# document

id: 33183a38e1a96a8e0c1bc46dade2cb4d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"Survey-based studies of public perceptions on hypothetical policy \r\ninstruments or activities, such as carbon taxes or energy infrastructure, \r\nsuggest that linking climate policy to other economic and social \r\nreforms can increase public support for climate governance (Carattini \r\net al. 2019; Bergquist et al. 2020). People and politicians tend to \r\nunderestimate other peoples' and politicians' willingness to support \r\nmitigation policies (Hurlstone et al. 2014; Mildenberger and Tingley \r\n2019), but if actors are informed about other actors actual perceptions \r\nand behaviours this may reduce the tendency to underestimate \r\nclimate governance support (Mildenberger and Tingley 2019)."


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"Corporate actors often influence policies and their adoption (Pulver \r\nand Benney 2013; Mildenberger 2020; Goldberg et al. 2020). \r\nCorporate actors acting individually or through industry associations, \r\nhave worked to sway climate policy in different countries (Falkner \r\n2008; Bernhagen 2008; Newell and Paterson 2010; Meckling 2011; \r\nMildenberger 2020). Their ability varies by country and issue (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (Skjaerseth and Skodvin 2010; \r\nBoasson and Wettestad 2013; Boasson 2015; Boasson et al. 2021) \r\nand depends on material endowments (Moe Singh 2012), access \r\nto the political system (Dillon et al. 2018; Mildenberger 2020), and \r\nthe ability to shape ideas, values and belief systems (Boasson 2015). \r\nCorporate actors tend to change their climate policy preferences over \r\ntime, as indicated by longitudinal studies of some European countries \r\n(Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Boasson 2015; Boasson et al. 2021)."


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"While Section 13.3 shows that structural factors condition climate \r\ngovernance, their ultimate importance also depends on whether and \r\nhow various actors are mobilised (Hochstetler 2020; Boasson 2015).\r\na  wide range of regional and local governments as well as non\u0002governmental actors have become increasingly engaged in climate \r\ngovernance, for instance through public-private partnerships and \r\ntransnational networks (Jordan et al. 2015; Dorsch and Flachsland \r\n2017; Jordan et al. 2018) and through the media and litigation, as \r\ndiscussed here. "


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"Corporate actors are crucial to policy implementation because they \r\nare prominent emitters of the greenhouse gases and owners of \r\ncarbon-intensive technologies and potential providers of solutions \r\nas developers, owners and adopters of low emission practices and \r\ntechnologies (Falkner 2008; Perrow and Pulver 2015). Many climate \r\npolicies and measures rely on businesses' willingness to exploit \r\nnewly created economic opportunities, such as support schemes \r\nfor renewable energy and energy efficiency sector or carbon pricing \r\n(Olsen 2007; Newell and Paterson 2010; Shen 2015; World Bank \r\n2019). Some corporate actors provide climate solutions, such as "


id: 3732bf0d44807174b1b61f64a64a2b6d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"Climate governance processes result from both slow-moving \r\nincremental changes to policy and more rapid bursts of change \r\ndue to, for example, responses to dramatic weather events, general \r\nelections or global climate summits (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Aamodt and Stensdal 2017; Jordan and Moore 2020; \r\nBoasson et al. 2021). While Section 13.3 assessed how entrenched \r\nstructural factors conditions climate governance developments, this \r\nsection examines how actors are able to alter climate governance "


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"and the Council of the European Union 2018). To date, there are only \r\na limited number of case studies that measure the direct effect of \r\nparticipation in these types of movements as it relates to climate \r\noutcomes (Saunders et al. 2014; Vestergren et al. 2018, 2019). "


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"renewable energy deployment, and have successfully influenced \r\nclimate policy development related to feed-in tariffs, taxations, \r\nquotas, or emission trading schemes, in the EU (Boasson 2019), \r\nGermany (Leiren and Reimer 2018), the USA (Stokes and Breetz \r\n2018), the Nordic countries (Kooij et al. 2018), China (Shen 2017) \r\nand Japan (Li et al. 2019)."


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"Citizens with less access to resources and power also participate \r\nby challenging nodes of power  - policymakers, regulators, and \r\nbusinesses  - to change their behaviours and/or accelerate their \r\nefforts. Tactics include lobbying, legal challenges, shareholder \r\nactivism, coop board stewardship, and voting (Gillan and Starks \r\n2007; Schlozman et al. 2012; Viardot 2013; Bratton and McCahery \r\n2015; Yildiz et al. 2015; Olzak et al. 2016). Citizens provide the labour \r\nand political will needed to pressure political and economic actors \r\nto enact emission-reducing policies, as well as providing resistance \r\nto them (Fox and Brown 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999; Oreskes and \r\nConway 2012; McAdam 2017). "


id: 9f082496052195d3ec77426aead525fb
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"Fossil fuel industries have been important agenda-setters in many \r\ncountries, including the USA (Dunlap and McCright 2015; Supran and \r\nOreskes 2017; Downie 2018), the EU (Skjaerseth and Skodvin 2010; \r\nBoasson and Wettestad 2013), Australia (Ayling 2017), China (Shen \r\nand Xie 2018; Tan et al. 2021), India (Schmitz 2017; Blondeel and Van \r\nde Graaf 2018), and Mexico (Pulver 2007), with differing positions \r\nand impacts across countries (Kim et al. 2016; Nasiritousi 2017). \r\nIn the US, the oil industry has underpinned emergence of climate \r\nscepticism (Dunlap and McCright 2015; Farrell 2016a; Supran and \r\nOreskes 2017), and its spread abroad (Dunlap and Jacques 2013; \r\nEngels et al. 2013; Painter and Gavin 2016). Corporate opposition \r\nto climate policies is often facilitated by a broad coalition of firms \r\n(Cory et al. 2021). "


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"Other citizen engagement involves a range of more confrontational \r\ntactics, such as boycotting, striking, protesting, and direct action \r\ntargeting politicians, policymakers, and businesses (Fisher et al. 2005; \r\nTarrow 2005; Fisher 2010; Saunders et al. 2012; Walgrave et al. 2012; \r\nWahlstrom et al. 2013; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Bondaroff 2014; \r\nHadden 2014, 2015; O'Brien et al. 2018; Chamorel 2019; Cock 2019; \r\n2019b; Hadden and Jasny 2019; Swim et al. 2019). Climate strikes and \r\nother more confrontational forms of climate activism have become \r\nincreasingly common (O'Brien et al. 2018; Evensen 2019; D.A. Fisher \r\n2019; Boulianne et al. 2020; Martiskainen et al. 2020; de Moor et al. \r\n2021; Fisher and Nasrin 2021a). Very few studies look specifically at \r\nthe effect of these tactics on actual climate-related outcomes and \r\nmore research is needed to understand the climate effects of citizen \r\nengagement and activism (Fisher and Nasrin 2021b)."


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"Conservative foundations, sometimes financed by business revenues, \r\nhave funded a  diversity of types of groups, including think-tanks, \r\nphilanthropic foundations, or activist networks to oppose climate \r\npolicy (Brulle 2014, 2019). However, there is limited knowledge \r\nabout the conditions under which actors opposed to climate action \r\nsucceed in shaping climate governance (Kinniburgh 2019; Martin \r\nand Islar 2021)."


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"Some labour unions have developed positions and programmes on \r\nclimate change (Snell and Fairbrother 2010; Stevins 2013; Rathzel \r\net al. 2018), formed alliances with other actors in the field of climate \r\npolicy (Stevis 2018) and participated in domestic policy networks on \r\nclimate change (Jost and Jacob 2004), but we know little about their \r\nrelative importance or success. In countries with significant fossil fuel \r\nresources such as Australia, Norway, and the United States, labour \r\nunions, particularly industrial unions, tend to contribute to reducing \r\nthe ambition of domestic climate policies mainly due to the concern \r\nof job losses (Mildenberger 2020). Other studies find that the role of \r\nlabour unions varies across countries (Glynn et al. 2017)."


id: 63c7e0406a09662b2a5da9c0b9928017
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"On Friday 20 August 2018, Greta Thunberg participated in the first climate school strike. Since then, Fridays for Future - the name of \r\nthe group coordinating this tactic of skipping school on Fridays to protest inaction on climate change - has spread around the world."


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"Although digital activism makes it easier to connect globally, it is unclear how digital technology will affect the youth climate \r\nmovement, and its effects on carbon emissions. Research suggests that online activism is likely to involve a more limited range of \r\nparticipants and perspectives (Bennett 2013; Elliott and Earl 2018). Digital tactics could also mean that groups are less embedded \r\nin communities and less successful at creating durable social ties, factors that have been found to lead to longer term engagement \r\n(Tufekci 2017; Rohlinger and Bunnage 2018; Shirky 2010). "


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"with enforcing environmental laws that aimed to maintain clean air \r\nand water in countries around the world (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement) (McCloskey 1991; Schreurs 1997; Rucht 1999; Brulle \r\n2000; Steinhardt and Wu 2016; Longhofer et al. 2016; Wong 2018). \r\nSeveral studies find environmental NGOs have a positive effect on \r\nreductions in carbon emissions, whether through effects that operate \r\nacross countries or (Frank et al. 2000; Schofer and Hironaka 2005; \r\nJorgenson et al. 2011; Baxter et al. 2013; Longhofer and Jorgenson \r\n2017; Grant et al. 2018) through impact of NGOs within nations \r\n(Shwom 2011; Dietz et al. 2015; Grant and Vasi 2017). "


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"At the same time, other research has documented various forms of \r\nbacklash against climate policies, both in terms of voting behaviour, \r\nas well as other collective efforts (Hill et al. 2010; Williamson et al. \r\n2011; McAdam and Boudet 2012; Wright and Boudet 2012; Walker \r\net al. 2014; Boudet et al. 2016; Fast et al. 2016; Krause et al. 2016; \r\nLyon 2016; Mayer 2016; Stokes 2016; Stokes and Warshaw 2017; \r\nMuradian and Pascual 2020; Stokes 2020). In a systematic analysis \r\nthat includes movements against fossil fuel investments along \r\nwith those against low-carbon emitting projects around the world, \r\nresearch finds that a quarter of all projects (no matter their targets) \r\nwere cancelled after facing resistance (Temper et al. 2020)."


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"A range of international organisations can be important, particularly \r\nin developing countries, for instance by assisting in framing of national \r\nclimate governance and supporting the design of climate policies \r\nthrough technical assistance projects (Talaei et al. 2014; Ortega Diaz \r\nand Gutierrez 2018; Kukkonen et al. 2018; Bhamidipati et al. 2019; \r\nCharlery and Traerup 2019). Yet for these climate aid initiatives to \r\nwork effectively requires improved institutional architecture, better \r\nappreciation of local contexts, and more inclusive and transparent \r\ngovernance, based on evidence from many multilateral mechanisms \r\nlike REDD+, CDM, GEF and GCF (Gomez 2013; Arndt and Tarp 2017), \r\nand bilateral programmes on energy, agriculture and land-use "


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"This sub-section focuses on relevant climate litigation for policies and \r\ninstitutions. Climate litigation is further discussed in Sections 14.5.1.2 \r\n(linkages between mitigation and human rights) and Section 14.5.3 \r\n(cross-country implications and international courts/tribunals). "


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"The vast majority of climate cases have emerged in United States, \r\nAustralia and Europe, and more recently in developing countries \r\n(Humby 2018; Kotze and du Plessis 2019; Peel and Lin 2019; Setzer \r\nand Benjamin 2019; Zhao et al. 2019; Rodriguez-Garavito 2020). "


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"Mayer 2019; Paiement 2020; Barritt 2020; Sindico et al. 2021). \r\nBetween 2015 and 2021, individuals and communities initiated at \r\nleast 37 cases (including Urgenda and Leghari) against states (Setzer \r\nand Higham 2021), challenging the effectiveness of legislation and \r\npolicy goals (Jackson 2020; Setzer and Higham 2021). Some cases \r\nalso seek to shape new legal concepts such as 'rights of nature' \r\nrecognised in the Future Generations case in Colombia (Savaresi and \r\nAuz 2019; Rodriguez-Garavito 2020) and 'ecological damage' in the \r\ncase of Notre Affaire a Tous and others vs France (Torre-Schaub 2021)."


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"As  of 31 May 2021, 1841 cases of climate change litigation from \r\naround the world had been identified. Of these, 1387 were filed \r\nbefore courts in the United States, while the remaining 454 were \r\nfiled in 39 other countries and 13 international or regional courts \r\nand tribunals (including the courts of the European Union). Outside \r\nthe US, Australia (115), the UK (73) and the EU (58) remain the \r\njurisdictions with the highest volume of cases. The majority of cases, \r\n1006, have been filed since 2015 (Setzer and Higham 2021). The \r\nnumber of climate litigation cases in developing countries is also \r\ngrowing. There are at least 58 cases in 18 Global South jurisdictions \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement) (Humby 2018; Kotze and du Plessis \r\n2019; Peel and Lin 2019; Setzer and Benjamin 2019; Zhao et al. 2019; \r\nRodriguez-Garavito 2020; Setzer and Higham 2021)."


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"Moreover, there are a  number of regulatory challenges to state \r\nauthorisation of high-emitting projects, which differs from systemic \r\ncases against states (Bouwer 2018; Hughes 2019a). For instance, the \r\nHigh Court in Pretoria, South Africa, concluded that climate change \r\nis a  relevant consideration for approving coal-fired power plants \r\n(Humby 2018). Similarly, the Federal Court of Australia concluded \r\nthat the Minister for the Environment owed a  duty of care to \r\nAustralian children in respect to climate impacts when exercising \r\na statutory power to decide whether to authorise a major extension \r\nto an existing coal mine (Peel and Markey-Towler 2021)."


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"Overall, courts have also played a  more active role for climate \r\ngovernance in democratic political systems (Peel and Osofsky 2015; \r\nEskander et al. 2021). Whether and to what extent differing law \r\ntraditions and political systems influence the role and importance \r\nof climate litigation has, however, not been examined enough \r\nscientifically (Setzer and Vanhala 2019; Peel and Osofsky 2020). "


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"The majority of climate change litigation cases are brought against \r\ngovernments, by civic and non-governmental organisations and \r\ncorporations (Eisenstat 2011; Markell and Ruhl 2012; Wilensky 2015; \r\nFisher et al. 2017; Setzer and Higham 2021). Many, although not all \r\nof these cases, seek to ensure that governmental action on climate \r\nchange is more ambitious, and better aligned with the need to avert or \r\nrespond to climate impacts identified and predicted by the scientific \r\ncommunity (Markell and Ruhl 2012; Setzer and Higham 2021). \r\nClimate aligned cases against governments can be divided into two \r\ndistinct categories: claims challenging the overall effort of a  State \r\nor its organs to mitigate or adapt to climate change (sometimes \r\nreferred to as 'systemic climate litigation') (Jackson 2020) and claims \r\nregarding authorisation of third-party activity (Bouwer 2018; Gerrard \r\n2021; Ghaleigh 2021). "


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"Systemic climate litigation that seeks an increase in a  country's \r\nambition to tackle climate change has been a growing trend since \r\nthe first court victories in the Urgenda case in the Netherlands (see \r\nBox  13.8 below) and the Leghari case in Pakistan in 2015. These \r\ncases motivated a wave of similar climate change litigation across \r\nthe world (Roy and Woerdman 2016; Ferreira 2016; Peeters 2016; "


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"countries and with unique cultural and political traditions also affect \r\nhow climate change is communicated (Eskjaer 2013)."


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"fuel industry (Franta 2017; Colombo 2021). In May 2021, the Hague \r\nDistrict Court of the Netherlands issued a ground-breaking judgment \r\nholding energy company Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) legally responsible \r\nfor greenhouse gas emissions from its entire value chain (Macchi and \r\nZeben 2021). Claims have also been brought against banks, pension \r\nfunds and investment funds for failing to incorporate climate risk \r\ninto their decision-making, and to disclose climate risk to their \r\nbeneficiaries (Wasim 2019; Solana 2020; Bowman and Wiseman \r\n2020). These litigation cases also impact on the financial market \r\nwithout directly involving specific financial institutions into the case \r\n(Solana 2020) but somehow aim to change their risk perceptions and \r\nattitude on high carbon activities (Griffin 2020). "


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"A broad variety of media platforms cover climate change issues, \r\nincluding traditional news media, such as newspapers and \r\nbroadcasting, digital social media (Walter et al. 2018), creative \r\nnarratives such as climate fiction and films (Svoboda 2016); humour \r\nand entertainment media (Brewer and McKnight 2015; Skurka \r\net al. 2018; Boykoff and Osnes 2019); and strategic communications \r\ncampaigns (Hansen and Machin 2008; Hoewe and Ahern 2017). Media \r\ncoverage can have far-reaching consequences on policy processes, \r\nbut we know less about its relative importance compared to other \r\npolicy shaping factors (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Liu \r\net al. 2011; Boykoff 2011; Hmielowski et al. 2014). "


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"Popular culture images, science fictions and films of ecological \r\ncatastrophe can dramatically and emotively convey the dangers \r\nof climate change (Bulfin 2017). The overall accuracy of the media \r\ncoverage on climate change has improved from 2005 to 2019 in \r\nthe United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the \r\nUSA (McAllister et al. 2021). Moreover, coverage of climate science \r\nis increasing. One study (MeCCO) has tracked media coverage of \r\nclimate change from over 127 sources from 59 countries in North and \r\nLatin America, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia and Oceania (Boykoff \r\net al. 2021). It shows the number of media science stories in those \r\nsources grew steadily from 47,376 per annum to 86,587 per annum \r\nbetween 2017 and 2021 across print, broadcast, digital media and \r\nentertainment (Boykoff et al. 2021). "


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"However, increasing media coverage does not always lead to more \r\naccurate coverage of climate change mitigation, as it can also spur \r\ndiffusion of misinformation (Boykoff and Yulsman 2013; van der \r\nLinden et al. 2015; Whitmarsh and Corner 2017; Fahy 2018; Painter \r\n2019). In addition, media professionals have at times drawn on the \r\nnorm of representing both sides of a controversy, bearing the risk of \r\nthe disproportionate representation of scepticism of anthropogenic \r\nclimate change despite the convergent agreement in climate science \r\nthat humans contribute to climate change, (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Freudenburg and Muselli 2010; Boykoff 2013; Painter \r\nand Gavin 2016; Tindall et al. 2018; McAllister et al. 2021). This \r\noccurs despite increasing consensus among journalists regarding the \r\nbasic scientific understanding of climate change (Bruggemann and \r\nEngesser 2017). "


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"Accurate transference of the climate science has been undermined \r\nsignificantly by climate change counter-movements, particularly in the \r\nUSA (McCright and Dunlap 2000, 2003; Jacques et al. 2008; Brulle et al. \r\n2012; Boussalis and Coan 2016; Farrell 2016a; Carmichael et al. 2017; \r\nCarmichael and Brulle 2018; Boykoff and Farrell 2019; Almiron and \r\nXifra 2019) in both legacy and new/social media environments through \r\nmisinformation (robust evidence, high agreement) (van der Linden et al. \r\n2017), including about the causes and consequences of climate change \r\n(Brulle 2014; Farrell 2016a; Farrell 2016b; Supran and Oreskes 2017). \r\nMisinformation can rapidly spread through social media (Walter et al. \r\n2018). Together with the proliferation of suspicions of 'fake news' and \r\n'post-truth', some traditional and social media contents have fuelled \r\npolarisation and partisan divides on climate change in many countries "


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"Media is another platform for various actors to present, interpret and \r\nshape debates around climate change and its governance (Tindall \r\net al. 2018). The media coverage of climate change has grown steadily \r\nsince 1980s (O'Neill et al. 2015; Boykoff et al. 2019), but the level \r\nand type of coverage differs over time and from country to country \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement) (Boykoff 2011; Schmidt et al. \r\n2013; Schafer and Schlichting 2014). Media can be a useful conduit \r\nto build public support to accelerate mitigation action, but may also \r\nbe utilised to impede decarbonisation endeavours (Boykoff 2011; \r\nO'Neill et al. 2015; Farrell 2016b; Carmichael et al. 2017; Carmichael \r\nand Brulle 2018). Different media systems in different regions and "


id: e9de768eb078e28503f663073117e594
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"(Feldman et al. 2017; Hornsey et al. 2018), which can further deter \r\ndevelopment of new and ambitious climate policy (Tindall et al. 2018). \r\nFurther, the ideological stance of media also influences the intensity \r\nand content of media coverage, in developed and developing countries \r\nalike (Dotson et al. 2012; Stoddart and Tindall 2015). "


id: 8b03b0e932d66c2e719db38b1722c622
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"These are either formal or informal, profit or non-profit and \r\npublic  or  private  (Avelino and  Wittmayer 2016). For example, \r\ncorporations are formal, private, and for-profit, the state and labour \r\norganisations are  formal, public, and non-profit, and communities \r\nare private, informal, and non-profit. An intermediary sector, crossing \r\nthe boundaries between private and public, for profit and non-profit, \r\nincludes energy cooperatives, not-for-profit energy enterprises, and \r\nthe scientific community (Avelino and Wittmayer 2016). "


id: 37255e66b67c604641ab5723b6b7b328
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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vector_id: 6060
content:
"To address the challenge of climate mitigation, a  range of actors \r\nacross sectors and jurisdictions have created coalitions for climate \r\ngovernance, operating as actor-networks. For example, mitigation \r\npolicies are particularly effective when they are integrated with \r\nco-benefits such as health, biodiversity, and poverty reduction \r\n(Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a). Transnational business and public\u0002private partnerships and initiatives, as well as international cooperation \r\nat the sub-national and city levels are discussed in Chapter 14."


id: 3c6e7690945a5da5542306b3fceefca3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"The decision adopting the Paris Agreement welcomed contributions \r\nof sub-national actors to mobilising and scaling up ambitious \r\nclimate action (see also Chapter 14). They engage in climate relevant \r\nmechanisms, such as the Sustainable Development Goals and the \r\nNew Urban Agenda. Sub-national actors fill a gap in national policies, \r\nparticipate in transnational and sub-national climate governance \r\nnetworks and facilitate learning and exchange among governmental, \r\ncommunity, and private organisations at multiple levels, gathering \r\nknowledge and best practices such as emission inventories and risk \r\nmanagement tools that can be applied in multiple contexts (Kona \r\net al. 2016; Sharifi and Yamagata 2016; Michaelowa and Michaelowa \r\n2017; Warbroek and Hoppe 2017; Bai et al. 2018; Busch et al. 2018; \r\nHsu et al. 2018; Lee and Jung 2018; Marvin et al. 2018; Romero\u0002Lankao et al. 2018b; Urge-Vorsatz and Seto 2018; Amundsen et al. \r\n2018; Heikkinen et al. 2019; Hultman et al. 2020). "


id: 1ea13ee112f040e566f704a65a1b6a72
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Common challenges in reporting climate change exist around the \r\nworld (Schmidt et al. 2013; Schafer and Painter 2021), but particularly \r\nso in the developing countries, due to lower capacities, lack of \r\njournalists' training in complex climate subjects, and lack of access \r\nto clear, timely and understandable climate-related resources and \r\nimages in newsrooms (robust evidence, high agreement) (Harbinson \r\n2006; Shanahan 2009; Broadbent et al. 2016; Luck et al. 2018). \r\nUgandan journalist Patrick Luganda has said, 'Those most at risk from \r\nthe impacts of climate change typically have had access to the least \r\ninformation about it through mass media.' (Boykoff, 2011), indicating \r\nthat information availability and capacity is a manifestation of global \r\nclimate (in)justice."


id: 7def8211cd730b1c619b90f15a671c2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Sub-national climate change policies exist in more than 142 countries \r\nand exemplify the increasing significance of mitigation policy \r\nat  the  sub-national level (Hsu et al. 2018). However, estimations \r\nof the number of sub-national actors pledging voluntary climate \r\naction are challenging and underreporting is a concern (Hsu et al. \r\n2018; Chan and Morrow 2019). As can be seen in Figure 13.3 more \r\nthan 10,500 cities and nearly 250 regions representing more than \r\n2 billion people, factoring for overlaps in population between these \r\njurisdictions, have pledged climate action as of December 2020 (Hsu \r\net al. 2020a). More jurisdictions in Europe and North America have \r\npledged action, but in terms of population almost all regions are \r\nsubstantially engaged in sub-national action."


id: 22b743d771c375d5686a95d66fb38e52
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"In many countries, sub-national actors and networks are a  crucial \r\ncomponent of climate mitigation as they have remit over land\u0002use planning, waste management, infrastructure, housing and \r\ncommunity development, and their jurisdictions are often where the \r\nimpacts of climate change are felt (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nDepending on the legal framework and other institutional constraints, \r\nsub-national actors play crucial roles in developing, delivering \r\nand contesting decarbonisation visions and pathways (Schroeder \r\net al. 2013; Ryan 2015; Abbott et al. 2016; Backstrand et al. 2017; \r\nAmundsen et al. 2018; Fuhr et al. 2018) (Section 13.3.3). "


id: 26a37d50bb109b873a7809b33765b222
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Many of these efforts are organised around transnational or regional \r\nnetworks. For example, a  coalition of 130 sub-national (in other \r\nwords, state, and regional) governments, representing 21% of the \r\nglobal economy and 672 million people, has pledged about 9% \r\nemissions reduction compared to a  base year (CDP 2020). More \r\nthan 10,000 cities, representing more than 10% of the global \r\npopulation, participate in the Global Covenant of Mayors, C40 Cities "


id: 2d09db073ab1c254fd16934cee5edcb5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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vector_id: 4520
content:
"Sub-national actors include organisations, jurisdictions, and \r\nnetworks (e.g.,  a coalition of cities or state authorities). "


id: 4ff6133102a673f06d5e7173c2a2a26
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Figure 13.3 | Sub-national GHG mitigation commitments: Total population by IPCC region. Population of sub-national actors (cities and regions) recording climate \r\naction commitments as captured in the ClimActor dataset. Population calculation considers overlap between City and Regions by only accounting for population once for Cities \r\nand Regions that are nested jurisdictions. Source: adapted with permission from Hsu et al. (2020a) to reflect IPCC AR6 aggregation. Compiled in 2020 from multiple sources \r\nbased on most recent year of data available."


id: 1b794a108d0388dcb2829df56ecde4a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1784
content:
"Sub-national mitigation policies are highlighted below, based on the \r\ntaxonomy of policies in Section 13.6.1: "


id: d5ad5ee39a6e11bdbb90b62e8abd53d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"European Network of Living Labs  - with a  global outreach  - has \r\nestablished a model of open and citizen-centric innovation for policy \r\nmaking. The proliferation of Climate Assemblies at the national and \r\nsub-national level further emphasises the increasing role that citizens \r\ncan play in both innovating and planning for carbon mitigation \r\n(Sandover et al. 2021)."


id: 2484835fb2ef52ed428206a477b8ffe6
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content:
"growing smaller cities in Latin America, Asia and Africa lack \r\ncapacity for urban planning and enforcement (Romero-Lankao \r\net al. 2015; Creutzig 2016)."


id: 8410814378dfb07bae2bbb64d7dc0aef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"State and local authorities are often central to initiating and \r\nimplementing experiments and use an incremental, 'learning by \r\ndoing' governing approach (Bai et al. 2010; Nevens et al. 2013; \r\nCastan Broto and Bulkeley 2013; Mcguirk et al. 2015; Nagorny\u0002Koring and Nochta 2018; Hodson et al. 2018; Peng and Bai 2018; \r\nSmeds and Acuto 2018; Culwick et al. 2019; Sengers et al. 2019). \r\nExperiments relate to technological learning and changes in policies, \r\npractices, services, user behaviour, business models, institutions, and \r\ngovernance (Castan Broto and Bulkeley 2013; Wieczorek et al. 2015; \r\nKivimaa et al. 2017a; Laurent and Pontille 2018; Torrens et al. 2019). "


id: a915b94507bce751066a0a73dcd85214
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Experimentation has contributed to learning, changes in outcomes \r\nwhen implemented, and shifts in the political landscape (Turnheim \r\net al. 2018). Experiments, however, are often isolated and do \r\nnot always result in longer-term, more widespread changes. The \r\ntransformative potential (understood as changes in the fundamental \r\nattributes of natural and human systems, see Annex I: Glossary) of \r\nexperiments is constrained by uncertainty about locally relevant \r\nclimate change solutions and effects; a lack of comprehensive, and \r\nsectorally inclusive national policy frameworks for decarbonisation; \r\nbudgetary and staffing limitations; and a  lack of institutional and \r\npolitical capacity to deliver integrated and planned approaches \r\n(Evans and Karvonen 2014; Mcguirk et al. 2015; Bulkeley et al. \r\n2016; Voytenko et al. 2016; Wittmayer et al. 2016; Webb et al. 2017; \r\nGrandin et al. 2018; Holscher et al. 2018; Nagorny-Koring 2019; \r\nSengers et al. 2019)."


id: c33fa38d58cdaf89314e30c4ad14c666
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Partnerships, such as those among private and public, or \r\ntransnational and sub-national entities, have been found to enable \r\nbetter mitigation results in areas outside direct government control \r\nsuch as residential energy use, emissions from local businesses, or \r\nprivate vehicles (Fenwick et al. 2012; Castan Broto and Bulkeley \r\n2013; Aylett 2014; Hamilton et al. 2014; Bulkeley et al. 2016; \r\nWakabayashi and Arimura 2016; Grandin et al. 2018). Partnerships \r\ntake advantage of investments that match available grants or enable \r\na local energy project, or enhance the scope or impact of mitigation \r\n(Burch et al. 2013). "


id: d646fdecb05fea666f949829bde9e9f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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vector_id: 31225
content:
"limited, there are concerns that implementation challenges persist \r\nwith city level plans, particularly tied to management of initiatives \r\nand engagement of the population (Messori et al. 2020)."


id: 66ab35419dcc7df14ff1917acb40a970
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Institutions and governance processes described in previous section \r\nresult in specific policies, that governments then implement and \r\nthat shape actions of many stakeholders. This section assesses \r\nthe empirical experience with the range of policy instruments \r\navailable to governments with which to shape mitigation outcomes. \r\nSection  13.7 that follows deals with how these instruments are \r\ncombined into packages, and Section 13.9 addresses economy-wide \r\nmeasures and issues."


id: b4cbf43774a76ef3b45bd7d90aa3ddf2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Whether participation in transnational climate initiatives impacts \r\nsub-national governments' achievement on climate mitigation goals \r\nis uncertain. Some find that higher ambition in climate mitigation \r\ncommitments did not translate into greater mitigation (Kona \r\net al. 2016; Hsu et al. 2019). Other studies associate participation in \r\nnetworks with increased solar photovoltaic systems (PV) investment \r\n(Khan and Sovacool 2016; Steffen et al. 2019), and with potential to \r\nachieve carbon emissions reductions per capita in line with a global \r\n2degC scenario (Kona et al. 2016)."


id: 99a7a5f7eb39551ef1c3ea7a3ec681aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
" Many different policy instruments for GHG reduction are in use. \r\nThey fall into a few major categories that share key characteristics. \r\nThis section provides one possible taxonomy of these major types of \r\npolicy instruments, presents a set of criteria for policy evaluation, and \r\nsynthesises the literature on the most common mitigation policies. \r\nThe emphasis is on recent empirical evidence on the performance \r\nof different policy instruments and lessons that can be drawn from \r\nthese experiences. This builds on and enhances the AR5 Chapter 15, \r\nwhich provided a more theoretical treatment of policy instruments \r\nfor mitigation."


id: b05f73bfc5598f465615f977c298b583
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content:
"Reporting networks may attract high-performing actors, suggesting \r\nan artificially high level of cities interested in taking climate \r\naction or piloting solutions (self-selection bias) that may not be \r\neffective elsewhere (van der Heijden 2018). Many studies present \r\na  conservative view of potential mitigation impact because they \r\ndraw upon publicly reported mitigation actions and exclude sub\u0002national actions that are not reported (Kuramochi et al. 2020)."


id: efd9be1b850216df3fda910a041a57fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"In addition to direct mitigation contributions, climate action \r\npartnerships may deliver indirect effects that, while difficult \r\nto quantify, ensure long-term change (Chan et al. 2015). \r\nExperimentation and policy innovation helps to establish best \r\npractices (Hoffmann 2011); set new norms for ambitious climate \r\naction that help build coalitions (Chan et al. 2015; Bernstein and \r\nHoffmann 2018); and translate into knowledge sharing or capacity \r\nbuilding (Lee  and Koski 2012; Hakelberg 2014; Purdon 2015; \r\nAcuto and Rayner 2016). Emergent research explores whether, in \r\naddition to realising outcomes, mitigation initiatives also provide \r\nthe resources, skills and networks that governments and other \r\nstakeholders currently use to target other development goals (Shaw \r\net al. 2014; Wolfram 2016; Wiedenhofer et al. 2018; Amundsen et al. \r\n2018; Heikkinen et al. 2019)."


id: 928d997d0f6912371694affe92471877
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"A large number of policies and policy instruments can affect GHG \r\nemissions and/or sequestration, whether their primary purpose is \r\nclimate change mitigation or not. Consequently, consistent with the \r\napproach in this chapter, this section adopts a broad interpretation to \r\nwhat is considered mitigation policy. Also, the section recognises the \r\nmultiplicity of policies that overlap and interact. "


id: 92752d84edb152e7d45db02b3b79f9f6
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content:
"Environmental policy instruments, including for climate change \r\nmitigation, have long been grouped into three main categories  - \r\n(i) economic instruments, (ii) regulatory instruments, and (iii) other \r\ninstruments  - although the specific terms differ across disciplines \r\nand additional categories are common (Kneese and Schultze 1975; \r\nJaffe and Stavins 1995; Nordhaus 2013; Wurzel et al. 2013). Examples \r\nof common policies in each category are shown in Table 13.1, but this \r\nis not a comprehensive list. Principles of and empirical experience \r\nwith the various instruments are synthesised in Sections 13.6.3 to \r\n13.6.5, international interactions are covered in Section 13.6.6. "


id: 8eb1006a898cfa1c2fb4ab38045ce91
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content:
"combustion. Fossil fuel use is subject to energy taxes in the majority \r\nbut not all jurisdictions, and in some instances, it is subsidised. "


id: f1b7e440d73b3cb344aeb880c7501da7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"An increasing share of global emissions sources is subject to \r\nmitigation policies, though coverage is still incomplete (Eskander and \r\nFankhauser 2020; Nascimento et al. 2021). "


id: f20c49205f0f67a4a2ab9377be11e751
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"The main gaps in current mitigation policy coverage are non-CO2\r\nemissions and CO2 emissions associated with production of industrial \r\nmaterials and chemical feedstocks, which are connected to broader \r\nquestions of shifting to cleaner production systems (Bataille et al. \r\n2018a; Davis et al. 2018). Sequestration policies focus mainly on \r\nforestry and carbon capture and storage (CCS) with limited support \r\nfor other carbon dioxide removal and use options (Geden et al. 2019; \r\nVonhedemann et al. 2020). "


id: 867b39098b166f617fcfd0c87d1a3666
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"While consistent information on global prevalence of policies is not \r\navailable, in G20 countries the use of various policy instruments \r\nhas increased steadily over the past two decades (Nascimento et al. \r\n2021). The share of countries that had mitigation policy instruments \r\nin place rose across all sectoral categories, albeit to different extents \r\nin different sectors and for different policy instruments (Figure 13.4). \r\nAmong G20 countries the electricity and heat generation has the \r\ngreatest number of policies in place, and the agriculture and forestry \r\nsector the fewest (Nascimento et al. 2021). "


id: 23dadfe87cd61526ef502920c63477d9
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content:
"The stringency of mitigation policies varies greatly by country, sector \r\nand policy (Box 13.9). Stringency can be increased through sequential \r\nchanges to policies (Pahle et al. 2018). "


id: ebcddcfc225415e9d44648715c496a68
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vector_id: 34604
content:
"The mix of policies has shifted towards more regulatory instruments \r\nand carbon pricing relative to information policies and voluntary \r\naction (Schmidt and Fleig 2018; Eskander and Fankhauser 2020). "


id: 471fc821151d26c43ab9002654111bf0
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"Estimates of the effective carbon price (as an estimate of overall \r\nstringency across policy instruments) differ greatly between countries \r\nand sectors (World Bank 2021a). Countries with higher overall \r\neffective carbon prices tend to have lower carbon intensity of energy \r\nsupply and lower emissions intensity of the economy, as shown in \r\nan analysis of 42 G20 and OECD countries (OECD 2018). The carbon \r\nprice that prevails under a carbon tax or ETS is not directly a measure \r\nof policy stringency across an economy, as the carbon prices typically \r\nonly cover a share of total emissions, and rebates or free allowance \r\nallocations can limit effectiveness (OECD 2018). At low emissions \r\nprices, mitigation incentives are small; as of April 2021, seventeen "


id: 44f3b3d45be5a27180aa416aa25f5e4c
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"The IEA database, which tracks renewable energy and energy \r\nefficiency policies at the national and sub-national levels for about \r\n160 countries, indicates an average of about 225 new renewable \r\nenergy and energy efficiency policies annually from 2010 through \r\n2019 with a peak in the number of new renewable energy policies in \r\n2011 (IEA 2021). "


id: 44588b567b2d05275d3e601225243cf2
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"Comparing the stringency of policies over time or across jurisdictions is very challenging and there is no single widely accepted metric \r\nor methodology (Compston and Bailey 2016; Burck et al. 2019; Tosun and Schnepf 2020; Fekete et al. 2021). Policies are also assessed \r\nfor their estimated effect on emissions, however, this requires estimation of a counterfactual baseline and isolation of other effects \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 14). Economic instruments can be compared on the basis of their price or cost per tCO2-eq. Even \r\nthat is fraught with complexity in the context of different definitions and estimations for fossil fuel taxes and subsidies. For non-price \r\npolicies an implicit or equivalent carbon price can be estimated. Factors such as the tax treatment of compliance costs can increase \r\ncomplexity. Accounting for the combined effect of overlapping policies presents additional challenges and such estimates are subject \r\nto numerous limitations."


id: 4e51c1f46cac3e4c66642a9f716d4199
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"together several lines of evidence to indicate that mitigation policies \r\nhave had a discernible impact on mitigation for specific countries, \r\nsectors and technologies and led to avoided global emissions to \r\ndate by several billion tonnes CO2-eq annually (medium evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). "


id: c4d805c250597c5a2814eec78e366c35
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"jurisdictions with a carbon pricing policy had a tax rate or allowance \r\nprice less than USD5 per tCO2 (World Bank 2021a). "


id: c922d4ce6398b65c3254b3e9a6701600
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Other policies, such as fossil fuel subsidies, may provide incentives to \r\nincrease emissions thus limiting the effectiveness of the mitigation \r\npolicy (Section 13.6.3.6). Those effects may be complex and difficult \r\nto identify. In most countries trade policy provides an implicit \r\nsubsidy to CO2 emissions (Shapiro 2020). The analysis of emissions \r\nfrom energy use in buildings in Chapter 9 illustrates the factors that \r\nsupport and counteract mitigation policies."


