# document

id: b21c127242471220baaad0a96d78939
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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"While the circular economy concept first emerged in the context of \r\nwaste avoidance, resource depletion, closed-loop recycling, etc., it \r\nhas now evolved as a  tool for a  broader systemic national policy \r\ndue to its potential wider benefits (Geng et al. 2013). It represents \r\nnew circular business models that encourage design for reuse \r\nand to improve material recovery and recycling, and so represents \r\na departure from the traditional linear production and consumption \r\nsystems (with landfilling at the end), with a wide range of potential \r\nco-benefits to a wide range of SDGs (Guo et al. 2016; Genovese et al. \r\n2017; Schroeder et al. 2019; UNSD 2020)."


id: b40d394ffae47797e865df36be06cd00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:41
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"Given the wide range of stakeholders involved in climate actions \r\nand their (often contradictory) interests and priorities, the nature of \r\nco-benefits and risk can affect decision-making processes and the \r\nbehaviour of stakeholders (Labella et al. 2020). Co-benefits form an \r\nimportant driver supporting the adoption of mitigation strategies, \r\nyet are commonly overlooked in policymaking. Karlsson et al. (2020), \r\nbased on a  review of 239 peer-reviewed articles concluded that \r\ndiverse co-benefit categories, including air, soil and water quality, \r\ndiet, physical activity, biodiversity, economic performance, and \r\nenergy security, are prevalent in the literature."


id: eb2f29ff1bdba17b61b51c939b839ad7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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"Genovese et al. (2017) articulates the advantages from an \r\nenvironmental and responsible consumption and production point \r\nof view (SDG 12). Many studies have outlined new business models \r\nbased on the circular economy that foster sustainable economic \r\ngrowth and the generation of new jobs (SDG 8) (Antikainen and \r\nValkokari 2016), as well as global competitiveness and innovation \r\nin business and the industrial sector (Pieroni et al. 2019), such as its \r\npotential synergies with industry 4.0 (Garcia-Muina et al. 2018)."


id: 3bd9e9d9225759181b1ab95eaeb3816e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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"Material efficiency, an important mitigation option (SDG 13, climate \r\naction) for heavy industries, is yet to be fully acknowledged and \r\nleveraged (Gonzalez Hernandez et al. 2018a; Sudmant et al. 2018; \r\nDawkins et al. 2019). Material efficiency directly addresses SDG \r\n12 (responsible production and consumption) but also provides \r\nopportunities to reduce the pressures and impacts on environmental \r\nsystems (SDG 6, clean water and sanitation) (Olivetti and Cullen 2018). \r\nExploiting material efficiency usually requires new business models \r\nand provides potential co-benefits of increased employment and \r\neconomic opportunities (SDG 8, decent work and economic growth)."


id: ed42fa2c59cb6f68e69543957c7f1f16
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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"Following a review of the literature, Schroeder et al. (2019) identified \r\nlinkages between circular economy practices and SDGs based on \r\na relationship scoring system, and highlighted that such SDGs as SDG \r\n6 (clean water and sanitation), SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy), \r\nSDG 8  (decent work and economic growth), SDG 12 (responsible \r\nconsumption and production), and SDG 15 (life on land) all strongly \r\nbenefit from circular economy practices. With the potential to impact \r\non all stages of the value chain (micro, meso and macro level of \r\nthe economy), circular economy has also been identified as a  key \r\nindustrial strategy to managing waste across sectors."


id: 3cf19ae4af8a6deee782fbb5ffe525a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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"Material efficiency also provides co-benefits through infrastructural \r\ndevelopment (SDG 9, industry, innovation and infrastructure) \r\n(Mathews et al. 2018) to support the wide range of potential \r\nmaterial efficiency strategies including light-weighting, reusing, \r\nremanufacturing, recycling, diverting scrap, extending product \r\nlives, using products more intensely, improving process yields, and \r\nsubstituting materials (Allwood et al. 2011). Worrell et al. (2016) \r\nalso emphasises how material efficiency improvements, in addition \r\nto limiting the impacts of climate change help deliver sustainable \r\nproduction and consumption co-benefits through environmental \r\nstewardship. Binder and Blankenberg (2017) and Dhandra (2019) "


id: 2d0957103dc50ffdc1a4ca6625ad6c31
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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"Chatziaras et al. (2016) highlights the co-benefit to SDG 7 (affordable \r\nand clean energy) resulting from waste-derived fuel for the cement \r\nindustry. Through the management of industrial waste using circular \r\neconomy practices, studies such as Geng et al. (2012) and Bonato \r\nand Orsini (2017) have pointed out co-benefits to SDGs beyond \r\nclear environmental and economic benefits, highlighting how it \r\nalso benefits SDG 3  and 11 through improved social relations \r\nbetween industrial sectors and local societies, and improved public \r\nenvironmental awareness and public health levels."


id: 8cafaa0c3e2dbce823b28ea1fa140972
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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"CCU and CCS have been identified as playing key roles in the \r\ntransition of industry to net zero. Advancements in the development \r\nand deployment of both CCS and CCU foster climate action (SDG 13). \r\nOther co-benefits for CCS include control of non-CO2 pollutants \r\n(SDG 3), direct foreign investment and know-how (SDG 9), enhanced \r\noil recovery from existing resources, and diversified employment \r\nprospects and skills (SDG 8) (Bonner 2017). For CCU, the main \r\nco-benefit related contributions are expected within the context of \r\nenergy transition processes, and in societal advancements that are \r\nlinked to technological progress (Olfe-Krautlein 2020). Therefore, the \r\nexpectations are that the deployment of CCU technologies would \r\nhave least potential for meeting the SDG targets relating to society/\r\npeople, compared with the anticipated contributions to the pillars of \r\necology and economy."


id: 21a71887584faed3245fa7b0d3a724e7
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"These mitigation options carry a  large number of risks as well. \r\nThe high cost of the capture and storage process not only limit \r\nthe technology penetration, but also make energy and products \r\nmore expensive (risk to SDG 7), potential leaks from undersea or \r\nunderground CO2 storages carries risks for achieving SDGs 6, 14 and \r\n15. While there are economic costs involved with the deployment \r\nof CCS and  CCU (Bataille et al. 2018a), there are also significant \r\neconomic and developmental costs associated with taking no action, \r\nbecause of the potential negative impact of climate change. CCS and \r\nCCU have been argued as providing public good (Bergstrom and Ty \r\n2017) and co-benefits to key SDGs (Schipper et al. 2011). On the \r\nother hand, Fan et al. (2018) among others have noted the potential \r\nlock-in of existing energy structures due to CCS. Refer to Table 17.1 \r\nfor CCS and CCU co-benefits with respect to other sector chapters."


id: 34b9f742861395320eab99efd0fb0270
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"Many studies report that energy efficiency improvements are \r\nessential for supporting overall economic growth, contributing \r\nto positive changes in multi-factor productivity (SDGs 8  and 9  - \r\ndecent work and economic growth and industry, innovation, and \r\ninfrastructure)  (Lambert et al. 2014; Bataille and Melton 2017; \r\nRajbhandari and Zhang 2018; Bashmakov 2019; Stern 2019) \r\nthrough industrial innovation (SDG 9) (Kang and Lee 2016), with \r\nsome dissent (e.g., Mahmood and Ahmad 2018). Improved energy \r\nefficiency against a  background of growing energy prices helps \r\nindustrial plants stay competitive (Bashmakov and Myshak 2018). \r\nEnergy efficiency allows continued economic growth under strong \r\nenvironmental regulation. Given that energy efficiency measures \r\nreduce the combustion of fossil fuels it leads to reduced air pollution \r\nat industrial sites (Williams et al. 2012) and better indoor comfort at \r\nworking places."


id: 894bfee0de89f3748cad3f8ad8491d35
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"Since less energy supply infrastructure is needed in cities and less \r\nenergy is needed to produce materials such as cement and concrete, \r\nand metals, energy efficiency indirectly supports 'sustainable cities \r\nand communities' (SDG 11) (Di Foggia 2018). In addition, energy \r\nefficiency in industry reflects achievements in meeting SDG 12 \r\n(responsible consumption and production)."


id: 42240f4e1bd340ebc6983fa98ba90f55
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"A key, generally underappreciated SDG benefit of electrification is \r\nimproved urban and indoor air quality (at working places as well) \r\nand associated health benefits (SDG 3) from clean electrification \r\n(SDG 7) of industrial facilities (IEA 2016). With energy being such \r\nan important cross-cutting issue to sustainable development, \r\nsome SDGs, such as SDGs 1, 3, 4  and 5  (Harmelink et al. 2018) \r\nare co-beneficiaries to using electrification and fuel switching as \r\na climate action mitigation option."


id: e333bfea79d4846e128247e953f98437
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"et al. 2013; Rogge and Reichardt 2016). Industrial decarbonisation \r\npolicies need to be innovative and definitive about net zero CO2\r\nemissions to trigger the level of investment needed for the profound \r\nchanges in production, use and recycling of basic materials needed \r\n(Nilsson et al. 2021). Inclusive and transparent governance that \r\nassesses industry decarbonisation progress, monitors innovation \r\nand accountability, and provides regular recommendations for \r\npolicy adjustments is also important for progressing (Mathy et al. \r\n2016; Bataille 2020a)."


id: e72839fc091508a0d6d724dd1b064d5c
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"Deployment of the mitigation options presented in this chapter \r\n(Sections  11.3 and 11.4) needs support from a  mix of policy \r\ninstruments including: GHG pricing coupled with border adjustments \r\nor other economic signals for trade-exposed industries; robust \r\ngovernment support for research, development, and deployment; \r\nenergy, material and emissions standards; recycling policies; \r\nsectoral technology roadmaps; market pull policies; and support for \r\nnew infrastructure (Figure 11.15) ( Flanagan et al. 2011; Rogge et al. \r\n2017; Bataille et al. 2018a; Tvinnereim and Mehling 2018; Creutzig \r\n2019; Bataille 2020a; Rissman et al. 2020). The combination of the \r\nabove will depend on specific sectoral market barriers, technology \r\nmaturity, and local political and social acceptance (Hoppmann "


id: 78fe2316435eceb3f8f915b7b9323bb1
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"The level of policy experience and institutional capacity needed \r\nvaries widely across the mitigation options. In many countries, "


id: f7256b52450a82ebd9cd0af72b95679f
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"et al. 2019). The section describes how the need to focus on long\u0002term transitions rather than incremental changes can be managed \r\nthrough the planning and strategising of transition pathways; \r\ndiscusses the role of research, development, and innovation policy; \r\nhighlights the need for enabling low-carbon demand and market \r\ncreation; reflects on the necessity of establishing and maintaining \r\na level of knowledge and capacity in the policy domain about the \r\nindustrial transition challenge; and points to the critical importance \r\nof coherence across geographical and policy contexts. The section \r\nconcludes with a reflection on how different groups of actors needs \r\nto take up different parts of the responsibility for mitigating climate \r\nchange in the industrial sector."


id: 2035cb9589ea387e7a5d34fd986c82e5
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"energy efficiency is a well-established policy field with decades of \r\nexperience from voluntary and negotiated agreements, regulations, \r\nstandards, energy audits, and demand-side management (DSM) \r\nprogrammes (see AR5), but there are also many countries where \r\nthe application of energy efficiency policy is absent or nascent (see \r\nAR5) (Tanaka 2011; Fischedick et al. 2014a; Garcia-Quevedo and \r\nJove-Llopis 2021; Saunders et al. 2021). The application of DSM \r\nand load flexibility will also need to grow with electrification and \r\nrenewable energy integration."


id: 8651cfd93c5ed940b73ca9f3d2c2a6c3
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"Internalising the cost of GHG emissions in consumer choices \r\nand producer investment decisions has been a  major strategy \r\npromoted by economists and considered by policymakers to mitigate \r\nemissions cost-effectively and to incentivise low-GHG innovations \r\nin a purportedly technology neutral way (Stiglitz et al. 2017; Boyce \r\n2018). In the absence of a coordinated effort, individual countries, \r\nregions and cities have implemented carbon-pricing schemes. As of \r\n23 August 2021, 64 carbon schemes have been implemented or are \r\nscheduled by law for implementation, covering 22.5% of global GHG \r\nemissions (World Bank 2020), 35 of which are carbon taxes, primarily \r\nimplemented on a national level and 29 of which are emissions trading \r\nschemes, spread across national and sub-national jurisdictions."


id: d65e5e5459778b2e46d7e018121be263
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"There is also a growing interest from policymakers in electrification \r\nand fuel switching but the focus has been mainly on innovation \r\nand on developing technical production-side solutions rather than \r\non creating markets for enabling demand for low-carbon products, \r\nalthough the concept of green public procurement is gaining traction. \r\nThe situation is similar for CCU and CCS. Low-carbon technologies \r\nadoption represents an additional cost to producers, and this must be \r\nhandled through fiscal incentives like tax benefits, GHG pricing, green \r\nsubsidies, regulation and permit procedures. For example, the 45Q tax \r\ncredit provides some incentives to reduce investor risk for CCS and \r\nattract private investment in the USA (Ochu and Friedmann 2021)."


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"Since industrial decarbonisation is only recently emerging as a policy \r\nfield there is little international collaboration on facilitation (Oberthur \r\net al. 2021). Given that most key materials markets are global and \r\ncompetitive, unless there is much greater global governance to \r\ncontribute to the decarbonisation of GHG-intensive industry through \r\nintergovernmental and transnational institutions it is questionable \r\nthat the world will achieve industry decarbonisation by 2050."


id: 9cb843590d3ffc9c67fbae5ac322af96
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"As GHG pricing, through GHG taxes or cap and trade schemes, has \r\nremained a  central avenue for climate policy, this section begins \r\nwith a review of how the industrial sector has been concerned with \r\nthese instruments. The rest of the section is then structured into \r\nfive key topics, following insights on key failures that policy must \r\naddress to enable and support large-scale transformations as well \r\nas the need for complementary mixes of policies to achieve this goal \r\n(Weber and Rohracher 2012; Rogge and Reichardt 2016; Grillitsch "


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"Legal challenges arise because CBAM can be perceived as \r\na protectionist measure violating the principle of non-discrimination \r\nunder the regulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However \r\nthe absence of GHG prices can also been perceived as a  subsidy \r\nfor fossil fuel-based production (Stiglitz 2006; Al Khourdajie and \r\nFinus 2020; Kuusi et al. 2020). Another argument supporting CBAM \r\nimplementation is the possibility to induce low-GHG investment in \r\nnon-regulated regions (Cosbey et al. 2019)."


id: e53d73e875e8eda9e81072dac02c3fb1
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"Thus far, California is the only jurisdiction that has implemented CBA \r\ntariffs applied on electricity imports from neighbouring states and \r\nprovides insights on how a CBA can work in practice by using 'default' \r\nGHG emissions intensity benchmarks (Fowlie et al. 2021). CBAM is an \r\napproach likely to be applied first to a few selected energy-intensive \r\nindustries that are at risk of carbon leakage, as the EU is considering. \r\nThe implementation of CBA needs to balance applicability versus \r\nfairness of treatment. An option recently proposed is an individual \r\nadjustment mechanism to give companies exporting to the EU the \r\noption to demonstrate their actual carbon intensity (Mehling and Ritz \r\n2020). Any CBAMs will have to comply with multilaterally agreed \r\nrules under the WTO Agreements to be implemented."


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"Clear and firm emission reduction caps towards 2050 are essential \r\nfor sending strong signals to businesses. However, many researchers \r\nrecognise that complementary policies must be developed to \r\nset current production and consumption patterns toward a  path \r\nconsistent with achieving the Paris Agreement goals as cap-and\u0002trade or carbon taxes are not enough (Schmalensee and Stavins \r\n2017; Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017; Bataille et al. 2018b; Kirchner \r\net al. 2019). In this broader policy context, proceeds from pricing \r\nschemes can be used to support the deployment of options with \r\nnear-term abatement costs that are too high to be incentivised by the \r\nprevailing carbon price, but which show substantial cost-reduction \r\npotential with scale and learning, and to ensure a  just transition \r\n(Wang and Lo 2021)."


id: 703d6a6ab1ac5277e0ada19b30d7b92b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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"The adoption of CBAM by different countries may evolve into \r\nthe formation of a  climate club where countries would align on \r\nspecific elements of climate regulation (e.g., primary iron or clinker \r\nintensity) to facilitate implementation and incentivise countries to \r\njoin (Nordhaus 2015; Hagen and Schneider 2021; Tagliapietra and \r\nWolff 2021a,b). However, not all countries have the same abilities \r\nto report, adapt and transition to low-carbon production. The \r\nimplications of CBAMs on trade relationships should be considered \r\nto avoid country divide and separation from a  common goal of \r\nglobal decarbonisation (Michaelowa et al. 2019; Kuusi et al. 2020; \r\nBanerjee 2021; Eicke et al. 2021; Bashmakov 2021). The globalisation \r\nof markets and the fragmentation of supply chains complicates the \r\nassignment of responsibility for GHG emissions mitigations related \r\nto trade (Jakob et al. 2021). Production-based carbon-price schemes "


id: 2e4e197f9ee7f5d332f8bf22e09cd700
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"Decarbonising the industry sector requires transitioning how material \r\nand products are produced and used today to development pathways \r\nthat include the strategies outlined in Sections 11.3 and 11.4 and \r\nFigure  11.15. Such broad approaches require the development \r\nof transition planning that assesses the impacts of the different \r\nstrategies and considers local conditions and social challenges that \r\nmay result from conflicts with established practices and interests, \r\nwith planning and strategies directly linked to these challenges."


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"Detailed sectoral roadmaps that assess the technical, economic, \r\nsocial and political opportunities and provide a clear path to low\u0002GHG development are needed to guide policy designs. For example, \r\nthe German state of North Rhine Westphalia passed a Climate Process \r\nLaw that resulted in the adoption of a Climate Protection Plan that \r\nset subsector targets through a transparent stakeholder engagement \r\nprocess based on scenario development and identification of low\u0002GHG options (Lechtenbohmer et al. 2015), see Box  11.3. Another \r\nexample is the UK set of Industrial Decarbonisation and Energy \r\nEfficiency Roadmaps to 2050 as well as the UK Strategic Growth \r\nPlan, which are accompanied by Action Plans for each energy\u0002intensive subsector."


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"Several studies (Ahman et al. 2017; Bataille et al. 2018a; Material \r\nEconomics 2019; Wyns et al. 2019) offer detailed transition plans using \r\nroughly the same five overarching strategies: (i) policies to encourage \r\nmaterial efficiency and high quality circularity; (ii) 'supply push' R&D \r\nand early commercialisation as well as 'demand pull' to develop niche \r\nmarkets and help emerging technologies cross 'the valley of death'; "


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"IN4Climate NRW (www.in4climate.nrw) was launched in September 2019 by the state government of North Rhine-Westphalia \r\n(IN4climate.NRW 2019) as a platform for collaboration between representatives from industry, science and politics. IN4climate.NRW \r\noffers a common space to develop innovative strategies for a carbon-neutral industrial sector, bringing together different perspectives \r\nand competencies."


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"North Rhine-Westphalia is Germany's industrial heartland. Around 19% of North Rhine-Westphalia's GHGs have their origin in the \r\nindustry sector. Consequently, the sector bears a particular responsibility when it comes to climate protection, but the state is also \r\na source of high-quality jobs and export value. The NRW government understands that the state's current competitive advantage can \r\nonly be maintained if the regional industry positions itself as a front runner for becoming GHG-neutral."


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"In working together across different branches (more than 30 companies representing mainly steel, cement, chemical, aluminium \r\nindustry, refineries and energy utilities) and enabling a direct interaction between industry and government officials, IN4Climate \r\nprovides a benefit to the participating companies. People from the different areas are working together in so-called innovation teams \r\nand underlying working groups with a self-organised process of setting their milestones and working schedule while reflecting long\u0002term needs as well as short-term requirements based on political or societal discussions."


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"The innovation teams aim to identify and set concrete impulses for development and implementation of breakthrough technologies, \r\nspecify necessary infrastructures (e.g., for hydrogen production, storage and transport) and appropriate policy settings (i.e., integrated \r\nstate, national and European policy mix). They also include an attempt to create a discourse between the public and the industry \r\nsectors as a kind of sounding board for the early detection of barriers and obstacles."


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content:
"The initiative has been successful so far, for example, having developed a clear vision for a hydrogen strategy and an associated policy \r\nframework as well as a broader decarbonisation strategy for the whole sector. It is present at the national level as well as at the \r\nEuropean level. Being successful and unique, IN4Climate is useful as a blueprint for other regions and is often visited by companies \r\nand administration staff from other German states."


id: e54856fd89a0c898aeca3382b65502f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"It is particularly the so far missing intensive and dedicated cooperation across industrial subsectors that can be seen as a success \r\nfactor. Facing substantial transformation needs associated with structural changes and infrastructure challenges, very often solutions \r\ncan't be provided and realised by a single sector but need cooperation and coordination. Even more, chicken-and-egg problems like \r\nthe construction of new infrastructures (e.g., for hydrogen and CO2 disposal) require cooperation and new modes of collaboration. \r\nIN4Climate provides the necessary link for this."


id: 7fe9bdaf143b3422fa465e7b4da8686a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Fostering collaborative innovation across sectors through the \r\nsupport of knowledge sharing and capabilities building is important \r\nas mitigation options involve new or stronger sectoral couplings \r\n(Tonjes et al. 2020). One example is linking chemicals to forestry in \r\nthe upscaling of forest bio-refineries, although it has proven to be \r\ndifficult to engage a diverse group of actors in such collaborations \r\n(Karltorp and Sanden 2012; Bauer et al. 2018). Heterogeneous \r\ncollaboration and knowledge exchange can be encouraged through \r\nconscious design of RDI programs and by supporting network \r\ninitiatives involving diverse actor groups (Van Rijnsoever et al. 2015; \r\nSoderholm et al. 2019)."


id: 60a4df93ec6b91f2363ea71ab67a51a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Policies for research, development, and innovation (RDI) for industry \r\nare present in most countries but it is only recently, and mainly in \r\ndeveloped countries, that decarbonisation of emissions-intensive \r\nindustries has been prioritised (Ahman et al. 2017; Nilsson et al. 2021). \r\nEmission-intensive industries are characterised by large dominant \r\nactors and mature process technologies with high fixed cost, long \r\npayback times and low profit margins on the primary production \r\nside of the value chain. Investments in RDI are commonly low and \r\naimed at incremental improvements to processes and products \r\n(Wesseling et al. 2017)."


id: 9b59d65d1293c99a8399c889385bd6bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 21988
content:
"The perception of an increasing durable demand for low-GHG \r\nproducts induces manufacturers to invest in decarbonisation \r\nstrategies (Olatunji et al. 2019). Policies can support and accelerate \r\nthis process by creating niche markets,  stimulating demand for \r\nlow-carbon products through procurement and financing and by \r\naddressing informational and other market barriers."


id: bcec09f619e2fd533a8dafc5a3d60f71
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Once a technology has been demonstrated with scale-up potential, \r\nthe next stage is commercialisation. This is a very expensive stage, \r\nwhere costs are not yet compensated by revenue (see, e.g., Ahman \r\net al. 2018 and Nemet et al. 2018). The H-DRI, SIDERWIN and \r\nLEILAC examples are all at the stage of scaling up. Given the \r\nresource requirement, a  diversified portfolio of investors and \r\nsupport is required to share the risk. LEILAC includes several firms, \r\nas did the UK Offshore Wind Accelerator. Government funds are \r\nalso required and could be refunded in the future through an \r\nequity position, royalty or tax. Fast-growing economies, which are \r\nadding new industrial capacity, can provide opportunities to pilot, \r\ndemonstrate and scale up new technologies, as shown by the rapid \r\nexpansion of electric vehicle and solar panel production in China, \r\nwhich contributed to driving down costs (Nemet 2019; Hsieh et al. \r\n2020; Jackson et al. 2021)."


id: 885a909e9722d5c4e9f353338126518
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Finally, large capital flows towards deployment of low-GHG solutions \r\nwill not materialise without a  growing demand for low-carbon \r\nmaterials and products that allows business opportunities. Policy will \r\nthus be needed to support the first niche markets which are essential \r\nfor refining new decarbonised technologies, troubleshooting, and for \r\nbuilding manufacturing economies of scale. Market creation does \r\nhowever go beyond the nurturing, shielding, and empowerment of \r\nearly niches (Smith and Raven 2012; Raven et al. 2016) and must \r\nalso consider how to significantly reshape existing markets to create \r\nspace for decarbonised solutions and crowd out fossil-based ones \r\n(Mazzucato 2016)."


id: 15128db05786a2a26a842958e36b17e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 823
content:
"In October 2017, California passed Assembly Bill (AB) 262, the Buy Clean California Act, a new law requiring state-funded building \r\nprojects to consider the global warming potential (GWP) of certain construction materials during procurement. The goal of AB 262 is \r\nto use California's substantial purchasing power to buy low-carbon products. Such low-carbon public procurement will directly reduce \r\nemissions by using lower-carbon products, and indirectly by sending a market signal to manufacturers to reduce their emissions in \r\norder to stay competitive in California."


id: a411a3a815f76adef478e0c9a86afca0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"The bill requirements are two-pronged: as of January 2020, manufacturers of eligible materials must submit a  facility-specific \r\nenvironmental product declaration (EPD), and the eligible materials must demonstrate (through submitted EPDs) GWP below \r\nthe product-specific compliance limits defined by the state Department of General Services (DGS), which will regulate policy \r\nimplementation. The eligible materials include structural steel, carbon steel rebar, flat glass, and mineral wool insulation. In January \r\n2021, the DGS published maximum acceptable GWP limits for each product category set at the industry average of facility-specific \r\nGWP for each material. Beginning 1 July 2021, awarding authorities were required to verify GWP compliance for all eligible materials \r\n(USGBC-LA 2018; DGS 2020)."


id: c67c867640904d12632b523947bde411
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Prior to adoption of the Buy Clean California Act, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) had been evaluating the use of \r\nlifecycle assessment and EPDs in evaluating materials. In addition to the materials specified in Buy Clean California Act (noted above), \r\nthe Caltrans project includes materials used extensively in transportation (concrete, asphalt, and aggregate). Also, the California High\u0002Speed Rail project had begun using EPDs as part of its procurement process. The High-Speed Rail Sustainability Report states that the \r\nconstruction projects will: (i) require EPDs for construction materials including steel products and concrete mix designs, and (ii) require \r\n'optimized lifecycle scores for major materials' and include additional strategies to reduce impacts across the life cycle of the project \r\n(Simonen et al. 2019)."


id: fcb587ac707455931092eb4a32b4de18
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37269
content:
"Several other states such as Washington, Minnesota, Oregon, Colorado, New York and New Jersey are developing similar types of Buy \r\nClean regulations (Simonen et al. 2019; BGA 2020)."


id: 2c8a4673932047d52aeb3e3ee8e3a053
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 4436
content:
"between 2015 and 2019 (SBTi 2021). As of August  2021, \r\n858  companies had set SBT and over 2000 companies across the \r\nworld currently use internal carbon pricing with a median internal \r\ncarbon price of USD25 per metric tonne of CO2-eq (Bartlett et al. \r\n2021). The most determined companies have developed internal GHG \r\nabatement strategies that incorporate their supply chains' emissions \r\n(Marti et al. 2015; Gillingham et al. 2017; Tost et al. 2020) and design \r\nprocurement contracts that encourage or require their suppliers \r\nto also improve their product GHG footprint (Liu et al. 2019a). For \r\nmany corporations, the emissions impact within their supply chain \r\nfar exceeds their operations direct emissions (CDP 2019). Therefore, \r\nthe opportunities to reduce emissions through purchasing goods \r\nand services from the supply chain (Scope 3) have much greater \r\npotentials than from direct emissions."


id: fa7a856ba9b1fab0cc4e671510659052
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"However, these trends have to be approached with caution as some \r\nof the emissions reductions are not direct emissions reductions \r\nfrom companies' operations, instead often from offset projects of \r\nvarying quality (Chrobak 2021). There is a lack of consistency and \r\ncomparability in the way firms are reporting emissions, which limits \r\nthe possibilities to assess companies' actual ambition and progress \r\n(Sullivan and Gouldson 2012; Burritt and Schaltegger 2014; Liu et al. \r\n2015; Rietbergen et al. 2015; Blanco et al. 2016). More research \r\nis needed to assess the current impacts of corporate voluntary \r\nclimate actions and if these efforts meet the Paris Agreement's goals \r\n(Rietbergen et al. 2015; Wang and Sueyoshi 2018). It will be critically \r\nimportant that the international corporate accounting frameworks, "


id: c2e7d58dcccf0d9fd5eb5dbdbc4ba39c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 28244
content:
"The most common climate mitigation strategies used by corporates \r\nare to set emissions reduction targets in line with the Paris Agreement \r\ngoals through science-based targets (SBTs) and to develop internal \r\ncarbon pricing (Kuo and Chang 2021). The SBT initiative records \r\nthat 338 SBT companies reduced their emissions by 302 MtCO2-eq"


id: 65f999f2f968ad4ab29be826e44316cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 13636
content:
"standards, and related guidance (e.g., GHG Protocol) be maintained \r\nand improved to reflect evolving needs in the global market and to \r\nallow for comparison of objectives and progress."


id: 5336cdff4a82d0027a28c42e85c59d17
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 10561
content:
"Governments are also turning their attention to developing standards \r\nto increase the durability of products and materials by requiring \r\noptions for maintenance, reparability, reusability, upgradability, \r\nrecyclability and waste handling. For example, the EU Ecodesign \r\nDirective includes new requirements for manufacturers to make \r\navailable for a minimum of seven to 10 years spare parts to repair \r\nhousehold equipment (Talens Peiro et al. 2020; Calisto Friant et al. \r\n2021; Nikolaou and Tsagarakis 2021). The European Commission \r\nplans to widen the resource efficiency requirements beyond energy\u0002related products to cover products such as textiles and furniture as \r\nwell as high-impact intermediary products such as steel, cement and \r\nchemicals in a new sustainable product policy legislative initiative. \r\n(Domenech and Bahn-Walkowiak 2019; Llorente-Gonzalez and \r\nVence 2019; European Commission 2020; Polverini 2021)."


id: afc609df0f183e0cc731acffb9f59570
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
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vector_id: 25173
content:
"Within the context of GHG content certifications and EPD \r\ndevelopment, more transparency is needed to increase international \r\ncomparability and to validate claims to meet consumers demand \r\nfor low-GHG material and products (Rangelov et al. 2021). Greater \r\nautomation, publicly available reference databases, benchmarking \r\nsystems and increased stakeholder collaboration can also support the \r\nimportant role of conveying credible emissions information between \r\nproducers, traders and consumers."


id: 1b310896fc1eeb7847230ec9906aed0a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 1742
content:
"Further research is needed to understand how different international \r\nand national frameworks, codes, and standards that focus on \r\nemissions can work in unison to amplify their mutually desired \r\noutcomes. Building performance and market instrument trading \r\nframeworks recognised globally do not always incentivise the same \r\noutcomes due to the differences in market approach. LCA metrics are \r\na  useful tool to help assess optimal options for ultimate emission \r\nreduction objectives (Rock et al. 2020; Shadram et al. 2020)."


id: dff5566490911e6a121b23b8890c2927
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
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vector_id: 32725
content:
"Policymakers can set minimum performance standards or maximum \r\nemission content specifications through legislation to increase the \r\nuse of low-GHG materials and products by mandating the adoption \r\nof low-GHG production and construction processes while requiring \r\nmaterial and resource efficiency aspects."


id: a02baeb5d8b7682907ffec3d21b65f1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Fossil-free basic materials production will often lead to higher \r\ncosts of production, for example, 20-40% more for steel, 70-115% \r\nmore for cement, and potentially 15-60% for chemicals (Material \r\nEconomics 2019). There is a nascent literature on what are effectively "


id: 858aee7b9f24946b73b905041803d706
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18545
content:
"GHG production already exist in countries where hydroelectric power \r\nis a common power source. Market developments will allow for low\u0002GHG aluminium to trade at a premium rate as demand develops. For \r\nexample, Harbor Aluminium has launched a green aluminium spot \r\npremium at the end of October 2019 and the London Metal Exchange \r\nhas introduced a 'green aluminium' spot exchange contract. (LME \r\n2020; Das 2021)."


id: 2adb10e0fa24fe2b7d87e6b9633c124c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 4171
content:
"material 'feed-in-tariffs' to bridge the commercialisation 'valley of \r\ndeath' (Wilson and Grubler 2011) of early development of low-GHG \r\nmaterials (Bataille et al. 2018a; Neuhoff et al. 2018; Sartor and Bataille \r\n2019; Wyns et al. 2019). Renewable electricity support schemes have \r\ntypically been price-based (e.g.,  production subsidies and feed\u0002in-tariffs) or volume-based (e.g.,  quota obligations and certificate \r\nschemes) and both principles can be applied when thinking about \r\nlow-GHG materials. Auction schemes are typically used for larger\u0002scale projects, for example, offshore wind parks."


id: 7c979b91ad9b5286fab2e28041eacf58
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 17196
content:
"Extended producer responsibility (EPR) systems are increasingly \r\nused by policymakers to require producers to take responsibility for \r\nthe end life of their outputs and to cover the cost of recycling of \r\nmaterials or otherwise responsibly managing problematic wastes \r\n(Kaza et al. 2018). According to the OECD, there are about 400 EPR \r\nsystems in operation worldwide, three quarters of which have been \r\nestablished over the last two decades. One third of EPR systems cover \r\nsmall consumer electronic equipment, followed by packaging and \r\ntyres (each 17%), vehicles, lead-acid batteries and a range of other \r\nproducts (OECD 2016)."


id: 57a6c880d906f7327a4298ecdceec593
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11289
content:
"New and innovative financial market contracts for basic materials \r\nthat represent low-carbon varieties of conventional materials are \r\nemerging. This is the case of aluminium for which quantity of low\u0002"


id: fa12ce37bf0bb6b03c2e336de381717e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 36858
content:
"The implementation of a circular economy relies on the operationalisation of the R-imperatives or strategies which extend from \r\nthe original 3Rs: Reduce, Reuse and Recycle, with the addition of Refuse, Reduce, Resell/Reuse, Repair, Refurbish, Remanufacture, \r\nRepurpose, Recycle, Recover (energy), Re-mine and more (Reike et al. 2018). The R  implementation strategies are diverse across \r\ncountries (Ghisellini et al. 2016; Kalmykova et al. 2018) but, in practice, the lower forms of retention of materials, such as recycling \r\nand recover (energy), often dominate. The lack of policies for higher retention of material use such as Reduce, Reuse, Repair and \r\nRemanufacture is due to institutional failures, lack of coordination and lack of strong advocates (Gonzalez Hernandez et al. 2018a)."


id: 925d37ff1e1fa7d4ff6d0b434c36401
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Policies addressing market barriers to circular business development need to demonstrate that circular products meet quality \r\nperformance standards, ensure that the full environmental costs are reflected in market prices and foster market opportunities for \r\ncircular products exchange, notably through industrial symbiosis clusters and trading platforms (Kirchherr et al. 2018; OECD 2019a; \r\nHartley et al. 2020; Hertwich 2020). Policy levels span from micro (such as consumer or company) to meso (eco-industrial parks) and \r\nmacro (provinces, regions and cities) (Geng et al. 2019). The creation of eco-industry parks ('industrial clusters') has been encouraged \r\nby governments to facilitate waste exchanges between facilities, where by-products from one industry are used as a feedstock to"


id: 3fba207f31abcc607a506e9f5b7c42f5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 7414
content:
"another (Ding and Hua 2012; Jiao and Boons 2014; Shi and Yu 2014; Tian et al. 2014; Winans et al. 2017). Systematic assessment \r\nof wastes and resources is carried out to assess possible exchange between different supply chains and identify synergies of waste \r\nstreams that include metal scraps, waste plastics, water heat, bagasse, paper, wood scraps, ash, sludge and others (Ding and Hua \r\n2012; Shi and Yu 2014)."


id: e49a7b1e178b64fb2710f26f32e0cc43
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"The development of data collection and indicators is nascent and need to ramp up to quantify the impacts and provide evidence to \r\nimprove circular economy and materials efficiency policies. Policymakers need to leverage the potential socio-economic opportunities \r\nof transitioning to circular economies (Llorente-Gonzalez and Vence 2020), which shows positive GDP growth and job creation by \r\nshifting to more labour-intensive recycling plants and repair services than resource-extraction activities (WRAP and Alliance Green \r\n2015; Cambridge Econometrics et al. 2018). The International Labour Organization estimates that worldwide employment would grow \r\nby 0.1% by 2030 under a circular economy scenario (ILO 2018). However questions remain if the type of jobs created are concentrated \r\nin low-wage labour-intensive circular activities which may need targeted policy instruments to improve working conditions (Llorente\u0002Gonzalez and Vence 2020)."


id: 342d5ac84006b715cd36323ebb7f41e6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5619
content:
"ex post evaluations of outcomes. Such organisational routines for \r\nlearning have been identified as a key aspect of policy capacity to \r\ngovern evolutionary processes (Karo and Kattel 2018; Kattel and \r\nMazzucato 2018). Although many governments have adopted ideas \r\nof focusing resources on the mission or challenge of climate change \r\nmitigation, comparisons between Western and East Asian contexts \r\nshow significant differences in the implementation of governance \r\nstructures (Karo 2018; Mazzucato et al. 2020; Wanzenbock \r\net al. 2020). Overall, improved knowledge and stronger expertise is \r\nimportant also to handle information asymmetries and the risk of \r\nregulatory capture."


id: 1e653b096b23b842f6cff9758469c39a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2224
content:
"Industrial net zero transitions, while technically feasible, involve not \r\njust a  shift in production technology but major shifts in demand, \r\nmaterial efficiency, circularity, supply chain structure and geographic \r\nlocation, labour training and adaptation, finance, and industrial policy. \r\nThis transition must also link decarbonisation to larger environmental \r\nand social goals (e.g,. air and water quality, low-GHG growth, poverty \r\nalleviation, sustainable development goals) (OECD 2019b)."


