# document

id: 469c39572d6f71eb74fe6dbdf3242148
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" Another innovation is to \r\nintroduce Aspergillus fungi that do not produce aflatoxins in biocontrol \r\nformulations, as is being undertaken in the Aflasafe project in Kenya \r\n(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2016)."


id: baefbfcafa05f6c0fe23bd24d0b2d5ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 26947
content:
"International trade changes are a potentially important adaptation \r\nmechanism for both the short-term effects of climate variability and \r\nlong-term changes in comparative advantage with globally substantial \r\nbenefits but that are distributed unevenly (Mosnier et al., 2014; Baldos \r\nand Hertel, 2015; Fuss et  al., 2015; Costinot et  al., 2016; Hertel and \r\nBaldos, 2016; Gouel and Laborde, 2021). One estimate is that, with a \r\nreduction in tariffs as well as institutional and infrastructural barriers, \r\nthe negative impacts of climate change globally would be reduced \r\nby 64%, with hunger-affected import-dependent regions seeing the \r\ngreatest benefit. However, in hunger-affected export-oriented regions, \r\npartial trade integration might lead to increased exports at the expense \r\nof domestic food availability (Janssens et  al., 2020)"


id: 6d0b2d4f568bc666da0f1ffce735970
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" It is possible for \r\npolicy changes that result in increased trade flows to also increase the \r\npotential for maladaptation, for example by encouraging conversion of \r\nenvironmentally sensitive areas to agriculture (Fuchs et al., 2020; 5.13.3)."


id: 5708f80e970ce9ae403bc85c1f63e140
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"All food production systems (crops, livestock, marine, fish, mixed, \r\naquaculture) have been undermined by climate change and are \r\nexpected to experience larger impacts in the future as described in \r\nearlier sections (see Sections  5.4.1, 5.5, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10). In addition, \r\nsudden production losses from extreme climate events can reduce food \r\nsecurity (FAO et al., 2018; Cottrell et al., 2019; FAO et al., 2020; Anttila\u0002Hughes et al., 2021). For example, a 2007 drought-induced crop failure \r\nin southern Africa led to severe food insecurity in Lesotho because \r\nof the land-locked country's dependence on imports from South \r\nAfrica that aggravated food availability and access under conditions \r\nof declining food production and land degradation (Verschuur et al., \r\n2021). Pest and disease outbreaks in both crops and livestock due \r\nto climate change (Sections  5.4.1, 5.5.1) have also impacted food \r\navailability and access (see Box  5.8 Desert Locust case study)"


id: 513dbbaf179d70783e842ecbbdd3cf5c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 10236
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" Loss \r\nin labour productivity from climate-change-related heat stress is a \r\ngrowing problem."


id: d6e789c6784b64256f617d7a7def5500
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
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content:
"Climate change affects agricultural labour productivity through \r\nincreased intensity and frequency of heat stress events, with \r\nthose performing physical labour in high humidity and ambient \r\ntemperatures most vulnerable to heat stress (high confidence) (Hsiang \r\net al.; FAO et al., 2018; Kjellstrom et al., 2019; Antonelli et al., 2020; \r\nShayegh et  al., 2020). Labour capacity, supply and productivity loss \r\nin moderate outdoor work due to heat stress is estimated between \r\n2% and 14%, depending on the location and indicator (Ioannou et al., \r\n2017; Kjellstrom et al., 2018), with an overall estimate of 5.3% loss \r\nin productivity for outdoor work between 2000 and 2015 (medium \r\nconfidence) (Watts et  al., 2018) but as high as 14% in low-income \r\ntropical countries (Antonelli et al., 2020; Shayegh et al., 2020)"


id: 74b0236b15411d0007fb801337ce56d1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" Highly \r\nvulnerable occupation groups affected by heat stress include farmers, \r\nfarmworkers and livestock keepers working outdoors in low-income \r\ntropical countries (high confidence) (Zander et  al., 2015; Kjellstrom \r\net  al., 2016; Flouris et  al., 2018; Kjellstrom et  al., 2018; Levi et  al., \r\n2018). Farmworkers and small-scale food producers in high- and \r\nmiddle-income countries involved in outdoor labour are also affected \r\nby heat stress (Zander et al., 2015; Gosling et al., 2018; Szewczyk et al., \r\n2018; Watts et  al., 2021). There is also evidence that heat stress is \r\naffecting labour supply through variation in nutrition intake (Antonelli \r\net al., 2020)."


id: 4aea6b7fa20449926dc9789b126640c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"At the end of 2019, desert locust swarms infested Eastern Africa and caused widespread damage to crops and pastures, threatening food \r\nsecurity and livelihoods (Kimathi et al., 2020; Salih et al., 2020). The FAO estimates that over 200,000 ha of crop and pastureland were \r\ndamaged, rendering 2 million people in the region acutely food insecure (IGAD, 2020). The desert locust infestation was facilitated by two \r\ntropical cyclones that created desert lakes in a usually dry region of Saudi Arabia. Moist soils, warm temperatures and ample vegetation \r\nprovided a suitable environment for desert locust breeding and migration to Yemen and Somalia, where the pest remained uncontrolled \r\ndue to conflict and spread to neighbouring countries. A series of political and socioeconomic weaknesses such as armed conflict, limited \r\nfinancial resources and lack of early actions compounded the impact of the current invasion and made it the most damaging in 70 years \r\n(Meynard et al., 2020; Salih et al"


id: d44f89422a6dcbb41d019956a708c78a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"Low-income urban and rural households who are net food buyers \r\nare particularly affected by food price increases, with reduction in \r\nconsumption of diverse food groups (high confidence) (Green et al., \r\n2013; Villasante et  al., 2015; FAO et  al., 2018). Depending on the \r\ncontext, particular groups, including women, ethnic and religious \r\nminorities, will be more vulnerable to worsening food insecurity from \r\nclimate change impacts (Clay et  al., 2018; Jantarasami et  al., 2018; \r\nNature climate change Editorials, 2019; Algur et  al., 2021 and see \r\nCross-Chapter Box  GENDER in Chapter 18). Indigenous Peoples are \r\noften more vulnerable to climate change, due to conditions of poverty, \r\nlimited resources, discrimination and marginalisation (high confidence) \r\n(Smith and Rhiney, 2016; Vinyeta et al., 2016; Jantarasami et al., 2018)"


id: 55becb8c93e64033b9e4e490f3f6c579
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" \r\nIndigenous Peoples may experience loss of culturally significant foods \r\nand declining traditional ecological knowledge (Dounias and Ichikawa, \r\n2017; Ross and Mason, 2020; 5.7)."


id: 8a39d7bd3681c2276b36597980a9bb19
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"Climate change will have negative effects on food security and nutrition \r\nin 2050 (high agreement, medium evidence) (Amjath-Babu et al., 2016; \r\nSpringmann et al., 2016; Lloyd et al., 2018; Richardson et al., 2018; see \r\nChapter 7; Hasegawa et al., 2021a). How many people are affected \r\nwill depend considerably on non-climatic drivers of food security (van \r\nDijk et al., 2021), but modelling studies agreed that climate change \r\nwould increase the risk of food insecurity. For example, one study \r\ncomparing an RCP8.5 scenario with one that has zero climate impacts \r\nestimates 65 million additional people (10% increase) will experience \r\nfood insecurity due to climate change impacts in 2050 (modelling \r\nresults in Nelson et al., 2018)"


id: 947efc6f8f94371b79ec861b54c33ae2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" Another study accounting for climate \r\nextreme events estimates that, by 2050, the number of people at risk \r\nof hunger will increase by 20% and 11% under high- and low-emission \r\nscenarios, respectively, owing to a once-per-100-year extreme climate \r\nevent (Hasegawa et  al., 2021a). Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia \r\nin this study were projected to be at the greatest risk, with triple the \r\namount of South Asia's current food reserves needed to offset such \r\nan extreme event. Models suggest that food security and malnutrition \r\nimpacts will be much more severe from 2050 onwards relative to pre\u00022050, but the scale and extent of the impacts will strongly depend on \r\nthe GHG emission scenario (FAO, 2018a; Richardson et al., 2018). Due \r\nto CIDs and non-climate drivers of food insecurity, Sub Saharan Africa \r\nis projected to be the hardest hit, followed by South Asia and Central \r\nand South America, but contingent on adaptation level (Richardson \r\net al., 2018; Hasegawa et al., 2021a)."


id: 6139201672bc816325d59e68ce244ab0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"Climate change significantly increases the future food \r\nsafety risks (high confidence) (Sections  5.8.2, 5.8.3, 5.11.1, \r\nBox  5.9). Increasing temperatures and drought stress are \r\nexpected to lead to greater aflatoxin contamination of food \r\ncrops.  Aflatoxins, a major foodborne hazard, contaminate \r\nstaple crops and are associated with various health risks, \r\nincluding stunting in children and cancer (Koshiol et al., 2017). \r\nIn LICs, children with high exposure to aflatoxins were found to \r\nbe more likely to suffer from micronutrient (zinc and vitamin A) \r\ndeficiencies (Watson et al., 2016b). Climate change is expected \r\nto cause decreases in micro- and macronutrient content of \r\nfoods, leading to an increased burden of infectious diseases, \r\ndiarrhea and anaemia, with an estimated 10% increase in \r\ndisability-adjusted life years (DALYs) by 2050 associated with \r\nundernutrition and micronutrient deficiencies  (Aberman and \r\nTirado, 2014; Smith and Myers, 2018; Weyant et al"


id: 4811ebbf994704346d2612d8398f758f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"One case study is the Water Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA) programme, a public-private \r\npartnership that transplants a cold shock protein B, known as Droughtgard, into maize in \r\norder to mitigate yield losses from drought. Proponents suggest that this GM venture, which \r\nwill be distributed free to smallholder farmers, represents the best strategy for ensuring \r\nstable yields in the face of climatic change across Africa (Kyetere et al., 2019). Critics argue \r\nthat WEMA maize is not a good fit with the smallholder farming systems it is designed to \r\nbenefit, with particular concerns around how farmers will access the extra inputs, credit and \r\nlabour that WEMA maize requires to be successful (Schnurr, 2019).\r\nEmergent genome-edited crops are considered a more precise, accessible and accelerated \r\nmeans of targeting stressors that matter to poor farmers, but evidence is limited (Kole \r\net al., 2015; Haque et al., 2018; Zaidi et al., 2019)"


id: 53fde1a1e77c60ce76732bc4e1a4c98c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" A more iterative and flexible adaptation \r\napproach beyond just genomic improvement to tackle the multiplicity of factors limiting \r\nsmallholder production is anticipated to increase the likelihood that these promising \r\ntechnologies can enhance food security and nutrition (medium confidence) (Giller et al., \r\n2017; Stone, 2017; Montenegro de Wit, 2019).\r\nTo address food security and nutrition, future breeding needs to move from just enhancing \r\nagronomic traits of a single crop to improving multiple traits of multiple crops suited to \r\nlocal conditions that will increase climate resilience of farming systems. To make breeding \r\ntechnologies scale-neutral, the policy structure needs to support and protect smallholders \r\n(medium confidence)."


id: 935da0f833dc3936eb52df8b824fc00d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"Urban areas have more than half of the global population and consume \r\nabout 70% of the total food supply (FAO, 2019b). The urban population \r\nis projected to grow further to about 70% of the global population \r\nby 2050 (UN, 2018). Direct evidence supporting climate resilience of \r\nurban and peri-urban agriculture (UPA) is limited and contextual, but \r\nthere is medium confidence of multi-functional benefits from UPA, \r\ndepending on regions and types of UPA (Artmann and Sartison, 2018; \r\nKareem et  al., 2020). UPA takes different forms of production, and \r\ncan be broadly classified into four categories, depending on operating \r\ncharacteristics and capital inputs (Table 5.16) (Goldstein et al., 2016). \r\nControlled environments can protect crops, livestock and fish from \r\nextreme weather events or pest and disease outbreak (Mohareb \r\net al., 2017)"


id: 7fe00240e0c03e4bec220e1a071af158
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" Innovative indoor farming such as vertical farming can \r\nbe highly productive with minimal water and nutrient supply but can \r\nbe capital intensive with high energy demand (O'Sullivan et al., 2019), \r\nand those with aquaponics can be water demanding (Love et  al., \r\n2015). Currently, commodities are often limited to crops with short \r\ngrowing seasons such as leafy vegetables. Vertically grown crops are \r\nmore expensive than field-grown produce and, thus, not accessible \r\nfor low-income urban dwellers (Al-Kodmany, 2018). Community and \r\ninstitutional unconditioned (outdoor) farms and gardens are better \r\npositioned to provide increased access to healthy food to those who \r\nneed it (Eigenbrod and Gruda, 2015; Goodman and Minner, 2019)."


id: 4e17e71279c6e4b106f7bcf9c4db6116
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"A study in Lesotho examined the extent to which climate change \r\nincreased the likelihood of an acute drought in 2007, and a related \r\nfood crisis (Verschuur et al., 2021). Given land degradation, reliance on \r\nrainfed agriculture and food imports from neighbouring South Africa, \r\nthe study recommended crop diversification, increased use of drought \r\ntolerant crop varieties and expanded trade partners in the medium to \r\nlong term, to both strengthen regional food production and reduce \r\nrisk of crop failure and the likelihood of climate-induced drought \r\nfrom trade partners reducing food imports (Verschuur et al., 2021). A \r\nlongitudinal study of smallholder coffee farmers in Nicaragua found \r\nthat crop diversification, alongside crop management and varietal \r\nimprovement, would help farmers strengthen food security long \r\nterm in the face of climate hazards such as drought and coffee leaf \r\nrust (Bacon et al., 2021)"


id: df30470737c376253823731e0e00132d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" Another medium- to long-term adaptation \r\nresponse is to address systemic gender, land tenure and other social \r\ninequities as part of an inclusive approach (Bezner Kerr et al., 2019; \r\nKhatri-Chhetri et al., 2020; Bacon et al., 2021). This long-term strategy \r\ncould be part of a human-rights-based approach (HRBA, 5.12.8)"


id: 267cba253d77a8f69a9f0767b3937c59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"menu (Bacon and Krpan, 2018; Kurz, 2018; Garnett et al., 2019; Gravert \r\nand Kurz, 2019), the relative price of vegetarian options (Garnett et al., \r\n2021) and the 'access' (order and distance) to vegetarian options in \r\nthe retail physical environment (Garnett et al., 2020) can all increase \r\nconsumption of plant-based foods and decrease meat consumption \r\n(Bianchi et al., 2018). Studies on food environment 'nudging' methods \r\nfound that making the vegetarian meal option the default during \r\nconference registration or on a meal plan significantly reduced meat \r\nconsumption (Campbell-Arvai et al., 2012; Hansen et al., 2019b). Studies \r\nsimply educating people about the negative health and environmental/\r\nclimate outcomes of meat consumption have been found to have very \r\nlittle impact (Byerly et al., 2018). More research is needed to understand \r\nthe potential for motivational crowding in shaping pro-climate dietary \r\nchoice, as has been demonstrated in development (Agrawal et al"


id: 77e026dcde8a489d8a42fed614c0a3ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"Integrated multi-sectoral strategies that incorporate social protection \r\nare effective adaptation responses (high confidence) (Gros et  al., \r\n2019; Ulrichs et  al., 2019; Medina Hidalgo et  al., 2020; Daron et  al., \r\n2021; Ilboudo Nebie et al., 2021; Verschuur et al., 2021; 7.4.2, Cross\u0002Chapter Box-GENDER in Chapter 18). Social protection programmes, \r\nsuch as cash transfers, weather index insurance and asset-building \r\nactivities such as well construction, can support short-term responses to \r\nacute food insecurity in response to extreme events but can also build \r\nadaptive capacity longer term (Table 5.16, Costella et al., 2017; Ulrichs \r\net al., 2019). An assessment of an adaptive social protection programme \r\nin the Sahel found that tailored seasonal forecasting can improve \r\nresponsiveness to climate-related extreme events, but investment in \r\ncapacity building and dialogue between forecasters, community groups \r\nand humanitarian organisations is needed (Daron et al., 2021)"


id: 1191ed4726bce7475b8ccfb7ed4def29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" Forecast\u0002based financing, which automatically disperses funds when threshold \r\nforecasts are reached for an extreme event (Coughlan de Perez et al., \r\n2016), used in Bangladesh prior to a 2017 flood event allowed low\u0002income, flood-prone communities to access better-quality food in the \r\nshort term without accruing debt (Gros et al., 2019)."


id: d475ab676e2d930e93a50ceeb7bbf16c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"A human rights-based approach (HRBA), endorsed by the UN, is one \r\nstrategy for addressing core inequities that are key drivers for food \r\ninsecurity and malnutrition of particular groups such as low-income \r\nconsumers, children, women, small-scale producers and different \r\nregions of the world (FAO, 2013; Claeys and Delgado Pugley, 2017; \r\nCaron et  al., 2018; Le Mouel et  al., 2018; Springmann et  al., 2018; \r\nTramel, 2018; HLPE, 2019; Willett et al., 2019). Climate change impacts, \r\nmitigation and adaptation approaches can also worsen inequities \r\n(Eastin, 2018; Borras et  al., 2020). HRBA includes core principles of \r\nparticipation, accountability, non-discrimination, transparency, human \r\nrights, empowerment and rule of law, which can be integrated into \r\npolicymaking and implementation as part of transforming the food \r\nsystem (FAO, 2013; Caron et al., 2018; Toussaint and Martinez Blanco, \r\n2020)"


id: b738797c62d5b0b9da8f559b41b33698
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" The right to well-being can serve as the overarching umbrella \r\nof HRBA to addressing climate change within food systems and \r\nincludes a right to health, right to food, cultural rights, the rights of \r\nthe child and the right to healthy environment (Swinburn et al., 2019). \r\nAn HRBA has a specific focus on those groups who are vulnerable \r\ndue to poverty, discrimination and historical inequities and involves \r\nmeaningful participation of vulnerable groups in governance, design \r\nand implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies, including \r\ngender responsiveness and integration of Indigenous Peoples' \r\nknowledge (UNHRC 2017; Caron et al., 2018; Mills, 2018). There can \r\nbe conflicts and trade-offs, such as between addressing land rights or \r\ntraditional fishing grounds, the right to food, and addressing climate \r\njustice concerns (Mills, 2018; Borras et al., 2020; Section 5.13)"


id: 853a9a4efd1c6aaf473de783266dee66
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" Adaptation \r\nstrategies that incorporate HRBA include legislation, programmes that \r\naddress gender inequities in agriculture, agroecology, recognition of \r\nrights to land, fishing areas and other natural resources, protection \r\nof culturally significant seeds, and community-based adaptation that \r\nexplicitly involves marginalised groups in governance (Mills, 2018; \r\nTramel, 2018; Huyer et al., 2019; Borras et al., 2020; Section 5.14)."


id: 9415aeba1db859803fbd1a53b7b51575
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"Differentiated responses based on food security level and climate risk \r\ncan be effective. A study of drought impacts on food security in Senegal \r\nbetween 1997 and 2016 recommended different adaptation strategies \r\nbased on whether the region was a higher risk of acute short-term food \r\ninsecurity and/or faced higher risk of drought (Table 5.16; Ilboudo Nebie \r\net  al., 2021). Given identified linkages between higher temperatures \r\nand extreme events with declines in child dietary diversity, safeguarding \r\ndiverse diets is one important adaptation priority (Niles et al., 2021). \r\nHumanitarian responses are appropriate for short-term acute hunger, \r\nwhile in the medium term, home-grown school feeding programmes \r\nwith diverse foods can support child nutrition and learning, and with \r\nlocal procurement can also increase income and food security of \r\nsmallholder farmers (Ilboudo Nebie et al., 2021)"


id: af9024e6c9655bcc62c2bf6137309c65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" Farmer associations \r\ncan manage regional staple food storehouses, in which farmers store \r\ntheir harvest and receive credit, and can sell their harvest later in \r\nthe season and pay back the credit with interest, strengthening local \r\nsupplies and farmer income (Ilboudo Nebie et al., 2021)."


id: 569caefbf1215ee2200d58c8fb6ce1fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"Land deals raise important social justice questions (Franco et  al., \r\n2017; Hunsberger et  al., 2017; Borras and Franco, 2018b; Borras \r\net  al., 2020; Sekine, 2021) (high confidence). Specific impacts of \r\nland deals vary according to their purpose, location, actors, land use \r\nhistory and procedural aspects. However, multi-case analyses identify \r\nsevere adverse impacts (Table 5.18). LSLAs are a significant driver of \r\ntropical forest loss (Davis et al., 2020), increasing emissions through \r\ndeforestation (Liao et  al., 2021) and industrialisation of agriculture \r\n(Rosa et  al., 2021). LSLAs entail large water appropriations (Breu \r\net  al., 2016; Chiarelli et  al., 2016; Adams et  al., 2019), affecting \r\nlocal populations' access to water and food security (Dell'Angelo \r\net  al., 2018; Veldwisch et  al., 2018). By increasing exported crops, \r\nand limiting local populations' access to land, LSLAs produce food \r\nsecurity risks (Marselis et  al., 2017; Muller et  al., 2021b)"


id: 228df12278d8f86b60eb20af9825fb81
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" Negative \r\nlivelihoods impacts arise through enclosure of assets, elite capture \r\n(Oberlack et  al., 2016), crowding out of small farmers (Nolte and \r\nOstermeier, 2017) and reducing local populations' access to commons \r\n(Dell'Angelo et al., 2016; Giger et al., 2019). Indigenous People are \r\naffected, facing high levels of violence in land acquisition conflicts \r\n(Dell'Angelo et al., 2021). The social burdens of land deals tend to be \r\ngendered (e.g., Fonjong et al., 2016; Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner \r\nKerr, 2017; Atuoye et al., 2021)."


id: 7618e2933eed4ff29375c7cf3e441613
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"Local populations can experience declining access to livelihood \r\nresources and deteriorating food security, increasing gendered \r\nvulnerabilities (Yengoh et  al., 2015; Faye and Ribot, 2017; Atuoye \r\net  al., 2021). Vulnerable groups displaced by land deals may face \r\nhigher exposure to climate change (Dell'Angelo et  al., 2017). \r\nLSLAs affecting common-pool resources governed by Indigenous \r\ninstitutions jeopardise the resilience and adaptive capacity of local \r\nsocio-ecological systems (Dell'Angelo et al., 2016; D'Odorico et al., \r\n2017; Hak et  al., 2018; Haller, 2019; Haller et  al., 2020). Growing \r\nland tenure insecurity may force farmers to engage in unsustainable \r\nfarming and forestry practices (Aha and Ayitey, 2017; Gabay and \r\nAlam, 2017) and hinder agroecological innovations to manage \r\nclimate risks (Nyantakyi-Frimpong, 2020b)"


id: 3b05e265375f3a9ae56cff0edaa1f1be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" Social justice concerns \r\nand vulnerability of local populations can be addressed by promoting \r\nland redistribution and recognition, particularly for customary lands \r\nof Indigenous and ethnic minorities, and land restitution to those \r\nwho were forcibly displaced (Franco et al., 2015; Borras and Franco, \r\n2018a)."


id: 41c4ed1ce2ccf2e43d6bc64008b39d4f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"Agricultural intensification seeks to increase agricultural productivity \r\nper input unit, reducing the pressure on land use and generating \r\npositive impacts in GHG emissions (Mbow et al., 2019), but valuing \r\nthe final effect requires common metrics in terms of carbon capture or \r\nemission reductions (Searchinger et al., 2018). It has been suggested \r\nto address multiple SDGs (SDG2, SDG13, SDG15) but only occasionally \r\nleads to simultaneous positive ecosystem service and well-being \r\noutcomes (Rasmussen et al., 2018). When the process relies only on \r\nincreasing input use, there is a risk of generating adverse outcomes \r\nthat may override positive effects, such as CO2 emissions, (McGill et al., \r\n2018), NOx emissions (Hickman et  al., 2017), soil salinisation and \r\ngroundwater depletion (Doody et al., 2015; Daliakopoulos et al., 2016; \r\nFragaszy and Closas, 2016; Foster et  al., 2018; Florke et  al., 2019)"


id: d8e98b412f1c12d6f5cdc4f80851a517
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"Competition over use of major aquaculture feed crops (Fry et al., 2016) \r\nwith terrestrial livestock (Troell et al., 2014), and fish use by terrestrial \r\nlivestock, will also place pressure on fish and crop resources (medium \r\nconfidence) (Cottrell et al., 2018). Increases in feed prices will affect \r\nfish and meat prices (Troell et al., 2014), and changes in agriculture \r\nwill be needed to satisfy aquaculture demands (Blanchard et al., 2017). \r\nAquaculture and livestock dietary components may also compromise \r\ncrops and forage fish that provide essential nutrients for low-income \r\nhouseholds increasing nutritional insecurity, in regions of sub-Saharan \r\nAfrica, Asia and Latin America (Troell et al., 2014). Waste fish products \r\ncan supplement fish meal and oil to reduce competition for feed, as \r\nwell as reducing use of fish that could go to human consumption \r\n(medium confidence) (Little et al., 2016; Shepherd et al., 2017; Dave \r\nand Routray, 2018; Naylor et al., 2021)"


id: 4918210bc136f0aa7f7d98c1ffd4e82d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" Use of algae, bacteria, yeast \r\nand insect diets could replace fishmeal for aquaculture (Cohen et al., \r\n2018; Hua et al., 2019; Cottrell et al., 2020), not affecting nutritional \r\nprofiles (Campanaro et al., 2019), and fish could be reared on waste \r\nby-products of other food production systems (Bava et  al., 2019). \r\nComplete fish oil substitutions with microalgae may be possible \r\nwithout compromising omega-3 contents, but energy usage in diet \r\nproduction should be considered Cottrell et al. (2020). Substitutions \r\nof plant-based and alternative feeds may decrease food conversion \r\nefficiencies (Cottrell et al., 2020), affect omega-3 content of farmed \r\nseafood (Fry et al., 2016; Shepherd et al., 2017), be problematic for \r\nthe fish themselves (Little et al., 2016; Naylor et al., 2021) and lead to \r\nreduced productivity (Shepherd et al., 2017)."


id: bead7331c2007e84320dfbf73f52f521
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content:
"Livestock and aquaculture feeds utilise crops such as soyabean \r\nand maize, with food conversion efficiencies similar in chicken and \r\nAtlantic salmon, and higher in pigs and cattle (Troell et  al., 2014; \r\nFry et al., 2018b; Fry et al., 2018a). Use of wild fish meal and oil has \r\nbeen decreasing, partly due to concerns regarding vulnerable small \r\npelagic fish stocks (Bindoff et  al., 2019). The instability of wild fish \r\nstocks has increased terrestrial crop feed components (Troell et  al., \r\n2014; Blanchard et al., 2017; FAO, 2017; Cottrell et al., 2018). The use \r\nof wild fish in fish feeds that may have been directly consumed may \r\nput low-income households at risk of food insecurity (Troell et  al., \r\n2014). An increasing demand for aquaculture products intensifies \r\ncompetition for feed supplies (medium confidence) (Troell et al., 2014; \r\nBlanchard et al., 2017)"


id: 4a22d26f4523fe2fe8eb079dc43ef1f9
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" Increases in demands for animal protein and \r\nshifts to pescatarian diets will increase the existing competition for \r\nland resources, particularly in low- and medium-income countries, \r\nwith negative impacts on food security (Makkar, 2018), but may be \r\nmitigated by dietary changes, novel feeds and food waste usage for \r\naquatic systems (Berners-Lee et  al., 2018; Hua et  al., 2019; Cottrell \r\net al., 2020)."


id: 1cd54edfc9d1426c365b8bceb9a74513
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"Inclusive planning initiatives such as community-based anticipatory \r\nadaptation combined with 'two-way learning' that considers future \r\nscenarios and different adaptation pathways can prevent maladaptation \r\n(high confidence) (Dovie, 2017; Bezner Kerr et al., 2019; Neset et al., \r\n2019a; Rahman and Hickey, 2019; Work et al., 2019; Butler et al., 2020; \r\nNunn et al., 2020; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020; Westoby et al., 2020; \r\nTable  5.20). Promising policy management tools combine temporal \r\nscales and mitigation-adaptation interactions and consider political \r\ndynamics, socioeconomic impacts and trade-offs for vulnerable groups, \r\nlong-term support for policy leaders, efforts to establish livelihood \r\n'niches' and ongoing participatory evaluation (Dovie, 2017; Holsman \r\net al., 2019; Rahman and Hickey, 2019; Work et al., 2019; Butler et al., \r\n2020). A focus on the most disadvantaged groups can help small\u0002scale producers at higher risk to prevent maladaptation (FAO, 2018c)"


id: b6681984c232f8d08b492c920df53839
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" \r\nGovernance mechanisms have emerged that consider food security, \r\nsocio-cultural factors, and land and water rights, using participatory, \r\ninclusive 'two-way learning' methods that involve vulnerable people \r\nalongside government (IPCC, 2018; Holsman et al., 2019; IPCC, 2019b; \r\nRahman and Hickey, 2019; Butler et al., 2020)."


id: adde0a5f092d0f63b73b0562b000d460
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"A significant proportion of land targeted for A/R projects is inhabited \r\nand used by Indigenous Peoples and local communities (Cagalanan, \r\n2016). Indigenous Peoples have rights to and/or manage at least \r\n37.9  million km2\r\n of land and influence land management across \r\nat least 28.1% of the land area (Garnett et  al., 2018). At least a \r\nquarter of the global land area is traditionally owned, managed, \r\nused or occupied by Indigenous Peoples, overlapping with 35-40% \r\nof the area that is formally protected (Garnett et al., 2018; Brondizio \r\net  al., 2019). In many cases, A/R is implemented in areas where \r\ntenure rights are insecure and Indigenous Peoples' rights are at \r\nrisk of being disregarded (Naughton-Treves and Wendland, 2014; \r\nKohler and Brondizio, 2017; Garnett et al., 2018) (medium evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Many projects are also found in areas where \r\ncomplex socio-political contexts challenge management (Jurjonas \r\nand Seekamp, 2019)"


id: b67fbbb886ca5b425863e986cde292b4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 26232
content:
" It is anticipated that A/R projects will create \r\nhuge pressures on existing land uses and generate further land use \r\nconflicts (Aggarwal, 2014; Robinson et al., 2014; Paul et al., 2016; \r\nBrancalion and Chazdon, 2017; Pye et al., 2017; Bond et al., 2019). \r\nIn addition, many afforestation projects are conducted in regions \r\nthat are not bio-climatically suitable, leading to the degradation of \r\necosystems that are key to local livelihoods (Veldman et al., 2015; \r\nRobinson et al., 2016b)."


id: 9ed73dded06eb260541d8625510a9acf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 22533
content:
"Insurance is a financial adaptation strategy increasingly used in \r\nagriculture and aquaculture. A relatively new approach to agricultural \r\ninsurance risk is the use of financial derivative products, such as index\u0002based agricultural insurance (IBAI), marketed by financial institutions \r\nto farmers to help them deal with weather-related production risks \r\n(Isakson, 2015; Jensen and Barrett, 2017). The basic idea is to rely on \r\neasily observed weather indices, such as precipitation or temperature, \r\nthat co-vary with farm production. Insurance payments are received \r\nwhen the metric trigger for a region is reached, eliminating the need \r\nto collect farm-specific information. Proponents of index insurance \r\nargue that it can resolve the information costs and incentive problems \r\ninherent in rural financial markets, such as adverse selection, and allow \r\nprovision of insurance coverage at a fraction of the costs of loss-based \r\npolices (Jensen and Barrett, 2017)"


id: 98838784e3c402d073279e44dee7195e
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content:
" Buyers of index policies do not have \r\nto prove their ownership of assets with weather-related losses. This \r\nlowers transactions costs and makes it more affordable to insure small \r\nplots of land."


id: 6ced8d4655af21cfcde6718903310638
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 14757
content:
"There may be inequality in access to climate services; their use may tend \r\nto benefit large-scale operations and disadvantage small- and medium\u0002scale farmers and others who face issues of access due to social and \r\neconomic inequity; also some groups such as pastoralists have not \r\nyet benefitted from climate services (high confidence) (Furman et al., \r\n2014; Muema et  al., 2018; Awazi et  al., 2019; Nyantakyi-Frimpong, \r\n2019; Paudyal et al., 2019; Vaughan et al., 2019; Nidumolu et al., 2020; \r\nPartey et  al., 2020). Other challenges include technology ignorance, \r\ndata privacy and security, data access permissions, software and \r\nsystem compatibility, and understanding how to use and derive value \r\nfrom accessed data (Chatuphale and Armstrong, 2018; Drewry et al., \r\n2019). More work is needed to understand the factors that prevent \r\nfarmers and fishers from benefitting from this new information"


id: 32fbbc19dcdcf3d7dddd10868b9b321
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 5444
content:
" Recent \r\nassessments suggest that access to, and value of, climate and weather \r\ninformation can be enhanced by the development of digital tools \r\n(including radio, text messages, etc.) appropriate to the specific needs \r\nof different vulnerable groups, as well as by including these groups in "


id: 25955865018af22503063be8df008e5d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"The creation of index insurance requires significant prior research \r\nand extensive data that may not be available or sufficient in lower\u0002income countries, including identifying the most appropriate farm and \r\nclimate variables to include and financial and regulatory support from \r\nthe public sector (Economic Commission for Latin America and the \r\nCaribbean and Central American Agricultural Council of the Central \r\nAmerican Integration System, 2013; Economic Commission for Latin \r\nAmerica and the Caribbean and System, 2014). Some insurance \r\nproviders bundle it with other services, such as fertilizer use or seeds \r\nthat may not be useful to particular farmers and can increase their \r\noverall capital costs (Isakson, 2015). Although proponents see IBAI \r\nas a way to mitigate farmers' risks associated with more variable \r\nweather patterns (Greatrex et al"


id: 6aba4826f23eca46ea27ba593c50eb77
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", 2015), critics argue that derivative\u0002based insurance products tend to benefit wealthier farmers and fail in \r\nassisting the poorest and most marginalised farmers (Isakson, 2015; \r\nTaylor, 2016). Thus far, there is low agreement and medium evidence\r\nregarding the adaptation potential of derivatives-based insurance \r\nproducts, signalling a need for further research in this area."


id: 2d81e21791e54138a1af9eae0e3a65ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4600
content:
"Community-based monitoring of forests, coral reefs, seagrass and \r\nmangroves are examples of local natural resource assessment that \r\ncan support food security and livelihoods while informing regional and \r\nnational climate change planning tools (Carter et  al., 2014; Gevana \r\net al., 2018; Avtar et al., 2019). Negotiation among many stakeholders \r\nat multiple scales, including inclusive mechanisms to address power \r\ninequities in governance structures and communities, may be needed \r\nfor CbA to be effective (Avtar et al., 2019; McNamara et al., 2020). \r\nIndigenous knowledge and community-based management of \r\nfisheries and aquaculture in the Arctic and Asia (Roux et  al., 2019; \r\nChen and Cheng, 2020; Galappaththi et al., 2020a; Schott et al., 2020; \r\nGalappaththi et al., 2021) provide adaptive strategies for sustainable \r\nuse. (Iticha and Husen, 2019)"


id: 5f205e2341c2147a0afadf1dfb98b335
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" Community-based climate services in \r\nthe Andes (managed through a collaboration of smallholder producers \r\nand an international partnership) built capacity and knowledge of \r\nclimate change dynamics as well as trust in local climate institutions, \r\nproviding meaningful information for regional responses to climate \r\nchange impacts (Rossa, 2020). Community-based participatory \r\nscenario planning can help identify multiple climate stressors and \r\nvulnerabilities to develop effective adaptation plans (Fernandez\u0002Gimenez et al., 2015; Bennett et al., 2016; Cross-Chapter Box MOVING \r\nPLATE this chapter)."


id: cea3c0701798d0b7914fecd6dd0c73c6
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"evidence, low agreement) (Griffin et al., 2015; Chapin et al., 2016; Karg \r\net al., 2016). Collective trademarks (Quinones-Ruiz et al., 2015) and \r\nparticipatory guarantee systems (Niederle et al., 2020) are examples \r\nof innovative institutional strategies to strengthen local and regional \r\nfood systems. In the urban context, the city region food system (CRFS) \r\napproach is motivated by reducing dependence on international trade \r\nand associated instability and to facilitate local decision making (Karg \r\net  al., 2016). CRFS includes a network within a regional landscape \r\naround one urban centre and surrounding peri-urban and rural regions \r\n(Blay-Palmer et al., 2018). UPA is promoted as an effective strategy to \r\nadapt to climate change in different contexts (see Section  5.12.5.3, \r\nDubbeling, 2015; Lwasa et  al., 2015)"


id: 744fae1a6e5f9173036d11418fc2b2b3
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" To cope with the effects of \r\nclimate change, strengthening regional food systems is becoming \r\nan explicit part of urban and regional policy, being tested in many \r\ndifferent cities worldwide (Dubbeling et al., 2017; Blay-Palmer et al., \r\n2018; Berner et al., 2019; Sellberg et al., 2020; van der Gaast et al., \r\n2020). Strengthening both local and regional food systems has to be \r\nbalanced against limitations and trade-offs, since modelling exercises \r\nof regionalisation scenarios show urban agriculture cannot achieve \r\nfood security in areas with rapid population growth (Le Mouel et al., \r\n2018). Furthermore, international trade can compensate in cases \r\nwhere the regional system fails due to extreme events or other related \r\nclimate shocks (Section 5.11.8)."


id: c9077b079709405ef26994c494044113
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"An assessment of 32 different CbA initiatives in the Pacific Islands, \r\nincluding addressing risks to food security, found high-performing \r\nprojects had six key entry points: effective methods to improve \r\nadaptive capacity, appropriate to the local context, which moved \r\nbeyond narrow geographical definitions of community to consider \r\nequity of impact, and ecosystem-based approaches, jointly addressing \r\nclimatic and non-livelihood pressures and consideration of future \r\nclimatic trends (McNamara et al., 2020). Low-performing initiatives, in \r\ncontrast, were not sustained; these overlooked future climatic trends \r\nin their initiatives, such as beehive susceptibility to climate extremes, \r\nand had dependent, unequal relationships that lacked genuine local \r\napproval or ownership and did not fit local values and context (Spires \r\net al., 2014; McNamara et al., 2020; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020)"


id: d540ee30b18f568c3e1b0ba3f5689238
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" CbA \r\ninitiatives can also suffer from not having adequate local knowledge of \r\npotential strategies to address future climatic scenarios, and may lead \r\nto maladaptation, increasing socioeconomic inequities in communities \r\n(Nagoda, 2015). Addressing inequity in power dynamics and building \r\ntechnical adaptive capacity of local people are some of the ways that \r\nCbA initiatives can support more resilient food systems (McNamara \r\net al., 2020)."


id: 8a5071af9f1f71f1e521dac69a85f622
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content:
"Food sovereignty brings together adaptation options based on \r\nagroecological methods, access to resources, collective and CbA (HLPE, \r\n2019). Addressing food security and nutrition in light of climate change \r\nimpacts and vulnerabilities is considered to arise from a mixture of \r\nglobalised supply chains and local production, not one or the other \r\n(Blesh et al., 2019; Stringer et al., 2020). Evidence on strengthening \r\nlocal and regional food systems with a food sovereignty approach, \r\nin terms of access to resources (land, seeds, water), shortened food \r\nchains and CbA strategies suggest that these strategies can positively \r\ncontribute to climate change adaptation in many contexts (medium \r\nconfidence) (SRCCL) but can also lead to conflict especially regarding \r\nmanagement of mobile resources such as fisheries (Section 5.8, Cross\u0002Chapter Box MOVING PLATE this chapter)"


id: 92cba984e2d92f6e7c79497bbaca9330
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" All these options can build \r\nadaptation through actions that strengthen local capacities and the \r\npower to act within food systems. Securing and recognising tenure \r\nfor Indigenous Peoples (Hurlbert et al., 2019) and local communities \r\n(Oates et al., 2020) can improve their ability to adapt by increasing \r\nthe incentive to invest in resilient infrastructure and sustainable \r\nland management practices. Community seed banks and networks \r\nstrengthen local seed systems and realise farmers' rights favouring \r\naccess to a variety of local genetic resources, with landraces often \r\nmore adapted to the local social, cultural and ecological environment \r\nand needs, and better adapted to harsh environments without external \r\ninputs (Mousseau, 2015; Bisht et al., 2018; Maharjan and Maharjan, \r\n2018; Otieno et  al., 2018; Mbow et  al., 2019). This plays a key role \r\nin PPB (Section 5.4.4.5; FAO, 2019e)"


id: 1eebadde18c27dc3db14fa125b4d1ae7
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" The integration of informal and \r\nformal seed system elements is important for the adaptive capacity of \r\nsmallholder farmers (Westengen and Brysting, 2014; Westengen and \r\nBerg, 2016; FAO, 2019e)."


id: 467b142bbe8785af58f6f59fd78a0461
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Addressing gender and other social inequities (e.g., racial, ethnicity, \r\nage, income, geographic location) in markets, governance and control \r\nover resources is a key enabling condition for climate-resilient \r\ntransitions in land and aquatic ecosystems (high confidence) (Pearse, \r\n2017; Vermeulen et  al., 2018; Blesh et  al., 2019; Rao et  al., 2019b; \r\nCross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18, Section 5,13,1; Tavenner \r\net  al., 2019). Adaptation strategies can have negative impacts on \r\nmarginalised social groups and worsen socioeconomic inequities \r\nunless explicit efforts are made to address unequal power dynamics and \r\ndifferences in access to resources in agricultural, fisheries, aquaculture, \r\nlivestock and forestry systems (high confidence) (Glemarec, 2017; \r\nHaji and Legesse, 2017; Nagoda and Nightingale, 2017; Nightingale, \r\n2017; Rao et al., 2019b; Huyer and Partey, 2020; Mikulewicz, 2020; \r\nTaylor and Bhasme, 2020; Eriksen et al., 2021)"


id: 241e527c9a06f860c2d8941ec40fca07
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content:
" Technical approaches to \r\nadaptation that ignore inequities can worsen them; see, for example, \r\nthe case study on Climate Smart Agriculture (Box  5.12). Enabling \r\nenvironments support inclusive decision making, capacity building, \r\nshifts in social rules, norms and behaviours and access to resources \r\nfor marginalised groups for climate change adaptation (e.g., Tschakert \r\net al., 2016; Ziervogel, 2019; Eriksen et al., 2021; Garcia et al., 2021)."