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"Policy evaluation is a  'careful, retrospective assessment of merit, \r\nworth and value of the administration, output and outcomes of \r\ngovernment interventions' (Vedung 2005). The inherent complexity \r\nof climate mitigation policies calls for the application of multiple \r\ncriteria, and reflexiveness of analysis with regard to governments' \r\nand societies' objectives for policies (Huitema et al. 2011)."


id: a2f462ca4583441f7d795f26ce2a8bc7
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"Furthermore, emissions pricing policies encourage reduction of \r\nemissions whose marginal abatement cost is lower than the tax/\r\nallowance price, so they have limited impact on emissions with \r\nhigher abatement costs such as industrial process emissions (Bataille \r\net al. 2018a; Davis et al. 2018). EU ETS emission reductions have \r\nbeen achieved mainly through implementation of low cost measures \r\nsuch as energy efficiency and fuel switching rather than more costly \r\nindustrial process emissions. "


id: 13722a8058131d535e6138af03ebd94d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"Evaluation of climate mitigation policy tends to focus on the \r\nenvironmental effectiveness and economic efficiency or cost\u0002effectiveness of GHG mitigation policies, with distributional \r\nequity sometimes as an additional criterion. In policy design and \r\nimplementation there is rising interest in co-benefits and side\u0002effects of climate policies, as well as institutional requirements for \r\nimplementation and the potential of policies to have transformative \r\neffect on systems. Table 13.2 elaborates. "


id: d1119b03934f13655fa63bd3c4ef2957
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"Estimating the overall effectiveness of mitigation policies is \r\ndifficult because of the need to identify which observed changes \r\nin emissions and their drivers are attributable to policy effort and \r\nwhich to other factors. Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 14 brings "


id: bd5299d1669012dfc7325d1efbe69b0c
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"Not all criteria are applicable to all instruments or in all circumstances \r\nand the relative importance of different criteria depend on the \r\nobjectives in the specific the context. a  given policy instrument \r\nmay score highly on only some assessment criteria. In practice, \r\nthe empirical evidence seldom exists for assessment of a  policy \r\ninstrument across all criteria. "


id: 2c41a764d90908ca8e15ee3682930d0d
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"the addition or subtraction of other policies. In practice, numerous \r\njurisdictions have not increased their tax rates annually and some \r\nscheduled tax increases have not been implemented (Haites \r\net al. 2018). Predictability of future tax rates helps improve economic \r\nperformance (Bosetti and Victor 2011; Brunner et al. 2012). \r\nUncertainty about the future existence of a carbon price can hinder \r\ninvestment (Jotzo et al. 2012) and uncertainty about future price \r\nlevels can increase the resource costs of carbon pricing (Aldy and \r\nArmitage 2020)."


id: 9ed6581f289f1a64ffb2f2986461cce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"Economic instruments, including carbon taxes, emissions trading \r\nsystems (ETS), purchases of emission reduction credits, subsidies for \r\nenergy efficiency, renewables and research and development and \r\nfossil fuel subsidy removal, provide a  financial incentive to reduce \r\nemissions. Pricing instruments, especially ETS and carbon taxes, \r\nhave become more prevalent in recent years (Section 13.6.1). They \r\nhave proven effective in promoting implementation of the low-cost \r\nemissions reductions, and practical experience has driven progress in \r\nmarket mechanism design (robust evidence, high agreement). "


id: 69cbaed7356b44fb0f7ee9c3bacca0f2
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"The most common ETS design  - cap-and-trade  - sets a  limit on \r\naggregate GHG emissions by specified sources, distributes tradable \r\nallowances approximately equal to the limit, and requires regulated \r\nemitters to submit allowances equal to their verified emissions. The \r\nprice of allowances is determined by the market, except in cases \r\nwhere government determined price floors or ceilings apply. "


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"ETSs for GHGs were in place in 38 countries as of April 2021 \r\n(World Bank 2021a). The EU ETS, which covers 30 countries, was \r\nrecently displaced by China's national ETS as the largest. ETSs tend \r\nto cover emissions by large industrial and electricity generating \r\nfacilities.2\r\n Allowance prices as of April 1, 2021 ranged from just \r\nover USD1 to USD50, and coverage between 9% and 80% of the \r\njurisdiction's emissions. "


id: ce22c37cff54770f79fcfb23f3ba17c
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"A carbon tax is a charge on carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases \r\nimposed on specified emitters or products. In practice features such \r\nas exemptions and multiple rates can lead to debate as to whether \r\na specific tax is a carbon tax (Haites 2018). While other taxes can also \r\nreduce emissions by increasing the price of GHG emitting products, \r\nthe result may be inefficient unless the tax rate is proportional to the \r\nemissions intensity. a tax on value of fossil fuels, for example, could \r\nraise the price on natural gas more than the price of coal, and hence \r\nincrease emissions if the resulting substitution towards coal were to \r\noutweigh reductions in energy use. "


id: 705181e2949ff62736854a6a3f815d72
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"Multiple regional pilot ETSs with different designs have been \r\nimplemented in China since 2013 to provide input to the design of \r\na national system that is to become the world's largest ETS (Jotzo \r\net al. 2018; Qian et al. 2018; Stoerk et al. 2019). Assessments have \r\nidentified potential improvements to emissions reporting procedures \r\n(Zhang et al. 2019) and the pilot ETS designs (Deng et al. 2018). China's \r\nnational ETS covering over 2200 heat and power plants with annual \r\nemissions of about 4 GtCO2took effect in 2021 (World Bank 2021a). "


id: 612e7ad5f8a8c79b279a660297070651
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"As of April 2021, 27 carbon taxes had been implemented by national \r\ngovernments, mostly in Europe (World Bank 2021a). Most of the \r\ntaxes apply to fossil fuels used for transportation and heating and \r\ncover between 3% and 79% of the jurisdiction's emissions. Several \r\ncountries also tax F-gases. Tax rates vary widely from less than USD1 \r\nto over USD137 per tCO2-eq. a  few jurisdictions lowered existing \r\nfuel taxes when they implemented the carbon tax, thus reducing the \r\neffective tax rate (OECD 2021a). How the tax revenue is used varies \r\nwidely by jurisdiction. "


id: 7d8aab8e5a063c34c4cf5ed01ebf9ae2
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"All of the ETSs for which data are available have accumulated surplus \r\nallowances which reduces their effectiveness (Haites 2018). Surplus \r\nallowances indicate that the caps set earlier were not stringent \r\nrelative to emissions trends. Most of those ETSs have implemented \r\nmeasures to reduce the surplus including removal/cancellation of \r\nallowances and more rapid reduction of the cap. Several ETSs have \r\nadopted mechanisms to remove excess allowances from the market \r\nwhen supply is abundant and release additional allowances into the \r\nmarket when the supply is limited, such as the EU 'market stability \r\nreserve' (Hepburn et al. 2016; Bruninx et al. 2020). Initial indications \r\nare that this mechanism is at least partially successful in stabilising \r\nprices in response to short term disruptions such as the COVID-19 \r\neconomic shock (Gerlagh et al. 2020; Bocklet et al. 2019). "


id: f83fee457227ee277366a1eb0289f532
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"Carbon taxes tend to garner the least public support among possible \r\nmitigation policy options (Rhodes et al. 2017; Rabe 2018; Maestre\u0002Andres et al. 2019; Criqui et al. 2019) although some regulations also \r\nmeet with opposition (Attari et al. 2009). Policymakers sometimes \r\nuse the revenue to build support for the tax, allocating some to \r\naddress regressivity, to address competitiveness claims by industry, \r\nto reduce the economic cost by lowering existing taxes, and to fund \r\nenvironmental projects (Gavard et al. 2018; Klenert et al. 2018; \r\nLevi et al. 2020). "


id: 779b40aae217a651667d14c24db0a58e
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"Some ETS also include provisions to limit the range of market prices, \r\nmaking them 'hybrids' (Pizer 2002). a price floor assures a minimum \r\nlevel of policy effect if demand for allowances is low relative to the \r\nETS emissions cap. It is usually implemented through a minimum price \r\nat auction, as for example in California's ETS (Borenstein et al. 2019). "


id: 7585b9abd14572ea5cda9fe1e797ee9e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"a  carbon tax generally is higher in countries where it constitutes \r\na large part of the fossil fuel price (Andersson 2019). "


id: ef94131a307bd155d73657f707c859e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"a price ceiling allows the government to issue unlimited additional \r\nallowances at a pre-determined price to limit the maximum cost of \r\nmitigation. Price ceilings have not been activated to date. "


id: 8b16680bdfddf67d8ba5db12728c3eaa
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"Few of the world's carbon prices are at a level consistent with various \r\nestimates of the carbon price needed to meet the Paris Agreement \r\ngoals. In modelling of mitigation pathways that limit warming to \r\n2degC (>50%)(Section  3.6.1) marginal abatement costs of carbon in \r\n2030 are about 60 to 120 USD2015 per tCO2, and about 170 to \r\n290  USD2015 per tCO2 in pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) with no or limited overshoot (Section  3.6). One synthesis \r\nstudy estimates necessary prices at USD40-80 per tCO2 by 2020 \r\n(High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices 2017). Only a  small \r\nminority of carbon pricing schemes in 2021 had prices above USD40 \r\nper tCO2, and all of these were in European jurisdictions (World Bank \r\n2021a). Most carbon pricing systems apply only to some share of \r\nthe total emissions in a jurisdiction, so the headline carbon price is \r\nhigher than the average carbon price that applies across an economy \r\n(World Bank 2021a). "


id: 621adb7789e74f215f333fbb7855b945
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"A carbon tax or GHG ETS increases the prices of emissions intensive \r\ngoods thus creating incentives to reduce emissions (Stavins 2019) for \r\na comparison of a tax and ETS). The principal advantage of a pricing \r\npolicy is that it promotes implementation of low-cost reductions; for \r\na carbon tax, reductions whose cost per tCO2-eq reduced is lower \r\nthan the tax and for an ETS the lowest cost (per tCO2-eq) reductions \r\nsufficient to meet the cap. Both a tax and an ETS can be designed \r\nto limit adverse economic impacts on regulated sources and \r\nemissions leakage."


id: 5d60c0129fe0d3500afaf85fe06e425f
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"The corresponding limitations of pricing policies are that they have \r\nlimited impact on adoption of mitigation measures when decisions \r\nare not sensitive to prices and do not encourage adoption of higher \r\ncost mitigation measures. Their effectiveness in influencing long-term \r\ninvestments depends on the expectation that the policy will continue \r\nand expectations related to future tax rates or allowance prices \r\n(Brunner et al. 2012). Other policies can be used in combination with \r\ncarbon pricing to address these limitations."


id: 475d890791908b7a2d140e827437ad4d
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"The number of pricing policies has increased steadily and covered \r\n21.5% of global GHG emissions in 2020 (World Bank 2021a). Effective \r\ncoverage is lower because virtually all jurisdictions with a  pricing \r\npolicy have other policies that affect some of the same emissions. For \r\nexample, a few jurisdictions reduced existing fuel taxes when they \r\nintroduced their carbon tax thus reducing the effective tax rate, and \r\nmany jurisdictions have two or more pricing policies "


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"There is abundant evidence that carbon pricing policies reduce \r\nemissions. Statistical studies of emissions trends in jurisdictions with \r\nand without carbon pricing find a significant impact after controlling \r\nfor other policies and structural factors (Best et al. 2020; Rafaty et al. \r\n2020). Numerous assessments of specific policies, especially the EU \r\nETS and the British Columbia carbon tax, conclude that most have \r\nreduced emissions (robust evidence, high agreement) (Narassimhan \r\net al. 2018; Haites et al. 2018; Aydin and Esen 2018; Pretis 2019; \r\nAndersson 2019; FSR Climate 2019; Metcalf and Stock 2020; Rafaty \r\net al. 2020; Bayer and Aklin 2020; Diaz et al. 2020; Green 2021; \r\nArimura and Abe 2021). "


id: 4bd1d562987470d8994d758d89fa90a7
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"Economic theory suggests that carbon pricing policies are on the \r\nwhole more cost effective than regulations or subsidies at reducing \r\nemissions (Gugler et al. 2021). Any mitigation policy imposes costs on \r\nthe regulated entities. In some cases entities may be able to recover \r\nsome or all of the costs through higher prices (Neuhoff and Ritz 2019; \r\nCludius et al. 2020). International competition from less stringently \r\nregulated firms limits the ability of emissions-intensive, trade\u0002exposed (EITE) firms to raise their prices. Thus, a unilateral mitigation \r\npolicy creates a risk of adverse economic impacts, including loss of \r\nsales, employment, profits, for such firms and associated emissions \r\nleakage (Section 13.6.6.1)."


id: e722bc87e09c37fcc9cb690d9856cb02
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"Estimating the emission reductions due to a specific policy is difficult \r\ndue to the effects of overlapping policies and exogenous factors such \r\nas fossil fuel price changes and economic conditions. Studies that \r\nattempt to attribute a  share of the reductions achieved to the EU \r\nETS place its contribution at 3-25% (FSR Climate 2019; Bayer and \r\nAklin 2020; Cheze et al. 2020). The relationship between a carbon tax \r\nand the resulting emission reductions is complex and is influenced \r\nby changes in fossil fuel prices, changes in fossil fuel taxes, and other \r\nmitigation policies (Aydin and Esen 2018). But the effectiveness of "


id: cf077cf7c40b45a17aa450c2693fa138
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"Pricing policies can be designed to minimise these risks; free \r\nallowances can be issued to EITE participants in an ETS and taxes \r\ncan provide exemptions or rebates. An extensive ex post literature \r\nfinds no statistically significant adverse impacts on competitiveness \r\nor leakage (13.6.6.1). "


id: 51ede65bdc01aa8afb46186ab6b6742d
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"An ex post analysis of European carbon taxes finds no robust \r\nevidence of a negative effect on employment or GDP growth (Metcalf \r\nand Stock 2020). The British Columbia carbon tax led to a  small \r\nnet increase in employment (Yamazaki 2017) with no significant \r\nnegative impacts on GDP possibly due to full recycling of the tax \r\nrevenue (Bernard and Kichian 2021). Few carbon taxes apply to EITE \r\nsources (Timilsina 2018), so competitiveness impacts usually are not \r\na particular concern. "


id: 268ef781656f57a38f72ce3d24e39dda
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"Carbon pricing, especially an ETS that covers industrial sources, \r\nstimulates technological change by participants and others (Calel \r\nand Dechezlepretre 2016; FSR Climate 2019; van den Bergh and \r\nSavin 2021) (Section 13.6.6.3 and Chapter 16). The purpose of pricing \r\npolicies is to encourage implementation of the lowest cost mitigation \r\nmeasures. Pricing policies therefore are more likely to stimulate \r\nquick, low cost innovation such as fuel switching and energy \r\nefficiency, rather than long term, costly technology development \r\nsuch as renewable energy or industrial process technologies (Calel \r\n2020; Lilliestam et al. 2021). To encourage long-term technology \r\ndevelopment carbon pricing policies need to be complemented by \r\nother mitigation and research and development (R&D) policies. "


id: cfa58a0af0d02a3a41451372b36a300a
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"Government revenue generated by carbon pricing policies globally \r\nwas approximately 53 billion USD in 2020 split almost evenly \r\nbetween carbon taxes and ETS allowance sales (World Bank 2021). \r\nRevenue raised though carbon pricing is generally considered \r\na relatively efficient form of taxation and a large share of revenue \r\nenters general government budgets (Postic and Fetet 2020). Some of \r\nthe revenue is returned to emitters or earmarked for environmental \r\npurposes. Allowance allocation and revenue spending measures have \r\nbeen used to create public support for many carbon pricing policies \r\nincluding at every major reform stage of the EU ETS (Klenert et al. \r\n2018; Dorsch et al. 2020) (Box 5.11)."


id: 5bbd3de27f8bdf110e50d8029c7e9a83
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"Offset credits are voluntary GHG emission reductions for which \r\ntradable credits are issued by a  supervisory body (Michaelowa \r\net al. 2019b). a buyer can use purchased credits to offset an equal \r\nquantity of its emissions. In a voluntary market governments, firms \r\nand individuals purchase credits to offset emissions generated by \r\ntheir actions, such as air travel. a compliance market al.ows specified \r\noffset credits to be used for compliance with mitigation policies, \r\nespecially ETSs, carbon taxes and low-carbon fuel standards. (Newell \r\net al. 2013; Bento et al. 2016; Michaelowa et al. 2019a)."


id: defa256f447de2bcd488e595803e2ef2
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"When used for compliance, governments typically specify \r\na maximum quantity of offset credits that can be used, as well as \r\nthe types of emission reduction actions, the project start dates and \r\nthe geographic regions eligible credits. Initially, the EU ETS, Swiss \r\nETS and New Zealand ETS accepted credits issued under the Kyoto \r\nProtocol (Chapter 14), but they terminated or severely constrained \r\nthe quantity of international credits allowed for compliance use after \r\n2014 (Shishlov et al. 2016) (Section 13.6.6). "


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"A key question for any offset credit is whether the emission \r\nreductions are 'additional': reductions that only happen because of \r\nthe offset credit payment (Greiner and Michaelowa 2003; Millard\u0002Ball and Ortolano 2010; van Benthem and Kerr 2013; Burke 2016; \r\nBento et al. 2016). To assess additionality and to determine the \r\nquantity of credits to be issued, regulators develop methodologies \r\nto estimate baseline (business-as-usual) emissions in the absence of \r\noffset payments (Newell et al. 2013; Bento et al. 2016). Credits are \r\nissued for the difference between the baseline and actual emissions \r\nwith adjustments for possible emissions increases outside the project \r\nboundary (Rosendahl and Strand 2011). Some research suggests that \r\nprocedural and measurement advances can significantly reduce the \r\nrisk of severe non-additionality (Mason and Plantinga 2013; Bento \r\net al. 2016; Michaelowa et al. 2019a). "


id: e523c6863276517c8244940ee13c157a
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content:
"Carbon taxes on fossil fuels have effects similar to the removal of \r\nfossil fuel subsidies (Ohlendorf et al. 2021) (Section 13.6.3.6). Even \r\nif a carbon tax is progressive it increases prices for fuels, electricity, \r\ntransport, food and other goods and services that adversely affect \r\nthe most economically vulnerable. Redistribution of tax revenue \r\nis critical to address the adverse impacts on low-income groups \r\n(Dorband et al. 2019) (Box 5.11). In countries with a limited capacity \r\nto collect taxes and distribute revenues to low-income households, \r\nsuch as some developing countries, carbon taxes may have greater \r\ndistributional consequences."


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"Distributional effects have generally not been a significant issue for \r\nETSs. Equity for industrial participants typically is addressed through \r\nfree allocation of allowances. Impacts on household incomes, \r\nwith the exception of electricity prices, are too small or indirect to \r\nbe a  concern. Some systems are designed to limit electricity price \r\nincreases (Petek 2020) or use some revenue for bill assistance to low\u0002income households (RGGI 2019). "


id: 60680729410df430903b7ea4e7bf63be
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content:
"Subsidies for mitigation encourage individuals and firms to invest \r\nin assets that reduce emissions, changes in processes or innovation. \r\nSubsidies have been used to improve energy efficiency, encourage \r\nthe uptake of renewable energy and other sector-specific emissions "


id: ac1caa4f84aaca4ad038d7ab9b428669
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"much of it in the form of feed-in tariffs in Germany, enabled the \r\nscaling up of the global solar photovoltaic industry and attendant \r\nlarge reductions in production costs that by 2020 made solar power \r\ncost competitive with fossil fuels (Buchholz et al. 2019). There is also \r\nevidence for increased innovation activity as a result of solar feed-in \r\ntariffs (Bohringer et al. 2017b). "


id: 896357e982f1bd8567b457aef1af538d
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"saving options (Chapters  6 to 11), and to promote innovation. \r\nTargeted subsidies can achieve specific mitigation goals yet have \r\nintrinsically narrower coverage than more broad-based pricing \r\ninstruments. Subsidies are often used not only to achieve emissions \r\nreductions but to address market imperfections or to achieve \r\ndistributional or strategic objectives. Subsidies are often used \r\nalongside or in combination with other policy instruments, and are \r\nprovided at widely differing cost per unit of emissions reduced. "


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"Many governments have also provided subsidies for the purchase \r\nof electric vehicles, including with strong effect in China (Ma et al. \r\n2017), Norway (Baldursson et al. 2021) and other countries, and \r\nsometimes at relatively high rates (Kong and Hardman 2019)."


id: e87795751551168c6881451bd64df8d0
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"Governments routinely provide direct funding for basic research, \r\nsubsidies for R&D to private companies, and co-funding of research and \r\ndeployment with industry (Dzonzi-Undi and Li 2016). Research \r\nsubsidies have been found to be positively correlated with green \r\nproduct innovation in a  study in Germany, Switzerland and Austria \r\n(Stucki et al. 2018). Government subsidies for R&D have been found to \r\ngreatly increase the green innovation performance of energy intensive \r\nfirms in China (Bai et al. 2019). For more detail see Chapter 16. "


id: 893f08476603525ca37cefc3ca2d3011
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"Many governments subsidise fossil fuel consumption and/or \r\nproduction through a variety of mechanisms (Burniaux and Chateau \r\n2014) (Figure  13.5). Different approaches exist to defining the \r\nscope and estimating the magnitude of fossil fuel subsidies (Koplow \r\n2018), and all involve estimates, so the magnitudes are uncertain. \r\nRationalising inefficient fossil fuel subsidies is one of the indicators to \r\nmeasure progress toward Sustainable Development Goal 12: Ensure \r\nsustainable consumption and production patterns (UNEP 2019a). "


id: c71374653f2d25a5f74e05647351c429
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"Subsidies of different forms are often provided for emissions savings \r\ninvestments to businesses and for the retrofit of buildings for energy \r\nefficiency. Emissions reductions from energy efficiencies can often \r\nbe achieved at low cost, but evidence for some schemes suggests \r\nlower effectiveness in emissions reductions than expected ex ante\r\n(Fowlie et al. 2018; Valentova et al. 2019). Tax credits can be used to \r\nencourage firms to produce or invest in low-carbon emission energy \r\nand low-emission equipment. Investment subsidies have been found \r\nto be more effective in reducing costs and uncertainties in solar \r\nenergy technologies than production subsidies (Flowers et al. 2016). "


id: 999476ea1991aae1a74b2c20d903ec6e
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"Consumption subsidies represent approximately 70% of the total. \r\nMost of the subsidies go to petroleum, which accounts for roughly \r\n50% of the consumption subsidies and 75% of the production \r\nsubsidies (IEA 2020; OECD 2020). Much of the variation in the \r\nconsumption subsidies is due to fluctuations in the world price of oil \r\nwhich is used as the reference price. "


id: bb113a7417769f932958277c6283e7f3
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"Subsidies have been provided extensively and in many countries for \r\nthe deployment of household rooftop solar systems, and increasingly \r\nalso for commercial scale renewable energy projects, typically using \r\n'feed-in tariffs' that provide a payment for electricity generated above \r\nthe market price (Pyrgou et al. 2016). Such schemes have  proven \r\neffective in deploying renewable energy, but lock-in subsidies for long \r\nperiods of time. In some cases they provide subsidies at higher levels \r\nthan would be required to motivate deployment (del Rio and Linares \r\n2014). High levels of net subsidies have been shown to diminish \r\nincentives for optimal siting of renewable energy installations \r\n(Penasco et al. 2019)."


id: 29d19d01e56b323583c04aa3c9668e52
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"A variant of subsidies for deployment of renewable energy are \r\nauctioned feed-in tariffs or auctioned contracts-for-difference, where \r\ncommercial providers bid in a competitive process. Auctions typically \r\nlead to lower price premiums (Eberhard and Kaberger 2016; Roberts \r\n2020) but efficient outcomes depend on auction design and market \r\nstructure (Grashof et al. 2020), although an emergent literature also \r\nquestions whether spread of auctions is due to performance or the \r\ndynamics of the policy formulation process (Fitch-Roy et al. 2019b; \r\nGrashof et al. 2020; Grashof 2021). The prequalification requirements \r\nor the assessment criteria in the auctions sometimes also include \r\nlocal co-benefits such as local economic diversification (Buckman \r\net al. 2019; White et al. 2021)."


id: a92528ab5849a07203fb66f4ff65aa72
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"The emissions reduction that could be achieved from fossil fuel subsidy \r\nremoval depends on the specific context such as magnitude and nature \r\nof subsidies, energy prices and demand elasticities, and how the fiscal \r\nsavings from reduced subsidies are used. Modelling studies of global \r\nfossil fuel subsidy removal result in projected emission reductions \r\nof between 1% and 10% by 2030 (Delpiazzo et al. 2015; IEA 2015; \r\nJewell et al. 2018; IISD 2019) and between 6.4% and 8.2% by 2050 \r\n(Schwanitz et al. 2014; Burniaux and Chateau 2014). "


id: a82fc0c7e8e886c65f5562311b6a1a2e
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"Support for rollout clean technologies at high prices can be \r\neconomically beneficial in the long run if costs are reduced greatly \r\nas a function of deployment (Newbery 2018). Deployment support, "


id: 30b8b66150219dcd458dc82a4b6ebe3e
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"An extensive literature documents the difficulties of phasing out \r\nfossil fuel subsidies (Schmidt et al. 2017; Gass and Echeverria 2017; \r\nSkovgaard and van Asselt 2018; Kyle 2018; Perry 2020; Gencsu et al. \r\n2020). Fossil fuel industries lobby to maintain producer subsidies and \r\nconsumers protest if they are adversely affected by subsidy reductions \r\n(Fouquet 2016; Coxhead and Grainger 2018). Yemen (2005 and 2014), \r\nCameroon (2008), Bolivia (2010), Nigeria (2012), Ecuador (2019) \r\nall abandoned subsidy reform attempts following public protests \r\n(Rentschler and Bazilian 2017; Mahdavi et al. 2020). Indonesia is an \r\nexample where fossil fuel subsidy removal was successful, helped by \r\nsocial assistance programmes and a communication effort about the \r\nbenefits of reform (Chelminski 2018; Burke and Kurniawati 2018). \r\nTo-date instances of fossil fuel subsidy reform or removal have \r\nbeen driven largely by national fiscal and economic considerations \r\n(Skovgaard and van Asselt 2019)."


id: 67b28b433afd177384ccf8c7774fd641
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"Performance standards grant regulated entities freedom to choose \r\nthe technologies and methods to reach a general objective, such as \r\na minimum market share of zero-emission vehicles or of renewable \r\nelectricity, or a maximum emissions intensity of electricity generated. \r\nTradable performance standards allow regulated entities to trade \r\ncompliance achievement credits; under-performers can buy surplus \r\ncredits from over-performers thereby reducing the aggregate cost of \r\ncompliance (Fischer 2008)."


id: 1c98a339471dad6959cd6c60006e2162
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"Tradable performance standards have been applied to numerous \r\nsectors including electricity generation, personal vehicles, building \r\nenergy efficiency, appliances, and large industry. An important \r\napplication is Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) for electricity \r\nsupply, which require that a  minimum percentage of electricity is \r\ngenerated from specified renewable sources sometimes including \r\nnuclear and fossil fuels with CCS when referred to as a clean electricity \r\nstandard (Young and Bistline 2018) (Chapter 6). This creates a price \r\nincentive to invest in renewable generation capacity. Such incentives \r\ncan equivalently be created through feed-in tariffs, a form of subsidy \r\n(Section 13.6.3) and some jurisdictions have had both instruments \r\n(Matsumoto et al. 2017). RPS can differ in features and stringency, \r\nand are in operation in many countries and sub-national jurisdictions, \r\nincluding a majority of US states (Carley et al. 2018). "


id: abacc36a4e2abbead69c623cbd888861
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"Regulatory instruments are applied by governments to cause the \r\nadoption of desired processes, technologies, products (including \r\nenergy products) or outcomes (including emission levels). Failure to \r\ncomply incurs financial penalties and/or legal sanctions. Regulatory \r\ninstruments range from performance standards, which prescribe \r\ncompliance outcomes - and in some cases allow flexibility to achieve \r\ncompliance, including the trading of credits  - to more prescriptive \r\ntechnology-specific standards, also known as command-and-control \r\nregulation. Regulatory instruments play an important role to achieve \r\nspecific mitigation outcomes in sectoral applications (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Mitigation by regulation often enjoys greater political \r\nsupport but tends to be more economically costly than mitigation by \r\npricing instruments (robust evidence, medium agreement)."


id: f81af0d1433f5757a9811051e56d4fea
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"Vehicle emissions standards are a  common form of performance \r\nstandard with flexibility (Chapter  9). a  corporate fuel efficiency \r\nstandard specifies an average energy use and/or GHG emissions \r\nper kilometre travelled for vehicles sold by a manufacturer. Another \r\nversion of this policy, the zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) standard, \r\nrequires vehicle sellers to achieve minimum requirements for sales "


id: 2c365c484d5239be03275cd79b70d6dc
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"(Raff and Walter 2020). Furthermore, standards may require high\u0002cost GHG reductions in one sector while missing low-cost options \r\nin another sector. Technology standards can also stifle innovation by \r\nblocking alternative technologies from entering the market (Sachs \r\n2012). Benefits of technology standards include their potential to \r\nachieve emission reductions in a  relatively short time frame and \r\nthat their effectiveness can be estimated with some confidence \r\n(Montgomery et al. 2019). "


id: 33c7e80973c6bf7612b319ed933c05c2
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"of zero-emission vehicles (Bhardwaj et al. 2020). Both instruments \r\nallow manufacturers to use tradable credits to achieve compliance. "


id: 42e83b5dbdaa25717dd8a16ceb2871d4
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"Low-carbon fuel standards (LCFS), which set an average life-cycle \r\ncarbon intensity for energy that declines over time, are another \r\nexample. LCFS are in place in many different jurisdictions (Chapter 9) \r\nand have been applied to petroleum products, natural gas, hydrogen \r\nand electricity (Yeh et al. 2016). An LCFS allows regulated entities \r\nto trade credits creating the potential for high carbon intensity fuel \r\nsuppliers to cross-subsidise low-carbon intensity transport energy \r\nproviders including low-carbon biofuels, hydrogen and electricity \r\n(Axsen et al. 2020). "


id: e9bb4d4e8ea335c6560d16a9b0f6e1ae
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"Regulatory policy instruments tend to be more economically costly \r\nthan pricing instruments, as explained above. However, regulatory \r\npolicies may be preferred for other reasons."


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"Trading and other flexibility mechanisms improve the economic \r\nefficiency of standards by harmonising the marginal abatement \r\ncosts among companies or installations subject to the standard. \r\nNevertheless tradable performance standards are less economically \r\nefficient in achieving emissions reductions than carbon pricing, \r\nsometimes by a significant amount (Giraudet and Quirion 2008; Chen \r\net al. 2014; Holland et al. 2015; Fox et al. 2017; Zhang et al. 2018)."


id: e703b4cd7eb0b97d3ba6fab97a13b647
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"In some cases, regulatory policy can elicit greater political support \r\nthan pricing policy (Tobler et al. 2012; Lam 2015; Drews and van \r\nden Bergh 2016). For example, USA citizens have expressed more \r\nsupport for flexible regulation like the RPS than for carbon taxes \r\n(Rabe 2018). And a survey in British Columbia a few years after the \r\nsimultaneous implementation of a carbon tax and two regulations - \r\nthe LCFS and a clean electricity standard - found much less strong \r\nopposition to the regulations, even after being informed that they \r\nwere costlier to consumers (Rhodes et al. 2017). The degree of public \r\nsupport for regulations depends, however, on the type of regulation, \r\nas outright technology prohibitions can be unpopular (Attari et al. \r\n2009; Cherry et al. 2012)."


id: 703e6c82d49cd9a07361e660d1f36ec8
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"Technology standards take a more prescriptive approach by requiring \r\na  specific technology, process or product. They typically take one \r\nof three forms: requirements for specific pollution abatement \r\ntechnologies; requirements for specific production methods; or \r\nrequirements for specific goods such as energy efficient appliances. \r\nThey can also take the form of phase-out mandates, as applied for \r\nexample to planned bans of internal combustion engines for road \r\ntransport (Bhagavathy and McCulloch 2020), coal use; for example, \r\nGermany's decisions to phase out coal (Oei et al. 2020), and some \r\nindustry processes and products, for example, hydrofluorocarbons \r\n(HFCs) and use of sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) in some products (see \r\nBox 13.10 on non-CO2 gases). Technology standards are also referred \r\nto as command-and-control standards, prescriptive standards, or \r\ndesign standards. "


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"In comparison to economic instruments, regulatory policies tend to \r\ncause greater cost of living increases in percentage terms for lower \r\nincome consumers - called policy regressivity (Levinson 2019; Davis \r\nand Knittel 2019). And unlike carbon taxes, regulations do not generate \r\nrevenues that can be used to compensate lower income groups."


