# document

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"difficult to measure, there are a growing number of cases of NELD \r\nglobally (medium evidence, high agreement). Illustrative examples \r\nof NELD from climate change include the Pacific (McNamara et  al., \r\n2021b) and SIDS in the Caribbean. (Martyr-Koller et  al., 2021). For \r\nexample, the hurricane season in 2017 was particularly extreme \r\nresulting in climate-induced displacement with direct implications for \r\nNELD, including threats to health and well-being and loss of culture \r\nand agency (Thomas and Benjamin, 2020)."


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"Climate change L&D presents an existential threat to some (Boyd et al., \r\n2017). For example, Pacific Island countries have contributed least to \r\ntotal GHG emissions, but the nations of the South Pacific are highly \r\nvulnerable to rising sea levels, tropical cyclones and other climate\u0002related risks (Nand and Bardsley, 2020). For example, across Oceania \r\nthere is significant risk that sea level rise will lead to forced relocation. \r\nPacific leaders underscore the importance of losses, including deep \r\nconnections between their world views and their land, and that \r\nleaving their islands can only be considered an option of 'last resort' \r\n(McDonnell, 2021)."


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"Geographical focus on non-economic losses in the literature is largely on \r\nthe Global South with studies mainly smaller in scale (high agreement). \r\nMany events studied include severe storms, floods and landslides. Key \r\ngroups affected include low-income groups, agro-pastoralists, women \r\nand girls, children and youth, Indigenous Peoples, ethnic and religious \r\nminorities. In Europe, the Samis face significant challenges to health as \r\necosystems deteriorate (Jaakkola et al., 2018). In Zimbabwe, Storm Idai \r\naffected 270,000 people and subsequent flooding and landslides left \r\n340 people dead and many others missing (Chanza et al., 2020). There "


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"Non-economic loss and damage (NELD) is values based (subjective \r\nand intangible) and relates to norms, social values and highlights \r\nintersectional experiences and perspectives on climate risk. The \r\ndiscourse on L&D includes a framing of NELD as loss of human and \r\nnon-human life, and mental and physical health that is experienced \r\nwidely across the world in vastly different ways associated with social \r\nvalues (Tschakert et al., 2019). There are respectable arguments for the \r\ncase that all life has intrinsic value (Vetlesen, 2019). The NELD framing \r\nof climate impacts highlights that not all risks are measurable. While "


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"following disasters or challenges posed by adverse climate change \r\nimpacts. For example, many households in villages affected by Cyclone \r\nAila in Dacope and Koyra upazilas of Khulna district in Bangladesh \r\nmigrated to other places permanently after the cyclone, as these \r\naffected villages were subject to long-term flooding (e.g., 2-3 years) \r\nfollowing the cyclone. They migrated as they were unable to restore \r\ntheir livelihoods and, thus, were unable to secure necessary income for \r\nsurvival (Saha, 2017)."


id: 57d9d3f4631004c9fc93d531cc7b2d35
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"The examples show the multifaceted nature of intangible and non\u0002economic losses that people experience in the context of climate \r\nchange and the daily risks they are exposed to. Conventional \r\nvulnerability assessments cover some aspects that are linked to the \r\nlikelihood of experiencing non-economic losses, such as aspects of \r\nhealth, governance, education and in some cases also forced migration \r\nand the role of social networks. Overall, the elements of this assessment \r\nhere underscore that it is not just the climatic stressor, but rather the \r\nunderlying context conditions that decide whether an extreme event \r\ntranslates into a disaster."


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"While there are limited studies that view economic and NELD from \r\nclimate change at a global scale of livelihood transformations there is \r\nrobust evidence on the granular linkages, at community, national and \r\nregional levels, between losses, coping strategies and livelihood shifts. \r\nAcross Africa, climate change is impacting crop yields and destroying \r\nhomes, resulting in loss of infrastructure and leading to non-economic \r\nlosses associated with involuntary migration and displacement (Olsson \r\net al., 2014), and loss of livestock and assets (see IPCC SR 1.5degC, Chapter "


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"NELD also includes the loss of social networks. This has lasting \r\nimplications for psychological health as well as for coping with crises "


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"3, (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018), resulting in long-term reduction in the \r\ncapacity for agriculture and land management. For example, in March \r\n2019 Tropical Cyclone Idai in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi \r\nled to substantial losses of agriculture, infrastructure, and access to \r\naid and support, all of which contributed to significant displacement \r\nin each country (Fischel de Andrade and de Lima Madureira, 2021). \r\nExamples of livelihood impacts include livelihood shifts among Kenyan \r\npastoralists to camel husbandry, resulting from household inequalities \r\nin assets and changes in relation to weakening of social norms of \r\nreciprocity and social cohesion (Volpato and King, 2019)."


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"Pascale et al., 2020; see also AR6 WGI Chapter 10, \r\nSection 10.6.2; M. Fanadzo,2021\r\nFunk, C. et al. 2018: Haile et al., 2020"


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"Seager et al.2015; Murray et al. 2021;.Greene 2021, \r\nGreene, 2018; Barreau et al., 2017. Hung et al, \r\n2021; Garwood, et al. (n.d.)"


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"van Oldenborgh et al. 2020; Celermajer et al., 2021; \r\nNguyen et al., 2021; Godfree et al., 2021"


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"Figure 8.10 |  Examples of non-economic loss and damage associated with climate hazards attributed to climate change against a background of global \r\nvulnerability. Symbols with corresponding detail in the table show examples where non-economic losses have been documented. The figure is not exhaustive in terms of examples \r\nof extreme or slow-onset events or losses. It does not capture undocumented cases. It is an illustration of the relationship between unequivocal human-induced climate change and \r\nintangible losses (Adapted from Boyd et al., 2021)."


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"in unfamiliar labour markets, resulting in mental health challenges \r\n(Palinkas, 2020). There has also been a 'climate gentrification' in parts \r\nof New Orleans (Aune et al., 2020). Many of those who returned to their \r\npre-Katrina areas had to deal with extensive damage to their homes \r\nand to public infrastructure."


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"generations may be of limited use. For example, rotational grazing \r\nis no longer possible as all pastures are being used, and changes in \r\nclimate result in unpredictable weather patterns unknown to earlier \r\ngenerations (Axelsson-Linkowski et al., 2020). These examples show \r\nthat there are complex factors underpinning the linking L&D and \r\nshifting livelihoods. Moreover, there are significant challenges to \r\nundertaking a shift to secure alternative livelihoods."


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"The effect of communication at different stages in the drought highlights how critical information needs to be provided in a format \r\nand language that empowers people to act appropriately and collaboratively (Muller, 2019; Rodina, 2019b; Rodina, 2019a). Getting \r\npolitical decisions made in a timely fashion and with public support is a long-standing challenge for managers of urban water supplies \r\n(Muller, 2017; Muller, 2019). In Cape Town this was further challenged by dependence on a malfunctioning national department for \r\nwater supply planning, poor coordination between the spheres of government--city, provincial and national governments--and poor \r\ncollaboration between political representatives, technical experts and strategic managers (Madonsela et al., 2019; Nhamo and Agyepong, \r\n2019; Rodina, 2019a; Ziervogel, 2019b). This highlights the need to strengthen partnerships and collaboration across sectors and scales "


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"of governance (Ziervogel, 2019a), including the adoption of a 'whole-of-society' approach that recognises the contributions of non-state \r\nactors as adopted in the Cape Town Resilience Strategy (CoCT, 2019; Simpson et al., 2020a). Experienced yet inflexible water management \r\ninitially operated at a distance from politicians and their citizens. There was limited knowledge and capacity in how various municipal \r\ndepartments thought about risk, exposure and vulnerability of Cape Town's highly differentiated population (Mukheibir and Ziervogel, \r\n2007; Pasquini et al., 2015; Madonsela et al., 2019). In the later stages of the drought, Cape Town's water management department was \r\nable to work collaboratively across different departments and with politicians to implement responses."


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"et al., 2014). Scenarios are limited by stakeholders' imaginations and, \r\nas such, new emergent challenges, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, \r\nare difficult to anticipate in scenario planning. Nevertheless, recent \r\nstudies and forecasts of the impact of COVID-19 on poverty conclude \r\nthat in the near- and medium-term future major portions of the newly \r\npoor will emerge in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Laborde \r\net al., 2020b; Sumner et al., 2020). Since these countries are already \r\ncharacterised by high levels of absolute poverty and vulnerability to \r\nclimate change, it is likely that these regions will face more severe \r\nchallenges in overcoming vulnerability and will be confronted with a \r\ngrowing adaptation gap. Thus, the implication for scenario planning is \r\nthat single crises or events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, might not \r\nsignificantly alter existing vulnerabilities, but rather reinforce them."


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"8.4.1.1 Exposure and Vulnerability under Different Scenarios \r\nand Alternative Development Pathways"


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"At the international and national level, the SSPs (O'Neill et al., 2017a) \r\nhave been developed to outline various development pathways, \r\nassociated emissions and levels of warming, but also different possible \r\ndevelopment profiles (i.e., levels of economic growth, poverty, inequality, \r\ndemographic change, etc.) that are highly relevant for adaptation."


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"Studies using the SSPs to understand multidimensional poverty are \r\nfew but growing, and underscore that the impacts of climate change \r\non poverty are extremely sensitive to different levels of warming (Byers \r\net al., 2018). Multi-sector risks approximately double between 1.5degC \r\nand 2degC global mean temperature (GMT) change, and double again \r\nin a +3degC world. Comparing a +1.5degC world pursuing sustainable \r\ndevelopment (SSP1) to a high-poverty and high-inequality +3degC world \r\n(SSP3), Byers et al. (2018) project substantial increases in populations \r\nexposed to drought, water stress, heat stress and habitat degradation \r\n(see in detail Byers et  al., 2018). While in a +1.5degC world exposed \r\npopulations increase by 7-17%, the increase within a +3degC plus \r\nworld is 27-51% (Byers et al., 2018; Frame et al., 2018). Populations \r\nin Asia and Africa account for more than 80% of the global population "


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"The SSPs scenarios orient climate models around possible development \r\npathways that produce future exposure patterns, risk probabilities and \r\nvulnerability for future populations (O'Neill et al., 2014; O'Neill et al., \r\n2017a). While the likelihood of any given scenario actually occurring is \r\nhighly uncertain, they have the advantage of pairing with computational \r\nmodels to generate robust projections about risk profiles in possible \r\nfutures, and therefore assess the relative influence of different drivers \r\nof change. In this way, scenario tools generate pictures of future \r\nvulnerability and adaptation pathways, and often have both an analytic \r\nand normative function. The decision-making context will determine \r\nwhich specific scenario approach is most appropriate (Rozenberg "


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"exposed to these phenomena, and within South Asia and the Sahel, \r\nup to 90% of populations are exposed. Scenario tools help us to \r\nunderstand the burden of increasing multidimensional poverty, and \r\npotential for poverty traps, if mitigation and adaptation measures are \r\nnot taken rapidly and effectively implemented."


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"et al., 2016). In addition, a World Bank study concludes that losses of \r\nhuman well-being are higher than the overserved economic losses from \r\nnatural hazards (Hallegatte et al., 2017). In this regard, it is likely that \r\nfuture impacts of climate change, particularly under increasing levels \r\nof global warming (above 1.5degC) will also increase non-economic \r\nlosses (see Section 8.3.2.3) and losses of human well-being that are \r\nparticularly relevant to most vulnerable groups and the poor."


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"At the national and sub-national levels, studies on development and \r\nrisk scenarios capture specific challenges, for example, urban growth, \r\ndemographic change, human health and ageing (e.g., Dong et  al., \r\n2015; Chapman et al., 2019). In this regard, local scenarios of human \r\nvulnerability can inform future strategies for adapting to hazards such \r\nas heatwaves in cities under different socioeconomic development \r\nstrategies. These scenario approaches allow us to focus on changes \r\nin climatic and societal conditions as well as urban transformations. \r\nThis provides a more comprehensive basis for defining adaptation \r\ngoals (see Fekete, 2019; Birkmann et al., 2021b). Costs and benefits of \r\ndifferent adaptation measures can be assessed against different future \r\nscenarios of climatic and societal change."


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"Furthermore, the expected future increase in the number of people \r\nexposed to climate hazards, such as sea level rise and coastal flooding, \r\nis not only determined by changing hazard patterns, but also by regional \r\nprocesses of migration and urbanisation for example in Asia and Africa, \r\nincluding an increasing number of urban poor living in low-elevation \r\ncoastal zones (United Nations, 2018). This can increase again the \r\nprobability that more people require assistance and support for buffering \r\nthese effects of climate-related hazards, for example, in coastal zones. \r\nHistorical urbanisation processes, in coastal cities in Asia (e.g., in China, \r\nVietnam, etc.) and Africa (e.g., in Nigeria) have increased the exposure \r\nof people to climate hazards, such as sea level rise, which by 2100 \r\nunder Relative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 8.5 will globally threaten \r\n630 million people, largely in coastal cities (Kulp and Strauss, 2019)."


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"The influence of climate change also impacts the future response \r\ncapacities of people and nations to deal with future climate change \r\nand climate hazards. Recent studies (e.g., Mysiak et al., 2016) conclude \r\nthat climate change can increase the severity and intensity of crises or \r\neven trigger disasters, particularly floods, storms, forest and wildfires, \r\nand droughts. These have undermined decade-long poverty reduction \r\nefforts, particularly in low-income and at-risk countries (Djalante, \r\n2019). Climate-influenced (disaster) risks are getting more complex \r\nand systemic (UNDRR, 2019). The magnitude of global annual average \r\neconomic losses from natural and climate-induced hazards to the built \r\nenvironment alone are estimated in the United Nations Office for \r\nDisaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) Global Assessment Report (2015) as \r\nbeing comparable with the GDP of the 36th largest economy in the \r\nworld at that time--the Philippines (in 2015) (UNISDR, 2015; Mysiak "


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"conditioning (Barreca et  al., 2016). That means well-off populations \r\nare better insulated from effects of global warming than poorer or \r\nmore vulnerable groups, even if they are geographically living in the \r\nsame exposure zone. These findings underscore that issues of climate \r\njustice need to be considered within the problem definition when \r\ndesigning adaptation strategies, and not solely at the end. Impacts \r\nof future climate hazards (heat stress, flooding, etc.) differ not only \r\ndue to changes in frequency and intensity of the hazard itself, but \r\nalso significantly in terms of the opportunities people have to respond \r\nand prepare for these hazards and climatic changes at present and in \r\nthe future. However, extreme heat stress has also caused significant \r\nfatalities in countries classified as having low vulnerability, such as \r\nseen within the heat wave in Europe in 2003."


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"In socio-ecological systems, tipping points occur when a (small \r\nquantitative) change inevitably triggers a nonlinear change in the \r\ncorresponding social component of the socio-ecological systems, driven \r\nby a self-reinforcing positive feedback mechanism, that inevitably and \r\noften irreversibly leads to a qualitatively different state of the social \r\nsystem (Milkoreit et al., 2018)."


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"In recent years, significant research efforts have been made to identify \r\nearly warning signals for social tipping points (Barrett and Dannenberg, \r\n2014; Bentley et al., 2014; Lenton et al., 2019). While some identify \r\nearly warning signals through time series (Scheffer et al., 2012), others \r\nsee them in interaction networks and individual thresholds (Barrett and \r\nDannenberg, 2014; McLeman, 2018). Empirical research conducted \r\nin a transboundary contentious region--the Jordan river valley--\r\nshowed that there were significant local and regional differences in \r\nthe identification of social tipping points (Rodriguez Lopez et al., 2019)."


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"Climate change has the potential to trigger major, sudden social \r\ntransformations, yet there are no clear linear relationships between \r\nthe magnitude of climate change impacts and the social changes they \r\ninduce (Steffen et al., 2018). Evidence shows that major destabilising \r\nsocial transformations (e.g., forced migration) can occur in response \r\nto limited climate change impacts, even while major climate change \r\nimpacts can be mitigated through the resilience of social, political and \r\neconomic systems, and thus yield only minor social impacts."


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"In the context of climate change, 'tipping points' have been identified \r\nas critical thresholds at which a tiny perturbation can qualitatively \r\nalter the state or development of a system (Lenton et al., 2008; Lenton "


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"Figure 8.11 |  A social tipping point is reached when climate impacts push a society towards a state of instability. Those climate impacts are typically aggravated by \r\neconomic, social and political stressors that reduce adaptive capacity and overwhelm its resilience. Once a social tipping point is reached, a society may experience mutually reinforcing \r\nstates of economic, social and political instability, leading to cascading disruptions such as livelihood insecurity, migration and displacement, food insecurity, impoverishment, civil \r\nand political conflict, and change of political regimes."


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"Shifting livelihoods is a typical adaptation strategy but can also \r\nreflect a social tipping point if this shift affects the community as a \r\nwhole. Therefore, social tipping points should not be confused with \r\nthe carrying capacity of a community. While the carrying capacity \r\nof a community is a fixed, predetermined limit, social tipping points \r\nare dynamic and constantly evolving under the influence of different \r\nsocial and political factors, such as solidarity networks or governance \r\nmechanisms. The carrying capacity of a community can evolve over time, \r\nbut remains a static concept, unlike social tipping points. Social tipping \r\npoints have also been applied to adaptation, through the concept of \r\nadaptation tipping points, which indicate how much pressure a socio\u0002environmental system is able to absorb (Ahmed et al., 2018). Beyond \r\nthe adaptation tipping point, the efficiency of adaptation responses \r\nwill be limited, and can even transform into maladaptive options."


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"shocks and climate hazards (e.g., droughts, floods), shifting livelihoods \r\nis a common response and, in many cases, can be unavoidable due \r\nto the negative consequences of these climate hazards on specific \r\nlivelihood capitals (see Section 8.5). Such shifts can involve a change \r\nin livelihood activities (e.g., continuing in agriculture but growing \r\ndifferent kinds of crops), or a change to broader livelihood strategies \r\n(e.g., diversifying into handicrafts or paid employment, specialising \r\nin one particular activity, or migrating, seasonally or permanently, in \r\nsearch of other livelihood opportunities) or even an entire change of \r\nthe livelihood activity, for example, abandoning agriculture altogether \r\n(McLeman and Smit, 2006; Black et al., 2011). Shifting livelihoods can \r\ntherefore involve mobility or take place in situ. Some of these shifts \r\nalso lead to social tipping points."


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"8.4.5.1.1 Proactive and reactive livelihood shifts and their relevance \r\nfor future risks due to climate change"


id: 6aff5157a734713ecc91918712705c1b
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"There is robust evidence with high agreement that future climate \r\nchange impacts will have severe consequences for poor households, \r\nparticularly those situated in areas highly exposed to actual or future \r\nclimate hazards, such as low-lying coastal communities (see also \r\nCross-Chapter Paper 1), drylands (see also Cross-Chapter Paper 3) or \r\nremote mountain (see also Cross-Chapter Paper 5) settlements with \r\nlow levels of connectivity to markets, poor infrastructure and high \r\ndependence upon poor quality natural capital (Barbier and Hochard, \r\n2018; Gioli et al., 2019). While livelihoods operate in a dynamic context \r\ncharacterised by multiple interacting structures and processes, climate \r\nchange can act as a risk multiplier. When current livelihood activities \r\nbecome untenable as a result of both long trends and short-term "


id: 2c0ca5b893dfa397a31833f60de5b4d7
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"et al., 2018). In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic and consequences \r\nlinked to measures to reduce the spreading of the virus are likely to \r\nincrease poverty, particularly in regions already facing high levels of \r\nvulnerability and poverty (Laborde et al., 2020b; Sumner et al., 2020)."


id: bfdcf02db1cc1fdc3850a2b7c18bcfd9
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"Overall, there is high agreement that future climate change impacts \r\nare going to worsen poverty and exacerbate inequalities within and \r\nbetween nations, with projections that by 2030 these will increase \r\nsignificantly (Olsson et al., 2014; Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017; Roy "


id: 745b3ffd13450bd23ee0e165375a2f62
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"Table 8.4 |  Summary of interlocking categories differentiation future risks, vulnerabilities, inequality and adaptation"


id: 80baaa65938242dc616783411a7f86e9
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"practices (Wangui and Smucker, 2018). This study found that most \r\nfemale-headed and poorest households could not access the land, \r\nwater for irrigation and financial assets required to access adaptive \r\npractices that are available in the wider community. Consequently, \r\nfuture impacts of climate change are likely to increase rather than \r\ndecrease inequality based on already observed impacts on adaptive \r\ncapacities that constrain future adaptation options, particularly for the \r\npoor (Roy et al., 2018)."


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"as most highly vulnerable is projected to grow significantly. A study \r\nusing five vulnerability categories globally concludes that the total \r\npopulation of all countries with very high vulnerability (see Figure 8.6) \r\nis projected to increase from 2019 numbers approximately by 102% \r\nby 2050 (i.e., roughly double) and 257% by 2100, while the population \r\nof all countries with very low vulnerability is projected to decrease by \r\n9% by 2050 and 17% by 2100 (based on UN medium probabilistic \r\nprojections). Another study estimates that the total population of \r\nall countries classified at most vulnerable (top two categories; using \r\nseven vulnerability categories globally) is predicted to increase by 82% \r\nby 2050 and 192% by 2100. In contrast the population of all countries \r\nclassified as least vulnerable (bottom two categories) is projected to \r\nonly increase by 9% by 2050 and 1% by 2100 (see in detail UN-DESA, \r\n2019; Birkmann et al., 2021a; Birkmann et al., 2022)."


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"That means that, based on current population growth estimates and if \r\nvulnerability levels are not reduced significantly, more people will be \r\nliving in more vulnerable context conditions in the future compared \r\nto those living in less vulnerable contexts. This is independent of the \r\ndevelopment of climatic hazard exposure. If significant reductions \r\nof vulnerability are achieved, this projection will change. However, \r\nthe vulnerability and poverty of some regions and countries, such \r\nas Afghanistan or Haiti, has proved over decades to be persistent. \r\nConsequently, the estimated future population growth is another \r\nfactor that points towards the urgent need to reduce vulnerability and \r\nto narrow the adaptation gap."


id: abab89a95c0baa85fb121bf3d1d6250e
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"While future adaptation options can also encompass measures or tools \r\nthat emerge in future, most of the future adaptation options and their \r\nrelevance for reducing vulnerability, poverty and inequality are known. \r\nEvidence exists that the importance of social networks that organise \r\nsocial protection and leverage resources in terms of reducing risks to \r\nclimate change is increasing, particularly for most vulnerable people or \r\ngroups in countries that have limited social security measures in place."


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"Local perceptions of losses from adverse effects of climate variability \r\nand change can help to assess the magnitude of impacts that \r\nindividuals and communities have not been able to cope with or adapt \r\nto (James et al., 2014; Barnett et al., 2016; McNamara and Jackson, \r\n2019 McNamara et al. 2021, Mecheler et al. 2020)."


id: f8cfbf3e000259be45efadd54781b5ef
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"The IPCC Special Report on a 1.5degC warming world shows with high \r\nconfidence that for the Arctic systems, if average temperature increase \r\nexceeds 1.5degC by the end of the century limits to adaptation and \r\nresidual impacts will be exceeded, compromising people's livelihoods \r\n(Ford et  al., 2015; O'Neill et  al., 2017b; Roy et  al., 2018; Hoegh\u0002Guldberg et  al., 2019a). The loss and degradation of the Amazon \r\nforest with global warming temperatures beyond 1.5degC is another \r\nclear example of irreversible loss, with significant impact to people's \r\nlivelihoods today and in the future (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Roy \r\net al., 2018). Moreover, the L&D from climate change impacts are also \r\nfelt heavily by women, children and elderly given the intersectionality \r\nwith socioeconomic and gender inequalities (Li et al., 2016; Roy et al., \r\n2018). For instance, gender and wealth inequality offers challenges \r\nto scale up the Maasai pastoralist community autonomous adaptive "


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"In SIDS, key risks are represented by losses of livelihoods of coastal \r\nsettlements, ecosystem services, infrastructure and economic stability, \r\nexhibiting limits to adaptation in the face of local people's coping \r\nstrategies capacity (Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2019a). There is high \r\nconfidence that sea level rise in SIDS combined with extreme flooding \r\nevents will threaten the future livelihoods of coastal communities \r\n(Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018)."


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"In the Global South, the increasing heat associated with warming \r\nglobal temperature represents an important risk due to losses in \r\nlabour productivity, crop failures and livelihood security. These involve \r\neconomic losses and health effects, as well as increasing deaths \r\nthat are anticipated to have significant implications for poverty, \r\ninequality and equity (Carleton, 2017; Roy et al., 2018). The increasing "


id: ebc4048ca7da86cd27d63af0ab74fcf0
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"the government (Warner and Van der Geest, 2013). Among Indigenous \r\nPeoples in the Global South, for example in the Brazilian Amazon, \r\nAustralia and Botswana, locally autonomous adaptive measures were \r\nnot sufficient to avoid significant losses (some irreversible in case of \r\nlost habitats). The barriers and insufficient adaptive capacities are also \r\nintrinsically linked to historical marginalisation and vulnerability of the \r\npopulation in these countries (Maru et al., 2014)."


id: d179c9e38abd665350ff985e73a437db
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"temperature, droughts and excessive rain lead to successive crop \r\nfailures and reduced productivity that are affecting children's growth \r\nand health in developing countries (Hanna and Oliva, 2016). Likewise, \r\nthe expected global temperature increase by the end of the century \r\nwill have devastating health consequences for children, associated \r\nwith sea level rise, heatwaves, affecting the incidence of malaria and \r\ndengue, and malnutrition, especially in Asian (Ghosh et al., 2018) and \r\nAfrican countries, such as Chad, Mali, Niger and Somalia (Hanna and \r\nOliva, 2016; Ghosh et al., 2018; Clark et al., 2020)."


id: 9430e22017df6222210689ff25d79aaa
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"In the Arctic, warming temperature and sea level rise constitute key \r\nrisks to the loss of identity and culture of Indigenous People. This is \r\nassociated with migration and relocation due to livelihood deterioration \r\nresulting from coastal erosion, permafrost thaw and reduced fisheries \r\nproductivity (Roberts and Andrei, 2015; Roy et al., 2018). These risks \r\nand losses often encompass various non-economic losses, such as the \r\nloss of identity, that cannot be replaced or economically compensated \r\n(see also Section 8.3.5)."


id: cb0dcc87f1a666a85e536b68e64d9485
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"Expected future risks to vulnerable communities and Indigenous \r\nPeoples include losses across a range of impacts. A larger household \r\ncomparative analysis across mountain regions in Africa, Asia and \r\nSoutheast Asia shows that more than 60% of the population reported \r\nlosses from residual impacts concerning droughts, floods, cyclones, \r\nsea level rise, glacier retreat and desertification, despite autonomous \r\nadaptation involving changing food consumption and formal aid from "


id: ca0d02d2c831174e1209b423b5aaf742
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"In semiarid West Africa, longer-term local adaptation is in place to help \r\npoor households deal with severe droughts. This involves reducing \r\nhousehold and cattle water consumption, planting drought-tolerant "


id: e7591e8474b5a74cfca18d4a81a42b06
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"The next section discusses how risks emerge as a result of the failure in \r\nadaptation or failure to implement it, with particular attention to risks \r\nthat are impossible to adapt to and lead to inevitable L&D among poor \r\nhouseholds, livelihoods and countries."


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"crops and adopting integrated crop-livestock production for efficiency, \r\nwith migration being either seasonal and or permanent. These measures \r\nare mostly effective (van der Geest et al., 2019). Likewise, in Ethiopia, \r\nNorthern Kenya and Senegal, adaptation has advanced with external \r\ngovernment and non-government organisation (NGO) support (Schafer \r\net al., 2019). This includes technological innovations and insurance for \r\nhouseholds (Schafer et al., 2019), but is not enough to prevent losses in \r\nalready impoverished households (Schafer et al., 2019)."


id: fcfef88d208e010983a822ea06582664
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"There is robust evidence that future risks to climate-sensitive livelihoods, \r\nsuch as agriculture, livestock and fisheries are amplified by gender, age, \r\nwealth inequalities (Wangui and Smucker, 2018), ethical background \r\nand geography (Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020; Thomas and Benjamin, \r\n2020), as well as by ecological thresholds that challenge autonomous \r\nadaptation among vulnerable disadvantaged communities mostly in \r\nthe Global South (Roy et al., 2018; Mechler et al., 2020)."


id: a31bd4a253784987d5423735a400c6d9
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"The assessment also points towards the fact that there are strong linkages \r\nbetween national-level vulnerability (e.g., Figure  8.6) and individual \r\nvulnerability at household or livelihood scale. Various disadvantaged and \r\nmarginalised groups or communities within a society are significantly \r\nconstrained in terms of the ability to build adaptive capacities for future \r\nclimate change threats due to limited access to resources or government \r\nsupport for planned adaptation. Consequently, these linkages between \r\nregional, national and local vulnerability need more attention in research \r\nand practical adaptation strategies (vertical integration)."


id: c947961feb717479e601b5725b97778a
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"The health impacts and economic losses estimates are not homogeneously gathered for the entire Amazon basin countries, but some \r\nrecent evidence associated with this knowledge gap shows the magnitude of the forest fire impacts, as well as where they spatially occur \r\nand who are the most affected by it. Fires associated with deforestation in the Amazon have been related to 1065-4714 deaths annually \r\nin South America (Reddington et al., 2015). The recent fires in the Amazon basin are directly affecting 24 million Amazonians with the \r\nworst impacts felt by children and the elderly (Machado-Silva et al., 2020), Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities (Fellows \r\net al., 2020). Children under 5 years old and the elderly in rural areas are respectively 11 and 22 times more affected by the smoke from \r\nfire outbreaks and temperature increase in the Amazon (Machado-Silva et al., 2020)."


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"gp\r\nIt is expected that by 2030 the incidence of extreme droughts in the Amazon will increase the costs of the health sector associated with \r\ntreatment costs of respiratory diseases (20-50%) and malaria incidence (5-10%). This will also incur a high social cost as people will less \r\nable to carry out their livelihoods (Lapola et al., 2018). It is also expected that the droughts will accelerate and intensify rural (traditional \r\ncommunities and Indigenous Peoples) migration to urban centres where migrants living standards are expected to decrease once they \r\nwill occupy marginal areas within larger urban centres (Lapola et al., 2018)."


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"Table 8.5 |  Categories of maladaptation as future risk and examples of outcomes and world regions based on literature assessment evidence."


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"associated with monsoons. However, these measures led to disruptions \r\nin social cohesion as conflicts over water sharing escalated (Mathew \r\nand Akter, 2015). In the same region, local governments prioritise the \r\nglacier retreat as a perceived risk to flooding from dams, but overlook \r\nthe slow and gradual impact of the deficit in precipitation that is \r\nnegatively affecting rice productivity (Mathew and Akter, 2015). In \r\nBurkina Faso, a region highly impacted by severe droughts, local \r\ncommunities have become less able to cope with droughts given a \r\ndecline in cultural pastoralism and increased dependence on crops (van \r\nder Geest et al., 2019)."


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"management and reforestation projects funded by multilateral donors \r\n(Work et al., 2019). As a consequence, losses emerge despite actions \r\nto prevent adverse impacts, and maladaptation instead becomes a \r\nvector of increased vulnerability for poor and vulnerable communities \r\n(Mechler et al., 2019a)."


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"As seen, maladaptive responses to droughts, sea level rise and \r\nflooding are negatively affecting poor farmers, pastoralists, and rural \r\nand urban informal workers, increasing loss of crops, infrastructure, \r\nincome, conflict and migration. Given the high risks of maladaptation \r\nto poor people this agenda should be given priority by development \r\nand planning sectors (Magnan et al., 2016). The categories in Table 8.5 \r\nalso represent important future compounding and complex risks that \r\ncan emerge due to maladaptation (high confidence)."


id: cfe5b2655f737110e2198921f7a61124
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"Communities and livelihoods with higher exposure to the risks posed \r\nby climate change and with lower adaptive capacity will experience a \r\nhigher burden of L&D in comparison to others (Tschakert et al., 2017). \r\nIn Asia (Indonesia) and the Arctic region, a decline in marine fisheries \r\nby approximately 3 million tonnes per degree of warming is expected \r\nto have severe negative regional impacts, especially on Indigenous \r\nPeople (Cheung et al., 2016)."


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"In Bangladesh, an expensive coastal climate-resilient infrastructure \r\nproject could potentially increase the vulnerability of urban poor as \r\nthey will remain in areas that are highly susceptible to flooding brought \r\nby sea level rise (Magnan et  al., 2016). In Central America, the lack \r\nof assessments of future climate variability on crop yield scenarios, \r\ncoupled with lack of policymakers to incorporate autonomous local \r\nadaptation practices, could lead to an unsustainable trajectory for local \r\ncommunities and risk of maladaptation (Beveridge et  al., 2018). In \r\nBhutan, small-scale rice farmers have adopted water-sharing measures \r\nto avoid the impacts of reduced and uncertain precipitation levels "


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"It is projected that climate change impacts on the incidence of disasters \r\nwill push 122  million additional people into extreme poverty with \r\nglobal temperature increase by 2030 (Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017; \r\nHoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Jafino et al., 2020). It is also expected \r\nthat around 330-396 million people will experience lower agricultural "


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"lack of finance, and high costs associated with disasters, poverty and \r\nenvironmental degradation, soft limits could become hard ones in the \r\nfuture (see Figure 8.5; Gracia et al., 2018)."


id: 8172ec932b472a0c3f2bf9f21dc15a8a
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"yields at warming beyond 1.5degC (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018), most \r\nof them in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 16; Roy et al., \r\n2018; World Bank, 2019a). There is also medium evidence that tens \r\nto hundreds of millions of people that are dependent upon climate\u0002sensitive livelihoods could out-migrate as a consequence of global \r\ntemperature increasing, mostly in Africa, Asia and Latin America--\r\nposing additional risks to unsustainable urbanisation and group \r\nconflict (Chapter 16; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018)."


id: 28c289b3768be33a38443e06584e1965
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"Table 8.6 |  Synthesis of hard and soft limits to adaptation and risks to livelihoods, equity and sustainability adapted from Chapter 5 of SR1.5degC (Roy et al., 2018)."


id: 29f56ca72f928a07e542865101a905a4
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"of the current number of people exposed and vulnerable to climate\u0002sensitive livelihoods. The supporting literature is listed in Table SM8.1."


id: 2210e53de5839a20b3afa12e2f2bdf03
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"New emerging considerations to ecological limits to adaptation \r\nassociated with severe glacier retreat in the Peruvian Andes, is expected \r\nto reduce lake discharge by 2-11% (7-14%) by 2050 (2100). This will \r\naffect smallholders farmers, through crop yield failures and severely \r\nreduced hydropower capacity (Drenkhan et al., 2019). In addition, the \r\nstudy showed a very high risk of glacier lakes being affected by GLOFs \r\nunder RCP8.5, posing serious threat to rural people's livelihoods \r\n(Drenkhan et al., 2019)."


id: f0182a19734f5e7dc5d52f0123efc46a
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"The compounding future effects on equity and sustainability emerge \r\nwhen multiple stressors linked to environmental and/or climate \r\nchange, together with underlying structural poverty, exclusion, \r\nmarginalisation, and conflicts creating risks that need to be addressed \r\nsimultaneously. Compounding risks of climate change received \r\nattention in AR5 (Oppenheimer et  al., 2014). This included risks \r\nassociated with compound hazards (O'Neill et  al., 2017b) and their \r\nimplications for future risk when repeated impacts erode human and \r\necosystem capacity, including through transboundary effects. In SRCCL \r\n(IPCC, 2019a), land degradation and climate change compounded \r\nto highly expose the livelihoods of the poor to climate hazards and \r\ncaused food insecurity (high confidence), migration, conflict and loss \r\nof cultural heritage (low confidence) (Olsson et al., 2019)."


