# document

id: 892ea222f9bd75de9e823601b1839e28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"Strengthening building structures to increase resilience and reduce \r\nexposure to the risk of extreme events, such as draughts, torrential floods, \r\nhurricanes and storms, can be partially achieved by improving building \r\nstandards and retrofitting existing buildings (Bjarnadottir et al. 2011). \r\nHowever, future climate is not yet considered in parameters of existing \r\nbuilding energy codes (Steenbergen et  al. 2012). While enhancing \r\nstructural resilience would lead to GHG emissions (Liu and Cui 2018), \r\nso would disaster recovery and rebuilding. This adaptation-mitigation \r\ntrade-off needs to be further assessed."


id: f6fd70c3494dd7ff71f8e96f7eb011d4
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"Higher frequency and intensity of hurricanes, storm surges and \r\ncoastal and non-coastal flooding can escalate economic losses to \r\ncivil infrastructure, especially when associated with population \r\ngrowth and urbanisation in hazardous areas (Bjarnadottir et al. 2011; \r\nLi et  al. 2016; Lee and Ellingwood 2017). Climate change should \r\nincrease the risk and exposure to damage from flood (de Ruig et al. \r\n2019), sea level rise (Bosello and De Cian 2014; Zanetti et al. 2016; \r\nBove et al. 2020) and more frequent wildfires (Barkhordarian et al. \r\n2018; Craig et al. 2020)."


id: 24cfd74f2abc82f67ef969f225aa6c9b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"The impacts on buildings can lead to higher maintenance needs \r\nand the consequent embodied environmental impacts related \r\nto materials production, transportation and end-of-life, which \r\naccount for a relevant share of GHG emissions in buildings lifecycle \r\n(Rasmussen et  al. 2018). Climate change induced biodegradation \r\nis especially important for bio-based materials such as wood and \r\nbamboo (Brambilla and Gasparri 2020) which are important options \r\nfor reducing emissions imbued in buildings' construction materials \r\n(Penaloza et al. 2016; Churkina et al. 2020; Rosse Caldas et al. 2020). "


id: 9a7c4b71294a6354e66c88c4cbd517d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"Well-designed and effectively implemented mitigation actions in \r\nthe sector of buildings have significant potential for achieving \r\nthe United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). \r\nSpecifically, the multiple impacts of mitigation policies and measures \r\ngo far beyond the goal of climate action (SDG 13) and contribute \r\nto further activating a  great variety of other SDGs (Figure  9.18 \r\npresents some indicative examples). Table 9.5 reviews and updates \r\nthe analysis carried out in the context of the IPCC Special Report \r\non Global Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5) (Roy et al. 2018) demonstrating \r\nthat the main categories of GHG emission reduction interventions \r\nin buildings, namely the implementation of energy sufficiency and \r\nefficiency improvements as well as improved access and fuel switch \r\nto modern low carbon energy, contribute to achieving 16 out of \r\na total of 17 SDGs. "


id: ed1bc72ce2ff4b0c46023284342bab4c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"Although there can potentially be conflicts between climate change \r\nmitigation and adaptation, these can be dealt with proper planning, \r\nactions, and policies. The challenge is to develop multifunctional \r\nsolutions, technologies and materials that can mitigate GHG \r\nemissions while improving buildings adaptive capacity. Solutions \r\nand technologies should reduce not only buildings' operational \r\nemissions, but also embodied emissions from manufacturing and \r\nprocessing of building materials (Rock et  al. 2020). For instance, \r\nsome building materials, such as bio-concrete, can reduce lifecycle \r\nemissions of buildings and bring benefits in terms of building thermal \r\ncomfort in tropical and subtropical climates. Also, energy efficiency, \r\nsufficiency and on-site renewable energy production can help to \r\nincrease building resilience to climate change impacts and reduce \r\npressure on the energy system."


id: e411f091680be4f644188aaa737afac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"A review of a relatively limited number of studies made by Urge\u0002Vorsatz et al. (2016) and Payne et al. (2015) showed that the size \r\nof multiple benefits of mitigation actions in the sector of buildings \r\nmay range from 22% up to 7400% of the corresponding energy \r\ncost savings. In 7 out of 11 case studies reviewed, the value of the \r\nmultiple impacts of mitigation actions was equal or greater than \r\nthe value of energy savings. Even in these studies, several effects \r\nhave not been measured and consequently the size of multiple \r\nbenefits of mitigation actions may be even higher. Quantifying \r\nand if possible, monetising, these wider impacts of climate action \r\nwould facilitate their inclusion in cost-benefit analysis, strengthen \r\nthe adoption of ambitious emissions reduction targets, and improve \r\ncoordination across policy areas reducing costs (Smith et al. 2016; \r\nThema et al. 2017)."


id: da58bd3586ab59541f100fb052e65c55
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"A growing body of research acknowledges that mitigation actions \r\nin buildings may have substantial social and economic value \r\nbeyond their direct impact of reducing energy consumption and/\r\nor GHG emissions (IEA 2014; Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2016; Deng et al. \r\n2017; Reuter et  al. 2017; US EPA 2018; Kamal et  al. 2019; Bleyl \r\net al. 2019) (see also Cross-Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 7). In other \r\nwords, the implementation of these actions in the residential and "


id: d9f956e54608f2004574e50fcc17e573
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"Figure  9.18 | Contribution of mitigation policies of the building sector to meeting sustainable development goals. Source: based on information from \r\nIEA(2019d); IEA (2020b); Mills (2016); European Commission (2016); Rafaj et al. (2018); Mzavanadze (2018a); World Health Organization (2016); and literature review \r\npresented in Section 9.8.5.2."


id: 66f9d38c9891432f30cdb6b6eeff2a30
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"Table  9.5 | Aspects of mitigation actions in buildings and their contributions to the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. S: enhancement of energy \r\nsufficiency; E: energy efficiency improvements; R: improved access and fuel switch to lower carbon and renewable energy."


id: 924708b9e2658a7fb2760fc04a535415
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"compared to current levels, and 1.5 million fewer premature deaths \r\nin relation to a reference scenario, which assumes the continuation \r\nof existing and planned policies. The level of incremental investment \r\nneeded in developing countries to achieve universal access to modern \r\nenergy was estimated at around USD0.8 trillion cumulatively to 2040 \r\nin the scenarios examined (Rafaj et al. 2018). "


id: ccdcdae6bc2269a18a201e65bb1205c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"At the core of these policies is the promotion of improved cook\u0002stoves and other modern energy-efficient appliances to cook (for the \r\nhealth benefits of improved cook-stoves see for example (Garcia\u0002Frapolli et al. 2010; Malla et al. 2011; Aunan et al. 2013; Jeuland et al. \r\n2018), as well as the use of non-solid fuels by poor households in \r\ndeveloping countries (Figure 9.19). Most studies agree that the use of \r\nnon-solid energy options such as LPG, ethanol, biogas, piped natural \r\ngas, and electricity is more effective in reducing the health impacts of \r\nHAP compared to improved biomass stoves (see for example Larsen \r\n2016; Rosenthal et  al. 2018; Steenland et  al. 2018; Goldemberg \r\net al. 2018). On the other hand, climate change mitigation policies \r\n(e.g., carbon pricing) may increase the costs of some of these clean \r\nfuels (e.g.,  LPG, electricity), slowing down their penetration in the \r\npoor segment of the population and restricting the associated health "


id: 1058906d5daf34b4464d178d15ae3662
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"benefits (Cameron et  al. 2016). In this case, appropriate access \r\npolicies should be designed to efficiently shield poor households \r\nfrom the burden of carbon taxation (Cameron et  al. 2016). The \r\nevaluation of the improved biomass burning cook-stoves under real\u0002world conditions has shown that they have lower than expected, and \r\nin many cases limited, long-run health and environmental impacts, \r\nas the households use these stoves irregularly and inappropriately, \r\nfail to maintain them, and their usage decline over time (Patange \r\net al. 2015; Aung et al. 2016; Hanna et al. 2016; Wathore et al. 2017). \r\nIn this context, the various improved cook-stoves programs should \r\nconsider the mid- and long-term needs of maintenance, repair, or \r\nreplacement to support their sustained use (Shankar et  al. 2014; \r\nSchilmann et al. 2019)."


id: cb0ef2425c74084bcd7eaff131738963
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"Electrification of households in rural or remote areas results \r\nalso to significant health benefits. For example, in El Salvador, \r\nrural electrification of households leads to reduced overnight air \r\npollutants concentration by 63% due to the substitution of kerosene \r\nas a lighting source, and 34-44% less acute respiratory infections \r\namong children under six (Torero 2015). In addition, the connection \r\nof the health centres to the grid leads to improvements in the quality \r\nof health care provided (Lenz et al. 2017)."


id: b90ed1991d9fe8d712f825aa2ee757ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"Improved energy efficiency in buildings contributes in fuel poverty \r\nalleviation and brings health gains through improved indoor \r\ntemperatures and comfort as well as reduced fuel consumption and \r\nassociated financial stress (Curl et al. 2015; Lacroix and Chaton 2015; \r\nLiddell and Guiney 2015; Thomson and Thomas 2015; Willand et al. \r\n2015; Poortinga et al. 2018). On the other hand, households suffering \r\nmost from fuel poverty experience more barriers for undertaking \r\nbuilding retrofits (Braubach and Ferrand 2013; Camprubi et al. 2016; "


id: a4b6c5ad64fac090788160832f9fc66b
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"per dwelling and would generate an average saving to the healthcare \r\nsystem of EUR372 per  year and dwelling (due to better thermal \r\ncomfort conditions in winter)."


id: 5a4c38f9d6db8611177adef5d8ad153c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"Apart from the health benefits mentioned above, mitigation actions \r\nin the buildings sector are also associated with environmental \r\nbenefits to ecosystems and crops, by avoiding acidification and \r\neutrophication, biodiversity through green roofs and walls, building \r\nenvironment through reduced corrosion of materials, and so on \r\n(Thema et al. 2017; Mzavanadze 2018b; Knapp et al. 2019; Mayrand \r\nand Clergeau 2018), while some negative effects cannot be excluded \r\n(Dylewski and Adamczyk 2016). "


id: 559eecba29a15b0bf41fd24a08b88c42
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"The health benefits of residents due to mitigation actions in buildings \r\nare significant (for a review see Maidment et al. 2014; Thomson and \r\nThomas 2015; Fisk et al. 2020), and are higher among low income \r\nhouseholds and/or vulnerable groups, including children, the elderly \r\nand those with pre-existing illnesses (Maidment et  al. 2014; IEA \r\n2014; Ortiz et al. 2019). Tonn et al. (2018) estimated that the health\u0002related benefits attributed to the two weatherisation programs \r\nimplemented in the US in 2008 and 2010 exceeds by a factor of 3 \r\nthe corresponding energy cost savings yield. IEA (2014) also found \r\nthat the health benefits attributed to energy efficiency retrofit \r\nprograms may outweigh their costs by up to a factor of 3. Ortiz et al. \r\n(2019) estimated that the energy retrofit of vulnerable households \r\nin Spain requires an investment of around EUR10.9-12.3 thousands "


id: d43acc7bbc15305448d0b81ff2a15118
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"Also, very important are the effects of mitigation actions in buildings \r\non the reduction of consumption of natural resources, namely fossil \r\nfuels, metal ores, minerals, and so on. These comprise savings from \r\nthe resulting reduced consumption of fuels, electricity and heat and \r\nthe lifecycle-wide resource demand for their utilities, as well as \r\npotential net savings from the substitution of energy technologies \r\nused in buildings  - production phase extraction (European \r\nCommission 2016; Thema et  al. 2017). Teubler et  al. (2020) found "


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"that the implementation of an energy efficiency scenario in European \r\nbuildings will result in resource savings (considering only those \r\nassociated with the generation of final energy products) of 406 kg \r\nper MWh lower final energy demand in the residential sector, while \r\nthe corresponding figure for non-residential buildings was estimated \r\nat 706 kg per MWh of reduced energy demand. On the other hand, \r\nSmith et al. (2016) claim that a switch to more efficient appliances \r\ncould result in negative impacts from increased resource use, which \r\ncan be mitigated by avoiding premature replacement and maximising \r\nrecycling of old appliances."


id: 2c4897e9d2ef81d3dc6263d8e904d9d1
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"Mitigation actions aiming to reduce the embodied energy of buildings \r\nthrough using local and sustainable building materials can be used to \r\nleverage new supply chains (e.g., for forestry products), which in turn \r\nbring further environmental and social benefits to local communities \r\n(Hashemi et  al. 2015; Cheong and Storey 2019). Furthermore, \r\nimproved insulation and the installation of double- or triple-glazed \r\nwindows result in reduced noise levels. It is worth mentioning that \r\nfor every 1 dB decrease in excess noise, academic performance in \r\nschools and productivity of employees in office buildings increases by \r\n0.7% and 0.3% respectively (Kockat et al. 2018b). Smith et al. (2016) \r\nestimated that in the UK the annual noise benefits associated with \r\nenergy renovations in residential buildings may reach PS400 million in \r\n2030 outweighing the benefits of reduced air pollution. "


id: b6e441ac29fbec62bd69b605fdfec2ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"The implementation of well-designed climate mitigation measures in \r\nbuildings can help to reduce energy/fuel poverty and improve living \r\nconditions with significant benefits for health (Section  9.8.2) and \r\nwell-being (Payne et al. 2015; Smith et al. 2016; Tonn et al. 2018). \r\nThe social implications of energy poverty alleviation for the people \r\nin low- and middle-income developing countries with no access to \r\nclean energy fuels are further discussed in Section 9.8.4.2. In other \r\ndeveloping countries and in developed economies as well, the \r\nimplementation of mitigation measures can improve the ability of "


id: d58d821c8e630778a0f71132debb6a83
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"countries to read, socialise, and be more productive during the \r\nevening, while it is also associated with greater school attendance \r\nby children (Torero 2015; Rao et al. 2016; Barnes and Samad 2018). \r\nChakravorty et al. (2014) found that a grid connection can increase \r\nnon-agricultural incomes of rural households in India from 9% up \r\nto 28.6% (assuming a  higher quality of electricity). On the other \r\nhand, some studies clearly show that electricity consumption for \r\nconnected households is extremely low, with limited penetration of \r\nelectrical appliances (Cameron et al. 2016; Lee et al. 2017) and low \r\nquality of electricity (Chakravorty et al. 2014). The implementation \r\nof appropriate policies to overcome bureaucratic red tape, low \r\nreliability, and credit constraints, is necessary for maximising the \r\nsocial benefits of electrification."


id: f1e50da4b955d7f21f3934df7b65b304
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"Regarding non-residential buildings, (European Commission 2016) \r\nreviewed a  number of studies showing that buildings with high \r\nenergy efficiency or certified with green certificates present higher \r\nsales prices by 5.2-35%, and higher rents by 2.5-11.8%. More \r\nrecent studies in relation to those included in the review confirm \r\nthese results (Mangialardo et  al. 2018; Ott and Hahn 2018) or \r\nproject even higher premiums. Chegut et  al. (2014) found that \r\ngreen certification in the London office market results in a premium \r\nof 19.7% for rents. On the other hand, in Australia, a review study \r\nshowed mixed evidence regarding price differentials emerged as \r\na  function of energy performance of office buildings (Acil Allen \r\nConsulting 2015). Other studies have shown that energy efficiency \r\nand green certifications have been associated with lower default \r\nrates for commercial mortgages (Wallace et al. 2018; An and Pivo \r\n2020; Mathew et al. 2021)."


id: ba92d4a86afefa9a434d772698abb5c5
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"As regards improvements in workforce performance due to improved \r\nindoor conditions (i.e., air quality, thermal comfort, etc.), (Kozusznik et al. \r\n2019) conducted a systematic review on whether the implementation \r\nof energy efficient interventions in office buildings influence well-being \r\nand job performance of employees. Among the 34 studies included in "


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"dollars of consumer bill savings in the US. These effects may again \r\nhave a  positive impact on public budgets. Furthermore, reduced \r\nenergy consumption on a large scale is likely to have an impact on \r\nlower energy prices and hence on reducing the cost of production \r\nof various products, improving the productivity of the economy and \r\nenhancing security of energy supply (IEA 2014; Thema et al. 2017)."


id: a7336a710697cb62f6c02645c03dfacd
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"More generally, (Giraudet 2020) based on a  meta-analysis of \r\nseveral studies, showed that the capitalisation of energy efficiency is \r\nobserved in building sales and rental (even in the absence of energy \r\nperformance certificates), but the resulting market equilibrium can \r\nbe considered inefficient as rented dwellings are less energy efficient \r\nthan owner-occupied ones."


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"Understanding the reasons why cost-effective investment in \r\nbuilding energy efficiency are not taking place as expected by \r\nrational economic behaviour is critical to design effective policies \r\nfor decarbonise the buildings (Cattano et al. 2013; Cattaneo 2019). \r\nBarriers depend from the actors (owner, tenant, utility, regulators, \r\nmanufacturers, etc.), their role in energy efficiency project and the \r\nmarket, technology, financial economic, social, legal, institutional, \r\nregulatory and policy structures (Reddy 1991; Weber 1997; Sorrell \r\net al. 2000; Reddy 2002; Sorrell et al. 2011; Cagno et al. 2012; Bardhan \r\net al., 2014; Bagaini et al. 2020; Vogel et al. 2015; Khosla et al. 2017; "


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"Furthermore, energy savings due to the implementation of mitigation \r\nactions will result, mainly in the long-run, in increased disposable \r\nincome for households, which in turn may be spent to buy other \r\ngoods and services, resulting in economic development, creation of \r\nnew permanent employment and positive public budget implications \r\n(IEA 2014; Thema et al. 2017; US EPA 2018). According to Anderson \r\net  al. (2014), the production of these other goods and services is \r\nusually more labour-intensive compared to energy production, \r\nresulting in net employment benefits of about 8 jobs per  million "


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"lue bars indicate \r\ners and enablers \r\nn. The shading in\r\n, 2030 versus 20\r\nEconomic \r\nCosts in 2030 and long term\r\nEffects on employment \r\nand economic growth\r\nB E B \r\ners and barriers \r\n100"


id: 3cc085b3da5f93d53a7cce954c41d526
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"high rebound effects upon retrofitting (Teli et  al. 2016; Cali et  al. \r\n2016; Galvin and Sunikka-Blank 2017). The access for all to modern \r\nenergy services such as heating and cooling is one of the well-being \r\nobjectives governments aim for. However, ensuring this access leads \r\nto an increase of energy demand which is considered as a rebound \r\neffect by (Chitnis et al. 2013; Orea et al. 2015; Poon 2015; Teli et al. \r\n2016; Seebauer 2018; Sorrell et  al. 2018; Berger and Holtl 2019). \r\nAydin et al. (2017) found that in the Netherlands the rebound effect \r\nfor the lowest wealth quantile is double compared to the highest \r\nwealth quantile. Similar, energy access in developing countries leads \r\nto an increase consumption compared to very low baselines which \r\nis considered by some authors as rebound (Copiello 2017). On the \r\nother hand, in households whose members have a  higher level of \r\neducation and/or strong environmental values, the rebound is lower \r\n(Seebauer 2018)."


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"Rebound effects in the building sector could be a co-benefit, in cases \r\nwhere the mechanisms involved provide faster access to affordable \r\nenergy and/or contribute to improved social well-being, or a trade-off, to \r\nthe extent that the external costs of the increased energy consumption \r\nexceed the welfare benefits of the increased  energy service \r\nconsumption (Chan and Gillingham 2015; Borenstein 2015; Galvin \r\nand Sunikka-Blank 2017; Sorrell et al. 2018). In cases where rebound \r\neffects are undesirable, appropriate policies could be implemented for \r\ntheir mitigation. "


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"In the buildings sector energy efficiency improvements and promotion \r\nof cleaner fuels can lead to all types of rebound effects,  while \r\nsufficiency measures lead only to indirect and secondary effects \r\n(Chitnis et  al. 2013). The consideration of the rebound effects as \r\na behavioural economic response of the consumers to cheaper energy \r\nservices can only partially explain the gap between the expected \r\nand actual energy savings (Galvin and Sunikka-Blank 2017). The \r\nprebound effect, a term used to describe the situation where there \r\nis a  significant difference between expected and observed energy \r\nconsumption of non-refurbished buildings, is usually implicated in "


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content:
"There is no single energy efficiency policy (Wiese et al. 2018) able to \r\ndecarbonise the building sector, but a range of polices are needed, often \r\nincluded in a policy package (Kern et al., 2017; Rosenow et al. 2017) "


id: 7848f45a6522b430b137e31c0c1d59f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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"Revisions in tenant and condominium law are necessary for reducing \r\ndisincentives between landlord and tenant or between multiple \r\nowners, these acts alone cannot incentivise them to uptake an energy \r\nefficiency upgrade in a property (Economidou and Serrenho, 2019). \r\nA package addressing split incentives include regulatory measures, \r\ninformation measures, labels, individual metering rules and financial \r\nmodels designed to distribute costs and benefits to tenants and \r\nowners in a  transparent and fair way (Bird and Hernandez 2012; \r\nEconomidou and Bertoldi 2015; Castellazi et  al. 2017). A more \r\nactive engagement of building occupants in energy saving practices, \r\nthe development of agreements benefitting all involved actors, \r\nacknowledgement of real energy consumption and establishment of \r\ncost recovery models attached to the property instead of the owner \r\nare useful measures to address misalignments between actors. "


id: 4335a6c05da33642af6d5d106903276d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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content:
"In Developed Countries policy packages are targeted to increase \r\nthe number and depth of renovations of existing building, while for \r\ndeveloping countries policies focus on new construction, including \r\nregulatory measures and incentives, while carbon pricing would be \r\nmore problematic unless there is a strong recycling of the revenues. \r\nBuilding energy codes and labels could be based on LCA emissions, \r\nrather than energy consumption during the use phase of buildings, as \r\nit is the case in Switzerland and Finland (Kuittinen and Hakkinen 2020)."


id: a6d487140ffab5dbe5118c6795365d07
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:39
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content:
"Policy packages should also combine sufficiency, efficiency, and \r\nrenewable energy instruments for buildings, for example some \r\nnational building energy codes already include minimum requirements \r\nfor the use of renewable energy in buildings."


id: d1468c9700df4583f36d04e3a18588cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Building energy codes. Several scholars highlighted the key \r\nrole of mandatory building energy codes and minimum energy \r\nperformance requirements for buildings (Enker and Morrison 2017). \r\nWang et al. (2019) finds that, 'Building energy efficiency standards \r\n(BEES) are one of the most effective policies to reduce building "


id: 782e3f5230469ad3d8fb3c8e22a4265d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Recently the concept of sufficiency complementary to energy \r\nefficiency has been introduced in policy making (Brischke et al. 2015; \r\nHewitt 2018; Thomas et al. 2019; Bertoldi 2020; Saheb 2021) (Box 9.1). "


id: fb38e238d6f19d9f30d8dfdbf0233323
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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"mandatory regulations for existing buildings include Canada, the \r\nUS (specific cities), China and Singapore. Policies include mandating \r\nenergy retrofits for low performances existing buildings, when sold \r\nor rented. In countries with increasing building stock, in particular in \r\ndeveloping countries, policies are more effective when targeting new \r\nbuildings (Kamal et al. 2019)."


id: 95b1ef6d842e6524e49d07ac1a115d7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"NZEBs definitions are proposed by (Marszal et al. 2011; Deng and Wu \r\n2014; Zhang and Zhou 2015; Williams et al. 2016; Wells et al. 2018), \r\ncovering different geographical areas, developing and Developed \r\nCountries, and both existing buildings and new buildings. In 2019, \r\nChina issued the national standard Technical Standard for Nearly \r\nZero Energy Building (MoHURD, 2019). California has also adopted \r\na  building energy code mandating for NZEBs for new residential \r\nbuildings in 2020 and 2030 for commercial buildings (Feng et  al. \r\n2019). Several countries have adopted targets, roadmaps or \r\nmandatory building energy codes requiring net zero energy buildings \r\n(NZEBs) for some classes of new buildings (Feng et al. 2019). "


id: e07ac2e41a2cda7b41c320c02c03a786
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Building labels and Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs).\r\nBuildings labels are an important instrument, with some limitations. \r\nLi et  al. (2019b) reviewed the EU mandatory Energy Performance \r\nCertificates for buildings and proposed several measures to make the \r\nEPC more effective in driving the markets towards low consumption \r\nbuildings. Some authors have indicated that the EPC based on the \r\nphysical properties of the buildings (asset rating) may be misleading \r\ndue to occupancy behaviour (Cohen and Bordass 2015) and \r\ncalculation errors (Crawley et al. 2019). Control authorities can have \r\na large impact on the quality of the label (Mallaburn 2018). Labels \r\ncan also include information on the GHG embedded in building \r\nmaterial or be based on LCA."


id: 70efbfcf14fd207feef2ac3cf15f29b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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"US EPA Energy Star and NABERS (Gui and Gou, 2020) are building \r\nperformance labels based on performance, not on modelled energy \r\nuse. Singapore has mandatory building energy labels, as do many \r\ncities in the US, while India and Brazil have mandatory labels for \r\npublic buildings."


id: 915faa8bd186e720921a1b8bcf4021c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Mandatory energy performance disclosure and benchmarking of \r\nbuilding energy consumption is a  powerful policy instrument in \r\nparticular for non-residential buildings (Trencher et  al. 2016) and \r\ncould be more accurate than energy audits. Gabe (2016) showed that \r\nmandatory disclosure is more effective than voluntary disclosure. \r\nSome US cities (e.g., New York) have adopted Emissions Performance \r\nStandards for buildings, capping CO2 emissions. Accurate statistics \r\nrelated to energy use are very important for reducing GHG in building \r\nsector. In 2015, the Republic of Korea stablished the National \r\nBuilding Energy Integrated Management System, where building \r\ndata and energy consumption information are collected for policy \r\ndevelopment and public information."


id: e7115391ac944926dedc601bc9df9450
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Building codes could also foster the usage of wood and timber as \r\na construction in particular for multi-storey buildings and in the long \r\nterm penalise carbon intensive building materials (Ludwig 2019) with \r\npolicies based on environmental performance assessment of buildings \r\nand the 'wood first' principle (Ludwig 2019; Ramage et al. 2017)."


id: cfc0d7ea34a84c2aff15940b13bfdbb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 30221
content:
"Retro-commissioning is a cost-effective process to periodically check \r\nthe energy performance of existing building and assure energy savings \r\nare maintained overtime (Kong et al. 2019; Ssembatya et al. 2021)."


id: 4494fada93170d9990e7ea0ad2081713
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"In countries with low rate of new construction, it is important to \r\nconsider mandatory building energy codes for existing buildings, but \r\nthis may also be relevant for countries with high new construction, \r\nas they will have soon a large existing building stock. The EU has \r\nrequirements already in place when building undergo a  major \r\nrenovation (Economidou et  al. 2020). Countries considering "


id: 4e1710b82bd8a8595c1fc524a120c967
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Energy audits. Energy audits, help to overcome the information \r\nbarriers to efficiency investments, in particular buildings owned \r\nor occupied by small companies (Kalantzis and Revoltella, 2019). \r\nIn the EU energy audits are mandatory for large companies under \r\nthe Energy Efficiency Directive (Nabitz and Hirzel 2019), with some \r\nEU Member States having a  long experience with energy audits, "


id: 672c4aaa3c3762fa976240f33b368ee1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 13828
content:
"be carefully selected and kept as simple as possible focusing on \r\nthe following: entertain, engage, embed and educate (Dewick and \r\nOwen 2015)."


id: f4dc39e14565f7f3ebad510b4b137e47
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 36033
content:
"as part of national voluntary agreements with the private sector \r\n(Rezessy and Bertoldi 2011; Cornelis 2019). Singapore has adopted \r\nmandatory audit for buildings (Shen et  al. 2016). In the United \r\nStates, several cities have adopted energy informational policies in \r\nrecent years, including mandatory buildings audits (Trencher et  al. \r\n2016; Kontokosta et al. 2020). The State of New York has in place \r\na subsidised energy audit for residential building since 2010 (Boucher \r\net al. 2018). It is important to assure the training of auditors and the \r\nquality of the audit."


id: 1164dc2b8dbdb1c8cbb96d647f0d9491
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 216
content:
"Appliance energy labelling. Mandatory energy labelling schemes \r\nfor building technical equipment and appliances are very often \r\nimplemented together with minimum efficiency standards, with the \r\nmandatory standard pushing the market towards higher efficiency \r\nand the label pulling the market (Bertoldi, 2019). OECD countries, \r\nand many developing countries (for example China, Ghana, Kenya, \r\nIndia, South Africa, etc.) (Chunekar 2014; Diawuo et  al. 2018; \r\nIssock et al. 2018) have adopted mandatory energy labelling. Other \r\nlabelling schemes are of voluntary nature, for example, the Energy \r\nStar programme in the US (Ohler et  al. 2020), which covers many \r\ndifferent appliances."


id: cf7b68a0ab25659a72a4afaad77b7689
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 30176
content:
"The concept of carbon allowances or carbon budget can also be \r\napplied to buildings, by assigning a  yearly CO2 emissions budget \r\nto each building. This policy would be a less complex than personal \r\nallowances as buildings have metered or billed energy sources \r\n(e.g.,  gas, electricity, delivered heat, heating oil, etc.). The scheme "


id: b8fed902c92a778228a86f8452842d76
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"stimulates investments in energy efficiency and on-site renewable \r\nenergies and energy savings resulting from behaviour by buildings \r\noccupant. For commercial buildings, similar schemes were \r\nimplemented in the UK CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme (closed in \r\n2019) or the Tokyo Metropolitan Carbon and Trade Scheme (Nishida \r\nand Hua 2011; Bertoldi et  al. 2013a). Since 2015 the Republic of \r\nKorea implemented an Emission Trading Scheme, covering buildings \r\n(Park and Hong 2014; Lee and Yu 2017; Narassimhan et al. 2018). \r\nMore recently under the New York Climate Mobilization Act enacted \r\nin 2019 New York City Local Law 97 established 'Carbon Allowances' \r\nfor large buildings (Spiegel-Feld 2019; Lee 2020). "


id: 253121ad0db59958bc13916e3517b307
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 3285
content:
"Public money can be used to reward and give incentives to energy \r\nsaved, as a result of technology implementation, and/or as a result of \r\nenergy conservation and sufficiency (Eyre 2013; Bertoldi et al. 2013b; \r\nPrasanna et al. 2018). This can be seen as a core feature of the Energy \r\nSavings Feed-in Tariff (ES-FiT). The ES-FiT is a  performance-based \r\nsubsidy, whereby actions undertaken by end-users  - for example, \r\ninvestments in energy efficiency technology measures - are awarded \r\nbased on the real energy savings achieved."


id: 5ecf1e1eda9b99783f4bfd5008bb604
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 12457
content:
"A policy, which can have similar impact to a carbon tax and is the \r\nenergy price/subsidy reform, which also involves raising energy \r\nprices. Energy price/subsidy reform reduces energy consumption and \r\ngreenhouse gas emissions and encourages investment in energy \r\nefficiency (Coady et al. 2018; Aldubyan and Gasim, 2021). In a similar \r\nmanner, government revenues from subsidies reforms can be used to \r\nmitigate the distributional impact on vulnerable population groups, \r\nincluding direct cash transfer programmes (Rentschler and Brazilian \r\n2017; Schaffitzel et al. 2020)."


id: 16d0cdc4604dda606b92429771d17142
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 1111
content:
"Energy or carbon taxes. Energy and/or carbon taxes are a climate \r\npolicy, which can help in reducing energy consumption (Sen and \r\nVollebergh 2018) and manage the rebound effect (Font Vivanco \r\net al. 2016; Peng et al. 2019; Freire-Gonzalez 2020; Bertoldi 2020). \r\nThe carbon tax has been adopted mainly in OECD countries and in \r\nparticular in EU Member States (Sen and Vollebergh 2018; Hajek \r\net al. 2019; Bertoldi 2020). There is high agreement that carbon taxes \r\ncan be effective in reducing CO2 emissions (Andersson 2017; IPCC \r\n2018; Hajek et al. 2019). It is hard to define the optimum level of \r\ntaxation in order to achieve the desired level of energy consumption \r\nor CO2 emission reduction (Weisbach et al. 2009). As for other energy \r\nefficiency policy distributional effect and equity considerations have \r\nto be carefully considered and mitigated (Borozan 2019). High energy "


id: b95d4c33210fcc06091159d235ec78a5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 26706
content:
"Taxes could also be used to penalise inefficient behaviour and favour \r\nthe adoption of efficient behaviour and technologies. Taxes are used \r\nin some jurisdictions to promote energy efficient appliances with \r\nlower VAT. Similarly, the annual building/property tax (and also the \r\npurchase tax) could be based on the CO2 emissions of the buildings, \r\nrather than on the value of the building. Tax credits are also an \r\nimportant subsidy for the renovation of buildings in France (Giraudet \r\n2020), Italy (Alberini and Bigano 2015) and other countries."


id: 7c028d766b74ed282ae296a64bf88069
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 17114
content:
"mortgages to finance efficiency improvements. There are two types of \r\nenergy mortgages: (i) the Energy Efficient Mortgages (EEMs), and (ii) the \r\nEnergy Improvement Mortgages (EIMs), both can help in overcoming \r\nthe main barriers to retrofit policies (Miu et  al. 2018). The success \r\ndepends on the improved energy efficiency with a positive impact on \r\nproperty value and on the reduction of energy bills and the income \r\nincrease in the household. In the EU, the EeMAP Initiative aims to create \r\na standardised energy efficient mortgage template (Bertoldi et al. 2021)."


id: 3e481167a6a76129519afedd2a2a93bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Grants and subsidies are traditional financing instruments used by \r\ngovernments when optimal levels of investments cannot be fully \r\nsupported by the market alone. They can partly help overcoming the \r\nupfront cost barrier as they directly fill an immediate financial gap \r\nand thus enable a temporary shift in the market (Newell et al. 2019). \r\nThese forms of support are usually part of policy mixes including \r\nfurther fiscal and financial instruments such as feed-in tariffs and \r\ntax breaks (Polzin et al. 2019). Potential issues with subsidies are the \r\nlimited availability of public financing, the stop and go due to annual \r\nbudget and the competition with commercial financing."


id: fe5492d42a14ca4c2680b46da98e51ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"On-bill financing is a mechanism that reduces first-cost barriers by \r\nlinking repayment of energy efficiency investments to the utility \r\nbill and thereby allowing customers to pay back part or all costs of \r\nenergy efficiency investments over time (Brown 2009). On-bill finance \r\nprogrammes can be categorised into: (i) on-bill loans (assignment of \r\nthe obligation to the property) and (ii) on-bill tariffs (payment off in \r\ncase of ownership transfer) (Eadson et  al. 2013). On-bill finance \r\nprogrammes can be more effective when set up as a service rather \r\nthan a loan (Mundaca and Klocke 2018)."


id: 82aabf1b82b90e63af276db5dfadd5de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18085
content:
"Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) is a  means of financing \r\nenergy renovations and renewable energy through the use of specific \r\nbonds offered by municipal governments to investors (Mills 2016). \r\nMunicipalities use the funds raised to loan money towards energy \r\nrenovations in buildings. The loans are repaid over the assigned long \r\nterm (15-20 years) via an annual assessment on their property tax \r\nbill (Kirkpatrick and Bennear 2014). This model has been subject \r\nto consumer protection concerns. Residential PACE programmes \r\nin California have been shown to increase PV deployment in \r\njurisdictions that adopt these programs (Kirkpatrick and Bennear \r\n2014; Ameli et al. 2017). In US commercial buildings, PACE volumes \r\nand programs, however, continue to grow (Lee 2020). "


id: 27bf550026f0c089f891f9b2067f0a84
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Wholesaling of EE of loans and utilities programmes, are other important \r\nfinancing instruments. Another financing mechanism for building \r\nefficiency upgrades, mainly implemented so far in the US, is efficiency\u0002as-a-service under an energy services agreement (ESA), where the \r\nbuilding owners or tenant pay to the efficiency service provider a charge \r\nbased on realised energy savings without any upfront cost (Kim et al. \r\n2012; Bertoldi, 2020). ESA providers give performance guarantees \r\nassuming the risk that expected savings would occur (Bertoldi, 2020)."


id: 5d4db159070b21737296f11f88c857a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12193
content:
"Revolving funds allow reducing investment requirements and \r\nenhancing energy efficiency investment impacts by recovering \r\nand reinvesting the savings generated (Setyawan 2014). Revolving \r\nfund could make retrofit cost-neutral in the long term and could \r\nalso dramatically increase low carbon investments, including in \r\ndeveloping countries (Gouldson et al. 2015)."


id: 5a0dce01e79bd1f658209955cfd6ca94
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11680
content:
"Carbon finance, started under the Kyoto Protocol with the flexible \r\nmechanisms and further enhanced under the Paris Agreement \r\n(Michaelowa et al. 2019), is an activity based on 'carbon emission rights' \r\nand its derivatives (Liu et al. 2015a). Carbon finance can promote low\u0002cost emission reductions (Zhou and Li 2019). Under Emission Trading \r\nSchemes or other carbon pricing mechanisms, auctioning carbon \r\nallowances creates a new revenue stream. Revenues from auctioning \r\ncould be used to finance energy efficiency projects in buildings with \r\ngrants, zero interest loans or guarantees (Wiese et al. 2020)."


id: fa85010b551731ce889cc41d4046067
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
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content:
"Crowdfunding is a  new and rapidly growing form of financial \r\nintermediation that channels funds from investors to borrowers \r\n(individuals or companies) or users of equity capital (companies) \r\nwithout involving traditional financial organisations such as banks \r\n(Miller and Carriveau 2018). Typically, it involves internet-based \r\nplatforms that link savers directly with borrowers (European Union \r\n2015). It can play a significant role at the start of a renewable and \r\nsustainable energy projects (Dilger et al. 2017)."


id: 3f0b3baa3d8a08107259b5a92104217a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7303
content:
"FiT systems is the increasing cost of policies maintenance (Zhang et al. \r\n2018; Pereira da Silva et al. 2019; Roberts et al. 2019a). In Germany, \r\nthe financial costs, passed on to consumers in the form a levy on the \r\nelectricity price have increased substantially in recent years (Winter \r\nand Schlesewsky 2019) resulting in opposition to the FiT in particular \r\nby non-solar customers. A particular set up of the FiT encourage self\u0002consumption through net metering and net billing, which has a lower \r\nfinancial impact on electricity ratepayers compared with traditional \r\nFiTs (Pacudan 2018; Roberts et al. 2019b; Vence and Pereira 2019)."


id: 2a7405ad06655dd2c72ae164120029c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 4108
content:
"The One-Stop Shop (OSS) service providers for buildings energy \r\nrenovations are organisations, consortia, projects, independent experts \r\nor advisors that usually cover the whole or large part of the customer \r\nrenovation journey from information, technical assistance, structuring and \r\nprovision of financial support, to the monitoring of savings (Mahapatra \r\net al. 2019; Bertoldi 2021b). OSSs are transparent and accessible advisory \r\ntools from the client perspective and new, innovative business models \r\nfrom the supplier perspective (Boza-Kiss and Bertoldi 2018)."