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"A renewable energy procurement obligation in South Africa \r\nsuccessfully required local hiring with perceived positive results \r\n(Walwyn and Brent 2015; Pahle et al. 2016), a  clean energy \r\nregulation in Korea was perceived to provide greater employment \r\nopportunities (Lee 2017), and a UK obligation on energy companies \r\nto provide energy retrofits to low-income households improved \r\nenergy affordability according to participants (Elsharkawy and \r\nRutherford 2018). "


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"Technology standards are a common climate policy particularly at the \r\nsector level (Chapters 6-11). Technology standards tend to score lower \r\nin terms of economic efficiency than carbon pricing and performance \r\nstandards (Besanko 1987). But they may be the best instrument for \r\nsituations where decisions are not very responsive to price signals \r\nsuch as consumer choices related to energy efficiency and recycling \r\nand decisions relating to urban land use and infrastructure choices. "


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"From an energy system transformation perspective, technology \r\nstandards, including phase-out mandates, have particular promise \r\nto achieve profound change in specific sectors and technologies \r\n(Tvinnereim and Mehling 2018). As such policies change the \r\ntechnologies available in the market, then economic instruments can \r\nalso have a greater effect (Pahle et al. 2018). "


id: 9b558dcaf045b6090a1811c773b99819
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"Non-CO2 gases weighted by their 100-year GWPs represent approximately 25% of global GHG emissions, of which methane (CH4) \r\naccounts for 18%, nitrous oxide (N2O) 4%, and fluorinated gases (HFCs, PFCs, SF6 and NF3) 2% (Minx et al. 2021). Only a small share \r\nof these emissions are subject to mitigation policies. "


id: 539cfe2d36c321f191ed46931293a1eb
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"Methane (CH4). Anthropogenic sources include agriculture, mainly livestock and rice paddies, fossil fuel extraction and processing, \r\nfuel combustion, some industrial processes, landfills, and wastewater treatment (EPA 2019). Atmospheric measurements indicate that \r\nmethane emissions from fossil fuel production are larger than shown in emissions inventories (Schwietzke et al. 2016). Only a small \r\nfraction of global CH4 emissions is regulated. Mitigation policies focus on landfills, coal mines, and oil and gas operations. "


id: 4653b2ad71402a90c5da966814fea451
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"Regulations and incentives to capture and utilise methane from coal seams came into effect in China in 2010 (Tan 2018; Tao et al. \r\n2019). Inventory data suggest that emissions peaked and began a slow decline after 2010 (Gao et al. 2020) though satellite data \r\nindicate that China's methane emissions, largely attributable to coal mining, continued to rise in line with pre-2010 trends (Miller et al. \r\n2019). Methane emissions from sources including agriculture, waste and industry are included in some offset credit schemes, including \r\nthe CDM and at national level in Australia's Emissions Reductions Fund (Australian Climate Change Authority 2017) and the Chinese \r\nCertified Emission Reduction (CCER) scheme (Lo and Cong 2017). "


id: 73881cb1a6084b4ca9fd55f9b3849a06
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"Nitrous oxide (N2O). N2O emissions are produced by agricultural soil management, livestock waste management, fossil \r\nfuel combustion, and adipic acid and nitric acid production (EPA 2019). Most N2O emissions are not regulated and global emissions \r\nhave been increasing. N2O emissions by adipic and nitric acid plants in the EU are covered by the ETS (Winiwarter et al. 2018). \r\nN2O  emissions are included in some offset schemes. China, the United States, Singapore, Egypt, and Russia produce 86% of \r\nindustrial N2O emissions offering the potential for targeted mitigation action (EPA 2019)."


id: 3fa45a19db3a0118fbcef51616a2523
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"Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Most HFCs are used as substitutes for ozone depleting substances. The Kigali Amendment (KA) to \r\nthe Montreal Protocol will reduce HFC use by 85% by 2047 (UN Environment 2018). To help meet their KA commitments developed \r\ncountry parties have been implementing regulations to limit imports, production and exports of HFCs and to limit specific uses of HFCs. "


id: 58232d0d64c5afb6e590e8f55971b752
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"The EU, for example, issues tradable quota for imports, production and exports of HFCs. Prices of HFCs have increased as expected \r\n(Kleinschmidt 2020) which has led to smuggling of HFCs into the EU (European Commission 2019b). HFC use has been slightly (1-6%) \r\nbelow the limit each year from 2015 through 2018 (EEA 2019). China and India released national cooling action plans in 2019, laying \r\nout detailed, cross-sectoral plans to provide sustainable, climate friendly, safe and affordable cooling (Dean et al. 2020). "


id: 42a51c344c695f1e5ca8b16a67902a11
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"Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3). With the exception of SF6, these gases are \r\nemitted by industrial activities located in the European Economic Area (EEA) and a limited number (fewer than 30) of other countries. \r\nRegulations in Europe, Japan and the USA focus on leak reduction as well as collection and reuse of SF6 from electrical equipment. \r\nOther uses of SF6 are banned in Europe (European Union 2014). "


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"PFCs are generated during the aluminium smelting process if the alumina level in the electrolytic bath falls below critical levels (EPA \r\n2019). In Europe these emissions are covered by the EU ETS. The industry is eliminating the emissions through improved process \r\ncontrol and a shift to different production processes. "


id: 9027f8bfaa7107e7ba0df61a9cf8c55a
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"The semiconductor industry uses HFCs, PFCs, SF6 and NF3 for etching and deposition chamber cleaning (EPA 2019) and has a voluntary \r\ntarget of reducing GHG emissions 30% from 2010 by 2020 (World Semiconductor Council 2017). Europe regulates production, import, \r\nexport, destruction and feedstock use of PFCs and SF6, but not NF3 (EEA 2019). In addition, fluorinated gases are taxed in Denmark, \r\nNorway, Slovenia and Spain."


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"In some jurisdictions, public administrations are required to apply a shadow cost of carbon to regulatory analysis. "


id: b2ac1a9bf4b1b8321fb0f70c37264494
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"Traditionally, for example in widespread application in the United States, the shadow cost of carbon is calibrated to an estimate of the \r\nsocial cost of carbon as an approximation of expected future cumulative economic damage from a unit of greenhouse gas emissions \r\n(Metcalf and Stock 2017). Social cost of carbon is usually estimated using integrated assessment models and is subject to fundamental \r\nuncertainties (Pezzey 2019). An alternative approach, used for example in regulatory analysis in the United Kingdom since 2009, is \r\nto define a carbon price that is thought to be consistent with a particular targeted emissions outcome. This approach also requires \r\na number of assumptions, including about future marginal costs of mitigation (Aldy et al. 2021). "


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"not (Stadelmann and Schubert 2018). Information policies can also \r\nsupport the changing of social norms about consumption choices, \r\nwhich have been shown to raise public support for pricing and \r\nregulatory policy instruments (Gossling et al. 2020)."


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"In some jurisdictions, the analysis of regulatory instruments is subject \r\nto an assessment on the basis of a shadow cost of carbon, which \r\ncan influence the choice and design of regulations that affect GHG \r\nemissions (Box 13.11). "


id: 2a18c6f1002dd2a6bfe3a09143ad2e0e
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"Energy audits provide tailored information about potential energy \r\nsavings and benchmarking of best practices through a network of \r\npeers. Typical examples include the United States Better Buildings \r\nChallenge that has provided energy audits to support USA commercial \r\nand industrial building owners, energy savings have been estimated \r\nat 18% to 30% (Asensio and Delmas 2017); and Germany's energy \r\naudit scheme for SMEs achieving reductions in energy consumption \r\nof 5-70% (Kluczek and Olszewski 2017)."


id: f472b25583378c0290ed22acb1fe45de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"A range of other mitigation policy instruments are in use, often \r\nplaying a complementary role to pricing and standards."


id: e80ced235e5921fc224410d9fa486940
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Effective climate change mitigation can cause economic and social \r\ndisruption where there is transformative change, such as changes \r\nin energy systems away from fossil fuels (Section 13.9). Transitional \r\nassistance policies can be aimed to ameliorate effects on consumers, \r\nworkers, communities, corporations or countries (Green and Gambhir \r\n2020) in order to create broad coalitions of supporters or to limit \r\nopposition (Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017). "


id: e577f504495fb79d385597a615e1a0eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"Consumption-oriented policy instruments seek to reduce GHG \r\nemissions by changing consumer behaviour directly, via retailers \r\nor via the supply chain. Aspects that hold promise are technology \r\nlists, supply chain procurement by leading retailers or business \r\nassociations, a  carbon-intensive materials charge and selected \r\ninfrastructure improvements (Grubb et al. 2020)."


id: 1ccdea5e6f7dd01d11a1b714c5bd7410
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"The information provided to consumers in labelling programmes is \r\noften not detailed enough to yield best possible results (Davis and \r\nMetcalf 2016). Providing information about running costs tends to be \r\nmore effective than providing data on energy use (Damigos et al. 2020). \r\nSound implementation of labelling programmes requires appropriate \r\ncalculation methodology and tools, training and public awareness \r\n(Liang Wong and Kruger 2017). In systems where manufacturers self\u0002report performance of their products, there tends to be misreporting \r\nand skewed energy efficiency labelling (Goeschl 2019)."


id: e6ae37cae6f639d4e0ff7e53764a17f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Information programmes, including energy efficiency labels, energy \r\naudits, certification, carbon labelling and information disclosure, are \r\nin wide use in particular for energy consumption. They can reduce \r\nGHG emissions by promoting voluntary technology choices and \r\nbehavioural changes by firms and households. "


id: ce5e159e700b3b92b80bfc9c3aef7229
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Energy efficiency labelling is in widespread use, including for \r\nbuildings, and for end users products including cars and appliances. \r\nCarbon labelling is used for example for food (Camilleri et al. 2019) \r\nand tourism (Gossling and Buckley 2016). Information measures also \r\ninclude specific information systems such as smart electricity meters \r\n(Zangheri et al. 2019). Chapters 5 and 9 provide detail."


id: 41125748136746e2b1caed73f136972f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"A new form of information programmes are financial accounting \r\nstandards as frameworks to encourage or require companies to \r\ndisclose how the transition risks from shifting to a  low-carbon \r\neconomy and physical climate change impacts may affect their \r\nbusiness or asset values (Chapter  15). The most prominent such \r\nstandard was issued in 2017 by the Financial Stability Board's Task \r\nForce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. It has found rapid \r\nuptake among regulators and investors (O'Dwyer and Unerman 2020). "


id: 75a5e384bed6d32abd2793bee356cf42
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content:
"Information programmes can correct for a range of market failures \r\nrelated to imperfect information and consumer perceptions (Allcott \r\n2016). Alongside mandatory standards (13.6.4), information \r\nprogrammes can nudge firms and consumers to focus on often \r\noverlooked operating cost reductions (Carroll et al. 2022). For \r\nexample, consumers who are shown energy efficiency labels on \r\naverage buy more energy efficient appliances than those who are "


id: 95ca80c2f204010a4592bcf4e11c0260
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Traditionally, corporate reporting has treated climate risks in a highly \r\nvaried and often minimal way (Foerster et al. 2017). Disclosure of \r\nclimate-related risks creates incentives for companies to improve "


id: 7d0809b94be0949f53d79ab67b54b3d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Government provision can also play an important role in economic \r\nstimulus programs, including as implemented in response to the \r\npandemic of 2020-2021. Such programmes can support low\u0002emissions infrastructure and equipment, and industrial or business \r\ndevelopment (Elkerbout et al. 2020; Hainsch et al. 2020; Barbier \r\n2020; Hepburn et al. 2020). "


id: f8ade8b3c13332d8d8f87769d492a23a
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content:
"their carbon and climate change exposure, and ultimately regulatory \r\nstandards for climate risk (Eccles and Krzus 2018). Disclosure can \r\nalso reinforce calls for divestment in fossil fuel assets predominantly \r\npromoted by civil society organisations (Ayling and Gunningham \r\n2017), raising moral principles and arguments about the financial risks \r\ninherent in fossil fuel investments (Green 2018; Blondeel et al. 2019)."


id: 9c6e18b71b89ca988b3c0462b935f717
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"National, sub-national and local governments determine many \r\naspects of infrastructure planning, fund investment in areas such \r\nas energy, transport and the built environment, and purchase \r\ngoods and services, including for government administration and \r\nmilitary provisioning. "


id: 959aa27b978250b19c299ec63a40504b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Voluntary Agreements result from negotiations between \r\ngovernments and industrial sectors that commit to achieve agreed \r\ngoals (Mundaca and Markandya 2016). When used as part of \r\na broader policy framework, they can enhance the cost effectiveness \r\nof individual firms in attaining emission reductions while pricing \r\nor regulations drive participation in the agreement (Dawson and \r\nSegerson 2008). "


id: 88357e4c6cad770f94d19c706591f7a6
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content:
"Public procurement rules usually mandate cost effectiveness but only \r\nin some cases allow or mandate climate change consideration in public \r\npurchasing, for example in EU public purchasing guidelines (Martinez \r\nRomera and Caranta 2017). Green procurement for buildings has \r\nbeen undertaken in Malaysia (Bohari et al. 2017). a  paper cites \r\nTaiwan (province of China) green public procurement law, which has \r\ncontributed to reduced emissions intensity (Tsai 2017). In practice, \r\nawareness and knowledge of 'green' public procurement techniques \r\nand procedures is decisive for climate-friendly procurement (Testa \r\net al. 2016). Experiences in low-carbon infrastructure procurement \r\npoint to procedures being tailored to concerns about competition, \r\ntransaction costs and innovation (Kadefors et al. 2020)."


id: 8d0262af3b27d8b3c1bf3232545c574c
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content:
"Public voluntary programmes, where a  government regulator \r\ndevelops programs to which industries and firms may choose to \r\nparticipate on a voluntary basis, have been implemented in numerous \r\ncountries. For example, the United States Environmental Protection \r\nAgency introduced numerous voluntary programmes with industry to \r\noffer technical support in promoting energy efficiency and emissions \r\nreductions, among other initiatives (EPA 2017). a European example \r\nis the EU Ecolabel Award programme (European Commission 2020b). \r\nAgreements for industrial energy efficiency in Europe (Cornelis 2019) \r\nand Japan (Wakabayashi and Arimura 2016) have been particularly \r\neffective in addressing information barriers and for smaller \r\ncompanies. The International Civil Aviation Organization's CORSIA \r\nscheme (Prussi et al. 2021) is an example of an international industry\u0002based public voluntary programme."


id: 9cf7339da0244fb1209d1c33d80c4a88
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content:
"Infrastructure investment decisions lock-in high or low emissions \r\ntrajectories over long periods. Low-emissions infrastructure can \r\nenable or increase productivity of private low-carbon investments \r\n(Jaumotte et al. 2021) and is typically only a little more expensive \r\nover its lifetime, but faces additional barriers including higher upfront \r\ncosts, lack of pricing of externalities, or lack of information or aversion \r\nto novel products (Granoff et al. 2016). In low-income developing \r\ncountries, where infrastructure has historically lagged developed \r\ncountries, some of these hurdles can be exacerbated by overall more \r\ndifficult conditions for public investment (Gurara et al. 2018). "


id: 738573aab148dcda192be9fd8a959caa
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content:
"Voluntary agreements are often implemented in conjunction with \r\neconomic or regulatory instruments, and sometimes are used to \r\ngain insights ahead of implementation of regulatory standards, as \r\nin the case of energy efficiency PVPs in South Korea (Seok et al. \r\n2021). In some cases, industries use voluntary agreements as partial \r\nfulfilment of a  regulation (Rezessy and Bertoldi 2011; Langpap \r\n2015). For example, the Netherlands have permitted participating \r\nindustries to be exempt from certain energy taxes and emissions \r\nregulations (Veum 2018). "


id: abca4ff5e5b1ad3ea537a19fcec350f6
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content:
"Governments can also promote low-emissions investments \r\nthrough public-private partnerships and government owned 'green \r\nbanks' that provide loans on commercial or concessional basis for \r\nenvironmentally friendly private sector investments (David and \r\nVenkatachalam 2019; Ziolo et al. 2019). Public funding or financial \r\nguarantees such as contracts-for-difference can alleviate financial \r\nrisk in the early stages of technology deployment, creating pathways \r\nto commercial viability (Bataille 2020). "


id: ab90af518689b2f4e8ea8a70c4da7255
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content:
"Private businesses tend to under-invest in research and development because of market failures (Geroski 1995), hence there is \r\na case for governments to support research and technology development. a range of different policy instruments are used, including \r\ngovernment funding, preferential tax treatment, intellectual property rules, and policies to support the deployment and diffusion of \r\nnew technologies. Chapter 16 treats innovation policy in-depth. "


id: 3e81ae764278df503f469fbdd2d2632c
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content:
"and Rivers 2017). However, the results are highly dependent on \r\nassumptions and typically do not reflect policy designs specifically \r\naimed at minimising or preventing leakage (Fowlie and Reguant 2018)."


id: 1d923f09e31f34fd5d10d7394397ae56
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content:
"One country's mitigation policy can impact other countries in various \r\nways including changes in their GHG emissions (leakage), creation \r\nof markets for emission reduction credits, technology development \r\nand diffusion (spillovers), and reduction in the value of their fossil \r\nfuel resources. "


id: d54f40c1338a4eac123dbafbea294e3d
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content:
"Numerous ex post analyses, mainly for the EU ETS, find no evidence \r\nof any or significant adverse competitiveness impacts and conclude \r\nthat there was consequently no or insignificant leakage (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (Branger et al. 2016; Haites et al. 2018; \r\nKoch and Basse Mama 2019; FSR Climate 2019; aus dem Moore et al. \r\n2019; Venmans et al. 2020; Kuusi et al. 2020; Verde 2020; Borghesi \r\net al. 2020). This is attributed to large allocations of free allowances \r\nto emissions-intensive, trade-exposed sources, relatively low \r\nallowance prices, the ability of firms in some sectors to pass costs on \r\nto consumers, energy's relatively low share of production costs, and \r\nsmall but statistically significant effects on innovation (Joltreau and \r\nSommerfeld 2019). Few carbon taxes apply to emissions-intensive, \r\ntrade-exposed sources (Timilsina 2018), so competitiveness impacts \r\nusually are not a particular concern. "


id: ad74064989790f7d8937fb786a0c90a8
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content:
"Compliance with a  mitigation policy can affect the emissions of \r\nforeign sources via several channels over different time scales (Zhang \r\nand Zhang 2017) (Box 13.13 ). The effects may interact and yield a net \r\nincrease or decrease in emissions. The leakage channel that is of most \r\nconcern to policymakers is adverse international competitiveness \r\nimpacts from domestic climate policies."


id: f2d4e19db5219b7103726b86d3dd4c0
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"In principle, implementation of a  mitigation policy in one country \r\ncreates an incentive to shift production of tradable goods whose \r\ncosts are increased by the policy to other countries with less costly \r\nemissions limitation policies (Section  12.6.3). Such 'leakage' could \r\nto some extent negate emissions reductions in the first country, \r\ndepending on the relative emissions intensity of production in \r\nboth countries. "


id: 8b775ccc4692c70ea41b7112b6a23d23
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content:
"Policies intended to address leakage include a  border \r\ncarbon  adjustment (Ward et al. 2019; Ismer et al. 2020). \r\na border carbon adjustment (BCA) imposes costs - a tax or allowance \r\npurchase obligation  - on imports of carbon-intensive goods \r\nequivalent to those borne by domestic products possibly mirrored \r\nby rebates for exports (Bohringer et al. 2012; Fischer and Fox 2012; \r\nZhang 2012; Bohringer et al. 2017c) (Chapter 14). A BCA faces the \r\npractical challenge of determining the carbon content of imports \r\n(Bohringer et al. 2017a) and the design needs to be consistent with \r\nWTO rules and other international agreements (Cosbey et al. 2019; "


id: 603732548562b15a321b072b04248462
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content:
"Competitiveness: Mitigation policy raises the costs and product prices of regulated sources which causes production to shift to \r\nunregulated sources, increasing their emissions."


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content:
"Fossil fuel channel: Regulated sources reduce their fossil fuel use, which lowers fossil fuel prices and increases consumption and \r\nassociated emissions by unregulated sources."


id: c13c6f6da6a6fad489cf1b8c0bc76b34
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content:
"Land-use channel: Mitigation policies that change land use lead to land use and emissions changes in other jurisdictions (Bastos \r\nLima et al. 2019)."


id: 856cab20b068591dd0c5eb471a859d78
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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vector_id: 18521
content:
"Terms of trade effect: Price increases for the products of regulated sources shift consumption to other goods, which raises emissions \r\ndue to the higher output of those goods."


id: 6ae8de01e19480d3d482aaa7dade1d3e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Technology channel: Mitigation policy induces low-carbon innovation, which reduces emissions by sources that adopt the innovations \r\nthat may include unregulated sources (Gerlagh and Kuik 2007)."


id: c3239c46e31c5a0c081c26565d7cdd10
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vector_id: 28275
content:
"Abatement resource effect: Regulated sources increase use of clean inputs, which reduces inputs available to unregulated sources \r\nand so limits their output and emissions (Baylis et al. 2014)."


id: a7106595f788703a104f921761de01ec
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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vector_id: 23796
content:
"Scale channel: Changes to the output of regulated and unregulated sources affect their emissions intensities so emissions changes \r\nare not proportional to output changes (Antweiler et al. 2001)."


id: 4fb71b82b528381cc7a7a086a53dcd01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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vector_id: 9978
content:
"Intertemporal channel: Capital stocks of all sources are fixed initially but change over time affecting the costs, prices, output and \r\nemissions of regulated and unregulated products. "


id: b169b9aa6bbefe39ed9ded0378161ee1
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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vector_id: 25410
content:
"Mehling et al. 2019). Model estimates indicate that a BCA reduces \r\nbut does not eliminate leakage (Branger and Quirion 2014). No BCA \r\nhas yet been implemented for international trade although such \r\na measure is currently under consideration by some governments."


id: 1f9bc064480dc860380b071abf4a2596
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content:
"technologies reduce the value of established resources. Mitigation \r\npolicies that reduce the use of fossil fuels also reduce the value of \r\nthese resources. A  single policy in one country is unlikely to have \r\na noticeable effect on the international price, but similar policies in \r\nmultiple countries could adversely affect the value of the resources. \r\nFor fossil fuel exporting countries, mitigation policies consistent with \r\nthe Paris Agreement goals could result in greater costs from changes \r\nin fossil fuel prices due to lower international demand than domestic \r\npolicy costs (medium evidence, high agreement) (Liu et al. 2020)."


id: ffcab40e88dda97812a282656be81212
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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vector_id: 37785
content:
"A mitigation policy may allow the use of credits issued for emission \r\nreductions in other countries for compliance purposes (see also \r\nSection 13.6.3.4 on offset credits and Chapter 14 on international credit \r\nmechanisms). Creation of international markets for emission reduction \r\ncredits tends to benefit other countries through financial flows in \r\nreturn for emissions credit sales (medium evidence, high agreement). "


id: 2401a13bf605ddae68c24b8781827e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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vector_id: 3107
content:
"The impact on the value of established resources will be mitigated, to \r\nsome extent, by the reduced incentive to explore for and develop new \r\nfossil fuel supplies. Nevertheless, efforts to lower global emissions will \r\nmean substantially less demand for fossil fuels, with the majority of \r\ncurrent coal reserves and large shares of known gas and oil reserves \r\nneeding to remain unused, with great diversity in impacts between \r\ndifferent countries (McGlade and Ekins 2015) (Chapters 3, 6, 15). "


id: 275708b305f5573d4b3b8a4f5b384ac6
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"The EU, New Zealand and Switzerland allowed participants in their \r\nemissions trading systems to use credits issued under the Kyoto \r\nProtocol mechanisms, including the Clean Development Mechanism \r\n(CDM), for compliance. From 2008 through 2014, participants used \r\n3.76 million imported credits for compliance of which 80% were \r\nCDM credits (Haites 2016).3\r\n Use of imported credits has fallen to \r\nvery low levels since 2014 (World Bank 2014; Shishlov et al. 2016).4"


id: 6230ca2f147d2be0d7adc99ff00aa1f5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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content:
"Estimates of the potential future loss in value differ greatly. There \r\nis uncertainty about remaining future fossil fuel use under different \r\nmitigation scenarios, as well as future fossil fuel prices depending \r\non extraction costs, market structures and policies. Estimates of total \r\ncumulative fossil fuel revenue lost range between 5-67 trillion USD \r\n(Bauer et al. 2015) with an estimate of the net present value of lost \r\nprofit of around 10 trillion USD (Bauer et al. 2016). Policies that \r\nconstrain supply of fossil fuels in the context of mitigation objectives \r\ncould limit financial losses to fossil fuel producers (Chapter 14). "


id: 417802b12b90a45fe20147d3f7180bd7
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content:
"The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the world's largest \r\noffset programme (Chapter  14). From 2001 to 2019 over 7500 \r\nprojects with projected emission reductions in excess of 8000 MtCO2-\r\neq were implemented in 114 developing countries using some \r\n140  different emissions reduction methodologies (UNFCCC 2012; \r\nUNEP DTU Partnership 2020). Credits reflecting over 2000 MtCO2-eq \r\nof emission reductions by 3260 projects have been issued. To address \r\nadditionality and other concerns the CDM Executive Board frequently \r\nupdated its approved project methodologies."


id: 1efb224b8fe65db8914e4ad9e48da1c4
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vector_id: 2313
content:
"Mitigation policies stimulate low-carbon R&D by entities subject \r\nto those policies and by other domestic and foreign entities (FSR \r\nClimate 2019). Policies to support technology development and \r\ndiffusion tend to have positive spillover effects between countries \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement) (Section 16.3)."


id: c6d674f05d709b056c9a07fe9bda35d2
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"Innovation activity in response to a  mitigation policy varies by \r\npolicy type (Jaffe et al. 2002) and stringency (Johnstone et al. 2012). \r\nIn addition, many governments have policies to stimulate R&D, \r\nfurther increasing low-carbon R&D activity by domestic researchers. \r\nEmitters in other countries may adopt some of the new low-carbon \r\ntechnologies thus reducing emissions elsewhere. Technology \r\ndevelopment and diffusion is reviewed in Chapter 16."


id: 63bd5cd4d70c7202b561c79b49b9b258
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"Fossil fuel resources are a significant source of exports, employment \r\nand government revenues for many countries. The value of these \r\nresources depends on demand for the fuel and competing supplies in \r\nthe relevant international markets. Discoveries and new production "


id: 3865abca77d83897e6a2ce1aad6bbdec
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"Second, since AR5 there is growing attention to enabling transitions \r\nover time. Literature on socio-technical transitions, rooted in innovation \r\nstudies, highlights the need for different policy focus at different stages \r\nof a transition (Geels et al. 2017b,a; Kohler et al. 2019) (Section 1.7.3). \r\nOther literature examines how broad patterns of development drive \r\nboth social and mitigation outcomes through shifts in policies and \r\na  re-alignment of enabling conditions (Chapter  4). Explicit efforts \r\nto shift development pathways, for example by shifting patterns of \r\nenergy demand and urbanisation, therefore offer broader mitigation \r\nopportunities (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4). Common to both \r\napproaches is an emphasis beyond the short term, and attention to \r\nenabling longer-term structural shifts in economies and societies."


id: a5d000aff0aa2de614a041cc175912b2
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"transitions, and is complemented by discussion in Section 13.8 on \r\nintegration between adaptation and mitigation, and Section  13.9 \r\non economy-wide measures and the broader enabling conditions \r\nnecessary to accelerate mitigation."


id: c3c0b558a06a0eee590d738cfbdde5b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"Since AR5 an emergent multidisciplinary literature on policy \r\npackages, or policy mixes, has emerged that examine how policies \r\nmay be combined for sustainable low-carbon transitions (Rogge \r\nand Reichardt 2016; Kern et al. 2019). This literature covers various \r\nsectors including: energy (Rogge et al. 2017); transport (Givoni et al. \r\n2013); industry (Scordato et al. 2018); agri-food (Kalfagianni and Kuik \r\n2017); and forestry (Scullion et al. 2016). "


id: e6a57d5b437b6d9a9025d4d79fdf7f6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"Taking these trends into account, Figure  13.6 outlines the climate \r\npolicy landscape, and how it maps to different parts of this Working \r\nGroup III report. One axis of variation captures alternative framings of \r\ndesired outcomes in national policymaking - mitigation versus multiple \r\nobjectives, while the second captures the shift in policymaking from \r\nan initial focus on shifting incentives through largely individual policy \r\ninstruments, to explicit consideration of how policies and economy\u0002wide measures, including those that shift incentives, can combine to \r\nenable transitions. As a result, Figure 13.6 represents interconnected \r\npolicy ideas, but backed by distinct strands of literature. Notably, each \r\nof these categories is salient to climate policymaking, although the \r\nbalance may differ depending on country context. "


id: c175202608edb337b805402d6e004161
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"A central theme in the literature is that transitions require policy \r\ninterventions to address system level changes, thereby going beyond \r\naddressing market failures in two ways. First, structural system \r\nchanges are needed for low-carbon transitions, including building \r\nlow-carbon infrastructure (or example aligning electricity grids and \r\nstorage with the requirements of new low-carbon technology), \r\nand  adjusting existing institutions to low-carbon solutions (for \r\nexample by reforming electricity market design) (Bak et al. 2017; \r\nPatt and Lilliestam 2018). Second, explicit transformational system \r\nchanges are necessary, including efforts at directing transformations, \r\nsuch as clear direction setting through the elaboration of shared \r\nvisions, and coordination across diverse actors across different policy \r\nfields, such as climate and industrial policy, and across governance \r\nlevels (Uyarra et al. 2016; Nemet et al. 2017). "


id: fea7b04273942b966f179e2729452e48
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"This section particularly focuses on climate policymaking for \r\ntransition - both socio-technical transitions and shifts in development \r\npathways, while direct climate policies and co-benefits are addressed \r\nin other parts of the report, as indicated in Figure 13.6. This section \r\nfocuses in particular on lessons for designing policy packages for "


id: 40b5b92867f2989598bda0510672d57b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"There are some specific suggestions for policy packages: Van den \r\nBergh et al. (2021) suggest that innovation support and information \r\nprovision combined with a carbon tax or market, or adoption subsidy \r\nleads to both effective and efficient outcomes. Others question \r\nthe viability of universally applicable policy packages, and suggest \r\npackages need to be tailored to local objectives (del Rio 2014) \r\nConsequently, much of the literature focuses on broad principles for \r\ndesign of policy packages and mixes, as discussed below."


id: ecbc948d96282c5f4bffa4377fb4d323
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"Comprehensiveness, balance and consistency are important criteria \r\nfor policy packages or mixes (robust evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Rogge and Reichardt 2016; Scobie 2016; Carter et al. 2018; Santos\u0002lacueva and Gonzalez 2018). Comprehensiveness assesses the \r\nextensiveness of policy packages, including the breadth of system \r\nand market failures it addresses (Rogge and Reichardt 2016). For \r\nexample, instrument mixes that include only moderate carbon \r\npricing, but are complemented by policies supporting new low\u0002"


id: e4f60f01452e909d98a4fdd89f223629
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"The economics literature provides insights on policy interactions among the multiple overlapping policies that directly or indirectly \r\naffect GHG emissions, including when different levels of government are involved. Multiple mitigation policies can be theoretically \r\njustified if there are multiple objectives or market failures or to achieve distributional objectives and increase policy effectiveness \r\n(Stiglitz 2019). Examples include the coexistence of the EU ETS with vehicle emission standards and energy efficiency standards (Rey \r\net al. 2013), and the fact that 85% of the emissions covered by California's ETS are also subject to other policies (Bang et al. 2017; \r\nMazmanian et al. 2020). Policy interactions are also widespread among energy efficiency policies (Wiese et al. 2018). "


id: f03b8bcc1e8b98dfa8c968c2e963cb5d
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"Interactive effects can influence the costs of policy outcomes. With multiple overlapping and possibly non-optimal policies, the effect \r\non total cost is not clear. A modelling study of USA mitigation policy finds the costs of using heterogeneous sub-national policies \r\nto achieve decarbonisation targets is 10% higher than national uniform policies (Peng et al. 2021). When multiple policy goals are \r\nsought, such as mitigation and R&D, a portfolio of optimal policies achieves the goals at significantly lower cost (Fischer and Newell \r\n2008). In some cases, overlapping mitigation policies can raise the cost of mitigation (Bohringer et al. 2016) while lowering the cost \r\nof achieving other goals, such as energy efficiency improvements and expansion of renewable energy (Rosenow et al. 2016; Lecuyer \r\nand Quirion 2019). It is possible that one or more of the policies is made redundant (Aune and Golombek 2021)."


id: 4bc4773dc91ae934c114613c63fcebdc
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"While overlapping policies may raise the cost of mitigation, they increase the likelihood of achieving an emission reduction goal. Policy \r\noverlap will lead to different optimal carbon prices across jurisdictions (Bataille et al. 2018b). The existence of overlapping policies will \r\nusually increase administrative and compliance costs. However, ex post analysis shows that transaction costs of mitigation policies are \r\nlow and are not a decisive factor in policy choice (Joas and Flachsland 2016). "


id: 4135eb9d4717abf6fe32a0b20ac7d63f
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"The effectiveness, as well as economic and distributional effects, of a given mitigation policy will depend on the interactions among all \r\nthe policies that affect the targeted emissions. Because a market instrument interacts with every other policy that affects the targeted \r\nemissions, interactions tend to be more complex for market instruments than for regulations that mandate specific emission reduction \r\nactions by targeted sources independent of other policies."


id: 242f74c7cd0996ff8018dc6ddd6c6cd6
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"An ETS scheme implemented with existing mitigation policies may be subject to the 'waterbed effect' - emission reductions undertaken \r\nby some emitters may be offset by higher emissions by other ETS participants due to overlapping mitigation policies (Schatzki and \r\nStavins 2012). This reduces the impact of the ETS and lowers carbon trading prices (Perino 2018). However ex post assessments \r\nfind net emissions reductions. ETS design features such as a price floor and 'market stability reserve' can limit the waterbed effect \r\n(Edenhofer et al. 2017; Kollenberg and Taschini 2019; Narassimhan et al. 2018; FSR Climate 2019). "


id: eae26eac6e5fb027eb55f4318c817b39
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"A carbon tax, unlike the allowance price, does not change in response to the effect of overlapping policies but those policies may \r\nreduce emissions by sources subject to the tax and so lower the emission reductions achieved by the tax (Goulder and Stavins 2011). "


id: d3a335ad5c273b46470ba93b14f9068e
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"Policy interactions often occur with the introduction of new mitigation policy instruments. For example, in China several sub-national \r\nETSs exist alongside policies to reduce emission intensity, increase energy efficiency and expand renewable energy supplies (Zhang \r\n2015). These quantity-based ETSs interact with many other policies (Duan et al. 2017), for example price-based provincial carbon \r\nintensity targets (Qian et al. 2017). They also interact with the level of market regulation; for example, full effectiveness of emissions \r\npricing would require electricity market reform in China (Teng et al. 2017). "


id: b834af1cbfa6f787f7479b6e52ebc102
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"of policies can build coalitions for climate policy, starting with green \r\nindustrial policy (e.g. supporting renewable energies through feed\u0002in tariffs) and introducing or making carbon pricing more stringent \r\nwhen supportive coalitions of stringent climate policy have been \r\nformed (Meckling et al. 2015). Similarly, investing in supportive \r\ninstitutions, with competencies compatible with low-carbon futures, \r\nare a necessary supportive element of transitions (Pahle et al. 2018; \r\nRosenbloom et al. 2019; Domorenok et al. 2021)."


id: 24c11f5bb9cc08253a546d85191b9269
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"This sub-section assesses policy integration and packages required \r\nto enable shifts in development pathways, with a  particular focus \r\non sectoral scale transitions. However, because shifting development \r\npathways requires broad transformative change, it complements \r\ndiscussion on broader shifts in policymaking such as fiscal, educational, \r\nand infrastructure policies (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4) and to \r\nthe alignment of a wide range of enabling conditions required for \r\nsystem transitions (Section 13.9). "


id: 243b7e1f778c251f2dd2f98d0abd4652
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"Another promising strategy is to design short-term policies which \r\nmight help to provide later entry points for more ambitious climate \r\npolicy (Kriegler et al. 2018) and supportive institutions. The sequencing "


id: 835ae421dd355e8f8490d2443b67c321
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"Third, achieving changes in development pathways requires engaging \r\nwith place-specific context. It requires attention to existing policies, \r\npolitical interests that may gain or lose from a transition, and locally \r\nspecific governance enablers and disablers. As a result, while there \r\nmay be approaches that carry over from one context to another, \r\nimplementation requires careful tailoring of transition approaches to \r\nspecific policy and governance contexts. Cross-Chapter Box 9 in this \r\nchapter summarises case studies of sectoral transitions from other \r\nchapters in this report (Chapters 5 to 12) to illustrate this complexity. \r\nBroader macroeconomic transformative shifts are discussed in more \r\ndetail in Section 13.9."