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"The evidence of compounded risks emerges from specific climate and \r\nenvironmental hazards, as in relation to heatwaves, droughts, altered \r\nprecipitation regimes and increasing aridity, cyclones, floods, hurricanes \r\nand wildfires (Table  8.7). Other evidence shows that the structural \r\npoverty and socioeconomic inequalities (Lusseau and Mancini, 2019), \r\ndisability (Sun et al., 2017), corruption (Markkanen, 2019) and isolation \r\n(Reyer et  al., 2017) (Table  8.7) compound to amplify climate risks \r\namong rural and urban poor, smallholder farms, coastal settlements, "


id: df271567a5bd05b39b7c2952c088bfc8
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"Table 8.7 |  Effects of compounded risks on the poor. Climate hazards: flooding, hurricanes, drought and heatwaves."


id: c3a7ff6455f000dc9002e85e72db5ad2
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"to fully recover post-disaster, especially in the context of increasing \r\nglobal temperature increase (van der Geest, 2018). Another example of \r\ncompounding effects of climate change to equity and sustainability is \r\nmigration, which is underpinned by the underlying socioeconomic and \r\npolitical context of vulnerability (see Section 8.2)."


id: b8535cccb24e01f3cc2369cb7179c26b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"with health impacts on children's development (Perera, 2017) and \r\nurban elderly (Sun et  al., 2017). In Tanzania, a greater exposure of \r\nhouseholds to climate change impacts and risks is associated with \r\nincreasing land value and variable tenure, compounded by declining \r\nfarm yields, accelerating the negative effects among the population \r\n(Roschel et  al., 2018). In India, extreme droughts and heatwaves \r\ncompound extreme poverty and high dependence on agriculture for \r\nincome and food production will affect crop productivity, income \r\nand food prices among smallholder farms (Singh and Leua, 2017). In \r\nMozambique, soil degradation and fertility, compounded by incidence \r\nof droughts, increase the vulnerability of already poor smallholders \r\nwho lack access to technological advances for crop yield management \r\nand drought-resistant crops (Kidane et al., 2019)."


id: 5306e92c8353b9b71eaceda67f2b3410
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"L&D from climate extremes, such as fatalities or economic losses \r\ndue to droughts or floods (see also Figure 8.6) also matter for future \r\nvulnerability and risk, since the poorest segments of society take \r\nlonger to recover after shocks (Gupta and Sharma, 2006; van der \r\nGeest, 2018). In some cases, poor households might never be able "


id: 8a642ee952f350098a64edbe67751db5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"of the value of ecosystem-based, institutional and social measures, \r\nincluding the provision of climate-linked safety nets for those who \r\nare most vulnerable (IPCC, 2014a). Climate adaptation measures are \r\nincreasingly integrated within wider policy, development strategies \r\nand spatial planning frameworks. Such integration streamlines the \r\nadaptation planning and decision-making process and embeds climate\u0002sensitive thinking in existing and new institutions and organisations \r\nacross scales and levels."


id: 6ab81f048768073e4037e7318f073ac0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"Overall, there is increasing evidence that the compounding effects of \r\nclimate hazards intertwined with dimensions of poverty, environmental \r\ndegradation and inequalities, represent a key risk to equity and \r\nsustainability among poor and vulnerable populations (medium evidence \r\nand high agreement). Compounding risks--compared to compounding \r\nhazards--can also be significantly influenced by societal tipping points \r\nand by different factors of human vulnerability that determine underlying \r\ndestabilisation processes of societies and communities exposed to \r\nclimate change, including issues of governance."


id: dea88bf9cb62f84533f5bd3d594fc77e
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"This section focuses on adaptation at household and community scales, \r\nincluding options, capacity and enabling environment, which include \r\nactions required towards building resilience. The emphasis is on the \r\ndecision-making space and governance including the role of the state, \r\nprivate sector and other actors. Successful adaptation requires not only \r\nidentifying adaptation options and assessing their costs and benefits, \r\nbut also exploiting available mechanisms for expanding the adaptive \r\ncapacity of human and natural systems (Klein et  al., 2014). At the \r\nsame time, developing suitable responses to hazards for communities \r\nand users of climate services is important in ensuring the success of \r\nadaptation measures. But despite this, knowledge about adaptation \r\noptions, including possible actions that can be implemented to improve \r\nadaptation and reduce the impacts of climate change hazards, is still \r\nlimited."


id: 1540648cb274d10779b57167ab8135e1
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"From the analysis in the IPCC  AR5, there is high agreement that \r\nengineered and technological adaptation options are still the most \r\ncommon adaptation responses. However, there is increased recognition "


id: ef87faa6a058dbefe6e9517561e3e8ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"and transformative changes in our perception and paradigms about the \r\nnature of climate change, adaptation and their relationship to other \r\nnatural and human systems."


id: ad8bd9ef77edf7081157a56340bf26cb
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"In practice, adaptation refers to initiatives such as a policy, plan, project \r\nor decision that are designed to change and/or respond to something in \r\nthe context of existing risks and hazards. For example, a farmer might \r\nadapt to drought by deciding to harvest their crop earlier; a municipality \r\ncan decide to build a sea wall to adapt to increased flood risk."


id: 74ddd7298ccf4328959f0dc5f054f2d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"This section assesses the literature on components of the enabling \r\nenvironment for adaptation. The point of departure considers findings \r\nin both the SR1.5degC report, which notes that adaptation becomes \r\nincreasingly difficult (and expensive) at temperatures that are more than \r\n1.5degC warmer (IPCC, 2018a). In addition, (IPCC, 2014a) underscores \r\nthat there is no one-size-fits-all approach to adaptation for all contexts, \r\nand that mitigation and adaptation must be pursued in tandem."


id: 92970775cbb5cd5b4b9a00d2d9b85e5b
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"The increasing complexity of adaptation practice means that institutional \r\nlearning is an important component of effective adaptation (Noble et al., \r\n2014). It is paramount that approaches to selecting adaptation options \r\ncontinue to emphasise incremental change to reduce impacts while \r\nachieving co-benefits. There is increasing evidence that transformative \r\nchanges may be necessary in order to prepare for climate change impacts \r\nand adaptation options in the context of climate hazards (Noble et al., \r\n2014). Transformation for some actors at some levels may equate with \r\nincremental change and transitions for other actors and scales. While \r\nattention to flexibility and safety margins is becoming more common \r\nin selecting adaptation options, many see the need for more urgent "


id: 98f250cc4aa68b6456f7890cd58bcbfe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"Climate change affects people inequitably, and everyone does not \r\ncontribute equally to climate change. A range of economic and non\u0002economic impacts can be experienced. This has led some researchers to \r\ncall for a more central role for rights-based approaches to adaptation "


id: c7ad32e9740af68d0432e0195af13926
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"United Nations treaty bodies in the reporting period. More broadly, \r\nrights-based approaches rely on the normative framework of human \r\nrights, requiring adaptation to be non-discriminatory, participatory, \r\ntransparent and accountable in both formal (e.g., legal and regulatory) \r\nand informal (e.g., social or cultural norms) settings and at international, \r\nnational and sub-national scales (Ensor et  al., 2015; Arts, 2017). \r\nSovacool et al. (2015) note that unless critical competing interests are "


id: 5b77e8586debc806827214d11b289f37
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"to help secure space for those marginalised from adaptation decision \r\nmaking and to prioritise access to resources and information for those \r\nmost vulnerable to, or affected by, the social, cultural or economic \r\nconsequences of climate change (Bee et  al., 2013; Da Costa, 2014; \r\nToussaint and Martinez Blanco, 2020; Box 8.7; Section 5.12). In terms \r\nof international law, the human rights obligations of states have been \r\nsubject to multiple recommendations relating to climate change by "


id: bb45232ce72f5386089675f407addef7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"Box 8.7 | Addressing inequalities in national capabilities: common but differentiated \r\nresponsibilities and respective capabilities relating to adaptation and the Paris Agreement"


id: 8c9154cded03ce40d2f7ace71104b683
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"The somewhat static interpretation of CBDR-RC prior to the Paris Conference of the Parties was overcome through the introduction \r\nof a qualification to the CBDR-RC principle: the phrase 'in the light of different national circumstances'. Without changing the original \r\nprinciple, the qualifier adds a dynamic element (Rajamani, 2016). Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities \r\nof parties are therefore recognised not to be 'tied to the annexes', but instead evolve alongside national circumstances (Maljean-Dubois, \r\n2016; Voigt and Ferreira, 2016 p.301). The Paris Agreement also recognises context, considering differentiation in relation to each of the \r\nDurban pillars: mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and transparency (Rajamani and Guerin, 2017)."


id: 151aff098f8da6863d91bb0d7af51cdd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"Article 7 of the Paris Agreement acknowledges adaptation as a 'global challenge faced by all', recognising, for the first time, a global \r\naspiration of 'enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change'. It calls for a balance \r\nbetween mitigation and adaptation funding and emphasises the need to provide developing country parties, especially the most \r\nvulnerable, with '[c]ontinuous and enhanced international support' for adaptation. The basis for differentiation under Article 7 therefore \r\nrelies mostly on diverse national circumstances, capabilities and vulnerabilities. LDCs, as well as SIDS, are assumed by the literature, to be \r\npart of this category (Maljean-Dubois, 2016)."


id: 9923dc38fe27e665e08def3bfd9a0d99
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"change (see also Figure 8.6). To support enabling conditions in highly \r\nvulnerable countries that are also characterised by state fragility (see \r\nFigure 8.8), funding and projects designed to support adaptation may \r\nneed to be modified to effectively promote regional cooperation and \r\ntransboundary adaptation. Nevertheless, such interventions can also \r\nreinforce particularly powerful agendas and fail to assist and empower \r\nthose with the greatest need to adapt (Biermann et al., 2010; Burch \r\net al., 2019) neglecting community voices and sovereignty (Schlosberg \r\nand Collins, 2014). It is therefore important that the relevance of people \r\nand community empowerment to effectively achieve vulnerability \r\nreduction and climate change adaptation is recognised."


id: b7c888076b6b24198560a89652670ed0
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"addressed during planning, adaptations may fail to achieve the desired \r\noutcomes. This is increasingly seen at a political level within efforts to \r\nimplement the Paris Agreement, in relation to the principle of 'common \r\nbut differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities' (CBDR-RC) \r\n(Box 8.7)."


id: 584615a7b0a747d876e65086a617ee8
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"It is also insufficient to consider countries as stand-alone entities, due \r\nto links such as those provided by international trade. Taking Europe as \r\nan example, the continent has strong links to major trade partners such \r\nas India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Vietnam, so failure to assist adaptation \r\nin other locations opens up important vulnerabilities through supply \r\nchains (Lung et al., 2017). Policies seeking to protect national interests \r\nalone (e.g., in terms of food security) are seen as causes of negative \r\nimpacts at a global scale (Puma et al., 2015; Challinor et al., 2017), \r\nwith those nations and individuals least able to adapt to evolving \r\nclimate changes experiencing exacerbation of existing imbalances \r\n(Elbehri et al., 2015). LDCs are projected to suffer greater import losses \r\nin more connected networks (Puma et al., 2015). In the food sector, \r\npoorer net food buyers are anticipated to experience the worst impacts \r\nof climate change (Gitz et al., 2015)."


id: fea64aa1fd2ed4803899dac706f27a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"Behind each policy are decisions about the magnitude of financial \r\nresource investments in specific adaptation actions, and their \r\nallocation between different sectors and groups in society, both \r\nspatially and temporally. The IPCC has estimated that limiting the \r\nrise in global average surface temperatures to 1.5degC would require \r\nbetween USD 1.6 trillion to USD 3.8 trillion of annual investment in \r\nsupply-side energy systems (those that generate energy) between \r\n2016 and 2050 (IPCC, 2018b). Resource allocations, however, are \r\nshaped by perceptions of the risks of climate change and the urgency \r\nof actions, as well as other motivational factors such as descriptive \r\nnorms and perceived self-efficacy (van Valkengoed and Steg, 2019) \r\nand the underlying approaches taken to valuing human well-being \r\n(e.g., see work from Bhutan on Gross National Happiness and climate \r\nchange actions (Kamei et al., 2021))."


id: b62b85e0f258232b5112fb01542200f2
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"Acknowledging that context and scale matter, it is nevertheless possible \r\nto set out the core components of a generic enabling environment \r\n(Figure  8.12), linking them to the literature on climate change and \r\nrecognising how they can support adaptation in different socioeconomic \r\nand environmental settings in which different emphases are required. \r\nThis broad set of enablers requires different emphases according to the \r\nspecific context, yet the interdependence between them is universally \r\napplicable."


id: 6f2591bf4c67480c5ddc742a5b006ac6
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"An increase in finance mobilised, however, does not automatically \r\nequate to adaptation interventions on the ground, nor does it \r\nguarantee the effectiveness of those adaptations deployed (Berrang\u0002Ford et al., 2021). Unintended negative consequences may arise due \r\nto lack of understanding of the drivers of vulnerability (such as gender \r\ninequality or inequitable access to natural resources), non-involvement \r\nof marginalised local groups, retrofitting adaptation into existing \r\ndevelopment agendas, and insufficiently defining adaptation success \r\n(Eriksen et al., 2021). A 2017 study estimated that less than 10% of \r\nclimate finance committed from international, regional and national \r\nclimate funds to developing countries between 2003 and 2016 went to \r\nlocally focused projects, suggesting a need to rethink approaches if the \r\nmost affected groups are to build sufficient resilience to the impacts of \r\nclimate change (Soanes et al., 2017)."


id: 7118c76716fb0c19d3856d2181754574
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"The literature shows with high confidence that the poorest groups in \r\nsociety often lose out, and require greater planned adaptation support, \r\nhaving less capacity to adapt than better off groups with easy access \r\nto assets (Barbier and Hochard, 2018; Ziervogel, 2019b; Box  8.5). \r\nDeveloping countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Zambia are not \r\nonly among the most vulnerable to climate change, they are also the \r\nleast able to mobilise the finance needed to adapt to its impacts (ND\u0002GAIN, 2019). Women and girls are often most heavily burdened. When \r\nbuilding adaptive capacity, these groups can require different support \r\nsuch that their knowledge, capacities and skills can be harnessed, \r\nin such a way that does not feminise responsibility and add to their \r\nburdens (Clissold et al., 2020; McNamara et al., 2021a)."


id: 35836a24c7b3286cb0bf0b9ff331aceb
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"There is broad support for the notion, enshrined in the Paris Agreement, \r\nthat adaptation finance flowing to developing countries of the Global \r\nSouth should primarily benefit the most climate-vulnerable among them \r\ndue to their limited technical capacity and financial capabilities, yet \r\nsuch countries are often insufficiently considered in funding decisions. "


id: 821c8e5fcd8e4736b2fe1751ecd040ce
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"building of trust, increasingly shown to be vital (Dorsch and Flachsland, \r\n2017). Literature indicates that professional and learning networks are \r\nimportant groups supporting adaptation in cities and can help harness \r\nresources (Woodruff, 2018); while the research of (Hauge et al., 2019) \r\nin Norway underscores the importance of working across multiple \r\ndisciplines and the inclusion of actors from different levels of authority \r\nin multi-level municipal networks. They found that these factors can \r\nhelp to identify specific adaptation actions as well support knowledge \r\nsharing within participating organisations, which in turn helps garner \r\ncommitment to adaptation and its implementation. They also found \r\nthat it is important to involve local leaders in polycentric adaptation \r\nnetworks."


id: c81e0cf366e5cbd3f8396cccb50607dd
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"brought about by greater exposure to climate risks (Buhr et al., 2018). \r\nThis has been further exacerbated by the recession and debt distress \r\naccompanying the COVID-19 pandemic (Kose et  al., 2021). A range \r\nof reforms, including comprehensive debt relief by public creditors, \r\ngreen recovery bonds, debt-for-climate swaps and new SDG-aligned \r\ndebt instruments may address unsustainable debt burdens, freeing up \r\ninvestment in climate adaptation and a green economic recovery (Volz \r\net al., 2020; see Section 8.6.3.1)."


id: 4d0c6bdcff9977c17ac3b0325051d9d9
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"Greater investment is also needed in the developed countries of \r\nthe Global North. For example, the 2018 forest fires in Sweden, the \r\n2019-2020 Australian bushfire season and the 2020 forest fire season \r\nalong the US West Coast were unusually long and severe, resulting in \r\nunprecedented damage to natural habitats and human livelihoods and, \r\nrelatedly, significant economic cost, particularly given interlinkages \r\nwith other stressors such as COVID-19. While a range of drivers \r\nunderpin annual fire seasons, including greater water withdrawal and \r\nyears of fire suppression, early research indicates that climate change \r\nincreases their likelihood due to long-term warming trends (van \r\nOldenborgh et al., 2021a)."


id: 71e7329b45783536f0387b54b7247c68
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"However, investing in poverty reduction does not necessarily lead \r\nto climate change adaptation and where adaptation does result, it \r\ndoes not always reduce vulnerability of the most marginalised, as \r\ndocumented in case studies from northeast Brazil (Nelson et al., 2016). \r\nPoverty also affects private adaptation options. For example, research \r\nfrom Portugal highlights the importance of private financial assets in \r\nhelping older adults to adapt to extreme temperatures (Nunes, 2018)."


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"important for the development of climate services at local, national and \r\ninternational levels (Vaughan et al., 2017) but this area of literature is \r\nnot yet well developed."


id: f1d038a1cfeb841f40fac5d368d2660a
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"potential benefits are realised and how they can be mainstreamed into \r\npolicy (Frantzeskaki et al., 2019). Similarly, there is limited evidence \r\non unintended consequences (e.g., methane production, creation of \r\nhabitat for disease vectors, increased human-wildlife conflict) and \r\nhow these can be avoided (Wolch et al., 2014)."


id: 8ac297a66982af1f1cf5a8d3e13aa328
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"in adaptation decision making, considering the role of power dynamics \r\ntherein (Collins and Ison, 2009; Ensor and Harvey, 2015; Phuong et al., \r\n2017; Apgar et al., 2018; Brymer et al., 2018; Fisher and Dodman, 2019). \r\nA growing body of evidence also links to organisational learning and \r\nadaptation. Organisations' adaptive behaviours, like those of house\u0002holds and individuals, do not operate in a vacuum, with organisations' \r\nbehaviours shaped by policy and market conditions amongst other \r\nfactors. Mudombi et al. (2017) highlight further barriers in their study \r\nin South Africa, linked to inadequate resourcing, political interference, \r\ngovernance shortcomings and knowledge/expertise gaps within or\u0002ganisations, alongside short time frames for implementing projects."


id: e7cc60845ac1d8cd1be0ac85a3ec6ebc
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"Successful adaptation requires support to be directed towards human \r\ncapital and socioeconomic capabilities and competences, in terms of \r\neducation, knowledge, experience, health and well-being, and migration, \r\nenabling people to contribute meaningfully towards development \r\n(Bowen et  al., 2012). At the same time, strong human capital and \r\ninvestment in actions that build human capacities to deal with climate \r\nchange, can further enhance adaptation activities linked to other capitals, \r\nand contribute positively to overall disaster risk reduction."


id: b3a2f713065467ff9d3f6ee4a76a43ba
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"At the same time, IKLK can inform adaptation actions (Apgar et al., \r\n2018), but is poorly integrated into formal educational systems and, in \r\nsome cases, is insufficient to adapt to new hazards that are emerging \r\nas a consequence of climate change. Education further feeds into \r\nlivelihood options, with close relationships between people's earning \r\ncapacities, the livelihood choices they can make and their levels of \r\nfinancial capital. It also supports food security (Lutz et  al., 2004). \r\nThere is medium evidence that climate change can undermine human \r\ncapital and education. For example, studies have shown that higher \r\ntemperatures reduce exam educational performance (Park, 2020), \r\nwhile extreme weather events such as snowstorms disrupt learning, \r\nyielding long-lasting and multidimensional effects (Maccini and Yang, \r\n2009; Cho, 2017; Graff Zivin et al., 2018)."


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"As well as studies examining formal education, a large body of re\u0002search has focused on social learning and its role in building adaptive \r\ncapacity through joint knowledge production and reflexivity. Fore\u0002grounding the need for continuous changes in response to emerging \r\nconditions, this literature identifies the potential of shared learning for \r\nco-constructing policy and practice responses to complex, multi-stake\u0002holder environmental problems, and highlights both the necessity and \r\nchallenge of including non-dominant values, knowledge and expertise "


id: 6bedc1e4d3ac17d810c789d4d0eb30f7
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"Indigenous knowledge about natural hazards enables communities \r\nat risk to take steps to reduce climate risk. Indigenous knowledge \r\nsystems are locally indispensable resources for adaptation to climate \r\nchange, yet are often misunderstood and undervalued. Generally, \r\nIndigenous Peoples and other local groups hold relevant local\u0002scale knowledge about environmental change, the impacts of those \r\nchanges on ecosystems and livelihoods at local scales, and possible "


id: 77a9976489b67369c90a4d50c64812e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"There are efforts in developing adaptation plans that utilise local \r\nknowledge. Local knowledge-based adaptation is focused primarily on \r\nthe use of traditional knowledge to increase adaptive capacity at the \r\ncommunity level and less on integration (Mimura et al., 2014). Hence, \r\nthere is need to increase effectiveness of policy processes that work \r\ntowards integration of local and scientific knowledge (Nakashima \r\net al., 2013; IPCC, 2014a)."


id: c9fb87c10a095ccd2bf3537cb878f978
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"Given the massive scale of investments required to build and sustain \r\nphysical capital at the state level, it is imperative to ensure physical \r\ncapital decisions consider climate resilience; not least because \r\nretrofitting and replacing are both highly costly. The World Bank \r\nestimates that adapting over the period 2010-2050 to a world that \r\nis 2degC warmer by 2050 will cost USD  70  billion to USD  100  billion \r\nper annum, with the infrastructure sector accounting for the largest \r\nshare of costs (World Bank, 2010). At the same time, every USD  1 \r\ninvested in preventive measures can save USD  5 of repairs (PRIF, \r\n2013). While adequate financing and technical expertise are required, "


id: 33df39045f0fed96d270dc93357a00b3
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"Social and cultural factors are closely linked to values, beliefs and \r\nidentities (Heimann and Mallick, 2016) and mediate the ways in which \r\npeople respond to climate variability and change (Adger et al., 2013). \r\nThere is limited evidence but medium agreement about the importance \r\nand role of social and cultural factors in shaping adaptation, in terms of "


id: a7be49211535e7a03917846a655264e1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"Historically, southern coastal Bangladesh, where the 1970 Bhola Cyclone killed 500,000 people, has been considered among the most \r\nclimate-vulnerable environments on Earth. However, in recent decades, extreme weather events, like Cyclone Aila, though still destructive \r\nand destabilising, have resulted in lower death tolls thanks to a concerted investment in flood mitigation infrastructure, a dense network \r\nof cyclone shelters and a robust early warning system (Chowdhury et al., 1993; Paul, 2009). Cyclone Aila struck the southwest coast of \r\nBangladesh on 25 May 2009 with a wind speed of 120 km hour-1 (Islam and Hasan, 2016). With tidal surges of up to 6.5 m, occurring \r\nover dry pre-monsoon soils, 11 coastal districts and more than 3.9 million people were affected (United Nations, 2010), 190 people died \r\nand 7100 people suffered injuries (Saha, 2017)."


id: b1c746965f092c8d4e037b5de72ce0f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"A range of coping and adaptation actions were enacted in response to losses of and damage to physical capital (Table Box 8.8.1). Actions \r\nvaried across the different affected areas and were taken by the households themselves, by the government and by NGOs."


id: 2684415af9976e261fbbe04cca4ee000
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content:
"Table Box 8.8.1 |  Coping and adaptation actions enacted in the Cyclone Aila-affected area in response to losses of and damage to physical capital."


id: cd48ff53d6c8049d9c40be7695e2fb5e
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"The impacts of some of these adaptations, particularly engagement in new livelihood activities after Aila, were varied, with income of \r\nthe affected households increasing in some cases and decreasing in others. In Koyra, the income of the poorest and middle-income \r\nhouseholds increased by 16% and 4%, respectively, while the income of richer households (many of whom lost physical capital assets \r\nthat they used to pursue their livelihoods) decreased by 50% (Abdullah et al., 2016)."


id: ca1f04590ab37844a3dceac7b9127073
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"Research into adaptation projects led by various actors has shown that adaptations taken by the households and community themselves \r\nare effective only to address typical challenges (such as seasonal shifts in temperature or rainfall) but are less effective in addressing \r\nextreme events that have long-lasting impacts. This is mainly due to lack of adequate resources and institutional support (Alam et al., \r\n2015). At the same time, some coping mechanisms are harmful in the longer term, for example, harvesting Sundarbans forest wood after \r\nAila for reconstruction could have negative impacts on the forest."


id: 41facd2d9c8a2bf08d8a8941898bc9a3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"Social factors in the context of adaptation, by contrast, are more widely \r\nstudied. The literature on adaptation and the role of social capital as an \r\nenabler is diverse. There is high confidence that during disasters, social \r\ncapital plays an important role in linking those who are affected to \r\nexternal supports and resources. On small islands, social networks can be \r\ndense and support adaptation (Petzold and Ratter, 2015), with traditional \r\nknowledge and societal cohesion helping small island communities to \r\nhave self-belief and build resilience even in the absence of external \r\ninterventions (Nunn and Kumar, 2018). Even the development of weak "


id: 89fb8c38b7802a4c5a362c8b55158a73
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"for the poor. It examines whether climate change response options, \r\nmeaning mitigation and adaptation, in different development sectors, \r\ncreate development synergies or trade-offs for low-income households \r\nand people living in poverty."


id: 38d7636815efac4116a1e8ba13f77633
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"Further warnings about social capital as an adaptation enabler come \r\nfrom Acosta et al. (2016) who recognise that it may be detrimental to \r\nprivate adaptation in some cases. Their research in rural Ethiopia found \r\nthat qualitative measures of trust predict contributions to public goods, \r\nsupporting theories about collective action, but that the effects of social \r\ncapital are not homogenous: it can be helpful in some contexts, but \r\nunhelpful, or even detrimental in others. This led them to highlight the \r\nneed for policymakers to consider these potentially different outcomes. \r\nOther research, also from Ethiopia, suggested that households with \r\nmore social capital are more specialised in their livelihood strategies. \r\nThis could leave them more vulnerable to climate change impacts (as \r\nper the Cyclone Aila example where shrimp farmers were specialised \r\nand hit hardest by the cyclone's impacts), though social capital acts as \r\na kind of informal insurance (Wuepper et al., 2018)."


id: a5dbcef8e0e91625468c2d0467946f72
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"The link between development and climate change was not \r\nevaluated comprehensively until the first decades of the 21st century \r\n(Figure  8.13; Klein et  al., 2005; Tol, 2005). Until recently mitigation \r\nand adaptation, the two primary approaches to climate action, have \r\nbeen dealt with separately in climate change science and policy \r\n(Landauer et al., 2015). Nevertheless, synergistic 'co-benefits' between \r\nmitigation and adaptation may be enhanced, and trade-offs reduced, \r\nthrough the holistic empirical evaluation of actions for climate change \r\nresponse (Runhaar et al., 2018). The synergistic effect of mitigation and \r\nadaptation has been documented for a few interventions across the \r\nglobe, however, evidence-based quantification of the synergies and \r\ntrade-offs are rare."


id: 8c40c031873efbf32eebb58ad73b5fbf
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"Where co-benefits have emphasised identifying mitigation-adaptation \r\nsynergies, a key turn has been evaluating climate compatible \r\ndevelopment (CCD), 'development that minimises the harm caused \r\nby climate change impacts, while maximising the many human \r\ndevelopment opportunities presented by a low emission, more resilient \r\nfuture' (Mitchell and Maxwell, 2010). CCD calls for triple wins, resulting "


id: acd2e65d9545a44473cf23c05bd3389e
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"bottom-up processes, and making use of available levers of policy, \r\ntechnology, education and financial/economic systems (Stringer et al., \r\n2020)."


id: 1ee9c22e2502f4c375685aa045a725b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"in synergies between mitigation-adaptation-development through \r\nsingle interventions (Figure  8.13; Ellis and Tschakert, 2019). CCD \r\noffers specific entry points for identifying ways on how to strengthen \r\nsynergies between mitigation and adaptation, particularly within the \r\ncontext of low-income countries. Effective integration of emission \r\nreductions and accommodation actions for mitigation and adaptation \r\ncan be win-win strategies, may be cost-efficient (Runhaar et al., 2018) \r\nand have the potential to create opportunities to foster sustainable \r\ndevelopment (Denton et al., 2014)."


id: 83ad60818798ea88dab24b0067bf5532
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"This assessment identifies and evaluates approaches to CRD 'that \r\ndeliberately adopt mitigation and adaptation measures to secure a safe \r\nclimate, meet basic needs, eliminate poverty and enable equitable, just \r\nand sustainable development'. The body of literature on the synergies \r\nand trade-offs between adaptation, mitigation, poverty, equity and \r\nsustainable development has grown steadily since the AR5 (IPCC, \r\n2014a). The IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of \r\n1.5degC (IPCC, 2018c), suggests that 'Limiting warming to 1.5degC can be \r\nachieved synergistically with poverty alleviation and improved energy \r\nsecurity and can provide large public health benefits through improved \r\nair quality, preventing millions of premature deaths.'"


id: e4b3838e343e7624ce5656bb8da1e97
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"Implementing the integrative concept of CRD is expected to produce \r\ntransformative benefits affecting the poorest populations primarily \r\n(Roy et al., 2018; Leal Filho et al., 2019). The risks of transformative \r\nactions to the poor are diminished when undertaken in the context \r\nof good governance at multiple levels, within existing top-down and "


id: eb106e9b7a9aedcfb33ebcc6cd0211b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"projects (e.g., hydropower) (Hennessey et al., 2017). Adaptation can \r\nsupport mitigation and contribute to co-benefits in various ways: \r\nensuring development-based natural resource management (Denton \r\net al., 2014; Suckall et al., 2015; Reang et al., 2021), integrating water \r\nresources management (Liang et  al., 2016; Sharifi, 2021), practicing \r\nsustainable agriculture (Bustamante et al., 2014; Duguma et al., 2014a; \r\nDi Gregorio et al., 2017; Reang et al., 2021), ensuring the protection \r\nof ecosystem services (Pandey et  al., 2017a; Baumber et  al., 2019), \r\nconserving biodiversity (Di Gregorio et al., 2017; Loboguerrero et al., \r\n2019; Smith et  al., 2019) and managing bioenergy resource (Dovie, \r\n2019)."


id: 97f4d6cd3b1f753ec0da8615279a8376
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"Mitigation planning has not sufficiently considered poverty reduction \r\npolicies, the basis for narrowing the adaptation gap (see also \r\nFigure 8.14). Many synergies between climate change mitigation and \r\npoverty reduction have been identified, although sometimes with limited \r\nevidence. The mitigation measures that have been most evaluated \r\ninclude clean development mechanisms (CDM), programmes aimed \r\nat reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation \r\n(REDD+), voluntary carbon offsets and biofuel production. However, \r\nwhile these mitigation programmes stimulate economic growth, \r\nthey may contribute to processes that trade-off against equitable \r\ndevelopment and threaten to further impoverish forest communities, \r\nsuch as large-scale land acquisitions (Carter et  al., 2017; Schaafsma \r\net al., 2021) and fortress conservation (see IPCC SR 1.5degC, Chapter 5 \r\n(Roy et al., 2018); and see also Chapter 6 of this report)."


id: ac2d3c6e5a251402f615ea90a5171db0
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"amending or reducing the discursive rift between climate policy and \r\nsustainable development (Venema and Rehman, 2007)."


id: 9780a27287c0050b757f40150f42e32e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"destruction by climate impacts, for example (Stadelmann et al., 2014). \r\nImplementing a mitigation or adaptation option may positively or \r\nnegatively, directly or indirectly, affect the feasibility and effectiveness \r\nof other options, such as soil management leading to soil organic \r\ncarbon (Locatelli et al., 2015; de Coninck et al., 2018). Farmers and local \r\npeople are often also being encouraged to undertake mitigation and \r\nadaptation activities leading to long-term benefits, such as cultivation \r\nof no-till wheat with residue retention leading to low emissions along \r\nwith saving energy and water (Wright et al., 2014)."


id: 30313b882274b5182c09ca434edc29ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"Moreover, a regulatory structure for evaluation of mitigation and \r\nadaptation actions is required to understand the co-benefits of these \r\ntwo actions. For example, the choice of adaptation actions can be \r\nmade according to their effectiveness per unit of money invested such \r\nas economic assets saved from destruction of climate change impacts \r\nand benefits can be evaluated in terms of economies, people and the \r\nenvironment, such as human lives and health protected rather than the \r\nemission reduction by mitigation strategies (Stadelmann et al., 2014)."


id: 1519244ae88212aa629e0ec12cf73eb0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"The assessed literature underscores that for synergies to be realised, \r\nmitigation and adaptation policies must be institutionally supported \r\nwithin a multi-level governance architecture (national to sub-national \r\nto municipal levels) with other priorities, and sustainable financing \r\nmechanisms identified within the country or via the international \r\ncommunity (Dovie and Lwasa, 2017). Integrating and mainstreaming \r\nadaptation and mitigation across agencies within countries can bridge \r\nthe divide between climate policy and sustainable development \r\n(Venema and Rehman, 2007)."


id: 92f01a88bff48eb1ef99f99ef833fa93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"Within sector policies and economic sectors (such as land use, \r\ntransportation and technology), mitigation and adaptation have many \r\npositive, negative, direct and indirect linkages within and beyond the \r\nsector (Locatelli et al., 2015). The land use sector, for example, includes \r\nagriculture and forestry, and encompasses the management of a mosaic \r\nof interacting urban environments and ecosystems with a diversity of \r\ncultural and institutional attributes (Locatelli et  al., 2015). The land \r\nuse sector is key to climate adaptation, where policy coordination can \r\nenhance food production, regulate urban microclimates, affect water \r\nsecurity and, in the case of mangroves, buffer the impacts of extreme \r\nclimate events in coastal areas (Locatelli et al., 2015). City-level actions, \r\nsuch as zoning and planning that promotes green development and "


id: f3154ec7797bf6551df5a0941b8588af
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"The Paris Agreement recognised that the agreement will reflect equity \r\nand CBDR-RC of national circumstances, (Voigt and Ferreira, 2016) and \r\nshould be broadened to include mitigation co-benefits (Dovie, 2019). \r\nIntegrating adaptation with mitigation may possibly contribute to "


id: a2af234da565e9188c1b681d53f0ec44
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"and incomes, adapt and build resilience to climate change, and reduce \r\nand/or remove GHG emissions (FAO, 2017). Various CSA technologies \r\nare capable of improving crop yields, increasing net income, increasing \r\ninput-use efficiencies and reducing emissions (Khatri-Chhetri et  al., \r\n2017). However, uptake and adoption of CSA by local farmers in poor \r\ndeveloping countries remains a challenge (Palanisami et al., 2015) due \r\nto the difficulty of identifying and prioritising of technologies suiting \r\nlocal climate risks and accommodating the farming practices of locals \r\n(Dougill et al., 2017; Khatri-Chhetri et al., 2017). An analysis of CSA \r\nimplementation in Mali, for example, identified major challenges to \r\npolicymakers' efforts to adopt CSA, including difficulties identifying \r\nCSA options and portfolios, valuing them and prioritising investments \r\n(Andrieu et al., 2017)."


id: d047f0b0519c7d31f8c9a762fd9a4ae
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"green and efficient energy use, can also be pivotal for reduction in \r\nemissions and improvement in resilience (UCLG, 2015). Urban planning \r\nand transport policies, such as means of transportation, are crucial to \r\nsupport a transition towards a low-carbon and resilient future (Ford \r\net al., 2018), as public and private transport facilities are crucial for \r\nemission reduction."


id: f68a3747fb813894c13d530a466cc36d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"Potential opportunities from CSA may also result from integration \r\nof 'technological packages' (Totin et  al., 2018), which include new \r\nmarket structures, knowledge infrastructure and agriculture extension \r\nservices, capacity-building programmes (Dougill et  al., 2017; Totin \r\net al., 2018) and institutional support for key enabling programmes, \r\nsuch as crop insurance, agro-advisories and rainwater harvesting \r\n(Khatri-Chhetri et  al., 2017). CSA is able--if carefully designed--to \r\nachieve transformative 'triple wins' for climate and development when \r\nit is accompanied by new governance architectures that are socially \r\ninclusive and respectful of traditions and livelihoods, and accommodate \r\ntraditional institutions that underpin the bargaining power of the \r\npoorest and most vulnerable groups (Karlsson et al., 2017)."


id: fa2bc134e3203b34ab2ae76361b8a1c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"Conservation agriculture (CA), another framework for achieving CRD, is \r\nbased on three synergistic principles: (a) soil management to reduce soil \r\nphysical disturbance and reduce its degradation, (b) crop management \r\nsuch as residue management to protect the soil top layers and (c) \r\ngenetic management to increase agricultural systems' biodiversity and \r\ntherefore their resilience (DeLonge and Basche, 2017). In the cereal \r\nsystems of the Indo-Gangetic Plains, India, CA has increased crop yields, \r\nreturns from crop cultivation and input-use efficiency, in spite of heat \r\nstress, while reducing GHGs emissions (Sapkota et al., 2015). However, \r\nchallenges with CA are also documented in the scientific literature. For \r\nexample, an evaluation of CA in Malawi noted that adoption of CA \r\nwas challenged by weak integration of CA in agricultural policies, lack \r\nof institutional arrangements of promoters and farmers' experiences \r\n(Chinseu et al., 2019)."


id: 9d7ac0c5310cfd8e9107b52bef64c2ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"CSA is discussed in the scientific literature as an approach that could \r\ntransform agricultural production systems and food value chains in \r\nline with sustainable development and food security under climate \r\nchange. However, concerns and criticisms have been raised, such as \r\nthe insufficient consideration of access to entitlements within CSA \r\nand the question who wins and loses when applying CSA in different \r\ncountry contexts (see Karlsson et al., 2017; Sain et al., 2017). CSA has \r\nthree main objectives: sustainably increase agricultural productivity "


id: 8912c50a4ced05b9cb7d775479467c07
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content:
"strategies (Tschora and Cherubini, 2020). In spite of various benefits \r\nof agroforestry, the expansion of existing areas of agroforestry and \r\nthe establishment of new agroforestry systems has remained limited \r\n(Martineau et al., 2016), mainly due to a lack of institutional support, \r\na lack of expert support to ensure adequate management, weak \r\ncapacity for monitoring and regulation, and a lack of financial support \r\n(Hernandez-Morcillo et al., 2018)."


id: 3ffd35679a07e944afec1e144c85918a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"Overall, different farming and pastoral systems can achieve reductions \r\nin the emissions intensity of livestock products. Depending on the \r\nfarming and pastoral systems and level of development, reductions \r\nin the emissions intensity of livestock products may lead to absolute \r\nreductions in GHG emissions (IPCC, 2019a) (medium confidence). \r\nSignificant synergies exist between adaptation and mitigation, for \r\nexample, through SLM approaches (high confidence)."


id: 6b750954030347525c5f0c3c0218e496
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Forests can support CRD in rural communities and households: they \r\nsupport consumption of energy, food and fibre, provide a safety net in \r\ncases of shocks, fill gaps during seasonal shortfalls and are a means \r\nto accumulate assets and provide support to emerge out of poverty \r\n(Angelsen et  al., 2014; Adams et  al., 2020). Forest ecosystems are \r\nan essential element of climate change mitigation and adaptation, \r\nwith the potential for synergy and conflict between the two climate \r\naction objectives (Morecroft et al., 2019). However, there are varied \r\nperspectives on the role of the forests, with some treating conservation \r\nand forest management practices as a barrier to livelihood resilience \r\n(Few et al., 2017) despite the broader role of forest management in \r\nclimate mitigation (Houghton, 2012)."


