# document

id: a2647aa8abc75a36dd0a6ce1df0108da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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"Between 2015 and 2019, global coal power capacity grew by 146 GW, or 7.6%, as new builds offset retirements in some countries \r\n(Global Energy Monitor et al. 2021). Meanwhile, an increasing number of countries and regions have committed to or operationalised \r\ncoal phase-outs (Jewell et al. 2019; Watts et al. 2019; Littlecott et al. 2021). Actions are being taken by various international and \r\nsub-national actors, including national and sub-national governments, public and private power companies, and financial institutions \r\nand pension funds that have committed not to fund new coal or coal-based infrastructure (yan Nie et al. 2016; Buckley 2019; Auger \r\net al. 2021). Although these initial efforts are not yet sufficient in limiting warming to 1.5degC, and most have occurred in regions with \r\nolder coal fleets, these examples provide insight into possible coal phase-out strategies (Spencer et al"


id: 694a68cdd9bb5bf46e59b1485de967f1
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" 2018) and help identify the \r\nmechanisms driving the move away from coal, such as market, technology, policy, or other societal objectives. They also enable better \r\nunderstanding of the possible character of oil and gas phase-downs that would ultimately be needed to limit warming two well below \r\n2degC (Section 6.7.4) (Raimi et al. 2019)."


id: 27c6efb50424da503742732b5ab9439c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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"Europe. Several European countries are part of the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA) and have committed to phase out unabated \r\ncoal on or before 2030 (Jewell et al. 2019). Because these countries represent a small share of global coal generation capacity and \r\nhave mostly ageing coal plants, they tend to face fewer changes in phasing out coal. The effectiveness of PPCA in countries with \r\nyounger coal fleets has thus been questioned (Jewell et al. 2019; Blondeel et al. 2020). Germany recently joined the PPCA and has \r\ncommitted to phase out unabated coal by 2038. As part of its commitment to phase out coal, Germany is implementing a set of \r\nmeasures that include compensation for power plant closures, labour market measures for coal workers, and substantial support \r\nof structural change in coal-mining regions. Poland, another coal-heavy country in Europe, has not indicated a coal phase-out target \r\nand faces substantial challenges (Whitley et  al. 2017; Antosiewicz et  al. 2020)"


id: f8e8b25c49b444761bf0e0efeb32cd30
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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" European efforts to phase out coal indicate that \r\nappropriate financial instruments are needed (Rentier et al. 2019), and a just transition for workers are important to gain broad public \r\nsupport and help those most affected by the phase-out (Johnstone and Hielscher 2017; Osicka et al. 2020)."


id: 59b411cc0e0175d7ed55d80fd1ca8992
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"North America. Coal use has been declining in North America. In the USA, the primary driver has been the availability of cheap \r\nshale gas and ageing coal fleets. Coal use in the USA has dropped by over 50% since 2008 (EIA 2019). The recently announced \r\nNationally Determined Contribution (NDC) by the Biden Administration sets a 100% carbon-free electricity goal by 2035 (The White \r\nHouse 2021), indicating a phase-out not only of unabated coal electricity generation, but also of natural gas generation. As one of the \r\ntwo founding countries of the PPCA, Canada has committed to phasing out unabated coal power by 2030 (Government of Canada \r\n2018). Declining coal use in both the USA and Canada has decreased GHG emissions, local air pollutants, and cooling water use \r\n(Harris et al. 2015; Kondash et al. 2019). However, there have been concerns about social and economic consequences, particularly at \r\nthe local level"


id: 69ee389130b968b38c515f7b07709ce9
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" For instance, the USA has lost about 50,000 coal mining jobs between 2011 and 2021 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, \r\n2021), with significant regional and economic inequities (Bodenhamer 2016; Abraham 2017; Greenberg 2018). Comprehensive social \r\nprogrammes, such as retirement compensation, training for reemployment, and business support for economic diversification, have \r\nbeen suggested as means to support a just transition (Homagain et al. 2015; Patrizio et al. 2018; Grubert 2020)."


id: 24b61d225731b680187ad13e2d9237d0
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"Asia. After a period of rapid growth, coal expansion has slowed in Asia, but it still the primary driver of the global increase in coal \r\ndemand (IEA 2020e). China's coal consumption reached a plateau under policy efforts during the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), \r\nand new coal plants are being built at a slower rate than previously. Both China and India have suspended and cancelled many new \r\ncoal power projects and retired a small set of old, dirty, inefficient coal plants (CEA 2019; Global Energy Monitor et al. 2021). These \r\nefforts are largely due to non-climate reasons, such air pollution and health (Singh and Rao 2015; Gass et al. 2016; Peng et al. 2018; \r\nMalik et al. 2020), overcapacity (Blondeel and Van de Graaf 2018), and rural electrification and renewable investments (Aklin et al. \r\n2017; Thapar et al. 2018). However, as new builds offset retirements, coal generation capacity has continued to grow in both countries \r\nsince 2015 (Global Energy Monitor et al. 2021)"


id: fb06848d6fc1f3028dcadd1cd1eac7f
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" Other fast-growing Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and the \r\nPhilippines have experienced strong growth in coal use (IEA 2020b), but an increasing number of new coal power projects are being \r\ncancelled (Littlecott et al. 2021). Coal projects in these countries are decreasingly likely to proceed because they rely on international \r\nfinancing, and China, Japan, USA, and other G7 countries have pledged to end overseas coal financing (Schiermeier 2021)."


id: f4d4bc9e8ef00703330db9934c2a2c4
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"and storage (CCUS) have continued to grow since 2015 (IEA 2017, \r\n2021a). Hydroelectric power grew from 3890 TWh yr -1 (14.0 EJ yr -1) \r\nin 2015 to 4290 TWh yr -1 (15.5 EJ yr -1) in 2019, or 10.3%; nuclear \r\npower grew from 2570 TWh yr -1 (9.3 EJ yr -1) to 2790 TWh yr -1\r\n(10.1 EJ yr -1), or 8.6%. Hydroelectric and nuclear shares in global \r\ntotal electricity generation remained around 16% and 10%, \r\nrespectively (IEA 2017, 2021a). Global biofuels production grew \r\nfrom 3.2 EJ yr -1 to 4.0 EJ yr -1 from 2015 to 2019 (IEA 2017, 2021a). \r\nBioenergy accounted for 2.4% of electricity generation in 2019. \r\nGeothermal energy sources produced 92 TWh  yr -1 (0.33  EJ  yr -1) \r\nof electricity in 2019, up from 80 TWh yr -1 (0.28 EJ yr -1) in 2015 \r\n(IEA 2017, 2021a). At present, there are 28 commercially operating \r\nCCUS facilities with a CO2 removal capacity of around 40 million \r\ntonnes yr -1 (Mtpa)"


id: e2cedc6047990de61958ddf9c30c0119
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" Only two of these are associated with \r\nelectricity production: the majority are in industrial applications - \r\n37  commercial projects, accounting for about 75 Mtpa, are in \r\nvarious stages of development and construction (Global CCS \r\nInstitute 2020). The share of marine energy in global electricity \r\ngeneration has remained at approximately 1 TWh yr -1 since 2015. \r\nIn total, low- and zero-carbon electricity generation technologies \r\nproduced 37% of global electricity in 2019."


id: aaaad9f6b09b5ee0f0aa989b72f963b0
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"Global PV and wind electric capacities grew 170% and 70%, respectively, \r\nbetween 2015 and 2019. Total solar and wind capacities in 2019 were \r\n609 GW and 623 GW (Figure 6.6) and generation was 680 TWh yr-1 \r\nand 1420 TWh yr-1. The combined share of solar and wind in the total \r\nglobal electricity generation in 2019 was around 8% (5.5% wind, 2.5% \r\nsolar), up from around 5% in 2015 (IEA 2021a). Since 2015, the cost \r\nof solar PVs has declined by over 60%. Offshore wind costs have fallen \r\nby 32%, and onshore wind costs have fallen by 23% (Section 6.4). PV \r\nwas around 99% of total solar capacity in 2019; onshore wind was \r\nabout 95% of total wind capacity. Concentrating solar power (CSP) \r\ndeployment has also continued to grow, but it remains far below PV. \r\nPrior to 2010, 50% of all wind capacity was in Europe, but since then, \r\ncapacity growth in Asia (led by China), has surpassed the growth in \r\nEurope"


id: 63321e9d7a0fb42b1076fffffedd884d
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" As a consequence, Europe's share in global solar capacity has \r\ndeclined from 74% in 2010 to 24% in 2019. Asia's share in wind and \r\nsolar capacity in 2019 was 41% and 56%, followed by Europe (31% \r\nand 24%) and North America (20% and 12%) (IRENA 2020a, 2021a)."


id: fc10301e9987d94d2a8e9d8572ff81fa
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"The role of carbon pricing is still limited though increasing. Different \r\nmeasures have been suggested to improve the performance of \r\nthe ETS, such as 'price floors and caps' and other carbon pricing \r\nschemes (Campiglio 2016; Bataille et  al. 2018; Goulder and \r\nMorgenstern 2018). In 2020, 61 regional, national and sub-national \r\ncarbon pricing instruments, representing 22% of the global GHG \r\nemissions, were in action or scheduled for implementation (World \r\nBank 2019). Over 51% of emissions covered are priced at less than \r\nUSD10  per  tCO2-eq. At present, however, only 5% of the global \r\nemissions covered under carbon pricing initiatives are consistent \r\nwith the range of carbon prices that have been suggested as \r\nneeded to limit warming to well below 2degC (Stiglitz and Stern 2017). \r\nMost of the carbon pricing schemes have taken place in the OECD \r\ncountries"


id: 61659fd6e0b8b76ba51fa2c3e8653ce4
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" The limited application of carbon pricing instruments \r\nin developing, and emerging economies may be due to political \r\neconomy constraints (Campiglio 2016; Finon 2019). Carbon pricing \r\nhad a  sizeable impact on emissions  - for example, the EU ETS \r\nimpacts emissions from electricity in Germany (Schafer 2019) and \r\nmanufacturing in France (Colmer et al. 2020), respectively. Emissions \r\nreductions could be increased with higher carbon prices and without \r\nfree allocation of allowances."


id: ac38eca977fcf49f7b7522e20d696627
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"Governments have chosen a  mix of policies and institutional \r\nmechanisms that consists of regulatory instruments, like efficiency \r\nand technology standards, economic instruments (e.g.,  carbon \r\npricing, subsidies) (Bertram et al. 2015; Martin and Saikawa 2017) \r\nand other policies, such as government interventions to provide \r\ninfrastructure, information policies, and voluntary actions by non\u0002government actors (Somanathan et  al. 2014). In recent years, \r\nregulatory instruments to promote low-carbon infrastructure have \r\ngained traction in developing countries (Finon 2019). The choice \r\nof policies has depended on institutional capacities, technological \r\nmaturity and other developmental priorities of governments. For \r\nexample, governments have favoured regulatory instruments over \r\neconomic instruments when there has been sufficient institutional \r\ncapacity to implement and monitor the regulations and standards \r\n(Hughes and Urpelainen 2015)"


id: 69386654707ce608418f27904f6d7bb5
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" Furthermore, institutional capacity \r\nhas also determined the extent of implemented measures (Adenle \r\net al. 2017). Market conditions and technological maturity are other \r\nimportant determinants of policy mixes being deployed in the energy \r\nsector. For example, subsidies for mitigation like feed-in-tariffs \r\nhave worked best when the technologies are in nascent stages of \r\ndevelopment (Gupta et al. 2019a)."


id: 9d646ef10d10ffd80517116791997a07
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"In the absence of a  global comprehensive carbon price, regional \r\nregulatory policies for fossil fuels supply and key demand sectors \r\nlike transport, industry and buildings (Chapters 9-11), coupled with \r\nregional carbon pricing instruments, were implemented to help \r\ninitiate the climate actions consistent with the Paris Agreement \r\n(Kriegler et  al. 2018). However, differences in the stringency of \r\nclimate regulation have triggered fear that regulation reduces the \r\ncompetitiveness of industries in regulated countries and leads to \r\nindustry relocation and 'carbon leakage' (Schenker et  al. 2018). \r\nIn recent years, however, there is little evidence of carbon leakage \r\n(Naegele and Zaklan 2019; Schafer 2019), and even positive effects \r\nof carbon pricing on efficiency have been observed (e.g., Loschel et al. \r\n2019, for German manufacturing firms, and Germeshausen 2020 \r\nfor German power plants)"


id: 512f129bd5a41317c366ba5032f30c62
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" However, with asymmetric rising carbon \r\nprices, discussions about specific policy mechanisms to address \r\ncarbon leakage like carbon border adjustments (Cosbey et al. 2019) \r\nwere amplified. Furthermore, multiple policies - often implemented \r\nby different governmental levels (national vs sub-national)  - \r\ninteracted with each other and thereby affected their environmental "


id: 62034371d4e0287017fdbc92dcb17e6e
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"Energy subsidies can be defined as policy measures in the energy sector to lower the prices for consumers, raise the prices for producers, \r\nor reduce energy production costs (IEA 1999). There are subsidies for fossil fuels, renewables, and energy efficiency measures. The \r\nmajority of the renewable subsidies are generation-based incentives for solar, wind or biomass in the form of feed-in-tariffs (Chapter 13), \r\nwith total annual renewable subsidy estimates of about USD150 billion yr-1 globally (IEA 2018b). Estimates of fossil fuel subsidies \r\ncan vary by an order of magnitude. For the year 2017, the IEA estimated fossil fuel subsidies of USD300 billion using IEA's pre-tax, \r\nprice-gap method (IEA 2018b), while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) included unpriced externalities in calculating subsidies of \r\nUSD5.2 trillion or 6.5% of global GDP (Coady et al. 2017, 2019; World Bank 2019)"


id: 5570609cad3586897f45076f490eb47f
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" It has been estimated that the amount spent on \r\nfossil fuel subsidies was around double the amount of subsidies spent on renewables (IEA 2018b). There are adverse environmental, \r\neconomic and social consequences of fossil fuel subsidies (Rentschler and Bazilian 2017). More than 75% of the distortions created by \r\nfossil fuel subsidies are domestic, and studies indicate that reforming them can have substantial in-country benefits (Coady et al. 2017, \r\n2019). Some of the G20 countries have implemented subsidy reforms based on low oil prices (Jewell et al. 2018)."


id: 5d7a66c62d3cb9983e23e28b3d50c537
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"Fossil fuel subsidies most commonly pursue non-climate objectives, for example, enhanced access to energy sources (high confidence). \r\nIn some cases, these energy access subsidies have helped extend modern energy sources to the poor (Kimemia and Annegarn 2016) \r\nand thereby contribute to SDG 7. However, the subsidies have proven to be regressive in most cases, with little benefit reaching the \r\npoor (Lockwood 2015). For example, Indonesia has introduced LPG subsidies for cooking. The kerosene-to-LPG conversion programme \r\n('Zero Kero') was launched in 2007 and provided mainly households with free initial LPG equipment and LPG at a low subsidised price \r\n(Imelda et al. 2018b; Thoday et al. 2018). Besides the national government, provincial governments and industry played a crucial role \r\nin implementation. Overall, the LPG conversion programme in Indonesia reduced cooking kerosene use (Andadari et al. 2014; Imelda \r\net al. 2018b) and GHG emissions (Permadi et al"


id: 94bb4a1da3a46a5fcad89835c8f5fc54
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" 2017) with positive health effects (Imelda et al. 2018b; Thoday et al. 2018). However, \r\nthe programme is generally viewed as regressive and has failed to reduce traditional solid fuel use (Andadari et al. 2014; Toft 2016; \r\nThoday et al. 2018). Furthermore, even if the programme decreased GHG emissions relative to continued kerosene use, these subsidies \r\nare still targeted at fossil fuels and contribute to GHG emissions."


id: b53cdc550a2151fe5d500ea623897503
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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"below  the operating costs of electricity generated from fossil fuels \r\n(high confidence). The weighted average cost of PV in 2019 was \r\nUSD68 MWh-1, near the bottom of the range of fossil fuel prices (IRENA \r\n2019b). The cost of electricity from PV has fallen by 89% since 2000 and \r\n69% since AR5, at a rate of -16% per year. The 5:95 percentile range \r\nfor PV in 2019 was USD52-190 MWh-1 (IRENA 2021b). Differences \r\nin solar insolation, financing costs, equipment acquisition, installation \r\nlabour, and other sources of price dispersion explain this range (Nemet \r\net  al. 2016; Vartiainen et  al. 2020) and scale. For example, in India, \r\nrooftop installations cost 41% more than utility-scale installations, and \r\ncommercial-scale costs are 39% higher than utility-scale. Significant \r\ndifferences in regional cost persist (Kazhamiaka et al. 2017; Vartiainen \r\net al. 2020), with particularly low prices in China, India, and parts of \r\nEurope"


id: 4e8360bbcf5c3726359ab1f28222df2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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" Globally, the range of global PV costs is quite similar to the \r\nrange of coal and natural gas prices."


id: 973b23568cadfacf2fe88aa162cf1e89
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"The global technical potential of direct solar energy far exceeds that of any \r\nother renewable energy resource and is well beyond the total amount of \r\nenergy needed to support ambitious mitigation over the current century \r\n(high confidence). Estimates of global solar resources have not changed \r\nsince the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (Lewis 2007; Besharat \r\net al. 2013) even as precision and near-term forecasting have improved \r\n(Diagne et al. 2013; Abreu et al. 2018). Approximately 120,000 TW of \r\nsunlight reaches the Earth's surface continuously, almost 10,000 times \r\naverage world energy consumption; factoring in competition for land \r\nuse leaves a technical potential of about 300 PWh yr-1 (1080 EJ yr-1) \r\nfor solar PV, roughly double current consumption (Dupont et al. 2020). \r\nThe technical potential for concentrating solar power (CSP) is estimated \r\nto be 45-82 PWh yr-1 (162-295 EJ yr-1) (Dupont et al. 2020)"


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" Areas \r\nwith the highest solar irradiation are: western South America; northern, \r\neastern and southwestern Africa; and the Middle East and Australia \r\n(Figure 6.7) (Pravalie et al. 2019)."


id: 81261d816fc3e5b94cc686cb4f66161f
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"The share of total costs of PV-intensive electricity systems attributed \r\nto integration costs has been increasing but can be reduced by \r\nenhancing grid flexibility (high confidence) (Sections 6.4.3 and 6.6, \r\nand Box 6.8). The total costs of PV include grid integration, which \r\nvaries tremendously depending on PV's share of electricity, other \r\nsupply sources like wind, availability of storage, transmission capacity, \r\nand demand flexibility (Heptonstall and Gross 2020). Transmission \r\ncosts can add USD1-10 MWh-1 or 3-33% to the cost of utility-scale \r\nPV (Gorman et al. 2019). Distributed (rooftop) PV involves a broader \r\nset of grid integration costs - including grid reinforcement, voltage \r\nbalancing and control, and impacts on other generations - and has \r\na larger range of integration costs from USD2-25 MWh-1, which is \r\n-3% to +37% (Hirth et al. 2015; Wu et al. 2015; Gorman et al. 2019). \r\nOther meta-analyses put the range at USD1-7 MWh-1 in the USA \r\n(Luckow et al. 2015"


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"; Wiser et al. 2017), while a comprehensive study \r\nput the range at USD12-18 MWh-1 for up to 35% renewables and \r\nUSD25-46 MWh-1 above 35% renewables (Heptonstall and Gross \r\n2020). Increased system flexibility can reduce integration costs of \r\nsolar energy (Wu et al. 2015) including storage, demand response, \r\nsector-coupling (Brown et  al. 2018; Bogdanov et  al. 2019), and \r\nincrease complementarity between wind and solar (Heide et al. 2010) \r\n(Sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4)."


id: 388b7c8f2280c3c5a608277739ee4b7f
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"Another environmental concern with large PV power plants is the \r\nconversion of land to collect solar energy (Hernandez et al. 2015). \r\nApproximately 2 hectares of land are needed for 1 MW of solar \r\nelectricity capacity (Perpina Castillo et al. 2016; Kabir et al. 2018); \r\nat 20% efficiency, a  square of PV panels of 550  km by 550  km, \r\ncomprising 0.2% of Earth's land area, could meet global energy \r\ndemand. Land conversion can have local impacts, especially near \r\ncities and where land used for solar competes with alternative \r\nuses, such as agriculture. Large installations can also adversely \r\nimpact biodiversity (Hernandez et  al. 2014), especially where the \r\nabove-ground vegetation is cleared and soils are typically graded. \r\nLandscape fragmentation creates barriers to the movement of \r\nspecies. However, a  variety of means have emerged to mitigate \r\nland use issues. Substitution among renewables can reduce land \r\nconversion (Trondle 2020)"


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" Solar can be integrated with other uses \r\nthrough 'agrivoltaics' (the use of land for both agriculture and solar \r\nproduction) (Dupraz et al. 2011) by, for example, using shade-tolerant \r\ncrops (Dinesh and Pearce 2016). Combining solar and agriculture can \r\nalso create income diversification, reduced drought stress, higher \r\nsolar output due to radiative cooling, and other benefits (Elamri et al. \r\n2018; Hassanpour Adeh et al. 2018; Barron-Gafford et al. 2019). PV \r\ninstallations floating on water also avoid land-use conflicts (Sahu \r\net al. 2016; Lee et al. 2020), as does dual-use infrastructure, such as \r\nlandfills (Jager-Waldau 2020) and reservoirs where evaporation can \r\nalso be reduced (Farfan and Breyer 2018)."


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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29587
content:
"The most important ways to minimise PV's impact on the environment \r\nlie in recycling materials at end of life and making smart land-use \r\ndecisions (medium confidence). A comprehensive assessment of PV's \r\nenvironmental impacts requires lifecycle analysis (LCA) of resource \r\ndepletion, land-use, ecotoxicity, eutrophication, acidification, ozone, \r\nand particulates, among other things (Mahmud et  al. 2018). LCA \r\nstudies show that solar PVs produce far less CO2 per unit of electricity \r\nthan fossil generation, but PV CO2 emissions vary due to the carbon \r\nintensity of manufacturing energy and offset electricity (Grant and \r\nHicks 2020). Concerns about systemic impacts, such as reducing the \r\nEarth's albedo by covering surfaces with dark panels, have shown \r\nto be trivial compared to the mitigation benefits (Nemet 2009) \r\n(Box  6.7). Even though GHG LCA estimates span a  considerable \r\nrange of 9-250 gCO2 kWh-1 (de Wild-Scholten 2013; Kommalapati \r\net  al"


id: 515a79819805eac449ad63e4a9cfef0e
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content:
" 2017), recent studies that reflect higher efficiencies and \r\nmanufacturing improvements find lower lifecycle emissions, \r\nincluding a  range of 18-60 gCO2 kWh-1 (Wetzel and Borchers \r\n2015) and central estimates of 80 gCO2 kWh-1 (Hou et  al. 2016), \r\n50 gCO2 kWh-1 (Nugent and Sovacool 2014), and 20 gCO2 kWh-1"


id: bc0947c7c514a3e83c16ed810a4cd047
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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content:
"Besides PV, alternative solar technologies exist, including CSP, \r\nwhich can provide special services in high-temperature heat and \r\ndiurnal storage, even if it is more costly than PV and its potential for \r\ndeployment is limited. CSP uses reflective surfaces, such as parabolic \r\nmirrors, to focus sunlight on a receiver to heat a working fluid, which \r\nis subsequently transformed into electricity (Islam et al. 2018). Solar \r\nheating and cooling are also well established technologies, and \r\nsolar  energy can be utilised directly for domestic or commercial \r\napplications such as drying, heating, cooling, and cooking (Ge et al. \r\n2018). Solar chimneys, (still purely conceptual), heat air using large \r\ntransparent greenhouse-like structures and channel the warm air \r\nto turbines in tall chimneys (Kasaeian et  al. 2017). Solar energy \r\ncan also be used to produce solar fuels, for example, hydrogen or \r\nsynthetic gas (syngas) (Montoya et  al. 2016; Nocera 2017; Detz \r\net al. 2018)"


id: cd4619e1a872b1b2338992851da31b58
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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content:
" In addition, research proceeds on space-based solar PV, \r\nwhich takes advantage of high insolation and a  continuous solar \r\nresource (Kelzenberg et al. 2018), but faces the formidable obstacle \r\nof developing safe, efficient, and inexpensive microwave or laser \r\ntransmission to the Earth's surface (Yang et al. 2016). CSP is the most \r\nwidely adopted of these alternative solar technologies."


id: 68c274075487171a52ea8fd067f1d8b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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content:
"Many alternative PV materials are improving in efficiency and stability, \r\nproviding longer-term pathways for continued PV costs reductions \r\nand better performance (high confidence). While solar PV based on \r\nsemi-conductors constructed from wafers of silicon still captures \r\n90% of the market, new designs and materials have the potential to \r\nreduce costs further, increase efficiency, reduce resource use, and open \r\nnew applications. The most significant technological advance within \r\nsilicon PV in the past 10 years has been the widespread adoption \r\nof the passivated emitter and rear cell (PERC) design (Green 2015), \r\nwhich now accounts for the majority of production. This advance \r\nboosts efficiency over traditional aluminium backing by increasing \r\nreflectivity within the cell and reducing electron-hole recombination \r\n(Blakers 2019). Bifacial modules increase efficiency by using reflected \r\nlight from the ground or roof on the backside of modules (Guerrero\u0002Lemus et al. 2016)"


id: 1412cb82621a06e06dcc5c54536314dc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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content:
" Integrating PV into buildings can reduce overall \r\ncosts and improve building energy performance (Shukla et al. 2016). \r\nConcentrating PV uses lenses or mirrors that collect and concentrate \r\nlight onto high efficiency PV cells (Li et al. 2020a). Beyond crystalline \r\nsilicon, thin films of amorphous silicon, cadmium telluride, and \r\ncopper indium gallium selenide (among others) have the potential \r\nfor much lower costs while their efficiencies have increased (Green \r\net al. 2019). Perovskites, inexpensive and easy to produce crystalline \r\nstructures, have increased in efficiency by a factor of six in the past \r\ndecade; the biggest challenge is light-induced degradation as well as \r\nfinding lead-free efficient compounds, or establishing lead recycling \r\nat the end of the lifecycle of the device (Petrus et al. 2017; Chang \r\net al. 2018; Wang et al. 2019b; Zhu et al. 2020)"


id: 48cae610619c7658f3f4fea1894b5fca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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content:
" Organic solar cells \r\nare made of carbon-based semiconductors like the ones found in the \r\ndisplays made from organic light emitting diodes (OLEDs) and can be \r\nprocessed in thin films on large areas with scalable and fast coating \r\nprocesses on plastic substrates. The main challenges are raising the \r\nefficiency and improving their lifetime (Ma et al. 2020; Riede et al. \r\n2021). Quantum dots, spherical semi-conductor nanocrystals, can be \r\ntuned to absorb specific wavelengths of sunlight, giving them the \r\npotential for high efficiency with very little material use (Kramer et al. \r\n2015). A common challenge for all emerging solar cell technologies \r\nis developing the corresponding production equipment. Hybrids \r\nof silicon with layers of quantum dots and perovskites have the \r\npotential to take advantage of the benefits of all three, although \r\nthose designs require that these new technologies have stability and \r\nscale that match those of silicon (Chang et al. 2017; Palmstrom et al"


id: f5216669101a256cabaa5aa41516c0e6
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content:
"Like PV, CSP facilities can deliver large amounts of power (up to \r\n200 MW per unit) and maintain substantial thermal storage, which \r\nis valuable for load balancing over the diurnal cycle (McPherson \r\net al. 2020). However, unlike PV, CSP can only use direct sunlight, \r\nconstraining its cost-effectiveness to North Africa, the Middle East, \r\nSouthern Africa, Australia, the Western USA, parts of South America \r\n(Peru, Chile), and the Western part of China (Deng et  al. 2015; \r\nDupont et al. 2020). Parabolic troughs, central towers and parabolic \r\ndishes are the three leading solar thermal technologies (Wang et al. \r\n2017d). Parabolic troughs represented approximately 70% of new \r\ncapacity in 2018 with the balance made up by central tower plants \r\n(Islam et al. 2018). Especially promising research directions are on \r\ntower-based designs that can achieve high temperatures, useful \r\nfor industrial heat and energy storage (Mehos et  al"


id: f3951a7d53106e844a4d1fb81cde7b78
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content:
" 2017), and \r\ndirect steam generation designs (Islam et  al. 2018). Costs of CSP \r\nhave fallen by nearly half since AR5 (Figure 6.8) albeit at a slower \r\nrate than PV. Since AR5, almost all new CSP plants have storage \r\n(Figure 6.9) (Thonig 2020)."


id: 84197d56b8a58c3c4cbfaed283ca77e6
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"in 2010 to 120 m in 2020) (IRENA 2021b), and average power \r\nratings (from 1.9 MW in 2010 to 3 MW in 2020). The generation \r\ncapacity of offshore wind turbines grew by a  factor of 3.7 in less \r\nthan two decades, from 1.6 MW in 2000 to 6 MW in 2020 (Wiser \r\net  al. 2021). Floating foundations could revolutionise offshore \r\nwind power by tapping into the abundant wind potential in deeper \r\nwaters. This technology is particularly important for regions where \r\ncoastal waters are too deep for fixed-bottom wind turbines. Floating \r\nwind farms potentially offer economic and environmental benefits \r\ncompared with fixed-bottom designs due to less-invasive activity on \r\nthe seabed during installation, but the long-term ecological effects \r\nare unknown and meteorological conditions further offshore and \r\nin deeper waters are harsher on wind turbine components (IRENA \r\n2019c)"


id: c61402d2b5a494c8b7af8ecc20880778
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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content:
" A radical new class of wind energy converters has also been \r\nconceived under the name of airborne wind energy systems that can \r\nharvest strong, high-altitude winds (typically between 200-800m), \r\nwhich are inaccessible by traditional wind turbines (Cherubini et al. \r\n2015). This technology has seen development and testing of small \r\ndevices (Watson et al. 2019)."


id: 6f6a658ba49a61a1d6acecc989153cba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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vector_id: 15158
content:
"mitigation from wind energy by 2100 ranges from 0.3degC-0.8degC \r\ndepending on the precise socio-economic pathway and wind energy \r\nexpansion scenario followed (Barthelmie and Pryor 2021). Wind \r\nresources are unevenly distributed over the globe and by time of \r\nthe year (Petersen and Troen 2012), but potential hotspots exist on \r\nevery continent (Figure 6.10) as expressed by the wind power density \r\n(a quantitative measure of wind energy available at any location). \r\nTechnical potentials for onshore wind power vary considerably, often \r\nbecause of inconsistent assessments of suitability factors (McKenna \r\net al. 2020). The potential for offshore wind power is larger than for \r\nonshore because offshore wind is stronger and less variable (Bosch \r\net  al. 2018). Offshore wind is more expensive, however, because \r\nof higher costs for construction, maintenance, and transmission"


id: 24c7cab35b665f47f621794f9963bfe4
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content:
" \r\nWind power varies at a range of time scales, from annual to sub\u0002seconds; the effects of local short-term variability can be offset by \r\npower plant control, flexible grid integration, and storage (Barra \r\net al. 2021) (Section 6.4.3). In some regions, interannual variations in \r\nwind energy resources could be important for optimal power system \r\ndesign (Wohland et al. 2019a; Coker et al. 2020)."


id: 644efcf135082cd5bf88126917745351
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content:
"Public support for onshore and particularly offshore wind energy \r\nis generally high, although people may oppose specific wind farm \r\nprojects (high confidence) (e.g.,  Bell et  al. 2005; Batel and Devine\u0002Wright 2015; Rand and Hoen 2017; Steg 2018). People generally \r\nbelieve that wind energy is associated with environmental benefits \r\nand that it is relatively cheap. Yet, some people believe wind turbines \r\ncan cause noise and visual aesthetic pollution, threaten places of \r\nsymbolic value (Devine-Wright and Wiersma 2020; Russell et al. 2020), \r\nand have adverse effects on wildlife (Bates and Firestone 2015), which \r\nchallenges public acceptability (Rand and Hoen 2017). Support for \r\nlocal wind projects is higher when people believe fair decision-making \r\nprocedures have been implemented (Dietz and  Stern  2008; Aitken \r\n2010a). Evidence is mixed whether distance from wind turbines or \r\nfinancial compensation increases public acceptability of wind turbines \r\n(Cass et al"


id: 35c26fd470121ad9ad558836c4ac6cec
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content:
" 2010; Rand and Hoen 2017; Rudolph et al. 2018; Hoen \r\net al. 2019). Offshore wind farms projects have higher public support, \r\nbut can also face resistance (Bidwell 2017; Rudolph et al. 2018)."


id: 2746ac2821fc3a3fe1d1b5dec836f1f4
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"support for hydro seems to differ for existing and new projects (high \r\nconfidence). Public support is generally high for small- and medium\u0002scale hydropower in regions where hydropower was historically used \r\n(Gormally et al. 2014). Additionally, there is high support for existing \r\nlarge hydropower projects in Switzerland (Rudolf et al. 2014; Plum \r\net al. 2019), Canada (Boyd et al. 2019), and Norway (Karlstrom and \r\nRyghaug 2014), where it is a  trusted and common energy source. \r\nPublic support seems lower for new hydropower projects (Hazboun \r\nand Boudet 2020), and the construction of new large hydropower \r\nplants has been met with strong resistance in some areas (Vince \r\n2010; Bronfman et al. 2015). People generally perceive hydroelectric \r\nenergy as clean and a  non-contributor to climate change and \r\nenvironmental pollution (Kaldellis et  al. 2013)"


id: 506ae88c6a348ea4b306c89382f86517
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" For example, in \r\nSweden, people believed that existing hydropower projects have as \r\nfew negative environmental impacts as solar, and even less than wind \r\n(Ek 2005). However, in areas where the construction of new large\u0002scale hydroelectric energy is met with resistance, people believe that \r\nelectricity generation from hydro can cause environmental, social, \r\nand personal risks (Bronfman et al. 2012; Kaldellis et al. 2013)."


id: a13f7d52552fdbf16150c5bcca617b14
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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"The construction time of hydroelectric power plants is longer than \r\nmany other renewable technologies, and that construction time \r\nmay be extended by the additional time it takes to fill the reservoir. \r\nThis extended timeline can create uncertainty in the completion \r\nof the project. The uncertainty is due to insecurity in year-to-year \r\nvariations in precipitation and the water inflows required to fill \r\nreservoirs. This is especially critical in the case of trans-boundary \r\nhydroelectric power plants, where filling up the reservoirs can have \r\nlarge implications on downstream users in other nations. As a result \r\nof social and environmental constraints, only a  small fraction of \r\npotential economic hydropower projects can be developed, especially \r\nin developed countries. Many developing countries have major \r\nundeveloped hydropower potential, and there are opportunities to \r\ndevelop hydropower combined with other economic activities such as \r\nirrigation (Lacombe et al. 2014)"


id: 56ee9148845b66024b6ba28e97d67fd9
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content:
" Competition for hydropower across \r\ncountry borders can lead to conflict, which could be exacerbated if \r\nclimate alters rainfall and streamflow (Ito et al. 2016)."


id: 34c5612be1b66a0d1b02b9592061bda1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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content:
"Hydroelectric power plants may pose serious environmental and \r\nsocietal impacts (high confidence) (McCartney 2009). Dams may lead \r\nto fragmentation of ecological habitats because they act as barriers \r\nfor migration of fish and other land and water-borne fauna, sediments, \r\nand water flow. These barriers can be mitigated by sediment passes \r\nand fish migration aids, and with provision of environmental flows. \r\nBelow dams, there can be considerable alterations to vegetation, \r\nnatural river flows, retention of sediments and nutrients, and water \r\nquality and temperature. Construction of large reservoirs leads to loss \r\nof land, which may result in social and environmental consequences. \r\nMinimising societal and environmental impacts requires taking \r\ninto account local physical, environmental, climatological, social, \r\neconomic, and political aspects during the planning stage (Killingtveit \r\n2020)"


id: c0edc47c5bbaf803fc19d256eeac653a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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" Moreover, when large areas of land are flooded by dam \r\nconstruction, they generate GHGs (Prairie et al. 2018; Phyoe and Wang \r\n2019; Maavara et al. 2020). On the other hand, hydropower provides \r\nflexible, competitive low-emission electricity, local economic benefits \r\n(e.g., by increasing irrigation and electricity production in developing \r\ncountries), and ancillary services such as municipal water supply, \r\nirrigation and drought management, navigation and recreation, \r\nand flood control (IRENA 2021b). However, the long-term economic \r\nbenefits to communities affected by reservoirs are a subject of debate \r\n(de Faria et al. 2017; Catolico et al. 2021)."


id: 6d58e69e031d6b3efb7e5410948f808d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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content:
"Nuclear energy is found to be favourable regarding land occupation \r\n(Cheng and Hammond 2017; Luderer et  al. 2019) and ecological \r\nimpacts (Brook and Bradshaw 2015; Gibon et  al. 2017). Similarly, \r\nbulk material requirements per  unit of energy produced are low \r\n(e.g., aluminum, copper, iron, rare earth metals) (Vidal et al. 2013; \r\nLuderer et  al. 2019). Water-intensive inland nuclear power plants \r\nmay contribute to localised water stress and competition for water \r\nuses. The choice of cooling systems (closed-loop instead of once\u0002through) can significantly moderate withdrawal rates of freshwater \r\n(Meldrum et al. 2013; Fricko et al. 2016; Mouratiadou et al. 2016; Jin \r\net al. 2019). Reactors situated on the seashore are not affected by \r\nwater scarcity issues (Abousahl et al. 2021)"


id: a9f5b7fc8a32f2978b71f65e77bbd133
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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content:
" Lifecycle analysis (LCA) \r\nstudies suggest that the overall impacts on human health (in terms \r\nof disability adjusted life years (DALYs)) from the normal operation \r\nof nuclear power plants are substantially lower than those caused \r\nby fossil fuel technologies and are comparable to renewable energy \r\nsources (Treyer et al. 2014; Gibon et al. 2017)."


id: e38ffc6a83722f42fadeca998dd7976b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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content:
"Nuclear power costs vary substantially across countries (high \r\nconfidence). First-of-a-kind projects under construction in Northern \r\nAmerica and Europe have been marked by delays and costs overruns \r\n(Berthelemy and Rangel 2015). Construction times have exceeded \r\n13-15 years and cost has surpassed three to four times initial budget \r\nestimates (IEA 2020j). In contrast, most of the recent projects in \r\nEastern Asia (with construction starts from 2012) were implemented \r\nwithin five to six years (IAEA 2021). In addition to region-specific \r\nfactors, future nuclear costs will depend on the ability to benefit from \r\nthe accumulated experience in controlling the main drivers of cost. \r\nThese cost drivers fall into four categories: design maturity; project \r\nmanagement; regulatory stability and predictability; and multi-unit \r\nand series effects (NEA 2020)"


id: b1d74fda9f6822dc0ff3b3e82bcc3dc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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vector_id: 25488
content:
" With lessons learned from first-of-a-kind \r\nprojects, the cost of electricity for new builds are expected to be in the \r\nrange of USD42-102 MWh-1 depending on the region (IEA 2020j)."


id: ca7946490c440c7cad052cd4153767ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29414
content:
"The theoretical global geologic storage potential is about \r\n10,000 GtCO2, with more than 80% of this capacity existing in saline \r\naquifers (medium confidence). Not all the storage capacity is usable \r\nbecause geologic and engineering factors limit the actual storage \r\ncapacity to an order of magnitude below the theoretical potential, \r\nwhich is still more than the CO2 storage requirement through 2100 \r\nto limit temperature change to 1.5degC (Martin-Roberts et  al. 2021) \r\n(high confidence). One of the key limiting factors associated with \r\ngeologic CO2 storage is the global distribution of storage capacity \r\n(Table  6.2). Most of the available storage capacity exists in saline \r\naquifers. Capacity in oil and gas reservoirs and coalbed methane \r\nfields is limited. Storage potential in the USA alone is >1000 GtCO2, \r\nwhich is more than 10% of the world total (NETL 2015). The Middle \r\nEast has more than 50% of global enhanced oil recovery potential \r\n(Selosse and Ricci 2017)"


id: 71cf888d90f081e5ad0424b81ba69e0c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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content:
" It is likely that oil and gas reservoirs will \r\nbe developed as geologic sinks before saline aquifers because of \r\nexisting infrastructure and extensive subsurface data (Alcalde et al. \r\n2019; Hastings and Smith 2020). Notably, not all geologic storage is \r\nutilisable. In places with limited geologic storage, international CCS \r\nchains are being considered, where sources and sinks of CO2 are \r\nlocated in two or more countries (Sharma and Xu 2021). For economic \r\nlong-term storage, the desirable conditions are a depth of 800-3000 \r\nm, thickness of greater than 50 m and permeability greater than \r\n500 mD (Chadwick et al. 2008; Singh et al. 2021). Even in reservoirs \r\nwith large storage potential, the rate of injection might be limited \r\nby the subsurface pressure of the reservoir (Baik et al. 2018). It is \r\nestimated that geologic sequestration is reliable with overall leakage \r\nrates at <0.001% yr -1 (Alcalde et al. 2018)"


id: b68da35f3fdcd2c83664e2048f382605
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26238
content:
" In many cases, geological \r\nstorage resources are not located close to CO2 sources, increasing \r\ncosts and reducing viability (Garg et al. 2017a)."