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"Second policymaking for shifting development pathways has to \r\naccount for inherent uncertainties in future development paths \r\n(Moallemi and Malekpour 2018; Castrejon-Campos et al. 2020). \r\nThese uncertainties may be greater in developing countries that \r\nare growing rapidly and where structural features of the economy \r\nincluding infrastructure and urbanisation patterns are fluid. For \r\nexample, reviews of modelling studies of Chinese (Grubb et al. 2015) \r\nand Indian emissions futures (Spencer and Dubash 2021) find that \r\ndifferences in projections can substantially be accounted for by \r\nalternative assumptions about future economic structural shifts. \r\nConsequently, an important design consideration is that policy \r\npackages should be robust, that is, perform satisfactorily for all \r\nkey objectives under a  broad range of plausible futures (Kwakkel \r\net al. 2016; Maier et al. 2016; Castrejon-Campos et al. 2020). Such \r\nan approach to decision-making can be contrasted with one that "


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"Authors: Parth Bhatia (India), Navroz K. Dubash (India), Igor Bashmakov (the Russian Federation), Paolo Bertoldi (Italy), Mercedes \r\nBustamante (Brazil), Michael Craig (the United States of America), Stephane de la Rue du Can (the United States of America), Manfred \r\nFischedick (Germany) Amit Garg (India), Oliver Geden (Germany), Robert Germeshausen (Germany), Siir Kilkis (Turkey), Susanna \r\nKugelberg (Denmark), Andreas Loeschel (Germany), Cheikh Mbow (Senegal), Yacob Mulugetta (Ethiopia), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the \r\nNetherlands), Vinnet Ndlovu (Zimbabwe/Australia), Peter Newman (Australia), Lars Nilsson (Sweden), Karachepone Ninan (India) "


id: a33ac4e34cb7eafa01d6cdb36cc3cd3a
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"Real world sectoral transitions reinforce critical lessons on policy integration: a high-level strategic goal (Column a in Cross-Chapter \r\nBox  9, Table  1), the need for a  clear sector outcome framing (column B), a  carefully coordinated mix of policy instruments and \r\ngovernance actions (column C), and the importance of context-specific governance factors (column D). Illustrative examples, drawn \r\nfrom sectors, help elucidate the complexity of policymaking in driving sectoral transitions. "


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"mitigation relationships and linkages (Section 13.8.3); and enabling \r\nand disabling factors for governance of mitigation and adaption."


id: f5053da2aa65ff20aabd7de23b649124
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"Integrated climate-development actions require a  context-specific \r\nunderstanding of synergies and trade-offs with other policy \r\npriorities (Figure  13.6) with the aim of implementing mitigation/\r\nadaptation policies that reduce GHG emissions while simultaneously \r\nstrengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement) (Klein et al. 2005; IPCC 2007; Zhao et al. 2018; Mills\u0002Novoa and Liverman 2019; Solecki et al. 2019). Efficient, equitable \r\nand inclusive policies which also acknowledge and contribute \r\ndirectly to other pressing priorities such reducing poverty, improving \r\nhealth, providing access to clean water, and fostering sustainable \r\nconsumption and production practices are helpful for mitigation/\r\nadaptation goals (robust evidence, high agreement) (Landauer et al. \r\n2019; Grafakos et al. 2020). "


id: bdd8cd43e9c6ee3b7333553f479eb77
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"Synergies between mitigation and adaptation actions and sustainable development that can enhance the quality and pace of \r\ndevelopment in Africa exist at both sectoral and national levels. Available data on NDCs show the top mitigation priorities in African \r\ncountries include energy, forestry, transport and agriculture and waste, and adaptation priorities focus on agriculture, water, energy \r\nand forestry. The energy sector dominates in mitigation actions and the agricultural sector is the main focus of adaptation measures, \r\nwith the latter sector being a slightly larger source of greenhouse gases than the former (Mbeva et al. 2015; African Development \r\nBank 2019; Nyiwul 2019)."


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"Renewable energy development can support synergies between mitigation and adaptation by stimulating local and national \r\neconomies through microenterprise development; providing off-grid affordable and accessible solutions; and contributing to poverty \r\nreduction through increased locally available resource use and employment and increased technical skills (Nyiwul 2019; Dal Maso \r\net al. 2020). The Paris Agreement's technology transfer and funding mechanisms could reduce renewable energy costs and providing \r\nscale economics to local economies. "


id: deaf4668b6c917af4cc79825037e51a9
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"Barriers to achieving these synergies include the absence of suitable macro-and micro- level policy environments for adaptation \r\nand mitigation actions; coherent climate change policy frameworks and governance structures to support adaptation; institutional \r\nand capacity deficiencies in climate and policy research such as on data integration and technical analysis; and the high financial \r\nneeds associated with the cost of mitigation and adaptation (African Development Bank 2019; Nyiwul 2019). Strengthening of \r\nnational institutions and policies can support maximising synergies and co-benefits between adaptation and mitigation to reduce silos \r\nand redundant overlaps, increase knowledge exchange at the country and regional levels, and support engagement with bilateral and \r\nmultilateral partners and mobilising finance through the mechanisms available (African Development Bank 2019)."


id: d7341c833d1802165cfebf7fe993f3a9
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"Adaptation and mitigation are deeply linked in practice  - at the \r\nlocal level, for instance, asset managers address integrated low\u0002carbon resilience to climate change impacts and urban planners \r\ndo the same (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2018; Grafakos et al. 2020) \r\n(Table 13.3). Similarly, ecosystem-based (or nature-based) solutions, \r\nmay generate co-benefits by simultaneously sinking carbon, cooling \r\nurban areas through shading, purifying water, improving biodiversity, \r\nand offering recreational opportunities that improve public health \r\n(Raymond et al. 2017). Accurately identifying and qualitatively or \r\nquantitatively assessing these co-benefits (Stadelmann et al. 2014; \r\nLeiter and Pringle 2018; Leiter et al. 2019) is central to an integrated \r\nadaptation and mitigation policy evaluation. "


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"state level, since risks and opportunities vary by location and the \r\nspecific local development context (robust evidence, high agreement) \r\n(IPCC 2014b; Denton et al. 2015). "


id: da2e42a0c540940dfdb1c555118829b9
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"Some studies press the need to consider the complex ways that power \r\nand interests influence how collective decisions are made, and who \r\nbenefits from and pays for these decisions, of climate policy and to be \r\naware of unintended consequences, especially for vulnerable people \r\nliving under poor conditions (Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016; De Oliveira \r\nSilva et al. 2018). The specific adaptation and mitigation linkages will \r\ndiffer by country and region, as illustrated by Box 13.15."


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"The IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) emphasised the \r\nimportance of climate-resilient pathways - development trajectories \r\nthat combine adaptation and mitigation through specific actions \r\nto achieve the sustainable development goals (Prasad et al. 2009; \r\nLewison et al. 2015; Fankhauser and McDermott 2016; Romero\u0002Lankao et al. 2016; Solecki et al. 2019) - from the household to the "


id: dcc2501472e1d38ecb945ca7a88636fc
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"To fully maximise their potential co-benefits and trade-offs of \r\nintegrating adaptation and mitigation, these should be explicitly \r\nsought, rather than accidentally discovered (Spencer et al. 2017; \r\nBerry et al. 2015), and policies designed to account for both (robust "


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"Conflicts have emerged over political views, government priorities of resources (oil, bioenergy, hydropower), and weak governance \r\namong national and local authorities, indigenous groups and other stakeholders such as NGOs which play a  critical role in the \r\ntechnological and financial support for the REDD+ initiative (Reed 2011; Kashwan 2015; Gebara et al. 2014; Locatelli et al. 2011, \r\n2017). a more holistic approach which recognises these social, environmental and political drivers would appear to have benefits but \r\nassessment is needed to allow evidence-based actionable policy statements. "


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"to create accessible recreational areas that improve public health \r\nwhile improving biodiversity, sinking carbon and protecting \r\nneighbourhoods from extreme flooding events, may lead to more \r\nefficient and cost-effective policies (Klein et al. 2005; Locatelli et al. \r\n2011; Kongsager et al. 2016; Mills-Novoa and Liverman 2019). "


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"evidence, high agreement) (Caetano et al. 2020). For example, the \r\nREDD+ initiative focus on mitigation by carbon sequestration was \r\nset up to provide co-benefits such as: nature protection, political \r\ninclusion, monetary income, economic opportunities. However, \r\nsome unintended trade-offs may have occurred such as physical \r\ndisplacement, loss of livelihoods, increased human-wildlife conflicts, \r\nproperty claims, food security concerns, and an unequal distribution \r\nof benefits to local population groups (Bushley 2014; Duguma \r\net al. 2014a; Gebara et al. 2014; Kongsager and Corbera 2015; \r\nAnderson et al. 2016; Di Gregorio et al. 2016, 2017). Ultimately, \r\necosystem (or nature-based) strategies, such as the use of wetlands "


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"The 'nexus' approach is another widely used framework that describes \r\nthe linkages between water, energy, food, health and other socio\u0002economic factors in some integrated assessment approaches (Rasul \r\nand Sharma 2016). The Food-Energy-Water (FEW)nexus, for example, \r\nconsiders how water is required for energy production and supply "


id: e2f39e489ec178e3641cf80da3453a49
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:47
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"(and thus tied to mitigation), how energy is needed to treat and \r\ntransport water, and how both are critical to adaptable and resilient \r\nfood production systems (Mohtar and Daher 2014; Biggs et al. 2015). \r\nClimate change impacts all these dimensions in the form of multi\u0002hazard risk (Froese and Schilling 2019). Although integrative, the FEW \r\nnexus faces many challenges including: limited knowledge integration; \r\ncoordination between different institutions and levels of government; \r\npolitics and power; cultural values; and ways of managing climate \r\nrisk (Leck and Roberts 2015; Romero-Lankao et al. 2017; Mercure \r\net al. 2019). More empirical assessment is needed to identify potential \r\noverlaps between sectoral portfolios, as this could help to delineate \r\nresources allocation for synergies and to avoid trade-offs. "


id: 4a891c5fe81f40bbdfe1300c9d6c6cfa
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"There are multiple ways that mitigation and adaptation may be \r\nintegrated. Table 13.3 sets out those relationships broken down into \r\nfour areas: adaptation that contributes to mitigation; mitigation that \r\ncontributes to adaptation; holistic, sustainability first strategies; and \r\ntrade-offs. The table shows that more holistic and sustainability\u0002oriented policies can open up the possibility for accelerated transitions \r\nacross multiple priority domains (robust evidence, high agreement). "


id: f9156db6bfc8de41535a740fb4b6fa36
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"development and climate resilience across scales (from global, regional, \r\nto local government actions (robust evidence, high agreement) (Duguma \r\net al. 2014b; Heidrich et al. 2016; Di Gregorio et al. 2017; Locatelli et al. \r\n2017; Nachmany and Setzer 2018; Mills-Novoa and Liverman 2019). \r\nEven so, the specific ways that these linkages are governed vary widely \r\ndepending on institutional and jurisdictional scale, competing policy \r\npriorities, and available capacity (Landauer et al. 2019). "


id: 7008be5bb8f90aa306999f1087d090de
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"13.8.3.1 Governing the Linkages Between Mitigation and \r\nAdaptation at the Local, Regional, and Global Scales "


id: dc59226537b98f1e2679cca166e66037
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"based differences in exposur to that risk, and the importance of local/\r\ntraditional and indigenous knowledge (Beg et al. 2002; Duguma \r\net al. 2014b). Despite the evidence that integrated mitigation and \r\nadaptation policies can be effective and efficient (Klein et al. 2005) \r\nand can potentially reduce trade-offs, there is still limited evidence \r\nof how such integrated policies would specifically contribute to \r\nprogress on the SDGs (robust evidence, high agreement) (Kongsager \r\net al.2016; Di Gregorio et al. 2017; Antwi-Agyei et al. 2018; De Coninck \r\net al. 2018; Campagnolo and Davide 2019)."


id: 4285bb80191dce517e25e1d8e10f9cbd
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"Where mainstreaming of environmental concerns has been \r\nattempted through national plans, they have had success in some \r\ncases when backed by strong political commitments that support \r\na vertical coordination structure rather than horizontal structures led \r\nby the focus ministry (Nunan et al. 2012). Such political commitments \r\nare therefore crucial to success but insufficient in and of themselves \r\n(Runhaar et al. 2018; Wamsler et al. 2020). Integration of the budget \r\nprocess is particularly important, as are aligned time frames across \r\ndifferent objectives (Saito 2013). Recognition of the functional \r\ninteractions across policy sectors is improved by a  translation of \r\nlong-term policy objectives into a plan that aligns with integration \r\ngoals (Corry 2012; Oels 2012; Dupont 2019)."


id: 60dc7f5e15b627cdf047d1094fac68e4
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"There are important links between inequality, justice and climate \r\nchange (Ikeme 2003; Bailey 2017). Many of these operate through \r\nthe benefits, costs and risks of climate action (distributive justice), \r\nwhile others focus on differential participation and recognition of \r\nsub-national actors and marginalised groups (procedural justice) \r\n(Bulkeley and Castan Broto 2013; Bulkeley et al. 2013; Hughes 2013; \r\nReckien et al. 2018; Romero-Lankao and Gnatz 2019). "


id: 3e8033cfc3ed540d299470aa29182440
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"Climate policy integration carries implications for the pursuit of the \r\nSDGs, given that it is nearly impossible to achieve the desired socio\u0002economic gains if fundamental environmental issues, such as climate \r\nchange, are not addressed (Gomez-Echeverri 2018). Research on \r\nclimate resilient development pathways (Roy et al. 2018), for instance, \r\nargues for long-term policy planning that combines the governance \r\nof national climate and SD goals, builds institutional capacity across \r\nall sectors, jurisdictions, and actors, and enhances participation and \r\ntransparency (robust evidence, high agreement) (Chapter 4 and 17)."


id: 60bffde4fc11934d7852fb6a28d1f601
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"In the Global South, climate change policies are often established in \r\nthe context of sustainable development and of other pressing local \r\npriorities (e.g.,  air pollution, health, and food security). National \r\nclimate policy in these countries tends to give prominence to \r\nadaptation based on country vulnerability, climatic risk, gender\u0002"


id: b7f9d15697e2fdc8b070c0455aab75e5
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"The potential for transformative climate change policy that delivers \r\nboth adaptation and mitigation is also shaped by a  number of \r\nenabling and disabling factors tied to governance processes (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Burch et al. 2014) (Section 13.9). "


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"Box 13.17 | Enabling and Disabling Factors for Integrated Governance of Mitigation \r\nand Adaptation"


id: d5adbaa2f4d0f2b21b8ecb56729c5b29
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"Ensuring participatory governance and social inclusion. Interlinkages in the food-energy-water nexus highlight the importance \r\nof inclusive processes (Shaw et al. 2014; Nakano et al. 2017; Cook and Chu 2018; Romero-Lankao and Gnatz 2019). The cultivation of \r\nurban grassroots innovations and social innovation may accelerate progress (Wolfram and Frantzeskaki 2016), as may the development \r\nof carefully-designed climate and energy dialogues that enable learning among multiple stakeholders (Cashore et al. 2019)."


id: df9d0d544c48f8b287ae83d287664bed
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"Considering synergies and trade-offs with broader sustainable development priorities. The explicit consideration of synergies \r\nand trade-offs will enable more integrated policy making (Dang et al. 2003; von Stechow et al. 2015). Policy frameworks to do so \r\nare just emerging, such as analysis of trade-offs between energy and water policies and agriculture (Huggel et al. 2015; Antwi\u0002Agyei et al. 2018). "


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"Employing a diverse set of tools to reach targets. Building codes, land-use plans, public education initiatives, and nature-based \r\nsolutions such as green ways may impact adaptation and mitigation simultaneously (Burch et al. 2014). Ecological restoration provides \r\nanother suite of tools, for instance the Brazilian target of restoring and reforesting 0.12 million km2\r\n of forests by 2030, which can \r\nenhance biodiversity and ecosystem services while also sinking carbon (Bustamante et al. 2019). Mandatory retrofits to improve \r\nindoor air quality can also increase energy efficiency and resilience to climate change impacts (Friel et al. 2011; Houghton 2011)."


id: 3eb724a6834ab2c830293108c6e237b7
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"Monitoring and evaluating key indicators, beyond only greenhouse gas emissions, such as biodiversity, water quality, \r\nand affordability: An integrated approach requires robust process for collecting data on these indicators. Challenges are related to \r\nthe limited evidence-base on synergies, co-benefits, and trade-offs across sectors and jurisdictions (Di Gregorio et al. 2016; Kongsager \r\net al. 2016; Locatelli et al. 2017; Zen et al. 2019). Moreover, adaptation policies mostly lack measurable targets or expected outcomes \r\nincreasing the challenge of designing an integrated framework (OECD 2017)."


id: cd0cbcfaaaf6d3374efab1d96d8b0a17
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"Iterative and adaptive management. Adaptive management helps to address the underlying uncertainty (Kundzewicz et al. 2018) \r\nthat characterises implementation of integrated approaches to adaptation and mitigation. Policy integration needs to be considered \r\niteratively along the process of development, implementation, and evaluation of climate policies. "


id: 7c339193810ad151bd9f8dd18c960ad4
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"Strategic partnerships that coordinate efforts. Strategic partnerships among diverse actors, therefore, bring diverse technical \r\nskills and capacities to the endeavour (Burch et al. 2016; Islam and Khan 2017). However, realising strategic approaches for joint \r\nadaptation and mitigation require adequate financial, technical and human resources. "


id: e7f08add256fcbd6a9ffdab95f211334
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"Participatory and collaborative planning approaches can help overcome injustices and address power differentials.\r\nParticipatory and collaborative planning approaches can provide multiple spaces of deliberation where marginalised voices can be \r\nheard (Blue and Medlock 2014; UN Habitat 2016; Castan Broto and Westman 2017; Waisman et al. 2019). These tools organise climate \r\nand sustainability action by addressing its democratic deficit and facilitating the recognition of multiple perspectives in environmental \r\nplanning alongside material limits of development (Agyeman 2013)."


id: 224e8a96eae2587b6c41dd63487e1496
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"This section follows on from Section 13.6 (single policy instruments) \r\nand 13.7 (policy packages). Section  13.9 literature follows closely \r\non from Section 13.7 literature on policy packages, which discusses \r\nchange within one system, although there remains an overlap."


id: 65d687c5042c08a2a56e019ecff43743
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"Section 13.9.2 provides a brief introduction to policy and institutions \r\nas two of the six dimensions of enabling conditions, and the \r\nimportance of enabling conditions to systemic change and climate \r\nmitigation. Section 13.9.3 briefly introduces actions for transformative \r\njustice, which seek to restructure the underlying system framework \r\nthat produces mitigation inequalities. Section  13.9.4 provides \r\na  brief overview of net zero policies and targets (often no more \r\nthan aspirational), which imply economy-wide measures and \r\nsystem change. Section  13.9.5 assesses the literature arguing for \r\na  system restructuring approach to climate mitigation, based on "


id: cbebacb0a841514227d9e20bd1e8de2
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"Section  13.9 assesses literature related to economy wide and \r\ncross  - sector systemic change as an approach to accelerate \r\nclimate mitigation. "


id: 326b39bbc3af34cadd37023c38fbff72
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"It focuses specifically on policy and institutions, as two of the six \r\nenabling conditions for economy-wide system change and thus \r\nprovides a third dimension of the role of policy and institutions to \r\nclimate mitigation. Enabling conditions in general are discussed in \r\nChapter 4 of the SR1.5 (IPCC 2018), as well as Chapter 4 of this report. "


id: 89cc4752156ad168a4d6a7da9ee13d9d
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"systemic restructuring. Section  13.9.6 assesses the literature on \r\nstimulus packages and green new deals which aim for systemic \r\nchange, sometimes with value for climate mitigation. And finally, \r\nSection 13.9.7 assesses emerging literatures which argues that there \r\nare existing challenges to accelerating climate mitigation that may \r\nbe overcome by systemic change and targeted actions."


id: 780559e537acf3147afc4985e1d9ee95
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"This sub-section introduces the concept of transformative justice \r\nas part of measures intending to accelerate mitigation. Fair and \r\neffective climate policymaking requires institutional practices to: \r\nconsider the distributional impacts of climate policy in the design \r\nand implementation of every policy (Agyeman 2013; Castan Broto \r\nand Westman 2017); align mitigation with other objectives such as \r\ninclusion and poverty reduction (Hughes and Hoffmann 2020; Rice \r\net al. 2020; Hess and McKane 2021); represent a variety of voices, \r\nespecially those of the most vulnerable (Bullard et al. 2008; Temper \r\net al. 2018); and rely on open processes of participation (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Anguelovski et al. 2016; Bouzarovski \r\net al. 2018; Rice et al. 2020)."


id: d2f67eaced9acad6051e3062e12fe918
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"Distributive approaches to climate justice address injustices related \r\nto access to resources and protection from impacts. There is an \r\nimportant difference between affirmative and transformative justice \r\naction (Fraser 1995; Agyeman et al. 2016; Castan Broto and Westman \r\n2019): Affirmative action includes policies and strategies that seek \r\nto correct inequitable outcomes without disturbing the underlying \r\npolitical framework while transformative action seeks to correct \r\ninequitable outcomes by restructuring the underlying framework that \r\nproduces inequalities. "


id: 56f92839c101ffec6bfa5b8a006b0a76
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"Transformative action that responds to distributive justice concerns \r\ninclude economy-wide actions via stimulus packages (such as \r\nthe European Green Deal and the New Green Deal in the USA) \r\n(Section  13.9.5). Other examples are the increasing number of \r\nclimate litigation suits that are transforming the way distributive \r\ndimensions of climate justice are understood (Section 13.4.2). "


id: 68d8828424ba71a3b8425d20fe5056bf
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"The last few years have seen a  proliferation of net zero emission \r\ntargets set by national and regional governments, cities as well as \r\ncompanies and institutions (NewClimate Institute and Data Driven \r\nEnviroLab 2020; Black et al. 2021; Rogelj et al. 2021) (see also Cross\u0002Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3). Meeting these targets implies economy\u0002wide systemic change (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 14c2659ebf9804ffd240818ac79c8530
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"The Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU) Net Zero Tracker divides \r\ncountries into those which have net zero emissions achieved, have it \r\nin law, have proposed legislation, have it in policy documents or have \r\nemission reduction targets under discussion in some form. a recent \r\nstudy estimated that 131 countries have either adopted, announced \r\nor are discussing net zero GHG emissions targets, covering 72% of \r\nglobal emissions (Hohne et al. 2021). Out of those, as of 1 October \r\n2021, the ECIU Net Zero Tracker states that Germany, Sweden, the \r\nEuropean Union, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Canada, South \r\nKorea, Spain, Denmark, New Zealand, Hungary and Luxembourg \r\nhave net zero targets set in law (ECIU 2021)."


id: c83cd2112090b81ed768d100f8aa7b7a
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"Chapter 4 is the lead chapter of this report for justice and climate \r\nmitigation issues, and includes an overview of institutions which \r\nhave been set up to ensure a Just climate transition (Section 4.5). \r\nChapter  13 has sought to integrate justice issues in Section  13.2 \r\nin reference to procedural justice and the impact of inequalities \r\non sub-national institutions, Section 13.6 in regard to distribution, \r\nand Section  13.8 in relation to integrating mitigation and \r\nadaptation policies."


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"Some have argued that the expansion of these emission reduction \r\ntargets marks an important increase in climate mitigation momentum \r\nsince the Paris Agreement of 2015 and the 2018 IPCC Special Report \r\non Global Warming of 1.5degC (Black et al. 2021; Hohne et al. 2021). On \r\nthe other hand net zero emission targets in their current state vary "


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"Others focus more on single system reconfigurations, such as the \r\nenergy system (Matthes 2017; Tozer 2020); urban systems (Holtz et al. \r\n2018); or the political system (Somerville 2020; Newell and Simms \r\n2020). Becken (2019) argues that only systemic changes at a large \r\nscale will be sufficient to break or disrupt existing arrangements and \r\nroutines in the tourism industry."


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"enormously in scope, quality and transparency - with many countries \r\nat the discussion stage - and this makes scrutiny and comparison \r\ndifficult (NewClimate Institute and Data Driven EnviroLab 2020; \r\nBlack et al. 2021; Rogelj et al. 2021)."


id: 4655ec31ebf2f264f494385db9397a30
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"In order to realise the mitigation potential of net zero emission \r\ntargets some areas within the targets might need to be changed. For \r\nexample, this includes clearer definitions; well defined time frames \r\nand scopes; focusing on direct emission reductions within their own \r\nterritory; minimal reliance on offsets; scrutiny of use and risks of CO2\r\nremoval; attention to equity, near-term action coupled with long\u0002term intent setting; and ongoing monitoring and review (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Levin et al. 2020; NewClimate Institute \r\nand Data Driven EnviroLab 2020; Black et al. 2021; Hohne et al. 2021; \r\nRogelj et al. 2021; World Bank 2021b)."


id: ef64f22ce10849ced8bc9b93f394532
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"There is now a significant body of work which explicitly states, or \r\nimplicitly accepts, that systemic change may be necessary to deliver \r\nsuccessful climate mitigation, including net zero targets. Newell \r\nphrases this as the difference between 'plug and play' mitigation \r\napplications where one aspect of a  system is changed while \r\neverything in the system remains the same compared to systemic \r\nchange, with change affecting all the system (Newell 2021a,b). This \r\nsection highlights an emergent, multidisciplinary literature since \r\nIPCC AR5, which suggests that acceleration to decarbonised systems \r\nvia a sustainable development pathway may be better achieved by \r\nmoving from a single policy instrument or mix of policies approach to \r\na systemic economy-wide approach (Figure 13.6). "


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content:
"Economy-wide stimulus packages which have occurred post \r\nCOVID-19, and in some cases in response to environmental concerns, \r\nhave the ability to undermine or aid climate mitigation (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). Attention in the early efforts of their \r\ndevelopment and design can contribute to shifting sustainable \r\ndevelopment pathways and net zero outcomes, while meeting short\u0002term economic goals (medium evidence, high agreement) (Hepburn \r\net al. 2020; Hanna et al. 2020)."


id: 6618af1d2ea03adba5fa0534ef87fc65
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"The complexity and multi-facetted challenges of rapidly decarbonising \r\nour current interconnected systems (such as energy, food, health) \r\nin a  just way has led Michaelowa et al. (2018) to conclude that \r\nimplementation of strong mitigation policy packages that are needed \r\nrequires a systemic change in policymaking."


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"Multiple modelling assessments of different development and \r\nmitigation pathways are available. Most of these analyses which lead \r\nto significant climate mitigation assume significant systemic change \r\nacross social, technological, and economic aspects of a country for \r\nexample, India (Gupta et al. 2020); Japan (Sugiyama et al. 2021) and \r\nthe globe (Rogelj et al. 2015; Dejuan et al. 2020)."


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"Economy-wide packages, as a  way to stimulate and/or restructure \r\ndomestic economies to deliver particular, desired outcomes is \r\na widely accepted tool of government (for example the Roosevelt's \r\nNew Deal packages in the USA between 1933 and 1939). a number \r\nof country-level stimulus package were put in place after the 2008 \r\nGlobal Recession, and there was support for a Global Green New Deal \r\nfrom UNEP (Steiner 2009; Barbier 2010). Cross-economy structural \r\nchange packages may provide opportunities for another approach to \r\naccelerate climate mitigation. "


id: a02985d44c702e2937e8b981e517fc13
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"UNEP (2020) argued that major, long-term sectoral transformation \r\nacross multiple systems is needed to reach net zero GHG emissions. \r\nBernstein and Hoffmann (2019) and Rockstrom et al. (2017) \r\nargue that the presence of multi-level, multi-sectoral lock-ins of \r\noverlapping and interdependent political, economic, technological \r\nand cultural forces mean that a new approach of coordinated, cross\u0002economy, systemic climate mitigation is necessary. Creutzig et al. \r\n(2018) propose a resetting of the approach to consumption and use \r\nof resources to that of demand side solutions, which would have \r\nongoing economy-wide systemic implications."


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content:
"This approach has already been taken up to some degree by \r\na  number of countries/blocs. For example, California as well as \r\nGermany, through the German Energiewende, are early examples of \r\na USA state and a country which have tried to link their economies to \r\na sustainable future through energy-wide efforts of structural change \r\n(Morris and Jungjohann 2016; Burger et al. 2020a). "


id: 90b8f53445f4ee8ae97a4be9fbfcb81
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content:
"boosting economic activity, supporting the recovery from the \r\nCOVID-19 pandemic (Jaumotte et al. 2020)."


id: 7b671d76d53221e2b3c974d9280b7529
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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"In addition to these economy-wide measures, there have since been \r\ncross-economy Green New Deals implemented such as the European \r\nGreen Deal (Elkerbout et al. 2020; Hainsch et al. 2020; UNEP 2020a) \r\n(Box 13.1) with calls for other New Deals, for example a Blue New \r\nDeal (Dundas et al. 2020), or deals to bring together climate and \r\njustice goals (Hathaway 2020; MacArthur et al. 2020). "


id: 3bf9ec91435ef6b48b1ff516b6ed6cf9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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"Conversely, other short-term fiscal or recovery measures in stimulus \r\npackages may perpetuate high carbon and environmental damaging \r\nsystems. These include fossil fuel based infrastructure investment; \r\nfiscal incentives for high carbon technologies or projects; waivers \r\nor roll-backs of environmental regulation; bailouts of fossil fuel \r\nintensive companies without conditions for low-carbon transitions \r\nor environmental sustainability (UNEP 2020a; O'Callaghan and \r\nMurdock 2021; Vivid Economics 2021)."


id: b0628d50cba34614d1bed622b33be4ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"The COVID-19 Pandemic has resulted in global economic recession, \r\nwhich many Governments have responded to with economic \r\nstimulus programmes. See also Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1 on \r\nCOVID-19. It has also led to more analysis of the potential of cross\u0002economy stimulus packages to benefit climate goals, including what \r\nlessons can be learned from the stimulus packages put in place as \r\na result of the 2008-2009 Global Recession. "


id: 5bc7062f0d7d619da3fd744d00029bd7
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"The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reviewed the \r\ngreen stimulus plans of the G20 following the 2008-2009 recession \r\nto examine what worked; what did not; and the lessons which could \r\nbe learnt (Barbier 2010). This work was updated (Barbier 2020) \r\nand concluded that the constituents of successful green stimulus \r\nframeworks were long-term commitments in public spending; pricing \r\nreform; ensuring concerns about affordability were overcome; and \r\nminimising unwanted distributional impacts. Others argue that \r\npost-2008 recession stimulus package outcomes benefited both \r\nenvironmental and industrial objectives and that a long-term policy \r\ncommitment to the transition to a sustainable, low-carbon economy \r\nmakes sense from both an environmental and industrial strategy \r\npoint of view (Fankhauser et al. 2013). "


id: e37f01cf71375d289b9ea1447a842efc
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"The multidisciplinary literature exploring how to accelerate \r\nclimate mitigation and transition to low GHG economies and \r\nsystems has grown rapidly over the last few years. Acceleration \r\nis also confirmed as an important sub-theme of the more specific \r\ntransition literature (Kohler et al. 2019). While literature focusing \r\non how to accelerate the impact of climate mitigation is derived \r\nfrom empirical evidence, there is very little ex post evidence of \r\ndirected acceleration approaches."


id: 570d12908b6bf416153dfd451556c329
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"The overlapping discussions of how to accelerate climate mitigation; \r\ntransition to low-carbon economies; and shift development pathways \r\ndepends heavily on country-specific dynamics in political coalitions, \r\nmaterial endowments, industry strategy, cultural discourses, and civil \r\nsociety pressures (Sections 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.7, and 13.8). Ambition \r\nfor acceleration at different scales and stringency (whether for cities, \r\ncountry climate policies, country industrial strategies, or national \r\neconomic restructuring) increase governance challenges, including \r\ncoordination across stakeholders, institutions, and scales. 'There is \r\ntherefore no \"one-size-fits-all\" blueprint for accelerating low-carbon \r\ntransitions' (medium evidence, high agreement) (Geels et al. 2017a; \r\nRoberts et al. 2018)."


id: 9931cec425523393bbbde62e3286bf2e
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"Others provide a framework which allows a systematic evaluation \r\nof options, given objectives and indicators, for COVID-19 stimulus \r\npackages (e.g. Dupont et al. 2020; Jotzo et al. 2020; OECD 2021c). \r\nJotzo et al. (2020) conclude that the programmes that most closely \r\nmatch green stimulus are afforestation and ecosystem restoration \r\nprogrammes, energy efficiency upgrades and RE projects. These type \r\nof policies provide short-term goals of COVID-19 while also making \r\nprogress on longer terms objectives (Jotzo et al. 2020). The IMF \r\nconcluded that a comprehensive mitigation policy package combining \r\ncarbon pricing and government green infrastructure spending (that \r\nis partly debt financed) can reduce emissions substantially while "


id: af4b10229b33bce68ca29bed6b984f79
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content:
"Markard et al. (2020) describe the key challenges to accelerating \r\nclimate mitigation and sustainability transitions as: "


id: 9ff64469a5086da5815d6f758b11798b
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content:
"transformative change. They argue that 'deep leverage points' - the \r\ngoals of a system, its intent, and rules - need to be addressed more \r\ndirectly, and they provide analysis of the food and energy systems. "


id: bda97547ab972a98a52ab10e1e4d1e91
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"The strategic choosing of policies and points of intervention is \r\nlinked to the importance of choosing self-reinforcing actions for \r\nacceleration (Rosenbloom et al. 2018; Butler-Sloss et al. 2021; Sharpe \r\nand Lenton 2021; Jordan and Moore 2020; Bang 2021). Butler-Sloss \r\net al. (2021) explains the types of self-reinforcing actions (or feedback \r\nloops) which can encourage or undermine rapid transformation of \r\nenergy systems. "


id: d5805eb3c04d41a34e8aa5fb8a0ffcd6
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content:
"An example of this first overarching action, the strategic targeting of \r\nthe challenges to acceleration, is the focus on undermining carbon\u0002intensive systems, thereby reducing opposition to more generalised \r\nacceleration policies, including the encouragement of low-carbon \r\nsystems (robust evidence, high agreement) (Hvelplund and Djorup \r\n2017; Rosenbloom 2018; Roberts and Geels 2019; Victor et al. \r\n2019; Rosenbloom et al. 2020; Rosenbloom and Rinscheid 2020). \r\nUndermining high carbon systems includes deliberately phasing out \r\nunsustainable technologies and systems (Kivimaa and Kern 2016; \r\nDavid 2017; European Environment Agency 2019; Johnsson et al. \r\n2019; UNEP 2019b; Carter and McKenzie 2020; Newell and Simms \r\n2020); confronting the issues of incumbent resistance (Roberts et al. \r\n2018); and avoiding future emissions and energy excess by reducing \r\ndemand (Rogelj et al. 2015; UNEP 2019b; Victor et al. 2019)."


id: 620668b6bb6acccaac75461b7d603b8c
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"Other strategic goals include tackling the equity and justice issues of \r\n'stranded regions' (Spencer et al. 2018); paying greater attention to \r\nsystem architecture to enable increased acceleration to low-carbon \r\nelectricity supply, in this case in the wind industry (McMeekin et al. \r\n2019); and the importance of maintaining global ecosystem of low\u0002carbon supply chains (Goldthau and Hughes 2020). "


id: e303b03770f8a188108ac2291badd80e
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"Other strategic goals combine national and global action. For \r\nexample, global NGO coalitions have formed around strategic policy \r\noutcomes such as the 'Keep it in the Ground' movement (Carter \r\nand McKenzie 2020), and are supported via coordinated networks, \r\nsuch as the Powering Past Coal Alliance (Jewell et al. 2019), and \r\nwith knowledge dissemination, for example, the 'Fossil Fuel Cuts \r\nDatabase' (Gaulin and Le Billon 2020). "


id: 5b63d96d6628e42cbe46e941bc65f28
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content:
"The acceleration literature links two over-arching actions: first, \r\na  strategic targeting approach to overcoming the challenges to \r\nacceleration by a parallel focus on undermining high carbon systems \r\nwhile simultaneously encouraging low-carbon systems; and second, \r\nfocusing on a coordinated, cross-economy systemic response, including \r\nharnessing enabling conditions (robust evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Rogelj et al. 2015; Geels et al. 2017b; Hvelplund and Djorup 2017; \r\nGomez Echeverri 2018; Markard 2018; Tvinnereim and Mehling 2018; \r\nO'Brien 2018; Roberts et al. 2018; Hess 2019; Kotilainen et al. 2019; \r\nVictor et al. 2019; European Environment Agency 2019; Rosenbloom \r\nand Rinscheid 2020; Newell and Simms 2020; Otto et al. 2020; Strauch \r\n2020; Burger et al. 2020a; Hsu et al. 2020b; Rosenbloom et al. 2020). "


id: c18488be5c978d271c287b67261f772e
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"The second overarching point highlighted by the literature is the \r\nbenefits of focusing on a  coordinated, cross-economy systemic \r\nresponse. Coordination is central to this. For example, coordination \r\nof actions and coherent narratives across sectors and cross \r\neconomy, including within and between all governance levels and \r\nscales of actions, is beneficial for acceleration (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement) (Zurn and Faude 2013; Hawkey and Webb 2014; \r\nHuttunen et al. 2014; Magro et al. 2014; Warren et al. 2016; Kohler \r\net al. 2019; Kotilainen et al. 2019; McMeekin et al. 2019; Victor et al. \r\n2019; Hsu et al. 2020b). Victor et al. (2019) provide a framework of \r\nhow to prioritise the most urgent actions for climate mitigation and \r\nthey give practical case studies of how to improve coordination to \r\naccelerate reconfiguration of systems for economy-wide climate \r\nmitigation in sectors such as power; cars; shipping; aviation; \r\nbuildings; cement; and plastics. "


id: 8be60944b57fd2b93a3b067a497938bd
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content:
"Strategic targeting, or the identifying of specific intervention points \r\n(Kanger et al. 2020), points of leverage (Abson et al. 2017), or upward \r\ncascading tipping points (Sharpe and Lenton 2021), broadly means \r\nchoosing particular actions which will lead to a greater acceleration \r\nof climate mitigation across systems. For example, Dorninger \r\net al.(2020) provide a  quantitative systematic review of empirical \r\nresearch addressing sustainability interventions. They take 'leverage \r\npoints' - places in complex systems where relatively small changes \r\ncan lead to potentially transformative systemic changes - to classify \r\ndifferent interventions according to their potential for system-wide "


id: 64a39950201ef063ba8474b6c775ecb6
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content:
"However, coordination is a  necessary but insufficient condition of \r\nacceleration. All enabling conditions are required to deliver systemic \r\ntransformation (Section 13.9.2)."


id: 38c2f5b52231c000b7ca2fc399ab9261
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content:
"Research has expanded in a  number of areas relevant to climate \r\nmitigation, yet there is considerable scope to add to knowledge. \r\nKey areas for research exist in climate institutions and governance, \r\npolitics, policies and acceleration of action. In each area there is an \r\noverarching need for more ex post analysis of impact, more cases \r\nfrom the developing world, and understanding how institutions and \r\npolicies work in combination with each other."


id: 9705c8b8099dd5a0e314d8d965d7af02
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"Institutions and governance underpin mitigation. Climate laws provide the legal basis for action, organisations through which policies \r\nare developed and implemented, and frameworks through which diverse actors interact. Specific organisations, such as expert \r\ncommittees, can inform emission reduction targets, inform the creation of policies and packages, and strengthen accountability. \r\nInstitutions enable strategic thinking, building consensus among stakeholders and enhanced coordination. "


id: 780d42493ef687c75a46e2735d60620a
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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"Climate governance is constrained and enabled by countries' political systems, material endowments and their ideas, values and \r\nbelief systems, which leads to a variety of country-specific approaches to climate mitigation. "


id: 39445f8bae90573e7b3244d7aadf4007
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"Countries follow diverse approaches. Some countries focus on greenhouse gases emissions by adopting comprehensive climate laws \r\nand creating dedicated ministries and institutions focused on climate change. Others consider climate change among broader scope \r\nof policy objectives, such as poverty alleviation, energy security, economic development and co-benefits of climate actions, with the \r\ninvolvement of existing agencies and ministries. See also FAQ 13.3 on sub-national climate mitigation."


id: 81f7db73ec70d0aff0f6863855089888
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"Institutions can enable creation of mitigation and sectoral policy instruments; policy packages for low-carbon system transition, \r\nand economy-wide measures for systemic restructuring. Policy instruments to reduce greenhouses gas emissions include economic \r\ninstruments, regulatory instruments and other approaches. "


id: e9b19f679843c5de627e5f976e508ad0
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"Economic policy instruments directly influence prices to achieve emission reductions through taxes, permit trading, offset systems, \r\nsubsidies, and border tax adjustments, and are effective in promoting implementation of low-cost emissions reductions. Regulatory \r\ninstruments help achieve specific mitigation outcomes particularly in sectoral applications, by establishing technology or performance \r\nrequirements. Other instruments include information programmes, government provision of goods, services and infrastructure, \r\ndivestment strategies, and voluntary agreements between governments and private firms."


id: 17bb7283648e4b44f17a7a17359c75e9
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"Climate policy instruments can be sector-specific or economy-wide and could be applied at national, regional, or local levels. \r\nPolicymakers may directly target GHG emission reduction or seek to achieve multiple objectives, such as urbanisation or energy \r\nsecurity, with the effect of reducing emissions. In practice, climate mitigation policy instruments operate in combination with other \r\npolicy tools, and require attention to the interaction effects between instruments. At all levels of governance, coverage, stringency \r\nand design of climate policies define their efficiency in reducing greenhouse gases emissions."


id: 70411c947a50aca51c0b8cab52ed127e
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content:
"Policy packages, when designed with attention to interactive effects, local governance context, and harnessed to a clear vision for \r\nchange, are better able to support socio-technical transitions and shifts in development pathways toward low-carbon futures than \r\nindividual policies. See also Chapter 14 on international climate governance. "


id: b30e96cc008f80fcfe025850dcdb7485
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"Sub-national actors (for example individuals, organisations, jurisdictions and networks at regional, local and city levels) often \r\nhave a remit over areas salient to climate mitigation, such as land-use planning, waste management, infrastructure, housing, and \r\ncommunity development. Despite constraints on legal authority and dependence on national policy priorities in many countries, sub\u0002national climate change policies exist in more than 120 countries. However, they often lack national support, funding, and capacity, \r\nand adequate coordination with other scales. Sub-national climate action in support of specific goals is more likely to succeed when \r\nlinked to local issues such as travel congestion alleviation, air pollution control."


id: 24278c8fdd28cded54f2f106db996135
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"The main drivers of climate actions at sub-national levels include high levels of citizen concern, jurisdictional authority and funding, \r\ninstitutional capacity, national level support and effective linkage to development objectives. Sub-national governments often \r\ninitiate and implement policy experiments that could be scaled to other levels of governance."


