# document

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"A recent development in the literature on international climate \r\ngovernance has been increased attention to the potential for climate \r\nclubs (Victor 2011). Hovi et al. (2016) define these as 'any international \r\nactor group that (1) starts with fewer members than the UNFCCC \r\nhas and (2) aims to cooperate on one or more climate change\u0002related activities, notably mitigation, adaptation, climate engineering \r\nor climate compensation'. While providing public goods (such as \r\nmitigation), they also offer member-only benefits (such as preferential \r\ntariff rates) to entice membership. In practice, climate clubs are sub\u0002global arrangements, and formal agreement by interstate treaty is not \r\na prerequisite. Actors do not have to be states, although in the literature \r\non climate clubs states have hitherto dominated"


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" The literature has an \r\nessentially static dimension that focuses on the incentives for actors \r\nto join such a club, and a dynamic one which focuses on the 'building \r\nblocks' for global cooperative agreements. "


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"The literature focusing on the static aspects of clubs highlight that \r\nthey represent 'coalitions of the willing' (Falkner 2016a; Gampfer \r\n2016; Falkner et al. 2021), which offer a package of benefits, part of \r\nwhich are pure public goods (available also to non-club members), \r\nand others are club benefits that are only available to members (Hovi \r\net al. 2016). The members-only or excludable part can be a system \r\nof transfers within the club to compensate the countries with higher \r\ncosts. For example, the benefit from participating in the club can be to \r\nhave access to a common emissions trading system, which in general \r\nis more attractive the larger the diversity of the countries involved, \r\nalthough this is not a general result, as discussed in detail in Doda \r\nand Taschini (2017)"


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" However, as costs and effort-sharing agreements \r\nare unsuccessful in a static context (Barrett 1994), mainly due to free\u0002rider incentives, several studies have proposed using tariffs on trade \r\nor other forms of sanctions to reduce incentives for free-riding (Helm \r\nand Sprinz 2000; Eyland and Zaccour 2012; Anoulies 2015; Nordhaus \r\n2015; Al Khourdajie and Finus 2020). For example, Nordhaus (2015) \r\nuses a  coalition formation game model to show that a  uniform \r\npercentage tariff on the imports from nonparticipants into the club \r\nregion (at a relatively low tariff rate of about 2%) can induce high \r\nparticipation within a range of carbon price values. More recently, \r\nAl Khourdajie and Finus (2020) show that border carbon adjustments "


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"Analytic approaches centred on equity and development figure \r\nprominently within this report, with many of the key concepts \r\naddressed in Chapter  4. Primarily the focus is on aligning climate \r\npolicy at the international level with efforts to shift development \r\npathways towards improved quality of life and greater sustainability \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4). There are also overlaps between \r\nthe equity framework and the others. Within the global commons \r\nframing, the emphasis is on international carbon markets to \r\nreduce the costs from climate policies, and as way of generating \r\nfinancial flows to developing countries (Michaelowa et al. 2019a)"


id: a38af39bcdee35dd6e853dd1f56adbf7
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" \r\nThe transitions framing, while focused empirically primarily on \r\nindustrialised countries, nevertheless aligns with an understanding of \r\nclimate mitigation taking place within a wider development agenda; \r\nin many cases it is a lack of development that creates a barrier to rapid \r\nsystem transformation, which international cooperation can address \r\n(Delina and Sovacool 2018) (Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16)."


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"are stable against a leader willing to change its status, for example, \r\nfrom leader to follower, or even completely leaving the climate club, \r\nfinding in most cases such stability to exist. Related studies on the \r\nmacroeconomic incentives for climate clubs by Paroussos et al. \r\n(2019) show that climate clubs are reasonably stable, both internally \r\nand externally (i.e., no member willing to leave and no new member \r\nwilling to join), and climate clubs that include obligations in line \r\nwith the 2degC goal combined with financial incentives can facilitate \r\ntechnology diffusion. The authors also show that preferential trade \r\narrangements for low-carbon goods can reduce the macroeconomic \r\neffects of mitigation policies. Aakre et al"


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" (2018) show numerically \r\nthat small groups of countries can limit black carbon in the Arctic, \r\ndriven mainly for reasons of self-interest, yet reducing methane \r\nrequires larger coalitions due to its larger geographical dispersal and \r\nrequires stronger cooperation."


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"In a  dynamic context, the literature on climate clubs highlights the \r\nco-called 'building blocks' approach (Stewart et al. 2013a,b, 2017). \r\nThis is a bottom-up strategy designed to create an array of smaller\u0002scale, specialised initiatives for transnational cooperation in particular \r\nsectors and/or geographic areas with a wide range of participants. As \r\npart of this literature, Potoski and Prakash (2013) provide a conceptual \r\noverview of voluntary environmental clubs, showing that many climate \r\nclubs do not require demanding obligations for membership and that \r\na  substantial segment thereof are mostly informational (Weischer \r\net al. 2012; Andresen 2014). Also crafted onto the building blocks \r\napproach, Potoski (2017) demonstrates the theoretical potential for \r\ngreen certification and green technology clubs"


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" Green (2017) further \r\nhighlights the potential of 'pseudo-clubs' with fluid membership \r\nand limited member benefits to promote the diffusion and uptake \r\nof mitigation standards. Falkner et al. (2021) suggest a  typology of \r\nnormative, bargaining, and transformational clubs. Before the adoption \r\nof the Paris Agreement, some literature suggested that the emergence \r\nof climate clubs in parallel to the multilateral climate regime would lead \r\nto 'forum shopping', with states choosing the governance arrangement \r\nthat best suits their interests (McGee and Taplin 2006; van Asselt \r\n2007; Biermann et al. 2009; Oh and Matsuoka 2017). However, more \r\nrecent literature suggests that climate clubs complement rather than \r\nchallenge the international regime established by the UNFCCC (van \r\nAsselt and Zelli 2014; Falkner 2016a; Draguljic 2019). "


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"In this dynamic context, one question is whether to negotiate a single \r\nglobal agreement or to start with smaller agreements in the hope that \r\nthey will eventually evolve into a larger agreement. It has been debated \r\nextensively in the context of free trade whether a multilateral (global) \r\nnegotiating approach is preferable to a  regional approach, seen as \r\na building block towards global free trade. Aghion et al. (2007) analysed \r\nthis issue formally for trade, showing that a  leader would always \r\nchoose to move directly to a global agreement. In the case of climate \r\nchange, it appears that even the mildest form of club discussed above \r\n(an efforts and costs sharing agreement, as in the case of the linkage \r\nof emissions trading systems) can yield global cooperation following \r\na building blocks approach, and that the sequential path relying on \r\nbuilding blocks may be the only way to reach global cooperation over \r\ntime (Caparros and Pereau 2017)"


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" While the existence of a  nearly \r\nuniversal agreement such as the Paris Agreement may arguably have \r\nrendered this discussion less relevant, the Paris Agreement co-exists, \r\nand will likely continue to do so, with a  multitude of sectoral and \r\nregional agreements, meaning that this discussion is still relevant for \r\nthe evolution of these complementary regimes. "


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"Many have pointed to the Montreal Protocol, addressing stratospheric \r\nozone loss, as an example of a  successful treaty because of its \r\nultimate environmental effectiveness, and relevance for solving \r\nclimate change. Scholarship emerging since AR5 emphasises that \r\nthe Paris Agreement has a greater 'bottom-up' character than many \r\nother MEAs, including the Montreal or Kyoto Protocols, allowing for \r\nmore decentralised 'polycentric' forms of governance that engage \r\ndiverse actors at the regional, national and sub-national levels \r\n(Ostrom 2010; Jordan et al. 2015; Falkner 2016b; Victor 2016). \r\nGiven the differences in architecture, lessons drawn from studies \r\nof MEA regimes need to be supplemented with assessments of the \r\neffectiveness of cooperative efforts at other governance levels and in \r\nother forums. Emerging research in this area proposes methodologies \r\nfor this task (Hsu et al. 2019a)"


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" Findings highlight the persistence \r\nof similar imbalances between developed and developing countries \r\nas at the global level, as well as the need for more effective ways \r\nto incentivise private sector engagement in transnational climate \r\ngovernance (Chan et al. 2018)."


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"The international climate change regime, in evolution for three \r\ndecades, comprises the 1992 UNFCCC, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and \r\nthe 2015 Paris Agreement. The UNFCCC is a 'framework' convention, \r\ncapturing broad convergence among states on an objective, a set of \r\nprinciples, and general obligations relating to mitigation, adaptation, \r\nreporting and support. The UNFCCC categorises Parties into Annex \r\nI and Annex II. Annex I Parties, comprising developed country Parties, \r\nhave a goal to return, individually or jointly, their GHG emissions to \r\n1990 levels by 2000. Annex II Parties, comprising developed country \r\nParties except for those with economies in transition, have additional \r\nobligations relating to the provision of financial and technology \r\nsupport. Parties including developing country Parties, characterised as \r\nnon-Annex-I Parties, have reporting obligations, as well as obligations \r\nto take policies and measures on mitigation and adaptation"


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" The \r\nUNFCCC also establishes the institutional building blocks for global \r\nclimate governance. Both the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris \r\nAgreement are distinct but 'related legal instruments' in that only \r\nParties to the UNFCCC can be Parties to these later instruments."


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"Finally, the literature on the performance of other MEAs highlights \r\nthe importance of institutional strength, which can include regulative \r\nquality, mechanisms to enhance transparency and accountability, \r\nand administrative capacity. Regulative quality includes guidance \r\nand signalling (Oberthur et al. 2017), as well as clear rules and \r\nstandards to facilitate collective action (Oberthur and Bodle 2016). \r\nThe literature is clear that legally-binding obligations (which \r\nrequire the formal expression of state consent) and non-binding \r\nrecommendations can each be appropriate, depending on the \r\nparticular circumstances (Skjaerseth et al. 2006), and indeed it has \r\nbeen argued that for climate change non-binding recommendations \r\nmay better fit the capacity of global governance organisations (Victor \r\n2011)"


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" Mechanisms to enhance transparency and accountability are \r\nessential to collect, protect, and analyse relevant data about Parties' \r\nimplementation of their obligations, and to identify and address \r\nchallenges in implementation (Kramarz and Park 2016; Kinley et al. \r\n2020). Administrative capacity refers to the strength of the formal \r\nbodies established to serve the Parties to the regime and help \r\nensure compliance and goal attainment (Andler and Behrle 2009; \r\nBauer et al. 2017). "


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"The 2015 Paris Agreement was negotiated in a  starkly different \r\ngeopolitical context to that of the 1992 UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto \r\nProtocol (Streck and Terhalle 2013; Ciplet et al. 2015). The 'rupturing \r\nbinary balance of superpowers' of the 1980s had given way to \r\na multipolar world with several distinctive trends: emerging economies \r\nbegan challenging US dominance (Ciplet et al. 2015); industrialised \r\ncountries' emissions peaked in the 2010s and started declining, \r\nwhile emissions from emerging economies began to grow (Falkner \r\n2019); the EU stretched eastwards and became increasingly supra\u0002national (Kinley et al. 2020); disparities within the group of developing \r\ncountries increased (Ciplet et al. 2015); and the role of non-state actors \r\nin mitigation efforts has grown more salient (Backstrand et al. 2017; \r\nKuyper et al. 2018b; Falkner 2019)"


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" The rise of emerging powers, many \r\nof whom now have 'veto power', however, some noted, did not detract \r\nfrom the unequal development and inequality at the heart of global \r\nenvironmental politics (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012)."


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"Although both the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement are under \r\nthe UNFCCC, they are generally seen as representing fundamentally \r\ndifferent approaches to international cooperation on climate change \r\n(Held and Roger 2018; Falkner 2016b). The Paris Agreement has been \r\ncharacterised as a 'decisive break' from the Kyoto Protocol (Keohane \r\nand Oppenheimer 2016). Some note that the mitigation efforts under \r\nthe Kyoto Protocol take the form of targets that, albeit based on \r\nnational self-selection, were part of the multilateral negotiation process, \r\nwhereas under the Paris Agreement Parties make Nationally Determined \r\nContributions. The different approaches have been characterised by \r\nsome as a distinction between a 'top down' and 'bottom up' approach \r\n(Bodansky and Rajamani 2016; Bodansky et al. 2016; Chan et al"


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" 2016; \r\nDoelle 2016) but others disagree with such a characterisation, pointing \r\nto continuities within the regime, for example, in terms of rules for \r\nreporting and review, and crossover and use of common institutional \r\narrangements (Depledge 2017; Allan 2019). Some note, in any case, \r\nthat the Kyoto Protocol's core obligations are substantive obligations \r\nof result, while many of the Paris Agreement's core obligations are \r\nprocedural obligations, complemented by obligations of conduct \r\n(Rajamani 2016a; Mayer 2018a). "


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"In this altered context, unlike in the 1990s when the main cleavages \r\nwere between the EU and the US (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012), US-\r\nChina 'great power politics' came to be seen as determinative of \r\noutcomes in the climate change negotiations (Terhalle and Depledge \r\n2013). The US-China joint announcement (Whitehouse 2014), \r\nfor instance, before the 2014 Lima climate conference, brokered \r\nthe deal on differentiation that came to be embodied in the Paris \r\nAgreement (Rajamani 2016a; Ciplet and Roberts 2017). Others have \r\nidentified, on the basis of economic standing, political influence, and \r\nemissions levels, three influential groups - the first comprising the \r\nUSA with Japan, Canada, and Russia, the second comprising the \r\nEU and the third comprising China, India and Brazil (Brenton 2013). \r\nThe emergence of the Major Economies Fora, among other climate \r\nclubs (discussed in Section 14.2.2) reflects this development (Brenton \r\n2013)"


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" It also represents a 'minilateral' forum, built on a recognition \r\nof power asymmetries, in which negotiating compromises are \r\npolitically tested and fed into multilateral processes (Falkner 2016a). "


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"The differences between and continuities in the three treaties that \r\ncomprise the UN climate regime are summarised in Table  14.3. \r\nThe Kyoto targets apply only to Annex I Parties, but the procedural \r\nobligations relating to NDCs in the Paris Agreement apply to all \r\nParties, with flexibilities in relation to some obligations for Least \r\nDeveloped Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), \r\nand developing countries that need them in light of their capacities. \r\nThe Kyoto targets are housed in its Annex B, therefore requiring \r\na formal process of amendment for revision, whereas the Paris NDCs \r\nare located in an online registry that is maintained by the Secretariat, \r\nbut to which Parties can upload their own NDCs. The Kyoto Protocol \r\nallows Annex B  Parties to use three market-based mechanisms \r\n- the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation \r\nand International Emissions Trading - to fulfil a part of their GHG \r\ntargets"


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" The Paris Agreement recognises that Parties may choose \r\nto cooperate voluntarily on markets, in the form of cooperative \r\napproaches under Article 6.2, and a mechanism with international \r\noversight under Article 6.4, subject to guidance and rules that are \r\nyet to be adopted. These rules relate to integrity and accounting "


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"not wholly developing' (Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2013). This fissure \r\nin part led to the High Ambition Coalition in Paris between vulnerable \r\ncountries and the more progressive industrialised countries (Ciplet \r\nand Roberts 2017). A  division also emerged between the BASIC \r\ncountries (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012), that each have distinctive \r\nidentities and positions (Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2013). In the lead \r\nup to the Paris negotiations, China and India formed the Like-Minded \r\nDeveloping Countries with the Organization of the Petroleum \r\nExporting Countries (OPEC) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the \r\nPeoples of our Americas (ALBA) countries, to resist the erosion of \r\ndifferentiation in the regime. Yet, the 'complex and competing' \r\nidentities of India and China, with differing capacities, challenges \r\nand self-images, have also influenced the negotiations (Ciplet and \r\nRoberts 2017; Rajamani 2017)"


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" Other developing countries' coalitions \r\nalso played an important role in striking the final deal in Paris. The \r\nAlliance of Small Island States, despite their lack of structural power, \r\nplayed a leading role, in particular in relation to the inclusion of the \r\n1.5degC long-term temperature goal in the UN climate regime (Agueda \r\nCorneloup and Mol 2014; Ourbak and Magnan 2018). The Association \r\nof the Latin American and Caribbean Countries (AILAC) that emerged \r\nin 2012 also played a decisive role in fostering ambition (Edwards \r\net al. 2017; Watts and Depledge 2018)."


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"negotiating process (Rajamani 2015; Maljean-Dubois and Wemaere \r\n2016; Bodansky et al. 2017b; Klein et al. 2017), the Paris Agreement \r\nis a treaty containing provisions of differing levels of 'bindingness' \r\n(Bodansky 2016; Oberthur and Bodle 2016; Rajamani 2016b). The \r\nlegal character of provisions within a treaty, and the extent to which \r\nparticular provisions lend themselves to assessments of compliance \r\nor non-compliance, depends on factors such as the normative content \r\nof the provision, the precision of its terms, the language used, and \r\nthe oversight mechanisms in place (Werksman 2010; Bodansky \r\n2015; Oberthur and Bodle 2016; Rajamani 2016b). Assessed on these \r\ncriteria, the Paris Agreement contains the full spectrum of provisions, \r\nfrom hard to soft law (Rajamani 2016b; Pickering et al. 2019) and even \r\n'non-law', provisions that do not have standard-setting or normative \r\ncontent but which play a narrative-building and context-setting role \r\n(Rajamani 2016b)"


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" The Paris Agreement, along with the  UNFCCC \r\nand the Kyoto Protocol, can be interpreted in light of the customary \r\ninternational law principle of harm prevention according to which \r\nstates must exercise due diligence in seeking to prevent activities \r\nwithin their jurisdiction from causing extraterritorial environmental \r\nharm (Mayer 2016a; Maljean-Dubois 2019). The key features of the \r\nParis Agreement are set out in Box 14.1."


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"on human rights' (UNFCCC 2015a, preambular recital 14), a first for \r\nan environmental treaty (Knox 2016). The 'respective obligations' \r\nreferred to in the Paris Agreement could potentially include those \r\nrelating to the right to life (UNGA 1948, Art. 3, 1966, Art. 6), right \r\nto health (UNGA 1966b, Art. 12), right to development, right to \r\nan adequate standard of living, including the right to food (UNGA \r\n1966b, Art. 11), which has been read to include the right to water \r\nand sanitation (CESCR 2002, 2010), the right to housing (CESCR \r\n1991), and the right to self-determination, including as applied in the \r\ncontext of indigenous peoples (UNGA 1966a,b, Art. 1). In addition, \r\nclimate impacts contribute to displacement and migration (Mayer \r\nand Crepeau 2016; McAdam 2016), and have disproportionate \r\neffects on women (Pearse 2017)"


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" There are differing views on the \r\nvalue and operational impact of the human rights recital in the Paris \r\nAgreement (Adelman 2018; Boyle 2018; Duyck et al. 2018; Rajamani \r\n2018; Savaresi 2018; Knox 2019). Notwithstanding proposals from \r\nsome Parties and stakeholders to mainstream and operationalise \r\nhuman rights in the climate regime post-Paris (Duyck et al. 2018), and \r\nreferences to human rights in COP decisions, the 2018 Paris Rulebook \r\ncontains limited and guarded references to human rights (Duyck \r\n2019; Rajamani 2019) (Section 14.5.1.2). In addition to the reference \r\nto human rights, the preamble also notes the importance of 'ensuring \r\nthe integrity of all ecosystems, including oceans and the protection \r\nof biodiversity' which provides opportunities for integrating and \r\nmainstreaming other environmental protections."


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"Figure  14.1 illustrates graphically the key features of the Paris \r\nAgreement. The Paris Agreement is based on a  set of binding \r\nprocedural obligations requiring Parties to 'prepare, communicate, \r\nand maintain' 'Nationally Determined Contributions' (NDCs) \r\n(UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 4.2) every five years (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 4.9). \r\nThese obligations are complemented by: (1) an 'ambition cycle' that \r\nexpects Parties, informed by five-yearly global stocktakes (Art. 14), to \r\nsubmit successive NDCs representing a progression on their previous \r\nNDCs (UNFCCC 2015a; Bodansky et al. 2017b), and (2) an 'enhanced \r\ntransparency framework' that places extensive informational \r\ndemands on Parties, tailored to capacities, and establishes review \r\nprocesses to enable tracking of progress towards achievement of \r\nNDCs (Oberthur and Bodle 2016)"


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" In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol \r\nwith its internationally inscribed targets and timetable for emissions \r\nreduction for developed countries, the Paris Agreement contains \r\nNationally Determined Contributions embedded in an international \r\nsystem of transparency and accountability for all countries (Doelle \r\n2016; Maljean-Dubois and Wemaere 2016) accompanied by a shared \r\nglobal goal, in particular in relation to a temperature limit. "


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"The overall purpose of international cooperation through the Paris \r\nAgreement is to enhance the implementation of the UNFCCC, \r\nincluding its objective of stabilising atmospheric GHG concentrations \r\n'at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference \r\nwith the climate system' (UNFCCC 1992, Art. 2). The Paris Agreement \r\naims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate \r\nchange, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to \r\neradicate poverty, by inter alia '[h]olding the increase in the global \r\naverage temperature to well below 2degC above pre-industrial levels \r\nand pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5degC \r\nabove pre-industrial levels' (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 2(1)(a))"


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" There is an \r\nongoing structured expert dialogue under the UNFCCC in the context \r\nof the second periodic review of the long-term global goal (the first \r\nwas held between 2013-2015) aimed at enhancing understanding \r\nof the long-term global goal, pathways to achieving it, and assessing \r\nthe aggregate effect of steps taken by Parties to achieve the goal."


id: a514d7cf4ed7757510d8614ed49510d8
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"Albeit non-binding, Article 4.1 has acted as a  catalyst for several \r\nnational net-zero GHG targets, as well as net-zero CO2 and GHG \r\ntargets across local governments, sectors, businesses, and other actors \r\n(Day et al. 2020). There is a wide variation in the targets that have \r\nbeen adopted - in terms of their legal character (policy statement, \r\nexecutive order or national legislation), scope (GHGs or CO2) and \r\ncoverage (sectors or economy-wide). National net-zero targets could \r\nbe reflected in the long-term strategies that states are urged to \r\nsubmit under Article 4.19, but only a few states have submitted such \r\nstrategies thus far"


id: ad7e7a05f17a4e35aa8d7245958304d6
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" The Paris Rulebook, agreed at the Agreement's first \r\nmeeting of the Parties in 2018, further strengthens the operational \r\nrelevance of the temperature goal by requiring Parties to provide \r\ninformation when submitting their NDCs on how these contribute \r\ntowards achieving the objective identified in UNFCCC Article 2, and \r\nParis Agreement Articles 2.1 (a) and 4.1 (UNFCCC 2019b, Annex I, \r\npara. 7). Parties could in this context include information on how their \r\nshort-term actions align with their long-term net zero GHG or CO2\r\ntargets, thereby enhancing the credibility of their long-term goals."


id: 1ffb6763f5c35165581051447986bc1f
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"As the risks of adverse climate impacts, even with a 'well below' 2degC \r\nincrease, are substantial, the purpose of the Paris Agreement extends \r\nto increasing adaptive capacity and fostering climate resilience \r\n(UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 2(1)(b)), as well as redirecting investment and \r\nfinance flows (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. (2)(1)(c); Thorgeirsson 2017). \r\nThe finance and adaptation goals are not quantified in the Paris \r\nAgreement itself but the temperature goal and the pathways they \r\ngenerate may, some argue, enable a  quantitative assessment of \r\nthe resources necessary to reach these goals, and the nature of the \r\nimpacts requiring adaptation (Rajamani and Werksman 2018). The \r\ndecision accompanying the Paris Agreement resolves to set a new \r\ncollective quantified finance goal prior to 2025 (not explicitly limited \r\nto developed countries), with USD100 billion yr-1 as a floor (UNFCCC \r\n2016a, para. 53; Bodansky et al. 2017b)"


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" Article 2  also references \r\nsustainable development and poverty eradication, and thus implicitly \r\nunderscores the need to integrate the SDGs in the implementation of \r\nthe Paris Agreement (Sindico 2016). "


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"The Paris Agreement's purpose is accompanied by an expectation \r\nthat the Agreement 'will be' implemented to 'reflect equity and \r\nthe principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and \r\nrespective capabilities (CBDRRC), in the light of different national \r\ncircumstances' (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 2.2). This provision generates \r\nan expectation that Parties will implement the agreement to \r\nreflect CBDRRC, and is not an obligation to do so (Rajamani \r\n2016a). Further, the inclusion of the term 'in light of different \r\nnational circumstances' introduces a  dynamic element into the \r\ninterpretation of the CBDRRC principle. As national circumstances \r\nevolve, the application of the principle will also evolve (Rajamani \r\n2016a)"


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" This change in the articulation of the CBDRRC principle is \r\nreflected in the shifts in the nature and extent of differentiation \r\nin the climate change regime (Maljean-Dubois 2016; Rajamani \r\n2016a; Voigt and Ferreira 2016a), including through a shift towards \r\n'procedurally-oriented differentiation' for developing countries \r\n(Huggins and Karim 2016)."


id: e11ecab79ee594565da5e2f4d603698d
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content:
"It is worth noting that Article 4.1 recognises that 'peaking will take \r\nlonger for developing countries' and that the balance between \r\nemissions and removals needs to be on the 'basis of equity, and \r\nin the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate \r\npoverty'. This suggests that not all countries are expected to reach \r\nnet zero GHG emissions at the same time, or in the same manner. \r\nIf global cost-effective 1.5degC and 2degC scenarios from integrated \r\nassessment models are taken, without applying an equity principle, \r\nthe results suggest that domestic net zero GHG and CO2 emissions \r\nwould be reached a decade earlier than the global average in Brazil \r\nand the USA and later in India and Indonesia (van Soest et al. 2021)"


id: 6e7daebe5877c4bc83c833aaf35048ae
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" \r\nBy contrast, if equity principles are taken into account countries like \r\nCanada and the EU would be expected to phase out earlier than \r\nthe cost-optimal scenarios indicate, and countries like China and \r\nBrazil could phase out emissions later, as well as other countries with \r\nlower per-capita emissions (van Soest et al. 2021). Some suggest that \r\nthe application of such fairness considerations could bring forward \r\nthe net zero GHG date for big emitting countries by up to 15 to \r\n35 years as compared to the global least-cost scenarios (Lee et al. \r\n2021b). In any case, reaching net zero GHG emissions requires to \r\nsome extent the use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods as \r\nthere are important sources of non-CO2 GHGs, such as methane and \r\nnitrous oxide, that cannot be fully eliminated (IPCC 2018b)"


id: 3021aaf535ca3af9491cf42cd2bda738
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" However, \r\nthere are divergent views on different CDR methods, policy choices \r\ndetermine the degree to which and the type of CDR methods that \r\nare considered and there is a  patchwork of applicable regulatory \r\ninstruments. There are also uncertainties and governance challenges \r\nassociated with CDR methods which render tracking progress against \r\nnet zero GHG emissions challenging (Mace et al. 2021). Researchers "


id: 31b13e9fcd44ce8c3806726a9b947050
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content:
"number of NDCs include adaptation, and several NDCs have \r\nconditional components, for instance, being conditional on the use of \r\nmarket mechanisms or on the availability of support (UNFCCC 2016b). \r\nThere are wide variations across NDCs. Uncertainties are generated \r\nthrough interpretative ambiguities in the assumptions underlying \r\nNDCs (Rogelj et al. 2017). According to the assessment in this report, \r\ncurrent policies lead to median global GHG emissions of 63 gigatonnes \r\nof CO2 equivalent (GtCO2-eq), with a full range of 57-70 by 2030 and \r\nunconditional and conditional NDCs to 59 (55-65) and 56 (52-61) \r\nGtCO2-eq, respectively (Table  4.1). Many omit important mitigation \r\nsectors, provide little detail on financing implementation, and are not \r\neffective in meeting assessment and review needs (Pauw et al. 2018). \r\nAlthough, it is estimated that the land use sector could contribute as \r\nmuch as 20% of the full mitigation potential of all the intended NDC \r\ntargets (Forsell et al"


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" 2016), there are variations in how the land use \r\ncomponent is included, and the related information provided, leading \r\nto large uncertainties on whether and how these will contribute to \r\nthe achievement of the NDCs (Forsell et al. 2016; Grassi et al. 2017; \r\nObergassel et al. 2017a; Benveniste et al. 2018; Fyson and Jeffery \r\n2019). All these variations make it challenging to aggregate the efforts \r\nof countries and compare them to each other (Carraro 2016). Although \r\nParties attempted to discipline the variation in NDCs, including whether \r\nthey could be conditional, through elaborating the 'features' of NDCs \r\nin the Rulebook, no agreement was possible on this. Thus, Parties \r\ncontinue to enjoy considerable discretion in the formulation of NDCs \r\n(Rajamani and Bodansky 2019; Weikmans et al. 2020). "


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"In communicating their NDCs every five years (UNFCCC 2015a, \r\nArt. 4.9), all Parties have an obligation to 'provide the information \r\nnecessary for clarity, transparency and understanding' (UNFCCC \r\n2015a, Art. 4.8). These requirements are further elaborated in \r\nthe Paris Rulebook (Doelle 2019; UNFCCC 2019b). This includes \r\nrequirements -  for Parties' second and subsequent NDCs -  to \r\nprovide quantifiable information on the reference point, for example \r\nbase year, reference indicators and target relative to the reference \r\nindicator (UNFCCC 2019b, Annex I, para. 1). It also requires Parties to \r\nprovide information on how they consider their contribution 'fair and \r\nambitious in light of different national circumstances', and how they \r\naddress the normative expectations of developed country leadership, \r\nprogression and highest possible ambition (UNFCCC 2019b, Annex I, \r\npara. 6)"


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" However, Parties are required to provide the enumerated \r\ninformation only 'as applicable' to their NDC (UNFCCC 2019b, \r\nAnnex I, para. 7). This allows Parties to determine the informational \r\nrequirements placed on them through their choice of NDC. In respect \r\nof Parties' first NDCs or NDCs updated by 2020, such quantifiable \r\ninformation 'may' be included, 'as appropriate', signalling a  softer \r\nrequirement, although Parties are 'strongly encouraged' to provide \r\nthis information (UNFCCC 2019b, Annex I, para. 9). "


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"It is clear, however, that the NDCs communicated by Parties for the \r\n2020-2030 period are insufficient to achieve the temperature goal \r\n(den Elzen et al. 2016; Rogelj et al. 2016; Schleussner et al. 2016; \r\nRobiou du Pont and Meinshausen 2018; UNEP 2018a; Alcaraz et al. \r\n2019; UNEP 2019, 2020), and the emissions gap is larger than ever \r\n(Christensen and Olhoff 2019) (Chapter 4). The IPCC Special Report \r\non Global Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5) notes that pathways that limit \r\nglobal warming to 1.5degC with no or limited overshoot show up to \r\n40-50% reduction of total GHG emissions from 2010 levels by 2030, \r\nand that current pathways reflected in the NDCs are consistent with \r\ncost-effective pathways that result in a  global warming of about \r\n3degC by 2100 (IPCC 2018b Summary for Policymakers D.1.1)"


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"Figure 14.2 | The role of international cooperation in the reductions in annual emissions by 2030 needed to follow a 1.5degC (respectively <2degC) cost-effective \r\npath from 2020 onwards. The figure represents the additional contribution of pledges included in the NDCs over current policies at the global level, and the remaining gap \r\nin emissions reductions needed to move from current policies to pathways that limit warning to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, and those to limit warming to \r\n2degC (>67%). Median values are used, showing the confidence interval for the total effort. See Figure 1 in Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4, and Tables 4.2 and 4.3 for details. \r\n(i) The grey share represents NDCs with abatement efforts pledged without any conditions (called 'unconditional' in the literature). They are based mainly on domestic abatement \r\nactions, although countries can use international cooperation to meet their targets"


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" (ii) The blue share represents NDCs with conditional components. They require international \r\ncooperation, for example bilateral agreements under Article 6, financing or monetary and/or technological transfers. (iii) The remaining gap in emissions reductions - the yellow \r\nshare - can potentially be achieved through national and international actions. International coordination of more ambitious efforts promotes global ambition and international \r\ncooperation provides the cost-saving basis for more ambitious NDCs. "


id: f70fe69687a29d668bd8221619cd85b7
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"In this context, it should be noted that many NDCs have been \r\nformulated with conditional elements, and such NDCs require \r\ninternational cooperation on finance, technology and capacity \r\nbuilding (Kissinger et al. 2019), potentially including through Article \r\n6  in the form of bilateral agreements and market mechanisms \r\n(UNFCCC 2016b). More broadly, some argue that there is a 'policy \r\ninconsistency' between the facilitative, 'bottom up' architecture \r\nof the Paris Agreement, and both the setting of the long-term \r\ntemperature goal and expectations that it will be delivered (Geden \r\n2016b). As Figure  14.2 shows, there is a  large share of additional \r\neffort needed to reach a 1.5degC compatible path by 2030 (and even \r\na 2degC compatible path)"


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" International coordination and cooperation \r\nare crucial in enhancing the ambition of current pledges, as countries \r\nwill be more willing to increase their ambition if matched by other \r\ncountries (coordination) and if cost-minimising agreements between \r\ndeveloped and developing countries, through Article 6  and other \r\nmeans, are fully developed (cooperation) (Saelen 2020)."


id: e868c9b30f54de1e94c723f4f2d724ea
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content:
"Many NDCs with conditional elements may not be feasible as \r\nthe conditions are not clearly defined and existing promises of \r\nsupport are insufficient (Pauw et al. 2020). Moreover, 'leadership \r\nby conditional commitments' (when some states promise to take \r\nstronger commitments if others do so as well), and the system of \r\npledge-and-review, may lead to decreasing rather than deeper \r\ncontributions over time (Helland et al. 2017). Some note, however, \r\nthat many of the NDCs are conservative and may be overachieved, \r\nthat NDCs may be strengthened over time as expected under the \r\nParis Agreement, and that there are significant non-state actions \r\nthat have not been adequately captured in the NDCs (Hohne et al. \r\n2017)"


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" Further, if all NDCs with and without conditional elements are \r\nimplemented, net land use, land use change and forestry emissions \r\nwill decrease in 2030 compared to 2010 levels, but large uncertainties \r\nremain on how Parties estimate, project and account for emissions \r\nand removals from this sector (Forsell et al. 2016; Fyson and Jeffery "


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"all emissions contribute to the problem regardless of their relative \r\nsize and there is a  clear articulation under the UNFCCC and Paris \r\nAgreement for developed countries to 'take the lead' in addressing \r\nGHG emissions (Preston 2020). Given the limited avenues for \r\nmultilateral determination of fairness, several researchers have \r\nargued that the onus is on the scientific community to generate \r\nmethods to assess fairness (Herrala and Goel 2016; Lawrence and \r\nReder 2019). Peer-to-peer comparisons also potentially create \r\npressure for ambitious NDCs (Aldy et al. 2017). \r\nThere are a range of options to assess or introduce fairness. These \r\ninclude: adopting differentiation in financing rather than in mitigation \r\n(Gajevic Sayegh 2017); adopting a carbon budget approach (Hales \r\nand Mackey 2018; Alcaraz et al"


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" 2019), which may occur through \r\nthe transparency processes (Hales and Mackey 2018); quantifying \r\nnational emissions allocations using different equity approaches, \r\nincluding those reconciling finance and emissions rights distributions \r\n(Robiou du Pont et al. 2017); combining equity concepts in a bottom\u0002up manner using different sovereign approaches (Robiou du Pont \r\nand Meinshausen 2018), using data on adopted emissions targets to \r\nfind an ethical framework consistent with the observed distribution \r\n(Sheriff 2019); adopting common metrics for policy assessment \r\n(Bretschger 2017); and developing a  template for organising \r\nmetrics on mitigation effort - emissions reductions, implicit prices, \r\nand costs - for both ex-ante and ex-post review (Aldy et al. 2017). \r\nThe burden of agricultural mitigation can also be distributed using \r\ndifferent approaches from effort sharing (responsibility, capability, \r\nneed, equal cumulative per-capita emissions) (Richards et al. 2018)"


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" \r\nFurther, there are temporal (inter-generational) and spatial (inter\u0002regional) dimensions to the distribution of the mitigation burden, \r\nwith additional emissions reductions in 2030 improving both inter\u0002generational and inter-regional equity (Liu et al. 2016). Some of the \r\nequity approaches rely on 'grandfathering' as an allocation principle, \r\nwhich some argue has led to 'cascading biases' against developing \r\ncountries (Kartha et al. 2018), and is morally 'perverse' (Caney \r\n2011). While no country's NDC explicitly supports the grandfathering \r\napproach, many countries describe as 'fair and ambitious' NDCs \r\nthat assume grandfathering as the starting point (Robiou du Pont \r\net al. 2017). It is worth noting that the existence of multiple metrics \r\nassociated with a range of equity approaches has implications for how \r\nthe ambition and 'fair' share of each state is arrived at; some average \r\nout multiple approaches and indicators (Hof et al. 2012; Meinshausen \r\net al"


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content:
" 2015; Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen 2018), others exclude \r\nindicators and approaches that do not, in their interpretation, accord \r\nwith principles of international environmental law (Rajamani et al. \r\n2021). One group of scholars has suggested that utilitarianism offers \r\nan 'ethically minimal and conceptually parsimonious' benchmark that \r\npromotes equity, climate and development (Budolfson et al. 2021)."


id: 1dba5aea2984e3f60c339de70615be8
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content:
"In the first round of NDCs, most Parties declared their NDCs as fair \r\n(Robiou du Pont et al. 2017). Their claims, however, were largely \r\nunsubstantiated or drawn from analysis by in-country experts \r\n(Winkler et al. 2018). At least some of the indicators Parties \r\nhave identified in their NDCs as justifying the 'fairness' of their \r\ncontributions, such as a  'small share of global emissions', 'cost\u0002effectiveness' and assumptions that privilege current emissions \r\nlevels ('grandfathering') are not, according to one group of scholars, \r\nin accordance with principles of international environmental law \r\n(Rajamani et al. 2021).  Moreover, the NDCs reveal long-standing \r\ninstitutional divisions and divergent climate priorities between \r\nAnnex I and non-Annex I Parties, suggesting that equity and fairness \r\nconcerns remain salient (Stephenson et al. 2019)"


