# document

id: 522bf702a9e0cece574b45d3935d9c91
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 10380
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" (2020); reduce 28% of GHG emissions in Argentina \r\nArrieta and Gonzalez (2018); about 25% in Portugal Esteve-Llorens \r\net al. (2020) and reduce GHG emissions, land use and blue water \r\nfootprint by 15-60% in Spain (Batlle-Bayer et al. 2020). In contrast, \r\nAleksandrowicz et al. (2019) found that meeting healthy dietary \r\nguidelines in India required increased dietary energy intake overall, \r\nwhich slightly increased environmental footprints by about 3-5% \r\nacross GHG emissions, blue and green water footprints and land use."


id: 7cd5a401002ed6306d6007833e200590
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 17237
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"Conclusions from AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, SROCC \r\nand SRCCL); mitigation potential, costs, and pathways.According \r\nto the AR5, changes in human diets and consumption patterns can \r\nreduce emissions 5.3 to 20.2 GtCO2-eq yr-1 by 2050 from diverted \r\nagricultural production and avoided land-use change (Smith et al. \r\n2014). In the SRCCL, a 'contract and converge' model of transition \r\nto sustainable healthy diets was suggested as an effective approach, \r\nreducing food consumption in over-consuming populations and \r\nincreasing consumption of some food groups in populations where \r\nminimum nutritional needs are not met (P. Smith et al. 2019a). The \r\ntotal technical mitigation potential of changes in human diets was \r\nestimated as 0.7-8 GtCO2-eq yr-1 by 2050 (Tilman and Clark 2014; \r\nSpringmann et al"


id: 1f1ef25cbf3ba4f00adcb93427fdd510
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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" 2016; Hawken 2017) (SRCCL, Chapter 2 and 6), \r\nranging from a 50% adoption of healthy diets (<60g of animal-based \r\nprotein) and only accounting for diverted agricultural production, to \r\nthe global adoption of a vegetarian diet."


id: 68b1f08ae731d79c54ac8f38a6af192e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
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vector_id: 14068
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. Shifting to sustainable healthy \r\ndiets has large potential to achieve global GHG mitigation targets as \r\nwell as public health and environmental benefits (high confidence). \r\nBased on studies to date, there is medium confidence that shifting \r\ntoward sustainable healthy diets has a technical potential including \r\nsavings in the full value chain of 3.6 (0.3-8.0) GtCO2-eq yr-1 of \r\nwhich 2.5 (1.5-3.9) GtCO2-eq yr-1 is considered plausible based \r\non a range of GWP100 values for CH4 and N2O. When accounting \r\nfor diverted agricultural production only, the feasible potential is \r\n1.7 (1-2.7) GtCO2-eq yr-1. A shift to more sustainable and healthy \r\ndiets is generally feasible in many regions (medium confidence)"


id: cf5ca78de35e4b3faaefee2a2ad518cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content_type: text
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vector_id: 30155
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" \r\nHowever, potential varies across regions as diets are location- and \r\ncommunity- specific, and thus may be influenced by local production \r\npractices, technical and financial barriers and associated livelihoods, \r\neveryday life and behavioural and cultural norms around food \r\nconsumption (Meybeck and Gitz 2017; Creutzig et al. 2018; FAO \r\n2018b). Therefore, a  transition towards low-GHG emission diets \r\nand achieving their mitigation potential requires a  combination \r\nof appropriate policies, financial and non-financial incentives and \r\nawareness-raising campaigns to induce changes in consumer \r\nbehaviour with potential synergies between climate objectives, \r\nhealth and equity (Rust et al. 2020)."


id: 8d398ef4723c7389f4638747ca242913
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
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"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Since the SRCCL, global studies continue to \r\nfind high mitigation potential from reducing animal-source foods \r\nand increasing proportions of plant-rich foods in diets. Springmann \r\net al. (2018) estimated that diet changes in line with global dietary \r\nguidelines for total energy intake and consumption of red meat, \r\nsugar, fruits, and vegetables, could reduce GHG emissions by 29% \r\nand other environmental impacts by 5-9% compared with the \r\nbaseline in 2050. Poore and Nemecek (2018) revealed that shifting \r\ntowards diets that exclude animal-source food could reduce \r\nland use by 3.1 billion ha, decrease food-related GHG emissions \r\nby 6.5 GtCO2-eq yr-1, acidification by 50%, eutrophication by \r\n49%, and freshwater withdrawals by 19% for a  2010 reference \r\nyear. Frank et al. (2019) estimated non-CO2 emissions reductions \r\nof 0.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1 at a  carbon price of USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 and \r\n0"


id: c133e7a42d751d78c5357ca463ec8b44
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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"6 GtCO2-eq yr-1 at USD20 tCO2\r\n-1 in 2050 from shifting to lower \r\nanimal-source diets (430 kcal of livestock calorie intake) in developed \r\nand emerging countries. From a systematic literature review, Ivanova \r\net al. (2020) found mitigation potentials of 0.4-2.1 tCO2-eq capita-1"


id: fe346c87004a40f7772051ffbcce08d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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"2010). Food waste typically takes place at the distribution (retail \r\nand food service) and consumption stages in the food supply chain \r\nand refers to food appropriate for human consumption that is \r\ndiscarded or left to spoil (HLPE 2014). Options that could reduce FLW \r\ninclude: investing in harvesting and post-harvesting technologies in \r\ndeveloping countries, taxing and other incentives to reduce business \r\nand consumer-level waste in developed countries, mandatory FLW \r\nreporting and reduction targets for large food businesses, regulation \r\nof unfair trading practices, and active marketing of cosmetically \r\nimperfect products (van Giesen and de Hooge 2019; Sinclair Taylor \r\net al. 2019). Other studies suggested providing options of longer\u0002lasting products and behavioural changes (e.g., through information \r\nprovision) that cause dietary and consumption changes and motivate \r\nconsumers to actively make decisions that reduce FLW"


id: 1a314a5dd2f2a7a6484731475808fdfa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content_type: text
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vector_id: 1587
content:
" Reductions \r\nof FLW along the food chain bring a range of benefits beyond GHG \r\nmitigation, including reducing environmental stress (e.g., water and \r\nland competition, land degradation, desertification), safeguarding \r\nfood security, and reducing poverty (Galford et al. 2020; \r\nVenkatramanan et al. 2020). Additionally, FLW reduction is crucial for \r\nachieving SDG 12 which calls for ensuring 'sustainable consumption \r\nand production patterns' through lowering per capita global food \r\nwaste by 50% at the retail and consumer level and reducing food \r\nlosses along food supply chains by 2030. In line with these SDG \r\ntargets, it is estimated that reducing FLW can free up several million \r\nkm2\r\n of land (high confidence). The interlinkages between reducing \r\nFLW and food system sustainability are discussed in Chapter  12"


id: 183a8d1c7ddff4a804a4e4e723105263
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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" \r\nRecent literature identifies a  range of barriers to climate change \r\nmitigation through FLW reduction, which are linked to technological, \r\nbiophysical, socio-economic, financial and cultural contexts at \r\nregional and local levels (Vogel and Meyer 2018; Gromko and \r\nAbdurasalova 2019; Rogissart et al. 2019; Blok et al. 2020). Examples \r\nof these barriers include infrastructural and capacity limitations, \r\ninstitutional regulations, financial resources, constraining resources \r\n(e.g., energy), information gaps (e.g., with retailers), and consumers' \r\nbehaviour (Gromko and Abdurasalova 2019; Blok et al. 2020)."


id: ee0226ff68e9953576f10d45f6c00ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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"found to be associated with potential emissions reductions ranging \r\nbetween 2.6 and 3.6 MtCO2-eq (Wilson et al. 2019). Other studies \r\ninvestigated the effect of tax mechanisms, such as 'pay as you \r\nthrow' for household waste, on the mitigation potential of reducing \r\nFLW.  Generally, these mechanisms are recognised as particularly \r\neffective in reducing the amount of waste and increasing the \r\nrecycling rate of households (Carattini et al. 2018; Rogissart et al. \r\n2019). Technological FWL mitigation opportunities exist throughout \r\nthe food supply chain; post-harvest opportunities for FLW reductions \r\nare discussed in Chapter  12. Based on IPCC AR4 GWP100 values \r\nfor CH4 and N2O, greatest economic mitigation potential (up to \r\nUSD100 tCO2\r\n-1) for the period 2020-2050 from FLW reduction is \r\nestimated to be in Asia and Pacific (192.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1) followed by \r\nDeveloped Countries (101.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1) (Roe et al. 2021)"


id: 6cce243256037819557a3d55c2c11eff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 14735
content:
" These \r\nestimates reflect diverted agricultural production and do not capture \r\npotential from avoided land-use changes."


id: f269befdd3256a2c0fd80cc6d56b233c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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"Activities, co-benefits, risks and implementation opportunities \r\nand barriers. The use of wood products refers to the fate of \r\nharvested wood for material uses and includes two distinctly different \r\ncomponents affecting the carbon cycle, including carbon storage in \r\nwood products and material substitution. When harvested wood is \r\nused for the manufacture of wood products, carbon remains stored \r\nin these products depending on their end use and lifetime. Carbon \r\nstorage in wood products can be increased through enhancing \r\nthe inflow of products in use, or effectively reducing the outflow \r\nof the products after use. This can be achieved through additional \r\nharvest under sustainable management (Pilli et al. 2015; Johnston \r\nand Radeloff 2019), changing the allocation of harvested wood to \r\nlong-lived wood products or by increasing products' lifetime and \r\nincreasing recycling (Brunet-Navarro et al. 2017; Jasinevicius et al. \r\n2017; Xu et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2021)"


id: 54ccc4f1bdfcf07d6d8f8bbc244f093c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 10794
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" Material substitution involves \r\nthe use of wood for building, textiles, or other applications instead \r\nof other materials (e.g.,  concrete or steel, which consume more \r\nenergy to produce) to avoid or reduce emissions associated with the \r\nproduction, use and disposal of those products it replaces."


id: 12b33c00d88f6d7da1ccc20ad051132c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 443
content:
"Critical assessment and conclusion. Based on studies to \r\ndate, there is strong evidence and medium agreement that \r\nthe improved use of wood products has a  technical potential \r\nof 1.0 (0.04-3.7) GtCO2-eq yr-1 and economic potential of \r\n0.4  (0.3-0.5) GtCO2-eq yr-1. There is strong evidence and high \r\nagreement at the product level that material substitution provides \r\non average benefits for climate change mitigation as wood products \r\nare associated with less fossil-based GHG emissions over their \r\nlifetime compared to products made from emission-intensive and \r\nnon-renewable materials. However, the evidence at the level of \r\nmarkets or countries is uncertain and fairly limited for many parts \r\nof the world. There is medium confidence that material substitution \r\nand carbon storage in wood products contribute to climate change \r\nmitigation when also the carbon balances of forest ecosystems are \r\nconsidered of sustainably managed large areas of forests in medium \r\nterm"


id: ecbaff42a1bc2b1e49e2f6dc6860dd92
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" The total future mitigation potential will depend on the forest \r\nsystem considered, the type of wood products that are produced and \r\nsubstituted and the assumed production technologies and conversion \r\nefficiencies of these products."


id: 8091e4e05b57598afddf5152b884602e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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"Developments since AR5 and IPCC Special Reports (SR1.5, \r\nSROCC and SRCCL). Since the SRCCL, several studies have \r\nexamined the mitigation potential of the enhanced and improved use \r\nof wood products. A global forest sector modelling study (Johnston \r\nand Radeloff 2019) estimated that carbon storage in wood products \r\nrepresented a  net carbon stock increase of 0.34 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nglobally in 2015 and which could provide an average mitigation \r\npotential (by increasing the HWP pool) of 0.33-0.41 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nfor the period 2020-2050, based on the future socio-economic \r\ndevelopment (SSP scenarios) and its effect on the production and \r\nconsumption of wood products. Traded feedstock provided another \r\n0.071 GtCO2 yr-1 of carbon storage in 2015 and 0.12 GtCO2 yr-1\r\nby 2065. These potentials exclude the effect of material substitution. \r\nAnother recent study estimated the global mitigation potential of \r\nmid-rise urban buildings designed with engineered wood products \r\nat 0.04-3"


id: 74a17a3ce78dc49cd3d8c2ea33029e29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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"7 GtCO2 yr-1 (Churkina et al. 2020). Another study (Oliver \r\net al. 2014) estimated that using wood to substitute for concrete \r\nand steel as building materials could provide a technical mitigation \r\npotential of 0.78-1.73 GtCO2 yr-1 achieved through carbon storage \r\nin wood products and through material and energy substitution."


id: 9ce65babe6fb074a5a5b1c10cdd08003
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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"Land-based mitigation options interact and create various trade\u0002offs, and thus need to be assessed together as well as with \r\nmitigation options in other sectors, and in combination with other \r\nsustainability goals (Popp et al. 2014; Obersteiner et al. 2016; \r\nRoe et al. 2019; Van Vuuren et al. 2019; Prudhomme et al. 2020; \r\nStrefler et al. 2021). The assessments of individual mitigation \r\nmeasures or sectoral estimates used to estimate mitigation \r\npotential in Section 7.4, when aggregated together, do not account \r\nfor interactions and trade-offs. Integrative land-use models (ILMs) \r\ncombine different land-based mitigation options and are partially \r\nincluded in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) which combine \r\ninsights from various disciplines in a single framework and cover \r\nthe largest sources of anthropogenic GHG emissions from different \r\nsectors. Over time, ILMs and IAMs have extended their system \r\ncoverage (Johnson et al. 2019)"


id: 545153fbf4a5d0d51089484be634fcac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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" However, the explicit modelling \r\nand analysis of integrated land-use systems is relatively new \r\ncompared to other sectoral assessments such as the energy system \r\n(Jia et al. 2019). Consequently, ILMs as well as IAMs differ in their \r\nportfolio and representation of land-based mitigation options, the \r\nrepresentation of sustainability goals other than climate action as \r\nwell as the interplay with mitigation in other sectors (van Soest \r\net al. 2019; Johnson et al. 2019). These structural differences have \r\nimplications for the regional and global deployment of different \r\nmitigation options as well as their sustainability impacts."


id: 122214ca5388113de8bb1a6f84ab398d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"As a consequence of the relative novelty of land-based mitigation \r\nassessment in ILMs and IAMs, the portfolio of land-based mitigation \r\noptions does not cover the full option space as outlined in Section 7.4. \r\nThe inclusion and detail of a  specific mitigation measure differs \r\nacross models. Land-based mitigation options are only partially \r\nincluded in ILM and IAM analyses, which mostly rely on afforestation/\r\nreforestation and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS). Most ILM and IAM \r\nscenarios are based on the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) \r\n(Riahi et al. 2017), which is a  set of contrasting future scenarios \r\nwidely used in the research community such as in the CMIP6 exercise, \r\nthe SRCCL and the IPBES global assessment"


id: 4352be5daa932978893ff726b66e7d35
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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" However, the coverage \r\nof land-based mitigation options in these scenarios is mostly limited \r\nto dietary changes, higher efficiency in food processing (especially \r\nin livestock production systems), reduction of food waste, increasing \r\nagricultural productivity, methane reductions in rice paddies, \r\nlivestock and grazing management for reduced methane emissions \r\nfrom enteric fermentation, manure management, improvement of \r\nN-efficiency, international trade, first generation of biofuels, avoided \r\ndeforestation, afforestation, bioenergy and BECCS (Popp et al. 2017; \r\nVan Meijl et al. 2018; Frank et al. 2019). Hence, there are mitigation \r\noptions not being broadly included in integrated pathway modelling \r\nas soil carbon, forest management, agroforestry or wetland "


id: c3d7c477c3cba1d63bf8133787ebb43
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"In most of the assessed mitigation pathways, the AFOLU sector is \r\nof great importance for climate change mitigation as it (i) turns \r\nfrom a  source into a  sink of atmospheric CO2 due to large-scale \r\nafforestation and reforestation, (ii) provides high amounts of biomass \r\nfor bioenergy with or without CCS and (iii), even under improved \r\nagricultural management, still causes residual non-CO2 emissions \r\nfrom agricultural production and (iv) interplays with sustainability \r\ndimensions other than climate action (Popp et al. 2017; Rogelj \r\net al. 2017; Van Vuuren et al. 2018; Frank et al. 2018; Hasegawa \r\net al. 2018; van Soest et al. 2019). Regional AFOLU GHG emissions \r\nin scenarios with <4degC warming in 2100 (scenario category C7), \r\nas shown in Figure  7.13, are shaped by considerable CH4 and \r\nN2O emissions throughout 2050 and 2100, mainly from ASIA and \r\nAFRICA"


id: 48b8bc3d3c153fa5aae2cdfa4ee6cb07
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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"Figure 7.13 | Land-based regional GHG emissions and removals in 2050 (top) and 2100 (bottom) for scenarios from the AR6 Database with <1.5degC (C1, \r\nC2), <2degC (C3, C4), <3degC (C5, C6) and <4degC (C7) global warming in 2100 (scenario type is indicated by colour). The categories shown include CH4 emissions \r\nfrom enteric fermentation (EntF) and rice production (Rice), N2O emissions from animal waste management (AWM) and fertilisation (Soil). The category CO2 Land includes CO2\r\nemissions from land-use change as well as removals due to afforestation/reforestation. BECCS reflects the CO2 emissions captured from bioenergy use and stored in geological \r\ndeposits. The annual GHG emission data from various models and scenarios is converted to CO2 equivalents using GWP factors of 27 for CH4 and 273 for N2O. The data is \r\nsummarised in boxplots (Tukey style), which show the median (vertical line), the interquartile range (IQR box) and the range of values within 1"


id: 10d11114377ca8929716abc4656d5c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"5 x interquartile range at either \r\nend of the box (horizontal lines) across all models and scenarios. The number of data points available for each emission category, scenario type, region and year is shown at the \r\nedge of each panel. Regional definitions: AFRICA = sub-Saharan Africa, ASIA = Asia, LAM = Latin America and Caribbean, MID_EAST = Middle East, OECD90+EU = OECD 90 \r\nand EU, REF = Reforming Economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union."


id: 8d38d0a4c1209b545528e819c8219a09
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"Figure 7.15 | Mitigation of CO2, CH4 and N2O emissions (in CO2-eq yr-1 using IPCC AR6 GWP100 values) from the AFOLU sector for increasing carbon \r\nprice levels for 2030 and 2050. In the left-hand panels, single data points are generated by comparing emissions between a policy scenario and a related benchmark \r\nscenario, and mapping these differences with the respective carbon price difference. Plots only show the price range of up to 250 USD2010 tCO2-eq-1 and the mitigation range \r\nbetween -2000 and 6000 MtCO2-eq yr-1 for better visibility. At the right-hand side, based on the same data as left-hand side panels, boxplots show medians (vertical line \r\nwithin the boxes), means (dots), 33%-66% intervals (box) and 10%-90% intervals (horizontal lines). Numbers on the very right indicate the number of observations falling \r\ninto the respective price range per variable"


id: 49de041695720e958c69bce5b20e2330
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" A wide range of carbon price induced mitigation options (such as technical, structural and behavioural options in the agricultural \r\nsector, afforestation, reforestation, natural re-growth or avoided deforestation in the LULUCF sector, excluding carbon capture and sequestration from BECCS) are reflected in \r\ndifferent scenarios."


id: a9a5e890ce654de8caf6776957fd3d89
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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"This approach is close to integrated assessment marginal abatement \r\ncost curves (MACCs) as described in the literature (Fujimori et al. \r\n2016; Frank et al. 2018, 2019; Harmsen et al. 2019) in the sense \r\nthat it incorporates besides the technical mitigation options also \r\nstructural options, as well as behavioural changes and market \r\nfeedbacks. Furthermore, indirect emission changes and interactions \r\nwith other sectors can be highly relevant (Daioglou et al. 2019; Kalt \r\net al. 2020) and are also accounted for in the presented potentials. \r\nHereby, some sequestration efforts can occur in other sectors, while \r\nleading to less mitigation in the AFOLU sector. For instance, as an \r\nintegral part of many scenarios, BECCS deployment will lead to \r\noverall emissions reductions, and even provision of CDR as a result of \r\nthe interplay between three direct components (i) LULUCF emissions/\r\nsinks, (ii) reduction of fossil fuel use/emissions, (iii) carbon capture \r\nand sequestration"


id: ed8fb7407f23bd40cec300369c99c988
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" Since the latter two effects can compensate for \r\nthe LULUCF effect, BECCS deployment in ambitious stabilisation \r\nscenarios may lead to reduced sink/increased emissions in LULUCF \r\n(Kalt et al. 2020). The same holds for trade-offs between carbon \r\nsequestration in forests versus harvested wood products both for \r\nenhancing the HWP pool and for material substitution. The strengths \r\nof the competition between biomass use and carbon sequestration \r\nwill depend on the biomass feedstocks considered (Lauri et al. 2019)."


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vector_id: 36329
content:
"When compared with the sectoral estimates from Harmsen et al. \r\n(2019), the integrated assessment median potentials are broadly \r\ncomparable for the N2O mitigation potential; Harmsen et al. \r\n2050 mitigation potential at USD125 is 0.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1 while \r\nthe integrated assessment estimate for the same price range is \r\n0.7 GtCO2-eq yr-1. The difference is substantially larger for the CH4\r\nmitigation potential; 0.9 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in Harmsen et al. while \r\n2 GtCO2-eq yr-1 the median integrated assessment estimate. While \r\nthe Harmsen et al. MACCs consider only technological mitigation \r\noptions, integrated assessments typically include also demand side \r\nresponse to the carbon price and GHG efficiency improvements \r\nthrough structural change and international trade"


id: 32acbcd52434e9eb6d8bcfb50b4080ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 5390
content:
" These additional \r\nmitigation options can represent more than 60% of the total non-CO2\r\nmitigation potential in the agricultural sector, where they are more \r\nimportant in the livestock sector, and thus the difference between \r\nsectoral and integrated assessments is more pronounced for the CH4\r\nemissions (Frank et al. 2019)."


id: 3d5ff8301d06db887ee48d545e564ef8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 7015
content:
"Figure 7.17 | Evolution and breakdown of (a) global land-based GHG emissions and removals and (b) global land-use dynamics under four Illustrative \r\nMitigation Pathways, which illustrate the differences in timing and magnitude of land-based mitigation approaches including afforestation and \r\nBECCS. All pathways are based on different IAM realisations: ModAct scenario (below 3.0degC, C6) from IMAGE 3.0; IMP Neg-2.0 (limit warming to 2degC (>67%), C3) from AIM/\r\nCGE 2.2; IMP Ren (1.5degC with no or low overshoot, C1) from REMIND-MAgPIE 2.1-4.3; IMP SP (1.5degC with no or low overshoot, C1) from REMIND-MAgPIE 2.1-4.2. In panel \r\nA the categories CO2 AFOLU, CH4 AFOLU and N2O AFOLU include GHG emissions from land-use change and agricultural land use (including emissions related to bioenergy \r\nproduction). In addition, the category CO2 Land includes removals due to afforestation/reforestation. BECCS reflects the CO2 emissions captured from bioenergy use and stored \r\nin geological deposits"


id: 3170615406e3ad66eca7ec2efafbccc2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5192
content:
"In contrast to IMPs Neg-2.0 and Ren, IMP SP (Soergel et al. 2021; 1.5degC \r\nwith no or low OS, C1) displays a future of generally low resource and \r\nenergy consumption (including healthy diets with low animal-calorie \r\nshares and low food waste) as well as significant but sustainable \r\nagricultural intensification in combination with high levels of \r\nnature protection. This pathway shows a strong near-term decrease \r\nof CO2 emissions from land-use change, mainly due to reduced \r\ndeforestation, and in difference to all other IMPs described in this \r\nchapter strongly decreasing N2O and CH4 emissions from agricultural \r\nproduction due to improved agricultural management but also based \r\non dietary shifts away from emissions-intensive livestock products \r\nas well as lower shares of food waste. In consequence, comparably \r\nsmall amounts of land are needed for land demanding mitigation \r\nactivities such as BECCS and afforestation"


id: 75c94788fc463902ccf1cf3034d7c1e1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16128
content:
" In particular, the amount \r\nof agricultural land converted to bioenergy cropland is smaller \r\ncompared to other mitigation pathways. Forest area increases either \r\nby regrowth of secondary vegetation following the abandonment \r\nof agricultural land or by afforestation/reforestation at the cost of \r\nagricultural land."


id: 3c685c9786d75cbb99f8eef73dfaa263
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6866
content:
"The scenario ModAct (limit warming to 3degC (>50%), C6) is based on \r\nthe prolongation of current trends (SSP2) but contains measures to \r\nstrengthen policies for the implementation of National Determined \r\nContributions (NDCs) in all sectors including AFOLU (Grassi et al. \r\n2018). This pathway shows a strong decrease of CO2 emissions from \r\nland-use change in 2030, mainly due to reduced deforestation, as well \r\nas moderately decreasing N2O and CH4 emissions from agricultural \r\nproduction due to improved agricultural management and dietary \r\nshifts away from emissions-intensive livestock products. However, \r\nin contrast to CO2 emissions, which turn net-negative around 2050 \r\ndue to afforestation/reforestation, CH4 and N2O emissions persist \r\nthroughout the century due to difficulties of eliminating these \r\nresidual emissions based on existing agricultural management \r\nmethods (Frank et al. 2017; Stevanovic et al. 2017)"


id: 9c8a51f5053d8b85221f25fd20fab945
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22178
content:
" Comparably small \r\namounts of BECCS are applied by the end of the century. Forest area \r\nincreases at the cost of other natural vegetation."


id: d9a3cd495938ca43b65875052364ad3b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31753
content:
"IMP-Neg is similar to ModAct scenario in terms of socio-economic \r\nsetting (SSP2) but differs strongly in terms of the mitigation target \r\n(limit warming to 2degC (>67%), C3) and its strong focus on the supply \r\nside of mitigation measures with strong reliance on net-negative \r\nemissions. Consequently, all GHG emission reductions as well as \r\nafforestation/reforestation and BECCS-based CDR start earlier in \r\ntime at a  higher rate of deployment. However, in contrast to CO2\r\nemissions, which turn net-negative around 2030 due to afforestation/\r\nreforestation, CH4 and N2O emissions persist throughout the century, \r\nsimilar to ModAct, due to ongoing increasing demand for total \r\ncalories and animal-based commodities (Bodirsky et al. 2020) and \r\ndifficulties of eliminating these residual emissions based on existing \r\nagricultural management methods (Stevanovic et al. 2017; Frank \r\net al. 2017)"


id: 9d97ae00b8a24d47b19c73a23ff3b252
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22326
content:
" In addition to abating land-related GHG emissions \r\nas well as increasing the terrestrial sink, this example also shows \r\nthe potential importance of the land sector in providing biomass \r\nfor BECCS and hence CDR in the energy sector. Cumulative CDR \r\n(2020-2100) amounts to 502 GtCO2 for BECCS and 121 GtCO2 for \r\nland-use change (including afforestation and reduced deforestation). \r\nIn consequence, compared to ModAct scenario, competition for \r\nland is increasing and much more other natural land as well as \r\nagricultural land (cropland and pasture land) is converted to forest or \r\nbioenergy cropland with potentially severe consequences for various \r\nsustainability dimensions such as biodiversity (Hof et al. 2018) and \r\nfood security (Fujimori et al. 2019)."


id: 5d4fcb8aa685720528b7dde761410ad9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12198
content:
"Since the establishment of the UNFCCC, international agencies, \r\ncountries, sub-national units and NGO's have developed policies to \r\nfacilitate and encourage GHG mitigation within AFOLU (Figure 7.18). \r\nEarly guidance and policies focused on developing GHG inventory \r\nmethodology with some emphasis on afforestation and reforestation \r\nprojects, but the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the Kyoto \r\nProtocol focused attention on emission reduction projects, mostly \r\noutside of AFOLU. As successive IPCC AR6 WGIII reports illustrated \r\nlarge potential for AFOLU mitigation, methods to quantify and \r\nverify carbon emission reductions emerged within several projects \r\nin the early 2000s, through both voluntary (e.g.,  the Chicago \r\nClimate Exchange (CCX)) and regulated (e.g., New South Wales and \r\nCalifornia) markets. The CDM dedicated large attention to LULUCF, \r\nincluding dedicated methodologies and bodies"


id: 53c9bf8d76a1ca3714c2bd3253b2dc5a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10650
content:
" The reasons for \r\nlimited uptake of CDM afforestation/reforestation projects were \r\nmultiple and not limited to the regulatory constraints, but also due to \r\nthe low abatement potential (poor cost/performance ratio) compared \r\nto other mitigation opportunities."


id: 64334815e74dd0e03919e120388b8292
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13334
content:
"The voluntary market data in Table  7.4 are offsets developed \r\nunder the major standard-setting organisations, and issued from \r\n2008-2018 (e.g., Hamrick and Gallant 2018). Note that there is some \r\npotential for double counting of voluntary offsets that may have \r\nbeen transacted in the California compliance market, however this \r\nwould only have applied to transactions of US-issued offsets, and \r\nthe largest share of annual transactions of voluntary AFOLU credits \r\noccurs with credits generated in Latin America, followed by Africa, \r\nAsia and North America. Europe and Oceania have few voluntary \r\ncarbon market transactions. Within forestry and agriculture, most \r\nof the voluntary offsets were generated by forestry projects. Using \r\nhistorical transaction data from various Forest Trends reports, the \r\noffsets generated were valued at USD46.9 million yr-1. Prices for \r\nvoluntary offset transactions in the period 2014-2016 ranged from \r\nUSD4.90 to USD5"


id: a1a1bf440b98d12a0da8115e91873e72
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22985
content:
"Canadian provinces have developed a range of policy options that can \r\ninclude carbon offsets. Quebec has an emissions trading programme \r\nthat plans to allow forest and agricultural offsets generated within \r\nthe province to be utilised. Alberta also allows offsets to be utilised by \r\nregulated sectors while British Columbia allows offsets to be utilised \r\nby the government for its carbon neutrality goals (Government of \r\nAlberta, 2021). Over 20 countries and regions have adopted explicit \r\ncarbon taxes on carbon emission sources and fossil fuels, however, \r\nthe charges have not been applied to non-CO2 agricultural emissions \r\n(OECD 2021a). California may implement regulations on methane \r\nemissions from cattle, however, regulations if approved, will not \r\ngo into effect until 2024. Institutional and trade-related barriers \r\n(e.g., leakage) likely will limit widespread implementation of taxes \r\non emissions in the food sector globally"


id: 83eaeec0087572fa2efd6996a1e284a3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18286
content:
" Many countries exempt \r\npurchases of fuels used in agricultural or fishery production from \r\nfuel or carbon taxes, thus lowering the effective tax rate imposed on \r\nthose sectors (OECD 2021a). Furthermore, bioenergy, produced from \r\nagricultural products, agricultural waste, and wood is often exempted \r\nfrom explicit carbon taxes. Colombia recently implemented a carbon \r\ntax on liquid fuels but allowed domestically produced forestry credits \r\nto offset the tax. Colombia also is in the process of developing an \r\nemissions trading scheme (OECD 2021a)."


id: ecc267cacb451a88e8b5f348acfa989f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34728
content:
"A large literature has investigated whether PES programmes have \r\nsuccessfully protected habitats. Studies in the USA found limited \r\nadditionality for programmes that encouraged conservation tillage \r\npractices, but stronger additionality for programmes that encouraged \r\nset-asides for grasslands or forests (Woodward et al. 2016; Claassen \r\net al. 2018), although the set-asides led to estimated leakage of \r\n20 up to 100% (Pfaff and Robalino 2017; Kallio et al. 2018; Wu 2000). \r\nEvidence from the EU similarly suggests that payments for some \r\nagroenvironmental practices may be additional, while others are not \r\n(Chabe-Ferret and Subervie 2013). Other studies, in particular in Latin \r\nAmerica where many PES programmes have been implemented, have \r\nfound a wide range of estimates of effectiveness (e.g., Honey-Roses \r\net al. 2011; Robalino and Pfaff 2013; Alix-Garcia et al. 2015; Robalino \r\net al. 2015; Mohebalian and Aguilar 2016; Jayachandran et al. 2017; \r\nBorner et al"


id: 61dcaa7bc3cae988236671dfe82e34b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 12961
content:
" 2017; Burivalova et al. 2019). Despite concerns, the \r\nmany lessons learned from PES programme implementation provide \r\ncritical information that will help policymakers refine future PES \r\nprogrammes to increase their effectiveness (medium confidence)."


id: 23012fdad7177de89aea71577bd8d96a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2952
content:
"Agroenvironmental Subsidy Programs/PES.  Climate policy \r\nfor agriculture has developed more slowly than in other sectors \r\ndue to concerns with food security and livelihoods, political \r\ninterests,  and difficulties in coordinating diffuse and diverse \r\nactivities and stakeholders (e.g., nutritional health, rural development, \r\nand biodiversity conservation) (Leahy et al. 2020). However, a review \r\nof the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPAs), National \r\nAdaptation Plans (NAPs), NAMAs, and NDCs in the Paris Agreement \r\nsuggest an increasing focus of policy makers on agriculture and \r\nfood security. The vast majority of parties to the Paris Agreement \r\nrecognise the significant role of agriculture in supporting a secure \r\nsustainable development pathway (Richards and VanWey 2015) with \r\nthe inclusion of agriculture mitigation in 103 NDCs from a total of \r\n160 NDC submissions"


id: fd94ed12fcf901e91d1aede73a8f3e25
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37414
content:
" Livestock is the most frequently cited specific \r\nagricultural sub-sector, with mitigation activities generally focusing \r\non increasing efficiency and productivity."