id: 1f09d799185b9faf02b8a661a2c83f1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2324
content:
"Although there is little evidence of carbon leakage so far it will \r\nbe ever more important to strive for coherence in climate and \r\ntrade policies as some countries take the lead in decarbonising \r\ninternationally traded basic materials (Jakob 2021b). At the time \r\nof writing the previously academic debate on this issue is shifting \r\nto real policymaking through debates and negotiations around \r\ncarbon border adjustment (Section 11.6.1) and sectoral agreements \r\nor climate clubs (Nordhaus 2015; Ahman et al. 2017; Jakob 2021a; \r\nNilsson et al. 2021). The climate and trade policy integration should \r\nalso consider what is sometimes called positive leakage, that is that \r\nheavy industry production moves to where it is easier to reach zero \r\nemissions. As a  result, policy should go beyond border measures \r\nto include, for example, international technology cooperation and \r\ntransfer and development of shared lead markets."


id: 66c5780257d18c060bf54513e0760b23
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 13765
content:
"All this argues for active co-oversight, management and assessment \r\nby government, firms, sector associations and other actors, in \r\neffect the formation of an active industrial policy that includes \r\ndecarbonisation in its broader mandate of economic and social \r\ndevelopment (OECD 2019b; Bataille 2020a). This could draw from \r\nthe quadruple helix innovation model, which considers the role of \r\ngovernment, universities, the private sector, the natural environment \r\nand social systems to foster collaboration in innovation (Carayannis \r\nand Campbell 2019; Duran-Romero et al. 2020). Important aspects of \r\ngovernance include mechanisms for monitoring, transparency, and \r\naccountability. It may involve the development of new evaluation \r\napproaches, including a  greater focus on ex ante evaluations and \r\nassessment of, for example, readiness and capacities, rather than "


id: 106dd659863d02e84849cf94e18f9ebe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Energy-intensive production steps may move where clean resources \r\nare most abundant and relatively inexpensive (Gielen et al. 2020; \r\nBataille et al. 2021a). For example, steel-making has historically \r\nlocated itself near iron ore and coal resources whereas in the future \r\nit may be located near iron ore and zero-GHG electricity or close \r\nto carbon storage sites (Fischedick et al. 2014b; Vogl et al. 2018; \r\nBataille 2020a). This indicates large changes in industrial and supply \r\nchain structure, with directly associated needs for employment and \r\nskills. Some sectors will grow, and some will shrink, with differing \r\nskill needs. Each new workforce cohort needs the general specific \r\nskill to provide the employment that is needed at each stage in \r\nthe transition, implicating a need for coordination with policies for \r\neducation and retraining."


id: 3b31fc8a3d83b15fc09af53e76dadb59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6668
content:
"investment in industrial decarbonisation and the minimum 10 or \r\nmore years horizon before there are significant new commercially \r\navailable processes."


id: 3c91a017ea26a0160a296463aeab770f
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 6899
content:
"All the above indicate the need for general industrial policy as part of \r\na coherent general economic, taxation, investment, employment and \r\nsocial policy for climate change mitigation (Wesseling et al. 2017; \r\nBataille et al. 2018a; Wyns et al. 2019; Nilsson et al. 2021)."


id: 8f7cec6a36f05eb513e9322242fd595d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
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vector_id: 20120
content:
"Different types of actors thus have to play different but coordinated \r\nroles and responsibilities in developing, supporting, and implementing \r\npolicies for an industrial transition. Table  11.6 below shows how \r\nthe different core parts of integrated policymaking for an industrial \r\ntransition may depend on efforts from different actors groups and \r\nhighlights the responsibility of these actor groups in developing \r\na  progressive and enabling policy context for the transition. \r\nThis  includes policymakers at local, national, and international \r\narenas as well as civil society organisations, industry firms, and \r\ninterest organisations."


id: 64e32fbfd16e5cdaea372e8d5ed5f3ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13439
content:
"Table 11.6 | Examples of the potential roles of different actors in key policy and governance areas for a low-GHG transition to indicate the importance \r\nof agency and wide stakeholder engagement in the governance of industrial decarbonisation."


id: dc2ca2fa5db9c34345eaaa861079d7ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32148
content:
"of industrial processes, the volume and purity of carbon dioxide \r\nflows, the energy requirements, the lifetime of utilisation products \r\nand the production route."


id: 4f166259e84e4c6a74b1a2cd0e8547c0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9885
content:
"An increasing body of research proposes deep decarbonisation \r\npathways for energy-intensive industries including mitigation \r\noptions such as materials efficiency, circular economy and new \r\nprimary processes. These options are under-represented in climate \r\nchange scenario modelling and integrated assessment models, some \r\nof which do not even reflect evolution of demand for basic materials, \r\nwhich is a key driver behind energy consumption and GHG emissions \r\nin the industrial sector. As a result, no agreement is reached so far \r\nbetween bottom-up and top-down studies on the effectiveness and \r\ncosts for many promising mitigation options, their respective roles, \r\nsequencing and packaging within various mitigation pathways."


id: 6b20e5c0fffa756eb9f4ff13c79634f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14475
content:
"The effectiveness of mitigation policies in industry is poorly known, \r\nas so far the sector has largely been sheltered from the impacts of \r\nclimate policy due to the concerns of competitiveness and carbon \r\nleakage. There is a  lack of integration of material efficiency and \r\ncircularity with energy and climate policies which partly results from \r\nthe inadequacy of monitored indicators to inform policy debates \r\nand set targets, a  lack of high-level political focus, a  history of \r\nstrong industrial lobbying, uncoordinated policy across subsectors \r\nand institutions, and the sequential nature of decision-making \r\nalong supply chains."


id: 48fca36ed7767eef332318766fc084c1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8865
content:
"A significant shift is needed from the transition process of the past \r\nmainly based on marginal and incremental changes, with a strong \r\nfocus on energy efficiency efforts, to one grounded in transformational \r\nchange where there is limited knowledge of how to implement such \r\nchange effectively."


id: b4d30bd4591bd4b4da4b34c317a70b9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25984
content:
"Industry as a whole is a very complex web of sectors, subsectors and \r\ninter-sectoral interactions and dependence, with diverse associated \r\nmitigation opportunities and co-benefits and costs. Additional \r\nknowledge is needed to understand sectoral interactions in the \r\ntransformation processes."


id: e3087fc53922a156d293009efa5b788a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33214
content:
"There is a  knowledge gap on comparable, comprehensive, and \r\ndetailed quantitative information on costs and potentials associated \r\nwith the mitigation options for deep decarbonisation in industry, \r\nas cost estimates are not often comparable due to the regional or \r\ncountry focus, differences in costs metrics, currencies, discount rates, \r\nand energy prices across studies and regions."


id: 3f3b3160cfb3b2a6b694009b0e79b502
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7344
content:
"Industrial climate mitigation policy is supplemental to many other \r\npolicy instruments developed to reach multiple industrial goals, for \r\nthe range of stakeholders with their interest and priorities reflecting \r\nthe assessment of co-benefits and risk and affecting decision-making \r\nprocesses and behaviour of stakeholders. Better knowledge is \r\nneeded to identify the co-benefits for the adoption of climate change \r\nmitigation strategies."


id: ecbe4fb7577ffb33c70edd7408e78218
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34725
content:
"A very large and important uncertainty is the availability of biomass \r\nfor deep decarbonisation pathways due to competition for biomass \r\nfeedstock with other priorities and the extent to which electrification \r\ncan reduce the demand for bioenergy in the industry, transport and \r\nenergy sectors."


id: a6648109bca0b2c2d1c4df55a78ef246
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23711
content:
"Babiker, M., G. Berndes, K. Blok, B. Cohen, A. Cowie, O. Geden, V. Ginzburg, A. Leip, P. Smith, M. Sugiyama, F. Yamba, \r\n2022: Cross-sectoral perspectives. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution \r\nof Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, \r\nJ. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, \r\nA.  Hasija, G.  Lisboa, S.  Luz, J.  Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA.\r\ndoi: 10.1017/9781009157926.005"


id: 94cfa51c9f10599d4c03157e245f06de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20925
content:
"and demand-side measures are important to reduce the GHG \r\nintensity of food systems. Integrated food policy packages based \r\non a combination of market-based, administrative, informative, and \r\nbehavioural policies  can reduce cost compared to uncoordinated \r\ninterventions, address multiple sustainability goals, and increase \r\nacceptance across stakeholders and civil society (limited evidence, \r\nmedium agreement). {7.2, 7.4, 12.4}"


id: ab80f0272ff171fdb38362d662142333
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24497
content:
"The total emission mitigation potential achievable by the year \r\n2030, calculated based on sectoral assessments, is sufficient \r\nto reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to half of the \r\ncurrent (2019) level or less (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nThis potential (32-44 GtCO2-eq) requires implementation of a wide \r\nrange of mitigation options. Options with mitigation costs lower \r\nthan USD20 tCO2\r\n-1 make up more than half of this potential and are \r\navailable for all sectors. {12.2, Table 12.3}"


id: be89e22f4a32b13d98561fc25e090429
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27531
content:
"Emerging food technologies such as cellular fermentation, \r\ncultured meat, plant-based alternatives to animal-based \r\nfood products, and controlled-environment agriculture, can \r\nbring substantial reductions in direct GHG emissions from \r\nfood production (limited evidence, high agreement). These \r\ntechnologies have lower land, water, and nutrient footprints, and \r\naddress concerns over animal welfare. Access to low-carbon energy \r\nis needed to realise the full mitigation potential, as some emerging \r\ntechnologies are relatively more energy intensive. This also holds for \r\ndeployment of cold chain and packaging technologies, which can help \r\nreduce food loss and waste, but increase energy and materials use in \r\nthe food system. (limited evidence, high agreement). {11.4.1.3, 12.4}"


id: 23412cd8528ee38cc049e42b26a6aee0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2995
content:
"Despite limited current deployment, moderate to large future \r\nmitigation potentials are estimated for direct air carbon \r\ncapture and sequestration (DACCS), enhanced weathering \r\n(EW) and ocean-based CDR methods (including ocean alkalinity \r\nenhancement and ocean  fertilisation) (medium evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). The potential for DACCS (5-40 GtCO2 yr-1) \r\nis limited mainly by requirements for low-carbon energy and by cost \r\n(USD100-300 (full range: USD84-386) tCO2\r\n-1). DACCS is currently \r\nat a  medium technology readiness level. EW has the potential to \r\nremove 2-4 (full range: <1 to about 100) GtCO2 yr-1, at costs ranging \r\nfrom USD50 to 200 (full range: USD24-578) tCO2\r\n-1.  Ocean-based \r\nmethods have a combined potential to remove 1-100 GtCO2 yr-1 at \r\ncosts of USD40-500 tCO2\r\n-1, but their feasibility is uncertain due to \r\npossible side effects on the marine environment. EW and ocean-based \r\nmethods are currently at a low technology readiness level. {12.3}"


id: 5ca25313052ed3ac4df36af779dd5f6c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12092
content:
"Realising the full mitigation potential from the food system \r\nrequires change at all stages from producer to consumer \r\nand waste management, which can be facilitated through \r\nintegrated policy packages (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nSome 23-42% of global GHG emissions are associated with \r\nfood systems, while there is still widespread food insecurity and \r\nmalnutrition. Absolute GHG emissions from food systems increased \r\nfrom 14 to 17 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in the period 1990-2018. Both supply "


id: 3c18e02954d4699ff3ca4bf4feaeada
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6812
content:
"Bio-based products as part of a  circular bioeconomy have \r\npotential to support adaptation and mitigation. Key to \r\nmaximising benefits and managing trade-offs are sectoral \r\nintegration, transparent governance, and stakeholder \r\ninvolvement (high confidence). A sustainable bioeconomy relying \r\non biomass resources will need to be supported by technology \r\ninnovation and international cooperation and governance of global \r\ntrade to disincentivise environmental and social externalities (medium \r\nconfidence). {12.5, Cross-Working Group Box 3 in this chapter}"


id: 84e0cc95c7dea4c9faec799dbcebe7a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18426
content:
"Carbon leakage is a critical cross-sectoral and cross-country \r\nconsequence of differentiated climate policy (robust \r\nevidence, medium agreement). Carbon leakage occurs when \r\nmitigation measures implemented in one country/sector lead to \r\nincreased emissions in other countries/sectors. Global commodity \r\nvalue chains and associated international transport are important \r\nmechanisms of carbon leakage. Reducing emissions from the value \r\nchain and transportation can offer opportunities to mitigate three \r\nelements of cross-sectoral spillovers and related leakage: (i) domestic \r\ncross-sectoral spillovers within the same country; (ii) international \r\nspillovers within a  single sector resulting from substitution of \r\ndomestic production of carbon-intensive goods with their imports \r\nfrom abroad; and (iii) international cross-sectoral spillovers among \r\nsectors in different countries. {12.6.3}"


id: 2929479210392d3e1022b87dbb1a03ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3907
content:
"Cross-sectoral considerations in mitigation finance are critical \r\nfor the effectiveness of mitigation action as well as for balancing \r\nthe often conflicting social, developmental, and environmental \r\npolicy goals at the sectoral level (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). True resource mobilisation plans that properly address \r\nmitigation costs and benefits at sectoral level cannot be developed \r\nin isolation from their cross-sectoral implications. There is an urgent \r\nneed for multilateral financing institutions to align their frameworks \r\nand delivery mechanisms including the use of blended financing to \r\nfacilitate cross-sectoral solutions as opposed to causing competition \r\nfor resources among sectors. {12.6.4}"


id: 663c5f17487408ec9aa5c060f1e4be87
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13677
content:
"synergies and trade-offs as well as the implications of measures that \r\nhave application in more than one sector and measures \r\nwhose  implementation in one sector impacts implementation in \r\nother sectors."


id: 1a4b699097946f845d256d6624e5222a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1606
content:
"Taking stock of the sectoral mitigation assessments, Chapter  12 \r\nprovides a  summary synthesis of sectoral mitigation costs and \r\npotentials in the short and long term along with comparison to the \r\ntop-down integrated assessment model (IAM) assessment literature \r\nof Chapter  3  and the national/regional assessment  literature of \r\nChapter 4."


id: c00bcb6d43f260097950b7996cf8c5f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Chapters  5  to 11 assess outcomes from mitigation measures that \r\nare applicable in individual sectors, and potential co-benefits and \r\nadverse side effects of these individual measures. Chapter 12 brings \r\ntogether the cross-sectoral aspects of these assessments including "


id: 2f365f63db525bd859d51124ead64beb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"(AFOLU) and energy sectors are dealt with in Chapters 6 and 7 and \r\nsynthesised in Section 12.3. Other methods, not dealt with elsewhere, \r\nare covered in more detail. A comparative assessment is provided for \r\nthe different CDR options in terms of costs, potentials, governance, \r\nimpacts and risks, and synergies and trade-offs."


id: fe0ce514295c388371d0f9e2e92f3fdf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37495
content:
"digitalisation, and hydrogen. Examples include the use of hydrogen as \r\nan energy carrier, which, when coupled with low-carbon energy, has \r\npotential for driving mitigation in energy, industry, transport, and \r\nbuildings (Box 12.5), and digitalisation has the potential for reducing \r\nGHG emissions through energy savings across multiple sectors."


id: c54e57758669c1a5c7e81a98a7d43030
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"The efficient realisation of the above examples of cross-sectoral \r\nmitigation would require careful design of government interventions \r\nacross planning, policy, finance, governance, and capacity \r\nbuilding  fronts. In this respect, Chapter  12 assesses literature on \r\ncross-sectoral integrated policies, cross-sectoral financing solutions, \r\ncross-sectoral spillovers and competitiveness effects, and on cross\u0002sectoral governance for climate change mitigation."


id: 43d113f0ee08357441eef69e3c23ba05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8079
content:
"Section  12.4 assesses the literature on food systems and GHG \r\nemissions. The term 'food system' refers to a composite of elements \r\n(environment, people, inputs, processes, infrastructures, institutions, \r\netc.) and activities that relate to the production, processing, \r\ndistribution, preparation and consumption of food, and the outputs \r\nof these activities, including socio-economic and environmental \r\noutcomes. Climate change mitigation opportunities and related \r\nimplications for sustainable development and adaptation are \r\nassessed, including those arising from food production, landscape \r\nimpacts, supply chain and distribution, and diet shifts."


id: fb95d10785b5c7c29b45c024832f69a5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Finally, in the context of cross-sectoral synergies and trade-offs, the \r\nchapter assesses the non-climate mitigation co-benefits and adverse \r\neffects in relation to SDGs, building on the fast-growing literature on \r\nthe non-climate impacts of mitigation."


id: cde6567e5ffee9d9c65fcb49b5b53356
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Section 12.5 provides a cross-sectoral perspective on land occupation \r\nand related impacts, risks and opportunities associated with land\u0002based mitigation options as well as mitigation options that are not \r\ndesignated land based, yet occupy land. It builds on SRCCL and \r\nChapter 7 in this report, which covers mitigation in AFOLU, including \r\nbiomass production for mitigation in other sectors. In addition to an \r\nassessment of biophysical and socio-economic risks, impacts and \r\nopportunities, this section includes a Cross-Working Group Box (WGII \r\nand WGIII) on Mitigation and Adaptation via the Bioeconomy, and \r\na Box on Land Degradation Neutrality as a framework to manage \r\ntrade-offs in land-based mitigation."


id: 73cdc301dc676b76854b0d4281a82cf5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"The chapter is mapped into seven sections. Cost and potentials \r\nof mitigation technologies are discussed in Section  12.2, where \r\na  comparative assessment and a  summary of sectoral mitigation \r\ncost and potentials is provided in coordination with the sectoral \r\nChapters 5 to 11, along with a comparison to aggregate cost and \r\npotentials based on IAM outputs presented in Chapter 3."


id: d926bf50ceb935cc97c762b4a304e57a
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content:
"Section  12.6 provides a  cross-sectoral perspective on mitigation, \r\nco-benefits, and trade-offs, including those related to sustainable \r\ndevelopment and adaptation. The synthesised sectoral mitigation "


id: c8666f50e7e425ac5af93a0d72b814e2
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content:
"Section  12.3 provides a  synthesis of the state and potential \r\ncontribution of CDR methods for addressing climate change. CDR \r\noptions associated with the agriculture, forestry and other land use "


id: 29b477f25d5a271b9dbd741c7a49f125
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content:
"emissions. Other potentials, such as market potentials, could also be \r\nconsidered, but they are not included in this section."


id: 40b6657654e837c3ebe46dc328cbaa7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7559
content:
"synergies and trade-offs are mapped into options/technologies, \r\npolicies, international trade, and finance domains. Cross-sectoral \r\nmitigation technologies fall into three categories in which the \r\nimplementation of the technology: (i) occurs in parallel in more than \r\none sector; (ii) could involve interaction between sectors, and/or \r\n(iii) could create resource competition among sectors. Policies that \r\nhave direct sectoral effects include specific policies for reducing \r\nGHG emissions and non-climate policies that yield GHG emissions \r\nreductions as co-benefits. Policies may also have indirect cross\u0002sectoral effects, including synergies and trade-offs that may, in \r\naddition, spill over to other countries."


id: 21bebdc54213e101a6df187cd5f0df4a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2740
content:
"Section 12.7 provides an overview of knowledge gaps, which could \r\nbe used to inform further research."


id: 8543f28c9b8de5431646ee503b1c14a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18494
content:
"Costs of mitigation options will change over time. For many \r\ntechnologies, costs will reduce as a result of technological learning. \r\nAn attempt has been made to take into account the average, \r\nimplementation-weighted costs until 2030. However, the underlying \r\nliterature did not always allow such costs to be presented. For the year \r\n2030, the results are presented similarly to AR4, with a breakdown \r\nof the potential in 'cost bins'. For the year 2050, a more qualitative \r\napproach is provided. The origins of the cost data in this section are \r\nmostly based on studies carried out in the period 2015-2020. Given \r\nthe wide range of the cost bins that are used in this section it is \r\nnot meaningful (and often not possible) to convert to USD values for \r\none specific year. This may lead to some extra uncertainty, but this is \r\nexpected to be relatively small."


id: e8db86069a2db898aeb55ebd24e71d41
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Table 12.2 | Key characteristics of the scenarios used as a reference for determining costs and potentials. The values are for the year 2030."


id: 1528963e06c0362625f33c597ee213ea
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content:
"a\r\n The difference between WEO-2020 and WEO-2019 is partly explained by the fact that WEO-2019 had two different reference scenarios: Current Policies and Stated Policies. \r\nWEO-2020 has only one reference: the Stated Policies Scenario, which 'is based on today's policy settings'. The Stated Policies Scenario in WEO-2019 had energy-related \r\nemissions of 34.9 GtCO2. EJ, exajoules (1 x 1018 joules); p.a., per annum."


id: 61391c7011f10cfcce6bb6d8ad29b43a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"For the energy sector the potentials are determined using the World \r\nEnergy Outlook 2019 Current Policies Scenario as a reference (IEA \r\n2019). However, for the economic assessment, more recent Levelised \r\nCosts of Electricity (LCOEs) for different electricity generating \r\ntechnologies were used (IEA 2020a). For the AFOLU sector, the \r\npotentials were derived from a variety of studies. It may be expected \r\nthat the best estimates, as averages, match with the reference in \r\na middle-of-the-road scenario. For the buildings sector, the Current \r\nPolicies scenario of World Energy Outlook 2019 (IEA 2019) was \r\nused as a reference. For the transport sector, the references of the \r\nunderlying sources were used. For the industry sector, the scenarios \r\nused have emissions that are slightly higher than in the Current \r\nPolicies scenario from the World Energy Outlook 2019 (IEA 2019)."


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content:
"In this section, we present an overview of mitigation options per \r\nsector. An overview of net emissions reduction potentials for different \r\nmitigation options is presented in Table 12.3."


id: c1d2db33b1faf44d1cc9794947f4cb38
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 28076
content:
"For the AFOLU sector, assessments of global net emissions reduction \r\nstudies were provided in Table 7.3. The number of studies depends \r\non the type of mitigation action, but ranges from five to nine. Each \r\nof these studies relies on a much larger number of underlying data \r\nsources. From these studies, emissions reduction ranges and best \r\nestimates were derived. The studies presented refer to different years \r\nin the period 2020 to 2050, and the mitigation potential presented \r\nfor AFOLU primarily refers to the average over the period 2020 to \r\n2050. However, because most of the activities involve storage of \r\ncarbon in stocks that accumulate carbon, or conversely decay over "


id: 5d89f0ab2c4579d454a3eb535c94a0bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Firstly, a brief overview of the process of data collection is presented, \r\nwith a  more detailed overview being found in Supplementary \r\nMaterial 12.SM.1.2. For the energy sector, the starting point for \r\nthe determination of the emissions reduction potentials was the \r\nEmissions Gap Report (UNEP 2017), but new literature was also \r\nassessed, and a  few studies that provide updated estimates of \r\nthe mitigation potentials were included. It was found that higher \r\nmitigation potentials than in the UNEP report are now reported for \r\nsolar and wind energy, but at the same time electricity production "


id: ea3c010c4a95ba27826b3645d8816d29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 34357
content:
"discussed previously (such as DACCS and enhanced weathering) \r\nwere taken from Section 12.3. For more details about data sources \r\nand data processing, see Supplementary Material 12.SM.1.2."


id: e5c29125760d7a1b20ad849bcbacba1f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 33654
content:
"time (e.g., forests, mangroves, peatland soils, agricultural soils, wood \r\nproducts), the 2020 to 2050 average provides a good approximation \r\nof the amount of permanent atmospheric CO2 mitigation that \r\ncould be available at a given price in 2030. The exception is BECCS, \r\nwhich is in an early upscaling phase, so the potential estimated by \r\nChapter 7 as an average for the 2020 to 2050 period is not included \r\nin Table 12.3. Note that for the energy sector a mitigation potential \r\nfor BECCS is provided in Table 12.3."


id: 3492e56f78deb02805bffde6bdffe8aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
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vector_id: 5681
content:
"In Table  12.4 mitigation potentials for all gases are presented \r\nin  GtCO2-eq. For most sectors the mitigation potentials (notably \r\nfor methane emissions reductions from coal, oil and gas, waste and \r\nwastewater) have been converted to CO2-eq using global warming \r\npotential (GWP) values as presented in AR6 WGIII (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox 2 in Chapter 2). However, the underlying literature did not always \r\naccommodate this, in which cases older GWP values apply. Given \r\nthe uncertainty ranges in the mitigation potentials in Table 12.3, the \r\nimpact on the results of using different GWP values is considered \r\nto be very small."


id: 2d2a65c9a2e3e57b66e57b9da32f84f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content_type: text
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vector_id: 4549
content:
"For all options, uncertainty ranges of the mitigation potentials are \r\ngiven in Table  12.3. As far as possible, the ranges represent the \r\nvariation in assessments found in the literature. This is the case \r\nfor wind and solar energy, for the AFOLU options, for the methane \r\nmitigation options (coal, oil and gas, waste and wastewater) and for \r\nfluorinated gas mitigation. For the latter options, some variability \r\nexists for each cost bin, but aggregated over cost ranges the variation \r\nis much smaller, typically +-50%. For the buildings sector and the \r\nindustrial sector options, the uncertainty in the mitigation potential \r\nis estimated by the lead authors of those chapters. For options for \r\nwhich only limited sources were available, an uncertainty range of \r\n+-50% was used. Overall, the uncertainty range per option is typically \r\nin the range of +-20% to +-60%."


id: 47a201a6729d4ab37f8776d212e61cc2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Despite these uncertainties, clearly a number of options with high \r\npotentials can be identified, including solar energy, wind energy, \r\nreducing conversion of forests and other natural ecosystems, and \r\nrestoration of forests and other natural ecosystems. As mid-range \r\nvalues, they each represent 4 to 7% of total reference emissions for \r\n2030. Soil carbon sequestration in agriculture and fuel switching \r\nin industry can also be considered as options with high potential, \r\nalthough it should be noted that these options consist of a number \r\nof discernible sub-options, see Table  12.3. It can be observed that \r\nfor each sector, a variety of options is available. Many of the smaller \r\noptions each make up 1 to 2% of the reference emissions for 2030. \r\nWithin this group of smaller options there are some categories that, \r\nsummed together, stand out as substantial: the energy efficiency \r\noptions and the methane mitigations options."


id: 85ddce4e9e2f6c0f9fa89fff5e48798a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"For the transport sector, Chapter 10 provided data on the emissions \r\nreduction potential for shipping. For the other transportation modes, \r\nadditional sources were used to achieve a  complete overview of \r\nemissions reduction potentials (for further details, see Supplementary \r\nMaterial 12.SM.1.2). A  limited number of estimates for global \r\nemissions reduction potential is available: the total number of \r\nsources is about 10, and some estimates rely on just one source. The \r\ndata have been coordinated with Chapter 10 authors."


id: 101dcb33f2919608a48a7e14f6b530c1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 24
content:
"For the industrial sector, global emissions reduction potentials per \r\ntechnology class per sector were derived by Chapter  11 authors, \r\nusing primarily sectoral or technology-oriented literature. The \r\nanalysis is based on about 75 studies, including sectoral assessments \r\n(Sections 11.4.1 and 11.4.2 and Figure 11.13)."


id: c4fbc59b8f1cbe54a9b4ccba16902fad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Costs are highly variable across the options. All sectors have several \r\noptions for which at least part of the potential has mitigation costs \r\nbelow USD20 tCO2\r\n-1. The only exception is the industrial sector, in \r\nwhich only energy efficiency is available below this cost level. At the \r\nsame time, a  substantial part of the emissions reduction potential \r\ncomes at higher cost, much being in the USD20 to 100 tCO2\r\n-1 cost \r\nranges. All sectors have substantial additional potential in these \r\ncost ranges; only for transportation is this limited. Aggregation \r\nof the potentials per cost bin shows that the potential in these \r\ncost bins is marginally smaller than in the two cheapest cost \r\nbins. For  some options, potential was identified in the 100 to \r\n200 tCO2\r\n-1 cost bin. The mitigation potentials identified in this cost \r\nrange make up only a small part of the total mitigation potential. "


id: 76b65000814cc3edefb211219202ae78
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 16257
content:
"For methane emissions reduction from oil and gas operations, coal \r\nmining, waste treatment and wastewater, an analysis was done, \r\nbased on three major data sources in this area (Harmsen et al. \r\n2019; US EPA 2019; Hoglund-Isaksson et al. 2020); for oil and gas \r\noperations this was complemented by IEA (2021a). A similar analysis \r\nfor reductions of emissions of fluorinated gases was carried out based \r\non analysis by the same institutes (Purohit and Hoglund-Isaksson \r\n2017; Harmsen et al. 2019; US EPA 2019). Data for CDR options not "


id: fdaf6efc86657c46c028a84c0b2db116
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Table 12.3 | Detailed overview of global net GHG emissions reduction potentials (GtCO2-eq) in the various cost categories for the year 2030. Note that \r\npotentials within and across sectors cannot be summed, as the adoption of some options may affect the mitigation potentials of other options. Only monetary costs and \r\nbenefits of options are taken into account. Negative costs occur when the benefits are higher than the costs. For wind energy, for example, this is the case if production costs \r\nare lower than those of the fossil alternatives. Ranges are indicated for each option separately, or indicated for the sector as a whole (see Notes column); they reflect full ranges. \r\nCost ranges are not cumulative, e.g., to obtain the full potential below USD50 tCO2-eq-1, the potentials in the cost bins <USD0, USD0-20 and USD20-50 tCO2-eq-1 need to \r\nbe summed together."


id: 26fb1c0b28b9b1fa207c6a13ac8c4dca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"It could be that there is limited potential in this range; however, \r\na  more plausible explanation, supported by several authors of \r\nsectoral chapters, is that this cost range is relatively unexplored."


id: 350152f3e9ec250a8ca488ab36ee3554
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 5748
content:
"In this section, the mitigation potentials are aggregated per sector, \r\nand then to the global economy. These potentials, which are based \r\non sectoral analysis, are then compared to the results from earlier \r\nassessments and the results from IAMs. Given the incompleteness \r\nof data on the mitigation potential at mitigation costs larger than \r\nUSD100 tCO2\r\n-1, the focus will be on options with mitigation costs \r\nbelow USD100 tCO2\r\n-1."


id: e01bc260658aa27a683d093e8baab588
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"In this assessment, the emphasis is on the specific mitigation costs of \r\nthe various options, and these are often considered as an indicator \r\nto prioritise options. However, in such a prioritisation, other elements \r\nwill also play a  role, like the development of technology for the \r\nlonger term (Section 12.2.4) and the need to optimise investments \r\nover longer time periods, see for example Vogt-Schilb et al. (2018) \r\nwho argue that sometimes it makes sense to start with implementing \r\nthe most expensive option."


id: 311f06b28477a5b79e21496c1ab408e1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 5147
content:
"As suggested previously, the overview presented in Table 12.3 should \r\nbe interpreted with care, as the implementation of one option may \r\naffect the mitigation potential of another option. Most sectoral chapters \r\nhave supplied mitigation potentials that were already adjusted for \r\noverlap and mutual influences (industry, buildings, AFOLU). For the \r\nenergy sector, interactions between the options will occur, but parallel \r\nimplementation of all the options seems to be possible; if all options \r\nat costs levels below USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 were implemented, this would \r\nlead to an additional power generation with no direct CO2 emissions \r\nof 41% of the total projected generation in 2030. This seems to be \r\npossible, but as higher penetrations are relatively unexplored, we "


id: 1c145174a5c401340d0874f1236a6230
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1880
content:
"In this section, an overview of emissions mitigation options for the \r\nyear 2030 was presented. The overview of the mitigation potential \r\nis based on a variety of approaches, relying on a large number of \r\nsources, and the number of sources varied strongly from sector to \r\nsector. The main conclusions from this section are: (i) there is a variety \r\nof options per sector, (ii) per sector the options combined show \r\nsignificant mitigation potential, (iii) there are a  few major options \r\nand a lot of smaller ones, and (iv) more than half of the potential \r\ncomes at costs below USD20 tCO2\r\n-1 (between sectors: medium to\r\nrobust evidence, high agreement)."


id: 1d2ce0f225bb2f077c746ec0d0411642
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"with a  decreased carbon intensity of the power sector. For other \r\nenergy sector options, such as methane emissions reduction from \r\ncoal, oil and natural gas operations, the situation is more complex. \r\nThe total emissions reduction potential for fossil fuels in the other \r\nsectors is high. Should this potential be realised, this would lead to \r\na reduction of the potential reported here. However, reducing fossil \r\nfuel use also leads to a  reduction in the upstream CH4 (methane) \r\nemissions, so in the case of reducing fossil fuel use, these upstream \r\nemissions will also be avoided, so no overestimate of the aggregate \r\nemissions reduction potential occurs."


id: 14b505ef6e78e287a51205ad89e726ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 766
content:
"apply a smaller uncertainty range at the high end. For the calculation \r\nof the aggregate potentials in the energy sector, error propagation \r\nrules were applied. For the transport sector, there will be interaction \r\nbetween the technical measures on the one hand and the modal shift \r\nmeasures on the other hand. Given the small mitigation contribution \r\nof the modal shift options, these interactions will be negligible. The \r\nresulting aggregate mitigation potentials and their uncertainty ranges \r\nper (sub)sector are given in Table 12.4 (columns indicated 'AR6'). This \r\noverview confirms the large potentials per sector, even when taking \r\nthe uncertainty ranges into account."


id: 276d78ad3d9cc9b29e72ed9466125da7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"The total potential, given these corrections for overlap, leads to \r\na mid-range value for the total mitigation potential at costs below \r\nUSD100 tCO2-eq-1 of 38 GtCO2-eq. Given the fact that it is not to \r\nbe expected that mitigation potentials of the various sectors are \r\nmutually correlated, that is, it is not to be expected that mitigation \r\npotentials are all on the high side or all on the low side, the ranges \r\nare aggregated using error propagation rules, which leads to a range \r\nfor the mitigation potential of 32 to 44 GtCO2-eq."


id: 4227ca5a2c01e71507c52e459fbe3149
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 7806
content:
"Calculating aggregated mitigation potentials for the global economy \r\nrequires that interactions between sectors also need to be taken into \r\naccount (Section  12.6). First of all, there may be overlap between \r\nthe electricity supply sector and the electricity demand sectors: if the \r\nelectricity sector is extensively decarbonised, the avoided emissions \r\ndue to electricity efficiency measures and local electricity production \r\nwill be significantly reduced. Therefore, this demand-side mitigation \r\npotential is only taken into account for 25% (reflecting the degree \r\nof further decarbonisation of the power sector) in the cross-sectoral \r\naggregation. For the other demand sectors, this problem does not \r\narise. The industry sector did not provide estimates for electricity \r\nefficiency improvement and in the transport sector the utilisation of \r\nelectricity to date is very low. Electrification options may occur in all \r\nsectors, but this enhances the mitigation potential in combination "


id: 6f6a4085bddccbadcc8fd2ea505d7693
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Mitigation costs and potentials for 2030 have been presented \r\npreviously, notably in AR4 Chapter 11 on Mitigation from a Cross\u0002sectoral Perspective (Barker et al. 2007) and the Emissions Gap \r\nReport (UNEP 2017). Note that AR5 did not provide emissions \r\nreduction potentials in this form. The aggregated potentials reported "


id: 5884cd107549b4bfc16479faf13ef193
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 11426
content:
"Note: Dir = reduction of direct emissions, Ind = reduction of indirect emissions (related to electricity production), Tot = reduction of total emissions, NE = not estimated, \r\nAR4: Table 11.3, UNEP-2017: Chapter 4."


id: 10ed6df1804b30c1fe083dfb8dc7fd8d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"here are higher than those estimated in AR4. Note, however, that AR4 \r\nsuggested the potentials were underestimated by 10 to 15%, but \r\na higher potential still remains in the current assessment. In a sector\u0002by-sector comparison, higher potentials than in AR4 can be observed \r\nespecially for the energy sector and the forestry sector, and to a more \r\nlimited extent for the industry sector and the transport sector. For \r\nthe energy sector, the change can largely be explained by the higher \r\nestimates for wind and solar energy and the improved understanding \r\nof how to integrate high shares of intermittent renewable energy \r\nsources into power systems. For industry and transport, the higher \r\npotentials can be partly explained by the inclusion of more options, \r\nlike recycling and material efficiency (for industry) and electric \r\ntransportation and modal shifts for transport. For buildings, a lower "


id: 8a9fe3631386535ae21c75feb243fbb5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
content_type: text
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vector_id: 19351
content:
"potential can be observed compared to AR4, one reason is that the \r\n2030 reference direct and indirect emissions were estimated as \r\n45% and 11% higher in AR4 than they were in AR6 (signalling a much \r\nquicker actual switch to electricity than was thought 15 to 20 years \r\nago, among other reasons). The other reason for a difference is that \r\nthe scenarios considered in AR4 had 25 to 30 years between their \r\nstart year until the target year of 2030 and the scenarios reviewed \r\nin AR6 have only 10 to 15 years before 2030. The current retrofitting \r\nrates of existing buildings and penetration rates of nearly zero\u0002energy buildings do not allow for decarbonisation of the sector over \r\n10 to 15 years, but they do over a longer time period. A much larger \r\npotential than reported here for 2030 can still be realised in the \r\ntimeframe up to 2050 (Section 9.6.2)."


id: 41ba0f877ef0064376d20a79b11f808c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 7744
content:
"the term IAMs is used as shorthand in the text that follows. All \r\nscenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower are included \r\nfor the comparison (i.e., the categories of scenarios C1 to C3 in \r\nChapter 3). A comparison per sector is provided in Figure 12.1. It \r\nis important to note that two different things are compared in this \r\nfigure: on the one hand emissions reduction potentials and on the \r\nother hand realisations of (part of) the potential within the context \r\nof a certain scenario. Having said that, a number of lessons can be \r\nlearned from the comparison of both."


id: 8038d6dc59be4d33367e021848220acf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Another global analysis was done by McKinsey (2009), which \r\npresents a  marginal abatement cost curve for 2030, suggesting \r\na  total potential of 38  GtCO2-eq (note that the reference for that \r\nstudy is 70 GtCO2-eq, which is at the high end of the reference range \r\nused in this assessment)."


id: 5b431d48f08a9f90cb77ffdc200e91ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 11863
content:
"The potentials reported here are comparable with UNEP (2017). Note \r\nthat material for the energy sector from the UNEP report was partly \r\nreused in this analysis. Furthermore, some options for the transport \r\nsector (aviation and biofuels) were identical to the estimates in the \r\nUNEP report. The remaining mitigation potentials are all based on \r\nnew - and much more extended - assessment. There are some notable \r\nchanges. The AR6 mitigation potential for forestry is substantially \r\nlarger. For buildings the potential is smaller, mainly related to the \r\nsmaller mitigation potential for electric appliances than in the UNEP \r\nreport. But overall, the estimates of the total mitigation potential are \r\nwell aligned, which confirms there is substantial consistency across \r\nvarious emissions reduction estimates."


id: 683578b0fdcdd9f4273cd069eab3a7a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"For the energy supply sector, the emissions reductions projected by \r\nthe IAMs are for the higher cost levels comparable with the potentials \r\nfound in the sectoral analysis. But at lower cost levels, the emissions \r\nreductions as projected by IAMs are smaller than for the sectoral \r\nanalysis. This is likely due to the fact that high costs for solar energy \r\nand wind energy are assumed in IAM models (Krey et al. 2019; Shiraki \r\nand Sugiyama 2020). This is not surprising, as the scenario database \r\ncomprises studies dating back to 2015. A more detailed comparison \r\nfor the power sector is given in Figure 12.2. Both the sectoral analysis \r\nand the IAMs find that both solar and wind energy in particular show \r\nstrong growth potential, although there is a continuing role for other \r\nlow-carbon technologies, like nuclear energy and hydropower."


id: 33be5687c92823fab2262a91314cacc9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"For the AFOLU sector, the sectoral studies provide net emissions \r\nreduction potentials comparable with projections from the IAMs at \r\ncosts levels up to USD50 tCO2-eq-1. However, beyond that level the \r\nmitigation potential found in the sectoral analysis is larger than in \r\nthe IAMs. For agriculture, it can be explained by the fact that carbon \r\nsequestration options, like soil carbon, biochar and agroforestry, \r\nhave little to no representation in IAMs. Similarly, for forestry and \r\nother land use-related options, the protection and restoration of \r\nother ecosystems than forests (peatland, coastal wetlands and \r\nsavannas) are not represented in IAMs. Also note that some IAM \r\nbaselines already have small carbon prices, which induce land-based \r\nmitigation, while in others, mitigation, particularly from reduced \r\ndeforestation, is part of the storyline even without an implemented "


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Figure 12.2 | Electricity production in 2030 as calculated by IAMs (dark blue), compared with electricity production potentials found in the sectoral \r\nanalysis (yellow). Cost cut-offs at USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 are applied to both electricity production in 2030 as calculated by IAMs and electricity production potentials found in the \r\nsectoral analyses. Hinges in the dark-blue box plots represent the interquartile ranges and whiskers extend to the 5th and 95th percentiles, while the hinges in the yellow box \r\nplots describe the full range."


id: 841ba08317d9b3e53d2f84c717261959
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 18321
content:
"carbon price. Both of these effects dampen the mitigation potential \r\navailable in the USD100 tCO2-eq-1 carbon price scenario from IAMs. \r\nFurthermore, estimates of mitigation through forestry and other land \r\nuse-related options from the AR6 IAM scenario database represent \r\nthe net emissions from A/R and deforestation, thus are likely to be \r\nlower than the sectoral estimates of A/R potential expressed as \r\ngross removals."