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content:
" Fairness concerns \r\nalso affect the share of CDR responsibilities for major emitters if they \r\ndelay near-term mitigation action (Fyson et al. 2020)."


id: 4fc9326eda9d9cf42990b00156b834dd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 9994
content:
"The information provided by Parties in biennial transparency \r\nreports and GHG inventories will undergo technical expert review, \r\nwhich must include assistance in identifying capacity-building \r\nneeds for developing country Parties that need it in light of their \r\ncapacities. Each Party is also required to participate in a 'facilitative, \r\nmultilateral consideration of progress' of implementation and \r\nachievement of its NDC. Although the aim of these processes is to \r\nexpose each Party's actions on mitigation to international review, \r\nthus establishing a  weak form of accountability for NDCs at the \r\ninternational level, the Rulebook circumscribes the reach of these \r\nprocesses (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019). The technical expert \r\nreview teams are prohibited in mandatory terms from making \r\n'political judgments' or reviewing the 'adequacy or appropriateness' \r\nof a Party's NDC, domestic actions, or support provided (UNFCCC \r\n2019k, Annex, para. 149)"


id: bf2dab683e12506bb6402ca05e91a84c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 27631
content:
" This, among other such provisions, has led \r\nsome to argue that the scope and practice of existing transparency \r\narrangements reflect rather than mediate ongoing disputes around \r\nresponsibility, differentiation and burden sharing, and thus there \r\nis limited answerability through transparency (Gupta and van \r\nAsselt 2019). There are also limits to the extent that the enhanced \r\ntransparency framework will reduce ambiguities and associated \r\nuncertainties, for instance, in how land use, land-use change \r\nand forestry (LULUCF) are incorporated into the NDCs (Fyson \r\nand Jeffery 2019), and lead to increased ambition (Weikmans \r\net al. 2020). More broadly, there has been 'weak' translation of \r\ntransparency norms into accountability (Ciplet et al. 2018)"


id: b425d1ef2fa47053663dbde7e0735a19
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 25858
content:
" Hence, \r\nthe Paris Agreement's effectiveness in ensuring NDCs are achieved \r\nwill depend on additional accountability pathways at the domestic \r\nlevel involving political processes and civil society engagement \r\n(Jacquet and Jamieson 2016; van Asselt 2016; Campbell-Durufle \r\n2018a; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018)."


id: f98a855f8172016f93bd2023169741f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
content_type: text
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vector_id: 36780
content:
"Article 6.1 recognises the role that cooperative approaches can play, \r\non a  voluntary basis, in implementing Parties' NDCs 'in order to \r\nallow for higher ambition' in their mitigation actions and to promote \r\nsustainable development and environmental integrity. Article 6.2 \r\nindicates that ITMOs can originate from a variety of sources, and that \r\nParties using ITMOs to achieve their NDCs shall promote sustainable \r\ndevelopment, ensure environmental integrity, ensure transparency, \r\nincluding in governance, and apply 'robust accounting' in accordance \r\nwith Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties \r\nto the Paris Agreement (CMA) guidance to prevent double counting"


id: 2766f28eda0bd72927298ffd545e1f0c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 3603
content:
" \r\nWhile this provision, unlike Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, does not \r\ncreate an international carbon market, it enables Parties to pursue \r\nthis option should they choose to do so, for example, through the \r\nlinking of domestic or regional carbon markets (Marcu 2016; Muller \r\nand Michaelowa 2019). Article 6.2 could also be implemented in \r\nother ways, including direct transfers between governments, linkage \r\nof mitigation policies across two or more Parties, sectoral or activity \r\ncrediting mechanisms, and other forms of cooperation involving \r\npublic or private entities, or both (Howard 2017). "


id: 88d4b27f658c8156da08e999c6f18347
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 19063
content:
"Article 5.2 encourages Parties to implement and support the existing \r\nframework for REDD+, including through 'results-based payments', \r\nthat is provision of financial payments for verified avoided or reduced \r\nforest carbon emissions (Turnhout et al. 2017). The existing REDD+ \r\nframework set up under decisions of the UNFCCC COP includes \r\nthe Warsaw Framework for REDD+, which specifies modalities for \r\nmeasuring, reporting and verifying greenhouse gas emissions and \r\nremovals. This provides an essential tool for linking REDD+ activities \r\nto results-based finance (Voigt and Ferreira 2015). Appropriate \r\nfinance support for REDD+ is also considered critical to move from \r\nits inclusion in many countries' NDCs to implementation on the \r\nground (Hein et al. 2018). Since public finance for REDD+ is limited, \r\nprivate sector participation is expected by some to leverage REDD+ \r\n(Streck and Parker 2012; Henderson et al. 2013; Pistorius and Kiff \r\n2015; Seymour and Busch 2016; Ehara et al"


id: fd0d4f9d30368d76e2d47107aa84ab1b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 37328
content:
" 2019). Article 5.2 also \r\nencourages Parties' support for 'alternative policy approaches' to \r\nforest conservation and sustainable management such as 'joint \r\nmitigation and adaptation approaches'. It reaffirms the importance \r\nof incentivising, as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated \r\nwith such approaches (e.g.,  improvements in the livelihoods of \r\nforest-dependent communities, facilitating poverty reduction and \r\nsustainable development). This provision, along with the support for \r\nnon-market mechanisms in Article 6 (discussed below), is seen as an \r\navenue for cooperative joint mitigation-adaptation and non-market \r\nREDD+ activities with co-benefits for biodiversity conservation \r\n(Gupta and Dube 2018)."


id: 84d269c83305e420557f3ac0fc142714
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18423
content:
"Assessments of the potential of Article 6.2 generally find that \r\nITMOs are likely to result in cost reductions in achieving mitigation \r\noutcomes, with the potential for such reductions to enhance \r\nambition and accelerate Parties' progression of mitigation pledges \r\nacross NDC cycles (Fujimori et al. 2016; Gao et al. 2016; Mehling \r\n2019). However, studies applying insights from the CDM highlight \r\nenvironmental integrity risks associated with using ITMOs under the \r\nParis Agreement given the challenges that the diverse scope, metrics, \r\ntypes and timeframes of NDC targets pose for robust accounting \r\n(Schneider and La Hoz Theuer 2019) and the potential for transfers of \r\n'hot air', as occurred under the Kyoto Protocol (La Hoz Theuer et al. \r\n2019)"


id: 12e1178a0109b3f401946c60cb68994e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
content_type: text
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vector_id: 476
content:
" These studies collectively affirm that robust governance on \r\naccounting for ITMOs, and for reporting and review, will be critical \r\nto ensuring the environmental integrity of NDCs making use of them \r\n(Mehling 2019; Muller and Michaelowa 2019). "


id: 72886a7932dd3bf932d27de6c27d79b2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15640
content:
"Much of the current literature on climate finance and the Paris \r\nAgreement focuses on the obligations of developed countries to \r\nprovide climate finance to assist the implementation of mitigation and \r\nadaptation actions by developing countries. The principal provision on \r\nfinance in the Paris Agreement is the binding obligation on developed \r\ncountry Parties to provide financial resources to assist developing \r\ncountry Parties (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 9.1). This provision applies to \r\nboth mitigation and adaptation and is in continuation of existing \r\ndeveloped country Parties' obligations under the UNFCCC. This signals \r\nthat the Paris Agreement finance requirements must be interpreted \r\nin light of the UNFCCC (Yamineva 2016). The novelty introduced by \r\nthe Paris Agreement is a further expansion in the potential pool of \r\ndonor countries as Article 9.2 encourages 'other Parties' to provide \r\nor continue to provide such support on a voluntary basis"


id: 5402b8f352580a623aa732a310522168
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 10679
content:
" However, \r\n'as part of the global effort, developed countries should continue \r\nto take the lead in mobilising climate finance', with a 'significant \r\nrole' for public funds, and an expectation that such mobilisation of \r\nfinance 'should represent a  progression beyond previous efforts'. \r\nBeyond this, there are no new recognised promises (Ciplet et al. \r\n2018). In the Paris Agreement, Parties formalised the continuation of \r\nthe existing collective mobilisation goal to raise USD100 billion yr-1\r\nthrough to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and \r\ntransparency on implementation. The Paris Agreement decision also \r\nprovided for the CMA by 2025 to set a new collective quantified goal \r\nfrom a floor of USD100 billion yr-1, taking into account the needs \r\nand priorities of developing countries (UNFCCC 2016a, para. 53)"


id: 4a766a62000b3ddfab725be89b8065f3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 9121
content:
" This \r\nnew collective goal on finance is not explicitly limited to developed \r\ncountries and could therefore encompass finance flows from \r\ndeveloping countries' donors (Bodansky et al. 2017b). Deliberations \r\non setting a new collective quantified goal on finance is expected to \r\nbe initiated at COP26 in 2021 (UNFCCC 2019g,e; Zhang 2019)."


id: 9ea9403e90cfa07020d81babec1a96
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 22502
content:
"More broadly, there is recognition of the need for better accounting, \r\ntransparency and reporting rules to allow evaluation of the fulfilment \r\nof finance pledges and the effectiveness of how funding is used (Xu \r\net al. 2016; Roberts et al. 2017; Jachnik et al. 2019; Gupta and van \r\nAsselt 2019; Roberts et al. 2021). There is also a concern about climate \r\nfinance being new and additional though the Paris Agreement does not \r\nmake an explicit reference to it, nor is there a clear understanding of \r\nwhat constitutes new and additional (UNFCCC 2018; Carty et al. 2020; \r\nMitchell et al. 2021). Some authors see the 'enhanced transparency \r\nframework' of the Paris Agreement (Section 14.3.2.4), and the specific \r\nrequirements for developed countries to provide, biennially, indicative \r\nquantitative and qualitative information as well as report on financial \r\nsupport and mobilisation efforts (Articles 9.5 and 9"


id: 1e2922865d7881dc3f7a6044a9557843
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
content_type: text
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vector_id: 2183
content:
"7), as promising \r\nmarked improvements (Weikmans and Roberts 2019), including for \r\nthe fairness of effort-sharing on climate finance provision (Pickering \r\net al. 2015). Others offer a more circumspect view of the transformative \r\ncapability of these transparency systems (Ciplet et al. 2018). "


id: 4479ba2d83e58b847042dbf7b570acf6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 8196
content:
"Article 10 of the Paris Agreement articulates a shared 'long-term \r\nvision on the importance of fully realising technology development \r\nand transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change \r\nand to reduce greenhouse gas emissions' (UNFCCC 2015, Art. \r\n10.1). All Parties are required 'to strengthen cooperative action \r\non technology development and transfer' (UNFCCC 2015, Art. \r\n10.2). In addition, support, including financial support, 'shall be \r\nprovided' to developing country Parties for the implementation \r\nof Article 10, 'including for strengthening cooperative action on \r\ntechnology development and transfer at different stages of the \r\ntechnology cycle, with a  view to achieving a  balance between \r\nsupport for mitigation and adaptation' (UNFCCC 2015, Art. 10.6)"


id: 4c2621a092c2a8e27547465bbd82bd4e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 9403
content:
" \r\nAvailable information on efforts related to support on technology \r\ndevelopment and transfer for developing country Parties is also one \r\nof the matters to be taken into account in the global stocktake \r\n(UNFCCC 2015, Art. 10.6) (Section 14.3.2.5)."


id: 626cf90eacadfbb019e7160d459a7f44
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 13046
content:
"The more limited literature focusing on the specific finance needs of \r\ndeveloping countries, particularly those expressed in NDCs conditional \r\non international climate finance, suggests that once all countries have \r\nfully costed their NDCs, the demand for (public and private) finance \r\nto support NDC implementation is likely to be orders of magnitude \r\nlarger than funds available from bilateral and multilateral sources. \r\nFor some sectors, such as forestry and land use, this could leave 'NDC \r\nambitions... in a precarious position, unless more diversified options \r\nare pursued to reach climate goals' (Kissinger et al. 2019). In addition, \r\nthere is a  need for fiscal policy reform in developing countries to \r\nensure international climate finance flows are not undercut by public \r\nand private finance supporting unsustainable activities (Kissinger \r\net al. 2019)"


id: 994f885bfa652f1bd8d597b7b23d3581
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 21636
content:
" During the 2018 Katowice conference, UNFCCC Parties \r\nrequested the Standing Committee on Finance to prepare, every \r\nfour years, a report on the determination of the needs of developing \r\ncountry Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris \r\nAgreement, for consideration by Parties at COP26 (UNFCCC 2019c)."


id: 4f39762bce36d38b93a68c591a11316c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"The Paris Agreement urges all Parties to cooperate to enhance \r\nthe capacity of developing countries to implement the Agreement \r\n(UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 11.3), with a particular focus on LDCs and SIDS \r\n(UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 11.1). Developed country Parties are specifically \r\nurged to enhance support for capacity-building actions in developing \r\ncountry Parties (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 11.3). Article 12 of the Paris \r\nAgreement addresses cooperative measures to enhance climate \r\nchange education, training, public awareness, public participation \r\nand public access to information, which can also be seen as elements \r\nof capacity building (Khan et al. 2020). Under the Paris Rulebook, \r\nefforts related to the implementation of Article 12 are referred to as \r\n'Action for Climate Empowerment' and Parties are invited to develop \r\nand implement national strategies on this topic, taking into account \r\ntheir national circumstances (UNFCCC 2019i, para. 6)"


id: efeb5d1aa53ff1310409154e4a397600
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" Actions to \r\nenhance climate change education, training, public awareness, \r\npublic participation, public access to information, and regional and \r\ninternational cooperation may also be taken into account by Parties in \r\nthe global stocktake process under Article 14 of the Paris Agreement \r\n(UNFCCC 2019i, para. 9)."


id: 9f3fd8cdd399327716ced0f8abd6f661
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 22592
content:
"inclusiveness, a  results-oriented approach, a  transformational \r\napproach and transparency. Its 'key themes' include innovation, \r\nimplementation, enabling environment and capacity building, \r\ncollaboration and stakeholder engagement, and support (UNFCCC \r\n2019e, Annex). A  number of 'actions and activities' are elaborated \r\nfor each thematic area. These include: enhancing engagement and \r\ncollaboration with relevant stakeholders, including local communities \r\nand authorities, national planners, the private sector and civil society \r\norganisations, in the planning and implementation of Technology \r\nMechanism activities; facilitating Parties undertaking, updating and \r\nimplementing technology needs assessments (TNAs) and aligning \r\nthese with NDCs; and enhancing the collaboration of the Technology \r\nMechanism with the Financial Mechanism for enhanced support for \r\ntechnology development and transfer"


id: dfd7cd6ae7fa360a76809a32f59eedc0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 32710
content:
" As regards TNAs, while some \r\ndeveloping countries have already used the results of their TNA process \r\nin NDC development, other countries might benefit from following the \r\nTNA process, including its stakeholder involvement and multi-criteria \r\ndecision analysis methodology, to strengthen their NDCs (Hofman and \r\nvan der Gaast 2019)."


id: 5e69180a306c97228175463c57213c8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
content_type: text
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vector_id: 12386
content:
"Under the Paris Agreement, capacity-building can take a  range of \r\nforms, including: facilitating technology development, dissemination \r\nand deployment; access to climate finance; education, training \r\nand public awareness; and the transparent, timely and accurate \r\ncommunication of information (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 11.1) \r\n(Section  14.3.2.4). Principles guiding capacity-building support are \r\nthat it should be: country-driven; based on and responsive to national \r\nneeds; fostering country ownership of Parties at multiple levels; \r\nguided by lessons learned; and an effective, iterative process that is \r\nparticipatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive (UNFCCC 2015a, \r\nArt. 11.2). Parties undertaking capacity building for developing \r\ncountry Parties must 'regularly communicate on these actions or \r\nmeasures'"


id: 5933ab08fb6f691556c91827ef37b769
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 11526
content:
" Developing country Parties have a  soft requirement \r\n('should') to communicate progress made on implementing capacity\u0002building plans, policies, actions or measures to implement the Paris \r\nAgreement (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. 11.4). "


id: a1201ac5f2167c861a10da1f8e48c598
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 22906
content:
"In its annual synthesis report for 2018, the UNFCCC secretariat \r\nstressed the importance of capacity building for the implementation \r\nof the Paris Agreement and NDCs, with a focus on measures already \r\nin place, regional and cooperative activities, and capacity-building \r\nneeds for strengthening NDCs (UNFCCC 2019h). Of the 168 NDCs \r\nsubmitted as of June 2019, capacity building was the most frequently \r\nrequested type of support (113 of 136 conditional NDCs) (Pauw \r\net al. 2020). The focus of capacity-building activities is on enabling \r\ndeveloping countries to take effective climate change action, \r\ngiven that many developing countries continue to face significant \r\ncapacity challenges, undermining their ability to effectively or fully \r\ncarry out the climate actions they intend to pursue (Dagnet et al. \r\n2016)"


id: 87377a66fddd5d0293229a122d9fee5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18808
content:
" Content analysis of NDCs shows that capacity building for \r\nadaptation is prioritised over mitigation for developing countries, \r\nwith the element of capacity building most indicated in NDCs being \r\nresearch and technology (Khan et al. 2020). In addition, developing \r\ncountries' needs for education, training and awareness raising for \r\nclimate change mitigation and adaptation feature prominently in \r\nNDCs, particularly those of LDCs (Khan et al. 2020). Differences are \r\nevident though between capacity-building needs expressed in the \r\nNDCs of LDCs (noting that Khan et al.s review was limited to NDCs \r\nin English) compared with those of upper-middle-income developing \r\ncountries as categorised by the World Bank (World Bank 2021); the \r\nlatter have more focus on mitigation with an emphasis on technology \r\ndevelopment and transfer (Khan et al. 2020)."


id: 4e681dc8711a214e1042b1b287b045e9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 9763
content:
"Article 11.5 provides that capacity-building activities 'shall be \r\nenhanced through appropriate institutional arrangements to support \r\nthe implementation of this Agreement, including the appropriate \r\ninstitutional arrangements established under the Convention that \r\nserve this Agreement'. The COP decision accompanying the Paris \r\nAgreement established the Paris Committee on Capacity-building, \r\nwith the aim to 'address gaps and needs, both current and emerging, \r\nin implementing capacity-building in developing country Parties and \r\nfurther enhancing capacity-building efforts, including with regard \r\nto coherence and coordination in capacity-building activities under \r\nthe Convention' (UNFCCC 2016a, para. 71). The activities of the \r\nCommittee are discussed further in Section 14.4.3 below. The relevant \r\nCOP decision also established the Capacity-building Initiative for \r\nTransparency (UNFCCC 2016a, para"


id: a964385afb64aebf6e7044c7c4b584c2
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vector_id: 24179
content:
" 84), which is managed by the \r\nGEF and designed to support developing country Parties in meeting \r\nthe reporting and transparency requirements under Article 13 of the \r\nParis Agreement (Robinson 2018). "


id: 2c7c2474f956b8e229212f8b61c717f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 4430
content:
"This mechanism is to operate in a transparent, non-adversarial and \r\nnon-punitive manner (Voigt 2016; Campbell-Durufle 2018b; Oberthur \r\nand Northrop 2018) that distinguishes it from the more stringent \r\ncompliance procedures of the Kyoto Protocol's Enforcement branch. \r\nThe Paris Rulebook elaborated the modalities and procedures for \r\nthe implementation and compliance mechanism, specifying the \r\nnature and composition of the compliance committee, the situations \r\ntriggering its procedures, and the facilitative measures it can apply, \r\nwhich include a  'finding of fact' in limited situations, dialogue, \r\nassistance and recommendations (UNFCCC 2019e). The compliance \r\ncommittee is focused on ensuring compliance with a  core set of \r\nbinding procedural obligations (UNFCCC 2019j, Annex, Para. 22). This \r\ncompliance committee, characterised as 'one of its kind' and an 'an \r\nimportant cornerstone' of the Agreement's legitimacy, effectiveness \r\nand longevity (Zihua et al"


id: c4d04b57eb31e4a563283c369e1e7a9f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28540
content:
"Previous assessment reports have assessed the Kyoto Protocol with \r\nrespect to each of the criteria identified in this chapter. However, at \r\nthe time of AR5, it was premature to assess the impact of Kyoto on \r\nemissions, as these data had not been entirely compiled yet. Since \r\nAR5, a  number of studies have done so. Chapter 2 of this report \r\nlists at least 18 countries that have sustained absolute emissions \r\nreductions for at least a decade, nearly all of which are countries \r\nthat had Kyoto targets for the first commitment period. Most studies \r\nhave concluded that Kyoto did cause emissions reductions. Such \r\nstudies find a positive, statistically significant impact on emissions \r\nreductions in Annex I countries (Kim et al. 2020), Annex B countries \r\n(Grunewald and Martinez-Zarzoso 2012; Kumazawa and Callaghan \r\n2012; Grunewald and Martinez-Zarzoso 2016; Maamoun 2019), or all \r\ncountries respectively (Aichele and Felbermayr 2013; Iwata and Okada \r\n2014)"


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" Overall, countries with emissions reduction obligations emit on \r\naverage less CO2 than similar countries without emissions reduction \r\nobligations - with estimates ranging from 3-50% (Grunewald and \r\nMartinez-Zarzoso 2012, 2016). Maamoun (2019) estimates that the \r\nKyoto Protocol reduced GHG emissions of Annex B countries by 7% \r\non average below a  no-Kyoto scenario between 2005 and 2012. \r\nAichele and Felbermayr (2013) conclude that Kyoto reduced CO2 and \r\nGHG emissions by 10% compared to the counterfactual. By contrast, \r\nAlmer and Winkler (2017) find no evidence for binding emission \r\ntargets under Kyoto inducing significant and lasting emissions \r\nreductions for any of the Annex B  or non-Annex B  countries. The \r\nauthors identify both negative and positive associations between \r\nKyoto and emissions for several countries in several years, but no \r\ncoherent picture emerges. Hartl (2019) calculates a  Kyoto leakage \r\nshare in global CO2 trade of 4.3% for 2002-2009."


id: 59c6efc21d0fdb047814a751b721f16b
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"potential for international cooperation under the Paris Agreement to \r\nadvance climate change mitigation. \r\nThese assessments are mixed and reflect uncertainty over the outcomes \r\nthe Paris Agreement will achieve (Christoff 2016; Clemencon 2016; \r\nKeohane and Oppenheimer 2016; Young 2016; Dimitrov et al. 2019; \r\nRaiser et al. 2020). There is a divide between studies that do not expect \r\na positive outcome from the Paris Agreement and those that do. The \r\nformer base this assessment on factors such as: a lack of clarity in \r\nthe expression of obligations and objectives; a lack of concrete plans \r\ncollectively to achieve the temperature goal; extensive use of soft \r\nlaw (i.e., non-legally binding) provisions; limited incentives to avoid \r\nfree-riding; and the Agreement's weak enforcement provisions (Allan \r\n2019), as well as US non-cooperation under the Trump administration \r\nand the resulting gap in mitigation, finance and governance (Bang \r\net al"


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" 2016; Spash 2016; Tulkens 2016; Chai et al. 2017; Lawrence \r\nand Wong 2017; Thompson 2017; Barrett 2018; Kemp 2018). Studies \r\nexpecting a positive outcome emphasise factors such as: the breadth \r\nof participation enabled by self-differentiated NDCs; the 'logic' of \r\ndomestic climate policies driving greater national ambition; the \r\nmultiplicity of actors engaged by the Paris Agreement's facilitative \r\narchitecture; the falling cost of low-carbon technologies; provision \r\nfor financial, technology and capacity-building support to developing \r\ncountry Parties; possibilities for voluntary cooperation on mitigation \r\nunder Article 6; and the potential for progressive ratcheting up of \r\nParties' pledges over time fostered by transparency of reporting and \r\ninternational scrutiny of national justifications of the 'fairness' of \r\ncontributions (Caparros 2016; Chan 2016a; Falkner 2016b; Victor \r\n2016; Morgan and Northrop 2017; Urpelainen and Van de Graaf \r\n2018; Hale 2020; Torstad 2020)"


id: c1453cee32b7e5c6079bd95587a298f1
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" Turning to the assessment criteria \r\narticulated in this chapter, the following preliminary assessments of \r\nthe Paris Agreement can be made. "


id: dfe1a3e115231244e9e91ed08a71d242
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"Assessing the effectiveness of Kyoto's market mechanisms is \r\nchallenging, and the results have been mixed (Aichele and Felbermayr \r\n2013; Iwata and Okada 2014; Kuriyama and Abe 2018). Kuriyama \r\nand Abe (2018) assessed emissions reduction quantities taking into \r\naccount heightened criteria for additionality. They identified annual \r\nenergy-related emissions reductions of 49 MtCO2-eq yr-1 flowing \r\nfrom the CDM, and non-energy related emissions reductions of \r\n177 MtCO2-eq yr-1. Others have pointed to issues associated with \r\nnon-energy related emissions reductions that suggest the latter \r\nestimate may be of questionable reliability, while also noting that \r\nregulatory tightening led later CDM projects to perform better with \r\nrespect to the additionality criterion (Michaelowa et al. 2019b). \r\nThe  CDM's contribution to capacity building in some developing \r\ncountries has been identified as possibly its most important \r\nachievement (Spalding-Fecher et al. 2012; Gandenberger et al"


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" 2015; \r\nMurata et al. 2016; Xu et al. 2016; Dong and Holm Olsen 2017; \r\nLindberg et al. 2018). There is evidence that the CDM lowered \r\ncompliance costs for Annex 1  countries by at least USD3.6 billion \r\n(Spalding-Fecher et al. 2012). In host countries, the CDM led to the \r\nestablishment of national approval bodies and the development of \r\nan ecosystem of consultants and auditors (Michaelowa et al. 2019b). "


id: 458dd93cd9b6cb8dc42b9e5a6bf8de7c
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"On the negative side, there are numerous findings that the CDM, \r\nespecially at first, failed to lead to additional emissions cuts in host \r\ncountries, meaning that the overall effect of CDM projects was to \r\nraise global emissions. Cames et al. (2016) concluded that over 70% \r\nof CDM projects led to emissions reductions that were likely less than \r\nprojected, including the absence of additional reductions, while only \r\n7% of projects led to actual additional emissions reductions that \r\nhad a high likelihood of meeting or exceeding the ex-ante estimates. \r\nThe primary reason the authors gave was associated with the low \r\nprice for CDM credits; this meant that the contribution of the CDM \r\nto project finance was negligible, suggesting that most CDM projects \r\nwould have been built anyway. A meta-analysis of ex-post studies of \r\nglobal carbon markets, which include the CDM, found net combined \r\neffects on emissions to be negligible (Green 2021)"


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" Across the board, \r\nCDM projects have been criticised for lack of 'additionality', problems \r\nof baseline determination, uneven geographic coverage (Michaelowa \r\nand Michaelowa 2011a; Cames et al. 2016; Michaelowa et al. 2019b), \r\nas well as failing to address human rights concerns (Schade and \r\nObergassel 2014). "


id: a07cdb7fa4b7055e89d981778f5e0468
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"In relation to the criterion of environmental effectiveness, the \r\nParis Agreement exceeds the Kyoto Protocol in terms of coverage \r\nof GHGs and participation of states in mitigation actions. In terms \r\nof coverage of GHGs, the Kyoto Protocol limits its coverage to \r\na defined basket of gases identified in its Annex A (carbon dioxide \r\n(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons \r\n(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), as well \r\nas nitrogen trifluoride (NF3)). The Paris Agreement does not specify \r\nthe coverage of gases, thus Parties may cover the full spectrum of \r\nGHGs in their NDCs as encouraged by the accounting provisions \r\nin Annex II to Decision  18/CMA.1 (or conversely they may choose \r\nto exclude important mitigation sectors) and there is also the \r\npossibility to include other pollutants such as short-lived climate \r\nforcers like black carbon. Article 4"


id: 84acdc17f25d223bd7417abc50b85db5
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"4 calls on developed countries \r\nto undertake economy-wide emissions reduction targets with \r\nthe expectation that developing country Parties will also move to \r\nintroduce these over time. Moreover, the Paris Agreement makes \r\nexpress reference to Parties taking action to conserve and enhance \r\n'sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases' (Article 5). As under the \r\nUNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, this allows for coverage of land use, \r\nland-use change and forestry and agriculture, forestry and other land \r\nuse (AFOLU) emissions, both CO2 and other Kyoto Annex A gases, \r\nas well as methane (Pekkarinen 2020). A few countries, particularly \r\nLDCs, include quantified non-CO2 emissions reductions from the "


id: b9f0ca0976fe866c03945250d7188857
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"As Figure 14.2 illustrates graphically, communicated unconditional \r\nNDCs, if achieved, lead to a reduction of about 7% of world emissions \r\nby 2030 in relation to the Kyoto GHGs, and NDCs with conditional \r\nelements increase this reduction to about 12% (den Elzen et al. 2016). \r\nAlthough there are uncertainties in the extent to which countries will \r\nmeet the conditional elements of their NDCs, the experience with \r\nthe Cancun pledges has been positive, as countries will collectively \r\nmeet their pledges by 2020, and even individual pledges will be met \r\nin most cases, although arguably helped by the COVID-19 pandemic \r\n(UNEP 2020). In any case, the main challenge that remains is to close \r\nthe emissions gap, the difference between what has been pledged \r\nand what needs to be achieved by 2030 to reach a 1.5degC compatible \r\npath (respectively 2degC) (Roelfsema et al. 2020; UNEP 2020, see \r\nalso Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4)"


id: fe988bb37c8a95dfe89ce3e9be3666e3
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" In terms of participation of \r\nstates in mitigation actions, the Paris Agreement performs better \r\nthan the Kyoto Protocol. The latter contains mitigation targets \r\nonly for developed countries listed in its Annex B, while the Paris \r\nAgreement extends binding procedural obligations in relation to \r\nmitigation contributions to all states. It is noted, however, that the \r\nParis Agreement represented a weakening of commitments for those \r\nindustrialised countries that were Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, \r\nalthough a strengthening for those that were not, and for developing \r\ncountries (Oberthur and Groen 2020). Finally, some analysts have \r\nsuggested that the recent proliferation of national mid-century net\u0002zero targets - currently 127 countries have considered or adopted \r\nsuch targets -  can be attributed, at least in part, to participation \r\nin the Paris Agreement and having agreed to its Article 4 (Climate \r\nAction Tracker 2020a; Day et al. 2020)."


id: 13e9e1f487ffdf54c6454a216b546531
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"In relation to the criterion of distributive outcomes, the Paris \r\nAgreement performs well in some respects but less well in others, \r\nand its performance relative to the Kyoto Protocol is arguably lower in \r\nrespect of some indicators such as industrialised country leadership, \r\nand differentiation in favour of developing countries. While the \r\nKyoto Protocol implemented a multilaterally agreed burden-sharing \r\narrangement set out in the UNFCCC and reflected in Annex-based \r\ndifferentiation in mitigation obligations, the Paris Agreement relies \r\non NDCs, accompanied by self-assessments of the fairness of these \r\ncontributions; some of these do not accord with equity principles of \r\ninternational environmental law, although it is worth noting that the \r\nKyoto Protocol was also not fully consistent with such principles"


id: 95c45c37383f2899fc4094f700a7cc8e
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" At \r\npresent, mechanisms in the Paris Agreement for promoting equitable \r\nburden sharing and evaluating the fairness of Parties' contributions \r\nare undefined, although numerous proposals have been developed \r\nin the literature Herrala and Goel 2016; (Ritchie and Reay 2017; \r\nRobiou du Pont et al. 2017; Alcaraz et al. 2019; Sheriff 2019) \r\n(Section  14.3.2.3). Zimm and Nakicenovic (2020) analysed the first \r\nset of NDCs and concluded that they would result in a decrease in the \r\ninequality of per capita emissions across countries. In relation to other \r\nindicators, such as the provision of support, the distributive outcomes \r\nof the Paris Agreement are dependent on the availability of support \r\nthrough mechanisms such as the GCF to meet the mitigation and \r\nadaptation financing needs of developing countries (Antimiani et al. \r\n2017; Chan et al. 2018)"


id: b6b624a311930bd92d52309f2b82459f
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" One study suggests that the implementation \r\nof the emissions reduction objectives stated in the NDCs implies \r\ntrade-offs with poverty reduction efforts needed to achieve SDGs \r\n(Campagnolo and Davide 2019), while other studies offer evidence \r\nthat the immediate economic, environmental, and social benefits \r\nof mitigation in line with developing countries' NDCs exceed those \r\nNDCs' costs, and ultimately align with the SDGs (Antwi-Agyei \r\net al. 2018; Vandyck et al. 2018; Caetano et al. 2020) (Chapter 17). \r\nIn relation to the promotion of co-benefits, the Paris Agreement has \r\nenhanced mechanisms for promoting co-benefits (e.g., in some cases \r\nfor biodiversity conservation through the endorsement of REDD+ \r\ninitiatives and activities) and linkages to sustainable development \r\n(e.g., through the Article 6.4 mechanism)"


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" Finally, in its preambular \r\ntext the Paris Agreement endorses both a human rights perspective \r\nand the concept of just transitions, creating potential hooks for further \r\nelaboration and expansion of these principles in mitigation actions.\r\nOn the criterion of economic performance, the Paris Agreement's \r\nperformance is potentially enhanced by the capacity for Parties "


id: c1a7db34541cc1f4ab2f6ca64098914d
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"In relation to the criterion of transformative potential, there is, as \r\nyet, limited empirical data or theoretical analysis on which to assess \r\nthe Paris Agreement's transformative potential. The IPCC Special \r\nReport on Global Warming of 1.5degC concluded that pathways \r\nlimiting global warming to 1.5degC would require systems transitions \r\nthat are 'unprecedented in terms of scale' (IPCC 2018b). There is \r\nlimited evidence to suggest that this is underway, although there \r\nare arguments made that Paris has the right structure to achieve this. \r\nThe linking of the UNFCCC financial apparatus, including the GCF, \r\nto the Paris Agreement, and the provisions on technology support \r\nand capacity building, provide potential avenues for promoting \r\nincreased investment flows into low-carbon technologies and \r\ndevelopment pathways, as Labordena et al. (2017) show in the case \r\nof solar energy development in Africa"


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"countries, potentially triggering institutional capacity-building at the \r\nnational, sub-national and sectoral levels (Section 14.3.2.7).\r\nUltimately, the overall effectiveness of the Paris Agreement depends \r\non its ability to lead to ratcheting up of collective climate action \r\nto meet the long-term global temperature goal (Bang et al. 2016; \r\nChristoff 2016; Young 2016; Dimitrov et al. 2019; Gupta and van \r\nAsselt 2019). As noted above, there is some evidence that this is \r\nalready occurring. The design of the Paris Agreement, with 'nationally \r\ndetermined' contributions at its centre, countenances an initial \r\nshortfall in collective ambition in relation to the long-term global \r\ntemperature goal on the understanding and expectation that Parties \r\nwill enhance the ambition of their NDCs over time (Article 4). This \r\nis essential given the current shortfall in ambition"


id: 4a32c335cf5d4bc6aebef3d781d0071f
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" The pathways \r\nreflecting current NDCs, according to various estimates, imply \r\nglobal warming in the range of 3degC by 2100 (UNFCCC 2016b; UNEP \r\n2018a) (Box  4.3). NDCs will need to be substantially scaled up if \r\nthe temperature goal of the Paris Agreement is to be met (Rogelj \r\net al. 2016; Rogelj et al. 2018; Hohne et al. 2017, 2018; UNEP 2020). \r\nThe Paris Agreement's 'ambition cycle' is designed to trigger such \r\nenhanced ambition over time. Some studies find that like-minded \r\nclimate mitigation clubs can deliver substantial emissions reductions \r\n(Hovi et al. 2017) and are reasonably stable despite the departure \r\nof a  major emitter such as the United States (Sprinz et al. 2018); \r\nother studies find that conditional commitments in the context \r\nof a  pledge and review mechanism are unlikely to substantially \r\nincrease countries' contributions to emissions reductions (Helland \r\net al"


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" 2017), and hence need to be complemented by the adoption of \r\ninstruments designed differently from the Paris Agreement (Barrett \r\nand Dannenberg 2016). In any case, high (but not perfect) levels of \r\nmean compliance rates with the Paris Agreement have to be assumed \r\nfor reaching the 'well below 2degC' temperature goal (Saelen 2020; \r\nSaelen et al. 2020). This is by no means assured."


id: 65893bdb7737122155fcb4c17437f87a
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"In relation to the criterion of institutional strength, the Paris \r\nAgreement's signalling and guidance function is, however, \r\narguably high. The Paris Agreement has the potential to interact \r\nwith complementary approaches to climate governance emerging \r\nbeyond it (Held and Roger 2018). It may also be used by public\u0002sector organisations -  organised and mobilised in many countries \r\nand transnationally - as a point of leverage in domestic politics to \r\nencourage countries to take costly mitigation actions (Keohane and \r\nOppenheimer 2016). More broadly, the Paris Agreement's architecture \r\nprovides flexibility for decentralised forms of governance (Jordan \r\net al. 2015; Victor 2016) (Section 14.5). The Agreement has served \r\na  catalytic and facilitative role in enabling and facilitating climate \r\naction from non-state and sub-state actors (Chan et al. 2015; Chan \r\net al. 2016; Hale 2016; Backstrand et al. 2017; Kuyper et al. 2018b)"


id: ca627c5c859f198ed26968f5a9c69857
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" \r\nSuch action could potentially 'bridge' the ambition gap created by \r\ninsufficient NDCs from Parties (Hsu et al. 2019b). The 2018 UNEP \r\nEmissions Gap Report estimates that if 'cooperative initiatives are \r\nscaled up to their fullest potential', the impact of non-state and sub\u0002national actors could be up to 1-23 GtCO2-eq yr-1 by 2030 compared \r\nto current policy, which could bridge the gap (Lui et al. 2021). \r\nHowever, at present such a contribution is limited (Michaelowa and \r\nMichaelowa 2017; UNEP 2018a). Non-state actors are also playing \r\na role in enhancing the ambition of individual NDCs by challenging \r\ntheir adequacy in national courts (Chapter 13 and Section 14.5.3)."