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"(Ford et  al., 2015; Brugnach et  al., 2017; Figueroa-Helland et  al., \r\n2018). Where  Indigenous  Peoples have access to and control over \r\ntheir lands and natural resources, food systems can potentially be \r\nmore sustainably managed and more resilient (high confidence) \r\n(Rumbach and Foley, 2014; O'Connell-Milne, 2015; Camacho et  al., \r\n2016; Janhiainen, 2017; Kihila, 2018). For example, on Solomon \r\nIslands, community-based adaptation combining with IK-informed \r\ncommunity mapping helped boost agricultural yields sustainably (Leon \r\net al., 2015), and in China people living in rich plant resource regions \r\nhave used their wild plants IK to complement the decrease of crop \r\nyields during extreme droughts to ensure food security (Zhang et al., \r\n2016). These cases have led scientists and local communities to call \r\nfor more practical actions to bridge local knowledge, IK and formal \r\nscience (Borquez et al., 2017; Klenk et al"


id: e711eaa8bb5c32d306468c72edae4ec1
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", 2017; Mukhopadhyay, 2017; \r\nOlorunfemi, 2017; Reyes-Garcia et  al., 2019). Despite this increased \r\npublic and scientific recognition, IK is often not acknowledged or used."


id: 3dabbcfa2ac94872dcb4dee0cbd6ded
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"Supporting Indigenous groups' knowledge and other excluded social \r\ngroups can help preserve and harness underutilised resources to \r\nenhance nutritional and economic security, with careful measures in \r\nprotecting Indigenous intellectual rights and avoiding commodification \r\nexploitation (Nakashima et  al., 2012; Nandal and Bhardwaj, 2014; \r\nGhosh-Jerath et al., 2015; Ebert, 2017). In some regions, there has been a \r\nloss of IK about food systems, reducing adaptive capacity (Richards et al., \r\n2019; Panikkar and Lemmond, 2020). Knowledge exchange between \r\nIndigenous elders and youth can support adaptive capacity (Osterhoudt, \r\n2018; Richards et al., 2019; Zin et al., 2019). Education utilising IK and \r\nLK can help prevent maladaptation options (high confidence) (Melvin \r\net  al., 2017; Taremwa, 2017; Forbis Jr. and Hayhoe, 2018; Narayan \r\net al., 2020)"


id: a536bcba5b501303e862e4ddc47b65a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) is an approach that aims to increase agricultural productivity, enhance food security, adapt to climate \r\nchange and, where possible, reduce GHG emissions. The effective implementation of climate-smart practices is conceptually linked to an \r\nenabling environment in which policies, institutions and finance can re-orient agricultural systems, thereby supporting development and \r\nenhancing food security in a changing climate (Lipper et al., 2014; Karttunen et al., 2017). However, the concept has received criticism \r\nbased on the absence of conceptual clarity of the interrelations between productivity, food security, adaptation and mitigation (Arenas\u0002Sanchez et al., 2019) and because of limited evidence on the efficacy of CSA for achieving adaptation and mitigation outcomes at a global \r\nscale (Arslan et al., 2015; Lamanna et al., 2016; Chandra et al., 2018)"


id: f4ede68b420da3c7e94f3ac61422f90f
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" Some argue that CSA operates within an apolitical framework that \r\ntends to minimise issues concerning power, inequity and access, and is overly focused on technical approaches (Taylor, 2017; HLPE, 2019). \r\nCSA is explicitly referenced by more than 30 countries in their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) (Ross et al., 2016), \r\nbut measuring the degree of its implementation still represents a challenge."


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"There is low agreement, medium evidence on the relationship between CSA and equity (Allen, 2018; Karlsson et al., 2018). CSA can \r\npotentially benefit women if they are able to take advantage of improvements in productivity, food security and adaptation decision \r\nmaking as a result of the implementation of CSA practices. Nevertheless, these advantages can be unequally realised given male \r\ndomination in receiving information and extension services, as well as financial or resource access (Jost et al., 2016). Some (Huyer and \r\nPartey, 2020) argue that CSA may undermine gender equity (Collins, 2018), entrench and solidify power (Haapala, 2018), and result in the \r\ndisproportional allocation of new labour-intensive activities to women (Jost et al., 2016). Uptake of some climate-smart technologies can \r\nfurther marginalise the most disadvantaged local groups (Roncoli et al., 2009; Haapala, 2018)"


id: 595b407934923dec5c8fe6ec436fb2f1
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" Unequal sharing of benefits and burdens \r\nwith respect to emission reduction costs among different agricultural groups has also been observed (Budiman, 2019)."


id: c8fffc688f8b20ecb71c8e43e7e71918
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"Recent reviews have summarised literature on production system \r\ntransformations, driven at least in part by a changing climate or \r\nchanging climate variability. Such transformations may involve \r\nsometimes substantial shifts in farm and livelihood enterprises \r\nand land configurations, including intensification, diversification, \r\nsedentarisation and abandonment of agriculture (Vermeulen et al., 2018; \r\nThornton et al., 2019). Relevant literature is summarised in Table 5.24, \r\nshowing reported farmers' perceptions of the drivers of change and \r\nthe different outcomes of these changes. The consequences of these \r\nproduction system transitions have been mixed; in about 40% of cases, \r\nthe outcomes at household level have been unequivocally beneficial. \r\nIn the other cases, there were detrimental effects on livelihoods, or \r\na mixture of positive and negative effects. The effects on nutritional \r\nsecurity reported in these studies were limited"


id: b911d76cf0e188e5e50454a1400a542f
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" Different enablers of \r\nchange appear critical if transitions are to have positive outcomes. \r\nPolicy environments, defined in terms of multi-level governance \r\nstructures and institutions, are a key driver of systems change, as well \r\nas being enablers of and barriers to adaptation responses (Xu et al., \r\n2008; Namgay et al., 2014; Galvin et al., 2015; Schmidt and Pearson, \r\n2016; Liao and Fei, 2017). Policies around property and grazing rights \r\nare directly linked to small-scale food producer vulnerability, and \r\nland ownership changes will pose a key challenge as climate change "


id: d6557a3a17f6187c173c2e7edafd8166
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"Young people are key agents in agrifood systems: both a vulnerable group, and one that can foster systemic change (high confidence) \r\n(Brooks et al., 2019; Figure X; IFAD, 2019; Flynn and Sumberg, 2021; HLPE, 2021). Food systems are the largest source of employment for \r\nyoung people, but do not always provide adequate livelihoods or decent working conditions (HLPE, 2021). Regions with more youthful \r\npopulations--such as Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Central America--are both highly vulnerable to climate change impacts and \r\nreliant on agriculture, forestry, aquaculture and fisheries for livelihoods (Brooks et al., 2019; IFAD, 2019; HLPE, 2021). Rural youth in \r\nthese sectors are particularly vulnerable, often with less access to land, water, capital and other resources, shaped by family and social \r\nrelations, and fewer opportunities (high confidence) (Chingala et al., 2017; Ricker-Gilbert and Chamberlin, 2018; IFAD, 2019; Yeboah et al"


id: fa6a7db99ed0c4de414f0e7309f2bab8
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", \r\n2020; Flynn and Sumberg, 2021; Nhat Lam Duyen, 2021). In these vulnerable regions, climate change compounds other drivers such as \r\npoverty to increase youth out-migration to urban areas or other regions (medium confidence) (Zin et al., 2019; Weinreb et al., 2020; HLPE, \r\n2021; Stoltz et al., 2021; Voss, 2021), which can further worsen rural economies. Young low-income rural women may be particularly \r\nmarginalised and vulnerable due to systemic gender inequities in access to land, credit, employment, institutions and other resources \r\n(medium confidence) (Sah Akwen, 2017; IFAD, 2019; Flynn and Sumberg, 2021)."


id: 55d218563569b4725b1b08bb33681708
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"Youth play a critical role in all sectors of the food system (HLPE, 2021; Figure Box 5.13.1), and some are actively pursuing work and \r\ninnovation in agrifood systems (medium confidence) (Sah Akwen, 2017; 2019; Yeboah et al., 2020; Flynn and Sumberg, 2021). Climate \r\nchange impacts may reduce youth employment options in food systems in some regions, while they are often politically marginalised \r\n(Brooks et al., 2019; IFAD, 2019; HLPE, 2021). At the same time, due to heightened awareness about climate change, youth may be \r\nmore willing to apply climate adaptation strategies (medium confidence) (Ali and Erenstein, 2017; Jiri et al., 2017; Sah Akwen, 2017; \r\nChamberlin and Sumberg, 2021; Doherty et al., 2021). Agrifood policy implementation of adaptation strategies could increase inclusive \r\nparticipation of youth to meet their needs (HLPE, 2021)"


id: 4ae1aed26b177393de1ea5ee6ffbb447
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" Inclusive investments in water management, infrastructure, agrifood science, \r\nand policies that increase youth access to land, credit, knowledge, education, skills and other crucial resources can support dignified and \r\nrewarding agrifood employment (Ahsan and Mitra, 2016; Brooks et al., 2019; HLPE, 2021). Digital technologies can support agrifood \r\nadaptations, but digital divides must be overcome to avoid worsening inequities (HLPE, 2021). Initiatives which protect and strengthen \r\nyouth engagement and employment in the all points of the food system, including recognition of youth's critical role and agency through \r\nrights-based approaches, can support sustainable food transitions (HLPE, 2021). Harnessing youth innovation and vision to address \r\nclimate change alongside other SDGs such as gender inequity and rural poverty will be a crucial strategy to ensure resilient economies in \r\nfood systems (high confidence) (Laube, 2016; Brooks et al., 2019; IFAD, 2019; Abay et al"


id: 3769719e91f05f4af1206fe88c0a15e3
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"impacts in the marginal lands intensify (Reid et al., 2014). Collective \r\naction at multiple scales and effective governance structures are also \r\na key enabler of transformational change, for helping community \r\ninitiatives overcome economic, social and technical barriers, and to \r\nstrengthen social capital and farmer knowledge (Haglund et al., 2011; \r\nReed et al., 2017; Vermeulen et al., 2018; Fedele et al., 2019). Market \r\ndevelopment has been shown to be a critical factor for successful \r\nadaptation at scale in sub-Saharan Africa (Ouedraogo et  al., 2017; \r\nIiyama et  al., 2018; Totin et  al., 2018)"


id: 960b550df515dc5deb821508557f0e6f
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" At the same time, financing \r\nmechanisms may be a crucial enabler for different food system actors: \r\nde-risking agricultural production and food system investments for \r\nproducers and input suppliers, for example, that address core market \r\nfailures and compensate actors for extra short-term costs that can \r\nlead to longer-term benefits, particularly for small-scale producers and \r\nbusinesses with comparatively low access to technologies and services \r\n(Vermeulen et al., 2018; Millan, 2019; see Section 5.14.2.5)."


id: 64dd5a8cb20e5641bfd08bc40e9c769f
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"Current understanding of finance flows and needs for adaptation in \r\ncrop agriculture, livestock, fisheries, aquaculture and forest products \r\nrelies primarily on top-down projections, with limited data (UNFCCC, \r\n2018; Buchner et  al., 2019; Jachnik et  al., 2019). By one estimate, \r\nin 2017/2018, agriculture, forestry and land use received 24% of \r\npublic adaptation finance (totaling USD 7 billion; half via multilateral \r\ndevelopment finance institutions and one-quarter from governments) \r\nand 35% of international grants (with 71% used for adaptation) \r\n(Buchner et al., 2019). According to data from OECD (2020), finance \r\nflows for agriculture, forestry and fisheries have risen fairly linearly \r\nfrom ca. USD 1.46 billion in 2010 (the year the Rio marker on climate \r\nchange adaptation was introduced) to ca.  5.5  billion in 2018. Over \r\nthe entire tracked period, the three subsectors combined received a \r\ntotal of USD 29"


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"82 billion for activities with principal and significant \r\nadaptation components.4\r\n However, the data set only includes climate\u0002related development finance from bilateral, multilateral and private \r\nphilanthropic sources, whereas private sector finance flows are not \r\ncaptured as this is notoriously difficult to track (UNEP, 2016; OECD, \r\n2020; cross-ref to Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). Most of \r\nthe funding (85%) was directed towards agriculture, with forestry (12%) \r\nand fisheries (3%) receiving significantly less, but across the subsectors, \r\nthere is consistency in the sense that policy and administrative \r\nmanagement and development receive the lion's share of support, \r\nwhich is predominantly given in the form of grants (72%), while debt \r\ninstruments (26%) and equity and shares in collective investment \r\nvehicles (2%) contribute less"


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" From a regional perspective, 80% were \r\ndirected to Africa (47%), Asia-Pacific (27%), and Latin America and \r\nCaribbean States (7%), whereas Eastern Europe and Western Europe \r\nand Other States received (2%) each and 17% were destined for \r\n'developing countries' without regional tags. Finally, it is noteworthy \r\nthat 38% of adaptation finance in agriculture, forestry and fisheries is \r\nmarked as also having mitigation benefits, and roughly a quarter of \r\nfunding is reported as having principal or significant gender objectives."


id: 3554c0b310d2cc5fd0a5a1fc45bb4aae
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"The examples in Table 5.24 highlight the uneven impact of adaptation \r\nprogrammes and projects in general, due in part to differences in \r\ninstitutional support and failure of policies to take into account \r\ninequities (Clay and King, 2019; Nightingale et al., 2020). Focusing on \r\ntransformational adaptation, Vermeulen (2018) suggested the need \r\nto expand the remit of adaptation planning to consider the multi\u0002functionality of agriculture and a system-wide view of food production \r\nand consumption. Several authors argue that transformational change \r\nmust address the personal, practical and political spheres, in view \r\nof the role of power relations and worldviews in shaping practices, \r\nfood security and inequity (O'Brien, 2015; Nightingale, 2017; O'Brien, \r\n2018; Eriksen et al., 2019; Gosnell et al., 2019)"


id: 3683ff1b4f637fa10c2db0effc51b838
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" If it involves new or \r\nunfamiliar technology, transformation may also be highly disruptive, \r\nand the added vulnerabilities of food system actors at risk will need to \r\nbe addressed (Herrero et al., 2020; see Box 5.5)."


id: fe759e2a5bbc553829afe36fbf043c56
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"Whether current levels of growth in adaptation finance for agriculture, \r\nforestry and fisheries is keeping up with estimated needs cannot be \r\nassessed because of the large uncertainties that surround adaptation \r\ncost estimates (Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). There is, \r\nhence, high agreement that better assessment of adaptation costs \r\nof climate impacts requires considerably more research (Watkiss, \r\n2015; Diaz and Moore, 2017). A recent study focusing on investments \r\nneeded to offset the effects of climate change on the prevalence \r\nof hunger concludes that investments in agricultural research and \r\ndevelopment (R&D) have to increase from USD 1.62 billion to USD \r\n2.77 billion per year between 2015 and 2050 (Sulser et al., 2021a). \r\nIn addition to agricultural R&D, significant investment increases in \r\nwater and infrastructure in the range of USD 12.7 billion and USD \r\n10"


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"8  billion are required, respectively, a considerable portion of \r\nwhich is relevant to the food system. In total, Sulser et al. (2021a) \r\nestimate that annual investment between USD 21.47  billion and \r\nUSD 29.8  billion are needed to avoid sliding back from climate\u0002change-related increases in the prevalence of hunger but recognise \r\nthe shortcomings of their approach and acknowledge that 'a full \r\nanalysis of adaptation to climate change in agriculture would \r\nrequire including many other social, economic, and environmental \r\ndimensions'. For comparison, World Bank (2010) estimated global \r\ncosts of USD 70-100  billion per year for agriculture, forestry \r\nand fisheries, infrastructure, water resources, health, ecosystem \r\nservices, coastal zones and extreme weather events to adapt to an \r\napproximately 2degC warmer world between 2010 and 2050"


id: 56fda59374afe631b9278203ffb0c760
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" While the \r\nWorld Bank includes more sectors, more recent publications consider \r\nthe resulting figures to be significantly too low (Baarsch et  al., \r\n2015; UNEP, 2016; Rossi and Miola, 2017; Hallegatte et  al., 2018; \r\nMarkandya and Gonzalez-Eguino, 2019; Chapagain et al., 2020; WGII \r\nCross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). Therefore, despite the \r\nmethodological and data challenges, further efforts are needed to \r\nbetter capture the economic risks of climate change and provide \r\nestimates of adaptation costs at global to national scales as well as \r\nacross sectors (Watkiss, 2015; Diaz and Moore, 2017).\r\nFinancial barriers limit implementation of adaptation options in \r\nagriculture, fisheries, aquaculture and forestry (high confidence)"


id: c63892f9f3b8beff0acbe1216300ab08
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"Use of climate-resilient financial strategies and instruments is limited \r\nby weak incentives, which commonly take the form of high upfront \r\ncosts (Verdolini et  al., 2018), high transaction and intermediation \r\ncosts (Havemann et al., 2020) and relatively long pay-off time. Tenant \r\nproducers may not experience benefits from adaptation investments \r\n(Woodard et al., 2019). Investors seek low-risk, liquid investments and \r\ncredit-worthy counterparties (Havemann et al., 2020), yet small- and \r\nmedium-sized producers and supply chain actors often lack access \r\nto formal credit. Given limited experience and weak information for \r\nadaptation finance, sub-optimal outcomes may include imbalanced \r\nallocation of public and private finance (e.g., to less vulnerable regions \r\nand producers; to lower-resilience investments; to short-term benefits) \r\nas well as inequitable division of risks and returns (e.g"


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", within blended \r\nfinance structures) (Clapp, 2017; World Bank, 2018; Attridge and \r\nEngen, 2019). Additionally, while risk-sharing finance strategies can \r\ndeliver adaptation benefits, they do not inherently reduce overall risk \r\nand commonly cover only specified types of risks (Kellett and Peters, \r\n2014; Watson et al., 2015)."


id: f56a578e315cd262c1e74b1b859206d7
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"quality changes under an IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios \r\n(SRES) A2 emissions scenario (Laderach et al., 2017); and development \r\nof participatory pathways to mid-century under RCPs 4.5 and 8.5 \r\nsupport regional adaptation planning in Hawke's Bay, New Zealand \r\nfor agricultural producers and rural communities (Cradock-Henry et al., \r\n2020). CRDPs mentioned in SROCC include shifting from providing \r\ncoastal defences to adapting to seawater inundation in coastal regions \r\n(Renaud et al., 2015) and retreating coastal megacities (Solecki et al., \r\n2017). Pathway frameworks continue to be used to frame the broad\u0002scale challenges of development and climate change, thereby linking \r\ndifferent types of food system actor with different responses through \r\ntime using a variety of approaches, top-down and participatory, \r\nqualitative and quantitative (Butler et  al., 2016; Antle et  al., 2017; \r\nThornton and Comberti, 2017; Collste et al., 2019; Loboguerrero et al"


id: 336d4189139fa96073942f9dd66945b2
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"While there is consensus that the concept of CRDPs is useful, there \r\nare major challenges in identifying, operationalising, monitoring and \r\nevaluating them (Lin et al., 2017; Bloemen et al., 2018). Management \r\napproaches seldom integrate across spatio-temporal scales and may be \r\nunable to address unidirectional change and extreme events (Holsman \r\net  al., 2019). The socioeconomic complexities and implications of \r\npursuing integrated outcomes make it difficult to evaluate synergies \r\nand trade-offs associated with different actions in local contexts \r\nthrough time (Thornton and Comberti, 2017; Ellis and Tschakert, 2019; \r\nHolsman et  al., 2019; Orchard, 2019)"


id: 3cd30874436c2637f8c0fe323179547
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" Case studies by Lo (2019) of \r\ntransformation in a fishing town in south China and by Gajjar (2019) \r\non undesirable path dependencies in development trajectories in urban \r\nand rural India show that overall adaptive capacity of populations \r\nmay be decreased though politicisation and entrenchment of existing \r\ninequities, severely limiting the possibilities for future adaptation. A \r\nfurther challenge of implementation is timely detection of tipping \r\npoints and abrupt exposure events in both climate and environmental \r\nsystems (Lenton et al., 2019; Trisos et al., 2020), which may alter the \r\nefficacy of current and planned adaptation actions, necessitating a \r\nswitch to other, more transformational strategies; in such cases, re\u0002energising food system actors' commitment to adaptation action may \r\nwell be needed (Bloemen et al., 2018)."


id: b6c50feeb6362150ec64478048f5eb04
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"Integrated modelling of CRDPs will increasingly be needed to throw \r\nlight on key SDG synergies and trade-offs into the future (Bleischwitz \r\net al., 2018). In investigating possible future pressures on land under \r\nthe SSPs, Doelman (2018) projected that the largest changes take place \r\nin sub-Saharan Africa in SSP3 and SSP4, mostly because of continued \r\nhigh population growth coupled with (projected) sluggish increases \r\nin agricultural efficiency, among other things, leading to expansion of \r\nagricultural land for crop and livestock production and reduced food \r\nsecurity. Lassaletta (2019) evaluated global pig production in the SSPs \r\nand concluded that the future sustainability of pig systems will depend \r\non production efficiency improvements coupled with other factors such \r\nas use of alternative feed sources and use of slurries on cropland"


id: b1fd035edacdecdfcc551cf30cc9190f
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" Such \r\nstudies will be increasingly important for quantifying the potential \r\ntrade-offs and synergies between different SDGs, to guide adaptation \r\n(and mitigation) action along CRDPs in the future. The current lack \r\nof widely accepted and simple-to-measure indicators for tracking \r\nprogress in adaptation is a significant hurdle to overcome. There is a \r\nlarge literature on the desirable characteristics of future global food "


id: ed6121133d6865e3fe54fbbfa97bd95c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
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vector_id: 34822
content:
"Developing New Bio-Based Solutions while Mitigating Overall Biomass Demand Growth\r\nMany existing bio-based products have significant mitigation potential. Increased use of wood in buildings can reduce GHG emissions \r\nfrom cement and steel production while providing carbon storage (Churkina et al., 2020). Substitution of fossil fuels with biomass in \r\nmanufacture of cement and steel can reduce GHG emissions where these materials are difficult to replace. Dispatchable power based on \r\nbiomass can provide power stability and quality as the contribution from solar and wind power increases (WGIII Chapter 6), and biofuels \r\ncan contribute to reducing fossil fuel emissions in the transport and industry sectors (WGIII Chapter 10 and Chapter 11)"


id: 557b7cc6dbbaa6988b40e8386aa53464
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
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vector_id: 10927
content:
" The use of bio\u0002based plastics, chemicals and packaging could be increased, and biorefineries can achieve high resource-use efficiency in converting \r\nbiomass into food, feed, fuels and other bio-based products (Aristizabal-Marulanda and Cardona Alzate, 2019; Schmidt et al., 2019). There \r\nis also scope for substituting existing bio-based products with more benign products. For example, cellulose-based textiles can replace \r\ncotton, which requires large amounts of water, chemical fertilizers and pesticides to ensure high yields."


id: 97bba7b321b5925d526f5b20e3122a45
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21394
content:
"While increasing and diversified use of biomass can reduce the need for fossil fuels and other GHG-intensive products, unfavourable \r\nGHG balances may limit the mitigation value. Growth in biomass use may in the longer term also be constrained by the need to protect \r\nbiodiversity and ecosystems' capacity to support essential ecosystem services. Biomass use may also be constrained by water scarcity and \r\nother resource scarcities and/or challenges related to public perception and acceptance due to impacts caused by biomass production \r\nand use"


id: 9b8c93f8d25a470a5d85eb1a40cb6166
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22030
content:
" Energy conservation and efficiency measures and deployment of technologies and systems that do not rely on carbon, such \r\nas carbon-free electricity supporting, inter alia, electrification of transport as well as industry processes and residential heating (IPCC, \r\n2018; UNEP, 2019), can constrain the growth in biomass demand when countries seek to phase out fossil fuels and other GHG-intensive \r\nproducts while providing an acceptable standard of living. Nevertheless, demand for bio-based products may become high where full \r\ndecoupling from carbon is difficult to achieve (e.g., aviation, bio-based plastics, and chemicals) or where carbon storage is an associated \r\nbenefit (e.g., wood buildings, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), biochar for soil amendments), leading to challenging \r\ntrade-offs (e.g., food security, biodiversity) that need to be managed in environmentally sustainable and socially just ways."


id: 4b04e601e5598ec5316396a71d5df47
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9220
content:
"Circular economy approaches (WGIII-12.6) are commonly depicted by two cycles, where the biological cycle focuses on regeneration in \r\nthe biosphere and the technical cycle focuses on reuse, refurbishment and recycling to maintain value and maximise material recovery \r\n(Mayer et al., 2019a). Biogenic carbon flows and resources are part of the biological carbon cycle, but carbon-based products can be \r\nincluded in, and affect, both the biological and the technical carbon cycles (Kirchherr et al., 2017; Winans et al., 2017; Velenturf et al., \r\n2019). The integration of circular economy and bioeconomy principles has been discussed in relation to organic waste management \r\n(Teigiserova et al., 2020), societal transition and policy development (Directorate-General for Research Innovation, 2018; Bugge et al., \r\n2019) as well as coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) recovery strategies (Palahi et al., 2020)"


id: c182fd6343bde5a0dc683432f0bc974
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 28031
content:
" To maintain the natural resource base, \r\ncircular bioeconomy emphasises sustainable land use and the return of biomass and nutrients to the biosphere when it leaves the\r\ntechnical cycle."


id: bd9cb875ab3bba3f8e35f212bec002ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27399
content:
"Agroecological approaches can be integrated into a wide range of land management practices to support a sustainable bioeconomy and \r\naddress equity considerations (HLPE, 2019). Relevant land use practices, such as agroforestry, intercropping, organic amendments, cover \r\ncrops and rotational grazing, can provide mitigation and support adaption to climate change via food security, livelihoods, biodiversity \r\nand health co-benefits (Ponisio et al., 2015; Garibaldi et al., 2016; D'Annolfo et al., 2017; Bezner Kerr et al., 2019; Clark et al., 2019; \r\nCordova et al., 2019; HLPE, 2019; Mbow et al., 2019; Renard and Tilman, 2019; Sinclair et al., 2019; Bharucha et al., 2020; Bezner Kerr \r\net  al., 2021;WGII Cross-Chapter Box  NATURAL in Chapter 2)"


id: 2d21ff46234998be5d0accfa1a970c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4541
content:
" Strategic integration of appropriate biomass production systems into \r\nagricultural landscapes can provide biomass for bioenergy and other bio-based products while providing co-benefits such as enhanced \r\nlandscape diversity, habitat quality, retention of nutrients and sediment, erosion control, climate regulation, flood regulation, pollination \r\nand biological pest and disease control (WGIII Chapter12 Box on UNCCD-LDN, Christen and Dalgaard, 2013; Asbjornsen et al., 2014; \r\nHolland et al., 2015; Ssegane et al., 2015; Dauber and Miyake, 2016; Milner et al., 2016; Ssegane and Negri, 2016; Styles et al., 2016; \r\nZumpf et al., 2017; Cacho et al., 2018; Alam and Dwivedi, 2019; Cubins et al., 2019; HLPE, 2019; Olsson et al., 2019; Zalesny et al., 2019; \r\nEnglund et al., 2020). Such approaches can help limit environmental impacts from intensive agriculture while maintaining or increasing \r\nland productivity and biomass output."


id: a6f806f04d1e8fe23d55b5cb91e6fd93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 23782
content:
"Transitions from conventional to new biomass production and conversion systems include challenges related to cross-sector integration \r\nand limited experience with new crops and land use practices, including needs for specialised equipment (WGII Chapter 5.10, Thornton \r\nand Herrero, 2015; HLPE, 2019). Introduction of agroecological approaches and integrated biomass/food crop production can result in \r\nlower food crop yields per hectare, particularly during transition phases, potentially causing indirect land use change, but can also support \r\nhigher and more stable yields, reduce costs, and increase profitability under climate change (Muller et al., 2017; Seufert and Ramakutty, \r\n2017; Barbieri et  al., 2019; HLPE, 2019; Sinclair et  al., 2019; Smith et  al., 2019c; Smith et  al., 2020a)"


id: 57249d975f1462c5fc12617e1936c780
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11194
content:
" Crop diversification, organic \r\namendments and biological pest control (HLPE, 2019) can reduce input costs and risks of occupational pesticide exposure and food \r\nand water contamination (Gonzalez-Alzaga et al., 2014; European Food Safety Authority Panel on Plant Protection Products and their \r\nResidues et al., 2017; Mie et al., 2017), reduce farmers' vulnerability to climate change (e.g., droughts and spread of pests and diseases \r\naffecting plant and animal health; Delcour et al., 2015; FAO, 2020a) and enhance provisioning and sustaining ecosystem services, such as \r\npollination (D'Annolfo et al., 2017; Sinclair et al., 2019)."


id: 49ad6d220786a490f0444f70eb45d51b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
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vector_id: 8984
content:
"Literature analysing the synergies and trade-offs between competing demands for land suggest that solutions are highly contextualised \r\nin terms of their environmental, socioeconomic and governance-related characteristics, making it difficult to devise generic solutions \r\n(Haasnoot et al., 2020). Aspects of spatial and temporal scale can further enhance the complexity, for instance where transboundary \r\neffects across jurisdictions or upstream-downstream characteristics need to be considered, or where climate change trajectories might \r\nalter relevant biogeophysical dynamics (Postigo and Young, 2021). Nonetheless, there is broad agreement that taking the needs and \r\nperspectives of multiple stakeholders into account in a transparent process during negotiations improves the chances of achieving \r\noutcomes that maximise synergies while limiting trade-offs (Ariti et al., 2018; Metternicht, 2018; Favretto et al., 2020; Kopacek, 2021; \r\nMuscat et  al., 2021)"


id: 7419476a8145d856d4818a8b26153b72
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
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vector_id: 15864
content:
" Yet differences in agency and power between stakeholders or anticipated changes in access to or control of \r\nresources can undermine negotiation results even if there is a common understanding of the overarching benefits of more integrated \r\nenvironmental agreements and the need for greater coordination and cooperation to avoid longer-term losses to all (Aarts and Leeuwis, \r\n2010; Weitz et al., 2017). There is also the risk that strong local participatory processes can become disconnected from broader national \r\nplans, and thus fail to support the achievement of national targets. Thus, connection between levels is needed to ensure that ambition for \r\ntransformative change is not derailed at the local level (Aarts and Leeuwis, 2010; Postigo and Young, 2021)."


id: f6783290640f790206688bad5f6e42d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36290
content:
"International trade in the global economy today provides important opportunities to connect producers and consumers, effectively \r\nbuffering price volatilities and potentially offering producers in low-income countries access to global markets, which can be seen as an \r\neffective adaptation measure (Baldos and Hertel, 2015; Costinot et al., 2016; Hertel and Baldos, 2016; Gouel and Laborde, 2021; WGII \r\nChapter 5.11).. But there is also clear evidence that international trade and the global economy can enhance price volatility, lead to food \r\nprice spikes and affect food security due to climate and other shocks, as seen recently due to the COVID-19 pandemic (WGII Chapter 5.12, \r\nCottrell et al., 2019; WFP-FSIN, 2020; Verschuur et al., 2021)"


id: 5f73798d4d793cc3759a194abdea0567
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12590
content:
" The continued strong demand for food and other bio-based products, mainly \r\nfrom high- and middle-income countries, therefore, requires better cooperation between nations and global governance of trade to more \r\naccurately reflect and disincentivise their environmental and social externalities. Trade in agricultural and extractive products driving land \r\nuse change in tropical forest and savanna biomes is of major concern because of the biodiversity impacts and GHG emissions incurred in \r\ntheir provision (WGII Cross-Chapter Paper 7, Hosonuma et al., 2012; Forest Trends, 2014; Henders et al., 2015; Curtis et al., 2018; Pendrill \r\net al., 2019; Seymour and Harris, 2019; Kissinger et al., 2021)."


id: f54ad102c9a0c33cffe1f2be4f955e59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36110
content:
"Food systems are complicated (Figure FAQ5.5.1). To improve food production, supply and distribution, we need \r\nto make changes throughout the food supply chain. For instance: improving the way farmers access the inputs \r\nneeded to grow food; improving the ways in which food is grown, with climate and market information, training \r\nand technical know-how, water-saving and water-harvesting technologies; adopting new low-cost and less \r\ncarbon-intensive storage and processing methods; and creating local networks of producers and processors For \r\nfood consumers, we could consider shifts to different diets that are healthier and make more efficient use of natural \r\nresources; depending on context, these could involve rebalancing consumption of meat and highly processed \r\nfoods, reducing food loss and waste, and preparing food in more energy-efficient ways"


id: 71170921461fc2a90655cd01a97b1e49
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15423
content:
" Policymakers can enable \r\nsuch actions through appropriate price and trade policies, implementing policies for sustainable and low-emission \r\nagriculture, providing safety nets where needed, and empowering women, youth and other socially disadvantaged \r\ngroups."