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"Preety Bhandari (India), Antonina Ivanova Boncheva (Mexico), Alejandro Caparros (Spain), \r\nKamal Djemouai (Algeria), Izumi Kubota (Japan), Jacqueline Peel (Australia), Agus Pratama Sari \r\n(Indonesia), Detlef F. Sprinz (Germany), Jorgen Wettestad (Norway)"


id: 502c3cb91c40e301768721777279bb66
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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"Mustafa Babiker (Sudan/Saudi Arabia), Govindasamy Bala (India), Christopher Bataille (Canada), \r\nPaolo Bertoldi (Italy), Felix Creutzig (Germany), Heleen de Coninck (the Netherlands), Navroz \r\nK.  Dubash (India), Rachael Garrett (Switzerland/the United States of America), Oliver  Geden \r\n(Germany), Veronika Ginzburg (the Russian Federation), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), Erik Haites \r\n(Canada), Benjamin Hinder (United Kingdom), Janna Hoppe (Germany), Yong-Gun Kim (Republic of \r\nKorea), Katharine J. Mach (the United States of America), Gregory F. Nemet (the United States of \r\nAmerica/Canada), Kilian Raiser (Germany), Yamina Saheb (France/Algeria), Sonia I.  Seneviratne \r\n(Switzerland), Raphael Slade (United Kingdom), Masahiro Sugiyama (Japan), Christopher H. Trisos \r\n(South Africa), Maarten van Aalst (the Netherlands), Harro van Asselt (the Netherlands)"


id: f70ad7a5212873391d52421b12c05fb6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"Patt, A., L. Rajamani, P. Bhandari, A. Ivanova Boncheva, A. Caparros, K. Djemouai, I. Kubota, J. Peel, A.P. Sari, D.F. Sprinz, \r\nJ. Wettestad, 2022: International cooperation. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. \r\nContribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change \r\n[P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, \r\nM. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, \r\nNY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.016"


id: 201868d887ee792551e888fdcb42505
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"equity remain of central importance in the UN climate regime, \r\nnotwithstanding shifts in the operationalisation of 'common but \r\ndifferentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities' from Kyoto \r\nto Paris (high confidence). {14.3} "


id: 5a9276fdeeb6a87bc883a1277527064f
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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"International cooperation is having positive and measurable \r\nresults (high confidence). The Kyoto Protocol led to measurable \r\nand substantial avoided emissions, including in 20 countries with \r\nKyoto first commitment period targets that have experienced \r\na  decade of declining absolute emissions. It also built national \r\ncapacity for greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting, catalysed the \r\ncreation of GHG markets, and increased investments in low-carbon \r\ntechnologies (medium confidence). Other international agreements \r\nand institutions have led to avoided carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions \r\nfrom land use practices, as well as avoided emissions of some non\u0002CO2 greenhouse gases (medium confidence). {14.3, 14.5, 14.6}"


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"International cooperation under the United Nations (UN) \r\nclimate regime has taken an important new direction with \r\nthe entry into force of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which \r\nstrengthened the objective of the UN climate regime, \r\nincluding its long-term temperature goal, while adopting \r\na  different architecture from that of the Kyoto Protocol to \r\nachieve it (high confidence). The core national commitments \r\nunder the Kyoto Protocol have been legally binding quantified \r\nemission targets for developed countries tied to well-defined \r\nmechanisms for monitoring and enforcement. By contrast, the \r\ncommitments under the Paris Agreement are primarily procedural, \r\nextend to all Parties, and are designed to trigger domestic policies \r\nand measures, enhance transparency, stimulate climate investments, \r\nparticularly in developing countries, and to lead iteratively to rising \r\nlevels of ambition across all countries (high confidence). Issues of "


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"This chapter assesses the role and effectiveness of international \r\ncooperation in mitigating climate change. Such cooperation includes \r\nmultilateral global cooperative agreements among nation states such \r\nas the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change \r\n(UNFCCC), and its related legal instruments, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol \r\nand the 2015 Paris Agreement, but also plurilateral agreements \r\ninvolving fewer states, as well as those focused on particular economic \r\nand policy sectors, such as components of the energy system. \r\nMoreover, this chapter assesses the role of transnational agreements \r\nand cooperative arrangements between non-state and sub-national \r\nactors, including municipal governments, private sector firms and \r\nindustry consortia, and civil society organisations. This chapter does \r\nnot assess international cooperation within the European Union, as \r\nthis is covered in Chapter 13 of this report."


id: 3ea2d73330e6fc9ab2003b94a951eb2a
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"Past IPCC assessment reports have discussed the theoretical literature, \r\nproviding insights into the rationale for international cooperation, as \r\nwell as guidance as to its structure and implementation. This chapter \r\nlimits such theoretical discussion primarily to the new developments \r\nsince the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). Important developments in \r\nthis respect include attention to climate clubs (groups of countries and \r\npotentially non-state actors that can work together to achieve particular \r\nobjectives), and the effects of framing the global climate change \r\nmitigation challenge as one of accelerating a socio-technical transition \r\nor transformation, shifting development pathways accordingly, in \r\naddition to (or rather than) solving a global commons problem. This \r\nchapter draws from theory to identify a set of criteria by which to assess \r\nthe effectiveness of existing forms of international cooperation."


id: e9312ea390a5ccc2db524e2f29a98adc
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"The key development since AR5 has been the negotiation and \r\nadoption of the Paris Agreement, which, building on the UNFCCC, \r\nintroduces a new approach to global climate governance. This new \r\napproach, as discussed below (Section  14.3.1.1), is driven by the \r\nneed to engage developing countries in emissions reductions beyond \r\nthose they had taken on voluntarily under the Cancun Agreements, \r\nextend mitigation commitments to those developed countries that \r\nhad rejected or withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, and to respond to \r\nthe rapidly changing geopolitical context (Section 14.3.1.2). "


id: 99fcf850ff11e862d7e79bbae1674cb8
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"This section describes recent insights from social science theory that \r\ncan shed light on the need for and ideal structure of international \r\ncooperation. This section starts by describing developments in \r\nframing the underlying problem, moves towards a  body of theory \r\ndescribing the benefits of multilateral sub-global action, and ends \r\nwith a theory-based articulation of criteria to assess the effectiveness \r\nof international cooperation."


id: eeae2a41b2e75861ce092442d6b376a2
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"Previous IPCC reports have framed international climate cooperation, \r\nand indeed climate mitigation more generally, primarily as addressing \r\na global commons problem (Stavins et al. 2014). In this report, by \r\ncontrast, multiple framings are considered. Chapter  1  introduces \r\nfour analytic frameworks: aggregated economic approaches such as \r\ncost-benefit analysis, which maps onto the global commons framing; \r\nethical approaches; analysis of transitions and transformations; and \r\npsychology and politics of changing course. Here, we highlight some \r\nof the findings that are of relevance to international cooperation."


id: 5f7ee8cda79640df2aaad2957ba58e30
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"When applied to the international context, the public good (or global \r\ncommons) framing stresses that the incentives for mitigation at \r\nthe global level are greater than they are for any single country, since \r\nthe latter does not enjoy the benefits of its own mitigation efforts \r\nthat accrue outside its own borders (Stavins et al. 2014; Patt 2017). \r\nThis framing does not preclude countries engaging in mitigation, \r\neven ambitious mitigation, but it suggests that these countries' level \r\nof ambition and speed of abatement would be greater if they were \r\npart of a cooperative agreement. "


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"extent, the dichotomy of views aligns with the two framings: analysis \r\nimplicitly aligned with the global commons framing is negative about \r\nthe Paris architecture, whereas that aligned with the transitions \r\nframing is more positive (Kern and Rogge 2016; Patt 2017; Roberts \r\net al. 2018)."


id: e9e127e8788e827c2b0076f56f9ad449
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"the agreement, as countries can credibly threaten potential free\u0002riders with a  short-term agreement where green investments will \r\nbe insufficient due to the hold-up problem (Battaglini and Harstad \r\n2016). Finally, thresholds and potential climate catastrophes have \r\nalso been shown, theoretically and numerically, to reduce free-riding \r\nincentives, especially for countries that may become pivotal in failing \r\nto avoid the threshold (Barrett 2013; Emmerling et al. 2020)."


id: b77292aa17c1465ba05d0856f3e2220e
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"The analytic approach focusing on transitions and transformation \r\nfocuses on path-dependent processes as an impediment to the shift \r\nto low-carbon technologies and systems. Cross-Chapter Box 12 on \r\nTransition Dynamics (Chapter  16) summarises the key points of \r\nthis literature. This chapter describes how the two framings focus \r\non different indicators of progress, and potentially different types \r\nof cooperative action within the international context. This chapter \r\nhighlights in later sections conflicting views on whether the Paris \r\nAgreement is likely to prove effective (Section  14.3.3.2). To some "


id: f7200ec9b935f6d7dea77a7a5ee48eda
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"Just as the transition framing highlights indicators of progress other \r\nthan global emissions, it de-emphasises the importance of achieving \r\ncost-effectiveness with respect to global emissions. Hence, this strand \r\nof the literature does not generally support the use of international "


id: ea94de753de00534abdb42e8b58e867e
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"and an open membership policy can lead to a large stable climate \r\nagreement, including full participation. Table 14.1 presents a number \r\nof key results related to climate clubs from a static context."


id: 381e42370c63763d37636a1c43de8c78
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"This section identifies a set of criteria for assessing the effectiveness \r\nof international cooperation, which is applied later in the chapter. \r\nLessons from the implementation of other multilateral environmental \r\nagreements (MEAs) can provide some guidance. There is considerable \r\nliterature on this topic, most of which predates AR5, and which will \r\ntherefore not be covered in detail. Issues include ways to enhance \r\ncompliance, and the fact that a  low level of compliance with an \r\nMEA does not necessarily mean that the MEA has no effect (Downs \r\net al. 1996; Victor et al. 1998; Weiss and Jacobson 1998). Recent \r\nresearch examines effectiveness from the viewpoint of the extent to \r\nwhich an MEA influences domestic action, including the adoption of \r\nimplementing legislation and policies (Brandi et al. 2019). "


id: e78c98afd29c1f5d4351a2083e284eeb
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"Results based on an agent-based model suggest that climate clubs \r\nresult in major emissions reductions if there is a  sufficiently high \r\nprovision of the club good and if initial membership by several states \r\nwith sufficient emissions weight materialises. Such configurations \r\nallow the club to grow over time to enable effective global action \r\n(Hovi et al. 2017). The departure of a  major emitter (specifically \r\nthe United States) triggered a scientific discussion on the stability of \r\nthe Paris Agreement. Sprinz et al. (2018) explore whether climate clubs "


id: ef6a644c6fbd0d960c0a422961051747
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content:
"While environmental outcomes and economic performance have \r\nbeen long-standing criteria for assessment of effectiveness, \r\nthe other elements deserve some note. It is the case that the \r\nachievement of climate objectives, such as limiting global average \r\nwarming to 1.5degC-2degC, will require the transition from high- to \r\nlow-carbon technologies and the transformation of the sectors "


id: a8cf86d6884bf1608812acb29f23e2fe
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"and social environments within which those technologies operate. \r\nSuch transformations are not linear processes, and hence many of \r\nthe early steps taken -  such as supporting early diffusion of new \r\nrenewable energy technologies - will have little immediate effect on \r\nGHG emissions (Patt 2015; Geels et al. 2017). Hence, activities that \r\ncontribute to transformative potential include technology transfer \r\nand financial support for low-carbon infrastructure, especially where \r\nthe latter is not tied to immediate emissions reductions. Assessing \r\nthe transformative potential of international cooperation takes these \r\nfactors into account. Equity and distributive outcomes are of central \r\nimportance to the climate change debate, and hence for evaluating \r\nthe effects of policies. Equity encompasses the notion of distributive \r\njustice which refers to the distribution of goods, burdens, costs and \r\nbenefits, as well as procedural-related issues (Kverndokk 2018). "


id: 24dc815e2439bc99b3371619ef8105fd
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"The Kyoto Protocol specifies GHG emissions reduction targets for \r\nthe 2008-2012 commitment period for countries listed in its Annex \r\nB (which broadly corresponds to Annex I to the UNFCCC) (UNFCCC \r\n1997, Art. 3  and Annex B). The Kyoto Protocol entered into force \r\nin 2005. Shortly thereafter, states began negotiating a  second \r\ncommitment period under the Protocol for Annex B Parties, as well \r\nas initiating a  process under the UNFCCC to consider long-term \r\ncooperation among all Parties."


id: 5ed72d84d9de3a7bb6bcdabbc65d0183
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"At the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP13) in \r\nBali in 2007, Parties adopted the Bali Action Plan which launched \r\nnegotiations aimed at an agreed outcome enhancing the UNFCCC's \r\n'full, effective and sustained implementation'. The agreed outcome \r\nwas to be adopted at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, but negotiations \r\nfailed to deliver a consensus document. The result instead was the \r\nCopenhagen Accord, which was taken note of by the COP. While \r\nit was a political agreement with no formal legal status under the \r\nUNFCCC, it reflected significant progress on several fronts and set \r\nin place the building blocks for the Paris Agreement, namely: setting "


id: 2238750064c47e6ff80219e94575696e
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"In addition to building on the social science theory just described, \r\nwe recognise that it is also important to strike a  balance \r\nbetween applying the same standards developed and applied to \r\ninternational cooperation in AR5 and maintaining consistency with \r\nother chapters of this report (primarily Chapters 1, 4, 13 and 15). \r\nTable 14.2 presents a set of criteria that do this, and which are then \r\napplied later in the chapter."


id: c1a5dd24049c62aabeb278f896e0f288
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"a goal of limiting global temperature increase to below 2degC; calling \r\non all countries to put forward mitigation pledges; establishing \r\nbroad new terms for the reporting and verification of countries' \r\nactions; setting a goal of mobilising USD100 billion a year by 2020 \r\nfrom a  wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and \r\nmultilateral, including alternative sources of finance; and, calling \r\nfor the establishment of a new Green Climate Fund and Technology \r\nMechanism (Rajamani 2010; Rogelj et al. 2010; UNFCCC 2010a). One \r\nhundred and forty states endorsed the Copenhagen Accord, with 85 \r\ncountries entering pledges to reduce their emissions or constrain \r\ntheir growth by 2020 (Christensen and Olhoff 2019). "


id: 830c44a434179a79d74ada1f7478d9da
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"At COP16 in Cancun in 2010, Parties adopted a set of decisions termed \r\nthe Cancun Agreements that effectively formalised the core elements \r\nof the Copenhagen Accord, and the pledges states made, under the \r\nUNFCCC.  The Cancun Agreements were regarded as an interim \r\narrangement through to 2020, and Parties left the door open to further \r\nnegotiations, in line with negotiations launched in 2005, toward \r\na legally-binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol (Freestone 2010; Liu \r\n2011a). Collectively the G20 states are on track to meeting the mid \r\nlevel of their Cancun pledges, although there is uncertainty about some \r\nindividual pledges. However, there is significant gap between annual "


id: ffad075fca154a8490189811ed71c393
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"(La  Hoz  Theuer et al. 2019). Article 5  also provides explicit \r\nendorsement of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest \r\ndegradation and fostering conservation (REDD+). The Kyoto Protocol \r\ncontains an extensive reporting and review process, backed by \r\na compliance mechanism. This mechanism includes an enforcement \r\nbranch, to ensure compliance, and sanction non-compliance (through \r\nthe withdrawal of benefits such as participation in market-based \r\nmechanisms), with its national system requirements, and GHG \r\ntargets. By contrast, the Paris Agreement relies on informational \r\nrequirements and flows to enhance the clarity of NDCs, and to track \r\nprogress in the implementation and achievement of NDCs."


id: 3689541c6d6300a71bdb50cb26cb4457
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"emissions expected under full implementation of pledges and the level \r\nconsistent with the 2degC goal (Christensen and Olhoff 2019)."


id: 106f5f888105305ae9c369596de8bf7
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"At the 2011 Durban climate conference, Parties launched negotiations \r\nfor 'a Protocol, another legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal \r\nforce' with a scheduled end to the negotiations in 2015 (UNFCCC \r\n2012, Dec. 1, para. 2). At the 2012 Doha climate conference, Parties \r\nadopted a  second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, \r\nrunning from 2013-2020. The Doha Amendment entered into force \r\non 31 December 2020. Given the subsequent adoption of the Paris \r\nAgreement, the Kyoto Protocol is unlikely to continue beyond 2020 \r\n(Bodansky et al. 2017a). At the end of the compliance assessment \r\nperiod under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex B  Parties were in full \r\ncompliance with their targets for the first commitment period; in \r\nsome cases through the use of the Protocol's flexibility mechanisms \r\n(Shishlov et al. 2016). "


id: 7a20757b1a3d31c3919b107ad21d5d04
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"Beyond these countries, in the decade leading up to the Paris climate \r\nnegotiations, increasing differences within the group of developing \r\ncountries divided the 134-strong developing country alliance of the \r\nG77/China into several interest-based coalitions (Vihma et al. 2011; \r\nBodansky et al. 2017b). A division emerged between the vulnerable \r\nleast developed and small island states on the one side and rapidly \r\ndeveloping economies, the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and \r\nChina) on the other, as the latter are 'decidedly not developed but "


id: d9a4132e745894fa7cf170b23926a0a0
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"EU, and China being perceived as leaders at different points in time \r\nand to varying degrees (Karlsson et al. 2012; Parker et al. 2014). Small \r\nisland states are also credited with demonstrating 'moral leadership' \r\n(Agueda Corneloup and Mol 2014), and non-state and sub-national \r\nactors are beginning to be recognised as pioneers and leaders (Wurzel \r\net al. 2019). There is also a burgeoning literature on the emergence of \r\ndiffused leadership and the salience of followers (Parker et al. 2014; \r\nBusby and Urpelainen 2020)."


id: 314bd9b6f3d60bf8db78d1996584c668
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"It is in the context of this complex, multipolar and highly differentiated \r\nworld - with a heterogeneity of interests, constraints and capacities, \r\nincreased contestations over shares of the carbon and development \r\nspace, as well as diffused leadership - that the Paris Agreement was \r\nnegotiated. This context fundamentally influenced the shape of the \r\nParis Agreement, in particular on issues relating to its architecture, \r\n'legalisation' (Karlas 2017) and differentiation (Bodansky et al. \r\n2017b; Kinley et al. 2020), all of which are discussed below."


id: eb7592a3929b05e0fdcff8823f42173e
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"The 2015 Paris Agreement to the UNFCCC, which entered into force \r\non 4 November 2016, and has 193 Parties as of March 2022, is at \r\nthe centre of international cooperative efforts for climate change \r\nmitigation and adaptation in the post-2020 period. Although its legal \r\nform was heavily disputed, especially in the initial part of its four-year "


id: 107a48605d6b2d46dd6e35be84bfc3f7
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"Leadership is essential to reaching international agreements and \r\novercoming collective action problems (Parker et al. 2015). The Paris \r\nnegotiations were faced, as a reflection of the multipolarity that had \r\nemerged, with a 'fragmented leadership landscape' with the USA, "


id: a8f0d92cfa478e56465cffedd82b51c4
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"Figure 14.1 | Key features of the Paris Agreement. Arrows illustrate the interrelationship between the different features of the Paris Agreement, in particular between \r\nthe Agreement's goals, required actions through NDCs, support (finance, technology and capacity building), transparency framework and global stocktake process. The figure \r\nalso represents points of interconnection with domestic mitigation measures, whether taken by state Parties or by non-state actors (NSAs). This figure is illustrative rather than \r\nexhaustive of the features and interconnections."


id: b4a0baab27df847651f1ee22cc3b2e01
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"Some authors interpret the Paris Agreement's temperature goal as \r\na single goal with two inseparable elements, the well below 2degC goal \r\npressing towards 1.5degC (Rajamani and Werksman 2018), but others \r\ninterpret the goal as a unitary one of 1.5degC with minimal overshoot \r\n(Mace 2016). Yet others interpret 1.5degC as the limit within the long\u0002term temperature goal, and that it 'signals an increase in both the \r\nmargin and likelihood by which warming is to be kept below 2degC' \r\n(Schleussner et al. 2016). Although having a long-term goal has clear \r\nadvantages, the literature highlights the issue of credibility, given \r\nthe lengthy timeframe involved (Urpelainen 2011), and stresses \r\nthat future regulators may have incentives to relax current climate \r\nplans, which could have a  significant effect on the achieved GHG \r\nstabilisation level (Gerlagh and Michielsen 2015)."


id: fec5ca8c327a9c3d0cf70fd226a94bd3
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"The preamble of the Paris Agreement lists several factors that provide \r\nthe interpretative context for the Agreement (Bodansky et al. 2017b; \r\nCarazo 2017), including a  reference to human rights. The human \r\nrights implications of climate impacts garnered particular attention \r\nin the lead up to Paris (Duyck 2015; Mayer 2016b). In particular, the \r\nHuman Rights Council, its special procedures mechanisms, and the \r\nOffice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, through a series \r\nof resolutions, reports, and activities, advocated a  rights-based \r\napproach to climate impacts, and sought to integrate this approach in \r\nthe climate change regime. The Paris Agreement's preambular recital \r\non human rights recommends that Parties, 'when taking action to \r\naddress human rights', take into account 'their respective obligations "


id: 3cb77a6375fc20c22ad6f2d2629186d3
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"At last count 131 countries had adopted or had net zero targets \r\n(whether of carbon or GHG) in the pipeline, covering 72% of global \r\nemissions. If these targets are fully implemented some estimate \r\nthat this could bring temperature increase down to 2degC-2.4degC by \r\n2100 as compared to current policies which are estimated to lead \r\nto a  temperature increase of 2.9-3.2degC, and NDCs submitted to \r\nthe Paris Agreement which are estimated to lead to a temperature \r\nincrease of 2.4degC-2.9degC (Hohne et al. 2021). "


id: b58af3bd9fe6131e4a5af59cdab0e771
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"Although NDCs are developed by individual state Parties, the Paris \r\nAgreement requires that these are undertaken by Parties 'with \r\na  view' to achieving the Agreement's purpose and collectively \r\n'represent a progression over time' (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 3). The Paris \r\nAgreement also encourages Parties to align the ambition of their \r\nNDCs with the temperature goal through the Agreement's 'ambition \r\ncycle', thus imparting operational relevance to the temperature goal \r\n(Rajamani and Werksman 2018). "


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"Article 4.1 contains a  further non-binding requirement that Parties \r\n'aim' to reach global peaking of GHG 'as soon as possible' and \r\nto undertake rapid reductions thereafter to achieve net zero GHG \r\nemissions 'in the second half of the century'. Some argue this implies \r\na need to reach net zero GHG emissions in the third quarter of the \r\n21st century (Rogelj et al. 2015; IPCC 2018b) (Chapter 2, Table 2.4 and \r\nCross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3). To reach net zero CO2 around 2050, \r\nin the short-term global net human-caused CO2 emissions would need \r\nto fall by about 45% to 60% from 2010 levels by 2030 (IPCC 2018b). \r\nAchieving the Paris Agreement's Article 4.1 aim potentially implies that \r\nglobal warming will peak and then follow a gradually declining path, \r\npotentially to below 1.5degC warming (Rogelj et al. 2021). "


id: 1d289f14d7fd921d4ed367e37d871ce9
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"have noted that given the key role of CDR in net zero targets and \r\n1.5degC compatible pathways, and the fact that it presents 'significant \r\ncosts to current and future generations', it is important to consider \r\nwhat an equitable distribution of CDR might look like (UNFCCC \r\n2019c; Day et al. 2020; Lee et al. 2021b)."


id: 9cf22c13a2008eae21fe27506377f957
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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"Each Party to the Paris Agreement has a  procedural obligation to \r\n'prepare, communicate and maintain' successive NDCs 'that it intends \r\nto achieve'. Parties have a further procedural obligation to 'pursue \r\ndomestic mitigation measures' (UNFCCC 2015a, Art.  4.2). These \r\nprocedural obligations are coupled with an obligation of conduct to \r\nmake best efforts to achieve the objectives of NDCs (Rajamani 2016a; \r\nMayer 2018b). Many states have adopted climate policies and laws, \r\ndiscussed in Chapter 13, and captured in databases (LSE 2020)."


id: aa985dac822dbfa288fd18108e58fb6d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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"The framing and content of NDCs is thus largely left up to Parties, \r\nalthough certain normative expectations apply. These include \r\ndeveloped country leadership through these Parties undertaking \r\neconomy-wide absolute emissions reduction targets (UNFCCC 2015a, \r\nArt. 4.4), as well as 'progression' and 'highest possible ambition' \r\nreflecting 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective \r\ncapabilities in light of different national circumstances' (Art. 4.3). \r\nThere is 'a firm expectation' that for every five-year cycle a  Party \r\nputs forward a new or updated NDC that is 'more ambitious than \r\ntheir last' (Rajamani 2016a). While what represents a Party's highest \r\npossible ambition and progression is not prescribed by the Agreement \r\nor elaborated in the Paris Rulebook (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019), \r\nthese obligations could be read to imply a due diligence standard \r\n(Voigt and Ferreira 2016b)."


id: 172d20a7993a223a5a8aa625b0e51be0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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"There are several approaches to evaluating NDCs, incorporating \r\nindicators such as CO2 emissions, GDP, energy intensity of GDP, \r\nCO2 per energy unit, CO2 intensity of fossil fuels, and share of fossil \r\nfuels in total energy use (Peters et al. 2017). However, some favour \r\napproaches that use metrics beyond emissions such as infrastructure \r\ninvestment, energy demand, or installed power capacity (Iyer et al. \r\n2017; Jeffery et al. 2018). One approach is to combine the comparison \r\nof aggregate NDC emissions using Integrated Assessment Model \r\nscenarios with modelling of NDC scenarios directly, and carbon \r\nbudget analyses (Jeffery et al. 2018). Another approach is to engage \r\nin a  comprehensive assessment of multiple indicators that reflect \r\nthe different viewpoints of the Parties to the UNFCCC (Aldy et al. \r\n2017; Hohne et al. 2018). These different approaches are described in \r\ngreater depth in Section 4.2.2."


id: e1966e9d29a4fc17bb6fb02d6f7a0291
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content:
"Parties' first NDCs submitted to the provisional registry maintained by \r\nthe UNFCCC Secretariat vary in terms of target type, reference year \r\nor points, timeframes, and scope and coverage of GHGs. A significant "


id: a29e2165ae59b4d6e805765fd5a6a907
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"2019). According to the estimates in Table  4.3, communicated \r\nunconditional commitments imply about a  7% reduction of world \r\nemissions by 2030, in terms of Kyoto GHGs, compared to a scenario \r\nwhere only current policies are in place. If conditional commitments \r\nare also included, the reduction in world emissions by 2030 would \r\nbe about 12%. "


id: 62e62b2d0182b9906de5b4ae18ab5477
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"(including their conditional elements), implies possibility of global \r\nemissions peaking before 2030'. However, such total global GHG \r\nemission level in 2030 is still expected to be 15.9% above the 2010 \r\nlevel. This 'implies an urgent need for either a significant increase in \r\nthe level of ambition of NDCs between now and 2030 or a significant \r\noverachievement of the latest NDCs, or a  combination of both.' \r\n(UNFCCC 2021a). "


id: 98d9cd65f2cbbbaa90fb426e6a96010e
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"The Paris Agreement encourages Parties, while submitting their NDCs, \r\nto explain how these are 'fair and ambitious' (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 4.8 \r\nread with UNFCCC 2016a, para. 27). The Rulebook obliges Parties to \r\nprovide information on 'fairness considerations, including reflecting \r\non equity' as applicable to their NDC (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019; \r\nUNFCCC 2019b paras. 7a and 9, Annex, paras. 6(a) and (b)). Although \r\nequity within nations and between communities is also important, \r\nmuch of the literature on fairness and equity in the context of NDCs \r\nfocuses on equity between nations."


id: c11ad57437dbac162d694bc09a2897b4
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content:
"It is challenging, however, to determine 'fair shares', and address \r\nfairness and equity in a  world of voluntary climate contributions \r\n(Chan 2016a), in particular, since these contributions are insufficient \r\n(Section  14.3.2.2.). Self-differentiation in contributions has also \r\nled to fairness and equity being discussed in terms of individual \r\nNationally Determined Contributions rather than between categories \r\nof countries (Chan 2016a). In the climate change regime, one option \r\nis for Parties to provide more rigorous information under the Paris \r\nAgreement to assess fair shares (Winkler et al. 2018), and another \r\nis for Parties to articulate what equity principles they have adopted \r\nin determining their NDCs and how they have operationalised \r\nthese principles, and to explain their mitigation targets in terms of \r\nthe portion of the appropriated global carbon budget (Hales and \r\nMackey 2018). "


id: a92092f1e297b76bab1c38d935a55798
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content:
"Equity is critical to addressing climate change, including through the \r\nParis Agreement (Klinsky et al. 2017), however, since the political \r\nfeasibility of developing equity principles within the climate change \r\nregime is low, the onus is on mechanisms and actors outside the \r\nregime to develop these (Lawrence and Reder 2019). Equity and \r\nfairness concerns are being raised in national and regional courts \r\nthat are increasingly being asked to determine if the climate actions \r\npledged by states are adequate in relation to their fair share \r\n(The Supreme Court of the Netherlands 2019; European Court of \r\nHuman Rights 2020; German Constitutional Court 2021), as it is \r\nonly in relation to such a 'fair share' that the adequacy of a state's \r\ncontribution can be assessed in the context of a  global collective \r\naction problem (Section 13.5.5). Some domestic courts have stressed \r\nthat as climate change is a  global problem of cumulative impact, "


id: 40331f69680a83ef77f8cb1061ff4251
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content:
"Although NDCs reflect a  'bottom-up', self-differentiated approach \r\nto climate mitigation actions, the Paris Agreement couples this to \r\nan international transparency framework designed, among other \r\nthings, to track progress in implementing and achieving mitigation \r\ncontributions (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 13). This transparency framework \r\nbuilds on the processes that already exist under the UNFCCC. The "


id: 4b75e4c49f3e84f1489937f2b8e9d357
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"transparency framework under the Paris Agreement is applicable \r\nto all Parties, although with flexibilities for developing country \r\nParties that need it in light of their capacities (Mayer 2019). Each \r\nParty is required to submit a  national inventory report, as well as \r\n'the information necessary to track progress in implementing and \r\nachieving' its NDC (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 13.7) biennially (UNFCCC \r\n2016a, para. 90). The Paris Rulebook requires all Parties to submit \r\ntheir national inventory reports using the 2006 IPCC Guidelines \r\n(UNFCCC 2019b, Annex, para. 20). "


id: 9e4949dd107fad938c8e1747f2f45e65
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content:
"The Paris Agreement's transparency framework is complemented by \r\nthe global stocktake, which will take place every five years (starting \r\nin 2023) and assess the collective progress towards achieving the \r\nAgreement's purpose and long-term goals (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 14). \r\nThe scope of the global stocktake is comprehensive  - covering \r\nmitigation, adaptation and means of implementation and support - \r\nand the process is to be facilitative and consultative. The Paris \r\nRulebook outlines the scope of the global stocktake to include social \r\nand economic consequences and impacts of response measures, \r\nand loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate \r\nchange (UNFCCC 2019f, paras. 8-10)."


id: 6339d441d96b3290df50e49f80fe8fb2
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"In relation to the provision of information necessary to track progress \r\ntowards implementation and achievement of NDCs, the Paris Rulebook \r\nallows each Party to choose its own qualitative or quantitative \r\nindicators (UNFCCC 2019k, Annex, para. 65), a significant concession \r\nto national sovereignty (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019). The Rulebook \r\nphases in common reporting requirements for developed and \r\ndeveloping countries (except LDCs and SIDS) at the latest by 2024 \r\n(UNFCCC 2019k, para. 3), but offers flexibilities in 'scope, frequency, \r\nand level of detail of reporting, and in the scope of the review' for \r\nthose developing countries that need it in light of their capacities \r\n(UNFCCC 2019k, Annex, para. 5). Some differentiation also remains \r\nfor information on support provided to developing countries (Winkler \r\net al. 2017), with developed country Parties required to report such \r\ninformation biennially, while others are only 'encouraged' to do so \r\n(UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 9.7). "


id: 94207566138b81b943759730dff9a23f
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"The global stocktake is to occur 'in the light of equity and the \r\nbest available science'. While the focus of the global stocktake is \r\non collective and not individual progress towards the goals of the \r\nAgreement, the inclusion of equity in the global stocktake enables \r\na discussion on equitable burden sharing (Rajamani 2016a; Winkler \r\n2020), and for equity metrics to be factored in (Robiou du Pont and \r\nMeinshausen 2018). The Paris Rulebook includes consideration of the \r\nmodalities and sources of inputs for the global stocktake (UNFCCC \r\n2019f, paras. 1, 2, 13, 27, 31, 36h and 37g), which arguably will result \r\nin equity being factored into the outcome of the stocktake (Winkler \r\n2020). The Rulebook does not, however, some argue, resolve the \r\ntension between the collective nature of the assessment that is \r\nauthorised by the stocktake and the individual assessments required \r\nto determine relative 'fair share' (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019; \r\nZahar 2019). "


id: fce3c32d38d5328338a1ca7ba8806d8
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"The global stocktake is seen as crucial to encouraging Parties to \r\nincrease the ambition of their NDCs (Huang 2018; Hermwille et al. \r\n2019; Milkoreit and Haapala 2019) as its outcome 'shall inform Parties \r\nin updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their \r\nactions and support' (Art. 14.3) (Rajamani 2016a; Friedrich 2017; \r\nZahar 2019). The Rulebook provides for the stocktake to draw on \r\na wide variety of inputs sourced from a full range of actors, including \r\n'non-Party stakeholders' (UNFCCC 2019f, para. 37). However, the \r\nRulebook specifies that the global stocktake will be 'a Party-driven \r\nprocess' (UNFCCC 2019f, para. 10), will not have an 'individual Party \r\nfocus', and will include only 'non-policy prescriptive consideration of \r\ncollective progress' (UNFCCC 2019f, para. 14)."


id: ed58b44fbd22ee58ce218d8947e9e970
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"Article 5  of the Paris Agreement calls for Parties to take action to \r\nconserve and enhance sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, \r\nincluding biomass in terrestrial, coastal, and marine ecosystems, \r\nand encourages countries to take action to support the REDD+ \r\nframework under the Convention. The explicit inclusion of land use \r\nsector activities, including forest conservation, is potentially, while \r\ncautiously, a 'game changer' as it encourages countries to safeguard \r\necosystems for climate mitigation purposes (Grassi et al. 2017). \r\nAnalyses of Parties' NDCs shows pledged mitigation from land \r\nuse, and forests in particular, provides a  quarter of the emissions \r\nreductions planned by Parties and, if fully implemented, would result "


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"have been at best mixed. However, Article 6 goes beyond the project\u0002based approach followed by the CDM, as hinted by the emerging \r\nlandscape of activities based on Article 6 (Greiner et al. 2020), such \r\nas the bilateral treaty signed under the framework of Article 6  in \r\nOctober 2020 by Switzerland and Peru (Section 14.4.4)."


id: af4eb59919a72ca6b915a4b98edfbd6f
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"A key action endorsed by Article 5  is REDD+, which refers to \r\ninitiatives established under the UNFCCC for reducing emissions from \r\ndeforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, \r\nsustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest \r\ncarbon stocks in developing countries. It remains an evolving concept \r\nand some identified weaknesses are being addressed, including \r\nthe issues of scale (project-based vs sub-national jurisdictional \r\napproach), problems with leakage, reversal, and benefit sharing, as \r\nwell as safeguards against potential impacts on local and indigenous \r\ncommunities. Nevertheless, REDD+ shows several innovations \r\nunder the climate regime with regard to international cooperation. \r\nThe legal system for REDD+ manages to reconcile flexibility \r\n(creating consensus) and legal security. It shows a high standard of \r\neffectiveness (Dellaux 2017)."


id: acd0fea832e5d1e94558debfe5bc9e36
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"This experience from the CDM is relevant to the implementation \r\nof Article 6  (4) of the Paris Agreement. It addresses a  number of \r\nspecific types of cooperative approaches, including those involving \r\nthe use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) \r\ntowards NDCs, a  'mechanism to contribute to mitigation and \r\nsupport sustainable development', and a framework for non-market \r\napproaches such as many aspects of REDD+. "


id: 92f4318d20584a3518dad29a29c353c1
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"Article 6 of the Paris Agreement provides for voluntary cooperative \r\napproaches. Its potential importance in terms of project-based \r\ncooperation should be viewed against the background of key lessons \r\nfrom the market-based mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, \r\nparticularly the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM has \r\nbeen used for implementing bilateral strategies and unilateral (non\u0002market) actions for instance in India (Phillips and Newell 2013), hence \r\narguably covering all the mechanisms now included in Article 6 of the \r\nParis Agreement. As we describe in Section 14.3.3.1, below, ex post\r\nevaluation of the Kyoto market mechanisms, in particular the CDM, "


id: 3be6f6a0dbe763c2110737de25a942e0
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"Article 6.4 concerns the mitigation mechanism, with some similarities \r\nto the Kyoto Protocol's CDM. Unlike the CDM, there is no restriction \r\non which Parties can host mitigation projects and which Parties can \r\nuse the resulting emissions reductions towards their NDCs (Marcu \r\n2016). This central mechanism will operate under the authority and \r\nguidance of the CMA, and is to be supervised by a body designated \r\nby the CMA (Marcu 2016)."