id: 4f4c42926c6f1ac8df8c51d414a5179e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9912
content:
"Nuclear power's long-term viability may hinge on demonstrating to \r\nthe public and investors that there is a long-term solution to spent \r\nnuclear fuel. Evidence from countries steadily progressing towards \r\nfirst final disposals - Finland, Sweden and France - suggests that \r\nbroad political support, coherent nuclear waste policies, and a well\u0002managed, consensus-based decision-making process are critical \r\nfor accelerating this process (Metlay 2016). Proliferation concerns \r\nsurrounding nuclear power are related to fuel cycle (i.e., uranium \r\nenrichment and spent fuel processing). These processes are \r\nimplemented in a  very limited number of countries following \r\nstrict national and internationals norms and rules, such as the \r\nInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines, treaties and \r\nconventions"


id: ab0ac4fa7234d5ec80ff55affa09aacf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24433
content:
" Most of the countries that might introduce nuclear \r\npower in the future for their climate change mitigation benefits \r\ndo not envision developing their own full fuel cycle, significantly \r\nreducing any risks that might be linked to proliferation (IAEA \r\n2014, 2019)."


id: 72a07bdc324eca3e334a15b834b1ef71
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vector_id: 15650
content:
"In addition to reductions in capture costs, other approaches to reduce \r\nCCS costs rely on utilising the revenues from co-products such as oil, \r\ngas, or methanol, and on clustering of large-point sources to reduce \r\ninfrastructure costs. The potential for such reductions is limited in \r\nseveral regions due to low sink availability, but it could jump-start initial \r\ninvestments (medium confidence). Injecting CO2 into hydrocarbon \r\nformations for enhanced oil or gas recovery can produce revenues and \r\nlower costs (Edwards and Celia 2018). While enhanced oil recovery \r\npotential is <5% of the actual CCS needs, they can enable early pilot \r\nand demonstration projects (Nunez-Lopez and Moskal 2019; Nunez\u0002Lopez et al. 2019). Substantial portions of CO2 are effectively stored \r\nduring enhanced oil recovery (Menefee and Ellis 2020; Sminchak et al. \r\n2020). By clustering together of several CO2 sources, overall costs may \r\nbe reduced by USD10 tCO2\r\n-1 (Abotalib et al. 2016; Garg et al"


id: 916d4f414090b401ec57a59471cf6574
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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vector_id: 20418
content:
" 2017a), \r\nbut geographical circumstances determine the prospects of these \r\ncost reductions via economies of scale. The major pathways for CO2\r\nutilisation via methanol, methane, liquid fuel production, and cement \r\ncuring have costs greater than USD500 tCO2\r\n-1 (Hepburn et al. 2019). \r\nThe success of these pathways therefore depends on the value of such \r\nfuels and on the values of other alternatives."


id: 84125f47545084bd9100afafb9b4e20e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18314
content:
"Existing post-combustion approaches relying on absorption are \r\ntechnologically ready for full-scale deployment (high confidence). \r\nMore novel approaches using membranes and chemical looping that \r\nmight reduce the energy penalty associated with absorption are in \r\ndifferent stages of development - ranging from laboratory phase to \r\nprototype phase (Abanades et al. 2015) (high confidence). There has \r\nbeen significant progress in post-combustion capture technologies \r\nthat used absorption in solvents such as monoethanolamine (MEA). \r\nThere are commercial-scale application of solvent-based absorption \r\nat two electricity generating facilities - Boundary Dam since 2015 \r\nand Petra Nova (temporarily suspended) since 2017, with capacities \r\nof 1 and 1.6  MtCO2 yr-1 respectively (Mantripragada et  al. 2019; \r\nGiannaris et al. 2020a)"


id: 7b7c72f3f3bcad71a6a125eaca307689
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17021
content:
" Several second- and third-generation capture \r\ntechnologies are being developed with the aim of not just lowering \r\ncosts but also enhancing other performance characteristics such \r\nas improved ramp-up and lower water consumption. These include \r\nprocesses such as chemical looping, which also has the advantage \r\nof being capable of co-firing with biomass with a better efficiency \r\n(Bhave et al. 2017; Yang et al. 2019). Another important technological \r\ndevelopment is the Allam cycle, which utilises CO2 as a working fluid "


id: 80993328245147259440c8d8f48b8a35
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17759
content:
"An important feature of bioenergy is that it can be used to remove \r\ncarbon from the atmosphere by capturing CO2 in different parts of \r\nthe conversion process and then permanently storing the CO2 (BECCS \r\nor biochar) (Smith et al. 2016; Fuss et al. 2018) (Chapters 3 and 7, \r\nand Section 12.5). Some early opportunities for low-cost BECCS are \r\nbeing utilised in the ethanol sector but these are applicable only in \r\nthe near-term at the scale of <=100 MtCO2 yr-1 (Sanchez et al. 2018). \r\nSeveral technological and institutional barriers exist for large-scale \r\nBECCS implementation, including large energy requirements for \r\nCCS, limit and cost of biomass supply and geologic sinks for CO2\r\nin several regions, and cost of CO2 capture technologies (high \r\nconfidence)"


id: 2d6968814f8bff22d73283b36a766433
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4588
content:
" Besides BECCS, biofuels production through pyrolysis \r\nand hydrothermal liquefaction creates biochar, which could also be \r\nused to store carbon as 80% of the carbon sequestered in biochar \r\nwill remain in the biochar permanently (Chapter 7). In addition to its \r\nability to sequester carbon, biochar can be used as a soil amendment \r\n(Wang et al. 2014b)."


id: 39ca2d6eb8f2440ba2661998e38124df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6469
content:
"First-generation bioenergy is currently competitive in some markets \r\nthough, on average, its costs are higher than other forms of final energy. \r\nBioenergy from waste and residues from forestry and agriculture is \r\nalso currently competitive, but the supply is limited (Aguilar et  al. \r\n2020). These costs are context-dependent, and regions having large \r\nwaste resources are already producing low-cost bioenergy (Jin and \r\nSutherland 2018). In the future, technology costs are anticipated \r\nto decrease, but bioenergy produced through cellulosic feedstocks \r\nmay remain more expensive than fossil alternatives. Large-scale \r\ndeployment of early opportunities, especially in the liquid fuel \r\nsector, may reduce the technological costs associated with biomass \r\nconversion (IEA 2020g). At the same time, the cost of feedstocks \r\nmay rise as bioenergy requirements increase, especially in scenarios \r\nwith large bioenergy deployment (Muratori et al. 2020)"


id: 875ec3e35b20e460692092aa8281be1c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
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vector_id: 18841
content:
"Acceptability of bioenergy is relatively low compared to other \r\nrenewable energy sources like solar and wind (Poortinga et al. 2013; \r\nMa et al. 2015; Peterson et al. 2015; EPCC 2017) and comparable \r\nto natural gas (Scheer et al. 2013). People also know relatively little \r\nabout bioenergy compared to other energy sources (Whitmarsh \r\net al. 2011a; EPCC 2017) and tend be be more ambivalent towards \r\nbioenergy compared to other mitigation options (Allen and \r\nChatterton 2013). People evaluate biomass from waste products \r\n(e.g., food waste) more favourably than grown-for-purpose energy \r\ncrops, which are more controversial (Plate et al. 2010; Demski et al. \r\n2015). The most pressing concerns for use of woody biomass are air \r\npollution and loss of local forests (Plate et al. 2010). Various types \r\nof bioenergy additionally raise concerns about landscape impacts \r\n(Whitmarsh et  al. 2011a) and biodiversity (Immerzeel et  al. 2014)"


id: 2039a9d4382730e1872d60c90deb6cac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2514
content:
" \r\nMoreover, many people do not see biomass as a renewable energy \r\nsource, possibly because it involves burning of material."


id: 8186ed651bb369c4d511c7ed02f4dc03
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17909
content:
"Methane emissions mainly from coal, oil, and gas currently represent in 2019 about 18% of energy supply sector greenhouse gas \r\n(GHG) emissions and 90% of global energy supply non-CO2 emissions in 2019 (Minx et al. 2021b). While approximately 80% of \r\nthe lifecycle methane emissions in the coal sector occur during underground mining, oil and gas emissions are spread throughout \r\nupstream, midstream, and downstream stages (Alvarez et al. 2018; IPCC 2019). For this reason, methane reductions from coal mining \r\ncan be accomplished through coal mine methane recovery (where methane and coal are recovered simultaneously) and from the \r\nventilation air, which can cumulatively reduce methane emissions by 50-75% (Zhou et al. 2016; Singh and Hajra 2018). Governments \r\nincentivise such operations through a number of emissions trading and offset programmes (Haya et al. 2020)"


id: e96e4ea5fd62bdeda7ce2173ab52c6af
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34235
content:
" Methane emissions in \r\nthe oil and gas sector can be reduced by leak detection and repair, relevant across varying time scales (hours to decades) and regional \r\nscopes (component/facility level to continental) (Fox et al. 2019). Around 50% of the methane emitted from oil and gas infrastructure \r\ncan be mitigated at net-negative costs; that is, the market price of the recovered methane is higher than the mitigation costs (IEA \r\n2021e). As CO2 emissions are reduced and fossil fuel consumption decreases, methane emissions associated with these supply chains \r\nare anticipated to decline (Section 6.7). That said, substantial 'legacy' methane emissions - methane leaks after abandonment - will \r\nremain, even if a complete fossil fuel phase-out takes place. These legacy emissions are estimated to be less than 1-4% of overall \r\nmethane emissions across all fossil fuel sources (Kholod et al. 2020; Williams et al. 2021b)"


id: a40de5abea90f160f859876ad1b3004a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23369
content:
" Even without a complete phase-out, 50-80% \r\nof methane emissions from coal, oil and gas could be avoided with currently available technologies at less than USD50 tCO2-eq-1\r\n(Harmsen et al. 2019; Hoglund-Isaksson et al. 2020). Methane recovery from abandoned coal mines could offset most project costs \r\n(Singh and Sahu 2018). For abandoned oil and gas wells, low plugging costs could be offset through methane recovery, while high \r\nplugging costs would likely require some market or policy support (Kang et al. 2019)."


id: cfaed4913560e8bbe0534989187662ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30209
content:
"Technological changes have continued to drive down fossil fuel \r\nextraction costs. Significant decarbonisation potential also exists \r\nvia diversification of the fossil fuel uses beyond combustion (high \r\nevidence). The costs of extracting oil and gas globally have gone \r\ndown by utilising hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling for \r\nresources in unconventional reservoirs (Wachtmeister and Hook \r\n2020). Although the extraction of these resources is still more \r\nexpensive than those derived from conventional reservoirs, the large \r\navailability of unconventional resources has significantly reduced \r\nglobal prices. The emergence of liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets \r\nhas also provided opportunities to export natural gas significant \r\ndistances from the place of production (Avraam et  al. 2020). The \r\nincrease in availability of natural gas has been accompanied by an \r\nincrease in the production of natural gas liquids as a co-product to oil \r\nand gas"


id: ca7b2b3a0888ea3682c984196d237ec4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29415
content:
" Over the period from 2014 to 2019, exports of natural gas \r\nliquids increased by 160%. Natural gas liquids could potentially be \r\na lower-carbon alternative to liquid fuels and hydrocarbons. On the \r\ndemand side, natural gas can be used to produce hydrogen using \r\nsteam methane reforming, which is a technologically mature process \r\n(Sections 6.4.4 and 6.4.5). When combined with 90% CO2 capture, \r\nthe costs of producing hydrogen are around USD1.5-2 kg(H2)\r\n-1\r\n(Collodi et al. 2017; Newborough and Cooley 2020), considerably less \r\nthan hydrogen produced via electrolysis."


id: 37ec0a402134cdf462f2786be2e06c54
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6173
content:
"Oil and coal consistently rank among the least preferred energy \r\nsources in many countries (high confidence). The main perceived \r\nadvantage of fossil energy is the relatively low costs, and emphasising \r\nthese costs might increase acceptability somewhat (Pohjolainen et al. \r\n2018; Boyd et al. 2019; Hazboun and Boudet 2020). Acceptability of \r\nfossil fuels is, on average, similar to acceptability of nuclear energy, \r\nalthough evaluations are less polarised. People evaluate natural \r\ngas as somewhat more acceptable than other fossil fuels, although \r\nthey generally oppose hydraulic fracturing (Clarke et al. 2016). Yet, \r\nnatural gas is evaluated as less acceptable than renewable energy \r\nsources, although evaluations of natural gas and biogas are similar \r\n(Liebe and Dobers 2019; Plum et  al. 2019). Acceptability of fossil \r\nenergy tends to be higher in countries and regions that strongly \r\nrely on them for their energy production (Pohjolainen et  al. 2018; \r\nBoyd et al. 2019)"


id: 4ac14801771e16c47efea07e843cdfc1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9177
content:
" Combining fossil fuels with CCS can increase their \r\nacceptability (Van Rijnsoever et al. 2015; Bessette and Arvai 2018). \r\nSome people seem ambivalent about natural gas, as they perceive \r\nboth benefits (e.g., affordability, less carbon emissions than coal) and \r\ndisadvantages (e.g., finite resource, contributing to climate change) \r\n(Blumer et al. 2018)."


id: d39f0d02455a185a7c1facecfe3c4711
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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vector_id: 30819
content:
"Suitable aquifers underlay 16% of the Earth's land surface and store \r\nan estimated 110,000-1,400,000 PWh (400,000-1,450,000 EJ) that \r\ncould theoretically be used for direct heat applications. For electricity \r\ngeneration, the technical potential of geothermal energy is estimated \r\nto be between 30 PWh yr -1 (108 EJ yr -1) (to 3  km depth) and \r\n300 PWh yr -1 (1080 EJ yr -1) (to 10 km depth). For direct thermal uses, \r\nthe technical potential is estimated to range from 2.7-86 PWh yr -1\r\n(9.7-310 EJ yr -1) (IPCC 2011). Despite the potential, geothermal \r\ndirect heat supplies only 0.15% of the annual global final energy \r\nconsumption. The technical potential for electricity generation, \r\ndepending on the depth, can meet one third to almost three times \r\nthe global final consumption  - based on International Energy \r\nAgency (IEA) database for IPCC"


id: 396510407f52a0a159f7bf3c9f39274d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6408
content:
" The mismatch between potential \r\nand developed geothermal resources is caused by high upfront costs, \r\ndecentralised geothermal heat production, lack of uniformity among \r\ngeothermal projects, geological uncertainties, and geotechnical risks \r\n(IRENA 2017a; Limberger et al. 2018). A limited number of countries \r\nhave a long history in geothermal. At least in two countries (Iceland \r\nand New Zealand), geothermal accounts for 20-25% of electricity \r\ngeneration (Pan et  al. 2019; Spittler et  al. 2020). Furthermore, in \r\nIceland approximately 90% of the households are heated with "


id: 201aca49bc287cabf324816dbea69a99
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2497
content:
"The ocean is a vast source of energy (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2019). \r\nOcean energy can be extracted from tides, waves, ocean thermal \r\nenergy conversion (OTEC), currents, and salinity gradients (Bindoff \r\net al. 2019). Their technical potentials, without considering possible \r\nexclusion zones, are explored below. Tidal energy, which uses \r\nelevation differences between high and low tides, appears in two \r\nforms: potential energy (rise and fall of the tide); and current energy \r\n(from tidal currents). The global technically harvestable tidal power \r\nfrom areas close to the coast is estimated as about 1.2 PWh yr -1\r\n(4.3 EJ yr -1) (IRENA 2020b). The potential for tidal current energy is \r\nestimated to be larger than that for tidal range or barrage (Melikoglu \r\n2018). Ocean wave energy is abundant and predictable and can \r\nbe extracted directly from surface waves or pressure fluctuations \r\nbelow the surface (Melikoglu 2018). Its global theoretical potential \r\nis 29"


id: f70c8ef0be70a54fde3962e031292ded
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36376
content:
"5 PWh yr-1 (106 EJ yr-1),which means that wave energy alone \r\ncould meet  all global energy demand (Mork et  al. 2010; IRENA \r\n2020b). The temperature gradients in the ocean can be exploited to \r\nproduce energy, and its total estimated available resource could be \r\nup to 44.0 PWh yr -1 (158 EJ yr -1) (Rajagopalan and Nihous 2013). \r\nSalinity gradient energy, also known as osmotic power, has a global \r\ntheoretical potential of over 1.6 PWh yr -1 (6.0 EJ yr -1) (IRENA \r\n2020b). The greatest advantage of most marine energy, excluding \r\nwave energy, is that their sources are highly regular and predictable, \r\nand energy can be furthermore generated both day and  night. \r\nAn  additional use of sea water is to develop lower-cost district \r\ncooling systems near the sea (Hunt et al. 2019)"


id: 2d11ddcfa68892a189d935f80cb1adc8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4531
content:
" The greatest barrier \r\nto most marine technology advances is the relatively high upfront \r\ncosts, uncertainty on environmental regulation and impact, need for \r\ninvestments and insufficient infrastructure (Kempener and Neumann \r\n2014a, b). There are also concerns about technology maturity and \r\nperformance; thus, not all have the potential to become economically \r\nviable (IRENA 2020b)."


id: c35e793c52ea0db35f05be530c627f1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28305
content:
"can reduce the mass of waste by 70-80% and the volume of waste by \r\n80-90% (Haraguchi et al. 2019). Incineration technology can reduce \r\nwater and soil pollution (Gu et  al. 2019). However, if not properly \r\nhandled, dust, and gases such as SO2, HCL, HF, NO2, and dioxins in the \r\nflue gases can harm the environment (Mutz et al. 2017). Anaerobic \r\ndigestion technology has a  positive environmental impact and the \r\nability to reduce GHG emissions (Ayodele et  al. 2018; Cudjoe et  al. \r\n2020). The by-product of the anaerobic digestion process could be used \r\nas a nutrient-rich fertiliser for enhancing soil richness for agricultural \r\npurposes (Wainaina et  al. 2020). Due to the potential negative \r\nimpacts on domestic environment and residents' health, WTE projects \r\nsuch as incineration encounter substantial opposition from the local \r\ncommunities in which they are located (Baxter et al. 2016; Ren et al. \r\n2016)"


id: 66da4b5e483899d898611683d1489bfe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13774
content:
" Therefore, for WTE to be deployed more widely, policies would \r\nneed to be tailored with specific guidelines focused on mitigating \r\nemissions, which may have an adverse effect on the environment."


id: 79e0964a0b6d0b3c03fc175b548b9406
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16749
content:
"Rather than incremental planning, strategic energy system planning \r\ncan help minimise long-term mitigation costs (high confidence). \r\nWith a whole-system perspective, integrated planning can consider \r\nboth short-term operation and long-term investment decisions, \r\ncovering infrastructure from local to national and international, \r\nwhile meeting security of supply requirements and incorporating \r\nthe flexibility provided by different technologies and advanced \r\ncontrol strategies (Zhang et  al. 2018; O'Malley et  al. 2020; Strbac \r\net al. 2020). Management of conflicts and synergies between local \r\ndistrict and national level energy system objectives, including \r\nstrategic investment in local hydrogen and heat infrastructure, can \r\ndrive significant whole-system cost savings (Zhang et al. 2019b; Fu \r\net  al. 2020)"


id: 2ee542af581c5f969567890d37816e96
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4810
content:
" For example, long-term planning of the offshore grid \r\ninfrastructure to support offshore wind development, including \r\ninterconnection between different countries and regions, can provide \r\nsignificant savings compared to a short-term incremental approach \r\nin which every offshore wind farm is individually connected to the \r\nonshore grid (E3G 2021)."


id: cc44d7a3ca8fb9c8c221e24e2da140af
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29681
content:
"A digitalised energy system can significantly reduce energy \r\ninfrastructure investments while enhancing supply security and \r\nresilience (high confidence) (Andoni et  al. 2019; Strbac et  al. \r\n2020). Significant progress has been made in the development of \r\ntechnologies essential for the transition to a digitalised energy control \r\nparadigm, although the full implementation is still under development. \r\nElectrification and the increased integration of the electricity system \r\nwith other systems will fundamentally transform the operational and \r\nplanning paradigm of future energy infrastructure. A fully intelligent \r\nand sophisticated coordination of the multiple systems through \r\nsmart control will support this paradigm shift. This shift will provide \r\nsignificant savings through better utilisation of existing infrastructure \r\nlocally, regionally, nationally, and internationally"


id: b2736fa9f0a51e277dfc8084845ba049
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25591
content:
" Supply system \r\nreliability will be enhanced through advanced control of local \r\ninfrastructure (Strbac et  al. 2015a). Furthermore, this paradigm \r\nshift offers the potential to increase energy efficiency through \r\na  combination of technologies that gather and analyse data and \r\nconsequently optimise energy use in real-time."


id: bc1aa347c87e469830342559ba5a5e7c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27163
content:
"Batteries. There are many types of batteries, all having unique \r\nfeatures and suitability, but their key feature is their rapid response \r\ntime. A rechargeable battery cell is charged by using electricity to \r\ndrive ions from one electrode to another, with the reverse occurring \r\non discharge, producing a  usable electric current (Crabtree et  al. \r\n2015). While lead-acid batteries (LABs) have been widely used for \r\nautomotive and grid applications for decades (May et al. 2018), LIBs \r\nare increasingly being used in grid-scale projects (Crabtree et  al. \r\n2015), displacing LABs. The rapid response time of batteries makes \r\nthem suitable for enhanced frequency regulation and voltage support, \r\nenabling the integration of variable renewables into electricity grids \r\n(Strbac and Aunedi 2016). Batteries can provide almost all electricity \r\nservices, except for seasonal storage"


id: 679b4ae6d9d982bc1fa5a4f9ac0cce67
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13891
content:
" LIBs, in particular, can store \r\nenergy and power in small volumes and with low weight, making \r\nthem the default choice for EVs (Placke et al. 2017). EV batteries are \r\nexpected to form a distributed storage resource as this market grows, \r\nboth impacting and supporting the grid (Staffell and Rustomji 2016)."


id: 5d5ed4e7cbfae053cea52187e3300dc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12215
content:
"The superior characteristics of LIBs will keep them the dominant choice \r\nfor EV and grid applications in the medium term (high confidence). \r\nThere are, however, several next-generation battery chemistries \r\n(Placke et  al. 2017), which show promise (high  confidence). \r\nCost reductions through economies of scale are a  key area for \r\ndevelopment. Extending the life of the battery can bring down overall \r\ncosts and mitigate the environmental impacts (Peters et al. 2017). \r\nUnderstanding and controlling battery degradation is therefore \r\nimportant. The liquid, air-reactive electrolytes of conventional LIBs \r\nare the main source of their safety issues (Janek and Zeier 2016; Gur \r\n2018), so all-solid-state batteries, in which the electrolyte is a solid, \r\nstable material, are being developed. They are expected to be safe, \r\nbe durable, and have higher energy densities (Janek and Zeier 2016)"


id: a0a5d2eacac0e49c12b60b30bb73cccf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
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vector_id: 22818
content:
" \r\nNew chemistries and concepts are being explored, such as lithium\u0002sulphur batteries to achieve even higher energy densities (Van \r\nNoorden 2014; Blomgren 2017) and sodium chemistries because \r\nsodium is more abundant than lithium (Hwang et  al. 2017). Cost\u0002effective recycling of batteries will address many sustainability issues \r\nand prevent hazardous and wasteful disposal of used batteries \r\n(Harper et  al. 2019). Post-LIB chemistries include metal sulphur, \r\nmetal-air, metal ion (besides lithium) and all-solid-state batteries."


id: c2705eeaadf4adf899b0fc6be89dec7f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28176
content:
"Thermal energy storage (TES). TES refers to a  range of \r\ntechnologies exploiting the ability of materials to absorb and store \r\nheat or cold, either within the same phase (sensible TES), through \r\nphase changes (latent TES), or through reversible chemical reactions \r\n(thermochemical TES). Pumped Thermal Energy Storage (PTES), \r\na hybrid form of TES, is an air-driven electricity storage technology \r\nstoring both heat and cold in gravel beds, using a reversible heat\u0002pump system to maintain the temperature difference between the \r\ntwo beds and gas compression to generate and transfer heat (Regen \r\n2017). TES technologies can store both heat and cold energy for long \r\nperiods, for example, in underground water reservoirs for balancing \r\nbetween seasons (Dahash et al. 2019; Tian et al"


id: 613110e6c034b6c44bf0468a66aadb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12866
content:
" 2019), storing heat \r\nand cold to balance daily and seasonal temperatures in buildings and \r\nreducing heat build-up in applications generating excessive waste \r\nheat, such as data centres and underground operations."


id: 711b94fa38cdadfd3ef4ac9c5896df49
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15427
content:
"Hydrogen and reversible hydrogen fuel cells (H/RHFC). Hydrogen \r\nis a flexible fuel with diverse uses, capable of providing electricity, \r\nheat, and long-term energy storage for grids, industry, and transport, \r\nand has been widely used industrially for decades (Section 6.4.5.1). \r\nHydrogen can be produced in various ways and stored in significant \r\nquantities in geological formations at moderate pressures, often \r\nfor long periods, providing seasonal storage (Gabrielli et al. 2020). \r\nA core and emerging implementation of PtX is hydrogen production \r\nthrough electrolysers. Hydrogen is a carbon-free fuel holding three \r\ntimes the energy of an equivalent mass of gasoline but occupying \r\na larger volume. An electrolyser uses excess electricity to split water \r\ninto hydrogen and oxygen through the process of electrolysis. A fuel \r\ncell performs the reverse process of recombining hydrogen and \r\noxygen back into water, converting chemical energy into electricity \r\n(Elzinga et  al. 2014)"


id: f15c9fdcfdae66604a3ab00b2cba1b2f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35480
content:
" Reversible hydrogen fuel cells (RHFCs) can \r\nperform both functions in a single device, however, they are still in \r\nthe pre-commercial stage, due to prohibitive production costs."


id: b13d660c94d5583c78925deba0d4383
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25391
content:
"Hydrogen production. Low- or zero-carbon hydrogen can be \r\nproduced from multiple sources. While there is no consensus on \r\nthe hydrogen production spectrum, 'blue' hydrogen (Goldmann and \r\nDinkelacker 2018) generally refers to hydrogen produced from natural \r\ngas combined with CCS through processes such as steam methane \r\nreforming (SMR) (Sanusi and Mokheimer 2019) and advanced gas \r\nreforming (Zhou et  al. 2020). Low-carbon hydrogen could also be \r\nproduced from coal coupled with CCS (Hu et al. 2020) (Table 6.7). \r\nCurrent estimates are that adding CCS to produce hydrogen from \r\nSMR will add on average 50% on the capital cost, 10% to fuel, and \r\n100% to operating costs. For coal gasification, CCS will add 5% \r\nto the capital and fuel costs and 130% to operating costs (Staffell \r\net al. 2018; IEA 2019d). Further, biomass gasification could produce \r\nrenewable hydrogen, and when joined with CCS could provide \r\nnegative carbon emissions. 'Green' hydrogen (Jaszczur et al"


id: a6f5d69d743c87d2403cba84bad38471
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23780
content:
" 2016) \r\nis most often referred to as hydrogen produced from zero-carbon \r\nelectricity sources such as solar power and wind power (Schmidt et al. \r\n2017) (Table 6.8). Nuclear power could also provide clean hydrogen, \r\nvia electrolysis or thermochemical water splitting (EERE 2020). "


id: 29eb26f4aaa56622a367d72576876b5a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4028
content:
"Hydrogen is a  promising energy carrier for a  decarbonised world \r\n(Box 6.9). It can be utilised for electricity, heat, transport, industrial \r\ndemand, and energy storage (Abdin et  al. 2020). In low-carbon \r\nenergy systems, hydrogen is expected to be utilised in applications \r\nthat are not as amenable to electrification, such as a  fuel for \r\nheavy-duty road transport and shipping, or as a chemical feedstock \r\n(Schemme et  al. 2017; Griffiths et  al. 2021). Hydrogen could also \r\nprovide low-carbon heat for industrial processes or be utilised for \r\ndirect reduction of iron ore (Vogl et al. 2018). Hydrogen could replace \r\nnatural gas-based electricity generation (do Sacramento et al. 2013) \r\nin certain regions and support the integration of variable renewables \r\ninto electricity systems by providing a means of long-term electricity \r\nstorage"


id: 7845638b6c65e8e162d9b375a519ac53
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16488
content:
" Hydrogen-based carriers, such as ammonia and synthetic \r\nhydrocarbons, can likewise be used in energy-intensive industries \r\nand the transport sector (Schemme et  al. 2017; IRENA 2019b) \r\n(e.g.,  synthetic fuels for aviation). These hydrogen-based energy \r\ncarriers are easier to store than hydrogen. At present hydrogen has \r\nlimited applications - mainly being produced onsite for the creation \r\nof methanol and ammonia (IEA 2019c), as well as in refineries."


id: e6b5e259560c6807c39c6b60a9ea1fbd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33781
content:
"In general, challenges around hydrogen-based energy carriers  - \r\nincluding safety issues around flammability, toxicity, storage, and \r\nconsumption - require new devices and techniques to facilitate their \r\nlarge-scale use. Relatively high capital costs and large electricity \r\nrequirements are also challenges for technologies that produce \r\nhydrogen energy carriers. Yet, these energy carriers could become \r\neconomically viable through the availability of low-cost electricity \r\ngeneration and excess of renewable energy production (Daiyan et al. \r\n2020). A key challenge in use of ammonia is related to the significant \r\namount of NOx emissions, which is released from nitrogen and \r\noxygen combustion, and unburned ammonia. Both have substantial \r\nair pollution risks, which can result in lung and other injuries, and \r\ncan reduce visibility (EPA 2001). Due to the low flammability of \r\nhydrogen energy carriers such as liquefied hydrogen (Nilsson et al. \r\n2016) and ammonia (Li et al"


id: 2f832922490e0bf41af80984d77f11ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4895
content:
" 2018), a stable combustion (Lamas and \r\nRodriguez 2019; Zengel et al. 2020) in the existing gas turbines is not \r\ncurrently feasible. In recent developments, however, the proportion of \r\nhydrogen in gas turbines has been successfully increased, and further \r\ndevelopment of gas turbines may enable them to operate on 100% \r\nhydrogen by 2030 (Pflug et al. 2019)."


id: d39c64696bf9e7d6c55940e094f5b25b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30818
content:
"Hydrogen energy carriers. Hydrogen can be both an energy \r\ncarrier itself, be converted further into other energy carriers (such \r\nas synthetic fuels) and be a  means of transporting other sources \r\nof energy. For example, hydrogen could be transported in its native \r\ngaseous form or liquefied. Hydrogen can also be combined with \r\ncarbon and transported as a synthetic hydrocarbons (Gumber and \r\nGurumoorthy 2018) (IRENA 2019d) as well as be transported via \r\nliquid organic hydrogen carriers (LOHCs) or ammonia (IRENA \r\n2019d). For synthetic hydrocarbons such as methane or methanol \r\nto be considered zero carbon, the CO2 used to produce them would \r\nneed to come from the atmosphere either directly through DACCS \r\nor indirectly through BECCS (IRENA 2019b). LOHCs are organic \r\nsubstances in liquid or semi-solid states, which store hydrogen \r\nbased on reversible catalytic hydrogenation and de-hydrogenation \r\nof carbon double bounds (Niermann et  al. 2019; Rao and Yoon \r\n2020)"


id: ce1c820f29c2e32180b484eceeea656d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29941
content:
" Hydrogen produced from electrolysis could also be seen as \r\nan electricity energy carrier. This is an example of the PtX processes \r\n(Section 6.4.4), entailing the conversion of electricity to other energy \r\ncarriers for subsequent use."


id: 119683e38f5bd325c2d4597fc6b88256
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 257
content:
"Ammonia is a  promising cost-effective hydrogen carrier (Creutzig \r\net  al. 2019). Onsite generation of hydrogen for the production of \r\nammonia already occurs today, and the ammonia (NH3) could be \r\nsubsequently 'cracked' (with a  15-25% energy loss) to reproduce \r\nhydrogen (Hansgen et  al. 2010; Montoya et  al. 2015; Bell and \r\nTorrente-Murciano 2016). Because the energy density of ammonia \r\nis 38% higher than liquid hydrogen (Osman and Sgouridis 2018), it \r\nis potentially a  suitable energy carrier for long-distance transport \r\nand storage (Salmon et  al. 2021). Moreover, ammonia is more \r\neasily condensable (liquefied at 0.8 MPa, 20degC), which provides \r\neconomically viable hydrogen storage and supply systems. \r\nAmmonia production and transport are also established industrial \r\nprocesses (about 180 MMT yr -1) (Valera-Medina et  al. 2017), and \r\nhence ammonia is considered to be a  scalable and cost-effective \r\nhydrogen-based energy carrier"


id: 878ce4eafa255cdae71d9624dd1a057c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18859
content:
" At present, most ammonia is used \r\nin fertilisers (about 80%), followed by many industrial processes, \r\nsuch as the manufacturing of mining explosives and petrochemicals \r\n(Jiao and Xu 2018). In contrast to hydrogen, ammonia can be used \r\ndirectly as a fuel without any phase change for internal combustion \r\nengines, gas turbines, and industrial furnaces (Kobayashi et al. 2019). \r\nAmmonia can also be used in low- and high-temperature fuel cells \r\n(Lan and Tao 2014), whereby both electricity and hydrogen can be \r\nproduced without any nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions. Furthermore, \r\nammonia provides the flexibility to be dehydrogenated for hydrogen\u0002use purposes. Ammonia is considered a  carbon-free sustainable \r\nfuel for electricity generation, since in a complete combustion, only \r\nwater and nitrogen are produced (Valera-Medina et al. 2017). Like \r\nhydrogen, ammonia could facilitate management of VRE, due to its \r\ncost-effective grid-scale energy storage capabilities"


id: a7f51fa9c0094a2bdc65624e66417e39
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23938
content:
"Hydrogen can be liquefied and transported at volume over the ocean \r\nwithout pressurisation. This requires a temperature of -253degC and is \r\ntherefore energy-intensive and costly (Niermann et al. 2021). Once \r\nit reaches its destination, the hydrogen needs to be re-gasified, \r\nadding further cost. A demonstration project is under development \r\nexporting liquid hydrogen from Australia to Japan (Yamashita et al. \r\n2019). Hydrogen could also be transported as ammonia by ocean in \r\nliquid form. Ammonia is advantageous because it is easier to store \r\nthan hydrogen (Zamfirescu and Dincer 2008; Soloveichik 2016; Nam \r\net al. 2018). Liquid ammonia requires temperatures below -33degC and \r\nis therefore more straightforward and less costly to transport than \r\nliquefied hydrogen and even liquefied natural gas (Singh and Sahu \r\n2018). A project exporting ammonia from Saudi Arabia to Japan is \r\nunder consideration (Nagashima 2018)"


id: 9d4fa1bfb66fdb57e5421486684a5dcf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22276
content:
" LOHCs could also be used \r\nto transport hydrogen at ambient temperature and pressure. This \r\nadvantageous property of LOHCs makes them similar to oil products, \r\nmeaning they can be transported in existing oil infrastructure \r\nincluding oil tankers and tanks (IEA 2019; Niermann et  al. 2019). \r\nA project is under development to export hydrogen from Brunei to \r\nJapan using LOHCs (Kurosaki 2018)."


id: 5445ec0e2cb8af0e8fd8c10cc008d19c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10719
content:
"Given the significant geographical variations in the efficiency of \r\nrenewable resources across different regions and continents, electricity \r\ntransmission could facilitate cost-effective deployment of renewable \r\ngeneration, enhance resilience and security of supply, and increase \r\noperational efficiency (high confidence). The diurnal and  seasonal \r\ncharacteristics of different renewable energy sources such as wind, \r\nsolar, and hydropower can vary significantly by location. Through \r\nenhanced electricity transmission infrastructure, more wind turbines \r\ncan be deployed in areas with high wind potential and more solar \r\npanels in areas with larger solar irradiation. Increases in electricity \r\ntransmission and trade can also enhance operational efficiency and \r\nreduce or defer the need for investment in peaking plants, storage, or \r\nother load management techniques needed to meet security of supply \r\nrequirements associated with localised use of VRE sources"


id: 7d8eac31142695ff7441b6ea0a4c8138
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17330
content:
" Increased \r\ninterconnectivity of large-scale grids also allows the aggregation of \r\n'smart grid' solutions such as flexible heating and cooling devices \r\nfor flexible demand in industrial, commercial, and domestic sectors \r\n(Hakimi et al. 2020) and EVs (Muratori and Mai 2020; Li et al. 2021). \r\nIn general, interconnection is more cost-optimal for countries that are \r\ngeographically close to each other and can benefit from the diversity \r\nof their energy mixes and usage (Schlachtberger et al. 2017). Such \r\ndevelopments are not without price, however, and among other \r\nconcerns, raise issues surrounding land use, public acceptance, \r\nand resource acquisition for materials necessary for renewable \r\ndevelopments (Capellan-Perez et al. 2017; Vakulchuk et al. 2020)."


id: 97553944d4d1615549c7e2fb40d72863
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21333
content:
"Figure 6.18 | Range of LCOE (in USD kWh-1) from recent studies for different electricity-generating technologies circa 2020 and in the future between \r\n2020-2040. LCOEs are primarily taken from recent studies, because the costs of some technologies are changing rapidly. To make the figure more tractable across the studies, \r\nwe highlight the data from IEA WEO 2020 STEPS scenario in yellow (IEA 2020), the EIA AEO 2021 in light blue (EIA 2021), NREL ATB 2021 in brown, (NREL 2021), and \r\nIRENA's 2020 Renewable Power Generation Costs in dark blue (IRENA 2021). All other studies are shown in light grey markers. Marker shapes identify the regions included in \r\nthe studies. Studies that included several regions are labelled as global. Only sources that provided LCOEs are included. Ranges for studies frequently reflect variations among \r\nregional estimates"


id: e1a42769b6e02319c52ed09f14a0df72
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32992
content:
" Studies that are shown as a mid-point and a solid line represent studies that reported either a median or an average, and that had either a confidence \r\ninterval or a minimum and a maximum reported. Dashed lines with markers at the end represent the range of values reported in studies that had several point estimates for \r\neither different regions or used different assumptions. All estimates were converted to USD2020. The publication year was used if no USD year was provided. Some studies \r\nincluded transmissions costs, and some of the CCS studies included storage and sequestration costs, while others did not. Vertical axis is capped at USD2020 0.30 kWh-1, but \r\nsome estimates for hydro, geothermal, natural gas and bioelectricity were higher than 0.30. The grey horizontal band denotes the range of fossil fuel electricity LCOEs circa 2020."


id: 33bb879ccfd232b528a4f8ea01e55b27
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5556
content:
"The literature provides multiple LCOE estimates for mitigation options \r\ntoday and in the future (see Table  6.9 for electricity  generation \r\noptions). LCOE ranges for low- and zero-carbon electricity technologies \r\noverlap with LCOE's of fossil generation without CCS. For example, \r\nLCOEs for utility solar and wind today and in the future overlap with \r\nthose of new coal and gas without CCS (IEA WEO 2020; Lazard, 2020; \r\nNREL 2021) (Figure 6.18). Some of the overlap stems from differences \r\nin assumptions or regional conditions that apply to all technologies \r\n(e.g.,  variations in assumed discount rates), but the overlap also \r\nreflects the fact that low- and zero-carbon electricity generation \r\noptions are, and will be, less expensive than emitting options in \r\nmany regions"


id: 54d2ce442cce07c87ad8670db1b27ec9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10798
content:
" Future cost projections also illustrate that several \r\ntechnologies are anticipated to experience further cost declines over \r\nthe coming decades, reinforcing the increasingly competitiveness of \r\nlow- and zero-carbon electricity. For example, IEA's LCOEs estimates \r\nfor offshore wind halve between 2020 and 2040 in several regions \r\n(IEA WEO 2020)."


id: e70e197255bda63d0428f8f26991f192
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33847
content:
"(IHA 2019). In general, increased precipitation will increase water \r\navailability and hydropower production. Increased precipitation \r\nintensity, however, may impact on the integrity of dam structures \r\nand affect power production by increasing debris accumulation and \r\nvegetation growth. Additionally, increased precipitation intensity \r\nresults in the silting of the reservoirs or increases the amount of \r\nwater spilt, resulting in erosion (Schaeffer et  al. 2012; IHA 2019). \r\nClimate change will likely lead to higher air temperatures, resulting \r\nin more surface evaporation, less water storage, and loss of \r\nequipment efficiency (Ebinger and Vergara 2011; Mukheibir 2013; \r\nFluixa-Sanmartin et  al. 2018; Hock et  al. 2019). Climate change \r\nmay alter the demands for water use by other sectors that often \r\nrely on stored water in multi-purpose reservoirs, and may therefore \r\ngenerate conflicts over water use"


id: 31f531b1155b4778d56ec8d4caff3185
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5273
content:
" The increased need for water \r\nfor irrigation and/or industry can affect the availability of water for \r\nhydropower generation (Spalding-Fecher et  al. 2016; Solaun and \r\nCerda 2017). Higher temperatures increase glacier melt, increasing \r\nwater availability for hydropower while the glaciers exist. Changes \r\nin the timing of snow and ice melt may require upgrading in storage \r\ncapacity and adaptation of the hydropower plant management for \r\nfully exploiting the increase in water availability."


