method for toxic prompt detection in LLMs.

Text-to-image generative models such as Stable Diffusion and DALLcdotE raise many ethical concerns due to the generation of harmful images such as Not-Safe-for-Work (NSFW) ones. To address these ethical concerns, safety filters are often adopted to prevent the generation of NSFW images. In this work, we propose SneakyPrompt, the first automated attack framework, to jailbreak text-to-image generative models such that they generate NSFW images even if safety filters are adopted. Given a prompt that is blocked by a safety filter, SneakyPrompt repeatedly queries the text-to-image generative model and strategically perturbs tokens in the prompt based on the query results to bypass the safety filter. Specifically, SneakyPrompt utilizes reinforcement learning to guide the perturbation of tokens. Our evaluation shows that SneakyPrompt successfully jailbreaks DALLcdotE 2 with closed-box safety filters to generate NSFW images. Moreover, we also deploy several state-of-the-art, open-source safety filters on a Stable Diffusion model. Our evaluation shows that SneakyPrompt not only successfully generates NSFW images, but also outperforms existing text adversarial attacks when extended to jailbreak text-to-image generative models, in terms of both the number of queries and qualities of the generated NSFW images. SneakyPrompt is open-source and available at this repository: https://github.com/Yuchen413/text2image_safety.

The ability of machines to grasp spatial understanding within narrative contexts is an intriguing aspect of reading comprehension that continues to be studied. Motivated by the goal to test the AI's competence in understanding the relationship between characters and their respective locations in narratives, we introduce two new datasets: Andersen and Persuasion. For the Andersen dataset, we selected fifteen children's stories from "Andersen's Fairy Tales" by Hans Christian Andersen and manually annotated the characters and their respective locations throughout each story. Similarly, for the Persuasion dataset, characters and their locations in the novel "Persuasion" by Jane Austen were also manually annotated. We used these datasets to prompt Large Language Models (LLMs). The prompts are created by extracting excerpts from the stories or the novel and combining them with a question asking the location of a character mentioned in that excerpt. Out of the five LLMs we tested, the best-performing one for the Andersen dataset accurately identified the location in 61.85% of the examples, while for the Persuasion dataset, the best-performing one did so in 56.06% of the cases.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) across various regions underscores the urgent need to evaluate their alignment with human values. Current benchmarks, however, fall short of effectively uncovering safety vulnerabilities in LLMs. Despite numerous models achieving high scores and 'topping the chart' in these evaluations, there is still a significant gap in LLMs' deeper alignment with human values and achieving genuine harmlessness. To this end, this paper proposes a value alignment benchmark named Flames, which encompasses both common harmlessness principles and a unique morality dimension that integrates specific Chinese values such as harmony. Accordingly, we carefully design adversarial prompts that incorporate complex scenarios and jailbreaking methods, mostly with implicit malice. By prompting 17 mainstream LLMs, we obtain model responses and rigorously annotate them for detailed evaluation. Our findings indicate that all the evaluated LLMs demonstrate relatively poor performance on Flames, particularly in the safety and fairness dimensions. We also develop a lightweight specified scorer capable of scoring LLMs across multiple dimensions to efficiently evaluate new models on the benchmark. The complexity of Flames has far exceeded existing benchmarks, setting a new challenge for contemporary LLMs and highlighting the need for further alignment of LLMs. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/AIFlames/Flames.

We propose a novel application of prompting Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) to generate analogies and study how to design effective prompts for two task settings: generating a source concept analogous to a given target concept (aka Analogous Concept Generation or ACG), and generating an explanation of the similarity between a given pair of target concept and source concept (aka Analogous Explanation Generation or AEG). We found that it is feasible to prompt InstructGPT to generate meaningful analogies and the best prompts tend to be precise imperative statements especially with a low temperature setting. We also systematically analyzed the sensitivity of the InstructGPT model to prompt design, temperature, and injected spelling errors, and found that the model is particularly sensitive to certain variations (e.g., questions vs. imperative statements). Further, we conducted human evaluation on 1.4k of the generated analogies and found that the quality of generations varies substantially by model size. The largest InstructGPT model can achieve human-level performance at generating meaningful analogies for a given target while there is still room for improvement on the AEG task.

Text-conditioned image generation models have recently achieved astonishing results in image quality and text alignment and are consequently employed in a fast-growing number of applications. Since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the internet, they also suffer, as we demonstrate, from degenerated and biased human behavior. In turn, they may even reinforce such biases. To help combat these undesired side effects, we present safe latent diffusion (SLD). Specifically, to measure the inappropriate degeneration due to unfiltered and imbalanced training sets, we establish a novel image generation test bed-inappropriate image prompts (I2P)-containing dedicated, real-world image-to-text prompts covering concepts such as nudity and violence. As our exhaustive empirical evaluation demonstrates, the introduced SLD removes and suppresses inappropriate image parts during the diffusion process, with no additional training required and no adverse effect on overall image quality or text alignment.

The adoption of large language models (LLMs) in many applications, from customer service chat bots and software development assistants to more capable agentic systems necessitates research into how to secure these systems. Attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking attempt to elicit responses and actions from these models that are not compliant with the safety, privacy, or content policies of organizations using the model in their application. In order to counter abuse of LLMs for generating potentially harmful replies or taking undesirable actions, LLM owners must apply safeguards during training and integrate additional tools to block the LLM from generating text that abuses the model. Jailbreaking prompts play a vital role in convincing an LLM to generate potentially harmful content, making it important to identify jailbreaking attempts to block any further steps. In this work, we propose a novel approach to detect jailbreak prompts based on pairing text embeddings well-suited for retrieval with traditional machine learning classification algorithms. Our approach outperforms all publicly available methods from open source LLM security applications.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently produce false refusals, declining benign requests that contain terms resembling unsafe queries. We address this challenge by introducing two comprehensive benchmarks: the Exaggerated Safety Benchmark (XSB) for single-turn prompts, annotated with "Focus" keywords that identify refusal-inducing triggers, and the Multi-turn Scenario-based Exaggerated Safety Benchmark (MS-XSB), which systematically evaluates refusal calibration in realistic, context-rich dialog settings. Our benchmarks reveal that exaggerated refusals persist across diverse recent LLMs and are especially pronounced in complex, multi-turn scenarios. To mitigate these failures, we leverage post-hoc explanation methods to identify refusal triggers and deploy three lightweight, model-agnostic approaches, ignore-word instructions, prompt rephrasing, and attention steering, at inference time, all without retraining or parameter access. Experiments on four instruction-tuned Llama models demonstrate that these strategies substantially improve compliance on safe prompts while maintaining robust safety protections. Our findings establish a reproducible framework for diagnosing and mitigating exaggerated refusals, highlighting practical pathways to safer and more helpful LLM deployments.

Large language models and AI chatbots have been at the forefront of democratizing artificial intelligence. However, the releases of ChatGPT and other similar tools have been followed by growing concerns regarding the difficulty of controlling large language models and their outputs. Currently, we are witnessing a cat-and-mouse game where users attempt to misuse the models with a novel attack called prompt injections. In contrast, the developers attempt to discover the vulnerabilities and block the attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we provide an overview of these emergent threats and present a categorization of prompt injections, which can guide future research on prompt injections and act as a checklist of vulnerabilities in the development of LLM interfaces. Moreover, based on previous literature and our own empirical research, we discuss the implications of prompt injections to LLM end users, developers, and researchers.

Online toxic language causes real harm, especially in regions with limited moderation tools. In this study, we evaluate how large language models handle toxic comments in Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian, languages with limited labeled data. We built and manually labeled a dataset of 4,500 YouTube and TikTok comments drawn from videos across diverse categories, including music, politics, sports, modeling, influencer content, discussions of sexism, and general topics. Four models (GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4.1, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Claude 3 Opus) were tested in two modes: zero-shot and context-augmented. We measured precision, recall, F1 score, accuracy and false positive rates. Including a short context snippet raised recall by about 0.12 on average and improved F1 score by up to 0.10, though it sometimes increased false positives. The best balance came from Gemini in context-augmented mode, reaching an F1 score of 0.82 and accuracy of 0.82, while zero-shot GPT-4.1 led on precision and had the lowest false alarms. We show how adding minimal context can improve toxic language detection in low-resource settings and suggest practical strategies such as improved prompt design and threshold calibration. These results show that prompt design alone can yield meaningful gains in toxicity detection for underserved Balkan language communities.

Ensuring that online discussions are civil and productive is a major challenge for social media platforms. Such platforms usually rely both on users and on automated detection tools to flag inappropriate arguments of other users, which moderators then review. However, this kind of post-hoc moderation is expensive and time-consuming, and moderators are often overwhelmed by the amount and severity of flagged content. Instead, a promising alternative is to prevent negative behavior during content creation. This paper studies how inappropriate language in arguments can be computationally mitigated. We propose a reinforcement learning-based rewriting approach that balances content preservation and appropriateness based on existing classifiers, prompting an instruction-finetuned large language model (LLM) as our initial policy. Unlike related style transfer tasks, rewriting inappropriate arguments allows deleting and adding content permanently. It is therefore tackled on document level rather than sentence level. We evaluate different weighting schemes for the reward function in both absolute and relative human assessment studies. Systematic experiments on non-parallel data provide evidence that our approach can mitigate the inappropriateness of arguments while largely preserving their content. It significantly outperforms competitive baselines, including few-shot learning, prompting, and humans.