id: 5eae371b87d7cc2cdd9e0afeb5055f19
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 12434
content:
"In some countries, for example, Australia (Duong et al. 2019), South \r\nKorea (Choi et al. 2018a), China (Yi et al. 2019), there was a transition \r\nfrom subsidies under the FiT to market-based mechanisms, such \r\nas RPSs and tendering. Compared with FiT, RPS (or Renewable \r\nObligations) reduce the subsidy costs (Zhang et al. 2018). A number \r\nof scholars (Xin-gang et  al. 2017; Liu et  al. 2018a, 2019a) have \r\nhighlighted the RPSs' effectiveness in promoting the development of \r\nrenewable energy. Other authors (Requate 2015; An et al. 2015) have \r\npresented possible negative impacts of RPSs. "


id: 836f2fafba460ab53080c55942eb34b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18211
content:
"On-site renewable energy generation is a  key component for the \r\nbuilding sector decarbonisation, complementing sufficiency and \r\nefficiency. Renewable energies (RES) technologies still face barriers \r\ndue to the upfront investment costs, despite the declining price of \r\nsome technologies, long pay-back period, unpredictable energy \r\nproduction, policy incertitude, architectural (in particular for built-in \r\nPV) and landscape considerations, technical regulations for access to \r\nthe grid, and future electricity costs (Mah et al. 2018; Agathokleous \r\nand Kalogirou 2020). "


id: 5b3f5fed63f5190c02d54b927126d2c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11861
content:
"Several policy instruments for RES have been identified by scholars \r\n(Fouquet 2013; Azhgaliyeva et  al. 2018; Pitelis et  al. 2020): direct \r\ninvestments; feed-in tariffs; grants and subsidies; loans and taxes; \r\n(tradable) green certificates or renewable/clean energy portfolio \r\nstandards; information and education; strategic planning; codes and \r\nstandards; building codes; priority grid access; research, development \r\nand deployment and voluntary approaches. There are specific policies \r\nfor renewable heating and cooling (Connor et al. 2013). In 2011, the \r\nUK introduced the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) support scheme \r\n(Balta-Ozkan et al. 2015; Connor et al. 2015). The RHI guarantee a fixed \r\npayment per unit of heat generated by a renewable heat technology \r\nfor a specific contract duration (Yilmaz Balaman et al. 2019)."


id: 2bfad2fea8c91fb2291ca5b90421ba78
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4348
content:
"The most common implemented policy instruments are the feed-in \r\ntariffs (FiTs) and the Renewable/Energy Portfolio Standards (RPSs) (Xin\u0002gang et al. 2017a; Alizada 2018; Bergquist et al. 2020), with FiTs more \r\nsuited for small scale generation. More than 60 countries and regions \r\nworldwide have implemented one of the two policies (Sun and Nie 2015). \r\nFiT is a price policy guaranteeing the purchase of energy generation at \r\na specific fixed price for a fixed period (Barbosa et al. 2018; Xin-gang \r\net al. 2020). RPS is a quantitative policy, which impose mandatory quota \r\nof RES generation to power generators (Xin-gang et al. 2020). "


id: 8793d8fcf205e1bd7b509fb325e09f88
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18863
content:
"A flat rate feed-in tariff (FiT) is a well-tested incentive adopted in many \r\njurisdictions to encourage end-users to generate electricity from RES \r\nusing rooftop and on-site PV systems (Pacudan 2018). More recently, \r\nthere has been an increasing interest for dynamic FiTs taking into \r\naccount electricity costs, hosting capacity, ambient temperature, and \r\ntime of day (Hayat et al. 2019). Since 2014, EU Member States have \r\nbeen obligated to move from FiT to feed-in premium (FiTP) (Hortay \r\nand Rozner 2019); where a FiTP consist in a premium of top of the \r\nelectricity market price. Lecuyer and Quirion (2019) argued that under \r\nuncertainty over electricity prices and renewable production costs a flat \r\nFiT results in higher welfare than a FiTP. One of the main concerns with "


id: 651dc6534e67516b81bd39f966d12662
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13474
content:
"Ghazali et  al. 2020; Haelg 2020). A support scheme based on \r\ntenders allows a  more precise steering of expansion and lower \r\nrisk of excessive support (Gephart et al. 2017). Bento et al. (2020) \r\nindicated that tendering is more effective in promoting additional \r\nrenewable capacity comparing to other mechanisms such as FiTs. It \r\nis also important to take into account the rebound effect in energy \r\nconsumption by on-site PV users, which might reduce up to one fifth \r\nof the carbon benefit of renewable energy (Deng and Newton 2017)."


id: 48e0d659b6254497b5666de20e71dd8d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8848
content:
"The end-user will be at the centre as a key participant in the future \r\nelectricity system (Zepter et al. 2019; Lavrijssen and Carrillo Parra, 2017) \r\nproviding flexibility, storage, energy productions, peer-to-peer trading, \r\nelectric vehicle charging. Zepter indicates that 'the current market \r\ndesigns and business models lack incentives and  opportunities for "


id: c9465dcbf8a57c795852d856d0bb9e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29230
content:
"As Section  9.6.3 points out, the incremental investment cost to \r\ndecarbonise buildings at national level is up to 3.5% GDP per annum "


id: 461a6b2c0cc7ae68a069631e97d44cde
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8408
content:
"Figure 9.21 | Incremental capital expenditure on energy efficiency investment (left) and renewable heat in buildings, 2015-2021. Notes: (i) An energy \r\nefficiency investment is defined as the incremental spending on new energy-efficient equipment or the full cost of refurbishments that reduce energy use. (ii) Renewable heat \r\nfor end-use include solar thermal applications (for district, space, and water heating), bioenergy and geothermal energy, as well as heat pumps. (iii) The investment in 2021 is \r\nan estimate. Source: IEA 2021b. "


id: af7defaf6c9865d19ab20ea832436b79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25126
content:
"(von Lupke and Well 2020), highlighting the need of reinforcing the \r\ninstitutions, anticipatory governance, the inconsistency of energy \r\npolicies and the emerging multi-level governance."


id: a4b45b1f84783e14807480ea41fc91c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23481
content:
"Multi-level and polycentric governance is essential for implementing \r\nsufficiency, energy efficiency and renewable energies policies (IPCC \r\n2018). Policies can be implemented at different levels of government \r\nand decision making, international, national, regional, and local. \r\nPolicies for building have be adopted at national level (Enker and \r\nMorrison 2017), at state or regional level (Fournier et al. 2019), or \r\nat city level (Trencher and van der Heijden 2019). Zhao et al. (2019) \r\nfind that national policies are instrumental in driving low carbon \r\ndevelopments in buildings."


id: efdb2b7466b243409f0ed8b5b2ef264d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35243
content:
"experts. Thus, in development support, addition to technology \r\ntransfer, also capacity buildings for national and local authorities \r\nshould be provides. The Paris Agreement Article 11 aims at enhancing \r\nthe capacity of decision-making institutions in developing countries \r\nto support effective implementation. "


id: 44152843e26f3de3cb7ead1deb91e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8126
content:
"Enforcement of policies is of key importance. Policies on appliance \r\nenergy standards need to establish criteria for random checks and \r\ntests of compliance, establish penalties and sanctions for non\u0002compliance. For building code compliance there is the need to verify \r\ncompliance after construction to verify the consistence with building \r\ndesign (Vine et al. 2017). Often local authorities lack resources and \r\ntechnical capacity to carry out inspections to check code compliance. \r\nThis issue is even more pressing in countries and cities with large \r\ninformal settlements, where buildings may not be respecting building \r\nenergy codes for safety and health."


id: 9ff5e5c38ed34b0a53750b85121833b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22703
content:
"In 2019, global GHG emissions from buildings were at 12 GtCO2-eq out of which 24% were direct emissions, 57% were indirect \r\nemissions, and 18% were embodied emissions. More than 95% of emissions from buildings were CO2 emissions, CH4 and N2O \r\nrepresented 0.08% each and emissions from halocarbon contributed by 3% to global GHG emissions from buildings."


id: 34e383addd5188e445cec84beca34335
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5728
content:
"Subash Dhar (India/Denmark), Ogheneruona E. Diemuodeke (Nigeria), Tsutomu Kajino (Japan), \r\nDavid Simon Lee (United Kingdom), Sudarmanto Budi Nugroho (Indonesia), Xunmin Ou (China), \r\nAnders Hammer Stromman (Norway), Jake Whitehead (Australia)"


id: 96340a33bec02652e1e388f56a80320c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21138
content:
"Otavio Cavalett (Brazil), Michael Craig (the United States of America), Felix Creutzig (Germany), \r\nNick Cumpsty (United Kingdom), Maria Josefina Figueroa Meza (Venezuela/Denmark), \r\nMaximilian  Held (Switzerland), Christine Hung (Norway), Alan Jenn (the United States of \r\nAmerica), Paul Kishimoto (Canada), Takashi Kuzuya (Japan), William F. Lamb (Germany/United \r\nKingdom), Shivika Mittal (India), Helene Muri (Norway), Minal Pathak (India), Daniel  Posen \r\n(Canada), Simon Robertson (Australia), Andrea Santos (Brazil), Karen C. Seto (the United States \r\nof America), Rohit Sharma (India), Benjamin K. Sovacool (Denmark/United Kingdom), Linda Steg \r\n(the Netherlands), Lorenzo Usai (Italy), Aranya Venkatesh (the United States of America/India), \r\nSonia Yeh (Sweden)"


id: 45b2cb09f5f9fa33673a0080811c7a0b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8365
content:
"Jaramillo, P., S. Kahn Ribeiro, P. Newman, S. Dhar, O.E. Diemuodeke, T. Kajino, D.S. Lee, S.B. Nugroho, X. Ou, \r\nA.  Hammer  Stromman, J. Whitehead, 2022: Transport. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate \r\nChange. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on \r\nClimate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, \r\nR. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and \r\nNew York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.012"


id: 3c0f298f4ed7e1fab79aa6e73196f303
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6804
content:
"Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) have lower lifecycle greenhouse \r\ngas emissions than internal combustion engine vehicles \r\n(ICEVs) when BEVs are charged with low-carbon electricity \r\n(high confidence). Electromobility is being rapidly implemented in \r\nmicromobility (e-autorickshaws, e-scooters, e-bikes), in transit systems, \r\nespecially buses, and, to a lesser degree, in the electrification of personal \r\nvehicles. BEVs could also have the added benefit of supporting grid \r\noperations. The commercial availability of mature lithium-ion batteries \r\n(LIBs) has underpinned this growth in electromobility."


id: cc94a9e614270d58c07624319234b369
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29725
content:
"Meeting climate mitigation goals would require transformative \r\nchanges in the transport sector (high confidence). In 2019, \r\ndirect greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the transport sector \r\nwere 8.7 GtCO2-eq (up from 5.0 GtCO2-eq in 1990) and accounted \r\nfor 23% of global energy-related CO2 emissions. 70% of direct \r\ntransport emissions came from road vehicles, while 1%, 11%, and \r\n12% came from rail, shipping, and aviation, respectively. Emissions \r\nfrom shipping and aviation continue to grow rapidly. Transport\u0002related emissions in developing regions of the world have increased \r\nmore rapidly than in Europe or North America, a trend that is likely \r\nto continue in coming decades (high confidence). {10.1, 10.5, 10.6}"


id: 98e8c5578a6633e347df5ce52fe62df9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21572
content:
"As global battery production increases, unit costs are declining. Further \r\nefforts to reduce the GHG footprint of battery production, however, \r\nare essential for maximising the mitigation potential of BEVs. The \r\ncontinued growth of electromobility for land transport would require \r\ninvestments in electric charging and related grid infrastructure (high \r\nconfidence). Electromobility powered by low-carbon electricity has \r\nthe potential to rapidly reduce transport GHG and can be applied \r\nwith multiple co-benefits in the developing world's growing cities \r\n(high confidence). {10.3, 10.4, 10.8}"


id: 1f85a4d6cf46bd0aa8e089d0c8d7a680
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2390
content:
"discretion of each country. While the International Civil Aviation \r\nOrganization (ICAO) and International Maritime Organization (IMO) \r\nhave established emissions reductions targets, only strategies to \r\nimprove fuel efficiency and reduce demand have been pursued, and \r\nthere has been minimal commitment to new technologies. Some \r\nauthors in the literature have argued that including international \r\nshipping and aviation under the Paris Agreement could spur stronger \r\ndecarbonisation efforts in these segments. {10.5, 10.6, 10.7}"


id: 1b7bf04dbbff46846ddab59b0e6fe855
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1786
content:
"There are growing concerns about resource availability, labour \r\nrights, non-climate environmental impacts, and costs of critical \r\nminerals needed for LIBs (medium confidence). Emerging \r\nnational strategies on critical minerals and the requirements from \r\nmajor vehicle manufacturers are leading to new, more geographically \r\ndiverse mines. The standardisation of battery modules and packaging \r\nwithin and across vehicle platforms, as well as increased focus on \r\ndesign for recyclability, are important. Given the high degree of \r\npotential recyclability of LIBs, a  nearly closed-loop system in the \r\nfuture could mitigate concerns about critical mineral issues (medium \r\nconfidence). {10.3, 10.8}"


id: 84bc7e05e3653ba6fcff9c2d7b21f95b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18413
content:
"The scenarios literature indicates that fuel and technology shifts are \r\ncrucial to reducing carbon emissions to meet temperature goals. \r\nIn general terms, electrification tends to play the key role in land\u0002based transport, but biofuels and hydrogen (and derivatives) could \r\nplay a  role in decarbonisation of freight in some contexts (high \r\nconfidence). Biofuels and hydrogen (and derivatives) are likely more \r\nprominent in shipping and aviation (high confidence). The shifts \r\ntowards these alternative fuels must occur alongside shifts towards \r\nclean technologies in other sectors (high confidence). {10.7}"


id: 92d8d32b819c0b8b41dbe5ba760a9028
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20618
content:
"The deployment of low-carbon aviation and shipping fuels \r\nthat support decarbonisation of the transport sector could \r\nrequire changes to national and international governance \r\nstructures (medium confidence). Currently, the Paris Agreement \r\ndoes not specifically cover emissions from international shipping \r\nand aviation. Instead, accounting for emissions from international \r\ntransport in the Nationally Determined Contributions is at the "


id: d101e0660bc87a9b4eba09008abcef5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30419
content:
"The  chapter assesses the future trajectories emerging from global, \r\nenergy, and national scenarios and concludes with a discussion on \r\nenabling conditions for transformative change in the sector."


id: d24952f5a3380724c42e03c8a5745e81
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30611
content:
"This chapter examines the transport sector's role in climate change \r\nmitigation. It appraises the transport system's interactions beyond the \r\ntechnology of vehicles and fuels to include the full lifecycle analysis \r\nof mitigation options, a  review of enabling conditions, and metrics \r\nthat can facilitate advancing transport decarbonisation goals. The \r\nchapter assesses developments in the systems of land-based transport \r\nand introduces, as a new feature since AR5, two separate sections \r\nfocusing on the trends and challenges in aviation and shipping. "


id: 47622e659f7935d1bd1fe7faaa808ba0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8619
content:
"This section (Section 10.1) discusses how transport relates to virtually \r\nall the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the trends and drivers \r\nmaking transport a big contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, \r\nthe impacts climate change is having on transport that can be \r\naddressed as part of mitigation, and the overview of emerging transport \r\ndisruptions with potential to shape a low-carbon transport pathway."


id: b9d0a8c4ea0830b66cadb0d9b049ca8b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26771
content:
"IRP 2019; WBA 2019; SLoCaT 2019; Yin 2019). Table 10.1 summarises \r\ntransport-related topics for these SDGs and corresponding research. \r\nSection 17.3.3.7 also provides a cross-sectoral overview of synergies \r\nand trade-offs between climate change mitigation and the SDGs."


id: 3d5a633826c327c61b2196ce162bcd45
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7012
content:
"The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by the \r\nUnited Nations (UN) has renewed international efforts to pursue and \r\naccurately measure global actions towards sustainable development \r\n(United Nations 2015). The 17 SDGs set out the overall goals that \r\nare further specified by 169 targets and 232 SDG indicators, many of \r\nwhich relate to transport (United Nations 2017; Lisowski et al. 2020). \r\nA sustainable transport system provides safe, inclusive, affordable, \r\nand clean passenger and freight mobility for current and future \r\ngenerations (Williams 2017; Litman 2021) so transport is particularly \r\nlinked to SDGs 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13 (Move Humanity 2018; "


id: d4c6df06c18ee94a3cdd29f19b43b8bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31002
content:
"The transport sector directly emitted around 8.9 Gtonnes (Gt) of carbon \r\ndioxide equivalent (CO2-eq) in 2019, up from 5.1 GtCO2-eq in 1990 \r\n(Figure 10.1). Global transport was the fourth largest source of GHG \r\nemissions in 2019 following the power, industry, and the agriculture, "


id: 8a1e4f505a297c1d40ae30794d6bea21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19258
content:
"Figure 10.1 | Global and regional transport greenhouse gas emissions trends. Indirect emissions from electricity and heat consumed in transport are shown in \r\npanel (a) and are primarily linked to the electrification of rail systems. These indirect emissions do not include the full lifecycle emissions of transportation systems (e.g., vehicle \r\nmanufacturing and infrastructure), which are assessed in Section 10.4. International aviation and shipping are included in panel (a) but excluded from panel (b). Indirect \r\nemissions from fuel production, vehicle manufacturing and infrastructure construction are not included in the sector total. Source: adapted from Lamb et al. (2021) using data \r\nfrom Minx et al. (2021)."


id: 523100789276e41ea008f1507f70872a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10383
content:
"three-wheelers, and mini buses contribute about 75% of passenger \r\ntransport-related CO2 emissions, while collective transport services (bus \r\nand railways) generate about 7% of the passenger transport-related \r\nCO2 emissions despite covering a fifth of passenger transport globally \r\n(Rodrigue 2017; Halim et al. 2018; Sheng et al. 2018; SLoCaT 2018a; \r\nGota et  al. 2019). While alternative lighter powertrains have great \r\npotential for mitigating GHG emissions from cars, the trend has been \r\ntowards increasing vehicle size and engine power within all vehicle \r\nsize classes, driven by consumer preferences towards larger sport \r\nutility vehicles (SUVs) (IEA 2020a). On a global scale, SUV sales have \r\nbeen constantly growing in the last decade, with 40% of the vehicles \r\nsold in 2019 being SUVs (IEA 2020a) (Section 10.4, Box 10.3)."


id: cc9791dd6b080214164ca775c353d32e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29726
content:
"forestry and land use (AFOLU) sectors. In absolute terms, the transport \r\nsector accounts for roughly 15% of total GHG emissions and about 23% \r\nof global energy-related CO2 emissions (IEA 2020a). Transport-related \r\nGHG emissions have increased fast over the last two decades, and \r\nsince 2010, the sector's emissions have increased faster than for any \r\nother end-use sector, averaging +1.8% annual growth (Section 10.7). \r\nAddressing emissions from transport is crucial for GHG mitigation \r\nstrategies across many countries, as the sector represents the largest \r\nenergy consuming sector in 40% of countries worldwide. In most \r\nremaining countries, transport is the second largest energy-consuming \r\nsector, reflecting different levels of urbanisation and land use patterns, \r\nspeed of demographic changes and socio-economic development (IEA \r\n2012; Gota et al. 2019; Hasan et al. 2019; Xie et al. 2019)."


id: 94a739cb2cb5b29b7b3b8f7eeb5f035
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20896
content:
"Indirect emissions from electricity and heat shown in Figure  10.1 \r\naccount for only a  small fraction of current emissions from the \r\ntransport sector (2%) and are associated with electrification of \r\ncertain modes like rail or bus transport (Lamb et al. 2021). Increasing \r\ntransport electrification will affect indirect emissions, especially \r\nwhere carbon-intense electricity grids operate."


id: b240eaa32c272136a9f726868aab548
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25551
content:
"Global freight transport, measured in tonne-kilometres (tkm), \r\ngrew by 68% between 2000 and 2015 and is projected to grow \r\n3.3 times by 2050 (ITF 2019). If unchecked, this growth will make \r\ndecarbonisation of freight transport very difficult (McKinnon 2018; \r\nITF 2019). International trade and global supply chains from industries \r\nfrequently involving large geographical distances are responsible for \r\nthe fast increase of CO2 emissions from freight transport (Yeh et al. \r\n2017; McKinnon 2018), which are growing faster than emissions \r\nfrom passenger transport (Lamb et  al. 2021). Heavy-duty vehicles \r\n(HDVs) make a disproportionate contribution to air pollution, relative \r\nto their global numbers, because of their substantial emissions of \r\nparticulate matter and of black carbon with high short-term warming \r\npotentials (Anenberg et al. 2019)."


id: 31f978f30699cc945d5acf250e795be9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5276
content:
"Growth in transport-related GHG emissions has taken place across \r\nmost world regions (see Figure  10.1b). Between 1990 and 2019, \r\ngrowth in emissions was relatively slow in Europe, Australia, Japan and \r\nNew Zealand, Eurasia, and North America while it was unprecedently \r\nfast in other regions. Driven by economic and population growth, \r\nthe annual growth rates in Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, South-East \r\nAsia and Pacific, and Africa were 6.1%, 5.2%, 4.7%, and 4.1%, \r\nrespectively. Latin America and the Middle East have seen somewhat \r\nslower growth in transport-related GHG emissions (annual growth \r\nrates of 2.4% and 3.3%, respectively) (ITF 2019; Minx et al. 2021). \r\nSection 10.7 provides a more detailed comparison of global transport \r\nemissions trends with those from regional and sub-sectoral studies."


id: daa6e828d7d064ef67d55f622c59b98a
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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"The rapid growth in global transport emissions is primarily a result of \r\nthe fast growth in global transport activity levels, which grew by 73% \r\nbetween 2000 and 2018. Passenger and freight activity growth have \r\noutpaced energy efficiency and fuel economy improvements in this \r\nperiod (ITF 2019). The global increase in passenger travel activities \r\nhas taken place almost entirely in non-OECD countries, often starting \r\nfrom low motorisation rates (SLoCaT 2018a). Passenger cars, two- and "


id: 39f16b58b949c6ad3e1c2d7ceb667d2f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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"Most countries are examining opportunities for combined mitigation\u0002adaptation efforts, using the need to mitigate climate change \r\nthrough transport-related GHG emissions reductions and reduction \r\nof pollutants as the basis for adaptation action (Thornbush et  al. \r\n2013; Wang et al. 2020). For example, urban sprawl indirectly affects \r\nclimate processes, increasing emissions and vulnerability, which \r\nworsens the potential to adapt (Congedo and Munafo 2014; Macchi \r\nand Tiepolo 2014). Hence, using a range of forms of rapid transit \r\nas structuring elements for urban growth can mitigate climate \r\nchange-related risks as well as emissions, reducing impacts on new \r\ninfrastructure, often in more vulnerable areas (Newman et al. 2017). \r\nSuch changes are increasingly seen as having economic benefit \r\n(Ha et  al. 2017), especially in developing nations (Chang 2016; \r\nMonioudi et al. 2018)."


id: c3ec2441aef11d598ddbf150d15378d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Electrification of passenger transport in light-duty vehicles (LDVs) is well \r\nunderway as a commercial process with socio-technical transformative \r\npotential and will be examined in detail in Sections 10.3 and 10.4. \r\nBut the rapid mainstreaming of electric vehicles (EVs) will still need \r\nenabling conditions for land transport to achieve the shift away from \r\npetroleum fuels, as outlined in Chapter 3 and detailed in Section 10.8. \r\nThe other mitigation options reviewed in this chapter are so far only \r\nincremental and are less commercial, especially shipping and aviation \r\nfuels, so stronger enabling conditions are likely, as detailed further in \r\nSections 10.5 to 10.8. The enabling conditions that would be needed \r\nfor the development of an emerging technological solution for such \r\nfuels are likely to be very different from those for electromobility, but \r\nnevertheless they both will need demand and efficiency changes to \r\nensure they are equitable and inclusive."


id: 22ba7ece9d9156045b736604afd00b22
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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"Section  10.2 sets out the transformation of transport through \r\nexamining systemic changes that affect demand for transport \r\nservices and the efficiency of the system. Section 10.3 looks at the \r\nmost promising technological innovations in vehicles and fuels. \r\nThe  next three sections (10.4, 10.5, and 10.6) examine mitigation \r\noptions for land transport, aviation, and shipping. Section  10.7 \r\ndescribes the space of solutions assessed in a range of integrated \r\nmodelling and sectoral transport scenarios. Finally, Section 10.8 sets "


id: a1192d978eed47c210e6cc42a31ee215
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"out what would be needed for the most transformative scenario that \r\ncan manage to achieve the broad goals set out in Chapter 3 and the \r\ntransport goals set out in Section 10.7."


id: 313347f7c06eda1adeb01487c824e7fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 5160
content:
"form and urban infrastructure influence the time and cost of travel, \r\nwhich, in turn, drive travel demand and modal choice (Marchetti and \r\nAusubel 2001; Newman and Kenworthy 2015)."


id: 944e64f8858a954c429bf090e0223414
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 20844
content:
"Throughout history, three main urban fabrics have developed, each \r\nwith different effects on transport patterns based on a fixed travel \r\ntime budget of around one hour (Newman et  al. 2016). The high\u0002density urban fabric developed over the past several millennia \r\nfavoured walking and active transport for only a few kilometres (km). \r\nIn the mid-19th  century, urban settlements developed a  medium\u0002density fabric that favoured trains and trams traveling over 10 to \r\n30  km corridors. Finally, since the mid-20th  century, urban form \r\nhas favoured automobile travel, enabling mass movement between \r\n50 and 60 km. Table 10.2 describes the effect of these urban fabrics \r\non GHG emissions and other well-being indicators."


id: 43237a05afb63429d81f832985e458a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Systemic change is the emergence of new organisational patterns that \r\naffect the structure of a system. While much attention has been given \r\nto engine and fuel technologies to mitigate GHG emissions from the \r\ntransport sector, population dynamics, finance and economic systems, \r\nurban form, culture, and policy also drive emissions from the sector. \r\nThus, systemic change requires innovations in these components. \r\nThese systemic changes offer the opportunity to decouple transport \r\nemissions from economic growth. In turn, such decoupling allows \r\nenvironmental improvements like reduced GHG emissions without \r\nloss of economic activity (UNEP 2011; UNEP 2013; Newman et  al. \r\n2017; IPCC 2018)."


id: 4a407a238052c42e5e73070b8f6766e1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"The physical characteristics that make up built areas define the \r\nurban form. These physical characteristics include the shape, size, \r\ndensity, and configuration of the human settlements. Urban form \r\nis intrinsically coupled with the infrastructure that allows human \r\nsettlements to operate. In the context of the transport sector, urban "


id: 4148b9e3fde31a35bb4825cedaab4b6d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 7664
content:
"Newman et al. 2017; Gota et al. 2019). While some cities continue \r\non a trend towards reaching peak car use on a per-capita basis, for \r\nexample Shanghai and Beijing (Gao and Newman 2020), there is \r\na need for increased investments in urban form strategies that can \r\ncontinue to reduce car dependency around the world."


id: a88bee2d750763d22bdc259169b68550
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Ultimately, infrastructure investments influence the structural \r\ndependence on cars, which in turn influence the lock-in or path \r\ndependency of transport options with their greenhouse emissions \r\n(Newman et al. 2015; Grieco and Urry 2016). The 21st century saw \r\na  new trend to reach peak car use in some countries as a  result \r\nof a  revival in walking and transit use (Grieco and Urry 2016; "


id: 3ea4bc89f459d9e9d7c4a34436e19d7c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 7239
content:
"Authors: Felix Creutzig (Germany), Karen C. Seto (the United States of America), Peter Newman (Australia)"


id: 748e8f54fbb29446569c9065c227ec34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 15936
content:
"Urban transport is responsible for about 8% of global CO2 emissions or 3 GtCO2 per year (Chapters 5 and 8). In contrast to energy \r\nsupply technologies, urban transport directly interacts with mobility lifestyles (Section 5.4). Similarly, non-GHG emission externalities, \r\nsuch as congestion, air pollution, noise, and safety, directly affect urban quality of life, and result in considerable welfare losses. \r\nLow-carbon, highly accessible urban design is not only a major mitigation option, it also provides for more inclusive city services \r\nrelated to well-being (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). Urban planning and design of cities for people are central to realise emission reductions \r\nwithout relying simply on technologies, though the modes of transport favoured will influence the ability to overcome the lock-in \r\naround automobile use (Gehl 2010; Creutzig et al. 2015b)."


id: 5ab194fac91e63bffe07e5ece026f42
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 11786
content:
"Where lock-in has occurred, other strategies may alleviate the GHG emissions burden. Urban planning still plays a key role in recreating \r\nlocal hubs. Available land can be used to build rail-based transit, made financially viable by profiting from land value captured around \r\nstations (Ratner and Goetz 2013). Shared or pooled mobility can offer flexible on-demand mobility solutions that are efficient also in \r\nsuburbs and for integrating with longer commuting trips (ITF 2017)."


id: 998a613b1f09d4bd1a599ed58dbaa94d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 21684
content:
"Low-carbon highly accessible urban design is not only a major mitigation option, it also provides for more inclusive city services related \r\nto well-being (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). Solutions involve planning cities around walkable sub-centres, where multiple destinations, such \r\nas shopping, jobs, leisure activities, and others, can be accessed within a 10 minute walk or bicycle ride (Newman and Kenworthy \r\n2006). Overall, the mitigation potential of urban planning is about 25% in 2050 compared with a business-as-usual scenario (Creutzig \r\net al. 2015a; Creutzig et al. 2015b). Much higher levels of decarbonisation can be achieved if cities take on a regenerative development \r\napproach and act as geo-engineering systems on the atmosphere (Thomson and Newman 2016)."


id: bd02b70dea6be7ddfe45eb4c30288008
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Avoid: the effect of prices and income on demand. Research \r\nhas shown that household income and price have a strong influence \r\non people's preferences for transport services (Bakhat et  al. 2017; \r\nPalmer et al. 2018). The relationship between income and demand \r\nis defined by the income elasticity of demand. For example, research \r\nsuggests that in China, older and wealthier populations continued to \r\nshow a preference for car travel (Yang et al. 2019) while younger and \r\nlow-income travellers sought variety in transport modes (Song et al. \r\n2018). Similarly, Bergantino et  al. (2018b) evaluated the income "


id: 10c19b6d8a9d66a0051c0cd998fb711f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Behaviour continues to be a  major source of interest in the \r\ndecarbonisation of transport as it directly addresses demand. \r\nBehaviour is about people's actions based on their preferences. \r\nChapter 5 described an 'Avoid, Shift, Improve' process for demand\u0002side changes that affect sectoral emissions. This section discusses \r\nsome of the drivers of behaviour related to the transport sector and \r\nhow they link to this 'Avoid, Shift, Improve' process."


id: f29762e3458692994a4f0d823ce5cf1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 35698
content:
"many work and personal travel requirements; and revitalised local \r\nactive transport and e-micromobility (Newman 2020a; SLoCaT \r\n2021). The permanence of these changes post-COVID-19 is \r\nuncertain but possible (Earley and Newman 2021) (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox 1 in Chapter 1). However, these changes will require growth of \r\ninfrastructure for better ICT bandwidths in developing countries, and \r\nbetter provision for micromobility in all cities."


id: f8da9af288259a37d93f269d9237b399
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"elasticity of transport by mode in the UK. They found that the income \r\nelasticity for private cars is 0.714, while the income elasticities of rail \r\nand bus use are 3.253 (the greater elasticity, the more the demand \r\nwill grow or decline, depending on income). Research has also shown \r\na positive relationship between income and demand for air travel, \r\nwith income elasticities of air travel demand being positive and \r\nas large as 2 (Gallet and Doucouliagos 2014; Valdes 2015; Hakim \r\nand Merkert 2016; Hakim and Merkert 2019; Hanson et al. 2022). \r\nA survey in 98 Indian cities also showed income as the main factor \r\ninfluencing travel demand (Ahmad and de Oliveira 2016). Thus, as \r\nincomes and wealth across the globe rise, demand for travel is likely \r\nto increase as well."


id: f2aad5f0df1c758dd21775fd5e346ca8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"While the literature continues to show that time, cost, and income \r\ndominate people's travel choices (Ahmad and de Oliveira 2016; \r\nCapurso et al. 2019; He et al. 2020), there is also evidence of a role \r\nfor personal values, and environmental values in particular, shaping \r\nchoices within these structural limitations (Bouman and Steg 2019). \r\nFor example, individuals are more likely to drive less when they care \r\nabout the environment (De Groot et al. 2008; Abrahamse et al. 2009; \r\nJakovcevic and Steg 2013; Hiratsuka et al. 2018; Unal et al. 2019). \r\nMoreover, emotional and symbolic factors affect the level of car \r\nuse (Steg 2005). Differences in behaviour may also result due \r\nto differences in gender, age, norms, values, and social status. For \r\nexample, women have been shown to be more sensitive to parking \r\npricing than men (Simicevic et al. 2020)."


id: e2210cedf429da0c632d67ddc6cc650e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Finally, and as noted in Chapter  5, recent research shows that \r\nindividual, social, and infrastructure factors also affect people's mode \r\nchoices. For example, perceptions about common travel behaviour \r\n(what people perceive to be 'normal' behaviour) influence their travel \r\nmode choice. The research suggests that well-informed individuals \r\nwhose personal norms match low-carbon objectives, and who \r\nbelieve they have control over their decisions, are most motivated \r\nto shift mode. Nonetheless, such individual and social norms can \r\nonly marginally influence mode choice unless infrastructure factors \r\ncan enable reasonable time and cost savings (Convery and Williams \r\n2019; Javaid et al. 2020; Feng et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2021)."


id: 2084288feb6d5aa97db7c4039a79521
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2568
content:
"Finally, structural shocks, such as a financial crisis, a pandemic, or the \r\nimpacts of climate change could affect the price and income elasticities \r\nof demand for transport services (van Ruijven et al. 2019). COVID-19 \r\nlockdowns reduced travel demand by 19% (aviation by 32%) and \r\nsome of the patterns that have emerged from the lockdowns could \r\npermanently change the elasticity of demand for transport (Tirachini \r\nand Cats 2020; Hendrickson and Rilett 2020; Newman 2020a; SLoCaT \r\n2021; Hanson et  al. 2022). In particular, the COVID-19 lockdowns \r\nhave spurred two major trends: electronic communications replacing "


id: a1adf427a12130670550a1f8d5b32835
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22996
content:
"design or manufacturing are offset by increased consumer demand \r\n(Kasulaitis et al. 2019). Whether or not dematerialisation can lead \r\nto reduction of emissions from the transport sector is still an open \r\nquestion that requires evaluating the entire product ecosystem \r\n(Van Loon et al. 2014; Coroama et al. 2015; Kasulaitis et al. 2019)."


id: d60f7134d35fef77cf4aff3b1d76a280
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Shared economy. Shared mobility is arguably the most rapidly \r\ngrowing and evolving sector of the sharing economy and includes \r\nbike sharing, e-scooter sharing, car sharing, and on-demand mobility \r\n(Greenblatt and Shaheen 2015). The values of creating a more shared \r\neconomy are related to both reduced demand and greater efficiency, \r\nas well as the notion of community well-being associated with the \r\nact of sharing instead of simply owning for oneself (Maginn et al. \r\n2018; Sharp 2018). The literature on shared mobility is expanding, \r\nbut there is much uncertainty about the effect shared mobility will \r\nhave on transport demand and associated emissions (Nijland and \r\nJordy 2017; ITF 2018a; Tikoudis et al. 2021)."


id: 6c4e5732c69b00eaf12c1161679c6218
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Asia represents the largest car-sharing region with 58% of worldwide \r\nmembership and 43% of global fleets deployed (Dhar et  al. 2020). \r\nEurope accounts for 29% of worldwide members and 37% of shared \r\nvehicle fleets (Shaheen et  al. 2018). Ride-sourcing and carpooling \r\nsystems are among the many new entrants in the short-term shared \r\nmobility options. On-demand transport options complemented with \r\ntechnology have enhanced the possibility of upscaling (Alonso\u0002Gonzalez et al. 2018). Car sharing could provide the same level of service \r\nas taxis, but taxis could be three times more expensive (Cuevas et al. \r\n2016). The sharing economy, as an emerging economic-technological \r\nphenomenon (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010), is likely to be a key driver \r\nof demand for transport of goods although data shows increasing \r\ncontainer movement due to online shopping (Suel and Polak 2018)."


id: af0e8be04d06a0841a1f12d41592b97f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 25073
content:
"Structural and behavioural choices that drive transport-related GHG \r\nemissions, such as time and cost based on geography of freight and \r\nurban fabric, are likely to continue to be major factors. But there is \r\nalso a variation within each structural choice that is based around \r\npersonal demand factors related to values that indirectly change \r\nchoices in transport. Chapter  5 identified three megatrends that \r\naffect demand for services, including circular economy, the shared \r\neconomy, and digitalisation. These three megatrends can have \r\nspecific effect on transport emissions, as described below."


id: 63e73bc09758b859051e252f7b14e53b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13285
content:
"Digitalisation. In the context of the transport sector, digitalisation \r\nhas enabled teleworking, which in turn reduces travel demand. On \r\nthe other hand, the prevalence of online shopping, enabled by the \r\ndigital economy, could have mixed effects on transport emissions \r\n(Le et al. 2021). For example, online shopping could reduce vehicle\u0002kilometres travelled but the move to expedited or rush delivery could \r\nmitigate some benefits as it prevents consolidation of freight (Jaller \r\nand Pahwa 2020)."


id: a5455516d3008b9345e91a2c812a4e64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Digitalisation could also lead to systemic changes by enabling \r\nsmart mobility. The smart mobility paradigm refers to the process \r\nand practices of assimilation of ICTs and other sophisticated high\u0002technology innovations into transport (Noy and Givoni 2018). Smart \r\nmobility can be used to influence transport demand and efficiency \r\n(Benevolo et  al. 2016). The synergies of emerging technologies \r\n(ICT, internet of things, big data) and shared economy could overcome "


id: 51c1354afd074cd168d99aecec4e4223
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10323
content:
"Information and communication technology (ICT). ICT is at the core of smart mobility and will provide the avenue for data to be \r\ncollected and shared across the mobility system. The use of ICT can help cities by providing real-time information on mobility options \r\nthat can inform those using private vehicles, along with transit users or those using bikes or walking. ICT can help with ticketing \r\nand payment for transit or for road user charges (Tafidis et al. 2017; Gossling 2018) when combined with other technologies such as \r\nBlockchain (Hargroves et al. 2020)."


id: 748f9155fb7a8cdbfc05df32cd7c347c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15937
content:
"Internet of Things sensors. Sensors can be used to collect data to improve road safety, improve fuel efficiency of vehicles, and reduce \r\nCO2 emissions (Kubba and Jiang 2014; Kavitha et al. 2018). Sensors can also provide data to digitally simulate transport planning \r\noptions, inform the greater utilisation of existing infrastructure and modal interconnections, and significantly improve disaster and \r\nemergency responses (Hargroves et al. 2017). In particular, IoT sensors can be used to inform the operation of fast-moving trackless \r\ntrams and their associated last-mile connectivity shuttles as part of a transit activated corridor (Newman et al. 2019, 2021)."


