# document

id: aa32ee0f21b4e29296e10c6a12142d8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Geographical selection of marine farm sites may prevent climate \r\nproductivity declines (medium confidence) (Froehlich et  al., 2018a; \r\nSainz et al., 2019; Oyinlola et al., 2020), particularly for temperature\u0002related mortality hotspots (Garrabou et  al., 2019), HAB occurrences \r\n(Dabbadie et  al., 2018) or extreme events (Liu et  al., 2020; Wu \r\net al., 2020). However, while downscaled climate forecasts facilitate "


id: 7d17f23bde482c8c9105c8f53fd0d934
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Figure 5.16 |  Assessment of the likelihood and effectiveness of a range of adaptation options for potential implementation in the near term (next decade) \r\nfor inland freshwater and brackish aquaculture (salinities of <10 ppm and/or no connection to the marine environment) (a) and marine aquaculture systems (b) per major \r\nFAO production zone. See SM5.6 (Tables SM5.8, 5.12) for assessment methodologies."


id: 786e2624f73d3c59901b84274ac11ec7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"localised adaptation planning (Falconer et al., 2020a), such projections \r\nare rare (Whitney et al., 2020). GIS can be used for climate adaptive \r\nplanning along with routine site assessments (Falconer et al., 2020b; \r\nGalappaththi et  al., 2020b; Jayanthi et  al., 2020). Building coastal \r\nprotection, stronger cages and mooring systems, and deeper ponds "


id: e66583ca9c18e9ea19b6fcb34fd98fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"and using sheltered bays can reduce escapees and mortalities related \r\nto flooding, increased storms and extreme events (medium confidence) \r\n(Dabbadie et al., 2018; Bricknell et al., 2021; Kais and Islam, 2021). \r\nInshore aquaculture in low-lying areas prone to sea level salinity \r\nintrusion (e.g., Mekong delta and Viet Nam) have already implemented "


id: ac209077d432691b7fc9b47259a04172
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"(Soto et  al., 2018). Early-warning systems for HABs enable rapid \r\ndecision making and risk mitigation (medium confidence), such \r\nas ocean colour monitoring in South Africa (Smith and Bernard, \r\n2020), where early harvesting and additional husbandry were used \r\nto minimise production and economic losses (Pitcher et al., 2019). \r\nNew tools, strategies and observations are needed to predict HAB \r\noccurrences and range shifts with changing climate (high confidence) \r\n(Schaefer et al., 2019; Tester et al., 2020), as there is uncertainty on \r\ndrivers of incidence and toxicity (Wells et al., 2020)."


id: 210d2f344d1a71464c861441d7876f1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"adaptation measures, such as conversion of land to mixed plant-\r\nanimal systems (Nguyen et al., 2019a), conversion of freshwater ponds \r\nto brackish or saline aquaculture (Galappaththi et al., 2020b), building \r\nof dams and dykes (Renaud et al., 2015) and intensification of shrimp \r\nor fish pond culture to reduce water and land usage (Nguyen et al., \r\n2019b; Johnson et  al., 2020). Other adaptation options for limited \r\nwater supply are government equitable water allocations and water \r\nstorage (high confidence) (Bunting et  al., 2017; Galappaththi et  al., \r\n2020b)."


id: a073f826853a98e6fea90fdb062331a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Some evidence exists of the buffering capacity that integrated \r\nsystems can provide in the face of climate change (Gil et al., 2017). \r\nThis buffering, often affecting the farming system as a whole rather \r\nthan the individual agricultural enterprises involved, applies to some "


id: aedd2d918ef1a9122c64f52ade53ccaf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"policy actions needed for the successful operation of mixed crop-\r\nlivestock systems may be similar across widely different situations: \r\ngood access to credit inputs and capacity building needed to facilitate \r\nuptake (Hassen et al., 2017; Marcos-Martinez et al., 2017), and good \r\nlevels of market infrastructure (Ouedraogo et al., 2017; Iiyama et al., \r\n2018)."


id: 3c5de3155d01e7de7a66fd059b8d1255
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"aquaculture-agriculture systems as well as to crop-livestock systems \r\n(Bunting et al., 2017; Stewart-Koster et al., 2017). In some situations, \r\nthere may be trade-offs and constraints at the household level that \r\naffect this resilience-conferring ability: for instance, mixed systems \r\noften need relatively high levels of management skill, and extra labour \r\nmay be required (van Keulen and Schiere, 2004; Thornton and Herrero, \r\n2015). The diversification of food production systems offers promise \r\nfor enhanced resilience at the global level (Kremen and Merenlender, \r\n2018; Dainese et  al., 2019; Section  5.4.4.4), though policies need \r\nto provide adequate incentives for resource efficiency, equity and \r\nenvironmental protection (Havet et  al., 2014; Thornton and Herrero, \r\n2014; Troell et al., 2014)."


id: 3003743887b9cb0600841037475107e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Overall, there is high confidence that farm strategies that integrate \r\nmixed crop-livestock systems can improve farm productivity and \r\nhave positive sustainability outcomes (Havet et  al., 2014; Thornton \r\nand Herrero, 2014; Herrero et al., 2015; Thornton and Herrero, 2015; \r\nHLPE, 2019). The scale of the improvement varies between regions and \r\nsystems and is moderated by overall demand in specific food products \r\nand the policy context. Integrated crop-livestock systems present \r\nopportunities for the control of weeds, pests and diseases. They can \r\nalso provide a range of environmental benefits, such as increased soil \r\ncarbon and soil water retention, increased biodiversity and reduced \r\nneed for inorganic fertilizers (Havet et al., 2014; Thornton and Herrero, \r\n2014; Herrero et al., 2015; Thornton and Herrero, 2015; HLPE, 2019)."


id: 70ccd2f41f419e809e33dfdef90a2e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Agroforestry is frequently mentioned as a strategy to adapt to and \r\nmitigate climate change and address food security (de Coninck et al., \r\n2018; Smith et  al., 2019c). There is strong evidence of net positive \r\nbiophysical and socioeconomic effects of agroforestry systems under \r\nboth smallholder and large-scale mechanised production systems \r\n(Quandt et  al., 2017; Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018; Sida et  al., 2018; \r\nWood and Baudron, 2018; Table 5.10; Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL in \r\nChapter 2; Quandt et al., 2019). Many of these effects also reduce climate \r\nrisk. At the same time, agroforestry systems are subject to impacts from \r\nclimate change, potentially reducing the benefits they provide. Still, there \r\nis limited evidence of observed climate impacts on agroforestry systems, \r\nand modelling climate impacts is more complex for agroforestry than for \r\nsingle cropping systems (Luedeling et al., 2014)."


id: 1873c004677469c755f4bb180a6f4cff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Research indicates that mixed crop-livestock systems are often more \r\nresilient to climate change (medium confidence). In the southern Afar \r\nregion of Ethiopia, crop-livestock households were more resilient than \r\nlivestock-only households to climate-induced shock (Mekuyie et  al., \r\n2018). However, the benefits of managing crop-livestock interactions \r\nin response to climate change depend on local context. For example, \r\nin higher-rainfall zones in Australia, Nie et al. (2016) found some yield \r\nreductions and difficulty in maintaining groundcover. The systematic \r\nreview of Gil et al. (2017) concluded that the integration of crop and \r\nlivestock enterprises as an adaptation measure can enhance resilience \r\n(FAQ 5.1)."


id: 3e6c7a6cd34ce9d5c5b188b1bf333eb9
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"Reconfiguration of mixed farming systems is occurring. In semi\u0002arid eastern Senegal, Brottem and Brooks (2018) found increasing \r\nreliance on livestock production mostly because of changing climate \r\nconditions. Many poorer households are having to rely on migration to \r\ncompensate for shortfalls in crop production arising from a changing \r\nclimate. Some farmers have successfully shifted to crop-livestock \r\nsystems in Australia, where they have allocated land and forage \r\nresources in response to climate and price trends (Bell et al., 2014)."


id: dac0b5bebc9cd8057db493555a71cf64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Important information gaps exist concerning the costs and benefits \r\nof many adaptation options in mixed systems, where the interactions \r\nbetween farming enterprises may be complex. Among communal \r\ncrop-livestock farmers in Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, Bahta \r\n(2016) reported high levels of vulnerability to drought and highlighted \r\nthe need for more coordination between monitoring agencies in terms \r\nof reliable early-warning information that can be communicated \r\nappropriately, between farmers' organisations and the private sector \r\nto facilitate adaptation options that can overcome feed shortages such "


id: a7de0e336f0762e3a9a5ad3f19b326c7
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"Mixed livestock-crop systems may increase burdens on women, \r\nrequire managing competing uses of crop residues, and have higher \r\nrequirements of capital and management skills. These factors can \r\nbe challenging in many lower-income countries (Rufino et al., 2013; \r\nThornton and Herrero, 2015; Jost et  al., 2016; Thornton, 2018). The "


id: ed1959adb7c8de62571ebd9e8c4105be
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"as fodder purchases in times of drought, and between government \r\ndepartments at the national and provincial level that address the \r\nconcerns and needs of affected communities. Nyamushamba (2017) \r\nreviewed the use of indigenous beef cattle breeds in smallholder \r\nmixed production systems in southern Africa. Some of these breeds \r\nexhibit adaptive traits such as drought and heat tolerance and \r\nresistance to tick-borne diseases. However, their adaptation potential \r\nin crossbreeding programmes is essentially unknown, as most African \r\ncattle populations are still largely uncharacterised."


id: 74efeb78a3f1113eafce47b90565f57c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Risk management in integrated production systems may constitute a \r\nbarrier to uptake of adaptation options (Rigolot et al., 2017). Watson \r\n(2018) highlighted the current lack of financial risk management tools \r\nthat could be used in smallholder coastal communities. Alongside other \r\nrisk management tools such as weather-based index insurance, risk \r\npooling may find wide application in different farming systems as an \r\neffective adaptation measure (medium agreement, limited evidence) \r\n(Hansen et al., 2019a)."


id: 32de2334b8fe764e6e1ec5a95c442e34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Climate change impacts on productivity of agroforestry systems are \r\nsimilar to individual perennial crops, although there is limited research on \r\ntree crops (see Section 5.4.1.2). Impacts include increased temperature \r\nor water stress, an increase in pathogens affecting crops, changes to \r\npollinator abundance, and changes in the nutrient content of one or \r\nmore of the agroforestry components. Many tree products such as fruits \r\nand nuts are grown in agroforestry settings. The quality and nutrition of \r\nthese products and other specialty crops are often negatively affected \r\nby rising temperatures, ambient CO2 concentrations and tropospheric \r\nozone (Ahmed and Stepp, 2016). There is also evidence that the fungus \r\ncoffee rust will be positively affected by climate change (Avelino et al., \r\n2015; Bebber et al., 2016), with adverse effects on coffee agroforestry \r\nsystems."


id: ebbef837a959376f55664984712ab11a
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"The impacts of climate change on risk in mixed farming systems are \r\nprojected to be dependent on market, ecosystem and policy context \r\n(medium evidence, low agreement). In mixed crop-livestock farms in \r\na semi-arid region of Zimbabwe, Descheemaeker (2018) found that \r\nfeeding forages and grain could alleviate dry-season feed gaps to the \r\n2050s, but their effectiveness depended on the household's livestock \r\nstocking density. In comparing different commercial production \r\nsystems, Tibesigwa (2017) found that, under South African conditions, \r\nclimate change to the 2050s will reduce productivity across the \r\nagricultural sector, with the largest impacts occurring in specialised \r\ncommercial crop farms owing to their relative lack of diversity. Mixed \r\nfarming systems were the least vulnerable in terms of relative effects "


id: 3270883f5f2d92de5d1d12eea5a1ca99
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"The Sahel region of West Africa has experienced some of the most severe multi-decadal rainfall variations in the world: excessive rainfall \r\nin the 1950s-1960s followed by two decades of deficient rainfall, leading to a large negative trend until the mid-to-late 1980s with \r\na decrease in annual rainfall of between 20% and 30%. Recently, there has been a partial recovery of annual rainfall amounts, more \r\nsignificant over the central than the western Sahel. This recovery is characterised by new rainfall features, including false starts and early \r\ncessation of rainy seasons, increased frequency of rainy days, increased precipitation intensity and more frequent and longer dry spells \r\n(Salack et al., 2015; Sanogo et al., 2015; Salack et al., 2016; Biasutti, 2019). The Sahel is experiencing a new era of rainfall extremes \r\n(Bichet and Diedhiou, 2018; Panthou et al., 2018), suggesting an intensification of the hydrological cycle (Doblas-Reyes et al., 2021)."


id: fab064600b27d9792c29f8c112c21e3d
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"There is no simple understanding of crop and livestock farmers' response in the Sahel to rainfall variability. Nielsen and Reenberg (2010) \r\ndeveloped human-environment timelines for the period 1950-2008 for a small village in northern Burkina Faso, relating livelihood \r\ndiversification and crop-livestock management changes that map closely to local rainfall variability, such as fields abandoned in dry \r\nyears and intense animal manure use in wet years. Although they found a significant correlation between crop-livestock management \r\npractice changes and major climatic events, the climate is only one of many interacting factors that influence local adaptation strategies \r\n(Mortimore, 2010; Nielsen and Reenberg, 2010; Sendzimir et al., 2011). Robust attribution of observed changes to specific change drivers \r\nremains a challenge."


id: decdfa5940e9afdd6ace65010145090c
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"Crop and livestock farmers in the Sahel have a sophisticated understanding of the local climate. There is considerable potential to \r\nharness this knowledge, coupled with an enabling institutional environment, in developing policies and adaptation plans (Rasmussen \r\net al., 2018); the Sahel is a region where meteorological stations and observed data are scarce (Buytaert et al., 2012; Nkiaka et al., 2017). \r\nA deeper understanding of the resilience of local ecological knowledge systems, in light of the hydro-climatic intensification currently \r\nexperienced in the region and future changes, may well provide further insights into their long-term effectiveness."


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"expected; populations in LMICs that are already vulnerable will be \r\nmost affected by simultaneous reductions in fisheries and agricultural \r\nproductivity (Blanchard et  al., 2017). Twelve out of 17 high-income \r\ncountries in Europe showed projected increases in agricultural \r\nproduction where adaptive capacity is higher, and agricultural and \r\nfood fisheries' dependence was lower. Some LMIC countries (Nigeria, \r\nCameroon, Ghana and Gabon) showed relative reductions in both \r\nfisheries and agricultural production, where food insecurity, human \r\npopulation growth and fisheries overexploitation rates are high \r\n(Blanchard et al., 2017). Model projections under the RCP6.0 scenario \r\nshow decrease in marine and terrestrial production to 2050 in 87 out \r\nof the 119 coastal countries studied, even though there is a wide "


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"variance in adaptive capacity and relative and combined dependencies \r\non fisheries and agriculture (Blanchard et al., 2017). A projected 2050 \r\nmove towards greater consumption of cultured seafood and less meat \r\nshowed that aquaculture requires less feed crops and land, but was \r\nregionally dependent upon differing patterns of production, trade and \r\nfeed composition (Froehlich et al., 2018b)."


id: a1b20e4dc1074322f943bd671f8d69d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"There is medium confidence in the effectiveness of changing \r\nthe nature of the integration between crops and livestock as an \r\nadaptation: moving from crops to livestock, moving from livestock to \r\ncrops, and moving from one species of livestock to others, for example \r\n(Roy et al., 2018). Such transitions that increase integration between \r\nfarm enterprises may contribute to risk reduction and increased food \r\nsecurity. In areas with adequate rainfall and relatively limited rainfall \r\nvariability under climate change, where agricultural diversity is the \r\ngreatest, transitions towards more diverse and integrated systems may \r\nbring substantial adaptation benefits (Waha et al., 2018)."


id: b85a54936589f65026fe37f86f6ddb0b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Barriers to increasing integration and diversification include policies \r\nwhich support cereals and crop specialisation, lack of markets, limited \r\npost-harvest processing, limited technical or biophysical research on \r\nimplementation and poor market infrastructure (Keatinge et al., 2015; \r\nBodin et  al., 2016; Garibaldi et  al., 2016; Bassett and Kone, 2017; \r\nKongsager, 2017; Rhiney et  al., 2018; Roesch-McNally et  al., 2018; \r\nClay and King, 2019; Ickowitz et al., 2019). Proactive policy and market \r\ndevelopment are needed to reduce these barriers (Clay and King, 2019; \r\nIckowitz et al., 2019; See 5.14.3.8 for Insurance)."


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"Agroforestry, the purposeful integration of trees or shrubs with crop \r\nor livestock systems, increases resilience against climate risks through \r\na range of biophysical and economic effects (high confidence). \r\nTraditional agroforestry has been practiced for millennia and provides \r\nprime examples of sustainable agroecological production systems \r\nmeeting the production, income and socio-cultural needs of farming \r\ncommunities within their ecological niches, but market forces have "


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"enabling environment, including appropriate markets, technologies and \r\ndelivery systems (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: fe381ceb7d1272a0232903077ef5c28f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"natural land. Weindl et al. (2015) assessed the implications of several \r\nclimate projections on land use change to 2045 and found that shifts \r\nin livestock production towards mixed crop-livestock systems would \r\nrepresent a resource- and cost-efficient adaptation option, reducing \r\nglobal agricultural adaptation costs and abating deforestation by \r\nabout 76 million ha globally. Both studies suggest that public policy \r\nsupport for transitioning livestock production systems to increase their \r\nefficiency could be an important lever for reducing adaptation costs and \r\ncontributing to emissions reductions. This policy support could include \r\nmodified regulatory and certification frameworks that incentivise \r\nlivestock producers to adapt and mitigate (Weindl et al., 2015)."


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"The food system is more than just the production of food. It includes \r\ndomestic and international transportation, storage, processing, market \r\ninfrastructure and institutions that make up value chains, as well as the \r\nfood environment in which consumers make food purchasing decisions \r\n(HLPE, 2017a). Climate change impacts along the value chain alter \r\navailability, access and stability of food security. Nutrition-dense \r\nfoods tend to be more perishable and are thus more vulnerable to \r\nlimitations of food storage and transportation infrastructure (Ickowitz \r\net  al., 2019). Climate-change-related damage to food in storage \r\n(e.g., electricity failures and loss of cold storage) and transportation \r\ninfrastructure (e.g., extreme weather events damaging roads and other \r\ninfrastructure) could significantly decrease availability and increase \r\nthe cost of highly perishable, nutritious foods such as fruits, vegetables, \r\nfish, meat and dairy."


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"This discussion of the post-harvest food system (i.e., after production \r\nor catch) focuses on three key elements--food safety, storage, and \r\ndomestic and international transactions--that could see significant \r\nclimate change impacts, either directly or indirectly. Higher temperatures \r\nand humidity can increase post-harvest loss from pests and diseases, \r\nincrease occurrence of food-borne diseases and contamination, and \r\nraise the cost of refrigeration and other forms of preservation. Extreme \r\nweather events can cause disruptions to food transport networks "


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"Transitions in and between the different elements of integrated \r\nagricultural systems can be an effective adaptation option (medium \r\nconfidence). Havlik et  al. (2014) projected that, by 2030, market\u0002driven autonomous transitions towards more efficient production \r\nsystems would increase ruminant meat and milk productivity by \r\nup to 20% and decrease emissions by 736 MtCO2e y-1, most of this \r\narising through avoided emissions from the conversion of 162 Mha of "


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"Shade-grown cocoa and coffee agroforestry systems provide an array of ecosystem services, including regulating pests and diseases, \r\nmaintaining soil fertility, maintaining biodiversity and carbon sequestration (high confidence) (Jha et al., 2014; Rajab et al., 2016; Cerda \r\net al., 2017; Pham et al., 2019). For example, a comparison of Indonesian cocoa stands found that total carbon stocks above and below \r\nground were five times higher in multi-shade agroforestry stands compared with monoculture stands (57 compared with 11 Mg C ha-1), \r\nand total NPP was twice as high (18 compared with 9 Mg C ha-1 yr-1). The extra carbon sequestration was achieved without any notable \r\ndifference in cocoa yield (Rajab et al., 2016). At higher levels of shade, there can be negative impacts on the yield of the understory crop, \r\nbut careful management of shade trees allows for both crops to thrive (Andreotti et al., 2018; Blaser et al., 2018; Niether et al., 2020)."


id: 89fb0d208a32e8e12715d2d37fee6207
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19235
content:
"Cocoa grown under shade in some situations may be more resilient to climate change (Schwendenmann et al., 2010; Schroth et al., \r\n2016). Schwendenmann et  al. (2010) implemented drought experimentally in the field and found shade trees increased drought \r\nresilience. Shade trees insulate the understory crop from the warming and drying sun (Schroth et al., 2016). On the other hand, full-sun \r\ncocoa systems may be more climate resilient in some cases (Abdulai et al., 2018), as interactions between understory trees and shade \r\ntrees are complex; in addition to shade effects, evapotranspiration and root interactions must be considered (Niether et al., 2017; \r\nWartenberg et al., 2020). Moving to a full-sun system may also involve additional inputs in irrigation, fertilizer and labour. Neither (2020) \r\nreviewed the literature comparing the two cocoa production systems and concluded that the agroforestry system was superior in terms \r\nof climate adaptation."


id: c51d0fe6167f74f9162f2f42a7c4aaae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
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vector_id: 28592
content:
"a product moves in the post-harvest chain to end users, post-harvest \r\nfood loss from climate change can occur from improper handling to \r\ndamage from microorganisms, insects, rodents or birds. Post-harvest \r\nlosses in quality can be the result of stresses and damage to a plant or \r\nanimal before harvest, including from climate change (Hodges et al., \r\n2011; Medina et  al., 2015a). Food waste caused by climate change \r\nmay occur at both retail units and homes because fresh ingredients \r\nand freshly prepared foods are vulnerable to quality reduction and "


id: 9a53aae2d54b386ffb80cc9560ba2cf6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21809
content:
"and storage infrastructure. Changes in regional weather can cause \r\nproduction centres to shift locations, potentially requiring changes in \r\nstorage and processing locations. Prices to producers and consumers \r\nwill change, although directions and magnitudes are determined by \r\nlocal conditions and policies."


id: e409d53bc04938b265205d3cf2246cb8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33358
content:
"Food loss is the harvest not used by industry or for food. Food waste is \r\nthe subset of food loss that is potentially recoverable for food use. As "


id: 5b88d43846ba845da51df173adbb1dde
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11902
content:
"Food safety is also anticipated to worsen from increased contaminant \r\nbioaccumulation under climate-induced warming (high confidence) \r\n(Sections 3.5.8, 3.5.9, 5.8, 5.9, Bindoff et al., 2019;), with changes in \r\npathogen, parasite, fungi and virus abundance and virulence (Bondad\u0002Reantaso et al., 2018). Coastal communities who depend on fisheries \r\nfor livelihoods and nutrition are especially vulnerable (Hilmi et  al., \r\n2014; Golden et al., 2016; Bindoff et al., 2019)."


id: 5576cd9c469d8bcb2ca9e6e92912b474
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10923
content:
"spoilage from exposure to higher temperatures and humidity. Food \r\nwaste also contributes to climate change by utilising resources that \r\nemit GHGs (Galford et al., 2020)."


id: 5e7923dbaebfaa8dcbcfb763ac6c6e41
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12401
content:
"Occurrence of bacterial pathogens such as Salmonella and \r\nCampylobacter will increase with rising temperatures (high \r\nconfidence). Foodborne pathogen risks will increase through multiple \r\nmechanisms, though in general the impacts of climate change on \r\ndifferent pathogens are uncertain (Akil et al., 2014; Hellberg and Chu, \r\n2016; Lake and Barker, 2018). Even species within a genus can be \r\naffected differently. For example, higher CO2 levels depress the growth \r\nrate of F. graminearum, an economically important pathogen on barley \r\nbut have little effect on F. verticillioides, which is the most reported \r\nfungal species infecting maize."


id: 7461e4290d98101edb34eba49f8a48ec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15902
content:
"Emerging food safety risks from climate change include those posed \r\nby toxigenic fungi, plant- and marine-based bacterial pathogens, HABs \r\nand increased use of chemicals (plant protection products, veterinary \r\ndrugs) potentially leaving residues in food (European Food Safety \r\nAuthority Panel on Plant Protection Products and their Residues et al., \r\n2017; Deeb et al., 2018; Mbow et al., 2019; FAO et al., 2020)."


id: 109ac0a7263983f8a1f1ae0dd61e9b5c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 90
content:
"Mycotoxins, produced by toxigenic fungi found on many crops, \r\ncontaminate food and feed and cause a wide range of adverse \r\nimpacts to human and animal health. Climate change can affect the \r\ngrowth and geographical expansion of these fungi (high confidence)\r\n(Wild et al., 2015; Battilani, 2016; FAO and WHO, 2016; Watson et al., \r\n2016b; Alshannaq and Yu, 2017; Chen et al., 2018a; Avery et al., 2019; \r\nMilicevic et al., 2019; Van der Fels-Klerx et al., 2019; FAO, 2020a; FAO \r\net al., 2020)."


id: bef2b011ea56339fb70ce1b5b1bb2301
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27597
content:
"Increases in rainfall intensity will have some effect on the transport \r\nof heavy metals by enhancing runoff from soil and increasing the \r\nleaching of heavy metals into water systems, with magnitudes \r\ndependent on local conditions (high confidence) (Joris et  al., 2014; \r\nWijngaard et al., 2017). Methyl mercury (MeHg) is highly neurotoxic \r\nand nephrotoxic and bioaccumulates and biomagnifies through the \r\nfood web via dietary uptake (fish, seafood, mammals) (Fort et  al., \r\n2016). Ocean warming facilitates methylation of mercury, and the \r\nsubsequent uptake of methyl mercury in fish and mammals has been \r\nfound to increase by 3-5% for each 1degC rise in water temperature \r\n(Booth and Zeller, 2005; FAO, 2020a). A changing climate will release \r\nmercury from snow and ice, raising the amount of mercury in aquatic \r\necosystems, although its importance relative to industrial sources is \r\nunknown (Morrissey et al., 2005)."


id: c62dfb3a0b25624275c8067b5165a131
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 28753
content:
"Aspergillus flavus is a fungus that infects a range of crops and \r\ncan reduce grain quality. Several strains also produce aflatoxin, a \r\nparticularly problematic mycotoxin. Increasing CO2 and drought stress \r\nhas little effect on growth of Aspergillus but significantly increases the \r\nproduction of aflatoxin (Medina et al., 2015b)."


id: ab04f2fe1f28c36416c698e7f2a13495
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24426
content:
"Increased frequency of inland floods has been associated with \r\ncontamination of food with toxic and fat-soluble persistent organic \r\npollutants (POPs), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and dioxins (Lake \r\net al., 2014; Tirado, 2015; Alava et al., 2017). Exposure to POPs can \r\nlead to serious health effects, including certain cancers, birth defects \r\nand impairments to the immune, reproductive and neurological \r\nsystems."


id: be22b5a199a9ad572a64b59126fe8aa3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27470
content:
"Climate change-contaminant interactions may alter the bioaccumulation \r\nand biomagnification of POPs and PCBs as well as MeHg (Alava et al., \r\n2017). Of particular concern is the pollution risk influenced by climate \r\nchange in Arctic ecosystems and the bioamplification of POPs and \r\nMeHg in seafoods resulting in long-term contamination of traditional \r\nfoods in Indigenous communities (Tirado, 2015; Alava et al., 2017)."


id: 671d7ec8410a4b3f7306466ac790b25f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13815
content:
"In aquatic systems, toxins produced during HABs also cause food \r\nsafety problems (high confidence) (Botana, 2016; Estevez et al., 2019; \r\nSection 5.8). Increased poleward expansion of Vibrio in coastal mid\u0002to high-latitude areas has been observed (Baker-Austin et al., 2017). \r\nVibrio-related mortalities from finfish consumption are expected to \r\nrise with climate change (water temperature, salinity, oxygen and \r\npH) (medium confidence) (Mohamad et al., 2019a; Mohamad et al., \r\n2019b). For shellfish species, oxygen deficits (Mohamad et al., 2019b), \r\nsea level rise (Deeb et al., 2018) and temperature (Green et al., 2019) \r\nwill be most important for food safety."


id: b83119a5fa049fd743478c3b5b45bee9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26510
content:
"The high risk associated with emerging zoonoses (animal diseases \r\nthat can infect humans) and alterations in the distribution, survival \r\nand transmission of vectors and associated pathogens and parasites \r\ncould lead to an increased use of veterinary drugs and more rapid \r\ndevelopment of microbial resistance (European Food Safety Authority \r\net al., 2020; FAO, 2020a) and higher veterinary drug residues in food \r\nof animal origin, potentially posing health issues for humans (Beyene \r\net al., 2015; FAO et al., 2018; European Food Safety Authority et al., "


id: ec91c9786676cd95e83fe6a537fd442b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34699
content:
"2020). These outcomes will depend, at least in part, on the extent of \r\nchanges in current regulatory systems for veterinary drugs. Pre-harvest \r\nstress on animals can increase the contamination of meat products \r\nwith zoonoses. Climate change may also increase rodent populations \r\nand rodent-born zoonoses (Naicker, 2011). Extreme weather events \r\nthat cause flooding, such as hurricanes or extreme rain events, increase \r\nthe chance of inundating areas that contain waste from animal farms \r\nwhere antibiotics are used for production, increasing the spread of \r\nantibiotic-resistant bacteria into the surrounding environment (FAO, \r\n2020a)."


id: eed3a2d66fce005e7e553c0b843127a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35045
content:
"There are several potential pathways for climate change impacts on \r\nprocessing that would negatively affect quality and appearance, but \r\nwith limited research to date. For example, some studies have indicated \r\nthat recent increases in temperature have decreased the appearance \r\nand milling quality of rice in the USA and East Asia, owing to increased \r\noccurrence of chalky grains (Lyman et al., 2013; Morita et al., 2016; \r\nMasutomi et al., 2019; Ishigooka et al., 2021). Impacts on quality of \r\nperennial crops and annual fruits and vegetables are discussed above \r\n(Section 5.4.3 and Box 5.2)."


id: 36fdcb5bfe8217a64a6edfc869d3ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6045
content:
"The higher temperatures and humidity will generally raise storage \r\ncosts and lower the quantity and quality of stored product, reducing \r\nproducer incomes and raising consumer prices (high agreement, \r\nmedium evidence) (Mbow et al., 2019). For example, in the US state of \r\nMichigan, climate change will shorten the period of reliably cold local \r\nstorage of potato by 11-17  days and 14-20  days further south by \r\nmid-century and by 15-29 days and 31-35 days, respectively, by late \r\ncentury. These changes would increase future demand for ventilation \r\nand/or refrigeration immediately after harvest and again in spring and \r\nearly summer (Winkler et al., 2018)."


id: 9e802f921109371066a17992b6eab2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22473
content:
"Insects are a main source of food loss. Climate change can alter \r\ninsect damage in at least two ways: increases in reproductive rate \r\nfrom temperature increases and changes in pheromone effectiveness \r\n(high confidence). Increasing temperature up to about 40degC raises the \r\nrates of insect food digestion and reproduction (Deutsch et al., 2018), \r\nbut temperatures above that level are fatal for many insects (Neven, \r\n2000). Most insects rely on pheromones to facilitate reproduction. \r\nHigher temperatures, but also increases in atmospheric CO2 and O3 \r\nlevels, can affect this process. Insect species that rely on long-range \r\nchemical signals (such as ladybirds, aphids, bark beetles and fruit \r\nflies) will be most impacted, because these signals suffer from longer \r\nexposure to processes that reduce pheromone effectiveness (Medina "


id: 2d715b1a1a6a57d1e63cbcbb9b8838c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4591
content:
"Climate change impacts will increase most global prices relative to \r\nearly 21st century levels, with varying effects on the cost of food \r\nimports (high confidence) (Nelson et  al., 2014; Wiebe et  al., 2015; "


id: aeb73465e7a4e098f09d4f34e73cfff5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
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vector_id: 25015
content:
"Table 5.13 |  Net exports of agricultural products, by net exporting and net importing \r\ncountries, 2010 and 2050 (billion constant parity US dollars), based on analysis in \r\nBeach et al. (2019)."


id: e0bb687d3f72a31d74230ae3379a2e3b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32863
content:
"Fujimori et  al., 2018; Lee et  al., 2018). For example, analysis using \r\nresults from one study (using CMIP5 data for RCP8.5 and SSP2) found \r\nthat net food importing countries in the early 21st century would \r\nsee expenditures on food imports decrease by USD 36 billion in mid\u0002century in real terms with climate change over a no climate change \r\nscenario. (Table 5.13)."


id: d2b461ce09c1bf5584bdff5d96e09d75
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30669
content:
"Global economic models with a focus on agriculture provide a \r\nperspective on the range of potential changes in market outcomes \r\nbecause of climate change. In one study comparing several SSPs to \r\na future with no climate change to one with impacts from RCP8.5, \r\n2050 yields with climate changes impacts are 17% smaller on average \r\nthan those without climate change. Adaptation by farmers reduce \r\nthat to an 11% decline. The change in 2050 prices of all crops and \r\nregions after climate change impacts and farm-level adaptation is a \r\nmean 20% increase (Nelson et al., 2014). Substantial differences arise \r\nfrom both the heterogeneous impacts of climate change over crops \r\nand geography and the diversity of modelling approaches in the GCM \r\nand crop models. A later study with more socioeconomic scenarios and \r\nfewer models got roughly similar results (Wiebe et al., 2015), as did a \r\nmodelling study focused on food security in South Asian countries (Cai \r\net al., 2016)."


id: cff14ac057d7cbf59cc7c2149215d7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30240
content:
"Most climate scenario modelling to date does not incorporate increasing \r\nvariability nor the use of storage, a critical tool to manage variability. \r\nTwo recent studies are exceptions. In one, climate change generally \r\nreduces mean yields and increases their variability in the Midwestern \r\nUSA and causes modest increases in price volatility (Thompson et al., \r\n2018). A second study (Chen and Villoria, 2019) focuses on maize net \r\nimporters across Africa, Asia and Latin America during 2000-2015. \r\nA 1% increase in the ratio of imports to total consumption reduces \r\ndomestic price variability by 0.29%. A 1% increase in stocks at the \r\nbeginning of the season is correlated with a 0.22% reduction in the \r\ncoefficient of variation."


id: aef300ca7bc964981a4a113890138a27
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25061
content:
"As discussed in Section  5.4, climate change is expected to increase \r\nvariability in yields. As long as the variability is not correlated across \r\nregions, trade flows within a year can partially compensate, with \r\nin-period exports from countries less affected to those that are. \r\nAlterations in trade flow patterns to accommodate these impacts will \r\nreduce the negative effects so long as this variability is not correlated \r\nacross regions (UK, 2015; Janetos et al., 2017)."


id: 5d9e197d3effaebc04e4c2241517e6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12254
content:
"In terms of food safety impacts, Lake and Barker (2018) highlight a range \r\nof approaches to enhance preparedness for more serious foodborne \r\ndisease effects from climate change: adoption of novel surveillance \r\nmethods to speed up detection and improve intervention in foodborne \r\noutbreaks; genotype-based approaches to surveillance of food pathogens \r\nto enhance spatiotemporal resolution in tracing and tracking of illness; \r\nimproving integration of plant, animal and human surveillance systems \r\nunder the rubric of One Health, increased commitment to cross-border \r\nand global information initiatives; and improved clarity regarding the \r\ngovernance of complex societal issues such as the conflict between food \r\nsafety and food waste and strong user-centric (social) communications \r\nstrategies to engage diverse stakeholder groups."


id: 404da7696272a32711cf22324856ac15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7497
content:
"The SRCCL (Mbow et  al., 2019) findings on adaptation support \r\ntargeting food value chains and intervention types to the needs of \r\nspecific locations. Furthermore, adaptation choices will need to be \r\ndynamic as climate change impacts are expected to worsen over time."


id: e62192ff62629720c98e104282ccfed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33700
content:
"As discussed above and in Section 6.2.5, climate change is expected \r\nto cause increasingly severe effects on infrastructure needed for food \r\nsecurity: roads and harbours for transport, water storage facilities \r\nfor irrigation and storage facilities able to withstand climate-related "


id: 5ab765915c1fa83d3d2dd6e306aed223
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11789
content:
"The range of potential adaptation approaches from production to \r\ntransportation to reduce food loss and waste is captured in Figure 5.17 \r\n(Galford et al., 2020)."


id: 7c22e0f19b66d87c0c22d195e0f73dfe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17130
content:
"The importance of reducing food loss and waste due to climate change \r\nis widely recognised, but literature on cost-effective reductions is \r\nsparse, particularly in low-income countries (Parfitt et  al., 2010). A \r\nlist of farm and post-harvest methods to reduce food loss (Sheahan \r\nand Barrett, 2017) includes potential farm interventions such as \r\nvarietal choice, education in harvest and post-harvest handling, \r\nhermetic storage technologies (see above), chemical sprays and \r\nintegrated pest management techniques in storage. The evidence on \r\ntheir effectiveness, especially in the face of increased climate change \r\nimpacts, is limited."


id: 55bde1256ac9e1c5bc03eaa7d77deff8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10971
content:
"(FAO et al., 2020). Overnutrition, a result of high-calorie unbalanced \r\ndiets, is also rising, with over 2 billion adults overweight or obese (FAO \r\net al., 2018; Swinburn et al., 2019; FAO et al., 2020; Venkatesh Mannar \r\net al., 2020; WHO, 2021). Many low- and middle-income countries now \r\nhave both high under- and overnutrition rates (FAO et al., 2018)."


id: 1b3336ced39ab66cfffe686f3ecc06d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1744
content:
"There are multiple drivers of food security, including changing dietary \r\npatterns, urbanisation and population growth (HLPE, 2017b; FAO et al., \r\n2018; Swinburn et al., 2019). Vulnerability to climate change impacts \r\non food insecurity and malnutrition is worsened by other underlying \r\ncauses, including poverty, multiple forms of inequity (e.g., gender, \r\nracial, income), low access to water and sanitation, macroeconomic \r\nshocks and conflict (Smith and Haddad, 2015; Clay et al., 2018; FAO \r\net  al., 2018; Cook et  al., 2019). Climate change frequently acts to \r\ncompound these drivers of food insecurity (Table 5.14)."