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"The Paris Agreement's institutional strength in terms of 'rules and \r\nstandards to facilitate collective action' is disputed given the current \r\nlack of comparable information in NDCs (Peters et al. 2017; Pauw et al. \r\n2018; Mayer 2019; Zihua et al. 2019), and the extent to which its \r\nlanguage, as well as that of the Rulebook, strikes a balance in favour \r\nof discretion over prescriptiveness (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019). \r\nSimilarly, in terms of 'mechanisms to enhance  transparency and \r\naccountability', although detailed rules relating to transparency \r\nhave been developed under the Paris Rulebook, these rules permit \r\nParties considerable self-determination in the extent and manner \r\nof application (Rajamani and Bodansky 2019), and may not lead \r\nto further ambition (Weikmans et al. 2020)"


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" Further the Paris \r\nAgreement's compliance committee is facilitative and designed to \r\nensure compliance with the procedural obligations in the Agreement \r\nrather than with the NDCs themselves, which are not subject \r\nto obligations of result. The Paris Agreement does, however, seek to \r\nsupport the building of transparency-related capacity of developing "


id: a00099a8fcd19cbe1c96bdafc115ca61
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"These findings derived from the peer-reviewed literature are also consistent with two additional sets of analysis. The first set concerns \r\ntrends in emissions, drawing directly from Chapters 2, 6 and 11, showing that global annual emission growth has slowed, as evidenced \r\nby annual emission increments of 0.55 GtCO2-eq yr-1 between 2011 and 2019 compared to 1.014 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2000 and 2008. \r\nThis suggests avoided emissions of 4-5 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (see also Figure 1.1d). The second set concerns emissions reductions projected \r\nby Annex I governments for 2020 in their fourth biennial reports to the UNFCCC. It is important to note that these are mostly projected \r\nannual savings from implemented policies (not ex-post evaluations), and there are considerable differences in countries' estimation \r\nmethodologies. Nevertheless, combining estimates from 38% of the total of 2,811 reported policies and measures yields an overall \r\nestimate of 3.81 GtCO2-eq yr-1 emission savings (UNFCCC 2020d)"


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"2. Proximate emission drivers. With less overt focus on emissions, studies of trends in energy efficiency, carbon intensity, or \r\ndeforestation often point to associated policies. The literature includes an increasing number of studies on demonstrable progress in \r\ndeveloping countries. For example, South and South-East Asia have seen energy intensity in buildings improving at about 5-6% yr-1\r\nsince 2010 (Figure 2.22). In India alone, innovative programmes in efficient air conditioning, LED lighting, and industrial efficiency are \r\nreported as saving around 25 Mtoe in 2019-2020, thus leading to avoided emissions of over 150 MtCO2 yr-1 (Malhotra et al. 2021) \r\n(Box 16.3). Likewise, reductions in deforestation rates in several South and Central American and Asian countries are at least partly \r\nattributable to ecosystem payments, land-use regulation, and internal efforts (Section 7.6.2)"


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" Finally, the policy-driven displacement of \r\nfossil fuel combustion by renewables in energy has led to reductions in carbon intensity in several world regions (Chapters 2 and 6). "


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"3. Technologies. The literature indicates unambiguously that the rapid expansion of low-carbon energy technologies is substantially \r\nattributable to policy (Sections 6.7.5 and 16.5). Technology-specific adoption incentives have led to a greater use of less carbon\u0002intensive (e.g., renewable electricity) and less energy-intensive (especially in transport and buildings) technologies. As Chapters 2 and \r\n6 of this report note that modern renewable energy sources currently satisfy over 9% of global electricity demand, and this is largely \r\nattributable to policy. There are no global-level studies estimating the avoided emissions due to renewable energy support policies, \r\nbut there are methods that have been developed to link renewable energy penetration to avoided emissions, such as that of IRENA \r\n(2021). Using that method, and assuming that 70% of modern renewable energy expansion has been policy induced, yields an \r\nestimate of avoided emissions of 1.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2019"


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" Furthermore, observed cost reductions are the result of policy-driven \r\ncapacity expansion as well as publicly funded resarch and development, in individual countries and globally. These correspond with \r\ninduced effects on number of patents, 'learning curve' correlations with deployed capacity, and cost component and related case study \r\nanalyses (Kavlak et al. 2018; Nemet 2019; Popp 2019; Grubb et al. 2021). "


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"export credit agencies. Further, another USD34.1 billion of the climate \r\nfinance provided through multilateral channels is attributable to the \r\ndeveloped countries (OECD 2021). The OECD methodology has been \r\ncritiqued as it uses Rio markers, the limitations of which could lead \r\nto erroneous reporting and assessment of finance provided as well \r\nas of the mitigation outcome (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011b; \r\nWeikmans and Roberts 2019). This issue is to be addressed through \r\nthe modalities, procedures and guidance under the Enhanced \r\nTransparency Framework of the Paris Agreement (Section 14.3.2.4), \r\nthrough the mandate to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and \r\nTechnological Advice (SBSTA) to develop common tabular formats for \r\nthe reporting of information on, inter alia, financial support provided, \r\nmobilised and received (UNFCCC 2019k)"


id: 2124015df1c1cd26c666145876b5f7c
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" Until then, the Biennial \r\nAssessment Report prepared by the Standing Committee on Finance \r\nprovides the best available information on financial support."


id: a96e4cbddb2da481d4e1eb2c519aa49b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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"of implementation. As mentioned in Section  14.3.2.8, in the Paris \r\nAgreement the binding obligation on developed country Parties to \r\nprovide financial resources to assist developing country Parties \r\napplies to both mitigation and adaptation (UNFCCC 2015a, Art. \r\n9.1). In 2019, climate finance provided and mobilised by developed \r\ncountries was in the order of USD79.6 billion, coming from different \r\nchannels including bilateral and multilateral channels, and also \r\nthrough mobilisation of the private sector attributable to these \r\nchannels (OECD 2021). A majority (two-thirds) of these flows targeted \r\nmitigation action exclusively (Chapter 15)"


id: 8c8bafd90ab979bbd07d4e140f05fe24
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" These estimates, however, \r\nhave been criticised on various grounds, including that they are an \r\noverestimate and do not represent climate-specific net assistance \r\nonly; that in grant equivalence terms the order of magnitude is \r\nlower; and the questionable extent of transparency of information \r\non mobilised private finance, as well as the direction of these flows \r\n(Carty et al. 2020). On balance, such assessments need to be viewed \r\nin the context of the original commitment, the source of the data \r\nand the evolving guidance, and modalities and procedures from the \r\nUNFCCC processes. As mentioned in Chapter 15, the measurement \r\nof climate finance flows continues to face definitional, coverage and \r\nreliability issues, despite progress made by various data providers \r\nand collators (Section 15.3.2)."


id: 9e28e41ee2fe5dbb19cb15f3e7bd2ec7
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" Together they play a  key role in international \r\ncooperation at the global, regional and sub-regional levels because \r\nof their growing mandates and proximity to policymakers (Engen and \r\nPrizzon 2018). For many, climate change is a growing priority and for \r\nsome, because of the needs of the regions or sub-regions in which \r\nthey operate, climate change is embedded in many of their operations. "


id: e2419f17add83e811d0d082b3fda784b
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"The multiplicity of actors providing financial support has resulted in \r\na fragmented international climate finance architecture as indicated \r\nin Section 14.3.2.8. It is also seen as a system which allows for speed, \r\nflexibility and innovation (Pickering et al. 2017). However, the system \r\nis not yet delivering adequate flows given the needs of developing \r\ncountries (Section 14.3.2.8). An early indication of these self-assessed \r\nneeds is provided in the conditional NDCs. Of the 136 conditional \r\nNDCs submitted by June 2019, 110 have components or additional \r\nactions conditioned on financing support for mitigation and 79 \r\nhave components or additional actions for support for adaptation \r\n(Pauw et al. 2020)"


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" While the Paris Agreement did not explicitly \r\ncountenance conditionality for actions in developing countries, it is \r\ngenerally understood that the ambition and effectiveness of climate \r\nambition in these countries is dependent on financial support (Voigt \r\nand Ferreira 2016b). "


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"in 2012 at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio \r\nde Janeiro (Inter-American Development Bank 2012). This has \r\nengendered other forms of collaboration among the MDBs, including, \r\ncommitments to: collectively total at least USD65 billion annually by \r\n2025 in climate finance, with USD50 billion for low- and middle\u0002income economies; to mobilise a further USD40 billion annually by \r\n2025 from private sector investors, including through the increased \r\nprovision of technical assistance, use of guarantees, and other de\u0002risking instruments; to help clients deliver on the goals of the Paris \r\nAgreement; to build a  transparency framework on the impact of \r\nMDBs' activities; and to enable clients to move away from fossil \r\nfuels (Asian Development Bank 2019)"


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" While the share of MDBs in \r\ndirect climate financing is small, their role in influencing national \r\ndevelopment banks and local financial institutions, and leveraging \r\nand crowding in private investments in financing sustainable \r\ninfrastructure, is widely recognised (NCE 2016). However, with this \r\nrecognition there is also an exhortation to do more to align with the \r\ngoals of the Paris Agreement, including a comprehensive examination \r\nof their portfolios beyond investments that directly support climate \r\naction to also enabling the long-term net zero GHG emissions \r\ntrajectory (Larsen et al. 2018; Cochran and Pauthier 2019). Further, \r\na recent assessment has shown that MDBs perform relatively better \r\nin mobilising other public finance than private co-financing (Thwaites \r\n2020)"


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" In addition, the banks have launched or are members of \r\nsignificant initiatives such as the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to \r\nreduce emissions of shortlived climate pollutants, the Carbon Pricing \r\nLeadership Coalition, the Coalition for Climate Resilient Investment \r\nand the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action. These help \r\nto spur action at different levels, from economic analysis to carbon \r\nfinancing, and convenors of finance and development ministers for \r\nclimate action, with leadership of many of these initiatives led by the \r\nWorld Bank."


id: c226875fd6c0f6afaffb2cef9b248938
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"There is a growing recognition of the importance of mobilising private \r\nsector financing including for climate action (World Bank 2015b; \r\nMichaelowa et al. 2020b). An early example of the mobilisation of \r\nthe private sector in a  cooperative mode for mitigation outcomes \r\nis evidenced from the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto \r\nProtocol and the linking with the European Union's Emissions \r\nTrading System, both triggered by relevant provisions in the Kyoto \r\nProtocol (Section 14.4.4) and lessons learned from this are relevant \r\nfor development of market mechanisms in the post Paris Agreement \r\nperiod (Michaelowa et al. 2019b). In 2019 and 2020, on average for \r\nthe two years, public and private climate financing was on the order \r\nof USD632 billion, of which USD310 billion originated from the private \r\nsector. However, as much as 76% of the (overall) finance stayed in \r\nthe country of origin. This trends holds true also for private finance \r\n(CPI 2021). Figure 14"


id: 3e98181bf7fa61640299c8b063a98c1e
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"4 depicts the international climate finance flows \r\ntotalling USD161 billion reported in 2020, about 19% of which were \r\nprivate flows. For (international) mitigation financing flows of USD116 \r\nbillion, the share provided by private sources was 24%. "


id: 37276c22802b2c49932f2dc2772728bc
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"The multilateral climate funds also have a role in the international \r\nclimate finance architecture. This includes, as mentioned in \r\nSection  14.3.2.8, those established under the UNFCCC's financial \r\nmechanism, its operating entities, the Global Environment Facility \r\n(GEF), which also manages two special funds, the Special Climate \r\nChange Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund; and the \r\nGreen Climate Fund (GCF), also an operating entity of the financial \r\nmechanism which in 2015, was given a  special role in supporting \r\nthe Paris Agreement. The GCF aims to provide funding at scale, \r\nbalanced between mitigation and adaptation, using various financial \r\ninstruments including grants, loans, equity, guarantees or others \r\nto activities that are aligned with the priorities of the countries \r\ncompatible with the principle of country ownership (GCF 2011). \r\nThe GCF faces many challenges"


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" While some see the GCF as an \r\nopportunity to transform and rationalise what is now a complex and \r\nfragmented climate finance architecture with insufficient resources \r\nand overlapping remits (Nakhooda et al. 2014), others see it as an \r\nopportunity to address the frequent tensions which arise between \r\nmitigation-focused transformation and national priorities of countries. \r\nThis tension is at the heart of the principle of country ownership and \r\nthe need for transformational change (Winkler and Dubash 2016). \r\nLeveraging private funds and investments by the public sector and \r\ntaking risks to unlock climate action are also expressed strategic \r\naims of the GCF. "


id: 4feba028132cd5432a2ad5351a204c02
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"International cooperation in science and technology occurs across \r\ndifferent levels, with a growing number of international cooperation \r\ninitiatives aimed at research and collaborative action in technology \r\ndevelopment. Weart (2012) finds that such global efforts are effective \r\nin advancing climate change science due to the international nature of \r\nthe challenge. Global research programmes and institutions have also \r\nprovided the scientific basis for major international environmental \r\ntreaties. For example, the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution \r\nConvention and the Montreal Protocol were both informed by scientific \r\nassessments based on collaboration and cooperation of scientists \r\nacross several geographies (Andresen et al. 2000)"


id: 7e75a0554fe4d4e17c67bdb9d179bab5
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" Furthermore, \r\nthe Global Energy Assessment (GEA) provided the scientific basis \r\nand evidence for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, \r\nin particular SDG 7  to ensure access to affordable, reliable and \r\nsustainable modern energy for all (GEA 2012). The GEA drew on \r\nthe expertise of scientists from over 60 countries and institutions. \r\nSeveral other platforms exist to provide scientists and policymakers \r\nan opportunity for joint research and knowledge sharing, such as The \r\nWorld in 2050, an initiative that brings together scientists from some \r\n40 institutions from around the world to provide the science for SDG \r\nand Paris Agreement implementation (TWI2050 2018). "


id: c94386f052dc8acdeb75ca11621d5277
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"The Technology Mechanism consists of the Technology Executive \r\nCommittee (TEC) (replacing the EGTT), as its policy arm, and the Climate \r\nTechnology Centre and Network (CTCN), as its implementation arm \r\n(UNFCCC 2015b). The TEC focuses on identifying and recommending \r\npolicies that can support countries in enhancing and accelerating \r\nthe development and transfer of climate technologies (UNFCCC \r\n2020b). The CTCN facilitates the transfer of technologies through \r\nthree core services: (i) providing technical assistance at the request \r\nof developing countries; (ii) creating access to information and \r\nknowledge on climate technologies; and (iii) fostering collaboration \r\nand capacity building (CTCN 2020a). The CTCN 'network' consists \r\nof a diverse set of climate technology stakeholders from academic, \r\nfinance, non-government, private sector, public sector, and research \r\nentities, together with more than 150 National Designated Entities, \r\nwhich serve as CTCN national focal points"


id: be198398bb1b1a32756c35d0da126b57
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" Through its network, the \r\nCTCN seeks to mobilise policy and technical expertise to deliver \r\ntechnology solutions, capacity-building and implementation advice \r\nto developing countries (CTCN 2020b). At the Katowice UNFCCC \r\nConference of the Parties in 2018, the TEC and CTCN were requested \r\nto incorporate the technology framework developed pursuant to \r\nArticle 10 of the Paris Agreement into their respective workplans and \r\nprogrammes of work (UNFCCC 2019f). "


id: 8c731feadea57842a5f66014856758c1
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"A particular locus for international cooperation on technology \r\ndevelopment and innovation is found within institutions and \r\nmechanisms of the UN climate regime. The UNFCCC, in Article 4.1(c), \r\ncalls on 'all Parties' to 'promote and cooperate in the development, \r\napplication and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, \r\npractices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic \r\nemissions of greenhouse gases' and places responsibility on \r\ndeveloped country Parties to 'take all practicable steps to promote, \r\nfacilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to \r\nenvironmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, \r\nparticularly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement \r\nthe provisions of the Convention' (UNFCCC 1992, Art. 4.5)"


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" The issue \r\nof technology development and transfer has continued to receive \r\nmuch attention in the international climate policy domain since its \r\ninitial inclusion in the UNFCCC in 1992 - albeit often overshadowed \r\nby dominant discourses around market-based mechanisms - and its \r\nrole in reducing GHG emissions and adapting to the consequences of \r\nclimate change 'is seen as becoming ever more critical' (de Coninck \r\nand Sagar 2015a). Milestones in the development of international \r\ncooperation on climate technologies under the UNFCCC have \r\nincluded: (i) the development of a  technology transfer framework \r\nand establishment of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) \r\nunder the SBSTA in 2001; (ii) recommendations for enhancing the "


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"and institutional cooperation) and systemic (creating enabling \r\nenvironments through regulatory and economic policies (Khan et al. \r\n2020; UNFCCC 2021b). In its annual synthesis report for 2018, the \r\nUNFCCC secretariat compiled information submitted by Parties on \r\nthe implementation of capacity building in developing countries, \r\nhighlighting cooperative and regional activities on NDCs, including \r\nprojects to build capacity for implementation, workshops related to \r\ntransparency under the Paris Agreement and collaboration to provide \r\ncoaching and training (UNFCCC 2019h). A  number of developing \r\ncountry Parties also highlighted their contributions to South-South \r\ncooperation (discussed further in Section  14.5.1.4), and identified \r\ncapacity-building projects undertaken with others (e.g"


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",  capacity\u0002building for risk management in Latin America and the Caribbean, \r\nimproving capacity for measurement, reporting and verification \r\nthrough the Alliance of the Pacific and a  climate action package \r\nlaunched by Singapore). "


id: 40998634a6ae7b3f17ae174730fdee5e
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"The importance of 'financial support' for strengthening cooperative \r\naction on technology development and transfer was recognised in \r\nArticle 10.6 of the Paris Agreement"


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" The technology framework \r\nestablished by the Paris Rulebook specifies actions and activities \r\nrelating to the thematic area of 'support' as including: (i) enhancing \r\nthe collaboration of the Technology Mechanism with the Financial \r\nMechanism; (ii) identifying and promoting innovative finance and \r\ninvestment at different stages of the technology cycle; (iii) providing \r\nenhanced technical support to developing country Parties, in \r\na  country-driven manner, and facilitating their access to financing \r\nfor innovation, enabling environments and capacity building, \r\ndeveloping and implementing the results of TNAs, and engagement \r\nand collaboration with stakeholders, including organisational and \r\ninstitutional support; and (d) enhancing the mobilisation of various \r\ntypes of support, including pro bono and in-kind support, from various \r\nsources for the implementation of actions and activities under each \r\nkey theme of the technology framework. "


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"Notwithstanding the technology framework's directive for enhanced \r\ncollaboration of the Technology and Financial Mechanisms of \r\nthe UNFCCC, linkages between them, and particularly to the GCF, \r\ncontinue to engender political contestation between developing and \r\ndeveloped countries (Oh 2020b). Developing countries sought to \r\naddress concerns over the unsustainable funding status of the CTCN \r\nby advocating linkage through a funding arrangement or financial \r\nlinkage, whereas developed countries favour the design of an \r\ninstitutional linkage maintaining the different and separate mandates \r\nof the CTCN and the GCF (Oh 2020a,b)"


id: 8e0432347ea330094e2d5ded7e35253c
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" With no resolution reached, \r\nthe UNFCCC COP requested the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, \r\nat its fifty-third session, to take stock of progress in strengthening \r\nthe linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial \r\nMechanism with a  view to recommending a  draft decision for \r\nconsideration and adoption by the Glasgow COP, scheduled for 2021 \r\n(UNFCCC 2019l)."


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"including the EU, Switzerland, China, South Korea, New Zealand, \r\nKazakhstan and several US states and Canadian provinces (Wettestad \r\nand Gulbrandsen 2018). More systems are in the pipeline, including \r\nMexico and Thailand (ICAP 2019). The link between the EU and \r\nSwitzerland entered into force in January 2020 and other linkages \r\nare being negotiated. Scholars analyse the potential benefits of these \r\nmultilateral linkages and demonstrate that these can be significant \r\n(Doda et al. 2019; Doda and Taschini 2017). Over time, the linkages \r\nof national emissions trading systems can be seen as building blocks \r\nto a  strategic enlargement of international cooperation (Caparros \r\nand Pereau 2017; Mehling 2019)"


id: c441b775d2c1d48480915d7fd0bf8c4f
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" The World Bank has emerged as an \r\nimportant lynchpin and facilitator of knowledge-building and sharing \r\nof lessons about the design and linking of carbon markets, through \r\ninitiatives such as the Partnership for Market Readiness, Networked \r\nCarbon Markets and the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition \r\n(Wettestad et al. 2021)."


id: 3b6116e263659690538fed6b9b8efd5d
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"capacity in developing countries (Robinson 2018). In an effort to \r\nimprove capacity-building efforts within the UNFCCC, in 2015, \r\nthe Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB) was established \r\nby the COP decision accompanying the Paris Agreement as the \r\nprimary body for enhancing capacity-building efforts, including by \r\nimproving coherence and coordination in capacity-building activities \r\n(UNFCCC 2016a, para. 71). The activities of the Committee include \r\nthe provision of guidance and technical support on climate change \r\ntraining and capacity building, raising awareness and sharing climate \r\ninformation and knowledge. During 2020, the PCCB was able, despite \r\nthe COVID-19 situation, to hold its fourth meeting, implement and \r\nassess its 2017-2020 work plan, and develop and agree on its future \r\nroadmap (2021-2024) (UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Implementation \r\n2020)"


id: ed38f2b99f4069531a0b483cc15107b4
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" Non-governmental organisations such as the Coalition on \r\nParis Agreement Capacity-building provide expert input to the PCCB. "


id: 95c2db9b8f8fad4acb7243ea2719e1cb
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content:
"However, it is important to distinguish between theory and practice. \r\nThe practice of ETS linking so far demonstrates a few attempts that \r\ndid not result in linkages due to shifts of governments and political \r\npreferences (for instance the process between the EU and Australia, \r\nand Ontario withdrawing from the Western Climate Initiative) (Bailey \r\nand Inderberg 2018). It is worth noting that the linking of carbon \r\nmarkets raises problems of distribution of costs and loss of political \r\ncontrol and hence does not offer a politically easy alternative route \r\nto a  truly international carbon market. Careful, piecemeal and \r\nincremental linking may be the most feasible approach forward \r\n(Green et al. 2014; Gulbrandsen et al. 2019). It is premature for any \r\nserious assessment of the practice of ETS linking to be conducted"


id: 7f0340765c9bffc1916c3865fc47d454
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" \r\nEnvironmental effectiveness, transformative potential, economic \r\nperformance, institutional strength and even distributional outcomes \r\ncan potentially be significant and positive if linking is done carefully \r\n(Doda and Taschini 2017; Mehling et al. 2018; Doda et al. 2019), but \r\nare all marginal if one focuses on existing experiences (Spalding\u0002Fecher et al. 2012; Haites 2016; Schneider et al. 2017; La Hoz Theuer \r\net al. 2019; Schneider et al. 2019)."


id: bb044bb54100cb1a21af0ff0e01f2bbe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"While Solar Radiation Modification (SRM) and carbon dioxide \r\nremoval (CDR) were often referred to as 'geoengineering' in earlier \r\nIPCC reports and in the literature, IPCC SR1.5 started to explore \r\nSRM and CDR more thoroughly and to highlight the differences \r\nbetween -  but also within -  both approaches more clearly. This \r\nsection assesses international governance of both SRM and CDR, \r\nrecognising that CDR, as a mitigation option, is covered elsewhere in \r\nthis report, whereas SRM is not. Chapter 12 of this report covers the \r\nemerging national, sub-national and non-state governance of CDR, \r\nwhile Chapters 6, 7 and 12 also assess the mitigation potential, risks \r\nand co-benefits of some CDR options. Chapters 4 and 5 of AR6 WGI \r\nassess the physical climate system and biogeochemical responses \r\nto different SRM and CDR methods"


id: b7d52976a1b8456ffa8bcba892c8de0b
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" Cross-Working Group Box 4 on \r\nSRM (AR6 WGII, Chapter  16; and Cross-Working Group Box  4  in \r\nthis chapter) gives a brief overview of Solar Radiation Modification \r\nmethods, risks, benefits, ethics and governance."


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"There is high agreement in the literature that for addressing climate change risks, SRM cannot be the main policy response to climate \r\nchange and is, at best, a supplement to achieving sustained net zero or net negative CO2 emission levels globally (de Coninck et al. \r\n2018; MacMartin et al. 2018; Buck et al. 2020; National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medecine 2021). SRM contrasts with \r\nclimate change mitigation activities, such as emissions reductions and CDR, as it introduces a 'mask' to the climate change problem \r\nby altering the Earth's radiation budget, rather than attempting to address the root cause of the problem, which is the increase in \r\nGHGs in the atmosphere. In addition, the effects of proposed SRM options would only last as long as a deployment is maintained - for \r\nexample, requiring a yearly injection of aerosols in the case of SAI as the lifetime of aerosols in the stratosphere is one to three years \r\n(Niemeier et al"


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" 2011) or continuous spraying of sea salt in the case of MCB as the lifetime of sea salt aerosols in the atmosphere is \r\nonly about 10 days - which contrasts with the long lifetime of CO2 and its climate effects, with global warming resulting from CO2\r\nemissions likely remaining at a similar level for a hundred years or more (MacDougall et al. 2020) and long-term climate effects of \r\nemitted CO2 remaining for several hundreds to thousands of years (Solomon et al. 2009)."


id: b4bb3316e1cb6ced1abae74a9b3779d0
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"In the context of reaching the long-term global temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, there are different hypothetical scenarios \r\nof SRM deployment: early, substantial mitigation with no SRM, more limited or delayed mitigation with moderate SRM, unchecked \r\nemissions with total reliance on SRM, and regionally heterogeneous SRM. Each scenario presents different levels and distributions \r\nof SRM benefits, side effects, and risks. The more intense the SRM deployment, the larger is the likelihood for the risks of side effects \r\nand environmental risks (e.g., Heutel et al., 2018). Regional disparities in climate hazards may result from both regionally-deployed \r\nSRM options such as GBAM, and more globally uniform SRM such as SAI (Jones et al. 2018; Seneviratne et al. 2018). There is an \r\nemerging literature on smaller forcings of SAI to reduce global average warming, for instance, to hold global warming to 1.5degC or 2degC \r\nalongside ambitious conventional mitigation (Jones et al"


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"warming either locally or globally, it would not maintain the climate in a present-day state nor return the climate to a pre-industrial \r\nstate (climate averaged over 1850-1900) (AR6 WGI, Box 1.2) in all regions and in all seasons even when used to fully offset the global \r\nmean warming (high confidence) (AR6 WGI Chapter 4). This is because the climate forcing and response to SRM options are different \r\nfrom the forcing and response to GHG increase. Because of these differences in climate forcing and response patterns, the regional \r\nand seasonal climates of a world with a global mean warming of 1.5degC or 2degC achieved via SRM would be different from a world with \r\nsimilar global mean warming but achieved through mitigation (MacMartin et al. 2018). At the regional scale and seasonal timescale \r\nthere could be considerable residual climate change and/or overcompensating change (e.g"


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", more cooling, wetting or drying than just \r\nwhat's needed to offset warming, drying or wetting due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions), and there is low confidence in \r\nunderstanding of the climate response to SRM at the regional scale (AR6 WGI, Chapter 4)."


id: c27ac155e782a1265f3b19bf2e721d2d
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"There is low confidence and large uncertainty in projected impacts of SRM on crop yields due in part to a limited number of studies. \r\nBecause SRM would result in only a slight reduction in CO2 concentrations relative to the emissions scenario without SRM (AR6 \r\nWGI, Chapter  5), the CO2 fertilisation effect on plant productivity is nearly the same in emissions scenarios with and without \r\nSRM. Nevertheless, changes in climate due to SRM are likely to have some impacts on crop yields. A single study indicates MCB may \r\nreduce crop failure rates compared to climate change from a doubling of CO2 pre-industrial concentrations (Parkes et al. 2015). Models \r\nsuggest SAI cooling would reduce crop productivity at higher latitudes compared to a scenario without SRM by reducing the growing \r\nseason length, but benefit crop productivity in lower latitudes by reducing heat stress (Pongratz et al. 2012; Xia et al. 2014; Zhan et al. \r\n2019)"


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" Crop productivity is also projected to be reduced where SAI reduces rainfall relative to the scenario without SRM, including \r\na case where reduced Asian summer monsoon rainfall causes a reduction in groundnut yields (Xia et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2016). \r\nSAI will increase the fraction of diffuse sunlight, which is projected to increase photosynthesis in forested canopy, but will reduce \r\nthe direct and total available sunlight, which tends to reduce photosynthesis. As total sunlight is reduced, there is a net reduction \r\nin crop photosynthesis with the result that any benefits to crops from avoided heat stress may be offset by reduced photosynthesis, \r\nas indicated by a single statistical modelling study (Proctor et al. 2018). SAI would reduce average surface ozone concentration (Xia \r\net al. 2017) mainly as a result of aerosol-induced reduction in stratospheric ozone in polar regions, resulting in reduced downward \r\ntransport of ozone to the troposphere (Pitari et al"


id: 3f326cf04f2a66587871e215601a4ac8
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" 2014; Tilmes et al. 2018). The reduction in stratospheric ozone also allows more UV \r\nradiation to reach the surface. The reduction in surface ozone, together with an increase in surface UV radiation, would have important \r\nimplications for crop yields but there is low confidence in our understanding of the net impact."


id: d840fa818fa1c2b6aa13a066cc9808e3
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"Few studies have assessed potential SRM impacts on human health and well-being. SAI using sulfate aerosols is projected to deplete \r\nthe ozone layer, increasing mortality from skin cancer, and SAI could increase particulate matter due to offsetting warming, reduced \r\nprecipitation and deposition of SAI aerosols, which would increase mortality, but SAI also reduces surface-level ozone exposure, which \r\nwould reduce mortality from air pollution, with net changes in mortality uncertain and depending on aerosol type and deployment \r\nscenario (Effiong and Neitzel 2016; Eastham et al. 2018; Dai et al. 2020). However, these effects may be small compared to changes \r\nin risk from infectious disease (e.g., mosquito-borne illnesses) or food security due to SRM influences on climate (Carlson et al. 2022)"


id: 5f775c93d6d1f05e50f24ccbf8279ff3
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" \r\nUsing volcanic eruptions as a natural analogue, a sudden implementation of SAI that forced the El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) \r\nsystem may increase risk of severe cholera outbreaks in Bengal (Trisos et al. 2018; Pinke et al. 2019). Considering only mean annual \r\ntemperature and precipitation, SAI that stabilises global temperature at its present-day level is projected to reduce income inequality \r\nbetween countries compared to the highest warming pathway (RCP8.5) (Harding et al. 2020). Some integrated assessment model "


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"There is large uncertainty in terrestrial ecosystem responses to SRM.  By decoupling increases in atmospheric greenhouse gas \r\nconcentrations and temperature, SAI could generate substantial impacts on large-scale biogeochemical cycles, with feedbacks to \r\nregional and global climate variability and change (Zarnetske et al. 2021). Compared to a high CO2 world without SRM, global-scale \r\nSRM simulations indicate reducing heat stress in low latitudes would increase plant productivity, but cooling would also slow down \r\nthe process of nitrogen mineralisation, which could decrease plant productivity (Glienke et al. 2015; Duan et al. 2020). In high latitude \r\nand polar regions SRM may limit vegetation growth compared to a high CO2 world without SRM, but net primary productivity may still \r\nbe higher than pre-industrial climate (Glienke et al. 2015)"


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" Tropical forests cycle more carbon and water than other terrestrial biomes \r\nbut large areas of the tropics may tip between savanna and tropical forest depending on rainfall and fire (Beer et al. 2010; Staver et \r\nal. 2011). Thus, SAI-induced reductions in precipitation in Amazonia and central Africa are expected to change the biogeography of \r\ntropical ecosystems in ways different both from present-day climate and global warming without SAI (Simpson et al. 2019; Zarnetske \r\net al. 2021). This would have potentially large consequences for ecosystem services (AR6 WGII, Chapters 2 and 9). When designing \r\nand evaluating SAI scenarios, biome-specific responses need to be considered if SAI approaches are to benefit rather than harm \r\necosystems. Regional precipitation change and sea salt deposition over land from MCB may increase or decrease primary productivity \r\nin tropical rainforests (Muri et al. 2015)"


id: 4ba39d2d552ef0d5abfa85d87fffeaf
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" SRM that fully offsets warming could reduce the dispersal velocity required for species to \r\ntrack shifting temperature niches whereas partially offsetting warming with SAI would not reduce this risk unless rates of warming \r\nwere also reduced (Trisos et al. 2018; Dagon and Schrag 2019). SAI may reduce high fire-risk weather in Australia, Europe and parts \r\nof the Americas, compared to global warming without SAI (Burton et al. 2018). Yet SAI using sulphur injection could shift the spatial \r\ndistribution of acid-induced aluminium soil toxicity into relatively undisturbed ecosystems in Europe and North America (Visioni et \r\nal. 2020). For the same amount of global mean cooling, SAI, MCB, and CCT would have different effects on gross and net primary \r\nproductivity because of different spatial patterns of temperature, available sunlight, and hydrological cycle changes (Duan et al. \r\n2020)"


id: 1e51933838eecd916e29f19b25eabb18
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" Large-scale modification of land surfaces for GBAM may have strong trade-offs with biodiversity and other ecosystem services, \r\nincluding food security (Seneviratne et al. 2018). Although existing studies indicate SRM will have widespread impacts on ecosystems, \r\nrisks and potential for risk reduction for marine and terrestrial ecosystems and biodiversity remain largely unknown."


id: 4666bfb33bca42101e851b00a7abcc2c
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"A sudden and sustained termination of SRM in a high CO2 emissions scenario would cause rapid climate change (high confidence) \r\n(AR6 WGI, Chapter 4). More scenario analysis is needed on the potential likelihood of sudden termination (Kosugi 2013; Irvine and \r\nKeith 2020). A gradual phase-out of SRM combined with emissions reduction and CDR could avoid these termination effects (medium \r\nconfidence) (MacMartin et al. 2014; Keith and MacMartin 2015; Tilmes et al. 2016). Several studies find that large and extremely rapid \r\nwarming and abrupt changes to the water cycle would occur within a decade if a sudden termination of SAI occurred (McCusker et \r\nal. 2014; Crook et al. 2015). The size of this 'termination shock' is proportional to the amount of radiative forcing being masked by \r\nSAI. A sudden termination of SAI could place many thousands of species at risk of extinction, because the resulting rapid warming \r\nwould be too fast for species to track the changing climate (Trisos et al"


id: ce752a5f0b9095c4c92d6e54f633b0d
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"Studies on the public perception of SRM have used multiple methods: questionnaire surveys, workshops, and focus group interviews \r\n(Burns et al. 2016; Cummings et al. 2017). Most studies have been limited to Western societies with some exceptions. Studies have \r\nrepeatedly found that respondents are largely unaware of SRM (Merk et al. 2015). In the context of this general lack of familiarity, \r\nthe publics prefer carbon dioxide removal (CDR) to SRM (Pidgeon et al. 2012), are very cautious about SRM deployment because of \r\npotential environmental side effects and governance concerns, and mostly reject deployment for the foreseeable future. Studies also \r\nsuggest conditional and reluctant support for research, including proposed field experiments, with conditions of proper governance \r\n(Sugiyama et al. 2020). Recent studies show that the perception varies with the intensity of deliberation (Merk et al. 2019), and that \r\nthe public distinguishes different funding sources (Nelson et al"


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" 2021). Limited studies for developing countries show a tendency for \r\nrespondents to be more open to SRM (Visschers et al. 2017; Sugiyama et al. 2020), perhaps because they experience climate change \r\nmore directly (Carr and Yung 2018). In some Anglophone countries, a small portion of the public believes in chemtrail conspiracy \r\ntheories, which are easily found in social media (Tingley and Wagner 2017; Allgaier 2019). Since researchers rarely distinguish different \r\nSRM options in engagement studies, there remains uncertainty in public perception."