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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"Forestry mitigation projects such as forest conservation, reduced de\u0002forestation, protected area management and sustainable forest man\u0002agement, can promote adaptation and can also have consequences \r\nfor the development objectives of other sectors (e.g., expansion of \r\nfarmland) (Smith et al., 2014). REDD+ (reducing emissions from de\u0002forestation and forest degradation, fostering conservation and sus\u0002tainable management of forest and enhancement of carbon stocks) \r\nis a payment programme that may provide adaptation benefits by \r\nenhancing households' economic resilience (Sills et al., 2014; Duch\u0002elle et al., 2018) and also produce positive livelihood impacts through "


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"Policies supporting sustainable rangeland management and the \r\nlivelihood strategies of rangeland users have an outsized influence on \r\nboth development and climate action (Gharibvand et al., 2015). Climate \r\nchange adaptation, mitigation practices and livestock production can \r\nbe supported by policies that encourage diversification of livestock \r\nanimals (within species), support sustainable foraging and feed varieties "


id: b6f5854bdfc9086a5341c63ec088fc0b
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"magnitude of climate change impacts (Bakkegaard et al., 2016), along \r\nwith facilitating participation of communities in the two activities and \r\ndefining forest policies (Ngum et  al., 2019). Moreover, international \r\ndonors and funds are also critical to guide countries to identify \r\nadaptation-mitigation synergies, through consultation processes, \r\ndialogue and awareness raising (Locatelli et al., 2016). Moreover, in \r\norder to be effective, nature-based climate solutions such as mixed \r\nspecies plantation, forest expansion and REDD+, must be people\u0002centric and respond to the needs of the rural and Indigenous Peoples \r\nwho manage ecosystems for their livelihoods, while at the same time \r\nsupporting the biodiversity of the ecosystems (Temperton et al., 2019; \r\nFleischman et al., 2020)."


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"the employment benefits of supporting conservation and sustainable \r\nmanagement of forests (Caplow et al., 2011). Furthermore, the man\u0002agement of ecosystem services may contribute to both mitigation and \r\nadaptation. For example, REDD+ projects, such as mangrove conser\u0002vation and restoration, simultaneously contribute to carbon storage \r\nand diversification of incomes and economic activities. At the same \r\ntime, mangroves protect coastal areas against flooding and hydrolog\u0002ical variations, improving capacity for adaptation in local livelihoods \r\n(Locatelli et al., 2016)."


id: ff77227abc22a4d1a23bf703ac73a2d1
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"The continued dependence on fossil energy sources for economic \r\ndevelopment is the primary source of increasing GHGs (Hansen et al., \r\n2017). There is emerging agreement in terms of the importance of the \r\nbioenergy sector for climate change mitigation (Jackson et al., 2016; \r\nHansen et  al., 2017), however, the options and limitations in terms \r\nof transforming the energy systems to support both mitigation and \r\nadaptation are still contested."


id: ad25bd36031a18a04d61474eece13965
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"To achieve CRD, forestry conservation strategies need to be driven \r\nby climate action and forest management policies that benefit \r\nboth ecological and human systems, and, above all, involve forest \r\ncommunities in programme and project implementation (Cordeiro\u0002Beduschi, 2020). Synergies between mitigation and adaptation of the \r\nforestry sector can be enhanced by considering on-the-ground contexts \r\nof constraints and social trade-offs that may undermine implemented \r\nactions (Few et al., 2017). However, the lack of knowledge about trade\u0002offs and synergies at the local level and between local and global \r\nscales makes this challenging."


id: 36bf97556f001bcb2bb1de14ff9642c0
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"Despite these constraints, forestry can serve as a foundation for CRD \r\nwhen adaptation and mitigation activities are effectively integrated \r\nfrom the stage of policy formulation with consideration of specific \r\ninstitutional structures and procedures that can help to facilitate such \r\nintegration (Locatelli et  al., 2015). Effectively integrated adaptation \r\nand mitigation activities can be achieved by encouraging collaboration \r\nbetween the two activities, promoting research on the impacts of \r\nthe integrated activities, their cost-effectiveness and their synergies \r\nwithin the complex setting of risks and uncertainty concerning the "


id: da5e198b55b1fa24a7b478bc47d22c69
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"emissions and increased benefits for communities (Morand et  al., \r\n2015). However, the policy perspective must be based on the country \r\ncircumstances, especially urbanisation, economic growth and energy \r\nconsumption matching with the income level of the country (Wang \r\net al., 2018)."


id: fc4fd8c98d06906764a3d4b907cc20e8
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"local production; and use of double cropping and flex crops to provide \r\nfood and energy (Souza et al., 2017)."


id: 230c43ba313a03cc6c4ee3c43d604039
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"This section lists several groups of strategies, including mainstreaming \r\nand coherence; dealing with complexities through broader and \r\ninnovative governance; provision of funding and the associated cost \r\nand benefit analysis; and focusing on the community and addressing \r\nunderlying equity through transformational adaptation."


id: b92d597331aa8abd676f8fa9e67c1104
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"and adaptation policies objectives and policies), external coherence \r\n(climate change and development objectives), vertical integration \r\n(mainstream climate change into sectoral policies) and horizontal \r\nintegration (overarching governance structures for cross-sectoral \r\ncoordination)."


id: 380fbe324fa14bfc62c99385bf875c92
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"Progress of policy integration varies from the global to local level. \r\nProgress in mainstreaming and coherence is emerging globally and \r\nhas slowly made it down to the national level (Di Gregorio et al., 2017). \r\nAdaptation and mitigation should be mainstreamed into planning \r\nand implementation on food security programmes, and cross-cutting \r\noversights are required to integrate land restoration, climate policy, \r\nfood security and disaster risk management into a coherent policy \r\nframework (Woolf et al., 2015)."


id: 633bbb9a8b4fa4cf24aef5c56c252bfa
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"There has been an increase in the literature examining adaptation \r\nand mitigation synergy in the Nationally Determined Contributions \r\nsubmitted by countries to the UNFCCC. Agriculture and energy \r\nare the two priority sectors for which there have been significant \r\npledges and commitments from countries, with, to some extent, good \r\nalignment between adaptation and mitigation. This alignment can \r\nprovide good opportunities to integrate both into national sectoral \r\npolicies (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018a). This suggests that inclusive and \r\nsustainable economic and social development can be achieved if \r\nnational governments focus on developing coherent, cross-sector \r\napproaches that deliver potential triple wins of mitigation, adaptation \r\nand development."


id: cf86353ac3144c95c6de38227b88caa
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"Another important strategy to better determine impacts of \r\nadaptation and mitigation and to promote inclusivity, transparency \r\nand accountability is the community-based approach. This approach \r\nalso supports adaptation and mitigation indirectly through the \r\nstrengthening of capacity and social capital. For example, in Bangkalan, \r\nIndonesia, the presence of high social capacity and readily available \r\nfree agricultural inputs are two decisive factors for effective climate \r\nchange mitigation and adaptation, as well as for enhancing community \r\nlivelihood (Sunkar and Santosa, 2018). The calls to consider Indigenous \r\nknowledge and Indigenous People to support integrated strategies in \r\nadaptation and mitigation are increasing (Ford et  al., 2016; Altieri "


id: e17e3e414ab172fad3566d223b405c9d
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"Increasing demands for water, energy, food and materials are putting \r\npressure on resource supply, and hence the nexus approach can inform \r\ntransition pathways for interlinked resource systems (Johnson et al., \r\n2019). The nexus approach, especially the water-energy-food nexus, "


id: f9513da19ef4a6bb9d9b095b7e4b4958
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"and employed across different jurisdictions. For example, solar \r\nphotovoltaic (PV) presents an established way across a multitude \r\nof countries to produce low-carbon energy at a profit and reduce \r\nglobal GHG emissions. Adaptation needs, however, vary greatly from \r\nlocation to location and short-term solutions, for example investments \r\nin irrigation technologies to improve water availability for specific \r\ncrops in a growing season, may differ from longer-term solutions, \r\nfor example, switching to different crops altogether. Benefits are not \r\nalways easily quantified and often accrue to local communities over \r\ntime rather than to investors looking for the kind of returns realised in \r\nmitigation actions."


id: 7838794ef6d59545d9d8a27af492a6d1
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"Development finance institutions mainly draw on market-rate loans \r\nand, to a lesser extent, concessional lending and grants to finance \r\nadaptation actions. There are regional differences in the choice of \r\ninstruments, too, owing to the degree of economic development: while \r\nmost of the adaptation finance flowing to the Asia-Pacific is market\u0002rate debt, the vast majority of adaptation finance flowing to sub\u0002Saharan Africa is in the form of concessional debt or grants (Richmond \r\net al., 2020)."


id: e709e4d7db8d6b10e544800e2280eb1c
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"There are strong interconnections between NBS, climate adaptation \r\nand mitigation actions. Ecosystem-based adaptation is a nature\u0002based solution that uses ecosystem services to help communities \r\nadapt to climate change. Examples of such approaches were covered \r\nin Section  8.5.2.2. For example, mangrove restoration provides \r\nboth climate mitigation (as carbon sinks) and adaptation to climate \r\nchange (increasing the resilience of coastal communities), while also \r\nsupporting the implementation of a range of other SDGs (e.g., through \r\nincreased food security). Research has found that without mangroves, \r\nglobal flood damage costs would increase by more than USD 65 billion \r\na year (Menendez et al., 2020). There is, therefore, an urgent need to \r\ninvest in a range of NBS."


id: 904274c9a7ae3efab29cdaafbd8178ae
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"Adaptation finance funds actions to adapt to the impacts of climate \r\nchange, yet such actions are heavily context, scale and time specific. \r\nMany mitigation actions in the energy sector can be easily quantified "


id: 86c193e235f3cb944bc5be7a6edfce5e
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"Box 8.9 | Adaptation financing for the poor \r\nand the need for systems transition: Eastern \r\nIndonesian Islands"


id: 37b3c1ecdd8efb67961988c589f93fd1
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"A 4-year project in Nusa Tenggara Barat Province, Indonesia, \r\naimed to stimulate an adaptation pathways process. The goal \r\nwas to support CRD in a context with low stakeholder capacity, \r\nhigh poverty, and rapid environmental and social change. On \r\nthese archipelagic islands, livelihoods are predominantly rural, \r\nfar from political and urban centres. The project focused on \r\nintegrated top-down and bottom-up development planning \r\nthat could enable CRD at the local level, linked to provincial \r\nand national plans."


id: 469b3197f93577983ef19d11b865731a
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"Since the AR5, there is greater documentation of the extreme measures \r\nand high-risk income alternatives that the world's poorest commonly \r\ntake to finance adaptation (Dawson, 2017; Ahmed et al., 2019). While \r\nstill a controversial topic, clear examples of extreme adaptation \r\nfinance measures include:"


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"they do not undermine other coping strategies such as risk spreading, \r\nprogrammes that ease access or subsidise loans for adaptation, mobile \r\nbanking and mobile-based financial and risk management tools, impact \r\npay-outs in the form of direct transfers and institutional support for \r\nhometown associations. International governance arrangements, such \r\nas the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage, might \r\naim primarily to clear the financing gap between global financial and \r\nrisk management institutions and the pocketbooks of the poorest \r\n(Wrathall et al., 2015)."


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"The chapter has moved beyond the IPCC WGII AR5 in that it lays \r\nout structural elements of vulnerability and provides quantitative \r\ninformation about climate-related vulnerability hotspots globally \r\ncomplemented by the assessment of poverty, local livelihood \r\nvulnerability and sustainable development. The assessment of non\u0002economic losses, and enabling and supportive environments for \r\nadaptation are also new aspects."


id: c0957083a15b4bd1076127fff502f2d1
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"The chapter also advances knowledge in terms of the interconnections \r\nbetween human vulnerability, observed losses and adverse \r\nconsequences. The assessment shows that statistically relevant \r\ndifferences in observed fatalities per hazard event can be explained \r\nby hazard intensity and frequency, and are also linked to different \r\nlevels of vulnerability of a region exposed. Despite all uncertainties \r\nabout future change, the assessed literature clearly provides an \r\naccurate picture of the expected societal impacts of climate change, \r\nthe requirements for successful adaptation and the need to address \r\nthe adaptation gap from the perspective of vulnerability."


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"The chapter shows that intersectionality approaches are becoming \r\nincreasingly central to grasping how differential vulnerability to climate \r\nhazards is experienced by different social groups. Intersectionality \r\nrecognises that age, gender, class, race and ethnicity are reinforcing \r\nsocial phenomena, shaping social inequalities and experiences of the \r\nworld, and also intersect with climate hazards and vulnerability. Our \r\nassessment reveals the central role of maladaptation with robust new \r\nevidence on negative consequences of interventions on different social \r\ngroups. Well-intentioned adaptation can exacerbate past and existing \r\nvulnerabilities and undermine livelihoods. There is also evidence that, \r\ndespite maladaptation, inclusive and sustainable development at the \r\nlocal level can reduce vulnerability."


id: 273fdd1fae822b78cc366cfa8f2a543d
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"Since AR5 L&D has taken much more central stage in sustainable \r\ndevelopment, policy, and poverty and livelihoods discourse. While \r\nthere is ambiguity about what constitutes L&D, the chapter highlights \r\nnew evidence of observed L&Ds, including slow-onset impacts (e.g., \r\nsea level rise and drought). Our assessment reveals that there is a \r\nbody of literature that explicitly addresses non-economic losses and \r\nthat these are experienced everywhere now due to human-induced \r\nclimate change. These are coupled with advancements in the science \r\nof extreme event attribution with new focus on adaptation metrics and \r\nvulnerability assessments."


id: 5532457b1259ba02898b0a23fe648edc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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content:
"This assessment also identifies emerging evidence of linkages between \r\nextreme and slow-onset events, NELD and livelihood shifts. This "


id: 1bfcdc790a4f6c270044ce1a4312553c
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"that depend strongly on natural capital for both subsistence and as \r\na source of income are particularly sensitive to climate risks; and are \r\nwhere perhaps adaptive actions are most urgently needed, even with \r\nsmaller rises in temperature under the most optimistic scenarios. This \r\napplies to both the Global South and the Global North. Investments in \r\nany form of capital asset to support adaptation need to be mindful of \r\nreinforcing existing inequalities and introducing new ones, particularly \r\nif transformation takes place. This also underscores the importance of \r\ninclusive, polycentric governance in ensuring the voices of all groups \r\nare heard and that wide-ranging knowledge types are incorporated \r\nin decision making, nevertheless recognising that trade-offs are in\u0002evitable."


id: 5fc417bb3612eb3602761077d42f438
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"suggests that losses are leading to a range of shifts in livelihoods, \r\nwhich may be easier for some social groups than others, and which \r\nhave implications for livelihoods security across transboundary \r\nscales. Yet, climate change is only one driver. Untangling the drivers \r\nof vulnerability using intersectionality approaches is also critical. Our \r\nquantification of vulnerability hotspots supports this concern. It is \r\ncritical to seek further knowledge on the extent of livelihood shifts \r\namong the most vulnerable resulting from specific NELD, for whom, \r\nwhere and at what scale. Gaps in knowledge highlight this as an area \r\nthat needs further work in order to develop and understand further the \r\nfull extent and reach of the relationships between extreme and slow\u0002onset climate events, non-economic losses and shifting livelihoods."


id: 382a41faa5a8a0192b79a23678c6727b
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"The chapter also highlights and provides quantitative evidence that \r\nadaptation strategies need to go beyond the idea of adapting to warming \r\nlevels only. Adaptation strategies have to reduce the adaptation gap \r\nand therewith reduce human vulnerability independent of a specific \r\nclimatic hazard. It has been shown that adaptation strategies that \r\nexplicitly address poverty and inequities, and also consider rights\u0002based approaches can generate co-benefits for resilience building of \r\nmost vulnerable groups and for sustainable development."


id: 851c720f8f8af4e9933a735e648b7a0d
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"Evidence on the kinds of enabling environment required paints a com\u0002plex picture. The assessment highlights the interaction of different \r\ncapital assets within the broader context of key enablers in shaping \r\nthe overall enabling environment for adaptation, which itself is highly \r\ncontext dependent. In this regard, countries present different starting \r\npoints for adaptation, with some requiring, for example, more of an \r\nemphasis on institutional capacity building; others requiring transfor\u0002mation to the broader legal and political conditions. Capitals are not \r\nnecessarily substitutable but rather act as an assemblage in shaping \r\nboth perceptions of climate risk and the necessity and appropriateness \r\nof actions. At the same time there is robust evidence that livelihoods "


id: 7725466b32972372e2d7dd5c1dfd4d3f
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"FAQ 8.1 | Why are people who are poor and disadvantaged especially vulnerable to climate change and why do \r\nclimate change impacts worsen inequality?"


id: 70f9a97e766826b956adda5247c1a1a4
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"Poor people and their livelihoods are especially vulnerable to climate change because they usually have fewer assets and less access to \r\nfunding, technologies and political influence. Combined, these constraints mean they have fewer resources to adapt to climate change impacts. \r\nClimate change impacts tend to worsen inequalities because they disproportionately affect disadvantaged groups. This in turn further increases \r\ntheir vulnerability to climate change impacts and reduces their ability to cope and recover."


id: ed99e8ad9500c35fc56f0f90e368625f
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"It is not just poverty that can make people more vulnerable to climate change and climate-related hazards. \r\nDisadvantage due to discrimination, gender and income inequalities and lack of access to resources (e.g., those \r\nwith disabilities or of minority groups) can mean these groups have fewer resources with which to prepare and \r\nreact to climate change and to cope with and recover from its adverse effects. They are therefore more vulnerable. \r\nThis vulnerability can then increase due to climate change impacts in a vicious cycle unless adaptation measures are \r\nsupported and made possible."


id: 323ff4be7e6b97c31633811c718f5c12
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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"A mix of multiple development challenges, such as poverty, hunger, conflict and environmental degradation, make countries and whole regions \r\nvulnerable to climate change. Many of the people in the most vulnerable situations and in the most vulnerable regions are also highly exposed \r\nto climate hazards, such as droughts, floods or sea level rise at present and will become increasingly so in the future. Studies estimate that \r\naround 3.3 to 3.6 billion people are living in regions classified as highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, which is significantly higher than \r\nthe number of people who reside in regions classified as least vulnerable. The most vulnerable regions include East, Central and West Africa, \r\nSouth Asia, Micronesia and Melanesia, and Central America."


id: fb613630d6883e7ce5cbc609ac285856
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"When a country or region is considered 'vulnerable' to climate change this means that climate hazards (e.g., drought, \r\nflood, heatwaves) have a very negative impact because there is a high number of people in these areas that lack \r\nthe ability or opportunity to cope and adapt to such events, due to, for example, high average poverty, inequality \r\nand lack of institutional support. This vulnerability could be due to many different development challenges that \r\nall come together and influence each other, such as poverty, lack of access to basic infrastructure services, high \r\nnumbers of uprooted people, state fragility, low or below average life expectancy and biodiversity degradation. \r\nThese structural social issues often affect regions for many decades and make it difficult for the state and for \r\nindividuals to respond to climate change and climate-related hazards."


id: 39db58bc8deecb8e0e18c05840055f31
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"For example, if a region is already characterised by poverty and struggling to feed its population and provide \r\nadequate access to basic infrastructure services, such as water and sanitation, this makes them vulnerable. If this \r\nregion is then faced with an increased number of extremely dry years, this exposes them to drought and will make \r\nthings even harder causing more hunger, poverty and worsened health--these are climate impacts."


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content:
"Most vulnerable regions are in Africa, as well as in South Asia, the Pacific and the Caribbean. In these regions, there \r\nare often multiple neighbouring countries that all are highly vulnerable, for example in Central and West Africa. \r\nThese regional clusters require special attention."


id: 429daaa85fe27075e9918ef44978336e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7870
content:
"There are also highly vulnerable groups and individuals within less vulnerable regions. For example, marginalised, \r\ndisadvantaged and poor minorities within highly affluent cities. Programmes that aim to support adaptation to \r\nclimate change need to focus on reducing the vulnerability of individuals, groups, countries and regions."


id: 22506424232407ad488dddd8b564878c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2847
content:
"FAQ 8.3 | How does and will climate change interact with other global trends (e.g., urbanisation, economic \r\nglobalisation) and shocks (e.g., COVID-19) to influence livelihoods of the poor?"


id: d8b4249ea5c11bfbb6ef2f2b23984dbf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31608
content:
"For example, climate change may alter the frequency or intensity of hazards that threaten the viability of a \r\ncommunity's traditional farming or fishing livelihoods. Local farmers or fishers are then forced to adapt how they \r\nfarm or fish or abandon livelihood practices entirely. The latter may mean migrating to a city to find work. As \r\nmany communities face the same challenge, this intersects with a global trend that is affecting billions of lives and \r\nlivelihoods--urbanisation--as seen in the rapid growth of informal settlements at the peripheries of cities around \r\nthe world, particularly rapidly growing mega-cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America. These developments will be \r\naccelerated by negative impacts of climate change and increase risks that larger segments of the population enter \r\nconditions of persistent poverty."


id: 64cd53ac8af2e80f8f356d212b2fcbdb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13429
content:
"At the same time, people whose livelihoods have been upended by climate change are subject to new threats, \r\nsuch as the global COVID-19 pandemic, which has shone a light on the plight of the most vulnerable people. For \r\nexample, the elderly, Indigenous Peoples and Communities of Colour were disproportionately severely impacted by \r\nCOVID-19; also the indirect economic consequences particularly hit the poor. Hence, COVID-19 demonstrates that \r\nthe livelihoods of the poorest and most marginalised are vulnerable to other global trends beyond climate change. \r\nAlso, most severe impacts are expected in regions that are already characterised by high levels of systemic human \r\nvulnerability."


id: 5364755af01be296a7dfb1a0266d0a69
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10591
content:
"Public and private investment in different types of assets can help reduce risks from climate change. Exactly which assets require investment \r\ndepends on the specific situation. However, the provision of access to basic services, such as water and sanitation, education and health care \r\nas well as the importance of reducing inequity is shown within the assessment for many regions. The poor have fewer resources to invest, so in \r\npoorer countries greater public investment is needed. Legal, social, political, institution and economic interventions can alter human behaviour, \r\nthough care must be taken that these do not amplify existing inequalities, create new inequalities or reduce future adaptation options."


id: 709685f6ededf09ff027d9fc891a760c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15332
content:
"At the same time, legal, social, political, institutional and economic solutions can alter human behaviour (e.g., \r\nthrough enforcement of building codes to prevent construction on low-lying land prone to flooding, timely \r\nprovision of weather information and early warning systems, knowledge-sharing activities, including adaptation \r\nstrategies grounded in Indigenous knowledge, crop insurance schemes, incentives such as payments to stop people \r\ncutting down trees or to enable them to plant them and social protection to provide a safety net in times of crisis)."


id: aaa804c262555ab31f1e27caf4d3283
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24380
content:
"The poorest groups often require greater public adaptation investments. Efforts to support adaptation need to be \r\nmindful of reinforcing existing inequalities and introducing new ones, making sure they are inclusive, culturally \r\nsensitive and that the voices of all groups of people are heard. It is also important that adaptations which reduce \r\nimmediate risks for the poor do not rule out adaptation options that could help them later on or which could cause \r\nthem to increase their emissions. Political will is needed to put people at the centre of climate change risk reduction \r\nefforts, including support for their livelihoods."


id: fe5128358c08861174e58327e323ea1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37542
content:
"FAQ 8.5 | How do present adaptation and future responses to climate change affect poverty and inequality?\r\nPresent adaptation can help to reduce the current and possibly future impacts of climate change. Future responses to climate change can reduce \r\npoverty and inequality, and even help transition toward climate-resilient livelihoods and climate resilient development. Pro-poor adaptation \r\nplanning is necessary to ensure future risks for the poor are being accounted for and the inequality underlying the poverty is being addressed."


id: cc8cce7665dd81d94a846f1b8230037e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29719
content:
"There are many ways in which poverty and inequality are influenced by climate change. The livelihood sources \r\nof the poor are likely to be affected and cumulative effects of losses and damages, and may influence future \r\npoverty. There are cases when present adaptation worsens future poverty and exacerbates inequality--this is called \r\nmaladaptation. The risks of maladaptation are greater in societies characterised by high inequality, and in many \r\ncases the poor and most vulnerable groups are the ones most adversely affected."


id: 815bb0221ec70a219bc502e9eb7a5049
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17882
content:
"Effective decision making in adaptation should be informed by past, present and future climate data, information \r\nand scenarios to cater for reliable plans and actions for climate-resilient livelihoods. Adaptation lessons from the \r\npast play an important role in decision making regarding responses to climate change. There is an emerging debate \r\non the role of learning, particularly forward-looking (anticipatory) learning, as a key element or important aspect \r\nfor adaptation and resilience in the context of climate change. Memory, monitoring of key drivers of change, \r\nscenario planning and measuring anticipatory capacity are seen as crucial ingredients for future adaptation and \r\nresilience pathways, and, hence overcoming maladaptation. Moreover, climate resilient development calls for \r\nensuring synergies between adaptation, mitigation and development are maximised, while trade-offs, especially \r\nthose affecting the poor, are minimised."


id: ab9a0adb2d8ce8422874bf5b37b0bd44
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24519
content:
"Coordinating Lead Authors: Christopher H. Trisos (South Africa), Ibidun O. Adelekan (Nigeria), \r\nEdmond Totin (Benin)"


id: 3da83dd5e533b340d9543385ad3a4bcb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7052
content:
"Lead Authors: Ayansina Ayanlade (Nigeria), Jackson Efitre (Uganda), Adugna Gemeda (Ethiopia), \r\nKanungwe Kalaba (Zambia), Christopher Lennard (South Africa), Catherine Masao (Tanzania), \r\nYunus Mgaya (Tanzania), Grace Ngaruiya (Kenya), Daniel Olago (Kenya), Nicholas P. Simpson \r\n(Zimbabwe/South Africa), Sumaya Zakieldeen (Sudan)"


id: d6d93211db3645b4f82020952836aaf9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31308
content:
"Review Editors: Stuart Mark Howden (Australia), Robert (Bob) J. Scholes (South Africa), Pius \r\nYanda (Tanzania)"


id: 78ffdbcc712b7c76a8cba06b3d73b15e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16590
content:
"Trisos, C.H., I.O. Adelekan, E. Totin, A. Ayanlade, J. Efitre, A. Gemeda, K. Kalaba, C. Lennard, C. Masao, Y. Mgaya, \r\nG. Ngaruiya, D. Olago, N.P. Simpson, and S. Zakieldeen, 2022: Africa. In: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation \r\nand Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel \r\non Climate Change [H.-O. Portner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegria, M. Craig, \r\nS. Langsdorf, S. Loschke, V. Moller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, \r\nNY, USA, pp. 1285-1455, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.011."


id: 556585ea7ffb2607c4e602bdcf42da2b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10905
content:
"resources can provide more actionable insights on climate risks and \r\nadaptation options in Africa. {9.1,5 9.4.5, 9.5.2}"


id: a1fd2a0889484b80952a0d95d9c96850
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23052
content:
"Adaptation generally is cost-effective, but annual finance \r\nflows targeting adaptation for Africa are billions of US dollars \r\nless than the lowest adaptation cost estimates for near-term \r\nclimate change (high confidence). Finance has not targeted more \r\nvulnerable countries (high confidence). From 2014-2018 more finance \r\ncommitments were debt than grants and--excluding multilateral \r\ndevelopment banks--only 46% of commitments were disbursed \r\n(compared to 96% for other development projects). {9.4.1}"


id: edb90d4e3403b067d28072758e1f035f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34864
content:
"Africa is one of the lowest contributors to greenhouse gas \r\nemissions causing climate change, yet key development sectors \r\nhave already experienced widespread losses and damages \r\nattributable to human-induced climate change, including \r\nbiodiversity loss, water shortages, reduced food production, \r\nloss of lives and reduced economic growth (high confidence1\r\n).\r\n{9.1.1, 9.1.6, 9.2, 9.6.1, 9.8.2, 9.10.2, 9.11.1, Box 9.4}"


id: 6d2bdc7ec785545eebe5257bc736bf2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14797
content:
"Adaptation costs will rise rapidly with global warming (very \r\nhigh confidence). Increasing public and private finance flows \r\nby billions of dollars per year, increasing direct access to \r\nmultilateral funds, strengthening project pipeline development \r\nand shifting more finance to project implementation would help \r\nrealise transformative adaptation in Africa (high confidence). \r\nConcessional finance will be required for adaptation in low-income \r\nsettings (high confidence). Aligning sovereign debt relief with climate \r\ngoals could increase finance by redirecting debt-servicing payments to \r\nclimate resilience. {9.4.1}"


id: 5e5f5c6b317166fd1846e75d983040c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12382
content:
"Between 1.5degC and 2degC global warming--assuming localised \r\nand incremental adaptation--negative impacts are projected \r\nto become widespread and severe with reduced food \r\nproduction, reduced economic growth, increased inequality \r\nand poverty, biodiversity loss, increased human morbidity \r\nand mortality (high confidence). Limiting global warming \r\nto 1.5degC is expected to substantially reduce damages to \r\nAfrican economies, agriculture, human health, and ecosystems \r\ncompared to higher levels of global warming (high confidence). \r\n{9.2, 9.6.2, 9.8.2, 9.8.5, 9.10.2, 9.11.2}"


id: ef6940ed12406986c9c2b0bb0c5c9238
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35151
content:
"Governance for climate resilient development includes long\u0002term planning, all-of-government approaches, transboundary \r\ncooperation and benefit-sharing, development pathways that \r\nincrease adaptation and mitigation and reduce inequality, and \r\nimplementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) \r\n(high confidence). {9.3.2, 9.4.2, 9.4.3}"


id: 802fb302227ac9642de07e73ec50f2c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17698
content:
"Exposure and vulnerability to climate change in Africa \r\nare multi-dimensional with socioeconomic, political and \r\nenvironmental factors intersecting (very high confidence). \r\nAfricans are disproportionately employed in climate-exposed sectors: \r\n55-62% of the sub-Saharan workforce is employed in agriculture and \r\n95% of cropland is rainfed. In rural Africa, poor and female-headed \r\nhouseholds face greater livelihood risks from climate hazards. In urban \r\nareas, growing informal settlements without basic services increase \r\nthe vulnerability of large populations to climate hazards, especially \r\nwomen, children and the elderly. {9.8.1, 9.9.1, 9.9.3, 9.11.4, Box 9.1}"


id: f12f0172c195108525ce364b3c28e93a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35448
content:
"Cross-sectoral 'nexus' approaches provide significant oppor\u0002tunities for large co-benefits and/or avoided damages (very \r\nhigh confidence). For example, climate change adaptation benefits \r\npandemic preparedness, 'One Health' approaches benefit human and \r\necosystem health, and ecosystem-based adaptation can deliver adap\u0002tation and emissions mitigation (high confidence). {9.4.3, 9.6.4, 9.11.5; \r\nBox 9.6}"


id: b3de6e7f196c030759cb5bf3947d4b69
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25813
content:
"Adaptation in Africa has multiple benefits, and most assessed \r\nadaptation options have medium effectiveness at reducing \r\nrisks for present-day global warming, but their efficacy at \r\nfuture warming levels is largely unknown (high confidence).\r\n{9.3, 9.6.4, 9.8.3, 9.11.4}"


id: e10fb9e7d94abf11ae3cbfe0d781d7bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32904
content:
"Without cross-sectoral, transboundary and long-term planning, \r\nadaptation and mitigation response options in one sector can \r\nbecome response risks, exacerbating impacts in other sectors \r\nand causing maladaptation (very high confidence). For example, \r\nmaintaining indigenous forest benefits biodiversity and reduces \r\ngreenhouse gas emissions, but afforestation--or wrongly targeting \r\nancient grasslands and savannas for reforestation--harms water \r\nsecurity and biodiversity, and can increase carbon loss to fire and \r\ndrought. Planned hydropower projects may increase risk as rainfall \r\nchanges impact water, energy and food security, exacerbating trade\u0002offs between users, including across countries. {9.4.3, Boxes 9.3, 9.5}"


id: a79438689ff977aadad3c3b23d329413
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23872
content:
"Climate-related research in Africa faces severe data constraints, \r\nas well as inequities in funding and research leadership that \r\nreduces adaptive capacity (very high confidence). Many countries \r\nlack regularly reporting weather stations, and data access is often \r\nlimited. From 1990-2019, research on Africa received just 3.8% of \r\nclimate-related research funding globally: 78% of this funding for \r\nAfrica went to EU and north American institutions and only 14.5% to \r\nAfrican institutions. The number of climate research publications with \r\nlocally based authors are among the lowest globally and research led \r\nby external researchers may focus less on local priorities. Increased \r\nfunding for African partners, and direct control of research design and "


id: 322d86b45dbc9b95a1a79b04e350e624
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5305
content:
"Africa), increasing exposure to pluvial and riverine flooding \r\n(high confidence). {9.5.3-7, 9.7}"


id: ece4ff8276957111d581135712f52de4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34751
content:
"Glaciers on the Rwenzoris and Mt Kenya are projected to disappear \r\nby 2030, and by 2040 on Kilimanjaro (medium confidence). {9.5.8}"


id: af4e1dca53fb89a33b6a80b514d4b36b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25094
content:
"Climate information services that are demand driven and \r\ncontext specific (e.g., for agriculture or health) combined with \r\nclimate change literacy can be the difference between coping \r\nand informed adaptation responses (high confidence). Across \r\n33 African countries, 23-66% of people are aware of human-caused \r\nclimate change--with larger variation at sub-national scales (e.g., \r\n5-71% among states in Nigeria). Climate change literacy increases \r\nwith education level but is undermined by poverty, and literacy rates \r\naverage 12.8% lower for women than men. Around 71% of Africans \r\nthat are aware of climate change agree it should be stopped. Production \r\nof salient climate information in Africa is hindered by limited availability \r\nof and access to weather and climate data. {9.4.5, 9.5.1, 9.8.4, 9.10.3}"


id: 318eb54594616e7466738e6583c2bd73
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5208
content:
"In east and southern Africa, tropical cyclones making landfall \r\nare projected to become less frequent but have more intense \r\nrainfall and higher wind speeds at increasing global warming \r\n(medium confidence). {9.5.7}"


id: 3b19b92d3de605773e9598b8eec7125a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6657
content:
"Heat waves on land, in lakes and in the ocean will increase \r\nconsiderably in magnitude and duration with increasing global \r\nwarming (very high confidence). Under a 1.5degC-compatible \r\nscenario, children born in Africa in 2020 are likely to be exposed \r\nto 4-8  times more heat waves compared to people born in 1960, \r\nincreasing to 5-10  times for 2.4degC global warming. The annual \r\nnumber of days above potentially lethal heat thresholds reaches 50-\r\n150 in west Africa at 1.6degC global warming, 100-150 in central Africa \r\nat 2.5degC, and 200-300 over tropical Africa for >4degC. {9.5.2, 9.5.3, \r\n9.5.4, 9.5.5, 9.5.6, 9.7.2.1}"


id: d7ee2e1c1eb368b9c3fdc5bec3e5bc82
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31501
content:
"Ecosystem-based adaptation can reduce climate risk while \r\nproviding social, economic and environmental benefits (high \r\nconfidence). Direct human dependence on ecosystem services in \r\nAfrica is high. Ecosystem protection and restoration, conservation \r\nagriculture practices, sustainable land management, and integrated \r\ncatchment management can support climate resilience. Ecosystem\u0002based adaptation can cost less than grey infrastructure in human \r\nsettlements (e.g., using wetlands and mangroves as coastal protection). \r\n{9.6.4, 9.7.3, 9.8.3, 9.9.5, 9.12.3, Box 9.7}"