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"of the international climate change regime, such as the Climate \r\nInvestment Funds administered through multilateral development \r\nbanks (the role of these banks in climate finance is discussed \r\nfurther in Section 14.4.1 below). "


id: 3bff8bae92a33b94f993d1b38f37eaab
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"The Article 6.4 central mechanism is intended to promote mitigation \r\nwhile fostering sustainable development. The decision adopting the \r\nParis Agreement specifies experience with Kyoto market mechanisms \r\nas a  basis for the new mitigation mechanism (UNFCCC 2016a, \r\npara. 37(f)). Compared with the CDM under the Kyoto Protocol, the \r\ncentral mechanism has a more balanced focus on both climate and \r\ndevelopment objectives, and a stronger political mandate to measure \r\nsustainable development impact and to verify that the impacts are \r\n'real, measurable, and long-term' (Olsen et al. 2018). There are also \r\nopportunities to integrate human rights into the central mechanism \r\n(Obergassel et al. 2017b; Calzadilla 2018). It is further subject to \r\nthe requirement that it must deliver 'an overall mitigation in global \r\nemissions', which is framed by the general objectives of Article 6 for \r\ncooperation to enhance ambition (Kreibich 2018)."


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"Pursuant to decisions adopted at the Paris and Katowice conferences, \r\nParties agreed that the operating entities of the financial \r\nmechanism - GEF and GCF - as well as the Special Climate Change \r\nFund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the \r\nStanding Committee on Finance, all serve the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC \r\n2016a, paras. 58 and 63, 2019e,g). The GCF, which became operational \r\nin 2015, is the largest dedicated international climate change fund \r\nand plays a key role in channelling financial resources to developing \r\ncountries (Antimiani et al. 2017; Brechin and Espinoza 2017). "


id: b6e445e93b1fcf8072e04473ad6fc6f7
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"Negotiations over rules to operationalise Article 6  have thus far \r\nproven intractable, failing to deliver both at COP24 in Katowice in \r\n2018, where the rest of the Paris Rulebook was agreed, and in COP25 \r\nin Madrid in 2019. Ongoing points of negotiation have included: \r\nwhether to permit the carryover and use of Kyoto CDM credits and \r\nassigned amount units into the Article 6.4 mechanism, whether to \r\nimpose a  mandatory share of proceeds on Article 6.2 mechanism \r\nto fund adaptation, like for Article 6.4; and whether and how credits \r\ngenerated under Article 6.4 should be subject to accounting rules \r\nunder Article 6.2 (Michaelowa et al. 2020a). "


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"Finance is the first of three means of support specified under the \r\nParis Agreement to accomplish its objectives relating to mitigation \r\n(and adaptation) (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 14.1). This sub-section \r\ndiscusses the provision made in the Paris Agreement for international \r\ncooperation on finance. Section  14.4.1 below considers broader \r\ncooperative efforts on public and private finance flows for climate \r\nmitigation, including by multilateral development banks and through \r\ninstruments such as green bonds."


id: c36344edfbcfd6e1f9e9702f4a3db8b4
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"As highlighted above, the objective of the Paris Agreement includes \r\nthe goal of '[m]aking finance flows consistent with a pathway towards \r\nlow greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development' \r\n(UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 2.1(c)). Alignment of financial flows, and in \r\nsome cases provision of finance, will be critical to the achievement of \r\nmany Parties' NDCs, particularly those that are framed in conditional \r\nterms (Zhang and Pan 2016; Kissinger et al. 2019) (Chapter 15). "


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"International cooperation on climate finance represents 'a complex \r\nand fragmented landscape' with a range of different mechanisms \r\nand forums involved (Pickering et al. 2017; Roberts and Weikmans \r\n2017). These include entities set up under the international climate \r\nchange regime, such as the UNFCCC financial mechanism, with the \r\nGlobal Environment Facility (GEF) and Green Climate Fund (GCF) \r\nas operating entities; special funds, such as the Special Climate \r\nChange Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund (both managed \r\nby the GEF), and the Adaptation Fund established under the Kyoto \r\nProtocol; the Standing Committee on Finance, a constituted body \r\nwhich assists the COP in exercising its functions with respect \r\nto the UNFCCC financial mechanism; and other bodies outside "


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"It is widely recognised that the USD100 billion yr-1 figure is a fraction \r\nof the broader finance and investment needs of mitigation and \r\nadaptation embodied in the Paris Agreement (Peake and Ekins \r\n2017). One estimate, based on a review of 160 Intended Nationally \r\nDetermined Contributions ((I)NDCs), suggests the financial demand \r\nfor both mitigation and adaptation needs of developing countries \r\ncould reach USD474 billion yr-1 by 2030 (Zhang and Pan 2016). The \r\nOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) \r\nreports that climate finance provided and mobilised by developed \r\ncountries was USD79.6 billion in 2019. This finance included "


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"four components: bilateral public, multilateral public (attributed \r\nto developed countries), officially supported export credits and \r\nmobilised private finance (OECD 2021) (Section 15.3.2 and Box 15.4). "


id: 4491dcaca07234c9e7648c137ac18419
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"development and transfer, with 70 Parties requesting technological \r\nsupport for both mitigation and adaptation, and 37 Parties for \r\nmitigation only (Pauw et al. 2020). Thirty-eight LDCs (79%) and \r\n29 SIDS made their NDCs conditional on technology transfer, as did \r\n50 middle-income countries (Pauw et al. 2020). "


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"While technology is seen as a  key means of implementation and \r\nsupport for Paris Agreement commitments, the issue of technology \r\ndevelopment and the transfer of environmentally sound technologies \r\nfor climate mitigation was heavily contested between developed and \r\ndeveloping countries in the Paris negotiations, and these differences \r\nare likely to persist as the Paris Agreement is implemented (Oh 2019). \r\nContestations continued in negotiations for the Paris Rulebook, \r\nparticularly regarding the meaning of technological innovation, \r\nwhich actors should be supported, and how support should be \r\nprovided by the UNFCCC (Oh 2020a). "


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"The Paris Agreement emphasises that efforts to accelerate, encourage \r\nand enable innovation are 'critical for an effective long-term global \r\nresponse to climate change and promoting economic growth and \r\nsustainable development' and urges that they be supported, as \r\nappropriate, by the Technology Mechanism and Financial Mechanism \r\nof the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2015, Art. 10.5). This support should be \r\ndirected to developing country Parties 'for collaborative approaches \r\nto research and development, and facilitating access to technology, \r\nin particular for early stages of the technology cycle' (UNFCCC \r\n2015, Art. 10.5). Inadequate support for research and development, \r\nparticularly in developing countries, has been identified in previous \r\nstudies of technology interventions by international institutions as \r\na  key technology innovation gap that might be addressed by the \r\nTechnology Mechanism (de Coninck and Puig 2015)."


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"Technology development and transfer is the second of three 'means \r\nof implementation and support' specified under the Paris Agreement \r\nto accomplish its objectives relating to mitigation (and adaptation) \r\n(UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 14.1). This sub-section discusses the provision \r\nmade in the Paris Agreement for international cooperation on \r\ntechnology development and transfer. Section 14.4.2 below considers \r\nbroader cooperative efforts on technology development and transfer \r\nunder the UNFCCC.  Both sections complement the discussion in \r\nSection  16.6 on the role of international cooperation in fostering \r\ntransformative change."


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"To support Parties' cooperative action, the Technology Mechanism, \r\nestablished in 2010 under the UNFCCC (Section 14.4.2), will serve the \r\nParis Agreement, subject to guidance of a new 'technology framework' \r\n(UNFCCC 2015, Art. 10.4). The latter was strongly advocated by \r\nthe African group in the negotiations for the Paris Agreement (Oh \r\n2020a), and was adopted in 2018 as part of the Paris Rulebook, with \r\nimplementation entrusted to the component bodies of the Technology \r\nMechanism. The guiding principles of the framework are coherence, "


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"The importance of technology as a  means of implementation for \r\nclimate mitigation obligations under the Paris Agreement is evident \r\nfrom Parties' NDCs. Of the 168 NDCs submitted as of June 2019, \r\n109 were expressed as conditional upon support for technology "


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"Together with finance, and technology development and transfer, \r\ncapacity building is the third of 'the means of implementation and \r\nsupport' specified under the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015a, \r\nArt. 14.1). Capacity building has primarily been implemented through \r\npartnerships, collaboration and different cooperative activities, inside \r\nand outside the UNFCCC. This sub-section discusses the provision \r\nmade in the Paris Agreement for international cooperation on capacity \r\nbuilding. Section 14.4.3 below considers broader cooperative efforts \r\non capacity building within the UNFCCC. "


id: c459d3fd5a59cd64fc36b7b322eae80a
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"under the Paris Agreement. For example, Umemiya et al. (2020) \r\nsuggest the need for a  common monitoring system at the global \r\nlevel, and evaluation research at the project level, to achieve more \r\neffective capacity-building support. Khan et al. (2020) articulate \r\n'four key pillars' of a  sustainable capacity-building system for \r\nimplementation of NDCs in developing countries: universities \r\nin developing countries as institutional hubs; strengthened civil \r\nsociety networks and partnerships; long-term programmatic finance \r\nsupport; and consideration of a capacity-building mechanism under \r\nthe UNFCCC - paralleling the Technology Mechanism - to marshal, \r\ncoordinate and monitor capacity-building activities and resources."


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"The Paris Agreement establishes a  mechanism to facilitate \r\nimplementation and promote compliance under Article 15. "


id: 6a60fa91291c3c633428d71acbca7b66
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"The Paris Agreement's overall aim is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable \r\ndevelopment and efforts to eradicate poverty. This aim is explicitly linked to enhancing implementation of the UNFCCC, including its \r\nobjective in Article 2 of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would 'prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference \r\nwith the climate system'. The Agreement sets three goals:"


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"In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal, Parties aim to reach global peaking of emissions as soon as possible, recognising \r\nthat peaking will take longer for developing countries, and then to undertake rapid reductions in accordance with the best available \r\nscience. This is designed to reach global net zero GHG emissions in the second half of the century, with the emissions reductions effort \r\nto be determined on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. In addition, \r\nimplementation of the Agreement as a whole is expected to reflect equity and Parties' 'common but differentiated responsibilities and \r\nrespective capabilities', in light of different national circumstances."


id: e50a7d9bacb9ac98b1b208836c2aa57e
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"The core mitigation commitments of Parties under the Paris Agreement centre on preparing, communicating and maintaining \r\nsuccessive 'Nationally Determined Contributions' (NDCs), the contents of which countries determine for themselves. All Parties must \r\nhave NDCs and pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of achieving the objectives of their NDCs, but Parties' NDCs are \r\nneither subject to a review of adequacy (at an individual level) nor to legally binding obligations of result. The compliance mechanism \r\nis correspondingly facilitative."


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"The Paris Agreement establishes a global goal on adaptation, and recognises the importance of averting, minimising and addressing \r\nloss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. "


id: c79ba88f70ed20b208eafb16a1a37dd0
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"These international processes establish an iterative ambition cycle for the preparation, communication, implementation and review \r\nof NDCs."


id: e20732a457ca1d45522056d93122b06c
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"For developing countries, the Paris Agreement recognises that increasing mitigation ambition and realising long-term low-emissions \r\ndevelopment pathways can be bolstered by the provision of financial resources, capacity building, and technology development and \r\ntransfer. In continuation of existing obligations under the Convention, developed countries are obliged to provide financial assistance \r\nto developing countries with respect to mitigation and adaptation. The Paris Agreement also recognises that Parties may choose to \r\nvoluntarily cooperate in the implementation of their NDCs to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and adaptation actions and \r\nto promote sustainable development and environmental integrity."


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"In terms of transformative potential, the Kyoto Protocol has been found \r\nto increase international patent applications for renewable energy \r\ntechnologies, especially in the case of solar energy technologies \r\nand especially in countries with more stringent emissions reduction \r\ntargets, and has even led to an increase in patent applications in \r\ndeveloping countries not obliged to reduce emissions under Kyoto \r\n(Miyamoto and Takeuchi 2019). Kyoto also had a  positive and \r\nstatistically significant impact on the cost-effectiveness of renewable \r\nenergy projects, as well as renewable energy capacity development, \r\nas it stimulated the introduction of domestic renewable energy \r\npolicies (Liu et al. 2019)."


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"The issue of institutional strength of Kyoto has been analysed by many \r\nauthors, and much of this has been assessed in previous assessment \r\nreports. Since AR5, several papers question the environmental efficacy \r\nof the Kyoto Protocol based on its institutional design (Rosen 2015; \r\nKuriyama and Abe 2018). Particular attention has focused on Kyoto's \r\nmarket mechanisms (Erickson et al. 2014; Kollmuss et al. 2015)."


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"As described in previous IPCC reports and above, the 1997 Kyoto \r\nProtocol included three international market-based mechanisms. \r\nThese operated among Annex I Parties (i.e., International Emissions \r\nTrading and Joint Implementation) and between Annex I Parties and \r\nnon-Annex I countries (i.e., the CDM) (Grubb et al. 2014; World Bank \r\n2018). Joint Implementation led to limited volumes of emissions \r\ncredit transactions, mostly from economies in transition but also \r\nsome Western European countries; International Emissions Trading \r\nalso led only to limited transaction volumes (Shishlov et al. 2016)."


id: 501cbfb2d45826ab6a8df821cb1378ec
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"Of the Kyoto Protocol's mechanisms, the CDM market has led to \r\na greater amount of activity, with a 'gold rush' period between 2005 \r\nand 2012. The main buyers of CDM credits were private companies \r\nsurrendering them within the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading \r\nSystem (ETS). Once the EU tightened its rules and restricted the use "


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"of CDM credits in 2011, there was a sharp drop in the price of CDM \r\ncredits in 2012. This price never recovered, as the demand for \r\nCDM was very weak after 2012, in part because of the difficulties \r\nencountered in securing the entry into force of the Doha Amendment \r\n(Michaelowa et al. 2019b). "


id: 3a8cadda0eb2472a26aee8a1a89f7deb
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"Given the comparatively recent conclusion of the Paris Agreement, \r\nevidence is still being gathered to assess its effectiveness in practice, \r\nin particular, since its long-term effectiveness hinges on states \r\ncommunicating more ambitious NDCs in successive cycles over \r\ntime. Assessments of the Paris Agreement on paper are necessarily \r\nspeculative and limited by the lack of credible counterfactuals. \r\nDespite these limitations, numerous assessments exist of the "


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"support. Victor et al. (2019) argue that international cooperation that \r\nenhances transformative potential needs to operate at the sectoral \r\nlevel, as the barriers to transformation are highly specific to each \r\nsector; the Paris Agreement's broad consensus around a clear level of \r\nambition sends a strong signal on what is needed in each sector, but \r\non its own will do little unless bolstered with sector-specific action \r\n(Geels et al. 2019). On the less optimistic side, it is noted that the \r\nextent of the 'investment signal' sent by the Agreement to business \r\nis unclear (Kemp 2018), and it is also unclear to what extent the Paris \r\nAgreement is fostering investment in break-through technologies. \r\nUnited States non-cooperation from 2017 to 2020 posed a significant \r\nthreat to adequate investment flows through the GCF (Chai et al. \r\n2017; Urpelainen and Van de Graaf 2018). "


id: 3d8989c653687140372993ec002d739a
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"agricultural sector in their NDCs, and many others include agriculture \r\nin their economy-wide targets (Richards et al. 2018). Some studies \r\nfind that agricultural development pathways with mitigation co\u0002benefits can deliver 21-40% of needed mitigation for the 'well below \r\n2degC' limit, thus necessitating 'transformative technical and policy \r\noptions' (Wollenberg et al. 2016). Other studies indicate that broader \r\n'natural climate solutions, including forests, can provide 37% of the \r\ncost-effective CO2 mitigation needed through 2030 for a more than \r\n66% chance of holding warming to below 2degC' (Griscom et al. 2017). "


id: 5ca2e690a6b77bfae9e459277a2828ac
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"to link mitigation policies, therefore improving aggregate cost\u0002effectiveness. Voluntary cooperation under Article 6  of the Paris \r\nAgreement could facilitate such linkage of mitigation policies (Chan \r\net al. 2018). A  combination of common accounting rules and the \r\nabsence of restrictive criteria and conditions on the use of ITMOs \r\ncould accelerate linkage and increase the latitude of Parties to scale \r\nup the ambition of their NDCs. However, significant question marks \r\nremain over how the environmental integrity of traded emissions \r\nreductions can be ensured (Mehling 2019). The ability of Article 6 to \r\ncontribute to the goal of the Paris Agreement will depend on the \r\nextent to which the rules ensure environmental integrity and avoid \r\ndouble counting, while utilising the full potential of cooperative \r\nefforts (Michaelowa et al. 2019a; Schneider et al. 2019). "


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"In conclusion, it remains to be seen whether the Paris Agreement will \r\ndeliver the collective ambition necessary to meet the temperature \r\ngoal. While the Paris Agreement does not contain strong and stringent \r\nobligations of result for major emitters, backed by a  demanding \r\ncompliance system, it establishes binding procedural obligations, lays \r\nout a range of normative expectations, and creates mechanisms for \r\nregular review, stock taking, and revision of NDCs. In combination \r\nwith complementary approaches to climate governance, engagement \r\nof a wide range of non-state and sub-national actors, and domestic \r\nenforcement mechanisms, these have the potential to deliver the \r\nnecessary collective ambition and implementation. Whether it will do \r\nso, remains to be seen."


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"Authors: Mustafa Babiker (Sudan/Saudi Arabia), Paolo Bertoldi (Italy), Christopher Bataille (Canada), Felix Creutzig (Germany), \r\nNavroz  K.  Dubash (India), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), Erik Haites (Canada), Ben Hinder (United Kingdom), Janna Hoppe \r\n(Switzerland), Yong-Gun Kim (Republic of Korea), Gregory F. Nemet (the United States of America/Canada), Anthony Patt (Switzerland), \r\nYamina Saheb (France), Raphael Slade (United Kingdom)"


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"This report notes both a growing prevalence of mitigation policies over the past quarter century (Chapter 13), and 'signs of progress' \r\nincluding various quantified indices of GHG mitigation (Table 2.4). Even though policies implemented and planned to date are clearly \r\ninsufficient for meeting the Paris long-term temperature goals, a natural question is to what extent the observed macro-level changes \r\n(global, national, sectoral, technological) can be attributed to policy developments. This Assessment Report is the first to address that \r\nquestion. This box describes the methods for conducting such 'attribution analysis' as well as its key results, focusing on the extent to \r\nwhich polices have affected three main types of 'outcome indices': "


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"Policy attribution examines the extent to which emission-relevant outcomes on these indices - charted for countries, sectors and \r\ntechnologies, particularly in Chapter 2 and the sectoral chapters - may be reasonably attributed to policies implemented prior to the \r\nobserved changes. Such policies include regulatory instruments such as energy efficiency programmes or technical standards and \r\ncodes, carbon pricing, financial support for low-carbon energy technologies and efficiency, voluntary agreements, and regulation \r\nof land-use practices. The sectoral chapters give more detail along with some accounts of policy, while trends in mitigation policy \r\nadoption are summarised in Chapter 13."


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"In reviewing hundreds of scientific studies cited in this report, the impacts of adopted policies on observed outcomes were assessed. \r\nThe vast majority of these studies examine particular instruments in particular contexts, as covered in the sectoral chapters and \r\nChapter 13; only a few have appraised global impacts of policies, directly or plausibly inferred (the most significant are cited in \r\nFigure 1 in this Cross-Chapter Box). Typically, studies consider 'mitigation policies' to be those adopted with either a primary objective \r\nof reducing GHG emissions or emissions reductions as one among multiple objectives. "


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"Policies differ in design, scope, and stringency, may change over time as they require amendments or new laws, and often partially \r\noverlap with other instruments. Overall, the literature indicates that policy mixes are, theoretically and empirically, more effective in \r\nreducing emissions, stimulating innovation, and inducing behavioural change than stand-alone policy instruments (Sections 5.6 and \r\n13.7) (Rosenow et al. 2017; Best and Burke 2018; Sethi et al. 2020). Nevertheless, these factors complicate analysis, because they give \r\nrise to the potential for double counting emissions reductions that have been observed, and which separate studies can attribute to \r\ndifferent policy instruments. "


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"Efforts to attribute observed outcomes to a policy or policy mix is also greatly complicated by the influence of many exogenous factors, \r\nincluding fossil fuel prices and socio-economic conditions. Likewise, technological progress can result from both exogenous causes, such \r\nas 'spillover' from other sectors, and policy pressure. Further, other policies, such as fossil fuel subsidies as well as trade-related policies, \r\ncan partially counteract the effect of mitigation policies by increasing the demand for energy or carbon-intensive goods and services. \r\nIn some cases, policies aimed at development, energy security, or air quality have climate co-benefits, while others increase emissions."


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"Studies have applied a number of methods to identify the actual effects of mitigation policies in the presence of such confounding \r\nfactors. These include statistical attribution methodologies, including experimental and quasi-experimental design, instrumental \r\nvariable approaches, and simple correlational methods. Typically, the relevant mitigation metric is the outcome variable, while \r\nmeasures of policies and other factors act as explanatory variables. Other methodologies include aggregations and extrapolations"


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"from micro-level data evaluation, and inference from combining multiple lines of analysis, including expert opinion. Additionally, the \r\nliterature contains reviews, many of them systematic in nature, that assess and aggregate multiple empirical studies. "


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"With these considerations in mind, multiple lines of evidence, based upon the literature, support a  set of high-level findings, as \r\nillustrated in Figure 1 in this Cross-Chapter Box, as follows. "


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"1. GHG Emissions. There is robust evidence with a high level of agreement that mitigation policies have had a discernible impact on \r\nemissions. Several lines of evidence indicate that mitigation policies have led to avoided global emissions to date of several billion \r\ntonnes CO2-eq annually. The figure in this box shows a selection of results giving rise to this estimate. "


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"As a starting point, one methodologically sophisticated econometric study links global mitigation policies (defined as climate laws \r\nand executive orders) to emission outcomes; it estimates emission savings of 5.9 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2016 compared to a no-policy world \r\n(Eskander and Fankhauser 2020) (Section 13.6.2)."


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"A second line of evidence derives from analyses of the Kyoto Protocol. Countries which took on Kyoto Protocol targets accounted \r\nfor about 24% of global emissions during the first commitment period (2008-12). The most recent robust econometric assessment \r\n(Maamoun 2019) estimates that these countries cut GHG emissions by about 7% on average over 2005-2012, rising over the period to \r\naround 12% (1.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1) relative to a no-Kyoto scenario. This isconsistent with estimates of Grunewald and Martinez (2016) of \r\nabout 800 MtCO2-eq yr-1 averaged to 2009. Developing countries' emissions reduction projects through the CDM (defined in Article 12 \r\nof the Kyoto Protocol) were certified as growing to over 240 MtCO2-eq yr-1 by 2012 (UNFCC 2021c). With debates about the full "


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content:
"Cross-Chapter Box 10, Figure 1 | Policy impacts on key outcome indices. The figure shows the impacts of policies on three indices: proximate \r\nemission drivers, technologies and GHG emissions, including several lines of evidence on GHG abatement attributable to policies."


id: a6ca701d2e4bd1ff951bf42bf10dc262
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"extent of 'additionality', academic assessments of savings from the CDM have been slightly lower, with particular concerns around \r\nsome non-energy projects (Section 14.3.3.1)."


id: c94d2cfeab24bda78038a0f4b74a88f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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"A third line of evidence derives from studies that identify policy-related, absolute reductions from historical levels in particular \r\ncountries and sectors through decomposition analyses (Le Quere et al. 2019; Lamb et al. 2021), or evaluate the impact of particular \r\npolicies, such as carbon pricing systems. From a wide range of estimates in the literature (Sections 2.8.2.2 and 13.6), many evaluations \r\nof the EU ETS suggest that it has reduced emissions by around 3% to 9% relative to unregulated firms and/or sectors (Schafer 2019; \r\nColmer et al. 2020), while other factors, both policy (energy efficiency and renewable support) and exogenous trends, played a larger \r\nrole in the overall reductions seen (Haites 2018). "


id: 67f0a4b532cd41c8cbb9198e5aa80a49
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"Victor 2016). The next two sections address this complementarity \r\nbetween the Paris Agreement and other agreements and institutions."


id: adf904b6a631aba61143939720d119c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"As discussed above, the Paris Agreement sets in place a  new \r\nframework for international climate policy albeit one that is \r\nembedded in the wider climate regime complex (Coen et al. 2020). \r\nWhereas international governance had earlier assumed centre stage, \r\nthe Paris Agreement recognises the salience of domestic politics \r\nin the governance of climate change (Kinley et al. 2020). The new \r\narchitecture also provides more flexibility for recognising the \r\nbenefits of working in diverse forms and groups and allows for more \r\ndecentralised 'polycentric' forms of governance (Jordan et al. 2015; "


id: 3c0378486360db602cc1544ae5f238a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"The Paris Agreement identifies a  number of pathways, or means \r\nof implementation, towards accomplishing rapid mitigation and \r\nthe achieving of its temperature goal: finance; capacity building; \r\ntechnology and innovation; and cooperative approaches and markets \r\n(Sections 14.3.2.7-14.3.2.10 above). In this section, we examine \r\neach of these means and mechanisms of implementation, and the \r\nagreements and institutions lying outside of the Paris Agreement \r\nthat contribute to each. In the following section, 14.5, we examine \r\nthe agreements and institutions playing other governance roles: "


id: c3e1c49823760047945fec55c363952d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"Figure 14.3 | Climate governance beyond the UNFCCC. The figure shows those relationships, marked in blue, between international governance activities, described in \r\nthe text, that relate to activities of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement."


id: c8fa775634c7c320c9730578e38779e4
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content:
"regulating activities in particular sectors; linking climate mitigation \r\nwith other activities such as adaptation; and stimulating and \r\ncoordinating the actions of non-state actors at a global scale. "


id: 9231a44639d9f12829861a57105ba0f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"International cooperation on climate finance is underpinned by \r\nvarious articles of the UNFCCC including Articles 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.7 \r\nand 11.5 (UNFCCC 1992). This was further amplified through the \r\ncommitment by developed countries in the Copenhagen Accord \r\nand the Cancun Agreements to mobilise jointly through various \r\nsources USD100 billion yr-1 by 2020 to meet the needs of the \r\ndeveloping countries (UNFCCC 2010b). This commitment was made \r\nin the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency "


id: 8eae9f0be0a0a517098a36db2d0036b2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"Figure  14.3 maps out the interlinkages described in the text of \r\nSections 14.4 and 14.5. It is an incomplete list, but illustrates \r\nclearly that across multiple types of governance, there are multiple \r\ninstruments or organisations with activities connected to the \r\ndifferent governance roles associated with the Paris Agreement and \r\nthe UNFCCC more generally."


id: 100836ce79de20fca90e89d4a6540e2e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"The Paris Agreement and the imperative for sustainable development \r\nreinforce the need to forge strong linkages between climate and \r\ndevelopment (Fay et al. 2015). This in turn has highlighted the urgent \r\nneed for greater attention to the relationship between development \r\nassistance and finance, and climate change (Steele 2015). "


id: de0d94e24f1e4f31aa01bce11023caf8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"In 2015, 20 representative MDBs and members of the International \r\nDevelopment Finance Club unveiled five voluntary principles to \r\nmainstream climate action in their investments: commitment \r\nto  climate strategies, managing climate risks, promoting climate \r\nsmart objectives, improving climate performance and accounting \r\nfor their own actions (World Bank 2015a; Institute for Climate \r\nEconomics 2017). The members subscribing to these principles had \r\ngrown to 44 as of January 2020. Arguably, it is only through closer \r\nlinkages between climate and development that significant inroads \r\ncan be made in addressing climate change. MDBs can play a major \r\nrole through the totality of their portfolios (Larsen et al. 2018). "


id: 56d98aa3be65d3bb52c1248ded870e3a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"The UNFCCC website cites some 20 bilateral development agencies \r\nproviding support to climate change programmes in developing \r\ncountries (UNFCCC 2020a). These agencies provide a  mix of \r\ndevelopment cooperation, policy advice and support and financing \r\nfor climate change projects. Since the year 2000, the OECD \r\nDevelopment Assistance Committee has been tracking trends in \r\nclimate-related development finance and assistance. The amount of \r\nbilateral development finance with climate relevance has increased \r\nsubstantially since 2000 (OECD 2019a). For 2019, it was reported \r\nto be USD28.8 billion in direct finance and USD2.6 billion through "


id: 27c883d3ace4e441c127960b62934a47
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"The UN system is also supporting climate action through much\u0002needed technical assistance and capacity building, which is \r\ncomplementary to the financial flows insofar as it enables countries \r\nwith relevant tools and methodologies to assess their needs, \r\ndevelop national climate finance roadmaps, establish relevant \r\ninstitutional mechanisms to receive support and track it, enhance \r\nreadiness to access financing, and include climate action across \r\nrelevant national financial planning and budgeting processes (UN \r\n2017a). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the \r\nlargest implementer of climate action among the UN Agencies, with \r\nothers, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United \r\nNations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Industrial \r\nDevelopment Organisation (UNIDO), and United Nations Office for \r\nSouth-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), providing relevant support."


id: d680ae1223e4f23fa76d8674c86fda2e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"The current architecture of climate finance is one that is primarily \r\nbased on north-south, developed-developing country dichotomies. \r\nThe Paris Agreement, however, has clearly recognised the role of \r\nclimate finance flows across developing countries, thereby enhancing \r\nthe scope of international cooperation (Voigt and Ferreira 2016b). \r\nEstimates of such flows, though, are not readily available. According \r\nto one estimate in 2020 the flows among non-OECD countries were \r\nof the order of USD29 billion (CPI 2021)."


id: 6f275659c4d4294126ce774f6322cbc2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"Foreign direct investments and their greening are seen as a channel \r\nfor increasing cooperation. An assessment of the greenfield foreign \r\ndirect investment in different sectors shows the growing share of \r\nrenewable energy at USD92.2 billion (12% of the volume and 38% \r\nof the number of projects) (FDI Intelligence 2020). Coal, oil and gas \r\nsectors maintain the top spot for capital investments globally. Over \r\nthe last decade there is growing issuance of green bonds with non\u0002financial private sector issuance gaining ground (Almeida 2020). \r\nWhile it is questionable if green bonds have a significant impact on \r\nshifting capital from non-sustainable to sustainable investments, \r\nthey do incentivise the issuing organisations to enhance their green \r\nambition and have led to an appreciation within capital markets of "


id: cee5d19eab4d5e1daba63bcbd3490fd8
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content:
"Figure 14.4 | International finance flows. Total international climate financial flows for 2020 were USD161 billion. By comparison, public sector bilateral and multilateral \r\nfinance in 2017 for fossil fuel development, including gas pipelines, was roughly USD4 billion. Part (a) disaggregates total financial flows according to public and private sources, \r\nand indicates the breakdown between mitigation on the one hand, and adaptation and multiple objectives on the other, within each source. Part (b) disaggregates total financial \r\nflows according to intended purpose, namely mitigation or adaptation and multiple objectives, and disaggregates each type according to source. Part (c) provides additional \r\ndetail on the relative contributions of different public and private sources. Sources: data from CPI 2021; OECD 2021."