id: ff1610e737ea84d96824e4f893278d27
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37685
content:
"The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has increased \r\nvulnerability to food insecurity and malnutrition of particular groups \r\nand sectors in the food system, including low-income households, \r\nfarmworkers, food service workers, informal food market sellers and \r\nlow-income countries dependent on food imports (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox COVID in Chapter 7). Climate change will compound pandemic \r\nvulnerabilities in the food system (high agreement, low evidence)\r\n(HLPE, 2020; UNDRR (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk \r\nReduction, Regional Office for Asia and Pacific), 2020; WFP-FSIN, \r\n2020). The pandemic may also increase coordination among sectors \r\nand a willingness to address food system weaknesses made visible \r\nby the impacts of COVID-19 (Blay-Palmer et al., 2020; Cohen, 2020; \r\nRamos et al., 2020)."


id: 57fb82caa439feaf2eaddace255997cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11348
content:
"Food security and nutrition are key desired outcomes of food systems. \r\nClimate change is already contributing to reduced food security and \r\nnutrition and will continue to do so (high confidence) (Sections 5.4, 5.5, \r\n5.8, 5.9, 5.10). Climate change impacts affect all four dimensions of \r\nfood security: availability, access, utilisation and stability (Table 5.14), \r\nthrough both direct and indirect pathways."


id: 21b45974a2618200adf78f60d116d2ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2731
content:
"Global food security improved dramatically in the 20th century even \r\nas global population increased from 2 to 6 billion. While some may \r\nassume that global food security is primarily provided by large-scale \r\nproducers, research since AR5 has shown the sizeable role of small and \r\nmid-sized food producers in Asia, Africa and Latin America contributing \r\nto global food security and nutrition, while being highly vulnerable to \r\nclimate change impacts on food security (Samberg et al., 2016; Herrero \r\net al., 2017; FAO et al., 2018; Ricciardi et al., 2018). In 2019, more than \r\n750 million people in the world, almost 1 in 10 people, suffered from \r\nsevere food insecurity, a figure which has risen since 2014 in every \r\nregion except North America and Europe"


id: 82af2af5964b838c2272cd8b687f3f41
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18086
content:
"Ecosystem services, the provisioning, supporting and regulating \r\nmechanisms we all depend on for food security and nutrition, are \r\nalso undermined by climate change impacts (Section 5.4.3). Even in \r\nthe absence of climate change, our current food system threatens to "


id: 4d48fbfe0e646f9211f29369d4bbec67
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Table 5.14 |  Impacts from climate change drivers on the four dimensions of food security. Adapted from Table 5.1 in SRCCL."


id: a9ff9b3a8c529552664e0c30cea03fb4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"(Anttila-Hughes et  al., 2021). Low-income urban households and \r\nmarginalised groups such as landless and ethnic minorities are at risk \r\nof increased food insecurity due in part to climate change extreme \r\nevents such as extended drought, floods or cyclones that interrupt \r\nsupply chains and impact livelihoods (Rodriguez-Llanes et al., 2016; \r\nFAO et al., 2018; Algur et al., 2021). A systematic review in India found \r\nthat women often experience greater workloads and stress during \r\ndrought events (Algur et al., 2021)."


id: 4ebad495081a7d6d9e5ef6b07cb2b21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"exceed planetary, regional or local boundaries of long-term sustainable \r\ndevelopment (Campbell et al., 2017). Climate change will make efforts \r\nto reduce this threat more difficult to achieve (medium confidence), \r\nthough many solutions to enhancing food security are also potential \r\nclimate change adaptation responses (Sections  5.4, 5.6, 5.8, 5.10, \r\n5.14)."


id: 1366f6bd558bc7e2ac35150ce43912cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 566
content:
"In the subsequent sections, the four dimensions of food security \r\nwill be discussed in relation to observed and projected impacts and \r\nvulnerabilities (Table 5.14)."


id: b3528e6c936031b862d00a97217bbbf8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Climate change is increasing the number of people experiencing \r\nfood insecurity through greater incidence and severity of climatic \r\nimpact drivers (CIDs), (Seneviratne et al., 2021) such as extreme heat, \r\ndrought and floods. Increasing CO2 concentrations have positive \r\neffects on food and forage crops by enhancing photosynthesis and \r\nalleviating drought stresses (5.4.3.1, 5.5.3.1) but have negative \r\neffects on nutrient concentrations in food crops. Ocean acidification \r\nis also caused by increasing CO2, causing negative impacts on aquatic \r\nsystems. Tropospheric ozone concentrations already hinder crop \r\nproduction (Section  5.4.1.4). Several CIDs increase the number of \r\npeople experiencing food insecurity (high confidence) (SROCC 2019, \r\nFAO et al., 2018; Mbow et al., 2019; Baker and Anttila-Hughes, 2020; \r\nTable 5.12)."


id: 1b5b9c34d7126dce42515b0dc839a2f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Vulnerability to climate impacts on food security and nutrition varies \r\nby region and group. Countries that experience CIDs such as extreme \r\nheat, severe drought or floods and have a large proportion of the \r\npopulation dependent on rainfed agriculture or livestock for their \r\nlivelihoods and food supply have experienced rising food insecurity \r\ndue to climate change impacts (FAO et al., 2018; Cooper et al., 2019; \r\nMbow et  al., 2019). Children in Sub-Saharan Africa are particularly \r\nat risk of undernutrition and mortality from increasing temperatures \r\n(Belesova et al., 2019; Baker and Anttila-Hughes, 2020). An additional \r\nestimated 5.9 million children became underweight because of rising \r\ntemperatures in 51 countries affected by ENSO intensity in 2015-2016 "


id: 5414216f998b08618496f932d8ffc28b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"et  al., 2018; Cooper et  al., 2019; Baker and Anttila-Hughes, 2020; \r\nBogdanova et al., 2021; Ilboudo Nebie et al., 2021). Extreme weather \r\nevents reduce physical and economic access to food, increase food \r\nprices, and compound underlying conditions of food insecurity and \r\nmalnutrition such as low access to diverse healthy foods and safe \r\nwater (FAO et  al., 2018; Niles et  al., 2021). Increased incidence of \r\nsevere drought conditions since 2005 is contributing to food insecurity \r\nin affected regions, including Africa, Asia and the Pacific (Chapter 7, \r\nPhalkey et al., 2015; FAO et al., 2018; Cooper et al., 2019; Ilboudo Nebie \r\net  al., 2021; Verschuur et  al., 2021;). In Arctic western Siberia, high \r\ntemperatures, melting ice and forest and tundra fires have degraded \r\nreindeer pastures; Indigenous Peoples have reduced traditional diets \r\nand increased purchased food with increases in hypertension and \r\nrelated health impacts (Bogdanova et al., 2021)."


id: 29137e59fe7cc50cdeb629aefda0d285
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"There is growing evidence that anthropogenic climate warming has \r\nalready  intensified climate extreme events induced by large-scale \r\nSST oscillations such as ENSO (Herring et al., 2018; Seneviratne et al., \r\n2021). For example, the 2015-2016 El Nino, the strongest in the past \r\n145 years, induced severe droughts in Southeast Asia and eastern and \r\nsouthern  Africa, some intensified by anthropogenic warming (Funk \r\net al., 2018). As a result, 20.5 million people faced acute food insecurity \r\nin 2016 (FSIN, 2017) and an estimated additional 5.9 million children \r\nbecame underweight (Anttila-Hughes et al., 2021)."


id: afdc24c4c0451469efa2adc5cd660a5e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Weather extreme events increased food prices and food price volatility \r\n(Peri, 2017), thereby worsening food insecurity (Shiferaw et al., 2014; \r\nBene et al., 2015; Miyan, 2015; FAO et al., 2018; Ilboudo Nebie et al., \r\n2021). Rising food prices can affect conflict, political instability and \r\nmigration (Bush and Martiniello, 2017), but the relationship between "


id: e56ff3effdd3a1fb527a83532306e8d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Increased extreme events (e.g., droughts, floods and tropical storms; \r\nSeneviratne et  al., 2021) due to climate change are key drivers of \r\nrecent rises in food insecurity rates and severe food crises in some \r\nregions (high confidence) (Section  5.4.1, Yeni and Alpas, 2017; FAO "


id: c94652650a1e79eb1d272aa108c3b023
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Although desert locusts have been here for centuries, this recent outbreak can be linked to a unique feature of the positive IOD event, \r\nin part caused by long-term trends in SSTs (Wang et al., 2020a). The warming of the western Indian Ocean has increased frequency and \r\nintensity of severe weather, including tropical cyclones (Roxy et al., 2014; Murakami H, 2017; Roxy et al., 2017). Under a 1.5degC warmer \r\nclimate, extreme positive IODs are anticipated to occur twice as often, which could also increase the occurrence of pest outbreaks (Cai \r\net al., 2018)."


id: 28a2b81cebae95e86a5f058e892ae31e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Climate change increases the need for robust adaptation measures, such as transnational early-warning systems, biological control \r\nmechanisms, crop diversification and further technological innovations in areas of sound and light stimulants, remote sensing, and \r\nmodelling for tracking and forecasting of movement (Maeno and Ould Babah Ebbe, 2018; Peng et al., 2020). The desert locust outbreak \r\nand the role of the Indian Ocean warming show that the impacts of climate change can increase unpredictable events. Extreme weather \r\nevents act as a compounding effect, exacerbated further by weak governance systems, political instability, limited financial resources and \r\npoor early-warning systems (Meynard et al., 2020)."


id: e092a6ae2fe5135fc2a553f4988e98b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"outcomes in 19 countries, and found that higher-than-average annual \r\ntemperatures correlated with declines in child diet diversity at levels \r\nequal to or greater than other factors which often are the focus of \r\npolicy, such as market access or education (Niles et al., 2021)."


id: 6eaff3f24f42972e481c9205c76754ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 15040
content:
"climate change, political instability and conflict is often mediated by \r\nother underlying factors such as poor governance (Chapter 7.2.7, \r\nMach et al., 2019; Selby, 2019)."


id: f489eafa3bdd595861cb093b1d8811fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Climate change has already changed the start and duration of the \r\ngrowing season and increased variability of rainfall in some places, \r\nwith impacts on food intake and nutritional status and income for \r\nlow-income and small-scale producers (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement, (FAO et al., 2018; Cooper et al., 2019). Evidence to date \r\nsuggests that climate change has negative impacts on the stability \r\nof food supply over the medium to long term, thereby affecting food \r\nstability (Myers et  al., 2017b). Increasing number and intensity of \r\nadverse weather events, driven by climate change (Seneviratne et al., \r\n2021), are important factors decreasing food stability, through reduced \r\navailability, increased local price volatility, reduced livelihoods for food \r\nproducers and disruption to food transport (Toufique and Belton, 2014; \r\nVerma et al., 2014; Ruiz Meza, 2015; Clay et al., 2018; FAO et al., 2018; \r\nMbow et al., 2019)."


id: f7a3e732728916076175ebdb249ed29b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Food utilisation refers to the way the body most effectively uses food, \r\nand includes food preparation, food quality and intra-household \r\ndistribution. Food utilisation is affected by climate change in several \r\nways: food safety, dietary diversity and food quality (Aberman and \r\nTirado, 2014)."


id: 90d13f83f95b4050e703f5a0cc7f00ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 20326
content:
"Climate change have increased food safety risks (high confidence), \r\nincluding foodborne zoonotic animal diseases (5.5), and marine toxins \r\nfrom HABs (Sections  5.8, 5.9) and mycotoxins (Section  5.11). Other \r\nfoodborne and waterborne infectious diseases such as cholera are \r\nfurther covered in Chapter 7."


id: b9d98b89b23dbbbfbbc3e0e7f761778b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Weather variability and extreme events (Seneviratne et al., 2021) have \r\nreduced availability and access to diverse foods to sell and to purchase \r\nin rural markets, thereby reducing access to affordable, diverse foods \r\nfor both rural small-scale producers and net consumers, particularly \r\nfor landlocked and low-income countries (high confidence) (Pant \r\net al., 2014; Villasante et al., 2015; Alston and Akhter, 2016; FAO et al., \r\n2018; Park et al., 2019; Niles et al., 2021) and otherwise marginalised \r\ncommunities (Algur et al., 2021). One study of 87 countries and 150 \r\nextreme events estimated that low-income food deficit and landlocked \r\ncountries had reduced nutrient supply ranging from -1.6 to -7.6% \r\nof average supply, a significant portion of a healthy child's average \r\ndietary intake (Park et al., 2019)."


id: 1aafe67133a7ac32a95b95a70db3203a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Rural children in low-income countries are at particular risk of \r\nundernutrition from climate change impacts, due to a combination \r\nof factors: potential reduction in food quantity and quality from \r\nheat impacts; greater exposure from outdoor play and agricultural \r\nactivities; and increased likelihood of heat exhaustion and vector\u0002borne and diarrheal diseases (Oppenheimer and Anttila-Hughes, 2016). \r\nA study of child growth data in 30 countries in Africa between 1993 \r\nand 2012 found that increased temperature was significantly related \r\nto children's wasting (Baker and Anttila-Hughes, 2020). Another \r\nstudy examined 30 years of climate data and child dietary diversity "


id: 91a4cbdd5a02f469c1eba6c4acfbaf3b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Without adaptive measures, heat stress impacts on agricultural labour \r\nwill increase with climate change (high confidence) (Im et al., 2017; \r\nLevy and Roelofs, 2019; Hertel and de Lima, 2020). Climate-change\u0002related heat stress will reduce outdoor physical work capacity on a "


id: 6a602c7af73457ec51d88ef98bd85444
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Temperature and humidity-driven reduction in first-hour physical capacity for outdoor work\r\nUpper insets and arrows point to the only locations across the globe where the first hour loss of physical work capacity* is 40% for the \r\nearly century and end century SSP1-2.6 scenario. Other locations will have large capacity losses over the course of a work day. End century \r\nimpacts will be much greater and more widespread under SSP5-8.5."


id: 55535f85a9852d3ecbeb7ece6157707b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Figure 5.18 |  The number of days per year where physical work capacity (PWC) is less than 60% based on average daily air temperature and relative humidity \r\n(Foster et al., 2021). PWC is defined as the maximum physical work output that can be reasonably expected from an individual performing moderate-to-heavy work in a 'cool' \r\nreference environment of 15degC. Values plotted are from the early (A) and end of century (B) for SSP5-8.5 using ensemble means from the ISI-MIP CMIP6 data set. See SM5.4 for details."


id: cc7c0d13df94c851e77edc02975a9fd1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"global scale. Depending on GHG concentrations, some regions will \r\nexperience losses of 200-250 outdoor workdays per year at century's \r\nend. Using results from one study reporting experimental procedures to \r\nassess loss of work capacity (Foster et al., 2021), regions hardest hit in \r\nan SSP5-8.5 scenario include much of South Asia, tropical Sub-Saharan \r\nAfrica and parts of Central and South America (Figure 5.18). de Lima \r\net al. (2021) projected that negative impacts of warming on crop yields \r\nand labour capacity would affect crop production and cost for workers \r\nand labour-saving mechanisation, raising food price by 5% at +3deg from \r\nthe baseline period (1986-2005) globally, with significant implications \r\nfor vulnerable regions (sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia). Large \r\nuncertainties, however, exist around population diversity and adaptive \r\ncapacity (Vanos et al., 2019). Agricultural labour productivity impacts "


id: 80ef8afbe60127fe4d98fef038c4f56e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"of heat attributed to climate change are expected to be worse in low\u0002and middle-income countries (Kjellstrom et  al., 2016). Adaptation \r\noptions needed to protect agricultural worker productivity outdoors \r\nand reduce occupational heat illnesses and deaths include cooled \r\nworking environments, improved surveillance systems and education \r\non the need to monitor (high confidence) (Xiang et al., 2016; Quiller \r\net al., 2017; Flouris et al., 2018; Day et al., 2019; Vanos et al., 2019). \r\nCurrently available options, however, are more difficult to achieve in \r\nlower-income economies (Kjellstrom et al., 2016; Im et al., 2017)."


id: 73dd55b152d9f5f87a54c12e06768475
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Under higher-emission scenarios, food availability will be further \r\nreduced after 2050, due to the potential for widespread crop failure \r\nand decline in livestock and fisheries stocks (Mbow et al., 2014; Kelley "


id: bde1baa34a98904f1f1b89567f89345
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 27430
content:
"et al., 2017; Challinor et al., 2018; Hendrix, 2018; Bindoff et al., 2019). \r\nAt +3degC from the preindustrial era, all food production sectors will \r\nexperience greater, and pronounced, losses due to climate change \r\ncompared with +1.5degC or +2degC (see Sections  5.2, 5.4.3, 5.8.3 and \r\n5.9.3)."


id: b9f8480eb36bde239a637ec4ce10c8b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"7.2.7). The interaction between extreme weather events, conflict and \r\nhuman migration may increase vulnerability of particular communities \r\nof low-income countries (WEF, 2017; D'Odorico et al., 2018; de Amorim \r\net al., 2018; Chapter 7). Further research is needed to better understand \r\nhow increased drought risk under future climate change might affect \r\nfood prices and water availability (Abbott et al., 2017)."


id: e6d0a77f34f7e7ad7068c077119c7bdd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Food insecurity from food price spikes due to reduced agricultural \r\nproduction associated with climate impact drivers such as drought \r\ncan lead to both domestic and international conflict, including political \r\ninstability (Abbott et al., 2017; Bush and Martiniello, 2017; WEF, 2017; \r\nD'Odorico et  al., 2018; de Amorim et  al., 2018;Chapter 7.2.7). While \r\nclimate change impacts, including drought impacts on food security, \r\nare important risk factors for conflict, other key drivers are often more \r\ninfluential, including low socioeconomic development, limited state \r\ncapacity, weak governance, intergroup inequities and recent histories of \r\nconflict (medium confidence) (Mach et al., 2019; Selby, 2019; Chapter "


id: 158844ee6f49e3d4dea8ab10fa6e0c8d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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"Increasing levels of CO2 directly contribute to reduced food quality \r\nby reducing levels of protein, iron, zinc and some vitamins, varying \r\nby crop species and cultivars (high confidence) (Section 5.4.3, Myers \r\net al., 2014; Smith and Haddad, 2015; Bisbis et al., 2018; Scheelbeek \r\net al., 2018; Weyant et al., 2018; Zhu et al., 2018a). Higher levels of CO2\r\nare predicted to lead to 5-10% reductions in a wide range of minerals \r\nand nutrients (Loladze, 2014). Climate warming will also reduce food \r\nquality of seafood, by changing the LC-PUFA content in phytoplankton \r\n(Section 5.8; Hixson and Arts, 2016)."


id: 545ece84aea91eedff4f9d5931d869ec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Current projections indicate that it is highly likely that the UN SDG2 \r\n('Zero Hunger') by 2030 will not be achieved, with climate impacts on \r\none of several drivers of food security and nutrition preventing this goal, \r\nincluding in Africa, Small Island States and South Asia (high confidence) \r\n(FAO et al., 2018; Otekunrin et al., 2019; Singh et al., 2019; Atukunda \r\net al., 2021; Kumar et al., 2021; Vogliano et al., 2021). Integrated policy \r\nstrategies that consider synergies and trade-offs between different \r\nfood system components would strengthen the likelihood of meeting \r\nSDG2 goals (Dyngeland et al., 2020; Lipper et al., 2020; Vogliano et al., \r\n2021) (Grosso et al., 2020). Adaptation options which address climate \r\nrisks for food security and nutrition are discussed below."


id: 10c96f887632f004dfd982542074757e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 116
content:
"Since AR5, there has been increased research on adaptation options \r\nthat address climate risks for food security and nutrition. In this section, \r\ncultivar improvements, urban and peri-urban agriculture, changing \r\ndietary patterns, integrated multi-sectoral approaches and rights-based \r\napproaches are assessed for their potential as an adaptation option \r\nthat addresses food security and nutrition. Feasibility and effectiveness \r\nassessment of several options is in Section 5.14."


id: 15ff043a645ffd777da1566ab1c91cef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Children in low-income countries will be at greater risk of \r\nundernutrition from these multiple climate change impacts, \r\nincluding lower food availability, quality and safety and \r\nincreased risk of diarrheal disease (high confidence) (Aberman \r\nand Tirado, 2014). One study of 30 countries in Africa estimated \r\nthat, by 2100, increased temperatures under RCP8.5 could \r\nincrease children's wasting by 37% in western Africa and 25% \r\nin southern Africa (Baker and Anttila-Hughes, 2020)."


id: 8653640f08a477255d50994a11cf8d79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"5.12.5.1 Potential, barriers and challenges for genetically \r\nmodified crops to address food security and nutrition"


id: 8d63ebd0ccc4fd876f5209729e65256d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"While biotechnology can be used as an adaptation strategy \r\n(Section  5.4.4.3), there is low confidence that genetically modified \r\n(GM) crops can increase food security and nutrition in smallholder \r\nfarming systems relative to alternative agronomic strategies (National \r\nAcademies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine, 2016; Qaim, 2016). \r\nSome underline their potential in building resilience to changing \r\nclimatic conditions, in the form of enhanced drought/heat tolerance, \r\npest/disease protection and/or reduced land usage, thus serving to \r\nbolster food security and nutrition (Sainger et al., 2015; Muzhinji and "


id: 11c578616b0439c43ab90cfa3b33ee3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 290
content:
"The combination of climate change and the presence of arsenic \r\nin paddy rice fields is expected to increase the toxic heavy metal \r\ncontent of rice and reduce production by 2100, threatening \r\nfood security and food safety mainly in low-income countries \r\nwhere rice is the main staple (Neumann et al., 2017; Muehe \r\net al., 2019; Farhat et al., 2021)."


id: a44fd47aa57385a7c33e2239c5f0e38b
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"Major challenges as a food security and nutrition adaptation include the introgression of GM \r\ntraits into host varieties (Dowd-Uribe, 2014), and confusion around proper growing practices \r\nthat can accelerate resistance (Iversen et al., 2014; Fischer et al., 2015). The combination \r\nof the kinds of traits and restrictions that come from the predominant intellectual property \r\nrights instruments used in their commercialisation, and concentration of plant and animal \r\nbreeding industry (Bonny, 2017) mean that benefits from released GM crops tend to be \r\ncaptured disproportionately by farmers with more land, wealth and education (Afidchao \r\net al., 2014; Ali and Rahut, 2018; Azadi et al., 2018) but also increase debt levels for growers \r\n(Dowd-Uribe, 2014; Leguizamon, 2014)."


id: 4d7caf18401cd3fde742e410688da3d2
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"et al., 2014; Horst et al., 2017). There is high agreement that proactive \r\npolicies for urban design accounting for food-energy nexus and social \r\ninclusion including addressing questions of governance and rights to \r\ngreen urban spaces are necessary to enhance food provisioning and to \r\ngain multiple functions of UPA (Lwasa et al., 2014; Horst et al., 2017; \r\nMohareb et al., 2017; Siegner et al., 2018; O'Sullivan et al., 2019; Titz \r\nand Chiotha, 2019; Halvey et al., 2020)."


id: efb319809788739f02b192b74641d30
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Ntuli, 2021). Others suggest that the empirical evidence supporting \r\nGM crops as a climate-resilience strategy remains thin (Leonelli, 2018). \r\nTechnical and social barriers and potential solutions are summarised \r\nin Table 5.15."


id: 54f2373ff6d85065665e193e7847a328
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"Dietary change in regions with excess consumption of calories and \r\nanimal-sourced foods to a higher share of plant-based foods with \r\ngreater dietary diversity and reduced consumption of animal-sourced \r\nfoods and unhealthy foods (as defined by scientific panels such as \r\nEAT-Lancet) has both mitigation and adaptation benefits along with \r\nreduced mortality from diet related non-communicable diseases, \r\nhealth, biodiversity and other environmental co-benefits (high \r\nconfidence) (Springmann et al., 2016; Springmann et al., 2018; Branca \r\net  al., 2019; Henry et  al., 2019; Searchinger et  al., 2019; Swinburn \r\net  al., 2019; Willett et  al., 2019; Rosenzweig et  al., 2020; Chapter \r\n7.4.2.1.3 and WGIII Chapter 12). Reducing food waste, especially of \r\nenvironment- and climate-costly foods would further extend these \r\nbenefits (Rosenzweig et al., 2020 and see Section 5.11)."


id: 2cbf140810aba8684dd214f59b092ac5
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"Dietary behaviour is complex: shaped by the broader food system \r\n(HLPE, 2017a), the food environment (Herforth and Ahmed, 2015; \r\nTurner et  al., 2018) and socio-cultural factors (Fischler, 1988). Since \r\nmost food-related decisions are made at a subconscious level \r\n(Marteau et al., 2012), achieving dietary change for personal health \r\nreasons has proven difficult; it seems unlikely that dietary change for \r\nclimate will be achieved without careful attention to the factors that \r\nshape dietary choice and behaviour. Food environments, defined as \r\n'the physical, economic, political and socio-cultural context in which "


id: cab13c2558cf5ede83bc2ba53516d197
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Table 5.16 |  Urban agriculture classifications based on operating characteristics and capital inputs (Goldstein et al., 2016; O'Sullivan et al., 2019), and a summary of literature \r\nsearch on positive and negative aspects."


id: 307f38e0cf6cae084af418c8aaa637cc
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"Urban agriculture has two components: vertical (e.g., grown on or in buildings) and horizontal (grown on land within urban boundaries, in backyards and marginal spaces). The \r\nhorizontal component of urban and peri-urban agriculture (UPA) has gained attention because of multiple functions that could improve food systems and ecosystem services \r\nunder climate change (Revi et al., 2014; Artmann and Sartison, 2018; FAO, 2019b; Mbow et al., 2019; Chapter 6).\r\nUPA cannot fully feed urban dwellers within its boundaries but can make an important contribution to local food security and nutrition (medium confidence) (Martellozzo et al., \r\n2014; Badami and Ramankutty, 2015; Algert et al., 2016; Mohareb et al., 2017; Clinton et al., 2018; Kriewald et al., 2019). UPA is also expected to play important roles in eco\u0002system functions in addition to alleviating food shocks caused by natural disasters and reducing food mileage."


id: 82a6652001a08b10b8e34bf3a1452538
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"production of plant-based foods in order to change the relative price of \r\nfoods and, thus, dietary choice (Franck et al., 2013; Harris et al., 2021). \r\nTaxes on animal-sourced foods that are climate-costly and unhealthy, as \r\ndefined by scientific panels such as the EAT-Lancet report, could similarly \r\nimpact relative price (Mbow et al., 2019; Willett et al., 2019). Regulation \r\nof marketing could change desirability of climate-unfriendly and \r\nunhealthy foods (Willett et al., 2019). Many of the same strategies used \r\nto increase sales by conventional food marketing efforts hold potential \r\nto change the desirability and people's preferences for plant foods which \r\nare strongly shaped by social-cultural norms. Studies have shown that \r\nchanges to the number, placing or prevalence of vegetarian options on a "


id: b289562ff3990a69fe2a986ed34026b3
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"consumers engage with the food system to make their decisions about \r\nacquiring, preparing and consuming food' (HLPE, 2017a): 28), include \r\nfood availability, accessibility, price/ affordability, food characteristics, \r\ndesirability, convenience and marketing."


id: 4faac2bd5bd59d884c5989d8c24f6d12
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"There are a range of options to change dietary patterns, but more \r\nresearch is needed in this area, adjusted to the regional, socioeconomic \r\nand cultural context. Studies of policy instruments to change diets \r\ninclude changes in subsidies, taxes, marketing regulation and efforts \r\nto change the retail physical environment. Subsidies directed at staple \r\nfoods and animal sourced foods could be shifted towards diversified "


id: 6f7d88a517eb97f6981af5158ac8bce1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Table 5.17 |  Examples of adaptation responses to drought and floods by food security level and time frame. Adapted from Ilboudo Nebie et al. (2021) Table 4, with information \r\nfrom Bahadur et al. (2015); Costella et al. (2017); Gros et al. (2019); Ulrichs et al. (2019); Medina Hidalgo et al. (2020); Bacon et al. (2021); and Verschuur et al. (2021)."


id: 758a3e1abfadcdefa32dc81afae23872
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content:
"areas (Lunstrum, 2016; Schleicher et  al., 2019), renewable energy \r\ninstallations (e.g., Sovacool, 2021) or natural disaster management \r\n(e.g. Uson, 2017)."


id: b789eac7332ef4cd1291803820adda0e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"This section presents information about the impacts generated by \r\ncompetition and trade-offs in food systems and discusses opportunities \r\nand challenges associated with the use of the Nexus framework."


id: 3e3f6468d7e5c384af73e767cab345e
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"Land deals, also known as large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs), \r\ndescribe recent changes in access to land globally (Borras et  al., \r\n2011). Since 2000, at least 160  million hectares have been under \r\nnegotiation (Land Matrix, 2021). Land deals surged after the 2007-\r\n2008 food price crisis and farmland investment boom (Fairbairn, \r\n2014), with a diverse range of drivers (Arezki et al., 2015; Zoomers \r\nand Otsuki, 2017; Conigliani et al., 2018) including land-based climate \r\nchange interventions (Dunlap and Fairhead, 2014; Davis et al., 2015a; \r\nHunsberger et al., 2017; Franco and Borras, 2019). Examples are the \r\nexpansion of biofuel crops (e.g., Yengoh and Armah, 2016; Aha and \r\nAyitey, 2017), afforestation and reforestation (A/R) projects (Olwig \r\net  al., 2016; Richards and Lyons, 2016; Scheidel and Work, 2018), \r\nREDD+ (Bayrak and Marafa, 2016; Ingalls et al., 2018), conservation "


id: bbda3bf821b4c48a30a2025f4e06ebf8
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content:
"Table 5.18 |  Adverse social and ecological risks and impacts of agricultural land deals on land use and vulnerable groups."


id: 4fae9173e045e34acd55ae134eb8e5b8
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"ecosystem services (high confidence) (Campbell et al., 2017; Balmford \r\net  al., 2018; Springmann et  al., 2018; Ickowitz et  al., 2019; Mbow \r\net  al., 2019). Agricultural intensification can also affect livelihoods \r\nof small-scale producers, compromising food security. It can increase \r\nlow-waged casual farm work, increasing gender and income inequity \r\n(Bigler et al., 2017; Clay and King, 2019; Table 5.18)."


id: bb8c4ca4b0f1421bd1854183fa0aba90
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Land available for provisioning ecosystem services is declining in \r\nmany places because of agricultural expansion, bioenergy crops \r\nand reforestation for mitigation (Kongsager, 2018), with adverse \r\nclimate impacts (Froese and Schilling, 2019). Cropland expansion can \r\ndeteriorate biodiversity (Delzeit et  al., 2017), water quality (Ayala \r\net al., 2016) and carbon storage (Goldstein et al., 2012) and increase \r\nwater demands (Yokohata et al., 2020)."


id: d7857922ff43402ba1879fd045697b2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"A systems-based perspective on land use is needed to address \r\nclimate change impacts on nutrition security and ecosystem services \r\n(Springmann et  al., 2018; IPCC, 2019b; Willett et  al., 2019). Land "


id: c13df5c6705011e7c7163926146818bc
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"Table 5.19 |  Case studies of trade-offs and negative outcomes associated with agricultural intensification on biodiversity and ecosystem services."


id: a05e6947114771198547dae1bf010b9b
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"sparing sets aside some land for conservation purposes and intensifies \r\nproduction on farmland (Balmford et  al., 2018; Benton et  al., 2018; \r\nIPCC, 2019b), with potential to offset GHG emissions (Lamb et  al., \r\n2016). Alternatively, 'land sharing' approach employs principles such \r\nas minimising fossil-fuel-based inputs, maximising synergies, and \r\naddressing climate change mitigation and adaptation as well as \r\nbiodiversity (Kremen and Miles, 2012; Kremen, 2015; Kremen and \r\nMerenlender, 2018; HLPE, 2019; Section  5.14, Box on Agroecology). \r\nCommunity-managed initiatives can address biodiversity and \r\necosystem conservation, livelihoods, food provisioning and other \r\necosystem services (Kremen and Merenlender, 2018; HLPE, 2019)."


id: 82a1ee6b330fa9e3c59a8266cc795b75
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"The concept of sustainable intensification has emerged, looking for \r\nenhancements in environmental outcomes, while maintaining or \r\nincreasing agricultural systems performance. There is a potential to find \r\nsynergies between agricultural production and landscape systems if \r\nsystems are designed to operate within planetary boundaries (Rockstrom \r\net al., 2017; Liao and Brown, 2018; Pretty, 2018; Pretty et al., 2018)."


id: d73fa93cd7ca6eccc5e01a632ed09d9c
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"Competition will be heightened by other climate impacts, such as \r\nchanges in water availability. Water usage is relatively high in animal \r\nproduction (Abraham et al., 2014; Sultana et al., 2014; de Miguel et al., \r\n2015; Palhares and Pezzopane, 2015; Weindl et  al., 2017). In some \r\nareas, increased demand for plant-based animal feeds will be affected \r\nby sea level rise and competing usage of available freshwater with \r\nother users, and ecosystem needs (Karttunen et al., 2017)."


id: dd79cd446cde13c28c01ce39bf3d004d
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"Flooding on agricultural land will enhance nutrient runoff, creating \r\neutrophication and increasing harmful phytoplankton blooms, \r\naffecting fisheries and aquaculture, human health and ecosystem \r\nbiodiversity. Changes in precipitation, monsoons, runoff and flood \r\npotential combine with deforestation and poor sewage treatment, "


id: de50c1f032396dfb29f6a94886d8f9e5
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"resulting in larger volumes of nutrients and freshwater reaching coastal \r\necosystems (Jin et al., 2018; Nasonova et al., 2018; Tamm et al., 2018). \r\nRising surface temperatures, ocean acidification and eutrophication \r\nwill increase pathogenic Vibrio bacterial loads in marine organisms, \r\nwith potential transfer to humans (Hernroth and Baden, 2018). \r\nShallow and microtidal estuaries will be more vulnerable to changing \r\nriver runoffs and saltwater intrusions, eutrophication and hypoxia \r\n(high confidence) (IPCC, 2019c)."


id: 2a456a72baf86ddc6b398ceb9a585abc
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"such policies increased national food production, they failed to \r\naddress high levels of malnutrition, worsening regional inequities, \r\ndegraded natural resources and an agrarian debt crisis (Singh, 2000; \r\nGupta et  al., 2016; Gajjar et  al., 2019). Agricultural livelihoods are \r\nincreasingly considered unviable, with lower adaptive capacity of \r\nfarmers, high debt levels (Gupta et al., 2016), and Indigenous and local \r\nknowledge loss and denigration (Kumar, 2016) alongside lower crop \r\ndiversification (Srivastava et al., 2016). Government institutions aimed \r\nat infrastructure often lack adaptive capacity needed to address rural \r\nlivelihoods (Singh et al., 2017; Gajjar et al., 2019)."


id: 1e25379b471725203796e7654ff31ef5
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"Adaptation options that consider adverse effects for different \r\ngroups reduce the risk increasing vulnerability, negatively affecting \r\nsocioeconomic factors to deal with climate impacts, or impeding efforts \r\nto implement SDGs (high confidence) (Juhola et al., 2016; Antwi-Agyei \r\net al., 2018; Paprocki and Huq, 2018; Holsman et al., 2019; IPCC, 2019b; \r\nStringer et al., 2020). Adaptation methods considering historical roots \r\nof current vulnerabilities can identify viable solutions, which are \r\ndifficult to undertake because of path dependencies (high confidence)\r\n(Ribot, 2014; Albizua et al., 2019; Gajjar et al., 2019; Paprocki, 2019; \r\nThomas, 2020). Planning techniques that model outcomes for different \r\ngroups from different adaptation options could be put in place to \r\ndiminish maladaptation risks (Rodriguez et al., 2019)."


id: 418d494111c509bb718900bc26ceb832
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"Maladaptation can result in three types of outcomes (Juhola et al., 2016): \r\n(1) rebounding vulnerability: short term adaptations that decrease \r\nadaptive capacity and hinder future choices; (2) shifting vulnerability: \r\nlarger-scale adaptation actions that produce spill-over effects in other \r\nlocations; (3) eroding sustainable development: adaptation strategies \r\nwhich increase emissions and deteriorate environmental conditions \r\nand/or social and economic values (Tables 5.20 and 5.21)."


id: 7d787fe3f05841e782a2f4583247725c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Existing climate policies do not adequately consider trade-offs, \r\nadaptive limits, cumulative costs and potential risks of maladaptation \r\n(robust evidence, medium agreement) (Dovie, 2017; Holsman et  al., \r\n2019; IPCC, 2019b; Work et  al., 2019; Thomas, 2020: Table  5.19). \r\nGovernment policies are seldom coordinated across scales and often \r\nfocused on regional short-term risks (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement) (Dovie, 2017; Holsman et al., 2019; Rahman and Hickey, \r\n2019; Butler et al., 2020). Past development trajectories and dominant \r\npolitical economic structures may narrow adaptation pathways, be \r\nrestrictive and increase the vulnerability of particular groups (Paprocki, \r\n2018; Quan et al., 2019; Rahman and Hickey, 2019; Work et al., 2019)."


id: d10ca25c6bb27673eb5572ec49fe386c
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"Many small-scale producers could not afford the irrigation investment \r\nand had to sell or rent their land to those who joined the irrigation \r\nproject. Many large-scale farmers using irrigation switched to corn \r\nand forage and dropped crops with high labour costs. Water costs are \r\nnow paid to a private company, and small-scale farmers lost access \r\nto communal water rights. The project increased inequity and land \r\nconcentration and lowered crop diversity, with small-scale producers \r\nmore vulnerable to climate change. Large-scale intensive farmers are \r\nmore exposed to crop price volatility than to climate vulnerability but \r\nhave greater access to subsidies and water rights (Albizua et al., 2019)."


id: 8d6c8311b5688b67cd9cfdb5b3c2bbcd
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"Indigenous people and ethnic minorities, many of them having special \r\ncultural associations to local foods, are particularly vulnerable to \r\nclimate change owing to changes in the availability of wild foods, crop \r\nfailure and food production losses or increased food prices (Norton\u0002Smith et al., 2016; Otto et al., 2017)."


id: c8916c0e70454e3538c95b96c22d7bb4
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"Government policies in colonial and postcolonial India invested in \r\ninfrastructure, export production and synthetic input use (Gupta, \r\n1998; Davis, 2001), setting the stage for current development \r\ntrajectories and closing out other adaptive options. Although "


id: 10e7bbccd1e81f295d182de8ecebc5e2
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"Table 5.21 |  Strategies to avoid maladaptation (adapted from Magnan, 2014; Lim-Camacho et al., 2015; Sovacool et al., 2015; FAO, 2018b; Paprocki and Huq, 2018; Sainsbury \r\net al., 2019)."


id: 65dd1ecbcdef9368c9acd39c1c1f2d47
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"iv) Focus on the impacts of adaptation on the poorest, structurally disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, and take power imbalances into account.\r\nv) Work across the full supply chain to consider linkages and possible ripple effects."


id: a9d8b29c142cf6e540978a81e3872c30
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"Until 2010, most A/F projects had technical, carbon-related goals \r\nand did not consider issues of livelihoods, community involvement \r\nor broader ecosystem impacts (Wolde et  al., 2016). New strategies \r\nsuch as nature-based solutions (Seddon et al., 2020) and forest and \r\nlandscape restoration (Brancalion and Chazdon, 2017) integrate a \r\nlarger set of social and environmental objectives. Indigenous Peoples \r\nenjoy a range of co-benefits of A/F initiatives such as improved habitat, \r\nfire management or protection from climatic shocks such as drought \r\n(Robinson et al., 2016b; Seddon et al., 2020), provided they are able to \r\nmanage carbon funds collectively, meet the monitoring and reporting \r\nrequirements, and protect forests from illicit uses and natural disasters \r\n(Wolde et al., 2016)."