id: 63aa1736411f597b0fdd68e1b91559ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13250
content:
"Mobility as a Service. New, app-based mobility platforms will allow for the integration of different transport modes (such as last-mile \r\ntravel, shared transit, and even micro-transit such as scooters or bikes) into easy-to-use platforms. By integrating these modes, users will \r\nbe able to navigate from A to B to C based on which modes are most efficient, with the necessary bookings and payments being made \r\nthrough one service. With smart city planning, these platforms can steer users towards shared and rapid transit (which should be the \r\ncentrepiece of these systems), rather than encourage more people to opt for the perceived convenience of booking a single-passenger ride \r\n(Becker et al. 2020). In low-density car-dependent cities, however, MaaS services such as the use of electric scooters/bikes are less effective \r\nas the distances are too long and they do not enable the easy sharing that can happen in dense station precincts (Jittrapirom et al. 2017)."


id: a9f2c1e9f557b0bee5da1d2649681176
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24273
content:
"Artificial intelligence (AI) and big data analytics. The rapidly growing level of technology enablement of vehicles and urban infrastructure, \r\ncombined with the growing ability to analyse larger and larger data sets, presents a significant opportunity for transport planning, design, \r\nand operation in the future. These technologies are used together to enable decisions about what kind of transport planning is used down \r\nparticular corridors. Options such as predictive congestion management of roads and freeways, simulating planning options, and advanced \r\nshared transit scheduling can provide value to new and existing transit systems (Toole et al. 2015; Anda et al. 2017; Hargroves et al. 2017)."


id: 6e8b211fc354a5e4c903a9d495f59056
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15021
content:
"Heavy haulage trucks in the mining industry are already autonomous \r\n(Gaber et al. 2021) and automation of long-haul trucks may happen \r\nsooner than automation of LDVs (Hancock et al. 2019). Autonomous \r\ntrucks may facilitate route and speed optimisation, and reduce fuel \r\nuse, which can in turn reduce emissions (Nasri et al. 2018; Paddeu \r\nand Denby 2021). There is growing interest in using drones for \r\npackage delivery. Drones could have lower impacts than ground\u0002based delivery and, if deployed carefully, drones could reduce \r\nenergy use and GHG emissions from freight transport (Stolaroff et al. \r\n2018). Overall, some commentators are optimistic that smart and \r\nautonomous technologies can transform the GHG emissions from \r\nthe transport sector (Seba 2014; Rifkin 2019; Sedlmeir et al. 2020). \r\nOthers are more sanguine unless policy interventions can enable the \r\ntechnologies to be used for purposes that include zero carbon and \r\nthe SDGs (Faisal et al. 2019; Hancock et al. 2019)."


id: 86643f7ffa34336e34af4c911763c0c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18686
content:
"The interactions between systemic factors set out here and technology \r\nfactors discussed in much more detail in the next sections show that \r\nthere is always going to be a  need to integrate both approaches. "


id: 82ea1454aed5d3586bf6463add732d05
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Good technology that has the potential to transform transport will \r\nnot be used unless it fulfils broad mobility and accessibility objectives \r\nrelated to time, cost, and well-being. Chapter  5 has set out three \r\ntransport transformations based on demand-side factors with highly \r\ntransformative potential. Table  10.3 provides a  summary of these \r\nsystemic changes and their likely impact on GHG emissions. Note that \r\nthe quantitative estimates provided in the table may not be additive \r\nand the combined effect of these strategies on GHG emissions from \r\nthe transport sector require additional analysis."


id: 67e6feb0c3b697bbab462b39d6aa0ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 13938
content:
"The advancements in energy carriers described in Figure  10.2 are \r\ndiscussed in greater detail in Chapter  6 (Energy) and Chapter  11 \r\n(Industry) but the review presented in this chapter highlights their \r\napplication in the transport sector. This section pays attention to the \r\nadvancements in alternative fuels, electric, and fuel cell technologies \r\nsince AR5."


id: b50b86d0e63bbea86ad3c45416d49c28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 26017
content:
"The average fuel consumption of new internal combustion engine \r\n(ICE) vehicles has improved significantly in recent years due to more \r\nstringent emissions regulations. However, improvements are now \r\nslowing down. The average fuel consumption of LDVs decreased by \r\nonly 0.7 % between 2016 and 2017, reaching 7.2 litres of gasoline\u0002equivalent (Lg-eq) per  100  km in 2017, much slower than the "


id: c2ba0ed86deec6088cd3e5aba407d9c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 28220
content:
"This section focuses on vehicle technology and low-carbon fuel \r\ninnovations to support decarbonisation of the transport sector. \r\nFigure 10.2 summarises the major pathways reviewed in this section. "


id: be1ef5421fea969c8b434caac5fdd3da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Figure 10.2 | Energy pathways for low-carbon transport technologies. Primary energy sources are shown in the far left, while the segments of the transport system are in \r\nthe far right. Energy carriers and vehicle technologies are represented in the middle. Primary pathways are shown with solid lines, while dotted lines represent secondary pathways."


id: 941eb68204a1f3f6720f00937edcee03
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Table 10.4 | Engine technologies to reduce emissions from light-duty ICE \r\nvehicles and their implementation stage. Table nomenclature: GDI = Gasoline \r\ndirect injection, VVT = Variable valve technology, CDA = Cylinder deactivation, \r\nCR  =  compression ratio, GDCI = Gasoline direct injection compression ignition, \r\nEGR = exhaust gas recirculation, RCCI = Reactivity controlled compression ignition, \r\nGCI = Gasoline compression ignition. Source: Joshi (2020)."


id: d6ecefd681c8c906be916c2812b3cad6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"More details on land-use change impacts and the potential to deliver the projected demands of biofuels at the global level are further \r\naddressed in Chapter 7. While, in general, the above results cover most of the variety of GHG range intensities of biofuel options \r\npresented in the literature, the more specific life cycle assessment (LCA) literature should be consulted when considering specific \r\ncombinations of biomass feedstock and conversion technologies in specific regions."


id: 6582df9127c82997d4e0cddf04fe2047
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 13546
content:
"Table  10.5 summarises performance data for different biofuel \r\ntechnologies, while Figure 10.3 shows the technology readiness levels."


id: 49ebcbac1f63ef4e29a054536e7374ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 9033
content:
"Within the aviation sector, jet fuels produced from biomass resources \r\n(so-called sustainable aviation fuels, or SAF) could offer significant \r\nclimate mitigation opportunities under the right policy circumstances. \r\nDespite the growing interest in aviation biofuels, demand and \r\nproduction volumes remain negligible compared to conventional \r\nfossil aviation fuels. Nearly all flights powered by biofuels have used \r\nfuels derived from vegetable oils and fats, and the blending level of \r\nbiofuels into conventional aviation fuels for testing is up to 50% today \r\n(Mawhood et al. 2016). To date, only one facility in the US is regularly \r\nproducing sustainable aviation fuels based on waste oil feedstocks. \r\nThe potential to scale up bio-based SAF volumes is severely restricted \r\nby the lack of low-cost and sustainable feedstock options (Chapter 7). \r\nLignocellulosic feedstocks are considered to have great potential for "


id: 3f1186dcb45a6703fe7164daf05b52b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Table 10.5 | Ranges of efficiency, GHG emissions, and relative costs of selected biofuel conversion technologies for road, marine, and aviation biofuels."


id: c4ba45f7baafca62d2b256b369ba2b1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 28523
content:
"Notes: a Calculated as liquid fuels output divided by energy in feedstock entering the conversion plant; b GHG emissions here refers only to the conversion process. Impacts form \r\nthe different biomass options are not included here as they are addressed in Chapter 7; c Olofsson et al. (2017); d\r\n Koeble et al. (2017); e Simell et al. (2014); f de Souza Dias et al. \r\n(2015); g\r\n Castanheira et al. (2015); h Tanzer et al. (2019); i Klein et al. (2018); j Narula et al. (2017); k de Jong et al. (2017); l Salman et al. (2017); m Moreira et al. (2014); Roy \r\net al. (2015); Handler et al. (2016); n\r\n Salman et al. (2017); Moreira et al. (2014); Roy et al. (2015); Handler et al. (2016)."


id: 501667358732a49f6794e00c05214db
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 10042
content:
"Figure 10.3 | Commercialisation status of selected biofuels conversion technologies. The grey boxes represent the current technology readiness level of each \r\nconversion technology. Source: based on Mawhood et al. (2016), Skeer et al. (2016), IEA (2017a), and Puricelli et al. (2021)."


id: f5ced8bb3f79d44d15417b80137e66b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 36191
content:
"carrier and be used in fuel cells. These characteristics have driven \r\nincreased interest in the low-carbon production of ammonia, which \r\nwould have to be coupled to low-carbon hydrogen production (with \r\nlow-carbon electricity providing the needed energy or with CCS)."


id: 69e97c793b9a3a2200921749785b577d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 14263
content:
"Ammonia. At room temperature and atmospheric pressure, \r\nammonia is a colourless gas with a distinct odour. Due to relatively \r\nmild conditions for liquefaction, ammonia is transferred and stored \r\nas a liquefied or compressed gas and has been used as an essential \r\nindustrial chemical resource for many products. In addition, since \r\nammonia does not contain carbon, it has attracted attention as \r\na carbon-neutral fuel that can also improve combustion efficiency (Gill \r\net al. 2012). Furthermore, ammonia could also serve as a hydrogen "


id: 5650d23024d662773d06186e383685a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 11063
content:
"For EVs sold in 2018, the material demand was about 11 kilotonnes (kt) \r\nof optimised lithium, 15 kt of cobalt, 11 kt of manganese, and 34 kt \r\nof nickel (IEA 2019a; IEA 2021a). IEA projections for 2030 in the EV \r\n30@30 scenario show that the demand for these materials would \r\nincrease by 30 times for lithium and around 25 times for cobalt. While \r\nthere are efforts to move away from expensive materials such as \r\ncobalt (IEA 2019a; IEA 2021a), dependence on lithium will remain, \r\nwhich may be a  cause of concern (Olivetti et  al. 2017; You and \r\nManthiram 2018). A more detailed discussion on resource constraints \r\nfor lithium is provided in Box 10.6."


id: adef42bf475454f7e075774818976f43
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24903
content:
"Widespread electrification of the transport sector is likely crucial for \r\nreducing transport emissions and depends on appropriate electrical \r\nenergy storage systems (EES). However, large-scale diffusion of EES \r\ndepends on improvements in energy density (energy stored per unit \r\nvolume), specific energy (energy stored per unit weight), and costs \r\n(Cano et al. 2018). Recent trends suggest EES-enabled vehicles are \r\non a path to becoming the leading technology for LDVs, but their \r\ncontribution to heavy-duty freight is more uncertain."


id: 6fa1f1d9c1fac99b3f43ae237169fb59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15189
content:
"Electrochemical storage of light and medium-duty vehicles.\r\nElectrochemical storage, i.e., batteries, are one of the most promising \r\nforms of energy storage for the transport sector and have dramatically \r\nimproved in their commerciality since AR5. Rechargeable batteries \r\nare of primary interest for applications within the transport sector, \r\nwith a range of mature and emerging chemistries able to support \r\nthe electrification of vehicles. The most significant change since \r\nAR5 and SPR1.5 is the dramatic rise in lithium-ion batteries (LIB), \r\nwhich has enabled electromobility to become a  major feature \r\nof decarbonisation."


id: 1caacd64e3ef0c830bec20beab559d9f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 1957
content:
"of their more advanced technology status and higher practically \r\nachievable energy density (Fu et al. 2017). Like Li-air batteries, their \r\npoor specific power and energy efficiency will probably prevent zinc\u0002air batteries from being used as a primary energy source for EVs. Still, \r\nthey could be promising when used in a dual-battery configuration \r\n(Cano et al. 2018)."


id: 40c0d52da206e4a17a3be5bc85415ccc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7570
content:
"Hybrid energy storage (HES) systems, which combine a  capacitor \r\nand a  battery, achieve both high power and high energy, solving \r\nproblems such as capacity loss of the battery and self-discharge of \r\nthe capacitor. In these systems, the capacitor absorbs the steeper \r\npower, while the LIB handles the steady power, thereby reducing the \r\npower loss of the EV to half. Furthermore, since the in-rush current of \r\nthe battery is suppressed, there is an improvement in the reliability \r\nof the LIB (Noumi et al. 2014). In a hybrid diesel train, 8.2% of the \r\nregenerative energy is lost due to batteries' limited charge-discharge \r\nperformance; however, using an EDLC with batteries can save this \r\nenergy (Takahashi et al. 2017; Mayrink et al. 2020)."


id: b2833a3625180bd78fa44e0f8758d781
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25603
content:
"The development of power storage devices and advanced \r\nintegrated system approaches, including power electronics circuits \r\nsuch as HES and their control technologies, are important for the \r\nelectrification of mobility. These technologies are solutions that \r\ncould promote the electrification of systems, reduce costs, and \r\ncontribute to the social environment through multiple outcomes in \r\nthe decarbonisation agenda."


id: e6ed1f751a3847f9d281c8a4f6c35c47
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33818
content:
"In harder-to-electrify transport segments, such as heavy-duty \r\nvehicles, shipping, and aviation, hydrogen holds significant promise \r\nfor delivering emissions reductions if it is produced using low-carbon \r\nenergy sources. In particular, hydrogen fuel cells are seen as an \r\nemerging option to power larger vehicles for land-based transport \r\n(Tokimatsu et al. 2016; IPCC 2018; IEA 2019b). Despite this potential, \r\nfurther advancements in technological and economic maturity will \r\nbe required in order for hydrogen fuel cells to play a greater role. \r\nWhile this section focuses primarily on hydrogen fuel cells, ammonia \r\nand methanol fuel cells may also emerge as options for low \r\npower applications."


id: 8b38f95154423d9d82b5475249e6bd9b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19430
content:
"Alternative electricity storage technologies for heavy-duty \r\ntransport.While LIBs described in the previous section are driving the \r\nelectrification of LDVs, their application to railways, aviation, ships, and \r\nlarge vehicles faces challenges due to the higher power requirements \r\nof these applications. The use of a capacitor with a higher power density \r\nthan LIBs could be suitable for the electrification of such vehicles. \r\nIt is one of the solutions for regenerating large and instantaneous \r\nenergy from regenerative brakes. Classical capacitors generally show \r\nmore attractive characteristics in power density (8000-10,000 watts "


id: 7a1788defd5628bb418b49e53dd345a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 16781
content:
"Hydrogen is likely to take diverse roles in the future energy system: \r\nas a fuel in industry and buildings, as well as transport, and as energy \r\nstorage for variable renewable electricity. Further research is required \r\nto understand better how a hydrogen transport fuel supply system \r\nfits within the larger hydrogen energy system, especially in terms of \r\nintegration within existing infrastructure, such as the electricity grid \r\nand the natural gas pipeline system (IEA 2015)."


id: 995a6fb2e5f76117566bbd2b71498177
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Strong and durable policies would be needed to enable widespread \r\nuse of hydrogen as a  transport fuel and to sustain momentum \r\nduring a  multi-decade transition period for hydrogen FCVs to \r\nbecome cost-competitive with electric vehicles (Hydrogen Council \r\n2017; FCHEA 2019; FCHJU 2019; IEA 2019c; BNEF 2020; Hydrogen \r\nCouncil 2020). The analysis suggests that hydrogen is likely to have \r\nstrategic and niche roles in transport, particularly in long-haul \r\nshipping and aviation. With continuing improvements, hydrogen and \r\nelectrification will likely play a role in decarbonising heavy-duty road \r\nand rail vehicles."


id: e3fc1e1925f34cf1b74043cddaf332ac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33344
content:
"Ammonia and methanol fuel cells are considered to be less mature \r\nthan hydrogen fuel cells. However, they offer the benefit of using \r\na  more easily transported fuel that can be directly used without \r\nconverting to hydrogen (Zhao et al. 2019). Conversely, both methanol \r\nand ammonia are toxic, and in the case of methanol fuel cells, carbon \r\ndioxide is released as a by-product of generating electricity with the \r\nfuel cell (Zhao et al. 2019). Due to the lower power output, methanol \r\nand ammonia fuel cells are also not well suited to heavy-duty \r\nvehicles (Jeerh et al. 2021). They are therefore unlikely to compete \r\nwith hydrogen fuel cells. However, ammonia and methanol could \r\nbe converted to hydrogen at refuelling stations as an alternative to \r\nbeing directly used in fuel cells (Zhao et al. 2019)."


id: 6aa620aabc556027dce7cb18deaad236
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 14392
content:
"EVs and HFCV require separate infrastructure than liquid fuels. The \r\nsuccessful diffusion of new vehicle technologies is dependent on \r\nthe preceding deployment of infrastructure (Leibowicz 2018), so that \r\nthe deployment of new charging and refuelling infrastructure will be \r\ncritical for supporting the uptake of emerging transport technologies \r\nlike EVs and HFCVs, where it makes sense for each to be deployed. \r\nAs a result, there is likely a need for simultaneous investment in both \r\ninfrastructure and vehicle technologies to accelerate decarbonisation \r\nof the transport sector."


id: 8f00a457f939554e6979fdd541895c7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 20038
content:
"Charging infrastructure. Charging infrastructure is important \r\nfor a number of key reasons. From a consumer perspective, robust \r\nand reliable charging infrastructure networks are required to build \r\nconfidence in the technology and overcome the often-cited barrier of "


id: 8b66ae92ec615ee4f6c597f91e4107de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"that replaces a physical plug (Ainalis et al. 2020; Hill et al. 2020). \r\nThis type of charging infrastructure is particularly relevant for road \r\nfreight where load demand is higher. Road electrification can take \r\nthe form of a charging rail built into the road pavement, run along \r\nthe side of the road, through overhead catenary power lines - similar \r\nto electrical infrastructure used for rail - or at recharging facilities \r\nat stations along the route. This infrastructure can also be used to \r\ndirectly power other electrified powertrains, such as hybrid and HFCV \r\n(Hardman et al. 2018; Hill et al. 2020)."


id: 242374303e01a4eb2ef687a6c88c0370
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Charging infrastructure also varies in terms of the level of charging \r\npower. For light vehicles, charging infrastructure is generally up to \r\n350 kW, which provides approximately 350 kilometres for every \r\n10 minutes of charging. For larger vehicles, like buses and trucks, \r\ncharging infrastructure is generally up to 600 kW, providing around \r\n50-100 km for every 10 minutes of charging (depending on the size \r\nof the vehicle). Finally, even higher-power charging infrastructure is \r\ncurrently being developed at rates greater than 1 MW, particularly \r\nfor long-haul trucks and for short-haul marine shipping and \r\naviation. For example, one of the largest electric ferries in the world, \r\ncurrently operating in Denmark, uses a 4.4 MW charger (Heinemann \r\net al. 2020)."


id: b1d3943d80319752ca2ade63a2d91285
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Finally, there are several different charging standards, varying across \r\ntransport segments and across geographical locations. Like electrical \r\nappliances, different EV charging connectors and sockets have \r\nemerged in different regions, such as CCS2 in Europe (ECA 2021), \r\nGB/T in China (Hove and Sandalow 2019). Achieving interoperability \r\nbetween charging stations is seen as another important issue for \r\npolicymakers to address to provide transparent data to the market \r\non where EV chargers are located and a  consistent approach to \r\npaying for charging sessions (van der Kam and Bekkers 2020). \r\nInteroperability could also play an important role in enabling smart \r\ncharging infrastructure (Neaimeh and Andersen 2020)."


id: 830e7ff3d929c3dca390e402d4c2facc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 18149
content:
"There are two types of charging infrastructure for electric vehicles: \r\nconductive charging involving a  physical connection and wireless/\r\ninduction charging. The majority of charging infrastructure deployed \r\ntoday for light- and heavy-duty vehicles is conductive. However, \r\nwireless charging technologies are beginning to emerge - particularly \r\nfor applications like bus rapid transit - with vehicles able to charge \r\nautonomously while parked and/or in motion (IRENA 2019). For \r\nroad vehicles, electric road systems, or road electrification, is also \r\nemerging as an alternative form of conductive charging infrastructure "


id: 7314c4a06fab74ec5af2e8d043863e88
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"and the dispensing strategy. Hydrogen supply could happen via on\u0002site production or via transport and delivery of hydrogen produced \r\noff-site. At the compression stage, hydrogen is compressed to achieve \r\nthe pressure needed for economic stationary and vehicle storage. This \r\npressure depends on the storage strategy. Hydrogen can be stored \r\nas a liquid or a gas. Hydrogen can also be dispensed to vehicles as \r\na gas or a liquid, depending on the design of the vehicles (though it \r\ntests the extremes of temperature range and storage capacity for an \r\nindustrial product). The technological and economic development of \r\neach of these components continues to be researched."


id: 7f272bfb7cdbd353b2630a987ae95694
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 17557
content:
"Jochem et al. 2021), reduce the uncertainty in forecasts of daily and \r\nhourly electrical loads (Peng et al. 2012), and allow greater utilisation \r\nof generation capacity (Hajimiragha et  al. 2010; Madzharov \r\net al. 2014)."


id: fa169a9b3d468a8a1a21f8bc676a805a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 36864
content:
"Smart charging strategies can also enhance the climate benefits \r\nof EVs (Yuan et al. 2021). Controlled charging can help avoid high\u0002carbon electricity sources, decarbonisation of the ancillary service \r\nmarkets, or peak shaving of high-carbon electricity sources (Jochem \r\net al. 2021). V2G-capable EVs can result in even lower total emissions, \r\nparticularly when compared to other alternatives (Reddy et al. 2016). \r\nNoel et  al. (2019) analysed V2G pathways in Denmark and noted \r\nthat at a penetration rate of 75% by 2030, USD34 billion in social \r\nbenefits could be accrued (through things like displaced pollution). \r\nThese social benefits translate to USD1,200 per vehicle. V2G-capable \r\nEVs were found to have the potential to reduce carbon emissions \r\ncompared to a conventional gasoline vehicle by up to 59%, assuming \r\noptimised charging schedules (Hoehne and Chester 2016)."


id: c0b1ad7e6f315b99268d03658381dea7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 27880
content:
"Hydrogen infrastructure. HFCVs are reliant on the development \r\nof widespread and convenient hydrogen refuelling stations \r\n(FCHEA 2019; IEA 2019c; BNEF 2020). Globally, there are around \r\n540 hydrogen refuelling stations, with the majority located in North \r\nAmerica, Europe, Japan, and China (IEA 2021a). Approximately 70% \r\nof these refuelling stations are open to the public (Coignard et al. \r\n2018). Typical refuelling stations currently have a refuelling capacity \r\nof 100 to 350 kg/day (CARB 2019; CARB 2020; H2 Tools 2020; AFDC \r\n2021). At most, current hydrogen refuelling stations have daily \r\ncapacities under 500 kg a day (Liu et al. 2020b)."


id: a7a6962850847f83232f491a8e17b855
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23883
content:
"emissions reported in literature are possibly underestimated by as \r\nmuch as 15-38%, in comparison to real driving emissions (Fontaras \r\net  al. 2017; Tsiakmakis et  al. 2017; Triantafyllopoulos et  al. 2019). \r\nThe extent of these underestimations, however, varies between \r\npowertrain types, engine sizes, driving behaviour and environment."


id: b20d95828d0f8d4f5d419ac16fd8f0d1
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vector_id: 25512
content:
"LDVs represent the main mode of transport for private citizens \r\n(ITF 2019) and currently represent the largest share of transport \r\nemissions globally (IEA 2019d). Currently, powertrains depending \r\non gasoline and diesel fuels remain the dominant technology in the \r\nLDV segment (IEA 2019d). HEVs, and fully battery electric vehicles \r\n(BEVs), however, have become increasingly popular in recent years \r\n(IEA 2021a). Correspondingly, the number of lifecycle assessment \r\n(LCA) studies investigating HEVs, BEVs, and fuel cell vehicles have \r\nincreased. While historically the focus has been on the tailpipe \r\nemissions of LDVs, LCA studies demonstrate the importance of \r\nincluding emissions from the entire vehicle value chain, particularly \r\nfor alternative powertrain technologies."


id: 806cbf1bc0f90e591dcea702f2e3bffe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 17733
content:
"Current average lifecycle impacts of mid-size ICEVs span from \r\napproximately 65 gCO2-eq pkm-1 to 210 gCO2-eq pkm-1, with \r\nboth values stemming from ICEVs running on biofuels. Between \r\nthis range of values, the current reference technologies are found, \r\nwith diesel-powered ICEVs having total median lifecycle impacts of \r\n130 gCO2-eq pkm-1 and gasoline-fuelled vehicle 160 gCO2-eq pkm-1. \r\nFuel consumption dominates the lifecycle emissions of ICEVs, with \r\napproximately 75% of these emissions arising from the tailpipe and \r\nfuel chain."


id: e893fbe6e84c8fccc98c12142544ff4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34099
content:
"Furthermore, note that the carbon footprint of biofuels used in \r\nFigure  10.4 are aggregate numbers not specific to any individual \r\nvalue chain or fuel type. They are derived by combining land use\u0002related carbon emissions from Chapter 7 with conversion efficiencies \r\nand emissions as described in Section  10.3. Specifically, land-use \r\nfootprints derived from the three modelling approaches employed \r\nhere are: i) Integrated Assessment Models  - Energy Modelling \r\nForum 33 (IAM EMF33); ii) Partial models assuming constant land \r\ncover (CLC), and, iii) Partial models using natural regrowth (NRG). The \r\nemissions factors used here correspond to scenarios where global \r\nproduction of biomass for energy purposes are 100 EJ/year, with \r\nlower emissions factors expected at lower levels of consumption and \r\nvice versa. Further details are available in Box 10.2 and Chapter 7."


id: bb06969d6490c28d8ec83b3a859594c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 26965
content:
"The tailpipe emissions and fuel consumption reported in the literature \r\ngenerally do not use empirical emissions data. Rather, they tend to \r\nreport fuel efficiency using driving cycles such as New European \r\nDriving Cycle or the US Environmental Protection Agency Federal Test \r\nProcedure. As a result, depending on the driving cycle used, operating "


id: 2f63bbc9aef5e9464af67668a858a314
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 4874
content:
"60 and 180 gCO2-eq pkm-1 with electricity generated from wind and \r\ncoal, respectively. The ability to achieve large carbon reductions via \r\nvehicle electrification is thus highly dependent on the generation of \r\nlow-carbon electricity, with the greatest mitigation effects achieved \r\nwhen charging the battery with low-carbon electricity. The literature \r\nsuggests that current BEVs, if manufactured on low-carbon electricity \r\nas well as operated on low-carbon electricity would have footprints \r\nas low 22 gCO2-eq pkm-1 for a  compact-sized car (Ellingsen \r\net  al. 2014; Ellingsen et  al. 2016). This value suggests a  reduction \r\npotential of around 85% compared to similarly-sized fossil fuel \r\nvehicles (median values). Furthermore, BEVs have a  co-benefit of \r\nreducing local air pollutants that are responsible for human health \r\ncomplications, particularly in densely-populated areas (Hawkins et al. \r\n2013; Ke et al. 2017)."


id: e2d89a2283d3fd36f4e8a3715de5906f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 33186
content:
"offset the higher manufacturing emissions of the vehicle (Luk et al. 2018; Wu et al. 2019). In addition, these advanced materials may \r\nbe challenging to recycle in a way that retains their high technical performance (Meng et al. 2017)."


id: c2de814746f5273b225ecb1363f09890
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28239
content:
"Co-effects on particulate matter. Lightweighting may also alleviate the particulate matter (PM) emissions arising from road and \r\nbrake wear. BEVs are generally heavier than their ICEV counterparts, which may potentially cause higher stress on road surfaces \r\nand tyres, with consequently higher PM emissions per kilometre driven (Timmers and Achten 2016). Regenerative braking in HEVs, \r\nBEVs and FCVs, however, reduces the mechanical braking required, and therefore may compensate for the higher brake wear emissions \r\nfrom these heavier vehicle types. In addition, BEVs have no tailpipe emissions, which further offsets the increased PM emissions from \r\nroad and tyre wear. Therefore, lightweighting strategies may offer a carbon and particulates mitigation effect; however, in some cases, \r\nother technological options may reduce CO2 emissions even further."


id: d91d556be40c942554092e0eadb703cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31667
content:
"Two-wheelers, consisting mainly of lower-powered mopeds and \r\nhigher-powered motorcycles, are popular for personal transport \r\nin densely populated cities, especially in developing countries. \r\nLCA studies for this class of vehicle are relatively uncommon \r\ncompared to four-wheeled LDVs. In the available results, however, \r\ntwo-wheelers exhibit similar trends for the different powertrain \r\ntechnologies as the LDVs, with electric powertrains having higher \r\nproduction emissions, but usually lower operating emissions. The \r\nlifecycle emissions intensity for two-wheelers is also generally lower \r\nthan four-wheeled LDVs on a  vehicle-kilometre basis. However, \r\ntwo-wheelers generally cannot carry as many passengers as four\u0002wheeled LDVs. Thus, on a passenger-kilometre basis, a fully occupied \r\npassenger vehicle may still have lower emissions than a  fully \r\noccupied two-wheeler. However, today, most passenger vehicles \r\nhave relatively low occupancy and thus have a correspondingly high "


id: fc53f11fcdb192adbd6f8f2688e7ed53
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37202
content:
"emissions intensity on a pkm basis. This points to the importance \r\nof utilisation of passenger vehicles at higher occupancies to \r\nreduce the lifecycle intensity of LDVs on a pkm basis. For example, \r\nthe median emissions intensity of a gasoline passenger vehicle is \r\n222 gCO2-eq  vkm-1, and 160 gCO2-eq vkm-1 for a  gasoline two\u0002wheeler (Cox and Mutel 2018). At a  maximum occupancy factor \r\nof four and two passengers, respectively, the transport emissions \r\nintensity for these vehicles is 55 and 80 gCO2-eq pkm-1. Under the \r\nsame occupancy rates assumption, BEV two-wheelers recharged on \r\nthe average European electricity mix, achieve lower lifecycle GHG \r\nintensities than BEV four-wheeled LDVs. On the other hand, FCV \r\ntwo-wheelers with hydrogen produced via steam methane reforming \r\npresent higher GHG intensity than their four-wheeled counterparts, \r\nwhen compared on a pkm basis at high occupancy rates."


id: 9d79ea6d05043868ee62a2484ac78d0a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 22307
content:
"Figure 10.5 | LCC for light-duty internal combustion engine vehicles, battery electric vehicles, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The results for ICEVs represent \r\nthe LCC of a vehicle running on gasoline. However, these values are also representative for ICEVs running on diesel as the costs ranges in the literature for these two solutions \r\nare similar. The secondary y-axis depicts the cost of the different energy carriers normalised in USD per gigajoule for easier cross-comparability."


id: d43301554e12e7e51c7ce9affed31369
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30910
content:
"To successfully transition towards LDVs utilising low-carbon fuels or \r\nenergy sources, the technologies need to be accessible to as many \r\npeople as possible, which requires competitive costs compared to \r\nconventional diesel and gasoline vehicles. The lifecycle costs (LCCs) of \r\nLDVs depend on the purchasing costs of the vehicles, their efficiency, \r\nthe fuel costs, and the discount rate. Figure 10.5 shows the results \r\nof a  parametric analysis of LCC for diesel LDVs, BEVs, and FCVs. \r\nThe range of vehicle efficiencies captured in Figure 10.5 is the same \r\nas the range used for Figure  10.4, while the ranges for fuel costs \r\nand vehicle purchase prices come from the literature. The assumed \r\ndiscount rate for this parametric analysis is 3%. Appendix  10.2 \r\nincludes the details about the method and underlying data used to \r\ncreate this figure."


id: 6428932f203f4fef74abae10de982374
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 13326
content:
"Figure  10.5 shows the range of LCC, in USD per  passenger\u0002kilometre, for different powertrain technologies, and the influence \r\nof vehicle efficiency (low or high), vehicle purchase price, and fuel/\r\nelectricity cost on the overall LCC. For consistency with Figure 10.4, \r\nan occupancy rate of 1.5 is assumed. Mid-sized ICEVs have \r\na purchase price of USD20,000-40,000, and average fuel costs are \r\nin the range of USD1-1.5 per litre. With these conditions, the LCC of \r\nfossil-fuelled LDVs span between USD0.22-0.35 pkm-1 or between \r\nUSD0.17-0.28 pkm-1, for low- and high-efficiency ICEVs respectively \r\n(Figure 10.5)."


id: b72523a7c7735886add32509ce369abe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26348
content:
"BEVs have higher purchase prices than ICEVs, though a sharp decline \r\nhas been observed since AR5. Due to the rapid development of the \r\nlithium-ion battery technology over the years (Schmidt et al. 2017) \r\nand the introduction of subsidies in several countries, BEVs are quickly \r\nreaching cost parity with ICEVs. Mid-sized BEVs' average purchase \r\nprices are in the range of USD30,000-50,000 but the levelised cost \r\nof electricity shows a larger spread (USD65-200/MWh) depending on \r\nthe geographical location and the technology (Chapter 6). Therefore, \r\nassuming purchase price parity between ICEVs and BEVs, BEVs show \r\nlower LCC (Figure 10.5) due to higher efficiency and the lower cost \r\nof electricity compared to fossil fuels on a per-gigajoule (GJ) basis \r\n(secondary y-axis on Figure 10.5)."


id: b2504c4f5ae29933c7ed3d690bda0826
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 25567
content:
"the transport sector. Use of these public transit systems will depend \r\non urban design and consumer preferences (Section 10.2, Chapters 5 \r\nand 8), which in turn depend on time, costs, and behavioural choices."


id: 7f880fdd229cee5be24064b2fc90f0de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 17613
content:
"lifecycle emissions for rail than for other transport modes (Chester \r\nand Horvath 2012; Chester et al. 2013). One study reported values \r\nranging from 10-25 gCO2 per  passenger-kilometre (International \r\nUnion of Railways 2016), although embodied emissions from rail are \r\nknown to vary widely across case studies (Olugbenga et al. 2019). \r\nThese caveats are also applicable to the other figures in this section."


id: f1f25bffbc0f216df647a3f5c3cdbd81
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35588
content:
"At high occupancy, both bus and rail transport offer substantial \r\nGHG reduction potential per pkm, even compared with the lowest\u0002emitting private vehicle options. Even at 20% occupancy, bus and \r\nrail may still offer emission reductions compared to passenger cars, \r\nespecially notable when comparing BEVs with low-carbon electricity \r\n(the lowest-emission option for all technologies) across the three \r\nmodes. Only when comparing a  fossil fuel-powered bus at low \r\noccupancy with a low-carbon powered car at high occupancy is this \r\nconclusion reversed. Use of public transit systems, especially those \r\nthat rely on buses and passenger rail fuelled with the low-carbon \r\nfuels previously described, would thus support efforts to decarbonise "


id: fb64b4e74386858c3aea2e77b52997d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37057
content:
"Figure 10.7 | Lifecycle costs for internal combustion engine vehicles, battery electric vehicles, and hydrogen fuel cell vehicles for buses and passenger \r\nrail. The range of efficiencies for each vehicle type are consistent with the range of efficiencies in Figure 10.6 (80% occupancy). The results for the ICEV can be used to evaluate \r\nthe lifecycle costs of ICE buses and passenger rail operated with any form of diesel, whether from petroleum, synthetic hydrocarbons, or biofuel, as the range of efficiencies \r\nof vehicles operating with all these fuels is similar. The secondary y-axis depicts the cost of the different energy carriers normalised in USD/GJ for easier cross-comparability."


id: fcbb6fc8f2d880d002f856234debee7b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37275
content:
"the focus of this review. Decarbonisation of medium- and heavy-duty \r\ntrucks would likely require the use of low-carbon electricity in battery \r\nelectric trucks, low-carbon hydrogen or ammonia in fuel-cell trucks, \r\nor bio-based fuels (from sources with low upstream emissions and \r\nlow risk of induced land-use change) used in ICE trucks."


id: 36569a84e88b16ad550148679d4bd91b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5942
content:
"As is the case with passenger transport, there is growing interest \r\nin alternative fuels that could reduce GHG emissions from freight \r\ntransport. Natural gas-based fuels (e.g., CNG, LNG) are an example, \r\nhowever these may not lead to drastic reductions in GHG emissions \r\ncompared to diesel. Natural gas-powered vehicles have been \r\ndiscussed as a  means to mitigate air quality impacts (Khan et  al. \r\n2015; Cai et  al. 2017; Pan et  al. 2020), but those impacts are not "


id: a4a76bffb0736d4d66c3e100cdd9332d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 23472
content:
"Freight rail is also a major mode for the inland movement of goods. \r\nTrains are more energy efficient (per tkm) than trucks, so expanded \r\nuse of rail systems (particularly in developing countries where "


id: 13f148065bf8140b24ea5833ef721263
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 646
content:
"For trucks, Figure 10.8 includes two x-axes representing two different \r\nassumptions about their payload, which substantially influence \r\nemissions per tonne-kilometre. These results highlight the importance \r\nof truckload planning as an emissions reduction mechanism, for \r\nexample, as also shown in Kaack et  al. (2018). Several studies \r\nalso point to improvements in vehicle efficiency as an important \r\nmechanism to reduce emissions from freight transport (Taptich et al. \r\n2016; Kaack et  al. 2018). However, projections for diesel vehicles \r\nusing such efficiencies beyond 2030 are promising, but still far higher \r\nemitting than vehicles powered with low-carbon sources."


id: f09fe7c352de08c1c8afb99458a7cf7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35359
content:
"demand for goods could grow exponentially) could provide carbon \r\nabatement opportunities. While diesel-based locomotives are still \r\na  major mode of propulsion used in freight rail, interest in low\u0002carbon propulsion technologies is growing. Electricity already powers \r\nfreight rail in many European countries using overhead catenaries. \r\nOther low-carbon technologies for rail may include advanced storage \r\ntechnologies, biofuels, synthetic fuels, ammonia, or hydrogen."


id: b296207a7820f21c1fd56b006d48d420
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25619
content:
"costs (especially the battery) would enable either alternative fuel \r\ntechnology to become financially attractive. These results are largely \r\nconsistent with raw results reported in existing literature, which \r\nsuggest ambiguity over whether BEV trucks are already competitive, \r\nbut more consistency that hydrogen is not yet competitive, but could \r\nbe in future (Zhao et al. 2016; Moultak et al. 2017; Sen et al. 2017; \r\nWhite and Sintov 2017; Zhou et al. 2017; Mareev et al. 2018; Yang \r\net  al. 2018a; El Hannach et  al. 2019; Lajevardi et  al. 2019; Tanco \r\net al. 2019; Burke and Sinha 2020; Jones et al. 2020). There is limited \r\ndata available on the LCC for freight rail, but at least one study \r\nIEA (2019g) suggests that electric catenary rail is likely to have \r\nsimilar costs to diesel rail, while battery electric trains remain more \r\nexpensive and hydrogen rail could become cheaper under forward\u0002looking cost reduction scenarios."