id: fb1b3140c9069d6f351989d34521b329
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37017
content:
"The COVID-19 pandemic has had a substantial impact on \r\nurban communities and climate adaptation (medium evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). The pandemic has revealed both systemic \r\nunder-investment resulting in multiple, persistent health-related \r\nvulnerabilities (many of which also exacerbate climate change risk) \r\nand co-benefits for urban interventions to reduce future pandemic \r\nand climate change risk. The COVID-19 pandemic is estimated to \r\nhave pushed an additional 119 to 124  million people into poverty \r\nin 2020, with South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa each contributing \r\nroughly two-fifths of this total (medium confidence). At city level, \r\ncommunity groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and local \r\ngovernments face challenges to bring agencies already working on \r\nsocial and economic development into coordinated action to reduce \r\nurban vulnerabilities and manage risks. COVID-19 and climate change \r\nimpacts are exacerbated by widening social inequality"


id: 24fd7e1b6e13e4a6f3b52321d73cafc6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3264
content:
" Addressing the \r\ncauses of social vulnerability creates opportunity for transformative \r\nadaptation. {Box  6.4; 6.1.4; 6.2.2.4; 6.2.5; 6.4.1.3; Case Study 6.4; \r\nCross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7}"


id: aab770f45f96807c2b2e6859a1665dcf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24386
content:
"The documentation of climate-related events and observed \r\nhuman and economic losses have increased since AR5 for urban \r\nareas and human settlements. Observed losses arise from single, \r\ncompound, cascading and systemic events (medium evidence, \r\nhigh agreement). Losses from single events include the direct impact \r\nof heat stress on human health. Compound event losses arise from the \r\ninteraction of single climate hazards with at least one other hazard \r\ndriver such as heat with poor air quality (e.g., from traffic fumes or \r\nwildfire), flooding with poor water quality (e.g., from contaminated \r\nrunoff and flood water) or land subsidence. Cascading impacts are \r\nobserved when damages in one place or system reduce resilience and \r\ngenerate impacts elsewhere (e.g., when flood waters damage energy \r\ninfrastructure causing blackouts and knock on financial and human \r\nimpacts). Losses become systemic when affecting entire systems and \r\ncan even jump from one system to another (e.g"


id: c49ddb939b14aaeddbf4c1614da2f21d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28506
content:
", drought impacting on \r\nrural food production contributing to urban food insecurity) (medium \r\nconfidence). In some cases, maladaptive responses to hazards have \r\nexacerbated inequality in the distribution of impacts, for example \r\nshifting risk from one community to another. {Figure 6.2; 6.2.6; 6.3.4.1; \r\n6.4.5; Cross-Chapter Paper 2; Cross-Working Group Box  URBAN in \r\nChapter 6}"


id: 72aed1b09279b9a506aa3c1732bc628e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15659
content:
"The number of people expected to live in urban areas highly \r\nexposed to climate change impacts has increased substantially \r\n(high confidence).  An additional 2.5  billion people are projected \r\nto be living in urban areas by 2050, with up to 90% of this increase \r\nconcentrated in the regions of Asia and Africa. Projections of the number \r\nof people expected to live in urban areas highly exposed to climate \r\nchange impacts have increased. Sea level increase and increases in \r\ntropical cyclone storm surge and rainfall intensity will increase the \r\nprobability of coastal city flooding,  with more than a billion people \r\nlocated in low-lying cities and settlements expected to be at risk from \r\ncoastal-specific climate hazards by 2050 (high confidence).  Sea level \r\nrise, increases in tropical cyclone storm surges and more frequent and \r\nintense extreme precipitation will increase the number of people, area of \r\nurban land, and damages from flood hazard (high confidence)"


id: 1e14cfe38c8f3b7b956ed0f92799d501
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2168
content:
" The main \r\ndriver for increased heat exposure is the combination of global warming \r\nand population growth in already-warm centres, and the majority of the \r\npopulation exposed to heatwaves will live in urban centres. An additional \r\n350 million people living in urban areas are estimated be exposed to \r\nwater scarcity from severe droughts at 1.5degC warming, and 410.7 million \r\nat 2degC warming. {6.1; 6.2.2; Cross-Chapter Paper 2}"


id: aa6d61311743bba0630720307044179d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24347
content:
"City and local governments are key among multiple actors \r\nfacilitating climate change adaptation in cities and settlements \r\n(medium confidence). City and local governments can invest directly \r\nand work in partnership with community, private sector and national \r\nagencies to address climate risk. Private and business investment in key \r\ninfrastructure, housing construction and through insurance requirements \r\ncan also drive widespread adaptive action, though at times excluding \r\nthe priorities of the poor (medium confidence). Networked community \r\nactions can also go beyond neighbourhood-scale improvements to \r\naddress widespread vulnerability. Such actions include fostering roles \r\nof intermediaries and multiple spaces for networked governance \r\nacross scales of decision-making, improving development processes \r\nthrough an understanding of social and economic systems, foresight, \r\nexperimentation and embedded solutions, and social learning"


id: e6abe21e8e0455bbb2bba02f9eb6f6ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33774
content:
" \r\nTransnational networks of local government can also enhance city level \r\ncapacity, share lessons and advocacy (medium confidence). {Table 6.2; \r\n6.3.3.4; 6.3.3.5; 6.4.1; 6.4.1.1; Case Study 6.2; FAQ 6.5}"


id: 57334ae60ae2ef787a256948dc7ff505
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11205
content:
"Globally, decisions about key infrastructure systems and urban \r\nexpansion drive risk creation and potential action on climate \r\nchange (high confidence). Urban infrastructure concentrates and \r\nconnects populations, physical assets and energy use. Urban expansion \r\nand the compromising of green infrastructure and ecosystem services \r\nreduce adaptive capacity and can increase risk: the urban heat island, a \r\nproduct of expansion, can add 2degC to local warming. How settlements \r\nand key infrastructure are planned, designed and maintained \r\ndetermines patterns of exposure, social and physical vulnerability \r\nand capacity for resilience. Unplanned rapid urbanisation, including \r\nperi-urban development, is a major driver of risk, particularly where \r\ncities and settlements are expanding into land that is prone to coastal \r\nflooding or landslides, or where there is inadequate water to meet \r\nthe needs of growing populations"


id: c8b4f74c9566e6dd6076fc3bfb40cf5d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29135
content:
" Urban decision making processes \r\nequally shape how far low- and zero-carbon development can meet \r\nsocial needs; enhancing well-being while enabling climate change \r\nmitigation and advancing the SDGs. {6.1.3; 6.2.3; 6.2.4; 6.3.3; 6.3.4; \r\n6.3.5; 6.4.6; Cross-Working Group Box URBAN in Chapter 6}"


id: 97945514f57e97b26a2826e55fde6fa2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21376
content:
"Investment in urban adaptation has not kept pace with inno\u0002vations in policy and practice (medium confidence). Knowledge \r\ntransfer and innovation in adaptation has broadened advances in so\u0002cial and ecological infrastructures including disaster risk management, \r\nsocial policy and green/blue infrastructure, especially where these are \r\nintegrated with grey/physical infrastructure (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). Innovation has also taken place at the interface of differ\u0002ence systems, for example information and communications technolo\u0002gy (ICT) and water or energy, although financial investment has been \r\nslow to recognise and support these activities. Adaption finance con\u0002tinues to be directed at large-scale grey/physical engineering projects, \r\nneglecting maintenance and reproducing risk of stranded assets if \r\nclimate change risk accelerates beyond planned-for levels"


id: 446ec5d1491aa280a013c7665cb73685
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8188
content:
" Finance de\u0002ployed at the interface of multiple, integrated adaptation measures \r\ncan support climate resilient development (high confidence). Access to \r\nfinance is most difficult for city, local and non-state actors, and in con\u0002ditions where governance is fragile. {6.3.3; 6.3.4; 6.3.6; 6.4.5; 6.4.5.2; \r\nTable 6.10; Table 6.11; Box 6.8; Case Study 6.2; Case Study 6.3; Case \r\nStudy 6.5}"


id: ecef382dc74a0f0b27303368646a0118
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34756
content:
"Slow uptake of monitoring and evaluation frameworks \r\nconstrains potential for developing climate resilient urban \r\ndevelopment pathways (medium confidence). A lack of agreement \r\non metrics and indices to measure urban adaptation investment, \r\nimpacts and outcomes, reduces the scope for sharing lessons and \r\njoined-up action across interconnected sectors and places in the face \r\nof compound and systemic risks. These constraints affect the potential \r\nfor climate resilient development pathways. Limits to adaptation are \r\noften most pronounced in rapidly growing towns and cities and smaller \r\nsettlements including those without dedicated local government. At \r\nthe same time, legacy infrastructure in large and mega-cities, designed \r\nwithout taking climate change risk into account, constrains innovation \r\nleading to stranded assets and increasing numbers of people unable to \r\navoid harm, including heat stress and flooding, without transformative \r\nadaptation. {6.2.5; 6.3.3.3; 6.3"


id: 714dcb0b0161690d5cb92c54f0a0e1ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15464
content:
"Global urbanisation offers a time-limited opportunity to work \r\ntoward widespread and transformational adaptation and climate \r\nresilient development (high confidence). Current dominant models \r\nof energy intensive and market-led urbanisation build high carbon \r\ndependency and high vulnerability into cities, but this need not be the \r\ncase. Integrated development planning that connects innovation and \r\ninvestment in social, ecological and grey/physical infrastructures can \r\nsignificantly increase the adaptive capacity of urban settlements and \r\ncities. Transitioning cities to low carbon development and equitable \r\nresilience may lead to trade-offs with dominant models of economic \r\ngrowth based on housing and infrastructure investment. Integrated \r\nplanning approaches are important for climate resilient development to \r\nenable planning and monitoring of interactions between development, \r\nmitigation and adaptation"


id: d53c5ce12f93a58abc99594a10526fa9
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" Urban adaptation measures can offer \r\na considerable contribution to climate resilient development. This \r\npotential is realised by adaptations that extend predominant physical \r\ninfrastructure approaches to also deploy nature-based solutions and \r\nsocial interventions. The most consistent limit for all infrastructure types \r\nis in risk transfer. Current adaptation approaches in cities, settlements \r\nand key infrastructure tend to move risk from one sector or place to \r\nothers. Multi-level leadership and institutional capacity, together with \r\nfinancial resources (including climate finance) to support inclusive \r\nand sustainable adaptation in the context of multiple pressures and \r\ninterconnected risks, can help to ensure that global urbanisation of an \r\nadditional 2.5  billion people by 2050 reduces rather than generates \r\nclimate risk (medium confidence). {Table  6.7; Table  6.5; 6.1.3; 6.3.6; \r\n6.3.5.2; 6.4.7; Box 6"


id: 5381e3c8fb4bc22b246b9d9f4dc234c6
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"Intersectional, gender-responsive and inclusive action can ac\u0002celerate transformative climate change adaptation. The great\u0002est gains in well-being in urban areas can be achieved by \r\nprioritising investment to reduce climate risk for low-income \r\nand marginalised residents and targeting informal settlements \r\n(high confidence). These approaches can advance equity and envi\u0002ronmental justice over the long term in ways more likely to lead to \r\noutcomes that reduce vulnerability for all urban residents. Participatory \r\nplanning for infrastructure provision and risk management to address \r\nclimate change and underlying drivers of risk in informal and under\u0002serviced neighbourhoods, the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge and \r\nlocal knowledge, communication and efforts to build local leader\u0002ship, especially among women and youth, are examples of inclusive \r\napproaches with co-benefits for equity"


id: 6d901f374cc42042a81c59d272516676
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" Providing opportunities for \r\nmarginalised people, including women, to take on leadership and par\u0002ticipation in local projects can enhance climate governance and its \r\noutcomes (high confidence). Since AR5 (IPCC, 2014), social movements \r\nin many cities, including movements led by youth, Indigenous and eth\u0002nic communities have also heightened public awareness about the \r\nneed for urgent, inclusive action to achieve adaptation that can also \r\nenhance well-being. {6.1.5; 6.3.5; 6.4.1.2; 6.4.7; Box 6.6, Case study \r\n6.2; Case study 6.4, FAQ6.3}"


id: 5d545a8de0a29238a427e1672c7ff
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"Since the publication of AR5, there has been rapid expansion in \r\npolicy, practice and research related to climate change and human \r\nsettlements. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the SDGs) \r\nagreed in September 2015, was preceded by the Sendai Framework for \r\nDisaster Risk Reduction 2015-30 and followed shortly afterwards by \r\nthe Paris Agreement (December 2015) (United Nations, 2015b). These \r\nmake explicit mention of 'mainstreaming of disaster risk assessments \r\ninto land use policy development and implementation, including urban \r\nplanning' (Sendai Framework) (UNISDR, 2015). The agreements identify \r\n'sustainable cities and communities' (SDG11) and 'cities and subnational \r\nauthorities' (Paris Agreement) as important actors in integrating climate \r\nand development goals (Sanchez Rodriguez, Urge-Vorsatz and Barau, \r\n2018)"


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" However not all urban SDGs have measurable targets yet, \r\nor data, particularly in regard to children and youth, the elderly and \r\ndisabled (Klopp and Petretta, 2017; Reckien et al., 2017; Nissen et al., \r\n2020). Clear procedures for linking climate adaptation in communities \r\nat all scales to the SDGs is lacking (Major, Lehmann and Fitton, 2018; \r\nSanchez Rodriguez, Urge-Vorsatz and Barau, 2018)."


id: 9f44786de4dc22218d3e44f57b36c1c6
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"Since AR5, there has been increasing understanding of the \r\ninterdependence of meta-regions, large, small and rural settlements \r\nwhich may be connected through key infrastructure (Lichter and Ziliak, \r\n2017), including national and trans-national infrastructure investments \r\n(Hanakata and Gasco, 2018). Almost all the world's non-urban \r\npopulation and its provisioning ecosystems are impacted by urban \r\nsystems through connecting infrastructure and family and kinship ties, \r\nremittances and trade arrangements that influence flows of water, \r\nfood, fibre, energy, waste and people (Trundle, 2020; McIntyre-Mills \r\nand Wirawan, 2018; Zhang et al., 2019; Nerini et al., 2019; Friend and \r\nThinphanga, 2018)"


id: 12fd4d4320eeeadab6960890c0a6cc30
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" Many rural places are so deeply connected to \r\nurban systems that risks are observed to cascade from one to the other, \r\nfor example, when drought in arable zones leads to food insecurity in \r\ncities, or where flood damage to urban transport infrastructure leads \r\nto prolonged isolation of small towns and rural settlements (Friend \r\nand Thinphanga, 2018; McIntyre-Mills and Wirawan, 2018). A focus \r\nof this chapter is the experience of a range of urban settlements, \r\nfrom small to large, and the connecting infrastructure and formal and \r\ninformal networks and systems that join them to each other. There are \r\nclose synergies with Chapters 7 (Health, Well-being and the Changing \r\nStructure of Communities) and 8 (Poverty, Livelihoods and Sustainable \r\nDevelopment). There are further important synergies with Working \r\nGroup III Chapter 8 (Urban Systems and Other Settlements) and the \r\nCross-Chapter Paper 2: Cities and Settlements by the Sea."


id: 9f3da3be5d0e446e9e7d28464409e395
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"The New Urban Agenda (NUA) (October 2016), with its focus on \r\nhousing and sustainable urban development, commits its signatories \r\nto building resilient and responsive cities that foster climate change \r\nmitigation and adaptation (United Nations, 2016b). This agreement \r\nfollowed the Geneva UN Charter on Sustainable Housing, endorsed \r\nby 56 member states of the United Nations Economic Commission \r\nfor Europe (United Nations, 2015d). The NUA aims to ensure access \r\nto decent, adequate, affordable and healthy housing for all, while \r\nreducing the impact of the housing sector on the environment and \r\nincreasing resilience to extreme weather events (United Nations, \r\n2016b). Voluntary, networked action led by cities was also illustrated \r\nby a November 2019 call to Mayors and youth climate activists to sign \r\na voluntary pledge in a 'Race to Zero' ahead of the Conference of the \r\nParties 26, which included endorsing principles of a New Green Deal \r\n(C40, 2019)"


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" Other voluntary, global, urban efforts have been led by \r\nthe scientific community including the Research and Action Agenda \r\non Cities and Climate Change Science which aims to promote research \r\nand reports (Prieur-Richard, Walsh and Craig, 2019)."


id: 5d10fc9a13fe6f5eebe7c4dcd84a9324
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"The framing of 'key economic sectors and services' in AR5 focused \r\nprimarily on three infrastructural areas (energy, water services, \r\ntransport) and on primary and secondary economic activities \r\n(including recreation and tourism, insurance and financial services). \r\nCities, settlements and key infrastructure are also referred to in the \r\nIPCC special reports released since AR5. The Special Report on Global \r\nWarming of 1.5degC (IPCC, 2018) examines impacts of global warming \r\non urban systems and infrastructure in the context of advancing \r\nsustainable development and eradicating poverty. It highlights the \r\nrisks facing residents of unplanned and informal urban settlements, \r\nmany of which are exposed to a range of climate-related hazards \r\n(Sections  3.4.8 and 4.4.1.3). The Special Report on Global Warming \r\nof 1"


id: a7c1abd588ed3121a0953d2ff654e912
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"5degC also identifies green infrastructure, sustainable land use \r\nand planning, and sustainable water management as key adaptation \r\noptions that can reduce risks in urban areas (SPM C2.4; C2.5), and \r\nhighlights 'urban and infrastructure' as one of four system transitions \r\nrequired to limit warming to 1.5degC to create an enabling environment \r\nfor adaptation (Section  4.3.3). Innovative governance arrangements \r\nthat go beyond formal 'government' and political arrangements and \r\nthat include non-state actors, networks and informal institutions \r\nwere identified as important in addressing climate change and \r\nimplementing responses to 1.5degC-consistent pathways (Special Report \r\non Global Warming of 1.5degC [Sections 4.4.1 and 5.6.2]). In addition, \r\nthe Special Report on Global Warming of 1"


id: 719e7a18e8868b89ed04cc857f15eda9
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"5degC mentions, with high \r\nconfidence, the climate-related health effects of urban heat islands, \r\nurban heatwaves and increasing risks from some vector-borne \r\ndiseases (illnesses caused by pathogens and parasites in human \r\npopulations) (SPM B5.2). The report also notes both trade-offs and \r\nimportant co-benefits of sustainable development in pursuit of climate \r\nresilient development pathways that achieve ambitious mitigation \r\nand adaptation in conjunction with poverty eradication and efforts to \r\nreduce inequalities (SPM D6)."


id: 34833d3917a039f275eb05f144f2401d
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"This assessment also considers new literature about how enabling \r\nenvironments can support adaptation in ways that are also sensitive to \r\nIndigenous knowledge and Local knowledge (see below Section 6.1), \r\nsocial justice (6.4.3.4)) and climate mitigation (Section 6.3.5.2). It builds \r\non the findings of AR5 which highlighted the concentration of global \r\nclimate risks in urban areas, the complex causal chains that mediate \r\nclimate impacts for smaller settlements and rural areas, and the multiple \r\nissues shaping and influencing economic sectors and infrastructure. \r\nThis integrated chapter enables a more detailed analysis of the \r\ninter-connected drivers of risk that affect urban people and settlements \r\nof different sizes"


id: 5279b0a2d53d5d06ef9aa4969178d637
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" This discussion also highlights the inter-connections \r\nwithin and between urban areas, and between different types of \r\ninfrastructure and how these complex relationships accentuate or limit \r\nthe effects of climate change and the institutional structures that play a \r\ncritical role in mediating and govern these relationships."


id: a2415b52ef36245298bbe4680028229a
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"This chapter has five main sections. The first elaborates on changes in the \r\ninternational policy context since 2014, highlighting the implications \r\nthat this has for responses to climate change in cities, settlements and \r\nkey infrastructure. Section 6.2 is focused on observed and projected \r\nclimate risks, paying particular attention to the ways in which these \r\nare created through processes of urbanisation and infrastructural \r\ninvestment. Section 6.3 takes an integrated and holistic approach to an \r\nassessment of adaptive actions relevant to key infrastructures (those \r\nthat form the material basis for resilience in cities and settlements, \r\ndrive economies and are essential for human well-being). Section 6"


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"4 \r\nassesses the enabling conditions and leadership qualities associated \r\nwith adaptation processes that can also meet the equity agenda of \r\nthe SDGs, to leave no-one behind, including the role of governance, \r\nfinance, institutions and emerging literature around the limits of urban \r\nadaptation."


id: 96a086b8eec41ff725ef13f2c4ed8b3d
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"The Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere (SROCC) similarly \r\nemphasizes the role governance plays in reducing disaster risk, \r\nthrough planning, and zoning (IPCC, 2019b). It identifies vulnerability \r\nfactors such as poverty, which can undermine resilience and \r\nsustainable development in urban communities (IPCC, 2019b SPM \r\nC3.1,and Section 2.3.2) The SROCC report shows that the emerging \r\nclimate-related challenges are impacting the accessibility and \r\navailability of vital resources and blurring the public and private \r\nboundaries of risk and responsibility (Cross-Chapter Box 3). According \r\nto the SROCC report, new governance arrangements are emerging \r\nto address these challenges, including participatory and networked \r\nstructures, and institutions linking formal and informal networks \r\ninvolving state, private sector, Indigenous and civil society actors \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box  3)"


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" The SROCC report calls for place-specific \r\naction because there is no single climate governance panacea \r\nfor the ocean, coasts and cryosphere (Cross-Chapter Box  3). The \r\nSROCC report highlights evidence of the importance of inclusivity, \r\nfairness, deliberation, reflexivity, responsiveness, social learning, the \r\nco-production of knowledge, and respect for ethical and cultural \r\ndiversity in climate-related urban decision making (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox 3). In addition, the Special Report on Climate Change and Land \r\nnotes that urbanisation can intensify extreme rainfall events over the \r\ncity or downwind of urban areas and have can significant consequences \r\nfor heat island effects on loss of food production, posing additional "


id: 8fa7fe817ad4b35b38dd137b4b57bfcf
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content:
"The AR5 conceptualised cities and settlements as complex \r\ninterdependent systems that could be engaged in supporting climate \r\nchange adaptation (Revi et  al., 2014 8.8.2). Effective municipal \r\ngovernance systems and cooperative multi-level governance supported \r\nadaptation action. The AR5 report expressed medium confidence\r\nthat governance interventions can help develop synergies across \r\ngeographical and institutional scales. Urban areas face challenges of \r\ninfrastructure investment and maintenance, land use management, \r\nlivelihood creation and ecosystem services protection. AR5 also \r\nconsidered how urban localities can encourage incremental and \r\ntransformative adaptation, build resilience and support sustainable \r\ndevelopment. The assessment identified the need for multi-level and \r\nmulti-partner action in rapidly growing cities where institutions and \r\ninfrastructure are still not established to meet the growing demands of \r\nthe cities"


id: b696926ab1b7a1def6b31f169111622f
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content:
" However, there was only medium confidence that adaptation \r\naction was happening in the AR5 review period."


id: c8f79d0ba1c6f414ec3b8c7fb569bce4
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"2018; Bassolas et  al., 2019). Key or critical infrastructure provides \r\nmuch of the material basis of cities and settlements, as well as the \r\nmechanisms for enabling flows of people, goods, data, waste, energy \r\n(through urban metabolism processes of consumption and production) \r\nand capital, between urban regions and rural areas (Blay-Palmer et al., \r\n2018; Dijst et  al., 2018). An overview of this process of 'planetary' \r\nurbanisation is provided in Box  6.1. The balance of accumulated \r\nscientific knowledge on climate risks, impact and adaptation has \r\nbeen generated from studies in large and medium-sized cities of \r\n1 million or more. While these larger cities continue to grow rapidly \r\n(UNDESA 2018), settlements of more than 5  million people contain \r\nless than a quarter of the world's urban population, and more than \r\nhalf of the world's urban residents live in settlements of 1 million or \r\nless (Table 6.1)"


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" There is a key gap in knowledge, especially concerning \r\nurban enabling environments and how smaller settlements can be \r\nsupported to accelerate equitable and sustainable adaptation in the \r\nface of financial and governance constraints (Birkmann et al., 2016; \r\nShi et al., 2016; Dulal, 2019; Rosenzweig et al., 2018b)."


id: 3917a11f581296c82183a5cd874570fe
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"Definitions of 'urban' have become more nuanced since the AR5 \r\nreview with the publication of the OECD report 'A new perspective \r\non urbanisation' (OECD and European Commission, 2020). This report \r\npresents two new global definitions of urbanisation reflecting the \r\ndegree of urbanisation on a continuum of cities, towns and semi-dense \r\nareas, and rural areas. The OECD estimates almost half the world's \r\npopulation (48%) live in cities, while just 24% live in rural areas and \r\n28% live in towns and semi-dense areas (28%). In addition, the OECD \r\nreport defines metropolitan areas as functional urban areas together \r\nwith their surrounding commuting zones 'to capture the full extent' of a \r\ncity's working population. Metropolitan areas account for 54% of total \r\nworld population, with the OECD estimating that commuting zones \r\nrepresenting 17% of the overall metropolitan population, rising to 31% \r\nin high-income countries"


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" In the context of these global definitions, \r\nthis chapter identifies 'cities and settlements' as concentrated human \r\nhabitation centres (along a dynamic continuum from rural to urban) \r\n(Murali et al., 2019; Ward and Shackleton, 2016) (Figure 6.1) that are \r\nfundamentally inter-connected to other urban centres and rural areas \r\nas nodes within broader networks."


id: a096bdc05fc1b37bc96af8f6176a8d23
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"Cities are complex entities where social, ecological and physical systems \r\ninteract in planned and unplanned ways (Markolf et  al., 2018). The \r\ncomplexity of cities, settlements and key infrastructure (Figure 6.2) where \r\nmultiple functional systems continuously interact makes it difficult to \r\ndistinguish risks (Box 6.1). The literature often resolves this by offering \r\ndiscrete assessments for specific sectors (see Section 6.3). This fragmented \r\napproach to understanding climate change associated impacts and \r\nrisks is then reflected also in siloed approaches to risk management \r\nand adaptation financing (see Section 6.4). Recent literature notes that \r\nresilience planning has begun to overcome this tendency by presenting \r\nclimate change impacts, losses and damages, and urban processes, as \r\nunfolding together in interacting and cascading pathways (Fraser et al., \r\n2020; Eriksen et al., 2020) (Figure 6.2)"


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" The chapter reflects this change in \r\nthe literature by presenting climate change impacts through a series of \r\nrisk assessments, including by hazard type, through indirect impacts on \r\nhealth or food security, key infrastructure systems, land use and human \r\nmobility, water flows and on structural conditions, such as poverty and \r\njustice in the city (see Sections 6.3 and 6.4). In a departure from AR5 \r\nwe also consider the consequential interactions of climate risks, impacts, \r\nadaptation and climate mitigation (see also Cross-Working Group \r\nBox URBAN in Chapter 6)."


id: ee37b1acdf714972fb9d5969e08f2520
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"This chapter also assesses conditions supporting incremental and \r\ntransformative adaptation (Section 6.4). Incremental and transformative \r\nadaptation are both important but serve distinct roles in the interaction \r\nof urban systems, climate risk and risk management, and in advancing \r\nsocial justice, just transitions and climate resilient development (see \r\nSection 6.4). Climate resilient development pathways are an emerging \r\nconcept in the literature since the AR5 (Schipper et al., 2020). Climate \r\nresilient development is an iterative process of systemic change that \r\nintegrates both mitigation and adaptation efforts (see Annex II: Glossary)"


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"The latest population projections from UNDESA (2018) reinforce the \r\ntrends identified previously, with even higher estimates for global \r\nurban populations. The 2012 data used in AR5 projected a global urban \r\npopulation of 4984 million in 2030 and 6252 million in 2050; the 2018 \r\nrevisions project 5167 million and 6680 million respectively. Particularly \r\nnoteworthy is the higher projection provided for sub-Saharan Africa's \r\nurban population: increasing from 596  million to 666  million in \r\n2030, and from 1069 million to 1258 million in 2050. These figures \r\nhighlight the continued trend toward larger urban populations, and the \r\nparticular significance of this in areas which currently have relatively \r\nsmall proportions of their populations living in towns and cities; this \r\nis also true in some Small Island States (e.g., the Solomon Islands) \r\n(McEvoy et al., 2020)"


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" The proportion of the global urban population \r\nliving in megacities (with populations of more than 10 million people) \r\nis expected to continue growing slowly (to 16% of the urban total, or \r\n862  million people, living in 48 agglomerations) by 2035 (UNDESA, \r\n2018). The size and form of these megacities presents particular \r\nchallenges with climate change impacts, in areas including air quality \r\n(Baklanov, Luisa and Molina, 2016), flooding (Januriyadi et al., 2018), \r\nand temperature increase (Darmanto et al., 2019) (see Section 6.2.3)."


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"urban settlements or neighbourhoods that developed outside the formal \r\nsystem that is meant to record land ownership and tenure and without \r\nmeeting a range of regulations relating to planning and land use, built \r\nstructures and health and safety. Informality is a broader concept than \r\n'slums', which are usually defined using measures of housing quality, \r\nprovision of services and overcrowding. While most countries do not \r\ngenerate formal statistics on the number of people living in informal \r\nsettlements, UN Habitat provides regional and global estimates of the \r\nnumber of urban households that are 'slum' households and therefore \r\nlikely to include most residents of informal settlements. These estimates \r\nsuggest that there were 1034 million slum dwellers in 2018, including \r\nsome 56% of the urban population in sub-Saharan Africa and more \r\nthan 30% of the urban population of South Asia (UN-Habitat, 2020)"


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" \r\nInformality is particularly important in understanding climate risks \r\nand responses in cities and settlements, and also in relation to key \r\ninfrastructure (Trundle, 2020; Taylor et al., 2021)."


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"by 2050, with up to 90% of this increase concentrated in the regions \r\nof Asia and Africa, particularly in India, China and Nigeria, where 35% \r\nof this urban growth is projected to occur (UNDESA, 2018). Growth \r\nrates are slowing down in North America, South America and Europe \r\n(UNDESA, 2018). Much global growth continues to outstrip the ability \r\nof governments or the private sector to plan, fund and provide for \r\nsustainable urban infrastructure and this is most marked in low-income \r\nand informal settlements (Angel et al., 2016). Rural migration as a driver \r\nof urbanisation is discussed in 6.2.4.3, and literature has documented \r\nthe way urban expansion and the conversion of agricultural land is \r\nalso driven by investment incentives and weak planning policies \r\n(Colsaet, Laurans and Levrel, 2018; Woodworth and Wallace, 2017)"


id: c88bd9a5fa1a7d6a678af258872d6b67
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" At \r\nthe same time, early evidence suggests that, at least in some locations, \r\nout-migration from cities occurred as a result of the COVID-19 \r\npandemic (Rajan, Sivakumar and Srinivasan, 2020), but the evidence \r\nis not clear and in some cases may have increased migration to other \r\nmegacities (Chow et al., 2021). There is also growing recognition that \r\npoor planning has exacerbated the concentrated of deprivation in \r\nspecific locations, deepening a cycle of exclusion and marginalisation \r\n(UNDESA, 2020)."


id: 967f588b8f33aa098584ae1844a91a1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"The scale, reach and complexity of contemporary urbanisation compounds climate risks and conditions adaptation (high confidence) \r\n(Miller and Hutchins, 2017; Rosenzweig et al., 2018b). Urbanisation manifests as a heterogeneous and plural process with varied spatial \r\nmanifestations (Oswin, 2018) that extends beyond cities and settlements, defining actions elsewhere in what has been called 'planetary \r\nurbanization' (Brenner, 2014b). While the concept of planetary urbanisation is contested, for example for a predominantly Eurocentric \r\nfocus (Veglio, 2021), the concept has reflected human urbanisation as a mega-trend of urban expansion and landuse intensification \r\n(Capon, 2017; Lauermann, 2018)"


id: d7d9206f646400f46f0db33b4b514527
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" Three dimensions of planetary urbanisation are currently shaping adaptation actions: the new forms \r\nand scales of urbanisation, the blurring of boundaries around clearly demarcated territories, and the fragmentation of the urban hinterland \r\ninto units that serve productive functions for the reproduction of urban space under capitalism (Brenner and Schmid, 2017)."


id: c101f75aabe08331209315f23a4ba3d2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"Planetary scale urbanisation challenges current understandings of spatial settlements and how risk affects urban communities (limited \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (Ruddick et al., 2018). Massive urbanisation manifests in large agglomerations such as metropolitan areas \r\nand urban regions, conurbations with unique risk challenges, particularly when interacting with other drivers of vulnerability (Adetokunbo \r\nand Emeka, 2015; Maragno, Pozzer and Musco, 2021). Experiences of regional collaboration to scale adaptation to metropolitan areas \r\nhave shown to be effective, particularly facilitating information and technology exchanges and institutional cooperation (Shi, 2019; \r\nLundqvist, 2016), but may face challenges such as addressing administrative and fiscal requirements and enrolling local populations in \r\na meaningful participation process (Shi, 2019)"


id: 89cd5d57e5806026d74885d9a5978aad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" For example, the coordination of planning policies in the Vienna-Bratislava metropolitan \r\nregion, further divided by an international border, demonstrates that institutional coordination alone is not sufficient to deliver effective \r\nspatial governance: instead, meaningful spatial policies required the involvement of multiple actors (Patti, 2017). In addition to \r\ninstitutional coordination, adaptation in rapidly urbanising areas requires understanding how these processes magnify risk and condition \r\nurban responses (see also Section 6.3)."


id: dd5c0a3d234e40526730db704ecbcabc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"Rural areas provide ecosystem services that benefit cities directly, including through reducing hazards (runoff, and temperature) and \r\nthrough carbon storage, and can be maintained through urban markets and other inputs (Gebre and Gebremedhin, 2019). Most urban \r\nareas extend into dispersive peri-urban areas where urban and rural land uses co-exist (Simon, 2016) and/or suburban areas which are \r\nlower density and primarily residential in function. Moreover, the urban and rural differentiation creates normative expectations at the \r\nheart of planning conflicts and constraints of urban governance (Taylor, Butt and Amati, 2017). Expanding peri-urban areas pose specific \r\nstructural constraints to addressing risks. In Bogota, Colombia, a study found marked inequalities as more impoverished families had \r\nrestricted access to peri-urban forests, trees and tree services (Escobedo et al., 2015)"


id: a3aa0449f3d676372274a69293704cd9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" Factors such as limited land ownership and tenure \r\ninsecurity in peri-urban areas hinder people's ability to invest in permanent infrastructure to buffer themselves from flood events, as \r\nwitnessed in the slums in Nairobi (Thorn, Thornton and Helfgott, 2015). Building resilience and adaptation via community mobilisation \r\nmay not be effective in peri-urban areas shaped by migration, agricultural intensification and industrialisation (Wandl and Magoni, 2017)."


id: d2f72c592b71d74b2ac12326dbd058ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"Urbanisation on an immense scale blurs the boundaries that previously defined cities and settlements (Arboleda, 2016a; Shaw, 2015; \r\nBrenner, 2014a; OECD and European Commission, 2020; Schmid, 2018; Davidson et al., 2019; Wu and Keil, 2020). For example, peri-urban \r\nareas typically extend over multiple government jurisdictions (Wandl and Magoni, 2017). Adaptation actions can be difficult to plan, \r\ncoordinate, implement and evaluate in these transboundary contexts (Solecki et al., 2018; Srivastava, 2020; Funfgeld, 2015; Rukmana, \r\n2020; Carter et al., 2018). In Medellin, Colombia, a 46-mile-long green belt is being built to stop urban expansion while also protecting \r\nurban forests, providing access to green spaces, and reducing urban heat island effects (Anguelovski et al., 2016)"


id: 5d96e53c1a69b709a643d070fc389b68
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" However, large-scale \r\ninfrastructure projects such as this one require coordination between regional transport authorities and the different municipalities in \r\ncharge of housing and public services, in addition to consulting communities on their social impact (Chu, Anguelovski and Roberts, 2017). \r\nLocal and regional authorities have competing mandates, such as a competition for taxpaying residents in peri-urban, commuting zones, \r\nand different infrastructure investment logics, political drivers and constituent needs. Smaller discrete infrastructure projects that actively \r\nengage local populations may provide better opportunities to build resilience across fragmented spaces (Santos, 2017; Kamalipour and \r\nDovey, 2020)."


id: b14baf8ec8c3a60de3042bb69b65195b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"Suburbanisation follows a gradual movement of citizens from high-density urban centres to the suburbs (Pieretti, 2014). The development \r\nof enclaves for higher-income people that appropriate resources and constrain access to those resources for disadvantaged populations \r\nhas been recorded in places as distant as Santiago de Chile, People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia and the Philippines (Calvet and \r\nCastan Broto, 2016; Phelps, Miao and Zhang, 2020; Bulkeley, Castan Broto and Edwards, 2014; Buchori et al., 2021; Kleibert, 2018). The \r\nappropriation of land and resources in enclaves defends exclusive, privileged communities at the expense of everyone else. Enclaves \r\nexacerbate inequalities because those who cannot afford to live in the enclave suffer the fragmentation of public services, restrictions in \r\naccess to resources, and greater exposure to climate risks (Hodson, 2010; Haase et al., 2017)"


id: 9ab986f99b2baf852567e1423333e5d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" Moreover, suburbanisation is linked to the \r\nprivatisation of public spaces and the decline of public infrastructures, collective spaces and green projects (Long and Rice, 2019; North, \r\nNurse and Barker, 2017). Climate gentrification, whereby vulnerable communities are displaced from urban areas with lower climate risks \r\n(UN-Habitat, 2020), reconfigures urban areas, for example, as higher-income populations move away from the city centres, as shown in \r\nNorth American cities that have already suffered climate-related impacts such as Miami, Philadelphia and New Orleans (Keenan, Hill and \r\nGumber, 2018; Shokry, Connolly and Anguelovski, 2020; De Koning and Filatova, 2020; Aune, Gesch and Smith, 2020)."


id: b385c3a4fde31038f437e13d19bbcc2a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 25756
content:
"Adaptation and related concepts of urban climate resilience are also con\u0002cerns for the broader agenda of sustainable development (Wachsmuth, \r\nCohen and Angelo, 2016). Urban areas can play a positive role in ad\u0002vancing sustainability, but the pace and scale of urban development \r\ncan also undermine progress in SDGs (Barnett and Parnell, 2016; Maes\r\net al., 2019; Anarfi, Hill and Shiel, 2020) (high confidence). With careful \r\nplanning, urbanisation can be a transformative force, enhancing equity \r\nand well-being through co-benefits and synergies between climate \r\nchange adaptation, equitable urban development and mitigation (me\u0002dium evidence, medium agreement) (Parnell, 2016a; Solecki et al., 2015; \r\nSharifi, 2020). Cities can be effective change agents when supported by \r\nnetworked local and national institutions, including professional bodies \r\n(high confidence) (Andonova, Hale and Roger, 2017; Brandtner and \r\nSuarez, 2021; Heidrich et  al"


id: 701e8c06060751a1d97914265ac7fada
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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", 2016; Kern, 2019; Farzaneh and Wang, \r\n2020). Low Emission Development Strategies (LEDS) have developed \r\neffective science-policy interactions to support energy-system, environ\u0002mental and economic development planning strategies in the city of \r\nShanghai, China (Farzaneh and Wang, 2020). New literature is emerging \r\nabout how adaptive changes at the urban level could integrate both far \r\nreaching rapid emission reduction and community protection in trans\u0002formative ways (Wamsler and Raggers, 2018; Rosenzweig and Solecki, \r\n2018; UN-Habitat, 2020; Ziervogel, 2019a). There is an increasing con\u0002sensus about the need for integrated governance of urban areas with\u0002in and across regions, so that urban risk management and adaptation \r\nhappen hand in hand with more general processes of transition toward \r\nmore sustainable urban regions (Simon, 2016; UN-Habitat, 2020)."


id: 8dc00022d5250aa35ded0ebcfe7a38a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"Since AR5, there has also been increasing recognition of the contribution \r\nof diverse knowledges including local and Indigenous knowledge in \r\ncontributing to the development and interpretation of urban relevant \r\nclimate change data and policy for effective action (Klenk et al., 2017; \r\nHosen, Nakamura and Hamzah, 2020; Makondo and Thomas, 2018). \r\nIndigenous and local knowledge inform coping strategies in urban \r\nadaptation planning and new directions for action (Nakashima, \r\nKrupnik and Rubis, 2018; Abudu Kasei, Dalitso Kalanda-Joshua and Tutu \r\nBenefor, 2019). Indigenous and local knowledge is also found to shape \r\nperceptions about urban climate risk awareness, its acceptable limits, \r\ncausation and preferences for adaptation (see also Pyhala et al., 2016 \r\nfor a review; see Jaakkola, Juntunen and Nakkalajarvi, 2018 for impacts \r\non Indigenous peoples in the EU; Saboohi et al., 2019)"


id: 58c6c3e57049d3f7e06bd0cd7d249cb3
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content:
" Local perceptions \r\nabout climate change in turn influence adaptation behaviours in \r\nsettlements and urban communities (Lee et al., 2015; Larcom, She and \r\nvan Gevelt, 2019). Engagement with Indigenous and local knowledge \r\nis an enabling condition for planning community-appropriate climate \r\nadaptation responses (Fernandez-Llamazares et  al., 2015). Urban \r\ndecision making that includes Indigenous and local knowledge \r\nhas co-benefits for addressing indigenous dispossession, historical \r\ninequities and marginalisation of indigenous values that occurred \r\n(Parsons et  al., 2019; Carter, 2019; Maldonado et  al., 2016; Orlove\r\net al., 2014; Pearce et al., 2015). Indigenous and local knowledge can \r\nhelp deliver culturally appropriate strategies and local choices for urban \r\nrisk management through, for example community-based observation \r\nnetworks (Alessa et al., 2016), integrating ecosystem-based adaptation \r\nstrategies in institutional structures (Nalau et al"


id: f7dbe5c852818e03f8258dfb35c6f34
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", 2018), using multiple \r\nevidence-based approaches (Tengo et al., 2014), and adopting forms \r\nof governance that centre Indigenous peoples in urban adaptation and \r\ndecision making (Horn, 2018; Parsons, Fisher and Nalau, 2016)."


id: e55cab64c9b56b83e9251bf5cbbeab14
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"As a blueprint for advancing human dignity, the SDGs emphasize the \r\nneed to consider how to achieve a better and more sustainable future \r\nwhile 'leaving no one behind.' In doing so, they highlight an agenda \r\nfocused on well-being, equality and justice. The objective for SDG11 is \r\ndefined as: 'Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient \r\nand sustainable' with 10 associated targets including ensuring access \r\nfor all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services; \r\nparticipatory planning; safeguarding heritage features; reducing \r\ndisasters, particularly water related disasters and economic impacts on \r\nthe poor; and promoting resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation \r\nto climate change, resilience to disasters, and develop and implement \r\nplans, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction"


id: 846b9754d13493e2164a85b4b99052f5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" \r\nSimilarly, SDG9 aims to build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive \r\nand sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation, with associated \r\ntargets. The IPCC 1.5 special report emphasized that there are often \r\nco-benefits in pursuit of SDGs and adaptation strategies where \r\n'well-designed mitigation and adaptation responses can support \r\npoverty alleviation, food security, healthy ecosystems, equality and \r\nother dimensions of sustainable development' (IPCC, 2018 FAQ5.1). \r\nHowever there may also be negative trade-offs, for example between \r\npursuit of growth and reducing climate change risk (International \r\nCouncil for Science, 2017; IPCC, 2018 Executive Summary; Roy et al., \r\n2018a)."


id: bc9c0c8cec38d54d8a70d5718ff160fe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"New urban activists and stakeholders, including youth, and Indigenous \r\nand minority communities and NGOs alongside business groups have \r\nalso been visible in the global urban climate debate, pressing for \r\nfaster, more far-reaching change (Frantzeskaki et al., 2016; O'Brien, \r\nSelboe and Hayward, 2018; Alves, Campos and Penha-Lopes, 2019; \r\nSmith and Patterson, 2018; Crnogorcevic, 2019; Campos et al., 2016; \r\nHayward, 2021). Emergent urban social movements for climate \r\njustice often build on established international networks including \r\nlocal activists such as Shack and Slum Dwellers International, while \r\nothers are inspired by Indigenous movements and are focused on \r\nhuman rights, indigenous sovereignty and land claims, access to \r\nwater, intergenerational justice, and gender and youth movements \r\ncoordinated on social media (Agyeman et  al., 2016; Cohen, 2018; \r\nUlloa, 2017; Hayward, 2021; Prendergast et al., 2021)"


id: 79e34012899d56dda72fa024a396b6f9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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" The emergence \r\nof climate justice movements in urban communities has the potential \r\nto reframe policy discussion in cities in ways that also bring inequality \r\nand climate justice to the fore (Sheller and Urry, 2016), underscoring \r\ngrowing public calls for more far-reaching, transformative changes \r\ntoward socially just urban transformations (Akbulut et  al., 2019; \r\nForan, 2019; Vandepitte, Vandermoere and Hustinx, 2019; Smith and \r\nPatterson, 2018)."


