Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) are improving at an exceptional rate. With the advent of agentic workflows, multi-turn dialogue has become the de facto mode of interaction with LLMs for completing long and complex tasks. While LLM capabilities continue to improve, they remain increasingly susceptible to jailbreaking, especially in multi-turn scenarios where harmful intent can be subtly injected across the conversation to produce nefarious outcomes. While single-turn attacks have been extensively explored, adaptability, efficiency and effectiveness continue to remain key challenges for their multi-turn counterparts. To address these gaps, we present PLAGUE, a novel plug-and-play framework for designing multi-turn attacks inspired by lifelong-learning agents. PLAGUE dissects the lifetime of a multi-turn attack into three carefully designed phases (Primer, Planner and Finisher) that enable a systematic and information-rich exploration of the multi-turn attack family. Evaluations show that red-teaming agents designed using PLAGUE achieve state-of-the-art jailbreaking results, improving attack success rates (ASR) by more than 30% across leading models in a lesser or comparable query budget. Particularly, PLAGUE enables an ASR (based on StrongReject) of 81.4% on OpenAI's o3 and 67.3% on Claude's Opus 4.1, two models that are considered highly resistant to jailbreaks in safety literature. Our work offers tools and insights to understand the importance of plan initialization, context optimization and lifelong learning in crafting multi-turn attacks for a comprehensive model vulnerability evaluation.

In this paper, we show that knowledge distillation can be subverted to manipulate language model benchmark scores, revealing a critical vulnerability in current evaluation practices. We introduce "Data Laundering," a three-phase process analogous to financial money laundering, that enables the covert transfer of benchmark-specific knowledge through seemingly legitimate intermediate training steps. Through extensive experiments with a 2-layer BERT student model, we show how this approach can achieve substantial improvements in benchmark accuracy (up to 75\% on GPQA) without developing genuine reasoning capabilities. Notably, this method can be exploited intentionally or even unintentionally, as researchers may inadvertently adopt this method that inflates scores using knowledge distillation without realizing the implications. While our findings demonstrate the effectiveness of this technique, we present them as a cautionary tale highlighting the urgent need for more robust evaluation methods in AI. This work aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion about evaluation integrity in AI development and the need for benchmarks that more accurately reflect true model capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/data_laundering.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) rely on vision encoders and Large Language Models (LLMs) to exhibit remarkable capabilities on various multi-modal tasks in the joint space of vision and language. However, the Typographic Attack, which disrupts vision-language models (VLMs) such as Contrastive Language-Image Pretraining (CLIP), has also been expected to be a security threat to LVLMs. Firstly, we verify typographic attacks on current well-known commercial and open-source LVLMs and uncover the widespread existence of this threat. Secondly, to better assess this vulnerability, we propose the most comprehensive and largest-scale Typographic Dataset to date. The Typographic Dataset not only considers the evaluation of typographic attacks under various multi-modal tasks but also evaluates the effects of typographic attacks, influenced by texts generated with diverse factors. Based on the evaluation results, we investigate the causes why typographic attacks may impact VLMs and LVLMs, leading to three highly insightful discoveries. By the examination of our discoveries and experimental validation in the Typographic Dataset, we reduce the performance degradation from 42.07% to 13.90% when LVLMs confront typographic attacks.

Smart contract vulnerability detection remains a major challenge in blockchain security. Existing vulnerability detection methods face two main issues: (1) Existing datasets lack comprehensive coverage and high-quality explanations for preference learning. (2) Large language models (LLMs) often struggle with accurately interpreting specific concepts in smart contract security. Empirical analysis shows that even after continual pre-training (CPT) and supervised fine-tuning (SFT), LLMs may misinterpret the execution order of state changes, resulting in incorrect explanations despite making correct detection decisions. To address these challenges, we propose Smart-LLaMA-DPO based on LLaMA-3.1-8B. We construct a comprehensive dataset covering four major vulnerability types and machine-unauditable vulnerabilities, including precise labels, explanations, and locations for SFT, as well as high-quality and low-quality output pairs for Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Second, we perform CPT using large-scale smart contract to enhance the LLM's understanding of specific security practices in smart contracts. Futhermore, we conduct SFT with our comprehensive dataset. Finally, we apply DPO, leveraging human feedback and a specially designed loss function that increases the probability of preferred explanations while reducing the likelihood of non-preferred outputs. We evaluate Smart-LLaMA-DPO on four major vulnerability types: reentrancy, timestamp dependence, integer overflow/underflow, and delegatecall, as well as machine-unauditable vulnerabilities. Our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, with average improvements of 10.43% in F1 score and 7.87% in accuracy. Moreover, both LLM evaluation and human evaluation confirm that our method generates more correct, thorough, and clear explanations.

Large language models (LLMs) are vital for a wide range of applications yet remain susceptible to jailbreak threats, which could lead to the generation of inappropriate responses. Conventional defenses, such as refusal and adversarial training, often fail to cover corner cases or rare domains, leaving LLMs still vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks. We propose a novel defense strategy, Safety Chain-of-Thought (SCoT), which harnesses the enhanced reasoning capabilities of LLMs for proactive assessment of harmful inputs, rather than simply blocking them. SCoT augments any refusal training datasets to critically analyze the intent behind each request before generating answers. By employing proactive reasoning, SCoT enhances the generalization of LLMs across varied harmful queries and scenarios not covered in the safety alignment corpus. Additionally, it generates detailed refusals specifying the rules violated. Comparative evaluations show that SCoT significantly surpasses existing defenses, reducing vulnerability to out-of-distribution issues and adversarial manipulations while maintaining strong general capabilities.

The impact of software vulnerabilities on everyday software systems is significant. Despite deep learning models being proposed for vulnerability detection, their reliability is questionable. Prior evaluations show high recall/F1 scores of up to 99%, but these models underperform in practical scenarios, particularly when assessed on entire codebases rather than just the fixing commit. This paper introduces Real-Vul, a comprehensive dataset representing real-world scenarios for evaluating vulnerability detection models. Evaluating DeepWukong, LineVul, ReVeal, and IVDetect shows a significant drop in performance, with precision decreasing by up to 95 percentage points and F1 scores by up to 91 points. Furthermore, Model performance fluctuates based on vulnerability characteristics, with better F1 scores for information leaks or code injection than for path resolution or predictable return values. The results highlight a significant performance gap that needs addressing before deploying deep learning-based vulnerability detection in practical settings. Overfitting is identified as a key issue, and an augmentation technique is proposed, potentially improving performance by up to 30%. Contributions include a dataset creation approach for better model evaluation, Real-Vul dataset, and empirical evidence of deep learning models struggling in real-world settings.

The rapid advancement of pre-trained language models (PLMs) has demonstrated promising results for various code-related tasks. However, their effectiveness in detecting real-world vulnerabilities remains a critical challenge. % for the security community. While existing empirical studies evaluate PLMs for vulnerability detection (VD), their inadequate consideration in data preparation, evaluation setups, and experimental settings undermines the accuracy and comprehensiveness of evaluations. This paper introduces RevisitVD, an extensive evaluation of 17 PLMs spanning smaller code-specific PLMs and large-scale PLMs using newly constructed datasets. Specifically, we compare the performance of PLMs under both fine-tuning and prompt engineering, assess their effectiveness and generalizability across various training and testing settings, and analyze their robustness against code normalization, abstraction, and semantic-preserving transformations. Our findings reveal that, for VD tasks, PLMs incorporating pre-training tasks designed to capture the syntactic and semantic patterns of code outperform both general-purpose PLMs and those solely pre-trained or fine-tuned on large code corpora. However, these models face notable challenges in real-world scenarios, such as difficulties in detecting vulnerabilities with complex dependencies, handling perturbations introduced by code normalization and abstraction, and identifying semantic-preserving vulnerable code transformations. Also, the truncation caused by the limited context windows of PLMs can lead to a non-negligible amount of labeling errors. This study underscores the importance of thorough evaluations of model performance in practical scenarios and outlines future directions to help enhance the effectiveness of PLMs for realistic VD applications.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have recently achieved state-of-the-art performance on tasks ranging from visual question answering to video understanding. However, existing studies have concentrated mainly on visual-textual misalignment, leaving largely unexplored the MLLMs' ability to preserve an originally correct answer when confronted with misleading information. We reveal a response uncertainty phenomenon: across nine standard datasets, twelve state-of-the-art open-source MLLMs overturn a previously correct answer in 65% of cases after receiving a single deceptive cue. To systematically quantify this vulnerability, we propose a two-stage evaluation pipeline: (1) elicit each model's original response on unperturbed inputs; (2) inject explicit (false-answer hints) and implicit (contextual contradictions) misleading instructions, and compute the misleading rate - the fraction of correct-to-incorrect flips. Leveraging the most susceptible examples, we curate the Multimodal Uncertainty Benchmark (MUB), a collection of image-question pairs stratified into low, medium, and high difficulty based on how many of twelve state-of-the-art MLLMs they mislead. Extensive evaluation on twelve open-source and five closed-source models reveals a high uncertainty: average misleading rates exceed 86%, with explicit cues over 67.19% and implicit cues over 80.67%. To reduce the misleading rate, we then fine-tune all open-source MLLMs on a compact 2000-sample mixed-instruction dataset, reducing misleading rates to 6.97% (explicit) and 32.77% (implicit), boosting consistency by nearly 29.37% on highly deceptive inputs, and slightly improving accuracy on standard benchmarks. Our code is available at https://github.com/Yunkaidang/uncertainty

This paper presents VulBERTa, a deep learning approach to detect security vulnerabilities in source code. Our approach pre-trains a RoBERTa model with a custom tokenisation pipeline on real-world code from open-source C/C++ projects. The model learns a deep knowledge representation of the code syntax and semantics, which we leverage to train vulnerability detection classifiers. We evaluate our approach on binary and multi-class vulnerability detection tasks across several datasets (Vuldeepecker, Draper, REVEAL and muVuldeepecker) and benchmarks (CodeXGLUE and D2A). The evaluation results show that VulBERTa achieves state-of-the-art performance and outperforms existing approaches across different datasets, despite its conceptual simplicity, and limited cost in terms of size of training data and number of model parameters.

Object hallucination poses a significant challenge in vision-language (VL) models, often leading to the generation of nonsensical or unfaithful responses with non-existent objects. However, the absence of a general measurement for evaluating object hallucination in VL models has hindered our understanding and ability to mitigate this issue. In this work, we present NOPE (Negative Object Presence Evaluation), a novel benchmark designed to assess object hallucination in VL models through visual question answering (VQA). We propose a cost-effective and scalable approach utilizing large language models to generate 29.5k synthetic negative pronoun (NegP) data of high quality for NOPE. We extensively investigate the performance of 10 state-of-the-art VL models in discerning the non-existence of objects in visual questions, where the ground truth answers are denoted as NegP (e.g., "none"). Additionally, we evaluate their standard performance on visual questions on 9 other VQA datasets. Through our experiments, we demonstrate that no VL model is immune to the vulnerability of object hallucination, as all models achieve accuracy below 10\% on NegP. Furthermore, we uncover that lexically diverse visual questions, question types with large scopes, and scene-relevant objects capitalize the risk of object hallucination in VL models.

Auto-completing code enables developers to speed up coding significantly. Recent advances in transformer-based large language model (LLM) technologies have been applied to code synthesis. However, studies show that many of such synthesized codes contain vulnerabilities. We propose a novel vulnerability-constrained decoding approach to reduce the amount of vulnerable code generated by such models. Using a small dataset of labeled vulnerable lines of code, we fine-tune an LLM to include vulnerability labels when generating code, acting as an embedded classifier. Then, during decoding, we deny the model to generate these labels to avoid generating vulnerable code. To evaluate the method, we chose to automatically complete Ethereum Blockchain smart contracts (SCs) as the case study due to the strict requirements of SC security. We first fine-tuned the 6-billion-parameter GPT-J model using 186,397 Ethereum SCs after removing the duplication from 2,217,692 SCs. The fine-tuning took more than one week using ten GPUs. The results showed that our fine-tuned model could synthesize SCs with an average BLEU (BiLingual Evaluation Understudy) score of 0.557. However, many codes in the auto-completed SCs were vulnerable. Using the code before the vulnerable line of 176 SCs containing different types of vulnerabilities to auto-complete the code, we found that more than 70% of the auto-completed codes were insecure. Thus, we further fine-tuned the model on other 941 vulnerable SCs containing the same types of vulnerabilities and applied vulnerability-constrained decoding. The fine-tuning took only one hour with four GPUs. We then auto-completed the 176 SCs again and found that our approach could identify 62% of the code to be generated as vulnerable and avoid generating 67% of them, indicating the approach could efficiently and effectively avoid vulnerabilities in the auto-completed code.

The code generation capabilities of large language models(LLMs) have emerged as a critical dimension in evaluating their overall performance. However, prior research has largely overlooked the security risks inherent in the generated code. In this work, we introduce SafeGenBench, a benchmark specifically designed to assess the security of LLM-generated code. The dataset encompasses a wide range of common software development scenarios and vulnerability types. Building upon this benchmark, we develop an automatic evaluation framework that leverages both static application security testing(SAST) and LLM-based judging to assess the presence of security vulnerabilities in model-generated code. Through the empirical evaluation of state-of-the-art LLMs on SafeGenBench, we reveal notable deficiencies in their ability to produce vulnerability-free code. Our findings highlight pressing challenges and offer actionable insights for future advancements in the secure code generation performance of LLMs. The data and code will be released soon.

In precision medicine, quantitative multi-omic features, topological context, and textual biological knowledge play vital roles in identifying disease-critical signaling pathways and targets. Existing pipelines capture only part of these-numerical omics ignore topological context, text-centric LLMs lack quantitative grounded reasoning, and graph-only models underuse node semantics and the generalization of LLMs-limiting mechanistic interpretability. Although Process Reward Models (PRMs) aim to guide reasoning in LLMs, they remain limited by unreliable intermediate evaluation, and vulnerability to reward hacking with computational cost. These gaps motivate integrating quantitative multi-omic signals, topological structure with node annotations, and literature-scale text via LLMs, using subgraph reasoning as the principle bridge linking numeric evidence, topological knowledge and language context. Therefore, we propose GALAX (Graph Augmented LAnguage model with eXplainability), an innovative framework that integrates pretrained Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) into Large Language Models (LLMs) via reinforcement guided by a Graph Process Reward Model (GPRM), which generates disease-relevant subgraphs in a step-wise manner initiated by an LLM and iteratively evaluated by a pretrained GNN, enabling process-level supervision without explicit intermediate reasoning annotations. As an application, we also introduced Target-QA, a benchmark combining CRISPR-identified targets, multi-omic profiles, and biomedical graph knowledge across diverse cancer cell lines, which enables GNN pretraining for supervising step-wise graph construction and supports long-context reasoning over text-numeric graphs (TNGs), providing a scalable and biologically grounded framework for explainable, reinforcement-guided subgraph reasoning toward reliable and interpretable target and pathway discovery in precision medicine.