id: 62fb316be5a5dd3fc8de3ff092a777d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13145
content:
"Taken together, the results in this section suggest a range of cost\u0002effective opportunities to reduce GHG emissions from land-based \r\ntransport. Mode shift from cars to passenger transit (bus or rail) \r\ncan reduce GHG emissions while also reducing LCCs, resulting in \r\na  negative abatement cost. Likewise, increasing the utilisation of \r\nvehicles (i.e.,  % occupancy for passenger vehicles or % payload \r\nfor freight vehicles) simultaneously decreases emissions and costs \r\nper pkm or per tkm, respectively. Within a given mode, alternative fuel \r\nsources also show strong potential to reduce emissions at minimal \r\nadded costs. For LDVs, BEVs can offer emissions reductions with LCCs \r\nthat are already approaching that for conventional ICEVs. For transit \r\nand freight, near-term abatement costs for the low-carbon BEV and \r\nFCV options relative to their diesel counterparts range from near \r\nUSD0/tonne CO2-eq (e.g., BEV buses and BEV passenger rail) into the "


id: 691aade73cb75c2ccca5a3c144f35035
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14133
content:
"hundreds or even low thousands of dollars per tonne CO2-eq (e.g., for \r\nheavy-duty BEV and FCV trucks at current vehicle and fuel costs). \r\nWith projected future declines in storage, fuel cell, and low-carbon \r\nhydrogen fuel costs, however, both BEV and FCV technologies can \r\nlikewise offer GHG reductions at negative abatement costs across all \r\nland-transport modes in 2030 and beyond. Further information about \r\ncosts and potentials is available in Chapter 12."


id: 9088eed312120544ca785c1d4536b4d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 20277
content:
"of fossil fuel aviation kerosene ('Jet-A'), although its non-CO2\r\nemissions can also affect climate (Section  10.5.2). International \r\nemissions of CO2 are about 65% of the total emissions from aviation \r\n(Fleming and de Lepinay 2019), which totalled approximately 1 Gt \r\nof CO2 in 2018. Emissions from this segment of the transport sector \r\nhave been steadily increasing at rates of around 2.5% per year over \r\nthe last two decades (Figure 10.10), although for the period 2010 to \r\n2018 the rate increased to roughly 4% per year. The latest available \r\ndata (2018) indicate that aviation is responsible for approximately \r\n2.4% of total anthropogenic emissions of CO2 (including land-use \r\nchange) on an annual basis (using IEA data, IATA data and global \r\nemissions data of Le Quere et al. (2018b))."


id: 652a32d26f7fd7df463a461c9fd2503
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13483
content:
"This section addresses the potential for reducing GHG emissions from \r\naviation. The overriding constraint on developments in technology \r\nand energy efficiency for this sector is safety. Governance is \r\ncomplex in that international aviation comes under the International \r\nCivil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a  specialised UN agency. The \r\nmeasures to reduce GHG emissions that are considered include both \r\nin-sector (technology, operations, fuels) and out of sector (market\u0002based measures, high-speed rail modal shift/substitution). Demand \r\nmanagement is not explicitly considered in this section, as it was \r\ndiscussed in 10.2. A limited range of scenarios to 2050 and beyond \r\nare available and assessed at the end of the section."


id: f09a88ee0c2e77a3b079d00bc4aaa649
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35355
content:
"Aviation's net warming effect results from its historical and current \r\nemissions of CO2, and non-CO2 emissions of water vapour, soot, \r\nsulphur dioxide (from sulphur in the fuel), and nitrogen oxides \r\n(NOx, = NO + NO2) (IPCC 1999; Lee et al. 2021; Szopa et al. 2021). \r\nAlthough the effective radiative forcing (ERF) of CO2 from historic \r\naviation emissions is not currently the largest forcing term, it is difficult \r\nto address because of the sector's current dependency on fossil-based \r\nhydrocarbon fuels and the longevity of CO2. A residual of emissions of \r\nCO2 today will still have a warming effect in many thousands of years \r\n(Archer et al. 2009; Canadell et al. 2021) whereas water vapour, soot, \r\nand NOx emissions will have long ceased to contribute to warming \r\nafter some decades. As a result, CO2 mitigation of aviation to net zero \r\nlevels, as required in 1.5degC scenarios, requires fundamental shifts in \r\ntechnology, fuel types, or changes of behaviour or demand."


id: 3f37d07ba2aa28db4796130ceb56b95b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 7341
content:
"Aviation is widely recognised as a 'hard-to-decarbonise' sector (Gota \r\net al. 2019) having a strong dependency on liquid fossil fuels and an \r\ninfrastructure that has long 'lock-in' timescales, resulting in slow fleet \r\nturnover times. The principal GHG emitted is CO2 from the combustion "


id: 9204e7a5b01dddae56ced8b7915fe8c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20498
content:
"or more to penetrate the fleet completely. Thus, the literature does \r\nnot support the idea that there are large improvements to be made \r\nin the energy efficiency of aviation that keep pace with the projected \r\ngrowth in air transport."


id: 2592252f28af2aac13a68ed1b4ef2f9a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3338
content:
"The development of 'sustainable aviation fuels' (referred to as \r\n'SAFs') that can reduce aviation's carbon footprint is a  growing \r\narea of interest and research. Alternative aviation fuels to replace \r\nfossil-based kerosene have to be certified to an equivalent standard \r\nas Jet-A for a  variety of parameters associated with safety issues. \r\nCurrently, the organisation responsible for aviation fuel standards, \r\nASTM International, has certified seven different types of sustainable \r\naviation fuels with maximum blends ranging from 10% to 50% \r\n(Chiaramonti 2019). Effectively, these blend requirements limit the \r\namount of non-hydrocarbon fuel (e.g., methanol) that can be added \r\nat present. While there currently is a  minimum level of aromatic \r\nhydrocarbon contained in jet fuel to prevent 'O-ring' shrinkage in "


id: 88aa5d9529df0dec7abfdd8036c2e499
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19029
content:
"the fuel seals (Khandelwal et al. 2018), this minimum level can likely \r\nbe lower in the medium to long term, with the added benefits of \r\nreduced soot formation and reduced contrail cirrus formation (Bier \r\net al. 2017; Bier and Burkhardt 2019)."


id: 789a970010d2473e12180a9e6fd5430d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 16537
content:
"fossil fuel by 2050 (Gossling et al. 2021a). These synthetic fuels have \r\npotential for large lifecycle emissions reductions (Schmidt et  al. \r\n2016). In comparison to bio-SAF production, the implementation of \r\nthe processes is in its infancy. However, assuming availability of low\u0002carbon energy electricity, these fuels have much smaller land and \r\nwater requirements than bio-SAF. Low carbon-energy supply, scalable \r\ntechnology, and therefore costs, represent barriers. Scheelhaase et al. \r\n(2019) review current estimates of costs, which are estimated to be \r\napproximately four to six times the price of fossil kerosene."


id: 59e40d75dd4b44fc2d2720f708bd5a68
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 11651
content:
"Costs remain a major barrier for bio-SAF, which cost around three \r\ntimes the price of kerosene (Kandaramath Hari et al. 2015). Clearly, \r\nfor SAFs to be economically competitive, large adjustments in prices \r\nof fossil fuels or the introduction of policies is required. Staples \r\net  al. (2018) estimated that in order to introduce bio-SAFs that \r\nreduce lifecycle GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2050, prices \r\nand policies were necessary for incentivisation. They estimate the \r\nneed for 268  new biorefineries per  year and capital investments \r\nof approximately 22 to 88 billion USD2015 per year between 2020 \r\nand 2050. Wise et al. (2017) suggest that carbon prices would help \r\nleverage production and availability."


id: 3559e006f2839cead59e33cf48d1dda8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 5806
content:
"The non-CO2 impacts of LH2-powered aircrafts remain poorly \r\nunderstood. The emission index of water vapour would be much larger \r\n(estimated to be 2.6 times greater by Strom and Gierens (2002)) than \r\nfor conventional fuels), and the occurrence of contrails may increase \r\nbut have lower ERF because of the lower optical depth (Marquart \r\net al. 2005). Moreover, contrails primarily form on soot particles from \r\nkerosene-powered aircraft, which would be absent from LH2 exhaust \r\n(Karcher 2018). The overall effect is currently unknown as there are \r\nno measurements. Potentially, NOx emissions could be lower with \r\ncombustor redesign (Khandelwal et al. 2013)."


id: 6ffba3e621b89807d79573d00886a154
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 15233
content:
"Various pathways have been discussed for the production of \r\nnon-bio SAFs such as power-to-liquid pathways (Schmidt et  al. \r\n2018), sometimes termed 'electro-fuels' (Goldmann et  al. 2018), \r\nor more generalised 'Power-to-X' pathways (Kober and Bauer \r\n2019). This process would involve the use of low-carbon electricity, \r\nCO2, and water to synthesise jet fuel through the Fischer-Tropsch \r\nprocess or methanol synthesis. Hydrogen would be produced via \r\nan electrochemical process, powered by low-carbon energy and \r\ncombined with CO2 captured directly from the atmosphere or \r\nthrough BECCS. The energy requirement from photovoltaics has \r\nbeen estimated to be of the order 14 to 20 EJ to phase out aviation "


id: 12b56cd32a5266ce0f8ece815a1c166a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 444
content:
"In conclusion, there are favourable arguments for LH2-powered \r\naircraft, both on an efficiency basis (Verstraete 2013) and an overall \r\nreduction in GHG emissions, even on an lifecycle basis. However, LH2\r\nrequires redesign of the aircraft, particularly for long-haul operations. \r\nSimilarly, there would be a need for expanded infrastructure for fuel "


id: 491b162640069c04524206e3271920a5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 8889
content:
"agreed in 2016 to commence, in 2020, the 'Carbon Offsetting and \r\nReduction Scheme for International Aviation' (CORSIA). The pandemic \r\nsubsequently resulted in the baseline being changed to 2019."


id: cdbc98b2d9d713435cf801151fa9d4d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 29894
content:
"manufacture, storage, and distribution at airports, which is likely to \r\nbe more easily overcome if there is a more general move towards \r\na hydrogen-based energy economy."


id: aea19b09b31cde838c4aa56ae3bee6c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24999
content:
"CORSIA has a  phased implementation, with an initial pilot phase \r\n(2021-2023) and a  first phase (2024-2026) in which states \r\nwill participate voluntarily. The second phase will then start in \r\n2026-2035, and all states will participate unless exempted. States \r\nmay be exempted if they have lower aviation activity levels or based \r\non their UN development status. As of September 2021, 109 ICAO \r\nMember States will voluntarily be participating in CORSIA starting \r\nin 2022. In terms of routes, only those where both States connecting \r\nthe route are participating are included. There will be a  special \r\nreview of CORSIA by the end of 2032 to determine the termination \r\nof the scheme, its extension, or any other changes to the scheme \r\nbeyond 2035."


id: f67450abec5668750fc11731f5355e1c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36287
content:
"Technological and operational trade-offs between CO2 and \r\nnon-CO2 effects. Since aviation has additional non-CO2 warming \r\neffects, there has been some discussion as to whether these can be \r\naddressed by either technological or operational means. For example, \r\nimproved fuel efficiency has resulted from high overall pressure ratio \r\nengines with large bypass ratios. This improvement has increased \r\npressure and temperature at the combustor inlet, with a  resultant \r\ntendency to increase thermal NOx formation in the combustor. \r\nCombustor technology aims to reduce this increase, but it represents \r\na potential technology trade-off whereby NOx control may be at the \r\nexpense of extra fuel efficiency. Estimating the benefits or disbenefits \r\nof CO2 (proportional to fuel burned) vs NOx in terms of climate is \r\ncomplex (Freeman et al. 2018)."


id: 7dd7ec890845d6f558d0ed5ad7399f4e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17369
content:
"Any global warming potential/temperature change potential type \r\nemissions equivalency calculation always involves the user selection \r\nof a  time horizon over which the calculation is made, which is \r\na subjective choice (Fuglestvedt et al. 2010). In general, the longer the \r\ntime horizon, the more important CO2 becomes in comparison with \r\na short-lived climate forcing agent. So, for example, a net (overall) \r\naviation GWP for a  20-year time horizon is 4.0 times that of CO2\r\nalone, but only 1.7 over a 100-year time horizon. Correspondingly, \r\na GTP for a 20-year time horizon is 1.3, but it is 1.1 for 100 years \r\n(Lee et al. 2021)."


id: 254c67bd59bd254b1c8d942f2c778420
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3294
content:
"Market-based offsetting measures. The EU introduced aviation \r\ninto its CO2 emissions trading scheme (ETS) in 2012. Currently, the \r\nEU-ETS for aviation includes all flights within the EU as well as to and \r\nfrom Eastern European and West-Central Asian states. Globally, ICAO "


id: 610dfc91bffc9114f3ef35c267b2ddc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 12842
content:
"the coming decades, the commencement of appropriate HSR services \r\nhas the potential to provide, particularly in the short- to medium\u0002term, additional means of aviation emissions mitigation."


id: b18e9e897ed220fb646771dfa9a03ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25431
content:
"and other markets and may be attributable to China having developed \r\na comprehensive network with hub stations, higher average speeds, \r\nand an integrated domestic market with strong patronage (Zhang \r\net al. 2019a)."


id: 451f0aa7f96e35a110b466c26bbb6a98
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 8295
content:
"The most recent projection from ICAO (prior to the COVID-19 \r\npandemic) for international traffic (mid-range growth) is shown in \r\nFigure 10.11. This projection shows the different contributions of \r\nmitigation measures from two levels of improved technology, as \r\nwell as improvements in air traffic management and infrastructure \r\nuse. The projections indicate an increase in CO2 emissions by \r\na  factor of 2.2 in 2050 over 2020 levels for the most optimistic \r\nset of mitigation assumptions. The high/low traffic growth \r\nassumptions would indicate increases by factors of 2.8 and 1.1, \r\nrespectively in 2050, over 2020 levels (again, for the most optimistic \r\nmitigation assumptions)."


id: c26bcd3919be44a5f3ebde778fe539d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28173
content:
"The International Energy Agency has published several long-term \r\naviation scenarios since AR5 within a  broader scope of energy \r\nprojections. Their first set of aviation scenarios include a 'reference \r\ntechnology scenario', a '2degC Scenario' and a 'Beyond 2degC Scenario'. \r\nThe scenarios are simplified in assuming a range of growth rates and \r\ntechnological/operational improvements (IEA 2017b). Mitigation \r\nmeasures brought about by policy and regulation are treated in \r\na broad-brush manner, noting possible uses of taxes, carbon pricing, \r\nprice and regulatory signals to promote innovation."


id: ac2192441d8734acde68a251b26e8ad8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Within the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 \r\nemissions database, a  range of aviation emissions scenarios for \r\na  range of Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) scenarios are \r\navailable (Figure  10.13). This Figure suggests that by 2050, direct \r\nemissions from aviation could be 1.5 to 6.5 (5-95th percentile) \r\ntimes higher than in the 2020 model year under the scenarios that "


id: 275da9811df883fd9dc785f00805cf03
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 3597
content:
"Figure 10.11 | Projections of international aviation emissions of CO2. Data in Mt yr -1, to 2050, showing contributions of improved technology and \r\nair traffic management and infrastructure use to emissions reductions to 2050. Data from Fleming and de Lepinay (2019); projections made pre-COVID-19 \r\nglobal pandemic."


id: 18bc7224a300a8ac78172f8f12e0b699
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 1388
content:
"Figure 10.12 | The International Energy Agency's scenario of future aviation fuel consumption for the States Policies Scenario ('STEPS') and composition \r\nof aviation fuel use in the Sustainable Development Scenario. Source: adapted from IEA (2021b)."


id: 73daf0275faf53206bce928a0b86e878
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 15844
content:
"exceed warming of 4degC during the 21st century with a likelihood of \r\n50% or greater (C8). In the C1 (which limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) \r\nduring the 2st century with no or limited overshoot) and C2 (which \r\nreturn warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during the 2st century after a high \r\novershoot) scenarios, aviation emissions could still be up to 2.5 times \r\nhigher in 2050 than in the 2020 model year (95th percentile) but may \r\nneed to decrease by 10% by 2050 (5th percentile)."


id: 473ae1395416a7ec2d68f84f62f09a04
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8587
content:
"countries, especially developing countries, for the progress of the \r\nwork to be presented to the 41st Session of the ICAO Assembly'. \r\nWhat form this goal will take is unclear until work is presented to \r\nthe 41st Assembly (Autumn, 2022). It is likely, however, that new \r\naccountability and governance structures will be needed to support \r\ndecarbonisation of the aviation sector."


id: 9f5e9b3d3f28840b8ba968ab44b149b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22619
content:
"Dalsoren et  al.  (2009), DNV GL (DNV GL 2019), CAMS-GLOB-SHIP \r\n(Jalkanen et al. 2014; Granier et al. 2019), EDGAR (Crippa et al. 2019), \r\nHoesly et al. (2018), Johansson et al. (2017), ICCT (Olmer et al. 2017), \r\nthe IMO GHG Studies; IMO 2nd (Buhaug et al. 2009), IMO 3rd (Smith \r\net al. 2014), IMO 4th-vessel and IMO 4th-voyage (Faber et al. 2020), \r\nand Kramel et al. (2021)."


id: cac1392369908073632c6e78eaca9876
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29462
content:
"Maritime transport is considered one of the key cornerstones \r\nenabling globalisation (Kumar and Hoffmann 2002). But as for \r\naviation, shipping has its challenges in decarbonisation, with a strong \r\ndependency on fossil fuels without major changes since AR5. At \r\nthe same time, the sector has a  range of opportunities that could \r\nhelp reduce emissions through not only changing fuels, but also by \r\nincreasing energy efficiency, optimising operations and ship design, \r\nreducing demand, improving regulations, as well as other options \r\nthat will be reviewed in this section."


id: c5a4f0e84d2feebee69ddd117d1e6167
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 28676
content:
"Like aviation, shipping is also a  source of emissions of SLCFs as \r\ndescribed in Section 10.5, including nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulphur \r\noxides (SOx, such as SO2 and SO4), carbon monoxide (CO), black \r\ncarbon, and non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs) \r\n(Szopa et  al. 2021). Though SLCF have a  shorter lifetime than the \r\nassociated CO2 emissions, these short-lived forcers can have both \r\na cooling effect (e.g., SOx) or a warming effect (e.g., ozone from NOx). \r\nThe cooling from the SLCF from a pulse emission will decay rapidly \r\nand diminish after a couple of decades, while the warming from the \r\nlong-lived substances lasts for centuries (Szopa et al. 2021)."


id: 43b9ddaaf27820a678a13564cf8990e6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8066
content:
"Emissions of SLCF from shipping not only affect the climate, but \r\nalso the environment, air quality, and human health. Maritime \r\ntransport has been shown to be a major contributor to coastal air \r\nquality degradation (Zhao et  al. 2013; Jalkanen et  al. 2014; Viana \r\net al. 2014; Goldsworthy and Goldsworthy 2015; Goldsworthy 2017). \r\nSulphur emissions may contribute towards acidification of the ocean \r\n(Hassellov et al. 2013). Furthermore, increases in sulphur deposition \r\non the oceans have also been shown to increase the flux of CO2\r\nfrom the oceans to the atmosphere (Hassellov et al. 2013). To address \r\nthe risks of SOx emissions from shipping, there is now a cap on the on \r\nthe sulphur content permissible in marine fuels (IMO 2013). There is \r\nalso significant uncertainty about the impacts of pollutants emitted \r\nfrom ships on the marine environment (Blasco et al. 2014)."


id: 2a15f1a725a4207d5a09348202fb2f92
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 4045
content:
"Maritime transport volume has increased by 250% over the past \r\n40 years, reaching an all-time high of 11 billion tonnes of transported \r\ngoods in 2018 (UNCTAD 2019). This growth in transport volumes has \r\nresulted in continued growth in GHG emissions from the shipping \r\nsector, despite an improvement in the carbon intensity of ship \r\noperations, especially since 2014. The estimated total emissions \r\nfrom maritime transport can vary depending on data set and \r\ncalculation method, but range over 600-1100 MtCO2 yr-1 over \r\nthe past decade (Figure  10.14), corresponding to 2-3% of total \r\nanthropogenic emissions. The legend in Figure  10.14 refers to the \r\nfollowing data sources: Endresen et al. (2003), Eyring et al. (2005), "


id: ba9634ca516d4fa654faef9da3786c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 26891
content:
"Figure 10.14 | CO2 emissions (Mt yr-1) from shipping 2000-2018. Data from various inventories as shown in the label."


id: 27034998ad85be73c3fab69561148e63
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3531
content:
"Pollution control is implemented to varying degrees in the modelling \r\nof the SSP scenarios (Rao et  al. 2017); for example, SSPs 1 and 5 \r\nassume that increasing concern for health and the environment result \r\nin more stringent air pollution policies than today (Szopa et al. 2021). \r\nThere is a downward trend in SOx and NOx emissions from shipping \r\nin all the SSPs, in compliance with regulations. The SLCF emissions \r\nreduction efforts, within the maritime sector, are also contributing \r\ntowards achieving the UN SDGs. In essence, while long-lived GHGs \r\nare important for long-term mitigation targets, accounting for short\u0002lived climate forcers is important both for current and near-term \r\nforcing levels as well as broader air pollution and SDG implications."


id: 74b2fadc97da5ad394fdb9e782e39c79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15957
content:
"Winther  et  al.  2014). Emission patterns and quantities, however, \r\nare also likely to change with future regulations from IMO, and \r\ndepend on technology developments, and activity levels which may \r\ndepend upon geopolitics, commodity pricing, trade, natural resource \r\nextraction, insurance costs, taxes, and tourism demand (Johnston \r\net al. 2017). The need to include indigenous peoples' voices when \r\nshaping policies and governance of shipping activities in the high \r\nnorth is increasing (Dawson et al. 2020)."


id: 8a7e3985ee29928d9d3927cd8a6da891
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19326
content:
"The Arctic climate and environment pose unique hazards and \r\nchallenges with regard to safe and efficient shipping operations: low \r\ntemperature challenges, implications for vessel design, evacuation \r\nand rescue systems, communications, oil spills, variable sea ice, and \r\nmeteorological conditions (Buixade Farre et al. 2014). To understand \r\nthe total implications of shipping in the Arctic, including its climate \r\nimpacts, a  holistic view of synergies, trade-offs, and co-benefits is \r\nneeded, with assessments of impacts on not only the physical climate, \r\nbut also the local environment and ecosystems. To further ensure safe \r\noperations in the Arctic waters, close monitoring of activities may \r\nbe valuable."


id: 2da672b75388c270411f4f1bbd4aca50
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4622
content:
"Increased Arctic shipping activity may also pose increased risks to \r\nlocal marine ecosystems and coastal communities from invasive \r\nspecies, underwater noise, and pollution (Halliday et al. 2017; IPCC \r\n2019). Greater levels of Arctic maritime transport and tourism \r\nhave political, as well as socio-economic, implications for trade, \r\nand nations and economies reliant on the traditional shipping \r\ncorridors. There has been an increase in activity from cargo, tankers, \r\nsupply, and fishing vessels in particular (Winther et al. 2014; Zhao \r\net  al. 2015). Projections indicate more navigable Arctic waters in \r\nthe coming decades (Smith and Stephenson 2013; Melia et  al. \r\n2016) and continued increases in transport volumes through the \r\nnorthern sea routes (Corbett et al. 2010; Lasserre and Pelletier 2011; "


id: 5c2028b46a5f9fa58ac0312196ea9e9c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 12004
content:
"Low-carbon hydrogen and ammonia are seen to have positive potential \r\nas a  decarbonised shipping fuel. Hydrogen and ammonia, when \r\nproduced from renewables or coupled to CCS as opposed to mainly \r\nby fossil fuels with high lifecycle emissions (Bhandari et  al. 2014), \r\nmay contribute to significant CO2-eq reductions of up to 70-80% \r\ncompared to low-sulphur heavy fuel oil (Bicer and Dincer 2018b; \r\nGilbert et al. 2018). These fuels have their own unique transport and \r\nstorage challenges as ammonia requires a pilot fuel due to difficulty "


id: 642c429320c5783982c84bf71287cc10
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13328
content:
"in combustion, and ammonia combustion could lead to elevated \r\nlevels of NOx, N2O, or NH3 emissions depending on engine technology \r\nused (DNV GL 2020). There is a need for the further development of \r\ntechnology and procedures for safe storage and handling of fuels \r\nsuch as hydrogen and ammonia, both onboard and onshore, for faster \r\nuptake (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2019), but they remain an encouraging \r\ndecarbonisation option for shipping in the next decade."


id: 38fdcafb6898e48c7fe720226cd2f58e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 6337
content:
"While methanol produced from fossil sources induces an emissions \r\nincrease of +7.5% (+44%), e-methanol (via hydrogen from \r\nelectrolysis based on renewable energy and carbon from direct \r\nair capture) reduces emissions by 80% (82%). In general, several \r\nsynthetic fuels, such as synthetic diesel, methane, methanol, ethanol, \r\nand dimethyl ether could in principle be used for shipping (Horvath \r\net al. 2018). The mitigation potential of these is fully dependent on \r\nthe sourcing of the hydrogen and carbon required for their synthesis."


id: dd3249ff88b2ae436194152670569200
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32301
content:
"Although projections indicate continued increase in freight demand \r\nin the future, demand-side reductions could contribute to mitigation. \r\nThe development of autonomous systems may play a role (Colling \r\nand Hekkenberg 2020; Liu et al. 2021) while 3-D printing can reduce \r\nall forms of freight as parts and products can be printed instead of \r\nshipped (UNCTAD 2018). As more than 40% of transported freight is \r\nfossil fuels, a lessened demand for such products in low-emissions \r\nscenarios should contribute to reducing the overall maritime transport \r\nneeds and hence emissions in the future (Sharmina et  al. 2017). \r\nAn  increase in alternative fuels, on the other hand, may increase \r\nfreight demand (Mander et  al. 2012). Potentials for demand-side \r\nreduction in shipping emissions may arise from improving processes \r\naround logistics and packaging, and further taxes and charges could \r\nserve as leverage for reducing demand and emissions."


id: defea7dc8d19e7128c4f745a9bd30ae6
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 32580
content:
"Policy choices may enable or hinder changes, and gaps in governance \r\nstructures may, to some degree, hinder the objectives of mechanisms \r\nlike SEEMP to improve energy efficiency and emissions. Policies \r\nmay be developed to incentivise investments in necessary changes \r\nto the global fleet and related infrastructures. The literature argues \r\nthat regulations and incentives that motivate mitigation through \r\nspeed optimisation, ship efficiency improvements, and retrofits with \r\nlower-carbon technologies at a sub-global scale may contribute to \r\nimmediate reductions in CO2 emissions from the sector (Bows-Larkin \r\n2015). The role of the financial sector, through initiatives such as \r\nthe Poseidon Principle, which limit lending to companies that fail \r\nto uphold environmental standards, could also become increasingly \r\nimportant (Sumaila et al. 2021)."


id: 1ad38da3c118c63aa7727d8be19a5d47
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"It has been proposed to make shipping corporations accountable \r\nfor their emissions by making it mandatory to disclose their vessels' \r\nemissions reductions (Rahim et al. 2016). Market-based mechanisms \r\nmay increasingly encourage ship operators to comply with IMO \r\nGHG regulations. Development of policies such as carbon pricing \r\nor taxation to enable a business case for adopting low-carbon fuels \r\ncould be a near-term priority for acceleration of transformation of the \r\nsector (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2019). The EU is considering including \r\nshipping in its carbon trading system, with the details still to be \r\nagreed upon but expected to come into force in 2023, along with the \r\nCII. The proposition is that shipowners who conduct voyages within \r\nEurope, or start or end at an EU port, will have to pay for carbon \r\npermits to cover the CO2 emitted by their vessel."


id: d075935c1e13075dc5b5037d1d31463d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 30325
content:
"Regulatory frameworks for the shipping sector have been developed \r\nover time and will continue to be through bodies such as the IMO, \r\nwhich was established by the UN to manage international shipping. \r\nThe IMO strategy involves a 50% reduction in GHG emissions from \r\ninternational shipping by 2050 compared to 2008 (IMO 2018). The \r\nstrategy includes a  reduction in carbon intensity of international \r\nshipping by at least 40% by 2030, and 70% by 2050, compared \r\nto 2008. IMO furthermore aims for the sectoral phase-out of GHG \r\nemissions as soon as possible this century."


id: f8a0923b9979d6e54f00dbd642a437d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Regulations exist also to limit emissions of air pollution from shipping \r\nwith the aim to improve environment and health impacts from \r\nshipping in ports and coastal communities. In sulphur emission control \r\nareas (SECAs), the maximum permissible sulphur content in marine \r\nfuels is 0.10% mass/mass. These are further tightened by the IMO \r\nlegislation on reducing marine fuel sulphur content to a maximum \r\nof 0.5% in 2020 outside SECAs, compared to 3.5% permissible since \r\n2012 (MARPOL Convention). The MARPOL Annex VI also limits the \r\nemissions of ozone-depleting substances and ozone precursors, \r\nNOx, and volatile organic compounds from tankers (Mertens et  al. \r\n2018). The implementation of the emission control areas have been \r\nshown to reduce the impacts on health and the environment (Viana \r\net al. 2015)."


id: e925d8ed055e788bc99871300563169e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 34197
content:
"While there are many governance and regulatory initiatives that help \r\nreduce emissions from the shipping sector, few are transformative \r\non their own, unless zero-carbon fuels can become available at \r\na reasonable cost as suggested in Sections 10.3 and below."


id: 3340927beb4b76c4bdac0d6e585e4378
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Figure 10.16 shows CO2 emissions from shipping in scenarios from \r\nthe AR6 database and the Fourth GHG study by the IMO (Faber et al. \r\n2020). Panel (a) shows that CO2 emissions from shipping go down by \r\n33-70% (5-95th% percentile) by 2050 in the C1 and C2 scenarios, \r\nwhich limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during the 21st century with \r\nno or limited overshoot or return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during "


id: e7d455b2cbdedf718b66cc75d919b8a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 33969
content:
"the most sustainable way (Rao et al. 2017). Conversely, there are no \r\nemissions reductions in the scenarios presented by the IMO Fourth \r\nGHG study, even though these scenarios incorporate some efficiency \r\nimprovements and a slight increase in the use of LNG."


id: b1313c86d6f178135027ba6fb61f826a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25382
content:
"Options outlined in this chapter suggest a combination of policies \r\nto reduce demand, increase investments by private actors and \r\ngovernments, and develop the technology readiness level of \r\nalternative fuels and related infrastructure (especially synthetic \r\nfuels). Some literature suggests that battery electric-powered short\u0002distance sea shipping could yield emissions reductions given access \r\nto low-carbon electricity. For deep sea shipping, advanced biofuels, \r\nhydrogen, ammonia, and synthetic fuels hold potential for significant \r\nemissions reductions, depending on GHG characteristics of the fuel \r\nchain and resource base. Other options, such as optimisation of \r\nspeed and hull design and wind-assisted ships, could also combine \r\nto make significant contributions by 2050 to further bring emissions \r\ndown. In total a suite of mitigation options exists or is on the horizon \r\nfor the maritime sector."


id: 66e18ba4d65f032da7084323fc160f5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"This section reviews the results of three types of models that \r\nsystemically combine options to assess different approaches to \r\ngenerating decarbonisation pathways for the transport system: \r\n(i) integrated assessment models (IAM); (ii) global transport energy \r\nmodels (GTEM); and (iii) national transport-energy models (NTEM) \r\n(Edelenbosch et  al. 2017; Yeh et  al. 2017). Common assumptions \r\nacross the three model types include trajectories of socioeconomic "


id: f902acb6d57c34df65ae189af72a5f80
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 36689
content:
"Combinations of measures are likely to be needed for transformative \r\ntransitioning of the shipping sector to a low-carbon future, particularly \r\nif an expected increase in demand for shipping services is realised \r\n(Smith et al. 2014; Faber et al. 2020). Both GHG and SLCF emissions \r\ndecrease significantly in SSP1-1.9, where mitigation is achieved in "


id: 6022079564ba3f6e464f65729028cc2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"development, technological development, resource availability, \r\npolicy, and behavioural change. The key differences underlying these \r\nmodels are their depth of technological and behavioural detail versus \r\nscope in terms of sectoral and regional coverage. In very general \r\nterms, the narrower the scope in terms of sectors and regions, the \r\nmore depth on spatial, technological, and behavioural detail. A large \r\nset of scenarios from these models were collected in a joint effort led \r\nby Chapter 3 and supported by Chapter 10 and others. The outcomes \r\nfrom over 100 models have been analysed for this chapter with the \r\nmethodologies set out in Annex III for the whole report."


id: d6529fcf0e0f58491e6a752a339181b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 31236
content:
"A large share of the scenarios was developed prior to 2020. Results \r\nfrom such scenarios are indexed to a  modelled (non-COVID) year \r\n2020, referred to as 2020Mod."


id: cfb4e8217fe39a88f1823b4db5f04be8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30213
content:
"GHG emissions from transport are a  function of travel demand, \r\ntravel mode, transport technology, GHG intensity of fuels, and energy \r\nefficiency. These drivers can be organised around a group of levers \r\nthat can advance the decarbonisation of the transport system. The \r\nlevers thus include reducing travel activity, increasing use of lower\u0002carbon modes, and reducing modal energy intensity and fuel carbon \r\ncontent. This section explores each lever's contributions to the \r\ndecarbonisation of the transport sector by reviewing the results from \r\nthe three model types IAM, GTEM, and NTEM."


id: 30a12413935f0dc658a15b6a9ff59856
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 5072
content:
"This section applies the following categorisation of scenarios (see \r\nTable 3.1 for more details):"


id: 70b5f9cb791b1395515d4dc7e2e617aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 15354
content:
"Figure 10.17 | Direct CO2 emissions from transport in 2030, 2050, and 2100 indexed to 2020 modelled year across R6 Regions and World. IAM results are \r\ngrouped by temperature targets. Sectoral studies are grouped by reference and policy categories. Plots show 5-95th percentile, 25-75th percentile, and median. Numbers above \r\nthe bars indicate the number of scenarios. Data from the AR6 scenario database."


id: 8216954e0c32781171d06fe433e9bf1c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 17986
content:
"Several GTEMs not included in AR6 scenario database have examined \r\nambitious CO2 mitigation scenarios. For example, a meta-analysis of \r\nscenarios suggests that global transport emissions consistent with\r\nwarming levels of 2degC, would peak in 2020 at around 7-8 GtCO2\r\nand decrease to 2.5-9.2 Gt for 2degC, with an average of 5.4 Gt by \r\n2050 (Gota et  al. 2019). For comparison, the IEA's Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Scenario suggests global transport emissions decrease \r\nto 3.3 Gt (or 55% reduction from 2020 level) by 2050 (IEA 2021f). \r\nThe latest IEA Net Zero by 2050 report proposes transport emissions \r\nto be close to zero by 2050 (IEA 2021e). The latter is lower than \r\nthe interquartile ranges of the C1 group of scenarios from the AR6 \r\ndatabase analysed here."


id: ccfa3d4490e5898117375d838d4d56ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29796
content:
"Growth in passenger and freight travel demand is strongly dependent \r\non population growth and GDP. In 2015, transport activities were \r\nestimated at around 35-50 trillion pkm, or 5,000-7,000 pkm \r\nper  person per  year, with significant variations among studies \r\n(IEA 2017b; ITF 2019). The number of passenger cars in use has \r\ngrown 45% globally between 2005-2015, with the most significant \r\ngrowth occurring in the developing countries of Asia and the Middle \r\nEast (119%), Africa (79%), and South and Central America (80%), \r\nwhile growth in Europe and North America is the slowest (21% and \r\n4% respectively) (IOMVM 2021). On the other hand, car ownership "


id: 99c785da4cb8c19cd019230434ef567b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 21718
content:
"Low-carbon scenarios are also available from national models (Latin \r\nAmerica, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Indonesia, India, \r\nItaly, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, UK, US) with a good representation \r\nof the transport sector. The low-carbon scenarios are either defined \r\nwith respect to a global climate stabilisation level of, for example, \r\n2degC/1.5degC Scenario (Dhar et al. 2018), or a CO2 target that is more \r\nstringent than what has been considered in the NDCs, such as the \r\nnet-zero emissions pathways (Bataille et al. 2020; IEA 2021e). These "


id: f146d41d7e14ef087caccf1d2936b1b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"limit or return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during the 21st  century \r\n(C1-C2) and below 2.5degC scenarios (C3-C4), respectively, compared \r\nto scenarios with warming levels of above 4degC (C8)."


id: 4fc5324d12295d9949ff4757fa2f9efa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"levels in terms of vehicles per  1000 people in 2015 were low in \r\ndeveloping countries of Asia and the Middle East (141), Africa (42), \r\nSouth and Central America (176), while in Europe and North America \r\nthey are relatively high (581 and 670 respectively) (IOMVM 2021). \r\nThe growth rate in commercial vehicles (freight and passenger) was \r\n41% between 2005 and 2015, with a somewhat more even growth \r\nacross developed and developing countries (IOMVM 2021)."


id: c36eb8fd01040c7d569daa15cab3a58b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Many models find small differences in passenger transport demand \r\nacross temperature goals because IAM models rely on historical \r\nrelationships between population, GDP, and demand for services to \r\nestimate future demand. This assumption poses a limitation to the \r\nmodelling efforts, as mitigation efforts would likely increase travel \r\ncosts that could result in lower transport demand (Zhang et  al. \r\n2018). In most models, demand is typically an exogenous input. \r\nThese models often assume mode shifts of activities from the most \r\ncarbon-intensive modes (driving and flying for passenger travel and \r\ntrucking for freight) to less carbon-intensive modes (public transit \r\nand passenger rail, and freight rail) to reduce emissions."


id: cef318c1acb2c841a4e266f99fddce83
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 30093
content:
"Traditionally there is a disconnection between IAM models and bottom\u0002up sectoral or city-based models due to the different scale (both spatial \r\nand temporal) and focus (climate mitigation vs urban pollution, safety \r\n(Creutzig 2016)). The proliferation of shared and on-demand mobility \r\nsolutions is leading to rebound effects for travel demand (Chen and \r\nKockelman 2016; Coulombel et al. 2019) and this is a new challenge \r\nfor modelling. Some IAM studies have recently begun to explore \r\ndemand-side solutions for reducing transport demand to achieve \r\nvery low-carbon scenarios through a combination of culture and low\u0002carbon lifestyle (Creutzig et al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2018); urban \r\ndevelopment (Creutzig et  al. 2015a); increased vehicle occupancy \r\n(Grubler et al. 2018); improved logistics and streamlined supply chains \r\nfor the freight sector (Mulholland et  al. 2018); and disruptive low-"


id: d7ffc2e4348064d5d1cc633bc51d3bae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 31511
content:
"carbon innovation, described as technological and  business model \r\ninnovations offering 'novel value propositions to consumers and which \r\ncan reduce GHG emissions if adopted at scale' (Wilson et al. 2019). In \r\nthe literature from national models, demand has been differentiated \r\nbetween conventional and sustainable development scenarios \r\nthrough narratives built around policies, projects, and programmes \r\nenvisaged at the national level (Dhar and Shukla 2015; Shukla et al. \r\n2015) and price elasticities of travel demand (Dhar et  al. 2018). \r\nHowever, a  greater understanding of  the mechanisms underlying \r\nenergy-relevant decisions and behaviours (Brosch et al. 2016), and the \r\nmotivations for sustainable behaviour (Steg et al. 2015), are critically \r\nneeded to realise these solutions."