id: 557f7d8923186b02e2d33cf8643cab74
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10930
content:
"In addition to direct climate impacts, interactions among changing \r\nurban form, exposure and vulnerability can create climate \r\nchange-induced risks and losses for cities and settlements. Climate \r\nchange already interacts with ongoing global trends in urbanisation \r\nto create regionally specific impacts and risk profiles. Through \r\ndemographic change and encroachment into natural and agricultural \r\nlands and coastal zones, rapidly expanding urban settlements can \r\nplace new physical assets and people in locations with high exposure \r\n(Tessler et al., 2015; Arnell and Gosling, 2016; Kundzewicz et al., 2014). \r\nIncreasing rates of global urbanisation will pose additional challenges \r\nto areas that have high levels of poverty, unemployment, informality, \r\nand housing and service backlogs (Jiang and O'Neill, 2017; Williams\r\net al., 2019). There is some evidence to suggest that climate change \r\nimpacts themselves are increasing urbanisation rates, generating \r\na challenging feedback loop"


id: ae5fa5ffd544aedd820e334823140d3a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 24959
content:
" In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, \r\nmanufacturing towns have experienced growth because of population \r\nmovement following droughts in agricultural hinterlands (Henderson, \r\nStoreygard and Deichmann, 2017). The rapid rate of urbanisation \r\ntherefore presents a time-limited opportunity to work toward risk \r\nreduction and transformational adaptation in towns and cities. The \r\nfollowing sections explore these dynamic interactions between urban \r\nsystems and climate change, and how these shape risk for people and \r\nfor key infrastructures."


id: 34d6b72832a62f3da7ec60e9038bd6fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"This section assesses observed and expected impacts from the \r\nmain hazards identified for cities, settlements and infrastructure; \r\ntemperature extremes (and the urban heat island), flooding (including \r\nsea level rise), water scarcity and security, as well as other hazards that \r\nare either less well-studied and/or likely to affect only a limited number \r\nof locations. The data assessed in this section are limited by uneven \r\ncoverage. Despite improvements since AR5, data continue to be more \r\ncomplete for extreme events than for chronic hazards and everyday \r\nrisks, which may have high aggregate impacts and disproportionately \r\nerode the well-being of urban poor households, especially for the most \r\nvulnerable, including women, children, the aged, disabled and homeless \r\n(van Wesenbeeck, Sonneveld and Voortman, 2016; Kinay et al., 2019; \r\nConnelly et al., 2018)"


id: 77e2666b524549cff2e6bdc1d72ebae7
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" Data coverage is also less comprehensive for \r\nsmaller settlements in poorer countries, the locations where urban \r\ngrowth is often high and adaptive capacities are often low (e.g., Rufat\r\net al., 2015). Thus, data gaps frequently coincide with highly vulnerable \r\npopulations (Rufat et  al., 2015; Satterthwaite and Bartlett, 2017). \r\nHere, even small changes in livelihoods, health, or representation \r\nand voice can rapidly bring households into positions of risk, even \r\nwhen hazard conditions are relatively stable (Ziervogel et al., 2017). \r\nThese structural limits in available data are discussed also in Section 7 \r\n(Health, Well-being and the Changing Structure of Communities) and \r\nSection 8 (Poverty, Livelihoods and Sustainable Development), and in \r\nDoblas-Reyes et  al. (2021) Box  10.3. There are implications also for \r\nadaptation (Section 6"


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content:
"3), where the greater availability of evidence on \r\nexposure-driven risk can limit resilience-building interventions that \r\nfocus on the reduction of vulnerability."


id: c73809f759fd41b2fd3229ecc3f7f80f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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"The challenges of managing these risks are amplified by the complex \r\ninteractions between climate and urban scenarios, owing to the \r\nsmaller spatial-temporal scales of urban areas in climate change \r\nmodelling relative to global climate models (GCM) and shared \r\nsocioeconomic pathways (SSP); geographical or geomorphological \r\nvariations in city location; uncertainties arising from incomplete \r\nassumptions about socio-economic pathways at urban scales affecting \r\nurban demographics, for example, fertility rates and life expectancies \r\nor increased rural-urban migration; and challenges in modelling the \r\nurban climate and in developing urban climate observational networks \r\nin cities (WGI Box 10.3; Kamei, Hanaki and Kurisu, 2016; Yu, Jiang and \r\nZhai, 2016; Jiang and O'Neill, 2017; Baklanov et al., 2018)"


id: dd38a28c32ecc107222395dbcd77a63
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" Additionally, \r\ncarbon-intensive economic growth, increasing inequalities, global \r\npandemics, and uncontrolled or unmanaged urbanisation will \r\nexacerbate the exposure and vulnerability of urban systems modelled \r\nin existing climate scenarios and pathways (high confidence) (Phillips\r\net  al., 2020; Jackson, 2021; Raworth, 2017; Moraci et  al., 2020). \r\nMitigating these outcomes requires new forms of urban governance \r\nfor climate adaptation, disaster risk reduction and building resilience \r\n(see Section 6.4)."


id: ab8a67afa69c78490a5fe0e45a3eff0d
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vector_id: 24506
content:
"resistance, presence of solar shading, thermal mass, ventilation, \r\norientation and geographical location (e.g., Liu and Coley, 2015; van \r\nHooff et al., 2014; Vardoulakis et al., 2015; Dodoo and Gustavsson, \r\n2016; Invidiata and Ghisi, 2016; Makantasi and Mavrogianni, 2016; \r\nMulville and Stravoravdis, 2016; Taylor et al., 2016; Hamdy et al., 2017; \r\nPerez-Andreu et al., 2018; Salthammer et al., 2018; Dino and Meral \r\nAkgul, 2019; Osman and Sevinc, 2019; Roshan, Oji and Attia, 2019; \r\nAlves, Goncalves and Duarte, 2021). Most of these studies employed \r\nnumerical simulations in which different climate scenarios were used \r\nto construct future climate data. In hot climates, energy-efficient \r\nbuildings with high insulation values and high airtightness, which have \r\ninsufficient protection from solar heat gains and/or limited ventilation \r\ncapabilities, are generally more vulnerable to overheating than older \r\nbuildings with lower insulation levels (e.g., van Hooff et  al"


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content:
", 2014; \r\nVardoulakis et al., 2015; Makantasi and Mavrogianni, 2016; Mulville \r\nand Stravoravdis, 2016; Salthammer et al., 2018; Fisk, 2015; Hamdy\r\net al., 2017; Fosas et al., 2018; Ozarisoy and Elsharkawy, 2019; see also \r\nFox-Kemper et  al., 2021 9.7 for building heat mitigation/adaptation \r\nlinks)."


id: c46fcd96b858672ad1184d0ef9ebff95
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content:
"Heat risk is associated with a range of health issues for urban \r\nresidents, with the consequences of higher urban temperatures being \r\nunevenly distributed across urban populations (high confidence). Clear \r\nevidence exists of increased health risks to elderly populations in \r\nsettlements, especially higher levels of mortality in elderly populations \r\nfrom urban heat islands during heatwave events (Fernandez Milan \r\nand Creutzig, 2015; Taylor et al., 2015; Ward et al., 2016a; Heaviside, \r\nMacintyre and Vardoulakis, 2017; Gough et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2020a), \r\nwhile health and fitness variables are also major determinants of the \r\neffects of heat stress (Schuster et al., 2017) (see also Table 7.2). Heat \r\nstress and dehydration are also related to behavioural and learning \r\nconcerns, with dehydration impairing concentration and cognition \r\nfor both adults and children (Merhej, 2019)"


id: 695ad15118e98a6992bfb92e174944f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" Literature on paediatric \r\nheat exposure is associated with increases in emergency department \r\nvisits for heat-related illnesses, electrolyte imbalances, fever, renal \r\ndisease and respiratory disease in young children (Winquist et  al., \r\n2016), with less severe outcomes such as lethargy, headaches, rashes, \r\ncramps and exhaustion negatively affecting children in school and play \r\nenvironments (Vanos, 2015; Hyndman, 2017). Young children in cities \r\nare particularly sensitive to heatwaves, and may have little experience \r\nor capacity to cope with heat extremes (Norwegian Red Cross, 2019). \r\nSuch vulnerability of young children to heat is compounded with \r\nprojected urbanisation rates and poor infrastructure, particularly \r\nin South Asian and in African cities (Smith, 2019)"


id: ba961756bcec293dc8a53357230c4c2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" There is evidence \r\nthat socioeconomically disadvantaged populations are more likely to \r\nlive in hotter parts of cities associated with higher-density residential \r\nland use in dwellings with less effective insulation built with poorer \r\nor older construction materials (Inostroza, Palme and de la Barrera, \r\n2016; Tomlinson et al., 2011). Specific emerging risks for occupational \r\nand related heat illnesses are found in urban tropical or subtropical \r\nlow- and middle-income countries (Andrews et al., 2018; Green et al., \r\n2019)."


id: 34675efdfa49c2aadfa55e2ca5fd5150
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
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vector_id: 5663
content:
"Higher urban temperatures result in lower labour productivity levels \r\nand economic outputs (medium confidence) (Graff Zivin and Neidell, \r\n2014; Yi and Chan, 2017; Houser et  al., 2015; Stevens, 2017; see \r\nSection  8.2.1). Globally, urban heat stress is projected to reduce \r\nlabour capacity by 20% in hot months by 2050 compared with a \r\ncurrent 10% reduction (Dunne, Stouffer and John, 2013). Burke et al. \r\n(2015) demonstrate a nonlinear relationship between temperature \r\nand global economic productivity, with potential global losses of 23% \r\nby 2100 due to climate change alone. In specific cases, Zander et al. \r\n(2015) estimate heat-related reductions in urban labour productivity \r\nin Australia to cost USD 3.6-5.1  billion yr-1, based on self-reported \r\nperformance reduction and absenteeism among 1726 workers in \r\n2013-142\r\n; while the high-temperature subsidies given in China at \r\noutdoor air temperatures above 35degC are projected to increase to USD \r\n35"


id: 9011b1c362ea91f617200e3d17c090db
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 20197
content:
"7  billion yr-1 after 2030 (compared with USD 5.5  billion yr-1 for \r\n1979-2005) (Zhao et al., 2016)3\r\n."


id: 491dd2b8d60c0651f049dce8d9dbf213
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 8891
content:
"Urban flooding risks are also increased by urban expansion and land \r\nuse and land cover change which enlarges impermeable surface \r\nareas through soil sealing, impacting drainage of floodwaters with \r\nconsequent sewer overflows (high confidence) (Arnbjerg-Nielsen\r\net  al., 2013; Ziervogel et  al., 2016; Aroua, 2016; Kundzewicz et  al., \r\n2014). These risks are also driven by increasing societal complexity, \r\nurban developmental policy on flood control and long-term economic \r\ngrowth (Berndtsson et al., 2019), including in mega-cities (Januriyadi\r\net al., 2018). The increase in flood risk from urban development can be \r\nconsiderable; based on modelling of two RCP (4.5 and 8.5) scenarios, \r\nKaspersen et al. (2017) noted flooding in four European cities could \r\nincrease by up to 10% for every 1% increase in impervious surface area"


id: 993ca746f7d8a3973164fa1736acf1a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" \r\nRisks are also compounded by the location of settlements, with greater \r\nrisks within cities located in low elevation coastal zones subject to sea \r\nlevel rise, potential land subsidence and exposure to tropical cyclones \r\n((Koop and van Leeuwen, 2017; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; see also \r\nSection CCP2.2) and within informal settlements, where generally little \r\ninvestment in drainage solutions exists and flooding regularly disrupts \r\nlivelihoods and disproportionately undermines local food safety and \r\nsecurity for the urban poor (Dodman, Colenbrander and Archer, 2017; \r\nDodman et al., 2017; Kundzewicz et al., 2014; Sections 5.4 and 5.8)."


id: 7be89c88c63553a40d0c8672c969db6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 17098
content:
"Future risks of urban flooding is increasing in conjunction with \r\ncontinued increases in global surface temperature (high confidence) \r\n(IPCC, 2019b; Winsemius et  al., 2015; Kulp and Strauss, 2019; \r\nHoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018). In particular, Asian cities are highly \r\nexposed to future flood risks arising from urbanisation processes. \r\nBetween 2000 and 2030, rapid urbanisation in Indonesia will elevate \r\nflood risks by 76-120% for river and coastal floods, while sea level rise \r\nwill further increase the exposure by 19-37% (Muis et al., 2015). In \r\nCan Tho, Vietnam, current urban development patterns put new assets \r\nand infrastructure at risk due to sea level rise and river flooding in \r\nthe Mekong Delta (Chinh et al., 2017; Chinh et al., 2016)"


id: b520b5aa2f14de25cc33b43d98c9055b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" Flooding in \r\nurban areas is exacerbated both by the encroachment of urban areas \r\ninto areas that retain water and by the lack of infrastructure such as \r\nembankments and flood walls, as is the case for large areas of Dhaka \r\nEast (Haque, Bithell and Richards, 2020). Zhou et al. (2019) have also \r\nshown that for the city of Hohhot, China, the increase in impervious \r\nsurfaces contributes between 2-4  times more to modelled annual \r\nflood risk compared with risk induced by climate change."


id: 62aec6dbdc913558b7d9183da20825ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 13095
content:
"Flood risks in settlements arise from hydrometeorological events \r\ninteracting with the urban system which exposes settlements to river \r\n(fluvial) floods, flash floods, pluvial (precipitation-driven) floods, sewer \r\nfloods, coastal floods and glacial lake outburst floods (IPCC, 2012). \r\nSea level increase and increases in tropical cyclone storm surge and \r\nrainfall intensity will increase the probability of coastal city flooding \r\n(high confidence) (WGI Box TS14). Globally, the increase in frequencies \r\nand intensities of extreme precipitation from global warming will \r\nlikely4 expand the global land area affected by flood hazards (medium \r\nconfidence) ((Alfieri et al., 2018; Alfieri et al., 2017; Hoegh-Guldberg\r\net  al., 2018); Section  4.2.4.2). Mishra et  al. (2015) noted that out \r\nof 241 urban areas, only 17% of cities experienced statistically \r\nsignificant increases in frequencies of extreme precipitation events \r\nfrom 1973 to 2012"


id: a5a2be3d29e583959fc1b9a05bd6c1ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 23630
content:
" In the future, there is some evidence that changes \r\nin high-intensity short duration (sub-daily) rainfall in urban areas will \r\nincrease (limited evidence, medium agreement) (Kendon et al., 2014; \r\nBan, Schmidli and Schar, 2015; Abiodun et al., 2017)."


id: 514a6ce319aae54768155ee2714f65fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"flooding may increase by PS60-200 million for projected 2-4degC warming \r\nscenarios; enhanced adaptation actions could manage flooding up to a \r\n2degC scenario but will be insufficient beyond that (Sayers et al., 2015). \r\nAnalyses conducted in South Korea suggests that future flood levels \r\ncould exceed current flood protection design standards by as much \r\nas 70% by 2100, considerably increasing urban flood risk (Kang et al., \r\n2016). Modelling of urban flood damage in the Kelani River Basin in Sri \r\nLanka showed increased frequency of flooding by 2030 could increase \r\npotential urban property damage by up to 10.2% (Komolafe Akinola, \r\nHerath and Avtar, 2018). Urban flood impacts may also exacerbate \r\nhealth burdens (including disease outbreaks of malaria, typhoid and \r\ncholera), which are compounded by damage to medical facilities (e.g., \r\ndamage to hospitals and disruption of medicinal supply chains), as \r\nobserved in urban areas of Ghana (Gough et al., 2019)"


id: 85d6260c5cd3ec7cbf82ede6ed579e1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" In addition, \r\nemerging research shows the cascading consequences of hazard \r\nevents, in this case urban flooding, on other risks to well-being in \r\nways that are particularly severe for the urban poor, including mental \r\nill-health, incidents of domestic violence impacting children and \r\nwomen, chronic diseases and salinity of drinking water ((Matsuyama, \r\nKhan and Khalequzzaman, 2020); Section  4.2.4.5; Section  6.2.4.2; \r\nBox 7.2; Section 8.4.5.2)."


id: eedd8cf179d8332af88d5c89e581303b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"Risks of urban water scarcity and security are compounded by \r\nvulnerabilities such as service availability and quality of infrastructure \r\nto supply water for increased urban demand from in-migration to \r\ncities (medium confidence) (Ahmadalipour et  al., 2019; Dong et  al., \r\n2020; Reynolds et al., 2019; Thomas et al., 2017; Mullin, 2020). Risks \r\nto local water security in cities are also exacerbated by drivers such \r\nas dependence on imported water resources from distant locales that \r\nmay be exposed to additional drought risks (high confidence) (Ahams\r\net al., 2017; Li et al., 2019b; Marston et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2020; \r\nZhang et al., 2020); from considerable projected urban expansion in \r\ndrought-stressed areas, for example, across drylands of Western Asia \r\nand North Africa (Guneralp et  al., (2015); and by export of virtual \r\nwater (i.e., export of water embedded in food and energy) from local \r\nsources to distant trading partners (Djehdian et al., 2019; D'Odorico\r\net al"


id: a91758e172ce5560880a4924271c77ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 24124
content:
", 2018; Fulton and Cooley, 2015; Rushforth and Ruddell, 2016; \r\nVerdon-Kidd et al., 2017; Vora et al., 2017)."


id: f504cf054dbd0281d488ab2d2559aea1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36061
content:
"Urban water scarcity occurs when gaps exist between supply and \r\ndemand of available freshwater resources (Zhang et al., 2019). Urban \r\nwater security requires a sustainable quantity and quality of water \r\nto meet community and ecosystem needs in a changing climate \r\n(Romero-Lankao and Gnatz, 2019; Allan, Kenway and Head, 2018; \r\nHuang, Xu and Yin, 2015; Chen and Shi, 2016). Risks arising from urban \r\nwater scarcity worldwide are very likely increasing due to climate drivers \r\n(e.g., warmer temperatures and droughts) and urbanisation processes \r\n(e.g., land use changes, migration to cities and changing patterns \r\nof water use including over extraction of surface and groundwater \r\nresources) affecting supply and demand (high confidence) (Allan, \r\nKenway and Head, 2018; Crausbay et  al., 2020; Haddeland et  al., \r\n2014; Pickard et al., 2017; De Stefano et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2019; Van \r\nLoon et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2019; Section 4.2.4.4; See Box 8"


id: 706c4babe964942ed1afa2d83b824f2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15309
content:
"6 for \r\ncase study on 2018 Cape Town drought). Florke et al. (2018) estimates \r\nthat nearly a third of all major cities worldwide may exhaust their \r\ncurrent water resources by 2050. Globally, projections suggest that \r\n350 million (+- 158.8 million) more people living in urban areas will \r\nbe exposed to water scarcity from severe droughts at 1.5degC warming \r\nand 410.7 million (+- 213.5 million) at 2degC warming (Liu et al., 2018)."


id: cfe30371bd1008972dbd369db0b660ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30234
content:
"Cold spells. Although frequencies and intensities of cold spells/\r\ncold waves are virtually certain to have decreased globally, and are \r\nprojected to consistently decrease for most warming levels (high \r\nconfidence; WGI Table  11.2), cold weather events can periodically \r\noccur and impact urban areas and their connected infrastructures. For \r\ncities in eastern Canada, the intra-annual distribution of freezing rain \r\nevents may become more frequent from December to February, and less \r\nfrequent in other months by 2100 (Cheng, Li and Auld, 2011). Freezing \r\nrain is also a risk to urban populations and infrastructure. In general, \r\nhigher population mortality rates likely occur during the winter season, \r\nwhile more temperature-attributable deaths are caused by cold than \r\nby heat in cities located in temperate climates (Gasparrini et al., 2015; \r\nChen et al., 2017; Ryti, Guo and Jaakkola, 2016)"


id: d6008decf6f75c117cc9084780b7c3d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31187
content:
" Winter mortality is \r\nunlikely to significantly decrease due to warming trends, partly because \r\na range of other medical factors (e.g., influenza seasons and elevations \r\nin cardiac risk factors) also drive this winter-excess mortality (Kinney\r\net al., 2015). However, the evidence is unclear whether mortality related \r\nto cold waves will decrease in coming decades in European (Smid\r\net al., 2019) or US cities (Wang et al., 2016). While projected global \r\ncold extremes are expected to decrease in frequency and intensity, the \r\nhigher regional variability of future climates means that cold waves \r\nmay remain locally important threats, including in milder regions where \r\nthere are larger temperature differences between 'normal' winter days \r\nand extreme cold events, and where there is less capacity to adapt (Ma, \r\nChen and Kan, 2014; Ho et al., 2019)"


id: 2a532eb74220d705d9af01156023d5bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4090
content:
" This will be accentuated in many \r\ncities, particularly in Europe, by anticipated demographic changes that \r\nresult in a more elderly population susceptible to cold wave health risks \r\n(Smid et al., 2019)."


id: 56ed1d3cbcdc5cb3221dbcb012a99a2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11150
content:
"Landslides. While geomorphological events (e.g., land subsidence from \r\npermafrost thaw at high latitudes or from groundwater extraction) and \r\nfactors associated with the built environment (e.g., settlement location \r\nadjacent to steep slopes and zonation laws for building construction) \r\nare major factors determining urban landslide risk, these can also \r\nbe influenced by a range of climatic variables, namely precipitation \r\n(frequency, intensity and duration), snow melt and temperature \r\nchange. Some 48 million people are exposed to landslide risk in Europe \r\nalone, with the majority in smaller urban centres (Mateos et al., 2020). \r\nTravassos et  al. (2020) also documented all landslide deaths in the \r\nSao Paulo Macro Metropolis Region from 2016 to 2019 that occurred \r\nfrom extreme rainfall events in vulnerable areas prone to landslides"


id: d7c15d51079e3bd986a3625ab50dc778
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" \r\nAn increase in the number of people exposed to urban landslide risks is \r\nprojected for landslide-prone settlements lying within regions projected \r\nto experience a corresponding increase in extreme rainfall (Gariano \r\nand Guzzetti, 2016). In addition, human factors such as expansion of \r\ntowns onto unstable land and land use changes within settlements "


id: 92dd7201acfb1d9ced7db54878ae8c91
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20620
content:
"For some air pollutants, for example concentrations of PM2.5 in several \r\nUS, Western European and Chinese cities have recently decreased as \r\na result of clean air regulations that have controlled emissions from \r\nsources such as motor vehicles, fossil fuel power plants and major \r\nindustries (Zheng et al., 2018a; Fleming et al., 2018). These decreases \r\nhave brought substantial improvements in public health in settlements \r\nwithin these regions (Ciarelli et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2018). In South \r\nAsia, Southeast Asia and Africa, however, concentrations of other \r\nair pollutants, for example tropospheric ozone, oxides of nitrogen \r\nand volatile organic compounds are likely to continue to grow and \r\npeak by mid-century before they subside due to global urbanisation \r\nassumptions embedded in the SSPs (Naik et al., 2021 Sections 6.2.1; \r\n6.7.1.2)"


id: e678736fc8434095547e4ddcc59bbfac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33747
content:
" Broadly, future air pollutant emissions are projected to decline \r\nglobally by 2050 as societies become wealthier and more willing \r\nto invest in air pollution controls, but the trajectories vary among \r\npollutants, world regions and scenarios (Silva et al., 2016b; Rao et al., \r\n2017; Silva et al., 2016c). Whereas cities in East Asia and South Asia \r\ncurrently have large exposure to anthropogenic air pollution, African \r\ncities may emerge by 2050 as the most polluted because of growing \r\npopulations and demand for energy, increased urbanisation and \r\nrelatively weak regulations to control emissions (Liousse et al., 2014)."


id: 82f73566239d452dd921964f64b063d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18134
content:
"Studies modelling climate change impacts on air quality find that the \r\nspatiotemporal patterns of concentration changes vary strongly at \r\nurban scales, and that often those patterns differ among the different \r\nyears modelled due to internal variability (Saari et  al., 2019) and \r\ndifferent models used (Weaver et al., 2009). Changes in PM2.5 due to \r\nclimate change are less clear than for ozone and may be relatively \r\nsmaller (Westervelt et al., 2019) as climate change can affect PM2.5\r\nspecies differently (Fiore, Naik and Leibensperger, 2015). For Beijing, \r\nclimate change is expected to cause a 50% increase in the frequency \r\nof meteorological conditions conducive to high PM2.5 concentrations \r\n(Cai et al., 2017). The impacts of future climate change on air quality \r\nand consequent risks on human health have been studied at urban \r\n(Knowlton et  al., 2004; Physick, Cope and Lee, 2014) and national \r\nscales (Fann et al., 2015; Orru et al"


id: 7134e3a9198fc74170970953bb0b45a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15447
content:
", 2013; Doherty, Heal and O'Connor, \r\n2017); globally, these studies have found a likely net increased risk \r\nof climate change on air pollution-related health (low confidence). \r\nThey have focused mainly on the USA and Europe, with few studies \r\nelsewhere (Orru, Ebi and Forsberg, 2017), although the relationship \r\nbetween climate and air quality in megacities is particularly complex \r\n(Baklanov, Luisa and Molina, 2016). Silva et al. (2017) found that global \r\npremature mortality attributable to climate change (and not from \r\nurbanisation) from ozone and PM2.5 will increase by about 260,000 \r\ndeaths per year in 2100 under RCP8.5, but substantial variance in \r\nresults exists between individual models."


id: 679c94850e2eab18395a112346c1e0b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Air Pollution. Despite recent observed improvements in air quality \r\narising from COVID-19 restrictions (Krecl et  al., 2020; Naik et  al., \r\n2021 Cross-Chapter Box  6.1), significant risks to human health in \r\ncities leading to premature mortality very likely arise from exposure \r\nto decreased outdoor air quality from a combination of biogenic \r\n(e.g., wildfires at the WUI that advect into the urban atmosphere \r\n[Reddington et al., 2014; Naik et al., 2021 Chapter 12 Box 12.1]) and \r\nanthropogenic sources that are influenced by climate change (e.g., \r\nfine particulate matter such as PM2.5, tropospheric ozone, oxides of \r\nnitrogen and volatile organic compounds [Burnett et al., 2018; Knight\r\net al., 2016; Turner et al., 2016; West et al., 2016; Chang et al., 2019b; \r\nLi et al., 2019a; Alexader, Luisa and Molina, 2016; Naik et al., 2021 \r\nSections  6.5.1, 6.7.1.1, 6.7.1.2])"


id: 88183a203a95b63d18ea42826d252f28
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18933
content:
" Risks of premature mortality from \r\nindoor air pollution in cities, arising from biomass burning for heating \r\nin winter or cooking, indoor pesticide use or exposure to volatile \r\norganic compounds from poor thermal insulation in buildings, are \r\nalso likely to occur (Leung, 2015; Peduzzi et al., 2020; Cross-Chapter \r\nBox HEALTH in Chapter 7)."


id: d22d1dede8c0f1bbda8b45c44824c9e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 30593
content:
"Migration, displacement and resettlement each play a foundational \r\nrole in differentiated vulnerability (see Cross-Chapter Box  MIGRATE \r\nin Chapter 7). The relationship between migration and vulnerability \r\nis complex (robust evidence, high agreement), and is the first of the \r\nthree components discussed within this section. Climate change, as a \r\npush factor, is only one among multiple drivers (political, economic and \r\nsocial) related to environmental migration (Heslin et al., 2019; Planitz, \r\n2019; Luetz and Merson, 2019). There is consensus that it is difficult \r\nto pin climate change as the sole driver of internal (within national \r\nboundaries) rural to urban migration decisions owing to, among other \r\nfactors, the disconnect between national and international policies \r\n(Wilkinson et al"


id: 88ce8e8c0d4badbcd5cd8bef7162c78
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 19059
content:
", 2016), the lack of unifying theoretical frameworks \r\nand the complex interactions between climatic and other drivers \r\n(social, demographic, economic and political) at multiple scales \r\n(Cattaneo et al., 2019; Borderon et al., 2019). Environmental migration, \r\nincluding rural to urban migration, triggered by climate change may \r\nensue from either slow- or rapid-onset climatic events and could be \r\neither temporary, cyclical or permanent movement that occurs within \r\nor beyond national boundaries (Heslin et al., 2019; Silja, 2017)."


id: 43b02015462ef92b71aea895a27bfe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8056
content:
"For individuals in urban communities, new literature highlights \r\nhow differences in vulnerability established by social and economic \r\nprocesses are further differentiated by household and individual \r\nvariability and intersectionality (Kaijser and Kronsell, 2014; Kuran et al., \r\n2020).This includes differences in wealth and capacity (Romero-Lankao, \r\nGnatz and Sperling, 2016); gender and non-binary gender (Michael \r\nand Vakulabharanam, 2016; Sauer and Stiess, 2021; Mersha and van \r\nLaerhoven, 2018); education, health, political power and social capital \r\n(Lemos et al., 2016); age, including young and elderly, low physical \r\nfitness, pre-existing disability, length of residence and social and ethnic \r\nmarginalisation (Inostroza, Palme and de la Barrera, 2016; Schuster\r\net al., 2017; Malakar and Mishra, 2017)"


id: a7c3bb4cfec1ba3639fefdba94d09284
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" An increasing proportion of \r\nrefugees and displaced people now live in urban centres, and their \r\ncharacteristics also make them vulnerable to a range of shocks and \r\nstresses (Earle, 2016). While some individuals, including children, may \r\nbe able to exercise agency to reduce their risk (Treichel, 2020), and \r\nsome indicators are culturally specific, overall, poor, marginalised, \r\nsocially isolated and informal urban households are particularly at risk \r\n(high confidence) (Brown and McGranahan, 2016; Kim et al., 2020b; \r\nHuq et al., 2020a; Huq et al., 2020b)."


id: a8148308316fa77a7d2ea28cc2a80a4d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 23958
content:
"Climate-induced migration is not necessarily higher among poorer \r\nhouseholds whose mobility is more likely to be limited due to the \r\npoverty trap (i.e., lack of financial resources) (high confidence) \r\n(Cattaneo et  al., 2019; Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020; Silja, 2017). \r\nFor example, in Bangladesh, vulnerability of rural populations is \r\nincreasing, so many of the poorest employ migration as a strategy of \r\nlast resort (Paprocki, 2018; Penning-Rowsell, Sultana and Thompson, \r\n2013; Adri and Simon, 2018) that occurs as soil salinity (as opposed \r\nto inundation alone) increases and is paralleled by economic \r\ndiversification (i.e., aquaculture) (Chen and Mueller, 2018). There is \r\nrobust evidence and high agreement that rapid-onset climatic events \r\ntrigger involuntary migration and short-term, short-distance mobilities \r\n(Cattaneo et  al., 2019)"


id: 3a8b836022781186b50d6229071b939b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 6575
content:
" There is also robust evidence and high \r\nagreement that slow-onset climatic events (such as droughts and sea \r\nlevel rise) lead to long-distance internal displacement, more so than \r\nlocal or international migration (Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020; Silja, \r\n2017), while sea level rise is expected to lead to the displacement of \r\ncommunities along coastal zones, such as in Florida in the USA (Hauer, \r\n2017; Butler, Deyle and Mutnansky, 2016)."


id: 6c052ee47fed331432677a8d77a1e633
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"Regardless of the reasons and the initiators for migration, community \r\ncontrol over resettlement both at the origin and destination leads to \r\nmore positive outcomes for both the communities being resettled and \r\nthe receiving communities (high confidence) (Perumal, 2018; Ferris, \r\n2015; Price, 2019; Mortreux and Adams, 2015; Tadgell, Doberstein and \r\nMortsch, 2018; Luetz and Havea, 2018). The protection of livelihoods \r\ncontributes to ensuring the well-being (physical and mental) and the \r\nprotection of the rights of communities (high confidence) (Ferris, 2015; \r\nPrice, 2019). There is limited evidence but high agreement that the \r\noutcomes of resettlement initiatives are complex and multi-faceted \r\n(Ferris, 2015)"


id: 6f08a301b8a3aa65214c3a9aab06f792
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" For example, in Shangnan County, northwest China, the \r\nMassive Southern Shaanxi Migration Program, based on voluntary \r\nparticipation, reduced risk exposure and improved the quality of life \r\nin general, but also disproportionately increased the vulnerability \r\nof disadvantaged groups (the poor, migrants, and those left behind) \r\n(Lei et al., 2017). Similarly, vulnerability increased due to the loss of \r\nconnection to place and community bonds in Mekong Delta, Vietnam \r\n(Miller, 2019), and due to unsafe construction, poor infrastructure, \r\ninstitutional incapacity and general neglect in resettlement initiatives \r\nin Malawi, sub-Saharan Africa (Kita, 2017)."


id: 9b17f381ed3997d46a99242b32db4591
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"Migration, including rural-urban migration, is also recognised as an \r\nadaptation strategy in some circumstances, whether this is voluntary \r\nor planned (Jamero et al., 2019; Esteban et al., 2020a; Bettini, 2014). \r\nVoluntary migration can be an element of household strategies to \r\ndiversify risk, depending on the nature of the climatic stress, and \r\ninteracts with household composition, individual characteristics, social \r\nnetworks, and historical, political and economic contexts (Hunter, \r\nLuna and Norton, 2015; Carmin et al., 2015; Hayward et al., 2020). \r\nFor example, in Colombia, rural to urban migration is differentiated \r\nacross gender depending on the climatic stress whereby men migrate \r\ndue to droughts, while women migrate due to excessive rain triggers \r\n(Tovar-Restrepo and Irazabal, 2013)"


id: 735544f2dcc131851a0f9d4ab154720c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 15767
content:
" Especially in Pacific small island \r\ndeveloping states, migration can be a strategy for urban settlements \r\nor tribal communities to relocate in customary areas, as in the case \r\nof Vunidogoloa in Fiji (McMichael, Katonivualiku and Powell, 2019; \r\nHayward et al., 2020); it can be a livelihood strategy as shown in the \r\nCataret Islands in Papua New Guinea (Connell, 2016); or it can be \r\nused to enhance education and international networks (i.e., voluntary \r\n'migration with dignity') as is the case in Kiribati (Heslin et al., 2019; \r\nVoigt-Graf and Kagan, 2017)."


id: 57eed2394296e2276d5b2c0879da989f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11337
content:
"Projected climatic changes, such as changing precipitation patterns, \r\ntemperatures and sea levels, contribute to pressures on human \r\nwell-being and the functioning of infrastructure systems (high \r\nconfidence). Furthermore, risks evolve due to macro-scale drivers of \r\nchange such as urbanisation, economic development, land use changes \r\nand other emergent factors (Adger, Brown and Surminski, 2018). \r\nInfrastructure networks are rapidly growing around the world (see \r\nTable 6.3). Since the quality and accessibility of infrastructure services \r\nare varied, it is important to understand how climate change poses \r\ndifferent kinds of risk on them"


id: 919ab65b43c43966e72fc48c99ba8e82
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 20450
content:
" Infrastructure can be broadly understood \r\nto include social infrastructure (housing, health, education, livelihoods \r\nand social safety nets, security, cultural heritage/institutions, disaster \r\nrisk management and urban planning), ecological infrastructure (clean \r\nair, flood protection, urban agriculture, temperature, green corridors, \r\nwatercourses and riverways) and physical infrastructure (energy, \r\ntransport, communications [including digital], built form, water and \r\nsanitation and solid waste management) (Thacker et al., 2019). This \r\nsection focuses especially on physical infrastructure where the literature "


id: 585e332bc80ccd678cd3f251f418cf91
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11409
content:
"Energy infrastructure underpins modern economies and quality of \r\nlife. Disruption to power or fuel supplies impacts upon all other \r\ninfrastructure sectors, and affects businesses, industry, healthcare and \r\nother critical services both within and across jurisdictional boundaries \r\n(Groundstroem and Juhola, 2019). The economic impacts of climate \r\nchange risks are significant, for example in the EU, the expected \r\nannual damages to energy infrastructure, currently EUR0.5  billion yr-1, \r\nare projected to increase 1612% by the 2080s (Forzieri et al., 2018). \r\nIn China, 33.9% of the population are vulnerable to electricity supply \r\ndisruptions from a flood or drought (Hu et al., 2016), whilst in the USA, \r\nhigher temperatures are projected to increase power system costs by \r\nabout USD 50 billion by the year 2050 (Jaglom et al., 2014)"


id: 6905dbc338ddeb38d5bc7ea5b2a80af9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" In a study \r\nof 11 Central and Eastern European countries, researchers found that \r\nenergy poverty is exacerbated by existing infrastructure deficits and \r\nenergy efficient building stock, as well as income inequality, which can \r\nlead to reduced economic productivity (Karpinska and Smiech, 2020). \r\nClimate change is expected to alter energy demand (Viguie et  al., \r\n2021), for example heatwaves increase spot market prices (Pechan \r\nand Eisenack, 2014), with a disproportionate impact on the poorest \r\nand most vulnerable populations. Energy infrastructure are susceptible \r\nto a range of climate risks (Cronin, Anandarajah and Dessens, 2018), \r\nwhilst issues pertaining to energy demand are considered by Working \r\nGroup III."


id: 92c6fc111b55b55d589f3eee7edb4f20
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"Most thermoelectric plants require water for cooling, many are therefore \r\nsituated near rivers and coasts and thus vulnerable to flooding. Increases \r\nin water temperature or restrictions on cooling water availability \r\naffect hydroelectric and thermoelectric plants. A 1degC increase in the \r\ntemperature of water used as coolant yields a decrease of 0.12-0.7% \r\nin power output (Mima and Criqui, 2015; Ibrahim, Ibrahim and Attia, \r\n2014). Excess biological growth, accelerated by warmer water, increases \r\nrisk of clogging water intakes (Cruz and Krausmann, 2013). While some \r\nregions are expected to experience increased capacity under climate \r\nchange (namely India and Russia), global annual thermal power plant \r\ncapacity is likely to be reduced by between 7% in a mid-century RCP2.6 \r\nscenario and 12% in a mid-century RCP8.5 scenario (van Vliet et al., \r\n2016). Worldwide, hydroelectric capacity reductions are projected at \r\n0.4-6.1% (van Vliet et al., 2016)"


id: 708a57dc80b8f240e63d3083817c4dda
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
" Analysis of the UK's water for energy \r\ngeneration abstractions showed that an energy mix of high nuclear or \r\ncarbon capture technologies could require as much as six times the \r\ncurrent cooling water demands (Byers, Hall and Amezaga, 2014; Byers \r\net al., 2016)."


id: 3ec69422d9583d35cd7a6aad471d2d95
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
content_type: text
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vector_id: 7259
content:
"Climate change can, for example, influence energy consumption \r\npatterns by changing how household and industrial consumers \r\nrespond to short-term weather shocks, as well as how they adapt \r\nto long-term changes (Auffhammer and Mansur, 2014). Recent \r\nstudies from Stockholm, Sweden, show that future heating demand \r\nwill decrease while cooling demand will increase (Nik and Sasic \r\nKalagasidis, 2013). A study from the USA showed that climate change \r\nwill impact buildings by affecting peak and annual building energy \r\nconsumption (Fri and Savitz, 2014). From an infrastructure standpoint, \r\nthe vulnerability of current hydropower and thermoelectric power \r\ngeneration systems may change due to changes in climate and \r\nwater systems and projected reduction of usable capacities (van Vliet \r\net  al., 2016; Byers et  al., 2016)"


id: 4c425a8ce778da57b7c30434b026ed09
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 9427
content:
" These examples show how energy \r\ninfrastructure planning under climate change must take into account \r\na greater number of scenarios and investigate impacts on particular \r\nenergy segments (Sharifi and Yamagata, 2016)."


