# document

id: 375cf7d2a858dfbfdce34fb10863b17e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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" No evidence indicates \r\nwhether general or specific framework laws yield better outcomes; \r\nhowever, reviews of more recent examples of framework laws in Africa \r\nsuggest a trend towards more specificity in the required content of \r\nadaptation strategies and duties (Rumble, 2019b)."


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"Legal systems play an important governance role in facilitating \r\nresponses to climate change across all levels of society (high \r\nconfidence) (Ruhl, 2010; McDonald and Styles, 2014; Mehling, 2015). \r\nLaws can facilitate climate action in multiple ways, including through: \r\n(i) mandating and guiding the behaviour of governance structures \r\nand actors, (ii) fostering coordination between different levels of \r\ngovernment, (iii) enforcing climate responses, (iv) its symbolic value \r\nand (iv) aligning scientific evidence and societal norms (Mehling, 2015; \r\nScotford et al., 2017). Laws also can embed climate change planning \r\nwithin the administrative structure of a state, rendering policy less \r\nvulnerable to revocation (Scotford et  al., 2017). Extensive revision \r\nto laws has occurred in the last decade: a survey of 164  countries \r\nshowed that over 1200 climate-related national laws and policies have \r\nbeen published, with approximately 44% being acts of parliament \r\n(Nachmany et al"


id: 2d0973193c9947654fbb94cbdaab8493
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"A sectoral approach to climate change legislation grafts climate-related \r\nprovisions into existing laws, such as environmental impact assessment, \r\nflood insurance and infrastructure planning, collectively creating an \r\naggregated legal landscape (Townshend et  al., 2011; Gerrard and \r\nFischer, 2012; Nachmany et  al., 2015; Scotford et  al., 2017; Rumble, \r\n2019a). This approach is particularly relevant to adaptation challenges \r\nwhich intersect with numerous bodies of law that are dedicated to other \r\nsocietal concerns (Gerrard and Fischer, 2012). However, integrating such \r\nconsiderations can be challenging in certain areas of law, particularly \r\nthose relating to property rights, water rights and endangered species \r\nprotection (Gerrard and Fischer, 2012)"


id: d1686330bff50f08aeb56db8c10e54b8
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" The incorporation of adaptive \r\nmanagement principles (including monitoring, periodic evaluation, and \r\nresponse modification) within existing laws can enhance their enabling \r\nrole and foster greater resilience (Godden, 2012; Arnold and Gunderson, \r\n2013; McDonald and Styles, 2014)."


id: ed5fcbcc82865be280c68008580f060c
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"Substantial developments in adaptation policy have occurred since \r\nAR5 (high confidence). Perhaps the most significant is the NDCs \r\nrequired under the Paris Agreement, where 184 out of 197 parties \r\nto the UNFCCC have already submitted their first plans (UNDP and \r\nUNFCCC, 2019). The NDCs have allowed countries to articulate their \r\npriorities and ambition with respect to climate action, and it has \r\nbeen suggested that these can in turn lead to cascading policies (and \r\nlaws) that drive and enable adaptation and climate risk management. \r\nAnalysis of the first NDCs submitted in the lead-up to and after the \r\nParis Agreement showed that adaptation priorities were more often \r\narticulated by developing countries and least developed countries, \r\nwhile developed countries and emerging economies focused mostly on \r\nmitigation (Pauw et al., 2019)"


id: c4d772035f47db0a4b7fdf2229ab562c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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" As of 2019, over 90 developing nations \r\nare at various stages of preparing National Adaptation Plans and 112 \r\nnations have indicated their intention to revise their NDCs for the 2020 \r\nupdate (UNDP and UNFCCC, 2019)."


id: 7c47384e7116f19943f8b8f0b1583b58
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"as shown for the local level (Reckien et al., 2019). However, the UK Act \r\nis considered to have made action on climate change more predictable, \r\nmore structured and more evidence based (Averchenkova et al., 2021).\r\nThere are numerous examples of regulatory and project-based \r\ninnovations by local governments. Their impact, however, is uneven, with \r\nmuch depending on the implementation capacity of local governments \r\nand other socio-institutional barriers, including those relating to mandate \r\nand joint project implementation, cross-departmental working, planning \r\ncycles, concerns relating to legal liability and compensation, political \r\nappetite and cost (Godden, 2012; Taylor, 2016a). Notwithstanding \r\nimplementation challenges, evidence is emerging that overarching \r\nframework laws play a foundational and distinctive role in supporting \r\neffective climate governance, including adaptation governance \r\n(Fankhauser et  al"


id: cecf389006531b3969a0faef1f2d8b0
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", 2018), and are drivers of subsequent activity \r\n(Townshend et al., 2011; Fankhauser et al., 2014; Clare et al., 2017b), \r\nespecially when formulated with clear guidance for all related actors, \r\nincluding lower level of governance (De Gregorio Hurtado et al., 2015). \r\nThis may explain the rapid increase in both local and national climate \r\nchange laws, now with an increased emphasis on regulatory provisions \r\n17.4.2.1.4 Regulations and standards\r\nThe presence and articulation of regulations and standards that \r\naddress climate risk, such as building codes and land use zoning \r\nare key enabling factors for effective decision-making (Kim et  al., \r\n2020). Regulations and standards provide a framework for common \r\nunderstanding of when and under what conditions action should be \r\ntaken specifically in relation to the construction and maintenance of \r\nthe built environment, infrastructure and environmental and social \r\npractice (Grynning et al., 2020)"


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" Regulations and standards for climate \r\naction emerge primarily from two settings: first, as an addition or \r\naugmentation to existing regulations and standards that emerged \r\ninitially to address existing potential climate extremes and stresses \r\n(e.g., size of culverts in response to maximum rainfall and runoff \r\nconditions); and second, new regulations and standards that were \r\ndeveloped in direct response to new or emergent climate risks (e.g., \r\nregulations in response to new presence of mean monthly high tide \r\nflooding) (Qiao et al., 2018). Commonly agreed upon social norms and \r\nconventions also can be described as regulatory and providing a set \r\nof standards."


id: af72a90cc9bfd511338080aa2753402
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"There are numerous examples of regulatory and project-based \r\ninnovations by local governments. Their impact, however, is uneven, with \r\nmuch depending on the implementation capacity of local governments \r\nand other socio-institutional barriers, including those relating to mandate \r\nand joint project implementation, cross-departmental working, planning \r\ncycles, concerns relating to legal liability and compensation, political \r\nappetite and cost (Godden, 2012; Taylor, 2016a). Notwithstanding \r\nimplementation challenges, evidence is emerging that overarching \r\nframework laws play a foundational and distinctive role in supporting \r\neffective climate governance, including adaptation governance \r\n(Fankhauser et  al., 2018), and are drivers of subsequent activity \r\n(Townshend et al., 2011; Fankhauser et al., 2014; Clare et al., 2017b), \r\nespecially when formulated with clear guidance for all related actors, \r\nincluding lower level of governance (De Gregorio Hurtado et al., 2015)"


id: 3184ad1135d2625de95ee982d147fa2c
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" \r\nThis may explain the rapid increase in both local and national climate \r\nchange laws, now with an increased emphasis on regulatory provisions \r\nto increase resilience and reduce vulnerability."


id: 1ff8c6b19dcc22558a222a0eba2e0676
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"The regional and sectoral chapters of this report provide significant \r\nevidence of how regulations and standards enhance or hinder \r\nopportunities for climate risk management and adaptation. Relevant \r\nregulations and standards are especially evident in the oceans and \r\ncoastal domains (Chapter 3 and CCP2, in cities and infrastructure \r\n(Chapter 6), and the water (Chapter 4) and food sectors (Chapter 5). \r\nEurope and North and South America (Chapters 12, 13 and 14) have \r\nthe most frequent documented occurrences of examples of regulations \r\nand standards. Regulations and standards focused on building codes \r\nto protect against extreme event and loss, water regulations and \r\nagreements to protect water supply and lessen drought impacts, and \r\nhealth codes to limit heat exposure are the most frequent examples \r\nof such practices"


id: a245199a20914e3b54e93a3f26391f64
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" Deficiencies of regulations and standards have been \r\nnoted with respect to their capacity to manage species migrating \r\nfrom climate change, and to provide opportunities for transformative \r\nadaptation. The evidence from the sectors and chapters illustrate \r\nthat more comprehensive regulations and standards lead to positive \r\nadaptation outcomes."


id: 765723064a0f5e56fe5fdc90859f5ddd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"The effectiveness of social and environmental governance varies \r\nby sector. For example, in the private business sector, Aragon-Correa \r\net al. (2019) assess the effects of mandatory and voluntary regulatory \r\npressure on firms' environmental strategies.  In summary, they find \r\nthat analyses of the effects of voluntary pressure demonstrate that by \r\nthemselves they are unlikely to bring about significant improvement \r\nin environmental outcomes. Professional organisations, however, \r\nhave made progress in addressing sectoral standards relative to the \r\nadaptation process. This includes the development of new industry \r\nguidelines, codes, standards and specifications, in addition to the \r\nimplementation of infrastructure inventories that incorporate evaluation \r\nof vulnerabilities and identification of priority at-risk areas (Chapter 14)"


id: e79fff32b22486f7bbed5a168c6bc42b
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" \r\nVoluntary pressures by themselves are not likely to result in positive \r\noutcomes and instead should be coupled with mandatory regulatory \r\npressure to achieve the environmental response desired (Bianco, 2020)."


id: 4859ef71b299c40586089554c9891b68
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"Since AR5, another key development in environmental and social \r\ngovernance has been the establishment of the Task Force on Climate\u0002related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), which aimed to develop guidelines \r\nfor companies to voluntarily report the financial implications of two \r\nbroad categories of climate risk: the transition risks of shifting to a \r\nlower-carbon economy and the physical risks of climate change \r\nitself (TCFD, 2017). As of 2019,  ~1340 companies with a market \r\ncapitalisation of USD 12.6 trillion and financial institutions responsible \r\nfor assets of USD 150 trillion have expressed support for the TCFD \r\n(TCFD, 2020). An analysis of reports to the TCFD in 2016 showed that \r\n83% of companies report on physical risks of climate change, and of \r\nthese, 82% reported on strategies to adapt to some of the identified \r\nrisks (Goldstein et al., 2019)"


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" The same analysis also noted that: (i) the \r\ntotal of estimates of assets at risk were two orders of magnitude lower \r\nthan generally accepted estimates of total financial risk; (ii) a minority \r\nof companies consider risks outside of their own operations or in their \r\nvalue chains; (iii) most underestimate or do not estimate the costs \r\nof adaptation; and (iv) many assume linear impacts and responses, \r\nneglecting the potential for tipping points or acceleration in risk and \r\npotentially transformative adaptation requirements.  At this stage, \r\nTCFD has influenced many companies' thinking and comprehension \r\nof physical climate risk, but it appears too early to assess whether this \r\nhas driven substantive responses to manage these risks."


id: d6dab55e5ed2d003319c8b4cae5aa0ef
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"Examples of the importance of these other two components--\r\nknowledge of response options and knowledge of enabling \r\nconditions--are provided by  networks of cities, including internal \r\ninstitutional networks (Aylett, 2015), intermunicipal networks (e.g., \r\nthose supported by Local Governments for Sustainability [ICLEI] \r\nand the international United Cities and Local Governments [UCLG] \r\nnetwork), transnational municipal networks (e.g., 100 Resilient Cities, \r\nAsian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network [ACCCRN]) and city\u0002to-city regional transdisciplinary learning networks (Ndebele-Murisa \r\net al., 2020). These networks generate and exchange knowledge which \r\ncan be critical to decision makers for understanding and evaluating the \r\nfeasibility of different response options, identifying synergies across \r\nsectors and mainstreaming adaptation to climate change (Haupt et al., \r\n2020)"


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" However, the question of how to finance such network activities \r\nremains under-studied (Bracking, 2021; See Box 17.3)."


id: 525fb1323f8085b49aace33f6bbb4c9c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"Successive reports of the IPCC (Vellinga et al., 2001; Mimura et al., 2008; Yohe et al., 2008; Klein et al., 2014) and the AR6 Special Reports \r\nhave noted the importance of finance as an enabler for adaptation, across both developed and developing nations. While the UNFCCC \r\nand the UNFCCC has yet to arrive at a formally agreed definition of climate finance, numerous overlapping have been suggested and \r\nreported (e.g., Falconer and Stadelmann, 2014; UNFCCC, 2014; Roberts and Weikmans, 2017; Munira et al., 2021). However, there is \r\nwide agreement across these definitions that climate finance refers to financial resources devoted to addressing climate change, both \r\nmitigation and adaptation to current and projected climate change, and that these resources can come from both public and private \r\nsources (high confidence). Climate finance includes, but in most definitions is not restricted to, international financial flows to developing \r\ncountries"


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" Finance can be delivered through a range of instruments including grants, concessional and non-concessional debt, and \r\ninternal budget reallocations (high confidence) (Watson and Schalatek, 2019). Adaptation and resilience are often used interchangeably \r\nin climate finance discussions, although adaptation is a process, while resilience (to climate risk) is the ability to progress towards desired \r\noutcomes in the face of impacts from a changing climate (Section 1.2.1)."


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"The adaptation and resilience finance landscape spans multiple sources, intermediaries, instruments and recipients, operating across \r\nglobal to sub-national scales (Buchner et al., 2019; Carter, 2020; Watson and Schalatek, 2021). Public finance is provided by national \r\nand sub-national governments and distributed directly by government or intermediaries such as development finance institutions \r\nand climate funds, either nationally or internationally. Private finance comes from five main sources: commercial financial institutions \r\n(banks), institutional investors (including asset managers, insurance companies and pension funds), other private equity (venture capital \r\nand infrastructure funds), non-financial corporations such as renewable energy or water companies, and individual households and \r\ncommunities"


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" Across these different sources, the main instruments used are grants, concessional debt, market debt, internal budget \r\nallocation, insurance, as well as personal savings in households (high confidence). Public and private sources of funding can be blended \r\ninto a single instrument, for example for insurance where public funds provide capital for both sovereign catastrophe instruments and \r\nmicro-insurance (Jarzabkowski et al., 2019) or for concessional loans. Similarly, public finance is often ultimately derived from commercial \r\ndebt instruments such as bonds."


id: dc5a56f62f218d1c13ef5ee1526bf4bc
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"The Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) has been tracking climate finance since 2009, allowing for trends to be assessed; however, trends \r\nreported are a function of both real changes in finance and changes in methods and information sources (Richmond et al., 2020). Total \r\nclimate finance tracked by CPI has increased from USD 364 billion yr-1 in 2010/2011 to 579 billion in 2017/2018 (SM17.3). Tracked finance \r\nremained relatively constant from 2010/2011 to 2013/2014 but has increased steeply in more recent years. The proportion of finance \r\nallocated to adaptation has remained small throughout, between 4% and 8% (high confidence); a further 1-2% of global finance has \r\nbeen classified as 'multiple-objectives'. The large majority of tracked adaptation finance is from public sources (high confidence), with \r\nonly 2% coming from private sources in 2017/2018 (CPI, 2020)"


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" This is at least partly because of the difficulty in demonstrating financial \r\n(as opposed to public good and avoided damages) return on investment for adaptation."


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"There is growing agreement on the sectors (such as infrastructure, agriculture or water management) and approaches (contingency \r\nfinance or insurance) where private sector adaptation investments alone, or leveraged by public mechanisms, might be best targeted, \r\nsuch as by reducing the risk of providing financial services for adaptation investments to domestic micro-, small and medium enterprises \r\nor agricultural smallholders, many of them women (Biagini and Miller, 2013; Chambwera et  al., 2014; Pauw et  al., 2016; Global \r\nCommission on Adaptation, 2019; Miller et al., 2019; Resurreccion et al., 2019; Richmond et al., 2020)"


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" A remaining open question is how \r\nto allocate limited public adaptation funds in a way that is equitable, effective and efficient between mobilising private investments and \r\nsafeguarding adequate financial support for necessary adaptation efforts, such as the provision of public goods, which the private sector \r\nwill not invest in (Fankhauser and Burton, 2011; Abadie et al., 2013; Baatz, 2018; Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019)."


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"Concerns have also been raised about the interactions between debt service, COVID economic recession and post-COVID recovery in \r\ndeveloping countries (Simmons et al., 2021; Volz et al., 2021). Debt service grows as a proportion of national budget during recession, \r\nreducing scope for investment in recovery, is a self-reinforcing cycle. It has been suggested that linking debt relief to Paris-aligned \r\nobjectives can act as an additional source of climate finance (Fenton et al., 2014). The G20 has begun addressing this debt crisis through \r\nits Debt Service Suspension Initiative and the Common Framework for Debt Treatments (IMF, 2020). It has been suggested that these \r\ninitiatives could be expanded to prioritise climate-focused debt-relief instruments and to include more countries (Steele and Patel, 2020; \r\nVolz et al., 2021)"


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" If debt relief is used to invest in national instrument for green and inclusive recovery, national ownership of the use of \r\nthe finance can occur, avoiding some of the negative connotations of historical debt restructuring (Volz et al., 2021)."


id: d4b569748c4cb0b9853156946b854a6b
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"Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge are gaining recognition \r\nat multiple scales (Kleiche-Dray and Waast, 2016; David-Chavez and \r\nGavin, 2018; Nakashima et  al., 2018). Of note is their association \r\nwith ecosystem-based adaptations, showcasing the long-term \r\nplace-based knowledge of Indigenous Peoples (Johnson et al., 2015; \r\nWalshe and Argumedo, 2016; Carter, 2019; Mazzocchi, 2020). These \r\nknowledges and practices can be an important enabling condition in \r\ndecision-making processes, complementing scientific information  by \r\nidentifying impacts (Fernandez-Llamazares et  al., 2017; Katz et  al., \r\n2020), emphasising values to consider (Huambachano, 2018), offering \r\nsolutions (Chanza and de Wit, 2016; Cuaton and Su, 2020; Orlove \r\net al., 2020), guiding land use and resource management (Brondizio \r\net al., 2021) and filling gaps in scientific knowledge (Hiwasaki et al., \r\n2014; Audefroy and Sanchez, 2017; Makondo and Thomas, 2018; Son \r\net al"


id: a948d49c61822913d1858d618a314867
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"The co-production of knowledge by different actors provides important \r\navenues for exchanging and integrating climate-related knowledge \r\nin decisions made across society (high confidence). Though many \r\ndefinitions of co-production have been offered in recent years (Bremer \r\nand Meisch, 2017; Vincent et  al., 2018; Bremer et  al., 2019; Harvey \r\net  al., 2019a), most describe a set of individuals or organisations \r\nwho work together to generate a set of products that entail new \r\nknowledge products and that guide action (Miller and Wyborn, 2020). \r\nSome major forms of co-production include action research (Baztan \r\net  al., 2017; Laursen et  al., 2018; Zanocco et  al., 2018a), trans\u0002disciplinarity (Howarth and Monasterolo, 2016; Wamsler, 2017; Lanier \r\net al., 2018; Scott et al., 2018; Knapp et al., 2019; Young et al., 2019), \r\nrapid assessment processes (Atkinson et al., 2018b) and participatory \r\nintegrated assessments (Howarth et  al., 2018; Krkoska Lorencova \r\net  al"


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", 2018; Bitsura-Meszaros et  al., 2019; Carter et  al., 2019a; \r\nCremades et  al., 2019; Leitch et  al., 2019; Martinez-Taguena et  al., \r\n2020; Section 17.3.1.3.1)."


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"Co-production promotes iterative dialogue, experimentation, \r\nthe tailoring of knowledge to context, needs and priorities, and \r\nlearning, often promoting integration of Indigenous knowledge, local \r\nknowledge and practitioner knowledge with scientific knowledge \r\n(high confidence). It generally entails long-lasting ties and fully \r\ninclusive partnerships between different parties (Kench et al., 2018). \r\nGovernance measures and adequate financing can act as enablers of \r\nsuch co-production. This integration is most extensive, and promotes \r\na wider consideration of alternatives where governance arrangements \r\npromote ongoing exchanges of information and discussion of solutions, \r\nwhether through formal mechanisms such as regional committees \r\n(Gim et  al., 2019; Ostovar, 2019; Rasmus et  al., 2020; Zarei et  al., \r\n2020) or informal mechanisms such as personal networks and local \r\ndiscussion groups (Madsen et  al., 2019; Yumagulova and Vertinsky, \r\n2019)"


id: 29a590245e3721d7acc97646f86c9926
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content:
" Where such arrangements are absent, practitioner knowledge \r\nis side-lined from the formulation and implementation of decisions \r\n(Orleans Reed et al., 2013; Aguilar-Barajas et al., 2019; Matsler, 2019; \r\nRamsey et al., 2019)."


id: a57f5a7e6a7383c7f8017a62b03bdbe7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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content:
"can be termed 'climate service governance' (Stegmaier et al., 2020). \r\nElements of this governance include the arrangements by which those \r\nparties engage with each other (Vaughan et al., 2016; Daniels et al., \r\n2020) and the financial arrangements, and associated responsibilities, \r\nwhich support the service (Lourenco et  al., 2015; Bruno Soares and \r\nBuontempo, 2019). Though governance varies by context, evidence \r\nsuggests that engaging a range of experts and potential users in the \r\nco-design and co-production of climate services increases the use and \r\nutility of services (Lemos et al., 2014; Pope et al., 2017; Masuda et al., \r\n2018; Harvey et al., 2019b). However, some studies warn that, even \r\nwith broad and inclusive participation, power differentials can create \r\nbarriers to co-production, reducing the usefulness of information \r\nproducts (Alexander et al"


id: 9b2983799f8e8891b8c1d62d7681b60c
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", 2020) and the neglect of non-meteorological \r\nsources of information which may also possess useful predictive power \r\n(Coughlan de Perez et al., 2019)."


id: 4a826e0cab6e70eb471d1fd68d69c0b2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"Cross-Chapter Box 12.2 in WGI AR6, 'Climate information for climate \r\nservices', shows that users are widely distributed across civil society. \r\nRelevant users of climate services include humanitarian organisations \r\n(Coughlan de Perez and Mason, 2014; Harvey et  al., 2019b), \r\ngovernment offices (Mahon et  al., 2019), international agencies \r\n(Perkins and Nachmany, 2019) and the private sector (Beckett, 2016; \r\nHudson et al., 2019). Climate services currently exist at local, national, \r\nregional and international scales, at time scales which range from sub\u0002seasonal to decadal and longer (White et al., 2017; Hewitt et al., 2020) \r\nand in a range of different sectors (Bruno Soares and Buontempo, \r\n2019). Agriculture is the sector with the largest number of examples \r\n(Zebiak et  al., 2015; Burke and Emerick, 2016; Cliffe et  al., 2016; \r\nHaigh et  al., 2018; Buontempo et  al., 2020); others include  health \r\n(Ghebreyesus et al., 2010; Ballester et al"


id: b3b6061f98af09fb75d5d8347c9958d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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content:
", 2016), forestry (Caurla and \r\nLobianco, 2020), fisheries (Busch et al., 2016), disaster risk reduction \r\n(Street et al., 2019) and water resources management (van Vliet et al., \r\n2015; Golding et al., 2019). Evaluations of the extent to which climate \r\nservices are accessed, used and deliver benefits to decision makers \r\nremain in an initial stage (Perrels, 2020), though studies suggest \r\nthat these contributions vary widely depending on context. A review \r\nof evaluation of weather and climate agricultural services in Africa, \r\nfor instance, found that most farmers use climate services when they \r\nare available , but that on-farm outcomes varied, with some farmers \r\nexperiencing yield losses and others gains upward of 60% (Vaughan \r\net al., 2019a). Other studies express concern that large climate service \r\nprojects have run for decades at significant expense, without adequate \r\nevaluation (Gerlak et al., 2020)."


id: 756ca25f466d8f6da460664ceb5f212d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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content:
"A small but growing number of papers consider the business models \r\nthat support climate services, including, for instance, the role of \r\nopen data (Iturbide et al., 2019; Chimani et al., 2020), the standards \r\nor institutional mandates by which users come to understand the \r\ncredibility and legitimacy of certain services (Bruno Soares and \r\nBuontempo, 2019), and the role of public-private partnerships \r\n(Cortekar et al., 2020). While the commercialisation of climate services \r\nholds significant promise that more and more specifically targeted \r\nservices will be provided, there is not yet agreement on which business \r\nmodels best support this in different contexts. There is also concern \r\nthat commercialisation of climate services may disadvantage under\u0002resourced actors at the expense of wealthier or more powerful ones \r\n(Webber, 2017; Webber and Donner, 2017; Cortekar et  al., 2020)"


id: c604782fa888e9daff301daf50fbc043
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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vector_id: 28733
content:
" It \r\nhas been noted that some climate services, such as weather forecasts \r\nand early warnings, are an example of a public good, best provided by \r\npublic agencies (high confidence) (Sutter, 2013; Kitchell, 2016; Hansen \r\net al., 2018)."


id: 71ac8c605d6301c4e3e1628a38f428d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15515
content:
"Knowledge of climate change influences decision-making not only by \r\nproviding information but also by increasing the motivation to act and \r\nby promoting behaviour change. Evidence from many sectors (including \r\nwater (Section 4.5.2), ocean and coastal ecosystems (Section 3.6.2), and \r\nagriculture (Section 5.4.2) and regions (including Africa [Section 9.8.4], \r\nAsia [Section 10.4.6] and North America [Section 10.4.5] shows that \r\nbuilding capacity (e.g., adaptive capacity, institutional capacity, \r\neducation/training in human capacity) can support adaptation and \r\nlimited governance capacity can constrain it (high confidence). An \r\nemerging area of research examines the contribution of building \r\ncapacity within public and technical organisations and agencies to draw \r\non Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge (Adger et  al., 2017; \r\nHochman et al., 2017; Bacud, 2018)"


id: 17a4eaeb71a8b915a8e3206e9eceb316
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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content:
" A number of factors influence the \r\neffect of knowledge on motivation and behaviour change, including \r\nvalues and education."


id: 4b0a361c16d959e26d92c2995f9078ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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vector_id: 9224
content:
"A clear difference between enabling conditions and catalysing \r\nconditions is emerging in the climate mitigation literature (Hermwille \r\net  al., 2019; Michaelowa et  al., 2021), with some examples in the \r\nadaptation literature as well (Madsen et  al., 2019; Booysen et  al., \r\n2019a; Bolorinos et  al., 2020). Though enabling conditions are \r\nnecessary pre-conditions that allow response options to be formulated \r\nand implemented, their presence alone does not guarantee that \r\nthese response options will occur in a timely fashion or at a scale \r\ncommensurate with the risk, or even that they will occur at all. \r\nCatalysing conditions address this deficit in advancing action. They \r\nserve to overcome the inertia that often operates as a barrier to action \r\nand motivate individuals and organisations to initiate or accelerate \r\naction"


id: 157116b3ba980f6ede457a1ad399899e
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content:
" Different forms of catalysing conditions, described below, lead \r\nindividuals and organisations to weigh more seriously the costs of \r\ndelaying action or keeping action at low levels. Catalysing conditions \r\nfocus the attention of individuals and organisations on particular risks, \r\nleading actors to augment their decision-making processes and to \r\nallocate financial and social resources to respond to those risks. This \r\nattention and deliberation can lead to more frequent and potentially \r\nsubstantial adaptations, whether through more extensive action on \r\nexisting forms of adaptation or through the adoption of entirely new \r\nadaptations (Bolorinos et al., 2020)."


id: 15431f3f4cb5a2b38b08d5bf58f85f5b
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content:
"The perception of climate change as a major threat that requires action \r\nhas increased since AR5, reflecting both the growth of information \r\nabout climate change and the processing of that information (Lee \r\net al., 2015; Fagan and Huang, 2019). Global social movements play \r\nan important role in raising public awareness of climate urgency \r\n(Thackeray et al., 2020). Climate change concern plays an important \r\nrole in decision-making outcomes which entail public participation \r\n(Lammel, 2015; Chiang, 2018; van Valkengoed and Steg, 2019; Arikan \r\nand Gunay, 2020). Nonetheless, public risk perception varies sharply \r\non spatial and temporal scales, reflecting environmental changes, \r\nsocial influences (Kousser and Tranter, 2018; Rousseau and Deschacht, \r\n2020), economic capacities (Arikan and Gunay, 2020) and culture (Noll \r\net al., 2020), as well as individual characteristics (van Valkengoed and \r\nSteg, 2019)"


id: a18ae70bf1077603cc0c167ab438e10
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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content:
" The importance of values and norms is demonstrated by \r\nrecent research which highlights how intrinsic motivation (altruistic, \r\nself-transcendental and eco-centric values) (Corner et al., 2014; Braito \r\net  al., 2017; Xiang et  al., 2019; Bouman et  al., 2020) and extrinsic \r\nsocial motivation (e.g., economic gains and social desirability) (van \r\nValkengoed and Steg, 2019) can drive action."


id: 48172851bea5baf48a783b0d36f069ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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content:
"Recent research shows the importance of education as a predictor of \r\nrisk perception, motivation and action. Education level is the strongest \r\npredictor of public awareness of climate change risk in a study across \r\n119 countries of public awareness of climate change risk (Lee, 2015), \r\nthough this relationship varies in different nations, and is influenced \r\nby mediating variables (Muttarak and Chankrajang, 2015; Blennow \r\net al., 2016) (Ballew et al., 2020). Knowledge and awareness of climate \r\nchange are correlated with the motivation to undertake action on \r\nclimate change (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017). The integration of climate \r\nscience in educational curricula has been shown to be effective (Hess \r\nand Maki, 2019; Molthan-Hill et al., 2019), including approaches such \r\nas integration of the complex system approach (Jacobson et al., 2017), \r\nexperiential climate change education (Siegner, 2018), including climate \r\ngames (O'Garra et al., 2021; Pfirman et al"


id: 732c5c4f011e1a359adff50cebc1cbec
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content:
", 2021), massive open online \r\ncourses and informal science learning centres (Geiger et al., 2017)."


id: 314480d65b112ae02d35dfeeb41f408b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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content:
"Urgency can catalyse action for individuals and organisations. A \r\nmoderate level of urgency serves as an important driver of climate \r\naction, but both high and low levels of urgency impede response \r\n(high confidence). Wilson and Orlove (2021) review 5 experimental \r\nand 20 observational papers that examine the relationship between \r\nurgency and levels of response in climate decision-making, across a \r\nrange of settings: from individuals and households to communities, \r\nmanaged ecosystems, sub-national regions and international river \r\nbasin. Urgency in the papers is defined primarily through objective \r\nand subjective time pressure, including the recognition of the costs of \r\ndelaying action and the importance of using windows of opportunity \r\nduring which new forms and higher levels of response are possible"


id: 9bb0a3172b6549c9941fc487139c70e8
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"Policy leaders, often described as policy entrepreneurs within the \r\nscholarly literature, are individuals in positions of leadership who set \r\nagendas and build coalitions to drive decision-making processes, and \r\nhence can function as catalysers of climate adaptation (Petridou and \r\nMintrom, 2020). Political leaders who have taken on climate change \r\nas a key policy issue function as policy entrepreneurs at international, \r\nnational and sub-national levels. City officials, including mayors and \r\nother executives, often play the role of climate policy entrepreneurs, \r\nwhile the absence of effective leadership negatively affects adaptation \r\nsuccess (Becker and Kretsch, 2019). Such entrepreneurs can be \r\nimportant forces for change in both reactive contexts following an \r\nextreme or focusing event and in proactive context"


id: e3e8147b84300454fa27b0df1493e90d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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content:
" They can be effective \r\nespecially in contexts where they navigate and link together formal and \r\ninformal networks of complex climate governance systems (Tanner et al., \r\n2019). Their capacity to act has been increased when they and their \r\ninstitutions are embedded within partnership networks (Bellinson and \r\nChu, 2019). It is in these contexts that the leadership and position of a \r\npolicy entrepreneur becomes even more catalytic when operating at the \r\ninterface of formal and informal networks (Mintrom, 2019; Stone, 2019)."


id: bbbf3f4f2212b1db4eaa077a5765f905
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"The highly contextual nature of adaptation, a multitude of applied \r\ndefinitions of adaptation (e.g., cost effectiveness versus outcomes), \r\nits overlaps with development interventions, and the long time \r\nhorizons over which outcomes accrue, deter a universal definition \r\nof adaptation success (Dilling et al., 2019; Section 17.5.1.2; Owen, \r\n2020; Singh et al., 2021). Moser and Boykoff (2013), Olazabal et al. \r\n(2019b) and Sherman and Ford (2013) suggest criteria against which \r\nsuccessful adaptation could potentially be tracked. The literature \r\nis converging to suggest that successful adaptation broadly refers \r\nto actions and policies that effectively and substantially reduce \r\nclimate vulnerability, and exposure to and/or impacts of climate risk \r\n(Noble et  al., 2014; Juhola et  al"


id: e0575bd98368c37d7ce349c81efefb82
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content:
", 2016), while creating synergies \r\nto other climate-related goals, increasing benefits to non-climate\u0002related goals (such as current and future economic, societal and \r\nother environmental goals) and minimise trade-offs (Grafakos et al., \r\n2019) across diverse objectives, perspectives, expectations and \r\nvalues (Eriksen et al., 2015; Gajjar et al., 2019a; Owen, 2020) (high \r\nconfidence)."


id: af5a4ce552e8afe5d2bc6d8775df34ee
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content:
"Sub-national actors and city officials including mayors and other \r\nexecutives are among the individuals most often described and assessed \r\nas climate policy entrepreneurs (Kalafatis and Lemos, 2017). City-level \r\nclimate policy entrepreneurs often operate using their own experience, \r\nconnections and persistence to address issues of importance to their \r\nconstituency. Climate risk concerns are often inherently local, and in \r\nturn local decision makers perceive it as being appropriate to engage. \r\nConversely, the absence of effective leadership negatively affects \r\nadaptation success (Kalafatis and Lemos, 2017; Becker and Kretsch, \r\n2019). Urban climate policy entrepreneurs operate in four key spheres \r\nof policy development and implementation: attention and support \r\nseeking strategies; linking strategies (e.g., coalition building); relational \r\nmanagement strategies (e.g., networking and trusting building); and \r\narena strategies including timing (Brouwer and Huitema, 2018)"


id: 5138444c4eb9523a1d09846dfdbb1fb1
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content:
" The \r\npresence and operation of urban climate policy entrepreneurs is positively \r\nassociated in settings with multiple jurisdictions and across differing \r\nspatial scales (Kalafatis and Lemos, 2017; Renner and Meijerink, 2018). "


id: b68fa14b0ef8c4bc209a89aad96beda2
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"With increasing impacts of climate change, settlements of all sizes are considering how to make their communities more resilient \r\nto climate risk (see Cross-Working Group Box  URBAN in Chapter 6; Araos et  al., 2016a; Araos et  al., 2017; Reckien et  al., 2018a). \r\nIn many settlements, demands for heightened resiliency are being coupled with opportunities to enhance the social and economic \r\nequity and quality of life of residents. Transformational adaptation (transformational, as being outcome-oriented; Vermeulen et al., 2018) \r\nand associated adjustments to the urban risk management decision-making require an integration of climate resiliency pathways and \r\nconditions of sustainable development (Mendizabal et al., 2018). At the same time, growing conflict is present between requirements \r\nfor greater resiliency and continued economic development, in particular in low-income environments (Ahenkan et al., 2020)"


id: 9b3c6015ad9d06922bee124d9eb9bf82
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content:
" Cities and \r\ntheir residents have the capacity to transform their own governance and decision-making systems (Birkmann et al., 2014; Chu, 2018; \r\nRomero-Lankao et al., 2018). Furthermore, cities have recognised the opportunity and demand to transform in order to be more ambitious \r\n(Mendizabal et al., 2018) and more successful, more equitable (Reckien et al., 2018b) and better able to connect the climate action to the \r\nsustainable development process (Singh et al., 2021)."


id: 1cc8a4da491f1f36d6f0584c745f6846
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"In some cases, transformational adaptation is associated with large-scale, top-down, formal decision processes leading to significant \r\npolicy shifts. For coastal cities, this might include actions to build massive flood protection systems (as opposed to simple increase of \r\nexisting structures) (Albers et al., 2015; Hinkel et al., 2018; Ajibade, 2019; see also Section 2.3.5, Cross-Chapter Paper 2) or policies \r\nto encourage managed retreat from increasing at risk locations (Hino et al., 2017; Rulleau and Rey-Valette, 2017). In more extreme \r\ninstances, the relocation of cities is presented as a possibility, such as planned for the city of Jakarta (Garschagen et al., 2018b). However, \r\nacceptability of top-down approaches to relocation are usually low, and bottom-up drivers of relocation are important, especially to avoid \r\ninequitable outcomes (Mach and Siders, 2021)"


id: cd72c1f0a582134062cf1e1b60379e39
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" Intensity of extreme events and changing risk perceptions and expectations of property \r\nprices have been identified as important behavioural drivers of voluntary relocation (de Koning et al., 2019; de Koning and Filatova, 2020). \r\nYet, when not supported by equitable public adaptation policies, the transformational adaptation left to the influence of autonomous \r\nadaptation and market institutions alone leads to climate gentrification low-income households are priced out from the hazard-free \r\nzones (de Koning and Filatova, 2020)."