id: 4b3c6e33dea7f4d1404a8ecd08f3e1de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"green frameworks and guidelines and signalled new expectations \r\n(Maltais and Nykvist 2020). In parallel, institutional investors \r\nincluding pension funds are seeking investments that align with the \r\nParis Agreement (IIGCC 2020). However, the readiness of institutional \r\ninvestors to make this transition is arguable (OECD 2019b; Ameli et al. \r\n2020). This evidence suggests that international private financing \r\ncould play an important role but this potential is yet to be realised \r\n(Chapter 15)."


id: a1de2a197472f62bc056d334fbb8be1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"Science, technology and innovation are essential for the design of \r\neffective measures to address climate change and, more generally, for \r\neconomic and social development (de Coninck and Sagar 2015a). The \r\nOECD finds that single countries alone often cannot provide effective \r\nsolutions to today's global challenges, as these cross national borders \r\nand affect different actors (OECD 2012). Madani (2020) shows how \r\nconflict, including international sanctions, can reduce science and \r\ninnovation capacity, which is not evenly distributed, particularly \r\nacross the developed and the developing world. For this reason, \r\nmany countries have introduced strategies and policies to enhance \r\ninternational cooperation in science and technology (Chen et al. \r\n2019). Partnerships and international cooperation can play a role in \r\nestablishing domestic innovation systems, which enable more effective \r\nscience and technology innovation (de Coninck and Sagar 2015b,a). "


id: de2a478e23fc30584992f8bd43e82bbe
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content:
"Non-state actors are also increasingly collaborating internationally. \r\nSuch collaborations, referred to as international cooperative \r\ninitiatives (ICIs), bring together multi-stakeholder groups across \r\nindustry, communities, and regions, and operate both within "


id: c61790214deef058d1ac2a98cafa0e19
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"technology transfer framework put forward at the Bali COP in 2007 \r\nand creation of the Poznan strategic programme on technology \r\ntransfer under the GEF; and (iii) the establishment of the Technology \r\nMechanism by the COP in 2010 as part of the Cancun Agreements \r\n(UNFCCC 2010b). The Technology Mechanism is presently the \r\nprincipal avenue within the UNFCCC for facilitating cooperation on \r\nthe development and transfer of climate technologies to developing \r\ncountries (UNFCCC 2015b). As discussed in Section 14.3.2.9 above, \r\nthe Paris Agreement tasks the Technology Mechanism also to serve \r\nthe Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015b, Art. 10.3). "


id: 4ecaddeae7c23d4b3a7af6d29e4accb3
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"and outside the UNFCCC process. Lui et al. (2021) find that such \r\ninitiatives could make a  major contribution to global emissions \r\nreduction, Bakhtiari (2018) finds that the impact on greenhouse gas \r\nreduction of these initiatives is hindered due to a lack of coordination \r\nbetween ICIs, overlap with other activities conducted by the UNFCCC \r\nand governments, and a  lack of monitoring systems to measure \r\nimpact. Increasing the exchange of information between ICIs, \r\nenhancing monitoring systems, and increasing collaborative research \r\nin science and technology would help address these issues (Boekholt \r\net al. 2009; Bakhtiari 2018)."


id: 873935a5571c04c148c6ebf8054dd36c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"At the level of research institutes, there has been a major shift to \r\na more structured and global type of cooperation in research; Wagner \r\net al. (2017) found significant increases in both the proportion of \r\npapers written by author teams from multiple countries and in \r\nthe number of countries participating in such collaboration, over the \r\ntime period 1990-2013. Although only a portion of these scientific \r\npapers address the issue of climate change specifically, this growth \r\nof scientific collaboration across borders provides a comprehensive \r\nview of the conducive environment in which climate science \r\ncollaboration has grown. "


id: cf0b62b56eaca7b0b8d6c9e6c033dad8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"However, there are areas in which international cooperation can \r\nbe strengthened. Both the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda \r\nfor Sustainable Development call for more creative forms of \r\ninternational cooperation in science that help bridge the science \r\nand policy interface, and provide learning processes and places to \r\ndeliberate on possible policy pathways across disciplines on a more \r\nsustainable and long-lasting basis. Scientific assessments, such as the \r\nIPCC and Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity \r\nand Ecosystem Services (IPBES) offer this possibility, but processes \r\nneed to be enriched for this to happen more effectively (Kowarsch \r\net al. 2016). "


id: 6a5dd70968adb2d17b4b27986f48cf02
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"The Joint Annual Report of the TEC and CTCN for 2019 indicated that, \r\nas of July 2019, the CTCN had engaged with 93 developing country \r\nParties regarding a  total of 273 requests for technical assistance, \r\nincluding 11 multi-country requests. Nearly three-quarters (72.9%) of \r\nrequests received by the CTCN had a mitigation component, with two\u0002thirds of those mitigation requests related to either renewable energy \r\nor energy efficiency. Requests for decision-making or information tools \r\nare received most frequently (28% of requests), followed by requests \r\nfor technology feasibility studies (20%) and technology identification \r\nand prioritisation (18%) (TEC and CTCN 2019). "


id: 2a948dbcfad6fcb86c508796334537c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"The CTCN is presently funded from 'various sources, ranging from the \r\n[UNFCCC] Financial Mechanism to philanthropic and private sector \r\nsources, as well as by financial and in-kind contributions from the \r\nco-hosts of the CTCN and from participants in the Network' (TEC and \r\nCTCN 2019, para. 97). Oh (2020b) describes the institution as 'mainly \r\nfinancially dependent on bilateral donations from developed countries \r\nand multilateral support'. Nevertheless, inadequate funding of the \r\nCTCN poses a problem for its effectiveness and capacity to contribute \r\nto implementation of the Paris Agreement. A  2017 independent \r\nreview of the CTCN identified 'limited availability of funding' as a key \r\nconstraint on its ability to deliver services at the expected level and \r\nrecommended that '[b]etter predictability and security over financial "


id: f5f7c078b985017c84720e9c569de715
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"resources will ensure that the CTCN can continue to successfully \r\nrespond to its COP mandate and the needs and expectations of \r\ndeveloping countries' (Ernst & Young 2017, para. 84). The 2019 Joint \r\nReport of the TEC and CTCN indicates that resource mobilisation for \r\nthe Network remains a challenge (TEC and CTCN 2019, pp. 23-24)."


id: 7ff5a49b1df9a91df31d5e7681eb5b02
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"Beyond the UNFCCC, other climate cooperation and partnership \r\nactivities on capacity building include climate-related bilateral \r\ncooperation and those organised by the OECD, IFDD (Francophonie \r\nInstitute for Sustainable Development), UNDP National \r\nCommunications Support Programme, UNEP and the World Bank. "


id: 799e6f82b55655afbc4fe9787e5982cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"Climate-related bilateral cooperation provides important human \r\nand institutional capacity building support for climate change \r\nactions and activities in developing countries, particularly through \r\ndeveloped countries' bilateral cooperation structures, such as the \r\nFrench Development Agency (AFD), the German Development Agency \r\n(The Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit - GIZ), \r\nthe Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and others."


id: ccb56889f274eadcd5a43e5956e5add3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"There are also a  number of regional cooperative structures with \r\ncapacity-building components, including ClimaSouth, Euroclima+, \r\nthe UN-REDD Programme, the Caribbean Regional Strategic \r\nProgramme for Resilience, the Caribbean Climate Online Risk and \r\nAdaptation Tool, a project on accelerating low carbon and resilient \r\nsociety realisation in the Southeast Asian region, the World Health \r\nOrganisation's Global Salm-Surv network, the Red Iberoamericana \r\nde Oficinas de Cambio Climatico network and the Africa Adaptation \r\nInitiative. Many climate-related capacity-building initiatives, \r\nincluding those coordinated or funded by international or regional \r\ninstitutions, are implemented at the national and sub-national levels, \r\noften with the involvement of universities, consultancy groups and \r\ncivil society actors. "


id: ba39bcbb38576a0ef5307bf4c2084064
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"International climate cooperation has long focused on supporting \r\ndeveloping countries in building capacity to implement climate \r\nmitigation actions. While there is no universally agreed definition of \r\ncapacity building and the UNFCCC does not define the term (Khan \r\net al. 2020), elements of capacity building can be discerned from \r\nthe Convention's provisions on education and training programmes \r\n(UNFCCC 1992, Art. 6), as well as the reference in Article 9(2)(d) to \r\nthe SBSTA providing support for 'endogenous capacity-building in \r\ndeveloping countries'. "


id: a22133c194bc93a6f68f3aabc965658d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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"It is also noted that comprehensive support is provided by the GCF \r\nto developing countries (GCF, 2020). This support is made available \r\nand accessible for all developing countries through three different \r\nGCF tools: the Readiness Programme, the Project Preparation \r\nFacility, and the funding of transformative projects and programmes. \r\nThe goal of the Readiness Programme is to strengthen institutional \r\ncapacities, governance mechanisms, and planning and programming \r\ncompetencies in support of developing countries' transformational \r\nlong-term climate policies (GCF, 2020). Despite a  decades-long \r\nprocess of capacity-building efforts under many development and \r\nenvironmental regimes, including the UNFCCC, progress has been \r\nuneven and largely unsuccessful in establishing institution-based "


id: ef8646bde6af87e04db1aea8e6ae6e7f
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content:
"Quantifying the contribution of capacity-building efforts to climate \r\nmitigation is acknowledged to be 'difficult, if not impossible' (Hsu \r\net al. 2019a). Nonetheless, such activities 'may play a valuable role in \r\nbuilding a foundation for future reductions' by providing 'necessary \r\ncatalytic linkages between actors' (Hsu et al. 2019a)."


id: fc35954bf1964f6f7b06de1193430a99
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"In theory, trading carbon assets can reduce the costs of global climate \r\nmitigation, by helping facilitate abatement of greenhouse gases \r\nat least-cost locations. This could help countries ratchet up their \r\nambitions more than in a situation without such mechanisms (Mehling \r\net al. 2018), particularly if mechanisms are scaled up from projects and \r\nprogrammes (Michaelowa et al. 2019b). Progress as to developing \r\nsuch mechanisms has however so far been moderate and uneven. "


id: 5a4e397cd828546256c531fb4d1374ca
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"Of the three international market-based mechanisms under the 1997 \r\nKyoto Protocol discussed in Section 14.3.2.7, and in previous IPCC \r\nreports, only the CDM or a similar mechanism may have a role to \r\nplay under the Paris Agreement, although the precise terms are yet \r\nto be decided. "


id: 1d8d0341a5ffc028860a59525a2ca716
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:48
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content:
"Article 6, also discussed in Section 14.3.2.7, is the main framework \r\nto foster enhanced cooperation within the Paris Agreement. \r\nAlthough there is an emerging global landscape of activities based \r\non Article 6 (Greiner et al. 2020), such as the bilateral treaty signed \r\nunder the framework of Article 6 in October 2020 by Switzerland \r\nand Peru, the possibilities of bilateral cooperation are yet to be fully \r\nexploited. As discussed above, adequate accounting rules are key to \r\nthe success of Article 6. Sectoral agreements are also a promising \r\ncooperative mechanism, as discussed in Section  14.5.2. In fact, \r\nboth bilateral and sectoral agreements have the potential to \r\nenhance the ambition of the Parties involved and can eventually \r\nserve as building blocks towards more comprehensive agreements \r\n(Section 14.2.2). "


id: b18840536181721300f4603bc7ab0b66
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content:
"A relevant and promising new development is the international \r\nlinkage of existing regional or national emissions trading systems \r\n(ETS). Several ETS are now operational in different jurisdictions, "


id: a1e68e2e494c90e7ebbce637b8c4dbf0
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"Authors: Govindasamy Bala (India), Heleen de Coninck (the Netherlands), Oliver Geden (Germany), Veronika Ginzburg (the Russian \r\nFederation), Katharine J. Mach (the United States of America), Anthony Patt (Switzerland), Sonia I. Seneviratne (Switzerland), Masahiro \r\nSugiyama (Japan), Christopher H. Trisos (South Africa), Maarten van Aalst (the Netherlands)"


id: bd511f108fd7003c13dd7af880455f62
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"Proposed Solar Radiation Modification schemes \r\nThis cross-working group box assesses Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) proposals, their potential contribution to reducing or \r\nincreasing climate risk, as well as other risks they may pose (categorised as risks from responses to climate change in the IPCC AR6 \r\nrisk definition in 1.2.1.1), and related perception, ethics and governance questions."


id: 167fabc1dd978dd1fd652c6883ab8ddd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"SRM refers to proposals to increase the reflection of shortwave radiation (sunlight) back to space to counteract anthropogenic warming \r\nand some of its harmful impacts (de Coninck et al. 2018) (AR6 WGI Chapters 4 and 5). A number of SRM options have been proposed, \r\nincluding: stratospheric aerosol interventions (SAI), marine cloud brightening (MCB), ground-based albedo modifications (GBAM), and \r\nocean albedo change (OAC). Although not strictly a form of SRM, cirrus cloud thinning (CCT) has been proposed to cool the planet \r\nby increasing the escape of longwave thermal radiation to space and is included here for consistency with previous assessments \r\n(de Coninck et al. 2018). SAI is the most-researched proposal. Modelling studies show SRM could reduce surface temperatures and \r\npotentially ameliorate some climate change risks (with more confidence for SAI than other options), but SRM could also introduce \r\na range of new risks."


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"The choice of SRM deployment scenarios and reference scenarios is crucial in assessment of SRM risks and its effectiveness in \r\nattenuating climate change risks (Keith and MacMartin 2015; Honegger et al. 2021a). Most climate model simulations have used \r\nscenarios with highly stylised large SRM forcing to fully counteract large amounts of warming in order to enhance the signal-to-noise \r\nratio of climate responses to SRM (Kravitz et al. 2015; Sugiyama et al. 2018a; Krishnamohan et al. 2019)."


id: 4c69f1411fb22557ea1ec0ff2381291e
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"The effects of SRM fundamentally depend on a variety of choices about deployment (Sugiyama et al. 2018b), including: its position \r\nin the portfolio of human responses to climate change (e.g., the magnitude of SRM used against the background radiative forcing), \r\ngovernance of research and potential deployment strategies, and technical details (latitude, materials, and season, among others, \r\nsee AR6 WGI Chapter 4.6.3.3). The plausibility of many SRM scenarios is highly contested and not all scenarios are equally plausible \r\nbecause of socio-political considerations (Talberg et al. 2018), as with, for example, CDR (Fuss et al. 2014, 2018). Development \r\nof scenarios and their selection in assessments should reflect a diverse set of societal values with public and stakeholder inputs \r\n(Sugiyama et al. 2018a; Low and Honegger 2020), as depending on the focus of a limited climate model simulation, SRM could look \r\ngrossly risky or highly beneficial (Pereira et al. 2021)."


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"(Tilmes et al. 2020). If emissions reductions and CDR are deemed insufficient, SRM may be seen by some as the only option left to \r\nensure the achievement of the Paris Agreement's temperature goal by 2100."


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"SRM risks to human and natural systems and potential for risk reduction\r\nSince AR5, hundreds of climate modelling studies have simulated effects of SRM on climate hazards (Kravitz et al. 2015; Tilmes et al. \r\n2018). Modelling studies have shown SRM has the potential to offset some effects of increasing GHGs on the global and regional \r\nclimate, including the increase in frequency and intensity of extremes of temperature and precipitation, melting of Arctic sea ice and \r\nmountain glaciers, weakening of Atlantic meridional overturning circulation, changes in frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones, \r\nand decrease in soil moisture (AR6 WGI, Chapter  4). However, while SRM may be effective in alleviating anthropogenic climate "


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"Cross-Working Group Box 4, Table 1 | SRM options and their potential climate and non-climate impacts. Description, potential climate impacts, \r\npotential impacts on human and natural systems, and termination effects of a number of SRM options: stratospheric aerosol interventions \r\n(SAI), marine cloud brightening (MCB), ocean albedo change (OAC), ground-based albedo modifications (GBAM), and cirrus cloud thinning (CCT)."


id: c22024894b0dcf008a3138ebfcb11cc8
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"SAI implemented to partially offset warming (e.g., offsetting half of global warming) may have potential to ameliorate hazards in \r\nmultiple regions and reduce negative residual change, such as drying compared to present-day climate, that are associated with fully \r\noffsetting global mean warming (Irvine and Keith 2020), but may also increase flood and drought risk in Europe compared to unmitigated \r\nwarming (Jones et al. 2021). Recent modelling studies suggest it is conceptually possible to meet multiple climate objectives through \r\noptimally designed SRM strategies (WGI, Chapter 4). Nevertheless, large uncertainties still exist for climate processes associated with \r\nSRM options (e.g., aerosol-cloud-radiation interaction) (AR6 WGI, Chapter 4) (Kravitz and MacMartin 2020)."


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"Compared with climate hazards, many fewer studies have examined SRM risks - the potential adverse consequences to people and \r\necosystems from the combination of climate hazards, exposure and vulnerability - or the potential for SRM to reduce risk (Curry et al. \r\n2014; Irvine et al. 2017). Risk analyses have often used inputs from climate models forced with stylised representations of SRM, such \r\nas dimming the sun. Fewer have used inputs from climate models that explicitly simulated injection of gases or aerosols into the \r\natmosphere, which include more complex cloud-radiative feedbacks. Most studies have used scenarios where SAI is deployed to hold \r\naverage global temperature constant despite high emissions."


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"scenarios have included SAI (Arino et al. 2016; Emmerling and Tavoni 2018; Heutel et al. 2018; Helwegen et al. 2019; Rickels et al. \r\n2020) showing the indirect costs and benefits to welfare dominate, since the direct economic cost of SAI itself is expected to be \r\nrelatively low (Moriyama et al. 2017; Smith and Wagner 2018). There is a general lack of research on the wide scope of potential risk \r\nor risk reduction to human health, well-being and sustainable development from SRM and on their distribution across countries and \r\nvulnerable groups (Honegger et al. 2021a; Carlson et al. 2022)."


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"SRM may also introduce novel risks for international collaboration and peace. Conflicting temperature preferences between countries \r\nmay lead to counter-geoengineering measures such as deliberate release of warming agents or destruction of deployment equipment \r\n(Parker et al. 2018). Game-theoretic models and laboratory experiments indicate a powerful actor or group with a higher preference \r\nfor SRM may use SAI to cool the planet beyond what is socially optimal, imposing welfare losses on others although this cooling does \r\nnot necessarily imply excluded countries would be worse off relative to a world of unmitigated warming (Ricke et al. 2013; Weitzman \r\n2015; Abatayo et al. 2020). In this context, counter-geoengineering may promote international cooperation or lead to large welfare \r\nlosses (Helwegen et al. 2019; Abatayo et al. 2020)."


id: 969010acb7ff9856f5d9f1087a4d7f6a
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"Cooling caused by SRM would increase the global land and ocean CO2 sinks (medium confidence), but this would not stop CO2 from \r\nincreasing in the atmosphere or affect the resulting ocean acidification under continued anthropogenic emissions (high confidence) \r\n(AR6 WGI, Chapter 5). "


id: 4b249e338f40982130f5a43cd5a35d44
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"Few studies have assessed potential SRM impacts on ecosystems. SAI and MCB may reduce risk of coral reef bleaching compared \r\nto global warming with no SAI (Latham et al. 2013; Kwiatkowski et al. 2015), but risks to marine life from ocean acidification would \r\nremain, because SRM proposals do not reduce elevated anthropogenic atmospheric CO2 concentrations. MCB could cause changes in \r\nmarine net primary productivity by reducing light availability in deployment regions, with important fishing regions off the west coast \r\nof South America showing both large increases and decreases in productivity (Partanen et al. 2016; Keller 2018)."


id: 437075d956e4da0a420a5f55e75a791e
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"Great Barrier Reef (McDonald et al. 2019). Co-evolution of governance and SRM research provides a chance for responsibly developing \r\nSRM technologies with broader public participation and political legitimacy, guarding against potential risks and harms relevant \r\nacross a full range of scenarios, and ensuring that SRM is considered only as a part of a broader portfolio of responses to climate \r\nchange (Stilgoe 2015; Nicholson et al. 2018). For SAI, large-scale outdoor experiments even with low radiative forcing could be \r\ntransboundary and those with deployment-scale radiative forcing may not be distinguished from deployment, such that MacMartin \r\nand Kravitz (2019) argue for continued reliance on modelling until a decision on whether and how to deploy is made, with modelling \r\nhelping governance development. "


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"to only those of a  research character, and in 2012 the CBD made \r\na  non-legally-binding decision to do the same, further requiring \r\nsuch research activities to be limited scale, and carried out under \r\ncontrolled conditions, until more knowledge is gained to be able to \r\nassess the risks (GESAMP 2019; Burns and Corbett 2020). In doing \r\nso they have taken a  precautionary approach (Sands and  Peel, \r\n2018). The London Convention and Protocol has also developed \r\nan Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean \r\nFertilisation (London Convention/Protocol 2010) and in 2013 adopted \r\namendments (which are not yet in force) to regulate marine carbon \r\ndioxide removal activities, including ocean fertilisation. "


id: 9494d2be92a19d92157a0100fd6f517
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"Currently, there is no targeted international law relating to SRM, \r\nalthough some multilateral agreements -  such as the Convention \r\non Biological Diversity, the UN Convention on the Law of the \r\nSea, the Environmental Modification Convention, and the Vienna \r\nConvention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal \r\nProtocol  -  contain provisions applicable to SRM (Bodansky 2013; \r\nJinnah and Nicholson 2019; Reynolds 2019a)."


id: 691a4d4dcd609661d3b6745be76a411a
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"CDR methods other than afforestation/reforestation and soil carbon \r\nsequestration have only played a minor role in UNFCCC negotiations \r\nso far (Fridahl 2017; Rumpel et al. 2020). To accelerate, and indeed \r\nbetter manage CDR globally, stringent rules and practices regarding \r\nemissions accounting, measuring, reporting and verifying and \r\nproject-based market mechanisms have been proposed (Honegger \r\nand Reiner 2018; Mace et al. 2018). Given their historic responsibility, \r\nit can be expected that developed countries would carry the main \r\nburden of researching, developing, demonstrating and deploying \r\nCDR, or finance such projects in other countries (Fyson et al. 2020; \r\nPozo et al. 2020). McLaren et al. (2019) suggest that there is \r\na  rationale for separating the international commitments for net \r\nnegative emissions from those for emissions reductions."


id: 5bcee4ab7aa6c967ec7ed49b183448fe
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"Specific regulations on CDR options have been limited to those \r\nposing transboundary risks, namely the use of ocean fertilisation. \r\nIn a series of separate decisions from 2008 to 2013, Parties to the \r\nLondon Convention and Protocol limited ocean fertilisation activities "


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"developed country Parties to phase down HFCs by 85% from 2011 \r\nto 2013 levels by 2036. Developing country Parties are permitted \r\nlonger phase-down periods (out to 2045 and 2047), but must freeze \r\nproduction and consumption between 2024 and 2028 (Ripley and \r\nVerkuijl 2016; UN 2016). A ban on trade in HFCs with non-Parties \r\nwill come into effect from 1  January 2033. For HFC-23, which is \r\na  by-product of HCFC production rather than an ODS, Parties are \r\nrequired to report production and consumption data, and to destroy \r\nall emissions of HFC-23 occurring as part of HCFCs or HFCs to the \r\nextent practicable from 2020 onwards using approved technologies \r\n(Ripley and Verkuijl 2016). "


id: c41f4ece1d1799da67b22b0f82321f2e
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"sub-global and regional); Section 14.5.2 discusses cooperation with \r\ninternational sectoral agreements and institutions such as in the \r\nforestry, energy and transportation sectors; and Sections 14.5.3-\r\n14.5.5 discuss transnational cooperation across civil society and \r\nsocial movements, business partnerships and investor coalitions, and \r\nbetween sub-national entities and cities, respectively. "


id: bdeefb36386acbf428648d2d5ba2207a
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"A key idea underpinning this analysis is that decomposition of \r\nthe larger challenge of climate mitigation into 'smaller units' may \r\nfacilitate more effective cooperation (Sabel and Victor 2017) and \r\ncomplement cooperation in the UN climate regime (Stewart et al. \r\n2017). However, it is recognised that significant uncertainty remains \r\nover the feasibility and costs of these efforts (Sabel and Victor 2017), \r\nas well as whether they ultimately strengthen progress on climate \r\nmitigation in the multilateral climate arena (Falkner 2016a)."


id: e23187cafc69c8acfe1d71e83870bf70
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content:
"International cooperation on climate change mitigation takes place \r\nat multiple governance levels, including under a range of multilateral \r\nenvironmental agreements (MEAs) beyond those of the international \r\nclimate regime. "


id: 3e1dbee6cbb5f5233031f942c4f25363
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"The 2016 Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol applies to the \r\nproduction and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). HFCs, \r\nwhich are widely used as refrigerants (Abas et al. 2018), have a high \r\nGWP100 of 14,600 for HFC-23, and are not ODS (Section 9.9.7.1). \r\nThe Kigali Amendment addresses the risk that the phase-out of \r\nHCFCs under the Montreal Protocol and their replacement with \r\nHFCs could exacerbate global warming (Akanle 2010; Hurwitz \r\net al. 2016), especially with the predicted growth in HFC usage for \r\napplications like air conditioners (Velders et al. 2015). In this way it \r\ncreates a cooperative rather than a conflictual relationship between \r\naddressing ozone depletion and the climate protection goals of the \r\nUNFCCC regime (Hoch et al. 2019). The Kigali Amendment requires "


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content:
"intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its \r\neffects' (Annex I: Glossary)."


id: 1e8c34f98d22176e17a36d55ed52c858
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"Distinct from project or programmatic level activities, however, \r\ninternational cooperation for adaptation operates to provide finance \r\nand technical assistance (Bouwer and Aerts 2006). In most cases it \r\ninvolves transboundary actions, such as in the case of transboundary \r\nwatershed management (Wilder et al. 2010; Milman et al. 2013; \r\nvan der Voorn et al. 2017). In others it involves the mainstreaming \r\nof climate change projections into existing treaties, such as for the \r\nprotection of migratory species (Trouwborst et al. 2012). "


id: b809caf012ead2150d901f578acc67ee
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"As discussed in Chapter  1, the emerging framing for the issue of \r\nclimate mitigation is that it is no longer to be considered in isolation \r\nbut rather in the context of its linkages with other areas. Adaptation, \r\nloss and damage, human rights and sustainable development are \r\nall areas where there are clear or potential overlaps, synergies, and \r\nconflicts with the cooperation underway in relation to mitigation."


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"The IPCC defines adaptation as: 'in human systems, the process of \r\nadjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, in order to \r\nmoderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In natural systems, \r\nthe process of adjustment to actual climate and its effect; human "


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"related losses of items both material and non-material that are not \r\ncommonly traded in the market, but whose loss is still experienced \r\nas such by those affected. Examples of NELD include loss of cultural \r\nidentity, sacred places, human health and lives (Serdeczny 2019). The \r\nSantiago Network is part of the Warsaw International Mechanism, to \r\ncatalyse the technical assistance of relevant organisations, bodies, \r\nnetworks and experts, for the implementation of relevant approaches \r\nto avert, minimise and address loss and damage at the local, national \r\nand regional levels, in developing countries that are particularly \r\nvulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change (UNFCCC 2020c). "


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"of financial support and transparency, functions better to leverage \r\nadaptation support into meaningful mitigation actions, there are \r\nonly few papers that examine this issue. Stua (2017a,b) explores the \r\nrelevance of the so-called 'share of proceeds' included in Article 6 of \r\nthe Paris Agreement as a key tool for leveraging adaptation though \r\nmitigation actions."


id: 55fb37415656fe46c68f082785acfcb6
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content:
"There are direct links between climate mitigation efforts, adaptation \r\nand loss and damage -  the higher the collective mitigation \r\nambition and the likelihood of achieving it, the lower the scale of \r\nadaptation ultimately needed and the lower the scale of loss and \r\ndamage anticipated. The liability of states, either individually or \r\ncollectively, for loss and damage is contested, and no litigation has \r\nyet been successfully launched to pursue such claims. The science \r\nof attribution, however, is developing (Otto et al. 2017; Skeie et al. \r\n2017; Marjanac and Patton 2018; Patton 2021) and while it has \r\nthe potential to address the thorny issue of causation, and thus \r\ncompensation (Stuart-Smith et al. 2021), it could also be used to \r\ndevelop strategies for climate resilience (James et al. 2014). "


id: cb2fcdfd57424975553fec1c5ad68505
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content:
"One scholar argues that climate impacts are 'incremental violence \r\nstructurally over-determined by international relations of power and \r\ncontrol' that affect most those who have contributed the least to \r\nGHG emissions (Dehm 2020). Calls for compensation or reparation \r\nfor loss and damage are therefore a  demand for climate justice \r\n(Dehm 2020). Many small island states entered declarations on \r\nacceptance of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement that they continue \r\nto have rights under international law regarding state responsibility \r\nfor the adverse effects of climate change, and that no provision in \r\nthese treaties can be interpreted as derogating from any claims or \r\nrights concerning compensation and liability due to the adverse \r\neffects of climate change."


id: beda4751788db2e8e850489401efbb25
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content:
"The adoption in 2013 of the Warsaw International Mechanism on \r\nLoss and Damage as part of the UNFCCC occurred despite the historic \r\nopposition of the United States to this policy. Vanhala and Hestbaek \r\n(2016) examine the roles of 'frame contestation' (contestations \r\nover different framings of loss and damage, whether as 'liability \r\nand compensation' or 'risk management and insurance' or other) and \r\nambiguity in accounting for the evolution and institutionalisation \r\nof the loss and damage norm within the UNFCCC. However, there \r\nis little international agreement on the scope of loss and damage \r\nprogrammes, and especially how they would be funded and by \r\nwhom (Gewirtzman et al. 2018). Moreover, non-economic loss and \r\ndamage (NELD) forms a  distinct theme that refers to the climate\u0002"


id: 77be0f9ec6b87e5c585b8a8db5d9d8e2
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content:
"As discussed in AR5, policies to open up trade can have a range of \r\neffects on GHG emissions, just as mitigation policies can influence \r\ntrade flows among countries. Trade rules may impede mitigation \r\naction by limiting countries' discretion in adopting trade-related \r\nclimate policies, but they also have the potential to stimulate the \r\ninternational adoption and diffusion of mitigation technologies and \r\npolicies (Droege et al. 2017)."


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"The mitigation impacts of trade agreements are difficult to ascertain, \r\nand the limited evidence is mixed. Examining the effects of three \r\nfree trade agreements (FTAs) - Mercosur, the North American Free \r\nTrade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Australia-United States Free Trade \r\nAgreement - on GHG emissions, Nemati et al. (2019) find that these \r\neffects depend on the relative income levels of the countries involved, \r\nand that FTAs between developed and developing countries may \r\nincrease emissions in the long run. However, studies also suggest \r\nthat FTAs incorporating specific environmental or climate-related \r\nprovisions can help reduce GHG emissions (Baghdadi et al. 2013; \r\nSorgho and Tharakan 2020)."


id: d034aa5f665409518f3fad2f2dbaa850
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"Investment agreements, which are often integrated in FTAs, seek \r\nto encourage the flow of foreign investment through investment \r\nprotection. While international investment agreements hold potential \r\nto increase low-carbon investment in host countries (PAGE 2018), \r\nthese agreements have tended to protect investor rights, constraining \r\nthe latitude of host countries in adopting environmental policies \r\n(Miles 2019). Moreover, international investment agreements may \r\nlead to 'regulatory chill', which may lead to countries refraining \r\nfrom or delaying the adoption of mitigation policies, such as phasing \r\nout fossil fuels (Tienhaara 2018). More contemporary investment \r\nagreements seek to better balance the rights and obligations of \r\ninvestors and host countries, and in theory offer greater regulatory \r\nspace to host countries (UNCTAD 2019), although it is unclear to \r\nwhat extent this will hold true in practice."


id: afcff000673184ab531cca62df457357
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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content:
"As the intersections between climate impacts and human rights have \r\nbecome increasingly clear, litigants have begun to use human rights \r\narguments, with a growing receptivity among courts towards such \r\narguments in climate change cases (Peel and Osofsky 2018; Savaresi \r\nand Auz 2019; Macchi and van Zeben 2021). In the landmark \r\nUrgenda climate case in 2019, the Dutch Supreme Court interpreted \r\nthe European Convention on Human Rights in light of customary \r\ninternational law and the UN climate change regime and ordered \r\nthe state to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 25% by 2020 \r\ncompared to 1990 (The Supreme Court of the Netherlands 2019). "


id: 5e9fe893d935bd1366a4fa90fed76a17
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"Several measures that can be adopted as part of carbon pricing \r\ninstruments to address carbon leakage concerns have been examined \r\nin the light of WTO rules. For instance, depending on the specific \r\ndesign, the free allocation of emissions allowances under an ETS could \r\nbe considered a subsidy inconsistent with the ASCM (Rubini and Jegou \r\n2012; Ismer et al. 2021). The WTO compatibility of another measure \r\nto counter carbon leakage, BCAs, has also been widely discussed \r\n(Box  14.2). Alternatives to BCAs, such as consumption charges on \r\ncarbon-intensive materials (Pollitt et al. 2020), can be consistent with \r\nWTO law, as they do not involve discrimination between domestic \r\nand  foreign products based on their carbon intensity (Ismer and \r\nNeuhoff 2007; Tamiotti 2011; Pauwelyn 2013; Holzer 2014; Ismer \r\nand Haussner 2016; Cosbey et al. 2019; European Commission 2019; \r\nMehling et al. 2019; Porterfield 2019; Ismer et al. 2020)."


id: c5a49b05de71ec097448d3768510d0a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"Analyses of the WTO compatibility of BCAs (Ismer and Neuhoff 2007; Tamiotti 2011; Hillman 2013; Pauwelyn 2013; Holzer 2014; \r\nTrachtman 2017; Cosbey et al. 2019; Mehling et al. 2019; Porterfield 2019) gained new currency following the legislative proposal to \r\nintroduce a 'carbon border adjustment mechanism' in the EU (European Commission 2021). BCAs can in principle be designed and \r\nimplemented in accordance with international trade law, but the details matter (Tamiotti et al. 2009). To increase the likelihood that \r\na BCA will be compatible with international trade law, studies suggest that it would need to: have a clear environmental rationale \r\n(i.e., reduce carbon leakage); apply to imports and exclude exports; consider the actual carbon intensity of foreign producers; account \r\nfor the mitigation efforts by other countries; and provide for fairness and due process in its design and implementation (Pauwelyn \r\n2013; Trachtman 2017; Cosbey et al. 2019; Mehling et al. 2019)."


id: 2ba3547a0fdd8303ad7c449fa18a0320
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"BCAs may also raise concerns regarding their consistency with international climate change agreements (Hertel 2011; Davidson Ladly \r\n2012; Ravikumar 2020). To mitigate these concerns, BCAs could include special provisions (e.g., exemptions) for LDCs, or channel \r\nrevenues from the BCA to developing countries to support low-carbon and climate-resilient development (Grubb 2011; Springmann \r\n2013; Mehling et al. 2019). Moreover, international dialogue on principles and best practices guiding BCAs could help to ensure that \r\nsuch measures do not hinder international cooperation on climate change and trade (Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Cosbey 2021). "


id: 5f0c35209eab55cce48cbfddb41ddccc
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"Renewable energy support measures may be at odds with the ASCM, \r\nthe GATT, and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment \r\nMeasures. In WTO disputes, measures adopted in Canada, India, and \r\nthe United States to support clean energy generation were found to \r\nbe inconsistent with WTO law due to the use of discriminatory local \r\ncontent requirements, such as the requirement to use domestically \r\nproduced goods in the production of renewable energy (Cosbey and \r\nMavroidis 2014; Kulovesi 2014; Lewis 2014; Wu and Salzman 2014; \r\nCharnovitz and Fischer 2015; Shadikhodjaev 2015; Espa and Marin \r\nDuran 2018)."


id: 9cf4ac49def1287d5edaf7b72463b775
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"Some measures may both lower trade barriers and potentially bring \r\nabout GHG emissions reductions. An example is the liberalisation of \r\ntrade in environmental goods (Hu et al. 2020). In 2012, the Asia\u0002Pacific Economic Cooperation economies agreed to reduce tariffs for \r\na list of 54 environmental goods (including, for example, solar cells; \r\nbut excluding, for example, biofuels or batteries for electric vehicles). \r\nHowever, negotiations on an Environmental Goods Agreement under "


id: fc3ef1f7ea0c4b3501e91d45cf6c724
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content:
"such as reinstating an exception for environmentally-motivated \r\nsubsidies under the ASCM (Horlick and Clarke 2017)."


id: 6eb31f9597c29b5de5a2e9e4ae04d4e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"the WTO stalled in 2016 due in part to disagreement over which \r\ngoods to include (de Melo and Solleder 2020). Another example is \r\nfossil fuel subsidy reform, which may reduce GHG emissions (Jewell \r\net al. 2018; Chepeliev and van der Mensbrugghe 2020; Erickson et al. \r\n2020) and lower trade distortions (Burniaux et al. 2011; Moerenhout \r\nand Irschlinger 2020). However, fossil fuel subsidies have largely \r\nremained unchallenged before the WTO due to legal and political \r\nhurdles (Asmelash 2015; De Bievre et al. 2017; Meyer 2017; Steenblik \r\net al. 2018; Verkuijl et al. 2019)."


