# document

id: 764ccb091031b7020bc9954ebd11804a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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" Moreover, even \r\na  correct assessment of risk, which could provide incentives for \r\ndivesting from carbon-intensive activities, does not necessarily lead \r\nto investing in the technical options needed for deep decarbonisation. \r\nTherefore, understanding the dynamics of the low-carbon transition \r\nrequire to fill in at the same time gaps about risk and gaps about \r\ninvestments in enabling activities in a broader sense."


id: 88cbc0cfbb7cee6386956002db040be
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"remain uncertain until it suddenly unravels. Note also that, in order \r\nto be relevant for financial risk, the disorderly transition does not \r\nneed to be a catastrophic scenario in terms of the fabric of markets. It \r\nalso does not automatically entail systemic risk, as discussed below"


id: c642b65344d7b28388ffe286c711b97
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" In the following we review some \r\nof the findings from the literature, but the field is relatively young \r\nand many of the questions are still open.12 Damages from climate \r\nchange are expected to escalate dramatically in Europe (Forzieri \r\net al. 2018) and in some EU countries there is already some evidence \r\nthat banks, anticipating possible losses on the their loan books, lend \r\nproportionally less as a consequence."


id: 3fd5da55932e59aff2bfd9276b6eb957
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"The concepts of carbon stranded assets (see e.g., Leaton and Sussams \r\n2011), and orderly vs disorderly transition (Sussams et al. 2015) which \r\nemerged in the NGO community, have provided powerful metaphors \r\nto conceptualise transition risks and have evolved into concepts \r\nused also by financial supervisors (NGFS 2019)and academics. The \r\nterm carbon stranded assets refers to fossil fuel-related assets (fuel \r\nor equipment) that become unproductive. An orderly transition \r\nis defined here as a situation in which market players are able to \r\nfully anticipate the price adjustments that could arise from the \r\ntransition. In this case, there would still be losses associated with \r\nstranded assets, but it would be possible for market players to spread \r\nlosses over time and plan ahead. In contrast, a disorderly transition \r\nis defined here as a situation in which a transition to a low-carbon \r\neconomy on a  2degC path is achieved (i.e"


id: fd49728f199e737d1fa07f11bdc4d214
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",  by about 2040), but the \r\nimpact of climate policies in terms of reallocation of capital into \r\nlow-carbon activities and the corresponding adjustment in prices of \r\nfinancial assets (e.g., bonds and equity shares) is large, sudden and \r\nnot fully anticipated by market players and investors. Note the impact \r\ncould be unanticipated even if the date of the introduction is known \r\nin advance by the market players. There are several reasons why such \r\nadjustments could occur. One simple argument is that the political \r\neconomy of the transition is characterised by forces pulling in \r\ndifferent directions, including opposing interests within the industry, \r\nand mounting pressure from social awareness of unmitigated climate \r\nrisks. Politics will have to find a  synthesis and the outcome could "


id: 92cd159c030db753179b89009295ea03
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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"Assessment of physical risk. There is a literature on estimates of \r\neconomic losses on physical assets (see Cross-Working Group Box \r\nECONOMIC in chapter 16 of AR6 WGII). Here we discuss some figures \r\nand mechanisms that are relevant for the financial system. Significant \r\ncost increases have been observed related to increases in frequency \r\nand magnitude of extreme events (high confidence) (Section 15.4.2). \r\nAt the global level, the expected 'climate value at risk' (climate \r\nVaR) of financial assets has been estimated to be 1.8% along \r\na business-as-usual emissions path (Dietz et al. 2016), with however, \r\na concentration of risk in the tail (e.g., 99th VaR equals to 16.9%, or \r\nUSD24.213 trillion, in 2016). Climate-related impacts are estimated \r\nto increase the frequency of banking crises (up over 200% across \r\nscenarios) while rescuing insolvent banks could increase the ratio of \r\npublic debt to gross domestic product by a factor of two (Lamperti \r\net al. 2019)"


id: 32cbb244bec3fa34f1da31e771d62cd9
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" Further assessments of physical risk for financial assets \r\n(Mandel 2020), accounting in particular for the propagation of losses \r\nthrough financial networks, estimate global yearly GDP losses at \r\n7.1% (1.13%) in 2080, without adaptation (with adaptation), the \r\nformer corresponding to a 10-fold increase with respect to the current \r\nyearly losses (0.76% of global GDP). Finally, climate physical risk can \r\nimpact on the value of sovereign bonds (one of the top asset classes \r\nby size), in particular for vulnerable countries (Volz et al. 2020)."


id: c77ee0b4d891d4f7e31498e29f07ee8b
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"that could be affected (Monasterolo 2020). This, in turn depends \r\non their direct or indirect role in the GHG value chain, their level of \r\nsubstitutability with respect to fossil fuel and their role in the policy \r\nlandscape. Moreover, such a classification needs to be replicable and \r\ncomparable across portfolios and jurisdictions. One classification that \r\nmeets these criteria is the Climate Policy Relevant Sectors (CPRS) \r\n(Battiston et  al. 2017) which has been used in several studies by \r\nfinancial supervisors (EIOPA 2018; ECB 2019; EBA 2020; ESMA 2020). \r\nThe CPRS classification builds on the international classification of \r\neconomic activities (ISIC) to map the most granular level (4 digits) \r\ninto a  small set of categories characterised by differing types of \r\nrisk: fossil fuel (i.e"


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", all activities whose revenues depend mostly and \r\ndirectly on fossil fuel, including concession of reserves and operating \r\nindustrial plants for extraction and refinement); electricity (affected in \r\nterms of input but that can in principle diversify their energy sources); \r\nenergy intensive (e.g., steel or cement production plants, automotive \r\nmanufacturing plants), which are affected in terms of energy cost \r\nbut not in terms of the main input); and transport and buildings \r\n(affected in terms of both energy sources and specific policies). All \r\nfinancial assets (e.g., bonds, equity shares, loans) having as issuers \r\nor counterparties firms whose revenues depend significantly on the \r\nabove activities are thus potentially exposed to transition risks and \r\nopportunities"


id: 182aa350b93b0d79b3d4bc29f7e5535d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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" Further, investors' portfolios have to be part of the \r\nanalysis since changes in financial assets values affect the stability \r\nof financial institutions and can thus feed back into the transition \r\ndynamics itself (e.g., through cost of debt for firms and through costs \r\nfor assisting the financial sector). One outstanding challenge for the \r\nanalysis of investors' exposure to climate risks is the difficulty of \r\ngathering granular and standardised information on the breakdown \r\nof non-financial firms' revenues and CAPEX in terms of low-/high\u0002carbon activities (high confidence)."


id: 523b865ae62ce761225512cd83f1e572
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"major catastrophes (such as in 2018 with hurricanes Harvey, Irma, \r\nand Maria). This trend is expected to continue. The indirect costs of \r\na climate-related flooding event can be up to 50% of the total costs, \r\nthe majority of which is not covered by insurance (Alnes et al. 2018) \r\n(Section15.6.4). The gap between total damage losses and insurance \r\npay-outs has increased over the past 10 years (Swiss Re Institute \r\n2019). Indeed, the probability of 'extreme but plausible' scenarios \r\nwill be progressively revised upwards in the 'value at risk'. As a result \r\nit becomes more difficult to find financial actors willing to provide \r\ninsurance, as was observed for real estate in relation to flood and \r\nwildfires in California (Ouazad and Kahn 2019)"


id: 62c3201c56ceea2f464d884d0746eb15
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" This progressive \r\nadjustment would keep the financial system safe (Climate-Related \r\nMarket Risk Subcommittee 2020; Keenan and Bradt 2020), but \r\ntransfer to taxpayers the onus of damage compensation and the \r\nfinancing of adaptation investments (OECD 2021c) as well as build \r\nup latent liabilities."


id: c5e50d66a5597ca59895ea0551c93b8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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"Assessment of transition risk. Carbon stranded assets. Fossil \r\nfuel reserve and resource estimates exceed in equivalent quantity \r\nof CO2 with virtual certainty the carbon budget available to reach \r\nthe 1.5degC and 2degC targets (high confidence) (Meinshausen et  al. \r\n2009; McGlade and Ekins 2015; Millar et  al. 2017). In relative \r\nterms, stranded assets of fossil fuel companies amount to 82% \r\nof global coal reserves, 49%  of global gas reserves and 33% of \r\nglobal oil reserves (McGlade and Ekins 2015). This suggests that \r\nonly less than the whole quantity of fossil fuels currently valued \r\n(either currently extracted, waiting for extraction as reserves or \r\nassets on company balance sheets) can yield economic return if \r\nthe carbon budget is respected. The devaluation of fossil fuel assets \r\nimplies financial losses for both the public sector (Section 15.6.8) \r\nand the private sector (Coffin and Grant 2019)"


id: e56dbb086533e625b985e3babaac05eb
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" Global estimates \r\nof potential stranded fossil fuel assets amount to at least 1 trillion, \r\nbased on ongoing low-carbon technology trends and in the \r\nabsence of climate policies (cumulated to 2035 with 10% discount \r\nrate applied; USD8  trillion without discounting (Mercure et  al. \r\n2018a)). With worldwide climate policies to achieve the 2degC target \r\nwith 75% likelihood, this could increase to over USD4 trillion (until \r\n2035, 10% discount rate; USD12 trillion without discounting). \r\nOther estimates indicate USD8-15 trillion (until 2050, 5% discount \r\nrate, (Bauer et al. 2015)) and USD185 trillion (cumulated to year \r\n2115 using combined social and private discount rate (Linquiti and \r\nCogswell 2016)). However the geographical distribution of potential \r\nstranded fossil fuel assets (also called 'unburnable carbon') is \r\nnot even across the world due to differences in production costs \r\n(McGlade and Ekins 2015)"


id: beed6765f4bda4955d6c2eba3168f35b
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" In this context, a delayed deployment of \r\nclimate finance and consequently limited alignment of investment \r\nactivity with the Paris Agreement tend to strengthen carbon and \r\nthus to increase the magnitude of stranded assets."


id: b1691f9b6a1c479e4761b92cdb00d96
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"Several financial supervisors have conducted assessments of \r\ntransition risk for the financial system at the regional level. For \r\ninstance, the European Central Bank (ECB) reported preliminary \r\nestimates of aggregate exposures of financial institutions to CPRS \r\nrelative to their total debt securities holdings as ranging between \r\n1% for banks to about 9% for investment funds (ECB 2019). The \r\nEuropean Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) \r\nreported aggregate exposures to CPRS of EU insurance companies \r\nat about 13% of their total securities holdings (EIOPA 2018). \r\nFurther analyses on the EU securities holdings indicate that among \r\nfinancial investments in bonds issued by non-financial corporations, \r\nEU institutions hold exposures to CPRS ranging between 36.8% for \r\ninvestment funds to 47.7% for insurance corporations; analogous \r\nfigures for equity holdings range from 36.4% for banks to 43.1% for \r\npension funds (Alessi et al. 2019)"


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" Another study indicates that losses \r\non EU insurance portfolios of sovereign bonds could reach up to 1%, \r\nin conservative scenarios (Battiston et al. 2019)."


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"Some financial authorities recognise that climate change represents \r\na major source of systemic risk, particularly for banks with portfolios \r\nconcentrated in certain economic sectors or geographical areas \r\n(de Guindos 2021). Specifically, the concern that central banks would \r\nhave to act as 'climate rescuers of last resort' in a systemic financial \r\ncrisis stemming from some combination of physical and transition \r\nrisk has been raised in the financial supervisor community (Bolton \r\net al. 2020). The systemic nature of climate risk is reinforced by the \r\npossible presence of moral hazard. Indeed, if a  sufficient number \r\nof financial actors have an incentive to downplay climate-related \r\nfinancial risk, then systemic risk builds up in the financial system, \r\neventually materialising for taxpayers (Climate-Related Market Risk \r\nSubcommittee 2020)"


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" While such type of risk may go undetected to \r\nstandard market indicators for a while, it can materialise with a time \r\ndelay, similarly to the developments observed in the run up to the \r\n2008 financial crisis."


id: fddfa04b8c16218cf2880da3ec43c097
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"Challenges for climate transition scenarios. The endogeneity of \r\nrisk and its associated deep uncertainty implies that the standard \r\napproach to financial risk, consisting of computing expected \r\nvalues and risk based on historical values of market prices, is not \r\nadequate for climate risk (high confidence) (Bolton et  al. 2020). \r\nTo address this challenge, a  recent stream of work has developed \r\nan approach to make use of climate policy scenarios to derive risk \r\nmeasures (e.g., expected shortfall) for financial assets and portfolios, \r\nconditioned to scenarios of disorderly transition (Battiston et al. 2017; \r\nMonasterolo and Battiston 2020; Roncoroni et al. 2020). In particular, \r\nclimate policy shocks on the output of low-/high-carbon economic \r\nactivities are calculated based on trajectories of energy technologies \r\nas provided by large-scale Integrated Assessment Models (Kriegler \r\net al. 2015; McCollum et al"


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" 2018) conditioned to the introduction of \r\nspecific climate policies over time. This approach allows to conduct \r\nclimate stress-tests both at the level of financial institutions and at \r\nthe level of the financial system of a given jurisdiction."


id: 1aaa921afa2f703dfceb8002f43a376
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"In a  similar spirit, recently, the community of financial supervisors \r\nin collaboration with the community of climate economics has \r\nidentified a set of climate policy scenarios, based on large-scale IAM, \r\nas candidate scenarios for assessing transition risk (Monasterolo \r\nand Battiston 2020). These scenarios have been used, for instance, \r\nin an assessment of transition risk conducted at a national central \r\nbank (Allen et al. 2020). This development is key to mainstreaming \r\nthe assessment of transition risk among financial institutions, but the \r\nfollowing challenges emerge (high confidence). First, a  consensus \r\namong financial supervisors and actors on scenarios of transition \r\nrisk that are too mild could lead to a  systematic underestimation \r\nof risk"


id: f96698468a1370d0579e9cadea969128
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" The reason is that the default probability of leveraged \r\nfinancial institutions is sensitive to errors in the estimation of the \r\nloss distribution and hence sensitive on the choice of transition \r\nscenarios (Battiston and Monasterolo 2020). This in turn could \r\nlead to an allocation of capital across low-/high-carbon activities \r\nthat is insufficient to cater for the investment needs of the low\u0002carbon transition."


id: 59fc86ba64ef007417de6f6582bc87b2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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"Endogeneity of risk and multiplicity of scenarios. One \r\nfundamental challenge is that climate-related financial risk is \r\nendogenous (high confidence). This means that the perception of \r\nthe risk changes the risk itself, unlike most contexts of financial \r\nrisk. Indeed, transition risk depends on whether governments and \r\nfirms continue on a business-as-usual pathway (i.e., misaligned with \r\nthe Paris Agreement targets) or engage on a  climate mitigation \r\npathway. But the realisation of the transition pathway depends \r\nitself on how, collectively, society, including financial investors and \r\nsupervisors, perceive the risk of taking or not taking the transition \r\nscenario. The circularity between perception of risk and realisation \r\nof the scenario implies that multiple scenarios are possible, and that \r\nwhich scenario is ultimately realised can depend on policy action. The \r\ncoordination problem associated also with low-carbon investments \r\nopportunities increases the uncertainty"


id: 5985edc4c35d6cc6499bf6f352e16741
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" Further, not all low-carbon \r\nactivities are directly functional to the transition (e.g., investments in \r\npharmaceutical, IT companies, or financial intermediaries), thus not \r\nall reallocations of capital lead to the same path."


id: aa071abda2d594bb8802eaf6a9517ba7
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"Macroeconomic implications of the technological transition. \r\nGlobal macroeconomic changes that may affect asset prices are \r\nexpected to take place as a result of a possible reduction in growth \r\nor contraction of fossil fuel demand, in scenarios in which climate \r\ntargets are met according to carbon budgets, but also following \r\nongoing energy efficiency changes (high confidence) (Clarke et  al. \r\n2014; Mercure et al. 2018a). A review of the economic mechanisms \r\ninvolved in the accumulation of systemic risk associated with \r\ndeclining industries, with focus on fossil fuels, is given by Semieniuk \r\net al. (2021). An example is the transport sector, which uses around \r\n50% of oil extracted (IEA 2018; Thoma 2018). A rapid diffusion of \r\nEV (and other alternative vehicle types) poses an important risk as \r\nit could lead to oil demand peaking far before mid-century (Mercure \r\net al. 2018b; 2021)"


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" New technologies and fuel switching in aviation, \r\nheavy industry and shipping could further displace liquid fossil fuel \r\ndemand (IEA 2017). A  rapid diffusion of solar photovoltaic could \r\ndisplace electricity generation based predominantly on coal and \r\ngas (Sussams and Leaton 2017). A  rapid diffusion of household \r\nand  commercial indoor heating and cooling based on electricity \r\ncould further reduce the demand for oil, coal and gas (Knobloch et al. \r\n2019). Parallels can be made with earlier literature on great waves of \r\ninnovation, eras of clustered technological innovation and diffusion \r\nbetween which periods of economic, financial and social instability \r\nhave emerged (Freeman and Louca 2001; Perez 2009)."


id: 976335d30714f68c7ece0a8f86aa890e
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"Due to the predominantly international nature of fossil fuel markets, \r\nassets may be at risk from regulatory and technological changes both \r\ndomestically and in foreign countries (medium confidence). Fossil fuel \r\nexporting nations with lower competitiveness could lose substantial \r\namounts of industrial activity and employment in scenarios of peaking \r\nor declining demand for fossil fuels. In scenarios of peaking oil demand, \r\nproduction is likely to concentrate towards the Middle East and OPEC \r\ncountries (IEA 2017). Since state-owned fossil fuel companies tend to \r\nenjoy lower production costs, privately-owned fossil fuel companies \r\nare more at risk (Thoma 2018). Losses of employment may be directly \r\nlinked to losses of fossil fuel-related industrial activity or indirectly \r\nlinked through losses of large institutions, notably of government \r\nincome from extraction royalties and export duties"


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" A  multiplier \r\neffect may take place making losses of employment spill out of fossil \r\nfuel extraction, transformation and transportation sectors into other \r\nsupplying sectors (Mercure et al. 2018a)."


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"Illustrative Mitigation Pathways include two groups of scenarios \r\nconsistent with modelled global pathways that limit warming to 2degC \r\n(>67%) or lower, respectively. The two groups are representative \r\nfor the IMPs defined in Chapter  3. In these scenarios, warming is \r\nstabilised before 2100. The warming levels along these paths imply \r\n'Moderate' physical risk until 2050 and 'High' risk in 2050-2100 \r\n(with low levels of adaptation). Transition risk can arise along these \r\ntrajectories from changes in expectations of economic actors about \r\nwhich of the scenarios is about to materialise. These changes imply, in \r\nturn, possible large variations in the financial valuation of securities \r\nand contracts, with losses on the portfolio of institutional investors \r\nand households. High policy credibility is key to avoiding transition \r\nrisk, by making expectations consistent early on with the scenario"


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" \r\nLow credibility can delay the adjustment of expectations by several \r\nyears, leading either to a  late and sudden adjustment. However, \r\nif the policy never becomes credible, this changes the scenario since \r\nthe initial target is not met."


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"The Paris Agreement recognised for the first time the key role of \r\naligning financial flows to climate goals. It further emphasises \r\nthe importance of making financial flows consistent with climate \r\nactions and SDGs (Zamarioli et  al. 2021).This alignment has now \r\nto be operated in a  specific environment where the scaling-up of \r\nclimate policies is conditional upon their contribution to post\u0002COVID-19 recovery packages (Sections  15.2.2 and 15.2.3 and \r\nBox  15.6). The enabling environments that are to be established \r\naccount for the structural parameters of the underinvestment in \r\nlong-term assets. The persistent gap between the 'propensity to save' \r\nand 'propensity to invest' (Summers 2016) obstructs the scaling \r\nup of climate investments, and it results from a short-term bias of \r\neconomic and financial decision-making (Miles 1993; Bushee 2001; \r\nBlack and Fraser 2002) that returns weighted on short-term risk \r\ndominate the investment horizon of financial actors"


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" Overcoming this \r\nbias is the objective of an enabling environment apt to launch of \r\na self-reinforcing circle of trust between project initiators, industry, \r\ninstitutional investors, the banking system, and governments."


id: e8ac092fc9f7d232c735d0ea72b4539a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34117
content:
"Green quantitative easing (QE) is now being examined as a tool for \r\nenabling climate investments (Dafermos et al. 2018) in which central \r\nbanks could explicitly conduct a  programme of purchases of low\u0002carbon assets (Aglietta et al. 2015). A green QE programme 'would \r\nhave the benefit of providing large amounts of additional liquidity \r\nto companies interested' in green projects (medium confidence) \r\n(Campiglio et  al. 2018). Green QE would have positive effects \r\nfor stimulating a  low-carbon transition, such as accelerating the \r\ndevelopment of green bond markets (Hilmi et al. 2021), encouraging \r\ninvestments and banking reserves, and reducing risks of stranded \r\nassets, while it might increase income inequality and financial \r\ninstability (Monasterolo and Raberto 2017). While the short-term \r\neffectiveness would not be substantial, the central bank's purchase \r\nof green bonds could have a positive effect on green investment in \r\nthe long run (Dafermos et al. 2018)"


id: 48fb0bd70014b8b08eee63850eb38caa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8864
content:
" However, the use of green QE \r\nneeds to be cautious on potential issues, such as undermining the \r\ncentral bank's independence, affecting the central bank's portfolio \r\nby including green assets with poor financial risk standards, and \r\npotential regulatory capture and rent-seeking behaviours (Krogstrup \r\nand Oman 2019)."


id: 131ea27ab8f0c9916dfd9c3c4f82780e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 522
content:
"The role of government is crucial for creating an enabling \r\nenvironment for climate (Clark 2018), and governments are critical \r\nin the launching and maintenance of this circle of trust by lowering \r\nthe political, regulatory, macroeconomic and business risks (high \r\nconfidence). The issue is not just to progressively enlarge the space \r\nof low-carbon investments but to replace one system (fossil fuels \r\nenergy system) rapidly with another (low-carbon energy system). \r\nThis is a wave of 'creative destruction' with the public support for \r\ndeveloping new markets and new entrepreneurship and finance for \r\ngreen products and technologies in a context which requires strong \r\ncomplementarities between Schumpeterian (technological) and \r\nKeynesian (demand-related) policies (Dosi et al. 2017)"


id: 25897b4a52189898850806320391f255
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 3332
content:
" However, it \r\nis challenging to overcome the constraint of public budget under the \r\npressure of competing demands and of creditworthy constraints for \r\ncountries that do not have an easy access to reserve currencies. It is \r\nneeded to maximise, both at the national and international levels, the \r\nleverage ratio of public funds engaged in blended finance for climate \r\nchange which is currently very low, especially in developing countries \r\n(Attridge and Engen 2019)."


id: 78e19642f7571191358cd26bd6f6df68
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16573
content:
"scientific evidence of climate impacts is being accompanied by \r\nrising levels of climate finance. Banks and institutional investors \r\nare also progressively rebalancing their investment portfolios away \r\nfrom fossil fuels and towards low-carbon investments (IEA 2019b; \r\nMonasterolo and de Angelis 2020). In the meantime, the world runs \r\nthe risk of sharp adjustments, crises and irreversible 'tipping points' \r\n(Lontzek et al. 2015) sufficiently destabilising climate outcomes. This \r\nleads to the policy prescription towards financial regulatory agencies \r\nrequiring greater and swifter disclosure of information about rising \r\nclimate risks faced by financial institutions in projects and portfolios \r\nand central bank attention to systemic climate risk problems as \r\none possible route of policy action (Carney 2015; Dietz et al. 2016; \r\nZenghelis and Stern 2016; Campiglio et al. 2018)"


id: 88ae1ceda7e345f36a3338c75e852617
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19033
content:
" However, disclosure \r\nrequirements of risks and information in private settings remain \r\nmostly voluntary and difficult to implement (Battiston et  al. 2017; \r\nMonasterolo et al. 2017)."


id: 5e2604a833b6503b39c6643b8dd5297c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12339
content:
"Nevertheless, financial markets are innovating in search of solutions \r\n(Section  15.6.6). Recognising and dealing with stranded fossil \r\nfuel assets is also a  key area of growing concern that financial \r\ninstitutions are beginning to grapple with. Larger institutions with \r\nmore patient capital (pensions, insurance) are also increasingly \r\nbeginning to enter the financing of projects and green bond markets. \r\nThe case for efficient financial markets in developing countries is \r\nworse (Abbasi and Riaz 2016; Hong et al. 2019) because of weaker \r\nfinancial institutions (Hamid et al. 2017), heightened credit rationing \r\nbehaviour (Bond et al. 2015), and high risk aversion as most markets \r\nare rated as junk, or below/barely investment grade (Hanusch \r\net  al. 2016)"


id: 3674dd43ceb609317f14aff9ee84d8c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5961
content:
" Other constraints such as limited long-term financial \r\ninstruments and underdeveloped domestic capital markets, absence \r\nof significant domestic bond markets for investments other than \r\nsovereign borrowing, and inadequate term and tenor of financing, \r\nmake the efficient markets thesis practically inapplicable for most \r\ndeveloping countries."


id: 820eb0e46afd7bc14dc570c2c16b2ef0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 17981
content:
"Markets, finance and creative destruction. Branches of macro\u0002innovation theory could be grouped into two principal classes \r\n(Mercure et  al. 2016): 'equilibrium  - optimisation' theories that \r\ntreat innovators as rational perfectly informed agents and reaching \r\nequilibrium under market price signals; and 'non-equilibrium' theory \r\nwhere market choices are shaped by history and institutional forces \r\nand the role of public policy is to intervene in processes, given \r\na historical context, to promote a better outcome or new economic \r\ntrajectory. The latter suggests that new technologies might not \r\nfind their way to the market without price or regulatory policies to \r\nreduce uncertainty on expected economic returns. A key issue is the \r\nperception of risk by investors and financial institutions"


id: 409a95ded8b41875d9ad8fd673a0d3b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 7544
content:
" The financial \r\nsystem is part of complex policy packages involving multiple \r\ninstruments (cutting subsidies to fossil fuels, supporting clean \r\nenergy innovation and diffusion, levelling the institutional playing \r\nfield and making risks transparent) (Polzin 2017) and the needed big \r\nsystemic push (Kern and Rogge 2016) requires it takes on the role of \r\n'institutional innovation intermediaries' (Polzin et al. 2016)."


id: dc22f99c7e4cc72a67540f18a871e1e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32145
content:
"to efficiently allocate the public financing, and State Investment \r\nBanks (SIBs) can take up key roles (i) to provide capital to assist with \r\novercoming financial barriers, (ii) to signal and direct investments \r\ntowards green projects, and (iii) to attract private investors by taking \r\nup a de-risking role. Also, they can become a first mover by investing \r\nin new and innovative technologies or business models (Geddes \r\net al. 2018). State-owned enterprises (SOEs) can also have an overall \r\npositive effect on renewables investments, outweighing any effect of \r\ncrowding out private competitors (Prag et al. 2018). Green investment \r\nbanks can assist in the green transition by developing valuable \r\nexpertise in implementing effective public interventions to overcome \r\ninvestment barriers and mobilise private investment in infrastructure \r\n(OECD 2015c)"


id: 5d50a4a4ec0a3a4723d2b16a67c7ff59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12200
content:
" De-risking measures may reduce investment risks, \r\nbut lacking research and data availability hinders designing such \r\nmeasures (Dietz et al. 2016). Local governments' efforts to de-risk by \r\nsecuritisation might have negative effects by narrowing the scope for \r\na green developmental state and encouraging privatisation of public \r\nservices (Gabor 2019)."


id: 4064a02ab607adcf7194f7169cc3343f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7515
content:
"policy characteristics. Carbon tax can be a simpler and easier way to \r\nimplement carbon pricing, especially in developing countries, because \r\ncountries can utilise the existing fiscal tools and do not need concrete \r\nenabling conditions as market-based frameworks (high confidence). \r\nThe reallocation of revenues from carbon taxes can be used for \r\nlow-carbon investments, supporting poorer sections of society and \r\nfostering technological change (High-Level Commission on Carbon \r\nPrices 2017). In combination with other policies, such as subsidies \r\nand public R&D on resource-saving technologies, properly designed \r\ncarbon taxes can facilitate the shift towards low-carbon, resource\u0002efficient investments (Bovari et  al. 2018; Naqvi and Stockhammer \r\n2018; Dunz et al. 2021) (Section 9.9.3). The effectiveness of carbon \r\npricing has been supported by various evidence. EU ETS has \r\ncut emissions by 42"


id: 9fffccbc59ca2a086bf6e8c1ee87fd0a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"8% in the main sectors covered (European \r\nCommission 2021a), and China had achieved emissions reductions \r\nand energy conservation through its pilot ETS between 2013 and \r\n2015 (Zhang et  al. 2019; Hu et  al. 2020). Institutional learning, \r\nadministrative prudence, appropriate carbon revenue management \r\nand stakeholder engagement are key ingredients for successful ETS \r\nregimes (Narassimhan et al. 2018)."


id: 46379d4d656dedb633d8bd677f5a07f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 8434
content:
"The potential role of coordinated multilateral initiatives.\r\nThere is a growing awareness of the low leverage ratio of public to \r\nprivate capital in climate blended finance (Blended Finance Taskforce \r\n2018b) and of a 'glass ceiling', caused by a mix of agencies' inertia \r\nand perceived loss of control over the use of funds, on the use of \r\npublic guarantees by MDBs to increase it (high confidence) (Gropp \r\net al. 2014; Schiff and Dithrich 2017; Lee et al. 2018). Many proposals \r\nhave emerged for multilateral guarantee funds: Green Infrastructure \r\nFunds (de Gouvello and Zelenko 2010; Studart and Gallagher 2015), \r\nMultilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (Enhanced Green MIGA) \r\n(Deau and Touati 2018), guarantee funds to bridge the infrastructure \r\ninvestment gap (Arezki et al. 2016), and multi-sovereign guarantee \r\nmechanisms (Dasgupta et  al. 2019)"


id: 77069ca15b8a9f6b9e73fbcb67c311bb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 16298
content:
" The obstacle of limited fiscal \r\nspace for economic recovery and climate actions in low-income and \r\nsome emerging economies can be overcome only in a multilateral \r\nsetting. Several multilateral actions are being envisaged: G20's \r\nsuspension of official bilateral debt payments, IMF's adoption of new \r\nSDRs allocation (IMF 2021b). However, any form of unconventional \r\ndebt relief will generate development and climate benefits only if \r\nthey credibly target bridging the countries' infrastructure gap with \r\nlow-carbon climate-resilient options."


id: cf1ba0f35f8ee9072bd31b1f581c71e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30122
content:
"The presence of carbon prices can promote low-carbon technologies \r\nand investments (Best and Burke 2018), and price signals, including \r\ncarbon taxation, provide powerful and efficient incentives for \r\nhouseholds and firms to reduce CO2 emissions (IMF 2019). The \r\nexpansion of carbon prices is dependent on country-specific fiscal \r\nand social policies to hedge against regressive impacts on welfare, \r\ncompetitiveness, and employment (Michaelowa et  al. 2018). Such \r\nimpacts need to be offset using the proceeds of carbon taxes \r\nor auctioned emission allowances to reduce distortive taxation \r\n(Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994; Goulder 1995; de Mooij 2000; \r\nChiroleu-Assouline and Fodha 2014) and fund compensating \r\nmeasures for the population sections that are most adversely \r\nimpacted (Combet et al. 2010; Jaccard 2012; Klenert et al. 2018)"


id: 7ead8817a4afb30f9fcd542d5ee9dea1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17493
content:
" This \r\nis more difficult for developing countries with a large share of energy\u0002intensive activities, fossil fuel exporting countries and countries \r\nwhich have lower potential to mitigate impacts due to lower wages \r\nor existing taxes (Lefevre et al. 2018)."


id: a366b3ff00b620a2e2c097bd1017a8ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23270
content:
"Of interest in multilateral settings is a  credibility-enhancing effect \r\nprovided by reciprocal gains for both the donor and the host \r\ncountry. Guarantor countries can compensate the public cost of their \r\ncommitments with the fiscal revenues of induced exports. As to the \r\nhost countries, they would benefit from new capital inflows and the \r\ngrant equivalents of reduced debt service which might potentially \r\ngo far beyond USD100 billion yr-1 (Hourcade et al. 2021a). A second \r\ninterest would be to support a learning process about agreed-upon \r\nassessment and monitoring methods using clear metrics. Developing \r\nstandardised and science-based assessment methods at low \r\ntransaction costs is essential to strengthen the credibility of green \r\ninvestments and the emergence of a pipeline of high-quality bankable \r\nprojects which can be capitalised in the form of credible assets and \r\nsupported with transparent and credible domestic spending"


id: 2dd31dd41226cd48edd9e56e95aeffb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4646
content:
"A widely used indicator for the relative attractiveness of renewable energy but also development of price levels is the levelised cost of \r\nenergy (LCOE). It is applied by a wide range of public and private stakeholders when tracking progress with regard to cost degression \r\n(Aldersey-Williams and Rubert 2019). LCOE calculation methodologies vary but in principle consider project-level costs only (NEA \r\n1989). Besides other weaknesses, the LCOE concept usually does not consider societal costs resulting from de-risking instruments \r\nand/or other public interventions/support and therefore caution has to be applied when using the LCOE as the sole indicator of the \r\nsuccess of enabling environments. The yearly IRENA mapping on renewable energy auction results demonstrates the extremely broad \r\nranges of LCOEs (equal to the agreed tariffs) for renewable energy which can be observed (IRENA 2019a). For example, in 2018, \r\nsolar PV LCOEs for utility-scale projects came in between USD0"


id: 2b0e1359bb14d1e1c75fd329f2d7fbb0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 4208
content:
"04 kWh-1 and USD0.35 kWh-1 with a global weighted average of \r\nUSD0.085 kWh-1. However, comparative analysis taking into account societal costs is hardly available driven by challenges in the \r\ncontext of the quantification of public support."


id: c7e47f136ef9669f161b772376371f28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29032
content:
"by development finance institutions and/or international financial \r\ninstitutions (DFIs/IFIs). With an increasing number of sectors \r\nbecoming viable and increasing complaints of private sector players \r\nwith regard to crowding out (Bahal et al. 2018), a stronger separation \r\nand crowding in of commercial financing at the project/asset level \r\nis targeted. MDBs and IFIs were crucial for opening and growth in \r\nthe early years of the green bonds, which represent a  substantial \r\nshare of issuances (CBI 2019a). Drivers of an efficient private sector \r\ninvolvement are stronger incentives to have projects delivered on \r\ntime and in budget as well as market competition (Hodge et  al. \r\n2018)"


id: 6565c34417f92a455f0a4ca7532aaac7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13529
content:
" It remains key that the private sector mobilisation goes hand \r\nin hand with institutional capacity building as well as strong sectoral \r\ndevelopment in the host country, as a strong, knowledgeable public \r\npartner with the ability to manage the private sector is a dominating \r\nsuccess factor for public-private cooperation (WEF 2013; Yescombe \r\n2017; Hodge et al. 2018)."


id: ab6624be2708938ac145170ccb37656c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24484
content:
"and green stimulus is argued to be the ideal response to tackle \r\nboth the economic and the climate crises at once, disparities \r\nbetween regional strategies hinder the low-carbon transition (high \r\nconfidence). Indeed, inconsistent policies within countries can also \r\ncounterbalance emission reductions from green stimulus, as well as \r\na lack of transparency and green spending pledged not materialising \r\n(Jaeger et al. 2020). Also, aggressive monetary policy as a response \r\nto the global financial crisis, including quantitative easing that did \r\nnot target low-carbon sectors, has been heavily criticised (Jaeger \r\net al. 2020)"


id: dfa0ef4c868ff3247cc20aa249b8fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32684
content:
" The COVID-19 crisis recovery, in contrast, benefits from \r\ndevelopments which have taken place since, such as an emerging \r\nclimate-risk awareness from the financial sector, reflected in the \r\ncall from the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action \r\n(Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action 2020), which unites \r\n50 countries' finance ministers, for a climate-resilient recovery."


id: e5cf183ba25ef82248d840d99b714a09
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33658
content:
"Public guarantees have been increasingly proposed to expand \r\nclimate finance, especially from the private sector, with scarce public \r\nfinance, by reducing the risk premium of the low-carbon investment \r\nopportunities (de Gouvello and Zelenko 2010; Emin et  al. 2014; \r\nStudart and Gallagher 2015; Schiff and Dithrich 2017; Lee et  al. \r\n2018; Steckel and Jakob 2018). They have the advantage of a broad \r\ncoverage including the 'macro' country risks and to tackle the up\u0002front risks during the preparation, bidding and development phases \r\nof the project lifecycle that deter project initiators, especially for \r\ncapital-intensive and immature options. Insurances are also powerful \r\nde-risking instruments (Deau and Touati 2018) but they entitle the \r\nissuer to review claims concerning events and cannot cope with \r\nup-front costs"


id: ab79e80ca4d674f433dc4253deee484c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24491
content:
" Contractual arrangements like power purchase \r\nagreements are powerful instruments to reduce market risks through \r\na guaranteed price but they weigh on public budgets. Risk-sharing \r\nthat brings together public agencies, firms, local authorities, private \r\ncorporates, professional cooperatives, and institutional financiers can \r\nreduce costs (UNEP 2011), and support the deployment of innovative \r\nbusiness models (Deau and Touati 2018). Combined with emission \r\ntaxes they can contribute to reducing credit rationing of immature \r\nand risky low-carbon technologies (Haas and Kempa 2020)."


id: 61d8d122d9d41315123630cb9c1184a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12958
content:
"Nevertheless, three uncertainties remain. First, only those countries \r\nand regions with highest credit-ratings (AAA or AA) with access to \r\ndeep financial markets and excess savings will be able to mount \r\nsuch counter-cyclical climate investment paths, typically high-income \r\ndeveloped economies (high confidence). In more debt constrained \r\ndeveloping countries lower access to global savings pools  because \r\nof higher risk perceptions and lower credit ratings (BBB or less), \r\nexacerbated by COVID-19, are already leading to credit downgrades \r\nand defaults (Kose et al. 2020) and have long tended to be fiscally pro\u0002cyclical (McManus and Ozkan 2015). These include the general class \r\nof virtually all major emerging and especially low-income developing \r\ncountries, to which such demand-stimulating counter-cyclical climate\u0002consistent borrowing path is likely"


id: 5ed29c7731b693f21b9c5fb0bea4fd57
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12461
content:
" To access such funds, these \r\ncountries would need globally coordinated fiscal policy and explicit \r\nsupporting cross-border instruments, such as sovereign guarantees, \r\nstrengthening local capital markets and boosting the USD100 billion \r\nannual climate finance commitment (Dasgupta et al. 2019)."