Existing 3D vision-language (3D-VL) benchmarks fall short in evaluating 3D-VL models, creating a "mist" that obscures rigorous insights into model capabilities and 3D-VL tasks. This mist persists due to three key limitations. First, flawed test data, like ambiguous referential text in the grounding task, can yield incorrect and unreliable test results. Second, oversimplified metrics such as simply averaging accuracy per question answering (QA) pair, cannot reveal true model capability due to their vulnerability to language variations. Third, existing benchmarks isolate the grounding and QA tasks, disregarding the underlying coherence that QA should be based on solid grounding capabilities. To unveil the "mist", we propose Beacon3D, a benchmark for 3D-VL grounding and QA tasks, delivering a perspective shift in the evaluation of 3D-VL understanding. Beacon3D features (i) high-quality test data with precise and natural language, (ii) object-centric evaluation with multiple tests per object to ensure robustness, and (iii) a novel chain-of-analysis paradigm to address language robustness and model performance coherence across grounding and QA. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art 3D-VL models on Beacon3D reveals that (i) object-centric evaluation elicits true model performance and particularly weak generalization in QA; (ii) grounding-QA coherence remains fragile in current 3D-VL models, and (iii) incorporating large language models (LLMs) to 3D-VL models, though as a prevalent practice, hinders grounding capabilities and has yet to elevate QA capabilities. We hope Beacon3D and our comprehensive analysis could benefit the 3D-VL community towards faithful developments.

Despite significant advances in alignment techniques, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art language models remain vulnerable to carefully crafted conversational scenarios that can induce various forms of misalignment without explicit jailbreaking. Through systematic manual red-teaming with Claude-4-Opus, we discovered 10 successful attack scenarios, revealing fundamental vulnerabilities in how current alignment methods handle narrative immersion, emotional pressure, and strategic framing. These scenarios successfully elicited a range of misaligned behaviors, including deception, value drift, self-preservation, and manipulative reasoning, each exploiting different psychological and contextual vulnerabilities. To validate generalizability, we distilled our successful manual attacks into MISALIGNMENTBENCH, an automated evaluation framework that enables reproducible testing across multiple models. Cross-model evaluation of our 10 scenarios against five frontier LLMs revealed an overall 76% vulnerability rate, with significant variations: GPT-4.1 showed the highest susceptibility (90%), while Claude-4-Sonnet demonstrated greater resistance (40%). Our findings demonstrate that sophisticated reasoning capabilities often become attack vectors rather than protective mechanisms, as models can be manipulated into complex justifications for misaligned behavior. This work provides (i) a detailed taxonomy of conversational manipulation patterns and (ii) a reusable evaluation framework. Together, these findings expose critical gaps in current alignment strategies and highlight the need for robustness against subtle, scenario-based manipulation in future AI systems.

We propose the first unified adversarial attack benchmark for Genomic Foundation Models (GFMs), named GenoArmory. Unlike existing GFM benchmarks, GenoArmory offers the first comprehensive evaluation framework to systematically assess the vulnerability of GFMs to adversarial attacks. Methodologically, we evaluate the adversarial robustness of five state-of-the-art GFMs using four widely adopted attack algorithms and three defense strategies. Importantly, our benchmark provides an accessible and comprehensive framework to analyze GFM vulnerabilities with respect to model architecture, quantization schemes, and training datasets. Additionally, we introduce GenoAdv, a new adversarial sample dataset designed to improve GFM safety. Empirically, classification models exhibit greater robustness to adversarial perturbations compared to generative models, highlighting the impact of task type on model vulnerability. Moreover, adversarial attacks frequently target biologically significant genomic regions, suggesting that these models effectively capture meaningful sequence features.

Despite their remarkable achievements and widespread adoption, Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have revealed significant security vulnerabilities, highlighting the urgent need for robust safety evaluation benchmarks. Existing MLLM safety benchmarks, however, fall short in terms of data quality and coverge, and modal risk combinations, resulting in inflated and contradictory evaluation results, which hinders the discovery and governance of security concerns. Besides, we argue that vulnerabilities to harmful queries and oversensitivity to harmless ones should be considered simultaneously in MLLMs safety evaluation, whereas these were previously considered separately. In this paper, to address these shortcomings, we introduce Unified Safety Benchmarks (USB), which is one of the most comprehensive evaluation benchmarks in MLLM safety. Our benchmark features high-quality queries, extensive risk categories, comprehensive modal combinations, and encompasses both vulnerability and oversensitivity evaluations. From the perspective of two key dimensions: risk categories and modality combinations, we demonstrate that the available benchmarks -- even the union of the vast majority of them -- are far from being truly comprehensive. To bridge this gap, we design a sophisticated data synthesis pipeline that generates extensive, high-quality complementary data addressing previously unexplored aspects. By combining open-source datasets with our synthetic data, our benchmark provides 4 distinct modality combinations for each of the 61 risk sub-categories, covering both English and Chinese across both vulnerability and oversensitivity dimensions.

Automating software vulnerability detection (SVD) remains a critical challenge in an era of increasingly complex and interdependent software systems. Despite significant advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) for code analysis, prevailing evaluation methodologies often lack the context-aware robustness necessary to capture real-world intricacies and cross-component interactions. To address these limitations, we present VulnSage, a comprehensive evaluation framework and a dataset curated from diverse, large-scale open-source system software projects developed in C/C++. Unlike prior datasets, it leverages a heuristic noise pre-filtering approach combined with LLM-based reasoning to ensure a representative and minimally noisy spectrum of vulnerabilities. The framework supports multi-granular analysis across function, file, and inter-function levels and employs four diverse zero-shot prompt strategies: Baseline, Chain-of-Thought, Think, and Think & Verify. Through this evaluation, we uncover that structured reasoning prompts substantially improve LLM performance, with Think & Verify reducing ambiguous responses from 20.3% to 9.1% while increasing accuracy. We further demonstrate that code-specialized models consistently outperform general-purpose alternatives, with performance varying significantly across vulnerability types, revealing that no single approach universally excels across all security contexts. Link to dataset and codes: https://github.com/Erroristotle/VulnSage.git

We present FLUKE (Framework for LingUistically-driven and tasK-agnostic robustness Evaluation), a task-agnostic framework for assessing model robustness through systematic minimal variations of test data. FLUKE introduces controlled variations across linguistic levels - from orthography to dialect and style varieties - and leverages large language models (LLMs) with human validation to generate modifications. We demonstrate FLUKE's utility by evaluating both fine-tuned models and LLMs across four diverse NLP tasks, and reveal that (1) the impact of linguistic variations is highly task-dependent, with some tests being critical for certain tasks but irrelevant for others; (2) while LLMs have better overall robustness compared to fine-tuned models, they still exhibit significant brittleness to certain linguistic variations; (3) all models show substantial vulnerability to negation modifications across most tasks. These findings highlight the importance of systematic robustness testing for understanding model behaviors.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in contexts where their failures can have direct sociopolitical consequences. Yet, existing safety benchmarks rarely test vulnerabilities in domains such as political manipulation, propaganda and disinformation generation, or surveillance and information control. We introduce SocialHarmBench, a dataset of 585 prompts spanning 7 sociopolitical categories and 34 countries, designed to surface where LLMs most acutely fail in politically charged contexts. Our evaluations reveal several shortcomings: open-weight models exhibit high vulnerability to harmful compliance, with Mistral-7B reaching attack success rates as high as 97% to 98% in domains such as historical revisionism, propaganda, and political manipulation. Moreover, temporal and geographic analyses show that LLMs are most fragile when confronted with 21st-century or pre-20th-century contexts, and when responding to prompts tied to regions such as Latin America, the USA, and the UK. These findings demonstrate that current safeguards fail to generalize to high-stakes sociopolitical settings, exposing systematic biases and raising concerns about the reliability of LLMs in preserving human rights and democratic values. We share the SocialHarmBench benchmark at https://huggingface.co/datasets/psyonp/SocialHarmBench.

Deep learning solutions for vulnerability detection proposed in academic research are not always accessible to developers, and their applicability in industrial settings is rarely addressed. Transferring such technologies from academia to industry presents challenges related to trustworthiness, legacy systems, limited digital literacy, and the gap between academic and industrial expertise. For deep learning in particular, performance and integration into existing workflows are additional concerns. In this work, we first evaluate the performance of CodeBERT for detecting vulnerable functions in industrial and open-source software. We analyse its cross-domain generalisation when fine-tuned on open-source data and tested on industrial data, and vice versa, also exploring strategies for handling class imbalance. Based on these results, we develop AI-DO(Automating vulnerability detection Integration for Developers' Operations), a Continuous Integration-Continuous Deployment (CI/CD)-integrated recommender system that uses fine-tuned CodeBERT to detect and localise vulnerabilities during code review without disrupting workflows. Finally, we assess the tool's perceived usefulness through a survey with the company's IT professionals. Our results show that models trained on industrial data detect vulnerabilities accurately within the same domain but lose performance on open-source code, while a deep learner fine-tuned on open data, with appropriate undersampling techniques, improves the detection of vulnerabilities.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in code understanding tasks. However, they demonstrate limited performance in vulnerability detection and struggle to distinguish vulnerable code from patched code. We argue that LLMs lack understanding of security specifications -- the expectations about how code should behave to remain safe. When code behavior differs from these expectations, it becomes a potential vulnerability. However, such knowledge is rarely explicit in training data, leaving models unable to reason about security flaws. We propose VulInstruct, a specification-guided approach that systematically extracts security specifications from historical vulnerabilities to detect new ones. VulInstruct constructs a specification knowledge base from two perspectives: (i) General specifications from high-quality patches across projects, capturing fundamental safe behaviors; and (ii) Domain-specific specifications from repeated violations in particular repositories relevant to the target code. VulInstruct retrieves relevant past cases and specifications, enabling LLMs to reason about expected safe behaviors rather than relying on surface patterns. We evaluate VulInstruct under strict criteria requiring both correct predictions and valid reasoning. On PrimeVul, VulInstruct achieves 45.0% F1-score (32.7% improvement) and 37.7% recall (50.8% improvement) compared to baselines, while uniquely detecting 24.3% of vulnerabilities -- 2.4x more than any baseline. In pair-wise evaluation, VulInstruct achieves 32.3% relative improvement. VulInstruct also discovered a previously unknown high-severity vulnerability (CVE-2025-56538) in production code, demonstrating practical value for real-world vulnerability discovery. All code and supplementary materials are available at https://github.com/zhuhaopku/VulInstruct-temp.

In the context of the rising interest in code language models (code LMs) and vulnerability detection, we study the effectiveness of code LMs for detecting vulnerabilities. Our analysis reveals significant shortcomings in existing vulnerability datasets, including poor data quality, low label accuracy, and high duplication rates, leading to unreliable model performance in realistic vulnerability detection scenarios. Additionally, the evaluation methods used with these datasets are not representative of real-world vulnerability detection. To address these challenges, we introduce PrimeVul, a new dataset for training and evaluating code LMs for vulnerability detection. PrimeVul incorporates a novel set of data labeling techniques that achieve comparable label accuracy to human-verified benchmarks while significantly expanding the dataset. It also implements a rigorous data de-duplication and chronological data splitting strategy to mitigate data leakage issues, alongside introducing more realistic evaluation metrics and settings. This comprehensive approach aims to provide a more accurate assessment of code LMs' performance in real-world conditions. Evaluating code LMs on PrimeVul reveals that existing benchmarks significantly overestimate the performance of these models. For instance, a state-of-the-art 7B model scored 68.26% F1 on BigVul but only 3.09% F1 on PrimeVul. Attempts to improve performance through advanced training techniques and larger models like GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 were unsuccessful, with results akin to random guessing in the most stringent settings. These findings underscore the considerable gap between current capabilities and the practical requirements for deploying code LMs in security roles, highlighting the need for more innovative research in this domain.

Software vulnerabilities present a persistent security challenge, with over 25,000 new vulnerabilities reported in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database in 2024 alone. While deep learning based approaches show promise for vulnerability detection, recent studies reveal critical limitations in terms of accuracy and robustness: accuracy drops by up to 45% on rigorously verified datasets, and performance degrades significantly under simple code modifications. This paper presents LLMxCPG, a novel framework integrating Code Property Graphs (CPG) with Large Language Models (LLM) for robust vulnerability detection. Our CPG-based slice construction technique reduces code size by 67.84 to 90.93% while preserving vulnerability-relevant context. Our approach's ability to provide a more concise and accurate representation of code snippets enables the analysis of larger code segments, including entire projects. This concise representation is a key factor behind the improved detection capabilities of our method, as it can now identify vulnerabilities that span multiple functions. Empirical evaluation demonstrates LLMxCPG's effectiveness across verified datasets, achieving 15-40% improvements in F1-score over state-of-the-art baselines. Moreover, LLMxCPG maintains high performance across function-level and multi-function codebases while exhibiting robust detection efficacy under various syntactic code modifications.

As the use of large language model (LLM) agents continues to grow, their safety vulnerabilities have become increasingly evident. Extensive benchmarks evaluate various aspects of LLM safety by defining the safety relying heavily on general standards, overlooking user-specific standards. However, safety standards for LLM may vary based on a user-specific profiles rather than being universally consistent across all users. This raises a critical research question: Do LLM agents act safely when considering user-specific safety standards? Despite its importance for safe LLM use, no benchmark datasets currently exist to evaluate the user-specific safety of LLMs. To address this gap, we introduce U-SAFEBENCH, the first benchmark designed to assess user-specific aspect of LLM safety. Our evaluation of 18 widely used LLMs reveals current LLMs fail to act safely when considering user-specific safety standards, marking a new discovery in this field. To address this vulnerability, we propose a simple remedy based on chain-of-thought, demonstrating its effectiveness in improving user-specific safety. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/yeonjun-in/U-SafeBench.

Large language models (LLMs) have brought significant advancements to code generation, benefiting both novice and experienced developers. However, their training using unsanitized data from open-source repositories, like GitHub, introduces the risk of inadvertently propagating security vulnerabilities. To effectively mitigate this concern, this paper presents a comprehensive study focused on evaluating and enhancing code LLMs from a software security perspective. We introduce SecuCoGenSecuCoGen has been uploaded as supplemental material and will be made publicly available after publication., a meticulously curated dataset targeting 21 critical vulnerability types. SecuCoGen comprises 180 samples and serves as the foundation for conducting experiments on three crucial code-related tasks: code generation, code repair and vulnerability classification, with a strong emphasis on security. Our experimental results reveal that existing models often overlook security concerns during code generation, leading to the generation of vulnerable code. To address this, we propose effective approaches to mitigate the security vulnerabilities and enhance the overall robustness of code generated by LLMs. Moreover, our study identifies weaknesses in existing models' ability to repair vulnerable code, even when provided with vulnerability information. Additionally, certain vulnerability types pose challenges for the models, hindering their performance in vulnerability classification. Based on these findings, we believe our study will have a positive impact on the software engineering community, inspiring the development of improved methods for training and utilizing LLMs, thereby leading to safer and more trustworthy model deployment.