id: e3a9ed1b5a8e376d15284b1b7092563d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33300
content:
"Agriculture is one of the most subsidised industries globally, especially \r\nin the European Union and the USA. While subsidy payments over \r\nthe last 20 years have shifted modestly to programmes designed \r\nto reduce the environmental impact of the agricultural sector, \r\nonly 15-20% of the more than USD700 billion spent globally on \r\nsubsidies are green payments (OECD 2021b). Under the Common \r\nAgricultural Policy in the EU, up to 30% of the direct payments to \r\nfarmers (Pillar 1) have been green payments (Henderson et al. 2020), \r\nincluding some actions that could increase carbon storage or reduce \r\nemissions. Similarly, at least 30% of the rural development payments \r\n(Pillar 2) are used for measures that reduce environmental impact, \r\nincluding reduction of GHG emissions and carbon storage. There is \r\nlimited evidence that these policies contributed to the 20% reduction \r\nin GHG emissions from the agricultural sector in the EU between \r\n1990 and 2018 (Baudrier et al"


id: 6bc0cc18d7c18d879508f109e229836c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 14581
content:
"Many OECD countries have strong legal frameworks that influence \r\nagricultural and forest management on both public and private land. \r\nThese include for example, legal requirements to protect endangered \r\nspecies, implement conservation tillage, protect riparian areas, replant \r\nforests after harvest, maintain historical species composition, forest \r\ncertification, and other approaches. Increasingly, laws support more \r\nwidespread implementation of nature-based solutions for a  range \r\nof environmental issues (e.g., see European Commission-EU 2021). \r\nThe extent to which the combined influence of these regulations has \r\nenhanced carbon storage in ecosystems is not quantified although \r\nthey are likely to explain some of the persistent carbon sink that has \r\nemerged in temperate forests of OECD countries (high confidence)"


id: ce7075046bd1396f4b85383720740750
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30012
content:
" In \r\nthe least developed and developing countries, regulatory approaches \r\nface challenges in part because environmental issues are a  lower \r\npriority than many other socio-economic issues (e.g.,  poverty, \r\nopportunity, essential services), and weak governance (Mayer \r\nPelicice 2019; Walker et al. 2020) (Box 7.2)."


id: ff15d7c7d3db72ba34568a0a2c056339
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37684
content:
"Set asides and protected areas have been a widely utilised approach \r\nfor conservation, and according to (FAO 2020d), 726 Mha (18%) of \r\nforests are in protected areas globally. A review of land sparing and \r\nland sharing policies in developing countries indicated that most of \r\nthem follow land sparing models, sometimes in combination with \r\nland sharing approaches. However, there is still no clear evidence of \r\nwhich policy provides the best results for ecosystem services provision, \r\nconservation, and livelihoods (Mertz and Mertens 2017). The literature \r\ncontains a  wide range of results on the effectiveness of protected \r\nareas to reduce deforestation (Burivalova et al. 2019), with studies \r\nsuggesting that protected areas provide significant protection of \r\nforests (e.g., Blackman 2015), modest protection (Andam et al. 2008), \r\nas well as increases in deforestation (Blackman 2015) and possible \r\nleakage of harvesting to elsewhere (Kallio et al. 2018)"


id: 41c00e3715202215d0a219e7e190757a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7747
content:
" An estimate \r\nof the contributions of protected areas to mitigation between 2000 \r\nand 2012, showed that in the tropics, PAs reduced carbon emissions \r\nfrom deforestation by 4.88 PgC, or around 29%, when compared to the \r\nexpected rates of deforestation (Bebber and Butt 2017). In that study, "


id: eaa602e292bb394274127dd8b3896df1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34426
content:
"Identified lessons. The elements of sustainability are intertwined with Menominee history, culture, spirituality, and ethics. The \r\nbalance between the environment, community, and economy for the short term as well as future generations is an example of \r\nprotecting the entire environment as the Menominee land is a non-fragmented remnant of the prehistoric Lake States forest which \r\nhas been dramatically reduced all around the reserve (Schabel and Pecore 1997). These and other types of community forest owner \r\nassociations exist all over the world. Examples are Sodra in Sweden (with 52,000 forest owners) (Sodra, 2021) or Waldbauernverband \r\nin North-Rhine Westphalia (with 150,000 forest owners and covering 585,000 ha) (AGDW-The Forest Owners, 2021). These are ways \r\nfor small forest owners to educate, jointly put wood on the market, employ better forest management, use machinery together, and \r\napply certification jointly"


id: cab2d9873d6ee3d3dc439bb551b57d97
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29453
content:
" In this manner and with all their diversity of goals, they manage to maintain carbon sinks and stocks, while \r\npreserving biodiversity and producing wood."


id: bd349c919fb2463765c22ff1cc0c4f09
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27333
content:
"There is evidence that the Amazon Soy Moratorium (ASM), an industry\u0002NGO effort whereby large industry consumers agreed voluntarily not \r\nto purchase soybeans grown on land deforested after 2006, reduced \r\ndeforestation in the legal Amazon (Nepstad et al. 2014; Gibbs et al. \r\n2015). However, recent studies have shown that some deforestation \r\nfrom the Amazon was displaced to the Cerrado (Brazilian savannas) \r\nregion (Moffette and Gibbs 2021), which is a  global hotspot for \r\nbiodiversity, and has significant carbon stocks. These results illustrate \r\nthe importance of broadening the scope of supply chain management \r\nto minimise or eliminate displacement (Lima et al. 2019). In addition, \r\nwhile voluntary efforts may improve environmental outcomes for a time, \r\nit is not clear that they are sufficient to deliver long-term reductions in \r\ndeforestation, given the increases in deforestation that have occurred \r\nin the Amazon in recent years (Box 7.9)"


id: 661a9796549b14c4150ad9514f6364c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13658
content:
" Voluntary efforts would be \r\nmore effective at slowing deforestation if they present stronger \r\nlinkages to regulatory or other approaches (Lambin et al. 2018)."


id: f9f730eee2168ff5c9bc21cdda71d9bb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36835
content:
"Combating deforestation was a  theme in several programs, government plans, and projects not being more restricted to the \r\nenvironmental agenda. This broader inclusion resulted from a long process of insertion and articulation in the government dating \r\nback to 2003 while elaborating on the Sustainable Amazon Plan. In May 2003, a historic meeting took place in an Amazonian city, \r\nwith the president of the Republic, state governors, ministers, and various business leaders, civil institutions, and social movements. It \r\nwas presented and approved the document entitled 'Sustainable Amazonia - Guidelines and Priorities of the Ministry of Environment \r\nfor the Sustainable Development of the Amazon Brazilian', containing several guidelines for conservation and sustainable use in the \r\nregion"


id: b757f5973433da92c366ceae830d7447
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 26374
content:
" At the meeting, the Union and some states signed a Cooperation Agreement aiming to elaborate a plan for the Amazon, to be \r\nwidely discussed with the various sectors of the regional and national society (Ministerio do Meio Ambiente, MMA, 2013)."


id: 9fbcc14f4de5d16a5888b35dce52914a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22671
content:
"The PPCDAm had three main lines of action: (i) territorial management and land use; (ii) command and control; and (iii) promotion \r\nof sustainable practices. During the execution of the 1st and 2nd phases of the PPCDAm (2004-2011), important results in the \r\nterritorial management and land-use component included, for example, the creation of 25 Mha of federal Protected Areas (PAs) \r\nlocated mainly in front of the expansion of deforestation, as well as the homologation of 10 Mha of Indigenous Lands. Also, states \r\nand municipalities created approximately 25 Mha, so that all spheres of government contributed to the expansion of PAs in the \r\nBrazilian Amazon. In the 'command and control' component, agencies performed hundreds of inspection operations against illegal \r\nactivities (e.g., illegal logging) under strategic planning based on technical and territorial priorities"


id: f8820430bab32a77f4e980d2c0838eeb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36608
content:
" Besides, there was a significant \r\nimprovement of the environmental monitoring systems, involving the analysis of satellite images to guide actions on the ground. \r\nAnother policy was the restriction of public credit to enterprises linked to illegal deforestation following a resolution of the Brazilian \r\nCentral Bank (2008) (Ministerio do Meio Ambiente, MMA, 2013). Also, in 2008, Brazil created the Amazon Fund, a REDD+ mechanism \r\n(Government of Brazil, n.d.)."


id: eb1b3e2380730f7f34b7552cbaf55d7b
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vector_id: 34491
content:
"However, alternative statistical approaches have been deployed in the \r\nliterature to assess additionality with a quasi-experimental method that \r\nrely on developing a counterfactual (e.g., Andam et al. 2008; Blackman \r\n2015; Sills et al. 2015; Fortmann et al. 2017; Roopsind et al. 2019). In \r\nseveral studies, additionality in avoided deforestation was established \r\nafter the project had been developed by comparing land-use change in \r\ntreated plots where the policy or programme was in effect with land\u0002use change in similar untreated plot. Alternatively, synthetic matching \r\nstatistically compares trends in a  treated region (i.e., a  region with \r\na policy) to trends in a region without the policy, and has been applied \r\nin a region in Brazil (e.g., Sills et al. 2015), and at the country level \r\nin Guyana (Roopsind et al. 2019)"


id: 6027730c89f78076abe2eb6e09fffad9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" While these analyses establish that \r\nmany projects to reduce deforestation have overcome hurdles related \r\nto additionality (high confidence), there has not been a  systematic \r\nassessment of the elements of project or programme design that lead \r\nto high levels of additionality. Such assessment could help developers \r\ndesign projects to better meet additionality criteria."


id: 56388a2387b296faf417eae273bb1660
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
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vector_id: 11050
content:
"carbon benefits and equity for sustainable development (Martius \r\net al. 2016). Around USD0.7 billion yr-1 has been invested in land\u0002based carbon offsets (Table 7.4), but as noted in Streck (2012), there \r\nis a large funding gap between these efforts and the scale of efforts \r\nnecessary to meet 1.5 or 2.0degC targets outlined in SR1.5. As Box 7.12 \r\ndiscusses, forestry actions could achieve up to 5.8 GtCO2 yr-1 with \r\ncosts rising from USD178 billion yr-1 to USD400 billion yr-1 by 2050. \r\nOver half of this investment is expected to occur in Latin America, \r\nwith 13% in SE Asia and 17% in sub-Saharan Africa (Austin et al. \r\n2020). Other studies have suggested that similar sized programmes \r\nare possible, although they do not quantify total costs (e.g., Griscom \r\net al. 2017; Busch et al. 2019)"


id: 24211e1b471ba8ed1db1b0b1834e45aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3126
content:
" The currently quantified efforts \r\nto reduce net emissions with forests and agricultural actions are \r\nhelpful, but society will need to quickly ramp up investments to \r\nachieve carbon sequestration levels consistent with high levels of \r\nmitigation. Only 2.5% of climate mitigation funding goes to land\u0002based mitigation options, an order of magnitude below the potential \r\nproportional contribution (Buchner et al. 2015)."


id: db7f0f0e8160cb1db24242c94d5da28d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 32048
content:
"Permanence focuses on the potential for carbon sequestered in \r\noffsets to be released in the future due to natural or anthropogenic \r\ndisturbances. Most offset registries have strong permanence \r\nrequirements, although they vary in their specific requirements. The \r\nVerified Carbon Standard (VCS) from the Verra programme requires \r\na  pool of additional carbon credits that provides a  buffer against \r\ninadvertent losses. The Climate Action Reserve (CAR) protocol for \r\nforests requires carbon to remain on the site for 100 years. The carbon \r\non the site will be verified at pre-determined intervals over the life \r\nof the project. If carbon is diminished on a given site, the credits for \r\nthe site have to be relinquished and the project developer has to use \r\ncredits from their reserve fund (either other projects or purchased \r\ncredits) to make up for the loss. Estimates of leakage in forestry \r\nprojects in AR5 suggest that it can range from 10% to over 90% in \r\nthe USA (Murray et al"


id: d668844ea222e2bfa6e5bbf9c81c1a01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" 2004), and 20-50% in the tropics (Sohngen \r\nand Brown 2004) for forest set-asides and reduced harvesting. \r\nCarbon offset protocols have made a  variety of assumptions. The \r\nClimate Action Reserve (CAR) assumes it is 20% in the USA. One of \r\nthe voluntary protocols (Verra) uses specific information about the \r\nlocation of the project to calculate a location specific leakage factor."


id: 83f2354f9265aeb5afdda6456eb7db72
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 18292
content:
"More recent literature has developed explicit estimates of leakage \r\nbased on statistical analysis of carbon projects or programs. The \r\nliterature suggests that there are two economic pathways for leakage \r\n(e.g.,  (Roopsind et al. 2019), either through a  shift in output price \r\nthat occurs when outputs are affected by the policy or programme \r\nimplementation, as described in (Wear and Murray 2004; Murray et al. \r\n2004; Sohngen and Brown 2004; Gan and McCarl 2007), or through \r\na shift in input prices and markets, such as for labour or capital, as \r\nanalysed in (Andam et al. 2008; Alix-Garcia et al. 2012; Honey-Roses \r\net al. 2011; Fortmann et al. 2017). Estimates of leakage through product \r\nmarkets (e.g.,  timber prices) have suggested leakage of up to 90% \r\n(Sohngen and Brown 2004; Murray et al. 2004; Gan and McCarl 2007; \r\nKallio et al. 2018), while studies that consider shifts in input markets are \r\nconsiderably smaller"


id: d8404a5ce117b45f0eabe6f35ead63df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 31549
content:
" The analysis of leakage for the Guyana programme \r\nby Roopsind et al. (2019) revealed no statistically significant leakage in \r\nSuriname. A key design feature for any programme to reduce leakage \r\nis to increase incentives for complementary mitigation policies to be \r\nimplemented in areas where leakage may occur. Efforts to continue \r\nto draw more forests into carbon policy initiatives will reduce leakage \r\nover time Roopsind et al. (2019), suggesting that if NDCs continue to \r\nencompass a broader selection of policies, measures and forests over \r\ntime, leakage will decline."


id: 155c4d291ed363684ce4995776bf4087
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 879
content:
"Although quantified emission reductions in agricultural projects \r\nare limited to date, a  number of OECD and economy in transition \r\nparties have reduced their net emissions through carbon storage \r\nin cropland soils since 2000. These reductions in emissions have \r\ntypically resulted from policy innovations outside of the climate \r\nspace, or market trends. For example, in the USA, there has been \r\nwidespread adoption of conservation tillage in the last 30 years as \r\na labour-saving crop management technique. In Europe, agricultural \r\nN2O and CH4 emissions have declined due to reductions in nutrient \r\ninputs and cattle numbers (Henderson et al. 2020). These reductions \r\nmay be attributed to mechanism within the Common Agricultural \r\nPolicy (Section 7.6.2.1), but could also be linked to higher nutrient \r\nprices in the 2000-2014 period"


id: a0bc42ee0b02d4b41106c9ef16277e1b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 22831
content:
" Other environmental policies \r\ncould play a  role, for example, efforts to reduce water pollution \r\nfrom phosphorus in The Netherlands, may ultimately reduce cattle \r\nnumbers, also lowering CH4 emissions."


id: 867bda924bba4474e4f1b99951d4bf26
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 18701
content:
"The agricultural sector throughout the world is influenced by many \r\npolicies that affect production practices, crop choices and land use. \r\nIt is difficult to quantify the effect of these policies on reference \r\nlevel GHG emissions from the sector, as well as the cost estimates \r\npresented in Sections 7.4 and 7.5. The presence of significant subsidy \r\nprogrammes intended to improve farmer welfare and rural livelihoods \r\nmakes it more difficult to implement regulatory programmes aimed \r\nat reducing net emissions in agriculture, however, it may increase \r\nthe potential to implement new subsidy programmes that encourage \r\npractices aimed at reducing net emissions (medium confidence). \r\nFor instance, in the USA, crop insurance can influence both crop \r\nchoices and land use (Miao et al. 2016; Claassen et al. 2017), both \r\nof which will affect emission trends"


id: 42a103e3794f0205008dc77bfddeac20
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7874
content:
" Regulations to limit nutrient \r\napplications have not been widely considered, however, federal \r\nsubsidy programmes have been implemented to encourage farmers \r\nto conduct nutrient management planning."


id: 6d325b95f1bcd358e92d08405fa166e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 14800
content:
"Total global agricultural land area has remained relatively stable while overall production has increased in recent decades (Section 7.3), \r\nindicating that agricultural intensification, as judged by production per unit of land (Petersen and Snapp 2015; OECD and FAO 2019) has \r\ntaken place. However, changes in agricultural land use and degradation of natural resources (UNEP 2019; IPBES 2019b) suggests that \r\nnot all of this intensification is sustainable. Although agricultural intensification has led to less GHG emissions compared to a scenario \r\nwhere that intensification had not taken place (Burney et al. 2010), absolute agriculture related emissions have continued to increase \r\n(Section 7.2). Active pursuit of SI was found to be expanding, with implementation on an increasing area, notably in developing \r\ncountries (Pretty et al. 2018), yet regional agricultural area expansion at the expense of native habitat also continues in such regions \r\n(Section 7.3)"


id: 58a5c62eb9476642aa8423f7f6795917
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 11443
content:
" Although there are specific examples of SI (Box 7.13) global progress in achieving SI is acknowledged as slow (Cassman \r\nand Grassini 2020) with potentially multiple, context specific geophysical and socio-economic barriers to implementation (Firbank \r\net al. 2018; da Silva et al. 2021)."


id: cd17137c2db7b26d2a5c4199b37ae920
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29818
content:
"A factor that will influence future carbon storage in so-called \r\nland-based reservoirs involves considering short- and long\u0002term climate benefits, as well as interactions among various natural \r\nclimate solution options. The benefits of various natural climate \r\nsolutions depend on a variety of spatially dependent issues as well as \r\ninstitutional factors, including their management status (managed or \r\nunmanaged systems), their productivity, opportunity costs, technical \r\ndifficulty of implementation, local willingness to consider, property \r\nrights and institutions, among other factors. Biomass energy, as \r\ndescribed elsewhere in this chapter and in (Cross-Working Group \r\nBox  3 in Chapter  12), is a  potential example of an option with \r\ntrade-offs that emerge when policies favour one type of mitigation \r\nstrategy over another"


id: 61b3a4569556e5d7269efa9e47205d02
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 12940
content:
" Bioenergy production needs safeguards \r\nto limit negative impacts on carbon stocks on the land base as is \r\nalready in place in the EU Renewable Energy Directive and several \r\nnational schemes in Netherlands, UK and Denmark (Buchholz et al. \r\n2016; Khanna et al. 2017; DeCicco and Schlesinger 2018; Favero \r\net al. 2020). It is argued that a carbon tax on only fossil fuel derived \r\nemissions, may lead to massive deployment of bioenergy, although \r\nthe effects of such a  policy can be mitigated when combined \r\nwith policies that encourage sustainable forest management and \r\nprotection of forest carbon stocks as well as forest management \r\ncertification (high confidence) (Nabuurs et al. 2017, Baker et al. 2019 \r\nand Favero et al. 2020)."


id: 66713dca2e057ab44b8f9f0449584b79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"The AR5 and other assessments have acknowledged many barriers \r\nand opportunities to effective implementation of AFOLU measures. \r\nMany of these barriers and opportunities focus on the context in \r\ndeveloping countries, where a  significant portion of the world's \r\ncost-effective mitigation exists, but where domestic financing for \r\nimplementation is likely to be limited. The SSPs capture some of this \r\ncontext, and as a  result, IAMs (Section  7.5) exhibit a  wide range \r\nof land-use outcomes, as well as mitigation potential. Potential \r\nmitigation, however, will be influenced by barriers and opportunities \r\nthat are not considered by IAMs or by bottom-up studies reviewed \r\nhere. For example, more efficient food production systems, or \r\nsustainable intensification within agriculture, and globalised trade \r\ncould enhance the extent of natural ecosystems leading to lower \r\nGHG emissions from the land system and lower food prices (Popp \r\net al"


id: 34c31040150b23bacaa2264145fcb534
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" 2017), but this (or any) pathway will create new barriers \r\nto implementation and encourage new opportunities, negating \r\npotential benefits (Box 7.11). It is critically important to consider the \r\ncurrent context in any country."


id: a8847bc77c86974065fcbafe7227a4d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 24038
content:
"Design and coverage of financing mechanisms. The lack of \r\nresources thus far committed to implementing AFOLU mitigation, \r\nincome and access to alternative sources of income in rural households \r\nthat rely on agriculture or forests for their livelihoods remains \r\na  considerable barrier to adoption of AFOLU (high confidence). \r\nSection  7.6.1 illustrates that to date only USD0.7  billion  yr-1 has \r\nbeen spent on AFOLU mitigation, well short of the more than \r\nUSD400 billion yr-1 that would be needed to achieve the economic \r\npotential described in Section  7.4. Despite long-term recognition \r\nthat AFOLU can play an important role in mitigation, the economic \r\nincentives necessary to achieve AFOLU aspirations as part of the \r\nParis Agreement or to maintain temperatures below 2.0degC have not \r\nemerged. Without quickly ramping up spending, the lack of funding \r\nto implement projects remains a substantial barrier (high confidence)"


id: 1f41a8d162b122f594288dfd28ff473b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" \r\nInvestments are critically important in the livestock sector, which has \r\nthe highest emissions reduction potential among options because \r\nactions in the sector influence agriculture specific activities, such \r\nas enteric fermentation, as well as deforestation (Mayberry et al. \r\n2019). In many countries with export-oriented livestock industries, \r\nlivestock farmers control large swaths of forests or re-forestable \r\nareas. Incentive mechanisms and funding can encourage adoption \r\nof mitigation strategies, but funding is currently too low to make \r\nconsistent progress."


id: e7e8803aab3efdd1f49dfddd3b5b32bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"Financing needs in AFOLU, and in particular in forestry, include both the direct effects of any changes in activities - costs of planting \r\nor managing trees, net revenues from harvesting, costs of thinning, costs of fire management, and so on - as well as the opportunity \r\ncosts associated with land-use change. Opportunity costs are a critical component of AFOLU finance, and must be included in any \r\nestimate of the funds necessary to carry out projects. They are largest, as share of total costs, in forestry because they play a prominent \r\nrole in achieving high levels of afforestation, avoided deforestation, and improved forest management. In case of increasing soil \r\ncarbon in croplands through reduced tillage, there are often cost savings associated with increased residues because there is less effort \r\ntilling, but the carbon effects per hectare are also modest. There could, however, be small opportunity costs in cases where residues \r\nmay otherwise be marketed to a biorefinery"


id: 5e0266cc6a0c8c9c9657810c2d88fdfe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12322
content:
" The effect of reduced tillage on yields varies considerably across sites and crop types, but \r\ntends to enhance yields modestly in the longer-run."


id: 5f8b23249913670a325312e4cd802f9f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12607
content:
"Cultural values and social acceptance. Barriers to adoption \r\nof AFOLU mitigation will be strongest where historical practices \r\nrepresent long-standing traditions (high confidence). Adoption \r\nof new mitigation practices, however, may proceed quickly if the \r\ntechnologies can be shown to improve crop yields, reduce costs, \r\nor otherwise improve livelihoods (Ranjan 2019). AR6 presents new \r\nestimates of the mitigation potential for shifts in diets and reductions \r\nin food waste, but given long-standing dietary traditions within most \r\ncultures, some of the strongest barriers exist for efforts to change \r\ndiets (medium confidence). Furthermore, the large number of \r\nundernourished who may benefit from increased calories and meat \r\nwill complicate efforts to change diets"


id: 6650bfd781ec0527ebf01e38d7b9ef08
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 13687
content:
" Regulatory or tax approaches \r\nwill face strong resistance, while efforts to use educational \r\napproaches and voluntary measures have limited potential to slow \r\nchanges in consumption patterns due to free-riders, rebound effects, \r\nand other limitations. Food loss and waste occurs across the supply \r\nchain, creating significant challenges to reduce it (FAO 2019c). Where \r\nfood loss occurs in the production stage, in other words, in fields \r\nat harvest, there may be opportunities to align reductions in food \r\nwaste with improved production efficiency, however, adoption of \r\nnew production methods often requires new investments or changes \r\nin labour practices, both of which are barriers."


id: f175717ad6b3ce859b95f44f424c6244
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35494
content:
"Transparent and accountable governance. Good governance and \r\naccountability are crucial for implementation of forest and agriculture \r\nmitigation. Effective nature-based mitigation will require large-scale \r\nestimation, modelling, monitoring, reporting and verification of \r\nGHG inventories, mitigation actions, as well as their implications for \r\nsustainable development goals and their interactions with climate \r\nchange impacts and adaptation. Efforts must be made to integrate \r\nthe accounting from projects to the country level. While global \r\ndatasets have emerged to measure forest loss, at least temporarily \r\n(e.g.,  Hansen et al. 2013), similar datasets do not yet exist for \r\nforest degradation and agricultural carbon stocks or fluxes. Most \r\ndeveloping countries have insufficient capacity to address research \r\nneeds, modelling, monitoring, reporting and data requirements \r\n(Ravindranath et al. 2017), compromising transparency, accuracy, \r\ncompleteness, consistency and comparability"


id: c99f0e9af1f3980fb1a707f22435640c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29277
content:
"Availability of land and water. Climate mitigation scenarios \r\nin the two recent special reports (SR1.5 and SRCCL) that aim to \r\nlimit global temperature increase to 2degC or less involve carbon \r\ndioxide (CO2) removal from the atmosphere. To support large-scale \r\nCDR, these scenarios involve significant land-use change, due to \r\nafforestation/reforestation, avoided deforestation, and deployment \r\nof biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). While \r\na considerable amount of land is certainly available for new forests \r\nor new bioenergy crops, that land has current uses that will affect not \r\nonly the costs, but also the willingness of current users or owners, \r\nto shift uses. Regions with private property rights and a history of \r\nmarket-based transactions may be the most feasible for land-use \r\nchange or land management change to occur"


id: e03f65d9e3abfbbf608e55c71b9d6268
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 32770
content:
" Areas with less secure \r\ntenure or a land market with fewer transactions in general will likely \r\nface important hurdles that limit the feasibility of implementing \r\nnovel nature-based solutions."


id: 1d0bce3da4f419a649db1fffed9072f9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2015
content:
"The linkage between biodiversity, ecosystem services, human \r\nwell-being and sustainable development is widely acknowledged \r\n(Millenium Ecosystem Assesment 2005; UNEP 2019). Loss of \r\nbiodiversity and ecosystem services will have an adverse impact on \r\nquality of life, human well-being and sustainable development (IPBES \r\n2019a). Such losses will not only affect current economic growth but \r\nalso impede the capacity for future economic growth.\r\nPopulation growth, economic development, urbanisation, technology, \r\nclimate change, global trade and consumption, policy and governance \r\nare key drivers of global environmental change over recent decades \r\n(Kram et al. 2014; UNEP 2019; WWF 2020). Changes in biodiversity and \r\necosystem services are mainly driven by habitat loss, climate change, \r\ninvasive species, over-exploitation of natural resources, and pollution \r\n(Millenium Ecosystem Assesment 2005). The relative importance of \r\nthese drivers varies across biomes, regions, and countries"


id: b89747eeea2aac8d9cf8d0bdad723880
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 26570
content:
" Climate \r\nchange is expected to be a major driver of biodiversity loss in the \r\ncoming decades, followed by commercial forestry and bioenergy \r\nproduction (OECD 2012; UNEP 2019). Population growth along with \r\nrising incomes and changes in consumption and dietary patterns, will \r\nexert immense pressure on land and other natural resources (IPCC \r\n2019). Current estimates suggest that 75% of the land surface has \r\nbeen significantly anthropogenically altered, with 66% of the ocean \r\narea experiencing increasing cumulative impacts and over 85% \r\nof wetland area lost (IPBES 2019a). As discussed, in Section  7.3, \r\nland-use change is driven amongst others by agriculture, forestry \r\n(logging and fuelwood harvesting), infrastructural development and \r\nurbanisation, all of which may also generate localised air, water, \r\nand soil pollution (IPBES 2019a)"


id: 90e47493d0ac5aae4860bf6b1c441523
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20340
content:
" Over a  third of the world's land \r\nsurface and nearly three-quarters of available freshwater resources \r\nare devoted to crop or livestock production (IPBES 2019a). Despite \r\na  slight reduction in global agricultural area since 2000, regional \r\nagricultural area expansion has occurred in Latin America and the \r\nCaribbean, Africa and the Middle East (FAO 2019c; OECD and FAO \r\n2019). The degradation of tropical forests and biodiversity hotspots, \r\nendangers habitat for many threatened and endemic species, \r\nand reduces valuable ecosystem services. However, trends vary \r\nconsiderably by region. As noted in Section 7.3, global forest area \r\ndeclined by roughly 178 Mha between 1990 and 2020 (FAO 2020a), \r\nthough the rate of net forest loss has decreased over the period, \r\ndue to reduced deforestation in some countries and forest gains \r\nin others"


id: 1d6d2cc4e23f1b62f47af34d9b7c6e77
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2075
content:
" Between 1990 to 2015, forest cover fell by almost 13% \r\nin South-East Asia, largely due to an increase in timber extraction, \r\nlarge-scale biofuel plantations and expansion of intensive agriculture \r\nand shrimp farms, whereas in North-East Asia and South Asia it \r\nincreased by 23% and 6% respectively, through policy instruments \r\nsuch as joint forest management, payment for ecosystem services, \r\nand restoration of degraded forests (IPBES 2018b). It is lamenting \r\nthat the area under natural forests which are rich in biodiversity \r\nand provide diverse ecosystem services decreased by 301 Mha \r\nbetween 1990 and 2020, decreasing in most regions except Europe \r\nand Oceania with largest losses reported in sub-Saharan Africa \r\n(FAO 2020a). The increasing trend of mining in forest and coastal \r\nareas, and in river basins for extracting has had significant negative "


id: 60e5b8df76d7f168989311d4df21fbdb
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vector_id: 12814
content:
"An evaluation of eighteen ecosystem services over the past five \r\ndecades (1970-2019) found only four (agricultural production, \r\nfish harvest, bioenergy production and harvest of materials) to \r\ndemonstrate increased performance, while the remaining fourteen, \r\nmostly concerning regulating and non-material contributions, were \r\nfound to be in decline (IPBES 2019a). The value of global agricultural \r\noutput (over USD3.54 trillion in 2018) had increased approximately \r\nthreefold since 1970, and roundwood production (industrial \r\nroundwood and fuelwood) by 27%, between 1980 to 2018, reaching \r\nsome 4 billion m3\r\n in 2018. However, the positive trends in these \r\nfour ecosystem services does not indicate long-term sustainability. \r\nIf increases in agricultural production are realised through forest \r\nclearance or through increasing energy-intensive inputs, gains are \r\nlikely to be unsustainable in the long run"


id: 816fd8d1597292d8289f50e382ba84df
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content:
" Similarly, an increase in \r\nfish production may involve overfishing, leading to local species \r\ndeclines which also impacts fish prices, fishing revenues, and the \r\nwell-being of coastal and fishing communities (Sumaila and Lam \r\n2020). Climate change and other drivers are likely to affect future fish \r\ncatch potential, although impacts will differ across regions (Sumaila \r\net al. 2017; Domke et al. 2019)."


id: a2371a5c5f8666908934812057d2cf14
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"de Groot et al. 2012; Ninan and Kontoleon 2016). The few studies \r\nthat have assessed the trends in the value of ecosystem services \r\nprovided by different ecosystems across regions and countries \r\nindicate a  declining trend (Costanza et al. 2014; Kubiszewski \r\net al. 2017). Land-use change is a  major driver behind loss of \r\nbiodiversity and ecosystem services in most regions (IPBES 2018b; \r\nIPBES 2018c, IPBES 2018d, Rice et al. 2018). Projected impacts of \r\nland-use change and climate change on biodiversity and ecosystem \r\nservices (material and regulating services) between 2015 to 2050 \r\nwere assessed to have relatively less negative impacts under global \r\nsustainability scenarios as compared to regional competition and \r\neconomic optimism scenarios (IPBES 2019a). The projected impacts \r\nwere based on a  subset of Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) \r\nscenarios and GHG emissions trajectories (RCP) developed in \r\nsupport of IPCC assessments"


id: 5210014bd2b8e38a86b48ea857650729
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" There are synergies, trade-offs and co\u0002benefits between ecosystem services and mitigation options with \r\nimpacts on ecosystem services differing by scale and contexts (high \r\nconfidence). Measures such as conservation agriculture, agroforestry, \r\nsoil and water conservation, afforestation, adoption of silvopastoral \r\nsystems, can help minimise trade-offs between mitigations options \r\nand ecosystem services (Duguma et al. 2014). Climate-smart \r\nagriculture (CSA) is being promoted to enable farmers to make \r\nagriculture more sustainable and adapt to climate change (Box 7.4). \r\nHowever, experience with CSA in Africa has not been encouraging. \r\nFor instance, a  study of climate-smart cocoa production in Ghana \r\nshows that due to lack of tenure (tree) rights, bureaucratic and legal \r\nhurdles in registering trees in cocoa farms, and other barriers small \r\ncocoa producers could not realise the project benefits (Box  7.13)"


id: 59f5acb77d9f757251abebefa12b4d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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" \r\nExperience of CSA in some other sub-Saharan African countries and \r\nother countries such as Belize too has been constrained by weak \r\nextension systems and policy implementation, and other barriers \r\n(Arakelyan et al. 2017; Kongsager 2017)."