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"residents, thereby removing connections to places of intrinsic value. For \r\nexample, the United Houma Nation in Louisiana is experiencing coastal \r\nland loss, sea level rise and strong Gulf hurricanes, which leads to the \r\nrelocation of some tribes causing loss of Houma identity (Sullivan and \r\nRosenberg, 2018). Another example is the relocation of Alaska Native \r\ncommunities due to climate change (Hamilton et al., 2016)"


id: f4af29cb5e3aa42a5d5ce27c1adf7519
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"Expansion of agriculture can bring distress to Indigenous communities \r\nbecause of environmental deterioration and the stress associated with \r\nrelocation or displacement (Otto et al., 2017). A/R programmes can also \r\nbring inequities to Indigenous communities (Godden and Tehan, 2016) \r\nand even violent displacement with tragic results (Celentano et  al., \r\n2017). A/R programmes can negatively affect a range of substantial \r\nand procedural Indigenous Peoples' rights entrenched in international \r\nhuman rights law (Table 5.22) and their potential for climate change \r\nadaptation (high confidence)."


id: b9585a6e4e5bcbfdba1762ba5e27e84a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Policies and safeguards attached to specific A/R initiatives determine \r\ntheir impact (high confidence) (Talor, 2015; West, 2016; Brancalion and \r\nChazdon, 2017). In countries where there is a great level of devolution \r\nof rights to Indigenous Peoples, there is a risk that the A/R agenda \r\nwill lead to recentralisation (limited evidence, medium agreement) \r\n(Bayrak and Marafa, 2016). Some A/R initiatives specify the need to \r\nrespect the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities and \r\nprotect biodiversity (medium evidence, high agreement) (Seddon \r\net al., 2020)."


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"Local communities' ability to participate in project design, implementation \r\nand monitoring is directly linked to the autonomy and independence \r\nof local institutions (Pye et al., 2017), their ability to formulate by-laws \r\n(Wolde et al., 2016) and handle funds in a transparent way (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Witasari, 2016). It is further dependent on \r\ncohesion in the community (Cagalanan, 2016), the existence of clear \r\nrules delineating community membership and the presence of elders and \r\ncommunity members with relevant local knowledge (Robinson et  al., \r\n2016b), and gender and out-migration dynamics affecting participation \r\nstructures (robust evidence, medium agreement) (Cormier-Salem and \r\nPanfili, 2016; Witasari, 2016; Wolde et al., 2016; Jurjonas and Seekamp, \r\n2019)."


id: bb9abed16dd0a9e23d140d4fd4fa7ba7
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"Table 5.22 |  Indigenous rights recognised in international human rights law negatively affected by A/R projects."


id: 11c64fdd9ad8d1979f60f5cc4f7db879
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"track prices of commodities and farmland have emerged, and the use \r\nof older vehicles such as forward and futures markets has increased \r\n(Schmidt and Pearson, 2016; Clapp and Isakson, 2018). These trends are \r\nconnected to climate change as financial investments are influenced \r\nby the likelihood that climate change will increase commodity and \r\nfarmland price variability (medium confidence) (Cotula, 2012; Isakson, \r\n2014; Tadesse et al.)."


id: 5a15eb1a56cd54773d116248c4432340
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Financial actors, markets, institutions and incentives have gained \r\nimportance in agricultural commodities and farmland markets in the \r\npast two decades (Clapp and Isakson, 2018; Fairbairn, 2020). New \r\ntypes of investment vehicles such as commodity index funds that "


id: ade928d8f06eb74ad9b5ca4d960a703b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"approaches (e.g., breeding, improved irrigation) and agroecological \r\napproaches, such as agroforestry, underutilised and more adapted \r\ncrops, and transition towards a circular economy (Alexander et  al., \r\n2015; Obersteiner et al., 2016; D'Odorico et al., 2018; Nhamo et al., \r\n2018; Soto Golcher and Visseren-Hamakers, 2018). Demand-side \r\nsolutions focus primarily on changes in consumer behaviour towards \r\nhealthier diets with lower carbon footprints, particularly reduction of \r\nmeat consumption (Alexander et al., 2015; Obersteiner et al., 2016). \r\nImproving the coordination of multilateral organisations could result \r\nin improved cross-boundary management of natural resources, \r\nparticularly related to water (Conway et al., 2015; Nhamo et al., 2018; \r\nSoto Golcher and Visseren-Hamakers, 2018)."


id: d793c3b692c27ef81db6eebd79f7d2f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Financial investors pool their investments through intermediaries, \r\nalongside other dynamic forces in the global economy, making \r\nunambiguous assessments of their effect difficult (Clapp, 2014; Clapp, \r\n2017). However, assessment of the broader trends at the interface of \r\nfinancial investment, food system dynamics and climate change shows \r\npotential connections."


id: 82560fd2e778508f4710c2a160fce8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Climate-induced variability in food production has the potential to \r\nintroduce a new level of uncertainty into food and farmland markets, \r\nencouraging financial investment into products to capitalise on price \r\nvolatility and to hedge risks. The new financial instruments enable \r\ninvestors to speculate more easily on the direction of food and land \r\nprices, especially when they are volatile (Ouma, 2014; Baines, 2017)."


id: 35943cd98cbc9ec83b1d544e6e4273c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"As relationships between individual subsystems are systemic, integrated \r\nsolutions would result in better outcomes across the FEW nexus (strong \r\nagreement). Obersteiner et  al. (2016) concluded that single-sector \r\npolicies can create strong trade-offs with other policy targets and SDGs, \r\nwhereas strategies that reduce pressure on food production systems \r\ndiminish trade-offs between FEW nexus components. This suggests that \r\nachieving multiple SDGs will require balancing societal demands in the \r\ncontext of finite natural resources (Jagermeyr et al., 2017; Amjath-Babu \r\net al., 2019; Momblanch et al., 2019)."


id: 79184ec3783586363d54b22413b90c93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Linkages between food security and nutrition with water and energy \r\nas well as other important socio-environmental issues are increasingly \r\nbeing described within a nexus framework (see also Chapters 3, 4, 6 \r\nand 7), with food systems frequently located at the centre of nexus \r\nconcepts (Caron et al., 2018)."


id: 810e71d6bf47df0da0e83dc3f5c09df3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Despite concluding that integrated solutions addressing the systemic \r\nconnections between the FEW nexus would improve development and \r\nenvironmental outcomes, there are limitations of integrating multiple \r\nframeworks, both in terms of describing the complexities and in finding \r\nsolutions (Leck et al., 2015; Weitz et al., 2017; Wichelns, 2017; Shannak \r\net al., 2018). Leck et al. (2015) and Weitz et al. (2017) indicate that \r\nevidence of successful implementation and improved outcomes based \r\non the application of nexus concepts is rare."


id: 8df7b633a061257e9e63e00614366adc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Climate change will affect the food-energy-water (FEW) nexus, \r\ncommonly in the form of risk multiplier (high confidence) (e.g., Conway \r\net al., 2015; Barik et al., 2016; Keairns et al., 2016; Abbott et al., 2017; \r\nEbhuoma and Simatele, 2017; Caron et  al., 2018; D'Odorico et  al., \r\n2018; de Amorim et  al., 2018; Mpandeli et  al., 2018; Nhamo et  al., \r\n2018; Soto Golcher and Visseren-Hamakers, 2018; Yang et al., 2018; \r\nAmjath-Babu et al., 2019; Froese and Schilling, 2019; Mercure et al., \r\n2019; Momblanch et  al., 2019; Pastor et  al., 2019; Xu et  al., 2019). \r\nXu et  al. (2019) modelled the irrigation demand for large-scale \r\nmaize production in Northeast China and concluded that increasing \r\ndroughts under future climate change would lead to extreme shortage \r\nof irrigation water without adaptive measures. Barik et  al. (2016) \r\ndescribed how the growing demand for food in India has led to more \r\nirrigation with a reduction in groundwater levels in some regions."


id: 8d2a7307938601e56ff52ef5742f0381
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Increasing demands for food, energy and water can lead to domestic \r\nand international conflict, including political instability and migration, \r\noften in the context of drought (high confidence) (Abbott et al., 2017; \r\nBush and Martiniello, 2017; WEF, 2017; D'Odorico et  al., 2018; de \r\nAmorim et al., 2018). de Amorim et al. (2018) conclude that the FEW \r\nnexus is susceptible to many global risks, including extreme weather \r\nevents and human migrations, and predominantly endangers vulnerable \r\ncommunities of less developed countries. There is emerging evidence that \r\nfood and water insecurity enhances social conflicts, including protests \r\nand violent riots, at least partially, by accelerating existing grievances \r\n(Heslin, 2021; Koren et al., 2021). Closer coordination at global, regional \r\nand national levels could be recommended to manage these risks."


id: 644014e35c8a6ff49a0d3b320d7a3bcd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Since AR5, several adaptation reviews have been done (Ford et  al., \r\n2015; Lesnikowski et  al., 2016). In a review of 1159 peer-reviewed \r\nsources, Berrang-Ford et al. (2021b) found that observed adaptations \r\nin food, fibre and other ecosystem products have consisted mainly of \r\nchanges in autonomous behaviour changes, such as changing planting \r\ntime, followed by technological/infrastructure and ecosystem-based \r\nadaptation approaches, the majority of which have occurred in Africa \r\nand Asia (Figures  5.20 and 5.21, Table  5.22). Several adaptation \r\noptions addressed multiple SDGs (e.g., 2, 6, 8, 12) (Figure 5.21)."


id: ca7bcc2cf9e9a7d67e022f3845f85de1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Assessment of adaptation options was done for 15 potential options \r\nfor land and ecosystem transitions (SM5.7, Figure  5.22a). Several \r\nadaptation options have high to medium feasibility, with robust \r\nevidence, high agreement about the adaptive capacity resilience \r\nbuilding potential of options in relation to climate change impact \r\ndrivers (high confidence). Policy and planning and production shifts \r\nhave limited evidence for feasibility. Most options are technically \r\nand physically feasible, with generally high political and social "


id: a0b3452773eb5998c65b3ce123469334
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Meeting growing demands for food, water and energy under a changing \r\nclimate requires technical solutions and behavioural change as well as \r\ngreater coordination across multilateral institutions and governance. \r\nSupply-side solutions focus on enhancing production, reducing food \r\nwaste and loss or lowering water demand through both technological "


id: dcae065c383cb4f8b28512eb1c2f5ed1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Figure 5.19 |  State of adaptation by region and type of response (based on 1159 peer-reviewed references that addressed adaptation in food, fibre and \r\nother ecosystem products sector; source: Global Adaptation Mapping Initiative (GAMI) database (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021a). The bars indicate the amount of \r\nevidence for the category x region."


id: af0fca6b79f528556197ea120229dba7
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"le 5.23 |  State of adaptation in food, fibre and other ecosystem products by actors and vulnerabe groups (source: GAMI database; Berrang-Ford et al., 2021a))."


id: 5a88b64029e742ad6f9523c43d5396ed
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"and agroecological approaches (medium confidence), suggesting \r\nmultiple co-benefits of these options. Most options have high scores \r\nfor enhancing social well-being and economic and environmental \r\nbenefits (medium confidence) but limited evidence for strengthening \r\ninstitutions for most options. There were low scores for potential \r\nmaladaptation (medium confidence)."


id: 7b6f5147f97d5e45a6ee9a43c40e5595
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"acceptability and environmental feasibility, but have limited evidence \r\nfor institutional feasibility. Most adaptation options have medium to \r\nhigh microeconomic feasibility (high confidence) but limited evidence\r\nfor macroeconomic viability."


id: e42cbba1c21240d7f66d2862b719020a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Among five effectiveness indicators (SM5.7, Figure  5.22b), most \r\noptions have robust evidence of reduced risk vulnerability to climate \r\nchange, with low scores for local governance, substitution of plant or \r\nanimal type, community forest management, livelihood diversification \r\nand climate services. Higher-scored options to reduce risk included \r\nincreasing biodiversity (at landscape and field level), community seed \r\nbanks, conventional breeding (plant and animals), mixed systems "


id: 781df25e509cb6981cef5ff447089ff3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"income countries, use of climate services can increase yields and \r\nincomes and promote changes in farmers' practices (low confidence) \r\n(Roudier et  al., 2014; Roudier et  al., 2016; Tarchiani et  al., 2017; \r\nOuedraogo et al., 2018). There is low confidence that climate services \r\nare delivering on their potential, whether they are being accessed \r\nby the vulnerable, and how these services are contributing to food \r\nsecurity and nutrition (Ouedraogo et al., 2018; Vaughan et al., 2019)."


id: 70c17d6fe3a1c009d18297c35fb7adad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"into climate-resilient systems (medium evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Albert et al., 2017; Brugere et al., 2019; Galappaththi et al., 2020b; \r\nSnapp et al., 2021; Cross-Working Group Box BIOECO; Cross-Chapter \r\nBox NATURAL in Chapter 2)."


id: 58997b4520c32edd206c9ff4cd752ace
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 11435
content:
"Climate services, understood as the production, translation, \r\ncommunication and use of climate information in decision-making \r\nprocesses, can contribute to adaptation efforts in agricultural systems \r\n(medium agreement, low evidence). Climate services can support \r\ndecision makers in agriculture by providing tailored information \r\nthat can inform the implementation of specific adaptation options \r\n(Vaughan, 2018; Buontempo et al., 2019; Dobardzic et al., 2019; Hank \r\net al., 2019)."


id: c511011bba15944bdbdb5a7d85260584
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Improved design and delivery of climate services can enhance \r\neffectiveness (medium confidence). Ways to enhance the impact of \r\nclimate services include integrating information from multiple sources \r\nat different scales (Bouroncle et al., 2019), participatory collection and \r\nanalysis of climate information (Loboguerrero AM, 2018; Tesfaye et al., \r\n2019; Rossa, 2020), and making forecast information available in local \r\nlanguages and as verbal communications for farmers who cannot read \r\n(Nkiaka et al., 2019)."


id: b806094354521d6ffb737c14552542c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"For some high- and medium-income countries, evidence suggests that \r\nclimate services have been underutilised (Mase and Prokopy, 2014), \r\nwith limited evidence in these countries of the impact of climate \r\nservices on yields, income, and food security and nutrition. In low\u0002"


id: dffbbbb2c64eff8542e79471dea34bf4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 32732
content:
"In countries with limited climate data, crowd sourcing (outsourcing \r\ndata collection to the public) (Minet et  al., 2017) and digital tools \r\npresent an opportunity for addressing climate risk (medium confidence)"


id: 9ad4407741e6d7eccfb9f989521907c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 21893
content:
"their development and building their capacity (medium confidence) \r\n(Camacho and Conover, 2019; Gumucio et al., 2020; Sultan et al., 2020)."


id: 164191863bc7c9e14569032188b0fab8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"(Osgood et al., 2018; Thornton, 2018; Partey et al., 2020; Sotelo et al., \r\n2020). Bundling additional services such as market information with \r\nclimate information may be effective at plugging information gaps \r\n(low confidence) (Chatuphale and Armstrong, 2018; Tsan et al., 2019; \r\nTesfaye et al., 2019)"


id: 5795d1d508f05acfa8dc826e4337e605
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11275
content:
"Table Box 5.11.1 |  Dimensions of agroecological transitions as a transformative climate change adaptation strategy, benefits, trade-offs and constraints to implementation"


id: 5968a7484f9ad71a2970189b14d483bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11558
content:
"there is strong evidence that participation of local stakeholders in \r\nadaptation planning and implementation improves communities' \r\ncapacity to monitor and respond to climate change impacts on food, \r\nfibre and forestry systems, provided that adequate resources and local \r\nknowledge on climate change exist. Participatory monitoring of climate \r\nchange impacts and participatory scenario development to develop \r\ncommunity action plans are examples, which can help strengthen \r\ncommunity preparation for and response to climate impacts."


id: d47d926fe5ddae62e794f5a16d710d64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 30955
content:
"Community-based adaptation (CbA) strategies, which involve locally \r\ndriven, place-based adaptation approaches, can help build adaptive \r\ncapacity to climate change impacts, but require explicit attention to \r\npower dynamics, respect for local and Indigenous knowledge systems, \r\nadequate resources, future climatic trends and coordination at \r\nmultiple levels of governance to be effective (high confidence) (Spires \r\net  al., 2014; Fernandez-Gimenez et  al., 2015; Nagoda, 2015; Ashley \r\net al., 2016; Berner et al., 2016; Ensor et al., 2016; Avtar et al., 2019; \r\nLam et al., 2019; Silwal et al., 2019; McNamara et al., 2020; Piggott\u0002McKellar et al., 2020; Rossa, 2020; Uchiyama et al., 2020). Since AR5, "


id: 35ce064dd032c753db2a38d4e782f46
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 5877
content:
"5.14.2 Enabling Conditions for Implementing Adaptation\r\n5.14.2.1 Addressing social inequities in food systems"


id: 8360e3ab2fc6e73b6de99875d1dacf15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 18198
content:
"Strengthening both local and regional food systems is a strategy \r\nto increase resilience (Schipanski et  al., 2016; Palmer et  al., 2017), \r\nresource use efficiency (Mu et  al., 2019) and self-reliance (medium "


id: 14939f46ed435adf99f4b7fc8ba2b991
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"2017; McMillen et al., 2017; McNeeley, 2017; Pearce et al., 2018), and \r\nto couple IK with proactive and regionally coherent adaptation plans, \r\nactions and cooperation (Shaffer, 2014; Melvin et al., 2017; Forbis Jr. \r\nand Hayhoe, 2018; Makondo and Thomas, 2018)."


id: edd0c27f9bb2fedbd0885ba1f7d42b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Effective adaptation requires a more holistic approach that includes \r\nthe recognition of Indigenous rights, governance systems and laws \r\n(high confidence) (Robinson et al., 2016a; Brugnach et al., 2017; Magni, "


id: 2a9b0cfd438f18492bef5dad7927fe6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 4127
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"In contrast, emerging research points to the potential of CSA as a supporting condition for gender equity, provided that equity and power \r\nconcerns are explicitly included in the approach (Chanana-Nag and Aggarwal, 2020). Some CSA technologies and practices, such as direct \r\nseeding, green manuring and laser land levelling, can have a significant role in reducing the gender gap in labour burden for women \r\nin agriculture (Khatri-Chhetri et al., 2020). The use of participatory approaches can facilitate community-based adaptation of gender\u0002sensitive CSA practices (Rosimo, 2018). CSA may also empower both men and women: in two villages in India, CSA adoption empowered \r\nboth sexes in decision making and use and control of income (Hariharan et al., 2018)."


id: e183a55e3877fc96b4a82caa970db9a3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"In general CSA programmes have tended to overlook questions of inequity (medium confidence), including limited attention to social \r\nconditions that promote Business-As-Usual pathways, although this is now changing. Addressing questions of rights, social injustice, \r\nunequal power relations and inequity would help make CSA-related policy responses more effective in addressing vulnerability (Chandra \r\net al., 2017; Clapp and Isakson, 2018; Karlsson et al., 2018; Westengen et al., 2018; Ellis and Tschakert, 2019; Eriksen et al., 2019; \r\nWestengen et al., 2019)."


id: e319f71187c03cafd3c2b5338b40bbf8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33224
content:
"climate change (Huaman and Valdiviezo, 2014; McNamara and Prasad, \r\n2014; Abah et  al., 2015; Mistry and Berardi, 2016; Tschakert et  al., \r\n2017; McNeeley et al., 2018; McNeeley et al., 2020). However, there are \r\nlimitations of IK and LK to address future climate impacts. Therefore, \r\nit is important that science-based knowledge and  other knowledge \r\ncoalesce to produce solutions that are sustainable and viable in the face \r\nof projected impacts of climate change. Community-based adaptation \r\napproaches can integrate IK and LK and more formal knowledge \r\nsystems, provided efforts to establish relationships of respect, trust and \r\ncommon understanding between different stakeholders involved (Herath \r\net al., 2015; Camacho et al., 2016; Fidelman et al., 2017; Inaotombi and \r\nMahanta, 2019; Lam et al., 2019)."


id: 27054ce09cffae038beabffe784588b8
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vector_id: 3535
content:
"Searchinger, 2019a; Searchinger T, 2019b; Loboguerrero et al., 2020; \r\nMeridian Institute, 2020; Steiner A, 2020)."


id: d87b19d4403c14e83fc84c798f9b29e
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Recent literature highlights the future challenges of producing the \r\nquantities of food needed to feed a growing world population in a \r\nway that satisfies nutritional needs, benefits everyone equally and \r\nequitably, and minimises the negative impacts of food systems on the \r\nenvironment and the natural resource base. There is broad agreement \r\nthat current trajectories towards the SDGs and countries' commitments \r\nunder the Paris Agreement are slow and that transformation of food \r\nsystems is needed (medium agreement, robust evidence) (Campbell \r\net al., 2018; Brondizio et al., 2019; Dury et al., 2019; EAT-LANCET, 2019; \r\nFAO, 2019 f; Food and Land Use Coalition, 2019; Sachs et al., 2019; "


id: dd50218887631a5fc508cab78e6ed0c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Table 5.24 |  Agricultural and livelihood system transformations from systematic searches of the literature, which are at least partially attributable to climatic factors and that \r\ninvolve increased or decreased system integration, and major consequences of the change. Information in the table is from the references cited. Sources: updated from (Vermeulen \r\net al., 2018; Thornton et al., 2019)."


id: 1bc441a1b07491436e193f21c76e2350
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"goods and services arising from multi-functional agricultural systems) \r\n(Vermeulen et al., 2018; Thornton et al., 2019)."


id: f54e063c4a8e0d945731d29cca5f7706
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Table 5.25 |  Potential adaptation finance strategies for categories of climate-related risks in the agriculture, fisheries, aquaculture and forestry sectors."


id: eb704ec9975a85841efaa1ba657ec93f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"(Shukla et al., 2019; FAO et al., 2020). Finance strategies can contribute \r\nto adaptation in these sectors in different ways (Table 5.25) and to \r\ndifferent degrees. Standardised strategies have not yet been developed \r\nfor specific adaptation needs, and in current practice, finance strategies \r\nare opportunistically deployed, with developing countries facing \r\nparticular challenges due to under-developed financial mechanisms \r\n(Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019)."


id: 71edc055eee50860ae2039179a0a5d38
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Many types of financial instruments are employed by diverse actors \r\n(Table 5.26) guided by their mandates (e.g., development, commerce), \r\ncapacity (investor, intermediary, donor) and risk appetite. Actors \r\nwithin a sector or local production area can coordinate their financial \r\nstrategies towards common objectives (e.g., reduced supply chain \r\nloss) or participate in joint financial action such as blended finance \r\nstructures that combine commercial and concessionary finance to \r\ncatalyse additional private investment, enrich the pipeline of bankable \r\nprojects, and test business models (FAO, 2020b)."


id: 286e497fdab00f61564d4fb54dcab544
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Expanding access to financial services and pooling climate risks \r\ncan enable and incentivise climate change adaptation (medium \r\nconfidence) (Shukla et  al., 2019). To mobilise financial instruments \r\n(Table  5.27) towards adaptation needs, individual actors can apply \r\nan adaptation lens to existing or new activities, accounting for \r\ninvestment characteristics (e.g., development stage; cash flow profile), \r\nrequirements (e.g., amount; risk-return) and context (e.g., regulatory \r\nlandscape) (Havemann et al., 2020). Risk-layering can match financial \r\ninstruments to severity and probability climate risks (Hochrainer\u0002Stigler and Reiter, 2021)."


id: be126c04c99180bc3f434c9a4d18738c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Flow of adaptation finance in the agriculture, fisheries, aquaculture \r\nand forestry sectors is impeded by weak measurement and \r\nbenchmarking of financial and resilience outcomes (Kramer et  al., \r\n2019; Negra et  al., 2020), and challenges in assessing repayment \r\ncapacity of investee producers and companies (medium confidence). \r\nImmature information systems (e.g., weak analytics, fragmented "


id: 54448a4f6f37117fc77a122d32546d17
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 10717
content:
"Table 5.26 |  Potential adaptation finance objectives for major actors in agriculture, fisheries, aquaculture and forestry sectors."


id: 41d1c70f2e7d5bebecc992fdcb06ad05
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Actors Potential adaptation finance objectives\r\nPrivate sector: Focused on capturing positive externalities (i.e., lower risks or costs) from adaptation investments (Woodard et al., 2019). Major considerations include fiduciary \r\nresponsibilities; expected rates of return (i.e., risk-adjusted; benchmarked to comparable investments); investment characteristics (e.g., liquidity, structure, size) and contribution to investor \r\nportfolio; material business risks (e.g., supply chain reliability; stranded assets); cost control (e.g., product losses; insurance); legal compliance; and sectoral requirements (e.g., climate risk \r\ndisclosure) (Havemann et al., 2020)."


id: b89ef4560e42d44394ef5ad2a66d4a83
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"standards) (Woodard et al., 2019; Negra et al., 2020) inhibit effective \r\ndue diligence and impact assessment, contributing to uncertainty \r\nand low investor confidence (Havemann et al., 2020; NGFS, 2020). \r\nImproved characterisation of adaptation finance strategies (e.g., \r\ninsurance, subsidies, blended finance) requires increased transaction \r\nvolume (Millan et al., 2019) and analysis of financial (e.g., risk-return \r\nprofile, investor demand) and resilience (e.g., reduced vulnerability) \r\neffects."


id: 80d3555722aa901d596c42226f07194c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 17793
content:
"Methods to strengthen adaptation finance include updating \r\nregulations and policies to support adaptation finance instruments \r\n(e.g., climate accounting standards), requiring climate-risk disclosure, \r\nimproved information-sharing among public and private sector actors \r\nand devolving funding to local actors (medium confidence) (Global \r\nCommission on Adaptation, 2019; Millan et al., 2019)."


id: 2d04d70346c45eb7dd47b4a056d8308a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 4516
content:
"Climate resilient development pathways (CRDPs) introduced in AR5 \r\n(Denton, 2014) can briefly be described as 'development trajectories \r\nthat integrate adaptation and mitigation to realise the goal of \r\nsustainable development' (see IPCC (2019a)) for a more extensive \r\ndefinition). Several characteristics were proposed in SR1.5 by which \r\nsuch CRDPs could be identified: consistency with principles of \r\nsustainable development; ability to deliver poverty reduction; ability \r\nto enhance social, gender, racial, ethnic and intergenerational equity; \r\nability to deliver resilience to climate change and other shocks and \r\nstresses; and ability to protect species, biodiversity and ecosystem \r\ngoods and services. There is an increasing literature, assessed in SR1.5, \r\non adaptation pathways approaches, generally for specific regions, \r\nlocations and subsectors."


id: 1254e392cef618bc7b7c0c5f0e6f723e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 391
content:
"Table 5.27 |  Major types of financial instruments suitable to adaptation finance in agriculture, fisheries, aquaculture and forestry sectors (adapted from Havemann et al., 2020)."


id: 1b9986f0ba3b73124db2aa50e96f78a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Financial instrument Description\r\nEquity: Ownership stake in a company (e.g., agricultural technology company; processing company) or collective investment vehicle (e.g., agriculture fund; Timber Investment Management \r\nOrganization; commodity index fund) providing returns (via dividends and/or sale of equity shares) corresponding to business-related risk (e.g., higher return for higher risk and/or lower \r\nliquidity)"


id: c3f7b43ec27495b2cea7499a75c58934
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 28404
content:
"systems, but much less on robust analysis that explicitly addresses \r\nand evaluates the pathways towards these desired futures. Gerten \r\n(2020) estimates that 10.2 billion people can be supported within key \r\nplanetary boundaries via spatially redistributed cropland and dietary \r\nchanges, among other actions. There are few, if any, analyses for \r\ndetailing the plausible pathways to move towards such a future in \r\nways that are socially, economically and environmentally acceptable \r\nthrough time; whether such pathways could indeed be made climate\u0002resilient is unknown. Appropriate monitoring and rapid feedback to \r\nfood system actors on what is working and why will be critical to \r\nthe successful operationalisation of adaptation actions within CRDPs \r\n(Bosomworth and Gaillard, 2019)."


id: 192fc8f5962fd5ac0726030555b2a3c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1457
content:
"Authors: Henry Neufeldt (Denmark/Germany), Goran Berndes (Sweden), Almut Arneth (Germany), Rachel Bezner Kerr (USA/Canada), \r\nLuisa F Cabeza (Spain), Donovan Campbell (Jamaica), Jofre Carnicer Cols (Spain), Annette Cowie (Australia), Vassilis Daioglou (Greece), \r\nJoanna House (UK), Adrian Leip (Italy/Germany), Francisco Meza (Chile), Michael Morecroft (UK), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the Netherlands), \r\nCamille Parmesan (UK/USA), Julio C Postigo (USA/Peru), Marta G. Rivera-Ferre (Spain), Raphael Slade (UK), Maria Cristina Tirado von der \r\nPahlen (USA/Spain), Pramod K. Singh (India), Peter Smith (UK)"


id: 16d494ae753d9a03e89ccc2d8538b479
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 1114
content:
"The growing demand for biomass offers both opportunities and challenges to mitigate and adapt to climate change and \r\nnatural resource constraints (high confidence). Increased technology innovation, stakeholder integration and transparent \r\ngovernance structures and procedures at local to global scales are key to successful bioeconomy deployment maximising \r\nbenefits and managing trade-offs (high confidence)."


id: cacb7b4b18d172a11c238b503c25e834
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29467
content:
"Limited global land and biomass resources accompanied by growing demands for food, feed, fibre and fuels, together with prospects for a \r\nparadigm shift towards phasing out fossil fuels, set the frame for potentially fierce competition for land5 and biomass to meet burgeoning \r\ndemands even as climate change increasingly limits natural resource potentials (high confidence)."


id: b41544580ea0e7937ee7e9a987c7780c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 25848
content:
"Sustainable agriculture and forestry, technology innovation in bio-based production within a circular economy and international \r\ncooperation and governance of global trade in products to reflect and disincentivise their environmental and social externalities can \r\nprovide mitigation and adaptation via bioeconomy development that responds to the needs and perspectives of multiple stakeholders to \r\nachieve outcomes that maximise synergies while limiting trade-offs (high confidence)."


id: 3b8dfb69a7cea8bf41a016cc4368d528
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6721
content:
"There is high confidence that climate change, population growth and changes in per capita consumption will increase pressures on \r\nmanaged as well as natural and semi-natural ecosystems, exacerbating existing risks to livelihoods, biodiversity, human and ecosystem \r\nhealth, infrastructure and food systems (Conijn et al., 2018; IPCC, 2018; IPCC, 2019b; Lade et al., 2020). At the same time, many global \r\nmitigation scenarios presented in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment reports rely on large greenhouse gas \r\n(GHG) emissions reduction in the Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector and concurrent deployment of reforestation/\r\nafforestation and biomass use in a multitude of applications (Rogelj et al., 2018; AR6 WGIII Chapter 3 and Chapter 7; Canadell et al., \r\n2021; Lee et al., 2021)"


id: bd2919af47b138cc47311c209dd77756
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 27329
content:
"Given the finite availability of natural resources, there are invariably trade-offs that complicate land-based mitigation unless land \r\nproductivity can be enhanced without undermining ecosystem services (e.g., Obersteiner et  al., 2016; Campbell et  al., 2017; Caron \r\net al., 2018; Conijn et al., 2018; Heck et al., 2018; WRI, 2018; Smith et al., 2019c). Management intensities can often be adapted to local \r\nconditions with consideration of other functions and ecosystem services, but at a global scale the challenge remains to avoid further \r\ndeforestation and degradation of intact ecosystems, in particular of biodiversity-rich systems (Cross-Chapter Box on NBS-NATURAL in \r\nChapter 2), while meeting the growing demands. Further, increased land use competition can affect food prices and impact food security \r\nand livelihoods (To and Grafton, 2015; Chakravorty et al., 2017), with possible knock-on effects related to civil unrest (Abbott et al., 2017; \r\nD'Odorico et al., 2018)."


id: 306e78217a763ada783d3706d983bc6b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Changes on the demand side as well as improvements in resource-use efficiencies within the global food and other bio-based systems \r\ncan also reduce pressures on the remaining land resources. For example, dietary changes towards more plant-based food (where \r\nappropriate) and reduced food waste can provide climate change mitigation along with health benefits ( WGIII Chapter 7.4 and 12.4, \r\nWillett et al., 2019) and other co-benefits with regard to food security, adaptation and land use (Mbow et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2019c; \r\nWGII Chapter 5). Advancements in the provision of novel food and feed sources (e.g., cultured meat, insects, grass-based protein feed and \r\ncellular agriculture) can also limit the pressures on finite natural resources (WGIII Chapter 12.4, Parodi et al., 2018; Zabaniotou, 2018)."


id: 97e71dabfcd7fe02e05f2d6474f6261c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Biomass scarcity is an argument for adopting circular economy principles for the management of biomass as for non-renewable \r\nresources. This includes waste avoidance, product reuse and material recycling, which keep down resource use while maintaining product \r\nand material value. However, reuse and recycling is not always feasible, such as when biofuels are used for transport and bio-based \r\nbiodegradable chemicals are used to reduce ecological impacts where losses to the environment are unavoidable. A balanced approach \r\nto management of biomass resources could take departure in the carbon cycle from a value-preservation perspective and the possible \r\nroutes that can be taken for biomass and carbon, considering a carbon budget defined by the Paris Agreement, principles for sustainable \r\nland use and natural ecosystem protection."


id: 5478aea8e0abcfe9774e648ceb8ca176
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Analyses of synergies and trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation in the agriculture and forestry sectors show that outcomes \r\ndepend on context, design and implementation, so actions have to be tailored to the specific conditions to minimise adverse effects \r\n(Kongsager, 2018). This is supported in literature analysing the nexus between land, water, energy and food in the context of climate \r\nchange, which consistently concludes that addressing these different domains together rather than in isolation would enhance synergies \r\nand reduce trade-offs (Obersteiner et al., 2016; D'Odorico et al., 2018; Soto Golcher and Visseren-Hamakers, 2018; Froehse and Schilling, \r\n2019; Momblanch et al., 2019)."


id: 4d91936ded7374ea953168c65fec2a38
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Nature-based solutions addressing climate change can provide opportunities for sustainable livelihoods as well as multiple ecosystem \r\nservices, such as flood risk management through floodplain restoration, saltmarshes, mangroves or peat renaturation (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox NATURAL in Chapter 2; UNEP, 2021). Climate-smart agriculture can increase productivity while enhancing resilience and reducing \r\nGHG emissions inherent to production (Lipper et al., 2014; Singh and Chudasama, 2021). Similarly, climate-smart forestry considers the \r\nwhole value chain and integrates climate objectives into forest sector management through multiple measures (from strict reserves "


id: 995ab4d12bd6fc2a6402c22a776c44e9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 21645
content:
"to more intensively managed forests) providing mitigation and adaptation benefits (Nabuurs et al., 2018; Verkerk et al., 2020; WGIII \r\nSection 7.3)"


id: 9a845a379e8497cc00b31776daa8229d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 21838
content:
"Figure Cross-Working Group Box BIOECONOMY.1 | Left: High-input intensive agriculture, aiming for high yields of a few crop species, with large \r\nfields and no semi-natural habitats. Right: Agroecological agriculture, supplying a range of ecosystem services, relying on biodiversity and crop and animal diversity \r\ninstead of external inputs, and integrating plant and animal production, with smaller fields and presence of semi-natural habitats. Credit: Jacques Baudry (left); Valerie \r\nViaud (right), published in van der Werf et al. (2020)."


id: 5313ea64f84182799108d3284d0b11b9
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content:
"Barriers towards wider implementation include absence of policies that compensate landowners for providing enhanced ecosystem \r\nservices and other environmental benefits, which can help overcome short-term losses during the transition from conventional practices \r\nbefore longer-term benefits can accrue. Other barriers include limited access to markets, knowledge gaps, financial, technological or "


id: 4ddb0f1c99dda59bb6ad1e04258a00b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 9675
content:
"labour constraints, lack of extension support and insecure land tenure (Jacobi et al., 2017; Kongsager, 2017; Hernandez-Morcillo et al., \r\n2018; Iiyama et  al., 2018; HLPE, 2019). Regional-level agroecology transitions may be facilitated by co-learning platforms, farmer \r\nnetworks, private sector, civil society groups, regional and local administration, and other incentive structures (e.g., price premiums, \r\naccess to credit, regulation) (Coe et al., 2014; Perez-Marin et al., 2017; Mier y Teran Gimenez Cacho et al., 2018; HLPE, 2019; Valencia \r\net al., 2019; SAPEA, 2020). With the right incentives, improvements can be made with regard to profitability, making alternatives more \r\nattractive to landowners."


id: ad2405959f84306ba9fe9bd0ede755cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Decisions on land uses between biomass production for food, feed, fibre or fuel, as well as nature conservation or restoration and other \r\nuses (e.g., mining, urban infrastructure), depend on differences in perspectives and values. Because the availability of land for diverse \r\nbiomass uses is invariably limited, setting priorities for land use allocations therefore first depends on making the perspectives underlying \r\nwhat is considered as 'high-value' explicit (Fischer et al., 2007; Garnett et al., 2015; de Boer and van Ittersum, 2018; Muscat et al., 2020). \r\nDecisions can then be made transparently based on societal norms, needs and the available resource base. Prioritisation of land use for \r\nthe common good therefore requires societal consensus-building embedded in the socioeconomic and cultural fabric of regions, societies \r\nand communities. Integration of local decision making with national planning ensures local actions complement national development \r\nobjectives."


id: e2f49f83404939a1f310992815d46e42
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"In summary, there is significant scope for optimising use of land resources to produce more biomass while reducing adverse effects (high \r\nconfidence). Context-specific prioritisation, technology innovation in bio-based production, integrative policies, coordinated institutions \r\nand improved governance mechanisms to enhance synergies and minimise trade-offs can mitigate the pressure on managed as well as \r\nnatural and semi-natural ecosystems (medium confidence). Yet, energy conservation and efficiency measures, and deployment of \r\ntechnologies and systems that do not rely on carbon-based energy and materials, are essential for mitigating biomass demand growth as \r\ncountries pursue ambitious climate goals (high confidence)."


id: 8ebf55ff2b39180793f35eb28170f73e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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content:
"Climate change has already made feeding the world's people more difficult. Climate-related hazards have become more common, disrupting \r\nthe supply of crops, meat and fish. Rapid changes in weather patterns have put financial strain on producers, while also raising prices and \r\nlimiting the choices and quality of produce available to consumers."


id: 142c03f406618e226d6096763f6ca017
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 686
content:
"Most of our food comes from crops, livestock, aquaculture and fisheries. Global food supply increased dramatically \r\nin the last century, but ongoing climate change has begun to slow that growth, reducing the gains that would have \r\nbeen expected without climate change. Regionally, negative effects are apparent in regions closer to the equator, \r\nwith some positive effects further north and south."


id: 1461acb090bad70f2433f18b1eee2309
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Climate impacts are also negatively affecting the quality of produce, from changes in micronutrient content to \r\ntexture, colour and taste changes that reduce marketability. With warmer and more humid condition, many food \r\npests thrive, food decays more quickly, and food contains more toxic compounds produced by fungi and bacteria."


id: a63e70f1e6d5db234edd9980e415b963
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 23691
content:
"Warming of the oceans has reduced potential fish catch. The increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has led to \r\nocean acidification, which is already impacting the production of farmed fish and shellfish. Changes in local climate \r\nhave forced producers to shift to new locations, changing what they grow or where they work (e.g., pole-ward \r\nshifting fishing grounds)."


id: 2134b2efb345bbfa2f81b4f186ff5046
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Climate hazards have increased over the past 50 years and are the major cause of sudden losses of production \r\n(food production shocks). Food shocks occur following droughts, heatwaves, floods, storms and outbreaks of \r\nclimate-related pests and combine to cause multiplying impacts. Climate hazards sometimes disrupt food storage \r\nand transport, which impairs the food supply."


id: 995d0ef15aba54b30cbe13c03a681160
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"All of these negative impacts can lead to increased food prices, and reduced income for producers and retailers as \r\nthere are fewer products to sell. Together, these impacts threaten to reduce the supply of varied, nutrient-rich foods \r\nto poor populations that already suffer ill health."


id: 16cfe390cb9ea929266f95012d46bff0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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vector_id: 1109
content:
"FAQ 5.2: How will climate change impact food availability by mid and late century and who will suffer most?"


id: d752cb771663927ef36b2a5a138bf49f
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"Climate change impacts will worsen over time, with the period after mid-century seeing more rapid growth in negative impact than in the \r\nearly part of this century. The impacts will be global, but people with fewer resources, and those who live in regions where impacts will worsen \r\nmore rapidly, will be hurt the most."


id: f96b2e3e1f3dec0f373e524a923e8317
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"Climate change impacts will worsen over time, but the extent depends on how rapidly greenhouse-gas emissions \r\ngrow. If the current rate of emissions continues, the impacts will worsen, especially after mid-century, with rapid \r\ngrowth in the number and severity of extreme weather events. Yields of plants, animals and aquaculture will \r\ndecline in most places, and marine and inland fisheries will suffer. Food production in some regions will become \r\nimpossible, either because the crops or livestock there cannot survive in the new climatic conditions, or it is too hot \r\nand humid for farm workers to be in the fields."