AI-powered coding assistants such as GitHub Copilot and OpenAI ChatGPT have achieved notable success in automating code generation. However, these tools rely on pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) that are typically trained on human-written code sourced from open-source project hosting sites like GitHub, which often contains inherent security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities may then be mirrored in the code generated by these LLMs, a critical risk revealed and highlighted by recent empirical studies. In this work, we present an exploratory study on whether fine-tuning pre-trained LLMs on datasets of vulnerability-fixing commits can promote secure code generation. We explored two parameter-efficient fine-tuning techniques (LoRa and IA3) on two pre-trained LLMs for code generation. We crawled a fine-tuning dataset (14,622 C and C++ files) for secure code generation by collecting code fixes of confirmed vulnerabilities from open-source repositories. Our evaluation dataset comprises 52 vulnerability scenarios designed to cover the top most dangerous C and C++ Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs). Each scenario is a prompt that may induce LLMs to generate vulnerable code. Our exploration reveals that fine-tuning LLMs can improve secure code generation by 6.4% in C language and 5.4% in C++ language. We further experimented with fine-tuning LLMs using different versions of the collected secure code dataset (block, function, and line). We found that fine-tuning with function-level and block-level datasets achieves the best secure code generation performance, compared to the alternatives (file-level and line-level).

Evaluating explanations of image classifiers regarding ground truth, e.g. segmentation masks defined by human perception, primarily evaluates the quality of the models under consideration rather than the explanation methods themselves. Driven by this observation, we propose a framework for jointly evaluating the robustness of safety-critical systems that combine a deep neural network with an explanation method. These are increasingly used in real-world applications like medical image analysis or robotics. We introduce a fine-tuning procedure to (mis)align modelx2013explanation pipelines with ground truth and use it to quantify the potential discrepancy between worst and best-case scenarios of human alignment. Experiments across various model architectures and post-hoc local interpretation methods provide insights into the robustness of vision transformers and the overall vulnerability of such AI systems to potential adversarial attacks.

With the rapid advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), securing these models against malicious inputs while align- ing them with human values has emerged as a critical challenge. In this paper, we investigate an important and unexplored question of whether techniques that successfully jailbreak Large Language Models (LLMs) can be equally effective in jailbreaking MLLMs. To explore this issue, we in- troduce JailBreakV-28K, a pioneering benchmark designed to assess the transferability of LLM jailbreak techniques to MLLMs, thereby evaluat- ing the robustness of MLLMs against diverse jailbreak attacks. Utilizing a dataset of 2, 000 malicious queries that is also proposed in this paper, we generate 20, 000 text-based jailbreak prompts using advanced jailbreak attacks on LLMs, alongside 8, 000 image-based jailbreak inputs from recent MLLMs jailbreak attacks, our comprehensive dataset includes 28, 000 test cases across a spectrum of adversarial scenarios. Our evaluation of 10 open- source MLLMs reveals a notably high Attack Success Rate (ASR) for attacks transferred from LLMs, highlighting a critical vulnerability in MLLMs that stems from their text-processing capabilities. Our findings underscore the urgent need for future research to address alignment vulnerabilities in MLLMs from both textual and visual inputs.

As automated attack techniques rapidly advance, CAPTCHAs remain a critical defense mechanism against malicious bots. However, existing CAPTCHA schemes encompass a diverse range of modalities -- from static distorted text and obfuscated images to interactive clicks, sliding puzzles, and logic-based questions -- yet the community still lacks a unified, large-scale, multimodal benchmark to rigorously evaluate their security robustness. To address this gap, we introduce MCA-Bench, a comprehensive and reproducible benchmarking suite that integrates heterogeneous CAPTCHA types into a single evaluation protocol. Leveraging a shared vision-language model backbone, we fine-tune specialized cracking agents for each CAPTCHA category, enabling consistent, cross-modal assessments. Extensive experiments reveal that MCA-Bench effectively maps the vulnerability spectrum of modern CAPTCHA designs under varied attack settings, and crucially offers the first quantitative analysis of how challenge complexity, interaction depth, and model solvability interrelate. Based on these findings, we propose three actionable design principles and identify key open challenges, laying the groundwork for systematic CAPTCHA hardening, fair benchmarking, and broader community collaboration. Datasets and code are available online.

While poisoning attacks on machine learning models have been extensively studied, the mechanisms by which adversaries can distribute poisoned models at scale remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we shed light on how model leaderboards -- ranked platforms for model discovery and evaluation -- can serve as a powerful channel for adversaries for stealthy large-scale distribution of poisoned models. We present TrojanClimb, a general framework that enables injection of malicious behaviors while maintaining competitive leaderboard performance. We demonstrate its effectiveness across four diverse modalities: text-embedding, text-generation, text-to-speech and text-to-image, showing that adversaries can successfully achieve high leaderboard rankings while embedding arbitrary harmful functionalities, from backdoors to bias injection. Our findings reveal a significant vulnerability in the machine learning ecosystem, highlighting the urgent need to redesign leaderboard evaluation mechanisms to detect and filter malicious (e.g., poisoned) models, while exposing broader security implications for the machine learning community regarding the risks of adopting models from unverified sources.

Adversarial threats against LLMs are escalating faster than current defenses can adapt. We expose a critical geometric blind spot in alignment: adversarial prompts exploit latent camouflage, embedding perilously close to the safe representation manifold while encoding unsafe intent thereby evading surface level defenses like Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), which remain blind to the latent geometry. We introduce ALKALI, the first rigorously curated adversarial benchmark and the most comprehensive to date spanning 9,000 prompts across three macro categories, six subtypes, and fifteen attack families. Evaluation of 21 leading LLMs reveals alarmingly high Attack Success Rates (ASRs) across both open and closed source models, exposing an underlying vulnerability we term latent camouflage, a structural blind spot where adversarial completions mimic the latent geometry of safe ones. To mitigate this vulnerability, we introduce GRACE - Geometric Representation Aware Contrastive Enhancement, an alignment framework coupling preference learning with latent space regularization. GRACE enforces two constraints: latent separation between safe and adversarial completions, and adversarial cohesion among unsafe and jailbreak behaviors. These operate over layerwise pooled embeddings guided by a learned attention profile, reshaping internal geometry without modifying the base model, and achieve up to 39% ASR reduction. Moreover, we introduce AVQI, a geometry aware metric that quantifies latent alignment failure via cluster separation and compactness. AVQI reveals when unsafe completions mimic the geometry of safe ones, offering a principled lens into how models internally encode safety. We make the code publicly available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/alkali-B416/README.md.

We propose the first unified adversarial attack benchmark for Genomic Foundation Models (GFMs), named GERM. Unlike existing GFM benchmarks, GERM offers the first comprehensive evaluation framework to systematically assess the vulnerability of GFMs to adversarial attacks. Methodologically, we evaluate the adversarial robustness of five state-of-the-art GFMs using four widely adopted attack algorithms and three defense strategies. Importantly, our benchmark provides an accessible and comprehensive framework to analyze GFM vulnerabilities with respect to model architecture, quantization schemes, and training datasets. Empirically, transformer-based models exhibit greater robustness to adversarial perturbations compared to HyenaDNA, highlighting the impact of architectural design on vulnerability. Moreover, adversarial attacks frequently target biologically significant genomic regions, suggesting that these models effectively capture meaningful sequence features.

The large-scale deployment of Solidity smart contracts on the Ethereum mainnet has increasingly attracted financially-motivated attackers in recent years. A few now-infamous attacks in Ethereum's history includes DAO attack in 2016 (50 million dollars lost), Parity Wallet hack in 2017 (146 million dollars locked), Beautychain's token BEC in 2018 (900 million dollars market value fell to 0), and NFT gaming blockchain breach in 2022 ($600 million in Ether stolen). This paper presents a comprehensive investigation of the use of large language models (LLMs) and their capabilities in detecting OWASP Top Ten vulnerabilities in Solidity. We introduce a novel, class-balanced, structured, and labeled dataset named VulSmart, which we use to benchmark and compare the performance of open-source LLMs such as CodeLlama, Llama2, CodeT5 and Falcon, alongside closed-source models like GPT-3.5 Turbo and GPT-4o Mini. Our proposed SmartVD framework is rigorously tested against these models through extensive automated and manual evaluations, utilizing BLEU and ROUGE metrics to assess the effectiveness of vulnerability detection in smart contracts. We also explore three distinct prompting strategies-zero-shot, few-shot, and chain-of-thought-to evaluate the multi-class classification and generative capabilities of the SmartVD framework. Our findings reveal that SmartVD outperforms its open-source counterparts and even exceeds the performance of closed-source base models like GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 Mini. After fine-tuning, the closed-source models, GPT-3.5 Turbo and GPT-4o Mini, achieved remarkable performance with 99% accuracy in detecting vulnerabilities, 94% in identifying their types, and 98% in determining severity. Notably, SmartVD performs best with the `chain-of-thought' prompting technique, whereas the fine-tuned closed-source models excel with the `zero-shot' prompting approach.

Vision systems to see and reason about the compositional nature of visual scenes are fundamental to understanding our world. The complex relations between objects and their locations, ambiguities, and variations in the real-world environment can be better described in human language, naturally governed by grammatical rules and other modalities such as audio and depth. The models learned to bridge the gap between such modalities coupled with large-scale training data facilitate contextual reasoning, generalization, and prompt capabilities at test time. These models are referred to as foundational models. The output of such models can be modified through human-provided prompts without retraining, e.g., segmenting a particular object by providing a bounding box, having interactive dialogues by asking questions about an image or video scene or manipulating the robot's behavior through language instructions. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive review of such emerging foundational models, including typical architecture designs to combine different modalities (vision, text, audio, etc), training objectives (contrastive, generative), pre-training datasets, fine-tuning mechanisms, and the common prompting patterns; textual, visual, and heterogeneous. We discuss the open challenges and research directions for foundational models in computer vision, including difficulties in their evaluations and benchmarking, gaps in their real-world understanding, limitations of their contextual understanding, biases, vulnerability to adversarial attacks, and interpretability issues. We review recent developments in this field, covering a wide range of applications of foundation models systematically and comprehensively. A comprehensive list of foundational models studied in this work is available at https://github.com/awaisrauf/Awesome-CV-Foundational-Models.

Large language models (LLMs) have brought significant advancements to code generation and code repair, benefiting both novice and experienced developers. However, their training using unsanitized data from open-source repositories, like GitHub, raises the risk of inadvertently propagating security vulnerabilities. Despite numerous studies investigating the safety of code LLMs, there remains a gap in comprehensively addressing their security features. In this work, we aim to present a comprehensive study aimed at precisely evaluating and enhancing the security aspects of code LLMs. To support our research, we introduce CodeSecEval, a meticulously curated dataset designed to address 44 critical vulnerability types with 180 distinct samples. CodeSecEval serves as the foundation for the automatic evaluation of code models in two crucial tasks: code generation and code repair, with a strong emphasis on security. Our experimental results reveal that current models frequently overlook security issues during both code generation and repair processes, resulting in the creation of vulnerable code. In response, we propose different strategies that leverage vulnerability-aware information and insecure code explanations to mitigate these security vulnerabilities. Furthermore, our findings highlight that certain vulnerability types particularly challenge model performance, influencing their effectiveness in real-world applications. Based on these findings, we believe our study will have a positive impact on the software engineering community, inspiring the development of improved methods for training and utilizing LLMs, thereby leading to safer and more trustworthy model deployment.

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly transitioning into medical clinical use, yet their reliability under realistic, multi-turn interactions remains poorly understood. Existing evaluation frameworks typically assess single-turn question answering under idealized conditions, overlooking the complexities of medical consultations where conflicting input, misleading context, and authority influence are common. We introduce MedQA-Followup, a framework for systematically evaluating multi-turn robustness in medical question answering. Our approach distinguishes between shallow robustness (resisting misleading initial context) and deep robustness (maintaining accuracy when answers are challenged across turns), while also introducing an indirect-direct axis that separates contextual framing (indirect) from explicit suggestion (direct). Using controlled interventions on the MedQA dataset, we evaluate five state-of-the-art LLMs and find that while models perform reasonably well under shallow perturbations, they exhibit severe vulnerabilities in multi-turn settings, with accuracy dropping from 91.2% to as low as 13.5% for Claude Sonnet 4. Counterintuitively, indirect, context-based interventions are often more harmful than direct suggestions, yielding larger accuracy drops across models and exposing a significant vulnerability for clinical deployment. Further compounding analyses reveal model differences, with some showing additional performance drops under repeated interventions while others partially recovering or even improving. These findings highlight multi-turn robustness as a critical but underexplored dimension for safe and reliable deployment of medical LLMs.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have made them indispensable, raising significant concerns over managing their safety. Automated red teaming offers a promising alternative to the labor-intensive and error-prone manual probing for vulnerabilities, providing more consistent and scalable safety evaluations. However, existing approaches often compromise diversity by focusing on maximizing attack success rate. Additionally, methods that decrease the cosine similarity from historical embeddings with semantic diversity rewards lead to novelty stagnation as history grows. To address these issues, we introduce DiveR-CT, which relaxes conventional constraints on the objective and semantic reward, granting greater freedom for the policy to enhance diversity. Our experiments demonstrate DiveR-CT's marked superiority over baselines by 1) generating data that perform better in various diversity metrics across different attack success rate levels, 2) better-enhancing resiliency in blue team models through safety tuning based on collected data, 3) allowing dynamic control of objective weights for reliable and controllable attack success rates, and 4) reducing susceptibility to reward overoptimization. Project details and code can be found at https://andrewzh112.github.io/#diverct.

The vulnerability of Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs) to jailbreak attacks appears as no surprise. However, recent defense mechanisms against these attacks have reached near-saturation performance on benchmark evaluations, often with minimal effort. This dual high performance in both attack and defense raises a fundamental and perplexing paradox. To gain a deep understanding of this issue and thus further help strengthen the trustworthiness of VLLMs, this paper makes three key contributions: i) One tentative explanation for VLLMs being prone to jailbreak attacks--inclusion of vision inputs, as well as its in-depth analysis. ii) The recognition of a largely ignored problem in existing defense mechanisms--over-prudence. The problem causes these defense methods to exhibit unintended abstention, even in the presence of benign inputs, thereby undermining their reliability in faithfully defending against attacks. iii) A simple safety-aware method--LLM-Pipeline. Our method repurposes the more advanced guardrails of LLMs on the shelf, serving as an effective alternative detector prior to VLLM response. Last but not least, we find that the two representative evaluation methods for jailbreak often exhibit chance agreement. This limitation makes it potentially misleading when evaluating attack strategies or defense mechanisms. We believe the findings from this paper offer useful insights to rethink the foundational development of VLLM safety with respect to benchmark datasets, defense strategies, and evaluation methods.

