# document

id: a7181219c4c81762206ebee4194fcfa2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"(Global Aggregate Impacts), while RFC2 (extreme weather events) has \r\nimplications for all RKRs, including direct linkages with critical physical \r\ninfrastructure, networks and services (RKR-C). Furthermore, risks \r\nemerging from the interaction of RKRs also contribute to the RFCs, \r\nbut are only qualitatively described in Section  16.5.4. For example, \r\nthe effects of risks to terrestrial and ocean ecosystems (RKR-A) affect \r\nliving standards and equity (RKR-C), as does the associated decline in \r\necosystem services which then impacts livelihoods (RKR-D)."


id: 958660c0cee3246c64c27cb606601b33
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"The method used to develop judgements on levels of risk builds \r\non the approach described in WGII AR5 Chapter 19 (Oppenheimer \r\net al., 2014) and outlined in more detail in the work of O'Neill et al. \r\n(2017), while integrating advances in the AR6 SRs including expert \r\njudgement (SRCCL, Zommers et al., 2020). We provide further details \r\non the underlying judgements of risk level compared with previous \r\nassessments by indicating key risk criteria associated with each \r\njudgement: magnitude of adverse consequences, likelihood of adverse \r\nconsequences, temporal profile of the risk, and ability to respond to \r\nthe risk (Section 16.5.1). The definitions of risk levels used to make the \r\nexpert judgements are presented in Table 16.7 (Section 16.5.1)."


id: 9d85971cee17bb13273cf353884bad5
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"The resulting risk transition or 'ember' diagram illustrates the \r\nprogression of socio-ecological risk from climate change as a function \r\nof global temperature change, taking into account the exposure and \r\nvulnerability of people and ecosystems, as assessed by literature\u0002based expert judgement. Section 16.6.3 presents these diagrams for \r\neach RFC, providing information about the most important literature\u0002based evidence that experts used to make their judgements. Similar "


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"A brief summary of the framework that was used to carry out the \r\nrisk assessment, synthesis and expert elicitation is presented here, \r\nand details are provided in SM16.6. Expert judgements about the \r\nqualitatively defined levels of risk (i.e., undetectable, moderate, "


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"further discussion on this, see Cross-Chapter Box CLIMATE in Chapter \r\n1). Hence, the diagrams are presented with a single y-axis representing \r\nglobal temperature change, generally referring to global temperature \r\nrise irrespective of when it occurs; however, the majority of the literature \r\nassessed considers alternative levels of warming during the 21st century. \r\nFor example, a warming level of 2degC might occur in the 2050s, in the \r\n2080s or in 2100 (see next section)."


id: a86c2b4207a2673e3d5d4749b11266aa
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"Furthermore, climate-related hazards associated with each of the RFCs \r\nare assessed in WGI AR6 Cross-Chapter Box 12.1 Table 1 (Tebaldi et al., \r\n2021), which synthesises information from various chapters of WGI on \r\n35 such hazards according to global warming levels (GWLs) to inform \r\nunderstanding of their potential changes and associated risks with \r\ntemperature levels in general."


id: c4cd990a68df10a93d0eb35798ac1f21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"When are the risks shown in the embers projected to occur? The issues \r\nassociated with assessing transient risks are discussed in Chapter 3, \r\nSR15 (IPCC, 2018a). Some of the literature, however, does explore the \r\ndynamics within human and natural systems (i.e., the way in which "


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"Figure 16.14 |  Expert elicitation approach for assessment of RFC risk level transitions. A more detailed description of the methodology used in this elicitation is \r\nprovided in SM16.6."


id: faadeebf7aa8dc7237797d4dbc31f7d7
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"AR5 (Oppenheimer et  al., 2014) assessed the transition from \r\nundetectable to moderate risk for RFC1 to lie below recent global \r\ntemperatures (1986-2005, which at the time was considered to \r\ncorrespond to a global warming level of 0.6degC above pre-industrial \r\nlevels; AR6 WGI now considers this time period of 1986-2005 to \r\ncorrespond to a global warming or approximately 0.7degC). At that time, \r\nthere was at least medium confidence in attribution of a major role for \r\nclimate change for impacts on at least one each of ecosystems, physical \r\nsystems and human systems within this RFC. SR15 Section  3.5.2.1 \r\n(Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018b), concurred with high confidence that \r\nthe transition to moderate risk had already occurred before the time \r\nof writing."


id: e0cb91eb09ee57883f18cf49e7ed412e
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"between climatic change, human interventions involving mitigation \r\nand adaptation actions, and processes in natural systems can be \r\nclassified as emergent risks if they pose a threat to human security."


id: 69117362aa0856a2b2c339186253666a
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"The following subsections present the expert assessment and \r\njudgements made during the elicitation process to identify consensus \r\ntransition values for each RFC. The description of these transitions is \r\nfurther extended with additional references to findings from underlying \r\nchapters in this report, and reviewed by Chapter 16 authors as part of \r\nindependent appraisal. No changes were made to the transition values \r\nassessed through the expert elicitation."


id: cee13b1de05d9ec713ffd8d0cb42b561
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"AR5 assessed the transition from moderate to high risk to lie around \r\n1degC above 1986-2005 levels (which corresponded at that time to \r\n1.6degC above pre-industrial levels but has been reassessed by AR6 WGI \r\nto correspond to 1.7degC) to reflect projected 'increasing risk to unique \r\nand threatened systems, including Arctic sea ice and coral reefs, as well \r\nas threatened species as temperature increases over this range.' SR15 \r\nrelocated the transition slightly from 1.6degC to 1.5degC, owing to increased \r\nliterature projecting the effects of climate change upon Arctic sea ice \r\nand new literature assessing projected impacts of climate change on \r\nbiodiversity at 1.5degC warming."


id: fc2a18c8592b58f11e48e5a1d64e695
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"In this AR6 assessment, the transition from moderate to high is based \r\non the high level of observed impacts, and the areas projected to begin \r\nundergoing major transformations by 1.5degC (see Cross-Chapter Paper "


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"northern and central two-thirds of the Great Barrier Reef were killed \r\nin 2015/2016. Subsequent coral recruitment in 2018 was reduced to \r\nonly 11% of the long-term average, representing an unprecedented \r\nshift in the ecology of the northern and middle sections of the reef \r\nsystem to a highly degraded state. A second key example are sea\u0002ice-dependent systems in the Arctic. During August to October of \r\n2010-2019, corresponding to a global warming of about 0.9degC, \r\naverage Arctic sea ice area has declined in area by 25% relative to \r\n1979-1988 (high confidence, AR6 WGI, Figure 9.13). September Arctic \r\nsea ice volume has declined by about 72% between 1979 and 2016, \r\nwith the latter deemed a conservative estimate (AR6 WGI, Schweiger \r\net al., 2019)."


id: 2fdf1035fd030e42aaf4ce391ebb8dc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"1, Chapter 2 and SR15 (IPCC, 2018a)). A substantial number of unique \r\nand threatened systems are assessed to be in a high risk state owing \r\nto the influence of anthropogenic climate change by the 2000-2010 \r\nperiod, when global warming had reached approximately 0.85degC \r\n(range 0.7-1degC) (see WGI AR6 Cross-Chapter Box  2.3, Gulev et  al., \r\n2021) using the 1995-2014 figure as a proxy for 2000-2010)."


id: 9667399d3b52022ff36ebdc4a2037aeb
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"The most prominent example of a system assessed to be already in \r\na high risk state is that of coral reefs, which are already degrading \r\nrapidly. Observed impacts on coral reefs increased significantly during \r\n2014-2017 (Table SM16.22 , corresponding to a global warming of \r\nabout 0.9degC). This includes mass bleaching in the Indian Ocean in \r\n1998, 2010, 2015 and 2016 when bleaching intensity exceeded 20% \r\nin surveyed locations in the western Indian Ocean, eastern Indian \r\nOcean and western Indonesia. In the tropical Pacific Ocean, climate\u0002driven mass bleaching was reported in all countries in the region, \r\nwith most bleaching reports coinciding with 2014-2017 marine \r\nheatwaves. Fifty percent of coral within shallow-water reefs of the "


id: bada1fb18e09cadfe9275f95e2359771
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"Other important examples of observed impacts on unique ecosystems \r\nthat indicate that risks are already at a high level (Table  SM16.22) \r\ninclude mass tree mortalities, now well recorded in multiple unique \r\nforest and woodland ecosystems around the world. Sections  2.4.3.3 \r\nand 2.4.5 report that, between 1945 and 2007, drought-induced tree "


id: 82bf064cf05efe289e7fe80c76c53e36
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"Based on observed and modelled impacts to unique and threatened \r\nsystems, including in particular coral reefs, sea-ice-dependent systems \r\nand biodiversity hotspots, AR6 assesses that the transition to high risks \r\nfor RFC1 have already occurred at a median level of 0.9degC, with a \r\nlower bound at 0.7degC and an upper bound at the present-day level of \r\nglobal warming of 1.2degC (WMO, 2020) (very high confidence)."


id: 2c5440e7adc93b6f9cf39262e897c501
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"AR5 assessed with high confidence that the transition from high to \r\nvery high risks for RFC1 lies around 2degC above 1986-2005 levels (then \r\nconsidered to correspond to 2.6degC above pre-industrial levels) to reflect \r\nthe very high risk to species and ecosystems projected to occur beyond \r\nthat level as well as limited ability to adapt to impacts on coral reef \r\nsystems and in Arctic sea-ice-dependent systems. Using the additional \r\nliterature which became available on projected risks to Arctic sea ice, \r\nbiodiversity and ecosystems at 1.5degC versus 2degC warming above pre\u0002industrial levels, SR15 assessed that the transition from high to very high \r\nrisks in RFC1 lay between 1.5degC and 2degC above pre-industrial levels."


id: d6ffd6f97234447760cf329eebb8a453
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Identification of the transition to very high risk is associated by \r\ndefinition with the reaching of limits to natural and/or societal \r\nadaptation. Adaptation which occurs naturally is already included in \r\nthe risk assessment, but experts also discussed the effect of additional \r\nhuman-planned adaptation in reducing risk levels in RFC1. This \r\nadditional adaptation could help species to survive in situ despite a \r\nchanging climate (for example, by reducing current anthropogenic \r\nstresses such as over-harvesting), or facilitate the ability of species \r\nto shift geographic range in response to changes in climate, and \r\nthe potential benefits of nature-based solutions and restoration (see \r\nCross-Chapter Box NATURAL, Section 2.6.5.1)."


id: fe24c81b5c6f4e41e2f3167e1f35a4b8
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"In AR6, risks are considered to start to transition from high to very \r\nhigh risks above 1.2degC warming (present day, WMO, 2020), with a \r\nmedian value of 1.5degC, owing in particular to the observation of a \r\npresent-day onset of ecosystem degradation in coral reefs, which are \r\nprojected in the SR15 report 'to decline by a further 70-90% at 1.5degC \r\n(very high confidence)' . The literature for projected increases in risk to \r\nother unique and threatened systems and their limited ability to adapt \r\nabove 2degC warming is substantial and robust, and the confidence \r\nlevel in very high risk remains high. At 2degC, 18% of 34,000 insects are \r\nprojected to lose >50% climatically determined geographic range, as \r\ncompared with 6% at 1.5degC (Warren et al., 2018a). The risk of species "


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"When considering planned adaptation, the main option often \r\nconsidered in terrestrial ecosystems is the expansion of the protected \r\narea network, which is broadly beneficial in increasing the resilience of \r\necosystems to climate change (e.g., Hannah et al., 2020). However, this "


id: 5ffd285c1142e09893575825acf33602
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"et al., 2021). The onset, and also median location of the transitions of risk \r\n(Figure 16.15) from undetectable to moderate, is therefore considered to \r\nbe 0.5degC. Further strong new evidence shows that changes in extremes \r\nemerged during the 1990s and 2000s (Dunn et al., 2020) by which time \r\n+0.7degC of global warming had taken place (IPCC SR15, Chapter 1; WGI \r\nAR6, Chapter 2). In AR5 Section 19.6.3.3 (Oppenheimer et al., 2014), \r\na transition to moderate risk was assessed to have taken place at the \r\nthen 'recent' global warming level of 0.6degC, with high confidence. Owing \r\nto the increase in evidence, there is now very high confidence that the \r\nmedian value of the transition from undetectable to moderate risk is at \r\n0.5degC and led by heat extremes, with the lower estimate set at 0.5degC as \r\nwell, and upper estimate at 0.7degC."


id: ad9dc6d4ac08fd73bd160033a4fa1020
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Further evidence of more recent observed changes in extreme \r\nweather and climate events, and their potential for associated adverse \r\nconsequences across many aspects of society and ecosystems, has \r\ncontinued to accrue (WGI AR6 Chapter 11; WGI AR6 Chapter 12). Since \r\na necessary condition for 'moderate' levels of risk is the detection \r\nand attribution of observed impacts, the following text provides an \r\noverview of some salient examples of this evidence. In particular, WGI \r\nAR6 Chapter 11 (Seneviratne et al., 2021) concludes that some recent \r\nhot extreme events that happened in the past decade (2010s) would \r\nhave been extremely unlikely to occur without human influence on the \r\nclimate system. Global warming in that decade reached approximately \r\n1.09degC on average (IPCC WGI AR6 Chapter 2)."


id: 3b58d9a2c387ee6ee0bc758f18028b65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"This RFC addresses the risks to human health, livelihoods, assets and \r\necosystems from extreme weather events such as heatwaves, heavy \r\nrain, drought and associated wildfires, and coastal flooding (Hoegh\u0002Guldberg et al., 2018b). Previous assessments of this RFC have focused \r\nmainly on changes to the hazard component of the risk, using the \r\nprojected increase in hazard as an indicator of higher risk. However, in \r\nAR6 an expanding (although still smaller) body of evidence now allows \r\nalso incorporation of the exposure and/or vulnerability components of \r\nrisk and, to a limited extent, their trends."


id: 37342de7b7b465bccd2614750a0091b
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"In addition, long-term trends in various types of extremes are now \r\ndetectable (WGI AR6 Chapter 11, Seneviratne et al., 2021). This includes \r\nincreases in hot extremes over most land regions (virtually certain), \r\nincreases in heavy precipitation at the global scale and over most \r\nregions with sufficient observations (high confidence), and increases \r\nin agricultural and ecological droughts in some regions (medium \r\nconfidence) (WGI AR6 Chapter 11). There has also been overall a likely"


id: b3f82763fc5212883e694416812201e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"(medium confidence). Increases at 1.5degC of global warming are projected \r\nin marine heatwaves (Laufkotter et al., 2020) and the occurrence of fire \r\nweather (IPCC, 2019a).  Heat-related mortality is assessed to increase \r\nfrom moderate to high levels of risk under about 1.5degC warming under \r\nSSP3, a socioeconomic scenario with large challenges to adaptation \r\n(Ebi et al., 2021) especially in urban centres (Chapter 6). An additional \r\n350 million people living in urban areas are estimated to be exposed \r\nto water scarcity from severe droughts at 1.5degC warming (Sections 6.1, \r\n6.2.2; CCP2 Coastal Cities). In summary, there is high confidence that the \r\nbest estimate for the transition from moderate to high risk is 1.2degC of \r\nglobal warming, with 1degC as lower estimate and 1.5degC as upper estimate. \r\nThe latter would be set to 1.3degC for an assessment at medium confidence."


id: 2d40ff5fad3bf531c658a1c0ffeccc65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"The general picture is one of annual or more frequent occurrences \r\nof severe extremes with widespread impacts (as also reflected in \r\nSection  16.2), and of multiple extremes, meeting the criteria for \r\nthe 'severe and widespread' nature of risks that is required for \r\nclassification at a 'high' level of risk. This is consistent with AR5 \r\nChapter 19 (Oppenheimer et al., 2014), and gives high confidence that \r\nthe lower threshold for entering high risks associated with extreme \r\nweather events is +1degC, and that the best estimate is that this \r\ntransition already occurred now that global warming has reached its \r\npresent-day level of ca. 1.2degC (WMO, 2020), slightly above the 1.09degC \r\naverage conditions in the 2010s, that is, 2011-2020 (IPCC WGI AR6 \r\nChapter 2, Gulev et al., 2021)."


id: c21998ada81caaafd84442ef3e3819d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"A range of literature projects further substantial increases in several \r\nextreme event types with a global warming of +1.5degC, notably hot \r\nextremes in most regions, heavy precipitation in several regions,  and \r\ndrought in some regions (IPCC SR15; WGI AR6 , Chapter 11). In particular, \r\nheavy precipitation and associated flooding are projected to intensify and \r\nbe more frequent in most regions in Africa and Asia (high confidence), \r\nNorth America (medium to high confidence depending on the region) \r\nand Europe (medium confidence). Also, more frequent and/or severe \r\nagricultural and ecological droughts are projected in a few regions in all \r\ncontinents except Asia, compared with 1850-1900 (medium confidence); \r\nincreases in meteorological droughts are also projected in a few regions "


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"there is the potential for very high risks associated with changes in \r\nclimate extremes for food security in the low adaptation case, already \r\nabove 2degC of global warming. Finally, studies suggest that regional \r\nthresholds for climate extremes could be reached at 2degC of global \r\nwarming, for instance in the Mediterranean (Guiot and Cramer, 2016). \r\nSamaniego et  al. (2018) conclude that soil moisture droughts in that \r\nregion would become two to three times longer than at the end of the \r\n20th century at 2degC, and three to four times longer (125 d long yr-1) \r\nat 3degC of global warming. There is clear evidence of very high risk at \r\n3degC global warming for wildfires, marine heatwaves and heatwaves in \r\nmegacities (the latter being set at 2.7degC)."


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"RFC3 reflects how key risks are distributed unevenly across regions \r\nand different population groups, due to the non-uniform spatial \r\ndistributions of physical climate change hazards, exposure and \r\nvulnerability across regions. It addresses how risks disproportionately \r\naffect particularly vulnerable societies and socio-ecological systems, \r\nincluding disadvantaged people and communities in countries at \r\nall levels of development. AR5 concluded that low-latitude and less \r\ndeveloped areas generally face greater risk than higher-latitude and \r\nmore developed countries, including for food- and health-related \r\nrisks. This conclusion remains valid and is now supported by greater \r\nevidence across a range of sectors and geographic regions."


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"Note that the assessment here is largely based on the national and \r\nregional distribution of impacts, rather than sub-national distribution or \r\nexplicit consideration of vulnerable elements of society. Climate risks are \r\nalso strongly related to inequalities, often but not always intersecting \r\nwith poverty (Section  16.1), geographic location, and political and \r\nsocio-cultural aspects. Thus, countries with high inequality tend to be \r\nmore vulnerable, and more exposed, to climate hazards (Section 16.1). \r\nWhile the literature assessed here tends to be insufficiently granular \r\nto resolve local inequalities, it does confirm the AR5 finding that low\u0002latitude and less developed areas generally face greater risk."


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"AR6 continues to highlight the uneven regional distribution of \r\nprojected climate change risks. Biodiversity loss is projected to affect \r\na greater number of regions with increasing warming, and to be "


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"highest in northern South America, southern Africa, most of Australia, \r\nand northern high latitudes (Section  2.5.1.3, medium confidence). \r\nClimate change is projected to increase the number of people at risk \r\nof hunger in mid-century, concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, South \r\nAsia and Central America (Chapter 5, high confidence), increasing \r\nundernutrition, stunting and related childhood mortality particularly \r\nin Africa and Asia and disproportionately affecting children and \r\npregnant women (Chapter 7, high confidence), strongly mediated by \r\nsocioeconomic factors (Sections 7.2.4.4, 7.3.1, very high confidence). \r\nStrong geographical differences in heat-related mortality are projected \r\nto emerge later this century, mainly driven by growth in regions with \r\ntropical and subtropical climates (Section 7.3.1, very high confidence)."


id: 4af486aa164d74cd95245427c656079d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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content:
"In AR5 and SR15, the transition from undetectable to moderate risk \r\nwas located below what were at the time 'recent' temperatures of \r\nbetween 0.5degC and 0.8degC above pre-industrial levels, with medium to \r\nhigh confidence, based on evidence of distributional impacts on crop \r\nproduction and water resources. New literature has continued to confirm \r\nthis transition has already taken place, including more recent observed \r\nimpacts for regions and groups within the food and water sectors, \r\nstrongly linked to Representative Key Risks for health, water and food \r\nsecurity (Sections 16.2, 16.5, 5.4.1, 5.5.1, 5.8.1, 5.12; Chapter 7)."


id: d5d9bf45afd10b5f10f66d8b592fb93e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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vector_id: 31159
content:
"Projections of increasing flood risk associated with global warming of \r\n1.5degC and 2degC continue to highlight regional disparities, with larger\u0002than-average increases projected in Asia and Africa (Hirabayashi et al., \r\n2021), including in China, India and Bangladesh (Alfieri et al., 2017). \r\nSimilarly, nearly 80% of the 8-80 million additional people projected \r\nto be at risk of hunger owing to climate change are located in Africa \r\nand Asia (Springmann et al., 2016; Lloyd and Oreskes, 2018; Nelson \r\net al., 2018). Schleussner et al. (2016b) analysed hotspots of multi\u0002sectoral risks with 1.5degC and especially 2degC warming, and highlighted \r\nprojected crop yield reductions in West Africa, Southeast Asia, and \r\nCentral and northern South America; a reduction in water availability \r\nin the Mediterranean; and widespread bleaching of tropical coral \r\nreefs."


id: d132d33ecb23d29958756a69c1eb29e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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vector_id: 30452
content:
"In AR6, moderate risks have already been assessed to have occurred \r\nin Africa for economic growth and reduced inequality, biodiversity \r\nand ecosystems, mortality and morbidity due to heat extremes and \r\ninfectious disease, and food production in fisheries and crop production \r\n(Figure  9.6). In Europe, moderate risks to heat stress, mortality and \r\nmorbidity have already been reached, as well as for water scarcity in \r\nsome regions (Figure 13.30, Figure 13.3 1). In Australasia, moderate \r\nrisks are assessed as present already for heat-related mortality risk as \r\nwell as cascading effects on cities and settlements, and also very high \r\nrisks already present in coral reef systems, and high risks to kelp forests \r\nand alpine biodiversity (Figure 17.6). In North America, moderate risks \r\nhave already been reached for freshwater scarcity, water quality \r\n(Figure  14.4), agriculture, forestry, tourism, transport, energy and \r\nmining, and construction (Figure 14.10)."


id: b5e00aaaf154d200860eb7d0065a228
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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content:
"High risks to crop production are assessed to occur in Africa with ~1.5-\r\n2degC warming (Figure 9.6), to agriculture in North America with ~1.5degC \r\nwarming (Figure  14.10), and with ~2.8degC in Europe (Figure  13.30). \r\nHigh risks of mortality and morbidity due to heat extremes and \r\ninfectious disease are assessed to be reached in Africa with ~1.5degC \r\nwarming (Figure 9.6); heat stress, mortality and morbidity in Europe \r\nare assessed to reach a high level of risk at ~2degC (Figure 13.30). Heat\u0002related mortality risk transitions to a high level by ~1.5-2degC warming \r\nin Australasia, while cascading effects on cities reach high risk with \r\n~1.2degC warming (Figure 17.6). Risks to water scarcity, forestry, tourism \r\nand transportation in North America are projected to reach high levels \r\nwith ~2degC warming (Figure 14.4, Figure 14.10)."


id: e60bb4764a0cd5c3a98f3d7201e579f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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vector_id: 33683
content:
"For this assessment, the transition to moderate risk was assessed \r\nto have occurred between 0.7degC and 1.0degC of warming with high \r\nconfidence, demonstrating that a moderate level of risk exists at \r\npresent. The 0.2degC increase in this temperature range as compared \r\nwith AR5 reflects the fact that AR6 WGI has assessed that the level \r\nof global warming reached by 1986-2005 was 0.52-0.82degC (as \r\nopposed to 0.55-0.67degC in previous assessments), and also reflects \r\nthe opportunity for observations to be have made of the observed \r\nconsequences of the additional rise in temperature that has taken place \r\nsince the literature underpinning the AR5 assessment was published."


id: 6f0d753ab0443071036d2da5e75e36c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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vector_id: 15096
content:
"Two complementary multi-sectoral analyses indicate that South Asia \r\nand Africa become hotspots of multi-sectoral climate change risk, \r\nlargely due to changes in water-related indicators which also affect \r\ncrop production (Arnell et al., 2018; Byers et al., 2018). For instance, \r\nByers et al. (2018) found that the doubling in global exposure to multi\u0002sector risks that accrues as warming increases from 1.5degC to 2degC is \r\nconcentrated in Asian and African regions (especially East Africa), \r\nwhich together account for 85-95% of the global exposure."


id: d376d0e17b14ca3591bda1d9712a2528
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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content:
"In AR5, the transition from moderate to high risk was assessed to occur \r\nbetween 1.6degC and 2.6degC above the pre-industrial levels with medium \r\nconfidence. In SR15, new literature on projected risks allowed this range \r\nto be narrowed to 1.5-2degC. There is now substantial literature providing \r\nrobust evidence of larger regional risks at 2degC warming than 1.5degC and in \r\na range of systems, including crop production (with risks of simultaneous \r\ncrop failure) (Thiault et al.; Gaupp et al., 2019), aquaculture and fisheries \r\n(Cheung et al., 2018b; Froehlich et al., 2018; Stewart-Sinclair et al., 2020), "


id: 671dd5472854ea84e0be793b7c6ce88b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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vector_id: 13816
content:
"Considering this evidence, for this assessment, the temperature range \r\nfor the transition from moderate to high risk is located between 1.5degC \r\nand 2degC above pre-industrial levels, with high confidence in the lower \r\nbound of 1.5degC, but medium confidence in the upper bound of 2degC, "


id: 93a2f35367af2ffd23b3f6a1cd8fd8d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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content:
"to persist at these higher levels of warming. Risks for heat-related \r\nmorbidity and mortality, ozone-related mortality, malaria, dengue, \r\nLyme disease and West Nile fever are projected to increase regionally \r\nand globally (Chapter 7) with potential infestation areas for disease\u0002carrying vectors in multiple geographic regions that could be five times \r\nhigher at 4degC than at 2degC (Liu-Helmersson et al., 2019)."


id: c36bff1a14c63eb976f5fdf6f2794082
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28315
content:
"because simulation studies do not account for climate variability and \r\ntherefore risks could be higher."


id: 4eca0756fef9293b159eee4352eb3ae6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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vector_id: 9829
content:
"This RFC considers impacts to socio-ecological systems that can be \r\naggregated globally into a single metric, such as monetary damages, \r\nlives affected, species lost or ecosystem degradation at a global \r\nscale (Oppenheimer et  al., 2014; O'Neill et  al., 2017). RFC4 shares \r\nunderlying key risk components with other RFCs (e.g., RFC1 and RFC2, \r\nsee O'Neill et al., 2017) and thus draws on a similar literature as those \r\nassessments; however, this RFC focuses on impacts that reach levels of \r\nconcern at the global level and also weighs the composite effect of risk \r\nelements ranging from economic to biodiversity."


id: 69917e44283228f5a1952d18952a899f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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content:
"above 1.5degC, many estimates are nonlinear, with marginal economic \r\nimpacts increasing with temperature (see Cross-Working Group \r\nBox ECONOMIC in this Chapter). At 1.5degC warming, most aggregate \r\nglobal impacts to GDP are negative across different estimation \r\nmethods, including bottom-up estimation (e.g., Takakura et  al., \r\n2019), meta-analysis (e.g., Howard and Sterner, 2017) and empirical \r\nestimations (e.g., Pretis et al., 2018; Kalkuhl and Wenz, 2020). At 2degC \r\nWatts et al. (2021) estimate a relative decrease in effective labour by \r\n10%, which would have profound economic consequences. Byers et al. \r\n(2018) found that global exposure to multi-sector risks approximately \r\ndoubles between 1.5degC and 2degC, while the percentage of the global \r\npopulation exposed to flooding is projected to rise by 24% with 1.5degC \r\nwarming and by 30% with 2.0degC warning (Hirabayashi et al., 2021)."


id: 5ea72430c6439eeffbcb4380941f3e2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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vector_id: 12430
content:
"either of these reports because the temperature threshold was beyond \r\nthe scope of the assessment in the case of SR15 and literature available \r\nfor this highest transition in AR5 was limited."


id: e4c503ed80f0c2e8a0c02263fa5a9df5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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vector_id: 33470
content:
"world's worst historical economic recessions'. Furthermore, climate \r\nchange impacts on income inequality could compound risks to living \r\nstandards (high confidence, 16.5.2.3.4). Chapter 4 finds that, at 4degC, \r\n4 billion people are projected to be exposed to physical water scarcity \r\n(medium confidence)."


id: 5255ff110131ce7eeea0b6246a0fa929
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10408
content:
"In AR5 Section  19.6.3.6 (Oppenheimer et  al., 2014), the boundary \r\nbetween undetectable and moderate risk is set at levels between \r\n0.6degC and 1.6degC above pre-industrial levels (i.e., 0degC and 1degC above \r\nthe 1986-2005 level) with high confidence, based on emerging early\u0002warning signals of regime shifts in Arctic and warm water coral reef \r\nsystems. The risk transition boundary between moderate and high \r\nrisk was set between 1.6degC and 3.6degC above pre-industrial levels (i.e., \r\n1degC and 3degC above the 1986-2005 level), with medium confidence \r\nbased on projections of ice sheet loss, with faster increase between \r\n1degC and 2degC than between 2degC and 3degC. The literature available at \r\nthe time did not allow AR5 to assess the boundary between high and \r\nvery high risk."


id: f309aa56b7451dd8fd2741606bdae05d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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content:
"In SR15 Section 3.5.2.5 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018b), new assessments \r\nof the potential collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet (WAIS) initiated \r\nby marine ice sheet instability (MISI) resulted in lowering the upper end \r\nof the transition from undetectable and moderate risk from 1.6degC to \r\n1degC warming above pre-industrial levels, and lowering the upper end of \r\nthe transition from moderate to high risk to 2.5degC. Although SR15 did \r\nnot produce embers beyond 2.5degC, authors reported that the transition \r\nto very high risk was assessed as lying above 5degC in light of growing \r\nliterature on ice sheet contributions to SLR."


id: 8a7472a962da6297133d3f5111b2e6c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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content:
"In addition to differences in methods, there are also differences in scope--geographic, sectoral and temporal. Global estimates are \r\nfrequently based on an aggregation of independent sector and/or regional modelling and estimates; however, there are examples of \r\nestimates from global modelling that simulate multiple types of climate impacts and their potential interactions within a single, coherent \r\nframework (e.g., Roson and Van der Mensbrugghe, 2012; Dellink et al., 2019; Takakura et al., 2019). Differences in scope also represent \r\nstrengths and weaknesses between the methodologies, with narrower scope allowing for more detailed assessment, but missing potential \r\ninteractions with the scope not covered (e.g., other geographic areas, sectors, markets or periods of time)."


id: eefd94d1ae999cf9dff4515683e27c93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35073
content:
"Comprehensive economic estimates are challenging to produce for many reasons, including complex interactions among physical, natural \r\nand social systems; pervasive climate, socioeconomic and system response uncertainties; and the heterogeneous nature of climate \r\nimpacts that vary across space and time. Critiques and commentaries of global estimation methods (Pindyck, 2013; Stern, 2013; van \r\nden Bergh and Botzen, 2015; Cropper et al., 2017; Diaz and Moore, 2017; Pindyck, 2017; Rose et al., 2017; Stoerk et al., 2018; DeFries \r\net al., 2019; Pezzey, 2019; Calel et al., 2020; Warner et al., 2020; EPRI, 2021; Grubb et al., 2021; Newell et al., 2021) include, among \r\nother things, concerns about statistical methods estimating weather but not climate relationships, making out-of-sample extrapolations, "


id: a839a758eede1ea5d4779fa5a6a94608
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"and model specification uncertainty, concerns about the observational grounding of structural modelling, and overall concerns about \r\nthe lack of adaptation consideration, as well as representation and evaluation of potential large-scale singular events such as ice \r\nsheet destabilisation or biodiversity destruction, some questioning the ability to generate robust estimates (i.e., estimates insensitive \r\nto reasonable alternative inputs and specifications), and general concerns about methodological details, transparency and justification."


id: 807470ed84749a2d7e2a2001c67f9460
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17737
content:
"Global estimates of the economic costs of climate impacts\r\nSince AR5, many new estimates of the global economic costs of climate change have been produced. Figure Cross-Working Group \r\nBox  ECONOMIC.1 shows a wide spread of estimates, with growing variance at higher levels of warming, both within and across \r\nmethodology types (i.e., statistical, structural or meta-analysis). Meta-analysis is used here to refer to studies that treat other studies' \r\nestimates as data points in an attempt to derive a synthesised functional form."


id: a238a08a2258156aeea2811ff1b4f4f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23091
content:
"From Figure Cross-Working Group Box ECONOMIC.1, we find a large span of damage estimates, even without considering uncertainty/\r\nconfidence in damage responses, including for today's level of warming (about 1degC). There is also evidence that some regions benefit \r\nfrom low levels of warming, leading to net benefits globally at these temperatures. The size of the span of estimates grows with global \r\nwarming level, with variation across statistical estimates larger than variation in structural estimates. The structural and meta-analyses \r\nestimates appear to be in closer agreement, but that outcome is contingent on the meta-analyses' data considerations and approach. \r\nMeta analyses to date have not assessed the alternative methods and dealt with the lack of comparability between methods."


id: ca4d0c277175f951f57369c096e8cb69
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"The wide range of estimates, and the lack of comparability between methodologies, does not allow for identification of a robust range \r\nof estimates with confidence (high confidence). Evaluating and reconciling differences in methodologies is a research priority for \r\nfacilitating use of the different lines of evidence (high confidence). However, the existence of higher estimates than AR5 indicate that \r\nglobal aggregate economic impacts could be higher than previously estimated (low confidence due to the lack of comparability across \r\nmethodologies and robustness of estimates)."


id: 8585472aa8164e38a5cc191a8c147b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18542
content:
"While Figure Cross-Working Group Box  ECONOMIC.1 summarises global aggregate estimates, the literature exhibits significant \r\nheterogeneity in regional economic impacts that are also sensitive to methodology, model specification and societal assumptions (with, for \r\ninstance, larger estimates due to the assumed size of society, but offsetting adaptive capacity improvements and adaptation responses). \r\nRegional results illustrate the potential for overall net benefits in more temperate regions at lower levels of warming with potential lower \r\nenergy demand and comparative advantages in agricultural markets; however, at higher levels of warming, net losses are estimated. In \r\naddition, economic impacts for poorer households and poorer countries represent a smaller share in aggregate quantifications expressed \r\nin GDP terms than their influence on well-being or welfare (Byers et al., 2018; Hallegatte et al., 2020)."


id: 8165ea766c74e365622d36ad6fcb287e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"In addition to the economic impacts methodological challenges discussed above with respect to aggregate economic impact estimates, \r\nthe additional components needed for SCC calculations give rise to a new set of technical issues and critiques, including incorporation \r\nof uncertainties in the components beyond climate damages, links between components, and discounting (van den Bergh and Botzen, \r\n2015; Cropper et al., 2017; Diaz and Moore, 2017; Pindyck, 2017; Rose et al., 2017; EPRI, 2021). For component-specific discussions and \r\nassessment, see Cropper et al. (2017), Rose et al. (2017) and EPRI (2021)."


id: f67f3c197f02ed9ce5d01e53956167cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Substantial progress has been made in recent years to better reflect complexities in the global economy, the climate system, and their \r\ninteraction. For example, recent studies have explored damages to natural capital (Bastien-Olvera and Moore, 2021), the influence of \r\nimperfect substitutability between environmental services and market goods (Sterner and Persson, 2008; Weitzman, 2012; Drupp and \r\nHansel, 2021), the implications of heterogeneous climate change impacts across income groups (Dennig et al., 2015; EPRI, 2021; Errickson \r\net al., 2021), the potential for persistent climate impacts to economic growth instead of effects on levels of economic output (Dietz and \r\nStern, 2015; Moore and Diaz, 2015; Ricke et al., 2018; Kikstra et al., 2021; Newell et al., 2021), valuing the risks of climate tipping points \r\n(Cai and Lontzek, 2019; Rising et al., 2020), valuing uncertainty under risk aversion (Jensen and Traeger, 2014; Lemoine and Traeger, "


id: 51abe13f642627630849079a66c168b9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10311
content:
"2016), and modelling a distinction between intertemporal inequality aversion and risk aversion in the social welfare utility function (Crost \r\nand Traeger, 2013; Jensen and Traeger, 2014; Daniel et al., 2015). These new studies have, in general, raised estimates of the SCC (Crost \r\nand Traeger, 2013; Jensen and Traeger, 2014; Gerlagh and Michielsen, 2015; Moore and Diaz, 2015; Faulwasser et al., 2018; Guivarch and \r\nPottier, 2018; Budolfson et al., 2019; Cai and Lontzek, 2019; Dietz and Venmans, 2019; Kalkuhl and Wenz, 2020), in some cases by an \r\norder of magnitude (Ricke et al., 2018). However, challenges persist in terms of moving from conceptual to practical application, such as \r\npinning down parameter specifications, modelling specific mechanisms for impacts, and more fully representing adaptation."