id: 3b870e0488023387f7d3c990d2af7880
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"1997), such as ignoring ecological feedbacks and non-linearities that \r\nare central to the processes that link all species to each other and their \r\nhabitats, ignoring substitution effects may also apply to the global \r\nassessment (Smith 1997; Bockstael et al. 2000; Loomis et al. 2000). \r\nLand degradation has had a pronounced impact on ecosystem functions \r\nworldwide (IPBES 2018e). Net primary productivity of ecosystem \r\nbiomass and of agriculture is presently lower than it would have been \r\nunder a natural state on 23% of the global terrestrial area, amounting \r\nto a  5% reduction in total global net primary productivity (IPBES \r\n2018e). Over the past two centuries, soil organic carbon, an indicator \r\nof soil health, has seen an estimated 8% loss globally (176 GtC) from \r\nland conversion and unsustainable land management practices (IPBES \r\n2018e). Projections to 2050 predict further losses of 36 GtC from soils, \r\nparticularly in sub-Saharan Africa"


id: 58adb28cf7f94944763ef5f44c99da3c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" These losses are projected to come \r\nfrom the expansion of agricultural land into natural areas (16 GtC), \r\ndegradation due to inappropriate land management (11 GtC) and the \r\ndraining and burning of peatlands (9 GtC) and melting of permafrost\r\n(IPBES 2018e). Trends in biodiversity measured by the global living \r\nplanet index between 1970 to 2016 indicate a  68% decline in \r\nmonitored population of mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles, and \r\nfish (WWF 2020). FAO's recent report on the state of the world's \r\nbiodiversity for food and agriculture points to an alarming decline in \r\nbiodiversity for food and agriculture including associated biodiversity \r\nsuch as pollination services, microorganisms which are essential for \r\nproduction systems (FAO 2019d). These suggest that overall ecosystem \r\nhealth is consistently declining with adverse consequences for good \r\nquality of life, human well-being, and sustainable development."


id: c22d157d3875ff4641d9d96666165a08
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"The climate-smart cocoa (CSC) production programme in Ghana involved distributing shade tree seedlings that can protect cocoa \r\nplants from heat and water stress, enhance soil organic matter and water holding capacity of soils, and provide other assistance with \r\nagroforestry, giving access to extension services such as agronomic information and agrochemical inputs. The shade tree seedlings \r\nwere distributed by NGOs, government extension agencies, and the private sector free of charge or at subsidised prices and was \r\nexpected to reduce pressure on forests for growing cocoa plants. The CSC programme was mainly targeted at small farmers who \r\nconstitute about 80% of total farm holdings in Ghana. Although the government extension agency (Cocobod) undertook mass spraying \r\nor pruning of cocoa farms they found it difficult to access the 800,000 cocoa smallholders spread across the tropical south of the \r\ncountry"


id: 4d65a26b147964656bfa1495d5e3237c
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content:
" The project brought all stakeholders together, in other words, the government, private sector, local farmers and civil society or \r\nNGOs to facilitate the sustainable intensification of cocoa production in Ghana. Creation of a community-based governance structure \r\nwas expected to promote benefit sharing, forest conservation, adaptation to climate change, and enhanced livelihood opportunities."


id: 45f722804d7af1c8402c0db72b947c47
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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"The policy intervention overlooks the institutional constraints characteristic of the cocoa sector in Ghana where small farmers are \r\ndominant and have skewed access to resources and markets. Lack of secure tenure (tree rights) where the ownership of shade trees \r\nand timber vests with the state, bureaucratic and legal hurdles to register trees in their cocoa farms are major constraints that impede \r\nrealisation of the expected benefits of the CSC programme. This is a great disincentive for small cocoa producers to implement CSC \r\ninitiatives and nurture the shade tree seedlings and undertake land improvement measures. The state marketing board has the \r\nmonopoly in buying and marketing of cocoa beans including exports which impeded CREMAs or farming communities from directly \r\nselling their produce to MNCs and traders"


id: d9b0dae6ec121a0c00b66ae318fd714b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" However, many MNCs have been involved in setting up of CREMA or similar structures, \r\nextending premium prices and non-monetary benefits (access to credit, shade tree seedlings, agrochemicals) thus indirectly securing \r\ntheir cocoa supply chains. A biased ecological discourse about the benefits of climate-smart agriculture and sustainable intensive \r\nnarrative, complexities regarding the optimal shade levels for growing cocoa, and dependence on agrochemicals are issues that affect \r\nthe success and sustainability of the project intervention. Dominance of private sector players especially MNCs in the sector may be \r\ndetrimental to the interests of smallholder cocoa producers (Nasser et al. 2020)."


id: 4ee26c0940f581d68213d91fd315b8ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 9847
content:
"Conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services is part of the \r\nlarger objective of building climate resilience and promoting good \r\nquality of life, human well-being and sustainable development. \r\nWhile two of the 17 SDGs directly relate to nature (SDGs 14 and 15 \r\ncovering marine and terrestrial ecosystems and biodiversity), most \r\nother SDGs relating to poverty, hunger, inequality, health and well\u0002being, clean sanitation and water, energy, and so on, are directly or \r\nindirectly linked to nature (Blicharska et al. 2019). A survey among \r\nexperts to assess how 16 ecosystem services could help in achieving \r\nthe SDGs relating to good environment and human well-being \r\nsuggested that ecosystem services could contribute to achieving \r\nabout 41 targets across 12 SDGs (Wood et al. 2018). They also \r\nindicated cross-target interactions and synergetic outcomes across \r\nmany SDGs"


id: c4a4ef5c83d2565d173a791997d9e6ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" Conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services \r\nis critical to sustaining the well-being and livelihoods of poor and \r\nmarginalised people, and indigenous communities who depend on \r\nnatural resources (high confidence). Nature provides a broad array of \r\ngoods and services that are critical to good quality of life and human \r\nwell-being. Healthy and diverse ecosystems can play an important \r\nrole in reducing vulnerability and building resilience to disasters \r\nand extreme weather events (SCBD 2009; The Royal Society Science \r\nPolicy Centre 2014; Ninan and Inoue 2017)."


id: 572335a1601e821b5e0304cda876fe7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 11192
content:
"Progress in achieving the 20 Aichi Biodiversity targets which are \r\ncritical for realising the SDGs has been poor with most of the targets \r\nnot being achieved or only partially realised (SCBD 2020). There \r\ncould be synergies and trade-offs between ecosystem services and \r\nhuman well-being. For instance, a study notes that although policy \r\ninterventions and incentives to enhance supply of provisioning \r\nservices (e.g.,  agricultural production) have led to higher GDP, it \r\nmay have an adverse effect on the regulatory services of ecosystems \r\n(Kirchner et al. 2015). However, we are aware of the inadequacies \r\nof traditional GDP as an indicator of well-being. In this context the \r\nDasgupta Biodiversity Review argues for using the inclusive wealth \r\napproach to accurately measure social well-being by tracking the \r\nchanges in produced, human and natural capital (Dasgupta 2021)"


id: 8f8f2aa8220bdfde291c3f5d4af1aa04
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content:
" \r\nTargets for nature (biodiversity and ecosystem services) should be \r\nrefined so as to fit in with the metrics tracked by the SDGs (IPBES \r\n2016; Rosa et al. 2017)."


id: 9d4400b970c92d0d24d8dcad2589421
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 22269
content:
"Combined mitigation and adaptation approaches have been \r\nhighlighted throughout Section  7.4 regarding specific measures. \r\nLand-based mitigation and adaptation to the risks posed by climate \r\nchange and extreme weather events can have several co-benefits \r\nas well as help promote development and conservation goals. \r\nLand-based mitigation and adaptation will not only help reduce \r\nGHG emissions in the AFOLU sector, but measures are required to \r\nclosely link up with adaptation. In the central 2degC scenario, improved \r\nmanagement of land and more efficient forest practices, a reduction \r\nin deforestation and an increase in afforestation, would account \r\nfor 10% of the total mitigation effort over 2015-2050 (Keramidas \r\net al. 2018). If managed and regulated appropriately, the Land \r\nsector could become carbon-neutral as early as 2030-2035, being \r\na key sector for emissions reductions beyond 2025 (Keramidas et al. \r\n2018)"


id: dca08d338984f81d885d2da99fa5d4d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" Nature-based solutions (NBS) with safeguards has immense \r\npotential for cost-effective adaptation to climate change; but their \r\nimpacts will vary by scale and contexts (high confidence). Griscom \r\net al. 2017 estimate this potential to provide 37% of cost-effective \r\nCO2 mitigation until 2030 needed to meet 2degC goals with likely co\u0002benefits for biodiversity. However, due to the time lag for technology \r\ndeployment and natural carbon gain this mitigation potential of NBS \r\nby 2030 or 2050 can be delayed or much lower than the estimated \r\npotential (Qin et al. 2021)."


id: 92029a626ccd76730ad43a105a4b23fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"Economic mitigation potential refers to the mitigation estimated to be possible at an annual cost of up to USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 mitigated. \r\nThis cost is deemed the price at which society is willing to pay for mitigation and is used as a proxy to estimate the proportion of \r\ntechnical mitigation potential that could realistically be implemented. Between 2020 and 2050, measures concerning forests and \r\nother ecosystem are estimated to have an average annual mitigation potential of 7.3 (3.9-13.1) GtCO2-eq yr-1 at USD100 tCO2\r\n-1. \r\nAt the same cost, agricultural measures are estimated to have a potential of 4.1 (1.7-6.7) GtCO2-eq yr-1. Emerging technologies, \r\nsuch as CH4 vaccines and inhibitors, could sustainably increase agricultural mitigation potential in future. The diverted production \r\neffects of changes in demand (reduced food losses, diet changes and improved and enhanced wood products use), is estimated to \r\nhave an economic potential of 2.2 (1.1-3.6) GtCO2-eq yr-1"


id: 9c51e39f0fc81fac8200d841afea9eb5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" However, cost forms only one constraint to mitigation, with realisation \r\nof economic potential dependent on multiple context-specific environmental and socio-cultural factors."


id: c5f44cdbbbec88188793d46fd6acd745
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 28722
content:
"The potential of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) remains a focus of debate with several studies evaluating the \r\nlevel at which BECCS could be sustainably implemented, published since AR5. BECCS involves sequestering carbon through plant \r\ngrowth (i.e., in trees or crops) and capturing the carbon generated when this biomass is processed for power or fuel. The captured \r\ncarbon then requires long-term storage in for example, geological, terrestrial or ocean reservoirs, or in products. While appearing to \r\ncreate a net removal of carbon from the atmosphere, BECCS requires land, water and energy which can create adverse side effects \r\nat scale. Controversy has arisen because some of the models calculating the energy mix required to keep the temperature to 1.5degC \r\nhave included BECCS at very large scales as a means of both providing energy and removing carbon from the atmosphere to offset \r\nemissions from industry, power, transport or heat"


id: 509b1aaf7ab61ebf0d84fee91f15c465
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content:
" For example, studies have calculated that for BECCS to achieve 11.5 GtCO2-eq \r\nper year of carbon removal in 2100, as envisaged in one scenario, 380-700 Mha or 25-46% of all the world's arable and cropland \r\nwould be needed. In such a  situation, competition for agricultural land seriously threatens food production and food security, \r\nwhile also impacting biodiversity, water and soil quality, and landscape aesthetic value. More recently however, the scenarios for \r\nBECCS have become much more realistic, though concerns regarding impacts on food security and the environment remain, while \r\nthe reliability of models is uncertain due to methodological flaws. Improvements to models are required to better capture wider \r\nenvironmental and social impacts of BECCS in order to ascertain its sustainable contribution in emissions pathways"


id: ed12a1823dcc8e6b727131dce3f4c110
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 34776
content:
" Additionally, \r\nthe opportunity for other options that could negate very large-scale deployment of BECCS, such as other carbon dioxide removal \r\nmeasures or more stringent emission reductions in other sectors, could be explored within models."


id: b3bf9bdc6cd426d0f4004dd11929bf61
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"The global share of future urban GHG emissions is expected to \r\nincrease through 2050, with moderate to low mitigation efforts, \r\ndue to growth trends in population, urban land expansion, \r\nand infrastructure and service demands, but the extent of the \r\nincrease depends on the scenario and the scale and timing \r\nof urban mitigation action (medium confidence). In modelled \r\nscenarios, global consumption-based urban CO2 and CH4 emissions \r\nare projected to rise from 29 GtCO2-eq in 2020 to 34 GtCO2-eq in \r\n2050 with moderate mitigation efforts (intermediate GHG emissions, \r\nSSP2-4.5), and up to 40 GtCO2-eq in 2050 with low mitigation efforts \r\n(high GHG emissions, SSP3-7.0). With aggressive and immediate \r\nmitigation policies to limit global warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no \r\nor limited overshoot by the end of the century (very low emissions, \r\nSSP1-1"


id: eb5d11f72d78a096d022aa692ccdfc18
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vector_id: 34525
content:
"9), including high levels of electrification, energy and material \r\nefficiency, renewable energy preferences, and socio-behavioural \r\nresponses, urban GHG emissions could approach net-zero and reach \r\na maximum of 3 GtCO2-eq in 2050. Under a scenario with aggressive \r\nbut not immediate urban mitigation policies to limit global warming \r\nto 2degC (>67%) (low emissions, SSP1-2.6), urban emissions could \r\nreach 17 GtCO2-eq in 2050.2\r\n (Figure TS.13) {8.3.4}"


id: 316d27eec5449d3615e29626456cfd15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 5191
content:
"Urban land areas could triple between 2015 and 2050, with \r\nsignificant implications for future carbon lock-in. There is \r\na  large range in the forecasts of urban land expansion across \r\nscenarios and models, which highlights an opportunity to shape \r\nfuture urban development towards low- or net-zero GHG emissions \r\nand minimise the loss of carbon stocks and sequestration in the \r\nagriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) sector due to \r\nurban land conversion (medium confidence). By 2050, urban areas \r\ncould increase up to 211% over the 2015 global urban extent, with \r\nthe median projected increase ranging from 43% to 106%. While the \r\nlargest absolute amount of new urban land is forecasted to occur \r\nin Asia and Pacific, and in Developed Countries, the highest rate of \r\nurban land growth is projected to occur in Africa, Eastern Europe and \r\nWest-Central Asia, and in the Middle East"


id: efc8704248293cd8146d736969f4f0f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 35233
content:
" The infrastructure that will \r\nbe constructed concomitant with urban land expansion will lock-in \r\npatterns of energy consumption that will persist for decades if not \r\ngenerations. Furthermore, given past trends, the expansion of urban \r\nareas is likely to take place on agricultural lands and forests, with \r\nimplications for the loss of carbon stocks and sequestration. {8.3.1, \r\n8.3.4, 8.4.1, 8.6}"


id: 1bfc1d3164c50cdec585b16e06c7ac6c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1865
content:
"Urban green and blue infrastructure can mitigate climate \r\nchange through carbon sequestration, avoided emissions, and \r\nreduced energy use while offering multiple co-benefits (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). Urban green and blue infrastructure, \r\nincluding urban forests and street trees, permeable surfaces, and \r\ngreen roofs3\r\n offer potential to mitigate climate change directly \r\nthrough sequestering and storing carbon, and indirectly by inducing \r\na cooling effect that reduces energy demand and reducing energy \r\nuse for water treatment. Global urban trees store approximately \r\n7.4 billion tonnes of carbon, and sequester approximately 217 million \r\ntonnes of carbon annually, although urban tree carbon storage and \r\nsequestration are highly dependent on biome"


id: 42de042ff5d2249c0f609ae5ebefb7ff
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content:
" Among the multiple \r\nco-benefits of green and blue infrastructure are reducing the urban \r\nheat island (UHI) effect and heat stress, reducing stormwater runoff, \r\nimproving air quality, and improving mental and physical health of \r\nurban dwellers. {8.2, 8.4.4}"


id: 55067d280bbc0ec594c3e1d4a362a4d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10832
content:
"The potential and sequencing of mitigation strategies to \r\nreduce GHG emissions will vary depending on a  city's land \r\nuse, spatial form, development level, and state of urbanisation \r\n(i.e., whether it is an established city with existing infrastructure, \r\na rapidly growing city with new infrastructure, or an emerging \r\ncity with infrastructure buildup (high confidence). New and \r\nemerging cities will have significant infrastructure development needs \r\nto achieve high quality of life, which can be met through energy\u0002efficient infrastructures and services, and people-centred urban \r\ndesign (high confidence). The long lifespan of urban infrastructures \r\nlocks in behaviour and committed emissions. Urban infrastructures \r\nand urban form can enable socio-cultural and lifestyle changes that \r\ncan significantly reduce carbon footprints"


id: ea2bfb50ff1e80bf176fd8b69996ec9a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34346
content:
" Rapidly growing cities can \r\navoid higher future emissions through urban planning to co-locate \r\njobs and housing to achieve compact urban form, and by leapfrogging \r\nto low-carbon technologies. Established cities will achieve the largest \r\nGHG emissions savings by replacing, repurposing, or retrofitting the \r\nbuilding stock, targeted infilling and densifying, as well as through \r\nmodal shift and the electrification of the urban energy system. New \r\nand emerging cities have unparalleled potential to become low \r\nor net-zero GHG emissions while achieving high quality of life by \r\ncreating compact, co-located, and walkable urban areas with mixed \r\nland use and transit-oriented design, that also preserve existing \r\ngreen and blue assets. {8.2, 8.4, 8.6}"


id: bf08440f46160a4cffd09851193fbe82
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vector_id: 27606
content:
"Since AR5, there has been growing scientific literature and policy foci \r\non urban strategies for climate change mitigation. There are three \r\npossible reasons for this. First, according to AR5 Working Group III \r\n(WGIII) Chapter 12 on Human Settlements, Infrastructure, and Spatial \r\nPlanning, urban areas generate between 71% and 76% of carbon \r\ndioxide (CO2) emissions from global final energy use and between \r\n67% and 76% of global energy (Seto et al. 2014). Thus, focusing on \r\n'urban systems' (see Annex I: Glossary and Figure 8.15) addresses \r\none of the key drivers of emissions. Second, more than half of the \r\nworld population lives in urban areas, and by mid-century 7  out \r\nof 10 people on the planet will live in a town or a city (UN DESA \r\n2019). Thus, coming up with mitigation strategies that are relevant \r\nto urban settlements is critical for successful mitigation of climate \r\nchange"


id: d7ddfa5ad6dd45c131a3fe515c476b65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31487
content:
" Third, beyond climate change, there is growing attention on \r\ncities as major catalysts of change and to help achieve the objectives \r\noutlined in multiple international frameworks and assessments."


id: 6fbd0acb2eb27db3ddaec8810623a8bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 15203
content:
"Figure 8.3: Population of the world, by area of residence and size class of urban settlement for 2018. As of 2018, 4.2 billion people or 55% of the world \r\npopulation reside in urban settlements while 45% reside in rural areas. The coloured stacked column for the urban population represents the total number of inhabitants \r\nfor a given size class of urban settlements. Megacities of 10 million or more inhabitants have a total of only 529 million inhabitants, corresponding to 12.5% of the urban \r\npopulation. In contrast, about 1.8 billion inhabitants reside in urban settlements with fewer than 300,000 inhabitants, corresponding to 41.5% of the urban population. \r\nThe pie chart represents the respective shares for 2018, with 42% of the urban population residing in settlements with more than 1 million inhabitants, and 58% of the \r\nurban population residing in settlements with fewer than 1  million inhabitants"


id: d2e1debcf349f7665c699fefb46fffa2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30698
content:
" Almost half of the world's urban population (48%) live in settlements with fewer than \r\n500,000 inhabitants. Source: adapted from UN DESA 2019, p. 56."


id: 40310bf39c9d0b7fe7fca0c6e2c0068a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 7472
content:
"Sixth, urbanisation in many emerging economies is characterised \r\nby informality and an informal economy (Brown and McGranahan \r\n2016). The urban informal economy includes a  wide array of \r\nactivities, including but not limited to street vending, home-based \r\nenterprises, unreported income from self-employment, informal \r\ncommerce, domestic service, waste-picking, and urban agriculture. \r\nThe urban informal economy is large and growing. Globally, about \r\n44% of the urban economy is informal, although there is much \r\nvariation between countries and regions (ILO 2018). Emerging and \r\ndeveloping economies have the highest percentage of the urban \r\ninformal economy, with Africa (76%) and the Arab States (64%) with \r\nthe largest proportion (ILO 2018). Urban informality also extends \r\nto planning, governance and institutions (Roy 2009; EU 2016; \r\nLamson-Hall et al. 2019)"


id: 3e7be568d9a4d71dbf46508a4f5d30cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" Given its prevalence, it is important for \r\nurban climate change mitigation strategies to account for informality, \r\nespecially in emerging and developing countries (Section 8.3.2)."


id: 9a8b3045044e1e3c3b4deabeb94772aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 21846
content:
"In cities, carbon cycles through natural (e.g.,  vegetation and soils) \r\nand managed (e.g.,  reservoirs and anthropogenic  - buildings, \r\ntransportation) pools. The accumulation of carbon in urban pools, \r\nsuch as buildings or landfills, results from the local or global transfer \r\nof carbon-containing energy and raw materials used in the city \r\n(Churkina 2008; Pichler et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2020b). Quantitative \r\nunderstanding of these transfers and the resulting emissions and \r\nuptake within an urban area is essential for accurate urban carbon \r\naccounting (USGCRP 2018). Currently, urban areas are a net source of \r\ncarbon because they emit more carbon than they uptake"


id: 2fe30e4d1265d8a000c5d8d6a843dff8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4960
content:
" Thus, urban \r\nmitigation strategies require a  twofold strategy: reducing urban \r\nemissions of carbon into the atmosphere, and enhancing uptake \r\nof carbon in urban pools (Churkina 2012) (for a broader definition of \r\n'carbon cycle' and related terms such as 'carbon sink,' 'carbon stock,' \r\n'carbon neutrality,' 'GHG neutrality,' and others, see Glossary)."


id: d9564ee9738492556cdc71a3df1a4ce0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31706
content:
"Burning fossil fuels to generate energy for buildings, transportation, \r\nindustry, and other sectors is a  major source of urban GHG \r\nemissions (Gurney et al. 2015). At the same time, most cities do \r\nnot generate within their boundaries all of the resources they use, \r\nsuch as electricity, gasoline, cement, water, and food needed for \r\nlocal homes and businesses to function (Jacobs 1969), requiring \r\nconsideration of GHG emissions embodied in supply chains serving \r\ncities. Furthermore, urban vegetation, soils, and aquatic systems can \r\nboth emit or remove carbon from the urban atmosphere and are \r\noften heavily managed. For example, urban parks, forests, and street \r\ntrees actively remove carbon from the atmosphere through growing \r\nseason photosynthesis. They can become a  net source of carbon \r\nmost often during the dormant season or heat waves. Some of the \r\nsequestered carbon can be stored in the biomass of urban trees, soils, \r\nand aquatic systems"


id: c09aafffa2256e07fade6ff658907b61
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 27865
content:
" Urban infrastructures containing cement also \r\nuptake carbon through the process of carbonation. The uptake of \r\ncarbon by urban trees is at least two orders of magnitude faster than \r\nby cement-containing infrastructures (Churkina 2012) (Section 8.4.4 \r\nand Figures 8.17 and 8.18)."


id: 626fae8ecaaf06afdfb471cc103c95f3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 13047
content:
"When planning and implementing low-carbon transitions, it is \r\nimportant to consider the socio-economic context. An inclusive \r\napproach emphasises the need to engage non-state actors, including \r\nbusinesses, research organisations, non-profit organisations and \r\ncitizens (Lee and Painter 2015; Hale et al. 2020). For example, \r\nengaging people in defining locally relevant mitigation targets and \r\nactions has enabled successful transformations in China (Engels \r\n2018), Africa (Gopfert et al. 2019) and Malaysia (Ho et al. 2015). \r\nAn active research and government collaboration through multiple \r\nstakeholder interactions in a large economic corridor in Malaysia led \r\nto the development and implementation of a low-carbon blueprint \r\nfor the region (Ho et al. 2013). Many cities in LDCs and developing \r\ncountries lack adequate urban infrastructure and housing"


id: 5f6a9ab75e66ba3273fa0f0738ad38cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 12582
content:
" An \r\nequitable transformation in these cities entails prioritising energy \r\naccess and basic services, including safe drinking water and \r\nsanitation, to meet basic needs of their populations."


id: f7383a4bf08219696342dd9e502e16f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 36413
content:
"Numerous studies have reviewed urban GHG accounting frameworks \r\nand methods with somewhat different nomenclatures and categorical \r\ndivisions (Lin et al. 2015; Lombardi et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2019b; \r\nArioli et al. 2020; Heinonen et al. 2020; Hachaichi and Baouni 2021; \r\nRamaswami et al. 2021). Furthermore, accounting frameworks are \r\nreflected in multiple protocols used by urban practitioners (BSI 2013; \r\nFong et al. 2014; ICLEI 2019b). Synthesis of these reviews and \r\nprotocols, as well as the many individual methodological studies \r\navailable, point to four general frameworks of urban GHG accounting: \r\n(i) territorial accounting (TA); (ii) community-wide infrastructure \r\nsupply chain footprinting (CIF); and (iii and iv) consumption-based \r\ncarbon footprint accounting (CBCF; Wiedmann and Minx 2008)"


id: c8f19a962ad9ef5b425fed042b84068a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" The \r\nlast, CBCF, can be further divided into accounting with a focus on \r\nhousehold or personal consumption (iii: the personal carbon footprint, \r\nor PCF); and an approach in which one includes final consumption \r\nin an area by all consumers (iv: the areal carbon footprint, or ACF) \r\n(Heinonen et al. 2020). A number of small variations to these general \r\ncategories are found in the literature (Lin et al. 2015; Chen et al. \r\n2020a), but these four general frameworks capture the important \r\ndistinctive (i.e., policy-relevant) features of urban GHG accounting."


id: 282d9c2908c12d983902bcce046d810a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3729
content:
"A second major area of advance since AR5 has been in methods \r\nto implement, verify and scale up the different GHG footprinting \r\napproaches. Advances have been made in six key areas: (i) advancing \r\nurban metabolism accounts integrating stocks and flows, and \r\nconsidering biogenic and fossil-fuel-based emissions (Chen et al. \r\n2020b); (ii) improving fine-scale and near-real-time urban use-activity \r\ndata through new urban data science (Gately et al. 2017; Gurney et al. \r\n2019; Turner et al. 2020; Yadav et al. 2021); (iii) using atmospheric \r\nmonitoring from the ground, aircraft, and satellites combined with \r\ninverse modelling to independently quantify TA emissions (Lamb \r\net al. 2016; Lauvaux et al. 2016, 2020; Davis et al. 2017; Mitchell \r\net al. 2018; Sargent et al. 2018; Turnbull et al. 2019; Wu et al"


id: c1f595c22880c13e35823b94f760dd9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 28093
content:
" 2020a); \r\n(iv)  improving supply chain and input-output modelling, including \r\nthe use of physically based input-output models (Wachs and Singh \r\n2018); (v) establishing the global multi-region input-output models \r\n(Lenzen et al. 2017; Wiedmann et al. 2021); and (vi) generating multi\u0002sector use and supply activity data across all cities in a nation, in \r\na manner where data aggregate consistently across city, province, \r\nand national scales (Tong et al. 2021) (Section 8.3)."


id: 50f71f2e485725069710bfa839c4f62b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 10187
content:
"Figure 8.4 summarises an evaluation of the synergies and/or trade\u0002offs with the SDGs for the mitigation options for urban systems based \r\non Supplementary Material 8.SM.1. The evaluations depend on the \r\nspecific urban context, with synergies and/or trade-offs being more \r\nsignificant in certain contexts than others. Urban mitigation with \r\na view of the SDGs can support shifting pathways of urbanisation \r\ntowards greater sustainability. The feasibility of urban mitigation \r\noptions is also malleable and can increase with more 'enabling \r\nconditions' (see Glossary), provided, perhaps, through institutional \r\n(i.e., financial or governmental) support (Section 8.5). Strengthened \r\ninstitutional capacity that supports the coordination of mitigation \r\noptions can increase linkages with the SDGs and their synergies"


id: 698a50869303bf6a624660ee12a45b4a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" \r\nFor example, urban land use and spatial planning for walkable and \r\nco-located densities, together with electrification of the urban energy \r\nsystem, can hold more benefits for the SDGs than any one of the \r\nmitigation options alone (Sections 8.4.2.3, 8.4.3.1 and 8.6)."


id: 5eaeeb6b3a39c6cdd0805598c440f324
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 12435
content:
"Evidence on the co-benefits of urban mitigation measures for human \r\nhealth has increased significantly since AR5, especially through the \r\nuse of health impact assessments, where energy savings and cleaner \r\nenergy supply structures based on measures for urban planning, \r\nheating, and transport have reduced CO2, nitrogen oxides (NOx), \r\nand coarse particulate matter (PM10) emissions (Diallo et al. 2016). \r\nSome measures, especially those related to land-use planning and \r\ntransportation, have also increased opportunities for physical activity \r\nfor improved health (Diallo et al. 2016). In developing countries, \r\nthe co-benefits approach has been effective in justifying climate \r\nchange mitigation actions at the local level (Puppim de Oliveira and \r\nDoll 2016). Mixed-use compact development with sufficient land\u0002use diversity can have a  positive influence on urban productivity \r\n(Section  8.4.2)"


id: a81b28c844716fc989487a004a1c0411
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23961
content:
" Conversely, urban spatial structures that increase \r\nwalking distances and produce car dependency have negative \r\nimpacts on urban productivity considering congestion as well as \r\nenergy costs (Salat et al. 2017)."


id: 2a139b2f5c5db4924170013f3c6fb1ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 4044
content:
"There are numerous synergies that come from coupling urban \r\nadaptation and mitigation. A  number of studies have developed \r\nmethods to assess the synergies between mitigation and adaptation \r\nstrategies, as well as their co-benefits (Solecki et al. 2015; Buonocore \r\net al. 2016; Chang et al. 2017; Helgenberger and Janicke 2017). \r\nCo-benefits occur when implementing mitigation (or adaptation) \r\nmeasures that have positive effects on adaptation (or mitigation) \r\n(Sharifi 2021). In contrast, the trade-offs emerge when measures \r\naimed at improving mitigation (adaptation) undermine the ability to \r\npursue adaptation (mitigation) targets (Sharifi 2020). The magnitude \r\nof such co-benefits and trade-offs may vary depending on various \r\nfactors"


id: 52f8c36a825b00f35bcc8141b9fdec7c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 10508
content:
" A  systematic review of over 50 climate change articles \r\nprovides evidence that mitigation can contribute to resilience  - \r\nespecially to temperature changes and flooding  - with varying \r\nmagnitudes, depending on factors such as the type of mitigation \r\nmeasure and the scale of implementation (Sharifi 2019)."


id: 585527a6292ebfa1ff482c68197eefde
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Measures from different sectors that can provide both mitigation and \r\nadaptation benefits involve urban planning (Section 8.4.2), buildings \r\n(Sections 8.4.3.2 and 8.4.4), energy (Section 8.4.3), green and blue \r\ninfrastructure (Section  8.4.4), transportation (Section  8.4.2), socio\u0002behavioural aspects (Section 8.4.5), urban governance (Section 8.5), \r\nwaste (Section  8.4.5.2), and water (Section  8.4.6). In addition \r\nto their energy-saving and carbon-sequestration benefits, many \r\nmeasures can also enhance adaptation to climate threats, such as \r\nextreme heat, energy shocks, floods, and droughts (Sharifi 2021). \r\nExisting evidence is mainly related to urban green infrastructure, \r\nurban planning, transportation, and buildings. There has been \r\nmore emphasis on the potential co-benefits of measures, such \r\nas proper levels of density, building energy efficiency, distributed \r\nand decentralised energy infrastructure, green roofs and facades, \r\nand public/active transport modes"


id: 40dd1753f87ae4810622dc5d651ca774
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 7590
content:
" Renewable-based distributed and \r\ndecentralised energy systems improve resilience to energy shocks \r\nand can enhance adaptation to water stress considering the water\u0002energy nexus. By further investment on these measures, planners and \r\ndecision makers can ensure enhancing achievement of mitigation/\r\nadaptation co-benefits at the urban level (Sharifi 2021)."


id: 433dce19d736db1dba086a330954be3d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 7982
content:
"Implementing waste management and wastewater recycling \r\nmeasures can provide additional sources of income for citizens \r\nand local authorities. Wastewater recycling can minimise the costs \r\nassociated with the renewal of centralised wastewater treatment \r\nplants (Bernstad Saraiva Schott and Canovas 2015; Gharfalkar \r\net al. 2015; Gonzalez-Valencia et al. 2016; Herrero and Vilella \r\n2018; Matsuda et al. 2018; Nisbet et al. 2019). Waste management \r\nand wastewater recycling is also a  pathway for inclusion of the \r\ninformal sector into the urban economy with high agreement and \r\nmedium evidence (Sharifi 2021). Additionally, authorities can sell \r\nenergy generated from wastewater recycling to compensate for \r\nthe wastewater management costs (Colenbrander et al. 2017; \r\nGondhalekar and Ramsauer 2017)"


id: c24696ac4671db07e63bb9ca8fbaed57
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 28148
content:
" Another measure that contributes \r\nto reducing household costs is the promotion of behavioural \r\nmeasures such as dietary changes that can decrease the demand for \r\ncostly food sources and reduce health care costs through promoting \r\nhealthy diets (Hoppe et al. 2016) (Sections 8.4.5 and 8.4.6)."