id: 32f037ccd62c0715605508745fcc29a2
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content:
"According to an assessment (Figure  17.11; see SM 17.1 for full \r\ndescriptions) of maladaptation-relevant outcome dimensions, here \r\ncalled criteria, that is, benefits to people, benefits to ecosystem services, \r\nbenefits to equity (marginalised ethnic groups, gender, low-income \r\npopulations), transformational potential and contribution to GHG \r\nemission reduction, no option is located at one or the other end of \r\nthe adaptation-maladaptation continuum (Figure  17.11, right panel), \r\nshowing that all options have some maladaptation potential, that \r\nis, trade-offs (very high confidence). This is also shown by the wide \r\nconfidence ranges of most options (right panel) signifying that most \r\nadaptation can be done in a way that involves a higher or a lower risk of \r\nmaladaptation (medium confidence; see also Figure 17.3). The option of \r\n'coastal infrastructure' signifies the highest risk for maladaptation"


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" While \r\nit can be an efficient adaptation option in highly densely populated areas \r\n(Oppenheimer et al., 2019; CCP2.3), it has potential trade-offs for natural \r\nsystem functioning and human vulnerability over time. The options most \r\nwidely associated with successful adaptation are 'nature restoration', \r\n'social safety nets', 'change of farm/fishery practice' and 'change of \r\ndiets/reducing food waste' (high confidence)."


id: 3c37b2ea87ff5750ed427fdd2cd9cf30
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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content:
"leads to findings for general situations, potentially obscuring critical \r\ncontextual specificities which can mediate successful adaptation or \r\nmaladaptation outcomes. In a certain context, Figure 17.11 will appear \r\ndifferent. Moreover, the analysis is based on a static interpretation of \r\nadaptation outcomes, while risk and risk reduction are dynamic. The \r\ncurrent, underlying literature does not help understanding the temporal \r\ndimension of the options, their flexibility or risk of lock-in, and related \r\npotential contribution to long-term maladaptation or successful \r\nadaptation. The added value of the analysis lies in the approach to \r\nassess the potential contribution to maladaptation or successful \r\nadaptation (via the seven criteria at the top of the figure), rather \r\nthan in the final results themselves"


id: 27964c4ee9e01b1410df9913e14b93ea
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" This overview illustrates how, in \r\na particular context and for particular groups of people, adaptation \r\noptions and their location on the adaptation-maladaptation continuum \r\ncan be assessed for a set of outcome dimensions, focusing on assessing \r\npotential contributions per and across criteria as well as per and across \r\noptions (critical information to support the identification of adaptation \r\npathways; Cross-Chapter Box DEEP in this Chapter)."


id: 742903f03c4df2709397bf4032b01028
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content:
"Figure 17.11 |  The potential contribution of 24 adaptation-related options to maladaptation and successful adaptation. The figure builds on evidence provided \r\nin the underlying sectoral and regional chapters and the Cross-Chapter Papers (SM17.1) to map 24 adaptation options identified as relevant to the eight Representative Key Risks \r\n(see Section 16.5) onto the adaptation-maladaptation continuum. It assesses the potential contribution of each of these adaptation options to successful adaptation and the risk of \r\nmaladaptation. The figure permits a review of options in multiple ways: (a) looking at adaptation options (first column), one can see which adaptation options score highest across \r\nthe criteria (the central rows)"


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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" Results by options show which ones carry the highest risk of maladaptation (largest circles per row); (b): looking at criteria (top centre), one can see \r\nwhich criteria seem to be most influential to contribute to maladaptation outcomes (largest circles per central column); (c) panel on the right: merging the scores of each adaptation \r\noption across criteria helps highlight whether the options are likely to end up as successful adaptation or maladaptation."


id: 5eaae87e414ec0e3bdd24b5711306147
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"A global assessment of 1682 papers on adaptation (Araos et al., 2021) \r\nfinds that about 60% of articles mentioned at least one vulnerable \r\ngroup being involved in the implementation of adaptation or targeted \r\nby it (medium confidence). Low-income groups (high agreement, 37% \r\nof 1682 articles) and women (medium agreement, 20% articles) are \r\nthe most frequently mentioned. Particularly in sectors and regions that \r\nincorporated coping measures in their adaptation response (poverty, \r\nfood, Africa, Asia, Central and South America), these groups are \r\nprevalent. In sectors where responses were more strategic or planned, \r\nsuch as in cities, terrestrial and water, in a larger proportion of articles \r\n(51%, 47% and 47% of articles, respectively) vulnerable groups were \r\nnot frequently included in the response (medium agreement)"


id: 5f5d0b518dc7ef31fc3a3eb1e29b3833
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" There \r\nwas also a stark difference in inclusion of marginalised and vulnerable \r\ngroups between high-income and low-income countries or regions, \r\nwith the majority of the responses from Australia, Europe and North \r\nAmerica, not including marginalised groups (high agreement with \r\n70%, 69% and 55% of articles, respectively), showing the need for \r\nincreasing attention in particular on a cross-sectoral and cross-regional \r\nrelation (Araos et al., 2021)."


id: e98165a800f6057e84d530e411e8e190
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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content:
"Procedural equity and justice: Participation is employed to enable \r\nprocedures that aim to redress power imbalances, which are assumed \r\nto be the root causes of vulnerability (i.e., the reasons that lead certain \r\npeople and places to be differentially vulnerable to climate risks) \r\n(Tschakert and Machado, 2012; Shackleton et al., 2015; Schlosberg et al., \r\n2017; Ziervogel et al., 2017). However, participation is often constrained \r\nby gender (Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18), social status, \r\nunequal citizenship (as concerns education, access to information, \r\nfinance and media) (Wallimann-Helmer et  al., 2019), entrenched \r\npolitical interests (Shackleton et  al., 2015; Chu et  al., 2017), power \r\ndynamics (Rusca et  al"


id: 2b209558410cae98c8fe3c50c596a6fc
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", 2015; Taylor and Bhasme, 2018; Kita, 2019; \r\nOmukuti, 2020; Taylor and Bhasme, 2020) or institutional shortcomings \r\n(Nightingale, 2017, in Nepal), which allow the most powerful access \r\nto funding and reinforce marginalisation of the powerless (Schipper \r\net al., 2014; Khatri, 2018; McNamara et al., 2020). Vulnerability is also \r\nsometimes used as a pretext to exclude groups from participation, \r\noften because vulnerable groups do not own land and lack legal status, \r\ntime or the ability to commit labour or material inputs for adaptation, \r\nall drivers of vulnerability in the first place (Nyantakyi-Frimpong and \r\nBezner Kerr, 2015; Camargo and Ojeda, 2017; Nagoda and Nightingale, \r\n2017; Nightingale, 2017; Thomas and Warner, 2019; Mikulewicz, 2020)."


id: c988af498b4030350e65da5dbf7680a3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"Reporting from the global assessment of equity considerations in \r\nadaptation, procedural equity and justice was slightly more often \r\nmentioned (~52%) than not (~48%) (medium agreement). However, the \r\nrobustness of the evidence on inclusion of vulnerable and marginalised \r\ngroups in the planning of adaptation responses is low (63%) (high \r\nagreement). Only for ~6% of the articles that provide evidence for \r\ninclusion of vulnerable groups was the robustness of evidence high (low \r\nagreement). Globally, the categories of low income (~25%) and women \r\n(~13%) are most often included, although the robustness remains \r\nlow. Most of the robust evidence comes from Africa and Asia, where \r\nadaptation responses mostly focus on low-income and women groups \r\nin the food (28%) and poverty (32%) sectors (medium agreement). With \r\nregard to other vulnerability categories, such as disabled populations, \r\nalmost negligible evidence was found for the inclusion of this group, \r\nglobally"


id: d9ad0adc6525b0b0197c878920074430
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" There is also little reporting of procedural equity in community\u0002based or ecosystem-based responses (Araos et al., 2021)."


id: 5b1cf8ae6794399cc319e365418aa34c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"Adaptation responses have been observed in every region and across \r\na wide variety of sectors (Section 16.3), but little evidence exists of \r\ntheir outcomes in terms of climate risk reduction (high confidence) \r\n(Section  1.4.3; Ford and Berrang-Ford, 2016; Tompkins et  al., 2018; \r\nBerrang-Ford et al., 2021; Eriksen et al., 2021; UNEP, 2021a). To advance \r\non that, the Paris Agreement is encouraging countries to engage in \r\n'Monitoring and evaluating and learning from adaptation plans, \r\npolicies, programmes and actions' (UN, 2015, Article 7.9d). Monitoring \r\nand evaluation (M&E) is the systematic process of collecting, analysing \r\nand using information to assess the progress of adaptation and evaluate \r\nits effects--for example, risk reduction outcomes, co-benefits and \r\ntrade-offs--mostly during and after implementation (AR6 Glossary, \r\nAnnex II)"


id: 4d2446a717875c80e1591c8d8ba4d0d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"Central to designing, monitoring and evaluating adaptation responses \r\nis outlining how activities are expected to lead to intended objectives, \r\nfor example, via a theory of change (Bours et al., 2014c; Oberlack and \r\nal., 2019). Theories of change or similar change models provide a basis \r\nto decide what to measure, but more attention needs to be paid to \r\nhow theories of change are constructed and who is involved (Mason \r\nand Barnes, 2007; Forsyth, 2018). Participatory approaches can support \r\nunderstanding how climate risks affect the respective population, \r\nhow these risks interact with social and cultural processes, and how \r\nresponses could most effectively address climate risks (Conway et al., \r\n2019). Inclusive M&E systems can facilitate ownership and enhance \r\nthe meaningfulness and usability of the generated information \r\n(CARE, 2014; Faulkner et al., 2015)"


id: a1f404a0de60b99e0fa2a9f480fd4732
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" Meaningfulness is not associated \r\nwith a particular approach or method but depends on whether the \r\nchosen M&E design fits the M&E purpose and the information needs \r\nof the intended audience (Fisher et al., 2015; Leiter, 2017). Effective \r\ncommunication of M&E findings and feedback into decision-making \r\nprocesses is essential to achieve the respective M&E purpose and \r\nfacilitate learning (Section 17.5.2.7)."


id: 2a21f7d6cb32acda1d0334ba26b9d125
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"A set of all-purpose and globally applicable standard indicators that \r\ncould comprehensively measure adaptation does not exist (high \r\nconfidence) (IPCC, 2014; Leiter and Pringle, 2018). A wide variety of \r\nindicators have been used to assess adaptation and its results (CARE, \r\n2010; Harvey et al., 2011; Lamhauge et al., 2013; Brooks et al., 2014; \r\nHammill et al., 2014b; Makinen et al., 2018; HM Government, 2019). \r\nLiterature has also noted unrealistic expectations of what indicators \r\ncan accomplish. For instance, decisions involving competing political \r\ninterests would not be adequately informed through simple indicators; \r\nand learning requires knowledge of how and why change has \r\nhappened, something that indicators often do not capture (Hinkel, \r\n2011; Bours et  al., 2014b). Indicators can also become misguided \r\nincentives and might steer attention away from what matters (Leiter \r\nand Pringle, 2018; Hallegatte and Engle, 2019; Klonschinski, 2021)"


id: 532f6c7dccc34d8b29373718b0450490
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" \r\nSurveys, scorecards, interviews and focus groups are alternative \r\nmethods of gaining insights on adaptation progress (Brooks et  al., \r\n2014; Porter et al., 2015; Das, 2019; McNamara et al., 2020)."


id: 90505ef06c95ac29c1c4c948157d8d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"Indices, the combination of multiple indicators into a single score, are \r\ncommon products of risk and vulnerability assessments to compare \r\ncountries or other entities, often in the form of rankings or maps \r\n(Preston et al., 2011; Reckien, 2018; de Sherbinin and et al., 2019). They \r\ncan indicate changes in vulnerability over time within their respective \r\nconceptualisation of vulnerability or risk. The construction of indices, \r\nincluding indicator selection, their weighting, normalisation and \r\ndata sources, has a profound impact on their scores (Reckien, 2018). \r\nResearch has consistently found large discrepancies between country \r\nvulnerability rankings (Brooks et  al., 2005; Eriksen and Kelly, 2007; \r\nLeiter et al., 2017b; Visser et al., 2020). Reviews of vulnerability and \r\nresilience indices identified 'substantial conceptual, methodological \r\nand empirical weaknesses' (Fussel, 2010: 8) and a widespread lack \r\nof validation (Cai et al., 2018)"


id: fbdae8c8f80271fac371520f89fbccbc
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" Using countries as a unit of analysis \r\nalso masks significant sub-national variation (Otto et  al., 2015; \r\nMohammadpour et  al., 2019). Individual indices therefore 'fail to \r\nconvene a robust guidance for policy makers' (Muccione et al., 2017: \r\n4) and should not present the sole basis for policy decisions (Brooks \r\net al., 2005; Leiter and Pringle, 2018). Due to their limitations (Singh \r\net  al., 2017), the OECD suggests that indices are primarily used for \r\n'initiating discussion and stimulating public interest' (OECD, 2008: 13)."


id: d8d9c4e5af54140e1eede9dd2f0502ec
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"developing national adaptation M&E systems, although less than half \r\nare yet reporting on implementation (Leiter, 2021b; Table 17.8). Country\u0002specific adaptation M&E systems vary considerably regarding their \r\nlegal mandate, purpose, content, involved actors and types of reporting \r\n(Hammill et al., 2014a; EEA, 2015; Leiter, 2015; Leiter et al., 2017a; EEA, \r\n2020). In most cases, they focus primarily on monitoring implementation \r\nrather than assessing outcomes, although some are linked to national \r\nclimate risk or vulnerability assessments (e.g., in Germany and the UK) \r\n(EEA, 2018). At least 15 countries have published evaluations of national \r\nadaptation plans which help inform the development of successive \r\nadaptation plans or strategies (Table 17.8). Nevertheless, there is only \r\nlimited empirical evidence of the ability of M&E systems to facilitate \r\naction or increase the level of ambition of revised policies"


id: 848131b94ea814b563be860ec021112e
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" More research \r\nis needed to determine the quality of national adaptation M&E systems \r\nand how well they support the policy cycle."


id: e75b0f28d2482538f1a087f948b36ed8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"Tracking adaptation finance requires defining what counts as \r\nadaptation. Different definitions can lead to large variations in the \r\nestimated amount of adaptation finance (Donner et  al., 2016; Hall, \r\n2017). A further challenge is how to account for adaptation that is \r\nmainstreamed, that is, where adaptation-specific investments form \r\nonly part of a larger programme or budget line, or where actions \r\ncontribute to adaptation without being labelled as adaptation. These \r\nchallenges limit the direct comparability between adaptation and \r\nmitigation finance (UNFCCC, 2019a). In fact, tracking adaptation \r\nfinance differs from tracking mitigation finance since activities cannot \r\nbe a priori assumed to constitute adaptation but instead have to be \r\nassessed for their linkage to climate risks in a particular context (MDBs \r\n& IDFC, 2018)"


id: 4d928e646bdf3cbc612261492eec418b
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" Methods for adaptation finance tracking continue to be \r\nfurther developed aiming at better comparability and completeness \r\n(Richmond and Hallmeyer, 2019; Richmond et al., 2021)."


id: f583f64bb9e2865935191ac528cffce3
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"Various methods are used to track adaptation finance, which makes \r\ncomparisons between adaptation finance figures challenging (UNFCCC \r\nSCF, 2018; Weikmans and Roberts, 2019). For example, multi-lateral \r\ndevelopment banks use a different methodology than countries do \r\nunder the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (Box 17.4; \r\nMDBs, 2019). One of the differences concerns the treatment of partially \r\nadaptation-relevant projects, namely whether only parts or the full \r\namount of a given project volume are counted as adaptation finance (see, \r\ne.g., MDBs, 2019). Under the OECD DAC methodology, countries often \r\nuse a fixed percentage (e.g., 50% of the total project value), whereas \r\nthe MDB methodology attempts for a project-specific estimation of the \r\nadaptation-relevant proportion (MDBs & IDFC, 2018). Another aspect is \r\nwhether tracking distinguishes between financial instruments, such as \r\ngrants or loans"


id: 4e01519e7f4b5b8db88724c38b1952af
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" Different accounting rules can lead to large differences \r\nin reported amounts of adaptation finance and to a lack of comparability \r\nbetween providers (Weikmans and Roberts, 2019). Studies identified an \r\nover-reporting (i.e., counting non-adaptation-related finance) by a factor \r\nof two to three, which suggests the need for a more consistent and \r\ntransparent accounting system (Weikmans et al., 2017; CARE, 2021)."


id: b653b1d1ed2b2739b0c74cc317bc5c2e
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"While more than 170 countries have policies that address adaptation (Nachmany et al., 2019b; Section 17.4.2), very few have operational \r\nframeworks to track and evaluate implementation and results (Leiter, 2021a; Section 17.5.2.4). In Europe, for example, most countries have \r\nadopted a national adaptation plan or strategy, but only few are tracking whether ambitions are realised (EEA, 2020; Section 13.11.2). \r\nMoreover, climate risks are interconnected across scales, regions and sectors (Eakin et al., 2009; Challinor et al., 2017; Cross-Chapter \r\nBox INTERREG in Chapter 16; Hedlund et al., 2018) (high confidence), complicating causal attribution. National assessments of progress \r\nusually do not assess private sector and non-governmental adaptation and barely account for climate risks that transcend across borders, \r\nfor example through supply chains or shared ecosystems (EEA, 2018; Benzie and Persson, 2019)"


id: 7c52d25196ef69ff5710a7ed9bec6e67
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" In addition, adaptation action in one \r\nplace or time can potentially lead to negative effects elsewhere (externalities) (Magnan and Ribera, 2016; Atteridge and Remling, 2018; \r\n17.5.1). Hence, determining the collective adequacy and effectiveness (see Figure 1.7 in Chapter 1) of adaptation responses is different \r\nfrom simple aggregates of national and sub-national information (UNEP, 2017)."


id: 88187bf43099430783fc029b9bbc5bab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"Global assessments typically require global availability of consistent data, be they quantitative or qualitative, which has proven to be a \r\nconstraining factor for attempts to assess global adaptation (high confidence). For example, many countries face difficulties in reporting \r\nadequately on progress in implementing the Sendai Framework and risk-related SDGs (UNDRR, 2019: vi). The availability of data also \r\ninfluences which variables can be eventually selected in an assessment. This limitation can affect the ability to meet the initial objectives \r\nand lead to biases in the framing and interpretation of assessment outcomes. For some variables, an alternative to relying on nationally \r\nprovided data can be to develop new global data sets (Magnan and Chalastani, 2019) or utilise data from Earth Observation (Andries \r\net al., 2018)"


id: ec8bb163961571027571cf688a225308
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" Adaptation is hence faced with a dilemma between globally available yet generic data and regionally or locally more \r\ndetailed yet patchy data (high confidence)."


id: e7314d6c6c52327fcc416b25bac6cb00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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"Conclusion--Combining approaches for assessing adaptation progress at the global level\r\nUnderstanding to what extent the world is on track to adapt to climate change impacts and risks globally is a pressing question in scientific \r\nand policy communities, especially in light of the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement. Important considerations for a robust \r\nassessment framework (e.g., consistency), as well as the associated scientific challenges (e.g., aggregation, externalities, breadth versus \r\ndepth of data) and the role of underlying objectives (e.g., on the contested issue of comparability) are increasingly understood (high \r\nconfidence). There is also a growing and diverse body of information on adaptation progress, although most assessments of global progress \r\nundertaken to date focus on processes and outputs (e.g., policies and plans) rather than outcomes (i.e., risk reduction)"


id: a3657cd0bf7f521dacd804b6c3736c72
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"project documents to international funding agencies. Novel approaches, including big data tools (Ford et al., 2016; Biesbroek et al., 2020), \r\nare also being explored but still have to prove their practical value. Each approach and source of information can contribute additional \r\nknowledge, but also demonstrates limitations, so that there is no single 'best' approach (high confidence). Yet, to date, the international \r\ncommunity has not sufficiently explored the relative strengths and weaknesses of different approaches and their applicability and, therefore, \r\ntheir potential synergies in complementing each other. Triangulated assessments have only rarely been applied (high confidence) due to \r\nmultiple conceptual and methodological challenges, despite their potential for increasing the robustness of knowledge"


id: 8b8f953ad53b31223e74aa951879644a
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" One overarching \r\nconclusion of this Cross-Chapter Box therefore is that the combination of different approaches will provide a more comprehensive picture of \r\nglobal adaptation progress than is currently available from individual approaches (limited evidence, high agreement)."


id: f736d6f3727b655e8b7a761893433fa5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Actions to ameliorate a climate risk have consequences beyond the \r\nimmediate effects on exposure or vulnerability to a hazard. They may \r\naim to combat many risks, could adversely interact with other risks and \r\nactions, or may be nested within a suite of actions across many risks. \r\nSome actions may have negative consequences for climate resilient \r\ndevelopment. In this broader context, the effectiveness of adaptations \r\nfor supporting climate resilient development is now better articulated \r\n(Box 17.1). Importantly, adaptations need to be designed to not only \r\ncombat current and future climate risks but also ensure that they \r\ndo not lock in undesirable pathways in the future as risks develop \r\nand change (very high confidence) (Sections  17.2, 17.3.1, 17.5). \r\nEffective management of climate risks will therefore be dependent \r\non satisfactorily managing current climate risks (Boxes 17.1, 17.2, \r\n17"


id: dfe6d8424ef779d88328d1b217b92aa8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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content:
"5), coupled with assessing prognoses for future climate risks, and \r\ndeveloping responses in advance for reducing those risks to tolerable \r\nresidual levels (very high confidence) (Sections  1.4, 1.6, 16.6, 17.2, \r\nBox 16.1; e.g., water risks, Section 4.7.1). The dynamic nature of risk \r\n(Viner et al., 2019; Simpson et al., 2021; Sections 16.3, 16.6) also means \r\nthat the contribution of current adaptations to ameliorating future \r\nrisks needs to be regularly reviewed (high confidence) (Section 17.5.2). \r\nAcross the Working Group II report are examples of how managing \r\nadaptations to ameliorate climate risks can negatively or positively \r\naffect sustainable development, thereby impacting the potential for \r\nclimate resilient development discussed in Chapter 18. Drawing on the \r\nassessment of sectoral and regional chapters in this report, this section \r\nexamines three broad components for orienting decision-making for \r\nclimate adaptation towards climate resilient development."


id: 5dfb05b91716819e18e9f5048ccde986
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:37
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"The complex, interacting and compounding nature of climate risks \r\nmeans that single risks cannot be managed in isolation (very high \r\nconfidence) (Section 16.5, Figure 16.11; Section 17.3.2; Nhamo et al., \r\n2018), including accounting for potential risks arising from adaptations \r\n(Simpson et al., 2021). Regional examples of needs for cross-sectoral \r\nintegrated management include the water-energy-food nexus in Africa \r\n(Section 10.5.1), Asia (Section 10.6.3), Australasia (Section 11.6), Europe \r\n(Section 13.2.2) and North America (Table 14.8), and ecosystem-oriented \r\nadaptations and/or nature-based solutions, in Africa (Section  9.6.5), \r\nAsia (Section 10.4.2), Australasia (Box 11.4, Section 11.3.5), Central and \r\nSouth America (Section 12.5.1), Europe (Section 13.3.2), North America \r\n(Section 14.6.1, Box 14.3) and Small Islands (Section 15.5.4)"


id: c8e9f9ce011904bdf3bd7a1705de121a
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content:
" The cross\u0002sectoral interactions within humans systems, including impacts on cities, \r\nsettlements and infrastructure, are reflected in those subjects as well as \r\nfor health in Africa (Section 9.10.2), Asia (Section 10.4.5), Australasia "


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"National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) submitted to the UNFCCC have \r\nbeen reviewed for quality by Woodruff and Regan (2019). In their \r\nreview, Woodruff and Regan used a number of indicators grouped \r\nwithin established 'quality principles'. They found that the plans \r\nwere more oriented at the strategic level or at the level of specific \r\nprojects rather than identifying methods for resolving cross-sectoral \r\nor cross-jurisdictional interactions or issues (medium confidence). \r\nA key recommendation from their review and supported by other \r\nstudies (e.g., Abutaleb et al., 2018) is that plans would be improved \r\ngreatly by having inputs from multiple government agencies and \r\nmultiple sectors (medium confidence), which could provide the basis \r\nfor planning and review of integrated adaptation. Also, the plans need \r\ngreater attention to implementation (Sections 9.4.1, 11.8, 13.11.2), \r\nand the identification of metrics by which success (Section  17.5"


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"1) \r\nand performance can be measured (Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS in \r\nthis Chapter), a common issue for adaptation planning generally (e.g., \r\nSections 12.5.2.6, 17.5)."


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"depend on appropriate enabling conditions, including institutional \r\nsupport and capacity, available financial resources and knowledge, \r\nand suitable conditions for stakeholder participation (high confidence) \r\n(Section  17.4). The current levels of uncertainty surrounding the \r\neffectiveness of many adaptation options (Section  17.5.2; Cross\u0002Chapter Box  PROGRESS in this Chapter) means that decision\u0002making approaches applicable to deep uncertainty (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox  DEEP in this Chapter; Section  17.3.1) will apply in many if not \r\nmost cases (medium confidence). An early step in identifying suitable \r\nintegrated pathways for managing climate risks, establishing 'no \r\nregrets' anticipatory options in a timely manner, and avoiding path \r\ndependencies is to jointly map the steps for adapting to sectoral \r\nrisks and determine suitable ways to avoid maladaptations arising \r\n(high confidence) (Section 17.3"


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"1, Cross-Working Group Box URBAN \r\nin Chapter 6 and Cross-Chapter Boxes DEEP in this Chapter). \r\nThe application of Dynamic Adaptive Pathway planning has been \r\nsuccessfully used in this way in Australasia (Section 11.7.3) and Europe \r\n(Sections 13.6.2.2, 13.10.2) (Lawrence et al., 2019a; Haasnoot et al., \r\n2020a). Current experience suggests that synergies between sectors \r\ncan save resources and effort (limited evidence) (Section  13.11.2). \r\nIterative processes can then enhance adaptation programmes by \r\nincluding more detailed modelling, and updated knowledge as the \r\nexperience is acquired (Section 17.3.1)."


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"Guidelines, instruments and resources to identify options for managing risks, and support decisions on the most \r\nsuitable course of actions to take, can be collectively referred to as decision-support frameworks. These can include \r\ndata services, decision-support tools, processes for making decisions and methods for monitoring and evaluating \r\nprogress and success.  Data services enable the identification, location and timing of risks that could manifest \r\nwith negative impacts, as well as potential opportunities.  Often, these are termed 'climate services' and assist \r\nwith mapping hazards and how they are changing. Decision-support tools range from qualitative approaches to \r\ndetermining overlap of areas of concern with those hazards in the future, to more quantitative and dynamic \r\nsimulation approaches that enable dynamic stress-testing of adaptation options and strategies to determine if \r\nproposed plans for adapting to the future could be successful"


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" An important consideration is whether options for \r\nrisk management or capitalisation on opportunities will limit options and flexibility for responding to unforeseen \r\nevents in the future. If these options have a negative effect on other areas of concern, then they could be identified \r\nin these planning scenarios as maladaptations, and therefore avoided."


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"Decision-support frameworks are most successful when they are iterative, integrative and consultative. Rather \r\nthan a single decision be made, and an action taken, there are processes for making the best decision possible, \r\nthen monitoring progress towards delivering a successful outcome. Given a set of suitable indicators with regular \r\nmonitoring, decisions can be revised, updated or changed as the future unfolds and foundations for the original \r\ndecision tested. This is important because climate responses need to be initiated well in advance of them being \r\nneeded due to the time required to implement suitable responses. These forward-looking approaches allow errors \r\nto occur and corrections made before problems arise"


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" They also enable action to be taken without having to wait \r\nfor the circumstances to arise, which if this were to occur could result in only limited reactions being available \r\nand the outcomes then dependent upon recovery from events rather than proactive planning and avoidance of \r\nevents. Integrated approaches to risk management are available to help manage portfolios of interacting risks, \r\nincluding the potential for compounding and cascading risks when climate-related events arise."


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"In a warming world, incremental adaptation, that is, proven standard measures of adaptation, will not always suffice \r\nto adjust to the negative impacts from climate change leading to substantial residual risks and, in some cases, the \r\nbreaching of adaptation limits; transformational adaptation, involving larger system-wide change (as compared \r\nwith in-system change), will increasingly be necessary as a complement for helping individuals and communities to \r\ncope with climate change. As an example of incremental adaptation, a farmer may decide to use drought-tolerant \r\ncrops to deal with increasing occurrences of heatwaves. With further warming and increases in heatwaves and \r\ndrought, however, the impacts of climate change may necessitate the consideration of system-wide change, such \r\nas moving to an entirely new agricultural system in areas where the climate is no longer suitable for current \r\npractices, or switching to livestock rearing"


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" Where on-site adaptation becomes infeasible and pull factors exist, the \r\nfarming households may decide to seek employment in other sectors, which may also lead to migration for work. \r\nAs another example, physical protection through sea walls to stop coastal flooding is a proven adaptation measure. \r\nWith further projected flooding due to increasing sea level rise attributable to climate change transformational \r\ncity planning, that would systemically change how flood water is managed throughout the whole city, potentially \r\nrequiring deeper institutional, structural and financial support. Also, the deliberate relocation of settlements \r\n(managed retreat) is seeing attention in the face of increasingly severe coastal or riverine flooding in some regions. \r\nWhile transformational adaptation is increasingly being considered in theory and planning, implementation is only \r\nbeginning to see attention."


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"A warming climate brings along increasing risks, part of which can be reduced or insured. What remains is called \r\nresidual risks and needs to be retained by households, the private and public sectors. People living in conflict-affected \r\nareas benefit only marginally from adaptation investments by governments, private sector or other institutions. \r\nThese people bear most of the changing climate risks themselves. Higher-income countries generally have invested \r\nheavily in structural adaptation to make sure people are not exposed to extreme events (e.g., dykes) and have \r\ndeveloped a variety of private or public insurance systems to finance the risk of the most rare or extreme events. In \r\nother, middle- or lower-income countries, these very extreme events are less likely to be insured, and the impacts \r\nare borne by the most vulnerable people. Absent risk reduction or insurance, coping with residual risks generally \r\nmeans reducing consumption (e.g"


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", food) or drawing down assets (selling machinery, houses, etc.), which all can \r\nbring along longer-term adverse developmental implications. Adaptation investments in low-income countries tend \r\nto focus more heavily on increasing capacity and reducing vulnerability; people remain exposed to the changing \r\nclimate risks and bear the burden of reacting and responding."


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"Conceptually, the opposite of successful adaptation is maladaptation, that is, when adaptation responses produce \r\nunintended negative side effects such as exacerbating or shifting vulnerability, increasing risk for certain people \r\nor ecosystems, or increasing greenhouse gas emissions. Among the adaptation options assessed in this report \r\n(Figure  FAQ17.5.1), physical infrastructure along coasts (e.g., sea walls) has the highest risk for maladaptation \r\nover time through negative side effects on ecosystem functioning and coastal livelihood opportunities. However, \r\nsuch adaptations may appear valuable in the short and even longer term for already densely populated urban \r\ncoasts, demonstrating that an adaptation can be differently judged based on the context it is implemented in \r\n(Figure FAQ17.5.1). Many other adaptation options have a larger potential to contribute to successful adaptation \r\n(Figure FAQ17.5"


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"1), such as nature restoration, providing social safety nets and changing diets/minimising food \r\nwaste."


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"Tracking progress, in particular outcomes and impacts of adaptation, involves a number of challenges. First, to \r\ndetermine progress over time, risk and vulnerability assessments need to be repeated at least once after starting an \r\nadaptation process. This is rarely done, as it demands resources that are usually not factored into the adaptation \r\nresponse. Second, attributing changes in climate risks and vulnerabilities to the adaptation response is often difficult \r\ndue to other influencing factors, such as socioeconomic development over time. Expected causal relationships \r\nbetween responses and their outcomes should already be outlined during the adaptation planning phase, for \r\nexample by mapping the way from activities to outcomes, and they should be monitored during implementation"


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" \r\nThird, as adaptation can occur in multiple forms and target multiple temporal and spatial scales, the engagement of \r\na diversity of stakeholders is vital to understanding how responses enable adaptation and adaptation success across \r\nvulnerable groups. Although stakeholder engagement can be time intensive and costly, in particular when reaching \r\nout to populations that are usually not part of policy and planning processes, it can support evaluating co-benefits \r\nand trade-offs of adaptation responses. Consideration and analysis of co-benefits and trade-offs along with a focus \r\non short, medium and long time horizons of adaptation goals, which is usually possible through flexible and strong \r\ninstitutions, facilitate successful adaptation and reduce the likelihood of maladaptation."


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"Contributing Authors: Paulina Aldunce (Chile), Aditya Bahadur (India), Natalia Barbosa de \r\nCarvalho (Brazil), Ritwika Basu (India), Nick Brooks (UK), Donald A. Brown (USA), Anna Carthy \r\n(Ireland), Vanesa Castan Broto (Spain/UK), Ralph Chami (USA), John Cook (USA), Daniel de Berredo \r\nViana (Brazil), Frode Degvold (Norway), Shekoofeh Farahmend (Iran), Roger Few (UK), Gianfranco \r\nGianfrate (France), H. Carina Keskitalo (Sweden), Florian Krampe (Germany/Sweden), Rinchen \r\nLama (South Africa), Julia Leventon (Czech Republic/UK), Rebecca McNaught (New Zealand), Yu \r\nMo (China/UK), Marianne Mosberg (Norway), Michelle Mycoo (Trinidad and Tobago), Johanna \r\nNalau (Australia/Finland), Karen O'Brien (Norway), Meg Parsons (New Zealand), Alain Safa \r\n(France), Majid Sameti (Iran), Zoha Shawoo (Pakistan/UK), Marcus Taylor (Canada/UK), Mark G.L. \r\nTebboth (UK), Bejoy K"


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"exacerbate injustices, as well as constrain the implementation of \r\nCRD for all (very high confidence). Climate change intensifies existing \r\nvulnerability and inequality, with adverse impacts of climate change on \r\nthe most vulnerable groups, including women and children in low-income \r\nhouseholds, Indigenous or other minority groups, small-scale producers \r\nand fishing communities, and low-income countries (high confidence). \r\nMost vulnerable regions and population groups, such as in East, Central \r\nand West Africa, South Asia, Micronesia and Melanesia, and Central \r\nAmerica, present the most urgent need for adaptation (high confidence) \r\n{Chapters 10, 12, 15}. Climate justice initiatives explicitly address \r\nthese multi-dimensional distributional issues as part of climate change \r\nadaptation"


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" However, adaptation strategies can worsen social inequities, \r\nincluding gender, unless explicit efforts are made to change those \r\nunequal power dynamics, including spaces to foster inclusive decision \r\nmaking. Drawing upon Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge can \r\ncontribute to overcoming the combined challenges of climate change, \r\nfood security, biodiversity conservation, and combating desertification \r\nand land degradation. {Section 18.2; Cross-Chapter Box GENDER; Cross\u0002Chapter Box INDIG}"


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"Climate resilient development (CRD) is a process of implementing \r\ngreenhouse gas mitigation and adaptation options to support \r\nsustainable development for all {Section  18.1}. Climate action \r\nand sustainable development are interdependent processes and \r\nclimate resilient development is possible when this interdependence is \r\nleveraged. Pursuing these goals in an integrated manner increases their \r\neffectiveness in enhancing human and ecological well-being. Climate \r\nresilient development can help build capacity for climate action, \r\nincluding contributing to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, \r\nwhile enabling the implementation of adaptation options that enhance \r\nsocial, economic and ecological resilience to climate change as the \r\nprospect of crossing the 1.5degC global warming level in the early 2030s \r\napproaches (WGI Table SPM1)"


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" For example, incorporating clean energy \r\ngeneration, healthy diets from sustainable food systems, appropriate \r\nurban planning and transport, universal health coverage and social \r\nprotection, can generate substantial health and well-being co-benefits \r\n(very high confidence1\r\n) {Section 7.4.4, Cross-Chapter Box HEALTH in \r\nChapter 7}. Similarly, universal water and energy access can help to \r\nreduce poverty and improve well-being while making populations less \r\nvulnerable and more resilient to adverse climate impacts (very high \r\nconfidence) {Section 18.1, Box 4.7}."


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"Opportunities for climate resilient development vary by location \r\n(very high confidence). Over 3.3 billion people live in regions that are \r\nvery high and highly vulnerable to climate change, while 2 billion people \r\nlive in regions with low and very low vulnerability. Response to global \r\ngreenhouse gas emissions trajectories, regional and local development \r\npathways, climate risk exposure, socioeconomic and ecological \r\nvulnerability, and the local capacity to implement effective adaptation \r\nand greenhouse gas mitigation options, differ depending on local \r\ncontexts and conditions {Table 18.3}. As an example, underlying social \r\nand economic vulnerabilities in Australasia exacerbate disadvantage \r\namong particular social groups and there is deep under-investment \r\nin adaptation, given current and projected risks {Chapter 11}"


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" There \r\nis also significant regional heterogeneity in climate change, exposure \r\nand vulnerability, indicating different starting points for CRD, as well \r\nas mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development opportunities, \r\nsynergies and trade-offs {Section 18.5}."