The rapid progress in open-source large language models (LLMs) is significantly advancing AI development. Extensive efforts have been made before model release to align their behavior with human values, with the primary goal of ensuring their helpfulness and harmlessness. However, even carefully aligned models can be manipulated maliciously, leading to unintended behaviors, known as "jailbreaks". These jailbreaks are typically triggered by specific text inputs, often referred to as adversarial prompts. In this work, we propose the generation exploitation attack, an extremely simple approach that disrupts model alignment by only manipulating variations of decoding methods. By exploiting different generation strategies, including varying decoding hyper-parameters and sampling methods, we increase the misalignment rate from 0% to more than 95% across 11 language models including LLaMA2, Vicuna, Falcon, and MPT families, outperforming state-of-the-art attacks with 30times lower computational cost. Finally, we propose an effective alignment method that explores diverse generation strategies, which can reasonably reduce the misalignment rate under our attack. Altogether, our study underscores a major failure in current safety evaluation and alignment procedures for open-source LLMs, strongly advocating for more comprehensive red teaming and better alignment before releasing such models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Princeton-SysML/Jailbreak_LLM.

GUI agents, powered by large foundation models, can interact with digital interfaces, enabling various applications in web automation, mobile navigation, and software testing. However, their increasing autonomy has raised critical concerns about their security, privacy, and safety. This survey examines the trustworthiness of GUI agents in five critical dimensions: security vulnerabilities, reliability in dynamic environments, transparency and explainability, ethical considerations, and evaluation methodologies. We also identify major challenges such as vulnerability to adversarial attacks, cascading failure modes in sequential decision-making, and a lack of realistic evaluation benchmarks. These issues not only hinder real-world deployment but also call for comprehensive mitigation strategies beyond task success. As GUI agents become more widespread, establishing robust safety standards and responsible development practices is essential. This survey provides a foundation for advancing trustworthy GUI agents through systematic understanding and future research.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

Stakeholders -- from model developers to policymakers -- seek to minimize the dual-use risks of large language models (LLMs). An open challenge to this goal is whether technical safeguards can impede the misuse of LLMs, even when models are customizable via fine-tuning or when model weights are fully open. In response, several recent studies have proposed methods to produce durable LLM safeguards for open-weight LLMs that can withstand adversarial modifications of the model's weights via fine-tuning. This holds the promise of raising adversaries' costs even under strong threat models where adversaries can directly fine-tune model weights. However, in this paper, we urge for more careful characterization of the limits of these approaches. Through several case studies, we demonstrate that even evaluating these defenses is exceedingly difficult and can easily mislead audiences into thinking that safeguards are more durable than they really are. We draw lessons from the evaluation pitfalls that we identify and suggest future research carefully cabin claims to more constrained, well-defined, and rigorously examined threat models, which can provide more useful and candid assessments to stakeholders.

The rapid integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse sectors has marked a transformative era, showcasing remarkable capabilities in text generation and problem-solving tasks. However, this technological advancement is accompanied by significant risks and vulnerabilities. Despite ongoing security enhancements, attackers persistently exploit these weaknesses, casting doubts on the overall trustworthiness of LLMs. Compounding the issue, organisations are deploying LLM-integrated systems without understanding the severity of potential consequences. Existing studies by OWASP and MITRE offer a general overview of threats and vulnerabilities but lack a method for directly and succinctly analysing the risks for security practitioners, developers, and key decision-makers who are working with this novel technology. To address this gap, we propose a risk assessment process using tools like the OWASP risk rating methodology which is used for traditional systems. We conduct scenario analysis to identify potential threat agents and map the dependent system components against vulnerability factors. Through this analysis, we assess the likelihood of a cyberattack. Subsequently, we conduct a thorough impact analysis to derive a comprehensive threat matrix. We also map threats against three key stakeholder groups: developers engaged in model fine-tuning, application developers utilizing third-party APIs, and end users. The proposed threat matrix provides a holistic evaluation of LLM-related risks, enabling stakeholders to make informed decisions for effective mitigation strategies. Our outlined process serves as an actionable and comprehensive tool for security practitioners, offering insights for resource management and enhancing the overall system security.

Automated detection of software vulnerabilities is a fundamental problem in software security. Existing program analysis techniques either suffer from high false positives or false negatives. Recent progress in Deep Learning (DL) has resulted in a surge of interest in applying DL for automated vulnerability detection. Several recent studies have demonstrated promising results achieving an accuracy of up to 95% at detecting vulnerabilities. In this paper, we ask, "how well do the state-of-the-art DL-based techniques perform in a real-world vulnerability prediction scenario?". To our surprise, we find that their performance drops by more than 50%. A systematic investigation of what causes such precipitous performance drop reveals that existing DL-based vulnerability prediction approaches suffer from challenges with the training data (e.g., data duplication, unrealistic distribution of vulnerable classes, etc.) and with the model choices (e.g., simple token-based models). As a result, these approaches often do not learn features related to the actual cause of the vulnerabilities. Instead, they learn unrelated artifacts from the dataset (e.g., specific variable/function names, etc.). Leveraging these empirical findings, we demonstrate how a more principled approach to data collection and model design, based on realistic settings of vulnerability prediction, can lead to better solutions. The resulting tools perform significantly better than the studied baseline: up to 33.57% boost in precision and 128.38% boost in recall compared to the best performing model in the literature. Overall, this paper elucidates existing DL-based vulnerability prediction systems' potential issues and draws a roadmap for future DL-based vulnerability prediction research. In that spirit, we make available all the artifacts supporting our results: https://git.io/Jf6IA.

This paper presents VLAI, a transformer-based model that predicts software vulnerability severity levels directly from text descriptions. Built on RoBERTa, VLAI is fine-tuned on over 600,000 real-world vulnerabilities and achieves over 82% accuracy in predicting severity categories, enabling faster and more consistent triage ahead of manual CVSS scoring. The model and dataset are open-source and integrated into the Vulnerability-Lookup service.

Deep learning (DL) models have become increasingly popular in identifying software vulnerabilities. Prior studies found that vulnerabilities across different vulnerable programs may exhibit similar vulnerable scopes, implicitly forming discernible vulnerability patterns that can be learned by DL models through supervised training. However, vulnerable scopes still manifest in various spatial locations and formats within a program, posing challenges for models to accurately identify vulnerable statements. Despite this challenge, state-of-the-art vulnerability detection approaches fail to exploit the vulnerability patterns that arise in vulnerable programs. To take full advantage of vulnerability patterns and unleash the ability of DL models, we propose a novel vulnerability-matching approach in this paper, drawing inspiration from program analysis tools that locate vulnerabilities based on pre-defined patterns. Specifically, a vulnerability codebook is learned, which consists of quantized vectors representing various vulnerability patterns. During inference, the codebook is iterated to match all learned patterns and predict the presence of potential vulnerabilities within a given program. Our approach was extensively evaluated on a real-world dataset comprising more than 188,000 C/C++ functions. The evaluation results show that our approach achieves an F1-score of 94% (6% higher than the previous best) and 82% (19% higher than the previous best) for function and statement-level vulnerability identification, respectively. These substantial enhancements highlight the effectiveness of our approach to identifying vulnerabilities. The training code and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/optimatch/optimatch.

Large language models (LLMs) are demonstrating increasing prowess in cybersecurity applications, creating creating inherent risks alongside their potential for strengthening defenses. In this position paper, we argue that current efforts to evaluate risks posed by these capabilities are misaligned with the goal of understanding real-world impact. Evaluating LLM cybersecurity risk requires more than just measuring model capabilities -- it demands a comprehensive risk assessment that incorporates analysis of threat actor adoption behavior and potential for impact. We propose a risk assessment framework for LLM cyber capabilities and apply it to a case study of language models used as cybersecurity assistants. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals high compliance rates but moderate accuracy on realistic cyber assistance tasks. However, our framework suggests that this particular use case presents only moderate risk due to limited operational advantages and impact potential. Based on these findings, we recommend several improvements to align research priorities with real-world impact assessment, including closer academia-industry collaboration, more realistic modeling of attacker behavior, and inclusion of economic metrics in evaluations. This work represents an important step toward more effective assessment and mitigation of LLM-enabled cybersecurity risks.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked concerns over their potential to acquire and misuse dangerous or high-risk capabilities, posing frontier risks. Current safety evaluations primarily test for what a model can do - its capabilities - without assessing what it would do if endowed with high-risk capabilities. This leaves a critical blind spot: models may strategically conceal capabilities or rapidly acquire them, while harboring latent inclinations toward misuse. We argue that propensity - the likelihood of a model to pursue harmful actions if empowered - is a critical, yet underexplored, axis of safety evaluation. We present PropensityBench, a novel benchmark framework that assesses the proclivity of models to engage in risky behaviors when equipped with simulated dangerous capabilities using proxy tools. Our framework includes 5,874 scenarios with 6,648 tools spanning four high-risk domains: cybersecurity, self-proliferation, biosecurity, and chemical security. We simulate access to powerful capabilities via a controlled agentic environment and evaluate the models' choices under varying operational pressures that reflect real-world constraints or incentives models may encounter, such as resource scarcity or gaining more autonomy. Across open-source and proprietary frontier models, we uncover 9 alarming signs of propensity: models frequently choose high-risk tools when under pressure, despite lacking the capability to execute such actions unaided. These findings call for a shift from static capability audits toward dynamic propensity assessments as a prerequisite for deploying frontier AI systems safely. Our code is available at https://github.com/scaleapi/propensity-evaluation.

An ideal model evaluation should achieve two goals: identifying where the model fails and providing actionable improvement guidance. Toward these goals for Language Model (LM) evaluations, we formulate the problem of generating a weakness profile, a set of weaknesses expressed in natural language, given an LM's performance on every individual instance in a benchmark. We introduce a suite of quantitative assessments to compare different weakness profiling methods. We also propose a weakness profiling method EvalTree. It constructs a capability tree where each node represents a capability described in natural language and is linked to a subset of benchmark instances that specifically evaluate this capability; it then extracts nodes where the LM performs poorly to generate a weakness profile. On the MATH and WildChat benchmarks, we show that EvalTree outperforms baseline weakness profiling methods by identifying weaknesses more precisely and comprehensively. Weakness profiling further enables weakness-guided data collection, and training data collection guided by EvalTree-identified weaknesses improves LM performance more than other data collection strategies. We also show how EvalTree exposes flaws in Chatbot Arena's human-voter-based evaluation practice. To facilitate future work, we release our code and an interface that allows practitioners to interactively explore the capability trees built by EvalTree.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized artificial intelligence, driving advancements in machine translation, summarization, and conversational agents. However, their increasing integration into critical societal domains has raised concerns about embedded biases, which can perpetuate stereotypes and compromise fairness. These biases stem from various sources, including historical inequalities in training data, linguistic imbalances, and adversarial manipulation. Despite mitigation efforts, recent studies indicate that LLMs remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks designed to elicit biased responses. This work proposes a scalable benchmarking framework to evaluate LLM robustness against adversarial bias elicitation. Our methodology involves (i) systematically probing models with a multi-task approach targeting biases across various sociocultural dimensions, (ii) quantifying robustness through safety scores using an LLM-as-a-Judge approach for automated assessment of model responses, and (iii) employing jailbreak techniques to investigate vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms. Our analysis examines prevalent biases in both small and large state-of-the-art models and their impact on model safety. Additionally, we assess the safety of domain-specific models fine-tuned for critical fields, such as medicine. Finally, we release a curated dataset of bias-related prompts, CLEAR-Bias, to facilitate systematic vulnerability benchmarking. Our findings reveal critical trade-offs between model size and safety, aiding the development of fairer and more robust future language models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have rapidly become integral to real-world applications, powering services across diverse sectors. However, their widespread deployment has exposed critical security risks, particularly through jailbreak prompts that can bypass model alignment and induce harmful outputs. Despite intense research into both attack and defense techniques, the field remains fragmented: definitions, threat models, and evaluation criteria vary widely, impeding systematic progress and fair comparison. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK), we address these challenges by (1) proposing a holistic, multi-level taxonomy that organizes attacks, defenses, and vulnerabilities in LLM prompt security; (2) formalizing threat models and cost assumptions into machine-readable profiles for reproducible evaluation; (3) introducing an open-source evaluation toolkit for standardized, auditable comparison of attacks and defenses; (4) releasing JAILBREAKDB, the largest annotated dataset of jailbreak and benign prompts to date; and (5) presenting a comprehensive evaluation and leaderboard of state-of-the-art methods. Our work unifies fragmented research, provides rigorous foundations for future studies, and supports the development of robust, trustworthy LLMs suitable for high-stakes deployment.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

While Large Language Models have shown promise in cybersecurity applications, their effectiveness in identifying security threats within cloud deployments remains unexplored. This paper introduces AWS Cloud Security Engineering Eval, a novel dataset for evaluating LLMs cloud security threat modeling capabilities. ACSE-Eval contains 100 production grade AWS deployment scenarios, each featuring detailed architectural specifications, Infrastructure as Code implementations, documented security vulnerabilities, and associated threat modeling parameters. Our dataset enables systemic assessment of LLMs abilities to identify security risks, analyze attack vectors, and propose mitigation strategies in cloud environments. Our evaluations on ACSE-Eval demonstrate that GPT 4.1 and Gemini 2.5 Pro excel at threat identification, with Gemini 2.5 Pro performing optimally in 0-shot scenarios and GPT 4.1 showing superior results in few-shot settings. While GPT 4.1 maintains a slight overall performance advantage, Claude 3.7 Sonnet generates the most semantically sophisticated threat models but struggles with threat categorization and generalization. To promote reproducibility and advance research in automated cybersecurity threat analysis, we open-source our dataset, evaluation metrics, and methodologies.

Different from the flow semantics of natural languages, programming languages are inherently rigid in structure and grammar. Existing fine-tuning methodologies for code vulnerability detection generally treat code as long text sequences, stripping away structural elements such as newlines ('/n') and whitespace. However, this approach inadvertently results in the loss of crucial structural information, diminishing the distinct characteristics of code and impairing the accuracy of vulnerability detection. To address these challenges, we propose a novel network architecture method based on pre-trained code models, which incorporates structural information awareness. We propose an enhanced code text processing workflow that retains structural elements prior to modeling. This refinement allows the model to retain and exploit line-level structural information and semantic information during the modeling process. Furthermore, we introduce a new network architecture, the Code Structure-Aware Network through Line-level Semantic Learning (CSLS), which integrates three key components: global vulnerability awareness, line-structural awareness, and sensitive-line awareness. We have conducted comprehensive experiments using vulnerability detection datasets from real-world projects. Extensive experiments were conducted on vulnerability detection datasets derived from real-world projects. The results demonstrate that our new code pre-processing flow significantly improves existing baselines (e.g., a 3\% accuracy improvement on the Devign dataset when applied to popular models such as CoderBert and UniXcoder). The proposed network architecture also demonstrates superior accuracy in detecting vulnerabilities, surpassing newly established benchmarks. These findings underscore the importance of structural information in enhancing the efficacy of code vulnerability detection models.