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"There is broad literature on ethical considerations around SRM, mainly stemming from philosophy or political theory, and mainly \r\nfocused on SAI (Flegal et al. 2019). There is concern that publicly debating, researching and potentially deploying SAI could involve \r\na 'moral hazard', with potential to obstruct ongoing and future mitigation efforts (Morrow 2014; Baatz 2016; McLaren 2016), while \r\nempirical evidence is limited and mostly at the individual, not societal, level (Burns et al. 2016; Merk et al. 2016; Merk et al. 2019). \r\nThere is low agreement whether research and outdoors experimentation will create a 'slippery slope' toward eventual deployment, \r\nleading to a lock-in to long-term SRM, or whether it can be effectively regulated at a later stage to avoid undesirable outcomes (Hulme \r\n2014; Parker 2014; Callies 2019; McKinnon 2019)"


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" Regarding potential deployment of SRM, procedural, distributive and recognitional \r\nconceptions of justice are being explored (Svoboda and Irvine 2014; Svoboda 2017; Preston and Carr 2018; Hourdequin 2019). With \r\nthe SRM research community's increasing focus on distributional impacts of SAI, researchers have started more explicitly considering \r\ninequality in participation and inclusion of vulnerable countries and marginalised social groups (Flegal and Gupta 2018; Whyte \r\n2018; Taiwo and Talati 2021), including considering stopping research (Stephens and Surprise 2020; National Academies of Sciences \r\nEngineering and Medecine 2021)"


id: f0fc1baa4d8329444eef36f47a626f7d
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" There is recognition that SRM research has been conducted predominantly by a relatively small \r\nnumber of experts in the Global North, and that more can be done to enable participation from diverse peoples and geographies in \r\nsetting research agendas and research governance priorities, and undertaking research, with initial efforts to this effect (Rahman et al. \r\n2018), noting that unequal power relations in participation could influence SRM research governance and have potential implications \r\nfor policy (Winickoff et al. 2015; Frumhoff and Stephens 2018; Whyte 2018; Biermann and Moller 2019; McLaren and Corry 2021; \r\nNational Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medecine 2021; Taiwo and Talati 2021)."


id: fa197f8aa29e12b10256de6aa214496f
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content:
"Currently, there is no dedicated, formal international SRM governance for research, development, demonstration, or deployment (AR6 \r\nWGIII, Chapter 14). Some multilateral agreements - such as the UN Convention on Biological Diversity or the Vienna Convention on \r\nthe Protection of the Ozone Layer - indirectly and partially cover SRM, but none is comprehensive and the lack of robust and formal \r\nSRM governance poses risks (Ricke et al. 2013; Talberg et al. 2018; Reynolds 2019a). While governance objectives range broadly, from \r\nprohibition to enabling research and potentially deployment (Sugiyama et al. 2018b; Gupta et al. 2020), there is agreement that SRM \r\ngovernance should cover all interacting stages of research through to any potential, eventual deployment with rules, institutions, \r\nand norms (Reynolds 2019b)"


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" Accordingly, governance arrangements are co-evolving with respective SRM technologies across the \r\ninteracting stages of research, development, demonstration, and - potentially - deployment (Rayner et al. 2013; Parker 2014; Parson \r\n2014). Stakeholders are developing governance already in outdoors research; for example, for MCB and OAC experiments on the "


id: 2cf0b0e79c0abfacac2edab440a44cc
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"While there is room for national and even sub-national governance of \r\nSAI - for example on research (differentiating indoor from open-air) \r\n(Jinnah et al. 2018; Hubert 2020) and public engagement (Bellamy \r\nand Lezaun 2017; Flegal et al. 2019) - international governance of \r\nSAI faces the challenge that comprehensive institutional architectures \r\ndesigned too far in advance could prove either too restrictive or too \r\npermissive in light of subsequent political, institutional, geophysical \r\nand technological developments (Sugiyama et al. 2018a; Reynolds \r\n2019a). Views on governance encompass a broad range, from aiming \r\nto restrict to wanting to enable research and potentially deployment; \r\nin between these poles, other authors stress the operationalisation \r\nof the precautionary approach: preventing deployment until specific \r\ncriteria regarding scientific consensus, impact assessments and \r\ngovernance issues are met (Tedsen and Homann 2013; Wieding \r\net al. 2020)"


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" Many scholars suggest that governance arrangements \r\nought to co-evolve with respective SRM technologies (Parker 2014), \r\nincluding that it stay at least one step ahead of research, development, \r\ndemonstration, and - potentially - deployment (Rayner et al. 2013; \r\nParson 2014). With the modelling community's increasing focus on \r\nshowing that, and in what ways, SAI could help to minimise climate \r\nchange impacts in the Global South, the SRM governance literature \r\nhas come to include considerations of how SAI could contribute \r\nto global equity (Horton and Keith 2016; Flegal and Gupta 2018; \r\nHourdequin 2018)."


id: 2a24d6e132096d8cb1b5d92ddf141f
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"Solar radiation modification, in the literature also referred to as 'solar \r\ngeoengineering', refers to the intentional modification of the Earth's \r\nshortwave radiative budget, such as by increasing the reflection of \r\nsunlight back to space, with the aim of reducing warming. Several \r\nSRM options have been proposed, including stratospheric aerosol \r\ninjection (SAI), marine cloud brightening (MCB), ground-based \r\nalbedo modifications (GBAM), and ocean albedo change (OAC). SRM \r\nhas been discussed as a potential response option within a broader \r\nclimate risk management strategy, as a  supplement to emissions \r\nreduction, carbon dioxide removal and adaptation (Crutzen 2006; \r\nShepherd 2009; Caldeira and Bala 2017; Buck et al. 2020), for \r\nexample as a temporary measure to slow the rate of warming (Keith \r\nand MacMartin 2015) or address temperature overshoot (MacMartin \r\net al. 2018; Tilmes et al. 2020)"


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content:
" SRM assessments of potential benefits \r\nand risks still primarily rely on modelling efforts and their underlying \r\nscenario assumptions (Sugiyama et al. 2018a), for example in the \r\ncontext of the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project \r\nGeoMIP6 (Kravitz et al. 2015). Recently, small-scale MCB and \r\nOAC experiments started to take place on the Great Barrier Reef \r\n(McDonald et al. 2019)."


id: ba9c00d9a97fd17c6864ddcac5f6dd25
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content:
"SAI -  the most researched SRM method -  poses significant \r\ninternational governance challenges since it could potentially \r\nbe deployed uni- or minilaterally and alter the global mean \r\ntemperature much faster than any other climate policy measure, \r\nat comparatively low direct costs (Parson 2014; Nicholson et al. \r\n2018; Smith and Wagner 2018; Sugiyama et al. 2018b; Reynolds \r\n2019a). While being dependent on the design of deployment \r\nsystems, both geophysical benefits and adverse effects would \r\npotentially be unevenly distributed (AR6 WGI, Chapter  4). \r\nPerceived local harm could exacerbate geopolitical conflicts, not \r\nleast depending on which countries are part of a  deployment \r\ncoalition (Maas and Scheffran 2012; Zurn and Schafer 2013), but \r\nalso because immediate attribution of climatic impacts to detected \r\nSAI deployment would not be possible"


id: ff71129639f6901a3162a27e3fd67a6
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content:
" Uncoordinated or poorly \r\nresearched deployment by a limited number of states, triggered by \r\nperceived climate emergencies, could create international tensions \r\n(Corry 2017; Lederer and Kreuter 2018). An additional risk is that \r\nof rapid temperature rise following an abrupt end of SAI activities \r\n(Parker and Irvine 2018; Rabitz 2019)."


id: 95e3bf5fc8b4e521f59d62ecbed8737a
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content:
"Given that risks and potential benefits of SRM proposals differ \r\nsubstantially and their large-scale deployment is highly speculative, \r\nthere is a wide array of concrete proposals for near-term anticipatory \r\nor adaptive governance. Numerous authors suggest a  wide range \r\nof governance principles Nicholson et al. (2018) encapsulate most \r\nof these in suggesting a  list of four: (i) Guard against potential \r\nrisks and harm; (ii) Enable appropriate research and development \r\nof scientific knowledge; (iii) Legitimise any future research or \r\npolicymaking through active and informed public and expert \r\ncommunity engagement; (iv) Ensure that SRM is considered only \r\nas a  part of a  broader, mitigation-centred portfolio of responses \r\nto climate change. Regarding international institutionalisation, \r\noptions range from formal integration into existing UN bodies like \r\nthe UNFCCC (Nicholson et al. 2018) or the Convention on Biological \r\nDiversity (CBD) (Bodle et al"


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" 2014) to the creation of specific, but \r\nless formalised global fora (Parson and Ernst 2013) to forms of club \r\ngovernance (Bodansky 2013; Lloyd and Oppenheimer 2014). Recent \r\nyears have also seen the emergence of transnational non-state actors "


id: 98bc621a63daf2c59806a29c02058fc6
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"Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) refers to a  cluster of technologies, \r\npractices, and approaches that remove and sequester carbon dioxide \r\nfrom the ocean and atmosphere and durably store it in geological, \r\nterrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products (Table 12.6). In contrast \r\nto SRM, CDR does not necessarily impose transboundary risks, except \r\ninsofar as misleading accounting of its use and deployment could give \r\na false picture of countries' overall mitigation efforts. CDR is clearly \r\na form of climate change mitigation, and as described in Chapter 12 \r\nis needed to counterbalance residual GHG emissions that may prove \r\nhard to abate (e.g., from industry, aviation or agriculture) in the context \r\nof reaching net zero emissions both globally - in the context of Article \r\n4 of the Paris Agreement - and nationally. CDR could also later be used \r\nfor reducing atmospheric CO2 concentrations by providing net negative \r\nemissions at the global level (Fuglestvedt et al"


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" 2018; Bellamy and \r\nGeden 2019). Despite the common feature of removing carbon dioxide, \r\ntechnologies like afforestation/reforestation, soil carbon sequestration, \r\nbioenergy with carbon capture and storage, direct air capture with \r\ncarbon storage, enhanced weathering, ocean alkalinity enhancement \r\nor ocean fertilisation are very different, as are the governance \r\nchallenges. Chapter 12 highlights the sustainable development risks \r\nassociated with land and water use that are connected to the biological \r\napproaches to CDR. As a public good which largely lacks incentives \r\nto be pursued as a business case, most types of CDR require a suite \r\nof dedicated policy instruments that address both near-term needs as \r\nwell as long-term continuity at scale (Honegger et al. 2021b)."


id: 8f4afc62a5f854ee612f017d2beb9ea8
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"The Paris Agreement sets in place a new framework for international \r\nclimate policy (Paroussos et al. 2019), which some cite as evidence \r\nof 'hybrid multilateralism' (Christoff 2016; Savaresi 2016; Backstrand \r\net al. 2017). While a  trend of widening involvement of non-state \r\nactors was evident prior to conclusion of the Paris Agreement, \r\nparticularly at UNFCCC COPs, the 'new landscape of international \r\nclimate cooperation' features an 'intensified interplay between \r\nstate and non-state actors', including civil society and social \r\nmovements, business actors, and sub-national or substate actors, \r\nsuch as local governments and cities (Backstrand et al. 2017, p. 562). \r\nThis involvement of other actors beyond states in international climate \r\ncooperation is facilitated by the Paris Agreement's 'hybrid \r\nclimate policy architecture' (Bodansky et al. 2016) (Section 14.3.1"


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"1), \r\nwhich acknowledges the primacy of domestic politics in climate change \r\nand invites the mobilisation of international and domestic pressure \r\nto make the Agreement effective (Falkner 2016b). In this landscape, \r\nthere is greater flexibility for more decentralised 'polycentric' forms \r\nof climate governance and recognition of the benefits of working in \r\ndiverse forms and groups to realise global climate mitigation goals \r\n(Jordan et al. 2015; Oberthur 2016) (Section 1.9). "


id: a87e576f5ee2d994f0b302ed37210574
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"Increasing attention has focused on the role of multi-level, multi\u0002actor cooperation among actors, groupings and agreements beyond \r\nthe UNFCCC climate regime as potential 'building blocks' towards \r\nenhanced international action on climate mitigation (Falkner \r\n2016a; Caparros and Pereau 2017; Potoski 2017; Stewart et al. \r\n2017). This can include agreements on emissions and technologies \r\nat the regional or sub-global level, what scholars often refer to as \r\n'climate clubs' (Nordhaus 2015; Hovi et al. 2016; Green 2017; Sprinz \r\net al. 2018). One forum through which such agreements are often \r\ndiscussed, in support of UNFCCC objectives, is high-level meetings \r\nof political leaders, such as the G7 and G20 states (Livingston 2016)"


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" \r\nIt also includes cooperation on narrower sets of issues than are \r\nfound within the Paris Agreement, for instance, other international \r\nenvironmental agreements dealing with a  particular subset of \r\nGHGs; linkages with, or leveraging of, efforts or agreements in other \r\nspheres such as adaptation, human rights or trade; agreements \r\nwithin particular economic sectors; or transnational initiatives \r\ninvolving global cooperative efforts by different types of non-state \r\nactors. Cooperative efforts in each of these forums are reviewed \r\nin the following sections of the chapter. Section  14.5.1 discusses \r\ninternational cooperation at multiple governance levels (global, "


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"Full compliance with the Kigali Amendment is predicted to reduce \r\nHFC emissions by 61% of the global baseline by 2050 (Hoglund\u0002Isaksson et al. 2017), with avoided global warming in 2100 due to \r\nHFCs from a baseline of 0.3degC-0.5degC to less than 0.1degC (WMO 2018). \r\nExamining the interplay of the Kigali Amendment with the Paris \r\nAgreement, Hoch et al. (2019) show how the Article 6 mechanisms \r\nunder the Paris Agreement could generate financial incentives for \r\nHFC mitigation and related energy efficiency improvements. Early \r\naction under Article 6  of the Paris Agreement could drive down \r\nbaseline levels of HFCs for developing countries (calculated in \r\nlight of future production and consumption in the early- and mid\u00022020s) thus generating long-term mitigation benefits under the \r\nKigali Amendment (Hoch et al. 2019)"


id: cba1c99bebd035702de5df8a7514034b
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" However, achievement of the \r\nobjectives of the Kigali Amendment is dependent on its ratification \r\nby key developed countries, such as the United States, and the \r\nprovision of funds by developed countries through the Protocol's \r\nMultilateral Fund to meet developing countries' agreed incremental \r\ncosts of implementation (Roberts 2017). The Kigali Amendment came \r\ninto force on 1 January 2019 and has been ratified by 118 of the 198 \r\nParties to the Montreal Protocol. "


id: c8e4d2d73559fe285f5b8347c4a1d2dc
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"The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone \r\nLayer (the Montreal Protocol) is the leading example of a  non\u0002climate MEA with significant implications for mitigating climate \r\nchange (Barrett 2008). The Montreal Protocol regulates a  number \r\nof substances that are both ozone-depleting substances (ODS) and \r\nGHGs with a significant global warming potential (GWP), including \r\nchlorofluorocarbons, halons and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). \r\nAs a  result, implementation of phase-out requirements for these \r\nsubstances under the Montreal Protocol has made a  significant \r\ncontribution to mitigating climate change (Molina et al. 2009) \r\n(Section 9.9.7.1). Velders et al. (2007) found that over the period from \r\n1990 to 2010, the reduction in GWP100-weighted ODS emissions \r\nexpected with compliance to the provisions of the Montreal Protocol \r\nwas 8 GtCO2-eq yr-1, an amount substantially greater than the first \r\ncommitment period Kyoto reduction target. Young et al"


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" (2021) \r\nsuggest that the Montreal Protocol may also be helping to mitigate \r\nclimate change through avoided decreases in the land carbon sink."


id: 997b52be1a19e274bbfdda3a2b717057
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"MEAs dealing with transboundary air pollution, such as the \r\nConvention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) \r\nand its implementing protocols, which regulate non-GHGs like \r\nparticulates, nitrogen oxides and ground-level ozone, can also have \r\npotential benefits for climate change mitigation (Erickson 2017). \r\nStudies have indicated that rigorous air quality controls targeting \r\nshort-lived climate forcers, like methane, ozone and black carbon, \r\ncould slow global mean temperature rise by about 0.5degC by mid\u0002century (Schmale et al. 2014). Steps in this direction were taken with \r\n2012 amendments to the CLRTAP Gothenburg Protocol (initially \r\nadopted in 1999) to include black carbon, which is an important \r\ndriver of climate change in the Arctic region (Yamineva and Kulovesi \r\n2018). The amended Protocol, which has 28 Parties including the US \r\nand EU, entered into force in October 2019"


id: f2608df8e26829c32f57ff1fd6c8e31c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" However, its limits on \r\nblack carbon have been criticised as insufficiently ambitious in light of \r\nscientific assessments (Khan and Kulovesi 2018). There is still a non\u0002negligible uncertainty in the assessment of radiative forcing of each \r\nshort-lived climate forcer (SLCF), and the results of AR6 WGI have \r\nbeen updated since AR5. For example, the assessment of Emission\u0002based Radiative Forcing from Black Carbon emissions was revised \r\ndownward in AR6 (AR6 WGI Section  6.4.2). When discussing co\u0002benefits with MEAs related to transboundary air pollution, attention \r\nshould be paid to the uncertainty in radiative forcing of SLCFs and \r\nthe update of relevant scientific knowledge."


id: fc5bf64f0dabd7988f591a498fc9a333
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"Another MEA that may play a  role in aiding climate change \r\nmitigation is the 2013 Minamata Convention on Mercury, which \r\ncame into force on 16 August 2017. Coal burning for electricity \r\ngeneration represents the second largest source (behind artisanal \r\nand small-scale gold mining) of anthropogenic mercury emissions to \r\nair (UNEP 2013). Efforts to control and reduce atmospheric emissions \r\nof mercury from coal-fired power generation under the Minamata \r\nConvention may reduce GHG emissions from this source (Eriksen \r\nand Perrez 2014; Selin 2014). For instance, Giang et al. (2015) have \r\nmodelled the implications of the Minamata Convention for mercury \r\nemissions from coal-fired power generation in India and China, \r\nconcluding that reducing mercury emissions from present-day levels \r\nin these countries is likely to require 'avoiding coal consumption and \r\ntransitioning toward less carbon-intensive energy sources' (Giang \r\net al. 2015)"


id: a164dad7a67ffd3adc8103afae9a45a5
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" Parties to the Minamata Convention include five of the \r\nsix top global CO2 emitters - China, the United States, the EU, India \r\nand Japan (Russia has not ratified the Convention). The Minamata \r\nConvention also establishes an Implementation and Compliance \r\nCommittee to review compliance with its provisions on a 'facilitative' \r\nbasis (Eriksen and Perrez 2014). "


id: e2726ea3b5f2328934daeffa80de9d86
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"Adaptation involves actions to lessen the harm associated with \r\nclimate change, or take advantage of potential gains (Smit and \r\nWandel 2006). It can seek to reduce present and future exposure \r\nto specific climate risks (Adger et al. 2003), mainstream climate \r\ninformation into existing planning efforts (Gupta et al. 2010; van der \r\nVoorn et al. 2012; van der Voorn et al. 2017), and reduce vulnerability \r\n(or increase resilience) of people or communities to the effects of \r\nclimate change (Kasperson and Kasperson 2001). There is a  body \r\nof literature highlighting potential synergies and conflicts between \r\nadaptation actions - in any of the three areas above - and mitigation \r\nactions -  and potential strategies for resolving them (Locatelli \r\net al. 2011; Casado-Asensio and Steurer 2014; Duguma et al. 2014; \r\nSuckall et al. 2015; Watkiss et al. 2015; van der Voorn et al. 2020). \r\nIn a strategic context, this issue has been analysed in Bayramoglu \r\net al"


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" (2018), Eisenack and Kahler (2016) and Ingham et al. (2013), \r\namong others. Bayramoglu et al. (2018) analyse the strategic \r\ninteraction between mitigation, as a  public good, and adaptation, \r\nessentially a  private good, showing that the fear that adaptation \r\nwill reduce the incentives to mitigate carbon emissions may not be \r\njustified. On the contrary, adaptation can reduce free-rider incentives \r\n(lead to larger self-enforcing agreements), yielding higher global \r\nmitigation levels and welfare, if adaptation efforts cause mitigation \r\nlevels between different countries to be complements instead of \r\nstrategic substitutes (Ingham et al. 2013). "


id: 6f85d9ab188efffa73ffbe555ffad1ce
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"MEAs that require state Parties to conserve habitat (such as the \r\nConvention on Biological Diversity) or to protect certain ecosystems like \r\nwetlands (such as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International \r\nImportance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat) may also have co-benefits \r\nfor climate change mitigation through the adoption of well-planned \r\nconservation policies (Phelps et al. 2012; Gilroy et al. 2014). At \r\na theoretical level, REDD+ activities have been identified as a particular \r\nopportunity for achieving climate mitigation objectives while also \r\nconserving tropical forest biodiversity and ecosystem services. Elements \r\nof REDD+ that promise greatest effectiveness for climate change \r\nmitigation (e.g., greater finance combined with reference levels which \r\nreduce leakage by promoting broad participation across countries with \r\nboth high and low historical deforestation rates) also offer the greatest \r\nbenefits for biodiversity conservation (Busch et al. 2011)"


id: 604d8f9c6214100f1ece8f225ab927d6
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" However, \r\nactual biodiversity and ecosystem service co-benefits are dependent \r\non the design and  implementation of REDD+ programmes (Ehara \r\net al. 2014; Panfil and Harvey 2016), with limited empirical evidence \r\nto date of emissions reductions from these programmes (Newton et al. \r\n2016; Johnson et al. 2019), and concerns about whether they meet \r\nequity and justice considerations (Schroeder and McDermott 2014) \r\n(Section 7.6.1). "


id: dd2479e84387e1ea0ed631b3f3d85db1
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"International cooperation in mitigation and adaptation share many \r\nof the same challenges, including the need for effective institutions. \r\nThe UNFCCC, for example, addresses international financial support \r\nfor adaptation and for mitigation in the same general category, and \r\nsubjects them to the same sets of institutional constraints (Peterson \r\nand Skovgaard 2019). Sovacool and Linner (2016) argue that the history \r\nof the UNFCCC and its sub-agreements has been shaped by an implicit \r\nbargain that developing countries participate in global mitigation policy \r\nin return for receiving financial and technical assistance for adaptation \r\nand development from industrialised countries and international \r\ngreen funds. Khan and Roberts (2013) contend that this played out \r\npoorly under the Kyoto framework: the Protocol's basic architecture, \r\noriented around legally binding commitments, was not amenable to \r\nmerging the issues of adaptation and mitigation. Kuyper et al. Kuyper \r\net al"


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" (2018a) argue that the movement from the Kyoto Protocol to the \r\nParis Agreement represents a shift in this regard; the Paris Agreement \r\nwas designed not primarily as a  mitigation policy instrument, but \r\nrather one encompassing mitigation, adaptation, and development \r\nconcerns. While this argument suggests that the Paris architecture, \r\ninvolving voluntary mitigation actions and a greater attention to issues "


id: f923fda4de0abe2f149176a0a38b39fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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"There are recognised limits to adaptation (Dow et al. 2013), and \r\nexceeding these limits results in loss and damage, a  topic that \r\nis gathering salience in the policy discourse. Roberts et al. (2014) \r\nfocused on 'loss and damage', essentially those climate change \r\nimpacts which cannot be avoided through adaptation. The Paris \r\nAgreement contains a  free-standing article on loss and damage \r\n(UNFCCC 2015a), focused on cooperation and facilitation, under \r\nwhich Parties have established a clearing house on risk transfer, and \r\na Task Force on Displacement (UNFCCC 2016a). The COP decision \r\naccompanying the Paris Agreement specifies that 'Article 8  does \r\nnot involve or provide a  basis for any liability or compensation' \r\n(UNFCCC 2016a). There is range of views on the treatment of loss \r\nand damage in the Paris Agreement, how responsibility for loss and \r\ndamage should be allocated (Lees 2017; McNamara and Jackson \r\n2019), and how it could be financed (Roberts et al"


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" 2017; Gewirtzman \r\net al. 2018). Some scholars argue that there are continuing options \r\nto pursue compensation and liability in the climate change regime \r\n(Mace and Verheyen 2016; Gsottbauer et al. 2018). There have also \r\nbeen efforts to establish accountability of companies - particularly \r\n'carbon majors' - for climate damage in domestic courts (Ganguly \r\net al. 2018; Benjamin 2021). For states that have suffered loss and \r\ndamage there is also the option to pursue 'state responsibility' claims \r\nunder customary international law and international human rights \r\nlaw (Wewerinke-Singh 2018; Wewerinke-Singh and Salili 2020)."


id: ede53fc04b46d9e4681b3dfd950a255b
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"There are also direct links between mitigation and sustainable \r\ndevelopment. The international agendas for mitigation and \r\nsustainable development have shaped each other, around concepts \r\nsuch as 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective \r\ncapabilities', as well as the distinction - in the UNFCCC and later the \r\nKyoto Protocol - between Annex I and non-Annex I countries (Victor \r\n2011; Patt 2015). The same implicit bargain that developing countries \r\nwould support mitigation efforts in return for assistance with respect \r\nto adaptation also applies to support for development (Sovacool \r\nand Linner 2016). That linkage between mitigation and sustainable \r\ndevelopment has become even more specific with the Paris Agreement \r\nand the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, each of which \r\nexplicitly pursues a set of goals that encompass both mitigation and \r\ndevelopment (Schmieg et al"


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" 2017), reflecting the recognition that \r\nachieving sustainable development and climate mitigation goals are \r\nmutually dependent (Gomez-Echeverri 2018). It is well accepted that \r\nthe long-term effects of climate mitigation will benefit sustainable \r\ndevelopment. A  more contested finding is whether the mitigation \r\nactions themselves promote or hinder short-term poverty alleviation. \r\nOne study, analysing the economic effects of developing countries' \r\nNDCs, finds that mitigation actions slow down poverty reduction \r\nefforts (Campagnolo and Davide 2019). Other studies suggest \r\npossible synergies between low-carbon development and economic \r\ndevelopment (Hanger et al. 2016; Labordena et al. 2017; Dzebo \r\net al. 2019). These studies typically converge on the fact that financial \r\nassistance flowing from developed to developing countries enhances \r\nany possible synergies or lessens the conflicts"


id: 806919eca96ef9a0e71d5cf92c37f621
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" However, mitigation \r\nmeasures can also have negative impacts on gender equality, and \r\npeace and justice (Dzebo et al. 2019). The International Monetary \r\nFund (IMF) has also taken on board the climate challenge and is \r\nexamining the role of fiscal and macroeconomic policies to address \r\nthe climate challenge for supporting its members with appropriate \r\npolicy responses."


id: f48c95ad037dc5752357c35834a2452a
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content:
"In  the Neubauer case in 2021, the German Federal Constitutional \r\nCourt ordered the German legislature, in light of its obligations, \r\nincluding on rights protections, to set clear provisions for reduction \r\ntargets from 2031 onward by the end of 2022 (German Constitutional \r\nCourt 2021). There are cases in the Global South as well (Peel and Lin \r\n2019; Setzer and Benjamin 2020), with the Supreme Court in Nepal \r\nin its 2018 decision in Shrestha ordering the government to amend \r\nits existing laws and introduce a new consolidated law to address \r\nclimate mitigation and adaptation as this would protect the rights to \r\nlife, food, and a clean environment, and give effect to the 2015 Paris \r\nAgreement (The Supreme Court of Nepal 2018). There are dozens of \r\nfurther cases in national and regional courts, increasingly based on \r\nhuman rights claims, and this trend is only likely to grow (Shi et al. \r\n2017; Peel and Osofsky 2018; Beauregard et al. 2021)"


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content:
" These cases \r\nface procedural hurdles, such as standing, as well as substantive \r\ndifficulties, for instance, with regard to the primarily territorial \r\nscope of state obligations to protect human rights (Boyle 2018; \r\nMayer 2021), however, there are increasing instances of successful \r\noutcomes across the world."


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"The literature also identifies institutional synergies at the international \r\nlevel, related to the importance of addressing climate change and \r\ndevelopment in an integrated, coordinated and comprehensive \r\nmanner across constituencies, sectors and administrative and \r\ngeographical boundaries (Le Blanc 2015). The literature also stresses \r\nthe important role that robust institutions have in making this \r\nhappen, including in international cooperation in key sectors for \r\nclimate action as well for development (Waage et al. 2015). Since \r\nthe publication of AR5, which emphasised the need for a  type of \r\ndevelopment that combines both mitigation and adaptation as a way \r\nto strengthen resilience, much of the literature has focused on ways \r\nto address these linkages and the role institutions play in key sectors \r\nthat are often the subject of international cooperation - for example, \r\nenvironmental and soil degradation, climate, energy, water resources, \r\nand forestry (Hogl et al"


id: 9f8bf974cc9d9890c5285f9bcde1df8d
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" 2016). An assessment of thematic policy \r\ncoherence between the voluntary domestic contributions regarding \r\nthe Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda should be integrated in \r\nnational policy cycles for sustainable and climate policymaking to \r\nidentify overlaps, gaps, mutual benefits and trade-offs in national \r\npolicies (Janetschek et al. 2020). "


id: 141668223e62a8dd64f1630da41d5875
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"It is only since 2008 that the relationship between climate change \r\nand human rights has become a  focus of international law and \r\npolicymaking. It is not just climate impacts that threaten the \r\nenjoyment of human rights but also the mitigation responses to \r\nclimate change that affect human rights (Shi et al. 2017). The issue of \r\nhuman rights-climate change linkages was first taken up by the UN \r\nHuman Rights Council in 2008, but has since rapidly gained ground \r\nwith UN human rights treaty bodies issuing comments (e.g., Human \r\nRights Committee 2018), recommendations (e.g., Committee on the \r\nElimination of Discrimination against Women 2018) and even a joint \r\nstatement (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2019) \r\non the impacts of climate change on the enjoyment of human rights"


id: d84f8a712bfab9469e64248faf718496
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" \r\nClimate change effects and related disasters have the potential to \r\naffect human rights broadly, for instance, by giving rise to deaths, \r\ndisease or malnutrition (right to life, right to health), threatening food \r\nsecurity or livelihoods (right to food), impacting upon water supplies \r\nand compromising access to safe drinking water (right to  water), \r\ndestroying coastal settlements through storm surge (right to adequate \r\nhousing), and in some cases forcing relocation as traditional territories \r\nbecome uninhabitable (UNGA 2019). In addition, the right to a healthy \r\nenvironment, recognised in 2021 as an autonomous right at the \r\ninternational level by the Human Rights Council (UN Human Rights \r\nCouncil 2021), arguably extends to a right to a 'safe climate' shaped in \r\npart by the Paris Agreement (UNGA 2019)."


id: d51bc3f48d5731ac55708000c9fa1cd7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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"In their NDCs, Parties mention various trade-related mitigation \r\nmeasures, including import bans, standards and labelling schemes, \r\nborder carbon adjustments (BCAs; see also Chapter 13), renewable \r\nenergy support measures, fossil fuel subsidy reform, and the use \r\nof international market mechanisms (Brandi 2017). Some of these \r\n'response measures' (Chan 2016b) may raise questions concerning \r\ntheir consistency with trade agreements of the World Trade \r\nOrganization (WTO). Non-discrimination is one of the foundational \r\nrules of the WTO. This means, among others, that 'like' imported and \r\ndomestic products are not treated differently ('national treatment') \r\nand that a  WTO member should not discriminate between other \r\nmembers ('most-favoured-nation treatment')"


id: f17652028f5a9167ae8bfafa35865035
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" These principles are \r\nelaborated in a set of agreements on the trade in goods and services, \r\nincluding the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the \r\nGeneral Agreement on Trade in Services(GATS), the Agreement on \r\nTechnical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the Agreement on Subsidies \r\nand Countervailing Measures (ASCM)."


id: 24d9968ce7223943073fdd526ca07c3d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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"Other regulatory measures may also target the GHG emissions \r\nassociated with the production of goods (Dobson 2018). These \r\nmeasures include bans on carbon-intensive materials, emissions \r\nstandards for the production process of imported goods, and \r\ncarbon footprint labels (Kloeckner 2012; Holzer and Lim 2020; \r\nGerres et al. 2021). The compatibility of such measures with trade \r\nagreements remains subject to debate. While non-discriminatory \r\nmeasures targeting the emissions from a  product itself (e.g.,  fuel \r\nefficiency standards for cars) are more likely to be allowed than \r\nmeasures targeting the production process of a good (Green 2005), \r\nsome studies suggest that differentiation between products based \r\non their production process may be compatible with WTO rules \r\n(Benoit 2011; McAusland and Najjar 2015). (Mayr et al"


id: 39927d05628816bfc9cad7e82f7081b9
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" 2020) find \r\nthat sustainability standards targeting the emissions from indirect \r\nland use change associated with the production of biofuels may be \r\ninconsistent with the TBT Agreement. Importantly, trade rules express \r\na strong preference for the international harmonisation of standards \r\nover unilateral measures (Delimatsis 2016)."


id: f3eface807d79bd596fae0a2ac6266e3
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"Options can also be pursued at the plurilateral and regional levels. \r\nSeveral studies suggest that climate clubs (Section  14.2.2) could \r\nemploy trade measures, such as lower tariffs for climate-related \r\ngoods and services, or BCAs, to attract club members (Nordhaus \r\n2015; Brewer et al. 2016; Keohane et al. 2017; Stua 2017a; Banks \r\nand Fitzgerald 2020). Another option is to negotiate a  new \r\nagreement addressing both climate change and trade. Negotiations \r\nbetween six countries (Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, New Zealand, \r\nNorway, Switzerland) were launched in 2019 on a new Agreement \r\non Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS), which, if \r\nsuccessfully concluded, would liberalise trade in environmental \r\ngoods and services, create new rules to remove fossil fuel subsidies, \r\nand develop guidelines for voluntary eco-labels (Steenblik and \r\nDroege 2019)"


id: f15ac929ee2625b29567c9c8626cf5fa
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" At the regional level, countries could further opt for \r\nthe inclusion of climate provisions in the (re)negotiation of FTAs \r\n(Morin and Jinnah 2018; Yamaguchi 2020). Moreover, the conduct \r\nof climate impact assessments of FTAs could help identify options \r\nto achieve both climate and trade objectives (Porterfield et al. 2017). \r\nIn their assessment of the feasibility of various options for reform, \r\nDas et al. (2019) find that the near-term feasibility of options that \r\nrequire consensus at the multilateral level (notably amendments of \r\nWTO agreements) is low. By contrast, options involving a  smaller \r\nnumber of Parties, as well as options that can be implemented by \r\nWTO members on a voluntary basis, face fewer constraints."


id: ab5a0be37507e913b420885d77cfce29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"With limited progress in the multilateral trading system, some studies \r\nsuggest that regional FTAs hold potential for strengthening climate \r\ngovernance. In some cases, climate-related provisions in such FTAs \r\ncan go beyond provisions in the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement, \r\naddressing for instance cooperation on carbon markets or electric \r\nvehicles (Gehring et al. 2013; van Asselt 2017; Morin and Jinnah 2018; \r\nGehring and Morison 2020). However, Morin and Jinnah (2018) find \r\nthat these provisions are at times vaguely formulated, not subject \r\nto third-party dispute settlement, and without sanctions or remedy \r\nin case of violations. Moreover, such provisions are not widely used \r\nin FTAs, and they are not adopted by the largest GHG emitters"


id: 70df29c49e72285357b771bd8fb7fb97
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" \r\nFor instance, the 2019 United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, \r\nNAFTA's successor, does not include any specific provisions on climate \r\nchange, although it could implement cooperative mitigation actions \r\nthrough its Commission for Environmental Cooperation (Laurens \r\net al. 2019)."


id: 2784389a41cf070218d5344b740511e9
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"Studies have discussed various options to minimise conflicts, and \r\nstrengthen the role of trade agreements in climate action, although \r\nthe mitigation benefits and distributional effects of these options \r\nhave yet to be assessed. Some options require multilateral action, \r\nincluding: (i) the amendment of WTO agreements to accommodate \r\nclimate action; (ii) the adoption of a 'climate waiver' that temporarily \r\nrelieves WTO members from their obligations; (iii) a 'peace clause' \r\nthrough which members commit to refraining from challenging \r\neach other's measures; (iv) an 'authoritative interpretation' by WTO \r\nmembers of ambiguous WTO provisions; (v) improved transparency \r\nof the climate impacts of trade measures; (vi) the inclusion of \r\nclimate expertise in WTO disputes; and (vii) intensified institutional \r\ncoordination between the WTO and UNFCCC (Hufbauer et al. 2009; \r\nEpps and Green 2010; Bacchus 2016; Droege et al. 2017; Das et al. \r\n2019)"


id: 789d4c96890e2f298fa5721b14f4a430
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"2012; Shimoda and Nakazawa 2012; UN 2018). An important new \r\ndevelopment in SSC is that in relation to some technologies the \r\ncooperation is increasingly led by Southern countries (for instance, \r\nwind energy between Europe, India and China), challenging the \r\nclassical North-South technology cooperation paradigm. More \r\nbroadly, Parties should ensure the sustainability of cooperation, \r\nrather than focusing on short-term goals (Eyben 2013). The Belt and \r\nRoad Initiative (BRI) is a classic example of a recent SSC initiative \r\nled by China. According to a joint study by Tsinghua University and \r\nVivid Economics, the 126 countries in the BRI region, excluding \r\nChina, currently account for about 28% of global GHG emissions, but \r\nthis proportion may increase to around 66% by 2050 if the carbon \r\nintensity of these economies only decreases slowly (according to \r\nhistorical patterns shown by developing countries)"


id: 9cec501e816af51d66abdea600641fe2
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" In this context \r\nit is important to highlight that China has already outlined a vision \r\nfor a  green BRI, and recently increased its commitment through \r\nthe Green Investment Principles initiative, announcing a  new \r\ninternational coalition to improve sustainability and promote green \r\ninfrastructure (Jun and Zadek 2019)."


id: 7821ac9ad97b4a5c11d568498b90ce8
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content:
"Janus et al. (2014) explore evolving development cooperation and \r\nits future governance architecture based on The Global Partnership \r\nfor Effective Development Cooperation and The United Nations \r\nDevelopment Cooperation Forum. Drawing on evidence from the \r\nhydropower, solar and wind energy industry in China, Urban (2018) \r\nintroduces the concept of 'geographies of technology transfer and \r\ncooperation' and challenges the North-South technology transfer \r\nand cooperation paradigm for low-carbon innovation and climate \r\nchange mitigation. While North-South technology transfer and \r\ncooperation (NSTT) for low-carbon energy technology has been \r\nimplemented for decades, South-South technology transfer and \r\ncooperation (SSTT) and South-North technology transfer and \r\ncooperation (SNTT) have only recently emerged. Kirchherr and Urban \r\n(2018) provide a meta-synthesis of the scholarly writings on NSTT, \r\nSSTT and SNTT from the past 30 years"


id: d2aa6533d5e8569059467c76d49e3cf9
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" The discussion focuses on \r\ncore drivers and inhibitors of technology transfer and cooperation, \r\noutcomes as well as outcome determinants. A case study of transfer \r\nof low-carbon energy innovation and its opportunities and barriers, \r\nbased on the first large Chinese-funded and Chinese-built dam in \r\nCambodia is presented by Hensengerth (2017). "


id: db18fcd827a58dbdb297cf4184787019
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"Information on triangular cooperation is more readily available than \r\non South-South cooperation though some UN organisations such \r\nas UNDP and FAO have established platforms for the latter which \r\nalso include climate projects. Further, although there are many \r\nSouth-South cooperation initiatives involving the development \r\nand transfer of climate technologies, the understanding of the \r\nmotivations, approaches and designs is limited and not easily \r\naccessible. There is no dedicated platform for South-South and \r\ntriangular cooperation on climate technologies. Hence, it is still too \r\nearly to fully assess the achievements in the field of climate action \r\n(UNFCCC and UNOSSC 2018). In order to maximise its unique \r\ncontribution to Agenda 2030, Southern providers recognise the \r\nbenefits of measuring and monitoring South-South cooperation, \r\nand there is a  clear demand for better information from partner \r\ncountries"


id: d1fd8b7e47fe2663a5e03d49a4ee8f91
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content:
" Di Ciommo (2017) argues that 'better data could support \r\nmonitoring and evaluation, improve effectiveness, explore synergies \r\nwith other resources, and ensure accountability' to a  diverse set \r\nof stakeholders. Besharati et al. (2017) present a  framework of \r\n20 indicators, organised in five dimensions, that researchers and \r\npolicymakers can use to access the quality and effectiveness of SSC \r\nand its contribution to sustainable development."