id: 7278256bd7c69bd1dc93721980e61136
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15628
content:
"Despite these scientific advances, SCC estimates vary widely in the literature. Technical issues with past and current modelling (e.g., \r\nPezzey, 2019; Pindyck, 2019; EPRI, 2021) and the challenge of comparability across methodologies imply that many estimates are not \r\nrobust (high confidence). Also, as a result, the issue of directional bias of past estimates remains unsettled. Better representation of \r\nuncertainty in methods can improve robustness, while detailed methodology assessment and comparison will help define the relative \r\nbiases of methods (high confidence)."


id: 2be85d99cfafc153d1f18f4dc2fb4888
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"the Antarctic (whether associated with MISI or not) and Greenland \r\nIce Sheets, is more than seven times higher over the period 2010-\r\n2016 than over the period 1992-1999 for Greenland and four times \r\nhigher for the same time intervals for Antarctica. Given their multi\u0002century commitments to global SLR, this reinforces the assessment of \r\nestimating the boundary between undetectable and moderate risks for \r\nice sheets to lie between 0.7degC (the level of global warming in the \r\n1990s when melting began to accelerate) and 1degC (as in SR15), with \r\na median of 0.9degC."


id: 99893ad4ca4eecbd46461e88299be5e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21683
content:
"Whether associated with MISI or not, WGI AR6 (Fox-Kemper et  al., \r\n2021) now assesses with very high confidence that mass loss from both "


id: 3b8822ea656ad9dc77638ee2a725bf85
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6717
content:
"finds that 'Primary tropical forest comprised a net source of carbon \r\nto the atmosphere, 2001-2019 (emissions 0.6 Gt y-1, net 0.1 Gt y-1) \r\n(Harris et al., 2021). Anthropogenic climate change has thawed Arctic \r\npermafrost (Guo et al., 2020), carbon emissions 1.7 +- 0.8 Gt y-1, 2003-\r\n2017 (Natali et al., 2019)'. This also supports the upper limit for this \r\ntransition lying at 1degC."


id: d65877482accf46171b5a64781a7fafb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31242
content:
"The potential global loss of an entire ecosystem type, coral reefs, is \r\nalso considered a large-scale singular event. In the 1990s when \r\nglobal warming was around 0.7degC large-scale coral reef bleaching \r\nalso became apparent (Section  16.2.3.1), also supporting the lower \r\nboundary for this transition in respect of coral reefs."


id: 4bf92b9786313651797af71d519de3f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9379
content:
"Overall, given the above evidence on ice sheets, Amazon Forest and \r\ncoral reefs, the transition from undetectable to moderate risk is \r\nassessed to occur between 0.7degC and 1degC warming with a median of \r\n0.9degC with high confidence."


id: 33844c5d719e66adfad4f67627b6470a
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content:
"The transition from moderate to high risk is informed by an assessment \r\nof risks at higher levels of warming than present. Nearly all climate \r\nmodels show warmer temperatures around Antarctica in conjunction \r\nwith rising global mean temperature, and all ice sheet models show \r\nsustained mass loss from the WAIS after temperature increase halts \r\n(thus implying MISI takes place) at various levels between 1.5degC and \r\n5degC. An increasing fraction of ice sheet models shows additional \r\nsustained mass loss from the East Antarctic Ice Sheet (EAIS) for peak \r\nwarming between 2degC and 4degC, and all ice sheet models show mass \r\nloss for peak warming higher than 4degC. Therefore, we assess an \r\nincreasing link between MISI, WAIS collapse and Antarctic mass loss, \r\nfor increasing temperature levels (high confidence)."


id: 11b67bdef38f241d34365174b31c103f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
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vector_id: 279
content:
"One of the criteria for locating a transition to very high risk is a limited \r\nability to adapt. In natural systems, limiting warming to 1.5degC rather \r\nthan 2degC would enhance the ability of coastal wetlands to adapt \r\nnaturally to SLR, since natural sedimentation rates more likely keep \r\nup with SLR (SR15, Hoegh-Guldberg 2018). In human systems, there \r\nis medium confidence that technical limits will be reached for hard \r\nprotection to SLR beyond 2100 under high-emissions scenarios, with \r\nlimits associated with socioeconomic and governance issues reached \r\nbefore 2100 (CCP2)."


id: 8e6bdc8297e4f3c81270df3f34533a3a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19929
content:
"We therefore estimate the boundary between moderate and high risk \r\nto lie between 1.5degC and 2.5degC, with a median at 2.0degC, with medium \r\nconfidence based on projections for melting ice sheets and drying in \r\nthe Amazon. We also estimate the boundary between high and very \r\nhigh risk to lie between 2.5degC and 4degC, but with low confidence due to \r\nuncertainties in the projections of SLR at higher levels of warming and \r\ndifferences between levels of warming at which very high risks were \r\nassessed in different systems."


id: a9d37fe5bf727e4999fe46b0d7976494
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24251
content:
"It should be noted that ice sheets may take many centuries to respond, \r\nimplying that risk levels increase over time for the same warming level. \r\nTherefore, we base judgements about risk transitions related to ice \r\nsheets primarily on their implications for 2000-year commitments to \r\nSLR from sustained mass loss from both ice sheets as projected by \r\nvarious ice sheet models, reaching 2.3-3.1 m at 1.5degC peak warming "


id: f0b15c386ed9abde00640997f608f8da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35366
content:
"for RFC2 would have transitioned to a high risk at 1.5degC and RFC1 \r\nwould be well into the transition to very high risk (high confidence). \r\nRemaining below 2degC warming (but above 1.5degC) would imply that \r\nrisk for RFC3 through 5 would be transitioning to high, and risk for \r\nRFC1 and RFC2 would be transitioning to very high (high confidence).\r\nBy 2.5degC warming, RFC1 will be in very high risk (high confidence) \r\nand all other RFCs will have begun their transitions to very high risk \r\n(medium confidence for RFC2, RFC3 and RFC4, low confidence for \r\nRFC5). These highest levels of risk are associated with an irreversible \r\ncomponent, such that some impacts would persist even were global \r\ntemperatures to subsequently decline in an 'overshooting' scenario."


id: 2826e19086e4c560ba2cc005c9523444
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3724
content:
"The updated RFCs show that transitions between levels of risk are now \r\nassessed to occur at lower levels of global warming than in previous \r\nassessments (high confidence), levels of confidence in assigning \r\ntransitions have generally increased, evidence on the potential for \r\nadaptation to adequately address risks at different warming levels \r\nremains limited, and transitions from high to very high levels of risk \r\nhave been assessed for all five RFCs, compared with just two RFCs in \r\nAR5, together showing how literature published since AR5 is informing \r\nus on our future climate risks."


id: 3d787d171ec5d1c743a81bd191f70026
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7028
content:
"In summary, risks to unique and threatened systems (RFC1) are higher \r\nat recent and projected levels of warming than assessed previously (very \r\nhigh confidence); risks associated with extreme weather events (RFC2) \r\nare assessed comparably to AR5 and SR15 at recent and low levels of \r\nwarming, but notably much higher at projected warming above 1.8degC \r\n(medium confidence); risks associated with distribution of impacts \r\n(RFC3) and global aggregate impacts (RFC4) are similar to SR15 and \r\nhigher than AR5 above 2degC (medium confidence); and those associated \r\nwith large-scale singular events (RFC5) are similar to SR15 and higher \r\nat both recent and projected warming than AR5 (medium confidence)."


id: 3657af622960da319c909d1f4e897a67
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5943
content:
"Limiting global warming to 1.5degC would ensure risk levels remain \r\nmoderate for RFC3, RFC4 and RFC5 (medium confidence), but risk "


id: 185c56e15a8fa5e353ebddaff8593c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1328
content:
"A few clusters of key risks can be identified which have the potential to become particularly severe and pose significant challenges for \r\nadaptation worldwide. These risks, therefore, deserve special attention. They include risks to important resources such as food and water, risks \r\nto critical infrastructures, economies, health and peace, as well as risks to threatened ecosystems and coastal areas."


id: cce3fa03bcbc92d08ac98260868ca09
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29774
content:
"More than 120 key risks across sectors and regions have been identified by the chapters of this report, which have \r\nthen been clustered into a set of 8 overarching risks, called representative key risks, which can occur from global \r\nto local scales but are of potential significance for a wide diversity of regions and systems globally. As shown \r\nin Figure  FAQ16.1.1, the representative key risks include risks to (a) low-lying coastal areas, (b) terrestrial and \r\nmarine ecosystems, (c) critical infrastructures and networks, (d) living standards, (e) human health, (f) food security, \r\n(g) water security and (h) peace and human mobility."


id: 2ffded49cba55854738d0f10aaed16eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4977
content:
"Adaptation helps to manage key risks by reducing vulnerability or exposure to climate hazards. However, constraining factors make it harder to \r\nplan or implement adaptation and result in adaptation limits beyond which risks cannot be prevented. Limits to adaptation are already being \r\nexperienced, for instance by coastal communities, small-scale farmers and some natural systems."


id: 2f744396a22fb9eac429759852b3eb4e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4888
content:
"Adaptation responses can occur in natural systems without the intervention of humans, such as species shifting their \r\nrange, time of breeding, or migration behaviour. Humans can also assist adaptation in natural systems through, \r\nfor example, conservation activities such as species regeneration projects or protecting ecosystem services. Other \r\nadaptation-related responses by humans aim to reduce risk by decreasing vulnerability and/or exposure of people \r\nto climate hazards. This includes infrastructural projects (e.g., upgrading water systems to improve flood control), \r\ntechnological innovation (e.g., early-warning systems for extreme events), behavioural change (e.g., shift to new \r\ncrop types or livelihood strategies), cultural shifts (e.g., changing perspectives on urban greenspace, or increased \r\nrecognition of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge) and institutional governance (e.g., adaptation \r\nplanning, funding and legislation)."


id: 3842a5f883d7730f776e5a2f1056eeb6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6224
content:
"Adaptation is critical for responding to unavoidable climate risks. Greater warming will mean more and more \r\nsevere impacts requiring a high level of adaptation which may face greater constraints and reach soft and hard \r\nlimits. At high levels of warming, it may not be possible to adapt to some severe impacts."


id: 1296c7a69c6ed7fbbb6743bde495f6ef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 421
content:
"FAQ 16.3 | How do climate scientists differentiate between impacts of climate change and changes in natural or \r\nhuman systems that occur for other reasons?"


id: 983b8c91815da1f317d3b896e9f0fda6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21460
content:
"We can already observe many impacts of climate change today. The large body of climatic impact data and research confirms this. To decide \r\nwhether an observed change in a natural or human system is at least partly an impact of climate change, we systematically compare the \r\nobserved situation with a theoretical situation without observed levels of climate change. This is detection and attribution research."


id: fc9b969c8c1ec41b485e4bf137a41945
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37260
content:
"'Impact of climate change' is defined as the difference between the observed state of the system and the state of \r\nthe system assuming the same observed levels of non-climate-related drivers but no climate change. For example, \r\nwe can compare the level of crop yields, damage induced by a river flood, and coral bleaching with differences \r\nin fertilizer input, land use patterns or settlement structures, without climate change and with climate change \r\noccurring."


id: e5858401fe651df60e9a51a6acbbbba2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33621
content:
"While this definition is quite clear, there certainly is the problem that, in real life, we do not have a 'no climate \r\nchange world' to compare with. We use model simulations where the influence of climate change can be eliminated \r\nto estimate what might have happened without climate change. In a situation where the influence of other \r\nnon-climate-related drivers is known to be minor (e.g., in very remote locations), the non-climate-change situation \r\ncan also be approximated by observation from an early period where climate change was still minor. Often, a \r\ncombination of different approaches increases our confidence in the quantification of the impact of climate change."


id: 862987afb75313c3a0af86945c7a5992
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18650
content:
"Impacts of climate change have been identified in a wide range of natural, human and managed systems. For \r\nexample, climate change is the major driver of observed widespread shifts in the timing of events in the annual \r\ncycle of marine and terrestrial species, and climate change has increased the extent of areas burned by wildfires \r\nin certain regions, increased heat-related mortality, and had an impact on the expansion of vector-borne diseases."


id: 6647a3146678e53a72fa3a4510b8ad1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13681
content:
"In some other cases, research has made considerable progress in identifying the sensitivity of certain processes \r\nto weather conditions without yet attributing observed changes to long-term climate change. Two examples of \r\nweather sensitivity without attribution are observed crop price fluctuations and waterborne diseases."


id: 21befb49205bff899a368190ae55c58f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2741
content:
"Finally, it is important to note that 'attribution to climate change' does not necessarily mean 'attribution to \r\nanthropogenic climate change'. Instead, according to the IPCC definition, climate change means any long-term \r\nchange in the climate system, no matter where it comes from."


id: 1d4888002fec41b93beda6a3e4a97ca1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2049
content:
"Adaptation-related responses are the actions taken with the intention of managing risks by reducing vulnerability or exposure to climate \r\nhazards. Responses are increasing and expanding across global regions and sectors, although there is still a lot of opportunity for improvement. \r\nExamining the adequacy and effectiveness of the responses is important to guide planning, implementation and expansion."


id: 4522fac924e417088a1b27940e2627d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8300
content:
"The most frequently reported adaptation-related responses are behavioural changes made by individuals \r\nand households in response to drought, flooding and rainfall variability in Africa and Asia. Governments are \r\nincreasingly undertaking planning, and implementing policy and legislation, including, for example, new zoning \r\nregulations and building codes, coordination mechanisms, disaster and emergency planning, or extension services \r\nto support farmer uptake of drought tolerant crops. Local governments are particularly active in adaptation-related \r\nresponses, particularly in protecting infrastructure and services, such as water and sanitation. Across all regions, \r\nadaptation-related responses are strongly linked to food security, with poverty alleviation a key strategy in the \r\nGlobal South."


id: 3b196194a2cd629544855c43fa5534a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
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vector_id: 6655
content:
"Increasing the extent of adaptation-related responses will require more widespread implementation and \r\ncoordination, more novel and radical shifts from Business-As-Usual practices, more rapid transitions, and challenging \r\nor surmounting limits--key barriers--to adaptation. This might include, for example, best-practice programmes \r\nimplemented in a few communities being expanded to a larger region or country, accelerated implementation of \r\nbehaviours or regulatory frameworks, coordination mechanisms to support deep structural reform within and across \r\ngovernments, and strategic planning that challenges fundamental norms and underlying constraints to change."


id: 1043f77dd1aad679dc4e39de73fb56e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 46
content:
"We have very little information on whether existing adaptation-related responses that have already been \r\nimplemented are reducing climate risks. There is evidence that risks due to extreme heat and flooding have \r\ndeclined, though it is not clear if these are due to specific adaptation-related responses or general and incremental \r\nsocioeconomic development. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of adaptation-related responses, and even \r\nmore difficult to know whether responses are adequate to adapt to rising climate risk. These remain unknown but \r\nimportant questions in guiding implementation and expansion of adaptation-related responses."


id: ecde9d3760cc84014c1a524d05a18e01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34745
content:
"Climate risk is a complex issue, and communicating it is fraught with difficulties. Risk generally increases with global warming, though it depends \r\non a combination of many factors such as exposure, vulnerability and response. To present scientific findings succinctly, a risk variation diagram \r\ncan help visualise the relationship between warming level and risk. The diagram can be useful in communicating the change in risk with warming \r\nfor different types of risk across sectors and regions, as well as for five categories of global aggregate risk called 'Reasons for Concern'."


id: c0368f26c5377ba866191769435a34e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27797
content:
"In this diagram, the risk variation bars or embers are shown with temperature on the y-axis, and the base of the \r\nember corresponds to a baseline temperature. Typically, this baseline temperature is that before global warming "


id: 92c7339fe4917d42c6c5fd616c8e5528
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20606
content:
"started (i.e., average temperatures for the pre-industrial period of 1850-1900). This area of the ember appears \r\nwhite, which indicates no to negligible impacts due to climate change. Moving up the ember bar, changing colours \r\nshow the increase in risk as the Earth warms globally in terms of degrees Celsius--yellow for moderate risk, red \r\nfor high risk, and purple for very high risk. Definitions of the risk levels are presented in Figure FAQ16.5.1 The risk \r\ntransitions are informed by the latest literature and scientific evidence, and developed through consultation and \r\ndevelopment of consensus among experts. The bars depict an averaged assessment across the world, which has the \r\ndisadvantage of hiding regional variation. For example, some locations or regions could face high risk even when \r\nthe global risk level is moderate."


id: 590a734355c470437037cb702558895b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11501
content:
"When the embers for different risk categories are placed next to each other, it is possible to compare risk levels at \r\ndifferent levels of global warming. For example, at 1degC warming all embers appear yellow or white, so it is possible \r\nto say that keeping global warming below that particular temperature would help ensure risks remain moderate \r\nfor all five categories of concern assessed. In contrast, at 2degC warming, risk levels have transitioned to high for all \r\ncategories assessed, and even reach a very high level of risk in the case of unique and threatened systems."


id: 9352611358147431a5c832628160f6f3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20694
content:
"Climate change has often been perceived as a slow and gradual process, but by now it is abundantly clear that many of its impacts arise through \r\nshocks, such as extreme weather events. Many places are facing more frequent and intense extremes, and also more surprises. The impact of \r\nsuch shocks is shaped by exposure and vulnerability, where we live, and how we are prepared for and able to cope with shocks and surprises."


id: 6b4896706f4a59397941f0275973227c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14502
content:
"The rising risk of extreme events is one of the major RFCs about climate change. It is clear that this risk has already \r\nincreased today. Many recent disasters already have a fingerprint of climate change."


id: 8a1b14f28576f70c4b6af72332c62a83
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19256
content:
"There are large differences in such risks from country to country, place to place, and person to person. This is of \r\ncourse partly due to differences in hazards such as heatwaves, floods, droughts, storms, storm surges, etc., and the \r\nway those hazards are influenced by climate change. However, an even more important aspect is people's exposure \r\nand vulnerability: do these hazards occur in places where people live and work, and how badly do they affect \r\npeople's lives and livelihoods? Some groups are especially vulnerable, for instance elderly in the case of heatwaves, \r\nor people with disabilities in the case of floods. In general, poor and marginalised people tend to be much more \r\naffected than rich people, partly because they have fewer reserves and support systems that help them to prepare \r\nfor, cope with and recover from a shock. On the other hand, absolute economic losses are generally higher in richer \r\nplaces, simply because more assets are at risk there."


id: 8bf4592dbc794cf4976caf7dca6e626f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19536
content:
"Many problems caused by extreme weather do not just appear because of one weather extreme, but due to a \r\ncombination of several events. For instance, dryness may increase the risk of a subsequent heatwave. But the \r\nincreased risk may also cascade through human systems, for instance when several consecutive disasters erode \r\npeople's savings, or when a heatwave reduces the ability of power plants to produce electricity, which subsequently \r\naffects availability of electricity to turn on air conditioning to cope with the heat. Many shocks also have impacts \r\nbeyond the place where they occur, for instance when a failed harvest affects food prices elsewhere. Climate risks \r\ncan also be aggravated by other shocks, such as in the case of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), which not \r\nonly had a direct health impact, but also affected livelihoods around the world and left many people much more \r\nvulnerable to weather extremes."


id: 5d4102a306b153a4873d6a21b1f8cf71
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12185
content:
"Understanding the risks we face can help in planning for the future. This may be a combination of short-term \r\npreparation, such as early-warning systems, and longer-term strategies to reduce vulnerability, for instance through \r\nurban planning, as well as reducing greenhouse gases to avoid longer-term increases in risk. Many interventions to \r\nincrease people's resilience are effective in the face of a range of shocks. For instance, social safety nets can help \r\nmitigate the impact of a drought on farmers' livelihoods, but also of the economic impacts of COVID-19."


id: b6fe64c13fbe2af4315813072482a6ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26321
content:
"Climate-related shocks are threats to society, but they can also offer opportunities for learning and change. Recent \r\ndisasters can motivate action during a short window of opportunity when awareness of the risks is higher and policy \r\nattention is focused on solutions to adapt and reduce risk. However, those windows tend to be short, and attention is \r\noften directed at the event that was recently experienced, rather than resilience in the face of a wider range of risks."


id: 32178bb8e416cd7d98445d6b6c7d4be5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5290
content:
"New, M., D. Reckien, D. Viner, C. Adler, S.-M. Cheong, C. Conde, A. Constable, E. Coughlan de Perez, A. Lammel, \r\nR. Mechler, B. Orlove, and W. Solecki, 2022: Decision-Making Options for Managing Risk. In: Climate Change 2022: \r\nImpacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the \r\nIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Portner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, \r\nA. Alegria, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Loschke, V. Moller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, \r\nUK and New York, NY, USA, pp. 2539-2654, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.026."


id: c2ef8e3e14980b7a7f4b753ef1c8f12
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28248
content:
"Chapter 17 assesses the options, processes and enabling conditions \r\nfor climate risk management, a key component of climate resilient \r\ndevelopment. While Chapter 16 assesses the risks that society and \r\necosystems face, and residual risks after adaptation, this chapter focuses \r\non the 'how' of climate risk management and adaptation. It covers: \r\nthe adaptation and risk management options that are available; the \r\ngovernance and applicability of options in different contexts; residual \r\nrisk and Loss and Damage; the methods and tools that can be drawn \r\non to support climate risk management planning and implementation; \r\nenabling conditions and drivers for adaptation; the role of monitoring \r\nand evaluation for integrated risk management and tracking progress, \r\nsuccess and the risk of maladaptation; and finally, integration of risk \r\nmanagement across sectors, jurisdictions and time horizons, under \r\ndynamic conditions of environmental and societal change."


id: 8d48a245a4bccbd06d59b086778d082b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19753
content:
"Adaptation options for managing a wide range of climate risks \r\nhave been proposed, planned or implemented across all sectors \r\nand regions, with prospects for wide-ranging benefits to nearly \r\nall people and ecosystems (high confidence1\r\n). Many options \r\nare widely applicable and could be scaled up to reduce vulnerability \r\nor exposure for the majority of the world's population and the \r\necosystems they depend on (high confidence). These include nature \r\nrestoration (high confidence), changing diets and reducing food waste \r\n(high confidence), infrastructure retrofitting (high confidence), building \r\ncodes (medium confidence), disaster early warning (high confidence) \r\nand cooperative governance (medium confidence). The portfolio of \r\nadaptation options that could be successfully implemented varies \r\nacross locations, with resource-limited and conflict-affected contexts \r\nbearing large amounts of residual risk (high confidence) {17.2, 17.2.1, \r\n17.5.1}."


id: 2c47a6e68ad377e4c8b37a5578468a1a
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"The majority of climate risk management and adaptation currently \r\nbeing planned and implemented is incremental (high confidence). \r\nTransformational adaptation will become increasingly necessary \r\nat higher global warming levels (medium confidence) but can be \r\nassociated with significant and inequitable trade-offs (medium \r\nconfidence). Adaptations with some of the highest transformative \r\npotential include migration (high confidence), spatial planning (medium \r\nconfidence), governance cooperation (medium confidence), universal \r\naccess to health care (medium confidence) and changing food systems \r\n(medium confidence). Options that tend to modify existing systems \r\nincrementally include early-warning systems (high confidence), insurance \r\n(medium confidence) and improved water use efficiency (high confidence) \r\n{17.2, 17.5.1}."


id: 3542e370c05b07fc7f35ac1261dc7056
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Governance, especially when inclusive and context sensitive, is \r\nan important enabling condition for climate risk management \r\nand adaptation (very high confidence). The use of formal \r\nand informal governance approaches, often in polycentric "


id: fc5d0dbe04b98ad3213a6b01f4197b58
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Urgency can stimulate prompt climate risk management (high \r\nconfidence). A moderate level of urgency contributes to enhanced \r\nclimate action, while both high and low levels of urgency can impede \r\nresponse (high confidence). Well-designed communication strategies \r\ncan move decision makers from low to moderate levels of urgency, \r\nstimulating action. As conditions approach a crisis state, however, \r\nurgency can weaken decision-making rather than support it (medium \r\nconfidence) {17.4.5.1}."


id: 5e4534230154779d382426ec0c14347c
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"commitment for 2020 (very high confidence). Substantial opportunities \r\nexist for improving access to climate finance, as well as its impact and \r\neffectiveness {17.4.2; Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in this Chapter}."


id: 1c4a2570d30555f2970054de1b565c25
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"Information and knowledge on climate risk and adaptation \r\noptions, derived from different knowledge systems, can support \r\nrisk management and adaptation decisions (high confidence).\r\nProcesses, such as co-production, that link scientific, Indigenous, local, \r\npractitioner and other forms of knowledge can make climate risk \r\nmanagement processes and outcomes more effective and sustainable \r\n(high confidence) {17.3.2; 17.4.4}."


id: 54c4079440db8f66f67e509bd0cfb49a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Successful adaptation and maladaptation form the opposite \r\npoles of a continuum (medium confidence). The evaluation of an \r\nadaptation option and its location on this continuum are context \r\nspecific and vary across time, place and evaluation perspectives \r\n(high confidence). Despite knowledge gaps, adaptation options can \r\nbe assessed according to several criteria, such as benefits to humans, \r\nbenefits to ecosystem services, benefits to equity (marginalised ethnic \r\ngroups, gender, low-income populations), transformational potential \r\nand contribution to greenhouse gas emission reduction (medium \r\nconfidence). These factors can aid evaluation of co-benefits and trade\u0002offs within and between adaptation responses (high confidence) \r\nfacilitating successful adaptation and reducing the likelihood of \r\nmaladaptation (medium confidence) {17.5.1, 17.5.2}."


id: b6031b63e6b4748a9b9584da96123ff7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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content:
"Climate services that provide reliable, relevant and usable \r\nclimate information for the short or long term are increasingly \r\nbeing produced and used in climate risk management (high \r\nconfidence). In many regions and sectors, the utility of climate services \r\nis strengthened by sustained engagement between stakeholders and \r\nexperts and by co-production (medium confidence). Significant gaps \r\nremain in the evaluation of climate services, and some studies indicate \r\nthat climate services often do not reach the most vulnerable and more \r\nisolated people, maintaining or exacerbating inequality{17.4.4; Cross\u0002Chapter Box Climate Services WGI Chapter 12}."


id: ea23c720659c723711363e0c1fad0a4
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"Adaptation options across a range of climate risk settings \r\n(Representative Key Risks) have potential for some degree of \r\nmaladaptation alongside varied potential for success (very \r\nhigh confidence). Maladaptation can result from unaccounted trade\u0002offs with low-income groups and the transformational potential of \r\nadaptation (medium confidence). Success is greatest when adaptation \r\nenhances gender equity (medium confidence) and supports ecosystem \r\nfunction and services (medium confidence). Among adaptation options, \r\ncoastal infrastructure is an example that has particularly high risk for \r\nmaladaptation through trade-offs for natural system functioning and \r\nhuman vulnerability over time. Examples of options with high potential \r\nfor successful adaptation are nature restoration (medium confidence), \r\nsocial safety nets (medium confidence) and adaptations relating to \r\nchanges of diets and reducing food waste (medium confidence) {17.5.2}."


id: cf2d922c3c81f124ebf2c3616b2676f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Understanding of residual impacts and risks in vulnerable \r\nregions and implications for Loss and Damage (L&D) has become \r\nincreasingly relevant as the limits to adaptation are projected \r\nto be reached in natural and human systems (high confidence).\r\nThe international L&D policy debate has seen heightened attention, \r\nwith some coalescence around key issues, including risk management, \r\nlimits to adaptation, existential risk, finance and support, including \r\nliability, compensation and litigation. Advisory groups have been set \r\nup with participation of policy and experts from research, civil society \r\nand practice to inform debate. Yet, the policy space and concrete remit \r\nfor L&D has remained vague, which renders policy formulation complex \r\n(high confidence) {17.2.2.5; Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in this Chapter }."


id: 63d372142c5e0bcd1477f3b1376cbb83
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"the planning stage into implementation, and provide benchmarks for \r\nadaptation progress. To assess adaptation progress (Section 17.5), the \r\ninterplay between top-down (institutional) and bottom-up (individual/\r\nsocial/community) processes, multi-scale interaction (local, regional, \r\nnational and international), iterative risk management, differing \r\nforms of knowledge, and equity are especially crucial (particularly \r\nSections 17.2, 17.4). Parallel to these advances is an understanding \r\nand assessment of appropriate decision support tools, methods and \r\nevaluation metrics (Section 17.3)."


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"The AR6 IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL) \r\n(IPCC, 2019b) added the dimensions of pace, intensity and scale of \r\nclimate impacts and adaptation or mitigation responses and adverse \r\nconsequences. Relevant land-based adverse consequences include \r\nthose on lives, livelihoods, health and well-being, economic, social \r\nand cultural assets and investments, infrastructure, services (including \r\necosystem services), ecosystems and species."


id: 6279c580a39c58a137c4f05551d6d424
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"While a generic understanding of the decision-making process has \r\nemerged from the literature, the chapter assesses how these components \r\nand their dimensions interact across a range of temporal (short, long term \r\nas defined in the IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a \r\nChanging Climate [SROCC]), scalar (household to global), institutional/\r\ngovernance (formal, informal, bottom-up, top-down) and magnitude (micro \r\nadaptation, small scale; macro adaptation, large scale) (Section 17.2). The \r\nIPCC SRCCL placed emphasis on acknowledging co-benefits and trade\u0002offs to avoid barriers to implementation, with particular attention to land \r\nuse decisions. It states that this coordination can be supported by building \r\nnetworks of decision makers across scales and sectors, including local \r\nstakeholders from vulnerable groups, and by adopting and implementing \r\npolicies in a flexible and iterative manner (IPCC, 2019b)."


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"This chapter utilises several points of departure to assess climate risk \r\nmanagement that emerge from AR5 and AR6, specifically. SR Climate \r\nChange and Land, especially Chapter 7 (IPCC, 2019b; Hurlbert et al., \r\n2019) and throughout SROCC (). These works provide foundational \r\nassessment of evidence on decision-making systems that connect "


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"different spatial and temporal scales and diverse cultural contexts in \r\nwhich climate risk management takes place, the varying interactions \r\nof decision makers and their stakeholder groups, and the barriers \r\nand enablers to decision-making, including governance, finance and \r\nknowledge (Section 17.4)."


id: ede252022888287473e9dc9d27a7ca1e
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"AR5 provides a broad overview of drivers as the determinants of \r\nclimate decision-making by individuals and organisations, including \r\nsocial, institutional and regulatory contexts, cultural values and norms, \r\neconomic resources and constraints, and the availability of information \r\nand of tools to process it. This chapter expands the discussion of the \r\ncontexts for decision-making in a number of ways (Section  17.4), \r\nincluding an examination of informal as well as formal decisions, \r\nan attention to emerging actors, particularly social movements, and \r\nconsideration of several dimensions of governance. It expands the \r\ntreatment of decision processes, with particular attention to framing \r\nand to the integration of multiple time frames (Sections 17.3 and 17.6)."


id: 8ef2e458f871edae3773cbe7d1e13bef
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"AR5 extensively assessed the conditions of adaptation with a focus on \r\nthe role of governance, finance, knowledge and capacity. AR6 extends \r\nthis examination of adaptation and the decision-making process \r\naround it by focusing on enablers. Adaptation enablers are defined \r\nas those conditions or properties that specifically promote or advance \r\nthe adaptation process (Chapter 1). Enablers are positively associated "


id: 9b4df081155d5403147e70e3178df233
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"with likelihood that adaptation planning occurs, and strategies will be \r\nput into practice. Three broad enabling conditions are presented in the \r\nchapter (Section 17.4): governance (legislation, regulation, institutions, \r\nlitigation), finance (needs, sources, intermediaries, instruments \r\nflows, equity) and knowledge (capacities, climate services, big data, \r\nIndigenous/local knowledge, co-production, boundary organisations). \r\nAs an extension of enabling conditions, the chapter also examines \r\ncatalysing conditions for adaptation (Section  17.4.5). Catalysing \r\nconditions motivate and accelerate the process of decision-making, \r\nleading to more frequent and potentially substantial adaptations. The \r\nchapter recognises that the relative influence of enabling conditions \r\nand catalysing conditions is set within the human dimensions of \r\nclimate change including vulnerability, inequality, poverty and the \r\nachievement/non-achievement of SDGs (Figure 8.1)."


id: 3c6d8ff01b6cebfecac94132e577d993
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"decision-making (Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in this Chapter). AR5 treated \r\nthe issues of equity and justice primarily with regard to mitigation, \r\nespecially in WGIII AR5 Chapter 3 (Kolstad et al., 2014); these issues in \r\nthe adaptation sphere are considered extensively in this chapter in areas \r\nsuch as finance, governance, success of adaptation, maladaptation, \r\nand monitoring and evaluation. The discussions of maladaptation and \r\nsuccess of adaptation (Section  17.5) consider questions of synergies \r\nand trade-offs across values and goals, while the consideration of \r\ndecision processes and tools shows opportunities to use co-benefits to \r\npromote effective decision-making, including approaches to decision\u0002making under conditions of deep uncertainty (Section  17.3; Cross\u0002Chapter Box DEEP in this Chapter). Successful adaptation across the \r\nreport (as specified in Chapter 1) is associated with conditions when \r\nco-benefits are high and (negative) trade-offs are low."


id: 5168f1c61fa7494cd83e1f4a183a99f6
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"The mechanisms and conditions for decision-making provide the \r\nbasis for the chapter. AR5 provided a detailed chapter on the support \r\nof climate decision-making. Chapter 2 of AR5 (Jones et  al., 2014) \r\nconcluded, with high confidence, that risk management provides a \r\nuseful framework for most climate change decision-making, and that \r\niterative risk management is most suitable in situations characterised \r\nby large uncertainties, long time frames, the potential for learning over \r\ntime, and the influence of both climate as well as other socioeconomic \r\nand biophysical changes. Furthermore, decision support is situated \r\nat the intersection of data provision, expert knowledge and human \r\ndecision-making at a range of scales from the individual to the \r\norganisation and institution."


id: c52b522bebc54bba64b72958f217dced
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"This chapter assesses the evidence of monitoring and evaluation \r\n(M&E) (see AR6 Glossary, Annex II) and their approaches as part of the \r\nadaptation process at the national, local and project level as well as \r\nin global assessments (Section 17.5.2; Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS \r\nin this Chapter). M&E can serve multiple functions, for example, to: \r\n(1) facilitate an understanding on whether and how interventions \r\nwork in achieving intended objectives; (2) inform ongoing and future \r\nimplementation; and (3) provide information that helps to substantiate \r\nupward and downward accountability (Preston et al., 2009; UNFCCC, \r\n2010b; Pringle, 2011; Spearman and McGray, 2011) (see BOX 17.1 for \r\nmore discussion). This chapter also addresses the relevance of iterative \r\nlearning as part of the design of M&E processes, as a means by which \r\nactors and institutions engaged in M&E acquire new insights on how \r\nthese processes work (or not) to achieve set objectives."


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"The climate risk management decision-making process follows a set \r\nof general considerations. The detail of each decision is often highly \r\ncontext specific. Climate risk decision-making is bound to the question \r\nof how and under what circumstance it is appropriate to alter, reduce or \r\ntransfer and retain risk. Different types of risk (e.g., gradual compared \r\nwith catastrophic) and conditions of risk (e.g., known versus uncertain) \r\nare associated with different types of responses (e.g., incremental versus \r\ntransformational). As the risk decision process proceeds, individuals \r\nand organisations will formally or informally utilise any number of \r\nmechanisms to guide, aid or facilitate the decision-making process. \r\nDecision-making can then take place in a linear set of steps or through \r\na complex iterative process involving reflexive and recursive steps."