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"After harvest, agricultural production passes through the agricultural value chain, supplying animal feeds, industrial \r\nuses and international markets, with some stored for use in the future. Each of these transitions will be affected \r\nby climate change. Food storage facilities will face more challenges in dealing with spoilage. Transportation of \r\nperishable fruits, vegetables and meats will become costlier to maintain quality. Households and food services will \r\nneed to spend more on food preservation."


id: a1148e9f3c886ca04711f7339bbfee3e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"Low-income countries and poor people are at higher risk, as they have limited social safety nets and suffer more \r\nfrom rising food prices and an unstable food supply. But large famers will also be hurt. Rural communities, especially \r\nsmallholder farmers, pastoralists and fishers, are extremely vulnerable because their livelihoods mainly depend on \r\ntheir production. The urban poor will have to spend more on food."


id: 16ec4feb33902cddc0ed83ebad05d5bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:04
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"A flood, for example, may force low-income families out of their homes, affect their employment and reduce their \r\naccess to food supplies, with prices often rising after natural disasters. Families will have less access to safe water \r\nsupplies, and this combination of lower food supplies, uncertain employment, displacement from home and rising \r\nfood costs will increase the number of children who are undernourished."


id: 8fd9201bd28a44c512cfd55794ab011
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"FAQ 5.3: Land is going to be an important resource for mitigating climate change: how is the increasing \r\ncompetition for land threatening global food security and who will be affected the most?"


id: 81a00668fbab94c3f17ac53c06b7e404
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Climate change will affect food production. Meeting future food needs requires greater land shares unless we change what we eat and how \r\nwe grow food. Additionally, large-scale land projects that aim to mitigate climate change will increase land competition. Less land will then \r\nbe available for food production, increasing food insecurity. People at greater risk from land competition are smallholder farmers, Indigenous \r\nPeoples and low-income groups."


id: 339aba4f4fc851fc95f8b7eda9e3103c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Land is a limited resource on which humans and ecosystems depend on to grow plants, which capture carbon \r\ndioxide and release oxygen, and provide food, timber and other products. We also have cultural, recreational and \r\nspiritual connections to land."


id: e3c05b0e73125be690c71d63917b1ca7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Figure FAQ5.3.1 |  Climate impacts will increase competition for land use, reducing coastal land for crops and affecting food security for \r\nvulnerable groups. Adaptation methods like coastal aquaculture and mangrove reforestation reduce climate effects but may increase land competition."


id: 9bb4d5f9348c688bbbc37694d6a54501
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Climate change results in more frequent heatwaves, extreme rainfall, drought and rising sea levels, which negatively \r\naffect crop yields. More land is thus needed to grow crops, increasing land competition with other food systems \r\nthat use crops to feed their animals (e.g., livestock, fish). Where land will be flooded, humans cannot grow crops, \r\nbut food production could be adapted to grow seafood instead. Extensive land allocations aiming at reducing \r\ncarbon emissions, such as afforestation, reduce land availability for food. Unless carefully managed, competition \r\nfor land will increase food prices and food security."


id: eb384f614c472a67d242c65039bd3d48
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Solutions to reduce land competition and protect food security\r\nSustainable land management allows land to remain productive and support key functions. Other land practices \r\ninclude growing cover crops to improve soil quality. Governments can provide incentives to producers to grow \r\nalternative foods and use sustainable practices. Making sure that vulnerable groups (e.g., low-income communities, \r\nIndigenous people and small-scale producers) strengthen land tenure rights will help protect food security."


id: 16c70e9db1150e2b5590a7e920e3ad34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Food by-products used as alternative food sources and other products reduce waste and increase sustainability. \r\nDietary changes are another important solution. People that eat high amounts of meat or unhealthy foods could \r\nreduce consumption of these foods and have more diverse diets. These dietary changes will benefit their health and \r\nreduce pressure on land. Regulated labelling, education and other policies which encourage healthy diets can \r\nsupport these shifts."


id: b543d844e31f2f10b4a82b4a6ff21db9
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"A variety of adaptation options exist to improve food security in a warming world. Examples of adaptation for crop production include crop \r\nmanagement and livelihood diversification. For livestock-based systems, an example is matching number of animals with the production \r\ncapacity of pastures. For fisheries, eliminating overfishing is an effective adaptation practice. For mixed cropping and nature-based systems, \r\nan appropriate adaptation is agroforestry."


id: 3ff424f514017d97d71e59ab95d49dc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Adaptation strategies to enhance food security vary from farm-level interventions to national policies and \r\ninternational agreements. They cover the following dimensions of food security: availability, access, utilisation \r\n(food quality and safety) and stability."


id: 803d73615b2e54fbf5eea23e0b1e3487
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"For the production of crops, adaptation strategies include field and farm-level options such as crop management, \r\nlivelihood diversification and social protection such as crop insurance. The most common field management options \r\nare changes in planting schedules, crop varieties, fertilizers and irrigation. For example, farmers can shift their \r\nplanting schedules in response to the early or late onset of the rainy season. Moreover, there are new crop insurance \r\nschemes that are based on changes in weather patterns."


id: c540a40540c34a14ecd0c9fc3ef4ee58
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"For livestock-based systems, adaptation options include matching the number of animals with the production \r\ncapacity of pastures; adjusting water management based on seasonal and spatial patterns of forage production; \r\nmanaging animal diet; more effective use of fodder, rotational grazing; fire management to control woody \r\nthickening of grass; using more suitable livestock breeds or species; migratory pastoralist activities; and activities to \r\nmonitor and manage the spread of pests, weeds and diseases."


id: 528e01aa3384656326299f18343caff4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 10445
content:
"For ocean and inland fisheries, adaptation options are primarily concentrated in the socioeconomic dimension and \r\ngovernance and management. In general, eliminating overfishing could help rebuild fish stocks, reduce ecosystem \r\nimpacts, and increase fishing's adaptive capacity. Aquaculture is often viewed as an adaptation option for fisheries \r\ndeclines. However, there are adaptation strategies specific to aquaculture, including proper species selections at the \r\noperational level, such as the cultivation of brackish species (shrimp, crabs) in inland ponds during dry seasons and \r\nrice-freshwater finfish in wetter seasons."


id: b76aceac0e9cd5f2e5dc62c570cee870
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"For so-called mixed farming systems that produce a combination of crops, livestock, fish and trees, these systems' \r\ninherent diversity provides a solid platform for adaptation. A good example is agroforestry, the purposeful \r\nintegration of trees or shrubs with crop or livestock systems, which increases resilience against climate risks."


id: 730ef52ee4523e6eecec654d05212319
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Overall, nature-based systems or ecosystem-based strategies in food systems, such as agroecology, can be a useful \r\nadaptation method to increase wild and cultivated food sources. Agroecological practices include agroforestry, \r\nintercropping, increasing biodiversity, crop and pasture rotation, adding organic amendments, integration of \r\nlivestock into mixed systems, cover crops and minimising toxic and synthetic inputs with adverse health and \r\nenvironmental impacts."


id: fde67434cfcf44933735ae0586fc7aee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"FAQ 5.5: Climate change is not the only factor threatening global food security: other than climate action, what \r\nother actions are needed to end hunger and ensure access by all people to nutritious and sufficient food all year \r\nround?"


id: 877f02af06fdc5f0edfae1106e8cb1bb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Our food systems depend on many factors other than climate change, such as food production, water, land, energy and biodiversity. People's \r\naccess to healthy food can be also be affected by factors such as poverty and physical insecurity. We are all stakeholders in food systems, \r\nwhether as producers or consumers, and we can all contribute to the goal of a food-secure world by the choices we make in our everyday lives."


id: ce1bbbf4539fb84d49aada0c7d2e2c21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Today more than 820 million people are hungry, and hunger is on the rise in Africa. Two billion people experience \r\nmoderate or severe food shortages, and another 2 billion suffer from overnutrition, a state of obesity or being \r\noverweight from unbalanced diets, with related health impacts such as diabetes and heart disease. The changing \r\nclimate is already affecting food production. These effects are worsening, affecting food production from crops, \r\nlivestock, fish and forests in many places where people already do not have enough to eat. Food prices will be \r\naffected as a result, with increasing risk that poorer people will not be able to buy enough for their families. Food \r\nquality will increasingly be affected too."


id: cbf738685382e4b6a5e46a02a7c4225c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Our ability to grow and consume food depends on many factors other than climate change. There are tight \r\nconnections between food production, water, land, energy and biodiversity, for example. Other factors like gender \r\ninequity, poverty, political exclusion, remoteness from urban centres and physical insecurity can all affect people's \r\naccess to healthy food."


id: 3278f4d2af34a21c06e40a3f6cf5db66
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Our food systems need to be robust and sustainable; otherwise we will not be able to manage the additional \r\npressures imposed on them by climate change. We can all contribute to this goal."


id: 11cbe7ac06370dc8307e1207170aacc2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Contributing Authors: Diane Archer (Australia/France), Chiara Bertolin (Italy), Shauna Brail \r\n(Canada), Anton Cartwright (South Africa), Mikhail Chester (USA), Sarah Colenbrander (Australia/\r\nSwitzerland), Tapan Dhar (Bangladesh), Barbara Evans (UK), Sudharto P. Hadi (Indonesia), \r\nWiwandari Handayani (Indonesia), David Hondula (USA), Twan van Hooff (the Netherlands), \r\nSirkku Juhola (Finland), Christine Kirchhoff (USA), Sari Kovats (UK), Hayley Leck (South Africa/UK), \r\nPablo Mendez Lazaro (Puerto Rico), Tischa Munoz-Erickson (Puerto Rico), Vishal Narain (India), \r\nMarta Olazabal (Spain), Luis Ortiz (Puerto Rico), Angelica Ospina (Colombia/Canada), Emmanuel \r\nOsuteye (Ghana), Chao Ren (China), Rukuh Setiadi (Indonesia), Shalini Sharma (India), Wan-Yu \r\nShih (Chinese Taipei), Gilbert Siame (Zambia), Faith Taylor (UK), Jennifer Vanos (Canada), J. Jason \r\nWest (USA), Linda Westman (Sweden)"


id: 8de5c84c11993f111afe764ec049ab5c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
content_type: text
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vector_id: 19855
content:
"Dodman, D., B. Hayward, M. Pelling, V. Castan Broto, W. Chow, E. Chu, R. Dawson, L. Khirfan, T. McPhearson, A. Prakash, \r\nY. Zheng, and G. Ziervogel, 2022: Cities, Settlements and Key Infrastructure. In: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, \r\nAdaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental \r\nPanel on Climate Change [H.-O. Portner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegria, M. Craig, \r\nS. Langsdorf, S. Loschke, V. Moller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, \r\nNY, USA, pp. 907-1040, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.008."


id: 4c7e52132b96518c4d43dd2582c27fdf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"FAQ 6.1 | Why and how are cities, settlements and \r\ndifferent types of infrastructure especially vulnerable \r\nto the impacts of climate change?  992"


id: 9fbcb9024a6b6ccf6e0b3067f52263da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"FAQ 6.2 | What are the key climate risks faced by cities, \r\nsettlements and vulnerable populations today, and how \r\nwill these risks change in a mid-century (2050) 2degC \r\nwarmer world?  993"


id: 85e356c8cb9a0ba8765471a7c9c35d9d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"FAQ 6.3 | What adaptation actions in human settlements \r\ncan contribute to reducing climate risks and building \r\nresilience across building, neighbourhood, city and \r\nglobal scales?  994"


id: 34b5116ea78f6e513a3650816dfc9b16
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"FAQ 6.4 | How can actions that reduce climate \r\nrisks in cities and settlements also help to reduce \r\nurban poverty, enhance economic performance and \r\ncontribute to climate mitigation?  995"


id: 2408f4b772aeb0d87f4375e5d72394ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"confidence). {Box  6.3, Box  6.4; 6.4.3.1; 6.4.5.2, Case Study 6.7; \r\nCross-Working Group Box URBAN in Chapter 6}"


id: d4f177b8f33368ce47508919aed19dff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"In all cities and urban areas, the risk faced by people and assets \r\nfrom hazards associated with climate change has increased (high \r\nconfidence1\r\n). Urban areas are now home to 4.2 billion people, the \r\nmajority of the world's population. Urbanisation processes generate \r\nvulnerability and exposure which combine with climate change hazards \r\nto drive urban risk and impacts (high confidence). Globally, the most \r\nrapid growth in urban vulnerability and exposure has been in cities and \r\nsettlements where adaptive capacity is limited, especially in unplanned \r\nand informal settlements in low- and middle-income nations and in \r\nsmaller and medium-sized urban centres (high confidence). Between \r\n2015 and 2020, urban populations globally grew by more than \r\n397 million people, with more than 90% of this growth taking place \r\nin less developed regions. {Box 6.1; 6.1.4; 6.2.1; 6.3.2; 6.3.3.4; 6.2.2.2; \r\n6.4.4}"


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"Evidence from urban and rural settlements is unequivocal; climate \r\nimpacts are felt disproportionately in urban communities, with \r\nthe most economically and socially marginalised being most \r\naffected (high confidence). Vulnerabilities are shaped by drivers of \r\ninequality, including gender, class, race, ethnic origin, age, level of ability, \r\nsexuality and non-conforming gender orientation, framed by cultural \r\nnorms, diverse values and practices (high confidence). Intersections \r\nbetween these drivers shape unique experiences of vulnerability and \r\nrisk and the adaptive capacities of groups and individuals. Robust \r\nadaptation plans are those developed in inclusive ways. However, \r\nfew adaptation plans for urban areas and infrastructure are being \r\ndeveloped through consultation and co-production with diverse and \r\nmarginalised urban communities. The concerns and capacities of \r\nmarginalised communities are rarely considered in planning (medium "


id: c19a9b9b305bc2723171b1164aeaeb48
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Many more cities have developed adaptation plans since AR5, \r\nbut only a limited number of these have been implemented \r\n(medium confidence). Many of these plans focus narrowly on climate \r\nrisk reduction, missing opportunities to advance co-benefits of climate \r\nmitigation and sustainable development, compounding inequality and \r\nreducing well-being (medium confidence). However, an increasing array \r\nof adaptation options are available. Nature-based solutions are now \r\nmainstream urban adaptation options and there remains considerable \r\nscope for their wider application. Social-policy-based adaptation, \r\nincluding education and the adaptation of health systems offers "


id: 67513ad913b9ffe0767bbe8ac37ab4ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"considerable future scope. Options of adapting physical infrastructure \r\nare similarly advancing, though at times constrained by existing \r\ninfrastructure design and location. The greatest gaps between policy \r\nand action are in failures to manage adaptation of social infrastructure \r\n(community facilities, services and networks) and failure to address \r\ncomplex interconnected risks for example in the food-energy-water-\r\nhealth nexus or the inter-relationships of air quality and climate risk \r\n(medium confidence). Barriers to implementing plans include lack of \r\npolitical will and management capacity, limited financial means and \r\nmechanisms (especially for smaller urban settlements) and competing \r\npriorities (limited evidence, high agreement). {6.3.1, 6.4.3; 6.4.5; \r\n6.4.5.1; 6.4.5.2; Figure 6.5}"


id: c11ee3a68f10a077fa598b84b71d6cac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"The shift from urban planning to action in ways that identify and \r\nadvance synergies and co-benefits of mitigation, adaptation and \r\nSustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has occurred slowly and \r\nunevenly (high confidence). While there is ambition for joined-up \r\npolicy, action and research, this is still the exception. One area of \r\nsustained effort is community-based adaptation planning and resilience \r\nactions which have potential to be better integrated to enhance \r\nwell-being and create synergies with the Sustainable Development \r\nGoal ambitions of leaving no one behind. Complex trade-offs and gaps \r\nin alignment between mitigation and adaptation over scale and across \r\npolicy areas where sustainable development is hindered or reversed \r\nalso remain. {6.1.1, Table 6.2; 6.1.5; 6.4.1.4; 6.4.3; 6.4.4}"


id: a91d539b4c2f44e9b338df5301ac7864
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"Urban adaptation gaps exist in all world regions and for all \r\nhazard types, although exposure to the limits to adaptation is \r\nunevenly distributed. Governance capacity, financial support \r\nand the legacy of past urban infrastructure investment \r\nconstrain how all cities and settlements are able to adapt \r\n(high confidence). Critical capacity gaps exist at city and community \r\nlevels that hinder adaptation. These include the limited ability to \r\nidentify social vulnerability and community strengths; the absence of \r\nintegrated planning to protect communities; and the lack of access \r\nto innovative funding arrangements and limited capability to manage \r\nfinance and commercial insurance (medium confidence). These can \r\nbe addressed through enhanced locally accountable decision making \r\nwith sufficient access to science, technology and local knowledge to \r\nsupport widespread application of adaptation solutions. {6.3.1, 6.4.3; \r\n6.4.5; 6.4.5.1; 6.4.5.2; Figure 6.4; Figure 6.5}"


id: dc23da5f433e9bbc93839e2f39c580ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 32146
content:
"city and community level action to be points of alignment between \r\nNationally Determined Contributions, National Adaptation Plans and \r\nthe SDGs. City and local action can complement, and at times go \r\nfurther than national and international interventions. Similarly, the \r\nConvention on Biological Diversity offers a global agreement through \r\nwhich nature-based solutions can be viewed as benefits for biodiversity, \r\nsocial justice and climate resilience. However, there is no specific global \r\nagreement that addresses informality and city-level climate adaptation. \r\nMore comprehensive and clearly articulated global ambitions for city \r\nand community adaptation will contribute to inclusive urbanisation, \r\nby addressing the root causes of social and economic inequalities \r\nthat drive social exclusion and marginalisation, so that adaptation \r\ncan directly support the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (high \r\nconfidence). {6.1.1; Table 6.2; 6.2.3.2; 6.4.1.4; Case Study 6.4}"


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"City and infrastructure planning approaches that integrate \r\nadaptation into everyday decision making are supported by the \r\n2030 Agenda (the Paris Agreement, the SDGs, the New Urban \r\nAgenda and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction) \r\n(high confidence). The 2030 Agenda provides a global framework for "


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"responses by actors from the local to the global scales to make human \r\nsettlements and infrastructure more resilient (UNDP, 2021). There is \r\nrecognition also of the considerable capacity in settlements to meet \r\nclimate change challenges, if the governance, financial and social \r\nconditions are in place (Carter et al., 2015; MINURVI, 2016). And yet \r\nthe implementation of climate adaptation planning lags behind climate \r\nmitigation efforts in urban communities (Sharifi, 2020; Grafakos et al., \r\n2019; Nagendra et al., 2018)."


id: ec8d41d1b7807cefa1b2a5ec6678946c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Cities and urbanising areas are currently home to over half the world's \r\npopulation. What happens in cities is crucial to successful adaptation \r\n(Grafakos et  al., 2019). By 2050, over two thirds of the world's \r\npopulation is expected to be urban, many living in unplanned and \r\ninformal settlements and in smaller urban centres in Africa and Asia \r\n(high confidence) (UNDESA, 2018). Between 2015 and 2020, urban \r\npopulations globally have grown by about 397  million people, with \r\nmore than 90% of this growth taking place in less developed countries \r\n(UNDESA, 2018). Projections of the number of people expected to live \r\nin urban areas highly exposed to climate change impacts have also \r\nincreased, exacerbating future risks under a range of climate scenarios. \r\nRates of population growth are most pronounced in smaller and \r\nmedium-sized settlements of up to 1 million people (UNDESA, 2018)."


id: 34e9faa78141fad7ca262ae16d2572a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Well-planned climate adaptation can have far reaching co-benefits \r\nfor sustainable development and community well-being (Nerini et al., \r\n2019; Tonmoy et  al., 2020). However, the varied success of cities' \r\nresponses to the global COVID-19 pandemic underscores how social \r\nand economic conditions, built environments and local planning \r\ncan exacerbate or reduce vulnerability and long-term sustainable, \r\ncommunity well-being (Megahed and Ghoneim, 2020; Plastrik et al., \r\n2020; Hepburn et al., 2020; Sarkis et al., 2020)."


id: b320e653d159107aabfd2d1f41a40cc9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"These collaborative global changes are reflected in the bodies of \r\nliterature assessed for this report. In AR5, the section on 'human \r\nsettlements, industry, and infrastructure' contained three chapters: \r\nurban areas; rural areas; and key economic sectors and services. \r\nThis chapter covers the full range of human settlements: from small \r\nsettlements in predominantly rural areas, to large metropolises in \r\nboth high-income and low-income countries. It also assesses evidence \r\nof climate change impacts, vulnerability and adaptation on a range \r\nof urban infrastructures, including infrastructure that incorporates \r\nsocio-economic and ecosystem dimensions (see Section 6.1.3)."


id: 38cf096e7621b64eeecd99c056d0567b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Many of the significant sustainable development initiatives that have \r\nbeen proposed and implemented in the last five years recognise the \r\ncritical importance of cities, settlements and key infrastructure in \r\nresponding to the crisis of climate change (Zhang et al., 2019; Nerini\r\net al., 2019). There is widespread acceptance of the need for far-reaching "


id: 9f3bf955ed234631ccd53f0d45889c92
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"Case studies highlight how climate and other issues interrelate to \r\ncreate (or reduce) urban risk within and between scales of decision \r\nmaking. They illustrate how multiple levels of governance and formal \r\nand informal decision making sectors influence how risk production/\r\nreduction plays out across a range of urban contexts and networks."


id: 7f4f48c771e2677a1050e41471f2fa01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"An additional research bridge between AR5 and AR6 was the IPCC \r\nCities and Climate Change Science conference held in Edmonton, \r\nCanada, in March 2018 (Prieur-Richard, Walsh and Craig, 2019). This \r\ngenerated a 'Global Research and Action Agenda on Cities and Climate \r\nChange Science' (Prieur-Richard, Walsh and Craig, 2019), which \r\nhighlights six topical research areas where more evidence is needed \r\nto inform action: finance; informality; uncertainty; urban planning \r\nand design; built and green/blue infrastructure; and sustainable \r\nconsumption and production. These areas are addressed in specific \r\nsections of this chapter or as cross-cutting themes. The Cross-Working \r\nGroup Box URBAN in this chapter provides a linkage with perspectives \r\nfrom Working Group III."


id: cfbcd55117845b05377eeecc9dd634ac
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"This chapter takes a comprehensive approach to understanding 'key \r\ninfrastructure' as expressed in social, nature-based and physical \r\ninfrastructure. Social infrastructure includes the social, cultural, and \r\nfinancial activities and institutions, as well as associated property, \r\nbuildings and artefacts and policy domains such as social protection, \r\nhealth and education that support well-being and public life (Frolova\r\net al., 2016; Latham and Layton, 2019). Nature-based infrastructure \r\nfocuses on solutions to risk, applying natural assets such as trees or \r\nopen water, physical infrastructure describes engineering approaches \r\nand grey/physical infrastructure refers to engineered assets that provide \r\none or multiple services required by society, such as transportation or \r\nwastewater treatment ([IISD, N.D.]; see also Annex II: Glossary)."


id: e017c0fc7b04ea66b14235c8bbff7587
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"This approach is based on a framing of cities and settlements as \r\ncomplex systems where social, ecological and physical processes \r\ninteract in planned and unplanned ways. This chapter therefore builds \r\non the AR5 Chapter 10 (Arent et al., 2014) conception of key economic \r\nsectors and services (e.g., energy, water, transport, waste, sanitation \r\nand drainage) by positioning these within three major categories of \r\ninfrastructure: social, nature based and physical (see Section  6.3). \r\nWhere adaptation challenges can be responded to by more than \r\none approach, sometimes working together, this is noted (see also \r\nSections  17.2 and 17.4). This approach allows an understanding of \r\nadaptation that is not constrained to the administrative boundaries \r\nof cities and settlements, but that includes the networks and flows "


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"Key infrastructure is used here to refer to 'critical nodes and arteries' \r\nthat comprise urban energy, food, water, sewerage, health, transport \r\nand communication systems (Steele and Legacy, 2017; Maxwell et al., "


id: abb408f2e64142366fe01b8827aff5af
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"Table 6.1 |  Proportion of the urban population in different size class urban areas (UN-DESA 2018). Each column indicates the percentage of urban residents in that region living \r\nin cities of that size class."


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"'Large villages', 'small towns', and 'small urban \r\ncentres'. The proportion of the population in rural \r\nand urban areas is influenced by each nation's \r\ndefinition of 'urban areas'"


id: 62784fdf0c680ee26abe15576d4b0299
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"for regions (coastal and non-coastal), informal settlements, and \r\ninfrastructure sectors (energy, water, and transport) (high confidence)' \r\n(IPCC, 2018).We take this statement as a starting point for assessing \r\nthe risks to cities, settlements and key infrastructure, with infrastructure \r\nextended as noted above. Risks from climate change are understood \r\nas the product of climate change associated hazards impacting on \r\nexposed and vulnerable people and assets (including biodiversity). \r\nAdaptation can, in some cases, reduce exposure and susceptibility \r\nand enable recovery and scope for transformation toward long-term \r\nequitable and sustainable development. Risks describe both present \r\nconditions and future prospects. Direct attribution of hazards to \r\nclimate change remains limited to temperature extremes and sea level \r\nrise, though we consider all hydrometeorological hazards as systems \r\nassociated with climate change processes."


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"that connect peri-urban communities, metropolitan regions, suburban \r\nsettlements and more rural places (see Box 6.1). Both formal provision \r\nof infrastructure services by government and informal provision \r\nby communities and individuals are considered at risk from climate \r\nchange, as are existing adaptation pathways and actions."


id: 92e53940dcc206504b04b463c97ad636
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"The IPCC 1.5degC Special Report commented that 'The extent of risk \r\ndepends on human vulnerability and the effectiveness of adaptation "


id: e78a05e1f678ba5d2bef1a26fe55cac1
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"A flash flood damages energy supply, for \r\nexample by flooding an electricity \r\nsub-station. This direct impact of the flood \r\ncascades rapidly to produce compound \r\nimpacts on social infrastructure through \r\ncompromising urban services, breaks in IT \r\nservices and shutdown in traffic \r\nmanagement."


id: 639f2d323499e094a3fa987d46dad93e
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"The chronic impacts of everyday flooding damage \r\nsocial infrastructure over time as livelihoods, local \r\nhealth and education services are eroded. These \r\nimpacts cascade through reduced city tax income at \r\na time when there is increased demand for urban \r\nservices including public transport, out-migration of \r\nskilled workers reduce the skill base to maintain IT \r\nand nature based solutions such\r\nas public parks. These impacts in turn\r\nconstrain social infrastructrue."


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"and Chu, 2019; Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2018). The benefits of integrating \r\ndecision making across scales for climate resilient development is also \r\nhighlighted in Section 6.4. How households engage with communities \r\nand neighbourhoods and larger units within cities, and how cities \r\n(both formal and informal) interact with sub-national and national \r\nactors is also discussed, as is the role of finance and community-based \r\norganisations (CBOs)/NGOs in the governance process."


id: 92cf7fca25d0f34b34fea20b9ec200cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Since AR5, many cities and other settlements, particularly unplanned \r\nand/or informal in Asia and Africa, have continued to grow at rapid \r\nrates (van den Berg , Otto and Fikresilassie 2021). Elsewhere, in Latin \r\nAmerica in particular, while growth is less rapid, inequality persists. \r\nAs a result, cities and settlements are crucial both as sites of potential \r\naction on climate change, and sites of increased exposure to risk \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 1f10e104bd8b6a2fb4dfa03559293b00
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"Patterns and trends for urban population growth were described in \r\ndetail in AR5. Between 2015 and 2020, urban populations globally \r\nhave grown by more than 397 million people, with more than 90% of \r\nthis growth taking place in less developed regions (UNDESA, 2018). "


id: e5702cb0e28d9bbbc448f0575c5ac647
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"While there are few analyses of urban trends at the global scale, an \r\nadditional 2.5 billion people are projected to be living in urban areas "


id: 392dcbf553f3f80d2acf093aafda4b49
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"Evidence since AR5 confirms that occupants of informal settlements \r\nare particularly exposed to climate events given low-quality housing, \r\nlimited capacity to adapt, and limited or no risk-reducing infrastructure \r\n(high confidence) (Melore and Nel, 2020; Twinomuhangi et al., 2021; \r\nSatterthwaite et  al., 2020; Patel et  al., 2020a)(see Section  6.2 and \r\ncase study). The impacts of COVID-19 are also increasingly impacting \r\nhigh-density informal and slum settlements where social distancing \r\nand access to water for handwashing are limited (Bhide, 2020; Pinchoff\r\net al., 2021; Tagliacozzo, Pisacane and Kilkey, 2021; Wilkinson, 2020). \r\nThis compounds pre-existing vulnerability to climate change associated \r\nhazards. Box  6.1 expands on trends in informality as part of global \r\nurbanism, peri-urbanisation and suburbanisation, with implications for \r\nthe global distribution of climate risks and adaptive capacity."


id: e5150960d566daeb587bea8ef204ff8b
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"One critical element of global urban trends which has received growing \r\nattention is informality (see also Prieur-Richard, Walsh and Craig, 2019). \r\nInformality is one of the key defining features of cities and settlements \r\nin the Global South (see Annex II: Glossary; Banks, Lombard and Mitlin, \r\n2020; Myers, 2021; UN-Habitat, 2016c). In almost all nations in the \r\nGlobal South, more than half the urban workforce work in informal \r\nemployment; the proportions are particularly high in South Asia (82% \r\nin informal employment) and sub-Saharan Africa (66%) (Chen, Roever \r\nand Skinner, 2016; Chen, 2014). The term 'informal settlement' refers to "


id: 6b731479e6f02f97b801f5cbb350686e
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"Urban expansion processes affect human settlements everywhere, regardless of their size. Figure 6.1 represents a continuum of settlements \r\nfrom high- to low-density areas (Ward and Shackleton, 2016). Urban and rural areas are not always clearly differentiated (Brenner, 2014a; "


id: 148eb83e171931fb4f83e3a5b1ae8eb
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"Brenner and Schmid, 2017). For example, in 2010/2011, drought-exacerbated wildfires across Russia's agricultural hinterland not only led \r\nto increased air pollution in Moscow and other large cities in the region, it also disrupted global supply chains of wheat and caused \r\nskyrocketing global food prices (Zscheischler et al., 2018). Floods in Bangkok, Thailand in 2011 destroyed many foreign-owned factories, \r\nleading to a global shortfall in different types of IT equipment (Levermann, 2014)."


id: 99735fe5ad20b6e0041f04b995a80508
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"At the same time, actions to improve access to peri-urban services almost always improve resilience (Simon, 2016) Evidence from Kampala, \r\nAddis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, Douala, Ibadan, Nairobi, Dakar and Accra shows that urban and peri-urban agriculture and forestry can \r\nsupport adaptation (Lwasa et al., 2014). In the metropolitan area of Milan, multi-functional agriculture supports a local, more sustainable \r\nfood chain (Magoni and Colucci, 2017). Since communities in peri-urban areas are often transitory, efforts toward creating social capital by \r\npromoting civic engagement are crucial to facilitate collective action (Narain et al., 2017). For example, adaptation actions can help to build \r\nthe capacity of the community to engage with service providers (Harris, Chu and Ziervogel, 2018; Ziervogel et al., 2017), as demonstrated \r\nin parts of peri-urban Kolkata, India and Khulna, and Bangladesh (Gomes and Hermans, 2018; Gomes, Hermans and Thissen, 2018)."


id: 3fe29b16c251d107d07cefcda1bb21ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Urbanisation leads to the spatial fragmentation of the hinterland, divided alongside functional units to serve the demands of the capitalist \r\nurban economy (Brenner and Schmid, 2017). Urbanisation is thus linked to new intensities of resource exploitation that threaten vulnerable \r\nland and ecosystems, as shown in the Amazon, and that extend across scales (Arboleda, 2016b; Wilson, 2018). The fragmentation of the \r\nhinterland for extractivist purposes depletes ecosystem services and further exacerbates cascading risks (high confidence) (Section 6.2.6)."


id: 1ccf02ac8f3f90556605fe72925444bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"This section reports on changes in global enabling environment; the \r\narchitecture of international agreements available to inform policy \r\nfor national governments and others on urbanisation and climate \r\nadaptation, since the AR5."


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"Six new international agreements and initiatives have been achieved, \r\neach of which has far-reaching implications for the management \r\nof rapid urbanisation and climate change: the Paris Climate \r\nAgreement (United Nations, 2015b); the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable \r\nDevelopment, including the SDGs (United Nations, 2015c); the Sendai \r\nFramework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2015); the New \r\nUrban Agenda (United Nations, 2016a); Addis Ababa Action Agenda \r\n(July 2015); and the World Humanitarian Summit (May 2016). Table 6.2 \r\nsummarises these."


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"Alongside new international agreements are a series of new landmark \r\nglobal stocktake reports: three IPCC special reports including the \r\nIPCC 1.5 report ( IPCC, 2019a; IPCC, 2019b Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., \r\n2018), the UN Environment GEO6 (UN Environment, 2019) and IPBES \r\n2019 (Brondizio et al., 2019), and UNDRR 2019 (UNDRR, 2019), each \r\nhave argued for urgent action on climate mitigation and to invest in \r\ninclusive strategies for adaptation if the SDGs are to be met. These \r\nfindings are comprehensively evidenced and do not need to be \r\nrevisited here. Our starting point then is to assess the science on how \r\ninclusive, sustainable development can be delivered through enhanced \r\nadaptation to climate change risks."


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"Table 6.2 |  International policy agreements with implications for urbanisation and climate adaptation"


id: fca8028a42d500c0804fa10c6a3dafad
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"the overall contribution that cities and settlements are making (Hale, \r\n2016; Chan et al., 2015b). Although meeting the Paris goals will require \r\nstaying within a 'carbon budget', supporting rapidly developing urban \r\nareas in the Global South to the same infrastructure level as developed \r\ncities may consume significant proportions of that budget (Bai et al., \r\n2018)."


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"contributions made by cities to NDCs (Hsu et  al., 2020; Backstrand \r\nand Kuyper, 2017). Over two-thirds, 113 out of 164, of initial Intended \r\nNationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), prior to ratification, had \r\nreferenced urban responses in the context of sustainable development, \r\nclimate mitigation and adaptation (UN-Habitat, 2016a). Analysis \r\nof those INDCs revealed 58 focused on urban climate adaptation, \r\n17 focused on both adaptation and mitigation, and 4 focused on \r\nmitigation (UN-Habitat, 2017). Simultaneously, multiple efforts have \r\nemerged to align the actions of nation states with those of other \r\nactors, including the UNFCC 2014 Global Climate Action Portal \r\n(Hsu, Weinfurter and Xu, 2017). While significant optimism has been \r\ngathered around the possibility to intervene at sub-national level, \r\nthe most difficult challenge has been to establish a coherent view of "


id: 8afcc5e11abb73aac11ad1ecb1d7523d
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"There is increasing international effort among non-Party stakeholders \r\nto the Paris Climate Agreement to collaborate to meet the Paris Climate \r\ngoals (Data Driven Yale New Climate Institute PBL, 2018; Chan et al., \r\n2015a). A review of contributions by non-state actors in 2019 by the EU \r\nCovenant of Mayors identified 10427 cities with climate commitments, \r\nwhile the Global Covenant of Mayors included 10543 cities representing "


id: 36e739f8bc0dff8f15dfdc97d87e3e3
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vector_id: 6027
content:
"Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC noted that 'Global warming of 2degC \r\nis expected to pose greater risks to urban areas than global warming \r\nof 1.5degC (medium confidence)'."


