# document

id: 632deeacbb38b36e4f80527f8d97045c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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" This transition will happen at higher warming in WCE \r\nsince risks are projected to increase less rapidly (transition between \r\n2degC and 3degC GWL) (medium confidence) (Section 13.2.1.2; Byers et al., \r\n2018). At 3degC GWL and beyond, water scarcity will become much more \r\nwidespread and severe in already water-scarce areas in SEU (high \r\nconfidence) and will expand to currently non-water-scarce regions \r\nin WCE (medium confidence) (Section 13.2.1.2; Bisselink et al., 2018; \r\nNaumann et al., 2018; Harrison et al., 2019; Koutroulis et al., 2019; \r\nCammalleri et al., 2020; Spinoni et al., 2020). Decrease in hydropower \r\npotential in SEU and WCE are expected beyond 3degGWL (Figure 13.16)."


id: 5c664c96585f0c6311e2e110dfe22369
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Risks related to water scarcity across multiple sectors can become \r\nsevere in WCE and, to a much larger extent, in SEU based on projections \r\nof drought damage, population and sectors exposed, and they \r\nincrease in water exploitation (Figure 13.31a; Table SM13.29). In EEU, \r\nuncertainty in hydrological drought projections and risk consequences \r\nis higher (Greve et al., 2018; Ranasinghe et al., 2021; Seneviratne et al., \r\n2021) and the available number of publications is lower, not allowing a \r\nconclusion on how risk levels change with GWL. Yet, there is emerging \r\nevidence that drought-related risks increase with warming beyond \r\n3degC GWL also in EEU (Seneviratne, 2021, for hydrological drought and \r\n4degC GWL; Kattsov and Porfiriev, 2020). Evidence from the detected \r\nchanges and attribution assessment suggests that the risk is already \r\nmoderate in SEU (e.g., 48 million people exposed to moderate water \r\nscarcity between 1981 and 2010) (high confidence) (Section 13.10"


id: 6b2d3929cd721cd7c34a7d19e0a407eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"To reduce risk to water scarcity, adaptation measures, at both the \r\nsupply and the demand side, have been suggested (Section  13.2.2; \r\nFigures  13.6, 13.31b; Garnier and Holman, 2019; Hagenlocher \r\net  al., 2019). Several measures are already in place showing high \r\ntechnical and institutional feasibility (Sections  13.2.2.2, 13.5.2.1). \r\nThe effectiveness of options varies regionally (in particular between \r\nnorthern and southern regions). For example, in SEU many water \r\nreservoirs are already in place. Irrigation is used to support agriculture \r\nwhere rain-fed supplies are not sufficient (Section 13.5.2). Their future \r\nextension depends on available precipitation. Also, wastewater reuse \r\ncan only be effective if sufficient wastewater is available. Improvements \r\nin water efficiency and behavioural changes are very effective in \r\nSEU (>25% of damages avoided) (Section  13.2.2.2)"


id: 18d3ac5f7f08378cbe5ef46770bd5dc6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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" Investments in \r\nlarge water infrastructures and advanced technologies (including \r\nstorage), water transfer, water recycling and reuse, and desalination \r\nwill allow to buy time and therefore to cope with additional warming \r\n(Papadaskalopoulou et  al., 2016; Greve et  al., 2018). Beyond 2.5degC \r\nGWL, transformational adaptation is needed to lower risk levels, such \r\nas planned relocation of industry, abandonment of farmland or the \r\ndevelopment of alternative livelihoods (Holman et al., 2017). In WCE, \r\nthe solution space to water scarcity is expanding with considerable \r\npotential for investments in large water infrastructure and advanced \r\ntechnologies (including storage), for reducing risks above 3degC GWL \r\n(Greve et  al., 2018). Under medium warming a larger portfolio of "


id: b6ab79adbe019abb704f9ab86b82d47f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Damages and losses from coastal and river floods are projected to \r\nincrease substantially in Europe over the 21st century (high confidence) \r\n(Section 13.2.1; SM13.10). Coastal areas have already started to be \r\naffected by SLR (see Box 13.1; Section 13.10.1) and human exposure \r\nto coastal hazards is projected to increase in the next decades (high \r\nconfidence), but less under SSP1 (20%) than SSP5 (50%) by the end of \r\nthe century (medium confidence) (Merkens et al., 2016; Reimann et al., \r\n2018a). Under low adaptation (i.e., coastal defences are maintained \r\nbut not further strengthened), severe consequences include an increase \r\nin expected annual damage by a factor of at least 20 for 1.5degC-2.1degC \r\nGWL (i.e., high risks) and by two to three orders of magnitude between \r\n2degC and 3degC GWL in EU-28 (i.e., very high risk) (medium confidence) \r\n(Figures  13.28, 13.34c; Section  13.2.1.1; Vousdoukas et  al., 2018b; \r\nHaasnoot et  al., 2021b). Under high adaptation (i.e"


id: f5c044748440f78279a26d372e86ae0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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", lowlands \r\nare protected where it is economically efficient), expected annual \r\ndamages still increase by a factor of 5 above 2degC GWL (Section 13.2; \r\nVousdoukas et al., 2020). Sea levels are committed to rise for centuries \r\n(Fox-Kemper et al., 2021), submerging at least 10% of the territory in "


id: 457ad76e69adefbecee99dffa01fc183
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Pluvial and riverine flood events in Europe have been attributed to \r\nclimate change, but the associated damages and losses also depend \r\non land-use planning and flood risk management practices (medium \r\nconfidence) (Section  13.10.1; Ranasinghe et  al., 2021). Exposure to \r\nurban flooding will increase with urbanisation (Jongman et al., 2012; \r\nJones and O'Neill, 2016; Dottori et al., 2018; Paprotny et al., 2018b). \r\nFlooding is projected to rise with temperature in Europe with, for \r\nexample, a doubling of damage costs and people affected from river \r\nflood for low adaptation above 3degC GWL (Alfieri et al., 2018). Inland \r\nflooding represents a KR for Europe due to the extent of settlements \r\nexposed, the frequency of the hazards, the risks to human lives \r\nassociated with flash floods and the limited adaptation potential to \r\npluvial flooding (e.g., difficulty to upgrade urban drainage systems) \r\n(Dale et al"


id: 90c308870b66608f50a5584c61ed6e31
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"European regions are affected by multiple KRs simultaneously. While \r\nthere is a wide range in quantifications, there is high agreement that \r\nthe consequences for socioeconomic and natural systems can be \r\nsubstantial, with more severe consequences in the south than in the \r\nnorth (very high confidence); and there is some indication also for a \r\nwest-to-east gradient, with higher uncertainty in eastern WCE and \r\nEEU, which makes adaptation more challenging (medium confidence). \r\nFurthermore, the food-water-energy-land nexus plays an important \r\nrole in amplifying overall risk levels in Europe (medium confidence) \r\n(Forzieri et al., 2016; Harrison et al., 2016; Byers et al., 2018; Arnell \r\net  al., 2019; Harrison et  al., 2019; Kebede et  al., 2021). Southern \r\nEurope, European cities and coastal areas are projected to become \r\nhotspots of multiple risks (high confidence) (Cramer et  al., 2018; \r\nForzieri et  al., 2018; Guerreiro et  al., 2018)"


id: e79cdf28a848b01044a1ffb5cc58f404
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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" The number of people \r\nexposed to multiple KRs in Europe are projected to at least double \r\nat 3degC GWL compared with 1.5degC GWL (Forzieri et al., 2017; Byers \r\net al., 2018; Arnell et al., 2019), but risk levels are already higher at \r\n1.5degC GWL than today for a number of KRs (medium confidence) \r\n(Figure 13.28)."


id: 86f2ab4d58ba2dcce6dc5c886a8d0edb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"A range of adaptation options to coastal flooding exists, and \r\nadaptation is possible in many European regions if started on time \r\n(Section  13.2; Figure  13.32d). Continuing a protection pathway is \r\ncost-effective in urbanised regions for this century (Vousdoukas \r\net al., 2020), but there is high agreement that it comes with residual \r\nrisk if coastal defences fail during a storm. This residual risk can \r\nbe reduced through early warning and evacuations, insurance and \r\naccommodate measures (Section  13.2.2). Soft limits to protection \r\nhave been identified under high GWL, in particular due to the rate of \r\nchange and delayed impacts of long-term SLR (medium confidence) \r\n(Hinkel et  al., 2018; Haasnoot et  al., 2020a). Ecosystem-based \r\nsolutions, such as wetlands, can reduce waves' propagation, provide \r\nco-benefits for the environment and climate mitigation, and reduce \r\ncosts for flood defences (medium confidence) (Section  13.2.2.1)"


id: fcde2e9f97c645c039f097ad0fec423e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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" \r\nAt higher GWL, ecosystems are projected to experience reduced \r\neffectiveness due to temperature increases and an increased rate \r\nof SLR combined with a lack of sediment and human pressures \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3). Retention and diversion can \r\nbe effective for compound flooding or for estuaries with a limited \r\nstorm surge duration, but there is a lack of knowledge on their \r\neffectiveness (Sections 13.2.2)."


id: a98dc9efd0e881c81c272e40db6353fd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Economic losses and damages for European economies from multiple \r\nKRs are projected to increase (high confidence) (Figure  13.34; \r\nSzewczyk et al., 2018; Feyen et al., 2020; Kalkuhl and Wenz, 2020) \r\nand potentially quadruple at 3degC GWL compared with 1.5degC GWL \r\n(Feyen et al., 2020). Existing estimates of projected economic costs for \r\nEurope, based on integrated assessment or computable general equi\u0002librium models, are, however, likely to be underestimations of the true \r\ncosts because of incomplete coverage of biophysical impacts, in par\u0002ticular low-probability high-impact events, and disruptive risk prop\u0002agation channels (Lamperti et al., 2018; Stoerk et al., 2018; Schewe \r\net al., 2019; Piontek et al., 2021). The main driver for this increase in \r\neconomic losses and damages is mortality due to heat stress (me\u0002dium confidence), followed by reduced labour productivity, coastal \r\nand inland flooding, water scarcity and drought (medium confidence) \r\n(Figure 13.33; Section 13.6.1"


id: 56cab4fc1d9336dd177f2c66be2d2459
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"3). While losses are highest in SEU for \r\nboth 1.5degC and 3degC GWL, and increase by a factor of more than 3 \r\nbetween these GWLs, the projected economic damages and losses \r\nalso increase significantly in WCE (by a factor of 4 from 1.5degC to 3degC \r\nGWL; 40% of total losses in EU-28 at 3degC GWL) and in NEU (almost \r\n10% of total losses at 3degC GWL) (Szewczyk et  al., 2018; Szewczyk \r\net al., 2020). Adaptation is projected to reduce macroeconomic costs, \r\nbut residual costs will remain particularly for warming above 3degC \r\nGWL (medium confidence) (De Cian et al., 2016; Bosello et al., 2018; \r\nParrado et al., 2020)."


id: 3f96a56086e729b70c5dd1ef3971a5a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Malmo (population 300,000): Since the 1990s, Malmo has been transitioning towards an environmentally, economically and socially \r\nsustainable city, investing in eco-districts (redeveloped areas that integrate and showcase the city's sustainability strategies) and adopting \r\nambitious adaptation and mitigation targets. The city has focused on energy-efficient buildings and construction, collective and low-carbon \r\ntransportation, and green spaces and infrastructure (Anderson, 2014; Malmo Stad, 2018). Malmo has developed creative implementation \r\nmechanisms, including a 'climate contract' between the city, the energy distributor and the water and waste utility to co-develop the \r\nclimate-smart district, Hyllie (Isaksson and Heikkinen, 2018; Kanters and Wall, 2018; Parks, 2019). Flagship eco-districts play a central role \r\nin the city's transition, in the wider adoption of CRD and in securing implementation partners (Isaksson and Heikkinen, 2018; Stripple and \r\nBulkeley, 2019)"


id: e568be4f0dce5d087792ad48eee1149f
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" The city has also leveraged its status as a CRD leader to attract investment. The private sector views CRD as profitable, due \r\nto the high demand and competitive value of these developments (Holgersen and Malm, 2015). Malmo adopted the SDGs as local goals \r\nand the city's Comprehensive Plan is evaluated based on them, for example, considering gender in the use, access and safety of public \r\nspaces, and emphasising development that facilitates climate-resilient lifestyles (Malmo Stad, 2018). Malmo also engages stakeholders via \r\ndialogue with residents, collaboration with universities and partnerships with industry and service providers (Kanters and Wall, 2018; Parks, \r\n2019)"


id: 10d25b9c9e9a815ca7d83a23506f14b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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" Despite measurable and monitored targets, and supportive institutional arrangements, sustainability outcomes for the flagship \r\ndistricts have been tempered by developers' market-oriented demands (Holgersen and Malm, 2015; Isaksson and Heikkinen, 2018) and \r\nthere is limited low-income housing in climate-resilient districts (Anderson, 2014; Holgersen and Malm, 2015)."


id: 5d721ff127073adc4f1ea3fde0e75e26
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"Milan (population 1.4 million): Milan is taking a CRD approach to new developments (Comune di Milano, 2019). From 2020, new \r\nbuildings must be carbon neutral and reconstructions must reduce the existing land footprint by at least 10%. The Climate and Air \r\nPlan (CAP) and the city's Master Plan (Comune di Milano, 2019) focus on low-carbon, inclusive and equitable development. The CAP \r\nis directed at municipal and private assets, and individual- to city-scale actions. In 2020, Milan released a revised Adaptation Plan and \r\nthe Open Streets Project to ensure synergies between the COVID-19 response and longer-term CRD. Examples include strengthening \r\nneighbourhood-scale disaster response and reallocating street space for walking and cycling (Comune di Milano, 2020). Milan emphasises \r\ninstitutionalisation of CRD via a dedicated resilience department, and through active participation in climate networks and projects that \r\nsupport learning and exchange"


id: abce7eb3bde3baf667fe089bf740d3ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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" Climate network commitments are cited in the city's Master Plan and CAP guidelines as driving more \r\nambitious deadlines and emissions targets (Comune di Milano, 2019). Implementation of Milan's plans remains a challenge, despite \r\ndedicated resources and commitment."


id: f80a67f521595757b9cd12d98b34117
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"The drivers of adaptation progress in Europe differ across sectors and \r\nregions. Common drivers include: experienced climatic events, improved \r\nclimatic information, societal pressures to act, projected economic and \r\nsocietal costs of climate change, participation in (city) networks, societal \r\nand political leadership, and changes in national and European policies \r\nand legislation (medium evidence, high agreement) (EEA, 2014; Massey \r\net al., 2014; Reckien et al., 2018). The availability of knowledge, human \r\nand financial resources appears important for proactive adaptation \r\n(Termeer et al., 2012; Sanderson et al., 2018), while adaptation is \r\nalso strongly dependent on economic and social development (high \r\nconfidence) (Sanderson et  al., 2018). How adaptation is governed \r\ndiffers substantially across Europe (Clar, 2019; Lesnikowski et al., 2021)"


id: c138b345af8a595062fcbae4c5b4f031
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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" \r\nPolitical commitment, persistence and consistent action across scales of \r\ngovernment is critical to move beyond planning for adaptation (Steps \r\nA-C in Figure 13.34) and to ensure adequacy of implementation (Steps \r\nD and E in Figure 13.34) (Howlett and Kemmerling, 2017; Lesnikowski \r\net al., 2021; Patterson, 2021)."


id: c6f5149f6dbba5f80e21282a7bdc76cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Coordinated responses are necessary to prevent inefficient and \r\ncostly action (Biesbroek, 2021), balance under- and overreaction to \r\nclimate risks (Peters et al., 2017; Biesbroek and Candel, 2019), prevent \r\nredistributing vulnerability and maladaptive actions (Atteridge and \r\nRemling, 2018; Albizua et al., 2019; Neset et al., 2019), and ensure \r\ntimely implementation (high confidence) (Benson and Lorenzoni, \r\n2017). Since AR5, progress has been made to increase coordinated \r\nadaptation actions, but so far this is limited to a few sectors (mostly \r\nwater management and agriculture) and European countries \r\nand regions (mostly SEU, and WCE depending on impact) (high \r\nconfidence) (Section 13.11.2; Lesnikowski et al., 2016; Biesbroek and \r\nDelaney, 2020; Booth et  al., 2020). Despite evidence of emerging \r\nbottom-up (e.g., citizens and business) and top-down initiatives (e.g"


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", \r\ngovernmental plans and instruments to ensure action), there are \r\nconsiderable barriers to mainstreaming adaptation (high confidence) \r\n(Runhaar et al., 2018)."


id: b7656b5596cdfd3a6e9edea19289656c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Many near-term investment decisions have long-term consequences, \r\nand planning and implementation (Steps C and D in Figure 13.34) can \r\ntake decades, particularly for critical infrastructure planning in Europe \r\n(Zandvoort et al., 2017; Pot et al., 2018). Consequently, there are calls \r\nto expand planning horizons, to consider long-term uncertainties to \r\nprevent lock-in decision dependencies, to seize opportunities and \r\nsynergies from other investments (e.g., socioeconomic developments \r\nand systems transitions) and to broaden the range of considered possible \r\nimpacts (e.g., Frantzeskaki et al., 2019; Marchau, 2019; Oppenheimer \r\net  al., 2019; Haasnoot et  al., 2020b ). Yet, high GWL scenarios \r\nbeyond 2100 are often not considered in climate-change adaptation \r\nplanning due to a lack of perceived usability, missing socioeconomic \r\ninformation, constraining institutional settings and conflicting \r\ndecision-making timeframes (medium confidence) (Lourenco et  al"


id: 3736e8c337cb3ee4c81317921fe20561
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", \r\n2019; Taylor et al., 2020). High GWL scenarios are often seen as having \r\na low probability of occurrence, resulting in inaction or incremental \r\nrather than transformative adaptation responses to projected climate \r\nrisks (Dunn et  al., 2017). Extending planning horizons to beyond \r\n2100 increases deep uncertainties for decision makers as a result of \r\nunclear future socioeconomic and climatic changes. For adaptation to "


id: f327bbce7c9d8659b38ecca06f55dfdd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"example, in energy and risk prevention in coastal and riverine cities, \r\nstimulating regulations and bottom-up initiatives (Cavelier et al., 2017; \r\nLe Cozannet et al., 2017; Reckien et al., 2018; Howard et al., 2020). \r\nHowever, climate service efficacy is rarely systematically evaluated \r\n(Cortekar et  al., 2020). Barriers to use include: lack of perceived \r\nusefulness of climate information to organisations and expertise to \r\nuse the information, outdated statistics, mismatch between needs and \r\ntype of information made available, insufficient effective engagement \r\nbetween providers and recipients of climate information and lack of \r\nbusiness models to sustain climate services over time (high evidence, \r\nmedium agreement) (Cavelier et al., 2017; Rasanen et al., 2017; Bruno \r\nSoares et al., 2018; Christel et al., 2018; Oberlack and Eisenack, 2018; \r\nHewitt et al., 2020)"


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" Adaptation-decision support platforms also face \r\nchallenges regarding updating, training and engagement with users \r\n(EEA, 2015; Palutikof et al., 2019)."


id: 88977e964b4b4548375497cd7cb6ff0f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Within the private sector, there tends to be a preference for 'soft' (e.g., \r\nknowledge generation) than 'hard' (e.g., infrastructure) adaptation \r\nmeasures (Goldstein et  al., 2019), in contrast to government-led \r\nresponses typically favouring hard measures (Pranzini et  al., 2015). \r\nHowever, there also remains diversity across sectors and organisations in \r\nthe degree and type of adaptation response (Trawoger, 2014; Dannevig \r\nand Hovelsrud, 2016; Ray et al., 2017; Ricart et al., 2019). Whereas some \r\nsectors, such as flood management, banking and insurance, and energy \r\n(Bank of England, 2015; Gasbarro and Pinkse, 2016; Bank of England, \r\n2019; Botzen et al., 2019), have generally made moderate progress on \r\nadaptation planning across Europe, there are key vulnerable economic \r\nsectors that are in earlier stages, including aviation (Burbidge, 2018), \r\nports and shipping (Becker et al., 2018; Ng et al., 2018), and ICT (high \r\nconfidence) (EEA, 2018b)"


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" There is also some evidence of 'short-sighted' \r\nadaptation or maladaptation; for example, in winter tourism there is a \r\npreference for technical and reactive solutions (e.g., artificial snow) that \r\nwill not be sufficient under high levels of warming (Section 13.6.1.4)."


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"Dedicated financial resources for the implementation of NAS and \r\nplans are a key enabling factor for successful adaptation (high \r\nconfidence) (Chapter 17; Russel et  al., 2020). Yet, only 14 EU \r\ncountries have announced such budget allocations in their plans \r\nand strategies; and even if budget numbers are available, they are \r\ndifficult to compare (EEA, 2020a). Current adaptation spending \r\nvaries greatly across and within European countries, partly reflecting \r\n(sub)national adaptation priorities or financing sources targeting \r\ninvestment projects (Lopez-Doriga et al., 2020; Russel et al., 2020) \r\nand competing statutory priorities (Porter et  al., 2015). European \r\ngovernment budgets are also burdened by climate-change damages \r\ntoday, particularly after huge flooding events, and austerity following \r\nfinancial crises, limiting anticipatory action (Penning-Rowsell and \r\nPriest, 2015; Miskic et  al., 2017; Schinko et  al., 2017; Slavikova \r\net  al., 2020)"


id: 62e0591fcb1cff71c5cdf7f14cde87ae
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" National adaptation funding in EU member states \r\nis complemented by EU funding (e.g., European Structural and \r\nInvestment Funds, European Regional Development Funds, and LIFE \r\nprogram). While the EU spending target on climate action increased \r\nfrom 20% in 2016-2020 to 25% in 2021-2026, most spending is \r\ngoing into mitigation, not adaptation (Berkhout et al., 2015; Hanger \r\net al., 2015; EEA, 2020a)."


id: 54d8b9ecb929827fee8944513167514a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Perceived personal responsibility for tackling climate change remains \r\nlow across the EU (Figure 13.35) and partly explains why household \r\nadaptation remains limited (high confidence) (Taylor et  al., 2014; \r\nvan Valkengoed and Steg, 2019), despite risk perception apparently \r\ngrowing (Figure Box 13.2.1; Capstick et al., 2015; Poppel et al., 2015; \r\nBEIS, 2019). Householders' risk perception and concern about climate \r\nchange fluctuates in response to media coverage and significant \r\nweather or sociopolitical events (high confidence) (Capstick et  al., \r\n2015). On average across Europe, and particularly in relation to gradual \r\nchange, compared with experts, non-experts continue to underestimate \r\nclimate-change risks (medium confidence) (Taylor et  al., 2014), have \r\nlow awareness of adaptation options, and confuse adaptation and \r\nmitigation (Harcourt, 2019), suggesting a need for improved climate \r\nliteracy among the public"


id: 5ff944f18ac4e2d297f73321372e190e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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content:
" Indeed, fostering learning and coping \r\ncapacity supports robust adaptation pathways (Jager et al., 2015)."


id: 2aa324073861412f0c519ce7d6937251
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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content:
"Planned behavioural adaptation remains limited among European \r\nhouseholds (high confidence), with few examples that can be consid\u0002ered transformative (e.g., structural, long-term, collective) (medium \r\nconfidence) (Wilson et al., 2020). One Swedish survey of householders \r\nat risk of extreme weather events (e.g., floods, storms) found evidence \r\nof some organisational measures (e.g., bringing possessions inside \r\nprior to a storm, preparing for power cuts with candles, etc.), but very \r\nfew households took any other (technical, social, nature-based, or eco\u0002nomic) measures (Brink and Wamsler, 2019). Similarly, few at risk of \r\nflooding are taking action (Sections  13.2.1, 13.6.1; Stojanov et  al., \r\n2015); for example, there is little public take-up of available municipal \r\nsupport for individual adaptation in Germany (Wamsler, 2016). Water \r\nefficiency measures in anticipation of, or response to, drought are also \r\nlimited (Bryan et  al"


id: f3f7d2e2a7a47a2e6c5f7c140a918ec3
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", 2019), although water reuse in Mediterranean \r\nand some other EU (e.g., the UK and the Netherlands) countries is \r\nincreasing (Section  13.2; Aparicio, 2017). Among the adaptation re\u0002sponses recorded, few are perceived as opportunities (Taylor et  al., "


id: 4adcda44b19810b2d17336ad9ec38ad1
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"Considerable barriers exist that prevent system transitions from taking \r\nplace in Europe, including institutional and behavioural lock-ins such \r\nas administrative routines, certain types of legislation and dominant \r\nparadigms of problem solving (high confidence) (Johannessen et  al., \r\n2019; Roberts and Geels, 2019). For example, near-term and sectoral \r\ndecision-making constrains transformative options for water-related risks \r\n(Section 13.2). Breaking through these lock-ins requires substantive (i.e., \r\npolitical) will, (un)learning of practices, resources, and evidence of what \r\nworks. Trade-offs exist between the depth, scope and pace of change \r\nin transitioning from one system to another, suggesting that designing \r\nsystem transformations is a delicate balancing act (Termeer et al., 2017). \r\nAspiring in-depth and comprehensive transformational changes might \r\ncreate a consensus framework to which to aspire, but it might not offer \r\nconcrete perspectives to act on the ground"


id: 8efb2cbf558fe1d41964665e07d40532
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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content:
"As well as temporal trends in climate-change risk perception, the lit\u0002erature since AR5 continues to show much heterogeneity (both within \r\nand between nations) among householders in respect of risk percep\u0002tion (high confidence). Higher climate-change risk perceptions have \r\nbeen observed in Spain, Portugal, Iceland and Germany (Figure 13.2); \r\nat the individual level, women, younger age groups, more educated, \r\nleft-leaning and those with more 'self-transcendent' values perceive \r\nmore negative impacts from climate change, although the strength \r\nof these relationships varies across European nations (Clayton et al., \r\n2015; Doran et al., 2018; Poortinga et al., 2019; Duijndam and van \r\nBeukering, 2021). Stronger evidence exists since AR5 that experience \r\nof extreme weather events can shape climate-change risk perceptions, \r\nif these events are attributed to climate change or evoke negative \r\nemotions (high confidence) (Clayton et al., 2015; Demski et al., 2017; \r\nOgunbode et al"


id: 8bbae0062a7eeb8ed54cfe6fbcbfafef
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", 2019). Proximity to climate hazards does not pre\u0002dict adaptation responses in a straightforward way: in Portugal, those \r\nliving by the coast were more likely to attribute local natural hazards \r\nto climate change and to take some adaptive measures (Luis et al., \r\n2017); while waterside residents in flood-prone regions of France and \r\nAustria were more resistant to relocation, due to higher place attach\u0002ment (Adger et al., 2013; Rey-Valette et al., 2019; van Valkengoed and \r\nSteg, 2019; Seebauer and Winkler, 2020). Migration from threatened \r\nregions is discussed in Section 13.8.1.3."


id: 18bcc04bcdd762a8808594d6697985bd
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"Adaptation responses can also be understood in terms of their trade\u0002offs and synergies with SDGs (Papadimitriou et al., 2019; Bogdanovich \r\nand Lipka, 2020). In terms of synergies, analysis of the Russian NAP \r\nfound that successful completion of the NAP's first phase could lead to \r\nsignificant progress towards 15 of the 17 goals (Bogdanovich and Lipka, \r\n2020). European water adaptation (e.g., flood protection) can similarly \r\nsupport freshwater provision; and water-secured environments support \r\nsocioeconomic growth (Sadoff et  al., 2015) since people and assets \r\ntend to accumulate in areas protected from flooding and supplied with \r\nwater, reducing the incentive for autonomous adaptation (de Moel et al., \r\n2011; Hartmann and Spit, 2016; Di Baldassarre et al., 2018). In health, \r\nbehavioural measures to reduce mental health impacts (e.g., gardening, \r\nactive travel) can have broader health benefits (SDG 3) as well as help \r\nreduce emissions (Section 13.7; SDGs 7 and 13)"


id: 8c6e17ecb7df2040ec3ac21e6377220e
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" Conversely, growing \r\nuse of air conditioning for humans and livestock represents a potential \r\ntrade-off between adaptation and mitigation (Sections  13.5-13.7, \r\n13.10). As noted in Section 13.8, addressing poverty (SDG 1)-including \r\nenergy poverty (SDG 7) and hunger (SDG 2); and addressing inequalities \r\n(SDG 10), including gender inequality (SDG 5)-improves resilience to \r\nclimate impacts for those groups that are disproportionately affected \r\n(women, low-income and marginalised groups). Also, more inclusive and \r\nfair decision making can enhance resilience (SDG 16; Section 13.4.4), \r\nalthough adaptation measures may also lead to resource conflicts (SDG \r\n16; Section  13.7). Climate adaptation, particularly NbS, also supports \r\necosystem health (SDGs 14 and 15) (Dzebo et al., 2019)."


id: 100b992d0300014d67750c633f2c9ba5
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"The implementation of far-reaching and rapid systemic changes, \r\nincluding both adaptation and mitigation options (de Coninck et  al., \r\n2018), remains less researched in societal systems than natural ones \r\n(Salomaa, 2020) that enhance multi-level governance and institutional \r\ncapabilities, and enables lifestyle and behavioural change as well as \r\ntechnology innovation. Adaptation responses across European regions \r\nand sectors are more often incremental than transformative (medium \r\nconfidence), with possible exceptions including water-related examples \r\nin, for example, the Netherlands (Section 13.2.2) and some cities (see \r\nBox  13.3). Transformative options may be better able to exploit new \r\nopportunities and co-benefits (see Box 13.3; Cross-Chapter Box HEALTH \r\nin Chapter 7; EEA, 2019a)"


id: cc8e35870b6f0674ccea78f634fff13d
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" Transitions towards more adaptive and climate\u0002resilient systems are often the result of responses to crises which create \r\nwindows of opportunity for systemic changes (Chapter 18; Johannessen \r\net al., 2019). This includes extreme weather events, financial crises, for \r\nexample in Malmo (Anderson, 2014; Isaksson and Heikkinen, 2018), and \r\nthe COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., Milan), all of which have disrupted the \r\nstatus quo and accelerated innovation and implementation (e.g., Milan; \r\nsee Box 13.3; Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7)."


id: c8de071d952109e22fc7993b2772e70b
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content:
"Economic trade-offs appear to be more common across adaptation \r\nstrategies, for example, reduced employment arising from land-use\u0002change measures (Papadimitriou et  al., 2019). There are also trade\u0002offs between large-scale mitigation measures (e.g., wind farms) and \r\nadaptation options that rely on ecosystem services (e.g., water regulation) \r\n(Sections  13.3-13.4); and conversely, some adaptation options (e.g., \r\nair conditioning) may negatively impact mitigation. Figure  13.36 \r\nsummarises the synergies between adaptation and SDGs as identified \r\nby 167 European cities in 2019; particularly prominent are reported \r\nbiodiversity and health benefits most often arising from societal (e.g., \r\ninformational) and structural (e.g., technological and/or engineering) \r\nmeasures. Beyond the urban context, biodiversity co-benefits from \r\nagroecology are also recognised (Section 13.5)"


id: 6588a66d02892979ee1da4784e37535f
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" Sustainable behaviour\u0002change measures have been found to be particularly likely to lead to \r\nsynergies with SDGs (Papadimitriou et al., 2019)."


id: e573688b028ac1aa553292e92d175140
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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content:
"Figure 13.36 |  Co-benefits for SDGs from adaptation actions. Shown is how European cities have assessed the sustainability co-benefits of taking adaptation actions. \r\nData were extracted from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) database using the 2019 dataset; of the 861 European cities submitting data, 167 provided data on their adaptation \r\nactions, and these data are shown here (CDP, 2019). The CDP categories of climate hazards were re-categorised into WGI Climate Impact Drivers (e.g., cold spell, heavy precipitation); \r\nCDP adaptation actions were re-classified into AR5 adaptation options ('social', 'structural' and 'institutional'; 'other' includes actions falling outside these AR5 categories); and CDP \r\nco-benefits were re-categorised as SDGs. The upper panel shows that all SDGs except one (SDG 17) were identified as a co-benefit of adaptation, although more environmental \r\nco-benefits were identified than social or economic ones"


id: 6b2471cc344e151850657b9456ceee22
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" The lower left panel shows that societal actions were most common, followed by structural, then institutional. Informational \r\nmeasures were particularly common. The lower right panel shows how many actions were taken by different European cities."


id: 34ad7bc16eaadcfd66e081384cb117f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Ecosystem degradation and biodiversity loss have been evident across Europe since 1950, mainly due to land use and \r\noverfishing; however, climate change is becoming a key threat. The unprecedented pace of environmental change \r\nhas already surpassed the natural adaptive capability of many species, communities and ecosystems in Europe. For \r\ninstance, the space available for some land ecosystems has shrunk, especially in Europe's polar and mountain areas, \r\ndue to warming and thawing of permafrost. Across Europe, heatwaves and droughts, and their impacts such as \r\nwildfires, add further acute pressures, as seen in the 2018 heatwave, which impacted forest ecosystems and their \r\nservices. In the Mediterranean Sea, plants and animals cannot shift northward and are negatively affected by \r\nmarine heatwaves"


id: f44d7f74053c4bf17a56357b55ad69b5
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" Food-web dynamics of European ecosystems are disrupted as climate change alters the timing \r\nof biological processes, such as spawning and migration of species, and ecosystem composition. Moreover, warming \r\nfosters the immigration of invasive species that compete with-and can even out-compete-the native flora and \r\nfauna."


id: 3d5fbf3fd422751d4067b81353891c2e
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"Preparing for heatwaves is an important first step. Implementing and sustaining effective measures, such as national \r\nor regional early warning and information systems, heatwave plans and guidelines, and raising public awareness \r\nthrough campaigns, are successful responses. Evidence suggests that such measures have contributed to reduced \r\nmortality rates in SEU and WCE. At city level, preparing for heatwaves can sometimes require urban re-design. \r\nFor example, green-blue spaces, such as recreational parks and ponds in cities, have been shown to reduce the \r\naverage temperature in cities dramatically and to provide co-benefits, such as improved air quality and recreational \r\nspace. The use of cool materials in asphalt, increasing reflectivity, green roofs and building construction measures \r\nare being considered in urban planning for reducing heat risks"


id: 2eec5eeb365afdb4a1f955e026482e95
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" Citizens can prepare themselves by using natural \r\nventilation, using approaches to stay cool in heatwaves, green roofs and green facades on their buildings."


id: c736c250ceffac6535eb065c62118ea9
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content:
"As warming and droughts impact SEU most strongly, direct opportunities from climate change are primarily in \r\nnorthern regions, thereby increasing existing inequalities across Europe. Across Europe, positive effects of climate \r\nchange are fewer than negative impacts and are typically limited to some aspects of agriculture, forestry, tourism \r\nand energy sectors. In the food sector, opportunities emerge by the northward movement of food production \r\nzones, increases in plant growth due to CO2 fertilisation and reduction of heating costs for livestock during cold \r\nwinters. In the energy sector, positive effects include increased wind energy in the southwest Mediterranean and \r\nreduced energy demand for heating across Europe. While climatic conditions for tourist activities are projected to \r\ndecrease for winter tourism (e.g., insufficient snow amount) and summer tourism in some parts of Europe (e.g"


id: 8ec36876f4ae5203c7a94b05accd2958
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", too \r\nmuch heat), conditions may improve during spring and autumn in many European locations. Fewer cold waves will \r\nreduce risks on transport infrastructure, such as cracking of road surface, in parts of NEU and EEU particularly by \r\nthe end of the century."


id: d0cd2832b07d5cfc2392ca3e2639f851
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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content:
"North American food production is increasingly affected by \r\nclimate change (high confidence), with immediate impacts \r\non the food and nutritional security of Indigenous Peoples.\r\nClimate change and extreme weather events have impacted North \r\nAmerican agroecosystems (high confidence), with crop-specific effects \r\nthat vary in direction and magnitude by event and location. Climate \r\nchange has generally reduced agricultural productivity by 12.5% since \r\n1961, with progressively greater losses moving south from Canada to \r\nMexico and in drought-prone rain-fed systems (high confidence) while \r\nfavourable conditions increased yields of maize, soybeans in regions \r\nlike the USA Great Plains. Loss of availability and access to marine and \r\nterrestrial sources of protein has impaired food security and nutrition \r\nof subsistence-dependent Indigenous Peoples across North America \r\n(high confidence)"


id: 53754a8a78c6bebabe3eec59db311ebc
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10602
content:
" Climate change has impacted aquaculture (high \r\nconfidence) and induced rapid redistribution of species (very high \r\nconfidence), and population declines of multiple key fisheries (high \r\nconfidence). {14.5.4, 14.5.6, 14.7}"


id: 6bfdef0a5e24d7e6fb53b0a186e610de
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content:
"Climate-induced redistribution and declines in North American \r\nfood production are a risk to future food and nutritional \r\nsecurity (very high confidence). Climate change will continue \r\nto shift North American agricultural and fishery suitability ranges \r\n(high confidence) and intensify production losses of key crops (high \r\nconfidence), livestock (medium confidence), fisheries (high confidence) \r\nand aquaculture products (medium confidence). In the absence of \r\nmitigation, incremental adaptation measures may not be sufficient to \r\naddress rapidly changing conditions and extreme events, increasing the \r\nneed for cross-sectoral coordination in implementation of mitigation \r\nand adaptation measures (high confidence). Combining sustainable \r\nintensification, approaches based on Indigenous knowledge and local \r\nknowledge, and ecosystem-based methods with inclusive and self\u0002determined decision making, will result in more equitable food and \r\nnutritional security (high confidence). {14.5"


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content:
"1-4, 14.5.6, 14.7, Cross\u0002Chapter Box INDIG in Chapter 18, Cross-Chapter Box MOVING PLATE \r\nin Chapter 5}"


id: ca089689430bba3d7bf794089a351047
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Terrestrial, marine and freshwater ecosystems are being \r\nprofoundly altered by climate change across North America (very \r\nhigh confidence). Rising air, water, ocean and ground temperatures \r\nhave restructured ecosystems and contributed to the redistribution \r\n(very high confidence) and mortality (high confidence) of fish, bird \r\nand mammal species. Extreme heat and precipitation trends on land \r\nhave increased vegetation stress and mortality, reduced soil quality \r\nand altered ecosystem processes including carbon and freshwater \r\ncycling (very high confidence). Warm and dry conditions associated \r\nwith climate change have led to tree die-offs (high confidence) and \r\nincreased prevalence of catastrophic wildfire (medium confidence) \r\nwith an increase in the size of severely burned areas in western \r\nNorth America (medium confidence)"


id: 42c0f77c0e73967ab6988a604dd471f3
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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content:
" Nature-based Solutions (NbS) \r\nand ecosystem-based management have been effective adaptation \r\napproaches in the past but are increasingly exceeded by climate \r\nextremes (medium confidence). {14.5.1-3, Box 14.7}"


id: f7fad7f8ff4c2ff7f66047f7e1b463cd
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"Chapter 14 sections are organised to address themes and content as \r\ncontained in the IPCC-approved outline for regions. Regional climate \r\nchanges assessed within North America are keyed to Figure 14.1 using \r\nfour-letter abbreviations (e.g., CA-ON, US-SE, MX-NW). The assessment \r\naddresses recent and future climate for North America, the impacts, risks \r\nand adaptations within sectors, key risksacross sectors (KR), the nature \r\nof adaptation and sustainable development pathways as well as two \r\nadditional sections on Indigenous Peoples and perceptions of climate \r\nchange. Seven boxes are used to highlight topics of interdisciplinary \r\nnature while four frequently asked questions (FAQ) were produced in \r\nplain language for communication to the public"


id: 2b5e9364eeeeafb8d2aeba127c0df100
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" The chapter utilises \r\nthe framework as well as designated terms in the standardised \r\nprocess for evaluating and characterising the degree of certainty in \r\nassessment findings developed through the expert judgement process \r\n(Section  1.3.4; Mach et  al., 2017). The Glossary [Annex II] provides \r\ndefinitions for terms and concepts used across the report."


id: 3702b046dce4d9bee035af2451cd2c26
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"With a 2019 total population of over 494 million people (USA 329 million, \r\nMexico 128 million and Canada 37 million), North America comprises \r\n6.4% of the global population. Relative to other countries, North \r\nAmerican countries have low population densities per square kilometre \r\n(Mexico 64 people, USA 35 people and Canada 4 people) (United \r\nNations, 2019). Population projections indicate a steady growth in the \r\nthree countries, which will exert pressure on consumption and increase \r\nrisks under climate change (United Nations, 2019). North America is \r\nalso responsible for about a quarter of global greenhouse gas (GHG) \r\nemissions. Since 1990, North American GHG emissions have increased \r\nby almost 18% (Ritchie and Roser, 2020), and in 2019 the region was \r\nresponsible for 5.9 MtCO2 emissions worldwide (Friedlingstein et  al., \r\n2020)"


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" In terms of annual CO2 emissions per capita, in 2019 Canada \r\nhad 15 metric tons of CO2 per person (tCO2 per person), the USA had \r\n16 tCO2 per person and Mexico had 3.4 tCO2 per person (Friedlingstein \r\net al., 2020)."