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"The chapter is organised around the broad narrative of climate risk \r\ndecision-making and management (Figure  17.1), building from the \r\nassessment of risks within RKRs (Chapter 16) and options available \r\nto address these risks and within a broader context of climate resilient \r\ndevelopment pathways (Chapter 18). Decision-making is considered \r\nto be a reflexive and recursive process where different evidentiary \r\nthreads and information inputs become relevant to the understanding \r\nand assessment of factors underlying specific decisions. Additionally, \r\nthis is also a discursive process, whereby actors and institutions' \r\ninterpretations of climate risks are also key to these deliberations."


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"Decision-making processes of risk management and adaptation are \r\nvaried and numerous. Section 17.2 assesses the risk management and \r\nadaptation options already in practice. Section 17.3 assesses decision\u0002support methods and tools available for application and the effectiveness \r\nof these in supporting climate decision-making across degrees of \r\nuncertainties and levels of governance and expected reach (scale) across \r\npopulations from households to international cooperation. Closely \r\ninterlinked across the decision-making process are the enabling and \r\ncatalysing conditions for decisions on adaptation and risk management \r\n(Section 17.4). Section 17.5 synthesises evidence on maladaptation and \r\nadaptation successes, and assesses the current knowledge on M&E "


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"AR5 provided an extensive discussion of the costs to human and natural \r\nsystems associated with climate risks. It recognised the challenges \r\nwhich long time frames, uncertainty and the differing values held by \r\nstakeholders create for the monetisation of losses. The AR6 SROCC \r\nbuilt on the discussion of cultural values--typically also difficult to \r\nmonetise--through a consideration of cultural ecosystem services and \r\ncultural forms of valuation, with cases from high mountain areas and \r\npolar regions (Hock et al., 2019; Meredith et al., 2019; IPCC, 2019c). AR6 \r\nexpands this discussion of multiple forms of valuation in several ways. \r\nIt considers regulation and litigation as mechanisms for promoting \r\nthe consideration of both monetisable and non-monetisable losses in "


id: dce2af438280b032ffd9f07e1a5251d8
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"Whether an adaptation is considered successful is context specific. It depends on who evaluates adaptation and at what time as well \r\nas on the ability to compare the outcome of adaptation with a hypothetical situation without adaptation and without other parallel \r\nchanges, such as development interventions (Singh et al., 2021; Dilling et al., 2019). The ability to compare the risk situation post and \r\nprior adaptation is complicated through the long time horizons at which adaptation outcomes often become apparent (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox ADAPT in Chapter 1; Section 17.5.1; Dilling et al., 2019)."


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"To operationalize 'success' in this chapter, it is characterised by the degree to which an adaptation response benefits (1) human systems \r\n(number of people), (2) ecosystems or ecosystem services, (3) marginalised ethnic groups, (4) women and girls, (5) and low-income \r\npopulations, and can be characterised as (6) transformational adaptation, and (7) contributing to greenhouse gas emission reductions \r\n(Section 17.5.1). Overarching to these factors are uncertainty and potential path dependency of decisions that may result in lock-in and \r\nmaladaptation in the long term, and recognition that what is successful in the near term is not necessarily successful in the long term."


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"Success in adaptation is antithetical to maladaptation. Maladaptation refers to current or potential future negative consequences, \r\nincluding failed or partially successful adaptation (or risk reduction) but also trade-offs or side effects of adaptation (see Glossary, Annex \r\nII). Thus, success of adaptation and maladaptation form the ends of a continuum that represents the balancing of synergies and trade-offs \r\nacross regions, populations or sectors (Singh et al., 2016; Magnan et al., 2020; Schipper, 2020). Every adaptation action may be placed \r\nalong such a continuum reflecting the empirical evidence of adaptation practices and their assessment (Section 17.5)."


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"of adaptation, including financial accounting, to support learning on \r\nthose, respectively. Here, M&E is considered distinct from the tracking \r\nof financial flows related to adaptation, given that financial accounting \r\ndoes not necessarily provide information on the implementation of \r\nadaptation measures and their results (see also Section  17.2.1.2). \r\nFinally, in Section  17.6, decision-making, climate risk responses and \r\ntheir relevance for climate resilient development are presented, where \r\nevidence on their respective contributions to facilitate actions in the \r\nadaptation solution space within a broader context for development is \r\nshown (Chapter 18). Throughout the decision-making process, crucial \r\nfeedback loops are present that define the results of specific actions and \r\nrecursive nature of climate risk management and adaptation."


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"There has been substantial progress in risk management and adaptation \r\nresponses around the world, as demonstrated in the sectoral and \r\nregional chapters of this report and illustrated in Chapter 16. This \r\nsection presents an overview of different options available to manage \r\nrisk, explaining how they are currently governed and the extent to \r\nwhich they can be applied around the world. The section contains an \r\nassessment of the ways in which different options are being combined \r\nto create adaptation portfolios, and describes how incremental and \r\ntransformational change is starting to be considered. Based on the human "


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"This section assesses options for climate risk management (CRM) across \r\ncommon risk settings that have been grouped into Representative \r\nKey Risks (RKRs; see Section 16.5.2.2). These risk management and "


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"adaptation actions target the components of risk: hazards, vulnerabilities \r\nand exposure associated with sudden or slow-onset events (see Chapter \r\n1 for more details on the definition of risk)."


id: 249fcdc7918e304a649e8c0c02becb87
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"For example, the adaptations listed under the RKR of 'Food security' \r\nare also related to the RKR on 'Human health' (Ebi and Prats, 2015). \r\nSee SM17.1 for more detail. The list is not comprehensive of all \r\npossible adaptations listed in the regional and sectoral chapters. \r\nFor example, this does not include adaptations by institutions who \r\nmight become unable to cope with increasing pace and magnitude of \r\nextreme events (Chapter 11)."


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"For each of the RKRs, three commonly discussed adaptation options \r\nare identified across the regional, sectoral and cross-chapter papers \r\nof this report. These 24 options have been selected to cover a \r\nrepresentative variety of strategies to adapt to climate change, while \r\na particular adaptation option can be relevant to many of the RKRs. "


id: 85cc5baebf8fbca1999bd62287232355
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"policy advancements in recent years encourage any investment in \r\nstructural measures to be complemented by 'softer' vulnerability \r\nreduction measures, such as accommodating building construction \r\n(Wesselink, 2016)."


id: 7bf3e08c3313f40cfa29696594039df7
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"Table 17.1 provides examples of each of these 24 adaptation options \r\nfrom across AR6 WGII. Detailed information about sectors and regions \r\nwhere these adaptations are being discussed can be found in the \r\nindicated chapters. Note that this list is curated to ensure a diversity of \r\noptions; therefore, most of the options will apply to more than one RKR."


id: 9167ccd8f11a71716a22550a1c9b967e
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"When it comes to 'softer' vulnerability reduction initiatives, these were \r\ntraditionally seen as 'no regrets' options for adaptation. However, \r\nsubsequent studies have cautioned that notion as vulnerability is \r\na dynamic quality, and can be co-created while development or \r\nadaptation efforts are being implemented (Schipper and Pelling, 2006; \r\nTempels and Hartmann, 2014; Dilling et al., 2015). Some scholars have \r\nsuggested the application of a 'do no harm' principle to climate change \r\nadaptation efforts (Mayer, 2016)."


id: e3704ecf0db8a43c259d0895a03e4909
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Of this list of adaptation options, many focus on reducing vulnerability \r\nto climate change (high confidence), as vulnerability is one of the \r\ncomponents of risk (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 8). Vulnerability is \r\nthe propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected, including \r\nsensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and \r\nadapt (see Chapter 1 for more details). In the world's threatened \r\necosystems, reducing vulnerability often means reducing other non\u0002climate negative pressures on ecosystems, such as pesticide use or \r\nfishery overexploitation (Section 3.3)."


id: 64c8e287d44ae8ee95dbf7638d9c1db2
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"For each adaptation option identified for the RKRs (Table 17.1), this \r\nsection presents an assessment of how decisions are made and how \r\nthe adaptations are being governed. The following section then covers \r\nbenefits to humans and ecosystems, and potential for maladaptation \r\nis covered in Section 17.5. See SM17.1 for more information on the \r\nassessment methods and underlying citations."


id: f3c81c3b2d3cd1d824580a1c54ecdc01
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"Vulnerability reduction is also a major focus in human systems, and \r\nthis includes development of investments that help people adapt \r\nto climate change. Examples include irrigation or diversifying crops. \r\nBuilding infrastructure resilient to climate-related risks is another \r\nexample; many of the structural and physical adaptation options can \r\nreduce sensitivity to disasters, such as elevating houses or doing beach \r\nnourishment in coastal areas (Section  15.5). Extreme events often \r\ncatalyse investment in adaptation to reduce vulnerability for the future \r\n(Kreibich et al., 2017; Slavikova et al., 2021)."


id: 426825d632bb66d036bf573fc1e8128e
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"The following analysis of adaptation options provides a synthesised \r\noverview of adaptation globally, but does not prescribe how important \r\neach adaptation should be in specific locations. Chapter 16 finds that \r\nthe 'scope' and 'speed' of adaptation is limited in many areas."


id: a7ffc611d4df4f608e33855056bbcd03
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"When it comes to decision-making, most of these 24 adaptations \r\nrely strongly on formal decision-making (high confidence), which \r\nfollows the procedures of a group of people rather than ad hoc \r\nindividual action. Formal decisions play a particularly strong role in the \r\nadaptations identified for infrastructure, early-warning systems and \r\nwater systems (Kolen and Helsloot, 2014; Calvello et al., 2015; Zhao \r\net al., 2017; Belcakova et al., 2019; Teo et al., 2019)."


id: 6c445e31e102f9f2ede49931811a1ccd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Next to vulnerability reduction, a large number of adaptation options \r\nfocus on reducing exposure to climate change (high confidence). \r\nSelecting low-risk locations is the most basic example of reducing \r\nexposure; for example, private companies are relocating factories to \r\nreduce flood-related disruptions to their supply chain (Neise and Revilla \r\nDiez, 2019), and species are autonomously adjusting their ranges \r\nto a changing climate (Section  2.4). Land use planning or investing \r\nin resilient infrastructure can avoid exposure in rapidly urbanising \r\nareas; however, the design and enforcement of these regulations can \r\nnegatively impact marginalised people (Anguelovski et al., 2016)."


id: 2c0b716ffaad340fdb352b03d27fefc4
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"In contrast, informal or individual-led decision-making is more \r\ncommon in several food security-related and livelihood-related \r\nadaptations, such as changes to diets, livelihood diversification and \r\nseasonal migration (high confidence) (Li et al., 2017; Radel et al., 2018; \r\nRobinson et al., 2020). People who have experienced climate shocks \r\nare more likely to take individual decisions to implement adaptation \r\nmeasures, and in countries where people are more exposed to extreme \r\nevents, autonomous adaptation is more common (Koerth et al., 2017; \r\nAerts et al., 2018b; van Valkengoed and Steg, 2019)."


id: e28a9751f61d6d5fdf91f4c7fbb0c872
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content:
"Managed retreat is an example of exposure reduction that, while often \r\ncontroversial, is increasingly being considered and implemented (CCP \r\n2.2.2, Section  15.3.4; Cross-Chapter Box  LOSS in this Chapter; Siders \r\net al., 2019). Examples include the US Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, \r\nwhich, among other activities, has helped people resettle outside of flood \r\nzones, and a 'no-build zone' established in the Philippines after Typhoon \r\nHaiyan (Hino et al., 2017). However, relocation is not always an option; \r\nimmobility is sometimes involuntary, such as in the case of 'trapped' \r\npopulations in Zambia (Nawrotzki and DeWaard, 2018; Section 8.2.1.3)."


id: 12e26e739634c491007310a93e2ebb09
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"All adaptation options can occur under a range of governance \r\narrangements (high confidence), with cases of either private, public or \r\ncommunity governance typically playing the dominant role, as depicted \r\nin Figure  17.2. Public governance is the most frequent governance \r\ntype for most adaptations considered. This is particularly true for social \r\nsafety nets and spatial planning, where governments are often required \r\nto lead adaptation efforts (high confidence) (Mesquita and Bursztyn, \r\n2016; Hssaisoune et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2021). While government \r\nactors do the day-to-day management of these systems, civil society \r\nand international organisations also play a role in shaping agendas \r\nand priorities of government actors (Nagle Alverio et al., 2021)."


id: 4779deef275879ffbca3ff27e8c77a6f
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"Adaptation efforts can have negative impacts on ecosystems and \r\nvulnerable groups (high confidence); see Figure 17.3 and Section 17.5 \r\nfor further information on maladaptation. While 'hard' structural \r\ninvestments have been popular to reduce exposure to climate \r\nextremes, barrier-type measures provide protection only up to a certain \r\nlimit, and are designed to fail in more extreme events. Given the risk \r\nof catastrophe from a climate extreme overcoming a physical barrier, "


id: e9a2afacf04a3c29abd4ed6199e14ed9
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"settlements, dug informal drainage channels to vacant lots, and filled \r\nareas of land (Limthongsakul et al., 2017). In these cases, individual\u0002led adaptation can have negative side effects, such as the building of \r\nflood defences in affluent communities increasing the flood impacts in \r\nless affluent regions of a city (Limthongsakul et al., 2017)."


id: cb64518ca9d1d7a29015ed8200974794
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"The private sector plays a large role in governance of insurance, \r\nminimising ecosystem stressors, and livelihood diversification (medium \r\nconfidence) (Allen et al., 2018; Mimet et al., 2020; Alam et al., 2020a). \r\nWhile having a key role in shaping and implementing many other \r\nadaptations, the private sector is not often the governing entity."


id: c6b80b85978a9f554d0ea428d9b85ace
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"There are a number of adaptation options that tend to be governed \r\nby communities and individuals, including adaptations to farming and \r\nfishery practices and ecosystem-based adaptations (high confidence) \r\n(Reid, 2016; Basupi et al., 2019; Giffin et al., 2020; Karlsson and Mclean, \r\n2020). In rapidly urbanising areas of Asia and Africa, individual- or \r\ncommunity-led adaptation is the norm in informal settlements that \r\nhave poor governance structures. Residents of Mathare slum in Nairobi \r\nhave established methods to pool risks, such as pooling labour to police \r\nlooting during flood events and developing community health centres \r\nin churches (Thorn et al., 2015). This is in addition to risk reduction \r\nmeasures such as building structures to withstand rising water levels \r\n(Thorn et  al., 2015). Residents in Bangkok have built walls around "


id: f5327e9121914c88631a23857e0c32c6
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"While some of the 24 adaptation options are specific to certain risk \r\ncontexts (e.g., coastal areas, agricultural production), others are more \r\nwidely applicable (e.g., early-warning systems, health care systems, \r\ncreation/restoration of natural areas). Figure 17.3 depicts which of these \r\nare most context specific, for example benefitting less than 1  billion \r\npeople. This is contrasted with the extent to which each adaptation \r\noption is beneficial to ecosystem services. Many of the more generalisable \r\nadaptations have also been shown to have benefits to ecosystem services, \r\nsuch as nature restoration and changes to diets/food waste (medium \r\nconfidence). While health care systems and the establishment of health\u0002"


id: c2bf42ece295d227804c1a295a0df66d
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"Figure 17.3 |  Benefit of representative adaptation options to humans and ecosystems. The breadth of applicability of each adaptation option benefiting humans \r\nis estimated by the degree to which each adaptation can be applied across multiple contexts, depicted on the x axis. The benefit of each adaptation option for ecosystems and \r\necosystem services is depicted on the y axis. See Annex A for literature underpinning each assessment. This figure uses the 24 representative adaptation options from Table 17.1 \r\nand Figure 17.2. Confidence levels are represented by dots."


id: f52175d1a96afc6cf7eeb838b7d0932
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"and actionable hazards, and require effective institutional governance \r\n(Wilkinson et al., 2018; IPCC, 2019c)."


id: ce6803832332782b0cc94ee3ee43e97e
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"related infrastructure can be widely used as adaptation options, their \r\ndesign and application to date have not generally benefitted ecosystems \r\nor ecosystem services (medium evidence, low agreement)."


id: 3766eda0ff0a26b401fe6c70173ace81
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"As a general method related to adaptive management, 'early \r\nwarnings' are the most frequently discussed adaptation option to \r\ndeal with a changing climate across all key risks, sectors and regions. \r\nEarly-warning systems are an adaptation that can benefit more than \r\n5 billion people (high confidence). Examples range from short-term \r\ndisaster early-warning systems to revision of sea level rise plans \r\nbased on monitoring. For example, the humanitarian community \r\nis investing in forecast-based financing systems to prepare for \r\nextreme events (Coughlan de Perez et  al., 2015; MacLeod et  al., \r\n2021). Forecasts are also used to manage hydropower dams (Ahmad \r\nand Hossain, 2020), to trigger interventions before public health \r\nemergencies (Section 7.4.2) and to alert fishermen of algal blooms in \r\nthe world's oceans (Section 3.6.2.3.3). Table 17.2 provides examples \r\nof adaptations using early-warning systems that have been used to \r\naddress each of the key risks."


id: e8b4f2391c926ad884f88d6b517de1e4
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"While the above assessments underlying Figures 17.2 and 17.3 isolate \r\nspecific risk management options for specific risks, several adaptation \r\nmeasures are present in any given location, affecting the overall \r\nrisk of a particular place. Policymakers are charged to evaluate risk \r\ncomprehensively, deciding on a variety of measures that are effective, \r\nfeasible and aligned with other policy goals for a specific place, or \r\nimplementing a new activity because of how it complements the existing \r\npackage of risk management activities (Girard et al., 2015)."


id: 4fb232e30ee34947cf8e7d7920fadeb7
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"Portfolios of adaptation options generally include actions to reduce \r\nvulnerability and exposure, complemented by risk financing mechanisms \r\nthat help people avoid the impacts of loss events, particularly very rare \r\nones. There is also explicit or implicit risk retention, where further risk \r\nmanagement is not desirable, cost-effective or feasible (Mechler and \r\nDeubelli, 2021). Risk financing can include a variety of instruments, with \r\ninsurance as the most widely known. Formal insurance uptake is lower \r\nin developing and emerging economies than in wealthier countries (Ali "


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"In addition to immediate investments that reduce vulnerability and \r\nexposure, monitoring and early-warning systems allow people to take \r\nadditional actions when there is an imminent event on the horizon (e.g., \r\ntemporary evacuation during extreme events rather than permanent \r\nmigration). This allows for ongoing adaptive decision-making (Alessa \r\net  al., 2016; Ebi et  al., 2016; Barnard et  al., 2017; Haasnoot et  al., \r\n2018). However, these systems are only cost-effective for forecastable "


id: eff542eb1db1d4cc0a77b7afcb2e7f66
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"Table 17.2 |  Examples of adaptation investments and early-warning system options for adaptive management for each of the key risks in Chapter 16."


id: 5aa16d0ebc05c31cf36d4f69ef032cce
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"et al., 2020). To overcome some of the barriers to insurance uptake, \r\nindex-based insurance has been offered for agriculture and livestock in \r\nmany developing economies, with varying levels of success (Chantarat \r\net al., 2013; Isakson, 2015; Dewi et al., 2018). In recent years, regional \r\ndisaster insurance pools for sovereign states have been established, \r\nsuch as the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) \r\n(Iyahen and Syroka, 2018). Insurance can encourage the quantitative \r\nevaluation of climate-related risks and adaptation limits, and it can \r\nincentivise risk reduction by charging lower premiums for less risky \r\nsituations (Schafer et al., 2019)."


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"While insurance is increasingly accepted as an adaptation option \r\n(Linnerooth-Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler, 2015), positive outcomes \r\nare not guaranteed (high confidence). First, there are concerns as to \r\nwhether this will shift responsibility to the most vulnerable people \r\nto pay premiums (Surminski et al., 2016). There is also high risk for \r\ninsurance to cause maladaptation (Muller et al., 2017); for example, \r\nAnnan and Schlenker (2015) showed that insured crops were less well \r\nadapted to heat stress. To avoid this, people simultaneously invest in \r\ninsurance and adaptations that reduce vulnerability/exposure (medium \r\nconfidence) (Surminski et al., 2016; Highfield and Brody, 2017; Schafer \r\net al., 2019; Reguero et al., 2020)."


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"The combination of interventions that reduce risk and risk financing for \r\nresidual risk (often through insurance for sudden-onset events, or social \r\nprotection for risks including those linked to slow-onset processes) will \r\nreduce collective risk to a certain level. For very extreme and potentially \r\ncatastrophic events, it is often impossible (or financially infeasible) to \r\nfully reduce vulnerability and exposure, and people, communities and \r\ncountries therefore retain risk requiring the ex post management of \r\nunavoided and unavoidable residual impacts in case of events."


id: 914c6e53b48d271b6f4464306c2f3e41
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"While many studies assess adaptation trends by geographical region or \r\nby sector, the amount of residual risk varies across countries with different \r\nincome and governance structures. Vulnerability, poverty and inequality, \r\nwhich constitute the human dimensions of climate change, affect how \r\nthese portfolios of adaptation options are structured around the world \r\n(Chapter 8). Figure 17.5 depicts several illustrative 'typologies' of how \r\nrisk is addressed. While no country or location fits any one typology, this \r\nillustrates a range of risk portfolios found in different contexts."


id: eaa0d2e1b31e23474933ef3623e03db8
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"Ex-post risk management relies on national assistance, social safety \r\nnets (Section 7.4.2.1.3; Bene et al., 2012; Elmi and Minja, 2019) and \r\nsupport from social networks as well as lending from international \r\ninstitutions (high confidence) (Hochrainer-Stigler et al., 2014). Even in \r\nplaces where normalised losses have stabilised in recent years with \r\ninvestments in adaptation, effective planning to manage losses remains \r\nnecessary (Jongman, 2018). Resilient recovery can support adaptation \r\ngoals in periods of losses and damages (Slavikova et al., 2021)."


id: 5f88dfa5950e2beda2f755bd4a8f5ebd
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"The first category in this typology, that of 'extensive protection', \r\nrequires substantial financial investment (Figure  17.5). In higher\u0002income contexts, this is often more feasible than in contexts with "


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"Figure 17.4 |  A graphical representation of layered risk management. Risks can be reduced or managed by risk finance (insurance and other means), but some residual \r\nrisk remains, particularly for high-impact unavoided and unavoidable risk, which is retained implicitly or explicitly. Where incremental and in situ adaptation is not effective in \r\nmanaging risks, transformational adaptation supports systemic change. Risk management occurs in national systems, and regional insurance systems have stimulated regional \r\ncollaboration. Particularly for high impact risks and impacts in specific events, international assistance is required. Policy domains on disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate \r\nchange adaptation (CCA) as well as Loss and Damage overlap in their governance of risk management. Figure building on Mechler et al. (2014); Cummins and Mahul (2009); Lal \r\net al. (2012); Mechler and Deubelli (2021)."


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"the largest amount of reported economic losses; however, at least \r\n40% of these losses are uninsured, even in the regions with high \r\ninsurance penetration (Baur et  al., 2018). Government involvement \r\nin insurance schemes is associated with higher penetration rates of \r\nthe general population (Paleari, 2019). While some, predominantly \r\nhigh-income countries can make use of disaster contingency funds or \r\ndedicated budget items, these do not exist or are not well endowed \r\nto adequately support relief, recovery and reconstruction (Linnerooth\u0002Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler, 2015). To help stabilise public finance \r\nin regions with little market-based insurance coverage and fiscal \r\nresponse mechanisms, regional public insurance pools have been set \r\nup with donor assistance, such as in the Caribbean, Africa and the \r\nPacific for flood and droughts (Schafer et al., 2016; Surminski et al., \r\n2016; Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2019)."


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"In contrast to the 'extensive protection' scenario, many regions \r\nof the world bear greater resemblance to the second typology in \r\nFigure  17.5 'moderate investment focused on adaptive capacity' \r\n(medium confidence). These contexts see greater adaptation funding \r\ninvested in capacity building activities to reduce vulnerability, rather \r\nthan structural or ecosystem-based protection measures to reduce "


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"Risk financing, especially insurance, is also common in higher-income \r\ncountries with well-developed insurance markets and higher levels \r\nof insurance penetration than in lower-income countries, illustrated \r\nby the purple bar in Figure 17.5 (high confidence) (Linnerooth-Bayer \r\net  al., 2019). Of climate-related disasters, floods and storms cause "


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"In the third typology, there are limited resources for adaptation, and \r\npopulations bear large amounts of residual risk (depicted by the purple \r\nbar in the third typology in Figure 17.5, 'little adaptation investment'). \r\nSIDS can often find themselves in this situation, because small \r\npopulations, small economies, lack of economies of scale, subsistence \r\nlivelihoods and other challenges mean risk reduction and risk financing \r\nare both costly (Chapter 15)."


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"Another example of this third typology are people living in conflict\u0002affected areas. These populations are highly vulnerable to the impacts \r\nof climate change (Basher, 2006; OCHA, 2011; IPCC, 2012; Zommers \r\nand Singh, 2014; Marktanner et  al., 2015; Walch, 2018; Eckstein \r\net al., 2019; Peters et al., 2019). In conflict-affected areas similar to \r\nthe third category of 'little adaptation investment', a combination of \r\nhigh vulnerability and relatively less support for adaptation means \r\nthat there is a large amount of 'residual risk', in which residents \r\ncope with the impacts of extreme events on a regular basis (high \r\nconfidence). For example, deaths from 'natural' disasters are 40% \r\nhigher in areas that are undergoing armed conflict (Marktanner \r\net al., 2015) (Box 17.2)."


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"Figure 17.5 |  Several illustrative typologies for how risk has been managed.\r\nThe first is 'extensive protection', in which the bulk of investments is made in reducing \r\nexposure, through protection up to limits (e.g., flood levees) and including retreat. \r\nThe second category is 'moderate investment focused on adaptive capacity', in which \r\nthe bulk of investment is made in reducing vulnerability (e.g., improved housing). The \r\nthird category is 'little adaptation investment', in which there is little investment in \r\neither reducing vulnerability or exposure, and the bulk of risk is residual, borne by the \r\npopulation."


id: 91128199e1854585820c8373db2ceff5
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"exposure (Biagini et al., 2014). Because of limited international and \r\ndomestic finance for large structural investments to reduce exposure, \r\nthe most prevalent adaptation choices in low-income contexts are \r\nhousehold-level vulnerability-reducing measures (Koerth et  al., \r\n2017)."


id: 4e0808d61ceeec28ecd2636ac5e2b2c5
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"Lack of access to finance can be one of the reasons countries engage \r\nmore readily in adaptive capacity-building activities. Countries that \r\nrank highly on the Corruption Perceptions Index engage less in \r\ntechnological solutions for risk management (Berrang-Ford et  al., \r\n2014). In addition, countries with higher levels of corruption receive \r\nless adaptation aid (Betzold and Mohamed, 2017; Weiler et  al., \r\n2018). Countries are more likely to receive adaptation aid if they \r\nimport goods from a donor country, or are a former colony of that \r\ndonor (Betzold and Mohamed, 2017; Weiler et al., 2018). In countries \r\nwith poor governance and limited aid flows, remittances make up a \r\nsubstantial portion of finance available to the local population for risk \r\nmanagement (Samuwai and Hills, 2018)."


id: 295c3ffe675761d2fc1615f9a71c6c31
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"Risk financing does play a large role in the 'moderate investment' \r\ncategory; there are a variety of instruments in use globally. Many \r\ncountries in the Global South have created national policies and \r\na number of regional catastrophe risk insurance pools, subsidised \r\nby international assistance, which make pay-outs to the national \r\ngovernment of affected nations when an extreme event happens and \r\nhave helped to build risk awareness (Clarke et al., 2015; Thirawat et al., \r\n2017). Beyond this, residual risk is often borne directly by affected \r\npeople (Andrianarimanana, 2015)."


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"While adaptation is rarely focused on taking advantage of opportunities \r\npresented by a changed climate, there are numerous co-benefits \r\nof adaptation opportunities, from health to reduced emissions to \r\necosystem services (high confidence) (Watts et al., 2015; Geneletti and \r\nZardo, 2016; Spencer et al., 2016). There is also literature proposing \r\nthat the actual process of adaptation planning can enable people to \r\ntake advantage of opportunities, including, for example, opportunities \r\nfor larger policy and governance reform (Coleman and Sandhu, 1965; \r\nErnst and Preston, 2017; Brown et al., 2017a)."


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"Conflict can also limit the effectiveness of adaptation measures that do exist; a study across Africa, the Caribbean and Asia concluded \r\nthat poor governance can limit the effectiveness of early-warning systems in these regions (Lumbroso et al., 2016). Poor state services \r\nhave health consequences and can limit social support networks (Peters, 2018). States are unable (even if they are willing) to assist or \r\nprotect citizens in disasters. Non-governmental stakeholders play a large role in these contexts, but questions of long-term implications \r\nand accountability remain unaddressed (Peters, 2018)."


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"Climate risk management and adaptation in conflict-affected contexts is challenging, first, given the complex and dynamic nature of \r\nvulnerability (Hilhorst, 2003; Frerks et  al., 2004) and, second, given factors such as weak or non-existent disaster risk governance, \r\nrestricted access, human rights violations, power dynamics between parties in conflict, and environmental degradation, among others \r\n(Kloos et al., 2013; Marktanner et al., 2015; ICRC, 2016; Quinn et al., 2017; Field and Kelman, 2018; Siddiqi, 2018). Climate can also \r\nbe a contributing factor to conflict (Mach et al., 2019). There is little peer-reviewed documentation available on adaptation in climate\u0002affected contexts, and what exists is narrowly focused on agriculture at the expense of other sectors, such as cities, infrastructure and \r\nhumanitarian operations (Sitati et al., accepted)."


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"debate regarding the role of decision-making on incremental and \r\ntransformational adaptation for dealing with residual risks to address \r\nsoft as well as hard adaptation limits (see Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in \r\nthis Chapter)."


id: 73bddb1de864437cc9673f1bf7537f01
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"Section  1.4.5 noted that transformational adaptation is increasingly \r\nbeing considered necessary to allow a system to extend beyond its \r\n(soft) limits as incremental adaptation cannot guarantee to avoid \r\nintolerable risks. Section  16.4 presents evidence on RKRs where a \r\nneed for transformational adaptation and climate risk management \r\nhas been identified in order to further reduce climate risks and avoid \r\nbreaching adaptation limits. The following section identifies how \r\nthe 24 adaptation options representative of the RKRs may support \r\nincremental and transformational risk management/adaptation that \r\ncan lead to small, medium and large systemic change, often as part \r\nof portfolios of options. This subsection further discusses the role \r\nof transformational adaptation vis a vis incremental adaptation by \r\nreviewing evidence across chapters (see also Box  17.3). The Cross \r\nChapter Box on Loss and Damage further expands on the international "


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"As the literature distinguishes active transformation to shape \r\nfuture risks from passive and unintended transformation (Lonsdale \r\net al., 2015; Chapter 1), the section queries how to inspire actors to \r\nconsider how to develop or implement transformational adaptation \r\nto complement incremental adaptation/risk management when and \r\nwhere appropriate."


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"In contrast to a broadening literature on conceptualisation and policy \r\nproposal, there has been little evidence reported in the literature \r\non transformational adaptation and risk management at scale \r\nof implementation (high confidence) (Klein et  al., 2017; Ajibade \r\nand Egge, 2019; Tabara et  al., 2019; Mechler and Deubelli, 2021). "


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"adaptation, there are examples of how it has been implemented in \r\na way that benefits poor, low-income, ethnic groups and/or females, \r\nand other examples of implementation in different contexts that have \r\nworsened the risks for those groups specifically. For example, while the \r\ngoal of cooperative governance can be to support the marginalised, \r\nthese same marginalised groups are usually excluded from \r\nparticipating in the design of the solutions, and many articles criticise \r\ngovernance results as protecting only the interests of the wealthier and \r\nmore powerful parties in the negotiations, especially in governance of \r\nmigration (Groutsis et al., 2015; Pijnenburg et al., 2018). This reinforces \r\nthe need for context-specific planning to ensure marginalised groups \r\nwill benefit from an adaptation plan. See Table 17.3 for examples of \r\nhow each adaptation option can have or not have equity benefits."


id: 67d88405bdd5fd09316f6671c54c54c3
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"Deubelli and Venkateswaran (2021) review evidence on largely non\u0002governmental organisation (NGO)-implemented community-level \r\nadaptation for floods, heat and drought across the globe. They suggest \r\nthat transformational adaptation success, while multi-facetted and \r\nchallenging, depends on the availability of appropriate enabling \r\nenvironments including experiential and niche learning, alignment \r\nof transformational change objectives with strategic (government or \r\nother actor's) priorities, strong bottom-up governance grounded in \r\nlocal contexts, phased long-term program support and appropriate \r\nfinancing."


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"17.2.2.5 Incremental and Transformational Adaptation for \r\nManaging Risk in the Context of Adaptation Limits"


id: 37b47c931bed14cdc6904cf2774a7763
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"With evidence on soft and hard limits being experienced in natural and \r\nhuman systems, including in terrestrial, aquatic and marine ecosystems, \r\ncoastal and island systems, agriculture, health systems, urban spaces \r\nand tourism (Table 16.5, 16.4.2, medium confidence), transformation \r\nis also being considered to expand the adaptation space beyond \r\nsoft limits and before hard limits are being reached. As a key area \r\nof advancement since AR5, this  section assesses the relationship \r\nof residual risks, limits and incremental as well as transformational \r\nadaptation integrating the assessment of limits in Section 16.4 with \r\nChapter 17 adaptation and risk management assessment along a \r\nspectrum of adaptation change. Section  17.2.2.5 thus contributes \r\nto understanding in which systems and regions transformational \r\nadaptation is increasingly required and considered once incremental \r\nadjustments are exhausted in the context of soft and hard limits."


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"Applying these key aspects to the list of 24 adaptation options from \r\nTable 17.1, certain options are assessed to be more transformational, \r\noften requiring large system changes that go beyond addressing \r\nindividual risks. Adaptations that are more transformational offer \r\npotential to lead to systemic change. Less transformational adaptations \r\nallow people to address specific climate-related risks while maintaining \r\nexisting systems (see SM17.1 for more details; see also Box 17.3)."


id: 79636c48ee111c1ec0eab7fd61bbdf1c
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"Assessing risk and limits requires in-depth analysis of the adaptability \r\nof human and natural systems under different warming and risk levels, \r\nalso considering socioeconomic exposure and vulnerability drivers, \r\ninformed by perspectives on what breaching limits means, especially \r\nif significant change and losses and damages occur (Sections  16.4, \r\n8.4). Assessments differ between natural systems (where adaptation \r\npotential is often very limited; Klein et al., 2014) and human systems \r\nwhere incremental and transformational adaptation can help to \r\nextend soft limits so that hard limits are not met or to buy time until \r\nhard limits are reached with higher levels of warming."


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"For example, several adaptations related to the RKR on risks to \r\npeace and migration, namely permanent migration, and cooperative \r\ngovernance, require moderate to high levels of transformation (high \r\nconfidence). Some behavioural adaptations, such as changing diets \r\nand reducing food waste, can also require large transformations in \r\nland use and food culture (medium confidence). Spatial planning, \r\nincluding urban zoning, also tends to be more transformational \r\n(medium confidence)."


id: 425729fbb287cc3f9d65e804c93f3f38
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"The assessment synthesises global and regional evidence across \r\nregional and thematic report chapters along a continuum from \r\nobserved to projected impacts and risks, the spectrum of incremental \r\nand transformational adaptation, and finally any evidence on soft \r\nand hard limits. We present regional evidence for two types of salient \r\nnatural and human systems and RKRs: RKR-B (risk to terrestrial and \r\nocean ecosystems), where we assess risks from marine heatwaves to \r\ncoral reefs; and RKR- E (risk of heat on human health as a human \r\nsystem). Both RKRs and systems are facing substantial (residual) risk, \r\ncharacterised by adaptation limits and sharing heatwaves as the \r\nhazard, for which climate change has been considered the major driver \r\nof increasing intensity and frequency (high confidence) (IPCC, 2021). \r\nThe assessment synthesises evidence on transformation as reported \r\nin the chapters as well as categorises identified adaptation options "


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"On the other end of the spectrum, disaster early-warning systems \r\ntend to be incremental rather than transformational (high confidence), \r\nbecause they enable people to maintain/protect existing systems. \r\nSeveral other adaptations allow people to maintain livelihoods and \r\nsystems in the face of changing risks. For example, improvements \r\nin agricultural and fishing practices can be done with moderate \r\ntransformation to systems (medium confidence). Similarly, insurance \r\ntends to require less transformation, as it can allow people to maintain \r\nexisting systems while being more resilient to climate-related shocks \r\n(medium confidence)."