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"a population of 969  million citizens (Palermo et  al., 2020; Peduzzi \r\net  al., 2020). International efforts also include the United Nations \r\nFramework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Non-State Actor \r\nZone for Climate Action (Data Driven Yale New Climate Institute PBL, \r\n2018). There is also a proliferation of new non-governmental and \r\npublic-private actors that address both adaptation and mitigation in \r\ncities and settlements, including: the C40 Cities Climate Leadership \r\nGroup, 100 Resilient Cities; the Global Resilient Cities Network, We \r\nMean Business, and We Are Still In (Ireland and Clausen, 2019) and \r\nthe Global Alliance for Buildings and Construction (Dean et al., 2016). \r\nHowever, there is as yet limited research into the effectiveness of these \r\ninitiatives in enhancing medium and small city adaptation and limited \r\ndocumentation of climate adaptation actions by non-traditional \r\nagents, particularly in the Global South (Lamb et al., 2019)."


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"This section commences with a review of scenarios and pathways \r\nlinking urban and infrastructural development with climate change; \r\nthen assesses the key risks (with a focus on those for which there is \r\na greater degree of evidence or confidence since AR5) and how these \r\nrisks are created in urban settings. It then assesses evidence on the \r\ndifferentiated nature of human vulnerability and the risks affecting key \r\ninfrastructure. Finally, this discussion reviews compound and cascading \r\nrisks, and risks created by adaptation actions."


id: 1f6afba6df3513f4a8ba6fad0a04c34a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"This section demonstrates the consistency with which urban processes \r\nand places have been rising to the top of international agreements and \r\nagendas in the last 10 years (Bulkeley, 2015; van der Heijden et al., \r\n2018; Knieling, 2016). However, many cities, particularly smaller cities \r\nand informal settlements in the Global South where development is \r\nrapid, need greater support for local governance, more information, \r\nand more diverse sources of finance to meet the vision of global \r\nclimate agreements (Greenwalt, Raasakka and Alverson, 2018; Cohen, \r\n2019). Moreover, the response of many cities to climate change is \r\noften constrained by wider political, social and economic structures, \r\ndevelopment path dependences and high carbon lock in (Princeti, \r\n2016; Johnson, 2018; Jordan et al., 2015)."


id: 35b6b96add0b7a937716d92a0ae5e34c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Examining projected climate change impacts and resulting risks in \r\ncities, settlements and key infrastructures requires the prerequisite \r\ndevelopment of scenarios which are plausible descriptions of how the \r\nfuture may develop based on a coherent and internally consistent set \r\nof assumptions about key driving forces, (e.g., rate of technological \r\nchange, prices and relationships) and pathways or the temporal \r\nevolution of natural and/or human systems, such as demographic and \r\nurban land cover change, toward a future state or states (Gao and \r\nO'Neill, 2020; Gao and O'Neill, 2019; see also Section 6.1.5)."


id: 6fdb3ea0039296019df100db8ca29967
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Climate change research creates scenarios integrating emissions and \r\ndevelopment pathways dimensions (Ebi et al., 2014; van Vuuren et al., \r\n2017b; van Vuuren et  al., 2017a) and Representative Concentration \r\nPathways (RCPs) (Riahi et al., 2017). For risk reduction at regional scales, \r\nscenarios require urban-relevant climate projections, for example, \r\ndownscaling from global and regional climate models of variables such "


id: 2b75e3b2e0169a719e626a5700ed93b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4279
content:
"This section assesses the impacts of hazards associated with climate \r\nchange that will affect cities, settlements and key infrastructure, \r\nparticularly how climate systems and urban systems interact to \r\nproduce patterns of risk and loss. The conclusions of the IPCC Special "


id: f636da7a94acb38da325262133b7187b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"as temperature, precipitation, air pollutants and sea level rise that are \r\nanalysed usually for mid- or end-21st Century timeframes (e.g., Mika\r\net al., 2018; Kusaka et al., 2016; Masson et al., 2014b). These data are \r\nneeded to ascertain likely ranges of climate change impacts within city \r\nand settlement boundaries, and to quantify physical exposure when \r\ndeveloping pathways for risk reduction. Consideration of current and \r\nprojected future growth pathways of multiple urban sectors and key \r\ninfrastructure, for example, transport, energy and buildings, are also \r\nneeded to estimate probabilities of risk outcomes and damages within \r\nand across urban systems (O'Neill et al., 2015)(WGIII AR6 Section 8)."


id: b1fcb3dad0f6df33648a9d63db042495
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 25501
content:
"independent of global climate change. Huang et  al. (2019) project \r\nthat urban land areas will expand by 0.6-1.3  million km2\r\n  between \r\n2015 and 2050, an increase of 78-171% over the urban footprint in \r\n2015. Specifically in relation to floods and droughts, Guneralp et al. \r\n(2015) calculate that even without accounting for climate change, the \r\nextent of urban areas exposed to flood hazards will increase 2.7 times \r\nbetween 2000 and 2030, the extent exposed to drought hazards will \r\napproximately double during this period, and urban land exposed to \r\nboth floods and droughts will increase more than 2.5 times."


id: 8e5f35c52ed078f165354e056594a39b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Strong connections exist between climate change scenarios and urban \r\nclimate-related risks. In some cases, the linkage is direct as climate \r\nchange is associated with more frequent and more intense extreme \r\nweather and climate events, as assessed in Section  6.2.3. In other \r\ncontexts, the connection is mediated by urban developmental pathways \r\narising from local-scale environmental stresses and degradation, and \r\naccess to adaptation options, as reviewed in Section 6.2.4."


id: ee93816d6107abebb3f67e67952d5e7a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Higher temperatures associated with climate change, through warmer \r\nglobal average temperatures and regional heatwave episodes, will \r\ninteract with urban systems in a variety of ways (Doblas-Reyes et al., \r\n2021 Box  10.3). Future urbanisation will amplify projected local air \r\ntemperature increase, particularly by strong influence on minimum \r\ntemperatures, which is approximately comparable in magnitude to \r\nglobal warming (high confidence) (Arias et  al. In Press Box  TS14). \r\nWithin cities, exposure to heat island effects is uneven, with some \r\npopulations disproportionately exposed to risk including low income \r\ncommunities, children, the elderly, disabled, and ethnic minorities \r\n(Quintana-Talvac et al., 2021; Sabrin et al., 2020; Chambers, 2020; and \r\nsee later in this section)."


id: 1409b5e74e316f059e99bfb4ed97479f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Urban systems interact with climate systems in multiple, dynamic and \r\ncomplex ways (Section  6.1.1, Doblas-Reyes et  al., 2021 Box  10.3). \r\nClimate change can have direct impacts on the functioning of urban \r\nsystems, while the nature of those systems plays a substantial role \r\nin modifying the effects of climate change (high confidence) (Frank, \r\nDelano and Caniglia, 2017; Smid and Costa, 2018). An example of this \r\nurban system climate nexus is the urban heat island effect (discussed \r\nin Section  6.2.3.1) (Susca and Pomponi, 2020). Assessing the \r\ninter-relationships between multiple systems and a range of hazards is \r\nparticularly important as many cities are presently exposed to multiple \r\nclimate-related hazards: more than 100 cities analysed as part of a \r\n571 city study in Europe were deemed vulnerable to two or more \r\nclimate impacts (Guerreiro et  al., 2018). Rapid expansion of urban \r\nareas increases the exposure of urban populations to various hazards "


id: 847a08203786f218116160a8c7320038
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"The risks to cities, settlements and infrastructure from heatwaves \r\nwill worsen (high confidence) (Leal Filho et  al., 2021; see also \r\nSections 6.2.5; 6.3.3.1, Arias et al. In Press Box TS14). Depending on \r\nthe RCP, between half (RCP2.6) to three-quarters (RCP8.5) of the "


id: 22332cb469f0c1f34a0f95e5da11c003
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 2827
content:
"major driver for increased heat exposure is the combination of global \r\nwarming and population growth in already-warm cities in regions \r\nincluding Africa, India and the Middle East (Klein and Anderegg, 2021)."


id: 66e0b071c9cdf8067df45b6907708848
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 13776
content:
"human population could be exposed to periods of life-threatening \r\nclimatic conditions arising from coupled impacts of extreme heat and \r\nhumidity by 2100 (Figure 6.3; Mora et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2021). \r\nCities in mid-latitudes are potentially subject to twice the levels of \r\nheat stress compared with their rural surroundings under all RCP \r\nscenarios by 2050, for example Belgian cities (Wouters et al., 2017). \r\nA disproportionate level of exposure exists in subtropical cities subject \r\nto year-round warm temperatures and higher humidity, requiring less \r\nwarming to exceed 'dangerous' thresholds, for example Nairobi (Scott\r\net al., 2017) and Sao Paulo (Diniz, Goncalves and Sheridan, 2020). It \r\nis expected that more than 90% of the 300 million people who will \r\nbe exposed to super- and ultra-extreme heatwaves in the Middle East \r\nand North Africa will live in urban centres (Zittis et al., 2021), while the "


id: 73d6d4d958466b01a80a9df9f6e51c66
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Locally, the urban heat island also elevates temperatures within cities \r\nrelative to their surroundings. It is caused by physical changes to \r\nthe surface energy balance of the pre-urban site from urbanisation, \r\nresulting from the thermal characteristics and spatial arrangement \r\nof the built environment, and anthropogenic heat release (Oke et al., \r\n2017; Chow et  al., 2014; Susca and Pomponi, 2020; Doblas-Reyes \r\net al., 2021 FAQ10.1). A considerable body of evidence exists on how \r\nthe multi-scale impacts and consequent risks arise when local elevated \r\ntemperatures within settlements are enhanced by climate change, with "


id: f74d85b0dd701655f4c8fb176a0f06ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Figure 6.3 |  Global distribution of population exposed to hyperthermia from extreme heat for (a) the present, and projections from selected Representative \r\nConcentration Pathways in (b) the mid-21st century and (c) the end of the 21st century. Shading indicates projected number of days in a year in which conditions of \r\nair temperature and humidity surpass a common threshold beyond which climate conditions turned deadly and pose a risk of death (Mora et al., 2017). Named cities are the top \r\n15 urban areas by population size during 2020, 2050 and 2100, respectively, as projected by Hoornweg and Pope (2017)"


id: 7f9d45a01f2b3e2944cbf1ec85837da9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"specific elements of this affecting megacities (Darmanto et al., 2019). \r\nThe urban heat island itself is amplified during heatwaves (Founda \r\nand Santamouris, 2017), but the extent to which varies regionally \r\nand by time of day (Ward et al., 2016a; Zhao et al., 2018b; Eunice Lo\r\net al., 2020). When combined with warming induced by urban growth, \r\nextreme heat risks are expected to affect half of the future urban \r\npopulation, with a particular impact in the tropical Global South and \r\nin coastal cities and settlements (Huang et al., 2019; Section CCP2.2.2; \r\nTable CCP2.A.1)."


id: f21f8baf4a08c0fedbaceb1439f6c1a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35625
content:
"Higher urban temperatures place unequal economic stresses on \r\nresidents and households through higher utilities demand during \r\nwarm periods, for example, electricity in regions where air conditioning \r\nis predicted to become more prevalent, and due to medical costs \r\nassociated with care for heat illnesses and related health effects, missed \r\nwork and other related impacts (medium confidence) (Jovanovic et al., \r\n2015; Liu et al., 2019; Schmeltz, Petkova and Gamble, 2016; Soebarto \r\nand Bennetts, 2014; Zander and Mathew, 2019; Zander et al., 2015). \r\nSuch stresses are projected to increase in many regions associated \r\nwith continuing global-scale climate change and urbanisation (e.g., \r\nVeliz et  al., 2017; Ang, Wang and Ma, 2017; Bezerra et  al., 2021), \r\nalthough some of these effects in cold-climate cities are offset by \r\nreduced stresses in winter associated with urban heat island or rising \r\ntemperatures more generally (see Section 6.2.2.4)."


id: be01190a212ed3157efb6ddbd4f71e86
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27451
content:
"There is an emerging risk of diminished indoor thermal comfort due \r\nto climate change, evidenced by research into negatively affected \r\nthermal comfort indices and/or increased number of overheating \r\nhours under future emissions scenarios (medium confidence) (e.g., \r\nLiu and Coley, 2015; van Hooff et al., 2014; Vardoulakis et al., 2015; \r\nDodoo and Gustavsson, 2016; Invidiata and Ghisi, 2016; Makantasi \r\nand Mavrogianni, 2016; Mulville and Stravoravdis, 2016; Taylor et al., \r\n2016; Hamdy et al., 2017; Perez-Andreu et al., 2018; Salthammer et al., \r\n2018; Dino and Meral Akgul, 2019; Osman and Sevinc, 2019; Roshan, \r\nOji and Attia, 2019). Decreases in thermal comfort and increases in \r\noverheating risks depend on building characteristics, such as thermal "


id: a2bd904f49225db445a58d980a0af5b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23172
content:
"Thermal inequity can also be seen as a distributive justice risk (Mitchell \r\nand Chakraborty, 2018). There are often disproportionate increases of "


id: 4026b385f66aa1b839e52b642ff382aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7470
content:
"experiencing (over the last two decades) rates of relative sea level rise \r\nthree to four times higher than typical estimates due to climate-induced \r\nchanges (Nicholls et al., 2021). This process can also result in release of \r\ncoastal waste into urban areas (Beaven et al., 2020)."


id: 4f1bd3d6318d5e8b5bfccdabbaae5d1f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"risk for individuals of lower socioeconomic status, especially migrants, \r\nfrom exposure to urban heat. These arise from inadequate housing, less \r\naccess to air-conditioning, and occupations, such as manual labour and \r\nwaste picking, that exacerbate heat exposure (Chu and Michael, 2018; \r\nSantha et al., 2016). Research from South Africa has shown that housing \r\noccupied by poor communities regularly experience indoor temperature \r\nfluctuations that are between 4degC and 5degC warmer compared with \r\noutdoor temperatures (Naicker et  al., 2017); while evidence from \r\nthe USA indicates that historical housing policies, particularly the \r\n'redlining' of neighbourhoods based on racially motivated perceptions, \r\nare associated with areas that are exposed to elevated land surface \r\ntemperatures (Hoffman, Shandas and Pendleton, 2020)."


id: 4c8062c2562a90ad69161862f6d7fefa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9456
content:
"Social surveys from temperate and tropical cities highlight the risk of \r\nreduced quality of life during heat events, including increased incidence \r\nof personal discomfort in indoor and outdoor settings, elevated \r\nanxiety, depression and other indicators of adverse psychological \r\nhealth, and reductions in physical activity, social interactions, work \r\nattendance, tourism and recreation (high confidence) (Chow et  al., \r\n2016; Elnabawi, Hamza and Dudek, 2016; Obradovich and Fowler, \r\n2017; Wang et al., 2017; Wong et al., 2017; Lam, Loughnan and Tapper, \r\n2018; Alves, Duarte and Goncalves, 2016). Extreme heat may also \r\nhave a cultural impact, for example affecting major sporting events, \r\nwith negative impacts on the athletic performance (Brocherie, Girard \r\nand Millet, 2015; Casa et  al., 2015) and the experience and health \r\nof spectators (Hosokawa, Grundstein and Casa, 2018; Kosaka et al., \r\n2018; Matzarakis et al., 2018; Vanos et al., 2019)."


id: 71e331a65744b1199211700f25586ab7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 15546
content:
"Global trends in surface water flooding are increasing, which poses \r\nrisks to vulnerable urban systems depending on current adaptation \r\nmeasures to manage flooding impacts, for example, stormwater \r\nmanagement, green infrastructure and sustainable urban drainage \r\nsystems (Molenaar et al., 2015). The economic risks associated with \r\nfuture surface water flooding in towns and cities are considerable. \r\nFor example in the UK, expected annual damages from surface water "


id: c9adfcc9e85126c0d1acb09e0c9ee82d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Flooding associated with sea level rise is addressed in more detail in \r\nCross-Chapter Paper 2, with detailed regional examples from Africa \r\ndiscussed in Section  9.3. Coastal flooding associated with sea level \r\nrise is exacerbated due to the significant number of people living in \r\nsubsiding areas. As a result of this, the average coastal resident is "


id: c95ec63d1b965b510ab1ea16df51ace3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"droughts, for example, hotter droughts (Herrera and Ault, 2017), snow \r\ndroughts (Cooper, Nolin and Safeeq, 2016; Mote et al., 2016) or 'flash' \r\ndroughts (Otkin et  al., 2016; Otkin et  al., 2018; Pendergrass et  al., \r\n2020) can exacerbate urban water scarcity, exposing the limitations of \r\nengineered water infrastructure designed to accommodate historical \r\npatterns of supply and demand (Gober et al., 2016; Ulibarri and Scott, \r\n2019; Zhao et al., 2018a)."


id: 62e6fa29cd0f0b7fdd2a41106bd041b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13134
content:
"Droughts interact and manifest in complex ways in interconnected \r\nurban areas that likely increase risks of urban water scarcity (Tapia\r\net al., 2017; Rushforth and Ruddell, 2015). Urban interdependencies \r\nmean droughts in one region can limit water resources availability \r\nin another (e.g., Macao and Zhuhai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen in China, \r\nSingapore and Johor, in cities in Pakistan and India, and in the west \r\nand southwest USA) (Chuah, Ho and Chow, 2018; Gober et al., 2016; \r\nSrinivasan, Konar and Sivapalan, 2017; Zhang et al., 2019; Zhao et al., \r\n2020). Likewise, physical and social teleconnections mean decisions \r\nmade about water resources in one region or location may impact \r\nanother in unexpected ways (Moser and Hart, 2015; Liu et al., 2015)."


id: 4735921949e09b13edb60e1307582a7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8580
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"Urban water security risks are confounded by inequities in economic \r\nopportunity, risk exposure and human well-being (medium evidence) \r\n(Sena et al., 2017; Stanke et al., 2013; Section 4.2.4.5). Water scarcity \r\nis felt more acutely among low-income compared with high-income \r\npopulations (Nerkar et al., 2016), and scarcity on top of inequities and \r\npolitical instability can lead to security issues, for example, conflict \r\nbetween different water users (Cosic et al., 2019; von Uexkull et al., \r\n2016; Ahmadalipour et  al., 2019; Doring, 2020; Ide et  al., 2021), \r\nparticularly when road infrastructures and access to water are \r\nlimited (Detges, 2016; Sena et al., 2017). Scarcity risks may also be \r\nexacerbated by human and ecosystem needs in water-short years \r\n(Srinivasan, Konar and Sivapalan, 2017). Finally, growing populations \r\nalong with migration into water scarce regions can exacerbate water \r\nsecurity issues (Akhtar and Shah, 2020; Singh and Sharma, 2019)."


id: 5c8143812d2b00b5f65e753cb50485eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12071
content:
"Decreased regional precipitation and associated changes in runoff and \r\nstorage from droughts is exacerbating urban scarcity by impairing the \r\nquality of water available for its resource management in cities (high \r\nconfidence). For example, less runoff to freshwater rivers can increase \r\nsalinity and concentrate pathogens and pollutants that increases risks \r\nof urban water scarcity (Hellwig, Stahl and Lange, 2017; Jones and van \r\nVliet, 2018; Leddin and Macrae, 2020; Lorenzo and Kinzig, 2020; Ma\r\net al., 2020; Mosley, 2015; Zhang et al., 2019; van Vliet, Florke and \r\nWada, 2017; see also Box 6.2). Drought also changes the dynamics of \r\ngroundwater pollution, leading to increased environmental health risks \r\nwhen those sources are used for urban water supplies (Kubicz et al., \r\n2021; Moreira et al., 2020; Pincetl et al., 2019). Changes in the nature of "


id: d3b32ae29bd2e2b96eaf22a651586893
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 30826
content:
"A range of other dynamic climate interactions are relevant for cities, \r\nsettlements and infrastructure: cold spells, landslides, wind, fire and \r\nair pollution."


id: 293951a3561936ba886c6f46c3ca20b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 3920
content:
"(e.g., road building, deforestation) are increasing human exposure \r\nto landslides and the likelihood of landslides occurring (Kirschbaum, \r\nStanley and Zhou, 2015). Rainfall triggered landslides kill at least \r\n5000 people per year, and at least 11.7% of these landslides occurred \r\non road networks (Froude and Petley, 2018). Although the spatial \r\nfootprint of an individual landslide might be small (i.e., < 1 km2\r\n), the \r\n'vulnerability shadow' cast over an area in terms of regional transport \r\nnetwork disruptions can be a significant proportion of a region, and \r\ncascade to other infrastructures (Winter et al., 2016)."


id: 5f72cad7623c80075e7f1356bb9c0b8a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Landslides tend to occur on moderate to steep slopes, and are \r\nthus particularly prevalent in mountainous regions which are also \r\ncharacterised by low infrastructure redundancy (i.e., few alternative \r\nroutes) and increased impacts from climate change (Schlogl et  al., \r\n2019). More robust forecasts of landslides driven by climate risk \r\nrequires (a) more complete long-term records of previous landslides \r\nand (b) baseline studies of the Global South which are currently \r\nmissing from the literature (Gariano et al., 2017)."


id: 71c027e6bcf1a252573347a042ec013d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15526
content:
"Wind. Urban morphology alters wind conditions at multiple spatial \r\nscales; generally, increased surface roughness in settlements have \r\nresulted in declining trends in both measured wind speed and \r\nfrequency of extremely windy days (Mishra et al., 2015; Peng et al., \r\n2018; Ahmed and Bharat, 2014; WGI Box 10.3)."


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content:
"Urban wind risks can also be affected by location adjacent to \r\nmountains, lakes or coasts with localised wind systems (WGI 10.3.3.4.2; \r\nWGI 10.3.3.4.3). In large cities with significant urban heat island, an \r\nurban-driven thermal circulation can enhance pollution dispersion \r\nunder calm conditions (Fan, Li and Yin, 2018) or advect heat to areas \r\ndownwind of the city (Bassett et al., 2016). Microscale wind conditions \r\nwithin urban canyons also strongly affect ventilation of air pollution \r\ndispersion and thermal comfort at pedestrian level, especially in cities \r\nlocated in warm climates (Rajagopalan, Lim and Jamei, 2014; Middel\r\net al., 2014; Lin and Ho, 2016)."


id: fc84a129a09316075996aa05eafb5d49
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"The effects of cold waves on the energy sector include breakdowns in \r\npower plants and reduced oil and gas production (Jendritzky, 1999), as \r\nwell as failures in overhead power lines and towers leading to outages \r\nin Moscow and Bucharest (Panteli and Mancarella, 2015; Andrei et al., \r\n2019). Six major power outages associated with cold shocks and ice \r\nstorms have been recorded since 2010, the majority recorded from large \r\ncities in the USA (Anel et al., 2017). Cold waves can also significantly \r\nincrease energy demand. A cold wave that affected the Iberian Peninsula \r\nin January 2017 caused electricity prices to peak at a mean price of \r\n112.8 EUR/MWh, the highest ever recorded in Spain (AEMET, 2017)."


id: 6ca83d3e65e71138ef7d4271636014a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"In cities, wind risks from climate change hazards can arise from \r\nincreased exposure from the expanding built environment. Very high \r\nwind speeds associated with severe weather systems, for example, \r\ntropical cyclones or derechos can cause significant structural damage \r\nto buildings and key infrastructure with insufficient wind load, as well \r\nas causing human injury through flying debris (Burgess et al., 2014). \r\nIn particular, there is evidence from North American cities that tornado \r\ndamage are likely fundamentally driven by growing built-environment \r\nexposure (medium confidence) (Ashley et al., 2014; Rosencrants and \r\nAshley, 2015; Ashley and Strader, 2016)."


id: 70273bff23a6a973bb2be9348c2fe980
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Extreme winds in urban areas can have particularly damaging effects \r\non poorly constructed buildings, including low-income houses in \r\nAfrican cities (Okunola, 2019), and on urban trees that may be \r\nuprooted by strong wind gusts from downbursts (Ordonez and Duinker, \r\n2015; Pita and de Schwarzkopf, 2016; Brandt et al., 2016), as well as \r\non disrupting transportation along urban road and railway networks \r\n(Koks et al., 2019; Pregnolato et al., 2016)."


id: cecfcda1c7fc90ac7e136c9472fb5799
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 30076
content:
"Fire. Hotter and drier climates in several regions, for example Australia, \r\nthe Western USA, the Mediterranean and Russia (IPCC, 2018), likely"


id: a1e78b20ea12984d587eb525ce9f775a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 23039
content:
"enable weather conditions driving fire events impacting cities within \r\nthese regions (Section 2.4.4.2, 2.5.5.2). These include wildfires along \r\nthe margins where cities are adjacent to wildlands, that is, the \r\nwildland-urban interface (WUI) (Bento-Goncalves and Vieira, 2020; \r\nRadeloff et al., 2018), or fires in cities with a high degree of informal \r\nsettlements having greater vulnerability to fire hazards (Kahanji, Walls \r\nand Cicione, 2019; Walls and Zweig, 2017; Sections  8.3.3.2). This \r\nvulnerability is considerable; over 95% of urban fire related deaths and \r\ninjuries occur within informal settlements in low- and middle-income \r\ncountries (Rush et al., 2020)."


id: 55989253258eeefc289770a57c74f575
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 10947
content:
"For wildfires at the WUI, anthropogenic climate change, natural \r\nweather variability, expansion of human settlement and a legacy of \r\nfire suppression are key factors in determining fire risk (Abatzoglou \r\nand Williams, 2016; Knorr, Arneth and Jiang, 2016; van Oldenborgh\r\net al., 2020). Recent wildfires in Australia and California both occurred \r\nunder hot and dry weather conditions exacerbated by climate change, \r\nand resulted in substantial property damage along the WUI, ecosystem \r\ndestruction and lives lost (Brown et al., 2020; Lewis et al., 2020; Yu\r\net al., 2020). Future climate risk of fires at the WUI are likely (medium \r\nconfidence), and are compounded by projected urban development \r\nalong the WUI within several regions, such as in the Western USA \r\n(Syphard et al., 2019), Australia (Dowdy et al., 2019) and the Bolivian \r\nChiquitania (Devisscher et al., 2016)."


id: 161c22ec04ddc56c2885acee31e6437
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"The mortality risk for several pollutants, for example PM2.5, is \r\nconsiderable (high confidence). Current estimates indicate that 95% \r\nof global population live in areas where ambient PM2.5 exceeds the \r\nWHO guideline of annual average exposure of 10 ug m-3 (Shaddick\r\net al., 2018a; Shaddick et al., 2018b; Chang et al., 2019b). Among the \r\n250 most populous urban areas, estimated PM2.5 concentrations are \r\ngenerally highest in cities in Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and \r\nEast Asia; PM2.5 in many cities in North Africa and the Middle East is \r\nlikely due mainly to wind-blown dust, whereas that in South Asia and \r\nEast Asia are mainly anthropogenic in origin (Anenberg et al., 2019). \r\nHowever, data on PM2.5 concentrations are unavailable in many cities \r\nin low- and middle-income countries owing to a lack of measurements \r\n(Martin et al., 2019)."


id: e0e5d3d94ca68534ca51bbc4386b94b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Evidence from urban and rural settlements is unambiguous; climate \r\nimpacts are felt unevenly, with differentiated human vulnerability \r\nleading to uneven social, spatial and temporal loss, risk and \r\nexperiences of resilience, including capacity for transformation (high \r\nconfidence) (Woroniecki et al., 2019; Tan, Xuchun and Graeme, 2015; \r\nSimon and Leck, 2015; Long and Rice, 2019; Chu, Anguelovski and \r\nRoberts, 2017; Borie et al., 2019). The evidence is also clear that for "


id: a47186664a953d6d68a12e5d6bfd969e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 23434
content:
"Nagendra, 2016), and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Yahia et al., 2018). In \r\naddition to facing emerging water- and heat-related risks, such areas \r\nare also more vulnerable to the health impacts of climate change \r\n(Scovronick, Lloyd and Kovats, 2015)."


id: 474302fa29a9ffe5e5020a96c510f876
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"those with fewest resources and already constrained life chances, \r\nlosses from climate change associated events reduce well-being and \r\nexacerbate vulnerability (high confidence) (van den Berg and Keenan, \r\n2019; Kashem, Wilson and Van Zandt, 2016; Michael, Deshpande and \r\nZiervogel, 2018). Human vulnerability is influenced by the adaptive \r\ncapacity of physical (built) structures, social processes (economic, \r\nwell-being and health) and institutional structures (organisations, laws, \r\ncultural and political systems/norms) (see Section  6.4). This section \r\nshould be read in conjunction with Chapter 8 (Poverty, Livelihoods and \r\nSustainable Development) and will emphasise urban processes that \r\nlead to the creation of differential vulnerability, risks and impacts."


id: a63d00614c3c0a96f1dc386a41de0519
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 23690
content:
"Even where formal planning is the norm, this has often remained \r\noriented toward enabling value by adding construction or the \r\nprotection of existing high-value physical assets, for example \r\ninfrastructure and built cultural heritage, private residential) rather \r\nthan enabling disaster risk reduction for all (Long and Rice, 2019). \r\nThis tendency has been widely documented, including from cases in \r\nAustralia, Thailand, Indonesia (King et al., 2016), Canada (Stevens and \r\nSenbel, 2017), Amman, Moscow and Delhi (Jabareen, 2015), and South \r\nAfrica (Arfvidsson et  al., 2017). Such inconsistencies between the \r\ndelivery of land use planning and the aims of the SDGs combine with \r\nother social structures, economic pathways and governance systems to \r\nshape city risk profiles (Dodman et al., 2017)."


id: d8a67ddec9f881326fb87c734191e418
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 31597
content:
"In both developed and less-developed regions, poverty in urban \r\nareas is frequently associated with higher levels of vulnerability (Huq\r\net al., 2020b). This is evident in both rural and urban settlements in a \r\nwide range of contexts, including the Philippines (Porio et al., 2019; \r\nValenzuela, Esteban and Onuki, 2020); Bangladesh (Matsuyama, Khan \r\nand Khalequzzaman, 2020); Brazil (Lemos et  al., 2016), Santiago, \r\nChile (Inostroza, Palme and de la Barrera, 2016); and New York City \r\n(Madrigano et al., 2015)."


id: 77672baa4cee306c468ed823d7589307
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"A range of specific studies highlight certain elements of vulnerability \r\nand migration, including the ways in which slow-onset events affect \r\nprecarious, resource-dependent livelihoods (such as farming and \r\nfisheries) (Cai et al., 2016). In small town Pakistan and Colombia, heat \r\nstress increases long-term migration of men, driven by a negative \r\neffect on farm income (Mueller, Gray and Kosec, 2014; Tovar-Restrepo \r\nand Irazabal, 2013). A study from Mexico reveals that an increase \r\nin drought months led to increased rural to urban migration, while \r\nincreased heat (temperature) led to a 'nonlinear' pattern of rural to \r\nurban migration that occurred only after extended periods of heat \r\n(nearly 34  months) (Nawrotzki et  al., 2017). This aligns with other \r\nfindings that a consistent increase in temperature between 2degC and \r\n4degC in some parts of the world renders involuntary, forced migration \r\ninevitable (Otto et al., 2017)."


id: 6a0d51ff2d293378e1fe8e37065cc5d2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Particularly in low- and middle-income countries, much urban building \r\noccurs outside formal parameters and entails a high degree of urban \r\ninformality. According to the United Nations statistics, the proportion \r\nof urban populations living in slums and informal settlements increased \r\nfrom 23% in 2014 to 23.5% in 2018 (United Nations, 2018). Informality \r\nis one pathway through which urbanisation generates differentiated \r\nvulnerability, tending to increase exposure and susceptibility of physical \r\nstructures and their occupants to climate-related risks (Dodman et al., \r\n2017; Dobson, 2017) in contexts including Guadalajara, Mexico (Gran \r\nCastro and Ramos De Robles, 2019), Kampala, Uganda (Richmond, \r\nMyers and Namuli, 2018), Bengaluru, India (Kumar, Geneletti and "


id: f8504768f7113a2bdc61e96835731d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 36585
content:
"and Pakistan (Islam and Khan, 2018) showed that migration as an \r\nadaptation strategy can be constrained due to resource barriers and \r\nlow mobility potential, and also, to high levels of place attachment \r\nsuch as in the Peruvian Highlands (Adams, 2016), Vanuatu (Perumal, \r\n2018) and the Tulun and Nissan Atolls of Bougainville, Papua New \r\nGuinea (Luetz and Havea, 2018). Migration can also be maladaptive \r\nfor the receiving contexts, whether due to the pressure on and/or \r\nconflict over land and/or the urban resources (high confidence) (Faist, \r\n2018; Singh and Basu, 2020; Luetz and Havea, 2018). Other views \r\nmaintain that migration as adaptation overlooks the agency of people \r\nand their resilience, that is the nuances of 'translocal social resilience' \r\n(Kelman, 2018; Silja, 2017; Sakdapolrak et al., 2016). For example, the \r\nni-Vanuatu prioritise in situ adaptation measures and leave migration \r\nas a last resort (Perumal, 2018)."


id: d5901e27ecee3c89a80076489fffda63
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"migration (especially international) triggered by climate change (Silja, \r\n2017; Otto et  al., 2017), and why estimates of future displacement \r\nattributed to climate change and other environmental causes \r\nvary between 25  million and 1  billion in 2050 (Heslin et  al., 2019). \r\nMany authors are critical of existing perspectives on climate-related \r\nmigration, and argue for more nuanced research on the topic (Boas\r\net al., 2019; Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020; Silja, 2017; Sakdapolrak\r\net al., 2016; Singh and Basu, 2020; Luetz and Havea, 2018)."


id: 2473ac14c5ca42ba2db519713318972b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 3183
content:
"The second component, displacement, also plays a crucial role in \r\ndifferentiated vulnerability. The lack of resources and capacities \r\nto support mobility limits the effectiveness of migration as an \r\nadaptation strategy, therefore leading to both displacement and \r\ntrapped populations in the future (Adger et al., 2015; Faist, 2018). For \r\nexample, studies from Colombia (Tovar-Restrepo and Irazabal, 2013), \r\nIndia (Singh and Basu, 2020), Mekong Delta in Vietnam (Miller, 2019) "


id: 67e41b68e332cbb12d2a8828bd7c0a43
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Table 6.3 |  Selected indicators of global proliferation of infrastructure networks and their annual usage."


id: ada91abc6664d06268f275ee36a917e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"one sector lead to cascading, compounding or knock-on effects across \r\nother sectors (Zscheischler and Seneviratne, 2017) (see Section 6.2.6 \r\nfor elaboration). Therefore, adaptation options should address climate \r\nrisks to infrastructure in an integrated and co-beneficial manner \r\n(medium evidence, high confidence) (see Sections 6.3 and 6.4)."


id: 2b924482ed40521da42a1203b08b843
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 4294
content:
"provides discrete risk and impact assessments. Physical infrastructure \r\nsystems are often immobile, indivisible, involve high fixed costs and \r\nhave longer lifecycles. Social and ecological infrastructure elements \r\nare rarely assessed alone and instead tend to be included in wider \r\nassessments of event impacts."


id: e782e2263455b703abaf7d4e6dd4cc2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 33922
content:
"Current climate variability is already causing impacts on infrastructure \r\nsystems around the world (high confidence). For global physical \r\ninfrastructure with a present value of USD 143 trillion, The Economist \r\nIntelligence Unit (2015) estimates present value losses of USD 4.2 \r\ntrillion by 2100 under a 2degC scenario. This estimation rises to USD \r\n13.8 trillion under a 6degC scenario. Extreme events are associated with \r\ndisruption or complete loss of these infrastructure services, whilst \r\ngradual changes in mean conditions are altering physical infrastructure \r\nperformance. Physical infrastructure is usually costly to repair and also \r\nhave significant impacts on people's health and well-being."


id: 7062d932b11c1d93f5e638df7504d0fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15298
content:
"This section synthesises and assesses the emerging literature on \r\nclimate change risks to key physical infrastructure domains as \r\nlisted in Table  6.3: energy/electricity infrastructure, transportation \r\ninfrastructure and information and communication technology (ICT) \r\n(water infrastructure is discussed in Section 6.2.2). It draws on evidence \r\nfrom around the world, but the specific risks to infrastructure in \r\ndifferent contexts are explained in more detail in the regional chapters \r\n(especially Section 9.8.4.1 for Africa, Section 10.4.6.3.8 for Asia and \r\nSection 13.6.1 for Europe). For cities and settlements, such risks are of \r\nparticular concern owing to a lack of adaptive capacity across many \r\neconomically important sectors and low levels of resource and capacity \r\nsupport to enhance adaptive capacity. Recent literature also illustrates \r\nthe interconnected and interdependent nature of infrastructure \r\nsystems (see Box 6.2), which lead to uncertainties over how risks in "


id: 3fd894293cca09e4e7cd43d72f16aee9
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"Infrastructure networks are increasingly dependent on each other--for power, control (via ICT) and access for deliveries or servicing \r\n(Figure 6.2). Moreover, a range of other mechanisms can create interdependencies that impact upon climate risks by creating pathways \r\nfor cascading failure (Undorf et al., 2020; Barabasi, 2013). In the UK, for example, all infrastructures utilities identify failure of components \r\nin another utility as a risk to their systems (Dawson et al., 2018)."


id: 280f69f33f301878fa202619c3d58e13
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"There is usually limited information on the risks between infrastructure sectors. Without frameworks for collaboration, and coupled \r\nwith commercial and security sensitivities, this remains a barrier to routine sharing and cooperation between operators. Despite this, \r\nmethods to tackle interdependence in climate risk analysis are emerging (Dawson, 2015). For example, Thacker et al. (2017) analysed the \r\ncriticality of the UK's infrastructure networks by integrating data on infrastructure location, connectivity, interdependence and usage. The \r\nanalysis showed that criticality hotspots are typically located around the periphery of urban areas where there are large facilities upon \r\nwhich many users depend or where several critical infrastructures are concentrated in one location. As infrastructure systems become \r\nincreasingly interconnected, associated risks from climate change will increase and require a cross-sectoral approach to adaptation \r\n(Dawson et al., 2018)."


id: e2fdc9e29d4c1e7e4e22a583a11f12f9
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content:
"Electricity generation. Electricity generation infrastructure can be \r\ndirectly damaged by floods, storm and other severe weather events. \r\nFurthermore, the performance of renewables (solar, hydro-electric, \r\nwind) is affected by changes in climate."


id: e582fc56f8e427ab9d397f7792dd7b5b
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content:
"can further reduce power output, and the need for cleaning (Patt, \r\nPfenninger and Lilliestam, 2013). Projected changes in wind and \r\nsolar potential are uncertain; the trends vary by region and season \r\n(Burnett, Barbour and Harrison, 2014; Cradden et  al., 2015; Fant, \r\nSchlosser and Strzepek, 2016). In an RCP8.5 scenario, Wild et al. (2015) \r\nconservatively calculate a global reduction of 1% per decade between \r\n2005 and 2049 for future solar power production changes due to \r\nchanging solar resources as a result of global warming and decreasing \r\nall-sky radiation over the coming decades. However, positive trends are \r\nprojected in large parts of Europe, the south-east of North America and \r\nthe south-east of China."


id: 95e3b21de46f965b277fbb471ac662ec
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21083
content:
"will be required through 2050 to maintain and repair roads in Malawi, \r\nMozambique and Zambia (Chinowsky, Price and Neumann, 2013)."


id: 5f2f75e9c627a7f283c8a750ed603230
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Fixed-line ICT networks that sprawl over large areas are especially \r\nsusceptible to increases in the frequency or intensity of storms that would \r\nincrease the risk of wind, ice and snow damage to overhead cables and \r\ndamage from wind-blown debris. More intense or longer droughts and \r\nheatwaves can cause ground shrinkage and damage underground ICT \r\ninfrastructure (Fu, Horrocks and Winne, 2016). In mountain and northern \r\npermafrost regions, communications and other infrastructure networks \r\nare subject to subsidence because of warming of ice-rich permafrost \r\n(Shiklomanov et al., 2017; Li et al., 2016; Melvin et al., 2017)."


id: 8f7e400dd4559846b6040bdebe0f5679
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content:
"In addition to direct damages from flooding and heatwaves, disruption \r\ncaused by road blockages will be increased by more frequent flood \r\nevents. For example, in the city of Newcastle upon Tyne (UK), road \r\ntravel disruption across the city from a 1-in-50  year surface water \r\nflood event could increase by 66% by the 2080s (Pregnolato et al., \r\n2017), whilst heatwaves could treble railway speed restrictions in \r\nparts of the UK (Palin et al., 2013). Knott et al. (2017) highlighted risks \r\nto coastal infrastructure where ~30 cm sea level rise sea level rise \r\nwould also push up groundwater and reduce design life by 5-17% \r\nin New Hampshire (USA). Heavy rain and flooding can also inundate \r\nunderground transport systems (Forero-Ortiz, Martinez-Gomariz and \r\nCanas Porcuna, 2020)."


id: a73c94d28b561eb2b264057e6291f67b
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"For the urban housing sector, climate impacts such as flooding, heat, \r\nfire and wind assessed in Section  6.2.3 will likely have detrimental \r\neffects on housing stock (including physical damage and loss of \r\nproperty value) and on residents exposed to climate risks (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement)."


id: 890f6960b96d078d3147e29c5f3e5982
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Waterways are still important transport routes for goods in many \r\nparts of the world, although they are mostly expected to benefit from \r\nreduced closure from ice (Jonkeren et al., 2014; Schweighofer, 2014), \r\nlow flows will likely lead to reduced navigability and increased closures; \r\nvan Slobbe et al. (2016) estimate the Rhine may reach a turning point \r\nfor waterway transportation between 2070-2095. Obstruction due \r\nto debris and fallen vegetation of roads and rails and to inland and \r\nmarine shipping from high winds are expected to increase (Koks et al., \r\n2019; Kawai et al., 2018; Karagiannis et al., 2019).."