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"Climate changes directly related to increasing mean and extreme \r\ntemperature, including reduced snowpack, sea and lake ice and glacier \r\nextent, and marine heatwaves (MHWs), can be attributed to human \r\nactivity and are affecting most of North America (high confidence). \r\nUpward trends in annual mean temperature across North America \r\nsince 1960 are widespread (Gutierrez et al., 2021a) but non-uniform \r\n(Figure 14.2A). Pronounced polar amplification of warming is observed \r\nin high latitudes (Figure 14.2A), particularly in winter (Gutierrez et al., \r\n2021a; Vose et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2019a). As average temperature \r\nrises, extreme high temperature records across North America are being \r\nset more frequently than extreme cold records (Meehl et  al., 2016) \r\nand the probability of cold extreme events is reduced (WGI Chapter \r\n11 [Seneviratne et al., 2021]). Trends in daily maximum and minimum \r\ntemperature are significant in high latitudes (US-AK, CA-NW, CA-NE)"


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" \r\nSummer daily maximum temperature is increasing in southwest desert \r\nregions (US-SW, MX-NW) (Martinez-Austria et  al., 2016; Martinez\u0002Austria and Bandala, 2017; Navarro-Estupinan et al., 2018)."


id: 49cf05416a53f0d968b80fff993b387d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Annual precipitation has increased in recent decades in northern and \r\neastern areas (CA-PR, CA-QU, US-NP, US-SP, US-MW, US-NE, US-AK) \r\n(high confidence), and has decreased across the western part of the \r\ncontinent (CA-BC, US-SW, US-NW, MX-NW) (medium confidence), \r\nwith considerable spatial variability within these regions (Zhang \r\net  al., 2019a; Gutierrez et  al., 2021a). Elsewhere across North \r\nAmerica there is limited evidence and low agreement on detection \r\nof observed trends in total precipitation and river flood hazards. The \r\nintensity and frequency of 1-day heavy precipitation events have \r\nvery likely2\r\n increased since the mid-20th Century across most of \r\nthe USA (US-NP, US-MW, US-NE, but not in US-SE) and in Mexico, \r\nbut no detectable trend is reported in Canada (Seneviratne et  al., \r\n2021; Zhang et al., 2019a). Recent flooding events along the mid\u0002latitude Pacific Coast have been attributed to increasingly intense \r\natmospheric river events ( Douville et  al"


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", 2021; Gershunov et  al., \r\n2019; Vano et  al., 2019), but there is low confidence in detecting \r\ntrends in atmospheric river activity."


id: 60e2a72d2a8ceb15741e19b71c36c8df
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"most notably in the USA (high confidence) (van der Linden et  al., \r\n2015; Cook and Lewandowsky, 2016; Bolsen and Druckman, 2018; \r\nChinn et  al., 2020) but with similar patterns in Canada (medium \r\nconfidence) (Lachapelle et al., 2012; Kevins and Soroka, 2018). Vocal \r\ngroups can affect public discourse and weaken public support for \r\nclimate mitigation and adaptation policies (medium confidence) \r\n(Aklin and Urpelainen, 2014; Lewandowsky et  al., 2019). Vested \r\neconomic and political interests have organised and financed \r\nmisinformation and 'contrarian' climate-change communication \r\n(Brulle, 2014; Farrell, 2016a; Farrell, 2016b; Supran and Oreskes, 2017; \r\nBolsen and Druckman, 2018; Brulle, 2018). Traditional media-print \r\nand broadcast-frame and transmit climate-change information and \r\nplay a crucial role in shaping public perceptions, understanding and \r\nwillingness to act (Happer and Philo, 2013; Schmidt et  al., 2013; \r\nHmielowski et al"


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", 2014; Bolsen and Shapiro, 2018; King et al., 2019; \r\nChinn et al., 2020). The journalistic norm of 'balance' (giving equal \r\nweight to climate scientists and contrarians in climate-change \r\nreporting) biases coverage by unevenly amplifying certain messages \r\nthat are not supported by science, contributing to politicisation of \r\nscience, spreading of misinformation and reducing public consensus \r\non action (Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; Boykoff and Boykoff, 2007; Cook \r\net al., 2017). Much online social media discussion of climate change \r\ntakes place in 'echo chambers'-a social network among like-minded \r\npeople in communities dominated by a single view that contributes to \r\npolarisation (Williams et al., 2015; Pearce et al., 2019) and the spread \r\nof misinformation (Treen et al., 2020)."


id: 6a47ce8903d1afc08807d04197ffaf88
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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content:
"In a 2018 survey across 26 nations, people in Canada and Mexico \r\nranked climate change as the top global threat, whereas in the USA \r\nclimate change ranked third (Poushter and Huang, 2019). The public's \r\nresponses to the causes of climate change and risk perceptions in \r\nCanada (Mildenberger et al., 2016) and the USA (Howe et al., 2015) \r\nhave revealed variations among regions (Figure  14.3) and less \r\nacceptance of climate change in rural regions than in urban areas. \r\nCanadian regions have higher acceptance of climate change (e.g., \r\nrecognise it is happening and attributable to human activity) than the \r\nmost liberal areas in the USA (Lachapelle et al., 2012; Mildenberger \r\net  al., 2016). Western Canadian regions with high carbon intensity \r\neconomies had lower acceptance of climate change than the rest of \r\nCanada, whereas in the USA perceptions were more stable across \r\nregions (Lachapelle et al., 2012)"


id: ff2342924e2227fbd88c77372bfa7f12
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" A recent survey in Mexico found that \r\nfor 73% of respondents climate change represents a major economic, \r\nenvironmental and social threat, and in the most vulnerable states \r\n(MX-SE), the perception is that climate-change impacts and \r\nextreme events have considerable implications for the way of life in \r\ncommunities (Zamora Saenz, 2018). In a 2017 survey, Azocar et al. \r\n(2021) found that 85% of respondents from Mexico acknowledged \r\nanthropogenic climate change. Peoples' experience with extreme \r\nevents (e.g., hurricanes, high temperatures), socio-demographic \r\ncharacteristics, level of marginalisation and economic and social \r\nexclusion, as well as education levels, were important factors \r\ninfluencing perception of climate change in Mexico (Corona-Jimenez, \r\n2018; Alfie and Cruz-Bello, 2021; Azocar et al., 2021). Drawing upon "


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content:
"Projected climate-change risk, urgency and necessary adaptations \r\nare perceived and understood differently by the public, communities, \r\nprofessional groups, climate scientists and public policy makers (high \r\nconfidence) (Bolsen et  al., 2015; Drews and Van den Bergh, 2016; \r\nMorton et  al., 2017; Treuer et  al., 2018). People can engage with \r\nclimate change across three dimensions: cognitive (knowledge), \r\naffective (feelings) and behavioural (responses and actions) (Galway, \r\n2019; Brosch, 2021). Risk assessment can be influenced by values \r\nregarding the subject under evaluation (Allison and Bassett, 2015; \r\nStevenson et al., 2015) and can interact with other risks and change \r\nover time (Mach et  al., 2016). Communities and practitioners (e.g"


id: a404f58b35964997ea4ce38c342e9a53
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"such as SLR, flooding and wildfires in North America (Mildenberger \r\net  al., 2019). 'Personalised' risk communications have had mixed \r\nresults creating behavioural change and policy support, and even \r\ncaused resistance (Schoenefeld and McCauley, 2016). Communication \r\nfocused extensively on risks and dangers of climate change can \r\nproduce fear or dread, lessen agency and create fatalism that hinders \r\naction (Giddens, 2015; Mayer and Smith, 2019); it also can be labelled \r\nalarmist (Leiserowitz, 2005). Detailed SLR flooding maps for the \r\nSan Francisco Bay area did not increase climate risk assessment but \r\nlessened personal risk perception of those with a strong belief in \r\nclimate change, although policy preferences and support for adaptation \r\ndid not change (Mildenberger et al., 2019)"


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" Defining coherent groups \r\nbased on variations in beliefs, risk perceptions and policy preferences \r\noffers opportunities for effectively engaging with segments of the \r\npopulation instead of using the same approach for everyone (low \r\nconfidence) (Maibach et al., 2011; Chryst et al., 2018). As an example, \r\nthe US population was segmented into a continuum ranging from \r\nthe 'Alarmed', the dominant group who were 'Concerned', then the \r\nCautious, Disengaged, Doubtful, and least prevalent, the Dismissive \r\n(Chryst et al., 2018)."


id: 55c0b969513f00e4185ee93aafa680f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"The practice and use of IK systems is recognised and affirmed by \r\nthe United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples \r\n(UNDRIP) (UNGA, 2007), and consistent with reports and guidance \r\nfrom UN bodies including the High Commissioner for Human Rights \r\n(Bachelet, 2019), Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples \r\n(UNGA, 2015; UNGA, 2018), the Permanent Forum of Indigenous Issues \r\n(Dodson, 2007; Cunningham Kain et al., 2013; Sena and UNPFII, 2013; \r\nSena, 2014; Quispe and UNPFII, 2015) and the Special Rapporteur on \r\nthe Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Cross-Chapter Box INDIG in Chapter \r\n18; Toledo, 2013; UNGA, 2017). The right to self-determination, control \r\nover territorial development and cultural integrity make it important \r\nthat climate scientists practise equitable engagement of IK and IK \r\nholders"


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" There is a growing literature of success and lessons learned \r\nfrom co-production of knowledge between IK systems and diverse \r\nscientific traditions relating to climate change (Behe et  al., 2018; \r\nLatulippe and Klenk, 2020; Camacho-Villa et al., 2021)."


id: 7447b6360136b8cfd6e34144a0178a05
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Current and projected climate-change impacts disproportionately harm \r\nIndigenous Peoples' livelihoods and economies (very high confidence). \r\nIndigenous Peoples' livelihoods in North America include a range of \r\nactivities closely tied to traditional lands, waters and territories. These \r\nactivities support a core economic base and an array of sustenance, \r\nincluding financial stability, food security, health and nutrition, safety, \r\nand adequate provisions and reserves of important supplies and \r\nresources, as well as the passing down of traditional knowledge. \r\nIndigenous lives and livelihoods are at risk in the following ways: \r\nIndigenous persons are more at risk of losing their lives due to factors \r\nthat are exacerbated by climate-change impacts (Ford et  al., 2006; \r\nBarbaras, 2014; Khalafzai et al., 2019). Indigenous Peoples' livelihood \r\npractices are being distressed, interrupted and, in some cases, made \r\nentirely inaccessible"


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" Livelihood activities known and anticipated to be \r\nimpacted by climate change are food security (Meakin and Kurtvits, \r\n2009; Wesche and Chan, 2010; Nyland et al., 2017), harvesting of fish, \r\nplants and wildlife (Dittmer, 2013; Parlee et  al., 2014; Jantarasami \r\net al., 2018b; ICC Alaska, 2020), agriculture (St Regis Mohawk Tribe, \r\n2013; Shinbrot et al., 2019; Settee, 2020), transportation (Swinomish \r\nIndian Tribe Community, 2010; Hori et al., 2018a; Hori et al., 2018b), \r\nand tourism and recreation (ICC Canada, 2008). Indigenous Peoples \r\nhave been active in gathering to assess the impacts of climate \r\nchange on their livelihoods, one example being the Bering Sea Elders \r\nAdvisory Group (Bering Sea Elders Advisory Group and Alaska Marine \r\nConservation Council, 2011; Bering Sea Elders Group, 2016)."


id: 10ca3eccf998f7f978c170b94cf09d93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"Indigenous knowledge and science are resources for understanding \r\nclimate-change impacts and adaptive strategies (very high confidence) \r\n(SM14.1; Table SM14.1). The Indigenous Peoples of North America have \r\ncontributed substantially to, and continue to contribute to, the growing \r\nliterature, scholarship and research on climate change (Barreiro, 1999; \r\nHouser et al., 2001; Mustonen, 2005; Bennett et al., 2014; Maynard, \r\n2014; Merculieff et al., 2017; FAQI, 2019; Ijaz, 2019; BIA, 2021). For \r\nthousands of years, Indigenous Peoples have developed and relied \r\non their own knowledge systems for sustaining their health, cultures \r\nand arts, livelihoods and political security (Battiste and Henderson, \r\n2000; Colombi, 2012; Nelson and Shilling, 2018). Diverse IK systems in \r\nNorth America consider weather and climate as major dimensions of \r\nunderstanding the relationship between society and the environment"


id: 4d96ab85e63e4bb87a39e55e137457ed
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" \r\nIndigenous Peoples have distinct knowledge of climate change, over \r\nextensive temporal measures (Trosper, 2002; Barrera-Bassols and \r\nToledo, 2005; Gearheard et  al., 2013). The basis of this knowledge \r\nis often Indigenous Peoples' long and profound relationships with \r\nthe environment, that is, to the ecosystems, waters, ice, lands, \r\nterritories and resources in their homelands. The relationships have \r\nbeen forged by adaptation to a particular environment and involve \r\nsystematic activities. Indigenous harvesters, including hunters, \r\nfishers, agriculturalists and plant gatherers, observe and monitor \r\nenvironmental change, and engage in systematic reflection with one \r\nanother about trends over short- and long-term periods (Sakakibara, \r\n2010; Sanchez-Cortes and Chavero, 2011; Kermoal and Altamirano\u0002Jimenez, 2016; Metcalfe et al., 2020b)"


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" The holistic perspective of the \r\ninterrelated and interdependent nature of ecosystems is a distinct \r\ncharacteristic of IK and often contrasts with findings and results of \r\nscience alone. Indigenous harvesters, agriculturalists, leaders, culture \r\nbearers, educators and government employees develop theoretical \r\nand practical knowledge of seasonal and climate change that seeks \r\nto furnish the best available knowledge and information to inform \r\nclimate-change policy and decisions (Barrera-Bassols and Toledo, 2005; "


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"Recent climate-related changes represent cultural threats similar to the ones that occurred when European settlement began in the \r\nAmericas over 500 years ago (Whyte, 2016; Whyte, 2017). Thus, for Indigenous Peoples, who often disproportionately bear the impacts \r\nof climate change, such changes are not novel, but seen as deja vu (Whyte, 2016). Since livelihoods and subsistence are often directly \r\ndependent on the land and water, Indigenous Peoples have direct insights into the localised impacts of global environmental change. \r\nIndeed, Indigenous Peoples consider themselves stewards of the land (and water), and have a spiritual duty to care for the land and its \r\nflora, fauna and aquatic community, or 'Circle' of beings. Indigenous knowledge (IK) has gained recognition for its potential to bolster \r\nWestern scientific research about climate change. Many recent examples demonstrate the scientific value of IK for resource management \r\nin climate-change adaptation and mitigation (e.g"


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", Kronik and Verner, 2010; Maldonado et al., 2013; Wildcat, 2013; Etchart, 2017; Nursey\u0002Bray et al., 2019). For example, Indigenous practices have not only contributed to the present understanding of North American forest \r\nfires, but also that the practice of frequent small-scale anthropogenic fires, also called cultural burns, is a key method to prevent large\u0002scale destructive fires (Section 14.7.1). The growing interest and recognised value in these practices, particularly in California, has led to \r\nformal agreements with state and federal agencies (Long et al., 2020a; Lake, 2021)."


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"Indigenous relationships with the land are commonly informed and guided by a cultural ethic of 'responsibility-based thinking' (Sioui \r\nand McLeman, 2014). The Indigenous cultural ethic informs and mediates personal and collective conduct with a sense of duty or \r\nresponsibility towards human and other-than-human relations (see Sioui, 2020). The Indigenous responsibility-based outlook stems from \r\na cultural paradigm that understands that it is human beings who must learn to live with the land (Cajete, 1999; Pierotti and Wildcat, \r\n2000; McGregor et al., 2010a; McGregor, 2014). This way of thinking instils in its adherents an inherent awareness that the other-than\u0002human realm is capable of existing and thriving without humans. Thus, it is for our own sake (as humans) that we learn to live according \r\nto certain ever-shifting parameters, requiring us to remain acutely attuned to our physical surroundings"


id: c1122f1589c961f2006aa59ff471478a
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" This Indigenous cultural precept \r\nis perhaps among the most significant contributions of Indigenous Peoples to the rest of humanity in the face of climate change."


id: 464f0cb66442d9a73d09b57c62d3a6be
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"Indigenous relationships with natural systems continue to be mediated by cultural orders of governance and legal systems that pre\u0002date, by several millennia, European traditions in North America. Napolean (2012) describes Indigenous legal orders as dynamic and \r\nencompassing knowledge that is simultaneously legal, religious, philosophical, social and scientific. Customary Indigenous legal orders \r\n(e.g., Borrows, 2002; Napolean, 2012) stand in contrast to Eurocentric understandings of law, which are closely related to, and founded \r\non, the Western principles of rights. Indigenous legal orders are based on duties, obligations and responsibilities to the land and all beings, \r\nincluding humans, animals, plants, future generations and the departed/ancestors (Borrows, 2002; Borrows, 2010a; Borrows, 2010b; \r\nBorrows, 2016)"


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" Indigenous spiritual laws are centred on the values of responsibility and accountability to the land, and how these differ, \r\nin theory and in practice, from Western law, which is based on 'universal' principles, with little consideration for the local environmental \r\ncontext (Craft, 2014). Research has elucidated these Indigenous understandings about how their land-based responsibilities act as the \r\nfoundation of how humans must operate according to the land on which they live and depend."


id: 6cc3f6c12fee86c7b36470f13a69d1de
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content:
"With increasing climate-change threats to land-based subsistence and cultural practices, Indigenous Peoples are increasingly taking their \r\nrightful leadership roles in resource co-management arrangements and other stewardship activities (Section 14.5.2.2). Indeed, Indigenous \r\nPeoples are increasingly assuming leadership positions with regard to land governance and climate-change action, as the stewards of \r\ntheir traditional territories since time immemorial. Therefore, it is imperative for Indigenous scholars, Elders and knowledge holders to \r\noccupy leadership roles in climate-change adaptation and mitigation, especially when their territories are concerned (Section 14.7; CCP6)"


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" \r\nFor instance, Indigenous 'resurgence' paradigms draw on the strengths of traditional land-based culture and knowledge with regard to \r\nIndigenous leadership in land governance and stewardship (Alfred and Corntassel, 2005; Alfred, 2009; Simpson, 2011; Corntassel and \r\nBryce, 2012; Coulthard, 2014; Alfred, 2015). Indigenous leadership in climate-change policy, therefore, can ensure that Indigenous right \r\nto self-determination is respected and upheld to allow Indigenous Peoples to continue to carry out their cultural responsibilities to the \r\nland, for the benefit of all North Americans (Powless, 2012; Etchart, 2017)."


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"In northern Canada, a fusion of leading-edge Western science and IK on permafrost informed the co-development of predictive decision\u0002support tools and risk management strategies to inventory and manage permafrost and adapt to permafrost thaw (CCP6). Permafrost \r\nthaw in the Dehcho region of Canada is widespread and occurring at unprecedented rates (WGI). The Dehcho Collaborative on Permafrost\r\n(DCoP) aims to improve the understanding of and ability to predict and adapt to permafrost thaw3\r\n. DCoP's collaborative approach, \r\nwhich places Indigenous Peoples in leadership positions, generates the new knowledge, predictive capacity and decision-support tools to \r\nmanage natural resources that support Indigenous Dene Peoples' ways of life"


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" Indigenous-academic partnerships can enhance climate\u0002change adaptation and mitigation capacity, and provide openings for more holistic co-management approaches that recognise and \r\naffirm the central role of Indigenous Peoples as stewards of their ancestral territories, especially as they face accelerating climate-change \r\nimpacts. Academic researchers and their Indigenous partners can support climate-change resilience via mobilising IK in stewardship \r\nand adaptation; researching governance arrangements, economic relationships and other factors that hinder Indigenous efforts in these \r\nareas; proposing evidence-based policy solutions at international and national scales; and outlining culturally relevant tools for assessing \r\nvulnerability and building capacity will also support climate-change resilience. Such IK underpins successful climate-change adaptation \r\nand mitigation (very high confidence) (see Green and Raygorodetsky, 2010; Kronik and Verner, 2010; Alexander et al"


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", 2011; Powless, \r\n2012; Ford et al., 2016; Nakashima et al., 2018). The inclusion of IK in adaptation and mitigation not only supports Indigenous cultural \r\nsurvival but also enables governments to recognise the territorial sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples."


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"Responsibility-based philosophies of Indigenous Peoples from across the continent support the development of climate-change adaptation \r\nand mitigation strategies that promote responsible and respectful relationships with the environment over the long term. Adapting to \r\nchange, in all its forms, has since time immemorial been one of the defining characteristics of Indigenous cultures on Turtle Island (the \r\nAmerican continent). In Yucatan, one Elder explained that with regards to climate-change impacts in the region, the Maya have always \r\ndealt with k'ech, or change, and that accepting and responding to change is part of the Maya identity and responsibility (Sioui, 2020)"


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" \r\nGiven successive failures in adequately and effectively responding to climate change, it has become urgent for the rest of the human \r\ncollective to (re)learn from Indigenous cultures to (re)consider our responsibility/ies to the land--the world over--and to reorient our \r\nsocietal imperatives to better respond and react to change. Such a process of learning from IK could foster the development of climate\u0002change policies that promote responsible and respectful relationships with the environment over the long term, and prove to be more \r\neffective and holistic. Although most inhabitants of North America are non-Indigenous, it is possible and beneficial for our societies to \r\nlearn to think and act in a more responsibility-based way about our relations to the land, and, by extension, about climate-change policy"


id: e383a88e224a7b920a1c83a0485700e0
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" \r\nA collective commitment to protecting and advancing Indigenous territorial rights, so Indigenous Peoples can continue to reassert their \r\nspiritual duty and role as stewards of their traditional territories, benefits all human and other-than-human 'Peoples'."


id: c8b5c1f54dcfec35ccea39841eff73e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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content:
"Inc., 2016; Scott et al., 2017; Reo and Ogden, 2018; Middleton et al., \r\n2020a) and changing production systems (Rioja-Rodriguez et  al., \r\n2018). Indigenous Peoples' mental health is at risk and has already \r\nbeen affected negatively by climate change (Donatuto et  al., 2021). \r\nWater security is one of the most serious concerns to Indigenous \r\nPeoples' health and well-being (Vanderslice, 2011; Cozzetto et  al., \r\n2013a; Redsteer et al., 2013; Hanrahan et al., 2014; Chief et al., 2016; \r\nGamble et al., 2016; Jantarasami et al., 2018b; Kloesel et al., 2018a; \r\nTom et al., 2018; Martin et al., 2020a; Arsenault, 2021). When some \r\npeople are less able to practise traditional, cultural, social and family \r\nactivities, they can become alienated, compounding the negative \r\neffects of traumas Indigenous persons already experience. Traumas \r\ninclude historic and continuing land dispossession, assimilation, social \r\nmarginalisation and discrimination, and food and financial insecurities"


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" \r\nThe practise of cultural traditions are associated with education, \r\nharvesting and agriculture, exercise, positive social relationships \r\nand family life, which play foundational roles in the achievement of \r\nphysical, public and mental health (Bell et  al., 2010; Cunsolo Willox \r\net al., 2015; Jantarasami et al., 2018b; Norgaard and Tripp, 2019; Billiot \r\net al., 2020b; Adams et al., 2021; Donatuto et al., 2021)."


id: b77f256b83c6a9109fe7cc96a3c3cf5b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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"are less available and harvesting activities are less possible to practise \r\n(Norton-Smith et al., 2016b; Rosol et al., 2016; Gonzalez et al., 2018). \r\nIndigenous Peoples experience widespread public health concerns from \r\nsevere droughts (Stewart et al., 2020; Schlinger et al., 2021; Wiecks \r\net  al., 2021), extreme heat (Doyle et  al., 2013; Campo Caap, 2018; \r\nKloesel et al., 2018a; Meadow et al., 2018; ITK, 2019; Ute Mountain \r\nUte Tribe and Wood Environment Infrastructure Solutions Inc, 2019; \r\nWhyte et  al., 2021), unpredictable precipitation patterns (Chavarria \r\nand Gutzler, 2018; Tom et al., 2018; Tlingit and Haida, 2019; Schlinger \r\net al., 2021), flooding and coastal erosion (Jamestown S'klallam Tribe, \r\n2016; Norton-Smith et  al., 2016b; Puyallup Tribe of Indians, 2016; \r\nMarks-Marino, 2019; Ristroph, 2019; Marks-Marino, 2020b; Schlinger \r\net al., 2021), wildfires and wildfire smoke (Edwin and Molders, 2018; \r\nUSEPA, 2018; Christianson et  al"


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", 2019a; ITK, 2019; Marks-Marino, \r\n2020a; Mottershead et al., 2020; Woo et al., 2020; Wiecks et al., 2021), \r\nalgal blooms (Peacock et al., 2018; Gobler, 2020; Donatuto et al., 2021; \r\nPreece et al., 2021; Schlinger et al., 2021), storms and hurricanes (Rioja\u0002Rodriguez et al., 2018), influxes of invasive species (Pfeiffer and Huerta \r\nOrtiz, 2007; Pfeiffer and Voeks, 2008; Voggesser et al., 2013; Bad River \r\nBand of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians and Abt Associates "


id: d43f082acf603c0c17b2ae9fce6cd219
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vector_id: 30919
content:
"communities. Through self-determination, durable, sustainable and \r\nrobust contributions from those with close, symbiotic relationships with \r\nthe environment can be revealed in favour of all humanity. Indigenous \r\nPeoples of North America have been engaged in wide-ranging activities \r\nto address climate change (Doolittle, 2010; Parker and Grossman, \r\n2012; Abate and Kronk, 2013; STACCWG, 2021). They include actions \r\nin the spheres of education (Donatuto et  al., 2020; McClain, 2021; \r\nMorales et al., 2021), development of IK and science (Maldonado et al., \r\n2016; AFN, 2020; Ferguson and Weaselboy, 2020; Huntington et  al., \r\n2021a; Jones et al., 2021; Sawatzky et al., 2021), adaptation planning \r\nand implementation (Angel et  al., 2018a; Tribal Climate Adaptation \r\nGuidebook Writing Team et al., 2018; Hepler and Kronk Warner, 2019; \r\nTribal Adaptation Menu Team, 2019; Metcalfe et al"


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content:
", 2020b), and political \r\naction and diplomacy (including treaty-based diplomacy) (Grossman, \r\n2008; Kronk Warner and Abate, 2013; Callison, 2015)."


id: 6f1292750ac77868f3c8aa20267e5620
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content:
"Indigenous Peoples are affected dramatically by climate-related \r\ndisasters and other climate-related extreme environmental events (very \r\nhigh confidence). Indigenous Peoples face numerous threats and have \r\nalready been harmed by, and are planning for, extreme weather events \r\nwith associations to climate change, including hurricanes and tornadoes \r\n(Oneida Nation Pre-Disaster Mitigation Plan Steering Committee \r\nand Bay-Lake Regional Planning Commission, 2016; Emanuel, 2019; \r\nCooley, 2021; Marks-Marino, 2021; Zambrano et al., 2021), heatwaves \r\n(Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, 2016; Wall, \r\n2017; La Jolla Band of Luiseno Indians, 2019; Mashpee Wampanoag, \r\n2019; Wiecks et  al., 2021), ocean warming and MHWs (Hoh Indian \r\nTribe, 2016; Port Gamble S'klallam Tribe, 2016; Port Gamble S'klallam \r\nTribe, 2020; State of Alaska, 2020; Muckleshoot Tribal Council, 2021; \r\nPort Gamble S'klallam Tribe, 2021), wildfires (Voggesser et  al., 2013; \r\nBilliot et  al"


id: 6b1c0de972cc6e94c311dc93ed134828
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 14468
content:
", 2020a; Cozzetto et  al., 2021b; Gaughen et  al., 2021; \r\nMorales et  al., 2021; National Tribal Air Association, 2021; Zambrano \r\net al., 2021), permafrost thaw (Haynes et al., 2018; Low, 2020), flooding \r\n(Riley et al., 2011; Ballard and Thompson, 2013; Brubaker et al., 2014; \r\nThompson et  al., 2014; Burkett et  al., 2017; Quinault Indian Nation, \r\n2017; Ristroph, 2019; Sharp, 2019; Thistlethwaite et  al., 2020) and \r\ndrought (Knutson et al., 2007; Chief et al., 2016; Redsteer et al., 2018; \r\nSioui, 2019; Bamford et al., 2020; Sauchyn et al., 2020). Some Indigenous \r\nPeoples are facing climate-change impacts that generate community\u0002led permanent relocation and resettlement as an adaptation option \r\n(Maldonado et al., 2021). Coastal erosion is one climate-change issue \r\nthat is often connected to Indigenous Peoples planning to resettle, \r\nincluding vulnerability connected to higher sea levels and storm surges \r\n(Quinault Indian Nation, 2017; Bronen et al"


id: 8ee04d25f0ae2b606b9e23ac3c361492
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", 2018; Affiliated Tribes of \r\nNorthwest Indians, 2020). Adapting to new settlement areas threatens \r\nthe continuity of communities. In a number of cases, Indigenous Peoples' \r\nhaving less access to adequate infrastructure is a driver of vulnerability \r\nto climate-related disasters and extreme weather events (Doyle et al., \r\n2018; Patrick, 2018; Cozzetto et al., 2021a; Indigenous Climate Action \r\net al., 2021). Disasters and extreme events are particularly severe when \r\ntheir impacts are compounded by inadequate infrastructure. Lack of \r\nflood protection infrastructure on Indigenous reserve communities leads \r\nto displacement, loss of homes and perpetuates disproportionate levels \r\nof risk to extreme weather events (Cunsolo et al., 2020; Fayazi et al., \r\n2020; Yellow Old Woman-Munro et al., 2021)."


id: f30f8d703bbf90f9bb1772c788e87f8b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 35755
content:
"Climate-change impacts on natural disturbances have affected \r\necosystems (very high confidence) (Table  14.2; see Box  14.2), and \r\nthese impacts will increase with future climate change (medium \r\nconfidence). Facilitated by warm, dry conditions, 'mega-disturbances' \r\nand synergies between disturbances that include wildfires, insect \r\nand disease outbreaks, and drought-induced tree mortality continue \r\nto affect large areas of North America (Cohen et  al., 2016; Young \r\net al., 2017a; Hicke et al., 2020), overwhelming adaptive capacities \r\nof species and degrading ecosystem services (Millar and Stephenson, \r\n2015; Stewart et al., 2021). This era of mega-disturbances is expected \r\nto become more widespread and severe in coming decades (Cook \r\net al., 2015; Seidl et al., 2017; Buotte et al., 2019), with potentially \r\nsignificant impacts on ecosystems (Allen et al., 2015; Crausbay et al., \r\n2017; Schwalm et  al., 2017; Coop et  al., 2020; Dove et  al., 2020 \r\nThompson et al"


id: bf76da4b023bc120f0bf545926c022bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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" 2020, Stewart et al. 2021). Effects include widespread \r\ntree mortality (Allen et  al., 2015; Kane et  al., 2017; van Mantgem \r\net  al., 2018) and accelerated ecosystem transformation (medium \r\nconfidence) (Guiterman et al., 2018; Crausbay et al., 2020; Munson \r\net al., 2020)."


id: ff8cf7393f6a2e29e1875d1a7ea3f91c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 37749
content:
"Adaptation efforts to assess vulnerability of species and ecosystems, \r\npredict adaptive capacity and identify conservation-oriented options \r\nhave increased markedly across North America (e.g., Hagerman and \r\nPelai, 2018; Keeley et  al., 2018; Thurman et  al., 2020; Peterson St\u0002Laurent et al., 2021; Thompson et al., 2021). Scenario-based planning, \r\nan approach for addressing uncertainty, continues to gain traction and \r\nis regularly applied by the US National Park Service (Star et al., 2016). \r\nNonetheless, barriers to implementation of specific actions often exist \r\n(e.g., inflexible policies, lack of resources and stakeholder buy-in, \r\npolitical will), hampering progress (Stein et al., 2013; Shi and Moser, \r\n2021). Efforts to evaluate the efficacy of implemented adaptation \r\nactions are also lacking (Prober et  al., 2019), but some cases show \r\nprogress"


id: 94c8863254a41f1ed79411964baa53bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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content:
" For example, ongoing efforts are quantifying how variable \r\nwater releases from the Colorado River's Glen Canyon Dam affect \r\nendangered fish species (Melis et al., 2016). Nature-based Solutions \r\n(NbS) for adaptation (see Box 14.7) are increasingly being evaluated, \r\nespecially at larger scales."


id: 2982e38a405817519f28700e69d46650
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 3968
content:
"Effective climate-informed ecosystem management requires a well\u0002coordinated suite of adaptation efforts (e.g., assessment, planning, \r\nfunding, implementation and evaluation) that is co-produced among \r\nstakeholders, Indigenous Peoples and across sectors (high confidence) \r\n(Millar and Stephenson, 2015; Dilling et al., 2019). New applications \r\nof conventional strategies can be modified to achieve conservation \r\ngoals under climate change (USGCRP, 2019). For example, mechanical \r\nthinning and prescribed burning (to reduce fuel loads and benefit \r\necosystems) could be used in combination with planting species better \r\nsuited to new conditions to build resilience in western US forests to \r\nlonger and hotter drought conditions (Bradford and Bell, 2017; Vernon \r\net al., 2018)"


id: 924049815fb0906ddfbbf3222eaaad36
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vector_id: 20533
content:
" Protection of buffer areas, such as riparian strips in arid \r\nregions and boreal ecosystems, reduces water temperature, builds \r\nresistance to invasive species, increases suitable habitat (Johnson and \r\nAlmlof, 2016) and facilitates protection of freshwater systems from \r\nrunoff during and after intense rain events (National Research Council, \r\n2002)."


id: 4dca6e3f123dc839f87e60d616cec5c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 9669
content:
"Projected climate change will cause habitat loss, alter physical and bio\u0002logical processes, and decrease water quality in freshwater ecosystems \r\n(high confidence) (Poesch et al., 2016; Crozier et al., 2019). Projected \r\nriver warming of 1degC-3degC is expected to reduce thermal habitat for \r\nimportant salmon and trout species in the northwest USA by 5-31% \r\n(Isaak et al., 2018) and in Mexico (Meza-Matty et al., 2021), and for \r\nmultiple fish species in Canada (Poesch et al., 2016). Cold-water streams \r\nat higher elevations will warm less and therefore may become climate \r\nrefugia (Isaak et al., 2016). Projected warming of mountain lake eco\u0002systems (Roberts et al., 2017b; Redmond, 2018) will affect ecosystem \r\nprocesses (Preston et al., 2016; Redmond, 2018; Moser et al., 2019). Loss \r\nof cold-water inputs from retreating glaciers are expected to adversely \r\naffect alpine stream ecosystems (Fell et al., 2017; Giersch et al., 2017). \r\nFor anadromous fish species (e.g"


id: 3b123e8658dbd39ce676e12d713d9366
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vector_id: 6653
content:
", Chinook salmon), future warming \r\nwill reduce habitat suitability from river headwaters to oceans (Crozier \r\net al., 2021)."


id: 965e5577ed87f117edeaf2f5a3332107
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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content:
"2019). Higher ocean temperatures have directly affected food-web \r\nstructure (Gibert, 2019) and altered physiological rates, distribution, \r\nphenology and behaviour of marine species with cascading effects \r\non food-web dynamics (very high confidence) (Gattuso et  al., 2015; \r\nPinsky and Byler, 2015; Sydeman et al., 2015; Poloczanska et al., 2016; \r\nFrolicher et al., 2018; Le Bris et al., 2018; Free et al., 2019; Stevenson \r\nand Lauth, 2019; Barbeaux et al., 2020; Dahlke et al., 2020). Pacific \r\ncoastal waters from Mexico to Canada and US mid-Atlantic coastal \r\nwaters have a high proportion of species (>5% of all marine species) \r\nnear their upper thermal limit, representing hotspots of risk from MHWs \r\n(medium confidence) (Smale et  al., 2019; Dahlke et  al., 2020)"


id: b24edb9b28e21a1936c0707cb086815d
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content:
" Kelp, \r\na macroalgae, forms important habitat for other marine species, and \r\nits biomass has decreased 85-99% in the past 40-60 years off Nova \r\nScotia, Canada, replaced by invasive and turf algae; this is associated \r\ndirectly with warming waters (Filbee-Dexter et al., 2016)."


id: 36650a51b04281602813c9daefbe1cc5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 5951
content:
"Climate change has induced phenological and spatial shifts in primary \r\nproductivity with cascading impacts on food webs (high confidence) \r\n(Siddon et al., 2013; Stortini et al., 2015; Sydeman et al., 2015; Stanley \r\net al., 2018). This includes widespread starvation events of fish, birds \r\n(e.g., tufted puffins in Bering Sea in 2016-2017 and Cassin's Auklets \r\nin British Columbia in 2014-2015) and marine mammals (grey whales \r\nalong both coasts of North America) (Sydeman et  al., 2015; Duffy\u0002Anderson et al., 2019; Jones et al., 2019b; Cheung and Frolicher, 2020; \r\nPiatt et  al., 2020), which challenge protected species and fisheries \r\nmanagement (Section 14.5.4; Chasco et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2018; \r\nBarbeaux et al., 2020; Free et al., 2020; Fisher et al., 2021; Cheung and \r\nFrolicher, 2020). Climate change has altered foraging behaviour and \r\ndistribution of North Atlantic right whales and their target copepod \r\nprey (Record et  al"


id: a5f05314055fb2fcb37d6a54ca70ac97
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23663
content:
"Recent Observations, Attribution to Climate Change and Projections\r\nAnthropogenic climate change has led to warmer and drier conditions (i.e., fire weather) that favour wildland fires in North America \r\n(high confidence) (see AR6, WGI, Chapter 12, Ranasinghe et al., 2021). In response, increased burned area in recent decades in western \r\nNorth America has been facilitated by anthropogenic climate change (medium confidence). Annual numbers of large wildland fires and \r\narea burned have risen in the past several decades in the western USA (USGCRP, 2017; USGCRP, 2018), and area burned has increased \r\nin Canada (although the number of large fires has declined slightly recently) (Gauthier et al., 2014; Natural Resources Canada, 2018; \r\nHanes et al., 2019). Attribution studies have reported that climate change increased burned area in Canada (1959-1999) (Gillett et al., \r\n2004) as well as the western USA (1984-2015) (Abatzoglou and Williams, 2016) and California (1972-2018) (Williams et al"


id: f61fc1006a5564397f05b6fd9113ccc9
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vector_id: 36231
content:
", 2019a). \r\nDecreased precipitation was the primary climate-change cause of increased burned area in the western USA, with warming a secondary \r\ninfluence (Holden et al. 2018), whereas warming (through aridity) was most important in a California study (Williams et al., 2019a). A \r\ndrier atmosphere (including reduced precipitation) has been linked to climate change through altered large-scale atmospheric circulation, \r\nwhich then facilitated greater burned area in the western USA (Zhang et al., 2019c). Through anomalous warm and dry conditions, \r\nanthropogenic climate change contributed to the extreme fires of 2016 (Kirchmeier-Young et al., 2019; Tan et al., 2019) in western \r\nCanada and the extreme fire season in 2015 in Alaska (Partain et al., 2017). These studies did not include human activities that influence \r\nfire-climate relationships (Syphard et al., 2017)."


id: 5f93a960f25189e45dd97932ce93a64f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12609
content:
"California fires were 149 billion USD (Wang et al., 2021). Poor air quality from fires caused increased respiratory distress (very high \r\nconfidence); exposure extends long distances from the fire source (Section 14.5.6.3). In addition to public and private property damage \r\nand loss, fires have caused irretrievable losses from archaeological and historical sites (Ryan et al., 2012). Post-fire conditions have \r\ncreated unanticipated challenges for communities' water supply operations (Bladon et al., 2014; Navar, 2015; Martin, 2016) by altering \r\nwater quality and availability (Smith et al., 2011; Bladon et al., 2014; Robinne et al., 2020) or public safety by increasing exposure to mass \r\nwasting events after extreme rainfall events (Cui et al., 2019; Kean et al., 2019)"


id: ac2f6978babb6f773a8127691483d77a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24624
content:
" California utilities have proactively shut down parts of \r\ntheir electricity grid to reduce risk of fire during extreme weather, and substantial numbers of people will be increasingly vulnerable to \r\nthis action in the coming decades (Abatzoglou et al., 2020)."