id: af51f26550c48a76c594ad7b81419384
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25098
content:
"In addition to cost savings, various measures such as stormwater \r\nmanagement and urban greening can enhance social equity and \r\nenvironmental justice. For example, the thermal comfort benefits \r\nprovided by green and blue infrastructure and passive design measures \r\ncan address issues related to energy poverty and unaffordability of \r\nexpensive air conditioning systems for some social groups (Sharma \r\net al. 2018; He et al. 2019). To achieve such benefits, however, the \r\ncosts of integrating green and blue infrastructure and passive design \r\nmeasures into building design would need to be minimised. Another \r\nexample is the flood mitigation benefits of stormwater management \r\nmeasures that can reduce impacts on urban poor who often reside \r\nin flood-prone and low-lying areas of cities (Adegun 2017; He et al. \r\n2019). Generally, the urban poor are expected to be disproportionately \r\naffected by climate change impacts"


id: 4ba3dcb6a9c7c9eb4a7537d8c52f20fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9320
content:
" Carefully designed measures \r\nthat reduce such disproportionate impacts by involving experts, \r\nauthorities and citizens would enhance social equity (Pandey et al. \r\n2018; He et al. 2019; Mulligan et al. 2020)."


id: 14b067a60a3798eec5a6245cfcdc4ef6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 761
content:
"Urbanisation: A megatrend driving global climate risk and potential for low-carbon and resilient futures\r\nSevere weather events, exacerbated by anthropogenic emissions, are already having devastating impacts on people who live in \r\nurban areas, on the infrastructure that supports these communities, as well as people living in distant places (high confidence) (Cai \r\net al. 2019; Folke et al. 2021). Between 2000 and 2015, the global population in locations that were affected by floods grew by \r\n58-86 million (Tellman et al. 2021). The direct economic costs of all extreme events reached USD210-268 billion in 2020 (Aon 2021; \r\nMunich RE 2021; WMO 2021) or about USD0.7 billion per day; this figure does not include knock-on costs in supply chains (Kii 2020) \r\nor lost days of work, implying that the actual economic costs could be far higher. Depending on RCP, between half (RCP2.6) and three\u0002quarters (RCP8"


id: 82b2fafdcdbad561767971a686e43d93
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18091
content:
"5) of the global population could be exposed to periods of life-threatening climatic conditions arising from coupled \r\nimpacts of extreme heat and humidity by 2100 (Mora et al. 2017; Huang et al. 2019) (see WGII Section 6.2.2.1, WGII Figure 6.3, and \r\nWGIII Sections 8.2 and 8.3.4)."


id: 41ed38aa81e3e7a15cf8902ce1234c1c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7772
content:
"Urban systems are now global, as evidenced by the interdependencies between infrastructure, services, and networks driven by \r\nurban production and consumption; remittance flows and investments reach into rural places, shaping natural resource use far \r\nfrom the city and bring risk to the city when these places are impacted by climate change (WGIII Section 8.4 and Figure 8.15). This \r\nmegatrend (Kourtit et al. 2015) amplifies as well as shapes the potential impacts of climate events and integrates the aims and \r\napproaches for delivering mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development (medium evidence, high agreement) (Dawson et al. \r\n2018; Tsavdaroglou et al. 2018; Zscheischler et al. 2018). For cities facing flood damage, wide-ranging impacts have been recorded on \r\nother urban areas near and far (Carter et al. 2021; Simpson et al. 2021) as production and trade is disrupted (Shughrue et al. 2020)"


id: a41535f6931ba1bb35b635b65359cad7
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23374
content:
" \r\nIn the absence of integrated mitigation and adaptation across and between infrastructure systems and local places, impacts that bring \r\nurban economies to a standstill can extend into supply chains and across energy networks causing power outages."


id: 4817e9043d576273831b396a6f8d14df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8717
content:
"Designing for resilient and low-carbon cities today is far easier than retrofitting for risk reduction tomorrow. As urbanisation unfolds, \r\nits legacy continues to be the locking-in of emissions and vulnerabilities (high confidence) (Seto et al. 2016; Urge-Vorsatz et al. \r\n2018) (see WGIII Section 8.4 and Figure 8.15). Retrofitting, disaster reconstruction, and urban regeneration programmes offer scope \r\nfor strategic direction changes to low-carbon and high-resilience urban form and function, so long as they are inclusive in design \r\nand implementation. Rapid urban growth means new investment, new buildings and infrastructure, new demands for energy and \r\ntransport and new questions about what a healthy and fulfilling urban life can be"


id: fd95088d37a1f09dc9fab3a631ee149e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37415
content:
" The USD90 trillion expected to be invested in new \r\nurban development by 2030 (NCE 2018) is a global opportunity to place adaptation and mitigation directly into urban infrastructure \r\nand planning, as well as to consider social policy including education, health care, and environmental management (Urge-Vorsatz \r\net al. 2018). If this opportunity is missed, and business-as-usual urbanisation persists, social and physical vulnerability will become \r\nmuch more challenging to address."


id: e577e8da6a940fd3383525e3384d7de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33607
content:
"The policy-action gap: urban low-carbon and climate-resilient development\r\nCities are critical places to realise both adaptation and mitigation actions simultaneously with potential co-benefits that extend \r\nfar beyond cities (medium evidence, high agreement) (Gopfert et al. 2019; Grafakos et al. 2020). Given rapid changes in the built \r\nenvironment, transforming the use of materials and the land intensiveness of urban development, including in many parts of the Global \r\nSouth, will be critical in the next decades, as well as mainstreaming low-carbon development principles in new urban development in \r\nall regions. Much of this development will be self-built and 'informal' - and new modes of governance and planning will be required \r\nto engage with this"


id: bc0ec80d693eafacbc2e63f85504652b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
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vector_id: 27151
content:
" Integrating mitigation and adaptation now rather than later, through reshaping patterns of urban development \r\nand associated decision-making processes, is a prerequisite for attaining resilient and zero-carbon cities (see WGIII Sections 8.4 and \r\n8.6, and WGIII Figure 8.21)."


id: e2dd56ededcc829040de40f9213c61f5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33190
content:
"Integrated approaches to tackle common drivers of emissions and cascading risks provide the basis for strengthening synergies across \r\nmitigation and adaptation, and help manage possible trade-offs with sustainable development (limited evidence, medium agreement) \r\n(Grafakos et al. 2019; Landauer et al. 2019; Pierer and Creutzig 2019). An analysis of 315 local authority emission-reduction plans \r\nreveals that the most common policies cover municipal assets and structures (Palermo et al. 2020a). Estimates of emission reductions \r\nby non-state and sub-state actors in 10 high-emitting economies projected GHG emissions in 2030 would be 1.2-2.0 GtCO2-eq yr-1\r\nor 3.8-5.5% lower compared to scenario projections for current national policies (31.6-36.8 GtCO2-eq yr-1) if the policies are \r\nfully implemented and do not change the pace of action elsewhere (Kuramochi et al. 2020)"


id: 6537a2a5172024cfd4c3896e03286db7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13494
content:
" The value of integrating mitigation \r\nand adaptation is underscored in the opportunities for decarbonising existing urban areas, and investing in social, ecological, and \r\ntechnological infrastructure resilience (WGII Section 6.4). Integrating mitigation and adaption is challenging (Landauer et al. 2019) but \r\ncan provide multiple benefits for the health and well-being of urban inhabitants (Sharifi 2021) (See WGIII Section 8.2.3)."


id: 7804bef9a9a8d1c1ff5a1da7c4f38830
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 16447
content:
"Innovative governance and finance solutions are required to manage complex and interconnected risks across essential key \r\ninfrastructures, networks, and services, as well as to meet basic human needs in urban areas (medium confidence) (Colenbrander \r\net al. 2018a; Moser et al. 2019). There are many examples of 'ready-to-use' policy tools, technologies, and practical interventions \r\nfor policymakers seeking to act on adaptation and mitigation (Bisaro and Hinkel 2018; Keenan et al. 2019; Chirambo 2021) (see \r\nWGIII Section 8.5.4). Tax and fiscal incentives for businesses and individuals can help support city-wide behaviour change towards \r\nlow-carbon and risk-reducing choices. Change can start where governments have most control - often in public sector institutions \r\nand investment - but the challenge ahead requires partnership with private sector and community actors acting at scale and with \r\naccountability"


id: 34075ac45c6939c690f96f0481bd0206
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" Urban climate governance and finance needs to address urban inequalities at the forefront if the urban opportunity is \r\nto realise the ambition of the SDGs."


id: 4782bcafec73721555f5e6a77345adc9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
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vector_id: 8636
content:
"Iterative and experimental approaches to climate adaptation and mitigation decision-making grounded in data and co-generated in \r\npartnership with communities can advance low-carbon climate resilience (medium evidence, high confidence) (Culwick et al. 2019; \r\nCaldarice et al. 2021; van der Heijden and Hong 2021). Conditions of complexity, uncertainty, and constrained resources require \r\ninnovative solutions that are both adaptive and anticipatory. Complex interactions among multiple agents in times of uncertainty \r\nmakes decision-making about social, economic, governance, and infrastructure choices challenging and can lead decision-makers \r\nto postpone action. This is the case for those balancing household budgets, residential investment portfolios, and city-wide policy \r\nresponsibilities. Living with climate change requires changes to business-as-usual design-making"


id: a0e4f5dce0c3c4f235ca5a4efbd41074
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" Co-design and collaboration with \r\ncommunities through iterative policy experimentation can point the way towards climate-resilient development pathways (Ataov \r\nand Peker 2021). Key to successful learning is transparency in policymaking, inclusive policy processes, and robust local modelling, \r\nmonitoring, and evaluation, which are not yet widely undertaken (Sanchez Rodriguez et al. 2018; Ford et al. 2019)."


id: 209b6dbc28da411e960a036a64a76558
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 2575
content:
"Local governments play an important role in driving climate action across mitigation and adaptation as managers of assets, regulators, \r\nmobilisers, and catalysts of action, but few cities are undertaking transformative climate adaptation or mitigation actions (limited \r\nevidence, medium confidence) (Heikkinen et al. 2019). Local actors are providers of infrastructure and services, regulators of zoning, \r\nand can be conveners and champions of an integrated approach for mitigation and adaptation at multiple levels (limited evidence, high \r\nconfidence). New opportunities in governance and finance can enable cities to pool resources together and aggregate interventions \r\nto innovate ways of mobilising urban climate finance at scale (Colenbrander et al. 2019; Simpson et al. 2019; White and Wahba 2019)"


id: d7fe83c2f2e119706b633521afa8d367
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" \r\nHowever, research increasingly points towards the difficulties faced during the implementation of climate financing in situ, such as \r\nthe fragmentation of structures of governance capable of managing large investments effectively (Mohammed et al. 2019) (see WGIII \r\nSection 8.5 and WGIII Chapter 13)."


id: 69bb823c0979056744a56cf85a3f9c2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
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vector_id: 14234
content:
"Scaling up transformative place-based action for both adaptation and mitigation requires enabling conditions, including land-based \r\nfinancing, intermediaries, and local partnerships (medium evidence, high agreement) (Chu et al. 2019; Chaudhuri, 2020) supported \r\nby a new generation of big data approaches. Governance structures that combine actors working at different levels with a different \r\nmix of tools are effective in addressing challenges related to implementation of integrated action while cross-sectoral coordination \r\nis necessary (Singh et al. 2020). Joint institutionalisation of mitigation and adaptation in local governance structures can also enable \r\nintegrated action (Gopfert et al. 2020; Hurlimann et al. 2021). However, the proportion of international finance that reaches local \r\nrecipients remains low, despite the repeated focus of climate policy on place-based adaptation and mitigation (Manuamorn et al. \r\n2020)"


id: 321a51d9a797b106200f2381045c275f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5295
content:
" Green financing instruments that enable local climate action without exacerbating current forms of inequality can jointly \r\naddress mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development. Climate finance that also reaches beyond larger non-state enterprises \r\n(e.g.,  small and medium-sized enterprises, local communities, or non-governmental organisations (NGOs)), and is inclusive in \r\nresponding to the needs of all urban inhabitants (e.g., disabled individuals, or citizens of different races or ethnicities) is essential \r\nfor inclusive and resilient urban development (Colenbrander et al. 2019; Gabaldon-Estevan et al. 2019; Frenova 2021). Developing \r\nnetworks that can exert climate action at scale is another priority for climate finance."


id: 958a6c2f28b3c1b4376fe4481ce6c2e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 21031
content:
"The urban megatrend is an opportunity to transition global society. Enabling urban governance to avert cascading risk and achieve \r\nlow-carbon, resilient development will involve the co-production of policy and planning, rapid implementation and greater cross\u0002sector coordination, and monitoring and evaluation (limited evidence, medium agreement) (Di Giulio et al. 2018; Grafakos et al. 2019). \r\nNew constellations of responsible actors are required to manage hybrid local-city or cross-city risk management and decarbonisation \r\ninitiatives (limited evidence, medium agreement). These may increasingly benefit from linkages across more urban and more rural \r\nspace as recognition of cascading and systemic risk brings recognition of supply chains, remittance flows, and migration trends as \r\nvectors of risk and resilience"


id: 4be49e8d3c427f58346114dcfd01418d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 9360
content:
" Urban governance will be better prepared in planning, prioritising, and financing the kind of measures \r\nthat can reduce GHG emissions and improve resilience at scale when they consider a view of cascading risks and carbon lock-ins \r\nglobally, while also acting locally to address local limitations and capacities, including the needs and priorities of urban citizens \r\n(Colenbrander et al. 2018a; Rodrigues 2019)."


id: 46923594f874ce1842408fb12f091d68
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 8485
content:
"Figure 8.5: Urban population density by decade (1970-2010) grouped by the AR6 WGIII 10-region aggregation. Panel (a) displays the results from all case \r\nstudy locations with a population >300,000. Panels (b) and (c) show results grouped by city size: (b) cities with a population >2 million (large urban centres), and (c) those \r\nwith a population >300,000 but <2 million (small and medium urban centres). Box plots show the median, first and third quartiles, and lower and upper mild outlier thresholds \r\nof bootstrapped average urban population densities at the turn of each decade. The estimates are shown on a logarithmic scale. The data shows an overall trend of declining \r\nurban population densities among all but one region in the last four decades, at varying rates - although the Latin America and Caribbean region indicates relatively constant \r\nurban population density over time"


id: b177b7df374a3ec5fdbce06ff5a2c960
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 25418
content:
" The Middle East region is the only region to present with an increase in urban population density across all city sizes. Source: adapted from\r\nGuneralp et al. (2020)."


id: c3159d10149a28ea3bcfd2c4a39c8ab1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
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vector_id: 28269
content:
"Informal urban areas can avoid the conventional trajectory of urban \r\ndevelopment by utilising large-scale strategies, such as micro-scale \r\ntechnologies, modal shifts towards compact, walkable urban form, \r\nas well as decentralised or meso-scale utilities of water, sanitation, \r\nand service centres - thereby mitigating emissions associated with \r\ntransport and treating wastes (Tongwane et al. 2015; Yang et al. \r\n2018). Some specific mitigation options include spatial adjustments \r\nfor walkability of neighbourhoods, low-energy-intensive mobility, \r\nlow-energy-intensive residential areas, low-carbon energy sources \r\nat city scale, off-grid utilities, and electrification and enhancement \r\nof the urban ecology - all of which have multiple potential benefits \r\n(Colenbrander et al. 2017; Fang et al. 2017; Laramee et al. 2018; van der \r\nZwaan et al. 2018; Wu et al. 2018; Silveti and Andersson 2019)"


id: b7b0d5d6eaad673c75b22ab1d5bde995
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" Some \r\nof the co-benefits of the various mitigation options include more job \r\nopportunities and business start-ups, increased incomes, air quality \r\nimprovement, and enhanced health and well-being (Gebreegziabher \r\net al. 2014; Dagnachew et al. 2018; Keramidas et al. 2018; Adams \r\net al. 2019; Ambole et al. 2019; Boltz et al. 2019; Moncada et al. 2019; \r\nWeimann and Oni 2019; Manga et al. 2020) (Section 8.2)."


id: ab08d7da91cb6b991c7e1b41b984285
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
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vector_id: 24431
content:
"A third trend in is urban land growth taking place on agricultural land, \r\ncarbon stocks, and other land uses (see 'carbon stock' and 'AFOLU' - \r\nagriculture, forestry, and other land uses - in Glossary). As Figure 8.7 \r\nshows, over 60% of the reported urban expansion (nearly 40,000 km2\r\n) \r\nfrom 1970 to 2010 was formerly agricultural land (Guneralp et al. 2020). \r\nThis percentage increased to about 70% for global urban expansion \r\nthat occurred between 1992 and 2015, followed by grasslands (about \r\n12%) and forests (about 9%) (Liu et al. 2020a). In terms of percent \r\nof total urban land expansion, the largest conversion of agricultural \r\nlands to urban land uses from 1970 to 2010 took place in the Eastern \r\nAsia, and South-East Asia and Pacific regions; the largest proportional \r\nlosses of natural land cover were reported for the North America and \r\nAustralia, Japan and New Zealand regions (Guneralp et al. 2020)"


id: 8a333765017da6f8afbf29f7ee5b0fdb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" At \r\na sub-regional level, agricultural land constituted the largest proportion \r\nof land converted to urban areas in China, India, Europe, Southeast \r\nAsian countries and the central United States between 1995 and 2015; \r\nin the eastern United States, most new urban land was converted \r\nfrom forests (Liu et al. 2020a). Urban expansion through 2040 may \r\nlead to the loss of almost 65 Mt of crop production - a scenario that \r\nunderscores the ongoing relationship between urbanisation and \r\nAFOLU (van Vliet et al. 2017) (Chapter 7)."


id: 7189add91add8fc7994d160d69724998
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"Figure 8.9: Changes in six metrics associated with urban and national-scale carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) emissions represented in the AR6 \r\nWGIII 6-region aggregation, with (a) 2000 and (b) 2015. The trends in Luqman et al. (2021) were combined with the work of Moran et al. (2018) to estimate the regional \r\nurban CO2-eq share of global urban emissions, the urban share of national CO2-eq emissions, and the urban per capita CO2-eq emissions by region. This estimate is derived \r\nfrom consumption-based accounting that includes both direct emissions from within urban areas and indirect emissions from outside urban areas related to the production \r\nof electricity, goods, and services consumed in cities. It incorporates all CO2 and CH4 emissions except aviation, shipping and biogenic sources (i.e., land-use change, forestry, \r\nand agriculture). The dashed grey line represents the global average urban per capita CO2-eq emissions"


id: 9d9c85085de4b6a5cb29f6ff3554c741
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 22330
content:
" The regional urban population share, regional CO2-eq share in total \r\nemissions, and national per capita CO2-eq emissions by region are given for comparison. Source: adapted from Gurney et al. (2022).5"


id: 5bfa63a4b03302fda39330a1f1dbe848
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11984
content:
"First, urban land areas will expand significantly by 2050 - by as much \r\nas 211% (see SSP5 forecast in Huang et al. 2019), but likely within \r\na large potential range of about 43-106% over the 2015 extent by \r\n2050 - to accommodate the growing urban population (Table 8.1). \r\nGlobally, there are large uncertainties and variations among the \r\nstudies  - and between the SSPs  - about the rates and extent of \r\nfuture urban expansion, owing to uncertainties about economic \r\ndevelopment and population growth (ranges of estimates are \r\nprovided in Table 8.1). Overall, the largest urban extents are forecasted \r\nunder SSP5 (fossil fuel-intensive development) for both 2050 and \r\n2100, whereas the smallest forecasted urban extents are under \r\nSSP3 ('regional rivalry'). Forecasted global urban extents could reach \r\nbetween 1 and 2.2 million km2\r\n (median of 1.4 million km2, a 106% \r\nincrease) in 2050 under SSP5, and between 0.85 and 1"


id: 5001594d0132885198dce577fc22b925
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vector_id: 10031
content:
"5 million km2\r\n(median of 1 million km2\r\n, a 43% increase) in 2050 under SSP3. Under \r\nSSP1, which is characterised by a focus on sustainability with more \r\ncompact, low-emissions development, urban extents could reach "


id: 6eaec2e40cc276d2cddb59219490404a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15039
content:
"studies is significant. Under SSP1, urban land areas could increase \r\nby between 69,000 and 459,000 km2\r\n in Developed Countries, \r\n77,000-417,000 km2\r\n in Asia and Pacific, and 28,000-216,000 km2\r\nin Africa. Under SSP3, where urban land expansion is forecasted to \r\nbe the lowest, urban land areas could increase by between 23,000 \r\nand 291,000 km2\r\n in Developed Countries, 57,000-168,000 km2 in \r\nAsia and Pacific, and 16,000-149,000 km2\r\n in Africa. Under SSP5, \r\nwhere urban land expansion is forecasted to be the highest, urban \r\nland area could increase by between 129,000 and 573,000 km2\r\n in \r\nDeveloped Countries, 83,000-472,000 km2\r\n in Asia and Pacific, and \r\n40,000-222,000 km2\r\n in Africa (Huang et al. 2019; Li et al. 2019b; \r\nChen et al. 2020a; Gao and O'Neill 2020). By 2100, however, the \r\nDeveloped Countries region is expected to have the most urban \r\nexpansion only in SSP5"


id: 737528e12e12413bf6bfbc697b6a659b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15786
content:
" In SSP2 and SSP4, the Developed Countries \r\nand Asia and Pacific regions have about equal amounts of new urban \r\nland; in SSP3, Asia and Pacific has more new urban land forecasted."


id: 5b94208fa06849a5cefec8d6170662c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11907
content:
"Second, there is a wide variation in estimates of urban land expansion \r\nacross regions (using the AR6 WGIII 6-region aggregation). Across all \r\nfour sets of forecasts, current urban land (circa 2015) is the largest \r\nin Developed Countries and in the Asia and Pacific region, with \r\napproximately two-thirds of the current urban extent occurring in \r\nthose two regions (Table 8.1 and Figure 8.10). The largest increases \r\nin urban land by 2050 are expected in the Asia and Pacific and \r\nDeveloped Countries regions, across all the SSPs. However, the rate \r\nof increase in urban land in Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia, \r\nLatin America and Caribbean, and the Middle East is significant and \r\nurban land could more than double by 2050. One-third of the studies \r\nconclude that the United States, China, and India will experience \r\ncontinued urban land expansion at least until 2050 (Huang et al. \r\n2019; Li et al. 2019b). However, Li et al"


id: 71b77833ecc12311664a43212336ad1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 15518
content:
" (2019) report that, after \r\n2050, China could experience a decrease in the rate of urban land \r\nexpansion, while growth will continue for India. This is not surprising \r\nsince India's urban demographic transition will only get underway \r\nafter the middle of the century, when the urban population is \r\nexpected to exceed the rural population. In contrast, China's urban \r\ndemographic transition could be nearly complete by 2050."


id: 417ce948d863ddb68ee592c0bbe741ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
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vector_id: 7704
content:
"Fourth, both the range of estimates and their implications on land\u0002use competition and urban life point to an opportunity for urban \r\nareas to consider their urban form when developing. Under the current \r\nurbanisation trajectory, 50-63% of newly expanded urban areas are \r\nexpected to occur on current croplands (Chen et al. 2020a). However, \r\nthere is significant regional variation; between 2000 and 2040, 12.5% \r\nof cropland in China and 7.5% of cropland in the Middle East and \r\nNorth Africa could potentially be displaced due to urban expansion, \r\ncompared to the world average of 3.7% (van Vliet et al. 2017). As \r\nurban clusters increase in size and greenspace is converted, future \r\nurban land expansion is expected to intensify UHIs and exacerbate \r\nnight-time extreme temperatures. An urban footprint increase of 78-\r\n171% by 2050 over the urban footprint in 2015 is expected to result in \r\naverage summer daytime and night-time warming in air temperature \r\nof 0.5degC-0"


id: c3a4fc3b8b3a5b4467f6e26b7b687934
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 28351
content:
"Figure 8.14: Comparison of urban emissions under different urbanisation scenarios (GtCO2-eq yr-1) for the AR6 WGIII 6-region aggregation. The panels \r\nrepresent the estimated urban emissions change in two different scenarios for the time period 2020-2030. Panel (a) represents resource efficient and compact urbanisation \r\nwhile panel (b) represents urbanisation with moderate progress. The two scenarios are consistent with estimated urban emissions under the SSP1-RCP1.9-SPA1 and \r\nSSP2-RCP4.5-SPA2 scenarios, respectively (Figure 8.13). In both panels, urban emissions estimates for the year 2020 are marked by the lines for each region. In the resource \r\nefficient and compact scenario, various reductions in urban emissions that take place by 2030 are represented by the dashed areas within the bars. The remaining solid shaded \r\nareas represent the remaining urban emissions in 2030 for each region on the path towards net-zero emissions"


id: 58b07eab6c0661c2a59d23fc6850f415
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11447
content:
" The total reductions in urban emissions worldwide that are given \r\nby the last dashed grey bar in panel (a) is estimated to be 9.8 GtCO2-eq yr-1 between 2020 and 2030 in this scenario. In the scenario with moderate progress, there are no \r\nregions with reductions in urban emissions. Above the white lines that represent urban emissions in 2020, the grey shaded areas are the estimated increases for each region so \r\nthat the total urban emissions would increase by 3.4 GtCO2-eq yr-1 from 2020 levels in 2030 under this scenario. The values are based on urban scenario analyses as given in \r\nGurney et al. (2021, 2022). Source: synthesised based on data from Gurney et al. (2022).9"


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content:
"eq, representing between 67% and 72% of global CO2 and CH4\r\nemissions, excluding aviation, shipping, and biogenic sources of \r\nemissions. By 2050, with moderate to low urban mitigation efforts, \r\nurban emissions are projected to rise to 34.0 GtCO2-eq (SSP2-\r\nRCP4.5) or 40.2 GtCO2-eq (SSP3-RCP7.0) - driven by growing urban \r\npopulation, infrastructure, and service demands. However, scenarios \r\nthat involve rapid urbanisation can have different outcomes as seen \r\nin SSP1-RCP1.9 based on green growth, versus SSP5-RCP8.5 with \r\nthe strongest carbon lock-in lacking any decarbonisation. Other \r\nscenarios involve mixed and/or low urbanisation, along with other \r\ndifferences, including the implementation of electrification, energy, \r\nand material efficiency, technology development and innovation, \r\nrenewable energy preferences, and behavioural, lifestyle, and dietary \r\nresponses (Table  8.2). With aggressive and immediate mitigation \r\nefforts to limit global warming to 1"


id: 6e916e7119cbad909932a67d91bfba9b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"5degC (>50%) with no or limited \r\novershoot, urban GHG emissions could approach net-zero and \r\nreach a  maximum of 3.3 GtCO2-eq in 2050 (SSP1-RCP1.9). Under \r\naggressive but not immediate urban mitigation efforts to limit global \r\nwarming to 2degC (>67%), urban emissions could reach 17.2 GtCO2-eq \r\nin 2050 (SSP1-RCP2.6)."


id: d449eea282fc133a02016a9be8a66cb3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"Similar analysis by the urban networks C40 and GCoM examine \r\ncurrent and future GHG emissions on smaller subsets of global cities, \r\noffering further insight on the potential emissions impacts of urban \r\nmitigation options. However, this analysis is limited to just a sample \r\nof the global urban landscape and primarily focused on cities in \r\nthe Global North (GCoM 2018, 2019; C40 Cities et al. 2019) with \r\nmethods to project avoided emissions in development (Kovac et al. \r\n2020). Different scopes of analysis between sectors, as well as limited \r\nknowledge of the impact of existing and new urban infrastructure, \r\nlimit the possibility of direct comparisons in emissions. Still, the \r\nshares of urban mitigation potential ranges between 77.7% and \r\n78.9% for combined strategies that involve decarbonised buildings \r\nand transport in urban infrastructure, and the wedges approach \r\nthe remaining emissions reductions also considering construction \r\nmaterials and waste"


id: a95aa1219a7ce5b9f6aa2e457a60b4ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 24174
content:
" This data supports urban areas pursuing \r\na package of multiple, integrated mitigation strategies in planning \r\nfor decarbonisation (Sections 8.4 and 8.6, and Figure 8.21)."


id: 76e0a21da0d0be98b57268d7860a4c0d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 16281
content:
"Urban areas are systems where multiple mitigation options  - \r\nespecially when integrated  - have cascading effects across \r\ntransport, energy, buildings, land use, and behaviour. These \r\ncascading effects take place both within and across urban systems \r\n(Figure  8.15). Mitigation actions also occur at multiple urban \r\nscales, from households and blocks to districts and city regions, \r\nand can be implemented as standalone sectoral strategies, such as \r\nincreasing energy efficiency for appliances, and also as system-wide \r\nactions. In reducing emissions locally, urban areas can help lower \r\nemissions outside of their administrative boundaries through their \r\nuse of materials and resources, and by increasing the efficiency of \r\ninfrastructure and energy use beyond what is possible with individual \r\nsectoral strategies. Urban mitigation policies that implement multiple \r\nintegrated interventions will provide more emissions savings than \r\nthe sum of individual interventions (Sethi et al"


id: e9c5a8b33e7f942bc186858728493f0c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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vector_id: 34276
content:
"The Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) represent different \r\nstrategies for maintaining temperature goals that are compliant \r\nwith the Paris Agreement, as well as their comparison with the \r\ncontinuation of current policies (Sections  1.5 and 3.2.5, and \r\nTable  8.3). The key characteristics that define the IMPs involve \r\naspects of energy, land use, lifestyle, policy, and innovation. Urban \r\nareas provide cross-cutting contexts where each of these key \r\ncharacteristics can be enabled and have a  particularly important \r\nrole in the transformation pathways for renewable energy (IMP\u0002Ren), low demand (IMP-LD), and shifting to sustainability (IMP-SP). \r\nPathways that are compliant with the Paris Agreement include such \r\nurban implications as a reversal of decreasing land-use efficiency in \r\nurban areas to lower energy demand based on spatial planning for \r\ncompact urban form (Section 8.4"


id: d406b2d181805f5465e34b104ed1c0f3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"2), changes in urban infrastructure \r\nfor supporting demand flexibility to handle variable energy supply \r\n(Section 8.4.3), as well as policies and governance that are conducive \r\nto innovation in urban areas (Section  8.5). Spatial planning for \r\ncompact urban form can enable reduced energy demand and changes \r\nin service provisioning, including through walkable neighbourhoods \r\nand mixed land use, providing venues for socio-behavioural change \r\ntowards active transport (Section  8.4.5). Electrification and sector \r\ncoupling in urban infrastructure can, for instance, be an important \r\nenabler of supporting higher penetrations of renewable energy in \r\nthe energy system."


id: 57be9b5b04549d8470641863ef52a426
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
"Carbon lock-in occurs as the result of interactions between \r\ndifferent geographic and administrative scales (institutional lock\u0002in) and across sectors (infrastructural and technological lock-in), \r\nwhich create the conditions for behavioural lock-in covering both \r\nindividual and social structural behaviours (Seto et al. 2016) (see \r\nGlossary for a broader definition of 'lock-in'). The way that urban \r\nareas are designed, laid out, and built (i.e., urban form) affects and \r\nis affected by the interactions across the different forms of carbon \r\nlock-in (Figures 8.15 and 8.16). Cities are especially prone to carbon \r\nlock-in because of the multiple interactions of technological, \r\ninstitutional, and behavioural systems, which create inertia and \r\npath dependency that are difficult to break. For example, the \r\nlock-in of gasoline cars is reinforced by highway and energy \r\ninfrastructures that are further locked-in by social and cultural \r\npreferences for individual mobility options"


id: 2e50bcb14cf5c1b90692df8bc16fce26
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:46
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content:
" The dominance of cars \r\nand their supporting infrastructures in auto-centric urban forms is \r\nfurther reinforced by zoning and urban development patterns, such \r\nas dispersed and low-density housing distantly located from jobs, \r\nthat create obstacles to creating alternative mobility options (Seto \r\net al. 2016; Linton et al. 2021)."


id: bfce70158458270f0cf3254f38fde0d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Figure 8.15 (continued): Urban systems, lock-in, and cascading effects of mitigation strategies. Cities are systems of interconnected sectors, activities, and \r\ngovernance structures. Urban-scale mitigation action can have cascading effects across multiple sectors, as shown in panel (a), as well as regional, national, and global impacts \r\nthrough supply chains, resource flows, and institutions, as shown in panel (b). Mitigation efforts implemented at larger scales of governance or in sectors that transcend \r\nurban boundaries, like energy and transportation, can also facilitate and amplify mitigation at the urban scale, as shown by the arrows extending in both directions across \r\nlayers (a). Because urban areas are connected locally and globally, urban mitigation efforts can also impact other cities and surrounding areas (agriculture, forestry and other \r\nland use (AFOLU))"


id: 2f3ae61c2778838ee97114c9f3320402
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Cities are prone to carbon lock-in due to the numerous reinforcing interactions among urban infrastructures and technologies, institutions, and individual \r\nand collective behaviours; see the side arrows extending across the layers in panel (a): the yellow arrow represents the infrastructure and technological lock-in involving user \r\ntechnologies and supporting infrastructure, the blue arrow indicates lock-in of local to international institutions, and the pink arrow represents behavioural lock-in for individuals \r\nand society. Urban carbon lock-in is strongly determined by urban form, in particular the layout of streets and land-use mix. The different coloured spatial patterns represent \r\nvarying levels of co-location of housing and jobs, and mobility options (Figure 8.16). Efforts to break urban carbon lock-in require meta-transformations to break inertia in and \r\namong infrastructures, institutions, and behaviours. Source: adapted in part from Seto et al. (2016)."


