Daily Papers

Cascades are a classical strategy to enable inference cost to vary adaptively across samples, wherein a sequence of classifiers are invoked in turn. A deferral rule determines whether to invoke the next classifier in the sequence, or to terminate prediction. One simple deferral rule employs the confidence of the current classifier, e.g., based on the maximum predicted softmax probability. Despite being oblivious to the structure of the cascade -- e.g., not modelling the errors of downstream models -- such confidence-based deferral often works remarkably well in practice. In this paper, we seek to better understand the conditions under which confidence-based deferral may fail, and when alternate deferral strategies can perform better. We first present a theoretical characterisation of the optimal deferral rule, which precisely characterises settings under which confidence-based deferral may suffer. We then study post-hoc deferral mechanisms, and demonstrate they can significantly improve upon confidence-based deferral in settings where (i) downstream models are specialists that only work well on a subset of inputs, (ii) samples are subject to label noise, and (iii) there is distribution shift between the train and test set.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi), a financial ecosystem without centralized controlling organization, has introduced a new paradigm for lending and borrowing. However, its capital efficiency remains constrained by the inability to effectively assess the risk associated with each user/wallet. This paper introduces the 'On-Chain Credit Risk Score (OCCR Score) in DeFi', a probabilistic measure designed to quantify the credit risk associated with a wallet. By analyzing historical real-time on-chain activity as well as predictive scenarios, the OCCR Score may enable DeFi lending protocols to dynamically adjust Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratios and Liquidation Thresholds (LT) based on the risk profile of a wallet. Unlike existing wallet risk scoring models, which rely on heuristic-based evaluations, the OCCR Score offers a more objective and probabilistic approach, aligning closer to traditional credit risk assessment methodologies. This framework can further enhance DeFi's capital efficiency by incentivizing responsible borrowing behavior and optimizing risk-adjusted returns for lenders.

In critical applications, it is vital for classifiers to defer decision-making to humans. We propose a post-hoc method that makes existing classifiers selectively abstain from predicting certain samples. Our abstaining classifier is incentivized to maintain the original accuracy for each sub-population (i.e. no harm) while achieving a set of group fairness definitions to a user specified degree. To this end, we design an Integer Programming (IP) procedure that assigns abstention decisions for each training sample to satisfy a set of constraints. To generalize the abstaining decisions to test samples, we then train a surrogate model to learn the abstaining decisions based on the IP solutions in an end-to-end manner. We analyze the feasibility of the IP procedure to determine the possible abstention rate for different levels of unfairness tolerance and accuracy constraint for achieving no harm. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to identify the theoretical relationships between the constraint parameters and the required abstention rate. Our theoretical results are important since a high abstention rate is often infeasible in practice due to a lack of human resources. Our framework outperforms existing methods in terms of fairness disparity without sacrificing accuracy at similar abstention rates.

Preference based Reinforcement Learning (PbRL) removes the need to hand specify a reward function by learning a reward from preference feedback over policy behaviors. Current approaches to PbRL do not address the credit assignment problem inherent in determining which parts of a behavior most contributed to a preference, which result in data intensive approaches and subpar reward functions. We address such limitations by introducing a credit assignment strategy (Hindsight PRIOR) that uses a world model to approximate state importance within a trajectory and then guides rewards to be proportional to state importance through an auxiliary predicted return redistribution objective. Incorporating state importance into reward learning improves the speed of policy learning, overall policy performance, and reward recovery on both locomotion and manipulation tasks. For example, Hindsight PRIOR recovers on average significantly (p<0.05) more reward on MetaWorld (20%) and DMC (15%). The performance gains and our ablations demonstrate the benefits even a simple credit assignment strategy can have on reward learning and that state importance in forward dynamics prediction is a strong proxy for a state's contribution to a preference decision. Code repository can be found at https://github.com/apple/ml-rlhf-hindsight-prior.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

We describe an incentive system for distributed deep learning of foundational models where peers are rewarded for contributions. The incentive system, Gauntlet, has been deployed on the bittensor blockchain and used to train a 1.2B LLM with completely permissionless contributions of pseudo-gradients: no control over the users that can register or their hardware. Gauntlet can be applied to any synchronous distributed training scheme that relies on aggregating updates or pseudo-gradients. We rely on a two-stage mechanism for fast filtering of peer uptime, reliability, and synchronization, combined with the core component that estimates the loss before and after individual pseudo-gradient contributions. We utilized an OpenSkill rating system to track competitiveness of pseudo-gradient scores across time. Finally, we introduce a novel mechanism to ensure peers on the network perform unique computations. Our live 1.2B run, which has paid out real-valued tokens to participants based on the value of their contributions, yielded a competitive (on a per-iteration basis) 1.2B model that demonstrates the utility of our incentive system.