id: 79a1c4aab60dd78e229d525c188dc005
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16704
content:
"In North American Arctic marine systems, rapid warming is significant, \r\nwith cascading impacts beyond polar regions (CCP6), and presents \r\nlimited opportunities (tourism, shipping, extractive) but high risks \r\n(shipping, fishing industries, Indigenous subsistence and cultural \r\nactivities) (high confidence) (Sections  14.5.4, 14.5.9, 14.5.11; CCP6 \r\nGaines et  al., 2018; IPCC, 2019b; Samhouri et  al., 2019; Free et  al., \r\n2020; Holsman et al., 2020). Both direct hazards and indirect food-web \r\nalterations from sea ice loss have imperilled seabirds, marine mammals, \r\nsmall-boat operators, subsistence hunters and coastal communities \r\n(CCP6; Sigler et al., 2014; Allison and Bassett, 2015; Huntington et al., \r\n2015; Hauser et  al., 2018; Raymond-Yakoubian and Daniel, 2018; \r\nDezutter et al., 2019). Increasingly favourable environmental conditions \r\ndue to warming combined with shipping and other activities has raised \r\nthe rate of invasive species movement into the Arctic (Mueter et al"


id: b8f544f11136eb49543b0326c62bb768
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26633
content:
", \r\n2011). Sea ice loss due to climate change is expected to accelerate over \r\nthe next century (Section 14.2, Fox-Kemper et al., 2021)."


id: 8105a28a61ac650a2aa7280b27c2c2bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17822
content:
"Sea level rise has led to flooding, erosion and damage to infrastructure \r\nalong the western Gulf of Mexico, the southeast US coasts and the \r\nsouthern coast of the Gulf of St Lawrence (very high confidence) \r\n(Section  14.2; Daigle, 2006; Lemmen et  al., 2016; Frederikse et  al., \r\n2020). Mangroves, important nurseries for fish and climate refugia for \r\ncorals (Yates et al., 2014), are under threat from climate change along \r\nthe east coast of Mexico (Pedrozo Acuna, 2012). This SLR, storm surge \r\nand attendant erosion of coastlines and barrier habitats are projected \r\nto have large impacts on coastal ecosystems, maritime industries \r\n(Section 14.5.9), urban centres and cities (Section 14.5.5) along the \r\nGulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, southeast USA, southern Gulf of St \r\nLawrence and Pacific Coast of Mexico (see Box 14.4; Semarnat, 2014; \r\nSweet et al., 2017; Vousdoukas et al., 2020). Coastal archaeological \r\nand historical sites are especially vulnerable to SLR (Anderson et al"


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content:
"Open ocean oxygen minimum zones (OMZ) are expanding in the North \r\nAtlantic, the North Pacific California Current and tropical oceans due to \r\nwarming waters, stratification and changes in precipitation (medium \r\nconfidence) (WGI Section  3.6.2; Deutsch et  al., 2015b; Breitburg \r\net al., 2018; Claret et al., 2018; Ito et al., 2019). Hypoxic events along \r\ncoasts, which are partially influenced by climate change, have been \r\ndocumented for all three countries, with events more prevalent \r\non the east coast and around the Gulf of Mexico due to a regional \r\noceanography dominated by rivers and estuaries carrying land-based \r\nnutrients (Breitburg et  al., 2018). Hypoxia has directly caused large \r\nmortality events for fish and crabs in US estuaries in the Northwest \r\nAtlantic (Chesapeake Bay), Northeast Pacific (Puget Sound) and the \r\nGulf of Mexico (Froehlich et al., 2015; Rakocinski and Menke, 2016; \r\nSato et al., 2016; Kolesar et al., 2017)"


id: 33708a82720db2483b981517570e798
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 5513
content:
" The OMZs and hypoxic events \r\nare projected to increase over the next century and may limit where \r\nfish can move (medium confidence) (Deutsch et  al., 2015b; Stortini \r\net al., 2015; Bianucci et al., 2016; Li et al., 2016)."


id: f9edb7c06a1a03e9ae0e45b8bff006d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 36831
content:
"Marine heatwaves are periods of discrete anomalously high (compared with a 30-year history) sea surface temperatures that persist for \r\na minimum 5 d but up to several months (Hobday et al., 2016; Frolicher et al., 2018; Holbrook et al., 2019; Laufkotter et al., 2020). There \r\nhave been MHWs attributed to climate change in every marine system of North America including large areas of the Northwest Atlantic \r\n(2012), Caribbean Sea (2015), Bering Sea (2016-2018) and central through Northeast Pacific (2013-2016) (NOAA, 2018; Holbrook et al., \r\n2019; Smale et al., 2019). Such MHW events have affected kelp forests (Arafeh-Dalmau et al., 2019), corals (Eakin et al., 2018), seagrasses, \r\nbottom-dwelling organisms, marine birds (Loredo et al., 2019; Smale et al., 2019), mammals (Suryan et al., 2021), fish and shellfish, and \r\nmarine-dependent human communities (Huntington et al., 2020; Fisher et al., 2021; Suryan et al., 2021)"


id: 16952c267bb785cfad98c446af6d8d75
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 1079
content:
" Increased sea temperatures \r\ndirectly increase metabolic demand and change productivity and behaviour of fish species (Stock et al., 2017; Free et al., 2019) as well as \r\ninduce rapid redistribution of species poleward and to deeper, colder waters (Pecl et al., 2017; Rheuban et al., 2017; Crozier et al., 2019; \r\nStevenson and Lauth, 2019; Yang et al., 2019; Barbeaux et al., 2020; Cheung and Frolicher, 2020). In the Pacific, from the Baja Peninsula \r\nto the Bering Sea, there is evidence of widespread shifts in coastal biota and multi-trophic-level starvation of seabirds and whales from \r\ncombined metabolic demand and reduced prey quality associated with protracted MHWs across multiple regions ((CCP6); Sydeman et al., \r\n2015; Duffy-Anderson et al., 2019; Sanford et al., 2019; Smale et al., 2019; Suryan et al. 2021). The distribution of two economically \r\nimportant North American species, Bering Sea Pacific cod (Pinsky et al., 2013b; Stevenson and Lauth, 2019; Barbeaux et al"


id: 49cb0283d6aa290b3e0cc2a1a41ba881
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 9004
content:
", 2020; Spies \r\net al., 2020) and American lobster (Rheuban et al., 2017), have shifted north. The MHW-induced loss of coral reefs across tropical North \r\nAmerican waters has varied in severity regionally. For instance, in 2015 and 2016, extensive, severe bleaching affected more than 30% \r\nof corals off the southeast USA and a large proportion of US Hawaiian Islands, but had moderate to no impact off the Mexican Yucatan \r\nPeninsula (Frieler et al., 2013; Weijerman et al., 2015a; Weijerman et al., 2015b; Cinner et al., 2016; van Hooidonk et al., 2016; Hughes \r\net al., 2018; Sully et al., 2019; Williams et al., 2019b). Some reefs are exhibiting recovery following efforts focused at reducing non-climate \r\nstressors (e.g., overfishing, nutrient pollution and tourism use). Such MHWs are increasing in intensity and frequency (Hobday et al., 2016; \r\nSmale et al"


id: a9bc95c6c7d34df59a4affc95897b667
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 24235
content:
", 2019) with the largest increases in frequency and spatial coverage projected for the Gulf of Mexico, US southern east coast \r\nand US Pacific Northwest (Ranasinghe et al., 2021) and pose a key risk to marine systems in North America (Section 14.5.2; Chapters 3, 16)."


id: c5beff41a2fe1804b15e9a266661691d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 28690
content:
"Ocean management that utilises a portfolio of nested, multi-scale, \r\nclimate-informed and ecosystem-based management approaches \r\nin North American waters can increase the resilience of marine \r\necosystems by addressing multiple stressors simultaneously (high \r\nconfidence) (Marshall et al., 2018; Holsman et al., 2019; Smale et al., \r\n2019; Holsman et al., 2020). Integrated ecosystem assessments (Foley \r\net al., 2013; Levin et al., 2014) are increasingly used to provide strategic \r\nadvice and context for harvest allocations and bycatch avoidance \r\n(Zador et al., 2017) as well as early warnings of ecosystem-wide change \r\n(e.g., sentinel species, ecological indicators) (Cavole et al., 2016; Hazen \r\net al., 2019; Moore and Kuletz, 2019). Dynamic ocean management \r\npolicies may improve resilience of marine species and ecosystems \r\nto climate (medium confidence) (Hyrenbach et  al., 2000; Maxwell \r\net al., 2015; Dunn et al., 2016; Tommasi et al., 2017a; Tommasi et al., \r\n2017b; Hazen et al"


id: f95b914f81e6b553affd79765f801620
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 36741
content:
", 2018; Wilson et al., 2018; Holsman et al., 2019; \r\nKarp et al., 2019). New proactive and rapid management approaches \r\nhave been developed to minimise impacts of increasingly frequent \r\nentanglements of protected species, caused by climate-driven changes \r\nin prey and fishery activities (Corkeron et  al., 2018; Meyer-Gutbrod \r\net al., 2018). Dynamic closure areas are being used to address these \r\nissues and reduce loggerhead turtle bycatch in Hawaiian shallow-set \r\nlongline fisheries (Howell et al., 2015; Lewison et al., 2015), blue whale \r\nship-strike risk in near-real time (Hazen et al., 2017; Abrahms et al., \r\n2019b) and bycatch of multiple top predator species in a west coast \r\ndrift gillnet fishery (Hazen et al., 2018)."


id: f67e89c27bdde0ee19a6bd076ed3099
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 36294
content:
"North America's dams, levees, wastewater-management and water \r\nconveyance facilities have improved water supply safety and have \r\nreduced flood and drought risks, but a substantial portion of that \r\ninfrastructure is ageing and inadequate for modern conditions (Ho \r\net  al., 2017; Tellman et  al., 2018; Carlisle et  al., 2019; FEMA, 2019; \r\nASCE, 2021). Increasingly heavy precipitation from a variety of \r\nstorm types has affected parts of North America (Feng et  al., 2016; \r\nPrein et al., 2017a; Kunkel and Champion, 2019; Kunkel et al., 2020), \r\ncontributing to contamination from combined sewer overflows (Olds \r\net al., 2018) and increased flood damages that are partially attributed \r\nto anthropogenic climate change (van der Wiel et al., 2017; Davenport, \r\n2021). Extreme precipitation events have overwhelmed water control \r\ninfrastructure, imperilling public safety and contributing to extensive \r\ndamages in parts of North America (Kytomaa et al., 2019; Vano et al., \r\n2019; White et al"


id: ba328a65422ed17b3708d8e3edd36114
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 26835
content:
", 2019). Damages stem from extremity of the event \r\nand prior land-use and infrastructure decisions (high confidence)."


id: 4d18bb095118eff487286886fbf602a2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9556
content:
"Securing broodstocks for rebuilding and supplementation can \r\nbe challenging for marine populations already in decline (e.g., \r\nblue king crab in Alaska, steelhead salmon in Puget Sound, white \r\nabalone in California, groundfish in the northeast USA and Canada) \r\n(Section 14.5.4; Table SM14.8). Marine protected areas can attenuate \r\nclimate impacts through trophic redundancy, preserving ecological \r\nprocesses, biodiversity and climate refugia (Roberts et  al., 2017a; \r\nSchoen et  al., 2017), although benefits decrease after mid-century \r\n(or sooner for high-latitude marine protected areas) as species reach \r\ntheir thermal limit, unless coupled with GHG mitigation (Bruno et al., \r\n2018)"


id: f0d03ac53f8b7d6005444bdb814da3f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35376
content:
"Climate trends are affecting riverine, lake and reservoir water quality \r\n(medium confidence). Droughts and increased evapotranspiration have \r\nimpaired water quality by concentrating pollutants in diminished water \r\nvolumes (Paul et  al., 2019a). Cyanobacterial blooms and pathogen \r\nexposure events are increasing in frequency, intensity and duration in \r\nNorth America (Taranu et al., 2015). They are closely associated with \r\nobserved changes in precipitation intensity and associated nutrient \r\nloading (e.g., agricultural runoff, sanitary sewer overflows), elevated \r\nwater temperatures and eutrophication (Michalak et  al., 2013; \r\nMichalak, 2016; Trtanj et al., 2016; Chapra et al., 2017; IBWC, 2017; \r\nWilliamson et al., 2017; Olds et al., 2018; Coffey et al., 2019). These \r\nevents endanger human and animal health, recreational and drinking \r\nwater uses and aquatic ecosystem functioning, and cause economic \r\nlosses (Michalak et  al., 2013; Bullerjahn et  al., 2016; Chapra et  al"


id: 59aa4d1265bb0d233db2e30f80854b0b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11605
content:
", \r\n2017; Huisman et al., 2018). Households and communities dependent \r\non substandard wells, unimproved water sources or deficient water \r\nprovision systems are more exposed than others to experience climate\u0002related impairment of drinking water quality (Section 14.5.6.5; Allaire \r\net  al., 2018; Baeza et  al., 2018; California State Water Resources \r\nControl Board, 2021; Navarro-Espinoza et al., 2021; Water and Tribes \r\nInitiative, 2021)."


id: e1c5b983df9471b23c552e0acdee5ea7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33018
content:
"changes to improve groundwater regulation and documentation of \r\nwater rights (California Department of Food and Agriculture, 2017; \r\nMiller, 2017; Lund et al., 2018; Hanak et al., 2019). Water allocation \r\npolicies are being reassessed to enhance equity, sustainability and \r\nflexibility through shortage sharing agreements, improved groundwater \r\nregulation and voluntary water transfers. Developments include an \r\ninterstate drought management agreement for the Colorado River (US \r\nLaw, 2019), and agreements between the USA and Mexico to provide \r\npulse flows to benefit the ecology of the Colorado River Delta (Pitt and \r\nKendy, 2017). Statewide water planning in Colorado has emphasised \r\nbuilding drought resilience (e.g., by facilitating temporary water \r\ntransfers) (Colorado State Government, 2015; Yates et  al., 2015). At \r\nlocal scales, there have been innovations in cooperative watershed \r\nprotection and water resource planning (Cantu, 2016)"


id: acf3ea536b1740440842c7acc3d9f738
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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vector_id: 24758
content:
" Indigenous \r\nPeoples are playing an increasing role in identifying equitable and \r\nresilient options for adaptation by contributing their knowledge and \r\nvoicing their perspectives on the importance of healthy water bodies \r\nfor human and environmental well-being (Norton-Smith et al., 2016a; \r\nWater and Tribes Initiative, 2020). Collaboration between stakeholders, \r\npolicymakers and scientists is increasingly common in water resources \r\nadaptation planning and assessment."


id: be674e0bb65181809c168bbadcf38732
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27504
content:
"Water serves a wide variety of environmental functions and human \r\nuses as it moves through North America's river basins, so the impacts \r\nof climate change are expected to be widespread and multifaceted. \r\nThis increases the importance of collaborative adaptation efforts \r\nthat are equitable, transparent and give voice to differing values, \r\nperspectives and entitlements across a broad socioeconomic spectrum \r\nof urban and rural, Indigenous and non-Indigenous participants \r\n(Miller et  al., 2016; Cosens et  al., 2018). Adaptation planning may \r\nbe hampered by conflicting interests, jurisdictional boundaries and \r\ninherent interconnections between actions and impacts at different \r\npoints throughout a watershed or river basin"


id: 9092889b33f504c96b8601a7012d1832
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20281
content:
" Differential power \r\nrelationships, decision-making authority and access to information \r\nalso can interfere with effective adaptive governance, while equitable \r\nprocesses for decision making bolstered by reliable shared information \r\ncan help to overcome those impediments (Cosens et al., 2016; Arnold \r\net al., 2017; Cosens et al., 2018; Porter and Birdi, 2018)."


id: 740d1e4d44ac39613eca0e4b2967651d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15858
content:
"Without adaptation, climate change is projected to reduce overall \r\nyields of important North American crops (e.g., wheat, maize, \r\nsoybeans) (high confidence) (Tables SM14.3, SM14.4; Chen et  al., \r\n2017; Levis et al., 2018). For example, projected heat stress (RCP8.5) \r\nreduced mid-century (2040-2069) maize and cotton yields by 12-\r\n15% of historical yields (1950-2005), with the US-SW suffering the \r\nlargest impacts (Table SM14.5; Elias et al., 2018). Warming and heat \r\nextremes will delay or prevent chill accumulation, affecting perennial \r\ncrop development (e.g., fruit set failure), yield (e.g., walnuts, pistachios, \r\nstone fruit) and quality (e.g., grapes) (medium confidence) (Parker \r\net al., 2020). Warming will alter the length of growing seasons of cold\u0002season crops (e.g., broccoli, lettuce) and will shift suitability ranges \r\nof warm-season California crops (e.g., tomatoes) (medium confidence) \r\n(Marklein et al., 2020)"


id: 6ff2433f15c0f4baa55df71967810d7b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15229
content:
" Increasing atmospheric CO2 will enhance yields \r\nyet reduce nutrient content of many crops (high confidence); a CO2\r\nconcentration of 541 ppm (seen by 2050 in RCP8.5) would reduce \r\nper-capita nutrient availability in North American diets by 2.5-4.0% \r\n(Beach et al., 2019). Crop pest and pathogen outbreaks are expected to \r\nworsen under climate change (high confidence) (Deutsch et al., 2018; \r\nWolfe et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019a)."


id: c12cdb6f2fb8c18df9e2be23253ddcf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27974
content:
"Research on water diplomacy recommends broadening negotiations \r\nbeyond a narrow focus on zero-sum issues, like rigid water allocations, \r\nto embrace a more diverse set of shared interests including the need \r\nfor flexibility to respond to changing conditions. A process for ongoing \r\ninclusive engagement of a watershed's stakeholders in mutual social, \r\npolicy and science learning is important. Such mutual learning can build \r\ntrust and establish a common platform of credible information for co\u0002creation of adaptation solutions. In addition, better understanding of \r\nthe policy positions and constraints of others can help stakeholders to \r\nidentify workable solutions to contentious water management issues \r\n(Payne, 2020; Wilder et al., 2020). Cooperation between Mexico and \r\nthe USA on mapping and assessment of transboundary aquifers is a \r\nproduct of such ongoing engagement (Callegary et al., 2018; Sanchez \r\net al., 2018)"


id: 653f2b812ca6260a9cc3ce3c210979c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 13504
content:
" Other examples of the benefits of sustained engagement \r\nare provided by a set of co-management arrangements between \r\nstate, federal and Indigenous authorities on water management for \r\nfishery restoration in the US Pacific Northwest (Tsatsaros et al., 2018) \r\nand Indigenous involvement in multi-level co-management of water \r\nresources in Canada's Northwest Territories (Latta, 2018)."


id: 92d548fe610eabea6f21f2cb60f5873d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20617
content:
"Climate change is anticipated to cause declines in livestock production \r\nacross North America (high confidence) (Table 14.4; SM14.6; Havstad \r\net  al., 2018; Murray-Tortarolo et  al., 2018). Increases in extreme \r\ntemperature raise the risk of livestock heat stress, disease and pest \r\nimpacts (Rojas-Downing et al., 2017). Projected aridification reduces \r\nforage production in the southwest USA and northern Mexico (high \r\nconfidence) (Polley et  al., 2013; Reeves et  al., 2014; Cooley, 2016; \r\nBradford et al., 2020) and transforms grasslands into woody shrublands \r\n(Briske et al., 2015; Murray-Tortarolo et al., 2018), while warmer and \r\nwetter conditions in the northern regions (CA-PR, US-NW, US-NP) may \r\nenhance rangeland production by extending growing seasons (high \r\nconfidence) (Hufkens et  al., 2016; Derner et  al., 2018; Zhang et  al., \r\n2019a). Increased CO2 will enhance production (medium confidence) \r\nbut reduce forage quality (high confidence) in US-NP and US-NW \r\n(Table SM14"


id: 26d16ea2986505642a3e66777162dd6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3500
content:
"Climate change has affected crops across North America through \r\nchanges in growing seasons and regions, extreme heat, precipitation, \r\nwater stress and soil quality (Table 14.1; Figure 14.5; Section 5.4.1; \r\nFigure 5.3) (Mann and Gleick, 2015; Galloza et al., 2017; Otkin et al., \r\n2018). These changes directly influence crop productivity, quality \r\nand market price (high confidence) (Kistner et al., 2018; Reyes and \r\nElias, 2019). Effects of historical climate change on maize, soybean, \r\nbarley and wheat crop yields vary from strong increases to strong \r\ndecreases (e.g., > -0.5 to > +0.5 t ha-1 yr-1 for maize) within North \r\nAmerica's agroecological regions, even for the same crop (Ray et al., \r\n2019). Across North America, climate change has generally reduced \r\nagricultural productivity by 12.5% since 1961, with progressively \r\ngreater losses moving south from Canada to Mexico (Ortiz-Bobea \r\net  al., 2021), yet responses are highly differential across regions \r\nand crops"


id: 64efcad8cb3abeac2bfd4050c9245f27
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13453
content:
" Some crop loss events are partially attributed to climate \r\nchange (high confidence) such as the 2012 Midwest and Great Plains \r\ndrought, which cost agriculture 30 billion USD (Smith and Matthews, \r\n2015; Rupp et al., 2017). Aridity is extending northward, altering crop \r\nsuitability ranges (Figure 14.4); up to 50% of distributional shifts in \r\ngrowing regions for US crops between 1970 and 2010 may be related "


id: 756c6bcf341ec87ebe23a12c973051cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16061
content:
"Climate-change impacts on forests (Section  14.5.1; see Box  14.2) \r\nmay affect timber production by altering tree species distributions, \r\nproductivity, and wildfire and insect disturbances (medium confidence). \r\nSouthern or drier locations may shift from forests to other vegetation \r\ntypes, whereas higher-latitude areas may experience forest expansion \r\n(Brecka et al., 2018). Tree species composition is projected to change \r\nwith climate change (Wang et al., 2015; Bose et al., 2017). Tree growth \r\nmay increase or decrease from changes in temperature or moisture \r\ndepending on location, with lower growth expected from warming \r\nin water-limited areas (Littell et  al., 2010). Increased productivity \r\nassociated with more favourable climate conditions is projected for \r\nboreal forests (Brecka et al., 2018), although in some regions, growth \r\nwill reverse and decline with additional warming (D'Orangeville et al., \r\n2018; Chaste et al., 2019)"


id: bbdf1240f527adf40449c994e0597961
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27120
content:
" As a result of these changes, timber yields \r\nin North America either may increase in the future (Beach et al., 2015; \r\nEPA, 2015a) or decrease (Boulanger et al., 2014; McKenney et al., 2016; "


id: 4a7040d0976b264f8f5b4fd0fb9097ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9115
content:
"Declines in yield and poleward stock redistributions (an average \r\nof ~20.6 km per decade) are expected to continue under climate \r\nchange and increase in magnitude with atmospheric carbon (high \r\nconfidence) (Table 14.4; Hare et al., 2016; Pecl et al., 2017; Rheuban \r\net al., 2017; Morley et al., 2018; Smale et al., 2019; Szuwalski et al., \r\n2021). For example, without adaptation, end-of-century losses of \r\nBering Sea pollock yield (relative to persistence scenarios) is likely to \r\nreach 50% under moderate (RCP4.5) and 80% under low (RCP8.5) \r\nmitigation scenarios, respectively (Holsman et  al., 2020). Expanding \r\nHABs, pathogens and altered ocean chemistry (OA and dissolved \r\noxygen) will reduce yields and increase closures of fisheries along all \r\nNorth American coasts (medium confidence) (Section 14.5.2; Deutsch \r\net al., 2015a; Ekstrom et al., 2015; Seung et al., 2015; Punt et al., 2016; \r\nHoward et al., 2020)"


id: b8cfba4585442dc65d68ce7733e78b33
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26599
content:
" For fisheries that represent 56% of current US \r\nfishing revenue, projected annual net losses under high-emission \r\nscenarios (RCP8.5, 2021-2100) may reach double that of low-emission \r\nscenarios (RCP2.6) (Moore et al., 2021)."


id: 2cce8bb44c488d345e05a325ec3eba8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4484
content:
"Climate impacts outlined in Section 14.5.2 have induced yield losses \r\nfor multiple subsistence, recreational and commercial fisheries \r\n(very high confidence), and contributed to commercial fishery \r\nclosures across North America (Sections 14.5.1, 14.5.3; Figure 14.6; \r\nTable SM14.7; Lynn et al., 2014; Barbeaux et al., 2020; Fisher et al., \r\n2021). Climate-driven declines in productivity are widespread (high \r\nconfidence) (Figure 14.6), although a few increases are observed in \r\nnorthern regions (medium confidence) (Cunningham et  al., 2018; \r\nCrozier et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019b). Redistribution of species \r\nhas increased travel distance to fishing grounds, shifted stocks across \r\nregulatory and international boundaries, and increased interactions \r\nwith protected species (very high confidence) (Figure  14.6; \r\nTable  SM14.7; Cross-Chapter Box  MOVING PLATE in Chapter 5; \r\nMorley et  al., 2018; Free et  al., 2019; IPCC, 2019b; Rogers et  al"


id: 5878251294a176bbb37a113fb4a3c42b
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content:
"2018; Wolfe et  al., 2018). Traditional agriculture inherently includes \r\nclimate adaptive practices that enhance biodiversity, soil quality and \r\nagricultural production (e.g., multiple cultivars, heat-tolerant heritage \r\ncattle breeds) (Bermeo et  al., 2014; Gomez-Aiza et  al., 2017; Ortiz\u0002Colon et  al., 2018). Agroecology and agroforestry (see Box  14.7) in \r\nNorth America has expanded from (but not replaced) traditional and \r\nrural practices in Mexico (Metcalfe et al., 2020a) as a sustainable and \r\nclimate-resilient alternative to industrial agriculture (Schoeneberger \r\net  al., 2017) that increases productivity (by 6-65% depending on \r\nthe crop), enhances microclimates and provides co-benefits for GHG \r\nmitigation (Abbas et al., 2017; Cardinael et al., 2017; Schoeneberger \r\net al., 2017; Snapp et al., 2021). Irrigation is an effective adaptation \r\nstrategy in key agricultural areas (Miller, 2017; Lund et al., 2018) and \r\ncould stabilise food security in rain-fed regions (e.g"


id: 3b7bffbaf2cf28b0bf0eb14c7eeb27c5
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content:
", southeast Mexico) \r\n(Spring, 2014); water allocation must balance multiple needs and rights \r\n(medium confidence) (Section 14.5.3; Brown et al., 2015b; Levis et al., \r\n2018; Gomez Diaz et al., 2019). Heritage livestock breeds, changing \r\nspecies and precision-ranching technology may promote ranch and "


id: e2c4d5615d057dd6d52716a2db754f08
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 33179
content:
"(Hazen et al., 2018) improves modelled fishery performance (medium \r\nconfidence) (Section  14.5.2; Froehlich et  al., 2017; Tommasi et  al., \r\n2017a; Tommasi et al., 2017b; Karp et al., 2019; Barbeaux et al., 2020), \r\nyet planning and policies that directly incorporate climate-change \r\ninformation remain limited (Skern-Mauritzen et  al., 2015; Marshall \r\net al., 2019b). Expanding aquaculture across North America will likely\r\naddress deficits in nutritional and protein yields (Gentry et al., 2019; \r\nCostello et al., 2020), yet aquaculture initiatives have largely progressed \r\nwithout explicitly considering climate impacts (FAO, 2018; Froehlich \r\net al., 2019), and critical elements for climate adaptation (e.g., climate\u0002informed zoning, monitoring, insurance) are not widely implemented \r\n(Linan-Cabello et al., 2016; FAO, 2018; Stewart-Sinclair et al., 2020)"


id: 65e810d08095153a1bb148a9a95fd566
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content:
" \r\nClimate-informed and standardised aquaculture governance, and \r\nincreased coordination with fishery and coastal management, is \r\nneeded for climate resilience (high confidence) (Brugere et al., 2019; \r\nFroehlich et al., 2019; Free et al., 2020; Galparsoro et al., 2020)."


id: d22d27fb31622455288b712141141d7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30594
content:
"Short-duration, high-intensity rainfall and other extreme events (e.g., \r\nhurricanes, atmospheric river events) create significant flooding risks \r\nand impacts for cities in North America and negatively affect the \r\nlives, livelihoods, economic activities, infrastructure and access to \r\nservices (high confidence) (Amec Foster Wheeler and Credit Valley \r\nConservation, 2017; Curry et al., 2019). In 2016, US flooding events \r\ncaused 126 fatalities and 11 billion USD (considering the 2016 USD \r\nvalue) in damages (NOAA, 2019). In Canada, flooding accounts for \r\n40% of the costs associated with weather-related disasters recorded \r\nsince 1970 (Canadian Institute for Climate Choices, 2020); the most \r\ncostly event was the 2013 Calgary flood (CA-PR) (1.8 billion CAD in \r\ncatastrophic insurance losses and 6 billion CAD in direct costs such \r\nas uninsured losses) (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2016)"


id: 4dfc65596fec96e5625ec504782cddc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 9691
content:
" \r\nMexico City is seasonally impacted by high-intensity rainfall events \r\nthat generate local flooding (de Alba and Castillo, 2014). Rural and \r\nremote settlements are also threatened by floods; Indigenous lands in \r\nCanada are disproportionately exposed to flooding, with almost 22% \r\nof residential properties at risk of a 1-in-100-year flood (Thistlethwaite \r\net al., 2020; Yumagulova, 2020)."


id: ba21217a903adfa1857935c0842b3ac9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26826
content:
"Cities are complex social-ecological systems with large populations, \r\nconcentrated wealth, ageing infrastructure, reliance on extrinsic and \r\nincreasingly stressed natural systems, social inequality, differential \r\ninstitutional capacities and impervious, heat-retaining surfaces \r\n(Maxwell et  al., 2018a; Schell et  al., 2020). These factors interact \r\nwith location (e.g., proximity to coast, in a floodplain) to create \r\ncity-specific vulnerabilities to climate change and requirements for \r\nresilience initiatives (Mercer Clarke et al., 2016). Cities are home to \r\ndiverse cultural and social communities, including large Indigenous \r\npopulations who can be uniquely affected by climate change yet who \r\nbring valuable IK and leadership to urban adaptation efforts (Statistics \r\nCanada, 2020; Brown et al., 2021)"


id: 2ec3cb48f758b101aa1cc14bc423303e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" The rural and remote settlements of \r\nNorth America also experience similar hazards and risks; however, such \r\nchallenges are due to different factors such as geographic isolation, \r\ndependence on local food resources and socioeconomic conditions \r\n(Kearney and Bell, 2019; Vodden and Cunsolo, 2021)."


id: a9e88df9f990b8cf3ceb462dec5e9562
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Extreme heat events are affecting natural assets and built infrastructure \r\nas well as individuals in cities and rural settlements across North \r\nAmerica (high confidence) (Maria Raquel et  al., 2016; Amec Foster \r\nWheeler and Credit Valley Conservation, 2017; Howell and Brady, \r\n2019; Martinich and Crimmins, 2019). Key urban infrastructure systems \r\n(e.g., services in buildings, energy distribution) are interdependent and \r\nsusceptible to cascading impacts (e.g., electricity supply disruption \r\nduring a heatwave compromising another system like water delivery, \r\nhigh-rise cooling) (Brown et  al., 2021). Urban social inequality and \r\nsystemic racism has led to disproportionately higher exposure to urban \r\nheat island effects in low-income and minority neighbourhoods in US \r\ncities, due in part, to less green space and tree cover to offset heat \r\nretained in the built environment (Hoffman et al., 2020; Schell et al., \r\n2020; Hsu et al., 2021)"


id: fc2639607c1d4250d1dbe41624a9ecb1
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content:
" In the rural context, extreme heat contributes \r\nto migration out of small communities; for example, see cases reported \r\nin Mexico (Nawrotzki et  al., 2015a). Extreme heat events pose a "


id: cff19a9664b81ea77789416e3b7c6c97
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"In the USA, many people are projected to be at risk of flooding \r\nfrom SLR (high confidence) (see Box 14.4). A projected SLR of 0.9 m \r\nby 2100 could place 4.2  million people at risk of inundation in US \r\ncoastal counties, whereas a 1.8-m SLR exposes 13.1  million people \r\n(Hauer et al., 2016). In California, under an extreme 2-m SLR by 2100, \r\n150  billion USD (2010) of property or more than 6% of the state's \r\nGDP and 600,000 people could be affected by flooding (Barnard \r\net  al., 2019). A 1-m SLR would inundate 42% of the Albemarle\u0002Pamlico Peninsula in North Carolina and incur property losses of up \r\nto 14 billion USD (considering the 2016 USD value) (Bhattachan et al., \r\n2018). In nine southeast US states, a 1-m SLR would result in the loss \r\nof more than13,000 recorded historical and archaeological sites with \r\nover 1000 eligible for inclusion in the National Register for Historic \r\nPlaces (Anderson et al., 2017)"


id: 85cceb88b000bb864b21c63e9f3a5f9a
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content:
" This SLR raises groundwater levels by \r\nimpeding drainage and enhancing runoff during rain events (Hoover \r\net al., 2017); coastal flooding enhances saltwater intrusion affecting \r\ndrinking water supply in settlements (e.g., coast of Texas) (Anderson \r\nand Al-Thani, 2016)."


id: ef4ca3b93b80b8ebf827a826d6c57754
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Extreme heat events are projected to increase in frequency and \r\nintensity across North America in the coming decades (Section 14.2.2; \r\nFigure 14.2F,G). Inland urban areas in the southern and eastern USA \r\nare susceptible to urban heat island effects, particularly the Midwest/\r\nGreat Lakes regions (Krayenhoff et  al., 2018) and also Mexico City \r\nand many other cities in Mexico (Vargas and Magana, 2020). Climate \r\nchange (RCP8.5) interacting with urban form, development and \r\nsystemic racism (Schell et  al., 2020; Hsu et  al., 2021) could worsen \r\nrisks from extreme heat in North American cities, especially where \r\nthere is limited adaptation (high confidence) (Krayenhoff et al., 2018). \r\nImpacts from extreme heat will be exacerbated when multiple hazards \r\noccur simultaneously (e.g., heatwaves concurrent with droughts) \r\n(Mora et  al., 2018; Zscheischler et  al., 2018)"


id: 1d93b7b52711e6dc63efe087d95ca34c
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" Extreme heat events \r\nincrease energy demand for space cooling in buildings, especially \r\nduring peak demand periods and heatwaves (IEA, 2018a). This can \r\ndecrease cooling efficiency, increase emissions of GHG from electricity \r\ngeneration, increase refrigerant loads and associated emissions, and \r\nnegatively affect air quality (IEA, 2018a). Major electrical grid failure \r\n(i.e., blackouts) have increased across the USA and will continue to \r\nbe particularly dangerous for human health when they coincide with \r\nextreme heat events (Stone et al., 2021). Efforts to increase resilience \r\nof the infrastructure that cities rely on are increasing (Climate-Safe \r\nInfrastructure Working Group, 2018)."


id: 7a1fce9125548be8bc96fd5ef812d384
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Other adaptation responses to reduce temperature effects include \r\nmodifying structures (roofs, engineered materials) and the urban \r\nlandscape through green infrastructure (e.g., urban trees, wetlands, \r\ngreen roofs), which increases climate resilience and quality of life \r\nby reducing urban heat island effects, while additionally improving \r\nair quality, capturing stormwater and delivering other co-benefits \r\nto the community (e.g., access to food, connection to nature, social \r\nconnectivity) (high confidence) (see Box 14.7; Ballinas and Barradas, \r\n2016; Emilsson and Sang, 2017; Kabisch et al., 2017; Krayenhoff et al., \r\n2018; Petrovic et al., 2019; Schell et al., 2020). Green infrastructure can \r\nbe flexible and cost-effective (Ballinas and Barradas, 2016; Emilsson \r\nand Sang, 2017; Kabisch et al., 2017). Initiatives can be 'bottom-up' \r\ncommunity-led adaptation with support from municipal governments \r\n(e.g., East Harlem in New York City) (Petrovic et  al., 2019)"


id: cb98c5a060030af5a68460659c970b5b
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content:
" Valuing \r\nmunicipal natural assets (e.g., assigning economic value to cooling \r\nfrom urban forests or stormwater retention by urban wetlands) is \r\nbecoming increasingly common in Canada and the USA (Wamsler, \r\n2015; Roberts et  al., 2017a; Municipal Natural Assets Initiative, \r\n2018). Guidance assists municipalities to identify, value and account \r\nfor natural assets in their financial planning and asset management \r\nprogrammes (O'Neil and Cairns, 2017) and consider future climate \r\n(Municipal Natural Assets Initiative, 2018)."


id: d4aec7e9c577b0e159f30b73035940ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"In North American cities, present-day adaptation responses extend \r\nbeyond the traditional focus on infrastructure to include measures \r\naimed to protect people, property and ecosystems (medium confidence). \r\nBarriers to adaptation include challenges related to the local physical \r\nand environmental setting, effects of colonialism and racism, \r\nsocioeconomic attributes of the population, institutional frameworks \r\nand competing interests of city stakeholders (medium confidence). \r\nThe current scale of adaptation is generally not commensurate with \r\nreducing risks from projected climatic hazards, although resources exist \r\nthat provide guidance and examples of effective adaptation (medium \r\nconfidence). Some remote Canadian communities have demonstrated \r\nstrengths (e.g., strong social networks) that support resilience to \r\nclimate change (Kipp et  al., 2020; Vodden and Cunsolo, 2021)"


id: eb45ad82cd607e35b096d39e2a785684
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content:
" In \r\nsome US cities with political resistance to action on climate change, \r\nadaptation measures focused on addressing extreme events (rather \r\nthan climate-change impacts) have been able to make progress (Hamin \r\net  al., 2014). Enhanced public awareness of the risks from extreme \r\nevents associated with climate change is important for motivating \r\nadaptation (Section 14.3; Howe et al., 2019) and developing a climate\u0002change agenda (Aragon-Durand, 2020)."


id: 4dab04a11cda5fb7a58f3f59622b3943
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Approximately 95 million Americans lived in coastal communities in 2017 (US Census Bureau, 2019) and in 2013, Canada had roughly \r\n6.5 million coastal residents (Lemmen et al., 2016), while Mexico had 19 million people living in coastal municipalities in 2015 (Azuz\u0002Adeath et al., 2018). Sea level rise around North American coastlines (Figure Box 14.4.1) is projected to be greatest along the coasts of \r\nAtlantic Canada, northern Gulf of Mexico for the USA and the Pacific coast of Mexico (IPCC, 2021). Sections 14.5.2.1, 14.5.5.1.3 and \r\n14.5.5.2.3 describe SLR impacts. The status of adaptation to SLR by local governments is variable (see Table Box 14.4.1, where progress \r\nis indicated by colour coding) and ranges from financed implementation to preliminary, preparatory or scoping studies and workshops"


id: 3af22e1f5691feef4aab2fd701548308
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content:
" \r\nAdaptation planning and implementation to address SLR and coastal flooding have been initiated across many cities and settlements in \r\nNorth America, but preparedness varies (high confidence)."


id: 3da49121c001f81f58f5ea0ac0287815
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vector_id: 7049
content:
"urban flooding, erosion and harmful runoff (Kovacs et al., 2014; Angel \r\net al., 2018b; Government of Canada, 2021c). Structural approaches \r\nhave limitations and require trade-offs that could be addressed with \r\na focus on social-ecological solutions and stronger institutional \r\ncoordination (e.g., flood risk management in Mexico City) (Aragon\u0002Durand, 2020). In response to high-intensity rainfall events, Mexico \r\nCity invested in stormwater infrastructure, although additional benefits \r\ncould have been realised if water supply needs had been incorporated \r\n(de Alba and Castillo, 2014). Some programmes exist to facilitate \r\nstormwater and wastewater infrastructure updating to accommodate \r\nincreased precipitation across North America. The US federal Clean \r\nWater State Revolving Fund provides low-interest loans for states \r\nto upgrade infrastructure for climate change, with 42  billion USD \r\nprovided since 1987 (ASCE, 2019)"


id: de6a3b9e02f5b026b63a0ccc2a94ba2b
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content:
" In Canada, local governments are \r\nimportant leaders in managing engineered and green infrastructure \r\ndecisions, incentivising property-level flood protection and ensuring \r\nservice delivery (Government of Canada, 2021c). The civil engineering \r\nprofession is playing an active role in facilitating an understanding \r\nof risks and prioritisation of adaptation investments in communities \r\n(Tye and Giovannettone, 2021).The high concentration of valuable \r\nassets in cities requires mechanisms to facilitate replacement of \r\nassets including use of existing and proposed insurance mechanisms \r\n(medium confidence) (Section 14.7)."