id: c3dabe1acefbbbea73bdc6fbf750f062
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"The AR5 concluded that infrastructure and four dimensions of \r\nurban form are especially important for driving urban energy use: \r\ndensity, land-use mix, connectivity, and accessibility. Specifically, \r\nlow-carbon cities have the following characteristics: (i) co-located \r\nmedium to high densities of housing, jobs, and commerce; (ii) high \r\nmix of land uses; (iii) high connectivity of streets; and (iv) high levels \r\nof accessibility, distinguished by relatively low travel distances and \r\ntravel times that are enabled by multiple modes of transportation. \r\nUrban areas with these features tend to have smaller dwelling \r\nunits, smaller parcel sizes, walking opportunities, high density of \r\nintersections, and are highly accessible to shopping. For brevity, \r\nwe will refer to these characteristics collectively as 'compact \r\nand walkable urban form' (Figure  8.16)"


id: 514c59214ba351c8bc4d0acc8b1e5f2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Compact and walkable \r\nurban form has many co-benefits, including mental and physical \r\nhealth, lower resource demand, and saving land for AFOLU.  In \r\ncontrast, dispersed and auto-centric urban form is correlated \r\nwith higher GHG emissions, and characterised by separated land \r\nuses, low population and job densities, large block size, and low \r\nintersection density."


id: 17a4c280c56915c59486f1ae4831d624
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Figure 8.16: Urban form and implications for GHG emissions. Compact and walkable urban form is strongly correlated with low GHG emissions and characterised by \r\nco-located medium to high densities of housing and jobs, high street density, small block size, and mixed land use (Seto et al. 2014). Higher population densities at places of \r\norigin (e.g., home) and destination (e.g., employment, shopping) concentrate demand and are necessary for achieving the Avoid-Shift-Improve (ASI) approach for sustainable \r\nmobility (Chapters 5 and 10). Dispersed and auto-centric urban form is strongly correlated with high GHG emissions, and characterised by separated land uses, especially of \r\nhousing and jobs, low street density, large block sizes, and low urban densities. Separated and low densities of employment, retail, and housing increase average travel distances \r\nfor both work and leisure, and make active transport and modal shift a challenge"


id: 218c7026268167fc7ea64642448a86a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 2703
content:
" Since cities are systems, urban form has interacting implications across energy, buildings, \r\ntransport, land use, and individual behaviour. Compact and walkable urban form enables effective mitigation while dispersed and auto-centric urban form locks-in higher levels \r\nof energy use. The colours represent different land uses and indicate varying levels of co-location and mobility options."


id: 755e244012084a4e8d83586f7701a1e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Meta-analyses of the reduction in VMT and the resulting GHG emissions \r\nconsider the existing and still dominant use of emitting transportation \r\ntechnology, transportation fleets, and urban form characteristics. Varied \r\nhistorical legacies of transportation and the built environment, which \r\ncan be utilised to develop more sustainable cities (Newman et al. 2016, \r\n2017), are often not taken into account directly. Metropolitan policies \r\nand spatial planning, as evident in Copenhagen's Finger Plan, as well \r\nas strategic spatial planning in Stockholm and Seoul, have been major \r\ntools to restructure urban regions and energy patterns (Sung and Choi \r\n2017). Road prices and congestion charges can provide the conditions \r\nfor urban inhabitants to shift mobility demands and reduce vehicle \r\nuse (Section  5.6.2)"


id: 88baeb559937d4058f4930ff0fcc890f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Surprisingly, even cities with higher population \r\ndensities and a greater range of land uses can show declines in these \r\nimportant attributes, which can lead to emissions increases, such as \r\nfound in a study of 323 East and South East Asian cities (Chen et al. \r\n2020c). Conversely, the annual CO2 emissions reduction of passenger \r\ncars in compact versus dispersed urban form scenarios can include at \r\nleast a 10% reduction by 2030 (Matsuhashi and Ariga 2016). When \r\ncombined with advances in transport technology, this share increases \r\nto 64-70% in 2050 based on compact urban form scenarios for 1727 \r\nmunicipalities (Kii 2020)."


id: fc9ae98ac99648da5756591c9a20e6cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"As a  reaffirmation of AR5, population density reduces emissions \r\nper capita in the transport, building, and energy sectors (Baur et al. \r\n2015; Gudipudi et al. 2016; Wang et al. 2017; Yi et al. 2017) (see \r\nalso Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.4 on past trends and forecasts of urban \r\npopulation density and land expansion). Urban compactness tends \r\nto reduce emissions per capita in the transport sector, especially for \r\ncommuting (Matsuhashi and Ariga 2016; Lee and Lim 2018; Lee and \r\nLee 2020). The relative accessibility of neighbourhoods to the rest of \r\nthe region, in addition to the density of individual neighbourhoods, \r\nis important (Ewing et al. 2018). Creating higher residential and \r\nemployment densities, developing smaller block sizes, and increasing \r\nhousing opportunities in an employment area can significantly \r\nreduce household car ownership and car driving, and increase the \r\nshare of transit, walk, and bicycle commuting (Ding et al. 2018)"


id: 75e46137fd90b9ad48d54d33931a3d6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" In \r\naddition to population density, land-use mix, rail transit accessibility, \r\nand street design reduce emissions from transport (Dou et al. 2016; \r\nCao and Yang 2017; Choi 2018). The impact of population density \r\nand urban compactness on emissions per capita in the household or \r\nenergy sector is also associated with socioeconomic characteristics \r\nor lifestyle preferences (Baiocchi et al. 2015; Miao 2017). Changes \r\nin the attributes of urban form and spatial structure have influences \r\non overall energy demand across spatial scales, particularly street, \r\nblock, neighbourhood, and city scales, as well as across the building \r\n(housing) and transport (mobility) sectors (Silva et al. 2017)"


id: 340bbffa90920c2af954dd8443b9da1d
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" \r\nUnderstanding the existing trade-offs (or synergetic links) between \r\nurban form variables across major emissions source sectors, and how \r\nthey impact the size of energy flows within the urban system, is key \r\nto prioritising action for energy-efficient spatial planning strategies, \r\nwhich are likely to vary across urban areas."


id: a25cbc9a5ef290ab7a519b6f995b6782
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 23108
content:
"benefit from urban design parameters, including density, block \r\narea, and  elongation that represent the influence of urban density \r\non energy density (Fonseca and Schlueter 2015; Shi et al. 2020). Heat\u0002demand density is a  function of both population density and \r\nheat demand per capita and can be equally present in urban areas \r\nwith high population density or high heat demand per capita (Moller \r\net al. 2019; Persson et al. 2019). Low-temperature networks that \r\nutilise waste heat or renewable energy can provide an option to avoid \r\ncarbon lock-in to fossil fuels while layout and eco-design principles \r\ncan further optimise such networks (Gang et al. 2016; Buffa et al. \r\n2019; Dominkovic and Krajacic 2019). Replacing gas-based heating \r\nand cooling with electrified district heating and cooling networks, for \r\ninstance, provides 65% emissions reductions also involving carbon\u0002aware scheduling for grid power (De Chalendar et al. 2019)"


id: 6e75fdf070d04a4379beb7e4904a9bcf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" The \r\nenvironmental and ecological benefits increase through the interaction \r\nof urban energy and spatial planning (Tuomisto et al. 2015; Bartolozzi \r\net al. 2017; Denarie et al. 2018; Zhai et al. 2020). These interactions \r\ninclude support for demand-side flexibility, spatial planning using \r\ngeographic information systems, and access to renewable and urban \r\nwaste heat sources (Moller et al. 2018; REN21 2020; Sorknaes et al. \r\n2020; Dorotic et al. 2019) (see Table 8.SM.2 for other references)."


id: 1224c39529c354c4c7b7e30721c26cb2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 356
content:
"Pursuing the electrification of mobility, heating, and cooling systems, \r\nwhile decarbonising electricity and energy carriers, and switching \r\nto net-zero materials and supply chains, represent important \r\nstrategies for urban mitigation. Electrification of energy end uses \r\nin cities and efficient energy demand for heating, transport, and \r\ncooking through multiple options and urban infrastructure, has an \r\nestimated mitigation potential of at least 6.9 GtCO2-eq by 2030 \r\nand 15.3 GtCO2-eq by 2050 (Coalition for Urban Transitions 2019). \r\nEnergy efficiency measures in urban areas can be enabled by urban \r\nform, building codes, retrofitting and renovation, modal shifts, and \r\nother options. Decarbonising electricity supply raises the mitigation \r\npotential of efficient buildings and transport in urban areas to about \r\n75% of the total estimate (Coalition for Urban Transitions 2019)"


id: 32a3ad5703492db64568e2473a1e2d88
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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" \r\nIn addition, relatively higher-density urban areas enable more cost\u0002effective infrastructure investments, including electric public transport \r\nand large-scale heat pumps in districts that support electrification. \r\nUrban policymakers can play a key role in supporting carbon-neutral \r\nenergy systems by acting as target setters and planners, demand \r\naggregators, regulators, operators, conveners, and facilitators for \r\ncoordinated planning and implementation across sectors, urban \r\nform, and demand (IEA 2021a; IRENA 2021)."


id: 25032272a491cbb3be68f88f0b1b287e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3267
content:
"As an enabler, electrification supports integrating net-zero energy \r\nsources in urban infrastructure across sectors, especially when there \r\nis more flexible energy demand in mobility, heating, and cooling to \r\nabsorb greater shares of variable renewable energy. In the transport \r\nsector, smart charging can reduce electric vehicle impacts on peak \r\ndemand by 60% (IEA 2021a). Urban areas that connect efficient \r\nbuilding clusters with the operation of smart thermal grids in \r\ndistrict heating and cooling networks with large-scale heat pumps \r\ncan support higher penetrations of variable renewable energy \r\nin smart energy systems (Lund et al. 2014, 2017). Higher urban \r\ndensities provide the advantage of increasing the penetration of \r\nrenewable power for deep decarbonisation, including mixed-use \r\nneighbourhoods for grid balancing and electric public transport \r\n(Hsieh et al. 2017; Tong et al. 2017; Fichera et al. 2018; Kobashi et al. \r\n2020)"


id: bb7ed10cc98a0733cb63ac88e1da30f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 27059
content:
"Smart electricity grids enable peak demand reductions, energy \r\nconservation, and renewable energy penetration, and are a subset \r\nof smart energy systems. GHG emission reductions from smart grids \r\nrange from 10 to 180 gCO2 kWh-1 (grams of CO2 per kilowatt-hour) \r\nwith a median value of 89 gCO2 kWh-1, depending on the electricity \r\nmix, penetration of renewable energy, and the system boundary \r\n(Moretti et al. 2017). Smart electricity grids are characterised by \r\nbi-directional flows of electricity and information between generators \r\nand consumers, although some actors can be both as 'prosumer' (see \r\nGlossary). Two-way power flows can be used to establish peer-to\u0002peer trading (P2P) (Hansen et al. 2020). Business models based on \r\nlocal citizen utilities (Green and Newman 2017; Green et al. 2020; \r\nSyed et al. 2020) and community batteries (Mey and Hicks 2019; \r\nGreen et al"


id: b2570d9a07543a84377731a7ae1ed96b
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content:
" 2020) can support the realisation of distributed energy \r\nand solar energy cities (Galloway and Newman 2014; Byrne and \r\nTaminiau 2016; Stewart et al. 2018; Allan 2020)."


id: b11a59c1d15d4f6e850fb89c5a538ac3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 25370
content:
"Figure 8.17: Relative volume of a given weight, its carbon emissions, and carbon storage capacity of primary structural materials comparing one tonne \r\nof concrete, steel, and timber. Concrete and steel have substantial embodied carbon emissions with minimal carbon storage capacities, while timber stores a considerable \r\nquantity of carbon with a relatively small ratio of carbon emissions-to-material volume. The displayed carbon storage of concrete is the theoretical maximum value, which may \r\nbe achieved after hundreds of years. Cement ratios of 10%, 15%, and 20% are assumed to estimate minimum, mean, and maximum carbon storage in concrete. Carbon \r\nstorage of steel is not displayed as it is negligible (0.004 tonne C per tonne of steel). The middle-stacked bars represent the mean carbon emission or mean carbon storage \r\nvalues displayed in bold font and underlined. The darker and lighter coloured stacked bars depict the minimum and maximum values"


id: 8a4c5a194e66dbaaf118f68b4e2eba33
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19295
content:
" Grey tones represent carbon emissions \r\nand green tones are given for storage capacity values. Construction materials have radically different volume-to-weight ratios, as well as material intensity (see representations \r\nof structural columns in the upper panel. These differences should be accounted for in the estimations of their carbon storage and emissions (see also Figure 8.22). Source: \r\nadapted with permission from Churkina et al. (2020)."


id: cb329af08f91bba5dfab47036c832adc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 29528
content:
"The initial carbon debt incurred in the production stage, even in \r\nsustainable buildings, can take decades to offset through operational \r\nstage energy efficiencies alone. Increased reduction in the energy \r\ndemands and GHG emissions associated with the manufacture of \r\nmineral-based construction materials will be challenging, as these \r\nindustries have already optimised their production processes. Among \r\nthe category of primary structural materials, it is estimated that \r\nfinal energy demand for steel production can be reduced by nearly \r\n30% compared to 2010 levels, with 12% efficiency improvement \r\nfor cement (Lechtenbohmer et al. 2016). Even when industries are \r\ndecarbonised, residual CO2 emissions will remain from associated \r\nchemical reactions that take place in calcination and use of coke \r\nfrom coking coal to reduce iron oxide (Davis et al. 2018)"


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content:
" Additionally, \r\ncarbon sequestration by cement occurs over the course of the \r\nbuilding lifecycle in quantities that would offset only a fraction of \r\ntheir production stage carbon spike (Xi et al. 2016; Davis et al. 2018). \r\nMoreover, there are collateral effects on the carbon cycle related \r\nto modern construction and associated resource extraction. The \r\nproduction of cement, asphalt, and glass requires large amounts of \r\nsand extracted from beaches, rivers, and seafloors, disturbing aquatic \r\necosystems and reducing their capacity to absorb atmospheric \r\ncarbon. The mining of ore can lead to extensive local deforestation \r\nand soil degradation (Sonter et al. 2017). Deforestation significantly \r\nweakens the converted land as a carbon sink and in severe cases may \r\neven create a net emissions source."


id: c7eecf061ae84016db3adbb1a3f9449d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Figure 8.18: Key mitigation benefits, adaptation co-benefits, and SDG linkages of urban green and blue infrastructure. Panel (b) evaluates those strategies in \r\nthe context of their mitigation benefits, adaptation co-benefits, and linkages to the SDGs. Urban forests and street trees provide the greatest mitigation benefit because of their \r\nability to sequester and store carbon while simultaneously reducing building energy demand. Moreover, they provide multiple adaptation co-benefits and synergies based on \r\nthe linkages to the SDGs (Figure 8.4). The assessments of mitigation benefits are dependent on context, scale, and spatial arrangement of each green and blue infrastructure \r\ntype and their proximity to buildings. Mitigation benefits due to reducing municipal water use are based on reducing wastewater loads that reduce energy use in wastewater \r\ntreatment plants"


id: 9332e7ec2abde735c0892464f52616d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 20672
content:
" The sizes of the bars are illustrative and their relative size is based on the authors' best understanding and assessment of the literature."


id: adb02d29c99867092af22f382d3b8d55
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Global urban tree carbon storage is approximately 7.4 billion tonnes \r\n(GtC) given 363 million hectares of urban land, 26.5% tree cover, and \r\nan average carbon storage density of urban tree cover of 7.69 kgC m-2\r\n(kilograms carbon per square metre) (Nowak et al. 2013; World \r\nBank et al. 2013). Estimated global annual carbon sequestration \r\nby urban trees is approximately 217 million tonnes (MtC) given \r\nan average carbon sequestration density per unit urban tree cover \r\nof 0.226 kgC m-2 (Nowak et al. 2013). With an average plantable \r\n(non-tree and non-impervious) space of 48% globally (Nowak and \r\nGreenfield 2020), the carbon storage value could nearly triple if all \r\nthis space is converted to tree cover. In Europe alone, if 35% of the \r\nurban surfaces (26,450 km2\r\n) were transformed into green surfaces, \r\nthe mitigation potential based on carbon sequestration would be an \r\nestimated 25.9 MtCO2 yr-1 with the total mitigation benefit being \r\n55"


id: 140975f10a0f70b2db72b12e8518d4b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"8 MtCO2 yr-1, including an energy saving of about 92 TWh yr-1\r\n(Quaranta et al. 2021). Other co-benefits include reducing urban \r\nrunoff by about 17.5% and reducing summer temperatures by \r\n2.5degC-6degC (Quaranta et al. 2021)."


id: a0a20ac404bc760250343ecd172f5c78
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 22814
content:
"Urban forested natural areas have unique benefits as they can provide habitat for native plants and animals, protecting local \r\nbiodiversity in a  fragmented landscape (Di Giulio et al. 2009). Forests can have a  greater cooling effect on cities than designed \r\ngreenspaces, and the bigger the forest the greater the effect (Jaganmohan et al. 2016). In New York City, urban forested natural \r\nareas have been found to account for the majority of trees estimated in the city (69%), but are a minority of the total tree canopy \r\n(25%, or 5.5% of the total city land area) (Pregitzer et al. 2019a). In New York City, natural areas are estimated to store a mean of \r\n263.5 MgC ha-1 (megagram carbon per hectare), adding up to 1.86 TgC (teragram carbon) across the city, with the majority of carbon \r\n(86%) being stored in the trees and soils (Pregitzer et al. 2021)"


id: 2297c6dadd6411c4ae068d04ae0e0356
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 2896
content:
" These estimates are similar to per-hectare estimates of carbon storage \r\nacross different pools in non-urban forest types (Table 1), and 1.5 times greater than estimates for carbon stored in just trees across \r\nthe entire city (Pregitzer et al. 2021)."


id: dfd02e1919dcf38917ae5d8b4e1c0eba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32709
content:
"Urban systems shape the behaviour and social structures of their \r\nresidents through urban form, energy systems, and infrastructure - \r\nall of which provide a  range of options for consumers to make \r\nchoices about residential location, mobility, energy sources, and the \r\nconsumption of materials, food, and other resources. The relative \r\navailability of options across these sectors has implications on urban \r\nemissions through individual behaviour. In turn, urban GHG emissions, \r\nas well as emissions from the supply chains of cities, are driven by the \r\nbehaviour and consumption patterns of residents, with households \r\naccounting for over 60% of carbon emissions globally (Ivanova et al. \r\n2016). The exclusion of consumption-based emissions and emissions \r\nthat occur outside of city boundaries as a result of urban activities, \r\nhowever, will lead to significant undercounting. For example, a study \r\nof 79 major cities found that about 41% of consumption-based \r\ncarbon footprints (1"


id: 99b29ae6863f6da29455c7caea564002
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Greenways support stormwater management to mitigate water \r\nrunoff and urban floods by reducing the water volume (e.g., through \r\ninfiltration) and by an attenuation or temporal shift of water discharge \r\n(Fiori and Volpi 2020; Pour et al. 2020). Using green infrastructure \r\ndelays the time to runoff and reduces water volume but depends \r\non the magnitude of floods (Qin et al. 2013). Measures are most \r\neffective for flood mitigation at a local scale; however, as the size of \r\nthe catchment increases, the effectiveness of reducing peak discharge \r\ndecreases (Fiori and Volpi 2020). Reduction of water volume through \r\ninfiltration can be more effective with rainfall events on a lower return \r\nrate. Overall, the required capacity for piped engineered systems \r\nfor water runoff attenuation and mitigation can be reduced while \r\nlowering flow rates, controlling pollution transport, and increasing \r\nthe capacity to store stormwater (Srishantha and Rathnayake 2017)"


id: 28847188b4967e6e3a166ec7bb9e53c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 3792
content:
" \r\nBenefits for flood mitigation require a careful consideration of the \r\nspatial context of the urban area, the heterogeneity of the rainfall \r\nevents, and characteristics of implementation (Qiu et al. 2021). \r\nMaintenance costs and stakeholder coordination are other aspects \r\nrequiring attention (Mguni et al. 2016)."


id: 27d7ae315d4d9baaa1dbf84c2318bc2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 3679
content:
"Providing a  connected system of greenspace throughout the \r\nurban area may promote active transportation (Nieuwenhuijsen \r\nand Khreis 2016), thereby reducing GHG emissions. Soft solutions \r\nfor improving green infrastructure connectivity for cycling is an \r\nurban NBS mitigation measure, although there is low evidence for \r\nemissions reductions. In the city of Lisbon, Portugal, improvements in \r\ncycling infrastructure and bike-sharing system resulted in 3.5 times \r\nmore cyclists within two years (Felix et al. 2020). In Copenhagen, the \r\ncost of cycling (0.08 EUR km-1) is declining and is about six times \r\nlower than car driving (Euro 0.50/km) (Vedel et al. 2017). In addition, \r\nparticipants were willing to cycle 1.84 km longer if the route has \r\na  designated cycle track and 0.8 km more if there are also green \r\nsurroundings"


id: a40a1bcfa0a3e0279cb29da635b1a59f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 23365
content:
" Changes in urban landscapes, including through \r\nthe integration of green infrastructure in sustainable urban and \r\ntransport planning, can support the transition from private motorised \r\ntransportation to public and physically active transportation in \r\ncarbon-neutral, more liveable and healthier cities (Nieuwenhuijsen \r\nand Khreis 2016; Nieuwenhuijsen 2020). Car infrastructure can be \r\nalso transferred into public open and green space, such as in the \r\nSuperblock model in Barcelona's neighbourhoods (Rueda 2019). \r\nHealth impact assessment models estimated that 681 premature \r\ndeaths may be prevented annually with this implementation (Mueller \r\net al. 2020) and the creation of greenways in Maanshan, China has \r\nstimulated interest in walking or cycling (Zhang et al. 2020)."


id: 4b120e79b558fd3071d9135067e6655f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 9233
content:
"clothes washing (5.0-5.7%), and optimising dishwashing (1-1.1%) \r\n(Levesque et al. 2019). Building standards and mandates could work \r\ntowards making these options required or more readily available and \r\naccessible. Residential appliance use, water heating, and thermostat \r\nsettings can be influenced by feedback on energy use, particularly \r\nwhen paired with real-time feedback and/or instructions on how to \r\nreduce energy use (Kastner and Stern 2015; Stern et al. 2016; Wynes \r\net al. 2018; Tiefenbeck et al. 2019). The energy-saving potentials of \r\nchanging occupant behaviour can range between 10% and 25% \r\nfor residential buildings, and between 5% and 30% for commercial \r\nbuildings (Zhang et al. 2018). Households are more likely to invest \r\nin energy-related home technologies if they believe it financially \r\nbenefits (rather than disadvantages) them, increases comfort, or will \r\nbenefit the natural environment (Kastner and Stern 2015)"


id: 48ea413465073cf47ffb46f8e8e5b799
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8857
content:
" Social \r\ninfluences and availability of funding for household energy measures \r\nalso support behaviour change (Kastner and Stern 2015)."


id: 3677782933a96130df7ad903b76f0259
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 5962
content:
"The implementation of the waste hierarchy from waste prevention \r\nonward, as well as the effectiveness of waste separation at \r\nsource, involves socio-behavioural options in the context of urban \r\ninfrastructure (Sun et al. 2018a; Hunter et al. 2019). Managing \r\nand treating waste as close to the point of generation as possible, \r\nincluding distributed waste treatment facilities, can minimise \r\ntransport-related emissions, congestion, and air pollution. Home \r\ncomposting and compact urban form can also reduce waste transport \r\nemissions (Oliveira et al. 2017). Decentralised waste management \r\ncan reinforce source-separation behaviour since the resulting \r\nbenefits can be more visible (Eisted et al. 2009; Hoornweg and Bhada\u0002Tata 2012; Linzner and Lange 2013)"


id: 3effd7afc07fbe1d144b904d22b1c898
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 7297
content:
" Public acceptance for waste \r\nmanagement is greatest when system costs for citizens are reduced, \r\nthere is greater awareness of primary waste separation at source, \r\nand there are positive behavioural spill-overs across environmental \r\npolicies (Milutinovic et al. 2016; Boyer and Ramaswami 2017; Diaz\u0002Villavicencio et al. 2017; Slorach et al. 2020). In addition to the choice \r\nof technology, the costs of waste management options depend on \r\nthe awareness of system users that can represent time-dependent \r\ncosts (Khan et al. 2016; Chifari et al. 2017; Ranieri et al. 2018; Tomic \r\nand Schneider 2020). Waste management systems and the inclusion \r\nof materials from multiple urban sectors for alternative by-products \r\ncan increase scalability (Eriksson et al. 2015; Boyer and Ramaswami \r\n2017; D'Adamo et al. 2021). As a broader concept, circular economy \r\napproaches can contribute to managing waste (Box  12.8) with \r\nvarying emissions impacts (Section 5.3.4)."


id: cb028738e2f5c1acc72d4d9d1f532cd1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29502
content:
"Accessibility as a criterion widens the focus beyond work trips and \r\nVKT/VMT, paying attention to a broader set of destinations beyond \r\nworkplaces, as well as walking and biking trips or active travel. It \r\nholds promise for targeting and obtaining greater reductions in GHG \r\nemissions in household travel by providing access through walking, \r\nbiking, and public transit. Accessibility as a criterion for urban form \r\nhas been embedded in neighbourhood form models since at least \r\nthe last century and in more recent decades in the 'urban village' \r\nconcept of the New Urbanism (Duany and Plater-Zyberck 1991) and \r\nTODs (Calthorpe 1993). However, accessibility did not gain much \r\ntraction in urban planning and transportation until the last decade. \r\nThe experience of cities and metropolitan areas with the COVID-19 \r\npandemic has led to a further resurgence in interest and importance \r\n(Handy 2020; Hu et al"


id: 8b0767aad52e9d910b2eaa0260952486
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content:
" 2020), and it is becoming a criterion at the \r\ncore of the concept of the 15/20-minute city (Moreno et al. 2021; \r\nPozoukidou and Chatziyiannaki 2021). Initially, neighbourhoods \r\nhave been designed to provide quality, reliable services within 15 or \r\n20 minutes of active transport (i.e., walking or cycling), as well as \r\na  variety of housing options and open space (Portland Bureau of \r\nPlanning and Sustainability 2012; Pozoukidou and Chatziyiannaki \r\n2021; State Government of Victoria 2021). Community life circles \r\nstrategy for urban areas has also emphasised walking access and \r\nhealth (Weng et al. 2019; Wu et al. 2021). The growing popularity \r\nof the 15/20-minute city movement has significant potential for \r\nreducing VMT/VKT and associated GHG emissions."


id: cf431feef33b5df72ddf44846eb2070b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Currently, cross-sectoral integration is one of the main thematic \r\nareas of climate policy strategies among the actions that are adopted \r\nby signatories to an urban climate and energy network (Hsu et al. \r\n2020c). Although not as prevalent as those for efficiency, municipal \r\nadministration, and urban planning measures (Hsu et al. 2020c), \r\nstrategies that are cross-cutting in nature across sectors can provide \r\nimportant emission-saving opportunities for accelerating the pace \r\nof climate mitigation in urban areas. Cross-sectoral integration \r\nalso involves mobilising urban actors to increase innovation in \r\nenergy services and markets beyond individual energy efficiency \r\nactions (Hsu et al. 2020c). Indeed, single-sector versus cross-sector \r\nstrategies for 637 cities from a  developing country can enable an \r\nadditional 15-36% contribution to the national climate mitigation \r\nreduction potential (Ramaswami et al. 2017a)"


id: 139cf81061e78927332d96bbb0f85149
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 592
content:
" The strategies at \r\nthe urban level involved those for energy cascading and exchange \r\nof materials that connected waste, heat, and electricity strategies \r\n(Section 8.5 and Box 8.4)."


id: eee2a7f033340fc4ec07ee0a914d921b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Governance and other institutions act as core components to urban \r\nsystems by facilitating and managing linkages between different \r\nsectors, geographic regions, and stakeholders. This position renders \r\nsubnational governments and institutions key enablers of climate \r\nchange mitigation (Seto et al. 2016, 2021; Hsu et al. 2018, 2020c; \r\nVedeld et al. 2021) (Section 8.4.1). Indeed, since AR5 more research \r\nhas emerged identifying these actors as vehicles through which \r\nto accelerate local-to-global efforts to decarbonise (IPCC 2018a; \r\nHsu et al. 2020b; Salvia et al. 2021; Seto et al. 2021) (Chapter 13, \r\nSections  4.2.3, 14.5.5, 15.6.5 and 16.4.7, and 'subnational actors' \r\nin Glossary). The current extent (Section  8.3.3) and projected rise \r\n(Section 8.3.4.2) in the urban share of global emissions underscores \r\nthe transformative global impact of supporting urban climate \r\ngovernance and institutions (Section 8.5.2)"


id: 7d813c19dc8d26ae6dc229eb71711480
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"When sufficient local autonomy is present, local policies have the \r\nability to upscale to higher levels of authority, imparting influence \r\nat higher geographic scales. Established urban climate leaders with \r\nlarge institutional capacity can influence small and mid-sized cities, \r\nor other urban areas with less institutional capacity, to enact effective \r\nclimate policies, by engaging with those cities through transnational \r\nnetworks and by adopting a public presence of climate leadership \r\n(Chan et al. 2015; Kern 2019; Seto et al. 2021) (Section  8.5.3). \r\nIncreasingly, subnational actors are also influencing their national \r\nand international governments through lobbying efforts that call \r\non them to adopt more ambitious climate goals and provide more \r\nsupport for subnational GHG mitigation efforts (Linton et al. 2021; \r\nSeto et al. 2021). These dynamics underscore the importance of \r\nrelative local autonomy in urban GHG mitigation policy"


id: 83092c5df87288816865a082e3cc82bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18143
content:
" They also \r\nhighlight the growing recognition of subnational authorities' role in \r\nclimate change mitigation by national and international authorities."


id: 64a3cd51c0712d58b9e4ada15fab084d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13410
content:
"The confluence of political will and policy action at the local level, \r\nand growing resources offered through municipal and regional \r\nnetworks and agreements, have provided a  platform for urban \r\nactors to engage in international climate policy (Section  8.5.3). \r\nThis phenomenon is recognised in the Paris Agreement, which, for \r\nthe first time in a multilateral climate treaty, referenced the crucial \r\nrole subnational and non-state actors like local communities have in \r\nmeeting the goals set forth in the agreement (UNFCCC 2015). The \r\nDurban Platform for Enhanced Action (Widerberg and Pattberg 2015), \r\nas well as UN-Habitat's NUA and the 2030 Development Agenda, are \r\nother examples of the international sphere elevating the local level \r\nto global influence (Fuhr et al. 2018). Another facet of local-to-global \r\naction is the emergence of International Cooperative Initiatives \r\n(ICIs) (Widerberg and Pattberg 2015)"


id: 3b6615956e739306b88220f79fba5a0f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6697
content:
" One such ICI, the City Hall \r\nDeclaration, was signed alongside the Paris Agreement during the \r\nfirst Climate Summit for Local Leaders. Signatories included hundreds \r\nof local government leaders, in partnership with private sector "


id: 8397972cec3cea9f07f93905360dd9c1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18240
content:
"A significant research question that has been paid more attention in \r\nboth the scientific and policy communities is related to subnational \r\nactors' role in and contribution to global climate mitigation. The 2018 \r\nUN Environment Programme's (UNEP) annual Emissions Gap report \r\nin 2018 included for the first time a special chapter on subnational \r\nand non-state (i.e.,  businesses and private) actors and assessed the \r\nlandscape of studies aiming to quantify their contributions to global \r\nclimate mitigation. Non-state action on net-zero GHG or CO2 emissions \r\ncontinues to be emphasised (UNEP 2021) (Box 8.4). There has been \r\nan increase in the number of studies aiming to quantify the overall \r\naggregate mitigation impact of subnational climate action globally. \r\nEstimates for the significance of their impact vary widely, from up to 30 \r\nMtCO2-eq from 25 cities in the United States in 2030 (Roelfsema 2017), \r\nto a  2"


id: 5c153065ef93f64c8f926c6105c7c3b5
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content:
"3 GtCO2-eq reduction in 2030 compared to a  current policy \r\nscenario from over 10,239 cities participating in GCoM (Hsu et al. 2018; \r\nGCoM 2019). For regional governments, the Under 2 Coalition, which "


id: 6408c0a51c2cb5edd08b150ea86c76cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13307
content:
"Subnational governments that participate in transnational \r\nclimate networks, however, are primarily located in developed \r\ncountries, particularly Europe and North America, with far less \r\nrepresentation in developing countries. In one of the largest studies \r\nof subnational climate mitigation action, more than 93% of just over \r\n6000 quantifiable subnational climate commitments come from cities \r\nand regions based in the European Union (NewClimate Institute et al. \r\n2019)"


id: 5a775b26029e9a774f5fb44e602e7ccd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Such gaps in geographic coverage have been attributed to \r\nfactors such as the dominating role of Global North actors in the \r\nconvening and diffusion of 'best practices' related to climate action \r\n(Bouteligier 2013), or the more limited autonomy or ability of \r\nsubnational or non-state actors in Global South countries to define \r\nboundaries and interests separately from national governments, \r\nparticularly those that exercise top-down decision-making or have \r\nvertically integrated governance structures (Bulkeley et al. 2012). \r\nMany of the participating subnational actors from under-represented \r\nregions are large megacities (of 10 million people or more) that will \r\nplay a pivotal role in shaping emissions trajectories (Data Driven Yale \r\net al. 2018; NewClimate Institute et al. 2019)."