id: 90685b12cad27c03e71c5fae0a6c07da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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vector_id: 20255
content:
"Since AR5, research has highlighted the implications for disruption to \r\nglobal supply chains (Becker et al., 2018; Shughrue and Seto, 2018; \r\nPato, 2015), and has made advancements in quantifying costs of \r\nclimate risks to transportation infrastructure. Climate risks to transport \r\ninfrastructure (from heat- and cold waves, droughts, wildfires, \r\nriver and coastal floods, and windstorms) in Europe could rise from \r\nEUR0.5  billion to over EUR10  billion by the 2080s (Forzieri et  al., 2018). \r\nAcross the Arctic, nearly four million people and 70% of all current \r\ninfrastructure, including resource extraction and transportation routes, \r\nwill be at risk by 2050 (Hjort et  al., 2018), although the design of \r\nspecific infrastructure may also affect the degree of infrastructure \r\ndamage, depending on local geological and ecological conditions. \r\nGlobally, Koks et al. (2019) calculated that approximately 7"


id: 188ba846a9ca5a318feb65f545f4862b
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content:
"5% of road \r\nand railway assets are exposed to a 1-in-100 year flood events, and \r\ntotal global expected annual damages (EAD) of USD 3.1-22  billion \r\n(mean USD 14.6  billion) due to direct damage from cyclone winds, \r\nsurface and river flooding, and coastal flooding. The majority of this is \r\ncaused by surface water and fluvial flooding (mean USD 10.7 billion). \r\nAlthough twice as much infrastructure is exposed to cyclone winds \r\ncompared with flooding, a mean EAD of USD 0.5 billion is significantly \r\nless than for coastal flooding (USD 2.3 billion), as cyclone damages \r\nare largely limited to bridge damage and the cost of removing trees \r\nfallen on road carriageways and railway tracks. This is small relative \r\nto global gross domestic product (GDP; ~0.02%). However, in some \r\ncountries EAD equates to 0"


id: 4afeb4705098b6db083c7fddcb4b5b6d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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content:
"5-1% of GDP, which is the same order \r\nof magnitude as typical national transport infrastructure budgets, but \r\nespecially significant for countries such as Fiji that already spend 30% \r\nof their government budget on transport (World Bank Group, 2017). \r\nKoks et al. (2019) did not assess future climate change impacts, but \r\ncomparable studies calculating changes in EAD from flooding based \r\nupon land use show increases of 170-1370%, depending on global \r\ngreenhouse gas emissions levels (Alfieri et al., 2017; Winsemius et al., \r\n2015). Moreover, Schweikert et  al., (2014) report that climate risks \r\nto transport infrastructure could cost as much as 5% of annual road \r\ninfrastructure budgets by 2100, with disproportionate impacts in some \r\nlow and lower middle-income countries."


id: 5c220a0d4fab14d39b269f3226428111
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12006
content:
"Electricity Transmission and Distribution. Electricity transmission \r\nand distribution networks span large distances, with overhead power \r\nlines often traversing exposed areas. Power lines and other assets, such \r\nas substations, are often located near population centres, including \r\nthose in floodplains. Structural damage to overhead distribution lines \r\nwill increase in areas projected to see more ice or freezing rain (e.g., \r\nmost of Canada), snowfall (e.g., Japan) or wildfires (e.g., California, \r\nUSA) (Bompard et al., 2013; Mitchell, 2013; Sathaye et al., 2013; Jeong \r\net al., 2018; Ohba and Sugimoto, 2020). Electricity outages may last \r\nfor prolonged periods of time and across vast areas, in addition to \r\npotentially disproportionately affecting poorer or more vulnerable \r\ncommunities. Increases in windstorm frequency and intensity increase \r\nthe risk of direct damage to overhead lines and pylons, in many \r\nlocations this is limited but Tyusov et al"


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content:
" (2017) calculate an increase as \r\nhigh as 30% in parts of Russia. Where the mode of failure is recorded, \r\ntransmission pylons are seen to be more susceptible to wind damage, \r\nwhilst distribution pylons are more likely to be affected by treefall and \r\ndebris (Karagiannis et al., 2019). Increased temperatures can lead to \r\nthe de-rating (lower performance) of power lines, whose resistance \r\nincreases with temperature with efficiency reductions of 2-14% being \r\nprojected by 2100 (Cradden and Harrison, 2013; Bartos et al., 2016)."


id: a404e2f8c8a1cf479a15e00c6baadaaf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23359
content:
"Fuels Extraction and Distribution. Non-electric energy infrastructure \r\nis susceptible to many of the same impacts as electric infrastructure. \r\nExtreme weather events impact extraction (onshore and offshore) and \r\nrefining operations of petroleum, oil, coal, gas and biofuels. Disruption \r\nof road, rail and shipping routes (see Section 6.2.5.2) interrupts fuel \r\nsupply chains. However, there are a number of risks that are specific \r\nto these sectors. Heat can lead to expansion in oil and gas pipes, \r\nincreasing the risk of rupture (Sieber, 2013), whilst heatwaves and \r\ndroughts can reduce the availability of biofuel (Moiseyev et al., 2011; \r\nSchaeffer et  al., 2012). Subsidence and shrinkage of soils damages \r\nunderground assets such as pipes intakes (Cruz and Krausmann, \r\n2013), while additional human activity such as extractive drilling may \r\ninduce earthquakes, as observed in the northern Dutch province of \r\nGroningen (Van der Voort and Vanclay, 2015)"


id: 89391482e1ffb8ac1005ac61f82f736f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19129
content:
" In Alaska, USA, the thaw \r\nof permafrost and subsequent ground instability is estimated to lead to \r\nUSD 33 million damages to fuel pipelines in an end-of-century RCP8.5 \r\nscenario (Melvin et al., 2017), with low-lying coastal deltas particularly \r\nvulnerable (Schmidt, 2015)."


id: 20c92a90b04b42d4eb39f7a11351f4b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:19
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2596
content:
"Changes in rainfall and temperature patterns are expected to increase \r\ngeotechnical failures of embankments and earthworks (Briggs, \r\nLoveridge and Glendinning, 2017; Tang et  al., 2018; Powrie and \r\nSmethurst, 2018) from landslides, subsidence, sinkholes, desiccation \r\nand freeze-thaw action. For instance, Pk et al. (2018) show this could \r\nlead to a 30% reduction in the engineering factor of safety of earth \r\nembankments in Southern Ontario (Canada). Increased river flows in \r\nmany catchments will also increase failures from bridge scours (Forzieri\r\net al., 2018). HR Wallingford (2014) calculate that the projected 8% \r\nincrease in scouring from high river flows in the UK will lead to 1 in \r\n20 bridges being at high risk of failure by the 2080s, whilst in the \r\nUSA the 129,000 bridges currently deficient could increase by 100,000 \r\n(Wright et al., 2012). With respect to temperature, analysis by Forzieri \r\net al"


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17797
content:
" (2018) concludes that heatwaves will be the most significant risk \r\nto EU transport infrastructure in the 2080s, as a result of buckling of \r\nroads and railways due to thermal expansion, melting of road asphalt \r\nand softening of pavement material. In the USA, over 50% more roads \r\nwill require rehabilitation (Mallick et al., 2018), whilst USD 596 million "


id: c06cb13a9ecd6d5789c68d90dc9327c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 27836
content:
"Many airports, and by their nature ports, are in the low elevation \r\ncoastal zone, making them especially vulnerable to flooding and \r\nsea level rise. Under a 2o\r\nC scenario, the number of airports at risk of \r\nstorm surge flooding increases from 269 to 338 or as many as 572 \r\nin an RCP8.5 scenario; these airports are disproportionately busy and \r\naccount for up to 20% of the world's passenger routes (Yesudian and \r\nDawson, 2021). Airport and port operations could be disrupted by icing \r\nof aircraft wings, vessels, decks, riggings and docks (Doll, Klug and \r\nEnei, 2014; Chhetri et al., 2015). Warming will increase microbiological \r\ncorrosion of steel marine structures (Chaves et al., 2016). Fog, high \r\nwinds and waves can disrupt port and airport activity, but changes \r\nare uncertain and with regional variation (Mosvold Larsen, 2015; \r\nIzaguirre et al., 2021; Becker, 2020; Leon-Mateos et al"


id: 9b85c298e4417494d2488f45f709a30e
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22021
content:
", 2021; Taszarek, \r\nKendzierski and Pilguj, 2020; Danielson, Zhang and Perrie, 2020; Kawai\r\net al., 2016)."


id: cbf9cc8aa383bf010b68123c35884b08
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29636
content:
"In the USA, for example, 15.4  million housing units fall within a \r\n1-in-100-year floodplain (Wing et  al., 2018). Assessment of the \r\nMiami-Dade area in Florida noted that coastal inundation caused by \r\ntidal flooding (and to a lesser extent sea level rise) resulted in over \r\nUSD 465 million in lost real-estate market value between 2005 and \r\n2016 (McAlpine and Porter, 2018), although property values have \r\nincreased from high-end housing construction and climate adaptation \r\nmeasures (Kim, 2020). Emergent risk reflecting novel research include \r\naggravated moisture problems in buildings from wind driven rain (Nik\r\net  al., 2015). Future risks from future sea level rise are elaborated \r\nin Section CCP2.2.1. Housing infrastructure are also susceptible \r\nto extreme heat and wind events (Stewart et al., 2018). These risks \r\nare further elaborated on in Section  6.2"


id: 9d95de8d786b58b02d47e528736e1c6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 22324
content:
"3, although it is important \r\nto note that heat risks, in particular, tend to be concentrated within \r\ncommunities with a higher proportion of social housing (Mavrogianni\r\net al., 2015; Sameni et al., 2015) or low-cost government-built houses \r\nand informal settlements."


id: 5f0bbbf9bb8bce85324bc5e3cea6e723
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 12498
content:
"Healthcare facilities (hospitals, clinics, residential homes) will suffer \r\nincreasing shocks and stresses related to climate variability and \r\nchange (Corvalan et  al., 2020). Some may be sudden shocks from \r\nextreme weather events, which both threaten the facility, staff and \r\npatients and increase the number of people seeking health care. There \r\nare extensive reports of health facilities being damaged after major \r\nfloods and windstorms (e.g., 2010 floods in Pakistan, Hurricane Sandy \r\nin the USA) which can be further exacerbated by power and water \r\nsupply failures (Powell, Hanfling and Gostin, 2012). Disruption to \r\nservices may persist for many months because of damage to buildings, \r\nloss of drugs and equipment, and damaged transport infrastructure \r\nsignificantly increasing travel time for patients (Hierink et al., 2020)"


id: b8d85fa9551725474ff14add444c3fb0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" \r\nThe impacts of climate change on the health of residents of 'slum' \r\nsettlements will also compound the existing health burdens faced by \r\nthese individuals, including infectious disease and other environmental \r\npublic health concerns (Lilford et al., 2016; Mberu et al., 2016)."


id: 16249cdbf9752eb42d7b0d3d172ee2ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 1008
content:
"Compound events can be initiated via hazards such as single extreme \r\nevents, or multiple coincident events overlapping and interacting with \r\nexposed urban systems or sectors as compound climate risks (Leonard\r\net al., 2014; IPCC, 2019b; Piontek et al., 2014). Hydrometeorological \r\nhazards, such as extreme precipitation from tropical cyclones, fronts \r\nand thunderstorms, often combine with storm surges and freshwater \r\ndischarge leading to high compound risks at exposed settlements \r\n(Zheng, Westra and Sisson, 2013; Chen and Liu, 2014; Ourbak and \r\nMagnan, 2018; Dowdy and Catto, 2017). The compounding effect \r\nbetween these hydrometeorological hazards suggest that the combined \r\nimpact of these events are greater than each of these variables on its \r\nown, and can amplify risks in affected settlements (Kew et al., 2013; \r\nVitousek et  al., 2017). These risks are concentrated in coastal cities \r\nexposed to sea level rise and severe storms (van den Hurk et al., 2015; \r\nWahl et al"


id: 64304286fa4c28552cfa2a1a1e6d322
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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", 2015; Paprotny et al., 2018b; Lagmay et al., 2015), or in \r\nsettlements located in valleys prone to slope failure, such as the 2013 \r\nUttarakhand floods and landslides arising from extreme precipitation \r\nand glacial lake outbursts along the Mandakini river in India (Ziegler\r\net al., 2016; Barata et al., 2018)."


id: 96b5cd174a49d4fb6894a3cb68eba6ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"Cascading climate events occur when an extreme event triggers a \r\nsequence of secondary events within natural and human systems \r\nthat causes additional physical, natural, social or economic disruption. \r\nThe resulting impact can be significantly larger than the initial \r\nhazard (IPCC, 2019b). Each step in a risk cascade can generate direct \r\n(immediate impacts) and secondary (consequential impacts) losses. \r\nRisks from these cascading impacts are complex and multi-dimensional \r\n(Hao, Singh and Hao, 2018; Zscheischler and Seneviratne, 2017). For \r\ninstance, combined droughts and heatwaves increases risks of urban \r\nwater scarcity (Miralles et al., 2019; Gillner, Brauning and Roloff, 2014; \r\nGill et al., 2013), as well as increasing wildfire extent and lowering \r\nsnowpack conditions that affected peri-urban settlements adjacent \r\nto forested areas, as observed in California during the 2014 drought \r\n(AghaKouchak et al., 2014)"


id: b8001da9801b859bd8404c35dada5ae4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" Similarly, heatwaves can increase the risk \r\nof mortality associated with air pollution (see Section 7.2.2.5)."


id: 4db7fb3929c3b3aa76b54bc1fbe6ff6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 9655
content:
"Secondary impacts occurring sequentially after an extreme hazard \r\ncan severely affect disaster management, especially in complex urban \r\nsystems (robust evidence, high agreement). Over time, relatively small \r\nperturbations can cascade outward from a primary failure, triggering \r\nfurther failures in other dependent parts of the network some distance \r\naway from the primary failure (Penny et al., 2018). In some cities, such \r\nas those prone to compound flood hazards, these dependent network \r\nparts can be dams, levees or other critical flood protection infrastructure \r\nthat are essential for managing these cascading risks (Serre and \r\nHeinzlef, 2018; Fekete, 2019)"


id: a37275d62246de28da81f8fa9d1b45c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 23279
content:
" Failure of these infrastructure systems \r\ncan result in sequential failures in urban transport (Zaidi, 2018), energy \r\nnetworks (Sharifi and Yamagata, 2016), urban biodiversity (Solecki \r\nand Marcotullio, 2013) and so-called na-tech disasters; when natural \r\nhazards trigger technological disasters (Girgin, Necci and Krausmann, \r\n2019). This risk cascade can propagate more widely by stopping flows \r\nof people, goods and services, with economic consequences beyond \r\nurban areas (Wilbanks and Fernandez, 2014)."


id: 1769b8df42853eb466b068d612fe82d1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
content_type: text
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vector_id: 1192
content:
"Urban areas and their infrastructure are susceptible to both \r\ncompounding and cascading risks arising from interactions between \r\nsevere weather from climate change and increasing urbanisation \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement) (Moretti and Loprencipe, 2018; \r\nMarkolf et  al., 2019). Risks are complex and multi-dimensional, \r\nand can significantly amplify the impact of single events across \r\nspace, scale and time. Impacts are determined by the magnitude \r\nof urban vulnerability and/or the interdependence of urban critical \r\ninfrastructure (Pescaroli and Alexander, 2018; Zuccaro, De Gregorio \r\nand Leone, 2018). Poorer and wealthier settlements and cities \r\nare then both at risk from compound and cascading risks though \r\npotentially through contrasting mechanisms"


id: 15d666e624c778a61904b2f664ae3f8f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" For richer and poorer \r\ncities, managing climate risk as part of compound and cascading risks \r\nthat can also include technological, biological and political risks places \r\nrenewed emphasis on investment in generic capabilities that reduce \r\nvulnerability and on risk monitoring capability to track and respond \r\nto impacts across infrastructures and places (limited evidence, high \r\nagreement). Considering climate risk and managing such risk as part \r\nof complex, compounding and/or cascading risks is in its infancy but \r\nrapidly being accepted as necessary, especially when considering the \r\nwider poverty and justice implications of climate change arising from \r\ndifferentiated vulnerability in cities."


id: 5e6d744cc8a2864fc4a62ba6b48686c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 12389
content:
"Planning and implementing climate adaptation in cities and settlements \r\ncan be hampered by incomplete scientific knowledge, a lack of \r\nawareness of cascading impacts (and residual risks), mismanagement of \r\nactions, human capacity and financing deficits, as well as opportunities \r\nfor eroding long-term sustainable development priorities (Juhola et al., \r\n2016). These tensions can become acute in fragile and conflict affected \r\nstates (see Box 6.3). It is important to differentiate between the climatic \r\ndrivers of risk and social drivers that may compound risk exposures \r\nand experiences (Brown, 2014; Nightingale et  al., 2020), especially \r\nsince technically- and scientifically-informed adaptation actions \r\ncan be redirected depending on socioeconomic, political or cultural \r\nconditions on the ground (Eriksen, Nightingale and Eakin, 2015)"


id: 6a1d175d87cf51c7544e076eb6a70ca5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" The \r\nimplementation of adaptation, whether by government, private sector or \r\ncivil society actors, can therefore lead to unanticipated and unintended \r\namplification of political, economic and ecological risks (Swatuk et al., \r\n2020). Many cities are still in the phase of piloting or testing out \r\nappropriate adaptation actions, although there is emerging consensus \r\nthat adaptation plans and projects should acknowledge trade-offs, \r\nintentionally avoid past development mistakes, not lock-in detrimental \r\nimpacts or further risks arising from implementation and explicitly \r\nanticipate the risks of maladaptation in decision making (Magnan\r\net  al., 2016; Gajjar, Singh and Deshpande, 2019). Maladaptation \r\ndescribes actions that lead to increased vulnerability or risk to \r\nclimate impacts or diminish welfare. Urban examples include green \r\ngentrification which offers nature-based solutions to the few, social \r\nsafety nets that promote risk inducing subsidies"


id: d364a9eb93e88685c6cf3c183bd2c66d
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" Whether an action is \r\nmaladapted can depend on context, for example air conditioning can \r\nreduce risk for the individual but is maladaptive at a societal level \r\n(see Section 6.3.4.2). It is informed by process; corruption can distort "


id: 6f5736ac47a43119f16685f7339c8d67
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 15146
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"Downstream impacts occur because adaptive capacity is often \r\nunequally distributed across sectors and communities (Matin, Forrester \r\nand Ensor, 2018; Makondo and Thomas, 2018). In cities and settlements, \r\nadaptation interventions can displace ecological impacts to more \r\nvulnerable areas or directly lead to socioeconomically exclusionary \r\noutcomes (Anguelovski et al., 2016), particularly when adaptation plans \r\nand actions are primarily assessed through the prism of economic and/\r\nor financial viability (Shi et al., 2016; Klein, Juhola and Landauer, 2017). \r\nAs a result, adaptation actions make only minimal contributions to the \r\nreduction of vulnerability, as the increased vulnerability of excluded \r\ncommunities more than offsets the decreased vulnerability of more \r\nwell-off communities"


id: c8327cdf2102fd8352d0be0aae668b89
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 29075
content:
" Numerous examples, ranging from the mega \r\ncoastal planning in Jakarta, Indonesia (Salim, Bettinger and Fisher, 2019; \r\nGoh, 2019), fragmentation of urban infrastructure intended to promote \r\nclimate resilience in Manila, Philippines (Meerow, 2017), exclusionary \r\nmodes of flood control in Sao Paulo, Brazil (Henrique and Tschakert, \r\n2019), strategies to reduce risks in the event of mudslides in Sarno, \r\nItaly (D'Alisa and Kallis, 2016), and involuntary community relocations \r\nin Vietnam (Lindegaard, 2020) and Mozambique (Arnall, 2019) all point \r\nto how an economic logic to adaptation can lead to exclusion of lower \r\nincome, informal or minority communities in adaptation."


id: 18d8187b80cb9547cc59827480e3da8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"A specific form of maladaptation is so-called green gentrification, this \r\nprivileges wealthy urban residents in urban greening projects (Rice\r\net  al., 2020; Shokry, Connolly and Anguelovski, 2020; Anguelovski, \r\nIrazabal-Zurita and Connolly, 2019; Blok, 2020). For example, in \r\nMiami-Dade County, Florida, USA, researchers found that adaptation \r\nfunctionality had a positive effect on property values (Keenan, Hill \r\nand Gumber, 2018). In New York City and Atlanta, Georgia, USA, \r\nresearch has shown that adaptation investments can increase \r\nproperty values and lead to neighbourhood change (Immergluck and \r\nBalan, 2018; Gould and Lewis, 2018). In the Gold Coast and Sunshine \r\nCoast, South East Queensland, Australia, where local communities \r\nhave a strong preference for waterfront living, local governments \r\nare pressured by property developers to protect these coastal zones \r\n(Torabi, Dedekorkut-Howes and Howes, 2018)"


id: 8112034d7e93fc690596cfd9a0a031a5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 17828
content:
" In Lagos, Nigeria, \r\nefforts to achieve climate resilience and sustainability through future \r\ncity practices risk perpetuating the enclosure and commodification of \r\nland (Ajibade, 2017). The exclusionary outcomes of some adaptation \r\ninterventions can therefore further heighten the risk to communities \r\nthat are socioeconomically more vulnerable. See Section  6.3 for \r\nfurther discussion of equity and justice considerations in local climate \r\nadaptation."


id: ccf142c5c0967926ced09f5691d6d3e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"Adaptation pathways are composed of sequences of adaptation \r\nactions connected through collaborative learning with the possibility \r\nof enabling transformations in urban and infrastructure systems \r\n(Werners et  al., 2021). Individual adaptation actions co-evolve with \r\nrisks (see Section  6.2) and development processes (Section  6.4) \r\nto compose more or less planned adaptation pathways that can \r\ninclude a range of unanticipated outcomes. This section engages \r\nwith this complexity by approaching adaptation through the notion \r\nof infrastructure. The adaptation options for individual infrastructure \r\nsystems are reviewed, and in Section  6.4 brought together through \r\nassessment of cross-cutting enabling conditions. Interpreted broadly, \r\ninfrastructure includes the social systems, ecological systems and grey/\r\nphysical systems that underpin safe, satisfying and productive life in \r\nthe city and beyond (Grimm et al., 2016)"


id: b0c64fbff00fa4aab69212eea6b96dc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" Social infrastructure includes \r\nhousing, health, education, livelihoods and social safety nets, cultural \r\nheritage/institutions, disaster risk management and security and urban \r\nplanning. Ecological infrastructure includes nature-based services: \r\ntemperature regulation, flood protection and urban agriculture. \r\nGrey, or physical infrastructure, includes energy, transport, water \r\nand sanitation, communications (digital), built form and solid waste \r\nmanagement. Framing infrastructure in this way enables an assessment \r\nof adaptation that is not constrained to the administrative boundaries \r\nof urban settlements, but also includes the flows of material, people \r\nand money between urban, peri-urban and more rural places, and \r\ncan include adaptation actions deployed by government, individuals \r\nand the private sector. Recognising the complexity of adaptation and "


id: e53a8bba12719f5329eb78824a1c4a1e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 33558
content:
"Finally, some adaptation policies or actions can erode the \r\npreconditions for sustainable and resilient development by indirectly \r\nincreasing society's vulnerability (Neset et  al., 2019; Juhola et  al., \r\n2016). Mandates to mainstream adaptation into existing development \r\nlogics and structures perpetuates development-as-usual, reinforcing \r\ntechnocratic forms of local governance and locking in structural causes \r\nof marginalisation and differential vulnerability (Scoville-Simonds, \r\nJamali and Hufty, 2020)"


id: 84684923e2b1a16d78e87a1b1e3e842a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 18363
content:
" Adaptation policy examples include: \r\nAustralia's adaptation policy focus on financial strategies, preference \r\nfor business-as-usual scenarios and incremental change will not \r\ncontribute to transformative change (Granberg and Glover, 2014); \r\nSurat, India, where a focus on adapting industries and economically \r\nimportant assets in the city can divert policy attention away from \r\ngeneral social equity and urban sustainability priorities (Chu, 2016; Blok, \r\n2020); Cambodia, where conflict between adaptation practitioners and \r\nlocal communities and non-compliance with regulatory safeguards \r\nled to conflict and potential for maladaptation (Work et  al., 2018). \r\nFinally, although insurance has the potential to incentivise practices \r\nto reduce risks, including through measures to reduce premiums (see \r\nSection  6.4"


id: a52e594b6fad96d0bc9f711a2f1c8ed8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 23551
content:
"5 for additional details), researchers of insurance-led \r\nadaptation actions have argued that, since insurance regimes privilege \r\nnormality, they tend to structurally embed risky behaviour and inhibit \r\nchange (O'Hare, White and Connelly, 2016). All of these examples \r\nillustrate how incremental strategies that rely on business-as-usual "


id: 4863d928407ae1a7ec7a135086b6b63c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 8766
content:
"Figure 6.4 |  The Urban Adaptation Gap. This is a qualitative assessment presenting individual, non-comparative data for world regions from 25 AR6 Coordinating Lead Authors \r\n(CLAs) and Lead Authors (LAs), the majority from regional chapters. Respondents were asked to make expert summary statements based on the data included within their chapters \r\nand across the AR6 report augmented by their expert knowledge. Multiple iterations allowed opportunity for individual and group judgement. Urban populations and risks are very \r\ndiverse within regions making the presented results indicative only. Variability in data coverage leads to the overall analysis having medium agreement, medium evidence. Major \r\ntrends identified in 6.3.1 at least meet this level of confidence"


id: 342d933906c55ba5f836bdda0fc5eac4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 5620
content:
" Analysis is presented for current observed climate change associated hazards and for three adaptation scenarios: \r\n(1) current adaptation (based on current levels of risk management and climate adaptation), (2) planned adaptation (assessing the level of adaptation that could be realised if all \r\nnational, city and neighbourhood plans and policies were fully enacted), (3) transformative adaptation (if all possible adaptation measures were to be enacted). Assessments were \r\nmade for the lowest and highest quintile by income. Residual risk levels achieved for each income class under each adaptation scenario are indicated by five adaptation levels: \r\nno risk, occasional discomfort, occasional impacts on well-being, frequent impacts on well-being, extreme events and/or chronic risk. The urban adaptation gap is revealed when \r\nlevels of achieved adaptation fall short of delivering 'no risk'"


id: 40aace540fd0a5f877f62aaf13ba6ff2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 7551
content:
" The graphic uses IPCC Regions, and has split Asia into two regions: North and East Asia, and Central and South Asia. \r\nTechnical support is acknowledged from Greg Dodds and Sophie Wang"


id: f82051e155634b814da40db4b7293cb2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 36552
content:
"Conventional zoning regulations (in which only one kind of use \r\nis permitted in a given area) and land use planning range in scale \r\nfrom the regional to the local and can be deployed to minimise risks \r\nthrough protection, accommodation or retreat. Protection entails, in \r\naddition to allocating zones for protective urban infrastructure (such \r\nas seawalls, levees and dykes, and slope revetments), avoidance \r\nmeasures that restrict or prevent urban development (e.g., through \r\ngrowth containment and/or no-build zones). Accommodation involves \r\nland use modifications and/or conversions while retreat requires either \r\ncompulsory or voluntary relocations and may entail buyouts (Butler, \r\nDeyle and Mutnansky, 2016; Leon and March, 2016; Lyles, Berke and \r\nOverstreet, 2018). Risk eliminating retreat measures are less widely \r\nadopted than other risk reducing zoning and land use measures \r\n(Anguelovski et al., 2016; Butler, Deyle and Mutnansky, 2016; Lyles, \r\nBerke and Overstreet, 2018)"


id: d37aa9cae9256b70dfe25a6881df58f1
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30798
content:
" This is attributed to the controversies \r\nof relocation and to the complexities of buyouts (Butler, Deyle and \r\nMutnansky, 2016; King et al., 2016)."


id: 383fff5724601c1f9b286f32e172a0fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 6220
content:
"Evidence from both richer countries and the Global South reveals \r\nthat conventional zoning is more effective when governance \r\nsystems facilitate the implementation of land use policies for climate \r\nadaptation that preclude negative human-nature interactions and that \r\ncurb spatial inequity, both of which can trigger climate gentrification \r\nand increase the vulnerability of economically disadvantaged groups \r\nto climate-related risk (high confidence) (Marks, 2015; Liotta et  al., \r\n2020; Keenan, Hill and Gumber, 2018). Cascading benefits of zoning \r\nand land use planning for climate adaptation are associated with \r\nthe use of soft land cover, green infrastructure and improvement of \r\nlivability through better conditions for walkability and cycling. This \r\ndecreases auto-dependency and contributes to health and economic \r\ndevelopment (by attracting businesses and retail that stimulate \r\neconomic prosperity and increase property values) (Larsen, 2015; \r\nCarter et al., 2015)"


id: 526675bdba55d8bb37a188de5f63d38b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" Such increases in property values have also been \r\nobserved in zones and areas protected from risks (such as flooding), \r\nwhere it may trigger spatial inequity leading to climate gentrification \r\n(Marks, 2015; Votsis, 2017; Votsis and Perrels, 2016; Keenan, Hill and \r\nGumber, 2018)."


id: 9b013b58564a37d94ba2a8d0f7fe2bc6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21929
content:
"Nalau and Becken, 2018; Perera and Emmanuel, 2018; Anguelovski\r\net al., 2016; Carter et al., 2015; Tsuda and Duarte, 2018; Nolon, 2016); \r\nwith community-based adaptations (trade-offs and valuations, i.e., \r\nwhich land uses are valued more) (Larsen, 2015; Nalau and Becken, \r\n2018; Perera and Emmanuel, 2018; Anguelovski et  al., 2016; Carter\r\net al., 2015; McPhearson et al., 2018; Nolon, 2016); and with built form \r\nregulations and codes (Leon and March, 2016; Yiannakou and Salata, \r\n2017; Perera and Emmanuel, 2018; Straka and Sodoudi, 2019; Larsen, \r\n2015; Nolon, 2016). The imposition of planning-based tools such as \r\nscenario planning, flexible zoning and development incentivisation \r\n(among others) has the capacity to influence and encourage these \r\nadaptations (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2017)"


id: 2cd2c6a330f48ad0dfac0acfb54c3572
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" \r\nLocal risk-reduction inputs can inform land use adaptation policies \r\n(accommodation and/or avoidance, specifically growth containment \r\nand no-build zones) that are better integrated within larger urban \r\nplans (Lyles, Berke and Overstreet, 2018; Nalau and Becken, 2018; \r\nTsuda and Duarte, 2018) (limited evidence, high agreement)."


id: 7d4a093430a57d9bd20a0fa5a1bbb513
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17288
content:
"Social protection, or social security, is defined as the set of policies and \r\nprogrammes designed to reduce and prevent poverty and vulnerability \r\nthroughout the lifecycle (ILO, 2017). Safety nets are intended to protect \r\nvulnerable households from impacts of economic shocks, natural \r\nhazards and disasters, and other crises. The UN policy frameworks for \r\nsustainable development, including the Sendai Framework for Disaster \r\nRisk Reduction 2015-2030, the new Strategic Framework 2018-2030 \r\nof the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) \r\nand UNFCCC, highlight the essential role of social protection in \r\npromoting comprehensive risk management (Aleksandrova, 2019)"


id: 36ec3a9052031ec50750270b2e934183
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" \r\nSince the term Adaptive Aocial Protection was introduced by the World \r\nBank (2015) and the IPCC (2014), it has been an emerging strategic tool \r\nto integrate poverty reduction, disaster risk reduction and humanitarian \r\ndevelopment into adaptation to climate change (Bene, Cornelius and \r\nHowland, 2018; Aleksandrova, 2019; Watson et al., 2016)."


id: 35939426691dd33beb674b2b38fe5b9b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Implementation of zoning and land use measures for climate adaptation \r\nfrom cities across diverse contexts remains limited (high agreement,\r\nrobust evidence) owing to a range of challenges. A range of evidence \r\nfrom multiple locations indicates the challenges of mainstreaming \r\nland use planning for climate adaptation, including in Bangkok, \r\nThailand (Marks, 2015), Legazpi City and Camalig Municipality in the \r\nPhilippines (Cuevas et al., 2016; Cuevas, 2016), the USA (Cuevas et al., \r\n2016; Cuevas, 2016), British Columbia, Canada (Stevens and Senbel, \r\n2017), and Australia (Serrao-Neumann et al., 2017)"


id: e010b8f4c5f444fe49b8c802807498e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" Mainstreaming is \r\nhindered by a lack of clarity of implementation strategies for climate \r\nadaptation, insufficient funding, competing priorities (especially \r\namong professional planners and politicians), institutional challenges \r\n(see Jabareen's [2015] study of 20 cities globally) and the need to fill \r\ndata gaps and continuously update weather statistics (Oberlack and \r\nEisenack, 2018) (medium evidence, high agreement). At the same \r\ntime, however, limited evidence from cities around the world such as \r\nthe urban regions of Stuttgart and Berlin in Germany (Larsen, 2015), \r\nGreater Manchester in the UK (Carter et al., 2015), and Colombo in \r\nSri Lanka (Perera and Emmanuel, 2018) reveals that risk reduction \r\nthrough zoning and land use can effectively protect and expand green \r\ninfrastructure and soft land cover to alleviate pluvial flooding and \r\ndecrease the urban heat island effect"


id: 969b4a623dbd6b3298b95104c66ba129
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" This evidence points that one \r\nof the primary roles of land use planning is to guide the development \r\nof the urban form. As such, it underpins and establishes the basis \r\nfor other infrastructure systems such as physical infrastructure and \r\nnature-based solutions (Morrissey, Moloney and Moore, 2018)."


id: 4761af9cd0d90e8a24128b84c34aebd4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"Adaptive social protection (ASP) is defined as a resilience-building \r\napproach by combining elements of social protection, disaster risk \r\nreduction and climate change adaptation, so as to break the cycle of \r\npoverty and vulnerability of household by investing in their capacity \r\nto prepare for, cope with and adapt to all types of shocks, especially \r\nunder climate change and other global challenges (Bowen et  al., \r\n2020; Ivaschenko et al., 2018). ASP has been justified as an effective \r\ninstrument to build household and community resilience to climate \r\nextremes and slow-onset climate events such as sea level rise and \r\nenvironmental degradation (Schwan and Yu, 2018; Aleksandrova, \r\n2019). In contexts of extreme poverty or climatic extremes, international \r\ndevelopment organisations, national provisions and market charities \r\nare complementary where family and kinship networks are weak and \r\ninadequate"


id: fd7aaa11a01235791d9dacc9602f1708
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" To deal with short-term vulnerability to climate shocks, ASP \r\ncan act as a crucial complement to risk management tools provided by \r\ncommunities and markets, tools which tend to be insufficient in the \r\nface of large or systemic shocks, by providing predictable transfers, \r\ndeveloping human capital and diversifying livelihoods (Hallegatte\r\net al., 2016). ASP can also facilitate long-term change and adaptation \r\nby improving education and health levels, as well as providing a \r\nproactive approach to managing climate-induced migration in both \r\nrural and urban areas (Schwan and Yu, 2018; Adger et al., 2014)."


id: e1ec415b2d5a0d919f291b903358c68f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"ASP may be very good at reducing extreme poverty by helping to meet \r\nindividual or household needs but not collective needs to mitigate \r\nlong-term climate shocks. For example, few programmes consider \r\nrisk assessment and climate-proof infrastructures as anticipatory \r\nmeasures to foster early action and preparedness (Aleksandrova, 2019; \r\nCostella et al., 2017). They therefore need to enable the adoption of \r\nforward-looking strategies for long-lasting adaptation (Tenzing, 2020). \r\nSome examples from China show social protection can improve \r\nadaptive capacity of urban communities with social medical insurance, \r\nhousing subsidies, weather-index insurance, post-disaster construction, \r\nrelocation planning, livelihood shift strategies, and so on. (Pan et al., \r\n2015; Zheng et  al., 2018b; Rao and Li, 2019; Song, Zheng and Lin, \r\n2021)"


id: 32bdda98f1eeea47b5efdc5bc52fbfe1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" However, social protection may lead to maladaptation in urban \r\npolicy when social security, or similar tools (for example insurance) \r\nto compensate for exposure deincentivise risk reduction (Grove, \r\n2021). In many developing countries, high concentrations of poor \r\nand vulnerable groups living in disaster-prone zones of urban centres, \r\nnew urban dwellers and informal residents are often excluded from \r\ncommunity-based networks and social services (Aleksandrova, 2019). \r\nRisk transfer tools (such as insurance) and risk retention measures \r\n(such as social safety nets) can avoid and minimise the burden of loss \r\nand damage and limit secondary and indirect effects (Aleksandrova, \r\n2019; Roberts and Pelling, 2018)."


id: d5a3c81484856de80ca6a39c79d983f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"There is growing evidence of the benefits of early warning systems \r\nfor urban preparedness decision making and action for climate and \r\nweather-related hazards such as cyclones, hurricanes and floods \r\n(medium evidence; high agreement) (Lumbroso, Brown and Ranger, \r\n2016; Zia and Wagner, 2015; Marchezini et  al., 2017). Climate \r\nforecasting is constantly evolving and becoming increasingly accurate. \r\nGlobal organisations such as the World Meteorological Organizations \r\nare increasingly focusing on new and emerging technologies such as \r\ncrowdsourced data collection to support integrated city services and \r\nearly warning systems (Baklanov et al., 2018). However, while climate \r\nforecasting is an increasingly central tool for risk management agencies, \r\na focus on urban areas or key infrastructure is still considerably rare \r\n(Lourenco et  al., 2015; Nissan et  al., 2019; Harvey et  al., 2019)"


id: e0bb2e8fdf0d26a682a54a63c7659252
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" \r\nThe significant rise in urban risks poses significant challenges to \r\nhumanitarian agencies. Humanitarian responses and local emergency \r\nmanagement are vital for disaster risk reduction yet are compromised \r\nin urban contexts where it is difficult to confirm property ownership \r\nand where renters and informal dwellers are often excluded from "


id: f15f7bf795c302741ed27f354aaea4c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"decision-making and planning (Parker and Maynard, 2015; Maynard\r\net al., 2017). Disaster survivors and growing urban refugee populations \r\nare often displaced across the city thereby complicating efforts to track \r\nand provide support (Maynard et al., 2017).\r\nExisting early warning systems remain insufficient and the complexity \r\nof urban landforms makes accurate and detailed early warning \r\ndifficult (medium evidence; high agreement) (Jones et al., 2015). This \r\nis particularly the case in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) \r\nwhere urban centres are often characterised by rapid expansion \r\nof interlinked formal and informal human settlements and land use \r\nzones. In such contexts, early warning services vary in effectiveness \r\nwithin the same urban centre (Allen et  al., 2020c; Rangwala et  al., \r\n2018)"


id: 57bf9085bd5acde5c7323e28e82017ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" Often, forecast-based action follows linear structures where \r\nforecast information is applied mainly for responding to negative \r\nimpacts rather than anticipatory decision-making and preparation to \r\navoid such impacts (Marchezini et al., 2017). Early warning systems are \r\neffective for warning of threshold breaching events including cyclonic \r\nactivity and riverine flooding but less able to provide localised warning, \r\nthough capability is rapidly increasing. Probabilistic risk forecasting \r\nand forecast based early action are only beginning to be applied to \r\nurban contexts and often those that are most vulnerable do not receive \r\nwarnings regarding hazardous events (Nissan et al., 2019)"


id: 5576c32834cda8330bc93bbae461ef98
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 10922
content:
" There is less \r\ncapacity for early warning systems in LMICs with key challenges linked \r\nto a lack of well-established risk baseline information; accessibility, \r\ncommunication and understanding of forecast information, as well as \r\npolitical and institutional barriers and limited resources and capacities \r\nto act on such information (Jones et al., 2015; Mustafa et al., 2015; \r\nZia and Wagner, 2015; Marchezini et al., 2017; Gotgelf, Roggero and \r\nEisenack, 2020). Political and institutional barriers to the incorporation \r\nof climate information to decision-making are not limited to LMICs \r\n(Harvey et al., 2019). For example, comprehensive studies on sectoral \r\nuse of climate information in Europe revealed that, despite climate \r\nservices becoming increasingly accessible and well resourced, there \r\nis limited organisational uptake of seasonal climate forecasts across \r\nkey sectors (e.g"


id: 429982dde811b4c7831c719f2fd2d866
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 7867
content:
", energy, transport, water and infrastructure) in \r\ninforming their decision making processes (Soares and Dessai, 2016; \r\nSoares, Alexander and Dessai, 2018). This is due both to technical and \r\nnon-technical barriers such as lack of awareness and knowledge of \r\nclimate information and forecasting (Soares and Dessai, 2016; Soares, \r\nAlexander and Dessai, 2018)."