id: 8bd29f2ef85734b14b7cb9d318c29734
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content:
"mortality related to cold temperatures and mortality due to other \r\nfactors that vary with season (Ebi and Mills, 2013; Ebi, 2015). Warmer \r\ntemperatures do not always equate to lower winter mortality: many \r\ncold-related deaths do not occur during the coldest times of year or in \r\nthe coldest places (high confidence) but occur during the beginning or \r\nend of the winter season (Barnett et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2014; Schwartz \r\net al., 2015; Sarofim et al., 2016b; Smith and Sheridan, 2019). Warmer \r\nUS cities generally experience more mortality from extreme cold events \r\nand cold temperatures than colder cities in the USA and Canada (Lee \r\net al., 2014; Gasparrini et al., 2015; Schwartz et al., 2015; Wang et al., \r\n2016; Smith and Sheridan, 2019). While mortality rates linked to direct \r\ncold exposure (e.g"


id: 75ff9315d03ebc596f4f20ca263dd40f
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content:
", hypothermia, falls and fractures) is generally low, \r\nthe relatively higher mortality during milder temperatures is thought to \r\nbe largely due to respiratory infections and cardiovascular impacts (Lee \r\net al., 2014; Gasparrini et al., 2015), which, although correlated with \r\ntemperature, may not be caused by cold temperatures (Ebi and Mills, \r\n2013; Ebi, 2015; Sarofim et al., 2016a). When separating the effects \r\nof cold temperatures from the effects of the winter season, one study \r\nfound that cold temperature did not drive mortality and suggested that \r\nwinter season excess mortality was due to seasonal factors other than \r\ntemperature (e.g., influenza, seasonal gatherings) (Kinney et al., 2015)."


id: b52e68e1d0a1b655a20b3d81e2a157d5
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vector_id: 26044
content:
"Climate change creates conditions that enable earlier seasonal \r\nactivity and general northern expansion of ticks (Ogden et al., 2014), \r\nincreasing human exposure to tick-borne diseases in North America \r\n(very high confidence). Lyme disease incidence and geographic extent \r\nhas already increased in Canada and the USA (Eisen et  al., 2016), \r\nwhich has been associated with climate change (Ogden et al., 2014), \r\nincluding warmer temperatures (Cheng et al., 2017; Lin et al., 2019). \r\nClimate change is projected to increase disease spread into new \r\ngeographic regions, lengthen the season of disease transmission and \r\nincrease tick-borne disease risk in North America across emissions \r\nscenarios throughout this century (very high confidence), with regional \r\nvariability (Roy-Dufresne et  al., 2013; Feria-Arroyo et  al., 2014; \r\nMonaghan et al., 2015; Robinson et al., 2015; McPherson et al., 2017). \r\nChagas disease is transmitted by triatomines, and most of the Mexican \r\npopulation (88"


id: 227c77340c7f348fbd6cccfa4af96bf1
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content:
"9%) already reside in areas with at least one infected \r\nvector species in both rural and urban populations (Carmona-Castro \r\net al., 2018). Chagas has already extended its range into the southern \r\nUSA, and the triatomines' niche is projected to expand northward this \r\ncentury (Garza et al., 2014; Carmona-Castro et al., 2018) in both rural \r\nand urban areas (Carmona-Castro et al., 2018)."


id: 17b67d216fa65ec7f7c328db0908083a
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1228
content:
"In North America, stormwater and water treatment infrastructure \r\nplay important roles in reducing water-borne disease risk during \r\nprecipitation events (high confidence). In the USA, heavy precipitation \r\nevents are associated with higher rates of childhood gastrointestinal \r\nillness in municipalities with untreated drinking water, but not in \r\nmunicipalities with treated drinking water (Uejio et  al., 2014). In \r\nMexico, disparities in access to treated water are a key determinant of \r\nmorbidity in children under age 5 years (Jimenez-Moleon and Gomez\u0002Albores, 2011; Romero-Lankao et al., 2014a). In remote communities \r\nin Alaska and Northern Canada, challenges in water service provision \r\nand maintenance can increase risk of water-borne disease during high\u0002impact weather events (Harper et al., 2011; Bressler and Hennessy, 2018; \r\nHarper et al., 2020)"


id: 553afb60f7b68792dcf5918db13fde01
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10873
content:
" In older sections of many North American cities, \r\nsewage treatment plant capacity is exceeded by overflow of combined \r\nsanitary and storm sewer systems during heavy precipitation events, \r\nresulting in bypass of untreated and microbiologically contaminated \r\nwastewater discharge into drinking water sources (Jagai et al., 2017; \r\nOlds et al., 2018; Staley et al., 2018). These sewer overflow events are \r\nassociated with increased gastrointestinal illness across age groups \r\n(Jagai et al., 2017)."


id: 2d0a6b2713a20730c643f6ffe1e24084
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4521
content:
"Winter tourism activities with hard limits to adaptation, particularly \r\nthose that occur at sea level where less precipitation is expected to \r\nfall as snow (i.e., Nordic skiing, snowmobiling, snowshoeing), are at \r\nthe highest risk from climate change and may experience irreversible \r\nimpacts well before 2degC of warming above pre-industrial levels (high \r\nconfidence) (Figure  14.9). During record warm winters, alpine ski \r\nresorts in eastern Canada experienced reductions in ski season lengths \r\nof between 11 and 17 d (Rutty et al., 2017) and resorts in the northeast \r\nUSA (US-NE) experienced decreased skier visits by 11.6% and \r\nreductions in operational profits of 33% amounting to 40-52 million \r\nUSD (Dawson et  al., 2009). Even with advanced snowmaking as an \r\nadaptation to warmer temperatures, average ski season lengths are \r\nprojected to decrease 8% (RCP2.6, 2050s) to 73% (RCP8.5, 2080s) in \r\nOntario, Canada (CA-ON) (Scott et al., 2019b), 12% (RCP4.5, 2050s) to \r\n22% (RCP8"


id: 1432c41886f633c8cfd4599a1450ac50
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content:
"5, 2080s) in Quebec, Canada (CA-QC), and 13% (RCP4.5, \r\n2050s) to 45% (RCP8.5, 2080s) in the northeast USA (US-NE) (Wobus \r\net al., 2017; Scott et al., 2020). Season length for snowmobiling and \r\ncross-country skiing is projected to decrease more dramatically (high \r\nconfidence), that is, by 80% (RCP4.5) to 100% (RCP8.5) by mid-century \r\n(CCP5; Wobus et al., 2017). The number of outdoor skating days may \r\ndecrease by 34% in Toronto and Montreal, and 19% in Calgary, by \r\n2090 under RCP8.5 (Robertson et al., 2015). The skating season length \r\nfor the Rideau Canal in Ottawa, Canada, a UNESCO World Heritage Site \r\nattracting 1.3 million visitors annually, may decrease by 3.8+-2.0 d per \r\ndecade with later opening dates of 2.6+-1.5 d per decade (Jahanandish \r\nand Alireza, 2019)."


id: efda553f733949e50b2dc7658e5ad854
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 35242
content:
"strategies to reduce climate risks as significant and widespread \r\nimpacts are not expected until 3degC-4degC of warming (Figure  14.9; \r\nRutty and Scott, 2015; Atzori et al., 2018; Santos-Lacueva et al., 2018; \r\nDuro and Turrion-Prats, 2019). Thirty percent of hotels along the Gulf \r\nof Mexico and Caribbean Sea are exposed to flooding and 66% are \r\nlocated on eroding beaches (Lithgow et al., 2019). Coral reef cover in \r\nAkumal Bay, Mexico, decreased by 79% between 2011 and 2014 (Gil \r\net al., 2015; Manuel-Navarrete and Pelling, 2015). The recreation value \r\nof coral reef tourism in Florida, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii is expected to \r\ndecrease by 90% by mid-century under RCP8.5 (Section 14.4.2; EPA, \r\n2017). Wildfires and insect outbreaks have contributed to reduced \r\ndesirability for tourism across forest and mountain regions (Bawa, \r\n2017; Hestetune et  al., 2018; White et  al., 2020). Visitors to Utah's \r\nNational Parks declined 0.5-1"


id: 96a13e29ee4c4f98c5623c47d84e046f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"5% during wildfire years between \r\n1993 and 2015, resulting in 2.7-4.5 million USD in lost revenue (see \r\nBox 14.2; Kim and Jakus, 2019). Trees damaged by insects have caused \r\ncampground and hiking trail closures in the western USA and Alaska \r\n(Arnberger et  al., 2018). Seal level rise, flooding, coastal erosion, \r\nchanging air and sea temperatures, changing humidity and extreme \r\nweather events are putting cultural heritage sites at risk (Fatoric and \r\nSeekamp, 2017; Hollesen et al., 2018; Tetu et al., 2019)."


id: 25f7e6d81003e6a3b40584348b754d70
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3399
content:
"Hard and soft limits to adaptation exist in the tourism sector (Manuel\u0002Navarrete and Pelling, 2015). For example, machine-made snow, without \r\nthe use of environmentally harmful chemical additives that are banned \r\nin most jurisdictions, can only be made efficiently in temperatures \r\nbelow -2degC, but projections indicate warming temperatures above this \r\nthreshold (Wobus et al., 2017; Scott et al., 2019a). Multi-jurisdictional \r\nadaptation planning for parks and protected areas in the USA has \r\nbeen hindered by a lack of funding and communication, and funding \r\ntrade-offs that could be remedied through coordination (Lemieux \r\net al., 2015). Social inequalities generated by the tourism development \r\nprocess must also be considered by climate-related interventions to \r\nprevent the perpetuation of inequalities that may exist, particularly in \r\nless developed regions and rapidly developing regions"


id: 6c141e33a7eb1a4dfb5fba82a80e271a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 14634
content:
" For example, \r\nnew developments in Hawaii, Florida, Quebec and popular resort areas \r\nin Mexico have led to social inequalities through increased property \r\ntaxes leading to the marginalisation of local residents away from these \r\nareas in favour of wealthy tourists (Section 14.5.9; Manuel-Navarrete \r\nand Pelling, 2015)."


id: 204fb13c28cad8693ee53e5283b30928
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2534
content:
"Cruise and yacht tourism in the North American Arctic have increased \r\nrapidly over the past decade as changes in sea ice has expanded open\u0002water areas and season length (Johnston et al., 2016; Pizzolato et al., \r\n2016; Dawson et al., 2018). The risk of a major accident or incident \r\namong Arctic-going yachts and some expedition passenger vessels is \r\nvery high relative to other ships (high confidence) due to the combined \r\nincreases in mobile ice, especially along the Northwest Passage (Barber \r\net al., 2018a; Howell and Brady, 2019; Copland et al., 2021; Lemmen \r\net al., 2021), limited regulation for private yachts (Dawson et al., 2014; \r\nDawson et al., 2017), the propensity for cruise ships to travel into newly \r\nice-free and poorly charted areas, and the increasing number of non\u0002ice-strengthened vessels operating in the region (Dawson et al., 2018; \r\nCopland et al., 2019; Copland et al., 2021)"


id: a7f11fc77b6ef00407159233e4974d6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 23935
content:
" Compounding risks include \r\na lack of hydrographic charting and the lack of emergency response \r\ninfrastructure (e.g., spill response, search and rescue, salvage) (Amap, \r\n2017). Tourism demand for polar bear viewing in Churchill, Manitoba, \r\nCanada, may change due to climate-related declines in polar bear \r\nhealth (Gil et  al., 2015; Manuel-Navarrete and Pelling, 2015), but \r\nmay be offset by 'Last Chance Tourism' (LCT), a niche tourism market \r\nof individuals who explicitly seek to visit vanishing landscapes and/\r\nor disappearing flora and fauna (Lemelin et al., 2010). The ethics of \r\npromoting LCT has been questioned considering that more visitation \r\nto sensitive sites increases local impacts as well as travel-related \r\nemissions (Groulx et al., 2016; Groulx et al., 2019)."


id: 87c625d65b76cf564c81f81701ab5506
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 18889
content:
"Economic sectors highly reliant on climate, such as agriculture, tourism, \r\nfisheries and forestry, have higher levels of exposure and sensitivity \r\n(high confidence) and greater overall risk to climate change compared \r\nwith other economic sectors such as mining, construction and \r\nmanufacturing (medium confidence). However, the cascading nature \r\nof climate impacts related to trade (see Box 14.5), labour productivity \r\n(Section 14.5.8.1.5) and infrastructure (Section 14.5.8.1.2) means that \r\nthere is no economic sector in North America that will be unaffected by \r\nclimate change (very high confidence) (Figure 14.10). For Canada, this \r\nassessment is further supported by the Canadian Climate Assessment \r\n(Lemmen et al., 2021). The combined economies of Canada, Mexico \r\nand the USA represented ~28% of the global GDP in 2019, with the \r\nUSA accounting for almost 90% of the total activity for North America \r\n(World Bank, 2020a)"


id: 98ca2eb06b34404c97b175b12e02d60
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 21554
content:
" The risks posed at different global warming \r\nlevels (GWLs) for any given economic activity or sector are presented \r\nin Figure  14.10. By combining expert judgement with a systematic \r\nreview of the literature for each sector, the information in Figure 14.10 "


id: 60002a1cf077227fac99074d8bb47dd4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"at risk of flooding from tropical storms (De la Pena et al. 2018). Low \r\nwater levels in the Great Lakes has severely impacted US grain transport \r\n(Attavanich et al., 2013). High-intensity rain events destroyed 1000 km \r\nof roads and washed out hundreds of bridges and culverts in 2013 \r\nresulting in an estimated 6 billion CAD (considering the 2013 CAD value) \r\nin damages and recovery costs in Alberta, Canada (Palko and Lemmen, \r\n2017). In 2019, the rail line from Winnipeg to Churchill Manitoba, which \r\nis the only ground transportation to the community and to Canada's only \r\ndeep-water Arctic port, was reopened after being closed for over 2 years \r\ndue to the cumulative effects of flooding, permafrost degradation and \r\npolitical challenges (Lin et al., 2020). In the USA, the number of heat\u0002related train delays has increased (Bruzek et al., 2013; Chinowsky et al., \r\n2019) and, by the end of the century, may cause economic losses of 25-\r\n45 billion USD (RCP4"


id: 392fc6fdc228411408f3a95ea5101de1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 6373
content:
"5) or 35-60 billion USD (RCP8.5) (Chinowsky et al., \r\n2019). Sea ice reduction in the North American Arctic has led to a rapid \r\nincrease in ship traffic (Huntington et al., 2015; Phillips, 2016; Pizzolato \r\net  al., 2016; Huntington et  al., 2021b; Li et  al., 2021) with cascading \r\nrisks related to invasive species introduction, accident rates, black carbon \r\nemissions, underwater noise pollution for marine mammals and risks to \r\nsubsistence harvesting activities in Indigenous communities (Ware et al., \r\n2014; Council of Canadian Academies, 2016; Huntington, 2021; Verna \r\net al., 2016; Chan et al., 2019)."


id: da9c0f39aaeffe356f59738c98e692be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
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vector_id: 31923
content:
"direct damage to buildings, roads, airport runways and other critical \r\ninfrastructure including decreased bearing capacities of building and \r\npipeline foundations, damage to road surfaces, and deterioration \r\nof reservoirs and impoundments used for wastewater and mine \r\ntailings containment (Pendakur, 2017; Meredith et  al., 2019). Ice \r\nroads have become less safe due to warming, pavement damage has \r\nincreased related to seasonal thaw-freeze cycles and there have been \r\ninterruptions in airport operations, water and sewage service, and \r\nschool operations in the Canadian territories of Yukon and Nunavut \r\n(Canadian Western and Eastern Arctic, i.e., CA-WA and CA-EA in \r\nFigure 14.1) (Council of Canadian Academies, 2019). By the end of the \r\ncentury, the economic impact of projected reconstruction of Alaska's \r\npublic infrastructure due to climate change (mainly from permafrost \r\nthaw) is estimated to range from 4.2 billion USD (RCP4.5) to 5.5 billion \r\nUSD (RCP8.5) (Melvin et al"


id: 313e56a0d1906e1ab40c2002656cb7bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 5168
content:
"Operational efficiency and human safety at mining and energy production \r\nsites is expected to be adversely affected by increases in extreme \r\nevents (Section  14.2), including storms, heavy rains, riverine flooding \r\nand wildfires (high confidence). General remoteness of many mining \r\nsites (especially in the North American Arctic) exacerbates risks related \r\nto emergency responses to extreme events such as wildfire (medium \r\nconfidence). The 2016 Fort McMurray wildfire in Alberta, Canada, forced \r\nthe evacuation of 88,000 people and the shutdown of mine operations. \r\nDamages were minimal because companies had undertaken proactive \r\nFireSmart interventions specifically developed for the industry (see \r\nBox  14.1; Council of Canadian Academies, 2019). Onshore oil field \r\nproduction in Tabasco, Mexico, which accounts for 16% of the country's \r\ndaily output, was interrupted by extensive flooding (Cruz and Krausmann, \r\n2013)"


id: 8e8fae7046558796ac599f7c0896c6b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 19948
content:
" Two-thirds of mine operators globally, including major operators \r\nin North America, have experienced production challenges related to \r\nwater shortages and flooding (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2013). Water \r\navailability stress due to climate change is lower in Canada than in the \r\nUSA and Mexico, and mines in Canada may be less exposed to this risk \r\n(World Resourcs Institute, 2012) with some exceptions, that is, water\u0002intensive oil sands mining in the Athabasca River basin in Canada \r\n(Section 14.5.3; Leong and Donner, 2016).Warming temperatures also \r\nhave the potential to alter the nature, characteristics and quality of \r\nmineral resources such as kaolin or limestone (Phillips, 2016)."


id: 9d98e8cb835d1597a5e427edef5bdbb5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22327
content:
"Climate change is negatively affecting working conditions and labour \r\nproductivity in North America (medium confidence) (Section 14.5.6.1; \r\nsee Box  14.5). Working conditions in temperatures above a heat \r\nindex of 85degF (29.4degC) are correlated with potentially hazardous \r\nhealth conditions (Tustin et  al., 2018), and for every degree Celsius \r\nincrease in temperature, labour productivity is estimated to be reduced \r\nby 0.11% for low-risk workers and 0.53% for high-risk workers (i.e., \r\nconstruction, mining, agriculture and manufacturing) (Hsiang et  al., \r\n2017). By mid-century (RCP8.5), temperature increase, changing water \r\navailability and SLR are projected to result in a 0.6% drop in labour \r\nproductivity in auto, timber, textile and chemical manufacturing in the \r\nsoutheast and Texas regions (Kinniburgh et  al., 2015; Hsiang et  al., \r\n2017)"


id: 2f988aeffd92fabcebfd36517cab52f5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 4910
content:
" Labour productivity in the US automobile industry decreases by \r\n8% for every six or more days of consecutive unusually hot weather \r\n(above 90degF/32.2degC) (Cachon et al., 2012). Thirty percent of California \r\nworkers are employed in high-risk industries, such as agriculture, with \r\nexposure to high temperature leading to loss in productivity (Rogers \r\net al., 2015). Under RCP8.5 increases in extreme temperatures, labour \r\nproductivity in the USA is projected to decrease, costing 190 billion \r\nUSD in lost wages by 2090 (EPA, 2017; Kjellstrom et al., 2019; also see \r\nGubernot et al., 2014; Kiefer et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2018)."


id: 6c072f35c4e08c62cb056e911a670d6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 14622
content:
"In the USA, construction workers comprise 6% of the total workforce but \r\naccounted for 36% of all occupational heat-related deaths from 1992 to \r\n2016 (Dong et al., 2019). It is expected that total labour hours among \r\noutdoor construction workers will decrease by 0.53% (+-0.01%) per \r\ndegree Celsius based on existing warming trends (Hsiang et al., 2017; also \r\nsee EPA, 2017). Risks are expected to be exacerbated as SLR and storm \r\nsurge expands the risk zone for coastal flooding exposing more property \r\nto inundation and enhancing construction demand (see Box  14.4; \r\nSection 14.5.5.1.3; EPA, 2017). Meeting existing and projected demand \r\nfor water in affected regions could also require building new desalination \r\nplants. For example, Texas has constructed over 44 desalination plants \r\nacross the state because of a lack of freshwater to meet potable water \r\ndemand and due to climate-driven droughts (Kloesel et al., 2018b)"


id: 6cd7c9ce824fc738e9ca24ec2a501b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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" Other \r\ninfrastructure damaged by floods and SLR will need to be reassessed and \r\nperhaps relocated away from the coast. Relocation requires availability of \r\nland that frequently does not exist within urban areas (Lithogow, 2019). \r\nSome US tribes and Indigenous groups in Canada lack the financial \r\nresources to build climate-resilient infrastructure, such as housing and \r\nsewage treatment facilities, to assure clean drinking water (Martinez \r\net al., 2014; Salgado and Luisa Martinez, 2017; Lithgow et al., 2019)."


id: 4d5866364166fee702b76560af14e4d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 9600
content:
"Adapting building codes more uniformly to changing climate conditions, \r\nsuch as SLR, storms, winds and wildfires, reduces risk (Olsen, 2015; \r\nMaxwell et al., 2018b). North America has not, on the whole, adapted \r\nits building code regulations to consider the dynamic challenges \r\nof climate change, although some specific efforts have been made, \r\nincluding the addition of requirements for wildfire within California's \r\nbuilding codes and Canada's climate-resilient building and core public \r\ninfrastructure initiative, which involves updating building codes and \r\nstandards to improve climate resiliency (see Box 14.4; Lacasse et al., \r\n2020). To enhance safety, some outdoor workers have been fitted with \r\nheat sensors to analyse or assess how warming may affect productivity \r\nand well-being (Runkle et al., 2019). Other options include raising public \r\nroads and seawalls, initiating buy-outs of property owners in flood risk \r\nareas and improving storm water drainage"


id: b288c7b5ec915db5f7280fbcd63cd099
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" Adopting approaches like \r\nthe International Future Living Institute's Living Building Challenge \r\n(LBC) may inform future regulatory processes (Eisenberg, 2016). The \r\nLBC9 has seven thematic areas that inform building design, although \r\nonly a subset of those are relevant for climate change including water, \r\nenergy and materials considerations."


id: d3764ebe8777de24236fbb6819e7a49f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 30793
content:
"Climate risks may create shocks to the trade system by damaging infrastructure and disrupting supply chains in North \r\nAmerica (medium confidence). Sea level rise, flooding, permafrost thaw, landslides and increased frequency and magnitude of extreme \r\nweather events are projected to impact transportation infrastructure which will pose challenges to the movement of goods, especially in \r\ncoastal areas (Lantuit et al., 2012; Dore et al., 2016; Hjort et al., 2018; Koks et al., 2019; Lemmen et al., 2021). Maritime ports are at the \r\ngreatest risk from climate hazards (Messner et al., 2013; Slack and Comtois, 2016), followed by roads, rail and airports (Anarde et al., \r\n2017). Due to the transnational nature of trade, extreme weather disruptions in one region are likely to lead to cascading effects in other \r\nregions (high confidence) (Lemmen et al., 2021)"


id: 61a68a3bd844fee707467901b08492b1
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content:
" For example, climate change will have negative impacts for global food and energy \r\ntrade where reductions in crop production and fish stocks in some regions could cause food and fish price spikes elsewhere (Figure 14.10; \r\nSections 14.5.4 and 5.11.8; Beaugrand et al., 2015; Lam et al., 2016; IPCC, 2019a)."


id: 5040f5cc3dce2948abade67aa91dbddb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 10071
content:
"Climate-change impacts may alter current trade practices and patterns with implications for regional economic development \r\nin North America, especially in the Arctic (medium confidence). Climate change is causing modal shifts in cargo shipping. For \r\nexample, lower water levels in lakes and rivers (e.g., Mackenzie River, Mississippi River) impact freight transport and may cause a shift \r\nfrom marine transport to more GHG-intensive rail, road or air transport (Koetse and Rietveld, 2009; Du et al., 2017; Pendakur, 2017). \r\nSea ice change is creating new Arctic marine trade corridors (Melia et al., 2016; Pizzolato et al., 2016; Ng et al., 2018; Bennett et al., \r\n2020; Mudryk et al., 2021), including shorter and potentially more economical routes such as the Northwest Passages (see Box CCP6.1)"


id: 9b6f67e102f34506d7f12498703cdb3a
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vector_id: 22005
content:
" \r\nWarming temperatures have also reduced the season length for ice roads, which are heavily relied upon to service remote communities \r\nand remote industries including forestry and mining (Section 14.5.8.1.2; Pendakur, 2017)."


id: f6803e483682e82f4888a5a39c59782d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 36298
content:
"Effective and equitable trade policies can act as important adaptation strategies (medium confidence). Higher temperatures \r\nhave had no direct effect on developed countries' exports, but have significantly reduced growth in exports among developing countries, \r\nwhich in turn can increase the price of goods that developed countries then import (Costinot et al., 2016; Constant and Davin, 2019). \r\nSchenker (2013) estimated that the climate impacts on trade from developing to developed countries could be responsible for 16.4% \r\nof the total expected cost of climate change in the USA in 2100 and, thus, North America would benefit from increased investment in \r\neffective and equitable trade policies and adaptation in developing regions. Under an RCP8.5 scenario (~2.6-4.8degC warming) and within \r\ncurrent trade integration, climate change could lead to up to 55 million undernourished people by 2050"


id: ad803d8e8d813f6eda396ae976b814cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 24839
content:
" These projections decrease \r\nby 64% (20 million people) with the introduction of reduced trade tariffs and the lessening of institutional and infrastructure barriers \r\n(Janssens et al., 2020). Although most studies focus on global food security (i.e., agriculture), it is likely that the same challenges exist for \r\nother commodities and manufactured goods."


id: 53e85b27076013ccc3bcd25437f191bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10668
content:
"Extreme weather events, including hurricanes, droughts and flooding, and wildfires, have been partly attributed to anthropogenic climate \r\nchange (high confidence) (Table SM 16.21; e.g., Rupp et al., 2015; Emanuel, 2017). Direct, indirect and non-market economic damages \r\nfrom extreme events have increased in some parts of North America (high confidence). The number of extreme events with inflation\u0002adjusted damages totalling more than 1 billion USD has risen in the USA over the past decades (NOAA, 2020; Smith, 2020), and similar \r\nincreases have been observed in Canada (Boyd and Markandya, 2021). Factors other than climate change, including increases in exposure \r\nand the value of the assets at risk, also explain increasing damage amounts (Freeman and Ashley, 2017; Vano et al., 2018). Climate \r\nchange explains a portion of long-term increases in economic damages of hurricanes (limited evidence, low agreement)"


id: d2c042e605410474801befdeb79adbbd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30680
content:
" Studies of US \r\nhurricanes since 1900 have found increasing economic losses that are consistent with an influence from climate change (Estrada et al., \r\n2015; Grinsted et al., 2019), although another study found no increase (Weinkle et al., 2018)."


id: fc8c802e5c9653f9cc2511905bff4fa4
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vector_id: 37251
content:
"Projections of market and non-market economic damages demonstrate the substantial economic risks of climate impacts associated \r\nwith high-temperature pathways (RCP8.5) (high confidence). Since AR5, a wide range of estimates of the costs of climate change have \r\nbeen developed for the USA (EPA, 2015a; Houser et  al., 2015; EPA, 2017; Hsiang et  al., 2017; Martinich and Crimmins, 2019), with \r\nongoing processes to update national estimates for Canada and Mexico (Semarnat, 2009; NRTEE, 2011; Estrada et al., 2013; Sawyer \r\net al., 2020). While the magnitudes of the estimates depend on approach and assumptions in the methods and expectations of future \r\nsocioeconomic conditions, these studies show substantial projected economic damages across North America by the end of the century, \r\nespecially for warming greater than 4degC (high evidence, high agreement). Whether these damages translate into GDP effects is not clear for \r\nCanada"


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" Some modelling approaches show modest GDP increases in 2050 and 2100, while others suggest modest decreases although it \r\nis anticipated that the economic effects for Canada will be large and negative (Boyd and Markandya, 2021). Large costs and risks, such as \r\nthose associated with extreme events such as wildfires (Hope et al., 2016) and the increased need for infrastructure replacement (Neumann \r\net al., 2015; Maxwell et al., 2018a), will have compounding effects in the markets by disrupting economic activities (see Box 14.5)."


id: e5971f155c31c4116b7d1b6bd4df24af
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"from temporary, seasonal to permanent migration to the warmer \r\nclimates of the southern USA and Mexico, often benefiting from the \r\nlower cost of living (Dominguez et  al., 2018). Temporary or semi\u0002permanent labour migration, generally followed by remittances, has \r\nbeen an important part of livelihoods for rural areas in Mexico (high \r\nconfidence) and has been employed as a response to climate hazards \r\n(low evidence). Drought in rural areas which are highly dependent on \r\nsubsistence agriculture have observed migration to urban areas in \r\nMexico (Nawrotzki et al., 2017). Evidence of international migration \r\nin response to climate hazards is sparse with difficulties in identifying \r\na climate signal due to the multi-causal nature of migration decision \r\nmaking (Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7). There is limited \r\nevidence of extreme weather events or climate hazards on migration \r\nfrom Mexico to the USA (Nawrotzki et  al., 2015b; Nawrotzki et  al., \r\n2015c; Nawrotzki et al"


id: d25fdbf4315beb20a9477f9dc55104e9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"Climate impacts have damaged livelihoods across North America, \r\nespecially those of marginalised people (high confidence) and \r\ndeepened inequalities for these groups (medium confidence). Across \r\nNorth America, climate change has affected livelihoods with larger \r\neffects on individuals, households and communities that are already \r\nmore vulnerable due to a range of pre-existing social and environmental \r\nstressors (Olsson et al., 2014; Hickel, 2017; Koch et al., 2019) such as \r\nIndigenous Peoples, urban ethnic minorities and immigrants (Guyot \r\net al., 2006; Gronlund, 2014; Klinenberg, 2015). These impacts have \r\nalso contributed to a deepening of inequalities for marginalised groups \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement) (Audefroy and Cabrera Sanchez, \r\n2017; Garcia et  al., 2018). As climate hazards further degrade their \r\nlivelihoods, these groups have faced additional challenges to avoiding \r\nor escaping poverty (Ruiz Meza, 2014)"


id: 5f94f1fa5e02026306b528208e3f5f7
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" Furthermore, these groups \r\nhave needed to use their more limited resources to manage present \r\nchallenges, restricting their future capacities to adapt (Tolentino\u0002Arevalo et al., 2019). Climate impacts have also affected the livelihoods \r\nof the middle classes (Dominguez et al., 2020) who have become more \r\nvulnerable due to changes in their social and economic security (Garza\u0002Lopez et al., 2018). Gender has also been recognised as a determinant \r\nof differential vulnerability with implications for women's livelihoods \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18)."


id: c0d9e707158c0522a17a2bf93b0ff712
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Pre-existing social vulnerabilities have also led to forced displacement \r\nfrom extreme weather events (low confidence). In the USA, \r\ncompounding effects of SLR and storm surge interacted with pre\u0002existing social vulnerabilities of local communities to generate large\u0002scale displacement after the effects of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans \r\nin 2005 (Jessoe et al., 2018). The processes of relocation and recovery in \r\nNew Orleans was further shaped by vulnerability where out-migration \r\nwas more likely to be minorities and economically disadvantaged, \r\nwhile the recovery was predominantly in neighbourhoods that were \r\nwealthier prior to the disaster (Fussell et al., 2014; Fussell, 2015). Newer \r\nevidence from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico in 2017 has shown an \r\ninitial spike in displacement with slower recovery with more vulnerable \r\ncommunities returning at higher rates (DeWaard et al"


id: a06b187418f15cb014b05b721d3de47a
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", 2020); however, \r\noverall out-migration trends have been consistent with long-term \r\neconomic migration (Santos-Lozada et  al., 2020). Interactions of \r\nslower onset climate hazards with displacement, such as observed \r\nin Shishmaref, Alaska, have revealed the challenges in attribution of \r\nmigration to climate as it intersects with socioeconomic conditions and \r\nlived experiences (Marino and Lazrus, 2015)."


id: 4fe151769e6fa5092911932733cf1219
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content:
"Maladaptation has also been occurring in livelihoods, especially as it \r\nrelates to agricultural practices that are less resilient to climate hazards and \r\ncompetition for land use (limited evidence, high agreement). Focusing on \r\nexamples in Mexico (see Section 14.5.4.3 for US and Canada examples), \r\nfor some Mexican Indigenous Peoples, the replacement of ancestral \r\nfarming practices with technological adaptations like transgenic crops \r\nhas reduced their resilience by making them more dependent on external \r\ninputs and more expensive supplies while increasing putting their health \r\nat risk with herbicide and insecticide use (Mercer et al., 2012). Existing \r\npower structures have also interacted with climate hazards to generate \r\nmaladaptive outcomes (Quintana, 2013)"


id: 1504fce7757df6f025d3adf040b56261
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" Mennonite communities in \r\nthe northern state of Chihuahua, Mexico, have pursued commercial \r\nagricultural markets that lead them to shift to transgenic crops and to \r\noverexploit local groundwater resources in a region experiencing multi\u0002year droughts. These actions have led to conflict with other local farming \r\ngroups with less economic capital to access groundwater (Quintana, \r\n2013). Climate mitigation measures may also have adverse effects on \r\nlocal livelihoods with implications for adaptive capacity. The Reducing \r\nEmissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing \r\nCountries (REDD+) mitigation programme has been highlighted as a \r\ntrade-off between an international/national carbon mitigation strategy \r\nand the ability of some Mexican rural communities to improve their food \r\nsecurity (Section 5.6.3.3; Barbier, 2014)."


id: e620d4d1cd3113e13a38cd3825dd7670
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Climate hazards undermine adaptation by damaging livelihoods \r\n(high confidence). Many actions that enhance and promote resilient \r\nlivelihoods can have substantial benefit for adaptation to climate \r\nhazards (medium confidence). Livelihoods in the context of climate \r\nchange are characterised by adjustments that then feed back into \r\nthe assets that comprise a livelihood. Social capital-in the form of \r\nhousehold and community cohesion-facilitates the development of \r\nadaptation strategies to the impacts of climate change in rural and \r\nurban communities at the household level and for small groups (Barbier, \r\n2014; Nawrotzki et al., 2015b; Nawrotzki et al., 2015c). Cultural capital, \r\nespecially in the form of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge, \r\ncan guide adaptation practices in North America (Akpinar Ferrand and \r\nCecunjanin, 2014), preserving Indigenous cultures and enhancing future \r\nadaptation and resilience (see Box 14.1; Pearce et al"


id: 5a501e95c55d3413e1cab0d35c590fbe
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", 2012; Audefroy \r\nand Cabrera Sanchez, 2017). In Mexico, rainwater harvesting (practised \r\nby some Mayan communities) and the use of local-traditional varieties \r\nof maize have assisted in the adaptation to climate impacts and \r\npromoted food security (Akpinar Ferrand and Cecunjanin, 2014; Hellin \r\net al., 2014). Funding and support for these social adaptation strategies \r\nhave been uneven (Barbier, 2014; Romeo-Lankao et al., 2014). The legacy \r\nof colonialism and historical patterns of development will continue to \r\nshape the adaptation responses and resiliency of Indigenous Peoples \r\n(Todd, 2015; Davis and Todd, 2017; Whyte, 2017; Cameron et al., 2019)."


id: 5ff432660c5e8cb593a90c9dd7b65b95
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content:
"Migration is a common adaptation strategy to maintain and diversify \r\npeople's livelihoods and will continue to play an important role \r\nwhen households manage climate and social risks (high confidence) \r\n(Section 7.4.3). In the near term, actions that enhance in situ adaptive \r\ncapacities as well as foster safe and orderly migration can result in \r\nsynergies for both adaptation and development (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox MIGRATE in Chapter 7). Populations that experience less mobility \r\nor cannot engage in voluntary migration as an adaptation may need \r\nadditional support to adapt to climate hazards, for example, northern \r\ncommunities that are at risk of climatic events (Hamilton et al., 2016)"


id: e883ce5c6e132a959bb4161fa5c7483e
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" \r\nPolicies associated with the transition from high-GHG intensive \r\nextractive industries, sometimes referred to as 'just transitions', may \r\nalso support in situ livelihoods if they also aim to address and redress \r\nexisting inequalities to reduce vulnerabilities (McCauley, 2018); \r\nhowever, these policies could result in maladaptation if they create \r\nnew inequalities or generate other environmental damages."


id: acc2b480620d3015d216d9c49af7bf86
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"Crime, including violent crime, has been associated with higher \r\ntemperatures in the USA (medium confidence). Studies of crime \r\nstatistics in the USA have revealed a relationship between temperature \r\nand a range of violent crimes including aggravated assaults, rapes and \r\nhomicides; effects for property crimes are weaker (limited evidence, \r\nmedium agreement) (Ranson, 2014; Houser et  al., 2015; Heilmann \r\nand Kahn, 2019; Mares and Moffett, 2019). These effects have been \r\nobserved in US urban centres (Hsiang et al., 2013; Mares, 2013; Ranson, \r\n2014; Schinasi and Hamra, 2017; Heilmann and Kahn, 2019) and more \r\ngenerally across the USA (Mares and Moffett, 2019). Differential effects \r\nhave also been observed within urban areas. Observed higher rates \r\nof domestic and intimate partner violence during periods of high heat \r\nin less affluent neighbours in Los Angeles have been associated with \r\ndisparities in access to air conditioning and greenery (Heilmann et al., \r\n2021)"


id: 4b8aed5d1fb01483ad7f45ae153d5f70
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" By contrast, Lynch et al. (2020a) found no significant correlation \r\nbetween annual homicide rate and annual temperature for New York City \r\n(Lynch et al., 2020b). For Mexico, Burke et al. (2018a) found temperature \r\nlinkages with intergroup killings by drug-trafficking organisations, \r\nhomicides and suicides. No linkages between temperature and crime \r\nhave been reported for Canada. Differences in spatial and temporal \r\naggregation of the crime statistics as well as in the measure of climate \r\nchange or variability explain some of the differences between studies. \r\nSeveral causal pathways can explain these relationships (Miles-Novelo \r\nand Anderson, 2019; Lynch et al., 2020b). The dominant theory is that \r\nweather changes result in changes in behavioural patterns that lead to \r\nmore opportunities for crimes"


id: 3bcb815ad87dd1f8eab0614fdd23b7ab
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" For example, studies that disaggregate \r\nby month often report significant positive associations between \r\ntemperature anomalies and violent crime (especially aggravated \r\nassaults, rapes and homicides), particularly in the cold season (Harp \r\nand Karnauskas, 2018; Mares and Moffett, 2019). Smaller increases in \r\ncrime during positive warm-season temperature anomalies may be due \r\nto people seeking shelter in cooler indoor spaces, decreasing crimes of \r\nopportunity (Section 7.2.7; Gamble and Hess, 2012)."


id: 46f2b8f1b919b0fca5ad2aea02ec641f
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"Climate change poses risks to peace (Section 16.5.2.3.8) that \r\ncould affect North America (medium confidence). Military and \r\nsecurity communities are adapting their planning, operations and \r\ninfrastructure to current impacts of climate change in North America \r\nand globally (medium agreement, medium evidence). Arctic nations \r\nare renewing their military capacity and expanding their constabulary \r\npresence around their existing boundaries (Choi, 2020). There is \r\nincreasing awareness that climate change causes weather patterns \r\nand extreme events that directly harm military installations and \r\nreadiness through infrastructure damage, loss of utilities, and loss of \r\noperational capability (Duffy-Anderson et  al., 2019). Transboundary \r\ndisputes and competition over resources, such as fish (Osthagen, \r\n2020), are a concern in the changing Arctic and increases in military \r\nand constabulary operations are being observed (Jonsson et al., 2012; \r\nSmith et al., 2018; Eyzaguirre et al"


id: 7cd414c26e3dded788237fd0d662f3e7
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"Projections of future crime derived from the empirical relation\u0002ships between temperature and crime in the USA show the \r\npotential for increased criminality under RCP8.5 compared with \r\nRCP4.5 (low confidence). For RCP8.5, holding all socioeconomic \r\nconditions at 2015 levels, violent crime could increase 0.6-2.1% by \r\nmid-century and 1.9-4.5% by late century (Houser et al., 2015). The \r\nrise in property crime is projected to be smaller as property crime \r\nflattens at higher temperatures (Hsiang et al., 2013). Using relation\u0002ships between crime and monthly temperatures established for five \r\nUS regions by Harp and Karnauskas (2018), Harp and Karnauskas \r\n(2020) project 18,800 additional violent crimes annually beyond 2014 \r\nlevels by the end of the 21st century under 1.5degC warming, rising to \r\n48,200 under 4degC warming. Aggregating data by states weighted by \r\npopulation density, Mares and Moffett (2019) project an average an\u0002nual increase of 0"


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"94% across seven categories of violent and prop\u0002erty crime for each anomalous degree Celsius of warming (an average \r\nannual increase of about 100,000 crimes). Changing socioeconomic \r\nconditions in the future may either reduce or exacerbate the projected \r\ncontemporaneous relationship between temperature anomalies and \r\ncrime (Agnew, 2011; Lynch et al., 2020b), whereas adaptation could \r\nweaken these relationships."


id: 53b6b2d04395c8d60efc1c1ea2c7f879
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content:
"Climate change will affect ecosystems (Section 16.5.2.3), living \r\nstandards (Section  16.5.2.3.4), health (Section  16.5.2.3.5) and \r\nfood security (Section  16.5.2.3.6) globally, and these changes \r\nmay exacerbate violence and political instability (medium \r\nconfidence) with implications for national security in North \r\nAmerica (medium confidence). Climate variability, hazards and trends, \r\nto date, have played a role in exacerbating conflict, but the influence of \r\nclimate appears to be minor and more uncertain than the roles of low \r\nsocioeconomic development, low state capability and high intergroup \r\ninequality (Mach et  al., 2019). More profound impacts from climate \r\nchange on weather and seasons, as well as changing socioeconomic \r\nconditions, could lead to patterns of violence that cannot be predicted \r\nby projecting relationships between current climate and violence into \r\nthe future (Section 14.6.3; Mach et al., 2019)"


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" If global levels of violence \r\nincrease, there will be increased demand for international efforts, \r\nincluding disaster aid and humanitarian efforts (Eyzaguirre et al., 2021). \r\nClimate change and geopolitical goals interact in the Arctic (Smith et al., \r\n2018). New transportation corridors and the potential access to natural \r\nresources could lead to competition for access to and control over the \r\nregion (Section CCP6.2.6; see Box CCP6.1; FAQ CCP6.2; Estrada, 2021). \r\nGovernance structures exist to manage geopolitical manoeuvring and \r\nto protect the human security of Arctic populations (Sections 14.5.10.3, \r\n7.2.7.1)."


id: 6e279ef4858f1eeb28b90192aaf4df20
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"Climate-change impacts are projected to cause large market and non\u0002market damages (high confidence). By end of century under higher GWL \r\nscenarios (>4degC), these damages are expected to reach several tens of \r\nbillions of USD annually in Canada and hundreds of billions annually \r\nin the USA. Losses in labour productivity and wages, and damages \r\nto coastal properties, will be especially large; however, all sectors in \r\nthe USA and most sectors in Canada are projected to see substantial \r\nrelative damages on high-emission pathways by mid- to end of century \r\ncompared with lower-emission pathways. Economic sectors with hard \r\nlimits to adaptation (i.e., winter tourism) or that are highly affected by \r\nclimate variability (i.e., agriculture and fisheries) will be at more risk \r\nat lower temperatures than other economic sectors (Sections 14.5.7, \r\n14.5.8)"


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" Strategic implementation of adaptation strategies coupled \r\nwith lower-emissions scenarios result in multi-billion-dollar reductions \r\nin economic damages (Section 14.5.8; see Box 14.6)."


id: 5aafe439dddf1e4c24b048bf61eb0b6c
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content:
"Droughts and earlier snowmelt runoff will increase water scarcity \r\nduring the summer peak water demand period especially in regions \r\nwith extensive irrigated agriculture, leading to economic losses and \r\nincreased pressures on groundwater as a substitute for diminished \r\nsurface water supplies (medium to high confidence) (Section 14.5.3). \r\nStreams in North America are expected to continue to warm, with \r\nimportant ramifications for aquatic ecosystems (high confidence), \r\nreducing habitat for salmon and trout species that are economically \r\nand culturally important (Section 14.5.1). Warming and drying coupled \r\nwith other stressors (e.g., pollutants, nutrients and invasive species) \r\npose a risk to ecosystem structure and function in lakes, streams \r\nand reservoirs across many parts of North America (high confidence) \r\n(Sections  14.5.1, 14.5.3). Warming increases in heavy rainfall and \r\nnutrient loading pose risks for water quality and HABs (medium to \r\nhigh confidence) (Section 14"


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"Ocean warming will increase the frequency and intensity of MHWs \r\n(see Box  14.3), accelerate unprecedented rates of sea ice loss, and \r\nalter ocean circulation, chemistry and nutrient cycling in ways that \r\nprofoundly impact marine productivity, biodiversity and food webs \r\n(very high confidence) (Section  14.5.2). Collectively these impacts \r\npose a risk to nearshore ecological and human systems (high \r\nconfidence), increasing the probability of phenological mismatches, \r\nlarge-scale redistribution of species, and species population declines \r\n(Section  14.5.4) with cascading impacts that strain cultural and \r\neconomic systems reliant on marine productivity across North America \r\n(high confidence)"


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" Nearshore areas of Chesapeake Bay (USA) and \r\nAkimiski Island, mid-western James Bay and the coasts in the Pacific \r\nranging from the Gulf of Alaska through Baja Peninsula, have a high \r\nproportion of species near their upper thermal limit, and are areas that \r\nare particularly susceptible to climate-change risk."