id: a3539b7d8cc9b91af37a9bf12f66fbc9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 23259
content:
"Overall, passenger and freight activity are likely to continue to \r\ngrow rapidly under the C7 (>3.0degC) scenarios, but most growth \r\nwould occur in developing countries. Most models treat travel \r\ndemand exogenously following the growth of population and \r\nGDP, but they have limited representation of responses to price \r\nchanges, policy incentives, behavioural shifts, nor innovative mobility \r\nsolutions that can be expected to occur in more stringent mitigation \r\nscenarios. Chapter  5 provides a  more detailed discussion of the \r\nopportunities for demand changes that may result from social and \r\nbehavioural interventions."


id: ee8b3b0bc8847499a1fa5a9ddf1a4d90
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 34999
content:
"Figure  10.19 shows activity trajectories for freight and passenger \r\ntransport through 2100 relative to a  modelled year 2020 across \r\ndifferent modes, based on the AR6 database for IAMs and global \r\ntransport models. Globally, climate scenarios from IAMs, and policy \r\nand reference scenarios from global transport models, indicate \r\nincreasing demand for freight and passenger transport via most modes \r\nthrough 2100 (Yeh et al. 2017; Mulholland et al. 2018; Zhang et al. \r\n2018; Khalili et al. 2019). Road passenger transport exhibits a similar \r\nincrease (roughly tripling) through 2100 across scenarios. For "


id: 60ad25f93825d26aae452a8486cd1374
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 12783
content:
"As noted in Section  10.2, commonly explored mitigation options \r\nrelated to mode change include a  shift to public transit, shared \r\nmobility, and demand reductions through various means, including \r\nimproved urban form, teleconferences that replace passenger "


id: 4d33f26a7c4d77a8aea345cc541e936
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9578
content:
"Figure 10.19 | Transport activity trajectories for passenger and freight across different modes. Global passenger (billion pkm per year) and freight (billion tkm \r\nper year) demand projections relative to a modelled year 2020 index. Results for IAM are for selected stabilisation temperatures by 2100. Also included are global transport \r\nmodels Reference and Policy scenarios. Data from the AR6 scenario database. Trajectories span the 5th to 95th percentiles across models, with a solid line indicating the median \r\nvalue across models."


id: a44c623ef1f1deef8c912311a4d0e5a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23407
content:
"Increasing the occupancy rate of passenger transport (Grubler et al. \r\n2018) and reducing empty miles or increasing payload in freight \r\ndeliveries (Gucwa and Schafer 2013; McKinnon 2018) via improved \r\nlogistics efficiency or streamlined supply chains (Mulholland et  al. \r\n2018), can present significant opportunities to effectively improve \r\nenergy efficiency and decrease GHG emissions in transport. However, \r\nthe recent trends of consumer behaviours have shown a  declining \r\noccupancy rate of light-duty vehicles in industrialised countries \r\n(Schafer and Yeh 2020), and the accelerating growing preference for \r\nSUVs challenges emissions reductions in the passenger car market (IEA \r\n2019d). These trends motivate a strong focus on demand-side options."


id: 6783b287557e3082a83a8a3002925abd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Based on the scenario literature, a 51% reduction in median energy \r\nintensity of passenger transport and a  corresponding 38-50% \r\nreduction in median carbon intensity by 2050 would be aligned \r\nwith transition trajectories yielding warming levels below 1.5degC by \r\nthe end of the century. For comparison, the LCA literature suggests \r\na switch from current ICEs to current BEVs would yield a reduction \r\nin energy intensity well beyond 45% and up to 70%, for a  mid\u0002sized vehicle (Section  10.4). Correspondingly, a  switch from diesel \r\nor gasoline to low-carbon electricity or low-carbon hydrogen would \r\nyield carbon intensity reduction beyond the median scenario value. \r\nThus, the LCA literature suggests technologies exist today that would \r\nalready match and exceed the median energy and carbon intensities \r\nvalues that might be needed by 2050 for low warming levels."


id: a93fd95cd64128335226dd9aa2e1a7c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 24156
content:
"aviation, rail, and shipping - and both passenger and freight transport. \r\nSince the technologies have different conversion efficiencies, these \r\nshares of final energy by fuel are necessarily different from the shares \r\nby service (passenger-km or tonne-km) by fuel and shares of vehicle \r\nstock by fuel. For example, a current battery electric LDV powertrain \r\nis roughly three times more energy-efficient than a comparable ICE \r\npowertrain (Section  10.3, Table  10.9 in Appendix 10.1); thus, fuel "


id: a124367cd8e4bd4fce47b57c1dc84f7b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"Two mechanisms for reducing carbon emissions from the transport \r\nsector are fuel switching for current vehicle technologies and \r\ntransitioning to low-carbon vehicle technologies. Figure  10.21 \r\ncombines data from IAMs and GTEMs on shares of transport final \r\nenergy by fuel. These shares account for fuel uses across modes - road, "


id: 4234fd4c1808a87164ceea93ae816f7c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7814
content:
"shares of 0.25 for electricity and 0.75 for oil could correspond to \r\nvehicle stock shares of 0.5 and 0.5, respectively. In general, while \r\nmodels may project that EVs constitute a greater share of road vehicle \r\nstock, and provide a greater share of road passenger-kilometres, their \r\nshare of transport final energy (Figure 10.21) can still remain lower \r\nthan the final energy share of fuels used in less-efficient (e.g., ICE) \r\nvehicles. Thus, the shares of transport final energy by fuel presented \r\nin Figure 10.21 should be interpreted with care."


id: a470a5aea744c8523465005a8c7ab1f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23431
content:
"While few IAMs report final energy shares by transport mode or \r\npassenger/freight, several relevant studies provide insights into \r\nfuel share trends in passenger LDVs and freight vehicles. The IEA \r\nsuggests that full LDV electrification would be the most promising \r\nlow-carbon pathway to meet a  1.75degC goal (IEA 2017b). The MIT \r\nEconomic Projection and Policy Analysis model focuses on the \r\nfuture deployment of gasoline versus EV technologies in the global \r\nLDV stock (Ghandi and Paltsev 2019). These authors estimate that \r\nthe global stock of vehicles could increase from 1.1 billion vehicles \r\nin 2015 up to 1.8 billion by 2050, with a growth in EVs from about \r\n1 million vehicles in 2015 up to 500 million in 2050. These changes are \r\ndriven primarily by cost projections (mostly battery cost reductions). \r\nSimilarly, the International Council on Clean Transport (ICCT) indicates \r\nthat EV technology adoption in the light-duty sector can lead to "


id: d0b83761a2c983abfad8426667628cf0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30369
content:
"Section 10.7 presents the full set of scenarios in the AR6 database and highlights the broader trends of how the transport sector may \r\ntransform in order to be compliant with different warming levels. This box elaborates on three illustrative mitigation pathways (IMPs) \r\nto exemplify a few different ways the sector may transform. Seven illustrative pathways are introduced in Section 3.2.5. In this box we \r\nfocus on three of the IMPs: (i) focus on deep renewable energy penetration and electrification (IMP-Ren), (ii) low demand (IMP-LD), \r\nand (iii) pathways that align with both Sustainable Development Goals and climate policies (IMP-SP). In particular, the variants of \r\nthese three scenarios limit warming to 1.5degC with no or limited overshoot (C1)."


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 911
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"All of the three selected pathways reach global net zero CO2 emissions across all sectors between 2060 and 2070, but not all reach \r\nnet zero GHG emissions (Figure 3.4). Panel (a) in Box 10.4, Figure 1 below shows the CO2 trajectories for the transport sector for the \r\nselected IMPs. Please note that the year 2020 is modelled in these scenarios, therefore, the scenarios do not reflect the effects of"


id: 558b0c808fdc6c7ab7b798871684e791
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 10936
content:
"the interquartile ranges) reductions in CO2 emissions from transport \r\n(below modelled 2020 levels) by 2050 would be compatible with \r\nwarming levels of 1.5degC (C1-C2 group). While the global scenarios \r\nsuggest emissions reductions in energy supply sectors at large precede \r\nthose in the demand sectors (Section 3.4.1), a subset of the scenarios \r\nalso demonstrate that more stringent emission reductions in the \r\ntransport sector are feasible. For example, the illustrative mitigation \r\npathways IMP-REN and IMP-LD suggest emissions reductions of 80% "


id: 6f0f9a19995e5a2cc325f127c74052af
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15098
content:
"This section provides an updated, detailed assessment of future \r\ntransport scenarios from IAM, GTEMs, and NTEMs given a wide range \r\nof assumptions and under a  set of policy targets and conditions. \r\nThe scenario modelling tools are necessary to aggregate individual \r\noptions and understand how they fit into mitigation pathways from \r\na systems perspective. The scenarios suggest that 43% (30-63% for "


id: 958e854908b99c05d7a392648537ebd3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21034
content:
"and 90% respectively are feasible by 2050 en route to warming levels \r\nof 1.5degC with low or no overshoot by the end of the century."


id: 7fff54f0ffb577a0a9eebf9c9fdb6b4c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content:
"transport mitigation options, as well as a  description of emerging \r\nissues. The section ends by outlining an integrated framework for \r\nenabling the transformative changes that are emerging and required \r\nto meet the potential transformative scenarios from Section 10.7."


id: 1000053f1347e66666774cd2298d3fbd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 0
content:
"The scenarios from the different models project continued growth in \r\ndemand for freight and passenger services, particularly in developing \r\ncountries. The potential for demand reductions is evident, but \r\nthe specifics of demand-reduction measures remain less explored by the \r\nscenario literature. This limitation notwithstanding, the IAM and GTEMs \r\nsuggest that interventions that reduce the energy and fuel carbon \r\nintensity of transport are likely crucial to successful mitigation strategies."


id: 16dcde61e1ed6cfa9a5d088afaab7030
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 1120
content:
"Demand and behaviour. While technology options receive \r\nsubstantial attention in this chapter, there are many social and \r\nequity issues that cannot be neglected in any transformative \r\nchange to mitigate climate change. Transport systems are socio\u0002economic systems that include systemic factors that are developing \r\ninto potentially transformative drivers of emissions from the sector. \r\nThese systemic drivers include, for example, changes in urban \r\nform that minimise automobile dependence and reduce stranded \r\nassets; behaviour change programmes that emphasise shared \r\nvalues and economies; smart technologies that enable better and \r\nmore equitable options for transit and active transport as well as \r\nintegrated approaches to using autonomous vehicles; new ways of "


id: 655d0bbdcd698afbcc9beff383c8e1ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13524
content:
"positive developments to enable EV technologies for buses, light- and \r\nmedium-duty trucks, and some rail applications (though advanced \r\nbiofuels and hydrogen may also contribute to the decarbonisation \r\nof these vehicles in some contexts). In developing countries, where \r\nmicromobility and public transit account for a large share of travel, \r\nEVs are ideal to support mitigation of emissions. Finally, demand \r\nfor critical materials needed for batteries has become a  focus of \r\nattention, as described in Box 10.6."


id: 1637b9e3235af94fe7266f4d76a8dc9c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 1023
content:
"enabling electric charging systems to fit into electricity grids, creating \r\nsynergistic benefits to grids, improving the value of electric transit, \r\nand reducing range anxiety for EV users; and new concepts for the \r\nfuture economy such as circular economy, dematerialisation, and \r\nshared economy that have the potential to affect the structure of \r\nthe transport sector. The efficacy of demand reduction and efficiency \r\nopportunities depends on the degree of prioritisation and focus by \r\ngovernment policy. Figure  10.22 suggests that innovative demand \r\nand efficiency strategies are at the regime scales. While these \r\nstrategies are moving beyond R&D, they are not mainstreamed yet \r\nand have been shown to work much more effectively if combined \r\nwith technology changes, as has been outlined in the transformative \r\nscenarios from Section 10.7 and in Chapter 5."


id: e7ab50df85c8a95005cab82f6df648aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33948
content:
"Electromobility options are moving from regime to landscape levels. \r\nThis transition is evident in the trend of incumbent automobile \r\nmanufacturers producing an increasing range of EVs in response to \r\ndemand, policy, and regulatory signals. EVs for light-duty passenger \r\ntravel are largely commercial and likely to become competitive with \r\nICE vehicles in the early 2020s (Dia 2019; Bond et al. 2020; Koasidis \r\net al. 2020). As these adopted technologies increase throughout cities \r\nand regions, governments and energy suppliers will have to deploy \r\nnew infrastructure to support them, including reliable low-carbon \r\ngrids and charging stations (Sierzchula et  al. 2014). In addition, \r\nregulatory reviews will be necessary to ensure equitable transition "


id: 9082a1328c43a8a734b8f0b26e3339fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20272
content:
"Electromobility in land-based transport. Since AR5, there has been \r\na significant breakthrough in the opportunities to reduce transport \r\nGHG emissions in an economically efficient way due to electrification \r\nof land-based vehicle systems, which are now commercially available. \r\nEV technologies are particularly well established for light-duty \r\npassenger vehicles, including micromobility. Furthermore, there are "


id: b8d23a25a710c5298c53cb92dc00f16b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26603
content:
"hydrogen. Biofuels are also of interest for these segments. To move \r\nout of the niche level, there is a need to set deployment targets to \r\nsupport breakthroughs in these fuels. Similarly, there is a need for \r\nregulatory changes to remove barriers in new procurement systems \r\nthat accommodate uncertainty and risks inherent in the early adoption \r\nof new technologies and infrastructure (Boren 2019; Sclar et  al. \r\n2019; Marinaro et  al. 2020). R&D programmes and demonstration \r\ntrials are the best focus for achieving fuels for such systems. Finally, \r\nthere is a need for regulatory changes. Such regulatory changes need \r\nto be coordinated through ICAO and IMO as well as with national \r\nimplementation tools related to the Paris Agreement (see Box 10.5). \r\nLong-term visions, including creative exercises for cities and regions, \r\nwill be required, providing a  protected space for the purpose of \r\ntrialling new technologies (Boren 2019; Geels 2019)."


id: 6448063c2692d5bedda59f737b579889
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13348
content:
"and achievement of SDGs, addressing the multitude of possible \r\nbarriers that may be present due to the incumbency of traditional \r\nautomotive manufacturers and associated supporting elements of \r\nthe socio-technical system (Newman 2020b) (Chapter 6). Similarly, \r\nnew partnerships between government, industry, and communities \r\nwill be needed to support the transition to electromobility. These \r\npartnerships could be particularly effective at supporting engagement \r\nand education programmes (Newman 2020b) (Chapter 8)."


id: 1cc3e62c9e309ac7bddcea84cb381349
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1977
content:
"Fuels for aviation and shipping. Despite technology improvements \r\nfor land-based transport, equivalent technologies for long distance \r\naviation and shipping remain elusive. Alternative fuels for use in \r\nlong-range aviation and shipping are restricted to the niche level. \r\nThe aviation sector is increasingly looking towards synthetic fuels \r\nusing low-carbon combined with CO2 from direct air capture, while \r\nshipping is moving towards ammonia produced using low-carbon "


id: e35730e8276534723b31980ec73d2e6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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content_type: text
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vector_id: 33255
content:
"Blue bars indicate \r\narriers and enabl\r\nthe option. The s\r\ngion), time (e.g.,\r\nEconomic \r\nCosts in 2030 and long term\r\nEffects on employment and \r\neconomic growth\r\nB E B \r\ngth of enablers and \r\n50 "


id: b46390e5e5373aed52667477b1790d27
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 25899
content:
"is likely crucial for the decarbonisation of shipping and aviation, \r\ncould also serve as storage for electricity produced during low\u0002demand periods. Integrated planning of transport and power \r\ninfrastructure would be particularly useful in developing countries \r\nwhere 'greenfield' development doesn't suffer from constraints \r\nimposed by legacy systems."


id: a4092da808d2df40bfa3769df29da338
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 23364
content:
"Planning for integration with the power sector: Decarbonising \r\nthe transport sector will require significant growth in low-carbon \r\nelectricity to power EVs, and more so for producing energy\u0002intensive fuels, such as hydrogen, ammonia and synthetic fuels. \r\nHigher electricity demand will necessitate greater expansion \r\nof the power sector and increase land use. The strategic use \r\nof energy-intensive fuels, focused on harder-to-decarbonise \r\ntransport segments, can minimise the increase in electricity \r\ndemand. Additionally, integrated planning of transport and power \r\ninfrastructure could enable sectoral synergies and reduce the \r\nenvironmental, social, and economic impacts of decarbonising \r\ntransport and energy. For example, smart charging of EVs could \r\nsupport more efficient grid operations. Hydrogen production, which "


id: 55ab9489925393535560950360a80dc4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10961
content:
"Shipping and aviation governance: Strategies to deliver \r\nfuels in sufficient quantity for aviation and shipping to achieve \r\ntransformative targets are growing in intensity and often feature the \r\nneed to review international and national governance. Some authors \r\nin the literature have argued that the governance of the international \r\ntransport systems could be included in the Paris Agreement process \r\n(Gencsu and Hino 2015; Lee 2018; Traut et al. 2018). Box 10.6 sets \r\nout these issues."


id: 635b71b21640bad7ec5c260c51dbb02
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 13206
content:
"Whenever borders are crossed, the aviation and shipping sector creates international emissions that are not assigned to states' \r\nNationally Declared Contributions under the Paris Agreement. Emissions from these segments are rapidly growing (apart from \r\nCOVID-19 affecting aviation) and are projected to grow between 60% to 220% by 2050 (IPCC 2018; UNEP 2020). Currently, the \r\nInternational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Marine Organization (IMO), specialised UN Agencies, are \r\nresponsible for accounting and suggesting options for managing these emissions."


id: b5a39db9e931cd4d4dc18d51b0f0f486
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:40
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vector_id: 26108
content:
"ICAO has two global aspirational goals for the international aviation sector: 2% annual fuel efficiency improvement through 2050; \r\nand carbon neutral growth from 2020 onwards. To achieve these goals, ICAO has established CORSIA  - Carbon Offsetting and \r\nReduction Scheme for International Aviation, a market-based programme."


id: 9746df7a19ffc1fdc274b04db87c883a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21322
content:
"In 2018, IMO adopted an Initial Strategy on the reduction of GHG emissions from ships. This strategy calls for a reduction of the carbon \r\nintensity of new ships through implementation of further phases of the energy efficiency design index (EEDI). The IMO calls for a 40% \r\nreduction of the carbon intensity of international shipping by 2030, and is striving for a 70% reduction by 2050. Such reductions in \r\ncarbon intensity would result in an overall decline in emissions of 50% in 2050 (relative to 2008)."


id: d23768c73aea5cd19abfafdf83f32066
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 30601
content:
"These goals are likely insufficiently transformative for the decarbonisation of aviation or shipping, though they are moving towards \r\na start of decarbonisation at a period in history where the options are still not clear, as set out in Sections 10.5 and 10.6."


id: c48e154a3725d58dc744d9ac21086787
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 28500
content:
"The ICAO is not a regulatory agency, but rather produces standards and recommended practices that are adopted in national and \r\ninternational legislation. IMO does publish 'regulations' but does not have powers of enforcement. Non-compliance can be regulated \r\nby nation states if they so desire, as a ship's MARPOL certificate, issued by the flag state of the ship, means there is some responsibility \r\nfor states with global shipping fleets."


id: f10fc99c4994f83cce8f4b9c04858874
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 35424
content:
"Some authors in the literature have argued that emissions from international aviation and shipping should be part of the Paris \r\nAgreement (Gencsu and Hino 2015; Lee 2018; Traut et al. 2018; Rayner 2021), arguing that the shipping and aviation industries \r\nwould prefer emissions to be treated under an international regime rather than a national-oriented regime. If international aviation \r\nand shipping emissions were a part of the Paris Agreement, it may remove something of the present ambiguity about responsibilities. \r\nHowever, inclusion in the Paris Agreement is unlikely to fundamentally change emissions trends unless targets and enforcement \r\nmechanisms are developed, by ICAO and IMO or by nation states through global processes."


id: c254d7c0be5903f0e2205497a3a3bb24
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28161
content:
"If international regulations are not made, then the transformation of aviation and shipping will be left to individual nations. In 2020, \r\nSwitzerland approved a new CO2 tax on flights (The Swiss Parliament 2020), with part of its revenues earmarked for the development \r\nof synthetic aviation fuels, to cover up to 80% of their additional costs compared to fossil jet fuel (Energieradar 2020). Appropriate \r\nfinancing frameworks will be a key to the large-scale market adoption of these fuels. Egli et al. (2019) suggest that the successful \r\ndesign of investment policies for solar and wind power over the past 20 years could serve as a model for future synthetic aviation \r\nfuels production projects 'attracting a broad spectrum of investors in order to create competition that drives down financing cost', and \r\nwith state investment banks building 'investor confidence in new technologies.' These national investment policies would provide the \r\nkey enablers for successful deployments."


id: 8d0850e54b7f84a0cc5f7a088eed7f2f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"Managing critical minerals: Critical minerals are required to \r\nmanufacture lithium-ion batteries (LIB) and other renewable power \r\ntechnologies. There has been growing awareness that critical minerals \r\nmay face challenges related to resource availability, labour rights, and \r\ncosts. Box 10.6 sets out the issues, showing how emerging national \r\nstrategies on critical minerals, along with requirements from major \r\nvehicle manufacturers, are addressing the need for rapid development "


id: 837d7dcb618f87df00851b10776b4f1e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18220
content:
"of new mines with a  more balanced geography, less use of cobalt \r\nthrough continuing LIB innovations, and a focus on recycling batteries. \r\nThe standardisation of battery modules and packaging within \r\nand across vehicle platforms, as well as increased focus on design \r\nfor recyclability, are important. Given the high degree of potential \r\nrecyclability of LIBs, a near closed-loop system in the future would be \r\na feasible opportunity to minimise critical mineral issues."


id: 7a6b9bc2c99784563f36ce3c36d86594
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 16834
content:
"The critical materials identified by most nations are: REEs neodymium and dysprosium for permanent magnets in wind turbines and \r\nelectric motors; lithium and cobalt, primarily for batteries though many other metals are involved; and, cadmium, tellurium, selenium, \r\ngallium and indium for solar PV manufacture (Valero et al. 2018; Giurco et al. 2019). Predictions are that the transition to a clean \r\nenergy world will be significantly energy intensive (World Bank Group 2017; Sovacool et al. 2020), putting pressure on the supply \r\nchain for many of the metals and materials required."


id: ec1861b266811e049a62d8985b2bc480
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34641
content:
"Governance of the sustainability of mining and processing of many of these materials, in areas generally known for their variable \r\nenvironmental stewardship, remains inadequate and often a source for conflict. Sovacool et al. (2020) propose four holistic recommendations \r\nfor improvement to make these industries more efficient and resilient: diversification of mining enterprises for local ownership and \r\nlivelihood benefit; improved traceability of material sources and transparency of mining enterprises; exploration of alternative resources; \r\nand the incorporation of minerals into climate and energy planning by connecting to the NDCs under the Paris Agreement."


id: 8ae28b6bfa2f212e16778de11398f461
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19388
content:
"Valero et al. (2018) highlight that the demand for many of the REEs and other critical minerals will, at the current rate of renewable energy \r\ninfrastructure growth, increase by 3000 times or more by 2050. Some believe this growth may reach constraints in supply (Giurco et al. \r\n2019). Others suggest that the minerals involved are not likely to physically run out (Sovacool et al. 2020) if well managed, especially \r\nas markets are found in other parts of the world (for example the transition away from lithium from brine lakes to hard rock sources). \r\nLithium hydroxide, more suitable for batteries, now competes well, in terms of cost, when extracted from rock sources (Azevedo et al. \r\n2018) due to the ability to more easily create high quality lithium hydroxide from rock sources, even though brines provide a cheaper"


id: fdcfcd7cb1a4909260a1613345f4129b
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 37451
content:
"source of lithium (Kavanagh et al. 2018). Australia has proven resources of all the Li-ion battery minerals and has a strategy for their \r\nethical and transparent production (Commonwealth of Australia 2019). Changes in the technology have also been used to reduce need \r\nfor certain critical minerals (Manberger and Stenqvist 2018). Recycling of all the minerals is not yet well developed but is likely to be \r\nincreasingly important (Habib and Wenzel 2014; World Bank Group 2017; Giurco et al. 2019; Golroudbary et al. 2019)."


id: 42b01b3531875fa6220c2f981b26b174
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7884
content:
"A number of critical materials strategies have now been developed by nations developing the manufacturing base of new power \r\nand transport technologies. Some of these strategies pay particular attention to the supply of lithium (Martin et al. 2017; Hache et al. \r\n2019). For example, Horizon 2020, a substantial EU Research and Innovation programme, couples research and innovation in science, \r\nindustry, and society to foster a circular economy in Europe, thus reducing bottlenecks in the EU nations. Similarly CREEN (Canada \r\nRare Earth Elements Network) is supporting the US-EU-Japan resource partnership with Australia (Klossek et al. 2016)."


id: 641866f22f38b44a6fbde0bdf974f3cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13314
content:
"As renewables and electromobility-based development leapfrog into the developing world it will be important to ensure the critical \r\nminerals issues are managed for local security of supply as well as participation in the mining and processing of such minerals to \r\nenable countries to develop their own employment around renewables and electromobility (Sovacool et al. 2020)."


id: d5a2a6389fe8e5c75acb29cb2bacd567
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31130
content:
"a  broad set of ideas about technologies, urban and infrastructure \r\nplanning (including transport, electricity, and telecommunications \r\ninfrastructure), and human behaviour and at the same time can \r\ncreate opportunities to achieve the SDGs."


id: 6e3a7f32c92b9f82523b4feef915779d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14961
content:
"Enabling creative foresight: Human culture has always had \r\na  creative instinct that enables the future to be better dealt with \r\nthrough imagination (Montgomery 2017). Science and engineering \r\nhave often been preceded by artistic expressions; for example Jules \r\nVerne first dreamed of the hydrogen future in 1874 in his novel \r\nThe Mysterious Island. Autonomous vehicles have regularly occupied \r\nthe minds of science fiction authors and filmmakers (Braun 2019). \r\nSuch narratives, scenario building, and foresighting are increasingly \r\nseen as a part of the climate change mitigation process (Lennon et al. \r\n2015; Muiderman et al. 2020) and can 'liberate oppressed imaginaries' \r\n(Luque-Ayala 2018). Barber (2021) emphasised the important role of \r\npositive images about the future instead of dystopian visions and the \r\nimpossibility of business-as-usual futures."


id: 55e6991f31f608a397eb515ce030fe2e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 10997
content:
"Transport visions can be a part of this cultural change as well as the \r\nmore frequently presented visions of renewable energy (Wentland \r\n2016; Breyer et  al. 2017). There are some emerging technologies, \r\nlike Maglev, Hyperloop, and drones that are likely to continue the \r\nelectrification of transport even further (Daim 2021) and which are \r\nonly recently at the imagination stage. Decarbonised visions for \r\nheavy vehicle systems appear to be a core need from the assessment \r\nof technologies in this chapter. Such visioning or foresighting requires \r\ndeliberative processes and the literature contains a growing list of \r\ntransport success stories based on such processes (Weymouth and \r\nHartz-Karp 2015). Ultimately, reducing GHG emissions from the \r\ntransport sector would benefit from creative visions that integrate "


id: fbfbd5a0e736f8cede38893ace76c7eb
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vector_id: 37138
content:
"climate action in some cases (Lamb et  al. 2020) but such pledges \r\ncan be calculated at a personal level and applied through every level \r\nof activity from individual, household, neighbourhood, business, \r\ncity, nation or groups of nations (Meyer and Newman 2020) and \r\nare increasingly being demonstrated through shared communities \r\nand local activism (Bloomberg and Pope 2017; Sharp 2018; Figueres \r\nand  Rivett-Carnac 2020). Finally, the world's major financing \r\ninstitutions are also engaging in decarbonisation efforts by requiring \r\ntheir recipients to commit to Net Zero Strategies before they can \r\nreceive their funding (Robins 2018; Newman 2020a) (Chapter  15, \r\nCross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1). As a result, transparent methods \r\nare emerging for calculating what these financing requirements \r\nmean for transport by companies, cities, regions, and infrastructure "


id: e3a418bf760fa56c83e8de1cfcbcf374
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
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vector_id: 33296
content:
"projects (Chapters 8 and 15). The continued engagement of financial \r\ninstitutions may, like in other sectors, become a  major factor in \r\nenabling transformative futures for transport as long as governance \r\nand communities continue to express the need for such change."


id: e20989d6331e9adbd2f231727e51463a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33060
content:
"Using the right tools and strategies is crucial for the successful \r\ndeployment of mitigation options. Table 10.7 summarises the tools and \r\nstrategies required to enable electromobility, new fuels for aviation \r\nand shipping, and the more social aspects of demand efficiency."


id: b44767d097c76c67cccf17989203c342
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25875
content:
"Electromobility is the biggest change in transport since AR5. When powered with low-carbon electricity, electric vehicles (EVs) \r\nprovide a  mechanism for major GHG emissions reductions from the largest sources in the transport sectors, including cars, \r\nmotorbikes, autorickshaws, buses and trucks. The mitigation potential of EVs depends on the decarbonisation of the power system. \r\nEVs can be charged by home or business renewable power before or in parallel to the transition to grid-based low-carbon power."


id: fe15545a6c6cb09f0defc655f6a20353
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
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vector_id: 37502
content:
"Electromobility is happening rapidly in micromobility (e-autorickshaws, e-scooters, e-bikes) and in transit systems, especially buses. \r\nEV adoption is also accelerating for personal cars. EVs can be used in grid stabilisation through smart charging applications."


id: 90615c397ce4f8cb13c89a2329bf26cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20248
content:
"The state-of-the-art lithium-lon batteries (LIBs) available in 2020 are superior to alternative cell technologies in terms of battery life, \r\nenergy density, specific energy, and cost. The expected further improvements in LIBs suggest these chemistries will remain superior \r\nto alternative battery technologies in the medium term, and therefore LIBs will continue to dominate the electric vehicle market."


id: 40e247c16bfe76f4957c2ae26222fd9b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7595
content:
"Dependence on LIB metals will remain, which may be a concern from the perspective of resource availability and costs. However, \r\nthe demand for such metals is much lower than the reserves available, with many new mines starting up in response to the new \r\nmarket, particularly in a diversity of places."


id: 73478d9ef6883a7d2b70cc1df7e2f802
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15754
content:
"Recycling batteries will significantly reduce long-term resource requirements. The standardisation of battery modules and packaging \r\nwithin and across vehicle platforms, as well as increased focus on design for recyclability, are important. Many mobility manufacturers \r\nand governments are considering battery recycling issues to ensure the process is mainstreamed."


id: 608211b8bf918c45c522490f78668b01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12757
content:
"The most significant enabling condition in electromobility is to provide electric recharging opportunities and an integration strategy \r\nso that vehicles support the grid."


id: 524d3a3a54ddc7b977a6254bec0be899
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10405
content:
"There are few obvious solutions to decarbonising heavy vehicles like international ships and planes. The main focus has been \r\nincreased efficiency, which so far has not prevented these large vehicles from becoming the fastest-growing source of GHG globally. \r\nThese vehicles likely need alternative fuels that can be fitted to the present propulsion systems. Emerging demonstrations suggest \r\nthat ammonia, advanced biofuels, or synthetic fuels could become commercial."


id: d36133133c29d24fd27d7aa595b5aa70
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30779
content:
"Electric propulsion using hydrogen fuel cells or Li-ion batteries could work with short-haul aviation and shipping, but the large \r\nlong-lived vessels and aircraft likely need alternative liquid fuels for most major long-distance functions."


id: 70640f072ea46fd07d5a2e71ff25c5fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15299
content:
"Advanced biofuels, if sourced from resources with low GHG footprints, offer decarbonisation opportunities. As shown in Chapters 2, \r\n6, and 12, there are multiple issues constraining traditional biofuels. Sustainable land management and feedstocks, as well as R&D \r\nefforts to improve lignocellulosic conversion routes, are key to maximising the mitigation potential from advanced biofuels."


id: 5dd0517808d338d5c8420c99215f9612
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12293
content:
"Synthetic jet and marine fuels can be made using CO2 captured with DAC/BECCS and low-carbon hydrogen. These fuels may also \r\nhave less contrails-based climate impacts and lower emissions of local air pollutants. However, these fuels still require significant \r\nR&D and demonstration."


id: 6a0856dc584ded47e3855ef240662e41
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14286
content:
"The deployment of low-carbon aviation and shipping fuels that support decarbonisation of the transport sector will likely require \r\nchanges to national and international governance structures."


id: ea369421687ad5f3dc2f24dd284112ac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34355
content:
"Cities can reduce their transport-related fuel consumption by around 25% through combinations of more compact land use and less \r\ncar-dependent transport infrastructure."


id: d7e029f3a88cc71451ff3b8f39cacbdb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31493
content:
"More traditional programmes for reducing unnecessary high-energy travel through behaviour change programmes (e.g., taxes on \r\nfuel, parking, and vehicles, or subsidies for alternative low-carbon modes) continue to be evaluated, with mixed results due to the \r\ndominance of time savings in an individual's decision-making."


id: b9e154551221a9ede5a333246cc4f478
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26784
content:
"The circular economy, the shared economy, and digitalisation trends can support systemic changes that lead to reductions in \r\ndemand for transport services or expand the use of more efficient transport modes."


id: e55b8ce6a85ab351ea05f0c22f30e92a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33581
content:
"COVID-19 lockdowns have confirmed the transformative value of telecommuting, replacing significant numbers of work and \r\npersonal journeys, as well as promoting local active transport. These changes may not last and impacts on productivity and health \r\nare still to be fully evaluated."


id: b81c3b3c3d48d8ba4b60fa3664a4278a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26495
content:
"Solutions for individual households and businesses involving pledges and shared communities that set new cultural means of \r\nreducing fossil fuel consumption, especially in transport, are setting out new approaches for how climate change mitigation can \r\nbe achieved."


id: faa252c4c760764f225a2913029941b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36954
content:
"In mid-2020, the IPCC, in collaboration with the Norwegian \r\nUniversity of Science and Technology, released a  request for data \r\nfrom the lifecycle assessment (LCA) community, to estimate the \r\nlifecycle greenhouse (GHG) emissions of various passenger and \r\nfreight transport pathways. The data requested included information \r\nabout vehicle and fuel types, vintages, vehicle efficiency, payload, \r\nemissions from vehicle and battery manufacturing, and fuel cycle \r\nemissions factors, among others."


id: cecb487d241dfa137888f6e84161759f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30071
content:
"Data submissions were received from approximately 20 research \r\ngroups, referencing around 30 unique publications. These submissions \r\nwere supplemented by an additional 20 studies from the literature. \r\nWhile much of this literature was focused on LDVs and trucks, \r\nrelatively few studies referenced bus and rail pathways."


id: 2f4b8e75bf51b0b38f6bcb7a0838206d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4861
content:
"First, the datapoints were separated into categories based on the \r\napproximate classification (e.g., heavy-duty vs medium-duty trucks), \r\npowertrain (i.e., internal combustion engines (ICEV), hybrid electric \r\nvehicles (HEV), battery electric vehicles (BEV), fuel cell vehicles \r\n(FCV)), and fuel combination. For each category of vehicle/powertrain/\r\nfuel, a  simplified LCA that harmonises values from across the \r\nreviewed studies was constructed, using the following basic equation:"


id: 759fbb2b9fd01f28015442589fa979b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16098
content:
"Note: for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV), the value of FC/P*EF \r\nis a weighted sum of this aggregate term for each of battery and \r\ndiesel/gasoline operation."


id: 933e5e0deb93c970b99708dc6c1d4a3b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20679
content:
"Fuel emissions factors used are presented in Table 10.8. Note that \r\nthe  fuel emissions factors were compiled from several studies \r\nthat used different global warming potential (GWP) values in their \r\nunderlying assumptions, and therefore the numbers reported here "


id: c8c0345204f46508c5e02183cd3dc80a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29145
content:
"For LDVs, the entire distribution of estimated lifecycle emissions is \r\npresented for each vehicle/powertrain/fuel category (as a boxplot) in \r\nFigure 10.4. For trucks, rail and buses, only the low and high estimates \r\nare presented (as solid bars) in Figures 10.6 and 10.8, since the \r\nnumber of datapoints were not sufficient to present as a distribution. \r\nTable 10.9 presents the low and high estimates of fuel efficiency for \r\neach category. The references used are reported in the main text."


id: 99dcb3d0d855ed94a165cc7e363a3704
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21731
content:
"may be slightly different if the 100-year global warming potential \r\n(GWP100) from the AR6 had been used. This difference would be \r\nsmall given the small contribution from non-CO2 gases to the total \r\nlifecycle emissions. For example, methane (CH4) emissions exist in \r\nthe lifecycle of natural gas supply chains or natural gas-dependent \r\nsupply chains such as hydrogen from steam methane reforming \r\n(SMR). Recent data from the US suggests emissions of approximately \r\n0.2-0.3 gCH4 per MJ natural gas (Littlefield et al. 2017, 2019), which \r\nwould range by no more than 1-2 gCO2-eq per MJ natural gas (<3% \r\nof natural gas lifecycle emissions) when converting from a GWP100 \r\nof 25 (AR4) or 36 (AR5) to the current (AR6) GWP100 of 29.8."


id: 22e1097011d0f0994aa463f63214c24e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2939
content:
"For transit and freight, the lifecycle harmonisation exercise allows two \r\naggregate parameters to vary from the low to high among submitted \r\nvalues within each category: FC/P and VC/P. Aggregate parameters \r\nare used to capture internal correlations (e.g., fuel consumption and \r\npayload; both depend heavily on vehicle size) and are presented in \r\nTables 10.10 to 10.14. The references used are reported in the main text."


id: dfbed1e61e5e2e50a601c133924ce007
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32699
content:
"Table 10.9 | Range of fuel efficiencies for light-duty vehicles by fuel and powertrain category, per vehicle kilometre"


id: 334e605bdebb87a8836dd8117fd56c07
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5489
content:
"Table 10.12 | Range of fuel efficiencies for heavy-duty truck by fuel and powertrain category, at 100% payload."


id: a6e9c2121646147cebc646b3ced3ec70
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23774
content:
"a\r\n Ammonia ICEV trucks are assumed to have the same fuel economy as diesel ICEVs due to lack of data."


id: 7e8aa6f68f5a48791c3874d17a181381
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17472
content:
"b\r\n Ammonia FCV trucks are assumed to have the same fuel economy as hydrogen FCVs due to lack of data."


id: 56be0952189ab7ea3d6cb2feb045a9b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11120
content:
"Table 10.13 | Range of fuel efficiencies for medium-duty truck by fuel and powertrain category, at 100% payl"


id: d3264d9d71a2dca79d81d9c67812e0fe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30746
content:
"a\r\n Ammonia ICEV trucks are assumed to have the same fuel economy as diesel ICEVs due to lack of data.\r\nb\r\n Ammonia FCV trucks are assumed to have the same fuel economy as Hydrogen FCVs due to lack of data."


id: 10169e723f1d9eab0e59a4cd16a30588
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15
content:
"The range of electricity costs used here is consistent with the range \r\nof levelised cost of electricity estimates presented in Chapter  6 \r\n(USD20-200 MWh-1)."