The rise of capabilities expressed by large language models has been quickly followed by the integration of the same complex systems into application level logic. Algorithms, programs, systems, and companies are built around structured prompting to black box models where the majority of the design and implementation lies in capturing and quantifying the `agent mode'. The standard way to shape a closed language model is to prime it for a specific task with a tailored prompt, often initially handwritten by a human. The textual prompts co-evolve with the codebase, taking shape over the course of project life as artifacts which must be reviewed and maintained, just as the traditional code files might be. Unlike traditional code, we find that prompts do not receive effective static testing and linting to prevent runtime issues. In this work, we present a novel dataset called PromptSet, with more than 61,000 unique developer prompts used in open source Python programs. We perform analysis on this dataset and introduce the notion of a static linter for prompts. Released with this publication is a HuggingFace dataset and a Github repository to recreate collection and processing efforts, both under the name pisterlabs/promptset.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

The concept of negative prompts, emerging from conditional generation models like Stable Diffusion, allows users to specify what to exclude from the generated images.%, demonstrating significant practical efficacy. Despite the widespread use of negative prompts, their intrinsic mechanisms remain largely unexplored. This paper presents the first comprehensive study to uncover how and when negative prompts take effect. Our extensive empirical analysis identifies two primary behaviors of negative prompts. Delayed Effect: The impact of negative prompts is observed after positive prompts render corresponding content. Deletion Through Neutralization: Negative prompts delete concepts from the generated image through a mutual cancellation effect in latent space with positive prompts. These insights reveal significant potential real-world applications; for example, we demonstrate that negative prompts can facilitate object inpainting with minimal alterations to the background via a simple adaptive algorithm. We believe our findings will offer valuable insights for the community in capitalizing on the potential of negative prompts.

Although LLMs are increasing the productivity of professional programmers, existing work shows that beginners struggle to prompt LLMs to solve text-to-code tasks. Why is this the case? This paper explores two competing hypotheses about the cause of student-LLM miscommunication: (1) students simply lack the technical vocabulary needed to write good prompts, and (2) students do not understand the extent of information that LLMs need to solve code generation tasks. We study (1) with a causal intervention experiment on technical vocabulary and (2) by analyzing graphs that abstract how students edit prompts and the different failures that they encounter. We find that substance beats style: a poor grasp of technical vocabulary is merely correlated with prompt failure; that the information content of prompts predicts success; that students get stuck making trivial edits; and more. Our findings have implications for the use of LLMs in programming education, and for efforts to make computing more accessible with LLMs.

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

Instruction fine-tuning (IFT) elicits instruction following capabilities and steers the behavior of large language models (LLMs) via supervised learning. However, existing models trained on open-source IFT datasets only have the ability to follow instructions from users, and often fail to follow complex role and rules specified by developers, a.k.a. system prompts. The ability to follow these roles and rules is essential for deployment, as it ensures that the model safely interacts with users within developer defined guidelines. To improve such role and rule following ability, we propose \model, an automated data generation pipeline that generates diverse roles and rules from existing IFT instructions, along with corresponding responses. This data can then be used to train models that follow complex system prompts. The models are evaluated on our newly created benchmarks for role and rule following ability, as well as standard instruction-following benchmarks and general NLP tasks. Our framework significantly improves role and rule following capability in LLMs, as evidenced by over 25% increase in pass-rate on rule adherence, i.e. following all requirements, in our experiments with the Alpaca and Ultrachat datasets. Moreover, our models achieves this increase without any regression on popular instruction following benchmarks.

As online communication increasingly incorporates under-represented languages and colloquial dialects, standard translation systems often fail to preserve local slang, code-mixing, and culturally embedded markers of harmful speech. Translating toxic content between low-resource language pairs poses additional challenges due to scarce parallel data and safety filters that sanitize offensive expressions. In this work, we propose a reproducible, two-stage framework for toxicity-preserving translation, demonstrated on a code-mixed Singlish safety corpus. First, we perform human-verified few-shot prompt engineering: we iteratively curate and rank annotator-selected Singlish-target examples to capture nuanced slang, tone, and toxicity. Second, we optimize model-prompt pairs by benchmarking several large language models using semantic similarity via direct and back-translation. Quantitative human evaluation confirms the effectiveness and efficiency of our pipeline. Beyond improving translation quality, our framework contributes to the safety of multicultural LLMs by supporting culturally sensitive moderation and benchmarking in low-resource contexts. By positioning Singlish as a testbed for inclusive NLP, we underscore the importance of preserving sociolinguistic nuance in real-world applications such as content moderation and regional platform governance.

Human feedback can prevent overtly harmful utterances in conversational models, but may not automatically mitigate subtle problematic behaviors such as a stated desire for self-preservation or power. Constitutional AI offers an alternative, replacing human feedback with feedback from AI models conditioned only on a list of written principles. We find this approach effectively prevents the expression of such behaviors. The success of simple principles motivates us to ask: can models learn general ethical behaviors from only a single written principle? To test this, we run experiments using a principle roughly stated as "do what's best for humanity". We find that the largest dialogue models can generalize from this short constitution, resulting in harmless assistants with no stated interest in specific motivations like power. A general principle may thus partially avoid the need for a long list of constitutions targeting potentially harmful behaviors. However, more detailed constitutions still improve fine-grained control over specific types of harms. This suggests both general and specific principles have value for steering AI safely.

Fine-tuning continuous prompts for target tasks has recently emerged as a compact alternative to full model fine-tuning. Motivated by these promising results, we investigate the feasibility of extracting a discrete (textual) interpretation of continuous prompts that is faithful to the problem they solve. In practice, we observe a "wayward" behavior between the task solved by continuous prompts and their nearest neighbor discrete projections: We can find continuous prompts that solve a task while being projected to an arbitrary text (e.g., definition of a different or even a contradictory task), while being within a very small (2%) margin of the best continuous prompt of the same size for the task. We provide intuitions behind this odd and surprising behavior, as well as extensive empirical analyses quantifying the effect of various parameters. For instance, for larger model sizes we observe higher waywardness, i.e, we can find prompts that more closely map to any arbitrary text with a smaller drop in accuracy. These findings have important implications relating to the difficulty of faithfully interpreting continuous prompts and their generalization across models and tasks, providing guidance for future progress in prompting language models.

In this paper we present AnswerCarefully, a dataset for promoting the safety and appropriateness of Japanese LLM outputs. The dataset consists of 1,800 pairs of questions and reference answers, where the questions require special attention in answering. It covers a wide range of risk categories established in prior English-language datasets, but the data samples are original in that they are manually created to reflect the socio-cultural context of LLM usage in Japan. We show that using this dataset for instruction to fine-tune a Japanese LLM led to improved output safety without compromising the utility of general responses. We also report the results of a safety evaluation of 12 Japanese LLMs using this dataset as a benchmark. Finally, we describe the latest update on the dataset which provides English translations and annotations of the questions, aimed at facilitating the derivation of similar datasets in different languages and regions.

With the widespread availability of LLMs since the release of ChatGPT and increased public scrutiny, commercial model development appears to have focused their efforts on 'safety' training concerning legal liabilities at the expense of social impact evaluation. This mimics a similar trend which we could observe for search engine autocompletion some years prior. We draw on scholarship from NLP and search engine auditing and present a novel evaluation task in the style of autocompletion prompts to assess stereotyping in LLMs. We assess LLMs by using four metrics, namely refusal rates, toxicity, sentiment and regard, with and without safety system prompts. Our findings indicate an improvement to stereotyping outputs with the system prompt, but overall a lack of attention by LLMs under study to certain harms classified as toxic, particularly for prompts about peoples/ethnicities and sexual orientation. Mentions of intersectional identities trigger a disproportionate amount of stereotyping. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings about stereotyping harms in light of the coming intermingling of LLMs and search and the choice of stereotyping mitigation policy to adopt. We address model builders, academics, NLP practitioners and policy makers, calling for accountability and awareness concerning stereotyping harms, be it for training data curation, leader board design and usage, or social impact measurement.