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"None of the 24 adaptation options are consistently beneficial for \r\nvulnerable and marginalised groups (high confidence). For each "


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"Table 17.3 |  The 24 adaptation options from Table 17.1 grouped and coloured by their potential for transformation. (See Appendix A for assessment methodology.) Adaptations \r\nin red tend to require small amounts of transformation, adaptations in orange tend to require middling levels of transformation, and adaptations in yellow tend to require large \r\nlevels of transformation, or systemic change. Each option is paired with examples of how that adaptation can be done in a way that does not benefit or worsens, the situation \r\nfor marginalised groups, as well as an example in which that adaptation has benefitted those groups. Examples of equity focus on benefits to poor, low-income, ethnic groups, or \r\nfemales."


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"(Africa, Asia) where lethal heatwaves are projected to occur almost \r\nannually towards later in the 21st (medium confidence) (Sections  9.1, \r\n10.4.7)."


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"along an adaptation spectrum according to the criteria discussed in \r\nSection  17.2.2.4, specifically whether adaptation leads to systems' \r\nchange or only change within a system is driven by multi-scale agency \r\nand considers equity impacts specifically."


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"This may involve urban redesign using nature-based solutions (such \r\nas green roofs and infrastructure) as well as rescheduling of outdoor \r\nlabour or cross-sectorial coordination. Integrated approaches across \r\ninterdependent systems (e.g., ecosystem-based approaches and \r\nclimate-sensitive urban design) are being proposed. Also, it may \r\nmean bolstering social safety nets and health systems that better \r\nattend to heat impacts by providing universal coverage. Societal \r\nand political transformations to reduce climate change risks for \r\nvulnerable groups are considered particularly relevant in some \r\nregions (Sections  9.4.2.1.2, 9.9.5, 10.4.6.4.3, 12.5.3.2, 13.6.2.1, \r\n14.6). Yet, across all regions there is limited evidence on proposed \r\ntransformational adaptation and very little evidence regarding \r\nimplementation (high confidence)."


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"As a consequence, studies project soft limits to be further reached as \r\nincreased mortality and morbidity will add stress to health systems, \r\nand labour productivity will be severely hampered, impacting economic \r\nsystems (medium to high confidence) at medium to higher levels of \r\nglobal warming (Sections  7.2.4.1, 9.10, 10.4.4.4, 11.9.1, 13.6.2.3, \r\n13.7.2, 13.7.4, 13.10.2.1, 13.8, 15.3.4.9)."


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"Planned and implemented adaptation interventions in all regions have \r\nremained largely incremental, while uptake is being intensified in some \r\nregions; options have included air conditioning (as autonomously \r\ndeployed), public cooling spaces, heat action plans that incorporate \r\nearly warning and response and heat-adapted building design \r\n(Sections 9.9.5, 11.3.6, 12.5.6.1.1,13.11.3, 13.11.3, 15.6.2)."


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"Hard limits may be breached in some regions where critical heat \r\ntolerance thresholds are projected to be surpassed at medium to higher \r\nlevels of global warming, such as physiological survivability thresholds, \r\nwhich, for example, may render urban outdoor labour in Asia, Africa \r\nand North America infeasible (Sections 10.4.6.3.2, 14.8, Box 9.1)."


id: 903e82a3de7ac8e628aa437f0cb079db
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"Given increasing risks projected and soft and hard limits already \r\nreported, transformation is being considered as a complement potentially \r\nleading to systemic and transformational change. Adaptation, if upgraded \r\nto also consider transformational interventions, will thus help to reduce \r\nheat risks (medium to high confidence, limited evidence), albeit with \r\nreduced effectiveness at higher levels of warming, particularly in regions "


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"Marine heatwaves have affected tropical coral reefs, which are \r\nanalysed as part of RKR-B (Table  SM17.20). Coral reefs across the \r\ntropics have recently seen massive bleaching events (such as for the \r\nGreat  Barrier  Reefs) (very high confidence). Risks are projected to be "


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"Global\r\nHeat is a significant health risk due to widespread urbanization, demographic changes and increase in hot weather (***) 323,000 estimated heat-related deaths and 13 million heat-related DALYs in 2019. Temperature-related mortality expected to increase under medium and high heating scenarios even with adaptation. By 2050 (compared to 1961-1991) an excess of 94,000 deaths per year attributable to climate change projected due to heat for medium warming.\r\nImplementation of heat warning systems has reduced relative mortality risk in developed countries (***), unclear trends in low-middle income countries. Multi-sectoral integrated approach beneficial including heat early warning and response systems targeting vulnerable groups (***). Longer term urban planning and design, including Nature based solutions (NBS) to reduce urban heat island effects. Improved basic protection for outdoor work including work rescheduling to cooler times of the day (***). S\r\niith ht tditihiliitf lbdtiit()"


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"y pp()\r\nHot extremes (including heatwaves) have become more frequent and more intense across most land regions since the 1950s (*****). Human-induced climate change is the main driver of these changes (***). Every additional 0.5degC of global warming causes clearly discernible increases in the intensity and frequency of heatwaves (***)."


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"Climate variability impacting the health of tens of millions of Africans through exposure to extreme heat. Heat extremes (hot days and hot nights) increased in frequency since 1980 (***). Increasing temperatures will cause tens of thousands of additional deaths under moderate and high global warming scenarios, particularly in North, West and Central Africa (***). Cooling stations, limited evidence of pro-active climate change adaptation in African cities (***). Urgent need for improved societal and political transformations to reduce climate change risks for vulnerable groups (**). Deployment considered necessary of NBS with demonstrated health, ecological, economic and social co-benefits. \r\nMorbidity and mortality will escalate with further global warming, placing additional strain on health and economic systems (***). Under high warming scenarios annual exceedance of deadly heat thresholds in North, West and Central Africa (***). "


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"g(gy g y)gg gy g()\r\nTransformational adaptation largely lacking, some incipient in larger cities, including NBS.\r\nHeat stress likely to approach critical health thresholds in West and South Asia under medium warming scenario, and in some other regions such as East Asia under high warming (***)."


id: 70b7161621d2f7ad7f66bd8e21ee6936
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"Increase in heatrelated mortality and morbidity for people and wildlife in Australia (). Urban cooling, education to reduce heat stress, heatwave early-warning systems, building standards that improve insulation/cooling. Current levels of adaptation largely incremental and reactive inconsistent with rising risks (***). NBS and well-resourced primary health care. "


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"Heat stress a health concern (***).\r\nSignificant increases in intensity, frequency and duration of heatwaves (***), strong increases in heat-related mortality in urban areas.\r\nFocus on early warning and surveillance systems for heat waves; political, institutional, and financial barriers limit feasibility to date (***). NBS proposed to be combined with community engagement and integration of diverse knowledge to foster transformational adaptation. No limits for health risk discussed."


id: 6b835bf7fd4ebef8fe778e589f979723
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"p\r\n70,000 and 54,000 deaths during 2003 and 2010 heatwaves, adaptation actions have reduced heat-related mortality in parts of Southern Europe (***). Ri\r\nk f ht tlitd bidittthtilt 3degC d t15degC ith jtd 90000 dthi2100 ()"


id: 8132d21c89f3664107bcc8cb2cd857d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Air cooling, heat warning and response systems, building interventions, but largely incremental adaptation (***). \r\nIncreasing use and plans for NBS in urban spaces; large scale system transformations needed due to adaptation limits in Southern Europe (**) involving strong behavioural change combined with large portfolios of preventive and planning options.\r\nAbove 3degC limits to the adaptation potential of people and existing health systems, particularly in Southern and Eastern Europe and with health systems under pressure (***)."


id: 80bb32d3f027f286c334292fb8956bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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content:
"High temperatures have increased mortality and morbidity (**** ) with impacts varying by age, gender, location, and socioeconomic conditions (**** ). Warming projected to increase heat-related mortality (**** ) and morbidity (**). Air conditioning and cooling stations. "


id: 5168cde038e6fb11968e1d42f358257e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Transformational, long-term adaptation action to increase resilience such as through redesign of urban space (***).\r\nAvailable (incremental) adaptation options unable to protect human health under high-emission scenarios (***). \r\nHard limits to adaptation may be reached for rural and urban outdoor labor towards end of century (**)."


id: c6c005b4c457bd5c15428ad7b298ba3f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Disproportionate health risks associated with changes in temperature. Heatwaves cause injuries and deaths. Heat-related mortality and risks of occupational heat stress in small island states projected to increase with higher temperatures. Higher temperatures also can affect productivity of outdoor workers.\r\nLimited evidence reported. Early warning and response systems; integrating climate services into health decision-making systems; public uptake and buy in; improving health data collection systems. No evidence of transformational adaptation. \r\nReduced habitability of small islands through a compounding of key risks including from heat-related health stress for warming of 1.5degC (***)."


id: c635510a38e804a2fb2a66554c132d21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Figure 17.6 |  Understanding the spectrum of incremental to transformational planned adaptation for managing climate related heat risk to health including \r\nassociated soft and hard adaptation limits (Representative Key Risk-E (RKR-E)). Evidence from regional and thematic chapters. The figure from the WGI Atlas shows the \r\nchange in extreme hot days (above 35degC) across regions for a medium-term scenario and medium global warming relative to 1850-1900. See Table SM17.19."


id: 6f50f408d1302915d7a8d57a81f92876
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"further exacerbated by increases in intensity, frequency and duration \r\nof marine heatwaves (high confidence) as well as impacts from \r\nextreme events such as tropical cyclones (low to medium confidence) \r\n(Section 3.4.2)."


id: 55c8695458c7c683c8328e0875f2ab01
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"AR5 (Jones et al., 2014; Kunreuther et al., 2014) recognised that the \r\ndecision-making procedures are as important to consider in managing \r\nrisks as are the options for responding to climate change, mostly \r\nbecause the procedures can themselves constrain the choices of \r\nactions, which could, in turn, lead to constrained pathways which are \r\nundesirable. The importance of iterative risk management is emphasised \r\nbecause risk and adaptation are dynamic. It also identified that (i) risk \r\nassessments, decision-support tools, early-warning systems, accounting \r\nfor uncertainty and delivering no-regret options by examining trade-offs \r\nare important, (ii) integration across different governance portfolios is \r\nneeded due to potential conflict of different actions between portfolios, \r\nand (iii) planning, implementation and decision-making, including the \r\nuse of methods, are dependent on local context."


id: 6c93bd63ffd9fd219811ef3f35c4acf2
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"Although there is some evidence of autonomous natural thermal \r\nadaptation, as indicated by the presence of stress-tolerant symbionts \r\nadapted to higher thermal thresholds observed in the Persian Gulf, there \r\nis low confidence (limited evidence, low agreement) that enhanced \r\nthermal tolerance can be maintained over time (Chapter 3 Box 5) as \r\nthe adaptability in natural system is considered very limited and risks \r\nare driven by water temperature. Evidence suggests that already at \r\nfurther warming of 1.5degC coral reefs are put at high risk (very high \r\nconfidence) (Section 3.4.2.1)."


id: 18c16d2aa0c519d0936c33acc3377ef1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Planned adaptation can help to buy some limited time, including \r\nthrough recovery and restoration efforts that target resistant coral \r\npopulations and interventions to culture heat-tolerant algal symbionts \r\nas well as by setting up marine protected areas. Under higher warming \r\nlevels, transformation has been proposed as possibly complementing \r\navailable management approaches with high-risk interventions, \r\nincluding enhanced corals and reef shading, which may help to \r\nsustain some coral reef systems beyond 1.5degC of global warming. \r\nModelling has shown, however, that the effectiveness of such high\u0002risk interventions declines beyond 2degC of global warming (Figure 3.23, \r\nSection 3.4.2.1) (medium confidence)."


id: d7e630f8cef83452dabc33f42e74e871
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"Chapter 16 has shown that climate risks vary greatly from small to large, \r\nlocal to regional, uncertain to deeply uncertain. The plethora of risks \r\nmeans there are many types of decisions, and many forms of analyses \r\nand processes that may be drawn on. Decisions can differ according \r\nto whether they are strategic, tactical or operational; whether there \r\nare one or many decision makers, from a domestic setting to national \r\ngovernments; the level of uncertainty present; the time available to \r\ntake the decision; and many more factors (Chapter 1; Section 17.1)."


id: f5ca01fe918c0e23646177ee4c00c95a
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"Already for limited warming beyond 1.5degC for mid-century with \r\nincreasing intensity and frequency of marine heatwaves, hard limits are \r\nprojected to become manifest in terms of widespread decline and loss \r\nof structural integrity (very high confidence) (Section 3.4.2.1), including \r\nfor the two largest such systems, the Great Barrier Reef and the \r\nMesoamerican coral reef (Section 11.3.2, Box 11.2, Tables 11.14, 12.4)."


id: 9015f5955b6079942fdf16b7ab751e6d
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"In terms of planned adaptation options that would provide benefits to \r\npopulations, evidence suggests these are very limited and uncertain \r\nand bring along substantial risks to people, culture and ecosystems \r\n(Section  3.5.2, Cross-Chapter Box  SLR). Concurrent with the loss of \r\ncoral reefs, important ecosystem services, including to fishery, tourism \r\nand coastal protection, would be lost. Transformational adaptation, \r\nwhile requiring difficult choices to be made, is being discussed to help \r\novercome soft limits through livelihood diversification for alternative \r\nincome sources, assisted migration and planned relocation of \r\ncommunities dependent on the services provided by the reef ecosystem \r\n(medium confidence) (Section 3.5.2)."


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"No single approach to decision-making best suits an individual climate \r\nrisk across any adaptation context (Richards et  al., 2013), although \r\nthere is now a greater awareness of the methods and approaches that \r\nare available and their requirements for best practice (Hurlbert et al., \r\n2019) (high confidence). This section aims, firstly, to assess the factors \r\nthat people responsible for organising and facilitating decision-making \r\nmay wish to consider in choosing the methods and approach for them \r\nto make decisions in their context. It also assesses existing experience \r\nin analysing the utility of methods for climate risk decision-making. \r\nThe second part then assesses progress in integrating decision-making \r\nacross a portfolio of risks."


id: 1596839d78a79b3a7dda428604ab52a5
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"AR5 (Chambwera et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2014; Klein et al., 2014; \r\nKunreuther et al., 2014; Mimura et al., 2014) represented a significant \r\nstep forward in focusing attention on how decision-making may \r\nfacilitate effective and robust responses to climate risks remaining \r\nafter mitigation measures have been taken, following recognition of \r\nthese needs in the IPCC 4th Assessment Report (AR4), including the \r\ndiverse contexts that face decision makers (Klein et al., 2007)."


id: 4de9e222d1145606438ae22272056b1d
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"This Cross-Chapter Box offers an assessment of the growing literature on Loss and Damage. Capitalised letter 'Loss and Damage' (L&D) \r\nhas been used to refer to negotiations under the UNFCCC. Research has used lowercase 'losses and damages' for residual effects from \r\n(observed) impacts and (projected) risks (see Glossary, Annex II)."


id: 636d7305763a56cae4419f88bd350510
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"Dialogue around L&D issues started with a proposal for insurance and compensation by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) (INC, \r\n1991) and has intensified over recent years with suggestions made to consider complements to adaptation in order to manage residual \r\nimpacts and risks 'beyond adaptation' in vulnerable developing countries (Section 1.4.5). L&D was formally recognised in 2013 at the \r\n19th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP19) through the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (UNFCCC, \r\n2013), governed by an Executive Committee (ExCom), to advance knowledge, foster dialogue and enhance action and support. Article 8 \r\nof the Paris Agreement provided a permanent legal basis for the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) (UN, 2015)."


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"An increasing body of research has focused on the role of climate risk management (Sections 8.3, 16.4 and 17.2; high confidence) \r\n(Birkmann and Welle, 2015; Gall, 2015; van der Geest and Warner, 2015; Mechler and Schinko, 2016; Boyd et al., 2017; IPCC, 2018b; IPCC, \r\n2019b; Boda et al., 2020; Broberg and Romera, 2020). A technical expert group on comprehensive risk management (TEG CRM) advises \r\nthe WIM ExCom, while other expert groups focus on slow-onset events and non-economic L&D (UNFCCC, 2019a)."


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"There has been less and often implicit discussion on the existential dimension of climate-related risk as pertaining to L&D (medium confidence).\r\nMcNamara and Jackson (2019) infer an existential dimension from notions of inevitability and irreversibility associated with migration and \r\nrelocation of communities (Eckersley, 2015; Mayer, 2017; McNamara et al., 2018), socio-cultural impacts linked to glacial retreat (Jurt et al., \r\n2015) and adverse psychological and inter-subjective effects (Herington, 2017; Adams et al., 2021). Many SIDS in their NDCs refer to sea level \r\nrise in particular posing existential threats, and call for enhanced international support for L&D (Thomas and Benjamin, 2017)."


id: 739b681f7193904a4f88132fc88550ea
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"International support and finance, including compensation for losses and damages, have been in the spotlight from the beginning of the \r\ndialogue (high confidence), starting with AOSIS' proposal (INC, 1991). Recent work has focused on finance sources, such as solidarity\u0002based donor and other support for experienced losses and damages and climate-induced displacement as well as questions of \r\ncompensation and litigation (Roberts et al., 2017; Gewirtzman et al., 2018; Mechler and Deubelli, 2021; Robinson et al., 2021). A selection \r\nof finance options has also been explored such as donor-supported insurance systems with built-in risk reduction provisions (Gewirtzman \r\net al., 2018) as well as roles for social protection (Aleksandrova and Costella, 2021). International policy and donors have provided \r\ntechnical assistance for insurance-related options (Insuresilience Global Partnership, 2018)."


id: e1f94fcc5ffcd3fc4df07c536b7b40be
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"As national and donor-related funding for impacts and risk management remains limited (Schafer and Kunzel, 2019; 17.2; Serdeczny, \r\n2019) even at current global warming, many highly exposed developing countries remain financially constrained in their capacity to \r\nattend to residual impacts and risk management needs (Linnerooth-Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler, 2015; Roberts et  al., 2017; UNEP, \r\n2021a) (high confidence). Discussion on options for the risk retention layer 'beyond adaptation' are likely to see further attention as the \r\ndialogue proceeds."


id: a9fdb555cf5b85127be17a1efb23dfdf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Although there is no explicit mandate regarding L&D, about a quarter of the Green Climate Fund's approved projects explicitly refer to \r\nL&D, while 16% of projects have thematic links to L&D across their main project activities (Kempa et al., 2021). Any estimate of L&D \r\nfinance needs and spending, however, remains highly speculative, as long as its exact remit including in relation to adaptation has not \r\nbeen clarified politically (medium evidence, high agreement) (Markandya and Gonzalez-Eguino, 2019)."


id: 5ba248f9593eda9fa034251bb91312d3
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"Liability and compensation, implying legally defined reimbursement of losses and damages attributable to climate change, remain \r\ncontentious in L&D dialogue (high confidence). Yet, in half of the academic and grey literature surveyed by McNamara and Jackson \r\n(2019), compensation is mentioned. Studies have laid out responsibility principles, such as historical responsibility based on the polluter \r\npays principle, beneficiary pays and ability to pay. Discussions on compensation are closely linked to justice and equity scholarship which \r\nhas studied compensatory, distributive and procedural equity considerations for burden sharing (Roser et al., 2015; Wallimann-Helmer, \r\n2015; Huggel et al., 2016; Boran, 2017; Page and Heyward, 2017; Roberts et al., 2017; Shockley and Hourdequin, 2017; Wallimann-Helmer \r\net al., 2019; Garcia-Portela, 2020)."


id: 6483b6f06fb2803179d88c364b04ff6f
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"Litigation and liability are linked, and a growing research body has examined the role of litigation and international law for the L&D \r\ncontext finding that litigation risks for governments and business may increase as the science, particularly on attribution, matures further \r\n(Mayer, 2016; Banda and Fulton, 2017; WGI CWGB Attribution, 8.2.1.2); Marjanac and Patton, 2018; James et al., 2019; Simlinger and \r\nMayer, 2019; Wewerinke-Singh and Salili, 2019; Toussaint and Martinez Blanco, 2020) (high agreement, medium evidence)."


id: bed3e9987755034c30964fd1fbe6f3a3
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"The WIM has been reviewed twice as to its delivery on its key functions. As an outcome of the second review in 2019, an expert group \r\non Action and Support has been set up to further discuss issues pertaining to finance, technology and capacity building and a Santiago \r\nNetwork for Technical Assistance will be established to consider providing technical support directly to developing countries (UNFCCC, \r\n2019b). Overall, the L&D dialogue under the WIM supported by an increasing body of research has made important advances with regard \r\nto the two functions of knowledge generation and coordination, yet less so on action and support (medium confidence) (Calliari et al., \r\n2020). Resolution on the last item will need additional attention as, despite the coalescence of themes, the L&D dialogue continues to \r\nproceed across interlinked yet contested discussion strands."


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"Processes and methods to facilitate decision-making, from problem \r\nrecognition to implementing a solution, have evolved in many \r\ncontexts, disciplines and applications over the last century (high \r\nconfidence). As a result, decision-making terminology has a vast \r\nnumber of synonyms that are not compiled here. For clarity, the term \r\n'decision-analytic methods' refers to procedures or tools that may \r\nbe used by decision makers to help develop, analyse and contrast \r\nalternative actions/adaptations; 'approaches' refers to processes that \r\nmay be undertaken by decision makers to facilitate the development \r\nof proposed actions/adaptations; 'decision-support tools' refers to "


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"software or procedures that facilitate the use of knowledge and data \r\n(Papathanasiou et al., 2016)."


id: 403623980ecc506f2012595d679eae85
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"Different classes of decision-analytic methods have been variously \r\npresented in IPCC reports since AR4 but without a summary \r\nassessment of their capacity to deal with different contexts of the \r\ndecision maker. 'Communities-of-practice' are developing tool boxes "


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"The choice of methods and approaches to decision-making for climate \r\nrisks (next section) will depend on (i) the cognitive needs of the \r\ndeliberations, otherwise considered to be the phase in developing a \r\ndecision, (ii) the types of models and modelling available to facilitate \r\nthe deliberations, (iii) the degree of uncertainty surrounding the \r\nchoices and (iv) the context of a choice (high confidence) (Richards \r\net al., 2013; Jones et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2019; French, 2021)."


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"The decision process often involves overlapping and iterative \r\ndevelopment of the components leading towards a decision, resulting in \r\nthe blurring of stages but involving different phases of cognitive activity \r\n(Figure 17.7; Holtzman, 1989; French, 2015; French, 2020). Framing the "


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"or structural adaptations. Dynamic stochastic modelling (Fulton and \r\nLink, 2014; Ianelli et al., 2016) has been used to assess short- to medium\u0002term interactions of more dynamic and variable sectors, such as those \r\nwith annual adjustments and management of water, agriculture, land \r\nand marine uses (Holsman et  al., 2019; Hollowed et  al., 2020; Bahri \r\net al., 2021). On a longer time frame, scenarios are used to test long\u0002term interactions but often with less variability and chance (Giupponi \r\net al., 2013; Adam et al., 2014; Rosenzweig et al., 2017)."


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"problem (Orlove et al., 2020), by modelling its relationships with the \r\nhuman and natural systems and eliciting objectives, values and scope of \r\nthe problem from stakeholders, is a precursor to analyses of options but \r\nmay be returned to whenever a phase of 'sense-making and modelling' \r\nis required (high confidence) (Ackermann, 2012; Keeney, 2012; Slotte \r\nand Hamalainen, 2014; Abbas and Howard, 2015; Marttunen et  al., \r\n2017; Korhonen and Wallenius, 2020; French, 2021)."


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"The phase of interpreting the analyses to make decisions on climate \r\nadaptation followed by implementation is the least described in the \r\nliterature (Figure  17.8). Decision process management tools and \r\nmethods for communicating choices, outcomes and implementation \r\nare expected to be used to provide support in this phase, particularly \r\nfor understanding whether the advice is fit for purpose, and the efficacy \r\nof choices are clear (low confidence) (Spetzler et al., 2016)."


id: d2d0c04b99d08db28de71dda3eb098ea
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"'Descriptive models' of socio-biophysical systems and their responses \r\nto different drivers (Argyris and French, 2017; French and Argyris, \r\n2018; Saltelli et  al., 2020) and 'prescriptive models', which capture \r\nthe beliefs, values and objectives of decision makers and stakeholders \r\n(Parnell et  al., 2013; Keisler et  al., 2014; French and Argyris, 2018), \r\nprovide the foundations of sense making (high confidence) and thereby \r\ninfluencing the options and choices available in the phase of analysis \r\nand exploration (medium confidence) (Gorddard et al., 2016)."


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"The Cynefin contexts relate to how well the system is understood for \r\nknowing precisely the outcomes of actions that may be taken, ranging \r\nfrom known, knowable and complex to chaotic. If a context is known \r\nor knowable, then it will be possible to build sophisticated models \r\nand make sound predictions. If the context is complex and chaotic the \r\noutcomes of actions will be less predictable, no matter how complex \r\nthe models may be, although more complex dynamic models may be \r\nuseful to test 'what if' scenarios in these cases (Marchau et al., 2019). \r\nUnder complex and chaotic circumstances an ensemble of models and \r\napproaches may be needed to help categorise a satisfactory 'solution \r\nspace' across the broad knowledge of relationships and dependencies, \r\nbut will need to have iterative processes to update and refine \r\nadaptations as knowledge improves (Marchau et al., 2019)."


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"Socio-biophysical models may be qualitative network models, statistical \r\nmodels or dynamic mathematical models (Melbourne-Thomas et  al., \r\n2017). Qualitative network modelling can help assess the nature and \r\nconsequences of the interactions, as well as facilitate understanding \r\nof possible structures to be used in dynamic models for assessing long\u0002term adaptation options (Reckien et al., 2013; Reckien, 2014; Reckien \r\nand Luedeke, 2014; Symstad et  al., 2017). These approaches help \r\narticulate the direct and indirect effects of fixed, long-term engineering "


id: 1560052a916c3ba65eeff13e9685deb8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Entities making decisions (countries, regions, organisations and \r\nindividuals) select methods that best suit them in their context \r\n(Funfgeld et al., 2018; Shi et al., 2019; French, 2020) (high confidence)."


id: 23145690e2353f42635f8814ba7e4c93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Case studies in Table 17.4 describe the utility of classes of decision\u0002analytic tools to facilitate decisions about climate adaptations (SM \r\n17.2). These case studies are presented in Figure  17.8 according to \r\nthe type of decision-making body and mapped according to their \r\ncontribution to a decision outcome relative to the geopolitical scale \r\nof the actions being assessed. The effectiveness of these methods \r\nand tools in Table 17.4 in the context of climate change adaptation \r\n(Box 17.1) has yet to be evaluated."


id: f3d411009b101d10bda850336a332acf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Many published studies on the utility of decision-analytic methods in \r\nmanaging climate risks are theoretical, and therefore it is difficult to \r\nfind studies on the value of analytic methods for underpinning final \r\ndecisions on climate risk adaptation. Bayesian, Deep Uncertainty and \r\nelicitation methods and tools to support decision-making were the \r\nmost easily located classes of methods to be used in different contexts \r\n(Figure  17.7), while the other classes were more oriented towards \r\ngovernment processes. This result highlights a key gap at present in the \r\nneed to have real-world experiences published and mapped for their \r\nutility for different tasks, thereby creating a resource for policymakers \r\nto identify suitable tools, such as in emerging communities-of-practice \r\nof decision practitioners (Watkiss and Hunt, 2013; Street et al., 2019; \r\nFrench, 2020)."


id: a581abe5771d5cfd16fd19f25fb968aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"The common approaches presented here are not undertaken in \r\nisolation and are often combined throughout, or applied at different \r\nstages of, a decision process, as illustrated in Figure 17.7."


id: 8225ae2d33b3e25344ed64d8dca36957
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:23
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"Elicitation methods help reduce these uncertainties (high confidence) \r\n(Butler et  al., 2016; Prober et  al., 2017; Symstad et  al., 2017; Beven \r\net  al., 2018b). In addition, informal decision processes can assist in \r\ndeveloping consensus in approaches and outcomes (Orlove et al., 2020)."


id: 297b632c0d2df3289eacb7b153fd5cc9
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"Figure 17.8 |  Decision-analytic tools used across different geo-political scales and how they contributed to decision outcomes. Points comprise the type \r\nof decision-making body (C = Community; G = Government; B = Business/Industry; F = Finance; N = NGO; A = All categories) coupled with the reference number in square \r\nbrackets, which correspond to numbered references in the case studies of Table 17.4. Colours of the points correspond to the class of decision-analytic tool: Bayesian (red), DMDU \r\n(decision-making under deep uncertainty) (brown), decision process management (dark blue), economic and financial methods (purple), interval methods (light blue), MCDA--full \r\nranking (light green) or partial ranking (dark green), soft elicitation (Black)."


id: 2019afec0a18a4cfee3cba28cf8d8621
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"will carry on in parallel, supported by social media, and these \r\ninformal deliberations may be used to affect the outcome of the \r\nformal processes. Stakeholders may feel excluded from the formal \r\ndeliberations either by governance structures or because they do not \r\nagree with their representatives. Conflicting value systems may cause \r\nsome stakeholders to feel side-lined, particularly if some of the key \r\ndecision makers are perceived holding different personal views and \r\ninterests or to have engaged in political horse-trading, which connect \r\nindependent decisions. There may be emotional responses, driven \r\nby poor comprehension of risk and probabilistic information, and \r\npotential for group biases or insularity of participants (Engler et al., \r\n2019). Well-designed decision processes recognise the informal and \r\nseek to gain information from it without introducing bias (medium \r\nconfidence) (French and Argyris, 2018)."


id: c48da9ab8cef5f640920cce60edffdf8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Informal decision-making pervades decision-making in all contexts \r\n(high confidence) (Orlove et  al., 2020); decisions relating to climate \r\nchange are affected not only by rational processes but also by many \r\ninformal, often behavioural responses to the situation, some of which \r\nmay not require formal processes. Informal processes were officially \r\nstudied in only a few of the publications contributing to Figure 17.8, but \r\nall of the studies have hints to informal decision-making that pervades \r\nall levels of governance. Although there are not many concrete \r\nstudies, citing roles of study participants can lead to a perception of \r\na disconnect between the process and the outcome that resulted (see \r\nSection 17.5.1 for enablers of success)."


id: 8f246580b346d1be2ad03ed2a2bb6d6e
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"Scenarios are described in SR1.5 (IPCC, 2018a) and SRCCL (IPCC, 2019b) \r\nas a description of how the future may develop based on a coherent \r\nand internally consistent set of assumptions about key driving forces \r\n(e.g., rate of technological change, prices) and relationships. Scenarios \r\nare neither predictions nor forecasts but are used to provide narratives \r\nand trajectories equipped with alternate outcomes. SR1.5 and the \r\nSRCCL describe a range of scenarios methods and how scenarios are \r\nused to guide risk management decision-making. Scenario analysis \r\nincludes a range of potential future conditions from low-end and mid\u0002range to high-end projections. Scenarios can also include a temporal \r\ncomponent, that is, short term, medium term and long term, as defined \r\nin the SROCC (IPCC, 2019c)."


id: 1ba0aaf8ffd206ed8ddca367fb65f68c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Trade-offs are pervasive in decision-making for climate change adap\u0002tation, including between adaptation and mitigation, economic/social \r\nand environmental cost including distributional/equity considerations, \r\naffordability and risk reduction, short- and long-term consequences, \r\nand spatial variations (Borgomeo et al., 2016; Hudson et al., 2016; Gil \r\net al., 2018; Landauer et al., 2019)."


id: ab3ac9134597e88f55ff8ae444fee101
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Trade-offs are often directly compared in cost-benefit analyses which \r\nrequire rigorous estimation of the monetised costs and benefits, \r\nwhere monetisation is feasible and values uncontested (such as for \r\ninfrastructure) (high confidence) (de Ruig et  al., 2019; Table  17.4). \r\nOther tools can be employed, such as cost-effectiveness analysis \r\nand multi-criteria analysis in order to draw stakeholders into the \r\nprocess (Posner, 2004; Matheny, 2007; Mechler and Schinko, 2016). \r\nStakeholder participation in measuring costs and benefits and in the \r\nmodelling can aid the process (Doukas and Nikas, 2020)."


id: 3ad338c9e775748789cff13c7465626c
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"Bayesian methods are increasingly used in advancing approaches \r\nfor decision-making and support in climate adaptation (Sperotto \r\net al., 2017), by being able to include stakeholder and decision-maker \r\nperceptions and biases (Dias et  al., 2018; Engler et  al., 2019; Phan \r\net  al., 2019; Fulton, 2021) in a transparent modelling environment, \r\nthereby facilitating consensus and impartiality (medium confidence) \r\n(Catenacci and Giupponi, 2013; Gelman and Hennig, 2017). Increasing \r\ncomputational efficiency means that these methods can enable \r\ndifferent approaches to be addressed and different descriptive \r\nand prescriptive models to be included within a single probabilistic \r\nenvironment, which also can be updated in iterative processes (high \r\nconfidence) (Table 17.4; Sperotto et al., 2017; Phan et al., 2019)."


id: 7851f37c77425e5c2487ef8530791c98
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"Logic trees include a range of decision protocols and multi-criteria \r\nrules, either based on quantitative or qualitative categories (Roncoli \r\net al., 2016), often termed multi-criteria analyses. The concept of the \r\nlogic tree has been increasingly applied in climate risk decision-making \r\ncontexts (Nikas et al., 2018)."


id: 4ea64684fb0eeebb82b821555e6f90d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Iterative decision-making and adaptive feedback management meet \r\nwhen the feedback management procedure is reviewed in total for \r\nits effectiveness in one of the review and adjustment iterations. \r\nAt present, a common approach for assessing different adaptation \r\noptions and their interaction is using, for example, scenarios in \r\ndynamic models (Adam et al., 2014; Girard et al., 2015). An emerging \r\nfield in adapting fisheries to climate change is to embed the decision\u0002making system in the scenario models in order to assess the capability \r\nof feedback management (decision-making, monitoring and capacity \r\nfor adjustment of the options over time) to achieve satisfactory trade\u0002offs among the objectives of the different stakeholders (medium \r\nconfidence) (Melbourne-Thomas et  al., 2017; Holsman et  al., 2019; \r\nHollowed et al., 2020). This method can enable prospective evaluation \r\nof future whole-of-management scenarios described in this chapter."


id: ef7772f8af6bcbfeef11a8b232291cca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"In recent years, methods for simultaneously considering multiple \r\nsocietal and sectoral objectives, climate risks and adaptation options \r\nhave been emerging, often termed 'integrated' approaches (Hadka \r\net al., 2015; Garner et al., 2016; Rosenzweig et al., 2017; Giupponi and \r\nGain, 2017a; Stelzenmuller et al., 2018; Marchau et al., 2019). Different \r\ndecision-making approaches can be complementary (Kwakkel et  al., \r\n2016), and multiple approaches will be needed to manage risks across \r\nsectors, in space and over short to long time scales (Section 17.6)."


id: 8a083c8bba0d194862905eb0f070540d
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"Higher-level integration was first presented in the IPCC Special Report \r\non Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance \r\nClimate Change Adaptation (SREX) (Burton et al., 2012; Lal et al., 2012; \r\nO'Brien et al., 2012) and includes concepts of planning, coordination \r\nand mainstreaming (Lal et  al., 2012), consideration of cross-scale \r\ndynamics and nested vulnerabilities (Klein et al., 2014), and decision\u0002making across governments and sectors (Denton et al., 2014; Mimura \r\net al., 2014)."


id: 1c2236d615809495c18e43c9ed9abfbf
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"Iterative decision-making requires that the implementation of \r\nadaptations be reviewed to determine whether the adaptation \r\neffectively achieved the objectives, and whether adjustments or \r\nadditional actions were required (Section  17.5). Adaptive feedback \r\nmanagement is an approach to managing dynamic climate risks \r\nby designing a field monitoring programme to provide data to an \r\nassessment procedure which in turn advises on what adjustments need \r\nto be made to a 'control action', all of which are part of the adaptation to \r\nbe implemented (Hurlbert et al., 2019; Figure 17.7). Adaptive feedback \r\nmanagement is more able to account for the dynamic nature of risk and \r\nthe future emergence of unforeseen risks because of the active design \r\nof how to adjust the management approach (Dickey-Collas, 2014)."


id: 5cd546e5f8dd68c33a36b4836a7c8aa7
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"Adaptive feedback management is important for managing climate risks \r\nthat fall within the Cynefin context of chaos, relying on observations \r\nand indicators to learn about the system and to trigger actions (medium \r\nconfidence) (Helmrich and Chester, 2020). It has been a valued approach \r\nfor managing wildfish fisheries in many oceans (high confidence) (Fulton \r\net al., 2019; Hollowed et al., 2020; Bahri et al., 2021) and is important \r\nfor responding to the challenges of climate change (high confidence) \r\n(Holsman et al., 2019; Hollowed et al., 2020; Bahri et al., 2021)."