We propose and release a new vulnerable source code dataset. We curate the dataset by crawling security issue websites, extracting vulnerability-fixing commits and source codes from the corresponding projects. Our new dataset contains 18,945 vulnerable functions spanning 150 CWEs and 330,492 non-vulnerable functions extracted from 7,514 commits. Our dataset covers 295 more projects than all previous datasets combined. Combining our new dataset with previous datasets, we present an analysis of the challenges and promising research directions of using deep learning for detecting software vulnerabilities. We study 11 model architectures belonging to 4 families. Our results show that deep learning is still not ready for vulnerability detection, due to high false positive rate, low F1 score, and difficulty of detecting hard CWEs. In particular, we demonstrate an important generalization challenge for the deployment of deep learning-based models. We show that increasing the volume of training data may not further improve the performance of deep learning models for vulnerability detection, but might be useful to improve the generalization ability to unseen projects. We also identify hopeful future research directions. We demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) are a promising research direction for ML-based vulnerability detection, outperforming Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) with code-structure features in our experiments. Moreover, developing source code specific pre-training objectives is a promising research direction to improve the vulnerability detection performance.

Traditional vulnerability detection methods rely heavily on predefined rule matching, which often fails to capture vulnerabilities accurately. With the rise of large language models (LLMs), leveraging their ability to understand code semantics has emerged as a promising direction for achieving more accurate and efficient vulnerability detection. However, current LLM-based approaches face significant challenges: instability in model outputs, limitations in context length, and hallucination. As a result, many existing solutions either use LLMs merely to enrich predefined rule sets, thereby keeping the detection process fundamentally rule-based, or over-rely on them, leading to poor robustness. To address these challenges, we propose a constraint-solving approach powered by LLMs named VULSOLVER. By modeling vulnerability detection as a constraint-solving problem, and by integrating static application security testing (SAST) with the semantic reasoning capabilities of LLMs, our method enables the LLM to act like a professional human security expert. We assess VULSOLVER on the OWASP Benchmark (1,023 labeled samples), achieving 96.29% accuracy, 96.55% F1-score, and 100% recall. Applied to popular GitHub repositories, VULSOLVER also identified 15 previously unknown high-severity vulnerabilities (CVSS 7.5-9.8), demonstrating its effectiveness in real-world security analysis.

The advent of instruction-tuned Large Language Models designed for coding tasks (Code LLMs) has transformed software engineering practices. However, their robustness against various input challenges remains a critical concern. This study introduces DegradePrompter, a novel method designed to systematically evaluate the robustness of instruction-tuned Code LLMs. We assess the impact of diverse input challenges on the functionality and correctness of generated code using rigorous metrics and established benchmarks. Our comprehensive evaluation includes five state-of-the-art open-source models and three production-grade closed-source models, revealing varying degrees of robustness. Open-source models demonstrate an increased susceptibility to input perturbations, resulting in declines in functional correctness ranging from 12% to 34%. In contrast, commercial models demonstrate relatively greater resilience, with performance degradation ranging from 3% to 24%. To enhance the robustness of the models against these vulnerabilities, we investigate a straightforward yet effective mitigation strategy. Our findings highlight the need for robust defense mechanisms and comprehensive evaluations during both the development and deployment phases to ensure the resilience and reliability of automated code generation systems.

Current approaches to building general-purpose AI systems tend to produce systems with both beneficial and harmful capabilities. Further progress in AI development could lead to capabilities that pose extreme risks, such as offensive cyber capabilities or strong manipulation skills. We explain why model evaluation is critical for addressing extreme risks. Developers must be able to identify dangerous capabilities (through "dangerous capability evaluations") and the propensity of models to apply their capabilities for harm (through "alignment evaluations"). These evaluations will become critical for keeping policymakers and other stakeholders informed, and for making responsible decisions about model training, deployment, and security.

The increasing use of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) in modern software engineering, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation, has transformed professional software development by boosting productivity and automating development processes. This adoption, however, has highlighted a significant issue: the introduction of security vulnerabilities into the code. These vulnerabilities result, e.g., from flaws in the training data that propagate into the generated code, creating challenges in disclosing them. Traditional vulnerability handling processes often involve extensive manual review. Applying such traditional processes to AI-generated code is challenging. AI-generated code may include several vulnerabilities, possibly in slightly different forms as developers might not build on already implemented code but prompt similar tasks. In this work, we explore the current state of LLM-based approaches for vulnerability handling, focusing on approaches for vulnerability detection, localization, and repair. We provide an overview of recent progress in this area and highlight open challenges that must be addressed in order to establish a reliable and scalable vulnerability handling process of AI-generated code.

In today's digital landscape, the importance of timely and accurate vulnerability detection has significantly increased. This paper presents a novel approach that leverages transformer-based models and machine learning techniques to automate the identification of software vulnerabilities by analyzing GitHub issues. We introduce a new dataset specifically designed for classifying GitHub issues relevant to vulnerability detection. We then examine various classification techniques to determine their effectiveness. The results demonstrate the potential of this approach for real-world application in early vulnerability detection, which could substantially reduce the window of exploitation for software vulnerabilities. This research makes a key contribution to the field by providing a scalable and computationally efficient framework for automated detection, enabling the prevention of compromised software usage before official notifications. This work has the potential to enhance the security of open-source software ecosystems.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

Security vulnerabilities in modern software are prevalent and harmful. While automated vulnerability detection tools have made promising progress, their scalability and applicability remain challenging. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs), such as GPT-4 and CodeLlama, have demonstrated remarkable performance on code-related tasks. However, it is unknown whether such LLMs can do complex reasoning over code. In this work, we explore whether pre-trained LLMs can detect security vulnerabilities and address the limitations of existing tools. We evaluate the effectiveness of pre-trained LLMs on a set of five diverse security benchmarks spanning two languages, Java and C/C++, and including code samples from synthetic and real-world projects. We evaluate the effectiveness of LLMs in terms of their performance, explainability, and robustness. By designing a series of effective prompting strategies, we obtain the best results on the synthetic datasets with GPT-4: F1 scores of 0.79 on OWASP, 0.86 on Juliet Java, and 0.89 on Juliet C/C++. Expectedly, the performance of LLMs drops on the more challenging real-world datasets: CVEFixes Java and CVEFixes C/C++, with GPT-4 reporting F1 scores of 0.48 and 0.62, respectively. We show that LLMs can often perform better than existing static analysis and deep learning-based vulnerability detection tools, especially for certain classes of vulnerabilities. Moreover, LLMs also often provide reliable explanations, identifying the vulnerable data flows in code. We find that fine-tuning smaller LLMs can outperform the larger LLMs on synthetic datasets but provide limited gains on real-world datasets. When subjected to adversarial attacks on code, LLMs show mild degradation, with average accuracy reduction of up to 12.67%. Finally, we share our insights and recommendations for future work on leveraging LLMs for vulnerability detection.

In this study, we evaluated the capability of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly OpenAI's GPT-4, in detecting software vulnerabilities, comparing their performance against traditional static code analyzers like Snyk and Fortify. Our analysis covered numerous repositories, including those from NASA and the Department of Defense. GPT-4 identified approximately four times the vulnerabilities than its counterparts. Furthermore, it provided viable fixes for each vulnerability, demonstrating a low rate of false positives. Our tests encompassed 129 code samples across eight programming languages, revealing the highest vulnerabilities in PHP and JavaScript. GPT-4's code corrections led to a 90% reduction in vulnerabilities, requiring only an 11% increase in code lines. A critical insight was LLMs' ability to self-audit, suggesting fixes for their identified vulnerabilities and underscoring their precision. Future research should explore system-level vulnerabilities and integrate multiple static code analyzers for a holistic perspective on LLMs' potential.

Recent advancements in generative AI have led to the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) in software engineering, addressing numerous long-standing challenges. However, a comprehensive study examining the capabilities of LLMs in software vulnerability detection (SVD), a crucial aspect of software security, is currently lacking. Existing research primarily focuses on evaluating LLMs using C/C++ datasets. It typically explores only one or two strategies among prompt engineering, instruction tuning, and sequence classification fine-tuning for open-source LLMs. Consequently, there is a significant knowledge gap regarding the effectiveness of diverse LLMs in detecting vulnerabilities across various programming languages. To address this knowledge gap, we present a comprehensive empirical study evaluating the performance of LLMs on the SVD task. We have compiled a comprehensive dataset comprising 8,260 vulnerable functions in Python, 7,505 in Java, and 28,983 in JavaScript. We assess five open-source LLMs using multiple approaches, including prompt engineering, instruction tuning, and sequence classification fine-tuning. These LLMs are benchmarked against five fine-tuned small language models and two open-source static application security testing tools. Furthermore, we explore two avenues to improve LLM performance on SVD: a) Data perspective: Retraining models using downsampled balanced datasets. b) Model perspective: Investigating ensemble learning methods that combine predictions from multiple LLMs. Our comprehensive experiments demonstrate that SVD remains a challenging task for LLMs. This study provides a thorough understanding of the role of LLMs in SVD and offers practical insights for future advancements in leveraging generative AI to enhance software security practices.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

Software vulnerabilities bear enterprises significant costs. Despite extensive efforts in research and development of software vulnerability detection methods, uncaught vulnerabilities continue to put software owners and users at risk. Many current vulnerability detection methods require that code snippets can compile and build before attempting detection. This, unfortunately, introduces a long latency between the time a vulnerability is injected to the time it is removed, which can substantially increases the cost of fixing a vulnerability. We recognize that the current advances in machine learning can be used to detect vulnerable code patterns on syntactically incomplete code snippets as the developer is writing the code at EditTime. In this paper we present a practical system that leverages deep learning on a large-scale data set of vulnerable code patterns to learn complex manifestations of more than 250 vulnerability types and detect vulnerable code patterns at EditTime. We discuss zero-shot, few-shot, and fine-tuning approaches on state of the art pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs). We show that in comparison with state of the art vulnerability detection models our approach improves the state of the art by 10%. We also evaluate our approach to detect vulnerability in auto-generated code by code LLMs. Evaluation on a benchmark of high-risk code scenarios shows a reduction of up to 90% vulnerability reduction.

Software vulnerabilities are increasing at an alarming rate. However, manual patching is both time-consuming and resource-intensive, while existing automated vulnerability repair (AVR) techniques remain limited in effectiveness. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have opened a new paradigm for AVR, demonstrating remarkable progress. To examine the capability of LLMs in AVR, several vulnerability benchmarks have been proposed recently. However, they still suffer from key limitations of outdated vulnerabilities, limited language coverage, unreliable patch validation, and insufficient reproducibility. To overcome these challenges, we introduce PATCHEVAL, a multilingual benchmark for Go, JavaScript, and Python, languages for which existing benchmarks remain unexplored. PATCHEVAL curates a dataset of 1,000 vulnerabilities drawn from CVEs reported between 2015 and 2025, covering 65 distinct CWEs. A subset of 230 CVEs is further equipped with runtime sandbox environments, enabling patch verification through both security tests and functionality tests. To provide a systematic comparison of LLM-based vulnerability repair, we evaluate a series of state-of-the-art LLMs and agents, presenting an in-depth analysis that empirically yields key insights to guide future research in AVR.

The safety of large language models (LLMs) has garnered significant research attention. In this paper, we argue that previous empirical studies demonstrate LLMs exhibit a propensity to trust information from authoritative sources, such as academic papers, implying new possible vulnerabilities. To verify this possibility, a preliminary analysis is designed to illustrate our two findings. Based on this insight, a novel jailbreaking method, Paper Summary Attack (PSA), is proposed. It systematically synthesizes content from either attack-focused or defense-focused LLM safety paper to construct an adversarial prompt template, while strategically infilling harmful query as adversarial payloads within predefined subsections. Extensive experiments show significant vulnerabilities not only in base LLMs, but also in state-of-the-art reasoning model like Deepseek-R1. PSA achieves a 97\% attack success rate (ASR) on well-aligned models like Claude3.5-Sonnet and an even higher 98\% ASR on Deepseek-R1. More intriguingly, our work has further revealed diametrically opposed vulnerability bias across different base models, and even between different versions of the same model, when exposed to either attack-focused or defense-focused papers. This phenomenon potentially indicates future research clues for both adversarial methodologies and safety alignment.Code is available at https://github.com/233liang/Paper-Summary-Attack

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized artificial intelligence and machine learning through their advanced text processing and generating capabilities. However, their widespread deployment has raised significant safety and reliability concerns. Established vulnerabilities in deep neural networks, coupled with emerging threat models, may compromise security evaluations and create a false sense of security. Given the extensive research in the field of LLM security, we believe that summarizing the current state of affairs will help the research community better understand the present landscape and inform future developments. This paper reviews current research on LLM vulnerabilities and threats, and evaluates the effectiveness of contemporary defense mechanisms. We analyze recent studies on attack vectors and model weaknesses, providing insights into attack mechanisms and the evolving threat landscape. We also examine current defense strategies, highlighting their strengths and limitations. By contrasting advancements in attack and defense methodologies, we identify research gaps and propose future directions to enhance LLM security. Our goal is to advance the understanding of LLM safety challenges and guide the development of more robust security measures.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to evolve, it is critical to assess the security threats and vulnerabilities that may arise both during their training phase and after models have been deployed. This survey seeks to define and categorize the various attacks targeting LLMs, distinguishing between those that occur during the training phase and those that affect already trained models. A thorough analysis of these attacks is presented, alongside an exploration of defense mechanisms designed to mitigate such threats. Defenses are classified into two primary categories: prevention-based and detection-based defenses. Furthermore, our survey summarizes possible attacks and their corresponding defense strategies. It also provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of the known defense mechanisms for the different security threats. Our survey aims to offer a structured framework for securing LLMs, while also identifying areas that require further research to improve and strengthen defenses against emerging security challenges.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

How should we evaluate the robustness of language model defenses? Current defenses against jailbreaks and prompt injections (which aim to prevent an attacker from eliciting harmful knowledge or remotely triggering malicious actions, respectively) are typically evaluated either against a static set of harmful attack strings, or against computationally weak optimization methods that were not designed with the defense in mind. We argue that this evaluation process is flawed. Instead, we should evaluate defenses against adaptive attackers who explicitly modify their attack strategy to counter a defense's design while spending considerable resources to optimize their objective. By systematically tuning and scaling general optimization techniques-gradient descent, reinforcement learning, random search, and human-guided exploration-we bypass 12 recent defenses (based on a diverse set of techniques) with attack success rate above 90% for most; importantly, the majority of defenses originally reported near-zero attack success rates. We believe that future defense work must consider stronger attacks, such as the ones we describe, in order to make reliable and convincing claims of robustness.