id: 2f748264b129737281b02ac0767ea8c6
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"incentive structure has changed the way REDD+ was developed and \r\nimplemented (Brockhaus et al. 2017). Large-scale market resources \r\nhave not fully materialised as a global carbon market system that \r\nexplicitly integrates REDD+ remains under development (Angelsen \r\n2017). Public funding for REDD+ is also limited (Climate Focus 2017). \r\nLeading up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the governments \r\nof Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom formed a partnership \r\nin 2014 called 'GNU' to support results-based financing for REDD+, \r\nwith Norway emerging as one of, if not the single largest, major \r\ndonor for REDD+ through its pledge in 2007 of approximately USD3 \r\nbillion annually. Norway pledged USD1 billion for Brazil in 2008 and \r\nthe same for Indonesia in 2010 (Schroeder et al. 2020)"


id: 436b7904ab536557849165903f81849d
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" Meanwhile, \r\nREDD+ Early Movers was established with support from Germany, \r\nand the Central African Forest Initiative, a collaborative partnership \r\nbetween the European Union, Germany, Norway, France, and the \r\nUnited Kingdom was also set up. It supports six central African \r\ncountries in fighting deforestation."


id: c274f5b441533b5684440c8590fc44e0
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"More recently, the Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest Finance \r\n(LEAF) Coalition was established, consisting of the governments of \r\nNorway, the UK, and the USA and initially nine companies, to accelerate \r\nREDD+ with a jurisdictional approach. LEAF uses the Architecture for \r\nREDD+ Transactions (ART)'s The REDD+ Environmental Excellence \r\nStandard (TREES), coordinated by Emergent, a non-profit intermediary \r\nbetween tropical countries and the private sector. Three jurisdictions \r\nin Brazil and two countries have already submitted concept notes \r\nto ART to receive results-based payments. REDD+ initiatives with \r\na jurisdictional approach have also been adopted in various markets, \r\nsuch as the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International \r\nAviation (CORSIA) (Maguire 2021). In addition to Brazil, Indonesia has \r\nattracted significant interest as a host country for REDD+"


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" Indonesia \r\nranks second, after Brazil, as the largest producer of deforestation\u0002related GHG emissions (Zarin et al. 2016), but it has committed \r\nto a  large reduction of deforestation in its NDC (Government of \r\nIndonesia 2016). Australia has collaborated on scientific research \r\nand emissions reduction monitoring (Tacconi 2017). It took a while, \r\nhowever, before emissions reductions were witnessed (Meehan et al. \r\n2019). The expansion of commodity plantations, however, conflict \r\nwith reduction ambitions (Anderson et al. 2016; Irawan et al. 2019) In \r\naddition to implementation at the site and jurisdictional levels, legal \r\nenforcement (Tacconi et al. 2019) as well as policy and regulatory \r\nreforms (Ekawati et al. 2019) appear to be needed."


id: 98aee51e05318a7f94a177edcbac5dc4
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"After the UN-sponsored Tropical Forestry Action Plan (Winterbottom \r\n1990; Seymour and Busch 2016), among the longest standing \r\nprogrammes in the forestry sector are the World Bank-sponsored \r\nForest Carbon Partnership Facility in 2007, which helps facilitate \r\nfunding for REDD+ readiness and specific projects, in addition to \r\npreparing countries for results-based payments and future carbon \r\nmarkets while securing local communities' benefits managed sub\u0002nationally, and the UN REDD+ Programme initiated in 2008, which \r\naims to reduce forest emissions and enhance carbon stocks in \r\nforests while contributing to national sustainable development in \r\ndeveloping countries, after the 2007 COP13 in Bali formally adopted \r\nREDD+ in the UNFCCC decisions and incorporated it in the Bali \r\nPlan of Action. As discussed above, Article 5 of the Paris Agreement \r\nencourages Parties to take action to implement and support REDD+"


id: 843bb15395e9019597003a43ec634f41
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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" \r\nThese efforts tend to focus on reducing emissions through the \r\ncreation of protected areas, payments for ecosystem services, and/\r\nor land tenure reform (Pirard et al. 2019). The UNREDD+ programme \r\nsupports national REDD+ efforts, inclusion of stakeholders in \r\nrelevant dialogues, and capacity building toward REDD+ readiness \r\nin partner countries. To date the conservation and emissions \r\nimpacts of REDD+ remain misunderstood (Pirard et al. 2019), but \r\nwhile existing evidence suggests that reductions in deforestation \r\nfrom sub-national REDD+ initiatives have been limited (Bos et al. \r\n2017) it shows an increasing prominence (Maguire et al. 2021). \r\nAdditionally, the Green Climate Fund has carried out results-based \r\npayments within REDD+. Eight countries have so far received \r\nsignificant funding (GCF 2021). The shift in the REDD+ focus from \r\necosystem service payment to domestic policy realignments and "


id: 9e3ec2a12c20aa750d7458ce57664c04
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"Recent efforts towards the enhancement of sinks from the forestry \r\nsector have the overarching goal of reaching zero gross deforestation \r\nglobally, that is, eliminating the clearing of all natural forests. The \r\nNew York Declaration on Forests (NYDF) was the first international \r\npledge to call for a halving of natural forest loss by 2020 and the \r\ncomplete elimination of natural forest loss by 2030 (Climate Focus \r\n2016). It was endorsed at the United Nations Climate Summit in \r\nSeptember 2014.  By September 2019  the list of NYDF supporters \r\nincluded over 200  actors: national  governments, sub-national \r\ngovernments, multi-national companies, groups representing \r\nindigenous communities, and non-government organisations"


id: af731e2da2ca89a2433728bde31edeee
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" These \r\nendorsers committed to doing their part to achieve the NYDF's ten \r\ngoals, which included ending deforestation for agricultural expansion \r\nby 2020, reducing deforestation from other sectors, restoring forests, \r\nand providing financing for forest action (Forest Declaration 2019). \r\nThese goals are assessed and tracked through the NYDF Progress \r\nAssessment, which includes NYDF Assessment Partners that collect \r\ndata, generate analysis, and release the finding based on the NYDF \r\nframework and goals. "


id: 6ab571a390096c6af9f4b0628d589d94
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"Recent efforts toward negative emissions through restoration \r\ninclude the Bonn Challenge, the African Forest Landscape \r\nRestoration Initiative (AFR100) and Initiative 20x20. The Bonn \r\nChallenge, initiated in 2011 by the Government of Germany and \r\nthe International Union for Conservation of Nature, is intended to \r\ncatalyse the existing international AFOLU commitments. It aimed \r\nto bring 150 million hectares (Mha) of the world's deforested and \r\ndegraded land into restoration by 2020, and 350 Mha by 2030. AFR \r\nhas the goal of restoring 100 Mha specifically in Africa (AUDA-NEPAD \r\n2019), while 20x20 aims to restore 20 Mha in Latin America and the \r\nCaribbean (Anderson and Peimbert 2019). Increasing commitments \r\nfor restoration have created momentum for restoration interventions \r\n(Chazdon et al. 2017; Mansourian et al. 2017; Djenontin et al. 2018). \r\nTo date 97 Mha has been pledged in NDCs. Yet only a small part of this \r\ngoal has been achieved"


id: 820682afc12a5eabf9919478d262e33b
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content:
" The Bonn Challenge Barometer - a progress\u0002tracking framework and tool to support pledgers -  indicates that \r\n27 Mha (InfoFLR 2018) are currently being restored, equivalent to \r\n1.379 GtCO2-eq sequestered (Dave et al. 2019). A key challenge in \r\nscaling up restoration has been to mobilise sufficient financing (Liagre \r\net al. 2015; Djenontin et al. 2018). This underscores the importance \r\nof building international financing for restoration (equivalent to the \r\nForest Carbon Partnership Facility focused on avoided deforestation \r\nand degradation)."


id: bbd25b29e5d28ea36b5eab79d58faa62
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"The effectiveness of these agreements, which lack binding rules, can \r\nonly be judged by the supplementary actions they have catalysed. \r\nThe NYDF contributed to the development of several other zero\u0002deforestation pledges, including the Amsterdam Declarations by seven \r\nEuropean nations to achieve fully sustainable and deforestation-free \r\nagro-commodity supply chains in Europe by 2020 and over 150 \r\nindividual company commitments to not source products associated \r\nwith deforestation (Donofrio et al. 2017; Lambin et al. 2018). Recent \r\nstudies indicate that these efforts currently lack the potential to \r\nachieve wide-scale reductions in clearing and associated emissions \r\ndue to weak implementation (Garrett et al. 2019), although in some \r\ncases in Indonesia and elsewhere the commodity supply chain \r\nsustainability drive appears to contribute to lowering deforestation \r\n(Wijaya et al. 2019; Chain Reaction Research 2020; Schulte et al. \r\n2020)"


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" The NYDF may have triggered small additional reductions \r\nin deforestation in some areas, particularly for soy, and to a lesser \r\nextent cattle, in the Brazilian Amazon (Lambin et al. 2018), but these \r\neffects were temporary, as efforts are being actively reversed and \r\ndeforestation has increased again significantly. Deforestation rates \r\nhave escalated in Brazil, with the rate in June 2019 (the first dry\u0002season month in the new administration) up 88% over the 2018 rate \r\nin the same month (INPE 2019). Curtis et al. (2018) find global targets \r\nare clearly not being met. More recent increase in the deforestation \r\nrate remains to be assessed. NYDF confirms that the initiative did not \r\nreach its zero-deforestation goal (NYDF Assessment Partners 2020)."


id: 90df311c7fe0eedcb8b61423fdc90595
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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"Sub-global agreements have also started to emerge, examples of \r\nissue-specific climate clubs. In 2015, 70 solar-rich countries signed \r\na framework agreement dedicated towards promoting solar energy \r\ndevelopment (ISA 2015). In 2017 the Powering Past Coal Alliance was \r\nformed, uniting a  set of states, businesses, and non-governmental \r\norganisations around the goal of eliminating coal-fired power \r\ngeneration by 2050 (Jewell et al. 2019; Blondeel et al. 2020). Scholars \r\nhave argued that greater attention to supply-side agreements such \r\nas this - focusing on reducing and ultimately eliminating the supply \r\nof carbon-intensive energy sources - would strengthen the UNFCCC \r\nand Paris Agreement (Collier and Venables 2014; Piggot et al. 2018; \r\nAsheim et al. 2019; Newell and Simms 2020)"


id: 2fc4d76e8256d368d2603a7e4b6af0e6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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" Chapter 6 of this report, \r\non energy systems, notes the importance of regional cooperation on \r\nelectric grid development, seen as necessary to enable higher shares \r\nof solar and wind power penetration (RGI 2011). Finally, a number \r\nof transnational organisations and activities have emerged, such as \r\nREN21, a  global community of renewable energy experts (REN21 \r\n2019), and RE100, an NGO-led initiative to enlist multilateral \r\ncompanies to shift towards 100% renewable energy in their value \r\nchains (RE100 2019)."


id: d652f71c13e346103634e5f7fb3fa9cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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"As Goldthau and Witte (2010) document, the majority of governance \r\nefforts, outside of oil and gas producing states, was oriented towards \r\nensuring reliable and affordable access for oil and gas imports. For \r\nexample, the original rationale for the creation of the International \r\nEnergy Agency (IEA), during the oil crisis of 1973-74, was to manage \r\na  mechanism to ensure importing countries' access to oil (van de \r\nGraaf and Lesage 2009). On the other side of the aisle, oil exporting \r\ncountries created the international institution OPEC to enable them \r\nto influence oil output, thereby stabilising prices and revenues for \r\nexporting countries (Fattouh and Mahadeva 2013). For years, energy \r\ngovernance was seen as a  zero-sum game between these poles \r\n(Goldthau and Witte 2010)"


id: f1a150103b3ad9f896f09969667ec3de
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content:
" The only international governance agency \r\nfocusing on low-carbon energy sources was the International Atomic \r\nEnergy Agency, with a dual mission of promoting nuclear energy and \r\nnuclear weapons non-proliferation (Scheinman 1987)."


id: 6bbb505d2485f4bd4c513f9eb8f4ec62
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"More recently, however, new institutions have emerged, and existing \r\ninstitutions have realigned their missions, in order to promote capacity \r\nbuilding and global investment in low-carbon energy technologies. \r\nCollectively, these developments may support the emergence of \r\na  nascent field of global sustainable energy governance, in which \r\na  broad range of global, regional, national, sub-national and non\u0002state actors, in aggregate, shape, direct and implement the low \r\ncarbon transition through climate change mitigation activities, which \r\nproduce concomitant societal benefits (Bruce 2018). Beginning in the \r\n1990s, for example, the IEA began to broaden its mission from one \r\nconcerned primarily with security of oil supplies, which encompassed \r\nconservation of energy resources, to one also concerned with the \r\nsustainability of energy use, including work programmes on energy \r\nefficiency and clean energy technologies and scenarios (van de Graaf \r\nand Lesage 2009)"


id: 5bacb495101d11ac05160f51fee9b3e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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" Scholars have suggested that it was the widespread \r\nperception that the IEA was primarily interested in promoting the \r\ncontinued use of fossil fuels, and underplaying the potential role of \r\nrenewable technologies, that led a  number of IEA member states \r\nto successfully push for the creation of a parallel organisation, the \r\nInternational Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), which was then \r\nestablished in 2009 (van de Graaf 2013). An assessment of IRENA's \r\nactivities in 2015 suggested that the agency has a  positive effect \r\nrelated to three core activities: offering advisory services to member \r\nstates regarding renewable energy technologies and systems; serving \r\nas a  focal point for data and analysis for renewable energy; and, \r\nmobilising other international institutions, such as multilateral \r\ndevelopment banks, promoting renewable energy (Urpelainen and "


id: fac965831a416168ac9714b41b0588a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"Whether a  result of the above activities or not, multilateral \r\ndevelopment banks' lending practices have shifted in the direction \r\nof renewable energy (Delina 2017), a point also raised in Chapter 15 \r\nof this report. Activities include new sources of project finance, \r\nconcessional loans, as well as loan guarantees, the latter through the \r\nMultilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (Multilateral Investment \r\nGuarantee Agency 2019). This appears to matter. For example, Frisari \r\nand Stadelmann (2015) find concessional lending by multilateral \r\ndevelopment banks to solar energy projects in Morocco and India to \r\nhave reduced overall project costs, due to more attractive financing \r\nconditions from additional lenders, as well as reducing the costs \r\nto local governments. Labordena et al"


id: afd5b45cff6e57387c464d51e15d1011
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" (2017) projected these \r\nresults into the future, and found that with the drop in financing \r\ncosts, renewable energy projects serving all major demand centres \r\nin sub-Saharan Africa could reach cost parity with fossil fuels by \r\n2025, whereas without the drop in financing costs associated with \r\nconcessional lending, this would not be the case. Similarly, Creutzig \r\net al. (2017) suggest that greater international attention to finance \r\ncould be instrumental in the full development of solar energy."


id: ee5df2adf47a44dbae06cfa034f1e000
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content:
"Given the complexity of global energy governance, it is impossible \r\nto make a  definitive statement about its overall contribution to \r\nmitigation efforts. Three statements, do however, appear to be \r\nrobust. First, prior to the emergence of climate change on the global \r\npolitical agenda, international cooperation in the area of energy \r\nwas primarily aimed at expanding and protecting the use of fossil \r\nenergy, and these goals were entrenched in a number of multilateral \r\norganisations. Second, since the 1990s, international cooperation \r\nhas gradually taken climate mitigation on board as one of its goals, \r\nseeing a realignment of many pre-existing organisations priorities, \r\nand the formation of a number of new international arrangements \r\noriented towards the development of renewable energy resources"


id: 6f78656c3bcf78f4d785a0d11c973ffb
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" \r\nThird, the realignment is far from complete, and there are still \r\nexamples of international cooperation having a  chilling effect on \r\nclimate mitigation, particularly through financing and investment \r\npractices, including legal norms designed to protect the interests of \r\nowners of fossil assets. "


id: eaeff4c6b857a72ac1ba845fe45b1623
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"The Paris Agreement neither explicitly addresses emissions from \r\ninternational aviation and shipping, nor repeats the Kyoto Protocol's \r\nprovision requiring Parties to work through ICAO/IMO to address \r\nthese emissions (Hoch et al. 2019). This leaves unclear the status of \r\nthe Kyoto Protocol's Article 2.2 directive after 2020 (Martinez Romera \r\n2016; Dobson 2020), potentially opening up scope for more attention \r\nto aviation and shipping emissions under the Paris Agreement \r\n(Doelle and Chircop 2019). Some commentators have suggested that \r\nemissions from international aviation and shipping should be part of \r\nthe Paris Agreement (Gencsu and Hino 2015; Traut et al. 2018), and \r\nshipping and aviation industries themselves may prefer emissions to \r\nbe treated under an international regime rather than a nationally\u0002oriented one (Gilbert and Bows 2012)"


id: a758e5ff40c5975ca29c7d0459424857
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content:
" In the case of shipping \r\nemissions, there is nothing in the Paris Agreement to prevent a Party \r\nfrom including international shipping in some form in its NDC (Doelle \r\nand Chircop 2019) Under the Paris Rulebook, Parties 'should report \r\ninternational aviation and marine bunker fuel emissions as two \r\nseparate entries and should not include such emissions in national \r\ntotals but report them distinctly, if disaggregated data are available' \r\n(UNFCCC 2019d). "


id: 52a91787ed5a94ab0d4aeabee054963
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content:
"ICAO has an overarching climate goal to 'limit or reduce the impact \r\nof aviation greenhouse gas emissions on the global climate' with \r\nrespect to international aviation. In order to achieve this, ICAO has \r\ntwo global aspirational goals for the international aviation sector, of \r\n2% annual fuel efficiency improvement through 2050 and carbon \r\nneutral growth from 2020 onwards (ICAO 2016). In order to achieve \r\nthese global aspirational goals, ICAO is pursuing a  'basket' of \r\nmitigation measures for the aviation sector consisting of technical \r\nand operational measures, such as a  CO2 emissions standard for \r\nnew aircraft adopted in 2016, measures on sustainable alternative \r\nfuels and a market-based measure, known as the Carbon Offset and \r\nReduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), which the \r\ntriennial ICAO Assembly of 193 Member States resolved to establish \r\nin 2016 (ICAO 2016)"


id: 8f0d81d1e7a862b51959fa9bf68560
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content:
"Practices (SARPs), now contained in Annex 16, Volume IV of the \r\nChicago Convention (1944), as a  common basis for CORSIA's \r\nimplementation and enforcement by each state and its aeroplane \r\noperators. From 1  January 2019, the CORSIA SARPs require states \r\nand their operators to undertake an annual process of monitoring, \r\nverification, and reporting of emissions from all international flights, \r\nincluding to establish CORSIA's emissions baseline (ICAO 2019). \r\nBased on this emissions data, CORSIA's carbon offsetting obligations \r\ncommenced in 2021, with three-year compliance cycles, including \r\na pilot phase in 2021-2023. States have the option to participate \r\nin the pilot phase and the subsequent voluntary three-year cycle in \r\n2024-2026. CORSIA becomes mandatory from 2027 onwards for \r\nstates whose share in the total international revenue tonnes per \r\nkilometre is above a  certain threshold (Hoch et al. 2019)"


id: 337d5f8a4c1663ad79bd09fd73a7d4a6
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content:
" Under \r\nCORSIA, aviation CO2 emissions are not capped, but rather emissions \r\nthat exceed the CORSIA baseline are compensated through use of \r\n'offset units' from emissions reduction projects in other industries \r\n(Erling 2018). However, it is unclear whether the goal of carbon \r\nneutral growth and further CO2 emissions reduction in the sector \r\nwill be sufficiently incentivised solely through the use of such offsets \r\nin combination with ICAO's manufacturing standards, programmes, \r\nand state action plans, without additional measures being taken, \r\nfor example, constraints on demand (Lyle 2018). If countries such \r\nas China, Brazil, India and Russia do not participate in CORSIA's \r\nvoluntary offsetting requirements this could significantly undermine \r\nits capacity to deliver fully on the sectoral goal by limiting coverage \r\nof the scheme to less than 50% of international aviation CO2\r\nemissions in the period 2021-2026 (Hoch et al. 2019; Climate Action \r\nTracker 2020b)"


id: b9efb987e3d7238753d6125641a8e8c7
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" In addition, a  wide range of offsets are approved \r\nas 'eligible emissions units' in CORSIA, including several certified \r\nunder voluntary carbon offset schemes, which may go beyond those \r\neventually agreed under the Paris Agreement Article 6  mechanism \r\n(Hoch et al. 2019). It is noted, however, that ICAO applies a set of \r\n'Emissions Unit Eligibility Criteria', agreed in March 2019, which \r\nspecify required design elements for eligible programmes. In June \r\n2020, the ICAO Council decided to define 2019 emissions levels, \r\nrather than an average of 2019 and 2020 emissions, as the baseline \r\nyear for at least the first three years of CORSIA, although there were \r\nsignificant reductions (45-60%) in aviation CO2 emissions in 2020 \r\ncompared with 2019 as a result of reductions in air travel associated \r\nwith the COVID-19 pandemic (Climate Action Tracker 2020b)."


id: ded769539418fe86839f0021cbd04ea3
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"However, it is unlikely that the EEDI and other IMO technical and \r\noperational measures will be sufficient to produce 'the necessary \r\nemissions reduction because of the future growth in international \r\nseaborne trade and world population' (Shi and Gullett 2018). \r\nConsequently, in 2018, the IMO adopted an initial strategy on \r\nreduction of GHG emissions from ships (IMO 2018). This includes \r\na goal for declining carbon intensity of the sector by reducing CO2\r\nemissions per transport work, as an average across international \r\nshipping, by at least 40% by 2030, and pursuing efforts towards \r\n70% by 2050, compared to 2008 levels (IMO 2018, Para. 3.1)"


id: 332d06181c5a50179292a0a7391b4a9b
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" The \r\nstrategy also aims for peaking of total annual GHG emissions from \r\ninternational shipping as soon as possible and a  reduction by at \r\nleast 50% by 2050 compared to 2008 levels, while pursuing efforts \r\ntowards phasing them out 'as soon as possible in this century' as \r\na point 'on a pathway of CO2 emissions reduction consistent with \r\nthe Paris Agreement temperature goals' (IMO 2018, Para. 2, 3.1). The \r\nshipping industry is on track to overachieve the 2030 carbon intensity \r\ntarget but not its 2050 target (Climate Action Tracker 2020c). The \r\ninitial IMO strategy is to be kept under review by the MEPC with \r\na view to adoption of a revised strategy in 2023. "


id: ad68e7a3bcda2a39b905cfbf22d85b93
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content:
"The IMO's initial strategy identifies a series of candidate short-term \r\n(2018-2023), medium-term (2023-2030) and long-term (beyond \r\n2030) measures for achieving its emissions reduction goals, including \r\npossible market-based measures in the medium-to-long term (IMO \r\n2018, paras. 4.7-4.9). Further progress on market-based measures \r\nfaces difficulty in light of conflicts between the CBDRRC principle of \r\nthe climate regime and the traditional non-discrimination approach \r\nand principle of no more favourable treatment enshrined in MARPOL \r\nand other IMO conventions (Zhang 2016). Both the CBDRRC and non\u0002discrimination principles are designated as 'principles guiding the \r\ninitial strategy' (IMO 2018, Para. 3.2). The challenges encountered \r\nin introducing global market-based measures for shipping emissions \r\nunder the IMO have prompted regional initiatives such as the \r\nproposed extension of the EU ETS to emissions from maritime \r\nactivities (Christodoulou et al"


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" 2021), which was announced on \r\n14 July 2021 by the EU Commission as part of its 'Fit for 55' legislative \r\npackage (European Commission 2021)."


id: bcc9c56b30e07fe5b18e29a53cc75257
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content:
"Prominent examples of new climate social movements that operate \r\ntransnationally are Extinction Rebellion and Fridays for Future, \r\nwhich collectively held hundreds of coordinated protests across the \r\nglobe in 2019-2021, marking out 'the transnational climate justice \r\nmovement as one of the most extensive social movements on the \r\nplanet' (Almeida 2019). Fridays for Future is a children's and youth \r\nmovement that began in August 2018, inspired by the actions of \r\nthen 15-year old Greta Thunberg who pledged to strike in front of the \r\nSwedish parliament every Friday to protest against a lack of action \r\non climate change in line with the Paris Agreement targets (Fridays \r\nfor Future 2019). Fridays for Future events worldwide encompass \r\nmore than 200 countries and millions of strikers. The movement is \r\nunusual for its focus on children and the rights of future generations, \r\nwith children's resistance having received little previous attention \r\nin the literature"


id: e18123f170c5d32e2f06d166d95e71fe
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" Fridays for Future is regarded as a  progressive \r\nresistance movement that has quickly achieved global prominence \r\n(for example, Thunberg was invited to address governments at the \r\nUN Climate Summit in New York in September 2019) and is credited \r\nwith helping to support the discourse about the responsibility of \r\nhumanity as a  whole for climate change (Holmberg and Alvinius \r\n2019). Whereas Fridays for Future has focused on periodic protest \r\naction, Extinction Rebellion has pursued a  campaign based on \r\nsustained non-violent direct citizen action that is focused on three \r\nkey demands: declaration of a 'climate emergency', acting now to halt \r\nbiodiversity loss and reduce greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by \r\n2025, and creation of a citizen's assembly on climate and ecological \r\njustice (Booth 2019; Extinction Rebellion 2019)"


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" The movement first \r\narose in the United Kingdom- where it claimed credit for adoption \r\nof a climate emergency declaration by the UK government - but now \r\nhas a presence in 45 countries with some 650 groups having formed \r\nglobally (Gunningham 2019)."


id: d1a60efebefc942911025501192b43f2
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"Transnationally organised civil society actors have had long-standing \r\ninvolvement in international climate policy, with a particular focus \r\non consulting or knowledge-sharing where they are present in \r\ntransnational climate governance initiatives (Michaelowa and \r\nMichaelowa 2017). The term 'civil society' generally denotes 'the \r\nvoluntary association of individuals in the public sphere beyond the \r\nrealms of the state, the market and the family' (de Bakker et al. 2013, \r\np. 575). Whereas civil society organisations are usually involved in \r\nlobbying or advocacy activities in a public arena, social movements \r\nfocus on mobilisation and action for social change (Daniel and \r\nNeubert 2019)"


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" Examples of civil society groups involved in \r\ninternational climate policy include non-governmental organisations \r\n(NGOs) such as Greenpeace International, the World Wide Fund \r\nfor Nature, the Environmental Defense Fund, the World Resources \r\nInstitute, Friends of the Earth and Earthjustice among many others, \r\nas well as NGO networks such as the Climate Action Network, which \r\nhas over 1300 NGO members in more than 130 countries, working \r\nto promote government and individual action to limit human\u0002induced climate change to ecologically sustainable levels (Climate \r\nAction Network International 2020). The influence of civil society \r\nengagement in global climate governance is well acknowledged, \r\nwith these organisations' globally dispersed constituencies and non\u0002state status offering perspectives that differ in significant ways from \r\nthose of many negotiating states (Derman 2014). "


id: 7a3492586fd5a1b053ff853f3c626665
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content:
"opinion from the ICJ. The aim of climate litigation more generally is \r\nto supplement other regulatory efforts by filling gaps and ensuring \r\nthat interpretations of laws and policies are aligned with climate \r\nmitigation goals (Osofsky 2010).\r\nThe overall impact of transnationally-organised civil society action \r\nand social movements for international cooperation on climate \r\nchange mitigation has not been comprehensively evaluated in \r\nthe literature. This may reflect the polycentric organisation of the \r\nmovement, which poses challenges for coordinating between groups \r\noperating in different contexts, acting with different strategies and \r\naround multiple issues, and lobbying multiple decision-making \r\nbodies at various levels of government in a sustainable way (Tormos\u0002Aponte and Garcia-Lopez 2018)"


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content:
" There is some literature emerging \r\non environmental defenders and their need for protection against \r\nviolence and repression, particularly in the case of indigenous \r\nenvironmental defenders who face significantly higher rates of violence \r\n(Scheidel et al. 2020). Scheidel et al. (2020) also find that combining \r\nstrategies of preventive mobilisation, protest diversification and \r\nlitigation can enhance rates of success for environmental defenders \r\nin halting environmentally destructive projects. In the area of climate \r\nlitigation, commentators have noted the potential for activists and \r\neven researchers to suffer retaliation through the courts as a result of \r\n'strategic lawsuits against public participation' and lawsuits against \r\nresearchers brought by fossil fuel interests (Setzer and Byrnes 2019; \r\nSetzer and Benjamin 2020)"


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content:
" Influence of social movements may be \r\nenhanced through taking advantage of 'movement spillover' (the \r\ninvolvement of activists in more than one movement) (Hadden 2014) \r\nand coordination of activities with a range of 'non-state governors', \r\nincluding cities, sub-national governments, and investor groups \r\n(Gunningham 2019). Studies of general societal change suggest that \r\nonce 3.5% of the population are mobilised on an issue, far-reaching \r\nchange becomes possible (Gladwell 2002; Chenoweth and Belgioioso \r\n2019) - a tipping point that may be approaching in the case of climate \r\nchange (Gunningham 2019). As noted in Chapter 5, in the particular \r\ncase of low-carbon technologies, 'if 10-30% of the population were \r\nto demonstrate commitment to low-carbon technologies, behaviours, \r\nand lifestyles, new social norms would be established'. "


id: 55163eeb7cce05deca2e2bf7202e8d4c
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content:
"Transnational civil society organisations advocating for climate \r\njustice in global governance have articulated policy positions around \r\nrights protections, responsibility-based approaches to climate \r\nfinance, and the need for transparency and accountability (Derman \r\n2014). Another recent area of activity, which overlaps with that of \r\nemerging investor alliances (Section 14.5.4), is the sustainability of \r\ncapital investment in fossil fuel assets. Efforts to shift away from \r\nfossil fuels led by civil society include the Beyond Coal Campaign \r\n(in the USA and Europe) and the organisation for a Fossil Fuel Non\u0002proliferation Treaty. 350.org has supported mobilisation of youth \r\nand university students around a campaign of divestment that has \r\ngrown into a  global movement (Gunningham 2019)"


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" As Mormann \r\n(2020) notes, as of November 2020 'more than 1,200 institutional \r\ninvestors managing over USD14 trillion of assets around the world \r\nhave committed to divest some or all of their fossil fuel holdings'. \r\nStudies suggest that the direct impacts of the divestment movement \r\nhave so far been small, given a  failure to differentiate between \r\ndifferent types of fossil fuel companies, a lack of engagement with \r\nretail investors, and a lack of guidance for investors on clean energy \r\nre-investment (Osofsky et al. 2019; Mormann 2020). The movement \r\nhas had a more significant impact on public discourse by raising the \r\nprofile of climate change as a financial risk for investors (Bergman \r\n2018). Blondeel et al. (2019) also find that broader appeal of the \r\ndivestment norm was achieved when moral arguments were linked \r\nto financial ones, through the advocacy of economic actors, such as \r\nthe Bank of England's governor."


id: 463cf0153cbce03d8a50afb9d4774936
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"Climate justice campaigns by transnational civil society organisations \r\nincreasingly embrace action through the courts. Chapter 13 discusses \r\nthe growth and policy impact of such 'climate litigation' brought by \r\ncivil society actors in domestic courts, which is attracting increasing \r\nattention in the literature (Setzer and Vanhala 2019; Peel and Osofsky \r\n2020). Transnational and international court actions focused on \r\nclimate change, by contrast, have been relatively few in number (Peel \r\nand Lin 2019). This reflects - at least in part - the procedural hurdles \r\nto bringing such claims, as in many international courts and tribunals \r\n(outside of the area of human rights or investor-state arbitration) \r\nlitigation can only be brought by states (Bruce 2017)"


id: d9b551198872ed8d69155dbe85e8d0cc
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" However, there \r\nhave been active discussions about seeking an advisory opinion \r\nfrom the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on states' international \r\nobligations regarding the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions \r\n(Sands 2016; Wewerinke-Singh and Salili 2020), or bringing a case to \r\nthe International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on marine pollution \r\nharms caused by climate change (Boyle 2019). In September 2021 the \r\nGovernment of Vanuatu announced a campaign to seek an advisory "


id: 3238fdaa7315b11a5cf180768d53fa5
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"as the World Bank, in initiating public-private partnerships (PPPs). \r\nAndonova (2017) calls this 'governance entrepreneurship'. Such \r\npartnerships can be defined as 'voluntary agreements between \r\npublic actors (international organisations, states, or sub-state public \r\nauthorities) and non-state actors (non-governmental organisations \r\n(NGOs), companies, foundations, etc.) on a  set of governance \r\nobjectives and norms, rules, practices, and/or implementation \r\nprocedures and their attainment across multiple jurisdictions and \r\nlevels of governance' (Andonova 2017)"


id: 973710f7852c5a9cabc9bea5a5715252
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" Partnerships may carry \r\nout different main functions: first, policy development, establishing \r\nnew agreements on norms, rules, or standards among a broader set \r\nof governmental and non-governmental actors; second, enabling \r\nimplementation and delivery of services, by combining resources from \r\ngovernmental and non-governmental actors; and, third, knowledge \r\nproduction and dissemination, to for example, the evolution of \r\nrelevant public policies. "


id: 1ea2ff55ae97b8fd5fcd27fa1c134b45
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"An example of a  prominent PPP in the area of climate mitigation \r\nis the Renewable Energy Network (REN21 2019), which is a global \r\nmulti-stakeholder network focused on promoting renewable energy \r\npolicies in support of the transition to renewable energy through \r\nknowledge, established in 2004. It includes members from industry, \r\nNGOs, intergovernmental organisations, and science and academia. \r\nAnother example is the Green Economy Coalition founded in 2009 \r\nto bring to bear the perspectives of workers, business, poor people, \r\nthe environment community, and academics in the transition to \r\na greener and more sustainable economy. Another example is that in \r\n2015, Peru, in collaboration with France and the UNFCCC Secretariat, \r\nlaunched the Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action, an online \r\nplatform to showcase commitments to climate action by companies, \r\ncities, regions and investors (Chan et al. 2016; Bertoldi et al. 2018)"


id: 5b6898b373b01c8610707614875a7889
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" \r\nMore recently, the UNFCCC Race to Zero initiative led by High-level \r\nClimate Champions Nigel Topping and Gonzalo Munoz seeks to \r\nmobilise actors beyond national governments to join the Climate \r\nAmbition Alliance and pursue net zero CO2 targets. Its membership \r\nincludes 454 cities, 23 regions, 1391 businesses, 74 of the biggest \r\ninvestors, and 569 universities."


id: 3f977f9d8ac9dc8218f80a2785509cb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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"PPPs for cooperation on climate mitigation goals have emerged \r\nat multiple levels of governance beyond the realm of international \r\norganisations. For example, PPP funding for cities expanded rapidly \r\nin the 1990s and outpaced official external assistance almost \r\ntenfold. Most of the PPP infrastructure investment has been aimed \r\nat telecommunications, followed by energy. However, with the \r\nexception of the telecommunications sector, PPP investments have \r\ngenerally bypassed low-income countries (Ivanova 2017). It is \r\ntherefore not surprising that PPPs have added relatively little to the \r\nfinancing of urban capital in developing countries over the past two \r\ndecades (Bahl and Linn 2014). Liu and Waibel (2010) argue that the \r\ninherent risk of urban investment is the main obstacle to increasing \r\nthe flow of private capital"


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" Nevertheless, there have been cases where \r\nPPP investments have exceeded official external aid flows even for \r\nwater and sanitation, and highly visible projects have been funded \r\nwith PPPs in selected metropolitan areas of developing countries, \r\nincluding urban rail projects in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Manila \r\n(Liu and Waibel 2010). "


id: 4a3fe0b6a52ffbc59b0992cd2a5b6865
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content:
"Community climate action plans consider all GHGs emitted within \r\nthe local geographic boundaries, including from industry, home \r\nheating, burning fuel in vehicles, and so on. It is these community \r\nplans that require large multi-stakeholder partnerships to be \r\nsuccessful. Partners in these partnerships generally include the local \r\ngovernment departments, other government departments, utilities, \r\nlarge businesses, Chambers of Commerce, some small and medium\u0002sized enterprises, universities, schools, and local civil society groups \r\n(Clarke and MacDonald 2016). Research shows that the partnership's \r\nstructural features enable the achievement of plan outcomes, such as \r\nreducing GHG emissions, while also generating value for the partners \r\n(Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Clarke and MacDonald 2016; Clarke \r\nand Ordonez-Ponce 2017). Stua (2017b) explores the Mitigation \r\nAlliances (MAs) on the national level"