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"Current development pathways, combined with the observed \r\nimpacts of climate change, are leading away from, rather \r\nthan towards, sustainable development, as reported in recent \r\nliterature (moderate agreement, robust evidence). While \r\ndemonstrable progress has been made on some of the Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Goals (SDGs), significant gains across a range of targets \r\nare still necessary, as is enhancing synergies and balancing and \r\nmanaging trade-offs. Severe risks to natural and human systems are \r\nalready observed in some places (high confidence) and could occur in \r\nmany more systems worldwide before mid-century (medium confidence) \r\nand by the end of the century at all scales, from the local to the global, \r\nand at all latitudes and altitudes (high confidence). The coronavirus \r\ndisease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic revealed the vulnerability of \r\ndevelopment progress to shocks and stresses, potentially delaying the \r\nimplementation of the 2030 Agenda for all {Section 8"


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"1, Cross-Chapter \r\nBox COVID in Chapter 7}. Various global trends, including rising income \r\ninequality, continued growth in greenhouse gas emissions, land use \r\nchange, food and water insecurity, human displacement and reversals \r\nof long-term increasing life expectancy trends in some nations, run \r\ncounter to the SDGs (very high confidence), as well as efforts to \r\nmitigate greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to a changing climate \r\n{Section  18.2}. These development trends contribute to worsening \r\npoverty, injustice and inequity, and environmental degradation. \r\nClimate change can exacerbate these conditions by undermining \r\nhuman and ecological well-being {Section 18.2}."


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"There are multiple possible pathways by which communities, \r\nnations and the world can pursue CRD. Moving towards \r\ndifferent pathways involves confronting complex synergies and \r\ntrade-offs between development pathways, and the options, \r\ncontested values and interests that underpin climate mitigation \r\nand adaptation choices (very high confidence). Climate resilient \r\ndevelopment pathways (CRDPs) are trajectories for the pursuit of CRD \r\nand navigating its complexities. Different actors, the private sector and \r\ncivil society, influenced by science, local and Indigenous knowledges, \r\nand the media are both active and passive in designing and navigating \r\nCRDPs {Sections 18.1, 18.4}. Increasing levels of warming may narrow \r\nthe options and choices available for local survival and sustainable \r\ndevelopment for human societies and ecosystems"


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" Limiting warming \r\nto Paris Agreement goals will reduce the magnitude of climate risks \r\nto which people, places the economy and ecosystems will have to \r\nadapt. Reconciling the costs, benefits and trade-offs associated with "


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"adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development interventions and \r\nhow they are distributed among different populations and geographies \r\nis essential and challenging, but also creates the potential to pursue \r\nsynergies that benefit human and ecological well-being. For example, in \r\nparts of Asia, sustainable development pathways that connect climate \r\nchange adaptation and disaster risk reduction can reduce climate \r\nvulnerability and increase resilience {Table  18.3, Section  10.6.2}. \r\nDifferent actors and stakeholders have different priorities regarding \r\nthese opportunities, which can exacerbate or diminish existing social, \r\neconomic and ecological vulnerabilities and inequities. For example, \r\nin parts of Africa, intensive irrigation contributes to the development \r\nof agriculture but has come at a cost to ecosystem integrity and \r\nhuman well-being {Table  18.3, Section  9.15.2}"


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" Careful and explicit \r\nconsideration for the ethical and equity dimensions of policies and \r\npractices associated with a climate resilient development pathway can \r\nhelp limit these negative externalities."


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"Systems transitions can enable CRD when accompanied by \r\nappropriate enabling conditions and inclusive arenas of \r\nengagement (very high confidence). Five systems transitions \r\nare considered: energy, industry, urban and infrastructure, land \r\nand ecosystems, and societal. Advancing CRD in specific contexts \r\nmay necessitate simultaneous progress on all five transitions. \r\nCollectively, these system transitions can widen the solution space, \r\nand accelerate and deepen the implementation of sustainable \r\ndevelopment, adaptation, and mitigation actions by equipping actors \r\nand decision makers with more effective options. For example, urban \r\necological infrastructure linked to an appropriate land use mix, street \r\nconnectivity, open and green spaces, and job-housing proximity \r\nprovides adaptation and mitigation benefits that can aid urban \r\ntransformation. {Table  18"


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"4, Cross-Working Group Box  URBAN in \r\nChapter 6} These system transitions are necessary precursors for more \r\nfundamental climate and sustainable-development transformations; \r\nbut can simultaneously be outcomes of transformative actions. \r\nHowever, the way they are pursued may not necessarily be perceived \r\nas ethical or desirable to all actors. Hence, enhancing equity and \r\nagency are cross-cutting considerations for all five transitions. Such \r\ntransitions can generate benefits across different sectors and regions, \r\nprovided they are facilitated by appropriate enabling conditions, \r\nincluding effective governance, policy implementation, innovation, \r\nand climate and development finance, which are currently insufficient \r\n{Sections 18.3, 18.4}."


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"Prevailing development pathways are not advancing CRD \r\n(very high confidence). Societal choices in the near term will \r\ndetermine future pathways. Some low-emissions pathways and \r\nclimate outcomes are unlikely2\r\n to be realised (very high confidence).\r\nRapid climate change is affecting every region across the globe and \r\naffecting natural and human systems relevant to the pursuit of the \r\nSDGs  {Sections  18.1, 18.2, Figure  18.1}. Even the most ambitious \r\ngreenhouse gas mitigation scenarios indicate climate change will \r\ncontinue for decades to centuries  {WGI, Section  18.2}. Increasing \r\nmitigation effort across multiple sectors exhibits opportunities \r\nfor synergies with sustainable development, but also trade-offs \r\nthat increase with mitigation efforts, that need to be balanced and \r\nmanaged (high confidence)"


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" The uncertainty associated with achieving \r\nspecific pathways and climate outcomes is a risk factor to consider \r\nin planning, with plausibility and transformational challenges, as well \r\nas trade-offs and synergies, affected by technology, policy design and \r\nsocietal choices {Section 18.2}. For instance, restrictions on utilisation \r\nof individual mitigation options to manage trade-offs (e.g., bioenergy \r\nwith carbon capture and storage [CCS], afforestation, nuclear power) \r\ncan also affect the mitigation cost to households (e.g., energy security, \r\ncommodity prices) and the likelihood of a desired climate outcome \r\nbeing realised. Developing and transitional economies are estimated \r\nas low-cost mitigation opportunities but are often at high risk from \r\nclimate change due to their regional and development context (high \r\nconfidence) {Sections  18.2, 18.5}"


id: b1c92ab0902a40de0d3e38a188d5375c
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" For example, in Africa, competing \r\nuses for water such as hydropower generation, irrigation and ecosystem \r\nrequirements can create trade-offs among different management and \r\ndevelopment objectives {Section 9.7.3}. In Asia, intensive irrigation and \r\nother forms of water consumption can have a negative effect on water \r\nquality and aquatic ecosystems {Section 10.6.3}. Developed countries \r\nalso face trade-offs, including in Australasia where adapting to fire risk \r\nin peri-urban zones introduces potential trade-offs among ecological \r\nvalues and fuel reduction in treed landscapes {Section  11.3.5}, and \r\nin North America where new coastal and alpine developments \r\ngenerate economic activity but enhance local social inequalities \r\n{Section 15.4.10}."


id: 7b54eebc5662616a14e082bbdfb16618
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"There is a rapidly narrowing window of opportunity to implement \r\nsystem transitions needed to enable CRD. Past choices have \r\nalready eliminated some development pathways, but other \r\npathways for CRD remain (very high confidence). In spite of a \r\ngrowth in national net-zero commitments, the current prospects of \r\nsurpassing 1.5degC global mean temperatures by the 2030s are high \r\n{WGI Table SPM1}. There is strong evidence of the worsening of multiple \r\nclimate impact drivers in all regions, that will place additional pressures \r\non ecosystem services that support food and water systems, increasing \r\nthe risks of malnutrition, ill-health and poverty in many regions {WGI \r\nFig SPM9, Table 18.4}. This implies that significant additional adaptation \r\nwill be needed. Over the near-term, implementing such transformational \r\nchange could be disruptive to various economic and social systems"


id: 96949c44542ebfcbbdcbed443da0dee8
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" \r\nOver the long-term, however, they could generate benefits to human \r\nwell-being and planetary health. Strengthening coordinated adaptation \r\nand mitigation actions can enhance the potential of local and regional \r\ndevelopment pathways to support CRD. Planning for CRD can support \r\nboth adaptation and decarbonisation via effective land use, promoting \r\nresilient and low-carbon infrastructure; protecting biodiversity and \r\nintegrating ecosystem services {Table 18.4}, assuming advancing just \r\nand equitable development processes."


id: ff62251a65490606478b28f7a64ef98a
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"People, acting through enabling social, economic and political \r\ninstitutions are the agents of system and societal transformations \r\nthat facilitate CRD founded on the principles of inclusion, equity, \r\nclimate justice, ecosystem health and human well-being (very\r\nhigh confidence). While much literature on climate action has focused \r\non the role of technology and policy as the factors that drive change, \r\nrecent literature has focused on the role of specific actors; citizens, \r\ncivil society, knowledge institutions (including local and Indigenous \r\nPeoples and science), governments, investors and businesses. Greater \r\nattention to, and transparency of, which actors' benefit, fail to benefit \r\nor are impacted by mitigation and adaptation choices actions could \r\nbetter support climate-resilient and sustainable development"


id: 738538e2f1a74c7926b01111f61f06e0
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" For \r\nexample, grounding adaptation actions in local realities could help to \r\nensure that adaptive actions do not worsen existing gender and other \r\ninequities within society (e.g., leading to maladaptation practices) (high \r\nconfidence). Differences in the ability of different actors to effect change \r\nultimately influence which interventions for sustainable development \r\nor climate action are implemented and thus what development \r\noutcomes are achieved. Recent literature has focused on the social, \r\npolitical and economic arenas of engagement in which these different \r\nactors interact. More focused attention on these arenas of engagement \r\ncould prove beneficial to reconciling divergent views on climate action, \r\nintegrating Indigenous knowledge and local knowledges, and elevating \r\ndiverse voices that have historically been marginalised from the policy \r\ndiscourse, thereby reducing vulnerability and deepening adaptive \r\ncapacity and the ability to implement CRD {Section 18"


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"CRDPs are determined through engagement in different arenas, \r\nthe degree to which the emergent pathways foster just and \r\nCRD depends on how contending societal interests, values and \r\nworldviews are reconciled through inclusive and participatory \r\ninteractions between governance actors in these arenas of \r\nengagement {Section 18.4.3} (high confidence). These interactions \r\noccur in many different arenas (e.g., governmental, economic and \r\nfinancial, political, knowledge, science and technology, and community) \r\nthat represent the settings, places and spaces in which societal actors \r\ninteract to influence the nature and course of development. For \r\ninstance, the Agenda 2030 highlights the importance of multi-level \r\nadaptation governance, including non-state actors from civil society \r\nand the private sector"


id: a89a3d2c521b2982554254183030bfb0
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" This implies the need for wider arenas and \r\nmodes of engagement around adaptation that facilitate coordination, \r\nconvergence and productive contestation among these diverse actors \r\nto collectively solve problems and to unlock the synergies between \r\nadaptation and mitigation and sustainable development."


id: 7a0df92a898f0184bc27b7ead3f7d02e
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"Regional and national differences mean different capacities \r\nfor pursuing CRDPs. Economic sectors and global regions are \r\nexposed to different opportunities and challenges in facilitating \r\nCRD, suggesting adaptation and mitigation options should \r\nbe aligned to local and regional context and development \r\npathways (very high confidence). Given their current state of \r\ndevelopment, some regions may prioritise poverty and inequality \r\nreduction, and economic development over the near-term as a means \r\nof building capacity for climate action and low-carbon development \r\nover the long-term. For example, Africa, South Asia, and Central and \r\nSouth America are highly exposed, vulnerable and impacted by climate \r\nchange, which is amplified by poverty, population growth, land use \r\nchange and high dependence on natural resources for commodity \r\nproduction"


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" In contrast, developed economies with mature economies \r\nand high levels of resilience may prioritise climate action to transition \r\ntheir energy systems and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Some \r\ninterventions may be robust in that they are relevant to a broad range of \r\npotential development trajectories and could be deployed in a flexible \r\nmanner. For example, conservation of land and water could be achieved \r\nthrough a variety of means and offer benefits to populations in the \r\nGlobal North and South alike. However, other types of interventions, \r\nsuch as those that are dependent upon emerging technologies, may \r\nrequire a specific set of enhanced enabling conditions or factors \r\nincluding infrastructure, supply chains, international cooperation, "


id: 350915b9e2886108cf1834e8c33ac1ce
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content:
"Pursuing CRD involves considering a broader range of sustainable \r\ndevelopment priorities, policies and practices, as well as enabling \r\nsocietal choices to accelerate and deepen their implementation \r\n(very high confidence). Scientific assessments of climate change \r\nhave traditionally framed solutions around the implementation of \r\nspecific adaptation and mitigation options as mechanisms for reducing \r\nclimate-related risks. They have given less attention to a fuller set of \r\nsocietal priorities and the role of non-climate policies, social norms, \r\nlifestyles, power relationships and worldviews in enabling climate \r\naction and sustainable development. Because CRD  involves different \r\nactors pursuing plural development trajectories in diverse contexts, the \r\npursuit of solutions that are equitable for all requires opening the space \r\nfor engagement and action to a diversity of people, institutions, forms \r\nof knowledge and worldviews"


id: e200520f720b5da782b0f03d1c07d19f
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" Through inclusive modes of engagement \r\nthat enhance knowledge sharing and realise the productive potential of \r\ndiverse perspectives and worldviews, societies could alter institutional \r\nstructures and arrangements, development processes, choices and \r\nactions that have precipitated dangerous climate change, constrained \r\nthe achievement of SDGs and, thus, limited pathways to achieving CRD \r\n{Box 18.1, Section 18.4}. Action over the next decade will be critical for \r\ncharting CRD pathways that catalyse the transformation of prevailing \r\ndevelopment practices and offer the greatest promise and potential for \r\nhuman well-being and planetary health."


id: 20f91834e1366800c6c8ba10435fb956
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"Past IPCC Assessment Reports have consistently examined extensive \r\nliterature on the links between climate change, adaptation and \r\nsustainable development (Smit et  al., 2001; Klein et  al., 2007; Yohe \r\net al., 2007). However, studies that explicitly refer to CRD as a concept \r\nor a guide for policy and practice remain modest (very high confidence). \r\nThe concept of CRD appeared in scholarly literature and development \r\nprogram documents over a decade ago (Kamal Uddin et al., 2006; Garg \r\nand Halsnaes, 2007) and has been used in more recent IPCC assessment \r\nreports and special reports (e.g., Denton et al., 2014; Roy et al., 2018). \r\nSimilarly, the use of the term climate resilient development pathways \r\n(CRDPs) dates to 2009 (Ayers and Huq, 2009), but its use accelerated \r\nafter appearing in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate \r\nChange (UNFCCC) publications around the launch of the Green Climate \r\nFund (UNFCCC, 2011)"


id: 2c9ca412b7fd93c8d935a4fca21c29a5
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" While this chapter prioritises the CRD literature, \r\nit also recognises that a broad range of literature, disciplinary expertise \r\nand development practice is relevant to the concept of CRD."


id: 4c096eb92b0a84073c174b85d86b7fc8
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"The links between climate change and development have been long \r\nrecognized by various research communities (Nagoda, 2015; Winkler \r\net  al., 2015; Webber, 2016; Carr, 2019) and have been assessed by \r\nWorking Group II in every IPCC Assessment Report since AR3 (Smit \r\net  al., 2001; Yohe et  al., 2007; Denton et  al., 2014). For the AR 1-3 \r\nreports, these links were largely framed in the context of sustainable \r\ndevelopment, a concept that has been well described in the literature \r\nfor decades (Brundtland, 1987). The AR5 introduced the framing of \r\nclimate-resilient pathways, which narrowed the discussion around \r\nsustainable development to specifically address the contributions \r\nof mitigation and adaptation actions to the reduction of risk to \r\ndevelopment and the various institutions, strategies and choices \r\ninvolved in risk management (Denton et al., 2014)"


id: 490d2796db2eab39f3ab73392a170a15
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content:
" That assessment \r\nconcluded that identifying and implementing appropriate technical \r\nand governance options for mitigation and adaptation as well as \r\ndevelopment strategies and choices that contribute to climate resilience \r\nare central to the successful implementation of such strategies. The \r\nAR5 also recognised that transformation of current development \r\npathways in terms of wider political, economic and social systems may \r\nbe necessary (Denton et al., 2014)."


id: 1690b76b8d3b43d434e7eb32f469b1b3
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"Much of this literature is assessed in recent IPCC Special Reports \r\n(Rogelj et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018; Bindoff et al., 2019; Hurlbert et al., \r\n2019; Oppenheimer et al., 2019), but new studies have continued to \r\nemerge. More specific uses of CRD found in the literature describe \r\ndevelopment that seeks to achieve poverty reduction and adaptation \r\nto climate change simultaneously without explicit mention of \r\nmitigation (USAID, 2014), as well as mitigation and poverty reduction, \r\ndescribed as 'low-carbon development', without explicit mention of \r\nadaptation (Alam et  al., 2011; Fankhauser and McDermott, 2016). \r\nOther similar terms include 'climate safe', 'climate compatible' and \r\n'climate smart' development (Huxham et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2017b; \r\nFicklin et al., 2018; Mcleod et al., 2018), each with varying nuances"


id: 5f35464d078ea3533030c8e04e9d7de4
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" \r\nClimate compatible development, coined by Mitchell and Maxwell \r\n(2010), specifically describes a 'triple win' of adaptation, mitigation \r\nand development (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2017; Favretto et al., 2018) (see \r\nalso Section  8.6). In this spirit, AR5 specifically referred to CRD as \r\n'development trajectories that combine adaptation and mitigation to \r\nrealize the goal of sustainable development' (Denton et al., 2014). This \r\nchapter builds on the AR5 and, for the purposes of assessment, formally \r\ndefines CRD as a process of implementing greenhouse gas mitigation \r\nand adaptation measures to support sustainable development for all"


id: a431e58c2af0ea64e0c693b6017bafb5
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" \r\nThis extension of the earlier definition reflects the emphasis in recent \r\nliterature on equity as a core element of sustainable development as \r\nwell as the objective of the SDGs to 'create conditions for sustainable, \r\ninclusive and sustained economic growth, shared prosperity and \r\ndecent work for all, taking into account different levels of national \r\ndevelopment and capacities' (United Nations, 2015: 3/35)."


id: bb5c92953e2eb56b73cfc07a9fea601c
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"The literature presenting research findings on climate resilient \r\ndevelopment (CRD) and pathways and processes for successfully \r\nachieving CRD has expanded significantly in the several years \r\nsince the AR5 (very high confidence). This includes both qualitative \r\nstudies of development as well as illustrative, quantitative analyses \r\nof development trajectories linked to specific scenarios, such as the \r\nShared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (Section 18.2.2). Furthermore, \r\nthe literature describing the role of system transitions and societal \r\ntransformation in enabling climate action (Box  18.1, Section  18.3), \r\ncompliance with the Paris Agreement (Sections  18.1.3, 18.2.1) and \r\nachievement of the SDGs (Section  18.1.3; Box  18.4) has expanded \r\nsignificantly (very high confidence)"


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" This expansion is comprised of \r\nstudies spanning a broad range of disciplinary perspectives, some of \r\nwhich have been underrepresented in prior IPCC assessments (high \r\nagreement, limited evidence) (Minx et al., 2017; Pearce et al., 2018b)."


id: f19a747206153d18bd33ba7ddd6b2285
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"Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are just one of a \r\nnumber of planetary boundaries which define safe operating spaces for \r\nhumanity and therefore opportunities for achieving sustainable and CRD. \r\nExceeding these boundaries poses increased risk of large-scale abrupt \r\nor irreversible environmental changes that would threaten human and \r\necological well-being (very high confidence) (Rockstrom et al., 2009a; \r\nRockstrom et al., 2009b; Butler, 2017; Schleussner et al., 2021). Other \r\nplanetary boundaries reported in the literature such as biodiversity loss, \r\nchanges in land systems and freshwater use are also directly influenced \r\nby patterns of development as well as climate change (Sections 18.2, \r\n18.5). Current rates of species extinction, conversion of land for crop \r\nproduction and exploitation of water resources exceed planetary \r\nboundaries, thereby undermining CRD"


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" Moreover, studies indicate that \r\nachievement of the SDGs, while consistent with maintaining some \r\nplanetary boundaries, could undermine others (O'Neill et  al., 2018; \r\nHickel, 2019; Randers et al., 2019) (Section 18.2), suggesting significant \r\nshifts in current patterns of development are necessary to maintain \r\ndevelopment within planetary boundaries."


id: f6539fa8fb59755c071a0f0c4aac877e
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"As illustrated in Figure 18.1, the ultimate aim of CRDPs is to support \r\nsustainable development for ensuring planetary health and human well\u0002being. CRD is both an outcome at a point in space and time, as observed \r\nthrough SDG achievement indicators, but also a process consisting of \r\nactions and social choices made by multiple actors--government, \r\nindustry, media, civil society, and science (Section 18.4). These actions \r\nand social choices are performed within different dimensions of \r\ngovernance--politics, institutions (norms, rules), and practice, and \r\nbounded by ethics, values and worldviews. The development outcomes \r\nand processes pertain to political, economic, ecological, socio-cultural, \r\nknowledge-technology and community arenas (Figure 18.2)"


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" A CRDP \r\nwill, for example, aspire to achieve ecological outcomes in terms of \r\nplanetary health and achievement of Paris Agreement goals as well as \r\nhuman well-being, solidarity and social justice, in addition to political, \r\neconomic and science-technology outcomes. These outcomes are \r\nenabled by achieving progress in core system transitions that catalyse \r\nbroader societal transformations (Figure 18.3)."


id: 7a9e54023e0c4b22c4bfe9b298f4e5
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"Exceedance of planetary boundaries contributes to human and ecological \r\nvulnerability to climate change and other shocks and stressors. People and \r\nregions that already face high rates of natural resource use, ecosystem \r\ndegradation and poverty are more vulnerable to climate change impacts, \r\ncompounding existing development challenges in regions that are \r\nalready strained (IPCC, 2014a; Hallegatte et al., 2019). The International \r\nMonetary Fund, for example, found that for a medium- and low-income \r\ndeveloping country with an annual average temperature of 25degC, the \r\neffect of a 1degC increase in temperature is a reduction in economic \r\ngrowth by 1.2% (Acevedo et  al., 2018). Countries whose economies \r\nare projected to be hard hit by an increase in temperature account for \r\nonly about 20% of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2016, but are \r\nhome to nearly 60% of the global population. This is expected to rise \r\nto more than 75% by the end of the century"


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" These economic impacts \r\nare a function of the underlying vulnerability of low- and middle-income \r\ndeveloping economies to the impacts of climate change (Section 18.5). \r\nSuch vulnerability was also evidenced and enhanced by the COVID-19 \r\npandemic which slowed progress on the SDGs in multiple nations \r\n(Naidoo and Fisher, 2020; Srivastava et al., 2020; Bherwani et al., 2021)."


id: 32db3a3e9a11def36f099bafd7e3be5f
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"While there are many possible successful pathways to future \r\ndevelopment in the context of climate change, history has shown that \r\npathways that are positive for the vast majority often induce notable \r\nimpacts and costs, especially on marginal and vulnerable people \r\n(Hickel, 2017; Ramalho, 2019), placing them in direct contradiction \r\nwith the commitment to 'leave no one behind' (United Nations, \r\n2015). Similarly, contemporary scenario analyses find that there are \r\nplausible development trajectories that lead towards sustainability \r\n(Figure  18.1, Section  18.2.2). Yet, a number of plausible trajectories \r\nthat perpetuate or exacerbate unstainable forms of development also \r\nappear in the literature (Figure  18.1, Section  18.2.2). A significant \r\nchallenge lies in identifying pathways that address current climate \r\nvariability and change, while allowing for improvements in human \r\nwell-being"


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" Furthermore, while a given pathway might lead to a set of \r\ndesired outcomes for one region or set of actors, the process of getting \r\nthere may come at high environmental, socio- and economic cost to \r\nothers (very high confidence) (Raworth, 2017; Faist, 2018). Frequently, \r\nconsiderations of social difference and equity are not prioritised in the \r\nevaluation of different development choices. The assumption that a \r\ngrowing economy lifts opportunity for all could, for example, further \r\nmarginalise those who are the most vulnerable to climate change \r\n(Matin et al., 2018; Diffenbaugh and Burke, 2019; Hickel et al., 2021)."


id: 832b7d33d5eacc9041b958b053bdbca
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content:
"(a) Climate resilient development is a process that takes place through continuous societal choices towards higher CRD (illustrative green pathways) or lower CRD (illustrative red pathways). (b) CRD is described by five development dimensions - people, prosperity, partnership, peace, planet - on which the SDGs build (18.2). Some societal choices have mixed outcomes for CRD (illustrative orange pathways). This figure builds on figure SPM.9 in AR5 WGII depicting climate resilient pathways by describing how CRDPs emerge from societal choices about adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development within multiple arenas - rather than solely from discrete decision points (18.4). Dimensions of CRD characterize both development outcomes as well as the interactions and societal choices that make up the development process"


id: 4684f6836e0d2058bebc577a43552dae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
" Societal choices, often contested, are made in arenas of engagement through interactions between key actors in civil society, the private sector and government (see Figure 18.2). The quality of interactions, such as degree of inclusion and empowerment of diverse voices, determine whether societal choices and associated actions shift development towards or away from CRD. The five CRD dimensions underline the close interconnectedness between the biosphere and humans, the two necessarily intertwined in interactions, actions, transitions, and futures (see Figure 18.3). There is a narrow and closing window of opportunity to make transformational changes to move towards and not away from development futures that are more climate-resilient and sustainable (Box 18.1). Pathways not taken (dotted line) illustrate that opportunities have been missed for higher CRD pathways due to past societal choices and increasing temperatures"


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" Present societal choices determine whether we shift towards higher CRD in future or whether pathways will be limited to lower CRD."


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"criticism in recent years (very high confidence) (Joakim et al., 2015; \r\nSchlosberg et al., 2017; Mikulewicz, 2018; Mikulewicz, 2019; Moser \r\net al., 2019), suggesting the need to enhance understanding of how \r\nresilience is being operationalised at the programme and project level \r\nand the net implications for human and ecological well-being.\r\nThis expansion of research has been accompanied by a shift in the \r\npolicy context for climate action including an increasingly strong link \r\nbetween climate actions and sustainable development. In particular, \r\nthe SDGs represent a near-term framework linking sustainability \r\nand human development in a manner that not only addresses \r\nplanetary health and human well-being, but also help better plan \r\nand implement mitigation and adaptation actions to achieve these \r\nlinked goals (Conway et al., 2015; Griscom et al., 2017; Allen et al., \r\n2018b; Roy et al., 2018; P.R. Shukla E. Calvo Buendia, 2019)"


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" The SDGs \r\nexplicitly identify climate action (SDG 13) among the goals needed \r\nto achieve sustainable development. Meanwhile, the text of the Paris \r\nAgreement makes explicit mention of the importance of considering \r\nclimate 'in the context of sustainable development' (Articles 2, 4, 6) \r\nor as 'contributing to sustainable development' (Article 7) (Article \r\n7, UNFCCC, 2015). Similarly, sustainable development appears \r\nprominently within the text of the Sendai Framework for Disaster \r\nRisk Reduction (UNDRR, 2015) and the Global Assessment Reports on \r\nDisaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR, 2019). At the local- or household\u0002level, a growing literature recognises that climate impacts tend to \r\nexacerbate existing inequalities within societies, even at the level of \r\ngender inequalities within households (Sultana, 2010; Arora-Jonsson, \r\n2011; Carr, 2013). Thus, climate change impacts threaten even short\u0002term gains in sustainable development (18.2, Box 18"


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"4), which could \r\nbe rolled back over longer adaptation and mitigation horizons. For \r\nexample, the COVID-19 pandemic is estimated to have reversed gains \r\nover the past several years in terms of global poverty reduction (very \r\nhigh confidence) (Phillips et al., 2020; Sultana, 2021; Wilhelmi et al., \r\n2021) (Cross-Chapter Box  COVID in Chapter 7), reflecting the risks \r\nposed by global, systemic threats to development."


id: 1c5f2ec6737a58b0efa393c608f42bd2
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"sustainability outcomes. This chapter therefore departs from the AR5s \r\nalignment of CRD with adaptation pathways and the emphasis on \r\ndecision points that enable one to manage (or fail to manage) climate \r\nrisk, towards a framing that integrates a range of possible futures each \r\noffering different opportunities, risks and trade-offs to different actors \r\nand stakeholders (see WGII AR5, IPCC, 2014b, Figure SPM.9). Instead, \r\nCRD emerges from everyday formal and informal decisions, actions, \r\nand adaptation or mitigation policy interventions. This is inclusive of \r\nsystem transitions, increased resilience, environmental integrity, social \r\njustice, equity, and reduced poverty and vulnerability, all facets of \r\nhuman well-being and planetary health. Rather than encompassing a \r\nformula or blueprint for particular actions, sustainable development is \r\na process that provides a compass for the direction that these multiple \r\nactions should take (Anders, 2016)"


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" This creates opportunities for actors \r\nto apply a diverse toolkit of adaptation, mitigation and sustainable \r\ndevelopment interventions, thereby opening up the solution space."


id: 76e6026cb66f10fab0028e5b17534a18
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"The WGII AR5 Report noted that adapting to the risks associated with \r\nclimate change becomes more challenging at higher levels of global \r\nwarming (IPCC, 2014a). This was evidenced by contrasting impacts \r\nand adaptive capacity for 2degC and 4degC of warming. This relationship \r\nbetween levels of warming, climate risk and reasons for concern (see \r\nChapter 16) is also relevant to the concept of CRD. For example, recent \r\nliterature on CRD emphasises the urgency of climate action that achieve \r\nsignificant reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the \r\nimplementation of adaptation options that result in significant gains \r\nin human and natural system resilience (very high confidence) (Haines \r\net al., 2017; Shindell et al., 2017; Xu and Ramanathan, 2017; Fuso Nerini \r\net al., 2018). This was explored extensively in the IPCC's SR1.5 report \r\nin its comparison of impacts associated with 1"


id: ce78d8bee074ebf300c2b3d0894769bd
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"5degC versus 2degC climate \r\nobjectives and synergies and trade-offs with the SDGs (IPCC, 2018a). \r\nHowever, the SR1.5 report and other literature also identified potential \r\ntrade-offs between aggressive mitigation and the SDGs (see also Frank \r\net al., 2017; Hasegawa et al., 2018). This indicates that while future \r\nmagnitudes of warming are a fundamental consideration in CRD, such \r\ndevelopment involves more than just achieving temperature targets. \r\nRather, CRD considers the possible transitions that enable those targets \r\nto be achieved, including the evaluation of different adaptation and "


id: 50348aa344bcb1deb62b609e73f5cbf7
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"Fifth, CRD involves processes involving diverse actors, at different scales \r\noperating within an environmental, developmental, socioeconomic, \r\ncultural and political context, as typified in the SDG and the Paris \r\nAgreement negotiations (very high confidence) (Kamau et al., 2018) \r\n(Section  18.4). The dependence of CRD on processes of negotiation \r\nand reconciliation among diverse actors and interests leads to the \r\ndismissal of the notion that there is a single, optimal pathway that \r\ncaptures the objectives, values and development contexts of all actors, \r\neven for a particular sector, country or region. Rather, preferences for \r\ndifferent pathways and specific actions in pursuit of those pathways \r\nwill be subjected to intense scrutiny and debate among diverse actors \r\nwithin various arenas of engagement (Section  18"


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"4), meaning the \r\nsettings, places and spaces in which key actors from government, civil \r\nsociety and the private sector interact to influence the nature and \r\ncourse of development."


id: e83b1162c2a1625ad0e31bc36935f2d9
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"This chapter hosts three Cross-Chapter Boxes, which have their natural \r\nhome here. The Cross-Chapter Box on Gender, Justice and Transformative \r\nPathways (Cross-Chapter Box GENDER) assesses literature specifically \r\non gender and climate change to uncover the importance of a justice \r\nfocus to facilitate transformative pathways, both towards CRD, as well \r\nas a means to achieving gender equity and social justice. The Cross\u0002Chapter Box on The Role of Indigenous Knowledge in Understanding \r\nand Adapting to Climate Change (Cross-Chapter Box INDIG) highlights \r\nthat achieving CRD requires confronting the uncertainty of a climate \r\nchange future. There are many perspectives about what future is \r\ndesired and how to reach it. Integrating multiple forms of knowledge \r\nis a strategy to build resilience and develop institutional arrangements \r\nthat provide temporary solutions able to satisfy competing interests \r\n(Grove, 2018)"


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" Indigenous knowledge is proven to enhance resilience in \r\nmultiple contexts (e.g., Chowdhooree, 2019; Inaotombi and Mahanta, \r\n2019). Meanwhile, Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB acts as an appendix to \r\nthe WGII report, synthesising information on the feasibility associated \r\nwith different adaptation options for reducing risk."


id: 8280e4f500d1338d255ff3d1dbe72d84
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"Transformational changes in the pursuit of climate resilient development pathways (CRDPs) involve interactions between individual, \r\ncollective and systems change (Figures 18.1-18.3). There are complex interconnections between transformation and transition (Feola, \r\n2015; Holscher et al., 2018), and they are sometimes used as synonyms in the literature (Holscher et al., 2018). Much of the transitions \r\nliterature focuses on how societal change occurs within existing political and economic systems. Transformations are often considered to \r\ninvolve deeper and more fundamental changes than transitions, including changes to underlying values, worldviews, ideologies, structures \r\nand power relationships (Gopel, 2016; O'Brien, 2016; Kuenkel, 2019; Waddock, 2019). Systems transitions alone are insufficient to achieve \r\nthe rapid, fundamental and comprehensive changes required for humanity and planetary health in the face of climate change (high \r\nconfidence)"


id: aa3afc08ff1fd9e4c6e0ba76f4465ba2
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" Transformative action is increasingly urgent across all sectors, systems and scales to avert dangerous climate change and \r\nmeet the SDGs (Pelling et al., 2015; IPCC, 2018a; IPCC, 2021b; Shi and Moser, 2021; Vogel and O'Brien, 2021) (high confidence). The SR1.5 \r\nidentified transformative change as necessary to achieve transitions within land, water and ecosystems systems; urban and infrastructural \r\nsystems; energy systems; and industrial systems. This box summarises key points in the transformations literature relevant to CRD."


id: 40e9972bc1f8bf758ae16ed820495b1c
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"Transformative actions aimed at 'deliberately and fundamentally changing systems to achieve more just and equitable outcomes', (Shi and \r\nMoser, 2021: 2) shift pathways towards climate resilient development (CRD) (high confidence). Transformative action in the context of CRD \r\nspecifically concerns leveraging change in the five dimensions of development (people, prosperity, partnership, peace, planet) that drive \r\nsocietal choices and climate actions towards sustainability (Section 18.2.2; Figure 18.1). Climate actions that support CRD are embedded in \r\nthese dimensions of development; for example, social cohesion and equity, individual and collective agency, and democratising knowledge \r\nprocesses have been identified as steps to transform practices and governance systems for increased resilience (Ziervogel et al., 2016b; \r\nNightingale et al., 2020; Colloff et al., 2021; Vogel and O'Brien, 2021) (high confidence)"


id: b37cd6f6152e1194efdc4a7dc218aa2
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" Transformative actions towards sustainability and \r\nincreased well-being, which are dominant components of CRD, include those that explicitly redress social drivers of vulnerability, shift \r\ndominant worldviews, decolonialise knowledge systems, activate human agency, contest political arrangements, and insert a plurality of \r\nknowledges and ways of knowing (Gorg et al., 2017; Fazey et al., 2018a; Brand et al., 2020; Gram-Hanssen et al., 2021; Shi and Moser, \r\n2021). They alter the governance and political economic arrangements through which unsustainable and unjust development logics and \r\nknowledges are implemented (Patterson et al., 2017; Shi and Moser, 2021) by shifting the goals of a system or altering the mindset or \r\nparadigm from which a system arises, for example, from individualism and nature-society disconnect to solidarity and nature-society \r\nconnectedness along the CRD dimensions in Figure 18"


id: 84a279c6ae94cf3996f180f17dc4ef2
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"1, and connecting inner and external dimensions of sustainability (Gopel, 2016; \r\nAbson et al., 2017; Wamsler and Brink, 2018; Fischer and Riechers, 2019; Horcea-Milcu et al., 2019; Wamsler, 2019)."