id: 1cef5b6309f6d63c462e1cdbf5594271
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2000
content:
"Higher public spending levels driven by the impacts of \r\nCOVID-19 and related recovery packages. Higher levels of public \r\nfunding represent a  massive chance but also a  substantial risk. \r\nA missing alignment of public funding and investment activity with \r\nthe Paris Agreement (and Sustainable Development Goals) would \r\nresult in significant carbon lock-ins, stranded assets and thus increase \r\ntransition risks and ultimately economic costs of the transition (high \r\nconfidence). Using IMF data for stimulus packages, Andrijevic et al. \r\n(2020) estimated that COVID-19-related fiscal expenditure had \r\nsurpassed USD12 trillion by October 2020 (80% in OECD countries), \r\na  third of which being spent in liquidity support and health care. \r\nTotal stimulus pledged to date is ten times higher than low-Paris\u0002consistent carbon investment needs from 2020-2024 (Andrijevic \r\net  al. 2020; Vivid Economics 2020). Overall, stimulus packages \r\nlaunched include USD3"


id: 305d44698b47f9bdd02ce035fb2982e9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5038
content:
"5 trillion to sectors directly affecting future \r\nemissions, with overall fossil fuel investment flows outweighing low\u0002carbon technology investment (Vivid Economics 2020)."


id: e29e763c2fad2cd69602f5df0174d3f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33161
content:
"Financial history suggests that capital markets may be willing to accommodate extended public borrowing for transient spending \r\nspikes (Barro 1987) when macroeconomic conditions suggest excess savings relative to private investment opportunities (Summers \r\n2015) and when public spending is seen as timely, effective and productive, with governments able to repay when conditions improve \r\nas economic crisis conditions abate (high confidence). A surge in global climate mitigation spending in the post-pandemic recovery \r\nmay be an important opportunity, which global capital markets are signalling (Global Investor Statement 2019). The standard 'neo\u0002classical' macroeconomic model is often used in integrated energy-economy-climate assessments (Balint et al. 2016; Nordhaus 2018)"


id: e3e42ffd6111eacb9b8b3a761d4c9e67
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" \r\nThis class of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models, however, has a limited treatment of the financial sector and assumes \r\nthat all resources and factors of production are fully employed, there is no idle capacity and no inter-temporal financial intermediation \r\n(Pollitt and Mercure 2018b). Investment cannot assume larger values than the sum of previously determined savings, as a fixed \r\nproportion of income. Such constraint, as stressed by Mercure et al. (2019), implies that investment in low-carbon infrastructure, under \r\nthe equilibrium assumptions, necessarily creates a (neo-Ricardian) crowding-out effect that contracts the remaining sectors. Box 15.6, \r\nFigure 1 shows the implications (in the red-shaded part of Figure 1)."


id: 78ed718d913c404ebb940e50e7ca5a11
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"Even if demand-led models work better in depressions, the question nevertheless is whether the additional public borrowing for such \r\n'green stimulus' can be undertaken by market borrowings given already high public debt levels and recovered in the future from taxes \r\nas the economy revives. The results of recent macroeconomic modelling work (Liu et al. 2021) represented by 10 major countries/\r\nregions suggests answers. It uses a non-standard macroeconomic framework, with Keynesian features such as financial and labour \r\nmarket rigidities and fiscal and monetary rules (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2013). First, a global 'green stimulus' of about an average of \r\n0.8% of GDP annually in additional fiscal spending between 2020-30 would be required to accelerate the emissions reduction path \r\nrequired for a 1.5degC transition. Second, such a stimulus would also accelerate the global recovery by boosting GDP growth rates by \r\nabout 0.6% annually during the critical post-COVID period"


id: a5ede57c7db48166703a2620b06f19e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Third, the optimal tax policy would be to backload the carbon taxes to \r\nlater in the macroeconomic cycle, both because this would avoid dampening near-term growth while pre-announced carbon tax plans \r\nwould incentivise long-term private energy transition investment decisions today and provide neutral borrowing. This macroeconomic \r\nmodelling path thus replicates the 'green stimulus' impacts expected in theory (Box 15.6, Figure 1). There are also some other additional \r\nfeatures of the modelled proposal: (i) fiscal stimulus - needed in the aftermath of the pandemic - can be an opportunity to boost green \r\nand resilient public infrastructure; (ii) green research and development 'subsidies' are feasible to boost technological innovations; and \r\n(iii) income transfers to lower income groups are necessary to offset negative impacts of rising carbon taxes."


id: 1d851feb0348d85bd62acfc14289202b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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"Substantial effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which is relatively unique in its public health impacts when combined with the \r\nconsequences of deep economy-wide shocks (economic downturn, public finances, and debt), are expected to last for decades \r\neven in the absence of no significant future recurrence. A scenario where the pandemic recurs mildly every year for the foreseeable \r\nfuture further hinders GDP and investment recovery, where growth is unlikely to rebound to previous trajectories, even within OECD \r\neconomies (McKibbin and Vines 2020) and with worse effects in developing regions. History is strongly supportive: studies on the \r\nlongevity of pandemics' impacts indicate significant macroeconomic effects persisting for decades, with depressed real rates of return, \r\nincreased precautionary savings (Jorda et al. 2020), unemployment (Rodriguez-Caballero and Vera-Valdes 2020) and social unrest \r\n(Barrett and Chen 2021)"


id: 703339681370d9449264180103df921e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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" The direct effect on emissions is likely to be a small reduction from previous trajectories, but the longer\u0002lasting impacts are more on the macroeconomic-finance side. Pandemic responses have increased sovereign debt across countries \r\nin all income bands (IMF 2021e). However, its sharp increase in most developing economies and regions has caused debt distress \r\n(Bulow et al. 2021), widening the gap in developing countries' access to capital (Hourcade et al. 2021b). While strong coordinated \r\ninternational recovery strategies with climate-compatible economic stimulus is justified (Barbier 2020; Barbier and Burgess 2020; \r\nIMF 2020c; Le Quere et al. 2021; Pollitt et al. 2021), national recovery packages announced do not show substantial alignment with \r\nclimate goals (D'Orazio 2021; Hourcade et al. 2021b; Rochedo et al. 2021; Shan et al. 2021)"


id: 23a9a72023659515fb8b70f23840d4e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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" Contradictory post-COVID-19 investments \r\nin fossil fuel-based infrastructure may create new carbon lock-ins, which would either hinder climate targets or create stranded assets \r\n(Hepburn et al. 2020a; Le Quere et al. 2021; Shan et al. 2021), whilst deepening global inequalities (Hourcade et al. 2021b)."


id: 39872e456116d31b36498c8abd194f73
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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"Considerations on global debt levels and debt sustainability \r\nas well as implications for climate finance. The Paris Agreement \r\nmarked the consensus of the international community that \r\na temperature increase of well below 2degC needs to be achieved and \r\nthe SR1.5 has demonstrated the economic viability of 1.5degC. However, \r\nin terms of increase of supply of, in particular, public finance, often the \r\ndebate is still driven by the question on affordability, considerations \r\naround financial debt sustainability and budgetary constraints \r\nagainst the background of macroeconomic headwinds - even more \r\nin the (post-)COVID-19 world (high confidence)"


id: fefdc0ba30442ff6c5a8ddde7304cb9d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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" The level of climate \r\nalignment of debt is hardly considered in debt-related regulation and/\r\nor debt sustainability agreements like the Maastricht Treaty ceilings \r\n(3% of GDP government deficit and 60% of GDP (gross) government \r\ndebt) not considering economic costs of deferred climate action as \r\nwell as economic benefits of the transformation."


id: bf60a3fd7915955101b7a11dec71efb5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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"by shocks is more difficult to analyse and requires country-specific \r\ndeep-dives. IPCC scenario data is often not sufficient to perform such \r\nanalysis with additional assumptions being needed (Acevedo 2016). \r\nFor debt sustainability analysis, these more short-term impacts are, \r\nhowever, a  crucial driver with transparency being limited to the \r\nsignificance of climate-related revision of estimates. The latter might \r\nresult in a continued overestimation of future GDP as happened in \r\nthe past, increasing the vulnerability of highly indebted countries \r\n(Guzman 2016; Mallucci 2020). While climate change considerations \r\nhave already impacted country ratings and debt sustainability \r\nassessments (and financing costs), it is unclear whether current \r\nGDP forecasts are realistic"


id: c52a9a74c91db506161bd30a923a3d6b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" The review of the IMF debt sustainability \r\nframework leads to a  stronger focus on vulnerability rather than \r\nonly income thresholds when deciding upon eligibility for debt relief \r\nand/or concessional resources (Mitchell 2015), which could become \r\na mitigation factor for the challenge described before."


id: 4408b6a51ad543de8cce80f3299d6c76
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 8113
content:
"Stranded assets. The debate around stranded assets focuses strongly \r\non the loss of value to financial assets for investors (Section 15.6.1), \r\nhowever, stranded assets and resources in the context of the \r\ntransition towards a low-emission economy 'are expected to become \r\na major economic burden for states and hence the tax payers' (high \r\nconfidence) (EEAC 2016). Assets include not only financial assets \r\nbut also infrastructure, equipment, contracts, know-how, jobs as \r\nwell as stranded resources (Bos and Gupta 2019). Besides financial \r\ninvestors and fiscal budgets, consumers remain vulnerable to stranded \r\ninvestments"


id: 8db6a7a078a9ab853ebfd2ced6f7df63
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Against the background of the frequent simultaneousness \r\nof losses occurring for financial investors on the one hand and negative \r\nemployment effects as well as regional development and fiscal effects \r\non the other hand, negotiations about compensations and public \r\nsupport to compensate for negative effects of phasing out of polluting \r\ntechnologies often remain interlinked and compensation mechanisms \r\nand related redistribution effects untransparent."


id: 1f010c42ceebc2bdfe4d34bb54bc18b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 2318
content:
"Considering the need for responses to both short-term liquidity \r\nissues and long-term fiscal space, current G20/IMF/World Bank debt \r\nservice suspension initiatives are focused on the liquidity issue rather \r\nthan underlying problems of more structural nature of many low\u0002income countries (Fresnillo 2020a). In order to ensure fiscal space \r\nfor climate action in the coming decade, a mix between debt relief, \r\ndeferrals of liabilities, extended debt levels and sustainable lending \r\npractices including new solidarity structures need to be considered \r\nin addition to higher levels of bilateral and multilateral lending to \r\nreduce dependency on capital markets and to bridge the availability \r\nof sustainably structured loans for highly vulnerable and indebted \r\ncountries. More standardised debt-for-climate swaps, a higher share \r\nof GDP-linked bonds or structures ensuring (partial) debt cancellation \r\nin case countries are hit by physical climate change impacts/shocks \r\nappear possible"


id: 848d462b96a2e285401299aeb2971f9b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" The 'hurricane' clause introduced by Grenada, or \r\nwider natural disaster clauses provide issuers with an option to \r\ndefer payments of interest and principal in the event of a qualifying \r\nnatural disaster and can reduce short-term debt stress (UN Addis \r\nAbaba Action Agenda Art. 102) (UN 2015a). A mainstreaming of such \r\nclauses has been pushed by various international institutions. The \r\ncollective action clause might be a good example of a loan/debt term \r\nwhich became market standard. Definition of triggers is likely the \r\nmost complex challenge in this context."


id: 2895d56d6c5b86b33b8bb53452883c98
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 3807
content:
"While there are questions about the sufficiency of insurance \r\nproducts to address the losses and damages of climate\u0002related disasters, insurance can help to cover immediate \r\nneeds directly, provide rapid response and transfer financial \r\nrisk in times of extreme crisis (high confidence) (GIZ 2015; \r\nLucas 2015; Schoenmaker and Zachmann 2015; Hermann et al. \r\n2016; Wolfrom and Yokoi-Arai 2016; Kreft and Schafer 2017; \r\nUNESCAP 2017; Matias et  al. 2018; UNECA 2018; Broberg \r\nand Hovani-Bue 2019; EEA 2019; Martinez-Diaz et  al. 2019). \r\nCommercial insurability is heavily driven by the predictability \r\nof losses and the resulting ability to calculate insurance \r\npremium levels properly. Climate change has become a major \r\nfactor of increasing uncertainty. The previously strong reliance \r\non historic data in calculation of premium levels may be but \r\na starting point given the likely need for upward adjustment \r\ndue to climate change and potential consequential economic \r\ndamage"


id: f786d7488bbb4a245f651ce849ee71a4
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" Different risk perceptions between policyholders and \r\ninsurers will create contrary assessments on premium levels \r\nand consequently underinsurance. McKinsey (2020b) also \r\nstresses the systemic effect of climate change on insurers' \r\nbusiness models and resulting availability of appropriate \r\ninsurance products."


id: 4e800aa544b8f0b08c2ccd52bb41ab54
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content:
"Since 2000, the world has been experiencing significant increase in \r\neconomic losses and damages from natural disasters and weather \r\nperils such as tropical cyclones, earthquakes, flooding and drought. \r\nTotal global estimate of damage is about USD4210 billion, 2000-2018 \r\n(Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre 2019). The largest portion \r\nof this is attributed to tropical cyclones (USD1253 billion), followed \r\nby flooding (USD914 billion), earthquakes (USD757 billion) and \r\ndrought (approximately USD372 billion, or about USD20 billion yr-1\r\nlosses) (Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre 2019). In the \r\nperiod 2017-2018, natural catastrophe losses totalled approximately \r\nUSD219 billion (Bevere 2019). According to the National Oceanic and \r\nAtmospheric Administration, 14 weather and climate disasters cost \r\nUSD91 billion in 2018 (NOAA NCEI 2019)"


id: 8d11892056a90c4e42799d39bf753abe
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" The European Environment \r\nAgency reports that 'disasters caused by weather and climate-related \r\nextremes accounted for some 83% of the monetary losses over the \r\nperiod 1980-2017' for EU Member States (EU-28) and that 'weather \r\nand climate-related losses amounted to EUR426 billion (at 2017 \r\nvalues)'. For the EEA member countries (EEA-33), the 'total reported \r\neconomic losses caused by weather and climate-related extremes' \r\nover the same period amounted to approximately EUR453 billion \r\n(EEA 2019). Asia Pacific and Oceania has been particularly impacted \r\nby typhoon and flooding (China, India, the Philippines) resulting in \r\neconomic losses of USD58 billion, 2000-2017, and a  combination \r\nof flooding, typhoon and drought totalling USD89 billion in 2018 \r\n(inclusive of loss by private insurers and government sponsored \r\nprogrammes (Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre 2019)"


id: fd137b2da3813ddbab756f3179469d54
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" Based \r\non past historical analysis, a region such as the Caribbean, which has \r\nexperienced climate-related losses equal to 1% of GDP each year \r\nsince 1960, is expected to have significant increases in such losses \r\nin the future leading to possibly upwards of 8% of projected GDP \r\nin 2080 (Commonwealth Secretariat 2016). Similarly, Latin American \r\ncountries, such as Argentina, El Salvador and Guatemala, experienced \r\nsevere losses in agriculture totalling about USD6 billion due to \r\ndrought in 2018 (Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre 2019). \r\nIn the African region, where climate is projected to get significantly \r\nwarmer, continuing severe drought in parts of East Africa, Tropical "


id: 5a3c7f75d077dee28c3eff2f51500c69
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"The conventional approach to such protective or hedging position \r\nhas been indemnity and other classical insurance micro-, meso- and \r\nmacro-level schemes (Hermann et  al. 2016). These include micro \r\ninsurance schemes such as index insurance and weather derivative \r\napproaches that cover individuals' specific needs such as coverage \r\nfor farm crops. Meso-level insurance schemes, which primarily benefit \r\nintermediary institutions, such as NGOs, credit unions, financial \r\ninstitutions and farmer credit entities, seek to reduce losses caused \r\nby credit default thereby 'enhancing investment potential', whereas \r\nmacro-level insurance schemes 'allow both insured and uninsured \r\nindividuals to be compensated for damages caused by extreme \r\nweather events' (Hermann et al. 2016). These macro-level insurance \r\nschemes include catastrophe bonds and weather derivatives and \r\nso on, that transfer risk to capital markets (Hermann et  al. 2016)"


id: 6465b94aaf08207794bd4e9fe4d3af60
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" \r\nOver the last decades, there has been a  trend towards weather\u0002index insurance and other parametric insurance products based on \r\npredefined pay-out risk pooling instruments. It has gained favour \r\nwith governments in developing regions such as Africa, the Caribbean \r\nand the Pacific because it provides certainty and predictability about \r\nfunding - financial preparedness - for emergency actions and initial \r\nreconstruction and reduces moral hazard. This 'financial resilience' is \r\nalso increasingly appealing to the business sector, particularly micro, \r\nsmall and medium enterprises (MSMEs), in developing countries \r\n(MEFIN Network and GI RFPI Asia 2016; Woods 2016; Schaer \r\nand Kuruppu 2018)."


id: 70cb830a95b6d09bad1cdbcb48a2937d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"the Pacific Islands (PCRAFI), the African Risk Capacity (ARC Agency \r\nand its financial affiliate), and the African Risk Capacity Limited (ARC \r\nLtd/ the ARC Group) (ARC 2016) and in the Asian region, the South \r\nEast Asian Disaster Risk Insurance Facility (SEADRIF) and the ASEAN \r\nDisaster Risk Financing and Insurance Program (ADRFI), (SEADRIF \r\n2018; GIZ and World Bank 2019; Martinez-Diaz et  al. 2019; Vyas \r\net al. 2019; World Bank 2019a). The group of 20 vulnerable countries \r\n(V20) has also developed a Sustainable Insurance Facility (SIF), billed \r\nas a  technical assistance facility for climate-smart14 insurance for \r\nMSMEs in 48 developing countries as well as potentially to de-risk \r\nrenewable energy in these countries and regions (ACT Alliance 2020; \r\nV20 2020; V20 2021).\r\nHowever, as noted above, climate risk pooling is not a  panacea. \r\nThere are very obvious and significant challenges"


id: 7ca340c5778613b0ccf6d18d46951b9
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" According to \r\nKreft and Schafer (2017), limitations of insurance schemes include \r\ncoordination challenges, limited scope, destabilisation due to exit of \r\none or more members as premiums rise and inadequate attention to \r\npermanence (Schaeffer et al. 2014). There are also challenges with \r\nrisk diversification, replication, and scalability (high confidence). For \r\nexample, CCRIF is extending both its membership and diversifying \r\nits geographic dimensions into Central America in seeking to lower \r\ncovariate risk (similar shocks among cohorts such as droughts or \r\nfloods). Under the SPC portfolio, CCRIF is able to segregate risk \r\nacross the regions. Risk insurance does not obviate from the need to \r\nengage in capacity building to scale-up as well as having process for \r\naddressing systemic risk. Currently, risk pools have limited sectoral \r\nreach and may cover agriculture but not other important sectors \r\nsuch as fisheries and public utilities"


id: e47838156dd7afee543bb0f8a1a1c44
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Only recently (July 2019) has \r\nCCRIF initiated coverage of fisheries with the development of its \r\nCaribbean Oceans and Aquaculture Sustainability Facility (COAST) \r\ninstrument (CCRIF SPC 2019; ACT Alliance 2020). Historically, risk \r\npool mechanisms, like CCRIF and ARC, only cover a small subset of \r\nperils, such as tropical cyclones, earthquakes and excess rainfall but \r\ndo not include other perils such as drought. Since 2016, ARC has \r\nincreased its scope to cover drought and in 2019 launched ARC \r\nReplica, which not only covers drought but offers premiums and \r\ncoverage to NGOs and the World Food Programme through the \r\nSTART Network and a pastoral drought product for protecting small \r\nfarmers and ensuring food security. In some regions and countries, \r\nthere may also be limited access to reinsurance (Schaeffer et  al. \r\n2014; Lucas 2015). An important down-side of climate risk pooling is \r\nthat it does not cover the actual cost of damage and losses"


id: c7ffdd12103b904095a1a3e7fd32596d
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content:
" Though \r\non the positive side, pay-out may exceed costs, but it may also be \r\nless than costs. Hence, the parametric approach is not a  panacea \r\nand does not preclude having recourse to conventional indemnity \r\ninsurance, which will cover full damage costs after a climate change \r\nevent as it involves full on-the-ground assessment of factors such as \r\nthe necessity and costs of repair versus, say, replacement value of \r\ndamaged infrastructure. This may be important for governmental and \r\npublicly provided services such as schools, hospitals, roads, airports, \r\ncommunications equipment and water supply facilities. Given \r\nthe growing popularity of parametric insurance and climate risk "


id: dfa896dab7c880141d3efbfa0e6c9600
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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"As noted also in IPCC AR5, risk sharing and risk transfer strategies \r\nprovide 'pre-disaster financing arrangements that shift economic \r\nrisk from one party to another' (IPCC 2012). Risk pooling among \r\ncountries and regions is relatively advantageous when compared \r\nto conventional insurance because of the effective subsidising of \r\n'affected regions' using revenues from unaffected regions which \r\ninvolve pooling among a large subset of countries (high confidence)\r\n(Lucas 2015). In general, the premiums are less costly than what an \r\nindividual country or entity can achieve and disbursement is rapid \r\nand there are also fewer transaction costs (Lucas 2015; World Bank \r\n2015)"


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" The World Bank argues that the experience with the Pacific \r\nCatastrophe Risk Insurance Pilot (PCRIP) and Africa Risk Capacity \r\nrisk pooling (ARC) show savings of 50% in obtaining insurance cover \r\nfor pooled risk compared with purchasing comparable coverage \r\nindividually (Lucas 2015; World Bank 2015; ARC 2016). However, \r\nit requires, as noted by UNESCAP, 'extensive coordination across \r\nparticipating countries, and entities' (Lucas 2015)."


id: ad507359ddd021e89c7b8fa901a26373
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content:
"At the same time, this approach has substantial basis risk (actual \r\nlosses do not equal financial compensation) (high confidence) \r\n(Hermann et al. 2016). With parametric insurance, pay-outs are pre\u0002defined and based on risk modelling rather than on-the-ground \r\ndamage assessment so may be less than, equal to, or greater than \r\nthe actual damage. It does not cover actual losses and damage and \r\ntherefore, may be insufficient to meet the cost of rehabilitation \r\nand  reconstruction. It may also be 'non-viable' or damaging to \r\nlivelihoods in the long run (UNFCCC 2008; Hellmuth et  al. 2009; \r\nHermann et al. 2016). Additionally, if the required threshold is not met, \r\nthere may be no pay-out, though a country may have experienced \r\nsubstantial damages from a  climatic event"


id: fa65ec1141cda6f2ef9ea198b8935197
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" This occurred for the \r\nSolomon Islands in 2014 which discontinued its insurance with the \r\nPacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Pilot when neither its Santa Cruz \r\nearthquake nor the 2014 flash floods were eligible to receive a pay\u0002out under the terms of the insurance (Lucas 2015)."


id: bf20c06c4f83850e5900840ed724f17f
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content:
"ARC and its impact on reducing vulnerability to disasters. It notes \r\nthat there is scarce literature on disaster risk insurance mechanisms \r\nin terms of impacts. In its current sample of 20 countries as of \r\nNovember 2017, four are projected to experience food security crisis \r\n(IPC Level 3) but are not signatories to the ARC, which may signal \r\nthat ARC is not attractive to all food insecure countries and that \r\nthere is no overwhelming appetite for ARC among poorer countries. \r\nAdditionally, Panda and Surminski (2020) research the importance \r\nof indicators and frameworks for monitoring the performance and \r\nimpact of Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) but \r\nmake no final assessment of any of the regional climate risk pool. \r\nHowever, they propose mechanisms to improve the transparency and \r\naccountability of the system"


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" Scherer (2017), Forest (2018) and Panda \r\nand Surminski (2020) seem to indicate that there is 'enthusiasm to \r\nsupport and scale-up regional climate risk insurance' (Scherer 2017, \r\np. 4) Examples of this support include: the Germany Ministry for \r\nEconomic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has provided USD5.9 \r\nmillion for the World Food Programme (WFP) to protect 1.2 million \r\nvulnerable African farmers with climate risk insurance, through ARC \r\nReplica, and the G7 InsuResilience Vision 2025, which has committed \r\nto ensuring 400-500 million poor persons are covered against disaster \r\nshock by pre-arranged finance and insurance mechanism by 2025; \r\nsome of this will be through ARC (WFP 2020). Of course, this does \r\nnot mean that risk pools are without challenges or are not failing on \r\nspecific sets of metrics"


id: 4884660804096bee0be2359c4ac1ea15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Forest (2018) flags three failing areas: policy \r\nholder and hazard coverage, the cost of premium and risk transfer \r\nparameters, and the use of pay-out, which in most cases are up to \r\nthe government. Here, ARC is flagged among the three regional risk \r\npools, as the only one with contingency plan requirements that can \r\nsupport effective use of pay-outs. Other research exploring climate \r\nrisk pooling and its impacts flag lack of transparency around pay-out, \r\npremium or risk transfer parameters. Ultimately, climate risk pools \r\nare not full insurance; they offer only limited coverage. Entities such \r\nas the U4 Anti-Corruption Help Desk are exploring how to mitigate \r\npotential corruption with regard to climate risk insurance."


id: c97386300d7fab5cdfdc0a23072e3811
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"pooling, there are very ambitious attempts to expand this approach \r\non several fronts (Scherer 2017). Schoenmaker and Zachmann \r\n(2015) have proposed a  global climate risk pool to help the most \r\nvulnerable countries. The pathway to this includes capacity building \r\nin underdeveloped financing sectors of developing countries. \r\nThey argue that as climate extremes become more normalised, they \r\nwill wipe out significant parts of the infrastructure and productive \r\ncapacity of developing countries. This will have knock-on impact \r\non fiscal capacity due to lowered tax revenue and high rebuilding \r\ncosts. 'Developing countries', Schoenmaker and Zachmann (2015) \r\nargue, 'cannot insure against such events on a  market basis, nor \r\nwould it be sensible to divert scarce fiscal resources away from \r\ninfrastructure investment into accumulating a  financial buffer for \r\nsuch situations'"


id: a53c480ba688714a471992ac60ece52b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" In that context, Schoenmaker and Zachmann (2015) \r\ncall for international risk pooling as 'the only sensible strategy', \r\nespecially if it addresses the major gaps in climate risk insurance for \r\npoor and vulnerable communities by enhancing demand through \r\n'smart support instrument' for premium support such as full or \r\npartial premium subsidies and investment in providing risk reduction \r\n(Schafer et al. 2016; Le Quesne et al. 2017; MCII 2018; Vyas et al. \r\n2019). This, it is argued, may help to smoothen out the limited uptake \r\nof regional institutions such as ARC and CCRIF SPC, which are only \r\nin three regions of the world (with missing mechanism in South \r\nAmerica) (Kreft and Schafer 2017). Existing regional mechanisms, \r\nwhile they may perform very well, only cover a portion of climatic \r\nhazards and tend to have limited subscribers"


id: 550e8d5ca204d092f263b941811f5e9d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" For example, across the \r\nkey four sovereign risk pools (ARC, CRIFSPC, PCRAFI and SEADRIF), \r\nthough there are 68 countries only one-third or 32% have purchased \r\ncoverage in 2019 and 46% 'did not deploy disaster risk financing \r\ninstruments' (ACT Alliance 2020)."


id: 554a8bbbec800c09300d75c37130813
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"Different finance challenges between rich and poor cities. \r\nAccess to capital markets has been one of the major sources for \r\nsubnational financing and is generally limited to rich cities, and much \r\nof this occurs through loans (high confidence). Different challenges \r\nto accessing capital markets associated with wealthy and poorer \r\ncities are compounded into three main issues: (i) scarcity and access \r\nof financial resources (Bahl and Linn 2014; Colenbrander et al. 2018b; \r\nCook and Chu 2018; Gorelick 2018); (ii) the level of implication from \r\nthe existing distributional uncertainties to the current financing of \r\ninfrastructural decarbonisation across carbon markets (Silver 2015); \r\nand (iii) the policy and jurisdictional ambiguity in urban public \r\nfinance institutions (Padigala and Kraleti 2014; Cook and Chu 2018)"


id: 40f752cb284c6e1064918e9ff7941834
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" \r\nIn poorer cities, these differing features continue to be inhibited by \r\ncontextual characteristics of subnational finance, including gaps in \r\ndomestic and foreign capital (Meltzer 2016), the mismatch between \r\ninvestment needs and available finance (Gorelick 2018), weak \r\nfinancial autonomy, insufficient financial maturity, investment-grade \r\ncredit ratings in local debt markets (Bahl and Linn 2014), scarce \r\ndiversified funding sources and stakeholders (Gorelick 2018; Zhan \r\net al. 2018; Zhan and de Jong 2018) and weak enabling environments \r\n(Granoff et al. 2016)."


id: 1be1d689a81d5fad8d063cd7c590e282
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1848
content:
"Climate investment and finance for communities. There is \r\ninsufficient evidence about which financing schemes contribute \r\nto climate change mitigation and adaptations at community level \r\n(high confidence). There is growing interest in the linkages between \r\nmicrofinance and adaptation in the agriculture sector (Agrawala and \r\nCarraro 2010; Fenton et al. 2015; Chirambo 2016; CIF 2018; Dowla \r\n2018), the finance for community-based adaptation actions (Fenton \r\net al. 2014; Sharma et al. 2014), and the relations between remittances \r\nand adaptation (Le De et al. 2013). However, there is less discussion \r\non community finance aside from the benefits of community finance \r\nand village funds in contributing to close investment gaps and \r\ncommunity-based mitigation in the renewable energy and forest \r\nsectors (Ebers Broughel and Hampl 2018; Bauwens 2019; Watts et al"


id: 3c0795e340770f2214c6222bcedc65c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 6800
content:
" \r\n2019) The full potential and barriers of the community finance model \r\nare still unknown and research needs to expand understanding of \r\nfavourable policy environments for community finance (Bauwens \r\n2019; Watts et al. 2019)."


id: 7ad57e63a680e9440cba862e8d22f6fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"There are several initiatives aimed at protecting the integrity of \r\nthe green label. Guidance on use and management of proceeds \r\nestablished by the International Capital Markets Association's \r\nGreen Bond Principles (GBP) is followed on a voluntary basis, which \r\nnotes eligible use of proceeds as primarily climate mitigation and \r\nadaptation projects. The GBP also recommend independent external \r\nreviews at the time of issuance, with 89% of green bond issuers in \r\n2020 having external reviews at the time of issuance (CBI 2021a). \r\nIn addition to best practice based on voluntary principles, a further \r\ncheck on greenwashing, although insufficient on its own, is the fear \r\nof reputation risk on behalf of investors, issuers and intermediaries in \r\nthe age of social media (Hoepner et al. 2017; Deschryver and de Mariz \r\n2020). A report on post-issuance green bond impact reporting notes \r\nthat despite concerns (Shishlov et al"


id: c6c302be18950255da6b6862799393c5
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content:
" 2018), greenwashing incidence \r\nis rare, with 77% of green bond issuers reporting on allocation and \r\n59% reporting on impact, but with significant variance in quality and \r\nconsistency of impact reporting (CBI 2021b)."


id: 316bcef26263d64e893dbfca6185891c
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content:
"Data challenges point to an inability to link emission reductions, \r\nincluding Scope 3 GHG emissions, at the organisation or firm level \r\nwith green bond use-of-proceeds issuance (Ehlers et  al. 2020; \r\nTuhkanen and Vulturius 2020). However one study found evidence \r\nof a  signalling effect of issuing green bonds resulting in emission \r\nreductions at the corporate level following issuance (Flammer 2020), \r\nand another study characterised the lifecycle emissions of renewable \r\nenergy financed by green bonds, indicating potentially substantive \r\navoided emissions but with variance up to a  factor of 12 across \r\nbonds depending on underlying assumptions (Gibon et  al. 2020). \r\nThere is also a lack of impact reporting requirements and consistency \r\nin the green bond market"


id: 5e2d3710a27f15da84ab33fa593b0ebd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Impact reporting is not typically required \r\nfor green bond listings on specific exchanges, nor are there any \r\nrequirements for independent reviews of impact reporting, however \r\nthis could change in future if investors apply pressure."


id: 520b19a92976c18aff215bbc0dfff120
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"While scaling up climate finance remains a challenge (Section 15.3.2), there is consensus that investments that are managed taking \r\ninto account broader sustainability criteria have increased consistently and ESG integration into sustainable investment is increasingly \r\nbeing mainstreamed by the financial sector over recent years (Maiti 2021). The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment \r\n(PRI) grew to over 3000 signatories in 2020, representing over USD100 trillion in assets under management (UN PRI 2020). And \r\naccording to the 2018 biennial assessment by Global Sustainable Investment Alliance,15 sustainable investments in five major \r\ndeveloped economies grew by 34% in the two-year period following the 2016 assessment"


id: 5a976fac8a44618bd511ab1671eaf206
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content:
" The primary ESG approaches leveraged \r\nwere exclusion criteria and ESG integration, which together amounted to over USD37 trillion, accounting for two-thirds of the assessed \r\nsustainable investments, with novel strategies such as best-in class screening and sustainability-themed investing showing significant \r\ngrowth, although together they accounted for around 6% of these investments (GSIA 2019). Shareholder activism or corporate \r\nengagement is the other key approach, which has been well established and continued to grow to nearly USD10 trillion (GSIA 2019)."


id: e40d427abb75d45282d1f0ba8a3b5d1
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content:
"However, research indicates that ESG strategies by themselves do not yield meaningful social or environmental outcomes (Kolbel et al. \r\n2020). When it comes to the tangible impact of the financial sector on addressing climate change and sustainable development, there \r\nremains ambiguity. There is a growing need for more robust assessment of ESG scores, including establishing higher standardisation of \r\nscoring processes and a common understanding of the different ESG criteria and their tangible impact on addressing climate change. \r\nThe issue was highlighted in an assessment of six of the leading ESG rating agencies' company ratings under the MIT Aggregate \r\nConfusion Project, which found the correlation among them to be 0.61, leading them to conclude that available ESG data was 'noisy \r\nand unreliable' (Berg et al. 2020). This need is reaffirmed by Drempetic et al"


id: 723af27c7e08a1ed61be7c5d8505a825
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vector_id: 15595
content:
" (2020), who claim that a thorough investigation of ESG \r\nscores remains a relatively neglected topic, with extraneous factors, such as firm size, influencing the score (Drempetic et al. 2020)."


id: cb2d221116ef05e669fa4163c8166034
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"There continues to be a research gap in assessing the direct impact of ESG and sustainable investments on climate change indicators, \r\nwith most existing studies assessing the co-relation between either the factors driving the sustainable finance trends and the impact \r\non sustainable investments, or sustainable investments and the impact on corporate financial performance. Nevertheless, since \r\nthe post-SDG adoption period, there has been a notable uptake on research linking sustainable business practices and financial \r\nperformance (Muhmad and Muhamad 2020). This research shows that there is a  growing business case for ESG investing, with \r\nevidence increasingly indicating a non-negative co-relation between ESG, SDG adoption and corporate financial performance (Friede \r\net al. 2015; Muhmad and Muhamad 2020), and ESG performance having a positive relation with stock returns (Consolandi et al. \r\n2020)"


id: 8e0fe30c0b61706a02dc762686a54de9
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content:
" Research focused on developed economies also indicates towards a positive relation between ESG criteria and disclosure, and \r\neconomic sustainability of a firm (Giese et al. 2019; Alsayegh et al. 2020) and allays investor fears by showing that sustainable finance \r\ninitiatives, such as divestment, do not adversely impact investment portfolio performance (Henriques and Sadorsky 2018; Trinks et al. \r\n2018). It should be reiterated that this research assesses the co-relation between ESG criteria and corporate financial performance, \r\nwith the researchers in some cases, such as Friede et al. (2015), including disclaimers of the results being inconclusive and highlighting \r\nthe need for a deeper assessment for linking ESG criteria with impact on financial performance."


id: 9a2a2070cca4a2dc68d5fc5df4c38537
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content:
"While there is a lack of research on the impact of sustainable finance products, divestment impact has been assessed in more detail. \r\nAlthough the research here also points towards the ambiguous direct impact of divestment on reducing GHG emissions or on the \r\nfinancial performance of fossil fuel companies, its indirect impact on framing the narrative around sustainable finance decisions \r\n(Bergman 2018), and the inherent potential of the divestment movement for building awareness and mobilising broader public support \r\nfor effective climate policies, have been better researched and could be considered to be the more relevant outcomes (Braungardt \r\net al. 2019). Arguments against divestment point to its largely symbolic nature, but Braungardt et al"


id: d43502aca30b8ba7948b28c758d0002a
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content:
" (2019) elaborate on the broader \r\npositive impacts of divestment, which include its ability to spur climate action as a moral imperative and stigmatise and reduce the \r\npower of the fossil fuel lobby, and the potential of the approach to mitigate systemic financial risks arising due to climate change and \r\naddress the legal responsibilities of investors merging in this regard."


id: 2b1cc991ea7123f6ed3bc39f3076d24
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content:
"International situational context. Developing countries make \r\nup two-thirds of the world's population and carry carbon-intensive \r\neconomies where 70% of investments (see Chapter  3) need to be \r\nconducted to limit warming to 2degC. The focus for climate investments \r\nhas been on China, USA, Europe, India and the G20 (UNEP 2019) \r\nbut studies highlight Paris and SDG attention should be devoted to \r\nAfrica, LDCs and SIDS (African Union Commission 2015; Feindouno et al. \r\n2020; GCA-AAI 2020; Warner 2020; AOSIS 2021). The 'special needs, \r\ncircumstances and vulnerability' of African, LDC and SIDS nations are \r\nrecognised under UNFCCC and UN agreements (UN 2009, 2015a,b,c; \r\nUNFCCC 2010, 2015; Pauw et  al. 2019). These nations currently \r\ncontribute very little to global emissions. Developing countries with their \r\ngrowing economies, including the vast African continent roughly the \r\nsize of China, Europe, USA, and India combined (IEA 2014b, p"


id: 69c29520dec8a7a5812a33c486831c30
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content:
" 20) with \r\na 1 billion population expected to double by 2050, growing reliance on \r\nfossil fuels and 'cheap' biomass (charcoal use and deforestation) amid \r\nrising urbanisation and industrialisation ambitions - collectively these \r\nnations hold large leap-frog potential for the energy transition as well \r\nas risks of infrastructure lock-in. Accelerated international cooperation \r\nis a critical enabler (IPCC 2018) in recognising this potential. This could \r\nmobilise global savings, scale up development of local capital markets \r\nfor accelerated low-carbon investment and adaptation in low- and \r\nlower-middle-income countries as well as tackle illicit finance including \r\ntax avoidance leakages that deprive developing countries of valuable \r\nresources (US DoJ 2009; Hearson 2014; Hanlon 2017; US DoJ 2019; \r\nIATFD 2021). Diversifying funding sources is important at a time hard\u0002currency Eurobond issuances reach records (Panizza and Taddei 2020; \r\nMoody's Investors Service 2021)"


id: d49fba5895fa1ca1d3fa79efc7ec6e44
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Otherwise, the structure of voluntary, \r\nnationally oriented, and financially fragmented arrangements under \r\nthe Paris Agreement (Chapter 17) could lead to 'regional rivalry' (SSP 3) \r\npathways (IPCC 2018; Gazzotti et al. 2021). The benefits are many times \r\ngreater than apparent costs in terms of expected decline in global GHG \r\nemissions and attaining SDGs. These could even generate large 'win\u0002win' opportunities back in capital source countries which will benefit \r\nfrom a flow back in import demand (Hourcade et al. 2021a)."