id: 1fe2eed01c4e66633d94c8d4245f4e0d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"A trend in international economic governance has been the adoption \r\nof 'mega-regional' trade agreements involving nations responsible \r\nfor a substantial share of world trade, such as the Comprehensive \r\nand Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the \r\nEU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), \r\nand the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in \r\nEast Asia. Given the size of the markets covered by these agreements, \r\nthey hold potential to diffuse climate mitigation standards (Meltzer \r\n2013; Holzer and Cottier 2015). While CETA includes climate\u0002related provisions and Parties have made a  broad commitment to \r\nimplement the Paris Agreement (Laurens et al. 2019), and the CPTPP \r\nincludes provisions promoting cooperation on clean energy and low\u0002emissions technologies, the RCEP does not include specific provisions \r\non climate change."


id: 2fbe59eff6fe1cad7f0220f0b795d3cb
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"For international investment agreements, various other suggestions \r\nhave been put forward to accommodate climate change concerns. \r\nThese include incorporating climate change through ongoing reform \r\nprocesses, such as reform of investor-state dispute settlement under \r\nthe UN Commission on International Trade Law; modernisation \r\nof the Energy Charter Treaty; the (re)negotiation of international \r\ninvestment agreements; and the adoption of a  specific treaty to \r\npromote investment in climate action (Brauch et al. 2019; Tienhaara \r\nand Cotula 2020; Yamaguchi 2020; Cima 2021)."


id: c1587988be9ea16363e2beba03af04cd
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"South-South cooperation (SSC) and triangular cooperation (TrC) are \r\nbold, innovative, and rapidly developing means of strengthening \r\ncooperation for the achievement of the SDGs (FAO 2018). SSC is \r\ngaining momentum in achieving sustainable development and \r\nclimate actions in developing countries (UN 2017b). Through SSC, \r\ncountries are able to map their capacity needs and knowledge gaps \r\nand find sustainable, cost-effective, long-lasting and economically \r\nviable solutions (FAO 2019). In the UN Climate Change Engagement \r\nStrategy 2017 (UNOSSC 2017), South-South Cooperation Action Plan \r\nis identified as a substantive pillar to support."


id: 3add9bc3d35d4873b784bddb59853358
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"In 2019, the role of South-South and triangular cooperation was \r\nfurther highlighted with the BAPA+40 Outcome document (UN \r\n2019), noting outstanding contributions to alleviating global \r\ninequality, promoting sustainable development and climate actions, \r\npromoting gender equality and enriching multilateral mechanisms. \r\nFurthermore, the role of triangular cooperation was explicitly "


id: d45cb595978fff320eaf36a8b17edb3c
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"recognised in the document reflecting its increasingly relevant role in \r\nthe implementation of the SDGs (UN 2019)."


id: 7d5b5ba6a5a617c30ddda85f04b20012
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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content:
"There has been a recent resurgence of South-South cooperation (Gray \r\nand Gills 2016). The South-South Cooperation Action Plan was adopted \r\nby the UN as a substantive pillar to support the implementation of \r\nthe UN Climate Change Engagement Strategy 2017 (UNOSSC 2017). \r\nLiu et al. (2017a) explored prospects for South-South cooperation for \r\nlarge-scale ecological restoration, which is an important solution to \r\nmitigate climate change. Emphasis is given to experience and expertise \r\nsharing, co-financing, and co-development of new knowledge and \r\nknow-how for more effective policy and practice worldwide, especially \r\nin developing and newly industrialised countries."


id: f88e53bf98750e53f4fef78aa1cf5225
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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content:
"Hensengerth (2017) explores the role that technology transfer/\r\ncooperation from Europe played in shaping firm-level wind energy \r\ntechnologies in China and India and discusses the recent technology \r\ncooperation between the Chinese, Indian, and European wind firms. \r\nThe research finds that firm-level technology transfer/cooperation \r\nshaped the leading wind energy technologies in China and to a lesser \r\nextent in India. Thus, the technology cooperation between China, India, \r\nand Europe has become multi-faceted and increasingly Southern-led."


id: b094db64a7822859014272d2ae0b5c0b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"The global landscape of development cooperation has changed \r\ndramatically in recent years, with countries of the South engaging \r\nin collaborative learning models to share innovative, adaptable and \r\ncost-efficient solutions to their development and socio-economic\u0002environmental challenges, ranging from poverty and education \r\nto climate change. The proliferation of new actors and cross\u0002regional modalities has enriched the understanding and practice of \r\ndevelopment cooperation and generated important changes in the \r\nglobal development architecture towards a more inclusive, effective, \r\nand horizontal development agenda. South-South cooperation \r\nwill grow in the future, while it is complimentary to North-South \r\ncooperation. However, there are knowledge gaps in relation to the \r\nprecise volume, impact, effectiveness and quality of development \r\ncooperation from emerging development partners. This gap needs to \r\nbe plugged, and evidence on such cooperation strengthened."


id: 16c9aa3c2492ec427dfb2e58b6eb08c0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"Rampa et al. (2012) focus on the manner in which African states \r\nunderstand and approach new opportunities for cooperation with \r\nemerging powers, especially China, India and Brazil, including the \r\ncrucial issue of whether they seek joint development initiatives with \r\nboth traditional partners and emerging powers. UN (2018) presents \r\nand analyses case studies of SSTT in Asia and Pacific and Latin \r\nAmerica and Caribbean regions. Illustrative case studies on TrC can \r\nbe consulted in Shimoda and Nakazawa (2012), and specific cases on \r\nbiofuel SSC and TrC in UNCTAD (2012)."


id: 598f9ffb1e4f7749c5da57dc96a289ab
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"The central argument in the majority of these case studies is that \r\nSouth-South cooperation, which is value-neutral, is contributing \r\nto sustainable development and capacity building (Rampa et al. "


id: bc6c3ba88ba102153ec1261e6b789a91
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"Sectors refer to distinct areas of economic activity, often subject to \r\ntheir own governance regimes; examples include energy production, \r\nmobility, and manufacturing. A  sectoral agreement could include \r\nvirtually any type of commitment with implications for mitigation. \r\nIt could establish sectoral emission targets, on either an absolute or \r\nan indexed basis. It could also require states (or particular groups \r\nof states, if commitments are differentiated) to adopt uniform or \r\nharmonised policies and measures for a sector, such as technology\u0002based standards, taxes, or best-practice standards, as well as \r\nproviding for cooperation on technology research or deployment."


id: 1067f0a0864e011fb114b108735375ff
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content:
"Since 2008, several, often overlapping, voluntary and non-binding \r\ninternational efforts and agreements have been adopted to reduce \r\nnet emissions from the forestry sector. These initiatives have varying \r\nlevels of private sector involvement and different objectives, \r\ntargets, and timelines. Some efforts focus on reducing emissions \r\nfrom deforestation and degradation, while other focus on the \r\nenhancement of sinks through restoration of cleared or degraded \r\nlandscapes. These initiatives do not elaborate specific policies, \r\nprocedures, or implementation mechanisms. They set targets, \r\nframeworks, and milestones, aiming to catalyse further action, \r\ninvestment, and transparency in conservation and consolidate \r\nindividual country efforts."


id: e7d8384d37b586a9ec784d48ae955495
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content:
"Another relevant initiative is one under the 2015 United Nations \r\nConvention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), which targets land \r\ndegradation neutrality, that is, 'a state whereby the amount and \r\nquality of land resources, necessary to support ecosystem functions \r\nand services and enhance food security, remains stable or increases \r\nwithin specified temporal and spatial scales and ecosystems' (Orr \r\net al. 2017). This overarching goal was recognised as also being \r\ncritical to reaching the more specific avoided deforestation and \r\ndegradation and restoration goals of the UNFCCC and UNCBD. The \r\nLand Degradation Neutrality (LDN) initiative from UNCCD includes \r\ntarget-setting programmes that assist countries by providing \r\npractical tools and guidance for the establishment of the voluntary \r\ntargets and to formulate associated measures to achieve LDN \r\nand accelerate implementation of projects (Chasek et al. 2019). "


id: b5d6f5942a6bd70a6f28169bae9c5943
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"resilience and the contribution of biodiversity to carbon stocks \r\nthough conservation and restoration, including 'restoration of at least \r\n15% of degraded ecosystems' (UNCBD 2010). The plan elaborates \r\nmilestones, including the development of national plans for potential \r\nrestoration levels and contributions to biodiversity protection, carbon \r\nsequestration, and climate adaptation to be integrated into other \r\nnational strategies, including REDD+. In 2020, however, the CBD \r\nfound that while progress was evident for the majority of the Aichi \r\nBiodiversity Targets, it was not sufficient for the achievement of the \r\ntargets by 2020 (CBD 2020)."


id: 32e799fb642dbfaae590e22495d70ae3
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"Today, 124 countries have committed to their LDN national targets \r\n(UNCCD 2015). The LDN Fund is an investment vehicle launched in \r\nUNCCD COP 13 in 2017, which exists to provide long-term financing \r\nfor private projects and programmes for countries to achieve their \r\nLDN targets. According to the UNCCD, most of the funds will be \r\ninvested in developing countries. "


id: 62f26aeebe31bc382cc71ddfad795933
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"In sum, existing international agreements have had a small impact \r\non reducing emissions from the AFOLU sector and some success in \r\nachieving the enhancement of sinks through restoration. However, \r\nthese outcomes are nowhere near levels required to meet the Paris \r\nAgreement temperature goal -  which would require turning land \r\nuse and forests globally from a  net anthropogenic source during \r\n1990-2010 to a net sink of carbon by 2030, and providing a quarter \r\nof emissions reductions planned by countries (Grassi et al. 2017). The \r\nAFOLU sector has so far contributed only modestly to net mitigation \r\n(Chapter 7)."


id: d60ebaf4c1a9c3d8fc881c6852b558e
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"International cooperation on issues of energy supply and security has \r\na long and complicated history. There exists a plethora of institutions, \r\norganisations, and agreements concerned with managing the sector. \r\nThere have been efforts to map the relevant actors, with authors \r\nin one case identifying six primary organisations (Kerebel and \r\nKeppler 2009), in another 16 (Lesage et al. 2010), and in a  third \r\n50 (Sovacool and Florini 2012). At the same time, very little of that \r\nhistory has had climate mitigation as its core focus. Global energy \r\ngovernance has encompassed five broad goals - security of energy "


id: d7f289a1d1df7e298a64ec07bad82fe
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content:
"In 2010, the Parties to the CBD adopted the Strategic Plan for \r\nBiodiversity 2011-2020 which included 20 targets known as the \r\nAichi Biodiversity targets (Marques et al. 2014). Of relevance to the \r\nforestry sector, Aichi Target 15 sets the goal of enhancing ecosystem "


id: 27624652e4a0ac608d2818c318ee57c8
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"Van de Graaf 2015). The United Nations, including its various agencies \r\nsuch as the Committee on Sustainable Energy within the United \r\nNations Economic Commission for Europe, has also played a  role \r\nin the realignment of global energy governance towards mitigation \r\nefforts. As a precursor to SDG 7, the United Nations initiated in 2011 \r\nthe Sustainable Energy for All initiative, which in addition to aiming \r\nfor universal access to modern energy services, included the goals of \r\ndoubling the rate of improvement in energy efficiency, and doubling \r\nby 2030 the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix \r\n(Bruce 2018)."


id: c3da712eac661ff3b870301299dcaa04
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"supply and demand, economic development, international security, \r\nenvironmental sustainability, and domestic good governance - and \r\nas only one of these provides an entry point for climate mitigation, \r\neffort in this direction has often been lost (van de Graaf and \r\nColgan 2016). To take one example, during the 1980s and 1990s \r\na  combination of bilateral development support and lending \r\npractices from multilateral development banks pushed developing \r\ncountries to adopt power market reforms consistent with the \r\nWashington Consensus: towards liberalised power markets and away \r\nfrom state-owned monopolies. The goals of these reforms did not \r\ninclude an environmental component, and among the results was \r\nnew investment in fossil-fired thermal power generation (Foster and \r\nRana 2020)."


id: ac1eab38b2aa34d999b528c0c80aca92
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"Despite improvements in the international governance of energy, it \r\nstill appears that a great deal of this is still concerned with promoting \r\nfurther development of fossil fuels. One aspect of this is the \r\ndevelopment of international legal norms. A large number of bilateral \r\nand multilateral agreements, including the 1994 Energy Charter "


id: dbd1f8a08cb27cbee975e8bd0418bf3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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content:
"Treaty, include provisions for using a system of investor-state dispute \r\nsettlement (ISDS) designed to protect the interests of investors in \r\nenergy projects from national policies that could lead their assets to \r\nbe stranded. Numerous scholars have pointed to ISDS being able to \r\nbe used by fossil-fuel companies to block national legislation aimed \r\nat phasing out the use of their assets (Tienhaara 2018; Bos and Gupta \r\n2019). Another aspect is finance; Gallagher et al. (2018) examine the \r\nrole of national development finance systems. While there has been \r\na great deal of finance devoted to renewable energy, they find the \r\nmajority of finance devoted to projects associated either with fossil \r\nfuel extraction or with fossil fuel-fired power generation. "


id: c70bd6b998afbaa39dbb7393448cf22c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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content:
"with international shipping contributing 1.2% of global GHG\r\nemissions. These international transport emissions are projected \r\nto be between approximately 60% and 220% of global emissions \r\nof CO2 in 2050, as represented by the four main illustrative model \r\npathways in SR1.5 (Rogelj et al. 2018; UNEP 2020) Notably, however, \r\nthe climate impact of aviation emissions is estimated to be two to \r\nfour times higher due to non-CO2 effects (Terrenoire et al. 2019; Lee \r\net al. 2021a). Increases in trans-Arctic shipping and tourism activities \r\nwith sea ice loss are also forecast to have strong regional effects due \r\nto ships' gas and particulate emissions (Stephenson et al. 2018). "


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"The Kyoto Protocol required Annex I  Parties to pursue emissions \r\nreductions from aviation and marine bunker fuels by working through \r\nIMO and ICAO (UNFCCC 1997, Art. 2.2). Limited progress was made \r\nby these organisations on emissions controls in the ensuing decades \r\n(Liu 2011b), but greater action was prompted by conclusion of the \r\nSDGs and Paris Agreement (Martinez Romera 2016), together with \r\nunilateral action, such as the EU's inclusion of aviation emissions in \r\nits Emissions Trading System (Dobson 2020). "


id: 78d0584dae64554fd18e317e4b2aa58
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"The transportation sector has been a particular focus of cooperative \r\nefforts on climate mitigation that extend beyond the sphere of the \r\nUNFCCC climate regime. A  number of these cooperative efforts \r\ninvolve transnational public-private partnerships, such as the \r\nEuropean-based Transport Decarbonisation Alliance, which brings \r\ntogether countries, regions, cities and companies working towards \r\nthe goal of a 'net-zero emission mobility system before 2050' (TDA \r\n2019). Other efforts are centred in specialised UN agencies, such \r\nas the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the \r\nInternational Maritime Organization (IMO). "


id: 417ac0382f9de30216daa0e15ed05226
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"Measures introduced by the ICAO and IMO have addressed CO2\r\nemissions from international shipping and aviation. Emissions from \r\nthese parts of the transportation sector are generally excluded \r\nfrom national emissions reduction policies and NDCs because the \r\n'international' location of emissions release makes allocation to \r\nindividual nations difficult (Bows-Larkin 2015; Lyle 2018; Hoch et al. \r\n2019). The measures adopted by ICAO take the form of standards and \r\nrecommended practices that are adopted in national legislation. IMO \r\npublishes 'regulations' but does not have a power of enforcement, \r\nwith non-compliance a responsibility of flag states that issue a ship's \r\n'MARPOL' certificate."


id: e8cf26e9e1463fb3bb117f877d12237f
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content:
"As discussed in Chapter 2 and Figure SPM.4, international aviation \r\ncurrently accounts for approximately 1% of global GHG emissions, "


id: f05ec5e96f0ceea5b47e4f714b521c83
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"and, as a  matter of urgency, aims to phase them out as soon as \r\npossible in this century. IMO has considered a range of measures to \r\nmonitor and reduce shipping emissions. In 2016, the IMO's Marine \r\nEnvironment Protection Committee (MEPC) approved an amendment \r\nto the MARPOL Convention Annex VI for the introduction of \r\na mandatory global data collection scheme for fuel oil consumption \r\nof ships (Dobson 2020). Other IMO measures have focused on \r\nenergy efficiency (Martinez Romera 2016). The IMO's Energy \r\nEfficiency Design Index (EEDI), which is mandatory for new ships, \r\nis intended, over a ten-year period, to improve energy efficiency by \r\nup to 30% in several categories of ships propelled by diesel engines \r\n(Smith and Ahmad 2018). In May 2019, the MEPC approved draft \r\namendments to the MARPOL Convention Annex VI, which if adopted, \r\nwill bring forward the entry into force of the third phase of the EEDI \r\nrequirements to 2022 instead of 2025 (IMO 2019; Joung et al. 2020). "


id: cab43bc5b3b13cbf73eafecbb397ac3f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"Other measures adopted by ICAO include an aircraft CO2 emissions \r\nstandard that applies to new aircraft type designs from 2020, and \r\nto aircraft type designs already in production as of 2023 (Smith \r\nand Ahmad 2018). Overall, CORSIA and regional measures, such \r\nas the EU ETS, are estimated to reduce aviation carbon emissions \r\nby only 0.8% per year from 2017-2030 (noting, however, that 'if \r\nnon-CO2 emissions are included in the analysis, then emissions will \r\nincrease') (Larsson et al. 2019). Accordingly, pathways consistent \r\nwith the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement are likely to \r\nrequire more stringent international measures for the aviation sector \r\n(Larsson et al. 2019). "


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"movements from the Global North and South, as well as from distinct \r\nindigenous rights and peasant rights movements, and are organised \r\nas a  decentralised network of semiautonomous, coordinated units \r\n(Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017; Tormos-Aponte and Garcia-Lopez \r\n2018). The climate justice movement held global days of protest \r\nin most of the world's countries in 2014 and 2015, and mobilised \r\nanother large campaign in 2018 (Almeida 2019). The polycentric \r\narrangement of the global climate movement allows simultaneous \r\ninfluence on multiple sites of climate governance, from the local to \r\nthe global levels (Tormos-Aponte and Garcia-Lopez 2018). "


id: 43c56e84a4fdee98e2fbe8d186796de4
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"with the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement requires concrete \r\nimplementation measures and strengthened targets in the next \r\niteration in 2023 (Doelle and Chircop 2019; Climate Action Tracker \r\n2020c). As a step towards this, in 2020, the IMO's MEPC put forward \r\ndraft amendments to the MARPOL Convention that would require \r\nships to combine a technical and an operational approach to reduce \r\ntheir carbon intensity. These amendments were formally adopted by \r\nthe Committee at its session in June 2021."


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content:
"Historically, the issue of climate change did not give rise to intense, \r\norganised transnational protest characteristic of social movements \r\n(McAdam 2017). During the 1990s and early 2000s, the activities \r\nof the global climate movement were concentrated in developed \r\ncountries and largely sought to exercise influence through \r\nparticipation in UNFCCC COPs and side events (Almeida 2019). The \r\nmid-2000s onwards, however, saw the beginnings of use of more \r\nnon-institutionalised tactics, such as simultaneous demonstrations \r\nacross several countries, focusing on a  grassroots call for climate \r\njustice that grew out of previous environmental justice movements \r\n(Almeida 2019). Groups representing indigenous peoples, youth, \r\nwomen, and labour rights brought to the fore new tools of contention \r\nand new issues in the UNFCCC, such as questions of a just transition \r\nand gender equity (Allan 2020). "


id: 8f1f6b673ca5eda4279caab33c117063
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"The Paris Agreement's preamble explicitly recognises the importance \r\nof engaging 'various actors' in addressing climate change, and \r\nthe decision adopting the Agreement created the Non-state Actor \r\nZone for Climate Action platform to aid in scaling up these efforts. \r\nSpecific initiatives have also been taken to facilitate participation \r\nof particular groups, such as the UNFCCC's Local Communities and \r\nIndigenous Peoples Platform, which commenced work in Katowice \r\nin 2019. Climate movements based in the Global South, as well \r\nas in indigenous territories, are playing an increasingly important \r\nrole in transnational negotiations through networks such as the \r\nIndigenous Peoples Platform. These groups highlight the voices \r\nand perspectives of communities and peoples particularly affected \r\nby climate change. For instance, the Pacific Climate Warriors is \r\na grassroots network of young people from various countries in the "


id: b652bb11eb27b305582b97a605a0cf50
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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content:
"Climate justice has been variously defined, but centres on addressing \r\nthe disproportionate impacts of climate change on the most vulnerable \r\npopulations and calls for community sovereignty and functioning \r\n(Schlosberg and Collins 2014; Tramel 2016). Contemporary climate \r\njustice groups mobilise multiple strands of environmental justice "


id: 4a71e8bdade87b0ce42489d4f63b9ff3
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"Pacific Islands region whose activities focus on resisting narratives \r\nof future inevitability of their Pacific homelands disappearing, and \r\nre-envisioning islanders as warriors defending rights to homeland \r\nand culture (McNamara and Farbotko 2017). Youth global climate \r\nactivism, particularly involving young indigenous climate activists, is \r\nanother notable recent development. Although there remains little \r\npublished literature on indigenous youth climate activism (MacKay \r\net al. 2020), analysis of online sources indicates the emergence of \r\nseveral such groups, including the Pacific Climate Warriors and Te Ara \r\nWhatu from Aotearoa New Zealand (Ritchie 2021), as well as Seed \r\nMob in Australia. "


id: f251b5c6a94d607211cfcfce402accd7
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"Combined national climate commitments fall far short of the Paris \r\nAgreement's long-term temperature goals. Similar political ambition \r\ngaps persist across various areas of sustainable development. Many \r\ntherefore argue that actions by non-state actors, such as businesses \r\nand investors, cities and regions, and NGOs, are crucial. However, non\u0002state climate and sustainability actions may not be self-reinforcing \r\nbut may heavily depend on supporting mechanisms. Governance \r\nrisk-reduction strategies can be combined to maximize non-state \r\npotential in sustainable and climate-resilient transformations (Chan \r\net al. 2019). "


id: eb2e502488bb7078f23b20822de94f48
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"mitigating climate, protecting biodiversity and conserving indigenous \r\nculture by institutionalising payments on carbon sequestration and \r\nbiodiversity conservation values of ecosystems services from global \r\nto local communities. These mechanisms include public-private \r\npartnership, and NGO participation. REDD+ and TEEB allocation \r\npolicies will be interventions in a  highly complex system, and will \r\ninevitably involve trade-offs; therefore, it is important to question \r\nthe 'win-win-win' discourse (Zia and Kauffman 2018; Goulder et al. \r\n2019). The initial investment and the longer periods of recovery of \r\ninvestment are sometimes barriers to private investment. In this \r\nsense, it is important to have government incentives and encourage \r\npublic-private investment (Ivanova and Lopez 2013)."


id: efba567d2c7c4463de5e169134755453
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"The World Bank has also established several partnerships since 2010, \r\nmainly in the field of carbon pricing. Prominent examples are the \r\nNetworked Carbon Markets initiative (established 2013' spanning \r\nboth governmental actors and experts' now entering a  phase II) \r\nand the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, established in 2015 \r\nand spanning a wide range of governmental and non-governmental \r\nactors, not least within business (World Bank 2018; World Bank 2019; \r\nWettestad et al. 2021). These partnerships deal with knowledge \r\nproduction and dissemination and seek to enable implementation \r\nof carbon pricing policies. The leadership role of the international \r\n'heavyweight' World Bank gives these partnerships additional \r\ncomparative political weight, meaning also a  potentially greater \r\ninvolvement of powerful finance ministries/ministers generally \r\ninvolved in Bank matters and meetings. "


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"PPPs may also be developed to assist with implementation and \r\nsupport of states' climate mitigation commitments. For instance, \r\nUNEP has initiated a  number of PPPs for climate change finance. \r\nThese are designed to increase financing for the purposes of \r\ndisseminating low-carbon technologies to tackle climate change and \r\npromote clean energy in many parts of developing countries (UNEP \r\n2018b; Charlery and Traerup 2019). "


id: 4e38a144a2ccbdde22d5d2845e447dd7
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"In the same vein, in 2010 FAO delivered the Framework for Assessing \r\nand Monitoring Forest Governance. The Framework draws on several \r\napproaches currently in use or under development in major forest \r\ngovernance-related processes and initiatives, including the World \r\nBank's Framework for Forest Governance Reform. The Framework \r\nbuilds on the understanding that governance is both the context \r\nand the product of the interaction of a  range of actors and \r\nstakeholders with diverse interests (FAO 2010). For example, UNFCCC \r\nand the UN-REDD programme focus on REDD+ and UNEP focuses on \r\nThe Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), institutional \r\nmechanisms that have been conceptualised as a 'win-win-win' for "


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"Local governments are also creating cross-sector social partnerships \r\n(CSSPs) at the sub-national level, entities created for addressing social, \r\neconomic, and/or environmental issues with partner organisations \r\nfrom the public, private and civil society sectors (Crane and Seitanidi \r\n2014). In particular, with support from international networks such \r\nas ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability, C40, Global Covenant \r\nof Mayors, and Global 100% Renewable Energy, local governments \r\naround the world are committing to aggressive carbon reduction \r\ntargets for their cities (Ivanova et al. 2015; Clarke and Ordonez-Ponce \r\n2017; Kona et al. 2018). Research on CSSPs implementing community "


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"impact on climate. An important initiative launched in September \r\n2008 -Natural Climate Solutions - has the objective of leveraging \r\nbusiness investment to capture carbon out of the atmosphere. This \r\ninitiative has built strong cross-sectoral partnerships and is intended \r\nto tap into this immense emissions reduction solution potential \r\nthrough natural methods with the help of private investment."


id: 7dd4e664eff1bfd70ed9c4d5048a5f57
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content:
"sustainability plans shows that climate change is one of the four \r\nmost common issues, after waste, energy and water (which are also \r\nhighly relevant to climate mitigation) (MacDonald et al. 2017). "


id: 7f5c5361ed568ff9b9ebe5ac6d351a7d
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"The Global Methane Initiative (GMI) is a  multilateral partnership \r\nlaunched in 2004 by the United States Environmental Protection \r\nAgency along with 36 other countries to generate a voluntary, non\u0002binding agenda for global collaboration to decrease anthropogenic \r\nmethane releases. The GMI builds on the Methane to Markets \r\n(M2M) Partnership, an international partnership launched in 2004. In \r\naddition to the GMI's own financial assistance, the initiative receives \r\nfinancial backing from the Global Methane Fund (GMF) for methane \r\nreduction projects. The GMF is a fund created by governments and \r\nprivate donors (Leonard 2014)."


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"Another potentially influential type of transnational business \r\npartnership is investor coalitions or alliances formed for the purpose \r\nof pushing investee companies to adopt stronger measures for \r\nstranded asset management and climate change mitigation. MacLeod \r\n& Park (2011, p. 55) argue that these transnational groups 'attempt \r\nto re-orient and \"regulate\" the behaviour of business by holding \r\ncorporations accountable via mechanisms of information sharing, \r\nmonitoring of environmental impacts, and disclosure of activities \r\nrelated to the corporate climate footprint'. This favours a theory of \r\nactive ownership (investor engagement with corporate boards) over \r\ncapital divestment as the optimal pathway to shape the behaviour \r\nof corporate actors on climate risk (Kruitwagen et al. 2017; Krueger \r\net al. 2020)."


id: d6289180a003ae8508ed6af505a39bb7
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"Transnational business partnerships are a  growing feature of the \r\nlandscape of multi-level, multi-actor governance of climate change. \r\nMany business leaders embraced the ethos of 'business cannot \r\nsucceed in societies that fail'. Examples of this line of reasoning \r\nare: poverty limits consumer spending, political instability disrupts \r\nbusiness activity, and climate change threatens the production \r\nand distribution of goods and services. Such situations endanger \r\nmultinational enterprise investments, global asset management \r\nfunds, and the core business of international insurance companies \r\nand pension funds (van Tulder et al. 2021)."


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"et al. 2014). Some recent studies aim to provide systems to assess \r\nthe impact of PPPs beyond the much-used notion of value for \r\nmoney. One of these recent studies proposes a conceptual model \r\nthat addresses six dimensions relevant to economic, social and \r\nenvironmental progress. These include resilience and environment, \r\naccess of services to the population, scalability and replicability, \r\neconomic impact, inclusiveness, and finally, degree of engagement \r\nof stakeholders (Berrone et al. 2019). These systems will most likely \r\ncontinue to evolve."


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"that the contribution from the private sector needs to be significant \r\n(Gardiner et al. 2016). "


id: 3c95a595f7288d08f1302783e675b954
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"There is a relatively large volume of literature that assesses PPPs in \r\ngeneral. Much of this applies to partnerships which, either by design \r\nor not, advance climate goals. This literature provides a good starting \r\npoint for assessing these partnerships as they become operational. \r\nThese can help assess whether such partnerships are worth the effort \r\nin terms of their performance and effectiveness (Liu et al. 2017b), their \r\neconomic and social value added (Quelin et al. 2017), their efficiency \r\n(Estache and Saussier 2014) and the possible risks associated with \r\nthem (Grimsey and Mervyn 2002). "


id: d1004b48a37c0f3d6bff589ed16034a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"climate regime's transformative potential. Second, the international \r\nmarket mechanisms under Article 6  - should an agreement on \r\nimplementation deals be reached - allow a shift from projects and \r\nprogrammes to policy-based and sectoral generation of emissions \r\ncredits. Moreover, the sectoral agreement CORSIA also makes use \r\nof such credits. Third, there is a lack of attention to both distributive \r\noutcomes and institutional support within sectoral agreements, \r\nrepresenting a serious gap in efforts to harmonise mitigation with \r\nequity and sustainable development. Fourth, there are transnational \r\npartnerships and initiatives, representing the actions of non-state \r\nactors, addressing each of the assessment criteria, with the exception \r\nof economic effectiveness."


id: 8aad18f7e3479ca2b9edd7bfba8cfc35
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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content:
"Table  14.5 provides examples of mechanisms addressing each \r\nof the assessment criteria identified in Section 14.2.3. The effects of \r\ndifferent forms of international cooperation are separated out, \r\nincluding not only UNFCCC and other multilateral processes, but also \r\nsub-global and sectoral agreements. Several points stand out. First, \r\nthe Paris Agreement has the potential to significantly advance the UN "


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content:
"the effectiveness of policies. The latter framing is particularly under\u0002developed. Greater development of theories resting in social science \r\ndisciplines such as economic geography, sociology, and psychology \r\ncould potentially provide a more complete picture of the nature and \r\neffectiveness of international cooperation."


id: 6514d875a2597b80ef50a1f70a6e3205
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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"Any assessment of the effectiveness of international cooperation \r\nis limited by the methodological challenge of observing sufficient \r\nvariance in cooperation in order to support inference on effects. \r\nThere is little in the way of cross-sectional variance, given that \r\nmost of the governance mechanisms assessed here are global in \r\ntheir geographical coverage. One exception is with respect to the \r\neffects of the Kyoto Protocol, which we have reported. Time series \r\nanalysis is also challenging, given that other determinants of climate \r\nmitigation, including technology costs and the effects of national and \r\nsub-national level policies, are rapidly evolving. Thus, this chapter \r\nprimarily reviews scholarship that compares observations with \r\ntheory-based counterfactual scenarios."


id: bb60044bf0413f5d8776bf7c388da594
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"Understanding of the effectiveness of international agreements and \r\ninstitutions is driven entirely by theory-driven prediction of how \r\nthe world will evolve, both with these agreements in place and \r\nwithout them. The predictions in particular are problematic, because \r\ngovernance regimes are complex adaptive systems, making it \r\nimpossible to predict how they will evolve over time, and hence what \r\ntheir effects will be. Time will cure this in part, as it will generate \r\nobservations of the world with the new regime in place, which we can \r\ncompare to the counterfactual situation of the new regime's being \r\nabsent, which may be a simpler situation to model. But even here our \r\nmodelling capacity is limited: it may simply never be possible to know \r\nwith a high degree of confidence whether international cooperation, \r\nsuch as that embodied in the Paris Agreement, is having a significant \r\neffect, no matter how much data are accumulated. "


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"Given the importance of theory for guiding assessments of the past \r\nand likely future impacts of policies, it is important to note that \r\namong the alternative theoretical frameworks for analysis, some have \r\nbeen much more extensively developed in the literature than others. \r\nThis chapter has noted in particular the partial dichotomy between \r\na  global commons framing of climate change and a  transitions \r\nframing, which include different indicators to be used to evaluate "


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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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content:
"UNFCCC, 2015a: Paris Agreement. 25 pp. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/\r\nenglish_paris_agreement.pdf (Accessed October 31, 2021)."


id: cee1657b0d664ad804c90feee11cd81
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
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content:
"15 December 2018, 53-58 https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/\r\ncma2018_3_add2_new_advance.pdf (Accessed October 31, 2021)."


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"42 pp. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_08_adv_1.pdf\r\n(Accessed October 31, 2021)."


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vector_id: 19468
content:
"Kreibiehl, S., T. Yong Jung, S. Battiston, P. E. Carvajal, C. Clapp, D. Dasgupta, N. Dube, R. Jachnik, K. Morita, N. Samargandi, \r\nM. Williams, 2022: Investment and finance. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. \r\nContribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate \r\nChange  [P.R.  Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, \r\nR. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and \r\nNew York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.017"


id: fa6471027c79345a7c56e941ccb69e4b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36911
content:
"fossil-fuel related financing continue to be of major concern despite \r\nrecent commitments. This reflects policy misalignment, the current \r\nperceived risk-return profile of fossil fuel-related investments, and \r\npolitical economy constraints (high confidence). {15.3}"


id: a05a8370c733b2bb9091318d3924fef1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22764
content:
"Estimates of climate finance flows - which refers to local, national, \r\nor transnational financing from public, private, multilateral, bilateral \r\nand alternative sources, to support mitigation and adaptation actions \r\naddressing climate change - exhibit highly divergent patterns across \r\nregions and sectors and a slowing growth. {15.3}"


id: bd10141be1b619b27160c24b4080de0c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27308
content:
"When the perceived risks are too high the misallocation of abundant \r\nsavings persists. Investors refrain from investing in infrastructure \r\nand industry in search of safer financial assets, even earning low or \r\nnegative real returns. {15.2, 15.3}"


id: 814cd05689b33c228f235b96669ec6d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17867
content:
"Global climate finance is heavily focused on mitigation (more than \r\n90% on average between 2017-2020). This is despite the significant \r\neconomic effects of climate change's expected physical impacts, \r\nand the increasing awareness of these effects on financial stability. \r\nTo meet the needs for rapid deployment of mitigation options, \r\nglobal mitigation investments are expected to need to increase by \r\nthe factor of 3 to 6 (medium confidence). The gaps are wide for all \r\nsectors and represent a major challenge for developing countries,3\r\nespecially Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), where flows have to \r\nincrease by factor 4 to 7, for specific sectors like agriculture, forestry \r\nand other land use (AFOLU) in relative terms, and for specific groups \r\nwith limited access to, and high costs of, climate finance (high \r\nconfidence). {15.4, 15.5}"


id: b8dcfc9633dd60d7ebf424c318043844
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26611
content:
"The actual size of sectoral and regional climate financing gaps \r\nis only one component driving the magnitude of the challenge, \r\nwith financial and economic viability, access to capital markets, \r\ninvestment requirements for adaptation, reduction of losses \r\nand damages, climate-responsive social protection, appropriate \r\nregulatory frameworks and institutional capacity to attract and \r\nfacilitate investments and ensure safeguards being decisive to scale\u0002up financing. Financing needs for the creation and strengthening \r\nof regulatory environment and institutional capacity, upstream \r\nfinancing needs as well as R&D and venture capital for development \r\nof new technologies and business models are often overlooked \r\ndespite their critical role to facilitate the deployment of scaled-up \r\nclimate finance (high confidence). {15.4.1, 15.5.2}"


id: 2adac3d0aff0aa546ebe3a2c7b713141
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4169
content:
"The relatively slow implementation of commitments by \r\ncountries and stakeholders in the financial system to  scale \r\nup  climate finance reflects neither the urgent need for \r\nambitious  climate action, nor the economic rationale \r\nfor ambitious climate action (high confidence). Delayed climate \r\ninvestments and financing  - and limited alignment of investment \r\nactivity with the Paris Agreement - will result in significant carbon "