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"While the benefits of investment in data and assessments can \r\noutweigh the costs of implementation (low confidence) (Fulton et al., \r\n2019), the implementation may take time when resources are limited, \r\nparticularly in developing nations, where low-cost approaches will be \r\nneeded for deciding on pathways for adaptation (Bhave et al., 2016; \r\nShortridge et al., 2016)."


id: c961d7e721787094e5124069ea286691
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"Authors: Carolina Adler (Switzerland/Chile/Australia), Robert Lempert (USA), Andrew Constable (Australia), Marjolijn Haasnoot (the \r\nNetherlands), Judy Lawrence (New Zealand), Katharine J. Mach (USA), Simon French (UK), Robert Kopp (USA), Camille Parmesan (USA), \r\nMauricio Dominguez Aguilar (Mexico), Elisabeth A. Gilmore (USA), Rachel Bezner Kerr (Canada), Adugna Gemeda (Ethiopia), Cristina \r\nTirado-von der Pahlen (USA/Spain), Debora Ley (Mexico), Rupa Mukerji (India)."


id: be219eaefb2dc3e8c4877c82565132f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Decision-relevant uncertainties for managing climate risk\r\nAdaptation decision-making can benefit from assessments that support planning for both 'what is most likely' as well as for stress-testing \r\nadaptation options over a range of scenarios (Sections 11.7 and 17.3; Cross-Chapter Box.5 in SROCC Chapter 1). This Cross-Chapter Box \r\nsummarises how deep uncertainties (Section 1.2; IPCC, 2019a) can be assessed in decision-making and addressed practically for adaptation."


id: d7c63f6e768fcfdec4ec05610c78b806
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"The concept of deep uncertainty has evolved in IPCC assessments, expanding beyond a focus on reducing uncertainty, to also considering \r\na range of tools and approaches that guide robust and timely decisions to address climate risks. Deep uncertainty is defined as \r\ncircumstances where experts or stakeholders do not know or cannot agree on one or more of the following: (1) appropriate conceptual \r\nmodels that describe relationships among drivers in a system; (2) the probability distributions used to represent uncertainty about \r\nvariables and parameters; and/or (3) how to weigh and value desirable alternative outcomes (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 1; Lempert \r\net al., 2003; IPCC, 2019a; IPCC, 2019c)."


id: f3c692f77ad172254bbbc272da0f1c29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Decisions by individuals, households, the private sector, governments and public-private partnerships are generally made with partial or \r\nuncertain information. This is also the case for adaptation and development decisions where there is often deep uncertainty about the \r\nimpacts and the societal conditions, preferences and priorities, and responses over time. Under such conditions, decision makers employ \r\ndecision processes and scientific information differently from situations where most decision-relevant information is available, uncontested \r\nand confidently characterised with single joint probability distribution. Assuming scientific information is certain, when it is not, is a barrier to \r\neffective communication of risks and to successful decisions under uncertainty, increasing the potential for failure and regret of investments, \r\nlost opportunities and transfers of costs to future generations (Sarewitz and Byerly, 2000; Marchau et al., 2019; Sections 11.7 and 17.6)."


id: 15e9168239a19c43ca97043864ce0bd
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"Addressing deep uncertainty is contextual as it depends on the decision options available, outcomes at stake and the available scientific \r\ninformation (Box 1.1. in Marchau et al., 2019). The IPCC uncertainty guidance note (Mastrandrea et al., 2010) addresses only the latter \r\n(see also Mastrandrea and Mach, 2011; Section 1.3.4). Deep uncertainty is generally more salient when policy-relevant statements have \r\nlow confidence or lack relevant data or information, or in cases where significant uncertainty contributes to disagreements and disputes \r\n(Sriver et al., 2018). Recent work has also included moral uncertainty (MacAskill et al., 2020) by evaluating the outcomes of alternative \r\nstrategies with analyses organised around different perspectives on the appropriate principles of justice (Ciullo et al., 2020; Section 17.3; \r\nJafino et al., 2021; Lempert and Turner, 2021)."


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"Approaches and information requirements for managing deep uncertainty\r\nMany approaches are available for evaluating robust decisions under conditions of deep uncertainty (Sections 17.3 and 11.7; Box 11.5 \r\nin Chapter 11). The majority use multiple scenarios to stress-test adaptation options and explore how alternative adaptation pathways \r\nmight evolve under a range of different conditions (Swanson and Bhadwal, 2009). Approaches differ in terms of their focus, types of \r\nstrategies best addressed, and data and other resources required (Marchau et al., 2019)."


id: e4afa055e6db623cf10172cb4894e9ab
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"'Low regret' options are one relatively simple and common approach to deep uncertainty (Sections 17.3 and 17.6) expected to perform \r\nwell over a wide range of scenarios and represent one example of robust strategies. However, such options will generally be insufficient \r\nfor adaptive responses to adapt over long time frames and to avoid lock-in of investments (Section 11.7; Box 11.5 in Chapter 11)."


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"'Adaptation pathways' provide another approach for addressing deep uncertainty and staging decisions over time (Haasnoot et al., 2013), \r\nby linking the choice of near-term adaptation actions with pre-determined future thresholds. Observation of such thresholds trigger \r\nsubsequent actions in the planning or implementation stages of adaptation strategies. Adaptation pathways can begin with low-regret, \r\nnear-term actions that aim to create and preserve future options to adjust if and when necessary. Alternative pathways can be explored \r\nand evaluated to design an adaptive plan with short-term actions and long-term options."


id: ce9aa7fea6bf4c5d6f4b24040c66086e
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"Climate resilient development (CRD), and the pathways (CRDPs) to it, can also involve decision-making under deep uncertainty. Literature \r\nassessed in sectoral and regional chapters of this report present several examples of potential risks to achieving development goals under \r\nclimate change, at global as well as national and local levels (high confidence) (Chapter 18). Achieving CRD depends on negotiation, \r\ncontestation and reconciliation of trade-offs among diverse actors, who in turn value preferred outcomes differently with respect to \r\nassociated climate risks and uncertainties, hence the prospect for deep uncertainty to manifest (Section 18.5). Deep uncertainty also \r\ncharacterises the development process itself, given that fundamental changes and disruptions are part of the transformational changes \r\nrequired to shift towards CRDPs."


id: d756c9da4890e987fc676a63b6bb7a1d
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"The 'keeping options open' approach, i.e. plans that use a series of sequential decisions and actions in the near term to avoid closing off \r\npotentially promising future options (Rosenhead, 2001; Section 2.6) or, by using real options, takes near-term actions that create currently \r\nunavailable options in the future (Kwakkel, 2020). Deep uncertainty approaches use a wide range of storylines as scenarios to test low\u0002regret options and to provide information relevant for potential thresholds for use in adaptation pathways (Haasnoot et al., 2013; Boxes \r\n11.4, 11.6; Sections 11.7, 17.3)."


id: ff2d2aa02b6ebfea034070ade955e3b4
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"Deep uncertainty approaches enhance the value of monitoring to detect signals of change in a timely manner (medium confidence). \r\nActionable warning can come from climate signals, and socioeconomic indicators/signposts, including drivers of change, vulnerability \r\nand impacts, best suited for timely, reliable and convincing signals for decision-making that anticipate future changes and the need for \r\nadaptation or the potential to seize opportunities (Hermans et al., 2017; Haasnoot et al., 2018; Stephens et al., 2018; Oppenheimer et al., \r\n2019). For early warning signals to be decision relevant, they need to have institutional connectivity to enable action (Haasnoot et al., \r\n2018; Sections 1.4, 11.4, 11.7; Table 11.18) (medium confidence)."


id: 8aeb421ed28d27c8ab7102ade8ca61ea
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"In view of these multiple and diverse examples, it is evident that the application of deep uncertainty methods is enabling decisions to \r\nbe made in a timely manner that avoid foreseeable and undesirable outcomes and take opportunities as they arise (high confidence)."


id: cc22583a9c0641470caf0d804a9256ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Deep uncertainty is increasingly salient for decision-making as recognition of climate-related risks and related uncertainties has increased \r\n(high confidence). These risks can compound and cascade to become new risks, increasing the breadth, frequency and severity of climate \r\nchange impacts and the consequently increasing scale and scope of adaptation (high confidence) (Cross-Chapter Box Extremes in Chapter \r\n2; Sections 1.3.1.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, 11.5, 11.7, and CCP5.3.1). Waiting until uncertainties are resolved (if they ever can) may leave little or \r\nno time to adapt. The lead time for planning and implementation of adaptation can take decades (Haasnoot et al., 2020b; Cross-Chapter \r\nBox SLR in Chapter 3), and socioeconomic developments can lock in undesirable pathways where underlying vulnerabilities and exposure, \r\nsuch as poverty, conflict and their associated displacement of people, remain unaddressed (Sections 5.13.4, 16.5.2.3.8; Cross-Chapter \r\nBox Migrate in Chapter 7)."


id: c99edbbd85d988423a43875f7cebb91d
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content:
"Overall, there is growing evidence that effective implementation of strategies developed for deeply uncertain problems require adequate \r\nmandates and funding frameworks, preparedness and disaster response plans, and monitoring and evaluation of the strategy outcomes, \r\nagainst how the future unfolds (medium confidence). Collaborative and adaptive governance arrangements, and education and \r\nawareness raising, promote learning environments for community engagement, and are essential for the effective implementation of \r\nrobust adaptation plans (medium confidence) (Sections 5.14.1, 17.3 and 11.7)."


id: 5d24fbc21e8eec22997f5ea91bf729a4
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"The WGII AR5 identified--with high confidence--a range of factors \r\nthat could enable or limit planning and implementation of adaptation \r\noptions and potentially their effectiveness (Klein et al., 2014; Mimura \r\net  al., 2014; Noble et  al., 2014). These included governance, finance, \r\nknowledge and capacity as enabling factors, as well as cultural, social, \r\npolitical and economic differences that influence individual and \r\ncollective willingness and capability to act. The AR6 Special Reports \r\n(specifically, de Coninck et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018; Collins et al., 2019; \r\nHurlbert et al., 2019) reinforced the AR5 findings, further noting that \r\nthe transitions needed for climate resilient development would need to \r\nbe supported by radical shifts in governance, knowledge development, \r\ntechnology application, finance and economics, and social norms."


id: e9f5d6636ed18aee9e9dddb9d03bfa16
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"This section builds on the AR5 and AR6 Special Reports by reviewing \r\nnew evidence on three key enablers identified in the AR5: governance, \r\nfinance and knowledge. The focus is on assessing new evidence on (i) "


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"guiding their review, implementation and enforcement (Averchenkova \r\nand Matikainen, 2017; Scotford et al., 2017) (medium confidence)."


id: d54e0dcff13e3f37757d870e93116dfd
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"understanding of these enabling conditions, (ii) how they have changed \r\non the ground and (iii) whether these conditions have enabled progress \r\non adaptation and risk management. The section also addresses an \r\nemerging related topic: the role of catalysing conditions and actors in \r\naccelerating action on climate change adaptation, such as litigation \r\non failure to adapt, understandings of urgency, and the aftermath of \r\nextreme weather events. While enabling conditions are necessary for \r\naction, they are not by their presence enough; catalysing conditions \r\nemerge when game-changing circumstances become present, such as \r\nwhen a high-profile extreme weather event occurs or when a champion \r\ndrives change in an organisation."


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"Existing legal systems also pose potential barriers to adaptation, as \r\ndescribed in Chapter 9 (Africa) and Chapter 8 (Poverty, Livelihoods \r\nand Sustainable Development). Laws may reinforce governance \r\narrangements and regulations that do not support responses to climate \r\nchange, and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and inequalities (Craig, \r\n2010; Arnold and Gunderson, 2013; Wenta et al., 2019). In such cases, \r\nlaws may require review and revision or replacement, and at the same \r\nbe written in ways that foster adaptive management (Craig, 2010; \r\nRuhl, 2010; Cosens et al., 2017)."


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"Governance is an inclusive concept of the range of means for deciding, \r\nmanaging, implementing and monitoring climate change responses. \r\nIt can involve contributions of various levels of government (global, \r\ninternational, regional, sub-national and local) along with those from \r\nthe private sector, of non-governmental organisations and of civil \r\nsociety. The importance of supportive governance arrangements is re\u0002iterated widely across regional and sectoral chapters in this report, in \r\nmultiple different contexts (very high confidence)."


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"National climate change laws are important for transposing ratified \r\ninternational commitments into domestic regimes, such as the Paris \r\nAgreement and the Convention on Biodiversity, as well as voluntary \r\nagreements such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. \r\nIn turn, the enactment of domestic laws can yield useful experiences \r\nand foster engagements that positively influence and support \r\nthe development of international commitments (Townshend and \r\nMatthews, 2013; Mehling, 2015). Strong and consistent regulatory \r\nframeworks also support the flow of climate finance to developing \r\ncountries that have such frameworks (Nachmany et  al., 2017). The \r\nsuccessful implementation of national and sub-national climate \r\nchange and related policies and strategies are often contingent upon \r\nthe underlying legislative framework empowering, mandating or "


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"The legal regime for adaptation is too embryonic for assessment of \r\ngood practice design and content, although similarities can be seen \r\nin the framework laws and draft bills across several countries. Some \r\nstudies highlight the importance of domestic 'whole of legal system' \r\nanalysis prior to development of modifying law. This can identify the \r\nrange of existing legislative instruments that can directly intersect \r\nwith climate change, along with related contextual factors such as \r\nnational circumstances, governance frameworks, and political and \r\neconomic realities as well as national administrative culture (Scotford "


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"emerging economies, as compared with low- and middle-income \r\nones (Olazabal et  al., 2019b). For example, by 2017, 26% of large \r\nand medium-sized European cities had an adaptation plan or a joint \r\nadaptation-mitigation plan in place (Reckien et al., 2018a)."


id: c657d33ef5db068fddb0b6b956e0200e
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"et al., 2017). This helps any new climate change laws to be absorbed \r\ninto, and harmonise with, the established legal system of each country \r\n(Scotford et al., 2017). Efforts are underway to assist countries in such \r\nassessments and the identification of areas for legislative reform, for \r\nexample through the Commonwealth and UN Environment's Law and \r\nClimate Change Toolkit.  Similarly, databases such as the Grantham \r\nResearch Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and the \r\nSabin Center on Climate Change Law are expanding the knowledge \r\nbase of national climate legislation developments."


id: fea1de0485aa578fd7ff8f9a54ebb7cc
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"Adaptation policies often comprise multiple goals and instruments, \r\nwhich develop over time, especially where jurisdiction over policy issues \r\nis shared among agencies or levels of government (Rio and Howlett, \r\n2013). The increase in the number and complexity of policy instruments \r\nacross geared towards adaptation raises questions of coherence and \r\nalignment between the selected policy mixes and their effectiveness \r\n(England et al., 2018; Ranabhat et al., 2018; Lesnikowski et al., 2019)."


id: 470dc0fca63a6ab40f172f704b810cf7
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"Climate change policies and plans are important in the translation \r\nof national commitments and legal requirements into specific on the \r\nground strategies and guidelines, which enable actions across multiple \r\nspheres and scales of government and non-government institutions \r\nand actors."


id: fd0ceb7df098aaeaac0ca4d753e50d92
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"Evaluation of national adaptation plans (NAPs) has only recently \r\nbeen undertaken. Woodruff and Regan (2019) compared national \r\nadaptation plans from 38  countries and concluded that most were \r\nstrong in identifying vulnerabilities and identifying potential adaptation \r\noptions but were weaker in articulating implementation pathways and \r\nmonitoring of progress; plans written by multi-agency teams were \r\nnearly always of higher quality. Garschagen et al. (2021) showed that, \r\nwhile most NAPs consider future changes in climate hazard, many do \r\nnot consider how vulnerability and exposure might change, concluding \r\nthat this limits the potential effectiveness of the plans. Morgan et al. \r\n(2019) showed that NAPs that are consistent with the Paris Agreement \r\ncan enable development pathways that promote synergies between \r\nenvironmental, social and economic goals."


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"Commitment to act, and guidance on how to do so, from international \r\nand national governance levels can drive national and sub-national \r\nadaptation (Reckien et al., 2013; Heidrich et al., 2016; Reckien et al., \r\n2018a). For example, more local plans have been developed in \r\nEuropean countries where it is obligatory for local municipalities to \r\ndevelop climate change plans (Reckien et al., 2018a). Local government \r\nhave also drawn on non-binding national climate frameworks, as well \r\nas international frameworks (such as European law) or international \r\nnetworks (such as Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy) \r\nto guide their actions (Reckien et al., 2013; De Gregorio Hurtado et al., \r\n2015; Reckien et al., 2015; Heidrich et al., 2016; Reckien et al., 2018a)."


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"Several other international agreements, including the Sendai Framework \r\nfor Disaster Risk Reduction and the UN Agenda 2030 Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Goals, have had significant impacts on the adaptation \r\nand risk-management decision-making processes. For example, the \r\nSendai Framework articulates the need for improved understanding \r\nof disaster risk in all its dimensions of exposure, vulnerability and \r\nhazard characteristics; accountability for disaster risk management; \r\npreparedness to 'Build Back Better'; recognition of stakeholders and \r\ntheir roles; mobilisation of risk-sensitive investment to avoid the creation \r\nof new risk resilience of health infrastructure, cultural heritage and \r\nworkplaces; strengthening of international cooperation and partnership; \r\nand risk-informed donor policies and programmes, including financial \r\nsupport and loans from international financial institutions."


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"However, a national framework is not always sufficient to trigger \r\nclimate change action on the lower level, in particular when the \r\nnational guiding document fails to clearly formulate how it should be \r\nused and 'translated down' to lower governance levels (De Gregorio \r\nHurtado et al., 2015). Guidance on how to apply a national framework \r\nat lower governance levels can assist in their uptake."


id: e2843f338dbd69b04b38873c85ac7869
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"In the case of climate change legislation, research on the impact of \r\nadaptation laws is limited, save for a few studies (Averchenkova and \r\nMatikainen, 2017), because many framework laws, particularly those \r\nwith more of an adaptation focus, have only been published recently \r\n(Rumble, 2019b). Reviews of the implementation of the risk assessment \r\nand adaptation components of the UK's Climate Change Act 2008 sug\u0002gest that they had a weaker implementation record compared with mit\u0002igation provisions (Fankhauser et al., 2018), potentially because imple\u0002mentation of adaptation is more complex as compared with mitigation "


id: 3234f791a3c69a75d313acb07cf30126
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"Specific adaptation policies have been formulated at national, \r\nregional/state and local levels across 68  countries and 136 coastal \r\ncities (Olazabal et al., 2019a). At the national level, the quantity and \r\ncomplexity of adaptation policies have increased since AR5, with most \r\npolicies coming into force since 2009 (Nachmany and Setzer, 2018). \r\nAdaptation is addressed in the executive climate policies of at least \r\n170  countries (Nachmany et  al., 2019a). Documented sub-national \r\nadaptation policies are more prevalent in developed countries and "


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"Table 17.5 |  Selected examples of framework and sectoral law approaches adopted by different nations that represent a variety of regional contexts."


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"of financing, and transparency. Environmental and social governance \r\nenables the testing and definition of implementation solutions, en\u0002hancing the opportunities for defining successful adaptation (Surmin\u0002ski, 2013). Several models and approaches to adaptive governance to \r\npromote adaptation and resilience in response to extreme weather \r\nevents have been observed. These include polycentric and multilayered \r\ninstitutions, participation and collaboration, self-organisation and net\u0002works, and learning and innovation (Djalante et al., 2011)."


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"Environmental and social governance refers to voluntary or non-legally \r\nrequired actions taken by participating parties to achieve a commonly \r\ndefined goal (Bodin, 2017; DeCaro et al., 2017; Partzsch, 2020). While \r\nnot explicitly described in the sectoral and regional chapters of this \r\nreport, the maintenance and exercise of environmental and social \r\ngovernance decision-making strategies do enable adaptation practice \r\nand have become especially important when formal legal and policy \r\nregimes are not yet present. As formal regulation promotes clear and \r\ncommon understanding of climate risks and mechanisms to develop \r\ncontext specific appropriate solutions, voluntary code-making and self\u0002regulation can forestall the need for legal action or can function as \r\nprecursors to the formulation and implementation of legislation, laws \r\nand regulations."


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"Social and environmental governance has long been presented within \r\nclimate risk decision-making, although more typically in the domain \r\nof climate mitigation (Wright and Nyberg, 2016; Vandenbergh and \r\nGilligan, 2017). Corporate climate decision-making emphasises \r\nthe importance of profit motives in shaping decisions; however, \r\nreputational factors as appropriate environmental stewards can also \r\nbe important when linked to sensitivity of other stakeholders such \r\nas investors, lenders, customers and employees (Vandenbergh and \r\nGilligan, 2017). Pulver (2011) notes that climate issues influence \r\ncorporate decision-making more strongly in organisations that are \r\nnetworked with other organisations that also consider these issues and \r\nthrough direct experience with climate-related events and associated \r\norganisational learning."


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"Since AR5, more case studies of social and environmental govern\u0002ance within the domain of climate adaptation have become evident, \r\nespecially within the context of adaptive management experimentation \r\n(Vella et al., 2016; Beunen and Patterson, 2019; Bluhdorn and Deflo\u0002rian, 2019). Environmental and social governance strategies for climate \r\nadaptation are diverse and reflect context-specific conditions of the \r\ndecision-making process, including the role of the state, the individual \r\nand private interests, formality/informality, social responsibility, sources "


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"Finance has long been recognised as an important enabling and \r\ncatalysing factor for adaptation, climate resilient development and \r\nclimate risk management. In Chapter 17, financing for adaptation and \r\nclimate risk management is covered in the extended Cross-Chapter \r\nBox, Financing for Adaptation and Resilience (FAR), below. The Cross-"


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"relations between knowledge producers and users. The discussion in \r\nSection 17.4.4 on knowledge as an enabling factor integrates these \r\ntwo strands of discussion of knowledge systems."


id: 1c4d6022cb3a6fc7ff4bee5d0a462b0a
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"Chapter Box aims to highlight key emerging evidence on financing of \r\nadaptation, covering both public and private sources and instruments. \r\nClimate finance is also covered in a dedicated chapter in the WGIII \r\nReport (WGIII AR6 Chapter 15 (Kreibiel et  al., 2022)), and readers \r\nshould refer to this chapter for a more comprehensive assessment of \r\nthis subject from both a mitigation and adaptation perspective."


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"It was well established in AR5 and SRs that a component of knowledge \r\nsystems for good climate decision-making is the production of \r\n'information on climate, its impacts, potential risks, and vulnerability' \r\nwhich can 'be integrated into an existing or proposed decision-making \r\ncontext' (Jones et  al., 2014: 200). Also important are two other \r\ncomponents of knowledge: of response options and knowledge of \r\nother enabling conditions, particularly governance and finance, which \r\nwere mentioned less frequently and more indirectly in AR5 and SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL. Decision makers assess the feasibility of different \r\nalternatives (see Cross-Chapter Box  FEASIB) and develop strategies \r\nfor the implementation and modification of the alternative, requiring \r\na level of knowledge of the governance, policy and finance landscapes \r\nat national (Tanner et al., 2019; Lopes et al., 2020; Roberts et al., 2020) \r\nand international scales (Woodruff, 2018)."


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"AR5 emphasised the importance of knowledge systems as an enabling \r\ncondition for decision-making, as did earlier ARs, all of which include \r\na focus on the policy relevance of knowledge (Section  1.1.4). First \r\nintroduced in IPCC reports in AR4, the term 'knowledge system' is used \r\nextensively in AR5 and the SRs. The discussion below follows a widely \r\ncited definition of knowledge systems as sets of interacting 'agents, \r\npractices and institutions that organize the production, transfer and \r\nuse of knowledge' (Cornell et al., 2013: 61). This definition emphasises \r\nthe social nature of knowledge and the importance of the link between \r\nknowledge and action, rather than presenting knowledge simply as \r\ninformation about past, present and future states of the world which \r\ncan be of use to decision makers."


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"This definition of knowledge systems indicates the importance of \r\ncapacity--the ability and the motivation to use knowledge for \r\naction--since capacity is an important feature which allows knowledge \r\nsystems to function. Capacity is a necessary enabling condition for \r\nknowledge to be put to use in adaptation activities (high confidence), \r\nas shown across sectors such as water (Section 4.5.2), food security \r\n(Sections 5.12.3, 5.14.3), cities and settlements (Sections 6.4.2, 6.4.4) \r\nand health and well-being (Sections 7.1.3, 7.2.6), and across regions, \r\nincluding Africa (Sections 9.13.1, 9.14.5), Asia (Sections 10.3.6, 10.4.4) \r\nand North America (Section 14.4.5)."


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"In addition to these general considerations of knowledge systems, \r\nresearch since AR5 has contributed to the understanding of specific types \r\nof knowledge. Scientific knowledge is thoroughly discussed in Chapter \r\n1, especially in Section 1.3 'Understanding and Evaluating Climate Risk', \r\nwhich shows recent advances in the well-established IPCC categories \r\nof observation of past conditions and model-based projections of \r\nfuture conditions. We add here a consideration of a new area within \r\nscientific knowledge, artificial intelligence, which offers new methods for \r\nproducing information that can be incorporated into knowledge systems."


id: 414bafadf312fd01bc2c1d6bb5871de3
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"Some research on knowledge systems retains the earlier attention to \r\ninformation as a resource for decision makers. A major focus, discussed \r\nelsewhere in this chapter, has been increasing the precision about the \r\ncertainty, likelihood and confidence with which certain statements are \r\nmade in relation to underlying evidence (see Cross-Chapter Box DEEP \r\nin this Chapter). This topic, which was first introduced in AR4, advanced \r\nsignificantly in AR5 (Mach et al., 2017)."


id: 5d49b5130f2bd71a8cd99f79c42f93c3
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"In addition to these characteristics of information, the social and \r\norganisational aspects of knowledge systems have also been the \r\nsubject of recent research. One strand of this discussion emphasises the \r\ndistinctiveness of different knowledge systems, often focusing on three \r\ntypes of knowledge: scientific, Indigenous and local, and the latter are \r\ntwo sometimes grouped as 'traditional' knowledge (see Cross-Chapter \r\nBox INDIG in Chapter 18). This strand emphasises the specific forms of \r\nknowledge production and circulation in each type. Another strand of \r\ndiscussion emphasises the networks of interactions between different \r\ngroups. This strand follows the influential 'Knowledge systems for \r\nsustainable development' (Cash et  al., 2003), which was cited in \r\nChapters 2, 7 and 8 in WGII AR5; Cash et al. (2003) emphasise the \r\nusability and acceptability of scientific knowledge, and highlight the "


id: d8b51e7994d07e505d70a52c0fdc5df
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content:
"Applying artificial intelligence (AI) to climate change is predominantly \r\nin the area of climate modelling and forecasting, inclusive of weather \r\nextremes (Monteleoni et  al., 2013; Jones, 2017; Huntingford et  al., \r\n2019). Recent efforts conceptualise the potential uses of AI for \r\nmitigation and adaptation (Rolnick et al., 2019; Cheong et al., 2020b) \r\nin addition to forecasting (Rolnick et al., 2019; Chattopadhyay et al., \r\n2020; Cheong et al., 2020b; Prabhat et al., 2021). There are very few \r\ncases to assess AI applications in these domains given that AI is \r\na new field for climate change impact and adaptation. To this date, \r\nsectoral applications of AI relevant to climate change adaptation and \r\nrisk reduction mainly have advanced in the areas of crop yields, early\u0002warning systems and water management."


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"Authors: Mark New (South Africa), Madeleine Rawlins (UK), David Viner (UK), Charlene Watson (UK), Lily Burge (UK), Lionel Mok (Canada), \r\nLauren Arendse (South Africa), Vita Karoblyte (UK), Liane Schalatek (USA), Neha Rai (UK), Baysa Naran (Mongolia), So-Min Cheong \r\n(Republic of Korea), Nicoletta Giulivi (Italy/Guatemala)."


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"This Cross-Chapter Box reports on: (i) new evidence on the finance needed for adaptation and resilience, and uncertainties in these \r\nestimates; (ii) the emerging public and private climate finance architecture; (iii) the status of financing for AR, including sources, total flows, \r\nregional and sectoral distributions; (iv) equity considerations; (iv) opportunities and challenges for financing adaptation and resilience \r\nduring and after the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. This Cross-Chapter Box does not focus on finance for mitigation, \r\nwhich is covered in WGIII Chapter 15 (Kreibiel et al., 20122), nor the economic damages of climate change or financial aspects of Loss and \r\nDamage, which are covered in Cross-Working Group Box ECONOMIC (Chapter 16) and Cross-Chapter Box LOSS (this chapter), respectively."


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"Box Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE.1 | The 100 Billion Climate Finance Commitment to \r\nDeveloping Countries"


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"At the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) in Copenhagen in 2009, developed country parties to the UNFCCC \r\ncommitted to a goal of jointly mobilising USD 100 billion yr-1 by 2020 to address the climate change needs of developing countries \r\n(UNFCCC, 2009). This was in response to a threat by developing countries to walk out of the negotiations, as they perceived \r\ndeveloped country support to be lagging and lacking in ambition (Roberts et al., 2021). The commitment was formalised in the \r\nCancun Agreements (Decision 1/CP.16) in 2010 and was re-affirmed as a key element of the Paris Agreement in 2015 (Article \r\n9, paragraph 4). At the 26th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP26) in 2021, formal deliberations will begin on a new \r\nclimate finance goal to be adopted in 2025; the current USD 100 billion target will serve as the annual minimum until 2025 \r\n(Chhetri et al., 2020)."


id: 6e1f6fdca35f105bb0edc2e83b3fac51
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"The '100 Billion' does not represent the total need to respond to climate change in developing countries, nor the global cost \r\nacross all countries, as is sometimes interpreted in the literature and media. As shown below in this Cross-Chapter Box, the \r\nestimated cost of adaptation for developing countries ranges from 15 to 411 billion USD yr-1 for climate change impacts out to \r\n2030, with the majority of estimates being well above 100 billion."


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"Proposed sources for the developed country commitment included 'a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and \r\nmultilateral, including alternative sources of finance' and several instruments including grants and loans. Nonetheless, there \r\nremain differences of opinion on the types of finance that should count towards this goal, with several issues identified (high \r\nconfidence) (Bodnar et al., 2015; Bhattacharya et al., 2020; Roberts et al., 2021), including: (i) counting non-grant finance, such \r\nas market and concessional loans (public and private), where developing countries ultimately have to repay the investment; (ii) \r\nwhat is counted as 'climate' by different funders, especially when climate is not the prime objective; (iii) the extent to which some \r\nfunds are 'new and additional' rather than a repurposing of development finance."