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content:
"species extinctions, fisheries collapse, community-managed relocation) \r\n(Lynham et al., 2017). Examples of systems with potential tipping points \r\nin North America include (a) permafrost and sea ice loss triggering \r\ntransformation of ecological and human systems (including substantial \r\nshipping opportunities) in the Arctic that are permanent and irreversible \r\nexcept on geological timescales, and which are potentially underway \r\n(high agreement, low evidence) (Section 14.6.2; see Box 14.3, CCP6), \r\n(b) mid-latitude forest ecosystems at low to middle elevations in \r\nwestern North America where wildfire and cumulative climate and \r\nnon-climate pressures may restructure forests and succession in ways \r\nthat promote transition to new vegetation types (Section 14.5"


id: 9b03ae20fef3e90ba0bb36fb0319b205
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"1) and \r\n(c) agricultural communities in northern Mexico and the southwest \r\nUSA where aridification and drought may interact with water resource \r\npolicies, economic opportunities and pressures, and farm practices \r\nto induce either adaptation (via changes in irrigation practices) or \r\nfarm abandonment, land-use transformation and livelihood changes \r\n(due to heat stress, soil deterioration or reduced economic viability) \r\n(Sections 14.5.3, 14.5.4, CCP6, Yumashev et al., 2019; Turner et al., \r\n2020; Heinze et al., 2021)."


id: ca0d00e40f629c046ea7d5a741931a10
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"Identification of critical thresholds, elements and connections within \r\na system may also help identify potential positive tipping points, that \r\nis, focal components or processes in a system where a relatively small \r\ninvestment or intervention can induce a large benefit and enable \r\nself-reinforcing transformative adaptation (Section 14.7; Chapter 17; \r\nTabara et  al., 2018; Lenton, 2020b; Otto et  al., 2020). Under low\u0002mitigation scenarios, compounding risks and higher-carbon-emission \r\nscenarios increase the potential that amplifying feedback loops and \r\nfatal synergies across sectors could lead to existential threats to the \r\nsocial-ecological systems of North America (medium confidence)"


id: 8e141e5be912df84dd47051705c8f2bb
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content:
" \r\nSocietal collapse has been linked to shifts in climate regimes, especially \r\nwhen societies have lost resilience due to slowly mounting social-\r\necological challenges, while other studies reveal that social continuity \r\nand flexibility enable historical climate resilience and prosperity under \r\nchanging environments (FAQ 14.2; Lenton et  al., 2019; Otto et  al., \r\n2020; Degroot et al., 2021; Richards et al., 2021)."


id: a986ea306c4dd67c24987c97cb54aa91
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"Accounting for tipping points, interactions and reinforcing dynamics \r\namong ecological, social and climate processes is necessary for \r\ncomprehensive analyses of climate-change risk, cost and urgency, \r\nas well as effective adaptation design and implementation \r\n(Section  14.7; Cai et  al., 2015; Steffen and et  al., 2018; Lenton \r\net al., 2019; Narita et al., 2020; Dietz et al., 2021). Multiple lines of \r\nevidence across sectors assessed in this chapter suggest that after \r\nmid-century and without carbon mitigation, climate-driven changes \r\nto ecological and social boundary conditions may rapidly push many \r\nsystems into disequilibrium (medium confidence), emphasising the \r\nimportance of prioritising adaptation actions with co-benefits for \r\nmitigation (Section 14.5.4; see Box 14.3). Reducing climate hazards \r\nthrough mitigation and removing catalysts of system instability \r\nthrough adaptation measures that increase system resilience (e.g"


id: 6a4e5f6e75d30434c259fb6b166ca297
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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", \r\necosystem restoration) will help reduce the risk that systems move \r\nacross a tipping point from a desirable to an alternate or undesirable \r\nstate (Sections 14.5.4, 14.7; see Box 14.3; Narita et al., 2020; Turner \r\net al., 2020; Heinze et al., 2021)."


id: 20a8b98d41f2e175c274abe2f58747e2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"Across North America, climate change poses a risk to social-ecological \r\nsystems increasingly destabilised by compounding climate impacts and \r\nnon-climate pressures (high confidence) (Sections 14.5.1-14.5.3) that \r\nerode the connectivity and redundancy underpinning system resilience \r\n(Sections 14.5.1-14.5.5; Xiao et al., 2017a; Koven et al., 2020; Malhi \r\net  al., 2020; Turner et  al., 2020). Accelerating climate change and \r\nincreasingly severe hazards and shocks may induce abrupt changes \r\nor push systems, people and species to critical points-tipping points-\r\nwhere a small additional change causes a disproportionately large \r\nresponse, triggering feedbacks that lock systems into novel regimes \r\n(Scheffer et al., 2001; Scheffer, 2010; Anderies et al., 2013; Lenton, 2013; \r\nIglesias and Whitlock, 2020; Lenton, 2020a)"


id: deb8c8e1c18f67d0a897c6a13855b8d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" Climate-change tipping \r\npoints can compound and amplify climate impacts and risk, induce \r\ndisparate climate burdens and benefits across human and ecological \r\nsystems, and irreversibly restructure ecosystems and livelihoods (e.g., "


id: 8a962fd3d8cf6381a293e76f3f6a768f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"According to archaeological evidence, however, these adaptation strategies were not always sufficient during times \r\nof climate-induced stress. Human remains showing the effects of malnutrition are fairly common, and conflict caused \r\nin part by climate-induced shortfalls in farming has left traces that include fortified sites, sites placed in defensible \r\nlocations and trauma to human bone. Larger and more hierarchical groups emerged, first in Mesoamerica and then \r\nin the southwest and southeast USA as well as the Midwest USA. These groups offered the possibility of buffering \r\npoor production in one area with surplus from another, but they also tended to increase inequality within their \r\nborders and often attempted to expand at the expense of their neighbours, introducing new sources of potential \r\nconflict"


id: 43f2b22fb98bd24276c63693ed0de95f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" Dense hierarchical societies also arose in other areas such as the northwest coast where agriculture was not \r\npractised but resources, such as salmon and roots, were abundant and either relatively constant or storable."


id: aed55e094c7320171afd76d837a9cc85
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Still, Indigenous knowledge and traditional knowledge among Euroamerican farming communities provide \r\nguidelines for how to cope with traditional problems. Contemporary governmental restrictions (such as legal \r\nwater-rights allocations, international borders and tribal-lands boundaries) have limited the adaptive capacity that \r\nIndigenous societies have developed over the centuries. Now human-caused climate forcing, if not mitigated by \r\nreducing heat-trapping GHGs, is expected to produce climates in North America that have no local analogues in \r\nhuman history even as it destroys heritage sites that are sources of knowledge about palaeoclimates and the diverse \r\nways of coping with them that past peoples have discovered"


id: e6fde6d8803430702ac9661650ec82eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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" Just as past peoples often avoided local climate change \r\nby moving on, in a world where mobility options are severely limited, a lesson from archaeology and history is that \r\nwe should use our hard-won knowledge of the causes of climate change to avoid creating futures with no past \r\nanalogues to provide useful guidance."


id: 9086a2e21aac151aa5b4452c92e2f4be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Rapid warming and extreme temperatures in the Arctic is leading to unprecedented seasonal sea ice loss, permafrost \r\nthaw and increasing ocean temperatures. Cascading from these biophysical changes are cultural, socioeconomic \r\nand political consequences that are widespread and largely unprecedented in human history. Changes in sea ice \r\ncreate safety hazards for Indigenous Peoples and northerners who rely on frozen seas and rivers for transportation \r\nbetween remote communities and to subsistence hunting areas. Thawing permafrost, especially that of ice-rich \r\npermafrost, creates challenges and costs for a region with low population density and a small tax base to support \r\nmajor infrastructure investments. Warmer ocean temperatures induce large-scale distributional shifts and reduced \r\nproductivity and access to the largest North American fisheries"


id: f66ff5dcda71888a9dd3a44d24a1c9f
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content:
" Ice-associated marine mammals, such as polar bears, \r\nseals and walruses, have declined precipitously with decreasing sea ice in the Bering Sea, and widespread ecosystem \r\nchanges from fish through birds and marine mammal species have altered the system with uncertain outcomes for \r\nthese productive ice-driven ecosystems. Newly ice-free shipping routes are increasing regional and geopolitical \r\ntensions and may facilitate novel threats like the spread of invasive species and safety hazards to local hunters and \r\nfishers. The local and regional impacts of climate change in the North American Arctic are profound and span social, \r\ncultural, health, economic and political imperatives."


id: 3f9ed94f450699210211bd1bcb2354e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"In Canada, the Map of Adaptation Actions10 presents over 200 \r\nadaptation case studies addressing a variety of climate-related impacts \r\n(Warren and Lulham, 2021). The City of Saskatoon, in developing its \r\nClimate Action Plan (which includes a Corporate Climate Adaptation \r\nStrategy), engaged with local businesses, non-governmental \r\norganisations (NGOs), residents and experts to identify potential risks \r\n(and benefits) requiring action (City of Saskatoon, 2019). Similarly, \r\nthe City of Surrey specifically used community outreach programmes \r\nto develop its Coastal Flood Adaptation Strategy (CFAS) through a \r\nvalue-based planning approach (City of Surrey, 2019). Municipal \r\nasset management, local services and community well-being were \r\nkey considerations for the City of Selkirk, Manitoba, when developing \r\nan adaptation strategy as well as ensuring a budgeting process that \r\nsupports implementation (City of Selkirk, 2019)"


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" As of 2019, 8 of 13 \r\nCanadian provinces and territories have high-level climate adaptation \r\nstrategies. The scope of these efforts vary by jurisdiction as a review \r\nconducted by federal and provincial auditors in Canada identified \r\nseveral deficiencies related to a lack of detailed implementation plans, \r\nobligated funding and specific timelines (Auditors General, 2018)."


id: d36e05660a5ed458af1fe0e17256abc0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"Across North America, individuals and households have taken action to \r\nreduce climate-influenced risks (high confidence). These autonomous \r\nadaptations comprise the majority of the observed responses in the \r\npeer-reviewed literature (Berrang-Ford and et al., 2021). The increased \r\nuse of cooling systems (which could be maladaptive unless there \r\nare innovations) (Section  14.5.5.3; Barreca et  al., 2016), creating \r\ndefensible space around homes in wildfire-prone areas (see Box 14.2), \r\nand the modification or redesign of housing structures along coasts \r\n(Koerth et al., 2017), are important household responses to existing \r\nrisks. Although these actions have played a role in reducing risks, the \r\ncapacity to undertake such actions is not uniform across individuals \r\nin North America and has exacerbated existing social inequities, \r\nespecially in coastal areas (Keenan et al., 2018; de Koning and Filatova, \r\n2020)"


id: 718f3fd8b6a2d631441f75ad7521c523
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content:
" Additionally, these adaptation activities often are taken without \r\nconsideration of the impact on mitigation efforts (Kates et al., 2012; \r\nFedele et al., 2019; Shi and Moser, 2021)."


id: 9a73fe4f6d934af4d5cd4910c4cb9441
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Progress in Mexico on adaptation implementation at the local level \r\nhas been extensive (INECC and Semarnat, 2018). Activities include \r\nexecuting programmes for relocating infrastructure in high-risk zones \r\nin priority tourist sites, incorporating adaptation criteria in public \r\ninvestment projects that involve construction and infrastructure \r\nmanagement, water management, application of climate adaptation \r\nnorms for the construction of tourist buildings in coastal zones, \r\nand improving the security of key water, communication and \r\ntransportation infrastructure (Sections  14.5.5, 14.5.7, 14.5.8). \r\nAdditionally, local capacity and protocol to respond to extreme \r\nweather events as a function of climate change have been integrated \r\nmore regularly into community-based hazard mitigation plans. States \r\nand municipalities in Mexico must have climate policies that are \r\nconsistent with the guidelines of national strategies (Section 14.7.1"


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"5) \r\nand state-level programmes on climate change, in addition to other \r\nstate and municipal laws. As a result, these entities have developed \r\nand implemented early warning systems designed to protect the \r\npopulation from climate-related risks, such as strong storms and \r\nhurricanes (INECC and Semarnat, 2018)."


id: a36802b008895d2809796a83403f1255
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content:
"The USA has experienced substantial revisions to its climate policy and \r\nits international engagement since AR5 with implications still unclear \r\n(Bomberg, 2021). Since AR5 and until early 2020, many congressionally \r\nmandated federal efforts (Beavers et  al., 2016; Parris et  al., 2016; \r\nRockman et al., 2016; Caffrey and Hoffman, 2018) faced programmatic \r\nchallenges, but most continued to provide research and capacity \r\ndevelopment to support adaptation implementation across the USA. \r\nImportantly, the US government sustained the national climate \r\nassessments (Lempert et al., 2018). Recently, the administration has \r\nre-engaged with the Paris Agreement and the USA has submitted an \r\nNDC (Government of the United States of America, 2021); however, \r\nadaptation was not directly addressed. Subsequent Executive orders \r\nmandate adaptation planning at the federal level (e.g., USEO 13754; \r\nUSEO 14008)"


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" As of the time of this report, the US climate policy \r\nlandscape is rapidly evolving, including major legislative initiatives \r\n(e.g., Green New Deal) (Boyle et al., 2021)."


id: be925a7967e616f75f730828d445f120
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content:
"Research-based institutions have accelerated the development of \r\nInternet-based tools for visualising and exploring climate information, \r\nin addition to furthering the scholarship on adaptation. In the USA, joint \r\nuniversity, foundation and government programmes have contributed \r\nto advancing the field with products such as oceanographic and fishery \r\nclimate forecasting tools (Section 14.5.2), in addition to methods for \r\nevaluating water resource plans under uncertainty about future mean \r\nand extreme conditions (ASCE, 2018a; Ray et al., 2020). Some regional \r\nresearch centres focus on stakeholder engagement in addition to \r\nresearch; these include the National and Regional Climate Adaptation \r\nScience Center Network of the US Geological Survey17, the US \r\nDepartment of Agriculture's Climate Hub Network18 and the Climate \r\nProgram Office of NOAA19 which includes the Regional Integrated \r\nScience Assessment Network20 to support delivery of climate services"


id: 1a5df695f10b2a227702eb96d056a9f6
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content:
" \r\nSo-called networks of networks, consisting of NGOs as well as state \r\nand city government programmes, have provided an alternative to \r\nfederal support. For example, the Science for Adaptation Network was \r\nformed subsequent to dismantling the federal advisory group to the US \r\nNational Climate Assessment (Moss et al., 2019)."


id: d144a8298e51f99d90897bb6d99c60b2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Adaptation actions in one place or sector can have adverse side \r\neffects elsewhere (medium confidence). For example, increased use \r\nof groundwater for irrigation in response to aridification can reduce \r\nbaseflows into rivers with adverse impacts on stream ecology and \r\nwater availability for communities far downstream (Section  14.5.3). \r\nAdditionally, across multiple sectors in North America, adaptation \r\nactions have tended to be sector specific rather than integrating \r\nacross systems (Gao and Bryan, 2017; Fulton et al., 2019), despite the \r\nincreasing awareness of cascading impacts and interdependencies \r\n(Zimmerman and Faris, 2010; C40 Cities and AECOM, 2017) and \r\nrisks from possible ecological and social thresholds that have been \r\nidentified under higher GWL (Section 14.6.3). For example, the water, \r\nenergy and food nexus in North America has highlighted that food, \r\nwater and energy security depend on transportation infrastructure \r\n(Section 14.5.8.1.2; Romero-Lankao et al"


id: 9ed89e5fe4f9852d1ddb4eae8c16f3d1
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content:
"Long-term policy signals to incentivise ongoing, scalable adaptation \r\naction that is coordinated with mitigation efforts will increase actions \r\nand prevent potential maladaptive investment (Moser, 2018; Shi \r\nand Moser 2021). Using SDG goals and the NDCs as a framework \r\nfor inclusive and coordinated partnership and vertical integration \r\nacross subnational, national and regional planning can promote \r\nclimate resilient development (CRD) (Section 18.1.3). Coordination of \r\npolicies and responses have been identified as supporting longer-term, \r\ntransformational adaptation and minimising risk (Termeer et al., 2017; \r\nFazey et  al., 2018). New approaches for enabling and incentivising \r\ntransformative adaptation in North America are rapidly emerging \r\n(Colloff et al. 2017; Fedel et al. 2019; Werners et al. 2021)"


id: a170961a9fe8c75c7e85c6f82878af5b
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content:
" Evaluation \r\nof the feasibility of evolving adaptation strategies is only in the early \r\nstages, but recent work has provided the foundation for assessing \r\nthese considerations (Table 14.7; Chapter 16)."


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content:
"Equity and justice in climate adaptation have been identified as providing \r\na foundation for resilience in natural, social and built systems (Cochran \r\net  al., 2013; Reckien et  al., 2017; Schell et  al., 2020). This approach \r\nrecognises that social vulnerability undermines efforts to increase adaptive \r\ncapacity and that adaptation may also entrench existing social inequities, \r\nsuch as marginalisation of communities of colour, gender discrimination, \r\nlegacy effects of colonisation and gentrification of coastal communities \r\n(Schell et al., 2020; Thomas, 2020). Thus, identifying systemic racism and \r\nthe effects of colonialism within and across institutions has also been \r\nidentified as part of achieving more just and equitable adaptation (Shi and \r\nMoser 2021)"


id: 5d37dcb6f624b272fb60bf0724a07cc6
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content:
" Acknowledgement and incorporation of IK in adaptation \r\nplanning and implementation also recognises Indigenous sovereignty \r\nissues and the importance of the equitable role of Indigenous self\u0002determination in governance and planning (see Box 14.1; Section 14.4; \r\nRaymond-Yakoubian and Daniel, 2018)."


id: 552cf73ee0584df4764104296292ba44
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"Through a capacity to evolve to keep pace with climate change, these approaches can impart self-sustaining and cost-efficient long-term \r\nprotection in addition to serving as biodiverse, carbon sinks (Scyphers et al., 2011; Cheong et al., 2013; Temmerman et al., 2013; Rodriguez \r\net al., 2014; Herr and Landis, 2016; Sasmito et al., 2016; Reguero et al., 2018). Nature-based adaptation is generally less expensive and \r\nstrengthens over time, as compared with built infrastructure which erodes with time (medium confidence) (Narayan et al., 2016; Smith \r\net al., 2017; Sutton-Grier et al., 2018). Analysis of the impacts of Hurricane Sandy determined that communities located behind wetlands \r\nexperienced 20% less damage (Narayan et al., 2016). Coral reefs are providing 544 million USD yr-1 (Beck et al., 2018a) and mangroves \r\n22 billion USD yr-1 in property protection for coastal communities in the USA and Mexico (Beck et al., 2018b)"


id: c427b1e8fd00bd8fc825b9a519bb33c0
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vector_id: 28426
content:
" By 2030, flooding from \r\nchanges in storms, SLR (based on RCP8.5) and increases in built infrastructure in the US Gulf Coast may result in net economic losses of "


id: 961f0064338fe03d7ec3e3a506d4a62f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Innovative approaches in Canada (Borsje et al., 2011; Spalding et al., 2014; Soto-Navarro et al., 2020) and the USA (Law et al., 2018; \r\nBuotte et al., 2019; Soto-Navarro et al., 2020) have led to social and environmental co-benefits and could address both future climate \r\nrisk and long-standing social injustices (Hobbie and Grimm, 2020; Schell et al., 2020; Cousins, 2021). Effective nature-based adaptation \r\nrequires a well-coordinated suite of adaptation efforts (e.g., assessment, planning, funding, implementation and evaluation) that is co\u0002produced among stakeholders and across sectors (high confidence) (Millar and Stephenson, 2015; Kabisch et al., 2016; Dilling et al., 2019; \r\nMorecroft et al., 2019; Lavorel et al., 2020). Evaluating the efficacy of nature-based adaptation may become more tractable with more \r\nuniform guidelines for implementation (Scarano, 2017; Malhi et al., 2020; Seddon et al"


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content:
", 2020), and coordination in scaling-up local-level \r\nnature-based adaptation measures is likely to facilitate long-term success (Gao and Bryan, 2017)."


id: 1a66fd9d1a3048594eda4ecf7b700b88
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1628
content:
"The water management and utilities sectors have made significant progress towards implementation of adaptation \r\nstrategies using broad-based participatory planning approaches. Consideration of climate change is now folded \r\ninto some ongoing watershed-wide planning efforts. An example is provided by the One-Water-One-Watershed \r\n(OWOW) approach followed by the Santa Ana Watershed Project Authority (SAWPA) in southern California. SAWPA \r\nis a joint powers authority comprising five regional water districts that provide drinking water to more than 6 million \r\npeople as well as industrial and irrigation water across the 2400-square-mile watershed. The OWOW perspective \r\nfocuses on integrated planning for multi-benefit projects and explicit consideration of the impacts of any planning \r\noption across the entire watershed"


id: c09eea47f5cb19a10c31c8d7ac763812
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27869
content:
" Planning is supported by stakeholder-driven advisory bodies organised along \r\nthemes that consider a full suite of technical, political, environmental and social considerations. SAWPA provides \r\nmember agencies with decision-support tools and assistance to implement water conservation policies and pricing \r\nregimes, and one member agency is an industry leader on potable water recycling."


id: ab32340219f96de6eee9649c842458d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24450
content:
"Reef island and coastal area habitability in small islands is \r\nexpected to decrease because of increased temperature, extreme \r\nsea levels and degradation of buffering ecosystems, which \r\nwill increase human exposure to sea-related hazards (high \r\nconfidence). Climate and non-climate drivers of reduced habitability \r\nare context specific. On small islands, coastal land loss attributable to \r\nhigher sea level, increased extreme precipitation and wave impacts \r\nand increased aridity have contributed to food and water insecurities \r\nthat are likely to become more acute in many places (high confidence). \r\nIn the Caribbean, additional warming by 0.2deg-1.0degC, could lead to a \r\npredominantly drier region (5-15% less rain than present day), a greater \r\noccurrence of droughts along with associated impacts on agricultural \r\nproduction and yield in the region. Crop suitability modelling on several \r\ncommercially important crops grown in Jamaica found that even an \r\nincrease of less than +1"


id: 4f545ea56cb672df1a9b48efd7cc6f69
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9920
content:
"5degC could result in a reduction in the range \r\nof crops that farmers may grow. Most Pacific Island Countries could \r\nexperience >= 50% declines in maximum fish catch potential by 2100 \r\nrelative to 1980-2000 under both an RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenario \r\n{15.3.4.3, 15.3.4.4}."


id: 7cabe75dbf0d87d90ae0feae749696e1
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content:
"Projected changes in aridity are expected to impose freshwater \r\nstress on many small islands, especially SIDS (high confidence). \r\nIt is estimated that with a warming of 1.5degC or less, freshwater stress \r\non small islands would be 25% less as compared to 2.0degC. While some \r\nisland regions are projected to experience substantial freshwater \r\ndecline, an opposite trend is observed for some western Pacific and \r\nnorthern Indian Ocean islands. Drought risk projections for Caribbean \r\nSIDS aligned with observations from the Shared Socioeconomic \r\nPathway (SSP) 2 scenario indicate that a 1degC increase in temperature \r\n(from 1.7degC to 2.7degC) could result in a 60% increase in the number \r\nof people projected to experience severe water resources stress from \r\n2043 to 2071. In some Pacific atolls, freshwater resources could be \r\nsignificantly affected by a 0.40-m SLR. Similar impacts are anticipated \r\nfor some Caribbean countries with the worst-case scenario (RCP8.5) \r\nindicating a 0"


id: d9e0e519e3077e8b560b51d5ee981e81
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 31797
content:
"5-m SLR by the mid-century (2046-2065) and a 1-m \r\nSLR by the end-of-century (2081-2100). SIDS with high projected \r\npopulation growth rates are expected to experience the most severe \r\nfreshwater stress by 2030 under a 2degC warming threshold scenario \r\n{15.3.3.2}"


id: f9bdd3d52e282e20f87b0f0fa623369e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36804
content:
"The reduced habitability of small islands is an overarching \r\nsignificant risk caused by a combination of several key risks \r\nfacing most small islands even under a global temperature \r\nscenario of 1.5degC (high confidence). These are loss of marine and \r\ncoastal biodiversity and ecosystem services; submergence of reef \r\nislands; loss of terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem services; water \r\ninsecurity; destruction of settlements and infrastructure; degradation \r\nof health and well-being; economic decline and livelihood failure); and \r\nloss of cultural resources and heritage. Climate-related ocean changes, \r\nincluding those for slow-onset events, and changes in extreme events \r\nare projected to cause and/or amplify Keys Risks in most small islands. \r\nIdentification of key risks facilitates the selection of optimal context\u0002specific adaptation options. Moreover, it can distil the benefits and/or \r\ndisadvantages and long-term implications of choosing such options \r\n(high confidence) {15"


id: c18bf407ea7e01d1bf480928b82157d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28045
content:
"Post-AR5 new studies confirm observed impacts on the natural and \r\nhuman systems and indicate projected risks in both these systems over \r\ntime. Over the past four decades, there was a significant increase in \r\nthe probability of the global exceedances of tropical cyclones (TCs) \r\nof major intensity (Kossin et  al., 2020), a trend confirmed by the \r\noccurrence of a growing number of intense TCs affecting the Atlantic \r\nand Pacific regions since AR5 (Magee et al., 2016; Bhatia et al., 2019; \r\nKnutson et al., 2019). Also, scientific evidence since AR5 has confirmed \r\nthat tropical corals are presently at high risk (very high confidence) and \r\nif global warming exceeds 1.5degC, known coral reef restoration options \r\nmay be ineffective (IPCC, 2018). Even achieving emission reduction \r\ntargets consistent with the ambitious goal of 1"


id: df8b0a675999068e54b54f2af12dc616
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 32669
content:
"5degC of global warming \r\nunder the Paris Agreement will result in the further loss of 70-90% of \r\nreef-building corals compared to today, with 99% of corals being lost \r\nunder warming of 2degC or more above the pre-industrial period (high \r\nconfidence) (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018)."


id: bd71986a9661fff8c85db6c55fa45e5a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27372
content:
"Additionally, since the last assessment, more robust scientific evidence \r\nexists on the impacts of sea level rise (SLR) and extreme sea level (ESL) \r\nevents on small islands. Under Representative Concentration Pathways \r\nemission scenarios, RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, many low-lying \r\ncoastal areas at all latitudes, including small islands, will experience \r\nSLR and ESL events such as coastal storm surges and coastal flooding \r\nmore frequently in the coming decades (Section 4.2.3.4.1; IPCC, 2019). \r\nSLR and ESL events will affect atoll islands and islands with higher \r\nelevations differently. New studies forecast that small islands are likely\r\nto experience some of the largest increases in endemic extinctions \r\nand may substantially contribute to future global biodiversity loss \r\nas well as to impaired ecosystem functioning (Fortini et  al., 2015; \r\nVogiatzakis et al., 2016; Cramer et al., 2018)"


id: c066d92cad8e7bd7accf987ee4225d50
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 27831
content:
" Scientific evidence points \r\nto large population reductions with an extinction risk of 100% for \r\nendemic species within insular biodiversity hotspots by 2100 (IPBES, \r\n2018; Manes et al., 2021). An overarching concern since AR5 is the \r\nreduced habitability of small islands. Eight key risks (KRs) affecting \r\nthe habitability of small islands are identified in this assessment and \r\nthese are covered in the pertinent sections of this chapter which assess \r\nadaptation responses."


id: dc1dda2b58be878d291df990ef3056a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32143
content:
"Kiribati (Biribo and Woodroffe, 2013; Duvat, 2013), and the Maldives \r\nIslands (Kench, 2012; Naylor, 2015; Duvat and Magnan, 2019b), \r\npopulation growth has led to land reclamation and the building of \r\ncoastal protection structures, such as seawalls. Land reclamation and \r\ncoastal protection structures negatively impact coastal and marine \r\necosystems, including reefs and mangroves, which compromise the \r\nprotection services that they deliver to island communities through \r\nwave energy attenuation and sediment supply (Gracia et al., 2018; \r\nCurnick et  al., 2019; Duvat and Magnan, 2019a) and may impact \r\nthe long-term sustainable adaptive planning of islands (Giardino \r\net al., 2018). In addition, these construction activities disrupt natural \r\ncoastal processes, thereby causing coastal erosion, which in turn \r\nincreases the risk of flooding (Yamano et  al., 2007; Duvat et  al., \r\n2017b) (Figure 15.3)"


id: 345cfe486b1d0dea95b8b68595623b68
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5653
content:
" This becomes a vicious cycle, with more land \r\nreclamation necessary to accommodate growing populations. Land \r\nreclamation requires stabilisation by protection structures, which "


id: 7b8539479b7de553ce052bb2814632d2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17027
content:
"Recent studies confirmed that observed ESL events causing extensive \r\nflooding generally resulted from compound effects, including the \r\ncombination of SLR (Section  3.2.2.2 and Cross-Chapter Box  SLR \r\nin Chapter 3) with ETCs, TCs and tropical depressions (WGI AR6 \r\nSections  11.7.1 and 11.7.2, Seneviratne, 2021), ENSO-related high\u0002water levels associated with high or spring tide and/or local human \r\ndisturbances amplifying impacts (high confidence). For example, the \r\nmajor floods that occurred in 1987 and 2007 in the Maldives involved \r\nthe combination of distant-source swells and high spring tides and the \r\nsettlement of reclaimed low-lying areas (Box 15.1; Wadey et al., 2017). \r\nIn the Tuamotu atolls, French Polynesia, the 1996 and 2011 floods were \r\ndue to the combination of distant-source swells causing lagoon filling \r\nand the obstruction of inter-islet channels by human-built structures \r\n(Canavesio, 2019)"


id: 443e4b4e0d51732a7e10940db8c5c8ef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8160
content:
" In 2011, the flooding of the lagoon-facing coast of \r\nMajuro Atoll, Marshall Islands, resulted from the combination of high \r\nsea levels occurring during La Nina conditions and seasonally high \r\ntides (Ford et al., 2018). Another example is the widespread flooding \r\ncaused by distant TC Pam (2015) in Kiribati and Tuvalu, which was \r\nattributed to the strong swell generated, the long duration of the \r\nevent and exceptionally high regional sea levels (Hoeke et al., 2021). \r\nOn high tropical islands, major floods often occurred during TC events, \r\ndue to the cumulative effects of storm surge and river flooding, the "


id: 140358ee7aaf33b46b5cde6fa923c048
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 656
content:
"Reconstructions of past storm surges and modelling studies \r\nassessing storm surge risk similarly highlighted high variations of \r\nrisk along island coasts, due to variations in exposure, topography \r\nand bathymetry (high confidence). For example, the storm surge \r\ncaused by TC Oli (2010) on the high volcanic island of Tubuai, French \r\nPolynesia, ranged from a few centimetres to 2.5 m, depending on coast \r\nexposure (Barriot et al., 2016). Investigating the contribution of reef \r\ncharacteristics to variations in wave-driven flooding on Roi-Namur \r\nIsland, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, Quataert et al. (2015) found \r\nthat the coasts fronted by narrow reefs with steep fore reef slopes \r\nand smoother reef flats are the most flood-prone. Modelling studies \r\nassessing storm surge risk in Fiji (McInnes et  al., 2014) and Samoa \r\n(McInnes et al., 2016) confirmed the influence of coast exposure and \r\nwater depth on risk distribution. In Apia, Samoa, Hoeke et al. (2015, p"


id: 64a4b0aa88f9fd1e491d4b1dce3b4ef1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13411
content:
" \r\n1117) found 'differences in extreme sea levels in the order of 1 m at \r\nspatial scales of less than 1 km' and estimated (p. 1131) that a '1 m \r\nSLR relative to constant topography increases wave energy reaching \r\nthe shore by up to 200% during storm surges.' These studies reaffirmed \r\nthe main control exerted by SLR on ESL events and associated storm \r\nsurges compared to ENSO (high confidence). In Hawaii and the \r\nCaribbean, SLR is projected to exponentially increase flooding, with \r\nnearly every centimetre of SLR causing a doubling of the probability of "


id: 3f32a95c2b36fd6a472cde3a1e60c98f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7334
content:
"systems that are not disturbed by human activities are, respectively, \r\nexpected to migrate lagoonward (Webb and Kench, 2010; Albert et al., \r\n2016; Beetham et al., 2017; Costa et al., 2019; Tuck et al., 2019) and \r\nlandward (Bindoff et al., 2019), and to also experience increased erosion \r\nas well as changes in configuration, volume and elevation (Kench and \r\nMann, 2017; Tuck et al., 2019) (Bramante et al., 2020; Kane and Fletcher, \r\n2020). Small reef islands and narrow coastal systems affected by human \r\ndisturbances will increasingly be at risk of disappearance due to SLR \r\n(KR2 in Figure 15.5), enhanced sediment loss caused by extreme events \r\n(Duvat et  al., 2019a) and/or human activities (high confidence), as \r\nreported in Hawaii (Romine and Fletcher, 2013), Puerto Rico (Jackson \r\net al., 2012), Sicily (Anfuso et al., 2012), and Takuu, Papua New Guinea \r\n(Mann and Westphal, 2014). SLR will also increase coastal erosion in the \r\nMediterranean Sea, (e.g"


id: 6fc457247bfbb7b4592d2ee8115ca9b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 15211
content:
", in the Aegean Archipelago, Greece (Monioudi \r\net al., 2017), and Mallorca, Spain (Enriquez et al., 2017)."


id: 57e6f8d369a27e1ac3b143a3ad88e960
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11334
content:
"(Duvat, 2018). The rates of change did not correlate with SLR rates, \r\nsuggesting that the impact of SLR on island land area was obscured \r\nby other climate drivers and human disturbances on some islands \r\n(high confidence) (Kench et al., 2015; McLean and Kench, 2015; Duvat, \r\n2018). However, reef island disappearance and reduction in land area \r\nwas clearly observed in New Caledonia and the Solomon Islands, and \r\nwas attributed to the synergistic interactions of gradual SLR with \r\nstronger trade winds causing higher sea levels and local tectonics in \r\nthe Solomon Islands (Albert et al., 2016; Garcin et al., 2016). Despite \r\nimportant knowledge gaps on coastal erosion in high tropical islands, \r\nrecent studies confirmed increasing shoreline retreat and beach loss \r\nover the past decades, mainly due to TC and ETC waves and human \r\ndisturbances (high confidence) (e.g"


id: f8855404219aafd3aca771187991f131
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36610
content:
", in the Caribbean region: Anguilla, \r\nSaint-Kitts, Nevis, Montserrat, Dominica and Grenada (Cambers, 2009; \r\nReguero et al., 2018)), and Pacific (Hawaii (Romine and Fletcher, 2013); \r\nTubuai, French Polynesia (Salmon et  al., 2019)) and Indian Oceans \r\n(Anjouan, Comoros (Ratter et al., 2016)."


id: 6b441f27db2b3018ef510a7def04384
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14499
content:
"Loss of marine and coastal biodiversity and ecosystem services is a key \r\nrisk in small islands (see KR1 in Figure 15.5). Coral bleaching caused \r\nby elevated water temperatures is the most visible and widespread \r\nmanifestation of a climate change impact on coastal ecosystems in \r\nmost small islands but is far from being the only one (Sections 3.4.2.1 \r\nand Section 5.3.4; Spalding and Brown, 2015; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., \r\n2017; IPCC, 2018; Bindoff et al., 2019; Sully et al., 2019). Severe coral \r\nbleaching, together with declines in coral abundance have been \r\ndocumented in many small islands, especially those in the Pacific Ocean \r\nand Indian Ocean (e.g., Guam, Fiji, Palau, Vanuatu, Chagos, Comoros, \r\nMauritius, Seychelles, and the Maldives (high confidence) (Box  15.1; \r\nGolbuu et  al., 2007; Woesik et  al., 2012; Perry and Morgan, 2017; \r\nHughes et al., 2018)"


id: 56de8f40baa2e08cd964a07b704e1d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11144
content:
" During severe bleaching events, not only do reefs \r\nlose a significant amount of live coral cover, but they also experience \r\na decrease in growth potential, and thus reef erosion surpasses reef \r\naccretion (Perry and Morgan, 2017). Median return time between two \r\nsevere bleaching events has diminished steadily since 1980 and is now \r\nonly 6 years (e.g., Hughes et al., 2017b; Hughes et al., 2018) and is often \r\nassociated with warm phase of ENSO events (high confidence) (Lix et al., \r\n2016). Modelling of both bleaching and ocean acidification effects under \r\nfuture climate scenarios suggested that some Pacific small islands (e.g., \r\nNauru, Guam, Northern Marianas Islands) will experience conditions that \r\ncause severe bleaching on an annual basis before 2040 and that 90% \r\nof the world reefs are projected to experience conditions that result in \r\nsevere bleaching annually by 2055 (medium confidence) (van Hooidonk \r\net al., 2016)"


id: f542cfae71e7f3e57a1a955f72f12327
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36102
content:
" Models are currently predicting the large-scale loss of coral \r\nreefs by mid-century under even low-emission scenarios. Even achieving \r\nemission reduction targets consistent with the ambitious goal of 1.5degC \r\nof global warming under the Paris Agreement will result in the further \r\nloss of 70-90% of reef-building corals compared to today, with 99% of \r\ncorals being lost under warming of 2degC or more above the pre-industrial \r\nperiod (high confidence) (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018)."