id: b6206262116462d5e4c61024a50f132a
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"There is no blueprint for how transformation is generated. An expanding literature suggests that transformation takes place through \r\ndiverse modalities and context-dependent actions (O'Brien, 2021). Transformation may require actions that disrupt moral or social \r\nboundaries and structures that are perpetuating unsustainable systems and pathways (Vogel and O'Brien, 2021) (high confidence). \r\nExtreme events and long-term climatic changes can trigger a realigning of practices, politics and knowledge (Carr, 2019; Schipper et al., \r\n2020b) (high confidence). While some see opportunities for generating social and political conditions needed for CRD in such actions and \r\nevents (Beck, 2015; Han, 2015; Shim, 2015; Mythen and Walklate, 2016; Domingo, 2018), this is not guaranteed. Climate shocks, when \r\nmanaged within socio-political systems in ways that safeguard rather than alter practices and structures, can also reinforce rather than \r\nshift the status quo (Mosberg et al"


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", 2017; Carr, 2019; Marmot and Allen, 2020; Arifeen and Nyborg, 2021) (high confidence). Further, in \r\nthe absence of equitable and inclusive decision making and planning, realignments resulting from disruptive actions and events can limit \r\ninclusiveness and lead to poor or coercive decision-making processes that undermine the equity and justice foundations of sustainable \r\ndevelopment (Orlove et al., 2020; Shi and Moser, 2021) and lead to adverse socio-environmental outcomes that generate transformations \r\naway from CRD (Vogel and O'Brien, 2021) (high confidence, see also CROSS-CHAPTER BOX 2)."


id: 6c0cf8d2126c1cc4bee413309b4de3c9
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"Prospects for transformation towards CRD increase when key governance actors work together in inclusive and constructive ways through \r\nengagement in political, knowledge-technology, ecological, economic and socio-cultural arenas (high confidence, Section 18.4.3). Yet the \r\ninteractions between key governance actors involve struggles and negotiations in addition to collaborations (Kakenmaster, 2019; Muok \r\net al., 2021). Transformative actions meet resistance by precisely the political, social, knowledge and technical systems and structures \r\nthey are attempting to transform (Blythe et al., 2018; Shi and Moser, 2021) (high confidence)"


id: 11823b14d5a6088e098d784fa4acdb24
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" There is expanding evidence that many \r\nadaptation efforts have failed to be transformative, but instead entrenched inequities, exacerbated power imbalances and reinforced \r\nvulnerability among marginalised groups and that, instead, marginalised groups and future trends in vulnerability need to be placed \r\nat the centre of adaptation planning (Atteridge and Remling, 2018; Mikulewicz, 2019; Owen, 2020; Eriksen et al., 2021a; Eriksen et al., \r\n2021b; Garschagen et al., 2021) (high confidence). Beyond the enablers, drivers or modalities, another question tackled in the literature \r\nis how to evaluate transformation by establishing criteria for transformation assessments (Ofir, 2021; Patton, 2021; Williams et al., 2021), \r\nexperience-based lessons on managing transformative adaptation processes (Vermeulen et al., 2018), climate policy integration (Plank \r\net al., 2021), investment criteria (Kasdan et al., 2021) and political economy analysis frameworks for climate governance (Price, 2021)"


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"(Government of Kenya, 2008). Dryland regions in Kenya occupy 80-90% of the land mass, are home to 36% of the population (Government \r\nof Kenya, 2012) and contribute about 10% of Kenya's gross domestic product (GDP) (Government of Kenya, 2012), which includes half \r\nof its agricultural GDP (Kabubo-Mariara, 2009). In dryland regions, pastoralism has long been the predominant form of livelihood and \r\nsubsistence (Catley et al., 2013; Nyariki and Amwata, 2019). The GoK seeks to improve connectivity and communication infrastructure \r\nwithin the drylands to better exploit and develop livestock, agriculture, tourism, energy and extractive sectors (Government of Kenya, \r\n2018)"


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" It argues that the transformation of dryland regions is crucial to enhance the development outcomes for the more than 15 million \r\npeople who inhabit these areas (Government of Kenya, 2016: 17) and to help the country to realise its wider national ambitions including \r\na 10% year on year growth in GDP (Government of Kenya, 2012). A key element within this vision is the promotion and implementation of \r\nthe Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia (LAPSSET) project. The LAPSSET Corridor consists of two elements: the 500 meter wide Infrastructure \r\nCorridor where the road, railway, pipelines, power transmission and other projects will be located and the Economic Corridor of 50 km \r\non either sides of the infrastructure corridor which will be contain other industrial investments (Enns, 2018)"


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" Supporters of the LAPSSET \r\nproject argue that it will help achieve priorities laid out in the Vision 2030 by opening up poorly connected regions, enabling the \r\ndevelopment of pertinent economic sectors such as agriculture, livestock and energy, and supporting the attainment of a range of social \r\ngoals made possible as the economy grows (Stein and Kalina, 2019)."


id: 55c3f168e39acbf4f594df290d57ded5
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"However, the development narrative surrounding LAPSSET remains controversial in its assumptions, not least because it is being promoted \r\nin the context of a highly complex and dynamic social, economic and biophysical setting (Cervigni and Morris, 2016; Atsiaya et al., 2019; \r\nChome, 2020; Lesutis, 2020). Some of the key trends driving contemporary and likely future change in dryland regions are changing \r\nhousehold organisation, evolving customary rules and institutions at local and community levels, and shifting cultures and aspirations \r\n(Catley et al., 2013; Washington-Ottombre and Pijanowski, 2013; Tari and Pattison, 2014; Cormack, 2016; Rao, 2019). Dryland regions are \r\nalso witnessing demographic growth and change in land use patterns linked to shifts in the composition of livestock (for example from \r\ngrazers to browsers), a decrease in nomadic and increase in semi-nomadic pastoralism, and transition to more urban and sedentary \r\nlivelihoods (Mganga et al., 2015; Cervigni et al"


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", 2016; Greiner, 2016; Watson et al., 2016). At a landscape level, land is becoming more \r\nfragmented and enclosed, often associated with increases in subsistence and commercial agriculture and the establishment of \r\nconservancies and other group or private land holdings (Reid et al., 2014; Carabine et al., 2015; Nyberg et al., 2015; Greiner, 2016; Mosley \r\nand Watson, 2016). In addition, there are political dynamics associated with Kenya Vision 2030 and decentralisation, the influence of "


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"There is a recognised need to adapt and chose development pathways that are resilient to climate change while addressing key \r\ndevelopmental challenges within dryland regions, notably, poverty, water and food insecurity, and a highly dispersed population with \r\npoor access to services (Government of Kenya, 2012; Bizikova et al., 2015; Herrero et al., 2016). The current vision for development of \r\ndryland regions comes with both opportunities and threats to achieve a more climate-resilient future. For example, the growth in and \r\nexploitation of renewable energy resources, made possible through increased connectivity, brings climate mitigation gains but also risks. \r\nThese risks include the uneven distribution of costs in terms of where the industry is sited compared with where benefits primarily accrue, \r\nand may exacerbate issues around water and food insecurity as strategic areas of land become harder to access (Opiyo et al., 2016; \r\nCormack and Kurewa, 2018; Enns, 2018; Lind, 2018)"


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" While LAPSSET will bring greater freedom of movement for commodities, benefitting \r\ninvestors, improving access to markets and urban centres, supporting trade or ease of movement for tourists supporting economic \r\ngoals, it can also result in the relocation of people and impede access to certain locations for the resident populations. Mobility is a key \r\nadaptation behaviour employed in the short and long term to address issues linked with climatic variability (Opiyo et al., 2014; Muricho \r\net al., 2019). With modelled changes in the climate suggesting decreases in income associated with agricultural staples and livestock\u0002dependent livelihoods, development that constrains mobility of local populations could retard resilience gains (Ochieng et al., 2017; \r\nASSAR, 2018; Enns, 2018; Nkemelang et al., 2018)"


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" The likely increase in urban populations and the growth in tourism and agriculture \r\nmay lead to increases in water demand at a time when water availability could become more constrained owing to the reliance on \r\nsurface water sources and the modelled increases in evapotranspiration due to rising mean temperature, more heatwave days and \r\ngreater percentage of precipitation falling as storms (ASSAR, 2018; Nkemelang et al., 2018; USAID, 2018). These pressures could make it \r\nharder to meet basic health and sanitation goals for rural and poorer urban populations, issues compounded further by likely increases \r\nin child malnutrition and diarrheal deaths linked to climate change (WHO, 2016; ASSAR, 2018; Hirpa et al., 2018; Nkemelang et al., 2018; \r\nLesutis, 2020). Development must pay adequate attention to these interconnections to ensure that costs and benefits of achieving climate \r\nmitigation and adaptation goals are distributed fairly within a population."


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"The AR5 examined the relationship between climate and sustainable \r\ndevelopment in Chapter 13 (Olsson et  al., 2014) and Chapter 20 \r\n(Denton et al., 2014) in Working Group II and Chapter 4 (Fleurbaey \r\net al., 2014) in Working Group III. It concluded that dangerous levels \r\nof climate change would limit efforts to reduce poverty (Denton \r\net  al., 2014; Fleurbaey et  al., 2014). Since the AR5, the adoption of \r\nthe Paris Agreement and Agenda 2030 have demonstrated increased \r\ninternational consensus regarding the need to pursue climate change \r\nas a component of sustainable development. For example, climate \r\nchange impacts 'undermine the ability of all countries to achieve \r\nsustainable development' (United Nations, 2015) and can reverse or \r\nerase improvements in living conditions and decades of development \r\n(Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017)"


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" However, recent analysis shows that \r\nactions to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement can undermine progress \r\ntowards some SDGs (high agreement, medium evidence) (Pearce \r\net al., 2018b; Liu et al., 2019; Hegre et al., 2020) (Section 18.2.5.3). \r\nMeanwhile efforts to achieve the SDGs can contribute to worsening \r\nclimate change (high agreement, medium evidence) (Fuso Nerini \r\net al., 2018). These findings in the literature highlight the importance \r\nof identifying clear goals and priorities for both climate action and "


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"The Agenda 2030 and its 17 SDGs and 169 targets seeks to 'leave no \r\none behind' through five pillars (5Ps): People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace \r\nand Partnership (United Nations, 2015). The five pillars align with the \r\ndimensions of development that influence motion towards or away from \r\nCRD. The focus on people refers to inclusion rather than exclusion, and \r\nthe extent to which people are empowered or disempowered to make \r\ndecisions about their well-being, determine their futures and be in a \r\nposition to assert their rights. This means being able to make decisions \r\nthat determine whether people are on a pathway towards or away \r\nfrom CRD (Figure 18.1-18.3). The focus on planet refers to protecting \r\nthe planet, ensuring a balance of ecosystems, biodiversity and human \r\nactivities, and giving equal space and respect for its integrity"


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" The focus \r\non prosperity refers to equity in well-being grounded in unanimity over \r\nshared goals and resources, rather than individualism, and economic, \r\nsocial and technological progress grounded in stewardship and care, \r\nrather than exploitation. The focus on partnership refers to mutual \r\nrespect embedded in solidarity that recognises multiple worldviews \r\nand their respective knowledges, rather than singular or hierarchy of \r\nknowledge, and acknowledges inherent nature-society connections, \r\nrather than posing nature as opposites or competitors. The focus on \r\npeace emphasises the need for just and equitable societies. These \r\nfive pillars are inter-related but local and national contexts situate \r\ncurrent status differently around the world. Successful achievement of \r\nAgenda 2030 is aligned with a safe climate with adequate mitigation \r\nand adaptation, and effective and inclusive systems transitions"


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" With \r\nthese conditions, a high CRD world can be attained, noting that when \r\napproached individually, the transformative potential of the SDGs is \r\nlimited (Veland et al., 2021)."


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"While demonstrable progress has been made towards the SDGs and \r\nimproving human well-being, globally and in specific nations, some \r\nobserved patterns of development are inconsistent with sustainable \r\ndevelopment and the principles of CRD (very high confidence) (van \r\nDooren et al., 2018; Eisenmenger et al., 2020; Leal Filho et al., 2020). \r\nA significant literature, for example, links development to the loss of \r\nbiodiversity and the extinction crisis (Ceballos et al., 2017; Goncalves\u0002Souza et al., 2020; Oke et al., 2021). Meanwhile, in human systems, \r\nindicators such as the limited convergence in income, life expectancy \r\nand other measures of well-being between poor and wealthy countries \r\n(with notable outliers such as China) (Bangura, 2019), and the increase \r\nin income inequality and the decline in life expectancy and well\u0002being in rich countries (Rougoor and van Marrewijk, 2015; Alvaredo \r\net  al., 2017; Goda et  al., 2017; Harper et  al., 2017; Goldman et  al"


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", \r\n2018), suggest limitations of the current development paradigm to \r\nsuccessfully deliver universal human and ecological well-being by the \r\n2030s or even mid-century (TWI, 2019)."


id: 4c2b588fcb4cfc1a393912896ec85157
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"Development is about 'improvement'. However there have been \r\ndifferent and often conflicting viewpoints on the improvement of \r\n'what' and 'how' to improve. The diversity of positions has resulted \r\nin a multitude of metrics to track development, some more influential \r\nthan others on policy. Alternative measures of development, while \r\nnumerous, generally seek to nuance the connection between economic \r\ngrowth and human well-being. Because they maintain core notions of \r\nprogress and, in some cases, economic growth seen in more mainstream \r\nmodels of development, they are less vehicles for transformation than \r\ncontinuations of thinking and action fundamentally at odds with \r\nthe needs of CRD"


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"Achieving CRD requires framings of development that move away \r\nfrom linear paradigms of development as material progress by \r\nfocusing on diversity and heterogeneity, well-being and equality, not \r\nonly in contemporary practices, but also pathways of change over \r\ntime (Gibson-Graham, 2005; Gibson-Graham, 2006). Such approaches, \r\nwhich are fundamentally aligned with ecological and ecosystem\u0002based environmental assessments that identified heterogeneity of \r\napproaches and actions as the most effective path to a sustainable \r\nworld (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005), emphasise the \r\nimportance of cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, not merely as \r\nalternative sources of information about the world, but as different \r\nparadigms of well-being (Kallis, 2018). These include Indigenous and \r\nlocal knowledge that provide alternatives to these framings of the \r\nworld (Cross-Chapter Box INDIG)"


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" This broad reframing of development \r\nincludes a focus on visions such as 'buen vivir' (Cubillo-Guevara et al., \r\n2014; Walsh, 2018; Acosta et  al., 2019), ecological Swaraj (Kothari \r\net  al., 2014; Demaria and Kothari, 2017; Shiva, 2017) and Ubuntu \r\n(Dreyer, 2015; Ewuoso and Hall, 2019), among others. All are linked \r\nby relationships with nature radically different from the Western \r\nmechanistic vision, presenting not only framings of development \r\nand the environment that yield locally appropriate CRDPs, but serve \r\nas examples of alternative ways of living in balance with nature that \r\nmight inform similar thinking in other places."


id: d036aea5f423d9e65fab477350923bae
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"Differing perspectives on development are in part determined by the \r\nmultiple diverse priorities held by different actors and nations. Another \r\nreason is that development is not a linear process with a single goal, \r\nand active development planning requires simultaneously taking \r\nmultiple processes and factors into account. This is well illustrated by \r\ngrowing attention to climate security. The AR5 delivered conflicting \r\nmessages regarding climate change and security (Gleditsch and \r\nNordas, 2014), yet the understanding of climate-related security \r\nrisks has made substantial progress in recent years (von Uexkull and \r\nBuhaug, 2021). Although there remains considerable research gaps in \r\ncertain regions (Adams et al"


id: 7c6060454eb4d1b5c89b44aa5f32895a
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", 2018), a large body of qualitative and \r\nquantitative studies from different disciplines provides new insight \r\ninto the relationship of climate change and security (Buhaug, 2015; \r\nDe Juan, 2015; Brzoska and Frohlich, 2016; Abrahams and Carr, \r\n2017; Sakaguchi et  al., 2017; Moran et al, 2018; Scheffran, 2020). \r\nThough not the only cause (Sakaguchi et al., 2017; Mach et al., 2019), \r\nclimate change undermines human livelihoods and security, because \r\nit increases the populations vulnerabilities, grievances and political \r\ntensions through an array of indirect--at times nonlinear--pathways, \r\nthereby increasing human insecurity and the risk of violent conflict \r\n(van Baalen and Mobjork, 2018; Koubi, 2019; von Uexkull and Buhaug, \r\n2021). Indeed, context, as well as timing and spatial distribution, \r\nmatter and need to be accounted for (Abrahams, 2020)."


id: 62ddf1d3881292a0300e0625267da64c
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"Sustainable development represents specific development processes \r\nand priorities that can affect climate risk. As a result, sustainable \r\ndevelopment both shapes the context in which different actors \r\nexperience climate change and represents a potential opportunity, \r\nparticularly by reducing climate risk by addressing vulnerability, \r\ninequity and shifting development towards more sustainable \r\ntrajectories (IPCC, 2012; Denton et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014b; IPCC, 2014a; \r\nIPCC, 2018a; IPCC, 2019b). As assessed in past IPCC special reports \r\nand assessment reports, this same literature has also illustrated how \r\ndifferent socioeconomic conditions affect mitigation options and costs. \r\nFor example, variations in future economic growth, population size \r\nand composition, technology availability and cost, energy efficiency, \r\nresource availability, demand for goods and services, and non-climate\u0002related policies (e.g"


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", air quality, trade), individually and collectively \r\nhave all been shown to result in different climates and contexts for \r\nmitigation and adaptation."


id: bb1baf2dc31cdb44c373057f289bf42b
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"One common approach for exploring the implications of different \r\ndevelopment trajectories is the use of scenarios of future socioeconomic \r\nconditions, such as the SSPs (O'Neill et al., 2017). The SSPs represent \r\nsets of future global societal assumptions based on different societal, \r\ntechnological and economic assumptions that result in different \r\ndevelopment trajectories. Such scenarios often correspond to a small \r\nset of scenario archetypes (Harrison et  al., 2019; Sitas et  al., 2019; \r\nFergnani and Song, 2020) in that they reflect core themes regarding \r\nthe future of development such as sustainability versus rapid growth. \r\nScenarios with assumptions more closely aligned with sustainability \r\nagendas (e.g., SSP1-Sustainability) commonly imply lower greenhouse \r\ngas emissions and projected climate change (Riahi et al., 2022), lower \r\nmitigation costs for ambitious climate goals (Riahi et al"


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", 2022), lower \r\nclimate exposure due in large part to the size of society (see Chapter \r\n16) and greater adaptive capacity (Roy et al., 2018) (see also Chapter \r\n16). In contrast, scenarios with rapid global economic and fossil energy \r\ngrowth (e.g., SSP5 Fossil-Fueled Development) imply higher emissions \r\nand project climate change and higher mitigation costs, as well as \r\ngreater social and economic capacity to adapt to climate change \r\nimpacts (Hunt et al., 2012) (Table 18.1)."


id: 5555df2f3eedc082c1a9b420f52612b2
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"In line with this better understanding, climate change and security \r\nhave been reframed in the political space, to focus more on human \r\nsecurity. The solutions to climate-related security risks cannot be \r\nmilitary, but are linked to development and people's vulnerabilities \r\nin complex social and politically fragile settings (Abrahams, 2020). \r\nThis has resulted in integration of climate-related security risk into \r\ninstitutional and national frameworks (Dellmuth et  al., 2018; Scott \r\nand Ku, 2018; Aminga and Krampe, 2020), including several Nationally \r\nDetermined Contributions (NDCs) (Jernnas and Linner, 2019; Remling, \r\n2021). One example is the UN Climate Security Mechanism--set up \r\nin 2018 between UNDP, UNEP and UN DPPA to help the UN more \r\nsystematically address climate-related security risks and devise \r\nprevention and management strategies. Yet work remains in bridging \r\nthese concerns with practical responses on the ground (Busby, 2021)"


id: f2ef2742d4d76b787883a9908af80d8f
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" \r\nEspecially since emerging research building on the maladaptation \r\nliterature shows that this practice cannot just mean adding adaptation \r\nand mitigation to the mix of development strategies in a given \r\nlocation, as this may have unintended and unanticipated effects and \r\nmight even backfire completely (Dabelko et al., 2013; Magnan et al., \r\n2020; Mirumachi et al., 2020; Schipper, 2020; Swatuk et al., 2021). In \r\nextremely underdeveloped, fragile contexts such as Afghanistan, the \r\nlocal-level side effects of climate adaptation and mitigation projects \r\nmight result in different development outcomes and question the \r\npotential for sustainable peace (Krampe et  al., 2021). Given the \r\nclearer understanding of the intertwined nature of climate change, \r\nsecurity and development--especially in fragile and conflict affected \r\nregions--a rethinking of how to transfer this knowledge into policy \r\nsolutions is necessary for the formulation of CRD."


id: 16bfedc874bd4497b797fbc172567bcf
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"The SSPs incorporate various assumptions regarding population, \r\nGDP and greenhouse gas emissions, for example, that are relevant to \r\ndevelopment and climate resilience. In addition, the SSPs have been \r\nused to explore a broad range of development outcomes for human and \r\necological systems (Table  18.1), including multiple studies exploring \r\nfutures for food systems, water resources, human health and income \r\ninequality. Limited, top-down modelling studies have used the SSPs \r\nto explore issues such as societal resilience (Schleussner et al., 2021) \r\nor gender equity (Andrijevic et al., 2020a). Such studies indicate that \r\ndifferent development trajectories have different implications for future \r\ndevelopment outcomes, but results vary significantly among different \r\nclimate (e.g., representative concentration pathways [RCPs]) and \r\ndevelopment contexts, resulting in limited agreement among different \r\nSSPs (Table 18.1)"


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" Nevertheless, for some outcomes, SSPs are associated \r\nwith generally similar outcomes. Over the near-term (e.g., 2030), those \r\noutcomes are strongly influenced by development inertia and path "


id: ef63b7bb31d11e002a05ff52629dd54e
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"The projected ranges for near- and mid-term global average warming \r\nlevels are estimated to result in increasing key risks and reasons for \r\nconcern (Chapter 16). Chapter 16 developed aggregate 'Representative \r\nKey Risks' (RKRs) as indicators for subsets of approximately 100 \r\nsectoral and regional key risks indicators. The RKRs include risks to \r\ncoastal socio-ecological systems, terrestrial and ocean ecosystems, \r\ncritical physical infrastructure, networks and services, living standards \r\nand equity, human health, food security, water security, and peace and \r\nmigration. The majority of these risks are directly linked to sustainable \r\ndevelopment priorities and the SDGs (Chapters 2 to 16; (Roy et  al., \r\n2018; IPCC, 2019d; IPCC, 2019b). Therefore, climate risks represent a \r\npotential additional challenge to pursuing sustainable development \r\npriorities, but also potential opportunities due to geographic variation \r\nin climate impacts"


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" In addition, positive synergies have been found \r\nbetween sustainable development and adaptation, but trade-offs are \r\nalso possible (e.g., Roy et al., 2018)."


id: 6ea0524da59a0ad91508af02670f6c89
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"Overall, pursuing sustainable development in the future is shown to \r\nhave synergies and trade-offs in its relationships with every element \r\nof climate risk: the emissions and mitigation determining hazard; the \r\nsize, location and composition of development determining exposure; \r\nand the adaptive capacity determining vulnerability. Importantly, the \r\nscenarios literature overall has found trade-offs such that none of the \r\nglobal societal projections achieve all the SDGs (very high confidence) \r\n(Roy et  al., 2018) (Section  18.2.5.3). Historical evidence supports \r\nthis as well, for example, finding low-cost energy and food access \r\nis historically associated with higher emissions but greater adaptive \r\ncapacity, and energy efficiency innovation contributing to lower \r\nemissions and greater adaptive capacity (e.g., Blanford et  al., 2012; \r\nBlanco et al., 2014; Mbow et al., 2019; USEPA, 2019)"


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" The literature \r\nsuggests that trade-offs in the pursuit of sustainable development \r\nare inevitable. Managing those trade-offs, as well as capitalising on \r\nthe synergies, will be important for CRD, particularly given trade-offs \r\nhave distributional implications that could contribute to inequities \r\n(Section 18.2.5.3)."


id: de707edde7832428af4f1610a8189c98
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"For all RKRs, additional global average warming is expected to increase \r\nrisk. However, the increases vary significantly by RKR, and across the \r\nunderlying key risks represented within each RKR. Geographic variation \r\nin key risk implications is only partially assessed in Chapter 16, but \r\nevidence can be drawn from the WGII individual regional chapters. \r\nRegionally, key risks are found to be potentially greatest in developing \r\nand transition economies (Chapter 16 and sectoral chapters), which is \r\nalso where the least-cost emissions reductions globally are projected \r\nto be (Riahi et al., 2022).See Figure 18.4 for an example of key risk \r\ngeographic heterogeneity (see also Section 18.5 for regional detail). \r\nChapter 16 also maps the RKRs to an updated aggregate 'Reasons \r\nfor Concern' (RFC) framing"


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" Thus, increasing RKR implies increasing \r\nRFC associated with unique and threatened systems, extreme weather \r\nevents, distribution of impacts, global aggregate impacts and large\u0002scale singular events."


id: 4da45f0cbf3bb6cd34b2ef1b0350e98e
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"In the near-term, additional climate change is expected regardless of \r\nthe scale of greenhouse gas mitigation efforts (IPCC, 2021a). Across \r\nthe global scenarios analysed in the AR6, global average temperature \r\nchanges relative to the reference period 1850-1900 range from 1.2degC \r\nto 1.9degC for the period 2021-2040 and 1.2degC to 3.0degC for the period \r\n2041-2060 (WGI AR6 SPM [IPCC, 2021b], very likely range). However, \r\nthe feasibility of emissions pathways (particularly RCP8.5) affect the \r\nplausibility of the associated climate projections, potentially lowering \r\nthe upper end of these ranges because the likelihood of the higher \r\nwarming levels is a function of the likelihood of the higher emissions \r\nscenarios (Riahi et  al., 2022) . There is significant overlap between \r\nclimate scenario ensemble ranges from different emissions scenarios \r\nthrough 2050, more so than through 2100 (Lee et al., 2021)"


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" There is \r\nalso overlap between emissions scenario ensembles consistent with \r\ndifferent temperature outcomes (Riahi et al., 2022) . Emissions pathway \r\nranges represent uncertainties for policymakers and organisations to \r\nconsider and manage (Rose and Scott, 2018, 2020) regarding, among \r\nother things, economic growth and structure, available technologies, \r\nmarkets, behavioural dynamics, policies and non-CO2 climate forcings \r\n(Riahi et al., 2022), while climate pathway ranges represent bio-physical \r\nclimate systems and carbon cycle uncertainties (Lee et al., 2021). For \r\nall climate projections and variables, there is significant regional \r\nheterogeneity and uncertainty in projected climate change (very high "


id: 2c4827fa5fa94ae3c9a0bad57b8a0cad
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"development should address proximate and systemic drivers of \r\nvulnerability (Wise et al., 2016), while remaining flexible and reversable \r\nto avoid the lock-in of undesirable or maladaptive trajectories (Cannon \r\nand Muller-Mahn, 2010; Wise et al., 2016). Such goals require critical \r\nreflection on processes for decision making and learning. In the AR5, \r\nmore inclusive, participatory adaptation processes were presumed to \r\nbenefit development planning by including a wider set of actors in \r\ndiscussions of future goals (Denton et al., 2014). The post-AR5 literature \r\nexpands on these critical perspectives to provide context regarding \r\nwhen participation is most effective. For example, (Eriksen et al., 2015) \r\nemphasise the need to build participatory adaptation processes to \r\navoid subsuming adaptation goals to development-as-usual, while \r\n(Kim et al"


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", 2017b) argues that this practice is most effective when it is \r\nfocused on development efforts and considers how climate change will \r\nchallenge the goals of those efforts. Adaptation, while presenting an \r\nopportunity to foster transformations needed to address the impacts of \r\nclimate change on human well-being, is also a contested process that \r\nis inherently political (medium agreement, medium evidence) (Eriksen \r\net al., 2015; Mikulewicz, 2019; Nightingale Bohler, 2019; Eriksen et al., \r\n2021b). How adaptation can challenge development and create a \r\nsituation where CRD effectively becomes transformative adaptation, \r\nadaptation that generates transformation of broader aspects of \r\ndevelopment, remains unclear (medium agreement, limited evidence) \r\n(Few et al., 2017; Schipper et al., 2020c)."


id: d414cf0ad9ebeb974990d819d69e0263
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"Given that adaptation is recognised as a key element of addressing \r\nclimate risk and CRD, the capacity for adaptation implementation is an \r\nimportant consideration for CRD. The AR5 noted a significant overlap \r\nbetween indicators of sustainable development and the determinants \r\nof adaptive capacity, and suggested that adaptation presents an \r\nopportunity to reduce stresses on development processes and the socio\u0002ecological foundations upon which they depend (Denton et al., 2014). \r\nAt the same time, it also noted that building adaptive capacity for \r\nsustainable development might require transformational changes that \r\nshift impacted systems to new patterns, dynamics or places (Denton \r\net al., 2014). Thus, adaptation interventions and pathways can further \r\nthe achievement of development goals such as food security (Campbell \r\net al., 2016; Douxchamps et al., 2016; Richardson et al., 2018; Bezner \r\nKerr et al., 2019) and improvements in human health (Watts et al"


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", 2019) \r\nincluding in systems where animals and humans live in close proximity \r\n(very high confidence) (Zinsstag et al., 2018). However, to do so requires \r\nnot only the avoidance of incremental adaptation actions that extend \r\ncurrent unsustainable practices, but also the ability to manage and \r\novercome the barriers which arise when the limits of incremental \r\nadaptation are reached (high agreement, medium evidence) (Few et al., \r\n2017; Vermeulen et al., 2018; Fedele et al., 2019)."


id: 4fba3070c3ca23034b54fab9b1e766ed
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content:
"The critical literature on socio-ecological resilience, which has grown \r\nsubstantially since the last AR (very high confidence), speaks to some \r\nof these questions. Since AR5, the IPCC and the wider literature on \r\nsocio-ecological resilience have shifted their use of the term to reflect \r\nnot only the capacity to cope with a hazardous event or trend or \r\ndisturbance, but also the ability to adapt, learn and transform in ways \r\nthat maintains socio-ecology's essential function, identity and structure \r\n(Chapter 1; Glossary, Annex II). This change in usage is significant in \r\nthat it shifts resilience from an emergent property of complex socio\u0002ecological systems to a deeply human product of efforts to manage \r\necology, economy and society to specific ends"


id: 2a38e59f6cdff562b0b8dbfa48c34ee7
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" This definition of \r\nresilience recognises the need to define what is an essential identity, \r\nfunction and structure for a given system, questions rooted not in \r\necological dynamics, but in politics, agency, difference and power that \r\nemerge around the management of ecological dynamics (Cote and \r\nNightingale, 2011; Brown, 2013; Cretney, 2014; Forsyth, 2018; Matin \r\net al., 2018; Carr, 2019)."


id: dff6f3a6494292ae710ff0b5e8a2d9eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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"Since AR5, the scientific community has deepened its understanding \r\nof the relationship between adaptation and sustainable development \r\n(very high confidence), particularly with regard to the place of \r\nresilience at the intersection of these two arenas. The literature has \r\nmoved forward in its identification of specific overlaps in sustainable \r\ndevelopment indicators and determinants of adaptive capacity, \r\nhow adaptation might reduce stress on development processes \r\nand their socio-ecological foundation, and how building adaptive \r\ncapacity might facilitate needed transformative changes. Broadly \r\nspeaking, work on these topics comes from one of two perspectives. \r\nOne perspective speaks to adaptation practices that might further \r\nsustainable development outcomes, while another perspective draws \r\non deeper understandings of the socio-ecological dynamics of the \r\nsystems in which we live, and which we may have to transform in the \r\nface of climate change impacts"


id: 2e0a5ad3f2243772f3be54cb657fe6ba
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" These two literatures are not yet well \r\nintegrated, leaving gaps in our knowledge of how best to implement \r\nadaptation in a manner that achieves sustainable development."


id: d3028490db0f9b80a350ec193441a608
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"Costs of implementing efficient adaptation measures and water\u0002related infrastructure in water-deficient regions have received \r\nattention at the global and regional level to bridge the 'adaptation \r\ngap' (Hallegatte et al., 2018; UNEP, 2018a; Dellink et al., 2019; UNEP, \r\n2021). Livelihood sustainability in the drylands, which cover more \r\nthan 40% of the land surface area, are home to roughly 2.5 billion \r\npeople, and support approximately 50% of the livestock and 45% \r\nof the food production, is threatened by a complex and inter-related \r\nrange of social, economic and environmental changes that present \r\nsignificant challenges to rural communities, especially women (Abu\u0002Rabia-Queder and Morris, 2018; Gaur and Squires, 2018). Adaptation \r\ndeficits in arid and semi-arid regions are of high order (see CROSS\u0002CHAPTER BOX 3)"


id: 8f528884d117534b43a4b471bed5d38e
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" To reduce adaptation deficit in arid and semi\u0002arid regions, comprehensive and efficient adaptation interventions \r\nintegrating better water management, use of non-traditional water \r\nsources, changes in reservoir operations, soil ecosystem rejuvenation \r\nand enhanced institutional effectiveness are needed (Section  18.5) \r\n(Makuvaro et al., 2017; Mohammed and Scholz, 2017; Morote et al., \r\n2019). Communities facing the lack of adequate technological, \r\nfinancial, human and institutional capacities to adapt effectively to \r\ncurrent and future climate change often encounter adaptation deficits. \r\nTo address current adaptation barriers and adaptation deficits, there \r\nis a need to promote efficient adaptation measures, coupled with \r\ninclusive and adaptive governance involving marginalised groups such \r\nas Indigenous communities and women."


id: 927ebcf643b4801b1282bcf1325e9fb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"Currently, there is no consensus around approaches to assess the \r\neffectiveness of adaptation actions across contexts and therefore \r\nmeasure adaptation gaps at a global scale (Singh et al., 2021a). UNEP \r\n(2021) suggests that comprehensiveness, inclusiveness, implementability, \r\nintegration and monitoring, and evaluation can be used to assess them \r\n(see also Cross-Chapter Box  FEASIB). However, limited information \r\nis available about future trends in national-level adaptation and the \r\ndevelopment of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Despite the \r\nchallenges of measurement associated with adaptation gaps, available \r\nevidence from smaller scales across several regions, communities and \r\nbusinesses suggest that significant adaptation gaps have existed in \r\nhistorical contexts of climate change, while expectations of extreme heat, \r\nincreasing storm intensity and rising sea levels will create the context \r\nfor the emergence of new gaps (very high confidence) (Hallegatte et al"


id: 92fb6b95550d3a4b680cad0e06c0ca02
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content:
", \r\n2018; UNEP, 2018a; Dellink et al., 2019; UNEP, 2021). These adaptation \r\ngaps create risks to well-being, economic growth, equity, the health of \r\nnatural systems and other societal goals. The negative impacts of these \r\ngaps can be compounded by adaptation efforts that are considered \r\nmaladaptive or by development actions that are labelled as adaptation \r\n(see Chapter 16)."


id: ea3fe695dd70f05e8e409ff2811a7553
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"As discussed in Chapter 16, adaptation is a key mechanism for \r\nmanaging climate risks, and therefore for pursuing CRD. The lower \r\nestimates in Table 18.2 are associated with higher levels of adaptation \r\nand more conducive development conditions. Furthermore, additional \r\nadaptation demand is associated with greater levels of climate change. \r\nAdaptation is a broad term referring to many different levels of response \r\nand options for natural and human systems, from individuals, specific \r\nlocations and specific technologies, to nations, markets, global dynamics \r\nand strategies at the system level. Adaptation also includes endogenous \r\nreflexive and exogenous policy responses. Perspectives on limits to \r\nadaptation, synergies, trade-offs and feasibility therefore depend on \r\nwhere the boundaries are drawn and the objective. Overall, there are \r\na broad range of adaptation options relevant to reducing risks posed \r\nby climate change to development"


id: 7fd0163eb4f06276f46e2fa7f87b0fdf
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" However, current understanding \r\nof how such options are implemented in practice, their effectiveness \r\nacross a range of possible climate futures and their potential limits, is \r\nmodest."


id: 55cdd957e42de86a1eeddd62e05ec91c
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content:
"Sustainable development is regarded as generally consistent with \r\nclimate change adaptation, helping build adaptive capacity by \r\naddressing poverty and inequalities and improving inclusion and \r\ninstitutions (Roy et  al., 2018). Some sustainable development \r\nstrategies could facilitate adaptation effectiveness by addressing \r\nwider socioeconomic barriers, addressing social inequalities and \r\npromoting livelihood security (Roy et al., 2018). With a common goal of \r\nreducing risks, sustainable development and adaptation are relatively \r\nsynergistic. For example, \"low-regrets\" adaptation strategies have \r\nbeen identified, such as improvements in health systems that reduce \r\nclimate health impacts in cities (Barata, 2018). However, trade-offs \r\nalso have been found and are important to consider and potentially \r\naddress"


id: 202d0c37a31e061c5deb0668d6cb4eeb
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" Synergies have been found between adaptation and poverty \r\nreduction, hunger reduction, clean water access and health; while, \r\ntrade-offs have also been found, particularly when adaptation \r\nstrategies prioritise one development objective (e.g., food security or \r\nheat-stress risk reduction) or promote high-cost solutions with budget \r\nallocation and equity implications (Roy et al., 2018) (Sections 18.2.5.3, \r\n18.5, Box 18.4). There are also opportunities for addressing the trade\u0002offs, in particular distributional effects--by recognising that there are \r\ntrade-offs and considering alternatives and complementary strategies \r\nto address those trade-offs (Section 18.2.5.3)."