id: f61fe70a15b2011d272bd11646692a38
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"Whole-of-society approach to mobilising diverse capital. There's \r\nno shortage of money globally: it is simply that it has yet to travel \r\nto where it's most needed. One challenge is unlocking unencumbered \r\nendowments to contribute to Paris and SDGs (high confidence).\r\nThe aggregate global wealth figures exceed USD200 trillion (Davies \r\net al. 2016; UBS 2017; Credit Suisse 2020; Heredia et al. 2020). Some \r\ndeveloping countries have run pilots for investing in government \r\nbonds capitalising on fintech growth discussed (The Economist 2017; \r\nAkwagyiram and Ohuocha 2021) (Section 15.6.6). Others are developing \r\ngreen products to encourage uptake by middle class retail investors \r\n(Eurosif 2018; UK DMO 2021). Millennial-aged inheritors expected to \r\nreceive intergenerational transfers mobilised by global citizen activism \r\n(Chapter 2) invest in green retail and tech products (Morgan Stanley \r\n2017; UBS 2017; Capgemini 2021)"


id: 4fdc2a166a73596e4db4dd36300f6ca9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Historic inequity and diaspora\u0002related private and public resources pledged and debated during \r\nthe COVID-19 pandemic might have potential to contribute towards \r\nParis and SDGs (Olusoga 2015; Glueck and Friedman 2020; Hall 2020; \r\nPiketty 2020; Timsit 2020; Goldman Sachs 2021; Guthrie 2021; Mieu \r\n2021; Wagner 2021). Philanthropic institutions use grants, debt, equity, \r\nguarantees and issue investment grade bonds in using unencumbered \r\nendowments (Manilla 2018; Covington 2020; Moody's Investors \r\nService 2020) but only about 2% of their resources are dedicated to \r\nclimate action (Williams T., 2015; Kramer 2017; Morena 2018; Delanoe \r\net al. 2021). The pandemic exemplified the unprecedented collaboration \r\nand mobilisation of multilateral and scientific communities supported \r\nby the COVAX risk sharing mechanism for COVID-19 vaccines with \r\npooling of financial and scientific resources (OECD 2021d)"


id: 811fb94fccb66d9ce7d53c7ed79d0ee5
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content:
" This \r\nmomentum in international cooperation can be harnessed to galvanise \r\nresources, including for teaching of sciences in developing countries \r\nimportant in tackling society challenges, alleviating poverty (TWAS \r\n2021) and inequity legacies compounded by climate impacts debated \r\nby many (Henochsberg 2016; Obregon 2018; Fernandez et al. 2021; \r\nThe Economist 2021). Suggestions towards equitable models include \r\n'global adaptation funding approaches' (Chancel and Piketty 2015), \r\na 'world climate bank' to finance climate investments through long\u0002term bonds (Foley 2009; Broome 2012; Broome and Foley 2016), \r\na 'cities development bank' (Alexander et al. 2019), and 'public debt \r\nfinancing models' (Rendall 2021) for generations to share the burden \r\nwhich has precedence in history (Draper 2007; Fowler 2015)."


id: 877d387815c61853863c01800cfd4396
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content:
"of examples: in the women of colour-led arena, a Chicago pension \r\nfund invested in a developing country using a private equity fund; \r\n(Langhorne 2021, USAID 2021). Institutional BlackRock's blended \r\nfinance vehicle with OECD MDB partners focuses on developing \r\ncountries (BlackRock 2021). In regional AAA MDB partnerships, the \r\nAfrican Development Bank (AfDB) collaborates with African nations \r\nthrough a  regional infrastructure fund (Africa50 2019); the Asian \r\nDevelopment Bank (ADB) collaborates with a  Philippines state\u0002owned pension fund and Dutch pension fund in using a private equity \r\nfund to catalyse private sector investment (ADB 2012). A UN entity \r\nwith several pooled public-private investment platforms includes an \r\nSDG blended finance vehicle (UN CDF 2020a; 2020b)"


id: c5458db4555d7d3ea27c21ca397623da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" A multilateral \r\nInternational Finance Corporation (IFC) blended finance fund, \r\nsupported by a  sovereign guarantee from Sweden's SIDA, and \r\nseparately a  USD1 billion green bond fund by IFC and Europe's \r\nAmundi asset manager buy green securities issued by developing \r\ncountry banks financing local currency climate investments (IFC 2018, \r\n2021; Amundi and IFC 2019). The key parameter is the investment \r\nmultiplier, the ratio of private investment mobilised by a  given \r\namount of public funds which varies by product type. IFC's portfolio \r\nof blended finance investments point to a self-reported range of 3 to \r\n15 times for project debt and even higher levels (10 to 30) for debt \r\nfinance provided on concessional terms (IFC 2021a)"


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content:
" Although an \r\nAAA-rated IFC blended finance fund was established in 2013, most \r\ninvestors joined in 2017 with insurers AXA and Swiss Re investing \r\nUSD500 million each to bring the fund to USD7 billion raised \r\nfrom eight global investors (Attridge and Gouett 2021). Critics of \r\nblended finance mechanisms point to lack of data transparency \r\nhampering independent assessment on (i) value for public money \r\nand costs of blending versus other financial mechanisms, (ii) risks \r\nand benefits of de-risking private capital to collateralising climate\u0002vulnerable Global South populations, (iii) lack of partnership with \r\nlocal players, and (iv) complex structures (Akyuz 2017; Mawdsley \r\n2018; Convergence 2020; Attridge and Gouett 2021; Gabor 2021)"


id: a381c068f2605a76f36bf987379994bd
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 23287
content:
" \r\nWhilst blended finance transactions (BFTF 2018) are quite common \r\nin mature regulated markets with mandatory reporting requirements \r\n(Morse 2015; ICAEW 2021), the additional finance mobilised and \r\ntheir developmental impact remain unknown due to poor reporting \r\nthat hammpers evidence-based policy making (Attridge and Gouett \r\n2021). Projects that are aligned with blended finance principles in \r\nthe UN Addis Agenda (UN 2015a), and take account of local contexts \r\nby partnering with local actors, are much more likely to have \r\nsustainable impacts."


id: 4db593bd70a63e0e4d1338372f7a9dd0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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"Local financial institutions with local markets knowledge \r\ncould benefit from technical assistance and partnership to \r\nscale up their potential with institutional investors better \r\nmobilised (high confidence). The Global South has some 260 public \r\ndevelopment banks/PDBs representing USD5 trillion in assets with \r\na worldwide PDB capacity to provide more than USD400 billion yr-1\r\nof climate finance (IDFC and GCF 2020). Case studies discuss the \r\npotential for diaspora bond issuance being deployed for climate \r\ninvestments including securitisation of remittances as collateral \r\nfor infrastructure bonds (Ketkar and Ratha 2010; Akkoyunlu and \r\nStern 2012; Gelb et al. 2021). Such instruments could help harness \r\ndiaspora remittances, whose flows rose from under USD 100 billion \r\nto USD530 billion during 1990-2018 (World Bank 2019c). PDBs could \r\nbenefit from technical partnership with multilaterals and other local \r\nbanks (Torres and Zeidan 2016)"


id: 2f1d055c15a4004e1c0e72a7db7e9583
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Their knowledge of local markets, can \r\nhelp build project pipelines (Figure 15.7) to channel local, domestic \r\nand international capital (Griffith-Jones et  al. 2020). Institutional \r\ndomestic and international investors have growing assets estimated \r\nto exceed USD100 trillion (high confidence) (Willis Towers Watson \r\n2020; UN PRI 2020; Halland et al. 2021; Heredia et al. 2021; Inderst \r\n2021) and could be better mobilised. Some 36% of total assets under \r\nmanagement (AUM) by the 100 largest asset owners come from \r\npensions and sovereign wealth funds in the Asia Pacific region, with \r\nthe remainder split almost evenly across Europe, the Middle East, \r\nAfrica and North America. The largest pension fund in South Africa \r\nheld about USD130 billion AUM in 2019 and African institutional \r\ninvestors held USD1.8 trillion in 2020 (PwC 2015; GEPF 2019; Bagus \r\net al. 2020; GCA 2021a)"


id: 5ee58084bde9cffc88dddf51ac803cfc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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" UK NGO War on Want's (2016) analysis of \r\n101 fossil fuel and mining companies on the London Stock Exchange \r\nestimates these as holding USD1 trillion assets inside Africa. The \r\nLatin America and Caribbean region holds just about USD1 trillion \r\nAUM (Curtis 2016; Serebrisky et al. 2015; Cavallo and Powell 2019)."


id: a048f988a3c839be787329f32a66d0e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"Investors with accumulated private capital are reported as \r\nlooking for climate investments to ensure Just Transition, \r\nalignment with Paris and SDGs. However, progress remains \r\npilot, slow and piecemeal (high confidence). Global investors \r\nhave published statements on their possible contribution, with \r\nrecommendations to governments on de-risking to accelerate private \r\nsector investment to support Paris-aligned NDCs in developing \r\ncountries (IIGCC 2015; IIGCC 2017; Global Investor Statement \r\n2018; IIGCC 2018; Global Investor Statement 2019; IIGCC 2020). \r\nIn March 2020, the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), \r\nhad 3038 members representing USD103 trillion (UN PRI 2020); \r\nanother coalition of investors published COVID-19 recovery plans \r\n(Investor Agenda 2020) and the Net Zero Asset Managers initiative \r\nwas launched in December 2020 (NZAM 2020)"


id: 59568ad33c200625d446c787aa89c6f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" However, it is still \r\nunclear how these pronouncements will be transformed to adequate \r\nfinancial flows and volumes of investment pipelines (IEA 2021d) \r\n(Chapter  3). Rempel and Gupta (2020) posit that a  proportion of \r\ninstitutional holding is in fossil fuels. Clean energy transition minerals \r\nraise ESG questions around inclusive development for indigenous \r\npopulations and require changes to supply chains exploiting child \r\nlabour (Herrington 2021; IEA 2021a; IEA 2021f)."


id: 154b598fd86f9da9ae299765fb591b3a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 867
content:
"women and children (IEA 2014b; IRENA 2020b,c; IEA et  al. 2021; \r\nESMAP 2020; Zhang 2021) (Box  6.1). These dire statistics remind \r\nof compounding tensions: historical inequities and the associated \r\n'first comer' exploiting African resources for development elsewhere, \r\nthe local climate change, 'latecomer' capacity development and \r\ntechnology transfer challenges, illicit mining finance and stranded \r\nassets (Curtis 2016; Bos and Gupta 2019; UNU-INRA 2019; Arezki \r\n2021). The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbates this tension with \r\nmore people pushed below the poverty line (Sumner et  al. 2020) \r\n(section 15.6.4, Box 15.6 on post-COVID). Recent analysis points to \r\nthe 60 largest banks providing USD3.8 trillion to fossil fuel companies \r\nsince 2016, including inside Africa (Rainforest Action Network et al. \r\n2021). IMF estimated fossil fuel subsidies totalling USD5.2 trillion or \r\n6.5% of global GDP in 2017 (Coady et al. 2019) to be compared with \r\nthe USD2"


id: 7429c5e58d1595225f673f456c121037
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 15870
content:
"4 trillion yr-1 energy investments over the next decade to \r\nlimit global warming to 1.5degC (IPCC 2018). Analysts point to models \r\nin improvements to resources husbandry that include (i) developing \r\nstrong minerals sector governance through sovereign wealth funds \r\nfor domestic development (Wills et al. 2016) and (ii) compensation for \r\nAfrica (Walsh et al. 2021) leaving fossil fuels underground (McGlade \r\nand Ekins 2015) in the Just Transition (Section  15.2.4) and Right \r\nto Develop debates as assets continue to be mined (IEA 2019c). In \r\nmany developing regions, some of the world's best renewable energy \r\nsources remain out of reach due to high costs which can be up to \r\nseven times those in developed countries (IEA 2021d). Shifting some \r\nrisks through financial de-risking approaches could be instrumental "


id: 978a0999a37a5fb72aec954196d123b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"(vii) ASEAN and African multi-sovereign regional local currency bond \r\nguarantee funds and a co-guarantee platform (GGGI 2019; Garbacz \r\net al. 2021). Fossil fuels currently benefit from de-risking tools from \r\nexport credit agencies (Lawrence and Archer 2021), with questions \r\naround sustainable development (Wright 2011); Gupta et al. (2020) \r\nargue that these could be deployed for renewable energy. Sample \r\nproject facilities reflecting the diverse project types across developing \r\ncountry regions can include i) UNEP Seed Capital ii) C40 Cities Facility \r\niii) Blue Natural Capital Facility (IUCN 2021); iv) Clean Cooking Fund \r\n(ESMAP 2021) v) opportunities for guarantees in LDCs (Garbacz et al. \r\n2021) vi) World Bank's Renewables Risk Mitigation (GCF 2021) and \r\nWorld Bank's Global Infrastructure Facility (GGGI 2019)."


id: 874a912795946cc94ef0dd612da9598e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Multilaterals \r\noffer credit enhancement to manage both actual and perceived risks: \r\nin India's corporate sector, renewable energy SPV project bonds \r\nhave been guaranteed jointly by ADB and an infrastructure company \r\nraising the credit rating from sub-investment grade to investment \r\ngrade to lower borrowing costs (ADB 2018; Agarwal and Singh 2018; \r\nCarrasco 2018)."


id: b6718605a1bdb1462776b0eb6fd1d430
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"complete construction enabled by concession finance. Bank loans are \r\npaid back by issuing bonds once the construction phase is completed. \r\nSuch bond refinancing over say, 15-25 years, in the low-risk mature \r\nproject phase can provide a lower cost of capital. Market-making to \r\ndevelop a pipeline of investment opportunities uses a complimentary \r\nmix of high-risk capital options in the form of grants, guarantees, \r\nequity, and mezzanine financing that can help (Attridge and Gouett \r\n2021): (i) reduce up-front risks in the early phases, (ii) allow banks to \r\nrecycle loans to new projects, and (iii) galvanise multilateral technical \r\nassistance for building bond yield curve benchmarks and de-risking \r\nlocal currency bond issuance of long tenors such as green bonds/\r\nresilience bonds (Berensmann et al. 2015; CBI 2015; Mercer 2018; \r\nDasgupta et al. 2019; PIDG 2019; Braga et al. 2021; CBI et al. 2021; \r\nHourcade et al. 2021a,b)"


id: 1e0ce8b21373e377f2cade090125e9a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Convergence (2019) points to investment \r\nfrom commercial banks with commercial debt of 11-15 years \r\nmaturity being covered by guarantees. To achieve scale, some have \r\nissued special purpose vehicle (SPV) green infrastructure project \r\nbonds combining tenors up to 15 years with credit ratings assigned \r\nto mobilise investors with community trusts for local participation \r\n(Kaminker and Stewart 2012; Mathews and Kidney 2012; Mbeng \r\nMezui and Hundal 2013; Essers et al. 2016; Moody's Investors Service \r\n2016; Ng and Tao 2016; Harber 2017). Bond refinancing could be \r\nfacilitated through standardised national infrastructure style bonds, \r\nnational infrastructure funds (Amonya 2009; Ketterer and Powell \r\n2018) and country SPV infrastructure funds issuing bonds (Cavallo \r\nand Powell 2019) embedding MDBs."


id: 139366c460f9f4d7d0a79e8e915837ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 586
content:
"Investment vehicles into green infrastructure come in various forms \r\n(high confidence) and can include indirect corporate investment such \r\nas bonds; semi-direct investment funds via pooled vehicles such as \r\ninfrastructure funds and private equity funds and project investment \r\n(direct) in green projects through equity and debt including loans, \r\nproject bonds and green bonds. For pension funds in Australia and \r\nCanada, direct investment in infrastructure is about 5% of total AUM \r\n(Inderst and Della Croce 2013) whilst less than 1% for OECD pension \r\nfunds goes to green infrastructure (Kaminker et  al. 2013). Some \r\nregional developing country institutional investors use a variety of \r\ninvestment vehicles that span SPVs, private equity, domestic and \r\nregional local currency bond markets with statutory level mandates \r\nto address historic inequities (GEPF 2019)"


id: bb6433621650dc4d38bc88803138122b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27044
content:
" Cross-border collaboration \r\nin regional power markets such as Europe's Nordpool; for developing \r\ncountries could be led by repository of technical partnership from \r\ninfrastructure funds and multilaterals (Oseni and Pollitt 2016; Juvonen \r\net al. 2019; Chen et al. 2020; Nordpool 2021). Barriers to investments \r\ninclude non-standardised investment vehicles of scale and lack \r\nof national infrastructure road maps to give investor confidence \r\nin government commitment. Some have set up infrastructure \r\ncoordinating entities embedding local science and engineering R&D \r\n(IPA 2021; National Infrastructure Commission 2021). Arezki et  al. \r\n(2016) argue that coordination within existing platforms could create \r\na  global infrastructure investment platform for de-risking through \r\nguarantees and securitisation; Matthaus and (Mehling (2020) point \r\nto a global guarantee mechanism. Such AAA multilateral approaches \r\ncreate credibility-enhancing effects in developing capital markets"


id: 8a92468ad6aeb8002bb6d29c2af31f3a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" \r\nHourcade et al. (2021a) suggest that the overall economic efficiency \r\ncould be higher with guarantees calibrated per tonne on an agreed \r\n'social, economic, and environmental value of mitigation actions \r\n[and] their co-benefits' (Article 108, Paris Agreement) basis, which \r\nwould operate as a notional carbon price (High-Level Commission on \r\nCarbon Prices 2017). The grant equivalent of guarantees and induced \r\nequity inflows could be far beyond the USD100 billion promise. \r\nSuch cooperative solutions in adopting development of local capital \r\nmarkets would end the drawbacks of the current plethora of low\u0002scale fragmented project-by-project and 'special-purpose' pilots \r\nand programmes"


id: 57ade5a4b2d9e2b7c9d2c09a3f6844f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"Existing project risk facilities including guarantees could \r\nbenefit from coordination, scaling and better reporting \r\nframeworks (high confidence). Individual and clubs of developed \r\nand developing countries currently provide public guarantees \r\n(ADB 2015, 2018; IIGCC 2015; Pereira Dos Santos 2018; GGGI \r\n2019; Garbacz et al. 2021). However MDB business models impose \r\nlimitations on use of guarantees and collaboration with other MDBs \r\n(Gropp et al. 2014; Schiff and Dithrich 2017; Lee et al. 2018; Pereira \r\ndos Santos and Kearney 2018). Loans continue to dominate as the \r\nfinancial instrument of choice by MDBs and DFIs, with guarantees \r\nmobilising the most private finance for OECD reported data, even \r\nif their use remains limited (IATFD 2020; OECD 2020c; Attridge \r\nand Gouett 2021)"


id: afd0430e0645fa2aa7038999af2a8e43
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Ramping up the use of guarantees to mobilise \r\nprivate investment raises questions around understanding efficacy \r\nin the design as there is no one size that fits all and more research \r\nis required to better understand this aspect (Convergence 2019). \r\nSample guarantee forms in literature: (i) single-country Sweden and \r\nUSA DFI forms (SIDA 2016, DCA 2018), (ii) multilateral institution \r\nofferings (Pereira Dos Santos 2018; IRENA 2020e), (iii) multi\u0002sovereign guarantees one-stop platforms such as those on the \r\nPIDG/GuarantCo (PIDG 2019) and Africa Guarantee Fund owned \r\nby DFIs, including the African Development Bank (AfDB), the French \r\nDevelopment Agency (AFD), the Nordic Development Fund (NDF), \r\nand the KfW Development Bank (AGF 2020), (iv) MIGA, established \r\nto provide political risk guarantees (enhanced green MIGA) (Deau \r\nand Touati 2018), (v) multilateral partnerships with developing \r\nnations via infrastructure funds (Section  15.6.7"


id: c775c733d5cb233b2c903288acd0d594
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"UNFCCC 2021). LDCs supported by humanitarian entities are \r\nleast likely to have active capital markets (ICRC 2020; IDFC 2020; \r\nCao et al. 2021b). Clubs of LDCs are partnering with AAA MDBs in \r\naggregation approaches (AfDB 2020; GCF 2020b). Some UN entities \r\nprovide technical assistance on municipal aggregation of projects \r\n(UN CDF 2021a), with Africa, LDC, SIDS nations and cities accessing \r\ngreen technical facilities and listings for labelled bonds (C40 Cities \r\nClimate Leadership Group 2016; Gorelick 2018; Jackson 2019; FSD \r\nAfrica and CBI 2020; Gorelick and Walmsley 2020; MoE Fiji 2020; IFC \r\n2021c). Elevated climate risks imperil developing country ability to \r\nrepay debts (Schmidt 2014; Buhr et al. 2018; Volz et al. 2020; Dibley \r\net al. 2021)"


id: acd3c8a02f21b07b77763987e3f40a4f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" To lower overall costs and achieve more, entities have \r\naccessed technical assistance, listed local currency labelled bonds, \r\nand used credit enhancing bond guarantees, regulatory treatments \r\nand philanthropy schemes (Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative 2012; \r\nSBN 2018; Agliardi and Agliardi 2019; Banga 2019). In the regions, \r\nChina issued guidelines for stock exchanges and regulatory support \r\nfor green bonds (Cao and Ma 2021), India issued regulations for \r\nlocal issuance of green bonds (CBI 2019a), while in the Latin America \r\nand Caribbean region, both plain vanilla and labelled bonds use the \r\nsame authority (Ketterer et al. 2019). African, LDC and SIDS nations \r\nare reviewing ways to harness local exchanges (SSE 2018; GCF \r\n2019; World Bank et al. 2021b; UN CDF 2021b). For taxonomies, the \r\ndifferences reflect the multitude of local Just Transition pathways, \r\nsome with a  purely environmental focus and others incorporating \r\nlivelihood improvements (ICMA 2021)"


id: 6f25d31a6d7d85a8db5198c3ad6e753b
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content:
" The sustainable bond market \r\nhas been expanding as transition bonds become listed in anticipation \r\nof future developments (Roos 2021)."


id: a843e1970de859d6e49401a5df77f20
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 23998
content:
"Harnessing existing bond markets and securities exchanges \r\nin nascent markets. The G20 has an action plan to support \r\nstrengthening local currency bond markets and development of local \r\ncapital markets is also part of the option for financing UN SDGs in \r\ndeveloping countries (UN 2015a, 2019, 2020; IATFD 2016, 2021). \r\nPrimers are available on bond market development to support policy \r\nchoices (World Bank and IMF 2001; Silva et  al. 2020; World Bank \r\n2020; Adrian et al 2021; IMF and World Bank 2021). Developing \r\ngovernment bond yield curves with different maturities can be an \r\nimportant policy objective (high confidence). This can support pricing \r\ndiscovery, liquidity (Wooldridge 2001) and can be achieved through \r\nstep by step tranches from shorter to longer maturities to boost \r\nconfidence and encourage municipals and other quasi-sovereigns"


id: 9b19e47fa3701168f31a99621193241c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" \r\nMoney market instruments (such as, green commercial paper) anchor \r\nthe short end of the yield curve with bonds of varying maturity issued \r\nby sovereign/quasi-sovereign entities (national treasuries, SOEs, \r\nmunicipalities) to mobilise investors (Goodfriend 2011; LSEG 2018; \r\nTolliver et al. 2019). A variety of bonds are being used for developing \r\ncountries including green (Ketterer et  al. 2019), blue-water (Roth \r\net  al. 2019), transition, SDG/social, biodiversity bonds (Aglionby \r\n2019), green/resilience bonds (AAC 2021); gender bonds (Andrade \r\nand Prado 2020) diaspora (LSEG 2017) and infrastructure project \r\nbonds (CBK 2021). Local policymakers would gain from technical \r\nand financial assistance in building green yield curves, for example \r\nwith support from multilaterals (EIB 2012; IATFD 2016; Shi 2017; EIB \r\n2018; Impact Investing Institute 2021). Green bonds are one of the \r\nmost readily accessible to help fund Paris goals (Tolliver et al"


id: 79d367a0b27d8d28c34a1c5b11e6ede2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16739
content:
" 2019; \r\nTuhkanen and Vulturius 2020). Section 15.3.2 refers to the growth in \r\nlabelled bond markets (CBI 2021a), low borrowing costs and yield \r\ncurve building in Europe (Bahceli 2020; Serenelli 2021; Stubbington \r\n2021; UK DMO 2021). For developing countries, labelled bonds have \r\nmostly been in hard currency (e.g. Smith 2021) despite local currency \r\nmarkets making up more than 80% total debt stock (IMF and World \r\nBank 2016; Silva et al. 2020; Adrian et al 2021; Inderst 2021). The \r\nlabelled bonds issuance by multilaterals do not currently mobilise \r\nthe trillion levels needed. Research studies show that participating \r\nin green bond markets in part depends on a country having credible \r\nNDCs (Tolliver et  al. 2020a; Tolliver et  al. 2020b) and highlights \r\ndiverse approaches working together to support local bond market \r\ndevelopment (Amacker and Donovan 2021; ICMA 2021; IMF and \r\nWorld Bank 2021)."


id: 56f849f354083028fb798a7ab4b4da29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 11158
content:
"Progress towards transparency using scientific-based methods \r\nto build trust and accountability. After 60 years of development \r\nfinance, critics underline limits coming from i) multilaterals model, \r\nlack of transparency around aid and debt (Mkandawire 2010; Lee \r\n2017; PWYF 2019; Bradlow 2021; Gianfagna et  al. 2021) ii) illicit \r\nfinance (Plank 1993; Sachs and Warner 2001; Hanlon 2016; US DoJ \r\n2019) ) iii) lack of developed country commitment to pledges (Nhamo \r\nand Nhamo 2016) iv) unregulated players as financial intermediaries \r\nin blended finance (Pereira 2017; Donaldson and Hawkes 2018; \r\nAttridge and Engen 2019; Tan 2019) v) weak accountability reflected \r\nin soft SDG data and vi) burden of responsibility in mobilising Paris \r\nand SDG resources to countries with historically soft institutional \r\ncapacity (Hickel 2015; Donald and Way 2016; Scheyvens et al. 2016; \r\nLiverman 2018). Literature around trust in blended finance pinpoints \r\nfour progress areas in accountability"


id: 513c7fde135375c86b214c9290f1ad84
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 10233
content:
" First, debt transparency through \r\npublic debt registries, centralised UN legacy debt restructuring and \r\nscience-centred UN national statistical systems (Donaldson and \r\nHawkes 2018; Jubilee Debt Campaign 2019; Stiglitz and Rashid 2020). \r\nSecond, international reporting bell-weathers could be called upon to \r\nproduce harmonised mandatory reporting frameworks that capitalise \r\non TCFD to capture climate, debt sustainability (Section 15.6.7.3), SDG \r\nand fossil fuels (GISD 2020). Third, standardisation of assessment by \r\nthird parties of the quantity and values of carbon saved by green \r\nprojects (Hourcade et al. 2012) and of their contribution to quantified \r\nperformance biodiversity targets (Finance for Biodiversity Initiative \r\n2021) to facilitate their bundling, securitisation and repackaging in \r\nstandardised liquid products and bonds (Arezki et al. 2016; Blended \r\nFinance Taskforce 2018a)."


id: 229b4610ac676ccc8df600063baca1ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 2898
content:
"Financial technology applications to climate change. Financial \r\ntechnology, abbreviated as 'fintech', applies to data-driven \r\ntechnological solutions that aim to improve financial services \r\n(Dorfleitner et al. 2017; Lee and Shin 2018; Schueffel 2018). Fintech \r\ncan enhance climate investment in innovative financial products and \r\nbuild trust through data, but also presents some challenges including \r\npotentially significant emissions from increased energy use with \r\ndistributed transactions (Lei et al. 2021). Blockchain is a key fintech \r\nthat secures individual transactions in a  distributed system, which \r\ncan have many applications with high impact potential but is also \r\nassociated with uncertainty (OECD 2019c; World Energy Council \r\n2019). Fintech applications with climate change mitigation potential \r\nhave been growing recently, including tracking payment or asset \r\nhistory for credit scoring in AFOLU activities (Nassiry 2018; Davidovic \r\net al"


id: de4e42ac254bfdeb9fdfaed50c904f46
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32466
content:
" 2019), blockchain supported grid transactions (Livingston et al. \r\n2018), carbon accounting throughout value chains (World Bank \r\n2018b), or transparency and verification mechanisms for green \r\nfinancial instrument investors (Kyriakou et al. 2017; Stockholm Green \r\nDigital Finance 2017). Generally, blockchain and digital currency \r\napplications are not well covered by governance systems (Tapscott \r\nand Kirkland 2016; Nassiry 2018), which could lead to problems with \r\nsecurity (Davidovic et al. 2019), and some licensing and prudential \r\nsupervision frameworks are in flux."


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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"Current main challenges of REDD+ finance include the uncertainty of \r\ncompliance carbon markets (which allow regulated entities to obtain \r\nand surrender emissions allowances or offsets to meet regulatory \r\nemissions reduction targets) (Maguire et al. 2021), as well as limited \r\nengagement of the private sector in REDD+ finance (high confidence). \r\nWith regard to the compliance carbon markets, at the international \r\nlevel, integrating climate cooperation through carbon markets into \r\nArticle 6 of the Paris Agreement and including REDD+ has potential \r\nto enable emission reduction in more cost-effective ways, while the \r\nlinks between carbon markets and REDD+ under Article 6 is under \r\ndiscussion at the UNFCCC (Environmental Defense Fund 2019; \r\nMaguire et al. 2021) (Chapter 14)"


id: 1ddae153e3dbf5fe17a806e86848449c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" At the national and subnational \r\nlevels, although compliance carbon markets such as in New Zealand, \r\nAustralia and Colombia allow forest carbon units, how REDD+ will \r\nbe dealt in the national and subnational government-led compliance \r\ncarbon markets is uncertain (Streck 2020; Maguire et al. 2021). As \r\nfor limited engagement of the private sector in REDD+ finance, there \r\nare various reasons why mobilising more private finance in REDD+ is \r\ndifficult (Dixon and Challies 2015; Laing et al. 2016; Golub et al. 2018; \r\nEhara et al. 2019; Streck 2020). The challenges include the needs of \r\na  clear understanding of carbon rights and transparent regulation \r\non who can benefit from national REDD+ (Streck 2020); a  clear \r\nregulatory framework and market certainty (Dixon and Challies 2015; \r\nLaing et al. 2016; Golub et al. 2018; Ehara et al. 2019); strong forest \r\ngovernance (Streck 2020), and implementation of REDD+ activities \r\nat national and subnational levels"


id: 44e672e0dd7cd2df38330eeedfa346ef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Other challenges are associated \r\nwith the nature of forest-based mitigation activities, the costs and \r\ncomplexity of monitoring, reporting and verification of REDD+ \r\nactivities, because of the need to consider the risks of permanence, \r\ncarbon leakage, and precisely determine and monitor the forest \r\ncarbon sinks (van der Gaast et al. 2018; Yanai et al. 2020). Although \r\nREDD+ has many challenges to mobilise more private finance, there \r\nis discussion on exploring other finance opportunities for the forest \r\nsector, such as building new blended finance models combining \r\ndifferent funding sources like public and private finance (Streck 2016; \r\nRode et al. 2019), and developing enhanced bonds for forest-based \r\nmitigation activities (World Bank 2017)."


id: 4dec1f094259ea33439812a9bc5153fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"REDD+. REDD+ can significantly contribute to climate change \r\nmitigation and also produce other co-benefits like climate \r\nchange adaptation, biodiversity conservation, and poverty reduction, \r\nif well-implemented (high confidence) (Milbank et al. 2018; Morita \r\nand Matsumoto 2018). We use the term REDD+ broadly, not limited \r\nto REDD+ implemented under the UNFCCC decisions, including \r\nWarsaw Framework for REDD+ (Chapter 14), but include voluntary \r\nREDD+ projects, such as projects which utilise voluntary carbon \r\nmarkets. Finance is a core element that incentivises and implements \r\nREDD+ activities. Various financial sources are financing REDD+ \r\nactivities, including bilateral and multilateral, public and private, \r\nand international and domestic sources, with linking with several \r\nfinance approaches/mechanisms including results-based finance \r\nand voluntary carbon markets (FAO 2018)"


id: f87669f27a00525c29a09a42d2ace547
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" However, there is lack \r\nof sufficient finance for REDD+ (Lujan and Silva-Chavez 2018; \r\nMaguire et  al. 2021). REDD+ under the UNFCCC is implemented \r\nin three phases: readiness, implementation, and results-based \r\npayment phases. The Ecosystem Marketplace identified that at least \r\nUSD5.4 billion in REDD+ in three phases funding has been committed \r\nthrough multiple development finance institutions so far (Maguire \r\net al. 2021), and public funds are main sources that are supporting \r\nthree phases, and most of the REDD+ finance was spent on the \r\nreadiness phase (Atmadja et al. 2018; Lujan and Silva-Chavez 2018; \r\nWatson and Schalatek 2021). There is a significant gap between the \r\nexisting finance and finance needs of REDD+ in each phase (Lujan \r\nand Silva-Chavez 2018)"


id: 6f270483f5ffe44ad6757df4d1cfb81e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 15114
content:
" Furthermore, private sector contributions to \r\nREDD+ are currently limited mostly to the project-scale payments for \r\ncarbon offsets/units through voluntary carbon markets (McFarland \r\n2015; Lujan and Silva-Chavez 2018)."


id: e110ca9ee48b54c886ebc8fcad0d8646
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32906
content:
"Private finance opportunities for nature-based solutions. The \r\ndevelopment of nature-based solutions faces barriers that relate to \r\nthe value proposition, value delivery and value capture of nature\u0002based solutions business models and sustainable sources of public/\r\nprivate finance to tap into (high confidence) (Toxopeus and Polzin \r\n2017; Mok et al. 2021). However, the demand for establishing new \r\nfinance and business models to attract both public and private \r\nfinance to nature-based solutions is increasing in a wide range of \r\ntopics such as urban areas, forestry and agriculture sectors, and blue \r\nnatural capital including mangroves and coral reefs (Toxopeus and \r\nPolzin 2017; EIB 2019; Cziesielski et al. 2021; Mok et al. 2021; Thiele \r\net al. 2021; UNEP et al. 2021)"


id: f04f492fb07a37aabdd71fdf766f7369
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35310
content:
" Furthermore, the recognition of the \r\nneeds of financial institutions to identify the physical, transition and \r\nreputational risks resulting from not only climate change but also loss \r\nof biodiversity is gradually increasing (De Nederlandsche Bank and \r\nPBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 2020; Dasgupta \r\n2021; TNFD 2021). Development of finance and business models for \r\nnature-based solutions needs to be explored, for example through \r\nutilising a  wide range of financial instruments (e.g.,  equity, loans, "


id: 662fb2fd8a3e02f14337aa1b9f804364
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 13665
content:
"15.6.8.3 Exploring Gender-responsive Climate Finance\r\nGlobal and national recognition of the lack of finance for women has \r\nled to increasing emphasis on financial inclusion for women (high \r\nconfidence). Currently, it is estimated that 980 million women are \r\nexcluded from formal financial system (Miles and Wiedmaier-Pfister \r\n2018); and there is a  9% gender gap in financial access across \r\ndeveloping countries (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2018). This gender gap \r\nis the percentage difference between men and women with bank \r\naccounts as measured and reported in the Global Financial Inclusion \r\n(Global Findex) database. Policies and frameworks to expand and \r\nenhance financial inclusion also extend to the area of climate \r\nfinance (high confidence). Since AR5, there remain many questions \r\nand not enough evidence on the gender, distribution and allocative \r\neffectiveness of climate finance in the context of gender equality and \r\nwomen's empowerment (Williams M., 2015; Chan et al"


id: 6652ab113914ec78d692385972c21559
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" 2018; Wong \r\net al. 2019). Nonetheless, the existing global policy framework (entry \r\npoints, policy priorities, etc.) of climate funds is gradually improving \r\nin order to support women's financial inclusion in both the public \r\nand the private dimensions of climate finance/investment (Schalatek \r\n2015; Chan et  al. 2018; Schalatek 2020). At the level of public \r\nmultilateral climate funds, there have been significant improvements \r\nin integrating gender equality and women's empowerment \r\nissues in the governance structures, policies, project approval and \r\nimplementation processes of existing multilateral climate funds such \r\nas the UNFCCC's funds managed by the Global Environment Facility, \r\nthe Green Climate Fund and the World Bank's CIFs (high confidence) \r\n(Schalatek 2015; Williams M., 2015; Sellers 2016; GCF 2017)"


id: 6571da57d1d9cc8167c6ae6f6024b2b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" But \r\naccording to a  recent evaluation report, the integration of gender \r\ninto operational policies and programmes is fragmented and there is \r\nlack of an 'adequate, systematic and comprehensive gender equality \r\napproach for the allocation and distribution of funds for projects \r\nand programmes on the ground' (GEF Independent Evaluation \r\nOffice 2017; Schalatek 2018). The review found that 'almost half \r\nof the analysed sample of 70 climate projects were judged to be \r\nlargely gender-blind, and only 5% considered to have successfully \r\nmainstreamed gender, including in two Least Developed Countries \r\nFund adaptation projects' (GEF Independent Evaluation Office \r\n2017; Schalatek 2018)"


id: 6ad686e9c4ce8f9afcc011fac12ce567
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 14421
content:
" While the GCF requires funding proposals \r\nto consider gender impact as part of their investment framework,16\r\nthe fund does not have its own funding stream targeted to women's \r\nproject on the ground, nor is there as yet an evaluation as to how \r\nentities are actually implementing gender action plan in the projects. \r\nIn the case of the CIFs, as noted by Schalatek (2018), 'gender is not \r\nincluded in the operational principles of the Pilot Program on Climate \r\nResilience (PPCR), which funds programmatic adaptation portfolios \r\nin a  few developing countries, although most pilot countries have "


id: be2ce763c7bfffed0a3154c040d55d44
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27476
content:
"Overall, efforts to promote gender responsive/sensitive climate \r\nfinance, at national and local levels, both in the public and private \r\ndimensions and more specifically in mitigation-oriented sectors such \r\nas clean and renewable energy, remain deficient (high confidence). \r\nRecent developments in the capital markets in the areas of social \r\nbond are focused around gender bonds - debt instruments targeted \r\nto activities and behaviours that are relevant to gender equality and \r\nwomen's empowerment. These bonds are aligned with Sustainability\u0002linked Bonds as well as Social Bonds Principles of the International \r\nCapital Market Association. Issuances of gender-labelled bonds \r\nare increasing in the Asia Pacific region (the most comprehensive \r\ninitiative is the Impact Investment Exchange's (IIX) multi-country \r\nUSD150 million Women's Livelihood Bond17) and in Latin America, \r\nColombia, Mexico and Panama each have gender bond issuances)"


id: 3fa5d1edaffed53dbf3e8f3089a338bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 7402
content:
" \r\nAdditionally, a few developing countries, such as Pakistan (May 2021) \r\nand Morocco (March 2021) have issued gender bond guidelines for \r\nfinancial market participants."