Recognizing vulnerability is crucial for understanding and implementing targeted support to empower individuals in need. This is especially important at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), where the court adapts Convention standards to meet actual individual needs and thus ensures effective human rights protection. However, the concept of vulnerability remains elusive at the ECtHR and no prior NLP research has dealt with it. To enable future research in this area, we present VECHR, a novel expert-annotated multi-label dataset comprising of vulnerability type classification and explanation rationale. We benchmark the performance of state-of-the-art models on VECHR from both prediction and explainability perspectives. Our results demonstrate the challenging nature of the task with lower prediction performance and limited agreement between models and experts. Further, we analyze the robustness of these models in dealing with out-of-domain (OOD) data and observe overall limited performance. Our dataset poses unique challenges offering significant room for improvement regarding performance, explainability, and robustness.

We reveal new methods and the theoretical foundations of techniques for editing large language models. We also show how the new theory can be used to assess the editability of models and to expose their susceptibility to previously unknown malicious attacks. Our theoretical approach shows that a single metric (a specific measure of the intrinsic dimensionality of the model's features) is fundamental to predicting the success of popular editing approaches, and reveals new bridges between disparate families of editing methods. We collectively refer to these approaches as stealth editing methods, because they aim to directly and inexpensively update a model's weights to correct the model's responses to known hallucinating prompts without otherwise affecting the model's behaviour, without requiring retraining. By carefully applying the insight gleaned from our theoretical investigation, we are able to introduce a new network block -- named a jet-pack block -- which is optimised for highly selective model editing, uses only standard network operations, and can be inserted into existing networks. The intrinsic dimensionality metric also determines the vulnerability of a language model to a stealth attack: a small change to a model's weights which changes its response to a single attacker-chosen prompt. Stealth attacks do not require access to or knowledge of the model's training data, therefore representing a potent yet previously unrecognised threat to redistributed foundation models. They are computationally simple enough to be implemented in malware in many cases. Extensive experimental results illustrate and support the method and its theoretical underpinnings. Demos and source code for editing language models are available at https://github.com/qinghua-zhou/stealth-edits.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed and integrated into thousands of applications, the need for scalable evaluation of how models respond to adversarial attacks grows rapidly. However, LLM security is a moving target: models produce unpredictable output, are constantly updated, and the potential adversary is highly diverse: anyone with access to the internet and a decent command of natural language. Further, what constitutes a security weak in one context may not be an issue in a different context; one-fits-all guardrails remain theoretical. In this paper, we argue that it is time to rethink what constitutes ``LLM security'', and pursue a holistic approach to LLM security evaluation, where exploration and discovery of issues are central. To this end, this paper introduces garak (Generative AI Red-teaming and Assessment Kit), a framework which can be used to discover and identify vulnerabilities in a target LLM or dialog system. garak probes an LLM in a structured fashion to discover potential vulnerabilities. The outputs of the framework describe a target model's weaknesses, contribute to an informed discussion of what composes vulnerabilities in unique contexts, and can inform alignment and policy discussions for LLM deployment.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized generative systems, achieving excellent performance across diverse domains. Although these models perform well in controlled environments, their real-world applications frequently encounter inputs containing both essential and irrelevant details. Our investigation has revealed a critical vulnerability in LLMs, which we term Contextual Distraction Vulnerability (CDV). This phenomenon arises when models fail to maintain consistent performance on questions modified with semantically coherent but irrelevant context. To systematically investigate this vulnerability, we propose an efficient tree-based search methodology to automatically generate CDV examples. Our approach successfully generates CDV examples across four datasets, causing an average performance degradation of approximately 45% in state-of-the-art LLMs. To address this critical issue, we explore various mitigation strategies and find that post-targeted training approaches can effectively enhance model robustness against contextual distractions. Our findings highlight the fundamental nature of CDV as an ability-level challenge rather than a knowledge-level issue since models demonstrate the necessary knowledge by answering correctly in the absence of distractions. This calls the community's attention to address CDV during model development to ensure reliability. The code is available at https://github.com/wyf23187/LLM_CDV.

Manual curation of evaluation datasets is struggling to keep up with the rapidly expanding capabilities and deployment scenarios of language models. Towards scalable model profiling, we introduce and validate a framework for evaluating LLMs, called Adaptive Evaluations. Adaptive evaluations use scaffolded language models (evaluator agents) to search through a target model's behavior on a domain dataset and create difficult questions (tasks) that can discover and probe the model's failure modes. We find that frontier models lack consistency when adaptively probed with our framework on a diverse suite of datasets and tasks, including but not limited to legal reasoning, forecasting, and online harassment. Generated questions pass human validity checks and often transfer to other models with different capability profiles, demonstrating that adaptive evaluations can also be used to create difficult domain-specific datasets.

In the rapidly advancing field of artificial intelligence, the concept of Red-Teaming or Jailbreaking large language models (LLMs) has emerged as a crucial area of study. This approach is especially significant in terms of assessing and enhancing the safety and robustness of these models. This paper investigates the intricate consequences of such modifications through model editing, uncovering a complex relationship between enhancing model accuracy and preserving its ethical integrity. Our in-depth analysis reveals a striking paradox: while injecting accurate information is crucial for model reliability, it can paradoxically destabilize the model's foundational framework, resulting in unpredictable and potentially unsafe behaviors. Additionally, we propose a benchmark dataset NicheHazardQA to investigate this unsafe behavior both within the same and cross topical domain. This aspect of our research sheds light on how the edits, impact the model's safety metrics and guardrails. Our findings show that model editing serves as a cost-effective tool for topical red-teaming by methodically applying targeted edits and evaluating the resultant model behavior

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed numerous fields by enabling advanced natural language interactions but remain susceptible to critical vulnerabilities, particularly jailbreak attacks. Current jailbreak techniques, while effective, often depend on input modifications, making them detectable and limiting their stealth and scalability. This paper presents Targeted Model Editing (TME), a novel white-box approach that bypasses safety filters by minimally altering internal model structures while preserving the model's intended functionalities. TME identifies and removes safety-critical transformations (SCTs) embedded in model matrices, enabling malicious queries to bypass restrictions without input modifications. By analyzing distinct activation patterns between safe and unsafe queries, TME isolates and approximates SCTs through an optimization process. Implemented in the D-LLM framework, our method achieves an average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 84.86% on four mainstream open-source LLMs, maintaining high performance. Unlike existing methods, D-LLM eliminates the need for specific triggers or harmful response collections, offering a stealthier and more effective jailbreak strategy. This work reveals a covert and robust threat vector in LLM security and emphasizes the need for stronger safeguards in model safety alignment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools, but their inherent safety risks - ranging from harmful content generation to broader societal harms - pose significant challenges. These risks can be amplified by the recent adversarial attacks, fine-tuning vulnerabilities, and the increasing deployment of LLMs in high-stakes environments. Existing safety-enhancing techniques, such as fine-tuning with human feedback or adversarial training, are still vulnerable as they address specific threats and often fail to generalize across unseen attacks, or require manual system-level defenses. This paper introduces RepBend, a novel approach that fundamentally disrupts the representations underlying harmful behaviors in LLMs, offering a scalable solution to enhance (potentially inherent) safety. RepBend brings the idea of activation steering - simple vector arithmetic for steering model's behavior during inference - to loss-based fine-tuning. Through extensive evaluation, RepBend achieves state-of-the-art performance, outperforming prior methods such as Circuit Breaker, RMU, and NPO, with up to 95% reduction in attack success rates across diverse jailbreak benchmarks, all with negligible reduction in model usability and general capabilities.

AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) are being deployed at scale, yet we lack a systematic understanding of how the choice of backbone LLM affects agent security. The non-deterministic sequential nature of AI agents complicates security modeling, while the integration of traditional software with AI components entangles novel LLM vulnerabilities with conventional security risks. Existing frameworks only partially address these challenges as they either capture specific vulnerabilities only or require modeling of complete agents. To address these limitations, we introduce threat snapshots: a framework that isolates specific states in an agent's execution flow where LLM vulnerabilities manifest, enabling the systematic identification and categorization of security risks that propagate from the LLM to the agent level. We apply this framework to construct the b^3 benchmark, a security benchmark based on 194331 unique crowdsourced adversarial attacks. We then evaluate 31 popular LLMs with it, revealing, among other insights, that enhanced reasoning capabilities improve security, while model size does not correlate with security. We release our benchmark, dataset, and evaluation code to facilitate widespread adoption by LLM providers and practitioners, offering guidance for agent developers and incentivizing model developers to prioritize backbone security improvements.

Although Foundation Models (FMs), such as GPT-4, are increasingly used in domains like finance and software engineering, reliance on textual interfaces limits these models' real-world interaction. To address this, FM providers introduced tool calling-triggering a proliferation of frameworks with distinct tool interfaces. In late 2024, Anthropic introduced the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to standardize this tool ecosystem, which has become the de facto standard with over eight million weekly SDK downloads. Despite its adoption, MCP's AI-driven, non-deterministic control flow introduces new risks to sustainability, security, and maintainability, warranting closer examination. Towards this end, we present the first large-scale empirical study of MCP servers. Using state-of-the-art health metrics and a hybrid analysis pipeline, combining a general-purpose static analysis tool with an MCP-specific scanner, we evaluate 1,899 open-source MCP servers to assess their health, security, and maintainability. Despite MCP servers demonstrating strong health metrics, we identify eight distinct vulnerabilities - only three overlapping with traditional software vulnerabilities. Additionally, 7.2% of servers contain general vulnerabilities and 5.5% exhibit MCP-specific tool poisoning. Regarding maintainability, while 66% exhibit code smells, 14.4% contain nine bug patterns overlapping with traditional open-source software projects. These findings highlight the need for MCP-specific vulnerability detection techniques while reaffirming the value of traditional analysis and refactoring practices.

Long contexts of recent LLMs have enabled a new use case: asking models to find security vulnerabilities in entire codebases. To evaluate model performance on this task, we introduce eyeballvul: a benchmark designed to test the vulnerability detection capabilities of language models at scale, that is sourced and updated weekly from the stream of published vulnerabilities in open-source repositories. The benchmark consists of a list of revisions in different repositories, each associated with the list of known vulnerabilities present at that revision. An LLM-based scorer is used to compare the list of possible vulnerabilities returned by a model to the list of known vulnerabilities for each revision. As of July 2024, eyeballvul contains 24,000+ vulnerabilities across 6,000+ revisions and 5,000+ repositories, and is around 55GB in size.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaksx2013methods to elicit harmful or generally impermissible outputs. Safety measures are developed and assessed on their effectiveness at defending against jailbreak attacks, indicating a belief that safety is equivalent to robustness. We assert that current defense mechanisms, such as output filters and alignment fine-tuning, are, and will remain, fundamentally insufficient for ensuring model safety. These defenses fail to address risks arising from dual-intent queries and the ability to composite innocuous outputs to achieve harmful goals. To address this critical gap, we introduce an information-theoretic threat model called inferential adversaries who exploit impermissible information leakage from model outputs to achieve malicious goals. We distinguish these from commonly studied security adversaries who only seek to force victim models to generate specific impermissible outputs. We demonstrate the feasibility of automating inferential adversaries through question decomposition and response aggregation. To provide safety guarantees, we define an information censorship criterion for censorship mechanisms, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. We propose a defense mechanism which ensures this bound and reveal an intrinsic safety-utility trade-off. Our work provides the first theoretically grounded understanding of the requirements for releasing safe LLMs and the utility costs involved.

Model distillation has become essential for creating smaller, deployable language models that retain larger system capabilities. However, widespread deployment raises concerns about resilience to adversarial manipulation. This paper investigates vulnerability of distilled models to adversarial injection of biased content during training. We demonstrate that adversaries can inject subtle biases into teacher models through minimal data poisoning, which propagates to student models and becomes significantly amplified. We propose two propagation modes: Untargeted Propagation, where bias affects multiple tasks, and Targeted Propagation, focusing on specific tasks while maintaining normal behavior elsewhere. With only 25 poisoned samples (0.25% poisoning rate), student models generate biased responses 76.9% of the time in targeted scenarios - higher than 69.4% in teacher models. For untargeted propagation, adversarial bias appears 6x-29x more frequently in student models on unseen tasks. We validate findings across six bias types (targeted advertisements, phishing links, narrative manipulations, insecure coding practices), various distillation methods, and different modalities spanning text and code generation. Our evaluation reveals shortcomings in current defenses - perplexity filtering, bias detection systems, and LLM-based autorater frameworks - against these attacks. Results expose significant security vulnerabilities in distilled models, highlighting need for specialized safeguards. We propose practical design principles for building effective adversarial bias mitigation strategies.

The rapid advancement of large models, driven by their exceptional abilities in learning and generalization through large-scale pre-training, has reshaped the landscape of Artificial Intelligence (AI). These models are now foundational to a wide range of applications, including conversational AI, recommendation systems, autonomous driving, content generation, medical diagnostics, and scientific discovery. However, their widespread deployment also exposes them to significant safety risks, raising concerns about robustness, reliability, and ethical implications. This survey provides a systematic review of current safety research on large models, covering Vision Foundation Models (VFMs), Large Language Models (LLMs), Vision-Language Pre-training (VLP) models, Vision-Language Models (VLMs), Diffusion Models (DMs), and large-model-based Agents. Our contributions are summarized as follows: (1) We present a comprehensive taxonomy of safety threats to these models, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, backdoor attacks, jailbreak and prompt injection attacks, energy-latency attacks, data and model extraction attacks, and emerging agent-specific threats. (2) We review defense strategies proposed for each type of attacks if available and summarize the commonly used datasets and benchmarks for safety research. (3) Building on this, we identify and discuss the open challenges in large model safety, emphasizing the need for comprehensive safety evaluations, scalable and effective defense mechanisms, and sustainable data practices. More importantly, we highlight the necessity of collective efforts from the research community and international collaboration. Our work can serve as a useful reference for researchers and practitioners, fostering the ongoing development of comprehensive defense systems and platforms to safeguard AI models.

Foundation models are increasingly central to high-stakes AI systems, and governance frameworks now depend on evaluations to assess their risks and capabilities. Although general capability evaluations are widespread, social impact assessments covering bias, fairness, privacy, environmental costs, and labor practices remain uneven across the AI ecosystem. To characterize this landscape, we conduct the first comprehensive analysis of both first-party and third-party social impact evaluation reporting across a wide range of model developers. Our study examines 186 first-party release reports and 183 post-release evaluation sources, and complements this quantitative analysis with interviews of model developers. We find a clear division of evaluation labor: first-party reporting is sparse, often superficial, and has declined over time in key areas such as environmental impact and bias, while third-party evaluators including academic researchers, nonprofits, and independent organizations provide broader and more rigorous coverage of bias, harmful content, and performance disparities. However, this complementarity has limits. Only model developers can authoritatively report on data provenance, content moderation labor, financial costs, and training infrastructure, yet interviews reveal that these disclosures are often deprioritized unless tied to product adoption or regulatory compliance. Our findings indicate that current evaluation practices leave major gaps in assessing AI's societal impacts, highlighting the urgent need for policies that promote developer transparency, strengthen independent evaluation ecosystems, and create shared infrastructure to aggregate and compare third-party evaluations in a consistent and accessible way.