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"In this section, the information on individual options reported  in \r\nSection  12.2.2 to sectoral and economy-wide totals has been \r\naggregated. It is concluded that, based on the sectoral analysis, the \r\nglobal mitigation potential is in the range of 32 to 44  GtCO2-eq. \r\nThis mitigation potential is substantially higher than that reported \r\nin AR4, but it is comparable to the more recent estimate by UNEP \r\n(2017). Differences exist with the results of IAMs, but most of these \r\ncan be well explained. The conclusion that the global potential is in \r\nthis range can be drawn with high agreement and robust evidence."


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"For the buildings and transport sectors, the sectoral mitigation \r\npotentials are higher than those projected by the IAMs. The \r\ndifference in the transport sector is particularly significant. One \r\npossible explanation is that options with negative costs are already \r\nincluded in the reference. In addition, some options, like avoiding \r\ndemand for energy services in the building sector and model shift in \r\ntransportation, are less well represented in IAMs."


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"Given the median projection of the reference emissions of \r\n60 GtCO2-eq in 2030, the range of mitigation potentials presented \r\nhere is sufficient to bring down global emissions in the year 2030 \r\nto a level of 16 to 28 GtCO2-eq. Taking into account that there is \r\na range in reference projections for 2030 of 54 to 68 GtCO2-eq, the \r\nresulting emissions level shows a wider range: 12 to 31 GtCO2-eq. \r\nThis is about, or below half, the most recent (2019) emissions value \r\nof 59 +- 6.6 GtCO2-eq (high confidence)."


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"For the industry sector, the sectoral emissions reduction potentials \r\nare somewhat higher than those reported on average by IAMs. The \r\ndifference can well be explained by the fact that most IAMs do not \r\ninclude circularity options like material efficiency and recycling; \r\nthese options together account for 1.5 GtCO2-eq at costs levels from \r\nUSD20 tCO2-eq-1 onwards."


id: 3b4663f01af352b988580da0a113ae93
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"As noted previously, a more qualitative approach is followed and less \r\nquantitative information is presented for 2050. The sectoral results are \r\nsummarised in Table 12.5. In addition to the many technologies that \r\nalready play a  role by 2030 (Table  12.3) additional technologies \r\nmay be needed for deep decarbonisation, for example for managing \r\npower systems with high shares of intermittent renewable sources \r\nand for providing new fuels and associated infrastructure for sectors \r\nthat are hard to decarbonise. New processes also play an important \r\nrole, notably for industrial processes. In general, stronger sector \r\ncoupling is needed, particularly increased integration of energy end \r\nuse and supply sectors."


id: e3925cc126a95254cfcf1013d7636cc1
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"For mitigation of emissions of methane and fluorinated gases, the \r\ncomparability between the sectoral results and IAMs is good."


id: 40fa2d2cd08cd510e55077de4df4ac16
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"Overall, it is concluded that there are differences between the \r\nsectoral analyses and the IAM outcomes, but most of the differences \r\ncan be explained by the exclusion of specific options in most IAMs. \r\nThis comparability confirms the reliability of the sectoral analysis of \r\nemissions reduction potential. It also demonstrates the added value \r\nof sectoral analyses of mitigation potentials: they can more rapidly \r\nadapt to changes in price levels of technologies and adopt new \r\noptions for emissions mitigation."


id: 10b7800354167cd9bac614adaf1fe108
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"soil carbon sequestration (SCS), biochar, wetland/peatland \r\nrestoration and coastal restoration) are dealt with elsewhere in \r\nthis report (Chapters  6  and 7). These methods are synthesised \r\nin Section  12.3.2. Others, not dealt with elsewhere,  - direct air \r\ncarbon capture and storage (DACCS), enhanced weathering (EW) of \r\nminerals and ocean-based approaches including ocean fertilisation \r\n(OF) and ocean alkalinity enhancement (OAE)  - are discussed in \r\nSections  12.3.1.1 to 12.3.1.3 below (see also IPCC 2019b and \r\nAR6 WGI, Section 5.6). Some methods, such as BECCS and DACCS, \r\ninvolve carbon storage in geological formations, which is discussed \r\nin Chapter 6. The climate system and the carbon cycle responses to \r\nCDR deployment and each method's physical and biogeochemical \r\ncharacteristics such as storage form and duration are assessed in \r\nChapters 4 and 5 of the AR6 WGI report."


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"Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) refers to a  cluster of technologies, \r\npractices, and approaches that remove and sequester carbon dioxide \r\nfrom the atmosphere and durably store the carbon in geological, \r\nterrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products. Despite the common \r\nfeature of removing carbon dioxide, CDR methods can be very \r\ndifferent (Smith et al. 2017). There are proposed methods for removal \r\nof non-CO2 greenhouse gases such as methane (Jackson et al. 2019; \r\nJackson et al. 2021) but scarcity of literature on these methods \r\nprevents assessment here."


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"A number of CDR methods (e.g.,  afforestation/reforestation \r\n(A/R), bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), "


id: 78b9fc24a09d4fa2a57ab166ec24a06e
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"Authors: Oliver Geden (Germany), Alaa Al Khourdajie (United Kingdom/Syria), Christopher Bataille (Canada), Goran Berndes \r\n(Sweden), Holly Jean Buck (the United States of America), Katherine Calvin (the United States of America), Annette Cowie (Australia), \r\nKiane  de  Kleijne (the Netherlands), Jan Christoph Minx (Germany), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the Netherlands), Glen P.  Peters (Norway/\r\nAustralia), Andy Reisinger (New Zealand), Pete Smith (United Kingdom), Masahiro Sugiyama (Japan)"


id: e3fdb4c74475eb5dc56e0086c42f45f7
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"CDR refers to anthropogenic activities that remove CO2 from the atmosphere and store it durably in geological, terrestrial, or ocean\r\nreservoirs, or in products. It includes anthropogenic enhancement of biological, geochemical or chemical CO2 sinks, but excludes \r\nnatural CO2 uptake not directly caused by human activities. Increases in land carbon sink strength due to CO2 fertilisation or other \r\nindirect effects of human activities are not considered CDR (see Glossary). Carbon capture and storage (CCS) and carbon capture and \r\nutilisation (CCU) applied to CO2 from fossil fuel use are not CDR methods as they do not remove CO2 from the atmosphere. CCS and \r\nCCU can, however, be part of CDR methods if the CO2 has been captured from the atmosphere, either indirectly in the form of biomass \r\nor directly from ambient air, and stored durably in geological reservoirs or products (Sections 11.3.6 and 12.3)."


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"Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 1 | Carbon dioxide removal taxonomy. Methods are categorised based on removal process (grey shades) and \r\nstorage medium (for which timescales of storage are given, yellow/brown shades). Main implementation options are included for each CDR method. \r\nNote that specific land-based implementation options can be associated with several CDR methods, for example, agroforestry can support soil carbon sequestration \r\nand provide biomass for biochar or BECCS. Source: adapted from Minx et al. (2018)."


id: aac33126591d737513f90ebc560ba852
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"shorter storage times and is more vulnerable than carbon stored in buildings as wood products; as biochar in soils, cement and other \r\nmaterials; or in chemical products made from biomass or potentially through direct air (Fuss et al. 2018; Minx et al. 2018; NASEM \r\n2019) capture (Section 11.3.6; AR6 WGI, Figure 5.36). Within the same category (e.g., land-based biological CDR) options often differ \r\nwith respect to other dynamic or context-specific dimensions, such as mitigation potential, cost, potential for co-benefits and adverse \r\nside effects, and technology readiness level (Table 12.6)."


id: e890386bc72798a97ff4c40ae32b367d
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"Within ambitious mitigation strategies at global or national levels, CDR cannot serve as a substitute for deep emissions reductions but \r\ncan fulfil multiple complementary roles: it can (i) further reduce net CO2 or GHG emission levels in the near-term; (ii) counterbalance \r\nresidual emissions from hard-to-transition sectors, such as CO2 from industrial activities and long-distance transport (e.g., aviation, \r\nshipping), or methane and nitrous oxide from agriculture, in order to help reach net zero CO2 or GHG emissions in the mid-term; \r\n(iii) achieve and sustain net-negative CO2 or GHG emissions in the long-term, by deploying CDR at levels exceeding annual residual \r\ngross CO2 or GHG emissions (Sections 2.7.3 and 3.5)."


id: 634e2bd082d0e9f2709febc252d28abf
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"In general, these roles of CDR are not mutually exclusive and can exist in parallel. For example, achieving net zero CO2 or GHG \r\nemissions globally might involve some countries already reaching net-negative levels at the time of global net zero, allowing \r\nother countries more time to achieve this. Equally, achieving net-negative CO2 emissions globally, which could address a potential \r\ntemperature overshoot by lowering atmospheric CO2 concentrations, does not necessarily involve all countries reaching net-negative \r\nlevels (Rajamani et al. 2021; Rogelj et al. 2021) (Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3)."


id: dfef74fcb0c61ebfd82a28356a8ea474
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"Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 2 shows these multiple roles of CDR in a stylised ambitious mitigation pathway that can be applied to \r\nglobal and national levels. While such mitigation pathways will differ in their shape and exact composition, they include the same \r\nbasic components: CO2 emissions from fossil sources, CO2 emissions from managed land, non-CO2 emissions, and various forms of \r\nCDR. Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 2 also illustrates the importance of distinguishing between gross CO2 removals from the atmosphere \r\nthrough deployment of CDR methods and the net emissions outcome (i.e., gross emissions minus gross removals)."


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"CDR methods currently deployed on managed land, such as afforestation or reforestation and improved forest management, lead to CO2\r\nremovals already today, even when net emissions from land use are still positive, for example, when gross emissions from deforestation \r\nand draining peatlands exceed gross removals from afforestation or reforestation and ecosystem conservation (Sections 2.2 and 7.2; "


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"Cross-Chapter Box  6  in Chapter  7). As there are currently no removal methods for non-CO2 gases that have progressed beyond \r\nconceptual discussions (Jackson et al. 2021), achieving net zero GHG implies gross CO2 removals to counterbalance residual emissions \r\nof both CO2 and non-CO2 gases, applying 100-year global warming potential (GWP100) as the metric for reporting CO2-equivalent \r\nemissions, as required for emissions reporting under the Rulebook of the Paris Agreement (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 2)."


id: 1c5fd460f5d6298490153d9f13b673c3
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"Net zero CO2 emissions will be achieved earlier than net zero GHG emissions. As volumes of residual non-CO2 emissions are expected \r\nto be significant, this time-lag could reach one to several decades, depending on the respective size and composition of residual GHG \r\nemissions at the time of net zero CO2 emissions. Furthermore, counterbalancing residual non-CO2 emissions by CO2 removals will lead \r\nto net-negative CO2 emissions at the time of net zero GHG emissions (Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3)."


id: 4d1bdec855fa061ca04bda16abb95e0e
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"Figure 12.3 | Sequestration through three predominant CDR methods: BECCS, CO2 removal from AFOLU (mainly A/R), and DACCS (upper panels) annual \r\nsequestration and (lower panels) cumulative sequestration. The IAM scenarios described in the figure correspond to those that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower. \r\nThe black line in each of the upper panels indicates the median of all the scenarios in categories C1 to C3. Hinges in the lower panels represent the interquartile ranges while \r\nwhiskers extend to 5th and 95th percentiles. The IMPs are highlighted with colours, as shown in the key. The number of scenarios is indicated in the header of each panel. \r\nThe number of scenarios with a non-zero DACCS value is 146."


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"of deployment, which presents a challenge since rapid and sustained \r\nupscaling from a small base is particularly difficult (de Coninck et al. \r\n2018; Nemet et al. 2018; Hanna et al. 2021). All Illustrative Mitigation \r\nPathways (IMPs) that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower use \r\nsome form of CDR.  Across the full range of similarly ambitious \r\nIAM scenarios (scenario categories C1 to C3; see Section 3.3), the "


id: b5f9575509234613adeb38fe08a649cc
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"and deployment scenario, CDR methods could bring about various \r\nco-benefits and adverse side effects (see below). All this highlights the \r\nneed for appropriate CDR governance and policies (Section 12.3.3)."


id: 1b5ad669ec197914c5b7ed370edea65d
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"Bistline and Blanford 2021; Garcia-Freites et al. 2021; Jackson et al. \r\n2021; Kato and Kurosawa 2021; Negri et al. 2021) while the literature \r\noutside developed countries is limited (Alatiq et al. 2021; Fuhrman \r\net al. 2021b; Weng et al. 2021)."


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"In IAMs, CDR is contributed mainly by the energy sector (through \r\nBECCS) and AFOLU (through A/R) (Figure 12.3). IAMs are starting to \r\ninclude other CDR methods, such as DACCS and enhanced weathering \r\n(Section 12.3.1), which are yet to be attributed to specific sectors in \r\nIAMs. Following IPCC guidance for UNFCCC inventories, A/R and SCS \r\nare reported in land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), while \r\nBECCS would be reported in the sector where the carbon capture occurs, \r\nthat is, the energy sector in the case of electricity and heat production, \r\nand the industry sector for BECCS linked to manufacturing (e.g., steel \r\nor hydrogen) (Tanzer et al. 2020; Bui et al. 2021; Tanzer et al. 2021)."


id: 550717adf1b1f99645a522f54c064d6f
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"This section assesses the CDR methods that are not carried out solely \r\nwithin conventional sectors and so are not covered in other parts of the \r\nreport: direct air carbon capture and storage, enhanced weathering, \r\nand ocean-based approaches. It provides an overview of each CDR \r\nmethod: their costs, potentials, risks and impacts, co-benefits, and \r\ntheir role in mitigation pathways. Since these processes, approaches \r\nand technologies have medium to low technology readiness levels, \r\nthey are subject to significant uncertainty."


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"At the national and regional levels, the role of land-based biological \r\nCDR methods has long been analysed, but there is little detailed \r\ntechno-economic assessment of the role of other CDR methods. There \r\nis a  small but emerging literature providing such assessments for \r\ndeveloped countries (Kraxner et al. 2014; Baik et al. 2018; Daggash \r\net al. 2018; Patrizio et al. 2018; Sanchez et al. 2018; Breyer et al. 2019; \r\nKato and Kurosawa 2019; Larsen et al. 2019; McQueen et al. 2020; "


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"using mineral carbonation) (Hepburn et al. 2019). The efficiency and \r\nenvironmental impacts of DACCS and DACCU options depend on \r\nthe carbon intensity of the energy input (electricity and heat) and \r\nother lifecycle assessment (LCA) considerations (Zimmerman 2018; \r\nJacobson 2019). See Chapters 6 and 11 for further details regarding \r\ncarbon capture and utilisation. Another key consideration is the net \r\ncarbon CO2 removal of DACCS over its lifecycle (Madhu et al. 2021). \r\nDeutz and Bardow (2021) and Terlouw et al. (2021) demonstrated \r\nthat the life-cycle net emissions of DACCS systems can be negative, \r\neven for existing supply chains and some current energy mixes. They \r\nfound that the GHG intensity of energy sources is a key factor."


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"vs nth plant) (Lackner et al. 2012), different configurations, and \r\ndisparate system boundaries. Estimates of industrial origin are often \r\non the lower side (Ishimoto et al. 2017). Fuss et al. (2018) suggest \r\na cost range of USD600-1000 tCO2\r\n-1 for first-of-a-kind plants, and \r\nUSD100-300 tCO2\r\n-1 as experience accumulates. An expert elicitation \r\nstudy found a similar cost level for 2050 with a median of around \r\nUSD200 tCO2\r\n-1 (Shayegh et al. 2021) (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). NASEM (2019) systematically evaluated the costs of \r\ndifferent designs and found a range of 84-386 USD2015 tCO2\r\n-1 for \r\nthe designs currently considered by active technology developers. This \r\ncost range excludes the site-specific costs of transportation or storage."


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"DAC options can be differentiated by the specific chemical processes \r\nused to capture ambient CO2 from the air and recover it from the \r\nsorbent (Fasihi et al. 2019). The main categories are (i) liquid solvents \r\nwith high-temperature regeneration, (ii) solid sorbents with low\u0002temperature regeneration and (iii) regenerating by moisturising of \r\nsolid sorbents. Other approaches such as electro-swing (Voskian and \r\nHatton 2019) have been proposed but are less developed. Compared \r\nto other CDR methods, the primary barrier to upscaling DAC is its high \r\ncost and large energy requirement (high confidence) (Nemet et al. \r\n2018), which can be reduced through innovation. It has therefore \r\nattracted entrepreneurs and private investments (IEA 2020b)."


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"Costs: As the process captures dilute CO2 (~0.04%) from the \r\nambient air, it is less efficient and more costly than conventional \r\ncarbon capture applied to power plants and industrial installations \r\n(with a  CO2 concentration of ~10%) (high confidence). The cost \r\nof a liquid solvent system is dominated by the energy cost (because \r\nof the much higher energy demand for CO2 regeneration, which \r\nreduces the efficiency) while capital costs account for a significant \r\nshare of the cost of solid sorbent systems (Fasihi et al. 2019). The \r\nrange of the DAC cost estimates found in the literature is wide \r\n(USD60-1000 tCO2\r\n-1) (Fuss et al. 2018) partly because different \r\nstudies assume different use cases, differing phases (first plant "


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"Co-benefits: While Wohland et al. (2018) proposed solid sorbent\u0002based DAC plants as a Power-to-X technology that could use excess \r\nrenewable power (at times of low or even negative prices), such \r\noperation would add additional costs. Installations would need to \r\nbe designed for intermittent operations (i.e., at low load factors) \r\nwhich would negatively affect capital and operation costs (Daggash \r\net al. 2018; Sandalow et al. 2018) as a high time-resolution model \r\nsuggests a  high utilisation rate (Breyer et al. 2020). Solid sorbent \r\nDAC designs can potentially remove more water from the ambient \r\nair than needed for regeneration, thereby delivering surplus water \r\nthat would contribute to SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation) in arid \r\nregions (Sandalow et al. 2018; Fasihi et al. 2019)."


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"Status, costs, potentials, risk and impacts, co-benefits, trade-offs and \r\nspillover effects and the role in mitigation pathways of DACCS are \r\nsummarised in Table 12.6."


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"Trade-offs and spillover effects: Liquid solvent DACCS systems \r\nneed substantial amounts of water (Fasihi et al. 2019), although \r\nmuch less than BECCS systems (Smith et al. 2016), which could \r\nnegatively affect SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation). Although the \r\nhigh energy demand of DACCS could affect SDG 7 (affordable and \r\nclean energy) negatively through potential competition or positively \r\nthrough learning effects (Beuttler et al. 2019), its impact has not been \r\nthoroughly assessed yet."


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"Role in mitigation pathways: There are a few IAM studies that \r\nhave explicitly incorporated DACCS. Stringent emissions constraints \r\nin these studies lead to high carbon prices, allowing DACCS to \r\nplay an important role in mitigation. Chen and Tavoni (2013) \r\nexamined the role of DACCS in an IAM (WITCH) and found that \r\nincorporating DACCS reduces the overall cost of mitigation and tends \r\nto postpone the timing of mitigation. The scale of capture goes up \r\nto 37 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2100. Akimoto et al. (2021) introduced DACCS \r\nin the IAM DNE21+, and also found the long-term marginal cost of \r\nabatement is significantly reduced by DACCS. Marcucci et al. (2017) \r\nran MERGE-ETL, an integrated model with endogenous learning, and \r\nshowed that DACCS allows for a model solution for the 1.5degC target, "


id: 5f2a8c69e0c094e1ece4897e2b3c2fd2
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content:
"Status: Enhanced weathering has been demonstrated in the \r\nlaboratory and in small-scale field trials (TRL 3-4) but has yet to \r\nbe demonstrated at scale (Beerling et al. 2018; Amann et al. 2020). "


id: 2ddf7433664f5f5acd06d029a3f5772e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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"Risks and impacts: Mining of rocks for enhanced weathering will \r\nhave local impacts and carries risks similar to those associated with \r\nthe mining of mineral construction aggregates, with the possible \r\nadditional risk of greater dust generation from fine comminution \r\nand land application. In addition to direct habitat destruction and \r\nincreased traffic to access mining sites, there could be adverse \r\nimpacts on local water quality (Younger and Wolkersdorfer 2004)."


id: cfbe433914e58112e7d6ecd786b32365
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Trade-offs and spillover effects: Air quality could be adversely \r\naffected by the spreading of rock dust (Edwards et al. 2017), though this \r\ncan partly be ameliorated by water-spraying (Grundnig et al. 2006). As \r\nnoted above, any significant expansion of the mining industry would \r\nrequire careful assessment to avoid possible detrimental effects on \r\nbiodiversity (Amundson et al. 2015). The processing of an additional \r\n10 billion tonnes of rock would require up to 3000 Terawatt-hours \r\nof energy, which could represent approximately 0.1-6 % of global \r\nelectricity use in 2100. The emissions associated with this additional \r\nenergy generation may reduce the net carbon dioxide removal by up \r\nto 30% with present-day grid average emissions, but this efficiency \r\nloss would decrease with low-carbon power (Beerling et al. 2020)."


id: 9e5e196512edc070824293280750a9b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 22442
content:
"Role in mitigation pathways: Only one study to date has included \r\nenhanced weathering in an integrated assessment model to explore \r\nmitigation pathways (Strefler et al. 2021)."


id: dd2b871b664e170e87a56f0fb408edd8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Status, costs, potentials, risk and impacts, co-benefits, trade-offs and \r\nspillover effects and the role in mitigation pathways of enhanced \r\nweathering are summarised in Table 12.6."


id: b2df5ecb25e58247f0e1b952e165943
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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"The ocean, which covers over 70% of the Earth's surface, contains \r\nabout 38,000 gigatonnes of carbon, some 45 times more than the \r\npresent atmosphere, and oceanic uptake has already consumed \r\nclose to 30-40% of anthropogenic carbon emissions (Sabine \r\net al. 2004; Gruber et al. 2019). The ocean is characterised by diverse \r\nbiogeochemical cycles involving carbon, and ocean circulation has \r\nmuch longer timescales than the atmosphere, meaning that additional "


id: 630298f05c96abb651dde4b43f3a8e50
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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"storage (Blain et al. 2008; Williamson et al. 2012; Trull et al. 2015). \r\nThe efficiency of OF also depends on the region and experimental \r\nconditions, especially in relation to the availability of other nutrients, \r\nlight and temperature (Aumont and Bopp 2006). In the case of \r\nmacronutrients, very large quantities are needed and the proposed \r\nscaling of this technique has been viewed as unrealistic (Williamson \r\nand Bodle 2016)."


id: af1bca391a0fa621f3fee463989c6b85
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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"Costs: Ocean fertilisation costs depend on nutrient production \r\nand its delivery to the application area (Jones 2014). The costs \r\nrange from USD2 tCO2\r\n-1 for fertilisation with iron (Boyd 2008) to \r\nUSD457 tCO2\r\n-1 for nitrate (Harrison 2013). Reported costs for \r\nmacronutrient application at USD20 tCO2\r\n-1 (Jones 2014) contrast \r\nwith higher estimates by (Harrison 2013) reporting that low costs are \r\ndue to overestimation of sequestration capacity and underestimation \r\nof logistical costs. The median of OF cost estimates, USD230 tCO2\r\n-1 \r\n(Gattuso et al., 2021) indicates low cost-effectiveness, albeit \r\nuncertainties are large."


id: f7164b0231b3e48347e6f04e9664e6d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Risks and impacts: Several of the mesoscale iron enrichment \r\nexperiments have seen the emergence of potentially toxic species \r\nof diatoms (Silver et al. 2010; Trick et al. 2010). There is also (limited) \r\nevidence of increased concentrations of other GHGs such as methane \r\nand nitrous oxide during the subsurface decomposition of the sinking \r\nparticles from iron-stimulated blooms (Law 2008). Impacts on \r\nmarine biology and food web structure are not well known, however \r\nOF at large scale could cause changes in nutrient distributions or \r\nanoxia in subsurface water (Fuhrman and Capone 1991; DFO \r\n2010). Other potential risks are perturbation to marine ecosystems \r\nvia reorganisation of community structure, enhanced deep ocean \r\nacidification (Oschlies et al. 2010) and effects on human food supply."


id: 864217d0c4b7fc2af2255dcb6a0cc3a1
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"Status: OF has a  natural analogue: periods of glaciation in the \r\ngeological past are associated with changes in deposition of dust \r\ncontaining iron into the ocean. Increased formation of phytoplankton \r\nhas also been observed during seasonal deposition of dust from the \r\nArabian Peninsula and ash deposition on the ocean surface after \r\nvolcanic eruptions (Achterberg et al. 2013; Jaccard et al., 2013; Olgun \r\net al. 2013; Martinez-Garcia et al. 2014). OF options may appear \r\ntechnologically feasible, and enhancement of photosynthesis and \r\nCO2 uptake from surface waters is confirmed by a number of field \r\nexperiments conducted in different areas of the ocean, but there is \r\nscientific uncertainty about the proportion of newly-formed organic \r\ncarbon that is transferred to deep ocean, and the longevity of "


id: 272f5ab7fedd1572a11fc05755b72f87
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content:
"Co-benefits: Co-benefits of OF include a potential increase in fish \r\nbiomass through enhanced biological production (Minx et al. 2018) \r\nand reduced ocean acidification in the short term in the upper \r\nocean (by CO2 removal), though it could be enhanced in the long \r\nterm in the ocean interior (by CO2 release) (Oschlies et al., 2010; \r\nGattuso et al. 2018)."


id: b9e46bf6057c4679112d211457b03c57
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Trade-offs and spillover effects: Potential drawbacks include \r\nsubsurface ocean acidification and deoxygenation (Cao and Caldeira \r\n2010; Oschlies et al., 2010; Williamson et al. 2012); altered regional \r\nmeridional nutrient supply and fundamental alteration of food webs \r\n(GESAMP 2019); and increased production of N2O and CH4 (Jin and \r\nGruber 2003; Lampitt et al. 2008). Ocean fertilisation is considered \r\nto have negative consequences for eight SDGs, and a combination \r\nof both positive and negative consequences for seven SDGs \r\n(Honegger et al. 2020)."


id: 8936f07aa5b01e00b0e9406fc1317511
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"2017). Some authors suggest use of maritime transport to discharge \r\ncalcium hydroxide (slaked lime) (Caserini et al. 2021)."


id: f94ea1a7913bdf89b64248c71042527b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Costs: Techno-economic assessments of OAE largely focus on \r\nquantifying overall energy and carbon balances. Cost ranges are \r\nUSD40-260 tCO2\r\n-1 (Fuss et al. 2018). Considering life-cycle carbon \r\nand energy balances for various OAE options, adding lime (or other \r\nreactive calcium or magnesium oxide/hydroxides) to the ocean would \r\ncost USD64-260 tCO2\r\n-1 (Renforth et al. 2013; Renforth &  Kruger \r\n2013; Caserini et al. 2019). Rau (2008) and Rau et al. (2018) estimate \r\nthat electrochemical processes for increasing ocean alkalinity may \r\nhave a net cost of USD3-160 tCO2\r\n-1, largely depending on energy \r\ncost and co-product (H2) market value. In the case of direct addition \r\nof alkaline minerals to the ocean (i.e., without calcination), the cost \r\nis estimated to be USD20-50 tCO2\r\n-1 (Harvey 2008; Kohler et al. 2013; \r\nRenforth and Henderson 2017)."


id: abcd08e9ac8ece4d1e4d76ad77011476
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"sequestration in shallow coastal ecosystems (Duarte, 2017). About \r\n20% of the countries that are signatories to the Paris Agreement \r\nrefer to blue carbon approaches for climate change mitigation \r\nin their NDCs and are moving toward measuring blue carbon in \r\ninventories. About 40% of those same countries have pledged to \r\nmanage shallow coastal ecosystems for climate change adaptation \r\n(Kuwae and Hori 2019)."


id: 303a2b789accf3e26c9fbac000d6a884
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Co-benefits: Intentional addition of alkalinity to the oceans \r\nthrough OAE would decrease the risk to ocean ecosystems caused \r\nby the  CO2-induced impact of ocean acidification on marine biota \r\nand the global carbon cycle (Doney et al. 2009; Kohler et al. 2010; Rau \r\net al. 2012; Williamson and Turley 2012; Albright et al. 2016; Bach et al. \r\n2019). OAE could be jointly implemented with enhanced weathering \r\n(Section  12.3.1.2), spreading the finely crushed rock in the ocean \r\nrather than on land. Regional alkalinisation could be effective in \r\nprotecting coral reefs against acidification (Feng et al. 2016; Mongin \r\net al., 2021) and coastal OAE could be part of a broader strategy for \r\ngeochemical management of the coastal zone, safeguarding specific \r\ncoastal ecosystems, such as important shellfisheries, from the adverse \r\nimpact of ocean acidification (Meysman and Montserrat 2017)."


id: 9b56c6f8ef8bcb7136c2e6923438bcab
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"Costs: There are large differences in the cost of CDR applying blue \r\ncarbon management methods between different ecosystems (and at \r\nthe local level). Median values are estimated as USD240, 30,000, and \r\n7800 tCO2\r\n-1, respectively for mangroves, salt marsh and seagrass \r\nhabitats (Gattuso et al. 2021). Currently estimated cost effectiveness \r\n(for climate change mitigation) is very low (Siikamaki et al. 2012; \r\nBayraktarov et al. 2016; Narayan et al. 2016)."


id: 3ef441f245822e57b6adfdde875324b2
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"Potentials: Globally, the total potential carbon sequestration \r\nrate through blue carbon CDR is estimated in the range \r\n0.02-0.08  GtCO2 yr-1 (Wilcox et al. 2017; National Academies \r\nof Sciences 2019). Gattuso et al. (2021) estimate the theoretical \r\ncumulative potential of coastal blue carbon management by 2100 \r\nto be 95 GtCO2, taking into account the maximum area that can be \r\noccupied by these habitats and historic losses of mangroves, seagrass \r\nand salt marsh ecosystems."


id: 2d0ffd08b763113086a59dd01a327c86
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"Risks and impacts: For blue carbon management, potential risks \r\nrelate to the high sensitivity of coastal ecosystems to external impacts \r\nassociated with both degradation and attempts to increase carbon \r\nsequestration. Under expected future warming, sea level rise and \r\nchanges in coastal management, blue carbon ecosystems are at risk, \r\nand their stored carbon is at risk of being lost (Bindoff et al. 2019)."


id: c061f42b64511aa62f8f30a104a6bec4
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"Co-benefits: Blue carbon management provides many non-climatic \r\nbenefits and can contribute to ecosystem-based adaptation, also \r\nreducing emissions associated with habitat degradation and loss \r\n(Howard et al. 2017; Hamilton and Friess 2018). Shallow coastal \r\necosystems have been severely affected by human activity; significant \r\nareas have already been deforested or degraded and continue to be \r\ndenuded. These processes are accompanied by carbon emissions. The \r\nconservation and restoration of coastal ecosystems, which will lead to \r\nincreased carbon sequestration, is also essential for the preservation \r\nof basic ecosystem services, and healthy ecosystems tend to be more \r\nresilient to the effects of climate change."


id: 5fa92148c8ae3f7b006f4f04769dd169
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"Trade-offs and spillover effects: Blue carbon management \r\nschemes should consist of a  mix of restoration, conservation and \r\nareal increase, including complex engineering interventions that \r\nenhance natural capital, safeguard their resilience and the ecosystem \r\nservices they provide, and decrease the sensitivity of such ecosystems \r\nto further disturbances."


id: bb2d30cb97cd35ced7702c48c40e7721
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"The term 'blue carbon' was used originally to refer to biological carbon \r\nsequestration in all marine ecosystems, but it is increasingly applied \r\nto CDR associated with rooted vegetation in the coastal zone, such \r\nas tidal marshes, mangroves and seagrasses. Potential for carbon \r\nsequestration in other coastal and non-coastal ecosystems, such as \r\nmacroalgae (e.g., kelp), is debated (Krause-Jensen and Duarte, 2016; \r\nKrause-Jensen et al., 2018). In this report, blue carbon refers to CDR \r\nthrough coastal blue carbon management."


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content:
"Artificial upwelling: This concept uses pipes or other methods to \r\npump nutrient-rich deep ocean water to the surface where it has \r\na fertilising effect (see OF section). To achieve CO2 removal at a Gt \r\nmagnitude, modelling studies have shown that artificial upwelling "


id: 2cbb1fd555c3a7d32dcccd9aab42650b
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"thods DACCS, \r\na barrier (B) to t\r\nat there is no or \r\nn overview of th\r\nsed. The assessm\r\nEconomic \r\nCosts in 2030 and long term\r\nEffects on employment and \r\neconomic growth\r\nB E B \r\nrs and barriers \r\n100"


id: bfd9b1872c5fe2c7ad0ff67dd5d4947
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"the atmosphere into the ocean to restore equilibrium. Electrochemical \r\nseawater CO2 extraction has been modelled, prototyped, and \r\nanalysed from a techno-economic perspective (Eisaman et al., 2012; \r\nWillauer et al., 2017; de Lannoy et al., 2018; Eisaman et al., 2018a; \r\nEisaman et al., 2018b)."


id: a6173b760541498a60acc1f02840041e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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"would have to be implemented on a  massive scale (over 50% of \r\nthe ocean to deliver maximum rate of 10GtCO2 yr-1 under RCP8.5) \r\n(Oschlies et al., 2010, Keller et al. 2014). Because the deep water \r\nis much colder than surface water, at massive scale this could cool \r\nthe Earth's surface by several degrees, but the cooling effect would \r\ncease as the deeper ocean warms, and would reverse, leading \r\nto rapid warming, if the pumping ceased (Oschlies et al., 2010, \r\nKeller et al. 2014)."


id: 752082cd26ce51c31a07c13410b982f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Status, costs, potentials, risk and impacts, co-benefits, trade-offs and \r\nspillover effects and the role in mitigation pathways of ocean-based \r\napproaches are summarised in Table 12.6."


id: 679e3f1e65865f002a9fb86b53e22928
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content:
"Furthermore, the cooling would also severely alter atmospheric \r\ncirculation and precipitation patterns (Kwiatkowski et al. 2015). \r\nSeveral upwelling approaches have been developed and tested (Pan \r\net al., 2016) and more R&D is underway."


id: a3e27d1e8bb8be73490181dfc2d121d1
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"Following the framework presented in Section  6.4 and Annex II, \r\nPart  IV, Section  11, a  multi-dimensional feasibility assessment of \r\nthe CDR methods covered here is provided in Figure  12.4, taking \r\ninto account the assessment presented in this section. Both DACCS \r\nand EW perform positively on the geophysical and technological \r\ndimensions while for ocean-based approaches performance is mixed. \r\nThere is limited evidence to assess social-cultural, environmental/\r\necological, and institutional dimensions as the literature is still \r\nnascent for DACCS and EW, while these aspects are positive for blue \r\ncarbon and mixed or negative for ocean fertilisation. On the economic \r\ndimension, the cost is assessed negatively for all CDR methods."