id: 1cf4fc6fb32bd29eb97c502b63d4428a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2006
content:
"Regional changes in hydropower are estimated from 5-20% \r\nincreases for most areas in high latitudes (van Vliet et  al. 2016b; \r\nTurner et al. 2017) to decreases of 5-20% in areas with increased \r\ndrought conditions (Cronin et al. 2018). Models show a consistent \r\nincrease in streamflow and hydropower production by 2080 in \r\nhigh latitudes of the northern hemisphere and parts of the tropics \r\n(Figure 6.20) (e.g., central Africa and southern Asia) while decreasing \r\nin the USA, southern and central Europe, Southeast Asia and southern \r\nSouth America, Africa and Australia (van Vliet et  al. 2016c,a). \r\nDecreases in hydropower production are indicated for parts of North \r\nAmerica, central and southern Europe, the Middle East, central Asia \r\nand Southern South America. Studies disagree on the changes in \r\nhydropower production in China, central South America, and partially \r\nin southern Africa (Hamududu and Killingtveit 2012; van Vliet et al. \r\n2016b; Solaun and Cerda 2019; Fan et al"


id: ef2041f2a0842e670f5a20268149c570
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35091
content:
"Future wind generation in Europe could decrease in summer and \r\nautumn, increasing in winter in northern-central Europe but decreasing \r\nin southernmost Europe (Carvalho et al. 2017). Towards 2100, intra\u0002annual variations increase in most of Europe, except around the \r\nMediterranean area (Reyers et al. 2016), but this may reflect natural \r\nmulti-decadal variability (Wohland et  al. 2019b). Wind speeds may \r\nbecome more homogeneous over large geographical regions in \r\nEurope due to climate change, increasing the likelihood of large areas \r\nexperiencing high or low wind speeds simultaneously (Wohland et al. \r\n2017). These changes could result in fewer benefits in the transmission \r\nof wind generation between countries and increased system integration \r\ncosts. Europe could require a modest increase (up to 7%) in backup \r\nenergy towards the end of the 21st century due to more homogeneous \r\nwind conditions over Europe (Wohland et al. 2017; Weber et al. 2018)"


id: e7c3e34dd5dadb766a7ef08d690f3886
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33962
content:
" \r\nHowever, other studies report that the impact of climate change is \r\nsubstantially smaller than interannual variability, with no significant \r\nimpact on the occurrence of extreme low wind production events \r\nin Europe (Van Der Wiel et al. 2019). If European electricity systems \r\nare designed to manage the effects of existing weather variability on \r\nwind power, they can likely also cope with climate change impacts \r\non wind power (Ravestein et al. 2018). Changes in wind-generation \r\nvariability caused by climate change are also reported for North \r\nAmerica (Haupt et al. 2016; Losada Carreno et al. 2018), with modest \r\nimpacts on electricity system operation (Craig et al. 2019)."


id: 274916b74088cb3a3998fb2c748f715f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3582
content:
"changes on solar insolation due to variations in water vapour and \r\nclouds in most regions. Also, future PV technologies will likely \r\nhave higher efficiency, which would offset temperature-related \r\ndeclines (Muller et  al. 2019). Cloud cover is projected to decrease \r\nin the subtropics (around -0.05% per year), including parts of North \r\nAmerica, vast parts of Europe and China, South America, South \r\nAfrica and Australia (medium agreement, medium evidence). Thus, \r\nmodels project modest (<3%) increases in solar PV by the end of \r\nthe century for southern Europe, northern and southern Africa, \r\nCentral America, and the Caribbean (Emodi et al. 2019). There are \r\nseveral studies projecting decreasing solar production, but these \r\nare generally influenced by other factors, for example, increasing air \r\npollution (Ruosteenoja et al. 2019). The multi-model means for solar \r\ninsolation in regional models decrease 0.60 W m-2 per decade from \r\n2006 to 2100 over most of Europe (Bartok et al"


id: 5ba38bd5a9ff7e66099d38515abf2c93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11925
content:
"The operation of thermal power plants will be affected by climate \r\nchange, deriving from changes in the ambient conditions like \r\ntemperature, humidity and water availability (Schaeffer et al. 2012) \r\n(high confidence). Changes in ambient temperature have relatively \r\nsmall impacts on coal-fired and nuclear power plants (Rankine \r\ncycle); however, gas-fired power plants (Brayton or combined-cycle) \r\nmay have their thermal efficiency and power output significantly \r\ndecreased (De Sa and Al Zubaidy 2011; Schaeffer et  al. 2012). \r\nDroughts decrease potential cooling water for thermal power plants \r\nand increase the probability of water outlet temperatures exceeding \r\nregulatory limits, leading to lower production or shutdowns. Thermal \r\npower utilisation has been reported to be, on average, 3.8% lower \r\nduring drought years globally (van Vliet et  al. 2016c), and further \r\nsignificant decreases in available thermal power plant capacity due \r\nto climate change are projected (Koch et  al"


id: 9de3c47ff81052f800593d49b9e1d267
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 22360
content:
" 2014; van Vliet et  al. \r\n2016b; Yalew et  al. 2020). An increase in climate-related nuclear \r\npower disruptions has been reported in the past decades globally \r\n(Ahmad 2021)."


id: ff53c023ff1666c92bb3a8a3951e55e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 37720
content:
"Older thermal power plants can be retrofitted to mitigate climate \r\nimpacts by altering and redesigning the cooling systems (Westlen \r\n2018), although the costs for these solutions may be high. For example, \r\ndry cooling may be used instead of once-through cooling; however, \r\nit lowers thermal efficiency and would leave plants vulnerable to \r\nambient temperature increase (Ahmad 2021). Closed-circuit cooling \r\nis much less sensitive to water temperature than once-through \r\ncooling (Bonjean Stanton et  al. 2016). Modifying policies and \r\nregulation of water and heat emissions from power plants may also \r\nbe used to mitigate plant reliability problems induced by climate \r\nchange (Eisenack 2016; Mu et al. 2020), albeit with potential impacts \r\nfor other water users and ecology"


id: ae02f6d43b8353ec46116a90b9b2aa15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24913
content:
" Improvements in water use and \r\nthermal efficiencies and the use of transmission capabilities over \r\nlarge geographical regions to mitigate risks on individual plants are \r\nalso possible mitigation options (Miara et al. 2017)."


id: d80651a60fb4b0fd05716851a2d8eda6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31516
content:
"While many studies have focused on energy consumption, climate \r\nextremes are expected to alter peak energy demands, with the \r\npotential for blackouts, brownouts, and other short-term energy system \r\nimpacts (Yalew et al. 2020). For example, peak energy demand during \r\nheatwaves can coincide with reduced transmission and distribution \r\ncapacity at higher temperatures. In large cities, extreme heat events \r\nincrease cooling degree days significantly, with the urban heat island \r\neffect compounding the impact (Morakinyo et  al. 2019). One study \r\nfound that total electricity consumption at the end of the century in the \r\nUSA could increase on average by 20% during summer months and \r\ndecrease on average by 6% in the winter (Ralston Fonseca et al. 2019). \r\nWhile the average increase in consumption is modest, climate change \r\nis projected to have severe impacts on the frequency and intensity of \r\npeak electricity loads (Auffhammer et al. 2017). Bartos et al"


id: bf919de85c14c28f206c18da511162ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27699
content:
" (2016) find \r\nthat peak per-capita summertime load in the USA may rise by 4.2-15% \r\nby mid-century. Efficient cooling technologies and other demand-side \r\nmeasures can limit cooling energy loads during periods of particularly \r\nhigh demand (IEA 2018; Dreyfus et al. 2020)."


id: 8b9c4f65014df69cd1dfda73706d05ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 19481
content:
"But some aspects of low-carbon energy systems will make them more resilient. Wind and solar farms are often spread geographically, \r\nwhich reduces the chances of being affected by the same extreme weather event (Perera et al. 2020). The diversification of energy \r\nsources, in which each component has different vulnerabilities, increases resilience. Less reliance on thermal electricity generation \r\ntechnologies will reduce the risks of curtailment or efficiency losses from droughts and heat waves (Lohrmann et  al. 2019). \r\nMore generally, increased electricity system integration and flexibility (Section 6.4.3) and weatherisation of generators increases \r\nelectricity system resilience (Busby et al. 2021; Heffron et al. 2021). Likewise, local district micro-grids with appropriate enabling \r\ntechnologies (e.g"


id: 6599ff235200fa141c9a359da46ecba1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13560
content:
", distributed generation, energy storage, greater demand-side participation, electric vehicles) may ensure access \r\nto electricity during major long-duration power outage events and radically enhance the resilience of supply of essential demand \r\n(Stout et al. 2019)."


id: a7982c66c523f208d065365260fe968b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23875
content:
"Solar energy. Observations and model simulations have addressed whether large-scale solar PV power plants can alter the local \r\nand regional climate. In rural areas at the local scale, large-scale solar PV farms change the surface characteristics and affect air \r\ntemperatures (Taha 2013). Measurements in rural Arizona, USA show local night-time temperatures 3degC-4degC warmer at the PV \r\nfarm than surroundings (Barron-Gafford et al. 2016). In contrast, measurements in urban settings show that solar PV panels on \r\nroofs provide a cooling effect (Taha 2013; Ma et al. 2017). On the regional scale, modelling studies suggest cooling in urban areas \r\n(0.11-0.53degC) and warming in rural areas (up to 0.27degC) (Millstein and Menon 2011). Global climate model simulations show that \r\nsolar panels induce regional cooling by converting part of the incoming solar energy to electricity (Hu et al. 2016)"


id: da935047841056202c4e7ccf4adca68d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31915
content:
" However, converting \r\nthe generated electricity to heat in urban areas increases regional and local temperatures, compensating for the cooling effect."


id: fd0235f6de4d10e7cb7ec3a2c6bdcb9d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37322
content:
"Precisely describing a  net-zero energy system is complicated by the \r\nfact that different scenarios attribute different future CO2 emissions \r\nto the energy system, even under scenarios where economy-wide CO2\r\nemissions reach net zero. It is also complicated by the dependence \r\nof energy system configurations on unknown future conditions such \r\nas population and economic growth, and technological change. The \r\nenergy system is not the only source or sink of CO2 emissions. Terrestrial \r\nsystems may store or emit carbon, and CDR options like BECCS or \r\nDACCS can be used to store CO2, relieving pressure on the energy \r\nsystem (Chapter 3). The location of such CDR options is ambiguous, as it \r\nmight be deployed within or outside of the energy sector (Figure 6.21), \r\nand many CDR options, such as DACCS, would be important energy \r\nconsumers (Bistline and Blanford 2021a) (Section  6.6.2). If CDR \r\nmethods are deployed outside of the energy system (e.g"


id: c28816eec890948663769cb4d42e0f20
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28198
content:
", net negative \r\nagriculture, forestry, and land-use CO2 emissions), it is possible for the \r\nenergy system to still emit CO2 but have economy-wide emissions of \r\nzero or below. When global energy and industrial CO2 emissions reach \r\nnet zero, the space remaining for fossil energy emissions is determined \r\nby deployment of CDR options (Figure 6.21)."


id: eebde53212f44445d0734f68ff3d1eb6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35035
content:
"The literature on the configuration of net-zero energy systems is \r\nlimited in a few respects. On the one hand, there is a robust integrated \r\nassessment literature that provides characterisations of these systems \r\nin broad strokes (the AR6 database), offering internally consistent \r\nglobal scenarios to link global warming targets to regional/national \r\ngoals. All integrated assessment scenarios that discuss net-zero \r\nenergy system CO2 emissions provide high-level characterisations of \r\nnet-zero systems. Because these characterisations have less temporal, \r\nspatial, technological, regulatory, and societal detail, however, they \r\nmay not consider the complexities that could ultimately influence \r\nregional, national, or local pathways. High-fidelity models and \r\nanalyses are needed to assess the economic and environmental \r\ncharacteristics and the feasibility of many aspects of net-zero or \r\nnet-negative emissions energy systems (high confidence) (Blanford \r\net al"


id: 148427f5e26ea50624483ffcf360846c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" 2018; Bistline and Blanford 2020). For example, evaluating the \r\ncompetitiveness of electricity sector technologies requires temporal, \r\nspatial, and technological detail to accurately represent system \r\ninvestments and operations (Collins et al. 2017; Santen et al. 2017; \r\nHelistoe et al. 2019; Bistline 2021c; Victoria et al. 2021)."


id: ef9d910386f324505b3e6ca6af9f5926
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35199
content:
"Net-zero energy systems will use far less fossil fuel than today (high \r\nconfidence). The precise quantity of fossil fuels will largely depend \r\non the relative costs of such fuels, electrification, alternative fuels, \r\nand CDR (Section 6.6.2.4) in the energy system (high confidence). All \r\nof these are affected by regional differences in resources (McGlade \r\nand Ekins 2015), existing energy infrastructure (Tong et  al. 2019), \r\ndemand for energy services, and climate and energy policies. Fossil \r\nfuel use may persist, for example, if and where the costs of such \r\nfuels and the compensating carbon management (e.g.,  CDR, CCS) \r\nare less than non-fossil energy. For most applications, however, it is \r\nlikely that electrification (McCollum et al. 2014; Madeddu et al. 2020; \r\nZhang and Fujimori 2020) or use of non-fossil alternative fuels (Zeman \r\nand Keith 2008; Graves et al. 2011; Hanggi et al. 2019; Ueckerdt et al. \r\n2021) will prove to be the cheapest options"


id: 36f86b5774f21a9a4694ed77b3a097d1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6039
content:
" Most residual demand \r\nfor fossil fuels is likely to predominantly be petroleum and natural \r\ngas given their high energy density (Davis et al. 2018), while demand \r\nfor coal in net-zero energy systems is likely to be very low (Luderer \r\net al. 2018; Jakob et al. 2020, Section 6.7.4) (high confidence)."


id: da928eafc925772d28f38bc5677ccc0b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Figure 6.22 (continued): Characteristics of global net-zero energy systems when global energy and industrial CO2 emissions reach net-zero. Scenarios \r\nreaching net-zero emissions show differences in residual emissions and carbon removal (a), energy resources (b), electrification (c), energy intensity (as measured here by \r\nenergy GDP-1) (d), and emissions trajectory (e), particularly with respect to warming levels (light blue = scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited \r\novershoot and scenarios that return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) after a high overshoot; yellow = scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) and scenarios that limit warming \r\nto 2degC (>50%); dark blue = scenarios that limit warming to 2.5degC (>50%), scenarios that limit warming to 3degC (>50%), scenarios that limit warming to 4degC (>50%), and \r\nscenarios that exceed warming of 4degC (>=50%); grey = unspecified warming)"


id: 92e47f64c2bc4944381b3c87bd34daf2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20623
content:
" Points represent individual scenarios from the AR6 Scenarios Database, with probability density \r\ndistributions shown along each axis for each warming level (colours corresponding to warming levels) and for all scenarios (black)."


id: f3064d6be6a7f26b714ff66771318f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35752
content:
"There are many possible configurations and technologies for zero- or net\u0002negative-emissions electricity systems (high confidence). These systems \r\ncould entail a  mix of variable renewables, dispatchable  renewables \r\n(e.g.,  biomass, hydropower), other firm, dispatchable ('on-demand') \r\nlow-carbon generation (e.g., nuclear, CCS-equipped capacity), energy \r\nstorage, transmission, carbon removal options (e.g., BECCS, DACCS), \r\nand demand management (Luderer et  al. 2017; Bistline et  al. 2018; \r\nJenkins et al. 2018b; Bistline and Blanford 2021b). The marginal cost of \r\ndeploying electricity sector mitigation options increases as electricity \r\nemissions approach zero; in addition, the most cost-effective mix of \r\nsystem resources changes as emissions approach zero and, therefore, \r\nso do the implications of electricity sector mitigation for sustainability \r\nand other societal goals (Mileva et  al. 2016; Bistline et  al. 2018; \r\nSepulveda et al. 2018; Jayadev et al. 2020; Cole et al"


id: 9c5ee4d2a8a63d3fe12a5aedb8ea0dbe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" 2021). Key factors \r\ninfluencing the electricity mix include relative costs and system benefits, \r\nlocal resource bases, infrastructure availability, regional integration \r\nand trade, co-benefits, societal preferences and other policy priorities, \r\nall of which vary by country and region (Section 6.6.4). Many of these \r\nfactors depend on when the net-zero point is reached (Figure 6.22)."


id: ba1b4b92b83edf5f5c59185275c99076
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26822
content:
"Energy storage will be increasingly important in net-zero energy \r\nsystems, especially in systems with shares of VRE (high confidence). \r\nDeployment of energy storage will vary based on the system benefits \r\nand values of different options (Arbabzadeh et al. 2019; Denholm and \r\nMai 2019). Diurnal storage options like lithium-ion batteries have \r\ndifferent value than storing and discharging electricity over longer \r\nperiods through long-duration energy storage with less frequent \r\ncycling, which require different technologies, supporting policies, \r\nand business models (Gallo et  al. 2016; Blanco and Faaij  2017; \r\nAlbertus  et  al. 2020; Dowling et  al. 2020; Sepulveda et  al. 2021) \r\n(Section 6.4.4). The value of energy storage varies with the level of \r\ndeployment and on the competitiveness of economic complements \r\nsuch as VRE options (Mileva et al. 2016; Bistline and Young 2020) and \r\nsubstitutes such as flexible demand (Brown et al. 2018; Merrick et al"


id: a2cce75c64f53a3ef66ef7fbdd043ec5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23182
content:
" \r\n2018), transmission (Schlachtberger et al. 2017; Brown et al. 2018; \r\nMerrick et  al. 2018; Bistline and Young 2019), trade (Bistline et  al. \r\n2020b), dispatchable generators (Hittinger and Lueken 2015; Gils \r\net al. 2017; Arbabzadeh et al. 2019), direct air capture (DAC) (Daggash \r\net al. 2019), and efficiencies in system operations (Tuohy et al. 2015)."


id: 53567fc74de62ddd8d5c4455d2498bc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10579
content:
"Based on their increasing economic competitiveness, VRE technologies, \r\nespecially wind and solar power, will likely comprise large shares of \r\nmany regional generation mixes (high confidence) (Figure  6.22). \r\nWhile wind and solar will likely be prominent electricity resources, \r\nthis does not imply that 100% renewable energy systems will be \r\npursued under all circumstances, since economic and operational \r\nchallenges increase nonlinearly as shares approach 100% (Box 6.8) \r\n(Frew et al. 2016; Imelda et al. 2018b; Shaner et al. 2018; Bistline and \r\nBlanford 2021a; Cole et  al. 2021). Real-world experience planning \r\nand operating regional electricity systems with high instantaneous \r\nand annual shares of renewable generation is accumulating, but \r\ndebates continue about how much wind and solar should be included \r\nin different systems, and the cost-effectiveness of mechanisms for \r\nmanaging variability (Box 6.8)"


id: 817cc5a7b59add360e8b7ea832abf8b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"It is technically feasible to use very high renewable shares (e.g., above 75% of annual regional generation) to meet hourly electricity \r\ndemand under a range of conditions, especially when VRE options, notably wind and solar, are complemented by other resources (high \r\nconfidence). There are currently many grids with high renewable shares and large anticipated roles for VRE sources, in particular wind \r\nand solar (Section 6.4), in future low-carbon electricity systems. An increasingly large set of studies examines the feasibility of high \r\nrenewable penetration and economic drivers under different policy, technology, and market scenarios (Cochran et al. 2014; Deason \r\n2018; Jenkins et al. 2018b; Bistline et al. 2019; Hansen et al. 2019; Dowling et al. 2020; Blanford et al. 2021; Denholm et al. 2021)"


id: 508d403f8c07c905b35e1fe42b9494ba
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" \r\nHigh wind and solar penetration involves technical and economic challenges due to their unique characteristics such as spatial and \r\ntemporal variability, short- and long-term uncertainty, and non-synchronous generation (Cole et al. 2017). These challenges become \r\nincreasingly important as renewable shares approach 100% (Sections 6.6.2.2 and 6.4.3)."


id: 6b5cfc025991a7d9b092569eddc0080e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14509
content:
"Energy systems that are 100% renewable (including all parts of the energy sector, and not only electricity generation) raise a range \r\nof technological, regulatory, market, and operational challenges that make their competitiveness uncertain (high confidence). \r\nThese systems require decarbonising all electricity, using this zero-carbon electricity broadly, and then utilising zero-carbon energy \r\ncarriers for all end uses not served by electricity, for example, air travel, long-distance transport, and high-temperature process heat. \r\nBroader questions emerge regarding the attractiveness of supplying all energy, and not just electricity, with renewables (Figure 6.22). \r\nIntegrated assessment and energy systems research suggest large roles for renewables, but energy and electricity shares are far from \r\n100%, even with stringent emissions reductions targets and optimistic assumptions about future cost reductions (Bauer et al. 2018; \r\nBistline et al. 2018; Jenkins et al"


id: 1be53fce5116bb3a48340ee5ce5d86bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1852
content:
" 2018b; Huntington et al. 2020) (Section 6.7.1). Scenarios with 100% renewable energy systems \r\nare an emerging subset in the decarbonisation literature, especially at regional levels (Hansen et al. 2019; Denholm et al. 2021). \r\nMany 100% renewables studies focus more heavily on electrification for decarbonising end uses, and include less biofuels and \r\nhydrogen than the broader literature on deep decarbonisation (Bauer et al. 2018a). These studies typically assume a constrained set of \r\navailable technologies to demonstrate the technical feasibility of very high renewable systems and do not optimise to find least-cost, \r\ntechnology-neutral decarbonisation pathways, and many 100% renewables studies focus on the electricity sector or a limited number \r\nof sectors (Jenkins et al. 2018a; Hansen et al. 2019)"


id: d642d3c1d33de5eec048548342431b00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31223
content:
" In addition to renewables, studies broadly agree that including additional low\u0002carbon options - including not only low-carbon electricity but also targeted use of fossil fuels with and without CCS (Section 6.6.2.1) \r\nand alternative fuels for sectors that are difficult to electrify (Section 6.6.2.4) - can lower the cost of decarbonisation, even with very \r\nhigh shares of renewables (Figure 6.22). However, there is disagreement about the magnitude of cost savings from larger portfolios, \r\nwhich depend on context- and scenario-specific assumptions about technologies, markets, and policies."


id: 5c0d3df462108619718f581051286791
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11990
content:
"Net-zero energy systems will rely more heavily on increased use of \r\nelectricity (electrification) in end uses (high confidence). The literature \r\non net-zero energy systems almost universally calls for increased \r\nelectrification (Sugiyama 2012; Williams et  al. 2012; Kriegler et  al. \r\n2014a; Williams et  al. 2014; Rogelj et  al. 2015a; Sachs et  al. 2016; \r\nLuderer et al. 2018; Sven et al. 2018; Schreyer et al. 2020). At least \r\n30% of the global final energy needs are expected to be served by \r\nelectricity, with some estimates suggesting upwards of 80% of \r\ntotal energy use being electrified (Figure  6.22, panel c). Increased \r\nelectrification is especially valuable in net-zero energy systems in \r\ntandem with decarbonised electricity generation or net-negative \r\nemissions electricity generation (Section 6.5.4.2)"


id: 5de60809da9c47277e0702b9216fb9ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12308
content:
" Flexible electric loads \r\n(electric vehicles, smart appliances) can in turn facilitate incorporation \r\nof VRE electricity options, increase system flexibility, and reduce needs \r\nfor grid storage (Section 6.4.3) (Mathiesen et al. 2015; Lund et al. 2018)."


id: 6735b4b0d91f53b53946ea5c702c6969
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13833
content:
"A significant share of transportation, especially road transportation, \r\nis expected to be electrified in net-zero energy systems (high \r\nconfidence). In road transportation, two- and three-wheelers, \r\nlight-duty vehicles (LDVs), and buses, are especially amenable to \r\nelectrification, with more than half of passenger LDVs expected to be \r\nelectrified globally in net-zero energy systems (medium confidence) \r\n(Fulton et al. 2015; Sven et al. 2018; Khalili et al. 2019; Bataille et al. \r\n2020). Long-haul trucks, large ships, and aircraft are expected to be \r\nharder to electrify without technological breakthroughs (Fulton et al. \r\n2015; Mathiesen et al. 2015), although continued improvements in \r\nbattery technology may enable electrification of long-haul trucks \r\n(Nykvist and Olsson 2021) (Chapter 10)"


id: 9da15a69860925e5020d9f8d105ee8a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22333
content:
" Due to the relative ease of \r\nrail electrification, near complete electrification of rail and a  shift \r\nof air and truck freight to rail is expected in net-zero energy systems \r\n(Fulton et al. 2015; Rockstrom et al. 2017; Sven et al. 2018; Khalili \r\net al. 2019). The degree of modal shifts and electrification will depend \r\non local factors such as infrastructure availability and location \r\naccessibility. Due to the challenges associated with electrification of \r\nsome transport modes, net-zero energy systems may include some \r\nresidual emissions associated with the freight sector that are offset \r\nthrough CDR technologies (Muratori et al. 2017b), or reliance on low \r\nand zero-carbon fuels instead of electrification."


id: a59e76e32dd2b6ae000a771e88b2a14f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23627
content:
"CO2 emissions from some energy services are expected to be particularly \r\ndifficult to cost-effectively avoid, among them: aviation; long-distance \r\nfreight by ships; process emissions from cement and steel production; \r\nhigh-temperature heat (e.g.,  >1000degC); and electricity reliability in \r\nsystems with high penetration of variable renewable energy sources \r\n(NAS) (Davis et al. 2018; Luderer et al. 2018; Sepulveda et al. 2018; \r\nChiaramonti 2019; Bataille 2020; Madeddu et al. 2020; Rissman et al. \r\n2020; Thiel and Stark 2021). The literature focused on these services and \r\nsectors is growing, but remains limited, and provides minimal guidance \r\non the most promising or attractive technological options and systems \r\nfor avoiding these sectors' emissions. Technological solutions do exist, \r\nbut those mentioned in the literature are prohibitively expensive, \r\nexist  only at an early stage, and/or are subject to much broader \r\nconcerns about sustainability (e.g., biofuels) (Davis et al"


id: d21f84bbc2e8f55eafe65381bef30657
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30586
content:
"Liquid biofuels today supply about 4% of transportation energy \r\nworldwide, mostly as ethanol from grain and sugar cane and biodiesel \r\nfrom oil seeds and waste oils (Davis et al. 2018). These biofuels could \r\nconceivably be targeted to difficult-to-electrify sectors, but face \r\nsubstantial challenges related to their lifecycle carbon emissions, \r\ncost, and further scalability (Tilman et  al. 2009; Staples et  al. 2018), \r\n(Section 6.4.2)"


id: 893ae1b1f39a65869136bc74bd161d67
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19130
content:
" The extent to which biomass will supply liquid fuels or \r\nhigh temperature heat for industry in a future net-zero energy system will \r\nthus depend on advances in conversion technology that enable use of \r\nfeedstocks such as woody crops, agricultural residues, algae, and wastes, \r\nas well as competing demands for bioenergy and land, the feasibility \r\nof other sources of carbon-neutral fuels, and integration of bioenergy \r\nproduction with other objectives, including CDR, economic development, \r\nfood security, ecological conservation, and air quality (Fargione 2010; \r\nWilliams and Laurens 2010; Creutzig et al. 2015; Chatziaras et al. 2016; \r\nLaurens 2017; Lynd 2017; Bauer et  al. 2018a, b; Strefler et  al. 2018; \r\nMuratori et al. 2020b; Fennell et al. 2021) (Section 6.4.2.6)."


id: 68649b21e000c32f04780b3726e03186
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 14009
content:
"A non-trivial number of industry applications could be electrified as \r\na part of a net-zero energy system, but direct electrification of heavy \r\nindustry applications such as cement, primary steel manufacturing, \r\nand chemical feedstocks is expected to be challenging (medium \r\nconfidence) (Davis et al. 2018; Philibert 2019; Madeddu et al. 2020; \r\nvan Sluisveld et  al. 2021). Process and boiler heating in industrial \r\nfacilities are anticipated to be electrified in net-zero energy systems. \r\nEmissions intensity reductions for cement and concrete production \r\ncan be achieved through the use of electrified cement kilns, while \r\nemissions associated with steel production can be reduced through \r\nthe use of an electric arc furnace (EAF) powered by decarbonised \r\nelectricity (Rissman et  al. 2020). Electricity can also be used to \r\nreplace thermal heat such as resistive heating, EAFs, and laser \r\nsintering (Madeddu et  al. 2020; Rissman et  al. 2020)"


id: 6168ee43e4d418f5bac2b13e8c22b640
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12896
content:
" One study \r\nfound that as much as 60% of the energy end-use in European \r\nindustry could be met with direct electrification using existing and \r\nemerging technologies (Madeddu et al. 2020). Industry electrification \r\nfor different regions will depend on the economics and availability \r\nof alternative emissions mitigation strategies such as carbon neutral \r\nfuels and CCS (Davis et al. 2018; Madeddu et al. 2020)."


id: 7f21a835b97235a158105a8fb72005d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17551
content:
"The phrase 'hydrogen economy' is often used to describe future energy systems in which hydrogen plays a prominent role. These \r\nfuture energy systems would not use hydrogen for all end uses; they would use hydrogen to complement other energy carriers, mainly \r\nelectricity, where hydrogen might have advantages. Hydrogen could provide long-term electricity storage to support high-penetration \r\nof intermittent renewables and could enable trading and storage of electricity between different regions to overcome seasonal or \r\nproduction capability differences (Dowling et al. 2020; Sepulveda et al. 2021). It could also be used in lieu of natural gas for peaking \r\ngeneration, provide process heat for industrial needs, or be used in the metal sector via direct reduction of iron ore (Chapter 11). Clean \r\nhydrogen could be used as a feedstock in the production of various chemicals and synthetic hydrocarbons. Finally, hydrogen-based \r\nfuel cells could power vehicles"


id: 7ae4daa3707d79f0747d5884cd9eb95f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16926
content:
" Recent advances in battery storage make electric vehicles the most attractive alternative for light-duty \r\ntransport. However, fuel cell technology could complement electric vehicles in supporting the decarbonisation of heavy-duty transport \r\nsegments (e.g., trucks, buses, ships, and trains) (Chapter 10)."


id: 2809b657e29c7bd2c0709993fe7c8112
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3707
content:
"However, the potential role of hydrogen in future energy systems depends on more than just production methods and costs. For \r\nsome applications, the competitiveness of hydrogen also depends on the availability of the infrastructure needed to transport and \r\ndeliver it at relevant scales (Lee et al. 2021). Transporting hydrogen through existing gas pipelines is generally not feasible without \r\nchanges to the infrastructure itself (Gumber and Gurumoorthy 2018; Muratori et al. 2018). Existing physical barriers, such as steel \r\nembrittlement and degradation of seals, reinforcements in compressor stations, and valves, require retrofitting during the conversion \r\nto H2 distribution or new dedicated pipelines to be constructed (Dohi et al. 2016). The capacity to leverage and convert existing \r\ngas infrastructure to transport hydrogen will vary regionally, but in many cases could be the most economically viable pathway \r\n(Cerniauskas et al. 2020; Brandle et al"


id: 6df5bd2d3557ccc3cc2eec47c51bde23
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14914
content:
" 2021; Brooks 2021; Wettengel 2021). Hydrogen could also be transported as liquid gas or as \r\nliquid organic hydrogen carriers such as ammonia, for which industry knowledge exists (Demir et al. 2018; Wulf et al. 2018; Hong et al. \r\n2021). Additionally, improvements in fuel cell technologies are needed to make hydrogen-based transport economically viable. There \r\nare also safety concerns associated with the flammability (Nilsson et al. 2017) and storage (Andersson and Gronkvist 2019; Caglayan \r\net al. 2019) of hydrogen which will need to be considered."


id: ea9fba5eaf1983177d49c1764d6194a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34421
content:
"A study (DeAngelo et  al. 2021) reviewed 153 integrated asset \r\nmanagement scenarios that attain net-zero energy sector CO2\r\nemissions and found that, under a scenario with net-zero emissions: \r\nglobal final energy per  capita lies between 21-109 GJ per  person \r\n(median: 57), in comparison to 2018 global final energy use of \r\n55  GJ per  person; many countries use far more energy per  capita \r\nthan today as their incomes increase; global final energy use \r\nper unit of economic output ranges from 0.7-2.2 EJ per trillion USD \r\n(median: 1.5), in comparison to 5 EJ per trillion USD in 2018; and \r\nthe median final energy consumption is 529 EJ. By comparison, final \r\nenergy consumption would be 550 EJ if current energy consumption \r\nper capita continued under a future population of 10 billion people"


id: d12c9f96335170634a205a409a36df4c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30448
content:
" \r\nAcross all scenarios, total final energy consumption is higher today \r\nthan in the year in which net-zero emissions are attained, and \r\nregionally, only the OECD+EU and Eurasia have lower median total \r\nfinal energy than in 2010."


id: 2cd8741c8d0673ca0f38fa625c970c05
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4491
content:
"Energy systems integration refers to connected planning and \r\noperations across energy carriers, including electricity, fuels, \r\nand  thermal resources. Coordinated planning could be important \r\nin lowering system costs, increasing reliability, minimising \r\nenvironmental impacts, and ensuring that costs of R&D and \r\ninfrastructure account for not just current needs but also for those \r\nof future energy systems (Section  6.4.3). Integration includes not \r\nonly the physical energy systems themselves but also simultaneous \r\nsocietal objectives (e.g., sustainable development goals), innovation \r\nprocesses (e.g.,  coordinating R&D to increase the likelihood of \r\nbeneficial technological spillovers), and other institutional and \r\ninfrastructural transformations (Sachs et  al. 2019)"


id: 79ecc92124934c6c92b7650dc53e2af4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16761
content:
" Given system \r\nvariability and differences in regional resources, there are economic \r\nand technical advantages to greater coordination of investments \r\nand policies across jurisdictions, sectors, and levels of government \r\n(Schmalensee and Stavins 2017). Coordinated planning and \r\noperations can improve system economics by sharing resources, \r\nincreasing the utilisation of capital-intensive assets, enhancing the \r\ngeographical diversity of resource bases, and smoothing demand. \r\nBut integration could require regulatory and market frameworks \r\nto facilitate and appropriate price signals to align incentives and to \r\ncoordinate investments and operations."


id: 69baf82b469c0ac84fdd5b95eb774c21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14232
content:
"Net-zero energy systems will be characterised by greater efficiency \r\nand more efficient use of energy across all sectors (high confidence). \r\nRoad transportation efficiency improvements will require a shift from \r\nliquid fuels (Chapters 5 and 10). Emissions reductions will come \r\nfrom a transition to electricity, hydrogen, or synthetic fuels produced \r\nwith low-carbon energy sources or processes. Vehicle automation, \r\nride-hailing services, online shopping with door delivery services, \r\nand new solutions like last mile delivery with drones may result in \r\nincreased service share. Lighter vehicles, a shift to public transit, and \r\nincorporation of two- and three-wheelers will be features of a net\u0002zero energy system (Chapter  10). Teleworking and automation of \r\nwork may provide reductions in driving needs"


id: ac48072f6370e05345a21140d100c095
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24643
content:
" Other sectors, such \r\nas air travel and marine transportation may rely on alternative fuels \r\nsuch as biofuels, synthetic fuels, ammonia, produced with zero carbon \r\nenergy source (Section 6.6.2.4)."


id: e343b85ad690effb90d1c5690874ef6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33246
content:
"sectoral coupling are increasingly relevant to ensure that net-zero \r\nenergy systems are reliable, resilient, and affordable (EPRI 2017; \r\nMartin et al. 2017; Buttler and Spliethoff 2018; O'Malley et al. 2020). \r\nDeep decarbonisation offers new opportunities and challenges for \r\nintegrating different sectors as well as supply- and demand-side \r\noptions. For instance, increasing electrification will change daily \r\nand seasonal load shapes, and end-use flexibilities and constraints \r\ncould impact the desirability of different supply-side technologies \r\n(Brown et al. 2018; EPRI 2019b). The feasibility of net-zero energy \r\nsystem configurations could depend on demonstrating cross-sector \r\nbenefits like balancing VRE sources in the electricity sector, and on \r\noffering the flexibility to produce multiple products"


id: 6385580c130a90b9e4612dc716d9fb4e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13227
content:
" For instance, \r\nlow-emissions synthetic fuels could help to bridge stationary and \r\nmobile applications, since fuel markets have more flexibility than \r\ninstantaneously balanced electricity markets due to the comparative \r\nease and cost of large-scale, long-term storage of chemical fuels \r\n(Davis et al. 2018)."


id: 8d299e636ec3a491779f30b9c193bd37
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19733
content:
"CDR covers a  broad set of methods and implementation options \r\n(Chapters 7 and 12). The two CDR methods most relevant to the energy \r\nsector are BECCS, which is used to produce energy carriers, and DACCS \r\nwhich is an energy user (Smith et al. 2016; Singh and Colosi 2021). \r\nBECCS has value as an electricity generation technology, providing \r\nfirm, dispatchable power to support electricity grids with large amounts \r\nof VRE sources, and reducing the reliance on other means to manage \r\nthese grids, including electricity storage (Mac Dowell et  al. 2017; \r\nBistline and Blanford 2021a). BECCS may also be used to produce \r\nliquid fuels or gaseous fuels, including hydrogen (Section  6.4.2.6) \r\n(Muratori et  al. 2020b). For instance, CO2 from bio-refineries could \r\nbe captured at <USD45 tCO2\r\n-1 (Sanchez et al. 2018)"


id: ada08526e454db359c94662c1374ad10
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24855
content:
" Similarly, while \r\nCO2 capture is expensive in the electricity sector, its integration with \r\nhydrogen via biomass gasification can be achieved at an incremental \r\ncapital cost of 3-35% (Muratori et al. 2020b) (Section 6.4). As with all \r\nuses of bioenergy, linkages to broad sustainability concerns may limit \r\nthe viable development, as will the presence of high-quality geologic \r\nsinks in close proximity (Melara et al. 2020)."


id: ba64deeaf83f59ac0bae887a5fc7382a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26857
content:
"There are few detailed archetypes of integrated energy systems that \r\nprovide services with zero- or net-negative CO2 emissions (such as \r\nJacobson et  al. 2019), so there is considerable uncertainty about \r\nintegration and interactions across parts of the system. Although \r\nalternate configurations, trade-offs, and pathways are still being \r\nidentified, common elements include fuels and processes like zero\u0002or negative-CO2 electricity generation and transmission, hydrogen \r\nproduction and transport, synthetic hydrocarbon production \r\nand transport, ammonia production and transport, and carbon \r\nmanagement, where linkages across pathways could include the use \r\nof electricity to produce hydrogen via electrolysis (Smith et al. 2016; \r\nMoore 2017; Davis et al. 2018; Jenkins et al. 2018b; Shih et al. 2018; \r\nvan Vuuren et al. 2018)"


id: 351de41c7fdeccce39b80f57883c42d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5765
content:
" Linked analytical frameworks are increasing \r\nbeing used to understand the potential role for system coupling with \r\ngreater temporal resolution, spatial resolution, and heterogeneity \r\nof consumer and firm decisions (Bohringer and Rutherford 2008; \r\nBistline and de la Chesnaye 2017; Collins et al. 2017; Gerboni et al. \r\n2017; Santen et al. 2017; Pye et al. 2021)."