id: d2cb55e88405967ef61678434e8729d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30685
content:
"For hydrogen, a range of USD1 to USD13 per kilogram is used. The \r\nupper end of this range corresponds approximately to reported retail \r\ncosts in the US (Eudy and Post 2018b; Argonne National Laboratory \r\n2020; Burnham et al. 2021). Despite the high upper bound, lower costs \r\n(USD6-7 kg-1) are already consistent with recent cost estimates of \r\nhydrogen produced via electrolysis (Chapter 6) and current production \r\ncost estimates from IRENA (IRENA 2020). The lower end of the range \r\n(USD1 kg-1) corresponds to projected future price decreases for \r\nelectrolytic hydrogen (BNEF 2020; Hydrogen Council 2020; IRENA \r\n2020), and is consistent with projections from Chapter 6 for the low \r\nend of long-term future prices for fossil hydrogen with CCS."


id: 601316480600df7fd60fcce8cc83ecab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12693
content:
"Capital cost ranges vary widely in the literature depending on the \r\nexact truck model, size and other assumptions. For ICEVs in this \r\nanalysis, the lower bound (USD90,000) corresponds to the 2020 \r\nestimate for China from Moultak et al. (2017), and the upper bound \r\n(USD250,000) corresponds to the 2030 projection for the US from \r\nthe same study. These values encompass the full range reported \r\nby Argonne (Burnham et  al. 2021). The lower bound BEV cost \r\n(USD120,000) is taken from 2030 projections for China (Moultak \r\net al. 2017) and the upper bound (USD780,000) is taken from 2020 \r\ncost estimates in the US (class 8 sleeper cab tractor) (Burnham et al. \r\n2021). The lower bound for FCV trucks (USD130,000) corresponds \r\nto the 2050 estimate for class 8 sleeper cab tractors from Argonne \r\nNational Laboratory and the upper bound (USD290,000) corresponds "


id: a55d95ed01630367240c1ba50b6d8daa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23582
content:
"The vehicle efficiencies used in developing the lifecycle cost estimates \r\nwere derived from the harmonised ranges used to develop lifecycle \r\nGHG estimates and are presented in Tables 10.9 to 10.14."


id: b44f38ab17235f52c33a265aa539ec38
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25880
content:
"to the 2020 estimate from the same study (Burnham et  al. 2021). \r\nThese values span the full range reported by Moultak et al. (2017) for \r\nthe US, Europe and China from 2020-2030."


id: 48621ddd5e9e9e19e40ef3baf0adea4c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8763
content:
"The analysis uses a truck lifetime of 10 years and annual distance \r\ntravelled of 140,000 km based on Burnham et al. (2021). An effective \r\npayload of 17 tonnes (80% of maximum payload of 21 tonnes) is \r\nassumed based on reported average effective payload submitted \r\nby Argonne National Laboratory in response to the IPCC LCA data \r\ncollection call. A discount rate of 3% is used, based on Burnham et al. \r\n(2021) and consistent with the social discount rate from Chapter 3. \r\nMaintenance costs are assumed to be USD0.15 km-1 for ICEV trucks \r\nand USD0.09 km-1 for BEV and FCV trucks, as reported in Burnham \r\net al. (2021)."


id: 9c22e815119662b596a54475c21d86c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22124
content:
"Coordinating Lead Authors:\r\nIgor A. Bashmakov (the Russian Federation), Lars J. Nilsson (Sweden)"


id: fa36176565b58088c975f37d70a66401
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36882
content:
"Adolf Acquaye (Ghana/United Kingdom), Christopher Bataille (Canada), Jonathan M. Cullen \r\n(New  Zealand/United Kingdom), Stephane de la Rue du Can (the United States of America), \r\nManfred Fischedick (Germany), Yong Geng (China), Kanako Tanaka (Japan)"


id: 37e234965da464b140b9d8c9f97d8aab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6166
content:
"Bashmakov, I.A., L.J. Nilsson, A. Acquaye, C. Bataille, J.M. Cullen, S. de la Rue du Can, M. Fischedick, Y. Geng, K. Tanaka, \r\n2022: Industry. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III \r\nto the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, \r\nA. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A.  Hasija, \r\nG. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. \r\ndoi: 10.1017/9781009157926.013"


id: 55da4df3097d88034a85c359b2dcda91
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10988
content:
"Scenario analyses show that significant cuts in global GHG \r\nemissions and even close to net zero emissions from \r\nGHG  intensive industry (e.g.,  steel, plastics, ammonia, and \r\ncement) can be achieved by 2050 by deploying multiple \r\navailable and emerging options (medium confidence). Cutting \r\nindustry emissions significantly requires a  reorientation from \r\nthe historic focus on important but incremental improvements \r\n(e.g., energy efficiency) to transformational changes in energy and \r\nfeedstock sourcing, materials efficiency, and more circular material \r\nflows. {11.3, 11.4}"


id: 930d803c14fe953ac913f00ab54e19c0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20651
content:
"The Paris Agreement, the Sustainable Development Goals \r\n(SDGs) and the COVID-19 pandemic provide a  new context \r\nfor the evolution of industry and the mitigation of industry \r\ngreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (high confidence). This chapter \r\nis focused on what is new since AR5. It emphasises the energy and \r\nemissions intensive basic materials industries and key strategies for \r\nreaching net zero emissions. {11.1.1}"


id: b76795326e3f74286450a1437ba33ebc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26382
content:
"Key climate mitigation options such as materials efficiency, \r\ncircular material flows and emerging primary processes, are \r\nnot well represented in climate change scenario modelling and \r\nintegrated assessment models, albeit with some progress in \r\nrecent years (high confidence). The character of these interventions \r\n(e.g., appearing in many forms across complex value chains, making \r\ncost estimates difficult) combined with the limited data on new fossil\u0002free primary processes help explain why they are less represented in \r\nmodels than, for example, CCS. As a result, overall mitigation costs \r\nand the need for CCS may be overestimated. {11.4.2.1}"


id: 10ba7154b68f4ed38eb89e2a5ec2a92a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 106
content:
"Electrification is emerging as a  key mitigation option for \r\nindustry (high confidence). Electricity is a versatile energy carrier, \r\npotentially produced from abundant renewable energy sources or \r\nother low carbon options; regional resources and preferences will vary. \r\nUsing electricity directly, or indirectly via hydrogen from electrolysis \r\nfor high temperature and chemical feedstock requirements, offers \r\nmany options to reduce emissions. It also can provide substantial \r\ngrid balancing services, for example through electrolysis and storage \r\nof hydrogen for chemical process use or demand response. {11.3.5}"


id: e3e12a1558ed9f636c78c82555857cb3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33331
content:
"Whatever metric is used, industrial emissions have been \r\ngrowing faster since 2000 than emissions in any other sector, \r\ndriven by increased basic materials extraction and production \r\n(high confidence). GHG emissions attributed to the industrial \r\nsector originate from fuel combustion, process emissions, product \r\nuse and waste, which jointly accounted for 14.1 GtCO2-eq or 24% of \r\nall direct anthropogenic emissions in 2019, second behind the \r\nenergy transformation sector. Industry is a  leading GHG emitter  - \r\n20 GtCO2-eq or 34% of global emissions in 2019  - if indirect \r\nemissions from power and heat generation are included. The share of \r\nemissions originating from direct fuel combustion is decreasing and \r\nwas 7 GtCO2-eq, 50% of direct industrial emissions in 2019. {11.2.2}"


id: 591bf270860dc75f51bdb0d2607cd4e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11517
content:
"Carbon is a key building block in organic chemicals, fuels and \r\nmaterials, and will remain important (high confidence). In order \r\nto reach net zero CO2 emissions for the carbon needed in society \r\n(e.g.,  plastics, wood, aviation fuels, solvents, etc.), it is important \r\nto close the use loops for carbon and carbon dioxide through \r\nincreased circularity with mechanical and chemical recycling, more \r\nefficient use of biomass feedstock with the addition of low GHG \r\nhydrogen to increase product yields (e.g.,  for biomethane and \r\nmethanol), and potentially direct air capture of CO2 as a new carbon \r\nsource. {11.3, 11.4.1}"


id: df8cbaf28ea8da7f0a258d39b1ac5187
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32672
content:
"Global material intensity (in-use stock of manufactured capital, \r\nin tonnes per unit of GDP is increasing (high confidence). In\u0002use stock of manufactured capital per capita has been growing \r\nfaster than GDP per capita since 2000. Total global in-use stock \r\nof manufactured capital grew by 3.4% yr-1 in 2000-2019. At the \r\nsame time, per capita material stocks in several developed countries \r\nhave stopped growing, showing a decoupling from GDP per capita. \r\n{11.2.1, 11.3.1}"


id: bbfd76ba8eeb4da07e1911489134c48b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27141
content:
"Production costs for very low to zero emissions basic materials \r\nmay be high but the cost for final consumers and the general \r\neconomy will be low (medium confidence). Costs and emissions \r\nreductions potential in industry, and especially heavy industry, are \r\nhighly contingent on innovation, commercialisation, and market \r\nuptake policy. Technologies exist to take all industry sectors to very \r\nlow or zero emissions but require 5 to 15 years of intensive innovation, \r\ncommercialisation, and policy to ensure uptake. Mitigation costs are \r\nin the rough range of USD50-150 tCO2-eq-1, with wide variation \r\nwithin and outside this band. This affects competitiveness and \r\nrequires supporting policy. Although production cost increases can \r\nbe significant, they translate to very small increases in the costs \r\nfor final products, typically less than a  few percent depending on \r\nproduct, assumptions, and system boundaries. {11.4.1.5}"


id: 8bf3a441ca928e635ff63417aef7d503
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19535
content:
"Plastic is the material for which demand has been growing \r\nthe strongest since 1970 (high confidence). The current \r\n>99%  reliance on fossil feedstock, very low recycling, and high \r\nemissions from petrochemical processes is a challenge for reaching \r\nnet zero emissions. At the same time, plastics are important for \r\nreducing emissions elsewhere, for example, light-weighting vehicles. \r\nThere are as yet no shared visions for fossil-free plastics, but several \r\npossibilities. {11.4.1.3}"


id: fb1130564b88f485a1d844266e553520
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37015
content:
"The pulp and paper industry has significant biogenic carbon \r\nemissions but relatively small fossil carbon emissions. Pulp \r\nmills have access to biomass residues and by-products and \r\nin paper mills the use of process heat at low to medium \r\ntemperatures allows for electrification (high confidence). \r\nCompetition for feedstock will increase if wood substitutes for \r\nbuilding materials and petrochemicals feedstock. The pulp and paper \r\nindustry can also be a source of biogenic carbon dioxide and carbon \r\nfor organic chemicals feedstock and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) \r\nusing CCS. {11.4.1.4}"


id: 2865c45d2ca82217769be0297475a85
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3772
content:
"There are several technological options for very low to zero \r\nemissions steel, but their uptake will require integrated \r\nmaterial efficiency, recycling, and production decarbonisation \r\npolicies (high confidence). Material efficiency can potentially \r\nreduce steel demand by up to 40% based on design for less steel use, \r\nlong life, reuse, constructability, and low contamination recycling. \r\nSecondary production through high quality recycling must be \r\nmaximised. Production decarbonisation will also be required, starting \r\nwith the retrofitting of existing facilities for partial fuel switching \r\n(e.g., to biomass or hydrogen), CCU and CCS, followed by very low \r\nand zero emissions production based on high-capture CCS or direct \r\nhydrogen, or electrolytic iron ore reduction followed by an electric arc \r\nfurnace. {11.3.2, 11.4.1.1}"


id: b5f7e3a6030df6b967b5eedf4d855ced
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26157
content:
"The geographical distribution of renewable resources has \r\nimplications for industry (medium confidence). The potential \r\nfor zero emission electricity and low-cost hydrogen from electrolysis \r\npowered by solar and wind, or hydrogen from other very low emission \r\nsources, may reshape where currently energy and emissions intensive \r\nbasic materials production is located, how value chains are organised, \r\ntrade patterns, and what gets transported in international shipping. \r\nRegions with bountiful solar and wind resources, or low fugitive \r\nmethane co-located with CCS geology, may become exporters of \r\nhydrogen or hydrogen carriers such as methanol and ammonia, or \r\nhome to the production of iron and steel, organic platform chemicals, \r\nand other energy-intensive basic materials. {11.2, 11.4 and Box 11.1}"


id: 6fce2f19cf4c747b30c95b2098ee3cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15214
content:
"The level of policy maturity and experience varies widely across \r\nthe mitigation options (high confidence). Energy efficiency \r\nis a  well-established policy field with decades of experience from \r\nvoluntary and negotiated agreements, regulations, energy auditing \r\nand demand side-management (DSM) programmes (see AR5). In \r\ncontrast, materials demand management and efficiency are not well \r\nunderstood and addressed from a  policy perspective. Barriers to \r\nrecycling that policy could address are often specific to the different \r\nmaterial loops (e.g.,  copper contamination for steel and lack of \r\ntechnologies or poor economics for plastics) or waste management \r\nsystems. For electrification and fuel switching the focus has so far \r\nbeen mainly on innovation and developing technical supply-side \r\nsolutions rather than creating market demand. {11.5.2, 11.6}"


id: 8a2c01f841bdcc05a845601edf89f8ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19267
content:
"While several technological options exist for decarbonising \r\nthe  main industrial feedstock chemicals and their \r\nderivatives, the costs vary widely (high confidence). Fossil fuel\u0002based feedstocks are inexpensive and still without carbon pricing, \r\nand their biomass- and electricity-based replacements will likely \r\nbe more expensive. The chemical industry consumes large amounts \r\nof hydrogen, ammonia, methanol, carbon monoxide, ethylene, \r\npropylene, benzene, toluene, and mixed xylenes and aromatics from \r\nfossil feedstock, and from these basic chemicals produces tens of \r\nthousands of derivative end-use chemicals. Hydrogen, biogenic or air\u0002capture carbon, and collected plastic waste for the primary feedstocks \r\ncan greatly reduce total emissions. Biogenic carbon feedstock is likely \r\nto be limited due to competing land uses. {11.4.1.3}"


id: 528e99f6abb802c0d05c78257daefd87
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10446
content:
"Industry has so far largely been sheltered from the impacts \r\nof climate policy and carbon pricing due to concerns for \r\ncompetitiveness and carbon leakage (high confidence). New \r\nindustrial development policy approaches needed for realising \r\na transition to net zero GHG emissions are emerging. The transition \r\nrequires a clear direction towards net zero, technology development, \r\nmarket demand for low-carbon materials and products, governance \r\ncapacity and learning, socially inclusive phase-out plans, as well as \r\ninternational coordination of climate and trade policies. It requires \r\ncomprehensive and sequential industrial policy strategies leading to \r\nimmediate action as well as preparedness for future decarbonisation, \r\ngovernance at different levels (from international to local), and \r\nintegration with other policy domains. {11.6}"


id: 667aa97a288bc412cb3d2647675c7f3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13714
content:
"Light industry and manufacturing can be largely decarbonised \r\nthrough switching to low GHG fuels (e.g.,  biofuels and\r\nhydrogen) and electricity (e.g.,  for electrothermal heating \r\nand heat pumps) (high confidence). Most of these technologies are \r\nalready mature, for example, for low temperature heat, but a major \r\nchallenge is the current low cost of fossil methane and coal relative \r\nto low and zero GHG electricity, hydrogen, and biofuels. {11.4.1.4}"


id: 6ccc7aaa68753bef508fff0529783b8b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14733
content:
"Factors in Equation 11.1 are interconnected by either positive or \r\nnegative feedbacks: scrap-based production or light-weighing \r\nimproves operational energy efficiency, while growing application of \r\ncarbon capture, use and storage (CCUS) brings it down and increases \r\nmaterial demands (Hertwich et al. 2019; IEA 2020a, 2021a). There are \r\ndifferent ways to disaggregate Equation 11.1: by industrial subsectors \r\n(Bashmakov 2021); by reservoirs of material stock (buildings, \r\ninfrastructure, vehicles, machinery and appliances, packaging, etc.); \r\nby regions and countries (where carbon leakage becomes relevant); \r\nby products and production chains (material extraction, production \r\nof basic materials, basic materials processing, production of final \r\nindustrial products); by traditional and low carbon technologies used; \r\nand by stages of products' lives including recycling."


id: 1d922a32b245393ba4b5007471e52c5b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2092
content:
"An industrial transition to net zero emissions is possible when the \r\nthree last multipliers in Equation 11.1 (in square parentheses) are \r\napproaching zero. Contributions from different drivers (energy \r\nefficiency, low carbon electricity and heat, material efficiency, \r\nswitching to low carbon feedstock and CCUS) to this evolution vary \r\nwith time. Energy efficiency dominates in the short- and medium \r\nterm and potentially long term (in the range of 10-40% by 2050) \r\n(IPCC 2018a; Crijns-Graus et al. 2020; IEA 2020a), but for deep \r\ndecarbonisation trajectories, contributions from the other drivers \r\nsteadily grow, as the share of non-energy sources in industrial \r\nemissions rises and new technologies to address mitigation from \r\nthese sources mature (Material Economics 2019; CEMBUREAU 2020; \r\nBP 2020; Hertwich et al. 2020, 2019; IEA 2021a, 2020a; Saygin and \r\nGielen 2021) (Figure 11.1)."


id: 8ee7d4dac79598f3f03e76d3df558b86
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 20015
content:
"*Dm=1, when territorial emission is considered, and Dm equals the ratio of \r\ndomestically used materials to total material production for the consumption-based \r\nemission accounting). CBAM - carbon border adjustment mechanism."


id: 965d578f01b2f68eca6cb6c33af72989
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21176
content:
"Key factors driving up industrial GHG emissions since 1900 include \r\npopulation and per capita GDP,2\r\n while energy efficiency and non\u0002combustion GHG emissions intensity (from industrial processes \r\nand waste) has been pushing it down. Material efficiency factors - \r\nmaterial stock intensity of GDP and ratio of extraction, processing \r\nand recycling of materials per unit of built capital along with \r\ncombustion-related emissions intensity factors and electrification - \r\nwere cyclically switching their contributions with relatively limited \r\noverall impact. Growing recycling allowed for replacement of \r\nsome energy-intensive virgin materials and thus contributed to \r\nmitigation. In 2014-2019, a combination of these drivers allowed \r\nfor a  slowdown in the growth of industrial GHG emissions to \r\nbelow 1% (Figure 11.2 and Table 11.1), while to match a net zero \r\nemissions trajectory it should decline by 2% yr-1 in 2020-2030 and \r\nby 8.9% yr-1 in 2030-2050 (IEA 2021a)."


id: bc2050ec6cb3fdecfa1e973714a5cd0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27168
content:
"The use of materials is deeply coupled with economic development \r\nand growth. For centuries, humanity has been producing and using \r\nhundreds of materials (Ashby 2012), the diversity of which skyrocketed \r\nin the recent half-century to achieve the desired performance and \r\nfunctionality of multiple products (density; hardness; compressive \r\nstrength; melting point, resistance to mechanical and thermal shocks \r\nand to corrosion; transparency; heat- or electricity conductivity; \r\nchemical neutrality or activity, to name a  few). New functions \r\ndrive the growth of material complexity of products; for example, \r\na  modern computer chip embodies over 60 different elements \r\n(Graedel et al. 2015)."


id: 1feeb9e331225ce42fa963257b2cc324
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2461
content:
"Figure 11.2 | Average annual growth rates of industrial sector GHG emissions and drivers (1900-2019). Before 1970, GHG emission (other) is limited to \r\nthat from cement production. Waste emission is excluded. Primary material extraction excludes fuels and biomass. Presented factors correspond directly \r\nto Equation 11.1. Sources: population before 1950 and GDP before 1960: Maddison Project (2018); population from 1950 to 1970: UN (2015); population and GDP for \r\n1960-2020: World Bank (2021); data on material stock, extraction, and use of secondary materials: Wiedenhofer et al. (2019); data on material extraction: UNEP and IRP \r\n(2020); industrial energy use for 1900-1970: IIASA (2018), for 1971-2019: IEA (2021b); data on industrial GHG emissions for 1900-1970: CDIAC (2017), for 1970-2019: \r\ndata from Crippa et al. (2021) and Minx et al. (2021)."


id: 31dd98d42d045c56384a355519db67d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5260
content:
"Total extraction of all basic materials (including biomass and \r\nfuels) in 2017 reached 92 Gt yr-1, which is 13 times above the \r\n1900 level (Figure 11.3).5\r\n When recycled resources are added, total \r\nmaterial inputs exceed 100 Gt (Circle Economy 2020). In Equation \r\n11.1 MPR represents only material inputs to the stock, excluding \r\ndissipative use - biomass (food and feed) and combusted fuels. Total \r\nextraction of stock building materials (metal ores and non-metallic \r\nminerals) in 2017 reached 55 Gt yr-1.\r\n6\r\n In 1970-2018, it grew 4.3-fold \r\nand the ratio of MPR to accumulated in-use capital has nearly been \r\nconstant since 1990 along with ratio to GDP (Figure 11.3)."


id: 6b8a5bc9b201f361f25e9cd53d69a1d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14537
content:
"For a  subset of materials, such as solid wood, paper, plastics, \r\niron/steel, aluminium, copper, other metals/minerals, concrete, \r\nasphalt, bricks, aggregate, and glass, total in-use stock escalated \r\nfrom 36 Gt back in 1900 to 186 Gt in 1970, 572 Gt in 2000, and \r\n960 Gt in 2015, and by 2020 it exceeded 1,100 Gt, or 145 tonnes \r\nper capita (Krausmann et al. 2018, 2020; Wiedenhofer et al. 2019). \r\nIn 1900-2019, the stock grew 31-fold, which is strongly coupled \r\nwith GDP growth (36-fold). As the UK experience shows, material \r\nstock intensity of GDP may ultimately decline after services \r\nfully dominate GDP, and this allows for material productivity "


id: 94e7c61b50bb27938423449f45f036ac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20936
content:
"End-of-life waste from accumulated stocks along with \r\n(re)-manufacturing and construction waste is assessed at 16 Gt yr-1 in \r\n2014 and can be extrapolated in 2018 to 19 Gt yr-1 (Krausmann et al. \r\n2018; Wiedenhofer et al. 2019), or 1.8% from stock of manufactured "


id: acb0b82e3f295f4bd8982b02b1d7fd6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24717
content:
"Figure  11.3 |  Raw natural materials extraction since 1970. In windows: left  - growth of population, GDP and basic materials production (1990 =  100) in \r\n1990-2020; right - in-use stock per capita vs income level (1900-2018; brown dots are for 2000-2018). The regressions provided show that for more recent years \r\nelasticity of material stock to GDP was greater than unity, comparing with the lower unity in preceding years. Source: developed based on Maddison Project (2018); \r\nWiedenhofer et al. (2019); IEA (2020b); UNEP and IRP (2020); International Aluminium Institute (2021a); Statista (2021a,b); U.S. Geological Survey (2021); World Bank \r\n(2021); World Steel Association (2021)."


id: b4044473eeba8e9bedf4659f5cb89901
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25836
content:
"capital. Less than 6 Gt yr-1 was recycled and used to build the stock \r\n(about 10% of inputs).7\r\n While the circularity gap is still large, and \r\nlimited circularity was engineered into accumulated stocks,8 material \r\nrecycling mitigated some GHG emissions by replacing energy\u0002intensive virgin materials.9\r\n When the stock saturates, in closed material "


id: a1e2c1ce8ecc4de1d2a127a54536b07a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23033
content:
"loops the end-of-life materials waste has to be equal to material input, \r\nand primary production therefore has to be equal to end-of-life waste \r\nmultiplied by unity minus recycling rate. When the latter grows, as \r\nthe linear metabolism is replaced with the circular one, the share of \r\nprimary materials production in total material input declines."


id: b7d7f8fd2a1b57320bb89338e6974a2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26463
content:
"Recycling rates for metals are higher than for other materials: the \r\nend-of-life scrap input ratio for 13 metals is over 50%, and stays in \r\nthe range of 25-50% for another ten, but even for metals recycling \r\nflows fail to match the required inputs (Graedel et al. 2011). Globally, \r\ndespite overall recycling rates being at 85%, the all-scrap ratio for \r\nsteel production in recent years stays close to 35-38% (Gielen et al. \r\n2020; IEA 2021b) ranging from 22% in China (only 10% in 2015) to \r\n69% in the US and to 83% in Turkey (BIR 2020). For end-of-life scrap \r\nthis ratio declined from 30% in 1995-2010 to 21-25% after 2010 \r\n(Gielen et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2021)."


id: fea6f747ccd34405c6e60402bb46d160
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37609
content:
"For aluminium, the share of scrap-based production grew from 17% \r\nin 1962 to 34% in 2010 and stabilised at this level until 2019, while \r\nthe share of end-of-life scrap grew from 1.5% in 1962 to nearly \r\n20% in 2019 (International Aluminium Institute 2021a). The global \r\nrecycling (mostly mechanical) rate for plastics is only 9-10%10\r\n(Geyer et al. 2017; Saygin and Gielen 2021), and that for paper \r\nprogressed from 34% in 1990 to 44% in 2000 and to over 50% in \r\n2014-2018 (IEA 2020b)."


id: ca7bb187b5db80a8abe5c80aca4e447d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29416
content:
"Physical energy intensity for the production of materials typically \r\ndeclines and then stabilises at the BAT level once the market is \r\nsaturated, unless a transformative new technology enters the market \r\n(Gutowski et al. 2013; Crijns-Graus et al. 2020; IEA 2021a). Thus, the \r\nenergy saving effect of switching to secondary used material comes \r\nto the forefront, as energy consumption per tonne for many basic \r\nprimary materials approach the BATs. This highlights the need to push \r\ntowards circular economy, materials efficiency, reduced demand, and "


id: 3a883dff5fb2518cbc08d1b20662bfb8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6573
content:
"In 2014-2019, the average annual growth rate (AAGR) of global \r\nindustrial energy use was 0.4% compared to 3.2% in 2000-2014, \r\nfollowing new policies and trends, particularly demonstrated by "


id: efa010184cb9af72ef1492e7893103d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35201
content:
"the dynamics shown by basic materials extraction and production. \r\nIndustry contributed nearly half (45%) of overall incremental global \r\nGHG emissions in the 21st century."


id: 9ac1e771cf354ad7967e52aa5a1b48f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21879
content:
"Industrial sector GHG emissions accounting is complicated by carbon \r\nstorage in products (Levi and Cullen 2018). About 35% of chemicals' \r\nmass is CO2, which is emitted at use stage  - decomposition of \r\nfertilisers, or plastic waste incineration (Saygin and Gielen 2021), \r\nand sinks. Recarbonation and mineralisation of alkaline industrial \r\nmaterials and wastes (also known as the 'sponge effect') provide \r\n0.6-1 GtCO2 yr-1 uptake by cement-containing products19 (Cao et al. \r\n2020; Guo et al. 2021); see Section 11.3.6 for further discussion in \r\ndecarbonisation context."


id: bff3a4ee2e42563eb80030d95019ccb1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 27755
content:
"In 1970-1990, industrial direct combustion-related emissions were \r\ngrowing modestly, and in 1990-2000 even switched to a  slowly \r\ndeclining trend, steadily losing their share in overall industrial \r\nemissions. Electrification was the major driver behind both indirect \r\nand total industrial emissions in those years. This quiet evolution was \r\ninterrupted in the beginning of the 21st century, when total emissions \r\nincreased by 60-68% depending on the metric applied (the fastest \r\ngrowth ever seen). In 2000-2019 iron, steel and cement absolute \r\nGHGs increased more than any other period in history (Bashmakov \r\n2021). Emissions froze temporarily in 2014-2016, partly in the wake \r\nof the financial crisis, but returned to their growth trajectory in \r\n2017-2019 (Figure 11.4a)."


id: 6c2dfe1d362925483c7662929c97b1be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"The largest incremental contributors to industrial emissions in \r\n2010-2019 were industrial processes at 40%, then indirect emissions \r\n(25%), and only then direct combustion (21%), followed by waste \r\n(14%; Figure 11.4). Therefore, to stop emission growth and to switch \r\nto a zero-carbon pathway more mitigation efforts should be focused \r\non industrial processes, product use and waste decarbonisation, along \r\nwith the transition to low-carbon electrification (Hertwich et al. 2020)."


id: 9f7e7b15cc3e55217fc0f7b7ebe8e8f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 22636
content:
"Basic materials production dominates both direct industrial GHG \r\nemissions (about 62%, waste excluded)20 as well as direct industrial \r\nCO2 emissions (70%), led by iron and steel, cement, chemicals, and \r\nnon-ferrous metals (Figure  11.4e). Basic materials also contribute \r\n60% to indirect emissions. In a  zero-carbon power world, with \r\nindustry lagging behind in the decarbonisation of high-temperature \r\nprocesses and feedstock, it may replace the energy sector as the \r\nlargest generator of indirect emissions embodied in capital stock.21\r\nAccording to Circle Economy (2020) and Hertwich et al. (2020), GHG "


id: 4b780e2044ad3aea18e0db6467bc6591
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"(a) Industrial emissions by source (left scale) and emissions structure (right scale). Comb - indicates direct emissions from fuel \r\ncombustion. IPPU - indicates emissions from industrial processes and product use. Indirect emissions from electricity and heat generation \r\nare shown on the top. Shares on the right are shown for direct emissions"


id: 4f26dc70fff5e497d347135ee009afd4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"Figure 11.4 | Industrial sector direct global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Source: calculated based on emissions data from Crippa et al. (2021) and Minx et al. \r\n(2021). Indirect emissions were assessed using IEA (2021b). For (e): Cao et al. (2020); IEA (2020b, 2021a); GCCA (2021a); International Aluminium Institute (2021a); and Wang \r\net al. (2021)."


id: 397fb193e8214cef6ff6abbb96b74c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"The carbon intensity of cement-making since 2010 is down by only \r\n4%. In 1990-2019 it fell by 19.5%, mostly due to energy efficiency \r\nimprovements (by 18.5%) as the carbon intensity of the fuel mix \r\ndeclined only by 3% (GCCA 2021b). Historical analysis shows the \r\ncarbon intensity of steel production has declined with 'stop and \r\ngo' patterns in 50-60-year cycles, reflective of the major jumps in \r\nbest available technology (BAT). From 1900 to 1935 and from 1960 \r\nto 1990 specific scope 1 + 2 + 3 emissions fell by 1.5-2.5 tCO2\r\nper tonne, or as much as needed now to achieve net zero. While \r\nhistorical declines were mostly due to commissioning large \r\ncapacities with new technologies, with total emissions growing, by \r\n2050 and beyond the decline will likely materialise via new ultra\u0002low emission capacity replacements pushing absolute emissions to \r\nnet zero (Bataille et al. 2021b)."


id: 99303a6bad57074ab1e9c280363130b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"emissions embodied in buildings and infrastructure, machinery and \r\ntransport equipment exceed 50% of their present carbon footprint."


id: 660cbe4d1f06945cfb89d0c236b971a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"In 1970-2000, direct GHG emissions per unit of energy showed \r\na  steady decline interrupted by noticeable growth in 2001-2018 \r\ndriven by the fast expansion of steel and cement production \r\n(Figure  11.5; IEA 2021a). Non-energy-related GHG emissions per \r\nunit of extracted materials decline continuously, as the share of not \r\ncarbon intensive building materials (aggregates and sand) grows."


id: 130cf1f82f07ac1cbedd50d4e0b78c46
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"|Iron and steel carbon intensity stagnated in 1995-2015 due to \r\nrapid growth in carbon-intensive production in some countries \r\n(Wang et al. 2021). For aluminium carbon intensity declined in \r\n2010-2019 by only 2% (International Aluminium Institute 2021a). "


id: 2e28f2ba5d3c5211ed2eed3e302968f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4704
content:
"The dramatic increase in industrial emissions after 2000 is clearly \r\nassociated with economic growth in Asia, which dominated both \r\nabsolute and incremental emissions (Figure 11.5a,b)."


id: 241050cee0dc4be80a84641d47735646
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"More recent 2010 to 2019 trends show that regional contributions to \r\nadditional emissions are distributed more evenly, while a large part \r\nstill comes from Asian countries, where both rates of economic growth \r\nand the share of industrial emissions much exceed the global average. \r\nAll other regions also contributed to total industrial GHG emissions. \r\nStructural shifts towards emissions from industrial processes and \r\nproducts use are common for many regions (Figure 11.5a)."


id: acb538b1eb73a2943cb64021d0f81138
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24720
content:
"Economic development. Regional differences in emission \r\ntrends are determined by the differences observed in economic \r\ndevelopment, trade and supply chain patterns. The major source "


id: 16a09507372e56e1e19faf508a502c93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 1083
content:
"The following overview of technical developments and mitigation \r\noptions which relate to the industrial sector is organised in six \r\nequally important strategies: (i) demand for materials, (ii) materials \r\nefficiency, (iii) circular economy and industrial waste, (iv) energy \r\nefficiency, (v) electrification and fuel switching, and (vi) CCUS, \r\nfeedstock and biogenic carbon. Each strategy is described in detail, \r\nfollowed by a  discussion of possible overlaps and interactions \r\nbetween strategies and how conflicts and synergies can be addressed \r\nthrough integration of the approaches."


id: 4bc596df6dd1d7d67c5276462eb6368c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"International trade and supply chain. In Equation 11.1 the share \r\nof allocated emissions (Dm) equals unity when territorial emission is \r\nconsidered, and to the ratio of domestically used materials to total \r\nmaterial production for consumption-based emission accounting. \r\nTracking consumption-based emissions provides additional insights \r\nin the global effectiveness of national climate policies. Carbon \r\nemissions embodied in international trade are estimated to account \r\nfor 20-30% of global carbon emissions (Meng et al. 2018; OECD.Stat \r\n2019) and are the reason for different emissions patterns of OECD \r\nversus non-OECD countries (Chapter 2)."


id: a224b2776aca5e76ebbde047508794b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23072
content:
"Demand for materials is a  key driver of energy consumption and \r\nCO2 emissions in the industrial sector. Rapid growth in material \r\ndemand over the last quarter century has seen demand for key \r\nenergy-intensive materials increase 2.5- to 3.5-fold (Figure  11.6), \r\nwith growth linked to, and often exceeding, population growth \r\nand economic development. The International Energy Agency (IEA) \r\nexplains, 'as economies develop, urbanise, consume more goods and \r\nbuild up their infrastructure, material demand per capita tends to \r\nincrease considerably. Once industrialised, an economy's material \r\ndemand may level off and perhaps even begin to decline' (IEA 2019b)."


id: c51b63cd7bae4e2baa36509d1195c00b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28591
content:
"Based on OECD.Stat (2019) datasets, 2015 CO2 emissions embodied \r\nin internationally traded industrial products (manufacturing and \r\nmining, excluding fuels) by all countries are assessed at 3  GtCO2, \r\nor 30% of direct CO2 emissions in the industrial sector as reported \r\nby Crippa et al. (2021). OECD countries collectively have reduced \r\nterritorial emissions (shares of basic materials in direct emissions in \r\nthose regions decline (Figure 11.5b), but demonstrated no progress \r\nin reducing outsourced emissions embedded in imported industrial \r\nproducts (Arto and Dietzenbacher 2014; OECD.Stat 2019). Accounting \r\nfor net carbon emissions embodied in international trade of only \r\nindustrial products (1283 million tCO2 in 2015) escalates direct OECD \r\nindustrial CO2 emissions (1333 million tCO2 of energy-related and \r\n502 million tCO2 of industrial processes) 1.7 fold, 2.3-fold for the US, \r\n1.5-fold for the EU, and more than triples it for the UK, while cutting "


id: 6e277795901b37bff8aee435748b42d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14949
content:
"The Kaya-like identity presented earlier in the chapter (Equation \r\n11.1) suggests that material demand can be decoupled from \r\npopulation and economic development by two means: (i) reducing \r\nthe accumulated material stock (MStock) used to deliver material "


id: 7e0a14ae8f1c1a86584e3592d2a11297
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17402
content:
"for replacing old stocks and maintenance. Saturation allows material \r\nefficiency strategies (such as light-weight design, longer lifetimes, and \r\nmore intense use) to reduce the required per capita level of material \r\nstocks, and material circularity strategies (closing material loops \r\nthrough remanufacture, reuse and recycling) to lessen the energy and \r\ncarbon impacts required to maintain the material stock. However, \r\nit should be noted that some materials still show little evidence of \r\nsaturation (i.e., plastics, see Box 11.2). Furthermore, meeting climate \r\nchange targets in developed countries will require the construction \r\nof new low-carbon infrastructures (i.e., renewable energy generation, \r\nnew energy distribution and storage systems, electric vehicles and \r\nbuilding heating systems) which may increase demand for emissions \r\nintensive materials (i.e., steel, concrete and glass)."


id: 278bdb45dddc90069ae8f6b2e8639fc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3627
content:
"services; and (ii) reducing the material (MPR +  MSE) required to \r\nmaintain material stocks (MStock). Such material demand reduction \r\nstrategies are linked upstream to material efficiency strategies (the \r\ndelivery of goods and services with less material demand, and thus \r\nenergy and emissions) and to demand reduction behaviours, through \r\nconcepts such as sufficiency, sustainable consumption and social \r\npractice theory (Spangenberg and Lorek 2019). Materials demand \r\ncan also be influenced through urban planning, building codes \r\nand related socio-cultural norms that shape the overall demand \r\nfor square metres per capita of floor space, mobility and transport \r\ninfrastructures (Chapter 5)."


id: 98537857cca60e9f403a3292f6599f2e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21476
content:
"Modelling suggests that per capita material stocks saturate (level \r\noff) in developed countries and decouple from GDP.  Pauliuk et al. \r\n(2013b) demonstrated this saturation effect in an analysis of in-use \r\nsteel stocks in 200 countries, showing that per capita steel in stocks \r\nin countries with a long industrial history (e.g., USA, UK, Germany) \r\nhad saturation levels between 11 and 16 tonnes. More recently, \r\nBleischwitz et al. (2018) confirmed the occurrence of a  saturation \r\neffect for four materials (steel, cement, aluminium and copper) in \r\nfour industrialised countries (Germany, Japan, UK and USA) together \r\nwith China. These findings have led to the revision of some material \r\ndemand forecasts, which previously had been based solely on \r\npopulation and economic trends."


id: 7118ce2365f6d914bbb88851b4965588
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15425
content:
"For developing countries, who are still far from saturation levels, \r\nstrong growth for new products and the creation of new infrastructure \r\ncapacity may still drive global material demand. However, there is an \r\nexpectation that economic development can be achieved at lower \r\nper capita material stock levels, based on the careful deployment of \r\nmaterial efficiency and circularity by design (Grubler et al. 2018)."


id: 6e3f01d54feca35981dff4a549fedc23
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14967
content:
"Material efficiency (ME) - the delivery of goods and services with \r\nless material  - is increasingly seen as an important strategy for \r\nreducing GHG emissions in industry (IEA 2017, 2019b). Options to \r\nimprove ME exist at every stage in the lifecycle of materials and \r\nproducts, as shown in Figure 11.7. This includes: designing products \r\nwhich are lighter, optimising to maintain the end-use service while "


id: b2da3305f3b58b0edc947e3977da6913
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25651
content:
"The saturation effect for material stocks is critical for managing \r\nmaterial demand in developed countries. Materials are required \r\nto meet demand for the creation of new stocks and the maintenance \r\nof existing stocks (Gutowski et al. 2017). Once saturation is attained \r\nthe need for new stocks is minimised, and materials are only required "


id: 49ccbd802e700c9110ac01b8264d8066
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9008
content:
"Hertwich et al. (2019) makes the link between ME strategies and \r\nreducing GHG emissions in buildings, vehicles and electronics, while \r\nGonzalez Hernandez et al. (2018a) examines leveraging ME as \r\na climate strategy in European Union (EU) policy. Research to explore \r\nthe combined analysis of materials and energy, using exergy analysis \r\n(for steel: Gonzalez Hernandez et al. 2018b) allows promising \r\ncomparisons across industrial sectors."