id: b4923e558a6722513bb6e722d86015d
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"Small islands are particularly vulnerable to climate change and many are already pursuing climate resilient development pathways \r\nthat enable integrated responses (Allen et al., 2018a; Mycoo, 2018; Hay et al., 2019; Robinson et al., 2021). Countries such as Belize \r\nhave opted for a systems approach and are working across the sustainable development goals (SDGs) to increase integration (Allen \r\net al., 2018a). This includes rethinking disaster reconstruction mechanisms in the Caribbean and introducing more diversified and \r\nsustainable tourism economies that can better withstand external shocks such as disruptions and loss of markets from COVID-19 \r\n(Sheller, 2021). In the Seychelles, various government and tourism industry initiatives are focused on the promotion of sustainable \r\ntourism ventures that lower emissions, protect and promote biodiversity conservation (e.g., new marine protected areas with \r\nmitigation and adaptation benefits), and are climate resilient (Robinson et al"


id: 77c3a930389f5b7a438c350f722b147f
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", 2021). In 2016, the Seychelles signed the world's first \r\nnature-for-debt swap, wherein a non-governmental organisation (NGO; The Nature Conservancy) agreed to pay off Seychelles' public \r\ndebt to the Paris Club (foreign creditors) in return for the Seychelles government establishing marine conservation areas (Silver and \r\nCampbell, 2018)."


id: 6cc8b2afb18e0e96f661740e8dee55ce
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content:
"Energy system transitions in small islands can produce synergies with SDG implementation and can lead to transformational outcomes. \r\nThe Pacific Island territory of Tokelau has demonstrated a nationwide energy transition, sourcing 100% of their energy needs from solar \r\npower (Michalena and Hills, 2018), and many other countries such as Fiji, Niue, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Cook Islands also \r\nhave 100% renewable energy targets. Benefits of small island distributed energy systems (such as solar photovoltaic [PV] systems) \r\ninclude less need for large, centralised infrastructure; reduced reliance on volatile fossil fuel markets; enhanced international climate \r\nnegotiations power; and enhanced local job markets/skills (Dornan, 2015; Cole and Banks, 2017; Weir, 2018). Additionally, renewable \r\nsystems can enhance resilience to hydro-meteorological disasters (Weir and Kumar, 2020)"


id: 22217da19ed8069faf1c2c3b16c5a783
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" For example, well-secured ground-based PV \r\nsystems withstood cyclones in the Pacific Island of Tonga during cyclone Gita and across the Caribbean during Hurricane Maria, with \r\npower restored in days rather than weeks associated with more centralised systems (Weir and Kumar, 2020). Yet a multitude of challenges \r\nremain. In the Pacific islands region, these include: the high up front capital investment of renewables; lack of private sector investment; \r\nlimited renewable energy data for policymaking; land tenure/rent costs; ongoing infrastructure maintenance skills and requirements; \r\npolitical turnover; failed experimentation; difficulty in obtaining and transporting replacement parts; and a highly corrosive environment \r\nfor equipment (Dornan, 2015; Cole and Banks, 2017; Lucas et al., 2017; Weir, 2018; Weir and Kumar, 2020)"


id: f1b574dfe29340d437ca87a272fc0c80
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" The example of Pacific energy \r\ntransitions demonstrates that a nuanced and context specific analysis of synergies and trade-offs for energy transitions is required to \r\nlessen the impact on fragile economies and maximise benefits for remote populations."


id: 74f279b74d744e3301a53ee5a0b0008f
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"Labour migration is increasingly recognised as a significant factor that can contribute to climate resilient development pathways for \r\nsmall islands. In the Pacific islands region, labour mobility schemes are already allowing for climate change adaptation and economic \r\ndevelopment to occur in labour migrants' countries of origin (Smith and McNamara, 2015; Klepp and Herbeck, 2016; Dun et al., 2020). \r\nDun et al. (2020) demonstrates that temporary or circular migrants from the Solomon Islands, working in Australia under its Seasonal \r\nWorker Programme (similar programmes operate in other developed countries), are using the money they earn to invest in adaptation \r\nand development activities back home. Similarly, labour migrants from Vanuatu, Kiribati and Samoa contribute to development and in \r\nsitu climate change adaptation (at a household, village and regional level) that enable discussions about more resilient futures for their \r\ncountries (Barnett and McMichael, 2018; Parsons et al"


id: cb5a06a3321c0657f197dda4b0c97108
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"Table Box 18.4.1 (below) provides a set of examples of how adaptation actions can either contribute to or undermine SDG achievement \r\nfor SDGs 2, 3, 6, 11 and 16. In general, formal adaptation policies as well as household and community-based adaptation strategies can \r\ngenerate positive outcomes, particularly if they are responsive to the local context and needs, with real participation and leadership by \r\ntarget populations (Remling and Veitayaki, 2016; Buckwell et al., 2020; McNamara et al., 2020; Owen, 2020). For example, integrated \r\nadaptation approaches to the water-energy-food (WEF) nexus aiming to build resilience in those sectors can lead to increased \r\nresource use efficiency and coherent strategies for managing the complex interactions and trade-offs among the water, energy \r\nand food SDGs (Mpandeli et al., 2018; Nhamo et al., 2020)"


id: 4c389cda743f00160d79b2b02226edfe
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" One such approach could involve cultivating indigenous crops suited to \r\nharsh growing conditions, which would allow for agricultural expansion for food and energy without increased water withdrawals \r\n(Mpandeli et al., 2018). Overall, adaptation commitments aiming to build resilience of vulnerable populations have typically shown to \r\ncontribute to SDGs focused on ending extreme poverty (SDG 1), improving food security (SDG 2), improving access to water (SDG 6), \r\nensuring clean energy (SDG 7), tackling climate change (SDG 13) and halting land degradation and deforestation (SDG 15) (Antwi\u0002Agyei et al., 2018)."


id: 4ae155ee62b435276557ded3f29099d5
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"Such maladaptive adaptation practices can undermine SDG achievement through increasing vulnerability of marginalised groups by \r\nfailing to address the underlying root causes of vulnerability and poverty that are related to political economy, power dynamics and \r\nvested interests more broadly, instead treating the symptoms as the cause (Magnan et al., 2016; Ajibade and Egge, 2019; Schipper, \r\n2020). For example, evidence exists of flood defence measures through large-scale infrastructure development leading to the violent \r\ndisplacement of poor communities, forcibly resettling people in areas far from their employment or pushing up land and housing costs \r\nwithout providing compensation (Fuso Nerini et al., 2018; Reckien et al., 2018). Moreover, sectoral approaches to adaptation that fail \r\nto acknowledge the linkages between SDGs can counter development efforts and generate further trade-offs (Terry, 2009; Rasul and \r\nSharma, 2016; von Stechow et al., 2016; Klinsky et al"


id: b18f4cc352ac93c0bca673232f31620f
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"In addition, a substantial literature also argues for policy coherence measures that adopt whole-of-government approaches and \r\nmainstream and nationalise SDG targets within national climate policies (Nilsson et al., 2012; Le Blanc, 2015; Ari, 2017; Collste et al., \r\n2017; Dzebo et al., 2017; Nilsson and Weitz, 2019). Institutional coordination mechanisms that aim to break down silos between different \r\nagencies and actors at the national level are suggested as beneficial for avoiding trade-offs between adaptation actions and SDGs \r\n(Mirzabaev et al., 2015; Howlett and Saguin, 2018; Scherer et al., 2018). However, these need to be paired with an investigation of the \r\ndeep-seated ideologies and vested interests that are creating goal conflicts and negatively impacting marginalised groups to begin with \r\n(Purdon, 2014; Bocquillon, 2018)"


id: 31f90650d7b305981685c1632eca7b6d
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" Ultimately, adaptation measures need to acknowledge and address the underlying drivers that make \r\ncertain groups particularly vulnerable, such as social disenfranchisement, unequal power dynamics and historical legacies of colonialism \r\nand exploitation (Magnan et al., 2016; Schipper, 2020)"


id: e5a1bd366c31c2cdea90f67fd42ccd3f
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content:
"Mitigation, including greenhouse gas emissions reductions, avoidance, \r\nand removal and sequestration, as well as management of other \r\nclimate forcing factors (WGIII AR6), is a key element of addressing \r\nclimate risk and pursuing CRD. There are numerous individual and \r\nsystem mitigation options throughout the economy and within human \r\nand natural systems (very high confidence) (Chapter 16; Section 18.5). \r\nLimiting global average warming has been found to reduce climate \r\nrisks (IPCC, 2018a; IPCC, 2019b), and limiting global average warming \r\nto any temperature level has also been found to be associated with \r\nbroad ranges of potential global emissions pathways that represent \r\nfuture uncertainty in the evolution of socioeconomic, technological, \r\nmarket and physical systems (very high confidence) (Rose and Scott, \r\n2018; Rose and Scott, 2020)"


id: 8cb8d9699ee02975b05f87defb722e67
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" Pathways consistent with limiting \r\nwarming to 2degC and below have been found to require significant \r\ndeployment of mitigation options spanning energy, land use and \r\nsocietal transformation ((Lecocq et  al., 2022; Riahi et  al., 2022); \r\nSection 18.3). and substantial economic, energy, land use, policy and \r\nsocietal transformation (Lecocq et al., 2022; Riahi et al., 2022). Such \r\nemissions pathways would represent deviations from current trends \r\nthat raise issues about their feasibility and therefore plausibility (Rose \r\nand Scott, 2018; Rose and Scott, 2020)."


id: 26a8ec2ab810af5ee2d296d0624e8b5e
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"Table  18.2 illustrates that greater climate ambition implies more \r\naggressive emissions reductions in each region, and earlier regional \r\npeaking of emissions (if they have not peaked to date). Near-term \r\nregional emissions increases are possible, even for 1.5degC compatible \r\npathways, but significantly lower emissions than today are shown in \r\nall regions by 2050. Increases in total regional energy consumption \r\nand fossil energy are observed for many pathways, even in the most \r\nambitious where energy consumption growth is potentially slower \r\ncompared with less ambitious pathways. By 2050, regional fossil \r\nenergy declines, but is not eliminated in any region. Regional growth in \r\nelectricity use is substantial in all pathways, even the most ambitious, \r\nwith the growth continuing and accelerating with time and regional \r\ndependence on electricity (share of total energy consumption) also \r\ngrowing significantly"


id: aa1d8f5e2a9edb017548b41fdd190a42
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" The broad ranges are an indication of uncertainty \r\nand risk for regional transitions, noting that full uncertainty is likely \r\nbroader than what is captured by emissions scenario databases \r\n(Rose and Scott, 2018; Rose and Scott, 2020). Among other things, \r\npathways commonly assume idealised climate policies with immediate \r\nimplementation, and model infeasibilities (i.e., models unable to \r\nsolve) increase with climate ambition and pessimism about mitigation \r\ntechnologies (e.g., Clarke et al., 2014; Bauer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., \r\n2018; Muratori et  al., 2020), highlighting the increasing challenge \r\nand potential for actual infeasibility with lower global warming \r\ntargets. Together, Table  18.2 provides insights into the increasingly \r\ndemanding system and development transitions associated with lower \r\nglobal warming levels, as well as some of the low-carbon transition \r\nuncertainties and risks (see also Figure 18.5)."


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"Past assessment has evaluated representative mitigation strategies \r\nin terms of economic, technological, institutional, socio-cultural, \r\nenvironmental/ecological and geophysical viability, as well as \r\nrelationships to SDGs (de Coninck et  al., 2018). The strategies \r\nassessment analysis has been updated for AR6 (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox FEASIB). These assessments identify types of barriers that could \r\naffect an option's feasibility. Among other things, this work finds that, \r\nother than public transport and non-motorised transport, every other \r\nmitigation option evaluated had at least one feasibility dimension that \r\nrepresented a barrier or obstacle. The barriers also imply that there are \r\ntrade-offs in these feasibility dimensions to consider. The assessment \r\nof mitigation option-sustainable development relationships identifies \r\nrelated literature and derives aggregate characterisations"


id: d0ddd3295b437bf8cf8d5a6d9134df2c
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" Concerns \r\nabout the potential sustainable development implications of some \r\nmitigation technologies may be motivation for precluding the use \r\nof some mitigation options. For instance, the potential food security \r\nand environmental quality implications of bioenergy have received \r\nsignificant attention in the literature (e.g., Smith et al., 2013). However, \r\nconstraining or precluding the use of bioenergy without or with CCS \r\ncould have significant implications for the cost of pursuing ambitious \r\nclimate goals, and potentially the attainability of those goals (e.g., \r\nClarke et al., 2014; Bauer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018; Muratori et al., \r\n2020). Bioenergy is not unique in this regard. Social, environmental, \r\nand sustainability concerns have also been raised about the large\u0002scale deployment of many low-carbon technologies, for example, \r\nREDD+, wind, solar, nuclear, fossil with CCS and batteries. See WGIII \r\nChapter 3 (Riahi et al"


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", 2022) for examples of the potential implications \r\nof limiting or precluding different low-carbon technologies."


id: 54ba50800683af90f38b3ebc344f78ac
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"Figure  18.5, derived from WGIII scenarios data, illustrates estimated \r\nrelationships between mitigation and various sustainable development \r\nproxy variables  for different global regions. Figure  18.5 illustrates \r\nsynergies and trade-offs with mitigation, as well as regional \r\nheterogeneity, that can intensify with the level of climate ambition--\r\nsynergies in air pollutants, such as black carbon, NOx and SO2; and \r\ntrade-offs in overall economic development, household consumption, \r\nfood crop prices and energy prices for electricity and natural gas. For \r\ncomparison, recent IPCC assessments also observed similar synergies \r\nand trade-offs but did not directly make comparisons regarding overall \r\ndevelopment nor evaluate potential climates above 2degC (Rogelj et al., \r\n2018; Roy et al., 2018; Mbow et al., 2019). Regional nonlinearity in the \r\neconomic costs of mitigation with greater climate ambition (i.e"


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", costs \r\nrising at an increasing rate with lower warming goals) can be significant \r\nwithin individual models (Rose and Scott, 2018; Rose and Scott, 2020). \r\nFigure 18.5 also illustrates transition risks in the potential for significant \r\nsynergistic and trade-off implications with, for instance, potentially large \r\nregional commodity price implications and household consumption \r\nlosses, as well as more significant air pollution benefits. Note that \r\nthe 1.5degC results in Figure 18.5 (and Table 18.2) are biased by model \r\ninfeasibilities. Many models are unable to solve, especially with less \r\noptimistic assumptions, resulting in small sample sizes and a different \r\nrepresentation of models compared to the 2degC and higher results."


id: 35b24d235f1510d73da990e6978da073
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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"Results such as those in Figure  18.5 illustrate that mitigation-\r\ndevelopment trade-offs are inevitable and need to be considered \r\nand addressed. For instance, Roy (2018) found that although limiting \r\nwarming to 1.5degC would make it markedly easier to achieve most of \r\nthe UN's SDGs, none of the 1.5degC pathways assessed achieved all of \r\nthe SDGs. A similar conclusion follows from the results in Figure 18.5 \r\nbased on WGIII AR6 scenarios.. A newer literature is developing, \r\nevaluating the potential for managing SDG trade-offs. Results like \r\nthose in Figure 18.5 provide insights regarding some of the types of \r\nstrategy sets to consider. Roy et al. (2018) discuss the potential for \r\npolicies that address distributional implications, such as payments, \r\nfood support and revenue recycling, as well as education, retraining \r\nand technology outreach, subsidies or prioritisation"


id: 288fbf0f0f9015da14ffd3530a97f912
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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" Recent studies \r\nhave begun to estimate potential payments to offset trade-offs, such \r\nas related to food, water and energy access (e.g., McCollum et al., \r\n2018a). These analyses estimate investments to address specific \r\ntrade-offs; however, with mitigation redirecting resources away \r\nfrom other productive activities, there is a need to also evaluate the \r\naggregate economy-wide, distributional and welfare effects, including \r\nthe redistribution effects of managing sustainable development \r\ntrade-offs."


id: 403e7f0cf447f3ffbd4557fa73481d24
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"Analyses of the potential implications of mitigation on sustainable \r\ndevelopment has various strands of literature--studies exploring \r\ngeneral greenhouse gas mitigation feedbacks to society, assessments \r\nof mitigation implications on specific societal objectives other than \r\nclimate and literature evaluating mitigation implications specifically \r\nfor sustainable development objectives (Denton et  al., 2022; Lecocq \r\net al., 2022; Riahi et al., 2022). In general, mitigation alters development \r\nopportunities by constraining the emissions future society can produce, \r\nwhich affects markets, resource allocation, economic structure, income \r\ndistribution, consumers and the environment (besides climate) (very \r\nhigh confidence). Examples of general development feedbacks from \r\nmitigation include estimated price changes, macroeconomic costs, \r\nand low carbon energy and land system transformations (Fisher et al., \r\n2007; Clarke et al., 2014; Popp et al., 2014; Rose et al"


id: 815fbebf44a03832c550279abf1c4ebe
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", 2014; Weyant \r\nand Kriegler, 2014; Bauer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018). Examples of \r\nmitigation implications for other specific variables of societal interest "


id: bad3cfa38d4f7129f791f5d1172ac00b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"Figure 18.5 |  Regional implications of climate mitigation pathways in 2050 for different global mean peak temperature outcomes (during the century) \r\nfor various development and sustainable development proxy variables. Each row reports results for a different variable for each of the five global regions (columns) \r\nused by WGIII, and SDG associated with each variable is noted. Blue dots represent individual emissions scenario results from each of the respective WGIII climate outcome \r\nscenario categories, with red bars the median results. All results are changes (percentage or fraction) relative to each WGIII scenario's reference scenario. In some circumstances \r\nthe reference case emissions are below those from the scenario consistent with a global warming level, which can produce results that appear counter-intuitive (e.g., increases in \r\nGDP or consumption)"


id: 21bc31fee20a3b4d4be04bb9c7f41554
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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vector_id: 2738
content:
" Data sample sizes vary substantially across temperature levels for a given variable and across variables due to model infeasibilities and model differences in \r\nreporting. Model infeasibilities, in particular, result in significantly fewer data points for 1.5degC compatible emissions pathways compared to 2degC pathways (i.e., models are more \r\noften unable to solve for a 1.5degC consistent pathway, than a 2degC pathway, with a given set of assumptions). Food/feed crop price results were not available for 1.5degC and 4degC \r\nwarming levels. Sample sizes for each variable and warming level respectively--1.5degC, 2degC, 3degC, and 4degC--are as follows (and apply to all regions): GDP (n = 2, 93, 29, 12); \r\nConsumption (2, 93, 30, 13); Black Carbon (2, 100, 39, 16), NOx (2, 100, 39, 15), SO2 (2, 100, 39, 16), price food/feed crops (0, 44, 23, 0); price electricity (2, 94, 38, 15); price "


id: ca43cf55413128854d4c0e1dab1fe93d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"Nonlinearities are an important consideration in evaluating risk \r\nmanagement combinations. Nonlinearities have been estimated in \r\nglobal and regional mitigation costs and potential economic damages \r\nfrom climate change (very high confidence) ((Riahi et al., 2022); (Clarke \r\net al., 2014; Burke et al., 2015; Rose, 2017). Nonlinear mitigation costs \r\nmean increasingly higher costs for each additional incremental reduction \r\nin emissions (or incremental reduction in global average temperature). \r\nNonlinear increases in estimated economic climate damage means \r\nincreasingly higher damages for each additional incremental increase \r\nin climate change (e.g., global average temperature). However, the \r\nevidence on whether damages increase at an increasing or decreasing \r\nrate is mixed (Chapter 16 CWGB: ECONOMIC). Nonlinearities are also \r\nsuggested in estimated changes in key risks and adaptation costs \r\n(Chapters 2 to 16). However, to date, they have not been as explicitly \r\ncharacterised"


id: d195b9dccf548bd68cfda09cae6d01d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
" These nonlinearities imply nonlinearities in climate risk \r\nmanagement synergies and trade-offs with sustainable development. \r\nNot only do trade-offs vary by climate level, as do synergies, but they \r\nincrease at an increasing rate and their relative importance can shift \r\nacross climate levels (very high confidence). Some of this is evident in \r\nresults such as those shown in Figure 18.5 for mitigation (keeping in \r\nmind differences in sample sizes across temperature levels). Uncertainty \r\nabout the degree of nonlinearity in mitigation, climate damages, key \r\nrisks and adaptation costs creates uncertainties in the strength of \r\nthe trade-offs and synergies, but also represents opportunities. For \r\ninstance, additional mitigation options and more economically efficient \r\npolicy designs have been shown to reduce mitigation costs and the \r\nnonlinearities in mitigation costs (very high confidence) (Riahi et al., \r\n2022). The same is true for adaptation options and adaptation costs."


id: 70bf3a2ee32b60e84f4daf73239a69f9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"At the most aggregate level, there is a long-standing literature \r\nexploring economically optimal global trade-offs between climate \r\nrisks and mitigation (e.g., Manne and Richels, 1992; Nordhaus, 2017; \r\nRose, 2017), as well as global stochastic analysis exploring global \r\nrisk hedging for a small number of uncertainties (e.g., (Lemoine and \r\nTraeger, 2014). Recent work has found optimal global emissions and \r\nclimate pathways to be highly sensitive to uncertainties and plausible \r\nalternative assumptions, with uncertainties throughout the causal chain \r\nfrom society to emissions to climate to climate damages shown to imply \r\na wide range of different possible economically optimal pathways (Rose, \r\n2017). Among other things, this work identifies assumptions consistent \r\nwith limiting warming to different temperature levels"


id: e3ae65ad611bb795e65263a4940c0ffe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
" For example, the \r\ncombination of potential annual climate damages of 15% of global GDP \r\nat 4degC of warming and a less sensitive climate system were consistent \r\nwith an economically efficient global pathway limiting warming to \r\n2degC. In addition, this work highlights the importance of characterising \r\nand managing uncertainties. These types of global aggregate analyses \r\ninform discussions regarding long-run global pathways and goals but \r\nare not designed to inform local planning."


id: 6d1faf8f8577c20ac3563e7322b377bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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vector_id: 14791
content:
"While ensuring development and adaptation produce synergies \r\nthat allow for the achievement of sustainable development is \r\nchallenging, modelling exercises suggest that there are pathways \r\nwhere synergies among the SDGs are realised (very high confidence) \r\n(Roy et al., 2018; Van Vuuren et al., 2019) (Section 18.5), particularly \r\nif longer time horizons are used. These pathways require progress on \r\nmultiple social, economic, technological, institutional and governance \r\naspects of development, including building human capacity, \r\nmanaging consumption behaviour, decarbonisation of the global \r\neconomy, improving food and water security, modernising cities and \r\ninfrastructure, and innovations in science and technology (Van Vuuren \r\net  al., 2019) (Section  18.3). In addition, Olsson et al, (Olsson et  al., \r\n2014) and Roy et al"


id: bf33b8df3d6a96497f63efa2fc5bcf94
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content:
" (2018) emphasise the importance of integrating \r\nconsiderations for social justice and equity in the pursuit of sustainable \r\ndevelopment (Gupta and Pouw, 2017)."


id: 7e92b46a6481663fba6e06bdc6ab225d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"Synergies between adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development \r\nmight be promoted by prioritising those CRD strategies most likely to \r\ngenerate synergies (very high confidence) (Roy et al., 2018; Karlsson \r\net al., 2020). This could include focusing on poverty alleviation that \r\nimproves adaptive capacity (e.g., Kaya and Chinsamy, 2016; Kuper \r\net al., 2017; Ley, 2017; Sanchez and Izzo, 2017; Stanczuk-Galwiaczek \r\net al., 2018; Ley et al., 2020); renewable energy systems that improve \r\nwater management and preservation of river ecological integrity \r\n(e.g., Berga, 2016; Rasul and Sharma, 2016); or internalising positive \r\nexternalities, such as subsidies for mitigation options thought to also \r\nimprove water use efficiency (e.g., Roy et al., 2018). Similarly, trade\u0002offs might be managed by prioritising strategies such as disqualifying \r\nmitigation options thought to have negative social implications \r\n(Section 18.2.5.3"


id: 25f65d61e780424802763859f8401214
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"1), internalising externalities, such as placing a fee or \r\nconstraint on a negative externality or related activity (Dubash et al., \r\n2022) (Bistline and Rose, 2018), or using complementary policies, \r\nsuch as transfer payments to offset negative mitigation, adaptation or \r\nsustainable development strategy implications (very high confidence)\r\n(e.g., McCollum et al., 2018b). Roy et al. (2018) discusses the latter, \r\nnoting, for instance, the possibility of complementary sustainable \r\ndevelopment payments to avoid global energy access, food security \r\nand clean water trade-offs (Box 4.7)."


id: 7b4b982150b2f24ee4f6ed75eda20feb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"Emerging evidence also suggests that many adaptation-labelled strategies \r\nmay exacerbate existing poverty and vulnerability or introduce new \r\ninequalities, for example by affecting certain disadvantaged groups more \r\nthan others, even to the point of protecting the wealthy elite at the expense \r\nof the most vulnerable (Eriksen et al., 2019). Pelling et al. (2016) find that \r\nadaptation has been conceived and implemented in such a manner that \r\nmost projects preserve rather than challenge the status quo. Specifically, \r\nthe potential for knowledge and the goals of adaptation to be contested \r\nby different actors and stakeholders and the need to sustain progress over \r\nextended periods of time can constrain the ability to effectively implement \r\nactions that lead to sustainable development outcomes that are protected \r\nfrom the impacts of climate change while also delivering climate mitigation \r\noutcomes, that is, for CRD (Bosomworth et  al., 2017; Bloemen et  al., \r\n2019)"


id: 5609d92112382962dae02a7a8f565f36
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"Locally, there are many qualitative similarities to the global perspective \r\nin thinking about risk management combinations across lower versus \r\nhigher levels of warming. However, there is one very important difference. \r\nLocal decision makers are confronted with uncertainty about what others \r\nwill do beyond their local jurisdiction. With future climate a function of \r\nthe sum of global decisions, sustainable development planning needs \r\nto consider the possibility of more and less emissions reduction action \r\nglobally and the potential associated climates. This implies the need for \r\nsustainable development to manage for the possibility of higher levels \r\nof warming by further facilitating adaptation and managing adaptation \r\ntrade-offs. Prioritising sustainable development locally is also supported \r\nby the insight that the impacts on poverty depend at least as much or \r\nmore on development than on the level of climate change (very high \r\nconfidence) (Wiebe et al"


id: c5a611fe805a2a7244dcd5dd450073f0
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vector_id: 28677
content:
"With surpassing 1.5degC a distinct possibility, considering higher levels \r\nof warming is a necessity. CRD could be pursued with additional \r\nadaptation, recognizing increasing challenges for adaptation and \r\nsustainable development with higher warming, just as there are \r\nincreasing challenges for mitigation and sustainable development with \r\nlimiting warming to lower levels. There are many possible pathways for \r\npursuing climate resilient development, though our understanding of \r\nthe possibilities with different levels of warming is currently limited \r\n(e.g., David Tabara et al., 2018; O'Brien, 2018). The current literature \r\nsuggests that different mixes of adaptation and mitigation strategies, \r\nand sustainable development and trade-off management priorities, \r\nmeasures and reallocations (Section  18.5.3.1), will be appropriate \r\nfor different expected climates and locations (Section 18.1"


id: 716511e38b56297c37f22d3a8f1efdf3
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content:
"2); while \r\ntrade-offs between climates will be dictated by relative nonlinearities, \r\nfeasibilities, shifts in priorities, and trade-off and reallocation options \r\nacross future climates."


id: ba84a014d6696251c29788bba6a49ba3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26879
content:
"Sustainable development considerations could be used to prioritise \r\nmitigation options, but as noted earlier, there are trade-offs, with a \r\npotentially significant impact on the economic cost of mitigation, as \r\nwell as a potential trade-off in terms of the climate outcomes that are \r\nstill viable (Riahi et al., 2022). For instance, all of the 1.5degC scenarios \r\nused in IPCC (2018a) deploy carbon dioxide removal technologies \r\n(Rogelj et al., 2018). Without these technologies, most models cannot \r\ngenerate pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC, and those that are \r\nable to adopt strong assumptions about global policy development and \r\nsocioeconomic changes. Sustainable development might also affect \r\nthe design of policies by prioritising specific sustainable development \r\nobjectives. However, there are trade-offs here as well, with costs and \r\nthe distribution of costs varying with alternative policy designs"


id: 3d41754f2bd00cf61ae720cf0e9e6615
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
" For \r\ninstance, prioritising air quality has climate co-benefits but does not \r\nensure the lowest cost climate strategy (Arneth et al., 2009; Kandlikar \r\net al., 2009). Similarly, prioritising land protection has a variety of co\u0002benefits but could increase food prices significantly, as well as the \r\noverall cost of climate mitigation (IPCC, 2019b). In this context, with \r\nlower climate risk and adaptation levels and larger mitigation effort, \r\nmanaging mitigation trade-offs could be a sustainable development \r\npriority. Furthermore, sustainable development could also be tailored \r\nto facilitate adaptation and manage mitigation costs."


id: ae7a55afe4123950585f700f9c4a1c8a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"Features of sustainable development, such as enhanced energy access, \r\nenergy security, reductions in air pollution and economic growth, \r\ncontinue to be the dominant influence on the evolution of energy systems \r\nand decision making regarding energy investments and portfolios \r\n(very high confidence) (Clarke et  al., 2022) . To date, climate policy \r\nhas been comparatively less influential in driving energy transitions \r\nglobally. Yet there are examples at the local, regional and national \r\nlevel of policy incentivising rapid changes in energy systems (very \r\nhigh confidence) (Clarke et al., 2022) . Many sustainable development \r\npriorities have co-benefits in terms of climate mitigation, such as air \r\npollution and conservation policies reducing short-lived climate forcers \r\nand sequestering carbon respectively, as well adaptation benefits, \r\nsuch as improved energy access and environmental quality enhancing \r\nadaptive capacity (very high confidence) (Clarke et  al"


id: 15216b0813833405a3d6d6d9cfc920e0
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content:
", 2022) (de \r\nConinck et al., 2018). Alternatively, sustainable development projects \r\ncan have negative climate implications with, for instance, hydroelectric \r\nprojects shut down by droughts or floods resulting in greater use of \r\nbunker and fuel oil, as well as natural gas."


id: cad698cbe5caadb05e80b2eed86d484c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29473
content:
"In the AR6, system transitions are defined as 'the process of changing \r\n(the system in focus) from one state or condition to another in a \r\ngiven period of time' (IPCC, 2018a; IPCC, 2019b). In the climate \r\nchange solution space, system transitions represent an important \r\nmechanism for linking and enabling mitigation, adaptation and \r\nsustainable development options and actions (very high confidence). \r\nSR1.5C identified the need for rapid and far-reaching transitions in \r\nfour systems--energy, land and terrestrial ecosystems, urban and \r\ninfrastructure, and industrial systems (IPCC, 2018b; IPCC, 2018a) \r\n(Sections 1.5.1 and 18.1). The SRCCL expanded on this with a focus \r\non terrestrial systems, while SROCC added additional evidence from \r\nocean and cryosphere systems. This section assesses the four system \r\ntransitions discussed in the SR1"


id: c6a28f592afab1f11f4e2e08da01b4cb
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content:
"5C assessment in the context of CRD, \r\nwhile also extending the assessment to consider societal transitions as \r\na cross-cutting, fifth transition important for CRD. Literature to support \r\nthis assessment is also drawn from AR6 regional and sectoral chapters, \r\nwhich is synthesised later in this chapter (Section 18.5)."


id: 2031b18e90f6e054070f4fbcd9487c27
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content:
"In addition to sustainable development priorities driving change in \r\nenergy systems, observed energy system trends have implications for \r\nsustainable development (e.g., IEA et al., 2019). Observed changes in \r\nenergy system size, rate of growth, composition and operations impact \r\nenergy access, equity, environmental quality and well-being, with both \r\nsynergies and trade-offs, including recent improvements in global \r\naccess to affordable, reliable and modern energy services. For instance, \r\nin some countries, such as the USA, there has been a significant shift \r\naway from coal as a fuel source for electricity generation in favour \r\nof natural gas. More recently, however, renewables have emerged \r\nas the dominant form of new electricity generation (Gielen et  al., \r\n2019)"


id: fc6103cfa2be4033b0ab8837c1fd2216
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" Similarly, for energy access in developing countries, renewable \r\nenergy or hybrid distributed generation systems are increasingly \r\nbeing prioritised because of challenges associated with access, costs \r\nand environmental impacts from traditional fossil fuel-based energy \r\ntechnologies (Mulugetta et al., 2019)."


id: 9c91841f2785804cda056f24fe0abb04
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"Energy systems have been a historical driver of climate change, but \r\nare also adversely affected by climate change impacts, including short\u0002term shocks and stressors from extreme weather as well as long-term \r\nshifts in climatic conditions (very high confidence). The potential for \r\nsuch factors is often incorporated into local system designs, operations \r\nand response strategies. There have been changes in observed weather \r\nand extreme event hazards for the energy system, but to date, many \r\nare not attributable solely to anthropogenic climate change (USGCRP, \r\n2017; IPCC, 2021a). Nevertheless, with observed extremes shifting \r\noutside of what has been observed historically, existing design criteria \r\nand operations may not be optimal for future climate conditions and \r\ncontingencies (Chapters 2 to 16). Overall, there is limited historical \r\nevidence on the efficacy of adaptation responses in reducing \r\nvulnerability of energy systems (high agreement, limited evidence)"


id: 7876201847f424351806040d218e2a1b
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content:
"Similarly, building and maintaining urban water systems that are \r\nresilient to climate shocks requires significant changes in water demand, \r\ninfrastructure and management. Enhancing redundancy in water \r\nsupply and the flexibility to shift between surface and groundwater \r\noptions aids adaptation. Decentralised water supply and sanitation \r\noptions are now feasible and can provide greater resilience than \r\nmost centralised systems (Parry, 2017), provided they have adequate \r\nsupply (Leigh and Lee, 2019; Rabaey et al., 2020). Water conservation \r\nand green infrastructure options for stormwater management are \r\nproven approaches for reducing climate risks (Venema and Temmer, \r\n2017b), with adaptation and mitigation co-benefits. Water demand \r\nmanagement and rainwater harvesting contribute to climate change \r\nmitigation and increase adaptive capacity by increasing resilience \r\nto climate change impacts such as drought and flooding (Paton \r\net  al., 2014; Berry et  al., 2015)"


id: a36b0f98bb8114b88a64b63e3b582c75
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content:
" In addition, they can contribute to \r\nrestoring urban ecosystems that offer multiple ecosystem services \r\nto citizens (Berry et  al., 2015) {Lwasa, 2022 #4317}. The context\u0002appropriate development of green spaces, protecting ecosystem \r\nservices and developing nature-based solutions, can increase the set \r\nof available urban adaptation options (IPCC, 2018b), while creating \r\nopportunities for more complex and dynamic approaches to urban \r\nwater management (Franco-Torres et  al., 2020). For example, the \r\nNetherlands' 'Room for the River' policy focuses on not only achieving \r\nhigher flood resilience, but also improving the quality of riverine areas \r\nfor human and ecological well-being (Busscher et al., 2019)."


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"The built environment is increasingly exposed to climate stresses and \r\nmore frequent co-occurrences of climate shocks than in the past. \r\nThis has the potential to increase rates of building and infrastructure \r\ndegradation and increase damage from extreme weather events. \r\nThe existing adaptation gaps and everyday risks within many cities, \r\nparticularly those of the Global South, combined with escalating \r\nrisk from climate change, makes rapid progress in enhancing urban \r\nresilience a high priority for CRD (Pelling et al., 2018; Davidson et al., \r\n2019; Lenzholzer et al., 2020). Strategic investments in disaster risk \r\nreduction, including climate-resilient green infrastructure, updated \r\nbuilding codes and land use planning can provide significant long\u0002term cost savings and social benefits"


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" Moreover, evaluating the relative \r\nmerits of 'fail safe' versus 'safe to fail' approaches to infrastructure \r\nplanning can help to identify more design principles that are more \r\nrobust to the uncertainties of climate change and urbanisation (Kim \r\net al., 2017a; Kim et al., 2019)."