id: 25e5600e7536f2789292e4a6028bf62c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3384
content:
"For example, one energy system characterised by differentiated \r\ninstitutional interactions is the USA, where delivery of liquid fuels \r\nis lightly regulated, while electricity delivery is closely regulated \r\n(Dworkin et  al. 2013)"


id: 4ca805da324517ff6e8c471e97a7af97
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9487
content:
"Societal preferences. Citizens in every country have preferences for \r\ncertain technological options or mitigation approaches over others \r\nthat will influence energy system choices. The public generally prefers \r\na  future energy system based largely on renewables. Preferences \r\nfor non-renewable energy differ across regions and groups. For \r\nexample, studies have found that people in the UK, Germany, the \r\nNetherlands, and Switzerland prefer renewable energy and personal \r\nenergy efficiency and savings to nuclear, fossil fuels and CCS (Jones \r\net al. 2012; Scheer et al. 2013; Demski et al. 2017; Bessette and Arvai \r\n2018; Steg 2018; Volken et al. 2018). Studies have found that people \r\nwith higher education levels, higher incomes, females, and liberals \r\nprefer renewables to fossil fuels and nuclear (Van Rijnsoever et al. \r\n2015; Bertsch et  al. 2016; Blumer et  al. 2018; Jobin et  al. 2019). \r\nThe  willingness to pay for renewable electricity differs by source \r\n(Ma et al"


id: 89de1d81ecd699701a91e536eebccdd5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19220
content:
"Warming cannot be limited to well below 2degC without rapid and \r\ndeep reductions in energy system GHG emissions (high confidence). \r\nEnergy sector CO2 emissions fall by 87-97% (interquartile range) \r\nby 2050 in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or \r\nlimited overshoot and 60-79% in scenarios limiting warming to 2degC \r\n(>67%) with action starting in 2020 (Figure 6.26). Energy sector GHG \r\nemissions fall by 85-95% (interquartile range) in scenarios limiting \r\nwarming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, and 62-78% \r\nin scenarios limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) with action starting in \r\n2020 (Figure 6.26). In 2030, in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) with no or limited overshoot, net CO2 and GHG emissions \r\nfall by 35-51% and 38-52% respectively. Key characteristics of \r\nemissions pathways  - the year of peak emissions, the year when \r\nnet emissions  reach zero, and the pace of emissions reductions  - \r\nvary widely across countries and regions"


id: afca113be691d4bab38eec40864f0634
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25176
content:
" These differences arise \r\nfrom differences in economic development, demographics, resource \r\nendowments, land use, and potential carbon sinks (Schaeffer, \r\net  al. 2020; Schreyer, et  al. 2020; van Soest, Heleen et  al. 2021) \r\n(Figure 6.27, Figure 6.28, Box 6.11). If countries do not move quickly "


id: a1a8d10d78da4ce5bdef339ead067268
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22992
content:
"Without additional efforts to reduce emissions, it is very unlikely \r\nthat energy system CO2 emissions will decrease sufficiently to limit \r\nwarming to well below 2degC (high confidence). Scenarios assuming \r\nimprovements in technology but no additional climate policies \r\nbeyond those in place today provide a  benchmark for comparison \r\nagainst energy-related CO2 emissions in mitigation scenarios \r\n(Figure  6.26). Emissions in these reference scenarios increase \r\nthrough 2050 but span a broad range (Riahi et al. 2017; Wei et al. \r\n2018) (Chapter 3, Figure 3.16). The highest emission levels are about \r\nfour times current emissions; the lowest are modestly below today's \r\nemissions. Emissions in these scenarios increase in most regions, but \r\nthey diverge significantly across regions (Bauer et  al. 2017). Asia \r\nand the Middle East and Africa account for the majority of increased \r\nemissions across these scenarios (Figure 6.27)"


id: 7022603560ec701fdfe29a88e8332eb2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15258
content:
"There are multiple possible strategies to transform the energy system to reach net-zero CO2 emissions and to limit warming to 2degC \r\n(>67%) or lower. All pathways rely on the strategies for net-zero CO2 energy systems highlighted in Section 6.6.2, but they vary in the \r\nemphasis that they put on different aspects of these strategies and the pace at which they approach net-zero emissions. The pathway \r\nthat any country or region might follow will depend on a wide variety of factors (Section 6.6.4), including, for example, resource \r\nendowments, trade and integration with other countries and regions, carbon sequestration potential, public acceptability of various \r\ntechnologies, climate, the nature of domestic industries, the degree of urbanisation, and the relationship with other societal priorities \r\nsuch as energy access, energy security, air pollution, and economic competitiveness"


id: dbc1265f0001f3f42f839251496929f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32088
content:
" The Illustrative Mitigation Pathways presented in \r\nthis box demonstrate four distinct strategies for energy system transformations and how each plays out for a different region, aligned \r\nwith global strategies that would limit warming to 2.0degC (>67%) or to 1.5degC (>50%). Each pathway represents a very different vision \r\nof a net-zero energy system. Yet, all these pathways share the common characteristic of a dramatic system-wide transformation over \r\nthe coming decades. "


id: 416724ebf9dab38889e54296347d985a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7689
content:
"CDR technologies can offset emissions from sectors that are difficult \r\nto decarbonise (Section 6.6), altering the timeline and character of \r\nenergy sector transitions. A number of studies suggest that CDR is \r\nno longer a choice, but rather a necessity to limit warming to 1.5degC \r\n(Rogelj et  al. 2015a; Detz et  al. 2018; Luderer et  al. 2018; Strefler \r\net al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2018). The reliance on CDR varies across \r\nscenarios and is tightly linked to future energy demand and the rate \r\nof emission reductions in the next two decades: deeper near-term \r\nemissions reductions will reduce the need to rely on CDR to constrain \r\ncumulative CO2 emissions. Some studies have argued that only with \r\na transition to lower energy demands will it be possible to largely \r\neliminate the need for engineered CDR options (Grubler et al. 2018; \r\nvan Vuuren et al. 2018)"


id: 961345b0653afa832738b969959e44f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21119
content:
" Overall, the amount of CDR will depend on \r\nCO2 capture costs, lifestyle changes, reduction in non-CO2 GHGs, and \r\nutilisation of zero-emission end-use fuels (Muratori et al. 2017; van \r\nVuuren et al. 2018)."


id: cfd8283f023f9fd49910715a0f6c7385
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30231
content:
"There is substantial uncertainty about the amount of CDR that might \r\nultimately be deployed. In most scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC, \r\nCDR deployment is fairly limited through 2030 at less than 1 GtCO2 yr-1. \r\nThe key projected increase in CDR deployment (BECCS and DAC only) \r\noccurs between 2030 and 2050, with annual CDR in 2050 projected \r\nat 2.5-7.5 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2050 (interquartile range) in scenarios \r\nlimiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with limited or no overshoot, and \r\n0.7-1.4 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2050 in scenarios limiting warming to 2degC \r\n(>67%) with action starting in 2020. This characteristic of scenarios \r\nlargely reflects substantial capacity addition of BECCS power plants. \r\nBECCS is also deployed in multiple ways across sectors. For instance, \r\nthe contribution (interquartile range) of BECCS to electricity is 1-5% \r\nin 2050 in scenarios limiting warming to 1"


id: 97cd6d92ab0d725396520f8596c55380
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 21402
content:
"5degC (>50%) with no or \r\nlimited overshoot, and 0-5% in scenarios that limit warming to 2degC \r\n(>67%) with action starting in 2020. The contribution (interquartile \r\nrange) of BECCS to liquid fuels is 9-21% in 2050 in scenarios limiting "


id: 11b95a342dbadf84b9627bb5eac4885f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 281
content:
"CO2 emissions from fuel combustion are the bottom line on energy system progress. Beyond CO2 emissions, primary energy demand \r\nby energy sources, final energy consumption by sectors, and total electricity demand provide a first order assessment of energy system \r\ntransitions. The year at which CO2 emissions peak is also important. The Kaya Identity can be used to decompose energy system CO2\r\nemissions into carbon intensity of the energy system (CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion and industry divided by energy \r\nuse), energy intensity (energy use divided by economic output), and economic output. The impacts of energy and climate policy are \r\nreflected in the changes of carbon intensity and energy intensity. Carbon intensity captures decarbonisation of energy supply systems, \r\nfor example, through fuel switching from fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels, upscaling of low-carbon energy sources, and deploying carbon \r\ndioxide removal technologies"


id: 801c9677f711a03625ce7df557c24cc1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" The carbon intensity of electricity is specifically important, given the role of the electricity sector in near\u0002term mitigation. Economy-wide energy intensity represents efforts of demand-side energy, such as energy conservation, increase of \r\nenergy performance of technologies, structural change of economy, and development of efficient urban infrastructure."


id: ea6627e2f2affcf9fe5a57a3425b447a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Such innovation also involves pervasive uncertainty around technical \r\npotential, cost, consumer demand, and social acceptance. Such \r\nuncertainty carries governance challenges. Policy approaches facing \r\ndeep uncertainty must protect against and/or prepare for unforeseeable \r\ndevelopments, whether it is through resistance (planning for the \r\nworst possible case or future situation), resilience (making sure you \r\ncan recover quickly), or adaptation (changes to policy under changing \r\nconditions). Such uncertainty can be hedged in part by learning by \r\nfirms, consumers, and policymakers. Social interactions and network \r\nbuilding (e.g., supply and distribution chains, intermediary actors) and \r\nthe articulation of positive visions, such as in long-term, low-emission \r\ndevelopment strategies, all play a crucial role. This uncertainty extends \r\nto the impacts of low-carbon innovations on energy demand and \r\nother variables, where unanticipated and unintended outcomes are \r\nthe norm"


id: 8c5cc27c2fbdaf92bd60c9c8a30c0a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 19595
content:
" For instance, rapid investments in public transport networks \r\ncould restrict car ownership from becoming common in developing \r\ncountries (Du and Lin 2017)."


id: 3e8fe7e2a4334a4aa2fd9c26fdb2782c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 7226
content:
"Near-term policy choices are particularly consequential for fast\u0002growing economies. For example, Malik et  al. (2020) found that \r\n133 to 227 GW of coal capacity would be stranded after 2030 if \r\nIndia were to delay ambitious mitigation through 2030 and then \r\npursue an ambitious, post-2030 climate strategy. Cui et  al. (2021) \r\nidentified 18% of old, small, inefficient coal plants for rapid near\u0002term retirement in China to help achieve air quality, health, water, \r\nand other societal goals and a feasible coal phase-out under climate \r\ngoals. Comparable magnitudes of stranded assets may also be \r\ncreated in Latin America when adding all announced, authorised, \r\nand procured power plants up to 2060 (Gonzalez-Mahecha et  al. \r\n2019). Options to reduce carbon lock-in include reducing fossil fuels \r\nsubsidies (Box  6.3), building CCS-ready facilities, or ensuring that \r\nfacilities are appropriately designed for fuel switching (Budinis et al. \r\n2018)"


id: 2522e2212155b75fc9756523fa9b5bd2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" Substantial lock-in may necessitate considerable deployment \r\nof CDR to compensate for high cumulative emissions."


id: 5fa699126ff5f56179953c7f216c8c3e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 12629
content:
"Stronger near-term mitigation will reduce premature retirements of fossil infrastructure, because more rapid mitigation will decrease \r\nnew builds of fossil infrastructure that might later be stranded (Johnson et al. 2015; Bertram et al. 2018) (high confidence). For example, \r\nif warming is limited to 2degC, strengthening the NDC pledges beyond their 2015 levels could decrease stranded electricity sector assets \r\nby more than 50% (Iyer et al. 2015). By contrast, if countries fail to meet their NDCs and continue to build fossil infrastructure, \r\nmitigation will need to be accelerated beyond 2030, resulting up to double the amount of stranded electricity generation capacity (Iyer \r\net al. 2015). This corresponds to a total undiscounted cost of about USD2 trillion from electricity infrastructure alone, from the period \r\n2015 to 2050 (IRENA 2017). CCS (6"


id: 5e1075641a4d4c6d53f73e60c43faa2d
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content:
"4) could potentially help reduce hundreds of gigawatts stranded power plant capacity along with \r\nother fossil-based capital (Clark and Herzog 2014; Iyer et al. 2017; Fan et al. 2018)."


id: fc124f35296002ce404c376a058d6590
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"consumption declines 130 EJ yr-1 to 140 EJ yr-1 in 2050 (78-99% \r\ncompared to 2020 levels, interquartile range) in scenarios limiting \r\nwarming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and 118 EJ yr-1\r\nto 139 EJ yr-1 (65% to 98% compared to 2020 levels) in scenarios \r\nlimiting warming to 2degC (>67%) with action starting in 2020. Coal \r\nconsumption without CCS falls by 67% to 82% (interquartile range) in \r\n2030 in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited \r\novershoot. Studies indicate that coal use may decline substantially in \r\nthe USA and Europe over the coming decade, based on the increasing \r\ncompetitiveness of low-carbon sources and near-term policy actions \r\n(Grubert and Brandt 2019; Oei et  al. 2020). In several developing \r\neconomies, the relative youth of the coal-fired electricity fleet will make \r\na complete phase-out before 2050 difficult (Garg and Shukla 2009; \r\nJewell et  al. 2016)"


id: ca2dbc0965a1387e96614e06a7fa7ca0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" There are considerable differences in projected \r\ncoal phase-out timelines in major Asian economies. Some studies \r\nsuggest that coal may continue to be a part of the Chinese energy mix \r\ncomposing around one-third of the total primary energy consumption \r\nby 2050, even if emissions are reduced by 50% by 2030 (He et al. \r\n2020). Others indicate that a strategic transition would decrease the \r\nrisk of stranded assets and enable a  near-complete phase-out by \r\n2050 (Wang et al. 2020a; Cui et al. 2021). This would entail prioritising "


id: 1a435b2859ec175b5ab2ae70eceb9678
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 1599
content:
"Natural gas may remain part of energy systems through mid-century, \r\nboth for electricity generation and use in industry and buildings, and \r\nparticularly in developed economies, even if warming is limited to \r\n2degC (>67%) or lower (medium confidence). The decline in natural gas \r\nuse from 2020 to 2050 is 38 EJ yr-1 to 78 EJ yr-1 (21-62% decline \r\nfrom 2020 levels, interquartile range) in scenarios limiting warming \r\nto 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and -22 EJ yr -1 to \r\n46  EJ yr -1 (-14% to 36% decline from 2020 levels, interquartile \r\nrange) in scenarios limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) with action \r\nstarting in 2020. Scenarios indicate that gas use in electricity will \r\nlikely peak around 2035 and 2050 if warming is limited to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) with limited or no overshoot or to 2degC (>67%) with action \r\nstarting in 2020, respectively"


id: 3f6cd64d9cfcec8468ba499909cdc8f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7363
content:
" There is variability in the role gas would \r\nplay in future scenarios based on national climate commitments and \r\navailability of cheap renewables (Malik et  al. 2020; Vishwanathan \r\nand Garg 2020; Vrontisi et al. 2020). Note that these differences are \r\nnot only present in the electricity sector but also in other end uses."


id: f040b226a70b407ef44a3c6ea4d9a06f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 35303
content:
"While oil use is anticipated to decline substantially, due to changes \r\nin the transport sector, its use will likely continue through the mid\u0002century, even if warming is limited to 2degC (>67%) or lower (medium \r\nconfidence). Oil use declines by 73 EJ yr-1 to 145 EJ yr-1 (30-78% \r\nfrom 2020 levels, interquartile range) in scenarios that limit warming \r\nto 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and 26 EJ yr-1 to \r\n86 EJ yr -1 (14-45% from 2020 levels) by 2050 in scenarios that limit \r\nwarming to 2degC (>67%) with action starting in 2020. While oil use \r\nis anticipated to decline immediately in scenarios limiting warming \r\nto 1.5degC (>50%), it is likely to continue to be used through 2050. Oil \r\nuse continues to be a significant source of transport fuels in most \r\nscenarios limiting warming to 2degC (Welsby et al. 2021)"


id: 51babaafd4b0d1691e9e2c92cd4ade5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" Oil use may \r\ndrop to about half of current levels as a transport fuel by 2050 if \r\nwarming is limited to 2degC, because of the availability of other options \r\n(biofuels, green hydrogen) and rapid deployment of EVs (Feijoo et al. \r\n2020). In the absence of rapid transport electrification, the decline \r\nis slower with some studies projecting peak oil use around 2035 \r\n(Delgado et al. 2020; Pan et al. 2020)."


id: 8e16ad18a4958b413804262ea1570be0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"These policy mixes (or policy packages) are shaped by different \r\nfactors, including policy goals and objectives (including political, \r\nsocial and technological influences), multiple market, governance \r\nor behavioural failures or previous policy choices of earlier policy \r\neras (Rogge 2017). When pursuing multiple policy goals or targeting \r\nsome type of imperfection, well designed policy mixes can, in \r\nprinciple, reduce mitigation costs (Corradini et al. 2018) or address \r\ndistributional concerns, especially vulnerable populations. For \r\nexample, the interaction between carbon pricing and the support \r\nfor clean energy technologies in the EU clean low-carbon strategy for \r\n2050 can reduce mitigation costs and allow for the early adoption of \r\nmore stringent climate targets (Vandyck et al. 2016)"


id: cafe9df3340aee25564fedc6a6f58de
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content:
" Policy efforts to \r\npromote adoption of low-carbon technologies are more successful if \r\nthey focus not only on economic incentives but include behavioural \r\ninterventions that target relevant cognitive and motivational \r\nfactors (Mundaca et  al. 2019; Khanna et  al. 2021) (Section  6.7.6). \r\nOverlapping nudges might not necessarily lead to lower effectiveness \r\n(Brandon et al. 2019)."


id: ce98e6c4dbecac496245427dd7d3f03f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 30046
content:
"Well-designed policy mixes can support the pursuit of multiple \r\npolicy goals, target effectively different types of imperfections and \r\nframework conditions and take into account the technological, \r\neconomical, and societal situation (high confidence). Accounting for \r\nthe different development stages of new technologies will enhance \r\nlow-emissions transitions (Graaf and Sovacool 2020). For prototype \r\ntechnologies and technologies in the demonstration phase, research \r\nsubsidies and demonstration projects are most important"


id: 203ed1f153125a0054f49b0bb90758ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" For \r\ntechnologies experiencing early adoption, infrastructure development \r\nand strengthening of markets are increasingly important, while \r\nretiring or repurposing of existing assets is important for mature \r\ntechnologies (IEA 2020h) Effective policy mixes will address different \r\nmarket frictions and deal with various uncertainties, for example, \r\nthose pertaining to technological, climate, and socio-economic \r\ndevelopments (Aldy 2020), but also with respect to outcomes of \r\nindividual policies (e.g.,  Borenstein et  al. 2019). Therefore, policy \r\nmixes may balance the trade-off between stability and the flexibility \r\nto change individual policies (Gawel and Lehmann 2019) and the \r\npolicy mix over time (Rayner et al. 2017). Some policy instruments \r\nmay become feasible over time, for example, as technological \r\nadvancements reduce the transaction costs of comprehensive market\u0002based approaches (Andoni et al. 2019; Di Silvestre et al"


id: 4a2ea04b7e21e02956c116831ce93aa8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" 2020), or \r\nas weakened barriers to stringency enable policy sequencing (Pahle \r\net al. 2018). Energy system policy mixes often include sector-specific \r\nregulation. Compared to economy-wide approaches, sectoral policies \r\nmay be able to directly target specific sectors or mitigation options. \r\nHowever, uncoordinated implementation or limited coordination \r\nacross sectors may lead to efficiency losses (e.g. Rosendahl et al. 2017). \r\nThese losses also depend on other policies, such as pre-existing taxes \r\n(Goulder et al. 2016; Marten et al. 2018) or research and development \r\npolicies (Acemoglu et al. 2016). Moreover, unilateral policies - those \r\ntaken by individual countries in the absence of coordination with \r\nother countries - could raise carbon leakage risks, while balancing "


id: 8ab2421aadc1c144e97086e1cbe5d404
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 19362
content:
"Financial incentives can motivate mitigation actions (Santos 2008; \r\nThogersen 2009; Bolderdijk et  al. 2011; Eliasson 2014; Maki et  al. \r\n2016), particularly when actions are costly (Mundaca 2007). \r\nIn many countries, more residential solar PV were installed after the \r\nintroduction of favourable financial schemes such as feed-in-tariffs, \r\nfederal income tax credits, and net metering (Wolske and Stern \r\n2018). Similarly, many programs have promoted the installation of \r\nlower-carbon household options such as heat pumps, district heating, \r\nor solar water heaters across Europe, the Asia-Pacific and Africa (Hu \r\net  al. 2012; Sovacool and Martiskainen 2020; Ahmed et  al. 2021). \r\nYet, financial incentives may underperform expectations when \r\nother factors are overlooked. For example, people may not respond \r\nto financial incentives when they do not trust the organisation \r\nsponsoring the programme, or when it takes too much effort to \r\nreceive the incentive (Mundaca 2007; Stern et al"


id: eac40f3fe061d9226d2333d3ded20750
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 34440
content:
" 2016a). Financial \r\nincentives are more effective if combined with strategies addressing \r\nnon-financial barriers."


id: 4c8e4fa659155b2257a9bd3a4436cbe6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 9466
content:
"Effective assessment of policy mixes requires comprehensive, validated \r\ninternational data, methodologies, and indicators. Existing policy \r\nmixes are difficult to evaluate because they target multiple objectives, \r\nand the evaluation must consider various criteria (Chapter  13 and \r\nSection  6.7.7), such as environmental and economic effectiveness, \r\ndistributional effects, transformative potential, institutional \r\nrequirements, and feasibility. Economic outcomes depend on policy \r\ngoals and implementation. Existing studies on policy mixes suggest \r\nthe benefits of a  comprehensive approach (Rosenow et  al. 2017), \r\nwhile also highlighting that an 'excessive' number of instruments \r\nmay reduce overall effectiveness (Costantini et al. 2017). Combining \r\nenvironmental regulation and innovation policies may be of particular \r\nimportance to tackle both emissions and innovation market failures \r\n(Fabrizi et al. 2018)"


id: 26e3ab51fe34e4ebd0c78367f37eeca6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3511
content:
" The consistency and credibility of policy mixes is \r\npositively associated with green innovation (Rogge and Schleich 2018)."


id: c4a26e04c685dea12864d416ce467b8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 28507
content:
"Providing information on the causes and consequences of climate \r\nchange or on effective mitigation actions increases people's \r\nknowledge and awareness, but generally does not promote mitigation \r\nactions by individuals (Abrahamse et  al. 2005) or organisations \r\n(Anderson and Newell 2004). Fear-inducing representations of \r\nclimate change may inhibit action when they make people feel \r\nhelpless (O'Neill and Nicholson-Cole 2009). Energy-related advice \r\nand feedback can promote energy savings, load shifting in electricity \r\nuse and sustainable travel, particularly when framed in terms of \r\nlosses rather than gains (Gonzales et al. 1988; Wolak 2011; Bradley \r\net al. 2016; Bager and Mundaca 2017). Also, credible and targeted \r\ninformation at the point of decision can promote action (Stern et al. \r\n2016a). Information is more effective when delivered by a trusted \r\nsource, such as peers (Palm 2017), advocacy groups (Schelly 2014), \r\nand community organisations (Noll et al"


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content:
" 2014), and when tailored \r\nto actors' personal situations and core values (Daamen et al. 2001; \r\nAbrahamse et al. 2007; Bolderdijk et al. 2013; Boomsma and Steg \r\n2014; Wolsko et al. 2016; van den Broek et al. 2017). This explains why \r\nhome energy audits promoted energy savings (Delmas et al. 2013; \r\nAlberini and Towe 2015), and investments in resource efficiency and \r\nrenewable energy generation (Kastner and Stern 2015)."


id: ab8d0428f5a09d5fee7ff0bb7b261f08
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 24512
content:
"Public acceptability reflects the extent to which the public \r\nevaluates climate policy, mitigation options, and system changes \r\n(un)favourably, which can shape, enable, or prevent low-carbon \r\nenergy system transitions. Public acceptability of policy and mitigation \r\noptions is higher when people expect these have more positive and \r\nless negative consequences for self, others, and the environment \r\n(Perlaviciute and Steg 2014; Demski et al. 2015; Drews and Van den \r\nBergh 2016). Public opposition may result when a culturally valued \r\nlandscape is affected by renewable energy development (Warren \r\net al. 2005; Devine-Wright and Howes 2010), particularly when place\u0002based identities are threatened (Devine-Wright 2009, 2013; Boudet \r\n2019). Acceptability can increase after a policy or change has been \r\nimplemented and the consequences appear to be more positive than \r\nexpected (Schuitema et al. 2010; Eliasson 2014; Weber 2015; Carattini \r\net al"


id: a7c339e1414ec33536c586db8c799151
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 23905
content:
"Energy use feedback can promote energy saving behaviour within \r\nhouseholds (Fischer 2008; Gronhoj and Thogersen 2011; Delmas \r\net al. 2013; Karlin et al. 2015; Zangheri et al. 2019) and at work (Young \r\net al. 2015), particularly when provided in real time or immediately \r\nafter the action so that people learn the impact of different actions \r\n(Abrahamse et al. 2005; Faruqui et al. 2009; Delmas et al. 2013; Yu et al. \r\n2015; Stern et al. 2016a; Tiefenbeck et al. 2016). Energy labels (Banerjee \r\nand Solomon 2003; Stadelmann 2017), visualisation techniques (Pahl \r\net al. 2016), and ambient persuasive technology (Midden and Ham \r\n2012) can encourage energy savings as they immediately make sense \r\nand hardly require users' conscious attention"


id: 95c25767e4e42b8d7b1a786b43f9ce9c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 21059
content:
" Feedback can make \r\npeople aware of their previous mitigation behaviours, which can \r\nstrengthen their environmental self-identity, and motivate them to \r\nengage in other mitigation actions, to act in line with their self-image \r\n(Van der Werff et al. 2014)."


id: c2da716b5bade82b33bcb442e27c6f1e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28236
content:
"Public acceptability of climate policy and low-carbon options differs \r\nacross individuals. Climate policy and low-carbon options are more \r\nacceptable when people strongly value protecting other people and \r\nthe environment, and support egalitarian worldviews, left-wing or \r\ngreen political ideologies, while acceptability is lower when people \r\nstrongly endorse self-centred values, and support individualistic \r\nworldviews (Dietz et  al. 2007; Perlaviciute and Steg 2014; Drews \r\nand Van den Bergh 2016). Similarly, public decision-makers support \r\nclimate policy more when they endorse environmental values \r\n(Nilsson et al. 2016). Climate and energy policy is more acceptable \r\nwhen people are more concerned about climate change (Hornsey \r\net  al. 2016), when they believe their actions would help mitigate \r\nclimate change, and feel responsible to mitigate climate change (Steg \r\n2005; Eriksson et al"


id: faf78b8853e9f452e1682d2158a482b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37004
content:
" 2006; Jakovcevic and Steg 2013; Drews and Van \r\nden Bergh 2016; Kim and Shin 2017; Unal et al. 2019)."


id: 15b9d01b27fd3d3d799c4295dd25ce98
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 937
content:
"The long-term economic characteristics of low-emissions energy \r\nsystem transitions are not well understood, and they depend on \r\npolicy design and implementation along with future costs and \r\navailability of technologies in key sectors (e.g., process heat, long\u0002distance transport), and the ease of electrification in end-use sectors \r\n(high confidence). The long-term aggregate economic outcomes from \r\na low-emissions future are not likely to be substantially worse than \r\nin an emissions-intensive future and may prove superior (Child et al. \r\n2019, Farmer et al. 2020; Bogdanov et al. 2021) (medium confidence). \r\nFor the whole economy, the interquartile range of estimated \r\nmitigation costs is between 140 USD2015 and 340 USD2015 tCO2\r\n-1\r\nin 2050 in scenarios limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) and between \r\n430 USD2015 and 990 USD2015 tCO2\r\n-1 in scenarios limiting \r\nwarming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (Chapter 3)"


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content:
" \r\nFor energy sectors in various regions and globally, different \r\nscenarios show a  wide range of implied carbon prices in 2050 to \r\nlimit warming to 1.5degC, from below USD50 tCO2\r\n-1 to more than \r\nUSD900 tCO2\r\n-1 (Brouwer et al. 2016; Rogelj et al. 2018a). Mitigation \r\ncosts for scenarios limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) were 3-11% in \r\nconsumption losses in AR5, but the median in newer studies is about \r\n3% in GDP losses (Su et al. 2018; Gambhir et al. 2019)."


id: d468385f6f9d9863e740ba02cefd1ad3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Efficient end-use technologies are likely to be particularly cost\u0002effective in developing countries where new infrastructure is \r\nrapidly getting built and there is an opportunity to create positive \r\npath dependencies (Section  6.7.3). Aside from reducing energy \r\nconsumption, efficient end-use technologies reduce resource \r\nextraction, for example, fossil fuel extraction or mining for materials \r\nused in wind turbines or solar PV cells (Luderer et  al. 2019). \r\nReduced resource extraction is an important precursor to SDG 12 \r\non sustainable consumption and production of minerals. End-use \r\nefficiency strategies also reduce the need for, and therefore SDG trade\u0002offs associated with, CDR towards the end of the century and avoid \r\ntemperature overshoot (van Vuuren et al. 2018). But fully leveraging \r\nthe demand-side efficiency would entail behavioural changes and \r\nthus rely on strong partnerships with communities (SDG  17)"


id: a8f517edb0ff821921dc422e9989add7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" For \r\ninstance, approaches that inform households of the economic value \r\nof conservation strategies at home could be particularly useful \r\n(Niamir et al. 2018). Improved energy efficiency is interlinked with \r\nhigher economic growth in Africa (Lin and Abudu 2020; Ohene-Asare \r\net al. 2020). An important distinction here between SDGs focusing \r\non infrastructural and behavioural interventions is the temporal \r\ncontext. Improving building heat systems or the electricity grid with \r\nreduced T&D losses would provide climate mitigation with one-time \r\ninvestments and minor maintenance over decades. On the other \r\nhand, behavioural changes would be an ongoing process involving \r\nsustained, long-term societal interactions."


id: ac3c1afb139f0b1ca5dfcddcff145a9e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Focusing only on aggregate economic outcomes neglects distributional \r\nimpacts, impacts on broader SDGs, and other outcomes of broad \r\nsocietal importance. Strategies to increase energy efficiency and \r\nenergy conservation are, in most instances, mutually reinforcing with \r\nstrategies to support sustainable development. Improving efficiency \r\nand energy conservation will promote sustainable consumption \r\nand production of energy and associated materials (SDG 12) (high \r\nconfidence). Contrastingly, successful implementation of demand\u0002side options requires sustainable partnerships (SDG 17) between \r\ndifferent actors in energy systems, for example, governments, utilities, \r\ndistributors, and consumers. Many authors have argued that energy \r\nefficiency has a large untapped potential in both supply and demand \r\n(Lovins 2018; Mejean et  al. 2019)"


id: b496e3a377aad972444d30f3e9a73b30
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" For example, improved fossil \r\npower plant efficiency has been estimated to lower the costs of CCS \r\nfrom USD80-100 tCO2\r\n-1 for a subcritical plant to <USD40 tCO2-1 for \r\na high-efficiency plant (Hu and Zhai 2017; Singh et al. 2017). This \r\ncould enhance energy access and affordability. Eliminating electricity "


id: c88b388917d7752d99e2e51d835efeaa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Increasing electrification will support and reduce the costs of key \r\nelements of human development, such as education, health, and \r\nemployment (high confidence). Greater access to electricity might \r\noffer greater access to irrigation opportunities for agricultural \r\ncommunities (Peters and Sievert 2016) which could have the potential \r\nfor increasing farmer incomes in support of SDG 1. Coordinated \r\nelectrification policies also improve enrolment for all forms of \r\neducation (Kumar and Rauniyar 2018; Lopez-Gonzalez et al. 2020). \r\nEmpirical evidence from India suggests that electrification reduced \r\nthe time for biomass collection, and thus increased the time children \r\nhave available for schooling (SDGs 4 and 5) (Khandker et al. 2014). \r\nReduced kerosene use in developing countries has improved indoor air \r\nquality (SDG 3) (Barron and Torero 2017; Lewis and Severnini 2020)"


id: 44ab8fa24c7c18b1f036ab5bd51aa836
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" \r\nThese positive linkages between climate change mitigation and other \r\ngoals have improved perceptions of solar PV among the public and \r\npolicymakers. 'Goodwill' towards solar PV is the highest among all the \r\nmajor mitigation options considered in this chapter (Section 6.4.2)."


id: 6ee9e1430d047559faa0913209dd54bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Phasing out fossil fuels in favour of low-carbon sources is likely to \r\nhave considerable SDG benefits, particularly if trade-offs such as \r\nunemployment to fossil fuel workers are minimised (high confidence). \r\nA phase-out of coal (Box 6.2) will support SDGs 3, 7 and 14, but it is \r\nalso anticipated to create large job losses if not properly managed. \r\nAt the same time, there are large potential employment opportunities \r\nthat may be created in alternative sectors such as renewables and \r\nbioenergy for both skilled and unskilled workers. 'Sustainable \r\ntransition' pathways have indicated a  complete fossil phase-out \r\nwhich could entail numerous other co-benefits. For instance, fossil \r\nfuels are estimated to generate only 2.65 jobs per million USD as \r\ncompared to projected 7.49 from renewables (Garrett-Peltier 2017). \r\nSimilar synergies may also emerge for nuclear power in the long \r\nterm, though the high costs create trade-offs in developing country \r\ncontexts (Agyekum et al"


id: 5f3e2c5828c377441573cf2caf1c6bb9
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content:
" 2020; Castor et al. 2020). While bioenergy \r\nproduction may create jobs, it may also be problematic for SDG 2 on \r\nzero hunger by affecting the supplies and prices of food. Phasing out \r\nof fossil fuels will also improve air quality (SDG 3) and premature \r\ndeaths by reducing PM2.5 emissions, (He et al. 2020; Li et al. 2020c). \r\nEnergy transitions from fossil fuels to renewables, as well as within \r\nfossil fuels (coal to gas switching), are already occurring in some \r\nregions, spurred by climate concerns, health concerns, market \r\ndynamics, or consumer choice (e.g., in the transport sector)."


id: 5e98f6e8e59f506f6379457b3e49ffa0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 12419
content:
"the energy intensity of the treatment process and the reusability \r\nof the treated waters (Klapperich et  al. 2014; Arena et  al. 2017); \r\nif the produced brine from geologic formations can be treated \r\nvia desalination technologies, there is an opportunity to keep the \r\nwater intensity of electricity as constant (Section  6.4.2.5). Both \r\nimplications of CCS and CDR are related to SDG 6 on clean water. \r\nCDR discussions in the context of energy systems frequently pertains \r\nto BECCS which could affect food prices based on land management \r\napproaches (Daioglou et  al. 2020a). Several CDR processes also \r\nrequire considerable infrastructure refurbishment and electrification \r\nto reduce upstream CO2 emissions (Singh and Colosi 2021). Large\u0002scale CDR could also open the potential for low-carbon transport and \r\nurban energy (by offsetting emissions in these sectors) use that would \r\ncreate synergies with SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities)"


id: dcf20032237f2e19a18e6d12f93a1456
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" \r\nEffective siting of CDR infrastructure therefore requires consideration \r\nof trade-offs with other priorities. At the same time, several SDG \r\nsynergies have also been reported to accompany CCS projects, such \r\nas with reduced air pollution (SDG 3) (Mikunda et al. 2021)."


id: 4dd77d687a639ad877441cfa3911af15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9673
content:
"Greater energy system integration (Sections 6.4.3 and 6.6.2) \r\nwould enhance energy-SDG synergies while eliminating trade-offs \r\nassociated with deploying mitigation options (high confidence).\r\nEnergy system integration strategies focus on codependence of \r\nindividual technologies in ways that optimise system performance. \r\nAccordingly, they can improve economic outcomes and reduce \r\nnegative implications for SDGs. For example, VRE electricity options \r\nraise intermittency concerns and hydrogen can be expensive due \r\nto the costs of electricity. Both are relevant to SDG 7 on affordable \r\nand reliable energy access. Routing excess solar generation during \r\ndaytime for hydrogen production will improve grid stability as lower \r\nhydrogen costs (Tarroja et al. 2015)"


id: 8a3e809a56d63d2dd52c931a125e4f64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" Due to the varying patterns of \r\nsolar and wind energy, these two energy sources could be operated \r\nin tandem, thus reducing the material needs for their construction \r\nand for storage, thus promoting SDG 12 on sustainable production \r\n(Weitemeyer et  al. 2015; Wang et  al. 2019d). For CCS facilities, \r\nco-firing of fossil fuels and biomass could enable a  more gradual, \r\nnear-term low-carbon transition (Lu et al. 2019). This could enable \r\nearly retirements (associated with SDG 1) while also providing air \r\npollution reductions (associated with SDG 3)."


id: 28295facbf9770f9e13cdf76cda5d28d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3727
content:
"Low-carbon energy systems will be similar to those of today in that they will provide many of the same services as today - for example, \r\nheating and cooling homes, travelling to work or on vacation, transporting goods and services, and powering manufacturing. But \r\nfuture energy systems may be different in that people may also demand new services that aren't foreseen today, just as people now \r\nuse energy for many information technology uses that were not anticipated 50 years ago. More importantly, low-carbon energy \r\nsystems will be different in the way that energy is produced, transformed, and used to provide these services. In the future, almost \r\nall electricity will be produced from sources that emit little or no CO2, such as solar power, wind power, nuclear power, bioenergy, \r\nhydropower, geothermal power, or fossil energy in which the CO2 is captured and stored"


id: 5b9cae266b10c1bb19cad82cc8bf1fb2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11917
content:
" Electricity, hydrogen, and bioenergy will \r\nbe used in many situations where fossil fuels are used today, for example, in cars or heating homes. And energy is likely to be used \r\nmore efficiently than today, for example, through more efficient cars, trucks, and appliances, buildings that use very little energy, \r\nand greater use or public transportation. All of these changes may require new policies, institutions, and even new ways for people \r\nto live their lives. And fundamental to all of these changes is that low-carbon energy systems will use far less fossil fuel than today."


id: a3705eddb412d091f627a9cb1eccba51
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23277
content:
"Renewable energy technologies harness energy from natural sources that are continually replenished, for example, from the sun \r\n(solar energy), the wind (wind energy), plants (bioenergy), rainfall (hydropower), or even the ocean. The energy from these sources \r\nexceeds the world's current and future energy needs many times. But that does not mean that renewable sources will provide all \r\nenergy in future low-carbon energy systems. Some countries have a lot of renewable energy, whereas others do not, and other \r\nenergy sources, such as nuclear power or fossil energy in which CO2 emissions are captured and stored (carbon dioxide capture \r\nand storage, or CCS) can also contribute to low-carbon energy systems. The energy from sources such as solar energy, wind energy, \r\nand hydropower can vary throughout the day or over seasons or years"


id: e4caa70b031a6bf49f2940c966ffe221
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" All low-carbon energy sources have other implications for \r\npeople and countries, some of which are desirable, for example, reducing air pollution or making it easy to provide electricity in \r\nremote locations, and some of which are undesirable, for example decreasing biodiversity or mining of minerals to produce low\u0002emissions technologies. For all of these reasons, it is unlikely that all low-carbon energy systems around the world will rely entirely \r\non renewable energy sources."


id: 46a34abc4b7e0693179a53dbada3e30f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 8500
content:
"To create a low-carbon energy system, emissions must be reduced across all parts of the system, and not just one or two. This \r\nmeans, for example, reducing the emissions from producing electricity, driving cars, hauling freight, heating and cooling buildings, \r\npowering data centres, and manufacturing goods. There are more opportunities to reduce emissions over the next decade in some \r\nsectors compared to others. For example, it is possible to substantially reduce electricity emissions over the next decade by investing \r\nin low-carbon electricity sources, while at the same time halting the construction of new coal-fired power plants, retiring existing \r\ncoal-fired power plants or retrofitting them with carbon capture and storage (CCS), and limiting the construction of new gas-fired \r\npower plants. There are also opportunities to increase the number of electric cars, trucks, and other vehicles on the road, or to use \r\nelectricity rather than natural gas or coal to heat homes"


id: 3dda1fb3eb8ecf5d1460328e9bc21c07
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" And across the whole energy system, emissions can be reduced by using \r\nmore efficient technologies. While these and other actions will be critical over the coming decade, it is also important to remember \r\nthat the low-carbon energy transition needs to extend for many decades into the future to limit warming. This means that it is \r\nimportant now to improve and test options that could be useful later on, for example, producing hydrogen from low-carbon sources \r\nor producing bioenergy from crops that require less land than today."