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content:
"Apart from land subsidence from urbanisation (e.g., Case Study 6.2), \r\nsubstantial climate risks to urban sanitation arise from droughts, \r\nflooding and storm surges. Low flows from drought can lead to \r\nsedimentation, increase pollutant concentration and block sewer \r\ninfrastructure networks (Campos and Darch, 2015). Flooding poses a \r\ngreater risk for urban sanitation in low- and middle-income settings \r\n(Burgin et  al., 2019) where onsite systems are more common. \r\nFloodwater may wash out pits and tanks, mobilising faecal sludges and \r\nother hazardous materials leading to both direct and indirect exposure \r\nvia food and contaminated objects and surfaces, and pollute streams \r\nand waterbodies (Howard et al., 2016; Braks and de Roda Husman, \r\n2013; Bornemann et  al., 2019). Floods also damage infrastructure; \r\ntoilets, pits, tanks and treatment systems are all vulnerable (Sherpa\r\net al., 2014; UNICEF and WHO 2019)."


id: 71b8d67430f149d98d3203fd80bf1ea1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 15519
content:
"Information and communication technology (ICT) comprises \r\nthe integrated networks, systems and components enabling the \r\ntransmission, receipt, capture, storage and manipulation of information \r\nby users on and across electronic devices (Fu, Horrocks and Winne, \r\n2016). ICT infrastructure faces a number of climate risks. Increased \r\nfrequency of coastal, fluvial or pluvial flooding will damage key ICT \r\nassets such as cables, masts, pylons, data centres, telephone exchanges, \r\nbase stations or switching centres (Fu, Horrocks and Winne, 2016). This \r\nleads to loss of voice communications, inability to process financial \r\ntransactions and interruption to control and clock synchronisation \r\nsignals. Insufficient information about the location and nature of many \r\nICT assets limits detailed quantitative assessment of climate change \r\nrisks."


id: 883d8a1cb4b9604f8693c2c6f0525f71
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 18959
content:
"Sanitation systems coupled with floodwater management are at risk \r\nof damage and capacity exceedance from high rainfall (Thakali, Kalra \r\nand Ahmad, 2016; Kirshen et al., 2015; Dong, Guo and Zeng, 2017). \r\nIn England, the number of water and wastewater treatment plants at "


id: ee43f5ad5548434c234b532935ed859f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 34956
content:
"risk of flooding is projected to increase by 33% under a 4oC scenario \r\n(Sayers et al., 2015), but risks are generally increasing for both formal \r\nand informal urban sanitation systems (Howard et al., 2016)."


id: 3dcbd1be39014ad79732be6e393b8d48
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 7077
content:
"as increased fertilisation through urban-enhanced nitrogen deposition \r\n(Decina, Hutyra and Templer, 2020). However, these trends may change \r\nin the future as further warming and decreasing water supply may \r\ndepress tree fitness, thus enabling more pests (Dale and Frank, 2017)."


id: c02b5120036f33210a9af5feb2b7e5ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
content_type: text
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vector_id: 27788
content:
"Climate risks to urban natural and ecosystem infrastructure entail \r\nsignificant economic costs. For example, in 2012, Hurricane Sandy led \r\nto total losses of up to USD 6.5 million to the New York City region's \r\nlow-lying salt marshes and beaches (Meixler, 2017). Research from \r\ncoastal settlements across Catalonia, Spain, shows significant levels \r\nof tourism loss (which contribute to 11.1% of the region's GDP), \r\ninfrastructure damage and natural capital loss attributed to inundation \r\nand erosion of beaches, which are projected to retreat by -0.7 m yr-1\r\ngiven current sea level rise projections of 0.53-1.75 m by 2100 (Jimenez\r\net al., 2017)."


id: 94fd919218bbafd86a424b91e7856254
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20946
content:
"Urban ecological infrastructure includes green (i.e., vegetated), blue \r\n(i.e., water-based) and grey (i.e., non-living) components of urban \r\necosystems (Li et al., 2017). While land cover change from urbanisation \r\ndirectly reduces the extent of natural and ecological infrastructure \r\n(e.g., Lin, Meyers and Barnett, 2015), notable risks arise from climate \r\ndrivers. Recent research particularly highlights future climate impacts \r\non coastal natural infrastructure, including beaches, wetlands and \r\nmangroves, which cause significant economic losses from property \r\ndamage and decreasing tourism income, as well as loss of natural \r\ncapital and ecosystem services. Research on climate risks to urban \r\ntrees and forests is comparatively limited. Instead, urban vegetation \r\nand green infrastructure are most often cast as adaptation strategies \r\nto reduce urban heat, mitigate drought and provide other ecosystem \r\nbenefits (see Section 6.3.2)."


id: d555808c57bc4b3af8a03c05d07a7cef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 31092
content:
"Coastal natural infrastructure is exposed to sea level rise, wave action \r\nand inundation from increasing storm events (See also Section CCP \r\n2.2.1). Beaches, in particular, are highly exposed to climate-induced \r\ncoastal erosion (Toimil et  al., 2018; Section CCP2). Research from \r\nsettlements across coastal Southern California, USA, show that 67% \r\nof all beaches may completely erode by 2100 (Vitousek, Barnard and \r\nLimber, 2017). Coastal zones across Cancun, Mexico, are exposed \r\nto a combination of sea level rise and tropical hurricanes, further \r\nexacerbated by urban development patterns blocking natural sediment \r\nreplenishment to beaches (Escudero-Castillo et al., 2018). In another \r\ncase, beach erosion along the heavily urbanised Valparaiso Bay, Chile, \r\nis heightened by El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events, which in \r\nthe past have caused an additional 15-20 cm in mean sea level rise \r\n(Martinez et al., 2018)."


id: ff92cc9c452394bc1453c3e5d360afeb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 37756
content:
"Wetlands, mangroves and estuaries, which tend to be heavily urbanised \r\nareas, are highly at risk from sea level rise and changing precipitation \r\n(Green et al., 2017; Feller et al., 2017; Alongi, 2015; Osland et al., 2017; \r\nChow, 2018; Godoy and Lacerda, 2015). Sea level rise is a concern \r\nfor wetlands and mangroves across coastal urban Asia, the Mississippi \r\nDelta (US) and low lying small island states (Ward et  al., 2016b). \r\nResearch on the highly urbanised Yangtze River estuary in China shows \r\nthat soil submersion and erosion from sea level rise, compounded by \r\nland conversation to agriculture and urban development, will cause all \r\ntidal flats to disappear by 2100 (Wu, Zhou and Tian, 2017). In another \r\nexample, sea level rise and high rates of tidal inundation have increased \r\noverall salinity in the San Francisco Bay-Delta estuary, threatening the \r\necosystem's ability to support biodiversity (Parker and Boyer, 2019)."


id: 258f41dc0a90a4c570981f72d7764616
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3337
content:
"Research on climate risks to urban trees and forests highlight direct \r\nimpacts from extreme temperatures, precipitation, wind events and sea \r\nlevel rise, as well as exposure to other hazards such as air pollution, fires, \r\ninvasive species and disease (Ordonez and Duinker, 2014). Since the \r\n1960s, climate change has enabled growth of urban trees, supported \r\nby longer growing seasons, higher atmospheric CO2 concentrations \r\nand reduced diurnal temperature range (Pretzsch et al., 2017), as well "


id: f14fa3b87684714a696dbc2e21f92ed0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 35466
content:
"Projected global compound risks will increase in the future, \r\nwith significant risks across energy, food and water sectors that \r\nlikely overlap spatially and temporally while affecting increasing \r\nnumbers of people and regions particularly in Africa and Asia (high \r\nconfidence) (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). In cities, the prevalence of \r\ncompounding risks therefore necessitates methodologies accounting \r\nfor non-stationary risk factors."


id: 40cd919572e99387051703209168b74d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7578
content:
"Compound and cascading climate risks require a different way of \r\naccounting for cumulative hazard impacts in urban areas (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). There is emerging literature calling for \r\nanalysis on interactions between individual and inter-related climate \r\nextremes with complex urban systems, so as to ascertain how urban \r\nand key infrastructural vulnerabilities can be identified and managed \r\nin a warming world (Butler, Deyle and Mutnansky, 2016; Gallina et al., \r\n2016; Moftakhari et al., 2017; Zscheischler et al., 2018; Baldwin et al., \r\n2019; Pescaroli and Alexander, 2018; Yin et  al., 2017; AghaKouchak\r\net al., 2020), as well as in managing adaptation for present and future \r\npandemics, for example COVID-19 (Pelling et al., 2021; Phillips et al., \r\n2020)."


id: 4af3ee3f5f41c630230fe5b3bcf8b89b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Compound risks to key infrastructure in cities have increased from \r\nextreme weather (medium evidence, high agreement), such as from \r\nurban flooding from extreme precipitation and storm surges disrupting \r\ntransport infrastructure and networks, for example Mehrotra et  al.\r\n(2018), see also San Juan case study in this chapter), ICT networks, for \r\nexample underground cables or transmission towers (Schwarze et al., \r\n2018), and energy generation from power plants (Marcotullio et al., \r\n2018)."


id: ff88b13414accb02586381b1343e99a2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 37747
content:
"In terms of policy, case studies from London's resilience planning \r\nprocess stressed the need for intermodal coordination, hazard risk \r\nand infrastructure mapping, clarifying tipping points and acceptable \r\nlevels of risk, training citizens, strengthening emergency preparedness, \r\nidentifying relevant data sources, and developing scenarios and \r\ncontingency plans (Pescaroli, 2018). Others also note the utility \r\nof a systems approach to analysing risks and benefits, including \r\nconsiderations of potential cascading ecological effects, full lifecycle \r\nenvironmental impacts, and unintended consequences, as well as \r\npossible co-benefits of responses (Ingwersen et al., 2014). Lowering \r\nthese risks requires urban stakeholders to reduce urban vulnerability \r\nby going beyond linear approaches to risk management (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement)."


id: 12eb4c8619acdc76829ccea807a58075
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 481
content:
"The increased risk arises not just from greater exposure from climate \r\nevents impacting cities, but is also magnified by low adaptive capacity \r\nthat can arise from intra-urban variations in infrastructure quality. \r\nFor instance, infrastructure within expanding informal settlements is \r\nassociated with deficiency in materials, structural safety and a lack \r\nof accessibility. These areas are often located in the most risk-prone \r\nurban areas in developing nations that are vulnerable to compound \r\nhazards (Dawson et al., 2018). Further, these risks can be exacerbated \r\nfrom complications arising from local versus national governance and/"


id: 485c1c9dd05d22dd453c0e96c7929b64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"processes and generate maladaptation (see Section 6.4.5.2). Climate \r\nresilient development raises the ambition for adaptation actions so that \r\nit is also possible to describe actions that do not also enhance climate \r\nmitigation and sustainable development outcomes as maladaptive (see \r\nSection  6.4.3.1). This section assesses three broad categories of risk \r\narising from downstream adaptation actions, including interventions \r\nthat transfer vulnerability across space and time, plans that yield \r\nsocioeconomically exclusionary outcomes, and actions that undermine \r\nlong-term sustainable and resilient development priorities."


id: ea13cfb0f326ebde6fbc3d04cef81af9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Larger cities may be the most stable administrative entities in states affected by conflict. Even here, ability to plan and deliver adaptation \r\ncan be hampered. Extending into urban areas within stable states, alienation and loss of trust between local populations and the \r\nstate can be exacerbated by top-down adaptation planning and delivery; socially and spatially uneven adaptation investment; and in \r\nthe economic and administrative limits of government that can lead to some places being excluded from formal planned investment\r\n(high confidence) (see Sections 6.3 and 6.4). These pathways for exclusion can combine among already marginalised and low-income \r\npopulations where trust in government agencies may already be low (Rodrigues, 2021)."


id: 81d341808cc0241eb9d5ad03ab1b91b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 17950
content:
"Climate change can be a threat multiplier in cities and urban regions, exacerbating existing human security tension (limited evidence, \r\nmedium agreement) (Froese and Schilling, 2019; Florke, Schneider and McDonald, 2018; Rajsekhar and Gorelick, 2017). Where conflict \r\nor administrative tensions extend beyond cities, adapting regional infrastructure systems that underpin urban life is challenging, for \r\nexample where elements of networked infrastructure are under the control of conflicting political interests. This has been noted for the \r\nwater sector (Tanzler, Maas and Carius, 2010). Coordinating political processes is a major challenge even for industrialised countries \r\nwith adequate administrative capacity. In post-conflict societies, the difficulties of coordination for urban planning are disproportionately \r\ngreater (Sovacool, Tan-Mullins and Abrahamse, 2018)."


id: 8c551a0371e4390e011bc44036b9a790
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 19590
content:
"In planning adaptation measures in cities, conflict-sensitive approaches to ensure participatory methods (Bobylev et al., 2021) can avoid \r\nadaptation being a polarising activity (Tanzler, Maas and Carius, 2010; Tanzler, 2017). Adaptation can provide a common goal reaching \r\nacross political differences and be a part of building political trust and local cooperation between alienated communities (Tanzler, Maas \r\nand Carius, 2010). Peacebuilding programmes led by government or civil society are typically concerned with the short-term and framed \r\nby socioeconomic policy, integrating the longer-term view and engineering-technical expertise for adaptation is a challenge (limited \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (Ishiwatari, 2021)."


id: ff54251efb50744473ec85cd86eba13
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"actions can further entrench unequal and unsustainable development \r\npatterns in the long term. There are also significant limits to urban \r\nadaptation (see Section  6.4) with consequential impacts on human \r\nwell-being."


id: 990fb53ad649b1fbbad21ada1aebd99a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Table 6.4 lists a selection of key risks (broadly defined as have severe \r\noutcomes common to a majority of cities) identified in our assessment \r\nof urban impacts and risks in this section. It provides a description \r\nof the consequences of the risk that would constitute a severe \r\noutcome, as well as the hazard, exposure and vulnerability conditions \r\ncontributing to its severity. It also provides adaptation options \r\nidentified and elaborated on in Section  6.3 as having the highest \r\npotential for reducing the risk, and an assessment of the confidence \r\nin the judgement that this risk could become severe. This table is \r\nalso reflected in Section 16.5.1, and the methodology is described in \r\nTable SM16.5.1."


id: 80f0d57706d6c605261588ff55f9d1bb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 17807
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"Following Chapter 16, the severity of a risk or impact is a subjective \r\njudgment based on a number of criteria. Key risks are 'potentially' \r\nsevere because, while some could already be severe now, more \r\ntypically they may become so over time because of changes in the \r\nnature of the climate-related hazards and/or of the exposure and/or \r\nvulnerability of societies or ecosystems to those hazards. They also may \r\nbecome severe owing to the adverse consequences of adaptation or \r\nmitigation responses to the risk."


id: b35bd1813d70b7539db5d410b521d914
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25730
content:
"Human behaviour can exacerbate climate impacts, for example in the \r\nemergence of 'last chance tourism', Lemieux et al. (2018) focused on \r\nbuilt cultural heritage at risk from climate change associated events, \r\nincluding from decay or even total loss generated by increased \r\nflooding and sea level rise (Camuffo, Bertolin and Schenal, 2017) and \r\nwater infiltration from post-flood standing water (Camuffo, 2019). Last \r\nchance tourism can lead to increased touristic interest over a short \r\ntime horizon and to precarious economic conditions, which can lead to \r\nfurther accelerated degradation cultural heritage sites already at risk \r\nfrom climate change."


id: ccdca50838daf69ca31353343badec5b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 29766
content:
"the research literature that reaches beyond individual infrastructural \r\ndomains, the section also reviews urban adaptation through the \r\ncross-cutting lenses of equity and mitigation. Section 6.4 assesses the \r\nenabling environment (political will, governance, knowledge, finance \r\nand social context) that shapes specific adaptation contexts and \r\nfutures."


id: 3069dbb949aa5ef294309612476d53d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5046
content:
"The adaptation gap is the difference between the ability to manage \r\nrisk and loss and experienced risk and loss (Chen et al., 2016; UNEP, \r\n2021). It describes both levels of capacity and residual risk. Figure 6.4 \r\npresents an analysis by IPCC World Region for urban populations and "


id: b572b98e44babdef79ac6752b0766491
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"current levels for risk and loss. The analysis seeks to draw out equity \r\nconsiderations by comparing the poorest and wealthiest quintiles for \r\neach region and for adaptation to the direct impacts of flooding and \r\nheatwave, as well as impacts felt in cities that include climate change \r\nimpacts on supply chains; water and food security. Figure 6.4 should \r\nnot be used to compare regions but can be used to contrast adaptation \r\ngaps by hazard type within regions."


id: bd09f1ffe9982a833aa703cdcf839713
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27301
content:
"Land use planning plays a major role in the siting of settlements \r\nand infrastructure. In relation to climate change, it affects whether \r\ndevelopment takes place in locations that are exposed to hazards; \r\nsimilarly, it shapes the potential effects that the built environment \r\ncan have on natural systems. Despite this, generally speaking, there is \r\nlimited implementation of zoning and land use measures for climate \r\nadaptation from cities across diverse contexts (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement), see for example Maputo (Castan Broto, 2014), \r\nsub-Saharan cities (Dodman et al., 2017) and Amman, Moscow and \r\nDelhi (Jabareen, 2015). Certain countries, such as South Korea, have, \r\nhowever, recently begun to address disaster risk reduction within their \r\nland use planning systems (Han et al., 2019)."


id: 228753985a15be00f58a1525ef19c988
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"The key finding from Figure 6.4 is that for all urban populations, both \r\ncurrently deployed and currently planned adaptations are not able to \r\nmeet current levels of risk associated with climate change. Even if all \r\nconceivable adaptation was to be deployed, the majority of risks faced \r\nby the urban rich and poor today would not be fully resolved. This \r\nclearly emphasizes the fundamental importance of climate change \r\nmitigation to avoid urban risk and loss."


id: ac711c2b6a09d3067e48dfe64217d49f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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"The urban adaptation gap is also found to be unequal. The poorest \r\nquintile has a larger adaptation gap than the richest quintile. Reported \r\ninequality in the application of urban adaptation is greatest in North, \r\nEast and Southeast Asia, reflecting rapid urbanisation in this region. \r\nReported inequality is lowest in Europe and Australasia. Observed \r\ninequalities indicate that the markets, government actions and civil \r\nsociety investments available to reduce vulnerability and risk among \r\nthe poor have not been observed to offset inequalities based on \r\nindividual and household capacities."


id: 98015c19f3e5457dbca6f5ed482bd65d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"There is some catch-up as analysis moves through actually deployed\r\nto planned and all conceivable deployment, particularly for water and \r\nfood security, but even here, inequality in risk is not fully resolved. \r\nAfrica and South and Central Asia in particular show considerable \r\ndisparity in adaptation to urban food security even with all conceivable \r\nadaptation. This means that even if all available adaptation was to \r\nbe deployed, inequality in ability to adapt to climate change would \r\nremain. This highlights the significance of addressing underlying \r\ninequalities in development that shape differential vulnerability (see \r\nSection 6.2.3.1, 6.2.3.3, 6.3.5.1 and 6.4) as part of vision and action on \r\nreducing risk to climate change so that no one is left behind."


id: 7b94e4fa1038e6c8afcd92736061f346
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content:
"Some hazard types and regions show strong capacity to close the \r\nadaptation gap if all planned adaptation was to be deployed: for \r\nexample, Europe for heatwave and Europe and Central and South \r\nAmerica for riverine and coastal flooding (particularly for wealthier \r\npopulations). This reveals capacity within the current approaches \r\nto climate risk management, but also highlights the importance of \r\nresolving challenges that prevent planned adaptation from being \r\ndeployed and deployed equitably."


id: 2e1ff14fe17580f425b0182f2a8e8ce5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4700
content:
"Social infrastructure refers to social, cultural and financial activities \r\nand institutions as well as associated property, buildings and artefacts \r\nthat can be deployed to reduce risk and recover from loss. This \r\nsection examines land use planning, livelihoods and social protection, \r\nemergency and disaster risk management, health systems, education \r\nand communication, and cultural heritage."


id: 9af26115fd2bf7fae818292121aacbe9
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content:
"Adaptation actions through zoning and land use are more effective \r\nwhen combined with other planning measures (high confidence), \r\nfor example with ecosystem-based adaptations (e.g., for flood \r\nmanagement and curbing the urban heat island effect) (Larsen, 2015; "


id: 7a548150fc65ef50d5efd9829d543dd1
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content:
"below a defined standard of living by providing cash, in kind and \r\nother social transfers to fight vulnerabilities (Islam and Hasan, 2019) \r\nincluding those associated with climate change impacts including food \r\nshocks. Strengthening the financial and social infrastructure of poor \r\nhouseholds is a critical component of adaptive and transformative \r\ncapacity (Haque, Dodman and Hossain, 2014; Ziervogel, Cowen and \r\nZiniades, 2016). Social safety nets are one mechanism for strengthening \r\nthis capacity."


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"Understanding how livelihoods, particularly of the urban poor, are both \r\nimpacted by climate risk and how they might be strengthened is central \r\nto understanding climate adaptation in cities and settlements (Dobson \r\net al. 2015). Rapid urbanisation and expanding physical infrastructure \r\ndo not have a clear relationship with improved outcomes for urban \r\nlivelihoods of low-income residents (Soltesova et al., 2014). Municipal \r\nand national efforts need to be closely aligned with building adaptive \r\ncapacity of residents themselves, often through community-based \r\nadaptation (Soltesova et al., 2014; Dobson, Nyamweru and Dodman, \r\n2015). Social safety nets protect individuals or households from falling "


id: 28ae4eec12015df26a2ad5865fbe9d36
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Many national ASP programmes are established to cover both rural and \r\nurban areas, however, only a small number of researchers pay attention \r\nto urban cases (Aleksandrova, 2019). ASP instruments can be classified \r\ninto four major types as presented in Table 6.5 (Ivaschenko et al., 2018; \r\nILO, 2017). ASP can contribute to both incremental and transformative \r\ninterventions both at the system level (short-term and long-term \r\ncoping strategies from communities) and at the beneficiaries' level \r\n(vulnerable populations) (Bene, Cornelius and Howland, 2018; World \r\nBank, 2015; Aleksandrova, 2019; Ivaschenko et al., 2018)."


id: f7191e7f4c016dfd2346033084ad84f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Countries at all income levels can set up ASP systems that increase \r\nresilience to natural hazards, but the systems need to identify cost-\r\nbenefits and be scalable and flexible to adjust to future, increasing \r\nclimate risk. Bastagli (2014) suggested a new design for effective social \r\nprotection including: (i) increasing the amount or value of transfer; (ii) \r\nextending the coverage of beneficiaries; and (iii) introducing payments \r\nor new programmes of social protections. For social protection \r\nprogrammes to contribute more effectively to adaptation, they need \r\nto be better coordinated across a range of agencies; better integrated \r\nwith climate data to anticipate times of need for vulnerable groups; \r\nand better aligned with other risk management instruments such as \r\ninsurance (Agrawal et al., 2019)."


id: a500c369baa9eba520822c8770c93f4e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Inclusive, targeted, responsive and equitable social protection can \r\nsupport long-term transition toward more sustainable, adaptive and \r\nresilient societies (Hallegatte et  al., 2016; Shi et  al., 2018; Bene, \r\nCornelius and Howland, 2018; Carter and Janzen, 2018; Adger et al., \r\n2014). ASP systems can be cost effective and equitable when targeting \r\naccuracy, timely risk sharing (disaster assistance) and improved policy \r\ncoherence. Carter and Janzen (2018) find that the long-term level \r\nand depth of poverty can be improved by incorporating vulnerability \r\ntargeted social protection into a conventional social protection system. "


id: 49f01fb53ed9a9ac0b4c200bcc439e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"through innovative flood-risk assessments that integrate behavioural \r\nadaptation dynamics. The study by Moghadas et al. (2019) highlights \r\nthe importance of hybrid multi-criteria approaches for assessing \r\nurban flood resilience in Tehran, Iran. A growing literature shows \r\nhow multidisciplinary and inclusive approaches that include Local \r\nknowledge can achieve greater accuracy in risk characterisation \r\nand support lasting impact of investments into more robust climate \r\nservices (Aerts et al., 2018; Lourenco et al., 2015; Sword-Daniels et al., \r\n2018; Singh et al., 2018; Nissan et al., 2019; Harvey et al., 2019; Simon \r\nand Palmer, 2020). This literature highlights the need for innovative \r\napproaches in urban contexts that transcend traditional approaches \r\nof local knowledge inclusion widely applied in rural contexts, such as \r\nparticipatory rural appraisal."


id: 42dc1d9412b3a31b7dba5d41fbbeff1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 7907
content:
"public health inspectors, etc.). Improved building design and spatial \r\nurban planning (where facilities are located) are essential to increase \r\nresilience for higher temperature and flood risk (medium evidence;\r\nhigh agreement) (WHO, 2021; Codjoe et al., 2020; Korah and Cobbinah, \r\n2017). Public health systems rely on information systems (including \r\ndisease and vector surveillance and monitoring) to identify new and \r\nemergent public health risks. Improvements to health surveillance will \r\nincrease resilience, particularly for populations in informal settlements \r\nthat are absent from health and vital registration systems."


id: 6bfcb15c59160a19839950c87ef1c033
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"of low-income communities setting up their own disaster insurance \r\nmechanisms. For example, the Community Development Funds for the \r\nBaan Mankong upgrading programme in Thailand include disaster \r\nfunds as insurance against housing damage (Archer, 2012). Such \r\napproaches also need to be more closely linked to existing urban risk \r\nmanagement planning approaches where urban livelihoods are seldom \r\nintegrated and informed by more dynamic risk reduction frameworks \r\nthat consider adaptive cycles and how resilience changes over time \r\n(Beringer and Kaewsuk, 2018; Cremades et al., 2018)."


id: 67fcd3239d0e909d94f590025e0ff685
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 13946
content:
"City-level and local government adaptation planning is facilitated \r\nby information on health impacts (Reckien et al., 2015), highlighting \r\nthe need for monitoring and surveillance and the need for local \r\nevidence-based risk assessments. Adaptation in the health sector can \r\nbe limited by lack of collaboration between health and other sectors, \r\nalthough this is often easier to facilitate at the local level (Woodhall, \r\nLandeg and Kovats, 2021)."


id: 763e6934724596c82e48da8f6bd63f2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 16196
content:
"Disaster risk management systems face increasing challenges in \r\nadapting to evolving risk profiles, shaped by expanding urban areas and \r\nchanging environmental conditions associated with climate change. In \r\naddition to flooding, risk monitoring and management systems have \r\nrecently shown considerable shortfalls in planning for and responding \r\nto increased fire risk such as the devastating Californian wildfires \r\nin October 2019 (Morley, 2020) and Australia's unprecedented and \r\ncatastrophic 2019-2020 wildfire season. Risk management has also \r\nbeen challenged by new risk experiences including wild/bush fires \r\nencroaching on expanding urban areas and fire outbreaks in densely \r\npopulated informal settlements pose increasing threats to livelihoods, \r\nhuman health and habitats globally (see also Sections  2.4.4.2 and \r\n2.5.5.2)."


id: 5b38b5ab82d92c3339205df299da3dc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 11858
content:
"Since AR5, there has been significant growth in research about \r\nclimate education and activism (Simpson, Napawan and Snyder, \r\n2019; O'Brien, Selboe and Hayward, 2018; Hayward, 2021). Access \r\nto knowledge is an important determinant of well-being, inclusivity \r\nand livelihood mobility and of driving human behaviour. Knowledge \r\nsystems include formal educational provision (capital assets, syllabus \r\nand human capital), informal learning based in social interaction and \r\ncustomary institutions (including through social media) and public \r\ncommunication (news media, government and other information \r\nsystems including commercial messaging). There is a growing body \r\nof literature addressing the role of information and communication \r\ntechnology in shaping behaviour in disaster response and recovery and \r\nclimate action, with particular focus on social media use and serious \r\ngaming (Houston et al., 2015; Carson et al., 2018) (see Section 6.3.4.3)"


id: a3047d4b4901098227618940ae86d7ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 23213
content:
"The WHO Operational Framework highlights the components that \r\ncan be strengthened to adapt to extreme weather (e.g., health care \r\nworkforce, information systems, etc.). The evidence is greatest for \r\nimpacts on larger health facilities (such as hospitals) and there is \r\nless evidence regarding impacts on health service delivery outside \r\nthese settings (smaller health facilities, pharmacies, first responders, "


id: 9c5fdcaa99f39a13eaa4135d5356900
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 22154
content:
"Other barriers to implementation include harnessing expert and \r\nlocal knowledge (of individuals and organisations) to identify both \r\nquantitative and qualitative methods and indicators that connect \r\ncultural significance and local values vis-a-vis climatic change over \r\ntime and that move beyond the prevalent high-risk or high-vulnerability \r\ncentred approaches (Carmichael et  al., 2017; Fatoric and Seekamp, \r\n2018; Haugen et al., 2018; Leijonhufvud, 2016; Pollard et al., 2014; \r\nPuente-Rodriguez et al., 2016; Richards et al., 2018; Dawson, 2013; \r\nFilipe, Renedo and Marston, 2017; Kotova et  al., 2019). This is \r\nparticularly important given that the significance of cultural heritage \r\nis often intangible, and its value cannot be determined solely through \r\nquantitative indicators. Accessing local resources (craftsmanship and \r\nmaterials compatible with the originals) can also improve built cultural \r\nheritage's adaptation capacity (Phillips, 2015)."


id: 9ea3692fdd237d39f742730e8abdf06
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 22498
content:
"Effective decision-making and practice for adapting built and intangible \r\ncultural heritage requires open dialogue and exchange of cultural, \r\nhistorical and technical information between diverse stakeholders \r\nand decision makers (Fatoric and Seekamp, 2017b; Benson, Lorenzoni \r\nand Cook, 2016). As noted in Section  6.2.6, human behaviour can \r\nbe a driving force for adaptation impacts on BCH at risk. Despite \r\nchallenges associated with intangibility, socio-cultural heritage such \r\nas Indigenous knowledge (e.g., food security and water management \r\npractices) presents important opportunities for climate adaptation and \r\nresilience building. More research is needed across diverse contexts \r\nto understand feasible climate adaptation measures, and barriers and \r\nopportunities for building the resilience of both built and intangible \r\ncultural heritage, as well as to increase awareness of cultural heritage \r\nbenefits among climate change policymakers (Fatoric and Egberts, \r\n2020)."


id: 4c7ffa1019727cb8ee3add444c94e8b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 9455
content:
"Urban climate models show that increased vegetation cover results \r\nin reducing both mean air temperatures and extreme temperatures \r\nduring heatwaves (Heaviside, Cai and Vardoulakis, 2015; Ferreira and \r\nDuarte, 2019; Schubert and Grossman-Clarke, 2013). Greater density \r\nand more canopy coverage relative to other built and paved surfaces "


id: 87c96adb6a88ca1d625255e0d30f641c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 18891
content:
"During periods with intense precipitation, low-lying urban parks and \r\nopen space, engineered devices and wetlands can play an important \r\nrole in reducing stormwater runoff volumes by providing places for \r\nwater to be stored and infiltrate during heavy storms (Moore et al., \r\n2016). However, the magnitude of the runoff reduction service will \r\ndepend on the total area of green infrastructure, vegetation type and \r\nits position on the landscape. There is less evidence of the effectiveness \r\nof NBS at larger temporal and spatial scales (Pregnolato et al., 2017; \r\nJefferson et al., 2017). The performance of NBS depends on the degree \r\nto which their extent and spatial configuration in the city are optimised \r\nto capture runoff (Fry and Maxwell, 2017). Investing in a diversity of \r\nNBS types may be important to maximise stormwater management \r\nand flood regulation, as different types of engineered NBS have \r\ndifferent strengths and weaknesses."


id: 50cdadb714b0b65fa0407198e745a725
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"USD 625 million during Hurricane Sandy in the USA in 2012. Similarly, \r\nresearchers found that villages with wider mangroves between them \r\nand the coast experienced significantly fewer deaths than villages with \r\nnarrow or no mangroves during a 1999 cyclone in India (World Bank, \r\n2016). Recently, Arkema et al. (2017) noted that the number of people, \r\npoor families, elderly and total value of residential property most \r\nexposed to hazards along the entire coast of the USA can be reduced \r\nby half if existing coastal habitats remain fully intact."


id: eff194509b0f5cf6839e7362e0fb9d64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 35256
content:
"Coastal habitats also have limitations in their ability to protect coasts \r\nfrom extreme events. Some studies suggest reduced effectiveness of \r\nvegetation and reefs for coastal protection from large storm waves \r\nand surge (Moller et al., 2014; Guannel et al., 2016) and there is active \r\ndebate in the literature about the ability of ecosystems to mitigate \r\nthe impact of tsunamis (Gillis et al., 2017). Further research is needed \r\nto understand and quantify coastal protection services provided by \r\nthese hybrid green-grey solutions, especially in urban areas (Bilkovic\r\net al., 2017). Additionally, in some coastlines, water may be too deep \r\nor waves too high for some species such as mangroves to grow, thrive \r\nand provided needed NBS."


id: 32c14317b797fc73e8740c7284586877
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Maximising the adaptation benefits of NBS for improving coastal flood \r\nprotection research requires that cities seek to restore and conserve \r\nthe vegetation and reef types that are appropriate for the exposure \r\nsetting and in sufficient abundance to be effective. In particular, \r\nplanners and managers can use vegetation in protected bays as \r\nalternatives to hard infrastructure for shoreline stabilisation. However, \r\nthe influence of ecosystems on flooding and erosion is variable and \r\ndepends on a suite of social, ecological and infrastructural factors that \r\nvary within and among urban areas (Narayan et al., 2017; Ruckelshaus\r\net al., 2016; Bridges et al., 2015). Additionally, long-term planning to \r\nrestore or ensure resilience of individual species and ecosystems that \r\nmay themselves be damaged or destroyed during extreme events is \r\nneeded in order for urban green and blue infrastructure to continue \r\nproviding NBS over the longer term."


id: d7a5474a3cd145ec26463b07496b7c9d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"NBS reduce both the volume of floodwater and the impact of floods \r\n(medium evidence, medium agreement). NBS reduce the volume of \r\nrunoff by increasing infiltration and water storage (Shuster et  al., \r\n2005; Salvadore, Bronders and Batelaan, 2015), and affect the \r\nproduction and impact of flood waters through reducing river energy \r\nand flow speed through physical blockage, stabilising riverbanks \r\nduring flood events, creating space for floodwaters to expand and \r\ncombating land subsidence (Palmer, Filoso and Fanelli, 2014; Ahilan\r\net al., 2018). Installing NBS to increase infiltration on low slopes and \r\nhigh-permeability soils can reduce the impacts of potential increases \r\nin urban flooding driven by climate change, especially for small- to \r\nmedium-scale flood events (lower than 20% mean annual flood) \r\n(Moftakhari et al., 2018)."