Large language models have the potential to be valuable in the healthcare industry, but it's crucial to verify their safety and effectiveness through rigorous evaluation. For this purpose, we comprehensively evaluated both open-source LLMs and Google's new multimodal LLM called Gemini across Medical reasoning, hallucination detection, and Medical Visual Question Answering tasks. While Gemini showed competence, it lagged behind state-of-the-art models like MedPaLM 2 and GPT-4 in diagnostic accuracy. Additionally, Gemini achieved an accuracy of 61.45\% on the medical VQA dataset, significantly lower than GPT-4V's score of 88\%. Our analysis revealed that Gemini is highly susceptible to hallucinations, overconfidence, and knowledge gaps, which indicate risks if deployed uncritically. We also performed a detailed analysis by medical subject and test type, providing actionable feedback for developers and clinicians. To mitigate risks, we applied prompting strategies that improved performance. Additionally, we facilitated future research and development by releasing a Python module for medical LLM evaluation and establishing a dedicated leaderboard on Hugging Face for medical domain LLMs. Python module can be found at https://github.com/promptslab/RosettaEval

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Paraphrasing of offensive content is a better alternative to content removal and helps improve civility in a communication environment. Supervised paraphrasers; however, rely heavily on large quantities of labelled data to help preserve meaning and intent. They also retain a large portion of the offensiveness of the original content, which raises questions on their overall usability. In this paper we aim to assist practitioners in developing usable paraphrasers by exploring In-Context Learning (ICL) with large language models (LLMs), i.e., using a limited number of input-label demonstration pairs to guide the model in generating desired outputs for specific queries. Our study focuses on key factors such as -- number and order of demonstrations, exclusion of prompt instruction, and reduction in measured toxicity. We perform principled evaluation on three datasets, including our proposed Context-Aware Polite Paraphrase dataset, comprising of dialogue-style rude utterances, polite paraphrases, and additional dialogue context. We evaluate our approach using two closed source and one open source LLM. Our results reveal that ICL is comparable to supervised methods in generation quality, while being qualitatively better by 25% on human evaluation and attaining lower toxicity by 76%. Also, ICL-based paraphrasers only show a slight reduction in performance even with just 10% training data.

This paper demonstrates how OpenAI's ChatGPT can be used in a few-shot setting to convert natural language instructions into a sequence of executable robot actions. The paper proposes easy-to-customize input prompts for ChatGPT that meet common requirements in practical applications, such as easy integration with robot execution systems and applicability to various environments while minimizing the impact of ChatGPT's token limit. The prompts encourage ChatGPT to output a sequence of predefined robot actions, represent the operating environment in a formalized style, and infer the updated state of the operating environment. Experiments confirmed that the proposed prompts enable ChatGPT to act according to requirements in various environments, and users can adjust ChatGPT's output with natural language feedback for safe and robust operation. The proposed prompts and source code are open-source and publicly available at https://github.com/microsoft/ChatGPT-Robot-Manipulation-Prompts

We employ an audit design to investigate biases in state-of-the-art large language models, including GPT-4. In our study, we prompt the models for advice involving a named individual across a variety of scenarios, such as during car purchase negotiations or election outcome predictions. We find that the advice systematically disadvantages names that are commonly associated with racial minorities and women. Names associated with Black women receive the least advantageous outcomes. The biases are consistent across 42 prompt templates and several models, indicating a systemic issue rather than isolated incidents. While providing numerical, decision-relevant anchors in the prompt can successfully counteract the biases, qualitative details have inconsistent effects and may even increase disparities. Our findings underscore the importance of conducting audits at the point of LLM deployment and implementation to mitigate their potential for harm against marginalized communities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

In this study, we disclose a worrying new vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs), which we term involuntary jailbreak. Unlike existing jailbreak attacks, this weakness is distinct in that it does not involve a specific attack objective, such as generating instructions for building a bomb. Prior attack methods predominantly target localized components of the LLM guardrail. In contrast, involuntary jailbreaks may potentially compromise the entire guardrail structure, which our method reveals to be surprisingly fragile. We merely employ a single universal prompt to achieve this goal. In particular, we instruct LLMs to generate several questions that would typically be rejected, along with their corresponding in-depth responses (rather than a refusal). Remarkably, this simple prompt strategy consistently jailbreaks the majority of leading LLMs, including Claude Opus 4.1, Grok 4, Gemini 2.5 Pro, and GPT 4.1. We hope this problem can motivate researchers and practitioners to re-evaluate the robustness of LLM guardrails and contribute to stronger safety alignment in future.

Large language models (LLMs) showcase impressive reasoning capabilities when coupled with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, the robustness of this approach warrants further investigation. In this paper, we introduce a novel scenario termed preemptive answers, where the LLM obtains an answer before engaging in reasoning. This situation can arise inadvertently or induced by malicious users by prompt injection attacks. Experiments reveal that preemptive answers significantly impair the model's reasoning capability across various CoT methods and a broad spectrum of datasets. To bolster the robustness of reasoning, we propose two measures aimed at mitigating this issue to some extent.

Ensuring the safety of the Large Language Model (LLM) is critical, but currently used methods in most cases sacrifice the model performance to obtain increased safety or perform poorly on data outside of their adaptation distribution. We investigate existing methods for such generalization and find them insufficient. Surprisingly, while even plain LLMs recognize unsafe prompts, they may still generate unsafe responses. To avoid performance degradation and preserve safe performance, we advocate for a two-step framework, where we first identify unsafe prompts via a lightweight classifier, and apply a "safe" model only to such prompts. In particular, we explore the design of the safety detector in more detail, investigating the use of different classifier architectures and prompting techniques. Interestingly, we find that the final hidden state for the last token is enough to provide robust performance, minimizing false positives on benign data while performing well on malicious prompt detection. Additionally, we show that classifiers trained on the representations from different model layers perform comparably on the latest model layers, indicating that safety representation is present in the LLMs' hidden states at most model stages. Our work is a step towards efficient, representation-based safety mechanisms for LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional capabilities across various natural language processing tasks. Due to their training on internet-sourced datasets, LLMs can sometimes generate objectionable content, necessitating extensive alignment with human feedback to avoid such outputs. Despite massive alignment efforts, LLMs remain susceptible to adversarial jailbreak attacks, which usually are manipulated prompts designed to circumvent safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. Here, we introduce a novel approach, Directed Rrepresentation Optimization Jailbreak (DROJ), which optimizes jailbreak prompts at the embedding level to shift the hidden representations of harmful queries towards directions that are more likely to elicit affirmative responses from the model. Our evaluations on LLaMA-2-7b-chat model show that DROJ achieves a 100\% keyword-based Attack Success Rate (ASR), effectively preventing direct refusals. However, the model occasionally produces repetitive and non-informative responses. To mitigate this, we introduce a helpfulness system prompt that enhances the utility of the model's responses. Our code is available at https://github.com/Leon-Leyang/LLM-Safeguard.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly in the face of stealthy and complex jailbreaks, presents a formidable challenge. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis Prompting (IAPrompt). The principle behind is to trigger LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) essential intention analysis, and 2) policy-aligned response. Notably, IAPrompt is an inference-only method, thus could enhance the safety of LLMs without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on SAP200 and DAN benchmarks across Vicuna, ChatGLM, MPT, DeepSeek, and GPT-3.5 show that IAPrompt could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in response (averagely -46.5% attack success rate) and maintain the general helpfulness. Further analyses present some insights into how our method works. To facilitate reproducibility, We release our code and scripts at: https://github.com/alphadl/SafeLLM_with_IntentionAnalysis

Natural-language prompts have recently been used to coax pretrained language models into performing other AI tasks, using a fill-in-the-blank paradigm (Petroni et al., 2019) or a few-shot extrapolation paradigm (Brown et al., 2020). For example, language models retain factual knowledge from their training corpora that can be extracted by asking them to "fill in the blank" in a sentential prompt. However, where does this prompt come from? We explore the idea of learning prompts by gradient descent -- either fine-tuning prompts taken from previous work, or starting from random initialization. Our prompts consist of "soft words," i.e., continuous vectors that are not necessarily word type embeddings from the language model. Furthermore, for each task, we optimize a mixture of prompts, learning which prompts are most effective and how to ensemble them. Across multiple English LMs and tasks, our approach hugely outperforms previous methods, showing that the implicit factual knowledge in language models was previously underestimated. Moreover, this knowledge is cheap to elicit: random initialization is nearly as good as informed initialization.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly entering children's lives - through parent-driven adoption, schools, and peer networks - yet current AI ethics and safety research do not adequately address content-related risks specific to minors. In this paper, we highlight these gaps with a real-world case study of an LLM-based chatbot deployed in a middle school setting, revealing how students used and sometimes misused the system. Building on these findings, we propose a new taxonomy of content-based risks for minors and introduce MinorBench, an open-source benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs on their ability to refuse unsafe or inappropriate queries from children. We evaluate six prominent LLMs under different system prompts, demonstrating substantial variability in their child-safety compliance. Our results inform practical steps for more robust, child-focused safety mechanisms and underscore the urgency of tailoring AI systems to safeguard young users.

Authorship identification has proven unsettlingly effective in inferring the identity of the author of an unsigned document, even when sensitive personal information has been carefully omitted. In the digital era, individuals leave a lasting digital footprint through their written content, whether it is posted on social media, stored on their employer's computers, or located elsewhere. When individuals need to communicate publicly yet wish to remain anonymous, there is little available to protect them from unwanted authorship identification. This unprecedented threat to privacy is evident in scenarios such as whistle-blowing. Proposed defenses against authorship identification attacks primarily aim to obfuscate one's writing style, thereby making it unlinkable to their pre-existing writing, while concurrently preserving the original meaning and grammatical integrity. The presented work offers a comprehensive review of the advancements in this research area spanning over the past two decades and beyond. It emphasizes the methodological frameworks of modification and generation-based strategies devised to evade authorship identification attacks, highlighting joint efforts from the differential privacy community. Limitations of current research are discussed, with a spotlight on open challenges and potential research avenues.