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"An overarching focus of urban sustainability is the reversal of long\u0002standing trends of ecosystem fragmentation and degradation that \r\nhave resulted in growing separation between human and natural \r\nsystems within urban environments (IPBES, 2019) (Lwasa et al., 2022). \r\nUrban ecosystems and the integration of nature-based solutions and \r\ngreen infrastructure into urban areas can yield benefits that facilitate \r\nachievement of the SDGs. There has been growing recognition of urban \r\necosystems as social, cultural and economic assets that can support \r\neconomic development while also enhancing resilience to extreme \r\nweather events and improving air and water quality (Shaneyfelt \r\net al., 2017; Matos et al., 2019). Investing in urban ecosystems and \r\ngreen infrastructure can provide lower-cost solutions to multiple \r\nurban development challenges when compared with traditional \r\ninfrastructure systems (Terton, 2017)"


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" Relatedly, agriculture, while \r\nlargely a rural system, is increasingly expanding within urban areas. \r\nUrban agriculture enables citizens to fulfil some of their food needs, \r\nimproving urban resilience to food shortages, enhancing biodiversity \r\nand increasing coping capacity during disasters (Demuzere et  al., \r\n2014; Clucas et al., 2018) (Lwasa et al., 2022). Strengthening urban \r\nagroecosystems therefore increases resilience to supply shocks from \r\nclimate change impacts and can contribute to community cohesion \r\n(Temmer, 2017a)."


id: bdfd082a15c4c6e7b86f36eaedbd980f
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"Other solutions focus on specific subsectors. Mutually supportive \r\nclimate and land policies have the potential to save resources, amplify \r\nsocial resilience, support ecological restoration, and foster engagement \r\nand collaboration between multiple stakeholders (IPCC, 2019 f, C.1). \r\nLand-based solutions can combat desertification in specific contexts: \r\nwater harvesting and micro-irrigation, restoring degraded lands using \r\ndrought-resilient ecologically appropriate plants, agroforestry and \r\nother agroecological and ecosystem-based adaptation practices (IPCC, \r\n2019 f, B.4.1). Reducing dust, sandstorms and sand dune movement \r\ncan lessen the negative effects of wind erosion and improve air quality \r\nand health"


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" Depending on water availability and soil conditions, \r\nafforestation, tree planting and ecosystem restoration programmes \r\nusing native and other climate-resilient tree species with low water \r\nneeds, can reduce sand storms, avert wind erosion and contribute to \r\ncarbon sinks, while improving micro-climates, soil nutrients and water \r\nretention (IPCC, 2019 f, B.4.2)."


id: ef710acef1847031d4e673ce823d3bdd
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"Given the pressures on land, oceans and ecosystems, enhancing \r\nresilience to climate change and other pressures of human development \r\nis a core priority of transition in these systems. Yet there are a few \r\nrecorded initiatives that provide evidence of successful improvement \r\nin ecosystem resilience (high agreement, limited evidence). Similarly, \r\nalthough there is significant evidence that a broad range of adaptation \r\ninitiatives have been pursued across global regions and sectors, \r\nincluding a rapid expansion of nature- or ecosystem-based solutions \r\n(Mainali et al., 2020), there is limited evidence of how these planned \r\nclimate adaptation efforts have contributed to enhanced ecosystem \r\nresilience. Additional research is necessary to evaluate these efforts in \r\nterms of their performance and also to identify mechanisms for scaling \r\nthem up in different contexts. As an example, Paik et al. (Paik et al"


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", \r\n2020) record the increased diffusion of salt tolerant rice varieties in the \r\nMekong River Delta, which is at risk of sea level rise and an associated \r\nsaline intrusion. This is a low-cost adaption to saline ingress, that \r\nincreases food productivity and reduces the risk of outmigration for \r\nthis vulnerable agricultural region."


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"Coastal blue carbon ecosystems, such as mangroves, salt marshes \r\nand seagrasses, can help reduce the risks and impacts of climate \r\nchange, with multiple co-benefits. Over 150 countries contain at least \r\none of these coastal blue carbon ecosystems and over 70 contain \r\nall three. Successful implementation of measures of carbon storage \r\nin coastal ecosystems could assist several countries in achieving a \r\nbalance between emissions and removal of greenhouse gases. Carbon \r\nstorage in marine habitats can be up to 1,000 tC ha-1, higher than \r\nmost terrestrial ecosystems. Conservation of these habitats would \r\nalso sustain a wide range of ecosystem services, assist with climate \r\nadaptation by improving critical habitats for biodiversity, enhance local \r\nfishery production and protect coastal communities from sea level rise \r\n(SLR) and storm events (IPCC, 2019b)"


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" Ecosystem-based adaptation is \r\na cost-effective coastal protection tool that can have many co-benefits, \r\nincluding supporting livelihoods, contributing to carbon sequestration \r\nand the provision of a range of other valuable ecosystem services \r\n(IPCC, 2019b)."


id: b38caa885f174632397f9eeaf80519c6
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"Polar regions will be profoundly different in the future. The degree \r\nand nature of that difference will depend strongly on the rate and \r\nmagnitude of global climate change, which will influence adaptation \r\nresponses regionally and worldwide. Future climate-induced changes \r\nin the polar oceans, sea ice, snow and permafrost will drive habitat and \r\nbiome shifts, with associated changes in the ranges and abundance \r\nof ecologically important species (IPCC, 2019g). Innovative tools and \r\npractices in polar resource management and planning show strong \r\npotential in improving society's capacity to respond to climate change. \r\nNetworks of protected areas, participatory scenario analysis, decision \r\nsupport systems and community-based ecological monitoring that \r\ndraws on local and Indigenous knowledge and self-assessments of \r\ncommunity resilience contribute to strategic plans for sustaining \r\nbiodiversity and limit risk to human livelihoods and well-being"


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" \r\nExperimenting, assessing and continually refining practices while \r\nstrengthening links with decision making has the potential to ready \r\nsociety for the expected and unexpected impacts of climate change \r\n(IPCC, 2019g)."


id: 8c7948e4ec522702d5dc37af5120c1d
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"Industrial transitions are also contingent upon consumer behaviour \r\nin terms of preferences for, and rates of, consumption of industrial \r\nproducts. Sustainable consumption can play an important role in \r\nsustainable production (Allwood et al., 2013; Allwood et al., 2019). This \r\nsuggests feedbacks between industrial production and consumption \r\nin driving industrial transitions. For example, sustainable consumption \r\ncould be triggered and/or enabled through sustainable production \r\nprocesses that provide more sustainable options to consumers as \r\nwell as public or private promotional campaigns that promote those \r\noptions. Meanwhile, demand from consumers for more sustainable \r\noptions could help to drive the expansion of markets and innovation \r\namong industrial producers to meet that demand"


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" However, some \r\nhave argued that such promotional campaigns that target consumers \r\ndo little to incentivize sustainable development and climate action \r\n(Farrell, 2015; Grydehoj and Kelman, 2017)."


id: e046fc60b13b970b83927e4e939c3a33
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"This chapter contributes a fifth system transition in addition to the \r\nfour which have already been introduced by SR1.5: the societal \r\nsystems transition. While society and people also feature in the \r\nother systems transitions, the purpose of defining a fifth transition \r\nis to explicitly highlight the challenges associated with changes in \r\nbehaviour, attitudes, values and consciousness required to achieve \r\nCRD. One caveat of considering transitions in societal systems is the \r\nlimit to which the nature of change is known: transitions accomplish \r\nreconfigurations towards a relatively known destination. Historical and \r\ncurrent differences between and within nations translate to a multitude \r\nof equally valid but diverse priorities for development, for example the \r\nunderstanding of development towards progress as linear has been \r\nchallenged as being a Western concept by scholars of colonialisation \r\n(Sultana et al., 2019)"


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" Thus, societal transitions are understood as being \r\nintrinsically diverse for the purpose of achieving CRD."


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"Climate change connects to ecosystem services through two links: climate change and its influence on ecosystems as well as its influence \r\non services (Section 2.2). The key climatic drivers are changes in temperature, precipitation and extreme events, which are unprecedented \r\nover millennia and highly variable by regions (Sections 2.3, 3.2; Cross-Chapter Box EXTREMES in Chapter 2). These climatic drivers \r\ninfluence physical and chemical conditions of the environment and worsen the impacts of non-climate anthropogenic drivers including \r\neutrophication, hypoxia and sedimentation (Section 3.4). Such changes have led to changes in terrestrial, freshwater, oceanic and coastal \r\necosystems at all different levels, from species shifts and extinctions, to biome migration, and to ecosystem structure and processes \r\nchanges (Sections 2.4, 2.5, 3.4, Cross-Chapter Box MOVING PLATE in Chapter 5)"


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" Changes in ecosystems leads to changes in ecosystem \r\nservices including food and limber prevision, air and water quality regulation, biodiversity and habitat conservation, and cultural and \r\nmental support (Sections 2.4, 3.5). Table Box 18.5.2 presents examples of climate change's impact on ecosystems and their services from \r\nother chapters in the WGII report. The degradation of ecosystem services is felt disproportionately by people who are already vulnerable \r\nbecause of historical and systemic injustices, including women and children in low-income households, Indigenous or other minority \r\ngroups, small-scale producers and fishing communities, and low-income countries (Sections 3.5, 4.3, 5.13)."


id: 4a9a84bff26706a61254f5eb6bfa4c26
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"Ecosystem protection and restoration, ecosystem-based adaptation (EBA), and nature-based solutions (NBS) can lower climate risk \r\nto people and achieve multiple benefits including food and material provision, climate mitigation and social benefits (Sections 2.6, \r\n3.6, 4.6, 5.13, 6.3, 8.6). Table Box 18.5.3 presents some examples of ecosystem adaptation practices reported in WGII sectoral and \r\nregional chapters and CCPs, as well as their co-benefits, potential for maladaptation and enabling conditions. Many of the strategies \r\nfocus on integrated systems (managing for multiple objectives and trade-offs) as well as the fair use of resources. However, there is \r\nlimited evidence of the extent to which adaptation is taking place and virtually no evaluation of the effectiveness of adaptation in the \r\nscientific literature (Sections 2.6, 3.5)"


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" Enabling conditions for the successful implementation ecosystem-based practice include regional \r\nand community-based based approaches, multi-stakeholder and multi-level governance approaches, Integration of local knowledge and \r\nIndigenous knowledge, finance and social equity (Sections 2.6, 3.6)."


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"The four systems transitions identified in SR1.5 already include a \r\ncomponent of societal change--for example, attitude change is \r\npart of public acceptance that facilitates shifts in energy including \r\nchanging electricity to renewables (Chapter 4 SR1.5, Section 4.3.1.1) \r\nand developing nuclear power (Section  4.3.1.3), and behavioural \r\nchange is a part of shifting irrigation practices to drive required \r\nland and ecosystems transitions (Section 4.3.2.1). Extracting societal \r\ntransitions also allows for a detailed examination of other societal \r\ndimensions that facilitate systems transitions, for example justice \r\nissues relating to water and energy access and distribution, and land \r\nuse. Societal transition, sometimes known as 'societal transformation', \r\nis an established concept in different literatures, as described below. \r\nTransformation and transition are terms often used as synonyms \r\n(Holscher et  al"


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", 2018), although different schools of thought \r\nunderstand them as sub-components of each other, for example \r\ntransition driving transformation, or transformation driving transition. \r\nFor a more detailed discussion on the differences between transition \r\nand transformation represented in the literature, see Box 18.1."


id: 6d86e9922133dc5154dd2dc1f7fa195a
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"Because of the multiple sectors, interests and scales that are involved \r\nin societal transitions, understanding and creating evidence on \r\ntransitions requires shifting across system boundaries and finding ways \r\nto transcend disciplinary silos. Relevant research includes work within \r\nthe topic of transformation and transitions (Holscher et  al., 2018). \r\nTransformations literature can be split into multiple sub-concepts and \r\nrequires engagement with multiple schools of thought (Feola, 2015; \r\nFeola et  al., 2021). Much focus within transformations research is \r\ncurrently related to biodiversity conservation (Massarella et al., 2021), \r\nand transitions work tends towards a focus in urban areas (Loorbach \r\net al., 2017). Though there is also work in both that is more broadly \r\nlabelled as sustainability transformations or transitions (Luederitz et al., \r\n2017)"


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" Furthermore, there is likely to be much relevant literature that \r\ndoes not explicitly label itself as transformations or transitions (Feola \r\net al., 2021). For example, we could look to political science theories \r\non policy change (Leventon et al., 2021) and historical perspectives on \r\nsocial change. Bridging these divides will require a deeper rethinking \r\nin the research community to undo power structures that marginalise \r\ndiverse knowledge (Caniglia et al., 2021; Lahsen and Turnhout, 2021)."


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"Societal transitions for the purpose of this report are understood as the \r\ncollection of shifts in attitudes, values, consciousness and behaviour \r\nrequired to move towards CRD. This builds on the SR1.5 (IPCC, 2018a: \r\n599) definition of societal (social) transformation: 'A profound and \r\noften deliberate shift initiated by communities towards sustainability, \r\nfacilitated by changes in individual and collective values and \r\nbehaviours, and a fairer balance of political, cultural, and institutional \r\npower in society'. This includes accepting Indigenous knowledge \r\nand local knowledge (IKLK) as an equally valid form of knowledge \r\nas compared with Western, scientific knowledge (see Cross-Chapter \r\nBox  INDIG) and recognition of the role of shifting gender norms to \r\nachieve climate resilience (see Cross-Chapter Box GENDER). Changes \r\nassociated with societal transitions are not specific to defined systems \r\n(e.g., energy, industry, land/ecosystems or urban/infrastructure)"


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" Rather, \r\nthese sectoral systems are embedded within broader societal systems, \r\nincluding for example political systems, economic systems, knowledge \r\nsystems and cultural systems (Davelaar, 2021; Turnhout et  al., 2021; \r\nVisseren-Hamakers et al., 2021). Changes that happen in these broader \r\nsocial systems can therefore prompt changes in all systems embedded \r\nwithin them, meaning that societal transition is key to transforming \r\nacross a range of sectors and topics (Leventon et al., 2021). Furthermore, "


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"Successfully implementing climate actions and managing trade\u0002offs between mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development \r\n(Section  18.2.4) has important time considerations that imply \r\nsignificant urgency, making substantive progress in system transitions \r\ncritical for CRD. Both the SDGs and the Sendai Framework, for \r\nexample, have target dates of 2030. Meanwhile, the Paris Agreement \r\nsets specific time horizons for NDCs and the SR1.5 indicated that \r\nlimiting warming to 1.5degC would similarly require substantial climate \r\naction by 2030 (IPCC, 2018a). While the literature is unambiguous \r\nregarding the need for significant system transitions to achieve CRD \r\n(Section  18.1.3), the current pace of global emissions reductions, \r\npoverty alleviation and development of equitable systems of \r\ngovernance is incommensurate with these policy time tables (Rogelj \r\net  al., 2010; Burke et  al., 2016; Oleribe and Taylor-Robinson, 2016; \r\nKriegler et al., 2018; Frank et al"


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", 2019; Sadoff et al., 2020). As noted \r\npreviously in the AR5, 'delaying action in the present may reduce \r\noptions for climate-resilient pathways in the future' (Denton et  al., \r\n2014: 1123). Accordingly, significant acceleration in the pace of system \r\ntransitions is necessary to enable the implementation of mitigation, \r\nadaptation and sustainable development initiatives consistent with \r\nCRD (very high confidence)."


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"Despite a current lack of empirical evidence, there are numerous \r\nframeworks emerging for exploring societal transitions across levels. \r\nThere is focus on pathways for sustainability transitions, which tends \r\nto look at projected, normative scenarios for the future, and explore \r\nor back-cast the institutional and societal changes that are required \r\nto get there (Westley et al., 2011; Sharpe et al., 2016). There is also \r\nwork that looks at scaling up of smaller sustainability initiatives, \r\nthrough processes of scaling up, scaling out and scaling deep (Moore \r\net al., 2015; Lam et al., 2020). In particular, systems thinking provides \r\nan organising framework for bringing together multiple disciplines \r\nand perspectives, to understand problem framings, and normative \r\nand design aspects of social systems and behaviours (Foster\u0002Fishman et  al., 2007)"


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" Within this, Meadows (1999) framework of \r\nleverage points for systems transformation has been operationalised \r\nwithin the sustainability transformations debate (Abson et  al., \r\n2017). Here, system properties relating to system paradigms and \r\ndesign are leverage points where interventions can create greatest \r\nsystem change; shallower leverage points relate to materials and \r\nprocesses. This framework is increasingly being used across a range \r\nof sustainability problems as boundary objects for cross-disciplinary, \r\ncritical research (Fischer and Riechers, 2019; Leventon et  al., 2021; \r\nRiechers et al., 2021)."


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"Studies since the AR5 directly address the issue of how to accelerate \r\ntransitions within the broader system transitions, sustainability \r\ntransitions and socio-technical transitions literature (Frantzeskaki \r\net al., 2017; Gliedt et al., 2018; Gorissen et al., 2018; Johnstone and \r\nNewell, 2018; Kuokkanen et  al., 2019; Markard et  al., 2020). Such \r\nliterature explores several core themes to facilitate acceleration, \r\nwhich are aligned with the discussion later in this chapter on arenas \r\nof engagement for CRD (Section  18.4.3). One dominant theme is \r\naccelerating the implementation of sustainability or low-carbon policies \r\nthat target specific sectors or industries (Bhamidipati et al., 2019). For \r\nexample, Altenburg and Rodrik (Altenburg and Rodrik, 2017) discuss \r\ngreen industrial polices including taxes, mandated technology phase \r\nouts and the removal of subsidies as means of constraining polluting \r\nindustries. Kivimaa et  al. (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018; Kivimaa \r\net al"


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", 2019a; Kivimaa et al., 2019b; Kivimaa et al., 2020) and Vihemaki \r\net  al. (2020) discuss low-carbon transitions in buildings, noting the \r\nimportant role that intermediaries play in facilitating policy reform. \r\nNikulina et al. (2019) identify mechanisms for facilitating policy change \r\nin personal mobility including political leadership, combining carrots \r\nand sticks to incentivise behavioural change and challenging current \r\npolicy frameworks. These various examples reflect a fragmented \r\napproach to system transitions, suggesting a large portfolio of such \r\ntransition initiatives would be required to accelerate change or \r\nmore fundamental and cross-cutting policy drivers are needed (high \r\nagreement, limited evidence)"


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" Policies that seek to promote social \r\njustice and equity, for example, could ultimately catalyse a broader \r\nrange of sustainability and climate actions than policies designed to \r\naddress a specific sector or class of technology (Delina and Sovacool, \r\n2018; White, 2020)."


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"Analyses of societal transitions have had limited engagement with \r\nadaptation questions. The focus of the sub-field of sustainability \r\ntransitions on a few industrialised nations, mostly in North America \r\nand Europe, limited the field's development to assumptions born from \r\nthe experiences in those areas. More recent studies have sought to \r\nunderstand sustainability transitions in other countries, especially \r\nemerging economies (Wieczorek, 2018; Kohler et  al., 2019). In \r\nparticular, China has received attention from scholars on sustainability \r\ntransitions (Huang et  al., 2018; Lo and Castan Broto, 2019; Castan \r\nBroto et al., 2020; Huang and Sun, 2020). As a result, some pressing \r\nissues related to societal transitions for adaptation have received \r\nlimited attention compared with that paid to other system transitions. \r\nHowever, more recently, scholarship has begun examining transitions \r\nthat have turned to nature and nature-based solutions"


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" Adaptive \r\ntransitions are an intermediary step towards sustainability transitions, \r\nwhereby multiple actions at material and institutional levels are \r\ncombined towards improving adaptation outcomes (Pant et al., 2015; \r\nScarano, 2017)."


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"driving transitions forward (high agreement, medium evidence). Ehnert \r\net  al. (2018) describe local organisations and civic engagement in \r\npolicy processes as an important engine for sustainability activities in \r\nEuropean states. Similarly, Ruggiero et al. (2021) note the potential to \r\nuse civic organisations to appeal to local identities in order to mobilise \r\ncitizens to pursue energy transition initiatives among communities in \r\nthe Baltic Sea region. Gernert et  al. (2018) attribute such influence \r\nto the ability of grassroots movements to bypass traditional social \r\nand political norms and thereby experiment with new behaviours \r\nand processes. Moreover, civic engagement is also the foundation for \r\ncollective action including protest and civil disobedience (Welch and \r\nYates, 2018, Section  18.5.3.7)"


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" However, Haukkala (2018) observes \r\nthat while green-transition coalitions in Finland could be an agent of \r\nchange driving energy transitions, the diversity of views among the \r\nvarious grassroots actors could make consensus building difficult, \r\nthereby slowing transition initiatives."


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"This Cross-Chapter Box highlights the intersecting issues of gender, climate change adaptation, climate justice and transformative \r\npathways. A gender perspective does not centre only on women or men but examines structures, processes and relationships of power \r\nbetween and among groups of men and women and how gender, particularly in its non-binary form, intersects with other social \r\ncategories such as race, class, socioeconomic status, nationality or education to create multi-dimensional inequalities (Hopkins, 2019). A \r\ngender transformative approach aims to change structural inequalities. Attention to gender in climate change adaptation is thus central \r\nto questions of climate justice that aim for a radically different future (Bhavnani et al., 2019). As a normative concept highlighting the \r\nunequal distribution of climate change impacts and opportunities for adaptation and mitigation, climate justice (Wood, 2017; Jafry et al"


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", \r\n2018; Chu and Michael, 2019; Shi, 2020a) calls for transformative pathways for human and ecological well-being. These address the \r\nconcentration of wealth, unsustainable extraction and distribution of resources (Schipper et al., 2020a; Vander Stichele, 2020) as well as \r\nthe importance of equitable participation in environmental decision making for climate justice (Arora-Jonsson, 2019)."


id: 11327831adb78780588f62f0035718eb
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"Research on gender and climate change demonstrates that an understanding of gendered relations is central to addressing the issue of \r\nclimate change. This is because gender relations mediate experiences with climate change, whether in relation to water (Kohler et al., \r\n2019) (see also Sections 4.7, 4.3.3, 4.6.4, 5.3), forests (Arora-Jonsson, 2019), agriculture (Carr and Thompson, 2014; Balehey et al., 2018; \r\nGarcia et al., 2020) (see also Chapter 4, Section 5.4), marine systems (Mcleod et al., 2018; Garcia et al., 2020) (see also Section 5.9) or \r\nurban environments (Reckien et al., 2018; Susan Solomon et al., 2021) (see also Chapter 6). Climate change has direct negative impacts \r\non women's livelihoods due to their unequal control over and access to resources (e.g., land, credit) and because they are often the ones \r\nwith the least formal protection (Eastin, 2018) (see also Box 9.2 in Chapter 9)"


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" Women represent 43% of the agricultural labour force \r\nglobally, but only 15% of agricultural landholders (OECD, 2019b). Gendered and other social inequities also exist with non-land assets \r\nand financial services (OECD, 2019b) often due to social norms, local institutions and inadequate social protection (Collins et al., 2019b). \r\nMen may experience different adverse impacts due to gender roles and expectations (Bryant and Garnham, 2015; Gonda, 2017). These \r\nimpacts can lead to irreversible losses and damages from climate change across vulnerability hotspots (Section 8.3)."


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"Participation in environmental decision making tends to favour certain social groups of men, whether in local environmental committees, \r\ninternational climate negotiations (Gay-Antaki and Liverman, 2018) or the IPCC (Nhamo and Nhamo, 2018). Addressing climate justice \r\nreinforces the importance of considering the legacy of colonialism on developing regional and local adaptation strategies. Scholars have \r\ncriticised climate programmes for setting aside forestland that poor people rely on and appropriating the labour of women in the Global \r\nSouth without compensatory social policy or rights; where women are expected to work with non-timber forest products to compensate \r\nfor the lack of logging and for global climate goals, but where their work of social reproduction and care is paid little attention (Westholm \r\nand Arora-Jonsson, 2015; Arora-Jonsson et al., 2016)"


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" A global ecologically unequal exchange, biopiracy, damage from toxic exports or \r\nthe disproportionate use of carbon sinks and reservoirs by high-income countries enhance the negative impacts of climate change. \r\nWomen in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) also endure the harshest impacts of the debt crisis \r\ndue to imposed debt measures in their countries (Appiah and Gbeddy, 2018; Fresnillo Sallan, 2020). The austerity measures derived as \r\nconditionalities for fiscal consolidation in public services increases gender-based violence (Castaneda Carney et al., 2020) and brings \r\nadditional burdens for women in the form of increasing unpaid care and domestic work (Bohoslavsky, 2019)."


id: b4a97db38ac0e2f6011d914bcb7a8636
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"Land, ecosystem and urban transitions to climate resilient development need to address gender and other social inequities to meet \r\nsustainability and equity goals, otherwise, marginalised groups may continue to be excluded from climate change adaptation. In the \r\nwater sector, increasing floods and droughts and diminishing groundwater and runoff have gendered effects on both production systems \r\nand domestic use (Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.5.3). Climate change is reducing the quantity and quality of safe water available in many \r\nregions of the world and increasing domestic water management responsibilities (high confidence). In regions with poor drinking water \r\ninfrastructure, it is forcing, primarily women and girls, to walk long distances to access water, and limiting time available for other \r\nactivities, including education and income generation (Eakin et al., 2014; Kookana et al., 2016; Yadav and Lal, 2018)"


id: b0bf8cf2c020452ab3c83e3082c66be1
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" Water insecurity \r\nand the lack of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure have resulted in psychosocial distress and gender-based violence, \r\nas well as poor maternal and child health and nutrition (Collins et al., 2019a; Wilson et al., 2019; Geere and Hunter, 2020; Islam et al., \r\n2020; Mainali et al., 2020) (Sections 4.3.3 and 4.6.4.4) (high confidence). Climate-related extreme events also affect women's health--by \r\nincreasing the risk of maternal and infant mortality, disrupting access to family planning and prevention of mother to child transmission \r\nregimens for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive pregnant women (UNDRR, 2019) (see also Section 7.2). Women and the \r\nelderly are also disproportionately affected by heat events (Sections 7.1.7.2.1, 7.1.7.2.3, 13.7.1)."


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"Climate change policies and programmes across regions reveal wide variation in the degree and approach to addressing gender inequities \r\n(see Table SMCCB GENDER.2). In most regions where there are climate change policies that consider gender, they inadequately address \r\nstructural inequalities resulting from climate change impacts, or how gender and other social inequalities can compound risk (high confidence). \r\nExperiences show that it is more frequent to address specific gender inequality gaps in access to resources. Regionally, Central and South \r\nAmerican countries (Section  12.5.8) have a range of gender-sensitive or gender-specific policies such as the intersectoral coordination \r\ninitiative Gender and Climate Change Action Plans (PAGcc), adopted in Peru, Cuba, Costa Rica and Panama (Casas Varez, 2017), or the \r\nGender Environmental policy in Guatemala that has a focus on climate change (Barcena-Martin et al., 2021)"


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" However, countries often have \r\nlimited commitment and capacity to evaluate the impact of such policies (Tramutola, 2019). In North and South America, policies have failed \r\nto address how climate change vulnerability is compounded by the intersection of race, ethnicity and gender (Radcliffe, 2014; Vinyeta et al., "


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"2016) (see also Section 14.6.3). Gender is rarely discussed in African national policies or programmes beyond the initial consultation stage \r\n(Holvoet and Inberg, 2014; Mersha and van Laerhoven, 2019), although there are gender and climate change action strategies in countries \r\nsuch as Liberia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (Mozambique and IUCN, 2014; Zambia and IUCN, 2017). European climate change \r\nadaptation strategies and policies are weak on gender and other social equity issues (Allwood, 2014; Boeckmann and Zeeb, 2014; Allwood, \r\n2020), while in Australasia, there is a lack of gender-responsive climate change policies. In Asia, there are several countries that recognise \r\ngendered vulnerability to climate change (Jafry, 2016; Singh et al., 2021b), but policies tend to be gender-specific, with a focus on targeting \r\nwomen, for example in the national action plan on climate change as in India (Roy et al., 2018) or in national climate change plan as in \r\nMalaysia (Susskind et al"


id: aeb9d138e63225f2215def61992be52b
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"Adaptation actions may reinforce social inequities, including gender, unless explicit efforts are made to change (Nagoda and Nightingale, \r\n2017; Garcia et al., 2020) (robust evidence, high agreement). Participation in climate action increases if it is inclusive and fair (Huntjens \r\nand Zhang, 2016). Roy et al. (2018) assessed links among various SDGs and mitigation options. Adaptation actions are grounded in local \r\nrealities, especially in terms of their impacts, so understanding links with the goals of SDG 5 becomes more important to make sure that \r\nadaptive actions do not worsen prevalent gender and other social inequities within society (robust evidence, high agreement). In the \r\nIPCC 1.5degC Special Report, Roy et al. (2018) assessed links between various SDGs and mitigation options, adaptation options were not \r\nconsidered"


id: 5914175c16a8609fc35ee4d662e91883
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" The current SDG 13 climate action targets do not specifically mention gender as a component for action, which makes it \r\neven more imperative to link SDG 5 targets and other gender-related targets to adaptive actions under SDG 13 to ensure that adaptation \r\nprojects are synergistic rather than maladaptive (Section 16.3.2.6, Table 16.6) (Susan Solomon et al., 2021; Roy et al., Submitted)."


id: 418cb641c69bb73c8b97a6cb11159d1d
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"This assessment is based on a systematic rapid review of scientific publications (McCartney et al., 2017; Liem et al., 2020) published on \r\nadaptation actions in nine sectors from 2014 to 2020 (see Table SMCCB GENDER.1) (Roy et al., Submitted)(Roy et al., Submitted)(Roy \r\net al., Submitted)and how they integrated gender perspectives impacting gender equity. The assessment is based on over 17,000 titles \r\nand abstracts that were initially found through keyword search and were reviewed. Finally, 319 relevant papers on case studies, regional \r\nassessments and meta-reviews were assessed. Gender impact was classified by various targets under SDG 5. Following the approach \r\ntaken in Roy et al. (2018) and (Hoegh-Guldberg et al"


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", 2019), the linkages were classified into synergies (positive impacts or co-benefits) \r\nand trade-offs (negative impacts) based on the evidence obtained from the literature review which is finally used to develop net impact \r\n(positive or negative) scores (see Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1 and Supplementary Material)."


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"Among the adaptation actions, ecosystem-based actions have the strongest net positive links with SDG 5 targets (Table Cross-Chapter \r\nBox GENDER.1, Table SMCCB GENDER.1). In the health, well-being and changing communities' sector, this is with robust evidence and \r\nmedium agreement, while in all other sectors there is medium evidence and low agreement. Net negative links are most prominent in \r\ninstitutional adaptation actions (Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1). For example, in mountain ecosystems, changes in gender roles \r\nin response to climatic and socioeconomic stressors is not supported by institutional practices, mechanisms and policies that remain \r\npatriarchal (Goodrich et al., 2019). Additionally, women often have less access to credit for climate change adaptation practices, including \r\npost-disaster relief, for example, to deal with salinisation of water or flooding impacts (Hossain and Zaman 2018)"


id: a83aaea0b0bfaa3c981b7b5269ffef08
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" Lack of coordination \r\namong different city authorities can also limit women's contribution in informal settlements towards adaptation. Women are typically \r\nunder-represented in decision making on home construction and planning and home-design decisions in informal settlements, but \r\nexamples from Bangladesh show they play a significant role in adopting climate-resilient measures (e.g., the use of corrugated metal \r\nroofs and partitions which is important in protection from heat) (Jabeen, 2014; Jabeen and Guy, 2015; Araos et al., 2017; Susan Solomon \r\net al., 2021)."


id: f86a1f23dcfac22cb1072a28e05a832c
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"The climate change adaptation and gender literature call for research and adaptation interventions that are 'gender-sensitive' (Jost et al., \r\n2016; Thompson-Hall et al., 2016; Kristjanson et al., 2017; Pearce et al., 2018a) and 'gender-responsive', as established in Article 7 of the \r\nParis Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). In addition, attention is drawn to the importance of 'mainstreaming' gender in climate/development \r\npolicy (Alston, 2014; Rochette, 2016; Mcleod et al., 2018; Westholm and Arora-Jonsson, 2018). Many calls have been made to consider \r\ngender in policy and practice (Ford et al., 2015; Jost et al., 2016; Rochette, 2016; Thompson-Hall et al., 2016; Kristjanson et al., 2017; \r\nMcleod et al., 2018; Lau et al., 2021; Singh et al., 2021b)"


id: 44269f52b95b8259836ee50727d200bc
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" Rather than merely emphasising the inclusion of women in patriarchal systems, \r\ntransforming systems that perpetuate inequality can help to address broader structural inequalities not only in relation to gender, but \r\nalso other dimensions such as race and ethnicity (Djoudi et  al., 2016; Pearse, 2017; Gay-Antaki, 2020). Adaptation researchers and \r\npractitioners play a critical role here and can enable gender-transformative processes by creating new, deliberative spaces that foster \r\ninclusive decision making and opportunities for renegotiating inequitable power relations (Tschakert et al., 2016; Ziervogel, 2019; Garcia \r\net al., 2020)."


id: 896edc5b0a115374ed5908dafc92ac7e
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"To date, empirical evidence on such transformational change is sparse, although there is some evidence of incremental change (e.g., \r\nincreasing women's participation in specific adaptation projects, mainstreaming gender in national climate policies). Even when national \r\npolicies attempt to be more gendered, there is criticism that they use gender-neutral language or include gender analysis without \r\nproposing how to alter differential vulnerability (Mersha and van Laerhoven, 2019; Singh et al., 2021b). More importantly, the mere \r\ninclusion of women and men in planning does not necessarily translate to substantial gender-transformative action, for example in \r\nNational Adaptation Programmes of Action across sub-Saharan Africa (Holvoet and Inberg, 2014; Nyasimi et al., 2018) and national and \r\nsub-national climate action plans in India (Singh et al., 2021b)"


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" Importantly, there is often an overemphasis on the gender binary (and \r\nhousehold headship as an entry point), which masks complex ways in which marginalisation and oppression can be augmented due to \r\nthe interaction of gender with other social factors and intra-household dynamics (Djoudi et al., 2016; Thompson-Hall et al., 2016; Rao \r\net al., 2019a; Lau et al., 2021; Singh et al., 2021b)."


id: b888d5c3e219b2ce71d54ba48e397148
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"Climate justice and gender transformative adaptation can provide multiple beneficial impacts that align with sustainable development. \r\nAddressing poverty (SDG 1), energy poverty (SDG 7), WaSH (SDG 6), health (SDG 3), education (SDG 4) and hunger (SDG 2)--along with \r\ninequalities (SDG 5 and SDG 10)--improves resilience to climate impacts for those groups that are disproportionately affected (women, \r\nlow-income and marginalised groups). Inclusive and fair decision making can enhance resilience (SDG 16; Section 13.4.4), although \r\nadaptation measures may also lead to resource conflicts (SDG 16; Section 13.7). Nature-based solutions attentive to gender equity also \r\nsupport ecosystem health (SDGs 14 and 15) (Dzebo et al., 2019)"


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" Gender and climate justice will be achieved when the root causes of \r\nglobal and structural issues are addressed, challenging unethical and unacceptable use of power for the benefit of the powerful and \r\nelites (MacGregor, 2014; Wijsman and Feagan, 2019; Vander Stichele, 2020). Justice and equality need to be at the centre of climate \r\nadaptation decision-making processes. A transformative pathway needs to include the voice of the disenfranchised (MacGregor, 2020; \r\nSchipper et al., 2020a)."


id: a90dae596caaec7aec16d2c671378131
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"A third theme is that of innovation, generally, and sustainability-oriented \r\ninnovation, specifically (de Vries et al., 2016; Geradts and Bocken, 2019; \r\nLoorbach et  al., 2020), which creates opportunities for overcoming \r\nexisting transition barriers (very high confidence). For example, Valta \r\n(2020) describes the role of innovation ecosystems--partnerships \r\namong companies, investors, governments and academics--in \r\naccelerating innovation (see also World Economic Forum, 2019). Burch \r\net al. (Burch et al., 2016) describe the role of small- and medium-sized \r\nbusiness entrepreneurship in promoting rapid innovation. Innovation \r\nextends beyond pure technology considerations to consider innovation \r\nin practices and social organisation (Li et  al., 2018; Psaltoglou and \r\nCalle, 2018; Repo and Matschoss, 2020)"


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" Zivkovic (2018), for example, \r\ndiscusses 'innovation labs' as accelerators for addressing so-called \r\nwicked problems such as climate change through multi-stakeholder \r\ngroups. Meanwhile, Chaminade and Randelli (2020) describe a case \r\nstudy where structural preconditions and place-based agency were \r\nimportant drivers of transitions to organic viticulture in Tuscany, Italy."