id: 6ef825066d3b6fc1a8882527c46e26b0
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"Researchers, practitioners and policy-makers are increasingly calling \r\nfor the use of nature-based approaches to protect urban shorelines \r\nfrom coastal hazards (Cunniff and Schwartz, 2015; Bilkovic et  al., \r\n2017). The expectation is that coastal ecosystems can help stabilise \r\nshorelines, protect communities against storm surge and from \r\ntidal-influenced flooding, while providing other co-benefits for people \r\nand ecosystems. However, vegetation along protected coastlines with \r\nhigher frequency, lower intensity coastal hazards (National Research \r\nCouncil, 2014) may be more effective for stabilising shorelines and \r\nreducing risk to coastal communities and properties, and benefits will \r\ndepend on local hydrology of the coastal region. Narayan et al. (2017) \r\nestimate that coastal wetlands alone reduced direct flood damages by "


id: 61bf89bc724e6d93fe4c350c3ba8a159
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Source reduction strategies include creating permeable areas such \r\nas parks and open spaces, as well as engineered devices such as \r\nraingardens, bioswales and retention ponds that help retain stormwater \r\nrunoff from impervious areas. River restoration can reduce flood \r\npeak flow and provide space for floodwaters to expand. Planting and "


id: f8918c4b7484292d28be05be1f803d6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"alternatives to traditional stormwater management techniques, where \r\npossible, since these solutions can promote groundwater recharge. \r\nAs green infrastructure is increasingly being used for stormwater \r\nabsorption in cities (McPhillips et al., 2020), rain gardens, wetlands, or \r\nengineered infiltration ponds and bioswales are the NBS most likely to \r\npromote recharge, reduce evapotranspiration and contribute to water \r\nprovisioning."


id: 670ce557c7748e0a1228132175bf49a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 13799
content:
"maintaining vegetation along riverbanks, often in the form of parks \r\nor river restoration, maintains structural integrity during flood events. \r\nWetland construction and improved connectivity to floodplains also \r\nreduces flood peaks. Efforts to restore floodplains are important to \r\ncreate space for floodwaters and reduce exposure by moving people out \r\nof the hazard zone. Floodplain restoration also provides access to the \r\nriver that has multiple benefits including recreation, access to water for \r\ndomestic use and other cultural ecosystem services. A key adaptation \r\nstrategy is to reduce streambank erosion (a result of high peak flow) \r\nusing riparian vegetation to stabilise riverbanks during flood events."


id: f080128610aca3e43890917effed032b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35336
content:
"Urban agriculture can serve as a NBS for food security (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement) across a range of urban contexts \r\n(Lwasa and Dubbeling, 2015; Nogeire-McRae et  al., 2018; Pourias, \r\nAubry and Duchemin, 2016) by contributing to food provisioning as \r\nwell as providing co-benefits including for recreation, place making \r\nand mental health (Petrovic et al., 2019; Soga, Gaston and Yamaura, \r\n2017; Goldstein et al., 2016b)."


id: 836aa81d9e971c3dec669406ad37b43e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Urban agriculture among poorer communities in lower income areas \r\nis already an important source of food supply for those communities, \r\ncontributing to food security and health (Orsini et al., 2013). However, \r\npotential for expanding open air urban food production may be \r\npractically constrained by land availability (Badami and Ramankutty, \r\n2015; Martellozzo et  al., 2014). This is particularly true in some \r\nlower-income countries where rapid urbanisation is occurring, which \r\ncompounds existing food insecurity (Satterthwaite, McGranahan and \r\nTacoli, 2010; Vermeiren et al., 2013). Land availability and suitability \r\nfor gardens can be further constrained by land use history, including \r\npast industrial uses that can contaminate soils with pollutants such \r\nas lead."


id: 41fa1fa5050a2e23348a6dbc69fd3cee
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"Climate change may have important impacts on urban food production \r\nand food security. While urban agriculture may provide benefits in \r\nterms of stability of food access in low-income households in some \r\nregions of the Global South where the climate is warmer, the shorter \r\ngrowing seasons in colder climates will reduce the role of outdoor \r\nurban agriculture in year-round food supply and diets. Though urban \r\nagriculture constitutes a small fraction of total food consumption in \r\nsome urban areas, several studies have attempted to estimate the \r\nextent to which urban agriculture could theoretically meet urban \r\ntotal food or vegetable demand (Badami and Ramankutty, 2015; "


id: 4f7c797dc2fb4453466e94ca28abad0
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vector_id: 9940
content:
"McClintock, 2014; Hara et al., 2018). Maximising the adaptation and \r\nresilience benefits of NBS for food production and security suggests \r\nthe need to embrace the multi-functionality of urban agriculture, \r\nrather than viewing it as solely concerning food production (Barthel, \r\nParker and Ernstson, 2015)."


id: 5c8bdb207615ce775c984e1428ad209a
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content:
"Interventions in the morphology and built form of cities can contribute \r\nto the reduction of the urban heat island effect and reduce the \r\nconsequences of urban heatwaves. These can include installing air \r\nconditioning, establishing public cooling centres (i.e., for use during \r\nheatwaves), pavement watering (Parison et al., 2020a) and increasing \r\nsurface albedo through 'cool roofs' (i.e., with high-reflectance \r\nmaterials) and walls. Air conditioning can significantly increase the \r\nlocal urban heat island (Salamanca et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2019a) \r\nand the choice of refrigerant has a significant impact on global \r\nwarming potential (McLinden et  al., 2017). The relative efficiency \r\nof cool roofs compared with green roofs is variable, because while \r\nwhite roofs have similar potential to reduce the urban heat island (Li, \r\nBou-Zeid and Oppenheimer, 2014), they can quickly turn grey due to \r\ndust and air pollution, losing their effectiveness (Gunawardena, Wells "


id: 40b7fcefea3487dbcf1eb14051bdde79
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content:
"Urban morphology describes the overall status of cities as physical, \r\nenvironmental and cultural entities. Cities interact with surrounding \r\nenvironmental processes, for example, as documented in Section 6.2 \r\nby influencing urban temperature, but also precipitation and through \r\ncoastal and riverine development fluvial and coastal sedimentary \r\nregimes of erosion and deposition that impact on flood risk. Rapid, \r\nincreased urbanisation has contributed to observed flood risks in "


id: a08ddcb113ecd65ec302725961b6073a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"van Hooff et al., 2014; Makantasi and Mavrogianni, 2016; Fosas et al., \r\n2018; Barbosa, Vicente and Santos, 2015; Taylor et al., 2018; Triana, \r\nLamberts and Sassi, 2018; Dodoo and Gustavsson, 2016). However, \r\nit must be noted that the cooling potential of natural ventilation will \r\ndecrease in the future because of increasing outdoor air temperatures \r\n(Gilani and O'Brien, 2020). Increased insulation (including through \r\ngreen solutions) without shading and ventilation can also lead to \r\nadverse impacts through the lowering of nighttime cooling (Reder\r\net  al., 2018). Similarly, air conditioning performance also decreases \r\nwith increasing outdoor temperatures, in addition to being maladaptive \r\nwhere use increases anthropogenic heat emissions into the urban area, \r\nand global greenhouse gas emissions if powered by carbon intensive \r\nenergy systems (Wang et al., 2018c)."


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"Passive cooling is a design-based, widely used strategy to create \r\nnaturally ventilated buildings, making it an important alternative to \r\naddress the urban heat island for residential and commercial buildings \r\n(Al-Obaidi, Ismail and Rahman, 2014). Generally, passive cooling is \r\nachieved by controlling the interactions between the building envelope \r\nand the natural elements. Facade fixes such as overhangs, louvres and \r\ninsulated walls are effective at shading buildings from solar radiation, \r\nwhile complex ones such as texture walls, diode roofs and roof ponds \r\nare effective at minimising heat gains from solar radiation and ambient \r\nheat (Oropeza-Perez and Ostergaard, 2018). Passive cooling is inspired \r\nalso by traditional design forms, for example from Mediterranean, \r\nIslamic and Mughal architecture in the Indian sub-continent (Di Turi \r\nand Ruggiero, 2017; Izadpanahi, Farahani and Nikpey, 2021)."


id: 249affb0c888e16850fa88198dbebec2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Limits on housing and building adaptation include failure of regulatory \r\nsystems so that formal design standards are not followed even \r\nwhen legally required (Arku et al., 2016; Durst and Wegmann, 2017; \r\nPan and Garmston, 2012; Awuah and Hammond, 2014). This can be \r\na result of pressures from clients for cheaper structures, developers "


id: 5c36aa131606cbb5335e95827120d8b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"illegally cutting costs or regulators lacking capacity for enforcement. \r\nTechnological innovation can also be slow to embed itself in building \r\nnorms and standards. Innovation also lies outside the formal sector \r\nand can include artisanal building techniques that may have adaptive \r\nvalue. Examples from Latin America demonstrate how initiatives in \r\ninformal settlement improvement associated with housing policy, \r\nguaranteeing access to land and decent housing, show the opportunity \r\nfor overarching policies encompassing development, poverty reduction, \r\ndisaster-risk reduction, climate-change adaptation and climate-change \r\nmitigation (see Section 12.5.5)."


id: 93b04cafebc39376ed33847dd4816816
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"ICTs play a role in adaptive responses to both short-term shocks and \r\nlong-term trends associated with climate change. Timely access to \r\ninformation (e.g., early warning, temperature and rainfall, agricultural \r\nadvice) through ICTs (e.g., mobile devices, SMS, radio, social media) \r\ncan be crucial to respond and mitigate the impact of emergencies such \r\nas floods and drought, for identifying pest and disease prevalence, \r\nand for informing livelihood options, key in adaptation pathways of \r\nvulnerable communities (Devkota and Phuyal, 2018; Panda et  al., \r\n2019)."


id: b275ae6d5cfd52b8f543cc3cee1e5afa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"In addition to contributing to the robustness and stability of the \r\ncritical infrastructure in the event of disasters, ICTs can strengthen \r\nother attributes of resilient urban systems by enabling learning and \r\ncommunity self-organisation, cross-scale networks and flexibility, \r\nhelping vulnerable stakeholders, in particular, to adjust to change and \r\nuncertainty (Heeks and Ospina, 2015; Heeks and Ospina, 2019). Big \r\ndata is being used to inform responses to humanitarian emergencies \r\n(Pham et al., 2014; Ali et al., 2016), as well as to generate new forms \r\nof citizen engagement and reporting (e.g., community-based maps \r\nof flood-prone areas) that can help to inform coping and adaptive \r\nresponses (Ogie et al., 2019)."


id: da0021eda91682989aa1fb1f4c1ce09a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"The selection and use of ICTs for adaptation needs to be fairly grounded \r\nin the broader socio-cultural, economic, political and institutional \r\ncontext, to ensure that these tools effectively help address existing, \r\nemerging and future adaptive needs. Typically, ICT is inadequate on its \r\nown to make a significant difference (Toya and Skidmore, 2015). The \r\nrole of ICTs in adaptive pathways is influenced by the availability of \r\nlocally relevant information (e.g., weather-based advisory messages, \r\nlocal market prices), the accessibility of information by all members \r\nof the community (e.g., using various text, audio and visual content, \r\nlocal languages, addressing gender-related exclusion, cost and digital \r\ncompetencies) and the applicability of information at the appropriate \r\nscale (local, regional or national), including data quality and verification \r\n(Namukombo, 2016; Haworth et al., 2018)."


id: dbe5591b9876fa607e6101c5760aeb9d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Information privacy and security, as well as the unintended impacts of \r\nICTs on inequality, spread of misinformation and on widening existing \r\ngaps (e.g., due to poverty, gender and power differentials), can also \r\nconstrain the contribution of ICTs to urban adaptation (Haworth et al., \r\n2018; Coletta and Kitchin, 2017; Leszczynski, 2016) and are among the \r\nkey challenges that need to be addressed in order to fully realise their \r\npotential."


id: b4bd386e48c835b78f116b5dc1a99ab4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"A number of measures are available to adapt existing energy \r\ninfrastructure to climate change. These typically involve changing \r\nengineering design codes and upgrading facilities to cope with new \r\nclimatic conditions, building redundancy and robustness into systems, \r\nand preparation to ensure continued operation following extreme \r\nevents. Adapting low carbon energy infrastructure improves its climate \r\nresilience whilst simultaneously delivering mitigation goals (Kemp, \r\n2017; Feldpausch-Parker et  al., 2018), benefitting all other sectors \r\n(Dawson et al., 2018; Pescaroli and Alexander, 2018; Kong, Simonovic \r\nand Zhang, 2019)."


id: 791f5493518b39be3d5146e566d1b4e7
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content:
"ICTs are playing an increasing role in resilience building and enabling \r\nclimate change adaptation. They are enabling access to information \r\nneeded for decision making, facilitating learning and coordination \r\namong stakeholders, and building social capital, as well as helping to \r\nmonitor, visualise and disseminate current and future climate impacts \r\n(Eakin et  al., 2015; Heeks and Ospina, 2019; Haworth et  al., 2018; \r\nImam, Hossain and Saha, 2017). Advocacy and awareness raising \r\nthrough ICTs, such social media applications, can influence behaviours \r\nand attitudes in support of adaptive pathways (Laspidou, 2014)."


id: b4ecd5ee1f7c7f77e9490c2df11185b7
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content:
"may be more appropriate to ensure support for vulnerable households \r\nand coordination of action and information (Ghanem, Mander \r\nand Gough, 2016). More generally, it is important for responder \r\norganisations to integrate energy needs in disaster preparedness and \r\nresponse plans. Whilst over the longer term, reducing household and \r\nindustrial demand for energy supply will reduce the need for capital \r\ninvestments and upgrades (Fu et al., 2017)."


id: df5ac2d4b6db4466e4c7a8a7d0f47df7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 32639
content:
"Hall et al. (2019) identified 4223 GW of global power generation at risk \r\nof flooding. If these assets were protected by 0.5 m flood protection, \r\n~700 GW would be at risk from the 1-in-100 year flood. Many assets \r\ncan be strengthened, relocated or replaced with new equipment built \r\nto higher standards. An example of this is in the UK where a total \r\nof PS172  million is being invested between 2011 and 2023 to raise \r\nflood protection of substations to be resilient to the 1-in-1000 year \r\nflood (ENA, 2015). Electricity cables can be upgraded in anticipation of \r\nreduced efficiency in a warmer climate, although in many locations this \r\nmay be achieved autonomously to meet growth in electricity demand \r\n(Fu et al., 2017)."


id: 24569a2a68de64b36794c20251c77cc8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 3165
content:
"Providing a reliable and resilient power supply is crucial to economic \r\nand social development (Fankhauser and Stern, 2016). Furthermore, \r\nthere are co-benefits from the use of low carbon energy systems \r\n(Chapter 8, WGIII AR6). For example, solar-charged street lamps and \r\nhousehold lighting gives reliable nighttime lighting, providing safety, \r\nsecurity and resilience to disruption of network power supplies (Burgess\r\net al., 2017). At larger scales, deploying solar power on building roofs \r\nreduces energy demand for cooling by 12% and lowers the urban heat \r\nisland, and thereby has health benefits (Masson et al., 2014a). In the \r\nUSA, construction of solar panels over 200  million parking spaces \r\nwould generate a quarter of the country's electricity supply (Erickson \r\nand Jennings, 2017)."


id: 9ec393faa686c59388ef33349c7e61be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Fuels, including oil, natural gas, hydrogen, biomass and CO2 prior to \r\nsequestration are delivered and distributed by pipeline or transportation \r\nby road, rail and shipping. In addition to engineering improvements, \r\nadaptation measures also include planning and preparation for \r\nservice disruption by changing transport patterns, increasing local \r\nstorage capacities and identifying and prioritising protection of critical \r\ntransport nodes (Wang et al., 2019b; Panahi, Ng and Pang, 2020)."


id: e4c147f07333fdedf618367ebf97d33c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 33467
content:
"As presented in Table 6.3, access to energy supply varies considerably. \r\nIn particular, many African countries require substantial energy \r\ninfrastructure to support their economic development. The combination \r\nof smart technologies with solar and other renewable generation \r\nprovides a huge opportunity (Anderson et al., 2017; Kolokotsa, 2017). \r\nHowever, care must be taken in rapidly developing cities, as failure \r\nto ensure energy access during urbanisation can reduce resilience \r\n(Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2018)."


id: 1036fa16100dff560fc6951209d6173e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Longer term systemic strategies could include a combination of \r\nincreased network redundancy and decentralisation of generation \r\nlocations (Fu et al., 2017), or the use of 'defensive islanding' which \r\ninvolves splitting the network into stable islands to isolate components \r\nsusceptible to failure and subsequently trigger a cascading event \r\n(Panteli et  al., 2016). Smart grids are being increasingly deployed \r\nwithin municipalities to provide more efficient management of supply \r\nand demand and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, however, there \r\nis limited understanding of their performance and reliability during \r\nfloods and other extreme weather events (Vasenev, Montoya and \r\nCeccarelli, 2016; Feldpausch-Parker et al., 2018)."


id: a9e2575a3e9f707c0e9ca975755d0044
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 24262
content:
"Wright et al. (2012) calculated that strengthening bridges in the USA \r\nwould cost USD 140-250  billion by 2090 (or several billion dollars \r\na year), but costs are reduced by 30% if interventions are made \r\nproactively. Koks et al. (2019) calculate a benefit-cost ratio of greater \r\nthan one for over 60% of the world's roads exposed to flooding. The \r\ngreatest benefits from adaptation of the global road network are in \r\nLMICs where reductions in flood risk are typically between 40% and \r\n80%. Pregnolato et al. (2017) showed that in the city of Newcastle \r\nupon Tyne (UK), two carefully targeted interventions at key locations to "


id: 18b2f44ee17db226a9d18b349bf15271
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"manage surface water flooding reduced the impacts of the 1-in-50 year \r\nevent in 2050 by 32%. In permafrost regions, geo-reinforcement, \r\nfoundation and piles can be strengthened (Trofimenko, Evgenev and \r\nShashina, 2017), whilst passive cooling methods, including high-albedo \r\nsurfacing, sun-sheds and heat drains can cool infrastructure (Dore, Niu \r\nand Brooks, 2016)."


id: 65eb5a3774a699ecd99948e05aca5a94
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13623
content:
"Adaptation to water scarcity can be through measures to increase \r\nsupply (e.g., water storage, rainwater harvesting, desalination, river \r\nbasin transfers, increased abstraction, reduced pollution of water \r\nsources), or manage demand (e.g., reduce leakage lower consumption, \r\nuse of water efficiency devices, greywater reuse, behaviour change). A \r\ncombination of these measures is usually required (e.g., Ives, Simpson \r\nand Hall, 2018; Dirwai et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2018a). Reliable and \r\nwell-adapted water and sanitation services support economic growth, \r\npublic health, reduce marginalisation and poverty, and can lower \r\nenergy use and improve water quality (Campos and Darch, 2015; \r\nMiller and Hutchins, 2017; Jeppesen et al., 2015; Hamiche, Stambouli \r\nand Flazi, 2016)."


id: d0468e8d41fcab795d0ecee3dbca289b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 30299
content:
"Hanson and Nicholls (2020) calculate the total global investment costs \r\nfor port adaptation to sea level rise and provision of new areas at \r\nUSD 223-768 billion by 2050. However, adaptation of existing ports \r\nis only 6% of this. Yesudian and Dawson (2021) estimate the cost \r\nof maintaining present levels of flood risk in 2100 for the global air \r\nnetwork will cost up to USD 57 billion (Monioudi et al., 2018; Esteban\r\net al., 2020b)."


id: 5f566cb58ac721abd19cd009e870d7f9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 12568
content:
"Globally, water sector adaptation costs are estimated to be USD \r\n20  billion yr-1 by 2050 (Fletcher, Lickley and Strzepek, 2019). \r\nGlobally, the budget required by 2030 for water infrastructure (new \r\nand refurbishment) is more than half of the budget required for all \r\ninfrastructure (Koop and van Leeuwen, 2017). For OECD countries, \r\nwater adaptation increases costs by 2%, but this proportion is far \r\nhigher for developing nations (Olmstead, 2014)."


id: 6aedeefc6763ccfbf858ef11130527b9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"A number of adaptation actions are available to reduce the impacts \r\nof floods on water and sanitation infrastructure. Active management \r\nreduces blockages in water infrastructure and protects related \r\nservices such as roads and culverts which are essential to ensure the \r\noperation of onsite sanitation infrastructure (Capone et al., 2020). The \r\nimpact of floods for onsite or sewerage systems can be lowered by \r\nreducing or eliminating excreta from the environment through regular \r\nmaintenance, cleaning and clearing of blockages (O'Donnell and \r\nThorne, 2020; Borges Pedro et al., 2020)."


id: 4365f310b183f303b7e086e6edb6e736
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Infrastructure to protect key assets such as water and wastewater \r\ntreatment plants or pumping stations has a high cost but benefits \r\nall connected households and reduces pollution from flood events. In \r\nwell-regulated water sectors, there has been an increasing focus on \r\nsuch investments (Campos and Darch, 2015). Whereas more diffused \r\ncheaper interventions can reduce flood water ingress to domestic \r\ntoilets (Irwin et al., 2018). Luh et al. (2017) found that protected dug \r\nwells were one of the least resilient technologies, whereas piped, \r\ntreated, utility managed surface water systems had higher resilience."


id: eadde8f798551c0efa2c7c9a86a2d5cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 34456
content:
"Safe and convenient walking and cycling (and public transport) \r\ninfrastructure in cities reduces carbon emissions and urban heat \r\nisland intensity, but also improve cardiovascular capacity which \r\nreduces heat stress (Schuster et al., 2017). In some regions, warmer \r\nweather may bring opportunities for increased uptake of cycling and \r\nwalking, though precipitation or thermal discomfort caused by high \r\ntemperature and humidity can reduce the use of active travel modes \r\nfor commuting and recreation (Chapman, 2015). Shaded pavements \r\nand lanes, and measures to mitigate the urban heat island can reduce \r\nrisks to disruption of active travel thereby also enhancing mitigation \r\n(Wong et al., 2017)."


id: c7898d743236dc5e76def2ffb88a73aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28978
content:
"Protecting water sources from pollution is even more important \r\nin a warmer climate that increases the frequency of algal blooms. \r\nIndividual assets such as water intake pipes can be protected using \r\nscreens (Kim et al., 2020a), whereas basin-scale land management is \r\nrequired to reduce nutrient load from runoff (Me et al., 2018), whilst \r\ninjecting water or installing barriers can protect coastal aquifers from \r\nsalinisation (Siegel, 2020)."


id: 67819831d5e1f6d8267b858f7c9e79d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 13873
content:
"Full system re-design may enable the greatest resilience but it does \r\nnot usually have a good benefit-cost ratio (Doll, Klug and Enei, 2014). \r\nMoreover, Caparros-Midwood et  al. (2019) show that transport \r\ninfrastructure planners will not always be able to resolve trade-offs \r\nbetween managing climate risks and mitigating greenhouse gases \r\nwithout tackling other sectors. However, infrastructure planners should \r\ncontinually seek opportunities for positive infrastructure lock in where \r\navailable (Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2018)."


id: 52244828562714f414de6c735957bc62
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 10376
content:
"More radical structural interventions may be needed in the longer \r\nterm, but would need to be planned and delivered in coordination \r\nwith investments in other sectors, particularly housing (Luthi, Willetts \r\nand Hoffmann, 2020). As an interim measure, sanitation services with \r\na lower reliance on fixed infrastructure, or container-based sanitation "


id: 1207d1c6893d14f6ae7dba8e3631ead2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"hard interventions such as dikes and levees are generally cost effective \r\n(Jongman, 2018; Ward et al., 2017)."


id: e56be13e14d1c1b2173c2f9545146861
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"could be appropriate in many urban areas that are badly affected by \r\nflooding (Mills et al., 2020)."


id: 87c7a980f18b117f9955df4bfe4465a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Other actions include use of adaptive planning (Evans, Rowell and \r\nSemazzi, 2020), integration of measures of climate resilience into \r\nwater safety plans (Prats et al., 2017), as well as improved accounting \r\nand management of water resources (Lasage et  al., 2015). Policy \r\nprescriptions on technologies for service delivery and changes in \r\nmanagement models offer potential to reduce risks, particularly in \r\nlow-income settings (Howard et  al., 2016). Where formal sewerage \r\nprovision is lacking, community based adaptation that incorporates \r\nboth the function of the sanitation system and the vulnerability of \r\nusers (e.g., women, children, elderly, ill or disabled) into the design is \r\nessential (Duncker, 2019)."


id: 16913aef9bdb2ceed9f7c5c7d0477953
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1075
content:
"Cities are deploying a broad range of strategies to adapt infrastructure \r\nto flooding, with hard engineering approaches (e.g., dikes and seawalls) \r\nincreasingly complementing soft approaches, including planning and \r\nuse of nature-based solutions, that emphasise natural and social \r\ncapital (Jongman, 2018; Sovacool, 2011). The infrastructure can alter \r\ndownstream risks and lead to increased residual risk by encouraging \r\nmore floodplain construction (Miller, Gabe and Sklarz, 2019; Ludy \r\nand Kondolf, 2012). Physical infrastructure is highly cost effective for \r\nlarge settlements, but not always for small settlements (Tiggeloven\r\net al., 2020) and can be inaccessible to poorer communities (Sayers, \r\nPenning-Rowsell and Horritt, 2018; Van Bavel, Curtis and Soens, 2018). \r\nIt is often inflexible once installed but new designs and adaptive \r\npathways are emerging (Anvarifar et al., 2016; Kapetas and Fenner, \r\n2020)."


id: 756019ffd9a8e9ae68192d482e76c1ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16050
content:
"More recent developments include sensor arrays to catalogue a river's \r\nreach and how changing hydraulics interact with roadways (Forbes\r\net  al., 2019). Kuala Lumpur's (Malaysia) stormwater management \r\nand road tunnel (SMART) during extreme rain events transitions the \r\nmotorway to a stormwater conduit, an example of multifunctionality \r\nenabling agility (Isah, 2016; Markolf et al., 2019). Smart stormwater \r\ncontrol systems are starting to use real-time control to dynamically \r\nmanage the retention and movement of water during storms, though \r\nuptake at large scales which provide the greatest improvements in \r\nperformance have been limited (Xu et al., 2020b)."


id: 10995f0d38b25cb447a2350f9a7ccc9e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 89
content:
"As urban areas have expanded, so too have the number of vulnerable \r\nassets, and efforts may now emphasise reducing construction in \r\nhigh-risk regions (Paprotny et  al., 2018a). The National Flood and \r\nCoastal Erosion Risk Management Strategy for England, for example, \r\ncalls for reductions in inappropriate developments in floodplains \r\n(Kuklicke and Demeritt, 2016; UK Environment Agency, 2020). Because \r\nclimate change increases the flood risk profile of certain regions, \r\nreconsideration of design criteria has become more common (Ayyub, \r\n2018). New York City now requires the sewer system currently designed \r\nfor hydraulic capacity in 5-year design life should be designed for 50-\r\nyear design life, taking into account climate changes over that period \r\n(NYC, 2019)."


id: 6433a25350f190e716f84bc1fafea15c
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vector_id: 13335
content:
"Adaptation strategies are diverse and often involve hybrid physical and \r\nNBS, and increasingly integrated management plans that consider both \r\nflood prevention and designing infrastructure and supporting people \r\nto cope with floods when they occur. Adaptation typically focuses on (i) \r\nincreasing the standard of protection to compensate for the increased \r\nmagnitude of extreme events; (ii) increased maintenance to cope with \r\nincreased frequency of extremes and changes in ambient conditions; (iii) \r\nchanged maintenance regimes from narrower maintenance windows, \r\nfor example as assets are used more frequently (Sayers, Walsh and \r\nDawson, 2015); (iv) land use planning and management to reduce \r\nexposure and manage hydrological flows; and (v) raising awareness, \r\npreparedness and incident management. In high population areas, "


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"initiative sets a goal of 80% of urban land able to absorb or reuse \r\n70% of stormwater through underground storage tanks and tunnels, \r\nand use of pervious pavements, in addition to NBS (Chan et  al., \r\n2018; Muggah, 2019). Similarly, several thousand water-sensitive \r\nurban design interventions have been implemented across the city of \r\nMelbourne (Kuller et al., 2018)."


id: 7f8b8435c681fff5d28e83c1ea9fb04e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"This section builds on 6.3.4 to offer two entry points for assessing \r\nurban adaptation that extend beyond individual infrastructure types \r\nand that demonstrate the interdependent and dynamic natures of \r\nurban systems."


id: dd52f65e40b7e5a2264e9e0e51aa14bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Physical coastal management infrastructure has significant benefits in \r\nreducing flood and erosion losses and damage from storms. Physical \r\ninfrastructure includes seawalls, dikes, breakwaters, revetments, \r\ngroynes and tidal barriers. Adapted infrastructure can alter risks in \r\nmorphologically connected areas, and lead to increased residual risk \r\nby encouraging more construction in the coastal zone (Miller, Gabe \r\nand Sklarz, 2019; Ludy and Kondolf, 2012). The infrastructure is \r\nhighly cost effective for large settlements, but not always for small \r\nsettlements (Tiggeloven et al., 2020) and can be inaccessible to poorer \r\ncommunities (Fletcher et al., 2016; Pelling and Garschagen, 2019)."


id: 594a37dffe668307159dab76340c1aef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Anticipated costs for this vary widely. For example, Hinkel et al. (2014) \r\ncalculate that adaptation costs to maintain current global levels of \r\ncoastal flood protection would be 1.2-9.3% of gross world product \r\nbut protect assets in human settlements of USD 21-210  billion; \r\nTiggeloven et  al. (2020) calculate the cost of adaptation to be USD \r\n176 billion (although this would provide a benefit-cost ratio of 106 \r\nunder RCP8.5); while Nicholls et al. (2019) estimate that global coastal \r\nprotection would cost substantially more, up to USD 18.3 trillion \r\nbetween 2015 and 2100 for RCP8.5 (this includes ranges of unit costs \r\nand maintenance costs which have often been ignored)."


id: 4c8b17b0f9f669e75f499dabb1a0fc42
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Coastal protection infrastructure such as dikes and sluice gates can \r\ninhibit salinity intrusion through careful management of water levels, \r\nthis can provide co-benefits for flood risk reduction and agricultural \r\nproductivity, but can also have negative impacts on ecosystems \r\n(Renaud et al., 2015). Managed aquifer recharge can be effective if \r\nthe objective is to secure freshwater drinking supply (Hossain, Ludwig \r\nand Leemans, 2018)."


id: 4d37d3b3073ded64aa68cb43790af23e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Distributive justice calls attention to unequal access to urban services, \r\nland, capital and technology. Related to this, exposure to health, \r\nflooding and drought risks of people living in low-income and informal \r\nsettlements is a growing concern, as is disaster preparedness and the \r\nability to support the needs of vulnerable groups such as the elderly, \r\nchildren and disabled, where data is often lacking (Lilford et al., 2016; \r\nCastro et al., 2017). There are also differences in who benefits from \r\ninfrastructures, as they are inherently political, embedded in social \r\ncontexts, politics and cultural norms (McFarlane and Silver, 2017) and \r\noften tend to benefit those already privileged (Henrique and Tschakert, "


id: 827b8dcd4cebc2e722deff5eaa51f307
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 18049
content:
"Where responses to COVID-19 include addressing inequities in social infrastructure, this opens a considerable and potentially society\u0002wide opportunity to reduce social vulnerability to climate change risks (see Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7)."


id: 113a8f365390ee167ee5c6b18e99ceb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"areas, there is often unequal access to services. For example, an \r\nassessment of sustainable urban mobility plans in Portugal showed \r\nthat some areas have considered equity in their plans and increased \r\naccess for disadvantaged users including the elderly and disabled, but \r\nin other cities this is lacking (Arsenio, Martens and Di Ciommo, 2016). \r\nUnderstanding who has access to what infrastructure can help to \r\nredress the drivers of social vulnerability that are central to just urban \r\nadaptation (Michael, Deshpande and Ziervogel, 2018; Shi et al., 2016)."


id: b09cba4bd1f44d3c6e1c63e5d40dd359
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"2019). As an example, fixing water leaks can depend as much on the \r\npolitics of who is involved and whose knowledge is prioritised as on \r\nthe technical aspects (Anand, 2015)."


id: f42ecb422a89f4259a2a05551aec082a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 35926
content:
"The quality and maintenance of infrastructure is often unequal across \r\ncities, benefiting some and increasing vulnerability of others. Some \r\nproperty is seen as dangerous and of lower value if highly exposed to \r\nrisk (Wamsley et al., 2015). Similarly, areas suffering from disinvestment \r\nin infrastructure might have a high risk of flooding (Haddock and \r\nEdwards, 2013). Zoning and land use trade-offs have been seen to \r\nbe unequally skewed in favour of prime real estate and economically \r\nvaluable assets (e.g., protecting factories and refineries from flooding) \r\n(Anguelovski et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2015). Urban planning reforms \r\nare therefore central to building a fairer urban adaptation response \r\n(Parnell, 2016b)."


id: 8d2debd6d1f59958dd77dab17b03358
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Changing land use and increasing green spaces to reduce climate \r\nrisks and attract investments and job opportunities has increased real \r\nestate values, triggered climate gentrification in some areas (Keenan, \r\nHill and Gumber, 2018) and decreased access to affordable housing \r\nin other areas (Larsen, 2015; Carter et  al., 2015). Displacement \r\nthrough evictions and relocations linked to land use conversion and \r\nresettlement in the name of adaptation has also increased people's \r\nvulnerability (Anguelovski et al., 2016; Henrique and Tschakert, 2019)."


id: e9dc49845f324d332595746f01fd0dc6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Infrastructure is often not adequately implemented in low-income \r\nurban areas and not equally accessible to all (Meller et al., 2017). For \r\nexample, low-income neighbourhoods often have less green space \r\nand therefore less associated cooling benefits. Even in high-income "


id: da7b378c84505efe92d90cf2f2568e50
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"and Remling, 2018). For example, the case of an area of peri-urban \r\nBangkok experiencing localised flooding due to unregulated private \r\nsector development saw households take both individual (building \r\nflood walls around homes, digging temporary drainage swales in the \r\ncarriageway) and collective action (petitioning authorities, pumping \r\nwater into vacant land). These actions, to a certain extent, merely \r\ndisplaced the flood water to other areas, or created new problems \r\nby damaging the carriageway, creating negative impacts on other \r\nhouseholds and the wider community. However, ultimately, it was the \r\nactions of improperly regulated private sector developers driving the \r\nneed for this autonomous adaptation (Limthongsakul, Nitivattananon \r\nand Arifwidodo, 2017)."


id: 5a317ab360728cbbbd158a7194b29001
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"there is secession from public infrastructure services that has financial \r\nimplications for viability (Romero-Lankao, Gnatz and Sperling, 2016). \r\nIn the case of the 2015-17 Cape Town drought, wealthy households \r\nsecured their water needs through off-grid technologies such as \r\nrainwater tanks and boreholes. Although this resulted in more water \r\nbeing available in the dams, it also led to less revenue being collected \r\nfor municipal water and less ability to cross-subsidise water for poor \r\nhouseholds (Ziervogel, 2019b; Simpson, 2019; Bigger and Millington, \r\n2019). More attention needs to be paid to how shifts in infrastructure \r\nare serving the interests of urban elites, often driven by the state, \r\nand failing to adequately consider the needs of the disadvantaged \r\n(Bulkeley, Castan Broto and Edwards, 2014; Ajibade, 2017; Shi et al., \r\n2016). Equally, more risk-reducing infrastructure is needed across all \r\nurban areas (Reckien et al., 2018a)."


id: 8347ee595beb45d30adaf11ede9e464f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"One of the tensions that emerge when addressing injustice is that \r\nthe global provision of modern infrastructure is increasingly seen as \r\nunfeasible. It is unfeasible, both in terms of the current high emissions \r\nassociated with infrastructure (World Bank, 2017) and the centralised, \r\nhigh standard ideal (Lawhon, Nilsson and Silver, 2018; Coutard and \r\nRutherford, 2015). Decentralisation is increasingly needed, which \r\nthe urban poor already engage in through their use of 'informal' \r\ninfrastructure technologies, given their limited access to infrastructure \r\nnetworks. Transformative adaptation pathways that reduce climate risk \r\nwhilst reducing inequity require an approach that sees infrastructure \r\nas inherently social and political."


id: 3ed8b50caace3bc7b4fd29a92ac6d040
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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vector_id: 7271
content:
"As analytical concepts, mitigation and adaptation have helped, over \r\nthe years, to structure thinking and action around climate change. \r\nHowever, since AR5 there has been a growing debate about the \r\nadequacy of a neat separation between adaptation and mitigation \r\n(Castan Broto, 2017)."


id: de60e86d644bbdf721651e97ecd1b81d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"For example, the ideas of climate resilient development and climate \r\ncompatible development help planners to consider the simultaneous \r\nwins that emerge between adaptation, mitigation and development, \r\nrequiring institutional building and partnerships to deliver triple \r\nwin solutions (Stringer et al., 2014; Seo, Jaber and Srinivasan, 2017; \r\nMitchell and Maxwell, 2010). While the evidence base for the actual "


id: d497e9b750336e9d6c8be055721c3ffe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Table  6.6 represents the contribution of 21 adaptation measures \r\nidentified in this chapter to 17 components of climate resilient \r\ndevelopment (CRD). CRD brings together the aims of climate adaptation, \r\nclimate mitigation, sustainable development and social justice (Singh \r\nand Chudasama, 2021). This provides a first assessment of the viability \r\nof adaptation to cities, settlements and key infrastructure as a part of \r\nglobal transition to sustainability (see also Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB \r\nin Chapter 18)."


id: 97af491e5cf32a922e65365ef86bfa26
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Two overarching messages and one key consequence for planning \r\narise from Figure  6.4. First, urban adaptation measures can offer a \r\nconsiderable contribution to CRD. Second, this potential is realised by \r\nadaptations that extend predominant physical infrastructure approaches \r\nto also deploy nature-based solutions and social interventions. The \r\nconsequence for planning is support for comprehensive monitoring \r\nand joined-up evaluation across the multiple components of CRD, as \r\nwell as between the sectors that contribute to adaptation."