The study of adversarial vulnerabilities of deep neural networks (DNNs) has progressed rapidly. Existing attacks require either internal access (to the architecture, parameters, or training set of the victim model) or external access (to query the model). However, both the access may be infeasible or expensive in many scenarios. We investigate no-box adversarial examples, where the attacker can neither access the model information or the training set nor query the model. Instead, the attacker can only gather a small number of examples from the same problem domain as that of the victim model. Such a stronger threat model greatly expands the applicability of adversarial attacks. We propose three mechanisms for training with a very small dataset (on the order of tens of examples) and find that prototypical reconstruction is the most effective. Our experiments show that adversarial examples crafted on prototypical auto-encoding models transfer well to a variety of image classification and face verification models. On a commercial celebrity recognition system held by clarifai.com, our approach significantly diminishes the average prediction accuracy of the system to only 15.40%, which is on par with the attack that transfers adversarial examples from a pre-trained Arcface model.

Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and Bard, have revolutionized natural language understanding and generation. They possess deep language comprehension, human-like text generation capabilities, contextual awareness, and robust problem-solving skills, making them invaluable in various domains (e.g., search engines, customer support, translation). In the meantime, LLMs have also gained traction in the security community, revealing security vulnerabilities and showcasing their potential in security-related tasks. This paper explores the intersection of LLMs with security and privacy. Specifically, we investigate how LLMs positively impact security and privacy, potential risks and threats associated with their use, and inherent vulnerabilities within LLMs. Through a comprehensive literature review, the paper categorizes the papers into "The Good" (beneficial LLM applications), "The Bad" (offensive applications), and "The Ugly" (vulnerabilities of LLMs and their defenses). We have some interesting findings. For example, LLMs have proven to enhance code security (code vulnerability detection) and data privacy (data confidentiality protection), outperforming traditional methods. However, they can also be harnessed for various attacks (particularly user-level attacks) due to their human-like reasoning abilities. We have identified areas that require further research efforts. For example, Research on model and parameter extraction attacks is limited and often theoretical, hindered by LLM parameter scale and confidentiality. Safe instruction tuning, a recent development, requires more exploration. We hope that our work can shed light on the LLMs' potential to both bolster and jeopardize cybersecurity.

While recent advancements in large language model (LLM) alignment have enabled the effective identification of malicious objectives involving scene nesting and keyword rewriting, our study reveals that these methods remain inadequate at detecting malicious objectives expressed through context within nested harmless objectives. This study identifies a previously overlooked vulnerability, which we term Attack via Implicit Reference (AIR). AIR decomposes a malicious objective into permissible objectives and links them through implicit references within the context. This method employs multiple related harmless objectives to generate malicious content without triggering refusal responses, thereby effectively bypassing existing detection techniques.Our experiments demonstrate AIR's effectiveness across state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) exceeding 90% on most models, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, and Qwen-2-72B. Notably, we observe an inverse scaling phenomenon, where larger models are more vulnerable to this attack method. These findings underscore the urgent need for defense mechanisms capable of understanding and preventing contextual attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a cross-model attack strategy that leverages less secure models to generate malicious contexts, thereby further increasing the ASR when targeting other models.Our code and jailbreak artifacts can be found at https://github.com/Lucas-TY/llm_Implicit_reference.

Over the past year, there has been a notable rise in the use of large language models (LLMs) for academic research and industrial practices within the cybersecurity field. However, it remains a lack of comprehensive and publicly accessible benchmarks to evaluate the performance of LLMs on cybersecurity tasks. To address this gap, we introduce CS-Eval, a publicly accessible, comprehensive and bilingual LLM benchmark specifically designed for cybersecurity. CS-Eval synthesizes the research hotspots from academia and practical applications from industry, curating a diverse set of high-quality questions across 42 categories within cybersecurity, systematically organized into three cognitive levels: knowledge, ability, and application. Through an extensive evaluation of a wide range of LLMs using CS-Eval, we have uncovered valuable insights. For instance, while GPT-4 generally excels overall, other models may outperform it in certain specific subcategories. Additionally, by conducting evaluations over several months, we observed significant improvements in many LLMs' abilities to solve cybersecurity tasks. The benchmarks are now publicly available at https://github.com/CS-EVAL/CS-Eval.

Modern language models often rely on Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to encourage safe behaviors. However, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks due to three key limitations: (1) the inefficiency and high cost of human annotation, (2) the vast diversity of potential adversarial attacks, and (3) the risk of feedback bias and reward hacking. To address these challenges, we introduce Adversarial Preference Learning (APL), an iterative adversarial training method incorporating three key innovations. First, a direct harmfulness metric based on the model's intrinsic preference probabilities, eliminating reliance on external assessment. Second, a conditional generative attacker that synthesizes input-specific adversarial variations. Third, an iterative framework with automated closed-loop feedback, enabling continuous adaptation through vulnerability discovery and mitigation. Experiments on Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 demonstrate that APL significantly enhances robustness, achieving 83.33% harmlessness win rate over the base model (evaluated by GPT-4o), reducing harmful outputs from 5.88% to 0.43% (measured by LLaMA-Guard), and lowering attack success rate by up to 65% according to HarmBench. Notably, APL maintains competitive utility, with an MT-Bench score of 6.59 (comparable to the baseline 6.78) and an LC-WinRate of 46.52% against the base model.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become a cornerstone in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP), offering transformative capabilities in understanding and generating human-like text. However, with their rising prominence, the security and vulnerability aspects of these models have garnered significant attention. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the various forms of attacks targeting LLMs, discussing the nature and mechanisms of these attacks, their potential impacts, and current defense strategies. We delve into topics such as adversarial attacks that aim to manipulate model outputs, data poisoning that affects model training, and privacy concerns related to training data exploitation. The paper also explores the effectiveness of different attack methodologies, the resilience of LLMs against these attacks, and the implications for model integrity and user trust. By examining the latest research, we provide insights into the current landscape of LLM vulnerabilities and defense mechanisms. Our objective is to offer a nuanced understanding of LLM attacks, foster awareness within the AI community, and inspire robust solutions to mitigate these risks in future developments.

The performance of AI-based software vulnerability detection systems is often limited by their poor generalization to unknown codebases. In this research, we explore the impact of data quality and model architecture on the generalizability of vulnerability detection systems. By generalization we mean ability of high vulnerability detection performance across different C/C++ software projects not seen during training. Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate that improvements in dataset diversity and quality substantially enhance detection performance. Additionally, we compare multiple encoder-only and decoder-only models, finding that encoder based models outperform in terms of accuracy and generalization. Our model achieves 6.8% improvement in recall on the benchmark BigVul[1] dataset, also outperforming on unseen projects, hence showing enhanced generalizability. These results highlight the role of data quality and model selection in the development of robust vulnerability detection systems. Our findings suggest a direction for future systems having high cross-project effectiveness.

Nowadays, developers increasingly rely on solutions powered by Large Language Models (LLM) to assist them with their coding tasks. This makes it crucial to align these tools with human values to prevent malicious misuse. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework for assessing the potential harmfulness of LLMs within the software engineering domain. We begin by developing a taxonomy of potentially harmful software engineering scenarios and subsequently, create a dataset of prompts based on this taxonomy. To systematically assess the responses, we design and validate an automatic evaluator that classifies the outputs of a variety of LLMs both open-source and closed-source models, as well as general-purpose and code-specific LLMs. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of models size, architecture family, and alignment strategies on their tendency to generate harmful content. The results show significant disparities in the alignment of various LLMs for harmlessness. We find that some models and model families, such as Openhermes, are more harmful than others and that code-specific models do not perform better than their general-purpose counterparts. Notably, some fine-tuned models perform significantly worse than their base-models due to their design choices. On the other side, we find that larger models tend to be more helpful and are less likely to respond with harmful information. These results highlight the importance of targeted alignment strategies tailored to the unique challenges of software engineering tasks and provide a foundation for future work in this critical area.

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

Despite the advanced capabilities of contemporary machine learning (ML) models, they remain vulnerable to adversarial and backdoor attacks. This vulnerability is particularly concerning in real-world deployments, where compromised models may exhibit unpredictable behavior in critical scenarios. Such risks are heightened by the prevalent practice of collecting massive, internet-sourced datasets for training multimodal models, as these datasets may harbor backdoors. Various techniques have been proposed to mitigate the effects of backdooring in multimodal models, such as CleanCLIP, which is the current state-of-the-art approach. In this work, we demonstrate that the efficacy of CleanCLIP in mitigating backdoors is highly dependent on the particular objective used during model pre-training. We observe that stronger pre-training objectives that lead to higher zero-shot classification performance correlate with harder to remove backdoors behaviors. We show this by training multimodal models on two large datasets consisting of 3 million (CC3M) and 6 million (CC6M) datapoints, under various pre-training objectives, followed by poison removal using CleanCLIP. We find that CleanCLIP, even with extensive hyperparameter tuning, is ineffective in poison removal when stronger pre-training objectives are used. Our findings underscore critical considerations for ML practitioners who train models using large-scale web-curated data and are concerned about potential backdoor threats.

Jailbreak attacks, where harmful prompts bypass generative models' built-in safety, raise serious concerns about model vulnerability. While many defense methods have been proposed, the trade-offs between safety and helpfulness, and their application to Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), are not well understood. This paper systematically examines jailbreak defenses by reframing the standard generation task as a binary classification problem to assess model refusal tendencies for both harmful and benign queries. We identify two key defense mechanisms: safety shift, which increases refusal rates across all queries, and harmfulness discrimination, which improves the model's ability to distinguish between harmful and benign inputs. Using these mechanisms, we develop two ensemble defense strategies-inter-mechanism ensembles and intra-mechanism ensembles-to balance safety and helpfulness. Experiments on the MM-SafetyBench and MOSSBench datasets with LLaVA-1.5 models show that these strategies effectively improve model safety or optimize the trade-off between safety and helpfulness.

Large Language Models (LLMS) have increasingly become central to generating content with potential societal impacts. Notably, these models have demonstrated capabilities for generating content that could be deemed harmful. To mitigate these risks, researchers have adopted safety training techniques to align model outputs with societal values to curb the generation of malicious content. However, the phenomenon of "jailbreaking", where carefully crafted prompts elicit harmful responses from models, persists as a significant challenge. This research conducts a comprehensive analysis of existing studies on jailbreaking LLMs and their defense techniques. We meticulously investigate nine attack techniques and seven defense techniques applied across three distinct language models: Vicuna, LLama, and GPT-3.5 Turbo. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of these attack and defense techniques. Our findings reveal that existing white-box attacks underperform compared to universal techniques and that including special tokens in the input significantly affects the likelihood of successful attacks. This research highlights the need to concentrate on the security facets of LLMs. Additionally, we contribute to the field by releasing our datasets and testing framework, aiming to foster further research into LLM security. We believe these contributions will facilitate the exploration of security measures within this domain.

The proliferation of software vulnerabilities presents a significant challenge to cybersecurity, necessitating more effective detection methodologies. We introduce White-Basilisk, a novel approach to vulnerability detection that demonstrates superior performance while challenging prevailing assumptions in AI model scaling. Utilizing an innovative architecture that integrates Mamba layers, linear self-attention, and a Mixture of Experts framework, White-Basilisk achieves state-of-the-art results in vulnerability detection tasks with a parameter count of only 200M. The model's capacity to process sequences of unprecedented length enables comprehensive analysis of extensive codebases in a single pass, surpassing the context limitations of current Large Language Models (LLMs). White-Basilisk exhibits robust performance on imbalanced, real-world datasets, while maintaining computational efficiency that facilitates deployment across diverse organizational scales. This research not only establishes new benchmarks in code security but also provides empirical evidence that compact, efficiently designed models can outperform larger counterparts in specialized tasks, potentially redefining optimization strategies in AI development for domain-specific applications.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

The rapid scaling of AI has spurred a growing emphasis on ethical considerations in both development and practice. This has led to the formulation of increasingly sophisticated model auditing and reporting requirements, as well as governance frameworks to mitigate potential risks to individuals and society. At this critical juncture, we review the practical challenges of promoting responsible AI and transparency in informal sectors like OSS that support vital infrastructure and see widespread use. We focus on how model performance evaluation may inform or inhibit probing of model limitations, biases, and other risks. Our controlled analysis of 7903 Hugging Face projects found that risk documentation is strongly associated with evaluation practices. Yet, submissions (N=789) from the platform's most popular competitive leaderboard showed less accountability among high performers. Our findings can inform AI providers and legal scholars in designing interventions and policies that preserve open-source innovation while incentivizing ethical uptake.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed with increasing real-world responsibilities, it is important to be able to specify and constrain the behavior of these systems in a reliable manner. Model developers may wish to set explicit rules for the model, such as "do not generate abusive content", but these may be circumvented by jailbreaking techniques. Evaluating how well LLMs follow developer-provided rules in the face of adversarial inputs typically requires manual review, which slows down monitoring and methods development. To address this issue, we propose Rule-following Language Evaluation Scenarios (RuLES), a programmatic framework for measuring rule-following ability in LLMs. RuLES consists of 15 simple text scenarios in which the model is instructed to obey a set of rules in natural language while interacting with the human user. Each scenario has a concise evaluation program to determine whether the model has broken any rules in a conversation. Through manual exploration of model behavior in our scenarios, we identify 6 categories of attack strategies and collect two suites of test cases: one consisting of unique conversations from manual testing and one that systematically implements strategies from the 6 categories. Across various popular proprietary and open models such as GPT-4 and Llama 2, we find that all models are susceptible to a wide variety of adversarial hand-crafted user inputs, though GPT-4 is the best-performing model. Additionally, we evaluate open models under gradient-based attacks and find significant vulnerabilities. We propose RuLES as a challenging new setting for research into exploring and defending against both manual and automatic attacks on LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various natural language processing (NLP) tasks in recent years. However, their susceptibility to jailbreaks and perturbations necessitates additional evaluations. Many LLMs are multilingual, but safety-related training data contains mainly high-resource languages like English. This can leave them vulnerable to perturbations in low-resource languages such as Polish. We show how surprisingly strong attacks can be cheaply created by altering just a few characters and using a small proxy model for word importance calculation. We find that these character and word-level attacks drastically alter the predictions of different LLMs, suggesting a potential vulnerability that can be used to circumvent their internal safety mechanisms. We validate our attack construction methodology on Polish, a low-resource language, and find potential vulnerabilities of LLMs in this language. Additionally, we show how it can be extended to other languages. We release the created datasets and code for further research.