id: c6c0110e182b49843b06115649158c1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28841
content:
"Despite storm-induced erosion prevailing along some shoreline \r\nsections, recent studies reaffirmed the contribution of TC and ETC \r\nwaves to coastal and reef island vertical building through massive reef\u0002to-island sediment transfer (high confidence). For example, TC Ophelia \r\n(1958) and Category 5 TC Fantala (2016), which eroded the islands \r\nof Jaluit Atoll, Marshall Islands (Ford and Kench, 2016), and Farquhar \r\nAtoll, Seychelles (Duvat et  al., 2017c), respectively, also contributed \r\nto island and beach expansion. Likewise, tropical depressions can \r\nhave constructional effects, as reported on Fakarava Atoll, French \r\nPolynesia (Duvat et  al., 2020b). On Saint-Martin/Sint Maarten and \r\nSaint-Barthelemy, the 2017 hurricanes, which caused marked shoreline \r\nretreat at most beach sites, also enabled beach formation and beach \r\nridge development along some natural coasts (Duvat et  al., 2019a; \r\nPillet et al., 2019)"


id: 6dba14518113575d05549fd31c204a57
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14871
content:
" Similarly, El Nino and La Nina were involved in rapid \r\nand highly contrasting shoreline changes (high confidence), including \r\nreef island accretion in the Ryukyu Islands, Japan (Kayanne et  al., \r\n2016), beach shifts on Maiana and Aranuka atolls, Kiribati (Rankey, \r\n2011), and beach erosion on Hawaii, USA (Barnard et  al., 2015). \r\nThese contrasting shoreline responses were, respectively, due to coral \r\nreef degradation from past bleaching events providing material to \r\nislands, wave directional shifts, and increased wave energy. The role \r\nof bleaching events in increasing short-term sediment generation in \r\natoll contexts was confirmed by a study conducted on Gaafu Dhaalu \r\nAtoll, Maldives, which reported an increase of sediment production \r\nfrom ~0.5 kg CaCO3 m-2 yr-1 to ~3.7 kg CaCO3 m-2 yr-1 between 2016 \r\n(pre-bleaching) and 2019 (bleaching + 3 years) (Perry et al., 2020)."


id: d963131ed07a277ef821988ab3bc25c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31714
content:
"Since 2011, the Caribbean region has been experiencing unprecedented \r\ninfluxes of the pelagic seaweed Sargassum. These extraordinary \r\nsargassum 'blooms' have resulted in mass strandings of sargassum \r\nthroughout the Lesser Antilles, with significant damage to coastal \r\nhabitats, mortality of seagrass beds and associated corals (van \r\nTussenbroek et al., 2017), as well as consequences for fisheries and \r\ntourism. Whether or not such events are related to long-term climate \r\nchange remains unclear; however, it has been suggested that the influx \r\nmay be related to strong Amazon discharge, enhanced West African \r\nupwelling, together with rising seawater temperatures in the Atlantic \r\n(low confidence) (Oviatt et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019)"


id: 818cdc3ab123394c8593ea8f8eeaec0
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17914
content:
" Since 2011, the \r\nPacific atoll nation of Tuvalu has also been affected by algal blooms, \r\nthe most recent being a large growth of Sargassum on the main atoll \r\nof Funafuti, and this phenomenon has been related to anthropogenic \r\neutrophication and high seawater temperatures (De Ramon N'Yeurt \r\nand Iese, 2014)."


id: 7f469edf791edce010aa6d91e1411ba2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17577
content:
"demonstrated in the Comoros Archipelago (Cowburn et al., 2018), in \r\nthe Pacific (Fox et al., 2019; Mollica et al., 2019; Romero-Torres et al., \r\n2020) and globally (Sully et al., 2019; McClanahan et al., 2020). It has \r\nbeen hypothesised that low-latitude tropical reefs bleached less than \r\nthose in higher latitudes because: (a) of the geographical differences \r\nin species composition, (b) of the higher genotypic diversity at low \r\nlatitudes, and (c) some corals were pre-adapted to thermal stress \r\nbecause of consistently warmer temperatures at low latitude prior to \r\nthermal stress events (Sully et al., 2019). However, latitudinal variation \r\nwas not reported in other global surveys of coral bleaching occurrence \r\n(Donner et  al., 2017; Hughes et  al., 2017a; Hughes et  al., 2017b; \r\nMcClanahan et al., 2019). Ainsworth et al. (2016) and Ateweberhan \r\net  al. (2013) showed that coral bleaching can be mitigated by pre\u0002exposure to elevated temperatures"


id: a4b34dfd72928139245a6b233b55793b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23479
content:
" Regionally, recovery is also highly \r\nvariable. While some reefs in the Seychelles and Maldives were shown \r\nto recover to pre-disturbance levels of coral cover after previous \r\nbleaching events (Box 15.1; Pisapia et al., 2016; Koester et al., 2020), \r\nother reefs underwent seemingly permanent regime shifts toward \r\ndomination by fleshy macro algae (Graham et  al., 2015), or major \r\ndeclines in carbonate budgets, and thus the capacity of reefs to sustain \r\nvertical growth under rising sea levels (Perry and Morgan, 2017)."


id: cd0f1cbd6cf7ebf5619330288c6b1921
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29812
content:
"Mangroves face serious risks from deforestation and unsustainable \r\ncoastal development (Section  3.4.2.5; Gattuso et  al., 2015). Large\u0002scale die-offs around many small islands suggest that mangroves face \r\nincreased risks from climate change (Sippo et  al., 2018). Mangrove \r\nseaward edge retreat has been demonstrated in American Samoa and at \r\nTikina Wai in Fiji, in Bermuda, West Papua, Grand Cayman and attributed \r\nto long-term SLR or tectonic subsidence (Ellison, 1993; Ellison, 2005; \r\nGilman et al., 2007; Ellison and Strickland, 2015). Inundation-related \r\nmortality of mangroves could, in theory, be mitigated if mangrove \r\nsubstrates can 'keep up' with rising sea level by accretion. Pacific \r\nIsland studies using radionuclides (e.g., 210Pb, 137Cs) have suggested \r\nthat most mangroves are keeping up with current rates of SLR (Alongi, \r\n2008; MacKenzie et  al., 2016), while surface elevation tables (SETs) \r\nsuggest otherwise. Lovelock et al"


id: dadfbac17988ba6cd6686507f88cd9c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31957
content:
" (2015) reported that nearly 70% of \r\nthe mangroves monitored with SETs are not keeping up with current \r\nSLR rates. If SLR exceeds 6 mm yr-1, mangroves may be unable to \r\nmaintain their elevation relative to sea level, a threshold likely to be \r\nsurpassed in the next 30 years under high emission scenarios (Ellison, \r\n1993; Saintilan et al., 2020). In these worst-case scenarios, flooding \r\nwould result in tree, root and rhizome death and an abrupt change \r\nin elevation through peat collapse (Krauss et al., 2010; Lang'at et al., \r\n2014), creating a positive feedback loop between SLR and elevation \r\nloss. Geomorphology, hydrology, tidal range and suspended sediments \r\nare important factors that will determine if mangroves will survive \r\nincreased rates of SLR (Lovelock et  al., 2015; Sasmito et  al., 2015; \r\nRogers et al., 2019). TCs can cause extensive damage to mangroves \r\n(Short et  al., 2016)"


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vector_id: 16708
content:
" While immediate physical damage is often \r\nconsiderable, trees can sometimes recover by re-foliating, re-sprouting \r\nor regenerating (Kauffman and Cole, 2010). Examples of substantive \r\nmangrove recovery include the regrowth of trees in the Bay Islands \r\nof Honduras following Hurricane Mitch (October 1998) (Fickert, 2018) \r\nand in the Nicobar Islands, India, following the December 2004 Indian \r\nOcean Tsunami (Nehru and Balasubramanian, 2018)."


id: 750badff140e94591088dde226ebe208
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16007
content:
"Despite their vital social and ecological value, substantial declines in \r\nseagrass communities have been documented in many small islands \r\n(Section 3.4.2.5; Arias-Ortiz et al., 2018; Kendrick et al., 2019; Brodie \r\net al., 2020), including Fiji (Joseph et al., 2019), Reunion Island (Cuvillier \r\net al., 2017), Bermuda, Cayman Islands, US Virgin Islands (Waycott et al., \r\n2009), Kiribati (Brodie et  al., 2020), Federated States of Micronesia, \r\nand Palau (Short et  al., 2016), but attribution of such declines to \r\nclimatic influences remains weak (low confidence). The impact of \r\nclimate change on seagrasses goes beyond the loss of seagrass but \r\nincludes acceleration of seagrass decomposition (Kelaher et al., 2018), \r\npalatability (Jimenez-Ramos et al., 2017) and the cumulative effect of \r\nwarming and eutrophication (Ontoria et al., 2019)"


id: f0e880763f110f4f6213e592f889d2c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 35398
content:
" Seagrasses face a \r\nmultitude of threats including physical disturbance and direct damage \r\ncaused by rapidly growing human populations, declines in water \r\nquality, and coastal erosion (Short et al., 2016). Experimental studies \r\nhave shown increased mortality, leaf necrosis, and respiration when \r\nseagrasses are exposed to higher-than-normal temperatures (Hernan \r\net al., 2017). As such, seagrass meadows growing near the edge of their \r\nthermal tolerance are at risk from rising temperatures (Pedersen et al., \r\n2016). In the Mediterranean, seagrass meadows are already showing \r\nsigns of regression, which may have been aggravated by climate change \r\n(high confidence). Some studies suggest seagrasses have potential for \r\nacclimation and adaptation (Duarte et al., 2018; Ruiz et al., 2018; Beca\u0002Carretero et al., 2020). Chefaoui et al"


id: e5a62ddc78927a8aa4beadc64b6bad44
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 33637
content:
" (2018) attempted to forecast the \r\ndistribution of two seagrasses in the future, including around the islands \r\nof Cyprus, Malta, Sicily and the Balearic Islands. Under the worst-case \r\nscenario, Posidonia oceanica was projected to lose 75% of suitable \r\nhabitat by 2050. Conversely, it has been suggested that seagrasses \r\ncould actually benefit from an increase in anthropogenic CO2because \r\nof increased growth and photosynthesis (Hopley et al., 2007; Waycott \r\net al., 2011; Sunday et al., 2016; Repolho et al., 2017). However, Collier \r\net al. (2017) argued that when faced with increased heat waves, thermal \r\nstress will rarely be offset by the benefit of elevated CO2 and therefore \r\nthat the widespread belief that seagrasses will be a 'winner' under \r\nfuture climate change conditions seems unlikely (low confidence)."


id: 92f81c2ba067e376ff7dbd03f37defef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 20641
content:
"Freshwater systems on small islands are exposed to dynamic climate \r\nimpacts and are considered to be among the most threatened on the \r\nplanet (key risk 3 in Box 15.1; Settele et al., 2014; IPCC, 2018; Butchart \r\net al., 2019). Hoegh-Guldberg et al. (2019) estimated that freshwater \r\nstress on small islands would be 25% less with a warming of 1.5degC or \r\nless as compared to 2.0degC. While some island regions are projected \r\nto experience substantial freshwater decline, an opposite trend is \r\nobserved for some western Pacific and northern Indian Ocean islands \r\n(Holding et al., 2016; Karnauskas et al., 2016). Island topography and \r\necophysiology influence water storage capacity and rainfall response \r\npotential (Dunn et  al., 2018)"


id: b454ba7a692be97c231d57e682b780e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 25886
content:
" On high volcanic and granitic islands, \r\nfreshwater ecosystems are often closely connected with coastal \r\nspaces, and changes in freshwater supply from river systems have \r\ndirect implications for salinity and sediment loads (high confidence) \r\n(Yang et al., 2015; Zahid et al., 2018). Climate impacts on streamflow \r\npatterns in tropical islands also create shifts in water supply for \r\ndownstream users and habitat conditions for organisms supporting \r\na wide range of ecosystem services (high confidence) (Strauch et al., \r\n2015; Frazier and Brewington, 2019; Frauendorf et al., 2020)."


id: 8b6b60cdbd30d4dc4e770184f1c4168c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 19454
content:
"Intact coral reefs (Woodhead et al., 2019), seagrass meadows (Hejnowicz \r\net al., 2015) and mangroves (UNEP, 2014b) (Friess, 2016) provide a variety \r\nof ecosystem services that are key to island communities, including \r\nprovisioning services (e.g., timber, fisheries, aquaculture), regulating \r\nservices (e.g., coastal protection, carbon storage, filtering of pollutants), \r\ncultural services (Pascua et al., 2017) as well as supporting community \r\nresilience (Forster et al., 2019). If coastal ecosystems are degraded and \r\nlost, then the benefits they provide are also lost (Oleson et al., 2018; \r\nForster et  al., 2019; Brodie et  al., 2020). In small islands where the \r\nrisk of loss to ecosystem services is high (Cross-Chapter Box DEEP in \r\nChapter 17), many of these ecosystem services cannot be easily replaced \r\n(medium confidence)"


id: 945cf8fe5f9f79c469f9f250466ba35b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 20852
content:
" The beneficial role that coral reefs play in coastal \r\nprotection through wave attenuation, and therefore enhancing climate \r\nresilience in small islands, has been extensively studied (e.g., Elliff and \r\nSilva, 2017; Harris et al., 2018; Reguero et al., 2018). Indeed, it has been \r\ndemonstrated that in small islands (such as the Cayman Islands, Grenada, \r\nBahamas) averted damages as a result of protecting intact coral reefs \r\ncan be considerable when expressed as a percentage of GDP (Beck et al., \r\n2018). Ferrario et al. (2014) conducted a global meta-analysis including \r\nmany small islands across the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans and \r\nfound that coral reefs reduce wave height by an average of 84% (and \r\nwave energy by 97%) and that reef crests alone dissipate most of this \r\nenergy. Based on another meta-analysis of 69 case studies worldwide \r\n(wave heights measured before and after the habitat), Narayan et al"


id: e318a01e5e9ec7fe993a5fb9a3eb395e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 33222
content:
" \r\n(2016) observed that coral reefs, mangroves and seagrass reduced \r\nwave height by 70%, 31% and 36%, respectively (Figure 15.4) and thus \r\nperform an essential role in protecting human lives and livelihoods (high \r\nconfidence). Post-TC studies have provided additional evidence for the \r\nprotection services offered by coastal ecosystems. On some Caribbean \r\nislands (e.g., Saint-Martin/Sint Maarten) where the dense indigenous \r\nvegetation belt was preserved, the vegetative structure buffered the \r\nwaves of TCs Irma and Jose (2017), reducing the extent of marine \r\ninundation and shoreline retreat to a 30-m-wide coastal strip against \r\nvalues >160 m in deforested areas (Duvat et  al., 2019a; Pillet et  al., \r\n2019). By contrast, the destruction of mangrove ecosystems, even a few \r\ntrees around the fringes, can accelerate coastal erosion, as exemplified \r\nby observations in Micronesia (Krauss et al., 2010; Nunn et al., 2017a)."


id: c8ec900cb4ce870d9802072a8035b503
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 29173
content:
"Recorded alterations of ecological interactions include increased \r\ncompetition, changes to migratory routes (Harter et  al., 2015) and \r\nmismatches between species, such as increased pathogen attacks on \r\nMediterranean forest species (Vogiatzakis et al., 2016). Also, in some \r\nareas of Madagascar there has been increased vulnerability to fire, due \r\nto the replacement of succulents by less fire-resilient species (Virah\u0002Sawmy et al., 2016). Further, the low functional redundancy of island \r\necosystems implies a comparatively higher proportion of keystone \r\nspecies than continents, many of them being endemic (Harter et al., \r\n2015), with potentially unpredictable system consequences due to \r\nclimate-induced ecological changes. For example, Caribbean land crabs \r\nhave been observed to alter their food intake as a response to drying \r\nconditions (McGaw et  al"


id: 170d10e9081d7bc0562ff1da557fe4cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 1145
content:
", 2019) and Aldabra giant land tortoises \r\nhave reduced their activity in response to increasing temperature and \r\ndecreasing precipitation (Falcon and Hansen, 2018); such changes in \r\nboth these ecosystem engineers are of potential consequence for seed \r\ndispersal, among other ecological functions."


id: dfb10693d9ed1dbab38d1da35eec1000
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 32694
content:
"Despite encompassing approximately 2% of the Earth's terrestrial \r\nsurface, oceanic and other high-endemicity islands are estimated to \r\nharbour substantial proportions of existing species including ~25% \r\nextant global flora, ~12% birds and ~10% mammals (Alcover et al., \r\n1998; Wetzel et  al., 2013; Kumar and Tehrany, 2017). Islands also \r\nhave higher densities of critically endangered species, hosting just \r\nunder half of all species currently considered to be at risk of extinction \r\n(Spatz et  al., 2017a; 2017b), hence making the loss of terrestrial \r\nbiodiversity and related ecosystem services a KR (KR3) for small islands \r\n(Figure  15.5). Impacts from developing synergies between changing \r\nclimate, natural and anthropogenic stressors on islands (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox DEEP in Chapter 17) could lead to disproportionate changes in \r\nglobal biodiversity"


id: 56a1ad99a1c8eb6077f89439a25f403b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11108
content:
" The most prominent drivers include: SLR, increasing \r\nintensities of extreme events (human activities--especially continuing/\r\naccelerating habitat destruction/degradation) and the introduction of \r\ninvasive alien species (IAS) (Tershy et al., 2015). When coupled with \r\ncharacteristic small island traits such as spatial and other resource \r\nlimitations, these synergies play a critical role towards increasing the \r\nvulnerability of these insular ecosystems (Box  CCP1.1). This is likely \r\nto hinder the adaptation response of terrestrial biota-increasing the \r\nrisk of biodiversity loss and, in turn, impairing the resilience capacity \r\nof ecosystem functioning and services (high confidence) (Heller and \r\nZavaleta, 2009; Ferreira et al., 2016; Vogiatzakis et al., 2016)."


id: c5272fdd0de43ca5e3a603a8b282b011
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"SLR has been projected to impact the terrestrial biodiversity of low\u0002lying islands and coastal regions via large habitat losses both directly \r\n(e.g., submergence) and indirectly (e.g., salinity intrusion, salinisation \r\nof coastal wetlands and soil erosion) at even the 1-m scenario (medium\r\nto high confidence). However, these impacts vary depending on the \r\nislands' topographical differences. In a study of SLR impacts on insular \r\nbiodiversity hotspots, Bellard et al. (2013a) reported that the Caribbean \r\nislands, Sundaland and the Philippines were projected to suffer the \r\nmost habitat loss while the East Melanesian islands were projected \r\nto be less (but not minimally) affected. The most threatened of these, \r\nthe Caribbean, was projected to have between 8.7% and 49.2% of its \r\nislands entirely submerged, respectively, from 1-m to 6-m SLR (Bellard \r\net  al., 2013a)"


id: 3a4b710d98e6faa2929809885112cefc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 6538
content:
" However, many current projection studies consider \r\nmarine flooding directly and seldom incorporate other indirect impacts \r\nsuch as increased habitat losses from horizontal erosion loss, increased \r\nsalinity levels, tidal ranges and extreme events. These projections are \r\nconsidered to be conservative, underestimating the extent of habitat \r\nloss to terrestrial biodiversity (Bellard et al., 2013b)."


id: d6744e3a39d660f5c9e6b381b96ccb34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 31253
content:
"Current observations of insular species response to climate change \r\ngenerally report geographic range shifts/reductions for species and \r\nvegetation associations in addition to resulting impacts on local \r\necology (Virah-Sawmy et al., 2016; Koide et al., 2017; Maharaj et al., \r\n2019). These include changes in plant/animal phenology and resulting \r\ncommunity alterations such as for the common Mediterranean island \r\nspecies Quercus ilex (holly oak) and Ficus carica (common fig). Species \r\nhave been shifting greater distances to access not only suitable climate \r\nconditions but also, by association, suitable breeding conditions and \r\nseasonal food. Examples include: migratory birds such as Coturnix \r\ncoturnix now having earlier spring arrival dates in the Mediterranean \r\ncompared to six decades ago and the increased mortality of the iconic \r\nArgyroxiphium sandwicense (Hinahina) as result of warmer drier \r\ntrends at Hawaiian high altitudes (Krushelnycky et al"


id: f954beb4281dc664dd2d6f67ede4af54
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content:
", 2012; Taylor and \r\nKumar, 2016a; Vogiatzakis et al., 2016). There have also been die-offs \r\nof some species from temperature extremes (e.g., flying fox species: \r\nPteropus species) within the Pacific islands (Taylor and Kumar, 2016a)."


id: e98a1290f31e9647830c3d8379144e38
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content:
"Continued high rates of habitat loss and degradation have been \r\nreported for many small islands as natural habitats continue to be \r\ncleared to meet increasing demands upon natural resources from rising \r\nhuman populations, agriculture, urbanisation, unsustainable tourism, \r\novergrazing and fires. This increases the vulnerability of ecosystems \r\nwithin especially oceanic islands--where isolation has given rise to high \r\nlevels of endemism but simple biotic communities, with low functional \r\nredundancy (Box CCP1.1). There is high confidence that climate change \r\nmay exacerbate the effects of this habitat loss upon the biodiversity \r\nof these islands as the climate refugia (Table  15.3) and the upslope \r\nshifts of range-restricted, dispersal-limited and poorly competitive \r\nspecies, confined within narrow latitudinal (and decreasing altitudinal) \r\ngradients, are increasingly challenged by fragmented and degraded \r\nlandscapes (e.g., Struebig et al., 2015a; IPBES, 2019)"


id: 15b47c1c39addf88c1c2fd0515fe23d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 934
content:
" Additionally, high\u0002altitude ecosystems such as cloud forests which harbour high levels \r\nof endemism are projected to shrink due to increasing atmospheric \r\ntemperature and competition from upward-shifting lowland species \r\n(Taylor and Kumar, 2016a). These may ultimately increase the risk of \r\nmultiple extinctions, negatively impacting upon global biodiversity \r\nlevels (high confidence) (Taylor and Kumar, 2016a; Portner et al., 2021)."


id: b652f6fbe1aca70b71b41c4f7919425
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 26212
content:
"Analyses of historical and current threats indicate that IAS and \r\ndisease have been the primary drivers of insular extinctions in modern \r\nhistory (Bellard et al., 2016). Impacts of IAS on islands are projected \r\nto increase with time due to synergies between climate change and \r\nother traditional drivers such as increasing global trade, tourism, \r\nagricultural intensification, overexploitation and urbanisation (Bellard \r\net al., 2014; Russell et al., 2017). Changing climate conditions may not \r\nnecessarily increase the rate of IAS introductions but is expected to \r\nimprove chances of IAS establishment via (a) altering IAS transport and \r\nintroduction mechanisms, (b) increasing the impacts and distributions \r\nof existing IAS and (ci) altering the effectiveness of existing control \r\nstrategies (Hellmann et al., 2008; Russell et al., 2017)"


id: 1fccd55bef311173f617f6547f729373
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 2439
content:
" These are likely \r\nto enhance IAS impacts on islands including: restructuring of ecological \r\ncommunities leading to declines and extinctions/extirpations in flora \r\nand fauna, habitat degradation, declining ecosystem functioning, \r\nservices and resilience and, in extreme cases, potential community \r\nhomogenisation (high confidence) (Russell and Blackburn, 2017; IPBES, \r\n2019). Given the high degree of endemicity within oceanic islands and \r\ntheir associated vulnerabilities, such exacerbation by changing climate \r\nposes a serious threat to decreasing global biodiversity (medium to \r\nhigh confidence) (van Kleunen et al., 2015)."


id: 36defb250f6fb536e72a4f70f1e980f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 6021
content:
"Table 15.3 |  Percentage of selected islands classified as refugia for biodiversity at increasing levels of warming. While protected land is still 'protected' this table demonstrates the \r\ndifficulty of protecting lands which might be 'more resilient' to climate change under increasing levels of warming and current land use practices. Derived from current and future \r\nprojected distributions of ~130,000 terrestrial fungi, plants, invertebrates and vertebrates (Warren et al., 2018a). Refugia=areas remaining climatically suitable for >75% of the \r\nspecies modelled (Warren et al., 2018b). Projections: based on mean impacts from 21 CMIP5 climate model patterns (no dispersal) and elevationally downscaled to 1 km under \r\ninterpolated warming levels derived from RCP2.6, 4.5, 6.0 and 8.0 (Warren et al., 2018a)"


id: b921efe2909bbc4b368b8d0bbe6020a7
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vector_id: 26661
content:
" First column-set: % island/island chain classified as a refugia based on climate alone; \r\nsecond column-set: % natural land projected to be climate refugia--illustrating potential refugia 'space' already lost to habitat conversion. Colour key: white: > 50%; yellow: \r\n30-50%; red: 17-30%; dark red: <17% of land classified as refugia."


id: f6034219f2011f22a2342a647669075d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 36218
content:
"Extreme weather and climate events, particularly TCs, floods, drought, \r\nand heatwaves can cause injuries, infectious diseases, and deaths \r\n(Box 15.1; Schutte et al., 2018). For example, Category 5 TC Winston \r\nhit Fiji on 20 February 2016. During the national state of emergency \r\n(7 March and 29 May 2016), the World Health Organization portable \r\ntoolkit for an early warning alert and response system (EWARS in a \r\nBox) was deployed within 24 h; it recorded 34,113 cases of the nine \r\nsyndromes among 326,861 consultations in a population of about \r\n900,000; 48% of cases were influenza-like illnesses, 30% were acute \r\nwatery diarrhoea, and 13% were suspected cases of dengue. There also \r\nwere 583 cases of Zika-like illness (1.7% of all cases) and two large \r\noutbreaks of viral conjunctivitis (total of 880 cases)"


id: a005b65fc46d25ce05eaf0918ab75b8b
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content:
" During TC Maria \r\nin Puerto Rico, there were more deaths per 100,000 among individuals \r\nliving in municipalities with the lowest socioeconomic development \r\nand for men 65  years of age or older (Santos-Burgoa et  al., 2018); \r\nthis excess risk persisted for at least 1 year after the event. The first \r\nhuman cases of leptospirosis in the U.S. Virgin Islands occurred in 2017 \r\nafter TC Irma and Maria. TCs also can affect treatment and care for \r\npeople with non-communicable diseases, including exacerbation or \r\ncomplications of illness and premature death (Ryan et al., 2015)."


id: 5ebc921643ed618bc91712a0bd976287
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 12444
content:
"Tropical and subtropical islands face risks from vector-borne diseases, \r\nsuch as malaria, dengue fever, and the Zika virus. El Nino events can \r\nincrease the risk of diseases such as Zika virus by increasing biting rates, \r\ndecreasing mosquito mortality rates and shortening the time required \r\nfor the virus to replicate within the mosquito (Caminade et al., 2017). \r\nBy combining disease prediction models with climate indicators that are \r\nroutinely monitored, alongside evaluation tools, it is possible to generate \r\nprobabilistic dengue outlooks in the Caribbean and early warning \r\nsystems (Oritz et al., 2015; Lowe et al., 2018). Projections suggest that \r\nmore individuals will become at risk of dengue fever by the 2030s \r\nand beyond because of an increasing abundance of mosquitos and \r\nlarger geographic range (Ebi et al., 2018). Projected increases in mean \r\ntemperature could double the dengue burden in New Caledonia by 2100 \r\n(Teurlai et al., 2015)"


id: c5dcc7566f559c90fdc651d94f93cbbf
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vector_id: 28704
content:
" In the Caribbean, Saharan dust transported across \r\nthe Atlantic can interact with Caribbean seasonal climatic conditions \r\nto become respirable and contribute to asthma presentations at the \r\nemergency department (See Table 15.5; Akpinar-Elci et al., 2015)."


id: 7341af63bb1a9b419e749553ccda5d5b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 15745
content:
"Population growth plays a major role in projected future water stress \r\n(Schewe et al., 2014). Combining projected aridity change (fractional \r\nchange compared to historical climatology) with population projections \r\nderived from SSP2 shows that the SIDS with high projected population \r\ngrowth rates are expected to experience the most severe freshwater \r\nstress by 2030 under a 2degC warming threshold scenario (Karnauskas \r\net  al., 2018). For several SIDS (e.g., Belize and Jamaica), increasing \r\naridity change is a prominent exacerbating factor, but for others (e.g., \r\nthe Solomon Islands and Comoros) population growth is the main \r\nfactor. An increase in temperature of 1degC (from 1.7degC to 2.7degC) could \r\nresult in a 60% increase in the number of people projected to experience \r\nsevere water resources stress in the period 2043-2071 (Schewe et al., \r\n2014; Karnauskas et al., 2018)"


id: 1dfb5fb5bff8867688bfb7953d6cf5f2
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vector_id: 2147
content:
" Research on Jamaica concluded that the \r\nability of rainwater harvesting to meet potable water needs between \r\nthe 2030s and 2050s will be reduced based on predicted shorter intense \r\nshowers and frequent dry spells (Aladenola et al., 2016)."


id: 70cae59bff7be318f145db608c4f3aa3
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"Climate-driven changes in the ability to access locally grown or harvested \r\nfood, either through environmental degradation or changes in extreme \r\nevent magnitude and/or frequency, can increase dependence on imported \r\nfood and increase rates of malnutrition and non-communicable diseases \r\n(Springmann et al., 2016; WHO, 2018; Savage et al., 2019; Lieber et al., \r\n2020). Projections suggest that local food accessibility could be reduced \r\nby 3.2% in the low- and middle-income countries of the Western Pacific \r\n(including the Philippines, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and \r\nother Pacific islands) by 2050, with approximately 300,000 associated \r\ndeaths possible (Springmann et al., 2016). A climate change-related 20% \r\ndecline in coral reef fish production in some Pacific Island countries by \r\n2050 could exacerbate the population growth-driven gap between volume \r\nof fish needed for nutritional security and fish available through sustained \r\nharvest (Bell et al"


id: 19c9116f7480a9eac3c74b9acd759656
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"The Caribbean and Pacific regions have historically been affected by \r\nsevere droughts (Peters, 2015; FAO, 2016; Barkey and Bailey, 2017; \r\nPaeniu et al., 2017; Trotman et al., 2017; Anshuka et al., 2018) with \r\nsignificant physical impacts and negative socioeconomic outcomes. \r\nWater quality is affected by drought as well as water availability. The \r\nEl Nino related 2015-1016 drought in Vanuatu led to reliance on small \r\namounts of contaminated water left at the bottom of household tanks \r\n(Iese et  al., 2021a). The highest land disturbance percentages have \r\ncoincided with major droughts in Cuba (de Beurs et al., 2019). Drought \r\nhas been shown to have an impact on rainwater harvesting in the \r\nPacific (Quigley et al., 2016) and Caribbean (Aladenola et al., 2016), \r\nespecially in rural areas where connections to centralised public water \r\nsupply have been difficult"


id: 42461f8ca597239d9084bf5bbe0ffa6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" Increasing trends in drought are apparent in \r\nthe Caribbean (Herrera and Ault, 2017) although trends in the western \r\nPacific are not statistically significant (McGree et al., 2016)."


id: 44caec87c5c5f6a157a6c38c7b31b4a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"economic status and level of dependence on agriculture and fisheries \r\nproduce dynamic climate impacts (Balzan et al., 2018). Climate change \r\nis impacting agricultural production in small islands through slow-onset \r\nstressors such as rising average temperatures, shifting rainfall patterns, \r\nSLR and extreme events like TCs. For example, TC Pam, a Category 5 \r\ncyclone, devastated Vanuatu in 2015 and caused losses and damages to \r\nthe agriculture sector valued at USD 56.5 million (64.1% of GDP) (Nalau \r\net al., 2017), and TC Winston in 2016 resulted in losses and damages \r\nin the agriculture sector in Fiji valued at USD 254.7 million (Iese et al., \r\n2020). In 2017, total losses and damages associated with hurricane \r\nMaria (Category 5) amounted to 224% of Dominica's 2016 GDP (Barclay \r\net  al., 2019). Losses and damages in agriculture often led to people \r\neating imported processed foods affecting their diet and nutrition \r\n(Haynes et al., 2020)"


id: 2951363120ea9799d07b4f35d8471759
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" Small islands communities are also witnessing \r\nthe indirect effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on agricultural systems \r\n(Hickey and Unwin, 2020). However, the limited diversity of agriculture \r\nproduction and reduced household incomes are contributing to low \r\ndiet diversity (Iese et al., 2021b). Bell and Taylor (2015) assessed the \r\neffects of climate change on specific sectors of agriculture in the Pacific \r\nislands region and found that, by 2090, staple food crops of taro, sweet \r\npotato and rice are expected to suffer from moderate to high impact. \r\nAmong export crops, coffee is expected to sustain the most significant \r\nimpact due largely to increased temperatures in the highland areas \r\nof Papua New Guinea--a high production area (Bell et  al., 2016). \r\nLivestock is an important protein source in some small islands and is \r\nparticularly vulnerable to changes in temperature through heat stress \r\n(Bell and Taylor, 2015; Lallo et  al., 2018)"


id: ed0923225645d950c714ad1484818a51
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content:
" With the concentration of \r\nisland people along (often reef-fringed) coasts, there is a comparatively \r\nlarge dependence on nearshore marine foods and coastal agricultural \r\nsystems (Ticktin et al., 2018)."


id: 6100ca8f5e37ec86ed2627ba657225e6
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"-20%) due to a greater proportion of fish occurring in the high seas \r\n(Bell et al., 2021), while projected increases have been anticipated for \r\nAscension Island and Saint Helena in the South Atlantic (Townhill et al., \r\n2021). Additionally, seafood plays an important role in achieving food \r\nsecurity in many islands. In the Pacific, fish protein is estimated to make \r\nup 50-90% of animal protein consumption in rural areas and 40-80% \r\nin urban areas (Bell et al., 2009; Hanich et al., 2018) with similar values \r\nreported for some Indian Ocean and Caribbean islands (e.g., Maldives, \r\nAntigua and Barbuda). It has been suggested that island nations may \r\nneed to retain more of their tuna catch rather than to rely solely on \r\ncoastal fisheries to achieve food security in the future (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox MOVING PLATE in Chapter 5; Bell et al., 2015; Bell et al., 2018)"


id: 9598e8ccc9d925dd860176a4477ee209
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" \r\nFurthermore, small island fisheries can be severely impacted by extreme \r\nevents such as TCs, yet rapidly recovering pelagic fisheries can help to \r\nalleviate immediate food insecurity pressures in some circumstances, \r\nhelping to build resilience (Pinnegar et al., 2019)."


id: 5cf6c80a43ca0c2afb8319314dd269ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Observed impacts of climate change on fish and fisheries in small islands \r\ninclude declines in reef-associated species due to coral bleaching or \r\ncyclone damage (Robinson et al., 2019; Magel et al., 2020), oceanic-scale \r\nshifts in the distribution of large pelagic fish and hence their fisheries \r\n(Erauskin-Extramiana et  al., 2019), changes to the size structure or \r\nbreeding behaviour of species (e.g., (Asch et al., 2018) (Sections 3.3.3.2 \r\nand 3.4.3.1)). Many studies of future fishery productivity in a changing \r\nclimate suggest that yields will fall as a result of ocean productivity \r\nreductions, local species extinction and/or migration (Nurse, 2011; Asch \r\net al., 2018; Robinson et al., 2019). Asch et al. (2018) provided future \r\nprojections for biodiversity and the maximum catch potential of fisheries \r\nin Pacific Island countries and territories"


id: c4d5b052ce25bc2147fdf87ce7538d1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" These authors concluded that \r\nnine of 17 Pacific Island entities (Cook Islands, Federated States of \r\nMicronesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Niue, Papua New Guinea, \r\nSolomon Islands, and Tuvalu) could experience >=50% declines in \r\nmaximum catch potential by 2100 relative to 1980-2000 under both an \r\nRCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenario (medium confidence). In Wallis and Futuna, \r\nmaximum catch potential was projected to increase slightly (around \r\n10%) by 2050, later declining by the year 2100. Similar projections \r\nhave now been provided for all countries worldwide, including Pacific, \r\nCaribbean, Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean small islands \r\n(Cheung et al., 2018). The small islands that show the largest anticipated \r\ndecrease in the maximum catch potential of fisheries by the end of \r\nthe century (according to an RCP4.5 and RCP8"


id: a53ea1f9f495fa38ea431fc7b0b88fb1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"5 scenario) include the \r\nFederated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tokelau, Tuvalu, \r\nSao Tome and Principe, whereas some other small islands such as \r\nBermuda, Easter Island (Chile), and Pitcairn Islands (UK), might actually \r\nwitness increases in fish catch potential (medium confidence) (Cheung \r\net al., 2018). Monnereau et al. (2017)showed that for the fisheries sector, \r\nsmall island states are generally more vulnerable to climate change \r\nimpacts compared to continental least-developed countries or coastal \r\nstates because of their increased reliance on fisheries, the exposure \r\nof coastal communities to potential climatic threats and their limited \r\nadaptive capacity.\r\nProjected impacts of climate change on agriculture and fisheries pose \r\nserious threats to dependent human populations (Ren et  al., 2018; \r\nHoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019), making the risk caused to livelihoods a \r\nkey risk in small islands (KR7 in Figure 15.5)"


id: 8df3c08d97a351fe8696bd13807e113c
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content:
" On small islands, despite \r\nbiophysical commonalities (e.g., size and isolation), differences in "


id: 98d9be5cce66604aedf1fd5af0af3cba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"It is challenging to disentangle the role of climate change from \r\nthat of globalisation and development in recent changes to human \r\nlivelihoods on small islands, given that the latter have characterised \r\nmany--especially SIDS--within the last few decades. However, recent \r\nclimate change is clearly implicated in livelihood deterioration in many \r\nisland contexts (Hernandez-Delgado, 2015; Nunn and Kumar, 2018). \r\nFor example, livelihood impacts of climate-driven stressors (including \r\nshoreline/riverbank erosion, flooding and erratic rainfall) in three \r\nMahishkhocha island chars (river-mouth sand islands of Bangladesh) \r\nhave been amplified by inadequate/misguided policy (Saha, 2017).The \r\nsubordination of IKLK in favour of external adaptation strategies has \r\naccelerated livelihood decline in many island contexts (Wilson and \r\nForsyth, 2018)"


id: 9ba077fef0a74e2d01e653c24e29e1e9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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" Although economic and financial development has the \r\npotential to reduce environmental (and livelihood) degradation in SIDS \r\n(Seetanah et al., 2019), it is also clear that uneven development can \r\nsteepen core-periphery disparities, especially in archipelagic contexts, \r\nresulting in deteriorating rural/peripheral livelihoods at the expense of \r\nimproving urban ones (Wilson, 2013; Sofer, 2015) and increased rural-\r\nurban migration (Birk and Rasmussen, 2014; Connell, 2015)."


id: 26384226ba9923b985c71c12a980ffd8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Climate-related migration is considered to be a particular issue for small \r\nislands because changes in extreme events and slow-onset changes \r\naffect increasingly highly exposed and vulnerable low-lying coastal \r\npopulations, therefore causing a threat to small island habitability (KR9 \r\nin Figure 15.5) (Storey and Hunter, 2010; Kumar and Taylor, 2015; Duvat \r\net  al., 2017b; Weir and Pittock, 2017; Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018; \r\nMycoo, 2018a; Rasmussen et al., 2018). A typology of climate-related \r\nmigration is provided in Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7. It is \r\nassumed that climate-related migration will increase in small islands; \r\nhowever, as is the case globally, the causes, form and outcomes are \r\nhighly context specific. Types of climate-related migration occur \r\nacross a continuum of agency from involuntary displacement at one \r\nend to voluntary movement to strategically reduce risks and planned \r\nresettlement at the other end (Section 15.5"


id: 5458df35972cead49650679bc087b887
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content:
"1, also see Chapter 7; Birk \r\nand Rasmussen, 2014; Betzold, 2015; McNamara and Des Combes, \r\n2015; Gharbaoui and Blocher, 2016; Stojanov et al., 2017; Weir, 2020)."