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" The internal governance model \r\nof MAs consists of overarching authorities mandated to harmonise \r\nthe overall organisational structure. These authorities guarantee an \r\neffective, equitable and transparent functioning of the MA's pillars \r\n(the demand, supply, and exchange of mitigation outcomes), in line \r\nwith the principles and criteria of the Paris Agreement. This hybrid \r\ngovernance model relies upon its unique links with international \r\nclimate institutions (Stua 2017a)."


id: fb35f94c0867303d1f988fc2aabd3974
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"Transnational cooperative action by investors on climate mitigation \r\nhas been facilitated by international standard-setting on issues \r\nof climate risk and disclosure. For example, in 2017 the Financial \r\nStability Board's Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures \r\n(TCFD) adopted international recommendations for climate risk \r\ndisclosure (TCFD 2017). These recommendations, which apply to all \r\nfinancial-sector organisations, including banks, insurance companies, \r\nasset managers, and asset owners, have received strong support \r\nfrom investor coalitions globally, including Climate Action 100+ \r\n(with 300 investors with more than USD33 trillion in assets under \r\nmanagement), the Global Investor Coalition on Climate Change \r\n(a coalition of regional investor groups across Asia, Australia, Europe \r\nand North America) and the Institutional Investors Group on Climate \r\nChange (IIGCC)"


id: 7fdd553f63337028a121faaded5d463b
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content:
" One of the key recommendations of the TCFD calls \r\nfor stress-testing of investment portfolios taking into consideration \r\ndifferent climate-related scenarios, including a 2degC or lower scenario. \r\nBroad adoption of the TCFD recommendations could provide a basis \r\nfor decisions by investors to shift assets away from climate-risk \r\nexposed assets such as fossil fuel extraction projects (Osofsky et al. \r\n2019). There is strong evidence showing the urgent need for scaling\u0002up climate finance to mitigate greenhouse gases in line with pursuit \r\nof limiting the temperature increase to 1.5degC above pre-industrial \r\nlevels, and to support adaptation to safeguard the international \r\ncommunity from the consequences of a  changing climate. While \r\npublic actors have a responsibility to deploy climate finance, it is clear "


id: 6b23216c1b8ce7046256dc58d94cc66d
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"A leading example is the World Business Council on Sustainable \r\nDevelopment (WBCSD), a global, CEO-led organisation of over 200 \r\nleading businesses working together to accelerate the transition \r\nto a sustainable world. Member companies come from all business \r\nsectors and all major economies, representing a combined revenue of \r\nmore than USD8.5 trillion and with 19 million employees. The WBCSD \r\naims to enhance 'the business case for sustainability through tools, \r\nservices, models and experiences'. It includes a Global Network of \r\nalmost 70 national business councils across the globe. The overall \r\nvision is to create a world where more than 9 billion people are all \r\nliving well and within the boundaries of our planet, by 2050. Vision \r\n2050,  released in 2010, explored what a  sustainable world would \r\nlook like in 2050, how such a world could be realised, and the role \r\nthat business can play in making that vision a reality"


id: e172a2f9e90ce079197883c85ab1c3ad
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" A few years \r\nlater, Action2020 took that Vision and translated it into a roadmap \r\nof necessary business actions and solutions (WBCSD 2019). WBCSD \r\nfocuses on those areas where business operates and can make an \r\nimpact. They identify six transformation systems that are critical \r\nin this regard: Circular Economy, Climate and Energy, Cities and \r\nMobility, Food and Nature, People and Redefining Value. All have an "


id: b684c3d2cc0b97abea4161dd42bdb4ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"As most of these partnerships are of recent vintage an assessment of \r\ntheir effectiveness is premature. Instead, partnerships can be assessed \r\non the basis of the three main functions introduced earlier. Starting \r\nwith policy development, that is, establishing new agreements on \r\nnorms, rules, or standards among a  broader set of governmental \r\nand non-governmental actors, this is not the most prominent aspect \r\nof partnerships so far, although both the cities' networks and risk \r\ndisclosure recommendations include some elements of this. The \r\nsecond element, enabling implementation and delivery of services, \r\nby combining resources from governmental and non-governmental \r\nactors, seems to be a  more prominent part of the partnerships \r\n(Ivanova et al. 2020). Both UNEP financing, the WBCSD, the REDD+ \r\nand TEEB mechanisms, and PPP funding for cities are examples here"


id: 5b47a628688c4280ae9519b48a43bb76
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" \r\nFinally, the third element, knowledge production and dissemination, \r\nfor example, contributing to the evolution of relevant public policies, \r\nis the most prominent part of these partnerships, with the majority \r\nincluding such activities. "


id: 4d07ced3428806a7d697c868a581c627
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"y \r\nLocal and regional governments have an important role to play in \r\nglobal climate action, something recognised by the Paris Agreement, \r\nand also assessed in Sections 13.3.2 and 13.3.4 of this report. There \r\nare several ways they can be useful. First, sub-national governments \r\ncan contribute insights and experience that provide valuable lessons \r\nto national governments, as well as offering needed implementation \r\ncapacity (GIZ 2017; Leffel 2018). A great deal of policymaking has \r\noccurred at the level of city governments in particular. Cities have \r\nbeen responsible for more than 70% of global greenhouse gas \r\nemissions and generate over 80% of global income (World Bank \r\n2010), and many of them have started to take their own initiative \r\nin enacting and developing mitigation policies (CDP 2015)"


id: 40781cd036e42689e2e01fd5456c2125
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" Most of \r\nthese activities aim at the reduction of GHG emissions in the sectors \r\nof energy, transportation, urban land use and waste (Bulkeley 2010; \r\nXuemei 2007), and are motivated by concerns not only over climate, \r\nbut also a  consideration of local co-benefits (Rashidi et al. 2017, \r\n2019). Second, sub-national governments can fill the void in policy \r\nleadership in cases where national governments are ineffectual, even \r\nto the point of claiming leadership and authority with respect to \r\nforeign affairs (Leffel 2018). International cooperation plays a role in \r\nsuch action. Several international networks, such as C40, ICLEI, Mayors \r\nfor Climate Protection, and the Covenant of Mayors have played an \r\nimportant role in defining and developing climate-policy initiatives \r\nat the city level (Funfgeld 2015)"


id: c6611f637322d748a85f0726ee3388d5
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" While the networks differ from each \r\nother, they generally are voluntary and non-hierarchical, intended to \r\nsupport the horizontal diffusion of innovative climate policies through \r\ninformation-sharing platforms linked to specific goals that member \r\ncities make (Kern and Bulkeley 2009). The literature has addressed \r\nthe questions of why cities join the networks (Betsill and Bulkeley \r\n2004; Pitt 2010), what recognition benefits cities can expect (Buis \r\n2009; Kern and Bulkeley 2009), and how memberships can provide \r\nvisibility to leverage international funding (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; \r\nHeinrichs et al. 2013). Membership in the networks has been found \r\nto be a significant predictor of cities' adoption of mitigation policies, \r\neven when controlling for national-level policies that may be in place \r\n(Rashidi and Patt 2018). Kona et al"


id: 9c221de7b03172e15098bef86431be9e
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" (2018) find that cities belonging \r\nto the Covenant of Mayors are engaging in emissions reductions at \r\na  rate consistent with achieving a  2degC global temperature target. \r\nKona et al. (2021) document this trend continuing.\r\nWith respect to their role in formal international cooperation, however, \r\nit is unclear what authority, as a non-state actor, they actually have. \r\nCities, for example, are members of transnational initiatives aimed at "


id: 312067b57683b6a31315e0de7b40f041
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"What is less common, but gradually growing, is an important and \r\nmore relevant literature on criteria to assess sustainability and impact \r\non climate and development goals. Michaelowa and Michaelowa \r\n(2017) assess 109 transnational partnerships and alliances based \r\non four design criteria: existence of mitigation targets; incentives for \r\nmitigation; definition of a baseline; and existence of a monitoring, \r\nreporting, and verification procedure . About half of the initiatives \r\ndo not meet any of these criteria, and not even 15% satisfy three \r\nor more. A recent study using a systematic review of business and \r\npublic administration literature on PPPs concludes that research in \r\nthe past rarely incorporated sustainability concepts. The authors \r\npropose a research agenda and a series of success factors that, if \r\nappropriately managed, can contribute to sustainable development, \r\nand in so doing contribute to a more solid scientific evaluation of \r\nPPPs (Pinz et al. 2018)"


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content:
" There is evidence that with the adoption \r\nof the Sustainable Development Goals, many of which are directly \r\nlinked to climate goals, PPPs will become even more prominent as \r\nthey will be called upon to provide resources, knowledge, expertise, \r\nand implementation support in a  very ambitious agenda. PPPs in \r\nthe developing world need to take into account different cultural \r\nand social decision-making processes, language differences, \r\nand unfamiliar bureaucracy (Gardiner et al. 2016). Having more \r\nevidence on what norms and standards in relation to sustainability \r\nare used and their governance is essential (Axel 2019). The issue \r\nof double counting should be revised. GHGs are accounted both \r\nat the national and sub-national level or company level (Schneider "


id: 423e76d86f5a4ec18fdb42e7c8c490da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"non-state actors, such as Global Climate Action, originally the Non\u0002state Actor Zone for Climate Action, under the UNFCCC. While there is \r\nreason to believe that such membership can add value to mitigation \r\nefforts, one study suggests that the environmental effects have yet \r\nto be reliably quantified (Hsu et al. 2019a). By contrast, Kuramochi \r\net al. (2020) provide evidence that non-state actors are leading \r\nto significant emissions reductions beyond what countries would \r\notherwise be achieving. In terms of institutional strength, Michaelowa \r\nand Michaelowa (2017) suggest that few such networks fulfil \r\ngovernance criteria, and hence challenge their effectiveness. Several \r\nresearchers suggest that their role is important in informal ways, given \r\nissues about the legitimacy of non-state actors (Chan et al. 2016; \r\nNasiritousi et al. 2016). Backstrand et al"


id: ebb9034e8145063a4bdaeadb33559262
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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" (2017) advance the concept \r\nof 'hybrid multilateralism' as a heuristic to capture this intensified \r\ninterplay between state and non-state actors in the new landscape of \r\ninternational climate cooperation. The effectiveness of such non-state \r\ngovernment actors should be measured not only by their contribution \r\nto mitigation, but also by their success to enhance the accountability, \r\ntransparency and deliberative quality of the UNFCCC and the Paris \r\nAgreement (Chan et al. 2015; Busby 2016; Hale et al. 2016). In the \r\npost-Paris era, effectiveness also revolves around how to align non\u0002state and intergovernmental action in a comprehensive framework \r\nthat can help achieve low carbon futures (Chan et al. 2016). Stua \r\n(2017b) suggests that networks involving non-state actors can play \r\nan important role in enhancing transparency"


id: dea86d5d19de4360dcb098c8a2123ccb
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content:
" Such effectiveness has \r\nto be complemented also by normative questions, applying a  set \r\nof democratic values: participation, deliberation, accountability, \r\nand transparency (Backstrand and Kuyper 2017). Such concepts of \r\npolycentric governance offer new opportunities for climate action, \r\nbut it has been argued that it is too early to judge their importance \r\nand effects (Jordan et al. 2015)."


id: aa96410b261c560d53e04d447bae286e
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content:
"to add up to the level of aggregate emissions reductions necessary to \r\nachieve the objectives of holding global average warming well below \r\n2degC, much less 1.5degC (Section  14.3.3 Figure  14.2), and that there \r\nis no legally binding obligation to achieve the NDCs. Arguments in \r\nsupport of Paris are that it puts in place the processes, and generates \r\nnormative expectations, that nudge NDCs to become progressively \r\nmore ambitious over time, including in developing countries. The \r\ngrowing number of countries with mid-century net-zero GHG or CO2\r\ntargets, consistent with Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, lends support \r\nto this proposition, although there is as yet no empirical literature \r\ndrawing an unambiguous connection. The collective quantified goal \r\nfrom a  floor of USD100 billion a  year in transfers to developing \r\ncountries, the Green Climate Fund and other provisions on finance in \r\nthe Paris Agreement have also been recognised as key to cooperation \r\n(Sections 14.3.2"


id: 801330c22d31e430ecf21308a6ceefca
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content:
"8 and 14.4.1). But then these arguments are met \r\nwith counter arguments, that even with Paris processes in place, \r\ngiven the logic of iterative, rising levels of ambition over time, this \r\nis unlikely to happen within the narrow window of opportunity that \r\nexists to avert dangerous levels of global warming (Section 14.3.3). \r\nThe degree to which countries are willing to increase the ambition \r\nand secure the achievement of their NDCs over time will be an \r\nimportant indicator of the success of the Paris Agreement; evidence \r\nof this was expected by the end of 2020, but the COVID-19 pandemic \r\nhas delayed the process of updating NDCs. "


id: 5e2b0c85c464a61221b668cf8c69d6ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"An increasing role is also played by other cooperative agreements, in \r\nparticular (potentially) under Article 6 (Sections 14.3.2.10 and 14.4.4), \r\ntransnational partnerships, and the institutions that support them. This \r\nfits both a transitions narrative that cooperation at the sub-global and \r\nsectoral levels is necessary to enable specific system transformations, \r\nand a recent emphasis in the public goods literature on club goods and \r\na gradual approach to cooperation, also referred to as building blocks \r\nor incremental approach (Sections 14.2 and 14.5.1.4). There has been \r\nlittle analysis of whether these other agreements are of sufficient scale \r\nand scope to ensure that transformations happen quickly enough. This \r\nchapter, appraising them together, concludes that they are not. First, \r\nmany agreements, such as those related to trade, may stand in the \r\nway of bottom-up mitigation efforts (Section 14.5.1.3)"


id: aa873e5df3d0a72299fd94a80e080c3e
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content:
" Second, many \r\nsectoral agreements aimed at decarbonisation - such as within the \r\nair travel sector - have not yet adopted targets comparable in scale, \r\nscope or legal character to those adopted under the Paris Agreement \r\n(Section 14.5.2.3). Third, there are many sectors for which there are \r\nno agreements in place. At the same time, there are some important \r\nbright spots, many in the area of transnational partnerships. A growing \r\nnumber of cities have committed themselves to adopting urban policies \r\nthat will place them on a path to rapid decarbonisation, while learning \r\nfrom each other how to implement successful policies to realise climate \r\ngoals (Section 14.5.5). An increasing number of large corporations have \r\ncommitted to decarbonising their industrial processes and supply chains \r\n(Section 14.5.4). And an ever-increasing number of non-state actors \r\nare adopting goals and initiating mitigation actions (Section 14.5.3)"


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" \r\nThese goals and actions, some argue, could bridge the mitigation gap \r\ncreated by inadequate NDCs, although the empirical literature to date \r\nchallenges this, suggesting that there is less transparency and limited \r\naccountability for such actions, and mitigation targets and incentives \r\nare also not clear (Sections 14.3.3 and 14.5). "


id: 878d01700a5c5e2609966b85fa9eb4fe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"The main development since AR5 in terms of international climate \r\ncooperation has been the shift from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris \r\nAgreement as the primary multilateral driver of climate mitigation \r\npolicy worldwide (Section  14.3). Most ex-post assessments of the \r\nKyoto Protocol suggest that it did lead to emissions reductions in \r\ncountries with binding targets, in addition to changing investment \r\npatterns in low-carbon technologies. As noted earlier, the Paris \r\nAgreement is tailored to the evolving understanding of the climate \r\nmitigation challenge as well as shifting political imperatives and \r\nconstraints. Whether the Paris Agreement will in fact be effective \r\nin supporting global action sufficient to achieve its objectives is \r\ncontested, with competing arguments in the scientific literature \r\nsupporting different views. To some extent these views align with the \r\ndifferent analytic frameworks (Section 14.2"


id: 32af473834b9a57a8bf8a4187f4f6657
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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"1): the Paris Agreement \r\ndoes not address the free-riding issue seen as important within the \r\nglobal commons framing, but may provide the necessary incentives \r\nand support mechanisms viewed as important under the political and \r\ntransitions framings, respectively. The strongest critique of the Paris \r\nAgreement is that current NDCs themselves fail by a wide margin "


id: a7215c6a13ce60c28415438d53520785
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"This section provides an overall assessment of international \r\ncooperation, taking into account the combined effects of cooperation \r\nwithin the UNFCCC process, other global agreements, as well as \r\nregional, sectoral, and transnational processes. Recent literature \r\nconsistent with the transitions framing highlights that cooperation \r\ncan be particularly effective when it addresses issues on a  sector\u0002by-sector basis (Geels et al. 2019). Table 14.4 below summarises the \r\neffects of international cooperation on mitigation efforts in each of \r\nthe sectoral areas covered in Chapters 5 to 12 of this report. As it \r\nindicates, there are some strong areas of sector-specific cooperation, \r\nbut also some important weaknesses. Formal agreements and \r\nprogrammes, both multilateral and bilateral, are advancing mitigation \r\nefforts in energy, AFOLU, and transportation, while transnational \r\nnetworks and partnerships are addressing issues in urban systems, \r\nindustry, and buildings"


id: f35b15a9ec61f12f363a74521ede1a37
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" Although many of the concerns relevant for \r\nbuildings may be embedded in the energy sector with respect to their \r\noperation, and the industrial sector with respect to their materials, \r\nreinforcing the networks with more formal agreements could be \r\nvital to putting these sectors on a pathway to net zero GHG or CO2\r\nemissions. Several of the sectors have very little formal cooperation \r\nat the international level, and a common theme across many of them \r\nis a need for increased financial flows to achieve particular objectives."


id: e60a06993716dcad0ccc8dafde0db294
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content:
"Many of the international agreements and institutions discussed in \r\nthis chapter, in particular the Paris Agreement, are new. The logic and \r\narchitecture of the Paris Agreement, in particular, breaks new ground, \r\nand there is limited evaluation of prior experience in the form of \r\nanalogous treaties to draw on. Such instruments have evolved in \r\nresponse to geopolitical and other drivers that are changing rapidly, \r\nand will continue to shape the nature of international cooperation \r\nunder it and triggered by it. The Paris Agreement is also, in common \r\nwith other multilateral agreements, a  'living instrument' evolving \r\nthrough interpretative and operationalising rules, and forms of \r\nimplementation, that Parties continue to negotiate at conferences \r\nyear on year. It is a constant 'work in progress' and thus challenging \r\nto assess at any given point in time"


id: ea89a738d2ca8d70cd742b9599209ab4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" The Paris Agreement also engages \r\na larger set of variables - given its privileging of national autonomy \r\nand politics, integration with the sustainable development agenda, \r\nand its engagement with actions and actors at multiple levels - than \r\nearlier international agreements, which further complicates the task \r\nof tracing causality between observed effects and international \r\ncooperation through the Paris Agreement."


id: 9a7ce9e0c54a3d9ebf40bb05fdc51b86
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content:
"Yes, to an extent. Countries' emissions were in line with their internationally agreed targets: the collective greenhouse gas (GHG) \r\nmitigation target for Annex I countries in the UNFCCC to return to their 1990 emissions levels by 2000, and their individual targets \r\nin the Kyoto Protocol for 2008-12. Numerous studies suggest that participation in the Kyoto Protocol led to substantial reductions in \r\nnational GHG emissions, as well increased levels of innovation and investment in low-carbon technologies. In this latter respect, the \r\nKyoto Protocol set in motion some of the transformational changes that will be required to meet the temperature goal of the Paris \r\nAgreement. It is too soon to tell whether the processes and commitments embodied in the Paris Agreement will be effective in achieving \r\nits stated goals with respect to limiting temperature rise, adaptation, and financial flows"


id: a584d559a448eddd6b51718fc7ac0d20
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content:
" There is, however, evidence that its entry into \r\nforce has been a contributing factor to many countries' adopting mid-century targets of net-zero GHG or CO2 emissions. "


id: a8227e810d648a8e3bb418134552d01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"Continued international cooperation remains critically important both to stimulate countries' enhanced levels of mitigation ambition, \r\nand through various means of support to increase the likelihood that they achieve these objectives. The latter is particularly the \r\ncase in developing countries, where mitigation efforts often rely on bilateral and multilateral cooperation on low-carbon finance, \r\ntechnology support, capacity building, and enhanced South-South cooperation. The Paris Agreement is structured around Nationally \r\nDetermined Contributions that are subject to an international oversight system, and bolstered through international support. \r\nThe international oversight system is designed to generate transparency and accountability for individual emissions reduction \r\ncontributions, and regular moments for stock-taking of these efforts towards global goals"


id: 977e819a1771ade9ab0c1ff4b30c30d4
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content:
" Such enhanced transparency may instil \r\nconfidence and trust, and foster solidarity among nations, with theory-based arguments that this will lead to greater levels of \r\nambition. Together with other cooperative agreements at the sub-global and sectoral levels, as well as a  growing number of \r\ntransnational networks and initiatives, the implementation of all of these mechanisms is likely to play an important role in making \r\npolitical, economic, and social conditions more favourable to ambitious mitigation efforts in the context of sustainable development \r\nand efforts to eradicate poverty. "


id: 6797168c505996e8a8976e0fddbc0ce3
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content:
"While international cooperation is contributing to global mitigation efforts, its effects are far from uniform. Cooperation has \r\ncontributed to setting a global direction of travel, and to falling greenhouse gas emissions in many countries and avoided emissions \r\nin others. It remains to be seen whether it can achieve the kind of transformational changes needed to achieve the Paris Agreement's \r\nlong-term global goals. There appears to be a large potential role for international cooperation to better address sector-specific \r\ntechnical and infrastructure challenges that are associated with such transformational changes. Finalising the rules to pursue \r\nvoluntary cooperation, such as through international carbon market mechanisms and public climate finance in the implementation \r\nof NDCs, without compromising environmental integrity, may play an important role in accelerating mitigation efforts in developing \r\ncountries"


id: 46553276fc5141620f966dd5d05f7412
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content:
" Finally, there is room for international cooperation to more explicitly address transboundary issues associated with carbon \r\ndioxide removal and solar radiation management. "


id: bc4f30e37e4e5cb6813e8ed8c3c0b95d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"Finance to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and \r\nenhance resilience to climate impacts represents a  critical \r\nenabling factor for the low carbon transition. Fundamental \r\ninequities in access to finance as well as its terms and \r\nconditions, and countries' exposure to physical impacts of \r\nclimate change overall result in a  worsening outlook for \r\na  global just transition (high confidence). Decarbonising the \r\neconomy requires global action to address fundamental economic \r\ninequities and overcome the climate investment trap that exists for \r\nmany developing countries. For these countries the costs and risks \r\nof financing often represent a significant challenge for stakeholders \r\nat all levels. This challenge is exacerbated by these countries' \r\ngeneral economic vulnerability and indebtedness"


id: 4d9c88f2ae633c1a18062e3e5f31a15d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" The rising public \r\nfiscal costs of mitigation, and of adapting to climate shocks, are \r\naffecting many countries and worsening public indebtedness and \r\ncountry credit ratings at a time when there were already significant \r\nstresses on public finances. The COVID-19 pandemic has made these \r\nstresses worse and tightened public finances still further. Other major \r\nchallenges for commercial climate finance include: the mismatch \r\nbetween capital and investment needs,1\r\n home bias2 considerations, \r\ndifferences in risk perceptions for regions, as well as limited \r\ninstitutional capacity to ensure safeguards represent. {15.2, 15.6.3}"


id: 232ddb08fbd39ce5f2973f26045f3fce
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content:
"Investors, central banks, and financial regulators are driving \r\nincreased awareness of climate risk. This increased awareness \r\ncan support climate policy development and implementation \r\n(high confidence). Climate-related financial risks arise from physical \r\nimpacts of climate change (already relevant in the short term), and \r\nfrom a  disorderly transition to a  low-carbon economy. Awareness \r\nof these risks is increasing leading also to concerns about financial \r\nstability. Financial regulators and institutions have responded with \r\nmultiple regulatory and voluntary initiatives by to assess and address \r\nthese risks. Yet despite these initiatives, climate-related financial risks \r\nremain greatly underestimated by financial institutions and markets \r\nlimiting the capital reallocation needed for the low-carbon transition"


id: 79571a0b4413ccc00ce0fc6096971ccd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" \r\nMoreover, risks relating to national and international inequity  - \r\nwhich act as a barrier to the transformation - are not yet reflected in \r\ndecisions by the financial community. Stronger steering by regulators \r\nand policy makers has the potential to close this gap. Despite the \r\nincreasing attention of investors to climate change, there is limited \r\nevidence that this attention has directly impacted emission reductions. \r\nThis leaves high uncertainty, both near-term (2021-30) and longer\u0002term (2021-50), on the feasibility of an alignment of financial flows \r\nwith the Paris Agreement (high confidence). {15.2, 15.6}"


id: e881e7167e2f37943df1d7cc14780328
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content:
"Innovative financing approaches could help reduce the systemic \r\nunderpricing of climate risk in markets and foster demand for \r\nParis-aligned investment opportunities. Approaches include \r\nde-risking investments, robust 'green' labelling and disclosure \r\nschemes, in addition to a  regulatory focus on transparency \r\nand reforming international monetary system financial sector \r\nregulations (medium confidence). Markets for green bonds, ESG \r\n(environmental, social, and governance), and sustainable finance \r\nproducts have grown significantly since the Fifth Assessment Report \r\nof the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC AR5) and \r\nthe landscape continues to evolve. Underpinning this evolution \r\nis investors' preference for scalable and identifiable low-carbon \r\ninvestment opportunities. These relatively new labelled financial \r\nproducts will help by allowing a  smooth integration into existing \r\nasset allocation models (high confidence)"


id: 3485cdcf2e93a506a1aee48307faa07e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" Markets for green bonds, \r\nESG (environmental, social, and governance), and sustainable \r\nfinance products have also increased significantly since AR5, but \r\nchallenges nevertheless remain, in particular there are concerns \r\nabout 'greenwashing' and the limited application of these markets \r\nto developing countries. New business models (e.g., pay-as-you-go) \r\ncan facilitate the aggregation of small-scale financing needs and \r\nprovide scalable investment opportunities with more attractive risk\u0002return profiles. Support and guidance for enhancing transparency \r\ncan promote capital markets' climate financing by providing quality \r\ninformation to price climate risks and opportunities. Examples \r\ninclude Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and environmental, \r\nsocial and governance (ESG) disclosure, scenario analysis and \r\nclimate risk assessments, including the Task Force on Climate-Related \r\nFinancial Disclosures (TCFD)"


id: 21b66a4bef429a0954fed9f6a34f130
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" The outcome of these market-correcting \r\napproaches on capital flows cannot be taken for granted, however, \r\nwithout appropriate fiscal, monetary and financial policies. Mitigation \r\npolicies will be required to enhance the risk-weighted return of low\u0002emission and climate-resilient options, and - supported by progress in \r\ntransparent and scientifically based projects' assessment methods - \r\nto accelerate the emergence and support for financial products \r\nbased on real projects, such as green bonds, and phase out fossil fuel \r\nsubsidies. Greater public-private cooperation can also encourage the \r\nprivate sector to increase and broaden investments, within a context \r\nof safeguards and standards, and this can be integrated into national \r\nclimate change policies and plans. {15.1, 15.2.4, 15.3.1, 15.3.2, \r\n15.3.3, 15.5.2, 15.6.1, 15.6.2, 15.6.6, 15.6.7, 15.6.8}."


id: d08027cb641746ccf2fbf57d859414ce
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content:
"Ambitious global climate policy coordination and stepped-up \r\n(public) climate financing over the next decade (2021-2030) \r\ncan help address macroeconomic uncertainty and alleviate \r\ndeveloping countries' debt burden post-COVID-19. It can \r\nalso help redirect capital markets and overcome challenges \r\nrelating to the need for parallel investments in mitigation and \r\nthe up-front risks that deter economically sound low carbon \r\nprojects. (high confidence). Providing strong climate policy signals \r\nhelps guide investment decisions. Credible and clear signalling by \r\ngovernments and the international community reduce uncertainty \r\nfor financial decision-makers and help reduce transition risk. In \r\naddition to indirect and direct subsidies, the public sector's role in \r\naddressing market failures, barriers, provision of information, and risk \r\nsharing (equity, various forms of public guarantees) can encourage \r\nthe efficient mobilisation of private sector finance (high confidence). \r\n{15"


id: 563c584cca6028fb99132a1aeaa9c87f
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content:
"gas emissions and climate-resilient development', positions finance \r\nas one of the Agreement's three overarching goals (UNFCCC 2015). \r\nThis formulation is a recognition that the mitigation and resilience \r\ngoals cannot be achieved without finance, both in the real economy \r\nand in the financial system, being made consistent with these goals \r\n(Zamarioli et al. 2021). It has in turn contributed to the development \r\nof the concept of alignment (with the Paris Agreement) used in \r\nthe financial sector (banks, institutional investors), businesses, and \r\npublic institutions (development banks, public budgets)"


id: 443202e0fba1e4e85047a343328584dd
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content:
" As a result, \r\nsince AR5, in addition to measuring and analysing climate finance, \r\nan increasing focus has been placed on assessing the consistency or \r\nalignment, as well as respectively the inconsistency or misalignment, \r\nof finance with climate policy objectives, as for instance illustrated \r\nby the multilateral development banks' joint framework for aligning \r\ntheir activities with the goals of the Paris Agreements (MDBs 2018)."


id: 178a2e1ca07c4ec602b4d933846c4ba5
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content:
"In many cases, the scope of what may be considered as 'climate \r\nfinance' will also depend on the context of implementation such as \r\npriorities and activities listed in countries' Nationally Determined \r\nContributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2019a) \r\nas well as national development plans more broadly targeting the \r\nachievement of SDGs. Hence, rather than opposing the different \r\noptions listed above, the choice of one or the other depends on the \r\ndesired scope of measurement, which in turn depends on the policy \r\nobjective being pursued. The increasingly diverse initiatives and body \r\nof grey literature address a range of different information needs. They \r\nprovide analyses at the levels of domestic finance flows (e.g., UNDP \r\n2015; Hainaut and Cochran 2018), international flows (e.g. OECD \r\n2016; AfDB et al. 2018), global flows (UNFCCC 2018a; Buchner et al. \r\n2019), the financial system (e.g"


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",  UNEP Inquiry 2016a) or specific \r\nfinancial instruments such as bonds (e.g.,  CBI 2018). Common \r\nframeworks, reporting transparency are, however, necessary in order \r\nto identify overlaps, commonalities and differences between these \r\ndifferent measurements in terms of scope and underlying definitions. \r\nIn that regard, the developments of national and international \r\ntaxonomies, definitions and standards can help, as further discussed \r\nin Section 15.6, and Chapter 17 in AR6 WGII report."


id: 31a23ca8c579ef84726b676e13139628
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content:
"The multiplication of sources and channels of international climate finance can help address growing climate-related needs, and \r\npartly results from increased decentralisation as well financial innovation, which in turn can increase the effectiveness of finance \r\nprovided. There is, however, also evidence that increased complexity implies transaction costs (Brunner and Enting 2014), in part due \r\nto bureaucracy and intra-governmental factors (Peterson and Skovgaard 2019), which constitutes a barrier to low-carbon projects \r\nand are often not accounted for in assessments of international climate finance. On the ground, activities by international providers \r\noperating in the same countries may overlap, with sub-optimal coordination and hence duplication of efforts, both on the bilateral and \r\nmultilateral sides (Ahluwalia et al. 2016; Gallagher et al"


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content:
" 2018; Humphrey and Michaelowa 2019), as well as risks of fragmentation of \r\nefforts (Watson and Schalatek 2020) which slows down coordination with international providers, national development banks and \r\nother domestic institutions."


id: d8f254456cbe31572559f354d9a001a6
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content:
"The AR5 concluded that published assessments of financial flows \r\nwhose expected effect was to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) \r\nemissions and/or to enhance resilience to climate change aggregated \r\nUSD343-385 billion4\r\n yr-1 globally between 2010 and 2012 (medium \r\nconfidence). Most (95% of total) went towards mitigation, which \r\nwas nevertheless underfinanced and adaptation even more so. \r\nMeasurement of progress towards the commitment by developed \r\ncountries to provide USD100 billion yr-1 by 2020 to developing \r\ncountries, for both mitigation and adaptation (Bhattacharya et  al. \r\n2020)  - a narrower goal than overall levels of climate finance  - \r\ncontinued to be a  challenge, given the lack of clear definition \r\nof such finance, although there remain divergent perspectives \r\n(Section  15.2.4)"


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content:
" As against these flows, annual need for global \r\naggregate mitigation finance between 2020 and 2030 was cited \r\nbriefly in the AR5 to be about USD635 billion (mean annual), both \r\npublic and private, implying that the reported 'gap' in mitigation \r\nfinancing of estimated flows during 2010 to 2012 was slightly under \r\none-half of that required (IPCC 2014)."


id: e767d6d5a7a300ffa8da7b3246db5766
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"Key findings from AR5 and other IPCC publications. For the \r\nfirst time the IPCC in AR5 (Clarke et al. 2014) elaborated on the role \r\nof finance in a  dedicated chapter. In the following year, the Paris \r\nAgreement (UNFCCC 2015) recognised the transformative role of \r\nfinance, as a  means to achieving climate outcomes, and the need \r\nto align financial flows with the long-term global goals even as \r\nimplementation issues were left unresolved (Bodle and Noens 2018). \r\nAR5 noted the absence of a  clear definition and measurement of \r\nclimate finance flows, a  difficulty that continues (Weikmans and \r\nRoberts 2019) (Sections 15.2 and 15.3)"


id: 85c6712963efe6eeedb423ca09863397
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" The approach taken in AR5 \r\nwas to report ranges of available information on climate finance flows \r\nfrom diverse sources, using a broad definition of climate finance, as in \r\nthe Biennial Assessments in 2014 and again in 2018 (UNFCCC 2014a, \r\n2018a) of the Standing Committee under the UNFCCC: Climate \r\nfinance is taken to refer to local, national or transnational financing - \r\ndrawn from public, private and alternative sources of financing - that \r\nseeks to support mitigation and adaptation actions that address \r\nclimate change (UNFCCC 2014b). For this chapter, while the focus is \r\nprimarily on mitigation, adaptation, resilience and loss and damage "


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"Mitigation finance deals with investments that aim to reduce global carbon emissions, while adaptation finance deals with the \r\nconsequences of climate change (Lindenberg and Pauw 2013). Mitigation affects the scale of adaptation needs and adaptation \r\nmay have strong synergies and co-benefits as well as trade-offs with mitigation (Grafakos et al. 2019). If mitigation investments \r\nare inadequate to reducing global warming (as in the last decade) with asymmetric adverse impacts in lower latitudes and low\u0002lying geographies, the scale of adaptation investments has to rise and the benefits of stronger adaptation responses may be high \r\n(Markandya and Gonzalez-Eguino 2019). If adaptation investments build greater resilience, they might even moderate mitigation \r\nfinancing costs. Similar policy coherence considerations apply to disaster risk reduction financing, the scale of which depends on \r\nsuccess with both adaptation and mitigation (Mysiak et al. 2018)"


id: 42873a8d3adf41439c1e8409836eae9e
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" The same financial actors, especially governments and the private \r\nsector, decide at any given time on their relative allocations of available financing for mitigation, adaptation and disaster-risk reduction \r\nfrom a constrained common pool of resources. The trade-offs and substitutability between closely-linked alternative uses of funds, \r\ntherefore, make it essential for a simultaneous assessment of needs - as in parts of this chapter. Climate finance versus the financing \r\nof other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) faces a similar issue. A key agreement was that climate financing should be 'new \r\nand additional' and not at the cost of SDGs. Resources prioritising climate at the cost of non-climate development finance increase \r\nthe vulnerability of a population for any given level of climate shocks, and additionality of climate financing is thus essential (Brown \r\net al. 2010)"


id: 5fbe94e81535d227bf05a0fcebdc83cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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" Policy coherence is also the reason why mitigation finance cannot be separated from consideration of spending and \r\nsubsidies on fossil fuels. Climate change may additionally cause the breaching of physical and social adaptation limits, resulting in \r\nclimate-related residual risks (i.e., potential impacts after all feasible mitigation, adaptation, and disaster risk reduction measures have \r\nbeen implemented) (Mechler et al. 2020). Because these residual losses and damages from climate-related risks are related to overall \r\nmitigation and adaptation efforts, the magnitude of potential impacts is related to the overall quantum of mitigation, adaptation, and \r\ndisaster risk reduction finance available (Frame et al. 2020). All categories of climate finance thus need to be considered together in \r\ndiscussions around climate finance."


id: 4680a08d12ae2db11367bc5ac0ac118
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"This is the first IPCC Assessment Report chapter on investment \r\nand finance since the 2015 Paris Agreement, which represented \r\na landmark event for climate finance because for the first time the \r\nkey role of aligning financial flows to climate goals was spelled out. \r\nSince then, the financial sector has recognised the opportunity and \r\nhas stepped up to centre-stage in the global policy conversation on \r\nclimate change. While before the Paris Agreement, only few financial \r\nprofessionals and regulators were acquainted with climate change, \r\ntoday climate change is acknowledged as a strategic priority in most \r\nfinancial institutions. This is a major change in the policy landscape \r\nfrom AR5. However, this does not mean that finance necessarily plays \r\nan adequate enabling role for climate investments. On the contrary, \r\nthe literature shows that without appropriate conditions, finance can \r\nrepresent a barrier to filling the climate investment gap (Hafner et al. \r\n2020)"


id: 2fbf7d1fa7e84c868bbcca8fd2ea60ab
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" Indeed, despite the enormous acceleration in policy initiatives \r\n(e.g., NGFS 2020) and coalitions of the willing in the private sectors, \r\nthe effect in terms of closing the investment gap identified already in \r\nAR5 has been limited (Section 15.5.2)."


id: cb10b63897ae8c6ea528df9cb29cfd67
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"The institutions under climate finance in this chapter refer to the \r\nset of financial actors, instruments and markets that are recognised \r\nto play a key role in financing decisions on climate mitigation and \r\nadaptation. For a definition of climate financial stock and flows see \r\nfurther Section 15.3 and the Glossary. The issue of climate finance is \r\nclosely related to the conversation on international cooperation and \r\nthe question of how cross-border investments can support climate \r\nmitigation and adaptation in developing countries. However, the issue \r\nis also related to more general questions of how financial institutions, \r\nboth public and private, can assess climate risks and opportunities \r\nfrom all investments, and what roles states, policymakers, regulators \r\nand markets can play in making them more sustainable"


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" In particular, \r\nthe question of the respective roles of the public and private \r\nfinancial actors has become important in deliberations on climate \r\nfinance in recent years. The broader macroeconomic context is an \r\nimportant starting point. Four major events and macro trends mark \r\nthe developments in climate finance in the previous five years and \r\nlikely developments in the near term."