id: fd282934073450c190e34b194badfc11
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
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vector_id: 37342
content:
"Linkage to sectoral climate change issues and gender and \r\nclimate finance. Subsets of actions designed to enhance women's \r\nmore formal integration into climate policies, programmes and \r\nactions by the global private sector include: investment in clean \r\nenergy, redirecting funds to support women and vulnerable regions \r\nas a component of social and green bonds as well as insurance for \r\nclimate risk management. In the latter context, insurance providers \r\nare arguing that 'given the fact that women are disproportionately \r\naffected by climate change, there could be new finance innovations \r\nto address this gap'.(Miles and Wiedmaier-Pfister 2018). AXA \r\nand IFC estimate that the global women's insurance market \r\nhas the opportunity to grow to three times its current size, to \r\nUDS1.7  trillion by 2030 (AXA Group et  al. 2015; GIZ et  al. 2017)"


id: 3459e0eb8d929127a82b23e3aafcced6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" \r\nHowever, across the board, and in particular with regard to public \r\nfunds, despite improvements in the substantive gender sensitisation \r\nand operational gender responsiveness of multilateral and bilateral \r\nclimate finance funds operations, current flows of public and climate \r\nfinance do not seem to be going to women and local communities \r\nin significant amounts (Chan et  al. 2018; Schalatek 2020). At the \r\nsame time, evaluations of the effectiveness of climate finance show \r\nthat equitable flow of climate finance can play an important role \r\nin levelling the playing field and in enabling women and men to \r\nsuccessfully respond to climate change and to enable the success and \r\nsustainability of local response in ensuring effective and sustainable "


id: 3f04b0dac7ecf5990d01b783f7ee6fa0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"The Paris Agreement has widened the scope of all financial flows from climate finance only to the full alignment of finance flows \r\nwith the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. While climate finance relates historically to the financial support of developed \r\ncountries to developing countries, the Paris Agreement and its Article 2.1(c) have developed a new narrative that goes much beyond \r\ntraditional flows and relates to all sectors and actors. Finance flows are consistent when the effects are either neutral with or \r\nwithout positive climate co-benefits to climate objectives; or explicitly targeted to climate benefits in adaptation and/or mitigation \r\nresult areas. Climate-related financial risk is still massively underestimated by financial institutions, financial decision-makers more \r\ngenerally and also among public sector stakeholders, limiting the sector's potential of being an enabler of the transition"


id: 5e07d7bbd6bc447e770b4f5be9f07de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 12324
content:
" The private \r\nsector has started to recognise climate-related risks and consequently redirect investment flows. Dynamics vary across sectors and \r\nregions with the financial sector being an enabler of transitions in only some selected (sub-)sectors and regions. Consistent, credible, \r\ntimely and forward-looking political leadership remains central to strengthen the financial sector as enabler."


id: b46246f65591739ccdc9d75096c9bc68
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 25898
content:
"Progress on the alignment of financial flows with low GHG emissions pathways remains slow. Annual global climate finance \r\nflows are on an upward trend since the Fifth Assessment Report, according to the Climate Policy Initiative reaching more than \r\nUSD630 billion in 2019/2020, however, growth has likely slowed down and flows remain significantly below needs. This is driven \r\nby barriers within and outside the financial sector. More than 90% of financing is allocated to mitigation activities despite the \r\nstrong economic rationale of adaptation action. Adjusting for higher estimates on current flows for energy efficiency based on \r\nInternational Energy Agency data, the dominance of mitigation becomes even stronger. Persistently high levels of both public and \r\nprivate fossil-fuel related financing as well as other misaligned flows continue to be of major concern despite recent commitments"


id: bd853180f8ead05544fc578ff77bb81c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 27385
content:
" \r\nSignificant progress has been made in the commercial finance sector with regard to the awareness of climate risks resulting from \r\ninadequate financial flows and climate action. However, a more consequent investment and policy decision-making that enables \r\na rapid redirection of financial flows is needed. Regulatory support as a catalyser is an essential driver of such redirections. Dynamics \r\nacross sectors and regions vary, with some being better positioned to close financing gaps and to benefit from an enabling role of \r\nfinance in the short-term."


id: f1ed4a45fef7795882629a41fd43b075
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"Maarten van Aalst (the Netherlands), Lara Aleluia Reis (Portugal), Mustafa Babiker (Sudan/Saudi \r\nArabia), Xuemei Bai (Australia), Rudi Bekkers (the Netherlands), Paolo Bertoldi (Italy), Sara Burch \r\n(Canada), Luisa F. Cabeza (Spain), Clara Caiafa (Brazil/the Netherlands), Brett Cohen (South Africa), \r\nFelix Creutzig (Germany), Renee van Diemen (the Netherlands/United Kingdom), Maria Josefina \r\nFigueroa Meza (Venezuela/Denmark), Clara Galeazzi (Argentina), Frank Geels (United Kingdom/\r\nthe Netherlands), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), Kirsten Halsnaes (Denmark), Joni Jupesta \r\n(Indonesia/Japan), Siir Kilkis (Turkey), Michael Konig (Germany), Jonathan Kohler (Germany), \r\nAbhishek Malhotra (India), Eric Masanet (the United States of America), William McDowall \r\n(United Kingdom), Nikola Milojevic-Dupont (France), Catherine Mitchell (United Kingdom), \r\nGregory F. Nemet (the United States of America/Canada), Lars J"


id: 178cc62400dde47343ecd1de41d87ca8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"innovation policy instruments would nonetheless have to be tailored \r\nto local development priorities, to the specific context of different \r\ncountries, and to the technology being supported. The timing of \r\ninterventions and any trade-offs with sustainable development \r\nalso need to be addressed. Public R&D funding and support, as \r\nwell as innovation procurement, have proven valuable for fostering \r\ninnovation in small to medium cleantech firms. Innovation outcomes \r\nof policy instruments not necessarily aimed at innovation, such \r\nas feed-in tariffs, auctions, emissions trading schemes, taxes and \r\nrenewable portfolio standards, vary from negligible to positive for \r\nclimate change mitigation. Some specific designs of environmental \r\ntaxation can also result in negative distributional outcomes. Most \r\nof the available literature and evidence on innovation systems \r\ncome from industrialised countries and larger developing countries"


id: 32be9b1202acf40e9954c64c5b6e12e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" \r\nHowever, there is a  growing body of evidence from developing \r\ncountries and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). {16.4, 16.4.4.3, \r\n16.4.4.4, 16.5, 16.7}"


id: 2979a8d22b113b9236d2aea7a7c34a52
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"Innovation in climate mitigation technologies has seen \r\nenormous activity and significant progress in recent years. \r\nInnovation has also led to, and exacerbated, trade-offs \r\nin relation to sustainable development (high confidence). \r\nInnovation can leverage action to mitigate climate change by \r\nreinforcing other interventions. In conjunction with other enabling \r\nconditions, innovation can support system transitions to limit \r\nwarming and help shift development pathways. The currently \r\nwidespread implementation of solar photovoltaic (solar PV) and \r\nlight-emitting diodes (LEDs), for instance, could not have happened \r\nwithout technological innovation (high confidence). Technological \r\ninnovation can also bring about new and improved ways of delivering \r\nservices that are essential to human well-being"


id: 7c7d98abb966b55c18b8cbf056b87bb4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" At the same time \r\nas delivering benefits, innovation can result in trade-offs that \r\nundermine both progress on mitigation and progress towards other \r\nSustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Trade-offs include negative \r\nexternalities  - for instance, greater environmental pollution and \r\nsocial inequalities - rebound effects leading to lower net emission \r\nreductions or even increases in emissions, and increased dependency \r\non foreign knowledge and providers (high confidence). Effective \r\ngovernance and policy has the potential to avoid and minimise such \r\nmisalignments (medium evidence, high agreement). {16.1, 16.2, \r\n16.3, 16.4, 16.5.1, 16.6}"


id: 110bfa4e69ce341de46ab0fdccf6e8b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 163
content:
"Experience and analyses show that technological change is \r\ninhibited if technological innovation system functions are \r\nnot adequately fulfilled. This inhibition occurs more often \r\nin developing countries (high confidence). Examples of such \r\nfunctions are knowledge development, resource mobilisation, and \r\nactivities that shape the needs, requirements and expectations \r\nof actors within the innovation system (guidance of the search). \r\nCapabilities play a key role in these functions, the build-up of which \r\ncan be enhanced by domestic measures, but also by international \r\ncooperation (high confidence). For instance, innovation cooperation \r\non wind energy has contributed to the accelerated global spread \r\nof this technology"


id: 2deadac7a164f3a8dfb9e5a06e4cf31c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4659
content:
" As another example, the policy guidance by the \r\nIndian government, which also promoted development of data, \r\ntesting capabilities and knowledge within the private sector, has been \r\na key determinant of the success of an energy-efficiency programme \r\nfor air conditioners and refrigerators in India. {16.3, 16.5, 16.6, Cross\u0002Chapter Box 12 in this chapter, Box 16.2}"


id: 61a3987426f59a04b4c22819187e9bb8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12928
content:
"A systemic view of innovation to direct and organise the \r\nprocesses has grown over the last decade. This systemic view \r\nof innovation takes into account the role of actors, institutions \r\nand their interactions, and can inform how innovation systems \r\nthat vary across technologies, sectors and countries, can \r\nbe strengthened (high confidence). Where a systemic view of \r\ninnovation has been taken, it has enabled the development and \r\nimplementation of indicators that are better able to provide insights \r\ninto innovation processes. This, in turn, has enabled the analysis \r\nand strengthening of innovation systems. Traditional quantitative \r\ninnovation indicators mainly include research and development \r\n(R&D) investments and patents. Systemic indicators of innovation, \r\nhowever, go well beyond these approaches"


id: 8e30c49f1a312a39eec6f29292a1fa94
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19901
content:
" They include structural \r\ninnovation system elements including actors and networks, as well \r\nas indicators for how innovation systems function, such as access to \r\nfinance, employment in relevant sectors, and lobbying activities. For \r\nexample, in Latin America, monitoring systemic innovation indicators \r\nfor the effectiveness of agroecological mitigation approaches has \r\nprovided insights on the appropriateness and social alignment of \r\nnew technologies and practices. Climate-energy-economy models, \r\nincluding integrated assessment models, generally employ a stylised \r\nand necessarily incomplete view of innovation, and have yet to \r\nincorporate a systemic representation of innovation systems. {16.2, \r\n16.2.4, 16.3, 16.3.4, 16.5, Table 16.7, Box 16.1, Box 16.3, Box 16.10}"


id: ab688b496782f72892d4cb9b13ded0b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24485
content:
"Although some initiatives have mobilised investments in \r\ndeveloping countries, gaps in innovation cooperation remain, \r\nincluding in the Paris Agreement instruments. These gaps \r\ncould be filled by enhancing financial support for international \r\ntechnology cooperation, by strengthening cooperative \r\napproaches, and by helping build suitable capacity in developing \r\ncountries across all technological innovation system functions \r\n(high confidence). The implementation of current arrangements of \r\ninternational cooperation for technology development and transfer, \r\nas well as capacity building, are insufficient to meet climate objectives \r\nand contribute to sustainable development"


id: b0cda42799d8a90c327d45fa8bebe0ac
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content:
" For example, despite \r\nbuilding a  large market for mitigation technologies in developing \r\ncountries, the lack of a systemic perspective in the implementation \r\nof the Clean Development Mechanism, operational since the mid\u00022000s, has only led to some technology transfer, especially to larger \r\ndeveloping countries, but limited capacity building and minimal \r\ntechnology development (medium confidence). In the current \r\nclimate regime, a more systemic approach to innovation cooperation \r\ncould be introduced by linking technology institutions, such as the \r\nTechnology Mechanism, and financial actors, such as the financial \r\nmechanism. {16.5.3}"


id: b6503c3b5721a92ec466485c2c959db8
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"Better and more comprehensive data on innovation indicators \r\ncan provide timely insights for policymakers and policy design \r\nlocally, nationally and internationally, especially for developing \r\ncountries, where such insights are missing more often. Data \r\nneeded include those that can show the strength of technological, \r\nsectoral and national innovation systems. It is also necessary to \r\nvalidate current results and generate insights from theoretical \r\nframeworks and empirical studies for developing countries contexts. \r\nInnovation studies on adaptation and mitigation other than energy \r\nand ex-post assessments of the effectiveness of various innovation\u0002related policies and interventions, including R&D, would also provide \r\nbenefits"


id: 40aed32e8874be2c2d88b21331f94d22
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Furthermore, methodological developments to improve the \r\nability of integrated assessment models (IAMs) to capture energy \r\ninnovation system dynamics, and the relevant institutions and \r\npolicies (including design and implementation), would allow for more \r\nrealistic assessment. {16.2, 16.3, 16.7}"


id: 8e3d69df2c6c1de0594f1174e1da2147
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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"Countries are exposed to sustainable development challenges \r\nin parallel with the challenges that relate to climate change. \r\nAddressing both sets of challenges simultaneously presents \r\nmultiple and recurrent obstacles that systemic approaches \r\nto technological change could help resolve, provided they \r\nare well managed (high confidence). Obstacles include both \r\nentrenched power relations dominated by vested interests that \r\ncontrol and benefit from existing technologies, and governance \r\nstructures that continue to reproduce unsustainable patterns of \r\nproduction and consumption (medium confidence). Studies also \r\nhighlight the potential for cultural factors to strongly influence the \r\npace and direction of technological change. Sustainable solutions \r\nrequire adoption and mainstreaming of locally novel technologies \r\nthat can meet local needs, and simultaneously address the SDGs"


id: e87488ff952d9701e3cc9c2310772be3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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" \r\nAcknowledging the systemic nature of technological innovation, \r\nwhich involves many levels of actors, stages of innovation and \r\nscales, can lead to new opportunities to shift development pathways \r\ntowards sustainability. {16.4, 16.5, 16.6}"


id: 3b189fb23ac702f7379783c835df0de9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"The literature refers to the terms 'technology push', 'market pull', \r\n'regulatory push-pull', and 'firm specific factors' as drivers for \r\ninnovation, mostly to inform policymakers (Zubeltzu-Jaka et al. 2018). \r\nThere has also been growing interest in social drivers, motivated by the \r\nrecognition of social issues, such as unemployment and public health, \r\nlinked to the deployment of innovative low-carbon technologies \r\n(Altantsetseg et al. 2020). Policy and social factors and the diverse \r\ntrajectories of innovation are influenced by regional and national \r\nconditions (Tariq et al. 2017), and such local needs and purposes need \r\nto be considered in crafting international policies aimed at fostering \r\nthe global transition towards increased sustainability (Caravella and \r\nCrespi 2020)"


id: 7d616eccd9fe73e1672a4d86076e55d7
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content:
" From this standpoint, a multidimensional, multi-actor, \r\nsystemic innovation approach would be needed to enhance global \r\ninnovation diffusion (de Jesus and Mendonca 2018), especially if this \r\nis to lead to overall sustainability improvements rather than result in \r\nnew sustainability challenges."


id: 37e26efd19bda167906ef98fa74b7431
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"Policies to mitigate climate change do not always take into account \r\nthe effects of mitigation technologies on other environmental \r\nand social challenges (Arvesen et al. 2011). Policies also often \r\ndisregard the strong linkages between technological innovation \r\nand social innovation; the latter is understood to be the use of soft \r\ntechnologies that brings about transformation through establishing \r\nnew institutions, new practices, and new models to create a positive \r\nsocietal impact, characterised by collaboration that crosses traditional \r\nroles and boundaries, between citizens, civil society, the state, and \r\nthe private sector (Reynolds et al. 2017). Market forces do not provide \r\nsufficient incentives for investment in development or diffusion of \r\ntechnologies, leaving a role for public policy to create the conditions \r\nto assure a  systemic innovation approach (Popp 2010; Popp and \r\nNewell 2012)"


id: 6779b542ce0b0541902e12038ffab3e2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" Moreover, public action is more than just addressing \r\nmarket failure, it is an unalienable element of an innovation system \r\n(Mazzucato 2013)."


id: f91b211c4e9f963bb3b599ed2f99f46f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"This phase of the innovation process focuses on generating \r\nknowledge or solving particular problems by creating a combination \r\nof artefacts to perform a particular function, or to achieve a specific \r\ngoal. R&D activities comprise basic research, applied research \r\nand technology development. Basic research is experimental or \r\ntheoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge \r\nof the underlying foundations of phenomena and observable facts, \r\nwithout any particular application or use in view. Applied research is \r\noriginal investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge, \r\nprimarily directed towards a  specific, practical aim or objective \r\n(OECD 2015a). Importantly, R&D activities can be incremental - that \r\nis, focused on addressing a  specific need by marginally improving \r\nan existing technology  - or radical, representing a  paradigm shift, \r\npromoted by new opportunities arising with the accumulation of new \r\nknowledge (Mendonca et al. 2018)"


id: b404ea53ecb4bb221469d64b37080fde
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content:
" Technology development, often \r\nleading to prototyping, consists of generating a  working model of \r\nthe technology that is usable in the real world, proving the usability \r\nand customer desirability of the technology, and giving an idea of \r\nits design, features and function (OECD 2015a). These early stages "


id: 857c566f56ec427b9a5178ffc5a49bef
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content:
"The outcomes of R&D are uncertain: the amount of knowledge that \r\nwill result from any given research project or investment is unknown \r\nex ante (Rosenberg 1998). This risk to funders (Goldstein and \r\nKearney 2020) translates into underinvestment in R&D due to low \r\nappropriability (Weyant 2011; Sagar and Majumdar 2014). In the case \r\nof climate mitigation technologies, low innovation incentives for the \r\nprivate sector also result from a negative environmental externality \r\n(Jaffe et al. 2005). Furthermore, in the absence of stringent climate \r\npolicies and targets, incumbent fossil-based energy technologies are \r\ncharacterised by lower financing risk, are heavily subsidised (Davis \r\n2014; Kotchen 2021), and depreciate slowly (Arrow 1962a; Nanda \r\net al. 2016; Semieniuk et al. 2021) (Section 16.2.3)"


id: 60901ee80507261f4fe182868ed04bcd
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content:
" In this context, \r\npublic research funding plays a  key role in supporting high-risk \r\nR&D, both in developed and developing economies: it can provide \r\npatient and steady funding not tied to short-term investment returns \r\n(Kammen and Nemet 2007; Anadon et al. 2014; Mazzucato 2015a; \r\nChan and Diaz Anadon 2016; Anadon et al. 2017; Howell 2017; \r\nZhang et al. 2019) (Section 16.4). Public policies also play a role in \r\nincreasing private incentives in energy research and development \r\nfunding (Nemet 2013). R&D statistics are an important indicator \r\nof innovation and are collected following the rules of the Frascati \r\nManual (OECD 2015a) (Section 16.3.3, Box 16.3 and Table 16.7)."


id: 95b172fd6be6d9e11f10031781b116f
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"Demonstration is carried out through pilot projects or large-scale \r\ntesting in the real world. Successfully demonstrating a  technology \r\nshows its utility and that it is able to achieve its intended purpose and, \r\nconsequently, that the risk of failure is reduced (i.e., that it has market \r\npotential) (Hellsmark et al. 2016). Demonstration projects are an \r\nimportant step to promote the deployment of low-carbon energy and \r\nindustrial technologies in the context of the transition. Government \r\nfunding often plays a large role in energy technology demonstration \r\nprojects because scaling up hardware energy technologies is \r\nexpensive and risky (Brown and Hendry 2009; Hellsmark et al. 2016). \r\nGovernments' engagement in low-carbon technology demonstration \r\nalso signals support for businesses willing to take the investment \r\nrisk (Mazzucato 2016)"


id: 78584d408fc246e73d5cf013b419ee34
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content:
" Venture capital, traditionally not tailored \r\nfor energy investment, can also play an increasingly important role, \r\nthanks to the incentives (e.g., through de-risking) provided by public \r\nfunding and policies (Gaddy et al. 2017; IEA 2017a)."


id: 99a5f048f5ca0bbb46a19953ca335df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"Technology readiness levels (TRLs) are a categorisation that enables \r\nconsistent, uniform discussions of technical maturity across different \r\ntypes of technology. They were developed by the National Aeronautics \r\nand Space Administration (NASA) in the 1970s (Mankins 1995, 2009) \r\nand originally used to describe the readiness of components forming \r\npart of a technological system. Over time, more classifications of TRLs \r\nhave been introduced, notably the one used by the European Union \r\n(EU). Most recently, the International Energy Agency (IEA) extended \r\nprevious classifications to include the later stages of the innovation \r\nprocess (IEA 2020b) and applied it to compare the market readiness \r\nof clean energy technologies and their components (OECD 2015a; \r\nIEA 2020b). TRLs are currently widely used by engineers, business \r\npeople, research funders and investors, often to assess the readiness \r\nof whole technologies rather than single components"


id: 562ed4c59a3a21fd8e2b92e4b2685c29
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content:
" To determine \r\na TRL for a  given technology, a  technology readiness assessment \r\n(TRA) is carried out to examine programme concepts, technology \r\nrequirements, and demonstrated technology capabilities. In the most \r\nrecent version of the IEA (IEA 2020b), TRLs range from 1 to 11, with \r\n11 indicating the most mature (Table 16.2)."


id: 982c30d7aa01bd45adcb0c8c4a55f1ea
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content:
"The benefits of R&D and learning by doing are larger at the economy \r\nlevel than at the firm level (Arrow 1962b; Romer 1990;). As a result, \r\nwhen left to its own, the market tends to generate less investment \r\nthan socially optimal. For instance, if the cost of a  technology is \r\ntoo high before a large amount of learning by doing has occurred, \r\nthere is a risk that it will not be adopted by the market, even if it \r\nis economically advantageous for the society. Indeed, initially new \r\ntechnologies are often expensive and cannot compete with the \r\nincumbent technologies (Cowan 1990). Large numbers of adopters \r\ncould lower this cost via learning by doing to a  level sufficient to \r\nbeat the incumbent technology (Gruebler et al. 2012). However, firms \r\ncould hesitate to be the first adopter and bear the high cost (Isoard \r\nand Soria 2001)"


id: 83f67897994ca25a09002fd39caf768b
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content:
" If this disadvantage overwhelms the advantages of \r\nbeing a first mover1\r\n and if adopters are not able to coordinate, it will \r\nlead to situation of a lock-in (Gruebler et al. 2012)."


id: e04d1e2f6abc20516c975db7700a7d21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"By allowing for experimenting with existing knowledge and combining \r\ndifferent technologies, knowledge spillovers can result in the \r\nemergence of novel technological solutions, which has been referred \r\nto as 'recombinant innovation' (Weitzman 1998; Fleming and Sorenson \r\n2001; Olsson and Frey 2002; Tsur and Zemel 2007; Arthur 2009). \r\nRecombinant innovations speed up technological change by combining \r\ndifferent technological solutions, and make things happen that would \r\nbe impossible with only incremental innovations (van den Bergh 2008; \r\nSafarzynska and van den Bergh 2010; Frenken et al. 2012). It has been \r\nshown that 77% of all patents granted between 1790 and 2010 in \r\nthe USA are coded by a  combination of at least two technology \r\ncodes (Youn et al. 2015). Spillovers related to energy and low-carbon \r\ntechnologies have been documented by a number of empirical studies \r\n(high confidence) (Popp 2002; Verdolini and Galeotti 2011; Aghion et al"


id: 3ac83e0dfc998e4ca88c1bba0cc7b4b8
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content:
" \r\n2016; Witajewski-Baltvilks et al. 2017; Conti et al. 2018). The presence \r\nof spillovers can have both positive and negative impacts on climate \r\nchange mitigation (high confidence)."


id: 3551ab78e99bf8671f06badb03ae92e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"The negative relation between costs and experience is a reason to invest \r\nin a narrow set of technologies; the uncertainty regarding the parameters \r\nof this relation is the reason to invest in wider ranges of technologies \r\n(Fleming and Sorenson 2001; Way et al. 2019). Concentrating \r\ninvestment in narrow sets of technologies (specialisation) enables \r\nfast accumulation of experience for these technologies and large cost \r\nreductions. However, when the potency of technology is uncertain, one \r\ndoes not know which technology is truly optimal in the long run. The \r\nnarrower the set, the higher the risk that the optimal technology will \r\nnot be supported, and hence will not benefit from learning by doing. \r\nWidening the set of supported technologies would reduce this risk \r\n(Way et al. 2019). Uncertainty is present because noise in historical data \r\nhides the true value of learning rates, and due to unanticipated future \r\nshocks to technology costs (Lafond et al. 2018)"


id: 3a3c1a79453b463c953fd4fd82699d53
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content:
" Ignoring uncertainty \r\nin integrated assessment models implies that these model results are \r\nbiased towards supporting a  narrow set of technologies, neglecting \r\nthe benefits of decreasing risk through diversification (Sawulski and \r\nWitajewski-Baltvilks 2020)."


id: 8095ac286575b567915c251b63fdb0e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"Digital technologies require energy, but increase efficiency, potentially \r\noffering technology-specific greenhouse gas (GHG) emission savings; \r\nthey also have larger system-wide impacts (Kaack et  al. 2021). In \r\nindustrial sectors, robotisation, smart manufacturing (SM), internet \r\nof things (IoT), artificial intelligence (AI), and additive manufacturing \r\n(AM or 3D printing) have the potential to reduce material demand \r\nand promote energy management (Section 11.3.4.2). Smart mobility \r\nis changing transport demand and efficiency (Section 10.2.3). Smart \r\ndevices in buildings, the deployment of smart grids and the provision \r\nof renewable energy increase the role of demand-side management \r\n(Serrenho and Bertoldi 2019) (Sections 9.4 and 9.5), and support the \r\nshift away from asset redundancy (Section 6.4.3). Digital solutions \r\nare equally important on the supply side, for example, by accelerating \r\ninnovation with simulations and deep learning (Rolnick et  al"


id: 98fb087fa77dfad0271451204509d17f
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content:
" \r\n2021) or realising flexible and decentralised opportunities through \r\nenergy-as-a-service concepts and particularly with pay-as-you-go \r\n(Section 15.6.8)."


id: 54085064845e3e32b45cb940b11de1e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"Direct impacts emerge because digital technologies consume large amounts of energy, but also have the potential to \r\nsteeply increase energy efficiency in all end-use sectors through material input savings and increased coordination \r\n(medium evidence, medium agreement) (Horner et al. 2016; Huang et al. 2016; IEA 2017b; Jones 2018). Global energy demand \r\nfrom digital appliances reached 7.14 EJ in 2018 (Chapter 9, Box 9.5), implying higher related carbon emissions. However, a small \r\nsmartphone offers services previously requiring many different devices (Grubler et al. 2018). Demand for data services is increasing \r\nrapidly; quantitative estimates of the growth of associated energy demand range from slow and marginal to rapid and sizeable, \r\ndepending the efficiency trends of digital technologies (Avgerinou et al. 2017; Vranken 2017; Stoll et al. 2019; Masanet et al. 2020) \r\n(Section 5.3.4.1)"


id: 31ca47c7800a5c39312502dfe966f252
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" Renewable energy can serve as a low-carbon energy provider for the operation of a data centre, which in turn can \r\nprovide waste heat for other purposes. Digital technologies can markedly increase the energy efficiency of mobility and residential \r\nand public buildings, especially in the context of systems integration (IEA 2020a). Reduction in energy demand and associated \r\nGHG emissions from buildings and industry, while maintaining service levels is estimated at 5 to 10%, with larger savings possible. \r\nApproaches include building energy management systems (BEMS), home energy management system (HEMS), demand response "


id: e2dea7ee1193ce48f677af49ed8abf01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"However, system-wide effects may endanger energy and GHG emission savings (high evidence, high agreement). Economic \r\ngrowth resulting from higher energy and labour productivities can increase energy demand (Lange et al. 2020) and associated GHG \r\nemissions. Importantly, digitalisation can also benefit carbon-intensive technologies (Victor 2018). Impacts on GHG emissions are \r\nvaried in smart and shared mobility systems, as ride hailing increases GHG emissions due to deadheading, whereas shared pooled \r\nmobility and shared cycling reduce GHG emissions, as occupancy levels and/or weight per person km transported improve (Section 5.3). \r\nEnergy and GHG emission impacts from the ubiquitous deployment of smart sensors and service optimisation applications in smart \r\ncities are insufficiently assessed in the literature (Milojevic-Dupont and Creutzig 2021). Systemic effects have wider boundaries of \r\nanalysis, including broader environmental impacts (e.g"


id: 4b547917c42a2bced3923f49c8f25369
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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"Broader societal impacts of digitalisation can also influence climate mitigation because of induced demand for \r\nconsumption goods, impacts on firms' competitiveness, changes the demand for skills and labour, worsening of \r\ninequality - including reduced access to services due to the digital divide - and governance aspects (low evidence,\r\nmedium agreement) (Sections 4.4, 5.3 and 5.6). Digital technologies expand production possibilities in sectors other than ICTs \r\nthrough robotics, smart manufacturing, and 3D printing, and have major implications on consumption patterns (Matthess and Kunkel \r\n2020). Initial evidence suggests that robots displace routine jobs and certain skills, change the demand for high-skilled and low-skilled \r\nworkers, and suppress wages (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2019). Digitalisation can thus reduce consumers' liquidity and consumption \r\n(Mian et al"


id: 37da91cde2ed98269abdc0ac41b6ae1e
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content:
" 2020) and contribute to global inequality, including across the gender dimension, raising fairness concerns (Kerras et al. \r\n2020; Vassilakopoulou and Hustad 2021). Digital technologies can lead to additional concentration in economic power (e.g., Rikap \r\n2020) and lower competition; however, open source digital technologies can counter this tendency (e.g., Rotz et al. 2019). Digital \r\ntechnologies play a role in mobilising citizens for climate and sustainability actions (Segerberg 2017; Westerhoff et al. 2018)."


id: 59fdd27153dc1d0bc99597724226f7d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Whether the digital revolution will be an enabler or a  barrier for decarbonisation will ultimately depend on the \r\ngovernance of both digital decarbonisation pathways and digitalisation in general (medium evidence, high agreement). \r\nThe understanding of the disruptive potential of the wide range of digital technologies is limited due to their ground-breaking \r\nnature, which makes it hard to extrapolate from previous history/experience. Municipal and national entities can make use of digital \r\ntechnologies to manage and govern energy use and GHG emissions in their jurisdiction (Bibri 2019a,b) and break down solution \r\nstrategies to specific infrastructures, building, and places, relying on remote sensing and mapping data, and contextual machine \r\nlearning about their use (Milojevic-Dupont and Creutzig 2021). Mobility apps can provide mobility-as-a-service access to cities, ensuring \r\ndue preference to active and healthy modes (Section 9.9 for the example of the Finnish city of Lahti)"


id: f4d654df6bca95a5abd3cca9a6bb392b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" Trusted data governance can \r\npromote the implementation of local climate solutions, supported by available big data on infrastructures and environmental quality \r\n(Hansen and Porter 2017; Hughes et al. 2020). Governance decisions, such as taxing data, prohibiting surveillance technologies, or \r\nreleasing data that enable accountability, can change digitalisation pathways, and thus underlying GHG emission (Hughes et al. 2020)."


id: 141e1b31c878b85ca7c8eec59b63778e
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content:
"Appropriate mechanisms also need to be designed to govern digitalisation as a megatrend (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). Digitalisation is expected to be a  fast process, but this transformation takes place against entrenched individual \r\nbehaviours, existing infrastructure, the legacy of time frames, vested interest and slow institutional processes, and requires trust from \r\nconsumers, producers and institutions. A core question relates to who controls and manages data created by everyday operations (calls, \r\nshopping, weather data, service use, and so on). Regulations that limit or ban the expropriation and exploitation of behavioural data, \r\nsourced via smartphones, represent crucial aspects in digitalisation pathways, alongside the possibility to create climate movements \r\nand political pressure from the civil society. Governance mechanisms need to be developed to ensure that digital technologies such \r\nas AI take over ethical choices (Craglia et al. 2018; Rahwan et al. 2019)"


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vector_id: 3371
content:
" Appropriate governance is necessary for digitalisation to \r\neffectively work in tandem with established mitigation technologies and choice architectures. Consideration of system-wide effects \r\nand overall management is essential to avoid runaway effects. Overall governance of digitalisation remains a challenge, and will have \r\nlarge-scale repercussions on energy demand and GHG emissions."


id: fa7766f7a6d61be308086fbb891dac8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"Recent studies attempt to separate the influence of learning by doing \r\n(which is a basis of Wright's law) versus other factors in explaining \r\ncost reductions, specifically in energy technologies. Some studies \r\nexplain cost reductions with two factors: cumulative deployment \r\n(as proxy for experience); and R&D investment - see the 'two factor' \r\nlearning curve (Klaassen et al. 2005). However, reliable information \r\non public energy R&D investments for developing countries is not \r\nsystematically collected. Available data for OECD countries cannot be \r\nprecisely assigned to specific industrial sectors or sub-technologies \r\n(Verdolini et al. 2018). Some learning-curve studies take into account \r\nthat historical variation in technology costs could be explained by \r\nvariation in key materials and fuel costs - for example, steel costs \r\nfor wind turbines (Qiu and Anadon 2012), silicon costs (Nemet 2006; \r\nKavlak et al"


id: f3bd5623f81e83b8e4ce382a2e7200d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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" 2018) as well as coal and coal plant construction costs \r\n(McNerney et al. 2011). Economies of scale played a significant role in \r\nthe PV cost reductions since the early 2000s (Yu et al. 2011) (Box 16.4), \r\nwhich can also become the case in organic PV technologies (Gambhir \r\net al. 2016; Kavlak et al. 2018)."


id: 85bc173c0afa56a0959038f4559a6798
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"The impact of energy prices on the size of low-carbon technological \r\nchange is supported by large number of empirical studies (Popp \r\n2019; Grubb and Wieners 2020). Studies document that higher \r\nenergy prices are associated with a  higher number of low-carbon \r\nenergy or energy efficiency patents (Newell et al. 1999; Popp 2002; \r\nVerdolini and Galeotti 2011; Noailly and Smeets 2015; Ley et al. 2016; \r\nWitajewski-Baltvilks et al. 2017; Lin and Chen 2019). Sue Wing (2008) \r\nfinds that innovation induced by energy prices had a minor impact \r\non the decline in US energy intensity in the last decades of the 20th \r\ncentury, and that autonomous technological change played a more \r\nimportant role. Several studies explore the impact of a carbon tax on \r\ngreen innovation (Section 16.4). However, disentangling the effect of \r\npolicy tools is complex because the presence of some policies could \r\ndistort the functioning of other policies (Bohringer and Rosendahl \r\n2010; Fischer et al"


id: 7c799de3935aabdfcbac8ddf3eaa7048
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content:
" 2017) and because the impact of policies could be \r\nlagged in time (Antosiewicz and Witajewski-Baltvilks 2021)."


id: 3f360517c1f8a34de03e049b57c2fed4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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vector_id: 7337
content:
"The model in Hemous (2016) predicts that such a coalition could \r\ninduce acceleration of clean technological change through a mix \r\nof carbon taxation, clean R&D subsidies and trade policies in that \r\nregion leading to reduction of cost of clean production inside the \r\ncoalition. Export of goods produced with clean technologies to \r\na region outside the coalition reduces demand for dirty goods in that \r\nregion. In the model by van den Bijgaart (2017) local advancements \r\nof clean technologies by a coalition with strong R&D potential are \r\nimitated outside the coalition. Furthermore, advancements of clean \r\ntechnologies will incentivise future clean R&D outside the coalition \r\ndue to intertemporal knowledge spillovers. In Golombek and \r\nHoel (2004) an increase in environmental concern in one region \r\nincreases abatement R&D in that region"


id: 7b4ade8820786ecf0082647cb463a7e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" Part of this knowledge \r\nspills over to other regions, increasing their incentive to increase \r\nabatement too, provided that the latter regions did not invest \r\nin abatement before."


id: 9e6a85f5422d668365481231aed3dba8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Market forces alone cannot deliver Pareto optimal (i.e., social) \r\nefficiency due to at least two types of externalities: GHG emissions \r\nthat cause climate damage; and knowledge spillovers that benefit \r\nfirms other than the inventor. Nordhaus (2011) argues that these two \r\nproblems would have to be tackled separately: once the favourable \r\nintellectual property right regimes (i.e., the laws or rules or regulation \r\non protection and enforcement) are in place, a price on carbon that \r\ncorrects the emission externality is sufficient to induce optimal level of \r\ngreen technological change. Acemoglu et al. (2012) demonstrates that \r\nsubsidising clean technologies (and not dirty ones) is also necessary \r\nto break the lock-in of dirty technological change"


id: 5194d885e3e159bcc7238fa0d658138f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" Recommendations \r\nfor technical changes are often based on climate considerations \r\nonly and neglect secondary externalities and environmental costs of \r\ntechnology choices (such as loss of biodiversity due to inappropriate \r\nscale-up of bioenergy use). The scale of adverse side effects and \r\nco-benefits varies considerably between low-carbon technologies in \r\nthe energy sector (Luderer et al. 2019)."