id: ddd88b64f2e9868cb74bc8cd70d6f066
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32399
content:
"The Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use1 (AFOLU) sector \r\nencompasses managed ecosystems and offers significant \r\nmitigation opportunities while delivering food, wood and \r\nother renewable resources as well as biodiversity conservation, \r\nprovided the sector adapts to climate change. Land-based \r\nmitigation measures represent some of the most important options \r\ncurrently available. They can both deliver carbon dioxide removal \r\n(CDR) and substitute for fossil fuels, thereby enabling emissions \r\nreductions in other sectors. The rapid deployment of AFOLU measures \r\nis essential in all pathways staying within the limits of the remaining \r\nbudget for a  1.5degC target (high confidence). Where carefully and \r\nappropriately implemented, AFOLU mitigation measures are uniquely \r\npositioned to deliver substantial co-benefits and help address many \r\nof the wider challenges associated with land management"


id: 4452df77b99277e3cb8a2b441d70af45
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" If AFOLU \r\nmeasures are deployed badly then, when taken together with the \r\nincreasing need to produce sufficient food, feed, fuel and wood, \r\nthey may exacerbate trade-offs with the conservation of habitats, \r\nadaptation, biodiversity and other services. At the same time the \r\ncapacity of the land to support these functions may be threatened by \r\nclimate change itself (high confidence). {IPCC AR6 WGI, Figure SPM.7; \r\nIPCC AR6 WGII, 7.1, 7.6}"


id: 6bcb66ef9b46121009f6758932a6a974
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"The AFOLU sector offers significant near-term mitigation \r\npotential at relatively low cost but cannot compensate for \r\ndelayed emission reductions in other sectors (high evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). The AFOLU sector can provide 20-30% \r\n(interquartile range) of the global mitigation needed for a 1.5degC or \r\n2degC pathway towards 2050 (robust evidence, medium agreement), \r\nthough there are highly variable mitigation strategies for how AFOLU \r\npotential can be deployed for achieving climate targets. The estimated \r\nlikely economic (<USD100 tCO2-eq-1) AFOLU sector mitigation \r\npotential is 8 to 14 GtCO2-eq yr-1 between 2020 and 2050, with \r\nthe bottom end of this range representing the mean from integrated \r\nassessment models (IAMs) and the upper end representing the mean \r\nestimate from global sectoral studies. The economic potential is about \r\nhalf of the technical potential from AFOLU, and about 30-50% could \r\nbe achieved under USD20 tCO2-eq-1"


id: 2d65f93c2131bd9351395feafe59797e
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vector_id: 4583
content:
" The implementation of robust \r\nmeasurement, reporting and verification processes is paramount to \r\nimproving the transparency of net-carbon-stock changes per land \r\nunit to prevent misleading assumptions or claims on mitigation. \r\n{7.1, 7.4, 7.5}"


id: c94e92df794668255c1020d514e2c5d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"The AFOLU (managed land) sector, on average, accounted for \r\n13-21% of global total anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) \r\nemissions in the period 2010-2019 (medium confidence). At the \r\nsame time managed and natural terrestrial ecosystems were \r\na carbon sink, absorbing around one third of anthropogenic CO2\r\nemissions (medium confidence). Estimated anthropogenic net \r\nCO2 emissions from AFOLU (based on book-keeping models) result in \r\na net source of +5.9 +- 4.1 GtCO2 yr-1 between 2010 and 2019 with \r\nan unclear trend. Based on FAOSTAT or national GHG inventories, \r\nthe net CO2 emissions from AFOLU were 0.0 to +0.8 GtCO2 yr-1\r\nover the same period. There is a  discrepancy in the reported CO2\r\nAFOLU emissions magnitude because alternative methodological \r\napproaches that incorporate different assumptions are used. If the \r\nmanaged and natural responses of all land to both anthropogenic \r\nenvironmental change and natural climate variability, estimated to \r\nbe a gross sink of -12.5 +- 3"


id: 662c158e0cf4b0b4c94f08ad3bd35763
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"2 GtCO2 yr-1 for the period 2010-2019, \r\nare included with land use emissions, then land overall, constituted \r\na net sink of -6.6 +- 5.2 GtCO2 yr-1 in terms of CO2 emissions (medium \r\nconfidence). {7.2, 7.2.2.5, Table 7.1; IPCC AR6 WGI}"


id: cf2a9bc71f13b4b7af9f54bcd1d1d0a9
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content:
"Between 2020 and 2050, mitigation measures in forests and \r\nother natural ecosystems provide the largest share of the \r\neconomic (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) AFOLU mitigation potential, \r\nfollowed by agriculture and demand-side measures (high \r\nconfidence). In the global sectoral studies, the protection, improved \r\nmanagement, and restoration of forests, peatlands, coastal wetlands, \r\nsavannas and grasslands have the potential to reduce emissions and/\r\nor sequester 7.3 mean (3.9-13.1 range) GtCO2-eq yr-1. Agriculture \r\nprovides the second largest share of the mitigation potential, with \r\n4.1 (1.7-6.7) GtCO2-eq yr-1 (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) from cropland \r\nand grassland soil carbon management, agroforestry, use of biochar, \r\nimproved rice cultivation, and livestock and nutrient management. \r\nDemand-side measures including shifting to sustainable healthy diets, \r\nreducing food waste, and building with wood and biochemicals and \r\nbio-textiles have a mitigation potential of 2.2 (1.1-3"


id: c08a511ca80167407ef42d709828636
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27851
content:
"The deployment of all land-based mitigation measures can \r\nprovide multiple co-benefits, but there are also risks and \r\ntrade-offs from misguided or inappropriate land management \r\n(high confidence). Such risks can best be managed if \r\nAFOLU mitigation is pursued in response to the needs and \r\nperspectives of multiple stakeholders to achieve outcomes \r\nthat maximise synergies while limiting trade-offs (medium \r\nconfidence). The results of implementing AFOLU measures are \r\noften variable and highly context specific. Depending on local \r\nconditions (e.g.,  ecosystem, climate, food system, land ownership) \r\nand management strategies (e.g.,  scale, method), mitigation \r\nmeasures have the potential to positively or negatively impact \r\nbiodiversity, ecosystem functioning, air quality, water availability \r\nand quality, soil productivity, rights infringements, food security, and \r\nhuman well-being"


id: 28fc221fc3229cee8b2547fe842366a5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3877
content:
" Mitigation measures addressing GHGs may also \r\naffect other climate forcers such as albedo and evapotranspiration. \r\nIntegrated responses that contribute to mitigation, adaptation, and \r\nother land challenges will have greater likelihood of being successful \r\n(high confidence); measures which provide additional benefits to \r\nbiodiversity and human well-being are sometimes described as \r\n'Nature-Based Solutions'. {7.1, 7.4, 7.6}"


id: 56a3f9f37d7fa73b1cfe9907db35c49b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11110
content:
"The economic and political feasibility of implementing AFOLU \r\nmitigation measures is hampered by persistent barriers. \r\nAssisting countries to overcome barriers will help to achieve \r\nsignificant short-term mitigation (medium confidence). \r\nFinance forms a critical barrier to achieving these gains as currently \r\nmitigation efforts rely principally on government sources and \r\nfunding mechanisms which do not provide sufficient resources to \r\nenable the economic potential to be realised. Differences in cultural \r\nvalues, governance, accountability and institutional capacity are also \r\nimportant barriers. Climate change could also emerge as a barrier to \r\nAFOLU mitigation, although the IPCC AR6 WGI contribution to AR6 \r\nindicated that an increase in the capacity of natural sinks may occur, \r\ndespite changes in climate (medium confidence)"


id: c8aa34f2eec736e0d8b33082e8068a56
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29129
content:
" The continued loss \r\nof biodiversity makes ecosystems less resilient to climate change \r\nextremes and this may further jeopardise the achievement of the \r\nAFOLU mitigation potentials indicated in this chapter (IPCC AR6 WGII \r\nand IPBES) (high confidence). {7.4, 7.6; IPCC AR6 WGI, Figure SPM.7}"


id: 712c996fbe26c385ca918256e429b04a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15439
content:
"AFOLU mitigation measures have been well understood \r\nfor decades but deployment remains slow and emissions \r\ntrends indicate unsatisfactory progress despite beneficial \r\ncontributions to global emissions reduction from forest\u0002related options (high confidence). Globally, the AFOLU sector has \r\nso far contributed modestly to net mitigation, as past policies have \r\ndelivered about 0.65 GtCO2 yr-1 of mitigation during 2010-2019 \r\nor 1.4% of global gross emissions (high confidence). The majority \r\n(>80%) of emission reduction resulted from forestry measures (high \r\nconfidence). Although the mitigation potential of AFOLU measures \r\nis large from a biophysical and ecological perspective, its feasibility \r\nis hampered by lack of institutional support, uncertainty over long\u0002term additionality and trade-offs, weak governance, fragmented \r\nland ownership, and uncertain permanence effects"


id: 289a4debdc987d2009fcaac74a7e1ce0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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" Despite these \r\nimpediments to change, AFOLU mitigation options are demonstrably \r\neffective and with appropriate support can enable rapid emission \r\nreductions in most countries. {7.4, 7.6}"


id: 934f4e05d5c1b26a66ddcc70cff263f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Bioenergy and other bio-based options represent an \r\nimportant share of the total mitigation potential. The range \r\nof recent estimates for the technical bioenergy potential \r\nwhen constrained by food security and environmental \r\nconsiderations is 5-50 and 50-250 EJ yr-1 by 2050 for residues \r\nand dedicated biomass production system respectively. These \r\nestimates fall within previously estimated ranges (medium \r\nagreement). Poorly planned deployment of biomass production \r\nand afforestation options for in-forest carbon sequestration may \r\nconflict with environmental and social dimensions of sustainability \r\n(high confidence). The global technical CDR potential of BECCS by \r\n2050 (considering only the technical capture of CO2 and storage \r\nunderground) is estimated at 5.9 mean (0.5-11.3) GtCO2 yr-1, of \r\nwhich 1.6 (0.8-3.5) GtCO2 yr-1 is available at below USD100 tCO2\r\n-1\r\n(medium confidence)"


id: 7c2f0312056ecaeaf9448cd49a29491
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content:
" Bioenergy and other bio-based products \r\nprovide additional mitigation through the substitution of fossil fuels \r\nfossil-based products (high confidence). These substitution effects \r\nare reported in other sectors. Wood used in construction may reduce \r\nemissions associated with steel and concrete use. The agriculture \r\nand forestry sectors can devise management approaches that \r\nenable biomass production and use for energy in conjunction with \r\nthe production of food and timber, thereby reducing the conversion \r\npressure on natural ecosystems (medium confidence). {7.4}"


id: a8577b9c4821e20b378e1a0540832dd2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 24012
content:
"Concerted, rapid and sustained effort by all stakeholders, from \r\npolicy makers and investors to land owners and managers is \r\na pre-requisite to achieving high levels of mitigation in the \r\nAFOLU sector (high confidence). To date USD0.7 billion yr-1 is \r\nestimated to have been spent on AFOLU mitigation. This is well short \r\nof the more than USD400 billion yr-1 that is estimated to be necessary \r\nto deliver the up to 30% of global mitigation effort envisaged in \r\ndeep mitigation scenarios (medium confidence). This estimate of the \r\nglobal funding requirement is smaller than current subsidies provided \r\nto agriculture and forestry. Making this funding available would \r\nrequire a change in flows of money and determination of who pays. \r\nA gradual redirection of existing agriculture and forestry subsidies \r\nwould greatly advance mitigation"


id: 6f824ddd2d737bf4d34b6f94c4a63717
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Realising the mitigation potential of the AFOLU sector depends \r\nstrongly on policies that directly address emissions and drive \r\nthe deployment of land-based mitigation options, consistent \r\nwith carbon prices in deep mitigation scenarios (high \r\nconfidence). Examples of successful policies and measures include \r\nestablishing and respecting tenure rights and community forestry, \r\nimproved agricultural management and sustainable intensification, \r\nbiodiversity conservation, payments for ecosystem services, improved \r\nforest management and wood chain usage, bioenergy, voluntary \r\nsupply chain management efforts, consumer behaviour campaigns, \r\nprivate funding and joint regulatory efforts to avoid, for example, \r\nleakage. The efficacy of different policies, however, will depend on \r\nnumerous region-specific factors. In addition to funding, these factors \r\ninclude governance, institutions, long-term consistent execution of \r\nmeasures, and the specific policy setting (high confidence). {7"


id: 89b5bffd51a1a467fc8a3c8d90a3d0ec
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content:
"There is a discrepancy, equating to 5.5 GtCO2 yr-1 between \r\nalternative methods of accounting for anthropogenic land \r\nCO2 fluxes. Reconciling these methods greatly enhances the \r\ncredibility of AFOLU-based emissions offsetting. It would also \r\nassist in assessing collective progress in a  global stocktake \r\n(high confidence). The principal accounting approaches are \r\nnational GHG inventories (NGHGI) and global modelling approaches. \r\nNGHGI, based on IPCC guidelines, consider a  much larger area of \r\nforest to be under human management than global models. NGHGI \r\nconsider the fluxes due to human-induced environmental change on \r\nthis area to be anthropogenic and are thus reported. Global models,2\r\nin contrast, consider these fluxes to be natural and are excluded from \r\nthe total reported anthropogenic land CO2 flux. To enable a like-with\u0002like comparison, the remaining cumulative global CO2 emissions \r\nbudget can be adjusted (medium confidence)"


id: 8836465d2b21a0f431e05f7853ef2a6d
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content:
" In the absence of \r\nthese adjustments, collective progress would appear better than it is. \r\n{Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter, 7.2}"


id: f181f763eb371cbb061cc1ec8dc49dd1
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content:
"Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses (AFOLU) is unique due \r\nto its capacity to mitigate climate change through greenhouse gas \r\n(GHG) emission reductions, as well as enhance removals (IPCC \r\n2019). However, despite the attention on AFOLU since early 1990s \r\nit was reported in the IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and \r\nLand (SRCCL) as accounting for almost a quarter of anthropogenic \r\nemission (IPCC, 2019), with three main GHGs associated with AFOLU; \r\ncarbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). Overall \r\nemission levels had remained similar since the publication of AR4 \r\n(Nabuurs et al. 2007). The diverse nature of the sector, its linkage \r\nwith wider societal, ecological and environmental aspects and the \r\nrequired coordination of related policy, was suggested to make \r\nimplementation of known and available supply- and demand-side \r\nmitigation measures particularly challenging (IPCC 2019)"


id: 7c3ef0f4d11b7c88ed3c58c19bbf8e83
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" Despite \r\nsuch implementation barriers, the considerable mitigation potential \r\nof AFOLU as a sector on its own and its capacity to contribute to \r\nmitigation within other sectors was emphasised, with land-related \r\nmeasures, including bioenergy, estimated as capable of contributing \r\nbetween 20% and 60% of the total cumulative abatement to 2030 \r\nidentified within transformation pathways (IPCC 2018). However, \r\nthe vast mitigation potential from AFOLU initially portrayed in \r\nliterature and in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), as explored \r\nin the IPCC Special Report on Climate Change of 1.5degC (SR1.5), is \r\nbeing questioned in terms of feasibility (Roe et al. 2021) and a more \r\nbalanced perspective on the role of land in mitigation is developing, \r\nwhile at the same time, interest by private investors in land-based \r\nmitigation is increasing fast."


id: 6258e76a034294064939d9a3e2fece09
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"In terms of mitigation, without reductions in overall anthropogenic \r\nemissions, increased reliance on large-scale land-based mitigation \r\nwas predicted, which would add to the many already competing \r\ndemands on land. However, some mitigation measures were \r\nsuggested to not compete with other land uses, while also having \r\nmultiple co-benefits, including adaptation capacity and potential \r\nsynergies with some Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As \r\nin AR5, there was large uncertainty surrounding mitigation within \r\nAFOLU, in part because current carbon stocks and fluxes are unclear \r\nand subject to temporal variability. Additionally, the non-additive \r\nnature of individual measures that are often inter-linked and the highly \r\ncontext specific applicability of measures, causes further uncertainty"


id: 9405e446450e9742bf11bb175251f937
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" \r\nMany AFOLU measures were considered well-established and some \r\nachievable at low to moderate cost, yet contrasting economic drivers, \r\ninsufficient policy, lack of incentivisation and institutional support to \r\nstimulate implementation among the many stakeholders involved, \r\nin regionally diverse contexts, was recognised as hampering \r\nrealisation of potential."


id: 34f8e511d1eec8a162fbec9ecb1431e4
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"The SRCCL (IPCC 2019) outlined with medium evidence and medium \r\nagreement that supply-side agriculture and forestry measures \r\nhad an economic (at USD100 tCO2-eq-1) mitigation potential of \r\n7.2-10.6 GtCO2-eq-1 in 2030 (using GWP100 and multiple IPCC values \r\nfor CH4 and N2O) of which about a third was estimated as achievable at \r\n<USD20 tCO2-eq-1. Agricultural measures were reported as sensitive \r\nto carbon price, with cropland and grazing land soil organic carbon \r\nmanagement having the greatest potential at USD20 tCO2-eq-1 and \r\nrestoration of organic soils at USD100 tCO2-eq-1. Forestry measures \r\nwere less sensitive to carbon price, but varied regionally, with \r\nreduced deforestation, forest management and afforestation having \r\nthe greatest potential depending on region. Although demand-side \r\nmeasures related to food could in theory make a large contribution \r\nto mitigation, in reality the contribution has been very small"


id: 4a1513ade55728efd2fad2ef5512ce20
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content:
" Overall, \r\nthe dependency of mitigation within AFOLU on a  complex range \r\nof factors, from population growth, economic and technological \r\ndevelopments, to the sustainability of mitigation measures and \r\nimpacts of climate change, was suggested to make realisation highly \r\nchallenging (IPCC 2019)."


id: 9f431862e251747fd2168a12e34d7354
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content:
"Mitigation measures are broadly categorised as those relating \r\nto (i)  forests and other ecosystems (ii) agriculture (iii) biomass \r\nproduction for products and bioenergy and (iv) demand-side levers. \r\nAssessment is made in the context that land-mitigation is expected to \r\ncontribute roughly 25% of the 2030 mitigation pledged in Nationally \r\nDetermined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement (Grassi \r\net al. 2017), yet very few countries have provided details on how this \r\nwill be achieved. In light of AR5 and the SRCCL findings, that indicate \r\nlarge land-based mitigation potential, considerable challenges to its \r\nrealisation, but also a clear nexus at which humankind finds itself, \r\nwhereby current land management, driven by population growth \r\nand consumption patterns, is undermining the very capacity of land, \r\na finite resource, to support wider critical functions and services on \r\nwhich humankind depends"


id: 4fc032f42daa0c612a30a06cbfd32e76
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" Mitigation within AFOLU is occasionally \r\nand wrongly perceived as an opportunity for in-action within other \r\nsectors. AFOLU simply cannot compensate for mitigation shortfalls \r\nin other sectors. As the outcomes of many critical challenges (UNEP \r\n2019), including biodiversity loss (IPBES 2019a) and soil degradation \r\n(FAO and ITPS 2015), are inextricably linked with how we manage \r\nland, the evaluation and assessment of AFOLU is crucial. This chapter \r\naims to address three core topics:"


id: b94afc85af9138fdf738513069e7db56
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content:
"Figure 7.3 | Subdivision of the total AFOLU emissions from Table 7.1 by activity and gas for the period 1990 to 2019. Positive values are emissions from land \r\nto atmosphere, negative values are removals. Panel A shows emissions divided into major activity and gases. Note that 'biomass burning' is only the burning of agriculture \r\nresidues in the fields. The indicated growth rates between 1990-2000, 2000-2010, 2010-2019 are annualised across each time period. Panel B illustrates regional emissions \r\nin the years 1990, 2000, 2010, 2019 AFOLU CO2 (green shading) represents all AFOLU CO2 emissions. It is the mean from three bookkeeping models (Hansis et al. 2015; \r\nHoughton and Nassikas 2017; Gasser et al. 2020) as presented in the Global Carbon Budget (Friedlingstein et al. 2020) and is not directly comparable to LULUCF in NGHGIs \r\n(Section 7.2.2). Data on CH4 and N2O emissions are from the EDGAR database (Crippa et al. 2021). See Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2"


id: dce65b832dd0254eb721d285ae22a35d
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content:
"3 for comparison of different datasets. All values \r\nexpressed are as CO2-eq with GWP100 values: CH4 = 27, N2O = 273."


id: a44e3e8d2536ca8d672e5f8d4447b1ad
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"b\r\n Net anthropogenic flux of CO2 are due to land-use change such as deforestation and afforestation and land management, including wood harvest and regrowth, peatland \r\ndrainage and fires, cropland and grassland management. Average of three bookkeeping models (Hansis et al. 2015; Houghton and Nassikas 2017; Gasser et al. 2020), \r\ncomplemented by data on peatland drainage and fires from FAOSTAT (Prosperi et al. 2020) and GFED4s (van der Werf et al. 2017). Bookkeeping based CO2-LULUCF emissions \r\n(5.7+-4.0) are consistent with AR6 WGI and Chapter 2 of this report. The value of 5.9(+-4.1) includes CO2 emissions from urea application to managed soils and pasture. \r\nComparisons with other estimates are discussed in 7.2.2. Based on NGHGIs and FAOSTAT, the range is 0 to 0.8 GtCO2 yr-1.\r\nc CH4 and N2O emission estimates and assessed uncertainty of 30 and 60% respectively, are based on Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) data \r\n(Crippa et al"


id: 27d3b2f439cc4f13bf218a30fe00af72
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" 2021) in accordance with Chapter 2, this report (Sections 2.2.1.3 and 2.2.1.4). Both FAOSTAT (Tubiello 2019; USEPA 2019; FAO 2021a) and the USA EPA (USEPA \r\n2019) also provide data on agricultural non-CO2 emissions, however, mean global CH4 and N2O values considering the three databases are within the uncertainty bounds of \r\nEDGAR. EDGAR only considers agricultural and not overall AFOLU non-CO2 emissions. Agriculture is estimated to account for approximately 89 and 96% of total AFOLU CH4\r\nand N2O emissions respectively. See Section 7.2.3 for further discussion."


id: 40f40b0dfbce699abe9b45a5084677a2
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content:
"To present a fuller understanding of land-atmosphere interactions, \r\nTable  7.1 includes an estimate of the natural sink of land to \r\natmospheric CO2 (Jia et al. 2019) (IPCC AR6 WGI Chapter 5). Land \r\nfluxes respond naturally to human-induced environmental change \r\n(e.g.,  climate change, and the fertilising effects of increased \r\natmospheric CO2 concentration and nitrogen deposition), known as \r\n'indirect anthropogenic effects', and also to 'natural effects' such \r\nas climate variability (IPCC 2010) (Table 7.1 and Section 7.2.2). This \r\nshowed a removal of -12.5 +- 3.2 GtCO2 yr-1 (medium confidence) \r\nfrom the atmosphere during 2010-2019 according to global dynamic \r\nglobal vegetation model (DGVM) models (Friedlingstein et al. 2020) \r\n31% of total anthropogenic net emissions of CO2 from all sectors"


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" \r\nIt is likely that the NGHIs and FAOSTAT implicitly cover some part \r\nof this sink and thus provide a net CO2 AFOLU balance with some \r\n5 GtCO2 lower net emissions than according to bookkeeping models, \r\nwith the overall net CO2 value close to being neutral. Model results "


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"Figure 7.4 | Global net CO2 flux due to AFOLU estimated using different methods for the period 1960 to 2019 (GtCO2 yr-1). Positive numbers represent \r\nemissions. Light-blue line: The mean from 17 DGVMs all using the same driving data under TrendyV9 used within the Global Carbon Budget 2020 and including different \r\ndegrees of management (Bastos et al. 2020; Friedlingstein et al. 2020). Brown line: Data downloaded 6 June 2021 from FAOSTAT (FAO 2021b; http://www.fao.org/faostat/) \r\ncomprising: net emissions from (i) forest land converted to other land, (ii) net emissions from organic soils in cropland, grassland and from biomass burning, including peat \r\nfires and peat draining (Prosperi et al. 2020) and (iii) net emissions from forest land remaining forest land, which includes managed forest lands (Tubiello et al. 2020). \r\nYellow line: Net flux estimate from National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (NGHGI) based on country reports to the UNFCCC for LULUCF (Grassi et al"


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" 2021) which include \r\nland-use change, and flux in managed lands. Red EO line: The 2001-2019 average net CO2 flux from non-intact forest-related emissions and removals based on ground \r\nand Earth Observation data (EO) (Harris et al. 2021). Data to mask non-intact forest were used in the tropics (Turubanova et al. 2018) and extra-tropics (Potapov et al. 2017). \r\nDark blue line: the mean estimate and minimum and maximum (dark-blue shading) from three bookkeeping models (Hansis et al. 2015; Houghton and Nassikas 2017; \r\nGasser et al. 2020). These include land cover change (e.g., deforestation, afforestation), forest management including wood harvest and land degradation, shifting cultivation, \r\nregrowth of forests following wood harvest or abandonment of agriculture, grassland management, agricultural management. Emissions from peat burning and draining are \r\nadded from external datasets (see text). Both the DGVM and bookkeeping global data is available at: https://www.icos-cp"


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"eu/science-and-impact/global-carbon-budget/2020\r\n(accessed on 4 October 2021). Data consistent with IPCC AR6 WGI Chapter 5. Dotted lines denote the linear regression from 2000 to 2019. Trends are statistically significant \r\n(P <0.05) with exception for the NGHGI trend (P <0.01)."


id: ff1ba283f94d62c01b4031edd7b16c32
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"The approach used by countries follows the IPCC methodological \r\nguidance for NGHGIs (IPCC 2006, 2019). Since separating direct, \r\nindirect and natural effects on the land CO2 sink is impossible with \r\ndirect observation such as national forest inventories (IPCC 2010), \r\nupon which most NGHGIs are based, the IPCC adopted the 'managed \r\nland' concept as a  pragmatic proxy to facilitate NGHGI reporting. \r\nAnthropogenic land GHG fluxes (direct and indirect effects) are \r\ndefined as all those occurring on managed land, that is, where \r\nhuman interventions and practices have been applied to perform \r\nproduction, ecological or social functions (IPCC 2006, 2019). GHG \r\nfluxes from unmanaged land are not reported in NGHGIs because \r\nthey are assumed to be non-anthropogenic"


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" Countries report NGHGI \r\ndata with a range of methodologies, resolution and completeness, \r\ndependent on capacity and available data, consistent with IPCC \r\nguidelines (IPCC 2006, 2019) and subject to an international review \r\nor assessment processes."


id: 2af5eb29420ef5a0d466748655ba2073
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content:
"Figure 7.6 | Main conceptual differences between global models (bookkeeping models, IAMs and DGVMs) and NGHGIs definitions of what is considered \r\nthe 'anthropogenic' land CO2 flux, and proposed solution (from Grassi et al. 2021). (a) Differences in defining the anthropogenic land CO2 flux by global models \r\n('land use') and NGHGIs ('LULUCF'), including the attribution of processes responsible for land fluxes (IPCC 2006; 2010) in managed and unmanaged lands. The anthropogenic \r\nland CO2 flux by global models typically includes only the CO2 flux due to 'direct effects' (land-use change, harvest, regrowth). By contrast, most NGHGIs consider anthropogenic \r\nall fluxes occurring in areas defined as 'managed', including also the sink due to 'indirect effects' (climate change, atmospheric CO2 increase, N deposition etc.) and due to \r\n'natural effects' (climate variability, background natural disturbances)"


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content:
" (b) Proposed solution to the inconsistency, via disaggregation of the 'Land Sink' flux from DGVMs into \r\nCO2 fluxes occurring in managed and in unmanaged lands. The sum of 'land use' flux (direct effects from bookkeeping models or IAMs) and the 'Land Sink' (indirect effects from \r\nDGVMs) in managed lands produces an adjusted global model CO2 flux which is conceptually more comparable with LULUCF fluxes from NGHGIs. Note that the figure may in \r\nsome cases be an oversimplification, in other words, not all NGHGIs include all recent indirect effects."


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content:
"models see Figure 7.4). Reconciling the differences, in other words, \r\nmaking estimates comparable, can build confidence in land-related \r\nCO2 estimates, for example for the purpose of assessing collective \r\nprogress in the context of the Global Stocktake (Cross-Chapter Box 6 \r\nin this chapter). The difference largely results from greater estimated \r\nCO2 in NGHGIs, mostly occurring in forests (Grassi et al. 2021). \r\nThis difference is potentially a consequence of: (i) simplified and/or \r\nincomplete representation of management in global models (Popp \r\net al. 2017; Pongratz et al. 2018), for example, concerning impacts of \r\nforest management in biomass expansion and thickening (Nabuurs \r\net al. 2013; Grassi et al. 2017), (ii) inaccurate and/or incomplete \r\nestimation of LULUCF fluxes in NGHGIs (Grassi et al"


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" 2017), especially \r\nin developing countries, primarily in non-forest land uses and in soils, \r\nand (iii) conceptual differences in how global models and NGHGIs \r\ndefine 'anthropogenic' CO2 flux from land (Grassi et al. 2018). The \r\nimpacts of (i) and (ii) are difficult to quantify and result in uncertainties \r\nthat will decrease slowly over time through improvements of both \r\nmodels and NGHGIs. By contrast, the inconsistencies in (iii) and its \r\nresulting biases were assessed as explained below."


id: be436e69849760d98314ae2623eb2399
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 27484
content:
"Since changing the NGHGIs' approach is impractical, an interim \r\nmethod to translate and adjust the output of global models was \r\noutlined for reconciling a bookkeeping model and NGHGIs (Grassi \r\net al. 2018). More recently, an improved version of this approach \r\nhas been applied to the future mitigation pathways estimated \r\nby IAMs (Grassi et al. 2021), with the implications for the Global \r\nStocktake discussed in Cross-Chapter Box  6 in this chapter. This \r\nmethod implies a post-processing of current global models' results \r\nthat addresses two components of the conceptual differences in \r\nthe 'anthropogenic' CO2 flux; (i) how the impact of human-induced \r\nenvironmental changes (indirect effects) are considered, and (ii) the \r\nextent of forest area considered 'managed'"


id: 96abc2ff513d63b71ea49e469492d2ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21227
content:
" Essentially, this approach \r\nadds DGVM estimates of CO2 fluxes due to indirect effects from \r\ncountries' managed forest area (using non-intact forest area maps \r\nas a proxy) to the original global models' anthropogenic land CO2\r\nfluxes (Figure 7.6)."


id: fbb6e4807c8ab517d6b5ec0094401813
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37104
content:
"This approach does not imply a change in the original decarbonisation pathways, nor does it suggest that indirect effects should be \r\nconsidered in the mitigation efforts. It simply ensures that a like-with-like comparison is made: if countries' climate targets use the \r\nNGHGI definition of anthropogenic emissions, this same definition can be applied to derive NGHGI-comparable future CO2 pathways. \r\nThis would have an impact on the NGHGI-comparable remaining carbon or GHG budget (i.e., the allowable emissions until net zero \r\nCO2 or GHG emissions consistent with a certain climate target). For example, for SSP2-1.9 and SSP2-2.6 (representing pathways in \r\nline with 1.5degC and well-below 2degC limits under SSP2 assumptions), carbon budget is 170 GtCO2-eq lower than the original remaining \r\ncarbon budget according to the models' approach (Cross-Chapter Box 6, Figure 1e)"


id: c3b59b6e14f3d43c640a13a873fb3976
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" Similarly, the remaining carbon (or GHG) budgets \r\nin Chapter 3 (this report), as well as the net zero carbon (or GHG) targets, could only be used in combination with the definition of \r\nanthropogenic emissions as used by the IAMs (Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3). In the absence of these adjustments, collective \r\nprogress would appear better than it is."


id: 429eb50473197cf674f6d7b2b44fb45d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 7871
content:
"Cross-Chapter Box 6, Figure 1 | Impact on global mitigation pathways of adjusting the modelled anthropogenic land CO2 fluxes to be comparable \r\nwith National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (NGHGIs) (from Grassi et al. 2021). (a) The mismatch between global historical LULUCF CO2 net flux from \r\nNGHGIs (black), and the original (un-adjusted) modelled flux historically and under future mitigation pathways for SSP2 scenarios from Integrated Assessment Models \r\n(IAMs, Chapter 3). (b) Fluxes due to indirect effects of environmental change on areas equivalent to countries' managed forest (i.e., those fluxes generally considered \r\n'anthropogenic' by countries and 'natural' by global models). (c) Original modelled (solid line) LULUCF mitigation pathways adjusted to be NGHGI-comparable \r\n(dashed line), for example, by adding the indirect effects in panel b. The indirect effects in panel b decline over time with increasing mitigation ambition, mainly \r\nbecause of the weaker CO2 fertilisation effect"


id: 18f2c8e87589f0c5650c7eb3a8b83200
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 1424
content:
" In panel c, the dependency of the adjusted LULUCF pathways on the target becomes less evident after 2030, because \r\nthe indirect effects in countries' managed forest (which are progressively more uncertain with time, as highlighted by the grey areas) compensate the effects of the \r\noriginal pathways. (d) NGHGI-comparable pathways for global CO2 emissions from all sectors including LULUCF (obtained by combining global CO2 pathways without \r\nLULUCF - where no adjustment is needed - and the NGHGI-comparable CO2 pathways for LULUCF (Gutschow et al. 2019; Grassi et al. 2017). (e) Cumulative impact \r\nof the adjustments from 2021 until net zero CO2 emissions or 2100 (whatever comes first) on the remaining carbon budget."


id: d037564375ef2d0d578f3a309d0becc0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30292
content:
"Trends in atmospheric CH4 and N2O concentrations and the \r\nassociated sources, including land and land use are discussed in \r\nSections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 of the IPCC AR6 WGI. Regarding AFOLU, the \r\nSRCCL and AR5 (Jia et al. 2019; Smith et al. 2014) identified three \r\nglobal non-CO2 emissions data sources: EDGAR (Crippa et al. 2021), \r\nFAOSTAT (FAO 2021a; Tubiello, 2019) and the USA EPA (USEPA 2019). \r\nMethodological differences have been previously discussed (Jia et al. \r\n2019). In accordance with Chapter 2, this report, EDGAR data are \r\nused in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.3. It is important to note that in terms of \r\nAFOLU sectoral CH4 and N2O emissions, only FAOSTAT provides data \r\non AFOLU emissions, while EDGAR and USEPA data consider just the \r\nagricultural component. However, the mean of values across the three \r\ndatabases for both CH4 and N2O, fall within the assessed uncertainty \r\nbounds (30 and 60% for CH4 and N2O respectively, Section  2.2.1, \r\nin this report) of EDGAR data"


id: a7f01deb8f27c5cd9b031e4132344909
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 23934
content:
" NGHGIs annually submitted to the \r\nUNFCCC (Section 7.2.2.3) provide national AFOLU CH4 and N2O data, \r\nas included in the SRCCL (Jia et al. 2019). Aggregation of NGHGIs to \r\nindicate global emissions must be considered with caution, as not "


id: 9409e6cfebee7a1383069c2893f79d19
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 20799
content:
"Figure 7.7 | Estimated global mean agricultural CH4 (top), N2O (middle) and aggregated CH4 and N2O (using CO2-eq according to GWP100 AR6 values).\r\n(Bottom) emissions for three decades according to EDGAR v6.0 (Crippa et al. 2021), FAOSTAT (FAO 2021a) and USEPA (USEPA 2019) databases. Latest \r\nversions of databases indicate historic emissions to 2019, 2019 and 2015 respectively, with average values for the post-2010 period calculated accordingly. For CH4, emissions \r\nclassified as 'Other Ag.' within USEPA data, are re-classified as 'Agricultural Biomass Burning'. Despite CH4 emissions from agricultural soils also being included, this category \r\nwas deemed to principally concern biomass burning on agricultural land and classified accordingly. For N2O, emissions classified within EDGAR as direct and indirect emissions \r\nfrom managed soils, and indirect emissions from manure management are combined under 'Agricultural Soils'"


id: 8a97b8ea315be9cf9cc0cb367e64abed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 19344
content:
" Emissions classified by FOASTAT as from manure deposition and \r\napplication to soils, crop residues, drainage of organic soils and synthetic fertilisers are combined under 'Agricultural Soils', while emissions reported as 'Other Ag.' under USEPA \r\ndata are re-classified as 'Agricultural Biomass Burning'."


id: eed8c590b78cb8e8177a036b2323b5d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35049
content:
"forcers remain the same. Changes in land conditions from land \r\ncover  change  or  land  management jointly affect water, energy, \r\nand aerosol fluxes (biophysical fluxes) as well as GHG fluxes \r\n(biogeochemical fluxes) exchanged between the land and atmosphere \r\n(high agreement, robust evidence) (Anderson et al. 2011; O'Halloran \r\net al. 2012; Alkama and Cescatti 2016; Naudts et al. 2016; Erb et al. \r\n2017). There is high confidence that changes in land condition do \r\nnot just have local impacts but also have non-local impacts in \r\nadjacent and more distant areas (Pielke et al. 2011; Mahmood et al. \r\n2014) which may contribute to surpassing climate tipping points \r\n(Nepstad et al. 2008; Brando et al. 2014). Non-local impacts may \r\noccur through: GHG fluxes and subsequent changes in radiative \r\ntransfer, changes in atmospheric chemistry, thermal, moisture and \r\nsurface pressure gradients creating horizontal transport (advection) \r\n(de  Vrese et al"


id: 7c9ff49fb9575670a83bfa046aaf0416
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17205
content:
" 2016; Davin and de Noblet-Ducoudre 2010) and \r\nvertical transport (convection and subsidence) (Devaraju et al. 2018). \r\nAlthough regional and global biophysical impacts emerge from \r\nmodel simulations (Davin and de Noblet-Ducoudre 2010; de Vrese \r\net al. 2016; Devaraju et al. 2018), especially if the land condition \r\nhas changed over large areas, there is very low agreement on the \r\nlocation, extent and characteristics of the non-local effects across \r\nmodels. Recent methodological advances, empirically confirmed \r\nchanges in temperature and precipitation owing to distant changes \r\nin forest cover (Cohn et al. 2019; Meier et al. 2021)."


id: dd65b27ee32aa1e5f0227ca692f39f1c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32330
content:
"In agreement with AR5 (Smith et al. 2014), the SRCCL identified \r\nAsia as having the largest share (37%) of emissions from enteric \r\nfermentation and manure management since 2000, but Africa to have \r\nthe fastest growth rate. Asia was identified as responsible for 89% of \r\nrice cultivation emissions, which were reported as increasing (Jia et al. \r\n2019). Considering classification by ten IPCC regions, data suggest \r\nenteric fermentation to have dominated emissions in all regions since \r\n1990, except in South-East Asia and Pacific, where rice cultivation \r\nforms the principal source (FAO 2021; USEPA 2019). The different \r\ndatabases broadly indicate the same regional CH4 emission trends, \r\nthough the indicated absolute change differs due to methodological \r\ndifferences (Section  7.2.3.1)"


id: 255810951d73816892650e813011ba51
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3306
content:
" All databases indicate considerable \r\nemissions growth in Africa since 1990 and that this region recorded \r\nthe greatest regional increases in emissions from both enteric \r\nfermentation and rice cultivation since 2010. Additionally, FAOSTAT \r\ndata suggest that emissions from agricultural biomass burning \r\naccount for a notably high proportion of agricultural CH4 emissions \r\nin Africa (Figure 7.8)."


id: 51427e8dcb14d6c99029b0eb27621c82
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10240
content:
"Following changes in land conditions, CO2, CH4 and N2O fluxes are \r\nquickly mixed into the atmosphere and dispersed, resulting in the \r\nbiogeochemical effects being dominated by the biophysical effects at \r\nlocal scales (high confidence) (Y. Li et al. 2015; Alkama and Cescatti \r\n2016). Afforestation/reforestation (Lejeune et al. 2018; Strandberg \r\nand Kjellstrom 2019), urbanisation (Li and Bou-Zeid 2013) and \r\nirrigation (Mueller et al. 2016 and Thiery et al. 2017) modulate the \r\nlikelihood, intensity, and duration of many extreme events including \r\nheatwaves (high confidence) and heavy precipitation events (medium \r\nconfidence) (Haberlie et al. 2015). There is high confidence and high \r\nagreement that afforestation in the tropics (Perugini et al. 2017), \r\nirrigation (Alter et al. 2015; Mueller et al. 2016) and urban greening \r\nresult in local cooling, high agreement and medium confidence on \r\nthe impact of tree growth form (deciduous vs evergreen) (Naudts \r\net al"


id: 6e648a782ae387c3cba779863f8744c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 14992
content:
" 2016; Luyssaert et al. 2018 and Schwaab et al. 2020), and \r\nlow agreement on the impact of wood harvest, fertilisation, tillage, \r\ncrop harvest, residue management, grazing, mowing, and fire \r\nmanagement on the local climate."


id: 9028456bd6fd40f9bb47f27aa591c708
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 20212
content:
"The SRCCL provided limited discussion on regional variation in \r\nagricultural N2O emissions but reported with medium confidence\r\nthat certain regions (North America, Europe, East and South Asia) \r\nwere notable sources of grazing land N2O emissions (Jia et al. \r\n2019). The AR5 identified Asia as the largest source and as having \r\nthe highest growth rate of N2O emissions from synthetic fertilisers \r\nbetween 2000 and 2010 (Smith et al. 2014). Latest data indicate \r\nagricultural N2O emission increases in most regions, though \r\nvariation between databases prevents definitive conclusions on \r\ntrends, with Africa, Southern Asia, and Eastern Asia suggested to \r\nhave had greatest growth since 1990 according to EDGAR (Crippa \r\net al. 2021), FAOSTAT (FAO 2021a) and USEPA (USEPA 2019) data \r\nrespectively"


id: 401ff77fff2794c3c9aa7ab52eb0dd8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 7465
content:
" However, all databases indicate that emissions declined \r\nin Eurasia and Europe from 1990 levels, in accordance with specific \r\nenvironmental regulations put in place since the late 1980s (Tubiello \r\n2019; European Environment Agency 2020; Tian et al. 2020), but \r\ngenerally suggest increases in both regions since 2010."


id: 93a15d0290df8538b1c110ce3dbb418a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20744
content:
"Since AR5 several global assessments (IPBES 2018a; NYDF Assessment \r\nPartners 2019; UNEP 2019; IPCC 2019) and studies (e.g., Tubiello 2019; \r\nTian et al. 2020) have reported on drivers (natural and anthropogenic \r\nfactors that affect emissions and sinks of the land-use sector) behind \r\nAFOLU emissions trends, and associated projections for the coming \r\ndecades. The following analysis aligns with the drivers typology used \r\nby IPBES (2019b) and the Global Environmental Outlook (UNEP 2019). \r\nDrivers are divided into direct drivers resulting from human decisions \r\nand actions concerning land use and land-use change, and indirect \r\ndrivers that operate by altering the level or rate of change of one or \r\nmore direct drivers. Although drivers of emissions in agriculture and \r\nFOLU are presented separately, they are interlinked, operating in many \r\ncomplex ways at different temporal and spatial scales, with outcomes \r\ndepending on their interactions"


id: 399ad1869949dd88a309e0ca7ab56e5e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" For example, deforestation in tropical \r\nforests is a  significant component of sectorial emissions. A  review \r\nof deforestation drivers' studies published between 1996 and 2013, \r\nindicated a wide range of factors associated with deforestation rates \r\nacross many analyses and studies, covering different regions (Busch \r\nand Ferretti-Gallon 2017) (Figure 7.9). Higher agricultural prices were \r\nidentified as a  key driver of deforestation, while law enforcement, \r\narea protection, and ecosystem services payments were found to be \r\nimportant drivers of reduced deforestation, while timber activity did \r\nnot show a consistent impact."