id: 114e17fe4ee3cc1ec7ff34993480f813
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 205
content:
"minimising material use, designing for circular principles (i.e., longer \r\nlife, reusability, repairability, and ease of high-quality recycling); \r\npushing manufacturing and fabrication process to use materials and \r\nenergy more efficiently and recover material wastes; increasing the \r\ncapacity, intensity of use, and lifetimes of product in use; improving \r\nthe recovery of materials at the end of life, through improved \r\nremanufacturing, reuse and recycling processes. For more specific \r\nexamples see Allwood et al. (2012); Lovins (2018); Hertwich et al. \r\n(2019); Scott et al. (2019); and Rissman et al. (2020)."


id: f43e353b9cfaa30189b2daf1a403ac3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35931
content:
"ME provides plentiful options to reduce emissions, yet because \r\ninterventions are dispersed across supply chains and span many \r\ndifferent stakeholders, this makes assessing mitigation potentials \r\nand costs more challenging. For this reason, ME interventions have \r\ntraditionally been under-represented in climate change scenario \r\nmodelling and integrated assessment models (IAMs) (Grubler et al. \r\n2018; Allwood 2018). However, two advances in the modelling of \r\nmaterials flows have underpinned the recent emergence of ME\r\noptions being included in climate scenario modelling."


id: 27362a8f8ed656ceec99f0b6524ee7e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3568
content:
"Firstly, over many years, the academic community has built up \r\ndetailed global material-flow maps of the processing steps involved \r\nin making energy-intensive materials. Some prominent recent \r\nexamples include: steel (Gonzalez Hernandez et al. 2018b), pulp \r\nand paper (Van Ewijk et al. 2018), petrochemicals (Levi and Cullen \r\n2018). In addition, material-flow maps at the regional and sectoral \r\nlevels have flourished, for example: steel (Serrenho et al. 2016) and \r\ncement (Shanks et al. 2019) in the UK; automotive sheet-metal \r\n(Horton et al. 2019); and steel-powder applications (Azevedo et al. \r\n2018). The detailed and transparent physical mapping of material \r\nsupply chains in this manner enables ME interventions to be traced \r\nback to where emissions are released, and allows these options to be \r\ncompared against decarbonisation and traditional energy efficiency \r\nmeasures (Levi and Cullen 2018). For example, a recent analysis by "


id: c123413fcfd36afae9837dcee18b271b
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content:
"may be energy- and emission-intensive, for example, the chemical \r\nrecycling of plastics (Section 11.4.1.3)."


id: c9fdbd474dd328e249202faefcc483e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"As one systemic approach, CE can be seen as conducted at different \r\nlevels, namely, at the micro level (within a single company, such as \r\nprocess integration and cleaner production), meso level (between \r\nthree or more companies, such as industrial symbiosis or eco\u0002industrial parks) and macro level (cross-sectoral cooperation, such \r\nas urban symbiosis or a regional eco-industrial network). Each level \r\nrequires different tools and policies, such as CE-oriented incentive \r\nand tax policies (macro level), and eco-design regulations (micro \r\nlevel). This section is focused on industry and a broader discussion of \r\nthe CE concept is found in Box 12.2 and Section 5.3.4.2."


id: ecbaad83be73888081945ba2a8c4b2c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34721
content:
"Clearly, more work is required to fully integrate ME strategies into \r\nmainstream climate change models and future scenarios. Efforts \r\nare focused on endogenising ME strategies within climate change \r\nmodelling, assessing the synergies and trade-offs which exist \r\nbetween energy efficiency and ME interventions, and building up \r\ndata for the assessment of emissions saved and the cost of mitigation \r\nfrom real ME actions. This requires analysts to work in cross\u0002disciplinary teams and to engage with stakeholders from across the \r\nfull breadth of material supply chains. Efforts should be prioritised to \r\nfoster engagement between the IAM community and emerging ME\r\nmodels based in the Life Cycle Assessment, Resource Efficiency, and \r\nIndustrial Ecology communities (see also Sharmina et al. 2021)."


id: 2e82534bb0fc77c1256be0b761d3efce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"Meso level: Industrial parks first appeared in Manchester, UK, \r\nat the end of the 19th century and they have been implemented \r\nin industrialised countries for maximising energy and material \r\nefficiency, which also has merit for CO2-emissions reduction, as stated \r\nin AR5. Industrial parks reduce the cost of infrastructure and utilities \r\nby concentrating industrial activities in planned areas, and \r\nare typically founded around large, long-term anchor companies. \r\nComplementary industries and services provided by industrial parks \r\ncan entail diversified effects on the surrounding region and stimulate \r\nregional development (Huang et al. 2019a). This is crucial for small \r\nand medium enterprises (SMEs) because they often lack access to \r\ninformation and funds for sophisticated technologies."


id: c102ca3384e327bc8c72c46e54556c32
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27943
content:
"Typical CE tools and policies at this level include sustainable \r\nsupply chains and industrial symbiosis. A  common platform \r\nfor sharing information and enhancing communication among \r\nindustrial stakeholders through the application of information and \r\ntelecommunication technologies is helpful for facilitating the creation \r\nof industrial symbiosis. The main benefit of industrial symbiosis is \r\nthe overall reduction of both virgin materials and final wastes, as \r\nwell as reduced/avoided transportation costs from by-product "


id: 1b05b939b47037a103751d8bec733cf1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1723
content:
"Energy efficiency in industry is an important mitigation option and \r\ncentral in keeping 1.5degC within reach (IPCC SR1.5). It has long been \r\nrecognised as the first mitigation option in industry (Yeen Chan and \r\nKantamaneni 2016; Nadel and Ungar 2019; IEA 2021a). It allows \r\nreduction of the necessary scale of deployment for low-carbon \r\nenergy supplies and associated mitigation costs (Energy Transitions \r\nCommission 2018). The efficiency potentials are greatest in the non\u0002energy-intensive industries and are often relatively limited in energy\u0002intensive ones, such as steel (Pardo and Moya 2013; Kuramochi 2016; \r\nArens et al. 2017). Deep decarbonisation in these subsectors requires \r\nfundamental process changes but energy efficiency remains important \r\nto reduce costs and the need for low-carbon energy supplies."


id: 85ac986c684dff49c92f94494b584a9c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"Below, we focus mainly on the technical progress and on new \r\noptions that are reflected in the literature since AR5 and refer the \r\nreader there for a broader and deeper treatment of energy efficiency. \r\nDigitalisation and the development of industrial high-temperature \r\nheat pumps are two notable technology developments that can \r\nfacilitate energy efficiency improvements."


id: 3858e6cb4fd2800fb334d2cadfcf29ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"Industrial energy efficiency can be improved through multiple \r\ntechnologies and practices (Tanaka 2011; Fawkes et al. 2016; Lovins \r\n2018; Crijns-Graus et al. 2020; IEA 2020a). There are two parallel \r\nprocesses in improvement of specific energy consumption (SEC): \r\nprogress in energy-efficient BAT and moving the SEC of industrial \r\nplants towards BAT. Both slow down as theoretical thermodynamic \r\nminimums are approached (Gutowski et al. 2013). For the last \r\nseveral decades the focus has been on effective spreading of BAT \r\ntechnologies through application of policies for worldwide diffusion \r\nof energy-saving technologies (Section 11.6). As a result the SEC for "


id: cd23b11d61871a2f834200aeb83a8a94
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29824
content:
"many basic primary materials is approaching BAT and there are signs \r\nthat energy efficiency improvements have been slowing down over \r\nrecent decades (IEA 2019d, 2020a, 2021a) (Figure 11.8)."


id: 42d1ffec12fc585fa66e0db1fec8ddfc
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content:
"3.0 GJ t-1 using an alternative heat exchange that recovers energy \r\nfrom hot steel. High-temperature industrial heat pumps represent \r\na  new and important development for upgrading waste heat and \r\nat the same time they facilitate electrification. One recent example \r\nis a high-temperature heat pump that can raise temperatures up to \r\n165degC at a  coefficient of performance (COP) of 3.5 by recovering \r\nheat from unused hot water (35degC-65degC) (Arpagaus et al. 2018). \r\nCommercially available heat pumps can deliver 100degC-150degC but \r\nat least up to 280degC is feasible (Zuhlsdorf et al. 2019). Mechanical \r\nvapour recompression avoids the loss of latent heat by condensation, \r\nthen it acts as a  highly efficient heat pump with a  5-10 COP \r\n(Philibert 2017a)."


id: c1ea8e79e638602fab601f22fa4a9dbf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 28089
content:
"While about 10% of global GHG emissions originate from combustion \r\nto produce high-temperature heat for basic material production \r\nprocesses (Sandalow et al. 2019), limited efforts have been made \r\nto decarbonise heat production. There is still a  large potential for \r\nusing various grades of waste heat and the development of high\u0002temperature heat pumps facilitates its use. NEDO (2019) applies \r\na 'Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle' concept for improved energy efficiency, \r\nand we use this frame our discussion of heat efficiency."


id: 7b09d0ba4593d52060929c07b2f7e809
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
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vector_id: 16952
content:
"generation it would take a leakage rate of about 2.7% from natural \r\ngas production to undo the direct fuel switching from coal mitigation \r\neffect, and the value is likely higher in most cases (Alvarez et al. 2012; \r\nHausfather 2015). Coal mine methane emissions are also estimated \r\nto be substantially higher than previously assessed (Kholod et al. \r\n2020). Alvarez et al. (2018) estimated US fugitive emissions (not \r\nincluding the Permian) at 2.3% of supply, 60% more than previously \r\nestimated, while recent Canadian papers indicate fugitive emissions \r\nare at least 50% more than reported (Chan et al. 2020; MacKay et al. \r\n2021). However, given the potential for energy supply infrastructure \r\nlock-in effects (Tong et al. 2019), purely fossil fuel to fossil fuel \r\nswitching is a limited and potentially dangerous strategy unless it is \r\nused very carefully and in a limited way."


id: ad30176a1dd4c025c0bb9d43db06260a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
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vector_id: 24790
content:
"Smart energy systems with real-time monitoring allow for \r\noptimisation of innovative technologies, energy demand response, \r\nbalancing of energy supply and demand including that on real\u0002time pricing, and product quality management, and prediction and \r\nreduction of idle time for workers and robots (ERIA 2016; Pusnik \r\net al. 2016; ISO 2018; Legorburu and Smith 2018; Ferrero et al. 2020; \r\nNimbalkar et al. 2020). The IEA estimated that smart manufacturing \r\ncould deliver 15 EJ in energy savings between 2014 and 2030 (IEA \r\n2019d). Smart manufacturing systems that integrate manufacturing \r\nintelligence in real time through the entire production operation \r\nhave not been yet widely spread in the industry. Examples have \r\nbeen demonstrated and integrated in real operation in the electrical \r\nappliance assembly industry (Yoshimoto 2016). Combining process \r\ncontrols and automation allows cost optimisation and improved \r\nproductivity (Edgar and Pistikopoulos 2018)."


id: 1eb390fcb869516a304672049ea47842
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
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vector_id: 2276
content:
"The principle of electrification and fuel switching as a GHG mitigation \r\nstrategy is that industries, to the extent possible, switch their end uses \r\nof energy from a high GHG intensity energy carrier to a lower or zero \r\nintensity one, including both its direct and indirect production and \r\nend-use GHG emissions. In general, and non-exclusively, this implies \r\na transition from coal (about 0.09 tCO2 GJ-1 on combustion), refined \r\npetroleum products (about 0.07 tCO2 GJ-1), and natural gas (about \r\n0.05 tCO2 GJ-1) to biofuels, direct solar heating, electricity, hydrogen, \r\nammonia, or net zero synthetic hydrocarbon fuels. Switching to these \r\nenergy carriers is not necessarily lower emitting, however; how they \r\nare made matters."


id: 74841c1aa312e28a600742b6907fc14a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
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vector_id: 15929
content:
"There is a  large identified potential for direct solar heating in \r\nindustry, especially in regions with strong solar insolation and sectors \r\nwith lower heat needs (<180degC), for example, food and beverage \r\nprocessing, textiles, and pulp and paper (Schoeneberger et al. \r\n2020). The key challenges to adoption are site and use specificity, \r\ncapital intensity, and a lack of standardised mass manufacturing for \r\nequipment and a supply chain to provide them."


id: 8736a933195a27ec272aa0978936e0ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 18807
content:
"Fuel switching has already been observed to reduce direct combustion \r\nCO2 emissions in many jurisdictions. There are significant debates \r\nabout the net effect of upstream fossil fuel production and fugitive \r\nemissions, but observers have noted that in the case of US power "


id: e794689cdfcf434db49c99fc656ff9d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33934
content:
"While most chemical production of feedstock chemicals (e.g.,  H2, \r\nNH3, CO, CH3OH, C2H4, C2H6 and C2H5OH) is done thermo-catalytically \r\ntoday, it is feasible to use direct electrocatalytic production, by itself \r\nor in combination with utilisation of previously captured carbon \r\nsources if a fossil fuel feedstock is used, or well-known bio-catalytic \r\n(e.g., fermentation) and thermo-catalytic processes (Bazzanella and \r\nAusfelder 2017; De Luna et al. 2019; Katelhon et al. 2019). It may even \r\nbe commercially possible to electrify cement sintering and calcination \r\nthrough plasma or microwave options (Material Economics 2019)."


id: 16844e81a479c13bb2e1bcc985f13d29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
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vector_id: 1067
content:
"The long-term potential for full-process electrification is a  very \r\nsector-by-sector and process-by-process phenomenon, with differing \r\nenergy and capacity needs, load profiles, stock turnover, capacity for \r\ndemand response, and characteristics of decision-makers. Industrial \r\nelectrification is most viable in the near term in cases with: minimal \r\nretrofitting and rebuild in processes; with relatively low local \r\nelectricity costs; where the degree of process complexity and process \r\nintegration is more limited and extensive process re-engineering \r\nwould not be required; where combined heat and power is not used; \r\nwhere induction heating technologies are viable; and where process \r\nheating temperatures are lower (Deason et al. 2018)."


id: d4e1bc4d39891ff6e7dc9db1996568b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 31016
content:
"While it has been demonstrated that almost any heating end use \r\ncan be directly electrified, this would imply very high instantaneous \r\nthermal loads for blast furnace-basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) steel \r\nproduction, limestone calcination for cement and lime production, and \r\nother end uses where flame-front (1000degC-1700degC) temperatures are \r\ncurrently needed. This indicates a possible need for another energy \r\ncarrier to minimise instantaneous generation and transmission needs. \r\nThese needs can be met at varying current and potential future costs \r\nusing: bioliquids or gases hydrogen, ammonia, or net zero synthetic \r\nhydrocarbons or alcohols."


id: c13e4bdc072e97ad83318768f909dd0e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"Broadly speaking, hydrogen can contribute to a  cleaner energy \r\nsystem in two ways: (i) existing applications of hydrogen \r\n(e.g.,  nitrogen fertiliser production, refinery upgrading) can use \r\nhydrogen produced using alternative, cleaner production methods; \r\n(ii) new applications can use low-GHG hydrogen as an alternative \r\nto current fuels and inputs, or as a complement to the greater use \r\nof electricity in these applications. In these cases - for example, in "


id: 9bb91490b10902f686fbf759d53e8999
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"transport, heating, industry (e.g., hydrogen-direct reduced iron and \r\nsteel production) and electricity - hydrogen can be used in its pure \r\nform, or be converted to hydrogen-based fuels, including ammonia, \r\nor synthetic net zero hydrocarbons and alcohols such as methane \r\nor methanol (IEA 2019f). The IEA states that hydrogen could be \r\nused to help integrate more renewables, including by enhancing \r\nstorage options and 'exporting sunshine and wind' from places \r\nwith abundant resources; decarbonise steel, chemicals, trucks, ships \r\nand planes; and boost energy security by diversifying the fuel mix and \r\nproviding flexibility to balance grids (IEA 2019f)."


id: 4e87b3db9683ec86cd868f072f3253a5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"All these processes would in turn need to be run using very low or \r\nzero GHG energy carriers for the resulting hydrogen to also be low \r\nin GHG emissions."


id: 4b9466a6f9709dab8b45318f3cef445e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 9311
content:
"Ammonia production, made from hydrogen and nitrogen using \r\nthe Haber-Bosch process, is the most voluminous chemical produced \r\nfrom fossil fuels, being used as feedstock for nitrogen fertilisers and \r\nexplosives, as well as a cleanser, a refrigerant, and for other uses. \r\nMost ammonia is made today using methane as the hydrogen \r\nfeedstock and heat source but has been made using electrolysis\u0002based hydrogen in the past, and there are several announced \r\ninvestments to resume doing so. If ammonia is used as a combustion \r\nfuel, care must be taken to avoid N2O as a GHG and NOx in general \r\nas a local air pollutant."


id: 2765e843183d987b3d2cd4d08dc2ef9b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"Hydrogen can also be combined with low-to-zero net GHG carbon \r\n(Section  11.3.6) and oxygen and made into methane, methanol\r\nand other potential net zero synthetic hydrocarbons and alcohol \r\nenergy carriers using methanation, steam reforming and Fischer\u0002Tropsch processes, all of which can provide higher degrees of storable \r\nand shippable high-temperature energy using known industrial \r\nprocesses in novel combinations (Bataille et al. 2018a; Davis et al. \r\n2018). If the hydrogen and oxygen is accessed via electrolysis, the \r\nterms 'power-to-fuel' or 'e-fuels' are often used (Ueckerdt et al. \r\n2021). Given their carbon content, if used as fuels, their carbon will \r\neventually be oxidised and emitted as CO2 to the atmosphere. This \r\nmakes their net-GHG intensity dependent on the carbon source \r\n(Hepburn et al. 2019), with recycled fossil fuels, biocarbon and direct \r\nair capture carbon all having very different net-CO2 impacts - see \r\nsection 11.3.6 on CCS and CCU for elaboration."


id: 7c0a944c907cc29d9d4595dcfdb48d20
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"The 'hydrogen economy' is a long-touted vision for the energy and transport sectors, and one that has gone through hype-cycles \r\nsince the energy crises in the 1970s (Melton et al. 2016). The widely varying visions of hydrogen futures have mainly been associated \r\nwith fuel cells in vehicles, small-scale decentralised cogeneration of heat and electricity, and to a  certain extent energy storage \r\nfor electricity (Eames et al. 2006; Syniak and Petrov 2008). However, nearly all hydrogen currently produced is used in industry, mainly for \r\nhydrotreating in oil refineries, to produce ammonia, and in other chemical processes, and it is mostly made using fossil fuels."


id: c57247ccc2879542cf5631fa6bc7edfb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"In the context of net zero emissions, new visions are emerging in which hydrogen has a central role to play in decarbonising industry. \r\nNear-term industrial applications for hydrogen include feeding it into ammonia production for fertilisers, while a more novel application \r\nwould be as a replacement for coal as the reductant in steel-making, being piloted by the HYBRIT project in Sweden 2020-2021, \r\nand many companies have initiated hydrogen steel-making projects. As shown in Sections 11.3.5 and 11.3.6, there are many other \r\npotential applications of hydrogen, some of which are still relatively unexplored. Hydrogen can also be used to produce various lower\u0002GHG hydrocarbons and alcohols for fuels and chemical feedstocks using carbon from biogenic sources or direct air capture of CO2\r\n(Ericsson 2017; Huang et al. 2020)."


id: 27ee5d60258ded56d217b992ef30a46b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"The geographical distribution of the potential for hydrogen from electrolysis powered by renewables like solar and wind, nuclear \r\nelectrothermally produced hydrogen, and hydrogen from fossil gas with CCS may reshape where heavy industry is located, how \r\nvalue chains are organised, and what gets transported in international shipping (Bataille 2020a; Gielen et al. 2020; Bataille et al. \r\n2021a; Saygin and Gielen 2021). Regions with bountiful renewables resources, nuclear, or methane co-located with CCS geology may \r\nbecome exporters of hydrogen or hydrogen carriers such as methanol and ammonia, or home to the production of iron and steel, \r\norganic platform chemicals, and other energy-intensive basic materials. This in turn may generate new trade patterns and needs for \r\nbulk transport."


id: 2eda7c92075ecaa7f84bfaf4a7dc400c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"the CO2 disposal upon injection if sealed properly (Mac Dowell et al. \r\n2017). There are several industrial CCS strategies and pilot projects \r\nworking to take advantage of the relative ease of concentrated CO2 \r\ndisposal (e.g.,  LEILAC for limestone calcination process emissions \r\nfrom cement production, HISARNA direct oxycombustion smelting \r\nfor steel) (Bataille 2020a). An emerging option for storing carbon is \r\nmethane pyrolysis by which methane is split into hydrogen and solid \r\ncarbon that may subsequently be stored (Schneider et al. 2020)."


id: 462a4e82be41881b81a266be3e5bb6b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"There are several post-combustion CCS projects underway globally \r\n(IEA 2019g), generally focused on energy production and processing \r\nrather than industry. Their costs are higher but evolving downward - \r\nGiannaris et al. (2020) suggest USD47 tCO2\r\n-1 for a  follow-up \r\n90% capture power generation plant based on learnings from the \r\nSaskpower Boundary Dam pilot - but crucially these costs are higher \r\nthan implicit and explicit carbon prices almost everywhere, resulting \r\nin limited investment and learning in these technologies. A  key \r\nchallenge with all CCS strategies, however, is building a gathering \r\nand transport network for CO2, especially from dispersed existing \r\nsites; hence most pilot projects are built near EOR/geological storage \r\nsites, and the movement towards industrial clustering in the EU and \r\nUK (UKCCC 2019b), and as suggested in IEA (2019f)."


id: b84fe4d98064d3bb635e133baf6d39bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"just on GHG mitigation but multi-attribute improvements to chemical \r\nprocesses from reutilisation of CO2, suggests the largest reduction \r\nin the absolute amount of GHGs from CO2 reutilisation could be \r\nachieved by the coupling of highly concentrated CO2 sources with \r\ncarbon-free hydrogen or electrons from low GHG power in so called \r\n'power-to-fuel' scenarios. From the point of view of maximising \r\nGHG mitigation using surplus 'curtailed' renewable power, however, \r\nDaggash et al. (2018) instead indicates the best use would be for \r\ndirect air capture and CCS. These results depend on what system is \r\nbeing measured, and what the objective is."


id: 9cb4a34e35e7e1c59ae34e49544c3ccd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"The above CCU literature has identified that there may be a highly \r\nunpredictable competition between fossil, biogenic and direct air \r\ncapture carbon to provide highly uncertain chemical feedstock, \r\nmaterial and fuel needs. Fossil waste carbon will likely initially be \r\nplentiful but will add to net atmospheric CO2 when released. Biogenic \r\ncarbon is variably, partially net-negative, but the available stock will \r\nbe finite and compete with biodiversity and agriculture needs for \r\nland. Direct air capture carbon will require significant amounts of \r\nlow-GHG electricity or methane with high-capture rate CCS (Keith \r\net al. 2018). There are clearly strong interactive effects between low\u0002carbon electrification, switching to biomass, hydrogen, ammonia, \r\nsynthetic hydrocarbons via CCU, and CCS. "


id: 8810d7841ebb4bcbe1ef5ed7195ce26f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"In this section we conceptually address interactions between service \r\ndemand, service product intensity, product material efficiency, energy \r\nefficiency, electrication and fuel switching, CCU and CCS, and what \r\nconflicts and synergies may exist. Post AR5 a substantial literature \r\nhas emerged, see Rissman et al. (2020), that addresses integrated "


id: b36576cd58557cd0ed5950aef351edd0
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content:
"There are widely varying estimates of the capacity of CCU to reduce \r\nGHG emissions and meet the net zero objective. According to Hepburn \r\net al. (2019), the estimated potential for the scale of CO2 utilisation in \r\nfuels varies widely, from 1 to 4.2 GtCO2 yr-1, reflecting uncertainties \r\nin potential market penetration, requiring carbon prices of around "


id: 893f38b502ff2009aa605163fe42d349
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"are the steel beams clearly tagged with their content? The answers to \r\nthese questions will be very regionally and site specific, and require \r\nrevision of educational curricula for the entire supply chain, as well \r\nas revision of building codes."


id: aa9d6258f7aa7a9c89001c8f8bb660f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 24373
content:
"Energy efficiency is a  critical strategy for net zero transitions and \r\nenabling clean electrification (IEA 2021a). Improving the efficiency \r\nof energy services provision reduces the need for material intensive \r\nenergy supply, energy storage, CCU and CCS infrastructure, and \r\nlimits generation and transmission expansion to reduce an ever\u0002higherdemand, with associated generation, transmission, and \r\ndistribution losses. Using electricity efficiently can help reduces peak \r\ndemand and the need for peaking plants (currently often powered by \r\nfossil fuels), and energy storage systems."


id: c2791fc4321fb7d56627922f98c1039f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 28185
content:
"Electrification and final energy efficiency are deeply entangled, \r\nbecause switching to electricity from fossil fuels in most cases \r\nimproves GJ for GJ end-use energy efficiency: resistance heaters \r\nare almost 100% efficient, heat pumps can be 300-400% efficient, \r\ninduction melting can improve mixing and temperature control, and \r\nelectric vehicle motors typically translate 90-95% of input electricity \r\nto motor drive in contrast to 35-45% for a large, modern internal \r\ncombustion engine. Overall, the combined effect could be 40% lower \r\nglobal final energy demand assuming renewable electricity is \r\nused (Eyre 2021)."


id: 4b568a72abd1ea0f1ab7e6b8675a9604
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"While the strategies are not sequential and interact strongly, we \r\ndiscuss them in the order given. Reduced demand through reduced \r\nservice demand and product intensity per service unit (Grubler \r\net al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2018) reduces the need for the next six \r\nstrategies. Greater material efficiency (see earlier sections) reduces \r\nthe need for the next five, and so on - see Figure 11.9 above."


id: ad0fb9b274384f6632355c8cde9212da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"There are potentially complicated physical and market fuel switching \r\nrelationships between low-GHG electricity, bioliquids and gases, \r\nhydrogen, ammonia, and synthetic hydrocarbons constructed \r\nusing CCU, with remaining CO2 potentially being disposed of \r\nusing CCS. Whether or not they compete for a  wide range of end \r\nuses and primary demand needs will be regional and whether or \r\nnot infrastructure is available to supply them. Regions with less \r\nthan optimal renewable energy resources, or not sufficient to meet \r\ngrowing needs, could potentially indirectly import them as liquid or \r\ncompressed hydrogen, ammonia or synthetic hydrocarbon feedstocks \r\nmade in regions with abundant resources (Armijo and Philibert 2020; \r\nBataille 2020a). Large-scale CCU and CCS applications need additional \r\nbasic materials to build corresponding infrastructure and energy to \r\noperate it, thus reducing overall material and energy efficiencies."


id: 6dc3d4f687c570d19f4db115ec8a3c9
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content:
"There are different roles for different actors in relation to the different \r\nmitigation strategies (exemplified in Table 11.2), with institutions and \r\nsupply chains developed to widely varying levels, for example, while \r\nenergy efficiency is a relatively mature strategy with an established \r\nsupply chain, material efficiency is not."


id: a56377e190d10af8f0f09e9277075a04
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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"Table 11.2 | Examples of the potential roles of different actors in relation to different mitigation strategies indicating the importance of engaging a wide \r\nset of actors across all mitigation strategies."


id: 3c76e383b2af4b294bf6f66afe367a9b
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"scenarios selected from chapters  3 and 4, representing different \r\nGHG mitigation ambitions and different pathways to achieve \r\ncertain mitigation targets. Comparing technology-focused sector\u0002based scenarios with more top-down-oriented scenario approaches \r\nallows for a  reciprocal assessment of both perspectives and helps \r\nto identify robust elements for the transformation of the sector. \r\nComparison of real-world conditions within the sector (e.g., industry \r\nstructure and logics, investment cycles, market behaviour, power, and \r\ninstitutional capacity) and the transformative pathways described \r\nin the scenarios helps researchers, analysts, governments, and all \r\nstakeholders understand the need not only for technological change, \r\nbut for structural (e.g.,  new value chains, markets, infrastructures, \r\nand sectoral couplings) and behavioural (e.g., design practices and \r\nbusiness models) change at multiple levels."


id: e8c34b1a9840016aec101024c39ad852
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"This section continues the discussion of the various mitigation \r\noptions and strategy elements introduced in Section 11.3 and makes \r\nthem explicit for the most relevant industry sectors. For the various \r\nsectors, Section  11.4.1 concludes with a  tabular overview of key \r\ntechnologies and processes, their technology readiness level (TRL), \r\npotential timing of market penetration, mitigation potential and \r\nassessment of associated mitigation costs."


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content:
"An integrated sequencing of mature short-term actions and less \r\nmature longer-term actions is crucial to avoid lock-in effects. Temporal \r\nimplementation and discussion of the general quantitative role of \r\nthe different options to achieve net zero emissions in the industrial \r\nsectors is core to the second part of the section (Section 11.4.2), where \r\nindustry-wide mitigation pathways are analysed. This comprises \r\nthe collection and discussion of mitigation scenarios available in the \r\nliterature with a high technological resolution for the industry sector \r\nin addition to a set of illustrative global and national GHG mitigation "


id: 2da43b27dcb0cf29fda182e2e82ba9fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4620
content:
"When undergoing a  transformative process, it is obvious that \r\ninteractions occur within the sector but also on a  cross-sectoral \r\nbasis. Relevant interactions are identified and discussed in the third \r\nand fourth part of the subsection. Changes are induced along the \r\nwhole value chain, i.e., switching to an alternative (climate-friendly, "


id: 40469d4ce2cfe1abbd780a30b3e753be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 7492
content:
"e.g., low-GHG hydrogen-based) steel-making process has substantial \r\nimpacts on the value chain, associated sub-suppliers, and electricity \r\nand coal outputs. In addition, cross-sectoral interactions are \r\ndiscussed. This includes feedback loops with other end-use chapters, \r\nfor example, higher material demand through market penetration \r\nof some GHG mitigation technologies or measures (e.g., insulation \r\nmaterials for buildings, steel for windmills) and lower demand \r\nthrough others (e.g., less steel for fossil fuel extraction, transport and \r\nprocessing), or substantial additional demand of critical materials \r\n(e.g., the widely varying demands for copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt \r\nand rare earths for producing windmills, solar panels, and batteries). \r\nGenerally, if consumption- (or behaviour-) driven additional material \r\ndemand creates scarcity it becomes important to increase efforts \r\non material efficiency, substitution, recycling/reuse, and sustainable \r\nconsumption patterns."


id: 6477e58e329efc10742b3a85fc722e85
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 13372
content:
"Based on the general discussion of strategies across industry \r\nin Section 11.3, this subsection focuses on the sector perspective and\r\nprovides insights into the sector-specific mitigation technologies \r\nand potentials. As industry is comprised of many different subsectors, \r\nthe discussion here has its focus on the most important sources \r\nof GHG emissions, that is, steel, cement and concrete, as well as \r\nchemicals, before other sectors are discussed."


id: 22e35be4c3942e703b021d97a46b9c25
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2940
content:
"An estimated 15% energy efficiency improvement is possible within \r\nthe BF-BOF process (Figure  11.8). Several options exist for deep\u0002GHG emissions reductions in steel-production processes (Fischedick \r\net al. 2014b; Leeson et al. 2017; Axelson et al. 2018; Vogl et al. \r\n2018; Bataille 2020a; Holappa 2020; Rissman et al. 2020; Fan and \r\nFriedmann 2021; Wang et al. 2021).Each could reduce specific CO2"


id: 622df65c03e21f24208c18df5015fa9c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13002
content:
"increases are significant, the effect on final end uses is typically \r\nvery small (Rootzen and Johnsson 2016), with significant policy \r\nconsequences (see Section 11.6 on public and private lead markets \r\nfor cleaner materials)."


id: 8414d9c59e47b4d3a8333998b6c8f36a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18316
content:
"a significant increase in energy efficiency compared with the direct \r\nreduced iron (DRI) and blast furnace routes (Cavaliere 2019). If \r\nthe electricity used is based on carbon-free sources, this steel\u0002production process can be nearly CO2 neutral. Both processes \r\nwould require supplemental carbon, but this is typically only up \r\nto 0.05% per tonne steel, with a  maximum of 2.1%. Aqueous \r\nelectrolysis is possible with today's electrode technologies, \r\nwhile molten oxide electrolysis would require advances in high\u0002temperature electrodes."


id: 6dad65a460a01b362e1bb7f53b6808ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14862
content:
"Reflecting the different conditions at existing and potential future \r\nplant sites, when choosing one of the above options a combination \r\nof different measures and structural changes (including electricity, \r\nhydrogen and CCU or CCS infrastructure needs) will likely be \r\nnecessary in the future to achieve deep reductions in CO2 emissions \r\nof steel production."


id: cf269532b764857878f23c625317a8fe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 30125
content:
"One of the simplest and most effective ways to reduce cement and \r\nconcrete emissions is to make stronger concrete through better \r\nmixing and aggregate sizing and dispersal; poorly and well-made \r\nconcrete can vary in strength by a factor of four for a given volume \r\n(Fechner and Kray 2012; Habert et al. 2020). This argues for a refocus \r\nof the market away from 'one size fits all', often bagged cements to \r\nprofessionally mixed clinker, cementitious material and filler mixtures \r\nappropriate to the needs of the end use."


id: 9003ffa8cc619d9c5bbbaa1aee097bd1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 20187
content:
"Architects, engineers and contractors also tend to overbuild with \r\ncement because it is cheap as well as corrosion- and water-resistant. \r\nBuildings and infrastructure can be purposefully designed to \r\nminimise cement use to its essential uses (e.g., compression strength \r\nand corrosion-resistance), and replace its use with other materials \r\n(e.g., wood, stone and other fibres) for non-essential uses. This could \r\nreduce cement use by 20-30% (Imbabi et al. 2012; Brinkerhoff and \r\nGLDNV 2015; D'Alessandro et al. 2016; Lehne and Preston 2018; IEA \r\n2019b; Shanks et al. 2019; Habert et al. 2020)."


id: 3a98dde772ba3731c6d43d11af4dc543
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
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vector_id: 6584
content:
"Abatement costs for these strategies vary considerably from case \r\nto case and for each a plausible cost range is difficult to establish; \r\ncompare this with Table  11.3 (Fischedick et al. 2014b; Leeson \r\net al. 2017; Axelson et al. 2018; Vogl et al. 2018; Fan and Friedmann \r\n2021; Wang et al. 2021). A key point is that while cost of production "


id: 2afd61ccbf5d18e4902d46373e3ab757
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4194
content:
"Because so much of the emissions from concrete come from the \r\nlimestone calcination to make clinker, anything that reduces use of \r\nclinker for a  given amount of concrete reduces its GHG intensity. "


id: 6cdbabaafa6f495a494620c105f85497
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 14747
content:
"While 95% Portland cement is common in some markets, it is typically \r\nnot necessary for all end-use applications, and many markets will add \r\nblast furnace slag, coal fly ash, or natural pozzolanic materials to \r\nreplace cement as supplementary cementitious materials; 71% was \r\nthe global average clinker content of cement in 2019 (IEA 2020a). \r\nAll these materials are limited in volume, but a  combination of \r\nroughly two to three parts ground limestone and one part specially \r\nselected, calcined clays can also be used to replace clinker (Fechner \r\nand Kray 2012; Lehne and Preston 2018; Habert et al. 2020). Local \r\nbuilding codes determine what mixes of cementitious materials are \r\nallowed for given uses and would need to be modified to allow these \r\nalternative mixtures where appropriate."


id: 1715cfa067728da669dbaaee107d640a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1150
content:
"are several highly regional alternative chemistries in use that provide \r\npartial reductions (Fechner and Kray 2012; Lehne and Preston 2018; \r\nHabert et al. 2020), for example, carbonatable calcium silicate clinkers, \r\nand there have been pilot projects with magnesium-oxide-based \r\ncements, which could be negative emissions. Lower carbon cement \r\nchemistries are not nearly as widely available as limestone deposits \r\n(Material Economics 2019), and would require new materials testing \r\nprotocols, codes, pilots and demonstrations."


id: dc112561e324968132ad6666a3405f7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32138
content:
"Any substantial changes in cement and concrete material efficiency \r\nor production decarbonisation, however, will require comprehensive \r\neducation and continuing re-education for cement producers, \r\narchitects, engineers, contractors and small, non-professional users \r\nof cements. It will also require changes to building codes, standards, \r\ncertification, labeling, procurement, incentives, and a  range of \r\npolices to help create the market will be needed, as well as those \r\nfor information disclosure, and certification for quality. Even an end\u0002of-pipe solution like CCS will require infrastructure for transport and \r\ndisposal. Abatement costs for these strategies vary considerably \r\nfrom case to case and for each a plausible cost range is difficult to \r\nestablish, but they are summarised in Table 11.3 from the following \r\nliterature and other sources (Wilson et al. 2003; Fechner and Kray \r\n2012; Leeson et al. 2017; Moore 2017; Lehne and Preston 2018; IEA \r\n2019f; Habert et al. 2020)."


id: d4860f41ed79fae9b5cd6caee58f5be0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30959
content:
"The chemical industry produces a broad range of products that are \r\nused in a  wide variety of applications. The products range from \r\nplastics and rubbers to fertilisers, solvents, and specialty chemicals \r\nsuch as food additives and pharmaceuticals. The industry is the \r\nlargest industrial energy user and its direct emissions were about \r\n1.1-1.7 GtCO2-eq or about 10% of total global direct industrial \r\nemissions in 2019 (Olivier and Peters 2018; IEA 2019f; Crippa et al. \r\n2021; Lamb et al. 2021; Minx et al. 2021) (Figure 11.4 and Table 11.1). \r\nWith regard to energy requirements and CO2 emissions, ammonia, \r\nmethanol, olefins, and chlorine production are of great importance \r\n(Boulamanti and Moya Rivera 2017). Ammonia is primarily used for \r\nnitrogen fertilisers, methanol for adhesives, resins, and fuels, whereas \r\nolefins and chlorine are mainly used for the production of polymers, \r\nwhich are the main components of plastics."


id: 480eb2876fd9e88b411bca4e21a005a3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8711
content:
"Technologies and process changes that enable the decarbonisation \r\nof chemicals production are specific to individual processes. Although \r\nenergy efficiency in the sector has steadily improved over the past \r\ndecades (Boulamanti and Moya Rivera 2017; IEA 2018a) (Figure 11.8), \r\na significant share of the emissions is caused by the need for heat \r\nand steam in the production of primary chemicals (Bazzanella and \r\nAusfelder 2017) (Box 11.2). This energy is currently supplied almost \r\nexclusively through fossil fuels which could be substituted with \r\nbioenergy, hydrogen, or low or zero carbon electricity, for example, \r\nusing electric boilers or high-temperature heat pumps (Bazzanella \r\nand Ausfelder 2017; Thunman et al. 2019; Saygin and Gielen 2021). \r\nThe chemical industry has among the largest potentials for industrial \r\nenergy demand to be electrified with existing technologies, indicating \r\nthe possibility for a  rapid reduction of energy-related emissions \r\n(Madeddu et al. 2020)."