id: 16fb484ed3d7eaa8f7eb6dcc72850986
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1141
content:
"One factor in this 'learning by researching' is applied to a wide range of \r\nenergy technologies but also to model improvements in the efficiency \r\nof energy use (Goulder and Schneider 1999; Popp 2004). More complex \r\nformulations include two-factor learning processes (Criqui et al. 2015; \r\nEmmerling et al. 2016; Paroussos et al. 2020) (Section  16.2.2.1), \r\nmultifactor learning curves (Kahouli 2011; Yu et al. 2011), or other drivers \r\nof cost reduction such as economies of scale and markets (Elia et al. \r\n2021). The application of two-factor learning curves to model energy \r\ntechnology costs is often constrained by the lack of information on \r\npublic and/or private energy R&D investments in many fast-developing \r\nand developing countries (Verdolini et al. 2018). The approach used to \r\nmodel energy technology cost reductions varies across technologies, \r\neven within the same model, depending on the availability of data and/\r\nor the level of maturity"


id: 7853abc4dc02bebe6b35396b1f9985c1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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vector_id: 16496
content:
" Less mature technologies generally depend \r\nhighly on learning by research, whereas learning by doing dominates \r\nin more mature technologies (Jamasb 2007)."


id: 12a4285444a3bc80ea3e9bdc8be68104
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"In addition to learning, knowledge spillover effects are also \r\nintegrated in climate-energy-economy models to reflect the fact that \r\ninnovation in a given country depends also on knowledge generated \r\nelsewhere (Emmerling et al. 2016; Fragkiadakis et al. 2020). Models \r\nwith a more detailed representation of sectors (Paroussos et al. 2020) \r\ncan use spillover matrices to include bilateral spillovers and compute \r\nlearning rates that depend on the human capital stock and the \r\nregional and/or sectoral absorption rates (Fragkiadakis et al. \r\n2020). Accounting for knowledge spillovers in the EU for PV, wind \r\nturbines, electric vehicles, biofuels, industry materials, batteries and \r\nadvanced heating and cooking appliances can lead to the following \r\nresults in a  decarbonisation scenario over the period 2020-2050 \r\nas compared to the reference scenario: an increase of 1.0-1.4% in \r\nGDP, 2.1-2.3% in investment, and 0.2-0.4% in employment by clean \r\nenergy technologies (Paroussos et al"


id: d5931ffa4b602bb25a7cefa4f2a448fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" 2017). When comparing two \r\npossible EU transition strategies - being a first-mover with strong \r\nunilateral emission reduction strategy until 2030 versus postponing \r\naction for the period after 2030  - endogenous technical progress \r\nin the green technologies sector can alleviate most of the negative \r\neffects of pioneering low-carbon transformation associated with loss \r\nof competitiveness and carbon leakage (Karkatsoulis et al. 2016)."


id: 83a8411105be5f89f5c56ee77114a833
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Technology diffusion may also be strongly influenced, either positively \r\nor negatively, by a number of non-cost, non-technological barriers or \r\nenablers regarding behaviours, society and institutions (Knobloch and \r\nMercure 2016). These include network or infrastructure externalities, the \r\nco-evolution of technology clusters over time ('path dependence'), the \r\nrisk-aversion of users, personal preferences and perceptions and lack \r\nof adequate institutional framework which may negatively influence \r\nthe speed of (low-carbon) technological innovation and diffusion, \r\nheterogeneous agents with different preferences or expectations, multi\u0002objectives and/or competitiveness advantages and uncertainty around \r\nthe presence and the level of environmental policies and institutional \r\nand administrative barriers (Marangoni and Tavoni 2014; Baker et al. \r\n2015; Iyer et al. 2015; Napp et al. 2017; Biresselioglu et al. 2020; van \r\nSluisveld et al. 2020)"


id: 903ccdfa41432511f4911dc5ba07c73a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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" These types of barriers to technology diffusion are \r\ncurrently not explicitly detailed in most of the climate-energy-economy \r\nmodels. Rather, they are accounted for in models through scenario \r\nnarratives, such as the ones in the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways \r\n(Riahi et al. 2017), in which assumptions about technology adoption \r\nare spanned over a plausible range of values. Complementary methods \r\nare increasingly used to explore their importance in future scenarios \r\n(Turnheim et al. 2015; Geels et al. 2016; Doukas et al. 2018; Gambhir \r\net al. 2019; Trutnevyte et al. 2019). It takes a very complex modelling \r\nframework to include all aspects affecting technology cost reductions \r\nand technology diffusion, such as heterogeneous agents (Lamperti \r\net al. 2020), regional labour costs (Skelton et al. 2020), materials \r\ncost and trade and perfect foresight multi-objective optimisation \r\n(Aleluia Reis et al. 2021)"


id: 199dd1b726a6ce844f991536c055a7e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"Median values of renewables installed capacity increase with respect to 2020 capacity in scenarios that limit warming to 3degC (>50%) \r\nand in scenarios that limit warming to 4degC (>50%) (Box 16.1 Figure 1b), where energy and climate policies are implemented in \r\nline with NDCs announced prior to COP26. More stringent targets (2degC) are achieved through a higher deployment of renewable \r\ntechnologies: by 2050 solar (wind) capacity is estimated to increase by a factor of 15 (10) (Box 16.1, Figure 1c). This is accompanied by \r\nan almost complete phase-out of coal (-87%). The percentage of median changes in installed capacity in scenarios that limit warming \r\nto 3degC (>50%) and in scenarios that limit warming to 4degC (>50%)is within comparable ranges of that observed in the last decade. In \r\nthe case of scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower, capacity installed is higher for renewable technologies and nuclear, \r\nand lower for fossil-based technologies (Box 16"


id: 1fc6ebc57002af520a7f2d1aee33c24b
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"Systemic analyses of innovation have predominantly focused on \r\nindustrialised countries There have been some efforts to use the \r\ninnovation systems lens for the developing country context (Jacobsson \r\nand Bergek 2006; Altenburg 2009; Lundvall et al. 2009; Tigabu et al. \r\n2015; Tigabu 2018; Choi and Zo 2019) and specific suggestions on \r\nways for developing countries to strengthening their innovation \r\nsystems (e.g.,  by universities taking on a  'developmental' role \r\n(Arocena et al. 2015), or industry associations acting as intermediaries \r\nto build institutional capacities (Watkins et al. 2015; Khan et al. 2020), \r\nincluding specifically for addressing climate challenges (Sagar et al. \r\n2009; Ockwell and Byrne 2016)"


id: 85184f1955cf08eff5c5f3e531e70e1b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" But the conditions in developing \r\ncountries are quite different, leading to suggestions that different \r\ntheoretical conceptualisations of the innovation systems approach \r\nmay be needed for these countries (Arocena and Sutz 2020), although \r\na system perspective would still be appropriate (Boodoo et al. 2018)."


id: 724440c886e6e87d3094bd00fd4710a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"Traditional perspectives on innovation policy were mostly science\u0002driven, and focused on strengthening invention and its translation \r\ninto application in a narrow sense. Also, a second main traditional \r\nperspective on innovation policy was focused on correcting for \r\n'market failures' (Weber and Truffer 2017) (Section 16.2). The more \r\nrecent understanding of, and shift of focus to, the systemic nature \r\non the innovation and diffusion of technologies has implications \r\nfor innovation policy, since innovation outcomes depend not just \r\non inputs such as R&D, but much more on the functioning of the \r\noverall innovation system (see Sections  16.3.1 and 16.4). Policies \r\ncan therefore be directed at innovation systems components and \r\nprocesses that need the greatest attention or support. This may \r\ninclude, for example, strengthening the capabilities of weak actors \r\nand improving interactions between actors (Jacobsson et al. 2017; \r\nWeber and Truffer 2017)"


id: 5e97975cfce7cf76723acf1f03be5890
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content:
" At the same time, a systemic perspective \r\nalso brings into sharp relief the notion of 'system failures' (Weber \r\nand Truffer 2017)."


id: dc2c23919ccb5006231b324580c3cf3c
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content:
"A much-used, complementary systemic framework is the Multi-Level \r\nPerspective (MLP) (Geels 2002), which focuses mainly on the diffusion \r\nof technologies in relation to incumbent technologies in their sector \r\nand the overall economy. A key point of MLP is that new technologies \r\nneed to establish themselves in a stable 'socio-technical regime' and \r\nare therefore generally at a disadvantage, not just because of their \r\nlow technological maturity, but also because of an unwelcoming \r\nsystem. The MLP highlights that the uptake of technologies in \r\nsociety is an evolutionary process, which can be best understood \r\nas a  combination of 'variation, selection and retention' as well as \r\n'unfolding and reconfiguration' (Geels 2002). Thus, new technologies \r\nin their early stages need to be selected and supported at the micro\u0002level by niche markets, possibly through a directed process that has \r\nbeen termed 'strategic niche management' (Kemp et al. 1998)"


id: 54bf3f1f98fdbcfe05474cf4d607a9ec
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" As, \r\nat the landscape level, pressures on incumbent regimes mount, and \r\nthose regimes destabilise, the niche technologies get a  chance to \r\nget established in a  new socio-technical regime. This allows these \r\ntechnologies to grow and stabilise, shaping a changed or sometimes \r\nradically renewed socio-technical regime. The MLP takes a systematic \r\nand comprehensive view about how to nurture and shape \r\ntechnological transitions by understanding them as evolutionary, \r\nmultidirectional and cumulative socio-technical processes playing \r\nout at multiple levels over time, with a concomitant expansion in the \r\nscale and scope of the transition (Elzen et al. 2004; Geels 2005). There \r\nhave been numerous studies that draw on the MLP to understand \r\ndifferent aspects of climate technology innovation and diffusion \r\n(van Bree et al. 2010; Geels 2012; Geels et al. 2017)."


id: 26828866ad8753e3919560dad7018b68
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"In Table  16.7, both quantitative and qualitative indicators for \r\nsystemic innovation are outlined, using clean energy innovation \r\nas an illustrative example, and drawing on a broad literature base, \r\ntaking into account both the input-output-outcome classification and \r\nits variations (Freeman and Soete 1997; Sagar and Holdren 2002; Hu \r\net al. 2018), combined with the functions of technological innovation \r\nsystems (Miremadi et al. 2018), while also being cognisant of the \r\nspecific role of key actors and institutions (Gallagher et al. 2012). \r\nA specific assessment of innovation may focus on part of such a list of \r\nindicators, depending on what aspect of innovation is being studied, \r\nwhether the analysis takes a  more or less systemic perspective, \r\nand the specific technology and geography considered"


id: 5c1337f247f304e0bd86e93433a397e2
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" Similarly, \r\ninnovation policies may be designed to specifically boost only some \r\nof these aspects, depending on whether a  given country/region is \r\ncommitted to strengthen a given technology or phase."


id: f785b4bc7b99cea432d2c313f306d796
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"The systemic approach to innovation and transition dynamics (Cross\u0002Chapter Box 12 in this chapter) has advanced our understanding of \r\nthe complexity of the innovation process, pointing to the importance \r\nof assessing the efficiency and effectiveness in producing, diffusing \r\nand exploiting knowledge  (Lundvall 1992), including how the \r\nexisting stock of knowledge may be recombined and used for new \r\napplications (David and  Foray 1995). There remains a  crucial need \r\nfor more relevant and comprehensive approaches of assessing \r\ninnovation (Freeman and Soete 2009; Dziallas and Blind 2019). \r\nIn the context of climate mitigation, innovation is a means to an end; \r\ntherefore, there is the need to consider the processes by which the \r\noutput of innovation (e.g.,  patents) are translated into real-world \r\noutcomes (e.g.,  deployment of low-carbon technologies) (Freeman \r\nand Soete 1997; Sagar and Holdren 2002)"


id: 825f273afb6e19ed2870ab17f6b3e8b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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" Currently, there is no \r\navailable set of quantitative metrics that, collectively, can help get \r\na  picture of innovation in a  particular energy technology or set \r\nof energy technologies. Also we are still lacking an understanding of \r\nhow to systematically use qualitative indicators to characterise the \r\nmore intangible aspects of the energy innovation system and to \r\nimprove front-end innovation decisions (Dziallas and Blind 2019)."


id: eff0874b541b9b987d3ec4d6b0c96834
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Because of the multiple market, government, system, and other \r\nfailures that are associated with the energy system, a range of policy \r\ninterventions are usually required to enable the development and \r\nintroduction of new technologies in the market (Jaffe et  al. 2005; \r\nBurer and Wustenhagen 2009; Negro et  al. 2012; Twomey 2012; \r\nVeugelers 2012; Weber and Rohracher 2012) used in what is termed \r\nas 'policy mixes' (Rogge and Reichardt 2016; Edmondson et al. 2019, \r\n2020; Rogge et al. 2020). Empirical research shows that, in the energy \r\nand environment space, when new technologies were developed and \r\nintroduced in the market, it was usually at least partly as a  result \r\nof a  range of policies that shaped the socio-technical system \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement) (Bunn et al. 2014; Bergek et al. \r\n2015; Rogge and Reichardt 2016; Nemet 2019)"


id: 22a73f1dd2fce0cdaeb8f23597ad4be4
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" An example of this \r\nsystemic and dynamic nature of policies is the 70-year innovation \r\njourney of solar photovoltaic (PV), covering multiple countries, which \r\nis reviewed in Box 16.4."


id: 7b36d5fb1236a4edb7078b351271bed
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"As this evolution makes clear, no individual country persisted in leading the technology, and every world-leading firm lost its lead \r\nwithin a few years (Green 2019). Solar followed an overlapping but sequential process of technology creation, market creation and \r\ncost reduction (comparable to emergence, early adoption, diffusion and stabilisation in Cross-Chapter Box 12 in this chapter). In the \r\ntechnology creation phase, examples of central processes include flows of knowledge from one person to another, between firms, \r\nand between countries as well as US and Japanese R&D funding in the 1970s and early 1980s. During market creation, PVs modular \r\nscale allowed it to serve a variety of niche markets from satellites in the 1950s to toys in the 1980s, when Germany transformed \r\nthe industry from niche to mass market with its subsidy programme that began in 2000 and became important for PV in 2004"


id: 47b3692b237069ee7403e46d6a867000
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" The \r\ndramatic increase in size combined with its 20-year guaranteed contracts reduced risk for investors and created confidence in PV's \r\nlong-term growth. Supportive policies also emerged outside Germany, in Spain, Italy, California, and China, which spread the risk, \r\neven as national policy support was more volatile. Rapid and deep cost reductions were made possible by: learning by doing in the \r\nprocess of operating, optimising, and combining production equipment; investing and improving each manufacturing line to gradually \r\nscale up to massive sizes; and incremental improvements in the PV devices themselves."


id: adcbbf7fe28255b9c2ae4d4541282585
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content:
"Central to PV development has been its modularity, which provided two distinct advantages: access to niche markets, and iterative \r\nimprovement. Solar has been deployed as a commercial technology across nine orders of magnitude: from a 1W cell in a calculator to \r\na 1GW plant in the Egyptian desert, and almost every scale in between. This modular scale enabled PV to serve a sequence of policy\u0002independent niche markets (such as satellites and telecoms applications), which generally increased in size and decreased in willingness \r\nto pay, in line with the technology cost reductions. This modular scale also enabled a large number of iterations, such that in 2020 \r\nover three billion solar panels had been produced"


id: e9e00fa92f21833a5a5303872d9c0df7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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vector_id: 34294
content:
" Compared to, for instance, approximately 1000 nuclear reactors that were ever \r\nconstructed, a million times more opportunities for learning by doing were available to solar PV: to make incremental improvements, \r\nto introduce new manufacturing equipment, to optimise that equipment, and to learn from failures. More generally, recent work has \r\npointed to the benefits of modularity in the speed of adoption (Wilson et al. 2020) and learning rates (Sweerts et al. 2020)."


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"There are many definitions of policy mixes from various disciplines \r\n(Rogge et al. 2017), including environmental economics (Lehmann \r\n2012), policy studies (Kern and Howlett 2009) and innovation \r\nstudies. Generally speaking, a  policy mix can be characterised by \r\na combination of building blocks, namely elements, processes and \r\ncharacteristics, which can be specified using different dimensions \r\n(Rogge and Reichardt 2016). Elements include: (i) the policy \r\nstrategy with its objectives and principal plans; (ii) the mix of \r\npolicy instruments; and (iii) instrument design. The content of \r\nthese elements is the result of policy processes. Both elements and \r\nprocesses can be described by their characteristics in terms of the \r\nconsistency of the elements, the coherence of the processes, and \r\nthe credibility and comprehensiveness of the policy mix in different \r\npolicy, governance, geography and temporal context (Rogge and \r\nReichardt 2016)"


id: ece2d07a177ddebf5cb814baa4c230af
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" Other aspects in the evaluation of policy mixes \r\ninclude framework conditions, the type of policy instrument and the \r\nlower level of policy granularity, namely design elements or design \r\nfeatures (del Rio 2014; del Rio and Cerda 2017). In addition, many \r\nhave argued for the need to craft policies that affect different actors \r\nin the transition, some supporting and some 'destabilising' (Geels \r\n2002; Kivimaa and Kern 2016)."


id: e0620cd4bc6e656be0e43ec4de621ae9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"Building on the frameworks for identifying market failures \r\n(Section 16.2) and systemic failures (Section 16.3) in the innovation \r\nsystem for climate-related technologies, Section  16.4 proceeds as \r\nfollows. First, it considers some of the policy instruments introduced \r\nin Chapter 13 that are particularly relevant for the pace and direction \r\nof innovation in technologies for climate change mitigation and \r\nadaptation. Second, it explains why governments put in place \r\npolicies to promote innovation in climate-related technologies. \r\nThird, it takes stock of the overall empirical and theoretical evidence \r\nregarding the relationship between policy instruments with a direct \r\nand an indirect impact on innovation outcomes (including intellectual \r\nproperty regimes) and also other outcomes (competitiveness and \r\ndistributional outcomes)"


id: 10e22717686af57b237541f53509feb8
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" Fourth, it assesses the evidence on the \r\nimpact of trade-related policies and of sub-national policies aiming \r\nto develop cleantech industrial clusters."


id: 44ce2977a6f738f66cf247d9dd35b556
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"The second column of Table  16.8 summarises the set of policies \r\nshaping broader climate outcomes over the past few decades in many \r\ncountries outlined in Chapter 13, Section 13.6, which groups them \r\ninto economic and financial, regulatory, and soft instruments. Other \r\npolicies, such as monetary, banking and trade policies, for instance, can \r\nalso shape innovation, but most government action to shape energy \r\nhas not focused on them. As Table 16.8 shows, this section discusses \r\nthe set of policy instruments on innovation outcomes, or a  subset \r\nof the 'Transformative Potential' criterion presented in Chapter 13, \r\nand thus complements the more general discussion presented there. \r\nTable 16.8 specifically prioritises the impact of the subset of policy \r\ninstruments on innovation outcomes for which evidence is available"


id: cd0edbb7c2b614dd23df995d11785ec1
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" \r\nThis focus is complemented by a  discussion of the impact of the \r\nsame policy instruments on competitiveness (a subcomponent of the \r\neconomic effectiveness evaluation criterion) and on distributional \r\noutcomes. Many of the policy instrument types listed in Table 16.8 \r\nhave been implemented or proposed to address the different types of \r\nmarket or systemic failures or bottlenecks described in Sections 16.2 \r\nand 16.3 (OECD 2011a)."


id: 8b885aaeb1b3c9a52219d5012b63ba1b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Governments around the world implement innovation policies in the \r\nenergy and climate space with the aim of simultaneously advancing \r\nenvironmental, industrial policy (or competitiveness), and security \r\ngoals (Anadon 2012; Surana and Anadon 2015; Meckling et al. \r\n2017; Matsuo and Schmidt 2019; Penasco et al. 2021) (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement). Co-benefits of policies shaping \r\ntechnological innovation in climate-related technologies, including \r\ncompetitiveness, health, and improved distributional impacts can \r\nbe drivers of climate mitigation policy in the innovation sphere \r\n(Stokes and Warshaw 2017; Deng et al. 2018; Probst et al. 2020)"


id: 4ba0881bbc97e680144cc42cafc1768a
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" \r\nFor instance, this was the case for climate and air pollution policies \r\nwith local content requirements for different types of renewable \r\nenergy projects in places including China (Qiu and Anadon 2012; \r\nLewis 2014), India (Behuria 2020), South Africa (Kuntze and \r\nMoerenhout 2012), and Canada (Genest 2014) (robust evidence,\r\nmedium agreement)."


id: 61ef420c0955d74079cf64916c74d4b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Three phases of politics in the development of policies to meet climate \r\nand industrial objectives can be identified, at the top, the middle \r\nand the bottom of the experience curve (Breetz et al. 2018) (see \r\nalso Figure 16.1, and Geels 2002). In the first phase of 'niche market \r\ndiffusion', the politics of more sustained support for a technology or \r\nset of technologies become possible after a group of economic winners \r\nand 'clean energy constituencies' are created (Meckling et al. 2015). \r\nWhen technologies grow out of the niche (second phase), they pose \r\na  more serious competition to incumbents who may become more \r\nvocal opponents of additional support for innovation in the competing \r\ntechnologies (Geels 2014; Stokes 2016). In a  third phase, path\u0002dependence in policymaking and lock-in in institutions need to change \r\nto accommodate new infrastructure, the integration of technologies, \r\nthe emergence of complementary technologies and of new regulatory \r\nregimes (Levin et al"


id: ccb25290ddab4bc9a08c002e00fb2930
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Public research, development and demonstration (RD&D) \r\ninvestments have been found to have a positive impact on different \r\ninnovation in energy- and climate-related technologies (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement), but the assessment relies almost entirely \r\non evidence from industrialised countries. Out of 17 publications \r\nfocusing on this assessment, only three found no relationship \r\nbetween R&D funding and innovation metrics (Doblinger et al. 2019; \r\nGoldstein et al. 2020; Penasco et al. 2021). Sixteen of them used ex \r\npost quantitative methods, and one relied on theoretical ex ante \r\nassessment; only two of them included some non-industrialised \r\ncountries, with one being the theoretical analysis. The evidence \r\navailable does not point to public R&D funding for climate-related \r\ntechnologies crowding out private R&D (an important driver of \r\ninnovation) but instead crowding it in. Box  16"


id: f77d1aa5fb87b5b9bc2182efdcacb584
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"6 summarises the \r\nevidence available of the impact of ARPA-E (a public institution \r\ncreated in the USA in 2009 to allocate public R&D funding in energy) \r\non innovation and competitiveness outcomes. Another institution \r\nsupporting energy R&D that is the subject of much interest is the \r\ninstitutions of the Fraunhofer Society."


id: 1fb55226ad1cfef8c49834125c824b4b
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"If policy instruments are created to (at least partly) shape innovation \r\nfor systemic transitions to a zero-carbon future, they also need to \r\nbe evaluated on their impact on the whole socio-technical system \r\n(Neij and Astrand 2006) and a  wide range of goals, including \r\ndistributional impacts and competitiveness and jobs (Stern 2007; \r\nPenasco et  al. 2021). Given this and the current policy focus on \r\ngreen recovery and green industrial policy, we assess impacts \r\non competitiveness and equity, although we primarily focus on \r\ninnovation outcomes. Table 16.9 lists the selected set of indicators \r\nused to assess the impact of the policy instrument types covered \r\nin the right-hand column in Table 16.8. The table does not include \r\ntechnology diffusion or deployment because these are covered in \r\nthe technological effectiveness evaluation criterion in Chapter 13. \r\nAs noted in section  16"


id: beb4d1c9dfc72a60674e87e8c433c2e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"2, it is very difficult to measure or fully \r\nunderstand innovation with one or even several indicators. In \r\naddition, all indicators have strengths and weaknesses, and may \r\nbe more relevant in some countries and sectors than in others. The \r\nliterature assessing the impact of different policy instruments on \r\ninnovation often covers just one of the various indicators listed in \r\nthe second column of Table 16.9."


id: d374735efc0f2e4c20bae60d25883498
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content:
"No evidence has been found regarding the specific impact of R&D \r\ntax credits on climate mitigation or adaptation technologies, but it \r\nis worth noting that, generally speaking, R&D tax credits are found \r\nto incentivise innovation in firms, with a greater impact on small and \r\nmedium firms (OECD 2020). This is consistent with the fact that most \r\nof the evidence on the positive impact of public R&D support schemes \r\ncovers small and medium firms (Howell 2017; Doblinger et al. 2019; \r\nGoldstein et al. 2020). Although there is a high level of agreement in \r\nthe literature regarding the impact of R&D investments on innovation \r\noutcomes in climate-related technologies, it is important to note that \r\nthis evidence comes from industrialised countries"


id: 48e0e18f35cd91490e739ab7547954d1
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" This does not mean \r\nthat public R&D investments in energy have been found to have \r\nno impact on developing countries innovation or competitiveness \r\noutcomes, but rather that we were not able to find such studies \r\nfocussing on developing countries."


id: 738971fa071ed6907e8b7b84074fa101
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content:
"The Green Public Procurement (GPP) policy is targeted at minimising the negative impacts of production and consumption on the nature \r\nenvironment (Melissen and Reinders 2012; Cerutti et al. 2016). It includes a wide range of environmental criteria for different product \r\ngroups that public organisations frequently procure, such as office equipment, uniforms, road works and catering. There are 45 product \r\ngroups (Melissen and Reinders, 2012) and six product clusters as part of the government's purchasing in terms of sustainability \r\n(PIANOo Expertisecentrum 2020). The six product clusters are: i) automation and telecommunications; ii) energy; iii) ground, road and \r\nhydraulic engineering; iv) office facilities and services; v) office buildings; and vi) transport (PIANOo Expertisecentrum 2020).The GPP \r\n2020 Tender Implementation Plan spells out the terms and conditions for green public procurement. Some of these are confidential \r\ndocuments and are not shared online"


id: fdee5945ef92030bf6c05b20ecd27f53
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content:
" Others are available for download. The tender implementation plan for The Netherlands is \r\navailable on https://gpp2020.eu/low-carbon-tenders/open-tenders/. One of the important scenarios is that the public procurers need \r\nthe details of Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) carried out in a tool called DuboCalc, which calculates the environmental impacts of the \r\nmaterials and methods of an infrastructural projects. GPP 2020 has reported that three million tonnes of CO2 would be saved in \r\nThe Netherlands alone if all Dutch public authorities applied the national Sustainable Public Procurement Criteria."


id: c21c4fb15e8dd4d623dfe5994a0e407d
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"Research has been carried out to determine the prime mover for implementing Green Public Procurement. An online survey was \r\nadministered among public procurement officers who subscribed to the newsletters of two Dutch associations that provide advice and \r\ntraining to public procurers. This yielded a sample size of more than 200 (Grandia and Voncken 2019). The first association is called \r\nNevi which is the only organisation in The Netherlands that offers certified procurement training programmes. The second association \r\nis called PIANOo which is a public procurement expertise centre paid by the Dutch national government to bring together relevant \r\ninformation regarding public procurement and provide public procurers with useful tools through their websites, workshops, meetings \r\nand annual conferences"


id: 85814dc0c3254af830dc128747b6d437
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content:
" The data from the survey was then analysed using structural equations modelling (SEM) and the results \r\nshow that ability, motivation and opportunities affect the implementation of GPP. Particularly, opportunity was found to affect GPP, \r\ninnovation-oriented public procurement and the circular economy, but not the other types of public procurement."


id: f79221101fcbec26b23c9f7b093f2767
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content:
"emerging and developing economies (Baron 2016). Its main goal \r\nis to acquire products or services to improve public services, \r\ninfrastructures and facilities and, in some cases, to also incentivise \r\ninnovation. It is important to implement several steps in the public \r\nprocurement procedure to improve transparency, minimise waste, \r\nfraud and corruption of public fund. These steps range from the \r\nassessment of a  need, issuance of a  tender, to the monitoring \r\nof delivery of the good or service. Box  16.5 outlines a  public \r\nprocurement programme that was implemented in The Netherlands \r\nin 2005 with a focus on green technologies. In spite of the fact that \r\ngreen procurement policies have been implemented, the literature \r\nassessing the innovation impact of public procurement programmes \r\nis relatively limited, and suggests either a  positive impact or no \r\nimpact (Alvarez and Rubio 2015; Baron 2016; Fernandez-Sastre \r\nand Montalvo-Quizhpi 2019; Penasco et al. 2021)"


id: b53e452732ae7b7363ed54640c08f91a
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" The majority of \r\ncases where the impact is positive are analyses of industrialised \r\ncountries, while no impact emerges in the case of a  developing \r\ncountry (Ecuador). More empirical research in both developing and \r\ndeveloped countries is needed to understand the impact of public \r\nprocurement, which has the potential to support the achievement \r\nof other societal challenges (Edler and Georghiou 2007; Henderson \r\nand Newell 2011; Baron 2016; ICLEI 2018)."


id: 8ba6092a3b9bc8581d76917df6650da1
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"One approach for allocating public R&D funds in energy involves relying on active programme managers and having clear technology \r\ndevelopment missions that focus on high-risk high-reward areas and projects. This approach can be exemplified by a relatively new \r\nenergy R&D funding agency in the USA, the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy (ARPA-E). This agency was created in \r\n2009 and it was modelled on the experience of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) - a US government agency \r\nfunding high-risk, high-reward research in defence-related areas (Bonvillian and Van Atta 2011; US National Academies of Sciences \r\nEngineering and Medicine 2017; Bonvillian 2018). DARPA programme managers had a lot of discretion for making decisions about \r\nfunding projects, but since energy R&D funding is usually more politically vulnerable than defence R&D funding, the ARPA-E model \r\ninvolved programme managers requesting external review as an informational input (Azoulay et al"


id: e4db48a65cb7d74e56121d10620438db
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"Penasco et al. (2021) review 20 evaluations: eight identified a positive \r\nimpact (although in at least two cases, the paper indicated that the \r\nimpact was small or negligible); 11 no impact; and one was associated \r\nwith a negative impact on innovation indicators. The studies that found \r\nno impact and the studies that found some impact covered all three \r\nmethods (quantitative ex post, qualitative and theoretical and ex ante\r\nanalysis). Another review focused only on empirical studies (mainly \r\nquantitative but also qualitative), covered a slightly longer period and \r\nidentified 19 studies (15 using quantitative methods) (Lilliestam et al. \r\n2021). With a narrower set of indicators of innovation, they concluded \r\nthat there was very little empirical evidence linking innovation with \r\nthe emissions trading schemes studied to date (Lilliestam et al. 2021)"


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" \r\nThis review focused mainly on papers evaluating the earlier stages \r\nof the European Emissions Trading Scheme, which featured relatively \r\nlow carbon dioxide prices, and covered a small set of firms, showing \r\nthat carbon pricing policy design is an important determinant of \r\ninnovation outcomes. Combining both reviews, there are a  total \r\nof 27  individual studies, some of them providing mixed evidence \r\nof impact, and 23 of them suggest there was no impact or that (in \r\na  couple of cases) it was small. It is important to note that some \r\nresearchers note that, for particular subsectors and actors, emissions \r\ntrading schemes have had an impact on patenting trends (Calel and \r\nDechezlepretre 2016). Overall the expectation is that higher prices \r\nand coverage would result in higher impacts and that, over time, the \r\nimpact on innovation would grow."


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"instruments in industrialised countries and emerging economies \r\ncan also lead to positive (or at least not negative) competitiveness \r\noutcomes and distributional outcomes (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement) (Section 16.3). Prioritising low-cost energy generation in \r\nthe design of FIT schemes can result in a lower focus of innovation \r\nefforts on more novel technologies and greater barriers to incumbents \r\nin less mature technologies (Hoppmann et al. 2013). Similarly, case \r\nstudy research from Mexico and South Africa indicates that focusing \r\non low-cost renewable energy generation can only result in a greater \r\nreliance on existing foreign value chains and capital, and thus in lower \r\nor negative impacts on domestic competitiveness. In other words, \r\nsome approaches can hinder the development of the local capabilities \r\nthat could result in greater long-term benefits domestically (Matsuo \r\nand Schmidt 2019)"


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" Evidence for developing countries indicates that \r\nlocal and absorptive capacity also play an important role, in particular, \r\non the ability of policies to contribute to competitiveness or industrial \r\npolicy goals (Binz and Anadon 2018). Research comparing China's \r\nand India's policies and outcomes on wind energy also suggest \r\nthat policy durability and systemic approaches can affect industrial \r\noutcomes (Surana and Anadon 2015)."


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"Depending on the design (including the value and coverage of the \r\ntax), carbon taxes can either have positive, negative or null impact \r\non competitiveness and distributional outcomes (medium evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). The evidence on the impact of carbon taxes on \r\ncompetitiveness is significant (a total of 27 evaluations) and mixed, \r\nwith six of them reporting some positive impacts, 10  reporting \r\nno impact, and 11 reporting negative impacts (so 59% were \r\nnot associated with negative impacts). Most of the evaluations \r\nreporting negative impacts were theoretical assessments, and only \r\nthree ex post quantitative analysis (Penasco et al. 2021). Twenty\u0002four evaluations covered distributional impacts of carbon taxes and \r\nother environmental taxes, the majority (15) found the existence of \r\nsome negative distributional impacts, six found positive impacts, \r\nand three  found no distributional impacts"


id: 90f8f42e663b2f276884810634762706
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" Differences in the \r\nassessment results stem from the design of the taxes (Penasco et al. \r\n2021). It is important to note that, once again, the evidence comes \r\nfrom industrialised countries and emerging economies."


id: 3effe94002d6f2db8c4d31d77f5f7e0d
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"The evidence of the impact of renewable energy auctions on \r\ninnovation outcomes is very small and provides mixed results \r\n(limited evidence, low agreement). Out of six evaluations, three \r\nidentify positive impacts, two no impacts, and one negative impacts. \r\nAll of the evaluations but one were qualitative or theoretical, \r\nand the quantitative assessment indicated no impact (Penasco \r\net al. 2021). There is more evidence covering emerging economies \r\nanalysing the impacts of auctions when compared to other policy \r\ninstrument types. For example, there is work comparing the \r\napproaches to renewable energy auctions in South Africa and \r\nDenmark (Toke 2015) finding a positive impact on the latter stages \r\nof innovation (mainly deployment), and broader work on auctions \r\ncovering OECD countries as well as Brazil, South Africa and China \r\nnot finding a significant impact on innovation (Wigand et al. 2016)"


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" \r\nWork comparing renewable energy auctions in different countries \r\nin South America generally finds a  positive impact on innovation \r\noutcomes (Mastropietro et al. 2014). The body of evidence \r\non the impact of auctions on competitiveness is also limited \r\n(six  evaluations) and indicates negative outcomes of renewable \r\nauctions of competitiveness (limited evidence, low agreement). As \r\nwith other policies, the design of the auctions can affect innovation \r\noutcomes (del Rio and Kiefer 2021). Only two studies investigated \r\ndistributional outcomes, and both were negative."