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content:
"Terrestrial biomass dumping: There are proposals to sink terrestrial \r\nbiomass (crop residues or logs) into the deep ocean as a means of \r\nsequestering carbon (Strand and Benford 2009). Sinking biochar \r\nhas also been proposed (Miller and Orton, 2021). Decomposition \r\nwould be inhibited by the cold and sometimes hypoxic/anoxic \r\nenvironment on the ocean floor, and absence of bacteria that \r\ndecompose terrestrial lignocellulosic biomass, so storage timescale \r\nis estimated at hundreds to thousands of years (Strand and Benford \r\n2009) (Burdige 2005). Potential side effects on marine ecosystems, \r\nchemistry, or circulation have not been thoroughly assessed. Neither \r\nhave these concepts been evaluated with respect to the impacts on \r\nland from enhanced transfer of nutrients and organic matter to the \r\nocean, nor the relative merits of alternative applications of residues \r\nand biochar as an energy source or soil amendment (Chapter 7)."


id: ace177cf03b6920ba8a320193420c10a
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"Status: BECCS, afforestation/reforestation (A/R), soil carbon \r\nsequestration (SCS) and biochar are land-based biological CDR \r\nmethods (Smith et al. 2016). BECCS combines biomass use for energy \r\nwith CCS to capture and store the biogenic carbon geologically \r\n(Section  6.4.2.6); A/R and SCS involve fixing atmospheric carbon \r\nin biomass and soils, and biochar involves converting biomass to \r\nbiochar and using it as a soil amendment. These CDR methods can \r\nbe associated with both co-benefits and adverse side effects (Smith \r\net al. 2016; Hurlbert et al. 2019; Mbow et al. 2019; Olsson et al. 2019; \r\nSchleicher et al. 2019; Smith et al. 2019b; Babin et al. 2021; Dooley \r\net al. 2021) (Sections 7.4 and 12.5)."


id: 2b8fe28d09ff4ec2e6be1853b1b226c6
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"Among CDR methods, BECCS and A/R are most commonly selected by \r\nIAMs to meet the requirements of scenarios that limit warming to 2degC \r\n(>67%) or lower. This is partially because of the long lead time required \r\nto refine IAMs to include additional methods and update techno\u0002economic parameters. Currently, few IAMs represent SCS or biochar \r\n(Frank et al. 2017). Given the removal potential of SCS and biochar and \r\nsome potential co-benefits, more efforts should be made to include \r\nthese methods within IAMs, so that their mitigation potential can be \r\ncompared to other CDR methods, along with possible co-benefits and \r\nadverse side effects (Smith et al. 2016; Rogelj et al. 2018) (Section 12.5)."


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content:
"Extraction of CO2 from seawater (with storage): CO2 can be \r\nextracted by applying a  vacuum, or by purging with a  gas low in \r\nCO2 (Koweek et al., 2016). CO2 stripping can also be accomplished \r\nby acidifying seawater with a mineral acid, or through electrodialysis \r\nand electrolysis, to convert bicarbonate ions (HCO3\r\n-\r\n) to CO2 (Willauer \r\net al., 2017; Eisaman et al., 2018; Digdaya et al., 2020; Eisaman 2020; \r\nSharifian et al., 2021). The removal of CO2 from the ocean surface \r\nleads to undersaturation in the water, thus forcing CO2 to move from "


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"Potential: The technical potential for BECCS by 2050 is estimated at \r\n0.5-11.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Table 7.3). These potentials do not include \r\navoided emissions resulting from the use of heat, electricity and/or \r\nfuels provided by the BECCS system, which depend on substitution \r\npatterns, conversion efficiencies, and supply chain emissions for the "


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content:
"BECCS and substituted energy systems (Box  7.7). The mitigation \r\neffect of BECCS also depends on how deployment affects land carbon \r\nstocks and sink strength (Section 7.4.4)."


id: c0d5a0bb3e220b8d58c65ddcbec04140
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 27905
content:
"employment and local livelihoods, economic diversification, energy \r\nsecurity, and technology development and transfer (medium evidence,\r\nhigh agreement) (Fuss et al. 2018) (Chapter  7). It may contribute \r\nto reduction of other air pollutants, health benefits, and reduced \r\ndependency on imported fossil fuels. A/R can improve biodiversity \r\nif native and diverse species are used (Fuss et al. 2018). For biochar, \r\nadditional co-benefits include increased crop yields, reduced drought \r\nimpacts, and reduced CH4 and N2O emissions from soils (Joseph et al., \r\n2021) (Section 7.4.5.2). SCS can improve soil quality and resilience \r\nand improve agricultural productivity and food security (Frank et al. \r\n2017; Smith et al. 2019b)."


id: cb8dd600dd614a74a2cede4c2799e4cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"As detailed in Chapter 7, the technical potential for gross removals \r\nrealised through A/R in 2050 is 0.5-10.1  GtCO2-eq yr-1, and for \r\nimproved forest management the potential is 1-2.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\n(including both CDR and emissions reduction). Technical potential for \r\nSCS in 2050 is estimated to be 0.6-9.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1, for agroforestry \r\nit is 0.3-9.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1, and for biochar it is 0.2-6.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1. \r\nPeatland and coastal wetland restoration have a technical potential \r\nof 0.5-2.1  GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2050, with an estimated 80% of the \r\npotential being CDR.  Note that these potentials reflect only \r\nbiophysical and technological conditions and become reduced when \r\nfactoring in economic, environmental, socio-cultural and institutional \r\nconstraints (Table 12.6)."


id: cca651413e607336c14be9b49c4f561
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Role in mitigation pathways: Biomass use for BECCS in 2050 is \r\n61  EJ yr-1 (13-208  EJ yr-1, 5-95th percentile range) in scenarios \r\nlimiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (C1, \r\nexcluding traditional energy). This corresponds to 5.3  GtCO2 yr-1\r\n(1.1-18 GtCO2 yr-1) CDR, if assuming 28 kg C GJ-1 biomass carbon \r\ncontent and 85% capture rate in BECCS systems. In scenarios that \r\nlimit warming to 2degC (>67%) (C3), biomass use for BECCS in 2050 \r\nis 28 EJ yr-1 (0-96 EJ yr-1, 5-95th percentile range), corresponding \r\nto 2.4 GtCO2 yr-1 (0-8.3 GtCO2 yr-1) CDR. Cumulative CO2 removal \r\nfrom AFOLU (mainly through A/R), as reported from models, \r\nin the period 2020 to 2100 is 262  GtCO2 (17-397  GtCO2) and \r\n209  GtCO2 (20-415  GtCO2) in C1 and C3 scenarios, respectively \r\n(5-95th percentile range)."


id: ff61c7c372b9bacbb71b6aef3109b487
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Costs: Costs across technologies vary substantially (Smith \r\net al. 2016) and were estimated to be USD15-400 tCO2\r\n-1 for \r\nBECSS, USD0-240 tCO2\r\n-1 for A/R, -USD45 to +USD100 tCO2-1 \r\nfor SCS and USD10-345 tCO2\r\n-1 for biochar. Fuss et al. (2018) \r\nestimated abatement cost ranges for BECCS, A/R, SCS and biochar \r\nto be 100-200, 5-50, 0-100, and 30-120 tCO2-eq-1 respectively, \r\ncorresponding to 2100  potentials. Ranges for economic potential \r\n(<USD100 tCO2\r\n-1) reported in Chapter 7 are 0.5-3.0 GtCO2 yr-1 (A/R); \r\n0.6-1.9 GtCO2 yr-1 (improved forest management); 0.7-2.5 GtCO2 yr-1\r\n(SCS); 0.4-1.1 GtCO2 yr-1 (agroforestry); 0.3-1.8 GtCO2 yr-1 (biochar); \r\nand 0.2-0.8 GtCO2 yr-1 (peatland and coastal wetland restoration)."


id: 6268ff9b90b109fba1e92ada4137a025
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Uncertainties remain in two main areas: the availability of land and \r\nbiomass, which is affected by many factors (Anandarajah et al. 2018) \r\n(Chapter 7), and the role of other mitigation measures including CDR \r\nmethods other than A/R and BECCS. Strong near-term climate change \r\nmitigation to limit overshoot, and deployment of CDR methods other \r\nthan A/R and BECCS, may significantly reduce the contribution of \r\nthese CDR methods in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC or 2degC \r\n(Koberle 2019; Hasegawa et al. 2021)."


id: d24b4f99acf22d7aa86e8eeb5719d4a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Risks, impacts, and co-benefits: a brief summary of risks, impacts \r\nand co-benefits is provided here and more detail is provided \r\nin Chapter  7  and Section  12.5. A/R and biomass production for \r\nBECCS and biochar potentially compete for land, water and other \r\nresources, implying possible adverse outcomes for ecosystem health, \r\nbiodiversity, livelihoods and food security (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Smith et al. 2016; Heck et al. 2018; Hurlbert et al. 2019; \r\nMbow et al. 2019) (Chapter 7). SCS requires the addition of nitrogen \r\nand phosphorus to maintain stoichiometry of soil organic matter, \r\nleading to a potential risk of eutrophication (Fuss et al. 2018). Apart \r\nfrom possible negative effects associated with biomass supply, \r\nadverse side effects from biochar are relatively low if the biomass is \r\nuncontaminated (Tisserant and Cherubini 2019)."


id: 5683168473738303b0cc9c5774bdefa9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Possible climate risks relate to direct and/or indirect land carbon \r\nlosses (A/R, BECCS, biochar), increased N2O emissions (BECCS, SCS), \r\nsaturation and non-permanence of carbon storage (A/R, SCS) (Jia et al. \r\n2019; Smith et al. 2019b) (Chapter 7), and potential CO2 leakage from \r\ndeep geological reservoirs (BECCS) (Chapter 6). Land cover change \r\nassociated with A/R and biomass supply for BECCS and biochar may \r\ncause albedo changes that reduce mitigation effectiveness (Fuss \r\net al. 2018; Jia et al. 2019). Potentially unfavourable albedo change \r\nresulting from biochar use can be minimised by incorporating biochar \r\ninto the soil (Fuss et al. 2018) (Chapter 7)."


id: a6494d25f151d9b2bf0337f3a6cd58d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 23696
content:
"mitigate biodiversity impacts and even improve ecosystem capacity \r\nto support biodiversity while mitigating climate change (Portner \r\net al. 2021) (Section 12.5). Systematic land-use planning could help \r\nto deliver land-based mitigation options that also limit trade-offs \r\nwith biodiversity (Longva et al. 2017) (Cross-Working Group Box 3: \r\nMitigation and Adaptation via the Bioeconomy, in this chapter)."


id: d1f4f9f34ece101ec97b0a640b805b69
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 30559
content:
"Status, costs, potentials, risk and impacts, co-benefits, trade\u0002offs and spillover effects and the role in mitigation pathways of \r\nA/R, biochar, SCS, peatland and coastal wetland restoration, \r\nagroforestry and forest management are summarised in Table 12.6. \r\nSee also Section 12.5."


id: d8f427ecfa3b13d69979fdf09d1a5f48
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Climate change mitigation policies in the UK have been motivated since 2008 by a  domestic, legally-binding framework. This \r\nframework includes a 2050 target for net zero greenhouse gas emissions, interim targets and an independent advisory body called the \r\nClimate Change Committee (Muinzer 2019). It has led successive UK governments to publish mitigation plans to 2050, causing policy \r\nto be more forward looking (Averchenkova et al. 2021)."


id: 6286edee428f995f464d9ad57650a0cd
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content:
"The UK's targets include emissions and removals from LULUCF. In 2008 the target for 2050 was an economy-wide net emissions \r\nreduction of at least 80% below 1990 levels. Even the first government plans to achieve this target proposed deployment of removal \r\nmethods, specifically afforestation and wood in construction, increased soil carbon and BECCS (HM Government 2011)."


id: e2a569ac42a42b3edb786a714c024b7f
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content:
"Adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 caused the government to change the legislated 2050 target to a reduction of at least 100% \r\n(i.e., net zero). Since then, removal of CO2 and other greenhouse gases has received greater prominence as a distinct topic. The most \r\nrecent national plan (published October 2021) proposes deployment not only of the methods mentioned above, but also DACCS, \r\nbiochar and enhanced weathering. The government has committed to amend accounting of UK targets to include a wider range of \r\nremoval methods beyond LULUCF, and set a target of 5 MtCO2 yr-1 from methods such as BECCS, DACCS and enhanced weathering \r\nby 2030. It is consulting on markets and incentives for deployment, and exploring new requirements for MRV (HM Government 2021)."


id: 563022346e4431a74974dc8315a10258
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content:
"In parallel to these policy developments, the UK funds research into technical, environmental and social aspects of removal (Lezaun \r\net al. 2021). Research on some elements (e.g., forestry, CCS, soils, bioenergy) have been funded for well over a decade, but the first \r\nprogramme dedicated to greenhouse gas removal ran during 2017-2021. This has been followed by two new programmes with \r\ngreater focus on demonstration, totalling GBP100 million over four years (HM Government 2021). A  wide variety of methods is \r\nsupported in these programmes, covering approaches such as CO2 capture from seawater and capture of methane from cattle, in \r\naddition to those included already in national mitigation scenarios."


id: 82727a6d182d713c280e633b665359e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Deployment of removal methods has lagged behind expectations, as national targets for tree planting are not being met and \r\ninfrastructure for CO2 transport and storage is not yet in place (Climate Change Committee 2021). While public awareness around \r\ncarbon removal is low, studies indicate support in general, provided it is perceived as enhancing rather than impeding action to reduce \r\nemissions (Cox et al. 2020a)."


id: 5499d3c1dcc664cccd14b60761c1641d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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vector_id: 10767
content:
"biological CDR methods such as SCS, biochar, A/R and blue carbon \r\nmanagement (robust evidence, high agreement) (VonHedemann \r\net al. 2020; Macreadie et al. 2021)."


id: 384367bce69111f77ac7898381afa3dd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"IPCC guidance on quantifying removals is available for land-based \r\nbiological CDR methods (IPCC 2006, 2019), but has yet to be \r\ndeveloped for other CDR methods (Royal Society and Royal Academy \r\nof Engineering 2018). Challenges with development of estimation \r\nalgorithms, data collection, and attribution between sectors and \r\ncountries will need to be overcome (Luisetti et al. 2020; Wedding \r\net al. 2021). Trusted methodologies for MRV, required to enable \r\nprivate sector participation. will need to address the permanence, \r\nleakage, and saturation challenges with land- and ocean-based \r\nbiological methods (Mace et al. 2021). Protocols that also capture \r\nsocial and ecological co-benefits could encourage the adoption of "


id: 884946331e966d2118e40a2139656be1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"International governance considerations include global technology \r\ntransfer around CDR implementation options (Batres et al. 2021); \r\nland use change that could affect food production and land condition \r\nand cause conflict around land tenure and access (Dooley and Kartha \r\n2018; Hurlbert et al. 2019; Milne et al. 2019); and efforts to create \r\nsustainable and just supply chains for CDR (Fajardy and Mac Dowell \r\n2020; Tan et al. 2021), such as resources used for BECCS, enhanced \r\nweathering, or ocean alkalinisation. International governance would \r\nbe particularly important for methods posing transboundary risks, \r\nespecially for ocean-based methods. Specific regulations have so \r\nfar only been developed in the context of the London Protocol, an "


id: 4a757dd2e1da4c2b6da228682ee464d2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"international treaty that explicitly regulates ocean fertilisation and \r\nallows parties to govern other marine CDR methods like ocean \r\nalkalinity enhancement (GESAMP 2019; Burns and Corbett 2020; \r\nBoettcher et al. 2021) (Section 14.4.5)."


id: 458832539285b34a2c38904f68833b04
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Sufficient food and adequate nutrition are fundamental human needs \r\n(HLPE 2020; Ingram 2020). Food needs to be grown and processed, \r\ntransported and distributed, and finally prepared and consumed. Food \r\nsystems range from traditional, involving only few people and short \r\nsupply chains, to modern food systems, comprising complex webs \r\ninvolving large numbers of stakeholders and processes that grow and \r\ntransform food commodities into food products and distribute them "


id: 6f1398c4fa9cfb4a6b4509b56a3e5bf9
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content:
"in developed countries, down from 9% in 1995, and 57% in least \r\ndeveloped countries, down from 71% in 1995 (World Bank 2021). \r\nEmployment in other (non-agriculture) food system sectors, such as \r\nthe food processing industry and service sectors, differs between food \r\nsystems. The share of total non-farm food system employment ranges \r\nfrom 10% in traditional food systems (e.g., sub-Saharan Africa), to over \r\n50% in food systems in transition (e.g., Brazil), to high shares (80%) \r\nin modern food systems (e.g., US) (Townsend et al. 2017). The share of \r\nthe food expenditures that farmers receive is decreasing; at the global \r\nlevel, this share has been estimated at 27% in 2015 (Yi et al. 2021)."


id: 3b6aa98da37df8d53fd09eb5388c3c5a
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content:
"bio-available nutrients, including almost 200 million suffering from \r\nstunting, wasting or overweight (UNICEF 2019)."


id: 32aa1863e4ca6db3acbd3600d18d7271
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Energy: Emissions from energy use occur throughout the food \r\nsupply chain. In 2018, the main contributions came from energy \r\nindustries supplying electricity and heat (970 MtCO2-eq yr-1), \r\nmanufacturing and construction (920 MtCO2-eq yr-1, of which 29% \r\nwas attributable to the food, beverage, and tobacco industry), and \r\ntransport (760 MtCO2-eq yr-1). These emissions were almost entirely \r\nas CO2. Energy emissions from forestry and fisheries amounted \r\nto 480 MtCO2-eq yr-1, with 91% of emissions as CO2. Emissions \r\nfrom residential and commercial fuel combustion contributed \r\n250 MtCO2-eq yr-1 (79% of emissions as CO2, and with emissions of \r\n1.7 MtCH4 yr-1) and 130 MtCO2-eq yr-1 (with 98% of emissions as \r\nCO2), respectively."


id: 5b45e88dfa7bf9a7f4bee97e84083ad7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"Modern food systems are highly consolidated, through vertical and \r\nhorizontal integration (Swinnen and Maertens 2007; Folke et al. 2019). \r\nThis consolidation has led to uneven distribution of power across the \r\nfood value chain, with influence concentrated among a few actors in \r\nthe post-farmgate food supply chain (e.g., large food processors and \r\nretailers), and has contributed to a loss of indigenous agriculture and \r\nfood systems, for example on Pacific Islands (Vogliano et al. 2020). \r\nWhile agricultural producers contribute a higher proportion of GHG \r\nemissions compared with other actors in the supply chain, they have \r\nrelatively little power to change the system (Clapp 2019; Group of \r\nChief Scientific Advisors 2020; Leip et al. 2021)."


id: e2fb3a571d98159347e5c52984b3230d
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content:
"Refrigeration uses an estimated 43% of energy in the retail sector \r\n(Behfar et al. 2018) and significantly increases fuel consumption \r\nduring distribution. Besides being energy intensive, supermarket "


id: 315cb6e41c64b8979a1876a06c5df26f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:42
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content:
"distances, the share of transport in total GHG emissions can be \r\nover 40% (e.g., bananas, with total global average GHG emissions \r\nof 0.7 kgCO2-eq kg-1) (Poore and Nemecek 2018), but transport is \r\na  minor source of GHG emissions for most food products (Poore \r\nand Nemecek 2018)."


id: ec7928db0ccedcd66025720a7ecaf4ef
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content:
"Industry: Direct industrial emissions associated with food systems are \r\ngenerated by the refrigerants industry (580 MtCO2-eq yr-1 as F-gases) \r\nand the fertiliser industry for ammonia production (280 MtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nas CO2) and nitric acid (60 MtCO2-eq yr-1 as N2O). The industry \r\nsector data account for CO2 stored in urea (-50 MtCO2-eq yr-1). \r\nPackaging contributed about 6% of total food system emissions \r\n(0.98 GtCO2-eq yr-1, 91% as CO2, with CH4 emissions of 2.8 Mt CH4\r\nyr-1). Major emissions sources are pulp and paper (60 MtCO2-eq yr-1) \r\nand aluminium (30 MtCO2-eq yr-1), with ferrous metals, glass, and \r\nplastics making a smaller contribution. High shares of emissions from \r\npackaging are found for beverages and some fruit and vegetables \r\n(Poore and Nemecek 2018)."


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content:
"Transport has overall a  minor importance for food system GHG \r\nemissions, with a share of 5% to 6% (Poore and Nemecek 2018; Crippa \r\net al. 2021b). The largest contributor to food system transport GHG \r\nemissions was road transport (92%), followed by marine shipping \r\n(4%), rail (3%), and aviation (1%). Only looking at energy needs, air \r\nor road transport consumes one order of magnitude higher energy \r\n(road: 70-80 MJ t-1 km-1; aviation: 100-200 MJ t-1 km-1) than \r\nmarine shipping (10-20 MJ t-1 km-1) or rail (8-10 MJ t-1 km-1) \r\n(FAO  2011). For specific food products with high water content, \r\nrelatively low agricultural emissions and high average transport "


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"Waste: Management of waste generated in the food system \r\n(including  food waste, wastewater, packaging waste, etc.) leads \r\nto biogenic GHG  emissions, and contributed 1.7  GtCO2-eq yr-1 to \r\nfood systems' GHG emissions in 2018. Of these emissions, 55% \r\nwere from domestic and commercial wastewater (30 MtCH4 yr-1\r\nand 310 ktN2O yr-1), 36% from solid waste management (20 MtCH4 yr-1\r\nand 310 ktN2O yr-1), and 8% from industrial wastewater (4 MtCH4 yr-1\r\nand 80 ktN2O yr-1). Emissions from waste incineration and other \r\nwaste management systems contributed 1%."


id: 943b78f815a03e5cedbd1217bb567d8f
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content:
"Table 12.7 | GHG emissions from food systems by sector according to IPCC classification in Mt gas yr-1 and food systems' share of total anthropogenic \r\nGHG emissions in 1990 and 2015."


id: c49d6ade504a18a2bd708713260f7473
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content:
"Notes: Agricultural emissions include the emissions from the whole sector; biomass production for non-food use currently not differentiated. Non-food system AFOLU emissions are \r\nnegative (that is, a net carbon sink), therefore the share of AFOLU food system emissions is >100. Source: EDGARv6 (Crippa et al. 2019; Crippa et al. 2021b), and FAOSTAT (FAO 2021). \r\nLULUCF: land use, land-use change and forestry."


id: 284d75cee54285905de7877d1690b278
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content:
"meat, which brings GHG footprints of beef from dairy herds closer to \r\nthose of meat from monogastric animals, with emissions intensities \r\nof pork (4.4-13  kgCO2-eq per 100 g  protein) and poultry meat \r\n(2.3-11 kgCO2-eq per 100 g protein) (Poore and Nemecek 2018)."


id: 1dfe6f9d3bf108186cd58e91c17656cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"specific (Meijaard et al. 2020) and for plant-based proteins, GHG \r\nfootprints per serving remain lower than those of animal source \r\nproteins (Kim et al. 2019).\r\n12.4.2.3 Territorial National Per Capita GHG Emissions \r\nfrom Food Systems"


id: 7cb71d87bbf91e3ebfcef9eda6604acd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 17219
content:
"Food systems are connected to other societal systems, such as the \r\nenergy system, financial system, and transport system (Leip et al. \r\n2021). Also, food systems are dynamic and continuously changing \r\nand adapting to existing and anticipated future conditions. Food \r\nproduction systems are very diverse and vary by farm size, intensity \r\nlevel, farm specialisation, technological level, production methods \r\n(e.g., organic, conventional, etc.), with differing environmental and \r\nsocial consequences (Vaclavik et al. 2013; Fanzo 2017; Herrero et al. \r\n2017; Herrero et al. 2021)."


id: e99db95e040fb8b486180f4b71b90cb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"Various frameworks have been proposed to assess sustainability of \r\nfood systems, including metrics and indicators on environmental, \r\nhealth, economic and equity issues, pointing to the importance of \r\nrecognising the multi-dimensionality of food system outcomes \r\n(Gustafson et al. 2016; Chaudhary et al. 2018; Hallstrom et al. 2018; \r\nZurek et al. 2018; Eme et al. 2019; Bene et al. 2020; Hebinck et al. 2021). \r\nData platforms are being developed, but so far comprehensive data \r\nfor evidence-based food system policy are lacking (Fanzo et al. 2020)."


id: adcb9e69a85c06af50e79d9f44fc117c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 24878
content:
"To visualise several food systems dimensions in a  GHG context, \r\nFigure 12.7 shows GHG emissions per capita and year for regional \r\ncountry aggregates (Crippa et al. 2021a; Crippa et al. 2021b), \r\nindicated by the size of the bubbles. The GHG emissions presented \r\nhere are based on territorial accounting similar to the UNFCCC GHG "


id: 83956ec35440ee79d17ec89f43cf95c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Figure 12.7 | Regional differences in health outcomes, territorial per capita GHG emissions from national food systems, and share of food system \r\nGHG emissions from energy use. GHG emissions are calculated according to the IPCC Tier 1 approach and are assigned to the country where they occur, not necessarily \r\nwhere the food is consumed. Health outcome is expressed as relative contribution of each of the following risk factors to their combined risk for deaths: child and maternal \r\nmalnutrition (red), dietary risks (yellow) or high body mass index (blue). Sources: wholesale cost of food per capita: Springmann et al. 2021); territorial food system GHG \r\nemissions: EDGAR v.6, Crippa et al. (2021a), recalculated according to Crippa et al. (2021b) using AR6 GWPs; deaths attributed to dietary factors: IHME (2018); GBD 2017 Diet \r\nCollaborators et al. (2019)."


id: 2108589ae1ce4013510b467b6e5c7a1b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 2634
content:
"The share of GHG emissions from energy use is taken as a proxy for \r\nthe structure of food supply in a region (Section 12.4.1), and the cost \r\nfor food as a  proxy for the structure of the demand side and the \r\naccess to (healthy) food (Chen et al. 2016; Finaret and Masters 2019; \r\nHirvonen et al. 2019; HLPE 2020; Springmann et al. 2021), though \r\nacknowledging the limitations of such a simplification."


id: 9960ac08c74f8e5cd3c798d5ccb4b9a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 21650
content:
"While total food system emissions in 2018 range between 0.9 and \r\n8.5 tCO2-eq per capita per year between regions, the share of energy \r\nemissions relative to energy and land-based (agriculture and food \r\nsystem land-use change) emissions ranges between 3% and 78%. \r\nRegional expenditures for food range from USD3.0-8.8 per capita \r\nper day (Figure 12.7), though there is high variability within countries "


id: c09c8519c9190647e4d8bd95a20770e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"and the costs of nutrient-adequate diets often exceeds those of diets \r\ndelivering adequate energy (Hirvonen et al. 2019; Bai et al. 2020; FAO \r\net al. 2020). Thus, low-income households in industrialised countries \r\ncan also be affected by food insecurity (Penne and Goedeme 2020)."


id: 2035aa921ec02a1944ee4d6ce64c6842
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"GHG emissions from food systems can be reduced by targeting direct \r\nor indirect GHG emissions in the supply chain including enhanced \r\ncarbon sequestration, by introducing sustainable production methods \r\nsuch as agroecological approaches which can reduce system-level \r\nGHG emissions of conventional food production and also enhance \r\nresilience (HLPE 2019), by substituting food products with high GHG \r\nintensities with others of lower GHG intensities, by reducing food \r\nover-consumption, and/or by reducing food loss and waste. The \r\nsubstitution of food products with others that are more sustainable \r\nand/or healthier is often called 'dietary shift'."


id: 1e70ff6e1fdecb251518e56768b235ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 2231
content:
"Table  12.8 summarises the main characteristics of food system \r\nmitigation opportunities, their effect on GHG emissions, and \r\nassociated co-benefits and adverse effects."


id: fe2d49f5fda83511b9dff22e0c1bb743
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Clark et al. (2020) showed that even if fossil fuel emissions were \r\neliminated immediately, food system emissions alone would \r\njeopardise the achievement of the 1.5oC target and threaten the \r\n2oC target. They concluded that both demand-side and supply-side \r\nstrategies are needed, including a  shift to a  diet with lower GHG \r\nintensity and rich in plant-based 'conventional' foods (e.g., pulses, \r\nnuts), or new food products that could support dietary shift. \r\nSuch dietary shift needs to overcome socio-cultural, knowledge, \r\nand economic barriers to significantly achieve GHG mitigation \r\n(Section 12.4.5)."


id: 8dda35ac8d2957c44ae46b51aa53fb32
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 19847
content:
"Agricultural food production systems range from smallholder \r\nsubsistence farms to large animal production factories, in open \r\nspaces, greenhouses, rural areas or urban settings."


id: 8dea55d5c5ed89e50b73b734e2ec4a31
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Dietary shift: Studies demonstrate that a  shift to diets rich in \r\nplant-based foods, particularly pulses, nuts, fruits and vegetables, \r\nsuch as vegetarian, pescatarian or vegan diets, could lead to \r\nsubstantial reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as compared to \r\ncurrent dietary patterns in most industrialised countries, while also \r\nproviding health benefits and reducing mortality from diet-related \r\nnon-communicable diseases (Springmann et al. 2018a; Chen et al. \r\n2019; Willett et al. 2019; Bodirsky et al. 2020; Costa Leite et al. 2020; \r\nErnstoff et al. 2020; Jarmul et al. 2020; Semba et al. 2020; Theurl et al. \r\n2020; Hamilton et al. 2021)."


id: feb4c2d012af8d566724881fcc7f0cf7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Food losses occur at the farm, post-harvest and during the food \r\nprocessing/wholesale stages of a food supply chain, while in the final \r\nretail and consumption stages the term food waste is used (HLPE \r\n2014). Typically, food losses are linked to technical issues such as \r\nlack of infrastructure and storage, while food waste is often caused \r\nby socio-economic and behavioural factors. Mitigation opportunities \r\nthrough reducing food waste and loss exist in all food supply chain \r\nstages and are described in the sub-sections below."


id: 96069e11e672825fa9e74c8122c43d32
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21111
content:
"Food system mitigation opportunities can be either incremental \r\nor transformative (Kugelberg et al. 2021). Incremental options are \r\nbased on mature technologies, for which processes and causalities \r\nare understood, and their implementation is generally accepted by \r\nsociety. They do not require a substantial change in the way food \r\nis produced, processed, or consumed and might lead to a  (slight) \r\nshift in production systems or preferences. Transformative mitigation \r\nopportunities have wider food system implications and usually "


id: a1496c90767c1b53aff19a353801085
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 22936
content:
"Technological innovations: have made food production more \r\nefficient since the onset of agriculture (Winiwarter et al. 2014; \r\nHerrero et al. 2020). Emerging technologies include digital agriculture "


id: 3c6987a4277156a75134ab92f7f68b5f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 6870
content:
"n options\r\normative\r\nD: d\r\ndem\r\nDir\r\n of by-products, \r\nd waste logistics \r\nement\r\nM+ FL+ \r\nvation\r\nFW+ E0 \r\naging \r\nechnologies\r\nFW+ M0 E0 \r\niency E+ \r\ngistics\r\nD+ FL+ FW- \r\nasures to \r\n waste in retail \r\ntering\r\nFW+ E+ M+ \r\nfuels/\r\nodes D+ \r\niency E+ \r\nefrigerants D+ \r\n017); [2] Foyer et al. (2016)\r\ntorfer et al. (2021); [12] Fol\r\n] Gomez and Gennaro Izzo \r\n (2019); [29] Gentry et al. (\r\nisto and Teixeira de Mattos \r\n and Sanjuan (2019); [46] \r\n0); [54] Buisman et al. (20\r\nes."


id: ddac95b5834314b265b27d750cc6bd8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Co-benefits of controlled-environment agriculture include minimising \r\nwater and nutrient losses as well as agro-chemical use (Al-Kodmany \r\n2018; Shamshiri et al. 2018; Armanda et al. 2019; Farfan et al. 2019; \r\nO'Sullivan et al. 2019; Rufi-Salis et al. 2020) (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement). Water is recycled in a  closed system and additionally \r\nsome plants generate fresh water by evaporation from grey or black \r\nwater, and high nutrient use efficiencies are possible. Food production \r\nfrom controlled-environment agriculture is independent of weather \r\nconditions and able to satisfy some consumer demand for locally\u0002produced fresh and diverse produce throughout the year (Benke and \r\nTomkins 2017; Al-Kodmany 2018; O'Sullivan et al. 2019)."


id: 611529cd84949e79c7164f9cd672594e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 12846
content:
"(using advanced sensors, big data), gene technology (crop bio\u0002fortification, genome editing, crop innovations), sustainable \r\nintensification (automation of processes, improved inputs, precision \r\nagriculture) (Herrero et al. 2020), or multi-trophic aquaculture \r\napproaches (Knowler et al. 2020; Sanz-Lazaro and Sanchez-Jerez \r\n2020), though literature on aquaculture and fisheries in the context of \r\nGHG mitigation is limited."


id: 5b9c58b7f20a824f2cb0168feb91011a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 11915
content:
"Such technologies may contribute to a reduction of GHG emissions \r\nat the food system level, enhanced provision of food, better \r\nconsideration of ecosystem services, and/or contribute to nutrition\u0002sensitive agriculture, for example, by increasing the nutritional quality \r\nof staple crops, increasing the palatability of leguminous crops such \r\nas lupines, or increasing the agronomic efficiency or resilience of \r\ncrops with good nutritional characteristics."


id: afc889e487facee3507eafe1198086e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 25175
content:
"Controlled-environment agriculture is a very energy intensive technology \r\n(mainly for cooling) and its GHG intensity depends therefore crucially \r\non the source of the energy. Options for reducing GHG intensity include \r\nreducing energy use through improved lighting and cooling efficiency \r\nor by employing low-carbon energy sources, potentially integrated into \r\nthe building structure (Benke and Tomkins 2017)."


id: 93cc5f2eebef5ce84da47bf3e4d8f89
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 20764
content:
"Comprehensive studies assessing the GHG balance of controlled\u0002environment agriculture are lacking. The overall GHG emissions \r\nfrom controlled-environment agriculture is therefore uncertain and \r\ndepends on the balance of reduced GHG emissions from production \r\nand distribution and reduced land requirements, versus increased \r\nexternal energy needs."


id: 1c98968f2c0ac90c425f055b171c6893
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Controlled-environment agriculture is mainly based on hydroponic or \r\naquaponic cultivation systems that do not require soil. Aquaponics \r\ncombine hydroponics with a re-circulating aquaculture compartment \r\nfor integrated production of plants and fish (Junge et al. 2017; \r\nMaucieri et al. 2018), while aeroponics is a further development of \r\nhydroponics that replaces water as a growing medium with a mist of \r\nnutrient solution (Al-Kodmany 2018). Aquaponics could potentially \r\nproduce proteins in urban farms, but the technology is not yet mature \r\nand its economic and environmental performance is unclear (Love \r\net al. 2015; O'Sullivan et al. 2019)."


id: d643f6e380ea258cadb99d6597e56e0b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Controlled-environment agriculture is often undertaken in urban \r\nenvironments to take advantage of short supply chains (O'Sullivan \r\net al. 2019), and might use abandoned buildings or be integrated in \r\nsupermarkets, producing for example herbs 'on demand'."


id: 569140edfac9effd5d2fa4642a99912a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"Optimising growing conditions, hydroponic systems achieve higher \r\nyields than un-conditioned agriculture (O'Sullivan et al. 2019); \r\nand yields can be further enhanced in CO2-enriched atmospheres \r\n(Shamshiri et al. 2018; Armanda et al. 2019). By using existing \r\nspaces or modular systems that can be vertically stacked, this \r\ntechnology minimises land demand, however it is energy intensive \r\nand requires large financial investments. So far, only a few crops \r\nare commercially produced in vertical farms, including lettuce and \r\nother leafy greens, herbs and some vegetables, due to their short \r\ngrowth period and high value (Benke and Tomkins 2017; Armanda \r\net al. 2019; Beacham et al. 2019; O'Sullivan et al. 2019). Through \r\nbreeding, other crops could reach commercial feasibility, or crops \r\nwith improved taste or nutritional characteristics can be grown \r\n(O'Sullivan et al. 2019)."


id: 6722b58bb7db7acd7d864fb6c544df64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"Meat analogues have attracted substantial venture capital, and \r\nproduction costs have dropped considerably in the last decade, with \r\nsome reaching market maturity (Mouat and Prince 2018; Santo et al. \r\n2020), but there is uncertainty whether they will 'disrupt' the food \r\nmarket or remain niche products. According to Kumar et al. (2017), the \r\ndemand for plant-based meat analogues is expected to increase as \r\ntheir production is relatively cheap and they satisfy consumer demands \r\nwith regard to health and environmental concerns as well as ethical \r\nand religious requirements. Consumer acceptance is still low for some \r\noptions, especially insects (Aiking and de Boer 2019) and cultured \r\nmeat (Chriki and Hocquette 2020; Siegrist and Hartmann 2020)."


id: 48f5ec6ecc4a5909be62172802736a2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"In controlled-environment agriculture, photosynthesis is fuelled by \r\nartificial light through LEDs or a combination of natural light with \r\nLEDs. Control of the wave band and light cycle of the LEDs and micro\u0002climate can be used to optimise photosynthetic activity, yield and \r\ncrop quality (Gomez and Gennaro Izzo 2018; Shamshiri et al. 2018)."


id: c4002da781cab15eaa49f85efc49e996
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Insects: Farmed edible insects have a higher feed conversion ratio \r\nthan other animals farmed for food, and have short reproduction \r\nperiods with high biomass production rates (Halloran et al. 2016). \r\nInsects have good nutritional qualities (Parodi et al. 2018). They \r\nare suited as a protein source for both humans and livestock, with \r\nhigh protein content and favourable fatty acid composition (Fasolin \r\net al. 2019; Raheem et al. 2019b). If used as feed, they can grow on \r\nfood waste and manure; if used as food, food safety concerns and \r\nregulations can restrict the use of manure (Raheem et al. 2019b) or \r\nfood waste (Varelas 2019) as growing substrates, and the dangers \r\nof pathogenic or toxigenic microorganisms and incidences of anti\u0002microbial resistance need to be managed (Garofalo et al. 2019)."


id: 36c8bf325fe0459f5d4527ede9d9ea0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"Algae and bivalves have a high protein content and a favourable \r\nnutrient profile and can play a  role in providing sustainable food. \r\nBivalves are high in omega-3 fatty acids and vitamin B12 and \r\ntherefore well suited as replacement of conventional meats, and have \r\na lower GHG footprint (Parodi et al. 2018; Willer and Aldridge 2020). \r\nMicro- and macro algae are rich in omega-3 and omega-6 fatty acids, \r\nanti-oxidants and vitamins (Parodi et al. 2018; Penalver et al. 2020; \r\nTorres-Tiji et al. 2020). Kim et al. (2019) show that diets with modest \r\namounts of animals low on the food chain such as forage fish, \r\nbivalves, or insects have similar GHG intensities to vegan diets. Algae \r\nand bi-valves can be used to filter nutrients from waters, though care \r\nis required to avoid accumulation of hazardous substances (Gentry \r\net al. 2020; Willer and Aldridge 2020)."


id: 3b4d87278309608c56f0d8f3e00104ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"A review of LCA studies on different plant-based, animal source and \r\nnine 'future food' protein sources (Parodi et al. 2018) concluded that \r\ninsects, macro-algae, mussels, mycoproteins and cultured meat show \r\nsimilar GHG intensities per unit of protein (mean values ranging \r\n0.3-3.1 kgCO2-eq per 100 g protein), comparable to milk, eggs, and \r\ntuna (mean values ranging 1.2-5.4  kgCO2-eq per 100 g  protein); \r\nwhile chlorella and spirulina consume more energy per unit of \r\nprotein and were associated with higher GHG emissions (mean \r\nvalues ranging 11-13  kgCO2-eq per 100 g  protein). As the main \r\nsource of GHG emissions from insects and cellular agriculture foods \r\nis energy consumption, their GHG intensity improves with increased \r\nuse of low-carbon energy (Smetana et al. 2015; Parodi et al. 2018; \r\nPikaar et al. 2018)."


id: e50c832c571de9bb00626a3deff837e0
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content:
"Future foods offer other benefits such as lower land requirements, \r\ncontrolled systems with reduced losses of water and nutrients, \r\nincreased resilience, and possibly reduced hazards from pesticide \r\nand antibiotics use and zoonotic diseases, although more research \r\nis needed including on allergenic and other safety aspects, and \r\npossibly reduced protein bioavailability (Alexander et al. 2017; \r\nParodi et al. 2018; Stephens et al. 2018; Fasolin et al. 2019; Chriki \r\nand Hocquette 2020; Santo et al. 2020; Hadi and Brightwell 2021; \r\nTzachor et al. 2021) (medium evidence, high agreement). Research \r\nis needed also on the effect of processing (Wickramasinghe et al. \r\n2021), though a randomised crossover trial comparing appetising \r\nplant foods with meat alternatives found several beneficial and no \r\nadverse effects from the consumption of the plant-based meats \r\n(Crimarco et al. 2020)."


id: d3bb717d5760fd2f47fb5e78ef0b93ac
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"Cellular agriculture: The use of fungi, algae and bacteria is an old \r\nprocess (beer, bread, yoghurt) and serves, among others, for the \r\npreservation of products. The concept of cellular agriculture (Mattick \r\n2018) covers bio-technological processes that use micro-organisms \r\nto produce acellular (fermentation-based cellular agriculture) or \r\ncellular products. Yeasts, fungi or bacteria can synthesise acellular \r\nproducts such as haem, milk and egg proteins, or protein-rich animal \r\nfeed, other food ingredients, and pharmaceutical and material \r\nproducts (Rischer et al. 2020; Mendly-Zambo et al. 2021). Cellular "


id: c05da31fce1b6e35274bbc56d3cd9828
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content:
"Food processing includes preparation and preservation of fresh \r\ncommodities (fruit and vegetables, meat, seafood and dairy \r\nproducts), grain milling, production of baked goods, and manufacture \r\nof pre-prepared foods and meals. Food processors range from small \r\nlocal operations to large multinational food producers, producing "


id: b6df8685638e5730cf28baac836fc8db
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"The second component of mitigation in food processing relates to \r\nreduction in fossil energy use. Opportunities include energy efficiency \r\nin processes (also discussed in Section  11.3), the use of heat and \r\nelectricity from low-carbon energy sources in processing (Chapter 6), \r\nthrough off-grid thermal processing (sun drying, food smoking) \r\nand improving logistics efficiencies. Energy-intensive processes \r\nwith energy-saving potential include milling and refining (oil seeds, \r\ncorn, sugar), drying, and food safety practices such as sterilisation \r\nand pasteurisation (Niles et al. 2018). Packaging also plays a role: \r\nreduced transport energy can be achieved through reducing the mass \r\nof goods transported and improving packing densities in transport \r\nvehicles (Lindh et al. 2016; Molina-Besch et al. 2019; Wohner \r\net al. 2019). Choice of packaging also influences refrigeration energy \r\nrequirements during transport and storage."


id: 2ae297ed5a2240f0b8eadf220b006492
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"food for local to global markets. The importance of food processing \r\nand preservation is particularly evident in developing countries \r\nwhich lack cold chains for the preservation and distribution of fresh \r\nperishable products such as fresh fish (Adeyeye and Oyewole 2016; \r\nAdeyeye 2017)."