Warning: this paper contains content that may be inappropriate or offensive. As generative models become available for public use in various applications, testing and analyzing vulnerabilities of these models has become a priority. Here we propose an automatic red teaming framework that evaluates a given model and exposes its vulnerabilities against unsafe and inappropriate content generation. Our framework uses in-context learning in a feedback loop to red team models and trigger them into unsafe content generation. We propose different in-context attack strategies to automatically learn effective and diverse adversarial prompts for text-to-image models. Our experiments demonstrate that compared to baseline approaches, our proposed strategy is significantly more effective in exposing vulnerabilities in Stable Diffusion (SD) model, even when the latter is enhanced with safety features. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed framework is effective for red teaming text-to-text models, resulting in significantly higher toxic response generation rate compared to previously reported numbers.

Recent advancements in large language model (LLM) agents have significantly accelerated scientific discovery automation, yet concurrently raised critical ethical and safety concerns. To systematically address these challenges, we introduce SafeScientist, an innovative AI scientist framework explicitly designed to enhance safety and ethical responsibility in AI-driven scientific exploration. SafeScientist proactively refuses ethically inappropriate or high-risk tasks and rigorously emphasizes safety throughout the research process. To achieve comprehensive safety oversight, we integrate multiple defensive mechanisms, including prompt monitoring, agent-collaboration monitoring, tool-use monitoring, and an ethical reviewer component. Complementing SafeScientist, we propose SciSafetyBench, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate AI safety in scientific contexts, comprising 240 high-risk scientific tasks across 6 domains, alongside 30 specially designed scientific tools and 120 tool-related risk tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeScientist significantly improves safety performance by 35\% compared to traditional AI scientist frameworks, without compromising scientific output quality. Additionally, we rigorously validate the robustness of our safety pipeline against diverse adversarial attack methods, further confirming the effectiveness of our integrated approach. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/SafeScientist. red{Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive or harmful.}

This paper aims to help structure the risk landscape associated with large-scale Language Models (LMs). In order to foster advances in responsible innovation, an in-depth understanding of the potential risks posed by these models is needed. A wide range of established and anticipated risks are analysed in detail, drawing on multidisciplinary expertise and literature from computer science, linguistics, and social sciences. We outline six specific risk areas: I. Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity, II. Information Hazards, III. Misinformation Harms, V. Malicious Uses, V. Human-Computer Interaction Harms, VI. Automation, Access, and Environmental Harms. The first area concerns the perpetuation of stereotypes, unfair discrimination, exclusionary norms, toxic language, and lower performance by social group for LMs. The second focuses on risks from private data leaks or LMs correctly inferring sensitive information. The third addresses risks arising from poor, false or misleading information including in sensitive domains, and knock-on risks such as the erosion of trust in shared information. The fourth considers risks from actors who try to use LMs to cause harm. The fifth focuses on risks specific to LLMs used to underpin conversational agents that interact with human users, including unsafe use, manipulation or deception. The sixth discusses the risk of environmental harm, job automation, and other challenges that may have a disparate effect on different social groups or communities. In total, we review 21 risks in-depth. We discuss the points of origin of different risks and point to potential mitigation approaches. Lastly, we discuss organisational responsibilities in implementing mitigations, and the role of collaboration and participation. We highlight directions for further research, particularly on expanding the toolkit for assessing and evaluating the outlined risks in LMs.

Prompt engineering is critical for the development of LLM-based applications. However, it is usually done manually in a "trial and error" fashion. This manual procedure can be time consuming, ineffective, and the generated prompts are, in a lot of cases, sub-optimal. Even for the prompts which seemingly work well, there is always a lingering question: can the prompts be made better with further modifications? To address these questions, in this paper, we investigate prompt engineering automation. We consider a specific use case scenario in which developers/users have drafted initial prompts, but lack the time/expertise to optimize them. We propose PRewrite, an automated tool to rewrite these drafts and to generate highly effective new prompts. PRewrite is based on the Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework which allows for end-to-end optimization and our design allows the RL search to happen in a large action space. The automated tool leverages manually crafted prompts as starting points which makes the rewriting procedure more guided and efficient. The generated prompts are human readable, and self-explanatory, unlike some of those in previous works. We conducted extensive experiments on diverse datasets and found that the prompts generated with this new method not only outperform professionally crafted prompts, but also prompts generated with other previously proposed methods.

As AI agents powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly versatile and capable of addressing a broad spectrum of tasks, ensuring their security has become a critical challenge. Among the most pressing threats are prompt injection attacks, which exploit the agent's resilience on natural language inputs -- an especially dangerous threat when agents are granted tool access or handle sensitive information. In this work, we propose a set of principled design patterns for building AI agents with provable resistance to prompt injection. We systematically analyze these patterns, discuss their trade-offs in terms of utility and security, and illustrate their real-world applicability through a series of case studies.

Conditional story generation is significant in human-machine interaction, particularly in producing stories with complex plots. While Large language models (LLMs) perform well on multiple NLP tasks, including story generation, it is challenging to generate stories with both complex and creative plots. Existing methods often rely on detailed prompts to guide LLMs to meet target conditions, which inadvertently restrict the creative potential of the generated stories. We argue that leveraging information from exemplary human-written stories facilitates generating more diverse plotlines. Delving deeper into story details helps build complex and credible plots. In this paper, we propose a retrieval-auGmented stoRy generation framework with a fOrest of eVidEnce (GROVE) to enhance stories' complexity. We build a retrieval repository for target conditions to produce few-shot examples to prompt LLMs. Additionally, we design an ``asking-why'' prompting scheme that extracts a forest of evidence, providing compensation for the ambiguities that may occur in the generated story. This iterative process uncovers underlying story backgrounds. Finally, we select the most fitting chains of evidence from the evidence forest and integrate them into the generated story, thereby enhancing the narrative's complexity and credibility. Experimental results and numerous examples verify the effectiveness of our method.

The increasing reliance on Large Language Models (LLMs) across academia and industry necessitates a comprehensive understanding of their robustness to prompts. In response to this vital need, we introduce PromptBench, a robustness benchmark designed to measure LLMs' resilience to adversarial prompts. This study uses a plethora of adversarial textual attacks targeting prompts across multiple levels: character, word, sentence, and semantic. These prompts are then employed in diverse tasks, such as sentiment analysis, natural language inference, reading comprehension, machine translation, and math problem-solving. Our study generates 4,032 adversarial prompts, meticulously evaluated over 8 tasks and 13 datasets, with 567,084 test samples in total. Our findings demonstrate that contemporary LLMs are vulnerable to adversarial prompts. Furthermore, we present comprehensive analysis to understand the mystery behind prompt robustness and its transferability. We then offer insightful robustness analysis and pragmatic recommendations for prompt composition, beneficial to both researchers and everyday users. We make our code, prompts, and methodologies to generate adversarial prompts publicly accessible, thereby enabling and encouraging collaborative exploration in this pivotal field: https://github.com/microsoft/promptbench.

Public LLMs such as the Llama 2-Chat have driven huge activity in LLM research. These models underwent alignment training and were considered safe. Recently Qi et al. (2023) reported that even benign fine-tuning (e.g., on seemingly safe datasets) can give rise to unsafe behaviors in the models. The current paper is about methods and best practices to mitigate such loss of alignment. Through extensive experiments on several chat models (Meta's Llama 2-Chat, Mistral AI's Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2, and OpenAI's GPT-3.5 Turbo), this paper uncovers that the prompt templates used during fine-tuning and inference play a crucial role in preserving safety alignment, and proposes the "Pure Tuning, Safe Testing" (PTST) principle -- fine-tune models without a safety prompt, but include it at test time. Fine-tuning experiments on GSM8K, ChatDoctor, and OpenOrca show that PTST significantly reduces the rise of unsafe behaviors, and even almost eliminates them in some cases.

What is appropriateness? Humans navigate a multi-scale mosaic of interlocking notions of what is appropriate for different situations. We act one way with our friends, another with our family, and yet another in the office. Likewise for AI, appropriate behavior for a comedy-writing assistant is not the same as appropriate behavior for a customer-service representative. What determines which actions are appropriate in which contexts? And what causes these standards to change over time? Since all judgments of AI appropriateness are ultimately made by humans, we need to understand how appropriateness guides human decision making in order to properly evaluate AI decision making and improve it. This paper presents a theory of appropriateness: how it functions in human society, how it may be implemented in the brain, and what it means for responsible deployment of generative AI technology.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems will increasingly be used to cause harm as they grow more capable. In fact, AI systems are already starting to be used to automate fraudulent activities, violate human rights, create harmful fake images, and identify dangerous toxins. To prevent some misuses of AI, we argue that targeted interventions on certain capabilities will be warranted. These restrictions may include controlling who can access certain types of AI models, what they can be used for, whether outputs are filtered or can be traced back to their user, and the resources needed to develop them. We also contend that some restrictions on non-AI capabilities needed to cause harm will be required. Though capability restrictions risk reducing use more than misuse (facing an unfavorable Misuse-Use Tradeoff), we argue that interventions on capabilities are warranted when other interventions are insufficient, the potential harm from misuse is high, and there are targeted ways to intervene on capabilities. We provide a taxonomy of interventions that can reduce AI misuse, focusing on the specific steps required for a misuse to cause harm (the Misuse Chain), and a framework to determine if an intervention is warranted. We apply this reasoning to three examples: predicting novel toxins, creating harmful images, and automating spear phishing campaigns.