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content:
"Many factors affect the impacts of feed-in tariffs (FITs) on outcomes \r\nother than innovation (robust evidence, high agreement). While \r\nFITs have been generally associated with positive innovation \r\noutcomes, some of the differences found in the literature may arise \r\nfrom differences in the evaluation method (Penasco et al. 2021) or \r\ndifferences in policy design (e.g., the level and the rate of decrease \r\nof the tariff) (Hoppmann et al. 2014), the policy mixes (Rogge et al. \r\n2017), the technologies targeted and their stage of development \r\n(Huenteler et al. 2016b), and the geographical and temporal context \r\nof where the policy was put in place (Section 16.3). Research has \r\nalso found that, particularly for less mature technologies, a higher \r\ntechnology specificity in the design of FITs is associated with more \r\ninnovation (Del Rio 2012)"


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" FITs yield better results if they account \r\nfor the specificities of the country; or else, the technology and the \r\npolicy could result in negative distributional and (to a lesser extent) \r\ncompetitiveness impacts. Meckling et al. (2017) indicate that an \r\n'enduring challenge' of technology-specific industrial policy such as \r\nsome FITs is to avoid locking in suboptimal clean technologies - \r\na challenge which, among other options, could be overcome with \r\ntargeted niche procurement for next-generation technologies. \r\nOther authors have cautioned that the move from renewable FITs \r\nto auctions may favour existing PVs (e.g.,  polysilicon) over more \r\nnovel solar power technologies (Sivaram 2018b) such as thin-film \r\nPV, amorphous PV, and perovskites."


id: 99d3aaafe9fec55aff4b660fab628bfd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"The impact of renewable portfolio standards without tradeable \r\ncredits on innovation outcomes is negligible or very small (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement). Out of the nine studies, seven \r\nreported no impact on innovation outcomes and two a  positive \r\nimpact (Penasco et al. 2021). Most of these papers focused on \r\npatenting and private R&D innovation indicators and not cost \r\nreductions. Impact on competitiveness is found to be negligible \r\nor positive (limited evidence, medium agreement). Out of eight \r\nevaluations, five  report a  positive impact and three a  negligible \r\nimpact; only two  are quantitative studies (Penasco et al. 2021). \r\nNegative distributional impacts from renewable portfolio standards \r\ncan emerge in some cases (limited evidence, low agreement). Out \r\nof eight evaluations, four identified positive impacts, and four \r\nnegative impacts; all of the studies identifying a  positive impact \r\nwere theoretical"


id: f258bb6ffcb0ab245a12511a538e5a57
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" There are efforts focused on clean energy portfolio \r\nstandards which include technologies beyond renewables."


id: c84937a4f01f91fa3c1ed1a2fcf8eff6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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vector_id: 29087
content:
"The literature specifically focusing on the impacts of labels is very \r\nlimited and indicates positive outcomes (limited evidence, high \r\nagreement). Energy labels may accompany a  minimum energy \r\nperformance standard, and the outcomes of these policies are often \r\ncombined in literature (IEA 2015). But again, given the limited \r\nevidence, more research is needed. Although there are many studies \r\non energy efficiency more broadly and for both standards and labels, \r\nonly eight studies specifically focus on labels. Furthermore, seven of \r\nthem report positive outcomes and one negative outcomes. Six of the \r\nstudies used qualitative methods mentioning the impacts of labelling \r\non the development of new products (Wiel et al. 2006). Research \r\nspecifically comparing voluntary labels with other mechanisms found \r\na significant and positive relationship between labels and the number \r\nof energy-efficient inventions (Girod et al. 2017)"


id: 87023a55f5ce2d68c884626f7a26001b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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" More research is \r\nneeded, especially in developing countries, that have extensive \r\nlabelling programmes in place, and also with quantitative methods, to \r\ndevelop evidence on the impacts of labelling on innovation. Box 16.7 \r\ndiscusses an example of a combination of policy instruments in China \r\nincluding labelling, sale bans and financial support."


id: c0b9f001648aeff62a7d7663caf282ef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"Voluntary approaches have a largely positive impact on innovation \r\nfor those that choose to participate (robust evidence, medium \r\nagreement). Research on voluntary approaches focuses on firms \r\nadopting voluntary environmental management systems that can \r\nbe certified based on standards of the widely adopted International \r\nOrganization for Standardization (ISO 14001  - standard for \r\nenvironmental management) or the European Union's Eco\u0002Management and Auditing Scheme (EMAS), which is partly mandatory. \r\nOut of 16 analyses: 70% report positive innovation outcomes in terms \r\nof patents, products or processes; 17% report negligible impacts; and \r\n13% report negative impacts. Positive innovation outcomes have \r\nbeen linked to firms' internal resource management practices and \r\nwere found to be strengthened in firms with mature environmental \r\nmanagement systems and in the presence of other environmental \r\nregulations (Inoue et al. 2013; He and Shen 2019; Li et al. 2019a)"


id: 39101c0d5154bf60a7cff6f9b7b86c26
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" \r\nOverall, studies are concentrated in a  few countries that do not \r\nfully capture where environmental management systems have been \r\nactually adopted (Boiral et al. 2018). There is a need for research in \r\nanalyses of such instruments in emerging economies, including China \r\nand India, and methodologically in qualitative and longitudinal \r\nanalyses (Boiral et al. 2018)."


id: ebeaf3acbbb0b8d3eeede2e32b7457b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"science and useful arts'. Patent systems aim to reach their goals by \r\ntrying to strike a balance between the creation of new knowledge and \r\ndiffusion of that knowledge (Scotchmer and Green 1990; Devlin 2010; \r\nAnadon et al. 2016b). They promote the creation of new knowledge \r\n(e.g., technological inventions) by providing a temporary, exclusive \r\nright to the holder of the patent, thus providing incentives to develop \r\nsuch new knowledge and helping parties to justify investments in \r\nR&D.  They promote the diffusion of this new knowledge via the \r\ndetailed disclosure of the invention in the patent publication, \r\nand by enabling a 'market for knowledge' via trading patents and \r\nissuing licences (Arora et al. 2004). Although IP protections provide \r\nincentives to invest in innovation, they can also restrict the use of \r\nnew knowledge by raising prices or blocking follow-on innovation \r\n(Wallerstein et al. 1993; Stiglitz 2008)"


id: da156a614fda1d3aa94dc916dd5b87ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" As institutions, national patent \r\nsystems feature prominently in models and theories of national \r\ninnovation systems (Edquist 1997; Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005)."


id: 35e83b4439dd24468885dadcbb6d6fd5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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vector_id: 5892
content:
"Overall, research indicates that trade can facilitate the entrance \r\nof new technologies, but the impact on innovation is less clear \r\n(limited evidence, low agreement). A recent study indicates that, for \r\ncountries with high environmental performance, FDI has a negligible \r\nimpact on environmental performance, while countries with a lower \r\nenvironmental performance may benefit from FDI in terms of their \r\nenvironmental performance (Li et al. 2019b). One analysis on China \r\nlinks FDI with improved environmental performance and energy \r\nefficiency and also innovation outcomes in general (Gao and Zhang \r\n2013). Other work links FDI with increased productivity across firms \r\n(not just those engaged in climate-related technologies) through \r\nspillovers (Newman et al. 2015)"


id: 8d2df95abcf020e4719e2d8fa7ab9fc1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" In addition, Brandao and Ehrl \r\n(2019) indicate that productivity of the electric power industry is \r\nmore influenced by the transfer of embodied technology from other \r\nindustries than by investments of the power industry. Also, they \r\nfind that countries with high R&D stocks are the main sources of \r\ninternational technology spillovers and the source countries may also \r\nbenefit from the spillover."


id: 32ef2b3aaf64d7037b9bf04051204b6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"The degree to which patent systems actually promote innovation \r\nis subject to debate. Patent protection has been found to have \r\na positive impact on R&D activities in patent-intensive industries, but \r\nthis effect was found to be conditional on access to finance (Maskus \r\net al. 2019). Patents are believed to be especially important to \r\nfacilitate innovation in selected areas such as pharmaceuticals, where \r\ninvestments in developments and clinical trials are high, imitation \r\ncosts are low, and there is often a one-to-one relationship between \r\na patent and a product, referred to as a 'discrete' product industry \r\n(Cohen et al. 2000). At the same time, an increasing body of theoretical \r\nand empirical literature suggests that the proliferation of patents \r\nalso discourages innovation (medium evidence, low agreement)"


id: 5fc3e7b9e5ec5b0686bb842c5e5b8136
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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" \r\nTheoretical contributions note that a appropriability regime that is too \r\nstringent may greatly limit the diffusion of advanced technological \r\nknowledge and eventually block the development of differentiated \r\ntechnological capabilities within an industry, in what is called an \r\n'appropriability trap' (Edquist 1997; Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005). \r\nThere has been a long-standing debate on the impact of patents and \r\nother IP rights on innovation and economic development (Machlup \r\n1958; Hall and Helmers 2019). Jaffe and Lerner (2004) and Bessen \r\nand Meurer (2009) highlight how IP rights also hamper innovation \r\nin a variety of ways. Other contributions in the literature focus on \r\nmore specific factors. For example, Shapiro (2001) discusses 'patent \r\nthickets', where overlapping sets of patent rights mean that those \r\nseeking to commercialise new technology need to obtain licences \r\nfrom multiple patentees"


id: 8530d85bf44e2bf7d4baa59c60b3ae30
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" Heller and Eisenberg (1998) argue that \r\na 'tragedy of the anticommons' is likely to emerge when too many \r\nparties obtain the right to exclude others from using fragmented \r\nand overlapping pieces of knowledge  - ultimately leading to no \r\none having the privilege of using the results of biomedical research. \r\nReitzig et al. (2007) describe the damaging effects of extreme \r\nbusiness strategies employing patents, such as 'patent trolling'."


id: 79c8f71dbabca41af96a25aeef5bffcb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"sets down minimum standards for the regulation by national \r\ngovernments of many forms of IP as applied to nationals of other \r\nWTO member nations (WTO 1994). Developing countries successfully \r\nmanaged to include some flexibilities into TRIPS, both in terms of \r\ntiming of legislative reform, and the content of the reforms. In an \r\nattempt to understand the  effects of the introduction of TRIPS, \r\nFalvey et al. (2006) find that the effect of IP protection on growth \r\nis positively and significantly related to growth for low- and high\u0002income countries, but not for middle-income countries. They argue \r\nthat low-income countries benefit from increased technology flows, \r\nbut middle-income countries may have offsetting losses from the \r\nreduced scope for imitation. Note that Falvey et al. (2006) do not \r\nbreak down their results in different technological areas, and they \r\ndo not focus on innovation, but instead on growth"


id: a19c7b581027043af5b3d27b96f033eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" It has been \r\nargued that the increasingly globalised IP regime through initiatives \r\nsuch as the TRIPS agreement will diminish prospects for technology \r\ntransfer and competition in developing countries, particularly for \r\nseveral important technology areas related to meeting sustainable \r\ndevelopment needs (Maskus and Reichman 2017)."


id: 4debbdac06e6fd8c4a9f96b750c19403
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"In principle, patent holders are not required to take their protected \r\ninvention into use, and neither have the obligation to allow \r\n(i.e., license) others to use the inventions in question (high evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Studies have shown that the way patent holders \r\nuse their patent differs considerably across industrial sectors: \r\nin pharmaceutics, patents are typically used to enable exclusive \r\nproduction of a certain good (and obtain monopoly rents), while in \r\nindustries such as computers, semiconductors, and communications, \r\npatents are often used to strengthen positions in cross-licensing \r\nnegotiations and to generate licensing income (Cohen et al. 2000; \r\nForay 2004). There are also companies that predominantly obtain \r\npatents for defensive reasons: they seek freedom to design and \r\nmanufacture, and by owning a  patent portfolio themselves, they \r\nhope to prevent becoming the target of litigation by other patent \r\nholders (Hall and Ziedonis 2001)"


id: 75790f85637316ea48f20d1e5be6c067
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" Patents are often used strategically \r\nto impede the development and diffusion of competing, alternative \r\nproducts, processes or services, by employing strategies known as \r\n'blanketing' and 'fencing' (Grandstrand 2000), although the research \r\nis not specific to the climate space."


id: c2faf1fdefb3885e491af4ae8c8b191e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Research examining the impacts of sub-national policies on \r\ninnovation and competitiveness is sporadic - regional variations have \r\nbeen quantitatively assessed in the USA or China, or with case studies \r\nin these and other countries. Research on wind energy in the USA, \r\ndistributed PV balance of systems in China, and renewable energy \r\ntechnologies in Italy have found that policies that incentivised local \r\ndemand were associated with inducing innovation, measured with \r\npatents (Corsatea 2016; Fu et al. 2018; Gao and Rai 2019). Different \r\npolicies may have different impacts - for example, in the USA, state\u0002level tax incentives and subsidies induced innovation within the \r\nstate; but for renewable portfolio standards, policies in other states \r\nwere associated with innovation because of impact on demand, but \r\nown-state policies were not (Fu et al. 2018)"


id: e9a35e46a81910aff9e59b94bb7fb204
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34260
content:
" Research has also noted \r\nthat the outcomes of policy and regulation on innovation are spatially \r\nheterogenous, because of differences in local planning authorities \r\nand capabilities (Corsatea 2016; Song et al. 2019)."


id: f36f1599bc20ef2d71388b703cf28fc2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35809
content:
"There are notable but specific exceptions to the general principle that \r\npatent holders are not obliged to license their patent to others. These \r\nexceptions include the compulsory licence, fair, reasonable and non\u0002discriminatory (FRAND) policies, and statement on licences of right \r\n(high evidence, high agreement). While patent holders are, in principle, \r\nfree to choose not to license their innovation, there are three important \r\nexceptions to this. First, most national patent laws have provisions for \r\ncompulsory licensing, meaning that a government allows someone \r\nelse to produce a patented product or process without the consent of \r\nthe patent holder, or plans to use the patent-protected invention itself \r\n(WTO 2020). Compulsory licences may be issued in cases of public \r\ninterest or events of abuse of the patent (WIPO 2008; Biadgleng \r\n2009)"


id: cdea2e1bed5d9d205867723872b25300
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29921
content:
" Compulsory licensing is explicitly allowed in the WTO TRIPS \r\nagreement, and its use in context of medicine (for instance, to control \r\ndiseases of public health importance, including HIV, tuberculosis and \r\nmalaria) is further clarified in the 'DOHA Declaration' from 2001 \r\n(Reichman 2009; WHO 2020). Second, standard-setting organisations "


id: 4139479de75f3b134bd9eb11bff29af1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7653
content:
"Although previous sections summarised the research disentangling \r\nthe role of individual policies in advancing or hindering innovation \r\n(as well as impacts on other objectives), other research has tried \r\nto characterise the impact of a policy mix on a particular outcome. \r\nAlthough the outcome studied was not innovation, but diffusion \r\n(technology effectiveness is in the set of criteria outlined in \r\nChapter 13), it seems relevant to discuss overall findings. Research \r\nreviewing renewable energy policies in nine OECD countries \r\nconcludes that, over time, a  broad set of policies characterised by \r\na 'balance' metric has been put in place. This research also identifies \r\na  significant negative association between the balance of policies \r\nin renewable energy and the diffusion of total renewable energy \r\ncapacity, but no significant effect of the overall intensity (coded as \r\nthe 46 weighted average of six indicators) on renewable capacity \r\n(Schmidt and Sewerin 2019)"


id: 5a6989d1c605a32536d483198eb9cc85
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11738
content:
" This indicates that a neutral conception \r\nof balance across all possible policies may not be desirable, and that \r\npolicy mix intensity by itself does not explain technology diffusion."


id: b5261cfac6788d0a2af8622a6bdc4f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26037
content:
"With the submission of their Nationally Determined Contributions \r\n(NDCs) as part of the Paris Agreement, most developing countries are \r\nnow engaged in climate mitigation and adaptation. While technology \r\nis seen as one of the 'means of implementation' of climate action, \r\ndeveloping countries often have relatively limited technology \r\ninnovation capabilities, which requires them to access technologies \r\ndeveloped in higher-income countries with stronger innovation \r\nsystems (Popp 2011; Binz et al. 2012; Urban 2018). In many cases, \r\nthese technologies require adaptation for the local context and needs \r\n(Sagar 2009; Anadon et al. 2016b), and innovation capabilities are \r\nrequired to suitably adapt these technologies for local use and also \r\nto create new markets and business models that are required for \r\nsuccessful deployment (Sagar 2009; Ockwell et al. 2015; Ockwell and \r\nByrne 2016)"


id: 28b8b8cc338ac357a0f9b3faf89a0bbd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3836
content:
" This can lead to dependencies on foreign knowledge \r\nand providers (Ockwell and Byrne 2016), negative impacts in terms of \r\nhigher costs (Huenteler et al. 2016a), balance of payments constraints, \r\nand vulnerability to external shocks (Ebeling 2020)."


id: 5c996f3ae3c613ad56d5f693d68b9223
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12085
content:
"Such globalisation of production and supply chains opens up \r\neconomic development opportunities for developing countries \r\n(Lema et al. 2020). At the same time, not all countries benefit from \r\nthe globalisation of innovation - barriers remain related to finance, \r\nenvironmental performance, human capabilities and cost (Weiss and \r\nBonvillian 2013; Egli et al. 2018), with developing countries being \r\nparticularly disadvantaged at leveraging these opportunities. The gap \r\nin low-carbon technology innovation between countries appears to \r\nhave reduced only among OECD countries (Yan et al. 2017; Du and \r\nLi 2019; Du et al. 2019) and the lower-income countries are not \r\nable to benefit as much from low-carbon technologies. For instance, \r\nin the case of agriculture, Fuglie (2018) notes that international \r\nR&D spillovers seem to have benefitted developed countries more \r\nthan developing countries. Gross et al"


id: 2efbab247a48902143cc50b8fd07581e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4827
content:
" (2018) also argue that the \r\ndevelopment timescales for new energy technologies can extend \r\nup to 70 years, even within one country. They recommend that \r\ninnovation efforts be balanced between early-stage R&D spending, \r\nand commercialising already low-emission technologies in the \r\ndemonstration phase and diffusing them globally."


id: 122034fb547f7d0fd7d2f74346c39c07
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Thus international cooperation on technology development and \r\ntransfer can enable developing countries to achieve their climate \r\ngoals more effectively, while also addressing other SDGs  - taking \r\nadvantage, where possible, of the globalisation of innovation and \r\nproduction (Lema et al. 2020). Earlier assessments in AR5 and SR1.5 \r\nhave made it clear that international technology transfer and \r\ncooperation could play a role in climate policy at both the international \r\nand the domestic policy level (Somanathan et al. 2014; Stavins et al. \r\n2014; IPCC 2018b) and for low-carbon development at the regional \r\nlevel (Agrawala et al. 2014). The Paris Agreement also reflects this \r\nview by noting that countries shall strengthen cooperative action on \r\ntechnology development and transfer regarding two main aspects: \r\n(i) promoting collaborative approaches to R&D; and (ii) facilitating \r\naccess to technology to developing country Parties (UNFCCC 2015)"


id: 59bb7a3e0b8bf0f007d9bde7c712c42c
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" \r\nFurthermore, both in literature and in UNFCCC deliberations, South\u0002South technology transfer is highlighted (Khosla et al. 2017) as \r\na complement to the transfer of technology and know-how from the \r\nNorth to the South."


id: 4f067eac7d597021fdaf9664e88e3484
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9874
content:
"Real-world outcomes in terms of low-emission technology \r\ndeployment in developing countries may vary significantly, depending \r\non the nature of the international engagement and the domestic \r\ncontext. While there has been some success in the enhancement \r\nof technology deployment through technology transfer in some \r\ndeveloping countries (de la Tour et al. 2011; Zhang and Gallagher \r\n2016), many others, and particularly least-developed countries, \r\nare lagging behind (Glachant and Dechezlepretre 2017). Glachant \r\nand Dechezlepretre (2017) indicate that this is due to the lack of \r\nparticipation in economic globalisation and that climate negotiations \r\ncould facilitate technology transfer to those countries through the \r\ncreation of global demand for low-emission technologies through \r\nstronger mitigation targets that will result in lowering of costs and \r\ntherefore enhanced technology diffusion"


id: d93d314aec050a0267534c283d3dd382
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31689
content:
"social, cultural and behavioural, marketing and market building; \r\nmacroeconomics; and support policy (Bakhtiar et al. 2020). Ramos \r\nMejia et al. (2018) indicate that the governance of low-emission \r\ntechnology transfer and deployment in developing countries is \r\nfrequently negatively affected by a mixture of well- and ill-functioning \r\ninstitutions  - for instance, in a  context of market imperfection, \r\nclientelist and social exclusive communities and patrimonial and/\r\nor marketised states. Furthermore, existing interests, such as fossil \r\nfuel production, may also impede the deployment of low-emission \r\ntechnologies, as highlighted in case studies of Vietnam and Indonesia \r\n(Dorband et al. 2020; Ordonez et al. 2021). It is for such reasons that \r\nboth domestic efforts and international engagement are seen as \r\nnecessary to facilitate technology transfer as well as deployment in \r\ndeveloping countries (Boyd 2012)"


id: 4e9b48bfc011359e7bf0a7a536f3072d
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content:
" The same has been seen as true \r\nin the case of agriculture, where the very successful international \r\nresearch efforts of the CGIAR - with remarkably favourable benefit\u0002cost ratios (Alston et al. 2021) - were complemented by the national \r\nagricultural research systems for effective uptake of high-yielding \r\nvarieties of crops (Evenson and Gollin 2003)."


id: fb84f42804e716f03263b71a4da63d6
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"As mentioned earlier, RD&D can aid the development of new \r\ntechnologies as well as their adoption for new use contexts. \r\nTherefore, it is not surprising that international cooperation on RD&D \r\nis identified as a  mechanism to promote low-carbon innovation \r\n(Suzuki 2015; Mission Innovation 2019; TEC 2021). This has resulted \r\nin a  variety of international initiatives to cooperate on technology \r\nin order to create knowledge spillovers and develop capacity. For \r\nexample, the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism, among other things, \r\naims to facilitate finance for RD&D of climate technologies by helping \r\nwith readiness activities for developing country actors. In particular \r\npreparing early-stage technologies for a  smoother transition to \r\ndeployment and commercialisation has been emphasised in the \r\ncontext of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) (TEC 2017)"


id: a328b84b06ee4c8d8649e617f982fc17
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" \r\nThere are numerous multilateral, bilateral and private programmes that \r\nhave facilitated RD&D, biased mostly towards mitigation (as opposed \r\nto adaptation) activities. Many programmes that seemed to be \r\nabout RD&D were in reality dialogues about research coordination \r\n(Ockwell et al. 2015). There are also a  variety of possible bilateral \r\nand multilateral models and approaches for engaging in joint R&D \r\n(Mission Innovation 2019). An update by the TEC (2021) reviewing \r\ngood practices in international cooperation of technology confirmed \r\nthe conclusions of Ockwell et al. (2015), and moreover highlighted \r\nthat most initiatives are led by the public sector, and that the private \r\nsector tended to get involved only in incubation, commercialisation \r\nand diffusion phases. It also concluded that, although participation of \r\nlarger, higher-income developing countries seems to have increased, \r\nparticipation of least-developed countries is still very low."


id: 26ea2003a8042fe05df2b6921d54fc51
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"One key area for underpinning effective technology uptake in \r\ndeveloping countries relates to capabilities for managing technological \r\nchange. This includes the capabilities to innovate, implement, and \r\nundertake integrated planning. There is much research to indicate \r\nthat the ability of a  country's firms to adopt new technologies is \r\ndetermined by its absorptive capacity, which includes its own R&D \r\nactivities, human capacity (e.g.,  technical personnel), government \r\ninvolvement (including institutional capacity), the infrastructure in the \r\ncountry (Kumar et al. 1999), and knowledge and capacity as part of its \r\n'intangible assets' or the 'software' (Ockwell et al. 2015; da Silva et al. \r\n2019; Corsi et al. 2020). For sustainable development, the capacity \r\nto plan in an integrated way and implement the SDGs (Khalili et al. \r\n2015; Elder et al. 2016), including using participatory approaches \r\n(Disterheft et al. 2015), is a  conditional means of implementation"


id: 19b52fb9574a9a8276807abb010b5240
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" \r\nIt also is argued that, if human capital were the focus of international \r\nclimate negotiations as well as national climate policy, it could \r\nchange the political economy in favour of climate mitigation, which \r\nis needed for developing such capabilities in advance to keep up with \r\nthe required speed of transformation (Ockwell et al. 2015; Hsu 2017; \r\nIPCC 2018b; Upadhyaya et al. 2020). In a  global analysis of wind \r\nenergy using econometric analysis, Halleck-Vega et al. (2018) lend \r\nquantitative credibility to the claim that a  technology skill base is \r\na  key determinant of technological diffusion. Activities to enhance \r\ncapabilities include informational contacts, research activities, \r\nconsulting, education and training, and activities related to technical \r\nfacilities (Huh and Kim 2018; Khan et al. 2020)."


id: 53b45c6757a2601fd4ccf0a1b5338d2b
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"In recent years, deliberate international climate finance investments have focused on ensuring that developing countries (and especially \r\nSIDS and least-developed countries) have access to improvements in hydrometeorological observations, modelling, and prediction \r\ncapacity, sometimes with a particular focus on the people intended to benefit from the information produced (CREWS 2016). For \r\ninstance, on the Eastern Caribbean SIDS of Dominica, researchers took a community-based approach to identify the mediating factors \r\naffecting the challenges to coastal fishing communities in the aftermath of two extreme weather events (in particular hurricane Maria \r\nin 2017) (Turner et al. 2020). Adopting an adaptive capacity framework (Cinner et al"


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" 2018), they identified 'intangible resources' that \r\npeople relied on in their post-disaster response as important for starting up fishery, but also went beyond that framework to conclude \r\nthat the response ability on the part of governmental organisations as well as other actors (e.g., fish vendors) in the supply chain is also \r\na requirement for rebuilding and restarting income-generating activity (Turner et al. 2020). Numerous other studies have highlighted \r\ncapacity-building as adaptation priorities (Basel et al. 2020; Kuhl et al. 2020; Sarker et al. 2020; Vogel et al. 2020; Williams et al. 2020)."


id: 46a33001314653ea49a69dcc37e4473a
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"(Nygaard and Hansen 2015; Hofman and van der Gaast 2019). \r\nSince 2009, the UNFCCC discussions on technology development \r\nand transfer have focused on the Technology Mechanism under the \r\nCancun Agreements of 2010, which can be seen as the global climate \r\ngovernance answer to redistributive claims by developing countries \r\n(McGee and Wenta 2014). The Technology Mechanism consists \r\nof the TEC and the Climate Technology Centre & Network (CTCN). \r\nAn independent review of CTCN, evaluated it on five dimensions - \r\nrelevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impacts and sustainability - and \r\nindicated that the organisation is achieving its mandate in all these \r\ndimensions, although there are some possible areas of improvement"


id: 5e23321c91833d6be9e1c2c85bb89fec
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" \r\nThe review also specifically noted that 'the lack of predictability \r\nand security over financial resources significantly affected \r\nthe CTCN's ability to deliver services at the expected level, as did the \r\nCTCN's lack of human and organizational resources and the capacity \r\nof NDEs [National Designated Entities].' (TEC 2017). The CTCN has \r\novercome some of the limitations imposed by resource constraints \r\nby acting as a  matchmaker from an open-innovation perspective \r\n(Lee and Mwebaza 2020). The CTCN's lack of financial sustainability \r\nhas been a  recurring issue, which may potentially be resolved by \r\ndeepening the linkage between the CTCN and Green Climate Fund \r\n(Oh 2020). In the meanwhile, the Green Climate Fund is planning to "


id: 463ca60499b6ad7451d287d8a56294e7
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"that around 40% of projects feature hardware or other types of \r\ninternational transfer of technology (Seres et al. 2009; Murphy et al. \r\n2015), depending on the nature of technology, the host country and \r\nregion (Cui et al. 2020) and the project type (Karakosta et al. 2012). \r\nThe CDM was generally positively evaluated on its contribution to \r\ntechnology transfer. However, it was also regarded critically as the \r\nmarket-responsiveness and following of export implies a bias to larger, \r\nmore advanced economies rather than those countries most in need \r\nof technology transfer (Gandenberger et al. 2016), although some \r\ncountries have managed to correct that by directing the projects, sub\u0002nationally, to provinces with the greatest need (Bayer et al. 2016). \r\nAlso, the focus on hardware in evaluations of technology transfer \r\nunder the CDM has been criticised (Haselip et al. 2015; Michaelowa \r\net al. 2019). Indeed, although many studies do go beyond hardware \r\nin their evaluations (e.g"


id: 51a3cd823cd381783c9830db7e1b3855
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", Murphy et al. 2015), the degree to which \r\nthe project leads to a change in the national system of innovation or \r\ninstitutional capacity development is not commonly assessed, or has \r\nbeen assessed as limited (de Coninck and Puig 2015)."


id: 5d27b12cf92d17b9c486c79d8f953a2b
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"From the broader assessment above, despite limitations of available \r\ninformation, it is clear that the number of initiatives and activities \r\non international cooperation and technology transfer and capacity \r\nbuilding seem to have been enhanced since the Cancun Agreements \r\nand the Paris Agreement (TEC 2021). However, much more can be \r\ndone, given the complexity and magnitude of the requirements in \r\nterms of coverage of activities, the amount of committed funding, \r\nand its effectiveness. Some assessments of UNFCCC instruments \r\nspecifically for technology transfer to developing countries have \r\nindicated that functions such as knowledge development, market \r\nformation and legitimacy in developing countries' low-emission \r\ntechnological innovation systems would need much more support to \r\nfulfil the Paris Agreement goals (de Coninck and Puig 2015; Ockwell \r\net al"


id: b09bd83a7964c47b3f6abcfdbf5fc627
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" 2015); such areas would benefit from continued attention, \r\ngiven their role in the overall climate technology transition."


id: e8f287060942e9e0afffead8fd762f2e
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"There is significantly less literature on capacity building under \r\nthe UNFCCC, especially as it relates to managing the technology \r\ntransition. In a  legal analysis, D'Auvergne and Nummelin (2017) \r\nindicate the nature, scope and principles of Article 11 on capacity \r\nbuilding of the Paris Agreement as being demand- and country\u0002driven, following a needs approach, fostering national, subnational \r\nand local ownership, and being iterative, incorporating the lessons \r\nlearnt, as well as participatory, cross-cutting and gender-response. \r\nThey also highlight that it is novel that least-developed countries \r\nand Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are called out as the most \r\nvulnerable and most in need of capacity building, and that it raises \r\na 'legal expectation' that all parties 'should' cooperate to enhance the \r\ncapacity in developing countries to implement the Paris Agreement"


id: e8e17bcc3df67a902a19d3f27a028fef
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" \r\nThese aspects are reflected in the terms of reference of the Paris \r\nCommittee on Capacity-building (PCCB) that was established in 2015 \r\nat the 21st Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC 2016; D'Auvergne \r\nand Nummelin 2017), and was extended by five years at the 25th \r\nConference of the Parties in 2019 (UNFCCC 2020a, b). In its work \r\nplan for 2020-2024, its aims include 'identifying capacity gaps and \r\nneeds, both current and emerging, and recommending ways to \r\naddress them'."


id: c2ab114c6008da4eda9482ee4036b3aa
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"There is also literature suggesting that weak IPR regimes have a 'strong and negative impact on the international diffusion of \r\npatented knowledge' (Dechezlepretre et al. 2013; Glachant and Dechezlepretre 2017). Also, patents may support market transactions \r\nin technology, including international technology transfer, especially to middle-income countries and larger developing countries \r\n(Maskus 2010; Hall and Helmers 2019) but least-developed countries may be better served by building capacity to absorb and \r\nimplement technology (Hall and Helmers 2010; Maskus 2010; Sanni et al. 2016; Glachant and Dechezlepretre 2017). It is also argued \r\nthat it is not even clear that the patent system as it exists today is the most appropriate vehicle for encouraging international access \r\n(Hall and Helmers 2010; Maskus 2010; Sanni et al. 2016; Glachant and Dechezlepretre 2017)"


id: 8d8b64dfd3c9bd31bbdce5823b9dc54c
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" Given the large variation in perspectives \r\non the role of IPRs in technology transfer, there is a need for more evidence and analysis to better understand if, and under what \r\nconditions, IPR may hinder or promote technology transfer (TEC 2012)."


id: 8a2a09751ce44b90cda66929ea022b3e
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"(Gibbons 1999; Jasanoff 2003), to the extent that the two can be \r\nseparated. From a science, technology and innovation perspective, Fu \r\net al. (2019) distinguish three categories of SDGs. The first category \r\ncomprises those SDGs representing essential human needs for which \r\ninputs that put pressure on sustainable development would need \r\nto be minimised. These include Zero hunger (SDG 2), Clear water \r\nand sanitation (SDG 6) and Affordable and clean energy (SDG 7) \r\nresources, which continue to rely on production technologies and \r\npractices that are eroding ecosystem services, potentially hampering \r\nthe realisation of SDGs 15 (Life on land) and 14 (Life below water) \r\n(Diaz et al. 2019). The second category includes those related to \r\ngovernance and which compete with each other for scarce resources, \r\nsuch as Industry, innovation and infrastructure (SDG 9) and Climate \r\naction (SDG 13), which require an interdisciplinary perspective"


id: f724d8054d78ce3d4930bb4c8aba063d
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" The \r\nthird category are those that require maximum realisation, include \r\nNo poverty (SDG 1), Quality education (SDG 4) and Gender equality \r\n(SDG 5) (Fu et al. 2019)."


id: 2ab3a04a38f81d0a7dc790a4cd8c3781
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"Resolving tensions between the SDGs requires adoption and \r\nmainstreaming of novel technologies that can meet needs while \r\nreducing resource waste and improving resource-use efficiency, and \r\nacknowledging the systemic nature of technological innovation, \r\nwhich involves many levels of actors, stages of innovation and scales \r\n(Anadon et al. 2016b). Changes in production technology have been \r\nfound effective to overcome trade-offs between food and water \r\ngoals (Gao and Bryan 2017). Innovative technologies at the food, \r\nwater and energy nexus are transforming production processes \r\nin industrialised and developing countries, such as developments in \r\nagrivoltaics, which is co-development of land for agriculture and solar \r\nwith water conservation benefits (Barron-Gafford et al. 2019; Lytle \r\net al. 2020; Schindele et al. 2020), and other renewably powered \r\nlow- to zero-carbon food, water and energy systems (He et al. 2019)"


id: e81cc133fc2b80ced32697854c19bfb
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"factors often keeps society 'locked in' to those technologies already in widespread use, rather than allowing a shift to new ones - \r\neven those that offer benefits (David 1985; Arthur 1994). Exceptions often follow consistent patterns (Geels 2002; Unruh 2002); since \r\nAR5 a growing number of scholars have suggested using these insights to design more effective climate policies and actions (Geels \r\net al. 2017). Chapter 1 (Section 1.7 and Figure 1.6) represents technology diffusion and a corresponding shift in policy emphasis \r\nas a continuous process; it is also useful to identify a sequence of distinct stages that typically occur, associating each stage with \r\na distinct set of processes, challenges, and effective policies (Patt and Lilliestam 2018; Victor et al. 2019). Consistent with elsewhere \r\nin this report (Section 5.5.2 and Supplementary Material 5.5.3 in Chapter 5, and Section 16"


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"3 in Chapter 16), Cross-Chapter Box 12 \r\nFigure 1 elaborates on four distinct stages: it portrays these as occurring in a cycle, recognising that even transformative technologies \r\nwill eventually be replaced with newer ones."


id: 9bb1f55da25f9ab04b0499099eef71df
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"for these new market entrants is too low for them to appear viable to investors (Murphy and Edwards 2003). A key process in the early \r\nadoption phase is induced innovation, a result of incremental improvements in both design and production processes, and of mass\u0002production of a growing share of key components (Nemet 2006; Grubb et al. 2021). There is diversity across classes of technologies, \r\nand learning tends to occur faster for technologies that are modular (Wilson et al. 2020) - such as photovoltaics - and slower for \r\nthose that require site- or context-specific engineering, such as in the shift to low-carbon materials production (Malhotra and Schmidt \r\n2020). Public policies that create a secure return on investment for project developers can lead to learning associated with industry \r\nexpansion (Chapter 16, Figure 16"


id: c015adda1d884112c9081cd0b7e0e28b
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"1); typically these are economically and politically viable when they promote growth within a market \r\nniche, causing little disruption to the mainstream market (Roberts et al. 2018). Direct support mechanisms are effective, including \r\ncross-subsidies (such as feed-in tariffs) and market quotas (such as renewable portfolio standards) (Geels et al. 2017b; Patt and \r\nLilliestam 2018; and Chapter 9 for assessment of early adoption policies in the building sector). The value of these policies is less in \r\ntheir immediate emissions reductions, but more in generating the conditions for self-sustaining transformational change to take place \r\nas technologies later move from niche to mainstream (Hanna and Victor 2021)."


id: 3dd4f937ba210ea61d5b841253e856fa
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"The third stage, diffusion, is where niche technologies become mainstream, with accelerating diffusion rates (Sections  1.7 and \r\n16.4), and is marked by changes to the socio-technical 'regime', including infrastructure networks, value chains, user practices, \r\nand institutions. This stage is often the most visible and turbulent, because more widespread adoption of a new technology gives \r\nrise to structural changes in institutions and actors' behaviour (e.g., increased adoption of smartphones to new payment systems \r\nand social media), and because when incumbent market actors become threatened, they often contest policies promoting the new \r\ntechnologies (Kohler et al. 2019). In the diffusion stage, policy emphasis is shifted from financial support during the early adoption \r\nstage, towards supporting regime-level factors needed to sustain, or cope with, rapid and widespread diffusion (Markard 2018). \r\nThese factors and policies are context specific. For example, Patt et al"


id: 3f3148dd244df36f4a00d0e8502e65f1
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" (2019) document that the policies needed to expand residential \r\ncharging networks for electric vehicles depend on the local structure of the housing market."


id: b7820f2c52c12c2166e7e8a1b695a077
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"Because different sectors are at different stages of low-carbon transitions, and because the barriers that policies need to address are \r\nstage- and often context-specific, effective policies stimulating socio-technical transitions operate primarily at the sectoral level (Victor \r\net al. 2019). This is particularly the case during early adoption, where economic barriers predominate; during diffusion, policies that address \r\nregime-level factors often need to deal with cross-sectoral linkages and coupling, such as those between power generation, transportation, \r\nand heating (Patt 2015; Bloess 2019; Fridgen et al. 2020). The entire cycle can take multiple decades. However, later stages can go faster by \r\nbuilding on the earlier stages that have taken place elsewhere"


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" For example, early RD&D into wind energy took place primarily in Denmark, \r\nwas followed by early adoption in Denmark, Germany, and Spain, before other countries, including the USA, India, and China, leapfrogged \r\ndirectly to the diffusion stage (Chaudhary et al. 2015; Dai and Xue 2015; Lacal-Arantegui 2019). A similar pattern played out for solar \r\npower (Nemet 2019). International cooperation, geared towards technology transfer, capacity and institution-building, and finance, can \r\nhelp ensure that developing countries leapfrog to low-carbon technologies that have undergone commercialisation elsewhere (Adenle et al. \r\n2015; Fankhauser and Jotzo 2018) (see also Chapter 5, Box 5.9, Chapter 15, Section 15.5, and Section 16.5 in this chapter)."