id: 78d7c78b22e9fdfe08ee5de5d5a5c402
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"The inclusion of Local knowledge and Indigenous knowledge in urban \r\nvulnerability and risk assessments can strongly enhance local resilience, \r\nbut its effectiveness is constrained by wider decision making and policy \r\ncontexts dominated by top-down approaches (medium evidence; high \r\nagreement) (Jones et  al., 2015; Sword-Daniels et  al., 2018; Nissan\r\net  al., 2019). Established non-state actors such as Shack and Slum \r\nDwellers International are particularly effective at implementing \r\ninclusive approaches for local knowledge incorporation into urban \r\ndecision-making. Climate change and disaster risk exacerbate existing \r\nproblems of economic development, yet macro-economic planning \r\nseldom incorporates adaptation. Recent evidence also confirms the \r\nrole of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge in management \r\npractices to reduce climate risks through early warning preparedness \r\nand response (see also Section 6.3.2.3)"


id: 11086609dee7715374fd09c51264d130
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" These practices are particularly \r\nimportant where alternative early warning methods are absent. For \r\ninstance, Abudu Kasei et al. (2019) show that Indigenous knowledge \r\ngathered through observations on changes in natural indicators \r\n(such as links between rainfall patterns, certain flora and fauna, and \r\ntemperature changes) could be applied to develop early warning of \r\nclimate hazards (floods and droughts) in informal urban settlements \r\nin African countries such as Ghana. Similarly, Hiwaski et  al. (2015) \r\nshow that observations of changes in the environment and celestial \r\nbodies are used to predict climate-related hazards in Indonesia, the \r\nPhilippines and Timor-Leste where communities in turn use local \r\nmaterials and methods, and customary practices to respond to the \r\nimpacts of climate change."


id: fed093d758f547686c757f47e4bd2b5b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"Insurance is a risk transfer mechanism for middle- and high-income \r\ncountries, yet is less widely available in LMICs (Surminski and \r\nThieken, 2017). Additionally, where insurance options do exist in \r\nLMICs, these are not usually available to large populations living or \r\noperating in the informal sector. Flood insurance is widely available \r\nin many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development \r\n(OECD) countries but the demand and uptake differ significantly \r\nacross countries (Hanger et  al., 2018). This financial tool is subject \r\nto increasing pressure under the changing climate, with growing \r\nconcerns around affordability and availability. More integrative \r\napproaches are required, such as where changes in the insurance \r\nindustry are closely linked to adaptation strategies, building standards \r\nand land use planning and their application (Cremades et al., 2018)"


id: fcdd14717af2206bb22a6eba17d8132b
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content:
" \r\nThis is particularly important in LMICs and of central concern for all \r\ninsurance schemes is ensuring access, fairness and affordability for the \r\nmost poor and vulnerable. However, there are some notable examples "


id: f21d1076c8d8cc9a15c6bd4d9205188a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35623
content:
"Globally, a considerable diversity of tools and frameworks for urban \r\nresilience assessments are being developed at multiple scales (Arup \r\nand Rockefeller, 2015; Elias-Trostmann et  al., 2018). These include \r\nhybrids such as ecosystem-based disaster risk reduction (Eco-DRR) \r\n(Begum et  al., 2014).While important advances have been made in \r\nassessing urban resilience, much debate remains around such tools and \r\nassessment approaches regarding issues such as validation, dynamics \r\nin exposure and vulnerability, and appropriateness of generic methods \r\nin high-density urban settlements (Leitner et al., 2018; Cardoso et al., \r\n2020; Rufat et al., 2019). Disaster impact and recovery time are strongly \r\ninfluenced by the behaviour and actions of individuals, communities, \r\nbusinesses, and government organisations (Merilainen, 2020; Rasanen\r\net al., 2020). For example, the review by Aaerts et al"


id: c8d9defced20ccfcfa47fc6d923e97f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 29157
content:
"Climate resilient health systems are a vital part of adaptation to \r\nprotect the most vulnerable from climate change (WHO, 2020). \r\nCardiovascular fitness for example is a root cause of morbidity and \r\nmortality form heat stress (Schuster et  al., 2017). The World Health \r\nOrganization has developed a framework of climate-resilient health \r\nsystems that addresses both mitigation and adaptation goals (WHO, \r\n2015). Universal health coverage (UHC) is an essential component of \r\nclimate-resilient health systems. In most countries, access to health \r\nservices is better in urban than in rural areas. However, there remain \r\nlarge urban populations with insufficient coverage of health services \r\n(WHO and WB, 2015) and UHC tracking needs to take better account \r\nof inequalities in coverage, including differences in access within \r\ncities and further disaggregation of urban populations by income. \r\nThus, health sector investment is an important tool in adaptive action \r\nand capacity"


id: 5739d9be1c5b84b3e71028502e56d3f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" Analyses of health survey data shows that, globally, \r\naccess to health care is increasing toward UHC targets (Lozano et al., \r\n2020). Financing for global health has increased steadily in the last \r\ntwo decades and modelling shows this trend is likely to continue \r\nto 2050, but at a slower pace of growth and the current disparities \r\nin per-capita health spending persist between high and low/middle \r\nincome countries, leading to insufficient health service coverage for \r\nthe poorest populations (Chang et al., 2019a). Out-of-pocket spending \r\nis projected to remain substantial in LMIC and will remain the only \r\nmeans to access health care for many poor urban populations."


id: d34f0c0d571c758beaacee4a943055ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30772
content:
"Given the amount of time that children spend in school settings, \r\nadapting educational infrastructure and programmes to climate \r\nchange is highly important. This includes not only making physical \r\nstructures safe, but also providing students with the knowledge \r\nand confidence to support individual and family-based adaptation. \r\nSeveral UN agencies (e.g., UNICEF and UNDRR) and international \r\nnon-governmental agencies (e.g., Plan International) have prioritised \r\nsafer schools and child-centred risk management that often focus on \r\nschools as places that should be prioritised for retrofitting and safe \r\nconstruction, but also as focal points for knowledge dissemination and \r\ncommunity organising where impacts can extend beyond the school \r\nto reduce risk among students' families"


id: 2e22b12a386b5f9b94dc3f99b46afd4b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" Universities and think tanks, \r\nas well as the third and private sector are key support mechanisms, \r\nparticularly at the local level and when working in collaboration with \r\nlocal government and communities. They can support the development \r\nof critical educational resources and innovative communication \r\nmethods, as well as facilitate the design and implementation of \r\nclimate policies and related action plans."


id: 2448888a9a3171f693ee0f2e071da523
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 3159
content:
"The climate change adaptation options for built cultural heritage fall \r\ninto seven categories (Rockman et  al., 2016; Fatoric and Seekamp, \r\n2017b). Financial constraints are the primary barriers that underpin \r\nthe first four adaptation options: no action at all, merely monitoring \r\nand/or documenting, or annual maintenance (Xiao et al., 2019; Sesana\r\net al., 2019; Fatoric and Seekamp, 2017a; Fatoric and Seekamp, 2017b; \r\nFatoric and Seekamp, 2018). Core and shell preservation, the fifth and \r\nsixth categories, are cost effective when they improve the condition of \r\nbuilt cultural heritage (BCH) (Bertolin and Loli, 2018; Loli and Bertolin, \r\n2018a; Loli and Bertolin, 2018b), while elevation and/or relocation, the \r\nfinal adaptation options, are extremely costly and might jeopardise the \r\nhistoric value (Xiao et al., 2019). To date, however, evidence indicates \r\nthat adaptation actions prioritise archaeological sites (Carmichael\r\net al., 2017; Fatoric and Seekamp, 2018; Pollard et al"


id: 330daf16e8952a056d86f51f6d29c622
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", 2014; Dawson, \r\n2013). The efficacy of adaptation of historic buildings can be increased \r\nthrough increased and stable funding, incentives, stakeholder \r\nengagement, and legal and political frameworks (Dutra et al., 2017; \r\nFatoric and Seekamp, 2018; Fatoric and Seekamp, 2017b; Fatoric and \r\nSeekamp, 2017a; Leijonhufvud, 2016; Phillips, 2015; Sesana et  al., \r\n2019; Sesana et al., 2018; Sitas, 2020)."


id: 3753f6fa6b6f2638f9b18e14955a23fd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"(medium evidence, high agreement). Climate change education in \r\nurban settlements has increasingly focused on enhancing children \r\nand young people's political agency in schools, universities, and in \r\nformal and informal media settings (Cutter-Mackenzie and Rousell, \r\n2019). However, an ambiguous framing of climate impacts and \r\nadaptation, for example around the science of urban heat islands \r\nby the media, can also exacerbate local community confusion and \r\nuncertainty (Iping et  al., 2019) and further training and capacity \r\nbuilding opportunities such as for vocational qualifications is still \r\nrequired across diverse settings (Simmons, 2021). Communication \r\nstrategies deployed in formal education and social media can be highly \r\ninfluential in exchanging information and establishing narratives and \r\nviewpoints that frame what adaptive action is legitimate, especially \r\nin large cities (Simpson, Napawan and Snyder, 2019)"


id: f87dd4b3dae767ca93f41e826e830c93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" However, the \r\neffectiveness of communication strategies for change, for example \r\nfrom Mayoral offices, can also be influenced by wider political and \r\nstructural drivers including community literacy or political partisanship \r\n(Boussalis, Coan and Holman, 2019). Recent research (e.g., Macintyre\r\net  al., 2018) highlights the need for new learning approaches to \r\nclimate education from school age to adult education. Emphasis is \r\non inclusivity in learning and recognising diverse perspectives across \r\nmultiple levels and settings, from formal and informal education to \r\nwider social learning. Informal learning that takes place outside of \r\nschool settings, such as in libraries and botanical gardens, in everyday \r\nlife is increasingly recognised as a key arena for climate education, \r\nlife-long learning and nurturing environmental citizenship and activism \r\n(Paraskeva-Hadjichambi et al., 2020)."


id: 291854904a285a883071c098cf46e024
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"The integration of culture into urban policy and planning is increasingly \r\nrecognised as critical to developing sustainable and resilient cities, \r\nand features in international agreements such as the SDGs (limited \r\nevidence; high agreement) (Sitas, 2020). However, urban cultural \r\npolicies are still limited, for example, Cape Town is the only African \r\ncity to have developed a city-level cultural policy (Sitas, 2020). Cultural \r\nheritage refers to both tangible (e.g., historic buildings and sites) and \r\nintangible (e.g., oral traditions and social practices) resources inherited \r\nfrom the past (Fatoric and Egberts, 2020; Jackson, Dugmore and Riede, \r\n2018). Learning about past societal and environment changes through \r\nheritage offers opportunity for reflection and transfer of knowledge and \r\nskills. This takes place in multiple contexts such as museums and cultural \r\nlandscapes, and in everyday life (Fatoric and Egberts, 2020; Jackson, \r\nDugmore and Riede, 2018)"


id: 3caf599016527c668dbeb452ec3e3914
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" Cultural heritage is primarily associated \r\nwith identity and is closely intertwined with the complexities of history, \r\npolitics, economics and memory. Climate change adds another layer \r\nof complexity to cultural heritage and resource management (Fatoric \r\nand Seekamp, 2017b). Changing climatic conditions are already \r\nnegatively impacting World Heritage Sites such as the Cordilleras' Rice \r\nTerraces of the Philippines and earthen architecture sites, for example \r\nthe Djenne mosque in Mali, are particularly vulnerable to changes in \r\ntemperature and water interactions (UNESCO, 2021). Climate change \r\nimpacts intangible cultural heritage across diverse settings such as in \r\nthe Caribbean and Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS) where \r\ntraditional ways of life and related aspects such as oral traditions \r\nand performing arts are under threat from extreme weather events \r\n(UNESCO, 2021)."


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"groups (Poulsen et al., 2015; Poulsen, Neff and Winch, 2017; Maughan, \r\nLaycock Pedersen and Pitt, 2018; Simon-Rojo, 2019; Cederlof, 2016). \r\nCo-benefits include a wide range of social and environmental benefits \r\n(Brink et al., 2016; Alves et al., 2019) for human physical and mental \r\nhealth (Kabisch, van den Bosch and Lafortezza, 2017; Sarkar, Webster \r\nand Gallacher, 2018; Engemann et al., 2019; Rojas-Rueda et al., 2019), \r\nclimate mitigation (De la Sota et al., 2019) and as habitat for local \r\nbiodiversity (Ziter, 2016; Knapp, Schmauck and Zehnsdorf, 2019). \r\nAt the same time, concerns about the unintended consequences of \r\ninvesting in green infrastructure for NBS, such as how it may contribute \r\nto gentrification (Turkelboom et  al., 2018; Anguelovski et  al., 2018; \r\nHaase et al"


id: 7f7cbff7776979dc529ba00a99f07722
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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", 2017), create more public use, increase water demand \r\n(Nouri, Borujeni and Hoekstra, 2019) or contribute to criminal activity \r\n(Cilliers and Cilliers, 2015) underlines the challenges of investing in \r\nadaptation in complex urban systems (see Section 6.2.6). Additionally, \r\nmore place-based analyses of the efficacy of NBS for reducing climate \r\nimpacts across varying urban contexts and future climate scenarios are \r\nneeded to better understand the cost effectiveness of investing in NBS \r\nto provide disaster risk reduction and deliver critical co-benefits for \r\nhuman well-being. Cooperation between scientists, decision-makers \r\nand Indigenous knowledge-holders can supplement current efforts and \r\nensure that investments in NBS do not negatively impact indigenous \r\ncommunities (Ban et al., 2018; Seddon et al., 2021; Townsend, Moola \r\nand Craig, 2020)."


id: 6f1675dac62f78b0afbbdc0da4267f71
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Well-functioning ecosystems can play a significant role in buffering \r\ncities, settlements and infrastructure from climate hazards at multiple \r\nscales (robust evidence, high agreement). Nature-based solutions \r\n(NBS) are actions to protect, sustainably manage and restore natural \r\nor modified ecosystems that address societal challenges effectively \r\nand adaptively, simultaneously providing human well-being and \r\nbiodiversity benefits (Cohen-Shacham et al., 2016). Widely recognised \r\nas low-regret measures for disaster risk reduction and climate change \r\nadaptation, green and blue infrastructure investments and natural \r\narea conservation in cities can provide NBS across scales to reduce \r\ntemperature shocks and provide natural flood defences among other \r\nadaptation and resilience benefits (McPhearson et al., 2018; Andersson\r\net al., 2019; Frantzeskaki et al., 2019). Blue infrastructure, for example, \r\nprovides ecological and hydrological functions (e.g"


id: 54bd6fd13878abbc5584e7acf3359e15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
", evaporation, \r\ntranspiration, drainage, infiltration, detention) critical to sustainable \r\nurban water management (Ioja et al., 2021). Public parks, urban forests, \r\nstreet trees and green roofs, as well as lakes, ponds and streams are \r\nwidely documented for providing local cooling, grass and riparian \r\nbuffers, forested watersheds can enhance flood and drought protection \r\nfor cities and settlements, and mangrove stands and wetlands in coastal \r\nareas can reduce storm surges. Despite increasing knowledge about \r\nNBS (here encompassing literature on ecosystem services for climate \r\nchange adaptation and resilience, ecosystem-based adaptation, and \r\nbenefits of green and blue infrastructure for adaptation), recent studies \r\nindicate that nature-based approaches to adaptation and resilience \r\nare still under-recognised and under-invested in urban planning and \r\ndevelopment (Matthews, Lo and Byrne, 2015; Geneletti and Zardo, \r\n2016; Frantzeskaki et al"


id: 7be2e68e2e8a87404d4812dca8bdb13d
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content:
", 2019), despite the potential scale of benefits, \r\nfor example, a recent study covering 70 cities in Latin America calculated \r\nthat 96 million people would benefit from improving main watersheds \r\nwith green infrastructure (Tellman et al., 2018)."


id: 89af3198a74e1a8779dfeba3738aff42
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"Nature-based strategies, including street trees, green roofs, green walls \r\nand other urban vegetation, can reduce heat and extreme heat by \r\ncooling private and public spaces (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nShading and evapotranspiration are the primary mechanisms for \r\nvegetation-induced urban cooling (Coutts et  al., 2016). Shading \r\nreduces mean radiant temperature, which is the dominant influence \r\non outdoor human thermal comfort under warm, sunny conditions \r\n(Thorsson et al., 2014; Viguie et al., 2020). Outdoor green space and \r\nparks may also slightly reduce indoor heat hazard (Viguie et al., 2020). \r\nApart from lowering temperature, NBS may also contribute to lower \r\nenergy costs by reducing extra demand for conventional sources of \r\ncooling (e.g., air conditioning) (Viguie et al., 2020; Foustalieraki et al., \r\n2017), especially during peak demand periods"


id: adf5f780f09d1b2274ced914ad74ac80
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" Homes with shade trees \r\nthat are located in cities where air conditioning systems are common \r\ncan save over 30% of residential peak cooling demand (Zardo et al., \r\n2017; Wang et al., 2015). Green roofs have been shown to significantly \r\nlower surface temperatures on buildings (Bevilacqua et al., 2017) and \r\nmodelling suggests that green roofs, if employed widely throughout \r\nurban areas, have the potential to impact the regional heat profile of \r\ncities (Bevilacqua et al., 2017; Rosenzweig, Gaffin and Parshall, 2006). \r\nCommunity or allotment gardens, backyard greening and other types \r\nof low vegetation, as well as lakes, ponds, rivers and streams, can \r\nalso provide local cooling benefits to nearby residents (Gunawardena, \r\nWells and Kershaw, 2017; Larondelle et al., 2014; Santamouris, 2020)."


id: 1df75a52e17f7da9d6713f36574d6d1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Grey infrastructure often damages or eliminates biophysical processes \r\n(e.g., through soil sealing, stream burial or altered hydrology) \r\nnecessary to sustain ecosystems, habitats and livelihoods, where urban \r\necological infrastructure (Childers et al., 2019) can be more flexible \r\nand cost effective for providing flood risk reduction and other benefits \r\n(Palmer et al., 2015). Hybrid approaches are emerging that integrate \r\necological and grey (engineered) infrastructure in adaptation planning \r\nand hazard protection (Grimm et al., 2016; Depietri and McPhearson, \r\n2017). Explicit policy uptake by city authorities is increasing (Hansen\r\net  al., 2015; Holscher et  al., 2019), such as in New York where in \r\n2010 the city committed to a hybrid infrastructure plan for storm \r\nwater management, investing USD 5.3 billion over 20 years, of which \r\nUSD 2.4  billion was targeted for green infrastructure investments \r\n(NYC, 2010)"


id: f9722d386b1157dad86a330f956f921b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" A subset of services from urban ecosystems are being \r\nincreasingly invested in as NBS for climate adaptation pathways \r\n(Keeler et al., 2019; Kabisch et al., 2016) and included as regulatory \r\ndrivers through flood management, hazard mitigation and air pollution \r\nregulations that encourage or enforce the implementation of green \r\ninfrastructure practices (Davis et al., 2020)."


id: 5dc43396f8d97bb392e4623f8ac338ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"Trees can also have negative effects by increasing pedestrian exposure \r\nto pollution if they are introduced in heavily travelled street canyons \r\nwhere air pollutants can be trapped (Vos et  al., 2013; Gromke and \r\nBlocken, 2015). To maximise the adaptation benefits of NBS for \r\nimproving air quality, planners and managers can target tree selection \r\nfor species with low VOC emissions, low allergen emissions and high \r\npollutant deposition potential (Keeler et  al., 2019), and combine \r\nwith low pollution transportation policies. Studies suggest sensitive \r\nplanting of roadside tree canopies can have positive effects on air \r\npollutants (Beckett, Freer Smith and Taylor, 2000; Yang, Chang and \r\nYan, 2015). For example, Xue et  al. (2021) found that the PM2.5 \r\nreduction between 2013 and 2017 in China was associated with a \r\nsaving of approximately USD 111 billion yr-1 nationally"


id: 6224abe81f4cd065160ad879cdc4f66b
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" Tree planting \r\nnear schools, nursing homes and hospitals can ensure that benefits \r\nprovided by trees are delivered to the local populations that stand to \r\nbenefit the most from improved air quality, but species need to be \r\nadapted to regional climate to provide benefits over time (Donovan, \r\n2017; Nowak et al., 2018)."


id: 71dd0b8556e117d481af42ec9e4a5aa7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"increases shade provision and evapotranspiration (Hamstead et  al., \r\n2016; Grilo et  al., 2020; Herath, Halwatura and Jayasinghe, 2018; \r\nKnight et al., 2021). However, local cooling by vegetation depends on \r\nregional climate context, geographic setting of the city, urban form, \r\nthe density and placement of the trees, in addition to a variety of other \r\necological, technical, and social factors, such as local stewardship \r\n(Salmond et al., 2016). Green spaces less than 0.5-2.0 ha may have \r\nnegligible cooling effects at regional scales, but impacts of shading \r\ncan have microscale cooling benefits (Gunawardena, Wells and \r\nKershaw, 2017; Zardo et al., 2017). Vegetation impacts on day versus \r\nnight-time cooling varies (Imran et al., 2019) as does cooling potential \r\nin temperate versus tropical climates"


id: 7e550435284e06b2cadf94794a57f9d8
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" The supply of cooler air from \r\nsurrounding peri-urban and rural areas can impact cooling in the urban \r\ncore suggesting that regional adaptation planning for NBS is important \r\nto maintain or extend ventilation paths from the urban fringe into the \r\ncity centre (Schau-Noppel, Kossmann and Buchholz, 2020)."


id: 442296ee1c994600213a5dc3c96b5a3f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"To maximize the adaptation benefits of NBS for regulating urban heat, \r\nit can be helpful to prioritise tree planting and other urban greening \r\ninvestments in areas where heat vulnerability and risk are the highest, \r\nespecially communities that lack urban tree canopy or accessibility to \r\nparks to cool off during hot days or heatwaves (Ziter et  al., 2019). \r\nPlanting trees closely together or in partly permeable vegetated \r\nbarriers along streets can improve local cooling benefits. Additionally, \r\nchoosing tree species with leaves that have the greatest leaf area \r\nindex or the largest leaves can improve cooling performance, as those \r\ntrees have the greatest shading and evapotranspiration benefits \r\nthat, in turn, provide the greatest cooling effects (Keeler et al., 2019). \r\nDrought-resistant trees, often native trees, are ideal to avoid high \r\nwatering costs, though dry or water scarce areas may limit adoption of \r\nurban vegetation as an NBS strategy (Coutts et al., 2013)"


id: 597cc0dfd7376b910e52162e328bb58f
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" Native trees \r\nand permaculture can provide additional benefits for local biodiversity \r\nas shown in study in Melbourne, Australia which found that increasing \r\nvegetation from 10% to 30% increased occupancy of bats, birds, \r\nbees, beetles and bugs by up to 130% (Threlfall et  al., 2017), with \r\nparticularly high impact on native species.. Additionally, planting fruit \r\nor nut trees can provide co-benefits for local food production, and yet \r\nchoice of species and placement is important to consider with respect \r\nto local cultural needs and norms (Adegun, 2018; Adegun, 2017)."


id: b7b3c0d3f8ad0623a2da3a0b54200362
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"Urban parks and open spaces, forests, wetlands, green roofs and \r\nengineered stormwater treatment devices help manage stormwater \r\nand wastewater by reducing the volume of stormwater runoff, reducing \r\nsurface flooding, and reducing contamination of runoff by pollutants \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). Engineered devices include \r\nbioswales, rain gardens, and detention and retention ponds, and are \r\nbecoming common and standard approaches to mitigate the negative \r\neffects of impervious surfaces on stormwater quality and surface \r\nflooding in cities (Zhou, 2014; McPhillips et  al., 2020). Allotment \r\ngardens, street trees, green roofs and urban forests may also help \r\nreduce runoff and provide a stormwater retention service (Pennino, \r\nMcDonald and Jaffe, 2016; Berland et al., 2017; Gittleman et al., 2017). \r\nModelling and empirical studies show that NBS at small spatial scales \r\nlead to improvements in water quality and reduction of peak flows \r\n(Moore et  al., 2016; Keeler et  al"


id: 1ff078ee56e9b7042e2caf1935f1454b
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", 2019; Webber et  al., 2020). Peak \r\nflow reductions are greatest for small rain events. For example, D-Ville \r\net al. (2018) observed a 30-70% reduction in peak flow for the 1-in\u000230 year storm, but performance reduces for more intense rainfall or if \r\nsaturated (Garofalo et al., 2016). Employing NBS to reduce flooding \r\non roads can be an important adaptation mechanism for reducing the \r\nimpact of flooding events on traffic flows (Pregnolato et al., 2016)."


id: a7d266bfe0d60244fe35d541d935e463
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"NBS in cities can help regulate air quality by absorbing air pollutants \r\n(medium evidence, medium agreement). For example, planting trees\r\nor vegetated barriers along streets or in urban forests can reduce \r\nparticulate matter, the ambient air pollutant with the largest global \r\nhealth burden (Janhall, 2015; Tiwary, Reff and Colls, 2008; Matos\r\net  al., 2019; McDonald et  al., 2016). However, findings show that \r\ntrees can also positively affect ground-level ozone (Calfapietra et al., \r\n2013; Kroeger et al., 2014), airborne pollen concentrations (Willis and \r\nPetrokofsky, 2017) and indirectly affect air quality through reduced \r\nemissions from energy production offset by shade provision (Keeler\r\net  al., 2019). Certain tree species however can also be detrimental \r\nto urban ozone formation by emitting significant amounts of reactive \r\nbiogenic volatile organic compounds (VOCs)"


id: a1545c69eb856480b272e952b3f037d7
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content:
" Decreasing urban \r\nemissions of VOCs is an increasingly important ozone mitigation \r\nstrategy in urban areas (Fitzky et al., 2019)."


id: 3ca8785cc3564e346b0eedc709149640
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"Overall, NBS are attractive adaptation options for stormwater \r\nmanagement and to reduce impacts of pluvial and fluvial flooding in \r\ncities (Rosenzweig et al., 2018a) compared, and in combination, with \r\ngrey infrastructure. Cities with combined sewer infrastructure are likely\r\nto see benefits from NBS due to reductions in stormwater quantity \r\nand reduced sewage overflows. Cities where a large proportion \r\nof residents lack access to piped infrastructure and drink surface \r\nwater may see large benefits, especially to human health, from NBS \r\ninvestments (Keeler et al., 2019). Where future large-scale upgrades or \r\ninstallation of grey infrastructure will be necessary, new and growing \r\ncities may have more opportunity to realise large net benefits from \r\ninvestments in NBS"


id: 96e406a794b59c28fbc6c5a88559908b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" Older cities, and new, rapidly urbanising areas \r\nthat lack large-scale water infrastructure may see the greatest benefits \r\nfrom enhanced NBS, relative to cities where heavy investments \r\ninfrastructure upgrades have already been made. Cities facing climate \r\nchanges that include more frequent or extreme precipitation may also \r\nsee large water quality benefits from investment in NBS (Keeler et al., \r\n2019). Overall, there is increasing evidence that NBS for addressing \r\nstormwater is cost effective (Bixler et  al., 2020; Kozak et  al., 2020; \r\nMguni, Herslund and Jensen, 2016), especially in cities facing a need \r\nto update current infrastructures."


id: 56b9bd4545c10da5688c5ed47ad81c6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11119
content:
"Coastal ecosystems including coral and oyster reefs, coastal forests \r\nincluding mangroves and other tree species, salt marshes and other \r\ntypes of wetland habitat, seagrass, dunes and barrier islands can \r\nreduce impacts of coastal flooding and storms (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Zhao, Roberts and Ludy, 2014; Boutwell and Westra, \r\n2016; Narayan et al., 2017; Yang, Kerger and Nepf, 2015; Bridges et al., \r\n2015; World Bank, 2016) (see also Section CCP2 Cities and Settlements \r\nby the Sea). Recent literature highlights the value of nature-based \r\napproaches for coastal protection in terms of avoided damages and \r\nhuman well-being (Narayan et  al., 2017; Silva et  al., 2016a). NBS \r\ncan protect coasts from flooding through reducing the wave energy \r\nby drag friction, reducing wave overtopping by eliminating vertical \r\nbarriers, and absorbing floodwaters in soil (Arkema, Scyphers and \r\nShepard, 2017; Dasgupta et al., 2019; Zhu et al., 2020)"


id: f07d26198ce6d8d81b3a337a45e8d908
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content:
" For example, \r\ncoastal and marine vegetation and reefs can dissipate wave energy, \r\nattenuate wave heights and nearshore currents, decrease the extent \r\nof wave run-up on beaches, and trap sediments (Ferrario et al., 2014; \r\nBridges et  al., 2015). These effects result in lower water levels and \r\nreduce shoreline erosion, which in turn has potential to save lives and \r\nprevent expensive property damages (Narayan et al., 2017)."


id: ff57dffc10139c5515f7546888b730c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"Cities manage flood risk using different types of adaptation and \r\nregulatory mechanisms (Naturally Resilient Communities, 2017). Built \r\nflood-control infrastructure, such as levees and stream channelisation, \r\nreduces the demand for nature-based flood impact reduction. \r\nCities facing flood risk that do not currently have extensive grey \r\nflood-mitigation infrastructure may find NBS to be an appealing, \r\nlower cost solution (Keeler et al., 2019). In cities where flood-control \r\ngrey infrastructure already exists, there is less demand for NBS of \r\nflood protection, but NBS may provide important back up, especially \r\nin a changing climate that may increase flood hazards (City of Los \r\nAngeles, 2017; Elmqvist et al., 2019)"


id: b22d8b74ca0c0bae421ffd09a64fe66b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" Overall, city and basin-wide NBS \r\nfor riverine flood impact reduction can reduce the generation of new \r\nhazards by making space for water which can reduce the potential for \r\na false sense of security provided by traditional flood management \r\napproaches (Ruangpan et al., 2020; Turkelboom et al., 2021)."


id: 32840b6ff76856c887a4449a541c4f52
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 5363
content:
"The role of NBS has been increasingly recognised for improving urban \r\nwater management, emphasising it's contribution for climate-adapted \r\ndevelopment and sustainable urbanisation (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Wong and Brown, 2009). NBS that protect or restore the \r\nnatural infiltration capacity of a watershed can increase the water \r\nsupply service to various extents, improving drought protection and \r\nproviding resilient water supply (Drosou et  al., 2019; Krauze and \r\nWagner, 2019), although different forms of NBS (e.g., street trees, \r\nparks and open space, community gardens, and engineered devices \r\nsuch as rain gardens, bioswales or retention ponds) contribute in \r\ndifferent ways to increasing stormwater infiltration. Additional sources \r\nof water may be available to replace the water supplied by NBS, \r\nsuch as rainwater harvesting, inter-basin transfers or desalination \r\nplants"


id: 1a691e8ec9eed870c8187995a69e6d67
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" Reliance on naturally sourced, locally available surface water \r\nand groundwater is more energy efficient and economical than \r\ndesalination or water reuse for potable use (Boelee et al., 2017), while \r\nrainwater harvesting is even more economical. Increasing the amount \r\nof green space in urban areas can secure and regulate water supplies, \r\nimproving water security (Liu and Jensen, 2018; Bichai and Cabrera \r\nFlamini, 2018). However, Bhaskar et al. (2016) reviewed the effect of \r\nurbanisation and NBS on baseflow and suggest that the confounded \r\neffects of infiltration and evapotranspiration losses, combined with \r\nthe subsurface infrastructure (sewer systems) and geology, makes it \r\ndifficult to predict the magnitude of baseflow enhancement resulting \r\nfrom the implementation of NBS in cities."


id: 2de2ce40a045942c7df4c594fe09167c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4657
content:
"At the same time, investments in vertical agriculture continue to expand, \r\nsuch as in Singapore where private investment in food production is \r\noccurring in high rise buildings (Wong, Wood and Paturi, 2020). Not \r\nall cities can benefit similarly from vertical agriculture since higher \r\nheating costs to produce vegetables indoors during northern winters \r\nconsumes considerable amounts of energy and may generate fossil \r\nfuel emissions depending on the energy source (Goldstein et al., 2016a; \r\nMohareb et al., 2017). Some regions can benefit from more traditional \r\noutdoor urban farming, such as in South and Southeast Asia, which can \r\nsupport multiple growing cycles per year for some crops, particularly in \r\ntropical areas where irrigation is available. Light availability, soil health \r\nand water availability will impact food production in urban areas"


id: f0d8a30294b00dd6dc491f38bd9cef00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35386
content:
" For \r\nexample, a study conducted in Vancouver, Canada, demonstrated that \r\nlight attenuation from buildings and trees can reduce both crop yield \r\nand water demand for crop growth (Johnson et al., 2015)."


id: ef359f4b990890cab29cf758f47f01ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35106
content:
"recent decades (see Section 5 4.2.4; Tramblay et al., 2019). The design \r\nprocess for physical infrastructure projects and significant construction \r\n(e.g., residential or industrial estates and large industrial development) \r\ntypically includes risk assessments and social and environmental impact \r\nassessments that consider neighbouring land uses and connected \r\ninfrastructure. Land use planning can consider diverse land uses \r\nand their interactions at the neighbourhood level (Section  6.3.2.1). \r\nResilience planning aims to bring together integrated, systemic views \r\nand enable joined-up planning at the city level (as well as lower scales) \r\n(Section  6.3.2.1). There is however a lack of long-term studies that \r\nassess the climate change impacts on urban form, including informal \r\nsettlements (Bai et  al., 2018; Ramyar, Zarghami and Bryant, 2019), \r\nleading to impact assessments that often overlook urban form (Ramyar, \r\nZarghami and Bryant, 2019)"


id: df20ad7f51d76f28cbae1a72783bcea9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" Additionally, context-specific spatial tools \r\nand community based approaches lack a precise connection to urban \r\nmorphology. For example, there is a need for further studies that \r\nconnect solar radiation, urban morphology (e.g., aspect and plot ratio), \r\nand the urban heat island spatio-temporal variability (Giridharan and \r\nEmmanuel, 2018; Li et al., 2019c)."


id: 6d9705ee58c190d9a2bfc97ecb3ea353
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"Globally, it is estimated that as much as USD 94 trillion of investment \r\nis required between 2016 and 2040 to replace, upgrade and extend \r\nthe world's physical infrastructure (Oxford Economics, 2017), much \r\nof which is ageing and will require replacement. Given the typical \r\nlifespan of infrastructure, this is both an opportunity and an imperative \r\nto ensure this investment is low carbon and resilient to climate change \r\nrisks (Grafakos et  al., 2020). 'Grey' or physical infrastructure is a \r\npriority for adaptation because its performance is sensitive to climate \r\n(particularly extreme events) and decisions on design and renovation \r\nhave long-lasting implications and are hard to reverse (Urge-Vorsatz\r\net al., 2018). Avoiding longer-term impacts on society, the economy \r\nand the environment will require future investment and retrofitting \r\nof existing infrastructure, to be undertaken in the context of the risks \r\nof climate change (Dawson et  al., 2018; Rosenzweig et  al., 2018b)"


id: 7c34034ea3d8c06ddfdb531c7fa51051
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" \r\nHowever, evidence from Africa shows that the benefits of pro-active \r\nadaptation measures and policies for infrastructure can result in net \r\nsavings depending on the country context (Section 9.8.5)."


id: 5fb91f98227855123d6f185fc38056b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12636
content:
"Several tools and models have emerged in response to \r\nrecommendations from AR5, including models that assess the impacts \r\nof urban heat island (Ramyar, Zarghami and Bryant, 2019), climatic \r\nuncertainty (Dhar and Khirfan, 2017), flood vulnerability (Abebe, Kabir \r\nand Tesfamariam, 2018) and inundation (Barau et al., 2015; Ford et al., \r\n2019). For example, findings from Kano, Nigeria, reveal that a lack of \r\ndistribution of certain urban morphological features, including open \r\nspaces and streets (both pervious and impervious), roof and building \r\nmaterials (e.g., concrete and metallic) and urban ecological features \r\n(e.g., urban ponds and ecological basin), exacerbates inundations \r\nand their associated impacts (Barau et al., 2015)"


id: e7465a7b2c7d8150d2d43c8c5650c892
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 33881
content:
" Also, findings about \r\nthe urban forms of coastal settlements, particularly in small islands, \r\nreveal that they often experience severe beach erosion due to wave \r\naction, sea level rise and storm surge that leads to landward retreat \r\nof coastline which threatens their social and economic activities (Dhar \r\nand Khirfan, 2016; Lane et  al., 2015; Khirfan and El-Shayeb, 2019). \r\nDespite these examples, very limited research is available to offer \r\nassessments of different urban scale morphologies and urban scale \r\nadaptation planning, including planning adaptation across supply \r\nchains and networked relationships with distant urban and rural \r\nplaces connected through trade and resource (financial, human and \r\nmaterial) or waste flows."


id: 1ac9c316a5454e528abf6289810916c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
content_type: text
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vector_id: 1685
content:
"Engineered measures for hazard mitigation such as seawalls, slope \r\nrevetments and river levees, as well as air conditioning are increasingly \r\nimplemented in urban centres, but many engineering interventions are \r\nless affordable and accessible in LMICs because of high construction \r\nand maintenance costs. These adaptive measures can also counter \r\nmitigation objectives because of reliance on climate-polluting energy \r\nsources. Despite this, engineering measures such as seawalls for \r\ntsunami protection and cooling areas in cities provide critical hazard \r\nreduction functions in urban contexts (Depietri and McPhearson, \r\n2017). As Pelling et  al. (2018) highlight, sustainable risk reduction \r\ncan be better achieved where these engineering measures include the \r\nat-risk poor majority and inclusive planning to support pro-poor risk \r\nreduction. Inclusive design and management of physical infrastructure \r\ncan enhance contributions to climate resilient development (Table 6"


id: 74f2e9adeade8008b05ada189a036ad6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 15996
content:
"6 \r\nand Supplementary Material). This section covers urban morphology \r\nand built form, building design, information and communication \r\ntechnology, energy, transport, water and sanitation, and coastal \r\nmanagement. All these domains of physical infrastructure will require \r\nadaptation to cope with a changing climate; many of them can also \r\ncontribute to broader adaptation for cities and settlements."