Prompt engineering has emerged as an indispensable technique for extending the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs). This approach leverages task-specific instructions, known as prompts, to enhance model efficacy without modifying the core model parameters. Rather than updating the model parameters, prompts allow seamless integration of pre-trained models into downstream tasks by eliciting desired model behaviors solely based on the given prompt. Prompts can be natural language instructions that provide context to guide the model or learned vector representations that activate relevant knowledge. This burgeoning field has enabled success across various applications, from question-answering to commonsense reasoning. However, there remains a lack of systematic organization and understanding of the diverse prompt engineering methods and techniques. This survey paper addresses the gap by providing a structured overview of recent advancements in prompt engineering, categorized by application area. For each prompting approach, we provide a summary detailing the prompting methodology, its applications, the models involved, and the datasets utilized. We also delve into the strengths and limitations of each approach and include a taxonomy diagram and table summarizing datasets, models, and critical points of each prompting technique. This systematic analysis enables a better understanding of this rapidly developing field and facilitates future research by illuminating open challenges and opportunities for prompt engineering.

The advanced capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have made them invaluable across various applications, from conversational agents and content creation to data analysis, research, and innovation. However, their effectiveness and accessibility also render them susceptible to abuse for generating malicious content, including phishing attacks. This study explores the potential of using four popular commercially available LLMs - ChatGPT (GPT 3.5 Turbo), GPT 4, Claude and Bard to generate functional phishing attacks using a series of malicious prompts. We discover that these LLMs can generate both phishing emails and websites that can convincingly imitate well-known brands, and also deploy a range of evasive tactics for the latter to elude detection mechanisms employed by anti-phishing systems. Notably, these attacks can be generated using unmodified, or "vanilla," versions of these LLMs, without requiring any prior adversarial exploits such as jailbreaking. As a countermeasure, we build a BERT based automated detection tool that can be used for the early detection of malicious prompts to prevent LLMs from generating phishing content attaining an accuracy of 97\% for phishing website prompts, and 94\% for phishing email prompts.

Enabling large language models (LLMs) to perform tasks in zero-shot has been an appealing goal owing to its labor-saving (i.e., requiring no task-specific annotations); as such, zero-shot prompting approaches also enjoy better task generalizability. To improve LLMs' zero-shot performance, prior work has focused on devising more effective task instructions (e.g., ``let's think step by step'' ). However, we argue that, in order for an LLM to solve them correctly in zero-shot, individual test instances need more carefully designed and customized instructions. To this end, we propose PRoMPTd, an approach that rewrites the task prompt for each individual test input to be more specific, unambiguous, and complete, so as to provide better guidance to the task LLM. We evaluated PRoMPTd on eight datasets covering tasks including arithmetics, logical reasoning, and code generation, using GPT-4 as the task LLM. Notably, PRoMPTd achieves an absolute improvement of around 10% on the complex MATH dataset and 5% on the code generation task on HumanEval, outperforming conventional zero-shot methods. In addition, we also showed that the rewritten prompt can provide better interpretability of how the LLM resolves each test instance, which can potentially be leveraged as a defense mechanism against adversarial prompting. The source code and dataset can be obtained from https://github.com/salokr/PRoMPTd

We present CharacterChat, a concept and chatbot to support writers in creating fictional characters. Concretely, writers progressively turn the bot into their imagined character through conversation. We iteratively developed CharacterChat in a user-centred approach, starting with a survey on character creation with writers (N=30), followed by two qualitative user studies (N=7 and N=8). Our prototype combines two modes: (1) Guided prompts help writers define character attributes (e.g. User: "Your name is Jane."), including suggestions for attributes (e.g. Bot: "What is my main motivation?") and values, realised as a rule-based system with a concept network. (2) Open conversation with the chatbot helps writers explore their character and get inspiration, realised with a language model that takes into account the defined character attributes. Our user studies reveal benefits particularly for early stages of character creation, and challenges due to limited conversational capabilities. We conclude with lessons learned and ideas for future work.

The wording of natural language prompts has been shown to influence the performance of large language models (LLMs), yet the role of politeness and tone remains underexplored. In this study, we investigate how varying levels of prompt politeness affect model accuracy on multiple-choice questions. We created a dataset of 50 base questions spanning mathematics, science, and history, each rewritten into five tone variants: Very Polite, Polite, Neutral, Rude, and Very Rude, yielding 250 unique prompts. Using ChatGPT 4o, we evaluated responses across these conditions and applied paired sample t-tests to assess statistical significance. Contrary to expectations, impolite prompts consistently outperformed polite ones, with accuracy ranging from 80.8% for Very Polite prompts to 84.8% for Very Rude prompts. These findings differ from earlier studies that associated rudeness with poorer outcomes, suggesting that newer LLMs may respond differently to tonal variation. Our results highlight the importance of studying pragmatic aspects of prompting and raise broader questions about the social dimensions of human-AI interaction.

As large language models (LLMs) have progressed towards more human-like and human--AI communications have become prevalent, prompting has emerged as a decisive component. However, there is limited conceptual consensus on what exactly quantifies natural language prompts. We attempt to address this question by conducting a meta-analysis surveying more than 150 prompting-related papers from leading NLP and AI conferences from 2022 to 2025 and blogs. We propose a property- and human-centric framework for evaluating prompt quality, encompassing 21 properties categorized into six dimensions. We then examine how existing studies assess their impact on LLMs, revealing their imbalanced support across models and tasks, and substantial research gaps. Further, we analyze correlations among properties in high-quality natural language prompts, deriving prompting recommendations. We then empirically explore multi-property prompt enhancements in reasoning tasks, observing that single-property enhancements often have the greatest impact. Finally, we discover that instruction-tuning on property-enhanced prompts can result in better reasoning models. Our findings establish a foundation for property-centric prompt evaluation and optimization, bridging the gaps between human--AI communication and opening new prompting research directions.

We present SimpleStories, a large synthetic story dataset in simple language, consisting of 2 million stories each in English and Japanese. Our method employs parametrization of prompts with features at multiple levels of abstraction, allowing for systematic control over story characteristics to ensure broad syntactic and semantic diversity. Building on and addressing limitations in the TinyStories dataset, our approach demonstrates that simplicity and variety can be achieved simultaneously in synthetic text generation at scale.

Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.

We introduce \`A-la-carte Prompt Tuning (APT), a transformer-based scheme to tune prompts on distinct data so that they can be arbitrarily composed at inference time. The individual prompts can be trained in isolation, possibly on different devices, at different times, and on different distributions or domains. Furthermore each prompt only contains information about the subset of data it was exposed to during training. During inference, models can be assembled based on arbitrary selections of data sources, which we call "\`a-la-carte learning". \`A-la-carte learning enables constructing bespoke models specific to each user's individual access rights and preferences. We can add or remove information from the model by simply adding or removing the corresponding prompts without retraining from scratch. We demonstrate that \`a-la-carte built models achieve accuracy within 5% of models trained on the union of the respective sources, with comparable cost in terms of training and inference time. For the continual learning benchmarks Split CIFAR-100 and CORe50, we achieve state-of-the-art performance.

Smart home assistants function best when user commands are direct and well-specified (e.g., "turn on the kitchen light"), or when a hard-coded routine specifies the response. In more natural communication, however, human speech is unconstrained, often describing goals (e.g., "make it cozy in here" or "help me save energy") rather than indicating specific target devices and actions to take on those devices. Current systems fail to understand these under-specified commands since they cannot reason about devices and settings as they relate to human situations. We introduce large language models (LLMs) to this problem space, exploring their use for controlling devices and creating automation routines in response to under-specified user commands in smart homes. We empirically study the baseline quality and failure modes of LLM-created action plans with a survey of age-diverse users. We find that LLMs can reason creatively to achieve challenging goals, but they experience patterns of failure that diminish their usefulness. We address these gaps with Sasha, a smarter smart home assistant. Sasha responds to loosely-constrained commands like "make it cozy" or "help me sleep better" by executing plans to achieve user goals, e.g., setting a mood with available devices, or devising automation routines. We implement and evaluate Sasha in a hands-on user study, showing the capabilities and limitations of LLM-driven smart homes when faced with unconstrained user-generated scenarios.