id: 416439e23fef3e66b246c52c522806bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 7685
content:
"In the long run, if some combination of material efficiency, better \r\nmixing and aggregate sizing, cementitious material substitution and \r\n90%+ capture CCS with supplemental bioenergy are not feasible in \r\nsome regions or at all to achieve near-zero emissions, alternatives \r\nto limestone-based ordinary Portland cement may be needed. There "


id: 376c0a829ed877e4ab3045bd771c0f92
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 6104
content:
"the emissions from the subsector (IEA 2018a). Future lower-carbon \r\noptions include electrifying the heat supply in the steam cracker as \r\ndescribed above, although this will not remove the associated process \r\nemissions from the cracking reaction itself or from the combustion \r\nof the by-products. Further in the future, electrocatalysis of carbon \r\nmonoxide, methanol, ethanol, ethylene and formic acid could allow \r\ndirect electric recombination of waste chemical products into new \r\nintermediate products (De Luna et al. 2019)."


id: a794d59da09f471ff37473b57d31e60
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23874
content:
"A ranking of key emerging technologies with likely deployment dates \r\nfrom the present to 2025 relevant for the chemical industry identified \r\ndifferent carbon capture processes together with electrolytic hydrogen \r\nproduction as being of very high importance to reach net zero \r\nemissions (IEA 2020a). Methane pyrolysis, electrified steam cracking, \r\nand the biomass-based routes for ethanol-to-ethylene and lignin-to\u0002BTX were ranked as being of medium importance. While macro-level \r\nanalyses show that large-scale use of carbon circulation through CCU \r\nis possible in the chemical industry as primary strategy, it would be \r\nvery energy intensive and the climate impact depends significantly \r\non the source of and process for capturing the CO2 (Artz et al. 2018; \r\nKatelhon et al. 2019; Muller et al. 2020). Significant synergies can be \r\nfound when combining circular CCU approaches with virgin carbon \r\nfeedstocks from biomass (Bachmann et al. 2021; Meys et al. 2021)."


id: 513f4305f6ba894b909ef581b6fe3fbe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 10238
content:
"Biomass feedstocks: Substituting fossil carbon at the inception of \r\na product lifecycle for carbon from renewable sources processed in \r\ndesignated biotechnological processes (Lee et al. 2019; Hatti-Kaul \r\net al. 2020) using specific biomass resources (Isikgor and Becer 2015) \r\nor residual streams already available (Abdelaziz et al. 2016). Routes \r\nwith thermochemical and catalytic processes, such as pyrolysis and \r\nsubsequent catalytic upgrading, are also available (Jing et al. 2019)."


id: 2ab35c64b8d5cdab7dcd9ede2460758d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 4143
content:
"Synthetic feedstocks: Carbon captured with direct air capture \r\nor from point sources (bioenergy, chemical recycling, or during \r\na  transition period from industrial-processes-emitting fossil CO2) \r\ncan be combined with low-GHG hydrogen into a syngas for further \r\nvalorisation (Katelhon et al. 2019). Thus, low-carbon methanol can \r\nbe produced and used in methanol-to-olefins/aromatics (MTO/MTA) \r\nprocesses, substituting the steam cracker (Gogate 2019) or Fischer\u0002Tropsch processes could produce synthetic hydrocarbons."


id: fd4e0af3692e6d7d0554fd615279c778
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 37364
content:
"Reducing emissions involves demand-side measures, for example, \r\nefficient end use, materials efficiency and slowing demand growth, \r\nas well as recycling where possible to reduce the need for primary \r\nproduction. The following strategies for primary production of \r\norganic chemicals which will continue to need a carbon source are \r\nkey in avoiding the GHG emissions of chemical products throughout \r\ntheir lifecycles:"


id: de19774b0a5713a91e5692fd3ba9ad73
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32440
content:
"Recycled feedstocks: Chemical recycling of plastics unsuitable \r\nfor mechanical recycling was already mentioned. Through pyrolysis\r\nof old plastics, both gas and a  naphtha-like pyrolysis oil can \r\nbe generated, a  share of which could replace fossil naphtha as \r\na feedstock in the steam cracker (Honus et al. 2018a,b). Alternatively, \r\nwaste plastics could be gasified and combined with low-carbon \r\nhydrogen to a  syngas, for example, the production and methanol \r\nand derivatives (Lopez et al. 2018; Stork et al. 2018). Other chemical \r\nrecycling options include polymer selective chemolysis, catalytic \r\ncracking, and hydrocracking (Ragaert et al. 2017). Carbon losses and \r\nprocess emissions must be minimised and it may thus be necessary \r\nto combine chemical recycling with CCS to reach near-zero emissions \r\n(Thunman et al. 2019; Smet and Linder 2019; Meys et al. 2021)."


id: 434e32d20b133aadcf576be1427c0e96
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"possible for low temperature needs (<100degC) and concentrating solar \r\nfor higher temperatures. Commercially available heat pumps can \r\ndeliver 100degC-150degC but at least up to 280degC is feasible (Zuhlsdorf \r\net al. 2019). Plasma torches using electricity can be used where high \r\ntemperatures (>1000degC) are required, but hydrogen, biogenic or \r\nsynthetic combustible hydrocarbons (methane, methanol, ethanol, \r\nLPG, etc.) can also be used (Bataille et al. 2018a)."


id: 5296036d595f7cdf6b600d7d0d14756e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10455
content:
"The other big sources of direct global industrial combustion and \r\nprocess CO2 emissions are light manufacturing and industry (9.7% \r\nin 2016), non-ferrous metals like aluminium (3.1%), pulp and paper \r\n(1.1%), and food and tobacco (1.9%) (Bataille 2020a; Crippa et al. \r\n2021; Lamb et al. 2021)."


id: d578929733b68f6fb39b8712ad611a06
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31107
content:
"There is also a large potential for energy savings through cascading \r\nin industrial clusters similar to the one at Kalundborg, Denmark. \r\nWaste heat can be passed at lower and lower temperatures from \r\nfacility to facility or circulated as low-grade steam or hot water, and \r\nboosted as necessary using heat pumps and direct heating. Such \r\ngeographic clusters would also enable lower-cost infrastructure for \r\nhydrogen production and storage as well as CO2 gathering, transport \r\nand disposal (IEA 2019f)."


id: 290561ef50273c1fe3a66ddd40dc0ff0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3881
content:
"Light manufacturing and industry represent a very diverse sector in \r\nterms of energy service needs (e.g., motive power, ventilation, drying, \r\nheating, compressed air, etc.) and it comprises both small and large \r\nplants in different geographical contexts. Most of the direct fossil \r\nfuel use is for heating and drying, and it can be replaced with low\u0002GHG electricity through direct resistance, high-temperature heat \r\npumps and mechanical vapour recompression, induction, infrared, \r\nor other electrothermal processes (Lechtenbohmer et al. 2016; \r\nBamigbetan et al. 2017). Madeddu et al. (2020) argue up to 78% \r\nof Europe's industrial energy requirements are electrifiable through \r\nexisting commercial technologies and 99% with the addition of new \r\ntechnologies currently under development. Direct solar heating is "


id: d24bead4f6aad9e8e79718f498260d9c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30613
content:
"Demand for aluminium comes from a  variety of end uses where \r\na reasonable cost, light-weight metal is desirable. It has historically \r\nbeen used in aircraft, window frames, strollers, and beverage "


id: 74666472a19f48d556a10f4e7bb6c44e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 15905
content:
"(Bataille and Stiebert 2018): (i) Increase material efficiency; \r\n(ii)  Increase recycling of existing stock; (iii) Pursue ore-extraction \r\nprocesses (e.g., hydro- and electro-metallurgy) that allow more use \r\nof low-carbon electricity as opposed to pyrometallurgy, which uses \r\nheat to melt and separate the ore after it has been crushed. These \r\nprocesses have been used occasionally in the past but have generally \r\nnot been used due to the relatively inexpensive nature of fossil fuels."


id: 39edd303ef24809e64d45231c3817660
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6484
content:
"A larger and more challenging issue is how the forestry industry \r\ncan contribute to the decarbonisation of other sectors and how \r\nbiogenic carbon will be used in a  fossil-free society, for example, \r\nthrough developing the forest-based bioeconomy (Pulzl et al. 2014; \r\nBauer 2018). In recent years the concept of biorefineries has gained \r\nincreasing traction. Most examples involve innovations for taking by\u0002products or diverting small streams to produce fuels, chemicals and \r\nbio-composites that can replace fossil-based products, but there is \r\nlittle common vision on what really constitutes a biorefinery (Bauer \r\net al. 2017). Some of these options have limited scalability and the \r\ncellulose fibre remains the core product even in the relatively large \r\nshift from paper production to textiles fibre production."


id: e26c16fbbbaa00e4529193684fa5229e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33131
content:
"The use of low- and zero-GHG electricity (e.g.,  historically from \r\nhydropower) can reduce the indirect emissions associated with \r\nmaking aluminium. A  public-private partnership with financial \r\nsupport from the province of Quebec and the Canadian federal \r\ngovernment has recently announced a  fundamental modification \r\nto the Hall-Heroult process by which the graphite electrode process \r\nemissions can be eliminated by substitution of inert electrodes. \r\nThis technology is slated to be available in 2024 and is potentially \r\nretrofittable to existing facilities (Saevarsdottir et al. 2020)."


id: eeb66d4998e65f7f3bb60b02572d5f04
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35033
content:
"Pulp mills have been identified as promising candidates for post\u0002combustion capture and CCS (Onarheim et al. 2017), which could allow \r\nsome degree of net-negative emissions. For deep decarbonisation \r\nacross all sectors, notably switching to biomass feedstock for fuels, \r\norganic chemicals and plastics, the availability of biogenic carbon (in \r\nbiomass or as biogenic CO2; Chapter 7) becomes an issue. A scenario \r\nwhere biogenic carbon is CCU as feedstock implies large demands "


id: 9a04d94ecefe9e53af6939a9e6fe77fd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21758
content:
"for hydrogen, completely new value chains and more closed carbon \r\nloops, all areas which are as yet largely unexplored (Ericsson 2017; \r\nMeys et al. 2021)."


id: 535864944f2004ce0af14df5efb6c970
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 10580
content:
"(e.g.,  90% emissions reduction via widespread deployment of \r\nhydrogen, electrification or bioenergy for stationary industrial heat/\r\ncombustion). Finally, costs range from 33-299 GBP tCO2-eq-1 when \r\nenergy and material efficiency are limited."


id: 9ac2b5f3b0ae718b1397223f5334e63e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21880
content:
"Table 11.3, modified from Bataille (2020a) and built from McMillan \r\net al. (2016); Bazzanella and Ausfelder (2017); Philibert (2017a); \r\nWesseling et al. (2017); Axelson et al. (2018); Bataille et al. (2018a) \r\nDavis et al. (2018); Energy Transitions Commission (2018); IEA \r\n(2019f, 2020c); Material Economics (2019); and UKCCC (2019b), \r\npresents carbon intensities that could be achieved by implementing \r\nmitigation options in major basic material industries, mitigation \r\npotential, estimates for mitigation costs, TRL and potential year of \r\nmarket introduction (Figure 11.13)."


id: c915b417d9a971871adc66ae384c3a18
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29197
content:
"Table  11.3 acknowledges that for many carbon-intensive products \r\na large variety of novel processes, inputs and practices capable of \r\nproviding very deep emission reductions are already available and \r\nemerging. However, their application is subject to different economic \r\nand structural limitations, therefore in the scenarios assuming deep \r\ndecarbonisation by 2050-2060 different technological mixes can be \r\nobserved (Section 11.4.2)."


id: 8ed1c25a814c861cf3db9f7a5640babc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19997
content:
"While deep GHG emissions reduction potential is assessed for \r\nvarious regions, assessment of associated costs is limited to only \r\na few regions; nevertheless those analyses may be illustrative at the \r\nglobal scale. UKCCC (2019b) provides costs assessments for different \r\nindustrial subsectors (Table  11.3) for the UK.  They provide three \r\nranges: core, more ambitious, and when energy and material efficiency \r\nare limited. The core options range from 2-85 GBP2019 tCO2-eq-1\r\n(e.g., reduction in GHG emissions by about 50% by 2050 applying \r\nenergy efficiency (EE), ME, CCS, biomass and electrification). The \r\nmore ambitious options are estimated at 32-119 GBP2019 tCO2-eq-1"


id: 7797c28fe0bd050550ed8cdf7007de0d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16373
content:
"Thus, the price impact scales down going across the value chain and \r\nmight be acceptable for a significant share of customers. However, \r\nit has to be reflected that the cumulative price increase could be \r\nmore significant if several different zero-carbon materials (e.g., steel, \r\nplastics and aluminium) in the production process of a certain product "


id: dc114b0ede036d13b6f91320e6dc3c0b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32139
content:
"Table 11.3 | Technological potentials and costs for deep decarbonisation of basic industries. Percentages of maximum reduction are multiplicative, not additive."


id: 728c1ac850750f349984570fbeb254bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15641
content:
"a\r\n Data for CCS costs for steel-making: Birat (2012); Leeson et al. (2017); and Axelson et al. (2018)."


id: 2990a9b0b922745ea1fb05828e508553
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3977
content:
"e\r\n Data for Molten Oxide Electrolysis (also known as SIDERWIN): Fischedick et al. 2014b and Axelson et al. 2018. The TRLs differ by source, the value provided is from Axelson \r\net al. (2018), based on UCLOS SIDERWIN."


id: 80c226c38f58be36e84378c595f1de65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17782
content:
"f\r\n Data for making hydrogen from SMR and ATR with CCUS: Leeson et al. (2017); Moore (2017); and IEA (2019f). The cost of CCS disposal of concentrated sources of CO2 at \r\nUSD15-40 tCO2-eq-1 is well established as commercial for direct or EOR purposes and is based on the long-standing practice of disposing of hydrogen sulphide and oil brines \r\nunderground: Wilson et al. (2003) and Leeson et al. (2017). There is a wide variance, however, in estimated tCO2-eq-1 break-even prices for industrial post-combustion capture \r\nof CO2 from sources highly diluted in nitrogen (e.g., Leeson et al. (2017) at USD60-170 tCO2-eq-1), but most fall under USD120 tCO2-eq-1."


id: 8fbf39049390eb4739447817697a605c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20154
content:
"h\r\n Rio Tinto, Alcoa and Apple have partnered with the governments of Quebec and Canada to form a coalition to commercialise inert as opposed to sacrificial graphite electrodes \r\nby 2024, thereby making the standard Hall-Heroult process very low emissions if low-carbon electricity is used."


id: 492e8e68351a322e39626d3e81225a59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8903
content:
"results of IAM-based scenarios followed by specific studies which \r\nprovide much higher technological resolution and allow a  much \r\ndeeper look into the interplay of different mitigation strategies. The \r\ncomparison of more technology-focused sector-based scenarios \r\nwith top-down-oriented scenarios provides the opportunity for \r\na reciprocal assessment across different modelling philosophies and \r\nhelps to identify robust elements for the transformation of the sector. \r\nOnly some of the scenarios available in the literature allow for at \r\nleast rough estimates of the necessary investments and give direction "


id: ab23452ab9476a6d38cdb670be968417
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24444
content:
"have to be combined, indicating the importance of material efficiency \r\nbeing applied along with production decarbonisation."


id: c53bcf82309642c43420fa25fa752517
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28613
content:
"To discuss the general role and temporal implementation of the \r\ndifferent options for achieving a net zero GHG emissions industry, \r\nmitigation pathways will be analysed. This starts with showing the "


id: 669507fca179b89cde7f8c94a66449fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13725
content:
"about relevant investment cycles and potential risks of stranded or \r\ndepreciated assets. In some specific cases cost comparisons can be \r\ntranslated into expected difference costs not only for the overall \r\nsector, but also for relevant materials or even consumer products."


id: a1ae0ff068696c1aaef3ca8a81c74210
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22997
content:
"but increasing demand in 2100, driven by growing material use \r\nthroughout the 21st century. While carbon intensity shrinks over \r\ntime, energy related CO2-emissions decline after 2030 even in \r\nless ambitious scenarios, but particularly in those pursuing \r\na temperature increase below 2degC. Reduction of CO2 emissions \r\nin the sector are achieved through a combination of technologies \r\nwhich includes nearly all options that have been discussed in \r\nthis chapter (Sections 11.3 and 11.4.1). However, there are big \r\ndifferences with regard to the intensity by which the various \r\noptions are implemented in the scenarios.  This is particularly \r\ntrue for CCS for industrial applications and material efficiency \r\nand material demand management (i.e., service demand, service \r\nproduct intensity). The latter options are still under-represented \r\nin many global IAMs."


id: 13a3336573c99dfead021196ae55a47f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 596
content:
"Chapter 3 conducted a comprehensive analysis of scenarios based \r\non IAMs. The resulting database comprises more than 1000 model\u0002based scenarios published in the literature. The scenarios span \r\na broad range along temperature categories from rather baseline-like \r\nscenarios to the description of pathways that are compatible with \r\nthe 1.5degC target. Comparative discussion of scenarios allows some \r\ninsights with regard to the relevance of mitigation strategies for the \r\nindustry sector (Figure 11.11)."


id: 9d5a0cd363d16c3b8b690bbf97305d5b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
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vector_id: 22283
content:
"Figure 11.11 Industrial final energy (top left), CO2 emissions (top middle), energy intensity (bottom left), carbon intensity (top right), share of electricity \r\n(bottom middle), and share of gases (bottom right). Energy intensity is final energy per unit of GDP. Carbon intensity is CO2 emissions per EJ of final energy. The first \r\nfour indicators are indexed to 2019, where values less than 1 indicate a reduction. Industrial-sector CO2 emissions include fuel-combustion emissions only. Boxes indicate the \r\ninterquartile range, the median is shown with a horizontal black line, while vertical lines show the 5 to 95% interval. Source: data are from the AR6 database; only scenarios \r\nthat pass the vetting criteria are included (Section 3.2)."


id: 2030e119c35b7f060e893e93aab077d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2505
content:
"detailed. Due to their top-down perspective IAMs to date have not \r\nbeen able to represent the high complexity of industries in terms \r\nof the broad variety of technologies and processes (particularly \r\ncircularity aspects) and to fully reflect the dynamics of the sector. \r\nIn addition, as energy and carbon price elasticities are still not \r\ncompletely understood, primarily cost-driven models have their \r\nlimitations. However, there are several ongoing activities to bring \r\nmore engineering knowledge and technological details into the \r\nIAM models (Kermeli et al. 2021)."


id: b7df7aa45546811e3ca1e4044ecc23d2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26466
content:
"In addition to the more aggregated discussion, the IAMs illustrative \r\nmitigation pathways (IMPs) allow a deeper look into the transformation \r\npathways related to the scenarios. For the illustrative mitigation \r\npathways (IMPs) approach, sets of scenarios have been selected which \r\nrepresent different levels of GHG mitigation ambitions, scenarios \r\nwhich rely on different key strategies or even exclude some mitigation \r\noptions, represent delayed actions or SDG-oriented pathways. For more \r\ndetailed information about the selection see Section 3.3.2. Figure 11.12 \r\ncompares for a selected number of key variables the results of IMPs \r\nand puts them in the context of the whole sample of IAMs scenario \r\nresults for three temperature categories."


id: 8f1c89965cc873584582b1cda0c5ad86
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20055
content:
"show a broad variety of contributions, with the GS scenario (where \r\nhydrogen is not relevant as a mitigation option) representing the upper \r\nbound to 2050, with almost 2 GtCO2 yr-1 captured and stored by 2050. \r\nBeyond 2050 the upper bound is associated with scenario IMP-Neg \r\nassociated with extensive use of CDR in the industry and energy \r\nsectors to achieve net-negative emissions in the second half of the \r\ncentury - more than 6 GtCO2 yr-1 is captured and stored in 2100 (this \r\nrepresents roughly 60% of 2018 direct CO2 emissions of the sector)."


id: 18d64fa6da7d170edb45c994b8f05768
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1409
content:
"a\r\n Based on bottom-up technology modelling of five energy-intensive industry subsectors (cement, iron and steel, chemicals and petrochemicals, aluminium, and pulp and paper).\r\nb\r\n Industrial direct CO2 emissions reached 8.3 GtCO2 in 2014, 24% of global CO2 emissions.\r\nSource: IEA (2017, 2019b, 2020a, 2020c,i, 2021a)."


id: c647c45558c056867ab7e90539a0826c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28771
content:
"A comparison of the different mitigation scenarios shows that they \r\ndepend on how individual mitigation strategies in the industry sector \r\n(Figure 11.13) are assessed. The use of CCS, for example, is in many \r\nscenarios assessed as very important, while other scenarios indicate \r\nthat ambitious mitigation levels can be achieved without CCS in the \r\nindustry sector. CCS plays a major role in the B2DS scenario (3.2 GtCO2\r\nin 2050), the ETC Supply Side scenario (5.4 GtCO2 in 2050) and the \r\nIEA (2020a, 2021a) scenarios (e.g., 2.8 Gt CO2 in NZE2050 in 2050, \r\nroughly one half of the captured CO2 is related to cement production), "


id: 487edbac74ea5cd34953be0999e1cdf8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8777
content:
"Two studies complement the discussion of the IEA scenarios and \r\nare related to the IEA database.26 The ETC Supply Side scenario \r\nbuilds on the ETP 2017 study, investigating additional emission \r\nreduction potentials in the emissions-intensive sectors such as \r\nheavy industry and heavy-duty transport so as to be able to reach \r\nnet zero emissions by the middle of the century. The LED scenario \r\n(Grubler et al. 2018) also builds on the ETP 2017 study, but focuses \r\non the possible potential of very far-reaching efforts to reduce \r\nfuture material demand."


id: 59e1f8fb8046a32ca4cb5ac1e8cf6e8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11646
content:
"(42%), innovative processes and CCS (37%), switching to lower \r\ncarbon fuels and feedstocks (13%), and material efficiency strategies \r\nin manufacturing processes (8%). Energy efficiency improvements \r\nare particularly important in the first time period."


id: bafa6ed00e73946fea62d9289e4c5551
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26954
content:
"The IEA World Energy Outlook indicates energy efficiency improvement \r\nin the 2020 to 2030 period as a major basis to switch from STEPS \r\n(stated policies) to the SDS (net zero emissions by 2070) pathway \r\n(IEA 2020i, 2021c). For many energy-intensive industries annual \r\nefficiency gains have to be almost doubled (e.g., from 0.6% yr-1 to \r\n1.0% yr-1 for cement production) to contribute sufficiently to the \r\noverall goal. If net zero CO2 emissions should be achieved already \r\nby 2050 as pursued in the NZE2050 scenario (IEA 2020i, 2021c) \r\nfurther accelerating energy efficiency improvements are necessary \r\n(e.g., for cement, annual efficiency gains of 1.75%), leading to the \r\neffect that in 2030 many processes are implemented closely to their \r\ntechnological limits. In total, sector final energy demand can be \r\nheld nearly constant at 2018 levels until 2050 and decoupled from \r\nproduct demand growth."


id: 279fcc07b030cf4003734fe2a9c85f5e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3643
content:
"Assessment of the scenario literature allows to conclude that under \r\nspecific conditions strong CO2-emission reductions in the industry \r\nsector by 2050-2070 and even net-zero-emission pathways are \r\npossible. However, there is no consensus on the most plausible or \r\nmost desirable mix of key mitigation strategies to be pursued. In \r\naddition it has to be stressed that suitable pathways are very country\u0002specific and depend on the economic structure, resource potentials, \r\ntechnological competences, and political preferences and processes \r\nof the country or region in question (Bataille 2020a)."


id: 679978dd0c39eaa9c09fcacf3e5a1594
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13890
content:
"There is a  consensus among the scenarios that a  significant shift \r\nis needed from a  transition process in the past mainly based on \r\nmarginal (incremental) changes (with a  strong focus on energy \r\nefficiency efforts) to one based on transformational change. To limit \r\nthe barriers that are associated with transformational change, besides \r\novercoming the valley of death for technologies or processes with \r\nbreakthrough character, it is required to carefully identify structural \r\nchange processes which are connected with substantial changes of \r\nthe existing system (including the whole process chain). This has to \r\nbe done at an early stage and has to be linked with considerations "


id: 6c66539afc4d79a01d0f8a0b05079495
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14682
content:
"mostly long operation times, investment cycles have to be used so \r\nas not to miss opportunities) and to gain experience. In the case \r\nof steel, companies can start with the integration of a natural gas\u0002based direct reduced iron furnace feeding the reduced iron to an \r\nexisting blast furnace, blending and later replacing the natural gas by \r\nhydrogen in a second stage, and later transitioning to a full hydrogen \r\nDRI EAF or molten oxide electrolysis EAF, all without disturbing the \r\nlocal upstream and downstream supply chains."


id: fa5d6486bac80307e53c7cd4a667f59e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36907
content:
"In general, early adoption of new technologies plays a major role. \r\nConsidering the long operation time (lifetime) of industrial facilities \r\n(e.g., steel mills and cement kilns) early adoption of new technologies \r\nis needed to avoid lock-in. For the SDS 2020 scenario, the IEA (2020h) \r\ncalculated the potential cumulative reduction of CO2 emissions from \r\nthe steel, cement and chemicals sector to be around 57 GtCO2 if "


id: 413ef62c3d30cf39802f2432373044b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7660
content:
"Table 11.5 | Contribution to emission reduction of different mitigation strategies for net zero emissions pathways (range represents three different \r\npathways for the industry sector in Europe; each related scenario focuses on different key strategies).27"


id: 1af624cd24218f7099538cb3e378becb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1714
content:
"materials to regions with large and inexpensive renewable energy \r\npotential or CCS geology (Bataille 2020a; Gielen et al. 2020; Bataille \r\net al. 2021a; Saygin and Gielen 2021)."


id: 710ff32434dc2ec29459849e274a881b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15420
content:
"production technology is changed at its first mandatory retrofit, \r\ntypically 25 years, rather than at 40 years (typical retrofitted lifetime) \r\n(Figure 11.14). Net zero pathways require that the new facilities \r\nare based on zero- or near-zero emissions technologies from 2030 \r\nonwards (IEA 2021c)."


id: 7c98a5b919a0dd3d126e91e362a6cd26
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17197
content:
"In a  sequence of sectoral- and industry-wide figures above \r\n(Figure 11.13), it is shown - starting in the present on the left and \r\nmoving through 2050 to 2070 on the right, how much separate \r\nmitigation strategies can contribute and how they are integrated \r\nin the literature to reach near-zero emissions. For cement, steel \r\nand primary chemicals GHG intensities are presented, and for \r\nall industry absolute GHG emissions are displayed. Effects of the \r\nfollowing mitigation strategies are reflected: energy efficiency, \r\nmaterial efficiency, circularity/recycling, feedstock carbon intensity, \r\nfuel switching, CCU and CCS. Contributions of technologies split by \r\ntheir readiness for 2050 and 2070 are provided along with ranges of \r\nmitigation costs for achieving near-zero emissions for each strategy, \r\naccompanied by ranges of associated basic materials cost escalations \r\nand driven by these final products' prices increments."


id: e49b8024ade76e819f202b3556b3edff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33445
content:
"Another important finding is that material efficiency and demand \r\nmanagement are still not well represented in the scenario literature. \r\nBesides IEA (2020a) two of the few exceptions are Material \r\nEconomics (2019) for the EU and Zhou et al. (2019) for China. Zhou \r\net al. (2019) describe a consistent mitigation pathway (Reinventing \r\nFire scenario) for China where in 2050 CO2 emissions are at a level \r\n42% below 2010 emissions. Around 13% of the reduction is related \r\nto less material demand, mainly based on extension of building and \r\ninfrastructure lifetime, as well as reduction of material losses in \r\nthe production process and application of higher quality materials \r\nparticularly high-quality cement (Zhou et al. 2019). For buildings \r\nand cars, Pauliuk et al. (2021) analysed the potential role of material \r\nefficiency and demand management strategies on material demand \r\nto be covered by the industry sector."


id: b3a4e56a89f2025840b8e7eb9f375a4a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25774
content:
"For the four subsectors in industry with high emissions, Table 11.5 \r\nshows results from Material Economics (2019) for the EU.  The \r\ncombination of circularity, material and energy efficiency, fossil and \r\nwaste fuels mix, electrification, hydrogen, CCS and biomass use \r\nvaries from scenario to scenario with none of these options ignored, \r\nbut trade-offs are required."


id: 2b477d2885d39bc098ccf7c79827822b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4245
content:
"The analysis of net zero emission pathways requires significantly \r\nhigher investments compared to business as usual (BAU): 25-65% for \r\nsteel, 6-26% for ammonia, 22-49% for cement, and with 122-199% \r\nthe highest number for plastics (Material Economics 2019)."


id: 7da698cdcbb9057c2f16cf0ffb7feb74
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17342
content:
"Using industrial waste heat for space heating, via district heating, \r\nis an established practice that still has a large potential with large \r\nquantities of low-grade heat being wasted (Fang et al. 2015). For \r\nDenmark it is estimated that 5.1% of district heating demand could \r\nbe met with waste heat (Buhler et al. 2017) and for four towns \r\nstudied in Austria 3-35% of total heat demand could be met (Karner \r\net al. 2016). A  European study shows that temporal heat demand \r\nflexibility could allow for up to 100% utilisation of excess heat \r\nfrom industry (Karner et al. 2018). A study of a Swedish chemicals "


id: 65e4ec09750a880b070e19aa47fd1288
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13618
content:
"For example, Japan's Keidanren promotes a  scheme by different \r\nindustries to reduce GHG through the global value chain, including \r\nmaterial procurement, product-use stages, and disposal, regardless \r\nof geographical origin, with provided quantitative visualisation \r\n(Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) 2018). The EU adopted \r\na non-financial disclosure directive in 2014 (Kinderman 2020) and \r\na Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance in 2019 (Section 15.6.1)."


id: e9008b16c196650b456da1ed788f72ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34178
content:
"complex estimated that 30-50% of excess heat generated on\u0002site could be recovered with payback periods below three years \r\n(Eriksson et al. 2018)."


id: afa263eb1f6b984e3d7502e461bfeb02
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 25149
content:
"A European study found that most of the industrial symbiosis or \r\nclustering synergies today are in the chemicals sector with shared \r\nstreams of energy, water, and carbon dioxide (Mendez-Alva et al. \r\n2021). For future mitigation, the UKCCC (2019b) finds that industrial \r\nclustering may be essential for achieving the necessary efficiencies \r\nof scale and to build the infrastructure needed for industrial \r\nelectrification; carbon capture, transport and disposal; hydrogen \r\nproduction and storage; heat cascading between industries and to \r\nother potential heat users (e.g., residential and commercial buildings)."


id: ca115ddff5a7ab0e706528c0c87c9500
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"Emissions are typically categorised by the territory, subsector or \r\ngroup of technologies from which they emanate. An alternative \r\nsubdivision is that between existing sources that will continue to "


id: f52f799d92906f96147cf948fb1d4c10
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 36088
content:
"generate emissions in the future, and those that are yet to be built \r\n(Erickson et al. 2015). The rate of emissions from existing assets will \r\neventually tend to zero, but in a timeframe that is relevant to existing \r\nclimate and energy goals, the cumulative contribution to emissions \r\nfrom existing infrastructure and equipment is likely to be substantial. \r\nAside from the magnitude of the contribution, the distinction between \r\nemissions from existing and forthcoming assets is instructive because \r\nof the difference in approach to mitigation that may be necessary or \r\ndesirable in each instance to avoid getting locked into decades of \r\nhighly carbon-intensive operations (Lecocq and Shalizi 2014)."


id: bc204fceb9e6e19cd99c054d78542550
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 27167
content:
"Data on the current age profile and typical lifetimes of emissions\u0002intensive industrial equipment are difficult to procure and verify and \r\nmost of the studies conducted in this area contain little detail on \r\nthe global industrial sector. Two recent studies are exceptions, both \r\nof which cover the global energy system, but contain detailed and \r\nnovel analysis on the industrial sector (Tong et al. 2019; IEA 2020a). \r\nTong et al. (2019) use unit-level data from China's Ministry of Ecology \r\nand Environment to obtain a more robust estimate of the age profile \r\nof existing capacity in the cement and iron and steel sectors in the \r\ncountry. The IEA (2020a) uses proprietary global capacity datasets for \r\nthe iron and steel, cement and chemicals sectors, and historic energy \r\nconsumption data for the remaining industry sectors as a proxy for \r\nthe rate of historic capacity build-up."


id: 8262c136f5685aac3a5e33ab4a6e258e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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content:
"As this review was being finalised several papers were released that \r\nsomewhat contradict the Tong et al. (2010) results (Bataille et al. 2021b; \r\nVogl et al. 2021b). Broadly speaking, these papers argue that while "


id: 415e1bf89548de0b71031f65e137945c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
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vector_id: 7682
content:
"vertical or horizontal depending on whether singular sectors or \r\ntechnologies are targeted (e.g., through R&D, tariffs and subsidies) \r\nor the whole economy (e.g., education, infrastructure, and general \r\ntax policies). The horizontal policies are not always thought of as \r\nindustrial policy, although taking a  broad view, including policy \r\ncoordination and institution building, is important for industrial \r\npolicy to be effective (see e.g., Andreoni and Chang 2019)."


id: 7c4248a874c49cd7c69cb41d0612ce67
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 17149
content:
"high-emitting facilities may last for a  long time, be difficult to shut \r\ndown early, and are inherent to local boarder supply chains, individual \r\nmajor processes that are currently highly GHG intense, such as blast \r\nfurnaces and basic oxygen smelters, could be retired and replaced \r\nduring major retrofits on much shorter time cycles of 15 to 25 years."


id: 9fa06e919ae0a11c3132293a4514c7aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22657
content:
"The cost of retrofitting or retiring a plant before the end of its lifetime \r\ndepends on plant-specific conditions as well as a range of economic, \r\ntechnology and policy developments. For industrial decarbonisation \r\nit may be a  greater challenge to accelerate the development and \r\ndeployment of zero-emission technologies and systems than to \r\nhandle the economic costs of retiring existing assets before end of \r\nlife. The 'lock-in' also goes beyond the lifetime of key process units, \r\nsuch as blast furnaces and crackers, since they are typically part \r\nof large integrated plants or clusters with industrial symbiosis, as \r\nwell as infrastructures with feedstock storage, ports, and pipelines. \r\nIndividual industrial plants are often just a small part of a complex \r\nnetwork of many facilities in an industrial supply chain. In that sense, \r\ncurrent assessments of 'carbon lock-in' rely on simplifications due to \r\nthe high the complexity of industry."


id: a7145ef5c3d2996202147ca719551cc4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 23799
content:
"Conditions are also subsector and context specific in terms of \r\nmitigation options, industry structures, markets, value chains and \r\ngeographical location. For example, the hydrogen steel-making joint \r\nventure in Sweden involves three different companies headquartered \r\nin Sweden (in mining, electricity and steel-making, respectively), two \r\nof which are state-owned, with a shared vision and access to iron ore, \r\nfossil-free electricity and high-end steel markets (Kushnir et al. 2020). \r\nIn contrast, chemical clusters may consist of several organisations \r\nthat are subsidiaries to large multinational corporations with \r\nheadquarters across the world, that also compete in different \r\nmarkets. Even in the presence of a local vision for sustainability this \r\nmakes it difficult to engage in formalised collaboration or get support \r\nfrom headquarters (Bauer and Fuenfschilling 2019)."


id: 5776ae315fc53ac5c61ff570bb7b8224
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 11256
content:
"Furthermore, it is relevant to consider also institutional and behavioural \r\nlock-in (Seto et al. 2016). On one side, existing high-emitting \r\npractices may be favoured through formal and informal institutions \r\n(e.g., regulations and social norms or expectations, respectively), for \r\nexample, around building construction and food packaging. On the \r\nother side, mitigation options may face corresponding institutional \r\nbarriers. Examples include how cars are conventionally scrapped \r\n(i.e.,  crushed, leading to copper contamination of steel) rather \r\nthan being dismantled, or slow permitting procedures for new \r\ninfrastructure and industrial installations for reducing emissions."


id: 39915cf4c8ea72a4a40575272641dfcf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6433
content:
"In the context of climate change policy, it is fair to say that industry has \r\nso far been sheltered from the increasing costs that decarbonisation \r\nmay entail. This is particularly true for the energy- and emissions\u0002intensive industries where cost increases and lost competitiveness \r\nmay lead to carbon leakage (i.e., that industry relocates to regions \r\nwith less stringent climate policies). Heavy industries typically pay no \r\nor very low energy taxes and where carbon pricing exists (e.g., in the \r\nEuropean Trading Scheme) they are sheltered through free allocation \r\nof emission permits and potentially compensated for resulting \r\nelectricity price increases. For example, Okereke and McDaniels "


id: b46bdcd8917e612d778e490e5471c5ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25907
content:
"The basic motivation for industrial policy historically has been \r\neconomic development and wealth creation. Industrial policy can be \r\nprogressive and promote new developments or be protective to help \r\ninfant or declining industries. It may also involve the phase-out of \r\nindustries, including efforts to retrain workers and create new jobs. \r\nIndustrial policy is not one policy intervention but rather the combined \r\neffects of many policy instruments that are coordinated towards an \r\nindustrial goal. Industrial policies can be classified as being either "


id: f6aad68ca6bb1e9948cd7de51a8d208b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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vector_id: 36323
content:
"show that sustainable consumption is positively related to life \r\nsatisfaction and subjective well-being (SDG 3), and Guillen-Royo \r\n(2019) adds positive associations with happiness and life satisfaction."


id: 63787c16f1a5828878348ac27cb322ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13221
content:
"(2012) show how the European steel industry was successful in \r\navoiding cost increases and how information asymmetry in the policy \r\nprocess was important for that purpose."


id: bf05e554c76f48e70b6edf105642ecd4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27605
content:
"The reduction in excessive consumption and demand for products \r\nand services generates a  reduction in post-consumption waste \r\nand so enhances clear water and sanitation (SDG 6) (Govindan \r\n2018; Minelgaite and Liobikiene 2019), and reduces waste along \r\nproduct supply chains and lifecycles (SDG 12) (Genovese et al. \r\n2017; UNSD 2020). At the risk side there are possible reductions of \r\nemployment, incomes, sales taxes from the material extraction \r\nand processing activities, considered as excessive for sustainable \r\nconsumption (Thomas 2003)."


id: 5a1899a51b89b0bb572e70f8187e7a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11687
content:
"The deployment of climate change mitigation strategies is \r\nprimarily influenced by its costs and potential, but also by other \r\nbroader sustainable development factors such as the Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Goals (SDGs). Mitigation actions therefore are to \r\nbe considered through the prism of impacts on achieving other \r\neconomic, social  and  environmental goals. Those impacts are \r\nclassified as co-benefits when they are positive or as risk when they \r\nare negative. Co-benefits can serve as additional drivers, while risks \r\ncan inhibit the deployment of available mitigation options. Actions \r\ntaken to mitigate climate change have direct and indirect interactions \r\nwith SDGs, both positive (synergies) or negative (trade-offs) (Fuso \r\nNerini et al. 2019)."