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content:
"Mitigation in food processing largely focuses on reducing food waste \r\nand fossil energy usage during the processing itself, as well as in the \r\ntransport, packaging and storage of food products for distribution \r\nand sale (Silva and Sanjuan 2019). Reducing food waste provides \r\nemissions savings by reducing wastage of primary inputs required \r\nfor food production. Another mitigation route, contributing to the \r\ncircular bioeconomy (Section  12.6.1.2 and Cross-Working Group \r\nBox  3  in this chapter), is by valorisation of food processing by\u0002products through recovery of nutrients and/or energy. No global \r\nanalyses of the emissions savings potential from the processing step \r\nin the value chain could be found."


id: 503f57bb69f345682311959f51e3435d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 10064
content:
"Transport mitigation options along the supply chain include \r\nimproved logistics, the use of alternative fuels and transport modes, \r\nand reduced transport distances. Logistics and alternative fuels and \r\ntransport modes are discussed in Chapter  10. Transport emissions \r\nmight increase with increasing demand for a diversity of foods as \r\ndeveloping countries become more affluent. New technologies that \r\nenable food on demand or online food shopping systems might further \r\nincrease emissions from food transport; however, the consequences \r\nare uncertain and might also entail a shift from individual traffic to \r\nbulk transport. The impact on food waste is also uncertain as more \r\ntargeted delivery options could reduce food waste, but easier access \r\nto a wider range of food could also foster over-supply and increase \r\nfood waste. Mitigation opportunities in food transport are inherently \r\nlinked to decarbonisation of the transport sector (Chapter 10)."


id: 22d57b084d00dd9d4038f67dfbd9fac6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 2932
content:
"Reduced food waste during food processing can be achieved by \r\nseeking alternative processing routes (Atuonwu et al. 2018), improved \r\ncommunication along the food value chain (Gobel et al. 2015), \r\noptimisation of food processing facilities, reducing contamination, \r\nand limiting damages and spillage (HLPE 2014). Optimisation of food \r\npackaging also plays an important role in reducing food waste, in \r\nthat it can extend product shelf life; protect against damage during \r\ntransport and handling; prevent spoilage; facilitate easy opening and \r\nemptying; and communicate storage and preparation information to \r\nconsumers (Molina-Besch et al. 2019)."


id: 2e29194c25ca0d09b71ce2e632de4c4f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Developments in smart packaging are increasingly contributing \r\nto reducing food waste along the food value chain. Strategies for \r\nreducing the environmental impact of packaging include using less, \r\nand more sustainable, materials and a shift to reusable packaging \r\n(Coelho et al. 2020). Active packaging increases shelf life through \r\nregulating the environment inside the packaging, including levels of \r\noxygen, moisture and chemicals released as the food ages (Emanuel \r\nand Sandhu 2019). Intelligent packaging communicates information \r\non the freshness of the food through indicator labels (Poyatos\u0002Racionero et al. 2018), and data carriers can store information on \r\nconditions such as temperature along the entire food chain (Muller \r\nand Schmid 2019)."


id: 77b6c49e919a32ce3234ee05ac1072d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 16394
content:
"Retail and the food service industry are the main factors shaping the \r\nexternal food environment or 'food entry points'; they are the 'physical \r\nspaces where food is obtained; the built environment that allows \r\nconsumers to access these spaces' (HLPE 2017). These industries \r\nhave significant influence on consumers' choices and can play a role \r\nin reducing GHG emissions from food systems. Opportunities are \r\navailable for optimisation of inventories in response to consumer \r\ndemands through advanced IT systems (Niles et al. 2018), and for \r\ndiscounting foods close to sell-by dates, which can serve to reduce \r\nboth food spoilage and wastage (Buisman et al. 2019)."


id: aec130e0d38eceb8f9c8ef81bac902c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25023
content:
"LCA can be used to evaluate the benefits and trade-offs associated \r\nwith different processing or packaging types (Silva and Sanjuan \r\n2019). Some options, such as aluminium, steel and glass, require \r\nhigh energy investment in manufacture when produced from primary \r\nmaterials, with significant savings in energy through recycling \r\nbeing possible (Camaratta et al. 2020). However, these materials \r\nare inert in landfill. Other packaging options, such as paper and \r\nbiodegradable packaging, may require a  lower energy investment \r\nduring manufacture, but may require larger land area and can release \r\nmethane when consigned to anaerobic landfill where there is no \r\nmethane recovery. Nevertheless, packaging accounts for only 1-12% \r\n(typically around 5%) of the GHG emissions in the lifecycle of a food \r\nsystem (Wohner et al. 2019; Crippa et al. 2021b), suggesting that \r\nits benefits can often outweigh the emissions associated with the \r\npackaging itself."


id: e528324b9afb48eb23417fb06c323bf7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 33547
content:
"As one of the highest contributors to energy demand at this stage \r\nin the food value chain, refrigeration has received a  strong focus \r\nin mitigation. Efficient refrigeration options include advanced \r\nrefrigeration temperature control systems, and installation of \r\nmore efficient refrigerators, air curtains and closed display fridges \r\n(Chaomuang et al. 2017). Also related to reducing emissions from \r\ncooling and refrigeration is the replacement of hydrofluorocarbons \r\nwhich have very high GWPs with lower GWP alternatives (Niles et al. \r\n2018). The use of propane, isobutane, ammonia, hydrofluoroolefins \r\nand CO2 (refrigerant R744) are among those that are being explored, \r\nwith varying success (McLinden et al. 2017). In recent years, due to \r\nrestrictions on high GWP-refrigerants, a considerable growth in the \r\nmarket availability of appliances and systems with non-fluorinated \r\nrefrigerants has been seen (Eckert et al. 2021)."


id: 46a1ec2341aa699fb8faef94128848db
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 8498
content:
"Energy efficiency alternatives generic to buildings more broadly are \r\nalso relevant here, including efficient lighting, heating, ventilation, \r\nand air conditioning systems and building management, with \r\nventilation being a  particularly high energy user in retail, that \r\nwarrants attention (Kolokotroni et al. 2015)."


id: 5526a65c81cae27bafa9bf844b3ecce5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 10856
content:
"Food system mitigation potentials in AFOLU are assessed in \r\nSection  7.4, and food system mitigation potentials linked to \r\ndemand-side measures are assessed in Chapter  5. Studies \r\nsuggest that implementing supply- and demand-side policies in \r\ncombination makes ambitious mitigation targets easier to achieve \r\n(Clark et al.  2020; Global Panel on Agriculture and Food Systems \r\nfor Nutrition 2020; Temme et al. 2020; Latka et al. 2021a) (high \r\nagreement, limited evidence)."


id: 33281ffd673d38121a917322278e7045
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5468
content:
"In developing countries particularly, better infrastructure for \r\ntransportation and expansion of processing and manufacturing \r\nindustries can significantly reduce food losses, particularly of highly \r\nperishable food (Niles et al. 2018; FAO 2019a)."


id: ed33fb58f26b811b670741ec38500810
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 34796
content:
"Notes: #1 Minimum level to be effective 20% price increase; #2 Minimum level to be effective USD50-80 tCO2-eq. a\r\n In addition, all interventions are assumed to address health \r\nand climate change mitigation. b Requires coordination between policy areas, participation of stakeholders, transparent methods and indicators to manage trade-offs and \r\nprioritisation between possibly conflicting objectives; and suitable indicators for monitoring and evaluation against objectives."


id: 2f936810170181e7adf8f2355245ecb2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 4906
content:
"Stoll-Kleemann and Schmidt 2017; El Bilali 2019; iPES Food 2019; \r\nMilford et al. 2019; Temme et al. 2020) (Section  12.4.1) (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement)."


id: c20001f94558610a134b39c40d97c658
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 28102
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"The trends in the global and national food systems towards \r\na globalisation of food supply chains and increasing dominance of \r\nsupermarkets and large corporate food processors (Dries et al. 2004; \r\nNeven and Reardon 2004; Baker and Friel 2016; Andam et al. 2018; \r\nPopkin and Reardon 2018; Reardon et al. 2019; Pereira et al. 2020) \r\nhave led to environmental, food insecurity and malnutrition problems. \r\nStudies therefore call for a  transformation of current global and \r\nnational food systems to solve these problems (Schosler and Boer \r\n2018; McBey et al. 2019; Kugelberg et al. 2021). This has not yet \r\nbeen successful, including due to insufficient coordination between \r\nrelevant food system policies (Weber et al. 2020) (medium evidence, \r\nhigh agreement)."


id: d704e7ae1eddd68bae8e01fe5bbef4e2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 31337
content:
"Table 12.9 summarises the implications of a range of policy instruments \r\ndiscussed in more detail in the following sub-sections and highlights \r\nthe benefits of integrated policy packages. Furthermore, Table 12.9 \r\nassesses transformative potential, environmental effectiveness, \r\nfeasibility, distributional effect, cost, and cost-benefits and trade\u0002offs of individual policy instruments, as well as their potential role as \r\npart of coherent policy packages. Table 12.9 shows that information \r\nand behavioural policy instruments can have significant but small \r\neffects in changing diets (robust evidence, medium agreement), but \r\nare mutually enforcing and might be essential to lower barriers and \r\nincrease acceptance of market-based and administrative instruments \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 89583337bb034378804e92bb561501ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"The policy instruments are assessed in relation to shifting food \r\nconsumption and production towards increased sustainability and \r\nhealth. This includes lowering GHG emissions, although not in all \r\ncases is this the primary focus of the instrument, and in some cases \r\nlowering GHG emissions may not even be explicitly mentioned."


id: 43eff1d5ea8d038c05209ec4ec8a944
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 8102
content:
"Transformation of food systems may come from technological, social \r\nor institutional innovations that start as niches but can potentially \r\nlead to rapid changes, including changes in social conventions \r\n(Centola et al. 2018; Benton et al. 2019)."


id: 6f660eb0fe94e9d3d12e65cf9a4477bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 15155
content:
"Modelling results show only small consumption shifts with moderate \r\nmeat price increases; and high price increases are required to reach \r\nmitigation targets, even though model predictions become highly \r\nuncertain due to lack of observational data (Mazzocchi 2017; \r\nBonnet et al. 2018; Fellmann et al. 2018; Zech and Schneider 2019; \r\nLatka et al. 2021b). Taxes applied at the consumer level are found \r\nto be more effective than levying the taxes on the production side \r\n(Springmann et al. 2017)."


id: 3a7bbbc940ce3838886a6ad81f844b0b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 6566
content:
"Unilateral taxes on food with high GHG intensities have been \r\nshown to induce increases in net export flows, which could reduce \r\nglobal prices and increase global demand. Indirect effects on GHG \r\nmitigation therefore could be reduced by up to 70-90% of national \r\nresults (Fellmann et al. 2018; Zech and Schneider 2019) (limited \r\nevidence, high agreement). The global mitigation potential for GHG "


id: 73b4ca0e27fbaaf6635b2e1d0f6e8933
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 15818
content:
"business is scarcely researched, although they could play a major role \r\nin food system transitions."


id: 561eea1293ffc75c99be1276332de723
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 11039
content:
"taxation of food products at USD52 kgCO2-eq-1 has been estimated \r\nat 1 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Springmann et al. 2017)."


id: 42c082e97e5331fa11196945d1bb5653
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 7894
content:
"The InterAcademy Partnership assessed how research can contribute \r\nto providing the required evidence and opportunities for food system \r\ntransitions, with a focus on climate change impacts and mitigation \r\n(IAP 2018). The project builds on four regional assessments of \r\nopportunities and challenges on food and nutrition security in \r\nAfrica (NASAC 2018), the Americas (IANAS 2018), Asia (AASSA \r\n2018), and Europe (EASAC 2017). The Partnership concludes with \r\na  set of research questions around food systems, that need to be \r\nbetter understood: (i) how are sustainable food systems constituted \r\nin different contexts and at different scales? (ii) how can transition \r\ntowards sustainable food systems be achieved? and (iii) how can \r\nsuccess and failure be measured along sustainability dimensions \r\nincluding climate mitigation?"


id: 4b39da1d7bf0e9fe8a1968f5fd6a714c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 9251
content:
"Studies have shown that taxes can improve the nutritional quality of \r\ndiets and reduce GHG emissions from the food system, particularly if \r\naccompanied by other policies that increase acceptance and elasticity, \r\nand reduce regressive and distributional problems (Niebylski et al. 2015; \r\nHagenaars et al. 2017; Mazzocchi 2017; Springmann et al. 2017; Wright \r\net al. 2017; Henderson et al. 2018; Sall 2018; FAO et al. 2020; Penne \r\nand Goedeme 2020) (robust evidence, high agreement)."


id: 4cf2f4e16a1a71cc22cb98c1615881b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9528
content:
"Marketing regulations: Currently, 16 countries regulate marketing \r\nof unhealthy food to children, mainly on television and in schools \r\n(Taillie et al. 2019), and many other efforts are ongoing across the \r\nglobe (European Commission 2019). The aim to counter the increase \r\nin obesity in children and target products high in saturated fats, \r\ntrans-fatty acids, free sugars and/or salt (WHO 2010) was endorsed \r\nby 192 countries (Kovic et al. 2018). Nutrition and health claims for \r\nproducts are used by industry to increase sales, for example in the \r\nsport sector or for breakfast cereals. They can be informative, but can \r\nalso be misleading if misused for promoting unhealthy food (Whalen \r\net al. 2018; Ghosh and Sen 2019; Sussman et al. 2019)."


id: c514718466a2ce55ad5e2b82eb9aedac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28586
content:
"Strong statutory marketing regulations can significantly reduce the \r\nexposure of children to, and sales of, unhealthy food compared \r\nwith voluntary restrictions (Kovic et al. 2018; Temme et al. 2020). \r\nData on effectiveness of marketing regulations with a broader food \r\nsustainability scope are not available. On the other hand, regulations \r\nthat mobilise private investment into emerging food production \r\ntechnologies can be instrumental in curbing the cost and making \r\nthem competitive (Bianchi et al. 2018a)."


id: a43d6d2866f5448fe6d92237e41804f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 23394
content:
"Investment into research and innovation: El Bilali (2019) assessed \r\nresearch gaps in the food system transition literature and found \r\na need to develop comparative studies that enable the assessment \r\nof spatial variability and scalability of food system transitions. The \r\nauthor found also that the role of private industry and corporate "


id: ffbe191ad8b80314debeb99c34635311
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37781
content:
"habitat degradation in Southeast Asia and concluded that production \r\nof certified palm oil continued to lead to deforestation."


id: 8786e3a08d56d1511274ba32781d12f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
content_type: text
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vector_id: 18857
content:
"using their potential for guiding food system policies in other sectors \r\n(Wijesinha-Bettoni et al. 2021)."


id: a953c86ff8a5edf36f658d3310cd3920
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24169
content:
"Organisational procurement: Green public procurement is a policy \r\nthat aims to create additional demand for sustainable products \r\n(Bergmann Madsen 2018; Mazzocchi and Marino 2019) or decrease \r\ndemand for less sustainable products (e.g.,  the introduction of \r\n'Meatless Monday' by the Norwegian Armed Forces) (Cheng et al. \r\n2018; Gava et al. 2018; Milford and Kildal 2019; Wilts et al. 2019). \r\nTo improve dietary choices, organisations can increase the price of \r\nunsustainable options while decreasing the price of sustainable ones, \r\nor employ information or choice architecture measures (Goggins and \r\nRau 2016; Goggins 2018). Procurement guidelines exist at global, \r\nnational, organisational or local levels (Noonan et al. 2013; Neto and \r\nGama Caldas 2018). Procurement rules in schools or public canteens \r\nincrease the accessibility of healthy food and can improve dietary \r\nbehaviour and decrease purchases of unhealthy food (Cheng et al. \r\n2018; Temme et al. 2020)."


id: 764cec52d1b57000204a32553126ced2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16203
content:
"Food regulations: Novel foods based on insects, microbial proteins \r\nor cellular agriculture must go through authorisation processes to \r\nensure compliance with food safety standards before they can be \r\nsold to consumers. Several countries have 'novel food' regulations \r\ngoverning the approval of foods for human consumption. For \r\nexample, the European Commission, in its update of the Novel Food \r\nRegulation in 2015, expanded its definition of novel food to include \r\nfood from cell cultures, or that produced from animals by non\u0002traditional breeding techniques (EU 2015)."


id: 99c65b1adc8b0579809630c3e721d97e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"For animal product analogues, regulatory pathways and procedures \r\n(Stephens et al. 2018) and terminology issues (defining equivalence \r\nquestions) (Carreno and Dolle 2018; Pisanello and Ferraris 2018) \r\nneed clarification, as does their relation to religious rules (Chriki and \r\nHocquette 2020)."


id: ea548f1e6a5033166cf26b796f7abe6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 34375
content:
"Examples of legislation targeting food waste include the French \r\nban on wasting food approaching best-before dates, requiring \r\nits donation to charity organisations (Global Alliance for the \r\nFuture of Food 2020). In Japan, the Food Waste Recycling Law set \r\ntargets for food waste recycling for industries in the food sector \r\nfor 2020, ranging between 50% for restaurants and 95% for food \r\nmanufacturers (Liu et al. 2016)."


id: ecfbde9295be95655dd32ebb8a6241fd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 34764
content:
"Food labels: Instruments to improve transparency and information \r\non food sustainability aspects are based on the assumption of the \r\n'rational' consumer. Information gives the necessary freedom of \r\nchoice, but also the responsibility to make the 'right choice' (Kersh \r\n2015; Bucher et al. 2016). Studies find a lack of consumer awareness \r\nabout the link between own food choices and environmental effect \r\n(Grebitus et al. 2016; Leach et al. 2016; Hartmann and Siegrist 2017; \r\nde Boer et al. 2018) and so effective messaging is required to raise \r\nawareness and acceptance of potentially stricter food system policies."


id: 5ba45acc1b1b75556b6950b8eed962e9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 11927
content:
"Sustainable food-based dietary guidelines: National food-based \r\ndietary guidelines (FBDGs) provide science-based recommendations \r\non food group consumption quantities. They are available for 94, mostly \r\nupper- and middle-income, countries globally (Wijesinha-Bettoni et al. \r\n2021), are adapted to national cultural and socio-economic context, \r\nand can be used as a benchmark for food formulation standards for \r\npublic and private food procurement, or to inform citizens (Bechthold \r\net al. 2018; Temme et al. 2020). Most FBDGs are based on health \r\nconsiderations and only a few mention environmental sustainability \r\naspects (Bechthold et al. 2018; Ritchie et al. 2018; Ahmed et al. 2019; \r\nSpringmann et al. 2020). Implementation of FBDGs so far focuses \r\nlargely in the education and health sectors, with few countries also "


id: 64984c2ee676535ecd5a34946aa82168
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 13394
content:
"Back-of-package labels usually provide detailed nutritional \r\ninformation (Temple 2019). Front-of-package labels simplify and \r\ninterpret the information: for example, the traffic light system or \r\nthe Nutri-Score label used in France (Kanter et al. 2018b) and the \r\nhealth star rating used in Australia and New Zealand (Shahid et al. \r\n2020) provide an aggregate rating based on product attributes such "


id: 7d7987f3007072b8d82d4469b3a30fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17313
content:
"and fast food companies, that enhance visibility of new products \r\nand ease integration into daily life for consumers, particularly if \r\nsustainable products are similar to the products they substitute \r\n(Slade 2018). This effect can be further increased by media and role \r\nmodels (Elgaaied-Gambier et al. 2018)."


id: 6d1e1c6e225b52eb0155f56825c76237
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14790
content:
"Choice architecture: Information is more effective if accompanied \r\nby reinforcement through structural changes or by changing the food \r\nenvironment, such as through product placement in supermarkets, \r\nto overcome the intention-behaviour gap (Bucher et al. 2016; \r\nBroers et al. 2017; Torris and Mobekk 2019). Behavioural change \r\nstrategies have also been shown to improve efficiencies of school \r\nfood programmes (Marcano-Olivier et al. 2020)."


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 10095
content:
"Research on food system governance is mostly non-empirical or case \r\nstudy based, which means that there is limited understanding of \r\nwhich governance arrangements work in specific social and ecological \r\ncontexts to produce particular food system outcomes (Delaney et al. \r\n2018). Research has identified a  number of desirable attributes in \r\nfood systems governance, including adaptive governance (Termeer \r\net al. 2018), a systems perspective (Whitfield et al. 2018), governance \r\nthat considers food system resilience (Ericksen 2008; Moragues\u0002Faus et al. 2017; Meyer 2020), transparency, participation of civil \r\nsociety (Candel 2014; Duncan 2015;), and cross-scale governance \r\n(Moragues-Faus et al. 2017)."


id: c065a33219e142e924bc7b90088d4d4a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 27829
content:
"and membership structures may hinder their ability to confront \r\nfundamental structural issues like unsustainable diets or inequities in \r\nfood access (Santo and Moragues-Faus 2019)."


id: f96e3fd79455bb817582a54f8a534e58
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 36754
content:
"to develop effective nexus governance (Cairns and Krzywoszynska \r\n2016; Weitz et al. 2017; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2018). Other policy \r\nparadigms and theoretical frameworks that aim to integrate \r\nfood systems governance include system transition, agroecology, \r\nmultifunctionality in agriculture (Andree et al. 2018), climate-smart \r\nagriculture (Taylor 2018) and the circular economy (Box 12.4). Cross\u0002sectoral coordination on food systems and climate governance \r\ncould be aided by internal recognition and ownership by agencies, \r\ndedicated budgets for cross-sectoral projects, and consistency in \r\nbudgets (Pardoe et al. 2018) (Boxes 12.1 and 12.2)."


id: 26d4c42e5fdc902ec7b95918f6da53a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 3503
content:
"Food systems governance is still fragmented at national levels, \r\nwhich means that there may be a proliferation of efforts that cannot \r\nbe scaled and are ineffective (Candel 2014). National policies can be \r\ncomplemented or possibly pioneered by initiatives at the local level \r\n(de Boer et al. 2018; Rose 2018). The city-region has been proposed \r\nas a useful focus for food system governance (Vermeulen et al. 2020); \r\nfor example, the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact involves 180 global \r\ncities committed to integrative food system strategies (Candel 2019; \r\nMoragues-Faus 2021). Local food policy groups and councils that \r\nassemble stakeholders from government, civil society, and the private \r\nsector have formed trans-local networks of place-based local food \r\npolicy groups, with over two hundred food policy councils worldwide \r\n(Andree et al. 2018). However, the fluidity and lack of clear agendas "


id: 4f932b0aff873eab0234fc3ce69341b4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 9952
content:
"Until 2016, the strategic goals of Finnish food policy were split between different programmes and ministries, resulting in fragmented \r\nnational oversight of the Finnish food system. To enable policy coordination, a national food strategy was adopted in 2017 called \r\nFood2030 (Government of Finland 2017). Food2030 embodies a holistic food system approach and addresses multiple outcomes of \r\nthe food system, including the competitiveness of the food supply chain and the development of local, organic and climate-friendly \r\nfood production, as well as responsible and sustainable consumption."


id: c763b74228af6fd1b7bd4b5e2199bb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 28959
content:
"mitigation measures that occupy land while not being considered \r\nland-based measures, we discuss ways to minimise potential \r\nadverse effects, and we consider the potential for synergies through \r\nintegrating mitigation measures with other land uses, by applying \r\na systems perspective that seeks to meet multiple objectives from \r\nmulti-functional landscapes. Mitigation measures with zero land \r\noccupation, e.g., offshore wind and kelp farming, are not considered."


id: 87186b7ef8a4a92013f1ffad344a60e9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 18788
content:
"This section provides a cross-sectoral perspective on land occupation \r\nand related impacts, risks and opportunities associated with land\u0002based mitigation options, as well as mitigation options that are not \r\ndesignated land-based, yet occupy land. It builds on Chapter 7, which \r\ncovers mitigation in agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU, \r\nincluding future availability of biomass resources for mitigation in \r\nother sectors. It complements Section 12.4, which covers mitigation \r\ninherent in the food system, as well as Chapters  6, 9, 10 and 11, \r\nwhich cover mitigation in the energy, transport, building and industry \r\nsectors, and Chapters 3 and 4 which cover land and biomass use, \r\nprimarily in energy applications, in mitigation and development \r\npathways in the near- to mid-term (Chapter  4) and in pathways \r\ncompatible with long-term goals (Chapter 3)."


id: f72ff89a9d3a0b47fc15bd7269fc4ac2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36405
content:
"The deployment of climate change mitigation options often affects \r\nland and water conditions, and ecosystem capacity to support \r\nbiodiversity and a range of ecosystem services (IPCC 2019a; IPBES \r\n2019) (robust evidence, high agreement). It can increase or decrease \r\nterrestrial carbon stocks and sink strength, hence impacting the \r\nmitigation effect positively or negatively. As for any other land uses, \r\nimpacts, risks and opportunities associated with mitigation options \r\nthat occupy land depend on deployment strategy and on contextual \r\nfactors that vary geographically and over time (Doelman et al. 2018; \r\nHurlbert et al. 2019; Smith et al. 2019a; Wu et al. 2020) (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement)."


id: ca7e8fe4410d3d1d6e9697cf59eee78d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29420
content:
"Depending on emissions-reduction targets, the portfolio of mitigation \r\noptions chosen, and the policies developed to support their \r\nimplementation, different land-use pathways can arise with large \r\ndifferences in resulting agricultural and forest area. Some response \r\noptions can be more effective when applied together (Smith et al. \r\n2019b); for example, dietary change, efficiency increases, and reduced \r\nwastage can reduce emissions as well as the pressure on land resources, \r\npotentially enabling additional land-based mitigation such as A/R and \r\ncultivation of biomass crops for biochar, bioenergy and other bio-based \r\nproducts. The SRCCL (Smith et al. 2019b) report that dietary change \r\ncombined with reduction in food loss and waste can reduce the land "


id: 119b86e3a29d89d26804f85f21bb120
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
content_type: text
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vector_id: 262
content:
"The IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5) found \r\nthat large areas may be utilised for A/R and energy crops in modelled \r\npathways limiting warming to 1.5degC (Rogelj et al. 2018). The SRCCL \r\ninvestigated the implications of land-based mitigation measures for \r\nland degradation, food security and climate change adaptation. It \r\nfocused on identification of synergies and trade-offs associated with \r\nindividual land-based mitigation measures (Smith et al. 2019b). \r\nIn this section we expand beyond the scope of the Special Report \r\non Climate Change and Land (SRCCL) assessment to include also "


id: a624b6e1304ab5f043233ec6bec3daad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23683
content:
"requirement for food production by up to 5.8 Mkm2 (0.8-2.4 Mkm2\r\nfor dietary change; about 2 Mkm2\r\n for reduced post-harvest losses, and \r\n1.4 Mkm2\r\n for reduced food waste) (Parodi et al. 2018; Springmann et al. \r\n2018; Clark et al. 2020; Rosenzweig et al. 2020b) (Sections 7.4 and \r\n12.4). Stronger mitigation action in the near term targeting non-CO2\r\nemissions reduction and deployment of other CDR options (DACCS, \r\nenhanced weathering, ocean-based approaches; see Section 12.3) can \r\nreduce the land requirement for land-based mitigation (Obersteiner \r\net al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2018)."


id: 89622c0f3c651d403b25f729ecd3f849
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 19155
content:
"Capellan-Perez et al. (2017) and Dupont et al. (2020) report 2-3% \r\navailability of urbanised surface area, when considering factors \r\nsuch as roof slopes and shadows between buildings, and threshold \r\nrelating to energy return on investment. Land occupation of solar \r\ntechnologies is considered to be underestimated in studies assuming \r\nideal conditions, with real occupation being five to ten times higher \r\n(De Castro et al. 2013; MacKay 2013; Ong et al. 2013; Smil 2015; \r\nCapellan-Perez et al. 2017)."


id: 15efb3f68c232e291f2b3d2bbba4204f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 973
content:
"Production of hydrogen and synthetic hydrocarbon fuels via \r\nelectrolysis and hydrocarbon synthesis is subject to conversion losses \r\nthat vary depending on technology, system integration and source \r\nof carbon (Wulf et al. 2020; Ince et al. 2021) (Sections 6.4.4.1 and \r\n6.4.5.1). Indicative electricity-to-hydrocarbon fuel efficiency loss is \r\nestimated at about 60% (Ueckerdt et al. 2021). The advantage of \r\nsmaller land occupation for solar, wind, hydro and nuclear, compared \r\nwith biomass-based options, is therefore smaller for hydrocarbon \r\nfuels than for electricity. Furthermore, biofuels are often co-produced \r\nwith other bio-based products, which further reduces their land \r\noccupation, although comparisons are complicated by inconsistent \r\napproaches to allocating land occupation between co-products \r\n(Ahlgren et al. 2015; Czyrnek-Deletre et al. 2017)."


id: c44cc0dc2ce398dcbaeaa40612c4639e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 28453
content:
"Note that comparisons on a  per-MWh basis do not reflect \r\nthe GHG emissions associated with the power options, or that the \r\ndifferent options serve different functions in power systems. \r\nReservoir hydropower and biomass-based dispatchable power can \r\ncomplement other balancing options (e.g.,  battery storage, grid \r\nextensions and demand-side management (Goransson and Johnsson \r\n2018) (Chapter 6) to provide power stability and quality needed in \r\npower systems with large amounts of variable electricity generation \r\nfrom wind and solar power plants. Furthermore, the requirements of \r\ntransport in grids, pipelines and so on differ. For example, electricity \r\nfrom buildings-integrated PV can be used in the same location as \r\nit is generated."


id: 91ba023f6076e6198516dede150f7f29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
content_type: text
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vector_id: 20465
content:
"The land occupation of PV depends on the share of ground-mounted \r\nversus buildings-integrated PV, the latter assumed to reach 75% \r\nshare by 2050 (Luderer et al. 2019). van de Ven et al. (2021) assumed \r\na  3% share of urbanised land in 2050 available for rooftop PV; "


id: 56ff66e147fc3540c0b871bfeb47fb27
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"biomass may also be a  co-product. We then discuss impacts and \r\nopportunities common to both systems, before considering impacts \r\nand opportunities associated with non-land-based mitigation options \r\nthat nevertheless occupy land."


id: dce6ae29be0925046b56ee6d07559d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 32250
content:
"forest ownership and the character and product portfolio of the \r\nassociated forest industry (Lauri et al. 2019; Favero et al. 2020). \r\nHow forest carbon stocks, biodiversity, hydrology, and so on are \r\naffected by changes in forest management and harvesting in turn \r\ndepends on both management practices and the characteristics of \r\nthe forest ecosystems (Eales et al. 2018; Griscom et al. 2018; Kondo \r\net al. 2018; Nieminen et al. 2018; Thom et al. 2018; Runting et al. \r\n2019; Tharammal et al. 2019) (robust evidence, medium agreement). \r\nAs described above, the GHG savings achieved from producing and \r\nusing bio-based products will in addition depend on the character \r\nof existing societal systems, including technical infrastructure and \r\nmarkets, as this determines the product substitution patterns."


id: 1b2c3005c1d263cf9243a70b83f2611c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 1739
content:
"Environmental and socio-economic co-benefits are enhanced when \r\necological restoration principles are applied (Gann et al. 2019) along \r\nwith effective planning at landscape level and strong governance \r\n(Morgan et al., 2020). For example, restoration of natural vegetation \r\nand establishing plantations on degraded land enable organic \r\nmatter to accumulate in the soil and have potential to deliver \r\nsignificant co-benefits for biodiversity, land resource condition \r\nand livelihoods (Box  12.3 and Cross-Working Group Box  3  in this \r\nchapter). Tree planting and agroforestry on cleared land can deliver \r\nbiodiversity benefits (Seddon et al. 2009; Kavanagh and Stanton \r\n2012; Law et al. 2014), with biodiversity outcomes influenced by \r\nblock size, configuration and species mix (Cunningham et al. 2015; \r\nPaul et al. 2016) (robust evidence, high agreement)."