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"Progress towards the 100 Billion target has shown an upward trend over the last several years (high confidence), but will fall \r\nshort in 2020, even when the most generous criteria are included (high confidence). In 2017/2018, the most recent year for \r\nwhich data have been comprehensively analysed, estimates using different (but overlapping) data sources and methods were in "


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"the range 48-75 billion USD yr-1, compared with 45-75 in 2015/2016 and 41-52 in 2013/2014 (Carty et al., 2020; SM17.3; CPI, \r\n2020; OECD, 2020; UNFCCC, 2020). The distribution between adaptation and mitigation has remained strongly weighted towards \r\nmitigation, although the proportion allocated to adaptation has increased from 17-25% in 2013/2014 to 19-30% in 2017/2018 \r\n(high confidence). One analysis that excludes debt repayments indicates that the debt-adjusted flows are about half the total \r\nflows reported above, of which circa 31-33% was for adaptation between 2015/2016 and 2017/2018 (Carty et al., 2020)."


id: 35e08c8009dc05339663d1aba48a4763
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"Estimates of global, regional or national finance needs for adaptation and resilience vary depending on both analysis approach, the level \r\nof climate change, and the geographic and sectoral scope of analysis (high confidence) (UNEP, 2016; Chapagain et al., 2020; UNEP, 2020). \r\nRecent estimates have adopted one of main approaches: (i) aggregation of individual case studies, along with scaling to generate global \r\nor regional costs; (ii) analysis of NDC adaptation cost estimates (Weischer et al., 2016; Hallegatte et al., 2018); (iii) integrated assessment \r\nmodel simulation of impacts and adaptation costs (Markandya and Gonzalez-Eguino, 2019; Chapagain et al., 2020)."


id: 5b2a86d89b40c733e8bb0895a3cbdb21
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"All approaches suffer from limitations that can cause both over- and underestimates, including incomplete coverage of sectors and \r\nrisks; inability to account for autonomous/unreported adaptation; incorrect cost estimations; soft and hard limits to adaptation; balance \r\nbetween adaptation, mitigation and residual cost; benefits and co-benefits on cost; and learning and innovation as climate change \r\nprogresses (UNEP, 2020). Global or developing region estimates based on scaling NDC data is particularly uncertain, as most NDCs did \r\nnot specify how the costs were calculated. Also, scaling from a relatively small set of NDCs with costs to the global scale is not particularly \r\nrobust, indicating a need for more transparency and better guidance for calculating adaptation costs (Watkiss et al., 2015; Zhang and Pan, \r\n2016; Hallegatte et al., 2018; African Development Bank, 2019)."


id: ef6eb02c4f77618f5dba9b52d26abde8
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"Most estimates of adaptation cost in the literature are for developing countries. Chapagain et al. (2020) assessed various estimates of \r\nadaptation for developing countries, under different emissions scenarios for 2030 and 2050. The median estimates (and range) from these \r\nstudies are 127 (15-411) and 295 (47-1088) billion USD yr-1 for climate change impacts out to 2030 and 2050, respectively (see SM17.3). \r\nAll but one study report adaptation costs higher than the 70-100 billion estimated in 2010 by the World Bank (World Bank, 2010)."


id: b5a5338ee57d266bca94a5b39e039716
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"Figure Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE.1 |  Comparison of recent studies that estimated developing country adaptation costs in billion USD (in 2005 \r\nprices) yr-1, for 2030 and 2050. Figure based on Chapagain et al. (2020). Major studies are World Bank (2010), Chapagain et al. (2020), UNEP (2016), Baarsch et al. \r\n(2015) and Markandya and Gonzalez-Eguino (2019). The solid-coloured bars are based on RCP2.6, and patterned bars are based on RCP 8.5; the width of the bars \r\nindicates the range of estimates (maximum and minimum) produced in each study."


id: 9d21b595885cba65bbcb328859b940f4
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"The cost of adaptation for developed countries is rarely reported; most literature either reports a global cost or developing country costs, \r\nor costs for a specific country or sector. Baarsch et al. (2015), using an Integrated Assessment Model (IAM), report adaptation annual \r\ncosts (2012 prices) in 2030 (and 2050) as 272 (660) billion globally and 205 (521) in developing countries only under the RCP2.6 scenario, \r\nindicating that developed country costs are around 25% (21%) of total cost."


id: 5a8ccb1ffae9c6bba4bbe901163cbbb
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"In addition to global estimated adaptation costs, there are many studies that have focused on specific regions, countries or sectors, such \r\nas estimated adaptation cost for coastal environments, water-related infrastructure, urban infrastructure, agriculture and energy (UNEP, \r\n2014; Watkiss et al., 2015; UNEP, 2016). Examples of such estimates are reported in various chapters in this report and summarised in \r\nSM17.3."


id: 21ab083f10adf06c0c08c00a911ed3c6
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"Estimating the benefit of adaptation, in terms of damage avoided, remains challenging. For example, Ricke et al. (2018) show that the \r\nsocial cost of carbon (monetary damage per tCO2 emitted) varies by up to two orders of magnitude depending on country, socioeconomic \r\nscenario, damage function, total greenhouse gases (GHG) forcing, and local climate change. In addition, non-monetary benefits such as \r\ncultural identity, sacred places, human health and lives are often ignored (Tschakert et al., 2017; Serdeczny, 2019; see also Cross-Working \r\nGroup Box ECONOMIC in Chapter 16; Cross-Chapter Box LOSS, this Chapter). Recent case studies and global level analyses continue \r\nto support the conclusion in IPCC AR5 WGII Chapter 17 (Chambwera et al., 2014) that the benefits of adaptation generally remain \r\nlarger than the costs (medium confidence), but the cost-benefit ratio varies widely by context and assumptions (OECD, 2015; Global \r\nCommission on Adaptation, 2019; WRI, 2019)"


id: 8f2a1d8176c63dfb8516ac24fab6a99b
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"International public climate finance flows are realised through bilateral and multi-lateral channels (Watson and Schalatek, 2021) where \r\ncontributions to these channels are received from Annex II and non-Annex I countries (UNFCCC SCF, 2018; Buchner et al., 2019). Annex II \r\ncountries contribute as part of their commitments in the Paris Agreement, while non-Annex I countries commit climate finance through \r\nthese channels on a voluntary basis (Pickering et al., 2015; Roberts and Weikmans, 2017; Egli and Stunzi, 2019). Bilateral intermediaries \r\ninclude development cooperation agencies and national development banks. These institutions often have long-standing development\u0002cooperation experience, and offer climate change projects, facilities and financial instruments based on their differing mandates, structures \r\nand priorities (Atteridge et al., 2009; Buchner et al., 2019)."


id: 9750c5b0a13779204ec7fa050f1cccf6
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"Multi-lateral channels include the UNFCCC financial mechanisms, such as the Green Climate Fund, and the multi-lateral development \r\nbanks (MDBs), such as the World Bank. Both pool contributor resources before committing such resources for climate change projects \r\nand programmes. Funding through multi-lateral channels promotes recipient country engagement in the governance and prioritisation of \r\nfunding decisions, with concurrent processes in the multi-laterals often existing to support country ownership of funded climate action \r\n(Ciplet et al., 2013; Ha et al., 2016)."


id: 1005ba54e0d0e0904b4c3bf169bc4ce7
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"There are five multi-lateral climate change funds of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement financial mechanisms. There are further multi-lateral \r\nclimate change funds that are not governed by the UNFCCC or Paris Agreement, the largest of which is the World Bank governed Climate \r\nInvestment Funds (Watson and Schalatek, 2021). Some of the major multi-lateral climate change funds have been established with a \r\nspecific focus on adaptation, while some bilateral donors have thematic or sectoral priorities. Multi-lateral climate change funds operate \r\nthrough accredited implementing entities. These have historically been multi-lateral in nature, such as the development banks, but recent \r\nyears have seen a rise in the accreditation of national and regional institutions (UNFCCC SCF, 2018). In addition to programming funds "


id: 92fd01b6f5782d9cd4a2d88bd459c29d
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"from external sources, such as through the multi-lateral climate change funds, the MDBs also raise and programme their own climate \r\nfinance (UNFCCC SCF, 2018; MDBs, 2019)."


id: 2ee7cff737b886123bdb18a26eed17df
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"Several major multi-lateral climate change funds work through grant-only programmes, whereas others include concessional loan, equity \r\nand guarantee instruments. The broader suite of instruments used by the MDBs includes grant, investment loan, equity, guarantee, line \r\nof credit, policy-based financing and results-based financing (MDBs, 2019)."


id: 9b54aee8957ed6000826da60f4cd6a98
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"Public funding of a concessional nature that flows from Annex II to non-Annex I countries supports research and capacity building and \r\ncan also facilitate private finance flows into climate action, with the intention to avoid creating a high debt burden in developing \r\ncountries, in response to climate impacts for which they have little historic responsibility (Watson, 2016; Carter, 2020; Schalatek, 2020). \r\nLess concessional public finance flows include other official flows that are not developmental in nature and can be trade related, \r\nincluding, for example, export credits."


id: 7d8e00cbb330a10bc20606f6ee5845b
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"Critiques of the public climate finance architecture are aimed at the overlapping mandates of the institutions programming climate \r\nfinance, particularly the multi-lateral climate funds, and the challenges in accessing funding (Nakhooda et al., 2014; Amerasinghe et al., \r\n2017; Pickering et al., 2017). However, Pickering et al. (2017) further note that institutional fragmentation of climate finance could result \r\nin more flexibility, resilience and innovation. There have also been important governance changes leveraged by some of these funds and \r\ninstruments, such as integration of gender considerations into projects (Schalatek, 2020)."


id: cd2109775133ede9ab1f83bd4a7c12b2
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"There is an increasing focus on the role of the private sector to support large-scale financing of adaptation and resilience (UNEP, 2016; \r\nUNEP, 2018). To date, it has been difficult to track adaptation and resilience finance within the private sector (UNEP, 2016) as it is either \r\nnot disclosed or not easily identifiable, since it is often built into capital and operating expenditure and is not a standalone investment. \r\nSeveral private mechanisms are emerging as important sources of climate finance (Gupta et al., 2014; Eccles and Krzus, 2018; Miller \r\net al., 2019)."


id: 7bd1a8a1a7bb0ee565471777862fbb16
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"Green, social impact and resilience bonds are similar to traditional bonds--fixed-income financial instruments raised on commercial \r\nmarkets by companies, governments or financial institutions--but the proceeds are used to fund activities that have positive \r\nenvironmental, social or climate benefit (Tuhkanen, 2020). Green bonds align to voluntary principles, such as the Green Bond Principles \r\nset out by the International Capital Market Association, the Climate Bonds Initiative's Climate Resilience Principles (Sartzetakis, 2020). \r\nGiven the voluntary nature and lack of standardisation of green bond principles, there are concerns around their additionality, and there \r\nis also a lack of data on how green bonds contribute to a scaling up of green projects (Dupre et al., 2018)."


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"Green bond annual issuance reached 260 billion in 2019 (CBI, 2020), but as of 2018, only 3-5% (USD 12 billion) of green bond total \r\nproceeds can be explicitly traced to climate-resilience-related efforts (CBI, 2019). Examples of AR focused bonds include those issued by \r\nFiji in 2017, dedicating 91% of spending to adaptation and resilience (Shukla and Peyraud, 2017; Ministry of Economy, 2019), and by \r\nthe European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's 2019 Climate Resilience Bond for USD 700 million to finance climate-resilient \r\ninfrastructure, commercial operations, agriculture or ecological systems (EBRD, 2019)."


id: 9a27d2fb21e832682ce3fda389e0563d
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"Dedicated investment vehicles are equity funds that are created to invest in products and services that enhance resilience and reduce \r\nrisks. An example is the Climate Resilience and Adaptation Finance and Technology Transfer Facility that is proposed as a USD 500 million \r\nprivate equity fund to invest in companies providing climate resilience solutions for developing countries. Initial funding has been \r\nprovided by donors (Miller et al., 2019)."


id: e4cb2b39cc3ba11e8fbba081c15344f2
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"Balance sheet finance occurs when an entity directly invests in resilience and adaptation rather than as a separate project. This source \r\nof funding may be from exiting reserves, re-allocation from other budget lines, or via external commercial finance, but the investment is \r\nfinanced by the firm rather than as a separate project (Gupta et al., 2014; Buchner et al., 2019)."


id: b24f58b03a70a06a4506f39052396be8
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"Insurance can play an important role in managing residual climate risks at any given level of adaptation, but insurers can also be \r\nimportant r risk assessment and risk reduction as part of any insurance package (Jarzabkowski et al., 2019; Section 11.3.8.3). While \r\ntraditional indemnity insurance is important for repair and rebuilding of damaged property and infrastructure, parametric insurance has \r\nbecome increasingly popular for supporting rapid post-disaster responses such as drought, hurricane damage and flooding. Examples \r\ninclude sovereign insurance facilities such as African Risk Capacity and the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (Broberg, 2019) "


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"as well as weather-index insurance targeted at individuals, especially in agriculture (Greatrex et al., 2015; Isakson, 2015; Surminski et al., \r\n2016; Jensen and Barrett, 2017; Fischer, 2019). The role of insurance as a climate risk management option, as well as limitations, is \r\ncovered in more depth in Section 17.2 and Cross-Chapter Box LOSS (this chapter)."


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"Mainstreaming physical climate risks and resilience in the private sector\r\nThe data on tracked climate finance and green bond issuance for adaptation and resilience both show a substantial gap between the \r\nadaptation needs and the finance deployed. Scaling up these instruments is unlikely to close this gap given the challenges with financing \r\nadaptation projects, particularly from the private sector. There is therefore a need for more systematic action to manage climate risks and \r\nmainstream climate change considerations (Miller et al., 2019)."


id: eb3f7c0718fd4c07c26cb726813492c
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"The financial case for mitigation investment can often be demonstrated through revenues from, for example, the sale of renewable \r\nelectricity. On contrast, the benefits from investment in adaptation and resilience are typically considered in terms of avoided losses and \r\ncost benefit ratios. For example, the Global Commission on Adaptation (2019) estimates that the overall rate of return on investments in \r\nimproved resilience is very high, with benefit-cost ratios ranging from 2:1 to 10:1, and in some cases even higher."


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"The private sector is becoming increasingly aware of the need to assess physical climate risks to avoid the long-term risks to assets and \r\nenhance climate resilience. The task force on climate-related financial disclosures (TCFD) is likely to create additional pressure from investors \r\nfor companies to identify, manage and reduce risks from climate change (Eccles and Krzus, 2018; ERM and CBEY, 2018; Tuhkanen, 2020)."


id: 5e2a9fdba5a90715c3340f72d68d9840
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"A key factor for the impact of the TCFD on mainstreaming of physical climate risks and demonstrating the case for investment in adaptation \r\nand resilience will be how investors systematically incorporate physical climate risks, adaptation and resilience into their investment \r\ndecisions. The Coalition for Climate Resilient Investment (DFID et al., 2019) was established to look at this from the private sector viewpoint \r\nand is working to systematically incorporate resilience into cash flow modelling and asset valuation practices, so that investors may \r\nquantify the investment in resilience for an asset and the benefits associated with reduced costs and more reliable revenue streams."


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"Considerable progress has been made in tracking climate finance since AR5, but substantial gaps remain, especially regarding domestic \r\npublic finance and private sector balance sheet investment in adaptation (Section 17.5.1.5; CPI, 2020; Richmond et al., 2020). The best \r\ndocumented information comes from international climate funds, which provide detail at the project level. Most bilateral and multi-lateral \r\ninvestment institutions report on whether debt, grants and other instruments are for climate projects, but with less detail. Private finance \r\nis harder to track, as reporting is voluntary; even for green bonds, where certification identifies the range of sectors a bond aims to cover, \r\nreporting of how the bond is spent is infrequent."


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"The majority of the most recently (2017/18) tracked adaptation and multiple-objective finance was supplied through public donors, \r\nlargely through grants, concessional and non-concessional instruments (Figure FAR.1). Most finance (44.1%) was spent transregionally \r\n(allocated in specific projects to recipients in more than a single region). For regionally specific funding, Sub-Saharan Africa and South \r\nAsia, along with the Latin America and Caribbean region, received the largest gross amounts, although Oceania has received the greatest \r\nper-capita funding. The largest proportion of AR funding has been allocated to increasing the resilience of infrastructure, energy and the \r\nbuilt environment, followed by agriculture, forestry and natural management, and then water and wastewater."


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"Across financial instruments, Sub-Saharan Africa received the highest relative proportion through grants (38%), followed by the Latin \r\nAmerica and Caribbean region (23%), with other non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regions receiving \r\nbetween 16% and 10% (SM17.3). Concessional debt as a proportion of the regional total varies from 84% in South Asia to as low as 29% \r\nin Latin America and Caribbean, which has the highest proportion of non-concessional debt (48%)."


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"Figure Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE.2 |  The flow and distribution of globally tracked adaptation and resilience finance in 2018 from different \r\nsources, through different instruments into different sectors and regions. Each strand shows the relative proportion of finance flowing from one category \r\nto another (for example, from private or public sources to different instruments). Categories from left to right are: (a) whether the finance is solely for adaptation or for \r\nadaptation and other objectives, including mitigation (multiple objectives); (b) whether the finance comes from public or private sources; (c) the financing instrument; \r\n(d) the broad sectoral allocation; (e) the geographical distribution of funding (proportion of total in % and per-capita allocation). Based on data collated by CPI (2020)."


id: 3a17ead4e5c799a6ae52fff37d6abcbc
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"The importance of public and private finance for adaptation and resilience\r\nAdaptation finance provided by international public mechanisms remains the core source of tracked flows in support of adaptation and \r\nresilience to developing countries (Micale et al., 2018; UNEP, 2018), although these public funds alone are insufficient to meet rapidly \r\ngrowing needs and constitute only a minority share of all public climate finance flows (UNEP, 2016; Global Commission on Adaptation, 2019)."


id: 86386b08722d8abfd5ec2e29d8d1415c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Public mechanisms can play a role in leveraging private sector finance for adaptation by addressing real and perceived regulatory, cost \r\nand market barriers through blended finance approaches, public-private partnerships or innovative financial instruments and structuring \r\nin support of private sector requirements for risk management and guaranteed investment returns (Pillay et al., 2017; Miller et al., 2019)."


id: 2290c1b3e04af98d2fb0bcd6b654b32a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Many adaptation interventions in the most vulnerable countries, communities and people provide no adequate financial return on \r\ninvestments and can therefore can only be funded with highly concessional public finance. Grant support is most appropriate for \r\nmeasures such as capacity building, planning, public policy and regulatory reforms, disaster risk management and response, community \r\nengagement or support for social safety nets, and for addressing social vulnerabilities, including poverty or gender inequality, which \r\nconstrain adaptation (Grasso, 2010a; Pillay et al., 2017; Agrawal et al., 2019; Buchner et al., 2019)."


id: 3c32eb2394f01dabe1d74e9a86e3ad7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Access to adequate adaptation grant finance is further constrained because several public mechanisms provide grants only for the\r\nadditional costs of adaptation measures compared with a development baseline in the absence of climate impacts. Calculating the \r\nincremental costs of adaptation measures imposes additional time and resource burden on the most vulnerable recipients, who are often \r\nfaced with data gaps or technical capacity constraints (Chambwera et al., 2014; GCF, 2018; UNEP, 2018; Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019)."


id: 130caeeb461ca5deab5cace7619a2c64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"An exact delineation of respective costs for adaptation and development components is difficult and might be unsuitable as many \r\nadaptation measures are intrinsically linked to development. It may also prevent realising necessary synergies between both components \r\n(McGray et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2011; Denton et al., 2014; Resch et al., 2017; Micale et al., 2018)."


id: 5bb4caff8406c10ec27f1595bfd3089c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Climate finance literature recognises that poor and least developed households, communities and countries are most affected and \r\nmarginalised by climate change, and least responsible for its causes, but receive relatively little financial support for adaptation (Chapters \r\n15, 8; Olsson et al., 2014; Rozenberg and Hallegatte, 2015; Hallegatte et al., 2016; Rai and Fisher, 2017; Shakya and Byrnes, 2017)."


id: 8cbd6d40b6cabb49daee78ab27fd8690
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"While the gap between current financial flows to developing countries and their adaptation needs (see Box Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE.1) \r\nis a major factor undermining equity and fairness in financing, several other factors that can also affect fair and just financing in \r\ndeveloping countries have been identified in recent literature (Klein et al., 2014; Colenbrander et al., 2018; Mfitumukiza et al., 2019; Khan \r\net al., 2019a; Doshi and Garschagen, 2020). First, financing is skewed in favour of mitigation, and therefore towards fast-growing upper\u0002and middle-income countries offering the biggest gains in emission reductions, especially in Southeast Asia, but also in Sub-Saharan \r\nAfrica (Rai et al., 2016). Further, as much of current finance uses debt-based instruments, mitigation projects are further preferred as \r\nreturns are more assured (Lee and Hong, 2018; Carty et al., 2020)."


id: 3c5ff750109e5ab9064cdf4406cf3fc4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Second, the requirement of many funders for readiness and fiduciary capacity means that least developed countries (LDCs) have been \r\nless able to access finance, despite many support mechanisms being offered. Additionally, geopolitical preferences of some countries \r\nmean that some developing countries are preferred to others for bilateral funding (Doshi and Garschagen, 2020). This is exacerbated for \r\nprivate sector investment, where lower credit ratings make finance more expensive, and increasing understanding of exposure to physical \r\nclimate risks could lead to 'capital flight' from most vulnerable countries (Global Commission on Adaptation, 2019; Miller et al., 2019; \r\nCooper, 2020)."


id: d15b88d761b0e7a3f3c5c20a1277529e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Third, within climate-vulnerable countries, very little is channelled to local communities who need it most; the few analyses available \r\nsuggest that less than 10% of total climate finance supports decentralised actions (Rai et al., 2016; Soanes et al., 2017). Reasons include: \r\n(i) lack of consideration of procedural equity in programme design (Grasso, 2010b; Wang and Gao, 2018; Venn, 2019; Khan et al., 2019a); \r\n(ii) finance being managed by multi-lateral implementers, rather than agencies that are closer to local communities; (iii) the higher \r\ntransaction costs of decentralised projects in low-income communities reduce their attractiveness to funders as well as the ability of local \r\norganisations to meet the fiduciary standards (Fonta et al., 2018; Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019)."


id: d925708d3bccd74767ed8d5fca92de2e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"It has been proposed that, as middle-income countries can leverage mitigation finance from the private sector, targeting scarce public \r\nfinance towards LDCs and SIDS may be necessary to ensure sufficient funds reach these countries (Steele, 2015). Matching domestic \r\nclimate spending with international support is one way to ensure LDCs get the funds they need (Grasso, 2010b; Bird, 2014). Targeting \r\nspecific marginalised communities and women within countries can also help make climate finance more effective and fairer, such as the \r\nAsian Development Bank's efforts to make lending portfolios more inclusive and pro-poor (ADB, 2018)."


id: bab3653c8c1910a055e8f01029e337a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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vector_id: 26916
content:
"Post-COVID recovery packages, debt relief and finance for adaptation and resilience\r\nRecent literature has highlighted the opportunity that COVID recovery packages offer for environmentally sustainable, low-carbon and \r\nclimate-resilient economic growth (Forster et al., 2020; Hepburn et al., 2020; Hanna et al., 2021). Assessment of whether this is indeed \r\nhappening is limited, although the few available studies suggest that that this opportunity is not being realised in many nations \r\n(O'Callaghan and Murdock, 2021; VIVID Economics, 2021). One study of the Group of Twenty (G20) and 10 other nations suggested that "


id: 8ffcd8725f1e3fe02bc6016216d5005c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"stimulus packages would have net negative environmental impact in two-thirds of these countries (VIVID Economics, 2021), while \r\nanother showed that around half of G20 recovery investment targeted at energy has had gone towards fossil fuels, rather than to cleaner \r\nenergy sources (Dibley et al., 2021)."


id: 63278adce2e97a08cf7520dd8daeae3c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
content_type: text
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vector_id: 13168
content:
"resembles local knowledge in that it is acquired through participation \r\nin activities, and yet it differs from local knowledge, which is often \r\nplace-based and tied directly to specific landscapes and communities. \r\nLocal knowledge typically covers a variety of environmental domains. \r\nPractitioner knowledge may be shared with people in different locations \r\nand is often more focused on a narrower set of work activities. Recent \r\ncalls have recommended bringing practitioners more fully into the \r\nIPCC assessment process, to promote more effective decision-making \r\n(Howarth et al., 2018)."


id: f668f905e2552a987e0aee9b9dbdcf29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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vector_id: 36277
content:
"These sectoral advances using AI employ various learning techniques \r\ninclusive of supervised and unsupervised learning, multi-modal learning \r\nand transfer learning techniques to generate more accurate predictions \r\nthan afforded by traditional climate projection methods (Cheong et al., \r\n2020b; Camps-Valls et  al., 2021). AI applications use finer-resolution \r\ndata such as sub-daily weather-related data, remote and wearable \r\nsensor data, text data and real-time survey data. They are fed into \r\nneural networks and semi-/unsupervised learning to configure detailed \r\nand more precise predictions of climate change impact on crop yields \r\n(Crane-Droesch, 2018), early warning (Moon et  al., 2019), impact of \r\nextreme heat on older adults (Cheong et al., 2020a), poverty in Africa \r\n(Oshri et  al., 2018) and multi-scale water management combining \r\nblockchain technology with remote water sensors (Lin et al., 2018)."


id: 91e3d6dfdb16ee25c5407bab5f7c2ec7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Practitioner knowledge makes significant contributions to decision\u0002making by broadening the range of alternatives which are considered \r\nand by bringing in understandings of systems to the selection and \r\nimplementation of alternatives. Such knowledge is applicable to a large \r\nnumber of domains, including biodiversity management (Tengo et al., \r\n2014; Rathwell et  al., 2015), and natural hazard risk management in \r\nurban settings, as reported in Denmark (Madsen et al., 2019), the USA \r\n(Matsler, 2019), Canada (Yumagulova and Vertinsky, 2019), Mexico \r\n(Aguilar-Barajas et al., 2019) and the Caribbean (Ramsey et al., 2019). \r\nOther contexts, all at regional scales, include watershed management \r\nin Peru (Ostovar, 2019), livestock management in Finland (Rasmus et al., \r\n2020), agricultural adaptation in a context of water scarcity in Iran (Zarei \r\net al., 2020) and the water-energy nexus in the USA (Gim et al., 2019)."


id: 35f9c2e9fa7a629d7af3ad50f8a1073a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge are thoroughly covered \r\nin SROCC (Abram et  al., 2019; IPCC, 2019c; IPCC, 2019d) and in \r\nSection 1.3.3. We here add relevant points to decision-making, and an \r\nadditional form of knowledge, practitioner knowledge."


id: ed2f039b28f2faee1dbcccb2f518e0b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Literature indicates the importance of effective governance for \r\npromoting integration of local and practitioner knowledge with \r\nscientific knowledge (high confidence). This integration is most \r\nextensive and promotes a wider consideration of alternatives, where \r\ngovernance arrangements promote ongoing exchanges of information \r\nand discussion of solutions, whether through formal mechanisms \r\nsuch as regional committees (Gim et al., 2019; Ostovar, 2019; Rasmus \r\net  al., 2020; Zarei et  al., 2020) or informal mechanisms such as \r\npersonal networks and local discussion groups (Madsen et al., 2019; \r\nYumagulova and Vertinsky, 2019). Where such arrangements are \r\nabsent, practitioner knowledge is side-lined from the formulation and \r\nimplementation of decisions (Aguilar-Barajas et  al., 2019; Matsler, \r\n2019; Ramsey et al., 2019)."


id: ecc6dfdfbe644ecff348cd5805bc332c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Practitioner knowledge--the pragmatic, practice-based knowledge \r\nthat comes from the regular exercise of craft or professional work--\r\nwas also acknowledged briefly in AR5 (Jones et al., 2014) and treated \r\nsignificantly in SROCC (Abram et  al., 2019). Practitioner knowledge "


id: 126c683f5da44622156f0acc5150e5fe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"et al., 2019; Daniels et al., 2020). When individuals and organisations \r\nfrom different disciplinary backgrounds and missions coordinate their \r\nactivities informally, the resulting ties have been termed 'knowledge \r\nnetworks' (Ziaja and Fullerton, 2015; Brugger et al., 2016; Guido et al., \r\n2016; Davies et al., 2018; Klenk, 2018; Muccione et al., 2019; Ziaja, \r\n2019). When such networks interact with each other, the resulting \r\nassociations have been called 'communities of practice', which \r\ncan work to collectively shape information to shared contextual \r\ncircumstances (Orsato et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2019b)."


id: 1fca877ef92e71458abafa759fefc8d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"There is strong evidence that composite knowledge systems--\r\ncharacterised by interactions between the producers and potential \r\nusers of climate change information--can help facilitate climate\u0002related decision-making (Prokopy and Power, 2015; Richards, 2018; \r\nRamsey et al., 2019). Several institutional forms and structures have \r\nbeen created to link scientific knowledge, Indigenous knowledge, and \r\nlocal and practitioner knowledge to climate change decision-making."


id: 63f2aeb37edae3dd5fcc87a0a31225a3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"There is extensive evidence that co-production can generate useful \r\nclimate knowledge (Djenontin and Meadow, 2018; Bisbal, 2019; Ryan \r\nand Bustos, 2019; Hewitt et al., 2020; Jack et al., 2020; Lavorel et al., \r\n2020; Ruiz-Mallen, 2020) and that it can increase the likelihood that \r\nknowledge will be used in decision-making (Vogel et al., 2016; Prokopy \r\net  al., 2017; Skelton et  al., 2017; Sylvester and Brooks, 2020). Co\u0002production is not without its costs, since it requires more time, money, \r\nfacilitation expertise and personal commitment from participants \r\nthan more conventional modes of knowledge production (Lemos \r\net al., 2018; Sletto et al., 2019; Wamsler et al., 2019; Blair et al., 2020). \r\nSome research has shown ways to decrease the costs of co-production \r\nfor participants, such as funding and time to enable and sustain \r\ninteractions and to build trust and legitimacy, or to create boundary \r\norganisations (Young et al., 2016; Klenk et al., 2017)."


id: 58e5b9eee26c21d84af088573bc7596c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Co-production is supported by project cycles that provide for the \r\ninvolvement of stakeholders from the outset (Daly and Dilling, 2019; \r\nBrady and Leichenko, 2020); flexible research agendas that do not \r\nassume a climate related question (Daniels et al., 2020); support for \r\ninteractivity and reflexivity (Araujo et al., 2020); and institutionalising \r\nincentives which address the different values, norms, perceptions \r\nand work patterns of scientists, policymakers and civil society \r\nrepresentatives (Cvitanovic et  al., 2015; Vincent et  al., 2015; Bruno \r\nSoares and Dessai, 2016; Singh et al., 2017; Djenontin and Meadow, \r\n2018; Norstrom et al., 2020; Turnhout et al., 2020). Certain roles, such \r\nas policy entrepreneurs (Tanner et al., 2019), embedded researchers \r\n(Pretorius et al., 2019) and knowledge brokers (Cvitanovic et al., 2015), \r\ncan facilitate co-production."


id: b138d6856de28aab70d40e0d0fb08cf3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Climate services (refer to CWG Box on Climate Services) can be \r\nimportant enablers of climate risk management, provided they are \r\ncredible, relevant and usable (high confidence), and will become \r\nincreasingly important as human influence on weather and climate \r\nextremes grows across all regions (Chapter 11; Fischer et  al., 2021; \r\nIPCC, 2021). Climate services are more effective and more widely \r\nused when they are tailored to specific decisions and decision makers \r\n(high confidence). Sustained iterative engagement between climate \r\ninformation users, producers and translators can improve the quality \r\nof the information and the decision-making and avoid maladaptation \r\n(medium confidence)."


id: acc37e4a099f0405fef3acf36c4736c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"An important mechanism of co-production is the boundary \r\norganisation, a knowledge-producing organisation composed of \r\nindividuals who reflect different disciplines or knowledge systems \r\nand who represent different activities, sectors or forms of governance \r\n(Blades et al., 2016; Graham and Mitchell, 2016; Guido et al., 2016; \r\nJeuring et al., 2019; Serrao-Neumann et al., 2020; Zarei et al., 2020). \r\nBoundary organisations themselves can be linked into boundary chains \r\n(Lemos et al., 2014; Meyer et al., 2015; Kirchhoff et al., 2015a; Pretorius "


id: 46eed6a00a4717211c8147036b4474f1
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content:
"seasonal forecasts and long-term climate projections (Hewitt et  al., \r\n2012; Blome, 2017; Bessembinder et al., 2019; Vaughan et al., 2019b)."


id: a95e2276293cc2369c148bb05b9009a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24178
content:
"Recent research on climate services shows that transdisciplinary \r\nknowledge co-production is a key enabler, starting to shift emphasis \r\nfrom the creation of climate services products to climate services \r\nprocesses (Vincent et  al., 2018; Carter et  al., 2019b; Daniels et  al., \r\n2020), potentially increasing uptake and sustainability (Norstrom \r\net al., 2020). This shift is a result of the recognition of benefits which \r\na co-production approach can offer, in addition to the provision of \r\ninformation; these additional benefits include building confidence, \r\ncapacities, learning, knowledge, social capital, institutional capacity, \r\nstakeholder relationships, social networks, beneficial management \r\npractices and strengthened institutions (Bruno Soares and Dessai, \r\n2016; Djenontin and Meadow, 2018; Bremer et al., 2019)."


id: c9285fd12a33a32f251e0352556c8851
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Recent reviews (Carr and Onzere, 2018; Hewitt et al., 2020) provide \r\nevidence that the use of climate services is affected by (a) the quality, \r\nreliability and skill of the climate information (Zebiak, 2019); (b) the \r\nfit, tailoring and contextualisation of that information with respect \r\nto the specific decision-making needs of particular users (Clarkson \r\net  al., 2019); (c) the mode and method by which the service is \r\ncommunicated (Golding et al., 2017); and (d) the characteristics of the \r\nusers themselves, including the users' access to resources that would \r\nallow them to alter their decisions based on the information provided \r\n(Clarkson et al., 2019)."


id: eded412b48abb08f9b2e755dfe0b873c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Decision makers who shape options for managing climate risk can \r\nevaluate stakeholders' capacities and motivations to participate in the \r\nimplementation process of these options. Stakeholder engagement in \r\nclimate change risk management supports successful adaptation (Gray \r\net al., 2014; Elsawah et al., 2015; Siders, 2017; Giordano et al., 2020). "


id: a2aed2f26e21e4d1595356c6971f1197
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23161
content:
"Research in psychology and related fields shows that the cognitive \r\nmechanisms by which individuals and organisations process climate \r\ninformation influence this capacity, motivation and engagement \r\n(Grothmann and Patt, 2005; Grothmann et  al., 2013; Masud et  al., \r\n2016; Nelson et al., 2016; Takahashi et al., 2016; Hugel and Davies, \r\n2020; Grothmann and Michel, 2021)."


id: cf19aff2483ae1e6433de8991c925a21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30118
content:
"The first two catalysing conditions described below address the costs \r\nof delaying action. Urgency increases the awareness of individuals and \r\norganisations of such costs, while windows of opportunity, including \r\nextreme events, are time-bound periods during which certain actions \r\nare possible, but after which they are more difficult or impossible. \r\nThe other two conditions stimulate new forms or levels of action by \r\npromoting or directing step changes from one policy or management \r\nregime to another (Solecki et  al., 2017). Litigation over adaptation \r\nissues, for example, can open new lines of action or close off old ones, \r\nwhile catalysing agents advance action through a variety of means \r\n(e.g., communicating the urgency of climate action, revising agendas \r\nfor action, expanding coalitions which undertake action). As detailed \r\nbelow, these four catalysing conditions can operate together as well as \r\nseparately to promote more prompt and extensive adaptations."


id: 4b7f8f21dbfa09454a862dc4ca1ca0ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9294
content:
"Attention to behavioural change of individuals has grown since AR5, \r\nincluding cases which address both adaptation and mitigation (e.g., \r\ndietary changes, modification of buildings, transport alternatives) \r\n(Azadi et  al., 2019; Fischer, 2019; Willett et  al., 2019; Sharifi, 2020; \r\nSharifi, 2021). The interventions to promote behavioural change \r\ncan be bottom-up, initiated by individuals, communities, non\u0002governmental organisations or the private sector, or top-down, coming \r\nfrom governments at various levels (Robertson and Barling, 2015; \r\nStern et al., 2016). They are supported by a number of mechanisms, \r\nincluding education, information strategies, and campaigns, financial \r\nincentives, regulatory processes and legislation (Rosenow et al., 2017; \r\nCreutzig et al., 2018; Carlsson et al., 2019). These behavioural changes \r\ncontribute significantly to effective risk management."


id: 669a011389253ac5636703a3d4ed7de2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13732
content:
"available resources (Asfaw et  al., 2019; Robins, 2019; Gee, 2020). \r\nGiven that climate decision makers in many regions and sectors are \r\nexperiencing greater pressure to act, this finding suggests the existence \r\nof windows for planning and action during which climate risks have \r\nled to moderate levels of urgency, but before these risks have resulted \r\nin urgency exceeding some upper threshold (Section 17.4.5.2)."


id: 96967b05b35891b8d249d531e663ca54
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"higher levels of response at intermediate levels of urgency and lower \r\nlevels of response at low or high levels of urgency (Figure 17.9). The \r\ngeneral shape of this relationship also is supported for other decision \r\ndomains by a well-established line of research within psychology \r\n(Heitz, 2014; Zakay, 2014; Prem et al., 2017)."


id: b5885ee0a57e927e60df319bdf554dca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"The synthesis of the studies on urgency offers two central lessons for \r\npolicymakers, community groups and others involved in addressing \r\nclimate change. First, greater levels of response to climate change\u0002induced challenges can be motivated by communication strategies \r\nthat move decision makers from low to moderate levels of urgency \r\n(high confidence). In the case of drought, a number of studies show \r\nthat urgent messages promote water conservation, especially when \r\nthese messages are repeated, perceived as trustworthy and linked \r\nto concrete suggestions for action (Gonzales and Ajami, 2017; \r\nJoubert and Ziervogel, 2019; Kam et al., 2019; Booysen et al., 2019a; \r\nBooysen et al., 2019b; Bolorinos et al., 2020). These effects are also \r\ndemonstrated in experimental studies of adaptation planning in \r\ncontexts including European flood preparations (Madsen et al., 2019; \r\nPot et  al., 2019) and Pacific Island coastal planning (Donner and \r\nWebber, 2014)."


id: 70d799cd21f007787c269477a4f7aba5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"In addition, these studies point to potential weaknesses as well as \r\nstrengths in strategic communication to modulate urgency. Such \r\nmessages may instead lead to lower levels of response if they induce \r\nvery high levels of urgency (Asfaw et al., 2019), though this effect may \r\nbe somewhat mitigated by messages that simultaneously increase \r\nrecipients' sense of self-efficacy or they are experienced in the specific \r\nrisk domain discussed in the messages (Bodin et  al., 2019). Future \r\nresearch on the relationships between urgency and effective risk \r\nmanagement could help refine the measurement of urgency, how the \r\nrelationship varies in different contexts, the role of different forms of \r\nmessaging about urgency and action (Fesenfeld and Rinscheid, 2021), \r\nand the effects of urgency on decision-making by high-level decision \r\nmakers within polities and by climate social movements."


id: 30b40df62ac7af839729860334c601e
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"Second, very high levels of urgency are a barrier to effective action \r\n(medium confidence) because last-minute actions to reduce risk \r\nduring crises can create haste and panic, often leading to insufficient \r\ndeliberation. In these cases, decision makers fail to consider a full \r\nrange of alternative actions, make rash choices and poorly mobilise "


id: 23dc8cdea9edd27aa93ecc01202321ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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vector_id: 3084
content:
"Windows of opportunity are time-bounded periods during which \r\nconditions are present for advancing and often accelerating climate \r\nadaptation strategies. They can act as significant catalysing conditions for \r\nclimate action and are connected to a range of possible outcomes from "


id: d303cb4cccc89ab1f074ea47f0bff1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"small incremental shifts to larger-scale more profound transformation \r\nadaptations (Novalia and Malekpour, 2020)."


id: a8ba23390713aa3bc3ad91b8b9e6df53
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24070
content:
"developments in climate attribution improve the ability to detect \r\nhuman influence on climate and broaden liability."


id: f9680e664bb80233163c5f80c962efe7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Since AR5 there has been growing recognition of the potential of \r\nlitigation for failure to take measures to adapt to climate change to \r\ndrive climate risk management (Banda and Fulton, 2017; Peel et  al., \r\n2017; Bouwer, 2018). Litigation cases on adaptation and loss and \r\ndamage account for about one-third of those covered in the literature \r\n(Setzer and Vanhala, 2019). Reasons for this growth are: (i) the \r\ngrowing gap between projected climate change impacts and current \r\nadaptation efforts (Stezer and Byrnes, 2019) and (ii) expanded legal \r\nduty of government, business and others to manage foreseeable harms \r\n(Marjanac and Patton, 2018). Climate change litigation is expanding \r\ngeographically into the Americas, Asia (and the Pacific region) and \r\nEurope, with several cases brought in low- and middle-income countries \r\n(Stezer and Byrnes, 2019) (Table 17.6)."