id: 490b101972198be26e32a4e7014dc40d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 8875
content:
"The global forest area in 2020 is estimated at 4.1 billion ha, \r\nrepresenting 31% of the total land area (FAO 2020a). Most forests \r\nare situated in the tropics (45%), followed by boreal (27%), \r\ntemperate (16%) and subtropical (11%) domains. Considering \r\nregional distribution of global forest area, Europe and the Russian \r\nFederation accounts for 25%, followed by South America (21%), \r\nNorth and Central America (19%), Africa (16%), Asia (15%) and \r\nOceania (5%). However, a  significant share (54%) of the world's \r\nforest area concerns five countries - The Russian Federation, Brazil, \r\nCanada, the USA and China (FAO 2020a). Forest loss rates differ \r\namong regions though the global trend is towards a net forest loss \r\n(UNEP 2019). The global forest area declined by about 178 Mha in \r\nthe 30 years from 1990 to 2020 (FAO 2020a). The rate of net forest \r\nloss has decreased since 1990, a  result of reduced deforestation \r\nin some countries and forest gains in others"


id: 19948c41ed8cb6fb307e7c9b4f00494b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1499
content:
" The annual net loss \r\nof forest area declined from 7.8 Mha in 1990-2000, to 5.2 Mha \r\nin 2000-2010, to 4.7 Mha in 2010-2020, while the total growing \r\nstock in global forests increased (FAO 2020a). The rate of decline \r\nin net forest loss during the last decade was due mainly to an \r\nincrease in the rate of forest gain (i.e., afforestation and the natural \r\nexpansion of forests)."


id: 59b697d0f97152d01a7f25fecb5205ef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11615
content:
"Although built-up areas (defined as cities, towns, villages and human \r\ninfrastructure) occupy a  relatively small fraction of land (around \r\n1% of global land), since 1975 urban clusters (i.e., urban centres as \r\nwell as surrounding suburbs) have expanded approximately 2.5 times \r\n(UNEP 2019; Chapter 8, this report). Regional differences are striking. \r\nBetween 1975 and 2015, built-up areas doubled in size in Europe \r\nwhile urban population remained relatively constant. In Africa built\u0002up areas grew approximately fourfold, while urban population \r\ntripled (UNEP 2019). Trends indicate that rural-to-urban migration \r\nwill continue and accelerate in developing countries increasing \r\nenvironmental pressure in spite of measures to mitigate some of \r\nthe impacts (e.g., by preserving or enhancing natural systems within \r\ncities, for example, lakes or natural and urban green infrastructures \r\n(UNEP 2019)"


id: de574f9d219bc8ca32fbc9fec54e171b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" If current population densities within cities remain \r\nstable, the extent of built-up areas in developed countries is expected \r\nto increase by 30% and triple in developing countries between 2000 \r\nand 2050 (Barger et al. 2018)."


id: 9b8b870c08e4c0416e99c7d6c7c75f27
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22028
content:
"Previous IPCC reports identify land-use change as an important \r\ndriver of emissions and agriculture as a key driver of land-use change, \r\ncausing both deforestation and wetland drainage (P.  Smith et al. \r\n2019a). The AR5 reported a  trend of declining global agricultural \r\nland area since 2000 (Smith et al. 2014). The latest data (FAO 2021b) \r\nindicate a 2% reduction in the global agricultural area between 2000 \r\nand 2019 (Figure 7.10). This area includes (though is not limited to) \r\nland under permanent and temporary crops or pasture, temporary \r\nfallow and natural meadows and pasture utilised for grazing or \r\nagricultural purposes (FAO 2021b), although the extent of land \r\nused for grazing may not be fully captured (Fetzel et al. 2017). Data \r\nindicate changes in how agricultural land is used. Between 2000 \r\nand 2019, the area classified as permanent meadow and pasture \r\ndecreased (-6%) while cropland area (under arable production \r\nand temporary crops) increased (+2%)"


id: d53a3b49b0fb70537dd10bc1415023a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31075
content:
" A key driver of this change \r\nhas been a  general trend of intensification, including in livestock \r\nproduction (Barger et al. 2018; OECD/FAO 2019; UNEP 2019), \r\nwhereby less grazing land is supporting increasing livestock numbers \r\nin conjunction with greater use of crops as livestock feed (Barger \r\net al. 2018). The share of feed crops, such as maize and soybean, of \r\nglobal crop production is projected to grow as the demand for animal \r\nfeed increases with further intensification of livestock production \r\n(OECD/FAO 2019). Despite increased demand for food, feed, fuel \r\nand fibre from a  growing human population (FAO 2019b), global \r\nagricultural land area is projected to remain relatively stable during \r\nthe next decade, with increases in production expected to result from \r\nagricultural intensification (OECD/FAO 2019)."


id: 1bd7149e734d6fbbc5b832d13d2e55ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1840
content:
"Urban expansion leads to landscape fragmentation and urban sprawl \r\nwith effects on forest resources and land use (Unal et al. 2019) while \r\ninteracting with other drives. For example, in the Brazilian Amazon, \r\nthe most rapid urban growth occurs within cities that are located \r\nnear rural areas that produce commodities (minerals or crops) and \r\nare connected to export corridors (Richards and VanWey 2015). \r\nUrbanisation, coastal development and industrialisation also play \r\ncrucial roles in the significant loss of mangrove forests (Hirales-Cota \r\n2010; Richards and Friess 2016; Rivera-Monroy et al. 2017). Among \r\ninfrastructural developments, roads are one of the most consistent \r\nand most considerable factors in deforestation, particularly in tropical \r\nfrontiers (Pfaff et al. 2007; Rudel et al. 2009; Ferretti-Gallon and \r\nBusch 2014)"


id: 7f072eeabbba915d49e4fe93c0a1a851
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 17543
content:
" The development of roads may also bring subsequent \r\nimpacts on further development intensity due to increasing economic \r\nactivities (see Chapter 8) mostly in the tropics and subtropics, where \r\nthe expansion of road networks increases access to remote forests \r\nthat act as refuges for biodiversity (Campbell et al. 2017) (Box 7.1). \r\nLogging is one of the main drivers of road construction in tropical \r\nforests (Kleinschroth and Healey 2017) which leads to more severe \r\nlong-term impacts that include increased fire incidence, soil erosion, \r\nlandslides, and sediment accumulation in streams, biological \r\ninvasions, wildlife poaching, illicit land colonisation, illegal logging \r\nand mining, land grabbing and land speculation (Laurance et al. \r\n2009; Alamgir et al. 2017)."


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vector_id: 34076
content:
"The area of forest designated for production has been relatively \r\nstable since 1990. Considering forest uses, about 30% (1.2 billion ha) \r\nof all forests is used primarily for production (wood and non-wood \r\nforest products), about 10% (424 Mha) is designated for biodiversity \r\nconservation, 398 Mha for the protection of soil and water, and \r\n186 Mha is allocated for social services (recreation, tourism, education \r\nresearch and the conservation of cultural and spiritual sites) (FAO and \r\nUNEP 2020). While the rate of increase in the area of forest allocated \r\nprimarily for biodiversity conservation has slowed in the last ten years, \r\nthe rate of increase in the area of forest allocated for soil and water \r\nprotection has grown since 1990, and notably in the last ten years. \r\nGlobal wood harvest (including from forests, other wooded land and \r\ntrees outside forests) was estimated to be almost 4.0 billion m3\r\n in \r\n2018 (considering both industrial roundwood and fuelwood) (FAO, \r\n2019)"


id: 8092c0b50266a265bb4d838c390d83ef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 17754
content:
" Overall, wood removals are increasing globally as demand for, \r\nand the consumption of wood products grows annually by 1% in line \r\nwith growing populations and incomes with this trend expected to \r\ncontinue in coming decades. When done in a sustainable way, more \r\nregrowth will occur and is stimulated by management, resulting in \r\na net sink. However illegal and unsustainable logging (i.e., harvesting \r\nof timber in contravention of the laws and regulations of the country \r\nof harvest) is a global problem with significant negative economic \r\n(e.g.,  lost revenue), environmental (e.g.,  deforestation, forest \r\ndegradation, GHG emissions and biodiversity losses) and social \r\nimpact (e.g.,  conflicts over land and resources, disempowerment \r\nof local and indigenous communities) (World Bank 2019). Many \r\ncountries around the world have introduced regulations for the \r\ninternational trade of forest products to reduce illegal logging, with \r\nsignificant and positive impacts (Guan et al"


id: 4e16f814fa0a73105e9f962132c59d46
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 9708
content:
"Wildland fires account for approximately 70% of the global biomass \r\nburned annually (van der Werf et al. 2017) and constitute a  large \r\nglobal source of atmospheric trace gases and aerosols (Gunsch et al. \r\n2018) (IPCC WGI AR6). Although fires are part of the natural system, \r\nthe frequency of fires has increased in many areas, exacerbated by \r\ndecreases in precipitation, including in many regions with humid and \r\ntemperate forests that rarely experience large-scale fires naturally. \r\nNatural and human-ignited fires affect all major biomes, from \r\npeatlands through shrublands to tropical and boreal forests, altering \r\necosystem structure and functioning (Arganaraz et al. 2015; Nunes \r\net al. 2016; Remy et al. 2017; Mancini et al. 2018; Aragao et al. 2018; \r\nEngel et al. 2019; Rodriguez Vasquez et al. 2021)"


id: a4b6075c07306216d8980d931d0f985c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 23484
content:
" However, the degree \r\nof incidence and regional trends are quite different and a study over \r\n14 years indicated, on average, the largest fires in Australia, boreal \r\nNorth America and Northern Hemisphere Africa (Andela et al. 2019). \r\nMore than half of the terrestrial surface of the Earth has fire regimes \r\noutside the range of natural variability, with changes in fire frequency \r\nand intensity posing major challenges for land restoration and \r\nrecovery (Barger et al. 2018). In some ecosystems, fire prevention \r\nmight lead to accumulation of large fuel loads that enable wildfires \r\n(Moreira et al. 2020a)."


id: 70dfe8026801b6a8a98ebc6729e3a372
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15392
content:
"About 98 Mha of forest and savannahs are estimated to have been \r\naffected by fire in 2015 (FAO and UNEP 2020). Fire is a prevalent \r\nforest disturbance in the tropics where about 4% of the total forest \r\nand savannah area in that year was burned and more than two\u0002thirds of the total area affected was in Africa and South America; \r\nmostly open savanna types (FAO and UNEP 2020). Fires have many \r\ndifferent causes, with land clearing for agriculture the primary driver \r\nin tropical regions, for example, clearance for industrial oil-palm and \r\npaper-pulp plantations in Indonesia (Chisholm et al. 2016), or for \r\npastures in the Amazon (Barlow et al. 2020). Other socio-economic \r\nfactors are also associated with wildfire regimes such as land-use \r\nconflict and socio-demographic aspects (Nunes et al. 2016; Mancini \r\net al. 2018)"


id: 649bfabeeacc18aec684a5cf3be42092
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13401
content:
" Wildfire regimes are also changing by the influence \r\nof climate change, with wildfire seasons becoming longer, wildfire \r\naverage size increases in many areas and wildfires occurring in areas \r\nwhere they did not occur before (Jolly et al. 2015; Artes et al. 2019). \r\nHuman influence has likely increased fire weather in some regions of \r\nall inhabited continents (IPCC AR6 WGI Technical Summary) and, in \r\nthe last years, fire seasons of unprecedented magnitude occurred \r\nin diverse regions as California (Goss et al. 2020), the Mediterranean \r\nbasin (Ruffault et al. 2020), Canada (Kirchmeier-Young et al. 2019) \r\nwith unprecedented fires in British Columbia in 2021, the Arctic and \r\nSiberia (McCarty et al. 2020), Brazilian Amazon (Silva et al. 2021) \r\nand Pantanal (Leal Filho et al. 2021), Chile (Bowman et al. 2019) and "


id: 3d20c4ba9f3e6a381a3246bf5ab9a24e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6982
content:
"Over-extraction of wood for timber and fuelwood is identified as \r\nan important driver of mangrove deforestation and degradation \r\n(Bhattarai 2011; Ajonina et al. 2014; Webb et al. 2014; Giri et al. 2015; \r\nThomas et al. 2017; Fauzi et al. 2019). Unsustainable selective logging \r\nand over-extraction of wood is a  substantial form of forest and \r\nmangrove degradation in many tropical and developing countries, \r\nwith emissions associated with the extracted wood, incidental \r\ndamage to the surrounding forest and from logging infrastructure \r\n(Bhattarai 2011; Ajonina et al. 2014; Webb et al. 2014; Pearson \r\net al. 2014, Giri et al. 2015; Thomas et al. 2017; Fauzi et al. 2019). \r\nTraditional fuelwood and charcoal continue to represent a dominant \r\nshare of total wood consumption in low-income countries (Barger \r\net al. 2018)"


id: e50f39fc79ea6c327d89924d97cf21b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33528
content:
" Regionally, the percentage of total wood harvested used \r\nas fuelwood varies from 90% in Africa, 62% in Asia, 50% in South \r\nAmerica to less than 20% in Europe, North America and Oceania. \r\nUnder current projections, efforts to intensify wood production in \r\nplantation forests, together with increases in fuel-use efficiency and \r\nelectrification, are suggested to only partly alleviate the pressure on \r\nnative forests (Barger et al. 2018). Nevertheless, the area of forest \r\nunder management plans has increased in all regions since 2000 "


id: 1fc8b5cac34151265c7473d4034e2580
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2435
content:
"Enteric fermentation dominates agricultural CH4 emissions \r\n(Section  7.2.3) with emissions being a  function of both ruminant \r\nanimal numbers and productivity (output per animal). In addition \r\nto enteric fermentation, both CH4 and N2O emissions from manure \r\nmanagement (i.e., manure storage and application) and deposition \r\non pasture, make livestock the main agricultural emissions source \r\n(Tubiello 2019). The AR5 reported increases in populations of all \r\nmajor livestock categories between the 1970s and 2000s, including \r\nruminants, with increasing numbers directly linked with increasing \r\nCH4 emissions (Smith et al. 2014). The SRCCL identified managed \r\npastures as a disproportionately high N2O emissions source within \r\ngrazing lands, with medium confidence that increased manure \r\nproduction and deposition was a key driver (Jia et al. 2019). The latest \r\ndata (FAO 2021c) indicate continued global livestock population \r\ngrowth between 1990 and 2019 (Figure  7"


id: 9b1f3849b211e12409db53820537bb2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21945
content:
"10), including increases \r\nof 18% in cattle and buffalo numbers, and 30% in sheep and goat \r\nnumbers, corresponding with CH4 emission trends. Data also indicate \r\nincreased productivity per animal for example, average increases of \r\n16% in beef, 17% in pig meat and 70% in whole (cow) milk per \r\nrespective animal between 1990 and 2019 (FAO 2021c). Despite these \r\nadvances leading to reduced emissions per unit of product (calories, \r\nmeat and milk) (FAO 2016; Tubiello 2019), increased individual \r\nanimal productivity generally requires increased inputs (e.g.,  feed) \r\nand this generates increased emissions (Beauchemin et al. 2020). \r\nManipulation of livestock diets, or improvements in animal genetics \r\nor health may counteract some of this. In addition, the production of \r\ninputs to facilitate increased animal productivity, may indirectly drive \r\nfurther absolute GHG emissions along the feed supply chain."


id: b0ae9780b84afe393d25964f1bb1ac6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25318
content:
"Both AR5 and the SRCCL described considerable increases in global \r\nuse of synthetic nitrogen fertilisers since the 1970s, which was \r\nidentified to be a major driver of increasing N2O emissions (Jia et al. \r\n2019). The latest data document a 41% increase in global nitrogen \r\nfertiliser use between 1990 and 2019 (FAO 2021e) corresponding \r\nwith associated increased N2O emissions (Figure  7.3). Increased \r\nfertiliser use has been driven by pursuit of increased crop yields, with \r\nfor example, a 61% increase in average global cereal yield per hectare \r\nobserved during the same period (FAO 2021c), achieved through \r\nboth increased fertiliser use and varietal improvements. Increased \r\nyields are in response to increased demand for food, feed, fuel \r\nand fibre crops which in turn has been driven by a growing human \r\npopulation (FAO, 2019), increased demand for animal-sourced food \r\nand bioenergy policy (OECD/FAO 2019)"


id: e6c80dd0f142042ff941694cbd1f0421
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33792
content:
" Global crop production is \r\nprojected to increase by almost 15% over the next decade, with low \r\nincome and emerging regions with greater availability of land and \r\nlabour resources expected to experience the strongest growth, and \r\naccount for about 50% of global output growth (OECD/FAO 2019). \r\nIncreases in global nitrogen fertiliser use are also projected, notably \r\nin low income and emerging regions (USEPA 2019)."


id: 95c681748b986e60e935705aaa95797c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21062
content:
"AFOLU mitigation or land-based climate change mitigation (used in \r\nthis chapter interchangeably) are a variety of land management or \r\ndemand management practices that reduce GHG emissions and/or \r\nenhance carbon sequestration within the land system (i.e., in forests, \r\nwetlands, grasslands, croplands and pasturelands). If implemented \r\nwith benefits to human well-being and biodiversity, land-based \r\nmitigation measures are often referred to as nature-based solutions \r\nand/or natural climate solutions (Glossary). Measures that result in \r\na net removal of GHGs from the atmosphere and storage in either \r\nliving or dead organic material, or in geological stores, are known \r\nas CDR, and in previous IPCC reports were sometimes referred to as \r\ngreenhouse gas removal (GGR) or negative emissions technologies \r\n(NETs) (Rogelj et al. 2018a; Jia et al. 2019)"


id: 3bb54e40f5ccc719c32d26007f15d877
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6750
content:
" This section evaluates \r\ncurrent knowledge and latest scientific literature on AFOLU \r\nmitigation measures and potentials, including land-based CDR \r\nmeasures. Section 7.4.1 provides an overview of the approaches for \r\nestimating mitigation potential, the co-benefits and risks from land\u0002based mitigation measures, estimated global and regional mitigation \r\npotential and associated costs according to literature published over \r\nthe last decade. Subsequent subsections assess literature on 20 key \r\nAFOLU mitigation measures specifically providing:"


id: ec1b48309f04ef4bd9eb66a76e6f2091
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34645
content:
"Mitigation potentials for AFOLU measures are estimated by \r\ncalculating the scale of emissions reductions or carbon sequestration \r\nagainst a counterfactual scenario without mitigation activities. The \r\ntypes of mitigation potential estimates in recent literature include: \r\n(i) technical potential (the biophysical potential or amount possible \r\nwith current technologies); (ii) economic potential (constrained by \r\ncosts, usually by a  given carbon price (Table  7.3); (iii) sustainable \r\npotential (constrained by environmental safeguards and/or natural \r\nresources, e.g., limiting natural forest conversion), and (iv) feasible \r\npotential (constrained by environmental, socio-cultural, and/or \r\ninstitutional barriers), however, there are no set definitions used in \r\nliterature"


id: d74d515dbbfa9702f91496090b1c449e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 31389
content:
" In addition to types of mitigation estimates, there are two \r\nAFOLU mitigation categories often calculated: supply-side measures \r\n(land management interventions) and demand-side measures \r\n(interventions that require a change in consumer behaviour)."


id: d3093e6024558912206879d402aca84e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 30723
content:
"Two main approaches to estimating mitigation potentials include: \r\n(i) studies on individual measures and/or sectors  - henceforth \r\nreferred to as sectoral assessments, and (ii) integrated assessment \r\nmodels (IAM). Sectoral assessments include studies focusing on one \r\nactivity (e.g.,  agroforestry) based on spatial and biophysical data, \r\nas well as econometric and optimisation models for a  sector, for \r\nexample, the forest or agriculture sector, and therefore cover a large \r\nsuite of practices and activities while representing a broad body of \r\nliterature. Sectoral assessments, however, rarely capture cross-sector \r\ninteractions or impacts, making it difficult to completely account for \r\nland competition, trade-offs, and double counting when aggregating \r\nsectoral estimates across different studies and methods (Smith et al. \r\n2014; Jia et al. 2019)"


id: bb84bf6c12ac012b7aea4855c0db046b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 27061
content:
" On the other hand, IAMs assess the climate \r\nimpact of multiple and interlinked practices across sectors and \r\ntherefore, can account for interactions and trade-offs (including land \r\ncompetition, use of other resources and international trade) between \r\nthem. However, the number of land-based measures used in IAMs \r\nare limited compared with the sectoral portfolio (Figure 7.11). The \r\nresolution of land-based measures in IAMs are also generally coarser \r\ncompared to some sectoral estimates, and as such, may be less \r\nrobust for individual measures (Roe et al. 2021). Given the differences \r\nbetween and strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches, it is \r\nhelpful to compare the estimates from both. We combine estimates \r\nfrom both approaches to establish an updated range of global land\u0002based mitigation potential."


id: d7710337a127f9d05c8abf04a098eb0c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 31417
content:
"Measures are categorised as supply-side activities in: (i) forests and \r\nother ecosystems (Section  7.4.2); (ii) agriculture (Section  7.4.3); \r\n(iii) bioenergy and other land-based energy technologies (Section 7.4.4); \r\nas well as (iv) demand-side activities (Section 7.4.5 and Figure 7.11). \r\nSeveral information boxes are dispersed within the section and \r\nprovide supporting material, including case studies exploring a range \r\nof topics from climate-smart forestry in Europe (Box 7.2), agroforestry \r\nin Brazil (Box 7.3), climate-smart village approaches (Box 7.4), farm \r\nsystems approaches (Box  7.5), mitigation within Indian agriculture \r\n(Box 7.6), and bioenergy and BECCS mitigation calculations (Box 7.7). \r\nNovel measures, including enhanced weathering and novel foods are \r\ncovered in Chapter 12, this report. In addition, as mitigation within \r\nAFOLU concerns land management and use of land resources, AFOLU \r\nmeasures impact other sectors"


id: 59c8db9ffe7c83a980a586ba37fea275
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 11631
content:
" Accordingly, AFOLU measures are \r\nalso discussed in other sectoral chapters within this report, notably \r\ndemand-side solutions (Chapter  5), bioenergy and bioenergy with \r\ncarbon capture and storage (BECCS) (Chapter  6), the use of wood \r\nproducts and biomass in buildings (Chapter  9), and CDR measures, \r\nfood systems and land related impacts, risks and opportunities of \r\nmitigation measures (Chapter 12)."


id: a8875c4efba04e749c359bc4bd2b10d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24042
content:
"While it is helpful to assess the general benefits, risks and \r\nopportunities possible for land-based mitigation measures \r\n(L.G. Smith et al. 2019), their efficacy and scale of benefit or risk \r\nlargely depends on the type of activity undertaken, deployment \r\nstrategy (e.g.,  scale, method), and context (e.g.,  soil, biome, \r\nclimate, food system, land ownership) that vary geographically \r\nand over time (robust evidence, high agreement) (L.G. Smith et al. \r\n2019; P.  Smith et al. 2019a; Hurlbert et al. 2019) (Section  12.5).\r\nImpacts of land-based mitigation measures are therefore highly \r\ncontext specific and conclusions from specific studies may not be \r\nuniversally applicable"


id: 1392e6f25cb8d8cf3262db8e856607c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 584
content:
" If implemented at appropriate scales and \r\nin a  sustainable manner, land-based mitigation practices have \r\nthe capacity to reduce emissions and sequester billions of tonnes \r\nof carbon from the atmosphere over coming decades, while also \r\npreserving or enhancing biodiversity, water quality and supply, air \r\nquality, soil fertility, food and wood security, livelihoods, resilience \r\nto droughts, floods and other natural disasters, and positively \r\ncontributing to ecosystem health and human well-being (high \r\nconfidence) (Toensmeier 2016; Karlsson et al. 2020)."


id: bb2d6a6e3fae428ac2339f87db5f1996
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26992
content:
"IPCC SRCCL (2019). The SRCCL assessed the full range of technical, \r\neconomic and sustainability mitigation potentials in AFOLU for the \r\nperiod 2030-2050 and identified reduced deforestation and forest \r\ndegradation to have greatest potential for reducing supply-side \r\nemissions (0.4 to 5.8 GtCO2-eq yr-1) (high confidence) followed by \r\ncombined agriculture measures, 0.3 to 3.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (medium \r\nconfidence) (Jia et al. 2019). For the demand-side estimates, shifting \r\ntowards healthy, sustainable diets (0.7 to 8.0 GtCO2-eq yr-1) (high \r\nconfidence) had the highest potential, followed by reduced food loss \r\nand waste (0.8 to 4.5 GtCO2-eq yr-1) (high confidence). Measures \r\nwith greatest potential for CDR were afforestation/reforestation \r\n(0.5 to 10.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1) (medium confidence), soil carbon \r\nsequestration in croplands and grasslands (0.4 to 8.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1) \r\n(medium confidence) and BECCS (0.4 to 11.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1) (medium \r\nconfidence)"


id: 59382c0402d8d6b046a5fc08c0dccd67
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11530
content:
" The SRCCL did not explore regional potential, associated \r\nfeasibility nor provide detailed analysis of costs."


id: f279c1cc39007543d30310af76924e1e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35673
content:
"IPCC AR6. This assessment concludes the likely range of global land\u0002based mitigation potential is approximately 8-14 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nbetween 2020-2050 with carbon prices up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1, \r\nabout half of the technical potential (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). About 30-50% could be achieved <USD20 tCO2-eq-1\r\n(Table  7.3). The global economic potential estimates in this \r\nassessment are slightly higher than the AR5 range. Since AR5, there \r\nhave been numerous new global assessments of sectoral land-based \r\nmitigation potential (Fuss et al. 2018; Griscom et al. 2017, 2020; Roe \r\net al. 2019; Jia et al. 2019; Griscom et al. 2020; Roe et al. 2021) as well \r\nas IAM estimates of mitigation potential (Riahi et al. 2017; Popp et al. \r\n2017; Rogelj et al. 2018a; Frank et al. 2019; Johnston and Radeloff \r\n2019; Baker et al. 2019), expanding the scope of AFOLU mitigation \r\nmeasures included and substantially improving the robustness and \r\nspatial resolution of mitigation estimates"


id: 67a0911fbfe4de2a11d761c64c0997f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13896
content:
" A  recent development \r\nis an assessment of country-level technical and economic \r\n(USD100 tCO2-eq-1) mitigation potential for 20  AFOLU measures, \r\nincluding for demand-side and soil organic carbon sequestration in \r\ncroplands and grasslands, not estimated before (Roe  et al. 2021). \r\nEstimates on costs, feasibility, sustainability, benefits, and risks \r\nhave also been developed for some mitigation measures, and they \r\ncontinue to be active areas of research. Developing more refined \r\nsustainable potentials at a country-level will be an important next \r\nstep. Although most mitigation estimates still do not consider the \r\nimpact of future climate change, there are some emerging studies "


id: 1fbc7feb5eedba2f9f28014534fce6ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2427
content:
"Overall, measures in the AFOLU sector are uniquely positioned to \r\ndeliver substantial co-benefits. However, the negative consequences \r\nof inappropriate or misguided design and implementation of \r\nmeasures may be considerable, potentially impacting for example, \r\nmitigation permanence, longevity, and leakage, biodiversity, wider \r\necosystem functioning, livelihoods, food security and human well\u0002being (Section  7.6) (AR6 WGII, Box  2.2). Land-based mitigation \r\nmay also face limitations and trade-offs in achieving sustained \r\nemission reductions and/or removals due to other land challenges \r\nincluding climate change impacts"


id: c0e07d674c4eb600d5332176b2bf6049
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27915
content:
" It is widely recognised that land\u0002use planning that is context-specific, considers other sustainable \r\ndevelopment goals, and is adaptable over time can help achieve \r\nland-based mitigation that maximises co-benefits, avoids or limits \r\ntrade-offs, and delivers on international policy goals including the \r\nSDGs, Land Degradation Neutrality, and Convention on Biological \r\nDiversity (Section 7.6; Chapter 12)."


id: 22abe1f351ced41d3e721b3fedd65da9
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"Table 7.3 | Estimated annual mitigation potential (GtCO2-eq yr-1) in 2020-2050 of AFOLU mitigation options by carbon price. Estimates reflect sectoral \r\nstudies based on a comprehensive literature review updating data from (Roe et al. 2019) and integrated assessment models using the IPCC AR6 database (Section 7.5). \r\nValues represent the mean, and full range of potential. Sectoral mitigation estimates are averaged for the years 2020-2050 to capture a wider range of literature, and the \r\nIAM estimates are given for 2050 as many model assumptions delay most land-based mitigation to mid-century. The sectoral potentials are the sum of global estimates for \r\nthe individual measures listed for each option. IAM potentials are given for mitigation options with available data; for example, net land-use CO2 for total forests and other \r\necosystems, and land sequestration from A/R, but not reduced deforestation (protect)"


id: 7797a3a28f30778d31aacd89914173e8
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" Sectoral estimates predominantly use GWP100 IPCC AR5 values (CH4 = 28, N2O = 265), \r\nalthough some use GWP100 IPCC AR4 values (CH4 = 25, N2O = 298); and the IAMs use GWP100 IPCC AR6 values (CH4 = 27, N2O = 273). The sectoral and IAM estimates \r\nreflected here do not account for the substitution effects of avoiding fossil fuel emissions nor emissions from other more energy intensive resources/materials. For example, \r\nBECCS estimates only consider the carbon dioxide removal (CDR) via geological storage component and not potential mitigation derived from the displacement of fossil fuel \r\nuse in the energy sector. Mitigation potential from substitution effects are included in the other sectoral chapters like energy, transport, buildings and industry. The total AFOLU \r\nsectoral estimate aggregates potential from agriculture, forests and other ecosystems, and diverted agricultural production from avoided food waste and diet shifts (excluding \r\nland-use impacts to avoid double counting)"


id: af7ebf1a8936363d9641f1b4666304f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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" Because of potential overlaps between measures, sectoral values from BECCS and the full value chain potential from demand-side \r\nmeasures are not summed with AFOLU. IAMs account for land competition and resource optimisation and can therefore sum across all available categories to derive the total \r\nAFOLU potential. Key: ND = no data; Sectoral = as assessed by sectoral literature review; IAM = as assessed by integrated assessment models; EJ = exajoule primary energy."


id: fcb00d7a0be17f492891c36fdce03a71
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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"assessment models (IAMs), the economic potential for land-based \r\nmitigation (Agriculture, LULUCF and BECCS) for USD100 tCO2-eq-1\r\nis 7.9 mean (4.1-17.3 range) GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2050 (Table  7.3). \r\nWe add the estimate for BECCS here to provide the full land\u0002based potential, as IAMs optimise land allocation based on costs, \r\nwhich displaces land-based CDR activities for BECCS.  Combining \r\nboth IAM and sectoral approaches, the likely range is therefore \r\n7.9-13.6 (rounded to 8-14) GtCO2-eq yr-1 up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1\r\nbetween 2020-2050. Considering both IAM and sectoral economic \r\npotential estimates, land-based mitigation could have the capacity \r\nto make the AFOLU sector net negative in GHG emissions from 2036 \r\n(Figure 7.12), although there are highly variable mitigation strategies \r\nfor how AFOLU potential can be deployed for achieving climate \r\ntargets (Illustrative Mitigation Pathways in Section 7.5.5)"


id: c0cb6fdda6b12355e7cc3db6097d8c2b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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" Economic \r\npotential estimates, which reflect a public willingness to pay, may be \r\nmore relevant for policy making compared with technical potentials \r\nwhich reflect a  theoretical maximum that may not be feasible \r\nor sustainable."


id: 5f68330c6eedefbe1c6ec28891b38c6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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"Regionally, economic mitigation potential up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1\r\nis estimated to be greatest in tropical countries in Asia and Pacific \r\n(34%), Latin America and the Caribbean (24%), and Africa and the \r\nMiddle East (18%) because of the large potential from reducing \r\ndeforestation and sequestering carbon in forests and agriculture \r\n(Figure  7.11). However, there is also considerable potential in \r\nDeveloped Countries (18%) and more modest potential in Eastern \r\nEurope and West-Central Asia (5%). These results are in line with the \r\nIAM regional mitigation potentials (Figure 7.11). The protection of \r\nforests and other ecosystems is the dominant source of mitigation \r\npotential in tropical regions, whereas carbon sequestration \r\nin  agricultural land and demand-side measures are important in \r\nDeveloped Countries and Asia and Pacific. The restoration and \r\nmanagement of forests and other ecosystems is more geographically \r\ndistributed, with all regions having significant potential"


id: 2732486b6cf925e0c177866ab54ec54d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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" Regions \r\nwith large livestock herds (Developed Countries, Latin America) and \r\nrice paddy fields (Asia and Pacific) have potential to reduce CH4. As \r\nexpected, the highest total potential is associated with countries and \r\nregions with large land areas, however when considering mitigation \r\ndensity (total potential per hectare), many smaller countries, \r\nparticularly those with wetlands have disproportionately high levels \r\nof mitigation for their size (Roe et al. 2021). As global commodity \r\nmarkets connect regions, AFOLU measures may create synergies and \r\ntrade-offs across the world, which could make national demand-side \r\nmeasures for example, important in mitigating supply-side emissions \r\nelsewhere (Kallio et al. 2018)."


id: 8063ad48028a53d43cec7d4ed8a37fde
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Among the mitigation options, the protection, improved management, \r\nand restoration of forests and other ecosystems (wetlands, savannas \r\nand grasslands) have the largest potential to reduce emissions \r\nand/or sequester carbon at 7.3 (3.9-13.1) GtCO2-eq yr-1 (up to \r\nUSD100 tCO2-eq-1), with measures that 'protect' having the single \r\nhighest total mitigation and mitigation densities (mitigation per \r\narea) in AFOLU (Table 7.3 and Figure 7.11). Agriculture provides the \r\nsecond largest share of mitigation, with 4.1 (1.7-6.7) GtCO2-eq yr-1 \r\npotential (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1), from soil carbon management \r\nin croplands and grasslands, agroforestry, biochar, rice cultivation, \r\nand livestock and nutrient management (Table 7.3 and Figure 7.11). \r\nDemand-side measures including shifting to sustainable healthy diets, \r\nreducing food waste, and improving wood products can mitigate \r\n2.2 (1.1-3"


id: 1daee773230b589dec5d2f3bdb1deac0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"6) GtCO2-eq yr-1 when accounting only for diverted \r\nagricultural production from diets and food waste to avoid double \r\ncounting with measures in forests and other ecosystems (Table 7.3 \r\nand Figure 7.11). The potential of demand-side measures increases \r\nthree-fold, to 6.5 (4-9.5) GtCO2-eq yr-1 when accounting for the \r\nentire value chain including land-use effects, but would overlap with \r\nother measures and is therefore not additive."


id: 195c5f38b324766bde77d0d93f76d1ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Although economic potentials provide more realistic, near-term \r\nclimate mitigation compared to technical potentials, they still do not \r\naccount for feasibility barriers and enabling conditions that vary by \r\nregion and country. For example, according to most models, including \r\nIAMs, avoided deforestation is the cheapest land-based mitigation \r\noption (Table 7.3, Sections 7.5.3 and 7.5.4), however implementing \r\ninterventions aimed at reducing deforestation (including REDD+) \r\noften have higher transaction and implementation costs than \r\nexpected due to various barriers and enabling conditions (Luttrell \r\net al. 2018) (Section  7.6). The feasibility of implementing AFOLU \r\nmitigation measures, including those with multiple co-benefits, \r\ndepends on varying economic, technological, institutional, socio\u0002cultural, environmental and geophysical barriers (high confidence) \r\n(L.G.  Smith et al. 2019)"


id: 99defadf3113cd6c704efc3a8408d85e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" The section for each individual mitigation \r\nmeasure provides an overview of co-benefits and risks associated \r\nwith the measure and Section 7.6.6 outlines key enabling factors and \r\nbarriers for implementation."


id: ac1b1c5aded938a8c57f3765e05e322a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Most mitigation options are available and ready to deploy. \r\nEmissions reductions can be unlocked relatively quickly, whereas \r\nCDR need upfront investment to generate sequestration over \r\ntime. The protection of natural ecosystems, carbon sequestration \r\nin agriculture, sustainable healthy diets and reduced food waste \r\nhave especially high co-benefits and cost efficiency. Avoiding the \r\nconversion of carbon-rich primary peatlands, coastal wetlands and \r\nforests is particularly important as most carbon lost from those \r\necosystems are irrecoverable through restoration by the 2050 \r\ntimeline of achieving net zero carbon emissions (Goldstein et al. \r\n2020)"


id: 88b7e42d63aad544352bc88a18db1124
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" Sustainable intensification, shifting diets, reducing food waste \r\ncould enhance efficiencies and reduce agricultural land needs, and \r\nare therefore critical for enabling supply-side measures such as \r\nreduced deforestation, restoration, as well as reducing N2O and CH4\r\nemissions from agricultural production - as seen in the Illustrative \r\nMitigation Pathway (IMP-SP) (Section  7.5.6). Although agriculture \r\nmeasures that reduce non-CO2, particularly of CH4, are important for "


id: 96da7d5dab30f4d44b8a101024bce639
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Figure 7.12 | Historic land sector GHG flux estimates and illustrative AFOLU mitigation pathways to 2050, based on data presented in Sections 7.2, 7.4 \r\nand 7.5. Historic trends consider both A anthropogenic (AFOLU) GHG fluxes (GtCO2-eq yr-1) according to FAOSTAT (FAO 2021a; 2021b) and B the estimated natural land CO2\r\nsink according to (Friedlingstein et al. 2020). Note that for the anthropogenic net land CO2 flux component, several approaches and methods are described within the literature \r\n(Section 7.2.2) with a wide range in estimates. For clarity, only one dataset (FAOSTAT) is illustrated here. It is not intended to indicate preference for one particular method \r\nover others. Historic flux trends are illustrated to 2019, the latest year for which data is available. Projected economic mitigation potential (at costs of up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) \r\nincludes estimates from IAMs and sectoral studies (Table 7.3)"


id: 63236d6a4328b23955a44ff29b00fa95
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" The 'sectoral studies' are disaggregated into several cumulative parts: first 'sectoral studies' involves measures \r\nin agriculture, forests and other ecosystems, then an additional BECCS share ('+ BECCS'), then the additional effect of demand-side measures and BECCS ('+BECCS and \r\ndemand-side measures'). The latter only accounting for diverted agricultural production to avoid double counting. Projected mitigation assumes adoption of measures to achieve \r\nincreasing, linear mitigation, reaching average annual potential in 2050, although this does not reflect deployment rates for most measures. For illustrative purposes, a pathway \r\nto projected emissions in 2050 according to a scenario of current policy (C7 - above 3.0degC - Model: GCAM 5.3) is additionally included for reference."


id: 307ea9931e548de45a77330530ba63ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Afforestation and reforestation (A/R) are activities that \r\nconvert land to forest, where reforestation is on land that has previously \r\ncontained forests, while afforestation is on land that historically has \r\nnot been forested (Box  7.2). Forest restoration refers to a  form of \r\nreforestation that gives more priority to ecological integrity as well, \r\neven though it can still be a managed forest. Depending on the location, \r\nscale, and choice and management of tree species, A/R activities have \r\na wide variety of co-benefits and trade-offs. Well-planned, sustainable \r\nreforestation and forest restoration can enhance climate resilience \r\nand biodiversity, and provide a variety of ecosystem services including \r\nwater regulation, microclimatic regulation, soil erosion protection, \r\nas well as renewable resources, income and livelihoods (Locatelli \r\net al. 2015; Stanturf et al. 2015; Ellison et al"


id: 8fca32d5a0df626aaf159addfbb7512f
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" 2017; Verkerk et al. 2020). \r\nAfforestation, when well planned, can help address land degradation \r\nand desertification by reducing runoff and erosion and lead to cloud \r\nformation however, when not well planned, there are localised trade\u0002offs such as reduced water yield or biodiversity (Teuling et al. 2017; \r\nEllison et al. 2017). The use of non-native species and monocultures may \r\nhave adverse impacts on ecosystem structure and function, and water \r\navailability, particularly in dry regions (Ellison et al. 2017). A/R activities \r\nmay change the surface albedo and evapotranspiration regimes, \r\nproducing net cooling in the tropical and subtropical latitudes for local \r\nand global climate and net warming at high latitudes (Section 7.4.2). \r\nVery large-scale implementation of A/R may negatively affect food \r\nsecurity since an increase in global forest area can increase food prices \r\nthrough land competition (Kreidenweis et al. 2016)."