id: 98d2b9c3fdfb658517393c6906a57542
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"When A/R activities comprise the establishment of natural forests, \r\nthe risk to land is primarily associated with potential displacement \r\nof previous land use to new locations, which could indirectly \r\ncause land-use change including deforestation (Sections 7.4.2 and \r\n7.6.2.4). A/R (including agroforestry) aimed at providing timber, fibre, \r\nbiomass, non-timber resources and other ecosystem services can \r\nprovide renewable resources to society and long-term livelihoods \r\nfor communities. Forest management and harvesting regimes \r\naround the world will adjust in different ways as society seeks to \r\nmeet climate goals. The outcome depends on forest type, climate, "


id: c56e354f0832698b2944724697328cc7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 28644
content:
"Biomass-based systems and A/R can contribute to addressing \r\nland degradation through land rehabilitation or restoration \r\n(Box  12.3). Land-based mitigation options that produce biomass \r\nfor bioenergy/BECCS or biochar through land rehabilitation rather \r\nthan land restoration imply a trade-off between production / carbon \r\nsequestration and biodiversity outcomes (Hua et al. 2016; Cowie "


id: 76f334476120fa9e036ec87106d25d7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Another example of beneficial effects includes perennial grasses \r\nand woody crops planted to intercept runoff and subsurface lateral \r\nflow, reducing nitrate entering groundwater and surface waterbodies \r\n(Femeena et al. 2018; Woodbury et al. 2018; Griffiths et al. 2019). In \r\nIndia, Garg et al. (2011) found desirable effects as a result of planting \r\nJatropha on wastelands previously used for grazing (which could \r\ncontinue in the Jatropha plantations): soil evaporation was reduced, \r\nas a larger share of the rainfall was channelled to plant transpiration \r\nand groundwater recharge, and less runoff resulted in reduced soil \r\nerosion and improved downstream water conditions. Thus, adverse \r\neffects can be reduced and synergies achieved when plantings are \r\nsited carefully, with consideration of potential hydrological impacts \r\n(Davis et al. 2013)."


id: 9fe1c5be43afb49432e3490901aed4d2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 22692
content:
"Several biomass conversion technologies can generate co-benefits \r\nfor land and water. Anaerobic digestion of organic wastes (e.g., food "


id: 6633473cfef16bb7b43394a163d5a02b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 13670
content:
"Both A/R and dedicated biomass production could have adverse \r\nimpacts on food security and cause indirect land-use change if \r\ndeployed in locations used for food production (IPCC 2019a). But \r\nthe degree of impact associated with a  certain mitigation option \r\nalso depends on how deployment takes place and the rate and total \r\nscale of deployment. The highest increases in food insecurity due to \r\ndeployment of land-based mitigation are expected to occur in sub\u0002Saharan Africa and Asia (Hasegawa et al. 2018). The land area that \r\ncould be used for bioenergy or other land-based mitigation options \r\nwith low to moderate risks to food security depends on patterns \r\nof socio-economic development, reaching limits between 1  and \r\n4 million km2\r\n (Hurlbert et al. 2019; IPCC 2019a; Smith et al. 2019c)."


id: a2e4286efd784650d18001ecd082e68b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 23194
content:
"The land requirement and impacts (including visual and noise impacts) \r\nof onshore wind turbines depend on the size and type of installation, \r\nand location (Ioannidis and Koutsoyiannis 2020). Wind power and \r\nagriculture can coexist in beneficial ways and wind power production \r\non agriculture land is well established (Fritsche et al. 2017; Miller and \r\nKeith 2018a). Spatial planning and local stakeholder engagement can \r\nreduce opposition due to visual landscape impacts and noise (Frolova \r\net al. 2019; Hevia-Koch and Ladenburg 2019). Repowering, that is, \r\nreplacing with higher capacity wind turbines, can mitigate additional \r\nland requirement associated with deployment towards higher share \r\nof wind in power systems (Pryor et al. 2020)."


id: 4adebff18721fce1070d31ee3e006f19
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"The use of less productive, degraded/marginal lands has received \r\nattention as an option for biomass production and other land-based \r\nmitigation that can improve the productive and adaptive capacity \r\nof the lands (Liu et al. 2017; Qin et al. 2018; Dias et al. 2021; Kreig \r\net al. 2021) (Section 7.4.4 and Cross-Working Group Box 3 in this \r\nchapter). The potential is however uncertain as biomass growth rates \r\nmay be low, a  variety of assessment approaches have been used, \r\nand the identification of degraded/marginal land as 'available' has \r\nbeen contested, as much low productivity land is used informally \r\nby impoverished communities, particularly for grazing, or may \r\nbe economically infeasible or environmentally undesirable for \r\ndevelopment of energy crops (medium evidence, low agreement) \r\n(Baka 2013; Fritz et al. 2013; Haberl et al. 2013; Baka 2014)."


id: aed5dd01d071ed820b9a6f8e47aff9e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"As many of the SDGs are closely linked to land use, the identification \r\nand promotion of mitigation options that rely on land uses described \r\nabove can support a  growing use of bio-based products while \r\nadvancing several SDGs, such as SDG 2 (zero hunger), SDG 6 (clean \r\nwater and sanitation), SDG  7  (affordable and clean energy) and \r\nSDG 15 (life on land) (Fritsche et al. 2017; IRP 2019; Blair et al. 2021). \r\nPolicies supporting the target of Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN) \r\n(SDG  15.3) encourage planning of measures to counteract loss of \r\nproductive land due to unsustainable agricultural practices and land \r\nconversion, through sustainable land management and strategic \r\nrestoration and rehabilitation of degraded land (Cowie et al. 2018). \r\nLDN can thus be an incentive for land-based mitigation measures "


id: a8bddbd7001c8a79d0a3e756a888a628
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 24076
content:
"As for wind power, land impacts of solar power depend on the \r\nlocation, size and type of installation (Ioannidis and Koutsoyiannis \r\n2020). Establishment of large-scale solar farms could have positive \r\nor negative environmental effects at the site of deployment, \r\ndepending on the location. Solar PV and CSP power installations \r\ncan lock away land areas, displacing other uses (Mohan 2017). Solar "


id: 437648115326cdea8dc87b75080e6ee0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 8024
content:
"reserve has been established around Chernobyl to conserve, enhance \r\nand manage carbon stocks and biodiversity (Deryabina et al. 2015; \r\nEwing et al. 2016), although invertebrate and plant populations are \r\naffected (Mousseau and Moller 2014; Mousseau and Moller 2020)."


id: bf43219e0171c81db94dcc5cc999a2cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27644
content:
"The land sector (Chapter 7) contributes to mitigation via emissions \r\nreduction and enhancement of land carbon sinks, and by providing \r\nbiomass for mitigation in other sectors. Key challenges for governance "


id: 37ef2f8214070c638eaeb920bf1ce1ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 6176
content:
"of land-based mitigation include social and environmental safeguards \r\n(Duchelle et al. 2017; Sills et al. 2017; Larson et al. 2018); insufficient \r\nfinancing (Turnhout et al. 2017); capturing co-benefits; ensuring \r\nadditionality; addressing non-permanence of carbon sequestration; \r\nmonitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions reduction \r\nand carbon dioxide removals; and avoiding leakage or spillover \r\neffects. Governance approaches to addressing these challenges are \r\ndiscussed in Section  7.6, and include MRV systems and integrity \r\ncriteria for project-level emissions trading; payments for ecosystem \r\nservices; land-use planning and land zoning; certification schemes, \r\nstandards and codes of practice."


id: e2aa5a66cf6c56cb8f9202b9f8a5bdea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 33165
content:
"Box 12.3 | Land Degradation Neutrality as a Framework to Manage Trade-offs \r\nin Land-based Mitigation"


id: 9d960437b21ab0d32dc720242748f910
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22325
content:
"The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) introduced the concept of Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN), \r\ndefined as 'a state whereby the amount and quality of land resources necessary to support ecosystem functions and services and \r\nenhance food security remain stable or increase within specified temporal and spatial scales and ecosystems' (UNCCD 2015), and it \r\nhas been adopted as a target of SDG 15 (life on land). At December 2020, 124 (mostly developing) countries had committed to pursue \r\nvoluntary LDN targets."


id: 2f18383c3d5471ec23a2dea1d8784217
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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vector_id: 4839
content:
"The goal of LDN is to maintain or enhance land-based natural capital, and its associated ecosystem services, such as provision \r\nof food and regulation of water and climate, while enhancing the resilience of the communities that depend on the land. LDN \r\nencourages a dual-pronged approach promoting sustainable land management (SLM) to avoid or reduce land degradation, combined \r\nwith strategic effort in land restoration and rehabilitation to reverse degradation on degraded lands and thereby deliver the target of \r\n'no net loss' of productive land (Orr et al. 2017)."


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"In the context of LDN, land restoration refers to actions undertaken with the aim of reinstating ecosystem functionality, whereas land \r\nrehabilitation refers to actions undertaken with a goal of provision of goods and services (Cowie et al. 2018). Restoration interventions \r\ncan include destocking to encourage regeneration of native vegetation; shelter belts of local species established from seed or \r\nseedlings, strategically located to provide wildlife corridors and link habitat; and rewetting drained peatland. 'Farmer-managed natural \r\nregeneration' is a low-cost restoration approach in which regeneration of tree stumps and roots is encouraged, stabilising soil and "


id: 73f51bd9190cb4bb2fd3e6293bc3a0ae
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"enhancing soil nutrients and organic matter levels (Chomba et al. 2020; Lohbeck et al. 2020). Rehabilitation actions include \r\nestablishment of energy crops, or afforestation with fast-growing exotic trees to sequester carbon or produce timber. Application of \r\nbiochar can facilitate rehabilitation by enhancing nutrient retention and water-holding capacity, and stimulating microbial activity \r\n(Cowie 2020a)."


id: fc623b0ffa1ab167918e12140be84423
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"SLM, rehabilitation and restoration activities undertaken towards national LDN targets have potential to deliver substantial CDR \r\nthrough carbon sequestration in vegetation and soil. In addition, biomass production, for bioenergy or biochar, could be an economically \r\nviable land use option for reversing degradation, through rehabilitation. Alternatively, a focus on ecological restoration (Gann et al. \r\n2019) as the strategy for reversing degradation will deliver greater biodiversity benefits."


id: 9cbc866ecae448ef20342b3ff368cf3e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Achieving neutrality requires estimating the likely impacts of land-use and land-management decisions, to determine the area of land, \r\nof each land type, that is likely to be degraded (Orr et al. 2017). This information is used to plan interventions to reverse degradation on \r\nan equal area of the same land type. Therefore, pursuit of LDN requires concerted and coordinated efforts to integrate LDN objectives \r\ninto land-use planning and land management, underpinned by sound understanding of the human-environment system and effective \r\ngovernance mechanisms."


id: a9a86206721117f663ec48a44eac61f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"Countries are advised to apply a landscape-scale approach for planning LDN interventions, in which land uses are matched to land \r\npotential, and resilience of current and proposed land uses is considered, to ensure that improvement in land condition is likely to \r\nbe maintained (Cowie 2020a). A  participatory approach that enables effective representation of all stakeholders is encouraged, \r\nto facilitate equitable outcomes from planning decisions, recognising that decisions on LDN interventions are likely to involve trade\u0002offs between various environmental and socio-economic objectives (Schulze et al. 2021)."


id: 1d87d3bb157f9b8fab851fd6ea1ca2dd
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"Planning and implementation of LDN programmes provides a framework in which locally-adapted land-based mitigation options \r\ncan be integrated with use of land for production, conservation and settlements, in multifunctional landscapes where trade-offs \r\nare recognised and managed, and synergistic opportunities are sought. LDN is thus a vehicle to focus collaboration in pursuit of the \r\nmultiple land-based objectives of the multilateral environmental agreements and the SDGs."


id: 2d60970fc1332d4b56c6a9e0404d8f97
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Table 12.10 collates risks, impacts and opportunities associated with \r\ndifferent mitigation options that occupy land."


id: 5b9b1b1eed37feebbfb9c790f620cffb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"Table 12.10 | Summary of impacts, risks and co-benefits associated with land occupation by mitigation options considered in Section 12.5."


id: 77c82a2e5f37c393980c281e2e604d28
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"Authors: Henry Neufeldt (Denmark/Germany), Goran Berndes (Sweden), Almut Arneth (Germany), Rachel Bezner Kerr (the United \r\nStates of America/Canada), Luisa F Cabeza (Spain), Donovan Campbell (Jamaica), Jofre Carnicer Cols (Spain), Annette Cowie (Australia), \r\nVassilis Daioglou (Greece), Joanna House (United Kingdom), Adrian Leip (Italy/Germany), Francisco Meza (Chile), Michael Morecroft \r\n(United Kingdom), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (Netherlands), Camille Parmesan (United Kingdom/the United States of America), Julio C. Postigo \r\n(the United States of America/Peru), Marta G. Rivera-Ferre (Spain), Raphael Slade (United Kingdom), Maria Cristina Tirado von der \r\nPahlen (the United States of America/Spain), Pramod K. Singh (India), Pete Smith (United Kingdom)"


id: b067a1223bda7383589b11f15319af1b
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"The growing demand for biomass offers both opportunities and challenges to mitigate and adapt to climate change and natural \r\nresource constraints (high confidence). Increased technology innovation, stakeholder integration and transparent governance \r\nstructures and procedures at local to global scales are key to successful bioeconomy deployment maximising benefits and managing \r\ntrade-offs (high confidence)."


id: fdf9f9d289a9ecb3158460874ba8453d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"Limited global land and biomass resources accompanied by growing demands for food, feed, fibre, and fuels, together with prospects \r\nfor a paradigm shift towards phasing out fossil fuels, set the frame for potentially fierce competition for land3\r\n and biomass to meet \r\nburgeoning demands, even as climate change increasingly limits natural resource potentials (high confidence)."


id: 69190320904a253cc89418dfb787fd60
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"Sustainable agriculture and forestry, technology innovation in bio-based production within a circular economy, and international \r\ncooperation and governance of global trade in products to reflect and disincentivise their environmental and social externalities, can \r\nprovide mitigation and adaptation via bioeconomy development that responds to the needs and perspectives of multiple stakeholders \r\nto achieve outcomes that maximise synergies while limiting trade-offs (high confidence)."


id: c960b2da9fd42fd366ce646a6d78c44c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"There is high confidence that climate change, population growth and changes in per capita consumption will increase pressures \r\non managed as well as natural and semi-natural ecosystems, exacerbating existing risks to livelihoods, biodiversity, human and \r\necosystem health, infrastructure, and food systems (Conijn et al. 2018; IPCC 2018; IPCC 2019a; Lade et al. 2020). At the same time, \r\nmany global mitigation scenarios presented in IPCC assessment reports rely on large GHG emissions reduction in the AFOLU sector \r\nand concurrent deployment of reforestation/afforestation and biomass use in a multitude of applications (Rogelj et al. 2018; Hanssen \r\net al. 2020) (AR6 WGI Chapters 4 and 5, AR6 WGIII Chapters 3 and 7)."


id: 3ea15bd14f351383abd1d2e0008dd70f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"Given the finite availability of natural resources, there are invariably trade-offs that complicate land-based mitigation unless land \r\nproductivity can be enhanced without undermining ecosystem services (Obersteiner et al. 2016; Campbell et al. 2017; Caron et al. \r\n2018; Conijn et al. 2018; Heck et al. 2018; Searchinger 2018a; Smith et al. 2019). Management intensities can often be adapted to local \r\nconditions with consideration of other functions and ecosystem services, but at a global scale the challenge remains to avoid further \r\ndeforestation and degradation of intact ecosystems, in particular biodiversity-rich systems (AR6 WGII Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL), \r\nwhile meeting the growing demands. Further, increased land-use competition can affect food prices and impact food security and \r\nlivelihoods (To and Grafton 2015; Chakravorty et al. 2017), with possible knock-on effects related to civil unrest (Abbott et al. 2017; \r\nD'Odorico et al. 2018)."


id: 37b83edf2b5625de4783766775662a2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"Changes on the demand side as well as improvements in resource-use efficiencies within the global food and other bio-based systems \r\ncan also reduce pressures on the remaining land resources. For example, dietary changes toward more plant-based food (where \r\nappropriate) and reduced food waste can provide climate change mitigation along with health benefits (Willett et al. 2019) (AR6 WGIII \r\nSections 7.4 and 12.4) and other co-benefits with regard to food security, adaptation and land use (Mbow et al. 2019; Smith et al. \r\n2019a) (AR6 WGII Chapter 5). Advancements in the provision of novel food and feed sources (e.g., cultured meat, insects, grass-based \r\nprotein feed and cellular agriculture) can also limit the pressures on finite natural resources (Parodi et al. 2018; Zabaniotou 2018) \r\n(AR6 WGIII Section 12.4)."


id: 875f0387d771cab9da46627de8240a28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"Scarcity is an argument for adopting circular economy principles for the management of biomass, as for non-renewable resources. \r\nWaste avoidance, product reuse and material recycling keep down resource use while maintaining product and material value. However, \r\nreuse and recycling are not always feasible, for example when biofuels are used for transport and bio-based biodegradable chemicals \r\nare used to reduce ecological impacts, where losses to the environment are unavoidable. A balanced approach to management of \r\nbiomass resources could start from the perspective of value preservation within the carbon cycle, with possible routes for biomass use \r\nbased on the carbon budget defined by the Paris Agreement, principles for sustainable land use and natural ecosystem protection."


id: 8995ed5a82dd8d2678bb3beb806cce61
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Analyses of synergies and trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation in the agriculture and forestry sectors show that outcomes \r\ndepend on context, design and implementation, so actions have to be tailored to the specific conditions to minimise adverse effects \r\n(Kongsager 2018). This is supported in literature analysing the nexus between land, water, energy and food in the context of climate \r\nchange, which consistently concludes that addressing these different domains together rather than in isolation would enhance \r\nsynergies and reduce trade-offs (Obersteiner et al. 2016; D'Odorico et al. 2018; Soto Golcher and Visseren-Hamakers 2018; Froese \r\net al. 2019; Momblanch et al. 2019)."


id: 708cc27c38f9d25b87ff2fbc172658d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Nature-based solutions addressing climate change can provide opportunities for sustainable livelihoods as well as multiple ecosystem \r\nservices, such as flood risk management through floodplain restoration, saltmarshes, mangroves or peat renaturation (UNEP 2021; \r\nAR6 WGII Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL). Climate-smart agriculture can increase productivity while enhancing resilience and reducing \r\nGHG emissions inherent to production (Lipper et al. 2014; Bell et al. 2018; FAO 2019b; Singh and Chudasama 2021). Similarly, climate\u0002smart forestry considers the whole value chain and integrates climate objectives into forest sector management through multiple \r\nmeasures (from strict reserves to more intensively managed forests) providing mitigation and adaptation benefits (Nabuurs et al. \r\n2018; Verkerk et al. 2020) (AR6 WGIII Section 7.3)."


id: c208b089463d607f121ed3f62c69d4a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"Cross-Working Group Box 3, Figure 1 | Left: High-input intensive agriculture, aiming for high yields of a few crop species, with large fields and no semi-natural \r\nhabitats. Right: Agroecological agriculture, supplying a range of ecosystem services, relying on biodiversity and crop and animal diversity instead of external inputs, \r\nand integrating plant and animal production, with smaller fields and presence of semi-natural habitats. Source: Reprinted by permission from Springer Nature \r\nCustomer Service Centre GmbH: Springer Nature, Nature Sustainability, Towards better representation of organic agriculture in life cycle assessment, Hayo M. G. van \r\nder Werf et al. (c) 2020."


id: 147b4ef3363929d775af4db56de7f91
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Decisions on land uses between biomass production for food, feed, fibre or fuel, as well as nature conservation or restoration and \r\nother uses (e.g., mining, urban infrastructure), depend on differences in perspectives and values. Because the availability of land for \r\ndiverse biomass uses is invariably limited, setting priorities for land-use allocations therefore first depends on making the perspectives \r\nunderlying what is considered as 'high-value' explicit (Fischer et al. 2007; Garnett et al. 2015; De Boer and Van Ittersum 2018; "


id: 4883d90819a8babcdc7eb79c779d8a04
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"Muscat et al. 2020). Decisions can then be made transparently based on societal norms, needs and the available resource base. \r\nPrioritisation of land use for the common good therefore requires societal consensus building embedded in the socio-economic and \r\ncultural fabric of regions, societies and communities. Integration of local decision-making with national planning ensures local actions \r\ncomplement national development objectives."


id: 116901b6c4322ab960c956392b70ed1d
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"In summary, there is significant scope for optimising use of land resources to produce more biomass while reducing adverse effects \r\n(high confidence). Context-specific prioritisation, technology innovation in bio-based production, integrative policies, coordinated \r\ninstitutions and improved governance mechanisms to enhance synergies and minimise trade-offs can mitigate the pressure on \r\nmanaged as well as natural and semi-natural ecosystems (medium confidence). Yet, energy conservation and efficiency measures, and \r\ndeployment of technologies and systems that do not rely on carbon-based energy and materials, are essential for mitigating biomass \r\ndemand growth as countries pursue ambitious climate goals (high confidence)."


id: 2c0516b5fb4d707df8d7885c7cd071a2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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content:
"the focus turns from sector-specific mitigation measures to mitigation \r\nmeasures which have cross-sectoral implications, including measures \r\nthat have application in more than one sector and measures where \r\nimplementation in one sector impacts on implementation in another. \r\nFinally, Section  12.6.1.3 notes the cross-sectoral relevance of \r\na selection of general-purpose technologies, a topic that is covered \r\nfurther in Chapter 16."


id: a0f683042cd3d42e903e657ce728192f
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"This section presents further cross-sectoral considerations related \r\nto GHG mitigation. Firstly, various cross-sectoral perspectives on \r\nmitigation actions are presented. Then, sectoral policy interactions \r\nare presented. Finally, implications in terms of international trade \r\nspillover effects and competitiveness, and finance flows and related \r\nspillover effects at the sectoral level, are addressed."


id: 42503ebecb0975643e223f01e787485c
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content:
"A body of literature has been developed which addresses the \r\nco-benefits of climate mitigation action (Karlsson et al. 2020). Adverse \r\nside effects of mitigation are also well documented. Co-benefits \r\nand adverse side effects in individual sectors and associated with \r\nindividual mitigation measures are discussed in the individual sector \r\nchapters (Sections 5.2, 6.7.7, 7.4, 7.6, 8.2, 8.4, 9.8, 10.1.1 and 11.5.3), \r\nas well as in previous IPCC General and Special Assessment reports. \r\nThe term 'co-impacts' has been proposed to capture both the co\u0002benefits and adverse side effects of mitigation. An alternative framing \r\nis one of multiple objectives, where climate change mitigation is \r\nplaced alongside other objectives when assessing policy decisions "


id: ab60a719ffab401e519dd95c8fca69e1
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"Chapters 5 to 11 present mitigation measures applicable in individual \r\nsectors, and potential co-benefits and adverse side effects4\r\n of these \r\nindividual measures. This section builds on the sectoral analysis \r\nof mitigation action from a  cross-sectoral perspective. Firstly, \r\nSection 12.6.1.1 brings together some of the observations presented \r\nin the sectoral chapters to show how different mitigation actions in \r\ndifferent sectors can contribute to the same co-benefits and result \r\nin the same adverse side effects, thereby demonstrating the potential \r\nsynergistic effects. The links between these co-benefits and adverse \r\nside effects and the SDGs is also demonstrated. In Section 12.6.1.2, "


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content:
"for energy storage has the potential to contribute to protecting water \r\nresources and reducing wastes associated with coal-fired power in \r\nmany parts of the world, but mining of lithium has the potential \r\nfor creating water and waste challenges if not managed properly \r\n(Agusdinata et al. 2018; Kaunda 2020)."


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content:
"(Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2014; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016; Cohen et al. \r\n2017; Bhardwaj et al. 2019)."


id: 63ba978d9135674564df1c9510bd0e95
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"The identification and assessment of co-benefits has been argued to \r\nserve a  number of functions (Section  1.4) including using them as \r\nleverage for securing financial support for implementation, providing \r\njustification of actions which provide a balance of both short- and long\u0002term benefits and obtaining stakeholder buy-in (robust evidence, low \r\nagreement) (Karlsson et al. 2020). Assessment of adverse side effects \r\nhas been suggested to be useful in avoiding unforeseen negative \r\nimpacts of mitigation and providing policy- and decision-makers with \r\nthe information required to make informed trade-offs between climate \r\nand other benefits of actions (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2014; Bhardwaj et al. \r\n2019; Cohen et al. 2019) (high evidence, low agreement)."


id: ddf2b02c3d622965dfc865857ba0a367
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:45
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"While earlier literature has suggested that co-impacts assessments \r\ncan support adoption of climate mitigation action, a  more recent \r\nbody of literature has suggested limitations in such framing (Ryan \r\n2015; Bernauer and McGrath 2016; Walker et al. 2018). Presenting \r\ngeneral information on co-impacts as a component of a mitigation \r\nanalysis does not always lead to increased support for climate \r\nmitigation action. Rather, the most effective framing is determined \r\nby factors relating to local context, type of mitigation action under \r\nconsideration and target stakeholder group. More work has been \r\nidentified to be required to bring context into planning co-impacts \r\nassessments and communication thereof (Ryan 2015; Bernauer and \r\nMcGrath 2016; Walker et al. 2018) (low evidence, low agreement)."


id: d1d0ba810051dc619503482ff42fd37
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"Various approaches to identifying and organising co-impacts in \r\nspecific contexts and across sectors have been proposed towards \r\nproviding more comparable and standardised analyses. However, \r\nconsistent quantification of co-impacts, including cost-benefit \r\nanalysis, and the utilisation of the resulting information, remain \r\na challenge (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2014; Floater et al. 2016; Mayrhofer \r\nand Gupta 2016; Cohen et al. 2019; Karlsson et al. 2020). This \r\nchallenge is further exacerbated when considering that co-impacts of \r\na mitigation measure in one sector can either enhance or reduce the \r\nco-impacts associated with mitigation in another, or the achievement \r\nof co-benefits in one geographic location can lead to adverse side \r\neffects in another. For example, the production of lithium for batteries "


id: 5116cb725871a101a84a79b0e7721de7
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"An area where the strong link between the cross-sectoral co-impacts \r\nof mitigation action and global government policies is being clearly \r\nconsidered is in the achievement of the SDGs (Obergassel et al. 2017; \r\nDoukas et al. 2018; Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi 2019; Smith et al. \r\n2019; van Soest et al. 2019) (Chapters 1 and 17, individual sectoral \r\nchapters). Figure 12.9 demonstrates these relationships from a cross\u0002sectoral perspective. It shows the links between sectors which give \r\nrise to emissions, the mitigation measures that can find application "


id: a1d84ea7efe57089706f3d3b9eb22db4
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"in the sector, and co-benefits and adverse side effects of mitigation \r\nmeasures and the SDGs (noting that the figure is not intended to be \r\ncomprehensive). Such a framing of co-impacts from a cross-sectoral \r\nperspective in the context of the SDGs could help to further support \r\nclimate mitigation action, particularly within the context of the Paris \r\nAgreement (Gomez-Echeverri 2018) (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). Literature sources utilised in the compilation of this \r\ndiagram are presented in Supplementary Material 12.SM.3."


id: 9fcb1496d356c1711f7cae52be33cfad
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content:
"hydrogen (Breyer et al. 2015; Anwar et al. 2020). Certain emissions \r\nreductions in the AFOLU sector are contingent on energy sector \r\ndecarbonisation. Trees and green roofs planted to counter urban \r\nheat islands reduce the demand for energy for air conditioning and \r\nsimultaneously sequester carbon (Kim and Coseo 2018; Kuronuma \r\net al. 2018). Recycling of organic waste avoids methane generation if \r\nthe waste would have been disposed of in landfill sites, can generate \r\nrenewable energy if treated through anaerobic digestion, and can \r\nreduce requirements for synthetic fertiliser production if the nutrient \r\nvalue is recovered (Creutzig et al. 2015). Liquid transport biofuels link \r\nto the land, energy and transport sectors (Section 12.5.2.2)."


id: 8099e36fd5f470f55a9e13379a3b9b8d
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content:
"Three aspects of mitigation from a  cross-sectoral perspective are \r\nconsidered, following Barker et al. (2007):"


id: f7f9aea0695f5eaf1e42043eda28e13d
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content:
"Demand-side mitigation measures, discussed in Chapter 5, also have \r\ncross-sectoral implications which need to be taken into account when \r\ncalculating mitigation potentials. Residential electrification has the \r\npotential to reduce emissions associated with lighting and heating, \r\nparticularly in developing countries where these are currently met \r\nby fossil fuels and using inefficient technologies, but will increase \r\ndemand for electricity (Chapters 5 and 8 and Sections 6.6.2.3 and \r\n8.4.3.1). Many industrial processes can also be electrified in the move \r\naway from fossil reductants and direct energy carriers (Chapter 11). \r\nThe impact of electrification on electricity sector emissions will \r\ndepend on whether electricity generation is based on fossil fuels in \r\nthe absence of CCS or low-carbon energy sources (Chapter 5)."


id: 7959c1a411d1ecac43806afb1e30f43a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"At this stage, however, there is no single global agreement on how circular economy principles are best implemented, and differential \r\ngovernment support for circular economy interventions is observed in different jurisdictions."


id: b1fe4a8edfff81d0572d4281ef786764
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"Box 12.5 provides further details on hydrogen in the context of cross\u0002sectoral mitigation specifically, while further details on the role of \r\nhydrogen in individual sectors are provided in Chapters 6, 8. 9, 10 and \r\n11. In contrast, the benefits of digitalisation, which could potentially \r\ngive rise to substantial energy savings across multiple sectors, need \r\nto be traded off against demand for electricity to operate consumer \r\ndevices, data centres, and data networks. Measures are required \r\nto increase energy efficiency of these technologies (IEA 2017). \r\nSection 5.3.4.1 of this report provides further information on energy \r\nand emissions benefits and costs of digitalisation."


id: 5ddc6ce5b32efec4d46be83a0a9ac71c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"General-purpose technologies (GPTs) include, but are not limited \r\nto, additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, \r\nhydrogen, digitalisation, electrification, nanotechnology and robots \r\n(de Coninck et al. 2018). Many of the individual sectoral chapters have \r\nidentified the roles that such technologies can have in supporting \r\nmitigation of GHG emissions. Section 16.2.2.3 presents an overview \r\nof the individual technologies and specific applications thereof."


id: 94d760f9b78a8945559f87bfe7b41457
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"With respect to co-impacts of GPTs, the other focus of this chapter, \r\nit is highlighted that assessment of the environmental, social \r\nand economic implications of such technologies is challenging and \r\ncontext specific, with multiple potential cross-sectoral linkages \r\n(de  Coninck et al. 2018). Each GPT would need to be explored in \r\ncontext of what it is being used for, and potentially in the geographical \r\ncontext, in order to understand the co-impacts of its use."


id: 10ce15f742041c64999ad332fd047dc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"In this chapter, which focuses on cross-sectoral implications of \r\nmitigation, it is highlighted that certain of these GPTs will find \r\napplication across the sectors, and there will be synergies and trade\u0002offs when utilising these technologies in more than sector. One \r\nexample here is the use of hydrogen as an energy carrier, which, \r\nwhen coupled with low-carbon energy, has potential for driving \r\nmitigation in energy, industry, transport, and buildings. The increased \r\nuptake of hydrogen across the economy requires establishment of \r\nhydrogen production, transport and storage infrastructure which \r\ncould simultaneously support multiple sectors, although there is the \r\npotential to utilise existing infrastructure in some parts of the world \r\n(Alanne and Cao 2017)."


id: 3970345f938378c541d3080716727052
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"When it comes to the production of low-carbon hydrogen, the focus of the attention is on production using electricity from renewable \r\nsources via electrolysis, so-called 'green hydrogen'. However, 'blue hydrogen', produced out of natural gas with CCS, is also often \r\nconsidered. Since a significantly increasing role for hydrogen would require considerable infrastructure investments and would affect \r\nexisting trade flows in raw materials, governments have started to set up national hydrogen strategies, both potential exporting \r\n(e.g., Australia) and importing (e.g., Japan) countries (METI 2017; COAG Energy Council 2019)."


id: e4ed0e5660e7fe46cc913dd0abca3bc6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"The IAM scenarios imply a modest role played by hydrogen, with some scenarios featuring higher levels of penetration. The consumption \r\nof hydrogen is projected to increase by 2050 and onwards in scenarios likely limiting global warming to 2degC or below, and the median \r\nshare of hydrogen in total final energy consumption is 2.1% in 2050 and 5.1% in 2100 (Box 12.4, Figure 1) (Numbers are based on \r\nthe AR6 scenarios database). There is large variety in hydrogen shares, but the values of 10% and more of final energy use that occur \r\nin many roadmaps are only rarely reached in the scenarios. Hydrogen is predominantly used in the industry and transportation sectors. \r\nIn the scenarios, hydrogen is produced mostly by electrolysis and by biomass energy conversion with CCS (Box 12.5, Figure 1). Natural \r\ngas with CCS is expected to play only a modest role; here a distinct difference between the roadmaps quoted before and the IAM \r\nresults is observed."


id: 14acfabb288c5bc29ea42c15ec8c8aa5
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"It is concluded that there is increasing confidence that hydrogen can play a significant role, especially in the transport sector and the \r\nindustrial sector. However, there is much less agreement on timing and volumes, and there is also a range of perspectives on the role \r\nof the various production methods of hydrogen."


id: c198f4ac9951be0985a69df83b08c71d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"measures. This has important implications for understanding the \r\ndifferences in magnitude and distribution of mitigation costs and \r\npotentials of Section 12.2 (Karplus et al. 2013; Rausch and Karplus \r\n2014). There is a comprehensive literature on the efficiency of uniform \r\ncarbon pricing compared to sector-specific mitigation approaches, \r\nbut relatively less literature on the distributional impacts of carbon \r\ntaxes and measures to mitigate potential adverse distributional \r\nimpacts (Rausch and Karplus 2014; Rausch and Reilly 2015; Wang \r\net al. 2016b; Ahman et al. 2017; Mu et al. 2018). For example, in terms \r\nof cross-sectoral distributional implications, studies  find negative \r\ncompetitiveness impacts for the energy-intensive industries (robust \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (Rausch and Karplus 2014; Wang et al. \r\n2016b; Ahman et al. 2017). "


id: 5695cd0a15b216eb7b07870cd455e999
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"A taxonomy of policy types and attributes is provided by Section 13.6. \r\nIn addition, the sectoral chapters provide an in-depth discussion of \r\nimportant mitigation policy issues such as policy overlaps, policy \r\nmixes, and policy interaction as well as policy design considerations \r\nand governance. The point of departure for the assessment in this \r\nchapter is a focus on cross-sectoral perspectives aiming at maximising \r\npolicy synergies and minimising policy trade-offs."


id: ca24967995e5ad801723b5c149bcc8c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"Synergies and trade-offs resulting from mitigation policies are \r\nnot clearly discernible from either sector-level studies or global \r\nand regional top-down studies. Rather, they would require \r\na cross-sectoral integrated policy framework (von Stechow et al. \r\n2015; Monier et al. 2018; Pardoe et al. 2018; Singh et al. 2019) or \r\nmultiple-objective-multiple-impact policy assessment framework \r\nidentifying key co-impacts and avoiding trade-offs (robust evidence, \r\nhigh agreement) (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2014)."


id: 1b64cca95228a33d34addad9fa1fe337
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"Strong interdependencies and cross-sectoral linkages create both \r\nopportunities for synergies and the need to address trade-offs. This \r\ncalls for coordinated sectoral approaches to climate change mitigation \r\npolicies that mainstream these interactions  (Pardoe et al. 2018). \r\nSuch an approach is also called for in the context of cross-sectoral \r\ninteractions of adaptation and mitigation measures, examples are in \r\nthe agriculture, biodiversity, forests, urban, and water sectors (Arent \r\net al. 2014; Berry et al. 2015; Di Gregorio et al. 2017).  Integrated "


id: 5e397ab5d47bec5c303e6e7b3d944c9b
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"approaches and multi-target back-casting approaches that take into \r\naccount unanticipated outcomes and indirect consequences would \r\nbe needed (robust evidence, high agreement) (Klausbruckner et al. \r\n2016; Hoff et al. 2019; van der Voorn et al. 2020) (Box 12.6)."


id: e7dda43db6fd2a8dd0884c09387ce220
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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content:
"planning and cross-sectoral alignment of climate change policies are \r\nparticularly evident in developing countries' NDCs pledged under \r\nthe Paris Agreement, where key priority sectors such as agriculture \r\nand energy are closely aligned between the proposed mitigation \r\nand adaptation actions in the context of sustainable development \r\nand the SDGs. An example is the integration between climate-smart \r\nagriculture and low-carbon energy (robust evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Antwi-Agyei et al. 2018; England et al. 2018). Yet, there appear to be \r\nsignificant challenges relating to institutional capacity and resources \r\nto coordinate and implement such cross-sectoral policy alignment, \r\nparticularly in developing country contexts (Antwi-Agyei et al. 2018)."


id: 772a387106402091e8ba24db2379953e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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content:
"Another dimension of climate change policy  interactions  in the \r\nliterature is related to trade-offs and synergies between climate \r\nchange mitigation and other societal objectives. For example, in \r\nmitigation policies related to energy, trade-offs and synergies \r\nbetween universal electricity access and climate change mitigation \r\nwould call for complementary policies such as pro-poor tariffs, fuel \r\nsubsidies, and broadly integrated policy packages  (Dagnachew \r\net al. 2018). In agriculture and forestry, research suggests that \r\nintegrated policy programmes enhance mitigation potentials across \r\nthe land-use-agriculture-forestry nexus and lead to synergies and \r\npositive  spillovers  (Galik et al. 2019). To maximise synergies and \r\ndeal with trade-offs in such a  cross-sectoral context, evidence\u0002based/informed and holistic policy analysis approaches like nexus "


id: 827f10d126556cdedd3c8acf69f12517
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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content:
"Finally, there are knowledge gaps in the literature particularly in \r\nrelation to policy scalability and the extent and magnitude of policy \r\ninteractions when scaling the policy to a  level consistent with \r\nlow GHG emissions pathways such as 2degC and 1.5degC. "


id: 52f6c135c6d70376c4098920833d19ec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"Shifting to renewable (in particular solar) energy reduces dependency on fossil fuel imports and greenhouse gas emissions, which is \r\ncrucial for mitigating climate change. Employing renewable energy for desalination of seawater and for cooling of greenhouses in \r\nintegrated production systems can enhance water availability, increase crop productivity and generate co-products and co-benefits \r\n(e.g., algae, fish, dryland restoration, greening of the desert)."