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"This report contains numerous examples of the positive feedbacks in the centre of Cross-Chapter Box 12, Figure 1, predominantly \r\narising during the early adoption and diffusion stages, and leading to rapid or unexpected acceleration of change. For example, public \r\nacceptance of meat alternatives leads to firms improving the products, increasing political and economic feedbacks (Section 5.4 \r\nand Box 5.5). Declining costs in solar and wind cause new investment in the power-generation sector being dominated by those \r\ntechnologies, leading to increased political support and further cost reductions (Chapter 6). In buildings (Chapter 9) and personal mobility \r\n(Chapter 10), low-carbon heating systems and electric vehicles are gaining public acceptance, leading to improved infrastructure and \r\nhuman resources, more employment in those sectors, and behavioural contagion"


id: f4b77c37ccc48354a4243bbc92bb9cda
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" Some have argued that technologies cross societal \r\ntipping points on account of these feedbacks (Obama 2017; Sharpe and Lenton 2021)."


id: c115060fffb78477dcd63a8afeacd817
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"In the urban context, the concept of sustainability experiments has been used to examine innovative policies and practices adopted \r\nby cities that have significant impact on transition towards low-carbon and sustainable futures (Bai et al. 2010; Castan Broto and \r\nBulkeley 2013). Individual innovative practices can potentially be upscaled to achieve low-carbon transition in cities (Peng and Bai \r\n2018), leading to a  process of broadening and scaling innovative practices in other cities (Peng et al. 2019).  Such sustainability \r\nexperiments give rise to new actor networks, which in some cases may accelerate change, and in others may lead to conflict (Bulkeley \r\net al. 2014). As in the diffusion phase in Cross-Chapter Box 12, Figure 1, contextual factors play a strong role. Examining historical \r\ntransitions to cycling across European cities, Oldenziel et al. (2016) found that contextual factors, including specific configurations of \r\nactors, can lead to very different outcomes"


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content:
" Kraus and Koch (2021) found a short-term social shock - such as the COVID-19 crisis - to \r\nlead to differential increases in cycling behaviour, contingent on other enabling conditions."


id: abb29d0eefb9ce6d4a41d9b7134a4486
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content:
"Linking system dynamics to development pathways and broader societal goals\r\nTransition dynamics insights can be broadened to shifting development pathways. Development paths are characterised by particular \r\nsets of interlinking regime rules and behaviours, including inertia and cascading effects over time, and are reinforced at multiple levels, \r\nwith varied capacities and constraints on local agency occurring at each level (Burch et al. 2014) (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4). \r\nThis is also observed by Schot and Kanger (2018), who identify a needed change in a 'meta-regime', crossing sectoral lines in linking \r\nvalue chains or infrastructure and overall development objectives. In the context of the UN climate change regime, international \r\ncooperation can bring together such best practices and lessons learnt (Adenle et al. 2015; Pandey et al. 2021)"


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" This is especially \r\nrelevant for developing countries, which often depend on technologies and financial resources from abroad, witnessing their pace \r\nand direction influenced by transnational actors (Marquardt et al. 2016; Bhamidipati et al. 2019), and benefitting little in terms of \r\nparticipating in high value-added activities (Whittaker et al. 2020)."


id: 70c8929bb1c9980bfdc59a72dbc1f8c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"System transitions differ according to context, such as across industrialised and developing countries (Ramos-Mejia et al. 2018), \r\nand within countries. Lower levels of social capital and trust negatively impact niche commercialisation (Lepoutre and Oguntoye \r\n2018). In contexts of poverty and inequality, stakeholders' - including users' - capabilities for meaningful participation are limited, \r\nand transition outcomes can end up marginalising or further excluding social groups (Osongo and Schot 2017; Hansen et al. 2018). \r\nMany studies of transitions in developing countries make note of the importance of innovation in the informal sector (Charmes 2016) \r\n(Box 5.10 in Chapter 5). Facilitating informal sector access to renewable energy sources, safe and sustainable buildings, and finance \r\ncan advance low-carbon transitions (McCauley et al. 2019; Masuku and Nzewi 2021)"


id: 7b01605d68fcc3b58395fb6d01e6099d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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" On the contrary, disregarding its importance can \r\nresult in misleading or ineffective innovation and climate strategies (Maharajh and Kraemer-Mbula 2010; Mazhar and Ummad 2014; \r\nde Beer et al. 2016; Masuku and Nzewi 2021)."


id: 21dcd33c121a4803c477c3264b185972
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Policies that shift innovation in climate compatible directions \r\ncan promote other development benefits, for instance, better \r\nhealth, increased energy access, poverty alleviation and economic \r\ncompetitiveness (Deng et al. 2018) (Cross-Chapter Box 12). Economic \r\ncompetitiveness co-benefits can emerge as climate mitigation \r\npolicies trigger innovation that can be leveraged for promoting \r\nindustrial development, job creation and economic growth, both \r\nin terms of localising low-emission energy technologies value \r\nchains as well as increased energy efficiency and avoided carbon \r\nlock-ins (Section  16.4). However, without adequate capabilities, \r\nco-benefits at the local level would be minimal, and they would \r\nprobably materialise far from where activities take place (Ockwell \r\nand Byrne 2016; Vasconcellos and Caiado Couto 2021). Innovation \r\nand technological change can also empower citizens"


id: 92cec20e46de58c41d10c014c2692765
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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" Grass-roots \r\ninnovation promotes the participation of grass-roots actors, such \r\nas social movements and networks of academics, activists and \r\npractitioners, and facilitate experimenting with alternative forms \r\nof knowledge creation (Seyfang and Smith 2007; UNCTAD 2019). \r\nExamples of ordinary people and entrepreneurs adopting and \r\nadapting technologies to local needs to address locally defined needs \r\nhave been documented in the development literature (van Welie and \r\nRomijn 2018) (Box 16.10). Digital technologies can empower citizens \r\nand communities in decentralised energy systems, contributing not \r\nonly to a more sustainable but also to a more democratic and fairer \r\nenergy system (Van Summeren et al. 2021) (Section 5.4 in Chapter 5, \r\nand Cross-Chapter Box 11 in this chapter)."


id: b2b1aebe9d5e4cad47cf6eb75e3de887
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"Innovation and climate mitigation policies can also have negative \r\nsocio-economic impacts, and not all countries, actors and regions \r\naround the world benefit equally from rapid technological change \r\n(Deng et al. 2018; McCauley and Heffron 2018; Eisenberg 2019; \r\nUNCTAD 2019; Henry et al. 2020). In fact, socio-technical transitions \r\noften create winners and losers (Roberts et al. 2018). Technological \r\nchange can reinforce existing divides between women and men, rural \r\nand urban populations, and rich and poor communities: older workers \r\ndisplaced by technological change will not qualify for jobs if they \r\nwere unable to acquire new skills; weak educational systems may not \r\nprepare young people for emerging employment opportunities; and \r\ndisadvantaged social groups, including women in many countries, \r\noften have fewer opportunities for formal education (McCauley and \r\nHeffron 2018; UNCTAD 2019)"


id: 2a9de3976a4c19298fab9b870c7b1df7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" That is a risk regarding technological \r\nchange for climate change mitigation, as emerging evidence \r\nsuggests that the energy transition can create jobs and productivity \r\nopportunities in the renewable energy sector, but will also lead to \r\njob losses in fossil fuel and exposed sectors (Le Treut et al. 2021). At \r\nthe same time, these new jobs may use more intensively high-level \r\ncognitive and interpersonal skills compared to regular, traditional \r\njobs, requiring higher levels of human capital dimensions such as \r\nformal education, work experience and on-the-job training (Consoli \r\net al. 2016). Despite the empowerment potentials of decentralised \r\nenergy systems, not all societal groups are equally positioned to \r\nbenefit from energy community policies, with issues of energy \r\njustice taking place within initiatives, between initiatives and related \r\nactors, as well as beyond initiatives (Calzadilla and Mauger 2018; \r\nvan Bommel and Hoffken 2021)."


id: 134d886c28ef59727dfd12d7259837a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Technological innovation may bring significant synergy in pursuing \r\nSDGs, but it may also create challenges to the economy, human \r\nwell-being, and the environment (Schillo and Robinson 2017; \r\nThacker et al. 2019; Walsh et al. 2020). The degree of potential \r\nsynergies and trade-offs among SDGs differs from country to country \r\nand over time (Section  16.6.1.1). These potentials will depend on \r\navailable resources, geographical conditions, development stage \r\nand policy measures. Even though synergies and trade-offs related \r\nto technological innovation have received the least attention from \r\nresearchers (Deng et al. 2018), literature show that higher synergy \r\nwas found where countries' policies take into account the linkages \r\nbetween sectors (Mainali et al. 2018)"


id: c9064f58b121bf21bbf43040e429257d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" For technology innovation to be \r\neffective in enhancing synergies and reducing trade-offs, its role and \r\nnature in production and consumption patterns, as well as in value \r\nchains and in the wider economy, requires clarification. Technology \r\nownership and control together with its current orientation and \r\nfocus towards productivity, needs to be revised if a  meaningful \r\ncontribution to the implementation of the SDGs is to be achieved \r\nin a transformative way (Walsh et al. 2020). Responsible innovation, \r\ncombining anticipation, reflexivity, inclusion and responsiveness, has \r\nbeen suggested as a framework for conducting innovation (Stilgoe \r\net al. 2013). Also inclusive innovation (Hoffecker 2021) could make \r\nsure that unheard voices and interests are included in decision\u0002making, and that methods for this have been implemented in practice \r\n(Douthwaite and Hoffecker 2017)."


id: 59a9cfd8c8378263edcb6089467ae072
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"importance of the link between technological innovation and \r\ncommunity action and its contribution to sustainable development \r\nis usually underestimated. Further research is needed on this and, \r\nmost importantly, its inclusion in the political agenda on sustainable \r\ndevelopment (Seyfang and Smith 2007). On the other hand, when \r\ntechnological innovation occurs far from where is implemented and \r\nparticipation in the production, and hence training activities of local \r\nactors is minimal, co-benefits and synergies among SDGs are limited \r\nand usually far below expectations (Bhamidipati and Hansen 2021; \r\nVasconcellos and Caiado Couto 2021). Actions by policymakers that \r\nsafeguard environmental and social aspects can boost synergies \r\nand maximise those co-benefits (Lema et al. 2021)"


id: 22568e3e51ba759b8125accf0a399862
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content:
" Given that \r\ntechnological change impacts countries, regions and social groups \r\ndifferently, transition policies can be designed to ensure that all \r\nregions and communities are able to take advantage of the energy \r\nand other transitions (McCauley and Heffron 2018; Henry et al. 2020)."


id: 9d05f8a209b909874cdcbaf58ed83f36
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"There are several examples of how to maximise synergies and avoid \r\nor minimise trade-offs when bringing technological innovation to the \r\nground. When implementing off-grid solar energy in Rwanda, synergies \r\nwere found between 80 of the 169 SDG targets, demonstrating \r\nhow mainstreaming off-grid policies and prioritising investment in \r\nthe off-grid sector can realise human development and well-being, \r\nbuild physical and social infrastructures, and achieve sustainable \r\nmanagement of environmental resources (Bisaga et al. 2021). Another \r\nexample is related to wind power in Northeast of Brazil where the \r\ncreation of direct and indirect jobs has been demonstrated in areas \r\nwhere capabilities are high, as well as associated improvements \r\nin wholesale and retail trade and real estate activities, though this \r\nalso emphasises the need for capacity development along with \r\ninternational collaboration projects (Vasconcellos and Caiado \r\nCouto 2021)"


id: 6c3e9ceaa6ab028ecba967260cfc9334
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" Other examples include studies raising awareness on \r\nsolar energy and women's empowerment (Winther et al. 2018) and \r\nrecycling and waste (Cross and Murray 2018)."


id: 50c120d100bbf59defe0825a72962abe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"One of knowledge gaps identified when assessing the literature \r\nis on the representation of developing countries in studies on \r\ninnovation and technology development and transfer. This includes \r\nthe conceptual core disciplines of the economics of innovation, \r\ninnovation systems and sustainability transitions. This is true for \r\nstudies on developing countries, and for authors originating from, or \r\nactive in, developing country contexts. The evidence of the impact of \r\ndecarbonisation policy instruments applied to developing countries \r\nor Small Island Developing States (SIDS) is limited"


id: 14194992042dc0c14c4a497b4225aee5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" Expanding the \r\nknowledge base with studies that focus on developing countries \r\nwould not only allow for testing whether the theories (developed \r\nby predominantly by developed-country researchers for industrialised \r\ncountries) hold in developing country contexts, but also yield policy \r\ninsights that could help both domestic and international policymakers \r\nworking on climate-related technology cooperation."


id: ed5b9b852bcab77779ac666bfdf561c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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vector_id: 34818
content:
"Accelerating climate actions and progress towards a  just \r\ntransition is essential to reducing climate risks and addressing \r\nsustainable development priorities, including water, food and \r\nhuman security (robust evidence, high agreement). Accelerating \r\naction in the context of sustainable development involves not only \r\nexpediting the pace of change (speed) but also addressing  the \r\nunderlying drivers of vulnerability and high emissions (quality \r\nand depth of change) and enabling diverse communities, sectors, \r\nstakeholders, regions and cultures (scale and breadth of change) to \r\nparticipate in just, equitable and inclusive processes that improve the \r\nhealth and well-being of people and the planet"


id: a45e82b2a313c4c9e972ff03d2f2c61e
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content:
" Looking at climate \r\nchange from a justice perspective means placing the emphasis on \r\n(i) the protection of vulnerable populations and low-income countries \r\nfrom the impacts of climate change, (ii) mitigating the  effects of \r\nthe transformations, and (iii) ensuring an equitable decarbonised \r\nworld. {17.1.1}"


id: 1a7cc7dd77fd0043c38110d0424a7d27
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"be taken into consideration (medium evidence, medium agreement). \r\nThe agriculture, forestry, and other land uses (AFOLU) sector offers \r\nmany low-cost mitigation options, but actions aimed at producing \r\nbioenergy, extending food access and protecting biodiversity can \r\nalso create trade-offs between different land uses (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Some options can help to minimise these trade\u0002offs, for example, integrated land management, cross-sectoral \r\npolicies and efficiency improvements. Lifestyle changes, including \r\ndietary changes and reduced food waste, have several synergies \r\nwith climate mitigation and the SDGs (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). Cross-sectoral policies are important in avoiding trade\u0002offs, to ensure that synergies between mitigation and SDGs are \r\ncaptured, and to ensure local people are involved in the development \r\nof new products, as well as production and consumption practices"


id: f71c1bc33513fc71809c0447b13c00e6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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vector_id: 36389
content:
" \r\nThere can be many synergies in urban areas between mitigation \r\npolicies and the SDGs, but capturing these depends on the overall \r\nplanning of urban structures and on local integrated policies, where, \r\nfor example, affordable housing and spatial planning as a  climate \r\nmitigation measure are combined with walkable urban areas, green \r\nelectrification and clean renewable energy. Such integrated options \r\ncan also reduce the pressures on agricultural land by reducing urban \r\ngrowth, thus improving food security. Access to green electricity \r\ncan also support quality education (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). {17.3.3, 17.3.3.1, 17.3.3.3}"


id: 90a93b00378b34031992e6a233d9bb8b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Countries with assets that are at risk of becoming stranded \r\nmay lack the relevant resources, knowledge, autonomy \r\nor agency to reorientate, or to decide on the speed, scale \r\nand quality of the transition (limited evidence, medium \r\nagreement). The urgency of mitigation might overshadow some \r\nof the other priorities related to the transition, like climate change \r\nadaptation and its  inherent vulnerabilities. Consequently, the \r\ntransition imperative could reduce the scope and autonomy for local \r\npriority-setting and could ignore the additional risks in countries \r\nwith a low capacity to adapt. A just transition will depend on local \r\ncontexts, regional priorities, the starting points of different countries \r\nin the transition and the speed at which they want to travel"


id: bb95028485fd0857b49aac14499f0496
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" Both \r\nmitigation and adaptation warrant urgent and prompt action \r\ngiven current and continuing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and \r\nassociated negative impacts on humanity and ecosystems (limited \r\nevidence, medium agreement). {17.3.2}"


id: ac05f7ffc1b9408d6bab0ba1480d3817
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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vector_id: 24585
content:
"A wide range of factors have been found to enable sustainability \r\ntransitions, ranging from technological innovations to shifts in \r\nmarkets, and from policies and governance arrangements to \r\nshifts in belief systems and market forces (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Many of these factors come together in \r\na co-evolutionary process that has unfolded globally, internationally \r\nand locally over several decades (low evidence, high agreement). \r\nThose same conditions that may serve to impede the transition \r\n(i.e.,  organisational structure, behaviour, technological lock-in) \r\ncan also 'flip' to enable both it and the framing of sustainable \r\ndevelopment policies to create a stronger basis and policy support \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). It is important to note that \r\nstrong shocks to these systems, including accelerating climate \r\nchange impacts, economic crises and political changes, may provide \r\ncrucial openings for accelerated transitions to sustainable systems"


id: eb184e3afd514103e2a8416a7afe22c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" \r\nFor example, rebuilding more sustainably after an extreme event, \r\nor renewed public debate about the drivers of social and economic \r\nvulnerability to multiple stressors (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). {17.4}"


id: 8ee8636146389bd60621f8fea21bd41e
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content:
"This chapter focuses on the opportunities and challenges for \r\n'accelerating the transition in the context of sustainable development'. \r\nThe chapter suggests that accelerating transitions in the context \r\nof sustainable development requires more than concentrating on \r\nspeed. Rather, it involves expediting the pace of change (speed) \r\nwhile also removing the underlying drivers of vulnerability and high \r\nemissions (quality and depth), and aligning the interests of different \r\ncommunities, regions, sectors, stakeholders and cultures (scale \r\nand breadth). One key to enabling deep and broad transitions is \r\nintegrating the views of different government agencies, businesses \r\nand non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in transition processes. \r\nAnother critical driver of deep and broad transitions is engaging \r\nand empowering workers, youth, women, the poor, minorities and \r\nmarginalised stakeholders in just, equitable and inclusive processes"


id: 1fa0e533d46197236eb13595bd86c38d
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" \r\nThe result of such processes will be the transformation of large-scale \r\nsocio-economic systems to restore the health and well-being of the \r\nplanet and the people on it.  "


id: 38bb758e0d8eae2b3fcacfb36216b3a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Climate change not only poses a profound challenge to sustainable \r\ndevelopment, it is inexorably linked to it. From the early stages of \r\nthe IPCC assessment process, this challenge and the inherent link \r\nbetween climate change and sustainable development have been \r\nwell recognised. For example, the First Assessment Report (FAR) \r\nhighlighted the relevance of sustainable development for climate \r\npolicy. The Second Assessment Report (SAR) went further to include \r\nequity issues in its presentation of sustainable development. The \r\nThird Assessment Report (TAR) (Banuri et al. 2001) made the link \r\neven stronger, noting that 'parties have a right to and should promote \r\nsustainable development' (as stated in the text of the UNFCCC 2015 \r\n(Article 3.4)), and offering an early review of studies integrating \r\nsustainable development and climate change. The Fourth Assessment \r\nReport (AR4) (Sathaye et al"


id: 58359b2497a231a01e576f838194e61
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content:
" 2007) added an additional perspective \r\nto these interconnections, acknowledging the existence of a two-way \r\nrelationship between sustainable development and climate change."


id: 4042fffd3671357b74c0d9b9c9125924
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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vector_id: 7486
content:
"Due in part to the shifting orientation of these international \r\nprocesses, there is growing evidence of action on climate change \r\nand sustainable development at other levels of decision-making. \r\nNational policies often aim to implement climate change policies \r\nin the context of sustainable development (Chimhowu et al. 2019; \r\nChirambo 2018; ECLAC 2017; Fuseini and Kemp 2015; Galli et al. \r\n2018; Haywood et al. 2019; Ministry of Environment of Jordan 2016; \r\nMcKenzie and Abdulkadri 2018; UNDESA 2016, 2017, 2018; UN \r\nWomen 2017). Some countries are adjusting their existing policies \r\nto build on themes familiar to sustainable development (Lucas et al. \r\n2016), including renewable energy and energy efficiency (Fastenrath \r\nand Braun 2018; Kousksou et al. 2015), urban planning (Gorissen \r\net al. 2018; Loorbach et al. 2016; Mendizabal et al. 2018), health \r\nsystems (Pencheon 2018; Roschnik et al. 2017) and agricultural \r\nsystems (Lipper and Zilberman 2018; Shaw and Roberts 2017)"


id: 45ab5bd827e3d38ba5df4bc9241ca7c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" Cross\u0002cutting and integrated approaches, such as the circular economy, \r\nhave also been gaining traction in some European countries (EESC \r\n2015) and G20 countries (Noura et al. 2020). Many of these efforts \r\nhave also extended up to the regional and down to the local level \r\n(Gorissen et al. 2018; Hess 2014; Shaw and Roberts 2017)."


id: 2dcd22c5141be2ddb2c2cc04f4af8cb6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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vector_id: 4645
content:
"found that collective action against climate change by businesses, \r\ngovernments and civil society, reinforced through partnerships and \r\ncoalitions across departments, industries and supply chains, can \r\ndeliver significant development impacts. In order for this diverse \r\ncollection of stakeholders to take action, a  fundamental paradigm \r\nshift is needed from a  linear model of knowledge-generation to \r\nan interdisciplinary model that co-produces knowledge (Liu et al. \r\n2019). In fact, some have argued that accelerating just transitions \r\nfor purposes of sustainable development requires the involvement of \r\nseveral actors, institutions and disciplines (Delina and Sovacool 2018). \r\nNot only do these roles need to be discussed more thoroughly (Kern \r\nand Rogge 2016); (den Elzen et al. 2019), but it is also important to \r\nsurvey different views on transitions and transformations"


id: aafc322a8d8ab810b3cf9dce4e7a4ffc
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24420
content:
" A variety \r\nof theories that are useful for explaining the causes and constraints \r\nregarding transitions are examined in Section 17.2."


id: 4427166f59b31d18621a5ab463a3ef33
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"A related line of thought common to economic explanations \r\ninvolves the principles of 'weak sustainability'. These principles \r\nsuggest that the substitution of exhaustible resources is, to some \r\nextent, feasible (Arrow et al. 2004). One way to capitalise on this \r\nsubstitution is to target investments at technological change, green \r\ngrowth, and research and development. Targeted investments in the \r\nform of subsidies can encourage the substitution of exhaustible by \r\nnon-exhaustible resources. To illustrate with a  concrete example, \r\ninvestments in renewable energy can not only mitigate climate \r\nchange but also offset the use of exhaustible fossil fuels and \r\nboost energy security (Heal 2020). It is nonetheless important \r\nto note that the principle of 'weak sustainability' contrasts with \r\n'strong sustainability' or 'integrated sustainability' principles. These \r\nstronger principles suggest that constraints on resources restrict \r\nsuch substitutions (Rockstrom et al. 2009)"


id: 8dc9171a403389a92ce305c04bf51631
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content:
" These constraints \r\nmerit attention because some scarce non-substitutable forms of \r\nnatural capital can be exhausted (Bateman and Mace 2020). There \r\nis hence a  need to capitalise on possible synergies such as those \r\nwith other development priorities and trade-offs, for example, the \r\nexhaustion of non-substitutable resources. Capturing these synergies \r\nand managing these trade-offs is consistent with sustainable \r\ndevelopment, a state where the needs of the present generation do \r\nnot compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own \r\nneeds (Bruntland, WCED 1987)."


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"The outcome of sustainable transitions is a sustainable transformation. \r\nWhile transitions involve 'processes that shift development pathways \r\nand reorient energy, transport, urban and other subsystems' (Loorbach \r\net al. 2017) (Chapter 16), transformation is the resulting 'fundamental \r\nreorganisation of large-scale socio-economic systems' (Holscher et al. \r\n2018). Such a  fundamental reorganisation often requires dynamic \r\nmulti-stage transition processes that change everything from public \r\npolicies and prevailing technologies to individual lifestyles, and social \r\nnorms to governance arrangements and institutions of political \r\neconomy. This set of factors can lock-in development pathways \r\nand prevent transitions from gathering the momentum needed for \r\ntransformations. Chapter  16 provides an overview of the multi\u0002stage transition dynamics involved in moving from experimentation \r\nto commercialisation to integration to stabilisation"


id: 43da22f24558d8b75570b0db2767643c
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" That overview \r\ndescribes how transitions can break through lock-ins and result in \r\na transformation."


id: 7f04df290513f73b4d147ceec3b03372
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"recovery packages have increased government-led investments \r\n(Section 1.3.3), which could potentially be aligned with sustainable \r\ndevelopment. Technological change and innovation are considered \r\nkey drivers of economic growth and of many aspects of social \r\nprogress (Section 16.1), but if technological innovation policies are \r\ncoordinated with the shift to sustainable development pathways, \r\nthen the economic benefits of technological change could come at \r\nthe cost of increasing climate risks (Gossart 2015) Alarcon and Vos \r\n2015). The environmental impacts of social and economic activities, \r\nincluding emissions of GHGs, are greatly influenced by the rate and \r\ndirection of technological changes. Innovation and technological \r\ntransformations present trade-offs that create externalities and \r\nrebound effects"


id: 44afd3d5ee84d7c81a657fdca8ab4033
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" This suggests that a sustainable future for people \r\nand nature requires rapid, radical and transformative societal change \r\nby integrating the technical, governance, financial and societal \r\naspects (Portner et al. 2021) (Section 16.1)."


id: 4e6ba42d972f32cf1f15c235d464ed64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"One area that is pertinent to transitions and has received \r\nconsiderable attention in economic modelling involving climate \r\nchange is innovation. In particular, some studies have shown how \r\nlow-cost innovations and improvements in end-use technologies \r\nhave significant potential for emissions reductions as well as \r\nsustainable development (Wilson et al. 2019). Currently information \r\ntechnologies are improving rapidly, and the internet of things (IoT), \r\nAI and Big Data can all contribute to other development needs. This \r\nis often the case in end-use sectors, as the benefits accrue directly \r\nto the individuals who use the new innovations. The achievement \r\nand widespread deployment of fully autonomous cars, for example, \r\nwill bring about broader car- and ride-sharing with negative or low \r\nadditional costs compared to more conventional approaches to car \r\nownership, with their typically very low load factors. (Grubler et al"


id: 4751842b2db7be4aed48fcf5193f83e9
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" \r\n2018) estimate that the Low Energy Demand (LED) scenario which \r\nassumes information technology innovations and induced social \r\nchanges, including a sharing economy, have considerable potential \r\nfor harmonising the multiple achievements of SDGs with low marginal \r\nabatement costs compared with other scenarios (IPCC 2018)."


id: 54d36a8695ed8aecc0d43f40003c2ecc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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"resources and can provide the technical support that can spread \r\ninnovative solutions (Bowman et al. 2017; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009; \r\nGordon 2015). Such support has become increasingly important during \r\nthe pandemic, as national governments transfer funds for investments \r\nin climate-friendly infrastructure, transport systems and energy \r\nsystems. This line of thinking is supported by calls to strengthen vertical \r\nand horizontal integration within and across government agencies and \r\nstakeholders in ways that can enhance policy coherence (Amanuma \r\net al. 2018; OECD 2018, 2019). The incoherence or misalignment \r\nbetween national and local fiscal institutions and policies can restrict \r\nthe ability of local governments to secure resources for climate-friendly \r\ninvestments. Such investments are particularly likely to flow, as more \r\nlocal governments have adopted net-zero targets, climate emergency \r\ndeclarations and action plans that can stimulate innovations (Davidson \r\net al"


id: 2d9eed0774c3307dda1afbe194a421e2
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content:
" 2020). Others have seen greater potential for collaboration and \r\ninnovation, with more multi-centred or polycentric forms of governance \r\nthat lead to the formulation and dissemination of transformative \r\nsolutions to climate and other environmental challenges (Ostrom \r\n2008). Though much of the above governance research has focused \r\non western countries, there are some applications in other regions and \r\ncountries such as China (Gu et al. 2020)."


id: a46289b5458e9b32f63e94d0e6f9a39d
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content:
"Though the above work tends to downplay politics and business, \r\nothers suggest that political economy should feature prominently in \r\ntransitions. Some branches of political-economy research underline \r\nhow resource-intensive and fossil-fuel industries leverage their \r\nresources and positions to undermine transitions (Jones, C.A. and \r\nLevy 2009; Newell and Paterson 2010; Zhao et al. 2013; Geels 2014; \r\nMoe 2014) (Chapter 1). These vested interests can lock-in status quo \r\npolicies in countries where political systems offer interest groups \r\nmore opportunities to veto or overturn climate- or eco-friendly \r\nproposals (Madden 2014). Companies with a  strong interest in \r\nearning profits and building competitiveness from conventional \r\nfossil fuel-based energy systems have particularly strong incentives \r\nto capture politicians and agencies (Meckling and Nahm 2018)"


id: 5e8982f32fb21522f888ae18c412f14
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content:
" \r\nSuch strategies can be particularly powerful when combined with \r\nconcerns over job losses and dislocation, preventing transitions \r\nfrom gaining traction (Haas 2021; Mattioli et al. 2020; Newell and \r\nMulvaney 2013; Power 2016)."


id: 4be43b1a3e24c75ed957b44bb9a958ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"One of the more direct channels through which transitions spread \r\nare climate change education and action-oriented research (Fazey \r\net al. 2018; Ives et al. 2019; Scharmer 2018; Schapke et al. 2018; \r\nSchneidewind et al. 2016). For instance, research using 'social \r\nexperiments' or 'real-world labs' has helped give rise to shifts in \r\nmindsets on energy, food, transport and other systems that can \r\nbenefit the climate (Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018; Berkhout et al. \r\n2010; Bulkeley et al. 2015; Hoffmann 2010). In much the same way, \r\nthe acquisition of transformational knowledge and transformative \r\nlearning (Lange 2018; O'Neil and Boyce 2018; Pomeroy and Oliver \r\n2018; Walsh et al. 2020; Williams 2013) contributes to thinking and \r\nacting that open climate-friendly development pathways (Berkhout \r\net al. 2010; Lo and Castan Broto 2019; Roberts et al. 2018; Turnheim \r\nand Nykvist 2019)) (Section 1.7.2)"


id: ec4284e0cfe0032710a034c317c1998b
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content:
" First-person and action research \r\ncan also facilitate similar changes that bring about climate actions \r\n(see e.g., Dick 2007; Streck 2007; Hutchison and Walton 2015; \r\nBradbury et al. 2019)."


id: 24d2a71be2e522a8cd9b7e93fd910285
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"The starting point for this virtuous circle are inner transitions. Inner \r\ntransitions occur within individuals, organisations and even larger \r\njurisdictions that alter beliefs and actions involving climate change \r\n(Woiwode et al. 2021). An inner transition within an individual (see \r\ne.g.,  Parodi and Tamm 2018) typically involves a  person gaining \r\na deepening sense of peace and a willingness to help others, as well \r\nas protecting the climate and the planet (see e.g., Banks 2007; Power \r\n2016). Inner transition can imply that individuals become sympathetic \r\nto concerns that include climate issues and values connected to \r\nnature. For instance, they may include a desire to become a steward \r\nof nature (Buijs et al. 2018); 'live according to the principles of \r\nintegrated sustainability' (Schweizer-Ries 2018); 'achieve the good \r\nlife' (Asara et al. 2015; Escobar 2015; Kallis 2017; Latouche 2018) \r\n(Chapter  5 and Section  1.6"


id: 74a4b9d330d7af6a354514ba7d73b4d5
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content:
"It is increasingly being recognised that sustainable development \r\npolicy goals and meeting short- and long-term climate policy goals \r\nare closely linked (IPCC 2018). It is also being realised that, under \r\nthe Paris Agreement, climate change policies should be integrated \r\ninto sustainable development agendas, while the UN 2030 Agenda \r\nas well includes SDG 13 on climate actions. In this way, both UN \r\nagreements provide joint opportunities for systematic transitions \r\nin support of both climate change and sustainable development. \r\nAchievement of the Paris Agreement's goals will require a rapid and \r\ndeep worldwide transition in all GHG emissions sectors, including \r\nland use, energy, industry, buildings, transport and cities, as well as in \r\nconsumption and behaviour (UNEP 2019)"


id: e8b85f5f8ff4e1f1d5815d10037ad2f0
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content:
" Meeting the goals of such \r\na transformation requires that the long-term targets and pathways to \r\nfulfil the stabilisation scenarios play an important role in guiding the \r\ndirection and pathways of short-term transitions. There is therefore "


id: c916e6ebbbcb42c5ce9030b056e76875
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content:
"In the context of the Paris Agreement, countries have submitted \r\ntheir initial plans for the decarbonisation of their economies to \r\nthe UNFCCC in the form of their so-called National Determined \r\nContributions (NDCs). The ambitions of the NDCs are closely related \r\nto the ongoing UNFCCC negotiations over the financial measures and \r\nforms of compensation. Although the Paris Agreement emphasises \r\nthe links between climate policies and sustainable development, the \r\nUN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs are \r\nnot very well represented at present in the NDCs, according to Fuso \r\nNerini et al. (2019). Very few of the NDCs include any reference to \r\nthe SDGs, which (Fuso Nerini et al. 2019) highlight as a barrier to the \r\nsuccessful implementation of the Paris Agreement, which induces \r\nthem to call for a more holistic policy approach"


id: 52f0645f3188dc512c475ba05600c816
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" Campagnolo and \r\nDavide (2019) have assessed the impacts of the submitted NDCs on \r\npoverty eradication and inequalities of income based on empirical \r\nresearch and a  global Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) \r\nmodel. One conclusion is that the NDCs of less developed countries \r\nwould tend to reduce poverty alleviation, but this can be offset if \r\ninternational financial support is provided for the mitigation actions."


id: 50b0df1f24a59ff2229df88482928d6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"A key barrier to the development of national plans and policies to \r\nmeet the UN 2030 SDGs is the lack of finance. (Sachs et al. 2019) \r\nconclude that meeting the SDGs to achieve social transformations \r\nworldwide would require 2-3% of global GDP and that it would \r\nbe a  huge challenge to ensure that finance is targeted to the \r\nworld's poorest countries and people. The UN Secretary-General \r\nhas called for the allocation of finance to meet the UN's 2030 \r\nAgenda with a strong emphasis on the private sector, but to date \r\nno governance frameworks or associated financial modalities have \r\nbeen established in the UN or the UNFCCC context for the formal \r\nalignment of sustainable development and transitions to take place \r\nin accordance with the low global temperature-stabilisation targets \r\nin the Paris Agreement. Accelerating investments, particularly in \r\nlow-income countries, will be required to meet both the Paris goals \r\nand the SDGs (Section 15.6.7)"


id: 3025f3c73bc4fc2361205293fe0dad9f
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" The mismatch between capital and \r\ninvestment needs, home-bias considerations and differences in risk \r\nperceptions between rich and poor represent major challenges for \r\nprivate finance. Green bond markets and markets for sustainable \r\nfinancal products have increased significantly, and the landscape has \r\ncontinued to evolve since AR5 (Executive Summary in Chapter 15). \r\nSpecial efforts and activities are particularly required for raising \r\nfinance in developing countries."


id: 697d61803649fa0d2390348bbfb7bf7e
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content:
"The alignment of climate-policy targets in the NDCs with sustainable \r\ndevelopment has been assessed by means of integrated assessment \r\nmodels (IAMs), macroeconomic and sectoral modelling. (Iyer et al. \r\n2018) based on IAM-based studies, the implications of framing NDCs \r\nbeing placed more narrowly on mitigation targets rather than on \r\na  framing in which the impacts on sustainable development were \r\nexplicitly taken into consideration. It was thus concluded that some \r\nSDGs would be directly supported as a side benefit of the climate \r\npolicy targets included in the NDCs, while other SDGs needed \r\na special policy design going beyond narrow climate policy objectives. \r\n(Iyer et al"


id: c7fc8fb67544d2b5f4d602e5b9f6a28e
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" 2018) also assessed the regional distribution of efforts in \r\nterms of domestic mitigation costs and SDG impacts and concluded \r\nthat the geographical distribution of mitigation costs and  SDG \r\nbenefits were not similar, so a  special effort would be needed to \r\nmatch climate policies and policies to meet the SDGs. Accordingly, \r\na national decision-making perspective suggests that SDGs should \r\nbe integrated into national climate policies."


id: 5c117006f2bc12787c73d33284d41072
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content:
"The NDCs submitted to the Paris Agreement have demonstrated \r\na lack of progress in meeting the long-term temperature goals. In \r\nthe context of the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, \r\nthe UN Sustainable Development Report 2019 (Sachs et al. 2019) \r\nalso concluded that there is a particular lack of progress in achieving \r\nSDG 13 (climate action), SDG 14 (life below water) and SDG 15 (life \r\non land). Given the close link between the SDGs and climate change \r\npolicies, the current obstacles in meeting the former could also be \r\na barrier to realising transitions to low-carbon societies. Conversely, \r\nopportunities to leverage the SDGs could in many cases involve \r\nclimate actions, since policies enabling climate adaptation and \r\nmitigation could also support food and energy security and water \r\nconservation if they were well designed (see the detailed discussion \r\nin the section on synergies and trade-offs between climate policies \r\nand meeting the SDGs in Section 17.3.3"


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content:
"7, Chapter 3, and IPCC 2018).\r\nThese findings point to a specific need to align economic and social "


id: 378cbc23c90fabac7483692aa8007895
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content:
"on other sustainable development benefits (Wilson et al. 2019). \r\nSimilarly, IAM models have been applied to model the potential for \r\nLow Energy Demand (LED) scenarios associated with demand-side \r\ninnovations in the service sector. (Grubler et al. 2018) have developed \r\na climate-friendly LED scenario which assumes information technology \r\ninnovations such as the internet of things (IoT) and induced social \r\nchanges such as the sharing economy. Nonetheless there are still \r\nvery important limits on the degree to which highly aggregated IAM \r\nmodels and macroeconomic models can integrate ethics, equity and \r\nseveral other key policy-relevant aspects of sustainable development \r\n(Easterlin et al. 2010; Koch 2020). A key limitation in this context is \r\nthat, while all countries share the totality of the SDGs, development \r\npriorities differ across countries and over time"


id: b6e12c39e9adbaec00e13386482d3235
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content:
" Moreover, these \r\npriorities are strongly linked to local contexts, and this can only be \r\nreflected directly in national models (Section 4.3.2)."


id: 20d446b308d9bfe6172ea6b4bf780dd2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2600
content:
"Development pathways that focus narrowly on climate mitigation or \r\neconomic growth will not lead to the SDGs and long-term climate\u0002stabilisation objectives being achieved. The best chances of doing \r\nthis lie in development pathways that can maximise the synergies \r\nbetween climate mitigation and sustainable development more \r\nbroadly (Section  1.3.2). Areas of focal modelling include green \r\ninvestments, technological change, employment generation and the \r\nperformance of policy instruments, such as green taxes, subsidies, \r\nemission permits, investments and finance. Short- and long-term \r\nmacroeconomic models have been used to assess the impacts of \r\nsuch policy instruments. Jaumotte et al. (2021) analyse the economic \r\nimpacts on net zero emissions by 2050 with a focus on short-term \r\neconomic policies and the integration of climate policies such as \r\nCO2 taxes with green reform policies"


id: 8eef1c7f9c80bf9af29b69c99216adeb
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
" This may imply the co-creation \r\nof benefits between climate policy objectives, and macroeconomic \r\npolicy goals such as employment creation."


id: 9375440dfb8e7277a32a74deaab7a8bb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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vector_id: 20716
content:
"Climate change has negative impacts on agricultural productivity in \r\ngeneral, including unequal geographical distribution (Chapter 3). On \r\ntop of that, there is also a risk that climate change mitigation aimed \r\nat achieving stringent climate goals could negatively affect food \r\naccess and food security (Akimoto et al. 2012; Fujimori et al. 2019; \r\nHasegawa et al. 2018). If not managed properly, the risk of hunger \r\ndue to climate policies such as large-scale bioenergy production \r\nincreases remarkably if the 2degC and 1.5degC targets are implemented \r\n(Section 3.7.1). Taking the highest median values from different IAMs \r\nfor given classes of scenarios, up to 14.9 GtCO2 yr-1 carbon dioxide \r\nremoval (CDR) from BECCS is required in 2100, and 2.4 GtCO2 yr-1 for \r\nafforestation. Across the different scenarios, median changes in global \r\nforest area throughout the 21st century reach the required 7"


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content:
"2 Mkm2\r\nincreases between 2010 and 2100, and agricultural land used for \r\nsecond-generation bioenergy crop production may require up to \r\n6.6 Mkm2\r\n in 2100, increasing the competition for land and potentially \r\naffecting sustainable development (AR6 scenarios database)."


id: 545d33dc7c3b2c360b5a521a3fb383
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"Energy scenarios for sustainable development were included in \r\nThe World Energy Outlook of the IEA (IEA 2019, 2020) in terms of \r\na Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS), which assessed not only \r\nSDG 13 (climate action) but also SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy) \r\nand SDG 3.9 (air pollution). This scenario takes as its starting point \r\nthe policy goal of meeting these SDGs and then assesses the costs \r\nof meeting an emissions reduction target of 70% of CO2 from the \r\nenergy system by 2030. The scenario concludes that retrofitting coal\u0002fired power plants with pollution controls is the cheapest option for \r\ndealing with local pollution in the short term, but that this is not \r\nconsistent with meeting the long-term emissions goals of the Paris \r\nAgreement. The SDS scenario combines the goal of reducing the \r\namount of CO2 in the energy system by 70%, with large decreases \r\nin energy-related emissions of NOX, SO2 and PM2.5, leading to a fall \r\nof 40-60% by 2030, and to 2"


id: 42669605d12e5bef5a55ae1b5ce828ce
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content:
"5 million fewer premature deaths from \r\nair pollution in 2030 than in the Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS), \r\nwhich represent a  continuation of current trends in the energy \r\nsystem (IEA 2020)."


id: d93411c838fb9004446ca0afacd8b17c
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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vector_id: 31683
content:
"Reducing climate change can reduce the share of the global \r\npopulation exposed to increased stress from reductions in water \r\nresources (Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes 2014) and therefore to \r\nwater  scarcity as defined by a  cumulative abstraction-to-demand \r\nratio (Hanasaki et al. 2013). (Byers et al. 2018), show that 8-14% of \r\nthe population will be exposed to severe reductions in water \r\nsupply if average temperatures increase between 1.5degC and 2degC \r\n(Section 3.7.2). (Hayashi et al. 2018) assess the water availability for \r\ndifferent emission pathways, including the 2degC and 1.5degC targets, \r\nin light of the various factors governing availability. There are very \r\ndifferent impacts among nations. In Afghanistan, Pakistan and South \r\nAfrica, water stress is estimated to increase by 2050 mainly due to \r\nincreases in irrigation water associated with the rising demand for \r\nfood, and climate change will already increase water stress within \r\nthe next decades"


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content:
" Other factors, such as changes in the demand for \r\nmunicipal water, water for electricity generation, other industrial \r\nwater, and water for livestock due to climate change mitigation, are \r\nof limited importance."