id: eb403f9e6412b2af651f0439785c13d0
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content:
"Windows can open because of extreme weather events (Birkmann and \r\nFernando, 2008), political shifts, such as new institutions, new laws \r\nand regulations, and presence of a new policy entrepreneur or new \r\npolicies (Haasnoot et al., 2013; Bell and Morrison, 2015), relevant and \r\nachievable policy goals, and emergence of new knowledge (Abunnasr \r\net al., 2013), and close after the initial causes recede and become less \r\nefficacious. They also serve as focusing events whereby a coalition of \r\ngroups address specific policy questions or response options (Rudel, \r\n2019). Recognising that windows of opportunity often catalyse action \r\ndoes not mean that action outside such windows is insignificant or \r\nimpossible."


id: 35eee3f6e91478e23e91e41da6aa1e72
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"Extreme events such as disasters often act as proximate drivers of \r\nwindows of opportunity (Birkmann and Fernando, 2008; McSweeney \r\nand Coomes, 2011). Climate disasters in a specific location become \r\nsignificant windows for new debate, policymaking and financing \r\n(McSweeney and Coomes, 2011). Extreme events also can facilitate \r\nchange at locations distant from the most impacted site when remote \r\nactors gain perspective on their own risks (Friedman et  al., 2019; \r\nSolecki et  al., 2019). Factors that facilitate extreme events driving \r\nproactive as opposed to reactive responses include access to relevant \r\nrisk and vulnerability data, pre-existing experience with similar events, \r\nand appropriate governance (Brown et al., 2017a). Page and Dilling \r\n(2020) find that worldview or ideology plays a central role in sense\u0002making and in shaping what organisational decision makers 'see' in \r\nterms of acceptable actions in response to an extreme event."


id: be7ddcd08d44c99ed0c34fce3c68b0a4
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content:
"Lawsuits against private entities contribute to articulating climate \r\nchange as a legal and financial risk (medium confidence) (Peel and \r\nOsofsky, 2015; Ganguly et al., 2018; McCormick et al., 2018; Peel and \r\nOsofsky, 2018). Even if unsuccessful, Estrin (2016) concludes they are \r\nimportant in underlining the high level of public concern."


id: fa769b67a1c4a8f1508cf8ee02622529
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Climate-related, legal, financial disclosure requirements are improving \r\ninvestment decision-making of corporations as well as augmenting ex \r\npost liability for failure to consider climate change risk in decision\u0002making. Organisations are required to disclose governance around \r\nclimate-related risks (impact of climate change on businesses, \r\nproducts, services, supply or value chain, adaptation and mitigation \r\nactivities, investment in research and development and operations). \r\nThis functions as a vehicle for identifying climate-related risk and the \r\norganisation's resilience strategy taking into consideration different \r\nclimate- related scenarios including a 2degC or lower scenario (Sarra, \r\n2018). Institutions such as the G20 (Carney, 2019), the American \r\nBar Association (Brammer and Chakrabarti, 2019) and the European \r\nCommission (Zadek, 2018) have adopted or endorsed these standards."


id: 54d9a727edd7eed3f3ec66122122250a
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"Significant variation is present across the mix and intensity of conditions \r\nthat promote action through a window of opportunity. Capacity to \r\nrespond to is a function of the presence of enabling conditions as well \r\nas tools and methods to aid decision-making (Shi et al., 2015). Political \r\nactivism provides windows of opportunity for climate adaptation \r\n(Lauer and Eguavoen, 2016; see also Section 17.4.5.3.1)."


id: bfaf21ebab3fce246d6d2ca23b40f1ac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Sudden shifts in institutions and legal framework can also catalyse \r\nclimate action. For example, the year 2015 included a series of \r\ninternational frameworks such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster \r\nRisk Reduction 2015-2030 (van Niekerk et al., 2020; Hofmann, 2021), \r\nthe 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which established \r\nthe Sustainable Development Goals (Sanchez Rodriguez et al., 2018), \r\nand the Paris Climate Agreement, which dramatically enhanced the \r\npromotion and implementation of altered the conditions under which \r\nclimate adaptation occurred."


id: 14359412d2782a496e54ec7302076306
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vector_id: 696
content:
"Individuals and organisations often serve as catalysing agents of \r\nclimate risk decision-making. They promote greater levels of new forms \r\nof climate action by communicating the urgency of climate action \r\nand by developing coalitions which undertake action. Agents include \r\nindividuals, organisations or collectives, or multiple organisations \r\nlinked together."


id: 29d4a765ebe813d2594a4bba0043e3a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Recent studies of climate-related social movements show that \r\nthey can act as catalysing agents which promote action to manage \r\nclimate-related risks (medium confidence). However, these studies use \r\nvarying definitions of climate movements within the broader context \r\nof environmental movements. A prominent topic of research is the \r\nrapidity and the large scale of the proliferation of these movements \r\naround the world, primarily in urban settings but also in rural and \r\nIndigenous contexts (Claeys and Delgado Pugley, 2017)."


id: 7d4fa442594c614f3ca2b9116bfd44d5
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"Litigation for Loss and Damage from climate change was first noted \r\nas a potential motivator for emissions reduction in AR4, and AR5 \r\nnoted that litigation was pending but not tested and that, while legal \r\nsystems were beginning to define the boundaries of responsibility for \r\nclimate change, it was 'unclear liability exists'. The SR1.5 (IPCC, 2018a) \r\nreported, with high confidence, that litigation risks of government and \r\nbusiness had increased, and the SRCCL (IPCC, 2019b) noted that recent "


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"These movements usually focus on climate mitigation but sometimes \r\ninclude adaptation. Their social bases include groups which had not \r\npreviously been active in climate politics, notably children and youth, \r\nas well as sectors with long traditions of environmental activism, such \r\nas women and Indigenous Peoples (see Cross-Chapter Boxes GENDER \r\nand INDIG in Chapter 18). Much of the literature on youth movements \r\ntraces the emergence of the movements themselves (Sanson et al., 2019; \r\nTreichel, 2020), their framings of climate change as a social justice issue \r\n(Holmberg and Alvinius, 2019) and their presence in demonstrations and \r\non social media (Boulianne et  al., 2020). Climate action catalysed by \r\nyouth and other climate movements include visible international events \r\nsuch as the signing of Declaration on Children, Youth, and Climate Action \r\nat COP25 in Madrid 2019 (Han and Ahn, 2020), as well as national "


id: f1e1b31b40ce7656aae465e238623dbe
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"efforts, including lawsuits, and local events such as in tree-planting and \r\nwaste reduction initiatives (Bandura and Cherry, 2019)."


id: c1b9b00cfd2e853d3b4991d36cf836eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"A recent review examines 2743 cases around the world of mobilisations \r\nfor environmental justice causes (Scheidel et al., 2020); roughly half the \r\ncases occurred between 1970 and 2007, and half between 2008 and \r\n2019. Of these environmental mobilisations, 17% are directly related \r\nto climate and energy, and others are related to climate-sensitive issues \r\n(15% for biomass and land use, 14% for water management). This study \r\nreports the proportion of positive outcomes for different strategies, \r\ndefined as meeting the goals of the movements, which generally align \r\nwith climate adaptation and sustainable resource management. These \r\nrates vary from 10% for negotiated solutions to 34% for court decisions. "


id: d17397f095a295100933923d148f1023
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"It is in these contexts that their capacity to operate simultaneously at \r\nthe interface of multiple networks is particularly valuable for promoting \r\nclimate action. Urban climate policy entrepreneurs can directly engage \r\nwith a range of constituent groups and offer and promote climate \r\nadaptation strategies that can have direct impact on the daily lives of \r\nthese residents and their interests."


id: d15cfcc9ada340c83e9a5d4d4e1cc89a
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"It notes the corresponding higher rates of failure, as well as the costs \r\nborne by the movements, which include criminalisation (20% of cases), \r\nviolence (18%) and assassination (13%). These costs are significantly \r\nhigher for Indigenous communities that engage in these mobilisations."


id: 1c6beea376a82eb31205689de85e3128
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"At a global scale, climate movements succeeded in pressing for the \r\ngreater recognition of the importance of Indigenous knowledge \r\nwithin international agreements (Tormos-Aponte and Garcia-Lopez, \r\n2018) but did not achieve the major reforms of climate finance which \r\nthey sought (Khan et al., 2019a); these differing outcomes reflect the \r\nsensitivity of the issues and the formation of coalitions which supported \r\nor opposed the movements. At national and local scales, one review of \r\nUS cases reports limited effectiveness of climate movements because \r\nof the ability of governmental agencies to co-opt them (Pulido et al., \r\n2016), while another review in Pakistan shows a number of successes, \r\nbecause the movements were able to build alliances with other public \r\nsector and community groups (Shawoo and McDermott, 2020)."


id: 5fe9309c1923fd532214933b4a6f320e
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"As evidence on adaptation implementation grows (Berrang-Ford et al., \r\n2021; Eriksen et al., 2021), there is a need to examine the outcomes of \r\nadaptation (Ford et al., 2011) for effectiveness, adequacy and justice/\r\nequity in both outcomes and process, as well as synergies and trade-offs \r\nwith mitigation, ecosystem functioning and other societal goals. There \r\nis also a growing recognition of the observed and potential negative \r\nconsequences of some adaptation interventions, often referred to as \r\nmaladaptation (Juhola et  al., 2016; Magnan et  al., 2016; Schipper, \r\n2020; Eriksen et  al., 2021). This section advances a new framing to \r\nallow for an improved assessment of the potential positive or negative \r\noutcomes of adaptation options, therefore allowing navigation of the \r\nadaptation-maladaptation continuum."


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"Maladaptation refers to current or potential negative consequences \r\nof adaptation-related responses that lead to an increase in the climate \r\nvulnerability of a system, sector or group (Barnett and O'Neill, 2010) \r\nby exacerbating or shifting vulnerability or exposure now or in the \r\nfuture (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2014; Noble et al., 2014; Juhola et al., 2016; \r\nMagnan et al., 2020) and eroding sustainable development (Juhola \r\net  al., 2016). Conceptually, maladaptation differs from 'failed' or "


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"Box 17.3 | Climate Risk Decision-Making in Settlements: From Incrementalism to \r\nTransformational Adaptation"


id: b7cf7f3a4ced9e1989c6de06c21a06b2
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"Cities are important sites of experimentation where the integration and management of adaptation decision-making complexity often \r\ntakes place. These actions provide early evidence of what aspects of complex climate risk management decision-making functions well, \r\nbut also what does not work (Revi et al., 2020). Cities are seen as locales where case examples of transformative adaptation can be \r\nexamined (Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2018; Vermeulen et al., 2018). Cities act as testbeds of how to integrate climate response into issues \r\nof equity, health, resource allocation and sustainability in ways that utilise innovative use of new and emerging decision-support tools, \r\nmethods and protocols."


id: 6b2d9c026b44254f8513d8a158bd4213
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content:
"Risk management has been an integral part of the community development and settlement building process. Three key sets of drivers \r\ninfluence risk management decision-making in cities (Solecki et al., 2017). These include: (1) root, that is, cultural norms and social \r\ntraditions; (2) context, that is, policy and governance conditions; and (3) proximate, that is, extreme events. Settlements have developed \r\ninformal and formal strategies, including climate protection levels, to respond to local conditions of climate risk and hazards. In formal \r\ncontexts, these strategies are contextualised in local climate change action plans (Araos et al., 2016a; Stults and Woodruff, 2017; Reckien \r\net al., 2018a; Singh et al., 2021) and defined around a set of evaluation tools and methods and building codes, standards and regulations \r\n(see discussion in Section 17.4.4)."


id: 298103ad41393db8be0e29f001b94bc1
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"Climate change has begun to alter the environmental baseline of cities, changing their risk and hazard profiles. In recent years, national \r\nand local risk management can benefit from assessments of current decision-making strategies and from evaluations of opportunities \r\nfor change in risk management policy. These changes can be adjustments of existing policies or transitions to a new policy for current \r\n(i.e., conditions already experienced by getting worse) or emerging risks (i.e., conditions not previously or widely experienced but now \r\nincreasingly present)."


id: 77db619c5eb2371b9b26afb12b0d70c7
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"These circumstances also have revealed potential advances in decision-making by encouraging greater participation, more effective \r\ngeneration and use of information and data, and more prominent inclusion of questions of social and economic equity (Ziervogel et al., \r\n2017; Reckien et al., 2018b; Solecki et al., In Press). Adaptation planning and decision-making, in general, within cities has increasingly \r\nfocused on actively engaging residents in participatory and neighbourhood scale co-production processes (Broto et al., 2015; Sarzynski, \r\n2015; Wamsler, 2017; Foster et  al., 2019). However, engaging residents in risk management and adaptation has not always led to \r\ntransformative decision-making and resiliency, but can at times also reinforce existing maladaptive systems (D'Alisa and Kallis, 2016)."


id: 664bb434f5d3baca51223d36333e11ad
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"Now increasing amounts of data are being collected via surveys or in participatory settings next to advanced methods, such as using \r\ncitizen science, big data and AI, to integrate these social dimensions of climate adaptation decisions in cities in formal models (Abebe \r\net al., 2019; Taberna et al., 2020). Linking to social data on individual decisions, risk perceptions, social norms and governmental policy, \r\nadvanced social models trace and quantify how adaptation in cities evolve and would cumulatively induce transformational change. \r\nAlthough wider application of these models is outstanding, there is opportunity to simulate and learn from the integration of social and \r\nbehavioural data with political and cultural norms (de Koning and Filatova, 2020)."


id: c077513393c1d530fb687b8be30d0b6a
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"Although non-urban areas could in many instances act in the same way as urban areas, the density of people, assets, infrastructure \r\nand economical values drive cities to act as testbeds, implement adaptation and strive for resiliency. Cities are showcases for the larger \r\nenvironmental systems of governments that also support mitigation ambition of national actors and are therefore demanding to be\r\nrecognised as valuable actors in the international negotiations, highlighting their contribution in emissions reductions (Chan et al., 2015; \r\nHale, 2016), such as in the preparation for the first Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement in 2023 (see Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS \r\nin this Chapter)."


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"hazards and the effects of iterative risk management. Unfortunately, \r\nthis temporal dimension is understudied in the literature (including \r\nstudying thresholds or speed), preventing advances on this specific \r\npoint."


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"'unsuccessful' adaptation (Schipper, 2020), which 'describes a failed \r\nadaptation initiative not producing any significant detrimental effect' \r\n(Magnan et al., 2016: 648). Several frameworks have been proposed \r\nto explain and better assess maladaptation (Hallegatte, 2009; Barnett \r\nand O'Neill, 2010; Magnan, 2014; Magnan et al., 2016; Gajjar et al., \r\n2019b). To limit the risk of maladaptation, a common focus of these \r\nframeworks is on intentionally avoiding negative consequences of \r\nadaptation interventions, anticipating detrimental lock-ins and path \r\ndependence, and minimising spatio-temporal trade-offs/ dis-benefits."


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content:
"Although the empirical evidence on current and potential successful \r\nadaptation and maladaptation remains small and fragmented \r\n(Magnan et al., 2020; Berrang-Ford et al., 2021; see Section 17.3.2 in \r\nthis Chapter), the above framing allows for moving a step further in \r\nassessing the potential contribution of a wide range of adaptation\u0002related options to success or maladaptation."


id: 8bc8eee3144949ed1ac9647c41541658
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"The adaptation literature challenges the simplistic dichotomy of \r\ninterventions being either successful or maladaptive (e.g., Moser and \r\nBoykoff, 2013; Singh et al., 2016; Magnan et al., 2020; Schipper, 2020). \r\nThere is no clear-cut boundary between these two categories; rather, \r\nsuccessful adaptation and maladaptation need to be considered as the \r\ntwo ends of a continuum of risk management strategies (Figure 17.10), \r\nemphasising that:"


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"Along the adaptation-maladaptation continuum, adaptation options \r\ncan score high or low on different outcome criteria identified in this \r\nsection such as: benefits to the number of people, benefits to ecosystem \r\nservices, equity outcomes (for marginalised ethnic groups, gender, low\u0002income populations), transformational potential and contribution to \r\nGHG emission reduction (see SM 17.1 for full descriptions). Importantly, \r\nthe outcome of the assessment, and consequently location of a given \r\nadaptation option along this continuum, is dynamic, depending on \r\nmultiple components, including changes in the characteristics of climate "


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"Some options show the dominant influence of certain criteria \r\n(Figure 17.11, central panel rows). For example, 'availability of health \r\ninfrastructure' and 'access to health care' are dominated by the criterion "


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"Figure 17.10 |  Successful adaptation and maladaptation are conceptualised as the two end points of a continuum, with adaptation options being located \r\nalong the continuum based on outcome criteria (how they benefit humans and ecosystems; how they contribute to or hinder equity goals; whether they \r\nenable transformative change to climatic risks; and synergies and trade-offs with climate mitigation). As indicated in SM 17.1 and Figure 17.10, adaptation options \r\nmight rate largely positive and slightly negative across outcome criteria (tending towards successful adaptation), while other adaptation options might have small positive aspects \r\nand larger negative ones across different outcome criteria (tending towards maladaptation). The figure draws on Singh et al. (2016), Magnan et al. (2020) and Schipper (2020)."


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"'greenhouse gas emissions'. Similarly, 'spatial planning' carries a high \r\nrisk of disadvantages to marginalised ethnic and low-income groups. \r\nThis means that these adaptations could be transformed into successful \r\nadaptations more easily than others, if attention is paid to the dominant \r\ncriterion. For example, if health care could be provided with low GHG \r\nemissions, it would move closer towards successful adaptation (high \r\nconfidence). For other options, the criteria's influence is more evenly \r\ndistributed, as illustrated for the 'diversification of livelihoods' and the \r\nthree options to address climate risks to peace and mobility, denoting \r\nmultiple entry points to reduce the risk of maladaptive outcomes for \r\nthese options."


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"Some criteria score highly across a number of options (Figure 17.11, \r\ncentral panel columns), showing that many adaptations do not pay \r\nattention to different trade-offs. For example, particular attention should \r\nbe paid to prioritising benefits to low-income groups and leveraging the \r\ntransformational potential of adaptation (having the largest number of \r\nlarge circles), that is, many evaluated options become maladaptive by \r\nexacerbating the vulnerability of low-income groups and by fortifying \r\nthe status quo (medium confidence). On the contrary, most evaluated \r\nadaptation options are widely applicable across populations (benefits \r\nto humans) and deliver ecosystem services, while some also respect \r\ngender equity (largest number of small bubbles across options). Through \r\nthese criteria, a number of adaptation options contribute to a higher \r\npotential for successful adaptation (high confidence)."


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"The results displayed in Figure 17.11 are not rigorous predictions but \r\nillustrate the maladaptive potential of options based on a synthesis of \r\nliterature from underlying WGII chapters and cross-chapter papers. This "


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"na = Information not available in the literature considered (i.e. essentially from AR6 WGII underlying chapters)"


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"other policies and address long-term risk reduction goals (Table 17.7). \r\nFor a wider discussion of enablers for adaptation and climate risk \r\nmanagement, see Section 17.4."


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"(10%), the elderly (8%), youths (5%), racial and ethnic minorities \r\n(4%), and migrants (4%) were the most frequently considered groups \r\nin adaptation responses. Individuals with disabilities are the least \r\nconsidered, with only 1% of articles including this group. There is a \r\ncategory of 'other' capturing characteristics of social disadvantage \r\nthat are distinct from the categories above. This includes, for example, \r\nspatially marginalised populations (e.g., groups relegated to flood\u0002prone or cyclone-prone areas) and groups marginalised due to marital \r\nstatus or assets (education, farm size and land tenure) (Araos et al., \r\n2021)."


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"Flexible and strong institutions: There is medium confidence that \r\nflexible institutions can enable adoption of new adaptation measures \r\nor course-correct established ones based on ongoing monitoring \r\nand evaluation, which is key to avoiding potential maladaptation \r\n(e.g., Granberg and Glover, 2014, in Australia; Magnan et al., 2016; \r\nTorabi et  al., 2018; Gajjar et  al., 2019a, in India). Cross-sectoral, \r\ncross-jurisdictional and cross-spatial institutional frameworks enable \r\nsuccessful adaptation by improving the ability of societies to respond \r\nto changes in their environment in a timely manner. The latter points \r\nto the vital role of monitoring and evaluation, as the tool to detect \r\nchange in risk and vulnerability, together with environmental or \r\nsocietal conditions determining risk and the effectiveness, efficiency, \r\nadequacy or success of adaptation responses."


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"Distributive equity and justice: Attention to distributional equity \r\nand justice aims to ensure that adaptation interventions do not \r\nexacerbate inequities (Atteridge and Remling, 2018) and that the \r\nbenefits and burdens of interventions are distributed fairly (Tschakert \r\net  al., 2013; Reckien et  al., 2017; Reckien et  al., 2018b; Pelling and \r\nGarschagen, 2019)."


id: 65c198e434e42cbbdd47a45104eb96eb
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"Table 17.7 |  Key factors that enable successful adaptation. The evidence and examples draw on the underlying sectoral and regional chapters as well as a synthesis of adaptation \r\nliterature."


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"Ballon, 2020). Such advances call into question the common reliance \r\non 'objective' indicators defined from an external perspective. Instead, \r\nthey suggest that multiple complementary approaches combined with \r\nhigher-frequency data collection produce a more elaborate picture of \r\nthe effects of adaptation and resilience responses (Jones and d'Errico, \r\n2019; Knippenberg et al., 2019; Singh et al., 2019; Jones, 2019a; see \r\nCross-Chapter Box PROGRESS in this Chapter) (medium confidence)."


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"carried out at certain point in time (OECD, 2002). M&E is an important \r\npart of the adaptation process (Figure  1.9). It can help to generate \r\ninformation on adaptation success or maladaptive outcomes."


id: ca327a1ebe031323afcfa51c392aef3b
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"M&E of adaptation is undertaken for different purposes, including: (1) \r\nunderstanding whether responses have achieved their intended objectives \r\nand contributed to a reduction in climate risks and vulnerability or to \r\nan increase of adaptive capacity and resilience, (2) informing ongoing \r\nimplementation and future responses, and (3) providing upward and \r\ndownward accountability (Preston et al., 2009; UNFCCC, 2010a; Pringle, \r\n2011; Spearman and McGray, 2011). M&E is also commonly linked to \r\nlearning (Section 17.5.2.7). By continuously monitoring implementation, \r\nfor example, to assess whether adaptation is on track or needs to be \r\naccelerated, M&E can aid decision-making under uncertainty. Adaptation \r\nM&E is distinct from tracking financial flows related to adaptation since \r\nfinancial accounting does not provide information on implementation \r\nand outcomes (Section  17.5.2.5; Adaptation Partnership, 2012; World \r\nBank Independent Evaluation Group, 2012)."


id: e86367c170329cda3bc2588f0671cb16
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"Adaptation M&E can be conducted for various purposes and in a wide \r\nvariety of different contexts ranging from the local to the global level \r\n(McKenzie Hedger et al., 2008; UNFCCC, 2010a; Spearman and McGray, \r\n2011). The context and specific purpose of M&E determine what \r\ninformation needs to be generated, and together with the available \r\nresources also determine the suitability of particular approaches and \r\nmethods (Leiter, 2016; Leiter, 2017). Several frameworks and approaches \r\nhave been proposed for M&E of adaptation and climate resilience (Bours \r\net  al., 2014d; Schipper and Langston, 2015; Adaptation Committee, \r\n2016; ODI, 2016; Cai et al., 2018; Gregorowski et al., 2018), including \r\nsector-specific ones for agriculture (FAO, 2017; FAO, 2019a; FAO, 2019b), \r\nhealth (Ebi et  al., 2018), ecosystem-based adaptation (Donatti et  al., \r\n2018; Donatti et al., 2020; GIZ, 2020) and cities (Section 6.4.6)."


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"Adaptation M&E generally seeks to answer whether implementation \r\nis taking place and what effects it has (Figure  17.12). Accordingly, \r\nM&E can focus on the processes, activities and outputs or on their \r\noutcomes and ultimate impacts (Harley et al., 2008; Pringle, 2011; Ford \r\net al., 2013). Most of the available guidance for the development of \r\nadaptation M&E systems is aimed at the household, local or project \r\nlevel (Pringle, 2011; Villanueva, 2012; Olivier et al., 2013; CARE, 2014; \r\nBRACED, 2015; Leiter, 2016; Jones, 2019b) with only limited guidance \r\nfor national or cross-sectoral M&E systems (Price-Kelly et al., 2015) or \r\nframeworks that are applicable at different scales (Brooks et al., 2014). \r\nThe available guidebooks take users through a series of steps which \r\nare synthesised in Figure 17.12."


id: 5236baa446722c7807b711be70fb47f3
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"The majority of adaptation M&E efforts have so far focused on \r\nprocesses and outputs rather than on achieved outcomes such as \r\nclimate risks, vulnerability, well-being or development (Droesch \r\net al., 2008; GIZ and Adelphi, 2017; UNDP Cambodia, 2014; Fawcett \r\net al., 2017) (high confidence) or use a combination thereof (Brooks \r\net al., 2011; Brooks et al., 2014). Newly emerging approaches include \r\nperception-based measurements and the use of data collected via \r\nmobile phones (Jones et al., 2018; Jones, 2019a), which can be collected \r\nfrequently (Clare et  al., 2017a; Knippenberg et  al., 2019; Jones and "


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"The difficulties of assessing adaptation and an emphasis on short-term \r\nresults have contributed to the common practice of relying on easily \r\nquantifiable indicators rather than assessing actual changes, that is, \r\noutcomes and impacts (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, \r\n2012; Fisher et  al., 2015). In fact, indicators used by international \r\nclimate funds largely measure outputs which provide little evidence \r\nof the actual effectiveness of adaptation, that is, its outcomes and \r\nimpacts (GCF Independent Evaluation Unit, 2018; Leiter et al., 2019; \r\nPauw et al., 2020)."


id: 81574a9c359ebe9b0095e19f5136f23e
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"Under the Paris Agreement, countries are encouraged to provide \r\ninformation on adaptation, including its adequacy and effectiveness \r\n(Mohner et al., 2017; Adaptation Committee, 2021). National adaptation \r\nM&E systems can inform both national as well as international \r\nreporting and contribute to the Global Stocktake (see Cross-Chapter \r\nBox  PROGRESS in this Chapter; Craft and Fisher, 2015; Leiter et  al., \r\n2017a). Guidance for and examples of national adaptation progress \r\nassessments are provided by Price-Kelly et  al. (2015), Brooks et  al. \r\n(2014), Brooks et al. (2019), EEA (2015), GIZ (2017), Karani (2018) and \r\nvan Ruth and Schonthaler (2018). Global assessments of adaptation \r\nprogress have so far often focused on adaptation planning and, to a \r\nlesser extent, implementation, while evidence of the collective effect "


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"Tracking the implementation of national adaptation plans is essential for \r\nunderstanding their effectiveness, that is, the progress made in addressing \r\nclimate risks, and can support assessing the success of adaptation and \r\nthe risk of maladaptation. Over 60 countries have developed or started "


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"clarity in concepts and explanatory variables (Dupuis and Biesbroek, \r\n2013; Biesbroek R, 2018a). The trade-off between standardisation and \r\ncontext specificity also complicates attempts to aggregate adaptation \r\nprogress across scales to the national or global level (Leiter and Pringle, \r\n2018; Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS in this Chapter)."


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"of adaptation globally remains limited (high confidence) (UNEP, 2021a; \r\nCross-Chapter Box PROGRESS in this Chapter)."


id: 8652f785bc911d9857fe268a265f3ad7
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"To date, literature has largely focused on aspects prior to implementation \r\nsuch as assessments of climate vulnerability and risks or appraisals of \r\nadaptation options (Sietsma et al., 2021; Cross-Chapter Box Adaptation). \r\nTo understand adaptation progress, the assessment of implemented \r\nadaptation actions and their outcomes requires more attention (very \r\nhigh confidence) (Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS in this Chapter)."


id: a5117fe22a4edb42a44d28d84c3fe11f
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"Adaptation finance tracking is capturing the financial flows associated \r\nwith adaptation. It can indicate how much is being spent on \r\nadaptation, where funds are going to and whether spending matches \r\nallocated budgets. Thus, adaptation finance tracking can provide useful \r\ninformation for decision-making, but it does not provide information \r\non the achievements resulting from the invested funds. Accordingly, \r\nit can complement, but not substitute, M&E of actions and outcomes. \r\nAdaptation finance tracking can be applied domestically (Guzman \r\net  al., 2017; Guzman et  al., 2018) as well as internationally, for \r\ninstance by developed countries to report on the goal to mobilise USD \r\n100 billion yr-1 by 2020 in climate finance (UNFCCC SCF, 2018). Data \r\non adaptation finance can be used alongside information on planning \r\nand implementation to assess adaptation progress (UNEP, 2021a)."


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"Outcomes on risk reduction are typically expressed in ways that are \r\nspecific to the respective sector or context (e.g., as agricultural yields, \r\nhealth benefits or reduced water stress) highlighting that 'adaptation \r\nhas no common reference metrics in the same way that tonnes of \r\nGHGs or radiative forcing values are for mitigation' (IPCC, 2014: \r\n856). Assessments of adaptation progress therefore need to specify \r\nwhat they are measuring and how they are measuring it. The way \r\nadaptation is conceptualised, for example as a continuum between \r\nsuccessful adaptation and maladaptation (Section  17.1.1), and the \r\nway adaptation is framed, for example as a technical challenge or \r\na political process (Juhola et al., 2011; Bassett and Fogelman, 2013; \r\nEriksen et  al., 2015), shape the understanding of progress and its \r\nsubsequent measurement (Singh et al., 2021)."


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"Furthermore, people can be differently affected even in the same \r\nlocation owing to, among others, differential vulnerability among \r\nthe population (Reckien and Petkova, 2019; Thomas et  al., 2019). \r\nDifferent views and values can also affect what it means to adapt \r\n(Few et al., 2021). Assessments of adaptation progress therefore need \r\nto be transparent and reflective about how they define and measure \r\nadaptation and account for culturally and geographic contingent \r\nconcepts of what it means to adapt in light of the global diversity of \r\nlivelihoods and concepts."


id: 334fc5f493f4a9fa1f930c71a356c10f
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"The lack of knowledge on adaptation progress is associated with further \r\nmeasurement challenges, including that avoided impacts are difficult \r\nto measure and that risk levels change over time, meaning what is \r\neffective today may not be effective in the future (Brooks et al., 2011; \r\nPringle, 2011; Spearman and McGray, 2011; Villanueva, 2012; Bours \r\net al., 2014a). Moreover, adaptation is embedded in complex political \r\nand social realities where power and politics shape outcomes and \r\nwhere simplistic views of how adaptation would take place may be ill\u0002conceived (Nightingale, 2017; Mikulewicz, 2018; Mikulewicz, 2020). In \r\npractice, this means that theories of change of adaptation projects may \r\nmiss important causes of risks and could subsequently lead to inaccurate \r\nassessments (Forsyth, 2018). Measuring adaptation is therefore a matter \r\nof understanding drivers of vulnerability and risk and of designing \r\nresponses and M&E systems accordingly (UNFCCC, 2019a, section V)."


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"The importance of context and the dependence on viewpoints \r\nmake comparative assessments of adaptation across nations, \r\nregions or responses challenging. Comparison requires a consistent \r\nconceptualisation of adaptation, comparable units of analysis and \r\naccess to relevant data sets (Ford et al., 2015; Ford and Berrang-Ford, \r\n2016). Comparative adaptation policy assessments to date often lack "


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"Table 17.8 |  Countries in different stages of developing or operating a national adaptation M&E system as of 1 August 2021 (Source: Leiter, 2021b). Countries can appear twice \r\nif they have published both a progress report and an evaluation."


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"Authors: Matthias Garschagen (Germany), Timo Leiter (Germany/UK), Robbert Biesbroek (the Netherlands), Alexandre K. Magnan (France), \r\nDiana Reckien (the Netherlands/Germany), Mark New (South Africa), Lea Berrang-Ford (UK/Canada), So Min Cheong (Republic of Korea), \r\nLisa Schipper (Sweden/USA), Robert Lempert (USA)."


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"This Cross-Chapter Box responds to a growing demand for assessing global climate change adaptation progress, which currently faces \r\nthe challenge of lacking consensus on how adaptation progress at this level can be tracked (high confidence). The box therefore assesses \r\nthe rationale and methodological approaches for understanding adaptation progress globally across sectors and regions. It discusses \r\nstrengths and weaknesses of existing approaches and sources of information, with a view towards informing the first Global Stocktake \r\nof the Paris Agreement in 2023."


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"Rationale for assessing adaptation progress at the global level\r\nGlobal assessments of adaptation are expected to help answer key questions of climate policy (Ford et al., 2015; UNEP, 2017; Adaptation \r\nCommittee, 2021) (limited evidence, high agreement), including: Do the observed, collective investments in adaptation lead humanity \r\nto being better able to avoid or reduce the negative consequences from climate change? Where is progress being made, and what gaps \r\nremain in the global adaptation response to climate risks?"


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"Assessing global progress on adaptation is therefore of high relevance to the scientific community, policymakers and other actors. Global \r\nassessments serve different information needs than local assessments, and their meaningfulness depends on the chosen approaches and \r\ntheir limitations. Aggregated global assessments of adaptation progress are therefore not meant to substitute place-specific ones but to \r\ncomplement them to enhance the knowledge base on adaptation beyond actions by or within individual countries. The Paris Agreement \r\nstipulates a Global Stocktake to be undertaken every 5 years to assess the collective progress towards its long-term goals, including "


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"on adaptation (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 14). Yet very few scientific studies have addressed the adaptation-specific aspects of the Global \r\nStocktake (Craft and Fisher, 2018; Tompkins et al., 2018), and there are different views and options on how assessing global progress \r\ncould take place (high confidence)."


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"Considerations in designing global adaptation assessments\r\nA number of key considerations for the design of global adaptation assessment approaches are discussed in the literature (Ford and \r\nBerrang-Ford, 2016; Berrang-Ford et al., 2017). Some of these involve trade-offs, such as global applicability versus context specificity, for \r\nwhich there is no simple solution. Design considerations directly depend on the objectives of global adaptation assessments, which can \r\ndiffer between actors and can include, for example, providing transparency, enabling accountability, understanding effectiveness or guiding \r\npolicy development (Section 17.5.2.1). The underlying objectives determine the suitability of approaches and the data requirements."


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"Global assessments may have the objective to compare adaptation over time and across sectors and regions (Ford et al., 2015). Such \r\ncomparison requires a consistent definition of concepts (Hall, 2017; Berrang-Ford et al., 2019) and the identification of variables that \r\nare both generic enough to be applicable from one context to another and specific enough to illustrate national circumstances. To date, \r\nfinding such balance has proven to be challenging (Dupuis and Biesbroek, 2013). The context dependence of adaptation outcomes poses \r\nlimits for meaningful comparisons. Even people exposed to the same climate hazard may be differentially affected due to varying levels \r\nof vulnerability and resilience (Jones et al., 2018; Thomas et al., 2019), meaning that perceptions on adaptation outcomes can also differ \r\n(Jones and d'Errico, 2019)."