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"types of financial flows such as equity, bond and banking credit \r\nmarkets, which in turn are likely to impact climate finance flows to \r\nall sub-sectors and geographies (with greater expected volatility in \r\nmore risky and more leveraged regions). This is in contrast to longer\u0002term trend considerations (2020-2050) that typically focus the \r\nattention on drivers of disaggregated flows of climate finance and \r\npolicies. The upward trends of the cycles tend to favour speculative \r\nbubbles like real estates at the expense of investment in production \r\nand infrastructures whereas the asymmetric downsides raise \r\nuncertainty and risks for longer-term investments on newer climate \r\ntechnologies, and favour a flight to near-term safety (e.g., lowest risk \r\nnon-climate short-term treasury investments, highest creditworthy \r\ncountries, and away from cross-border investments (Section 15.5) - \r\nmaking the challenge of longer-term low-carbon transition more \r\ndifficult"


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" In this respect, the impact of financial regulation is unclear. \r\nOn the one hand, it could be argued that the tighter bank regulations \r\nunder Basel III, combined with an economic environment with higher \r\nuncertainty and flatter yield curve, can push banks to retrench \r\nfrom climate finance projects (Blended Finance Taskforce, 2018a), \r\nsince banks tend to limit loan maturity to five or eight years, while \r\ninfrastructure projects typically require the amortisation of debt over \r\n15 to 20 years (Arezki et al. 2016). On the other hand, other studies \r\nreport that stricter capital requirements are not a driving factor for \r\nmoving away from sustainability projects (CISL and UNEP FI 2014)."


id: 657b1c662448e188574ed0bcef3df54e
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"Four key aspects of the global macroeconomy, each slightly different, \r\npointed in a cascading fashion towards a deteriorating environment \r\nfor stepped-up climate financing over the next crucial decade \r\n(2020-2030), even before COVID-19. The argument is often made \r\nthat there is enough climate financing available if the right projects \r\nand enabling policy actions ('bankable projects') present themselves \r\n(Cuntz et  al. 2017; Meltzer 2018). The attention to 'bankability' \r\ndoes not however address access and equity issues (Bayliss and \r\nVan Waeyenberge 2018). Some significant gains in climate financing \r\nat the sectoral and microeconomic levels were nevertheless \r\nhappening in specific segments, such as solar energy financing and \r\nlabelled green bonds (although how much of such labelled financing \r\nis incremental to unlabelled financing that might have happened \r\nanyway remains uncertain) (Tolliver et al. 2019)"


id: e0478916b47fda77a9eaae9e0c072733
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" Issues of 'labelling' \r\n(Cornell 2020) apply even more to ESG (environmental, social and \r\ngovernance) investments, which started to grow rapidly after 2016 \r\n(Section  15.6.5). Overall, these increments for climate finance \r\nremained, however, small in aggregate relative to the size of the shifts \r\nin climate financing required in the coming decade. Annual energy \r\ninvestments in developing regions (other than China) which account \r\nfor two-thirds of the world population, with least costs of mitigation \r\nper tonne of emissions (one-half that in developed regions), and \r\nfor the bulk of future expected global GHG emissions, saw a 20% \r\ndecline since 2016, and only a one-fifth share of global clean energy \r\ninvestment, reflecting persistent financing problems and costs of \r\nmobilising finance towards clean energy transition, even prior to the \r\npandemic (IEA 2021a)"


id: 4c09c02981c3c60721cbf69c10cdc50c
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" In the words of a macroeconomic institution, \r\n'tangible policy responses to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have \r\nbeen grossly insufficient to date' (IMF 2020a). The reason is in part \r\nglobal macroeconomic headwinds, which show a relative stagnation \r\nsince 2016 and limited cross-border flows in particular (Yeo 2019)."


id: 756aaa23e26a2a281b72c937feb4242a
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"Slowing and more unstable GDP growth. The first headwind \r\nwas more unstable and slowing GDP growth at individual country \r\nlevels and in aggregate because of worsening climate change impact \r\nevents (Donadelli et al. 2019; Kahn et al. 2019). As each warmer year \r\nkeeps producing more negative impacts - arising from greater and \r\nrising variability and intensity of rainfall, floods, droughts, forest fires \r\nand storms - the negative consequences have become more macro\u0002economically significant, and worst for the most climate-vulnerable \r\ndeveloping countries (high confidence). Paradoxically, while these \r\neffects should have raised the social returns and incentives to invest \r\nmore in future climate mitigation, a standard public policy argument, \r\nthese macroeconomic shocks may work in the opposite direction \r\nfor private decisions by raising the financing costs now (Cherif and \r\nHasanov 2018)"


id: ce92e1a3d55da4a3ea1ca9efff21d191
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" With some climate tipping points, potentially in \r\nthe near-term reach (see AR6 WGI Chapter 4) the uncertainty with \r\nregard to the economic viability and growth prospects of selected \r\nmacroeconomically critical sectors increases significantly (AR6 WGII \r\nChapters 8 and 17). Taking account of other behavioural failures, this \r\nwas creating a barrier for proactive and accelerated mitigation and \r\nadaptation action."


id: 4cdd87c85434ecc1baa05d64eecda195
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"The macroeconomic headwinds have worsened dramatically with the \r\nonset of COVID-19. Almost two years after the pandemic started, it \r\nis still too uncertain and early to conclude impacts of the pandemic \r\nuntil 2025-2030, especially as they affect climate finance. Multiple \r\nwaves of the pandemic, new virus mutations, accumulating human \r\ntoll, and growing vaccine coverage but vastly differing access across \r\ndeveloped versus developing regions, are evident. They are causing \r\ndivergent impacts across sectors and countries, which combined with \r\nthe divergent ability of countries and regions to mount sufficient \r\nfiscal and monetary policy actions imply continued high uncertainty \r\non the economic recovery paths from the crisis. The situation remains \r\nmore precarious in middle- and low-income developing countries \r\n(IMF 2021a)"


id: 52ea0e4d71d4c69225d00630a2505d95
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" While recovery is happening, the job losses have been \r\nlarge, poverty rates have climbed, public health systems are suffering \r\nlong-term consequences, education gains have been set back, public \r\ndebt levels are higher (5-10% of GDP higher), financial institutions \r\nhave come under longer-term stress, a larger number of developing \r\ncountries are facing debt distress, and many key high-contact sectors, \r\nsuch as tourism and trade, will take time to recover (Eichengreen et al. \r\n2021). The implication is negative headwinds for climate finance with \r\npublic attention focused on pandemic relief and recovery and limited \r\n(and divergent) fiscal headroom for a  low-carbon transition, with \r\nconsiderable uncertainties ahead (Hepburn et al. 2020b; Maffettone \r\nand Oldani 2020; Steffen et al. 2020)."


id: 8556721b29734a2a5bdbf07c2d9515a2
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"Public finances. The second headwind was rising public fiscal costs \r\nof mitigation and adapting to rising climate shocks affecting many \r\ncountries, which were negatively impacting public indebtedness and \r\ncountry credit ratings (Cevik and Jalles 2020; Klusak et al. 2021) at \r\na time of growing stresses on public finances and debt (Benali et al. \r\n2018; Kling et  al. 2018; Kose et  al. 2020) (high confidence). Every \r\nclimate shock and slowing growth puts greater pressures on public \r\nfinances to offset these impacts. Crucially, the negative consequences \r\nwere typically greater at the lower end of income distributions \r\neverywhere (Acevedo et al. 2018; Aggarwal 2019). As a result, the \r\nstandard prescription of raising distributionally adverse carbon taxes \r\nand reducing fossil fuel subsidies to raise resources faced political \r\npushback in several countries (Copland 2020; Green 2021), and low \r\nrates elsewhere"


id: b24c6aa7014c9498a397f992774a1727
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" Reduced taxes on capital, by contrast, was viewed \r\nas a way to improve growth (Bhattarai et al. 2018; Font et al. 2018), \r\nand working against broader fiscal action. Progress with carbon \r\npricing remained modest across 44 OECD and G20 countries, with \r\n55-70% of all carbon emissions from energy use entirely unpriced \r\nas of 2018 (OECD 2021a). Climate-vulnerable countries meanwhile \r\nfaced sharply rising cost of sovereign debt. Buhr et al. (2018) calculate \r\nthe additional financing costs of Climate Vulnerable Forum countries \r\nof USD40 billion5\r\n on government debt over the past 10 years and \r\nUSD62 billion for the next 10 years. Including private financing cost, \r\nthe amount increases to USD146-168 billion over the next decade."


id: d3f99569c664b8f288dedc10eb424744
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"An important immediate finding from the COVID-19 crisis was that the \r\nslowdown in economic activity is illustrating some of these choices: \r\nimmediately after the onset, more costly and carbon-intensive coal \r\nuse for energy use tumbled in major countries such as China and \r\nthe USA, while the forced 'stay-at-home' policies adopted around the \r\nmajor economies of the world led to a -30-35% decline in individual \r\ncountry GDP, and was in turn associated with a  decrease in daily \r\nglobal CO2 emissions by -26% at their peak in individual countries, \r\nand -17% globally (-11 to -25% for +-1s) by early April 2020 \r\ncompared with the mean 2019 levels, with just under half coming \r\nfrom changes in surface transport, city congestion and country \r\nmobility (Le Quere et al. 2020). Along with the carbon emissions drop \r\nwas a dramatic improvement in other parameters such as clean air \r\nquality"


id: 73b4cc2f53c173c55f70aee660670a74
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" Moreover, longer-term behavioural impacts are also possible: \r\na dramatic acceleration of digital technologies in communications, \r\ntravel, retail trade and transport. The question however is whether \r\nthe world might revert to the earlier carbon-intensive path of \r\nrecovery, or to a different future, and the choice of policies in shaping \r\nthis future. Studies generally suggest that the gains from long-term \r\nimpacts of the pandemic on future global warming will be limited \r\nand depend more on the nature of public policy actions and long\u0002term commitments by countries to raise their ambitions, not just \r\non climate but on sustainable development broadly (Barbier 2020; \r\nBarbier and Burgess 2020; Forster et al. 2020; Gillingham et al. 2020; \r\nReilly et al. 2021)"


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" The positive lesson is clear: opportunities exist for \r\naccelerating structural change, and for a re-orientation of economic \r\nactivity modes to a low-carbon use strategy in areas such as coal use \r\nin energy consumption and surface transport, city congestion and \r\nin-country mobility, for which lower-cost alternatives exist and offer \r\npotentially dramatic gains (Hepburn et al. 2020b)."


id: de227cc072731fb13efcf2d316537c64
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"Bank 2020). Evidence from 133 countries between 2001-2018 \r\nsuggests that such shocks can cause social unrest, and migration \r\npressures, especially when starting inequality is high and social \r\ntransfers are low (Saadi Sedik and Xu 2020). Additionally, climate \r\npolicies are more politically difficult to implement when the setting \r\nis one of high inequality but much less politically costly where \r\nincomes are more evenly distributed with stronger social safety nets \r\n(Furceri et al. 2021). A redrawn social compact incorporating climate \r\n(Beck et al. 2021) that would adopt redistributive taxes and lower \r\ncarbon consumption, and strengthen state capacity to deliver safety \r\nnets, health and education with accelerated climate and environmental \r\nsustainability within and across countries, is increasingly recognised \r\nas important"


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" Countries, regions and coordination bodies of the larger \r\ncountries (G7, G20) have already begun such a shift to financing of \r\na Just Transition, but primarily focused on the developed countries, \r\nalthough gaps remain (Krawchenko and Gordon 2021)."


id: 9ab452026b2aec5df0e4826ec5d37f67
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"Climate finance in support of a Just Transition is likely to be a key \r\nto a  successful low-carbon transition globally (high confidence). \r\nAmbitious global climate agreements are likely to work far better \r\nby maximising cooperative arrangements (IPCC 2018; Gazzotti et al. \r\n2021) with greater financing support from developed to developing \r\nregions in recognition of 'common but differentiated responsibilities \r\nand respective capabilities' and a  greater ethical sense of climate \r\njustice (Khan et al. 2020; Sardo 2020; Warner 2020; Pearson et al. \r\n2021). While Just Transition issues apply within developed countries \r\nas well (see later discussion), these are of relatively second-order \r\nsignificance to addressing climate justice issues between richer and \r\npoorer countries - given the scale of financing and existing social \r\nsafety nets in the former and their absence in the latter"


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" For example, \r\nover the past three decades drought in Africa has caused more \r\nclimate-related mortality than all climate-related events combined \r\nfrom the rest of the world (Warner 2020). These issues can however \r\nserve both as a  bridge and a  barrier to greater cooperation on \r\nclimate change. The key is to build greater mutual trust with clearer \r\ncommitments and well-structured key decisions and instruments \r\n(Sardo 2020; Pearson et al. 2021)."


id: edf43821b1a0176d0437e2f656f2ec49
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"The Just Transition discussion has picked up steam. It was explicitly \r\nrecognised in the Paris Agreement and the 2018 Just Transition \r\nDeclaration signed by 53 countries at COP24, which 'recognised the \r\nneed to factor in the needs of workers and communities to build \r\npublic support for a rapid shift to a zero-carbon economy.' Originally \r\nproposed by global trade unions in the 1980s, the recent discourse \r\nhas become broader. It has coalesced into a more inclusive process \r\nto reduce inequality across all three areas of energy, environment \r\nand climate (McCauley and Heffron 2018; Bainton et  al. 2021)"


id: d9b529e4737b2b40ed36562999a1194a
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" It \r\nseeks accelerated public policy support to ensure environmental \r\nsustainability, decent work, social inclusion and poverty eradiation \r\n(Burrow 2017), widely shared benefits, and protection of indigenous \r\nrights, and livelihoods of communities and workers who stand to \r\nlose (including workers in fossil fuel sectors such as coal and oil \r\nand gas) (UNFCCC 2018b; EBRD 2020; Jenkins et al. 2020). Because \r\nthe process involves 'climate justice' and equity within and across \r\ngenerations, it involves difficult political trade-offs (Newell and \r\nMulvaney 2013). The implications for a  Just Transition in climate \r\nfinance are clear: expanding equitable and greater access to climate \r\nfinance for vulnerable countries, communities and sectors, not just \r\nfor the most profitable private investment opportunities, and a larger \r\nrole for public finance in fulfilling existing finance commitments \r\n(Bracking and Leffel 2021; Kuhl 2021; Long 2021; Roberts et al. 2021). "


id: 7d4b39545b805b72d6d379d9fe78d61
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"equivalency measure can easily and more accurately measure the \r\nvalue and benefit of blended public and private finance by comparing \r\nthe effective interest cost (and volume) gain with such financing, \r\nagainst the benchmark costs without such blending. Here again, \r\na pressing challenge is to improve the operational definitions of what \r\ncounts as ODA within blended finance. Blended finance remains very \r\npoorly defined and accounted (Pereira 2017; Andersen et al. 2019; \r\nAttridge and Engen 2019; Basile and Dutra 2019). Guarantees are \r\nexpressly not included in the definition of ODA (Garbacz et al. 2021)"


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" \r\nAs a result, bilateral and multilateral agencies have no incentive or \r\nlimited authority and basis to use such instruments, while multilateral \r\ndevelopment banks continue to approach guarantees with great \r\ncaution because of the limits of their original charters (World Bank \r\n2009) and require counter-indemnities by recipient countries, internal \r\nand historic agency inertia, perceived loss of control over the use \r\nof funds (compared to their preferred direct project-based lending) \r\nand employ restrictive accounting rules for capital provisioning of \r\nguarantees at 100% of their face value to maintain AAA ratings \r\nwith credit rating agencies (Humphrey 2017; Pereira dos Santos \r\nand Kearney 2018; Bandura and Ramanujam 2019; Hourcade et al. \r\n2021a)"


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" Largely because of such official uncertainty the actual flows \r\nof blended finance and guarantees continue to remain a very small \r\nshare (typically, less than 5%) of official and multilateral finance \r\nflows to lower project risks and costs, and hence the potential for \r\nlarge-scale accelerated low-carbon private investments in developing \r\ncountries. Public guarantees can offer a fifteen times multiplier effect \r\non the scale of low-carbon investments generated with such support, \r\ncompared to a 1:1 ratio in direct financing (Hourcade et al. 2021a)."


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"A second priority is to accelerate the implementation of the \r\nUSD100  billion a  year (and likely more, given growing financing \r\ngaps) in climate finance commitments expressed in the Copenhagen \r\nAgreement Accord (and reiterated since) from developed to \r\ndeveloping countries, and to build greater confidence by agreeing \r\nrapidly on key definitions. Shifting to a grant equivalent net flows \r\ndefinition of climate finance, which is now universally accepted for \r\nall other aid flows by all parties since 2014 and which took effect \r\nsince 2019 on every other public international good finance provision \r\n(under the SDGs), with the sole exception of climate finance, would \r\nresolve many uncertainties: the disbursement of climate finance flows \r\non a  grant equivalent basis that is comparable across institutions, \r\ninstruments and countries, and measurement with greater accuracy \r\nabout the effective transfer of resources"


id: fb978f6e0adecd2fd2476144f6f29e4a
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" The journey to get to a clear \r\nand precise definition of net official overseas development assistance \r\n(ODA) took time. The original proposal was first initiated in the 1960s \r\n(Pincus 1963) but it was not till multilateral development banks \r\n(MDBs) and others laid out the compelling reasons why (Chang et al. \r\n1998) that this was accomplished: especially to resolve decades of \r\nconfusion and inconsistency between different types of financial \r\nflows and hence the perennial measurement problems and 'the \r\ncompromise between political expediency and statistical reality' \r\n(Bulow and Rogoff 2005; Hynes and Scott 2013; Scott 2015, 2017)."


id: 22af1da9c6ff441fe8084745746a35a2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"A fourth priority is expanding jobs and dealing with job losses in the \r\nglobal low-carbon transition (Carley and Konisky 2020; Crowe and Li \r\n2020; Pai et al. 2020; Cunningham and Schmillen 2021; Hanto et al. \r\n2021), especially in coal and other sectors, as well as land and other \r\neffects for indigenous communities (Zografos and Robbins 2020). \r\nMany countries, especially low-income countries, remain dependent \r\non fossil fuels for their energy and exports and jobs, and support \r\nfor their transition to a low-carbon future will be essential. Global \r\nrecovery from the pandemic will take longer than initially envisaged \r\n(IMF 2021c; OECD 2021b) and an accelerated climate action for \r\na Build Back Better global infrastructure plan with better and more \r\nresilient jobs might play a  key role as part of the Just Transitions. \r\nAlready, there is substantial evidence (Sulich et al. 2020; Dell'Anna \r\n2021; Dordmond et al"


id: 6d14cb779adb81065b2b367e1c3e23e3
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content:
"employment multipliers and mutual gains from given spending) than \r\nwould any other large-scale alternative. But this would nevertheless \r\nrequire a carefully managed transition globally, including access to \r\nmuch larger volumes of climate financing in developing economies \r\n(Muttitt and Kartha 2020). The multilateral finance institutions have \r\ngenerally played a  supportive role, expanding their financing to \r\ndeveloping countries during the pandemic (even as bilateral aid flows \r\nhave fallen sharply), but have been hampered by the constraints on \r\ntheir mandates and instruments (as noted earlier). Political leadership \r\nand direction will be again crucial to enhance their roles"


id: fc7ebda53f71b98a3ed65ae33904382a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" The recent \r\nexpansion of SDR quotas at the IMF similarly might help, but the \r\ncurrent distributions of quota benefits flow primarily to the developed \r\ncountries and do little to expand investment flows on a longer-term \r\nbasis for a global expansion in growth and job opportunities in the \r\nlow-carbon transition."


id: 218fbe5a377fe9986adfd25fa5d9c678
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"These five options identified above on near-term actions and \r\npriorities will however, require greater collective political leadership. \r\nA review of past crisis episodes suggests that collective actions to \r\navoid large global or multi-country risks work well primarily when \r\nthe problems are well defined, a small number of actors are involved, \r\nsolutions are relatively well established scientifically, and public \r\ncosts to address them are relatively small (Sandler 1998, 2015) (for \r\nexample, dealing with early pandemic outbreaks such as Ebola, \r\nTB, and cholera; extending global vaccination programmes such as \r\nsmallpox, measles and polio; early warning systems and actions for \r\nnatural disasters such as tsunamis, hurricanes/cyclones and volcanic \r\ndisasters; the Montreal Protocol for ozone-depleting refrigerants, \r\nand renewables wind and solar energy development)"


id: f0d634a0e237e9494fedb2918046ab75
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" They do not \r\nappear to work as well for more complex global collective action \r\nproblems which concern a  number of economic actors, sectors, \r\nwithout inexpensive and mature technological options, and where \r\npolitical and institutional governance is fragmented. Greater \r\npolitical coordination is needed because the impacts are often not \r\nnear term or imminent, but diffuse, slow moving and long term, \r\nand where preventive disaster avoidance is costly even when these \r\ncosts are  low compared to the longer-term damages  - till tipping \r\npoints are reached of the need for reduced 'stressors' and increasing \r\n'facilitators' (Jagers et al. 2020). But by then, it may be too late."


id: 4bdda1caeba0c9cbc147babfdb75cd40
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"As a  fifth priority, transformative climate financing options based \r\non equity and global sustainability objectives may also need to \r\nconsider a greater mix of public pricing and taxation options on the \r\nconsumption side (Arrow et al. 2004; Folke et al. 2021). Two-thirds of \r\nglobal GHG emissions directly or indirectly are linked to household \r\nconsumption, with average per capita carbon footprint of North \r\nAmerica and Europe of 13.4 and 7.5 tCO2-eq per capita, respectively, \r\ncompared to 1.7 in Africa and Middle East (Gough 2020) and as \r\nhigh as 200 tCO2-eq per capita among the top 1% in some high\u0002income geographies versus 0.1 tCO2-eq at the other end of the \r\nincome distribution in some least-developed countries (Chancel \r\nand Piketty 2015)"


id: 39b9f11baff2bea69136aa5824d9be7a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" Globally, the highest-expenditure households \r\naccount for eleven times the per capita emissions of lowest\u0002expenditure households, with rising carbon income elasticities that \r\nsuggest 'redistribution of carbon shares from global elites to global \r\npoor' as welfare efficient (Chancel and Piketty 2015; Hubacek et al. \r\n2017). Within countries and regions, and within sectors, similar \r\npatterns hold. The top 10% of the population with the highest \r\nper capita footprints account for 27% of the EU carbon footprint, \r\nand the top 1% have a carbon footprint of 55 tCO2-eq per capita, \r\nwith air transport the most elastic, unequal and carbon-intensive \r\nconsumption (Ivanova and Wood 2020). Similarly, within sectors, \r\nthere are large differences in carbon-intensity in the building sector \r\nin North America (Goldstein et  al. 2020) and across cities where \r\nconsumption-based GHG emissions vary widely across the world \r\n(ranging from 1.8 to 25.9 tCO2-eq per capita)."


id: 846098868e253458bf974dc676bd1281
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"The second level of attention needed on Just Transitions has to \r\ndo with inequities within a  large country setting, developed or \r\ndeveloping. The Just Transition issue exists within developed \r\ncountries as well. As the ongoing pandemic illustrates, the first \r\nclimate burden hit is often felt most acutely at the level of states \r\nand cities, with many smaller ones without enough fiscal capacity \r\nor ability to mount an adequate discretionary counter policy. Only \r\nnational governments have the ability to borrow more in their fiscal \r\naccounts to address large collective problems, whether pandemics \r\nor climate change. Therefore, it is important that national policies \r\nand funds be available for programmes to address the Just Transition \r\nissues for larger subnational states, cities and regions"


id: 6ee3b16439393c4a8add116eabfbb206
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"Measures of financial flows and stocks provide complementary \r\nand interrelated insights into trends over time: the accumulation \r\nof flows, measured per unit of time, results in stocks, observed at \r\na given point in time (IMF 2009; UN and ECB 2015). On the flows \r\nside, GDP, a System of National Accounts (SNA) statistical standard \r\nthat measures the monetary value of final goods and services \r\nproduced in a country in a given period of time. In 2020, global GDP \r\nrepresented above USD2015 70 trillion6\r\n (down from around 80 trillion \r\nUSD2015 in 2019), out of which developed countries represented \r\napproximately 60% (Figure 15.1); a slowly decreasing share over \r\nthe last years. The GDP metric is useful here as an indicator of the \r\nlevel of activity of an economy but gives no indication relating to \r\nhuman well-being or SDG achievements (Giannetti et al"


id: f3a714e989e950fdad4cbacab445304b
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" 2015) as it \r\ncounts positively activities that negatively impact the environment, \r\nwithout making deductions for the depletion and degradation of \r\nnatural resources."


id: f7fea5d555c1611beeab11c65e82edf9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"On the stock side, an increasingly significant portion of the growing \r\nvalue of financial capital (stocks in particular) may be disconnected \r\nfrom the value of underlying productive capital in the real economy \r\n(Igan et  al. 2020). This trend, however, remains uneven between \r\ndeveloped countries, most of which have relatively deep capital \r\nmarkets, and developing countries at different stages of development \r\n(Section  15.6.7). Bonds, a  form of debt financing, represent \r\na significant share of total financial assets. As of August 2020, the \r\noverall size of the global bond markets (amount outstanding) was \r\nestimated at approximately USD128.3 trillion, out of which over two \r\nthirds was from 'supranational, sovereign, and agencies', and just \r\nunder a third from corporations (ICMA 2020b)"


id: ee499f3f68636a1069298f48e32bdaea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" As discussed later in \r\nthe chapter, since AR5, an increasing number and volume of bonds \r\nhave been earmarked for climate action but these still only represent \r\nless than 1% of the total bond market. As of end-2020, climate\u0002aligned bonds outstanding were estimated at USD0.9 trillion (Giorgi \r\nand Michetti 2021), though already raising concerns in terms of both \r\nunderlying definitions (Section 15.6.6) and risks of increased climate\u0002related indebtedness (Section 15.6.1, 15.6.3)."


id: 4e294cf634549f1c3ed3b7f599175c97
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"There remain well documented interpretations and debates on how to account for progress (Clapp et al. 2012; Stadelmann et al. \r\n2013; Jachnik et al. 2015; Weikmans and Roberts 2019). Different interpretations relate mainly to the type and proportion of activities \r\nthat may qualify as 'climate' on the one hand, and to how to account for different types of finance (and financial instruments) on \r\nthe other hand. As an example, there are different points at which financing can be measured, for example, pledges, commitments, \r\ndisbursements. There can be significant lags between these different points in time, for example disbursements may spread over \r\ntime. Further, the choice of point of measurement can have an impact on both the volumes and on the characteristics (geographical \r\norigin, labelling as public or private) of the finance tracked"


id: c2a7b170d4b4ce935caacaf40de2113c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" The enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement may \r\nlead to improvements and more consensus in the way climate finance is accounted for and reported under the UNFCCC. Available \r\nanalyses specifically aimed at assessing progress towards the USD100 billion goal remain rare, for example the UNFCCC SCF Biennial \r\nAssessments do not directly address this point (UNFCCC 2018a). Dedicated OECD reports provide figures based on accounting for \r\ngross flows of climate finance based on analysing activity-level data recorded by the UNFCCC (bilateral public climate finance) and \r\nthe OECD (multilateral public climate finance, mobilised private climate finance and climate-related export credits) (OECD 2015a; \r\nOECD 2019a; OECD 2020b). For 2018, the OECD analysis resulted in a total of USD78.9 billion, out of which USD62.2 billion of public \r\nfinance, USD2.1 billion of export credits and USD14.5 billion of private finance was mobilised"


id: 86b465409a6d0adc11f415703cbb11a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"As called for by Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement and introduced \r\nin Section  15.3.1, achieving the goal of the Paris Agreement of \r\nholding the increase in the global average temperature to well below \r\n2degC above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the \r\ntemperature increase to 1.5degC above pre-industrial levels requires \r\nmaking all finance consistent with this goal. Data on investments \r\nand financing to high GHG activities remain very partial and \r\ndifficult to access, as relevant actors currently have little incentive \r\nor obligations to disclose such information compared to reporting \r\non and communicating about their activities contributing to climate \r\naction"


id: 7911258fc9fdddb7f2b3f6687ee8deb2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" Further, the development of methodologies to assess \r\nfinance for activities misaligned with climate mitigation goals, for \r\nhard- and costly-to-abate sectors such as heavy industries, as well \r\nas for activities that eventually need to be phased out but can play \r\na  transition role for a  given period, remain work in progress. This \r\nresults in limited empirical evidence to date."


id: d0a579bf874ee896b9649db363f5fc79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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"The IEA provides comprehensive analyses of global energy \r\ninvestments, estimated at about USD1.8 trillion a year over 2017-\r\n2019 (IEA 2019a, 2020a), and expected to reach that level again in \r\n2021 after a drop to about 1.6 trillion in 2020 (IEA 2021c). Energy \r\ninvestments represent about 8% of global GFCF (Section 15.3.2.1). \r\nIn the power sector, fossil fuel-related investments reached an \r\nestimated USD120 billion yr-1 on average over 2019-2020, which \r\nremains well above the level that underpin the IEA's own Paris\u0002compatible Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS) and Net Zero \r\nEmission (NZE) scenarios. The IEA observes a similar inconsistency \r\nfor supply-side new investments: in 2019-2020 on average yr-1, an \r\nestimated USD650 billion were invested in oil supply and close to \r\nUSD100 billion in coal supply. These estimates also result in fossil \r\nfuel investments remaining larger in aggregate than the total \r\ntracked climate finance worldwide (Section  15.3.2.2)"


id: c6d684651257fdb9df23861e8754862b
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" For oil and \r\ngas companies, which are amongst the world's largest corporations \r\nand sometimes government owned or backed, low-carbon solutions \r\nare estimated to represent less than 1% of capital expenditure \r\n(IEA 2020b). As discussed in the remainder of this chapter, shifting \r\ninvestments towards low-GHG solutions requires a combination of "


id: 8bc88a63c24cb7e57ced7a35d111e432
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content:
"In terms of financing provided to fossil fuel investments, available \r\nanalyses point out a still significant role played by commercial banks \r\nand export credit agencies. Commercial banks provide both direct \r\nlending as well as underwriting services, the latter facilitating capital \r\nraising from investors in the form of bond or share issuance. Available \r\nestimates indicate that lending and underwriting extended over \r\n2016- 2019 by 35 of the world's largest banks to 2100 companies \r\nactive across the fossil fuel lifecycle reached USD687 billion yr-1 on \r\naverage (Rainforest Action Network et al. 2020). Official export credit \r\nagencies, which are owned or backed by their government, de-risk \r\nexports by providing guarantees and insurances or, less often, loans"


id: c33d5f8e4fc5ea57cca4cb91106e4a50
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" \r\nIn 2016-2018, available estimates indicate the provision of about \r\nUSD31 billion yr-1 worth of fossil fuel-related official export credits, \r\nout of which close to 80% was for oil and gas, and over 20% for coal \r\n(DeAngelis and Tucker 2020)."


id: 4e77e6b81aa0d63d09cbdfee3dd4c937
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Finance for new fossil fuel-related assets lock in future GHG \r\nemissions that may be inconsistent with remaining carbon budgets \r\nand, as discussed above, with emission pathways to reach the Paris \r\nAgreement goals. This inconsistency exposes investors and asset \r\nowners to the risk of stranded assets, which results from potential \r\nsharp strengthening climate public policies, that is, transition risk. As \r\na result, a growing number of investors and financiers are assessing \r\nclimate-related risks with the aim to disclose information about their \r\ncurrent level of exposure (to both transition and physical climate\u0002related risks), as well as to inform their future decisions (TCFD 2017). \r\nReporting to date is, however, inconsistent across geographies and \r\njurisdictions (CDSB and CDP 2018; Perera et  al"


id: 7b503ce8782aef747bb2a2102cf697af
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content:
" 2019), with also \r\na wide variety of metrics, methodologies, and approaches developed \r\nby commercial providers that contribute to disparate outcomes \r\n(Kotsantonis and Serafeim 2019; Boffo and Patalano 2020). Further, \r\nas developed in Section 15.6.1, there is currently not enough evidence \r\nin order to conclude whether climate-related risk assessments result \r\nin increased climate action and alignment with the goals of the Paris \r\nAgreement (The 2deg Investing Initiative and Wuest Partner 2020)."


id: 2e3f858a266d63bade91ae1dbc2f5592
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"Financing needs7 are discussed in various contexts, only one being \r\ninternational climate politics and finance. Also, financing needs are \r\nused as an indicator for required system changes (when compared \r\nto current flows and asset bases) and an indicator for near- to long\u0002term investment opportunities from the perspective of investors \r\nand corporates. Investment needs are widely used as an indicator \r\nfocusing on initial investments required to realise new infrastructure. \r\nIt compares relatively well with private sector flows dominated \r\nby return-generating investments but lacks comparability and \r\nexplanatory power regarding the needs in the context of international \r\nclimate cooperation, where considerations on economic costs play \r\na more substantial role. Chapter 12 elaborates on global economic \r\ncost estimates for various technologies. This indicator includes both \r\ncosts and benefits of options, of which investment-related costs \r\nmake up only one component"


id: b59d7f164260d4ddbec3d45973580f96
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
" Both analyses offer complementary \r\ninsights. There are financing needs not directly related to the \r\nrealisation of physical infrastructure and which are not covered \r\nin both investment and cost estimates. For instance, the needs for \r\nbuilding institutional capacity to achieve social and economic goals \r\nand to strengthen knowledge, skills, national and international \r\ncooperation might not be significant, but an enabling environment \r\nfor future investments would not be established without satisfying it. \r\nMoreover, comprehending financial needs for addressing economic \r\nlosses due to climate change can hardly be measured in terms of the \r\nindicators introduced before."


id: ff55d4b8599e4f90a20fca2c5fc44577
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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content:
"assessment of the needs. For finance to become an enabler of the \r\ntransition, domestic and international public interventions can be \r\nneeded to ensure enough supply of finance across sectors, regions \r\nand stakeholders. The location of financing needs and vicinity to \r\ncapital matter given home bias (Fuchs et  al. 2017; OECD 2017a; \r\nIto and McCauley 2019) (prioritising own country or regions), \r\ntransaction costs and risk considerations (Section 15.2). Most of the \r\nfinance is mobilised domestically but the depth of capital markets is \r\nsubstantially greater in developed countries, increasing the challenges \r\nto mobilise substantial volumes of additional financing for many \r\ndeveloping countries. The same applies to various stakeholders with \r\nlimited connections into the financial sector"


id: beb8c5f00233be26d8e8cfecc667e8ef
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content:
" In addition, governments \r\nenabling financial market frameworks, guidelines and supportive \r\ninfrastructure is crucial for inclusive finance for the bottom of the \r\npyramid, especially disadvantaged and economically marginalised \r\nsegments of society."


id: cae0bfb7e35bd6121b29fe504725db55
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29479
content:
"For example, the recent Chinese policy direction towards tougher \r\naccess to and a  substantial cut in feed-in-tariffs in 2018 led to \r\na significant drop in renewable investment and new capacity addition \r\nin China (FS-UNEP Centre and BNEF 2019; Hove 2020). However, the \r\nsignificant bouncing back of newly installed capacity (72 GW wind \r\npower and 47 GW solar power in 2020) shows the strong development \r\nof zero-carbon power generation driven by lower cost and policies to \r\nsupport them by energy revolution strategies in China. Investors had \r\nproven to be willing to work with transparent support mechanisms, \r\nsuch as with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which \r\nstimulated emission reductions and allowed industrialised countries \r\nto implement emission-reduction projects in developing countries to \r\nmeet their emission targets (Michaelowa et al. 2019)"


id: c5cc77633c7afe752f79fac92cd0cc24
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:52
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" However, the \r\ncollapse of carbon markets and prices, especially of the EU Emissions \r\nTrading System, led to the continuous decline of Certified Emission \r\nReductions issuances from CDM in the past years (World Bank Group \r\n2020). Also, the dependency on regulatory intervention to ensure fair \r\nmarket access only has proven to burden investor appetite."