id: f357472669528964aa1729a778353d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"and Kershaw, 2017), although these effects are now well studied and \r\nnewer performance standards should account for ageing and soiling \r\neffects on reflectivity (Paolini et al., 2014). Ageing of 'cool pavements' \r\nis more complex, which makes their long-term performance less reliable \r\nto predict (Lontorfos, Efthymiou and Santamouris, 2018). The cooling \r\nperformance of green roofs is highly variable and depends on the \r\nactual water content of the green roof substrate, with dry vegetation \r\nperforming poorly in terms of cooling (Parison et  al., 2020b). This \r\nholds true for regular vegetation and NBS in general (Daniel, Lemonsu \r\nand Viguie, 2018). For all built environment adaptations, changes are \r\nlocked-in for a long time, and are likely to be expensive so that care is \r\nneeded to avoid potential negative impacts on social equity (Cabrera \r\nand Najarian, 2015; Romero-Lankao et  al., 2018; Fried et  al., 2020; \r\nRode et al., 2017) and carbon-intensive construction (Bai et al"


id: a91c78b6874944de0cf78b418edc5be2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
content_type: text
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vector_id: 24132
content:
"Architectural and urban design regulations at the single-building \r\nscale (building codes and guidelines) facilitate climate responsive \r\nbuildings that adapt to a changing climate and have the potential to \r\ncollectively change user behaviour during extreme weather events \r\n(Osman and Sevinc, 2019). They include buildings that are adaptive \r\nto ensure user comfort during extremes of hot and cold as well \r\nas to floods (e.g., building on stilts and amphibian architecture). \r\nChanges to design standards can scale quickly and widely, but \r\nretrofit of existing buildings is expensive, so care must be taken to \r\navoid potential negative impacts on social equity (Schunemann et al., \r\n2020; Matopoulos, Kovacs and Hayes, 2014; Ajibade and McBean, \r\n2014; Bastidas-Arteaga and Stewart, 2019). Buildings can be adapted \r\nto the negative consequences of climate change by altering their \r\ncharacteristics, for example increasing the insulation values (e.g., van \r\nHooff et al"


id: d9a1e1998cab0800acc8adfa92d7ebfe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 31751
content:
", 2014; Makantasi and Mavrogianni, 2016; Fisk, 2015; Fosas\r\net al., 2018; Barbosa, Vicente and Santos, 2015; Invidiata and Ghisi, \r\n2016; Perez-Andreu et al., 2018; Taylor et al., 2018; Triana, Lamberts \r\nand Sassi, 2018), adding solar shading (e.g., van Hooff et al., 2014; \r\nMakantasi and Mavrogianni, 2016; Barbosa, Vicente and Santos, 2015; \r\nInvidiata and Ghisi, 2016; Perez-Andreu et al., 2018; Taylor et al., 2018; \r\nTriana, Lamberts and Sassi, 2018; Dodoo and Gustavsson, 2016; Osman \r\nand Sevinc, 2019), increasing natural ventilation, preferably during the \r\nnight (e.g., van Hooff et al., 2014; Makantasi and Mavrogianni, 2016; \r\nPerez-Andreu et al., 2018; Triana, Lamberts and Sassi, 2018; Dodoo and \r\nGustavsson, 2016; Osman and Sevinc, 2019; Mulville and Stravoravdis, \r\n2016; Cellura et al., 2017; Fosas et al., 2018; Dino and Meral Akgul, \r\n2019), solar orientation of bedroom windows (Schuster et al"


id: 5f20362ab278d17a634e993b62990428
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12519
content:
", 2017), \r\napplying high-albedo materials for the building envelope (van Hooff\r\net al., 2014; Invidiata and Ghisi, 2016; Baniassadi et al., 2018; Triana, \r\nLamberts and Sassi, 2018), altering the thermal mass (van Hooff et al., \r\n2014; Mulville and Stravoravdis, 2016; Din and Brotas, 2017), adding \r\ngreen roofs/facades to poorly insulated buildings (Geneletti and Zardo, \r\n2016; Skelhorn, Lindley and Levermore, 2014; van Hooff et al., 2014; \r\nde Munck et  al., 2018; Feitosa and Wilkinson, 2018) and for water \r\nharvesting (Sepehri et al., 2018).\r\nIn general, the most promising adaptation measures are a combination \r\nof solar shading with increased levels of insulation and ample \r\npossibilities to apply natural ventilation to cool down a building (e.g., "


id: 24619aab1956879988532baf81b89e49
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
content_type: text
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vector_id: 3169
content:
"In addition, wind towers, solar chimneys and air vents are features that \r\nfacilitate cool air circulation within buildings while dissipating heat \r\n(Bhamare, Rathod and Banerjee, 2019). These features may be arranged \r\nto address hotspots or highly frequented spaces within buildings. \r\nSimilar to NBS, the effectiveness of passive cooling to ameliorate \r\nthe urban heat island varies widely depending on the location of \r\nthe sun, wind direction and the type of strategy used. For instance, \r\nnatural ventilation strategies (e.g., wind towers, solar chimneys, etc.) \r\nhave shown temperature reductions of up to 14degC (Bhamare, Rathod \r\nand Banerjee, 2019; Calautit and Hughes, 2016; Rabani et al., 2014). \r\nShading strategies alone can reduce indoor temperatures by 3degC, \r\nwhile heat sinks (in which heat is directed at a medium such as water) \r\nmay result in indoor temperatures up to 6degC lower than the outdoor \r\ntemperature (Oropeza-Perez and Ostergaard, 2018)"


id: bff2c89b0578ec0a68d36b4da87098be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 27754
content:
" More systemic \r\ninterventions, such as altering urban form through urban planning, \r\ncan mitigate the urban heat island across suburbs and cities (Lee and \r\nLevermore, 2019; Takkanon and Chantarangul, 2019; Yin et al., 2018; \r\nLiang and Keener, 2015; Emmanuel and Steemers, 2018). Experience in \r\nKano (Nigeria) has shown that incorporating Indigenous knowledge \r\ninto building design and urban planning can increase resilience to heat \r\nand flood risks (Barau et al., 2015). A review by Lemi (2019) suggests \r\nthat traditional ecological knowledge can provide wider climate \r\nchange adaptation benefits."


id: 7d6651fe9006cacffbea54d46b396a5c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17300
content:
"Information and communication technologies (ICTs) are deeply \r\nintertwined with the functioning of urban and infrastructure systems, \r\nand are at the core of the 'smart city' concept (Angelidou, 2015). ICT \r\nis more flexible than other physical infrastructure, although as other \r\nsectors are increasingly reliant on ICT, it is creating new climate-related \r\nfailure mechanisms (Norman, 2018; Maki et al., 2019). ICT assets and \r\nnetworks in urban, national and international communications systems \r\nwill need to be strengthened to enable ICT infrastructure to better cope \r\nwith climate change, and to enable ICT infrastructure to support the \r\nresilience of cities, settlements and other infrastructure. The increased \r\npervasiveness of ICT in smart cities, smart infrastructure and day-to-day \r\nliving, will evidently have long-term implications for exposure to \r\nclimate change risks and how cities manage those risks (Norman, 2018; \r\nMaki et  al., 2019)"


id: 9dbfe2e35bb3f867e51a753263434ae5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" For example, even if the ICT network is resilient \r\nto heatwaves, it is dependent on the electricity network to power it. \r\nConversely, other networks are dependent upon ICT for control systems, \r\nfor example smart grids for energy. There is limited information on how \r\nthese interdependencies, and associated risks, will evolve."


id: 8e1e4684f880306bf2ff5ed2f7956422
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Although networked like many other infrastructure systems, ICT \r\ncomponents have some distinctive properties. They are relatively \r\ncheap, and the advent of wireless communications has enabled ICT \r\nto have the widest reach of all infrastructures. Components can be \r\nrapidly deployed or repaired, and generally ICT networks are therefore \r\nbuilt with inherent redundancy and flexibility (Sakano et  al., 2016). \r\nComponents have a wide range of expected lifetimes which leads \r\nto faster cycles of innovation. There is therefore greater potential to \r\naccelerate uptake of climate resilience in this infrastructure sector, but \r\nconversely, this can increase waste and (energy intensive) resource \r\nconsumption"


id: 15481c7cc1c14cd5095b0e6cdc9ab6af
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" For example, mobile phones and computers may last as \r\nlittle as a year, cables and switching units may be moved and upgraded \r\nto improve bandwidth every few years, poles and masts are typically \r\ndesigned to last several decades, whilst exchanges and other critical \r\nnodes can be in use for over half a century."


id: ea1785108d887deeb2f5d8bd4ba8bd5c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"Several options are available to reduce the impacts of reduced \r\ncooling water for thermoelectric power generation, increases in water \r\ntemperature and lower flows for hydropower generation. These include \r\n(i) switching from freshwater to seawater (if available) or air cooling; \r\n(ii) replacing once-through cooling systems with recirculation systems; \r\n(iii) replacing fuel sources for thermoelectric power generation; (iv) \r\nincreasing the efficiency of hydro and thermoelectric power plants; (v) \r\nrelaxing discharge temperature rules to allow warmer water to enter \r\nrivers; (vi) installation of screens to stop algae or jellyfish blooms clogging \r\nintakes; (vii) reducing power production and managing demand; and \r\n(viii) changing reservoir operation rules (where available). Shreshta \r\net al. (2021) show that changing reservoir operation rules can offset \r\nreduced water availability under RCP8.5 until 2050, but is insufficient \r\nby the 2080s. van Vliet et al"


id: ee497cfea6826b458478c2622a723ff6
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content:
", (2016) showed that a 10% increase in \r\nhydroelectric generation efficiency can compensate for reduced water \r\navailability in most regions. Higher efficiency thermoelectric plans \r\noffset impacts under lower climate change scenarios but are shown \r\nto be inadequate under RCP8.5 by the 2080s; whereas a switch \r\nto seawater and dry (air) cooling provides a net increase under this \r\nscenario. However, these technologies can increase costs. Increasing \r\nthe temperature of water discharged from the power station can have \r\nnegative environmental impacts (Thome et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2015)."


id: c2727b30308c7697e8a842a262cce381
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content:
"A wide range of adaptation options are available for transport \r\ninfrastructure and most provide a good benefit cost ratio (Doll, Klug \r\nand Enei, 2014; Forzieri et  al., 2018). Options include upgrading \r\ninfrastructure (which can often be achieved autonomously as part \r\nof standard repair and replacement schedules) and strengthening \r\nor relocating (critical) assets. Adaptation of road and rail networks \r\nin Australasia includes re-routing, coastal protection, improved \r\ndrainage and upgrading of rails (Table 11.7.) In areas with substantial \r\ninfrastructure deficits, such as much of Africa, investments in public \r\ntransport and transit-oriented development are highlighted as desired \r\nmitigation-adaptation interventions within cities of South Africa, \r\nEthiopia and Burkina Faso (Section  9.8.5.3)"


id: d43dd1f1244a9354e8bc733f91a9cceb
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content:
" Adapting low carbon \r\ntransport infrastructure will be crucial to ensure resilience to climate \r\nchange impacts whilst simultaneously delivering mitigation goals \r\n(Shaheen, Martin and Hoffman-Stapleton, 2019; Costa et al., 2018)."


id: f3287bfcbbed76cd076ff891af024a93
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content:
"New technologies and design innovations can improve the resilience \r\nof cars, trains, boats and other vehicles to cope with more extreme \r\nweather. Mobility transitions have the potential to improve mobility \r\nand accessibility, to influence urban form and to reduce vehicular \r\nuse (and thereby infrastructure degradation), vehicle miles travelled \r\nand vehicle-based emissions (Sperling, Pike and Chase, 2018). For \r\nexample, use of electric vehicles, hydrogen vehicles and greater uptake \r\nof public transport and other vehicles that reduce exhaust head \r\nemissions reduces the urban heat island (Kolbe, 2019). Carsharing \r\ncan reduce carbon emissions by over 50% (Shaheen, Martin and \r\nHoffman-Stapleton, 2019)"


id: bbaa590fbdca0864a69bb949d3983525
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" Ride hailing, matching non-professional \r\ndrivers of private vehicles with paying passengers, positively impacts \r\nlow-income, low-car ownership households in Los Angeles (Brown, \r\n2018), and fills market gaps in cities where public transit infrastructure \r\nis inadequate, unreliable or unsafe (Suatmadi, Creutzig and Otto, 2019; \r\nVanderschuren and Baufeldt, 2018), but can also create a precarious \r\nand insecure job market that impacts well-being (Fleming, 2017). \r\nWhether the resulting impacts are positive or negative, largely depends \r\non local, national and international policy and practices."


id: c5de50fa16e76b77784e72aa4b036735
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28707
content:
"Prevention or attenuation solutions include: rooftop detention, \r\nreservoirs, bioretention, permeable paving, infiltration techniques, \r\nopen drainage, floating structures, wet-proofing, raised structures, \r\ncoastal defences, barriers and levees, and have been deployed in \r\ndiverse configurations and environments around the world (Matos \r\nSilva and Costa, 2016). Barcelona (Spain) reached 90% impermeable \r\nsurface cover by the 1980s, and has recently begun implementing \r\nartificial detention, underground reservoirs and permeable pavement \r\ntechnologies (Favaro and Chelleri, 2018; Matos Silva and Costa, 2016). \r\nFlorida Power and Light (USA), which provides service to approximately \r\n10 million people, is investing USD 3 billion in flood protection and \r\nthe hardening of assets (for example, upgrading wooden poles to \r\nsteel and concrete) (Brody, Rogers and Siccardo, 2019)"


id: b15faacc8a32882c1696bc2fc3224057
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vector_id: 25407
content:
" The City of \r\nSeattle recommends increasing preventative maintenance activities, \r\nthe regular review of appropriate pavement technologies and \r\nmodifications to subgrades and drainage facilities for high-risk areas \r\n(City of Seattle, 2017), whilst also providing benefits to transport \r\ndisruption (Arrighi et al., 2019). Adaptation in African cities is often \r\ndominated by informal responses (Owusu-Daaku and Diko, 2018). In \r\nthe absence of centralised responses, low-income residents in Nairobi \r\n(Kenya) dig trenches and construct temporary dikes to protect homes, \r\nand in Accra (Ghana) the community has developed a range of social \r\nresponses, including communal drains and local evacuation teams, to \r\nhelp protect people and critical valuables, although these innovations \r\nrequire connection to city-wide infrastructure to effectively reduce \r\nwidespread risk (Amoako, 2018)."


id: aae5552306b08f67998bf4cd11745bd
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"In contrast to a 'fail-safe' approach to design which emphasises \r\nstrengthening infrastructure against more intense environmental \r\nconditions, 'safe-to-fail' flood strategies allow infrastructure to fail in \r\nits ability to carry out its primary function but control the consequences \r\nof the failure. Examples include the use of a bioretention basin in \r\nScottsdale (Arizona, USA) to accommodate excess runoff and help \r\ndrain the city; a subsidy for affected farmers for lost crop production \r\nas part of the Netherlands' Room for the River programme; targeted \r\ndestruction of a levee to control flooding in the Mississippi River Valley \r\nin 2011 (Kim et al., 2019)"


id: ec56179f72fe4498123055df2a33337a
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34671
content:
" Water-sensitive urban design, low-impact \r\ndevelopment, sponge cities, sustainable urban drainage and natural \r\nflood management involve deployment of systems and practices \r\nthat use or mimic natural processes that result in the infiltration, \r\nevapotranspiration or use of stormwater to protect water quality and \r\nassociated aquatic habitat. These are being designed and implemented \r\nat increasingly ambitious scales. For example, China's Sponge City "


id: 9ece682c0a1218670c4c1a49446fb06b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22527
content:
"Questions of equity and justice influence adaptation pathways for \r\ncities, settlements and infrastructure (see also Chapter 8). Although \r\ninfrastructure, ranging from social to ecological and physical to \r\ndigital, can help to reduce the impacts of climate change (Stewart \r\nand Deng, 2014; Baro Porras et al., 2021), there is limited evidence of \r\nhow infrastructures, implemented to reduce climate risk, also reduce \r\ninequality. Rather, there is more evidence to suggest that both adaptation \r\nplans and associated infrastructure implementation pathways are \r\nincreasing inequality in cities and settlements (Chu, Anguelovski and \r\nCarmin, 2016; Anguelovski et  al., 2016; Romero-Lankao and Gnatz, \r\n2019)"


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content:
" Social, economic and cultural structures that marginalise \r\npeople by race, class, ethnicity and gender all contribute in complex \r\nways to climate injustices and need to be urgently addressed for \r\nadaptation options to shift to benefit those most vulnerable, rather \r\nthan mainly benefitting the already privileged and maintaining the \r\nstatus quo (Thomas et al., 2019; Porter et al., 2020; Ranganathan and \r\nBratman, 2019). Innovation and imagination are needed in adaptation \r\nresponses to ensure that cities and settlements shift from perpetuating \r\nstructural domination and inequality to fairer cities (Porter et  al., \r\n2020; Henrique and Tschakert, 2019; Parnell, 2016b). To support these \r\npossibilities, this section explores adaptation through the lens of \r\ndistributive and procedural justice. Although not expanded on here, \r\nspatial and recognition injustices are equally important (Fisher, 2015; \r\nChu and Michael, 2018; Campello Torres et  al., 2020)"


id: c96150361248add29683817f87300ed0
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" Recognition \r\ncan be supported through a capabilities approach that helps to bring \r\nattention to past cultural domination and enable citizens to develop \r\nthe functioning life they choose (Schlosberg, Collins and Niemeyer, \r\n2017). This brings a focus on local action, emphasising the relevance \r\nto vulnerability reduction and resilience building of individual and \r\nlocal/community capacities and supporting structures. This blurs \r\nthe distinction between climate change adaptation and community \r\ndevelopment, with the former firmly embedded in the latter. Struggles \r\nfor recognition are deeply political and central to adaptation responses \r\nwhich requires increased focus on power to support more equitable \r\nand just adaptation (Nightingale, 2017). Justice questions are not \r\nstatic, Box  6.4 overviews the implications of COVID-19 for urban \r\njustice and vulnerability."


id: e3f15665fc95fa5b4ee517ca9c392cb1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"Physical infrastructure can provide substantial benefits, be constructed \r\nquickly and has enabled coastal cities and settlements around the \r\nworld to flourish and grow. Multifunctional physical infrastructure \r\ncan also provide economic and social co-benefits. These include \r\nintegration of transport, recreation, agriculture (e.g., cattle pasture), \r\nfounding for wind turbines, housing, office or industry into the coastal \r\nmanagement infrastructure (Anvarifar et al., 2017; Kothuis and Kok, \r\n2017). However, physical infrastructures can also disrupt natural \r\nprocesses, often leading to undesirable impacts such as pollution, \r\ndegradation of ecosystems and displacement of erosion and flood \r\nrisk to other locations (Wang et al., 2018b; Dawson, 2015; Nicholls, \r\nDawson and Day, 2015)"


id: 44175b220bdd6d367b77e4740975081a
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content:
" Coastal management strategies that take \r\na hybrid approach, integrating physical and natural infrastructure, \r\nprovide the best opportunities for managing risk and achieving wider \r\nsocioeconomic and environmental benefits (Depietri and McPhearson, \r\n2017; Morris et al., 2018; Schoonees et al., 2019; Powell et al., 2019)."


id: 97dc9c68c6b54e34e3783321f1f29404
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"COVID-19 impacts have highlighted the depth and unevenness of systemic social vulnerability and the compounding characteristics of \r\ncontemporary development models, with direct relevance to climate change risk accumulation and its reduction (Patel et al., 2020b; \r\nManzanedo and Manning, 2020; Bahadur and Dodman, 2020). This is plain at the global level: of the estimated 119-124 million additional \r\npeople induced into poverty by COVID-19 in 2020, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa each contribute two-fifths (Lakner et al., 2021). \r\nThese are rapidly urbanising and highly climate-hazard-exposed world regions, indicating COVID-19 impacts may further concentrate \r\nrisk in these regions. Within cities, COVID-19 and climate change risk and loss is concurrent by gender, race and income or livelihood, \r\nfor example, when vulnerable elderly populations are simultaneously exposed to COVID-19 and heatwave risk. Globally, in 2020, about \r\n431"


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"7 million vulnerable people were exposed to extreme heat during the COVID-19 pandemic, including about 75.5 million during the \r\nJuly and August 2020 European heatwave, with an excess mortality of over 9000 people arising from heat exposure (Walton and van \r\nAalst, 2020)."


id: 803b596de7b0e386ccaa0bcdb62b9d80
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"The pandemic has demonstrated the multiple, often reinforcing, ways in which specific drivers of vulnerability interact both in generating \r\nurban risk and shaping who is more or less able to recover (Phillips et al., 2020; Honey-Roses et al., 2020) (see Section 6.2). Again, this \r\nis not a new lesson for urban climate change adaptation, but it is a lesson that has not yet been seen to enter into routine practice for \r\nurban adaptation. Two key challenges for climate change adaptation are the associations between COVID-19 risk and urban connectivity \r\nand overcrowding. Connectivity has been presented in urban adaptation policy as a virtue, a means to share risk and diversity inputs (Ge\r\net al"


id: 452abb252f1dd5b211bc7a150f0dcb26
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", 2019; Kim and Bostwick, 2020), COVID-19 has surfaced the unevenness with which people and places are connected and also the \r\nneed to balance connectivity against risk transfer, through the failure of food supply chains or remittance flows, as well as by the direct \r\ntransfer of disease (Challinor et al., 2018). High-density living has advantages for urban resource efficiency including benefiting climate \r\nchange mitigation. When high-density living is not supported by adequate access to critical infrastructure (sufficient internal living space, \r\naccess to potable water and sanitation, access to open green space), this exacerbates overcrowding and generates vulnerability to \r\nmultiple risks, including climate change hazards and communicable disease (Bamweyana et al., 2020; Hamidi, Sabouri and Ewing, 2020; \r\nPeters, 2020; Satterthwaite et al., 2020)"


id: 9483bf1208606c55a2aa6341516a72eb
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" Where overcrowding coincides with precarious livelihoods, for example in informal settlements, \r\nrisk is further elevated (Wilkinson, 2020). Neighbourhood associations (a benefit of high-density living) have been an important source \r\nof resilience through providing trusted information, access to food and water for washing during the pandemic and serving populations \r\nunable to access government or market provision (Pelling et al., 2021). Here local organising has not only met gaps in service provision, \r\nbut opened dialogue to vision and organise for alternative development futures. These distinctly urban challenges should be read as a \r\nsub-set of wider cross-cutting lessons for recovery from COVID-19 (see Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7)."


id: 774adab828182fd48b345da9371f94c2
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content:
"Procedural justice, which focuses on the institutional processes by \r\nwhich adaptation decisions are made, brings attention to the lack \r\nof opportunity for engaging in political decision making and limited \r\nrepresentation of diverse voices in cities and settlements, and in \r\nrelation to investment in infrastructure (Coates and Nygren, 2020; \r\nHenrique and Tschakert, 2019). Even when inclusive adaptation \r\nprocesses are run, they seldom produce procedurally just outcomes \r\n(Malloy and Ashcraft, 2020). Understanding who is excluded and \r\nincluded is important (Sara, Pfeffer and Baud, 2017). One example \r\nis the increasing numbers of migrants who are confronted with lack \r\nof access to citizenship rights and housing tenure (Romero-Lankao \r\nand Norton, 2018). Often, migrants are not allowed to formally claim \r\npublic provisions in health, finance and shelter (Chu and Michael, \r\n2018)"


id: 58567ea7b916142eac2dce6679637f72
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" Further, migrants and their settlements are likely unrecognised \r\nin spatial or infrastructure development plans. In this context, social \r\ninfrastructure, zoning and land use planning for climate adaptation \r\nhas triggered inequity through omission, as some planning process \r\nhave been racialised and excluded groups such as migrants and ethnic \r\nminorities (Anguelovski et al., 2016). Urban adaptation policy-making \r\nprocesses that explicitly integrate multiple stakeholder interests can \r\nhelp to balance top-down solutions (Reckien et al., 2018a)."


id: c3d55fc9b923ed5d20483c92d3374879
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"The delivery of climate change action has revealed numerous \r\nco-benefits between adaptation and mitigation, around diverse areas \r\nsuch as implementing NBS and delivering health and development \r\nbenefits (Urge-Vorsatz et  al., 2014; Suckall, Stringer and Tompkins, \r\n2015; Puppim de Oliveira and Doll, 2016; Spencer et  al., 2017). \r\nThere has been a strong interest in delivering development benefits \r\nalongside climate mitigation, thus benefiting the overall infrastructure \r\nbase (Suckall, Stringer and Tompkins, 2015). Some of these co-benefits \r\nhave also emerged in experiences of urban planning, pointing toward \r\nthe dilemma of separating adaptation and mitigation in a context in \r\nwhich integration, rather than an analytical differentiation, was seen \r\nas being required to transcend work in silos (Aylett, 2015)"


id: c26443391547854ebbb95ba40289c817
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" Because \r\nurban planning needs to carefully consider long time scales, the \r\nneat separation between mitigation and adaptation runs counter to \r\nintegrated forms of planning that can consider scales (time and space) \r\ncarefully and that are aimed to deliver the sustainable city as a whole \r\n(Solecki et al., 2015; Grafakos et al., 2020)."


id: e41cd7cbb9bda76110fc83acf7663df1
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"Identifying who is least able to adapt to climate risks sufficiently \r\nis important (Thomas et  al., 2019). Some people may have few \r\nopportunities to relocate away from flooded areas in the long term \r\nor to evacuate in the short term. It is also harder for many from \r\nlow-income areas to rebuild after an extreme event. Lack of housing \r\ntenure and sub-standard housing has been shown to limit the ability \r\nof residents to improve and manage their landscapes and therefore \r\nit is hard for them to enhance energy efficiency (Dempsey et  al., \r\n2011). Access to information is critical for adapting to climate risk \r\nand reducing vulnerability to hazards, yet access to this information is \r\noften not equally available (Ma et al., 2014). For example, low literacy \r\ncan hamper ability to respond to early warning information (Dugan\r\net  al., 2011)"


id: a3f9e58146fb752c2c7ad4ee913c136f
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" In other instances, racial violence has surfaced during \r\ndisasters, with Black victims' lives being seen as less important than \r\nothers (Anderson et al., 2020)."


id: 61510aef37fe14b91f079b29f1c62e87
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"possibility of achieving such triple wins remains scarce (Tompkins\r\net  al., 2013; Sharifi, 2020), emerging examples show important \r\ndevelopments. For example, establishing safe and convenient walking \r\nand cycling infrastructure can lead to improvements in population \r\nhealth, thereby highlighting the close interaction between urban land \r\nuse, infrastructure and population health (Schuster et al., 2017), while \r\nclean cooking has the potential to deliver positive health outcomes \r\nalongside improvements in air quality and emissions reductions and \r\nthrough reducing pressure on woodland as a fuel source for expanding \r\nurban populations (Msoffe, 2017). Furthermore, active transport \r\ninfrastructure reduces air pollution and related health risks, and helps \r\nto mitigate further climate change (Schuster et al., 2017)"


id: 469c6ec57b8096ee2c09d57e2ddcef71
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" These are \r\nsupported by city networks such as the C40 Clean Air Cities Declaration \r\nand the Clean Air Coalition that complements WHO guidelines \r\nand standards, for example through the Breathe Life Campaign. In \r\nconclusion, in both urban environments and infrastructural sectors, \r\ntriple wins are only realisable through broader perspectives that \r\nlink climate compatible development to institutional change or the \r\nachievements of wider welfare objectives such as those enshrined in \r\nthe United Nations 2030 Agenda of Development (Castan Broto et al., \r\n2015; England et al., 2018) (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 4c3385ca2675a78b75fbe3cf7959060a
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"The aspiration to deliver climate change action within a broader \r\nagenda of transformative change, introduced in the SREX report, \r\nreceived renewed attention after the publication of IPCC Special \r\nReport on Global Warming of 1.5degC, which argues for a focus on \r\nurban transformations and highlighted that informal settlements \r\nwere vital for understanding the delivery of these transformations. \r\nDeep decarbonisation has emerged as a new idea that regards the \r\ndevelopment of low or zero carbon pathways as a condition for good \r\nadaptation in the long term. Decarbonisation becomes urgent in \r\nthe face of growing impacts attributable to climate change (Ribera\r\net al., 2015; Bataille et al., 2016; Wesseling et al., 2017). Urbanisation \r\nopens opportunities for deep mitigation in low-impact developments, \r\nand hence, it is imperative to understand the implications of those \r\nopportunities for climate action (Mulugetta and Broto, 2018). These \r\ngains are not limited to urban areas"


id: 5143f298a291fdf6ff7eab03d4963a40
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" The reliance on connected urban-\r\nrural systems for water, food and fuel has led to city government and \r\nurban-based businesses supporting landscape adaptations in rural \r\nhinterlands with strong potential for mitigation and rural development \r\nco-benefits. Water Funds bring downstream urban public and private \r\nfinance to support upstream rural residents to make land use and \r\nagricultural management decisions to avoid damaging runoff, soil \r\nerosion and downstream sedimentation with reduction in water quality \r\nand increased flood risk. There are more than 30 Water Funds in Latin \r\nAmerica and sub-Saharan Africa. These operate at landscape scale; \r\nthe Upper Tana-Nairobi Water Fund, Kenya (Vogl et al., 2017), planned \r\nfor a USD 10  million investment in Water Fund-led conservation \r\ninterventions, with a projected return of USD 21.5 million in economic \r\nbenefits over a 30-year timeframe (Apse and Bryant, 2015)"


id: a8ebf0b2afa95962088f4819e456a961
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" However, \r\nthese investments do not occur where communities lack funding or \r\nthe institutions to direct funding from downstream beneficiaries to \r\nupstream residents (Brauman et al., 2019)."


id: 8297cd9a128dff80cf63a042e98dfc6c
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content:
"Adaptation in urban areas and settlements can be incremental (when \r\nit addresses the causes of problems but without fundamentally \r\nchanging the social and political structures that drive it, for example \r\nthrough planning or new regulations), reformist (when it changes the \r\nfeatures that cause problems but without fundamentally changing the \r\nstructures) or transformative (when it addresses fundamental systems \r\nattributes and outcomes such as reducing inequality in political and \r\nsocioeconomic structures or enhancing well-being [Mendizabal et al., \r\n2018; Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2018] which change the situation \r\ncompletely) (Heikkinen, Yla-Anttila and Juhola, 2019; Roberts and \r\nPelling, 2020; O'Brien, Selboe and Hayward, 2018). In the context of \r\nthe SGDs mission to leave-no-one behind, transformative adaptation \r\naddresses fundamental systems' functions to enable enhanced social \r\njustice and socio-ecological well-being"


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" Incremental adaptation actions \r\nseek to maintain the essence and integrity of a system or process at \r\na given scale (see Annex II: Glossary). Adaptation that seeks only to \r\ndefend existing development status will not contribute to enhanced \r\nwell-being and is not transformative, even if fundamental infrastructure \r\nengineering or legislative systems are changed to maintain the status \r\nquo in the face of increasing risk (Mendizabal et al., 2018)."


id: 7c761e4032330cd43fafd2699444553d
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"City populations and non-state actors, together with local and \r\nregional governments, can play an essential role in creating enabling \r\nconditions for action, including, for example, civil society mobilising \r\nconcerns of marginalised voices and future generations, as indicated \r\nin the worldwide student mobilisations against climate change (Wood, \r\n2019; Maor, Tosun and Jordan, 2017; Cloutier, Papin and Bizier, 2018; \r\nPrendergast et al., 2021), which may then be prioritised by local and \r\nregional governments. National governments also play a crucial role, \r\nfor example in facilitating resources and finance for urban adaptation \r\nactions, alongside financial organisations and the business sector (see \r\nSection 6.4.5)"


id: 1eb4ef8f4cf91d9dc8822680852ce09d
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" This section starts assessing adaptation experiences in \r\ncities, settlements and infrastructures since the AR5, before reviewing \r\nevidence of how to foster enabling conditions for adaptation through \r\ninstitutionalisation, governance capacity, finance, evaluation and social \r\nlearning."


id: 8079421865a9331336b3f595ff31167b
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"Multi-level governance measures that support local governments \r\ncan foster robust adaptation approaches and address risks and \r\nvulnerabilities across scales (high confidence) (Westman, Broto and \r\nHuang, 2019; Hardoy et al., 2014; Romero-Lankao and Hardoy, 2015). \r\nEffective action by local government requires national government's \r\nsupport (medium confidence). For example, Araos et  al. (2017) \r\ndocuments the case of Dhaka, Bangladesh, where a national plan \r\nprioritises measures for protecting coasts and agricultural production. \r\nIn this context, the local government has minimal access to human and \r\nfinancial resources. Without national support, the local government \r\nstruggles to coordinate action among different stakeholders"


id: e5ddc8fd4419dabe0c327dfc09b54d60
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" National \r\nurban adaptation directives can influence municipal governments' \r\naction and planning, but evidence suggests that national policy alone \r\nis not sufficient to deliver action on the ground without understanding \r\nlocal conditions (high confidence) (Archer et al., 2014; Lehmann et al., \r\n2015)."


id: bb584b3b078f63f64cb6906540d95b0f
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"Flexible institutions that allow for both top-down and bottom-up action \r\ncan bring capacities together from across levels of government and \r\nactors within a settlement (Sharifi and Yamagata, 2017). Predominant \r\nplanning and capacity-building strategies, however, lack the flexibility \r\nto address the needs of a rapidly changing environment (Carter et al., \r\n2015; Dhar and Khirfan, 2017; Juhola, 2016). Efforts to adapt to new \r\nchallenges may have to speed up. This is especially true in urban areas \r\nand settlements with lower levels of development and experiencing \r\nrapid urbanisation, growing inequality and exposure to multiple \r\nhazards (Dulal, 2019; Grafakos et al., 2019; Solecki et al., 2018). Even \r\nwithin cities that share similar characteristics, there are considerable \r\ndifferences in the level of investment in adaptation (Georgeson et al., \r\n2016)"


id: ccce00c851ad4d4b00f93c6db34fea5a
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" There is also a danger that uncoordinated actions for climate \r\nchange mitigation and adaptation may constrain future adaptation \r\nopportunities or create maladaptation (Juhola et  al., 2016). The \r\nevidence emerging since the AR5 suggests that institutional change \r\ncan be accelerated by closer collaboration between the diverse actors \r\nand deployment of the diverse approaches that can deliver adaptation."


id: 8d276a3834c63a25cd382b77f044351c
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"The assessment of cases of local adaptation demonstrates that most \r\nurban adaptation is led by local governments (although the local \r\ngovernment is also a heterogeneous category and local governance \r\narrangements may vary across administrative and political contexts) \r\n(high confidence) (Amundsen et al., 2018; Lesnikowski et al., 2021). \r\nLocal government reform at different levels can improve local \r\nadaptation, whether this is by strengthening specific teams or building \r\ncross-departmental linkages (high confidence) (Paterson et al., 2017; \r\nShi, 2019; Wamsler and Raggers, 2018). Adaptation success often \r\ndepends on having political champions driving the adaptation agenda \r\nalongside measures such as access to a knowledge base, resources at \r\nhand, political stability and the presence of dense social networks that \r\ncan be supported through local government reform (Pasquini et al., \r\n2015)"


id: ee326863f2005e1724a0ddd426cde97d
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content:
" Aligning adaptation objectives with other potential benefits \r\nof sustainable development also supports adaptation. Specifically, \r\npolicies and plans that link adaptation to the objectives of Agenda "


id: bb5530a1fc9e266becc2585206f95a7a
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content:
"urbanising countries (Nagendra et  al., 2018). Business continuity \r\ndescribing private sector preparedness notes that firms underestimate \r\nthe impacts of climate risks on their business models (Goldstein et al., \r\n2019; Forino and von Meding, 2021; Korber and McNaughton, 2017; \r\nCrick et  al., 2018b). There is little research on how businesses can \r\nplay a leading role in urban adaptation (Klein et al., 2018). A global \r\nassessment of the private sector's role in urban adaptation using \r\ndata from 402 cities shows that most adaptation projects focus on \r\nthe public sector and do not address private sector concerns or local \r\npeople's participation (Klein et  al., 2018). Recorded private sector \r\naction is recognised through partnerships and participation (Peterson \r\nand Hughes, 2017; Hughes and Peterson, 2018). There are a few \r\nexamples of studies of private sector-led adaptation action which \r\nadopts a national focus (Crick et al., 2018a; Crick et al., 2018b)"


id: a5157a0107b704d4958a9e3441cd8494
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 23540
content:
" This \r\nlack of evidence contrasts with a well-developed body of literature on \r\nprivate sector-led mitigation (Averchenkova et al., 2016). "


id: ba78c88d17dd10aa2b96f87de1eb6dee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 26873
content:
"Community based adaptation includes a range of initiatives that put \r\ncommunities at the centre of planning for adaptation, often led by \r\ncommunities themselves (Reid, 2016). Community based adaptation is \r\na comprehensive and effective strategy to deliver resilience at a human \r\nscale (Trogal et al., 2018; Greenwalt et al., 2020). Many community \r\nbased responses to climate impacts represent coping strategies \r\ndeveloped within households with a small effect on adaptation \r\ncapacities beyond incremental improvements. Residents adopt private \r\ncoping strategies to reduce exposure to and the impacts of heat, floods, \r\nflash floods, landslides, storms and diseases on their lives (Hambati \r\nand Yengoh, 2018)"


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" These coping strategies include the construction \r\nof physical protection against flooding, reforestation, the construction \r\nof terraces, flood diversion measures and interventions to protect \r\nhouses (such as raised doorsteps or use of sandbags and adoption \r\nof building techniques for making homes resilient to storms and \r\nlandslides), ventilation of houses, urban agriculture and redefinition \r\nof daily practices and livelihoods (Navarro et al., 2020; Malabayabas \r\nand Baconguis, 2017; Apreda, 2016; de Andrade and Szlafsztein, 2020; \r\nSahay, 2018; Bausch, Eakin and Lerner, 2018)."


id: a1de39c571342148f96b2f131f5dcf8f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Businesses have an essential role in urban adaptation actions, through \r\nthe collective formulation of adaptation strategies, the provision \r\nof critical adaptive interventions and collaboration in partnerships. \r\nBusinesses in the property sector, such as real estate developers, \r\nare on the frontline of climate change impacts but display differing \r\nattitudes toward climate adaptation. A study of property businesses \r\nin cities in Australia (Taylor et  al., 2012) showed that speeding up \r\nplanning approval processes facilitated adaptation actions, and joint \r\nprivate-public decision-making was the preferred mode of governance \r\nfor responding to climate concerns. Property businesses in cities in \r\nSweden had a limited and reactive engagement in climate issues and \r\nresisted regulation (Storbjork et  al., 2018)"


id: 81cf5f3ef45b7d3fee95efe831cce050
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" Corporate, private sector \r\ninterventions in urban risk reduction more broadly remain limited, with \r\na mix of public and private responsibility for planning, implementing \r\nand maintaining adaptations in the built environment, and yet limited \r\nengagement of private sector actors in providing healthcare measures \r\nfor heat prevention (medium confidence) (Mees, 2017)."


id: 388bfc48960c657505ce505e09e9462f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Individual coping strategies are generally ineffective in reducing \r\nextreme risks and they rarely address the underlying structural \r\ncauses of vulnerability (high confidence) (Sahay, 2018; Rozer et  al., \r\n2016; Jay et  al., 2021). Expending resources on private coping \r\nstrategies in some cases may divert resources and capacity for wider \r\ncommunity adaptation efforts (de Andrade and Szlafsztein, 2020). \r\nHowever, individual coping strategies can provide foundations for the \r\nimplementation of collaborative action in communities, building on \r\npeople's experiences, in ways which may have a longer-term, durable \r\nimpact on developing resilience (high confidence) (McEwen et  al., \r\n2018). Community based adaptation can be effective at different \r\nscales, whether this is to manage transboundary issues (Limthongsakul, \r\nNitivattananon and Arifwidodo, 2017), support the replication of local \r\nsolutions (Daniere et  al., 2016), increase the uptake of adaptation \r\nmeasures (Liang et al"


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", 2017) or inform the design of more effective \r\npolicies for resilience (Berquist, Daniere and Drummond, 2015; \r\nOdemerho, 2015). Community action may be mediated by NGOs or \r\nthird sector organisations who play a coordinating or enabling role, \r\nparticularly where other local government mechanisms are absent."