id: c575fec740da834c397d4b2afd2c141b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"The Sahara Forest project integrated production system uses amply available natural resources, namely solar energy and seawater, \r\nfor improving water availability and agricultural/biomass production, while simultaneously providing new employment opportunities. \r\nUsing hydroponic systems and humidity in the air, water needs for food production are 50% lower compared to other greenhouses."


id: 85651595d16e8b26bc2b9eba41e43ebd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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content:
"Technical and economic nexus solutions\r\nSeveral major technologies are combined in the Sahara Forest Project, namely electricity production through the use of solar power \r\n(PV or CSP), freshwater production through seawater desalination using renewable energy, seawater-cooled greenhouses for food \r\nproduction, and outdoor revegetation using run-off from the greenhouses."


id: 82f03e26cbdf1ca67a06cee53b928cc1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"The key stakeholders which benefit from such an integrated production system are from the water sector, which urgently requires an \r\naugmentation of irrigation (and other) water, and the agricultural sector, which relies on the additional desalinated water to maintain \r\nand increase agricultural production. The project also involves public and private sector partners from Jordan and abroad, with little \r\nengagement of civil society so far."


id: 39cabd35890baacf92ffd12d25ec5b6f
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"The Sahara Forest Project has been implemented at pilot scale so far, including the first pilot with one hectare and one greenhouse \r\npilot in Qatar and a larger 'launch station' with three hectares and two greenhouses in Jordan. These pilots have been funded by \r\ninternational organisations such as the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the \r\nEuropean Union. Alignment with national policies, institutions and funding, as well as upscaling of the project, is underway or planned."


id: 3de0a6ef7eac816abd461591511b3f5d
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"The multi-sectoral planning and investments that are needed to upscale the project require cooperation among the water, agriculture, \r\nand energy sectors and an active involvement of local actors, private companies, and investors. These cooperation and involvement \r\nmechanisms are currently being established in Jordan. Given the emphasis on the economic value of the project, public-private \r\npartnerships are considered as the appropriate business and governance model, when the project is upscaled. Scenarios for upscaling \r\n(seawater use primarily in low-lying areas close to the sea, to avoid energy-intensive pumping) include 50 MW of CSP, 50 hectares of \r\ngreenhouses, which would produce 34,000 tonnes of vegetables annually, provide employment for over 800 people, and sequester \r\nmore than 8000 tonnes of CO2-eq annually."


id: a32f680d5019bc923420d8b058297080
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"final goods but also across those producing raw materials and \r\nintermediary goods all over the world."


id: fcfcd5b3cc971a2c2284d85fff0e14f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"International spillovers of mitigation policies are effects that \r\ncarbon-abatement measures implemented in one country have on \r\nsectors in other countries. These effects include (i) carbon leakage \r\nin manufacture; (ii) the effects on energy trade flows and incomes \r\nrelated to fossil fuel exports from major exporters; (iii) technology \r\nand knowledge spillovers; and (iv) transfer of norms and preferences \r\nvia various approaches to establish sustainability requirements on \r\ntraded goods, such as EU-RED and environmental labelling systems \r\nto guide consumer choices (robust evidence, medium agreement).\r\nThis section focuses on cross-sectoral aspects of international \r\nspillovers related to the first two effects."


id: 2206e50711aa03003140cb9b64fde895
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"This type of leakage is especially important because the countries \r\nthat provide basic materials are usually emerging or developing \r\neconomies, many of which have no or limited regulation of GHG \r\nemissions. For this reason, foreign direct investment in developing \r\neconomies usually leads to an increase in emissions (Kivyiro and \r\nArminen 2014; Shahbaz et al. 2015; Bakhsh et al. 2017): in the case \r\nof basic materials the effect of expansion of economic activity on \r\nemissions exceeds the effect of technological spillovers, while for \r\ndeveloped countries the effect is opposite (Shahbaz et al. 2015; \r\nPazienza 2019). Meng et al. (2018) calculated that environmental \r\ncost for generating one unit of GDP through international trade was \r\n1.4 times higher than that through domestic production in 1995. By \r\n2009, this difference increased to 1.8 times. Carbon leakage due \r\nto the differences in environmental regulation was the main driver \r\nof this increase."


id: 1433d21e39293844df72158e9671c7b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"Carbon leakage occurs when mitigation measures implemented in \r\none country or sector lead to a  rise in emissions in other countries \r\nor sectors. Three types of spillovers are possible: (i) domestic cross\u0002sectoral spillovers when mitigation policy in one sector leads to the \r\nre-allocation of labour and capital towards the other sectors of the \r\nsame country; (ii) international spillovers within a single sector when \r\nmitigation policy leads to substitution of domestic production of carbon\u0002intensive goods with their imports from abroad; and (iii) international \r\ncross-sectoral spillovers when mitigation policy in one sector in one \r\ncountry leads to the rise in emissions in other sectors in other countries. \r\nWhile the first two are described in Section 13.6, this section focuses \r\non the third. Though some papers address this type of leakage, there is \r\nstill a significant lack of knowledge on this topic."


id: 5d266a0b687c0b4a32bc85dba3cd38d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"In order to address emissions leakage through global value chains, \r\nLiu and Fan (2017) propose the value-added-based emissions \r\naccounting principle, which makes it possible to account for GHG \r\nemissions within the context of the economic benefit principle. \r\nDavis et al. (2011) notice that the analysis of value chains gives \r\nan opportunity to find the point where regulation would be the \r\nmost efficient and the least vulnerable to leakage. For instance, \r\ntransaction costs of global climate policy and the risks of leakage \r\nmay be reduced if emissions are regulated at the extraction stage as \r\nthere are far fewer agents involved in this process than in burning of \r\nfossil fuels or consumption of energy-intensive goods. Li et al. (2020) \r\ncalls for coordinated efforts to reduce emissions embodied in trade \r\nflows in pairs of the economies with the highest leakage, such as \r\nChina and the United States, China and Germany, China and Japan, \r\nRussia and Germany."


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"One possible channel of cross-sectoral international carbon leakage \r\nis through global value chains. Mitigation policy in one country not \r\nonly leads to shifts in competitiveness across industries producing "


id: 1a432ce6b85988f66bcb3fc9eabdfc00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"make each country build more complete industrial systems to satisfy \r\ntheir final demand, although they have comparative disadvantages \r\nin some production stages. As a  result, emissions would increase. \r\nAccording to Zhang et al. (2020), for China, the decrease of the \r\ndegree of global value chain participation (which ranges from 0 to 1) \r\nby 0.1 would lead to an increase in gross carbon intensity of China's \r\nexports of 11.7%. On distributional implications, Parrado and De Cian \r\n(2014) report that trade-driven spillover effects transmitted through \r\nimports of materials and equipment result in significant inter-sectoral \r\ndistributional effects, with some sectors witnessing substantial \r\nexpansion in activity and emissions and others witnessing a decline \r\nin activities and emissions."


id: 40bf2b9e49a377f6f4cec1882cae189d
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"Unfortunately, these proposals either face difficulties in collection \r\nand verification of data on emissions along value chains or require \r\na high level of international cooperation, which is hardly achievable \r\nat the moment. Neuhoff et al. (2016) and Pollitt et al. (2020) focus \r\non the regulation of emissions embodied in global value chains \r\nthrough national policy instruments. They propose implementation \r\nof a  charge on consumption of imported basic materials into the \r\nEuropean emissions trading system. Such a  charge, equivalent to \r\naround EUR80 tCO2\r\n-1, could reduce the EU's total CO2 emissions by \r\nup to 10% by 2050 (Pollitt et al. 2020) without significant effects \r\non competitiveness. This proposal is very close to the carbon border \r\nadjustment introduced in the EU and described in more detail in \r\nSections 13.2 and 13.6."


id: 265e8ea538726bbdf0e085e66623f4ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"It should also be mentioned that international trade leads to important \r\nknowledge and technology spillovers (Sections 16.3 and 16.5) and \r\nis critically important for achieving other Sustainable Development \r\nGoals (Section  12.6.1). Any policies imposing additional barriers \r\nto international trade should therefore be implemented with great \r\ncaution and require comprehensive evaluation of various economic, \r\nsocial and environmental effects."


id: d6743f212f3e34ecddbc872e02534a41
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"Cross-sectoral trade-related spillovers of mitigation policies include \r\ntheir effect on energy prices. Other things being equal, regulation \r\nof emissions of industrial producers decreases the demand for fossil \r\nfuels that would reduce prices and encourage the rise of fossil fuel \r\nconsumption in regions with no or weaker climate policies (robust \r\nevidence, medium agreement)."


id: 35f300050564a61f36d8c3c94320c0a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"Arroyo-Curras et al. (2015) studied the energy channel of carbon \r\nleakage with the REMIND IAM of the global economy. They came to \r\nthe conclusion that the leakage rate through the energy channel is \r\nless than 16% of the emissions reductions of regions who introduce \r\nclimate policies first. This result did not differ much for different sizes \r\nand compositions of the early mover coalition."


id: 20487ed2de789904c2923dc560fb5b0a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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content:
"Another important cross-sectoral aspect of carbon leakage concerns \r\nthe transport sector. If mitigation policy leads to the substitution of \r\ndomestic carbon-intensive production with imports, one of the side \r\neffects of this substitution is the rise of emissions from transportation \r\nof imported goods. International transport is responsible for about \r\na  third of worldwide trade-related emissions, and over 75%  of \r\nemissions for major manufacturing categories (Cristea et al. \r\n2013). Carbon leakage would potentially increase the emissions \r\nfrom transportation significantly as the trade of major consuming \r\neconomies of the EU and US would shift towards distant trading \r\npartners in East and South Asia. Meng et al. (2018) consider more \r\ndistant transportation as one of the major contributors to the rise in \r\nemissions embodied in international trade from 1995 to 2009."


id: 5c950a3e2cb245d10be369a877107add
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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content:
"Bauer et al. (2015) built a  multi-model scenario ensemble for the \r\nanalysis of energy-related spillovers of mitigation policies and \r\nrevealed huge uncertainty: energy-related carbon leakage rates \r\nvaried from negative values to 50%, primarily depending on the \r\ntrends in inter-fuel substitution."


id: 765a4dabd89ebda3da9b5760e41145df
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"Another kind of spillover in the energy sector concerns the 'green \r\nparadox': announcement of future climate policies causes an \r\nincrease in production and trade in fossil fuels in the short term \r\n(Jensen et al. 2015; Kotlikoff et al. 2016). The delayed carbon tax \r\nshould therefore be higher than an immediately implemented carbon \r\ntax in order to achieve the same temperature target (van der Ploeg \r\n2016). Studies also make a distinction between a 'weak' and 'strong' \r\ngreen paradox (Gerlagh 2011). The former refers to a short-term rise \r\nin emissions in response to climate policy, while the latter refers to \r\nrising cumulative damage."


id: 4054ebdc62ed921ab3feddb9a1620860
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"Emissions leakage due to international trade, investment and value \r\nchains is a  significant obstacle to more ambitious climate policies \r\nin many regions. However, it does not mean that disruption of \r\ntrade would reduce global emissions. Zhang et al. (2020) show that \r\ndeglobalisation and the drop in international trade may result in \r\nemissions reductions in the short term, but in the longer term it will "


id: d4295c3a4584160838064e41243995fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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content:
"The green paradox may work in different ways for different kinds \r\nof fossil fuels. For instance, Coulomb and Henriet (2018) show that \r\nclimate policies in the transport and power-generation sectors "


id: 5c5e7bed5428ccc336c1e75567899ede
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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"increase the discounted profits of the owners of conventional oil and \r\ngas, compared to the no-regulation baseline, but will decrease these \r\nprofits for coal and unconventional oil and gas producers."


id: 653e606e451bd3cf8711c85adede82e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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vector_id: 13502
content:
"Many studies also distinguish different policy measures by the scale \r\nof green paradox they provide. The immediate carbon tax is the first\u0002best instrument from the perspective of global welfare. Delayed \r\ncarbon tax leads to some green paradox but less than in the case of \r\nsupport for renewables (Michielsen 2014; van der Ploeg and Rezai \r\n2019). With respect to the latter, support for renewable electricity \r\nhas a  lower green paradox than support for biofuels (Michielsen \r\n2014; Gronwald et al. 2017). The existence of the green paradox is \r\nan additional argument in favour of more decisive climate policy \r\nnow: any postponements will lead to additional consumption of \r\nfossil fuels and consequently the need for more ambitious and costly \r\nefforts in future."


id: ba13b7ce404c1ffc899f91ef9ce2a0e1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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vector_id: 26818
content:
"The effect of fossil fuel production expansion as a result of anticipated \r\nclimate policy may be compensated by the effect of  divestment. \r\nDelayed climate policy creates incentives for investors to divest \r\nfrom fossil fuels. Bauer et al. (2018) show that this divestment effect \r\nis stronger and thus announcing of climate policies leads to the \r\nreduction of energy-related emissions."


id: 1bde9c2c15697c961000ed37a14b6229
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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vector_id: 1844
content:
"The implication of the effects of mitigation policies through the \r\nenergy-related spillovers channel is of particular significance to \r\noil-exporting countries (medium evidence, medium agreement). \r\nEmissions-reduction measures lead to decreasing demand for fossil \r\nfuels and consequently to the decrease in exports from major oil\u0002and gas-exporting countries. The case of Russia is one of the most \r\nillustrative. Makarov et al. (2020) show that the fulfilment by Paris \r\nAgreement Parties of their NDCs would lead to 25% reduction of \r\nRussia's energy exports by 2030 with significant reduction of its \r\neconomic growth rates. At the same time, the domestic consumption \r\nof fossil fuels is anticipated to increase in response to the drop in \r\nexternal demand that would provoke carbon leakage (Orlov and \r\nAaheim 2017). Such spillovers demonstrate the need for dialogue \r\nbetween exporters and importers of fossil fuels while implementing \r\nthe mitigation policies."


id: bc7bab246888b1944a9453474e60fb09
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27235
content:
"Finance is a  principal enabler of GHG mitigation and an essential \r\ncomponent of countries' NDC packages submitted under the \r\nParis Agreement (UNFCCC 2016). The assessment of investment \r\nrequirements for mitigation along with their financing at sectoral \r\nlevels are addressed in detail by sectoral chapters while the \r\nassessment of financial sources, instruments, and the overall \r\nmitigation financing gap is addressed by Chapter 15 (Sections 15.3, \r\n15.4, and 15.5). The focus in this chapter with respect to finance is on \r\nthe scope and potential for financing integrated solutions that create \r\nsynergies between and among sectors. "


id: d9f8e18a9ed81ffc3d959eee6acbca8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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vector_id: 31815
content:
"in petroleum  imports  and GHG emissions while enhancing energy \r\nsecurity. Yet,  under a  water-constrained scenario as a  result of \r\nclimate change, the need for additional energy to expand irrigation \r\nto previously rain-fed sugar plantations and to power desalination \r\nplants yields the opposite result in terms of GHG emissions and \r\nenergy costs, making biofuels a sub-optimal option, and negatively \r\naffects their economics and the prospects for financing. "


id: 5eb71b200515cba54300787e0a037d8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12440
content:
"Finally, the literature review and analysis in Chapter 12 has taken \r\naccount of the post-AR5 literature available and accessible to the \r\nchapter authors. Nonetheless, the assessment of the chapter is \r\nincomplete without mentioning knowledge gaps encountered during \r\nthe assessment. These knowledge gaps include:"


id: 7c2bfaf3bb856eea804f3e3c5e8e27d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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vector_id: 17138
content:
"At the local level, integrated planning and financing are needed to \r\nachieve more sustainable outcomes.  For example, at a  city level, \r\nintegration is needed across sectors such as transport, energy systems, \r\nbuildings, sewage and solid waste to optimise emissions footprints. \r\nHow a  city is designed will  affect transportation demands, which \r\nmakes it either more or less difficult to implement efficient public \r\ntransportation, leading in turn to more or fewer emissions.  Under \r\nsuch cases, solutions in terms of public and private investment paths \r\nand financing policies based on purely internal sector considerations \r\nare bound to cause adverse impacts on other sectors and poor overall \r\noutcomes (Gouldson et al. 2016)."


id: b60925f1e731febc1cf643171c4a440
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26169
content:
"Limiting the increase in warming to well below 2degC, and achieving net zero CO2 or GHG emissions, will require anthropogenic CO2 \r\nremoval from the atmosphere."


id: 25dcbf9f0c65a66e077f85ecb2febc2a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3380
content:
"The carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods studied so far have different removal potentials, costs, co-benefits and side effects. \r\nSome biological methods for achieving CDR, like afforestation/reforestation or wetland restoration, have long been practised. \r\nIf implemented well, these practices can provide a  range of co-benefits, but they can also have adverse side effects such as \r\nbiodiversity loss or food price increases. Other chemical and geochemical approaches to CDR include direct air carbon capture \r\nand storage (DACCS), enhanced weathering or ocean alkalinity enhancement. They are generally less vulnerable to reversal than \r\nbiological methods."


id: cc6575fcd9ef67da03d0ea6e2d4b9a42
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29696
content:
"DACCS uses chemicals that bind to CO2 directly from the air; the CO2 is then removed from the sorbent and stored underground or \r\nmineralised. Enhanced weathering involves the mining of rocks containing minerals that naturally absorb CO2 from the atmosphere \r\nover geological timescales, which are crushed to increase the surface area and spread on soils (or elsewhere) where they absorb \r\natmospheric CO2. Ocean alkalinity enhancement involves the extraction, processing, and dissolution of minerals and addition to the \r\nocean where they enhance sequestration of CO2 as bicarbonate and carbonate ions in the ocean."


id: 190f5dff5b115137d71296b5e454589f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1436
content:
"Mitigation measures do not only reduce GHGs, but have wider impacts. They can result in decreases or increases in GHG emissions \r\nin another sector or part of the value chain from where they are applied. They can have wider environmental (e.g., air and water \r\npollution, biodiversity), social (e.g., employment creation, health) and economic (e.g., growth, investment) co-benefits or adverse \r\nside effects. Mitigation and adaptation can also be linked. Taking these considerations into account can help to enhance the benefits \r\nof mitigation action, and avoid unintended consequences, as well as provide a stronger case for achieving political and societal \r\nsupport and raising the finances required for implementation."


id: f9af34dcaf3cd6dd27d75fb479b1a71d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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vector_id: 36796
content:
"Activities associated with the food system caused about one-third of total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2015, distributed across \r\nall sectors. Agriculture and fisheries produce crops and animal-source food, which are partly processed in the food industry, packed, \r\ndistributed, retailed, cooked, and finally eaten. Each step is associated with resource use, waste generation, and GHG emissions."


id: d53c76525c1bcab5507c20597636e16c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31079
content:
"A food systems approach helps identify critical areas as well as novel and alternative approaches to mitigation on both the supply \r\nside and the demand side of the food system. But complex co-impacts need to be considered and mitigation measures tailored to \r\nthe specific context. International cooperation and governance of global food trade can support both mitigation and adaptation."


id: 35033561192b66bcf24820675179772e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5752
content:
"There is large scope for emissions reduction in both cropland and grazing production, and also in food processing, storage and \r\ndistribution. Emerging options such as plant-based alternatives to animal food products and food from cellular agriculture are \r\nreceiving increasing attention, but their mitigation potential is still uncertain and depends on the GHG intensity of associated energy \r\nsystems due to relatively high energy needs. Diet changes can reduce GHG emissions and also improve health in groups with excess \r\nconsumption of calories and animal food products, which is mainly prevalent in developed countries. Reductions in food loss and \r\nwaste can help reduce GHG emissions further."


id: 1871d3b27b18ca33476743fad11978aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1342
content:
"Recommendations to buy local food and avoid packaging can contribute to reducing GHG emissions but should not be generalised, \r\nas trade-offs exist with food waste, GHG footprint at farm gate, and accessibility to diverse healthy diets."


id: f4406b06109f8d3515b3b2539cf8c560
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35934
content:
"Elin Lerum Boasson (Norway), Mercy J.  Borbor-Cordova (Ecuador), Solomone Fifita (Tonga), \r\nErik  Haites (Canada), Mark Jaccard (Canada), Frank Jotzo (Australia), Sasha Naidoo (South \r\nAfrica), Patricia Romero-Lankao (Mexico/the United States of America), Wei Shen (China/United \r\nKingdom), Mykola Shlapak (Ukraine), Libo Wu (China)"


id: f3d313658cb794de1aaecc077d13b88e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35876
content:
"Dubash, N.K., C.  Mitchell, E.L.  Boasson, M.J.  Borbor-Cordova, S.  Fifita, E.  Haites, M.  Jaccard, F.  Jotzo, S.  Naidoo, \r\nP.  Romero-Lankao, M.  Shlapak, W.  Shen, L. Wu, 2022: National and sub-national policies and institutions. In IPCC, \r\n2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment \r\nReport of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, \r\nD.  McCollum, M.  Pathak, S.  Some, P. Vyas, R.  Fradera, M.  Belkacemi, A.  Hasija, G.  Lisboa, S.  Luz, J.  Malley, (eds.)]. \r\nCambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.015"


id: 334912e31dc2183be135ce5009988693
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5487
content:
"Sub-national actors are important for mitigation because \r\nmunicipalities and regional governments have jurisdiction \r\nover climate-relevant sectors such as land-use, waste and \r\nurban policy; are able to experiment with climate solutions; \r\nand can forge partnerships with the private sector and \r\ninternationally to leverage enhanced climate action (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). More than 10,500 cities and nearly \r\n250 regions representing more than 2 billion people have pledged \r\nlargely voluntary action to reduce emissions. Indirect gains include \r\ninnovation, establishing norms and developing capacity. However, \r\nsub-national actors often lack national support, funding, and \r\ncapacity to mobilise finance and human resources, and create new \r\ninstitutional competences. {13.5}"


id: b0074f8c553e29281a4042cdbae627e9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25225
content:
"Long-term deep emission reductions, including the reduction \r\nof emissions to net zero, is best achieved through institutions \r\nand governance that nurture new mitigation policies, \r\nwhile at the same time reconsidering existing policies that \r\nsupport continued Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). To do so effectively, the scope of \r\nclimate governance should include both direct efforts to target GHG \r\nemissions and indirect opportunities to tackle GHG emissions that \r\nresult from efforts directed towards other policy objectives. {13.2, \r\n13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.9} "


id: 2896f8ea9dc5fb313b9bc1140f1189b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3811
content:
"Climate governance is constrained and enabled by domestic \r\nstructural factors, but it is still possible for actors to make \r\nsubstantial changes (medium evidence, high agreement).\r\nKey structural factors are domestic material endowments (such as \r\nfossil fuels and land-based resources); domestic political systems; \r\nand prevalent ideas, values and belief systems. Developing countries \r\nface additional material constraints in climate governance due to \r\ndevelopment challenges and scarce economic or natural resources. \r\na broad group of actors influence how climate governance develop \r\nover time, including a  range of civic organisations, encompassing \r\nboth pro-and anti-climate action groups. {13.3, 13.4}"


id: 9c45d4a44cfe1262b0b22fac161e4adc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22140
content:
"Policies have had a  discernible impact on mitigation for \r\nspecific countries, sectors, and technologies (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement), avoiding emissions of several GtCO2-eq yr-1 \r\n(medium evidence, medium agreement). Both market-based and \r\nregulatory policies have distinct, but complementary roles. The share \r\nof global GHG emissions subject to mitigation policy has increased \r\nrapidly in recent years, but big gaps remain in policy coverage, and the \r\nstringency of many policies falls short of what is needed to achieve \r\nstrong mitigation outcomes (robust evidence, high agreement). {13.6, \r\nCross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 14}"


id: 42f8e1c70cdacdf51e5ea92f3f0044
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7931
content:
"Mitigation strategies, instruments and policies that fit with \r\ndominant ideas, values and belief systems within a  country \r\nor within a sector are more easily adopted and implemented \r\n(medium evidence, medium agreement). Ideas, values and beliefs \r\nmay change over time. Policies that bring perceived direct benefits, \r\nsuch as subsidies, usually receive greater support. The awareness of \r\nco-benefits for the public increases support of climate policies (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). {13.2, 13.3, 13.4}"


id: 5eb1949715aacbbe88c65327b344b96
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12436
content:
"Climate laws enable mitigation action by signalling the \r\ndirection of travel, setting targets, mainstreaming mitigation \r\ninto sector policies, enhancing regulatory certainty, creating \r\nlaw-backed agencies, creating focal points for social \r\nmobilisation, and attracting international finance (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). By 2020, 'direct' climate laws primarily \r\nfocused on GHG reductions were present in 56 countries covering \r\n53% of global emissions, while more than 690 laws, including \r\n'indirect' laws, may also have an effect on mitigation. Among direct \r\nlaws, 'framework' laws set an overarching legal basis for mitigation \r\neither by pursuing a  target and implementation approach, or by \r\nseeking to mainstream climate objectives through sectoral plans and \r\nintegrative institutions. {13.2}"


id: 6037d2b7444243aaaf9efc33afa27782
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12713
content:
"Climate litigation is growing and can affect the outcome \r\nand ambition of climate governance (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). Since 2015, at least 37 systemic cases have been \r\ninitiated against states that challenge the overall effort of a  state \r\nto mitigate or adapt to climate change. If successful, such cases \r\ncan lead to an increase in a  country's overall ambition to tackle \r\nclimate change. Climate litigation has also successfully challenged \r\ngovernments' authorisations of high-emitting projects setting \r\nprecedents in favour of climate action. Climate litigation against \r\nprivate sector and financial institutions is also on the rise. {13.4}"


id: 6893de59c830cc1b740d245dcc5bc669
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14043
content:
"The media shapes the public discourse about climate \r\nmitigation.  This can usefully build public support to \r\naccelerate mitigation action, but may also be used to impede \r\ndecarbonisation (medium evidence, high agreement). Global \r\nmedia coverage (across a study of 59 countries) has been growing, \r\nfrom about 47,000  stories in 2016-2017 to about 87,000 in \r\n2020-2021. Generally, the media representation of climate science \r\nhas increased and become more accurate over time. On occasion, \r\nthe propagation of scientifically misleading information by organised \r\ncounter-movements has fuelled polarisation, with negative \r\nimplications for climate policy. {13.4}"


id: ffa6f6e9a4d1832903e52e4ffc649fa9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37763
content:
"Institutions can enable improved governance by coordinating \r\nacross sectors, scales and actors, building consensus for \r\naction, and setting strategies (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). Institutions are more stable and effective when they \r\nare congruous with national context, leading to mitigation-focused \r\ninstitutions in some countries and the pursuit of multiple objectives \r\nin others. Sub-national institutions play a  complementary role to \r\nnational institutions by developing locally-relevant visions and plans, \r\naddressing policy gaps or limits in national institutions, building \r\nlocal administrative structures and convening actors for place-based \r\ndecarbonisation. {13.2}"


id: 90c56620f86fe66cd5841c0d7b5ac786
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20323
content:
"(medium evidence, high agreement). Creation of markets for emission \r\nreduction credits tends to benefit countries able to supply credits. \r\nPolicies to support technology development and diffusion tend to \r\nhave positive spillover effects (medium evidence, high agreement).\r\nThere is no consistent evidence of significant emissions leakage or \r\ncompetitiveness effects between countries, including for emissions\u0002intensive trade-exposed industries covered by emission trading \r\nsystems (medium evidence, medium agreement). {13.6}"


id: 1da7b300c65e557d96146c0db1b87535
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2104
content:
"Explicit attention to equity and justice is salient to both social \r\nacceptance and fair and effective policymaking for mitigation \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). Distributional implications of \r\nalternative climate policy choices can be usefully evaluated at city, \r\nlocal and national scales as an input to policymaking. Institutions \r\nand governance frameworks that enable consideration of justice \r\nand just transitions are likely to build broader support for climate \r\npolicymaking. {13.2, 13.6, 13.8, 13.9}"


id: 384044dd72994a6eb04f617ff5afab2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6222
content:
"Policy packages are better able to support socio-technical \r\ntransitions and shifts in development pathways toward low\u0002carbon futures than are individual policies (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). For best effect, they need to be harnessed to \r\na  clear vision for change and designed with attention to local \r\ngovernance context. Comprehensiveness in coverage, coherence \r\nto ensure complementarity, and consistency of policies with the \r\noverarching vision and its objectives are important design criteria. \r\nIntegration across objectives occurs when a  policy package is \r\ninformed by a  clear problem framing and identification of the full \r\nrange relevant policy sub-systems. {13.7}"


id: fd7ce88c6495730acd3378c8165cfe22
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37399
content:
"The co-benefits and trade-offs of integrating adaptation and \r\nmitigation are most usefully identified and assessed prior \r\nto policy making rather than being accidentally discovered \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). This requires strengthening \r\nrelevant national institutions to reduce silos and overlaps, increasing \r\nknowledge exchange at the country and regional levels, and \r\nsupporting engagement with bilateral and multilateral funding \r\npartners. Local governments are well placed to develop policies that \r\ngenerate social and environmental co-benefits but to do so require \r\nlegal backing and adequate capacity and resources. {13.8}"


id: fec58efc69963694a7ec6f39a12f761a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37625
content:
"Climate change mitigation is accelerated when attention \r\nis given to integrated policy and economy-wide approaches, and \r\nwhen enabling conditions (governance, institutions, behaviour, \r\ninnovation, policy, and finance), are present (robust evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). Accelerating climate mitigation includes \r\nsimultaneously weakening high carbon systems and encouraging \r\nlow-carbon systems; ensuring interaction between adjacent systems \r\n(e.g. energy and agriculture); overcoming resistance to policies \r\n(e.g., from incumbents in high carbon emitting industries), including \r\nby providing transitional support to the vulnerable and negatively \r\naffected by distributional impacts; inducing changes in consumer \r\npractices and routines; providing transition support; and addressing \r\ncoordination challenges in policy and governance. {13.7, 13.9}"


id: fd152a9a562f810ba54d3d3f4634ec14
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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content:
"Removing fossil fuel subsidies would reduce emissions, improve \r\npublic revenue and macroeconomic performance, and yield \r\nother environmental and sustainable development benefits; \r\nsubsidy removal may have adverse distributional impacts especially on \r\nthe most economically vulnerable groups which, in some cases can \r\nbe mitigated by measures such as redistributing revenue saved, all \r\nof which depend on national circumstances (high confidence); fossil \r\nfuel subsidy removal is projected by various studies (using alternative \r\nmethodologies) to reduce global CO2 emissions by 1-4%, and GHG \r\nemissions by up to 10% by 2030, varying across regions (medium \r\nconfidence). {6.3, 13.6}"


id: 22996841685ba1aa8ea7b9dce8e82865
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"Economy-wide packages, including economic stimulus \r\npackages, can contribute to shifting sustainable development \r\npathways and achieving net zero outcomes while meeting \r\nshort term economic goals (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). The 2008-2009 Global Recession showed that \r\npolicies for sustained economic recovery go beyond short-term fiscal \r\nstimulus to include long-term commitments of public spending on \r\nthe low-carbon economy; pricing reform; addressing affordability; \r\nand minimising distributional impacts. COVID-19 spurred stimulus \r\npackages and multi-objective recovery policies that may have the \r\npotential to meet short-term economic goals while enabling longer\u0002term sustainability goals. {13.9}"


id: f0def2c0852a6edeedae8e52174a50af
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"National mitigation policies interact internationally with \r\neffects that both support and hinder mitigation action \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). Reductions in demand for \r\nfossil fuels tend to negatively affect fossil fuel exporting countries "


id: e111bda88d9094d63a6a4510da90e330
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"attention to the opportunities for economy-wide system change \r\npresented by consideration of post-COVID recovery packages, and \r\nwider efforts at sustainable economic restructuring (Section  13.9). \r\nConsistent with the discussion in Chapter 4, these larger approaches \r\noffer opportunities to undertake systemic restructuring and shift \r\ndevelopment pathways."


id: e4840f1969376b86fe0d5e086933c9af
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"Finally, the chapter addresses core themes from earlier assessment \r\nreports, but seeks to do so in an enhanced manner. The discussion of \r\nclimate institutions assesses a growing literature on climate law, as \r\nwell as both purpose-built climate organisations and the layering of \r\nclimate responsibilities on existing organisations at national and sub\u0002national scales (Section 13.2). The discussion of policies focuses on \r\nan ex post assessment of policies, as well as the interaction among \r\nthem, and learnings on how they can be combined in packages \r\n(Sections  13.6 and 13.7). It also lays out a  framework for their \r\nassessment that encompasses environmental effectiveness, economic \r\neffectiveness, distributional outcomes, co-benefits, institutional \r\nrequirements, as well as a new criterion of transformational potential \r\n(Section 13.6). "


id: 20ed941394a2ebc89c5022f06e2a3b05
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"The aim of this chapter is to assess the full range of the multi-stranded \r\nand diverse literature on climate institutions and policy, reflecting the \r\nrichness of real-world climate governance."


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"This encompassing approach to climate governance is also built on \r\na  recognition that climate policymaking is routinely formulated in \r\nthe context of multiple policy objectives such as energy security, \r\nenergy access, urban development, and mitigation-adaptation \r\nlinkages. This informs policymaking based on an understanding that \r\nto fully maximise direct and indirect climate mitigation potential, \r\nmaximising co-benefits and minimising trade-offs should be explicitly \r\nsought rather than accidentally discovered and policies designed \r\naccordingly. This understanding also informs the design of institutions \r\n(Section 13.2) and policies (Sections 13.6 and 13.7) as well as the \r\nlinkage between mitigation and adaptation (Section 13.8)."