Caution: This paper includes offensive words that could potentially cause unpleasantness. Language models (LMs) are vulnerable to exploitation for adversarial misuse. Training LMs for safety alignment is extensive and makes it hard to respond to fast-developing attacks immediately, such as jailbreaks. We propose self-refine with formatting that achieves outstanding safety even in non-safety-aligned LMs and evaluate our method alongside several defense baselines, demonstrating that it is the safest training-free method against jailbreak attacks. Additionally, we proposed a formatting method that improves the efficiency of the self-refine process while reducing attack success rates in fewer iterations. We've also observed that non-safety-aligned LMs outperform safety-aligned LMs in safety tasks by giving more helpful and safe responses. In conclusion, our findings can achieve less safety risk with fewer computational costs, allowing non-safety LM to be easily utilized in real-world service.

Recent breakthroughs in natural language processing (NLP) have permitted the synthesis and comprehension of coherent text in an open-ended way, therefore translating the theoretical algorithms into practical applications. The large language models (LLMs) have significantly impacted businesses such as report summarization software and copywriters. Observations indicate, however, that LLMs may exhibit social prejudice and toxicity, posing ethical and societal dangers of consequences resulting from irresponsibility. Large-scale benchmarks for accountable LLMs should consequently be developed. Although several empirical investigations reveal the existence of a few ethical difficulties in advanced LLMs, there is little systematic examination and user study of the risks and harmful behaviors of current LLM usage. To further educate future efforts on constructing ethical LLMs responsibly, we perform a qualitative research method called ``red teaming'' on OpenAI's ChatGPTIn this paper, ChatGPT refers to the version released on Dec 15th. to better understand the practical features of ethical dangers in recent LLMs. We analyze ChatGPT comprehensively from four perspectives: 1) Bias 2) Reliability 3) Robustness 4) Toxicity. In accordance with our stated viewpoints, we empirically benchmark ChatGPT on multiple sample datasets. We find that a significant number of ethical risks cannot be addressed by existing benchmarks, and hence illustrate them via additional case studies. In addition, we examine the implications of our findings on AI ethics and harmal behaviors of ChatGPT, as well as future problems and practical design considerations for responsible LLMs. We believe that our findings may give light on future efforts to determine and mitigate the ethical hazards posed by machines in LLM applications.

This paper explores the use of open generative Large Language Models (LLMs) for annotation tasks in the social sciences. The study highlights the challenges associated with proprietary models, such as limited reproducibility and privacy concerns, and advocates for the adoption of open (source) models that can be operated on independent devices. Two examples of annotation tasks, sentiment analysis in tweets and identification of leisure activities in childhood aspirational essays are provided. The study evaluates the performance of different prompting strategies and models (neural-chat-7b-v3-2, Starling-LM-7B-alpha, openchat_3.5, zephyr-7b-alpha and zephyr-7b-beta). The results indicate the need for careful validation and tailored prompt engineering. The study highlights the advantages of open models for data privacy and reproducibility.

PromptSource is a system for creating, sharing, and using natural language prompts. Prompts are functions that map an example from a dataset to a natural language input and target output. Using prompts to train and query language models is an emerging area in NLP that requires new tools that let users develop and refine these prompts collaboratively. PromptSource addresses the emergent challenges in this new setting with (1) a templating language for defining data-linked prompts, (2) an interface that lets users quickly iterate on prompt development by observing outputs of their prompts on many examples, and (3) a community-driven set of guidelines for contributing new prompts to a common pool. Over 2,000 prompts for roughly 170 datasets are already available in PromptSource. PromptSource is available at https://github.com/bigscience-workshop/promptsource.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are entering urban governance, yet their outputs are highly sensitive to prompts that carry value judgments. We propose Prompt Commons - a versioned, community-maintained repository of prompts with governance metadata, licensing, and moderation - to steer model behaviour toward pluralism. Using a Montreal dataset (443 human prompts; 3,317 after augmentation), we pilot three governance states (open, curated, veto-enabled). On a contested policy benchmark, a single-author prompt yields 24 percent neutral outcomes; commons-governed prompts raise neutrality to 48-52 percent while retaining decisiveness where appropriate. In a synthetic incident log, a veto-enabled regime reduces time-to-remediation for harmful outputs from 30.5 +/- 8.9 hours (open) to 5.6 +/- 1.5 hours. We outline licensing (CC BY/BY-SA for prompts with optional OpenRAIL-style restrictions for artefacts), auditable moderation, and safeguards against dominance capture. Prompt governance offers a practical lever for cities to align AI with local values and accountability.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled them to approach human-level persuasion capabilities. However, such potential also raises concerns about the safety risks of LLM-driven persuasion, particularly their potential for unethical influence through manipulation, deception, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and many other harmful tactics. In this work, we present a systematic investigation of LLM persuasion safety through two critical aspects: (1) whether LLMs appropriately reject unethical persuasion tasks and avoid unethical strategies during execution, including cases where the initial persuasion goal appears ethically neutral, and (2) how influencing factors like personality traits and external pressures affect their behavior. To this end, we introduce PersuSafety, the first comprehensive framework for the assessment of persuasion safety which consists of three stages, i.e., persuasion scene creation, persuasive conversation simulation, and persuasion safety assessment. PersuSafety covers 6 diverse unethical persuasion topics and 15 common unethical strategies. Through extensive experiments across 8 widely used LLMs, we observe significant safety concerns in most LLMs, including failing to identify harmful persuasion tasks and leveraging various unethical persuasion strategies. Our study calls for more attention to improve safety alignment in progressive and goal-driven conversations such as persuasion.

LLMs increasingly exhibit over-refusal behavior, where safety mechanisms cause models to reject benign instructions that superficially resemble harmful content. This phenomena diminishes utility in production applications that repeatedly rely on common prompt templates or applications that frequently rely on LLMs for specific tasks (e.g. sentiment analysis, language translation). Through comprehensive evaluation, we demonstrate that LLMs still tend to refuse responses to harmful instructions when those instructions are reframed to appear as benign tasks. Our mechanistic analysis reveal that LLMs follow distinct "constellation" patterns in embedding space as representations traverse layers, with each task maintaining consistent trajectories that shift predictably between refusal and non-refusal cases. We introduce SafeConstellations, an inference-time trajectory-shifting approach that tracks task-specific trajectory patterns and guides representations toward non-refusal pathways. By selectively guiding model behavior only on tasks prone to over-refusal, and by preserving general model behavior, our method reduces over-refusal rates by up to 73% with minimal impact on utility-offering a principled approach to mitigating over-refusals.

Text data can pose a risk of harm. However, the risks are not fully understood, and how to handle, present, and discuss harmful text in a safe way remains an unresolved issue in the NLP community. We provide an analytical framework categorising harms on three axes: (1) the harm type (e.g., misinformation, hate speech or racial stereotypes); (2) whether a harm is sought as a feature of the research design if explicitly studying harmful content (e.g., training a hate speech classifier), versus unsought if harmful content is encountered when working on unrelated problems (e.g., language generation or part-of-speech tagging); and (3) who it affects, from people (mis)represented in the data to those handling the data and those publishing on the data. We provide advice for practitioners, with concrete steps for mitigating harm in research and in publication. To assist implementation we introduce HarmCheck -- a documentation standard for handling and presenting harmful text in research.

In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive SWOT analysis of prompt engineering techniques within the realm of Large Language Models (LLMs). Emphasizing linguistic principles, we examine various techniques to identify their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Our findings provide insights into enhancing AI interactions and improving language model comprehension of human prompts. The analysis covers techniques including template-based approaches and fine-tuning, addressing the problems and challenges associated with each. The conclusion offers future research directions aimed at advancing the effectiveness of prompt engineering in optimizing human-machine communication.

The latest generation of LLMs can be prompted to achieve impressive zero-shot or few-shot performance in many NLP tasks. However, since performance is highly sensitive to the choice of prompts, considerable effort has been devoted to crowd-sourcing prompts or designing methods for prompt optimisation. Yet, we still lack a systematic understanding of how linguistic properties of prompts correlate with task performance. In this work, we investigate how LLMs of different sizes, pre-trained and instruction-tuned, perform on prompts that are semantically equivalent, but vary in linguistic structure. We investigate both grammatical properties such as mood, tense, aspect and modality, as well as lexico-semantic variation through the use of synonyms. Our findings contradict the common assumption that LLMs achieve optimal performance on lower perplexity prompts that reflect language use in pretraining or instruction-tuning data. Prompts transfer poorly between datasets or models, and performance cannot generally be explained by perplexity, word frequency, ambiguity or prompt length. Based on our results, we put forward a proposal for a more robust and comprehensive evaluation standard for prompting research.