id: 7d575e64bddc0250c263474de03f3d17
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17296
content:
"The attractiveness of a sector and region for capital markets depends \r\non several factors. Some essential elements are the duration of loan \r\nand profile as long-term loans and heavily heterogeneous returns \r\nrepresent challenges in financing mitigation technologies and \r\npolicies. After the financial crisis and restricted access to long-term \r\ndebt, capital intensity of technologies and resulting long payback \r\nperiods of investment opportunities for mitigation technologies have \r\nbeen a crucial challenge (Bertoldi et al. 2021). Also, implicit discount \r\nrates applied during the investment decision process vary depending \r\non the payback profile, with research mainly covering the difference \r\nbetween the financing of assets generating revenues versus costs \r\n(Jaffe et al. 2004; Schleich et al. 2016)"


id: 2d12e2d931288fbd9d10a5ca3282c43a
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" In addition, a low correlation \r\nbetween the climate projects and dominating asset classes might \r\nprovide an opportunity in climate action by satisfying the appetite \r\nof institutional investors, which tend to manage portfolios with \r\nconsideration of the Markowitz modern portfolio theory (optimising \r\nreturn and risk of a portfolio through diversification) (Marinoni et al. \r\n2011). Transaction cost is a significant barrier to the diffusion and \r\ncommercialisation of low-carbon technologies and business models \r\nand adaptation action. High transaction costs, attributed to various \r\nfactors, such as complexity and limited standardisation of investments, \r\nlimited pipelines, complex institutional and administrative procedures, \r\ncreate significant opportunity costs of green investments comparing \r\nwith other standard investments (IRENA 2016; Nelson et al. 2016; \r\nFeldman et al. 2018)"


id: 54ecdc6cc3df3fb87d73c5b307bca769
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" For example, transaction costs are commonly \r\nobserved in small-scale, dispersed independent renewable energy \r\nsystems, especially in rural areas, and energy efficiency projects \r\n(Hunecke et al. 2019). A more robust standardisation and alignment of \r\nPower Purchase Agreement (PPA) terms with best practices globally \r\nhas led to a  substantially increased interest in capital markets in \r\ndeveloping countries (WBCSD 2016; Schmidt et al. 2019; World Bank \r\n2021). Notably, PPA significantly increases the probability of more \r\nbalanced investment and development outcomes and ultimately \r\nmore sustainable independent power projects in developing \r\ncountries. Therefore, lowering transaction costs would be essential \r\nfor creating investor appetite. The role of intermediaries bundling \r\ndemand for financing has been demonstrated to reduce transaction \r\ncosts and to reach investors' critical size. In addition, new innovative \r\napproaches, such as fintech and blockchain (Section  15.6"


id: c16887acf684c636586946512faea1e1
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"rather representing an add-on component and consequently \r\nrequiring the support of decision-makers used to business-as-usual \r\nprojects. Despite the benefits that improvement of energy efficiency \r\nhas in contributing to curbing energy consumption, mitigating \r\ngreenhouse gas emissions, and providing multiple co-benefits (IEA \r\n2014a), investment in energy efficiency is a low priority for firms, and \r\nthe financial environment is not favourable due to lack of awareness \r\nof energy efficiency by financial institutions, existing administrative \r\nbarriers, lack of expertise to develop projects, asymmetric information, \r\nand split incentives (UNEP DTU 2017; Cattaneo 2019)"


id: 5ddd392c783637cfbf2dc3f4b9a02919
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content:
" While Energy \r\nService Companies' (ESCO) business models are expected to facilitate \r\nthe investment in energy efficiency by sharing a portion of financial \r\nrisk and providing expertise, there has been limited progress made \r\nwith ESCO business models, and only slightly over 20% of projects \r\nused financing through ESCOs (UNEP DTU 2017)."


id: f957032f0141ca6e7a720f3717008f09
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content:
"The investment needs and existing challenges differ by sector. Each \r\nsector has different characteristics along the arguments listed above \r\nmaking the supply of finance by commercial investors an enabling \r\nfactor or barrier. In the transport sector, transformation towards green \r\nmobility would provide significant co-benefits for human health by \r\nreducing transport-related air pollution, so the transport sector cannot \r\nachieve such transformation in isolation from other sectors. However, \r\na considerable involvement of the public sector in many transportation \r\ninfrastructure projects is given, and the absence of a standard solution \r\nincreases transaction costs (including bidding package, estimating, \r\ndrawing up a contract, administering the contract, corruption, and \r\nso on). Financial constraints, including access to adequate finance, \r\npose a significant challenge in the agriculture sector, especially for \r\nSMEs and smallholder farmers"


id: 1eca49718c3eb27229faa3d8c384c24c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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" The distortion created by government \r\nfailure and a lack of effective policies create barriers to financing for \r\nagriculture. The inability to manage the impact of the agriculture\u0002related risks, such as seasonality, increases uncertainty in financial \r\nmanagement. Moreover, inadequate infrastructure, such as electricity \r\nand telecommunication, makes it difficult for financial institutions to \r\nreach agricultural SMEs and farmers and increases transaction costs \r\n(World Bank 2016). Low economies of scale, low bargaining power, \r\npoor connectivity to markets, and information asymmetry also lead \r\nto higher transaction costs (Pingali et  al. 2019). In the industrial \r\nmanufacturing and residential sector, gaining energy efficiency \r\nremains one of the critical challenges"


id: e16ebcdfebf90a7558b1c79d5bd9870b
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" Investment in achieving energy \r\nefficiency encounters some challenges when it may not necessarily \r\ngenerate direct or indirect benefits, such as increase in production \r\ncapacity or productivity and improvement in product quality. Also, \r\nearly-stage, high upfront cost and future, stable revenue stream \r\nstructure suggest the needs for a better enabling environment, such \r\nas a robust financial market, awareness of financial institutions, and \r\nregulatory frameworks (e.g., stringent building codes, incentives for \r\nESCOs) (IEA 2014a; Barnsley et al. 2015)."


id: d46d60b3ec091b29270f2752d2b3c9c0
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"One source of uncertainty about the investment estimates for the \r\npower sector is the evolution of the levelised cost of technical \r\noptions in the future, for example the continuation of the observed \r\ndeclining costs trends of renewable energy (IRENA 2020b) which has \r\nbeen underestimated in many modelling exercises. The learning by \r\ndoing processes and economies of scale might be at least partially \r\noutweighed, in all countries and more specifically in Small Island \r\nDeveloping States (SIDS) and other developing countries because of \r\ndifferent risk factors, scales of installations, accessibility, and others \r\n(Lucas et  al. 2015; van der Zwaan et  al. 2018). These parameters, \r\ntogether with transaction costs/soft costs (Section  15.5), financing \r\ncosts and the level of technical competences need to be better \r\nrepresented in the future to represent the 'climate investment trap' \r\nin many developing countries (Garcia de Fonseca et al. 2019)"


id: 71c599d6981a4f73a823f1ce268ca244
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content:
" This \r\n'climate investment trap', as flagged by Ameli et al. (2021a), is created \r\nby existing and expected physical effects of climate change, higher \r\nfinancing costs and resulting lower investment levels in developing \r\ncountries. Applying significantly standardised assumptions can \r\nconsequently not provide robust insights for specific country groups. \r\nThis will require progress in the spatiotemporal granularity of the \r\nmodels (Collins et al. 2016)."


id: 6ddabcda0d5ee61354bf7bda867af69d
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"about the structural functioning of the energy-economy-land\u0002use system (see Annex III: 'Scenarios and modelling methods' for \r\ndetails). Tables 15.2 and 15.3 focus on the near-term (2023-2032) \r\ninvestment requirements in the energy sector and how these differ \r\ndepending on temperature category. Figures 3.36 and 3.37 present \r\nthe data for the medium term (2023-2052). The results highlight \r\nboth requirements for increased investments and a shift from fossil \r\ntowards renewable technologies and efficiency for more ambitious \r\ntemperature categories. The substantial ranges within each category \r\nreflect multiple pathways, differentiated by socio-economic \r\nassumptions, technology, and so on. It is necessary to open up these \r\nextra dimensions and contrast them with national and sub-regional \r\nanalysis to understand how investment requirements depend \r\non particular circumstances and assumptions within a  country \r\nfor a  specific technology. Limiting peak temperature to levels of \r\n1"


id: 356d6c881e44b31a5ae595604b92162d
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content:
"5degC-2degC requires rapid decarbonisation of the global energy \r\nsystems, with the fastest relative emission reductions occurring in the \r\npower generation sector (Hirth and Steckel 2016; Luderer et al. 2018)."


id: b7c6368ff174f26e69367a5bd89f18d1
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"This requires fast shifts of investment as infrastructures in the power \r\nsector generally have long lifetimes of a  few decades. in global \r\nmodelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no \r\nor limited overshoot, investments into non-biomass renewables \r\n(especially solar and wind, but also including hydro, geothermal, and \r\nothers not shown in Table 15.2) increase to over USD1 trillion yr-1 \r\nin 2030, increasing by more than factor 3 over the values of around \r\nUSD250-300 billion yr-1 that have been relatively stable over the \r\nlast decade (IEA 2019a). Overall, electricity generation investments \r\nincrease considerably, reflecting the higher relevance of capital \r\nexpenditures in decarbonised electricity systems"


id: 835cccb900263aaefb969063320afba3
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" While decreasing \r\ntechnology costs have substantially reduced the challenge of high \r\ncapital intensity, still remaining relative disadvantages in terms of \r\ncapital intensity of low-carbon power technologies can especially \r\ncreate obstacles for fast decarbonisation in countries with high \r\ninterest rates, which decrease the competitiveness of those \r\ntechnologies (Iyer et al. 2015; Hirth and Steckel 2016; Steckel and \r\nJakob 2018; Schmidt et  al. 2019). CCS as well as nuclear will not \r\ndrive investment needs until 2030, given considerably longer lead\u0002times for these technologies, and the lack of a  significant project \r\npipeline currently."


id: 8cfdde378047916fb8e7826ff099c40e
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content:
"Using global scenarios assessed in Chapter  3  for assessing \r\ninvestment requirements. Tables  15.2 and 15.3 present the \r\nanalysis of investment requirements in global modelled mitigation \r\npathways assessed in Chapter 3 for key energy sub-sectors within \r\nmodelled global pathways that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or \r\nlower. These pathways explore the energy, land-use, and climate \r\nsystem interactions and thus help identify required energy sector \r\ntransformations to reach specific long-term climate targets. However, \r\nreporting of investment needs outside the energy sector was scarce, \r\nreducing the explanatory power of the shown total investment need \r\nin the context of overall investment needs (Ekholm et  al. 2013; \r\nIPCC 2018, Box 4.8; McCollum et al. 2018; Bertram et al. 2021)"


id: 39ef2f976f77fd0cf8f9f1166727dd55
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"It is worth highlighting that driven by technology cost assumptions, \r\nIRENA forecasts falling average annual investments needs for energy, \r\nbut also energy efficiency, for the period 2030-2050 compared to \r\n2020-2030. In the 1.5degC scenario (1.5-S) the total annual investment \r\nneeds excluding fossils and nuclear decrease from 5.0 trillion USD2015\r\nuntil 2030 yr-1 to 3.8 trillion USD2015 yr-1 for 2030-2050 (IRENA \r\n2021). In IAM scenarios of Category C1, electricity supply investments \r\n(including generation, transmission and distribution, and storage) \r\nremain flat at 2.2 trillion USD2015 yr-1 through the coming three \r\ndecades in absolute terms. Given rising GDP, the complementary \r\nmethods and sources thus consistently point to a peak in electricity \r\nsupply investments as a percentage of GDP in mitigation scenarios \r\nin the coming decade"


id: 13fb7b60637a2fff76953d2607f2c8b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" This reflects the fact that the coming decade \r\nrequires low-carbon power generation investments to both cover \r\nthe demand increase and (partly premature) replacement of fossil \r\ngeneration capacities, both concentrated in emerging and developing \r\ncountries. Relative investment numbers for electricity measured \r\nagainst GDP then decrease towards 2050, as they only need to \r\ncover natural replacement and increasing demands (which due \r\nto electrification will also pick up in developed countries), and due to \r\nfurther declining technology costs. Investments for low-carbon fuel "


id: 196f0d3e7c6a052db108618781129c04
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 1484
content:
"However, given the strong interlinkage of the presented transitions \r\nand accumulated effects, climate change related investments \r\ncan hardly be separated (The Food and Land Use Coalition 2019). \r\nShakhovskoy et  al. (2019) present an overview of financing needs \r\nof small-scale farmers globally, however, without focusing on the \r\nrequired climate-related investments. According to their assessment, \r\n270 million smallholder farmers in South and South-East Asia, sub\u0002Saharan Africa and Latin America face approximately USD240 billion \r\nof financing needs, thereof USD100 billion short-term agricultural \r\nneeds, USD88 billion long-term agricultural needs and USD50 billion \r\nnon-agricultural needs (Shakhovskoy et  al. 2019). These numbers \r\ncan only provide 'an indication of the magnitude of the climate \r\ninvestments required in small-scale agriculture' (CPI 2020). \r\nTable 15.4 summarises the studies used as well as adjustments made \r\nto determine needs for the gap discussion in Section 15"


id: ab7b11a30fb551e0bc7fb1a8bce2c8a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"A few exercises tried assess the consequences of the perpetuation of \r\nthese drivers on the magnitude of the financing gap. They suggest, \r\ncomparing the evolution of the infrastructure investment trends \r\n(beyond energy) by comparison with what they should be in an optimal \r\nscenario, a cumulative deficit between 19% (Oxford Economics 2017) \r\nand 32% (Arezki et al. 2016). The volume of this gap is of the same order \r\nof magnitude as the incremental infrastructure investments (energy and \r\nbeyond) for meeting a 1.5degC target (2.4% of the world GDP on average) \r\n(Box 4.8 of SR1.5 (IPCC 2018)) calculated by exercises assuming no \r\npre-existing investment gap. This figure is consistent with the 1.5% \r\nto 1.8% assessed by the European Commission (2020) for Europe and \r\nthe 2% of the IMF (2021d) for the G20, which do not encompass many \r\ndeveloping countries for which economic take-off is today fossil fuels \r\ndependent"


id: b534c4b6c08ac934bbe9bafae118dea2
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content:
" For low- and middle-income economies, Rozenberg and \r\nFay's (2019) results suggest to increase the infrastructure investments \r\nby 2.5 to 6 percentage points of GDP to cover both the reduction of the \r\nstructural investment gap and the specific additional costs for bridging \r\nit with low-carbon and climate-resilient options. These assessments \r\nindicate the challenge at stake but do not exist at very disaggregated \r\nsectoral and regional levels for sectors other than energy."


id: 3edf85fd021b38d5c9750c50e075c7fc
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content:
"Most studies choose to assess public sector projects, ignoring \r\nhousehold-level investments as well as private sector adaptation \r\n(UNEP 2018; Buchner et al. 2019). UNEP's 2020 Adaptation Gap Report \r\nestimates adaptation costs amounting to 140-300 billion  USD  yr-1\r\nin 2030 and USD280-500 billion yr-1 in 2050 (UNEP 2021). Over \r\n100 countries included adaptation components in their intended \r\nNDCs (INDCs) and approximately 25% of these referenced national \r\nadaptation plans (NAPs) (GIZ 2017a) but estimates of the financing \r\nrequired for NAP processes is not available. These NAPs, as formally \r\nagreed under the UNFCCC in 2010, are iterative, continuous processes \r\nthat have multiple stages with a developmental phase that requires \r\ncountry-specific financing of primarily which comprises grants, bond \r\nissuance or debt conversion (NDC Partnership 2020, NAP Global \r\nNetwork 2017)"


id: ee9c6653a86088930a00cc875e14c050
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content:
" At the same time, multilateral climate funds such as the \r\nGreen Climate Fund and the GEF/Least Developed Countries Fund offer \r\n'readiness and preparatory support' and implementation for the NAPs \r\nand adaptation planning process (GCF 2020a; GEF 2021a,b). There has \r\nbeen no significant updating of adaptation cost estimates since UNEP's \r\n(UNEP 2016, 2018). The Global Commission on Adaptation makes the \r\ncase that investing USD1.8 trillion in early warning system, climate\u0002resilient infrastructure, global mangrove and resilient water resources \r\nwould generate about USD1.7 trillion in benefits due to avoided cost \r\nand non-monetary and social resources (Verkooijen 2019; UNEP 2021)."


id: 568ee984902b8c414f6b4072bf69f0da
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content:
"The below quantitative analysis does not differentiate between \r\nfinancing gaps driven by barriers within or outside the financial sector \r\ngiven that the IAM models as well as most other studies used do \r\nnot incorporate actual risk ranges depending on policy strength and \r\ncoherence and institutional capacity, low-carbon policy risks, lack of \r\nlong-term capital, cross-border currency fluctuation, and pre-investment \r\ncosts and barriers within the financial sector that discourage private \r\nsector financing. They comprise short-termism (UNEP Inquiry 2016b), \r\nhigh perceived risks for mitigation-relevant technologies and/or \r\nregions (information gap through incomplete/asymmetric information, \r\n(Kempa and Moslener 2017; Clark et  al. 2018)), lack of carbon \r\npricing effects (Best and Burke 2018), home bias (results in limited \r\nbalancing for regional mismatches between current capital and needs \r\ndistribution, (Boissinot et al"


id: 737c43a7ac8a086490aa362944f9d161
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content:
" 2016)), and perceived high opportunity \r\nand transaction costs (results from limited visibility of future pipelines \r\nand policy interventions; SME financing tickets and the missing middle, \r\n(Grubler et al. 2016)). In addition, barriers outside the financial sector \r\nwill have to be addressed to close future financing gaps. The mix and \r\ndominance of individual barriers might vary significantly across sectors \r\nand regions and is analysed below."


id: 9a867e9157d07841c0dbbf84dc26e13e
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content:
"Figure 15.4 | Breakdown of recent average (downstream) mitigation investments and model-based investment requirements for 2020-2030 (USD billion) \r\nin scenarios that likely limit warming to 2degC or lower. Mitigation investment flows and model-based investment requirements by sector / segment (energy efficiency in \r\nbuildings and industry, transport including efficiency, electricity generation, transmission and distribution including electrification, and agriculture, forestry and other land use), by \r\ntype of economy, and by region (see Annex II Part I Section 1: By region is based on intermediate level (R10) classification scheme. By type of economy is based on intermediate \r\nlevel (R10) classification scheme, which considers 'North America', 'Europe', and 'Australia, Japan and New Zealand' as developed countries, and the other seven regions as \r\ndeveloping countries)"


id: 130d177958606899d22846e674801d55
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" Breakdown by sector / segment may differ slightly from sectoral analysis in other contexts due to the availability of investment needs data. The granularity \r\nof the models assessed in Chapter 3, and other studies, do not allow for a robust assessment of the specific investment needs of LDCs or SIDSs. Investment requirements in \r\ndeveloping countries might be underestimated due to missing data points as well as underestimated technology costs. In modelled pathways, regional investments are projected \r\nto occur when and where they are cost cost-effective to limit global warming. The model quantifications help to identify high-priority areas for cost-effective investments, but do \r\nnot provide any indication on who would finance the regional investments. Investment requirements and flows covering downstream / mitigation technology deployment only"


id: da9bba00d63b9481f280848db374ab4d
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content:
" \r\nData includes investments with a direct mitigation effect, and in the case of electricity, additional transmission and distribution investments. See section 15.4.2 Quantitative \r\nassessment of financing needs for detailed data on investment requirements. Data on mitigation investment flows are based on a single series of reports (Climate Policy \r\nInitiative, CPI) which assembles data from multiple sources. Investment flows for energy efficiency are adjusted based on data from the International Energy Agency (IEA). \r\nData on mitigation investments do not include technical assistance (i.e., policy and national budget support or capacity building), other non-technology deployment financing. \r\nAdaptation only flows are also excluded. Data on mitigation investment requirements for electricity are based on emission pathways C1, C2 and C3 (Table SPM.1). For electricity \r\ninvestment requirements, the upper end refers to the mean of C1 pathways and the lower end to the mean of C3 pathways"


id: 95dd509a51a912ab19f7f1c78060de22
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content:
" Data points for energy efficiency, transport and \r\nAFOLU cannot always be linked to C1-C3 scenarios. Data do not include needs for adaptation or general infrastructure investment or investment related to meeting the SDGs \r\nother than mitigation, which may be at least partially required to facilitate mitigation. The multiplication factors show the ratio of average annual model-based mitigation \r\ninvestment requirements (2020-2030) and most recent annual mitigation investments (averaged for 2017-2020). The lower and upper multiplication factors refer to the lower \r\nand upper ends of the range of investment needs."


id: 291a5f362018df1482daf0b528a53c9c
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content:
"are crucial options here, as in other low-income countries and \r\nregional settings. Notably, climate finance flows to African countries \r\nmight have even decreased for mitigation technology deployment \r\n(stagnated for adaptation between 2017 and 2020), widening the \r\nfinance gap in African countries in the recent years (high confidence).\r\nOver 80% of climate finance is reported to originate and stay within \r\nborders, and even higher for private climate flows (over 90%) \r\n(Boissinot et  al. 2016). There are multiple reasons for such 'home \r\nbias' in finance - national policy support, differences in regulatory \r\nstandards, exchange rate, political and governance risks, as well \r\nas information market failures"


id: 72c7d89b2ba5750a3ad84d550558f179
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content:
" The extensive home bias means \r\nthat even if national actions are announced and intended to be \r\nimplemented unilaterally and voluntarily, the ability to implement \r\nthem requires access to climate finance which is constrained by the \r\nrelative ability of financial and capital markets at home to provide \r\nsuch financing, and access to global capital markets that requires \r\nsupporting institutional policies in source countries. 'Enabling' public \r\npolicies and actions locally (cities, states, countries and regions), to \r\nreduce investment risks and boost domestic climate capital markets \r\nfinancing, and to enlarge the pool of external climate financing \r\nsources with policy support from source capital countries thus matters \r\nat a general level. The biggest challenge in climate finance is likely to \r\nbe in developing countries, even in the presence of enabling policies \r\nand quite apart from any other considerations such as equity and \r\nclimate justice (Klinsky et al"


id: 5fff859a50f50a2e884d5d0bdb0444e4
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content:
" 2017) or questions about the equitable \r\nallocations of future 'climate budgets' (Gignac and Matthews 2015). \r\nThe differentiation between developed and developing countries \r\nmatters most on financing. Most developed countries have already \r\nachieved very high levels of incomes, have the largest pool of capital \r\nstock and financial capital (which can be more easily redeployed \r\nwithin these countries given the home bias of financial markets), the \r\nmost well-developed financial markets and the highest sovereign \r\ncredit ratings, in addition to starting with very high levels of per \r\ncapita carbon consumption - factors that should allow the fastest \r\nadjustment to low-carbon investments and transition in these \r\ncountries from domestic policies alone. The financial and economic \r\ncircumstances are more challenging in many developing countries, \r\neven within a heterogeneity of circumstances across countries"


id: b82cd79adf568b994ba32bab9e6c9c26
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 26505
content:
" The \r\ndilemma, however, is that the fastest rates of the expected increase \r\nin future carbon emissions are in developing countries. The biggest \r\nchallenge of climate finance globally is thus likely to be  the \r\nconstraints to climate financing because of the opportunity costs \r\nand relative under-development of capital markets and financing \r\nconstraints (and costs) at home in developing countries, and the \r\nrelative availability or absence of adequate financing policy support \r\ninternationally from developed countries. The Paris Agreement and \r\ncommitment by developed countries to support the climate financing \r\nneeds of developing countries thus continue to matter a great deal.\r\nSoft costs/institutional capacity (Osama et  al. 2021). Most \r\nfunding needs assessments focus on technology costs and ignore \r\nthe cascade of financing needs as outlined above"


id: 221096572fc41361111751843d68b107
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
" International \r\ngrant funding or national budget allocations for soft costs like \r\nthe creation of a  regulatory environment can be a  prerequisite \r\nfor the supply of commercial financing for the deployment of \r\ntechnologies. Such critical funding needs might represent a small "


id: 7cd78dd6c936af7edd638c305f8f55f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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content:
"Agricultural support is an important source of distortions to \r\nagricultural incentives in both rich and poor countries (Mamun et al. \r\n2019) ranging from the largest component of the support, market \r\nprice supports, increased gross revenue to farmers as a  result of \r\nhigher prices due to market barriers created by government policies, \r\nto production payments and other support including input subsidy \r\n(e.g., fertiliser subsidy)  (Searchinger et al. 2020). USD600 billion of \r\nannual governmental support for agriculture in the OECD database \r\ncontributes only modestly to the related objectives of boosting crop \r\nyields and just transition (Searchinger et al. 2020)"


id: a013f73df54a4f0affb9808c974e299f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 22720
content:
" A review of NDCs \r\nof 40 developing countries which submitted a NDC to the UNFCCC \r\nInterim NDC Registry by April 2017, and include within their NDC \r\nefforts to REDD+ via support from the UN-REDD Programme and/or \r\nWorld Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, indicates that none \r\nof the countries reviewed mention fiscal policy reform of existing \r\nfinance flows to agricultural commodity production or other publicly \r\nsupported programmes that affect the direct and underlying drivers \r\nof land use conversion (Kissinger et al. 2019)."


id: f1f1f4ac2d830b43af1d10a0811a67bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 35587
content:
"Analysis by region and type of economy. The analysis of \r\ngaps by type of economy illustrates the challenge for developing \r\ncountries. Estimated mitigation financing needs as a  percentage \r\nof mean 2017-2020 GDP in USD2015 comes in at around 2-4% for \r\ndeveloped countries, and around 4-9% for developing countries (high \r\nconfidence) (Figure 15.4). Climate finance flows have to increase by \r\na factor of four to seven in developing countries and three to five \r\nin developed countries. This disparity is further exacerbated when \r\nconsidering adaptation, infrastructure and SDG-related investment \r\nneeds (high confidence) (Hourcade et al. 2021a). However, differences \r\nacross developing countries are significant. Flows to Eastern Asia, \r\nwith its annual average flows (2017-2020) of 252 billion USD2015\r\nbeing dominated by China (more than 95% of total mitigation \r\nflows to Eastern Asia), would have to increase by a  factor of two \r\nto four, a  comparable level to developed countries"


id: 7784a4b53f1337df13320d34762fdd21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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vector_id: 16355
content:
" Section  15.6.2 \r\nelaborates on outlooks with regard to fiscal space and ability to tap \r\ncapital markets, in particular for developing countries. In particular, \r\nattention must accelerate on low-income Africa. This large continent \r\ncurrently contributes very little to global emissions, but its rapidly \r\nrising energy demands and renewable energy potential versus its \r\ngrowing reliance on fossil fuels and 'cheap' biomass (especially \r\nfuelwood for cooking and charcoal, with impacts on deforestation) \r\namid fast-rising urbanisation makes it imperative that institutional \r\ninvestors and policymakers recognise the very large 'leap-frog' \r\npotential for the renewable energy transition as well as risks of lock\u0002in effects in infrastructure more generally in Africa that is critical to \r\nhold the global temperatures rise to well below 2degC in the longer \r\nterm (2020-2050). Overlooking this transition opportunity, rivalling \r\nChina, India, USA and Europe, would be costly"


id: 1e69fa9d1398f35617d36848d7252d98
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
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vector_id: 2225
content:
"share of overall investment needs but current (relatively small) \r\ngaps in funding of policy reforms can hinder or delay deployment \r\nof large volumes of funding in later years. The role, as well as the \r\napproximate volumes of such required timely international grant \r\nfunding or national budget allocations, appear underestimated in \r\nresearch. The numbers available for the creation of an enabling \r\nenvironment for medium-sized renewable energy (RE) projects in \r\nUganda (GET FiT Uganda 2018) are illustrative only and cannot be \r\ntransferred as assumptions to other countries without taking into \r\naccount potentially varying starting points in terms of institutional \r\nreadiness, pipelines, as well as the general business environment"


id: 3ff9d3b73619a9ad779bfd02e875faf5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7449
content:
" \r\nGET FiT Uganda supported 170 MWp of medium-scale RE capacity \r\ntriggering investments of USD453 million (GET FiT Uganda 2018), \r\ninternational results-based incremental cost support amounted to \r\nUSD92 million and project preparation, technical assistance, and \r\nimplementation support, required USD8 million, excluding support \r\nfrom national agencies."


id: 2bbea09b2d374b8af06bd0fd58c8c3de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4309
content:
"Early stage/venture capital financing/pilot project financing. \r\nEarly-stage companies in impact investment sectors with business \r\nsolutions can contribute positively to climate impact. Figure SPM.8 \r\nhighlights the need for new business models facilitating parts of the \r\nbehavioural change. Also, SE4All has underpinned the need for an \r\nexpansion of available business models to achieve universal access \r\n(SEforALL and CPI 2020). Further research and development needs range \r\nfrom resource efficiency of proven technologies and next generation \r\ntechnologies but also new technologies (Chapter 16). Access to early \r\nstage financing remains critical with performance in recent years being \r\nweak (Gaddy et al. 2016). This historically weak performance of clean \r\ntech start-ups burdens the interest of investors in the sector on the \r\none hand and discourages experienced executive talent (Wang and \r\nYee 2020)"


id: a849e01a4a8a3b126a928d34f615833c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24006
content:
" Besides that, the concentration of venture capital markets \r\nin the USA, Europe and India represents a major challenge (FS-UNEP \r\nCentre and BNEF 2019; Statistica 2021). With regard to commercial\u0002scale demonstration projects, IEA estimates a need of USD90 billion of \r\npublic sector finance before 2030 having around USD25 billion already \r\nplanned by governments to 2030 (IEA 2021c)."


id: ac89350a841e47cbcdc552b4ab4adda5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24687
content:
"There is strong evidence of the correlation between institutional \r\ncapacity of countries and international climate finance flows towards \r\nthose economies (Adenle et al. 2017; Stender et al. 2019) and a strong \r\nneed for robust institutional capacity to manage the transformation \r\nin a sustainable and human rights based way (Duyck et al. 2018). \r\nOne example to consider unaddressed social concerns is the ongoing \r\ncall for feedback by the European Commission and its platform on \r\nsustainable finance. It argues for a social taxonomy, that can support \r\nthe identification of financing opportunities for economic activities \r\ncontributing to social objectives (European Commission 2021b). \r\nSEforAll has highlighted the issue of investments not going to the \r\ncountries with the greatest need, also partly driven by institutional \r\ncapacity levels (SEforALL and CPI 2020)"


id: df00f7ce230d9158eeb8dcd4f603b73a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32581
content:
" Also, most of the developing \r\ncountries' NDCs are conditional upon international support for \r\ncapacity building (Pauw et al. 2020). The Climate Technology Centre \r\nand Network (CTCN) was created as an operational arm of the UNFCCC \r\nTechnology Mechanism with the mandate to respond to requests from \r\ndeveloping countries. Initial evaluations of the mechanism underpin \r\nits importance and value for developing countries but stress long \r\nlead times and predictability of future international public finance \r\nto maintain operations as key challenges (UNFCCC 2017; DANIDA \r\n2018). While limited pipelines, limited absorptive capacities as well \r\nas restricted institutional capacity of countries are often stated as \r\nchallenges for an accelerated deployment of finance (Adenle et al. \r\n2017), the question remains on the role of international public climate \r\nfinance to address this gap and whether a concrete current financing \r\ngap exists for patient institutional capacity building"


id: 89d5d116b07b5e6e929e5b3bf019f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19213
content:
" While current \r\nshort-term, mostly project-related, capacity building often fails to \r\nmeet needs but alternative, well-structured patient interventions and \r\nfinance could play an important role (Saldanha 2006; Hope 2011) \r\naccepting other barriers than financing playing a role as well. One \r\nreason why international public climate finance is not sufficiently \r\ndirected to such needs might be the complexity in measuring \r\nintangible, direct outcomes like improved institutional capacity (Clark \r\net al. 2018)."


id: c426131b0b2994d51844f063e4cf5975
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
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vector_id: 28425
content:
"Need for parallel rather than sequential investment decisions.\r\nThe needs and gaps assessment does not include upstream \r\ninvestment needs required to facilitate the technology deployment \r\nas foreseen in the scenarios presented above. For example, for their \r\ntransforming energy scenario IRENA estimates the number of EVs \r\nto increase from around 8 million units in 2019 to 269 million units \r\nin 2030 (IRENA 2020c). This would require investments in battery \r\nfactories amounting to approximately USD207 billion with further \r\ninvestment requirements in the value chain (IRENA 2020d). This \r\nillustrates the extent of parallel investments based on goals rather \r\nthan concrete regulatory interventions and/or demand and poses \r\na problem of upfront investment risks for each industry in the chain \r\nin the absence of certainty of the presence of parallel decisions in the \r\nupstream and downstream links in the chain"


id: efc76843392f2a7f03c52fa33fe952c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35232
content:
" This is a typical element \r\nof the 'valley of the death' of innovation (Scherer et al. 2000; Ahman \r\net al. 2017). It discourages risk-taking and slows down the learning\u0002by-doing processes, economies of scale and increasing returns to \r\nadoption needed for lowering the costs of systemic technical change \r\n(Kahouli-Brahmi 2009; Weiss et  al. 2010). Implications for risk \r\nperception, financing costs as well as investment decision-making \r\nprocesses and ultimately for feasibility are rarely considered."


id: efa8e9c6a1af7394e900107c3b90c63d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35206
content:
"protection with financial instruments in a consistent policy package, \r\nwhich includes financial instruments to deliver adequate liquidity \r\nand contingency plans for the disbursement of funds post disaster. \r\nChallenges related to financing residual climate-related losses and \r\ndamages are particularly high for developing countries. Financing \r\nlosses and damages from extreme events requires rapid pay-outs; the \r\ncost of financing for many developing countries is already quite high; \r\nand the expense of risk financing is expected to increase as disasters \r\nbecome more frequent, intense and more costly, not only due to \r\nclimate change but also due to higher levels of exposure. Addressing \r\nboth extreme and slow onset climate impacts requires designing \r\nadequate financial protection systems for reaching the most \r\nvulnerable"


id: fc5bf25162f8e72565e9b8b80b7ddf94
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37206
content:
" Moreover, some fraction of losses and damages, both \r\nmaterial and non-material, are not commonly valued in monetary \r\nterms (non-economic loss) and hence financing requirements are \r\nhard to estimate. These non-market-based residual impacts include \r\nloss of cultural identity, sacred places, human health and lives (Ameli \r\net al. 2021a; Paul 2019; Serdeczny 2019)."


id: 327c8d7f4074ea3635391e0ccbc537fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
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vector_id: 5358
content:
"which will include sectoral approaches such as water, energy, \r\ninfrastructures, and food production. According to the UNFCCC, 'in \r\n2015-2016, 3% of international public adaptation finance flows \r\nwas supplied by multilateral climate funds, while 84% came from \r\ndevelopment finance institutions and 13% from other government \r\nsources' (UNFCCC 2019c). Comprehensive reporting on adaptation \r\nfinance by Murphy and Parry (2020) and Buchner et al. (2019) argues \r\nthat flows of finance for adaptation action in developing countries \r\nin 2017 and 2018 were estimated to be approximately USD30 \r\nbillion; this plus an additional estimated flow of USD12 billion for \r\ndual adaptation and mitigation actions totalled USD42 billion, \r\naccounting for 7.25% of the total estimated international public and \r\nprivate flows of climate finance (Buchner et al. 2019). They are far \r\nbelow the financing needs given in Section 15.4"


id: 1b40fd78a945fedd08ce21cd410f69b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1753
content:
" To date, the private \r\nsector has limited involvement in NAPs and adaptation projects and \r\nplanning but can be involved through public-private partnership \r\n(Section  15.6.2.1) and other incentives provided by governments \r\n(Schmidt-Traub and Sachs 2015; Druce et al. 2016; Koh et al. 2016; \r\nUNEP 2016; NAP Global Network 2017; Murphy and Parry 2020) \r\nand innovative private financing mechanisms such as green and \r\nblue bonds. However, adaptation financing is only about 2% of the \r\nshare of green bond financing raised up to June 2019 (UNFCCC \r\n2019c),11 whereas it is about 10% of sovereign green bonds raised \r\n(UNFCCC 2019d). (Tuhkanen 2020), in a  detailed review of green \r\nbond issuance in the Environmental Finance Data base 2019, found \r\nthat between March 2010 to April 2019, '5% of all green bonds \r\nissued were categorised as adaptation and that 'the private sector \r\naccounts for a  significant proportion of adaptation-related green \r\nbond issuances' (Tuhkanen 2020)"


id: 23a73c37f93755ef9ed77628d059e65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3058
content:
" However, GIZ (2017b), Nicol et al. \r\n(2017, 2018a), and Tuhkanen (2020) highlight that there is scepticism \r\nabout this stream of finance for adaptation due to the factors that \r\nhave thus far limited the private sector's involvement in adaptation: \r\nlack of resilience-related revenue streams, the small scale of some \r\nadaptation projects and the overall 'intangibility' of financing \r\nadaptation projects (Larsen et al. 2019)."


id: 5ca58068472b9decff8ae1c77908a1c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12095
content:
"Addressing knowledge gaps with regard to climate risk analysis and \r\ntransparency will be one key driver for more appropriate climate \r\nrisk assessment and efficient capital allocation (Section  15.6.1), \r\nefficient enabling environments to support the reduction of financing \r\ncosts and reduce dependency on public financing (Section 15.6.2), \r\na  revised common understanding of debt sustainability, including \r\nthat negative implications of deferred climate investments on future \r\nGDP, particularly stranded assets and resources to be compensated, \r\ncan facilitate the stronger access to public climate finance, \r\ndomestically and internationally (Section 15.6.3), climate risk pooling \r\nand insurance approaches are a key element of financing of a just \r\ntransition (Section 15.6.4), the supply of finance to a widened focus \r\non relevant actors can ensure transformational climate action at all \r\nlevels (Section 15.6"


id: 6441f4776baa47eaa5bafae07b07dcc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13343
content:
"5), new green asset classes and financial products \r\ncan attract the attention of capital markets and support the scale \r\nup of financing by providing standardised investment opportunities \r\nwhich can be well integrated in existing investment processes \r\n(Section 15.6.6), a stronger focus on the development of local capital \r\nmarkets can help mobilise new investor groups and to some extent \r\nmitigate home bias effects (Section  15.6.7), new business models "


id: 646f2a8666de37aa36160e17f72cdfa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:53
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13369
content:
"regarded in the finance community only as an ethical issue. The \r\nreasons why climate change implies financial risk are not new and \r\nare discussed more in detail below. What is new is that climate \r\nenters now as a factor in the assessment of financial institutions' risk \r\n(e.g., the European Central Bank or the European Banking Authority) \r\nand credit rating (Section  15.6.3), and, going forward, into stress\u0002test exercises. This implies changes in incentives of the supervised \r\nfinancial actors, both public and private, and thus changes in the \r\nlandscape of mitigation action by generating a  new potential for \r\nclimate finance flows. However, critical knowledge gaps remain. \r\nIn particular, the underestimation of climate-related financial risk \r\nby public and private financial actors can explain that the current \r\nallocation of capital among financial institutions is often inconsistent \r\nwith the mitigation objectives (Rempel et al. 2020)"