We propose a structural default model for portfolio-wide valuation adjustments (xVAs) and represent it as a system of coupled backward stochastic differential equations. The framework is divided into four layers, each capturing a key component: (i) clean values, (ii) initial margin and Collateral Valuation Adjustment (ColVA), (iii) Credit/Debit Valuation Adjustments (CVA/DVA) together with Margin Valuation Adjustment (MVA), and (iv) Funding Valuation Adjustment (FVA). Because these layers depend on one another through collateral and default effects, a naive Monte Carlo approach would require deeply nested simulations, making the problem computationally intractable. To address this challenge, we use an iterative deep BSDE approach, handling each layer sequentially so that earlier outputs serve as inputs to the subsequent layers. Initial margin is computed via deep quantile regression to reflect margin requirements over the Margin Period of Risk. We also adopt a change-of-measure method that highlights rare but significant defaults of the bank or counterparty, ensuring that these events are accurately captured in the training process. We further extend Han and Long's (2020) a posteriori error analysis to BSDEs on bounded domains. Due to the random exit from the domain, we obtain an order of convergence of O(h^{1/4-epsilon}) rather than the usual O(h^{1/2}). Numerical experiments illustrate that this method drastically reduces computational demands and successfully scales to high-dimensional, non-symmetric portfolios. The results confirm its effectiveness and accuracy, offering a practical alternative to nested Monte Carlo simulations in multi-counterparty xVA analyses.

We develop a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) method to learn scalable control policies for target tracking. Our method can handle an arbitrary number of pursuers and targets; we show results for tasks consisting up to 1000 pursuers tracking 1000 targets. We use a decentralized, partially-observable Markov Decision Process framework to model pursuers as agents receiving partial observations (range and bearing) about targets which move using fixed, unknown policies. An attention mechanism is used to parameterize the value function of the agents; this mechanism allows us to handle an arbitrary number of targets. Entropy-regularized off-policy RL methods are used to train a stochastic policy, and we discuss how it enables a hedging behavior between pursuers that leads to a weak form of cooperation in spite of completely decentralized control execution. We further develop a masking heuristic that allows training on smaller problems with few pursuers-targets and execution on much larger problems. Thorough simulation experiments, ablation studies, and comparisons to state of the art algorithms are performed to study the scalability of the approach and robustness of performance to varying numbers of agents and targets.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

We provide a new theoretical framework for the variable-step deferred correction (DC) methods based on the well-known BDF2 formula. By using the discrete orthogonal convolution kernels, some high-order BDF2-DC methods are proven to be stable on arbitrary time grids according to the recent definition of stability (SINUM, 60: 2253-2272). It significantly relaxes the existing step-ratio restrictions for the BDF2-DC methods (BIT, 62: 1789-1822). The associated sharp error estimates are established by taking the numerical effects of the starting approximations into account, and they suggest that the BDF2-DC methods have no aftereffect, that is, the lower-order starting scheme for the BDF2 scheme will not cause a loss in the accuracy of the high-order BDF2-DC methods. Extensive tests on the graded and random time meshes are presented to support the new theory.

Reinforcement learning (RL) holds significant promise for training LLM agents to handle complex, goal-oriented tasks that require multi-step interactions with external environments. However, a critical challenge when applying RL to these agentic tasks arises from delayed rewards: feedback signals are typically available only after the entire task is completed. This makes it non-trivial to assign delayed rewards to earlier actions, providing insufficient guidance regarding environmental constraints and hindering agent training. In this work, we draw on the insight that the ultimate completion of a task emerges from the cumulative progress an agent makes across individual steps. We propose Stepwise Progress Attribution (SPA), a general reward redistribution framework that decomposes the final reward into stepwise contributions, each reflecting its incremental progress toward overall task completion. To achieve this, we train a progress estimator that accumulates stepwise contributions over a trajectory to match the task completion. During policy optimization, we combine the estimated per-step contribution with a grounding signal for actions executed in the environment as the fine-grained, intermediate reward for effective agent training. Extensive experiments on common agent benchmarks (including Webshop, ALFWorld, and VirtualHome) demonstrate that SPA consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art method in both success rate (+2.5\% on average) and grounding accuracy (+1.9\% on average). Further analyses demonstrate that our method remarkably provides more effective intermediate rewards for RL training. Our code is available at https://github.com/WangHanLinHenry/SPA-RL-Agent.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems play an increasingly prominent role in human decision-making, challenges surface in the realm of human-AI interactions. One challenge arises from the suboptimal AI policies due to the inadequate consideration of humans disregarding AI recommendations, as well as the need for AI to provide advice selectively when it is most pertinent. This paper presents a sequential decision-making model that (i) takes into account the human's adherence level (the probability that the human follows/rejects machine advice) and (ii) incorporates a defer option so that the machine can temporarily refrain from making advice. We provide learning algorithms that learn the optimal advice policy and make advice only at critical time stamps. Compared to problem-agnostic reinforcement learning algorithms, our specialized learning algorithms not only enjoy better theoretical convergence properties but also show strong empirical performance.