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"There is little published literature documenting the heterogeneity \r\nof business and the private sector's responses to climate impacts \r\n(Linnenluecke, Birt and Griffiths, 2015; Doh, Tashman and Benischke, \r\n2019). Firms have varying abilities to introduce climate adaptation \r\nmeasures related to staff availability, levels of awareness, perceptions \r\nof responsibility and duration of contracts (short-term projects implies \r\nless interest in adaptation outcomes) (Shearer et al., 2016). The impact \r\nof COVID-19 has serious but uncertain implications for both access \r\nto finances for sustainable development by LMICs and sub-national \r\ngovernments, and the possibility of stimulating maladaptive \r\ninfrastructure and policy responses (OECD, 2020; Sovacool, Del Rio and \r\nGriffiths, 2020). The response of businesses to disasters influences the \r\nresilience in the communities in which they operate (McKnight and \r\nLinnenluecke, 2016; Linnenluecke and McKnight, 2017)"


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" However, \r\nat the same time there is a growing literature that warns against \r\nthe conflict interests that businesses may have in their adaptation \r\nstrategies. For example, real estate responses to flooding have led to \r\nprocesses of climate gentrification, whereby lower income populations \r\nare displaced toward higher risk areas which stablishes racialised \r\nand class-based patterns of inequality of exposure to risk, with hard \r\nevidence rapidly growing specially in US cities (Keenan, Hill and \r\nGumber, 2018a; Shokry, Connolly and Anguelovski, 2020; De Koning "


id: 43ebe986b616d3258efa7f419b669306
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"Public-private partnerships are increasingly relevant for collaborative \r\ndevelopment of urban adaptation (Klein et  al., 2018). Partnerships \r\ncan deliver infrastructure, coordinate policy and support learning. \r\nThe main limitation of partnerships is scale, as partnership action is \r\nusually limited to discrete projects or objectives. Partnerships tend to \r\nbe linked to reactive (rather than proactive) adaptation projects and \r\nthe deviation of objectives away from adaptation concerns (Harman, \r\nTaylor and Lane, 2015). Partnerships can support capacity building in \r\npublic and private organisations and facilitate networking efforts that \r\nextend beyond the private sector to communities and NGOs (Bauer \r\nand Steurer, 2014; Castan Broto et al., 2015). Public actors can benefit \r\nfrom the private sector's innovation and implementation capacity, \r\nand businesses can de-risk investments"


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" Still, partnerships can also \r\nstrengthen the ideologies of growth and managerialism within the \r\noperations of the local government (Taylor et al., 2012). Reconciling \r\ndivergent norms and routines within public and private organisations \r\nremains one of the challenges to establishing successful public-private \r\npartnerships for adaptation (Lund, 2018). Administrative and political \r\nculture influences the nature of interactions between public and private \r\nsector actors in urban adaptation agendas (Bauer and Steurer, 2014), \r\nwith negative consequences such as the imposition of vertical chains \r\nof commands on horizontal collaborations, and the need to formalise \r\ncontractual relations (Klein and Juhola, 2018)."


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"Unnikrishnan et  al. (2018) have documented how the colonial and postcolonial history of water management in Bengaluru shapes \r\nthe water infrastructure and provision systems today. Water access inequalities can be traced to the patterns of spatial development \r\ndeveloped by colonial policies. Records from the sixth century onwards show how city rulers invested in an interconnected, community \r\nmanaged network of tanks and open wells, regularly recharged through harvested rainwater. The water system was changed at the \r\nend of the 18th century, as first the colonial state, then the post-independence government of Karnataka took responsibility for water \r\nmanagement. Ideas of modernist planning influenced the development of new water infrastructure and piped networks, including the \r\nfirst piped infrastructure, bringing water from sources 30 km away, including the Hesaraghatta and then the TG Halli reservoirs"


id: 49a7c538c90587e4ad567bab0326c5c
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" The old \r\nnetwork of tanks gradually deteriorated as tanks became disused, polluted or built over. More prolonged and costly water transfers took \r\nplace in the post-colonial period, delivering water from the Cauvery River in a massive engineering project with a high energetic cost and \r\nenmeshed in inter-state conflicts over water use (Castan Broto and Sudhira, 2019). Scarcity is still a problem in Bengaluru. The citizen \r\nresponse has been an activist movement to reclaim the city's tanks, accompanied by a plea to reconsider current water uses within the \r\ncity, including actions to protect and rejuvenate water wells (Nagendra, 2016). Unnikrishnan et al. (2018) document different actions \r\nled by citizen-led collectives, including projects for lake rejuvenation, filtering technologies to treat sewage, recovering the value of lakes \r\nthrough a share of photos and art projects, and involvement of local knowledge in-tank restoration"


id: a281a556ede7465fbb9fb67d9e3480a6
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" Those efforts suggest an untapped \r\npotential to deliver adaptive green spaces through the recovery of Bengaluru's tanks."


id: 2ff71f717d5c47ff13d207112a18d6b7
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"Since the late 1990s, transnational municipal networks (TMNs) have \r\nincreased awareness of climate change and served as a bridge for cities \r\nto access critical financial resources from private and philanthropic \r\nsources (Rashidi and Patt, 2018; Funfgeld, 2015). Recently, TMNs \r\nhave taken on more programmatic functions, working with cities \r\nto strategise, plan and incrementally improve their organisation \r\nfunctions in the face of climate change. For example, the Rockefeller \r\nFoundation's 100 Resilient Cities program (2014-2019) provided a \r\ntwo-year salary for a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO) to be situated in \r\na municipal authority to bridge silos, incentivise change and develop \r\ndevelopment strategies for resilience (Bellinson and Chu, 2019; Spaans \r\nand Waterhout, 2017)"


id: 39e6794c0d2a40fdd6dff77970333501
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" In these cases, external actors have enabled \r\nbroad organisation change, resource mobilisation pathways and \r\nalternative forms of agenda-setting in cities (Chu, 2018; Hakelberg, \r\n2014) (see also Case Study 6.2, Semarang)."


id: 52749d08237baac54d326af7e011841c
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"Institutional change refers to processes that aim to shift existing \r\nnorms and practices within organisations to deliver more effective \r\naction for adaptation. Institutional change at the local level can be \r\nachieved with diverse strategies (Patterson, de Voogt and Sapiains, \r\n2019). Table  6.7 illustrates various instruments that enable the \r\ninstitutionalisation of climate adaptation concerns into policy and \r\nplanning. As Table  6.7 shows, institutional change is often used as \r\nsynonymous with mainstreaming. Both terms refer to the integration \r\nof climate adaptation concerns into other areas of work and as part of \r\npractical routines and arguments (Chu, Anguelovski and Carmin, 2016; \r\nStorbjork and Uggla, 2015; Runhaar et al., 2018; Uittenbroek et al., \r\n2014). Early assessments understood mainstreaming as activities \r\nthat integrate climate adaptation into long-range and sectoral plans \r\n(Anguelovski and Carmin, 2011; Aylett, 2015)"


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" Since then, efforts to \r\nmainstream climate adaptation have grown into agendas around \r\nthe community and economic development (Ayers et  al., 2014), \r\nclimate mitigation (Gopfert, Wamsler and Lang, 2019), spatial and \r\ninfrastructure planning (Anguelovski, Chu and Carmin, 2014), urban \r\nfinance (Musah-Surugu et  al., 2018; Keenan, Chu and Peterson, \r\n2019), public health (Araos et al., 2015), environmental management \r\n(Wamsler, 2015; Kabisch et al., 2016) and multi-level decision making \r\n(Ojea, 2015; Visseren-Hamakers, 2015). Such efforts require various \r\ndegrees of regulatory or programmatic action to integrate adaptation \r\nwith other concerns (Wamsler and Pauleit, 2016). However, institutional \r\nchange has a broader remit than mainstreaming adaptation, as it may \r\ninclude, for example, changing the organisations already dealing with \r\nclimate adaptation and make them more effective including changes \r\nin inputs, procedures and options (Patterson, de Voogt and Sapiains, \r\n2019)."


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"Cities can leverage input-driven institutional change even without \r\nnational support for climate change adaptation or mitigation. For \r\nexample, where cities have defined policymaking and budget raising \r\npowers, city level political leadership can support adaptation action \r\ngoing beyond national policy (Hamin, Gurran and Emlinger, 2014; \r\nShi, Chu and Debats, 2015; Carlson and McCormick, 2015). Examples \r\ninclude the Surat Climate Change Trust in Surat, India (Chu, 2016) and \r\nInitiative for Urban Climate Change and Environment in Semarang, \r\nIndonesia (Taylor and Lassa, 2015). In Saint Louis, Senegal, support \r\nfrom national and state-level actors enabled local institutional change \r\n(Vedeld et  al., 2016). Processual levers may be also mobilised in \r\nsituations of political instability (which disrupts patterns in champions \r\nand networks), clientelism (which can cause environmental projects \r\nto be discontinued) (Pasquini et al"


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", 2015) or in contexts where there \r\nare high political and socioeconomic inequalities (Harris, Chu and \r\nZiervogel, 2018; Chu, Anguelovski and Carmin, 2016)."


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"Output-driven institutional change is shaped by organisational \r\nproducts such as strategies, plans, policies and evaluative metrics \r\n(Patterson and Huitema, 2019; Bellinson and Chu, 2019) (See Table \r\n6.8). There are numerous examples of institutional change through \r\nplanning outcomes. For example, Manizales, Colombia has included \r\nclimate adaptation into long-established environmental policy \r\n(Biomanizales) and a local environmental action plan (Bioplan), which \r\nfollows on from a long coherent trajectory of climate change policy \r\n(Hardoy and Velasquez Barrero, 2014). A significant number of North \r\nAmerican cities have integrated adaptation into long-range plans, \r\nwhile fewer cities integrate adaptation in sustainable development \r\nplans or sectoral plans (Aylett, 2015). Canadian cities are more likely \r\nto have a plan specifically focused on adaptation rather than having \r\nadaptation integrated into municipal long-range planning (Aylett, \r\n2015)"


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" In the European Union, adaptation plans depended on national \r\nclimate legislation or, in fewer cases, the influence of an international \r\nclimate network (Reckien et  al., 2018b). A comparative report from \r\nthe Covenant of Mayors, however, suggests that the adaptation pillar \r\nneeds development to demonstrate the effectiveness of adaptation \r\nresponses and their integration with mitigation goals (Bertoldi et al., \r\n2020). Municipalities in Sweden have been called 'pre-reactive' because \r\nadequate strategic guidelines are in place to frame the accessibility, \r\naesthetics and adaptability of waterfront developments (Storbjork and "


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"A policy action gap arises when administrative, communication, \r\nfinancial and other organisational blockages and inertia interrupt \r\nimplementation of policy, the intent of political leadership and \r\ndelivery of adaptation interventions on the ground (Ampaire et  al., \r\n2017; Bell, 2018; Shi, 2019). Political and policy confidence are key \r\nenabling conditions for adaptation decision making. As the AR5 \r\nalready acknowledged, political inaction can arise where there is low \r\nconfidence that adaptation actions can deliver a safer future for all \r\n(Chan et al., 2015a). For example, in some administrative jurisdictions \r\n(most of them local governments), calls by social movements for \r\nthe adoption of Climate Emergency Declarations were addressed, \r\nhowever, practical outcomes in terms of adaptation have been limited, \r\nand may have foreclosed other future local actions (Nissen et  al"


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", \r\n2020; Ruiz Campillo, Castan Broto and Westman, 2020) and raised \r\nconcerns about maladaptation (Long and Rice, 2019). Political inaction \r\nfor climate justice is particularly visible in contexts of informality \r\n(Ziervogel, 2020). Studies of city and local authority decision-making \r\nin South America (Di Giulio et  al., 2019), Asia (Araos et  al., 2017) \r\nand Europe (Lesnikowski et  al., 2021) indicate that where there is "


id: 3de75b943641705788f15b4508ebfaf2
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"aligned with transformative efforts to address structural drivers of \r\nvulnerability (high confidence). For example, mainstream actions \r\nthat seek to advance other development objectives, as explained \r\nabove, may reduce adaptation to 'low-hanging fruits', which may \r\nmaintain business-as-usual practices without any fundamental \r\ntransformation of the social, institutional and economic systems that \r\ndrive vulnerabilities (Aylett, 2014). However, as explained above, \r\nmainstreaming can also generate wider processes of institutional \r\nchange (Section 6.4.2). Mainstream strategies may help to demonstrate \r\nhow policy and frameworks can produce practical outcomes on the \r\nground (Biesbroek and Delaney, 2020)"


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" However, previous experiences \r\nin other sectors, such as gender mainstreaming, have shown the \r\nlimitations of the mainstreaming approach, particularly in terms of \r\naddressing the structural drivers of inequality and vulnerability, and \r\nin achieving justice for those who suffer most (Moser, 2017). Local \r\ngovernments in particular, can link mainstreaming efforts with specific \r\nstrategies that support justice in adaptation, including redistribution \r\nefforts to address vulnerabilities (see Section  6.3.2), representation \r\nin local institution and deliberative processes, and recognition of the \r\nconditions for self-realisation, including personal and collective safety \r\n(Agyeman et al., 2016; Castan Broto and Westman, 2017; Castan Broto \r\nand Westman, 2019; Hess and McKane, 2021)."


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"Success in urban adaptation is most often understood as requiring \r\nmeasurable outcomes and evaluation (see also Section 6.4.6). However, \r\nmany adaptation outcomes are not measurable (medium evidence,\r\nmedium agreement) (Bene et  al., 2018). Adaptation action solely \r\nfocused on action tends to ignore areas in the city for which there is no \r\nexisting data even though actions in these areas may play an essential \r\nrole in shaping resilience and its limits. Informal settlements and \r\ninformal economies, which are integral in managing urban resources \r\nfor effective climate adaptation, are not routinely included in formal \r\nurban and national monitoring(Guibrunet and Castan Broto, 2016). The \r\nresulting understanding and monitoring of city needs, capacities and \r\nactions that feed into policy is incomplete. The innovation, as well as \r\nparticular concerns and capacities of the informal sector, which is often \r\nhighly gendered, are not always measured (Brown and McGranahan, \r\n2016)"


id: 9992580f7cc25f30ed5af03dc91ef0f
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" An emphasis on measurable adaptation outcomes may lead \r\nto prioritising techno-economic measures to adaptation at the local \r\nlevel. Technocratic approaches to environmental policy continue to \r\nshape local sustainability politics (Bulkeley, 2015). The deployment \r\nof such technocratic approaches at the local scale is detrimental for \r\ndemocratic and collaborative practices (Metzger and Lindblad, 2020). \r\nFor example, while China has received praise in terms of delivering \r\nurban policies that put climate change at its core, thus suggesting its \r\nrole providing leadership in climate change debates (Liu et al., 2014; \r\nWang and He, 2015; Fu and Zhang, 2017), other analyses suggest that \r\nprocesses of planning should take greater account of certain groups \r\nand interests (Westman and Broto, 2018). Urban sustainability policy \r\nmay, as a result, fail to deliver collaborative social and environmental \r\nobjectives, and this is maladaptive in terms of CRD."


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"Coordination of adaptation policy goals cuts across cities to integrate \r\nthem into international processes of climate policy formulation; \r\ncoordination in cities produces effective collective outcomes, \r\ncementation of common standards and methodologies for climate \r\naction (e.g., emission inventories) (high agreement, medium evidence) \r\n(Gordon and Johnson, 2017; Hsu and Rauber, 2021). A collective \r\nglobal response has become a significant concern in international \r\nclimate policy (Chan et al., 2015a). The UNFCCC has adopted a role as \r\nan orchestrator, including providing framework for city governments \r\n(Backstrand and Kuyper, 2017). Within cities, coordination can arise \r\nfrom active programming; for example, in Rotterdam and New York \r\nCity, local authorities adopted long-term objectives and conditions for \r\naction, bringing together a multiplicity of actors across sectors to orient \r\ncontributions, share knowledge and coordinate actions (Holscher\r\net  al., 2019)"


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" Where national politics is supportive, coordination \r\nbetween city and national government is an asset (Chan and Amling, \r\n2019; Inch, 2019). The use of social media and digital mechanisms for \r\ncoordination with public interest is ambiguous: in China, Weibo has \r\nfacilitated an expansion of public engagement, although it remains top \r\ndown and dominated by a few influencial actors (Liu and Zhao, 2017; \r\nYang and Stoddart, 2021). The pilot project #OurChangingClimate \r\nis one example of engaging youth with an understanding of their \r\ncommunities and their resilience or vulnerability to climate change \r\n(Napawan, Simpson and Snyder, 2017)."


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"Cooperative governance models provide insights for designing forms \r\nof participatory and collaborative planning through which communities \r\nand state actors can identify concrete actions and resources to improve \r\nservices and mitigate structural vulnerabilities to disasters (Castan \r\nBroto et al., 2015). Experiences of co-production of sanitation services \r\nshow how co-production may improve outcomes, while at the same \r\ntime opening up avenues for grassroots organisations to claim political \r\ninfluence (McGranahan and Mitlin, 2016). Co-production may change \r\ninstitutions in response to external interventions (Das, 2016). Although \r\nthere are drawbacks in terms of the extent to which co-production \r\ncan be used to legitimise unfair interventions within a given context, \r\nco-production may also be a tool for improving the accountability of \r\ndominant groups to vulnerable sectors of the population (Nastiti et al., \r\n2017). There are limitations to co-production"


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" The city of Barcelona, \r\nSpain, used co-production methodologies to develop the Barcelona \r\nClimate Plan. However, policymakers and civil servants were reluctant \r\nto use lay knowledge from participants and political deadlines \r\nconstrained the time dedicated to deliberation (Satorras et al., 2020)."


id: 7cc1229255bf2dcc7e78ab75f99ea12e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Since AR5, there has been a growing literature about the role of urban design, creating new opportunities for both incremental and \r\ntransformative adaptive responses to climate change (medium evidence, high agreement). For example, some of these creative design \r\napproaches compliment and extend regulatory and land use planning approaches such as form-based codes and established certifications \r\nsuch as Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design-Neighbourhood Design (LEED-ND) (Garde, 2018; Garde and Hoff, 2017) and the \r\nUSA's Sustainable Sites Initiative (SITES) (Valente, 2014). Emphasis on sufficiency has also influenced urban design, for example, with the \r\nmobilisation of 'doughnut' economics that emphasise both a social foundation and an environmental ceiling, for example Amsterdam \r\n(Raworth, 2017). However, such cases are rare, substantial public investment is often required (high confidence, high agreement) (see \r\nalso Section  6.4.7 on finance and insurance)"


id: 90eacea686757d4830b3960d5c8881c3
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" Other approaches underscore innovation and creativity, at the essence of which are \r\ncontext-specific interventions that draw on a compendium of urban design principles such as indeterminacy (to accommodate climate \r\nuncertainty), polyvalency and diversity, and harmony with nature (Dhar and Khirfan, 2017). Creative interventions include the daylighting \r\nof buried streams to create climate adaptive public realms (Khirfan et al., 2020; Khirfan, Mohtat and Peck, 2020). For example, the \r\ndemolition of a major expressway and the restoration of the Cheonggyecheon Stream reorganised downtown Seoul, South Korea, and \r\nsignificantly contributed to climate change adaptation through stormwater management and reducing the urban heat island effect \r\n(Kim and Jung, 2019). Biomimicry and ecological infrastructure are design features that governance bodies can use to reshape space \r\nand contribute to place making (Santos Nouri and Costa, 2017; Prior et al., 2018)"


id: a2a78aaa094787bed4fd19a81b97c613
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" For example, urban metabolism and local ecological \r\nknowledge has constituted the essence of urban design interventions on the Island of Tobago in ways that capitalise on the contiguous \r\nrelationship between ecosystems (e.g., the mangrove forest) and human actions (rainwater harvesting and grey water management) \r\n(Khirfan and Zhang, 2016). While lack of funding or design capacity, restrictive planning regulations, inequality and competing urban \r\nagendas can create barriers for the implementation of creative design solutions. Transition architecture movements are also driving local \r\nurban adaptation experiments and exploring ways local learning can be scaled up (Tubridy, 2020; Irwin, 2019)."


id: b854dbec714fdb6e20a3aab4fab9fffb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
"to occur if people have the agency to influence decisions and enact \r\nchange (Archer and Dodman, 2015). Cities are also more likely to build \r\nand develop infrastructure that serves the needs of disadvantaged \r\ngroups when urban climate governance encourages wider community \r\nparticipation and inclusion (Ziervogel, 2019a; Holscher et  al., 2019; \r\nAnguelovski et al., 2016). This can help to stimulate innovation, shift \r\npower relations and address diverse needs (Martel and Sutherland, \r\n2019; Chu, Schenk and Patterson, 2018)"


id: 62d8c28794cca7e011c6e1ace715fc37
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" Experiments in including \r\nmarginalised groups in adaptation planning are starting to emerge in \r\nplaces such as Quito (Ecuador), Lima (Peru), Manizales (Colombia) and \r\nSurat (India), where disadvantaged youth, informal settlers and other \r\nvulnerable communities are included in discussions of short-/long-term \r\nadaptation needs and fair distribution of adaptation resources (Chu, \r\nAnguelovski and Carmin, 2016; Sara, Pfeffer and Baud, 2017; Hardoy \r\nand Velasquez Barrero, 2014). These processes can also support \r\ncitizens to manage risks as they encounter them in their everyday life \r\n(Ziervogel et al., 2017)."


id: a92091842078f9df64313e7651276535
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"The failure to deliver inclusive and sustainable adaptation contributes \r\nto a collective inability to mobilise the power of creative community \r\nvision (medium evidence, high agreement). Urban design plays a \r\ncentral role to support creative adaptation strategies (Box 6.7). Much \r\nadaptation action repeats previous experiences. However, the potential \r\nfor building resilience to deliver adaptation, especially transformative \r\nadaptation, requires an articulation of collective visions of the future \r\nand the imagination of new or alternative urban futures (Glaas et al., \r\n2018), including through design and deliberate engagement with \r\ncultural artefacts, technologies and performances (Jordan, 2020). Social \r\nmovements can be powerful sources of such alternative visions of the \r\nfuture, as exemplified by recent Youth Climate Strikes and Extinction \r\nRebellion (limited evidence, medium agreement)"


id: ebbb6a14b14c11c4057170742735e65e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" Community \r\nprotest such as Youth Climate Strikes have influenced urban climate \r\npolicy agendas including the declaration of climate emergency in \r\nmunicipalities worldwide, fostering a new debate on climate change, \r\nalthough their impact on local policy is ambiguous (Davidson et al., \r\n2020; Thomas, Cretney and Hayward, 2019; Prendergast et al., 2021; \r\nRuiz Campillo, Castan Broto and Westman, 2020). Social movements \r\non climate mitigation, such as the Transition Movement and Transition \r\nTowns (Feola and Nunes, 2014), and school strikes may serve as an \r\nexample for mobilisations more specifically about climate adaptation \r\nand the way new, networked, grassroots citizen activism and \r\ncommunity organisations can encourage urban institutional change \r\n(Gunningham, 2019; Jordan et al., 2018; Wahlstrom et al., 2019). Other \r\nstrategies such as cultural production and exhibitions may also have \r\nan impact (Stripple, Nikoleris and Hildingsson, 2021)."


id: 3841a75126684244f22f125b13e3e6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Table 6.9 presents a defined framework of ideas that local institutions, \r\nmostly local governments, can put into practice to improve their \r\nadaptive capacity. Enabling transformative capacity requires novel \r\ngovernance arrangements based on broad participation, a diversity of \r\nactor networks, socially embedded leadership and empowerment of \r\ncommunities, alongside an understanding of the system dynamics, which \r\nrefers to system awareness, collective visions, practical experimentation, \r\nreflexivity, capacity building, institutional mainstreaming and the \r\nmultiple levels of agency or scales (Ziervogel, Cowen and Ziniades, \r\n2016; Ziervogel, 2019a; Wolfram, 2019; Holscher and Frantzeskaki, \r\n2020; Castan Broto et al., 2018). Many of the transformative capacity \r\ncomponents are already visible in local adaptation actions, but many \r\nefforts emphasise one element at the expense of others without \r\ndelivering a systemic perspective"


id: b39c5304f0697999a369ca9d85a987ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" In particular, measures to facilitate \r\nthe empowerment of communities, reflexivity and social learning are \r\nrare but often point toward heightened capacities for transformative, \r\nalongside incremental, adaptation (Castan Broto et  al., 2018). \r\nTransformative capacity frameworks may foster inclusive governance \r\nto deliver risk management that works for the poor in countries such \r\nas South Africa (Ziervogel, 2019a)."


id: b421a5ae3ca604c6e2857543f52382c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"In delivering adaptation in cities, settlements and infrastructure, \r\nhowever, there is a need to understand and measure the adaptive \r\ncapacity and limits to manage future risks in communities, institutions \r\nand organisations (Filho et al., 2019). However efforts to track urban \r\nadaptation lack consistent methods, metrics and data gathering \r\n(Olazabal et al., 2019b). The scale of complex, cascading challenges, \r\nlimited finance and governance capacity, combined with the impacts \r\nof growing social inequality and sustainable development priorities \r\ncan result in both soft and hard limits on cities government's capacity \r\nto adapt to climate change (Chanza, 2018; Sanchez Rodriguez, \r\nUrge-Vorsatz and Barau, 2018; Lehmann et al., 2015; Di Giulio et al., \r\n2018). Hard limits to adaptation are identified when it is unfeasible \r\nto avoid severe risks, while soft limits exist when technological and \r\nsocioeconomic options are not immediately deployable (IPCC, 2014)"


id: 796864fdbd751058348c03749ca73df4
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" \r\nIn urban contexts, soft limits may become hard limits when large \r\nnumbers of people are unable to avoid severe climate-related risks \r\nof loss and damage (Mechler et  al., 2020). Climate change-related \r\nloss and damage that are intangible also require more caution in \r\nassessment processes (Roberts and Pelling, 2018; Andrei et al., 2015; \r\nBarnett et  al., 2016; Thomas and Benjamin, 2018). Incorporating \r\nIndigenous knowledge can identify people-oriented and place-specific \r\nscenarios, leading to development of urban adaptation policies that \r\nfoster identity, dignity, self-determination and better collective decision \r\nmaking/capacity to act (McShane, 2017; Preston, 2017), and are also \r\nsensitive to the local context and limits of community adaptation \r\n(Makondo and Thomas, 2018)."


id: 49a70fe354ebadd1d11f3a7739d9d65b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Urban transformations represent forms of adaptation that challenge \r\nthe principles in which a society is established (Pelling, O'Brien and \r\nMatyas, 2015) and can be deployed to go beyond the existing limits \r\nof development justice and climate change adaptation capacity. While \r\nnot all adaptation will be transformative, transformative capacities \r\nsupport both ongoing adaptation efforts and the broader systemic \r\nchange processes that align adaptation efforts with decarbonisation \r\nrequirements and the delivery of SDGs. 'Urban transformative capacity' \r\nfocuses on understanding what elements of a system to respond to \r\nexternal changing conditions in a manner that transforms the system \r\ntoward a more sustainable state (Ziervogel, Cowen and Ziniades, \r\n2016)"


id: 4c18799b02a9dfbfbef14146046605dd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" The capacities required to deliver adaptation action in cities and \r\nsettlements are 'transformative capacities', because they move away \r\nfrom thinking of adaptation as an adjustment to a changing external \r\nenvironment to think instead of it as a reconfiguration of infrastructures \r\nand institutions to build resilience in the surrounding environment \r\n(Pelling, 2010; Matyas and Pelling, 2015). Reflective and iterative \r\nlearning is integral to fostering transformative capacity (c.f. Luederitz\r\net al., 2017). Transformative capacity extends across multiple agency \r\nlevels or geographical locations, as well as various domains (Wilson\r\net al., 2013; Olsson, Bodin and Folke, 2010; Keeler et al., 2019b). The \r\ncomponents of transformative capacity in cities and settlements can be \r\ngrouped into three categories (see Table 6.9): (1) agency and forms of \r\ninteraction, (2) development processes and (3) relational dimensions \r\n(Wolfram, 2016)"


id: 4ca932cc58234b0d60408d602f71a7a0
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" Alongside different forms of technical expertise, there \r\nis a need to broaden the interventions of disadvantaged populations in \r\nurban sustainability (Wolfram, Borgstrom and Farrelly, 2019)."


id: c9c20834f4d4ec989c749738f9c5cb99
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"However, investments in ex ante urban climate adaptation may prove \r\nless attractive to these financiers than other opportunities because of \r\ntheir long maturities and high risk (Keenan, Chu and Peterson, 2019) \r\n(see also Table  6.11). Many generate economic returns primarily \r\nthrough avoided losses from climate impacts, which are difficult \r\nto measure and are, in any case, more attractive to funders than \r\nfinanciers (Kaufman, 2014). Ex post, insurance already plays a critical \r\nrole in protecting urban households, firms and other stakeholders \r\nfrom the full economic costs of high-severity, low-frequency events \r\nby sharing risk over time and space. Insurance can also be designed to \r\nincentivise risk-reducing behaviours and investments (Banhalmi-Zakar\r\net  al., 2016; Paddam and Wong, 2017). Some researchers suggest \r\nthat, in urban environments, insurance practices are helping to \r\nestablish adaptation and risk as a new area of public health and \r\npublic protection"


id: 9a19909f5c8c209d094f5923e3b0779
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" For example, local governments are using new risk \r\ntransfer instruments, such as re-insurance and catastrophe bonds, to \r\nfund investments in resilience projects and disaster recovery (Collier \r\nand Cox, 2021). However, the commercial feasibility of private sector \r\ninsurance depends on more robust estimates of current and future \r\nrisks, and premiums commensurate with the ability and willingness of \r\nconsumers to pay. Therefore, ex ante investments must complement \r\ninsurance schemes to improve climate modelling and reduce climate \r\nrisk (Surminski, Bouwer and Linnerooth-Bayer, 2016). The private sector \r\nalso faces practical barriers to invest in adaptation."


id: 8d6ca29c72fbf88f0247f6c4434fad79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Since the 1960s, gross capital formation (sometimes called Gross domestic investment) has been less than 22% in Africa, whilst in East \r\nAsian countries, it has risen to 42% (OECD, 2016). Africa faces an estimated 40% infrastructure financing gap, but this gap is almost \r\ncertainly higher in the continent's rapidly growing cities (Baker and McKenzie, 2015). Relative poverty, weak or absent local fiscal \r\nsystems, and contested tenure that prevents land being used as collateral, have restricted investment in African cities (Berrisford, Cirolia \r\nand Palmer, 2018; Dodman et al., 2017). Sub-Saharan African countries are reaching the 40% urban threshold at national per capita \r\nincomes of around USD 1000 per annum, significantly poorer than South-East Asian and Latin American cities at the same level of \r\nurbanisation (Freire, Lall and Leipziger, 2014)"


id: b2046cb9ac2a7374d314808ea38d6852
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" Absolute poverty, in conjunction with weak revenue collection and low levels of investment, \r\nrender conventional infrastructure finance difficult (Smolka, 2013; Global Commission on Economy and Climate, 2017; Berrisford, Cirolia \r\nand Palmer, 2018; Cirolia and Mizes, 2019). Sprawled urban development in Africa might make the provision of public services both more \r\nenergy intensive and three times more expensive than high-density developments (Collier and Venables, 2016)."


id: 1fd7936d1945081454ec79a0290cbdf0
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"Corruption in urban adaptation and disaster risk management finance \r\nis a considerable but little researched challenge observed from all world \r\nregions (Sanderson et al., 2021). Corruption generates maladaptation, \r\nincreasing risk, for example where infrastructure is constructed with \r\nfaulty design, substandard materials and inadequate maintenance \r\n(Kabir et al., 2021). More widely, corruption increases vulnerability \r\nand reduces capacity by damaging the body politic, distorting markets \r\nand reducing economic growth (Alexander, 2017). The construction \r\nand infrastructure industries are repeatedly identified as sources of \r\ncorruption (GIACC, 2020; Chan and Owusu, 2017; Sanderson et al., \r\n2021). Corruption and misuse of climate finance is exacerbated \r\nby limited public access to information, political considerations in \r\nfinance decision making and lack of accountability for decisions and \r\nactions (Kabir et al., 2021). In construction, Owusu et al"


id: 3909682e9a841fef6f3a9d7906859934
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" (2019) found \r\ncauses included too-close relationships, poor professional ethical \r\nstandards, negative industrial and working conditions, negative \r\nrole models and inadequate sanctions throughout the phases of \r\nconstruction. Post-disaster response and reconstruction, and periods \r\nof surge funding following international or national policy priorities \r\nare especially vulnerable to corruption, with increased funding and \r\npressure to lower norms of financial management (Imperiale and \r\nVanclay, 2021). Mixed delivery mechanisms have been shown to \r\nreduce corruption, for example where civil society organisations \r\nare involved in project approval stages, although there is also a risk \r\nthat civil society organisations will themselves become entangled \r\nin corruption"


id: b207ebd4e3950363f22b9bdacea476db
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" International donors have a role to play in working \r\nwith government and civil society to promote wider scrutiny and \r\ntransparency of financing processes and project delivery through \r\npromoting media and press freedom and legislation for access to \r\ninformation to reduce corruption by enhancing transparency and \r\naccountability (Kabir et al., 2021)."


id: e47182d8955673d45d850da578fe3b50
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"The challenges related to the evaluation of adaptation progress (lack of \r\nmethods, agreed metrics, data and definitions, including the ambiguity \r\nof the concept of 'adaptation') have been widely recognised after \r\nthe Paris Agreement by multiple organisations, including the OECD, \r\nthe World Bank, the European Environment Agency and the Global \r\nEnvironment Facility (Ford et al., 2015; Magnan, 2016; Bours, McGinn \r\nand Pringle, 2014). Monitoring and evaluation systems in urban areas \r\nwill necessarily be incremental and additive, and will have to build on \r\nexisting indicator systems (Solecki and Rosenzweig, 2020). There is a \r\nneed to develop practical and efficient frameworks to assess adaptation \r\nprogress across all levels of public and private decision making"


id: 54a88c76441e6d236af615b6c89a0576
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" \r\nThis should include the assessment and consideration of top-down \r\nadaptations alongside informal, bottom-up community actions, or \r\ncorporate-led programmes developed to reduce vulnerabilities and \r\nclimatic risks and increase resilience (high confidence, high agreement)."


id: 48306ec359893f0068b18c73f0c46f63
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"The IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report acknowledged the lack of standard \r\nmetrics to measure and monitor success in urban adaptation and \r\nsuggested a list of indicators that could be developed, while also taking \r\nnote of the localised nature of adaptation (see also (Rufat et al., 2015)). \r\nHowever, predominant approaches are typically not conducted at the \r\nappropriate scale to inform adaptation decision-making (Ford et al., \r\n2018). While some scholars advocate the use of a unifying indicator of \r\nsocial vulnerability (Spielman et al., 2020), others propose to develop \r\nflexible sets of comparable indicators that can be adjusted to different \r\ncontexts (Leiter et al., 2019). Risk-based approaches are seen as an \r\nalternative in a context where the monitoring of decision-relevant \r\nvariables in urban climate adaptation planning is essential to link \r\nclimatic risk assessment and action (Hallegatte and Engle, 2019; \r\nKingsborough, Borgomeo and Hall, 2016; McDermott and Surminski, \r\n2018)"


id: df645687073b4636d0e90ce0f7bea605
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" Because of the need to define normative frameworks for risk \r\nevaluation, what is acceptable, for what purpose and for how long \r\n(Galarraga et al., 2018), these approaches may offer an opportunity \r\nfor the generation of a shared understanding on goals and limitations \r\nof adaptation (McDermott and Surminski, 2018). However, risk-based \r\nindicators may also create a bias toward quantifiable variables that \r\ntend to be based on climatic modelling outputs, engineering or \r\nfinancial assessments. Based on this and various examples of urban \r\ndevelopment projects, Hallegatte and Engle (2019) claim it is important \r\nto consider output-based indicators and process-based indicators that \r\ntalk about government, voice and empowerment. Overall, dozens of \r\nindicator-based approaches to assess climate adaptation have been \r\nproposed across the scientific and policy literature, especially in the \r\nbroader framework of (community) resilience assessment tools (Sharifi, \r\n2016; Feldmeyer et al"


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", 2019), and in different sectors, for example the \r\nclimate benefits of NBS (Kabisch et  al., 2016; Donatti et  al., 2020). \r\nAlthough these efforts may help to mainstream the evaluation of \r\nadaptation in current city evaluation initiatives, the development of \r\ncomprehensive monitoring and evaluation systems is lacking."


id: 78039c46bee374ff59e95247bc51de9f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Transformation is often approached as a process of institutional \r\ntransformation, akin to the process described in Section 6.4.2 (see, for \r\nexample, Duijn and van Buuren, 2017). Transformation engages with \r\ncritiques of adaptation or risk reduction as an individual responsibility \r\n(Sou, 2018). The idea is to use transformation to focus on coordinating \r\ncollective efforts (Haque et al, 2014). The coordination of multiple \r\nactors is a condition to enable transformative institutions (Torabi et \r\nal, 2018) and link adaptation action to development efforts (Chu et \r\nal, 2017; Roberts and O'Donoghue, 2013). The role of communities \r\nand citizens in such an approach to transformation is ambiguous. \r\nSometimes communities and citizens are presented as critical agents of \r\ntransformation (Limthongsakul et al, 2017). Other times, however, they \r\nare simply situated within strong and durable networks that provide \r\nthe institutional setting to build resilience (Daniere et al., 2016)"


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" Despite \r\nthe political nature of transformative approaches and the evidence that \r\ntransformative approaches rely on protest and political activism, few \r\nauthors recognise this strategy (but see Bahadur and Tanner, 2014; Chu, \r\nAnguelovski and Roberts, 2017; Dierwechter and Wessells, 2013)."


id: bf27c3068019d1c6c83658f27558348d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Transformation is also more than a single instance of institutional \r\nchange. Historical perspectives on transformation enable an \r\nunderstanding of the chain of institutional changes that ultimately \r\nlead to significant or far-reaching reconfiguration of infrastructure \r\nand service provision (Rojas et al, 2015). Paradigm changes, such as \r\nnew engagements with nature and green infrastructure, will improve \r\nadaptation outcomes (Roberts et  al., 2012). Changes of paradigms, \r\nhowever, are not inherently positive and may clash with existing \r\ninterests or involve trade-offs with other priorities. When care is taken \r\nto ensure greater inclusion in urban decision-making, disadvantaged, \r\nvulnerable communities are less likely to be disadvantaged"


id: c4f5302ffa390af34ce5e843f59d494d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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content:
" For \r\nexample, indigenous traditions of nature management provide entry \r\npoints for the sustainable management of resources, such as seed \r\nbanks, urban agriculture and the local management of watersheds \r\nand floods, may be at odds with conventional structures of expert \r\nknowledge (Cid-Aguayo, 2016; Chandra and Gaganis, 2016). These \r\ntraditions are vital both because of the solution space that they open \r\nin the local context and how they serve to create resilience through \r\ncollective and intergenerational learning (Chandra and Gaganis, 2016)."


id: 39e61861e24f80078b6ecd19495f79e9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6482
content:
"There is little evidence on how best to make monitoring and evaluation \r\napproaches practical at the local scale. Cities worldwide face important \r\nsocial, environmental and economic conflicts related to resource \r\ninequality, poverty, environmental pollution and social tensions that \r\ncoexist with climatic risks. It makes sense to integrate climate change \r\nadaptation assessment goals and needs into existing frameworks for \r\nthe sake of efficiency. This will benefit small urban areas and cities \r\nin developing regions that often face data scarcity and may also find \r\navailable indicators irrelevant to their realities and, thus, be required \r\nto adjust them (Simon et al., 2016). Efforts to coordinate frameworks \r\nfor the assessment of sustainability (e.g., Local Agenda, sustainability \r\nappraisals), resilience (e.g., 100 Resilient Cities, new standards for \r\nurban resilience), greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reporting (e.g"