id: b126764d726ef5d6bdb95609129c3d33
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"Some studies from the Pacific suggest that climate-migration linked \r\nto reduced habitability (Section 15.3.4.6) can have particularly severe \r\ncultural implications in a small island context where community solidarity \r\nand cohesion linked to place-based identity are important aspects of \r\nadaptive capacity (Hofmann, 2014; Lazrus, 2015; Warrick et al., 2017). \r\nIn the Federated States of Micronesia, land is owned through the \r\nmatrilineal system and hence puts women at the centre of decision\u0002making. The deterioration and loss of land (through saltwater intrusion, \r\nflooding, drought, erosion) not only can lead to economic deprivation \r\nbut it also compromises cultural identities: 'Where land signifies political, \r\nsocial, and economic well-being, becoming bereft of land cuts off an \r\nimportant thread of people's sense of belonging' (Hofmann, 2017, p. 82) \r\nparticularly for Chuuk women"


id: da47dc7d0d2eed3a0d0ac1d858b483a7
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content:
" Land degradation and loss involves the \r\n'interruption to the matrilineal transmission of land' (Hofmann, 2017; p. \r\n82), the loss of identities, relationships and their customary authority."


id: dcd468b8bbce0679cdb8d4ab4ce50c0f
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content:
"This section builds on cross-chapter work led by Chapter 16 aimed at \r\nidentifying and assessing KRs across sectors and regions (Section 16.5 \r\nand SM16). KRs are the risks of most pressing concern that are caused \r\nor exacerbated by climate change in a given region. A KR is defined as a \r\n'potentially' severe risk, which can either be already severe or projected \r\nto become severe in the future, as a result of (a) changes in associated \r\nclimate-related hazards and/or the exposure and/or vulnerability of \r\nnatural and human systems to these hazards, and/or of (b) the adverse \r\nconsequences of adaptation or mitigation responses to the risk"


id: a3af2d71f1d7e0a34f7388fdb227b30d
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content:
" In line \r\nwith the guidelines used in the WGII AR6, the identification of KRs in \r\nsmall islands is based on the chapter authors' expert judgement, using \r\nscientific literature and five types of criteria: (1) importance of the \r\naffected system or dimension of the system, which is a value judgement \r\nleft to readers to make; (2) magnitude of adverse consequences, based \r\non their pervasiveness, degree and irreversibility, and on the potential for \r\nimpact thresholds and cascading effects across the system; (3) likelihood \r\nof adverse consequences, although this probability is rarely quantifiable \r\nfor small islands due to limited downscaled data at a small island level; \r\n(4) temporal characteristics of the risk, including its period of emergence, \r\npersistence over time and trend; and (5) ability to respond to the risk, \r\nwith the severity of the risk being inversely proportional to this ability."


id: 2bd8801f47168e0fa57efffc244ba90d
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"The unquantifiable and highly localised cultural losses resulting from \r\nclimate drivers are less researched and less acknowledged in policy than \r\nphysical and economic losses (Karlsson and Hovelsrud, 2015; Thomas \r\nand Benjamin, 2018a). In the Bahamas, prolonged displacement \r\nof the entire population of Ragged Island following Hurricane Irma \r\n(2017) highlighted the cultural losses that can result from climate\u0002induced displacement from ancestral homelands. Threats to identity, \r\nsense of place and community cohesion resulted from displacement, \r\nalthough all were important foundational features of the Islanders' \r\nself-initiated rehabilitation efforts and eventual return. Nonetheless, \r\nnon-economic losses were not accounted for by policy addressing \r\ndisplacement (Thomas and Benjamin, 2018a). In the case of Monkey \r\nRiver Village in Belize, coastal erosion is threatening the community's \r\ncemetery"


id: 315b1bd9df92a970de7fe523e160e307
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" Residents place significant spiritual and emotional value on \r\nthe cemetery, which serves important community functions, and, thus, \r\nthreats to it are perceived to be serious and necessary to be taken into \r\naccount in any planned response (Karlsson and Hovelsrud, 2015). A \r\nsimilar situation exists on Carriacou in the West Indies where culturally \r\nand historically significant archaeological sites are being lost due to \r\ncoastal erosion caused by a combination of sand mining and extreme \r\nclimate-ocean events exacerbated by SLR (Fitzpatrick et al., 2006)."


id: e4e3eac21e253f3c59e5808810de4fdd
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content:
"The 1997-1998 ENSO event was severe in the Maldives and as a result the living coral cover dropped to <10% (Bianchi et al., 2003). \r\nRecovery was still in progress in 2004 when the tsunami caused further (although not quantitatively assessed (Gischler and Kikinger, \r\n2006)) damage to the reef ecosystem. Post-1998 recovery ultimately took 15 years, (i.e., longer than following the 1987 ENSO event, \r\nafter which recovery had only taken a few years) and also longer than in the neighbouring undisturbed Chagos atolls, thereby suggesting \r\nthe alteration of the recovery capacity of the reef ecosystem by human-induced reef degradation and climate change (Morri et al., 2015; \r\nPisapia et al., 2017). Mid-2016, a new ENSO event occurred, which reduced living coral cover by 75% (Perry and Morgan, 2017)"


id: 610f290ac905bba003d1a8b601bfeb73
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" Future \r\nrecovery of the reef ecosystem, which is critical to both current livelihoods and economic activities (especially diving-oriented tourism and \r\nfishing) and to long-term island persistence, will mainly depend first on the frequency and magnitude of future bleaching events, which \r\nare expected to increase due to ocean warming, and second on the highly variable effects of anthropogenic disturbances locally (Perry \r\nand Morgan, 2017; Pisapia et al., 2017; Duvat and Magnan, 2019b)."


id: 75fd3acb00e1e23957eaedc02c23efc7
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content:
"Among the 29 Caribbean SIDS, 22 were affected by at least one Category 4 or 5 TC in 2017. These events highlighted how the pre-cyclone \r\nhigh exposure and vulnerability of these islands and their populations has caused a 'cumulative community vulnerability' (Lichtveld, 2018, \r\np. 28) that has amplified the impacts of these TCs, which will in turn increase the long-term vulnerability of affected islands. The exposure \r\nof these islands over their entire surface, combined with the concentration of people, infrastructure, utilities and public services in flood\u0002prone coastal areas, inadequate housing, limited access to healthy food and transportation, and unpreparedness explains widespread-to\u0002total devastation (Shultz et al., 2018; Briones et al., 2019). The destruction of transport systems (Lopez-Candales et al"


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", 2018) and island \r\nsupply chains (Kim and Bui, 2019), which heavily depend on ports, roads, power and communications, made rescue logistically complex, \r\nexplaining the lack of freshwater, food supplies, medications and fuel on some islands for several weeks after the event. This cumulative \r\nvulnerability caused 'cascading public health consequences' (Shultz et al., 2018, p. 9), including delayed (i.e., over the next year) mortality, \r\nphysical injury during the clean-up and recovery phase and increased risk of chronic, vector-borne, contaminated water-related diseases \r\nas well as of mental sequelae (Kishore et al., 2018; Ferre et al., 2019)."


id: 231cfdbf6f8eede57757e2efa81a6d1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Risk accumulation and amplification through cascading effects from \r\necosystems and ecosystem services to human systems will likely \r\ncause reduced habitability of some small islands (high confidence) \r\nidentified as the overarching KR (KR9). Habitability is understood \r\nas the ability of these islands to support human life by providing \r\nprotection from hazards which challenge human survival; by \r\nassuring adequate space, food and freshwater; and by providing \r\neconomic opportunities, which contribute to health and well-being--\r\nrecognising that both supportive ecosystems and sociocultural \r\nconditions (i.e., beliefs and values, institutions and governance \r\narrangements, sense of community and attachment to place) play \r\na critical role in habitability (Duvat et al., 2021a). The reduction of \r\nisland habitability is expected to cause increased migration, along the \r\nafore-mentioned involuntary displacement to planned resettlement \r\nspectrum (Section 15.3.4"


id: 96d1435d3dc414ddd2e78293ec0737c8
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content:
"6), which may eventually lead to population \r\nmovements from exposed areas and depopulation of some islands. \r\nThis risk is the highest for atoll nations, where some islands might \r\nbecome uninhabitable over this century (Section 15.3.4.6; Storlazzi \r\net al., 2018; Duvat et al., 2021a). Despite a lack of literature assessing \r\nthe risk of reduced habitability in non-atoll islands, the latter are \r\nalso expected to experience decreased habitability, especially in their \r\ncoastal areas."


id: 18cdd5661e7389d6191c2fca7a5160c6
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content:
"As highlighted in AR5, detection of climate change impacts on the \r\nfragile environments of small islands is challenging because of \r\nother non-climate drivers that affect small islands. Determination of \r\nattribution to incremental change of climate drivers is also challenging \r\nbecause of the natural climate variability. Therefore, there is limited \r\nscientific literature on observed impacts and attribution. A synthesis of \r\nfindings on the impacts of climate change (Sections 15.3.3 and 15.3.4) \r\nshows that there is more information on impacts on ecosystems \r\ncompared to human systems. There is high confidence in attribution \r\nto climate change of impacts on the coastal and marine as well as \r\nterrestrial ecosystems (Hansen and Cramer, 2015; Shope et al., 2016; \r\nvan Hooidonk et al., 2016; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2017; Hughes et al., \r\n2017b; Mentaschi et al., 2017; Shope et al., 2017; Vitousek et al., 2017; \r\nWadey et al., 2017; Ford et al., 2018; Hughes et al"


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content:
", 2018; IPCC, 2018; \r\nStorlazzi et al., 2018; Bindoff et al., 2019) and medium confidence in \r\nattribution to climate change of impacts on livelihoods, economics and \r\nhealth (Figure 15.6; McIver et al., 2016; Eckstein et al., 2018; Santos\u0002Burgoa et al., 2018; Schutte et al., 2018; WHO, 2018)."


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"In most small island contexts, the costs of adaptation through \r\naccommodation are prohibitive so that it has in most cases not been \r\ncontemplated as a widespread option. However, accommodation \r\nmeasures such as the raising of dwellings and key infrastructure like \r\ncoastal roads above ground level have been implemented to reduce the \r\nimpacts of flooding in some islands (Figure 15.7). In the most populous \r\nislands of the Tuamotu atolls, French Polynesia, where between 48% \r\nand 98% of dwellings have already experienced flooding since the \r\n1980s, elevated houses with floors built 1.5 m above ground level \r\nare subsidised by the government as part of risk prevention plans \r\n(Magnan et  al., 2018). Despite this incentive, the opposition of the \r\nlocal authorities and population to these plans (which also include \r\nconstraining setback guidelines) considerably limited implementation, \r\nhence elevated houses only represent 7% of the total housing stock"


id: d89ea27571d58435fea9fb8fae0cc852
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" \r\nIn the Philippines (Tubigon) and Indonesia (Jakarta area), residents \r\nhave elevated their houses by building stilted houses or raising the \r\nfloor using coral stones to face increased flooding (Jamero et al., 2017; \r\nEsteban et al., 2020). Also, in Puerto Rico houses have been raised to \r\naddress flooding (Lopez-Marrero, 2010)."


id: 2997d8eb9fe585b052e97b7f0ad92fac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"In situ adaptation options are frequently the preference of communities \r\nover resettlement (Jamero et al., 2017) and in many documented cases, \r\nrelocation--both planned and autonomous--is an adaptation option \r\nof last resort due to high economic and sociocultural cost (McNamara \r\nand Des Combes, 2015; Jamero et al., 2017; Crichton et al., 2020). In \r\nsmall islands, there is medium evidence and high agreement that the \r\ndegree of migrant agency and choice in decisions about whether to \r\nmove, where, when and how is an important determinant of success and \r\ntherefore 'adaptiveness' (see Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter \r\n7; McNamara and Des Combes, 2015; Hino et  al., 2017; McMichael \r\net al., 2019; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019a; Bertana, 2020)"


id: c9c803ce9232ead7d1b5cdad5eda38f3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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" Two case \r\nstudies of community relocation in Fiji (Denimanu and Vunidogoloa \r\nvillages) recommend that participatory inclusion of all social groups \r\nin the relocation planning process, including in planning for livelihood \r\nsustainability in new locations, should be ensured in future planned \r\ncommunity relocation to foster positive adaptive outcomes (Piggott\u0002McKellar et al., 2019a)."


id: f9ef28f26ef47cdaed6f3510fbe26e9a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"In some small island settings, land reclamation (i.e., land gain through \r\ninfilling) has been implemented for decades to allow for infrastructure \r\nconstruction and to address land shortages arising from high \r\npopulation growth. For example, land reclamation in Port of Spain, the \r\ncapital city of Trinidad, has long been used as a solution space to meet \r\nland for housing, industrial development and infrastructure provision \r\n(Mycoo, 2018b). Likewise, one third of the land area of Male', the \r\ncapital island of the Maldives, results from land reclamation (Naylor, \r\n2015). Land reclamation is also common in Pacific atoll countries and \r\nterritories, where it occurs both in urban islands facing high population \r\npressure, such as South Tarawa, Kiribati (Biribo and Woodroffe, 2013), \r\nFunafuti Atoll, Tuvalu (Onaka et al., 2017), and Rangiroa Atoll, French \r\nPolynesia (Duvat et  al., 2019b), and in rural islands, for example, \r\nTakapoto and Mataiva atolls, French Polynesia (Duvat et al"


id: 530e36df32f9a14f4a48fb588f0d1f37
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", 2017b). \r\nIn some cases, land reclamation has paved the way for land raising, \r\nwhich is increasingly considered to adapt to SLR in small island \r\ncontexts (Figure 15.7). For example, since the 1990s, the capital area of \r\nthe Maldives has been expanded through the construction of a large \r\nnew island, Hulhumale, which is still under construction and is built \r\n60 cm higher than Male' to take into account SLR (Hinkel et al., 2018; \r\nBrown et al., 2020). More generally, in the Maldives, the 2004 Indian "


id: c394ec4c79ba6f83ec113dfa82c94f30
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"There are few examples of highly 'successful' and therefore adaptive \r\ninternational resettlement or relocation in response to environmental \r\npressures in history. For example, the experiences of Gilbertese \r\nresettled in the Solomon Islands highlight that tensions with host \r\ncommunities over land and resource rights and limited knowledge of \r\nnew environments (such as when communities previously reliant on \r\nmarine resources are resettled in high island locations) can create new \r\nvulnerabilities (Donner, 2015; Weber, 2016a; Tabe, 2019). Even where \r\ngradual international relocation is supported and planned through \r\npolicy as in the case of Kiribati's 'migration with dignity' strategy, strong \r\ncultural connection to land and uncertainty about life in receiving \r\ncommunities in Australia and New Zealand means that many remain \r\nopposed to indefinite or permanent migration (Allgood and McNamara, \r\n2017; Hermann and Kempf, 2017)"


id: ee29443aac68dde5c762f56352c1e3bf
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" The same challenges could apply \r\nwhere domestic migration occurs between significantly different \r\ncultural, social and physical environments. However, planned migration \r\nfor employment or education can reduce exposure in sending locations \r\nand spread risk through expanding economic opportunities and \r\nproviding remittances, thus having inadvertent adaptation outcomes "


id: 2e7af24ad7468977dcb54e151b156119
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"Since the 1990s, artificial reefs have been increasingly used in \r\nsmall islands to support reef restoration and reduce beach erosion, \r\nespecially in the Caribbean region (e.g., Dominican Republic, Antigua, \r\nGrand Cayman, Grenada) and Indian Ocean (Maldives, Mauritius) \r\n(Fabian et  al., 2013; Reguero et  al., 2018). They have been more or \r\nless successful in reducing the destructive impacts of extreme events, \r\ndepending on their technical characteristics and the local context. \r\nFor example, while it resisted the waves generated by hurricanes \r\nGeorges and Mitch in 1998, the artificial reef (Reef Ball breakwater \r\ntype) implemented at Gran Dominicus Resort, Dominican Republic, \r\ndid not prevent significant beach erosion"


id: 1184c19d21300dbe55d0ad2b5d945420
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" By contrast, the coral reef \r\nrestoration project implemented to 'build a beach' on the resort island \r\nof Ihuru, North Male Atoll, Maldives, was successful as it enabled \r\nbeach expansion and prevented the erosive impacts of the 2004 Indian \r\nOcean tsunami on the beach (Fabian et al., 2013)."


id: 8de100f878665d10e1238afbf0139725
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"Small islands have focused increasingly on EbA approaches and other \r\nnature-based solutions that bring benefits both for the ecosystems \r\nand communities (Figure  15.7; Giffin et  al., 2020). There is robust \r\nevidence on implementation of EbA approaches across small islands, \r\nyet medium agreement on the exact benefits of these activities \r\n(Mercer et al., 2012; Doswald et al., 2014; Nalau et al., 2018a) given \r\nthe difficulties in quantifying benefits and the absence of monitoring \r\nand evaluation frameworks (Doswald et al., 2014). Traditionally, EbA \r\nactivities, especially at national and regional scales, have predominantly \r\nfocused on restoring or conserving coastal and marine ecosystems \r\n(e.g., coral reefs, mangrove forests and seagrass meadows), with less \r\nemphasis on the services provided by natural inland forests (Mercer \r\net al., 2012). Incorporation of forests is, however, increasing, in most \r\ncases as components of ridge to reef (Figure 15"


id: 3890283f9dcaa6d90e29cf973b1858
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content:
"4) (or Disaster Risk \r\nReduction) projects (limited to medium evidence), and is geared \r\ntowards integrated watershed management to establish downstream \r\nwater security, erosion control and ultimately to protect the health of \r\ncoral reef ecosystems (Forster et al., 2019)."


id: 61af930590128dcc4e762cbb3a7a13de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"Figure 15.7 |  Adaptation measures implemented to reduce coastal risks in small islands. Panel 1 provides examples of implementation of different types of measures \r\naimed at reducing coastal erosion and flooding. The measures include no response (no intervention, widespread in small islands), hard protection through the construction of \r\nengineering-based structures, accommodation through dwelling and infrastructure raising, planned retreat, advance (i.e., especially island raising) and ecosystem-based measures, \r\nin three small island regions, the Indian and Pacific oceans and Caribbean. It highlights the prevalence of no response, hard protection and the increasing use of ecosystem-based \r\nmeasures. Based on the example of two beach sites in Mauritius (Mon Choisy in the north and Saint-Felix in the south), panel 2 shows that the measures used at a given coastal \r\nsite evolve over time (e.g"


id: ad468a37f56844ad6708b5dc2c639685
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content:
", from no response to hard protection, and then planned retreat and ecosystem-based measures) and that recent DRR (Saint-Felix) and adaptation (Mon \r\nChoisy) projects often combine several types of measures, including retreat and ecosystem-based measures (Duvat et al., 2020a). Together, panels 1 and 2 emphasise the diversity \r\nand increasing complexity of the measures implemented in small islands."


id: eb4c5248f277b9a72670e82e57770288
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vector_id: 34517
content:
"fishers have undertaken adaptation in response to increases in air \r\nand ocean temperature, increases in wind and changes in rainfall. In \r\nAntigua, adaptation strategies amongst coastal fishers have included \r\ninvestments in improved technologies and equipment, changing \r\nfishing grounds, and seeking better training and education (Blair and \r\nMomtaz, 2018). In Efate (Vanuatu) the majority (87%) of the fishermen \r\nused livelihood diversification as an adaptation strategy whereas \r\n53% also searched for new fishing areas as a result of the changing \r\nconditions (Blair and Momtaz, 2018). In southwest Madagascar, due to \r\ndeteriorated reef conditions, coastal fishermen now go further offshore \r\nto catch fish or have adapted their fishing techniques, while others \r\ncloser to the tourism markets have opted for livelihood diversification \r\n(Lemahieu et al., 2018)"


id: 96781c89530d2edf8e93862009379832
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" Coastal fishers in the Dominican Republic have \r\nalso diversified their livelihoods and use local knowledge in changing \r\nfishing practices and locations depending on environmental conditions \r\n(Karlsson and McLean, 2020). In the future, increased inland rainfall \r\ncould, for example, provide new areas for inland aquaculture in the \r\nSolomon Islands as an adaptation strategy and also reduce pressure \r\nfrom coastal fishing (Dey et al., 2016)."


id: 2e92d8088328b31e976325d652350ac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"Community-based adaptation (CBA) is best described as a \r\n'community-led process based on meaningful engagement and \r\nproactive involvement of local individuals and organisations' \r\n(Remling and Veitayaki, 2016; p. 380). Enabling CBA projects to \r\nsucceed relies on gaining a good understanding of the sociopolitical \r\ncontext within which the communities operate, including such key \r\nissues as land tenure arrangements and ownerships, gender and \r\ndecision-making processes that operate on the ground (Nunn, 2013; \r\nBuggy and McNamara, 2016; Crichton and Esteban, 2018; Delevaux \r\net al., 2018; Nalau et al., 2018b; Parsons et al., 2018; McNamara et al., \r\n2020; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020).This also includes the broader and \r\noften more urgent development issues that impact on communities' \r\nwell-being (Piggott-McKellar et  al., 2020)"


id: 58cf46bafd362e29de896cc6f133408c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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" Community-based \r\nprojects demonstrate in the Pacific that communities' vulnerabilities, \r\npriorities and needs might be a better and more effective entry point \r\nfor climate adaptation than framing projects solely around climate \r\nchange (Remling and Veitayaki, 2016; Weir, 2020).This is supported by \r\na recent review of 32 CBA initiatives in the Pacific where initiatives \r\nthat were locally funded and implemented were more successful than \r\nthose with external international funding (McNamara et  al., 2020). \r\nInitiatives that integrated EbA and climate awareness raising also \r\nperformed better (McNamara et al., 2020)."


id: fe25eed99ffe68296a83376ca14c83e2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"In the agricultural sector in Jamaica, adaptation strategies include \r\nvarying expenditure on inputs (e.g., fertilisers, chemicals, labour), \r\ndiversifying cropping patterns, expanding or prioritising other \r\ncash crops (e.g., fruits and vegetables), engaging in small-scale \r\nlivestock husbandry (Guido et al., 2018), and investing in irrigation \r\ntechnologies due to increased drought and infrequent rainfall (Popke \r\net  al., 2016). In many higher-elevation islands within the Pacific, \r\nincluding Vanuatu and Fiji, communities continue to use to varying \r\ndegrees traditional adaptive strategies designed to reduce their \r\nvulnerability to tropical cyclones"


id: 2ead91d76f7e2cfe7d6cf527e0daeda0
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" These include planting a diversity \r\nof different crops within household and communal gardens, locating \r\ngardens in different areas within their customary lands to ensure that \r\nnot all crops are destroyed by an extreme event, and the storage \r\nand preservation of certain foodstuffs (so-called famine foods) \r\n(Campbell, 2014b; McMillen et al., 2014; Le De et al., 2018; Moncada \r\nand Bambrick, 2019)."


id: 7acf0e5bd44cda292a21d6ac008660fc
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"Many small islands, especially those with the highest risks and the \r\nleast resources, remain highly challenged in building and sustaining \r\nintegrated, people-centred, end-to-end early warning systems (EWS) \r\nthat are fully functional across the four interrelated components \r\nof EWS. Warning dissemination and communication, and disaster \r\npreparedness and response capacities are particular components \r\nof EWS requiring strengthening in SIDS (WMO, 2020). More recent \r\nassessments of early warning capabilities in the Caribbean highlight \r\nimprovements in EWS for weather, water and climate over time (WMO \r\net al., 2018; Mahon et al., 2019). However, progress has been uneven \r\nacross hazards, governance levels and spatial and temporal scales, with \r\nmore advanced development of some sub-systems and EWS pillars than \r\nothers"


id: 519a97e4b03b7cdec2dff7ea489779b3
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" Significant progress has been made in the area of detection, \r\nmonitoring, analysis and forecasting of severe weather systems but \r\nthere is a need to strengthen this area for other climate-related hazards \r\nsuch as wildfires, localised intense rainfall, floods, as well as heatwaves \r\nand droughts, which become more important in a changing climate. \r\nAssessments also point to specific deficiencies including significant gaps \r\nin the area of disaster risk knowledge--particularly the development \r\nof risk assessments, the variable capacity for interpreting scientific \r\nwarning products across states, as well as effective communication of \r\nwarning messages to populations at risk (Lumbroso et al., 2016; WMO \r\net al., 2018)."


id: 8a0c6d2bbbfb82baeda5d842e4cb4507
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Evidence from Vanuatu shows that climate risk to tourism destinations \r\nis influenced by multiple, interconnected economic, sociocultural, \r\npolitical and environmental factors suggesting that holistic approaches \r\nare needed to reduce risk and avoid negative knock-on effects (Loehr, \r\n2019). Tourism can strengthen mechanisms that reduce vulnerability \r\nand increase adaptive capacity of the wider destination, such as \r\nproviding adaptation finance, investing in education and capacity \r\nbuilding, and working with nature (Loehr, 2019). Examples include \r\nnumerous EBA initiatives in the Caribbean including marine-protected \r\nareas in St. Lucia and Jamaica (Mycoo, 2018a). In Vanuatu, tourism \r\nbusinesses are engaged in establishing marine-protected areas to \r\naddress multiple risks from climate change, population growth and \r\ndevelopment (Loehr et al., 2020)"


id: ec6c55c44ad85c8223716489c51b3463
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content:
" In the Seychelles, coral restoration \r\nprogrammes and mangrove reforestation are promoted through \r\npublic-private partnerships, generating new opportunities for wetland\u0002tourism livelihoods (Khan and Amelie, 2015)."


id: 834fa379ff05600af4257e1079983243
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"The willingness of tourism businesses to finance adaptation measures \r\nvaries. Islands have developed building codes which consider impacts \r\nfrom SLR but these are often not enforced (Hess and Kelman, 2017). \r\nIn cases where tourist resorts have been part of climate adaptation \r\nprojects, such as funding for hard coastal protection infrastructure, \r\nthe resort owners find that these diminish the aesthetics of the beach \r\ndestination (Crichton and Esteban, 2018). Adaptation taxes and levies \r\nimposed on tourism can provide funding (Mycoo, 2018a) as The \r\nEnvironmental Protection and Tourism Improvement Fund Act, 2017 of \r\nBritish Virgin Islands shows (Smith, 2017). A lack of interaction between \r\ntourism and climate change decision makers is a commonly identified \r\nissue (Becken, 2019; Mahadew and Appadoo, 2019; Scott et al., 2019)"


id: 7f1a97f9ff158b25d03d8e4faa4c0fd9
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" \r\nA number of adaptation measures are recommended in the literature \r\nsuch as increasing climate change research, education and institutional \r\ncapacities; product and market diversification away from coastal \r\ntourism to include terrestrial-based experiences and heritage tourism; \r\nand mainstreaming adaptation in tourism policies and vice versa (e.g., \r\nto include appropriate planning guidelines for tourism development, \r\ncoastal setbacks and environmental impact assessments (Mycoo, \r\n2018a; Becken et al., 2020) Thomas et al., 2020; van der Veeken et al., \r\n2016)."


id: 3538b66bc4ad612c6b6a205b15deb94b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"There is increasing recognition and commitment at global \r\n(Section  3.6.3.2.4; WMO, 2014; UN, 2015c; UN, 2015b; UN, 2015a), \r\nregional (CCCCC, 2012; CDEMA, 2014; SPC, 2016; SPREP, 2017; CIMH \r\net al., 2019) and national levels (SPREP, 2016a; WMO, 2016a) of the \r\nimportance of climate services in supporting adaptation decision\u0002making in small islands (medium evidence, high agreement). A number \r\nof SIDS-focused climate service programmes have emerged, especially \r\nin the Caribbean and Pacific (Group, 2015; Martin et al., 2015; SPREP, \r\n2016b; WMO, 2016b; WMO, 2018a; WMO, 2018b) and at least one \r\nSIDS--Dominica--has been prioritised as a pilot implementation \r\ncountry under the Global Framework for Climate Services (WMO, \r\n2016a). As is the case globally, climate services focused on decision\u0002making at seasonal (3-6  month) timescales has thus far been the \r\nfocus of investment in small islands"


id: 99750e4f11b1504e33baf8f791f61084
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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vector_id: 21666
content:
" Less attention has been given \r\nto investments in and assessments of climate services for decision\u0002making at longer timescales (Vaughan et al., 2018)."


id: 3ef562b17892a3ef1fa6ec58b9fc6a34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Adaptation governance is also complicated further by the multitude \r\nof stakeholders involved, with differing agendas and priorities. In \r\nthe Bahamas, private properties have significant say in how and \r\nwhat adaptation measures they decide to pursue and are not well \r\nregulated, with the tourism sector in particular dominated mainly by \r\nexternal investors (Petzold et  al., 2018). Social organisations, such \r\nas the churches, which have significant influence in many Oceanic \r\ncountries, are engaging in climate change discussions and governance. \r\nMany churches report, however, being constrained to act on climate \r\nadaptation due to lack of financial resources, low levels of professional \r\nknowledge on adaptation, and their members not perceiving climate \r\nchange as an urgent risk (Rubow and Bird, 2016)"


id: 463709a80bbe683795af776a40a6e803
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" Actors such as \r\nmilitary services in the Indian and Pacific oceans also control a high \r\nnumber of assets in vulnerable locations and will need to integrate \r\nclimate information into adaptive planning in the future (Finucane and \r\nKeener, 2015)."


id: b4764f7c11a5611c6a0e0b8777e3b145
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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"Specific governance-related barriers for effective adaptation include: \r\nlack of coordination between government departments and sectors \r\nand limited policy integration (Scobie, 2016; Robinson, 2018b), lack of \r\nownership of adaptation implementation in cases where communities \r\nor national governments have not been part of the adaptation decision \r\nprocess (Conway and Mustelin, 2014; Kuruppu and Willie, 2015; \r\nPrance, 2015; Nunn and Kumar, 2018; Parsons and Nalau, 2019), and \r\ndifficulties in integrating IKLK in adaptation initiatives. Specific barriers \r\nto effective sustained adaptation in the Pacific include variable climate \r\nchange awareness among decision makers, and the preference for \r\nshort-term responses rather than longer-term transformative ones \r\n(Nunn et al., 2014)"


id: 519c0e857affa2a3f259247a9428405d
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" These barriers also stem from donors' preferencing \r\ntheir own priorities that do not necessarily fit the country priorities or \r\ncontext (Conway and Mustelin, 2014; Kuruppu and Willie, 2015; Prance, \r\n2015), which has led to increasing calls for effective community/cultural \r\nengagement in adaptation, especially through CBA and EbA (Nalau \r\net al., 2018b). In cases where recovery efforts are framed as purely a \r\nmatter of infrastructure other important aspects, such as livelihoods \r\nand gender, are more easily overlooked in adaptation (Turner et  al., \r\n2020)."


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"Limited regional cooperation across sub-national island jurisdictions \r\n(jurisdictions with semi-autonomous status) along with limited \r\nregional-scale climate information are also stymying action \r\n(Petzold and Magnan, 2019). This is a concern given the need \r\nfor pooled governance in response to capacity constraints across \r\nsmall jurisdictions (Dornan, 2014; Kelman, 2018). There is also an \r\ninsufficient understanding of the role of regional and international \r\nactors such as the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre and \r\nthe Global Environment Facility, respectively (Middelbeek et al., 2014). \r\nSometimes external pressure and, for example, transregional trade \r\nagreements are 'useful for reducing unsustainable local sociopolitical \r\narrangements' as seen in the Solomon Islands regarding fisheries \r\nmanagement within the concept of blue economy (Keen et al., 2018, p. \r\n338)"


id: 242890c799ac4e35078a69cc68e59b86
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" Similarly, in Samoa, the World Bank's Pilot Program for Climate \r\nResilience (PPCR) and the Adaptation Fund's Enhancing Resilience of \r\nSamoa's Coastal Communities to Climate Change illustrate successful \r\nexamples of multilevel governance due to their programmatic and \r\npragmatic approaches versus project-based approaches (McGinn \r\nand Solofa, 2020). Enabling factors in these programmes relate to \r\nstrategic placements of funds and responsibilities in the relevant \r\nministries, alignment with national priorities and pre-existing \r\nplans, pooling funding to fill existing finance gaps, and increased \r\nawareness across scales and departments of synergies and gaps \r\nbetween different initiatives (McGinn and Solofa, 2020). Initiatives \r\nsuch as the Pacific Adaptive Capacity Framework (Warrick et  al"


id: 9acb7951e196ed3dfc7a0574f31d7387
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
", \r\n2017) and regional strategies such as the Framework for the Disaster \r\nand Climate Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP) enable the \r\nlocalising of climate adaptation into cultural contexts in an integrated \r\nmanner (SPC, 2016)."


id: 5a0941db3842796af5c1880845e254b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11679
content:
"In the Caribbean small islands such as Jamaica and St. Lucia, and also \r\nin the Pacific, barriers to mainstreaming adaptation include competing \r\ndevelopment priorities, the absence of planning frameworks or \r\n'undetected' overlaps in existing frameworks, serious governance flaws \r\nlinked to the prevalence of corruption and corrupt people in political \r\nand public life, and insufficient manpower and human resources, linked \r\nto countries' financial capacity (Robinson, 2018b). In addition, the lack \r\nof strong governance mechanisms for urban planning has contributed \r\nto urban sprawl and expansion that has increased the number of \r\ninformal settlements, which together with population growth are \r\ndriving Caribbean small islands to their limits (Enriquez-de-Salamanca, \r\n2018; Mycoo, 2018a; 2018b)"


id: e487c313a594cddb38419f2dc89c45be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" In the Pacific, only a few countries have \r\nembedded climate change adaptation in existing legislation despite \r\nthe overall regional agreement to A New Song for Coastal Fisheries--\r\nPathways to Change: The Noumea Strategy to improve coastal fisheries \r\nmanagement in a changing climate (Gourlie et al., 2018). Many climate \r\nchange-specific initiatives across small islands have a unidirectional \r\nfocus on climate risks and shift limited resources away from other \r\nimportant development objectives (Baldacchino, 2018). Local-level \r\nplans are often overlooked: For example, in Mauritius, local-level \r\nclimate adaptation plans are currently nearly non-existent while district \r\ncouncils have rarely been successful in even accessing international \r\nadaptation finance (Williams et al., 2020)"


id: 5ce008ef7a1c2978bdf2caac8cba4fd9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
" In Samoa, several national\u0002level programs on adaptation have had difficulties in engaging with \r\nthe local level even if the decision-making powers on actual land \r\nmanagement sit within the communities (McGinn and Solofa, 2020)."


id: 804a25fb554f44b06fc676a55622b31a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
"Countries including the Seychelles and Maldives have developed \r\nnational climate change plans that recognise linkages to food \r\nsecurity, health and DRR, although these face significant resourcing \r\nissues when it comes to implementation (Techera, 2018). National\u0002level plans, such as National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs), \r\nincreasingly could include local government engagement and have \r\na stronger focus on urban centres and adaptation (Mycoo, 2018a). \r\nBuilding codes act as supportive enablers for adaptation governance: \r\nRequiring more hurricane-resistant housing in the Caribbean, including \r\nincentives for informal settlements to build in a more resilient \r\nmanner, can achieve multiple development and adaptation outcomes \r\n(Mycoo, 2018a). In Dominica, a Climate Resilience Executing Agency \r\nof Dominica (CREAD) established in 2019, aims to enable stronger \r\nclimate resilience by bringing all sectors and services together for more \r\neffective coordination (Turner et  al"


id: 20678eb00ba145f0f10d12fe07e27d53
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
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content:
", 2020). Improvements in cross\u0002sectoral and cross-agency coordination are creating opportunities for \r\nimproved disaster preparedness and resilience measures in Vanuatu \r\n(Webb et al., 2015). A range of mechanisms also exist in the tourism \r\nindustry: Adaptation taxes and improved building regulations could \r\nreduce risk drastically, for example, in the Caribbean region (Mycoo, \r\n2018a)."


id: 1a0834ab1ce93102eb59314669346aa3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1562
content:
"In small island states, water, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure are \r\nparticularly vulnerable to climate change, with impacts on the burden of \r\ndiarrhoeal diseases. The resilience of types of sanitation infrastructure \r\nin urban and rural households in the Solomon Islands differs under \r\nscenarios of increased rainfall and flooding versus decreased rainfall \r\nand drought, reinforcing the centrality of taking the local context into \r\naccount during adaptation decision-making (Fleming et  al., 2019). \r\nHealthcare facilities, including hospitals, clinics and community care \r\ncentres, are vulnerable to extreme weather and climate events, such \r\nas flooding and TCs, and to climate-related outbreaks of infectious \r\ndiseases that overwhelm their capacity to provide critical services \r\n(WHO, 2020). These facilities may lack functioning infrastructure \r\nand trained health workforce, and be predisposed to inadequate \r\nenergy supplies and water, sanitation and waste management \r\nservices"


id: 3e7cedbead7f62554854cdedf81d3ea5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7208
content:
"The term 'health systems' refers to the organisation of people, \r\ninstitutions and resources that work to protect and promote \r\npopulation health. The two components of health systems are \r\npublic health and healthcare; adaptation is needed in both to \r\ndevelop climate-resilient health systems (WHO, 2015). Adaptation \r\nmeasures focus on each of the building blocks of health systems, \r\nincluding leadership and governance; a knowledgeable health \r\nworkforce; health information systems; essential medical products \r\nand technologies; health service delivery; and financing. Many small \r\nisland states have policies to manage climate-sensitive health risks, \r\nalthough ministries of health are largely unprepared to adapt to a \r\nchanging climate because few programmes take climate change \r\ninto account (McIver et  al., 2016)"


id: de6d5ec75dd42e78eedb1c9a05eabcc4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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vector_id: 32494
content:
" Particularly vulnerable groups, \r\nsuch as Indigenous Peoples, are often inadequately represented in \r\nadaptation planning processes and implementation, resulting in less \r\neffective interventions (Jones, 2019)."


id: 3f14ff1783918e972bbceb55261c8ff5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
content_type: text
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vector_id: 7314
content:
"A range of climate-sensitive diseases pose threats to island \r\ncommunities. A vulnerability and adaptation assessment conducted \r\nin Dominica identified vector-, water- and food-borne diseases and \r\nfood security as priority threats from climate change (Schnitter et al., \r\n2019). Short-term adaptation options include strengthening solid \r\nwaste management and enforcing current legislation; increasing public \r\nawareness; training health sector staff; improving the reliability and \r\nsafety of water-storage practices; improving climate change and health \r\ndata collection methods and enhancing environmental monitoring; \r\nenhancing the integration of climate services into health decision\u0002making; strengthening the organisational structure of emergency \r\nresponse; and ensuring sufficient resources and surge capacity"


id: 1afe05b7feedbf895d174c0e11674589
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
"(Weir and Pittock, 2017; Magnan and Duvat, 2018). There are growing \r\nconcerns among policy- and decision-makers in small islands about the \r\ncurrent levels and forms of adaptation finance, and about countries' \r\nexperience with accessing it (Robinson and Dornan, 2017). In the \r\nCaribbean, 38% of flows were concessional loans and 62% were \r\ngrants (Atteridge et al., 2017); the situation in the Atlantic and Indian \r\noceans is starkly different--nearly 75% of the flows were in the form \r\nof concessional loans and grants accounted for the remaining 25% \r\n(Canales et al., 2017). This raises questions about fairness and justice \r\nfor small islands having to finance adaptation to climate impacts \r\nto which they have made a negligible contribution"


id: 9c6577a74db1fff88e9494a373a16a79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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vector_id: 22161
content:
" In the Pacific, \r\n86% of aid was delivered as project-based support (Atteridge and \r\nCanales, 2017), which can undermine the long-term sustainability of \r\nadaptation interventions (Conway and Mustelin, 2014; Remling and \r\nVeitayaki, 2016; Atteridge and Canales, 2017). Direct budget support \r\nwas rare (Atteridge and Canales, 2017), signalling the importance of \r\nworks such as Rambarran (2018) that support cross-regional lesson\u0002learning by, for example, showcasing the experience of Seychelles \r\nwith successfully devising innovative financing mechanisms for \r\nsupporting adaptation and conservation goals, and reducing its public \r\ndebt"


id: 91bfb0e0e91c11f3e1c586239bb24cd9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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vector_id: 20469
content:
" Regional catastrophe risk insurance schemes, however, such as \r\nPacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Company under the World Bank's \r\nPacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) \r\nProgram are trying to enable a regional effort in increasing accessibility \r\nto insurance (PCRAFI, 2017) as does the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk \r\nInsurance Facility, although these funds are still rather small compared \r\nto the needs across the countries (Handmer and Nalau, 2019)."