id: 59f3b63a394ac0e3bca87e59433d73f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11661
content:
"Meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement will require fundamental \r\nchanges that will be most successful when cities work together \r\nwith provincial and national leadership and legislation, third-sector \r\nleadership, transformative action, and supportive financing. Urban \r\ngovernments often obtain their powers from provincial, state and/\r\nor national governments, and are subjected to laws and regulations \r\nto regulate development and implement infrastructure. In addition, \r\nthe sources of revenue are often set at these levels so that many \r\nurban governments rely on state/provincial and national government \r\nfunds for improving infrastructure, especially transit infrastructure. \r\nThe increasing financialisation of urban infrastructures is another \r\nfactor that can make it more difficult for local governments to \r\ndetermine infrastructure choices (O'Brien et al. 2019)"


id: 50381df5d78ce78b7fdb5bb2ecc12916
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 10060
content:
" Urban transit \r\nsystem operations, in particular, are heavily subsidised in many \r\ncountries, both locally and by higher levels of government. As a result \r\nof this interplay of policy and legal powers among various levels of \r\ngovernment, the lock-in nature of urban infrastructures and built \r\nenvironments will require multi-level governance responses to ensure \r\nmeeting decarbonisation targets. The reliance on state and national \r\npolicy and/or funding can accelerate or impede the decarbonisation \r\nof urban environments (McCarney et al. 2011; McCarney 2019)."


id: a12f6ebd1bf820aa7ca5f1e8f58d7495
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 22918
content:
"The world's infrastructure spending is expected to more than double \r\nfrom 2015 to 2030 under a low-carbon and climate-resilient scenario. \r\nMore than 70% of the infrastructure will concentrate in urban areas \r\nby requiring USD4.5-5.4 trillion per year (CCFLA 2015).  However, \r\ntoday's climate finance flows for cities or 'urban climate finance', \r\nestimated at USD384 billion annually on average in 2017/18, are \r\ninsufficient to meet the USD4.5-5.4 trillion annual investment needs \r\nfor urban mitigation actions across key sectors (CCFLA 2015; CPI and \r\nWorld Bank 2021; Negreiros et al. 2021). Low-carbon urban form \r\n(e.g"


id: 2866f53140b537c296f3f578b0f4b372
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 3773
content:
", compact, high-density, and mixed-use characteristics) is likely \r\nto economise spending in infrastructure along with the application \r\nof new technologies and renewable energies that would be able \r\nto recover the increasing upfront cost of low-carbon infrastructure \r\nfrom more efficient operating and energy savings (medium evidence,\r\nhigh agreement) (Global Commission on the Economy and Climate \r\n2014; Foxon et al. 2015; Bhattacharya et al. 2016; Floater et al. 2017; \r\nColenbrander et al. 2018b)."


id: 873c3c2be3f4d95ae67536c59a487726
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18814
content:
"As a combined evaluation, integrating multiple mitigation options in \r\nurban systems involves the greatest requirement for strengthening \r\ninstitutional capacity and governance through cross-sectoral \r\ncoordination. Notably, integrated action requires significant effort \r\nto coordinate sectors and strategies across urban growth typologies \r\n(Sections 8.4 and 8.6, and Figure 8.21). Institutional capacity, if not \r\nstrengthened to a suitable level to handle this process - especially \r\nto break out of carbon lock-in  - can fall short of the efforts this \r\nentails. These conditions can pose barriers for realising cross-sectoral \r\ncoordination while the formation of partnerships and stakeholder \r\nengagement take place as important enablers. Overcoming \r\ninstitutional challenges for cross-sectoral coordination can support \r\nrealising synergies among the benefits that each mitigation option \r\ncan offer within and across urban systems, including for the SDGs"


id: 85d9af9675d665930a93a33dacd527d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 18603
content:
" \r\nThese include those that can be involved in co-located and walkable \r\nurban form together with decarbonising and electrifying the urban \r\nenergy system as well as urban green and blue infrastructure, \r\nproviding the basis for more liveable, resource efficient and compact \r\nurban development with benefits for urban inhabitants (Section 8.2)."


id: 60ce7cfb57750353a5a603073845827
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 12802
content:
"Yet urban mitigation options that can be implemented to transform \r\nurban systems involve the interplay of multiple enablers and \r\nbarriers. Based on a  framework for assessing feasibility from \r\na multi-dimensional perspective, feasibility is malleable and various \r\nenablers can be brought into play to increase the implementation of \r\nmitigation options. The scope of this assessment enables an approach \r\nfor considering multiple aspects that have an impact on feasibility \r\nas a tool for policy support (Singh et al. 2020). In Figure 8.19, the \r\nassessment framework that is based on geophysical, environmental\u0002ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural, and institutional \r\ndimensions is applied to identify the enablers and/or barriers in \r\nimplementing mitigation options in urban systems. The feasibility of \r\noptions may differ across context, time, and scale (Section 8.SM.2). \r\nThe line of sight upon which the assessment is based includes urban \r\ncase studies (Lamb et al"


id: ee00d399f8f0d70eae8f386a7e1b70ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Across the enablers and barriers of different mitigation options, \r\nurban land use and spatial planning for increasing co-located \r\ndensities in urban areas has positive impacts in multiple indicators, \r\nparticularly reducing land use and preserving carbon sinks when the \r\ngrowth in urban extent is reduced and avoided, which if brought \r\ninto interplay in decision-making, can support the enablers for its \r\nimplementation. Improvements in air quality are possible when \r\nhigher urban densities are combined with modes of active transport, \r\nelectrified mobility as well as urban green and blue infrastructure \r\n(Sections 8.3.4, 8.4 and 8.6). The demands on geophysical resources, \r\nincluding materials for urban development, will depend on whether \r\nadditional strategies are in place with largely negative impacts under \r\nconventional practices"


id: a83c637db6e04874bf45ff60805e9964
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" The technological scalability of multiple \r\nurban mitigation options is favourable while varying according to \r\nthe level of existing urban development and scale of implementation \r\n(Tables 8.SM.3 and 8.SM.4)."


id: 8442cfaab2719d3a95409e2123c1c9a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18344
content:
"Similarly, multiple mitigation options have positive impacts on \r\nemployment and economic growth, especially when urban densities \r\nenable productivity. Possible distributional effects, including \r\navailability of affordable accommodation and access to greenspace, \r\nare best addressed when urban policy packages combine more \r\nthan one policy objective. Such an approach can provide greater \r\nsupport to urban mitigation efforts with progress towards shifting \r\nurban development to sustainability. The electrification of the urban \r\nenergy system involves multiple enablers that support the feasibility \r\nof this mitigation option, including positive impacts on health and \r\nwell-being. In addition, increases in urban densities can support \r\nthe planning of district heating and cooling networks that can \r\ndecarbonize the built environment at scale with technology readiness \r\nlevels increasing for lower temperature supply options"


id: 85d4d591571d9c9f585af55b42858572
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Preventing, \r\nminimising, and managing waste as an urban mitigation option can \r\nbe enabled when informality in the sector is transformed to secure \r\nemployment effects and value-addition based on the more circular \r\nuse of resources (Sections 8.4.3 and 8.4.5, and Tables 8.SM.3 and \r\n8.SM.4 in Supplementary Material 8.2)."


id: 7c5e88211c11faffa947aeb29f32d097
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"The most effective and appropriate packages of mitigation \r\nstrategies will vary depending on several dimensions of a city. This \r\nsection brings together the urban mitigation options described \r\nin Section  8.4 and assesses the range of mitigation potentials for \r\ndifferent types of cities. There is consensus in the literature that \r\nmitigation strategies are most effective when multiple interventions \r\nare coupled together. Urban-scale interventions that implement \r\nmultiple strategies concurrently through policy packages are more \r\neffective and have greater emissions savings than when single \r\ninterventions are implemented separately. This is because a  city\u0002wide strategy can have cascading effects across sectors, that have \r\nmultiplicative effects on GHG emissions reduction within and outside \r\na city's administrative boundaries"


id: b4eaa8394d54b2ab119cfd8252aaa7f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Therefore, city-scale strategies can \r\nreduce more emissions than the net sum of individual interventions, \r\nparticularly if multiple scales of governance are included (Sections 8.4 \r\nand 8.5). Furthermore, cities have the ability to implement policy \r\npackages across sectors using an urban systems approach, such as \r\nthrough planning, particularly those that affect key infrastructures \r\n(Figures 8.15, 8.17 and 8.22)."


id: 350678ad0c8a122b37c887f721660eee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Taken together, urban form (Figure  8.16) and growth typology \r\n(Figure 8.20) can act as a roadmap for cities or sub-city communities \r\nlooking to identify their urban context and, by extension, the \r\nmitigation opportunities with the greatest potential to reduce GHG \r\nemissions. Specifically, this considers whether a  city is established \r\nwith existing and managed infrastructure; rapidly growing with \r\nnew and actively developing infrastructure; or emerging with large \r\namounts of infrastructure build-up. The long lifespan of urban \r\ninfrastructure locks in behaviour and committed emissions. Therefore, \r\nthe sequencing of mitigation strategies is important for determining \r\nemissions savings in the short and long term"


id: 4d53f4b42ef71b0d45e9bbf88f765d4b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Hence, different types \r\nof cities will have different mitigation pathways, depending upon \r\na city's urban form and state of that city's urban development and \r\ninfrastructure; the policy packages and implementation plan that \r\nprovide the highest mitigation potential for rapidly growing cities with \r\nnew infrastructures will differ from those for established cities \r\nwith existing infrastructure."


id: ecf4e4f0e208e069e5c4dad6482c450
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Figure 8.20: Urban growth typologies define the main patterns of urban development. Emerging urban areas are undergoing the buildup of new infrastructure. \r\nThese are new urban areas that are budding out. Rapidly growing urban areas are undergoing significant changes in either outward and/or upward growth, accompanied by \r\nlarge-scale development of new urban infrastructure. Established urban areas are relatively stable with mature urban form and existing urban infrastructures. Each of these \r\ntypologies represents different levels of economic development and state of urbanisation. Rapidly growing urban areas that are building up through vertical development are \r\noften those with higher levels of economic development. Rapidly growing urban areas that are building outward through horizontal expansion are found at lower levels of \r\neconomic development and are land intensive. Like with urban form, different areas of a single city can undergo different growth typologies"


id: c9450f0494e8fb7a11f977bd21918dd4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29228
content:
" Therefore a city will be comprised \r\nof multiple urban growth typologies. Source: synthesized from Mahtta et al. (2019) and Lall et al. (2021)."


id: 6078a8d80f95bb6c3ba58f434ee07a71
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Figure 8.21: Priorities and potentials for packages of urban mitigation strategies across typologies of urban growth (Figure 8.20) and urban form \r\n(Figure 8.16). The horizontal axis represents urban growth typologies based on emerging, rapidly growing, and established urban areas. The vertical axis shows the continuum \r\nof urban form, from compact and walkable, to dispersed and auto-centric. Urban areas can first locate their relative positioning in this space according to their predominant style \r\nof urban growth and urban form. The urban mitigation options are bundled across four broad sectors of mitigation strategies: (i) spatial planning, urban form, and infrastructure \r\n(blue); (ii) electrification and net-zero-emissions resources (yellow); (iii) urban green and blue infrastructure (green); and (iv) socio-behavioural aspects (purple). The concentric \r\ncircles indicate lower, medium, and higher mitigation potential considering the context of the urban area"


id: 723cd91951145ca8f843f62c1bd7c456
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 15597
content:
" For each city type (circular graphic) the illustrative urban mitigation \r\nstrategy that is considered to provide the greatest cascading effects across mitigation opportunities is represented by a section that is larger relative to others; those strategy \r\nsections outlined in black are 'entry points' for sequencing of strategies. Within each of the larger strategy sections (i.e., spatial planning, urban green and blue infrastructure, \r\netc.), the size of the sub-strategy sections are equal and do not suggest any priority or sequencing. The relative sizes of the strategies and extent of mitigation potential are \r\nillustrative and based on the authors' best understanding and assessment of the literature."


id: 8a82132485d8db7fee8aa61a264ef3c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 19330
content:
"System-wide energy savings and emissions reductions for low\u0002carbon urban development are widely recognised to require both \r\nbehavioural and structural changes (Zhang and Li 2017). Synergies \r\nbetween social and ecological innovation can reinforce the \r\nsustainability of urban systems while decoupling energy usage and \r\neconomic growth (Hu et al. 2018; Ma et al. 2018). In addition, an \r\nintegrated sustainable development approach that enables cross\u0002sector energy efficiency, sustainable transport, renewable energy, \r\nand local development in urban neighbourhoods can address \r\nissues of energy poverty (Puksec et al. 2018). In this context, cross\u0002sectoral, multi-scale, and public-private collaborative action is crucial \r\nto steer societies and cities closer to low-carbon futures (Holscher \r\net al. 2019)"


id: b51ead2050956019901f57b1937b3b6c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 26031
content:
" Such actions include guiding residential living area per \r\ncapita, limiting private vehicle growth, expanding public transport, \r\nimproving the efficiency of urban infrastructure, enhancing urban \r\ncarbon pools, and minimising waste through sustainable, ideally \r\ncircular, waste management (Lin et al. 2018). Through a coordinated \r\napproach, urban areas can be transformed into hubs for renewable \r\nand distributed energy, sustainable mobility, as well as inclusivity \r\nand health (Newman et al. 2017; Newman 2020)."


id: a05dfcc78763f173d156bcf42b534b7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22765
content:
"A shared understanding for urban transformation through \r\na  participatory approach can largely avoid maladaptation and \r\ncontribute to equity (Moglia et al. 2018). Transformative urban \r\nfutures that are radically different from the existing trajectories of \r\nurbanisation, including in developing countries, can remain within \r\nplanetary boundaries while being inclusive of the urban poor (Friend \r\net al. 2016). At the urban policy level, an analysis of 12,000 measures \r\nin urban-level monitoring emissions inventories based on the mode \r\nof governance further suggests that local authorities with lower \r\npopulation have primarily relied on municipal self-governing while \r\nlocal authorities with higher population more frequently adopted \r\nregulatory measures as well as financing and provision (Palermo et al. \r\n2020b). Policies that relate to education and enabling were uniformly \r\nadopted regardless of population size (Palermo et al. 2020b)"


id: 9908d85b886760874028287df026a272
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Multi\u0002disciplinary teams, including urban planners, engineers, architects, \r\nand environmental institutions, can support local decision-making \r\ncapacities, including for increasing energy efficiency and renewable \r\nenergy considering building intensity and energy use (Mrowczynska \r\net al. 2021) (Section 8.5)."


id: 343a4cda60e6ca236d6d0f74d5271829
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5626
content:
"Rapidly growing cities have entry points into an integrated \r\nstrategy based on spatial planning, urban form and infrastructure \r\n(Figure 8.21). For rapidly growing cities that may be co-located and \r\nwalkable at present, remaining compact is better ensured when \r\nco-location and mixed land use, as well as TOD, continues to be \r\nprioritised (Section  8.4.2). Concurrently, ensuring that electricity \r\nand energy carriers are decarbonised while electrifying mobility, \r\nheating and cooling will support the mitigation potential of these \r\ncities. Along with an integrated approach across other illustrative \r\nstrategies, switching to net-zero materials and supply chains holds \r\nimportance (Section 8.4.3). Cities that remain compact and walkable \r\ncan provide a  greater array of locational and mobility options to \r\nthe inhabitants that can be adopted for mitigation benefits"


id: ac572ea3c8a8f9691e66c1d73095e4c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Rapidly \r\ngrowing cities that may currently be dispersed and auto-centric \r\ncan capture high mitigation potential through urban infill and \r\ndensification. Conserving existing green and blue assets, thereby \r\nprotecting sources of carbon storage and sequestration, as well as \r\nbiodiversity, have high potential for both kinds of existing urban \r\nform, especially when the rapid growth can be controlled.  "


id: 564cc3a4ba3b799b5a297c12c4deb6c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11061
content:
"Rapidly growing cities have significant opportunities for integrating \r\nclimate mitigation response options in earlier stages of urban \r\ndevelopment, which can provide even greater opportunities for \r\navoiding carbon lock-in and shifting pathways towards net-zero \r\nGHG emissions. In growing cities that are expected to experience \r\nlarge increases in population, a  significant share of urban \r\ndevelopment remains to be planned and built. The ability to shift \r\nthese investments towards low-carbon development earlier in the \r\nprocess represents an important opportunity for contributing to \r\nnet-zero GHG emissions at the global scale"


id: 3ec3e6a7350ee0d5c6ceac16deaa0fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" In particular, evidence \r\nsuggests that investment in low-carbon development measures and \r\nreinvestment based on the returns of the measures, even without \r\nconsidering substantial co-benefits, can provide tipping points for \r\nclimate mitigation action and reaching peak emissions at lower \r\nlevels while decoupling emissions from economic growth, even in \r\nfast-growing megacity contexts with well-established infrastructure \r\n(Colenbrander et al. 2017)."


id: b44780b6e0b6aa85bdd6f11aba617b4d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25876
content:
"In low-energy-driven urban design, parameters are evaluated based \r\non the energy performance of the urban area in the early design phase \r\nof future urban development (Shi et al. 2017b). Energy-driven urban \r\ndesign generates and optimises urban form according to the energy \r\nperformance outcome (Shi et al. 2017b). Beyond the impact of urban \r\nform on building energy performance, the approach focuses on the \r\ninterdependencies between urban form and energy infrastructure in \r\nurban energy systems. The process can provide opportunities for both \r\npassive options for energy-driven urban design, such as the use of \r\nsolar gain for space heating, or of thermal mass to moderate indoor \r\ntemperatures, as well as active options that involve the use of energy \r\ninfrastructure and technologies while recognising interrelations of \r\nthe system. Future urban settlements can also be planned and built \r\nwith net-zero CO2 or net-zero GHG emissions, as well as renewable \r\nenergy targets, in mind"


id: 99c221acfc6e9998f443f1c0a0435fec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21709
content:
" Energy master planning of urban areas that \r\ninitially target net-zero operational GHG emissions can be supported \r\nwith energy master planning from conceptual design to operation, \r\nincluding district-scale energy strategies (Charani Shandiz et al. 2021)."


id: f7c4b3a83d488d968860b607741c599
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36500
content:
"Low-carbon urban development that triggers economic decoupling \r\ncan have a positive impact on employment and local competitiveness \r\n(Kalmykova et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2018b; Garcia-Gusano et al. 2018; \r\nHu et al. 2018; Shen et al. 2018). In addition, sustainable urban \r\ntransformation can be supported with participatory approaches \r\nthat provide a  shared understanding of future opportunities \r\nand challenges where public acceptance increases with citizen \r\nengagement and citizen empowerment as well as an awareness of \r\nco-benefits (Blanchet 2015; Bjorkelund et al. 2016; Flacke and de \r\nBoer 2017; Gao et al. 2017; Neuvonen and Ache 2017; Sharp and \r\nSalter 2017; Wiktorowicz et al. 2018; Fastenrath and Braun 2018; \r\nGorissen et al. 2018; Herrmann et al. 2018; Moglia et al. 2018)"


id: 91ee8df9d252b491fda726db02a77f32
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 20485
content:
" \r\nSustainable and low-carbon urban development that integrates \r\nissues of equity, inclusivity, and affordability, while safeguarding \r\nurban livelihoods, providing access to basic services, lowering energy \r\nbills, addressing energy poverty, and improving public health can also \r\nimprove the distributional effects of existing and future urbanisation \r\n(Friend et al. 2016; Claude et al. 2017; Colenbrander et al. 2017; Ma \r\net al. 2018; Mrowczynska et al. 2018; Puksec et al. 2018; Wiktorowicz \r\net al. 2018) (Section 8.2)."


id: 47e2369056e10bbbcc1ad9e7edf3f7ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8677
content:
"Though there has been a  rapid rise in quantification and analysis \r\nof urban emissions, gaps remain in comprehensive global coverage, \r\nparticularly in the Global South, and reliance on standardised \r\nframeworks and systematic data are lacking (Gurney and Shepson \r\n2021; Mueller et al. 2021). The development of protocols by (BSI \r\n2013; Fong et al. 2014; ICLEI 2019b) that urban areas can use to \r\norganise emissions accounts has been an important step forward, but \r\nno single agreed-upon reporting framework exists (Lombardi et al. \r\n2017; Chen et al. 2019b; Ramaswami et al. 2021). Additionally, there \r\nis no standardisation of emissions data and limited independent \r\nvalidation procedures (Gurney and Shepson 2021). This is partly \r\ndriven by the recognition that urban emissions can be conceptualised \r\nusing different frameworks, each of which has a different meaning \r\nfor different urban communities (Section 8.1.6.2)"


id: 4df1d9e83eb5e79f5a56023acf4494dc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9686
content:
" Equally important \r\nis the recognition that acquisition and analysis of complex data used \r\nto populate urban GHG inventory protocols remains a  barrier for \r\nlocal practitioners (Creutzig et al. 2019). The limited standardisation \r\nhas also led to incomparability of the many individual or city \r\ncluster analyses that have been accomplished since AR5. Finally, \r\ncomprehensive, global quantification of urban emissions remains \r\nincomplete in spite of recent efforts (Moran et al. 2018; Zheng \r\net al. 2018; Harris et al. 2020; Jiang et al. 2020; Wei et al. 2021; \r\nWiedmann et al. 2021)."


id: 1d52338983c6c817aef99d315262c65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2056
content:
"The most impactful urban mitigation plans reduce urban GHG emissions by considering the long lifespan of urban layout and urban \r\ninfrastructures (Sections  8.4.1 and 8.6). Chapter  8  identifies three overarching mitigation strategies with the largest potential \r\nto decrease current, and avoid future, urban emissions: (i) reducing or changing urban energy and material use towards more \r\nsustainable production and consumption across all sectors including through spatial planning and infrastructure that supports \r\ncompact, walkable urban form (Section  8.4.2); (ii) decarbonise through electrification of the urban energy system, and switch \r\nto net-zero-emissions resources (i.e., low-carbon infrastructure) (Section 8.4.3); and (iii) enhance carbon sequestration through \r\nurban green and blue infrastructure (e.g"


id: 1188e751a9dd2e1c362925573bfab462
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 246
content:
", green roofs, urban forests and street trees), which can also offer multiple co-benefits like \r\nreducing ground temperatures and supporting public health and well-being (Section 8.4.4). Integrating these mitigation strategies \r\nacross sectors, geographic scales, and levels of governance will yield the greatest emissions savings (Sections 8.4 and 8.5)."


id: ce94437c969eb236e87d84c63af16631
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"There are two different emissions estimation techniques applied, individually or in combination, to the four frameworks outlined \r\nin Section 8.1.6.2 to estimate urban GHG emissions: 'top-down' and 'bottom-up'. The top-down technique uses atmospheric GHG \r\nconcentrations and atmospheric modelling to estimate direct (scope 1) emissions (see Glossary). The bottom-up technique estimates \r\nemissions using local activity data or direct measurements such as in smokestacks, traffic data, energy consumption information, and \r\nbuilding use. Bottom-up techniques will often include indirect emissions (see Glossary) from purchased electricity (scope 2) and the \r\nurban supply chain (scope 3). Inclusion of supply-chain emissions often requires additional data such as consumer purchasing data \r\nand supply chain emission factors. Some researchers also take a hybrid approach combining top-down and bottom-up estimation \r\ntechniques to quantify territorial emissions"


id: 6d0d8a8a2572a1a0036736defd1d4575
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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" Individual self-reported urban inventories from cities have shown chronic underestimation \r\nwhen compared to estimates using combined top-down/bottom-up atmospherically calibrated estimation techniques."


id: 3e0939810b3f03666f9c75b2beab9ae4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 7120
content:
"the thermal mass of buildings (to store heat for the cold season and \r\nto protect occupants from high temperatures (i.e., heatwaves), when \r\ndesigning energy services, moving from ownership to usership of \r\nappliances and towards more shared space, are among the sufficiency \r\nmeasures already implemented in the leading municipalities"


id: c59afa1417df02d364feafb134238b54
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" At the \r\nglobal level, the main drivers of emissions include (i) population \r\ngrowth, especially in developing countries, (ii) increase in floor area \r\nper capita, driven by the increase of the size of dwellings while the \r\nsize of households kept decreasing, especially in developed countries, \r\n(iii) the inefficiency of the newly constructed buildings, especially in \r\ndeveloping countries, and the low renovation rates and ambition \r\nlevel in developed countries when existing buildings are renovated, \r\n(iv) the increase in use, number and size of appliances and equipment, \r\nespecially ICT and cooling, driven by the growing welfare (income), \r\nand (v) the continued reliance on fossil fuel-based electricity and heat \r\nslow decarbonisation of energy supply. These factors taken together \r\nare projected to continue driving GHG emissions in the building sector \r\nin the future (high evidence, high agreement) {9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, \r\nand 9.9}."


id: 154af2b7cd0c8bc94d9c07b29292e480
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from buildings were \r\nin 2019 at 12 GtCO2-eq, equivalent to 21% of global GHG \r\nemissions that year, out of which 57% were indirect emissions \r\nfrom offsite generation of electricity and heat, 24%  direct \r\nemissions produced onsite and 18% were embodied emissions \r\nfrom the use of cement and steel (high evidence, high \r\nagreement). More than 95% of emissions from buildings were \r\nCO2 emissions, CH4 and N2O represented 0.08%, and emissions \r\nfrom halocarbon contributed by 3% to global GHG emissions from \r\nbuildings. If only CO2 emissions would be considered, the share of \r\nCO2 emissions from buildings out of global CO2 emissions increases \r\nto 31%. Global final energy demand from buildings reached 128.8 EJ \r\nin 2019, and global electricity demand was slightly above 43 EJ. The \r\nformer accounted for 31% of global final energy demand and the latter \r\nfor 18% of global electricity demand"


id: 16427008d4aa8a8c805c2ec84386aed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Residential buildings consumed \r\n70% of global final energy demand from buildings. Over the period \r\n1990-2019, global CO2 emissions from buildings increased by 50%, \r\nglobal final energy demand grew by 38% and global final electricity \r\ndemand increased by 161% (high evidence, high agreement) {9.3}."


id: 590b4246436b6c91ff3902946f52f9
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content:
"Bottom-up studies show a mitigation potential up to 85% in \r\nEurope and North America and up to 45% in Australia, Japan and \r\nNew Zealand, compared to the baselines by 2050, even though \r\nthey sometimes decline (robust evidence, high agreement). In \r\ndeveloping countries, bottom-up studies estimate the potential \r\nof up to 40-80% in 2050, as compared to their sharply growing \r\nbaselines (medium evidence, high agreement). The aggregation \r\nof results from all these bottom-up studies translates into \r\na global mitigation potential by 2050 of at least 8.2 GtCO2, \r\nwhich is equivalent to 61% of their baseline scenario. The largest \r\nmitigation potential (5.4 GtCO2) is available in developing countries \r\nwhile Developed Countries will be able to mitigate 2.7 GtCO2. These \r\npotentials represent the low estimates, and the real potential is likely \r\nto be higher"


id: 69e8bac143b5dbec748475dd465c9123
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" These estimated potentials would be higher if embodied \r\nemissions in buildings and those from halocarbons would be included \r\n(low evidence, high agreement) {9.3, 9.6}."


id: 30eb1b1d7fabe40b155784ab167d8d7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Drivers of GHG emissions in the building sector were assessed \r\nusing the SER (Sufficiency, Efficiency, Renewables) framework. \r\nSufficiency measures tackle the causes of GHG emissions \r\nby avoiding the demand for energy and materials over the \r\nlifecycle of buildings and appliances. Sufficiency differs from \r\nefficiency in that the latter is about the continuous short-term marginal \r\ntechnological improvements, which allows doing less with more in \r\nrelative terms without considering the planetary boundaries, while \r\nthe former is about long-term actions driven by non-technological \r\nsolutions (i.e., land-use management and planning), which consume \r\nless in absolute term and are determined by biophysical processes. \r\nSufficiency addresses the issue of a fair consumption of space and \r\nresources"


id: bfe6ff9aff2e1c767955dd520635aa34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" The remaining carbon budget, and its normative target for \r\ndistributional equity, is the upper limit of sufficiency, while requirements \r\nfor a decent living standard define the minimum level of sufficiency. \r\nThe SER framework introduces a hierarchical layering which reduces \r\nthe cost of constructing and using buildings without reducing the \r\nlevel of comfort of the occupant. Sufficiency interventions in buildings \r\ninclude the optimisation of the use of building, repurposing unused \r\nexisting buildings, prioritising multi-family homes over single-family \r\nbuildings, and adjusting the size of buildings to the evolving needs \r\nof households by downsizing dwellings. Sufficiency measures do not \r\nconsume energy during the use phase of buildings. "


id: 139dbfe915fe9164847e56dbc9aff6f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"The development, since the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report \r\n(AR5), of integrated approaches to construction and retrofit of \r\nbuildings has led to the widespread adoption of zero energy/\r\ncarbon buildings in all climate zones. The complementarity and the \r\ninterdependency of measures lead to cost reduction while optimising \r\nthe mitigation potential grasped and avoiding the lock-in-effect. The \r\ngrowing consideration of integrated approach to construction of new \r\nbuildings as well as to the renovation of existing buildings results in \r\na lower relevance of the step-by-step approach to renovate buildings \r\nand to breaking down the potential into cost categories, as to deliver \r\ndeep mitigation and cost savings technologies and approaches shall \r\nbe applied together in an integrated and interdependent manner \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement)"


id: 90fef5cd0a33917f2ad2d6c052db7765
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content:
" The potential associated with \r\nthe sufficiency measures as well as the  exchange of appliances, \r\nequipment, and lights with efficient ones is at cost below \r\nUSD0  tCO2\r\n-1 (high evidence, high agreement). The construction of \r\nhigh-performance buildings will become by 2050 a business-as-usual \r\ntechnology with costs below USD20 tCO2\r\n-1 in developed countries \r\nand below USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 in developing countries (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). For existing buildings, there have been "


id: e8d324aeb795418e392c3f955cc77b1c
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"Actions are needed to adapt buildings to future climate while \r\nensuring well-being for all. The expected heatwaves will \r\ninevitably increase cooling needs to limit the health impacts \r\nof climate change (medium evidence, high agreement). \r\nGlobal warming will impact cooling and heating needs but also the \r\nperformance, durability and safety of buildings, especially historical \r\nand coastal ones, through changes in temperature, humidity, \r\nconcentrations of CO2 and chloride, and sea level rise. Adaptation \r\nmeasures to cope with climate change may increase the demand \r\nfor energy and materials leading to an increase in GHG emissions \r\nif not mitigated. Sufficiency measures such as bioclimatic design \r\nof buildings, which consider the expected future climate, and \r\nincludes natural ventilation, white walls and nature-based solutions \r\n(e.g.,  green roofs) will decrease the demand for cooling"


id: dbf18bf8c8382828d626e6c7ae319f17
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content:
" Shared \r\ncooled spaces with highly efficient cooling solutions are among \r\nthe mitigation strategies which can limit the effect of the expected \r\nheatwaves on people health. Sufficiency, efficiency, and renewable \r\nenergy can be designed to reduce buildings' vulnerability to climate \r\nchange impacts (medium evidence, high agreement) {9.7, 9.8}. "


id: 806eb319e3d16a1a24791e9eb2388e27
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content:
"Policy packages based on the SER (Sufficiency, Efficiency, \r\nRenewables) framework could grasp the full mitigation \r\npotential of the global building stock (medium evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Low ambitious policies will lock buildings in \r\ncarbon for decades as buildings last for decades if not centuries \r\n(high evidence, high agreement). Building energy codes is the \r\nmain regulatory instrument to reduce emissions from both \r\nnew and existing buildings (high evidence, high agreement). \r\nMost advanced building energy codes include bioclimatic design \r\nrequirements to capture the sufficiency potential of buildings, \r\nefficiency requirements by using the most efficient technologies and \r\nrequirements to increase the integration of renewable energy solutions \r\nto the building shape. Some announced building energy  codes \r\nextend these requirements from the use phase to the whole building \r\nlifecycle"


id: 36eea0a80767e73fafb526ee6aad1e64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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" Building energy codes are proven to be especially effective \r\nif compulsory and combined with other regulatory instruments \r\nsuch as minimum energy performance standard for appliances and \r\nequipment, especially if the performance level is set at the level of \r\nthe best available technologies in the market (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement). Market-based instruments such as carbon  taxes with \r\nrecycling of the revenues and personal or building carbon allowances \r\nalso contribute to foster the decarbonisation of the building sector \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). Requirements to limit the use \r\nof land and property taxes are also considered effective policies to \r\nlimit urban sprawl and to prioritise multi-family buildings over single\u0002family homes (medium evidence, high agreement) {9.9}. "


id: 3a77a8301f2e6301c0f80d6955ca28ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"COVID-19 emphasised the importance of buildings for human \r\nwell-being. However, the lockdown measures implemented to \r\navoid the spread of the virus have also stressed the inequalities \r\nin the access for all to suitable and healthy buildings, which \r\nprovide natural daylight and clean air to their occupants\r\n(low evidence, high agreement). Meeting the new WHO health \r\nrequirements, has also put an emphasis on indoor air quality, \r\npreventive maintenance of centralised mechanical heating, ventilation, \r\nand cooling systems. Moreover, the lockdown measures have led to \r\nspreading the South Korean concept of officetel (office-hotel) to many \r\ncountries and to extending it to officetelschool. The projected growth, \r\nprior to the COVID-19, of 58% of the global residential floor area \r\nby 2050 compared to the 290 billion m2 yr-1 in 2019 might well be \r\ninsufficient"


id: 12719c7b19e19def9919b05a98d77aa7
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content:
" Addressing the new needs for more residential buildings \r\nmay not, necessarily mean constructing new buildings, especially in \r\nthe global North. Repurposing existing non-residential buildings, no \r\nlonger in use due to the expected spread of teleworking triggered by \r\nthe health crisis and enabled by digitalisation, could be the way to \r\novercome the new needs for officetelschool buildings triggered by the \r\nhealth crisis (low evidence, high confidence) {9.1, 9.2}."