id: 919f224552b8451b29e7ade1ca912c1b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20452
content:
"Most African countries will enter unprecedented high temperature \r\nclimates earlier in this century than generally wealthier, higher \r\nlatitude countries, emphasising the urgency of adaptation \r\nmeasures in Africa (high confidence). {9.5.1}"


id: 2cdf90c252a5e1cee9459a9f57b05439
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4496
content:
"Multiple African countries are projected to face compounding \r\nrisks from reduced food production across crops, livestock \r\nand fisheries, increased heat-related mortality, heat-related \r\nloss of labour productivity and flooding from sea level rise, \r\nespecially in west Africa (high confidence). {9.8.2, 9.8.5, 9.9.4, \r\n9.10.2, 9.11.2}"


id: dc34e95ce11c3fe465c9f8bf3108936d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32158
content:
"Increasing mean and extreme temperature trends across \r\nAfrica are attributable to human-caused climate change (high \r\nconfidence). {9.5.1, 9.5.2}"


id: d1eb66794dc057bab4d3b0c51d0bd548
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30552
content:
"Climate change has increased heat waves (high confidence) \r\nand drought (medium confidence) on land, and doubled the \r\nprobability of marine heatwaves around most of Africa (high \r\nconfidence). Multi-year droughts have become more frequent in west \r\nAfrica, and the 2015-2017 Cape Town drought was three times more \r\nlikely2 due to human-caused climate change. {9.5.3-7, 9.5.10}"


id: 4446a1ef6e0830a51d7d13a009ccbd58
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8163
content:
"Recent extreme variability in rainfall and river discharge \r\n(around -50% to +50% relative to long-term historical means) \r\nacross Africa have had largely negative and multi-sector \r\nimpacts across water-dependent sectors (high confidence).\r\n{9.7.2, 9.10.2} Hydrological variability and water scarcity have induced \r\ncascading impacts from water supply provision and/or hydroelectric \r\npower production to health, economies, tourism, food, disaster risk \r\nresponse capacity and increased inequality of water access. {Box 9.4}"


id: 25d74df2bda378a18b27c687c46dabc8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3379
content:
"Increases in drought frequency and duration are projected over \r\nlarge parts of southern Africa above 1.5degC global warming \r\n(high confidence), with decreased precipitation in North Africa \r\nat 2degC global warming (high confidence), and above 3degC global \r\nwarming, meteorological drought frequency will increase, and \r\nduration will double from approximately 2 months to 4 months \r\nin parts of North Africa, the western Sahel and southern Africa \r\n(medium confidence). {9.5.2, 9.5.3, 9.5.6.}"


id: ed76fcbaf27b979c2c7125a396bce111
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34830
content:
"Extreme hydrological variability is projected to progressively \r\namplify under all future climate change scenarios relative to \r\nthe current baseline, depending on region (high confidence).\r\nProjections of numbers of people exposed to water stress by the 2050s \r\nvary widely--decreases/increases by hundreds of millions, with higher \r\nnumbers for increases--with disagreement among global climate "


id: 3cab716383a79646d83d9838ed64c371
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6911
content:
"models on the major factor driving these large ranges. Populations in \r\ndrylands are projected to double by 2050. Projected changes present \r\nheightened cross-cutting risks to water-dependent sectors, and require \r\nplanning under deep uncertainty for the wide range of extremes \r\nexpected in future. {9.7.1, 9.7.2, 9.9.4}"


id: 825fea9707582bef045cf01f2aba61e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18035
content:
"Climate change threatens livestock production across \r\nAfrica (high agreement, low evidence). Rangeland net primary \r\nproductivity is projected to decline 42% for west Africa by 2050 at 2degC \r\nglobal warming. Vector-borne livestock diseases and the duration of \r\nsevere heat stress are both projected to become more prevalent under \r\nwarming. {9.8.2}"


id: 137f2286656bf6701e8be3b8bf5d9fff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 576
content:
"Climate change poses a significant threat to African marine and \r\nfreshwater fisheries (high confidence). Fisheries provide the main \r\nsource of protein for approximately 200  million people in Africa and \r\nsupport the livelihoods of 12.3 million people. At 1.5degC global warming, \r\nmarine fish catch potential decreases 3-41%, and decreases by 12-69% \r\nat 4.3degC by 2081-2100 relative to 1986-2005 levels, with the highest \r\ndeclines for tropical countries. Under 1.7degC global warming, reduced fish \r\nharvests could leave 1.2-70 million people in Africa vulnerable to iron \r\ndeficiencies, up to 188 million for vitamin A deficiencies, and 285 million \r\nfor vitamin B12 and omega-3 fatty acids by mid-century. For inland \r\nfisheries, 55-68% of commercially harvested fish species are vulnerable \r\nto extinction under 2.5degC global warming by 2071-2100. {9.8.5}"


id: bf9466198d9ddd0737534bf22db061a3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27700
content:
"Climate change has reduced economic growth across Africa, \r\nincreasing income inequality between African countries \r\nand those in temperate northern hemisphere climates (high \r\nconfidence). One estimate suggests gross domestic product (GDP) \r\nper capita for 1991-2010 in Africa was on average 13.6% lower \r\nthan if climate change had not occurred. Impacts manifest largely \r\nthrough losses in agriculture, as well as tourism, manufacturing and \r\ninfrastructure. {9.6.3, 9.11.1}"


id: d78e1e0d946e9640ce70dc8d83d3a640
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31435
content:
"Climate variability and change undermine educational attainment \r\n(high agreement, medium evidence). High temperatures, low \r\nrainfall and flooding, especially in the growing season, may mean \r\nchildren are removed from school to assist income generation. Early life \r\nundernutrition associated with low harvests or weather-related food \r\nsupply interruptions can impair cognitive development. {9.11.1.2}"


id: c5fc725a947a1771aea6010c4c59e982
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28729
content:
"Climate variability and change already negatively impacts the \r\nhealth of tens of millions of Africans through exposure to non\u0002optimal temperatures and extreme weather, and increased \r\nrange and transmission of infectious diseases (high confidence).\r\n{9.10.1}"


id: ab8106e7979dcc69bce07e0dd273ac04
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24498
content:
"Limiting global warming to 1.5degC is very likely to positively \r\nimpact GDP per capita across Africa. Increasing economic damage \r\nforecasts under high emissions diverge from low emission pathways \r\nby 2030. Inequalities between African countries are projected to widen \r\nwith increased warming. Across nearly all African countries, GDP per \r\ncapita is projected to be at least 5% higher by 2050 and 10-20% higher \r\nby 2100 if global warming is held to 1.5degC compared with 2degC. {9.11.2}"


id: 76e586073caa4a15314302587db54c23
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16285
content:
"In Africa, climate change is reducing crop yields and productivity \r\n(high confidence). Agricultural productivity growth has been reduced \r\nby 34% since 1961 due to climate change, more than any other \r\nregion. Maize and wheat yields decreased on average 5.8% and 2.3%, \r\nrespectively in sub-Saharan Africa due to climate change in the period \r\n1974-2008. Farmers and pastoralists perceive the climate to have \r\nchanged and over two-thirds of Africans perceive climate conditions for \r\nagricultural production have worsened over the past 10 years. Woody \r\nplant encroachment has reduced fodder availability. {9.4.5, 9.6.1, 9.8.2}"


id: 9ed2efda6669202d7d0f744910279aeb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22530
content:
"Future warming will negatively affect food systems in Africa \r\nby shortening growing seasons and increasing water stress \r\n(high confidence). By 1.5degC global warming, yields are projected \r\nto decline for olives (north Africa) and sorghum (west Africa) with a \r\ndecline in suitable areas for coffee and tea (east Africa). Although yield \r\ndeclines for some crops may be partially compensated by increasing \r\natmospheric CO2 concentrations, global warming above 2degC will result \r\nin yield reductions for staple crops across most of Africa compared \r\nto 2005 yields (e.g., 20-40% decline in west African maize yields), \r\neven when considering adaptation options and increasing CO2\r\n(medium confidence). Relative to 1986-2005, global warming of 3degC \r\nis projected to reduce labour capacity in agriculture by 30-50% in sub\u0002Saharan Africa. {9.8.2, 9.8.3, 9.11.2}"


id: eef4ec112ee8eed8f3644f8bba04ea34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35069
content:
"Exposure of people, assets and infrastructure to climate hazards \r\nis increasing in Africa compounded by rapid urbanisation, \r\ninfrastructure deficit, and growing population in informal \r\nsettlements (high confidence)."


id: 3dcb8b76cc6c49995e89ac774e763405
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7076
content:
"High population growth and urbanisation in low-elevation \r\ncoastal zones will be a major driver of exposure to sea level rise \r\nin the next 50 years (high confidence). By 2030, 108-116 million \r\npeople in Africa will be exposed to sea level rise (compared to "


id: 32db54844b2fc6e03f8d275a3b432b5a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5419
content:
"and vegetation distributions (high confidence). Impacts include \r\nrepeated mass coral bleaching events in east Africa, and uphill (birds) \r\nor poleward (marine species) shifts in geographic distributions. For \r\nvegetation, the overall observed trend is woody plant expansion, \r\nparticularly into grasslands and savannas, reducing grazing land and \r\nwater supplies. {9.6.1, 9.6.2, 9.8.2}"


id: 338ef090e7a6763d3db856124f01f69c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5532
content:
"54 million in 2000), increasing to 190-245 million by 2060 (medium \r\nconfidence). {9.9.1, 9.9.4}"


id: 3bbd52015810103c6e50297660ec1129
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6755
content:
"The outcome of the effect of the interaction of increasing \r\nCO2 and aridity that operate in opposing directions on future \r\nbiome distributions is highly uncertain. Further increasing CO2\r\nconcentrations could increase woody plant cover, but increasing aridity \r\ncould counteract this, destabilising forest and peatland carbon stores \r\nin central Africa (low confidence). Changes in vegetation cover could \r\noccur rapidly if tipping points are crossed {9.6.1, 9.6.2, 9.8.2}"


id: c4e9a109b4f3ce42b2644f9134481481
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28554
content:
"African biodiversity loss is projected to be widespread and \r\nescalating with every 0.5degC increase above present-day global \r\nwarming (high confidence). Above 1.5degC, half of assessed species \r\nare projected to lose over 30% of their population or area of suitable \r\nhabitat. At 2degC, 36% of freshwater fish species are vulnerable to \r\nlocal extinction, 7-18% of terrestrial species assessed are at risk of \r\nextinction, and over 90% of east African coral reefs are projected \r\nto be destroyed by bleaching. Above 2degC, risk of sudden and severe \r\nbiodiversity losses becomes widespread in west, central and east \r\nAfrica. Climate change is also projected to change patterns of invasive \r\nspecies spread. {9.6.2, Figure 9.19}"


id: 5f9ae21ef609a070ad9883d1b4ecc4b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12620
content:
"Most climate-related migration observed currently is within \r\ncountries or between neighbouring countries, rather than to \r\ndistant high-income countries (high confidence). Urbanisation has \r\nincreased when rural livelihoods were negatively impacted by low rainfall. \r\nOver 2.6  million and 3.4  million new weather-related displacements \r\noccurred in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018 and 2019. {Box 9.8}"


id: 2b90bde27dcd29df89490c62b39afe49
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4293
content:
"There is increasing evidence linking increased temperatures \r\nand drought to conflict risk in Africa (high confidence). \r\nAgriculturally dependent and politically excluded groups are \r\nespecially vulnerable to drought-associated conflict risk. However, \r\nclimate is one of many interacting risk factors, and may explain \r\na small share of total variation in conflict incidence. Ameliorating \r\nethnic tensions, strengthening political institutions and investing in \r\neconomic diversification could mitigate future impacts of climate \r\nchange on conflict. {Box 9.9}"


id: 8997708708d576cc6dcb73ca839e8c1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19184
content:
"Climate change is projected to increase migration, especially \r\ninternal and rural to urban migration (high agreement, medium \r\nevidence). With 1.7degC global warming by 2050, 17-40 million people \r\ncould migrate internally in sub-Saharan Africa, increasing to 56-\r\n86 million for 2.5degC (>60% in west Africa) due to water stress, reduced \r\ncrop productivity and sea level rise. This is a lower-bound estimate \r\nexcluding rapid-onset hazards such as floods and tropical cyclones. \r\n{Box 9.8}"


id: 4371ac17b75fccada69610d13c33837c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8021
content:
"African cultural heritage is already at risk from climate hazards, \r\nincluding sea level rise and coastal erosion. Most African \r\nheritage sites are neither prepared for, nor adapted to, future \r\nclimate change (high confidence). {9.12}"


id: a90ab1092db989b3837bfbfac2d45313
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24116
content:
"Climate-related infrastructure damage and repairs will be a \r\nfinancially significant burden to countries (high confidence). \r\nWithout adaptation, aggregate damages from sea level rise and coastal \r\nextremes to 12 major African coastal cities in 2050 under medium and \r\nhigh emissions scenarios will be USD 65 billion and USD 86.5 billion, \r\nrespectively. Potential costs of up to USD  183.6  billion may be \r\nincurred through 2100 to maintain existing road networks damaged \r\nfrom temperature and precipitation changes due to climate change. \r\nIncreased rainfall variability is expected to affect electricity prices in \r\ncountries highly dependent on hydropower. {9.9.4, Boxes 9.4, 9.5}"


id: 5a4d0e31961e3fbe7a27d7f04f6e9467
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11712
content:
"With global warming increasing above present-day levels, the \r\nability of adaptation responses to offset risk is substantially \r\nreduced (high confidence). Crop yield losses, even after adaptation, \r\nare projected to rise rapidly above 2degC global warming. Limits to \r\nadaptation are already being reached in coral reef ecosystems. \r\nImmigration of species from elsewhere may partly compensate for \r\nlocal extinctions and/or lead to local biodiversity gains in some regions. \r\nHowever, more African regions face net losses than net gains. At 1.5degC "


id: 69db05cfd31d0b8730dd2dde928750b4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14252
content:
"scenario planning, monitored groundwater use, waterless on\u0002site sanitation, rainwater harvesting and water re-use, reducing \r\nrisk to human settlements, food systems, economies and human \r\nhealth (high confidence). {9.8, 9.9, 9.10, 9.11}"


id: a64f3334f011ef114dbceae877a00ac9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23700
content:
"global warming, over 46% of localities face net losses in terrestrial \r\nvertebrate species richness with net increases projected for under 15% \r\nof localities. {9.6.1.4, 9.6.2.2, 9.8.2.1, 9.8.2.2, 9.8.4}"


id: 9c6ed3ca28bca3b74b4e2281f88834b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22168
content:
"Technological, institutional and financing factors are major \r\nbarriers to climate adaptation feasibility in Africa (high con\u0002fidence). {9.3, 9.4.1}"


id: f02dda85af20d35e78a6d9ec1c3e32b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35291
content:
"Water sector adaptation measures show medium social and \r\neconomic feasibility but low feasibility for most African cities \r\ndue to technical and institutional restrictions, particularly for \r\nlarge supply dams and centralised distribution systems (medium \r\nconfidence). {9.3.1, 9.7.3} Use of integrated water management, \r\nwater supply augmentation and establishment of decentralised water \r\nmanagement systems can reduce risk. Integrated water management \r\nmeasures including sub-national financing, demand management \r\nthrough subsidies, rates and taxes, and sustainable water technologies \r\ncan reduce water insecurity caused by either drought or floods (medium \r\nconfidence). {9.7.3, Box 9.4}"


id: 907b1b883a7f68c15fbad2b582cba7c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20264
content:
"There is limited evidence for economic growth alone reducing \r\nclimate damages, but under scenarios of inclusive and sustainable \r\ndevelopment, millions fewer people in Africa will be pushed \r\ninto extreme poverty by climate change and negative impacts \r\nto health and livelihoods can be reduced by 2030 (medium \r\nconfidence). {9.10.3, 9.11.4}"


id: 9bef78f26498a3f48bfd87d717b0d7a2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22090
content:
"Gender-sensitive and equity-based adaptation approaches reduce \r\nvulnerability for marginalised groups across multiple sectors \r\nin Africa, including water, health, food systems and livelihoods \r\n(high confidence). {9.7.3, 9.8.3, 9.9.5, 9.10.3, 9.11.4, Boxes 9.1, 9.2}"


id: bb712c733aa80179b35269c8259d4559
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27048
content:
"Agricultural and livelihood diversification, agroecological \r\nand conservation agriculture practices, aquaculture, on-farm \r\nengineering and agroforestry can increase resilience and \r\nsustainability of food systems in Africa under climate change \r\n(medium confidence). However, smallholder farmers tend to address \r\nshort-term shocks or stresses by deploying coping responses rather \r\nthan transformative adaptations. Climate information services, \r\ninstitutional capacity building, secure land tenure, and strategic \r\nfinancial investment can help overcome these barriers to adaptation \r\n(medium confidence). {9.3.1, 9.4.5, 9.8.3, 9.8.5}"


id: aaa544a20b0587fc5b5ae19ee11532a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24377
content:
"Integrating climate adaptation into social protection pro\u0002grammes, such as cash transfers, public works programmes and \r\nhealthcare access, can increase resilience to climate change \r\n(high confidence). Nevertheless, social protection programmes may \r\nincrease resilience to climate-related shocks, even if they do not spe\u0002cifically address climate risks. {9.4.2, 9.10.3, 9.11.4}"


id: 9f7606d36c1429e9f69c827eb08090c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22627
content:
"The diversity of African Indigenous Knowledge and local knowl\u0002edge systems provide a rich foundation for adaptation actions \r\nat local scales (high confidence). African Indigenous Knowledge \r\nsystems are exceptionally rich in ecosystem-specific knowledge used \r\nfor management of climate variability. Integration of Indigenous \r\nKnowledge systems within legal frameworks, and promotion of In\u0002digenous land tenure rights can reduce vulnerability. {9.4.4, Boxes \r\n9.1, 9.2}"


id: 16df6fca506f5a246d3ef50d7c217ba3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1123
content:
"African countries and communities are inadequately insured \r\nagainst climate risk, but innovative index-based insurance \r\nschemes can help transfer risk and aid recovery, including \r\nin food systems (medium confidence). Despite their potential, \r\nuptake of climate insurance products remains constrained by lack of \r\naffordability, awareness and product diversity. {9.4.5, 9.8.4, 9.11.4.1}"


id: 75b3ea1fe3f519c09b0db911991cc966
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16112
content:
"Human migration is a potentially effective adaptation strategy \r\nacross food systems, water, livelihoods and in climate-induced \r\nconflict areas, but can also be maladaptive if vulnerability is \r\nincreased, particularly for health and human settlements (high \r\nconfidence). Migration of men from rural areas can aggravate the \r\nwork burden faced by women. The more agency migrants have (i.e., \r\ndegree of voluntarity and freedom of movement) the greater the \r\npotential benefits for sending and receiving areas (high agreement, \r\nmedium evidence).{9.3, 9.8.3, 9.9.1-3, 9.10.2.2.2, Boxes 9.8, 9.9, \r\nCross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7}"


id: 6cccd4d7ce130b4f1122387b2f136aee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14734
content:
"Early warning systems based on targeted climate services \r\ncan be effective for disaster risk reduction, social protection \r\nprogrammes, and managing risks to health and food systems \r\n(e.g., vector-borne disease and crops) (high confidence). {9.4.5, \r\n9.5.1, Box 9.2, 9.8.4, 9.8.5, 9.10.3, 9.11.4}"


id: 28540fc0f6c2ae413fb05712bc0595cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3758
content:
"Risk-sensitive infrastructure delivery and equitable provision \r\nof basic services can reduce climate risks and provide net \r\nfinancial savings (high confidence). However, there is limited \r\nevidence of proactive climate adaptation in African cities. Proactive \r\nadaptation policy could reduce road repair and maintenance costs \r\nby 74% compared to a reactive policy. Adapting roads for increased \r\ntemperatures and investment in public transport are assessed as 'no \r\nregret' options. In contrast, hydropower development carries risk of \r\nregrets due to damages when a different climate than was expected \r\nmaterialises. Energy costs for cooling demands are projected to \r\naccumulate to USD 51.3 billion by 2035 at 2degC global warming and to \r\nUSD 486.5 billion by 2076 at 4degC. {9.8.5}"


id: 9f7852588aa324c318c6d82d70787054
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22630
content:
"This chapter assesses the scientific evidence on observed and projected \r\nclimate change impacts, vulnerability and adaptation options in Africa. \r\nThe assessment refers to five African sub-regions--north, west, \r\ncentral, east and southern--closely following the African Union (AU), \r\nbut including Mauritania in west Africa and Sudan in north Africa \r\nbecause much of the literature assessed places these countries in these \r\nregions (Figure 9.1). Madagascar and other island states are addressed \r\nin Chapter 15."


id: 4eb6868d88b9dee86c4a01bf23607b6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9812
content:
"The contribution of Africa is among the lowest of historical greenhouse \r\ngas (GHG) emissions responsible for human-induced climate change \r\nand it has the lowest per capita GHG emissions of all regions currently \r\n(high confidence) (Figure  9.2). Yet Africa has already experienced \r\nwidespread impacts from human-induced climate change (high \r\nconfidence) (Figure 9.2; see Table 9.1)."


id: e86df258171603499721aefd55249f8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34074
content:
"Since AR5 (Assessment Report 5), there have been notable policy \r\nchanges in Africa and globally. The Paris Agreement, 2030 Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Goals (SDGs), the Sendai Framework and Agenda 2063 \r\nemphasise interlinked aims to protect the planet, reduce disaster risk, \r\nend poverty and ensure all people enjoy peace and prosperity (AU, \r\n2015; UNFCCC Paris Agreement, 2015; UNISDR Sendai Framework, \r\n2015; United Nations General Assembly, 2015). To match these \r\ninterlinked ambitions, this chapter assesses risks and response options \r\nboth for individual sectors and cross-sectorally to assess how risks \r\ncan compound and cascade across sectors, as well as the potential \r\nfeasibility and effectiveness, co-benefits and trade-offs and potential for \r\nmaladaptation from response options (Simpson et al., 2021b; Williams \r\net al., 2021)."


id: d16890e09a21880b99119afa0b77eace
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30484
content:
"Based on an analysis of 1022 mentions of Africa or African countries \r\nacross the three AR6 Special Reports, the following main conclusions \r\nemerged."


id: 694e1df848a0ab3bbdaf46fdb87e04f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:10
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vector_id: 14165
content:
"Figure 9.2 |  Historical greenhouse gas (GHG) emission trends for Africa compared to other world regions: "


id: edc2b37fcacf75d99367383672f01ae6
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"(d) Total emissions in Africa since 1990, broken down by GHG (left) and sector (right). Methane and CO2 emissions comprise an almost equal share of GHG emissions in Africa, \r\nwith the largest emissions sectors being energy and agriculture (Crippa et al., 2021). Agriculture emissions in panel (d) do not include land use, land use change and forestry \r\n(LULUCF CO2). One-hundred-year global warming potentials consistent with WGI estimates are used. Emissions data are from Crippa et al. (2021), compiled in Working Group III \r\n(WGIII) Chapter 2."


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"Figure 9.3 |  Climate-related research on Africa has received a very small percentage (around 4%) of global climate research funding (a).\r\n(b) As a percentage of all research funding allocated to a region, climate research has, since 2010, made up 5% of Africa-related research funding compared to a 3% share for \r\nclimate research in global research funding."


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"(d) Most funding for climate-related research on Africa flows to institutions based in Europe and the USA. Funding comes mainly from government organisations with private \r\nphilanthropy providing only around 1% (Overland et al., 2021)."


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"(e) Africa-related climate research funding focuses mostly on food systems, ecosystems and freshwater, while health, poverty, security and conflict, and urban areas have received \r\nthe least."


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"(f) Research on climate mitigation received only 17% of funding while climate impacts and adaptation each received 40%. A greater proportion of Africa-focused climate funding \r\nhas gone to social sciences and humanities (28%) than is the case globally (12%) (Overland et al., 2021). Data are from an analysis of 4,458,719 research grants in the Dimensions \r\ndatabase with a combined value of USD 1.51 trillion awarded by 521 funding organisations globally (Overland et al. 2021). The Dimensions database is the world's largest database \r\non research funding flows (Overland et al. 2021). It draws on official data from all major funding organisations in the world, mainly government research councils or similar \r\ninstitutions. Note: The South African National Research Foundation is the only African research funding body that is sufficiently large to be included in Dimensions."


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"Figure 9.4 |  Major gaps in climate change research funding, participation and publication exist within Africa, and for Africa compared to the res\r\nworld."


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"(a) Funding: Amount of climate change research funding focused on African countries 1990-2020 (Overland et al., 2021). Considering population size, research on Egypt and \r\nNigeria stands out as particularly underfinanced."


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"(b) Participation: Percentage of peer-reviewed climate change papers on impacts and adaptation published on a given country that also include at least one author based in that \r\ncountry (Pasgaard et al. 2015)."


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"(c) Number of publications of climate change adaptation research focused on individual countries identified from a global sample of 62,191 adaptation-relevant peer-reviewed \r\narticles published from 1988-2020 (Sietsma et  al., 2021). There is a general lack of adaptation-related research on many vulnerable countries in Africa. Topic biases in \r\nadaptation-relevant research also exist where research focuses more on disaster and development-related topics in global south countries (but published by authors from the global \r\nnorth), while research on global north countries focuses more on governance topics (Sietsma et al., 2021)."


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"Climate-related research in Africa faces severe funding constraints \r\nwith unequal funding relationships between countries and with \r\nresearch partners in Europe and North America (high confidence). \r\nBased on analysis of over 4  million research grants from 521 \r\nfunding organisations globally, it is estimated that, from 1990-2020, \r\nUSD  1.26  billion funded Africa-related research on climate impacts, \r\nmitigation and adaptation. This represents only 3.8% of global funding \r\nfor climate-related research--a figure incommensurate with Africa's \r\nhigh vulnerability to climate change (see Figure 9.3; Box 9.1; Chapter 8 \r\nFigure 8.6; Overland et al., 2021). Almost all funding for Africa-related "


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"climate research originates outside Africa and goes to research \r\ninstitutions outside Africa (Blicharska et  al., 2017; Bendana, 2019; \r\nSiders, 2019; Overland et al., 2021). From 1990-2020, 78% of funding \r\nfor Africa-related climate research flowed to institutions in Europe "


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"and the USA--only 14.5% flowed to institutions in Africa (Figure 9.3; \r\nOverland et al., 2021). Kenya (2.3% of total funding) and South Africa \r\n(2.2%) are the only African countries among the top 10 countries in \r\nthe world in terms of hosting institutions receiving funding for climate\u0002related research on Africa (Overland et al., 2021)."


id: 80539de81c3a4694a76538bea33361ec
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"United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) \r\nas stated in its Article 2 (Oppenheimer et al., 2014). The process for \r\nidentifying key risks for Africa included reviewing risks from Niang \r\net  al. (2014) and assessing new evidence on observed impacts and \r\nprojected risks in this chapter."


id: 912cce7eafa4d9ff86cba18c244fd1f8
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"Several key risks were identified for both ecosystems and people \r\nincluding species extinction and ecosystem disruption, loss of food \r\nproduction, reduced economic output and increased poverty, increased \r\ndisease and loss of human life, increased water and energy insecurity, \r\nloss of natural and cultural heritage and compound extreme events \r\nharming human settlements and critical infrastructure (Table 9.2). In \r\norder to provide a sector- and continent-level perspective, the key risks \r\naggregate across different regions and combine multiple risks within \r\nsectors. For detailed assessments of observed impacts and future risks \r\nwithin each sector and each sub-region of Africa, see the sector-specific \r\nsections of this chapter (Sections 9.6 to 9.12)."


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"Assessment of impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation highlights climate \r\nchange is leading to loss and damage across Africa, that breach current \r\nand projected adaptation limits (Table 9.1; Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in \r\nChapter 17)."


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"A key risk is defined as a potentially severe risk. In line with AR5, \r\n'severity' relates to dangerous anthropogenic interference with the \r\nclimate system, the prevention of which is the ultimate objective of the "


id: fe9f993eb50966495eea18602fb6cfdd
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"and tea in east Africa and sorghum in west Africa (Figures 9.22; 9.23; \r\nSections 9.8.2.1; 9.8.2.2), and >12% decline in marine fisheries catch \r\npotential for multiple west African countries, potentially leaving \r\nmillions at risk of nutritional deficiencies (Figure 9.25; Section 9.8.5); \r\ntens of millions more people exposed to vector-borne diseases in east \r\nand southern Africa (malaria), and north, east and southern Africa \r\n(dengue, zika), increased risk of malnutrition in central, east and west \r\nAfrica, and more than 15 additional deaths per 100,000 annually due \r\nto heat in parts of west, east and north Africa (Figures  9.32; 9.35; \r\nSections 9.10.2; 9.9.4.1)."


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"Based on a systematic assessment of observed climate adaptation \r\nresponses in the scientific literature covering 827 adaptation response \r\ntypes in 553 studies (2013-2021), and expert elicitation process, 24 \r\ncategories of adaptation responses in Africa were identified (Williams \r\net  al., 2021; Figure  9.7). This assessment excluded autonomous \r\nadaptation in ecosystems, such as migration and evolution of animal \r\nand plant species."


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"The majority of adaptation studies were in west and east Africa \r\n(Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania), followed by southern Africa, \r\nwith the least coming from central and north Africa (Figure  9.7; \r\nWilliams et al., 2021). Most studies were on adaptation actions in the \r\nfood sector, with the least on health (Figure 9.7). The five adaptation \r\nresponse categories with the highest number of reported actions were \r\nsustainable water management (food sector), resilient infrastructure \r\nand technologies (health sector), agricultural intensification (food \r\nsector), human migration (poverty and livelihoods) and crop \r\nmanagement (food sector)."


id: 42acbbd640a8c8f5ec25b27abe224dd9
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"No adaptation response categories were assessed to have high \r\nfeasibility of implementation. Technological barriers dominate factors \r\nlimiting implementation (92% of adaptation categories have low \r\ntechnological feasibility) followed by institutional barriers (71% \r\nof adaptation categories have low institutional feasibility). This \r\nassessment matches review studies finding institutional responses \r\nto be least common in Africa and highlight inadequate institutional \r\ncapacities as key limits to human adaptation (Berrang-Ford et  al., \r\n2021; Thomas et al., 2021) (Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB in Chapter 18). \r\nFeasibility is higher for the social dimension of adaptation responses \r\n(with moderate feasibility for 88% of categories). The largest evidence \r\ngap is for environmental feasibility for which 67% could not be \r\nassessed due to insufficient evidence (Figure 9.7)."


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"The feasibility and effectiveness of existing adaptation options \r\nunder current levels of warming are assessed in Section 9.10.2 and \r\nadaptation options considering future levels of warming are assessed \r\nin the chapter section for each sector."


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"feasibility and low institutional and technological feasibility. Bulk \r\nwater infrastructure was assessed to have high effectiveness, but low \r\ninstitutional and technological feasibility. Increasing variability in climate \r\nand environmental challenges has made sustainable and resilient \r\ninfrastructure design a key priority (Minsker et al., 2015). RIT is, however, \r\ngenerally new in the African context (Cumming et al., 2017) and that \r\nmay be why there is limited evidence to assess some of its dimensions \r\n(economic and environmental feasibility). Construction of resilient public \r\nwater infrastructures that include safeguards for sanitation and hygiene \r\nare expensive and, across national and local levels, planning for its \r\nconstruction poses multiple challenges (Choko et al., 2019)."


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"(e.g., efficient irrigation) and less water-intensive cropping (also see \r\nSection 9.8.3), and was the most reported adaptation response in the \r\nfood sector. SWM was assessed with medium economic and social \r\nfeasibility and low environmental, institutional and technological \r\nfeasibility. The feasibility of this adaptation category may depend \r\nlargely on socioeconomic conditions (Amamou et al., 2018; Harmanny \r\nand Malek, 2019; Schilling et  al., 2020), as many African farmers \r\ncannot afford the cost of SWM facilities (Section 9.8.4)."


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"Resilient Infrastructure and Technologies (RIT) for health include improved \r\nhousing to limit exposure to climate hazards (Stringer et al., 2020), and \r\nimproved water quality, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure (e.g., \r\ntechnology across all sectors to prevent contamination and pollution \r\nof water, improved water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) approaches \r\nsuch as promotion of diverse water sources for water supply, improving \r\nhealth infrastructure) (Section 9.10.3). Overall, RIT had medium social "


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"Figure 9.7 |  Assessment of the feasibility and effectiveness of observed climate adaptation responses under current climate conditions for 24 categories of \r\nadaptation responses across regions of Africa. The assessment comprised evaluation of each adaptation category along six dimensions: for feasibility these were economic \r\nviability, environmental sustainability, social validity, institutional relevance, and technological availability; and for effectiveness this was potential for risk reduction (considering current \r\nclimate conditions) (Williams et al., 2021). Fifty-six experts on the African region were consulted using a structured, expert-driven elicitation process to increase the coverage and \r\nrobustness of the continent-wide adaptation feasibility and effectiveness assessment in Williams et al. (2021). Assessment included both peer-reviewed articles and grey literature."


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"(Nziguheba et  al., 2015; Ritzema et  al., 2017). Yet many of these \r\noptions currently face low institutional and technological feasibility \r\n(Figure  9.7). Social and economic feasibility is higher, but barriers \r\ninclude high cost of farm inputs (land, capital and labour), lack of \r\naccess to timely weather information and lack of water resources can \r\nmake this option quite challenging for African smallholder farmers \r\n(Sections 9.8.1; 9.11.4; Kihila, 2017; Williams et al., 2019b)."


id: bb3cc8a22b27b720e41d9952c08d0e66
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"Human migration was assessed to have high potential for risk \r\nreduction (Cross-Chapter Box  MIGRATE in Chapter 7, Box  9.8; Rao \r\net  al., 2019; Sitati et  al., 2021). However, it had low feasibility for \r\neconomic, institutional and technological dimensions, with limited \r\nevidence on environmental feasibility. Institutional factors such \r\nas the implementation of top-down policies have been reported as \r\nlimiting options for coping locally, resulting in migration (Brockhaus \r\net  al., 2013). Limited financial and technical support for migration \r\nlimits the extent to which it can make meaningful contributions to \r\nclimate resilience (Djalante et al., 2013; Trabacchi and Mazza, 2015). \r\nInternational and domestic remittances are an important resource that \r\ncan help aid recovery from climate shocks, but inadequate finance \r\nand banking infrastructure can limit cash transfers (Box  9.8). Male \r\nmigration can increase burdens of household and agricultural work, "


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"Crop management includes adjusting crop choices, planting times, or the \r\nsize, type and location of planted areas (Altieri et al., 2015; Nyagumbo \r\net  al., 2017; Dayamba et  al., 2018). This option faces environmental, \r\ninstitutional and technological barriers to feasibility. Social and \r\neconomic barriers to implementation are fewer. Factors such as tenure \r\nand ownership rights, labour requirements, high investment costs and \r\nlack of skills and knowledge on how to use the practices are reported \r\nto hinder implementation of crop management options by smallholder \r\nfarmers (Muller and Shackleton, 2013; Nyasimi et al., 2017). For instance, "


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"Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) offers opportunities for smallholder \r\nfarmers to increase productivity (SDG 2), build adaptive capacity while \r\nreducing the emission of GHGs (SDG 13) from agricultural systems \r\n(Lipper et  al., 2014; Mutenje et  al., 2019). CSA practices including \r\nconservation agriculture, access to climate information, agroforestry \r\nsystems, drip irrigation, planting pits and erosion control techniques \r\n(Partey et al., 2018; Antwi-Agyei et al., 2021) can improve soil fertility, \r\nincrease yield and household food security (Zougmore et  al., 2016; \r\nZougmore et al., 2018), thereby contributing to the realisation of SDG \r\n2 in Africa (Mbow et al., 2014)."


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"especially for women (Poudel et al., 2020; Rao et al., 2020; Zhou et al., \r\n2020). The more agency migrants have (that is, degree of voluntarity \r\nand freedom of movement), the greater the potential benefits for \r\nsending and receiving areas (high agreement, medium evidence) \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7; Box 9.8)"


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"Adaptation options within a number of categories, including sustainable \r\nagriculture practices, agricultural intensification, fisheries management, \r\nhealth advisory services and education, social infrastructure, \r\ninfrastructure and built environment, and livelihood diversification, \r\nwere observed to reduce socioeconomic inequalities (Williams et  al., \r\n2021). Whether adaptation options reduce inequality can be a key \r\nconsideration enhancing acceptability of policies and adaptation \r\nimplementation (Box 9.1; Section 9.11.4; Islam and Winkel, 2017)."


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"Synergies between the adaptation to climate change and progress \r\ntowards the SDGs present potential co-benefits for realising multiple \r\nobjectives towards climate resilient development in Africa, increasing \r\nthe efficiency and cost-effectiveness of climate actions (Cohen et al., \r\n2021). However, designing adaptation policy under conditions of \r\nscarcity, common to many African countries, can inadvertently lead to \r\ntrade-offs between adaptation options, as well as between adaptation \r\nand mitigation options, can reinforce inequality, and fail to address \r\nunderlying social vulnerabilities (Kuhl, 2021)."