id: cffdf17dd73e7d91b68df50a84c1cc9e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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vector_id: 30251
content:
"In Vanuatu, discussions are ongoing on increasing insurance availability \r\nfor TCs and droughts, but standardisation of housing designs to get \r\ninsurance can become difficult where the costs make it prohibitive and \r\nrun counter to traditional building designs and materials (Baarsch and \r\nKelman, 2016). Empirical evidence from Belize, Grenada, Jamaica and \r\nSt. Lucia indicates that there are also other factors why people do not \r\ntake insurance, including 'the cost of premiums (44%), lack of trust \r\nin insurance companies (27%), having never considered insurance \r\n(26%), a lack of need for insurance (25%) and a lack of knowledge \r\nof insurance (22%)' (Lashley and Warner, 2013, p. 108)"


id: 97ec3b4b666fd588f28b04669ae1d627
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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vector_id: 21419
content:
" Increasing \r\ntrust could be addressed by seeking out domestic banks or credit \r\nunions with whom people are already engaging with, while also using \r\nsocial marketing campaigns to raise awareness of weather-related \r\ninsurance to address knowledge gaps and lack of awareness of these \r\ntools (Lashley and Warner, 2013). In Dominica, many coastal fishers \r\nare suspicious of insurance schemes given past experiences of not \r\nbeing paid out on time or having to disclose catch data (Turner et al., \r\n2020). Yet, insurance is not capable of addressing all kinds of losses \r\nand damages accruing from climate impacts and should be used as an \r\nadaptation strategy in combination with other strategies (Lashley and \r\nWarner, 2013)."


id: f7a4996622dc3180605355f34456fb83
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36475
content:
"Microfinance is increasingly viewed as a positive mechanism to improve \r\naccess to climate adaptation funding (Di Falco and Sharma, 2018). In \r\nthe Caribbean, a significant barrier in accessing climate finance relates \r\nto bureaucratic structures, which means that money intended for \r\ncommunities does not reach them (Mycoo, 2018a). Many adaptation \r\nprojects even at the community level have upfront costs that need \r\nto be supported, especially in communities where there is little hard \r\ncash in use (Remling and Veitayaki, 2016). Despite such challenges, \r\ncommunities in the Pacific region have used 'cashless adaptation' for \r\na long time, which involves trading of services and items as a form of \r\nindigenous microfinance (Nunn and Kumar, 2019b). Social networks \r\nalso function as a source of informal microfinance where extended \r\nfamily members send back remittances from overseas to their families \r\nand communities especially after disasters"


id: 3e55a57a37b617d85a656431990ea592
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
" In Samoa, indigenous \r\ntourism operators receive remittances from overseas family members \r\n(Crichton and Esteban, 2018; Parsons et  al., 2018), with similar \r\nprocesses observed among atoll communities in the Solomon Islands \r\n(Birk and Rasmussen, 2014), Vanuatu (Handmer and Nalau, 2019) and \r\nJamaica (Carby, 2017). However, the role of migration and remittances \r\nis still poorly understood; it is difficult to quantify the informal flows \r\nand understand the extent to which they support effective adaptation \r\n(limited evidence, high agreement) (Campbell, 2014a; Parsons et al., \r\n2018; Handmer and Nalau, 2019)."


id: ded17c130f238c899153b0550d68a8f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32553
content:
"Insurance cover is a critical question in small islands. For example, in \r\nVanuatu, some companies do not 'cover storm damage from the sea or \r\nhigh tides...which is not helpful for properties damaged by a tropical \r\ncyclone's storm surge' (Baarsch and Kelman, 2016, p. 6). There is also \r\nlimited access to insurance schemes due to lower demand in small \r\nmarkets (Petzold and Magnan, 2019) especially when many people \r\ndo not have high cash-based incomes and likely cannot pay insurance \r\npremiums (Baarsch and Kelman, 2016). In St. Lucia and Grenada \r\n(via the Caribbean Oceans and Aquaculture Sustainability Facility), \r\ndiscussions are ongoing with regard to national-level parametric \r\ninsurance, underpinned by financing from the US State Department, \r\nto help fishing communities recover more quickly following the \r\npassage of TCs in the future (Sainsbury et al., 2019; Turner et al., 2020). \r\nLikewise, Reguero et al"


id: 2875c04fea8039e4f69f3d0c96b779d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
" (2020) have suggested a resilience insurance \r\nmechanism that could in theory reduce climate-related losses and \r\ndamages through investments in nature-based adaptation projects \r\n(e.g., coral reef restoration and potentially mangrove restoration)."


id: 608c81f6cb1cbe42c1499e45fb288aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12762
content:
"Workshops and training are seen as crucial at the local scale to build \r\ncommunities' capacity to take action and to integrate climate change \r\nconsiderations to the broader development processes (Remling and \r\nVeitayaki, 2016), although purely workshop-based short-term capacity \r\nbuilding in adaptation has been questioned (Conway and Mustelin, \r\n2014; Lubell and Niles, 2019). More interactive community engagement \r\nstrategies could include 'participatory three-dimensional modelling \r\n(P3DM), participatory video, development of photo journals, and civil \r\nsociety plans' (Beckford, 2018, p. 46) that enables broader engagement. \r\nIn Fiji, Laje Rotuma youth ecocamps have been used to engage younger \r\nFijians to understand adaptation and increasing environmental \r\nstewardship with good outcomes (McNaught et  al., 2014). In Palau, \r\nCamp Ebiil provides a culturally based platform for younger generations \r\nto learn about nature and culture in an interactive camp (Singeo, 2011)"


id: aaf9f62a31988921b9785076536b5700
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
" \r\nVanuatu's Volunteer Rainfall Observer Network, in turn, engages \r\nvolunteers to record their rainfall observations, demonstrating the use \r\nof IKLK that can be integrated with contemporary weather forecasting \r\n(Chand et al., 2014). Likewise, initiatives such as ePOP Petites Ondes \r\nParticipatives aim to develop a citizen network to share environmental \r\ninformation (e.g., via mini-videos on smartphones). Across the Pacific, \r\nprojects such as the European Union Pacific Technical Vocational \r\nEducation and Training on Sustainable Energy and Climate Change \r\nAdaptation Project (EU PacTVET) have sought to increase the capacity \r\nof Pacific islanders in disaster risk management and climate adaptation \r\n(Hemstock et al., 2018)."


id: 4cd673bb6367fee3b7efdb8f7c6ef92a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Culture can be defined as 'material and non-material symbols that \r\nexpress collective meaning' (Adger et al., 2014, p. 762) and includes \r\nworldviews and values, how individuals and communities relate to \r\ntheir environment, and what they perceive to be at risk and in need \r\nof adaptation (McNaught et al., 2014; Nunn et al., 2014; Remling and \r\nVeitayaki, 2016; Nunn et  al., 2017b; Granderson, 2017; Neef et  al., \r\n2018; Oakes, 2019). In small islands, culture plays an important role \r\nin individual and community decision-making on adaptation both as \r\nan enabling factor and as a barrier (robust evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Nunn et al., 2017b; Parsons et al., 2017; Neef et al., 2018; Piggott\u0002McKellar et al., 2020). The concept of Vai Nui as the interconnectedness \r\nof Pacific Islanders continues to support the collective agency to \r\nplan and undertake adaptation efforts in the region (Hayward et al., \r\n2019)"


id: 991c788adaea593d86e978b5e9b984d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" In Samoa, the principles of Fa'asamoa (the Samoan way of life) \r\nimpacts on how decisions are made, including the role of the aiga\r\n(extended family) that is a web of local, national and transnational \r\nkinship networks (Parsons et  al., 2018). Traditional village council \r\nstructures and land stewardship enable an expanded range of coastal \r\nadaptation options in Samoa, including potential relocation, but at the \r\nsame time may limit participation of all social groups in adaptation \r\ndecision-making (Crichton et al., 2020). In Dominica, in the aftermath \r\nof Hurricane Maria (2017), social capital in the form of transboundary \r\nnearby island networks enabled some communities to recover faster \r\nfrom the disaster including access to more livelihood opportunities and \r\nassets (Turner et al., 2020)."


id: 9aaf69d28525c22857b1f1668a1ebfe7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21867
content:
"In Fiji, a study on adaptive behaviour and intention to invest in more \r\nadaptive portfolios found that the intent for adaptive behaviour \r\nincreased with the supply of climate information (Di Falco and Sharma, \r\n2018). In the Pacific, high-performing CBA initiatives included climate \r\nawareness raising that equipped people with knowledge to understand \r\noccurring environmental changes and what to do (McNamara et al., \r\n2020). Lack of information can increase community vulnerability. \r\nRemote indigenous farming communities in St. Vincent, in the \r\nCaribbean, for example, have already observed decreased rainfall \r\nand increases in temperatures, but they have been largely excluded \r\nfrom agricultural training that includes information in how to improve \r\nagricultural strategies in times of climatic shocks and how to prepare \r\nfor changing climatic conditions (Smith and Rhiney, 2016)"


id: 67d98e1061de49b94e70cd69ee961ba8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13927
content:
" In the \r\nBahamas, cultural background, income and education levels impact \r\nthe extent to which people are aware of climate risks (Petzold et al., \r\n2018). In Dominica, access to information critical to fisheries is noted \r\nas a significant challenge, including data collection, its management \r\nand human resources in building capacity to process and use this \r\ninformation for evidence-based decision-making (Turner et al., 2020)."


id: 1be610736fbe4256a3c2cd76ac215041
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Yet, culture is often overlooked in adaptation policies and plans. For \r\nexample, in the National Communications of 16 SIDS, only one country \r\n(Cook Islands) reported adaptation actions that addressed social issues, \r\nculture and heritage (Robinson, 2018b). Externally driven adaptation \r\nefforts in rural small island communities that exclude community \r\npriorities, ignore or undervalue IKLK, and are based on secular \r\nWestern/global worldviews (Donner and Webber, 2014; Prance, 2015; \r\nMcNamara et al., 2016; Nunn et al., 2017b; Schwebel, 2017; Mallin, \r\n2018; Nunn and McNamara, 2019; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019b) are \r\noften less successful (high agreement, medium evidence). The World \r\nBank Kiribati Adaptation Program (KAP), for example, builds mainly \r\non Western knowledge and science despite consultations with the \r\nKiribati communities (Prance, 2015)"


id: 6b1e05072e7706ba3db123946808470d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
" Yet, in many contexts, most land \r\nand knowledge are embedded in traditional governance and culture \r\nwhile adaptation plans and decisions are made elsewhere on how that \r\nland should be used and what knowledge is used (high agreement) \r\n(Nunn, 2013; Prance, 2015; Charan et al., 2017; Nalau et al., 2018a; \r\nParsons et al., 2018; McGinn and Solofa, 2020)."


id: def656f09538afcf09acd4ec53bdc586
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32573
content:
"Despite widespread international evidence that the impacts of \r\nclimate change and disaster events often negatively affect women \r\n(and gender minorities) more than men (McSherry et al., 2014; Aipira \r\net al., 2017; Gaillard et al., 2017), attention to gender equality as a \r\nconcept is still only 'embryonic in climate change adaptation in the \r\nPacific', and although recognised in some policies and project designs, \r\nit is not well supported by on-the-ground actions or well monitored \r\n(Aipira et al., 2017, p. 237). Many Pacific small island climate change \r\nadaptation policies do not mainstream gender across the activities \r\n(Aipira et  al., 2017), with women's groups being excluded from \r\nclimate grants due to patriarchal formal and informal governance \r\nstructures, lack of resources, less access to educational and training \r\nschemes and no track record (or receiving grants or meeting grant \r\nmilestones) (McLeod et  al., 2018)"


id: 26ca7f4038728e8fb11e15b81792c8ac
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content:
" However, Pacific women identify \r\nseveral strategies that enable them to adapt to climate change more \r\neffectively. These include the recognition and support of women's IKLK \r\nby governments, researchers and NGOs; increasing women's access \r\nto climate change funding and support from organisations to allow \r\nthem to meet the requirements of international climate change grants; \r\nand specific education and training to women's groups to allow them \r\nto develop strategic action plans, mission statements, learn financial \r\nreporting requirements as well as general leadership and institutional \r\ntraining (McLeod et al., 2018). These and other measures could enable \r\na broader representation and participation in adaptation processes \r\ndespite cultural constraints (Table 15.7 on Enabling Conditions)."


id: c58af901fb22de7cff30b0d4939bc2f5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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"The cultural context and sources of knowledge are myriad and diverse \r\nin small islands. Community members often use both IKLK as well as \r\nWestern scientific-based weather forecasts to take actions to prepare \r\nfor extreme weather events (Chand et al., 2014; Johnston, 2015; Janif \r\net  al., 2016; Granderson, 2017; Kelman et  al., 2017), with specific \r\nexamples from Niue, Tonga, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands (high \r\nagreement, high evidence) (Chand et al., 2014; Chambers et al., 2017; \r\nChambers et al., 2019). In Samoa, people keep particular areas reserved \r\nfor disaster times such as TC seasons (Kuruppu and Willie, 2015), while \r\nin Vanuatu, IKLK indicators for TCs include mango trees flowering early \r\nand turtles going further inland to lay their eggs (Chand et al., 2014). \r\nIKLK are, however, not evenly distributed within communities due to \r\nIKLK being traditional intellectual property of particular roles in the \r\nvillages (e.g"


id: bd5fcb13f479687493a6a189ddcf0dc4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
", weathermen in Vanuatu), and not available to other \r\ncommunity members or external actors directly (Chand et al., 2014; \r\nPrance, 2015). In Tongoa Island, Vanuatu, communities are finding, \r\nhowever, that their IKLK-based seasonal calendars are out of sync \r\ngiven the changes in climatic conditions (Granderson, 2017), while \r\nerosion of IKLK remains a concern across most small island nations \r\n(Kuruppu and Willie, 2015; Granderson, 2017; Beckford, 2018)."


id: fa9ac4f794aea4de37632c77a2934769
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
"Not all IKLK and other knowledge are necessarily helpful and IKLK can \r\nlead to maladaptation (Mercer et  al., 2012; Beckford, 2018). Elders \r\nfrom the Chuuk State (Federated States of Micronesia; Elders from \r\nAtafu Atoll, 2012), for instance, assign blame for changeable weather \r\npatterns, destructive typhoons and loss of biodiversity to people's failure \r\nto maintain and employ their IKLK. Fatalism (belief that disasters are \r\nGod's will) is still reported as a major cultural barrier to adaptation. In \r\nMaldives, fatalism decreases direct adaptation action and influences \r\nperceptions of climate risks (Shakeela and Becken, 2015) while \r\nindigenous communities in St. Vincent do not prepare for hurricanes or \r\nclimatic shocks for the same reason (Smith and Rhiney, 2016). In Oceania, \r\nChristianity and the church play an important role in how issues, such as \r\nclimate change, are communicated and thought about (Rubow and Bird, \r\n2016; Nunn et al"


id: f3cfbca074bcbe924689936888bf7ea5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
", 2017b), including the Noah and flood story used as a \r\njustification that there is no need to worry about SLR (Rubow and Bird, \r\n2016). New emerging forms of eco-theology (theology that connects \r\nhumans with land, sea and sky), however, situate climate change as part \r\nof environmental stewardship (Rubow and Bird, 2016) making churches \r\nactive partners in caring for the environment."


id: 36c77cf6a3d65152cd9c3496e2ad3160
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
"In the context of small islands, climate justice research is expanding \r\nbeyond initial debates about nation-states responsibilities for the \r\ncauses and responses to climate change, to demonstrate complex and \r\ndynamic intergenerational and multiscalar dilemmas of climate justice \r\n(Ferdinand, 2018; Sheller, 2018; Baptiste and Devonish, 2019; Look \r\net al., 2019; Douglass and Cooper, 2020; Kotsinas, 2020; Sheller, 2020). \r\nIn Caribbean SIDS, research highlights how intersecting external and \r\ninternal socioeconomic and political processes are leading marginalised \r\npopulations to become increasingly socially and economically \r\ndisadvantaged and politically marginalised, which in turn heightens \r\nclimate vulnerability and impedes sustainable development efforts \r\n(Baptiste and Devonish, 2019) (Moulton and Machado, 2019; Gahman \r\nand Thongs, 2020; Rhiney, 2020; Duvat et al., 2021b)"


id: c9d7f616568a42c38252866571efca1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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vector_id: 29311
content:
" Inequity extends \r\nto how development and disaster aid was coordinated and distributed \r\nwithin various nations after hurricanes Irma, Maria and Harvey in 2017."


id: 6ad64accadd67d3e0f594b67ae2f2bf7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
"Observed changes--including increases in air and ocean temperatures, increases in storm surges, heavy rainfall \r\nevents, and possibly more intense tropical cyclones--are already reducing the number and quality of ecosystem \r\nservices, thereby causing the disruption of human livelihoods, damage to buildings and infrastructure, and loss \r\nof economic activities and cultural heritage on small islands. Widespread observed impacts include severe coral \r\nreef bleaching events, such as that associated with the 2015-2016 El Nino season, the most damaging on record \r\nworldwide. Additionally, the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season was unusually characterised by sequential severe TCs \r\nthat resulted in widespread cyclone-induced damage to ecosystems from the very interior of small islands to those \r\nof the ocean waters that surround them as well as damage to human settlements and economic activities within \r\nthe whole Caribbean region"


id: 59ae6867905ad3d1bcb91ec13afcc94b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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vector_id: 11609
content:
" Although knowledge is limited regarding long-term increases in TC intensity, studies \r\nhave shown that heavy rainfall and intense wind speed of individual TCs were increased by climate change. The \r\ncombination of various climate events, such as TCs, extreme ocean waves, and El Nino or La Nina phases, with SLR \r\ncauses increased coastal flooding, especially on low-lying atoll islands of the Indian and Pacific oceans."


id: cc868324b66c4b6df73c3167313f79dd
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"terrestrial food supplies, biodiversity and ecosystems, and economic activities. It is unlikely that these locations \r\nwould remain habitable unless such impacts are mitigated through reduction of heat-trapping greenhouse gas \r\nemissions or adaptation solutions that are acceptable for the populations of these islands. Acceptable adaptation \r\noptions may be limited in these locations. Additionally, drought intensity may challenge freshwater security in some \r\nregions such as the Caribbean. Likewise, remote atoll islands where inhabitants rely on reef-derived food and other \r\nresources and that are at high risk of widespread coral reef degradation may become uninhabitable. Strategies to \r\nreduce risk may include substituting the consumption of vulnerable inshore reef resources by developing onshore \r\naquaculture (fish farming), or promoting access to tuna and other pelagic fish, and/or importing food to meet \r\nnutritional needs"


id: 9ec72a0c7f3c902950e4dd152157136c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
"Where relocation is successful, it is most commonly driven and funded by governments and non-government \r\norganisations, often within a specially designed policy framework. The Government of Fiji, for example, has \r\nintroduced a relocation framework that specifically develops guidance on relocation processes, with several villages \r\nalready having relocated. Evaluations to date recommend thorough cost--benefit analyses of relocation be \r\nundertaken before this strategy is pursued. Relocation is often viewed as a 'last resort' adaptation option because \r\nof high cost and because some sociocultural aspects of life cannot be maintained in locations separated from \r\ncustomary land. The Bahamas relocated a community on Family Island from the shoreline to an inland location and \r\nthe community of Boca de Cachon in the Dominican Republic was relocated to higher ground"


id: d28692d6f46b05caee10773bb9473b15
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vector_id: 30647
content:
" The Navunievu \r\ncommunity (Bua, Fiji) has mandated that every young adult building their family home in the village should do so \r\nupslope rather than on the regularly flooded coastal flat where the existing village is located. Over the next few \r\ndecades, this will result in the gradual upslope migration of the community, an example of autonomous adaptation. \r\nSuch creative community-grounded solutions hold great promise for future adaptation on small islands, where they \r\nare undertaken inclusively."


id: 3bb9e525c80f0f1ee23aa4366ff465fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
"Ecosystem-based adaptation can be a low-cost anticipatory adaptation measure that is often used in small islands. \r\nIt is referred to as a 'no-regret' or 'low-regret' strategy because it is low-costing, brings co-benefits and requires less \r\nmaintenance in contrast to hard engineering structures. Ecosystem-based adaptation is used at different scales and \r\nin different sectors such as to protect fisheries, farming and tourism assets, and integrates various stakeholders from \r\nnational to local governments and non-governmental agencies. Many islands have implemented ecosystem-based \r\nadaptation such as watershed management, mangrove replanting and other nature-based solutions to strengthen \r\ncoastal foreshore areas that are subjected to coastal erosion and flooding caused by SLR and changing rainfall \r\npatterns. For example, mangroves have been planted on several cays in Belize and pandanus trees have been planted \r\nnear the coastlines of the Marshall Islands"


id: 979b97649e02803dc6581ff0a883f68c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
" Agroforestry is another example of ecosystem-based adaptation. Planting \r\ntrees and shrubs in combination with crops has been used to increase resilience of crops to droughts or excessive \r\nrainfall run-off. Case studies show that people living on islands benefit even further from using ecosystem-based \r\nadaptation. Their health improves as well as their food and water supply, while risks of disasters caused by extreme \r\nevents are reduced."


id: ac552c63b04343f4a7f5eded8b2511c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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vector_id: 24650
content:
"Changes in the frequency and severity of TCs or droughts will pose challenges for many islands. For example, \r\nmore pronounced dry seasons, warmer temperatures and greater evaporation could cause plant stress reducing \r\nproductivity and harvests. The impacts of drought may hinder insects and animals from pollinating crops, trees and \r\nother vegetative food sources on tropical islands. For instance, many agroforestry crops are completely dependent \r\non insect pollination, and it is, therefore, important to monitor and recognise how climate change is affecting the \r\nnumber and productivity of these insects. Coastal agroforest systems in small islands are important to national \r\nfood security but rely on biodiversity (e.g., insects for pollination services). Biodiversity loss from traditional \r\nagroecosystems has been identified as one of the most serious threats to food and livelihood security in islands"


id: 336b2cd42031008c68722aafc6b42727
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vector_id: 5508
content:
" \r\nEcosystem-based adaptation practices and diversification of crop varieties are possible solutions."


id: bcb791b2ef017813012657823bc53fc1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
"Many studies have proposed biodiversity hotspots based on different \r\ncriteria, taxa and geographic contexts (e.g., Myers et  al., 2000; \r\nMittermeier et  al., 2004; Mittermeier et  al., 2011; Williams et  al., \r\n2011; Noss et al., 2015; Asaad et al., 2017). A coherent comparative \r\nassessment of all such schemes is beyond the scope of this chapter \r\nbut is provided in recent reviews (Asaad et  al., 2017; Jefferson and \r\nCostello, 2019). We base this assessment on the 'WWF Global 200' \r\nareas of conservation importance (Olson and Dinerstein, 2002). These \r\n238 ecoregions have been used in a previous climate risk assessment \r\n(Warren et  al., 2018b) and cover terrestrial, freshwater and marine \r\nenvironments (Table CCP1.1; Figures CCP1.1; CCP1.2). In addition, we \r\nincluded terrestrial 'biodiversity hotspots' as defined by Myers et al. \r\n(2000) and extended later (Mittermeier et  al., 2011; Williams et  al., \r\n2011; Noss et  al., 2015)"


id: 9cc2d82d5052e487fbda50f02c08772f
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content:
" This assessment thus covers the 'Global \r\n200' (hereafter G200) and 'Myers' biodiversity hotspots, rather than \r\nparticular species or ecological systems, such as rainforests, coral \r\nreefs or the deep sea. Such systems are assessed in Chapters 2 and 3. \r\nChapters 2 and 3 also cover observed and projected impacts, changes \r\nin ecosystem functioning, and species extinction risks at a global level."


id: 6a94576876f54f1b0c18ce4cf8ee5428
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
"Although conservation status has only been assessed globally for about \r\n6% of all species (Costello, 2019) and most confirmed extinctions and \r\nthreatened species are terrestrial, a higher proportion of freshwater \r\nspecies are threatened. This is reflected in the higher proportion \r\nof freshwater hotspots impacted by humans (Collen et  al., 2014; \r\nCostello, 2015; Harrison et al., 2018). The rate of species endemicity \r\nis exceptionally high in freshwater biogeographic realms (i.e., large \r\nregions of distinct species composition and endemicity), at 89-96% for \r\nfish in all but one realm, compared to 11-98% for terrestrial vertebrate \r\ngroups (Leroy et al., 2019) and 17-84% for marine realms (Costello \r\net al., 2017). Already, one-third of wetlands have been lost and 9000 \r\nfreshwater species are threatened with extinction without considering \r\nthe effects of climate change (Darwall et al., 2018), and only 13% of \r\nworld rivers were recently classified as least impacted (Su et al"


id: 2ed4c2df935e84848d4bb6fb391b99bb
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"Based on WGI Interactive Atlas data (Gutierrez et  al., 2021), global \r\nwarming is projected to affect terrestrial hotspots less than non\u0002hotspot areas: 80% less for Myers and 95-96% less for G200 terrestrial \r\nand freshwater hotspots at global warming of 1.5degC-3degC (medium \r\nconfidence) (Kocsis et  al., 2021). In contrast, warming is projected \r\nto be 12-13% greater inside than outside marine hotspots (medium \r\nconfidence) (Kocsis et  al., 2021). Precipitation is generally projected \r\nto increase more in terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity hotspots \r\ncompared to outside them (low confidence) (Kocsis et al., 2021). The \r\nexception is Myers hotspots, which are projected to have, on average, \r\n~28% less precipitation at 1.5degC warming, but ~33% more at 2degC and \r\n~65% more at 3degC (low confidence)"


id: a04447fb05e5cf4e74fcf156ff46e688
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content:
" However, precipitation changes \r\nare often difficult to assess as many hotspots cover large areas, with \r\nsome areas projected to be wetter and some drier with wide differences \r\nbetween different climate models."


id: fe68e3ef40ae6df7d608c405e6dd512e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
"Biodiversity hotspots are expected to be especially vulnerable to climate \r\nchange because their endemic species have smaller geographic ranges \r\n(high confidence) (Sandel et  al., 2011; Brown et  al., 2020; Manes \r\net al., 2021). Manes et al. (2021) reviewed over 8000 projections of \r\nclimate change impacts on biodiversity in 232 studies, including 6116 \r\nprojections on endemic, native and introduced species in terrestrial \r\n(200  studies), freshwater (14  studies) and marine (34  studies) \r\nenvironments in biodiversity hotspots. Only half of the hotspots \r\nhad studies on climate change impacts. All measures of biodiversity \r\nwere found to be negatively impacted by projected climate change, \r\nnamely, species abundance, diversity, area, physiology and fisheries \r\ncatch potential (medium confidence). However, introduced species' \r\nresponses were neutral to positive (medium confidence). Land areas \r\nwere projected to be more negatively affected by climate warming \r\nthan marine"


id: 956d03604e69ba5130f432448a6eca28
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content:
" Land plants, insects, birds, reptiles and mammals were \r\nall projected to be negatively affected (medium confidence), as well as \r\nfish, coral reef, benthic, planktonic and other marine species (medium \r\nconfidence)."


id: 9a3fbfc8629aa7f1ec60d89fcb838b74
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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vector_id: 21789
content:
"(Figure CCP1.2b; Halpern et al., 2008; Halpern et al., 2015; Ramirez et al., \r\n2018). Although there is a strong overlap of non-climatic and climatic \r\nimpacts in marine ecosystems (Blowes et al., 2019; Bowler et al., 2020), \r\nthe effects suggest that climate change impacts are most severe in \r\ntropical and northern high-latitude seas (high confidence) (Doney \r\net al., 2012; Gattuso et al., 2015; Cheung et al., 2018; IPCC, 2019b). \r\nTemperature-driven range shifts and range expansions are projected to \r\nalso lead to cascading effects on marine biodiversity through ecological \r\ninteractions (high confidence) (Pecl et  al., 2017; Verges et  al., 2019). \r\nCascading effects may be especially pronounced in temperate reefs, \r\nwhere tropicalisation could lead to the arrival of herbivorous fish and \r\npredators previously absent (Verges et al., 2019)"


id: ee20210a68f326c61382a62a54fa1b4e
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content:
" However, how these \r\nindirect effects of climate change on species may change food webs \r\nand ecosystem function, including carbon sequestration, is unknown. \r\nDirect and indirect human impacts due to fisheries and pollution can \r\nalso lead to cascading effects that may be additive to climate impacts \r\non biodiversity. Destruction of marine biogenic habitats due to trawling \r\nand dredging and loss of large proportions of marine megafauna, \r\nparticularly fish, mammals, birds and reptiles, alter food webs and \r\nreduce resilience to additional disturbances, such as those caused by \r\nclimate change (medium evidence, high agreement) (Brander, 2007; \r\nWernberg et al., 2011; Ramirez et al., 2017; Cheung et al., 2018; Bates \r\net al., 2019; Costello, 2021)."


id: cd465c8ab3a6766ac529373bc2e43812
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vector_id: 29846
content:
"In Australia, climate change has been implicated in: drought-induced \r\ncanopy dieback across a range of forest and woodland types due to \r\ndecades of declining rainfall in the southwestern hotspot (H133); fires \r\nin the palaeo-endemic pencil pine forests (Tasmania H142); declines in \r\nvertebrates in the Australian Wet Tropics World Heritage Area, which \r\noverlaps with the eastern part of the northern Australia hotspot \r\n(H131), related to warming and increased length of the dry season; and \r\ndeclines in grass and increases in shrubs in the Bogong High Plains \r\n(high confidence) (Hoffmann et al., 2019). The Australian Alps have seen \r\nincreased species diversity following retreat of the snow line (Slatyer, \r\n2010), replacement of long-lived trees by short-lived shrubs following \r\nmultiple wildfires (Zylstra, 2018), and changing ecological interactions \r\ndue to climate-related snow loss, drought and fires (high confidence) \r\n(Hoffmann et  al., 2019)"


id: 12532f595675c2f8341fb619bc49cc1f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 389
content:
" While warming is allowing mangroves to \r\nexpand their range in coastal hotspots of Asia and Australia (Ward et al., \r\n2016; Hughes et al., 2019a), drought and associated salinity stress has \r\nkilled mangroves in northern Australia hotspots (Babcock et al., 2019)."


id: 5e39e693ce86f097776b452dc7099c43
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
"Most terrestrial species in biodiversity hotspots in North America \r\nhave been projected to be negatively impacted by climate change \r\n(medium evidence, medium agreement, medium confidence). About \r\n~80% of projections for assessed species showed a negative impact \r\nof climate change, with ~25% at very high risk of extinction (Figure \r\nCCP1.7; Manes et al., 2021). Alterations to vegetation that would have \r\necosystem-wide impacts, such as a shift from oak-dominated forests to \r\npredominantly hickory and maple species in the Appalachian Forests \r\n(H17) (Ma et al., 2016) or the continued shrinking of tundra ecosystems, \r\nhave also been projected. Range shifts have been projected for a variety \r\nof plants (Beltran et al., 2014; Riordan and Rundel, 2014) and vertebrate \r\ntaxa (Warren et al., 2014; Stralberg et al., 2015; McKelvy and Burbrink, \r\n2017). Sizeable range loss, which particularly affects endemic species, \r\nis projected with higher levels of climate change"


id: 7bbe2a4964edefda637f1d3bbc96d2fe
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content:
" Adaptation in the \r\nagricultural sector poses an additional risk to remaining wildlife habitat \r\n(e.g., wine in California: Roehrdanz and Hannah, 2016)."


id: 77eaa66f9a2884e17c2f26cf7713486a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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content:
"In Asia, there is a bias in studies towards Indo-Burma (H105, 106, 107, 114, \r\n115), followed by Himalaya (H95, 98, 99) and Southeast Asian montane \r\ntropical and temperate forests. About ~70% of projections for assessed \r\nspecies showed a negative impact of climate change, with ~30% at \r\nvery high risk of extinction (medium confidence) (Figure CCP1.7; Manes \r\net al., 2021). Impacts include species' range changes, habitat loss for \r\nendemic plants, expansion of invasive species, decreased connectivity \r\nand overall species richness decline (high confidence) (DasGupta and \r\nShaw, 2013; Telwala et al., 2013; Sridhar et al., 2014; Zomer et al., 2014; \r\nAli and Begum, 2015; Aryal et al., 2016). A projected decrease in habitat \r\nsuitability for large species like the Asiatic black bear (Ursus thibetanus) \r\nis of concern as alternative habitats are outside protected areas, and \r\nmay lead to human-wildlife conflicts (Farashi and Erfani, 2018)"


id: 7e498705a8c7fd99259dd1b052816987
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17430
content:
" The \r\nfew positive impacts of climate change were projected as increases in \r\nsuitable habitat and distribution range for a few endangered plants \r\nand mammals (medium confidence) (Banag et al., 2015; Shrestha et al., \r\n2018). Animals benefiting from increased fruit and seed production in \r\nSoutheast Asian forests during warm El Nino cycles were also projected \r\nto increase with climate warming (Corlett, 2011)."


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vector_id: 30757
content:
"In Central and South America, risks have been assessed in at least \r\n24 terrestrial hotspots, especially within the Atlantic Forest, Cerrado, \r\nMesoamerica and the Caribbean, the most studied hotspots in \r\nthe world in terms of climate change impacts (H47, 44, 15, 16, 20, \r\nrespectively) (Manes et  al., 2021). About 85% of projections for \r\nassessed species showed a negative impact of climate change (high \r\nconfidence), with ~26% projecting species extinctions (Figure CCP1.7; \r\nManes et al., 2021). Projected impacts include contraction or loss of \r\nspecies' geographic range, loss of diversity and high species turnover \r\n(high confidence). Most studies had focused on vertebrates and plants \r\nin the Atlantic Forest (H47) and Cerrado (H44) (Loyola et al., 2014; de \r\nOliveira et al., 2015; Vale et al., 2018; Vasconcelos et al., 2018; Hidasi\u0002Neto et al., 2019; Lima et al., 2019; Lourenco-de-Moraes et al., 2019; \r\nVasconcelos and Prado, 2019; Velazco et  al., 2019)"


id: 7acd4f139ac4d0c63c6a7d28b98aa420
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16909
content:
" Several insect \r\nspecies are projected to lose suitable climatic conditions, including \r\nmoths in Cerrado (H44) (Khormi and Kumar, 2014). There were \r\nprojected negative impacts on vegetation such as rupestrian grasslands \r\nin Cerrado (H44) (Fernandes et al., 2018) and tropical and temperate \r\nforests in Mesoamerica (H15, H16) (Mendoza-Ponce et  al., 2018; \r\nMendoza-Ponce et al., 2019). Endemic species face consistent risks of \r\ndecrease in suitable habitat in the Atlantic Forest (H47) (Vale et al., \r\n2018), Cerrado (H44) (Vasconcelos, 2014), Tumbes-Choco-Magdalena \r\n(H28, H23) (Hermes et al., 2018), and Mesoamerica (H15, H16) (Garcia \r\net al., 2014; Ramirez-Amezcua et al., 2016). Climate change may also \r\nbenefit invasive plant species in terms of range expansion (Wang et al., \r\n2017) and physiology (de Faria et al., 2018) in the region."


id: 82a4d6a47a07fbe0c4e569b107fdd160
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18081
content:
"All projections for assessed species in Australia and New Zealand \r\nterrestrial biodiversity hotspots showed a negative impact of climate \r\nchange, with half at very high risk of extinction (low confidence) \r\n(Manes et  al., 2021). Observed impacts in the Australian Alps were \r\nprojected to continue under future climate change (Zylstra, 2018). The \r\nnorthern Australia savanna (H131) may experience increased rainfall \r\nand carbon dioxide due to climate change (Scheiter et al., 2015), and \r\nthe range of exotic grasses was projected to be reduced under climate \r\nwarming (Gallagher et  al., 2009). In Australian tropical wet forests, \r\nground-living vertebrates may be more sensitive than arboreal species \r\nto unstable climates (Scheffers et  al., 2017). Bellard et  al. (2016) \r\nprojected losses of land due to sea level rise in the East Australian \r\nForest hotspot (H140), and Gonzalez-Orozco et al"


id: bde8419c581086b10c7a7cc653557163
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27438
content:
" (2016) projected the \r\ncontraction of eucalyptus species towards the coast of the Southwest \r\nAustralia hotspot (H134), exposing them to sea level rise. In New \r\nZealand forests (H139), native plants may be replaced by more fire\u0002resistant introduced species following climate change-related fires \r\n(Perry et  al., 2014). While forest growth is projected to potentially "


id: 9d6212c2693d833ef05d933d0e7a956a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22291
content:
"In Europe, including the Mediterranean freshwater hotspots, climate \r\nchange is projected to result in reduced river flow, low oxygen in \r\nsummer, salinity incursions, further eutrophication and spread of \r\ninvasive species, compromising the survival of native biodiversity \r\n(medium confidence) (Moss et al., 2009). The longer growth season \r\nin the boreal and Arctic latitudes is projected to aid the invasion of \r\nexotic species, and increase lake stratification resulting in lower \r\noxygen below the hypolimnion (medium confidence). In addition, strict \r\ncold-water species are projected to lose suitable habitat (Moss et al., \r\n2009). An analysis of 1648 species of freshwater fish, amphibians, \r\nturtles, plants, molluscs, crayfish and dragonflies, projected ~6% of \r\ncommon and ~77% of rare species to lose 90% of their geographic \r\nrange (low confidence) (Markovic et al., 2014). Even if some species \r\ncan spread to other areas and follow the climate, Markovic et  al"


id: bf8a59d9947a90069d0bfdc6764ee0a5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27691
content:
" \r\n(2014) projected a loss of species, especially molluscs, from the \r\nsoutheastern Mediterranean, including the Balkan biodiversity hotspot \r\n(H162) (medium confidence). Similarly, within Europe, Mediterranean \r\nfish (Jaric et al., 2019) and insects (Conti et al., 2014) are the most \r\nthreatened by climate warming, droughts and floods. The fish species \r\nof the Danube river delta hotspot (H161) are less susceptible to climate \r\nchange than in the Balkans (H162) and Anatolian (H163) hotspots. \r\nThe rest of Europe, from the Iberian Peninsula to Scandinavia is not \r\nclassified as a biodiversity hotspot. Thus, the areas where freshwater \r\nbiodiversity is most threatened by climate change in Europe are in two \r\nof the three hotspots (high confidence)."


id: aedb3c6480580ada19c140fbc62f04d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25046
content:
"Kelp forests are in decline in mid-latitudes due to warming and \r\nassociated increased herbivory (medium confidence) (Section 3.4.2.3, \r\nChapter 11). South and southeastern (H228), and southwestern (H227) \r\nAustralia have experienced a climate-related decline of kelp forests \r\n(Wernberg et  al., 2011; Verges et  al., 2016; Wernberg et  al., 2016). \r\nWest Australia (H227) has been affected by extreme climate events \r\ncharacterised by the replacement of kelp and sessile invertebrates \r\nby algal turfs and warm-water fish species (Wernberg et  al., 2013; \r\nWernberg et  al., 2016). Australia's Great Barrier Reef (H236), kelp \r\nforests, seagrass meadows and mangroves (due to drought), have \r\nsuffered mortalities due to climate change (medium confidence) \r\n(Babcock et al., 2019)"


id: d514d5037d35e49e91084d19b77d3266
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31054
content:
" Climate warming driven changes in seaweed \r\nassemblages have been reported not only in Australia, but in the marine \r\nbiodiversity hotspots of Atlantic Canada, Japan, Mediterranean, New \r\nZealand (Laffoley and Baxter, 2016; Thomsen et  al., 2019; Thomsen \r\nand South, 2019) and California (H207, 231, 216, 238, 199) (Arafeh\u0002Dalmau et al., 2019; McPherson et al., 2021). However, while climate \r\nchange is having measurable effects on kelp, the dominant effects on \r\nkelp projected to 2025 are fishing, through its effects on herbivores \r\nand predators (medium confidence) (Steneck et al., 2002). Although \r\nfishing affected Atlantic cod in the Barents Sea (H214) and Gulf of \r\nMaine (H207) biodiversity hotspots, it was also affected by climate \r\nchange, but negatively and positively, respectively (Kjesbu et al., 2014; \r\nPershing et al., 2015)."


id: afa145aca29b940750652b4ea3841e8f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25146
content:
"Mangroves occupy the interface of terrestrial, freshwater and marine \r\nenvironments, dominate in eight hotspots (Table  CCP1.1) and are \r\nconnected to or integral habitats within one-third of all terrestrial \r\nand freshwater, and two-thirds of marine, hotspots (Figures CCP1.1; \r\nCCP1.2). A global analysis of sediment cores from mangroves indicated \r\nthat mangroves can accrete sediment at levels of sea level rise projected \r\nunder low emission scenarios, but may decline at their seaward edge \r\nunder high emission scenarios (Saintilan et al., 2020, Chapter 3.4.2, \r\nCross-Chapter Box Sea-level rise). However, even if this seaward \r\nerosion occurs, the expansion of mangroves inland due to sea level \r\nrise will increase carbon sequestration, because they capture carbon \r\nfrom seawater and freshwater runoff, in addition to photosynthesis, \r\ninto their underlying sediments"