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"The formal space for national, sub-national and international \r\nadaptation governance emerged at COP 16 (UNFCCC, 2010) when \r\nadaptation was recognised as a similar level of priority as GHG \r\nmitigation. The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) built on this and the \r\n2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (United Nations, 2015) to link \r\nadaptation to development and climate justice. It also highlighted the \r\nimportance of multi-level adaptation governance, including new non\u0002state voices and climate actors that widen the scope of adaptation \r\ngovernance beyond formal government institutions. For example, \r\nindividuals can act as agents of changes in their own behaviour, such \r\nas via change in their consumption patterns, but also generate change \r\nwithin organisations, fields of practice and the political landscape \r\nof governance"


id: 14d24040854b0e03b380dccb6fcd685
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" Accordingly, these interactions among actors across \r\ndifferent scales implies the need for wider modes of, and arena for, \r\nengagement around adaptation to accommodate a diversity of \r\nperspectives (high agreement, medium evidence) (Chung Tiam Fook, \r\n2017; Lesnikowski et al., 2017; IPCC, 2018a)."


id: 4890bf518799a515bf3b4531296e38d1
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"The fourth theme is that of transition management (Goddard and \r\nFarrelly, 2018), particularly vis-a-vis, disruptive technologies (Inigo and \r\nAlbareda, 2016; Kuokkanen et al., 2019) or broader societal disruptions \r\n(Brundiers, 2020; Davidsson, 2020; Hepburn et  al., 2020; Schipper \r\net al., 2020b). Recent literature has given attention to how actors can \r\nuse disruptive events, such as disasters, as a window of opportunity \r\nfor accelerating changes in policies, practices and behaviours (high \r\nagreement, medium evidence) (Brundiers, 2018; Brundiers and Eakin, \r\n2018). This is consistent with concepts in resilience thinking around \r\n'building back better' after disasters (Fernandez and Ahmed, 2019). \r\nFor example, Hepburn et  al"


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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" discuss fiscal recovery packages for \r\nCOVID-19 as a means of accelerating climate action, with a particular \r\ninfluence on clean physical infrastructure, building efficiency retrofits, \r\ninvestment in education and training, natural capital investment, and \r\nclean research and development (Andrijevic et al., 2020b)."


id: 2a2a8ca1d3610ff987d1dc2a2d9d250b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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"As reflected in the discussion of societal transitions (Section  18.3), \r\npeople and their values and choices play an instrumental role in CRD. \r\nThe agency of people to act on CRD is grounded in their worldviews, \r\nbeliefs, values and consciousness (Woiwode, 2020), and is shaped \r\nthrough social and political processes including how policies and \r\ndecision making recognise the voices, knowledges and rights of \r\nparticular actors over others (very high confidence) (Harris and \r\nClarke, 2017; Nightingale, 2017; Bond and Barth, 2020; Muok et al., \r\n2021). Since the AR5, evidence on diverse forms of engagement by \r\nand among social, political and economic actors to support CRD and \r\nsustainability outcomes, has increased"


id: 9b521913464e510b1d33a2b0056683e8
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" New forms of decision making \r\nand engagement are emerging within the formal policymaking \r\nand planning sphere, including co-production of knowledge, \r\ninterventions grounded in the arts and humanities, civil participation \r\nand partnerships with business (Ziervogel et  al., 2016a; Roberts \r\net  al., 2020). In addition, the set of actors that drive climate and \r\ndevelopment actions are recognised to extend beyond government \r\nand formal policy actors to include civil society, education, industry, \r\nmedia, science and art (Ojwang et  al., 2017; Solecki et  al., 2018; "


id: 81146fcbd2d42afe137b69c953fafb62
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"and societal choices made by multiple actors from government, the \r\nprivate sector and civil society, with important influences by science \r\nand the media (very high confidence). These actions and social choices \r\nare determined by the available solution space and options, along \r\nwith a range of enabling conditions (Section 18.4.2) that are largely \r\nbounded by individual and collective worldviews, and related ethics \r\nand values. This view is consistent with sustainable development being \r\na process constituted by multiple inter-related societal choices and \r\nactions that are often contested as the needs and interests of current \r\nand future generations are addressed. Development choices have \r\npath dependencies and context-sensitive synergies and trade-offs \r\nwith natural and embedded human systems, and they are bounded by \r\nmultiple and contested knowledges and worldviews (Goldman et al., \r\n2018; Heinrichs, 2020; Nightingale et al., 2020; Schipper et al., 2020b)"


id: 686087ea006d5d04ce1eeefa18ffb768
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" \r\nConsequently, societal choices about the political economy underpin \r\nprospects for moving towards or away from CRD."


id: a9be87a87fbf0c821ed43251318f624f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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"Second, assessment of this literature suggests four attributes of the \r\npolitical economy of adaptation influence development trajectories \r\nin diverse settings, from Australia to Honduras and the Maldives \r\n(Sovacool et al., 2015), as delivered through the Global Environment \r\nFacility's Least Developed Countries Fund (Sovacool et al., 2017). These \r\ninclude enclosure (public resources or authority captured by private \r\ninterests); exclusion (stakeholders are marginalised from decision \r\nmaking); encroachment (natural systems and ecosystem services \r\ncompromised); and entrenchment (inequality exacerbated). These \r\nattributes hamper adaptation efforts, and reveal the political nature \r\nof adaptation (Dolsak and Prakash, 2018) and, by extension, CRD"


id: 17c2b4f3cf6c7aa13f09ce3bf5756b63
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" \r\nParadoxically, development initiatives labelled as 'risk' reduction or \r\nresilience building or 'equitable and environmentally sustainable', \r\nsuch as coastal restoration efforts in Louisiana, USA, can compound \r\ninequity and climate risk, and perpetuate unsustainable development \r\n(Gotham, 2016; Eriksen et al., 2021b)."


id: 3c68fd11d87cb0b7a474eeee51e8e76d
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"An overarching enabling condition for achieving system transitions and \r\ntransformations is the presence of enabling governance systems (very \r\nhigh confidence). Recent literature on the translation of governance \r\ninto system transitions in practice suggests four key actions are \r\nimportant. The first is the critical reflection on so-called 'development \r\nsolutions', alternatively framed by some as 'empty promises', \r\nthat worsen climate risk, inequity, injustice and ultimately lead to \r\nunsustainable development (Mikulewicz, 2018; Mikulewicz and Taylor, \r\n2020). Examples include development aid (Scoville-Simonds et  al., \r\n2020), large-scale development projects such as biofuel production in \r\nEthiopia (Tufa et al., 2018) and urban growth management in Vietnam \r\n(DiGregorio, 2015)"


id: 11e22caee92f765bc4bd17e4ff6424cc
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" The second is the recognition that while the power of \r\ndifferent actors and institutions is often tied to access to resources and \r\nthe ability to constrain the actions of others, other dimensions of power \r\nsuch as its ability to produce knowledge as well as its contingency on \r\ncircumstances and relationships are also important in enabling energy \r\ntransitions (Avelino et al., 2016; Avelino and Wittmayer, 2016; Lockwood \r\net  al., 2016; Ahlborg, 2017; Avelino and Grin, 2017; Partzsch, 2017; \r\nSmith and Stirling, 2018). Third, governance systems can help to develop \r\nproductive interactions between formal government institutions, the \r\nprivate sector and civil society including the provision 'safe arenas' for \r\nsocial actors to deliberate and pursue transitional and transformational \r\nchange (Haukkala, 2018; Tornberg, 2018; Strazds; Ferragina et al., 2020; \r\nKoch, 2020) (Section 18.3.1, Box 18.1)"


id: 7f582e86202b5edfa9bfb20e05f33680
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"System transitions towards CRD is contingent on reducing the costs \r\nof current climate variability on society while making investments that \r\nprepare for the future effects of climate change. Climate change and \r\nresponses to climate change will affect many different economic sectors \r\nboth directly and indirectly (Stern, 2007; IPCC, 2014a; Hilmi et al., 2017). \r\nAs a consequence, the characteristics of economic systems will play an \r\nimportant role in determining their resilience (very high confidence). \r\nThese effects will occur within the context of other developments, \r\nsuch as a growing world population, which increases environmental \r\npressures and pollution. This impact is higher for developing countries \r\nthan for high-income countries (Liobikiene and Butkus, 2018). While \r\nlooking for sustainable climate-resilient policies, many complex and \r\ninterconnected systems, including economic development, must be \r\nconsidered in the face of global-scale changes (Hilmi and Safa, 2010)"


id: 961274625852a53e46a09f158a21dae6
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"One output from systems of governance is formal policy frameworks and \r\npolicies that influence processes and outcomes of system transitions \r\nthat support CRD (Section 18.1.3). The Paris Agreement, for example, \r\nprovides a framework for CRD by defining a mitigation-centric goal \r\nof 'limiting warming to well below 2degC and enabling a transition to \r\n1.5degC' (UNFCCC, 2015). It also provides for a broadly defined global \r\nadaptation goal (UNFCCC, 2015: Art. 7.1). The NDCs are the core \r\nmechanism for achieving and enhancing climate ambitions under the \r\nParis Agreement. However, the pursuit of a given NDC within a specific \r\ncountry will likely necessitate a range of other policy interventions \r\nthat have more immediate impact on technologies and behaviour, \r\nimplicating transitions in energy, industry, land and infrastructure \r\n(very high confidence) (Section  18.3.1)"


id: 8f25091c2012342b4d49fc28a0d78e91
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" SDG-relevant activities are \r\nincreasingly incorporated into climate commitments in the NDCs (at \r\nlast count 94 NDCs also addressed SDGs), contributing to several (154 \r\nout of the 169) SDG targets (Brandi and Dzebo; Pauw et al., 2018). \r\nThis reflects the potential of the NDCs as near-term policy instruments \r\nand signposts for progress towards CRD (medium agreement, limited \r\nevidence) (McCollum et al., 2018b)."


id: 7e3add14fed7aed16dc17623361da64
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content:
"Miller (2017) discusses some of the planning for, and application \r\nof, adaptation measures that improve sustainability, noting the \r\nimportance of considering a range of factors including complexities \r\nof interconnected systems, the inherent uncertainties associated with \r\nprojections of climate change impacts and the effects of global-scale \r\nchanges such as technological and economic development for decision \r\nmakers. For example, addressing climate impacts in isolation is unlikely \r\nto achieve equitable, efficient or effective adaptation outcomes (very \r\nhigh confidence)"


id: a7fd3583af318731d4b0c42bb0b5b6dd
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content:
" Instead, integrating climate resilience into growth \r\nand development planning allows decision makers to identify what \r\nsustainable development policies can support climate-resilient growth \r\nand poverty reduction and understand better how patterns and trends \r\nof economic development affect vulnerability and exposure to climate \r\nimpacts across sectors and populations, including distributional \r\neffects (Doczi, 2015). Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi (2019) highlighted \r\nthat climate change mitigation policy can influence inequality both \r\npositively and negatively. Although higher levels of poverty, corruption, \r\nand economic and social inequalities can increase the risk of negative \r\noutcomes, these potential negative effects would be mitigated if \r\ninequality impacts were taken into consideration in all stages of policy \r\nmaking (very high confidence)."


id: 432dd6a911fd42f241511da8ade09923
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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"As reflected by the SDGs (and SDG 13 specifically), the mainstreaming \r\nof climate change concerns into development policies is one mechanism \r\nfor pursuing sustainable development and CRD (very high confidence). \r\nHowever, such mainstreaming has also been critiqued for perpetuating \r\n'development as usual', reinforcing established development logics, \r\nstructures and worldviews that are themselves contributing to climate \r\nchange and vulnerability (O'Brien et al., 2015) and for obscuring and \r\ndepoliticising adaptation choices into technocratic choices (Murtinho, \r\n2016; Webber and Donner, 2017; Benjaminsen and Kaarhus, 2018; Khatri, \r\n2018; Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020). The coordinated implementation \r\nof sustainable development policy and climate action is nonetheless \r\ncrucial for ensuring that the attainment of one does not come at the \r\nexpense of others (Stafford-Smith et al., 2017)"


id: bee7feafddf7da0bd0bd53a2ec0013e9
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" For example, aggressive \r\npursuit of climate policies that facilitate transitions in energy systems \r\ncan undermine efforts to secure sustainability transitions in other \r\nsystems (Sections 18.3.1.1, 18.2.5.3, Table 18.7)."


id: 85da8ab9c2e3ea2ac2b42c61819e7143
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"The primary objective of economic and financial incentives around \r\ncarbon emissions is to redirect investment from high to low carbon \r\ntechnologies (Komendantova et  al., 2016). Recent years have seen \r\npolicy interventions to incentivise transitions in energy, land and \r\nindustrial systems to address climate change and sustainability \r\nfocus on price-based, as opposed to quantity based, interventions. \r\nPrice-based interventions aim at leveraging market mechanisms to \r\nachieve greater efficiency in the allocation of resources and costs \r\nof mitigating climate change. For example, carbon pricing initiatives \r\naround the world today cover approximately 8 gigatons of carbon \r\ndioxide emissions, equivalent to about 20% of global fossil energy \r\nfuel emissions and 15% of total carbon dioxide GHG emissions (Boyce, \r\n2018)"


id: dceda05d8e341a671e737c45f73fba62
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content:
" Meanwhile, environmental taxes and green public procurement \r\npush producers to eliminate the negative environmental effects \r\nof production (Danilina and Trionfetti, 2019). There are several \r\nadvantages for environmental taxation including environmental "


id: 51866ec44ab343d39865adead1c27c84
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content:
"Policies encouraging eco-innovation, defined as 'new ideas, behaviour, \r\nproducts, and processes that contribute to a decreased environmental \r\nburden' (Yurdakul and Kazan, 2020), can positively affect economic \r\ncompetitiveness. By implementing policies to encourage eco\u0002innovation, countries enhance their energy efficiency. These gains can \r\nprovide more resource-efficient production technologies and positively \r\naffect economic competitiveness (very high confidence) (Costantini \r\net al., 2018; Liobikiene and Butkus, 2018). Other than eco-innovation, \r\nit is important to also consider exnovation, meaning the phasing out \r\nof old technologies, as otherwise the expansion of supply could lead \r\nto a rebound owing to cheaper prices for carbon-based products (Arne \r\nHeyen et  al., 2017; David, 2017). Hence, decarbonisation strategies \r\nthat set limits to carbon-based trajectories can be beneficial"


id: dd664487987869f13416db2ddb9075bb
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" Quantity\u0002based interventions--or so-called 'command-and-control' policies--\r\ninvolve constraints on the quantity of energy consumption or GHG \r\nemissions through laws, regulations, standards and enforcement, with \r\na focus on effectiveness rather than efficiency."


id: 45210edd77657cb063c8813dcb72ec4e
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"Despite the expansion of green mandates across the investment chain, \r\ndefinitions of some of the asset classes associated with green investing \r\nare ambiguous and poorly defined. The EU taxonomy for sustainable \r\nactivities is a promising step in the right direction. For example, a \r\n'green' label for bonds is often stretched to encompass financing \r\nfacilities of issuers that misrepresent the actual environmental \r\nfootprint of their operations (the so-called risk of 'greenwashing'). \r\nEven in cases where the bonds' proceeds are actually used to finance \r\ngreen projects, investors often remain exposed to both the green and \r\n'brown' assets of the issuers (Gianfrate and Peri, 2019; Flammer, 2020)"


id: b496a7e3c64e2aeb5df582d00df09d92
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" \r\nThe heterogeneity of metrics and rating methodologies (along with \r\ninherent conflict of interests between issuers, investors and score/\r\nrating providers) results in inconsistent and unreliable quantification \r\nof the actual environmental footprint of corporate and sovereign \r\nissuers (Battiston et al., 2017; Busch et al.)."


id: 8447a6271dbbb5b991fbcf2e8bf2e963
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content:
"Achieving progress on system transitions will be contingent on the \r\nability of actors and institutions to access the financing they need to \r\ninvest in innovation, adaptation and mitigation, and broader system \r\nchange (very high confidence). By greening their investment portfolios, \r\ninvestors can support reduction in vulnerability to the consequences \r\nof climate change and the reduction of GHG emissions. Finance can \r\ncontribute to the reduction of GHG emissions, for example, by efficiently \r\npricing the social cost of carbon, by reflecting the transition risks in \r\nthe valuation of financial assets, and by channelling investments in \r\nlow-carbon technologies (OECD, 2017). At the same time, there is a \r\ngrowing need to spur greater public and private capital into climate \r\nadaptation and resilience including climate-resilient infrastructure \r\nand nature-based solutions to climate change"


id: 2024c8e94a7de6fbf8522df4b60a9fe7
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content:
" For instance, the Green \r\nClimate Fund, established within the framework of the UNFCCC, is \r\nassisting developing countries in adaptation and mitigation initiatives \r\nto counter climate change."


id: b456a66546227a14c28c3e6c07a52cb8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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vector_id: 25889
content:
"In order to promote financial climate-related disclosures for companies \r\nand financial intermediaries, the financial system could play a key \r\nrole in pricing carbon and in allocating capital towards low-carbon \r\nemission companies (Aldy and Gianfrate, 2019; Bento and Gianfrate, \r\n2020; Aldy et al., 2021). Stable and predictable carbon-pricing regimes \r\nwould significantly contribute to fostering financial innovation \r\nthat can help further accelerate the decarbonisation of the global \r\neconomy, even in jurisdictions which are more lenient in implementing \r\nclimate mitigation actions (very high confidence) (Baranzini et  al., \r\n2017). A growing number of financial regulators are intensifying \r\nefforts to enhance climate-related disclosure of financial actors. \r\nIn particular, the Financial Stability Board created the Task Force on \r\nClimate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) to improve and increase \r\nreporting of climate-related financial information"


id: f7909aa86aa19b9c9a530965b6064f37
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
" Several countries \r\nare considering implementing mandatory climate risk disclosure in \r\nline with TCFD's recommendations. Central Banks are also considering \r\nmandatory disclosure and climate stress testing for banks. For instance, \r\nin November 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) published a guide \r\non climate-related and environmental risks explaining how the ECB \r\nexpects banks to prudently manage and transparently disclose such "


id: 5f0f206b2f377d7d19fb390a63cd1177
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
"Ongoing innovations in technology, finance and policy have enabled \r\nmore ambitious climate action over the past decade, including \r\nsignificant growth in renewable energy, electrical vehicles and energy \r\nefficiency. However, access to, and the benefits of, that innovation have \r\nnot been evenly distributed among global regions and communities, \r\nand continued innovation is needed to facilitate climate action and \r\nsustainable development (very high confidence). Policymakers need \r\nuseful science and information (Cornell et al., 2013; Kirchhoff et al., \r\n2013; Calkins, 2015; IPCC, 2019 f; Guido et al., 2020) to make informed \r\ndecisions about possible risks, and the benefits, costs and trade-offs \r\nof available adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development \r\nsolutions (i.e., Article 4.1 of the Paris Agreement; UNFCCC, 2015)"


id: 74b54ee735637188e8770e61ba2b52ec
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
" \r\nMoreover, recent literature has emphasised the need for deep \r\ntechnological, as well social, changes to avert the risks of conventional \r\ndevelopment trajectories (Gerst et al., 2013; IPCC, 2014a)."


id: 78248f750c1b622fab52dbc957d6f7ae
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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vector_id: 16470
content:
"Institutional capacity for system transitions refers to the capacity \r\nof structures and processes, rules, norms and cultures to shape \r\ndevelopment expectations and actions aimed at durable improvements \r\nin human well-being. The AR5 highlighted the need for strong \r\ninstitutions to create enabling environments for adaptation and GHG \r\nmitigation action (Denton et al., 2014). Institutions stand within the \r\nsocial and political practices and broader systems of governance \r\nthat ultimately drive adaptation and development processes and \r\noutcomes. They are thus produced by them and can become tools by \r\nwhich some actors constrain the actions of others (Gebreyes, 2018). As \r\na consequence, they and can become a significant barrier to change, \r\nwhether incremental or more transformational (very high confidence)"


id: ff5e59a7199be19fd565f7fbd590bf72
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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content:
" \r\nThe post-AR5 focus on transformational adaptation and resilience \r\npresent in the literature suggests that institutions that enable system \r\ntransitions towards CRD are secure enough to facilitate a wide range \r\nof voices, and legitimate enough to change goals or processes over \r\ntime, without reducing confidence in their efficacy."


id: 1bb04716d619c102b05ed5d8016a3e93
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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vector_id: 1816
content:
"An effective and innovative technological regime is one that is \r\nintegrated with local social entities across different modes of life, local \r\ngovernance processes (Pereira, 2018; Nightingale et  al., 2020) and \r\nlocal knowledge(s), which increasingly support adaptation to socio\u0002environmental drivers of vulnerability (Schipper et al., 2014; Nalau et al., \r\n2018; IPCC, 2019 f). These actors and their knowledge are often ignored \r\nin favour of knowledge held by experts and policymakers, exacerbating \r\nuneven power relations (Naess, 2013; Nightingale et  al., 2020). For \r\nexample, achieving sustainability and shifting towards a low carbon \r\nenergy system (e.g., hydropower dams, wind farms) remains a contested \r\nspace with divergent interests, values and future prospects (Bradley and \r\nHedren, 2014; Avila, 2018; Mikulewicz, 2019), and potential impacts \r\non human rights as embodied by the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, \r\n2015)"


id: 1bf460d1566eba50bfac5828b21f84d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1861
content:
" A number of studies have emphasised the limits of relying upon \r\ntechnology innovation and deployment (e.g., expansion of renewable \r\nenergy systems and/or carbon capture) as a solution to challenges of \r\nclimate change and sustainable development (Section 18.3.1.2). This is \r\nbecause such solutions may fail to consider the local historical contexts \r\nand barriers to participation of vulnerable communities, restricting their \r\naccess to land, food, energy and resources for their livelihoods."


id: 1588f3f2721b87a77e66e7daef3c7afa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:38
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 904
content:
"The limited literature on institutions and pathways relevant to system \r\ntransitions and CRD suggests that institutions are most effective when \r\ntaking a development-first approach to adaptation. This is consistent \r\nwith the principles of CRD which emphasise not simply reducing \r\nclimate risk, but rather making development processes resilient to \r\nthe changing climate. There is agreement in this literature that such \r\nan approach allows for the effective integration of climate challenges \r\ninto existing policy and planning processes (very high confidence) \r\n(Pervin et  al., 2013; Kim et  al., 2017b; Mogelgaard et  al., 2018). \r\nHowever, this approach generally rests on an incremental framing of \r\ninstitutional change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009) based on two critical \r\nassumptions"


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" The first is that existing processes and institutions are \r\ncapable of bringing about system transitions that generate desired \r\ndevelopment outcomes and thus can be considered appropriate \r\nvehicles for the achievement of CRD. A large critical literature questions \r\nthe efficacy of formal state and multilateral institutions. The evidence \r\nfor the ability of local, informal institutions to achieve development \r\ngoals remains uneven, with robust evidence of positive impacts on \r\npublic service delivery, but more ambiguous evidence on behaviour \r\nchanges associated with strengthened institutions (Berkhout et  al., \r\n2018). The second is that the mainstreaming of adaptation will bring \r\nabout changes to currently unsustainable development practices and \r\npathways, instead of merely strengthening development as usual by \r\nsubsuming adaptation to existing development pathways and allowing \r\nthem to endure in the face of growing stresses (Eriksen et al"


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", 2015; \r\nGodfrey-Wood and Otto Naess, 2016; Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020). \r\nThere is evidence that countries with poor governance have limited \r\nadaptation planning or action at the national level, even when other "


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"Active Ownership. Equity investors can exercise the voting rights at shareholders' meetings in relation to governance and business \r\nstrategy, including the environmental performance. In addition, institutional investors engage with the management and the boards \r\nof directors of investee companies. Active ownership is therefore defined as the full exercise of the rights that accrue to the 'owners' \r\nof the securities issued by companies (Dimson et al., 2015; Dimson et al., 2020). Active owners are entitled to question and challenge \r\nthe robustness of financial analyses and the risk assessment behind strategic decisions including the environmental footprint ones. For \r\ninstance, since fossil fuel businesses face the prospect of dramatic business decline (Ansar et al., 2013) and must revisit their business \r\nmodel to survive, active ownership by institutional investors may foster the transition to cleaner production and supply chain"


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" Companies \r\nmore exposed to carbon risks particularly need the active support of long-term shareholders. In turn, investors adopting an active \r\nownership approach can manage their holdings' exposure to climate change risks, thus protecting the value of their investments on a \r\nlong-term horizon (Krueger et al., 2019)."


id: a77b3ce28f903b683c8d1ae11d7f833c
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"in climate and related parameters can be identified and linked with \r\nadverse impacts on human populations, infrastructure and other \r\nsystems (Naylor et al., 2020). An 'impacts' approach is one in which \r\nresilience is measured in terms of actual or avoided impacts and is \r\nsuited for tracking adaptation success in delivering CRD over longer \r\ntimescales, for example at the national level (Brooks et  al., 2014). \r\nFinally, a 'systems' approach is one where resilience is described in \r\nterms of the characteristics of a system using quantitative or qualitative \r\nindicators which are often associated with different 'dimensions' of \r\nresilience (Serfilippi and Ramnath, 2018; Saja et al., 2019). This allows \r\nmeasurement of key indicators that are proxies for resilience at regular \r\nintervals, even in the absence of significant climate hazards and \r\nassociated disruptions (very high confidence) (Brooks et al., 2014) (see \r\nalso Cross-Chapter Box ADAPT in Chapter 1)"


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" Similar criteria could be \r\napplied to evaluating adaptation options and their implementation as \r\nwell as various interventions in pursuit of SDGs."


id: a542e69e84f990ed045612d581c04a74
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"There are many other visible and less visible arenas of engagement \r\nin the other interconnected spheres of societal interaction spanning \r\nscales from the local to international level. The metaphor of arenas \r\nderives from diverse social and political theory, with applications \r\nin studies of, among other things, governance transformation and \r\ntransitions (Healey, 2006; Jorgensen, 2012; Jorgensen et  al., 2017). \r\nIt underscores that these arenas can be enduring or temporary in \r\nnature, are historically situated and often spatially bounded, and \r\nsignifies the many different mechanisms by which societal actors \r\ninteract in dynamic and emergent ways. Power and politics impact \r\naccess and influence in these arenas of engagement--with varying \r\nlevels of inclusion and exclusion shaping the nature and trajectory of \r\ndevelopment"


id: 7f6335d7d476022669e5ed28dac5e843
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" In practice, some arenas of engagement are 'struggle \r\narenas' as different societal actors strive to influence the trajectory of \r\ndevelopment, with inevitable winners and losers."


id: 6605246e6bcbdebe6d484ee24570b28e
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"Much of the enabling conditions for system transitions discussed \r\nin Section 18.4.2 are inherently linked to actors and their agency in \r\npursuing system change. Yet a significant literature has developed \r\nsince the AR5, exploring not only the role of different actors in pursuing \r\nadaptation, mitigation and sustainable development options, but also \r\nhow those actors interact with one another to drive outcomes. CRDPs are \r\ndetermined by the interactions between societal actors and networks, \r\nincluding government, civil society and the private sector, as well as \r\nscience and the media. The resultant social choices and cumulative \r\nprivate and public actions (and inactions) are institutionalised through \r\nboth formal and informal institutions that evolve over time and seek to \r\nprovide societal stability in the face of change"


id: 9f0390a412b4395f776a5b4ac6a79f92
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" The degree to which the \r\nemergent pathways foster just and CRD depends on how contending \r\nsocietal interests, values and worldviews are reconciled through these \r\ninteractions. These interactions occur in many different arenas of \r\nengagement, that is, the settings, places and spaces in which societal \r\nactors interact to influence the nature and course of development, \r\nincluding political, economic, socio-cultural, ecological, knowledge-\r\ntechnology and community arenas (Figures 18.1, 18.2)."


id: 476b4ac806552bdce828cfd5bd17dd8f
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"For example, political arenas range from formalised election and voting \r\nprocedures to more informal and less transparent practices, such as \r\nspecial interest lobbying. Town squares and streets can become sites \r\nof political struggle and dissent, including protests against climate \r\ninaction. As a more specific case in point, the formal space for national, \r\nsub-national and international adaptation governance emerged at \r\nCOP 16 (UNFCCC, 2010) when adaptation was recognised as having \r\na similar level of priority as mitigation. The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, \r\n2015) built on this and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda \r\n(United Nations, 2015) to link adaptation to development and climate \r\njustice, widening the scope of adaptation governance beyond formal \r\ngovernment institutions. It also highlighted the importance of multi\u0002level adaptation governance, including non-state voices from civil \r\nsociety and the private sector"


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" This implied the need for wider arenas \r\nand modes of engagement around adaptation (Chung Tiam Fook, 2017; \r\nLesnikowski et al., 2017; IPCC, 2018a) that facilitate coordination and \r\nconvergence among these diverse actors including individual citizens "


id: 1682b71edb24ddf71531e34046e85894
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"To address these difficult contests, worldviews regarding climate and \r\nglobal environmental change are often expressed in scientific language \r\nand themes (Parsons et al., 2016; Goldman et al., 2018). This can exclude \r\nother worldviews grounded in other forms of knowledge or ways of \r\nknowing which ultimately narrows understanding of climate change \r\nand the solution space. Hence, the post-AR5 literature on worldviews \r\nfocuses on the numerous meanings, associations, narratives and \r\nframes of climate change and how these shape perceptions, attitudes \r\nand values (Morton, 2013; Boulton, 2016; Hulme, 2018; Nightingale \r\nBohler, 2019). The recognition of the diversity of interpretations and \r\nmeanings has led to multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary research \r\nthat incorporates the humanities and the arts (Murphy, 2011; Elliott \r\nand Cullis, 2017; Steelman et al., 2019; Tauginiene et al., 2020), feminist \r\nstudies (MacGregor, 2003; Demeritt et al"


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", 2011; Bell, 2013; Brink and \r\nWamsler, 2019; Plesa, 2019) and religious studies (Sachdeva, 2016; \r\nMcPhetres and Zuckerman, 2018) to examine diverse understandings \r\nof reality and knowledge possibilities around climate change. In \r\naddition, literature on cultural cognition, epistemological plurality and \r\nrelational ontologies draws on non-Western worldviews and forms of \r\nknowledge (Goldman et al., 2018)); ."


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"In addition to the 'arm's length' acts of voting, social mobilisation, \r\nprotest and dissent can be critical catalysts for transformative change \r\n(Porta, 2020). These are competitions for recognition, power and \r\nauthority (Nightingale, 2017) that take place in settings. This is evidenced \r\nby experiences from the energy sector in Bangladesh which became \r\na contested national policy domain and where social movements \r\neventually transformed the nation's energy politics (Faruque, 2017). \r\nSimilarly, in Germany, the nation's energy transition led to marked \r\nchanges in agency and legal frameworks, and energy markets drove \r\nthe proliferation of so-called municipalisations of energy systems--a \r\nreversal of years of system privatisation (Becker et  al., 2016)"


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" \r\nMeanwhile, experience in Bolivia demonstrate that the transformative \r\npotential of political conflict depends on transcending narrow issues \r\nto form broad coalitions with a collective identity that challenge \r\nprevailing development objectives and trajectories (Andreucci, 2019). \r\nSuch examples illustrate the power of the communities as a vanguard \r\nagainst environmentally destructive practices (Villamayor-Tomas \r\nand Garcia-Lopez, 2018). Social movements have been successful at \r\ncountering fossil fuel extraction (Piggot, 2018) and open up political \r\nopportunities in the face of increasing efforts to capture natural \r\nresources (Tramel, 2018) and are bolstered by resistance from within \r\nsome corporations and/or their shareholders (Fougere and Bond, 2016; \r\nSwaffield, 2017; Walton, 2018a; Walton, 2018b)."


id: 3129523203b3208e158b0e971cc78757
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"CRD is embedded in social systems, in the political economy and its \r\nunderlying ideologies, interests and institutions (Section  18.4.1). \r\nThe pursuit of CRD, and shifting development pathways away from \r\nprevailing trends, unfolds in an array of political arenas, from the \r\noffices of bureaucrats to parliament buildings, sidewalks and streets, \r\nto discursive arenas in which governance actors interact--from the \r\nvillage level to global forums (Jorgensen et al., 2017; Montoute et al., \r\n2019; Sorensen and Torfing, 2019; Pasquini, 2020). Paradoxically, the \r\npost-AR5 literature suggests that political arenas are often used to \r\nshut down efforts to explore the solution space for climate change \r\nand sustainable development (medium agreement, robust evidence) \r\n(e.g., Kenis and Mathijs, 2012; Kenis and Mathijs, 2014; Beveridge and \r\nKoch, 2016; Kenis and Lievens, 2016; Driver et  al., 2018; Meriluoto, \r\n2018; Swyngedouw, 2018; Mocca and Osborne, 2019)"


id: 5f18bcd41e92bbd0dd2ae87b812981fd
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"Indigenous knowledge refers to the understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies with long histories of interaction \r\nwith their natural surroundings (UNESCO, 2018; IPCC, 2019a). Local knowledge refers to the understandings and skills developed by \r\nindividuals and populations, specific to the places where they live (UNESCO, 2018; IPCC, 2019a). Indigenous knowledge and local \r\nknowledge are inherently valuable but have only recently begun to be appreciated and in western scientific assessment processes in their \r\nown right (Ford et al., 2016). In the past these often endangered ways of knowing have been suppressed or attacked (Mustonen, 2014). \r\nYet these knowledge systems represent a range of cultural practices, wisdom, traditions and ways of knowing the world that provide \r\naccurate and useful climate change information, observations and solutions (very high confidence) (Table Cross-Chapter Box INDIG.1)"


id: a3e2e215acadacd11c64eb690dfd21d1
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" \r\nRooted in their own contextual and relative embedded locations, some of these knowledges represent unbroken engagement with the \r\nearth, nature and weather for many tens of thousands of years, with an understanding of the ecosystem and climatic changes over \r\nlonger-term timescales that is held both as knowledge by Indigenous Peoples and local peoples, as well as in the archaeological record \r\n(Barnhardt and Angayuqaq, 2005; UNESCO, 2018)."


id: 4c388ece1c405d725f9010a9650be24b
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"Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge are crucial to address environmental impacts, such as climate change, where the uncertainty \r\nof outcome is high and a range of responses are required (Mackey and Claudie, 2015). However, working with this knowledge in an \r\nappropriate and ethically acceptable way can be challenging. For instance, questions of data 'validity' and the requirement to communicate \r\nsuch knowledge in the dominant language can lead to inaccurate portrayals of Indigenous knowledge as inferior to science. This may \r\noverlook the uniqueness of Indigenous knowledge and then lead to the overall devaluation of indigenous political economies, cultural \r\necologies, languages, educational systems and spiritual practices (Smith, 2013; Sillitoe, 2016; Naude, 2019; Barker and Pickerill, 2020)"


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" \r\nFurthermore, Indigenous knowledge is too often only sought superficially--focusing only on the 'what', rather than the 'how' of climate \r\nchange adaptation and/or seen through the lenses of 'romantic glorification' leaving little room for the knowledge to be expressed as \r\nauthored by the communities and knowledge holders themselves (Yunkaporta, 2019)."


id: 92e386e23dfd24295844d1d8a710c71c
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"Indigenous knowledge systems include not only the specific narratives and practices to make sense of the world, but also profound \r\nsources of ethics and wisdom. They are networks of actors and institutions that organise the production, transfer and use of knowledge \r\n(Lofmarck and Lidskog, 2017). There is a pluralism of forms of knowledge that emerge from oral traditions, local engagement with \r\nmultiple spaces, and Indigenous cultures (Peterson et al., 2018). Recognising such multiplicity of forms of knowledge has long been \r\nan important concern within sustainability science (Folke et  al., 2016). Less dominant forms of knowledge should not be put aside \r\nbecause they are not comparable or complementary with scientific knowledge (Brattland and Mustonen, 2018; Mustonen, 2018; Ford \r\net al., 2020; Ogar et al., 2020)"


id: e28b50f5d1f5b4f87fd5a8161b110774
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" Instead, Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge can shape how climate change risk is understood \r\nand experienced, the possibility of developing climate change solutions grounded in place-based experiences, and the development of \r\ngovernance systems that match the expectations of different Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge holders (very high confidence)."


id: bfb3d50c2e014df146d79588de80c69d
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"Different frameworks that enable the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge have emerged from efforts to utilise more than one knowledge \r\nsystem (robust evidence, high agreement). For example, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem \r\nServices (IPBES) has developed a 'nature's contribution to peoples' framework that provides a common conceptual vocabulary and \r\nstructural analysis (Diaz et al., 2015; Tengo et al., 2017; Diaz et al., 2018; Peterson et al., 2018). The IPBES approach complements other \r\nefforts to study areas of intersection between scientific and indigenous worldviews (Barnhardt and Angayuqaq, 2005; Huaman and \r\nSriraman, 2015) or 'boundaries' that illustrate 'blind spots' in scientific knowledge (Cash et al., 2003; Clark et al., 2016; Brattland and \r\nMustonen, 2018)"


id: 5e4272bbed2823408c4f47e8b41f1274
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" These frameworks highlight areas of collaboration but provide less guidance in areas where sources of evidence \r\nconflict across different knowledge systems (Lofmarck and Lidskog, 2017). These experiences suggest that the inclusion of Indigenous \r\nknowledge and local knowledge in international assessments may transform the process of assessment of scientific, technical and "


id: ab44c596e0bdc8625f7dfda2d90dcf70
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"Obtaining free and prior-informed consent is a necessary but not sufficient condition to engage in knowledge production with Indigenous \r\nPeoples (Sillitoe, 2016). Self-determination in climate change assessment, response and governance is critical (Chakraborty and Sherpa, \r\n2021), and Indigenous Peoples are actively contributing to respond to climate change (Etchart, 2017). Climate change assessment and \r\nadaptation should be self-determined and led by Indigenous Peoples, acknowledge the importance of developing genuine partnerships, \r\nrespect Indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing, and acknowledge Indigenous Peoples as stewards of their environment (Country \r\net al., 2016; Country et al., 2018; ITK, 2019; Barker and Pickerill, 2020; Chakraborty and Sherpa, 2021)"


id: a8e2ee3d11711276c0dd1f5b026adcee
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" Supporting Indigenous Peoples' \r\nleadership and rights in climate adaptation options at the local, regional, national and international levels is an effective way to ensure that \r\nsuch options are adapted to their living conditions and do not pose additional detrimental impacts to their lives (very high confidence). \r\nChapter 18 shows that the transformations required to deliver climate-resilient futures will create societal disruptions, with impacts that \r\nare most often unevenly experienced by groups with high exposure and sensitivity to climate change, including Indigenous Peoples and \r\nlocal communities (Schipper et al., 2020a). Climate-resilient futures depend on finding strategies to address the causes and drivers of \r\ndeep inequities (Chapter 18). For example, climate-resilient futures will depend on recognising the socioeconomic, political and health \r\ninequities that often affect Indigenous Peoples (Mapfumo et al., 2016; Ludwig and Poliseli, 2018) (very high confidence)."