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"Adaptation options, such as access to climate information, provision \r\nof climate information services, growing of early maturing varieties, \r\nagroforestry systems, agricultural diversification and growing of \r\ndrought-resistant varieties of crops may deliver co-benefits, providing \r\nsynergies that result in positive outcomes. For instance, in sub\u0002Saharan African drylands including northern Ghana and Burkina Faso \r\nand large parts of the Sahel, migration as a result of unfavourable \r\nenvironmental conditions closely linked to climate change has \r\noften provided opportunities for farmers to earn income (SDG 1) \r\nand mitigate the effects of climate-related fluctuations in crop and \r\nlivestock productivity (SDG 2) (Zampaligre et al., 2014; Antwi-Agyei \r\net al., 2018; Wiederkehr et al., 2018). Renewable energy can mitigate \r\nclimate effects (SDG 13), improve air quality (SDG 3), wealth and \r\ndevelopment (SDGs 1, 2)."


id: e909aaa2bc2c1c549f4ba15af998989c
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"Climate resilient development (CRD) is a process of implementing \r\nGHG mitigation and adaptation measures to support sustainable \r\ndevelopment for all (Denton et  al., 2014; Andrijevic et  al., 2020; \r\nOwen, 2020; Cornforth et al., 2021). It emphasises equity as a core \r\nelement of sustainable development as well as conditions for inclusive \r\nand sustained economic growth, shared prosperity and decent work \r\nfor all, taking into account different levels of national development \r\nand capacities as encoded in the SDGs (Section  9.3.2; Chapter 18 \r\nSection 18.1). This section identifies five key dimensions of CRD for \r\nAfrica: climate finance, governance, cross-sectoral and transboundary \r\nsolutions, adaptation law, and climate services and literacy."


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"Different types of irrigation including drip and small-scale irrigation can \r\ncontribute towards increased agricultural productivity (SDG 2), improved \r\nincome (SDG 1) and food security (SDG 2) and increase resilience to \r\nlong-term changes in precipitation (SDG 13) (Bjornlund et al., 2020). \r\nIn Kenya and Tanzania, small-scale irrigation provides employment \r\nopportunities and income to both farmers and private businesses (SDGs \r\n8 and 9) (Lefore et al., 2021; Simpson et al., 2021c). Land management \r\npractices including the use of fertilizers and mulching have also been \r\nhighlighted as adaptation options improving soil fertility for better \r\nyields (SDG 2) and delivering opportunities to reduce the climate \r\nchange effects (SDG 13) (Muchuru and Nhamo, 2019)."


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"Access to adequate financial resources is crucial for climate change \r\nadaptation (Cross-Chapter Box  FINANCE in Chapter 17). Since the \r\nCopenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009), and then extended by the Paris \r\nAgreement (UNFCCC Paris Agreement, 2015 see Article 4.4, and also 4.8, \r\n4.9), developed countries are expected to scale up climate finance for \r\ndeveloping countries toward a collective goal of USD 100 billion per year \r\nby 2020, with a balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation."


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"There is limited research providing quantitative estimates of \r\nadaptation costs across Africa. Adaptation costs in Africa have been \r\nestimated at USD  7-15  billion per year by 2020 (Schaeffer et  al., \r\n2013), corresponding to USD  5-11 per capita per year. The African \r\nDevelopment Bank estimates costs of near-term adaptation needs \r\nidentified in the Intended NDCs (INDCs) of African countries as \r\nUSD 7.4 billion per year from 2020, recognising INDCs describe only \r\na limited subset of adaptation needs (AfDB, 2019). Many African \r\ncountries, particularly Least Developed Countries (LDCs), express \r\na stronger demand for adaptation finance--a study of financial \r\ndemands in INDCs for 16 African countries suggests a ratio around \r\n2:1 for adaptation to mitigation finance with demand for Eritrea and \r\nUganda approximately 80% for adaptation (Zhang and Pan, 2016)."


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"The multilateral development banks (MDBs) report 43% of their climate\u0002related commitments to sub-Saharan Africa in 2018 targeted adaptation \r\n(EBRD et al., 2021). Sources other than international public finance are \r\nmore difficult to track and there is limited data on Africa (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox  FINANCE in Chapter 17). Considering a wider range of finance \r\ntypes (including private flows and domestic mobilisation), an estimated \r\nannual average of roughly USD 19 billion in climate finance for 2017-\r\n2018 went to sub-Saharan Africa, of which only 5% was for adaptation \r\n(CPI, 2019; Adhikari and Safaee Chalkasra, 2021). The mobilisation of \r\nprivate finance by developed country governments, through bilateral and "


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"Although analysts face challenges related to the nature of climate \r\nchange impacts (Sussman et al., 2014) and data limitations (Li et al., \r\n2014) when estimating all costs and benefits for adaptation measures in "


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"Figure 9.9 |  Adaptation finance for Africa has focused most on agriculture and water, and disbursement ratios for climate-related finance are very low \r\n(a) The amounts of finance targeting adaptation committed to different sectors across Africa from 2014-2018 in millions of USD as reported to OECD and including multilateral \r\ndevelopment banks (Savvidou et al., 2021). "


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"(c) disbursement ratios for adaptation finance broken down by each African sub-region for 2014-2018 (for all funders reporting to OECD except multilateral development banks). \r\nSource: Savvidou et al. (2021)."


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"multilateral financial support, is lower in Africa relative to other world \r\nregions. Globally, in 2016-2018, Africa made up only 17% of mobilised \r\nprivate finance relevant for climate change (OECD, 2020).\r\nbut decreased in central Africa (Savvidou et  al., 2021) (Figure  9.8b). \r\nClimate-related finance was >50% for adaptation in 19 countries, while \r\n26 received >50% for mitigation (Savvidou et al., 2021)."


id: 384c8fcf23b4a9adc1e3c64a38dd60f8
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"Strong differences exist among African sub-regions. Finance commitments \r\ntargeting adaptation increased from 2014-2018 for east and west Africa "


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"regions (Fonta et  al., 2018). This suggests the quality of proposals \r\nand therefore the capacity to develop fundable proposals remains \r\ninadequate in the region."


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"exacerbate fiscal challenges, especially in light of high sovereign debt \r\nlevels from the COVID-19 pandemic (Bulow et al., 2020; Estevao, 2020). \r\nFrom 2014-2018, more finance commitments targeting adaptation \r\nin Africa were debt instruments (57%) than grants (42%) (Savvidou \r\net al., 2021)."


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"For Africa combined, the sectors targeted with most support for \r\nadaptation are agriculture and water supply and sanitation, which \r\naccount for half of total adaptation finance from 2014-2018 \r\n(Figure 9.9a). The sectoral distribution has changed little over these \r\nyears, suggesting adaptation planners and funders are maintaining a \r\nrelatively narrow view of where support is needed and how to build \r\nclimate resilience (Savvidou et al., 2021)."


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"Adaptation finance has not been targeted more towards more \r\nvulnerable countries (Barrett, 2014; Weiler and Sanubi, 2019; Doshi \r\nand Garschagen, 2020; Savvidou et al., 2021). Reasons for this include \r\nfast-growing middle-income countries offering larger gains in emission \r\nreductions, so finance has favoured mitigation in these economies, \r\neven within sub-Saharan Africa, and as more climate finance uses debt \r\ninstruments, mitigation projects are further preferred because returns \r\nare perceived to be more certain (Rai et al., 2016; Lee and Hong, 2018; \r\nCarty et al., 2020; Simpson et al., 2021c)."


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"yet there is often a lack of coordination, clear leadership or governance \r\nmandates (Shackleton et al., 2015; Leck and Simon, 2018) and unequal \r\npower relations between African countries and developed countries can \r\nhinder progress on governance of financial markets, budget allocations \r\nand technology transfer to address addressing climate technology gaps \r\nin Africa (Rennkamp and Boyd, 2015; Olawuyi, 2018)."


id: b0404a9d9c4395277f02c4a49cc908a2
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"Policy implementation can be slow due to the absence of support \r\nmechanisms and dependency on funding by international partners \r\n(Leck and Roberts, 2015; Ozor and Nyambane, 2020). In many countries, \r\ncommitment to climate policy objectives is low (Naess et al., 2015), \r\nparticularly in light of competing development imperatives and post\u0002COVID-19 recovery efforts (Caetano et al., 2020), although COVID-19 \r\nrecovery efforts offer significant opportunities for health, economic \r\nand climate resilience co-benefits (Sections  9.4.3; 9.11.5; Cross\u0002Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7). Another challenge relates to long\u0002term planning and decision making which is hampered by uncertainty \r\nrelated to future socioeconomic and GHG emissions scenarios (Coen, \r\n2021), political cycles and short-term political appointment terms \r\n(Pasquini et al., 2015)."


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"Lack of community agency in climate governance affects the capacity \r\nfor citizen-led climate interventions in Africa (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2015; \r\nMersha and Van Laerhoven, 2016). This is attributed partly to low civic \r\neducation, limited participation power of citizens and tokenism due \r\nto perceived lack of immediate benefits (Odei Erdiaw-Kwasie et  al., \r\n2020), as well as low rates of climate change literacy in many regions \r\n(Section 9.4.3; Simpson et al., 2021a). Participation in climate policy \r\nalso extends to the private sector, which has been relatively uninvolved \r\nin adaptation discussions to date (Crick et al., 2018)."


id: 8cebc89bb8ae1108212fa61c9a71208d
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"Africa requires substantial resources and support to adapt to the \r\nunavoidable consequences of climate change, a pertinent climate \r\njustice concern for governments. However, the mechanisms needed to \r\nredress current power imbalances, structural and systemic inequality \r\nare often absent (Saraswat and Kumar, 2016; see Section  9.11.4) \r\nand policies that underpin environmental justice concerns, including \r\ndistributive justice, participation, recognition and capability (Shi et al., \r\n2016; Chu et al., 2017) are also needed."


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"Good governance can contribute to positive climate outcomes and \r\nCRD in Africa through long-term planning, development-focused policy \r\nenvironments, the development of robust and transformational policy \r\narchitecture, inclusive participation and timely implementation of NDCs \r\n(Bataille et al., 2016; Werners et al., 2021; see Table 9.3 for examples)."


id: 11fe2d4bacfbdcd4d224b3f125eefca9
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"African governments are developing and revising ambitious adaptation \r\npolicies that are enforceable and aligned with wider societal \r\ndevelopment goals, including an enabling environment for finance and \r\ninvestment in the jobs and skills development necessary to support \r\na just transition (Section 9.4.5; ILO, 2019). If appropriately designed, \r\nsuch institutions offer the opportunity to foster adaptive governance \r\nthat is collaborative, multi-level and decentralised, offering integration \r\nof policy domains, flexibility and an emphasis on non-coerciveness and \r\nadaptation (Ruhl, 2010)."


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"community members in decision making, increasing the capacity of \r\nthese communities to respond to climate change (Reid, 2014)."


id: a4445036ed318a851e48e5475eb9deac
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"Coordination across multiple sectors, supported with leadership from \r\nthe highest levels of government, has shown to improve implementation \r\neffectiveness and anticipated scaling up (Rigaud et al., 2018). This high\u0002level engagement promotes the inclusion of climate resilience and \r\nadaptation targets in national planning and budgeting. Financial and \r\ncapacity support is essential (Adenle et al., 2017; UNEP, 2021), as is \r\nthe tracking of national progress towards development goals (Box 9.6)."


id: da77d865228584e7f4c2fd7272287774
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"Specific indicators can be included in the performance metrics and \r\nmonitoring frameworks for each sector, policy intervention and budget \r\nplanning cycle (Wojewska et al., 2021). Many countries in Africa are also \r\nrevamping their institutional coordination mechanisms to reflect an all\u0002of-government approach and partnership with non-state stakeholders \r\nwith diverse capabilities and expertise (see examples from Rwanda \r\nand Zambia in Table 9.3). This includes Cape Town's drought response \r\nin 2017/2018 where non-state actors actively partnered with the state \r\nresponse around water management/savings practices (Simpson et al., \r\n2020a; 2020b; Cole et al., 2021b)."


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"In Africa, climate governance occurs in a context of deep inequality \r\nand asymmetric power relations--both within countries and between \r\ncountries--making adequate mechanisms for multi-stakeholder \r\nparticipation essential (Sapiains et al., 2021). This requires the creation \r\nof avenues for the voices of marginalised groups in policy processes \r\nand enabling policy environments that can catalyse inclusive action \r\nand transformational responses to climate change (Totin et al., 2018; \r\nRevi et  al., 2020; Ziervogel et  al., 2021), safeguarding protection \r\nagainst the climate harms of the most vulnerable in society, particularly \r\nof women and children (see also Box 9.1). Community-based natural \r\nresource management in pastoral communities was observed to \r\nimprove institutional governance outcomes through involving "


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"and risk pathways across country boundaries and regions (although \r\nwith different levels of impact) accelerate the urgency for integrated \r\napproaches to manage and benefit from shared resources and promote \r\ntheir security for populations and economies (Namara and Giordano, \r\n2017; Frame et al., 2018; Carter et al., 2021). At the same time, natural \r\nresources such as water generate economic benefits shared across \r\nboundaries, such as hydroelectric power generation and regional food \r\nsecurity (Dombrowsky and Hensengerth, 2018)."


id: ee62993104119715a60c553a5c1eb45f
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"working in widely different sectors (Simpson et al., 2021b). Traditional \r\nrisk assessments typically only consider one climate hazard and one \r\nsector at a time, but this can lead to substantial misestimation of risk \r\nbecause multiple climate risks can interact to cause extreme impacts \r\n(Zscheischler et al., 2018; Simpson et al., 2021b)."


id: e6869b8abc6f68c7ecd2e578a084a2b7
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"Because multiple risks are interlinked and can cascade and amplify \r\nrisk across sectors, cross-sectoral approaches that consider these \r\ninterlinkages are essential for CRD, especially for managing trade-offs \r\nand co-benefits among SDGs, mitigation and adaptation responses \r\n(Liu et al., 2018a)."


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"Poor governance, particularly at the transboundary level, can undermine \r\nwater security and climate change is likely to add new challenges to pre\u0002existing dynamics, emphasising the necessity of formal transboundary \r\narrangements (Jensen and Lange, 2013; UNECA, 2016). Further, it can \r\nconstrain access to critical financial resources at a time when it is \r\nneeded most. This is particularly the case when climate impact pathways \r\nmanifest at the transboundary level (Challinor et  al., 2018; Simpson \r\net al., 2021b), but where the need to protect sovereign interests can \r\nblock regionally integrated institutional arrangements that are pivotal \r\nfor accessing the multilateral climate funds for transboundary climate \r\ninvestments that include resilient infrastructure and greater water \r\nbenefits across Africa's shared river basins (Cross-Chapter Box INTEREG \r\nin Chapter 16; Carter et al., 2021)."


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"In Africa, placing cross-sectoral approaches at the core of CRD provides \r\nsignificant opportunities to deliver large benefits and/or avoided \r\ndamages across multiple sectors including water, health, ecosystems \r\nand economies (very high confidence) (Boxes 9.5; 9.6; 9.7). They can \r\nalso prevent adaptation or mitigation action in one sector exacerbating \r\nrisks in other sectors and resulting in maladaptation, for example, from \r\nlarge-scale dam construction or large-scale afforestation (e.g., water-\r\nenergy-food nexus and large-scale tree planting efforts) (Boxes 9.3; \r\n9.5)."


id: 2a8e4b015e5816497c5926ec3426e5f9
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"Cross-sectoral or 'nexus' approaches can improve the ability of \r\ndecision makers to foresee and prevent major climate impacts. Barriers \r\nto developing nexus approaches arise from rigid sectoral planning, \r\nregulatory and implementation procedures, entrenched interests, and \r\npower structures and established sectoral communication structures. \r\nOpportunities for overcoming these barriers include creating a \r\ndedicated home for co-development of nexus risk assessment \r\nand solutions, promoting co-leadership of projects by multiple \r\nsectors, specific budget allocations for nexus projects, facilitating \r\nand coordinating services, compiling useful strategies into toolkits, \r\nameliorating inequitable power relations among participants and \r\nmeasuring progress on nexus approaches through metrics (Palmer \r\net al., 2016; Baron et al., 2017)."


id: f31d0fd49e4f868a3b30000262791744
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"In response, the African Development Bank is supporting two of the \r\nmost climate-vulnerable and larger African river basins to leverage GCF \r\nand Global Environment Facility (GEF) funds to finance Programmes for \r\nIntegrated Development and Adaptation to Climate Change (PIDACC). \r\nPIDACC finance is approved at the multinational level in the Niger basin \r\nwhich is shared by nine west and central African States (AfDB, 2018c; \r\nGCF, 2018a), while a PIDACC proposal is currently under development \r\nfor the Zambezi basin (Zambezi Watercourse Commission, 2021)."


id: 1f76fbfa3c51966fad6353522a05a5ae
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"Beyond cross-sectoral collaboration, international cooperation is vital \r\nto avert dangerous climate change as its impacts reach beyond the \r\njurisdiction of individual states. International good practice and regional \r\nagreements, protocols and policies together recognise that regional \r\nintegration, cooperative governance and benefit-sharing approaches \r\nare cornerstones of effective resource security and climate change \r\nresponses in Africa (Jensen and Lange, 2013; World Bank, 2017a; \r\nDombrowsky and Hensengerth, 2018). Natural resource development, \r\nparticularly governance of shared river basins, exemplifies opportunities \r\nfor governance responses for African nations that can be cooperative, \r\nregionally integrated and climate resilient."


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"In Africa, climate vulnerability crosses geopolitical divides as regional \r\nclusters of fragile and high vulnerability countries exist, emphasising \r\nthe need for transboundary cooperation (Birkmann et al., 2021; Buhaug \r\nand von Uexkull, 2021). Natural resource security is increasingly reliant \r\non transboundary governance, regional integration and cooperation \r\n(Namara and Giordano, 2017). There are 60 international or shared river \r\nbasins on the continent, a function of colonial divides and topography, \r\nwith some basins shared by four or more countries (UNECA, 2016; \r\nPopelka and Smith, 2020). Climate changes which result in impact "


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"Enhanced transboundary governance arrangements suggest that \r\ncountries are joining forces to coherently manage and protect natural \r\nresources (Spalding-Fecher et  al., 2014; AfDB, 2021). Underlying \r\ngovernance issues and political economy interests block or advance \r\nsuch transitions to regionally integrated resource management and \r\nbenefit-sharing, the market drivers of water security (AMCOW, 2012; "


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"Robust legislative frameworks, both climate change specific and non\u0002specific, can foster adaptive responses to climate change, particularly \r\nin LDCs (Nachmany et  al., 2017). As discussed in Chapter 17, there \r\nare many reasons for this. The successful implementation of policy \r\nobjectives across the continent is often contingent upon or at least \r\nsupported by an underlying legislative framework (Averchenkova and \r\nMatikainen, 2017; Scotford et al., 2017). There are also wider systemic \r\nand structural reasons for developing climate change legislation, \r\nincluding the promotion of coordination within government, its policy \r\nentrenching role, its symbolic value and its potential to support climate \r\nfinance flows (Nachmany et al., 2017; Scotford and Minas, 2019)."


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"appropriate body of law with a strong focus on adaptation responses \r\n(Rumble, 2019). As discussed in Chapter 17, however, there remains the \r\nneed for in-country expert input on how the domestic legal landscape \r\nmay influence their operation, and for each jurisdiction to independently \r\ninterrogate its adaptation needs and objectives (Scotford et al., 2017)."


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"Legal systems, however, also have the potential to be maladaptive. \r\nLaws may be brittle, often assuming and reinforcing a static state, and \r\nthe boundary of the law may not align to the relevant location, scale or \r\nimpact (Craig, 2010; Arnold and Gunderson, 2013; Wenta et al., 2019). \r\nThis necessitates the review and revision of existing laws to remove \r\nsuch barriers and foster adaptive management (Craig, 2010; Ruhl, \r\n2010; Cosens et al., 2017) and, where necessary, the promulgation of \r\nnew laws."


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"Numerous African states have also included dedicated climate change\u0002related provisions within various existing statutes that regulate \r\nthe environment or disaster management. For example, Tanzania's \r\nEnvironmental Management Act 20 of 2004 contains dedicated \r\nprovisions to address climate change. Rwanda's Law on Environment \r\n48/2018 also contains detailed provisions on mainstreaming climate \r\nchange into development planning processes, education on climate \r\nchange, vulnerability assessments and the promotion of measures \r\nto enhance adaptive capacity. Some countries have also developed \r\nlaws dedicated to a specific aspect of adaptation. For example, the \r\nConservation and Climate Adaptation Trust of Seychelles Act 18 of 2015 \r\nestablishes a trust fund to finance climate change adaptation responses \r\nin Seychelles. Similarly, many countries including Algeria, Burkina Faso, "


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"There has been a rise in framework and sectoral climate change laws \r\nacross Africa, as illustrated in Figure  9.10. The map illustrates the \r\ntwo framework statutes which have been promulgated in Benin and \r\nKenya, as well as the three framework bills which have been drafted \r\nin Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda. There are also discussions taking \r\nplace in Zimbabwe and Ghana regarding the potential development of \r\na draft framework climate change bill. A review of the climate change \r\nframework laws indicates evidence of cross-pollination in design across \r\nAfrican jurisdictions, creating the potential for a unique and regionally "


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"of climate change considerations within the local sphere of government, \r\nand a willingness to foster such practices (Mwanga, 2019)."


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"Djibouti, Ghana, Namibia, Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, \r\nTanzania and South Africa have dedicated disaster management laws. \r\nAt this stage, it is still too early to determine whether these laws \r\nare having any substantive influence in strengthening resilience and \r\nreducing vulnerability and, as discussed in Chapter 17, this is identified \r\nas a knowledge gap requiring further research."


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"Laws are now being developed to formalise and entrench institutional \r\nstructures, specifying their mandate, function, membership and related \r\nprocedures. A useful example of such an approach can be found in the \r\nNigerian Climate Change Bill which establishes the National Climate \r\nCouncil on Climate Change headed and chaired by the Vice-President, \r\nwith a wide membership of ministers, the Chairmen of the Governors' \r\nForum and Association of Local Governments, as well as the private \r\nsector and non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives."


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"Climate change framework laws can play an instrumental role in \r\nachieving mainstreaming by directing relevant actors to integrate \r\nadaptation considerations into existing mandates, operations and \r\nplanning instruments (Rumble, 2019). By way of example, the \r\nSouth African Draft Climate Change Bill contains a general duty to \r\n'coordinate and harmonise the policies, plans, programmes and \r\ndecisions of the national, provincial and local spheres of government' \r\nto achieve, among other things, the climate change objectives of the \r\nBill and national adaptation objectives."


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"Policy actors across Africa perceive that human-caused climate \r\nchange is already impacting their locales through a range of negative \r\nsocioeconomic and environmental effects (Pasquini, 2020; Steynor and \r\nPasquini, 2020). They are highly concerned about and motivated to \r\naddress these impacts (Hambira and Saarinen, 2015; Pasquini, 2020). \r\nTransformative responses to the impacts of climate change facilitate \r\nCRD and are informed by perceptions of climate variability and change \r\nand climate change literacy (Figure 9.11)."


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"Another common theme is the requirement to develop national climate \r\nchange adaptation strategies and plans. Many laws further entrench \r\ntheir longevity by requiring them to be subject to strong community \r\nparticipation and consultation, as demonstrated by the Kenyan Climate \r\nChange Act and the Nigerian Climate Change Bill."


id: ff285703db38d61be865c7e42dda6571
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"Climate services (CS) broadly include the generation, tailoring and \r\nprovision of climate information for use in decision making at all levels \r\nof society (Street, 2016; Vaughan et al., 2018). There is a range of climate \r\nservice providers in Africa, including primarily National Meteorological \r\nand Hydrological Services (NMHS) and partner institutions, \r\ncomplemented by NGOs, the private sector and research institutions \r\n(Snow et al., 2016; Harvey et al., 2019), which offer the potential for \r\npublic-private partnerships (Winrock, 2018; Harvey et al., 2019)."


id: 5fcfbb8334dbce0094d4d607999bf273
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"International development funding has progressed the provision of \r\nCS and, together with technological advances and capacity-building \r\ninitiatives, has increased the reliability of CS across Africa (Vogel \r\net al., 2019). Most CS investments have been towards the agricultural \r\nsector, with other focal sectors, including pastoralism, health, water, \r\nenergy and disaster risk reduction, having only small CS initiatives \r\ndirected towards them (Nkiaka et al., 2019; Carr et al., 2020). Despite \r\nthis focus and investment, however, there remains a mismatch \r\nbetween the supply and uptake of CS in Africa as information is \r\noften inaccessible, unaffordable, not relevant to context or scale, \r\nand is poorly communicated (Singh et  al., 2018; Antwi-Agyei et  al., \r\n2021) (Table 9.4; Sections 9.4.1.5.1 and 9.13.4.1). Observational data \r\nrequired for effective regional CS, including trend analyses, seasonal "


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"Figure 9.11 |  Climate services and climate literacy are important for informing transformative responses to climate change (including adaptation and \r\nmitigation responses) "


id: c0e4a2e3cef522d7bd58b6479d7d6bc1
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"(b, c) Percentage of studies that have recorded that perception of temperature changes and precipitation changes agreed with local meteorological or climate records across 33 \r\nAfrican countries (size of bubble indicates number of studies per country for both b and c. In b, agreement with temperature changes is indicated for all studies within a country in \r\nred, and articles indicating no agreement in orange; while in c, agreement with precipitation changes is indicated per country in dark blue and articles indicating no agreement in \r\nlight blue. A total of 144 studies assessed across the 33 countries)."


id: ab800e6763d50afea73a34ada19d76a4
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"(d) Country-level rates of climate change literacy for 33 African countries (i.e., percentage of the population that have heard about climate change and think that human activity \r\nis wholly or partly the cause of climate change) Simpson et al. (2021a)."


id: e9192c6a5d84cb93937dc23db1dcabe5
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"climate assessment, modelling and model evaluation, is sparse and \r\noften of poor quality (Figure 9.11) and usually requires payment which \r\nrenders it unaffordable (Winrock, 2018).\r\nA number of these challenges can be addressed through the transdis\u0002ciplinary co-production of CS (Alexander and Dessai, 2019; Vogel et al., \r\n2019; Carter et  al., 2020). Co-production of CS involves climate in\u0002formation producers, practitioners and stakeholders, and other knowl\u0002edge holders participating in equitable partnerships and dialogues to \r\ncollaboratively identify climate-based risk and develop scale-relevant \r\nclimate information to address this risk (Table  9.4) (Vincent et  al., \r\n2018; Carter et al., 2020)."


id: eccb38cb184ccd65d30766ecbf9a2a69
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"Table 9.4 |  Challenges and opportunities for Climate Services in Africa for the supply and uptake of climate services."


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"increased drought frequency, shorter rainy season and rainy season \r\ndelay, and increased temperatures (Figure 9.11; Rurinda et al., 2014; \r\nBoansi et al., 2017; Ayanlade et al., 2018), but not in all cases or not for \r\nall perceived changes, with common discrepancies in perceived lower \r\nrainfall totals (Alemayehu and Bewket, 2017; Ayal and Leal Filho, 2017; \r\nSimpson et al., 2021a)."


id: e26f50e12a6699dab3feadb92dddf46a
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"However, the effectiveness of co-production processes are hindered \r\nby aspects such as inequitable power relationships between different \r\ntypes of knowledge holders (e.g., scientists and practitioners), \r\ninequitable distribution of funding between developed country and \r\nAfrican partners that favours developed country partners, an inability \r\nto develop sustained trust relationships as a result of short-funding \r\ncycles, a lack of flexibility due to product-focused engagements and the \r\nscalability of co-production to enable widespread reach across Africa \r\nas the process is usually context specific (high confidence) (Vincent \r\net al., 2018; Vogel et al., 2019; 2020a)."


id: 1e884fc794c3c95aded11bae1c9ab698
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"Farming experience, access to extension services and increasing \r\nage are the most frequently cited factors positively influencing the \r\nperceptions of climate changes (Alemayehu and Bewket, 2017; Oduniyi \r\nand Tekana, 2019). Personal experience of climate-related changes \r\nand their impacts appears to be an important factor influencing \r\nperceptions through shaping negative associations, for example, \r\nexperience of flash floods (Elshirbiny and Abrahamse, 2020) or direct \r\neffect on economic activity, indicating that perception is not restricted \r\nto crop farmers (Liverpool-Tasie et  al., 2020). However, perceptions \r\nshow common misconceptions about the causes of climate change, \r\nwhich has implications for climate action (Elshirbiny and Abrahamse, \r\n2020), highlighting the importance of climate change literacy."


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"Despite these challenges, the inclusive nature of co-production has\r\nhad a positive influence on the uptake of CS into decision making \r\nwhere it has been applied (Table 9.4; Figure 9.12; Vincent et al., 2018; \r\nVogel et al., 2019; Carter et al., 2020; Chiputwa et al., 2020) (medium \r\nconfidence), through sustained inter/transdisciplinary relationships \r\nand capacity development (Norstrom et al., 2020), strategic financial \r\ninvestment, fostering of ownership of resulting products and the \r\ncombining of scientific and other knowledge systems (Carter et  al., \r\n2020; Steynor et  al., 2020a). There is high confidence that together \r\nwith improved institutional capacity building and strategic financial \r\ninvestment, CS can help African stakeholders adapt to projected \r\nclimate risks (Figure 9.11)."


id: c2291e794676077cda1c1a2ffbc47c12
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"Understanding the human cause of climate change is a strong \r\npredictor of climate change risk perception (Lee et  al., 2015) and a \r\ncritical knowledge foundation that can affect the difference between \r\ncoping responses and more informed and transformative adaptation \r\n(Figure 9.11; Oladipo, 2015; Mutandwa et al., 2019). At a minimum, \r\nclimate change literacy includes both having heard of climate change \r\nand understanding it is, at least in part, caused by people (Simpson \r\net al., 2021a). However, large inequalities in climate change literacy \r\nexist between and within countries and communities across Africa."


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"Perceptions of climate variability and change affect whether and how \r\nindividuals and institutions act, and thus contribute to the success or \r\nfailure of adaptation policies related to weather and climate (Silvestri \r\net al., 2012; Arbuckle et al., 2015; Simpson et al., 2021a)."


id: bc77125d60d5e25a368fdea0b9ded7f5
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"The average national climate change literacy rate in Africa is only 39% \r\n(country rates range from 23-66%) (Figure 9.11). Of 394 sub-national \r\nregions surveyed by Afrobarometer, 8% (37 regions in 16 countries) \r\nhave a climate change literacy rate lower than 20%, while only 2% \r\n(8 regions) score higher than 80%, which is common across European \r\ncountries (Simpson et  al., 2021a). Striking differences exist when \r\ncomparing sub-national units within countries. Climate change literacy \r\nrates in Nigeria range from 71% in Kwara to 5% in Kano, and within \r\nBotswana from 69% in Lobatse to only 6% in Kweneng West (Simpson \r\net al., 2021a). Education is the strongest positive predictor of climate \r\nchange literacy, particularly tertiary education, but poverty decreases \r\nclimate change literacy and climate change literacy rates average \r\n12.8% lower for women than men (Simpson et al., 2021a)."


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"As the identified factors driving climate change literacy overlap \r\nwith broader developmental challenges on the continent, policies \r\ntargeting these factors (e.g., increased education) can potentially yield \r\nco-benefits for both climate change adaptation as well as progress \r\ntowards SDGs, particularly education and gender equality (Simpson \r\net al., 2021a). Progress towards greater climate change literacy affords \r\na concrete opportunity to mainstream climate change within core \r\nnational and sub-national developmental agendas in Africa towards \r\nmore CRD pathways. Synergies with CS can also overcome gendered \r\ndeficits, for example, although women are generally less climate \r\nchange aware and more vulnerable to climate change than men in "


id: 75754f29daae6e4aa8cd45c894ececdd
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"Rural communities, particularly farmers, are the most studied \r\ngroups for climate change perception. They perceive the climate \r\nto be changing, most often reporting changes in rainfall variability, \r\nincreased dry spells, decreases in rainfall and increased temperatures \r\nor temperature extremes. They perceive these changes to bring a range \r\nof negative socioeconomic and environmental effects (Alemayehu and \r\nBewket, 2017; Liverpool-Tasie et al., 2020; Simpson et al., 2021a). In \r\nsome cases, farmers' perceptions of changes in weather and climate \r\nfrequently match climate records for decreased precipitation totals, "


id: 94d91bef54427dd72844919d28fd713
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"Vulnerability in Africa is socially, culturally and geographically differentiated among climatic regions, countries and local communities, with \r\nclimate change impacting the health, livelihoods and food security of different groups to different extents (Gan et al., 2016; Onyango et al., \r\n2016a; Gumucio et al., 2020). This synthesis emphasises intersectionality within vulnerable groups as well as their position within dynamic \r\nsocial and cultural contexts (Wisner, 2016; Kuran et al., 2020), and highlights the differential impacts of climate change and restricted \r\nadaptation options available to vulnerable groups across African countries (see also Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18)."


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"Figure  Box  9.1.1 |   Factors contributing to the progression of vulnerability to climate change in African contexts considering socioeconomic \r\nprocesses, resource access, livelihood changes, and intersectional vulnerability among social groups. This figure reflects a synthesis of vulnerability across \r\nsections of this chapter and highlights how the interactions of multiple dimensions of vulnerability compound each other to increase overall vulnerability (Potts, 2008; "


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"The differential impacts of climate change and adaptation options available to vulnerable groups in Africa are a critical knowledge gap. \r\nMore research is needed to examine the intersection of different dimensions of social status on climate change vulnerability in Africa \r\n(Thompson-Hall et al., 2016; Oluwatimilehin and Ayanlade, 2021). More analysis of vulnerability based on gender and other social and \r\ncultural factors is needed to fully understand the impacts of climate change, the interaction of divergent adaptive strategies, as well as \r\nthe development of targeted adaptation and mitigation strategies, for example, for women in patrilineal kinship systems, people living \r\nwith disabilities, youth, girls and the elderly. Finally, there is an urgent need to build capacity among those conducting vulnerability \r\nassessments, so that they are familiar with this intersectionality lens."


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"Additional information and capacity development through education and early warning systems could enhance vulnerable groups' ability \r\nto cope and adapt their livelihoods (Jaka and Shava, 2018). However, some groups of people may struggle to translate information into \r\nactual changes (Makate et al., 2019; McOmber et al., 2019). Lack of access to assets and social networks, for example, among older \r\npopulations, are critical limitations to locally driven or autonomous adaptation and limit potential benefits from planned adaptation \r\nactions (e.g., adoption of agricultural technologies or effective use of early warning systems)."


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"There is an urgent need for societal and political change to realise potential benefits for these vulnerable groups in the long term (Nyasimi \r\net al., 2018). There is a need for gender-sensitive climate change policies in many African countries and gender-responsive policies, \r\nimplementation plans and budgets for all local-level initiatives (Wrigley-Asante et al., 2019)."


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"Africa, they are generally more likely to adopt climate-resilient crops \r\nwhen they are climate change aware and have exposure to extension \r\nservices (Acevedo et al., 2020; Simpson et al., 2021a)."


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"(Figure  9.13b), and in some regions different observed precipitation \r\ndatasets disagree on the direction of rainfall trends (Panitz et al., 2013; \r\nSylla et al., 2013; Contractor et al., 2020). The uncertainty of observed \r\nrainfall trends results from a number of sources, including high \r\ninterannual and decadal rainfall variability, different methodologies \r\nused in developing rainfall products, and the lack of and poor quality \r\nof rainfall station data (Figure 9.15; Gutierrez et al., 2021)."


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"This section assesses observed and projected climate change over Africa. \r\nIn Working Group I of the IPCC AR6 (WGI), four chapters make regional \r\nassessments of observed and projected climate change (Doblas-Reyes \r\net al., 2021; Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe et al., 2021; Seneviratne \r\net  al., 2021), which facilitates a more nuanced assessment in this \r\nsection of climate and ocean phenomena that impact African systems."


id: 6fdfaebcde2ba22dd43ad917c689e0e0
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"With increased GHG emissions, mean temperature is projected to \r\nincrease over the whole continent, as are temperature extremes \r\nover most of the continent (Figure 9.16a, b). Increased mean annual \r\nrainfall is projected over the eastern Sahel, eastern east Africa and \r\ncentral Africa (Figures 9.14; 9.16c). In contrast, reduced mean annual \r\nrainfall and increased drought (meteorological and agricultural) are \r\nprojected over southwestern southern Africa and coastal north Africa, \r\nwith drought in part as a result of increasing atmospheric evaporative \r\ndemand due to higher temperatures (Figure 9.16e; Ukkola et al., 2020; \r\nRanasinghe et al., 2021; Seneviratne et al., 2021). The frequency and \r\nintensity of heavy precipitation are projected to increase across most of \r\nAfrica, except northern and southwestern Africa (Figures 9.14; 9.16d)."