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"The aggregation of data from local or regional to global scales can take different forms ranging from qualitative synthesis to quantitative \r\naggregation, which may involve condensing a diverse set of variables into a single score (Leiter, 2015; Section 17.5.2.3). In contrast to \r\nclimate change mitigation, adaptation does not have a global reference metric against which adaptation levels could be assessed to \r\nidentify progress or gaps. Experience from the Global Environment Facility, for example, has shown that mechanical aggregation based \r\non standardised indicators fails to capture what makes the greatest difference on the ground (Chen and Uitto, 2014)."


id: 5b9e958fe248934ff90e39c0435fde15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Adaptation progress at any spatial scale can in principle be assessed in terms of input (e.g., resources spent), process (i.e., the way \r\nadaptation is organised), output (i.e., adaptation capacities and actions) and outcomes (i.e., actual changes induced) (Section 17.5.2.2). \r\nDue to the challenges inherent in measuring adaptation outcomes (Sections 16.3, 17.5.1 and 17.5.2.5), most global assessments to \r\ndate have focused on outputs, such as whether countries have adopted adaptation plans (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021; UNEP, 2021a) (high \r\nconfidence). Understanding the effectiveness of adaptation responses globally requires a way to conceptualise and capture outcomes, \r\nfor example in terms of effective climate risk reduction, while avoiding simplifications that mask maladaptation at the global level, \r\nsuch as where climate risks are shifted to other countries, sectors or population groups (Cross-Chapter Box INTERREG in Chapter 16, \r\nSection 17.5.1)."


id: 9d59552cd79cfda7ae2814a8ce53757e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Assessment of existing approaches to assess adaptation progress at the global level\r\nOnly few global assessments of adaptation progress across sectors have been undertaken to date (high confidence). They focus, for \r\nexample, on whether countries have progressed their adaptation policies and actions over time (Lesnikowski et al., 2015; Nachmany \r\net al., 2019b), the extent of implemented adaptation globally (Leiter, 2021a; Leiter, 2021b), and the type and actors of responses (Berrang\u0002Ford et al., 2021), evidence for reduced vulnerability to climate-related hazards (Formetta and Feyen, 2019; UNDRR, 2019) or adaptation \r\nplanning in cities across the globe (Araos et al., 2016a; Reckien et al., 2018a; Olazabal et al., 2019a). Each of these assessments draws "


id: 6ec0deed312259d17fe3cfbfefca0850
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"on different approaches and data, and all have particular potential but also limitations (Table Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS.1) (high \r\nconfidence). The application of differing approaches shows that there is no single 'best' approach or data source to assess global progress \r\non adaptation (high confidence). Existing global assessments have provided valuable insights into the extent and types of responses and \r\ntheir level of planning and implementation (Section 16.3.2.4). However, they do not provide comprehensive and robust answers so far on \r\nwhether climate risk and vulnerability have been reduced (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021) (high confidence). As a result, combining different \r\napproaches and integrating data on climate risk levels, policy measures, implemented actions and their effects on climate risk reduction \r\nis currently regarded as the most robust approach (Berrang-Ford et al., 2019) (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 278eab7cecb8a101b2cc5d05a1b831a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Table Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS.1 |  Key approaches and data sources used for global adaptation assessments."


id: 1ed39c3ba5c95940cd1f8f7aa1b5e4a4
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"The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) introduced a methodology to track the amount of bilateral official development \r\nassistance (ODA) that is targeting climate change mitigation and/or adaptation. It distinguishes whether activities have adaptation as a \r\n'principal' objective (score '2'), as a 'significant' objective (score '1') or as not targeting it (score '0') (OECD, 2016). The associated project \r\nvalue is counted in full, in part, or not counted as adaptation finance, respectively. Countries count the volume of partial adaptation \r\nprojects (score '1') to a different extent, which limits comparability and can lead to over-reporting (OECD, 2019). The first data on this \r\n'adaptation marker' became available in 2012 for the financial flows of 2010. It forms the basis for developed countries' reporting to the \r\nUNFCCC Secretariat on their financial commitments towards developing countries (Weikmans and Roberts, 2019)."


id: 25bef8c3a3f519124039b64accdfab90
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"While a guidebook with requirements for adaptation as a principle or significant objective has been developed (OECD, 2016), several \r\nstudies have shown that OECD DAC donors tend to overestimate the number of activities in their portfolio that genuinely have adaptation \r\nobjectives (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011; Weikmans et al., 2017; CARE, 2021). Hence, the amount of adaptation finance from \r\npublic sources may be lower than reported. The use of just three categories leads to a broad range of the extent of adaptation being \r\nconcentrated in the middle category ('significant objective'). Accordingly, the category 'principle objective adaptation' provides a more \r\nrobust predictor of the relevance of an activity to adaptation (Donner et al., 2016)."


id: 18631a6d62dd84315e6c65e3a81b1e93
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"Good coverage of adaptation finance data exists around international \r\npublic finance flows, predominantly official development assistance \r\nflows from OECD DAC members and from multi-lateral development \r\nbanks. Less data exist around domestic public finance and private \r\nfinance flows to adaptation activities, but data sources continue to \r\nbe further expanded, for example through climate change expenditure \r\ntagging and city-level data (Weikmans et al., 2017; UNFCCC SCF, 2018; \r\nRichmond et  al., 2021). Recent estimates of adaptation finance are \r\nprovided in UNFCCC SCF (2018), Macquarie et al. (2020) and Cross\u0002Chapter Box FAR in this Chapter."


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"Different types of evaluations are appropriate for different evaluation \r\nquestions (Silvestrini et al., 2015). Evaluations of the available evidence \r\nof effective adaptation, in particular topics or sectors, have emerged \r\nmore recently, for instance on mainstreaming (Runhaar et al., 2018) and \r\nagricultural climate services (Vaughan et al., 2019a). Impact evaluations \r\nof capacity building measures are important because capacity building \r\nis assumed to lead to adaptation, but its actual effects are seldom \r\nexamined (Mortreux and Barnett, 2017; Alpizar F and Meiselman, \r\n2019). If well designed and utilised for learning, evaluations can play \r\nan important role in improving adaptation responses (Hilden, 2011)."


id: ead55a8ff4aa0d352fff5048c1cfc916
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"Learning requires information about how and why change occurred and \r\nwhat experiences have been made (Feinstein, 2012). M&E is frequently \r\nassociated with learning, but it is rarely made explicit how learning \r\nis supposed to take place (Armitage et al., 2008; Baird et al., 2015; \r\nBorras and Holund, 2015). The design of adaptation M&E systems can \r\nsupport learning by gathering relevant information and disseminating \r\nit in a way that is accessible and effectively linked to decision-making \r\nprocesses (Spearman and McGray, 2011; Villanueva, 2012; Fisher \r\net al., 2015). Options include institutionalised feedback mechanisms, \r\npeer learning and knowledge sharing events, a learning culture and \r\nways to gather in-depth insights beyond indicators (ibid; Oswald and \r\nTaylor, 2010). Since AR5, adaptation programmes and funds such as "


id: 385c40483420abdd7932a61e89c18f7c
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"Most adaptation M&E frameworks and tools proposed to date refer \r\nto monitoring rather than evaluation (high confidence) (Adaptation \r\nCommittee, 2016). Evaluations are envisioned to go beyond monitoring \r\nby examining how and why results have been achieved and what could \r\nbe improved (Brousselle and Buregeya, 2018; Vahamaki and Verger, \r\n2019). Evaluations of adaptation outcomes are still rare, particularly \r\nquantitative impact evaluations (Weldegebriel and Prowse, 2013; Das, \r\n2019; Bene et  al., 2020). Impact evaluations of adaptation need to \r\naddress several methodological as well as practical challenges (Dinshaw \r\net  al., 2014; Fisher et  al., 2015; Bene et  al., 2017; Puri et  al., 2020). "


id: 9431ef74a239e03aa5b914b1f9091bd3
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"the BRACED programme, the Adaptation Fund, the Climate Investment \r\nFunds and the Green Climate Fund have created knowledge-sharing \r\nunits and provide resources to support learning activities (BRACED, \r\n2015; Roehrer and Kouadio, 2015; Adaptation Fund, 2016; Leavy et al., \r\n2018; CIF, 2020; Puri et al., 2020), but there is little information about \r\ntheir longer-term effectiveness."


id: 81b19b171ef009426e24f5840f0da9ef
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"(Section  11.3.6), Central and South America (Section  12.5.6), Europe \r\n(Section  13.7.2), North America (Section  14.6.1) and Small Islands \r\n(Section 15.6.2), and poverty and livelihoods in Africa (Section 9.11.3), \r\nAsia (Sections  10.4.5, 10.5), Australasia (Section  11.4), Central and \r\nSouth America (Section 12.5.7), Europe (Section 13.8.2), North America \r\n(Section 14.6.1) and Small Islands (Section 15.3.4)."


id: 4fa5cd24aa67b0a339d60ba60ea15152
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"These examples demonstrate that the emergence of climate risks can \r\nbe at different rates and different time horizons, and the interactions \r\nbetween risks vary from region to region (very high confidence). \r\nThe need to manage these risks in an integrated manner is readily \r\nidentified in the water-energy-food nexus (Box  9.5). However, in \r\nterms of climate resilient development, the need for integration is \r\ndemonstrated by the diverse and interacting impacts of climate risks \r\non ecosystems (Sections 2.7, 3.6), cities (Sections 6.2.3, 6.2.4, Boxes \r\n6.2, 6.3), health (Section 7.4), and poverty and livelihoods (Section 8.6)."


id: f97ed97be491b58951d28db72786fb4b
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"Since WGII AR5, new methods for simultaneously considering multiple \r\nsocietal and sectoral objectives, climate risks and adaptation options \r\nhave emerged (Section 17.3.2; Adam et al., 2014; Hadka et al., 2015; \r\nGarner et al., 2016; Rosenzweig et al., 2017; Giupponi and Gain, 2017a; \r\nStelzenmuller et al., 2018; Marchau et al., 2019), including methods \r\nfor accounting for different sources of uncertainty and types of risk \r\n(Section 17.3.1; Giupponi and Gain, 2017a). Different decision-making \r\napproaches can be complementary (high confidence) (Section 17.3.1; \r\nKwakkel et al., 2016), and multiple approaches will likely be necessary \r\nin managing the risks across sectors, over different spatial scales, and \r\nover short to long time scales (medium confidence) (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox PROGRESS in this Chapter; Girard et al., 2015; Rouillard and Spray, \r\n2016)."


id: f33ab644547cb34f78bfa6526d5efd16
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"Deciding on which adaptations to adopt when managing climate \r\nrisks inevitably needs examination of trade-offs in outcomes (very \r\nhigh confidence) (Sections 17.3.1, 17.5.1; Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB \r\nin Chapter 18). A current difficulty with integrated assessments is to \r\ndevelop a set of metrics that are appropriately scaled for the different \r\nsectors or outcomes to be compared (e.g., Sections 12.5.2.6, 17.3.1, \r\n17.5.2; Cross-Chapter Box  PROGRESS in this Chapter). For climate \r\nresilient development, dimensions of poverty, equity, justice and health \r\nneed to be factored into analyses (Boxes 17.1, 17.5), many of which \r\nare difficult to quantify (high confidence) (Section 18.2.4). Moreover, \r\nuncertainties on the interactions within and between sectors can \r\nmake trade-off analyses uneven in their precision across sectors and \r\nuncertain as to the outcome of an implemented adaptation (medium \r\nconfidence) (Sections 4.7.2, 17.4, 17.5)."


id: 666023ddcfa81179a8625233344af559
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"Expertise and resources for using tools and approaches for integrated \r\nrisk management vary between the developed and developing \r\ncountries (high confidence) (e.g., Section  4.7.2). Exploration of \r\nadaptation scenarios can be derived from Earth System Models (high \r\nconfidence) (e.g., Sections 4.7.1.2, 11.7.3.1). However, the feasibility \r\nof possible adaptations and the degree to which they are likely to be \r\neffective (Box  17.1) will require further exploration as success will "


id: 90e22420e7ddf23148e2e9b375562dd4
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"Hence, satisfactorily managing intersecting climate risks in different \r\nsettings, of which RKRs provide examples, is central to achieving \r\nsustainable development (high confidence) (Section 16.6.4), requiring \r\nintegrated risk management within and across regions, jurisdictions, \r\nsectors and ecosystems (high confidence) (see CCP5.4.2, CCP5.4.3). \r\nIterative processes will enable measuring progress and updating \r\nadaptation at a satisfactory rate, to account for the different needs \r\nwithin regions and across sectors at different times (high confidence). \r\nThe degree to which equity and justice will be achieved will be \r\ndetermined by the participatory processes in deciding on suitable \r\nadaptation options, the investment in the adaptation processes and \r\nthe coordination and collaboration built among institutions and people \r\nacross regions (high confidence)."


id: a11abbfe2ef6d025dfd99673ca768cd1
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"This chapter has assessed and detailed a number of decision-making \r\ntools (Section 17.3) and enabling mechanisms and catalysing conditions \r\n(Section 17.4) that could be used in mainstreaming the management \r\nof climate risk and adaptation in the sustainable development of \r\ncommunities, different sectors and nations. Since AR5, the challenges \r\nfacing the management of climate risks have been articulated (Adger \r\net  al., 2018; Balasubramanian, 2018), and greater clarity on the \r\nsteps that could be taken to better mainstream adaptation has been \r\ndeveloped (high confidence) (Cuevas, 2016; Giupponi and Gain, 2017a; \r\nGomez-Echeverri, 2018; Sanchez Rodriguez et al., 2018). Nevertheless, \r\nthe choice of decision processes is recognised as being dependent on \r\na variety of local factors influencing development (Ayers et al., 2014; \r\nSzabo et al., 2016)."


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"Adaptation strategies or plans, some of which incorporate elements \r\nof climate resilient development, have been developed in many \r\njurisdictions from local (Cuevas, 2016; Araos et  al., 2016a; Reckien \r\net al., 2018a; Gopfert et al., 2019) to provincial/state (Warnken and \r\nMosadeghi, 2018) to national governments (Markolf et  al., 2015; \r\nCSIRO, 2018; Warnken and Mosadeghi, 2018; Brown et  al., 2018a; \r\nTable 17.8). National Adaptation Plans have been a requirement under \r\nthe UNFCCC and establish the general approach taken by nations for \r\nadapting to climate change (Woodruff and Regan, 2019). Integrated \r\nrisk assessments and adaptation processes are being developed but \r\nwith much less experience evident in their implementation (high \r\nconfidence) (Wise et al., 2014; Woodruff and Stults, 2016; Brown et al., \r\n2018a)."


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"FAQ 17.1 | Which guidelines, instruments and resources are available for decision makers to recognise climate risks \r\nand decide on the best course of action?"


id: 9ef27088376506586b5343e6de4659bd
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"A great challenge for decision makers is how to choose effective options when the future is uncertain. Uncertainty \r\ncan arise not just in the statistical error of the magnitude of risk but also in the nature and consequence of risk from \r\nuncertainty about mechanisms that link areas of concern to hazards, uncertainty in the decision processes themselves \r\nand so on. Methods are available to help develop no-regret options, commonly referred to as decision-making \r\nunder conditions of deep uncertainty'."


id: c21c9626dcdb8040f43fb95c819c29da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Managing uncertainty with forward-looking processes needs to be more deliberative and oriented towards building \r\ntrust in a collaborative process. Building relationships through informal, bottom-up processes enables this to occur. \r\nTop-down planning processes are important for ensuring that the management of risks and opportunities do not \r\nend up with maladaptations and that the approaches are equitable and proportional to that which is needed to \r\nmanage the risks."


id: de75e33b68e05a12941a1668e2257e59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"What do we mean by 'climate finance'?\r\nThe UNFCCC has no formally agreed upon definition of climate finance. The current IPCC definition is: 'the financial \r\nresources devoted to addressing climate change by all public and private actors from global to local scales, including international financial \r\nflows to developing countries to assist them in addressing climate change' (see Annex II: Glossary)."


id: ff227083062447f1bdf2b93aa54a317a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Financial resources might be needed for a range of adaptation and resilience building activities. These include \r\nresearch, education and capacity building; development of laws, regulations and standards; provision of climate \r\nservices and other information; reducing the vulnerability of existing assets, activities and services; and ensuring \r\nfuture development--such as new infrastructure, settlements, health services and business activities--is climate \r\nresilient. Finance is also needed to recover and rebuild from the damage of climate hazards that cannot be \r\ncompletely avoided through adaptation. Adaptation actions can be undertaken by many different actors, alone or \r\nin partnership, including national and sub-national governments, public and private utilities, businesses of varying \r\nsize, communities, households and individuals."


id: 4ccbfeeb60c25cbf1b03767b12400374
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"Table FAQ17.2.1 |  Examples of adaptation and resilience activities that might need to be financed"


id: f19b3270d990f310f855b2a8b94ffa1
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"How much finance is needed?\r\nThe amount of adaptation finance depends on global, regional and local factors, including: the amount and timing \r\nof global warming, and how this translates into impacts and adaptation needs across the world; the levels of \r\nadaptation already in place; the type of risk being adapted to; and the adaptation options being chosen, including \r\nwhether the adaptation required is incremental or transformational."


id: cdfea6c8993cfc52c5a7e0d4bef900e0
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"The most-mentioned figure for finance need is the developed countries' commitment to provide USD 100 billion per \r\nyear by 2020 to support developing countries' efforts in mitigation and adaptation. Negotiations will start in 2021 \r\non updating this amount for 2025. While sometimes thought to represent the actual cost of responding to climate \r\nchange in developing countries, this is not the case. More recent estimates of the global cost of adaptation by 2030 \r\nacross developed and developing countries range between about USD 80 and 300 billion per year."


id: cb295a91ae38cef6419bb15513fc3b8f
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"What types of finance are available?\r\nFour main types (or instruments) of finance are currently being used to support adaptation. These different types \r\nare not mutually exclusive; grants can be combined with loans to provide blended finance."


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"Grants are useful for a range of adaptation actions where it is hard to generate a financial return. These include \r\ncapacity-building activities, piloting new adaptation innovations, high-risk investment settings or projects where \r\nthere are considerable non-financial benefits. In contrast, loans and other debt instruments can often support \r\nlarger investments, for example for scaling out of successful pilot projects or for building adaptation and resilience \r\ninto general development investment. To date, a large proportion of international climate finance for adaptation \r\nin developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania, has been grant led, sourced from OECD \r\npublic funds, indicating that in many instances financing via loans is either considered too risky by the commercial \r\ninvestment sector or it has been hard to demonstrate sufficient return on investment."


id: 30e56e6ac31cc480c3efdbc1476fd19f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"FAQ 17.3 | Why is adaptation planning along a spectrum from incremental to transformational adaptation \r\nimportant in a warming world?"


id: 6aa7d8f2cd385375393fb8865682e643
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"FAQ 17.4 | Given the existing state of adaptation, and the remaining risks that are not being managed, who bears \r\nthe burden of these residual risks around the world?"


id: 997e3ee55b96d8659b732f708cb27734
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Adaptation aims to reduce exposure and vulnerability to climate change by responding to dynamic and multi-scalar \r\ncombinations of climatic risks. What might be seen as successful at one scale or at one point in time might not be \r\nat another, particularly if climate risks continue to rise. Moreover, the benefits of adaptation interventions may not \r\nreach all intended beneficiaries or everyone affected by climate impact and risk, causing different people to have \r\ndifferent views on how successful adaptation has been."


id: d544e3ff30036151876fdd415bf5c5fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"There is, therefore, no universal way to measure adaptation success, but there is high agreement that success is \r\nassociated with a reduction of climate risks and vulnerabilities (for humans and ecosystems) and an equitable \r\nbalancing of synergies and trade-offs across diverse objectives, perspectives, expectations and values. Adaptation \r\nthat is successful is also commonly expected to be inclusive of different socioeconomic groups, especially the most \r\nvulnerable, and to be based on flexible and integrative planning processes that take into account different climate \r\nscenarios."


id: 77c88040871c80cf12fa4cc865d70cb6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Assessments of adaptation need to be transparent about how they are measuring success. Monitoring and \r\nEvaluation (M&E) can be used to track progress and evaluate success and to identify if course corrections during \r\nadaptation implementation are needed to achieve the envisaged objectives. Given the diversity of adaptation \r\nactions and contexts, no one-size-fits-all approach to M&E and no common reference metrics for adaptation exist. \r\nTo date, assessments of progress of adaptation have often focused on processes and outputs (i.e., actions taken, \r\nsuch as adaptation plans adopted) that are easier to measure than the effects of these actions in terms of long-term \r\nreduction of risks and vulnerabilities. However, knowledge about the outcomes in terms of reducing climate risk, \r\nimpact and vulnerability is critically required to know if adaptation has been successful."


id: 99587b31359ff23205a15fbf7359c00d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Figure FAQ17.5.1 |  Contribution of adaptation options to potentially successful adaptation and to the risk of maladaptation. Note: A similar \r\nfigure is part of Section 17.5.1."


id: 890c41cd22d1aa310bea3a262033bbd2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Coordinating Lead Authors: E. Lisa F. Schipper (Sweden/UK), Aromar Revi (India), Benjamin L. \r\nPreston (Australia/USA)"


id: c710988382f7e936dfcac70e97e768b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"Lead Authors: Edward. R. Carr (USA), Siri H. Eriksen (Norway), Luis R. Fernandez-Carril (Mexico), \r\nBruce Glavovic (South Africa/New Zealand), Nathalie J.M. Hilmi (France/Monaco), Debora Ley \r\n(Mexico/Guatemala), Rupa Mukerji (India/Switzerland), M. Silvia Muylaert de Araujo (Brazil), \r\nRosa Perez (Philippines), Steven K. Rose (USA), Pramod K. Singh (India)"


id: 8b2adcdecd53a118230e9cebb463af3f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Schipper, E.L.F., A. Revi, B.L. Preston, E.R. Carr, S.H. Eriksen, L.R. Fernandez-Carril, B.C. Glavovic, N.J.M. Hilmi, D. Ley, \r\nR. Mukerji, M.S. Muylaert de Araujo, R. Perez, S.K. Rose, and P.K. Singh, 2022: Climate Resilient Development Pathways. \r\nIn: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment \r\nReport of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Portner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, \r\nK. Mintenbeck, A. Alegria, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Loschke, V. Moller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University \r\nPress, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA, pp. 2655-2807, doi:10.1017/9781009325844.027."


id: 5d512be87de3389876086ed4355dc2db
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"FAQ 18.2 | What is climate resilient development \r\nand how can climate change adaptation (measures) \r\ncontribute to achieving this?  2734"


id: 3946ba1d223de216efe2936980d65029
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"FAQ 18.3 | How can different actors across society \r\nand levels of government be empowered to pursue \r\nclimate resilient development?  2736"


id: 661851dee2e65028b9c0d22856f213d1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"FAQ 18.4 | What role do transitions and transformations \r\nin energy, urban and infrastructure, industrial, \r\nland and ocean ecosystems, and in society, play in \r\nclimate resilient development?  2736"


id: 496fd59f0643f72f35c7562357f5b695
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"FAQ 18.5 | What are success criteria in climate resilient \r\ndevelopment and how can actors satisfy those \r\ncriteria?  2737"


id: e0ae7f6516c2db1bac3c38bec527973e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB | Feasibility Assessment of \r\nAdaptation Options: An Update of the SR1.5  2769"


id: f60ded2782fd3a2c33f0ec432fda1ebd
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content:
"Prospects for transformation towards CRD increase when key \r\ngovernance actors work together in inclusive and constructive \r\nways to create a set of appropriate enabling conditions \r\n{Section  18.4.2} (high confidence). These enabling conditions \r\ninclude effective governance and information flow, policy frameworks "


id: 150cd6a3b534aea6ade5ab898a360f2e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"and education and training that currently limit their implementation \r\nto certain settings {Section  18.5}. Notwithstanding national and \r\nregional differences, development practices that are aligned to people, \r\nprosperity, partnerships, peace and the planet, as defined in Agenda \r\n2030, could enable more CRD {Figure 18.1}."


id: da6badb5401c9edbac04620f863ed9e6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"that incentivise sustainability solutions; adequate financing for \r\nadaptation, mitigation and sustainable development; institutional \r\ncapacity; science, technology and innovation; monitoring and \r\nevaluation of climate resilient development policies, programmes \r\nand practices; and international cooperation. Investment in social \r\nand technological innovation could generate the knowledge and \r\nentrepreneurship needed to catalyse system transitions and their \r\ntransfer. The implementation of policies that incentivise the deployment \r\nof low-carbon technologies and practices within specific sectors such \r\nas energy, buildings and agriculture could accelerate greenhouse gas \r\nmitigation and deployment of climate-resilient infrastructure in urban \r\nand rural areas. Civic engagement is an important element of building \r\nsocietal consensus and reducing barriers to action on adaptation, \r\nmitigation and sustainable development {Section 18.4}."


id: 77e87a8bbe7b1cfa3bc82206796363b2
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"This chapter therefore focuses on assessing this more recent literature \r\nand the diverse scientific understandings of CRD and the pathways \r\nfor pursuing it. Notably, this chapter takes off where Chapters 16 \r\nand 17 end: recognising the decision-making context to address the \r\nrepresentative key risks and their intersections with development, \r\namong others. This chapter therefore highlights not only how climate \r\nrisk undermines CRD, but also how current patterns of development \r\ncontribute to climate risk, both generally and in different sectoral and \r\nregional contexts. In particular, this chapter focuses on achieving CRD \r\nthrough systems transitions, discussing these in relation to societal \r\ntransformation, and how different actors engage one another in order \r\nto pursue policy and practice consistent with CRD."


id: 3bd519be327a3670ea7429f27f5bd0c0
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"Past, present and future concentrations of greenhouse gases in the \r\natmosphere are the direct result of both natural and anthropogenic \r\ngreenhouse gas emissions which are, in turn, a function of past and \r\ncurrent patterns of human and economic development (very high \r\nconfidence, WGI SPM [IPCC, 2021b]). This includes development \r\nprocesses that drive land use change, extractive industries, \r\nmanufacturing and trade, energy production, food production, \r\ninfrastructure development and transportation. These patterns of \r\ndevelopment are therefore drivers of current and future climate risk \r\nto specific sectors, regions and populations (Byers et  al., 2018), as "


id: 94190e9f3ceb853aff36492b1a309203
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content:
"well as the demand for both mitigation and adaptation as a means of \r\npreventing climate change from undermining development goals. The \r\nSDGs represent targets for supporting human and ecological well-being \r\nin a sustainable manner. Yet, while progress is being made towards a \r\nnumber of the SDGs, success in achieving all of the SDGs by 2030 \r\nacross all global regions remains uncertain (high agreement, medium \r\nevidence) (United Nations, 2021). Moreover, current commitments to \r\nreduce greenhouse gas emissions are not yet consistent with limiting \r\nchanges in global mean temperature elevation to well-below 2degC or \r\n1.5degC (very high confidence) (IPCC, 2018a) (see also Section 18.2)."


id: 74e9c610b82dc1e05807f8ea268a6b7
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"a background of autonomous developments, leading to a specific \r\nfuture situation' (Haasnoot et  al., 2013; Bourgeois, 2015). As such, \r\na pathway represents changes over time in response to policies and \r\npractices, as well spontaneous and exogenous events. For example, \r\nthe SR1.5 report suggested that CRD pathways are 'a conceptual and \r\naspirational idea for steering societies towards low-carbon, prosperous \r\nand ecologically safe futures' (Roy et  al., 2018: 468), and a way to \r\nhighlight the complexity of decision making processes at different \r\nlevels. Here, consistent with the aforementioned definition of CRD, we \r\ndefine CRD pathways as development trajectories that successfully \r\nintegrate mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development."


id: 9567de97feffe09d985e44a33cff7e9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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"One approach for operationalising the concept of CRD in a decision \r\nmaking context is to link the concept of CRD to that of pathways \r\n(Figure  18.1). A pathway can be defined as 'a trajectory in time, \r\nreflecting a particular sequence of actions and consequences against "


id: 52ef2b01df7b8b336a88faf62809ab59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:24
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content:
"This understanding of CRD implies that different actors--governments, \r\nbusinesses and civic organisations--will have to design and navigate \r\ntheir own CRD pathways towards climate-resilient and sustainable \r\ndevelopment. This includes determining the appropriate balance of \r\nadaptation, mitigation and sustainable development actions and \r\ninvestments that are consistent with individual actors' development \r\ncircumstances and goals, while also ensuring that the collective actions \r\nremain consistent with global agreements and goals (such as the SDGs, \r\nSendai Framework and the Paris Agreement; Section 18.1.3), planetary \r\nboundaries and other principles of CRD including social justice and \r\nequity (Roy et al., 2018). Empowering individual actors to pursue CRD \r\nin a context-specific manner while coordinating action among actors \r\nand a diversity of scales, local to global, is a key challenge associated \r\nwith achieving CRD (high agreement, limited evidence)."


id: ee27832281eb72f92d0eb921797f64d4
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content:
"As reflected in Chapter 1 of the AR6 WGII report, CRD is emerging as one \r\nof the guiding principles for climate policy, both at the international level \r\n(Denton et al., 2014; Segger, 2016), as reflected in the Paris Agreement \r\n(Article 2, UNFCCC, 2015), and within specific countries (Simonet and \r\nJobbins, 2016; Kim et  al., 2017b; Vincent and Colenbrander, 2018; \r\nYalew, 2020). This framing of development recognises the risks posed \r\nby climate change to development objectives (Section 18.2; see also \r\nChapter 16); the opportunities, constraints and limits associated with \r\nreducing risk through adaptation; synergies and trade-offs between \r\nmitigation, adaptation and sustainable development (Sections 18.2.5, \r\n18.5, Box 18.4); and the role of system transitions in enabling large\u0002scale transformations that limit future global warming to less than \r\n1.5degC, while boosting resilience (IPCC, 2018a) (Section 18.3, Box 18.1)."


id: f5f5fa94449e4bc24951c0bd74e85e40
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"Since the AR5, the volume of research at the nexus of climate action and \r\nsustainable development has changed markedly (very high confidence). \r\nA rapidly growing, multi-disciplinary literature has emerged on CRD \r\n(Mitchell et al., 2015; Clapp and Sillmann, 2019; Hardoy et al., 2019; \r\nYalew, 2020) and associated pathways (Naess et  al., 2015; Winkler \r\nand Dubash, 2016; Brechin and Espinoza, 2017; Solecki et al., 2017; \r\nEllis and Tschakert, 2019) (Section 18.2.2). Nevertheless, the concept \r\nof resilience generally, and CRD specifically, has come under increasing "


id: d691e6ffda7e09a52a4e60faca08c4ae
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"change (Box 18.1). The qualities that describe sustainable development \r\nprocesses (e.g., social justice, alternative development models, equity \r\nand solidarity, as described above and in Figure 18.1) lead to short\u0002term outcomes and conditions, such as those represented by SDGs, \r\nthat in an iterative fashion enable or constraint subsequent efforts \r\ntowards CRD. For example, success or failure in achieving the SDGs or \r\nthe Paris Agreement would shape future efforts in pursuit of CRD and \r\nthe options available to different actors."


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"mitigation options and how the implementation of these strategies \r\ninteracts with broader sustainable development efforts and goals. This \r\ninterdependence between patterns of development, climate risk and \r\nthe demand for mitigation and adaptation action is fundamental to the \r\nconcept of CRD (Fankhauser and McDermott, 2016). Therefore, climate \r\nchange and sustainable development cannot be assessed or planned \r\nin isolation of one another."


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"In operationalising the aforementioned definitions of CRD and \r\nCRDP, this chapter builds its assessment around five core elements \r\nthat provide insights relevant to policymakers actively pursuing the \r\nintegration of climate resilience into development. First, as noted \r\nabove, climate change poses a potential risk to the achievement of \r\ndevelopment goals, including global goals such as the SDGs, as well as \r\nnationally or locally specific goals. Accordingly, Chapter 16's discussion \r\nof key risks, their implications for the SDGs and the options for risk \r\nmanagement are fundamental to the pursuit of CRD. This includes \r\nthe opportunities for implementing adaptation, mitigation or other \r\nrisk management options. Yet the management of climate risk must \r\nbe accompanied by interventions that address social and ecological \r\nvulnerabilities that enhance climate risk."


id: b10c3a57eceb95e83fbe86769efb401f
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"Second, CRD is dependent on achieving transitions in key systems \r\nincluding energy, land and ecosystem, urban and infrastructure, and \r\nindustrial systems (very high confidence) (Box  18.1, Figure  18.3). In \r\nthis context, CRD links to the discussion of system transitions in the \r\nSR1.5 report (IPCC, 2018b; IPCC, 2018a). However, in building on the \r\nSR1.5, here the assessment of CRD also recognises the importance of \r\ntransitions in societal systems that drive innovation, preferences for \r\nalternative patterns of consumption and development, and the power \r\nrelationships among different actors that engage in CRD. In particular, \r\nthe rate at which actors can achieve system transitions has important \r\nimplications for the pursuit of CRD. Transitions that are slow to evolve \r\nor that are more incremental in nature may not be sufficient to enable \r\nCRD in comparison with faster transitions that contribute to more \r\nfundamental system transformations."


id: 2029cf7fb32c76fc108a14c41c3dce4b
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"This chapter engages with understanding CRD and the pathways to \r\nachieving it by building on the concepts introduced in Chapter 1 of this \r\nWorking Group II report, as well as the regional and sectoral context \r\npresented in other chapters (Section 18.5). Notably, this chapter takes \r\noff where Chapters 16 and 17 end: recognising the significance of \r\nthe representative key risks for CRD and the decision making context \r\nof different actors who are implementing policies and practices to \r\npursue different CRD pathways and manage climate risk. Therefore, \r\nthis chapter assesses options for pursuing CRD and the broader system \r\ntransitions and enabling conditions in support of CRD."


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"Third, equity and social justice are consistently identified in the literature \r\nas being central to CRD (very high confidence; Sections 18.1.1, 18.3.1.5, \r\n18.4, 18.5). This includes designing and implementing adaptation, \r\nresilience and climate risk management options in a manner that \r\npromotes equity in the allocation of the costs and benefits of those \r\noptions. Similarly, the literature on CRD emphasises equity should \r\nbe pursued in the implementation of options for greenhouse gas \r\nmitigation, transitions in energy systems and low-carbon development. \r\nThis emphasis on equity is consistent with the SDGs which place \r\nan emphasis on reducing inequality and achieving sustainable \r\ndevelopment for all."


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"Fourth, success in CRD and alignment of development interventions to \r\nCRDPs is contingent on the presence of multiple enabling conditions \r\n(very high confidence, Section 18.4.2), that operate at different scales \r\nranging from those that provide capacity to implement specific \r\nadaptation options to those that enable large-scale transformational "


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"In assessing the opportunities and constraints associated with \r\nthe pursuit of sustainable development, this chapter proceeds in \r\nSection  18.2 to assess the links between sustainable development \r\nand climate action, including examination of current patterns of \r\ndevelopment and consideration for synergies and trade-offs among \r\ndifferent strategies and options. Then, in Section  18.3, the chapter \r\nassesses five systems transitions to identify the shifts in development "


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"that would enable CRD. Section  18.4 assesses the role of different \r\nactors in the pursuit of CRD as well as the public and private arenas \r\nin which they engage. Section 18.5 synthesises CRD assessments from \r\ndifferent WGII sectoral and regional chapters to identify commonalities \r\nand differences. The chapter concludes in Section 18.6 with a summary \r\nof key opportunities for enhancing the knowledge needed to enable \r\ndifferent actors to pursue CRD."


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"Evidence for transformative actions largely exists at the community or city level. While identifying how to rapidly and equitably generate \r\ntransformations at a global scale has remained elusive, there is high agreement but limited evidence from studies of ecosystem services \r\nthat suggest facilitating a wide range of locally appropriate management decisions and actions can bring about positive global-scale \r\noutcomes (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Diverse local efforts to transform towards sustainability in the face of climate "


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"change have been observed, such as community mobilisation for equitable and just adaptation actions and alternative visions of societal \r\nwell-being (Shi, 2020b) and farmer-led shifts in agricultural production systems (Rosenberg, 2021). There has been an increase in \r\ntransformative actions taking place through city-level resilience building aimed at shifting inequitable relations and opening up space for \r\na plurality of actors (Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2018; Ziervogel et al., 2021) (high confidence)."


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"The government of Kenya's (GoK) ambition through Vision 2030 is to create a globally competitive and prosperous country with a high \r\nquality of life by 2030. It aims to transform Kenya into a newly-industrialising, middle-income country providing a high quality of life to \r\nall its citizens in a clean and secure environment."


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"international capital, foreign investors and incorporation into global markets (Cormack, 2016; Kochore, 2016; Mosley and Watson, 2016; \r\nEnns and Bersaglio, 2020), as well as increasing militarisation and conflict in the drylands (Lind, 2018). Allied to these social and political \r\ndynamics are ongoing processes of habitat modification and degradation and biophysical changes linked in part to climate variability \r\n(Galvin, 2009; Mganga et al., 2015). The interconnected nature of these drivers will intersect with LAPSSET in myriad ways. For example, \r\nthe implementation of LAPSSET may accentuate some trends, such as increases in land enclosure and a shift towards more urban and \r\nsedentary livelihoods (Lesutis, 2020). Conversely, the perceived threat LAPSSET could pose to pastoral lifestyles may lead to greater \r\nvisibility, solidarity and strength of pastoralist institutions (Cormack, 2016)."