id: a573d5b29c1f5adc0c18850b255f36dc
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content:
"Total GHG emissions in the building sector reached 12 GtCO2-eq \r\nin 2019, equivalent to 21% of global GHG emissions that year, of \r\nwhich 57% were indirect CO2 emissions from offsite generation \r\nof electricity and heat, followed by 24% of direct CO2 emissions \r\nproduced on-site and 18% from the production of cement and steel \r\nused for construction and/or refurbishment of buildings. If only \r\nCO2 emissions would be considered, the share of buildings CO2\r\nemissions increases to 31% out of global CO2 emissions. Energy \r\nuse in residential and non-residential buildings contributed 50% \r\nand 32% respectively, while embodied emissions contributed 18% \r\nto global building CO2 emissions. Global final energy demand from \r\nbuildings reached 128.8 EJ in 2019, equivalent to 31% of global \r\nfinal energy demand. Residential buildings consumed 70% out of \r\nglobal final energy demand from buildings"


id: 4f77bf54af56f5a57e83968fd01ee203
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content:
" Electricity demand from \r\nbuildings was slightly above 43 EJ in 2019, equivalent to more than \r\n18% of global electricity demand. Over the period 1990-2019, global \r\nCO2 emissions from buildings increased by 50%, global final energy \r\ndemand grew by 38%, with 54% increase in non-residential buildings \r\nand 32% increase in residential ones. Among energy carriers, the \r\ngrowth in global final energy demand was strongest for electricity, \r\nwhich increased by 161%."


id: 9ff258c940984bcd26a37e6d2e62a212
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Sufficiency is not a  new concept, its root goes back to the Greek word sophrosune, which was translated in Latin to sobrietas, \r\nin a  sense of enough (Cezard and Mourad 2019). The sufficiency concept was introduced to the sustainability policy debate by \r\n(Sachs 1993) and to academia by (Princen 2003). Since 1997, Thailand considers sufficiency, which was framed already in 1974 as \r\nSufficiency Economy Philosophy, as a new paradigm for development with the aim of improving human well-being for all by shifting \r\ndevelopment pathways towards sustainability (Mongsawad 2012). The Thai approach is based on three principles (i) moderation, \r\n(ii) reasonableness, and (iii) self-immunity. Sufficiency goes beyond the dominant framing of energy demand under efficiency and \r\nbehaviour"


id: 55aecdf34ecbf931b3ab420661300d43
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content:
" Sufficiency is defined as avoiding the demand for materials, energy, land, water and other natural resources while delivering \r\na decent living standard for all within the planetary boundaries (Saheb 2021b, Princen 2005). Decent living standards are a set of \r\nessential material preconditions for human well-being which includes shelter, nutrition, basic amenities, health care, transportation, \r\ninformation, education, and public space (Rao and Baer 2012; Rao and Min 2018; Rao et al. 2019). Sufficiency addresses the issue \r\nof a fair consumption of space and resources. The remaining carbon budget, and its normative target for distributional equity, is the \r\nupper limit of sufficiency, while requirements for a decent living standard define the minimum level of sufficiency. Sufficiency differs \r\nfrom efficiency in that the latter is about the continuous short-term marginal technological improvements which allow doing more"


id: 3e634664c99c105aac235dd4c9cf00a0
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content:
"Downsizing dwellings through cohousing strategies by repurposing existing buildings and clustering apartments when buildings \r\nare renovated and by prioritising multi-family buildings over single-family homes in new developments (Wilson and Boehland 2005; \r\nDuffy 2009; Fuller and Crawford 2011; Stephan et al. 2013; Huebner and Shipworth 2017; Sandberg 2018; McKinlay et al. 2019; \r\nEllsworth-Krebs 2020; Ivanova and Buchs 2020; Berrill and Hertwich 2021) are among the sufficiency measures that avoid the \r\ndemand for materials in the construction phase and energy demand for heating, cooling and lighting in the use phase, especially \r\nif the conditioned volume and window areas are reduced (Duffy 2009; Heinonen and Junnila 2014). Less space also means less \r\nappliances and equipment and changing preferences towards smaller ones (Aro 2020). Cohousing strategies provide users, in both \r\nnew and existing buildings, a shared space (i.e"


id: ea384b4e49c3d71a955e4e334f311be8
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content:
", for laundry, offices, guest rooms and dining rooms) to complement their private space. \r\nThus, reducing per capita consumption of resources including energy, water and electricity (Klocker et al. 2012; N. Klocker 2017), \r\nwhile offering social benefits such as limiting loneliness of elderly people and single parents (Wankiewicz 2015; Riedy et al. 2019). \r\nSenior cooperative housing communities and eco-villages are considered among the cohousing examples to scale-up (Kuhnhenn \r\net al. 2020). Local authorities have an important role to play in the metamorphosis of housing by proposing communal spaces to be \r\nshared (Williams 2008; Marckmann et al. 2012) through urban planning and land-use policies (Duffy 2009; Newton et al. 2017). Thus, \r\nencouraging inter-generational cohousing as well as interactions between people with different social backgrounds (Williams 2008; \r\nLietaert 2010)"


id: 6617f93d319584509de5917cabdc4e04
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 13654
content:
" Progressive tax policies based on a cap in the per-capita floor area are also needed to adapt the size of dwellings to \r\nhouseholds' needs (Murphy 2015; Akenji 2021). "


id: 4932a754a2a159d042d71a28fe11c672
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8905
content:
"COVID-19 emphasised the importance of buildings for human well\u0002being, however, the lockdown measures implemented to avoid the \r\nspread of the virus has also stressed the inequalities in the access for \r\nall to suitable and healthy buildings, which provide natural daylight \r\nand clean air to their occupants (see also Cross-Chapter Box  1 in \r\nChapter 1). COVID-19 and the new health recommendations (World \r\nHealth Organization 2021) emphasised the importance of ventilation \r\nand the importance of indoor air quality (Sundell et al. 2011; Nazaroff \r\n2013; Fisk 2015; Guyot et al. 2018; Wei et al. 2020). The health crisis \r\nhas also put an emphasis on preventive maintenance of centralised \r\nmechanical heating, ventilation, and cooling systems. Moreover, the \r\nlockdown measures have led to spreading the South Korean concept \r\nof officetel (office-hotel) (Gohaud and Baek 2017) to many countries \r\nand to extending it to officetelschool"


id: 4a6cfcc610f8ca44e8c264c50a9faf9c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9112
content:
" Therefore, the projected growth, \r\nprior to the COVID-19, of 58% of the global residential floor area \r\nby 2050 compared to the 290 billion m2 yr -1 in 2019 might well be \r\ninsufficient. However, addressing the new needs for more residential \r\nbuildings may not, necessarily mean constructing new buildings. In \r\nfact, repurposing existing non-residential buildings, no longer in use \r\ndue to the expected spread of teleworking triggered by the health \r\ncrisis and enabled by digitalisation, could be the way to overcome the \r\nnew needs for officetelschool triggered by the health crisis."


id: 1f944a9e3a4b4932847b33f1252520b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"At a  global level, from historical perspective (from the Neolithic \r\nto the present), building techniques have evolved to be able to \r\nsolve increasingly complex problems. Vernacular architecture has \r\nevolved over many years to address problems inherent in housing. \r\nThrough a process of trial and error, populations have found ways \r\nto cope with the extremes of the weather. The industrial revolution \r\nwas the single most important development in human history \r\nover the past three centuries. Previously, building materials were \r\nrestricted to a few manmade materials (lime mortar and concrete) \r\nalong with those available in nature as timber and stone. Metals \r\nwere not available in sufficient quantity or consistent quality to \r\nbe used as anything more than ornamentation. The structure was \r\nlimited by the capabilities of natural materials; this construction \r\nmethod is called on-site construction which all the work is done \r\nsequentially at the buildings site"


id: 32da1f147130f258b17bf75850d79d9b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 5416
content:
"Over the period 1990-2019, global CO2 emissions from buildings \r\nincreased by 50%. Global indirect CO2 emissions increased by \r\n92%, driven by the increase of fossil fuels-based electrification, \r\nwhile global direct emissions decreased by 1%. At regional level, \r\nemissions in residential buildings decreased in Developed Countries, \r\nexcept in Australia, Japan and New Zealand, while they increased \r\nin developing countries. The highest decrease was observed in \r\nEurope and Eurasia, with 13.6% decrease of direct emissions and \r\n33% decrease of indirect emissions, while the highest increase of \r\ndirect emissions occurred in Middle East, 198%, and the highest \r\nincrease of indirect emissions occurred in Eastern Asia, 2258%. \r\nIndirect emissions from non-residential buildings increased in all \r\nregions"


id: a73a649b7b81ac4b675cfe622574a22a
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content:
" The highest increase occurred in Eastern Asia, 1202%, and \r\nthe lowest increase occurred in Europe and Central Asia, 4%, where \r\ndirect emissions from non-residential buildings decreased by 51%. \r\nEmbodied emissions have also increased in all regions. The highest \r\nincrease occurred in Southern Asia, 334%, while the lowest increase \r\noccurred in North America, 4% (Figure 9.3b). "


id: b8fb3f04e43322fb6ce95be76f512a6c
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"Total GHG emissions in the building sector reached 12 GtCO2-eq in \r\n2019, equivalent to 21% of global GHG emissions that year. 57% \r\nof GHG emissions from buildings were indirect CO2 emissions from \r\ngeneration of electricity and heat off-site, 24% were direct CO2\r\nemissions produced on-site, and 18% were from the production \r\nof cement and steel used for construction and refurbishment of \r\nbuildings (see Cross-Chapter Box 3 and Cross-Working Group Box 1 \r\nin Chapter 3, and Figure 9.3a). Halocarbon emissions were equivalent \r\nto 3% of global building GHG emissions in 2019. In the absence of \r\nthe breakdown of halocarbon emissions per  end-use sectors, they \r\nhave been calculated for the purpose of this chapter, by considering \r\nthat 60% of global halocarbon emissions occur in buildings (Hu et al. \r\n2020). CH4 and N2O emissions were negligible, representing 0.08% \r\neach out of the 2019 global building GHG emissions. Therefore, this \r\nchapter considers only CO2 emissions from buildings"


id: 4f1487f309354e02e8ff64bde3634c18
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9883
content:
" By limiting the \r\nscope of the assessment to CO2 emissions, the share of emissions from \r\nbuildings increases to 31% of global 2019 CO2 emissions. Energy use \r\nin residential and non-residential buildings contributed 50% and \r\n32% respectively, while embodied emissions contributed 18% to \r\nglobal building CO2 emissions."


id: 44b2d4f7504d2196d4c6226a75622bce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8231
content:
"At regional level, by 2050, the lowest emissions are projected \r\nto occur in developed Asia and Pacific, with 6.73 MtCO2 under \r\nRECC-LED scenario and 12.4 MtCO2 under the IEA-SDS, and the \r\nhighest emissions are projected to occur in Europe and Eurasia in all \r\nthree scenarios, with 152 MtCO2 in IEA-SDS, 199 MtCO2 in RECC-LED \r\nscenario and 381 MtCO2 in IMAGE-LiRE scenario. Emissions in Africa \r\nare projected to decrease to 10 MtCO2 in RECC-LED, this is nine \r\ntime less than those of 2019, while they are projected to increase by \r\n25% in IEA-SDS compared to those of 2019. Compared to IEA-SDS \r\nand IMAGE-LiRE, RECC-LED projects the highest decreases, over \r\nthe period 2020-2030, of direct emissions in residential buildings \r\nin all regions, up to 45% in Australia, Japan and New Zealand, and \r\nEastern Asia and the highest decreases of indirect emissions, ranging \r\nfrom 52% in Eastern Asia to 86% in Latin America and Caribbean"


id: eceedd217b03839976ce45c4bc21b8c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34755
content:
" \r\nOver the same period, the IEA-SDS projects the highest decreases \r\nof indirect emissions to occur in Australia, Japan and New Zealand, \r\nand North America. IMAGE-LiRE projects the lowest decreases of \r\nemissions over the same decade in almost all regions (Figure 9.3b). "


id: 603e8d3b4ec4cd59aebf94a20a5f073f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12717
content:
"decomposition of emissions into four driving factors is shown in \r\nEquation 1, where m2\r\n refers to total floor area, EJ refers to final \r\nenergy demand, and MtCO2 refers to the sum of direct and indirect \r\nCO2 emissions in the use phase. The allocation of changes in emissions \r\nbetween two cases k and k-1 to changes in a single driving factor D \r\nis shown in Equation  2. To calculate changes in emissions due to \r\na single driver such as population growth, D will take on the value of \r\npopulation in the two compared cases. The superscript k stands for \r\nthe case, defined by the time period and scenario of the emissions, for \r\nexample, IEA-CPS baseline scenario in 2050. When decomposing \r\nemissions between two cases k and k-1, either the time-period, or \r\nthe scenario remains constant. The decomposition was done at the \r\nhighest regional resolution available from each model output, and \r\nthen aggregated to regional or global level"


id: ffa5dccfe561e7002a5d35378761f6b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37761
content:
" For changes in emissions \r\nwithin a  scenario over time, the decomposition is done for every \r\ndecade, and the total 2020-2050 decomposition is then produced by \r\nsumming decompositions of changes in emissions each decade."


id: afba5662b56df2b3cec51c6462c8798f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25159
content:
"effect. By setting a cap in the growth of the floor area per capita \r\nin developed countries, 5% of emission reductions in IMAGE-LiRE \r\nscenario derives from sufficiency. However, compared to 2020, the \r\nlack of sufficiency measures in the baseline scenario will contribute \r\nto increasing emissions by 31%. RECC-LED scenario shows the \r\nhighest global sufficiency potential captured compared to its \r\nbaseline scenario in 2050 as this scenario assumes a reduction in the \r\nfloor area per capita in Developed Countries and slower floor area \r\ngrowth in emerging economies. The four scenarios show a  higher \r\ncontribution of the decarbonisation of energy supply to reducing \r\nemissions than the reduction of energy demand through sufficiency \r\nand efficiency measures (Figure 9.6a)"


id: 6a9fbe01d117ca9b62d9570d0394148f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14391
content:
" At regional level, the emissions \r\nreduction potential from sufficiency is estimated at 25% in North \r\nAmerica under both IMAGE-LiRE and RECC-LED scenarios and at \r\n19% in both Eastern Asia and Europe/Eurasia regions (Figure 9.6b). \r\nThe highest decarbonisation potential due to growth of renewable \r\nenergy is 75% in Southern Asia under IMAGE-LiRE scenario. "


id: 5043f95508588602c10de7f2fda8776a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10073
content:
"Hydrogen emerged in the policy debate as an important energy \r\ncarrier for the decarbonisation of the energy system. In the case of the \r\nbuilding sector, depending on how hydrogen is sourced (Box 12.3), \r\nconverting gas grids to hydrogen might be an appealing option to \r\ndecarbonise heat without putting additional stress on the electricity \r\ngrids. However, according to (Element Energy Ltd 2018; Strbac et al. \r\n2018; Frazer-Nash Consultancy 2018; Broad et  al. 2020; Gerhardt \r\net al. 2020) the delivered cost of heat from hydrogen would be much \r\nhigher than the cost of delivering heat from heat pumps, which could \r\nalso be used for cooling. Repurposing gas grids for pure hydrogen \r\nnetworks will also require system modifications such as replacement \r\nof piping and replacement of gas boilers and cooking appliances, \r\na factor cost to be considered when developing hydrogen roadmaps \r\nfor buildings"


id: 73f1c34d0153a9f80a0733690582651
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15850
content:
" There are also safety and performance concerns with \r\ndomestic hydrogen appliances (Frazer-Nash Consultancy 2018). Over \r\nthe period 1990-2019, hydrogen was not used in the building sector \r\nand scenarios assessed show a  very modest role for hydrogen in \r\nbuildings by 2050 (Figure 9.7). "


id: 6673142c7f92f972e6c2a193b700c7d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13710
content:
"In a warming world (IPCC 2021) with a growing population and expanding middle-class, the demand for cooling is likely to increase \r\nleading to increased emissions if cooling solutions implemented are carbon intensive (Santamouris 2016; Sustainable Energy for All \r\n2018; Dreyfus et al. 2020b; Kian Jon et al. 2021; UNEP and IEA 2020). Sufficiency measures such as building design and forms, which \r\nallow balancing the size of openings, the volume, the wall and window area, the thermal properties, shading, and orientation are all \r\nnon-cost solutions, which should be considered first to reduce cooling demand. Air conditioning systems using halocarbons are the \r\nmost common solutions used to cool buildings. Up to 4 billion cooling appliances are already installed and this could increase to up \r\nto 14 billion by 2050 (Peters 2018; Dreyfus et al. 2020b)"


id: 2bd8b8bf120d80cee9ca7cade98a362
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4324
content:
" Energy efficiency of air conditioning systems is of a paramount importance \r\nto ensuring that the increased demand for cooling will be satisfied without contributing to global warming through halocarbon \r\nemissions (Campbell 2018; Shah et al. 2015, 2019; UNEP and IEA 2020). The installation of highly efficient technological solutions with \r\nlow global warming potential (GWP), as part of the implementation of the Kigali amendment to the Montreal Protocol, is the second \r\nstep towards reducing GHG emissions from cooling. Developing renewable energy solutions integrated to buildings is another track \r\nto follow to reduce GHG emissions from cooling. "


id: 40daae590a3cc04cbd459bfc85746879
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7585
content:
"Building electricity demand was slightly above 43 EJ in 2019, which is equivalent to more than 18% of global electricity demand. Over \r\nthe period 1990-2019, electricity demand increased by 161%. The increase of global electricity demand is driven by the combination \r\nof rising incomes, income distribution and the S-curve of ownership rates (Wolfram et al. 2012; Gertler et al. 2016). Electricity is used \r\nin buildings for plug-in appliances, in other words, refrigerators, cleaning appliances, connected and small appliances and lighting. \r\nAn important emerging trend in electricity demand is the use of electricity for thermal energy services (cooking, water and space \r\nheating). The increased penetration of heat pumps is the main driver of the use of electricity for heating. Heat pumps used either \r\nindividually or in conjunction with heat networks can provide heating in cold days and cooling in hot ones. (Lowes et al"


id: 35c6f7608a387ac1acb815c17a7fe5b4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5875
content:
" 2020) \r\nsuggests electricity is expected to become an important energy vector to decarbonise heating. However, the use of heat pumps will \r\nincrease halocarbon emissions (UNEP and IEA 2020). Connolly (2017), Bloess et al. (2018), and Barnes and Bhagavathy (2020) argue \r\nfor electrification of heat as a cost-effective decarbonisation measure, if electricity is supplied by renewable energy sources (Ruhnau \r\net al. 2020). The electrification of the heat supplied to buildings is likely to lead to an additional electricity demand and consequently \r\nadditional investment in new power plants. Thomassen et al. (2021) identifies flexibility as a key enabler of larger heat electrification \r\nshares. Importantly, heat pumps work at their highest efficiency level in highly efficient buildings and their market uptake is likely to \r\nrequire incentives due to their high up-front cost (Hannon 2015; Heinen et al. 2017). "


id: cd30525c49601673efbb0e9589deaf41
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29833
content:
"Digitalisation occurs also at the construction stage. (European Union 2019; Witthoeft and Kosta 2017) identified seven digital \r\ntechnologies already in use in the building sector. These technologies include (i) Building Information Modelling/Management (BIM), \r\n(ii) additive manufacturing, also known as 3D printing, (iii) robots, (iv) drones, (v) 3D scanning, (vi) sensors, and (vii) internet of things \r\n(IoT). BIM supports decision making in the early design stage and allows assessing a variety of design options and their embodied \r\nemissions (Basbagill et al. 2013; Rock et al. 2018). 3D printing reduces material waste and the duration of the construction phase \r\nas well as labour accidents (Dixit 2019). Coupling 3D printing and robots allows for increasing productivity through fully automated \r\nprefabricated buildings. Drones allow for a better monitoring and inspection of construction projects through real-time comparison \r\nbetween planned and implemented solutions"


id: ad0b8f3d7a8655dd7f5958ad0c50de11
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24771
content:
" Coupling drones with 3D scanning allows predicting building heights and energy \r\nconsumption (Streltsov et  al. 2020). Sensors offer a  continuous data collection and monitoring of end-use services (i.e.,  heating, \r\ncooling, and lighting), thus allowing for preventive maintenance while providing more comfort to end-users. Coupling sensors with \r\nIoT, which connects to the internet household appliances and devices such as thermostats, enable demand-response, and flexibility to \r\nreduce peak loads (IEA 2017a; Lyons 2019). Overall, connected appliances offer a variety of opportunities for end-users to optimise \r\ntheir energy demand by improving the responsiveness of energy services (IEA 2017a; Nakicenovic et al. 2019) through the use of \r\ndigital goods and services (Wilson et al., 2020) including peer-to-peer electricity trading (Morstyn et al. 2018)."


id: e71ee789499ace4f9a97b7f6943968c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33857
content:
"be 32% lower in 2050 than 2020 in a baseline scenario, primarily \r\ndue to a lower growth rate of building floor area per population. \r\nThis is because the global population growth rate slows over the \r\ncoming decades, leading to less demand for new floor area relative \r\nto total population. Further baseline reductions in embodied \r\nemissions between 2020 and 2050 derive from improvements \r\nin material production and a gradual decline in GHG intensity of \r\nenergy supply. In a  LED + 2degC policy scenario, 2050 embodied \r\nemissions are 86% lower than the baseline"


id: a97c7822a2b8c97f884510f2005caf3b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24198
content:
" This reduction of 2050 \r\nemissions comes from contributions of comparable magnitude \r\nfrom three sources; slower floor area growth leading to less floor \r\narea of new construction per  capita (sufficiency), reductions in \r\nthe mass of materials required for each unit of newly built floor \r\narea (material efficiency), and reduction in the GHG intensity of \r\nmaterial production, from material substitution to lower carbon \r\nmaterials, and faster transition of energy supply. "


id: 785e00ed1ac2ed69da66724bc664266f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16502
content:
"The literature evaluating the embodied energy in building materials \r\nis extensive, but that considering embodied carbon is much more \r\nscarce (Cabeza et al. 2021). Recently this evaluation is done using the \r\nmethodology lifecycle assessment (LCA), but since the boundaries \r\nused in those studies are different, varying, for example, in the \r\nconsideration of cradle to grave, cradle to gate, or cradle to cradle, \r\nthe comparison is very difficult (Moncaster et al. 2019). A summary of \r\nthe embodied energy and embodied carbon cradle to gate coefficients \r\nreported in the literature are found in Figure 9.9 (Alcorn and Wood \r\n1998; Crawford and Treolar 2010; Vukotic et al. 2010; Symons 2011; \r\nMoncaster and Song 2012; Cabeza et al. 2013; De Wolf et al. 2016; \r\nBirgisdottir et al. 2017; Pomponi and Moncaster 2016, 2018; Omrany \r\net al. 2020; Cabeza et al. 2021)"


id: da42c4b9588e3661f2c40986f14d6cf0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31866
content:
" Steel represents the materials with \r\nhigher embodied energy, 32-35 MJ kg-1; embodied energy in masonry \r\nis higher than in concrete and earth materials, but surprisingly, some \r\ntypes of wood have more embodied energy than expected; there are \r\ndispersion values in the literature depending on the material. On the \r\nother hand, earth materials and wood have the lowest embodied \r\ncarbon, with less than 0.01 kgCO2 per kg of material (Cabeza et al. \r\n2021). The concept of buildings as carbon sinks arise from the idea \r\nthat wood stores considerable quantities of carbon with a relatively \r\nsmall ratio of carbon emissions to material volume and concrete has \r\nsubstantial embodied carbon emissions with minimal carbon storage \r\ncapacity (Sanjuan et al. 2019; Churkina et al. 2020)."


id: 748bf0035752ba9ac50b20b10d674bbc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15934
content:
"The attribution of changes in embodied emissions to changes in the \r\ndrivers of population, sufficiency, material efficiency, and GHG \r\nintensity of material production is calculated using additive log\u0002mean divisia index decomposition analysis (Ang and Zhang 2000). \r\nThe decomposition of emissions into four driving factors is shown in \r\nEquation 9.3, where m2\r\nNC refers to floor area of new construction, \r\nkgMat refers to mass of materials used for new construction, and \r\nkgCO2e refers to embodied GHG emissions in CO2e. The allocation of \r\nchanges in emissions between two cases k and k-1 to changes in \r\na single driving factor D is shown in Equation 9.4. For instance, to \r\ncalculate changes in emissions due to population growth, D will take \r\non the value of population in the two cases being compared. The \r\nsuperscript k stands for the time period and scenario of the \r\nemissions, for example, SSP2 baseline scenario in 2050"


id: d7d84c1f34b3ccd068fb2190412c0261
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31484
content:
" When \r\ndecomposing emissions between two cases k and k-1, either the \r\ntime period or the scenario stays constant. The decomposition is \r\ndone for every region at the highest regional resolution available, \r\nand aggregation (e.g., to global level) is then done by summing over \r\nregions. For changes in emissions within a  scenario over time \r\n(e.g., SSP baseline emissions in 2020 and 2050), the decomposition \r\nis made for every decade, and the total 2020-2050 decomposition is \r\nthen produced by summing decompositions of changes in emissions \r\neach decade."


id: f654268e916bd7da806ad0e2c7e1e507
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36266
content:
"Embodied emissions from production of materials are an important \r\ncomponent of building sector emissions, and their share is \r\nlikely to increase as emissions from building energy demand \r\ndecrease (Rock et  al. 2020). Embodied emissions trajectories can \r\nbe lowered by limiting the amount of new floor area required \r\n(Berrill and Hertwich 2021; Fishman et  al. 2021), and reducing \r\nthe quantity and  GHG intensity of materials through material \r\nefficiency measures such as light-weighting and improved building \r\ndesign, material substitution to lower-carbon alternatives, higher \r\nfabrication yields and scrap recovery during material production, \r\nand re-use or lifetime extension of building components (Allwood \r\net al. 2011; Heeren et al. 2015; Hertwich et al. 2019; Churkina et al. \r\n2020; Pamenter and Myers 2021; Pauliuk et al. 2021). Reducing the \r\nGHG intensity of energy supply to material production activities \r\nalso has a large influence on reducing overall embodied emissions"


id: 53e6c12605145bf5d6de382802cece19
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10665
content:
" \r\nFigure  9.10 shows projections of embodied emissions to 2050 \r\nfrom residential buildings in a  baseline scenario (SSP2 baseline) \r\nand a scenario incorporating multiple material efficiency measures \r\nand a much faster decarbonisation of energy supply (LED and 2degC \r\npolicy) (Pauliuk et al. 2021). Embodied emissions are projected to "


id: bb46066d76638e3d565eede191584ce3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27012
content:
"Figure 9.11 | Energy savings potential of technology strategies for climate change mitigation in buildings. Sources: adapted from Imanari et al. (1999); Cabeza \r\net al. (2010); Fallahi et al. (2010); Privara et al. (2011); Radhi (2011); Asdrubali et al. (2012); Capozzoli et al. (2013); Chen et al. (2013); de Gracia et al. (2013); Seong and Lim \r\n(2013); Sourbron et al. (2013); Bojic et al. (2014); Haggag et al. (2014); Sarbu and Sebarchievici (2014); Spanaki et al. (2014); Vakiloroaya et al. (2014); Djedjig et al. (2015); \r\nMujahid Rafique et al. (2015); Yang et al. (2015); Andjelkovic et al. (2016); Costanzo et al. (2016); Coma et al. (2016); Harby et al. (2016); Navarro et al. (2016); Pomponi \r\net al. (2016); Coma et al. (2017); Khoshbakht et al. (2017); Saffari et al. (2017); Luo et al. (2017); Jedidi and Benjeddou (2018); Romdhane and Louahlia-Gualous (2018); \r\nLee et al. (2018); Alam et al. (2019); Bevilacqua et al. (2019); Gong et al. (2019); Hohne et al. (2019); Irshad et al"


id: 5f89ea8b5e87b0b74be3655cde786e76
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12604
content:
" (2019); Langevin et al. (2019); Liu et al. (2019); Omara and \r\nAbuelnour (2019); Rosado and Levinson (2019); Soltani et al. (2019); Varela Lujan et al. (2019); Zhang et al. (2019); Annibaldi et al. (2020); Cabeza and Chafer (2020); Dong \r\net al. (2020); Nematchoua et al. (2020); Ling et al. (2020); Mahmoud et al. (2020); Peng et al. (2020); Zhang et al. (2020c); Yu et al. (2020)."


id: e5ab92a45bfd9b4e11169935d5345695
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33641
content:
"The integration of energy generation on-site means further contribution \r\nof buildings towards decarbonisation (Urge-Vorsatz  et  al.  2020). \r\nIntegration of renewables in buildings should always come after \r\nmaximising the reduction in the demand for energy services through \r\nsufficiency measures and maximising efficiency improvement to \r\nreduce energy consumption, but the inclusion of energy generation \r\nwould mean a step forward to distributed energy systems with high \r\ncontribution from buildings, becoming prosumers (Sanchez Ramos et al. \r\n2019). Decrease price of technologies such as photovoltaic (PV) and the \r\nintegration of energy storage (de Gracia and Cabeza 2015) are essential \r\nto achieve this objective. Other technologies that could be used are \r\nphotovoltaic/thermal (Sultan and Ervina Efzan 2018), solar/biomass \r\nhybrid systems (Zhang et al. 2020b), solar thermoelectric (Sarbu and \r\nDorca 2018), solar powered sorption systems for cooling (Shirazi et al"


id: e82762836b0f12b69e2e6c2676f6087f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34031
content:
"District heating networks have evolved from systems where heat was \r\nproduced by coal or waste and storage was in the form of steam, to much \r\nhigher energy efficiency networks with water or glycol as the energy \r\ncarrier and fuelled by a wide range of renewable and low carbon fuels. \r\nCommon low carbon fuels for district energy systems include biomass, \r\nother renewables (i.e., geothermal, PV, and large solar thermal), industry \r\nsurplus heat or power-to-heat concepts, and heat storage including \r\nseasonal heat storage (Lund et al. 2018). District energy infrastructure \r\nopens opportunities for integration of several heat and power sources \r\nand is 'future proof' in the sense that the energy source can easily be \r\nconverted or upgraded in the future, with heat distributed through \r\nthe existing district energy network. Latest developments include \r\nthe inclusion of smart control and AI (Revesz et  al. 2020), and low \r\ntemperature thermal energy districts"


id: c6bc6bc8e1a2bbcd306922792efecb41
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28836
content:
"Warehouses are major contributors to the rise of greenhouse gas \r\nemissions in supply chains (Bartolini et  al. 2019). The expanding \r\ne-commerce sector and the growing demand for mass customisation \r\nhave even led to an increasing need for warehouse space and buildings, \r\nparticularly for serving the uninterrupted customer demand in the \r\nbusiness-to-consumer market. Although warehouses are not specifically \r\ndesigned to provide their inhabitants with comfort because they are \r\nmainly unoccupied, the impact of their activities in the global GHG \r\nemissions is remarkable. Warehousing activities contribute roughly \r\n11% of the total GHG emissions generated by the logistics sector across \r\nthe world"


id: 2472f14ab7b1044f115455b6cab68b94
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vector_id: 3181
content:
" Following this global trend, increasing attention to green \r\nand sustainable warehousing processes has led to many new research \r\nresults regarding management concepts, technologies, and equipment \r\nto reduce warehouses carbon footprint, that is, the total emissions of \r\nGHG in carbon equivalents directly caused by warehouses activities."