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"Temperature increases due to human-caused climate change are \r\ndetected across Africa and many regions have warmed more rapidly \r\nthan the global average (Figure  9.13a; Ranasinghe et  al., 2021). A \r\nsignal of increased annual heatwave frequency has already emerged \r\nfrom the background natural climate variability over the whole \r\ncontinent (Figure  9.14; Engdaw et  al., 2021). However, detection of \r\nstatistically significant rainfall trends is evident in only a few regions "


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"Most African countries are expected to experience high temperatures \r\nunprecedented in their recent history earlier in this century than generally \r\nwealthier, higher latitude countries (high confidence). As low latitudes "


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"measured; development and running of early warning systems; \r\nclimate projection and impact studies; and extreme event attribution \r\nstudies (Harrison et al., 2019; Otto et al., 2020). "


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"Sustained station observation networks (Figure  9.15) are essential \r\nfor the long-term analysis of local and regional climate trends, \r\nincluding for temperature and rainfall, as well as: the calibration of \r\nsatellite-derived climate products; development of gridded climate \r\ndatasets using interpolated and blended station-satellite products \r\nthat form the baseline from which climate change departures are "


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"over the Sahara and the Sahel (Fontaine et  al., 2013; Moron et  al., \r\n2016). Trends in mean maximum (TX) and minimum (TN) temperatures \r\nrange between +2degC and +3degC per century over north Africa, and the \r\nfrequencies of hot days (TX > 90th percentile, TX90p) and tropical nights \r\n(TN > 20degC), as well as the frequencies of warm days and nights, roughly \r\nfollow these mean TX and TN trends (Fontaine et al., 2013; Moron et al., \r\n2016; Ranasinghe et  al., 2021; Seneviratne et  al., 2021). Warm spell \r\nduration has increased in many north African countries (Donat et  al., \r\n2014a; Filahi et al., 2016; Lelieveld et al., 2016; Nashwan et al., 2018) \r\nand heatwave magnitude and spatial extent have increased across north \r\nAfrica since 1980, with an increase in the number of events since 2000 \r\nthat is beyond the level of natural climate variability (Russo et al., 2016; \r\nCeccherini et al., 2017; Engdaw et al., 2021)."


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"Mean and seasonal temperatures have increased at twice the global rate \r\nover most regions in north Africa due to human-induced climate change \r\n(Ranasinghe et  al., 2021; Figures  9.13a and; 9.14) (high confidence).\r\nIncreasing temperature trends have been particularly strong since the \r\n1970s (between 0.2degC per decade and 0.4degC per decade), especially in \r\nthe summer (Tanarhte et al., 2012; Donat et al., 2014a; Lelieveld et al., \r\n2016). Similar warming signals have been observed since the mid-1960s "


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"Mean annual precipitation decreased over most of north Africa \r\nbetween 1971-2000 (Donat et al., 2014a; Hertig et al., 2014; Nicholson \r\net al., 2018; Zittis, 2018), with a gradual recovery to normal or wetter \r\nconditions in Algeria and Tunisia since 2000 and over Morocco since \r\n2008 (Nouaceur and Murarescu, 2016). Since the 1960s days with more \r\nthan 10 mm of rainfall have decreased and the number of consecutive \r\ndry days have increased in the eastern parts of north Africa, while in the \r\nwestern parts of north Africa heavy rainfall and flooding has increased \r\n(Donat et  al., 2014a). Aridity, the ratio of potential evaporation to \r\nprecipitation, has increased over the Mediterranean and north Africa \r\ndue to significant decreases in precipitation (Greve et al., 2019)."


id: 43e435feef8af26c63cd5f333f98c2cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8092
content:
"Mean annual precipitation is projected to decrease in north Africa at \r\nwarming levels of 2degC and higher (high confidence) with the most \r\npronounced decreases in the northwestern parts (Figures 9.13a and; \r\n9.14; Schilling et al., 2012; Filahi et al., 2017; Barcikowska et al., 2018; \r\nRanasinghe et al., 2021). Meteorological drought over Mediterranean \r\nnorth Africa in CMIP5 and CMIP6 models are projected to increase \r\nin duration from approximately 2  months during 1950-2014 to \r\napproximately 4 months in the period 2050-2100 under RCP8.5 and "


id: ed5f83e6fe24bc9a8d19267ad542d045
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34819
content:
"Projected changes \r\nof climate variables and hazards\r\n(relative to 1995-2014 average)\r\nat 1.5degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming\r\nabove pre-industrial (1850-1900)"


id: 1665ebe9c3a7bd3ead5f01803e92d348
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1045
content:
"(f) Mean sea surface temperature change (degC). All figures are derived from the WGI Interactive Atlas and show results from between 26 to 33 CMIP6 (Coupled Model Intercomparison \r\nProject) global climate models depending on the climate variable. CMIP6 models include improved representations of physical, biological, and chemical processes as well as higher \r\nspatial resolutions compared to previous CMIP5 models (Eyring et al., 2021). Robustness of the projected change signal is indicated by hatching - no overlay indicates high model \r\nagreement, where at least 80% of models agree on sign of change; diagonal lines (/) indicate low model agreement, where fewer than 80% of models agree on sign of change. \r\nNOTE: Model agreement is computed at a gridbox level and is not representative of regionally aggregated results over larger regions (Gutierrez et al., 2021)."


id: 807d9d30b6bfb4b0afcd2d4fba4999a2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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vector_id: 17744
content:
"be almost double the 1981-2010 average at GWL 2degC (Dosio, 2017; \r\nBathiany et al., 2018; Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe et al., 2021). \r\nHeatwave frequency and intensity are projected to increase under all \r\nscenarios, but limiting global warming to 1.5degC leads to a decreased \r\nheatwave magnitude (-35%) and frequency (-37%) compared to 2degC \r\nglobal warming (Dosio, 2017; Weber et  al., 2018; Nangombe et  al., \r\n2019). Children born in 2020, under a 1.5degC-compatible scenario will \r\nbe exposed to 4-6 times more heatwaves in their lifetimes compared \r\nto people born in 1960; this exposure increases to 7-9  times more \r\nheatwaves at GWL 2.4degC (Thiery et al., 2021)."


id: e3a06a2ed12b1f4311fd0cce30c9cec6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33291
content:
"SSP5-85 (Ukkola et  al., 2020). Extreme rainfall (monthly maximum \r\n1-day rainfall - RX1 day) in the region is projected to decrease (Donat \r\net al., 2019)."


id: ef4781687c4772b3ea3dfc5a8cecf2d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35120
content:
"During 1984-2012, north Africa experienced a decreasing dust trend \r\nwith north African dust explaining more than 60% of global dust \r\nvariations (Shao et al., 2013). Dust loadings and related air pollution \r\nhazards (from fine particles that affect health) are projected to \r\ndecrease in many regions of the Sahara as a result of decreased wind \r\nspeeds (Evan et al., 2016; Ranasinghe et al., 2021)."


id: f24983dc9c04dc16451e465e860e6ed7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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vector_id: 35648
content:
"The number of dangerous heat days (TX >40.6degC) is projected to \r\nincrease from approximately 60 per year in 1985-2005 to approximately \r\n110, 130 and 140 under RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, respectively, in \r\nthe 2060s and to 105, 145 and 196 in the 2090s (Rohat et al., 2019). \r\nOver tropical west Africa, heat-related mortality risk through increased \r\nheat and humidity is 6-9 times higher than the 1950-2005 average at \r\nGWL 2degC, 8-15 times at GWL 2.65degC and 15-30 times at GWL 4.12degC \r\n(Ahmadalipour and Moradkhani, 2018) (Coffel et al., 2018). The number \r\nof potentially lethal heat days per year is projected to increase from <50 \r\nduring 1995-2005 to 50-150 at GWL 1.6degC, 100-250 at GWL 2.5degC \r\nand 250-350 at GWL 4.4degC, with highest increases in coastal regions \r\n(Mora et al., 2017). Increasing urbanisation concentrates this exposure \r\nin cities, such as Lagos, Niamey, Kano and Dakar (Section 9.9.3.1; Coffel \r\net al., 2018; Rohat et al., 2019)."


id: 401bb4c4a0afe4948c50374e6df94156
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7463
content:
"Observed mean annual and seasonal temperatures have increased \r\n1-3degC since the mid-1970s with the highest increases in the Sahara and \r\nSahel (Figures 9.13a; Cook and Vizy, 2015; Lelieveld et al., 2016; Dosio, \r\n2017; Nikiema et al., 2017; Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe et al., \r\n2021) and positive trends in mean annual maximum (TX) and minimum \r\n(TN) of 0.16degC and 0.28degC per decade, respectively (Mouhamed et al., \r\n2013; Moron et al., 2016; Russo et al., 2016; Barry et al., 2018). The \r\nfrequency of very hot days (TX > 35degC) and tropical nights has increased \r\nby 1-9 days and 4-13 nights per decade between 1961-2014 (Moron \r\net al 2016), and cold nights have become less frequent (Fontaine et al., \r\n2013; Mouhamed et al., 2013; Barry et al., 2018). In the 21st century, \r\nheatwaves have become hotter, longer and more extended compared \r\nto the last two decades of the 20th century (Mouhamed et al., 2013; \r\nMoron et al., 2016; Russo et al., 2016; Barbier et al., 2018)."


id: fddc287b25ff4927ef6f764efea2f5f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37460
content:
"Negative trends in rainfall accompanied by increased rainfall variability \r\nwere observed between 1960s-1980s over west Africa (Nicholson \r\net  al., 2018; Thomas and Nigam, 2018), caused by a combination \r\nof anthropogenic aerosols and GHGs emitted between the 1950s \r\nand1980s (Booth et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2016; Giannini and Kaplan, \r\n2019; Douville et al., 2021). Declining rainfall trends ended by 1990 \r\ndue to the growing influence of GHGs and reduced cooling effect \r\nof aerosol emissions, with a trend to wetter conditions emerging in \r\nthe mid-1990s accompanied by more intense, but fewer precipitation \r\nevents (Sanogo et al., 2015; Sylla et al., 2016; Kennedy et al., 2017; \r\nBarry et  al., 2018; Bichet and Diedhiou, 2018a; 2018b; Thomas and \r\nNigam, 2018). A shift to a later onset and end of the west African \r\nmonsoon is also reported in west Africa and Sahel (low confidence) \r\n(Chen et  al., 2021; Ranasinghe et  al., 2021). Between 1981-2014 "


id: a924f5b86959dde5fbba2b12044272c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24145
content:
"At 1.5degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming above pre-industrial levels, \r\nmean annual temperatures in west Africa are projected to be on \r\naverage, 0.6degC, 1.1degC and 2.1degC warmer than the 1994-2005 average, \r\nrespectively (Figure  9.16a). Under mid- and high-emission scenarios \r\nend of century summer temperatures are projected to increase by 2degC \r\nand 5degC, respectively (Sylla et  al., 2015a; Russo et  al., 2016; Dosio, \r\n2017). The annual number of hot days is projected to increase at all \r\nglobal warming levels with larger increases at higher warming levels \r\n(Figure  9.16b). By 2060 the frequency of hot nights is projected to "


id: 4d801df47381f51c584835ff803a3cd3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9626
content:
"the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel have experienced more intense \r\nprecipitation events (Panthou et al., 2014; Bichet and Diedhiou, 2018a; \r\nPanthou et al., 2018) and the frequency of mesoscale storms has tripled \r\n(Taylor et al., 2017; Callo-Concha, 2018). Extreme heavy precipitation \r\nindices show increasing trends from 1981-2010 (Barry et al., 2018), \r\nincreasing high flow events in large Sahelian rivers as well as small \r\nto mesoscale catchments leading to pluvial and riverine flooding \r\n(Douville et  al., 2021). Meteorological, agricultural and hydrological \r\ndrought in the region has increased in frequency since the 1950s \r\n(medium confidence) (Seneviratne et al., 2021)."


id: e2c4be0430ba568b95566bdc5f1ca319
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33178
content:
"Mean annual temperature across central Africa has increased by \r\n0.75degC-1.2degC since 1960 (Aloysius et al., 2016; Gutierrez et al., 2021). \r\nThe number of hot days, heatwaves and heatwave days increased \r\nbetween 1979-2016 (Hu et  al., 2019) and cold extremes have \r\ndecreased (Figure 9.14; Aguilar et al., 2009; Seneviratne et al., 2021). \r\nUncertainties associated with the poor ground-based observation \r\nnetworks in the region and associated observational uncertainties \r\n(Section 9.5.1.1) result in an assessment of medium confidence in an \r\nincrease in the number of heat extremes over the region."


id: 2136fc99ade6c275d6211cc4087b2187
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2663
content:
"The frequency and intensity of extremely heavy precipitation are projected \r\nto increase under mid- and high-emission scenarios (Figures 9.13a; 9.14; \r\nSylla et al., 2015b; Diallo et al., 2016; Akinsanola and Zhou, 2019; Giorgi \r\net al., 2019; Dosio et al., 2021; Li et al., 2021; Seneviratne et al., 2021). \r\nHowever, heavy rainfall statistics from global and regional climate models \r\nmay be conservative as very-high-resolution, convection-permitting \r\nclimate models simulate more intense rainfall than these models (Stratton \r\net al., 2018; Berthou et al., 2019; Han et al., 2019; Kendon et al., 2019)."


id: b172bf52b31c63946dbc193b11e54eab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25412
content:
"At 2degC global warming, west Africa is projected to experience a drier, \r\nmore drought-prone and arid climate, especially in the last decades of \r\nthe 21st century (Sylla et al., 2016; Zhao and Dai, 2016; Klutse et al., \r\n2018). The duration of meteorological drought in the western parts of \r\nWest Africa is projected to increase from approximately 2 months during \r\n1950-2014 to approximately 4 months in the period 2050-2100 under \r\nRCP8.5 and SSP5-8.5 (Ukkola et al., 2020). Increased intensity of heavy \r\nprecipitation events combined with increasing drought occurrences will \r\nsubstantially increase the cumulative hydroclimatic stress on populations \r\nin west Africa during the late 21st century (Giorgi et al., 2019)."


id: 47160b0c038be016324e6bfe286ef198
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8564
content:
"The severe lack of station data over the region leads to large uncertainty \r\nin the estimation of observed rainfall trends and low confidence in \r\nchanges in extreme rainfall (Figure  9.13b; Creese and Washington, \r\n2018; Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe et al., 2021). There is some \r\nevidence of drying since the mid-20th century through decreased mean \r\nrainfall and increased precipitation deficits (Gutierrez et  al., 2021), \r\nas well as increases in meteorological, agricultural and ecological \r\ndrought (medium confidence) (Seneviratne et  al., 2021). However, \r\nthere is spatial heterogeneity in annual rainfall trends between 1983-\r\n2010 ranging from -10 to +39 mm per year (Maidment et al., 2015), "


id: a81f068bc5a312c9a0b8ddd05b0e5453
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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vector_id: 23964
content:
"> 40.6 degC) compared to 1985-2005 including Blantyre-Limbe, Lusaka \r\nand Kampala (Mora et al., 2017; Rohat et al., 2019). Children born in \r\n2020, under a 1.5degC-compatible scenario will be exposed to 3-5 times \r\nmore heatwaves in their lifetimes compared to people born in 1960; \r\nthis exposure increases to 4-9 times more heatwaves at GWL 2.4degC \r\n(Thiery et  al., 2021). The number of potentially lethal heat days per \r\nyear is projected to increase from <50 during 1995-2005 to <50 at \r\nGWL 1.6degC, 50-120 at GWL 2.5degC and 150-350 at GWL 4.4degC with \r\nlargest increases at the coast (Mora et al., 2017), highlighting the new \r\nemergence of dangerous heat conditions in these areas."


id: dc31e9e20015797de24e1761ea65015a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32153
content:
"with a decline in mean seasonal April-June precipitation of -69 mm \r\nper year in most regions except in the northwest (Zhou et al., 2014; \r\nHua et al., 2016; Klotter et al., 2018; Hu et al., 2019). Southern and \r\neastern central Africa were identified as drought hotspots between \r\n1991-2010 (Spinoni et al., 2014)."


id: b3f0885a01a70a90943544dbcaa794c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25824
content:
"Under low emission scenarios and at GWL 1.5degC and GWL 2degC there \r\nis low confidence in projected mean rainfall change over the region \r\n(Figure 9.16c). At GWL 3degC and GWL 4.4degC, an increased mean annual \r\nrainfall of 10-25% is projected by regional climate models (Coppola \r\net al., 2014; Pinto et al., 2015) and the intensity of extreme precipitation \r\nwill increase (high confidence) (Figure  9.16c, d; Sylla et  al., 2015a; \r\nDiallo et al., 2016; Dosio et al., 2019; Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe \r\net al., 2021; Seneviratne et al., 2021). This is projected to increase the \r\nlikelihood of widespread flood occurrences before, during and after the \r\nmature monsoon season (Figure 9.14)."


id: e74e5e0734fc568e4ef1dfcb3bf6d463
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33884
content:
"Over equatorial east Africa the short rains (October-November-\r\nDecember) have shown a long-term wetting trend from the 1960s until \r\npresent (Manatsa and Behera, 2013; Nicholson, 2015; 2017), which is \r\nlinked with western Indian Ocean warming and a steady intensification \r\nof Indian Ocean Walker Cell (Liebmann et al., 2014; Nicholson, 2015)."


id: 6f2f888ea369b879a94473c04b5af394
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15120
content:
"Convection-permitting simulations (4.5 km spatial resolution) simulate \r\nincreased dry spell length not apparent at coarser resolutions, suggesting \r\ndrying in addition to more intense extreme rainfall (Stratton et  al., \r\n2018). Although reduced drought frequency is indicated in Figure 9.16e, \r\nthe SPI metric does not account for the effect of increased temperature \r\non drought (increased moisture deficit), and metrics that account for \r\nthis indicate slightly increased drought frequency or no change (Spinoni \r\net al., 2020). Therefore, there is low confidence in projected changes of \r\ndrought frequency over the region (Figure 9.14)."


id: e8082964bd419b395860a8e5dccca472
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34005
content:
"In contrast, the long rainfall season (March-April-May) has experienced \r\na long-term drying trend between 1986 and 2007, with rainfall declines \r\nin each of these months and a shortening of the wet season (Rowell et al., \r\n2015; Wainwright et  al., 2019). Unlike previous decades, since around \r\n2000, the long rains have exhibited a significant relationship with the El \r\nNino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) (Park et al., 2020), as multiple droughts \r\nhave occurred during recent La Nina events and when the western to \r\ncentral Pacific sea surface temperature gradient was La Nina-like (Funk \r\net al., 2015; Funk et al., 2018a). Wetter-than-average rainfall years within \r\nthis long-term drying trend are often associated with a stronger amplitude \r\nof the Madden-Julian Oscillation (Vellinga and Milton, 2018)."


id: 6138542b11afa30a24ae3e5657fba82b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12868
content:
"In the northern, summer rainfall region (June-September), a decline \r\nin rainfall occurred in the 1960s and rainfall has remained relatively \r\nlow, while interannual variability has increased since the late 1980s \r\n(Nicholson, 2017); the cause of this drying trend is uncertain."


id: 47f711285b812119de3e5ff500a44acd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8700
content:
"Mean temperatures over the region have increased by 0.7degC-1degC \r\nfrom 1973 to 2013, depending on the season (Ayugi and Tan, 2018; \r\nCamberlin, 2018). Increases in TX and TN are evident across the region \r\naccompanied by significantly increasing trends of warm nights, warm \r\ndays and warm spells (Russo et al., 2016; Gebrechorkos et al., 2019; \r\nNashwan and Shahid, 2019). The greatest increases are found in \r\nnorthern and central regions."


id: ec68f7dc238c6aa3c17328bc02e2fb31
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34676
content:
"Since 2005, drought frequency has doubled from once every 6 to \r\nonce every 3  years and has become more severe during the long \r\nand summer rainfall seasons than during the short rainfall season \r\n(Ayana et al., 2016; Gebremeskel Haile et al., 2019). Several prolonged \r\ndroughts have occurred predominantly within the arid and semi-arid \r\nparts of the region over the past three decades (Nicholson, 2017)."


id: 23fe03bf2fd4c5c36b35ff3c0f6d5713
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3103
content:
"At 1.5degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming above pre-industrial levels, \r\nmean annual temperatures in east Africa are projected to be on \r\naverage, 0.6degC, 1.1degC and 2.1degC warmer than the 1994-2005 average, \r\nrespectively (Figure 9.16a). Highest increases are projected over the \r\nnorthern and central parts of the region and the lowest increase \r\nover the coastal regions (Otieno and Anyah, 2013; Dosio, 2017). The \r\nmagnitude and frequency of hot days are projected to increase from \r\nGWL 2degC and above with larger increases at higher GWLs (Figure 9.16a, \r\nb; Dosio, 2017; Bathiany et al., 2018; Dosio et al., 2018; Kharin et al., \r\n2018). At GWL 4.6degC a number of east African cities are projected to \r\nhave an up to 2000-fold increase in exposure to dangerous heat (days "


id: fd67e5557b85155a3bb006618eb5f6de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37380
content:
"Higher mean annual rainfall, particularly in the eastern parts of east \r\nAfrica are projected at GWL 1.5degC and 2degC by 25 CORDEX models \r\n(Nikulin et  al., 2018; Osima et  al., 2018). The additional 0.5degC of \r\nwarming from 1.5degC increases average dry spell duration by between \r\ntwo and four days, except over southern Somalia where this is reduced \r\nby between 2-3  days (Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018; Nikulin et  al., \r\n2018; Osima et al., 2018; Weber et al., 2018)."


id: c7392aa743ef6475e34ee0f78eb7e728
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28935
content:
"During the short rainy season, a longer rainfall season (Gudoshava \r\net  al., 2020) and increased rainfall of over 100 mm on average is "


id: 2135d0123c39443d8b70a3cd62f19cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2662
content:
"with low mitigation (Iyakaremye et al., 2021). Children born in 2020, \r\nunder a 1.5degC-compatible scenario will be exposed to 3-4  times \r\nmore heatwaves in their lifetimes compared to people born in 1960, \r\nalthough in Angola this is 7-8  times; at GWL 2.4degC this exposure \r\nincreases to 5-9 times more heatwaves (>10 times in Angola) (Thiery \r\net al., 2021)."


id: 98f8c60c098adc097ccc33a9c9e03547
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21584
content:
"projected over the eastern Horn of Africa and regions of high/complex \r\ntopography at GWL 4.5degC (Dunning et al., 2018; Endris et al., 2019; \r\nOgega et al., 2020)."


id: 386c8773d3f36c5bb90455a1eb1eb1cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6250
content:
"During the long rainy season, there is low confidence in projected \r\nmean rainfall change (Gutierrez et al., 2021). Although some studies \r\nreport projected increased end of century rainfall (Otieno and Anyah, \r\n2013; Kent et al., 2015), the mechanisms responsible for this are not \r\nwell-understood and a recent regional model study has detected no \r\nsignificant change (Cook et al., 2020b). Projected wetting is opposite \r\nto the observed drying trends, giving rise to the 'east African rainfall \r\nparadox' (Rowell et al., 2015; Wainwright et al., 2019). In other parts \r\nof east Africa, no significant trend is evident (Ogega et  al., 2020), \r\nagreement on the sign of change is low, and in some regions, CMIP5 \r\nand CORDEX data show opposite signs of change (Lyon et al., 2017; \r\nLyon and Vigaud, 2017; Osima et al., 2018; Kendon et al., 2019; Ogega \r\net al., 2020)."


id: f9f3250c3b97eb918da1cda80546c7fb
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Heavy rainfall events are projected to increase over the region at \r\nglobal warming of 2degC and higher (high confidence) (Nikulin et  al., \r\n2018; Finney et al., 2020; Ogega et al., 2020; Li et al., 2021). Drought \r\nfrequency, duration and intensity are projected to increase in Sudan, \r\nSouth Sudan, Somalia and Tanzania but decrease or not change over \r\nKenya, Uganda and the Ethiopian Highlands (Liu et al., 2018c; Nguvava \r\net al., 2019; Haile et al., 2020; Spinoni et al., 2020)."


id: 3b2c53cea3263cffbaaffa65fac4b0cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"Mean annual temperatures over the region increased by between \r\n1.04degC and 1.44degC over the period 1961-2015 depending on the \r\nobservational dataset (Gutierrez et  al., 2021) and, in northern \r\nBotswana and Zimbabwe, they have increased by 1.6degC-1.8degC \r\nbetween 1961-2010 (Engelbrecht et al 2015). The annual number of \r\nhot days have increased in southern Africa over the last four decades \r\n(Ceccherini et al., 2017; Kruger and Nxumalo, 2017a; 2017b) and there \r\nis increasing evidence of increased heat stress impacting agriculture \r\nand human health (Section 9.10.2). The occurrence of cold extremes, \r\nincluding frost days, have decreased (Figure 9.14; Kruger and Nxumalo, \r\n2017b)."


id: 9677ab3be05371f6d2e9a1a15ed29cd8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Mean annual rainfall in the summer rainfall region is projected to \r\ndecrease by 10-20%, accompanied by an increase in the number of \r\nconsecutive dry days during the rainy season under RCP8.5 (Kusangaya \r\net  al., 2014; Engelbrecht et  al., 2015; Lazenby et  al., 2018; Maure \r\net al., 2018; Spinoni et al., 2019). The western parts of the region are \r\nprojected to become drier, with increasing drought frequency, intensity \r\nand duration likely under RCP8.5 (high confidence) (Figures 9.16c, e; \r\n9.14; Engelbrecht et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2018b; 2018c; Ukkola et al., \r\n2020), including multi-year droughts (Zhao and Dai, 2016; Dosio, \r\n2017)."


id: 90e221de014effece8a51a92d52925c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Dryness in the summer rainfall region is expected to increase at 1.5degC \r\nand higher levels of global warming (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018) and \r\ntogether with higher temperatures will enhance evaporation from the \r\nregion's mega-dams and reduce soil-moisture content (Section 9.7.1; \r\nEngelbrecht et al., 2015). Increases in drought frequency and duration \r\nare projected over large parts of southern Africa at GWL 1.5degC (Liu \r\net  al., 2018b; 2018c; Seneviratne et  al., 2021) and unprecedented \r\nextreme droughts (compared to the 1981-2010 period) emerge at \r\nGWL 2degC (Spinoni et  al., 2021). Meteorological drought duration is \r\nprojected to increase from approximately 2 months during 1950-2014 \r\nto approximately 4 months in the mid-to-late-21st century future under \r\nRCP8.5 (Ukkola et al., 2020). Heavy precipitation in the southwestern "


id: 66173bc00e5ea2bca8f5886e921b5522
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"At 1.5degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming above pre-industrial levels, \r\nmean annual temperatures in southern Africa are projected to be \r\non average, 1.2degC, 2.3degC and 3.3degC warmer than the 1994-2005 \r\naverage respectively (Figure 9.16a). The annual number of heatwaves \r\nis projected to increase by between 2-4 (GWL 1.5degC), 4-8 (GWL 2degC) \r\nand 8-12 (GWL 3degC) and hot and very hot days are virtually certain to \r\nincrease under 1.5degC and 2degC of global warming (Engelbrecht et al., \r\n2015; Russo et al., 2016; Dosio, 2017; Weber et al., 2018; Seneviratne \r\net al., 2021). Cold days and cold extremes are projected to decrease \r\nunder all emission scenarios with the strongest decreases associated "


id: e03441943f79f191bbf3342b1f3bbc8a
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content:
"region is projected to decrease (Donat et al., 2019) and increase in the \r\neastern parts of southern Africa at all warming levels (Li et al., 2021; \r\nSeneviratne et al., 2021)."


id: b2591d8f660b4cf692f2095554a1547b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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vector_id: 25571
content:
"Rouault, 2005). The SAM shows a systematic positive trend over the \r\nlast five decades (Niang et al., 2014)."


id: 5d524971174ee32b1ba31965990ea41a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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vector_id: 12203
content:
"There is no clear indication that climate change will impact the \r\nfrequencies of ENSO and IOD (Stevenson et  al., 2012; Endris et  al., \r\n2019), although there is some indication that extreme ENSO events \r\nand extreme phases of the IOD, particularly the positive phase, may \r\nbecome more frequent with implications for extreme events associated \r\nwith these features, such as drought (Collins et al., 2019; Cai et al., \r\n2021; Seneviratne et  al., 2021). Under high-emission scenarios, a \r\npositive trend in SAM is projected to continue through the 21st century, \r\nhowever, under low emission scenarios, this trend is projected to be \r\nweak or even negative given the potential for ozone hole recovery \r\n(Arblaster et al., 2011)."


id: ea6053263ef2e7808e82ab041424fb71
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"There is limited evidence of an increased frequency of Category 5 \r\ntropical cyclones in the southwestern Indian Ocean (Fitchett et al., 2016; \r\nRanasinghe et al., 2021; Seneviratne et al., 2021) and more frequent \r\nlandfall of tropical cyclones over central to northern Mozambique \r\n(Malherbe et  al., 2013; Muthige et  al., 2018). There is a projected \r\ndecrease in the number of tropical cyclones making landfall in the \r\nregion at 1degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming, however, they are \r\nprojected to become more intense with higher wind speeds so when \r\nthey do make landfall the impacts are expected to be high (medium \r\nconfidence) (Malherbe et al., 2013; Muthige et al., 2018; Ranasinghe \r\net al., 2021)."


id: ab5a752a2c6897297aad7d86adb8a400
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"Marine heatwaves are periods of extreme warm sea surface \r\ntemperature that persist for days to months and can extend up to \r\nthousands of kilometres (Hobday et al., 2016; Scannell et al., 2016), \r\nnegatively impacting marine ecosystems (Section 9.6.1.4)."


id: 4fa237d74f7c886f414b0d8b91439177
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"Total glacial area on Mount Kenya decreased by 121 x 103 m2 (44%) \r\nduring 2004-2016 (Prinz et al., 2016), Kilimanjaro from 4.8 km2\r\n in 1984 \r\nto 1.7 km2\r\n in 2011 (Cullen et al., 2013) and in the Rwenzori Mountains \r\nfrom ~2 km2\r\n in 1987 to ~1 km2 in 2003 (Taylor et al., 2006). Declining \r\nglacial areas in east Africa are linked to rising air temperatures (Taylor \r\net  al., 2006; Hastenrath, 2010; Veettil and Kamp, 2019), and in the \r\ncase of Kilimanjaro and Mount Kenya, declining precipitation and \r\natmospheric moisture (Molg et al., 2009a; 2009b; Prinz et al., 2016; \r\nVeettil and Kamp, 2019)."


id: 96470cc9b73f13feeaea9e0e4071fc28
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"The number of marine heatwaves doubled in mediterranean north \r\nAfrica and along the Somalian and southern African coastlines from \r\n1982-2016 (Frolicher et  al., 2018; Oliver et  al., 2018; Laufkotter \r\net  al., 2020), very likely as a result of human-caused climate \r\nchange (Seneviratne et  al., 2021). Marine heatwave intensity has \r\nincreased along the southern African coastline (Oliver et al., 2018). \r\nIn the ecologically sensitive region west of southern Madagascar, the \r\nlongest and most intense marine heatwave in the past 35 years was \r\nrecorded during the austral summer of 2017 in the region, it lasted \r\n48 days and reached a maximum intensity of 3.44degC above the 35-\r\nyear average (Mawren et al., 2021). Satellite-derived measurements \r\nof coastal marine heatwaves may under-report their intensity as \r\nmeasured against coastal in situ measurements (Schlegel et  al., \r\n2017)."


id: d960d5af1d1b4dc1a6511f4e32229385
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"Glacial ice cover is projected to disappear before 2030 on the Rwenzori \r\nMountains (Taylor et al., 2006) and Mount Kenya (Prinz et al., 2018) \r\nand by 2040 on Kilimanjaro (Cullen et al., 2013). The loss of glaciers is \r\nexpected to result in a loss in tourism revenues, especially in mountain \r\ntourism (Wang and Zhou, 2019)."


id: 7301c61936a91f9f8bcd9acb6c6da077
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"The ENSO, Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) and Southern Annular Mode \r\n(SAM) are the primary large-scale drivers of African seasonal and \r\ninterannual climate variability. The diurnal temperature range tends to \r\nbe greater during La Nina than El Nino in northeastern Africa (Hurrell \r\net al., 2003; Donat et al., 2014a), and in southern Africa, the El Nino \r\nwarming effect has been stronger for more recent times (1979-2016) \r\ncompared to earlier period (1940-1978) (Lakhraj-Govender and Grab, \r\n2019). In east Africa, ENSO and IOD exert an interannual control \r\non particularly October-November-December (short rains) and \r\nJune-July-August-September seasons. In southern Africa, El Nino is \r\nassociated with negative rainfall and positive temperature anomalies \r\nwith the opposite true for La Nina. The SAM exerts control on rainfall \r\nin the southwestern parts of the region and a positive SAM mode is \r\noften associated with lower seasonal rainfall in the region (Reason and "


id: 3608f254bd10349ace9139a42a42e829
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"This box aims to map the diversity of Indigenous Knowledge and local knowledge systems in Africa and highlights the potential of \r\nthis knowledge to enable sustainability and effective climate adaptation. This box builds on the framing of the IPCC system for which \r\n'indigenous knowledge (IK) refers to the understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies with long histories of interaction \r\nwith their natural surroundings' (IPCC, 2019b), while 'local knowledge (LK) refers to the understandings and skills developed by individuals \r\nand populations, specific to the place where they live' (Cross-Chapter Box INDIG in Chapter 18; IPCC, 2019b)."


id: 1852695f5f6d555d405904baa423ce56
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"In most African Indigenous agrarian systems, local communities integrate IK to anticipate or respond to climate variability (Mafongoya \r\net al., 2017). This holds potential for a more holistic response to climate change, as Indigenous Knowledge and local knowledge (IKLK) \r\napproaches seek solutions that increase resilience to a wide range of shocks and community stresses (IPCC, 2019b). In Africa, IKLK are \r\nexceptionally rich in ecosystem-specific knowledge, with the potential to enhance the management of natural hazards and climate \r\nvariability (high confidence), but there is uncertainty about IKLK for adaptation under future climate conditions."


id: 9060a69345ee83656f7963b2da3f19b9
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"Communities across Africa have long histories of using IKLK to cope with climate variability, reduce vulnerability and improve the capacity \r\nto cope with climate variability (Iloka Nnamdi, 2016; Mapfumo et al., 2017). The adaptation is mostly incremental, such as customary \r\nrainwater harvesting practices and planting ahead of rains (Ajibade and Eche, 2017; Makate, 2019), which are used to address the \r\nlate-onset rains and rainfall variability. Although IKLK adaptation practices implemented by African communities are incremental, such \r\npractices record higher evidence of climate risk reduction compared to practices influenced by other knowledge types (Williams et al., \r\n2020). African communities have used IKLK to cope, adapt to and manage climate hazards, mainly floods, wildfires, rainfall variability and \r\ndroughts (see Box Table 9.2.1; IPCC, 2018b; IPCC, 2019b)."


id: 61af676aaf149a2d7309bc78b7469d0
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content:
"Table Box 9.2.1 |  Selected studies where Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge have been used to cope with climate variability and climate change impacts in \r\nAfrica."


id: fe93ab81ed1f732c6e038ba13751b862
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"IKLK and adaptation/coping strategies in Table Box 9.2.1 are supportive measures that communities cannot solely rely upon, but which \r\ncan be used to complement other adaptation options to increase community resilience."


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"The diversity of African languages is crucial for climate adaptation. Africa has over 30% of the world's Indigenous languages (Seti et al., \r\n2016), which are exceptionally rich in ecosystem-specific knowledge on biodiversity, soil systems and water (Oyero, 2007; Mugambiwa, \r\n2018). Taking into consideration the low level of literacy in Africa, especially among women and girls, Indigenous languages hold great \r\npotential for more effective climate change communication and services that enable climate adaptation (Brooks et al., 2005; Ologeh \r\net al., 2018; IPCC, 2019b). African traditional beliefs and cultural practices place great value on the natural environment, especially land \r\nas the dwelling place of the ancestors and source of livelihoods (Tarusarira, 2017; see Section 9.12)."


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"Figure Box 9.2.1 |  Indigenous earth walls (hayit) built by Indigenous people in Akobo, Jonglei Region, South Sudan, to protect their houses and \r\ninfrastructure from the worst flood in 25 years that occurred in 2019. The wall is 1-2 m high. Photo credit: Laurent-Charles Tremblay-Levesque."