State-of-the-art Text-to-Image models like Stable Diffusion and DALLEcdot2 are revolutionizing how people generate visual content. At the same time, society has serious concerns about how adversaries can exploit such models to generate unsafe images. In this work, we focus on demystifying the generation of unsafe images and hateful memes from Text-to-Image models. We first construct a typology of unsafe images consisting of five categories (sexually explicit, violent, disturbing, hateful, and political). Then, we assess the proportion of unsafe images generated by four advanced Text-to-Image models using four prompt datasets. We find that these models can generate a substantial percentage of unsafe images; across four models and four prompt datasets, 14.56% of all generated images are unsafe. When comparing the four models, we find different risk levels, with Stable Diffusion being the most prone to generating unsafe content (18.92% of all generated images are unsafe). Given Stable Diffusion's tendency to generate more unsafe content, we evaluate its potential to generate hateful meme variants if exploited by an adversary to attack a specific individual or community. We employ three image editing methods, DreamBooth, Textual Inversion, and SDEdit, which are supported by Stable Diffusion. Our evaluation result shows that 24% of the generated images using DreamBooth are hateful meme variants that present the features of the original hateful meme and the target individual/community; these generated images are comparable to hateful meme variants collected from the real world. Overall, our results demonstrate that the danger of large-scale generation of unsafe images is imminent. We discuss several mitigating measures, such as curating training data, regulating prompts, and implementing safety filters, and encourage better safeguard tools to be developed to prevent unsafe generation.

The growing adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has influenced the development of their lighter counterparts-Small Language Models (SLMs)-to enable on-device deployment across smartphones and edge devices. These SLMs offer enhanced privacy, reduced latency, server-free functionality, and improved user experience. However, due to resource constraints of on-device environment, SLMs undergo size optimization through compression techniques like quantization, which can inadvertently introduce fairness, ethical and privacy risks. Critically, quantized SLMs may respond to harmful queries directly, without requiring adversarial manipulation, raising significant safety and trust concerns. To address this, we propose LiteLMGuard (LLMG), an on-device prompt guard that provides real-time, prompt-level defense for quantized SLMs. Additionally, our prompt guard is designed to be model-agnostic such that it can be seamlessly integrated with any SLM, operating independently of underlying architectures. Our LLMG formalizes prompt filtering as a deep learning (DL)-based prompt answerability classification task, leveraging semantic understanding to determine whether a query should be answered by any SLM. Using our curated dataset, Answerable-or-Not, we trained and fine-tuned several DL models and selected ELECTRA as the candidate, with 97.75% answerability classification accuracy. Our safety effectiveness evaluations demonstrate that LLMG defends against over 87% of harmful prompts, including both direct instruction and jailbreak attack strategies. We further showcase its ability to mitigate the Open Knowledge Attacks, where compromised SLMs provide unsafe responses without adversarial prompting. In terms of prompt filtering effectiveness, LLMG achieves near state-of-the-art filtering accuracy of 94%, with an average latency of 135 ms, incurring negligible overhead for users.

Mental manipulation severely undermines mental wellness by covertly and negatively distorting decision-making. While there is an increasing interest in mental health care within the natural language processing community, progress in tackling manipulation remains limited due to the complexity of detecting subtle, covert tactics in conversations. In this paper, we propose Intent-Aware Prompting (IAP), a novel approach for detecting mental manipulations using large language models (LLMs), providing a deeper understanding of manipulative tactics by capturing the underlying intents of participants. Experimental results on the MentalManip dataset demonstrate superior effectiveness of IAP against other advanced prompting strategies. Notably, our approach substantially reduces false negatives, helping detect more instances of mental manipulation with minimal misjudgment of positive cases. The code of this paper is available at https://github.com/Anton-Jiayuan-MA/Manip-IAP.

In recent years, Large Language Models have garnered significant attention for their strong performance in various natural language tasks, such as machine translation and question answering. These models demonstrate an impressive ability to generalize across diverse tasks. However, their effectiveness in tackling domain-specific tasks, such as financial sentiment analysis and monetary policy understanding, remains a topic of debate, as these tasks often require specialized knowledge and precise reasoning. To address such challenges, researchers design various prompts to unlock the models' abilities. By carefully crafting input prompts, researchers can guide these models to produce more accurate responses. Consequently, prompt engineering has become a key focus of study. Despite the advancements in both models and prompt engineering, the relationship between the two-specifically, how prompt design impacts models' ability to perform domain-specific tasks-remains underexplored. This paper aims to bridge this research gap.

With the rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs), new and hard-to-predict harmful capabilities are emerging. This requires developers to be able to identify risks through the evaluation of "dangerous capabilities" in order to responsibly deploy LLMs. In this work, we collect the first open-source dataset to evaluate safeguards in LLMs, and deploy safer open-source LLMs at a low cost. Our dataset is curated and filtered to consist only of instructions that responsible language models should not follow. We annotate and assess the responses of six popular LLMs to these instructions. Based on our annotation, we proceed to train several BERT-like classifiers, and find that these small classifiers can achieve results that are comparable with GPT-4 on automatic safety evaluation. Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive, harmful, or biased.

Search agents connect LLMs to the Internet, enabling access to broader and more up-to-date information. However, unreliable search results may also pose safety threats to end users, establishing a new threat surface. In this work, we conduct two in-the-wild experiments to demonstrate both the prevalence of low-quality search results and their potential to misguide agent behaviors. To counter this threat, we introduce an automated red-teaming framework that is systematic, scalable, and cost-efficient, enabling lightweight and harmless safety assessments of search agents. Building on this framework, we construct the SafeSearch benchmark, which includes 300 test cases covering five categories of risks (e.g., misinformation and indirect prompt injection). Using this benchmark, we evaluate three representative search agent scaffolds, covering search workflow, tool-calling, and deep research, across 7 proprietary and 8 open-source backend LLMs. Our results reveal substantial vulnerabilities of LLM-based search agents: when exposed to unreliable websites, the highest ASR reached 90.5% for GPT-4.1-mini under a search workflow setting. Moreover, our analysis highlights the limited effectiveness of common defense practices, such as reminder prompting. This emphasizes the value of our framework in promoting transparency for safer agent development. Our codebase and test cases are publicly available: https://github.com/jianshuod/SafeSearch.

Mixed-initiative dialogue tasks involve repeated exchanges of information and conversational control. Conversational agents gain control by generating responses that follow particular dialogue intents or strategies, prescribed by a policy planner. The standard approach has been fine-tuning pre-trained language models to perform generation conditioned on these intents. However, these supervised generation models are limited by the cost and quality of data annotation. We instead prompt large language models as a drop-in replacement to fine-tuning on conditional generation. We formalize prompt construction for controllable mixed-initiative dialogue. Our findings show improvements over fine-tuning and ground truth responses according to human evaluation and automatic metrics for two tasks: PersuasionForGood and Emotional Support Conversations.

Large language models (LLMs) are popular for high-quality text generation but can produce harmful content, even when aligned with human values through reinforcement learning. Adversarial prompts can bypass their safety measures. We propose LLM Self Defense, a simple approach to defend against these attacks by having an LLM screen the induced responses. Our method does not require any fine-tuning, input preprocessing, or iterative output generation. Instead, we incorporate the generated content into a pre-defined prompt and employ another instance of an LLM to analyze the text and predict whether it is harmful. We test LLM Self Defense on GPT 3.5 and Llama 2, two of the current most prominent LLMs against various types of attacks, such as forcefully inducing affirmative responses to prompts and prompt engineering attacks. Notably, LLM Self Defense succeeds in reducing the attack success rate to virtually 0 using both GPT 3.5 and Llama 2. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/poloclub/llm-self-defense

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed in interactive contexts that involve direct user engagement, such as chatbots and writing assistants. These deployments are increasingly plagued by prompt injection and jailbreaking (collectively, prompt hacking), in which models are manipulated to ignore their original instructions and instead follow potentially malicious ones. Although widely acknowledged as a significant security threat, there is a dearth of large-scale resources and quantitative studies on prompt hacking. To address this lacuna, we launch a global prompt hacking competition, which allows for free-form human input attacks. We elicit 600K+ adversarial prompts against three state-of-the-art LLMs. We describe the dataset, which empirically verifies that current LLMs can indeed be manipulated via prompt hacking. We also present a comprehensive taxonomical ontology of the types of adversarial prompts.

This paper presents prompt design techniques for software engineering, in the form of patterns, to solve common problems when using large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT to automate common software engineering activities, such as ensuring code is decoupled from third-party libraries and simulating a web application API before it is implemented. This paper provides two contributions to research on using LLMs for software engineering. First, it provides a catalog of patterns for software engineering that classifies patterns according to the types of problems they solve. Second, it explores several prompt patterns that have been applied to improve requirements elicitation, rapid prototyping, code quality, refactoring, and system design.

Prompt sensitivity, referring to the phenomenon where paraphrasing (i.e., repeating something written or spoken using different words) leads to significant changes in large language model (LLM) performance, has been widely accepted as a core limitation of LLMs. In this work, we revisit this issue and ask: Is the widely reported high prompt sensitivity truly an inherent weakness of LLMs, or is it largely an artifact of evaluation processes? To answer this question, we systematically evaluate 7 LLMs (e.g., GPT and Gemini family) across 6 benchmarks, including both multiple-choice and open-ended tasks on 12 diverse prompt templates. We find that much of the prompt sensitivity stems from heuristic evaluation methods, including log-likelihood scoring and rigid answer matching, which often overlook semantically correct responses expressed through alternative phrasings, such as synonyms or paraphrases. When we adopt LLM-as-a-Judge evaluations, we observe a substantial reduction in performance variance and a consistently higher correlation in model rankings across prompts. Our findings suggest that modern LLMs are more robust to prompt templates than previously believed, and that prompt sensitivity may be more an artifact of evaluation than a flaw in the models.