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content:
"(Grubler et al. 2018) models a pathway leading to global temperature \r\nchange of less than 1.5degC without carbon capture and storage \r\n(CCS), taking end-use changes into account, including innovations in \r\ninformation technologies and changes to consumer behaviour apart \r\nfrom passive consumption. The pathway estimates global final-energy \r\ndemand of 245 EJ yr-1 in 2050, which is much lower than in existing \r\nstudies (Section  5.3.3). It also shows the possibilities of creating \r\nsynergies between multiple SDGs, including hunger, health, energy \r\naccess and land use. Integrated technological and social innovations \r\nwill increase the opportunity to achieve sustainable development. \r\n(Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020) estimate global final energy at 149 EJ yr-1\r\nin 2050 as required to provide decent material living standards, which \r\nis much lower than the 1"


id: 9e0fe54e31d2ec588f0f32491f126d1c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"5degC scenario ranges (330-480 EJ yr-1 in \r\n2050) of IAMs (IPCC 2018) and the 390 EJ yr-1 in the IEA SDS (IEA \r\n2019), and also lower than (Grubler et al. 2018). The conclusion is that, \r\nalthough providing material living standards does not guarantee that \r\nevery person will live a good life, there are large potentials in achieving \r\nlow energy demand with sustainable development."


id: 8970a0699fb71fc9d949817f93729460
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:54
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content:
"An overview of the co-benefits and trade-offs of several SDGs based \r\non modelling results is provided in Figure 3.39 (Section 3.7). Selected \r\nmitigation co-benefits and trade-offs are provided in relation to meeting \r\nthe 1.5degC temperature goal based on a subset of models and scenarios, \r\ndespite many IAMs so far not having comprehensive coverage of the \r\nSustainable Development Goals (Rao et al. 2017; van  Soest et al. \r\n2019). There are several co-benefits of mitigation policies, including \r\nincreased forest cover (SDG 15) and reduced mortality from ambient \r\nPM2.5 pollution (SDG 3) compared to reference scenarios. However, \r\nmitigation policies can also cause higher food prices and thus increase \r\nthe share of the global population at risk from hunger (SDG 2), while \r\nalso relying on solid fuels (SDGs 7 and 3) as side effects. It is then \r\nconcluded in Section 3"


id: 5add5524ff9096ca57c4a1a2387eada5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 11811
content:
"7 that these trade-offs can be balanced through \r\ntargeted support measures and/or additional SD policies (Bertram et al. \r\n2018; Cameron et al. 2016; Fujimori et al. 2019)."


id: 68914496ddde03f81647dd4d1d5fad0a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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content:
"The transition to low-emission pathways will require policy efforts \r\nthat also address the emissions that are locked-in to existing \r\ninfrastructure such as power plants, factories, cargo ships and other \r\ninfrastructure already in use: for example, today coal-fired power \r\nplants account for 30% of all energy-related emissions (IEA 2019). \r\nOver the past twenty years, Asia has accounted for 90% of all coal\u0002fired capacity built worldwide, and these plants have potentially long \r\noperational lifetimes ahead of them. In developing economies in Asia, \r\nexisting coal-fired plants are just twelve years old on average. There \r\nare three options for bringing down emissions from the existing stock \r\nof plants: to retrofit them with carbon capture and storage (CCS) or \r\nbiomass co-firing equipment; to repurpose them to focus on providing \r\nsystem adequacy and flexibility while reducing operations; and to \r\nretire them early"


id: 62837b68f4da0e1bdc9f117e544e1f3b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 13067
content:
" In the IEA Sustainable Development Scenario, most \r\nof the 2080 GW of existing coal-fired capacity would be affected by \r\none of these three options."


id: d30019ba74baa56862988e14c83e7e3d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
content_type: text
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vector_id: 30718
content:
"The coal transition will pose challenges not only to the power sector, but even more importantly to coal mining. A less diversified \r\nlocal economy, low labour mobility and heavy dependence on coal revenues will make closing down coal production particularly \r\nchallenging from a political economy perspective. Policy is needed to support and invest in impacted areas to smooth the transition, \r\nabsorb the impact and incentivise new opportunities. A supportive policy for the transition could include both short-term support \r\nand long-term investment. Short-term compensation could be helpful for local workers, communities, companies and governments to \r\nmanage the consequences of coal closures. Earlier involvement with local stakeholders using a structured approach is crucial and will \r\nmake the transition policy more targeted and better administered"


id: 719ea145004fdd7939664a997b1e2a5d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 15507
content:
" The long-term policy should target support to the local economy \r\nand workers to move beyond coal, including a  strategic plan to transform the impacted area, investment in local infrastructure \r\nand education, and preference policies to incentivise emerging businesses. Most importantly, ex ante policy implementation is far \r\nbetter than ex post compensation. Even without the climate imperative, historical evidence shows that coal closures can happen \r\nsurprisingly fast."


id: 60f9619b3825996e6cbf37cdbface128
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 12824
content:
"Presently, coal-fired power plants play a key role in the German energy system, providing almost 46% of the electricity consumed \r\nin Germany. These coal power plants play a crucial role in balancing fluctuations in producing electricity form renewables (Parra \r\net al. 2019). Political and economic considerations, at least regionally, are also of great importance in the coal sector due to the \r\napproximately 35,000 people employed within it (including coal mining and the power stations themselves). For a long time, coal\u0002fired power plants were able to protect their position in Germany, but against the background of decreasing public acceptance, \r\neconomic problems resulting from the growing use of renewables and ambitious GHG reduction targets, the sector cannot resist \r\nthe political pressure against it any longer"


id: afd0aed5bea81f4c45864d2dc792a7a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 25184
content:
" The governing parties have agreed to establish a commission called 'Growth, structural \r\nchange and employment' to develop a strategy for phasing out coal-fired power plants (E3G Annual Review 2018). This Commission \r\nconsists of experts and stakeholders from industry, associations, unions, the scientific community, pressure groups and politicians. Its \r\nestablishment shows that the phasing-out process deserves close attention and that management policies must be implemented to \r\nensure a soft landing for the electricity sector."


id: 21ce0edd4edb3ab2c21b56240c05197d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2754
content:
"Indeed, pressure is mounting on fossil fuel industries to remove their \r\ncapital from heavy carbon industries. As the former Governor of the \r\nBank of England, Mark Carney, remarked, a wholesale reassessment \r\nof prospects, especially if it were to occur suddenly, could potentially \r\ndestabilise markets, sparking a pro-cyclical crystallisation of losses \r\nand a persistent tightening of financial conditions. In other words, \r\nan abrupt resolution to the tragedy of horizons itself poses a  risk \r\nto financial stability (OECD 2015). The divestment narrative is also \r\nbased on the view that a shift away from intensive carbon resources \r\nwill be significant, as the 'less value will be destroyed, [...] the \r\nmore can be re-invested in low carbon infrastructure' (OECD 2015). \r\nSocial movements are critical to triggering rapid transformational \r\nchange and moving away from dangerous levels of climate change \r\n(Mckibben 2012)"


id: 74e8641c72c39f3c33072a8388c531e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 15987
content:
" Although divestment is hailed as a  necessary \r\naction to decouple fossil fuel from growth and force carbon\u0002intensive industries to go out of business, there is the sense that \r\nthere is no shortage of investors who are willing to buy shares, so \r\nthat such resources are not stranded, but simply relocated. Criticism \r\nhas been levelled at the divestment movement for not having \r\na significant impact on funding fossil fuels and not being sufficiently \r\nin tune with other wide-ranging complexities that go beyond the \r\nmoral dimensions (Bergman 2018). Despite being labelled a 'moral \r\nentrepreneur', the divestment movement has the potential to disrupt "


id: 53a0a35c3ed31b66b219d1d3657e12e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 10623
content:
"Despite their efforts in deploying renewable energies, many \r\ndeveloping countries are still contending with problems related to \r\nthe immaturity of the current technologies and the challenges of \r\nbattery storage. In short, the transition to low-carbon development \r\nmust consider the challenges of renewable-energy penetration and \r\nexisting energy-related vulnerabilities and inequalities. There are \r\npower asymmetries between first-comers and latecomers, especially \r\nin cases where mature technologies can be located in countries with \r\nless stringent laws and standards. Carbon leakage has implications \r\nfor just transitions, as carbon-intensive industries can move their \r\ndirty industries to developing countries as a  way of outsourcing \r\nthe production of carbon (Bos and Gupta 2019; UNU-INRA 2020)"


id: b7e72b90a0e74a1118fb0f6d73b0861d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 26468
content:
" \r\nWhen the challenge of climate mitigation is transferred to developing \r\ncountries in the form of carbon leakage, the risks of carbon lock-in for \r\ndeveloping countries are heightened (Bos and Gupta 2019)."


id: 2f6fe1568767a1f6d86beea29c11bd38
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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content:
"The risks attached to the stranding of fossil fuel assets have increased \r\nwith the recent and sustained plunge in oil prices because of the \r\nglobal health pandemic (COVID-19) and the concomitant economic \r\ndownturn, forcing demand to plummet to unprecedentedly low levels. \r\n(Oil prices have recently increased.) Many economies in transition \r\nand countries dependent on fossil fuels are going through turbulent \r\ntimes where asset and transition management will be critical (UNEP/\r\nSEI 2020). However, COVID-19 provides a foretaste of what a low\u0002carbon transition could look like, especially if assets become stranded \r\nin an effort to respond to the call for action in 'building back better' \r\nand putting clean energy jobs and the just transition at the heart \r\nof the post-COVID-19 recovery (IEA 2020; United Nations General \r\nAssembly 2021). COVID-19 provides a useful proxy for issuing two \r\nalerts"


id: f0e40f0ff4b88b70ed5c00304d3f640a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 35395
content:
" First, it is a  reminder of the urgency of addressing climate \r\nchange, given that delaying the move away from stranded assets \r\nwill further worsen climate change. Second, failure to recognise \r\nthe threat from stranded assets will result in new assets becoming \r\nstranded (Rempel and Gupta 2021). Hence, the momentum towards \r\na transformational push is resting on a new opportunity ushered in \r\nby COVID-19 to emphasise the urgency for a new departure towards \r\nrapid emissions reductions (Cronin et al. 2021)."


id: 5882eef97184de95321425392bff469e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 11425
content:
"The shrinking carbon budget has raised questions over whether to \r\nmeet our commitment to 2degC if fossil fuel resources were to be mined \r\nor left stranded, as McGlade and Ekins argue: '... [a] large portion \r\nof the reserve base and an even more significant proportion of the \r\nresource base should not be produced if the temperature rise is to \r\nremain below 2 degrees C' (McGlade and Ekins 2015). This logic \r\nmeans that developing countries that rely on fossil fuel extraction \r\nwill need to replace their hydrocarbon revenues with other income\u0002generating activities. Stranded assets remind most oil-producing \r\ngovernments that fossil fuel assets do not have a durable value and \r\nare vulnerable to politico-economic forces and fluctuations. The goal \r\nof staying within the 1.5degC temperature goal, in line with the Paris \r\nAgreement, is already part of the policy vision and planning of large \r\nfossil fuel-consuming economies"


id: c5d6559c60acc1ad632c45c54aaf49d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 28700
content:
" For early fossil-fuel producers, \r\nhowever, the reality that their resources may not yield the desired \r\nreturns is often perceived as bad news, particularly in the context of \r\nthe increasing depreciation of fossil fuel products."


id: d92c02ca6a6bdb2806c6132767fe9629
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
content_type: text
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vector_id: 31676
content:
"Transitions are broad-based and complex, involving governance \r\nstructures, institutions and climate vulnerabilities, and there is a need \r\nto include historical responsibility, resource intensity and capacity \r\ndifferentials, thus relegating the debate across simplistic binary lines \r\nof developed versus developing countries (Carney 2016). Hence, \r\ntransition processes will have to respond to several preconditions \r\nand structural inequalities related to climate finance, energy \r\npoverty, vulnerabilities and the broader macroeconomic implications \r\nassociated with managing the debt burden, fiscal deficits and \r\nuneven terms of development in developing countries. In addition \r\nto structural inequalities, the COVID-19 pandemic has severely \r\ndisrupted energy and food systems, and reduced the speed at which \r\ndeveloping countries can procure new low-carbon technologies and \r\ndecouple economic growth from fossil fuels (Winkler 2020)"


id: 492c10824d2e2d3944d854d4b9f077d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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content:
" For \r\ninstance, global supply-chain transition costs might be lower when \r\ncompared to in-country supply chains, as became evident when \r\nCOVID-19 created further disruption to renewable-energy projects \r\n(Cronin et al. 2021). Moreover, developing countries can experience \r\ndifficulties in phasing out old technologies, especially if the latter has \r\na  cost disadvantage, has not benefitted from an established track \r\nrecord and its performance is uncertain (Bos and Gupta 2019). There "


id: d21af8222c6fe017ed0df71fb1444a4f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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content:
"Other disruptions are linked to redundant contracts and postponed or \r\ncancelled explorations, as many oil companies are diversifying their \r\nproduction in the wake of the pandemic and are cutting back on \r\nplanned hydrocarbon investments (Denton et al. 2021). These failed \r\nconcessions and disruptions have implications for the just transition, \r\nespecially in developing countries without the financial ability to \r\npull out of fossil fuels and to diversify with the same urgency as the \r\nindustrialised nations (Peszko et al. 2020). For instance, in South Africa, \r\nwhich is seeking to divest away from coal and decarbonise its energy \r\nsector, if the transition is not properly managed, this could lead to \r\na loss in revenue of R1.8 trillion (USD125 billion), thus compromising \r\nthe government's ability to support social spending (Huxham et al. \r\n2019). Emerging oil producers like Uganda are having to postpone \r\nthe start of production"


id: 2400690d67baf4fcb002df1c7d5bc020
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content:
" Eni and Total, two of the largest international \r\noil and gas majors in Africa, have already signalled they are making \r\n25% cuts to their investment in exploration and production projects in \r\n2020, representing a EUR4 billion reduction in foreign direct investment \r\nfor Total and a USD2 billion reduction for Eni (Le Bec 2020)."


id: 48eb039b221ebafa0b0b183eaafcc0ef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 8859
content:
"Nonetheless, the production of fossil fuels is central to many \r\neconomies with numerous development implications related to \r\nrents associated with export revenues, energy security and poverty \r\nalleviation (Lazarus and van Asselt 2018). The central question is: who \r\ndecides which types of carbon should be burnable or non-burnable? \r\nHence, social equality is at the heart of the transition process, but it \r\nfalls short of a response on how to chart a new road map towards \r\ncarbon neutrality, especially given that fossil fuel producers and \r\ninvestors tend to belong to large, powerful companies and wield \r\na great deal of influence and power, especially when their entrenched \r\ninterests are at stake (Lazarus and van Asselt 2018)"


id: c9e66266b8aad1cab1b62e3df9e3ee6b
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 29320
content:
" The question of \r\nwhether developing countries should be compensated for foregoing \r\ntheir resources in light of their current development needs has not \r\nyielded many results and had only limited success in mobilising \r\ninternational finance, as demonstrated by the case of Yasuni-ITT in \r\nEcuador (Sovacool and Scarpaci 2016). According to (Sovacool et al. \r\n2021), affected communities and their views may be discounted and \r\nexcluded from planning, which can neglect important matters such \r\nas rights, recognition and representation (Sovacool 2021)."


id: 3b213ef8509c80b2e9d3f6d9ad768ba3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 6663
content:
"The economic implications of the transition will be felt by developing \r\ncountries with high degrees of dependence on hydrocarbon products \r\nas a revenue stream, as they are exposed to reduced fiscal incomes, \r\ngiven the low demand for oil and low oil prices, and the associated \r\neconomic fallout of the pandemic. This link with stranded assets is \r\nimportant, but it may be overlooked, as countries whose assets are \r\nbecoming stranded may not have the relevant resources, knowledge, \r\nautonomy or agency to design a fresh orientation or decide on the \r\ntransition. In addition, some developing countries are dependent not \r\nonly on fossil fuel revenues, but also on foreign exchange earnings \r\nfrom exports"


id: 8dcda9c565f07c198f99386c89d4b883
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 19836
content:
" This dependence comes into sharp focus when one \r\nconsiders that 30% of the Malaysian government's revenues are \r\nlinked to petroleum products, and that Mozambique, by exploiting \r\nits newly discovered natural-gas reserves, can earn seven times \r\nthe country's current GDP over a  period of 25 years (Cronin et al. \r\n2021). Thus, any attempt to accelerate the transition to low-carbon \r\ndevelopment must take into account foreign exchange, domestic \r\nrevenue and employment generation, which are precisely what ensure \r\nthe attractiveness of fossil fuel industries (Addison and Roe 2018)."


id: f62fd8bbad6c17c2bb4ed2c757c8a204
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36239
content:
"Energy use and its deployment are sovereign matters. State \r\nresponsibilities over the control and use of natural resources \r\nconcern both current and future generations (Carney 2016). Climate \r\nchange impacts will disable the food, water and energy systems \r\nof the most vulnerable. Therefore, the resources required to enable \r\na just transition are predicated on good leadership and governance \r\ninstitutions that will support quality and justice-based transitions. \r\nBeyond energy systems, changes to land systems can benefit from \r\nsustainable land management in ways that will reduce the pressure \r\non land for food and at the same time support carbon storage. With \r\nland coming under increased pressure, land and forest management \r\nare critical for carbon sequestration, as well as other ecosystem \r\nbenefits. Extractive processes have impacts on land, and often there \r\nare few if any redistributive benefits for communities in regions \r\nwhere extraction takes place"


id: ce690976a1adcf673f7ca841b669d53a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30009
content:
" In addition, extraction of strategic \r\nminerals such as cobalt, copper and lithium have been linked to \r\nviolence, human rights abuses and conflict (Cronin et al. 2021)."


id: f04f8c8aeca5cd3a8a59ba6789d5b40d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35311
content:
"However, in the race to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, some of the \r\nother priorities of the transition, like climate change adaptation and \r\nits inherent vulnerabilities, might become muted, given the urgency \r\nto mitigate at all costs. Consequently, the transition imperative \r\nreduces the scope for local priority-setting and ignores the additional \r\nrisks faced by countries with the least capacity to adapt. Equally, the \r\n'just transition' is often seen through the prism of job losses and \r\nthe attendant retooling and reskilling imperatives necessary to re\u0002dynamise local businesses, especially those that may fail as a result \r\nof mine closures. It is equally important to consider current disparities \r\nin knowledge and capacity which could maintain the existing \r\ninequalities in the global regional distribution of costs and benefits. \r\nOne striking example is the manufacturing of PV in India when \r\ncompared to manufacturing PV in China"


id: f78caea7a9bf7c251762e93d4dde176
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36460
content:
" In China, manufacturing \r\ncosts are lower than in India, as are import tariffs (Behuria 2020). \r\nSimilarly, a solar industry might have greater development prospects "


id: b4c707feacca9c7f35e2616bfd720c4f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25977
content:
"The 'Just Transition' concept has evolved over the years (Sweeney \r\nand Treat 2018) and is still undergoing further evolution. It \r\nemphasises the key principles of respect and dignity for vulnerable \r\ngroups, the creation of decent jobs, social protection, employment \r\nrights, fairness in energy access and use, and social dialogue and \r\ndemocratic consultation with relevant stakeholders, whilst coping \r\nwith the effects of asset-stranding or the transition to green and \r\nclean economies. The concept has come under increased scrutiny, \r\nwith its protagonists emphasising the need to focus on the equality \r\nof the transition, not simply on its speed (Forsyth 2014). The \r\nemphasis on justice is also gaining in momentum, with a growing \r\nrecognition that the sustainability transition is about justice in the \r\ntransition and not simply about economics (Newell and Mulvaney \r\n2013; Swilling, M. Annecke 2010; Williams and Doyon 2020)"


id: 567b0a95ad592cd7b0156b71055d796
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11082
content:
"The determination of a  just transition is complex and not simply \r\ndependent on the allocation of perceived risks or solutions, but rather \r\non how risks and solutions are defined (Forsyth 2014). Acting urgently \r\nto achieve environmental solutions or meet transition imperatives has \r\ncertain risks given the need to go beyond commonplace definitions \r\nof the just transition by emphasising the distributive or procedural \r\naspects. The framing of policies to align with fast and low-cost \r\nmitigation without paying sufficient attention to social and economic \r\nresilience creates its own potential risks and can enhance social \r\nvulnerability rather than address it. The need to distribute climate \r\nchange solutions must not delegitimise appropriate economic growth \r\nstrategies, nor indeed create the additional risks of policy imposition. \r\nPerceptions of justice with regard to environmental problems and \r\nsolutions matter equally"


id: 88aac296da2e7b5c58ecbbad6feec18a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19030
content:
" Hence, the types of transition pathway that \r\nare chosen may have equality implications. Mitigation at all costs, if \r\ndone 'cheaply and crudely', can create additional problems for social \r\njustice and inclusive development (Forsyth 2014)."


id: f2bac8ba43436d6db98e26cb8be799e2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 35714
content:
"The assumption that the benefits of mitigation are enough to \r\noffset trade-offs with other policy objectives can be questioned. \r\nIf one accepts the argument that not all adaptation addresses \r\nvulnerability concerns (Kjellen 2006), and that some adaptation \r\nstrategies can heighten vulnerabilities if there are flaws in their \r\ndesign and implementation, then the same logic applies, namely \r\nthat not all mitigation is necessarily beneficial. Hence the emphasis \r\non the transition resulting from mitigation should be placed not \r\nonly on speed or cost-effectiveness, but also on the legitimacy of \r\nthe actions, and whether the transition is well designed or not. In \r\nshort, justice is not always a shorthand for acting ethically, but rather \r\na point of reasoning on what is considered legitimate. Planning for \r\nthe transition often discounts human rights and social inclusivity that \r\ncan occur as the result of a rapid transition"


id: 47509705f53b489c17b170c86d7615a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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content:
" The emphasis should be \r\nplaced on the management of the transition rather than the speed - \r\nfor instance, if in the rush to build new hydropower energy sources \r\nimplies that populations are displaced, then this constitutes a human \r\nrights violation (Castro et al. 2016; Piggot et al. 2019)."


id: 133ea78f243b528383708b61f2b11e1b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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content:
"The Global Assessment on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services \r\nReport (IPBES 2019, Chapter 5) assessed the relationship between \r\nmeeting the goals of the Paris Agreement and SDGs 2 (zero hunger), \r\n7 (affordable and clean energy) and 15 (life on land). It concluded \r\nthat a  large expansion of the amount of land used for bioenergy \r\nproduction would not be compatible with these SDGs. However, \r\ncombining bioenergy options with other mitigation options, like \r\nmore efficient land management and the restoration of nature, could \r\ncontribute to welfare improvements and to accessing food and water. \r\nDemand-side climate-mitigation measures, like energy-efficiency \r\nimprovements, reduced meat consumption and reduced food waste, \r\nwere considered to be the most economically attractive and efficient \r\noptions in order to support low GHG emissions, food security and \r\nbiodiversity objectives"


id: 16196554bb8eed3323d402b54794c53f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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content:
" Implementing such options, however, can \r\ninvolve challenges in terms of lifestyle changes (IPBES 2019)."


id: 7fbe8285ee0ee3614cf9f2e8c4c257e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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content:
"(Springmann et al. 2018) conclude that reductions in food waste could \r\nbe a very important option for reducing agricultural GHG emissions, the \r\ndemand for agricultural land and water, and nitrogen and phosphorous \r\napplications. In addition to the possibility to reduce food waste, their \r\nstudy analysed several other options for reducing the environmental \r\neffects of the food system, including dietary changes in the direction \r\nof healthier, more plant-based diets and improvements in technologies \r\nand management. It was concluded that, relative to a baseline scenario \r\nfor 2050, dietary changes in the direction of healthier diets could reduce \r\nGHG emissions by 29% and 5-9% respectively in a dietary-guideline \r\nscenario, and by 56% and 6-22% respectively in a more plant-based \r\ndiet scenario. Demand-side, service-oriented solutions vary between \r\nand within countries and regions, according to living conditions and \r\ncontext. Avoiding food waste reduces GHG emissions substantially"


id: c08ba4d3941585f3eea01a402f961b9f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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content:
" \r\nDietary shifts to plant-based nutrition lead to healthier lives and reduce \r\nGHG emissions (Section 5.3)."


id: a3845a063f3698531a455423495eb210
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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content:
"(FAO 2019). The basis of this initiative was the 'Love Food, Hate \r\nWaste' radio, TV, print and online media campaign run by a  non\u0002profit organisation, the Waste and Resources Action Programme \r\n(WRAP). The campaign raised awareness among consumers about \r\nhow much food they waste, how it affects their household budgets \r\nand what they can do about it. This initiative collaborated with \r\nfood manufacturers and retailers to stimulate innovation, such as \r\nresealable packaging, shared meal-planning and food-storage tips. \r\nThe total implementation costs during the five-year period were \r\nestimated at GBP26 million, from which it was households that \r\nderived the most benefit, estimated to be worth GBP6.5 billion. Local \r\nauthorities also realised a substantial GBP86 million worth of savings \r\nin food-waste disposal costs. As for the private sector, the benefits \r\ntook the form of increased product shelf lives and reduced product \r\nloss"


id: 331fb985890d80a6dfe890debfae7c01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 5465
content:
" While households started to consume more efficiently and \r\ncompanies may have experienced a decline in food sales, the latter \r\nalso stated that the non-financial benefits, such as strengthened \r\nconsumer relationships, had offset the costs."


id: e77307a9aa1b22fbe3f82a38ae1607d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 33907
content:
"In conclusion, the AFOLU sector offers many low-cost mitigation \r\noptions, which, however, can also create trade-offs between land use \r\nfor food, energy, forest and biodiversity. Some options can help to \r\nmitigate such trade-offs, like agricultural practices (e.g., improved yields, \r\nagroforestry), forest conservation (e.g., afforestation, reforestation), soil \r\ncarbon sequestration (e.g., biochar addition to soils) and the removal \r\nof carbon dioxide (e.g.,  BECCS), which could contribute to climate \r\nchange mitigation. Lifestyle changes, including dietary changes and \r\nreduced food waste, are tightly embedded in modes of behaviour that \r\nare influenced by the immediate environment (e.g., household, farm), \r\nthe indirect environment (e.g., community) and macro-environmental \r\nfactors (e.g., political, financial and economic contexts)"


id: ac3c630253831d1cd3e0d5b9c23eea8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 24637
content:
" Achieving zero \r\nfood waste could reduce the demands for land (SDG 15), water use \r\n(SDG 6) and chemical fertilisers (SDG 9), leading to GHG emissions \r\nreductions (SDG 13) by encouraging sustainable consumption and \r\nproduction practices (SDG 12)."


id: 6835fe1d91ccdcc3d07b5c44d0b832a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
content_type: text
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vector_id: 13978
content:
"In the ongoing transition towards renewable sources of energy (see \r\nalso Chapters 3, 4 and 6), the impact of the hydro-climate on energy \r\nproduction continues to be highly relevant (Jones and Warner 2016). \r\nAs the shares of thermoelectric energy production in the energy \r\ngrid go down along with the introduction of thermoelectric cooling \r\ntechnologies using smaller amounts of water, new energy sources \r\nand technologies are being introduced, and existing sources scaled \r\nup. Of these, hydropower, wind and solar energy are the key energy \r\nsources currently and will be in the near future, making up 2.5% and \r\n1.8% of the total global primary energy supply in 2017 respectively \r\n(IEA 2019). Wind and solar energy are directly independent of water \r\nin themselves, but are dependent on atmospheric conditions related \r\nto processes that also drive the water balance and circulation"


id: 9ede312d0c27ad355b26ae59fd83b6fd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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content:
" \r\nHydropower, on the other hand, is directly influenced by and \r\ndependent on the supply of water, while at the same time being \r\nan essential counter-component to seasonality and climatological \r\nvariation, as well as to current and future demand curves and diurnal \r\nvariations, as against wind and solar energy (De Barbosa et al. 2017)."


id: 818ca5b3da4ce1b4804432b29bb9788f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 17912
content:
"The renewable-energy conversion technologies that are currently \r\ndominant globally and are projected to remain so are less vulnerable \r\nto water deficiencies than fossil-based technologies, since no cooling is \r\nused. These renewable-energy conversion sources include, for example, \r\nwind, solar PV and wave energy. The implementation of such sources \r\nwill, in the longer run, have the potential to reduce water usage by the \r\nenergy sector substantially (Lohrmann et al. 2019). Also, an increasing \r\nshare of renewables within desalination, as well as improved irrigation \r\nefficiencies, have been shown to potentially improve the inter-sectorial \r\nWEFN water balance (Lohrmann et al. 2019; Caldera and Breyer 2020). \r\nSome less dominant renewable-energy technologies do use water for \r\ncooling, such as geothermal energy and concentrating solar power \r\n(CSP), if wet cooling is employed"


id: bbd70f67413eafd2873bac0f4d53fc7a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27113
content:
" Despite the general detachment from \r\nwater resources, wind and solar PV, for example, are highly dependent \r\non climate change patterns, including variability depending on future \r\nenergy-storage capacities and on-/off-grid solutions (Schlott et al. \r\n2018). Furthermore, regardless of whether or not they are based on \r\nrenewables, climate change will affect energy usage across sectors, \r\nsuch as heating and cooling in the building stock. The energy systems \r\nin question need to be able to handle variations and extremes in \r\ndemand (Larsen et al. 2020)."


id: eeff8212dd9c8c4bfa6048b60941ef87
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 35076
content:
"water conservation, indicating that additional coherence in policies \r\naffecting the water, energy and food sectors (among others) will \r\nbe critical in achieving the SDGs (Chapter 7). Subsidised fertilisers, \r\nenergy and crops can drive unsustainable levels of water usage \r\nand pollution in agriculture. More than half the world's population, \r\nroughly 4.3 billion people in 2016, live in areas where the demand for \r\nwater resources outstrips sustainable supplies for at least part of the \r\nyear. Irrigated agriculture is already using around 70% of the available \r\nfreshwater, and the large seasonal variations in water supply and the \r\nneeds of different crops can create conflicts between water needs \r\nacross sectors at different time scales (Wada et al. 2016). However, as \r\nthere is little potential for increasing irrigation or expanding cropland \r\n(Steffen et al"


id: c7b1e11af4d03f62935f428ff464602a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 28999
content:
" 2015), gaps in food production gaps must be closed by \r\nincreasing productivity and cropping densities on currently harvested \r\nland by increasing either rain-fed yields or water-use efficiency \r\n(Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012)."


id: c4b2d081eb6d43f95b71ffeea4b606b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 28516
content:
"The extraction, distribution and wastewater processes of \r\nanthropogenic water-management systems similarly use vast \r\namounts of energy, making the proper management of water \r\nessential to reduce energy usage and GHG emissions (Nair et al. \r\n2014)Chapter 11). One study reports that the water sector accounts \r\nfor 5% of total US GHG emissions (Rothausen and Conway 2011). \r\nWithin the WEFN, there is an obvious trade-off between water \r\navailability and food production, competing demands that pose a risk \r\nto the supply of the basic commodities of food, energy and water in \r\nline with the SDGs (Bleischwitz et al. 2018; Gao et al. 2019), all of \r\nwhich have the potential for inter-sectorial or inter-regional conflicts \r\n(Froese and Schilling 2019). Currently, 24% of the global population \r\nlive in regions with constant water-scarce food production, and \r\n19% experience occasional water scarcities (Kummu et al. 2014)"


id: 271adbaab2bc10760e86922acf93d6d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 3545
content:
" \r\nTo counterbalance the demand for food and comestibles in regions \r\nthat experience constant or intermittent supplies, transportation \r\nis needed, which in itself requires suitable infrastructure, energy \r\nsupplies, a well-functioning trading environment and support policies. \r\nOf the 2.6  billion people who experience constant or occasional \r\nwater scarcities in food production, 55% rely on international \r\ntrade, 21% on domestic trade and the remainder on water stocks \r\n(Kummu et al. 2014)."


id: 8a8f0bed30c5ffa490bd8c56bc5d324b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 19338
content:
"It has been argued that applying an integrated approach to water\u0002energy-climate-food resource management and policymaking is \r\nhighly beneficial in properly addressing the co-benefits and trade\u0002offs (Brouwer et al. 2018; Howells et al. 2013), accommodating the \r\nSDGs (Rasul 2016) and, in general, assessing enabling strategies \r\nto improve resource efficiency (Dai et al. 2018). For an integrated \r\napproach to analysing the WEFN, a number of modelling approaches, \r\ntools and frameworks have been proposed (Brouwer et al. 2018; \r\nde Strasser et al. 2016; Gao et al. 2019; Larsen et al. 2019; Smajgl \r\net al. 2016), often involving multi-objective calibration. Such tools \r\nenable decision-makers to evaluate the optimal water-allocation and \r\nenergy-saving solutions for the specific geography in question"


id: a56cedbfa4789a94f5f5dd11554d4702
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 23595
content:
" As an \r\nexample, (Scott 2011) found the higher transportability of electricity, \r\ncompared to water, pivotal in water-energy adaptation solutions in \r\nthe USA, while arguing for the additional coordination of water and \r\nenergy policies as a key instrument in balancing the trade-offs."


id: f5de0d1f6aa352da6906ad668396a4ef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 36196
content:
"Common to all these integrated efforts is the challenge involved in \r\nmaking comparisons across studies due to the combined complexities \r\nof assumptions, model codes, regions, variables, forcings, and so \r\non. To accommodate these challenges, (Larsen et al. 2019) suggest \r\nemploying shared criteria and forcing data to enable cross-model \r\ncomparisons and uncertainty estimates, as also highlighted by \r\n(Brouwer et al. 2018). Other limitations in current WEFN research \r\nare partial system descriptions, the failure to address uncertainties, \r\nsystem boundaries, and evaluation methods and metrics (Zhang \r\net al. 2018). The lack of proper access to WEFN data and data \r\nquality has been highlighted by (D'Odorico et al. 2018; Larsen et al. \r\n2019)"


id: f4070c0f94f62c9fd0197eae6237a39f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35902
content:
" Furthermore, gaps have been identified between theory and \r\nend-user applications in the lack of any focus on food nutritional \r\nvalues as opposed to calories alone, in the understanding of water \r\navailability in relation to management practices, in integrating \r\nnew energy technologies and in the resulting environmental issues \r\n(D'Odorico et al. 2018)."


id: f127b20b0b589ff4573f97359671ad3a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 35441
content:
"The co-benefits of energy-saving measures described by \r\n146  signatories to a  city climate network due to improved air \r\nquality have been quantified as 6596 avoided premature deaths \r\n(with a 95% confidence interval of 4356 to 8572 avoided premature \r\ndeaths) and 68,476 years of life saved (with a  95% confidence \r\ninterval of 45,403 and 89,358 years of life saved) (Monforti-Ferrario \r\net al. 2019). Better air quality further reinforces the health co-benefits \r\nof climate-mitigation measures based on walking and cycling, since \r\nthe evidence suggests that increased physical activity in urban \r\noutdoor settings with low levels of black carbon improves lung \r\nfunction (Laeremans et al. 2018). Chapter 9 shows that mitigation \r\nactions in buildings have multiple co-benefits resulting in substantial \r\nsocial and economic value beyond their direct impacts on reducing \r\nenergy consumption and GHG emissions, thus contributing to the \r\nachievement of almost all the UN's SDGs"


id: 5fd1942faa08e2dd392715d3046b9138
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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vector_id: 12655
content:
" Most studies agree that \r\nthe value of these multiple benefits is greater than the value of the \r\nenergy savings, while their quantification and inclusion in decision\u0002making processes will strengthen the adoption of ambitious reduction \r\ntargets and improve coordination across policy areas."


id: 20a3f867cb79ba8845ba12020df03b8f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2581
content:
"For many cities, a key to reorienting development paths will be investing \r\nin sustainable, low-carbon infrastructure. Because infrastructure has \r\na  long lifetime and influences everything from lifestyle choices to \r\nconsumption patterns, decisions over an estimated USD90 trillion of \r\ninfrastructure investment (from now to 2030) will be critical in order \r\nto avoid becoming locked-in to unsustainable paths (WRI 2016). This \r\nis particularly true in developing countries, where demands for new \r\nbuildings, roads, energy and waste-management systems are already \r\nsurging. To some extent, policies that accelerate building renovation \r\nrates, including voluntary programmes (Van der Heijden 2018), can \r\nsupport transitions down more sustainable paths (Kuramochi et al. \r\n2018)"


id: b63254fb6afbc6fe41d7c8d0d6792d68
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26196
content:
" Factoring climate and sustainable development considerations \r\ninto policy tools that facilitate the quantitative emission performance \r\nstandard (EPS) and the inclusion of climate and sustainable \r\ndevelopment benefits and risks in infrastructure assessments or \r\nrisk-adjusted returns on investments in development banks could \r\nalso prove useful (Rydge et al. 2015). Strong policy signals from the \r\nUNFCCC and from national climate policies and strategies (including \r\nNDCs) could facilitate uptake of the relevant policies and the use \r\nof these tools."


id: 8ee60fad247b4f8ea0520af30a180e28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:55
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20011
content:
"There are several examples of cities that have developed plans for \r\nmeeting both the SDGs and mitigation, which demonstrates the \r\nfeasibility of meeting these objectives jointly. Quito, Ecuador, a city \r\nwith large carbon footprints (Global Opportunity Explorer 2019) and \r\nclimate vulnerabilities, has adopted low-carbon plans that aim to \r\nachieve the climate goals while introducing net-zero energy buildings \r\nand reducing water stress (Ordonez et al. 2019; Marcotullio et al. \r\n2018). Several cities in China, Indonesia and Japan have invested in \r\ngreen-city initiatives by means of green infrastructural investments, \r\nwhich is claimed to be a  form of smart investment. Through this \r\ntype of investment, economic growth and greenhouse gas (GHG) \r\nemissions reductions can be achieved in cities (Jupesta et al. 2016)"