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"in the Sahel, appear transitory and localised rather than widespread \r\nand permanent (Dardel et al., 2014; Pandit et al., 2018; Sterk and \r\nStoorvogel, 2020)."


id: 4a991ec697a85ceb6566ecf0d86de147
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"There is high agreement that land use activities counteract or exacerbate \r\nclimate-driven vegetation change (Aleman et al., 2017; Timm Hoffman \r\net al., 2019). Decreased woody plant biomass in 11% of sub-Saharan \r\nAfrica was attributed to land clearing for agriculture (Brandt et al., 2017; \r\nOrdway et al., 2017). Localised loss of tree cover in Miombo woodlands \r\nand 16.6+-0.5 Mha of forest loss in the Congo Basin between 2000-2014 \r\nwas driven largely by forest clearing and drought mortality (McNicol \r\net al., 2018; Tyukavina et al., 2018)."


id: e8ffd81a13d50b106c3dd14d9990fa1d
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"water quality and productivity of algae, invertebrates and fish (high \r\nconfidence). In deeper lakes, warmer surface waters and decreasing \r\nwind speeds reduced shallow waters mixing with nutrient-rich deeper \r\nwaters, reducing biological productivity in the upper sunlit zone \r\n(Ndebele-Murisa, 2014; Saulnier-Talbot et al., 2014). In several lakes, \r\nclimate change was identified as causing changes in insect emergence \r\ntime (Dallas and Rivers-Moore, 2014) and in loss of fish habitats \r\n(Natugonza et  al., 2015; Gownaris et  al., 2016). This set of changes \r\ncan harm human livelihoods, for example, from reduced fisheries \r\nproductivity (see Section 9.8.5; Ndebele-Murisa, 2014; Ogutu-Ohwayo \r\net al., 2016) and reduced water supply and quality (Section 9.7.1)."


id: 8c1f31dd123656540a15e2bf6703a273
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"Small climatic variations have large impacts on ecosystem function \r\nin Africa's freshwaters (Ndebele-Murisa, 2014; Ogutu-Ohwayo et  al., \r\n2016). Warming of water temperatures from 0.2degC to 3.2degC occurred in \r\nseveral lakes over 1927-2014 and has been attributed to human-caused \r\nclimate change (Figure  9.17; Ogutu-Ohwayo et  al., 2016). Increased \r\ntemperature, changes in rainfall and reduced wind speed altered the \r\nphysical and chemical properties of inland water bodies, affecting "


id: 6dc26b58544bdd47cc285ae6054bba52
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"reversing climate- and CO2-driven greening in savannas (Aleman \r\net al., 2018; Quesada et al., 2018)."


id: 360d88076942a2d5afde6eb14de00ccb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"Vegetation growth simulated by dynamic vegetation models is often \r\nhighly sensitive to CO2 fertilisation. These models project the African \r\ntropical forest carbon sink to be stable or strengthened under scenarios \r\nof future climate change (Huntingford et al., 2013; Martens et al., 2021). \r\nIn contrast, statistical modelling suggests it has begun to decline and \r\nwill weaken further, decreasing from current estimates of 0.66 tonnes \r\nof carbon removed from the atmosphere per hectare per year to 0.55 \r\ntonnes of carbon (Hubau et al., 2020). Increasing rainfall seasonality \r\nand aridity over central Africa (Haensler et  al., 2013) threatens the \r\nmassive carbon store in the Congo Basin's Cuvette Centrale peatlands, \r\nestimated at 30.6 billion tonnes (Dargie et al., 2019)."


id: 33d55963fb7d8e5ea885f5415f7ca67
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Local extinction is when a species is extirpated from a local site. \r\nThe magnitude and extent of local extinctions predicted across \r\nAfrica increase substantially under all future GWLs (high confidence) "


id: dcc14b12e6cf0bb9bac6ff372e8de8b9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"Aridity is an important determinant of these biomes, however the distribution of \r\ngrasslands, savannas and forests are also strongly shaped by interactions between \r\ndisturbance and climate and as such changes in disturbances are also important \r\ndeterminants of biomes boundaries. Multiple stable biome states are often possible at \r\nthe transition between savanna and forest. Shifts in rainfall seasonality are not \r\ndepicted here, though through altering disturbance regimes and drought intensity, this \r\nis also expected to be an important factor."


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content:
"Forests expand into savannas;\r\nsavannas experience densification and tending to \r\nbecome closed canopy systems."


id: 4fa13eae7954f7c1c741ce102aa8ace2
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"As CO2\r\n increases the water use efficiency of \r\ntrees and grasses increases causing woody \r\nproliferation in arid savannas. This may also \r\ninduce expansion of grasses into arid shrublands."


id: cfab99fcbe2fe1ee380b506f525887fd
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content:
"(Table 9.5; Figure 9.19). Above 2degC, the risk of sudden disruption or \r\nloss of local biodiversity increases and becomes more widespread, \r\nespecially in central, west and east Africa (Trisos et al., 2020)."


id: 3de3b628f83c4c9071cd28e4685b7fd9
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"Global extinction is when a species is extirpated from all areas. At 2degC \r\nglobal warming, 11.6% of African species (mean 11.6%, 95% CI 6.8-\r\n18.2%) assessed are at risk of global extinction, placing Africa second \r\nonly to South America in the magnitude of projected biodiversity losses \r\n(Urban, 2015). At >2degC, 20% of north African mammals may lose all "


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content:
"suitable climates (Soultan et  al., 2019), and over half of the dwarf \r\nsucculents in South African Karoo may lose >90% of their suitable \r\nhabitat (Young et al., 2016). Among the thousands of species at risk, \r\nmany are species of ecological, cultural and economic importance such \r\nas African wild dogs (Woodroffe et al., 2017) and Arabica coffee (Moat \r\net al., 2019)."


id: 8e1444592d71d5c3fed0665ff87445e9
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"warming (very high confidence) (Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018). At \r\naround 2.5degC global warming, an important reef-building coral \r\n(Diploastrea heliopora) in the central Red Sea is projected to stop \r\ngrowing altogether (Cantin et al., 2010). By 2.5degC, suitable habitat \r\nof >50% of species are projected to decline for coastal lobster \r\nin east and north Africa, with large declines for the commercially \r\nimportant lobster species Jasus lalandii in southern Africa (Boavida\u0002Portugal et  al., 2018). More generally, tropical regions, especially \r\nexclusive economic zones in west Africa, are projected to lose large \r\nnumbers of marine species and may experience sudden declines with \r\nextratropical regions having potential net increases as species track \r\nshifting temperatures poleward (Garcia Molinos et al., 2016; Trisos \r\net al., 2020)."


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"African coastal and marine ecosystems are highly vulnerable to \r\nclimate change (high confidence). At 1.5degC of global warming, \r\nmangroves will be exposed to sedimentation and sea level rise, while \r\nseagrass ecosystems will be most affected by heat extremes (high \r\nconfidence) (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018) and turbidity (Wong et al., \r\n2014). These risks will be amplified at 2degC and 3degC (virtually certain) \r\n(Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018). Over 90% of east African coral \r\nreefs are projected to be destroyed by bleaching at 2degC of global "


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"The loss of African biodiversity \r\nunder future climate change \r\nis projected to be widespread and increasing \r\nsubstantially with every 0.5degC above the \r\ncurrent (2001-2020) level of global warming"


id: ce985528f2cca766dec3ff9fa97be9ee
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"Figure 9.19 |  The loss of African biodiversity under future climate change is projected to be widespread and increasing substantially with every 0.5deg above \r\nthe current (2001-2020) level of global warming (high confidence)."


id: 3c112da6231e9cb956c80bb281cc5c23
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"(a) Projected biodiversity loss, quantified as percentage change in species abundance, range size or area of suitable habitat increases with increasing global warming levels \r\n(relative to 1850-1900). Above 1.5degC global warming, half of all assessed species are projected to lose >30% of their population, range size or area of suitable habitat, with losses \r\nincreasing to >40% for >2degC. The 2001-2020 level of global warming is around 1degC higher than 1850-1900 (IPCC, 2021). Boxplots show the median (horizontal line), 50% \r\nquantiles (box), and points are studies of individual species or of multiple species (symbol size indicates the number of species in a study)."


id: 7eb105a54da63b5af9cc59c6f5d0bcc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"(b-c) The mean projected local extinction of vertebrates, plants and insects within 100 km grid cells increases in severity and extent under increased global warming (relative \r\nto 1850-1900). Local extinction >10% is widespread by 1.5degC. Pixel colour shows the projected percentage of species undergoing local extinction and the agreement between \r\nmultiple biodiversity models."


id: e3ce25d6282bb4f38d97ecb7332fd90c
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"Direct human dependence on provisioning ecosystem services in \r\nAfrica is high (Egoh et al., 2012; IPBES, 2018). For example, natural \r\nforests provided 21% of rural household income across 11 African \r\ncountries (Angelsen et al., 2014) and wild-harvested foods (including \r\nfisheries) provide important nutrition to millions of Africans, including \r\nthrough important micronutrients and increased dietary diversity \r\n(Sections 9.8.2.3; 9.8.5; Powell et al., 2013; Baudron et al., 2019a)."


id: 37026aff62b3a47ad91268215f5c1ee
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"Climate change has affected ecosystem services in Africa by reducing \r\nfish stocks, crop and livestock productivity, and water provisioning due \r\nto heat and drought (see Sections  9.8.2.1; 9.8.2.2; 9.8.2.4; 9.8.5.1). \r\nWoody encroachment is decreasing cattle production and water \r\nsupply (Smit and Prins, 2015; Stafford et  al., 2017), but can also \r\nprovide forage for goat production, as well as resins, fuelwood and \r\ncharcoal (Reed et al., 2015; Stafford et al., 2017; Charis et al., 2019). \r\nLocal communities perceive climate change to have decreased crop \r\nand livestock productivity, reduced wild food availability and reduced \r\nforest resources across Africa (see Sections  9.8.2.1; 9.8.2.2; 9.8.2.4; \r\n9.8.2.3; Onyekuru and Marchant, 2014)."


id: 2a1c15bd0d34f594cbcd7b583d43577a
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"Nature-based tourism is important for African economies and jobs. \r\nTourism contributed 8.5% of Africa's 2018 gross domestic product \r\n(GDP) (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2019a) with wildlife tourism \r\ncontributing a third of tourism revenue (USD 70.6 billion), supporting \r\n8.8 million jobs (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2019b)."


id: 437c500e8d761ef13e9263e631334ab1
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content:
"Invasive species threaten African ecosystems and livelihoods (Ranasinghe \r\net  al., 2021). For instance, economic impacts were estimated at \r\nUSD 1 billion per year for smallholder maize farmers in east Africa (Pratt "


id: 99d5d3e1784f0f2363572f9c2e349413
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Future climate change is projected to further negatively affect nature\u0002based tourism. Decreased snow and forest cover may reduce visits to "


id: 5488216992d99503d0b9b6e134d66c3f
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"Figure 9.20 |  Over a third (36%) of all adaptation actions identified in the NDCs of 52 African countries as of early 2020 were ecosystem-based adaptations \r\n(EbA). Of these actions +-83% fall within the agriculture, land use/forestry, environment and water sectors. The EbA actions identified from the NDCs span 12 primary sectors and \r\n29 sub-sectors."


id: 5446bce118f3053d361af1dfafb96aee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"African protected areas store around 1.5% of global land ecosystem \r\ncarbon stocks and support biodiversity (Gray et al., 2016; Melillo et al., \r\n2016; Sala et al., 2018). They also support livelihoods and economies, \r\nsuch as through nature-based tourism and improved fisheries \r\n(Brockington and Wilkie, 2015; Mavah et al., 2018; Ban et al., 2019)."


id: ba907bcccc8665e05ab188175c49d5a6
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"Ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) uses biodiversity and ecosystem \r\nservices to assist people to adapt to climate change (Swanepoel and \r\nSauka, 2019). Africa's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) \r\nshow 36% of adaptation actions identified by 52  countries are \r\nconsidered to be EbA (Figure 9.20)."


id: 36d0505d83116f7ec4a72c8adfd16b9f
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"Climate change and land use change will interact to influence the \r\neffectiveness of African protected areas (high confidence). Species \r\nrepresentation in the existing African protected area network is \r\nprojected to decrease due to species range shifts for mammals, bats, \r\nbirds and amphibians (Hole et  al., 2009; Baker et  al., 2015; Payne "


id: 6b5f81634eaa00e400187192bf8a282
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"Table 9.6 |  The beneficial outcomes of ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) actions and assessed confidence in these outcomes. Assessment is provided for EbA options in the \r\nfour most prevalent EbA sectors identified in the Nationally Determined Contributions of 52 African countries (Figure 9.20). See Chapter 2.6.3 and 3.6.2 of this report for further \r\nassessment of EbA approaches in terrestrial, freshwater and marine systems."


id: 6a086d64f5e9e1b355d9c5e783f861be
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"also accounted for (Table  9.6; Baig et  al., 2016; Emerton, 2017; \r\nChausson et  al., 2020). This is particularly relevant in Africa where \r\nclimate vulnerabilities are strongly linked to natural resource-based \r\nlivelihood practices and existing grey infrastructure levels are low in \r\nmany regions (Dube et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2019). However, financial \r\nconstraints limit EbA project implementation (Mumba et  al., 2016; \r\nSwanepoel and Sauka, 2019)."


id: 938851b4073bd9d26b4207af0986c336
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"through involving community members in decision making, increasing \r\nthe capacity of these communities to respond to climate change (Reid, \r\n2014)."


id: 87d9be704d0df0dd12e31dbc7bbad815
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"EbA can also increase ecological resilience. Re-introduction of fire and \r\nlarge mammals can restore ecosystem services, enhance adaptive \r\ncapacity and benefit people by combatting woody encroachment, \r\nrestoring grazing and increasing streamflow (Asner et al., 2016; Stafford \r\net al., 2017; Cromsigt et al., 2018). Herbivores can also reduce fuel loads \r\nin areas facing increased fire risk (Hempson et al., 2017)."


id: 4137b82700e86af74e6a853bcd8adcc3
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"Evidence for EbA in Africa is largely case study based and often anecdotal \r\n(Reid et  al., 2018). There is high agreement that costs, challenges and \r\nnegative outcomes of EbA interventions are still poorly understood (Reid, \r\n2016; Chaplin-Kramer et al., 2019), despite limited evidence for the efficacy \r\nof context-specific applications at different scales (Doswald et al., 2014)."


id: 58278783846afab6a783c1d610b2b4e9
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"Protected areas can be 'stepping stones' that facilitate climate-induced \r\nspecies range shifts (Roberts et  al., 2020), preserve medicinal plant \r\ndiversity despite climate change (Kaky and Gilbert, 2017) and provide \r\nlivelihood diversification opportunities (Table 9.6). Protecting 30% of \r\nsub-Saharan Africa's land area could reduce the proportion of species \r\nat risk of extinction by around 60% in both low and high warming \r\nscenarios (Hannah et al., 2020). The role of protected areas in EbA can be \r\nstrengthened by: (a) increasing coverage of diverse environments and \r\nhigh carbon storage ecosystems, (b) restoring habitat, (c) maintaining \r\nintact habitat, (d) participatory, equitable conservation and adaptation \r\nstrategies; (e) cooperating across borders and (f) adequate monitoring \r\n(Gillson et al., 2013; Rannow et al., 2014; Midgley and Bond, 2015; Pecl \r\net al., 2017; Dinerstein et al., 2019; Roberts et al., 2020)."


id: 4aa5ee698016b28de3d96d7eb6bece93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Improved ecosystem care and restoration are cost-effective for \r\ncarbon sequestration while providing multiple environmental, social \r\nand economic co-benefits (Griscom et al., 2017; Shukla et al., 2019). \r\nProtecting and restoring natural forests and wetlands reduces flood \r\nrisk across multiple African countries (Bradshaw et al., 2007). In Kenya, \r\nenclosures for rangeland regeneration diversified income sources, \r\nwhich could increase the adaptive capacity of local people (Mureithi \r\net  al., 2016; Wairore et  al., 2016). Sustainable agroforestry in semi\u0002arid regions provides income sources from fuelwood, fruit and timber \r\nand reduces exposure to drought, floods and erosion (Quandt et al., \r\n2017). Forest protection in Zimbabwe maintains honey production \r\nduring droughts, providing food supply options if crops fail (Lunga and \r\nMusarurwa, 2016). Community-based natural resource management \r\nin pastoral communities improved institutional governance outcomes "


id: bc15c704664b4389a2ac6def67ba27d7
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"EbA can mitigate flooding and increase the resilience of freshwater \r\necosystems (Table 9.6). Adaptation in African freshwater ecosystems is \r\nheavily influenced by non-climate anthropogenic factors, including land "


id: 4c9c8c0c9a1dd2eecf369428bfbbb7f0
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"Due to widespread deforestation and forest degradation (Malhi et al., 2014), future scenarios to limit global warming include large-scale \r\nreforestation and afforestation (Griscom et al., 2017; Bastin et al., 2019). Africa has been targeted through the AFR100 (https://afr100.\r\norg) to plant ~1 million km2\r\n of trees by 2030 (Bond et al 2019). Maintaining existing indigenous forest and indigenous forest restoration \r\nis a win-win, maximising benefits to biodiversity, adaptation and mitigation (Griscom et al., 2017; Watson et al., 2018; Lewis et al., 2019) \r\n(high confidence)."


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"Exotic tree species are often selected for planting (e.g., Pinus spp. or Eucalyptus spp.), but in parts of Africa, they have become invasive \r\n(Zengeya, 2017; Witt et al., 2018), increasing fire hazards and decreasing biodiversity and water resources (Nunez et al., 2021) (high \r\nconfidence). Negative impacts of afforestation on ecosystems are not restricted to plantations of exotic species; they extend to \r\ninappropriate planting of native forest species (Slingsby et al., 2020)."


id: 301c4575d4afe37fe6003ae13fc4a018
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"use change, water abstraction and diversion, damming and overfishing \r\n(Dodds et al., 2013; Kimirei et al., 2020; UNESCO and UN-Water, 2020). \r\nWetlands and riparian areas support biodiversity, act as natural filtration \r\nsystems and serve as buffers to changes in the hydrological cycle, thereby \r\nincreasing the resilience of freshwater ecosystems and the people that \r\nrely on them (Ndebele-Murisa, 2014; Musinguzi et al., 2015; Lowe et al., \r\n2019). However, national adaptation programmes of action, NAPs and \r\nnational communications rarely consider the ecological stability of "


id: a3839c22a17065501664141e574f5efc
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"ecosystems safeguarding the very water resources they seek to preserve \r\n(Kolding et  al., 2016). Some countries have mandated the protection \r\nof riparian zones, but implementation is low (Musinguzi et  al., 2015; \r\nMuchuru and Nhamo, 2018). Protecting terrestrial areas surrounding Lake \r\nTanganyika benefited fish diversity (Britton et al., 2017). Afforestation \r\nreduces water availability but forest restoration and removing invasive \r\nplant species can increase water flows in regions facing water insecurity \r\nfrom climate change (Chausson et  al., 2020; Le Maitre et  al., 2020). "


id: 7c5385722fa454ae6a99657ea721d098
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"Regular, long-term monitoring of African freshwaters would improve \r\nunderstanding of responses to climate change. General principles for this \r\ntype of monitoring were developed for Lake Tanganyika (Plisnier et al., \r\n2018) and could be applied to develop harmonised, regional monitoring \r\nof African lakes, rivers and wetlands (Tamatamah and Mwedzi, 2020)"


id: 49d42dc19a983eaee097eb4da4a2bec2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"increased frequency of heavy rainfall events (see Section 9.5). In west \r\nAfrica, declines in river flows have been attributed to declining rainfall \r\nand increasing temperature, drought frequency and water demand \r\n(Biao, 2017; Thompson et al., 2017; Descroix et al., 2018). In central \r\nAfrica, the Congo river demonstrates inter-decadal shifts but no long\u0002term trend (Mahe et al., 2013; Alsdorf et al., 2016). However, recently \r\nobserved falling water levels in its upper and middle reaches are \r\nattributed to climate change (von Lossow, 2017)."


id: aa8ab52e05ac19198d66b1ca69e93b56
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Marine and coastal ecosystems such as mangroves, seagrass and \r\ncoral reefs provide storm protection and food security for coastal \r\ncommunities (high confidence) (IPCC, 2019d). Restoring reef systems \r\nreduced wave height in Madagascar (Narayan et al., 2016), but there is \r\nlimited evidence for the efficacy of coral reef restoration at large scales \r\nwith increased warming (Chapter 3 Section 3.6.3). Populations at risk \r\nfrom storm surge and/or sea level rise coincide with areas of high \r\ncoastal EbA potential from Mozambique to Somalia, and coastlines \r\nof the Gulf of Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone (Jones \r\net al., 2020). Understanding hotspots of EbA potential is particularly \r\nimportant for west Africa with some of the highest levels of human \r\ndependence on marine ecosystems at high risk from climate change \r\nand large populations vulnerable to sea level rise (Sections  9.9.3.1; \r\n9.8.5.2; Selig et al., 2018; Trisos et al., 2020)."


id: 1025214b83a752beedb476657425986b
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"A review of river flow and lake level changes in 82 basins in eastern and \r\nsouthern Africa regions for 1970-2010 showed mixed trends: 51% had \r\ndecreasing trends ranging from 10-49% and 11% increasing trends \r\nranging from 7-60% (Schafer et al., 2015). However, in southern Africa \r\nas a whole, river flows have mostly decreased (high confidence) (Dallas \r\nand Rivers-Moore, 2014). In east Africa, large rivers such as the Tana \r\nshow increasing flow (1941-2016) related to increased rainfall in the \r\nhighlands, with little influence of flow regulation by a series of dams \r\n(Langat et al., 2017). The Nile river basin has been experiencing a mainly \r\nincreasing rainfall trend upstream and decreasing trend downstream \r\n(Onyutha et al., 2016). The observed changes are driven by a complex \r\ncoupling of changes in climate, land use and water demand."


id: 6e3ff679e5ea27d65f64f7838e9aa6ae
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"Marine protected areas (MPAs) can yield multiple adaptation benefits, \r\nsuch as buffering species from extinction and increasing fish stocks, as \r\nwell as storing large amounts of carbon (Edgar et al., 2014; Roberts \r\net  al., 2017; Lovelock and Duarte, 2019). However, this potential of \r\nMPAs will reach limits with increased warming (Roberts et al., 2017). \r\nFor example, MPAs cannot prevent coral bleaching at scale and mass \r\ndie-offs are well-described from MPAs following climate shocks (Bates \r\net al., 2019; Bruno et al., 2019). However, prioritising MPA coverage of \r\nclimate refugia, such as the Northern Mozambique Channel, may offer \r\nsome increased resilience (McClanahan et al., 2014)."


id: 48e36a7b95c9abfdab505af1d099cbd9
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"Much of Africa experiences very high hydrological variability in all \r\ncomponents of the water cycle, with important implications for people \r\nand ecosystems. Most of the continent's water is stored in groundwater \r\n(660,000 km3\r\n), which is 20 times more than the water stored in the \r\nlakes and 100 times more than the annual renewable water resources \r\n(MacDonald et  al., 2012). The accessible volume of groundwater via \r\nwells and springs is smaller than these estimates (Xu et  al., 2019). \r\nAfrica has 63 transboundary river basins (UNEP, 2010), 72 mapped \r\ntransboundary aquifers (Nijsten et  al., 2018) and 33 transboundary \r\nlakes (ILEC and UNEP, 2016), reflecting a highly water-connected and \r\ninterdependent socio-ecological system across countries, also extending \r\nto the coastal areas of the continent (see Chapter 4 Section 4.1)."


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"The mixed signal in river flow trends (increase/decrease/no change) \r\nacross Africa mirrors the results seen globally for runoff and streamflow \r\n(see Chapter 4 Section 4.2.3). Hydrological extremes are, however, of \r\nincreasing concern. There has been an increase in drought frequency, \r\nseverity and spatial extent in recent decades. From 1900-2013, Africa \r\nsuffered the largest number of drought events globally and registered "


id: 8c2e81e540b1b32f714fe6c3062473d7
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"Many African cities will face increasing water scarcity under climate change (Grasham et al., 2019). The Cape Town and Dodoma cases \r\nillustrate challenges for both surface and groundwater supply and what adaptation responses have been employed."


id: efe01263d532d97ca1554b87b2d60a33
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"The Cape Town drought illustrates how a highly diverse African city and its citizens responded to protracted and unanticipated water \r\nscarcity. Human-caused climate change made the reduced rainfall that caused the drought three times more likely (95% confidence \r\ninterval 1.5-6) (Otto et al., 2018; Pascale et al., 2020; Doblas-Reyes et al., 2021). After three consecutive years of low precipitation, \r\nCape Town braced for a 'Day Zero' where large portions of the city would lose water supply (Cole et al., 2021a). The risk of Day Zero \r\nwas anticipated to cascade to affect risks to health, economic output and security (Simpson et al., 2021b). The case study highlights \r\nthe importance of communication, budgetary flexibility, robust financial buffers and insurance mechanisms, disaster planning, \r\nintergovernmental cooperation, nature-based solutions, infrastructure transformations and equitable access for climate adaptation in \r\nAfrican cities facing water scarcity."


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"The drought led the municipality to consider a broader diversity of water supply options, including groundwater (CoCT, 2019), developing \r\ncity-scale, slow-onset disaster planning (Cole et al., 2021a) and building an enhanced 'relationship with water' (CoCT, 2019; Madonsela \r\net al., 2019). This shift in approach is displayed in the recognition of nature-based solutions as a priority in water resilience-building \r\nefforts (Rodina, 2019) and is signalled in Cape Town's Water Strategy which aims to become a 'water sensitive city' that makes 'optimal \r\nuse of stormwater and urban waterways for flood control, aquifer recharge, water re-use and recreation' (CoCT, 2019)."


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"The drought required cooperation between multiple spheres of government, and the management of a broad range of stakeholders and \r\npolitical entities (Nhamo and Agyepong Adelaide, 2019; Cole et al., 2021a). The case highlights how a lack of coordination between \r\nessential organs of state and political entities can reduce response efficacy (Rodina, 2019). Despite significant investments in water \r\nsecurity by public and private entities, one-quarter of Cape Town's population remains in persistent conditions of water stress, emphasising \r\nthe challenge and importance of inclusive solutions that address the persistent social and economic stressors which affect vulnerability to \r\nwater scarcity (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019)."


id: f759f04b1ec72290200bc7d3f9fef533
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"Since 1954, the Makutapora wellfield in semi-arid, central Tanzania has supplied safe water to the city of Dodoma. Substantial rises \r\nin wellfield pumping and population growth have increased freshwater demand in Dodoma and dependence upon the Makutapora \r\nwellfield, currently the sole perennial source of piped water to the city. Yet, there is high uncertainty of groundwater recharge rates \r\n(Nkotagu, 1996; Taylor et al., 2013) which rely on intense seasonal rainfall associated with the ENSO and the IOD modes of climate \r\nvariability (e.g., 2 to 7 years) to contribute disproportionately to recharge (Taylor et al., 2013; Kolusu et al., 2019)."


id: 327307375d578b0ad26401e6f2a12928
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"As freshwater demand in Tanzania's rapidly growing capital is projected to increase substantially in the coming decades, questions \r\nremain as to whether the capacity of the Makutapora wellfield can meet some or all of this demand. Nature-based solutions to improve \r\nthe resilience of wellfield abstraction to increased pumpage and climate change include managed aquifer recharge (MAR). The sharing \r\nof general lessons learned from other cities in dryland Africa employing MAR, such as Windhoek in Namibia (Murray et al., 2018), could \r\nprove invaluable."


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"the second largest number of people affected after Asia (Masih et al., \r\n2014). The likelihood of recent severe climate conditions such as the \r\nmulti-year Cape Town drought has increased due to human-caused \r\nclimate change (Otto et al., 2018; Pascale et al., 2020; see Box 9.4), \r\nand regional and urban floods (Yuan et al., 2018; Tiitmamer, 2020) and \r\ndroughts (Funk et al., 2018b; Siderius et al., 2018; Uhe et al., 2018) are \r\nexpected to increase."


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"In north Africa, in the upper White Nile basin, Olaka et  al. (2019) \r\nproject a 25% and 5-10% (RCP4.5) increase in the intensification of \r\nfuture annual rainfall in the eastern and western parts of the Lake \r\nVictoria Basin, respectively, with corresponding variability in future \r\nriver discharge ranging from 5% to 26%. In the upper Blue Nile basin, \r\nmodels also indicate up to 15% increase in runoffs in wet season and \r\nup to -24% decrease in dry season during 2021-2040 (RCP8.5) (Ayele \r\net al., 2016; Siam and Eltahir, 2017; Meresa and Gatachew, 2018). The \r\nincrease of precipitation in the wet season indicates a higher possibility \r\nof flash floods, while decreased runoffs in dry season further intensify \r\nexisting shortage of irrigation water demand (Ayele et al., 2016; Siam "


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"By 2050, up to 921 million additional people in sub-Saharan Africa \r\ncould be exposed to climate change-related water stress, while up \r\nto 459 million could experience reduced exposure (Dickerson et al., \r\n2021). This large variance in numbers and direction of change is \r\nrelated to uncertainties in climate models and non-climate factors \r\nlike population growth and water withdrawals (Dickerson et  al., \r\n2021). The baseline for most of the projected risks presented here \r\nis 1971-2000."


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"and Eltahir, 2017; Meresa and Gatachew, 2018). The annual flow and \r\nrevenues from hydropower production and irrigated agriculture of the \r\nBlue Nile River at Khartoum are projected to increase under maximum \r\nbut are expected to decrease under minimum and median projected \r\nchanges in streamflow for 2041-2070 and 2071-2100, respectively \r\n(Tariku et al., 2021). The Middle Draa valley in Morocco is expected \r\nto experience more severe droughts and the estimation of the water \r\nbalance suggests a lack of supply in the future (Karmaoui et al., 2016)."


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"projections of strong early summer drying trends remain uncertain \r\n(Munday and Washington, 2019)."


id: e45fa0c036dee9407e0f250bf04d5f24
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"In east Africa, Liwenga et  al. (2015) project warmer and wetter \r\nconditions in the Great Ruaha River region and with increasing \r\nseasonal variation and extremes towards the end of the century. A \r\nsimilar observation is made for the River Pangani, with mean river \r\nflow being about 10% higher in the 2050s relative to the 1980-1999 \r\nperiod, associated with a 16-18% increase in rainfall in its upper \r\ncatchment (Kishiwa et al., 2018). However, at more local scales, the \r\nprojections cover a range of slight declines to significant increases \r\nin mean annual rainfall amounts (Gulacha and Mulungu, 2017). In \r\nthe Tana River basin in Kenya, water yield is projected to increase \r\nprogressively under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 relative to the baseline period \r\n1983-2011 but is characterised by distinct spatial heterogeneity \r\n(Muthuwatta et al., 2018)."


id: d27f8ee35f3d863dec5c354ce42925fb
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"Lake surface temperatures across Africa are expected to rise in tandem \r\nwith increasing global warming. Lake heatwaves, periods of extreme \r\nwarm lake surface water temperature, are projected to become hotter \r\nand longer (Figure 9.21), with heatwaves more than 300 days per year \r\nin many lakes for global warming of 4.2degC (Woolway et  al., 2021). \r\nLake warming is expected to have adverse consequences for aquatic \r\nbiodiversity, habitats, water quality and disruption of current lake physical \r\nprocesses and circulation patterns (Kraemer et al., 2021)."


id: cbbeb2b40af42acad5c3c16112a1fafe
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"In southern Africa, reductions in rainfall over the Limpopo and Zambezi \r\nriver basins under 1.5degC and 2degC global warming could have adverse \r\nimpacts on hydropower generation, irrigation, tourism, agriculture and \r\necosystems (Figure Box  9.5.1) (Maure et  al., 2018), although model "


id: 9302d1b18509d201aafbac7a7c625682
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"Stringer et al., 2021). Appropriate ecosystem-based adaptations that are \r\napplicable at scale should be identified and strongly embedded in these \r\napproaches to deliver multiple benefits while maintaining the integrity of \r\necosystems and biodiversity (UN Environment, 2019; see Sections 9.6.4; \r\n9.8.5; Box 4.6). Furthermore, adaptation options are often influenced or \r\nconstrained by institutions, regulation, availability, distribution, price and \r\ntechnologies (McCarl et al., 2016). Thus, institutional capacity to manage \r\ncomplex water supply systems under rapidly increasing demand and \r\nclimate change stress is critical in achieving water security for African \r\ncities, particularly as cities become more dependent on alternative and \r\ndistant water sources (Padowski et al., 2016)."


id: b322908a992eb427b7061eff386a36d5
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"Climate change is projected to reduce water availability and increase the \r\nextent of water scarcity (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2016), particularly in \r\nsouthern and north Africa, while other regions will be more affected by \r\nincreased hydrological variability over temporally short to interannual \r\ntime scales (see Section 9.6.2). African countries are considered to be \r\nparticularly at risk due to their underlying vulnerabilities (IPCC, 2014b; \r\nUNESCO and UN-Water, 2020), yet the continents' water resources \r\nare still inadequately quantified and modelled (Muller Schmied et al., \r\n2016; Reinecke et  al., 2019), constraining sustainable management \r\npractices (Cuthbert et al., 2019; Hughes, 2019)."


id: 66a64a3eec0b0c4a1e99355382e49ae1
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"Hydrological fluctuations are associated with drought, flood and \r\ncyclone events which have had multi-sector impacts across Africa \r\n(Siderius et  al., 2021; see Chapter  4 Sections  4.3; 4.5), including: \r\nreduced crop production (D'Odorico et  al., 2018), migration and \r\ndisplacement (Siam and Eltahir, 2017; IDMC, 2018), food insecurity \r\nand extensive livestock deaths (Nhamo et al., 2018), electricity outages \r\n(Gannon et  al., 2018), increased incidence of cholera (Olago et  al., \r\n2007; Sorensen et al., 2015; Houemenou et al., 2020) and increased \r\ngroundwater abstraction amplifying the risk of saline intrusion from \r\nsea level rise (Hamed et al., 2018; Ouhamdouch et al., 2019)."


id: 438c9acd46917d969c51c8c4fd4d99fd
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"An integrated systems and risk-based approach to the design and \r\nmanagement of water resources at scale is generally accepted as a \r\npractical and viable way of underpinning the resilience of water systems \r\nto climate change and human pressures (Duffy, 2012; Garcia et al., 2014). \r\nSuch approaches confer multiple benefits to nature and society at scale \r\nand enhance efficiency gains through technology and management \r\nimprovements, but their full implementation has not yet been realised \r\n(Weinzierl and Schilling, 2013; McDonald et al., 2014; UN Environment, \r\n2019). Drylands are particularly singled out as ignored areas that require \r\nintegrated water resource management approaches (Section  9.3.1; "


id: bdfe7e916615b378635461f79da7a0d2
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"achieve a water sensitive city ideal, reaping benefits such as improved \r\nliveability, reduced flooding impacts, safe water and overall lower \r\nnet energy requirements and avoid making the mistakes developed \r\ncountries' cities have made (Fisher-Jeffes et al., 2017) (Brodnik et al., \r\n2018). However, the challenge of large proportions of the population \r\nlacking access to even basic water supply and sanitation infrastructure \r\n(Armitage et  al., 2014) must be simultaneously and effectively \r\naddressed, particularly in light of other major exacerbating factors, like \r\nthe COVID-19 pandemic (Section 9.11.5)."


id: a9eed2d0262c6647f14d8ee2c4cd2925
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"Many studies in Africa use the river basin as a unit of analysis at scale \r\nand adopt sophisticated model-based techniques to assess climate \r\nchange impacts on hydrology under different climate and development \r\nscenarios, thereby presenting trade-offs between competing uses such \r\nas hydropower generation, irrigation and ecosystem requirements \r\n(Section  9.12.1; Yang and Wi, 2018; Ahmed, 2020). However, longer "


id: 856c68ee35a05c7462c2da26dc83e890
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"Hydropower plants clustered within the same areas, are likely to \r\nexperience similar rainfall and run-off patterns, increasing the risk \r\nthat neighbouring states will experience concurrent drought-induced \r\nhydropower shortages."


id: 546d752e28c751d9a3caf828cb5af482
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"When historical annual river flows are weakly or negatively \r\ncorrelated, power trade between basins will be more effective in \r\nmanaging the risk of shortages than power trade between those \r\nexperiencing similar patterns. "


id: aaff5a62d768cd828c70f4c26aa3a956
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"(a) The map shows the location and size of existing (blue) and planned (orange) hydropower plants in African governments' infrastructure expansion plans, 2015-2050. \r\n(b) Matrix shows historical correlations in annual river flows between some of the major river basins indicating risk of hydropower shortages where correlations are higher. \r\n(c, e) Existing and planned hydropower and irrigation are indicated in charts. Dark blue shows forecasted revenues from 2015-2050 of existing hydropower and irrigation in \r\nmajor African river basins in a scenario without further climate change (i.e., based on historical data). Orange in charts (c, e) shows the expected increase in hydropower and \r\nirrigation revenues as new hydropower and irrigation infrastructure is added based on planned infrastructure development (PIDA+) in a scenario without climate change."


id: 7f3ee8b452f56ccc0e84cdedfe3f3b71
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"(multi-decadal) hydrological datasets and model improvements \r\nare required (Taye et  al., 2015), and models should incorporate the \r\nquantification of the wider benefits, risks and political opportunities \r\narising from reservoir development to better inform decision makers \r\nto achieve a higher level of (transboundary) cooperation (Digna et al., \r\n2016; Nijsten et  al., 2018). Collaboration between scientists and \r\npolicymakers to address the complexity of decision making under \r\nuncertainty (Steynor et al., 2016) (Pienaar and Hughes, 2017), coupled \r\nwith community involvement in participatory scenario development and \r\nparticipatory GIS to aid in collaborative planning that is context specific \r\n(Muhati et al., 2018; Alvarez Larrain and McCall, 2019) are powerful \r\ntools for more beneficial adaptive and resilience-building actions."


id: fa14ff84827374d1e90bc8390e1be117
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"Gender is important in building resilience and adaptation pathways to \r\nglobal environmental change (Ravera et al., 2016). It is well-established \r\nthat women, in most societies, have accumulated considerable knowledge "


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"for pastoralist communities in east and southern Africa (Sonwa et al., \r\n2017; Basupi et al., 2019). Rural communities often have poor transport \r\nnetworks, limited access to markets or information and fewer livelihood \r\nalternatives, and are less able to be informed of risks or be assisted in the \r\nevent of extreme climate events (Sonwa et al., 2017; Basupi et al., 2019)."