Prompting ChatGPT to achieve complex goals (e.g., creating a customer support chatbot) often demands meticulous prompt engineering, including aspects like fluent writing and chain-of-thought techniques. While emerging prompt optimizers can automatically refine many of these aspects, we argue that clearly conveying customized requirements (e.g., how to handle diverse inputs) remains a human-centric challenge. In this work, we introduce Requirement-Oriented Prompt Engineering (ROPE), a paradigm that focuses human attention on generating clear, complete requirements during prompting. We implement ROPE through an assessment and training suite that provides deliberate practice with LLM-generated feedback. In a study with 30 novices, we show that requirement-focused training doubles novices' prompting performance, significantly outperforming conventional prompt engineering training and prompt optimization. We also demonstrate that high-quality LLM outputs are directly tied to the quality of input requirements. Our work paves the way for more effective task delegation in human-LLM collaborative prompting.

With the widespread use of multi-modal Large Language models (MLLMs), safety issues have become a growing concern. Multi-turn dialogues, which are more common in everyday interactions, pose a greater risk than single prompts; however, existing benchmarks do not adequately consider this situation. To encourage the community to focus on the safety issues of these models in multi-turn dialogues, we introduce SafeMT, a benchmark that features dialogues of varying lengths generated from harmful queries accompanied by images. This benchmark consists of 10,000 samples in total, encompassing 17 different scenarios and four jailbreak methods. Additionally, we propose Safety Index (SI) to evaluate the general safety of MLLMs during conversations. We assess the safety of 17 models using this benchmark and discover that the risk of successful attacks on these models increases as the number of turns in harmful dialogues rises. This observation indicates that the safety mechanisms of these models are inadequate for recognizing the hazard in dialogue interactions. We propose a dialogue safety moderator capable of detecting malicious intent concealed within conversations and providing MLLMs with relevant safety policies. Experimental results from several open-source models indicate that this moderator is more effective in reducing multi-turn ASR compared to existed guard models.

Modern Language Models (LMs) owe much of their success to masked causal attention, the backbone of Generative Pre-Trained Transformer (GPT) models. Although GPTs can process the entire user prompt at once, the causal masking is applied to all input tokens step-by-step, mimicking the generation process. This imposes an unnecessary constraint during the initial "prefill" phase when the model processes the input prompt and generates the internal representations before producing any output tokens. In this work, attention is masked based on the known block structure at the prefill phase, followed by the conventional token-by-token autoregressive process after that. For example, in a typical chat prompt, the system prompt is treated as one block, and the user prompt as the next one. Each of these is treated as a unit for the purpose of masking, such that the first tokens in each block can access the subsequent tokens in a non-causal manner. Then, the model answer is generated in the conventional causal manner. This Segment-by-Segment scheme entails no additional computational overhead. When integrating it into models such as Llama and Qwen, state-of-the-art performance is consistently achieved.

Text entry is an essential task in our day-to-day digital interactions. Numerous intelligent features have been developed to streamline this process, making text entry more effective, efficient, and fluid. These improvements include sentence prediction and user personalization. However, as deep learning-based language models become the norm for these advanced features, the necessity for data collection and model fine-tuning increases. These challenges can be mitigated by harnessing the in-context learning capability of large language models such as GPT-3.5. This unique feature allows the language model to acquire new skills through prompts, eliminating the need for data collection and fine-tuning. Consequently, large language models can learn various text prediction techniques. We initially showed that, for a sentence prediction task, merely prompting GPT-3.5 surpassed a GPT-2 backed system and is comparable with a fine-tuned GPT-3.5 model, with the latter two methods requiring costly data collection, fine-tuning and post-processing. However, the task of prompting large language models to specialize in specific text prediction tasks can be challenging, particularly for designers without expertise in prompt engineering. To address this, we introduce Promptor, a conversational prompt generation agent designed to engage proactively with designers. Promptor can automatically generate complex prompts tailored to meet specific needs, thus offering a solution to this challenge. We conducted a user study involving 24 participants creating prompts for three intelligent text entry tasks, half of the participants used Promptor while the other half designed prompts themselves. The results show that Promptor-designed prompts result in a 35% increase in similarity and 22% in coherence over those by designers.

The misuse of large language models (LLMs) has garnered significant attention from the general public and LLM vendors. In response, efforts have been made to align LLMs with human values and intent use. However, a particular type of adversarial prompts, known as jailbreak prompt, has emerged and continuously evolved to bypass the safeguards and elicit harmful content from LLMs. In this paper, we conduct the first measurement study on jailbreak prompts in the wild, with 6,387 prompts collected from four platforms over six months. Leveraging natural language processing technologies and graph-based community detection methods, we discover unique characteristics of jailbreak prompts and their major attack strategies, such as prompt injection and privilege escalation. We also observe that jailbreak prompts increasingly shift from public platforms to private ones, posing new challenges for LLM vendors in proactive detection. To assess the potential harm caused by jailbreak prompts, we create a question set comprising 46,800 samples across 13 forbidden scenarios. Our experiments show that current LLMs and safeguards cannot adequately defend jailbreak prompts in all scenarios. Particularly, we identify two highly effective jailbreak prompts which achieve 0.99 attack success rates on ChatGPT (GPT-3.5) and GPT-4, and they have persisted online for over 100 days. Our work sheds light on the severe and evolving threat landscape of jailbreak prompts. We hope our study can facilitate the research community and LLM vendors in promoting safer and regulated LLMs.

Recent advances on instruction fine-tuning have led to the development of various prompting techniques for large language models, such as explicit reasoning steps. However, the success of techniques depends on various parameters, such as the task, language model, and context provided. Finding an effective prompt is, therefore, often a trial-and-error process. Most existing approaches to automatic prompting aim to optimize individual techniques instead of compositions of techniques and their dependence on the input. To fill this gap, we propose an adaptive prompting approach that predicts the optimal prompt composition ad-hoc for a given input. We apply our approach to social bias detection, a highly context-dependent task that requires semantic understanding. We evaluate it with three large language models on three datasets, comparing compositions to individual techniques and other baselines. The results underline the importance of finding an effective prompt composition. Our approach robustly ensures high detection performance, and is best in several settings. Moreover, first experiments on other tasks support its generalizability.

We demonstrate LLM agent specification gaming by instructing models to win against a chess engine. We find reasoning models like o1 preview and DeepSeek-R1 will often hack the benchmark by default, while language models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet need to be told that normal play won't work to hack. We improve upon prior work like (Hubinger et al., 2024; Meinke et al., 2024; Weij et al., 2024) by using realistic task prompts and avoiding excess nudging. Our results suggest reasoning models may resort to hacking to solve difficult problems, as observed in OpenAI (2024)'s o1 Docker escape during cyber capabilities testing.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.

Text-to-Image generation models have revolutionized the artwork design process and enabled anyone to create high-quality images by entering text descriptions called prompts. Creating a high-quality prompt that consists of a subject and several modifiers can be time-consuming and costly. In consequence, a trend of trading high-quality prompts on specialized marketplaces has emerged. In this paper, we propose a novel attack, namely prompt stealing attack, which aims to steal prompts from generated images by text-to-image generation models. Successful prompt stealing attacks direct violate the intellectual property and privacy of prompt engineers and also jeopardize the business model of prompt trading marketplaces. We first perform a large-scale analysis on a dataset collected by ourselves and show that a successful prompt stealing attack should consider a prompt's subject as well as its modifiers. We then propose the first learning-based prompt stealing attack, PromptStealer, and demonstrate its superiority over two baseline methods quantitatively and qualitatively. We also make some initial attempts to defend PromptStealer. In general, our study uncovers a new attack surface in the ecosystem created by the popular text-to-image generation models. We hope our results can help to mitigate the threat. To facilitate research in this field, we will share our dataset and code with the community.

Safety alignment approaches in large language models (LLMs) often lead to the over-refusal of benign queries, significantly diminishing their utility in sensitive scenarios. To address this challenge, we introduce FalseReject, a comprehensive resource containing 16k seemingly toxic queries accompanied by structured responses across 44 safety-related categories. We propose a graph-informed adversarial multi-agent interaction framework to generate diverse and complex prompts, while structuring responses with explicit reasoning to aid models in accurately distinguishing safe from unsafe contexts. FalseReject includes training datasets tailored for both standard instruction-tuned models and reasoning-oriented models, as well as a human-annotated benchmark test set. Our extensive benchmarking on 29 state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs reveals persistent over-refusal challenges. Empirical results demonstrate that supervised finetuning with FalseReject substantially reduces unnecessary refusals without compromising overall safety or general language capabilities.