id: 150d058afec3de66098627d4eddf71d1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Since the SRCCL, several studies have provided \r\nupdated and convergent estimates of economic mitigation potentials \r\nby region (Busch et al. 2019; Griscom et al. 2020; Austin et al. 2020; \r\nRoe et al. 2021). Tropical forests and savannas in Latin America \r\nprovide the largest share of mitigation potential (3.9 GtCO2 yr-1\r\ntechnical, 2.5 GtCO2 yr-1 at USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) followed by South-East \r\nAsia (2.2 GtCO2 yr-1 technical, 1.5 GtCO2 yr-1 at USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) and \r\nAfrica (2.2 GtCO2 yr-1 technical, 1.2 GtCO2 yr-1 at USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) \r\n(Roe et al. 2021). Tropical forests continue to account for the \r\nhighest rates of deforestation and associated GHG emissions. While \r\ndeforestation shows signs of decreasing in several countries, \r\nin others, it continues at a  high rate or is increasing (Turubanova \r\net al. 2018). Between 2010-2020, the rate of net forest loss was \r\n4"


id: cf04a0a83e3d8453b81c89c1bbea563e
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content:
"7 Mha yr-1 with Africa and South America presenting the largest \r\nshares (3.9 Mha and 2.6 Mha, respectively) (FAO 2020a)."


id: 23a6af2e71deccdb6858c1aeec22a838
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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"A major uncertainty in all studies on avoided deforestation potential \r\nis their reliance on future reference levels that vary across studies and \r\napproaches. If food demand increases in the future, for example, the \r\narea of land deforested will likely increase, suggesting more technical \r\npotential for avoiding deforestation. Transboundary leakage due to \r\nmarket adjustments could also increase costs or reduce effectiveness \r\nof avoiding deforestation (e.g., Ingalls et al. 2018; Gingrich et al. 2019). \r\nRegarding forest regrowth, there are uncertainties about the time for \r\nthe secondary forest carbon saturation (Houghton and Nassikas 2017; \r\nZhu et al. 2018)"


id: 5569dfb522e85aa6677a35f94f5a96c4
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" Permanence of avoided deforestation may also be \r\na  concern due to the impacts of climate change and disturbance of \r\nother biogeochemical cycles on the world's forests that can result in \r\nfuture potential changes in terrestrial ecosystem productivity, climate\u0002driven vegetation migration, wildfires, forest regrowth and carbon \r\ndynamics (Ballantyne et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2017b; Lovejoy and Nobre \r\n2018; Aragao et al. 2018)."


id: 1b8c916329075ea9f4333c7cf6ab8246
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"carbon pools and implementation on a rather theoretical maximum \r\nof 678 Mha of land (Griscom et al. 2017; Roe et al. 2019). The lower \r\nestimates represent the minimum range from an Earth System Model \r\nand a  sustainable global CDR potential (Fuss et al. 2018). Climate \r\nchange will affect the mitigation potential of reforestation due to \r\nimpacts in forest growth and composition, as well as changes in \r\ndisturbances including fire. However, none of the mitigation estimates \r\nincluded in the SRCCL account for climate impacts.\r\nDevelopments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Since SRCCL, additional studies have been \r\npublished on A/R mitigation potential by Bastin et al. (2019), Lewis \r\net al. (2019), Doelman et al. (2019), Favero et al. (2020) and Austin \r\net al. (2020). These studies are within the range reported in the \r\nSRCCL stretching the potentials at the higher range"


id: f5603a77dacb6e53246556e386c721b6
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" The rising public \r\ninterest in nature-based solutions, along with high profile initiatives \r\nbeing launched (UN Decade on Restoration announced in 2019, the \r\nBonn challenge on 150 million ha of restored forest in 2020 and the \r\none trillion trees campaign launched by the World Economic Forum in \r\n2020), has prompted intense discussions on the scale, effectiveness, \r\nand pitfalls of A/R and tree planting for climate mitigation (Luyssaert \r\net al. 2018; Bond et al. 2019; Anderegg et al. 2020; Heilmayr et al. \r\n2020; Holl and Brancalion 2020). The sometimes sole attention on \r\nafforestation and reforestation - suggesting it may solve the climate \r\nproblem to large extent, in combination with the very high estimates \r\nof potentials - have led to polarisation in the debate, resulting in \r\ncriticism to these measures or an emphasis on nature restoration only \r\n(Lewis et al. 2019)"


id: d5953482a7e212ecc7fbfeabca6cf79c
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content:
" Our assessment based on most recent literature \r\nproduced regional economic mitigation potential at USD100 tCO2\r\n-1\r\nestimate of 100-400 MtCO2 yr-1 in Africa, 210-266 MtCO2 yr-1 in Asia \r\nand Pacific, 291 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Developed Countries (87% in North \r\nAmerica), 30 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia, \r\nand 345-898 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Latin America and Caribbean (Roe \r\net al. 2021), which totals to about 1200 MtCO2 yr-1, leaning to the \r\nlower range of the potentials in earlier IPCC reports. A recent global \r\nassessment of the aggregate costs for afforestation and reforestation \r\nsuggests that at USD100 tCO2\r\n-1, 1.6 GtCO2 yr-1 could be sequestered \r\nglobally for an annual cost of USD130 billion (Austin et al. 2020). \r\nSectoral studies that are able to deal with local circumstances and \r\nlimits estimate A/R potentials at 20 MtCO2 yr-1 in Russia (Eastern \r\nEurope and West-Central Asia) (Romanovskaya et al. 2020) and \r\n64 MtCO2 yr-1 in Europe (Nabuurs et al. 2017)"


id: a28a56239807d164e988c2ab5130e3d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" (Domke et al. 2020) \r\nestimated for the USA an additional 20% sequestration rate from \r\ntree planting to achieve full stocking capacity of all understocked \r\nproductive forestland, in total reaching 187 MtCO2 yr-1 sequestration. \r\nA new study on costs in the USA estimates 72-91 MtCO2 yr-1 could be \r\nsequestered between now and 2050 for USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 (Wade et al. \r\n2019). The tropical and subtropical latitudes are the most effective \r\nfor forest restoration in terms of carbon sequestration because of the \r\nrapid growth and lower albedo of the land surface compared with \r\nhigh latitudes (Lewis et al. 2019). Costs may be higher if albedo is \r\nconsidered in North America, Russia, and Africa (Favero et al. 2017). \r\nIn addition, a wide variety of sequestration rates have been collected \r\nand published in the IPCC Good Practice Guidance for the AFOLU \r\nsector (IPCC 2006).\r\nCritical assessment and conclusion. There is medium \r\nconfidence that the global technical mitigation potential "


id: 4ca31be5c2ceb5a32203c189e7322a9d
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content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Improved sustainable forest management of already \r\nmanaged forests can lead to higher forest carbon stocks, better \r\nquality of produced wood, continuously produced wood, while \r\nmaintaining and enhancing the forest carbon stock, and can also \r\npartially prevent and counteract the impacts of disturbances (Kurz \r\net al. 2008; Marlon et al. 2012; Abatzoglou and Williams 2016; Seidl \r\net al. 2017; Nabuurs et al. 2017; Tian et al. 2018; Ekholm 2020). \r\nFurthermore, it can provide benefits for climate change adaptation, \r\nbiodiversity conservation, microclimatic regulation, soil erosion \r\nprotection and water and flood regulation with reduced lateral \r\ncarbon fluxes (Ashton et al. 2012; Martinez-Mena et al. 2019; Verkerk \r\net al. 2020)"


id: 6ad9156b84fd5c1d277ed8fb8d4c38d6
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content:
" Often, in existing (managed) forests with existing \r\ncarbon stocks, large changes per hectare cannot be expected, \r\nalthough many forest owners may respond to carbon price incentives \r\n(Favero et al. 2020; Ekholm 2020). The full mitigation effects can be \r\nassessed in conjunction with the overall forest and wood use system \r\ni.e., carbon stock changes in standing trees, soil, harvested wood \r\nproducts (HWPs) and its bioenergy component with the avoided \r\nemissions through substitution. Forest management strategies aimed \r\nat increasing the biomass stock may have adverse side effects, such \r\nas decreasing the stand-level structural complexity, large emphasis \r\non pure fast-growing stands, risks for biodiversity and resilience to \r\nnatural disasters."


id: 9f4db076d5a43c8a210520dc944af7bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Generally, measures can consist of one or combination of longer \r\nrotations, less intensive harvests, continuous-cover forestry, mixed \r\nstands, more adapted species, selected provenances, high quality \r\nwood assortments, and so on. Further, there is a trade-off between \r\nmanagement in various parts of the forest product value chain, \r\nresulting in a wide range of results on the role of managed forests in \r\nmitigation (Agostini et al. 2013; Braun et al. 2016; Soimakallio et al. \r\n2016; Gustavsson et al. 2017; Erb et al. 2017; Favero et al. 2020; \r\nHurmekoski et al. 2020). Some studies conclude that reduction in \r\nforest carbon stocks due to harvest exceeds for decades the joint \r\nsequestration of carbon in harvested wood product stocks and \r\nemissions avoided through wood use (Soimakallio et al. 2016; Seppala \r\net al"


id: 5295a843700a2f1e5ae340b392b70952
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" 2019), whereas others emphasise country level examples where \r\ninvestments in forest management have led to higher growing stocks \r\nwhile producing more wood (Schulze et al. 2020; Ouden et al. 2020; \r\nCowie et al. 2021)."


id: bb148c298795217fd5b6ba0c25a32d85
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
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vector_id: 26978
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. There is medium confidence\r\nthat the global technical mitigation potential for improved forest \r\nmanagement by 2050 is 1.7 (1-2.1) GtCO2 yr-1, and the economic \r\nmitigation potential (<USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) is 1.1 (0.6-1.9) GtCO2 yr-1. \r\nEfforts to change forest management do not only require, for example, \r\na carbon price incentive, but especially require knowledge, institutions, \r\nskilled labour, good access and so on. These requirements outline \r\nthat although the potential is of medium size, we estimate a feasible \r\npotential towards the lower end. The net effect is also difficult to \r\nassess, as management changes impact not only the forest biomass, \r\nbut also the wood chain and substitution effects. Further, leakage can \r\narise from efforts to change management for carbon sequestration. \r\nEfforts, for example to set aside large areas of forest, may be partly \r\ncounteracted by higher harvesting pressures elsewhere (Kallio \r\net al. 2018)"


id: f68159df2072016bb1f0b5e602bcbd24
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" Studies such as (Austin et al. 2020) implicitly account \r\nfor leakage and thus suggest higher costs than other studies. We \r\ntherefore judge the mitigation potential at medium potential with \r\nmedium agreement."


id: 967b82a8679de4b993105d403a811db8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 21195
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Fire management objectives include safeguarding life, \r\nproperty, and resources through the prevention, detection, control, \r\nrestriction, and management of fire for diverse purposes in natural \r\necosystems (SRCCL, Chapter  6). Controlled burning is an effective \r\neconomic method of reducing fire danger and stimulating natural \r\nregeneration. Co-benefits of fire management include reduced air \r\npollution compared to much larger, uncontrolled fires, prevention \r\nof soil erosion and land degradation, biodiversity conservation \r\nin rangelands, and improvement of forage quality (Hurteau and \r\nBrooks 2011; Falk 2017; Hurteau et al. 2019). Fire management is \r\nstill challenging because it is not only fire suppression at times of \r\nfire, but especially proper natural resource management in between \r\nfire events"


id: e0f23f7939b6c50543a34f18e07dd47e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 32892
content:
" Furthermore, it is challenging because of legal and \r\npolicy issues, equity and rights concerns, governance, capacity, and \r\nresearch needs (Wiedinmyer and Hurteau 2010; Goldammer 2016; \r\nRussell-Smith et al. 2017). It will increasingly be needed under future \r\nenhanced climate change."


id: 720ef720303e1fa69a4154ac806e5660
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 15573
content:
"Savannas. Savannas constitute one of the most fire-prone vegetation \r\ntypes on Earth and are a significant source of GHG emissions. Savanna \r\nfires contributed 62% (4.92 PgCO2-eq yr-1)) of gross global mean \r\nfire emissions between 1997 and 2016. Regrowth from vegetation \r\npostfire sequesters the CO2 released into the atmosphere, but not \r\nthe CH4 and N2O emissions which contributed an approximate \r\nnet of 2.1 PgCO2-eq yr-1 (Lipsett-Moore et al. 2018). Therefore, \r\nimplementing prescribed burning with low intensity fires, principally \r\nin the early dry season, to effectively manage the risk of wildfires \r\noccurring in the late dry season is associated with reducing emissions \r\n(Whitehead et al. 2014). Considering this fire management practice, \r\nestimates of global opportunities for emissions reductions were \r\nestimated at 69.1 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Africa (29 countries, with 20 least \r\ndeveloped African countries accounting for 74% of the mitigation \r\npotential), 13"


id: 9e3881d55c363d9e5c208cfbcee643af
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"3 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in South America (six countries), and \r\n6.9 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in Australia and Papua New Guinea (Lipsett-Moore \r\net al. 2018). In Australia, savanna burning emissions abatement \r\nmethodologies have been available since 2012, and abatement has \r\nexceeded 9.3 MtCO2-eq mainly through the management of low \r\nintensity early dry season fire. Until September 2021, 78 projects were \r\nregistered (Australian Government, Clean Energy Regulator, 2021)."


id: e9be62b55e2009fc6816b0a88190b96d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 34274
content:
"ecological reasons (Kalies and Yocom Kent 2016). Fire resilience is \r\nincreasingly managed in Southwestern USA forest landscapes, which \r\nhave experienced droughts and widespread, high-severity wildfires \r\n(Keeley et al. 2019). In these forests, fire exclusion management, \r\ncoupled with a  warming climate, has led to increasingly severe \r\nwildfires (Hurteau et al. 2014). However, the impacts of prescribed \r\nfires in forests in reducing carbon emissions are still inconclusive. \r\nSome positive impacts of prescribed fires are associated with other \r\nfuel reduction techniques (Loudermilk et al. 2017; Flanagan et al. \r\n2019; Stephens et al. 2020), leading to maintaining carbon stocks and \r\nreducing carbon emissions in the future where extreme fire weather \r\nevents are more frequent (Krofcheck et al. 2018, 2019; Hurteau \r\net al. 2019; Bowman et al. 2020a,b; Goodwin et al. 2020). Land \r\nmanagement approaches will certainly need to consider the new \r\nclimatic conditions (e.g"


id: 6878b2cb4afda7a7f176cc15d39049d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 14026
content:
", the proportion of days in fire seasons with \r\nthe potential for unmanageable fires more than doubling in some \r\nregions in northern and eastern boreal forest) (Wotton et al. 2017)."


id: 89dd5ab7d2db35af75c634d2af79cae0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
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vector_id: 19218
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. The \r\nSRCCL reported a  mitigation potential for reduced conversion of \r\ngrasslands and savannas of 0.03-0.12 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Griscom et al. \r\n2017; IPCC 2019) considering the higher loss of soil organic carbon in \r\ncroplands (Sanderman et al. 2017). Assuming an average starting soil \r\norganic carbon stock of temperate grasslands (Poeplau et al. 2011), \r\nand the mean annual global cropland conversion rates (1961-2003) \r\n(Krause et al. 2017), the equivalent loss of soil organic carbon \r\nover 20 years would be 14 GtCO2-eq, for example, 0.7 GtCO2 yr-1\r\n(SRCCL, Chapter 6). IPCC AR5 and AR4 did not explicitly consider the \r\nmitigation potential of avoided conversion of grasslands-savannas \r\nbut the management of grazing land is accounted for considering \r\nplant, animal, and fire management with a mean mitigation potential \r\nof 0.11-0"


id: 17598861257132c1f2a61288d868fee8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 1179
content:
"80 tCO2-eq ha-1 yr-1 depending on the climate region. This \r\nresulted in 0.25 GtCO2-eq yr-1 at USD20 tCO2\r\n-1 to 1.25 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nat USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 by 2030."


id: e9bbb7af97010bbdbbfe35014bd922db
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34272
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. There is low confidence\r\nthat the global technical mitigation potential for grassland and \r\nsavanna fire management by 2050 is 0.1 (0.09-0.1) GtCO2 yr-1, \r\nand the economic mitigation potential (<USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) is 0.05 \r\n(0.03-0.07) GtCO2 yr-1. Savanna fires produce significant emissions \r\nglobally, but prescribed fires in the early dry season could mitigate \r\nemissions in different regions, particularly Africa. Evidence is less \r\nclear for fire management of forests, with the contribution of \r\nGHG mitigation depending on many factors that affect the carbon \r\nbalance (e.g.,  Simmonds et al. 2021). Although prescribed burning \r\nis promoted to reduce uncontrolled wildfires in forests, the benefits \r\nfor the management of carbon stocks are unclear, with different \r\nstudies reporting varying results especially concerning its long-term \r\neffectiveness (Wotton et al. 2017; Bowman et al. 2020b)"


id: e5ab7ed2f96455eb36ac1528ccb18975
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" Under \r\nincreasing climate change however, an increased attention on fire \r\nmanagement will be necessary."


id: ad48c9f37f2a324fe7c28112af556924
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Unlike most of the measures covered in \r\nSection 7.4, there are currently no global, spatially explicit mitigation \r\npotential estimates for reduced grassland conversion to generate \r\ntechnical and economic potentials by region. Literature developments \r\nsince AR5 and SRCCL are studies that provide mitigation estimates \r\nin one or a  few countries or regions. Modelling experiments \r\ncomparing Californian forests and grasslands found that grasslands \r\nresulted in a more resilient carbon sink than forests to future climate \r\nchange (Dass et al. 2018). However, previous studies indicated \r\nthat precipitation is a key controller of the carbon storage in these \r\ngrasslands, with the grassland became a carbon sink in 2005, when \r\nthe region received relatively high spring precipitation (Ma et al. \r\n2007). In North America, grassland conversion was the source for \r\n77% of all new croplands from 2008-2012 (Lark et al"


id: 3f2ffbffdd52dc03d1290d92c1a1d91f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" 2015). Avoided \r\nconversion of North American grasslands to croplands presents an \r\neconomic mitigation potential of 0.024 GtCO2-eq yr-1 and technical \r\npotential of 0.107 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Fargione et al. 2018). This potential \r\nis related mainly to root biomass and soils (81% of emissions from \r\nsoils). Estimates of GHG emissions from any future deforestation in \r\nAustralian savannas also point to the potential mitigation of around \r\n0.024 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Bristow et al. 2016). The expansion of the \r\nSoy Moratorium (SoyM) from the Brazilian Amazon to the Cerrado \r\n(Brazilian savannas) would prevent the direct conversion of 3.6 Mha \r\nof native vegetation to soybeans by 2050 and avoid the emission of \r\n0.02 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Soterroni et al. 2019)."


id: 8b51e329a0f12e1e2befa95505866321
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Grasslands cover approximately 40.5% of the \r\nterrestrial area (i.e., 52.5 million km2\r\n) divided as 13.8% woody \r\nsavanna and savanna; 12.7% open and closed shrub; 8.3% non\u0002woody grassland; and 5.7% is tundra (White et al. 2000). Sub\u0002Saharan Africa and Asia have the most extensive total area, 14.5 \r\nand 8.9 million km2\r\n, respectively. A review by Conant et al. (2017) \r\nreported based on data on grassland area (FAO 2013) and grassland \r\nsoil carbon stocks (Sombroek et al. 1993) a global estimate of about \r\n343 PgC (in the top 1 m), nearly 50% more than is stored in forests \r\nworldwide (FAO 2007). Reducing the conversion of grasslands and \r\nsavannas to croplands prevents soil carbon losses by oxidation, and \r\nto a smaller extent, biomass carbon loss due to vegetation clearing \r\n(SRCCL, Chapter  6)"


id: 90ed2fba1b4b61b3e755014a3839f981
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" Restoration of grasslands through enhanced \r\nsoil carbon sequestration, including (i) management of vegetation, \r\n(ii) animal management, and (iii) fire management, was also \r\nincluded in the SRCCL and is covered in Section 7.4.3.1. Similar to \r\nother measures that reduce conversion, conserving carbon stocks in \r\ngrasslands and savannas can be achieved by controlling conversion "


id: 555fe4ef58003c6ba85dd5e3ee83b381
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
"economic mitigation potential (<USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) is 0.04 GtCO2 yr-1. \r\nMost of the carbon sequestration potential is in below-ground \r\nbiomass and soil organic matter. However, estimates of potential \r\nare still based on few studies and vary according to the levels of \r\nsoil carbon, and ecosystem productivity (e.g., in response to rainfall \r\ndistribution). Conservation of grasslands presents significant benefits \r\nfor desertification control, especially in arid areas (SRCCL, Chapter 3). \r\nPolicies supporting avoided conversion can help protect at-risk \r\ngrasslands, reduce GHG emissions, and produce positive outcomes \r\nfor biodiversity and landowners (Ahlering et al. 2016). In comparison \r\nto tropical rainforest regions that have been the primary target for \r\nmitigation policies associated to natural ecosystems (e.g"


id: e027be0dc7f7dae376a61c2c0b8fe957
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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", REDD+), \r\nconversion grasslands and savannas has received less national and \r\ninternational attention, despite growing evidence of concentrated \r\ncropland expansion into these areas with impacts of carbon losses."


id: 9e021a876a59ea7557418e1bf33fcb3b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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vector_id: 22385
content:
"and about 20% of peatland carbon stock but about 80% of peatland \r\ncarbon emissions, primarily from peatland conversion in Indonesia \r\n(about 60%) and Malaysia (about 10%) (Hooijer et al. 2010; Page \r\net al. 2011; Leifeld and Menichetti 2018). While the total mitigation \r\npotential of peatland conservation is considered moderate, the \r\nper hectare mitigation potential is the highest among land-based \r\nmitigation measures (Roe et al. 2019).\r\nDevelopments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Recent studies continue to report high \r\ncarbon stocks in peatlands and emphasise the vulnerability \r\nof peatland carbon after conversion. The carbon stocks of \r\ntropical peatlands are among the highest of any forest, \r\n1,211-4,257 tCO2-eq ha-1 in the Peruvian Amazon (Bhomia \r\net al. 2019) and 1,956-14,757 tCO2-eq ha-1 in Indonesia (Novita \r\net al. 2021)"


id: edd72e11fce61d1ad408113ebc47f2f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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content:
" Ninety percent of tropical peatland carbon stocks \r\nare vulnerable to emission during conversion and may not be \r\nrecoverable through restoration; in contrast, boreal and temperate \r\npeatlands hold similar carbon stocks  (1,439-5,619 tCO2-eq ha-1) \r\nbut only 30% of northern carbon stocks are vulnerable to emission \r\nduring conversion and irrecoverable through restoration (Goldstein \r\net al. 2020). A  recent study shows global mitigation potential of \r\nabout 0.2 GtCO2-eq yr-1 at costs up to USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 (Roe et al. \r\n2021). Another study estimated that 72% of mitigation is achieved \r\nthrough avoided soil carbon impacts, with the remainder through \r\navoided impacts to vegetation (Bossio et al. 2020). Recent model \r\nprojections show that both peatland protection and peatland \r\nrestoration (Section 7.4.2.7) are needed to achieve a 2degC mitigation \r\npathway and that peatland protection and restoration policies \r\nwill have minimal impacts on regional food security (Leifeld et al"


id: 3f46f6f32d70ef9c9a95328bfda59db6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7348
content:
" \r\n2019, Humpenoder et al. 2020). Global studies have not accounted \r\nfor extensive peatlands recently reported in the Congo Basin, \r\nestimated to cover 145,500 km2\r\n and contain 30.6 PgC, as much as \r\n29% of total tropical peat carbon stock (Dargie et al. 2017). These \r\nCongo peatlands are relatively intact; continued preservation is \r\nneeded to prevent major emissions (Dargie et al. 2019). In northern \r\npeatlands that are underlain by permafrost roughly 50% of the \r\ntotal peatlands north of 23deg latitude, (Hugelius et al. 2020), climate \r\nchange (i.e., warming) is the major driver of peatland degradation \r\n(e.g., through permafrost thaw) (Schuur et al. 2015, Goldstein et al. \r\n2020). However, in non-permafrost boreal and temperate peatlands, \r\nreduction of peatland conversion is also a cost-effective mitigation \r\nstrategy. Peatlands are sensitive to climate change and there is \r\nlow confidence about the future peatland sink globally (SRCCL, \r\nChapter  2)"


id: 41fffdb16d52a5ec5f4f2512a056e8b2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 7785
content:
" Permafrost thaw may shift northern peatlands from \r\na net carbon sink to net source (Hugelius et al. 2020). Uncertainties \r\nin peatland extent and the magnitude of existing carbon stocks, in \r\nboth northern (Loisel et al. 2014) and tropical (Dargie et al. 2017) \r\nlatitudes limit understanding of current and future peatland carbon \r\ndynamics (Minasny et al. 2019).\r\nCritical assessment and conclusion. Based on studies to date, \r\nthere is medium confidence that peatland conservation has \r\na  technical potential of 0.86 (0.43-2.02) GtCO2-eq yr-1 of which \r\n0.48  (0.2-0.68) GtCO2-eq yr-1 is available at USD100 tCO2\r\n-1\r\n(Figure 7.11). High per hectare mitigation potential and high rate of \r\nco-benefits particularly in tropical countries, support the effectiveness "


id: 8987c1fa210b58cd0e32af8c7dc8f15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"Peatlands are carbon-rich wetland ecosystems with organic soil \r\nhorizons in which soil organic matter concentration exceeds 30% \r\n(dry weight) and soil carbon concentrations can exceed 50% \r\n(Page and Baird 2016, Boone Kauffman et al. 2017). Reducing the \r\nconversion of peatlands avoids emissions of above- and below\u0002ground biomass and soil carbon due to vegetation clearing, fires, \r\nand peat decomposition from drainage. Similar to deforestation, \r\npeatland carbon stocks can be conserved by controlling the drivers \r\nof conversion and degradation (e.g.,  commercial and subsistence \r\nagriculture, mining, urban expansion) and improving governance \r\nand management. Reducing conversion is urgent because peatland \r\ncarbon stocks accumulate slowly and persist over millennia; loss of \r\nexisting stocks cannot be easily reversed over the decadal time scales \r\nneeded to meet the Paris Agreement (Goldstein et al. 2020)"


id: 87acf38340662c7a11e55c54ea343527
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" The main \r\nco-benefits of reducing conversion of peatlands include conservation \r\nof a unique biodiversity including many critically endangered species, \r\nprovision of water quality and regulation, and improved public health \r\nthrough decreased fire-caused pollutants (Griscom et al. 2017). \r\nAlthough reducing peatland conversion will reduce land availability \r\nfor alternative uses including agriculture or other land-based \r\nmitigation, drained peatlands constitute a small share of agricultural \r\nland globally while contributing significant emissions (Joosten 2009). \r\nMitigation through reduced conversion of peatlands therefore has \r\na high potential of avoided emissions per hectare (Roe et al. 2019)."


id: 4f6eb0fe85db6bf3699eb61ecb841821
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9930
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation barriers.\r\nPeatland restoration involves restoring degraded and damaged \r\npeatlands, for example through rewetting and revegetation, which \r\nboth increases carbon accumulation in vegetation and soils and \r\navoids ongoing CO2 emissions. Peatlands only account for about \r\n3% of the terrestrial surface, predominantly occurring in boreal \r\necosystems (78%), with a  smaller proportion in tropical regions \r\n(13%), but may store about 600 GtC or 21% of the global total soil \r\norganic carbon stock of about 3000 Gt (Page et al. 2011; Leifeld \r\nand Menichetti 2018). Peatland restoration delivers co-benefits \r\nfor biodiversity, as well as regulating water flow and preventing \r\ndownstream flooding, while still allowing for extensive management \r\nsuch as paludiculture (Tan et al. 2021). Rewetting of peatlands also \r\nreduces the risk of fire, but may also mobilise salts and contaminants \r\nin soils (van Diggelen et al"


id: 1a1af83464853ea89c0248944bd881ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1569
content:
" 2020) and in severely degraded peatlands, \r\nrestoration of peatland hydrology and vegetation may not be feasible \r\n(Andersen et al. 2017). At a  local level, restoration of peatlands \r\ndrained for agriculture could displace food production and damage \r\nlocal food supply, although impacts to regional and global food \r\nsecurity would be minimal (Humpenoder et al. 2020). Collaborative \r\nand transparent planning processes are needed to reduce conflict \r\nbetween competing land uses (Tanneberger et al. 2020b). Adequate \r\nresources for implementing restoration policies are key to engage \r\nlocal communities and maintain livelihoods (Resosudarmo et al. \r\n2019; Ward et al. 2021)."


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content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation barriers.\r\nReducing conversion of coastal wetlands, including mangroves, \r\nmarshes and seagrass ecosystems, avoids emissions from above and \r\nbelow ground biomass and soil carbon through avoided degradation \r\nand/or loss. Coastal wetlands occur mainly in estuaries and deltas, \r\nareas that are often densely settled, with livelihoods closely linked \r\nto coastal ecosystems and resources (Moser et al. 2012). The \r\ncarbon stocks of these highly productive ecosystems are sometimes \r\nreferred to as 'blue carbon'. Loss of existing stocks cannot be easily \r\nreversed over decadal time scales (Goldstein et al. 2020). The main \r\ndrivers of conversion include intensive aquaculture, agriculture, salt \r\nponds, urbanisation and infrastructure development, the extensive \r\nuse of fertilisers, and extraction of water resources (Lovelock \r\net al. 2018)"


id: 120aa184920c043b09604c577bea7912
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 337
content:
"and storm surge prevention, and increased resilience to cyclones \r\n(Windham-Myers et al. 2018a; UNEP 2020). Risks associated with \r\nthe mitigation potential of coastal wetland conservation include \r\nuncertain permanence under future climate scenarios, including \r\nthe effects of coastal squeeze, where coastal wetland area may be \r\nlost if upland area is not available for migration as sea levels rise \r\n(Lovelock and Reef 2020) (AR6 WGII, Section 3.4.2.5). Preservation \r\nof coastal wetlands also conflicts with other land use in the coastal \r\nzone, including aquaculture, agriculture, and human development; \r\neconomic incentives are needed to prioritise wetland preservation \r\nover more profitable short-term land use"


id: 8e2bed650d042c11bc28467c9f0b16
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19898
content:
" Integration of policies \r\nand efforts aimed at coastal climate mitigation, adaptation, \r\nbiodiversity conservation, and fisheries, for example through \r\nintegrated coastal zone management and marine spatial planning, \r\nwill bundle climate mitigation with co-benefits and optimise \r\noutcomes (Herr et al. 2017)."


id: 880d107eed486635939b4becb4100f87
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18926
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways.\r\nCoastal wetlands contain high, yet variable, organic carbon stocks, \r\nleading to a range of estimates of the global mitigation potential of \r\nreduced conversion. The SRCCL (Chapter 2) and SROCC (Chapter 5), \r\nreport a technical mitigation potential of 0.15-5.35 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nby 2050 (Pendleton et al. 2012; Lovelock et al. 2017; Howard et al. \r\n2017; Griscom et al. 2017). The mitigation potential is derived from \r\nquantification of losses of carbon stocks in vegetation and soil \r\ndue to land conversion, shifts in GHG fluxes associated with land \r\nuse, and alterations in net ecosystem productivity. The wide range \r\nin estimates mostly relate to the scope (all coastal ecosystems vs \r\nmangroves only) and different assumptions on decomposition rates. \r\nLoss rates of coastal wetlands have been estimated at 0"


id: 5ed77dcef3717bb80c9ea309bff01504
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12463
content:
"2-3% yr-1, \r\ndepending on the vegetation type and location (Atwood et al. 2017; \r\nHoward et al. 2017)."


id: ddc8cbf0d00bc8dc9e0bf1bc1d9ad61
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32391
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation barriers.\r\nCoastal wetland restoration involves restoring degraded or damaged \r\ncoastal  wetlands including mangroves, salt marshes, and seagrass \r\necosystems, leading to sequestration of 'blue carbon' in wetland \r\nvegetation and soil (SRCCL, Chapter 6; SROCC, Chapter 5). Successful \r\napproaches to wetland restoration include: (i) passive restoration, \r\nthe removal of anthropogenic activities that are causing degradation \r\nor preventing recovery; and (ii) active restoration, purposeful \r\nmanipulations to the environment in order to achieve recovery to \r\na  naturally functioning system (Elliott et al. 2016) (IPCC AR6 WGII \r\nChapter  3). Restoration of coastal wetlands delivers many valuable \r\nco-benefits, including enhanced water quality, biodiversity, aesthetic \r\nvalues, fisheries production (food security), and protection from rising \r\nsea levels and storm impacts (Barbier et al. 2011; Hochard et al"


id: c4fa49bb03fa00ec3dfe9a2cb7361ee7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28565
content:
" 2019; \r\nSun and Carson 2020; Duarte et al. 2020). Of the 0.3 Mkm2\r\n coastal \r\nwetlands globally, 0.11 Mkm2\r\n of mangroves are considered feasible \r\nfor restoration (Griscom et al. 2017). Risks associated with coastal \r\nwetland restoration include uncertain permanence under future \r\nclimate scenarios (IPCC AR6 WGII, Box 3.4), partial offsets of mitigation "


id: 8d3836747058f5f2d30ff216984b39bb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19741
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Recent studies emphasise the time frame needed \r\nto achieve the full mitigation potential (Duarte et al. 2020; Taillardat \r\net al. 2020). The first project-derived estimate of the net GHG benefit \r\nfrom seagrass restoration found 1.54 tCO2-eq (0.42 MgC) ha-1 yr-1\r\n10 years after restoration began (Oreska et al. 2020); comparable \r\nto the default emission factor in the Wetlands Supplement (Kennedy \r\net al. 2014). Recent studies of rehabilitated mangroves also indicate \r\nthat annual carbon sequestration rates in biomass and soils can \r\nreturn to natural levels within decades of restoration (Cameron et al. \r\n2019; Sidik et al. 2019). A  meta-analysis shows increasing carbon \r\nsequestration rates over the first 15 years of mangrove restoration \r\nwith rates stabilising at 25.7 +- 7.7 tCO2-eq (7.0 +- 2"


id: d3bd04353124b2af6f7d584f2f55cddd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30838
content:
"1 MgC) ha-1 yr-1\r\nthrough forty years, although success depends on climate, sediment \r\ntype, and restoration methods (Sasmito et al. 2019). Overall, 30% of \r\nmangrove soil carbon stocks and 50-70% of marsh and seagrass \r\ncarbon stocks are unlikely to recover within 30 years of restoration, \r\nunderscoring the importance of preventing conversion of coastal \r\nwetlands (Goldstein et al. 2020) (Section 7.4.2.8)."


id: 7df1d26935e68ae86c2b53b14b42a9a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17390
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Increasing soil organic matter in croplands are \r\nagricultural management practices that include (i) crop management: \r\nfor example, high input carbon practices such as improved crop \r\nvarieties, crop rotation, use of cover crops, perennial cropping systems \r\n(including agroforestry; see Section  7.4.3.3), integrated production \r\nsystems, crop diversification, agricultural biotechnology; (ii) nutrient \r\nmanagement including fertilisation with organic amendments/green \r\nmanures (Section 7.4.3.6); (iii) reduced tillage intensity and residue \r\nretention, (iv) improved water management: including drainage of \r\nwaterlogged mineral soils and irrigation of crops in arid/semi-arid \r\nconditions, (v) improved rice management (Section  7.4.3.5) and \r\n(vi) biochar application (P.  Smith et al. 2019a) (Section  7.4.3.2)"


id: c436052d0a271645ddc28b9667a1d81a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 28435
content:
" \r\nFor increased soil organic matter in grasslands, practices include \r\n(i) management of vegetation: including improved grass varieties/\r\nsward composition, deep rooting grasses, increased productivity, \r\nand nutrient management, (ii) livestock management: including \r\nappropriate stocking densities fit to carrying capacity, fodder banks, \r\nand fodder diversification, and (iii) fire management: improved use of \r\nfire for sustainable grassland management, including fire prevention \r\nand improved prescribed burning (Smith et al. 2014, 2019b). All these \r\nmeasures are recognised as Sustainable Soil Management Practices \r\nby FAO (Baritz et al. 2018). While there are co-benefits for livelihoods, \r\nbiodiversity, water provision and food security (P. Smith et al. 2019a), "


id: 12162f09226cf97a8564963f856ac37e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 343
content:
"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways. Building \r\non AR5, the SRCCL reported the global mitigation potential for soil \r\ncarbon management in croplands to be 1.4-2.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Smith \r\net al. 2014), though the full literature range was 0.3-6.8 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\n(Sommer and Bossio 2014; Powlson et al. 2014; Dickie et al. 2014b; \r\nHenderson et al. 2015; Herrero et al. 2016; Paustian et al. 2016; \r\nZomer et al. 2016; Frank et al. 2017; Conant et al. 2017; Griscom et al. \r\n2017; Hawken 2017; Sanderman et al. 2017; Fuss et al. 2018; Roe \r\net al. 2019). The global mitigation potential for soil organic carbon \r\nmanagement in grasslands was assessed to be 1.4-1.8 GtCO2-eq yr-1, \r\nwith the full literature range being 0.1-2.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Herrero \r\net al. 2013; 2016; Conant et al. 2017; Roe et al. 2019)"


id: c1a794455d0991f8cacccdc1297edea8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 28055
content:
" Lower values \r\nin the range represented economic potentials, while higher values \r\nrepresented technical potentials - and uncertainty was expressed by \r\nreporting the whole range of estimates. The SR1.5 outlined associated \r\ncosts reported in literature to range from USD -45 to 100 tCO2\r\n-1, \r\ndescribing enhanced soil carbon sequestration as a  cost-effective \r\nmeasure (IPCC 2018). Despite significant mitigation potential, there \r\nis limited inclusion of soil carbon sequestration as a response option \r\nwithin IAM mitigation pathways (Rogelj et al. 2018a)."


id: 495915721f5443226bcd02ae80736271
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8920
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Biochar is produced by heating organic matter in \r\noxygen-limited environments (pyrolysis and gasification) (Lehmann \r\nand Joseph 2012). Feedstocks include forestry and sawmill residues, \r\nstraw, manure and biosolids. When applied to soils, biochar is \r\nestimated to persist from decades to thousands of years, depending \r\non feedstock and production conditions (J. Wang et al. 2016; Singh \r\net al. 2015). Biochar systems producing biochar for soil application \r\nplus bioenergy, generally give greater mitigation than bioenergy \r\nalone and other uses of biochar, and are recognised as a  CDR \r\nstrategy. Biochar persistence is increased through interaction with \r\nclay minerals and soil organic matter (Fang et al. 2015). Additional \r\nCDR benefits arise through 'negative priming' whereby biochar \r\nstabilises soil carbon and rhizodeposits (Weng et al. 2015; J. Wang \r\net al. 2016; Archanjo et al. 2017; Hagemann et al"


id: 817d0820cc08f39eab94a2bf6569cedf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17900
content:
" 2017; Han Weng \r\net al. 2017; Weng et al. 2018). Besides CDR, additional mitigation \r\ncan arise from displacing fossil fuels with pyrolysis gases, lower \r\nsoil N2O emissions (Cayuela et al. 2014, 2015; Song et al. 2016; He \r\net al. 2017; Verhoeven et al. 2017; Borchard et al. 2019), reduced \r\nnitrogen fertiliser requirements due to reduced nitrogen leaching \r\nand volatilisation from soils (Liu et al. 2019; Borchard et al. 2019), \r\nand reduced GHG emissions from compost when biochar is added \r\n(Agyarko-Mintah et al. 2017; Wu et al. 2017). Biochar application \r\nto paddy rice has resulted in substantial reductions (20-40% on \r\naverage) in N2O (Song et al. 2016; Awad et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2018) \r\n(Section 7.4.3.5) and smaller reduction in CH4 emissions (Song et al. \r\n2016; Kammann et al. 2017; Kim et al. 2017a; He et al. 2017; Awad \r\net al. 2018). Potential co-benefits include yield increases particularly \r\nin sandy and acidic soils with low cation exchange capacity (Woolf \r\net al"


id: e690f70dddb0a2e11d5b07acd4ebdcb4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 33756
content:
" 2016; Jeffery et al. 2017); increased soil water-holding capacity \r\n(Omondi et al. 2016), nitrogen use efficiency (Liu et al. 2019; Borchard \r\net al. 2019), biological nitrogen fixation (Van Zwieten et al. 2015); \r\nadsorption of organic pollutants and heavy metals (e.g., Silvani et al. \r\n2019); odour reduction from manure handling (e.g.,  Hwang et al. \r\n2018) and managing forest fuel loads (Puettmann et al. 2020). Due to \r\nits dark colour, biochar could decrease soil albedo (Meyer et al. 2012), \r\nthough this is insignificant under recommended rates and application \r\nmethods. Biochar could reduce enteric CH4 emissions when fed to \r\nruminants (Section 7.4.3.4). Barriers to upscaling include insufficient \r\ninvestment, limited large-scale production facilities, high production \r\ncosts at small scale, lack of agreed approach to monitoring, reporting "


id: f076df80cc2f6e57c5855596b39fce7b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35331
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). No recent literature has been published which \r\nconflict with the mitigation potentials reported in the SRCCL. Relevant \r\npapers include Lal et al. (2018) which estimated soil carbon \r\nsequestration potential to be 0.7-4.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1 for croplands \r\nand 1.1-2.9 GtCO2-eq yr-1 for grasslands. Bossio et al. (2020)\r\nassessed the contribution of soil carbon sequestration to natural \r\nclimate solutions and found the potential to be 5.5 GtCO2 yr-1 across \r\nall ecosystems, with only small portions of this (0.41 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nfor cover cropping in croplands; 0.23, 0.15, 0.15 GtCO2-eq yr-1 for \r\navoided grassland conversion, optimal grazing intensity and legumes \r\nin pastures, respectively) arising from croplands and grasslands. \r\nRegionally, soil carbon management in croplands is feasible \r\nanywhere, but effectiveness can be limited in very dry regions \r\n(Sanderman et al. 2017)"


id: a0b4e9158e68b9a3fe1a53ccf40f3f82
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22829
content:
" For soil carbon management in grasslands \r\nthe feasibility is greatest in areas where grasslands have been \r\ndegraded (e.g., by overgrazing) and soil organic carbon is depleted. \r\nFor well managed grasslands, soil carbon stocks are already high and \r\nthe potential for additional carbon storage is low. Roe et al. (2021) \r\nestimate the greatest economic (up to USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) potential \r\nbetween 2020 and 2050 for croplands to be in Asia and the Pacific \r\n(339.7 MtCO2 yr-1) and for grasslands, in Developed Countries \r\n(253.6 MtCO2 yr-1)."