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"change will interact with broader components of African food systems, \r\nand strategies for making these systems more resilient, particularly \r\nin a context of rapid population growth and urbanisation across the \r\ncontinent (Adenle et al., 2017; Schmitt Olabisi et al., 2018)."


id: 5f0866908b3b4475e13dbd2104b69a82
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"Extreme climate events have been key drivers in rising acute food \r\ninsecurity and malnutrition of millions of people requiring humanitarian \r\nassistance in Africa (high confidence). Between 2015 and 2019, an \r\nestimated 45.1  million people in the Horn of Africa and 62  million \r\npeople in eastern and southern Africa required humanitarian assistance \r\ndue to climate-related food emergencies. Children and pregnant women \r\nexperience disproportionately greater adverse health and nutrition \r\nimpacts (very high confidence) (Gebremeskel Haile et  al., 2019; see \r\nChapter 7 Section 7.2.4)."


id: 63cb2b0dd0eb83fa32b64ece411c32ae
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"Agricultural activities are mainly rainfed and subsistence across Africa. \r\nThe dominant farming system is mixed cereal-livestock (Thornton and \r\nHerrero, 2015; Nematchoua et al., 2019), with pastoral systems in east \r\nAfrica, and commercial livestock and crop systems also representing a \r\nsignificant proportion of the food system in southern Africa (Thornton \r\nand Herrero, 2015). Many African regions are vulnerable to food \r\ninsecurity, facing dwindling food production, food access, stocks and \r\nincome due to low adaptive capacity (Evariste et al., 2018; Fuller et al., \r\n2018; Bang et al., 2019; Gebre and Rahut, 2021)."


id: bfdac1ba1fd8b6e8effafe5f182e17a1
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"Future climate warming is projected to have a substantial adverse \r\nimpact on food security in Africa and is anticipated to coincide with low \r\nadaptive capacity as climate change intensifies other anthropogenic \r\nstressors, as 85% of Africa's poor live in rural areas and mostly depend \r\non agriculture for their livelihoods (Adams, 2018; Mahmood et  al., \r\n2019). This highlights the need to prioritise innovative measures for \r\nreducing vulnerabilities in African food systems (Fuller et  al., 2018; \r\nMahmood et al., 2019)."


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"Across regions with food systems highly vulnerable to climate change, \r\nfemale farmers, cocoa farmers, pastoralists, plantain farmers, coastal \r\nzone communities, rural households and forest communities in central \r\nAfrica indicate higher vulnerability (Chia et al., 2016; Schut et al., 2016; \r\nNematchoua et  al., 2019). Their vulnerability is multi-dimensional \r\nand affected by low adaptive capacity, location, livelihood system, \r\nsocioeconomic status, gender, age and ethnicity (Perez et  al., 2015; \r\nWeston et al., 2015; Gebre and Rahut, 2021; see also Box 9.1)."


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"Climate change impacts could increase the global number of people \r\nat risk of hunger in 2050 by 8 million under a scenario of sustainable \r\ndevelopment (SSP1) and 80  million under a scenario of reduced \r\ninternational cooperation and low environmental protection (SSP3), \r\nwith populations concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, south Asia and \r\ncentral America (see Chapter  5 Sections  5.2.2; 5.4.2; 5.4.3). Global \r\nclimate impacts on food availability are expected to lead to higher food \r\nprices, increasing the risk of hunger for people in African countries, \r\nand slowing progress towards eradicating child undernutrition and \r\nmalnutrition in all its forms (see Chapter 7 Section 7.4)."


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"Across Africa, including west Africa, adverse climate conditions for \r\nagricultural and pastoral livelihoods have contributed to rural to urban \r\nmigration patterns and migration among African regions (see Box 9.8; \r\nBaudoin et  al., 2014; Abbas, 2017; Gemenne and Blocher, 2017b). \r\nRural to urban migration may increase vulnerability of migrants \r\nthrough exposure to additional risks, including food insecurity (Amadi \r\nand Ogonor, 2015; Abbas, 2017). In general, west African countries \r\nare characterised by the poor adaptive capacity of rural households \r\n(Douxchamps et al., 2015; Dumenu and Obeng, 2016)."


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"In north Africa, livelihoods and economies are strongly dependent \r\non agriculture. Pressure on water demand due to climate change \r\nand variability is threatening income, development processes and \r\nfood security in the region (high confidence) (Mohmmed et al., 2018; \r\nKhedr, 2019). Increased temperatures and droughts have enhanced the \r\nvulnerability of the irrigation sector (Verner et al., 2018; Ilseven et al., \r\n2019), and the combined effect of these hazards negatively affects \r\ncrop and animal production (Mohmmed et  al., 2018; Verner et  al., \r\n2018). For example, dairy farms in Tunisia are experiencing warmer \r\ntemperatures above the thermoneutral zone of cows for more than \r\n5  months each year, reducing production efficiency and resulting in \r\nsignificant economic losses (Amamou et al., 2018)."


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"Climate change is already negatively impacting crop production and \r\nslowing productivity growth in Africa (high confidence) (Iizumi et al., \r\n2018; Ray et al., 2019; Sultan et al., 2019; Ortiz-Bobea et al., 2021). \r\nClimate change has reduced total agricultural productivity growth in \r\nAfrica by 34% since 1961, more than in any other region (Ortiz-Bobea \r\net al., 2021). Maize yields have decreased 5.8% and wheat yields 2.3%, \r\non average, in sub-Saharan Africa due to climate change in the period \r\n1974-2008 (Ray et al., 2019). Overall, climate change has decreased \r\ntotal food calories across all crops in sub-Saharan Africa by 1.4% on \r\naverage compared to a no climate change counterfactual since 1970, \r\nwith up to 10% reductions in Ghana and Zimbabwe (Ray et al., 2019)."


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"Non-climatic stressors aggravate food insecurity in many parts of \r\nthe continent, including lack of access to production inputs and land, \r\nlack of education and limited income sources, with adverse climate \r\nimpacts on agriculture reducing education attainment for children \r\n(Section 9.11.1.2; Evariste et al., 2018; Fuller et al., 2018). Geographic \r\nand social isolation is another type of social vulnerability, especially "


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"2016a; Elum et  al., 2017; Kichamu et  al., 2017; Alvar-Beltran et  al., \r\n2020). Farmers attribute these perceived changes as a major driver \r\nof yield losses (Ayanlade and Jegede, 2016; see Section 9.4.5). Over \r\nhalf of surveyed farmers in west Africa perceive increases in crop pests \r\nand diseases as due to climate change as the range and seasonality of \r\nmany pests and diseases change under warming (Callo-Concha, 2018). \r\nPests and diseases contribute between 10-35% yield losses for wheat, \r\nrice, maize, potato and soybean in sub-Saharan Africa (Savary et al., \r\n2019). Recent locust outbreaks in 2019 in east Africa have been linked \r\nto climate conditions caused in part by ocean warming (Wang et al., \r\n2020b; see Box 5.8)."


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"phosphorus are limiting crop growth. Additional Free-Air Carbon dioxide \r\nEnrichment (FACE) experiments are needed in the tropics, particularly \r\non the African continent, to better understand the impacts of increased \r\nCO2 concentrations on the productivity of crops and cultivars grown in \r\nAfrica under additional temperature impacts and water and nutrient \r\nlimitations (Ainsworth and Long, 2021). Warming and elevated CO2\r\nmay also change the nutritional content of some crops. By 2050 under \r\nRCP8.5 (2.4degC global warming), overall wheat yields and grain protein \r\ncontent may decrease by 10% and 15%, respectively, in north and east \r\nAfrica, and by over 15% in southern Africa (Asseng et al., 2019). See \r\nChapter 5 for more details on CO2 impacts and uncertainties."


id: cae6d89a915c35c00eb9387e1492cd34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Future climate change may increase insect pest-driven losses in Africa \r\nfor maize, rice and wheat. Compared to 1950-2000, losses may \r\nincrease by up to 50% at 2degC of global warming (Deutsch et al., 2018). \r\nHowever, many challenges remain in modelling pest and disease under \r\nclimate change with additional research needed expanding the range \r\nof crops and diseases studied (Newbery et al., 2016)."


id: c2eeee60850ee104b4c79280de0eaa43
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Few studies have attributed changes in yields of cash crops and other \r\nregionally important food crops in Africa to human-caused climate \r\nchange, but recent research suggests yields of cash crops in Africa \r\nhave already been impacted by climate change, in both a negative \r\nand positive manner (Falco et al., 2012; Traore et al., 2013; Ray et al., \r\n2019). For example, between the period 1974-2008, sugarcane yields \r\ndecreased on average by 3.9% and 5.1% in sub-Saharan Africa and \r\nnorth Africa, respectively, due to climate change, while sorghum yields \r\nincreased 0.7%, and cassava yield increased 1.7% in sub-Saharan \r\nAfrica and 18% in north Africa (Ray et al., 2019)."


id: c22e9369baf6c1d579f859791ee4fe2f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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vector_id: 28134
content:
"Agriculture in Africa is especially vulnerable to future climate change \r\nin part because 90-95% of African food production is rainfed (Adams, \r\n2018). Maize, rice, wheat and soybean yields in tropical regions \r\n(20degS-20degN) are projected to decrease approximately 5% per degree \r\nCelsius of global warming in a multi-model ensemble (Rosenzweig \r\net  al., 2014; Franke et  al., 2020). Dryland agricultural areas are \r\nespecially sensitive to changes in rainfall. For example, without \r\nadaptation, substantial yield declines are projected for staple crops \r\nin north Africa. A recent meta-analysis of 56  studies indicates that, \r\ncompared to 1995-2005, economic welfare in the agriculture sector \r\nin north Africa is projected to decline 5% for 2degC global warming and \r\n20% for 3degC global warming, and in sub-Saharan Africa by 5% (2degC) \r\nand 10% (3degC) (Moore et  al., 2017a), both more pessimistic than \r\nprevious economic estimates."


id: 7391716869cb7c3f25910c2e451008da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"There are also limited studies assessing projected climate change impacts \r\non important cash crops and food crops other than maize, rice and wheat \r\n(Jarvis et al., 2012; Schroth et al., 2016; Awoye et al., 2017). These studies \r\noften represent changes at specific sites in a country or assess changes \r\nin the yield and/or suitability for cultivating a specific crop across a larger \r\ngeographic area. Climate change is projected to have overall positive \r\nimpacts on sugarcane and Bambara nuts in southern Africa, oil palm in \r\nNigeria and chickpea in Ethiopia (low confidence) (Figure 9.23)."


id: c29f7fc8c8f3a0e4cde9e616bcf1d322
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"A synthesis of projected staple crop impacts across 35  studies for \r\nnearly 1040 locations and cases shows, on average, decreases in \r\ncrop yields with increasing global warming across staple crops in \r\nAfrica, including when accounting for CO2 increases and adaptation \r\nmeasures. For example, for maize in west Africa, compared to 2005 \r\nyield levels, median projected yields decrease 9% at 1.5degC global \r\nwarming and 41% at 4degC, without adaptation (Figure 9.22). However, \r\nuncertainties in projected impacts across crops and regions are driven \r\nby uncertainties in crop responses to increasing CO2 and adaptation \r\nresponse, especially for maize in east Africa and wheat in north Africa \r\nand east Africa (Figure 9.22; Hasegawa et al., 2021)."


id: c0c2f6913b977aa03ab040e992550b46
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content:
"There is also growing evidence that climate change is likely beginning \r\nto outpace adaptation in agricultural systems in parts of Africa (Rippke \r\net al., 2016). For example, despite the use of adjusted sowing dates and \r\nexisting heat-tolerant varieties, Sudan's domestic production share of \r\nwheat may decrease from 16.0% to 4.5-12.2% by 2050 under RCP8.5 \r\n(2.4degC global warming) (Iizumi et al., 2021)."


id: 628fb8ad9342bacc921b463fd836a9ea
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content:
"For all other crops, there is at least one study that finds low to highly \r\nnegative impacts for one or several warming levels (Figure  9.23). \r\nMixed results on the direction of change often occur when several \r\ncontrasting sites with varying baseline climates are studied, and when \r\na study considers the full range of climate scenarios. For example, \r\nthere are mixed results on the direction of change for impacts of 1.5degC "


id: 8c302ff868d1824c06d98818db6bf0a5
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content:
"Elevated CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere might mitigate some or \r\nall climate-driven losses (Swann et al., 2016; Durand et al., 2018), but \r\nthere is considerable uncertainty around the CO2 response (Deryng et al., \r\n2016; Toreti et al., 2020), especially when nutrients such as nitrogen and "


id: c6eba820417fbedd1454a9ac65c9bec3
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content:
"global warming on cassava, cotton, cocoa and millet in west Africa \r\n(low confidence) (Figure 9.23). In general, there is limited evidence in \r\nthe direction of change, due to single studies being available for most \r\ncrop-country combinations (Knox et al., 2010; Chemura et al., 2013; \r\nAsaminew et  al., 2017; Bouregaa, 2019). Occasionally, two studies \r\nagree on the direction and magnitude of change, for example, for \r\npotatoes in east Africa, yields are projected to decrease by 11-17% \r\nwith 3degC of warming (Fleisher et al., 2010; Tatsumi et al., 2011)."


id: be49fcc0297c23781ccae5d5bd3874e
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"Figure 9.23 |  Projected risks at increasing global warming levels for regionally important cash and food crops in Africa. Insufficient data indicates there were \r\nlimited to no published studies that have quantified projected climate change impacts or adaptation options for specific crops under different warming levels (see Table SM9.6). \r\nGlobal warming levels were calculated using a baseline for pre-industrial global mean temperature of 1850-1900."


id: 311fa7c2e0130403cbfedc008e538530
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"et al., 2013; Shumsky et al., 2014; Wunder et al., 2014; Baudron et al., \r\n2019b). In Zimbabwe, during lean times, consumption of wild fruits \r\nincreases, as does their sale to generate income for additional food \r\nexpenses in poor, rural households (Mithofer and Waibel, 2004). In Mali, \r\nTanzania and Zambia, household surveys indicate that forest products \r\nincluding wild foods can play an important role in reducing household \r\nvulnerability to climate shocks by providing alternative sources of food "


id: f92a5b73571a5c9d7a22aaf292cd0538
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Wild-harvested foods (e.g., fruits, vegetables and insects) provide \r\ndietary diversification and for many people in Africa, wild-harvested \r\nfood plants may provide a livelihood and/or nutritional safety net \r\nwhen other sources of food fail, such as during drought (Sunderland "


id: 8883d73ef72d507278867b70244bceb4
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content:
"and income during droughts and floods (Robledo et al., 2012). In the \r\nparklands of west Africa, wild trees are a significant source of wild \r\nfoods and are thus a place where one might expect wild plant foods \r\nto make an important contribution to diets and nutrition (Boedecker \r\net al., 2014; Lessmeister et al., 2015). Non-timber forest products are \r\nconsumed by an estimated 43% of all households in Burkina Faso (FAO, \r\n2019), and wild vegetables accounted for about 50% of total vegetable \r\nconsumption in southeastern Burkina Faso (Mertz et al., 2001)."


id: 4d2ef1166ff44725ffa018f43fe32b4a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Fodder quality, critical for animal health and weight gain, is at risk \r\nfrom climate change as increases in temperature, elevated CO2 and \r\nwater stress have been shown to reduce dry matter digestibility and \r\nnitrogen content for C3 grasses (Augustine et  al., 2018), tropical C4\r\ngrasses (Habermann et al., 2019) and fodder crops such as Lucerne/\r\nAlfalfa (Polley et al., 2013; Thivierge et al., 2016)."


id: 5edacaa0dc5d25231ebdb022ca9ef4fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Livestock systems in Africa are already being affected by changes in climate \r\nthrough increased precipitation variability leading to decreasing fodder \r\navailability (Sloat et al., 2018; Stanimirova et al., 2019). More than twice \r\nas many countries in Africa have experienced increases in precipitation \r\nvariability in the last century than decreases (Sloat et al., 2018). Fodder \r\navailability is also being impacted by woody plant encroachment--\r\nthe increase in shrub and tree cover--which has increased by 10% \r\non subsistence grazing lands and 20% on economically important \r\ngrazing lands in south Africa in the last 60 years (Stevens et al., 2016), \r\nand is driven in part by climatic factors (see Section 9.6.1.1). Increased \r\ntemperature and precipitation have contributed to the expanding range, \r\nespecially in east and southern Africa, of several ixodid tick species which \r\ncarry economically important livestock diseases (Nyangiwe et al., 2018)."


id: 239a0f455f8deff8515f947822d75365
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"Heat stress may already be the largest factor impacting livestock \r\nproduction in many regions in Africa (El-Tarabany et al., 2017; Pragna \r\net al., 2018), as the combination of high temperatures and high relative \r\nhumidity can be dangerous for livestock and has already decreased \r\ndairy production in Tunisia (Amamou et al., 2018). Climate change is \r\nprojected to increase heat stress for all types of livestock, especially in \r\nthe tropics (Figure 9.24; Lallo et al., 2018). More studies quantifying \r\nthe impact of heat stress on other types of livestock production loss \r\nare needed in Africa (Rahimi et al., 2021)."


id: 66cb391c81cbc2b4d5a343d601a47a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"Pastoralists in Africa perceive the climate as already changing and \r\nreport more erratic and reduced rainfall, prolonged and more frequent \r\ndroughts and a rise in temperature (Sanogo et al., 2017; Kimaro et al., \r\n2018). They also report reduced milk production, increased deaths and \r\ndisease outbreaks in their herds due to malnutrition and starvation \r\nresulting from the shortages in forage and water (Kimaro et al., 2018). \r\nAdditional research is required to attribute precipitation variability to \r\nhuman-induced climate change (see Section 9.5), and to evaluate the \r\nrelative contributions of climate change and management to disease \r\nvector extent."


id: 39a9b422e418017eedd8afa329953deb
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content:
"Climate change will impact livestock disease prevalence primarily \r\nthrough changes in vector dynamics or range (Abdela and Jilo, \r\n2016; Semenza and Suk, 2018). African Rift Valley Fever (RVF) and \r\ntrypanosomiasis are positively associated with extreme climate events \r\n(droughts and ENSO) (Bett et al., 2017) and are projected to expand in \r\nrange under climate change (Kimaro et al., 2017; Mweya et al., 2017). \r\nMore quantitative estimates of projected risk from diseases are needed."


id: 151eda28904f8bb96e17f8a4020b4af2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"(c, d) Projected increase in the number of days per year with severe heat stress for a global warming level of 1.5degC and 3.75degC. Severe heat stress for cattle is projected to become \r\nmuch more extensive in the future in Africa at increased global warming levels. Strong mitigation would substantially limit the spatial extent and the duration of cattle heat stress \r\nacross Africa. Heat stress is estimated using the Temperature Humidity Index with a value greater than 79 considered the onset of severe heat stress (Livestock Weather Safety Index) \r\n(Lallo et al., 2018). Global warming of 1.5degC used scenario SSP1-2.6 and global warming of 3.75degC used SSP5-8.5, both for 2070-2099 (12 climate models from O'Neill et al., \r\n2016; Tebaldi et al., 2021). Global warming levels were calculated using a baseline for pre-industrial global mean temperature of 1850-1900."


id: 2fc9005909948026506342aaad15c372
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"regions of west Africa, small-scale irrigation, including the digging \r\nof ditches, holes and depressions to collect rainwater (Makondo and \r\nThomas, 2018), is widely adopted and promoted to support national \r\nfood security (Dowd-Uribe et al., 2018)."


id: 5a11912c4f1bae23c4c648b0ba184e37
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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"Agricultural and livelihood diversification are strategies used by \r\nAfrican households to cope with climate change, enabling them to \r\nspread risks and adjust to shifting climate conditions (Thierfelder et al., \r\n2017; Thornton et al., 2018). This includes adjusting cropping choices, \r\nplanting times, or size, type and location of planted areas (Altieri et al., \r\n2015; Nyagumbo et  al., 2017; Dayamba et  al., 2018). In southern \r\nAfrica, changes in planting dates provide farmers with greater yield \r\nstability in uncertain climate conditions (Nyagumbo et  al., 2017). \r\nIn Ghana, farmers are changing planting schedules and using early \r\nmaturing varieties to cope with late-onset and early cessation of the \r\nrainy season (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2014; Bawakyillenuo et al., 2016)."


id: f1e62d25c4b69c32bfed4c842baa73bf
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"African farmers are also diversifying their income sources to offset \r\nreduced yields or crop losses by shifting labour resources to off-farm work, \r\nor by migrating seasonally or longer term (Kangalawe et al., 2017; Hove \r\nand Gweme, 2018). Off-farm activities provide financial resources that \r\nrural households need to cope with extreme climate variability (Hamed \r\net al., 2018; Rouabhi et al., 2019). However, in some cases, these off-farm \r\nactivities can be maladaptive at larger scales, such as when households \r\nturn to charcoal production, which contributes to deforestation (Egeru, \r\n2016). Whether off-farm activities constitute maladaptation depends on \r\nwhether resources are available to upgrade skills or support investments \r\nthat make a new business more lucrative. Without such resources, this \r\noption may lead to impoverishment (see Box 5.8)."


id: dd7cb2b29833f9f770d0b7b0e721fee0
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"The use of drought-tolerant crop varieties is another adaptation \r\navailable to African farmers (Hove and Gweme, 2018; Choko et  al., \r\n2019). Adoption, however, is hindered by lack of information and \r\ntraining, availability or affordability of seed, inadequate labelling and \r\npackaging size for seed supplies and financial constraints (Fisher et al., \r\n2015). Moreover, drought-tolerant varieties do not address changing \r\ntemperature regimes (Guan et al., 2017)."


id: bbd170b70ee383b3bf4026a4995490bb
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"Smallholder farmers' responses tend to address short-term shocks \r\nor stresses by deploying coping responses (e.g., selling labour, \r\nreducing consumption and temporary migration), rather than longer\u0002term sustainable adaptations (Ziervogel and Parnell, 2014; Jiri et al., \r\n2017). This is partly due to institutional barriers (e.g., markets, credit, \r\ninfrastructure and information) and resource requirements that are \r\nunaffordable to smallholder farmers (Pauline et al., 2017). There is a \r\nneed for policies that strengthen natural, financial, human and social \r\ncapitals, the latter being key to household and community resilience, \r\nespecially where government services may be limited (Mutabazi et al., \r\n2015; Alemayehu and Bewket, 2017). There is evidence that collective \r\naction, local organisations and climate information are associated with \r\nhigher food security, and that institutional interventions are needed to \r\nensure scaling up of adaptations (Thornton et al., 2018)."


id: 5c5afaa60dd38ecf5eaf6f83f851fc54
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content:
"Crop diversification enhances crop productivity and resilience and \r\nreduces vulnerability in smallholder farming systems (McCord et al., \r\n2015; Mulwa and Visser, 2020). In Tanzania, diversified crop portfolios \r\nare associated with greater food security and dietary quality (Brussow \r\net al., 2017). In Kenya, levels of crop diversity are higher in villages \r\naffected by frequent droughts, which are the main cause of crop failure \r\n(Bozzola and Smale, 2020). Crop diversification also helps control \r\npest outbreaks, which may become more frequent and severe under \r\nincreased climate variability and extreme events (Schroth and Ruf, \r\n2014). High farming diversity enables households to better meet food \r\nneeds, but only up to a certain level of diversity (Waha et al., 2018), \r\nand the viability of and benefits from mixed farming are highly context \r\ndependent (Thornton and Herrero, 2015; Weindl et al., 2015)."


id: 52fb803d859a904e2b136dc1796ec8e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:11
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content:
"A range of options is considered potentially effective in reducing future \r\nclimate change risk, including plant breeding, crop diversification \r\nalongside livestock, mixed planting, intercrops, crop rotation and \r\nintegrated crop-livestock systems (see Chapter 5 Sections 5.4.4; 5.14.1; \r\nThornton and Herrero, 2014; Cunningham et al., 2015; Himanen et al., \r\n2016; Farrell et al., 2018; Snowdon et al., 2021). However, adaptation \r\nlimits for crops in Africa are increasingly reached for global warming \r\nabove 2degC (high confidence), and in tropical Africa may already be \r\nreached at current levels of global warming (low confidence)."


id: cc3359679b212511f3c98dce28dac447
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"Agroecological and conservation agriculture practices, such as \r\nintercropping, integration of legumes, mulching and incorporation of \r\ncrop residues, are associated with household food security and improved \r\nhealth status (Nyantakyi-Frimpong et al., 2017; Shikuku et al., 2017). \r\nThese practices can enhance the benefits of other adaptations, such as \r\nplanting drought- and heat-tolerant or improved varieties, although \r\neffects vary across soil types, geographical zones and social groups \r\n(Makate et al., 2019; Mutenje et al., 2019). Non-climatic variables, such \r\nas financial resources, access to information and technology, level of \r\neducation, land security and gender dynamics affect feasibility and \r\nadoption (Makate et al., 2019; Mutenje et al., 2019)."


id: 924aad88067d7058246e9f48490fdbbe
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content:
"Global warming beyond 2degC will place nearly all of sub-Saharan \r\nAfrica cropland substantially outside of its historical safe climate \r\nzone (Kummu et al., 2021) and may exponentially increase the cost of \r\nadaptation and residual damage for major crops (Iizumi et al., 2020). \r\nWithout accounting for CO2 increases, global-scale studies employing \r\nensembles of gridded crop models for 2degC of global warming find \r\nthat for adaptation using genetic cultivar change in most of Africa net \r\nlosses are projected, even with adaptation up to 2degC of global warming \r\nfor rice, maize, soybean and wheat (Minoli et  al., 2019; Zabel et  al., \r\n2021), although model uncertainty is still high (Muller et al., 2021). In \r\ncontrast, when accounting for CO2 increases, applying new genetics for \r\nrice under warming is projected to fully counteract all climate change\u0002induced losses in Africa up to 3.5degC of global warming, except in west \r\nAfrica (van Oort and Zwart, 2018)."


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content:
"To mitigate growing water stress, countries like Ethiopia, Rwanda, \r\nTanzania and Uganda are striving to improve irrigation efficiency \r\n(McCarl et al., 2015; Connolly-Boutin and Smit, 2016; Herrero et al., \r\n2016). The feasibility and effectiveness of this adaptation depend \r\non biophysical and socioeconomic conditions (Amamou et  al., \r\n2018; Harmanny and Malek, 2019; Schilling et  al., 2020). Irrigation \r\nis unaffordable for many smallholder farmers and only covers a \r\nnegligible proportion of the total cultivated area. Nonetheless, in some "


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content:
"Marine and freshwater fisheries provide 19.3% of animal protein intake \r\n(Chan et al., 2019) and support the livelihoods of 12.3 million people \r\n(de Graaf and Garibaldi, 2015) across Africa. Estimates suggest that fish \r\nprovides approximately 200 million people in Africa with their main \r\nsource of animal protein and key micronutrients (Obiero et al., 2019). \r\nAlthough marine fisheries account for >50% of total capture fishery \r\nproduction (Obiero et al., 2019), 2.9 million tonnes of fish are harvested \r\nannually from inland water bodies constituting the highest per capita \r\ninland fishery production of any continent (2.56 kg per person per year) \r\n(Harrod et al., 2018a; Funge-Smith and Bennett, 2019)."


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"In addition to adaptation in crop, soil and water management, the \r\ncombination of (a) Climate Information Services, (b) institutional \r\ncapacity building and (c) strategic financial investment can help \r\nAfrican food producers adapt to projected climate risks (Carter et al., \r\n2015; Surminski et  al., 2016; Scott et  al., 2017; Cinner et  al., 2018; \r\nDiouf et al., 2019; Hansen et al., 2019a). There is growing evidence \r\nof farmers' use of weather and climate information, especially at the \r\nshort- and medium-time horizon (Carr et al., 2016; Singh et al., 2018). \r\nDigital services can contribute to the sustainable intensification of food \r\nproduction globally (Duncombe, 2018; Klerkx et al., 2019). This points \r\nto the need for the scientific and development communities to better \r\nunderstand the conditions that enable widespread adoption in Africa."


id: 257294441f722eb4fffe6a6d1f4504f8
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"Although climate information services have the potential to strengthen \r\nfarmers' resilience, barriers to accessibility, affordability and utilisation \r\nremain (Krell et  al., 2021). Often the information offered is not \r\nconsistent with what farmers need to know and how they access \r\nand process information (Meadow et  al., 2015; Singh et  al., 2018). \r\nProduction of salient and credible climate information is hindered \r\nby the limited availability of and access to weather and climate data \r\n(Coulibaly et  al., 2017; Hansen et  al., 2019a). The existing weather \r\ninfrastructure remains suboptimal to enable the development of \r\nreliable early warning systems (Africa Adaptation Initiative, 2018; Krell \r\net al., 2021). Of the 1017 land-based observational networks in the \r\nworld, only 10% are in Africa, and 54% of Africa's surface weather \r\nstations cannot capture data accurately (Africa Adaptation Initiative, \r\n2018; World Bank, 2020d)."


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"in this region (Okpara et al., 2017b). Small-scale and artisanal fisher \r\ncommunities are ill-equipped to adapt to climate impacts because \r\nthere are few financially accessible alternative livelihoods (Belhabib \r\net al., 2016; Ndhlovu and Saito, 2017)."


id: a247e3f75392baabe31cd415650a1efc
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"At 4.3degC global warming, maximum catch potential (MCP) from marine \r\nfisheries in African Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) would decrease by \r\n12-69% by the end of the 21st century relative to recent decades (1986-\r\n2005), whereas global warming of 1.6degC would limit the MCP decrease to \r\n3-41% (Cheung William et al., 2016; IPCC, 2019c). By mid-century under \r\n2degC global warming, MCP would decrease by 10 to >30% on the western \r\ncoast of South Africa, the Horn of Africa and west Africa, indicating these \r\nregions could be at risk to declines in MCP earlier in the century than \r\nother parts of Africa (Cheung et al., 2016). Declining fish harvests due to \r\nsea temperature rise could leave 1.2-70 (median 11.1) million people in \r\nAfrica vulnerable to deficiencies in iron, and up to 188 million to vitamin "


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"Figure 9.25 |  Climate change increases risks to the catch potential and nutrition from marine fisheries."


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"(a) The percentage of animal source foods consumed that originate from a marine environment. Countries with higher dependence are indicated by darker shades of green (Golden \r\net al., 2016)."


id: 147aef3eec5e761d22a52e9b3c36933a
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"(b-c) Projected percentage change in maximum catch potential of marine fisheries compared to the recent past (1986-2005) under 1.6degC global warming and >4degC global \r\nwarming by end of 21st century (2081-2100) in countries' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) (Cheung William et al., 2016). Darker red indicates greater percentage reduction \r\n(negative values)."


id: 9f33ae8a67c6c7b27e423e69df06fe81
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"(d-e) Countries (in purple) that have overlap between high nutritional dependence on marine fisheries and high risk of reduction in maximum catch potential under the two global \r\nwarming scenarios. Global warming levels were calculated using a baseline for pre-industrial global mean temperature of 1850-1900."


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"are predicted to affect the early life history stages of several marine \r\nfood species, including fish and crustaceans (Kifani et al., 2018). Climate \r\nwarming is projected to impact water temperature and horizontal and \r\nvertical mixing on the southern Benguela ecosystem, with marked \r\nnegative effects on the biomass of several important fishery resources by \r\n2050 amplified under 2.5degC compared to 1.7degC global warming (Ortega\u0002Cisneros et al., 2018)."


id: d290eb9d5f64ce022ce57a8a640a06e9
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"For inland fisheries, 55-68% of commercially harvested fish species will \r\nbe vulnerable to extinction under 2.5degC global warming by the end of \r\nthe 21st century (2071-2100) compared to 77-97% under 4.4degC global \r\nwarming (Figure 9.26). This will increase the number of countries that \r\nare at food security risk due to fishery species declines from 10 to 13 \r\n(Figure 9.26). Other recent analyses suggest that African countries with \r\nthe highest inland fisheries production have low- to mid-range projected \r\nclimate risk (2.4degC-2.6degC local temperature increase compared to "


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"(a) Countries' dependence on inland fisheries for nutrition; darker green shows higher dependence on inland fisheries."


id: 42e79a7d03ff932dcfa05b5fa7cb0402
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"(b-c) Projected numbers of freshwater fishery species vulnerable to climate change within freshwater ecoregions under >2degC global warming and >4degC global warming estimated \r\nby the end of the 21st century (2071 to 2100). Numbers of vulnerable fish species translate to an average of 55-68% vulnerable at >2degC and 77-97% vulnerable at >4degC global \r\nwarming. Darker reds indicate higher concentrations of vulnerable fish species."


id: 548488de25f88c958bf922d22597ea5f
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"(d-e) Countries (in purple) that have an overlap between high dependence on freshwater fish and high concentrations of fishery species that are vulnerable to climate change \r\nunder two warming scenarios. Countries' dependence on inland fisheries for nutrition was estimated by catch (total, tonnes) (FAO, 2018b; Fluet-Chouinard et al., 2018), per capita \r\ncatch (kg per person per year) (FAO, 2018b), percentage reliance on fish for micronutrients, and percentage consumption per household (Golden et al., 2016). Z-scores of each \r\nmetric were averaged for each country to create a composite index describing 'current dependence on freshwater fish' for each country with darker blue colours indicating higher \r\ndependence. Data on vulnerable fish species was from (Nyboer et al., 2019)."


id: 849fd143c90cd5c426df4ce15866e41d
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"For both marine and freshwater fisheries, climate-related extreme \r\nweather events and flooding may drive the loss of fishing days, cause \r\ndamage and loss to fishing gear, endanger the lives of fishers and \r\nblock transportation from damaged roads (Muringai et al., 2021). Fish \r\nprocessing via weather-dependent techniques such as sun drying may \r\nbe hampered, causing post-harvest losses (Akintola and Fakoya, 2017; \r\nChan et al., 2019)."


id: f10ba87c989da5e5f1bcf9adb3c406ba
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"2016). Much of the rapid rate of urbanisation has resulted from the \r\ngrowth of small towns and intermediary cities (African Development \r\nBank et al., 2016)."


id: 9349217a4f1889a36132bdcbbad8d192
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"Approximately 59% of sub-Saharan Africa's urban population resides \r\nin informal settlements (in some cities up to 80%), and the population \r\nin informal settlements is expected to increase (very high confidence) \r\n(Taylor and Peter, 2014; UN-Habitat, 2014; 2016; UNDP, 2019). These \r\nurbanisation trends are compounding increasing exposure to climate \r\nhazards, particularly floods and heatwaves (high confidence) (Dodman \r\net al., 2015)."


id: 7f1bf392a0bddcb36c009a0fb3d8119
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"Globally, the highest rates of population growth and urbanisation are \r\ntaking place in Africa's coastal zones (high confidence) (Merkens et al., \r\n2016). Coastal urban populations account for 25-29% of the total \r\npopulation in west, north and southern Africa (OECD/SWAC, 2020). \r\nAccounting for a continuing young population, stagnant economies \r\nand migration to regional growth centres, projections indicate that the \r\nlow-lying coastal zone population of Africa could increase to over 100 \r\nmillion people by 2030 and over 200 million people by 2060 relative to \r\n54 million in 2000 (Neumann et al., 2015; see Figure 9.28)."


id: db1ac38728769f2e61fbe53e169f6e1b
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"Climate-related displacement is widespread in Africa, with increased \r\nmigration to urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa linked to decreased \r\nrainfall in rural areas, increasing urbanisation and affecting household \r\nvulnerability (see Box 9.9). Much of this growth can occur in informal \r\nsettlements which are growing due to both climatic and non-climatic \r\ndrivers, and which often house temporary migrants, including internally \r\ndisplaced people. Such informal settlements are located in areas \r\nexposed to climate change and variability and are exposed to floods, \r\nlandslides, sea level rise and storm surges in low-lying coastal areas, \r\nor alongside rivers that frequently overflow, thereby exacerbating \r\nexisting vulnerabilities (Satterthwaite et al., 2020)."


id: 4cd85c830d15ea597656d0860063adc4
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"Sub-Saharan Africa's large infrastructure deficit (quantity, quality and \r\naccess) with respect to road transport, electricity, water supply and \r\nsanitation places the region at the lowest of all developing regions \r\n(AfDB, 2018a; Calderon et  al., 2018). Adequate infrastructure to \r\nsupport Africa's rapidly growing population is important to raise living \r\nstandards and productivity in informal settlements (AfDB, 2018b; \r\nUN Environment, 2019). Yet planned infrastructure developments, \r\nincluding those related to the AU's PIDA, along with other energy \r\nplans, and China's Belt and Road Initiative, may increase or decrease \r\nboth climate change mitigation and adaptation depending on whether \r\ninfrastructure planning integrates current and future climate change \r\nrisks (Cervigni et al., 2015; Addaney, 2020; see Box 9.5)."