id: 7378e595928ec6bc6ac1cf2bdc353102
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Table 6.6 shows that adapting key grey/physical infrastructure (built \r\nform and design, ICT, energy, transport, water and sanitation) is \r\nfundamental to CRD. This provides resilience to a range of hazards, \r\nwith benefits to livelihoods, social capital and health, and provides \r\nbenefits for the adaptation of other, connected infrastructure systems. \r\nChallenges to the contributions of grey/physical infrastructure, where \r\nadaptation through nature-based solutions and social policy offer \r\nalternatives are a lack of flexibility post-deployment constraining \r\nability to flex as climate and vulnerability change; risk transferred to \r\nother people/places, not resolved; negative ecological consequences; \r\nand limited evidence of targeting marginality and inequality."


id: d314efc4cf701cb252a30bde4bda46f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"The significance of a CRD lens for the evaluation of adaptation \r\nstrategy can be seen in approaches to riverine and coastal flooding. \r\nThis viewpoint brings physical (e.g., embankments and defenses), \r\nnature-based (e.g., mangrove stands) and social policy (livelihood \r\nand social protection) options together. The benefits of physical \r\ninfrastructure interventions for strengthening existing livelihoods \r\nand protecting health, for being deployable at scale and supporting \r\nother infrastructures to adapt are recognised and set these against \r\nchallenges including hazard generation and risk transfer, limited \r\nflexibility, ecological harm, carbon costs and an undermining of social \r\ninclusion and accountability. Final evaluations will be determined \r\nby individual contexts, raising the importance of comprehensive \r\nmonitoring of existing urban systems adaptation interventions and \r\ntheir association with ongoing development processes and outcomes \r\n(see Section 6.4)."


id: d610b33c1b84ab0959eb3512201cdcea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"The most consistent limit for all urban systems infrastructure types is \r\nin risk transfer. Current adaptation approaches in cities, settlements \r\nand key infrastructure have a tendency to move risk from one sector \r\nor place to others. With the exception of social infrastructure, the \r\nobserved contribution of adaptation to social transformation is also \r\nlimited. There are consequences for equity and sustainability as the \r\nimpacts of climate change increase, and implications for evaluation \r\nand planning to work across adaptation interventions and connect \r\nwith social and environmental policy and practice."


id: 59283b4e658a7670e42e32b83bde6ccf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"This section assesses the effectiveness of efforts to create enabling \r\nconditions for adaptation. New policy innovations such as National \r\nUrban Policies are emerging to address the multi-level governance \r\ndemands of climate change (UN-Habitat, 2020; Kinyanjui, 2020). \r\nThere is no one-size-fits-all approach to deliver adaptation that will \r\nfit every case, because the local conditions of implementation bear a \r\nstrong influence on adaptation's feasibility and impacts (Archer et al., \r\n2014). Ways to foster adequate enabling conditions for adaptation are \r\nwell-documented (IPCC, 2018 Ch.4). These often include integrated \r\nplanning, multi-agency working and multi-scale and sector action. \r\nExisting techniques can be shared and new innovations taken up \r\n(Maxwell et al., 2018)."


id: 7b622edde82a68a41ce21a4c5ace66e6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"2030 supports action at the local level (UN-Habitat, 2016b). Showing \r\nthe economic benefits of adaptation is a strategy for local institutions \r\nto gain support for adaptation action. For example, local governments \r\nin Surat, Indore and Bhubaneswar in India linked adaptation to local \r\ndevelopment needs in experiments that facilitated accessing human \r\nand finance resources, at the local, national and international levels \r\n(Chu, 2016). However, linking adaptation to co-benefits may also \r\ndivide efforts and reduce the effectiveness of adaptation actions. For \r\nexample, urban land use planning and management in Ambo town, \r\nEthiopia, resulted in the implementation of urban greening projects, \r\nbut these projects did not directly address the climate-related disaster \r\nrisks affecting the settlement, including urban flooding, water stress, \r\nwater shortages, increased urban heat, wind and dust storms (Ogato\r\net al., 2017)."


id: ff0e8bb6d478af9e3f9f73ae1487a268
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Since AR5, there is increasing evidence that successful adaptation to \r\nclimate change is context-specific and responsive to the particular \r\nneeds of urban locations. This section assesses the contributions of key \r\nurban actors, local government, civil society and the local private sector, \r\nin enabling adaptation. Wider influences from national government \r\ncross cut this and are discussed with the role of international agencies, \r\nand finance which is assessed in Section 6.4.5."


id: 489f97b9950fe1d110d6ca24a66085bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"The literature on the governance of adaptation has grown since the \r\nAR5, though with few cases from cities and settlements in the Middle \r\nEast, North Africa, Central Asia and former USSR countries. Potential \r\nreasons for the continued lack of studies in these areas include the \r\ncentralised character of decision making systems in countries in these \r\nregions and the early stage of adaptation planning in these urban \r\nareas (Clar, 2019; Mitchell and Laycock, 2019; Olazabal et al., 2019a)."


id: 653bb2d17fbbbd70db046e8eff04f5aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"There are barriers for municipal adaptation plans to deliver effective \r\nadaptation outcomes and implemented actions often diverge from \r\nplans (see Section  6.4.6). For example, a comparison of adaptation \r\nplans and budget expenditures of six metropolitan cities in South \r\nKorea between 2012 and 2016 showed that the implementation of \r\nadaptation programmes diverged substantially from the original plans, \r\nboth in terms of total and sector-specific spending (Lee and Kim, 2018). \r\nOften, a focus on institutional change and reform limits attention \r\nto more practical aspects of adaptation that improve communities' \r\nresilience (Castan Broto and Westman, 2020). Adaptation actions, even \r\nwhere financed effectively, do not always deliver positive outcomes \r\n(high confidence) (Reckien et  al., 2015; Woodruff and Stults, 2016; \r\nUittenbroek, 2016; Aguiar et al., 2018; Reckien et al., 2018a; Olazabal\r\net al., 2019b; Campello Torres et al., 2021) (see also Section 6.4.7)."


id: ad67c8ddc919068f576c3f38f5b46934
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"There are multiple actors, other than local governments, that can deliver \r\nadaptation action, including businesses, not for profit organisations \r\nand trade unions (high confidence) (Giordano et  al., 2020; Eakin\r\net  al., 2021). Empirical evidence since the AR5 highlights the role \r\nof communities, universities, the private sector and transnational \r\nnetworks in adaptation (Hunter et al., 2020; Backstrand et al., 2017). \r\nNon-state actors are particularly important in enabling adaptation \r\nby linking government agencies with low-income and marginalised "


id: e4cd7462903dc6838fc4faf232194e68
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"communities, including those living in informal settlements (Kuyper, \r\nLinner and Schroeder, 2018; Khosla and Bhardwaj, 2019)."


id: c5922b169c83011abc218bca23fc8d3c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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"Since AR5, civil society and private actors have emerged as core \r\nknowledge holders and drivers of experimentation, even succeeding \r\nin changing public policy in the process (Klein, Juhola and Landauer, \r\n2017; McKnight and Linnenluecke, 2016; Mees, 2017). Previous \r\nIPCC Assessment Reports noted that civil society actors enable local \r\nrisk awareness, sensitisation and adaptive capacity, and generate \r\nlocally based innovation (e.g., through community based adaptation \r\nprogrammes)."


id: c6e1de8def11349b02134d8baf5fae1c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"There is weak evidence of private sector involvement in urban \r\nadaptation (Pauw, 2015; Heurkens, 2016). The absence of private \r\nsector investment in adaptation is particularly visible in rapidly "


id: b5dc24045879107d8568831a22a64de3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"and Filatova, 2020; Aune, Gesch and Smith, 2020). Private-sector \r\nparticipation in adaptation solutions depend on having mechanisms \r\nto enable transparency and open reporting on the nature of support \r\nand the solutions proposed. For example, businesses adopting \r\n'community-centric' disaster management strategies can assist local \r\nrecovery efforts by protecting employment, provision of emergency \r\nsupplies and participation in reparations (McKnight and Linnenluecke, \r\n2016). Private sector actors engaged in community climate responses \r\ncan play a role in funding and managing programmes that address \r\npublic health and education concerns. The potential of ecopreneurship, \r\nsocial enterprises, cooperatives and other sustainability-oriented \r\nbusiness models (Schaltegger, Hansen and Ludeke-Freund, 2016; \r\nLopes et al., 2020; Battaglia, Gragnani and Annesi, 2020) for urban \r\nadaptation remains under-explored in the literature on urban climate \r\ngovernance."


id: d82360aaca67bde0632753f9bfa7aa8f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"focus on institutional arrangements that facilitate interaction between \r\ncommunities and civil society, experts, government representatives, \r\nfirms and international organisations. Box  6.5 demonstrates the \r\ndecisive role that community activists can play in building resilience \r\nover long periods."


id: 4bf696a65f31d9834bb0be39308e75c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"Institutional fragmentation reduces the capacity to deliver adaptation \r\n(Den Uyl and Russel, 2018) Multi-level governance shows a commitment \r\nto tackling fragmented and complex policy issues through collaboration \r\nbetween national governments and non-state actors, as explained in \r\nthe 2030 Development Agenda, especially SDG17 ('Revitalize the global \r\npartnership for sustainable development'). Multi-level governance \r\nis particularly important to deliver adaptation at the metropolitan \r\nscale, that require coordinating actions across different institutions \r\nin inter-municipal institutions (Lundqvist, 2016). Gaps in knowledge \r\nremain regarding the effectiveness of multi-level governance actions \r\nin different contexts and the extent to which multi-level governance \r\nstrategies transfer the brunt of responsibility for adaptation action to \r\nless-resourced local governments (Hale et al., 2021)."


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"The private sector also constitutes a key stakeholder group involved in \r\ncollaborative processes to develop adaptation strategies. The inclusion \r\nof private sector actors in deliberative policy-making processes in \r\nurban adaptation can lead to higher procedural legitimacy levels, as \r\nwitnessed in Rotterdam's case (Mees, Driessen and Runhaar, 2014). \r\nRotterdam has created an institutional environment that favours \r\neco-innovation (Huang-Lachmann and Lovett, 2016). The municipal \r\ngovernment works directly with the private sector to enhance \r\nprotection against flooding constructing a marketing strategy around \r\na 'floating city' concept. A 'floating housing' market has expanded, \r\nwith benefits for the local real estate and construction industries and \r\nknowledge-exporting businesses that provide consultation expertise, \r\ndelta technologies and architectural models. Nevertheless, these new \r\ntrends raise new governance challenges to deliver adaptation."


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"There are obstacles associated with reconciling private sector interests \r\nwith public priorities and justice agendas in local climate programmes. \r\nThe involvement of the private sector in adaptation actions may lead \r\nto the appropriation of land and natural resources, and to the exclusion \r\nof vulnerable populations (Anguelovski et al., 2016; Rumbach, 2017; \r\nScoppetta, 2016) (see also Section 6.4.4.2). Navigating the inclusion \r\nof businesses in urban planning processes requires local authorities \r\nto engage in ongoing negotiations, to reflect on constantly shifting \r\npower balances and to move delicately between the role of regulator \r\nand facilitator in the process of defining and maintaining long-term \r\nobjectives (Storbjork, Hjerpe and Glaas, 2019b; Storbjork, Hjerpe and \r\nGlaas, 2019a)."


id: f9d88e3ef20ae7e5e50feb8a448a9f90
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"Local authorities are an important enabling actor that can guide \r\nthe private sector and communities to take responsibility for \r\ncreating policy and regulatory environments that encourage private \r\nsector participation aligned with the SDGs' equity and ecological \r\nsustainability principles (high confidence). For example, Frantzeskaki \r\net al. (2014) report a port relocation project in the Netherlands where \r\nsustainability principles drove private sector participation. Klein et al. \r\n(2017) cite examples from two cities--Helsinki and Copenhagen, \r\nwhere local authorities have shifted adaptation responsibilities to \r\nprivate actors through regulation and public problem ownership. In \r\nMombasa, private companies provide green infrastructure to match \r\nlocal government requirements, in what has frequently been cited as \r\nan example of NBS (Kithiia and Dowling, 2010; Kitha and Lyth, 2011)."


id: f251144aac65d60dd7367a5aef74026c
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"Multi-level governance remains an influential paradigm that \r\nrecognises government institutions' influence at different scales and \r\nthe diversification of actors intervening in public issues from the private \r\nsector and civil society (robust evidence, high agreement). Establishing \r\nlinkages between multiple organisations can help deliver coordinated \r\naction. Multi-level governance includes mechanisms for multiple \r\nactors to engage in local adaptation strategies through collaborative \r\nprocesses of planning, learning, experimentation, capacity building, \r\nconstruction of coalitions and communication channels (Barton, \r\n2013; Jaglin, 2013; Reed et al., 2015; Restemeyer, van den Brink and \r\nWoltjer, 2017; Melica et  al., 2018). Many of these studies directly "


id: d64fc8204ff1309cc2a950580ea40cab
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"In Bengaluru, India, communities have traditionally managed a network of water tanks of immense ecological importance. However, \r\nin the last half-century, urban development has increasingly threatened this blue network (Unnikrishnan and Nagendra, 2015). Today's \r\nBengaluru depends on long-distance water transfers that create political conflict and a dense network of private boreholes that are \r\ndepleting the city's water resources. The restoration of the existing community managed water tanks network offers a more sustainable \r\nand socially just alternative for managing water resources."


id: 842169a68a34cc5ba532a8ebf3b99efc
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"sectors (Bellinson and Chu, 2019; Busch, Bendlin and Fenton, 2018; \r\nFunfgeld, 2015; Busch, 2015; Papin, 2019; Rashidi and Patt, 2018). \r\nHowever, participation in TMNs is biased toward cities in the Global \r\nNorth (Bansard, Pattberg and Widerberg, 2017; Haupt and Coppola, \r\n2019). A recent comparative study of 337 cities found out that cities \r\nthat participation in TNMs are more likely to take adaptation action \r\nand that being part of multiple networks leads to higher levels of \r\nadaptation planning (Heikkinen et al., 2020)."


id: 84f80a5a02ac84de443930ce85d0fe42
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:05
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content:
"The main barriers to urban climate adaptation, and strategies to \r\naddress them, relate to institutional change (high confidence) (see \r\nTable 6.7). Institutions include legislative and policy frameworks and \r\nguidelines intended to direct the action of government, civil society and \r\nprivate sector organisations and extend into informal and customary \r\npractices that shape individual behaviour. Many of the barriers that \r\ninhibit institutions acting in ways that can support action for inclusive \r\nand sustainable adaptation have historical roots, grounded in complex \r\npolitical and social relations and can be reinforcing (Table  6.7). \r\nOvercoming these barriers requires coordinating the activities of \r\nmultiple actors who can facilitate institutional and political change \r\n(Eisenack et al., 2014)."


id: 20a2bcf4b57af9535f235cefdf4e0e73
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"A range of TMNs also support and encourage cities and settlements \r\nto plan and implement adaptation actions. ICLEI-Local Governments \r\nfor Sustainability has developed protocols and implemented projects \r\nfor member cities. The C40 Climate Leadership Group has facilitated \r\nthe coordination of both local governments and business actors at a \r\nglobal scale (Gordon, 2020). Policy coordination has been central to \r\nthe signatories of the Covenant of Mayors (Domorenok et al., 2020). \r\nSuch networks can encourage the sharing of information about \r\nappropriate practices between urban areas; contribute to goal setting; \r\nsupport experimentation and development of new policy instruments; \r\nenhance stakeholder engagement; institutionalise climate agendas; \r\nand encourage policy integration across governance levels and "


id: 3914f32f26b505c7b57922cc64b89048
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"Institutional change is needed to open new options for inclusive and \r\nsustainable adaptation and to integrate adaptation and mitigation \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement) (see also Section 6.3.5). "


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"that enable adaptation action (Carlson and McCormick, 2015). In urban \r\nareas in Africa, research on internal networks has also investigated \r\nhow informal arrangements shape action possibilities (Satterthwaite\r\net al., 2020). For example, in Zimbabwe, informal, traditional and civil \r\nsociety institutions are core arenas for issue discussion because of lower \r\npublic sector capacities (Mubaya and Mafongoya, 2017). In Durban, \r\nSouth Africa, local governments rely considerably on shadow systems \r\nand informal spaces of information and knowledge exchange across \r\ntheir operations to introduce and sustain new ideas (Leck and Roberts, \r\n2015). In the metropolitan area of Styria, Austria, informal cooperation \r\nhas supported the development of rural-urban partnerships for the \r\nformulation of common goals (Oedl-Wieser et al., 2020). In Arkansas, \r\nUSA, informal governance structures support planning to manage \r\nwildfires (Miller, Vos and Lindquist, 2017)."


id: f770dc8c57413f09b98ac12c0fe817e
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"Input-driven institutional change creates incentives to deliver adaptation \r\naction. An input view focuses on the intrinsic capacities of a given \r\norganisation. Input indicators are often referred to as political capital \r\n(Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2018; Diederichs and Roberts, 2016), existing \r\nor endogenous resources (Moloney and Funfgeld, 2015; Wamsler \r\nand Brink, 2014), or local drivers for adaptation (Dilling et al., 2017). \r\nReResearch conducted across two municipalities in Western Cape, \r\nSouth Africa, showed the importance of a dedicated environmental \r\nchampion, access to a knowledge base, the availability of resources, \r\npolitical stability and the presence of dense social networks (Pasquini\r\net  al., 2015). Research from Sao Paulo, Brazil, showed how intrinsic \r\npolitical capacities and contextual factors, such as the political ideology \r\nof elected officials, shaped opportunities for embedding adaptation into \r\nongoing urban agendas (Di Giulio et al., 2018)."


id: 11498bc85512e3f4f676b9c6596b9cd7
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"Networks, interactions and actor coalitions shape options for institutional \r\nchange. Aylett (2015) noted the importance of internal networks between \r\nmunicipal departments, including informal communication channels, \r\ncultivating personal contacts and trust between the person or team \r\nresponsible for climate planning and staff within other local government \r\nagencies. Internal networks can facilitate the commitment of local \r\nelected officials (Hughes, 2015), support higher municipal expenditures \r\nper capita and foster perceptions that climate adaptation is needed (Shi, \r\nChu and Debats, 2015). Collective decision-making can integrate multiple \r\ntypes of information with moral concerns and provide key rationales "


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content:
"Uggla, 2015). Some Asian cities also report high output effectiveness, \r\nwhere they are more likely to indicate senior local government officials' \r\nperformance management contracts, the budgeting procedures of \r\nlocal government agencies and the procedures that local government \r\nagencies use for budgeting infrastructure spending (Aylett, 2015). \r\nDespite this evidence, there is a gap in understanding the general \r\ntrends of planning and institutional change in Africa, Asia, East Europe \r\nand the Middle East."


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"Institutional change processes are complex, contested and sporadic \r\n(Patterson, de Voogt and Sapiains, 2019). Such processes are often \r\ninhibited by unclear planning mandates, conflicting development \r\npriorities, lack of leadership and resource and capacity shortfalls \r\n(Anguelovski et  al. 2014). There is no one size fits all approach to \r\ninstitutional change, which works in situ, and benefits from clearly \r\ndefined plans and an incremental approach to revising new elements \r\nand addressing gaps or failures (Beunen et al., 2017). A longitudinal \r\nview of institutional change allows for assessing actors and dynamics \r\ninvolved in integrating adaptation into the sectoral agendas or \r\ngovernance arrangements mentioned above (Patterson and Huitema, \r\n2019)."


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"insufficient political will (that is lack of prioritisation of the issue and \r\ninadequate allocation of resources including staffing and finance) and \r\nlack of inclusive, coordinated leadership, it can be difficult to overcome \r\ninaction, generating a policy action gap."


id: a87e2d5b6a69714554f7392e4ccd2bd1
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"Multiple actors contribute to deliver climate change adaptation (Chan\r\net al., 2015a; Backstrand et al., 2017). There are also multiple scales \r\nof action, from the provision of local services to large infrastructures \r\nof national or even international significance. Figure 6.5 provides an \r\ninsight into the challenges that shape the policy action gap and a \r\nrange of strategies that can help bridge policy action gaps. Effective \r\nadaptation governance will depend on the compound impact of the \r\nactions of multiple agents operating at different scales (medium \r\nconfidence, medium agreement) (Di Giulio et  al., 2019; Hale et  al., \r\n2021; Zwierzchowska et al., 2019)."


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"Two forms of mainstreaming are usually found in urban policy: \r\nincorporating climate adaptation into different sectors or incorporating \r\nclimate adaptation in holistic sustainability or resilience plans, linking \r\nclimate adaptation objectives with other social and development \r\nobjectives (Reckien et  al., 2019; Fainstein, 2018). The integration \r\nof climate adaptation in local policies in cities and settlements has \r\noften been seen as maintaining business-as-usual and not always "


id: 2d2d3ab15a2da0448ac0e0d7bf215b72
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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"in three cities across the Czech Republic, stakeholder participation \r\nexercises were used to prioritise climate change risks, provide impetus \r\nand opportunity for knowledge co-production, and support adaptation \r\nplanning (Krkoska Lorencova et  al., 2018). In municipalities in \r\nMalaysia, stakeholders and citizens are active in the adaptation policy \r\ncycle (Palermo and Hernandez, 2020). In Quebec, Canada, citizens \r\ncollaborated with the municipal authority to bring together climate \r\nscience and 'ordinary' urban management and design solutions \r\n(Cloutier et  al., 2015). Service co-production enables integrating \r\nmultiple actors in the management and delivery of public services \r\n(Pestoff and Brandsen, 2013; Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere, 2013). \r\nCivil society-driven, co-productive approaches can pioneer new forms \r\nof institutional relations and practices filling gaps where the public \r\nsector is absent or retreating (Frantzeskaki et al., 2016)."


id: e784e50bb21f2bcad483f36bafb07a26
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"McGranahan and Mitlin, 2016; Chowdhury, Jahan and Rahman, \r\n2017; Moretto and Ranzato, 2017; Nastiti et al., 2017). Co-production \r\ninvolves the active involvement of citizens and citizens' organisation \r\nin iterative public service planning and delivery, and has become \r\nincreasingly central in climate change responses alongside other \r\nbottom-up, community-led strategies (Bremer et al., 2019; Vasconcelos, \r\nSantos and Pacheco, 2013)."


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"Co-production builds on public participation that brings together \r\ndiverse sets of citizen interests, values and ideas to inform change and \r\nsolve problems relating to a collective adaptation challenge (Archer\r\net al., 2014; Bisaro, Roggero and Villamayor-Tomas, 2018; Sarzynski, \r\n2015), and is increasingly important in environmental policy more \r\nwidely (McGranahan, 2015; Moretto and Ranzato, 2017). For example, "


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"example, fisherwomen in the western coast of India rely on a complex \r\narrangement of relationships around categories of class, caste and \r\ngender that shapes their possibilities to draw political resources \r\nto maintain their livelihoods and, hence, influence the dynamics of \r\ntransformation (Thara, 2016). Intersectionality is central to build \r\nresilience across communities, rather than in particular areas (Khosla \r\nand Masaud, 2010; Reckien et  al., 2017). Including intersectionality \r\ndeliberately in partnerships with communities can empower socially \r\nexcluded groups and highlight justice issues while aligning agendas \r\nwith local development priorities (Castan Broto et al., 2015a). Despite \r\nthe high confidence on the growing importance of intersectionality \r\nconcerns in the delivery of just environmental policies, there is limited \r\nevidence of its explicit inclusion in adaptation policies."


id: 194e353bb060c4addec1d4019692e0a2
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"A co-production approach to climate change governance addresses \r\nthe increasing public interest on climate change (Davies, Broto and \r\nHugel, 2021). Youth movements such as Forum for Future have joined \r\nforces with other environmental and Indigenous organisations to lobby \r\ngovernments and institutions to action (Kenis, 2021; Fisher and Nasrin, \r\n2021; Davies and Hugel, 2021; Hayward, 2021). These movements have \r\nbuilt momentum moving local governments and other institutions to \r\ndeclare a climate emergency and have supported the creation of new \r\nforums where climate change can be addressed collectively, such as \r\ncitizens' assemblies. In the UK, for example, initial scepticism has led to \r\nthe proliferation of citizen-centric Climate Assemblies at the local level \r\n(Sandover, Moseley and Devine-Wright, 2021)."


id: 4489b240b83a0ab315a67c7771bfb5d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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"Women are under-represented internationally in governance \r\nstructures (Prihatini, 2019; Gonzalez-Eiras and Sanz, 2018; \r\nRashkova and Zankina, 2017; Koyuncu and Sumbas). This \r\nsituation is reflected in urban authorities where participation \r\nby those who identify as women is low (Williams, Devika and \r\nAandahl, 2015; Kivoi, 2014). Das (2014) reports deep-rooted \r\neconomic inequalities are barriers for women's participation \r\nin Indore, India, and that women's collective empowerment \r\ncould increase their bargaining power within households \r\nas well as in the community and state. Kivoi (2014) draws a \r\nsimilar conclusion presenting experiences from Kenya. The big \r\nquestion is how to make women more visible in the urban \r\ngovernance process?"


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"What are the barriers women face and how do we increase \r\ntheir participation so that urban governance become more \r\ninclusive? Escalante and Valdivia (2015) show the participatory \r\ntools that can be used at different stages of planning for \r\nwomen's empowerment using bottom-up planning models. \r\nUsing these tools makes planning processes more inclusive. \r\nAraujo and Tejedo-Romero (2016) show from Spanish local \r\ncouncils that women's political representation in municipalities \r\nhas a positive influence on the level of transparency, increasing \r\ninformation transparency and reducing information asymmetry. \r\nIn Myanmar, Minoletti (2014) increased levels of women's \r\nparticipation in urban authorities helped to improve the quality \r\nof governance such as reducing corruption and conflicts, and \r\nimproving service delivery."


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"Inclusive and sustainable adaptation can address the causes of \r\nsystemic vulnerability (medium evidence, high agreement). This points \r\nto the fundamental requirements of adaptation action in line with the \r\nUniversal Declaration of Human Rights. Climate justice theories draw \r\non the environmental justice movement experiences at the local level \r\n(Bickerstaff, 2012; Bickerstaff, Walker and Bulkeley, 2013; Perez et al., \r\n2015; Hall, Hards and Bulkeley, 2013). Slogans such as 'leave no one \r\nbehind' embedded in international policy for cities and settlements \r\nrecognise the connection between systems of oppression and exclusion \r\nthat reproduce and perpetuate urban inequality and the delivery of \r\nurban services and security (Kabeer, 2016; Stuart and Woodroffe, 2016)."


id: 66cb43651c8ae62d252b6bf750a282b2
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"Intersectional strategies of action seek to consider the multiple forms \r\nof structural oppression experienced at the local level (Grunenfelder \r\nand Schurr, 2015) and, in the context of adaptation, explain how they \r\nproduce or exacerbate vulnerabilities. For example, intersectionality \r\nties with the idea of how multiple deprivations shape access to \r\nservices (from sanitation to health and education) and the exposition \r\nto environmental risks (Sicotte, 2014; Lau and Scales, 2016; Van Aelst \r\nand Holvoet, 2016; Lievanos and Horne, 2017; Raza, 2017; Yon and \r\nNadimpalli, 2017; European Environment Agency, 2020) (see Box 6.6 \r\non the participation of women in local decision making bodies). For "


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"People traditionally excluded from climate change governance, such \r\nas children, are also more likely to have their needs and priorities \r\nconsidered in urban planning for adaptation where there are national \r\nadvocacy bodies, for example, Commissions for Future, or Children's \r\ncommissions (Nordstrom and Wales, 2019; Watts et  al., 2019; \r\nHayward, 2021). An emphasis on procedural justice in decision-making \r\nhas potential to produce transformational outcomes where these are \r\ndefined as significantly reducing inequality (Holland, 2017). In this light, \r\nemerging evidence suggests transformative adaptation is more likely "


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"To respond to urban injustices, attention needs to be paid to both the \r\nlocal level and to broader system-wide governance issues (that are \r\nunpacked further in Section 6.4). At the local level, it is important to \r\nunderstand who is most vulnerable to climate risk, which is likely to be \r\nrelated to class, race, gender, ability and age (Wilby and Keenan, 2012; \r\nRanganathan and Bratman, 2019; Thomas, Cretney and Hayward, \r\n2019). Factors such as age and levels of ability, as well as those \r\npursuing outdoor livelihoods, have a direct link to higher vulnerability \r\nto heat stress (Conry et al., 2015). In least-developed countries, less \r\nthan 60% of the urban population have access to piped water which \r\nimpacts on health and well-being, and emphasises the importance of \r\nalternative resources for these households (World Health Organization, \r\nNations and Fund, 2017)."


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"The amount invested in urban adaptation is limited. The Cities Climate \r\nFinance Leadership Alliance tracked USD 3.7  billion of investments \r\nin adaptation projects in 2017-2018, of which only 3-5% had an \r\nurban component (Richmond et  al., 2021). Cities and settlements \r\nfrequently face barriers of inadequate financing for climate adaptation \r\nand mitigation (Cook and Chu, 2018). Finance barriers interact \r\nwith economic barriers and socioeconomic conflicts and need to be \r\nconsidered within an integrated perspective (Hinkel et al., 2018)."


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"Many early leaders in climate adaptation are, therefore, perhaps \r\nunsurprisingly, political capitals or financial centres in the Global North \r\nwith much larger resource envelopes and well-developed fiscal and \r\nfinancing capacities (Westerhoff, Keskitalo and Juhola, 2011; Shi, Chu \r\nand Debats, 2015)."


id: 9f4463ead236e0e2be25b3f98eb34b5a
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"The funding required to deliver climate change adaptation will depend \r\non choices made about climate mitigation (IPCC, 2018). Still, the cost \r\nof adapting to a global temperature increase of 1.5degC will be a fraction \r\nof the cost of adapting to a global temperature increase exceeding 3o\r\nC \r\n(IPCC, 2019a; IPCC, 2019b; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). It will also \r\ndepend on selected adaptation options, as they have different capital \r\nrequirements, operating costs and returns on investment (See 6.3). \r\nFinally, costs depend on financing sources and mechanisms selected."


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"Broadly, there are two options for adaptation investment: funding, \r\ndirect expenditure in preparation for or response to climate change \r\nimpacts, and financing, the deployment of market-based instruments \r\nto attract third-party resources to an adaptation action (Keenan, \r\n2018; Banhalmi-Zakar et al., 2016). Using funding can be a lower-cost \r\nstrategy, as there is no third party expecting a return on investment. \r\nHowever, using financing can expand the total resources available for \r\nadaptation (White and Wahba, 2019)."


id: b370e9bcd132759bfa9c05564819e33a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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"Table 6.9 |  Components of urban transformative capacity with broader relevance for multiple forms of adaptation (Wolfram, 2016)."


id: 26371b64c39d0ca7562e649761b2ce28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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"investors and lenders do not seem ready to provide adaptation finance \r\non significantly easier or cheaper terms than conventional finance \r\n(White and Wahba, 2019). However, a variety of means for financing \r\nclimate change adaptation in urban areas exist (Table 6.10)."


id: 74e41e7fdfde05a47fb939ca8b0f1400
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"The choice of funding and financing mechanism is often based on \r\nimplicit economic world views (Keenan, Chu and Peterson, 2019) \r\nor on the technical support available to sub-national governments, \r\nsuch as preparing municipal bonds or contracting for public-private \r\npartnerships (Bisaro and Hinkel, 2018). The urban finance literature has \r\nlong called for critical interrogation of these choices, as adaptation \r\nfinance has profound justice implications (Khan et al., 2020). However, \r\nthe literature on adaptation investments is limited (Harman, Taylor and \r\nLane, 2015; Keenan, Chu and Peterson, 2019). The use of municipal \r\ndebt such as green bonds, for example, intensify the financial and \r\nenvironmental risks borne primarily by the poor, the working class or \r\npeople discriminated against because of race, sexual orientation or \r\nability (Bigger and Millington, 2019)."


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"Cities and settlements in higher-income countries typically have \r\naccess to funding that could be used to enhance resilience and build \r\nadaptive capacity; this includes both the private resources of individual \r\nhouseholds and firms (which varies significantly within and among \r\ncities) and public budgets of different government tiers (see Table 6.10)."


id: bf4f86c024344183fe1a547d7a32449e
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"Depending on fiscal devolution levels within a country, public \r\nrevenues may be collected and managed primarily at the national, \r\nstate, metropolitan or local level. In federal countries, sub-national \r\ngovernments collect an average of 49.4% of public revenues, \r\ncompared with only 20.7% in unitary countries (OECD/UCLG, 2019). \r\nFor example, sub-national revenues represent over a quarter of total \r\npublic revenues in Belgium, Canada and Denmark, but less than 5% in \r\nGreece, Ireland and New Zealand (OECD/UCLG, 2019). The share of the \r\nnational revenue transferred to sub-national governments also varies \r\nsignificantly among countries: grants and subsidies account for over "


id: 550e8d5ba320fb3e80532b841a3c6f58
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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content:
"The climate imperative has not yet fundamentally changed urban \r\ninfrastructure investment (White and Wahba, 2019). Mobilising \r\nadaptation investment in urban areas continues to depend on \r\nstrengthening public finance capacities (particularly evaluating and \r\nintegrating climate risk into economic decisions) and meeting private \r\ninvestors and lenders' expectations. Climate change creates new \r\ninvestment risks and physical risks (Martimort and Straub, 2016), \r\nand highlights the limitations of current models to account for risk \r\nand uncertainty when pricing investments (Keenan, 2018). Private "


id: 57d570efc3ecb35441a56813a46a2d2b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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content:
"Table 6.10 |  Finance instruments to deliver adaptation in urban areas. Source: adapted from Richmond et al. (2021) and UN-Habitat (2016b)"


id: 20d3e195651ca39da704b2bd860cf683
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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content:
"that resources for resilience must be allocated by higher levels of \r\ngovernment (Hughes, 2015), which also perceive opportunity costs to \r\nadaptation investments. Funding from non-state actors is, therefore, \r\nproving important. For example, in the USA, private foundations and \r\nnon-profit organisations account for 17% and 16%, respectively, of \r\nadaptation support in urban areas (Carmin, Nadkarni and Rhie, 2012). \r\nHowever, tapping into these funding sources raises complex questions \r\nabout accountability and ownership of urban adaptation (Chu, Schenk \r\nand Patterson, 2018). Land reclamation may foster real estate markets \r\nand mobilise finance for adaptation, as shown in Germany, the \r\nNetherlands and the Maldives (Bisaro et al., 2019)."


id: cd4f1f56f373881c480af7074d8e5f3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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content:
"three-quarters of sub-national government revenue in Malta, but less \r\nthan a quarter of sub-national revenue in Iceland (OECD/UCLG, 2019). \r\nA local government's capacity to collect revenues is further mediated \r\nby incomes within a city (which dictates the prospective tax base) and \r\nthe capacity of civil servants to administer taxes, fees and charges. \r\nThe result is that metropolitan and local governments' budgets vary \r\ndramatically, across and within countries. For example, per capita \r\nmunicipal budgets vary from USD 1114 in Saskatoon and USD 2682 in \r\nPeterborough (Canada), USD 2635 in Leipzig and USD 3638 in Freiburg \r\n(Germany), to USD 4907 in Bristol and USD 5612 in Aberdeen (UK) \r\n(Loffler, 2016)."


id: 2e63878160c5ec27fc89a4d9c2477947
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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vector_id: 4742
content:
"City governments need to anticipate climate shocks and stresses, and \r\ndesign their operating models and investment plans accordingly to \r\nensure financial resilience (Clarvis et al, 2015). Climate risks threaten \r\nfiscal models, for example, a drought may disrupt water revenues by \r\nreducing total water consumption and incentivising households and \r\nfirms to invest in independent water storage or supply infrastructure \r\n(Simpson et al., 2019). Storm surges and sea level rise may threaten "


id: 2c3e3287675b1adfc82c3f23da023636
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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content:
"Revenue streams are often insufficient relative to the scale of \r\nadaptation requirements. For example, Kano, Nigeria, is a large \r\nurban area that urgently needs investment in human development \r\nand climate resilience but where a fragmented local government has \r\nlittle capacity to finance their climate plans (Mohammed, Hassan and \r\nBadamasi, 2019). Many local governments are unable to mobilise \r\nfunds for adaptation as they face competing priorities, meaning "


id: e22476dcbcb25bd734ad8272d77f2b7a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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content:
"National governments typically determine the fiscal transfers that \r\nsub-national governments receive and the taxes, fees and charges \r\nthey permit to collect (see for example CBO, 2016). Local governments \r\nmay strengthen their own source revenue collection and management \r\ncapacities to better exploit these funding streams and improve their \r\nbalance sheets, but their total budget will be limited to these funding \r\nsources (Ahmad et  al., 2019). The amount of local public funding \r\navailable for urban adaptation depends on the relationships across \r\ndifferent government levels."


id: 2a00ad05456595fdd1e83afb09e6a59a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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vector_id: 4038
content:
"sunk investments in revenue-generating infrastructures such as toll \r\nroads or electricity generation and transmission systems. ."


id: 894dbf106c873b89d23793b853d8e76c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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vector_id: 19142
content:
"Common sources of adaptation finance might include donor \r\nagencies including the Green Climate Fund, sovereign funds (e.g., the \r\nBangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund) and private finance from \r\ncommercial banks, investment companies, pension funds and insurance \r\ncompanies (Floater et al., 2017). These capital sources have different \r\nrisk-return expectations and investment horizons, so they will suit \r\ndifferent types and stages of projects. Many sub-national governments \r\nin the Global North have access to well-developed domestic, if not \r\nglobal, capital markets to raise and steer finance for urban investment \r\n(Banhalmi-Zakar et al., 2016)."


id: ef760616361956f9cbef9ac832335aee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:06
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vector_id: 35161
content:
"Similarly, mobilising private finance for urban adaptation projects \r\ndemands robust institutional, fiscal and regulatory frameworks, which \r\nare typically national authorities' responsibility. For local governments \r\nto access private finance for adaptation may require national (or in \r\nfederal countries, state) governments to reform policies and rules \r\ngoverning municipal borrowing, public-private partnerships, land \r\nvalue capture instruments and other financing mechanisms (Ware \r\nand Banhalmi-Zakar, 2017). Such fiscal reforms tap into fundamental \r\npolitical and policy issues, such as local governments' autonomy or the \r\ntariff-setting powers of national ministries (Gorelick, 2018; White and \r\nWahba, 2019)."