id: 7093ab1e5cacef2ff4087b510ea3c416
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15329
content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Agroforestry is a set of diverse land management systems \r\nthat integrate trees and shrubs with crops and/or livestock in space \r\nand/or time. Agroforestry accumulates carbon in woody vegetation and \r\nsoil (Ramachandran Nair et al. 2010) and offers multiple co-benefits \r\nsuch as increased land productivity, diversified livelihoods, reduced \r\nsoil erosion, improved water quality, and more hospitable regional \r\nclimates (Ellison et al. 2017; Kuyah et al. 2019; Mbow et al. 2020; Zhu \r\net al. 2020). Incorporation of trees and shrubs in agricultural systems, \r\nhowever, can affect food production, biodiversity, local hydrology and \r\ncontribute to social inequality (Amadu et al. 2020; Fleischman et al. \r\n2020; Holl and Brancalion 2020). To minimise risks and maximise co\u0002benefits, agroforestry should be implemented as part of support \r\nsystems that deliver tools, and information to increase farmers' agency"


id: b9f6ad092b135cc46e982dfc7beb4030
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26800
content:
" \r\nThis may include reforming policies, strengthening extension systems \r\nand creating market opportunities that enable adoption (Jamnadass \r\net al. 2020; Sendzimir et al. 2011; P. Smith et al. 2019a). Consideration \r\nof carbon sequestration in the context of food and fuel production, as \r\nwell as environmental co-benefits at the farm, local, and regional scales \r\ncan further help support decisions to plant, regenerate and maintain \r\nagroforestry systems (Kumar and Nair 2011; Miller et al. 2020). In spite \r\nof the advantages, biophysical and socio-economic factors can limit the \r\nadoption (Pattanayak et al. 2003). Contextual factors may include, but \r\nare not limited to; water availability, soil fertility, seed and germplasm \r\naccess, land policies and tenure systems affecting farmer agency, \r\naccess to credit, and to information regarding the optimum species for \r\na given location."


id: 392402e0fa4f8a1c5603c0f71e9c994c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6366
content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL). Developments include mechanistic understanding \r\nof 'negative priming' and biochar-soil-microbes-plant interactions \r\n(DeCiucies et al. 2018; Fang et al. 2019). Indirect climate benefits are \r\nassociated with persistent yield response to biochar (Katterer et al. \r\n2019; Ye et al. 2020), improved crop water use efficiency (Du et al. \r\n2018; Gao et al. 2020) and reduced GHG and ammonia emissions \r\nfrom compost and manure (Sanchez-Monedero et al. 2018; Bora \r\net al. 2020a,b; Zhao et al. 2020). A quantification method based on \r\nbiochar properties is included in the IPCC guidelines for NGHGIs \r\n(Domke et al. 2019). Studies report a range of biochar responses, from \r\npositive to occasionally adverse impacts, including on GHG emissions, \r\nand identify risks (Tisserant and Cherubini 2019)"


id: 1b3bae443b88f2898a608771b47f4a9f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 1750
content:
" This illustrates the \r\nexpected variability (Lehmann and Rillig 2014) of responses, which \r\ndepend on the biochar type and climatic and edaphic characteristics \r\nof the site (Zygourakis 2017). Biochar properties vary with feedstock, \r\nproduction conditions and post-production treatments, so mitigation \r\nand agronomic benefits are maximised when biochars are chosen to \r\nsuit the application context (Masek et al. 2018). A recent assessment \r\nfinds greatest economic potential (up to USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) between \r\n2020 and 2050 to be in Asia and the Pacific (793 MtCO2 yr-1) \r\nfollowed by Developed Countries (447 MtCO2 yr-1) (Roe et al. 2021). \r\nMitigation through biochar will be greatest where biochar is applied \r\nto responsive soils (acidic, low fertility), where soil N2O emissions \r\nare high (intensive horticulture, irrigated crops), and where the \r\nsyngas co-product displaces fossil fuels"


id: 9dd94b26d290d8e63c5aa20a18f28720
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22354
content:
" Due to the early stage of \r\ncommercialisation, mitigation estimates are based pilot-scale facilities, \r\nleading to uncertainty. However, the long-term persistence of biochar \r\ncarbon in soils has been widely studied (Singh et al. 2012; Fang et al. \r\n2019; Zimmerman and Ouyang 2019). The greatest uncertainty is the \r\navailability of sustainably-sourced biomass for biochar production."


id: 6b661a853d62fced18c74f5324a36666
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14515
content:
"Regional estimates of mitigation potential are scant with agroforestry \r\noptions differing significantly by geography (Feliciano et al. 2018). For \r\nexample, multi-strata shaded coffee and cacao are successful in the \r\nhumid tropics (Somarriba et al. 2013; Blaser et al. 2018), silvopastoral \r\nsystems are prevalent in Latin American (Peters et al. 2013; Landholm \r\net al. 2019) while agrosilvopastoral systems, shelterbelts, hedgerows, \r\nand windbreaks are common in Europe (Joffre et al. 1988; Rigueiro\u0002Rodriguez 2009). At the field scale, agroforestry accumulates between \r\n0.59 and 6.24 t ha-1 yr-1 of carbon above-ground. Below-ground \r\ncarbon often constitutes 25% or more of the potential carbon gains \r\nin agroforestry systems (De Stefano and Jacobson 2018; Cardinael \r\net al. 2018). Roe et al. (2021) estimate greatest regional economic \r\n(up to USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) mitigation potential for the period 2020-2050 \r\nto be in Asia and the Pacific (368"


id: a7c6f6d8c55dc7aee88ede19c1d7288a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23909
content:
"2020) with high (e.g.,  16-70% depending on study) mitigation \r\npotential reported (e.g.,  Hristov et al. 2015; McGinn et al. 2019; \r\nMelgar et al. 2020) and commercial availability expected within \r\ntwo years in some countries (Reisinger et al. 2021). However, their \r\nmitigation persistence (McGinn et al. 2019), cost (Carroll and \r\nDaigneault 2019; Alvarez-Hess et al. 2019) and public acceptance \r\n(Jayasundara et al. 2016) or regulatory approval is currently \r\nunclear while administration in pasture-based systems is likely \r\nto be challenging (Patra et al. 2017; Leahy et al. 2019). Research \r\ninto other inhibitors/feeds containing inhibitory compounds, such \r\nas macroalga or seaweed (Chagas et al. 2019; Kinley et al. 2020; \r\nRoque et al. 2019), shows promise, although concerns have been \r\nraised regarding palatability, toxicity, environmental impacts and \r\nthe development of industrial-scale supply chains (Abbott et al. \r\n2020; Vijn et al. 2020)"


id: 720cb28a13b9866ec95dc61e3991a6eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15571
content:
" In the absence of CH4 vaccines, which are still \r\nunder development (Reisinger et al. 2021) pasture-based and non\u0002intensive systems remain reliant on increasing production efficiency \r\n(Beauchemin et al. 2020). Breeding of low emitting animals may \r\nplay an important role and is a  subject under ongoing research \r\n(Pickering et al. 2015; Jonker et al. 2018; Lopez-Paredes et al. 2020)."


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content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Mitigating CH4 emissions from enteric fermentation \r\ncan be direct (i.e., targeting ruminal methanogenesis and emissions \r\nper animal or unit of feed consumed) or indirect, by increasing \r\nproduction efficiency (i.e., reducing emission intensity per unit of \r\nproduct). Measures can be classified as those relating to (i) feeding, \r\n(ii) supplements, additives and vaccines, and (iii) livestock breeding \r\nand wider husbandry (Jia et al. 2019). Co-benefits include enhanced \r\nclimate change adaptation and increased food security associated \r\nwith improved livestock breeding (Smith et al. 2014). Risks include \r\nmitigation persistence, ecological impacts associated with improving \r\nfeed quality and supply, or potential toxicity and animal welfare \r\nissues concerning feed additives"


id: c76df7bc9d098639011efe96424003cf
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content:
" Implementation barriers include \r\nfeeding/administration constraints, the stage of development of \r\nmeasures, legal restrictions on emerging technologies and negative \r\nimpacts, such as the previously described risks (Smith et al. 2014; Jia \r\net al. 2019; P. Smith et al. 2019a)."


id: e1f5210effe22913f0e04831880ba6c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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"Approaches differ regionally, with more focus on direct, technical \r\noptions in Developed Countries, and improved efficiency in \r\ndeveloping countries (Caro Torres et al. 2016; Mottet et al. 2017b; \r\nMacLeod et al. 2018; Frank et al. 2018). A recent assessment finds \r\ngreatest economic (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) potential (using \r\nthe IPCC AR4 GWP100 value for CH4) for 2020-2050 in Asia and \r\nthe Pacific (32.9 MtCO2-eq yr-1) followed by Developed Countries \r\n(25.5 MtCO2-eq yr-1) (Roe et al. 2021). Despite numerous country \r\nand sub-sector specific studies, most of which include cost analysis \r\n(Hasegawa and Matsuoka 2012; Hoa et al. 2014; Jilani et al. 2015; \r\nEory et al. 2015; Pradhan et al. 2017; Pellerin et al. 2017; Ericksen and \r\nCrane 2018; Habib and Khan 2018; Kashangaki and Ericksen 2018; \r\nSalmon et al. 2018; Brandt et al. 2019b; Kiggundu et al. 2019; \r\nKavanagh et al. 2019; Mosnier et al. 2019; Pradhan et al. 2019; Sapkota \r\net al. 2019; Carroll and Daigneault 2019; Leahy et al"


id: 5b78d33378bededc65758e765506a43e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" 2019; Dioha and \r\nKumar 2020), sectoral assessment of regional technical and notably \r\neconomic (Beach et al. 2015; USEPA 2019) potential is restricted by \r\nlack comprehensive and comparable data. Therefore, verification of \r\nregional estimates indicated by global assessments is challenging. \r\nFeed quality improvement, which may have considerable potential \r\nin developing countries (Caro et al. 2016; Mottet et al. 2017a), may \r\nhave negative wider impacts. For example, potential land-use change \r\nand greater emissions associated with production of concentrates \r\n(Brandt et al. 2019b)."


id: c9d2e1c8fef65d7714636b7cf3900041
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Since AR5 and the SRCCL, studies on mitigation \r\nhave principally focused on water and nutrient management \r\npractices with the aim of improving overall sustainability as well as \r\nmeasurements of site-specific emissions to help improve the resolution \r\nof regional estimates. Intensity of emissions show considerable \r\nspatial and temporal variation, dependent on site specific factors \r\nincluding degradation of soil organic matter, management of water \r\nlevels in the field, the types and amount of fertilisers applied, rice \r\nvariety and local cultivation practices. Variation in CH4 emissions have \r\nbeen found to range from 0.5-41.8 mg m2\r\n hr-1 in South-East Asia \r\n(Sander et al. 2014; Chidthaisong et al. 2018; Setyanto et al. 2018; \r\nSibayan et al. 2018; J. Wang et al. 2018; Maneepitak et al. 2019), \r\n0.5-37.0 mg m2\r\n hr-1 in Southern and Eastern Asia (Zhang et al. 2010; \r\nWang et al. 2012; Oo et al. 2018; J"


id: 1be0cb71faeec298d756a11f82f86c55
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content:
" Wang et al. 2018; Takakai et al. \r\n2020), and 0.5-10.4 mg m2\r\n hr-1 in North America (J. Wang et al. 2018). \r\nCurrent studies on emissions of N2O also showed high variation in \r\nthe range of 0.13-654 ug/m2\r\n/hr (Akiyama et al. 2005; Islam et al. \r\n2018; Kritee et al. 2018; Zschornack et al. 2018; Oo et al. 2018)."


id: 561a90bcf16333fd3df353be18283325
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Emissions from rice cultivation mainly concern CH4\r\nassociated with anaerobic conditions, although N2O emission also \r\noccur via nitrification and denitrification processes. Measures to \r\nreduce CH4 and N2O emissions include (i) improved water management \r\n(e.g., single drainage and multiple drainage practices), (ii) improved \r\nresidue management, (iii) improved fertiliser application (e.g., using \r\nslow release fertiliser and nutrient specific application), and (iv) soil \r\namendments (including biochar and organic amendments) (Pandey \r\net al. 2014; Kim et al. 2017b; Yagi et al. 2020; Sriphirom et al. \r\n2020)"


id: 4c8288f5666e8a52864960eb5209cd5d
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content:
" These measures not only have mitigation potential but can \r\nimprove water use efficiency, reduce overall water use, enhance \r\ndrought adaptation and overall system resilience, improve yield, \r\nreduce production costs from seed, pesticide, pumping and labour, \r\nincrease farm income, and promote sustainable development \r\n(Quynh and Sander 2015; Yamaguchi et al. 2017; Tran et al. 2018; \r\nSriphirom et al. 2019). However, in terms of mitigation of CH4 and \r\nN2O, antagonistic effects can occur, whereby water management \r\ncan enhance N2O emissions due to creation of alternate wet and dry \r\nconditions (Sriphirom et al. 2019), with trade-offs between CH4 and \r\nN2O during the drying period potentially offsetting some mitigation \r\nbenefits"


id: 434402a9ecd89f137cf4274b90ee3c44
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content:
" Barriers to adoption may include site-specific limitations \r\nregarding soil type, percolation and seepage rates or fluctuations \r\nin precipitation, water canal or irrigation infrastructure, paddy \r\nsurface level and rice field size, and social factors including farmer \r\nperceptions, pump ownership, and challenges in synchronising water \r\nmanagement between neighbours and pumping stations (Quynh and \r\nSander 2015; Yamaguchi et al. 2017; Yamaguchi et al. 2019)."


id: 20aeff52c5e5b8687f63fe1aa66a22b2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"Recent studies on water management have highlighted the potential \r\nto mitigate GHG emissions, while also enhancing water use efficiency \r\n(Tran et al. 2018). A  meta-analysis on multiple drainage systems \r\nfound that Alternative Wetting and Drying (AWD) with irrigation \r\nmanagement, can reduce CH4 emissions by 20-30% and water use by \r\n25.7%, though this resulted in a slight yield reduction (5.4%) (Carrijo \r\net al. 2017). Other studies have described improved yields associated \r\nwith AWD (Tran et al. 2018). Water management for both single and \r\nmultiple drainage can (most likely) reduce methane emissions by \r\nabout 35% but increase N2O emissions by about 20% (Yagi et al. \r\n2020). However, N2O emissions occur only under dry conditions, \r\ntherefore total reduction in terms of net GWP is approximately \r\n30%. Emissions of N2O are higher during dry seasons (Yagi et al"


id: 1b0e56d689e0fb43e026f3c36162feba
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content:
" \r\n2020) and depend on site specific factors as well as the quantity \r\nof fertiliser and organic matter inputs into the paddy rice system. \r\nVariability of N2O emissions from single and multiple drainage can \r\nrange from 0.06-33 kg/ha (Hussain et al. 2015; Kritee et al. 2018). \r\nAWD in Vietnam was found to reduce both CH4 and N2O emissions \r\nby 29-30 and 26-27% respectively with the combination of net \r\nGWP about 30% as compared to continuous flooding (Tran et al. \r\n2018). Overall, greatest average economic mitigation potential (up \r\nto USD100 tCO2-eq-1) between 2020 and 2050 is estimated to be in \r\nAsia and the Pacific (147.2 MtCO2-eq yr-1) followed by Latin America \r\nand the Caribbean (8.9 MtCO2-eq yr-1) using the IPCC AR4 GWP100 \r\nvalue for CH4 (Roe et al. 2021)."


id: 44b5331ac9c7e91c6a0f42573cc481de
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content:
"7.4.3.6 Crop Nutrient Management\r\nActivities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. Improved crop nutrient management can reduce N2O \r\nemissions from cropland soils. Practices include optimising fertiliser \r\napplication delivery, rates and timing, utilising different fertiliser \r\ntypes (i.e., organic manures, composts and synthetic forms), and \r\nusing slow or controlled-released fertilisers or nitrification inhibitors \r\n(Smith et al. 2014; Griscom et al. 2017; P.  Smith et al. 2019a). In \r\naddition to individual practices, integrated nutrient management that \r\ncombines crop rotations including intercropping, nitrogen biological \r\nfixation, reduced tillage, use of cover crops, manure and bio-fertiliser \r\napplication, soil testing and comprehensive nitrogen management \r\nplans, is suggested as central for optimising fertiliser use, enhancing \r\nnutrient uptake and potentially reducing N2O emissions (Bationo \r\net al. 2012; Lal et al. 2018; Bolinder et al"


id: 8b2f52a4d573914a3608e30a1110ead4
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vector_id: 19425
content:
" 2020; Jensen et al. 2020; \r\nNamatsheve et al. 2020). Such practices may generate additional \r\nmitigation by indirectly reducing synthetic fertiliser manufacturing \r\nrequirements and associated emissions, though such mitigation \r\nis accounted for in the Industry Sector and not considered in this \r\nchapter. Tailored nutrient management approaches, such as 4R \r\nnutrient stewardship, are implemented in contrasting farming \r\nsystems and contexts and supported by best management practices \r\nto balance and match nutrient supply with crop requirements, \r\nprovide greater stability in fertiliser performance and to minimise \r\nN2O emissions and nutrient losses from fields and farms (Fixen 2020; \r\nMaaz et al. 2021)"


id: 10fe5e9f3117f9902ca516669a779d13
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content:
" Co-benefits of improved nutrient management \r\ncan include enhanced soil quality (notably when manure, crop \r\nresidues or compost is utilised), carbon sequestration in soils and \r\nbiomass, soil water holding capacity, adaptation capacity, crop \r\nyields, farm incomes, water quality (from reduced nitrate leaching \r\nand eutrophication), air quality (from reduced ammonia emissions) \r\nand in certain cases, it may facilitate land sparing (Sapkota et al. \r\n2014; Johnston and Bruulsema 2014; Zhang et al. 2017; P. Smith et al. \r\n2019a; Mbow et al. 2019)."


id: d760c6a7dd61f378ddb53320cb4c30bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Research since the SRCCL highlights the \r\nmitigation potential and co-benefits of adopting improved nutrient \r\nmanagement strategies, notably precision fertiliser application \r\nmethods and nutrient expert systems, and applicability in both \r\nlarge-scale mechanised and small-scale systems (USEPA 2019; \r\nHijbeek et al. 2019; Griscom et al. 2020; Tian et al. 2020; Aryal et al. \r\n2020; Sapkota et al. 2021). Improved crop nutrient management is \r\nfeasible in all regions, but effectiveness is context dependent. Sub\u0002Saharan Africa has one of the lowest global fertiliser consumption \r\nrates, with increased fertiliser use suggested as necessary to meet \r\nprojected future food requirements (Mueller et al. 2012; ten Berge \r\net al. 2019; Adam et al. 2020; Falconnier et al. 2020). Fertiliser use \r\nin Developed Countries is already high (Figure 7"


id: 9f3fac2dd47dd3041524c47ad7bed016
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content:
"10) with increased \r\nnutrient use efficiency among the most promising mitigation \r\nmeasures (Roe et al. 2019; Hijbeek et al. 2019). Considering that \r\nAsia and Pacific, and Developed Countries accounted for the greatest \r\nshare of global nitrogen fertiliser use, it is not surprising that these \r\nregions are estimated to have greatest economic mitigation potential \r\n(up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) between 2020 and 2050, at 161.8 and \r\n37.1 MtCO2-eq yr-1 respectively (using the IPCC AR4 GWP100 value \r\nfor N2O) (Roe et al. 2021)."


id: 22c4007915e521697193aa66a847791a
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content:
"Country specific studies provide insight into regionally applicable \r\nmeasures, with emphasis on small-scale anaerobic digestion \r\n(e.g.,  dome digesters), solid manure coverage and daily manure \r\nspreading in Asia and the Pacific, and Africa (Hasegawa and Matsuoka \r\n2012; Hoa et al. 2014; Jilani et al. 2015; Hasegawa et al. 2016; Pradhan \r\net al. 2017; Ericksen and Crane 2018; Pradhan et al. 2019; Kiggundu \r\net al. 2019; Dioha and Kumar 2020). Tank/lagoon covers, large-scale \r\nanaerobic digestion, improved application timing, nitrogen inhibitor \r\napplication to urine patches, soil-liquid separation, reduced livestock \r\nnitrogen intake, trailing shoe, band or injection slurry spreading and \r\nacidification are emphasised in Developed Countries (Kaparaju and \r\nRintala 2011; Eory et al. 2015; Pape et al. 2016; Jayasundara et al. \r\n2016; Pellerin et al. 2017; Liu and Liu 2018; Lanigan et al. 2018; \r\nCarroll and Daigneault 2019; Eckard and Clark 2020)"


id: 7c5a3e06da1dfa529f2eb08afff32b6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" Using IPCC \r\nAR4 GWP100 values for CH4 and N2O, a recent assessment finds 69% \r\n(63.4 MtCO2-eq yr-1) of economic potential (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) \r\nbetween 2020-2050, to be in Developed Countries (Roe et al. 2021)."


id: c2723a4fbd1d5997bef525b47f8338a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Research published since SRCCL broadly \r\nfocuses on measures relevant to intensive or confined systems \r\n(e.g., (Hunt et al. 2019; Kavanagh et al. 2019; Sokolov et al. 2020; \r\nIm et al. 2020; Adghim et al. 2020; Mostafa et al. 2020), highlighting \r\nco-benefits and risks. For example, measures may enhance nutrient \r\nrecovery, fertiliser value (Sefeedpari et al. 2019; Ba et al. 2020; Yao \r\net al. 2020) and secondary processes such as biogas production \r\n(Shin et al. 2019). However, the potential antagonistic relationship \r\nbetween GHG and ammonia mitigation and need for appropriate \r\nmanagement is emphasised (Aguirre-Villegas et al. 2019; Grossi et \r\nal. 2019; Kupper et al. 2020; Ba et al. 2020). In some circumstances, \r\nfugitive emissions may reduce the potential mitigation benefits of \r\nbiogas production (Scheutz and Fredenslund 2019; Bakkaloglu et al"


id: 9e55d4ac863fafb9aeb5fa25c620da13
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" \r\n2021), while high implementation cost is identified as an adoption \r\nbarrier, notably of anaerobic digestion (Liu and Liu 2018; Niles and \r\nWiltshire 2019; Ndambi et al. 2019; Ackrill and Abdo 2020; Adghim \r\net al. 2020). Nitrification inhibitors have been found to be effective \r\nat reducing N2O emissions from pasture deposited urine (Lopez\u0002Aizpun et al. 2020), although the use of nitrification inhibitors is "


id: dbfa92a9f489caca2e9c21b5a306e7c8
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content:
"There is robust evidence and high agreement that agriculture needs to change to facilitate environment conservation while \r\nmaintaining and where appropriate, increase overall production. The SRCCL identified several farming system approaches, deemed \r\nalternative to conventional systems (Olsson et al. 2019; Mbow et al. 2019; L.G. Smith et al. 2019). These may incorporate several of the \r\nmitigation measures described in Section 7.4.3, while potentially also delivering environmental co-benefits. This Box assesses evidence \r\nspecifically on the mitigation capacity of some such system approaches. The approaches are not mutually exclusive, may share similar \r\nprinciples or practices and can be complimentary. In all cases, mitigation may result from either (i) emission reductions or (ii) enhanced \r\ncarbon sequestration, via combinations of management practices as outlined in Figure 1 within this Box"


id: edcb323b514ebfc948c285c53a83d1b9
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content:
" The approaches will have \r\npros and cons concerning multiple factors, including mitigation, yield and co-benefits, with trade-offs subject to the diverse contexts \r\nand ways in which they are implemented."


id: bd6d30d535fa06b76575acab78699482
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content:
"There is limited discussion on the mitigation potential of AE (Gliessman 2013; Altieri and Nicholls 2017), but robust evidence that \r\nAE can improve system resilience and bring multiple co-benefits (Altieri et al. 2015; Mbow et al. 2019; Aguilera et al. 2020; Tittonell \r\n2020; Wanger et al. 2020) (AR6 WGII Box 5.10). Limited evidence concerning the mitigation capacity of AE at a system level (Saj \r\net al. 2017; Snapp et al. 2021) makes conclusions difficult, yet studies into specific practices that may be incorporated, suggest AE \r\nmay have mitigation potential (medium confidence) (Section 7.4.3). However, AE, that incorporates management practices used in \r\norganic farming (see below), may result in reduced yields, driving compensatory agricultural production elsewhere. Research into \r\nGHG mitigation by AE as a system and impacts of wide-scale implementation is required"


id: a0a50cb3e87768af7fb8d3706ea575ae
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content:
" Despite absence of a universally accepted \r\ndefinition (see Annex I), RA is gaining increasing attention and shares principles of AE. Some descriptions include carbon sequestration \r\nas a specific aim (Elevitch et al. 2018). Few studies have assessed mitigation potential of RA at a system level (e.g., Colley et al. 2020). \r\nLike AE, it is likely that RA can contribute to mitigation, the extent to which is currently unclear and by its case-specific design, will \r\nvary (medium confidence)."


id: f4d63778ca9649eed49628abc4f20049
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"OF can be considered a form of AE (Lampkin et al. 2017) though it is discussed separately here as it is guided by specific principles \r\nand associated regulations (Annex I). OF is perhaps noted more for potential co-benefits, such as enhanced system resilience and \r\nbiodiversity promotion, than mitigation. Several studies have reviewed the emissions footprint of organic compared to conventional \r\nsystems (Mondelaers et al. 2009; Tuomisto et al. 2012; Skinner et al. 2014; Meier et al. 2015; Seufert and Ramankutty 2017; Clark and \r\nTilman 2017; Meemken and Qaim 2018; Bellassen et al. 2021). Acknowledging potential assessment limitations (Meier et al. 2015; \r\nvan der Werf et al. 2020), evidence suggests organic production to typically generate lower emissions per unit of area, while emissions \r\nper unit of product vary and depend on the product (high agreement, medium evidence). OF has been suggested to increase soil \r\ncarbon sequestration (Gattinger et al"


id: a9c3273e4ad243b774b29309d39c5a76
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content:
" 2012), though definitive conclusions are challenging (Leifeld et al. 2013). Fewer studies consider \r\nimpacts of large-scale conversion from conventional to organic production globally. Though context specific (Seufert and Ramankutty \r\n2017), OF is reported to typically generate lower yields (Seufert et al. 2012; De Ponti et al. 2012; Kirchmann 2019; Biernat et al. 2020). \r\nLarge-scale conversion, without fundamental changes in food systems and diets (Muller et al. 2017; Theurl et al. 2020), may lead to \r\nincreases in absolute emissions from land-use change, driven by greater land requirements to maintain production (L.G. Smith et al. \r\n2019; Leifeld 2016; Meemken and Qaim 2018)."


id: 6a7cb9f2f294c8d7b00f013648e083cb
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content:
"The study shows that by 2030 under BAU scenario GHG emissions from the agricultural sector in India would be 515 MtCO2-eq yr-1\r\n(using GWP100 and IPCC AR4 values) with a technical mitigation potential of 85.5 MtCO2-eq yr-1 through the adoption of various \r\nmitigation practices. About 80% of the technical mitigation potential could be achieved by adopting cost-saving measures. \r\nThree mitigation options, for example, efficient use of fertiliser, zero-tillage, and rice-water management, could deliver more than 50% \r\nof the total technical abatement potential. Under the BAU scenario the projected GHG emissions from major crop and livestock species \r\nis estimated at 489 MtCO2-eq in 2030, whereas under mitigation scenario GHG emissions are estimated at 410 MtCO2-eq implying \r\na technical mitigation option of about 78.67 MtCO2-eq yr-1 (Box 7.6, Figure 1). Major sources of projected emissions under the BAU \r\nscenario, in order of importance, were cattle, rice, buffalo, and small ruminants"


id: 9b3ebe1a7f6fa7382fa8c857ab30a015
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vector_id: 21964
content:
" Although livestock production and rice cultivation \r\naccount for a major share of agricultural emissions, the highest mitigation potential was observed in rice (about 36 MtCO2-eq yr-1) \r\nfollowed by buffalo (about 14 MtCO2-eq yr-1), wheat (about 11 MtCO2-eq yr-1) and cattle (about 7 MtCO2-eq yr-1). Crops such as \r\ncotton and sugarcane each offered mitigation potential of about 5 MtCO2-eq yr-1 while the mitigation potential from small ruminants \r\n(goat/sheep) was about 2 MtCO2-eq yr-1."


id: 2615dd04aef751cff91c41a5a03cae5a
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vector_id: 3411
content:
"Sapkota et al. (2019) also estimated the magnitude of GHG savings \r\nper year through adoption of various mitigation measures, together \r\nwith the total cost and net cost per unit of CO2-eq abated. When \r\nthe additional benefits of increased yield due to adoption of the \r\nmitigation measures were considered, about 80% of the technical \r\nmitigation potential (67.5 out of 85.5 MtCO2-eq) could be achieved \r\nby cost-saving measures. When yield benefits were considered, \r\ngreen fodder supplements to ruminant diets were the most cost\u0002effective mitigation measure, followed by vermicomposting \r\nand improved diet management of small ruminants. Mitigation \r\nmeasures such as fertigation and micro-irrigation, various methods \r\nof restoring degraded land and feed additives in livestock appear \r\nto be cost-prohibitive, even when considering yield benefits, if \r\nany"


id: 8f9379163c211103e1d5d8cdef71a90e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20136
content:
" The study accounted for GHG emissions at the farm level \r\nand excluded emissions arising due to processing, marketing or \r\nconsumption post farm-gate. It also did not include emissions \r\nfrom feed production, since livestock in India mostly rely on crop \r\nby-products and concentrates. Further the potential of laser land \r\nlevelling seems exaggerated which may also be redundant with \r\nalready accounted potential from 'improved water management \r\nin rice'. The mitigation potential of agroecological approaches/\r\ntechnologies such as natural farming which is picking up in India in \r\nrecent years has also been overlooked."


id: 8cd9e6a0e9b4b74aad7479f48304438a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19679
content:
"Increased availability of spatially explicit data and advances in \r\nthe modelling of crop productivity and land use, land carbon \r\nstocks, hydrology, and ecosystem properties, have enabled more \r\ncomprehensive analyses of factors that influence the contribution of \r\nbioenergy and BECCS in IAM-based mitigation scenarios, and also \r\nassociated co-benefits and adverse side effects (Turner et al.2018a; \r\nWu et al. 2019, Li et al. 2020, Hanssen et al. 2020; Drews et al. 2020; \r\nAi et al. 2021; Hasegawa et al. 2021). Yet, IAMs are still coarse in \r\nlocal land-use practices. (Daioglou et al. 2019; Wu et al. 2019; \r\nMoreira et al. 2020b). Literature complementary to IAM studies \r\nindicate opportunities for integration of biomass production systems \r\ninto agricultural landscapes (e.g.,  agroforestry, double cropping) \r\nto produce biomass while achieving co-benefits (Section  12.5). \r\nSimilarly, climate-smart forestry puts forward measures (Box  7"


id: e8138c575e796f7a5ab2e65e53a703ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34014
content:
"3) \r\nadapted to regional circumstances in forest sectors, enabling co\u0002benefits in nature conservation, soil protection, employment and \r\nincome generation, and provision of wood for buildings, bioenergy \r\nand other bio-based products (Nabuurs et al. 2017)."


id: 88ba4973e46b221a7d82a6cecd8f4e47
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19042
content:
"Bioenergy and BECCS can be associated with a range of co-benefits \r\nand adverse side effects (Smith et al. 2016; Jia et al. 2019; Calvin \r\net al. 2021) (Section  12.5). It is difficult to disentangle bioenergy \r\ndevelopment from the overall development in the AFOLU sector \r\ngiven its multiple interactions with food, land, and energy systems. It \r\nis therefore not possible to precisely determine the scale of bioenergy \r\nand BECCS deployment at which negative impacts outweigh \r\nbenefits. Important uncertainties include governance systems, \r\nfuture food and biomaterials demand, land-use practices, energy \r\nsystems development, climate impacts, and time scale considered \r\nwhen weighing negative impacts against benefits (Robledo-Abad \r\net al. 2017; Turner et al. 2018b; Daioglou et al. 2019; Wu et al. 2019; \r\nKalt et al. 2020; Hanssen et al. 2020; Calvin et al. 2021; Cowie et al. \r\n2021) (SRCCL, Cross-Chapter Box 7; Box 7.7)"


id: f5de59dd979e0208fac4e38bc265576f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36197
content:
" The use of municipal \r\norganic waste, harvest residues, and biomass processing by-products \r\nas feedstock is commonly considered to have relatively lower risk, \r\nprovided that associated land-use practices are sustainable (Cowie \r\net al. 2021). Deployment of dedicated biomass production systems \r\ncan have positive and negative implications on mitigation and \r\nother sustainability criteria, depending on location and previous \r\nland use, feedstock, management practice, deployment strategy \r\nand scale (Rulli et al. 2016; Popp et al. 2017; Daioglou et al. 2017; \r\nStaples et al. 2017; Carvalho et al. 2017; Humpenoder et al. 2018; \r\nFujimori et al. 2019; Hasegawa et al. 2020; Drews et al. 2020; Schulze \r\net al. 2020; Stenzel et al. 2020; Mouratiadou et al. 2020; Buchspies et al. \r\n2020; Hanssen et al. 2020, IPBES 2019b) (Sections 12.5 and 17.3.3.1)."


id: 5746c237c910be6bf78a35c000440c4c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11221
content:
"Studies have also investigated the extent and possible use of \r\nmarginal, abandoned, and degraded lands, and approaches to help \r\nrestore the productive value of these lands (Awasthi et al. 2017; \r\nFritsche et al. 2017; Chiaramonti and Panoutsou, 2018; Fernando \r\net al. 2018; Elbersen et al. 2019; Rahman et al. 2019; Naess et al. \r\n2021). In the SRCCL, the presented range for degraded or abandoned \r\nland was 32-1400 Mha (Jia et al. 2019). Recent regional assessments \r\nnot included in the SRCCL found up to 69 Mha in EU-28, 185 Mha \r\nin China, 9.5 Mha in Canada, and 127 Mha in the USA (Emery et al. \r\n2017; Liu et al. 2017; Elbersen et al. 2019; Zhang et al.2020; Vera \r\net al. 2021). The definitions of marginal/abandoned/degraded land, \r\nand the methods used to assess such lands remain inconsistent \r\nacross studies (Jiang et al. 2019), causing large variation amongst \r\nthem (Jiang et al. 2021)"


id: 5c76855d9cd2a425f606c492ef1f869f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12063
content:
" Furthermore, the availability of such lands \r\nhas been contested since they may serve other functions, such as: \r\nsubsistence, biodiversity protection, and so on (Baka 2014)."


id: 3738ec4b8b7e812bf0ee3f649abd3a5e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6078
content:
"Besides emissions, and possible avoided emissions, related to the supply chain, the GHG effects of using bioenergy depend on: \r\n(i) change in GHG emissions when bioenergy substitutes another energy source; and (ii) how the associated land use and possible land\u0002use change influence the amount of carbon that is stored in vegetation and (Calvin et al. 2021) soils over time. Studies arrive at varying \r\nmitigation potentials for bioenergy and BECCS due to the large diversity of bioenergy systems, and varying conditions concerning \r\nwhere and how they are deployed (Elshout 2015; Harper et al.2018; Muri 2018; Kalt et al.2019; Brandao et al. 2019; Buchspies et al. \r\n2020; Cowie et al. 2021; Calvin et al. 2021). Important factors include feedstock type, land management practice, energy conversion \r\nefficiency, type of bioenergy product (and possible co-products), emissions intensity of the products being displaced, and the land use/\r\ncover prior to bioenergy deployment (Zhu et al"


id: cf2655f393d345bd790aff045fba8fbb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30124
content:
" 2017; Staples et al. 2017; Daioglou et al. 2017; Carvalho et al. 2017; Hanssen et al. \r\n2020; Mouratiadou et al. 2020). Studies arrive at contrasting conclusions also when similar bioenergy systems and conditions are \r\nanalysed, due to different methodologies, assumptions, and parametrization (Harper et al.2018; Kalt et al.2019; Brandao et al. 2019; \r\nAlbers et al. 2019; Buchspies et al. 2020; Bessou et al. 2020; Rolls and Forster 2020; Cowie et al. 2021)."


id: 70fafd1403832f6360c162ef7f0188ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15411
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. Recent estimates of technical \r\nbiomass potentials constrained by food security and environmental \r\nconsiderations fall within previous ranges corresponding to medium \r\nagreement, (e.g.,  Turner et al. 2018b; Daioglou et al. 2019; Wu \r\net al. 2019, Hansen et al.2020; Kalt et al. 2020) arriving at 4-57 \r\nand 46-245 EJ yr-1 by 2050 for residues and dedicated biomass \r\ncrops, respectively. Based on studies to date, the technical net \r\nCDR potential of BECCS (including LUC and other supply chain \r\nemissions, but excluding energy carrier substitution) by 2050 is \r\n5.9 (0.5-11.3) GtCO2 yr-1 globally, of which 1.6 (0.5-3.5) GtCO2 yr-1\r\nis available at below USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 (medium confidence) (Lenton \r\n2010; Koornneef et al. 2012; McLaren 2012; Powell and Lenton 2012; \r\nFuss et al. 2018; Turner et al. 2018a; Hanssen et al. 2020; Roe et al. \r\n2021) (Figure  7.11). The equivalent economic potential as derived \r\nfrom IAMs is 1.8 (0.2-9.9) GtCO2 yr-1 (Table 7"


id: 6670582844a11323af4cd3e3332636b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13708
content:
"a  transition towards more plant-based consumption and reduced \r\nconsumption of animal-based foods, particularly from ruminant \r\nanimals, could reduce pressure on forests and land used for feed, \r\nsupport the preservation of biodiversity and planetary health (FAO \r\n2018c; Theurl et al. 2020), and contribute to preventing forms of \r\nmalnutrition (i.e.,  undernutrition, micronutrient deficiency, and \r\nobesity) in developing countries (Section  12.4). Other co-benefits \r\ninclude lowering the risk of cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes, \r\nand reducing mortality from diet-related non-communicable diseases \r\n(Toumpanakis et al. 2018; Satija and Hu 2018; Faber et al. 2020; \r\nMagkos et al. 2020). However, transition towards sustainable healthy \r\ndiets could have adverse impacts on the economic stability of the \r\nagricultural sector (MacDiarmid 2013; Aschemann-Witzel 2015; \r\nVan Loo et al. 2017)"


id: 11a8c6a24bb0e7e8fdde6ac5ec1d38bb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 267
content:
" Therefore, shifting toward sustainable and \r\nhealthy diets requires effective food-system oriented reform policies \r\nthat integrate agriculture, health, and environment policies  to \r\ncomprehensively address synergies and conflicts in co-lateral sectors\r\n(agriculture, trade, health, environment protection etc.) and capture \r\nspill-over effects, for example, climate change, biodiversity loss, food \r\npoverty (FAO and WHO 2019; Galli et al. 2020)."


id: 7c159ed8928fd959f39110069dcdab6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17125
content:
"Regionally, mitigation potentials for shifting towards sustainable \r\nhealthy diets (50% convergence to <60g of meat-based protein, \r\nonly accounting for diverted production) vary across regions. \r\nA recent assessment finds greatest economic (up to USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) \r\npotential for 2020-2050 in Asia and the Pacific (609 MtCO2-eq yr-1) \r\nfollowed by Developed Countries (322 MtCO2-eq yr-1) based on \r\nIPCC AR4 GWP100 values for CH4 and N2O) (Roe et al. 2021). In the \r\nEU, (Latka et al. 2021) found that moving to healthy diets through \r\nprice incentives could bring about annual reductions of non-CO2\r\nemissions from agriculture of 12-111 MtCO2-eq yr-1. At the country \r\nlevel, recent studies show that following National Dietary Guidelines \r\n(NDG) would reduce food system GHG emissions by 4-42%, confer \r\nlarge health gains (1.0-1.5 million quality-adjusted life-years) and \r\nlower health care system costs (NZD 14-20 billion) in New Zealand \r\nDrew et al"