We consider the task of evaluating policies of algorithmic resource allocation through randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Such policies are tasked with optimizing the utilization of limited intervention resources, with the goal of maximizing the benefits derived. Evaluation of such allocation policies through RCTs proves difficult, notwithstanding the scale of the trial, because the individuals' outcomes are inextricably interlinked through resource constraints controlling the policy decisions. Our key contribution is to present a new estimator leveraging our proposed novel concept, that involves retrospective reshuffling of participants across experimental arms at the end of an RCT. We identify conditions under which such reassignments are permissible and can be leveraged to construct counterfactual trials, whose outcomes can be accurately ascertained, for free. We prove theoretically that such an estimator is more accurate than common estimators based on sample means -- we show that it returns an unbiased estimate and simultaneously reduces variance. We demonstrate the value of our approach through empirical experiments on synthetic, semi-synthetic as well as real case study data and show improved estimation accuracy across the board.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have the ability to self-correct even when they make mistakes in their reasoning paths. However, our study reveals that when the reasoning process starts with a short but poor beginning, it becomes difficult for the model to recover. We refer to this phenomenon as the "Prefix Dominance Trap". Inspired by psychological findings that peer interaction can promote self-correction without negatively impacting already accurate individuals, we propose **Learning from Peers** (LeaP) to address this phenomenon. Specifically, every tokens, each reasoning path summarizes its intermediate reasoning and shares it with others through a routing mechanism, enabling paths to incorporate peer insights during inference. However, we observe that smaller models sometimes fail to follow summarization and reflection instructions effectively. To address this, we fine-tune them into our **LeaP-T** model series. Experiments on AIME 2024, AIME 2025, AIMO 2025, and GPQA Diamond show that LeaP provides substantial improvements. For instance, QwQ-32B with LeaP achieves nearly 5 absolute points higher than the baseline on average, and surpasses DeepSeek-R1-671B on three math benchmarks with an average gain of 3.3 points. Notably, our fine-tuned LeaP-T-7B matches the performance of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B on AIME 2024. In-depth analysis reveals LeaP's robust error correction by timely peer insights, showing strong error tolerance and handling varied task difficulty. LeaP marks a milestone by enabling LRMs to collaborate during reasoning. Our code, datasets, and models are available at https://learning-from-peers.github.io/ .

Large neural models are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, raising concerns about whether their behavior reliably aligns with human values. Interpretability provides a route to internal transparency by revealing the computations that drive outputs. We argue that interpretability especially mechanistic approaches should be treated as a design principle for alignment, not an auxiliary diagnostic tool. Post-hoc methods such as LIME or SHAP offer intuitive but correlational explanations, while mechanistic techniques like circuit tracing or activation patching yield causal insight into internal failures, including deceptive or misaligned reasoning that behavioral methods like RLHF, red teaming, or Constitutional AI may overlook. Despite these advantages, interpretability faces challenges of scalability, epistemic uncertainty, and mismatches between learned representations and human concepts. Our position is that progress on safe and trustworthy AI will depend on making interpretability a first-class objective of AI research and development, ensuring that systems are not only effective but also auditable, transparent, and aligned with human intent.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Counterfactual explanations is one of the post-hoc methods used to provide explainability to machine learning models that have been attracting attention in recent years. Most examples in the literature, address the problem of generating post-hoc explanations for black-box machine learning models after the rejection of a loan application. In contrast, in this work, we investigate mathematical programming formulations for scorecard models, a type of interpretable model predominant within the banking industry for lending. The proposed mixed-integer programming formulations combine objective functions to ensure close, realistic and sparse counterfactuals using multi-objective optimization techniques for a binary, probability or continuous outcome. Moreover, we extend these formulations to generate multiple optimal counterfactuals simultaneously while guaranteeing diversity. Experiments on two real-world datasets confirm that the presented approach can generate optimal diverse counterfactuals addressing desired properties with assumable CPU times for practice use.

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study adaptive attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds publicly known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-n attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.