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"International conventions to support and utilise Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge\r\nSeveral tools within international conventions may support instruments to develop equitable processes that facilitate the inclusion of \r\nIndigenous knowledge and leadership in climate change adaptation initiatives. The International Labour Convention 69 recognised \r\nIndigenous People's right to self-determination in 1989 (ILO, 1989). The United Nations' Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples \r\n(United Nations, 2007) includes articles on the right to development (Article 23), the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive \r\nspiritual relationship and to uphold responsibilities to future generations (Article 25), and the right to the conservation and protection \r\nof the environment and the productive capacity of their territories (Article 29)"


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" Article 26 upholds the right to the lands, territories and \r\nresources, the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, and legal recognition and protection of these lands, territories and \r\nresources. Indigenous Peoples are also recognised within the Sustainable Development Goals as a priority group (Carino and Tamayo, \r\n2019). International events such as the 'Resilience in a time of uncertainty: Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change' conference brought \r\ntogether Indigenous Peoples' representatives and government leaders from around the world to discuss the role of Indigenous Peoples \r\nin climate adaptation (UNESCO, 2015)."


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"For climate research, the role of oral histories as a part of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge is extremely relevant. For example, \r\nocean adaptation initiatives can be guided by oral historians and keepers of knowledge who can convey new knowledge and baselines of \r\necosystem change over long-time frames (Nunn and Reid, 2016). Oral histories can also convey cultural indicators and linguistic devices \r\nof species identification as a part of a local dialect matrix, and changes in ecosystems and species using interlinkages not available to \r\nscience (Mustonen, 2013; Frainer et al., 2020). Oral histories attached to maritime place names, especially underwater areas (Brattland \r\nand Nilsen, 2011), can position observations relevant for understanding climate change over long ecological timeframes (Nunn and Reid, \r\n2016). Species abundances, well-being and locations are some of the examples present in the ever-evolving oral histories as living ways \r\nof knowing"


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" Indigenous knowledge and oral histories may also have the potential to convey governance, moral and ethical frameworks \r\nof sustainable livelihoods and cultures (Mustonen and Shadrin, 2020) rooted in the particular Indigenous or local contexts that are not \r\notherwise available in written or published forms."


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"Climate change research involving Indigenous Peoples and local communities has shown that the generation, innovation, transmission \r\nand preservation of Indigenous knowledge is threatened by climate change (Kermoal and Altamirano-Jimenez, 2016; Simonee et al., \r\n2021). This is because Indigenous knowledge is taught, local knowledge is gained through experience, and relationships with the land \r\nare sustained through social engagement within and among families, communities and other societies (Tobias J.K, 2014; Kermoal and \r\nAltamirano-Jimenez, 2016). The knowledge that has traditionally been passed on in support of identity, language and purpose has been \r\ndisrupted at an intergenerational level (Lemke and Delormier, 2017). Many of these dynamics have affected local knowledge transfers \r\nequally (Mustonen, 2013)"


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" This scenario represents a tension for Indigenous Peoples, where Indigenous knowledge in the form of land\u0002based life ways, languages, food security, intergenerational transmission and application are threatened by climate change, yet in parallel, \r\nthese same practices can enable adaptation and resilience (McGregor et al., 2020)."


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"and adaptation strategies, coordinating and developing effective \r\nlocal responses, enabling community engagement and more effective \r\npolicies around exposure and vulnerability reduction (Fudge et  al., \r\n2016). Local authorities are well-positioned to involve the wider \r\ncommunity in designing and implementing climate policies and \r\nadaptation implementation (Slee, 2015; Fudge et  al., 2016). Local \r\ngovernments also help deliver basic services and protect their integrity \r\nfrom climate impacts (Austin et al., 2015; Cloutier et al., 2015; Nalau \r\net  al., 2015; Araos et  al., 2017). However, the resource limitations \r\nof local governments as well as their small geographic sphere of \r\ninfluence suggests the need for more funding for this from higher \r\nlevels of government, particularly national governments, to address \r\nadaptation gaps (very high confidence) (Dekker, 2020)"


id: 8dfd2d9a9536ab4f49ca5c3994bf400
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" Local adaptation \r\nimplementation gaps can be linked to limited political commitment \r\nat higher levels of government and weak cooperation between key \r\nstakeholders (Runhaar, 2018). Incongruities and conflicts can exist \r\nbetween adaptation agendas pursued by national governments and \r\nthe spontaneous adaptation practices of communities. There may be \r\ngrounds for re-evaluating current consultative processes integral to \r\npolicy development, if narrow technical approaches emerge as the \r\nnorm for adaptation (Smucker et al., 2015)."


id: edf038460e7811d884b5bb8ed672bf62
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"The strong role of governments in climate action has implications for \r\nthe nature of democracy, the relationship between the local and the \r\nnational state, and between citizens and the state (Dodman and Mitlin, \r\n2015). More integration of government policy and interventions across \r\nscales, accompanied by capacity building to accelerate adaptation is \r\nneeded (very high confidence). Key needs include enhanced funding, \r\nclear roles and responsibilities, increased institutional capability, \r\nstrategic approaches, community engagement and judicial integrity \r\n(Lawrence et al., 2015). More resources, and more active involvement \r\nof the private sector and civil society can help maintain adaptation on \r\nthe policy agenda. Multi-level adaptation approaches are also relevant \r\nin low-income countries where local governments have limited financial \r\nresources and human capabilities, often leading to dependency on \r\nnational governments and donor organisations (Donner et  al"


id: ae432f486546dc06d2ded7d885a8b1d8
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"Therefore, the traditional view of adaptation as a local process \r\nhas now widened to recognise it as a multi-actor process that \r\ntranscends scales from the local and sub-national to national and \r\neven international (very high confidence) (Mimura et al., 2014). Many \r\nof the impacts of climate change are both local and transboundary, \r\nso that local, bilateral and multilateral cooperation is needed \r\n(Nalau et al., 2015; Donner et al., 2016; Magnan and Ribera, 2016; \r\nTilleard and Ford, 2016; Lesnikowski et al., 2017). National policies \r\nand transnational governance should be seen as complementary, \r\nespecially where they favour transnational engagement with sub\u0002and non-state actors (Andonova et al., 2017). National governments \r\ntypically act as a pivot for adaptation coordination, planning, \r\ndetermining policy priorities, and distributing financial, institutional \r\nand sometimes knowledge resources"


id: 5caaa07c2cdb60ef8423e9f0c88f3451
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" National governments are also \r\naccountable to the international community through international \r\nagreements. National governments have helped enhance adaptive \r\ncapacity through building awareness of climate impacts, encouraging \r\neconomic growth, providing incentives, establishing legislative \r\nframeworks conducive to adaptation and communicating climate \r\nchange information (Berrang-Ford et al., 2014; Massey et al., 2014; \r\nAustin et al., 2015; Huitema et al., 2016)."


id: d95752796d364b669e883b8e1a522274
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Another mechanism for evaluating environmental performance is \r\nto include environmental data in the System of National Accounts \r\n(SNA) through the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting \r\n(SEEA) introduced by the UN. As the international statistical standard \r\nfor environmental-economic accounting (Pirmana et  al., 2019), SEEA \r\nincludes natural capital resources in national accounting. A number \r\nof recent studies conclude that failure to account for natural capital \r\nin macroeconomic impact assessments results in overly optimistic \r\noutcomes (Pirmana et al., 2019; Jendrzejewski, 2020; Naspolini et al., \r\n2020); (Banerjee et al., 2019; Kabir and Salim, 2019; Keith et al., 2019). For \r\nexample, Jendrzejewski (2020) inserted natural capital into a computable \r\ngeneral equilibrium model of the 2017 European windstorm on state\u0002owned forests in Poland"


id: 2e10b03878096a2c12b4bc6dfcee48f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" This resulted in more negative assessment of \r\nimpacts, suggesting excluding natural capital could lead to erroneous \r\ninvestments, strategies or policies. Similarly, other studies rely on Quality \r\nof life (QOL) measurements as alternatives for GDP. Estoque et al. (2018) \r\nsuggested a 'QOL-Climate' assessment framework, designed to capture \r\nthe social-ecological impacts of climate change and variability."


id: 8476906e0726cb764b19c3bced153e03
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"The performance of local, national and global economies is a priority \r\nconsideration shaping perceptions of climate risk and the costs and \r\nbenefits of different policy responses to climate change. The most \r\ncommonly used indicator of performance is GDP (Hoekstra et al., 2017). \r\nTraditionally, national development efforts have sought to maximise \r\nthe growth of GDP under the assumption that GDP growth equates \r\nnot only to economic prosperity (including poverty reduction) but \r\nalso to increased efficiency and reduced environmental externalities \r\n(Ota, 2017). Such assumptions often employ models such as the \r\nenvironmental Kuznets curve (EKC) that postulates that economic \r\ndevelopment initially increases environmental impacts, but these \r\ntrends eventually reverse with continued economic growth"


id: 4f31a78145faeb12d7034211caf1c136
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" Wealthy \r\nnations of the Global North, including for example the USA, Great \r\nBritain, Iceland and Japan, have had success over the past decade in \r\nreducing their GHG emissions while growing their economies (very \r\nhigh confidence). However, attempts to empirically test EKC in different \r\nnational contexts has yielded mixed results. Case studies in Myanmar, \r\nChina and Singapore, for example, suggest that the impacts of GDP \r\non environmental quality are contingent on the development context \r\nand the environmental impact under consideration (Aung et al., 2017; \r\nLee and Thiel, 2017; Xu, 2018; Chen and Taylor, 2020)"


id: e42eec27efc18cc90120a5c1bab659c0
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" In addition, an \r\nextensive literature now argues that current patterns of development, \r\nand the economic systems underpinning that development, are \r\nunsustainable (Washington and Twomey, 2016), and thus economic \r\ngrowth may not necessarily continue indefinitely in the absence of \r\nmore concerted effort to pursue sustainable development, including \r\nreducing the impacts of climate change."


id: d75908dd2762e6c82f37155d17f9214a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"Another alternative to GDP is Green GDP which seeks to incorporate \r\nthe environmental consequences of economic growth (Boyd, 2007; \r\nStjepanovic et al., 2017; Stjepanovic et al., 2019). Green GDP is difficult to \r\nmeasure, because it is difficult to evaluate the environmental depletion \r\nand ecological damages of growth (Stjepanovic et al., 2019). Although \r\nthere is no consensus in measuring Green GDP, attempts have been \r\nmade for select countries including the USA (Garcia and You, 2017), \r\nEurope (Stjepanovic et al., 2019), China (Chi and Rauch, 2010; Yu et al., \r\n2019; Wang et al., 2020), Ukraine and Thailand (Harnphatananusorn \r\net al., 2019), and Malaysia (Vaghefi et al., 2015). Le (2016) illustrated \r\nthe potential negative impacts of climate change vulnerability on green \r\ngrowth. Some studies have suggested that focusing on green growth \r\nas the only strategy to address climate change would be risky"


id: e8341aa2fabcf6dd5d48654920a064fb
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" Hickel \r\nand Kallis (2020) argue that green growth is likely to be a misguided \r\ngoal due to the difficulties of separating economic growth from \r\nresource use and, therefore, carbon emissions (see also (Antal and van \r\nden Bergh, 2014). Therefore, alternative strategies are required (Hickel \r\nand Kallis, 2020). In addition, green growth should also be able to \r\njustly respond to social movements involving contestation, internal \r\ndebates and tensions (Mathai et al., 2018)."


id: bb4ccb5d9dedbbf9dfefabd61dc6d90
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content:
"interact is described in sustainability transitions literature (Fazey et al., \r\n2018b; Sengers et al., 2019l Kanger, 2020 #3709). A common theme \r\nexplored in that literature is the ability of actors to access and apply \r\nvarious forms of knowledge as a means of effecting change. Different \r\nforms of innovation are recognised as a core enabling condition for \r\nachieving system transitions for CRD (Section  18.3.3; Cross-Chapter \r\nBox  INDIG). However, while scientific and technology knowledge \r\nmay be useful, in some cases, they remain subordinate to political \r\nagendas, or are controlled by actors in positions of power and thus \r\nnot equitably distributed (very high confidence) (Mormina, 2019). \r\nParticipatory decision making, for example, assumes that multiple \r\nactors, with differing motivations, agency and influence, engage with \r\nclimate decision making and co-produce actions"


id: 91957f91aea945af76fe92131bbbafe
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" Yet some actors may \r\nnot participate in the process if the proposed actions do not align with \r\ntheir motivations or if they do not have adequate agency (Roelich and \r\nGiesekam, 2019). Hence, effectively using knowledge to inform policy \r\nis challenging for both scientists, policymakers and civil society alike."


id: eddf057de03ff3357746902b52d71d
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"A potential critique of the various alternative metrics and models for \r\neconomic development is that they are all framed in the context of \r\ngrowth. Over the past decade, ecological economists and political \r\nscientists have proposed degrowth (e.g., Kallis, 2011; Demaria et al., \r\n2013) and managing without growth (e.g., Jackson, 2009) as a \r\nsolution for achieving environmental sustainability and socioeconomic \r\nprogress. Such concepts are a deliberate response to concerns \r\nabout ecological limits to growth and the compatibility between \r\ngrowth-oriented development and sustainability (Kallis et al., 2009). \r\nSustainable degrowth is not the same as negative GDP growth, which \r\nis typically referred to as a recession (Kallis, 2011). Degrowth goes \r\nbeyond criticising economic growth; it explores the intersection among \r\nenvironmental sustainability, social justice and well-being (Demaria \r\net al., 2013). Under current economic and fiscal policies (see Box 18"


id: ff3e9148135bd16d79f5f21cc141e6d
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content:
"7), \r\ndegrowth has been argued as an unstable development paradigm \r\nbecause declining consumer demand leads to rising unemployment, \r\ndeclining competitiveness and a spiral of recession (Jackson, 2009: \r\n46). More comprehensive modelling of socioeconomic performance \r\nunderstands the segments of sufficient social transformation to \r\nguarantee maintenance and rises in well-being coupled with reduced \r\n'footprints' (Raworth, 2017; Hickel, 2019; D'Alessandro et al., 2020)."


id: 15f34a6fcaa1cf89edfb41509a7fb76
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"Science, technology and innovation (STI) policies are expected \r\nto shape expectations of the potential for a better world based on \r\naccess to information, clean technologies, higher labour productivity, \r\neconomic growth and a healthier environment (Brasseur and Gallardo, \r\n2016; Schot and Steinmueller, 2018; Singh et  al., 2018; Mormina, \r\n2019; Bamzai-Dodson et  al., 2021). STI policies are considered as \r\n'social goods for development'. Hence, STI policies are often proposed \r\nor implemented as means of addressing environmental challenges \r\nsuch as climate change along with SDGs such as the reduction of \r\ninequality, poverty and environmental pollution (Mormina, 2019). \r\nRealising the benefits of STI, however, may be contingent on building \r\nbroader STI capacity and bolstering nations' systems of innovation \r\n(very high confidence) (Mormina, 2019)"


id: 822449a902b9fcee3b3bd6d084a6f3f9
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" This could include building \r\nglobal research partnerships to address priority STI needs as well \r\nas long-standing gaps between the Global North and South. Such \r\nan approach shifts the framing of STI as one focused on individual "


id: ac96281d994d072412da5c97493237a4
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content:
"Changes in climate and subsequent policy responses could increase volatility of food and energy prices, resulting in higher headline \r\ninflation rates. Thus, Central Banks (CBs) have to pay careful attention to underlying inflationary factors to maintain their inflationary \r\ntargets. In response, CBs can take a number of actions. For example, they could require that collateral comprises assets that support \r\nthe move to low-carbon economy, or their refinancing operations and crisis facilities could incentivise borrowers' move to low-carbon \r\nactivities, particularly in countries where CBs' mandate has been expanded to account for climate impact (Papoutsi et al., 2021). Other \r\nactions that CBs could take include adoption of sustainable and responsible investment principles (Rudebusch, 2019) and requiring \r\nfinancial firms to disclose their climate-related risks (ECB, 2020; Lee, 2020)"


id: e21143c24e658f85e4df12a19d0cda8a
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content:
" Despite these opportunities, there is ongoing debate regarding \r\nwhether CBs should actively use monetary policy to address climate change and its risks (Honohan, 2019)."


id: 72dfca7ae671d45732a76fa0ee14439e
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content:
"The application of green fiscal policies to address climate change could lead to environmental benefits, including environmental revenues \r\nthat may be used for broader fiscal reforms (OECD, 2021). As the USA aims at becoming carbon neutral by 2050, fiscal policies at the \r\nnational, sectoral and international level can help to achieve this goal, along with investment, regulatory and technology policies (Parry, \r\n2021). The effectiveness of green fiscal policies are through their fiscal potential, opportunities for efficiency gains, distributional and \r\nmacroeconomic impacts, and their political economy implications (Metcalf, 2016). The International Monetary Fund argues public support \r\nfor green policies may rise in response to the COVID-19 crisis (IMF, 2017). For example, Leibenluft (2020) argues that investments to \r\ncombat climate change should be an important component of the efforts to rebuild the economy in the wake of COVID-19"


id: 3cbea9b317dff715ffc7a3b1a535db62
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" Such action is \r\njustified not only on ecological and social welfare grounds, but from a long-term fiscal perspective. For example, climate change impacts \r\nand/or efforts to adapt to those impacts drive increased spending in areas such as public health and disaster mitigation or response. \r\nPreventive and corrective actions would strengthen resilience to shocks and alleviate the financial constraints they create, particularly \r\nfor small countries (Catalano et al., 2020). For example, Mallucci (2020) found that natural disasters exacerbate fiscal vulnerabilities and \r\ntrigger sovereign defaults in seven Caribbean countries. Ryota (2019) illustrates how to include natural disaster and climate change in a \r\nfiscal policy framework to developing countries."


id: ea9304416f811aa693bb578755d8741e
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content:
"Pricing of GHGs, including carbon, is a crucial tool in any cost-effective climate change mitigation strategy, as it provides a mechanism for \r\nlinking climate action to economic development (IMF/OECD, 2021). By 2019, 57 nations around the world had implemented or scheduled \r\nimplementation of carbon pricing. These initiatives cover 11 gigatons of carbon dioxide or about 20% of GHG emissions. Carbon prices in \r\nexisting initiatives range between USD 1 and USD 127 per ton of carbon dioxide, while 51% of the emissions that are covered are priced \r\nmore than USD 10 per ton of carbon dioxide. Moreover, in 2018, Governments raised about USD 44 billion in carbon pricing revenues \r\n(World Bank, 2019). However, the carbon prices are lower than the levels required for attaining the ambitious goal of climate change \r\nmitigation, and therefore, prices would need to increase if pricing alone is going to be used to drive compliance with the Paris Agreement"


id: 25946db56c152a0c77b674c8f8086a25
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" \r\nHigher carbon prices would also be warranted if prices are based on the social cost of carbon, which represents the present value of the \r\nmarginal damage to economic output caused by carbon emissions (Cai and Lontzek, 2018). This cost needs to be considered with the \r\nsocial benefits of reducing carbon emissions through cost-benefit analyses to make the intended regulation acceptable."


id: 2a19b2d8d0134d2a6cf065eb2410023e
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content:
"Carbon taxes represent another financial mechanism for addressing climate change (Metcalf, 2019), 2019b). For example, the \r\nimplementation of a carbon tax and a value-added tax on transport fuel in Sweden resulted in a reduction of CO2 emissions from \r\ntransport of about 11%, of which the carbon tax had the largest share (Andersson, 2019). In the USA, for example, a carbon tax could \r\nincrease fiscal flexibility by collecting new revenues that can be redeployed to finance reforms and help stimulate economic growth. \r\nHowever, US tax-inclusive energy prices would have to be 273% higher than laissez-faire levels in 2055 in order to meet international \r\nagreements (Casey, 2019). Similarly, limiting global warming to 2degC or less would likely require a carbon tax rate in the Asia/Pacific region \r\nto be significantly higher than USD 25 per ton (IMF, 2021)"


id: 8aaf87cd0482248077e8e102d9d3a3a8
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" Therefore, using tax revenues to issue payments back to taxpayers that are \r\ndisproportionately impacted, or to redistribute capital among regions, may be one of the most important features of carbon tax policies. \r\nAlthough the average effect of carbon tax on welfare would be positive, some regions (56%) will gain and some regions (44%) lose \r\n(Scobie, 2013). Therefore, large transfer payments are needed to compensate those losing from carbon tax (Krusell and Smith, 2018).\r\nThe International Monetary Fund (IMF (2019) argues that, of the various mitigation strategies to reduce fossil fuel CO2 emissions, carbon \r\ntaxes are the most powerful and efficient, because they allow firms and households to find the lowest-cost ways of reducing energy use \r\nand shifting towards cleaner alternatives."


id: 6e3c36b8d2b5db2531845538d2aaba4f
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content:
"The World Bank has been encouraging both developed and developing states, especially those with petroleum reserves, to use the \r\nremoval of subsidies as a mechanism for promoting energy transitions away from fossil fuels. The transition has led to social unrest in \r\nsome cases, especially where there is a culture of entitlement to low-cost energy because it is an indigenous resource. Such reforms have \r\nbeen more effective when governments have been able to clearly show how savings are applied to social and health programs that \r\nbenefit human well-being. Nevertheless, policymakers should not underestimate the complexity of issues involved in the removal of \r\nsubsidies that will increase the cost of carbon and hasten the transition to cleaner fuels (Scobie, 2017; Scobie et al., 2018; Chen et al., \r\n2020a). A crucial issue to take into account is the harmful effects some subsidies have on biodiversity"


id: cf14cb05a5a5bbe0f55e7ebe28542d17
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content:
" Although governments agreed in \r\n2010 to make progress on reducing subsidies in 2010, by 2020 few governments had identified specific incentives to remove or taken \r\naction towards their removal. Further investigation of the positive and negative effects of subsidy redirection or elimination on people \r\nand the environment (Dempsey et al., 2020)."


id: d49cb81b5624c638973eff0a86210964
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content:
"Furthermore, an extensive literature increasingly incorporates natural \r\nand ecological systems as knowledge domains relevant to understanding \r\nopportunities for sustainability and CRD. For example, the literature on \r\nsocio-ecological systems (SES) (Sterk et al., 2017; Holzer et al., 2018; \r\nAvriel-Avni and Dick, 2019; Martinez-Fernandez et al., 2021) as well \r\nas social, ecological and technological systems (SETS) (McPhearson \r\nand Wijsman, 2017; Webb et al., 2018; Ahlborg et al., 2019), explicitly \r\nintegrate ecological knowledge into sustainability, including concepts \r\nsuch as planetary boundaries (Section  18.1.1), adaptation and \r\nnature-based solutions, natural resources management, rights and \r\naccess to nature, and understanding of how humans govern society-\r\nnature interactions in the face of climate change (Benjaminsen and \r\nKaarhus, 2018; Mikulewicz, 2019; Nightingale et  al., 2020)"


id: 61a0a20328f05bc0286d518806fe03ae
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content:
" Some \r\nof these interactions are explained in Cross-Chapter Box  INDIG, \r\nincluding conflict over which knowledges are recognised as valuable \r\nin understanding and responding to climate change and therefore \r\nshape the nature of climate actions. Actor engagement in stewardship, \r\nsolidarity and inclusion of multiple knowledges and nature-society \r\nconnectedness can highlight the intertwined nature of ecological \r\nchange and knowledge relations, thereby supporting shifts to \r\nsustainability (Pelling, 2010; Hulme, 2018; Ives et al., 2019; Nightingale \r\net al., 2020) (see also Box 18.6)."


id: b7758b25c03599630d4493898ef94213
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26389
content:
"While the SR1.5 (de Coninck et al., 2018) for the first time comprehensively \r\nassessed behavioural dimensions of climate change adaptation, most \r\nliterature still has a greater focus on what triggers mitigation behaviour \r\n(Lorenzoni and Whitmarsh, 2014; Clayton et al., 2015). Meanwhile, with \r\nCRD still a relatively young concept, there is little literature focused on \r\nwhat motivates action in pursuit of CRD rather than its sub-components \r\nof climate action and sustainable development. Nevertheless, a common \r\nmotivation that is emerging in the literature is clinically significant \r\nlevels of climate distress among individuals (Bodnar, 2008), which is \r\nexperienced as a continuing distress over a changed landscape which no \r\nlonger offers solace, also known as solastalgia (high agreement, medium \r\nevidence) (Albrecht et  al., 2007)"


id: c023809447882de3478033f533e0e3a3
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" This is accompanied by a shift from \r\nblaming natural forces for disasters to attributing it to human negligence, \r\nwhich is known to lead to more acute perceptions of risk as well as more \r\nprolonged post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than trauma arising \r\nfrom non-human causes. Improving social connections, acknowledging \r\nanxiety, reconnecting to nature and finding creative ways to re-engage \r\nare identified as ways of managing this growing anxiety (Lertzman, \r\n2010; Clayton et  al., 2017). Climate action in communities at various \r\nscales could fulfil many of these needs."


id: ca5adfb4d987fe5660bfaca180022304
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"in all regions except Antarctica, the magnitude of the change varies. \r\nMoreover, little change is projected for daily maximum temperatures \r\nacross different regions. Nevertheless, the number of days over different \r\ntemperature thresholds such as 35degC increases markedly in most \r\nregions, reflecting the disproportionate impact that global warming \r\nhas on the tails of temperature distributions. Given outcomes in many \r\nsystems including public health, agriculture, ecosystems and biodiversity, \r\nand infrastructure are often associated with biophysical thresholds (e.g., \r\nphysiological or design thresholds), those regions where such thresholds \r\nare increasingly exceeded due to climate change may experience \r\ndisproportionately higher impacts (very high confidence)"


id: 322da812ae4a02bf5583257691b5fb5a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" Given such \r\ntemperatures occur more frequently in regions such as Africa and Central \r\nand South America, this disproportionate exposure is exacerbated by \r\ndisproportionate vulnerability, adaptation gaps and development needs \r\n(very high confidence; Section 18.2.4; Table 18.4)."


id: aaba2cc2dc48859ef6ced869bb3e69df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"However, even within a given region, there is significant variation in \r\nPPAHDI among nations. Such differences reflect fundamental differences \r\nin historical patterns of development, as well as current development \r\nneeds and challenges, and they imply differences in what future \r\ndevelopment pathways would be consistent with CRD. In addition, \r\nnations and regions with lower PPAHDI values suggests greater capacity \r\nchallenges for both GHG mitigation and climate adaptation. However, \r\nnations and regions with high PPAHDI values also tend to have higher \r\nper capita CO2-e emissions production, indicating that economic \r\ndevelopment based on fossil fuel use undermines both efforts on \r\nclimate action as well as the SDGs (very high confidence) (Figure 18.6)"


id: 7ad034f109b1e78c7d569583f42d23e1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" \r\nSuch challenges are also reflected by differential Gini coefficients and \r\nmetrics of state fragility among regions, which reflect inequities in \r\nincome distribution and broader vulnerability of nations and regions \r\nto shocks and stressors (Figure  18.6). In addition, high variation is \r\nobserved in CO2 emissions production, even among comparatively \r\nwealthy nations, suggesting CO2-e emissions of some nations are tightly \r\ncoupled to development, while others have pursued more carbon neutral \r\ndevelopment trajectories. Even within regions such as Africa, Asia, \r\nCentral and South America, and Europe, large within-region variations \r\nare observed in inequality and state fragility, suggesting high variability \r\namong nations. Given the emphasis in the sustainable development and \r\nCRD literature on equity and vulnerability, addressing such determinants \r\nof vulnerability is a core design principle for CRDPs."


id: 13c509e186ce1ef0929ff31dd572fd8d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"The regional response of precipitation to globally averaged temperature \r\nincreases is less clear than temperature, in part due to high intra\u0002region variability. Average daily precipitation remains fairly stable in \r\nall global regions in response to higher magnitudes of global warming \r\n(Table  18.4). However, 5-day precipitation totals provide a clearer \r\nsignal of increasing hydrologic activity in response to higher globally \r\naveraged temperatures (Table 18.4). Such data does not necessarily \r\nreflect changes in rainfall extremes that could occur with downstream \r\nconsequences for hazards such as drought or flooding. Similarly, while \r\nsea surface temperatures (SSTs) are more uniform across global ocean \r\nbasins, all basins are anticipated to warm in response to higher globally \r\naveraged temperatures (Table 18.5)"


id: cf900328da8d08459c89fb62b5fc1e73
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" Unlike temperature, however, SST \r\nincreases are anticipated to be only a fraction of the globally averaged \r\nincrease in temperature, due in large part to the heat capacity of the \r\noceans. Nevertheless, such higher SSTs have implications not only for \r\nocean ecosystems and the distribution of marine species, but also for \r\nweather patterns, such as formation and intensity of tropical cyclones \r\n(very high confidence)."


id: 73523bd1067db7a78dd96bef0e8cce4a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"The other aspect of the regional climate responses to global temperature \r\nincreases that is important for CRD is the marked differences observed \r\nbetween changes in response to 1.5degC versus 4degC of warming. Higher \r\nlevels of global warming are associated with higher regional changes, \r\nincluding changes in extremes of temperature. This in turn increases \r\nclimate risk to exposed and vulnerable human and natural systems, \r\nthereby increasing demand for adaptation. If that demand is not met, \r\nthen the adaptation gap will be larger, with greater risk of loss and \r\ndamage (very high confidence) (Schaeffer et  al., 2015; Chen et  al., \r\n2016; United Nations Environment Programme, 2021). This is true \r\nnot only for regions, but also at the sectoral level (Section  18.5.2)"


id: 2ccf8232738c634cc0ed0eda288a93fd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" \r\nTherefore, CRD pathways must balance the demands for emissions \r\nreductions to reduce exposure, adaptation to manage residual climate \r\nchange risks, and sustainable development to address vulnerability \r\nand enhance capacity for sustainable development."


id: 6eee3416ebd81884b4d4dd9f42db183b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"In addition to development indicators, the literature assessed in the \r\nWGII regional chapters indicates that different regions experience \r\na range of development challenges and opportunities that affect the \r\npursuit of CRD (very high confidence). These represent dimensions of \r\ngovernance, institutions, economic development, capacity, and social \r\nand cultural factors that shape decision making, investment and \r\ndevelopment trajectories. For example, significant challenges exist \r\nwithin regions with respect to managing debt and the ability to fund or \r\nfinance climate action and sustainable development interventions (very \r\nhigh confidence). On the other hand, a broad range of opportunities \r\nexist to pursue CRD including challenges with debt and financing of \r\nadaptation competing policy objectives, social protection programmes, \r\neconomic diversification, investing in education and human capital \r\ndevelopment, and expanding disaster risk reduction efforts (very high \r\nconfidence)"


id: 413b5e0a0cad8e6f2a23bdfa64d8cf23
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"In addition, the sectoral assessments identify a broad range of specific \r\nadaptation, mitigation and sustainable development options that could \r\nplay a role in facilitating CRD. Many of these options appear initially \r\nto be specific to a given sector. For example, options for the water \r\nsector (Chapter 4) are assessed independently from those for health \r\nand well-being (Chapter 7). In practice, however, evidence suggests \r\nthe importance of thinking about sectoral options as cross-cutting, \r\nmutually supportive and synergistic packages rather than singular \r\noptions. First, each of the sectoral chapters has links to multiple SDGs \r\n(Table 18.7), implying each sector is important for achieving a range of \r\nsustainability goals that extend beyond sectoral boundaries. Moreover, \r\nprogress across multiple sectors simultaneously creates opportunities \r\nfor synergies for achieving the SDGs, but also enhances the risk of \r\npotential trade-offs (very high confidence)"


id: 997300553bbfb539ca81a8f45a7899e9
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" Second, a number of \r\noptions are common to multiple sectors. For example, options \r\nassociated with ecosystem-based adaptation and nature-based \r\napproaches to environmental management appear in multiple sectors \r\n(Table  18.7). Similarly, climate-smart agriculture and agroecological \r\napproaches to food systems create opportunities for food security, but \r\nthose same options also benefit land-based ecosystems, water, poverty \r\nand livelihoods, and human well-being."


id: c363e0fb236f4cfc577786e4a0d88362
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"The sectoral chapters of the WGII report provide insights regarding how \r\ndevelopment processes interact with sectors to shape the potential for \r\nCRD. Similar to global regions, each sector is associated with various \r\nchallenges, opportunities and options that enable or constrain CRD \r\n(Table 18.7). A number of challenges are common across sectors and \r\nmirror those associated with different regions. For example, issues \r\nassociated with natural resource dependency, access to information \r\nfor decision making, access to human and financial capital, and path \r\ndependence of institutions represent barriers that must be overcome \r\nif sectors are to support transitions that enable CRD. These challenges \r\nare more acute within vulnerable communities or nations where \r\ncapacity to innovate and invest are constrained and social inequities \r\nreinforce the status quo (very high confidence)"


id: ef7d27681feb39387f5db48cfdea350a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" At the same time, a \r\nnumber of sector-specific opportunities for mitigation, adaptation and \r\nsustainable development can be used to integrate sectors into CRDPs. \r\nThis could include policies and planning initiatives to enhance sector \r\nsustainability and resilience, as well as capacity building and greater \r\ninclusion of different actors and groups in decision making including \r\ncapitalising on local and Indigenous knowledge as a mechanism for \r\nmore representative and equitable action."


id: 4686dc662e19d3873ddef1fc92d7407
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content:
"The more recent literature adds significant context to the concept \r\nof CRD, but also introduces broader perspectives regarding its \r\nsignificance in the arena of climate action. Hence, concepts that are \r\nboth complementary to, and competitive with, CRD, such as 'climate \r\nsafe', 'climate compatible' and 'climate smart' development (Huxham \r\net al., 2015; Kim et al., 2017b; Ficklin et al., 2018; Mcleod et al., 2019) \r\n(Section 18.1.1). These different framings of the intersection between \r\nsustainable development and climate action are used in different \r\ncommunities of research and practice, which complicates efforts to \r\nprovide clear guidance to decision makers regarding the goals of CRD \r\nand how best to achieve it. This is attributable in part to persistent \r\nconceptual confusion and disciplinary divides over more fundamental \r\nconcepts such as resilience and sustainability (Rogers et  al"


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", 2020; \r\nZaman, 2021), not to mention contested perspectives regarding \r\ndevelopment (Lo et  al., 2020; Song et  al., 2020a; Morton, 2021) \r\n(medium agreement, medium evidence)."


id: bcaeafd65412c8aec5298c0de07c321d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Given the pace of climate change and the inherent challenge of \r\nsustainable development, particularly in the face of inevitable \r\ndisruptions and setbacks such as the COVID-19 pandemic (Cross\u0002Chapter Box  COVID in Chapter 7), the feasibility of achieving CRD is \r\nan open question. Rapid changes will be required to shift public and \r\nprivate investments, strengthen institutions and orient them towards \r\nmore sustainable policies and practices, expand the inclusiveness of \r\ngovernance and the equity of decision making, and shift societal and \r\nconsumer preferences to more climate-resilient lifestyles"


id: d17757302905a0fcd8e8a4e51293b7c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" Nevertheless, \r\nthe collective body of recent literature on CRD, system transitions \r\nand societal transformation, combined with the assessments within \r\nrecent IPCC Special Reports (IPCC, 2018a; IPCC, 2019b; IPCC, 2019d) \r\nindicate that there are a broad range of opportunities for designing and \r\nimplementing adaptation and mitigation options that enable the climate \r\ngoals in the Paris Agreement to be achieved while enhancing resilience \r\nand meeting sustainable development objectives. However, options \r\nshould be considered alongside the mechanisms by which societies can \r\nengage to create the conditions that can support the implementation \r\nof those options (Section 18.4). This includes formal policy mechanisms \r\npursued by governments, the catalysation of innovation by private firms \r\nand entrepreneurship, as well as informal, grassroots interventions by \r\ncivil society"


id: f4069e8b073bacd5212ab38b3db74a6f
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content:
" While there is no 'one-size-fits-all' solution for CRD that \r\nwill work for all actors at all scales, exploring different pathways by \r\nwhich actors can achieve their development and climate goals can make \r\nvaluable contributions to developing effective strategies for CRD."