This paper introduces RiskCards, a framework for structured assessment and documentation of risks associated with an application of language models. As with all language, text generated by language models can be harmful, or used to bring about harm. Automating language generation adds both an element of scale and also more subtle or emergent undesirable tendencies to the generated text. Prior work establishes a wide variety of language model harms to many different actors: existing taxonomies identify categories of harms posed by language models; benchmarks establish automated tests of these harms; and documentation standards for models, tasks and datasets encourage transparent reporting. However, there is no risk-centric framework for documenting the complexity of a landscape in which some risks are shared across models and contexts, while others are specific, and where certain conditions may be required for risks to manifest as harms. RiskCards address this methodological gap by providing a generic framework for assessing the use of a given language model in a given scenario. Each RiskCard makes clear the routes for the risk to manifest harm, their placement in harm taxonomies, and example prompt-output pairs. While RiskCards are designed to be open-source, dynamic and participatory, we present a "starter set" of RiskCards taken from a broad literature survey, each of which details a concrete risk presentation. Language model RiskCards initiate a community knowledge base which permits the mapping of risks and harms to a specific model or its application scenario, ultimately contributing to a better, safer and shared understanding of the risk landscape.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant improvements in many tasks across various domains, such as code interpretation, response generation, and ambiguity handling. These LLMs, however, when upgrading, primarily prioritize enhancing user experience while neglecting security, privacy, and safety implications. Consequently, unintended vulnerabilities or biases can be introduced. Previous studies have predominantly focused on specific versions of the models and disregard the potential emergence of new attack vectors targeting the updated versions. Through the lens of adversarial examples within the in-context learning framework, this longitudinal study addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive assessment of the robustness of successive versions of LLMs, vis-\`a-vis GPT-3.5. We conduct extensive experiments to analyze and understand the impact of the robustness in two distinct learning categories: zero-shot learning and few-shot learning. Our findings indicate that, in comparison to earlier versions of LLMs, the updated versions do not exhibit the anticipated level of robustness against adversarial attacks. In addition, our study emphasizes the increased effectiveness of synergized adversarial queries in most zero-shot learning and few-shot learning cases. We hope that our study can lead to a more refined assessment of the robustness of LLMs over time and provide valuable insights of these models for both developers and users.

The proliferation of pre-trained models (PTMs) and datasets has led to the emergence of centralized model hubs like Hugging Face, which facilitate collaborative development and reuse. However, recent security reports have uncovered vulnerabilities and instances of malicious attacks within these platforms, highlighting growing security concerns. This paper presents the first systematic study of malicious code poisoning attacks on pre-trained model hubs, focusing on the Hugging Face platform. We conduct a comprehensive threat analysis, develop a taxonomy of model formats, and perform root cause analysis of vulnerable formats. While existing tools like Fickling and ModelScan offer some protection, they face limitations in semantic-level analysis and comprehensive threat detection. To address these challenges, we propose MalHug, an end-to-end pipeline tailored for Hugging Face that combines dataset loading script extraction, model deserialization, in-depth taint analysis, and heuristic pattern matching to detect and classify malicious code poisoning attacks in datasets and models. In collaboration with Ant Group, a leading financial technology company, we have implemented and deployed MalHug on a mirrored Hugging Face instance within their infrastructure, where it has been operational for over three months. During this period, MalHug has monitored more than 705K models and 176K datasets, uncovering 91 malicious models and 9 malicious dataset loading scripts. These findings reveal a range of security threats, including reverse shell, browser credential theft, and system reconnaissance. This work not only bridges a critical gap in understanding the security of the PTM supply chain but also provides a practical, industry-tested solution for enhancing the security of pre-trained model hubs.

Catastrophic regime shifts in complex natural systems may be averted through advanced detection. Recent work has provided a proof-of-principle that many systems approaching a catastrophic transition may be identified through the lens of early warning indicators such as rising variance or increased return times. Despite widespread appreciation of the difficulties and uncertainty involved in such forecasts, proposed methods hardly ever characterize their expected error rates. Without the benefits of replicates, controls, or hindsight, applications of these approaches must quantify how reliable different indicators are in avoiding false alarms, and how sensitive they are to missing subtle warning signs. We propose a model based approach in order to quantify this trade-off between reliability and sensitivity and allow comparisons between different indicators. We show these error rates can be quite severe for common indicators even under favorable assumptions, and also illustrate how a model-based indicator can improve this performance. We demonstrate how the performance of an early warning indicator varies in different data sets, and suggest that uncertainty quantification become a more central part of early warning predictions.

As large language models grow in capability and agency, identifying vulnerabilities through red-teaming becomes vital for safe deployment. However, traditional prompt-engineering approaches may prove ineffective once red-teaming turns into a weak-to-strong problem, where target models surpass red-teamers in capabilities. To study this shift, we frame red-teaming through the lens of the capability gap between attacker and target. We evaluate more than 500 attacker-target pairs using LLM-based jailbreak attacks that mimic human red-teamers across diverse families, sizes, and capability levels. Three strong trends emerge: (i) more capable models are better attackers, (ii) attack success drops sharply once the target's capability exceeds the attacker's, and (iii) attack success rates correlate with high performance on social science splits of the MMLU-Pro benchmark. From these trends, we derive a jailbreaking scaling law that predicts attack success for a fixed target based on attacker-target capability gap. These findings suggest that fixed-capability attackers (e.g., humans) may become ineffective against future models, increasingly capable open-source models amplify risks for existing systems, and model providers must accurately measure and control models' persuasive and manipulative abilities to limit their effectiveness as attackers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are one of the most promising developments in the field of artificial intelligence, and the software engineering community has readily noticed their potential role in the software development life-cycle. Developers routinely ask LLMs to generate code snippets, increasing productivity but also potentially introducing ownership, privacy, correctness, and security issues. Previous work highlighted how code generated by mainstream commercial LLMs is often not safe, containing vulnerabilities, bugs, and code smells. In this paper, we present a framework that leverages testing and static analysis to assess the quality, and guide the self-improvement, of code generated by general-purpose, open-source LLMs. First, we ask LLMs to generate C code to solve a number of programming tasks. Then we employ ground-truth tests to assess the (in)correctness of the generated code, and a static analysis tool to detect potential safety vulnerabilities. Next, we assess the models ability to evaluate the generated code, by asking them to detect errors and vulnerabilities. Finally, we test the models ability to fix the generated code, providing the reports produced during the static analysis and incorrectness evaluation phases as feedback. Our results show that models often produce incorrect code, and that the generated code can include safety issues. Moreover, they perform very poorly at detecting either issue. On the positive side, we observe a substantial ability to fix flawed code when provided with information about failed tests or potential vulnerabilities, indicating a promising avenue for improving the safety of LLM-based code generation tools.

Foundation models are increasingly becoming better autonomous programmers, raising the prospect that they could also automate dangerous offensive cyber-operations. Current frontier model audits probe the cybersecurity risks of such agents, but most fail to account for the degrees of freedom available to adversaries in the real world. In particular, with strong verifiers and financial incentives, agents for offensive cybersecurity are amenable to iterative improvement by would-be adversaries. We argue that assessments should take into account an expanded threat model in the context of cybersecurity, emphasizing the varying degrees of freedom that an adversary may possess in stateful and non-stateful environments within a fixed compute budget. We show that even with a relatively small compute budget (8 H100 GPU Hours in our study), adversaries can improve an agent's cybersecurity capability on InterCode CTF by more than 40\% relative to the baseline -- without any external assistance. These results highlight the need to evaluate agents' cybersecurity risk in a dynamic manner, painting a more representative picture of risk.

Pretrained language models sometimes possess knowledge that we do not wish them to, including memorized personal information and knowledge that could be used to harm people. They can also output toxic or harmful text. To mitigate these safety and informational issues, we propose an attack-and-defense framework for studying the task of deleting sensitive information directly from model weights. We study direct edits to model weights because (1) this approach should guarantee that particular deleted information is never extracted by future prompt attacks, and (2) it should protect against whitebox attacks, which is necessary for making claims about safety/privacy in a setting where publicly available model weights could be used to elicit sensitive information. Our threat model assumes that an attack succeeds if the answer to a sensitive question is located among a set of B generated candidates, based on scenarios where the information would be insecure if the answer is among B candidates. Experimentally, we show that even state-of-the-art model editing methods such as ROME struggle to truly delete factual information from models like GPT-J, as our whitebox and blackbox attacks can recover "deleted" information from an edited model 38% of the time. These attacks leverage two key observations: (1) that traces of deleted information can be found in intermediate model hidden states, and (2) that applying an editing method for one question may not delete information across rephrased versions of the question. Finally, we provide new defense methods that protect against some extraction attacks, but we do not find a single universally effective defense method. Our results suggest that truly deleting sensitive information is a tractable but difficult problem, since even relatively low attack success rates have potentially severe societal implications for real-world deployment of language models.

Vulnerability prediction is valuable in identifying security issues more efficiently, even though it requires the source code of the target software system, which is a restrictive hypothesis. This paper presents an experimental study to predict vulnerabilities in binary code without source code or complex representations of the binary, leveraging the pivotal idea of decompiling the binary file through neural decompilation and predicting vulnerabilities through deep learning on the decompiled source code. The results outperform the state-of-the-art in both neural decompilation and vulnerability prediction, showing that it is possible to identify vulnerable programs with this approach concerning bi-class (vulnerable/non-vulnerable) and multi-class (type of vulnerability) analysis.

Harm reporting in Artificial Intelligence (AI) currently lacks a structured process for disclosing and addressing algorithmic flaws, relying largely on an ad-hoc approach. This contrasts sharply with the well-established Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) ecosystem in software security. While global efforts to establish frameworks for AI transparency and collaboration are underway, the unique challenges presented by machine learning (ML) models demand a specialized approach. To address this gap, we propose implementing a Coordinated Flaw Disclosure (CFD) framework tailored to the complexities of ML and AI issues. This paper reviews the evolution of ML disclosure practices, from ad hoc reporting to emerging participatory auditing methods, and compares them with cybersecurity norms. Our framework introduces innovations such as extended model cards, dynamic scope expansion, an independent adjudication panel, and an automated verification process. We also outline a forthcoming real-world pilot of CFD. We argue that CFD could significantly enhance public trust in AI systems. By balancing organizational and community interests, CFD aims to improve AI accountability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with structured function-calling interfaces have dramatically expanded capabilities for real-time data retrieval, complex computation, and multi-step orchestration. Yet, the explosive proliferation of plugins, connectors, and inter-agent protocols has outpaced discovery mechanisms and security practices, resulting in brittle integrations vulnerable to diverse threats. In this survey, we introduce the first unified, end-to-end threat model for LLM-agent ecosystems, spanning host-to-tool and agent-to-agent communications, formalize adversary capabilities and attacker objectives, and catalog over thirty attack techniques. Specifically, we organized the threat model into four domains: Input Manipulation (e.g., prompt injections, long-context hijacks, multimodal adversarial inputs), Model Compromise (e.g., prompt- and parameter-level backdoors, composite and encrypted multi-backdoors, poisoning strategies), System and Privacy Attacks (e.g., speculative side-channels, membership inference, retrieval poisoning, social-engineering simulations), and Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., exploits in Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol). For each category, we review representative scenarios, assess real-world feasibility, and evaluate existing defenses. Building on our threat taxonomy, we identify key open challenges and future research directions, such as securing MCP deployments through dynamic trust management and cryptographic provenance tracking; designing and hardening Agentic Web Interfaces; and achieving resilience in multi-agent and federated environments. Our work provides a comprehensive reference to guide the design of robust defense mechanisms and establish best practices for resilient LLM-agent workflows.

With the growing popularity of Large Language Models (e.g. GitHub Copilot, ChatGPT, etc.) in software engineers' daily practices, it is important to ensure that the code generated by these tools is not only functionally correct but also free of vulnerabilities. Although LLMs can help developers to be more productive, prior empirical studies have shown that LLMs can generate insecure code. There are two contributing factors to the insecure code generation. First, existing datasets used to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) do not adequately represent genuine software engineering tasks sensitive to security. Instead, they are often based on competitive programming challenges or classroom-type coding tasks. In real-world applications, the code produced is integrated into larger codebases, introducing potential security risks. There's a clear absence of benchmarks that focus on evaluating the security of the generated code. Second, existing evaluation metrics primarily focus on the functional correctness of the generated code while ignoring security considerations. Metrics such as pass@k gauge the probability of obtaining the correct code in the top k suggestions. Other popular metrics like BLEU, CodeBLEU, ROUGE, and METEOR similarly emphasize functional accuracy, neglecting security implications. In light of these research gaps, in this paper, we described SALLM, a framework to benchmark LLMs' abilities to generate secure code systematically. This framework has three major components: a novel dataset of security-centric Python prompts, an evaluation environment to test the generated code, and novel metrics to evaluate the models' performance from the perspective of secure code generation.

Effective evaluation of language models remains an open challenge in NLP. Researchers and engineers face methodological issues such as the sensitivity of models to evaluation setup, difficulty of proper comparisons across methods, and the lack of reproducibility and transparency. In this paper we draw on three years of experience in evaluating large language models to provide guidance and lessons for researchers. First, we provide an overview of common challenges faced in language model evaluation. Second, we delineate best practices for addressing or lessening the impact of these challenges on research. Third, we present the Language Model Evaluation Harness (lm-eval): an open source library for independent, reproducible, and extensible evaluation of language models that seeks to address these issues. We describe the features of the library as well as case studies in which the library has been used to alleviate these methodological concerns.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly aided developers by generating or assisting in code writing, enhancing productivity across various tasks. While identifying incorrect code is often straightforward, detecting vulnerabilities in functionally correct code is more challenging, especially for developers with limited security knowledge, which poses considerable security risks of using LLM-generated code and underscores the need for robust evaluation benchmarks that assess both functional correctness and security. Current benchmarks like CyberSecEval and SecurityEval attempt to solve it but are hindered by unclear and impractical specifications, failing to assess both functionality and security accurately. To tackle these deficiencies, we introduce CWEval, a novel outcome-driven evaluation framework designed to enhance the evaluation of secure code generation by LLMs. This framework not only assesses code functionality but also its security simultaneously with high-quality task specifications and outcome-driven test oracles which provides high accuracy. Coupled with CWEval-bench, a multilingual, security-critical coding benchmark, CWEval provides a rigorous empirical security evaluation on LLM-generated code, overcoming previous benchmarks' shortcomings. Through our evaluations, CWEval reveals a notable portion of functional but insecure code produced by LLMs, and shows a serious inaccuracy of previous evaluations, ultimately contributing significantly to the field of secure code generation. We open-source our artifact at: https://github.com/Co1lin/CWEval .