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"Institutions and governance arrangements can help address 'policy \r\ngaps' and 'implementation gaps' (Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4) \r\nthat hinder climate mitigation. While the need for institutions and \r\ngovernance is universal, individual country approaches vary, based on \r\nnational approaches and circumstances, as discussed in this section. "


id: b6269ab0dfb5fef273d1f52763fb8ae4
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"The chapter also engages with several new developments and an \r\nexpansion of the literature since AR5. "


id: babf457233be07f7e57fffd679bae893
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"Since AR5, the understanding of climate governance has become \r\nmore encompassing and complex, involving multiple actors, decision\u0002making arenas, levels of decision-making and a variety of political \r\ngoals. Climate governance sometime directly targets GHG emissions; \r\nat other times mitigation results from measures that primarily aim \r\nto solve other issues, for instance relating to food production, forest \r\nmanagement, energy markets, air pollution, transport systems or \r\ntechnology development, but with mitigation or adaptation effects \r\n(Karlsson et al. 2020). "


id: 3f188832b6bef05d2405ac0c8dc33b93
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"A growing literature assesses how national policymaking on climate \r\nmitigation is dependent on national politics around, and building \r\nconsensus on, climate action. This, in turn, is shaped by both \r\nnationally specific structural features (Section 13.3) and the role of \r\ndifferent actors in the policymaking process (Section 13.4). Important \r\nnew avenues through which climate policy making is shaped, such \r\nas climate litigation (Section 13.4.2), and channels for public opinion \r\nformation, such as the media (Section 13.4.3) are also assessed. The \r\nchapter weaves discussions of the role of justice, understood through \r\na discussion of procedural justice (Section 13.2), distributional justice \r\n(Section 13.6) and vulnerability (Section 13.8), and its role in creating \r\npublic support for climate action (Section 13.9)."


id: e9e5535962eb7942d2d8062dd7ffa612
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"Consistent with usage in this assessment, institutions are rules, norms \r\nand conventions that guide, constrain or enable behaviours and \r\npractices, including the organisations through which they operate, \r\nwhile governance is the structure, processes and actions that public \r\nand private actors use to address societal goals (See Glossary for \r\ncomplete definitions). Multiple terms are used in the literature to \r\ndiscuss climate governance, often varying across countries. Climate \r\nlaws, or legislation, is passed by legislatures, and often sets the \r\noverarching governance context, but the term is also used to refer \r\nto legislation that is salient to climate outcomes even if not centrally \r\nfocused on climate change. National strategies, often referred to as \r\nplans, most often operate through executive action by government, "


id: fc255fd1f512b341bdbf7fdb7aadf6d0
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"A significant new theme is the focus on the dynamic elements of policy \r\nmaking, that is, how policy can be designed to accelerate mitigation. \r\nThis includes through technological transitions, socio-technical \r\ntransitions, shifts in development pathways and economy-wide \r\nmeasures. This literature emphasises the importance of examining \r\nnot just individual policies, but packages of policies (Section 13.7) \r\nand how these are enabled by the alignment of policy, institutions, \r\nfinance, behaviour and innovation (Section  13.9). Also new is "


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"set guidance for action and often are not legally binding, although \r\nstrategies may also be enshrined in law. Both laws and strategies \r\nmay elaborate targets, or goals, for emissions outcomes, although \r\nthese are not necessary components of laws and strategies. While \r\nlaws typically operate at the national level (states may also make \r\nlaws in federal nations), strategies, plans and targets may also \r\noperate at the sub-national level."


id: 158027ff69f9baddef3e6d13fd2e8f3e
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"This section begins with a  discussion of national laws for climate \r\naction (Section  13.2.1), followed by a  discussion of national \r\nstrategies (Section  13.2.2). The third section examines institutions \r\n(Section13.2.3), including organisations that are established to \r\ngovern climate actions, and the final section explores sub-national \r\ninstitutions and their challenges in influencing climate mitigation \r\n(Section 13.2.4). "


id: ff5b42a7cd3bee6635f135440c051604
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"There are both narrow and broad definitions of what counts as \r\n'climate laws'. The literature distinguishes direct climate laws that \r\nexplicitly considers climate change causes or impacts - for example \r\nthrough mention of greenhouse gas reductions in its objectives \r\nor title (Dubash et al. 2013)  - from indirect laws that have 'the \r\ncapacity to affect mitigation or adaptation' through the subjects they \r\nregulate, for example, through promotion of co-benefits, or creation \r\nof reporting protocols (Scotford and Minas 2019). Closely related is \r\na 'sectoral approach' based on the layering of climate considerations \r\ninto existing laws in the absence of an overarching framework \r\nlaw (Rumble 2019). Many countries also adopt executive climate \r\nstrategies (discussed in Section  13.2), which may either coexist \r\nwith or substitute for climate laws, and that may also be related to \r\na country's NDC process under the Paris Agreement. "


id: afb660b8ccab0922dbcd848f696fb98
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"However, country examples also suggest other, different approaches \r\nto framework laws. Korea's Framework Act on Low Carbon, \r\nGreen Growth seeks to shift business and society toward green \r\ngrowth through a  process of strategy setting and action plans \r\n(Jang et al. 2010). Kenya's framework Climate Change Act creates \r\nan institutional structure to mainstream climate considerations into \r\nsectoral decisions, one of several examples across Africa of efforts \r\nto create framework legislation to promote mainstreaming (Rumble \r\n2019). Mexico's General Law on Climate Change includes sectoral \r\nemission targets, along with the creation of coordinating institutions \r\nacross ministries and sub-national authorities (Averchenkova and \r\nGuzman Luna 2018). Consequently, different countries have placed \r\nemphasis on different aspects of framework laws, although the most \r\nwidely prevalent approach is that exemplified by the UK. "


id: a7b5ce2afca2521b17cfa5cd6fbdc9b9
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"The prevalence of both direct and indirect climate laws has increased \r\nconsiderably since 2007, although definitional differences across \r\nstudies complicate a  clear assessment of their relative importance \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement) (Iacobuta et al. 2018; Nachmany "


id: c0cbe6ef92236283863e82d725442fcc
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"Figure 13.1 | Prevalence of legislation by emissions and number of countries across regions. Top: Shares of global GHG emissions under national climate change \r\nlegislations - in 2010, 2015 and 2020. Emissions data used are for 2019, since emissions shares across regions deviated from past patterns in 2020 due to COVID. Bottom: \r\nNumber of countries with national climate legislation - in 2010, 2015, and 2020. Climate legislation is defined as an act passed by a parliament that includes in its title or \r\nobjectives reductions in GHGs. AR6 regions: DEV = Developed countries; APC = Asia and Pacific; EEA = Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia; AFR = Africa; LAM = Latin \r\nAmerica and the Caribbean; MDE = Middle East. Source: updated and adapted with permission from Iacobuta et al. (2018) to reflect AR6 regional aggregation and recent data."


id: 6b9aaf5a077f2ade7698d31fac4e8787
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"Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) prepared under the \r\nParis Agreement may be informed by national strategies (Rocha \r\nand Falduto 2019). But the process of preparing NDCs can itself \r\nraise political awareness, encourage institutional innovation \r\nand coordination, and engage stakeholders (Roser et al. 2020). \r\nNationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) illustrate a diversity of \r\napproaches: direct mitigation targets, strategies, plans and actions \r\nfor low-GHG emission development, or the pursuit of mitigation \r\nco-benefits resulting from economic diversification plans and/\r\nor adaptation actions (UNFCCC Secretariat 2021). Figure  13.2 \r\nshows that the prevalence of emission targets increased across all \r\nregions between 2010 and 2020, the period during which the Paris \r\nAgreement was reached. "


id: 9bc08e70e9247e0f83f07ba5f90aaabd
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"The performance of framework laws suggests a mixed picture. While \r\nthe structure of the UK Act successfully sets a  direction of travel \r\nand has resulted in a  credible independent body, it performs less \r\nwell in fostering integration across sectoral areas and providing an \r\nenforcement mechanism (Averchenkova et al. 2021). a  review of \r\nseven European climate change acts concludes that overall targets \r\nmay not be entirely aligned with planning, reporting and evaluation \r\nmechanisms, and that sanction mechanisms are lacking across the \r\nboard (Nash and Steurer 2019), which limit the scope for legislation \r\nto perform its integrative task. These observations suggest the need \r\nfor careful attention to the design of framework laws."


id: 38e66074d4e409959acc475254798f58
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"There is extremely limited evidence on the aggregate effects of \r\nclimate laws on climate outcomes, although there is a  broader \r\nliterature assessing climate policies (Section  13.6 in this chapter \r\nand Cross-Chapter Box  10 in Chapter  14). a  single assessment of \r\ndirect and indirect climate laws as well as relevant executive action \r\nacross a  global database finds a  measurable and positive effect: \r\nglobal annual emissions have reduced by about 5.9 CO2 compared \r\nto an estimation of what they otherwise would have been (Eskander \r\nand Fankhauser 2020). Climate laws require further research, \r\nincluding on the quantification of impact, framework versus sectoral \r\napproaches, and the various mechanisms through which laws act - \r\ntarget setting, creating institutional structures, mainstreaming and \r\nensuring compliance. "


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"Almost all Parties outlined domestic mitigation measures as key \r\ninstruments for achieving mitigation targets in specific priority areas \r\nsuch as energy supply (89%), transport (80%), buildings (72%), \r\nindustry (39%), agriculture (67%), LULUCF (75%) and waste (68%). \r\nRenewable energy generation was the most frequently indicated \r\nmitigation option (84%), followed by improving energy efficiency \r\nof buildings (63%) and multi-sector energy efficiency improvement \r\n(48%); afforestation, reforestation and revegetation  (48%); "


id: 16467acbdaf814c82ffce25b75c929cc
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"National climate strategies, which are often formulated through \r\nexecutive action, contribute to climate governance in several ways. \r\nStrategies enable discussion of low-emissions pathways while \r\naccounting for uncertainty, national circumstances and socio\u0002economic objectives (Falduto and Rocha 2020). "


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"and improving energy efficiency of transport (45%) (UNFCCC \r\nSecretariat 2021). Parties often communicated mitigation options \r\nrelated to the circular economy, including reducing waste (29%) \r\nand recycling waste (30%) and promoting circular economy (25%). \r\nMany Parties highlighted policy coherence and synergies between \r\ntheir mitigation measures and development priorities, which \r\nincluded long-term low-emission development strategy(LT-LEDS), \r\nthe sustainable development goals (SDGs) and, for some, green \r\nrecovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. "


id: da61b5e45fe29624235a383fa5e6a23a
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"Universal 'best-practice' formulations of organisations may not be \r\napplicable across country contexts, but institutions that are suited \r\nto national context can be ratcheted up over time in their scope \r\nand effectiveness (medium evidence, medium agreement). National \r\nclimate institutions take diverse forms because they emerge out of \r\ncountry-specific interactions between national climate politics and \r\nexisting institutional structures. Certain institutional forms tend to be \r\ncommon across countries, such as expert climate change commissions; \r\na review finds eleven such institutions in existence as of mid-2020. \r\nAlthough this institutional form may be common, these commissions \r\nvary in terms of expertise, independence and focus (Abraham-Dukuma \r\net al. 2020), reinforcing the important shaping role of national context. "


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"Some countries approach NDCs as an opportunity to integrate \r\nmitigation objectives and broader economic shifts or sectoral \r\ntransformations (medium evidence, medium agreement). For \r\nexample, Brazil's 2016 NDC focussed on emissions from land-use \r\nchange, including agricultural intensification, to align mitigation \r\nwith a  national development strategy of halting deforestation \r\nin the Amazon, and increasing livestock production (De Oliveira \r\nSilva et al. 2018). While the forest sector accounts for the bulk of \r\nMadagascar's mitigation potential, its NDC promotes GHG mitigation \r\nin both AFOLU and energy sectors to maximise co-benefits, and \r\nachieve a higher number of sustainable development goals (SDGs) \r\n(Nogueira et al. 2020). "


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"The central institutional arrangements of climate governance in the UK were established by the 2008 Climate Change Act (CCA): \r\nstatutory five-year carbon budgets; an independent advisory body, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC); mandatory progress \r\nmonitoring and reporting to Parliament; and continuous adaptive planning following a five-yearly cycle. The CCC is noteworthy as an \r\ninnovative institution that has also been emulated by other countries."


id: 1254c221aa8c1c20f2bc2e77961c1be2
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"The design of the CCC was influenced by the concept of independent central banking (Helm et al. 2003). It has established a reputation \r\nfor independent high quality analysis and information dissemination, is frequently referred to in Parliament and widely used by other \r\nactors in policy debates, all of which suggest a high degree of legitimacy (Averchenkova et al. 2018). However, since the CCC only \r\nrecommends rather than sets budgets (McGregor et al. 2012), accountability for meeting the carbon budgets works primarily through \r\nreputational and political effects rather than legal enforcement. "


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"created for other purposes that nonetheless have implications for \r\nmitigation outcomes (Dubash 2021). In relatively few countries do \r\nnew, purpose-built, legally-mandated bodies created specifically for \r\nclimate mitigation exist although this number is growing; examples \r\ninclude the UK (Averchenkova et al. 2018), China (Teng and Wang \r\n2021), Australia (Keenan et al. 2012) and New Zealand (Timperley \r\n2020). These cases indicate that dedicated and lasting institutions \r\nwith a  strategic long-term focus on mitigation emerge only under \r\nconditions of broad national political agreement around climate \r\nmitigation as a national priority (Dubash 2021). However, the specific \r\nforms of those institutions differ, as illustrated by the case of the UK's \r\nClimate Change Committee established as an independent agency \r\n(Box  13.2) and China, which is built around a  top-down planning \r\nstructure (Box 13.3)."


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"Where economy-wide institutions do not exist, new institutions may \r\nstill address sub-sets of the challenge. In Australia, while political \r\nconditions resulted in the repeal of an overarching Clean Energy \r\nAct in 2014, although a Climate Change Authority continued, other \r\ninstitutions primarily focused on the energy sector such as the Clean \r\nEnergy Regulator, the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, and the \r\nAustralia Renewable Agency continued to shape energy outcomes \r\n(MacNeil 2021). "


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"New rules and organisations are not only created, they are also \r\ndismantled or allowed to wither away. Cases of institutional \r\ndismantling or neglect include the Australian Clean Energy Act \r\n(Crowley 2017; MacNeil 2021), the Indian Prime Minister's Council \r\non Climate Change, which, while formally functional, effectively does "


id: df8fca5b82909e3f11278f172ab42c5c
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"Skovgaard (2012) suggests that there is an important distinction \r\nbetween finance ministries that bring a  limiting 'budget frame' \r\nto climate action, versus a 'market failure frame' that encourages \r\nbroader engagement by relevant ministries."


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"not meet (Pillai and Dubash 2021), and the weakening of climate \r\nunits inside sectoral ministries in Brazil (Hochstetler 2021). While \r\nthere is limited literature on the robustness of climate institutions, \r\ncase studies suggest institutions are more likely to emerge, persist \r\nand be effective when institutions map to a  framing of climate \r\nchange that has broad political support (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). Thus while mitigation focused framings and institutions \r\nmay win political support in some countries, in other cases sectorally \r\nfocused or multiple objectives oriented institutions may be most \r\nuseful and resilient (Dubash 2021). "


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"Coordination within federal systems poses additional complexities, \r\nsuch as overlapping authority across jurisdictions, multiple norms in \r\nplace, and approaches to coordination across scales (Brown 2012). \r\nMulti-level governance systems such as the EU can influence the \r\ndesign and functioning of climate policies and institutions in member \r\nstates, such as Germany (Skjaerseth 2017; Janicke and Wurzel 2019; \r\nFlachsland and Levi 2021) and the UK (Lockwood 2021a). In some \r\ncases, this can result in distinct European modes of governance as has \r\nbeen suggested occurred in the case of wind energy (Fitch-Roy 2016)."


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"Climate governance challenges include ensuring coordination, \r\nbuilding consensus by mediating conflict, and setting strategy \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). Coordination is important \r\nbecause climate change is an all-of-economy and society problem \r\nthat requires cross-sectoral and cross-scale action; building \r\nconsensus is needed because large-scale transformations can \r\nunsettle established interests; and strategy setting is required due \r\nto the transformative and time-bound nature of climate mitigation \r\n(Dubash et al. 2021). Yet, climate institutions have a mixed record in \r\naddressing these challenges. "


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"Within countries, institutional platforms allow federal and sub\u0002national governments to negotiate and agree on policy trajectories \r\n(Gordon 2015). In Germany, cooperation is channelled through \r\nperiodic meetings of environment ministers and centre-state working \r\ngroups (Weidner and Mez 2008; Brown 2012), and in Canada \r\nthrough bilateral negotiations and side-payments between scales of \r\ngovernment (Rabe 2007; Gordon 2015). Federal systems might allow \r\nfor sub-national climate action despite constraints at the federal \r\nlevel, as has occurred in Australia (Gordon 2015; MacNeil 2021) and \r\nthe United States (Rabe 2011; Jordaan et al. 2019; Bromley-Trujillo \r\nand Holman 2020; Thompson et al. 2020). Where agenda-setting \r\nrests with the central government, coordination may operate through \r\ntargets, as with China (Qi and Wu 2013), or frameworks for policy \r\naction, as in India (Vihma 2011; Jogesh and Dubash 2015)."


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"Institutions that provide coordination, integration across policy areas \r\nand mainstreaming are particularly important given the scope and \r\nscale of climate change (Candel and Biesbroek 2016; Tosun and Lang \r\n2017) (Section 13.7). Ministries of environment are often appointed \r\nas de facto agents of coordination, but have been hampered by \r\ntheir limited regulative authority and ability to engage in intra\u0002governmental bargaining with ministries with larger budgets and \r\npolitical heft (Aamodt 2018). "


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"Institutions can also create spaces to accommodate concerns of \r\nother actors (Upadhyaya et al. 2021). Deliberative bodies, such as \r\nGermany's Enquete Commission (Weidner and Mez 2008; Flachsland \r\nand Levi 2021) or the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change (Tyler and \r\nHochstetler 2021) provide a space for reconciling competing visions \r\nand approaches to climate change. Many countries are creating \r\ndeliberative bodies to forge 'Just Transition' strategies (Section 13.9). "


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"Without explicit coordination with finance ministries, there is a risk \r\nof parallel and non-complementary approaches. For example, the \r\nSouth African Treasury pursued a carbon tax without clear indication \r\nof how it interfaced with a  quantitative sectoral budget approach \r\nespoused by the environment ministry (Tyler and Hochstetler 2021). "


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"Spatially localised alternative discourses of justice are often more recognised socially than national and universal framings of climate \r\njustice (Bailey 2017). Participatory forms of governance such as climate assemblies and citizen juries (Ney and Verweij 2015) can help \r\nenhance the legitimacy of institutional decisions, even while empirical assessments suggest that these approaches continue to face \r\npractical challenges (Devaney et al. 2020; Sandover et al. 2021; Creasy et al. 2021). "


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"South Africa's national monitoring and evaluation system provides high-level guidance on information requirements and assessment \r\nmethodologies (DEA 2015). The country is developing a comprehensive, integrated National Climate Change Information System, \r\nto enable tracking, analysis and enhancement of South Africa's progress towards the country's transition to a low-carbon economy \r\nand climate-resilient society (DFFE Republic of South Africa 2021). It includes information on GHG emission reductions achieved, \r\nobserved and projected climate change, impacts and vulnerabilities, the impact of adaptation and mitigation actions, financial flows \r\nand technology transfer activities. South Africa's approach is premised upon continuous learning and improvement through a phased \r\nimplementation approach (DEA 2019). "


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"a recent innovation is the creation of Citizens' Assemblies that bring \r\ntogether representative samples of citizens to deliberate on policy \r\nquestions with the intent of informing them (Devaney et al. 2020; \r\nSandover et al. 2021). The ability of institutions to forge agreement \r\nalso rests on attention to procedural justice (Box 13.4)."


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"Since addressing climate change requires transformative intent and \r\nshifting development pathways (Sections 1.6, 3.6, 4.3, 4.4, 13.9, 17.3.2, \r\nand Cross-Chapter Box  5 in Chapter  4), institutions that can devise \r\nstrategies and set trajectories are useful enablers of transformation. \r\nStrategy setting often requires an overarching framework such as \r\nthrough framework laws that set targets (Averchenkova et al. 2017), \r\nor identify key sectors and opportunities for low-carbon transition \r\n(Hochstetler and Kostka 2015) and innovation (UNEP 2018). Few \r\ncountries have built deliberate and lasting institutions that provide \r\nstrategic intent, and those that have, have pursued different \r\napproaches. The UK's approach rests on five-yearly targets (Box 13.2); \r\nGermany requires sectoral budgets enforced through the Bundestag \r\n(Flachsland and Levi 2021); and China uses an apex decision-body to \r\nset targets (Teng and Wang 2021) (Box 13.3). "


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"The perceived need for attention to institutional capacity is \r\nhighlighted by the fact that the NDCs of 113 developing countries \r\nout of 169 countries studied list capacity building as a condition of \r\nNDC implementation (Pauw et al. 2020). While international support \r\nfor capacity is widely articulated as essential for many countries \r\n(Khan et al. 2020), ensuring the form of capacity is appropriate, \r\neffective and led domestically remains a challenge (Nago and Krott \r\n2020; Sokona 2021). "


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"Addressing all of these governance concerns  - coordination, \r\nmediating interests, and strategy setting  - require attention to \r\ninstitutional capacity. These include the capacity to address 'upstream' \r\npolicy issues of agenda setting, framing, analysis and policy design; \r\npursue goals even while mediating interests (Upadhyaya et al. 2021); "


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"Transnational networks have limited influence on climate policies \r\nwhere national governments exert top-down control (e.g., in the city \r\nof Rizhao, China) (Westman et al. 2019); where sub-national actors \r\nface political fragmentation, lack regulations, and financial and \r\nhuman resources; or where vertically-integrated governance exists, \r\nas in State of Sao Paulo, Santiago de Chile, and Mexico City (Romero\u0002Lankao et al. 2015; Setzer 2017)."


id: 5dd63c91a2d49bc909fa4dd539f4cda4
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"Jurisdiction over significant mitigation-related arenas like planning, \r\nhousing and community development reside at the sub-national \r\nlevel. To address linkages between mitigation and local concerns, \r\nsub-national actors engage in institution building within a broader \r\nsocio-economic and political context, with actors and institutions at \r\na multitude of scales shaping the effectiveness of sub-national-scale \r\ninterventions (Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a). Mitigation policies may \r\ndemand coordination between sectoral and jurisdictional units that \r\nhistorically have not collaborated; they may require sub-national \r\nactors to confront politically sensitive issues such as carbon taxes \r\nor increases in utility rates; and they may demand a redistribution \r\nof resources to protect endangered ecosystems or vulnerable \r\npopulations (Hughes and Romero-Lankao 2014). "


id: 3fe8f7aabb7110e4dd54c16558bb9389
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"Public support for sub-national climate institutions increases when \r\nclimate policies are linked to local issues such as travel congestion \r\nalleviation or air pollution control (Puppim de Oliveira 2013; Romero\u0002Lankao et al. 2013; Simon Rosenthal et al. 2015; Romero-Lankao \r\net al. 2015; Ryan 2015), or when embedded in development priorities \r\nthat receive support from the national government or citizens \r\n(Jorgensen et al. 2015b; Floater et al. 2016; Dubash et al. 2018). \r\nFor example, Indian cities have engaged in international climate \r\ncooperation seeking innovative solutions to address energy, water \r\nand infrastructure problems (Beermann et al. 2016). "


id: 3e1ae21f8ead2d432bc05eab2e07eb98
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"Sub-national actors have built climate institutions by creating new \r\nvisions and narratives, by setting new entities or committing existing \r\noffices, providing them with funds, staff and legal authority, or by \r\nexperimenting with innovative solutions that could be transferred \r\nto other local governments or scaled nationally (Hoffmann 2011; \r\nHoornweg et al. 2011; Aylett 2015; Hughes and Romero-Lankao 2014; \r\nRomero-Lankao et al. 2015; Hughes 2019b). These actors have also \r\ncreated task forces, referendums, coordination of financial and human \r\nresources, technical assistance, awareness campaigns and funding \r\n(Castan Broto 2017; Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a; Hughes 2019b). \r\nNational governments can play a key role supporting planning for \r\nclimate change at the regional and national level, for example, \r\nthrough the articulation of climate change action in national urban \r\npolitics (Van Den Berg et al. 2018; Cobbinah et al. 2019). "


id: a49155a02fa515cc265f49a39f732de1
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"Availability of federal funding is a fundamental pillar of city actors' \r\ncapacity to develop mitigation policies. Administrative structures, \r\nsuch as the presence of a  professional city manager and staff \r\nassigned specifically to climate efforts (Simon Rosenthal et al. 2015). \r\nCooperation between administrative departments, and the creation \r\nof knowledge and data on energy use and emissions are also \r\nessential for mitigation planning (Hughes and Romero-Lankao 2014; \r\nRyan 2015). For example, the high technical competency of Tokyo's \r\nbureaucracy combined with availability of historical and current data \r\nenabled the city's unique cap-and-trade system on large building \r\nfacilities (Roppongi et al. 2017)."


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"Multi-jurisdictional and multi-sectoral sub-national networks in \r\ndozens of countries globally have helped build climate institutions. \r\nThey have also facilitated social and institutional learning, and \r\naddressed gaps in national policy (Holden and Larsen 2015; Jordan \r\net al. 2015; Setzer 2015; Haarstad 2016; Hermwille 2018; Kammerer \r\nand Namhata 2018; Rashidi and Patt 2018; Westman and Castan \r\nBroto 2018; Lee and Jung 2018; Lee 2019; Schwartz 2019). "


id: ace81746de978f9e7df9ea7355352f9b
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"Visions and narratives about the future benefits or risks of climate \r\nchange are often effectively advanced at the sub-national level, \r\ndrawing on local governmental abilities to bring together actors \r\ninvolved in place-based decarbonisation across sectors (Hodson \r\nand Marvin 2009; Bush et al. 2016; Huang et al. 2018; Prendeville \r\net al. 2018; Levenda et al. 2019). For example, in the plans of \r\n43 C40 Cities, climate action is framed as part of a vision for vibrant, \r\neconomically prosperous, and socially just cities, that are habitable, \r\nsecure, resource-efficient, socially and economically inclusive, and \r\ncompetitive internationally (Romero-Lankao and Gnatz 2019). "


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"Transnational networks have opened opportunities for sub-national \r\nactors to play a crucial mitigation role in political stalemates (Jones \r\n2014; Schwartz 2019). The C40, the Global Covenant of Mayors for \r\nClimate and Energy, and ICLEI have disseminated information on best \r\npractices and promoted knowledge sharing between sub-national \r\ngovernments (Lee 2013; Hakelberg 2014; Heidrich et al. 2016; Kona \r\net al. 2016; Di Gregorio et al. 2020) (Section 14.5.5). Organisations \r\nsuch as the US Carbon Cycle Working Group of the United States \r\nGlobal Change Research Program, the Australian Climate Action \r\nNetwork, and the Mexican Metropolitan Environmental Commission \r\nhave helped facilitate coordination and learning across multiple \r\njurisdictions and sectors, and connected ambiguous spaces between \r\npublic, private and civil society actors (Romero-Lankao et al. 2015; \r\nHorne and Moloney 2019; Hughes 2019b). "


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"However, institution building is often constrained by a lack of national \r\nsupport, funding, human resources, coalitions, coordination across \r\nold and new organisations, and the ability to create new institutional \r\ncompetences (Valenzuela 2014; Jorgensen et al. 2015a; Ryan 2015; \r\nDubash et al. 2018; Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a; Anderton and Setzer \r\n2018; Cointe 2019; Di Gregorio et al. 2019; Jaccard et al. 2019; Hughes \r\n2019b). Climate mitigation can also be limited by cultural norms and \r\nvalues of policy actors with varying levels of power, and shifting \r\nalliances (Lachapelle et al. 2012; Damso et al. 2016; Giampieri et al. \r\n2019; Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a). "


id: 808ba9a7897e14d08c51a11ea0a66f18
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"Durban has effectively linked climate change agendas with ongoing sustainability actions and goals. To do so, adaptation has \r\nbeen broadened to include a just transition to a low-carbon future to address development, energy security and GHG reduction \r\n(Roberts et al. 2016). "


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"Durban has mainstreamed climate and justice concerns within local government through strong local leadership by key individuals and \r\ndepartments; included climate concerns within various municipal short-term and long-term planning processes; mobilised civil society; \r\nenhanced local and international networking; explored funding opportunities; and restructured institutions (Roberts et al. 2016). "


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"Durban shows that embedding responses to climate change within local government activities requires that climate change is made\r\nrelevant locally and framed within a broader environmental justice framework (Roberts 2010). Civil society has been key in balancing \r\nthe influence of the private sector on Durban's dynamic political process (Aylett 2013). "


id: a9be29ecfb8789bc12d2e6b5f37a66b9
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"Institution building is constrained by inequities; resources, legal remit, \r\nknowledge, and political clout vary widely within and among sub\u0002national governments globally (Jorgensen et al. 2015b; Genus and \r\nTheobald 2016; Joffe and Smith 2016; Klinsky 2018; Reckien et al. \r\n2018; Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi 2019). Dominant discourses tend \r\nto prioritise scientific and technical expertise and, thus, they focus on \r\ninfrastructural and economic concerns over the concerns and needs \r\nof disadvantaged populations (Heikkinen et al. 2019; Romero-Lankao \r\nand Gnatz 2019)."


id: 97d76869a624f9bf813dc6f12f171fb4
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"Moreover, deep mitigation requires moving beyond existing \r\ntechnological responses (Mulugetta and Castan Broto 2018) to \r\npolicies that correspond to the realities of developing countries \r\n(Bouteligier 2013). However, best practice approaches tend to \r\nbe fragmented due to the requirements of different contexts, and \r\noften executed as pilot projects that rarely lead to structural change \r\n(Nagorny-Koring 2019). Instead, context-specific approaches that \r\ninclude consideration of values, cultures and governance better \r\nenable successful translation of best practices (Affolderbach and \r\nSchulz 2016; Urpelainen 2018)."


id: 5e3b7e5e3780c2e3bba2d94801a2eac3
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"A growing literature suggests that ambitious climate policy emerges \r\nout of strong domestic political support (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement) (Aklin and Mildenberger 2020; Lamb and Minx 2020; \r\nColgan et al. 2021). Such support is the outcome of political interest \r\nconstellations and struggles that vary from country to country. \r\nStructural factors (such as economic wealth and natural resources, \r\nthe character of the national political system, and the dominant ideas, \r\nvalues and beliefs) shape how climate change is governed (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Boasson 2015; Hochstetler 2020). This \r\nsection assesses the ways these structural factors affect political \r\ndynamics and decision-making, and ultimately constrain, sustain or \r\nenable development of domestic climate governance."


id: 849831a1236661fb6d3ece28c8e71774
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"To address this situation requires procedural justice that involves \r\nall communities, particularly disadvantaged, in climate mitigation \r\ndecisions and policies (Box 13.4). Also essential is recognition justice, \r\nthat addresses past inequities through tools such as subsidies, \r\ntariffs, rebates, and other policies (Agyeman 2013; Rydin 2013; UN \r\nHabitat 2016). Both tenets are key to ensure the fair distribution of \r\nbenefits or negative impacts from mitigation policies (distributional \r\njustice) (McCauley and Heffron 2018; Lewis et al. 2020). However, \r\nthe benefits of inclusive approaches are often overlooked in favour \r\nof growth oriented mitigation and planning (Rydin 2013; Altenburg \r\n2011; Smith 2019; Lennon 2020). Box  13.6 discusses how the "


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"While these structural factors are crucial, they do not determine the \r\noutlook of given countries' climate governance, as civic, corporate \r\nand/or political groups or individuals can be mobilised and seek \r\nto counteract these structural effects, as indicated in the following \r\nSection 13.4 that examines the role of various actors and agencies \r\nin shaping governance processes. Taken together, Sections 13.3 and \r\n13.4 show that domestic climate governance is not fully constrained \r\nby structural factors, but rather that diverse actors can and do achieve \r\nsubstantial changes."


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"potential trade-offs and challenges (Dagnachew et al. 2018; Ellis \r\nand Tschakert 2019; Penasco et al. 2021) (Section  13.7.2 for \r\nwider discussion)."


id: 6f12e3e31a5e728a3dab87553da501d1
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"Material endowments are natural and economic resources, such as \r\nfossil fuels and renewable energy, forests and land, and economic or \r\nfinancial resources, which tend to shape developments of domestic \r\nclimate governance (medium evidence, high agreement) (Friedrichs \r\nand Inderwildi 2013; Lachapelle and Paterson 2013; Bang et al. 2015; \r\nLamb and Minx 2020). Most countries' social and economic systems \r\nare largely developed on the basis of their material endowment, and \r\nthus they contribute to shape the distribution of political power in \r\nthat country (Hall and Soskice 2001). Material endowments are by \r\nno means the only influencing factor, and actors may succeed to \r\neither circumvent or exploit material endowments to impact climate \r\ngovernance (limited evidence, medium agreement) (Boasson 2015; \r\nGreen and Hale 2017; Aklin and Mildenberger 2020). "


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"The effectiveness of domestic climate governance will significantly \r\nrely on how well it fits with the features of the countries' specific \r\npolitical systems (limited evidence, high agreement) (Schmitz \r\n2017; Lamb and Minx 2020). Political systems have developed \r\nover generations and constitute a set of formal institutions, such as \r\nlaws and regulations, bureaucratic structures, political executives, \r\nlegislative assemblies and political parties (Egeberg 1999; Pierson \r\n2004). Different political systems create differing conditions for \r\nclimate governance to emerge and evolve, but because political \r\nsystems are so politically and historically entrenched they are not \r\nlikely to change quickly even though this could facilitate domestic \r\nclimate mitigation efforts (medium evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Duit and Galaz 2008; Boasson et al. 2021). In addition, variations \r\nin governance capacities also affect climate policy making and \r\nimplementation (Meckling and Nahm 2018). "


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"Broader public participation and more open contestation spaces tend \r\nto nurture more encompassing climate policies, facilitate stronger \r\ncommitments to international agreements (Battig and Bernauer 2009; \r\nBohmelt et al. 2016), achieve more success in decoupling economic \r\ngrowth from CO2 emissions (Laegreid and Povitkina 2018), reduce \r\nmore CO2 emissions (Clulow 2019; von Stein 2020), and maintain \r\nlower deforestation rates (medium evidence, medium agreement) \r\n(Buitenzorgy and Mol 2011). States with less public participation \r\nand contestation space can also develop ambitious climate emission \r\nreduction targets and institutions (Zimmer et al. 2015; Eckersley \r\n2016; Han 2017; Engels 2018), but the drivers and effects of climate \r\npolicies within less open and liberal political contexts has not yet \r\nbeen sufficiently investigated. "


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"Rich carbon-intensive resources and well developed infrastructure \r\ncan make low-carbon activities relatively less economically profitable, \r\nand negatively influence some perceptions of climate mitigation \r\npotential (Bertram et al. 2015a; Erickson et al. 2015). If effective \r\nclimate policies are introduced despite this, they can alter the \r\nimportance of country's material endowments in a way that underpin \r\nmore forceful climate governance over time. For instance, policy \r\ninterventions to limit fossil fuel exploitation or support renewable \r\nenergy deployment may change the value of these energy resources \r\nover time (Schmitz et al. 2015; Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2018; Chailleux \r\n2020; Colgan et al. 2021). "


id: f3a9c4b5b41a317e67a13a8f44e401ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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vector_id: 35850
content:
"Developing countries face additional material constraints in climate \r\ngovernance due to challenges associated with underdevelopment \r\nand scarce economic or natural resources (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). Hence, many developing countries design domestic \r\nclimate mitigation policies in combination with policy goals that \r\naddress various developmental challenges (von Stechow et al. \r\n2016; Deng et al. 2017; Thornton and Comberti 2017; Campagnolo \r\nand Davide 2019), such as air quality, urban transportation, energy \r\naccess, and poverty alleviation (Klausbruckner et al. 2016; Li \r\net al. 2016; Melamed et al. 2016; Slovic et al. 2016; Khreis et al. \r\n2017; Geall et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2018). Combining climate and \r\ndevelopmental policies for beneficial synergies should not overlook "


id: b81abc8179d4d4535cf40ac0587c33f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26494
content:
"However, new norms sometimes only influence political discussion \r\nand not actual governance. For instance, more ambitious climate \r\nemission reduction targets may not lead to more effective mitigation \r\nactions or policy instruments. Put another way, words do not replace \r\nactions (Geden 2016). "


id: 6ad62dce63ef27f9fcb7d2db45967318
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14419
content:
"Significant variation in ideas, values and beliefs related to climate \r\ngovernance are detected across and within regions, countries, \r\nsocieties, organisations, and individuals (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement) (Shwom et al. 2015; Boasson et al. 2021; Knox-Hayes \r\n2016; Wettestad and Gulbrandsen 2018). These factors provide the \r\ncontext for climate policymaking and include differences in countries' \r\nhistories (Aamodt 2018; Aamodt and Boasson 2020); the political \r\nculture and regulatory traditions in governing environmental and \r\nenergy issues (Tosun 2018; Aamodt 2018; Boasson et al. 2021); \r\nand even bureaucrats' educational background (Rickards et al. \r\n2014). Structural factors in a  country, such as deeply held value \r\nsystems, are not changed rapidly, just as political systems or natural \r\nendowments, are not changed rapidly. Consequently, climate policy \r\nand governance is more effective if it takes into account these deep\u0002rooted values and beliefs."


id: 93cd2dcc4bf22444936e7bdcf2064597
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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vector_id: 20765
content:
"Differences in dominant individual preferences may also be important. \r\nThe factors that shape individual ideas, values and beliefs about \r\nclimate governance include trust in politicians, the state and other \r\npeople in general (Drews and van den Bergh 2016; Harring et al. 2019; \r\nHuber et al. 2020), fairness beliefs, variation in political orientation \r\n(left leaning more concerned), and class (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement) (Schmitz et al. 2018; Inglehart and Norris 2017). "


id: 948747dee6f83fba4e16e17cec48c3e2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20883
content:
"Levels of climate change concern on the individual level have \r\nincreased in most countries (Shwom et al. 2015), and vary with \r\ngender (females are more concerned), and place of residence (urban \r\nresidents are more concerned) (Shwom et al. 2015; McCright et al. \r\n2016a; Ziegler 2017). The higher educated in developing countries \r\ntend to be more concerned (Lee et al. 2015) while individuals working \r\nin polluting industries tend to oppose forceful climate governance \r\n(Bechtel et al. 2019; Mildenberger 2020). "


id: 28068bd27ccaf422c24bf4980af195b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3703
content:
"Ideas, values and beliefs affect climate governance by shaping \r\npeople's perceptions, attitude, and preferences on specific policy and \r\ngovernance issues (medium evidence, high agreement) (Boasson \r\n2015; McCright et al. 2016b; Schifeling and Hoffman 2019; Leipold \r\net al. 2019; Boasson et al. 2021). While these are often entrenched, \r\nthey can also change, for instance when facing growing exposures \r\nto climate risks, stronger scientific evidence, and dominant public or \r\npolitical discourse (Mayer et al. 2017; Diehl et al. 2021). While change \r\ntend to be incremental, the pace of change may vary substantially \r\nacross countries and specific climate issue areas."


id: 8b65996674a32daf18cb99366843e6c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
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vector_id: 19451
content:
"medium agreement) (Schleich et al. 2018; Mildenberger and Tingley \r\n2019). For example, emission trading schemes are welcomed as a new \r\nregulatory instrument in China in the context of its market-oriented \r\nreforms and ideological shift in the past decades (Lo 2013). Based \r\non the study of 167 nation-states and 95 sub-national jurisdictions \r\nwith carbon pricing, researchers find that that high public belief in \r\nclimate science underpin adoption of systems that produce a rather \r\nhigh carbon price (Levi et al. 2020). These public opinions need to \r\nbe identified and leveraged in supporting specific policy choices \r\nor changes (Mildenberger and Tingley 2019). Policy support tends \r\nto be greater if people believe effective measures are being taken \r\nby other actors, including other households (Bostrom et al. 2018; \r\nMarlon et al. 2019), and other countries and at the international level \r\n(Schleich et al. 2018). "


id: d3256163fc50bc326344d1bbb2ef1e1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30745
content:
"A broad array of actors are engaged in shaping mitigation policy \r\nprocesses, including politicians and political parties, corporate actors, \r\ncitizen groups, indigenous peoples organisations, labour unions and \r\ninternational organisations. Actors aiming to influence the climate\u0002related policymaking process are studied together to understand \r\nclimate policy dynamics and outcomes (Bulkeley 2000; Fisher 2004; \r\nJost and Jacob 2004; Jasny et al. 2015; Fisher and Leifeld 2019; Jasny \r\nand Fisher 2019) and collaboration and influence within climate \r\npolicy networks (Ingold and Fischer 2014; McAllister et al. 2014; \r\nWagner and Yla-Anttila 2018; Kammerer et al. 2021). Most research, \r\nhowever, focuses on one particular type of actor. "


id: 2e6f0cac6d69289f809a61cc4c1f5ccb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4754
content:
"On the other hand, anti-climate ideas or beliefs may arise due to \r\nthe introduction of more constraining or ambitious climate policies, \r\nfor example protests in reaction to toll roads in Norway, which \r\nincrease the cost of driving, or protests in France against increasing \r\ncarbon taxes (Grossman 2019; Wanvik and Haarstad 2021). The \r\npolicy implication is that vulnerable or effected groups should be \r\nconsidered when introducing policy change, and that participation, \r\ntransparency, and good communication all helps to reduce climate\u0002related discontent. "


id: 65423b046e8e395b7a0d417ddb245f5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13507
content:
"Political actors are decision-makers, and also influence whether \r\nclimate governance is perceived as urgent and appropriate (Okereke \r\net al. 2019; Ferrante and Fearnside 2019; Boasson et al. 2021). They \r\ninclude political parties, legislative assemblies and committees, \r\ngovernmental executives and the political leaders of governmental \r\nministries (Boasson 2015). They are more likely to pay attention to \r\nclimate issues when polling indicates high political salience with the \r\npublic (Carter 2006, 2014), or when it becomes a  contested issue \r\namong differing political parties (Boasson et al. 2021). Fluctuations \r\nin the public's interest and attention may underpin a  disjointed \r\napproach in politicians' engagement (Willis 2017, 2018). Policy \r\nimplementation can be hampered if political actors propose frequent \r\npolicy changes (Boasson et al. 2021). "