id: ef793009efa9e25c3de3e84906bb59c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 35166
content:
"With demand-side measures (DSM), such as shifting demand \r\na  few hours, peak net demand can be reduced by up to 10-20% \r\n(Stotzer et al. 2015); a similar potential is available for short-term \r\nload shifting during evening hours (Aryandoust and Lilliestam 2017). \r\nAlthough different household types show different consumption \r\npatterns and thus an individual availability of DSM capacity during \r\nthe day (Fischer et al. 2017), there is limited (Shivakumar et al. 2018) \r\nor inexistent (Drysdale et al. 2015; Nilsson et al. 2017) information \r\nof consumers' response to time of use pricing, specifically among \r\nthose living in apartments (Bartusch and Alvehag 2014). Behavioural \r\nbenefits are identified in terms of increased level of energy awareness \r\nof the users (Rehm et al. 2018), measured deliberate attempts of the \r\nconsumers to reduce and/or shift their electricity usage (Bradley et al. \r\n2016)"


id: 45dc90f04448732a1b2cc51c4f64c609
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 8378
content:
" Real-time control and behavioural change influence 40% \r\nof the electricity use during the operational life of non-residential \r\nbuildings (Kamilaris et al. 2014). "


id: eef1f2eaaef88846f743d212fbb477a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 35065
content:
"The sharing economy generates an increased utilisation rate of \r\nproducts or systems by enabling or offering shared use, access \r\nor ownership of products and assets that have a  low ownership \r\nor use rate. Measures include conditioned spaces (accommodation, \r\nfacility rooms, offices) as well as tools and transfer of ownership \r\n(i.e., second-hand or donation) (Rademaekers et al. 2017; Mercado \r\n2018; Hertwich et al. 2020; Cantzler et al. 2020; Harris et al. 2021; \r\nMata et al. 2021a). The evidence on the link between user behaviour \r\nand net environmental impacts of sharing options is still limited \r\n(Laurenti et al. 2019; Mata et al. 2020a; Harris et al. 2021) and even \r\nbegins to be questioned, due to rebounds that partially or fully offset \r\nthe benefits (Agrawal and Bellos 2017; Zink and Geyer 2017). For \r\nexample, the costs savings from reduced ownership can be allocated \r\nto activities with a  higher carbon intensity, or result in increased \r\nmobility"


id: a388aa3eeca9b6167a3cad8c78bd3850
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 23293
content:
" Both reduced ownership and other circular consumption \r\nhabits show no influence on material footprint, other than mildly \r\npositive influence in low-income households (Junnila et  al. 2018; \r\nOttelin et al. 2020)."


id: 772b28bbdb2b3a69edf61850aa18789e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16317
content:
"The studies presented in Figure  9.15 rely on all, the combination, \r\nor either of the following mitigation strategies: the construction \r\nof new high energy-performance buildings taking the advantage of \r\nbuilding design, forms, and passive construction methods; the thermal \r\nefficiency improvement of building envelopes of the existing stock; the \r\ninstallation of advanced HVAC systems, equipment and appliances; \r\nthe exchange of lights, appliances, and office equipment, including \r\nICT, water heating, and cooking with their efficient options; demand\u0002side management, most often controlling comfort requirements and \r\ndemand-side flexibility and digitalisation; as well as onsite production \r\nand use of renewable energy"


id: 8c7cd84c2ed945482ff196d911a4dc39
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19625
content:
" Nearly all studies, which assess \r\nthe technological potential assume such usage of space heating, \r\ncooling, water heating, and lighting that does not exceed health, \r\nliving, and working standards, thus realising at least a  part of the \r\nnon-technological potential, as presented in Figure 9.14. The results \r\npresented in Figure  9.15 relate to measures applied within the \r\nboundaries of the building sector, including the reduction in direct and \r\nindirect emissions. The results exclude the impact of decarbonisation \r\nmeasures applied within the boundaries of the energy supply sector, \r\nthat is, the decarbonisation of grid electricity and district heat. "


id: 856856663e778c9ea6748c30e6a63d7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18517
content:
"Government support is needed as an initiator but also to reinforce \r\nbuilding retrofit targets, promote more stringent energy and material \r\nstandards for new constructions, and protect consumer interests \r\n(Hongping 2017; Fischer and Pascucci 2017; Patwa et al. 2020). Taxes \r\nclearly incentivise waste reduction and recycling (Rachel and Travis \r\n2011; Ajayi et  al. 2015; Volk et  al. 2019). In developing countries, \r\nbroader, international, market boundaries can allow for a  more \r\nattractive business model (Mohit et al. 2020). Participative and new \r\nownership models can favour the adoption of prefabricated buildings \r\n(Steinhardt and Manley 2016). Needs for improvements are observed, \r\nin terms of design for flexibility and deconstruction, procurement \r\nand prefabrication and off-site construction, standardisation and \r\ndimensional coordination, with differences among solutions (Osmani \r\n2012; Coehlo et al.2013; Lu and Yuan 2013; Cossu and Williams 2015; \r\nSchiller et al"


id: 9e1c7941aac8389e4a8afe0e78556c30
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 22400
content:
"Figure 9.15 | Potential GHG emission reduction in buildings of different world countries grouped by region, as reported by sixty-seven bottom-up \r\nstudies. Sources: North America: Canada (Trottier 2016; Radpour et al. 2017; Subramanyam et al. 2017a,b; Zhang et al. 2020a), the Unites States of America (Gagnon et al. \r\n2016; Nadel 2016; Yeh et al. 2016; Wilson et al. 2017; Zhang et al. 2020a); Europe: Albania (Novikova et al. 2020, 2018c), Austria (Ploss et al. 2017), Bulgaria, the Czech \r\nRepublic, Hungary (Csoknyai et al. 2016), France (Ostermeyer et al. 2018b), the European Union (Duscha et al. 2019; Roscini et al. 2020; Brugger et al. 2021), Germany \r\n(Markewitz et al. 2015; Burger et al. 2019; Ostermeyer et al. 2019b), Greece (Mirasgedis et al. 2017), Italy (Calise et al. 2021; Filippi Oberegger et al. 2020), Lithuania (Toleikyte \r\net al. 2018), Montenegro (Novikova et al. 2018c), Netherlands (Ostermeyer et al. 2018c), Norway (Sandberg et al. 2021), Serbia (Novikova et al"


id: 3d66c886abd851dd147180d83075fe6
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 7020
content:
" 2018a), Switzerland (Iten et al. \r\n2017; Streicher et al. 2017), Poland (Ostermeyer et al. 2019a), the United Kingdom (Ostermeyer et al. 2018a); Eurasia: Armenia, Georgia (Timilsina et al. 2016); the Russian \r\nFederation (Bashmakov 2017; Zhang et al. 2020a); Australia (Energetics 2016; Butler et al. 2020; Zhang et al. 2020a), Japan (Momonoki et al. 2017; Wakiyama and Kuramochi \r\n2017; Minami et al. 2019; Zhang et al. 2020a; Sugyiama et al. 2020); Africa: Egypt (Makumbe et al. 2017; Calise et al. 2021), Morocco (Merini et al. 2020), Nigeria (Dioha et al. \r\n2019; Kwag et al. 2019; Onyenokporo and Ochedi 2019), Rwanda (Colenbrander et al. 2019), South Africa (Department of Environmental Affairs 2014), Uganda (de la Rue du \r\nCan et al. 2018), Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia (Krarti -2019); Middle East - Qatar (Krarti et al. 2017; Kamal et al. 2019), Saudi Arabia (Alaidroos and Krarti \r\n2015; Khan et al"


id: 1eaad7a596c78d414cadfdb3a9ddc8df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2266
content:
" 2017), Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Yemen (Krarti 2019); \r\nEastern Asia - China (Tan et al. 2018; Zhou et al. 2018; Xing et al. 2021; Zhang et al. 2020); Southern Asia: India (Yu et al. 2018; de la Rue du Can et al. 2019; Zhang et al. \r\n2020); South-East Asia and Pacific: Indonesia (Kusumadewi and Limmeechokchai 2015, 2017), Thailand (Kusumadewi and Limmeechokchai 2015, 2017; Chaichaloempreecha \r\net al. 2017), Vietnam (ADB 2017), respective countries from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (Zhang et al. 2020a); Latin America and Caribbean: Brazil (de Melo \r\nand de Martino Jannuzzi 2015; Gonzalez-Mahecha et al. 2019), Colombia (Prada-Hernandez et al. 2015), Mexico (Grande-acosta and Islas-samperio 2020; Rosas-Flores and \r\nRosas-Flores 2020)."


id: b303f58637c77980c5016297f8675217
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 25681
content:
"Figure 9.16 argues that it is possible to mitigate 8.2 GtCO2 or 61% \r\nof global building emissions in 2050, as compared to their baseline. \r\nAt least 1.4 GtCO2 or 10% of baseline emissions could be avoided \r\nintroducing the sufficiency approaches. Further 5.6 GtCO2 or 42% \r\nof baseline emissions could be mitigated with the help of energy \r\nefficiency technologies and practices. Finally, at least 1.1 GtCO2 or \r\n9% of baseline emissions could be reduced through the production \r\nand use of onsite renewable energy. Out of the total potential, the \r\nlargest share of 5.4 GtCO2 will be available in developing countries; \r\nthese countries will be able to reduce 59% of their baseline emissions. \r\nDeveloped Countries will be able to mitigate 2.7 GtCO2 or 65% of \r\ntheir baseline emissions"


id: 86108e4cebdb541e72dd407d429cc2c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18631
content:
" Only few potential studies, often with only \r\nfew mitigation options assessed, were available for the countries of \r\nSouth-East Asia and Pacific, Africa, and Latin America and Caribbean; \r\ntherefore, the potential estimates represent low estimates, and the \r\nreal potentials are likely be higher."


id: 4f00d17ce688914efaa01ea7c9c01e79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 9871
content:
"Advanced HVAC technologies backed-up with demand-side \r\nmanagement, and onsite integrated renewables backed-up with \r\ndemand-side flexibility and digitalisation measures are typically a part \r\nof the retrofit or construction strategy. Among HVAC technologies, \r\nheat pumps are very often modelled to become a  central heating \r\nand cooling technology supplied with renewable electricity. The \r\nestimates of HVAC cost-effectiveness, including heat pumps, vary in \r\nmodelling results from very cost-effective to medium (Department of \r\nEnvironmental Affairs 2014; Prada-Hernandez et al. 2015; Akander \r\net al. 2017; Hirvonen et al. 2020). Among demand-side management, \r\ndemand-side flexibility and digitalisation options, various sensors, \r\ncontrols, and energy consumption feedback devices have typically \r\nnegative costs, whereas advanced smart management systems as \r\nwell as thermal and electric storages linked to fluctuating renewables \r\nare not yet cost-effective (Nguyen et al"


id: 30b22a2943751a6a7e64e7c12cfc340d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 5081
content:
" 2015; Prada-Hernandez et al. \r\n2015; Huang et al. 2019; Uchman 2021; Duman et al. 2021; Sharda \r\net al. 2021; Rashid et al. 2021). Several Developed Countries achieved \r\nto make onsite renewable energy production and use profitable for at \r\nleast a part of the building stock (Horvath et al. 2016; Akander et al. \r\n2017; Vimpari and Junnila 2019; Fina et al. 2020), but this is not yet \r\nthe case for developing countries (Kwag et al. 2019; Cruz et al. 2020; \r\nGrande-Acosta and Islas-Samperio 2020). Due to characteristics \r\nand parameters of different building types, accommodating the \r\ncost-optimal renewables at large scale is especially difficult in non\u0002residential buildings and in urban areas, as compared to residential \r\nbuildings and rural areas (Horvath et al. 2016; Fina et al. 2020). "


id: 72ed5cc42190c06dd5ddc52af7c392c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 15694
content:
"The novelty since AR5 is that a growing number of bottom-up studies \r\nconsiders the measures as an integrated package recognising their \r\ntechnological complementarity and interdependence, rather than \r\nthe linear process of designing and constructing buildings and \r\ntheir systems, or incremental improvements of individual building \r\ncomponents and energy-using devices during building retrofits, \r\nlosing opportunities for the optimisation of whole buildings. \r\nTherefore, integrated measures rather than the individual measures \r\nare considered for the estimates of costs and potentials. Figure 9.17 \r\npresents the indicative breakdown of the potential reported in \r\nFigure 9.16 by measure and cost, to the extent that it was possible \r\nto disaggregate and align to common characteristics. Whereas the \r\nbreakdown per measure was solely based on the literature reviewed \r\nin Section  9.6.1, the cost estimates additionally relied on the \r\nliterature presented in this section, Figure 9"


id: 6771fad522d3b87b00d630f82d470728
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 13861
content:
"20, and Supplementary \r\nMaterial Table  9.SM.6. The literature reviewed reports fragmented \r\nand sometimes contradicting cost-effectiveness information. \r\nDespite a large number of exemplary buildings achieving very high \r\nperformance in all parts of the world, there is a lack of mainstream \r\nliterature or official studies assessing the costs of these buildings at \r\nscale (Lovins 2018; Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2020)."


id: 41337d7bfe10270f200ded0703442020
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7645
content:
"strategies: very 'deep' envelope retrofits followed by the exchange \r\nof HVAC with various advanced alternatives (Csoknyai et al. 2016; \r\nNovikova et al. 2018c,b; Duscha et al. 2019; Filippi Oberegger et al. \r\n2020) or more shallow retrofits followed by switching to low-carbon \r\ndistrict heating or by the exchange of current HVAC with heat pumps \r\nlinked to onsite renewables backed up energy storages (Yeh et  al. \r\n2016; Kotzur et  al. 2020; Hirvonen et  al. 2020). The factors, which \r\nimpact the feasibility of these strategies, therefore, are the building \r\nretrofit rates and replacement rates of building systems. To achieve \r\nthe building stock decarbonisation by 2050, most studies reviewed \r\nin Figure 9.16 assume 'deep' retrofit rates between 2.5% and 5%, \r\nand even 10% per  annum. Esser et  al. (2019) reported that the \r\nannual renovation rate in EU-28 is around 0.2%, with relatively small \r\nvariation across individual EU member states. Sandberg et al"


id: 3ddabdfd3c3155b9b6cd4491c4fcbc28
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7092
content:
" (2016) \r\nsimulated retrofit rates in eleven European countries and concluded \r\nthat only minor future increases in the renovation rates of 0.6-1.6% \r\ncould be expected. Therefore, without strong policies supporting \r\nthese renovations, the feasibility to achieve such high 'deep' retrofit \r\nrates is low. "


id: 9da26c1aa450a68d832923ee26e41949
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 22334
content:
"For a  few studies, which conducted an assessment of the sector \r\ntransformation aiming at emission reduction of 50-80% in 2050 \r\nversus their baseline, the incremental investment need over the \r\nmodelling period is estimated at 0.4-3.3% of the country annual \r\nGDP of the scenario first year (Markewitz et  al. 2015; Bashmakov \r\n2017; Novikova et  al. 2018c; Kotzur et  al. 2020). These estimates \r\nrepresent strictly the incremental share of capital expenditure \r\nand sometimes installation costs. Therefore, these figures are not \r\ncomparable with investment tracked against the regional or national \r\nsustainable finance taxonomies, as recently developed in the EU \r\n(European Parliament and the Council 2020), Russia (Government of \r\nRussian Federation 2021), South Africa (National Treasury of Republic \r\nof South Africa 2021), and others, or the growing literature on \r\ncalculating the recent finance flows (Novikova et al. 2019; Valentova \r\net al. 2019; Kamenders et al. 2019; Macquarie et al"


id: d543e1393e5530a2469ccf00ebea028b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31084
content:
" 2020; Hainaut \r\net al. 2021), because they are measured against other methodologies, \r\nwhich are not comparable with the methodologies used to derive the \r\nincremental costs by integrated assessment models and bottom-up \r\nstudies. Therefore, the gap between the investment need and recent \r\ninvestment flows is likely to be higher, than often reported."


id: 25b8e7534347826b114a3e94c6aa8722
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3360
content:
"(Hertwich et al. 2019). Even through the data records a permanent \r\nenergy efficiency improvement of individual devices (Figure  9.12), \r\ntheir growing offsets energy savings delivered by this improvement. \r\nThe emerging literature suggests addressing the growing number of \r\nenergy services and devices as a part of climate and energy policy \r\n(Bierwirth and Thomas 2019b). Section 9.5.2.2 describes measures \r\nfor limiting demand for these services and Section 9.5.3.6 addresses \r\nreducing the number of technologies through their ownership and \r\nuse patterns. (Grubler et al. 2018) also suggested redefining energy \r\nservices and aggregating appliances, illustrating the reduction of \r\nenergy demand by a  factor of 30 to substitute over 15 different \r\nend-use devices with one integrated digital platform"


id: 7c7cb1552102b4dd31f255d270ff53ce
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17187
content:
" More research \r\nis needed to understand opportunities to realise this sufficiency \r\npotential for appliances, and more research is needed to understand \r\npolicies which may support these opportunities (Bierwirth and \r\nThomas 2019a). "


id: 66ae531d8522df949134d793343db9ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13745
content:
"The literature emphasises the critical role of the time between in \r\n2020 and 2030 for the building sector decarbonisation (IEA 2020a; \r\nRoscini et al. 2020). To set the sector at the pathway to realise its \r\nwhole mitigation potential, it is critical to exponentially accelerate \r\nthe learning of this know-how and skills to reduce the costs and \r\nremove feasibility constraints to enable the penetration of advanced \r\ntechnologies at speed that the world has not seen before. The World \r\nEnergy Outlook (IEA 2020c) shown in the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 \r\nScenario (Box 9.2) the challenges and commitments the sector will \r\nhave to address by 2030. These include bringing new buildings and \r\nexisting buildings to near zero, with a half of existing buildings in \r\nDeveloped Countries and a third of existing buildings in developing \r\ncountries being retrofitted by 2030"


id: 7f8a72af004576aa176554ae0108e59b
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 17614
content:
" These also mean banning the \r\nsale of new fossil fuel-fired boilers, as well as making heat pumps \r\nand very efficient appliances standard technologies. The Net Zero \r\nEmissions by 2050 Scenario achieves almost fully to decarbonise \r\nthe sector by 2050, with such commitments reflected neither in \r\nthe planning and modelling efforts (Section  9.9) nor in policies \r\nand commitments (Section  9.9) of most world countries, with the \r\ncountries of South-East Asia and Pacific, Southern Asia, Africa, and \r\nLatin America and Caribbean having the least research. "


id: e1ac61aa9e085477b69c24b1a842dce
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32998
content:
"The difference between baselines is among the main reason for \r\ndifference between the potential estimates in 2030 reported by \r\nChapter 6 on buildings of AR4 (Levine et al. 2017) and the current \r\nsection of AR6. For Developed Countries, the sector direct and indirect \r\nbaseline emissions in AR6 are 43% and 28% lower than those in \r\nAR4 respectively. For developing countries, the sector direct baseline \r\nemissions in AR6 are 47% lower than those in AR4, and the sector \r\nindirect baseline emissions are 3% higher than those in AR4. As AR6 \r\nis closer to 2030 than AR4 and thus more precise, the likely reason \r\nfor the difference (besides the fact that some potential was realised) \r\nis that AR4 overall overestimated the future baseline emissions, and \r\nit underestimated how quickly the fuel switch to electricity from \r\nother energy carriers has been happening, especially in developing \r\ncountries"


id: 36fcbc04d8470d17036ef697938c75a4
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vector_id: 6043
content:
" As illustrated, the baseline is one of determinant of \r\nthe potential size and hence, all reported estimates shall only be \r\ninterpreted together with the baseline developments. "


id: b72e2c27ab2d04f86626a00cdeed6c4d
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vector_id: 26353
content:
"for building construction instead of conventional materials, such \r\nas concrete and steel, because more carbon is stored in bio-based \r\nconstruction materials than released during their manufacturing. \r\nAssuming the aggressive use of timber in mid-rise urban buildings, \r\nChurkina et al. (2020) estimated the associated mitigation potential \r\nbetween 0.04-3.7 GtCO2 per year depending on how fast countries \r\nadopt new building practices and floor area per  capita. Based on \r\na simplified timber supply-demand model for timber-based new floor \r\narea globally by 2050, Pomponi et al. (2020) showed that the global \r\nsupply of timber can only be 36% of the global demand for it between \r\n2020 and 2050; especially much more forest areas will be required \r\nin Asian countries, such as China and India and American countries, \r\nsuch as the USA, Mexico, and Argentina. Goswein et  al"


id: 67d83d1148493d14ec02bd363c33460b
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13924
content:
" (2021) \r\nconducted a similar detailed analysis for Europe and concluded that \r\ncurrent European forest areas and wheat plantations are sufficient to \r\nprovide timber and straw for the domestic construction sector. "


id: b911fa55631faa2f3000bd1e23ba5ed3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26649
content:
"The increased use of timber and other bio-based materials in buildings \r\nbrings not only benefits, but also risks. The increased use of timber \r\ncan accelerate degradation through poor management and the \r\npressure for deforestation, as already recorded in the Amazon and \r\nSiberia forests, and the competition for land and resources (Carrasco \r\net al. 2017; Brancalion et al. 2018; Hart and Pomponi 2020; Pomponi \r\net al. 2020). Churkina et al. (2020) emphasised that promoting the \r\nuse of more timber in buildings requires the parallel strengthening \r\nof legislation for sustainable forest management, forest certification \r\ninstruments, and care for the people and social organisations that \r\nlive in forests. In tropical and subtropical countries, the use of \r\nbamboo and other fibres brings more benefits and less risks than \r\nthe use of timber (ibid)"


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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
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vector_id: 316
content:
" One of the main barriers associated with the \r\nuse of bio-based materials in buildings is fire safety, although there \r\nis extensive research on this topic (Ostman et  al. 2017; Audebert \r\net al. 2019). This is a particularly important criterion for the design of \r\nmedium and high-rise buildings, which tend to be the most adequate \r\ntypologies for denser and more compact cities. Overall, more robust \r\nmodels are needed to assess the interlinkages between the enhanced \r\nuse of bio-based materials in the building stock and economic and \r\nsocial implications of their larger supply, as well as the associated \r\ncompetition between forest and land-use activities (for food), and \r\necological aspects. Furthermore, more research is required on how \r\nto change forest and building legislation and design a combination \r\nof policy instruments for the specific political, economic and cultural \r\ncounty characteristics (Hildebrandt et al. 2017)"


id: d267c35aa65a3fe0e5ddc93b76d1dfe0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Benefits and risks of \r\nenhanced use of wood products in buildings are also discussed in \r\nChapter 7, Section 7.4.5.3."


id: ebd4d59da6507e359c0d9b63552f3ca6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 34607
content:
"Increasing temperatures can lead to higher cooling needs and, \r\ntherefore, energy consumption (Li et  al. 2012; Schaeffer et  al. \r\n2012; Wan et  al. 2012; Clarke et  al. 2018; International Energy \r\nAgency 2018; Andric et al. 2019). Higher temperatures increase the \r\nnumber of days/hours in which cooling is required and as outdoor \r\ntemperatures increase, the cooling load to maintain the same indoor \r\ntemperature will be higher (Andric et al. 2019). These two effects are \r\noften measured by cooling degree-days1\r\n (CDD) and there is a vast \r\nliterature on studies at the global (Isaac and van Vuuren 2009; Atalla \r\net  al. 2018; Clarke et  al. 2018; Mistry 2019; Biardeau et  al. 2020) \r\nand regional level (Zhou et al. 2014; Bezerra et al. 2021; Falchetta \r\nand Mistry 2021). Other studies use statistical econometric analyses \r\nto capture the empirical relationship between climate variables and \r\nenergy consumption (Auffhammer and Mansur 2014; van Ruijven \r\net al. 2019)"


id: a4c7641df6f179fae023a96e22ed618f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23501
content:
" A third effect is that higher summer temperatures can \r\nincentivise the purchase of space cooling equipment (Auffhammer \r\n2014; De Cian et  al. 2019; Biardeau et  al. 2020), especially in \r\ndeveloping countries (Pavanello et al. 2021). "


id: 1244704d14519d187286c5018a8d26fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 378
content:
"Studies have assessed the increases in energy demand to meet indoor \r\nthermal comfort under future climate (de Wilde and Coley 2012; \r\nLi et al. 2012; Clarke et al. 2018; Andric et al. 2019). Higher cooling \r\nneeds may induce increases in energy demand (Wan et  al. 2012; \r\nLi et al. 2012), which could lead to higher emissions, when electricity \r\nis fossil-based (International Energy Agency 2018; Biardeau et  al. \r\n2020), and generate higher loads and stress on power systems (Dirks \r\net al. 2015; Auffhammer et al. 2017). In this regard, increasing energy \r\nefficiency of space cooling appliances and adopting dynamic cooling \r\nsetpoint temperatures, can reduce the energy needs for cooling and \r\nlimit additional emissions and pressures on power systems (Davide \r\net  al. 2019; Bienvenido-Huertas et  al. 2020; Bezerra et  al. 2021) \r\n(Section 9.4, Figure 9.11 and Supplementary Material Tables 9.SM.1 \r\nto 9.SM.3)"


id: 59950e95e20268bdcbef19c6a9dd858a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 11592
content:
" This can also be achieved with on-site renewable energy \r\nproduction, especially solar PV for which there can be a  timely \r\ncorrelation between power supply and cooling demand, improving \r\nload matching (Salom et al. 2014; Grove-Smith et al. 2018)."


id: c0377dcf213fbd10b1be514d1f00ac03
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27798
content:
"Since adaptation of the existing building stock may be more expensive \r\nand require building retrofit, climate change must be considered \r\nin the design of new buildings to ensure performance robustness in \r\nboth current and future climates, which can have implications for \r\nconstruction costs (Hallegatte 2009; Pyke et al. 2012; de Wilde and \r\nColey 2012; de Rubeis et al. 2020; Picard et al. 2020) and emissions \r\n(Liu and Cui 2018). Building energy codes and regulations are usually \r\nbased on cost-effectiveness and historical climate data, which can lead \r\nto the poor design of thermal comfort in future climate (Hallegatte \r\n2009; Pyke et al. 2012; de Wilde and Coley 2012) and non-efficient \r\nactive adaptive measures based on mechanical air conditioning \r\n(De Cian et al. 2019) (Section 9.4, Figure 9.11 and Supplementary \r\nMaterial Tables 9.SM.1 to 9.SM.3)"


id: 21373e88c8b27dcf935d0f595e41f437
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 2664
content:
" However, uncertainty about future \r\nclimate change creates difficulties for projecting parameters for the \r\ndesign of new buildings (Hallegatte 2009; de Wilde and Coley 2012). \r\nThis can be especially relevant for social housing programs (Rubio\u0002Bellido et al. 2017; Triana et al. 2018; Gonzalez Mahecha et al. 2020) \r\nin developing countries. "


id: e4cdb32a70cb6805f7546b532f907ad5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"non-residential sector holds numerous multiple impacts (co-benefits, \r\nadverse side-effects, trade-offs, risks, etc.) for the economy, society \r\nand end-users, in both developed and developing economies, which \r\ncan be categorised into the following types (IEA 2014; Urge-Vorsatz \r\net al. 2016; Ferreira et al. 2017; Thema et al. 2017; Reuter et al. 2017; \r\nUS EPA 2018; Nikas et al. 2020): (i) health impacts due to better indoor \r\nconditions, energy/fuel poverty alleviation, better ambient air quality \r\nand reduction of the heat island effect; (ii) environmental benefits \r\nsuch as reduced local air pollution and the associated impact on \r\necosystems (acidification, eutrophication, etc"


id: 218bf6d472ffbece6ac7ad9d48dbd791
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 2701
content:
") and infrastructures, \r\nreduced sewage production, and so on; (iii) improved resource \r\nmanagement including water and energy; (iv) impact on social well\u0002being, including changes in disposable income due to decreased \r\nenergy expenditures and/or distributional costs of new policies, fuel \r\npoverty alleviation and improved access to energy sources, rebound \r\neffects, increased productive time for women and children, and \r\nso on; (v) microeconomic effects (e.g.,  productivity gains in non\u0002residential buildings, enhanced asset values of green buildings, \r\nfostering innovation); (vi) macroeconomic effects, including impact \r\non GDP driven by energy savings and energy availability, creation of \r\nnew jobs, decreased employment in the fossil energy sector, long\u0002term reductions in energy prices and possible increases in electricity \r\nprices in the medium run, possible impacts on public budgets, and \r\nso on; and (vii) energy security implications (e.g"


id: a35b4774afea4696d5b8499c7d256b6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 23263
content:
", access to modern \r\nenergy resources, reduced import dependency, increase of supplier \r\ndiversity, smaller reserve requirements, increased sovereignty \r\nand resilience). "


id: 128a0fdcceb5640d7f1bf02b771f969
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 411
content:
"Notes: The strength of interaction between mitigation actions and SDGs is described with a seven-point scale (Nilsson et al., 2016). Also, the blue bullet shows the interactions \r\nbetween co-benefits/risk associated with mitigation actions and the SDGs. SDG 1: Sufficiency and efficiency measures result in reduced energy expenditures and other financial \r\nsavings that further lead to poverty reduction. Access to modern energy forms will largely help alleviate poverty in developing countries as the productive time of women and \r\nchildren will increase, new activities can be developed, and so on. The distributional costs of some mitigation policies promoting energy efficiency and lower carbon energy may \r\nreduce the disposable income of the poor. SDG 2: Energy sufficiency and efficiency measures result in lower energy bills and avoiding the 'heat or eat' dilemma"


id: bf13a74f16ee50a8e5c2496232dd6383
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27615
content:
" Improved cook\u0002stoves provide better food security and reduces the danger of fuel shortages in developing countries; under real-world conditions these impacts may be limited as the households \r\nuse these stoves irregularly and inappropriately. Green roofs can support food production. Improving energy access enhances agricultural productivity and improves food security; \r\non the other hand, increased bioenergy production may restrict the available land for food production. SDG 3: All categories of mitigation action result in health benefits through \r\nbetter indoor air quality, energy/fuel poverty alleviation, better ambient air quality, and reduction of the heat island effect. Efficiency measures with inadequate ventilation may \r\nlead to the \"sick building\" syndrome symptoms. SDG 4: Energy efficiency measures result in reduced school absenteeism due to better indoor environmental conditions. Also, fuel \r\npoverty alleviation increases the available space at home for reading"


id: 2a121d0c12a84f0293013f199d1c55a3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4043
content:
" Improved access to electricity and clean fuels enables people living in poor developing countries to read, \r\nwhile it is also associated with greater school attendance by children. SDG 5: Efficient cook-stoves and improved access to electricity and clean fuels in developing countries will \r\nresult in substantial time savings for women and children, thus increasing the time for rest, communication, education and productive activities. SDG 6: Reduced energy demand \r\ndue to sufficiency and efficiency measures as well as an upscaling of renewable energy sources (RES) can lead to reduced water demand for thermal cooling at energy production \r\nfacilities. Also, water savings result through improved conditions and lower space of dwellings. Improved access to electricity is necessary to treat water at homes. In some \r\nsituations, the switch to bioenergy could increase water use compared to existing conditions"


id: 5ee0921c9501912e4e723af2b1bfc474
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12470
content:
" SDG 7: All categories of mitigation action result in energy/fuel poverty alleviation \r\nin both developed and developing countries as well as in improving the security of energy supply. SDG 8: Positive and negative direct and indirect macroeconomic effects (GDP, \r\nemployment, public budgets) associated with lower energy prices due to the reduced energy demand, energy efficiency and RES investments, improved energy access and fostering \r\ninnovation. Also, energy efficient buildings with adequate ventilation, result in productivity gains and improve the competitiveness of the economy. SDG 9: Adoption of distributed \r\ngeneration and smart grids helps in infrastructure improvement and expansion. Also, the development of 'green buildings' can foster innovation. Reduced energy demand due to \r\nsufficiency and efficiency measures as well as an upscaling of RES can lead to early retirement of fossil energy infrastructure"


id: b01dce4f225bcae2bc6c31522e9d7c57
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25232
content:
" SDG 10: Efficient cook-stoves as well as improved \r\naccess to electricity and clean fuels in developing countries will result in substantial time savings for women and children, thus enhancing education and the development of \r\nproductive activities. Sufficiency and efficiency measures lead to lower energy expenditures, thus reducing income inequalities. The distributional costs of some mitigation policies \r\npromoting energy efficiency and lower carbon energy as well as the need for purchasing more expensive equipment and appliances may reduce the disposable income of the poor \r\nand increase inequalities. SDG 11: Sufficiency and efficiency measures as well as fuel switching to RES and improvements in energy access would eliminate major sources (both \r\ndirect and indirect) of poor air quality (indoor and outdoor). Helpful if in-situ production of RES combined with charging electric two, three and four wheelers at home"


id: d5813bc4303108a01e5ce9f34849f531
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31114
content:
" Buildings \r\nwith high energy efficiency and/or green features are sold/rented at higher prices than conventional, low energy efficient houses. SDG 12: Energy sufficiency and efficiency \r\nmeasures as well as deployment of RES result in reduced consumption of natural resources, namely fossil fuels, metal ores, minerals, water, and so on. Negative impacts on natural \r\nresources could be arisen from increased penetration of new efficient appliances and equipment. SDG 13: See Sections 9.4-9.6. SDG 15: Efficient cookstoves and improved \r\naccess to electricity and clean fuels in developing countries will result in halting deforestation. SDG 16: Building retrofits are associated with lower crime. Improved access to \r\nelectric lighting can improve safety (particularly for women and children)"


id: 61537109618b6a926dbaf56bb5ee9d91
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Institutions that are effective, accountable and transparent are needed at all levels of government for \r\nproviding energy access and promoting modern renewables as well as boosting sufficiency and efficiency. SDG 17: The development of zero energy buildings requires among \r\nothers capacity building, citizen participation as well as monitoring of the achievements."


id: d5e7aeaec99431488a83fe07f194741f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31170
content:
"Sources: Brounen and Kok (2011); Deng et al. (2012); Zheng et al. (2012); Hogberg (2013); Hyland et al. (2013); Kahn and Kok (2014); Koirala et al. (2014); Maidment et al. \r\n(2014); Mirasgedis et al. (2014); Scott et al. (2014); Bailis et al. (2015); Boermans et al. (2015); Fuerst et al. (2015, 2016); Galan-Marin et al. (2015); Hasegawa et al. (2015); \r\nHejazi et al. (2015); Holland et al. (2015); Liddell and Guiney (2015); Liu et al. (2015a); Mattioli and Moulinos (2015); Payne et al. (2015); Torero (2015); Willand et al. (2015a); \r\nWinter et al. (2015); Baimel et al. (2016); Camarinha-Matos (2016); Cameron et al. (2016); De Ayala et al. (2016); European Commission (2016); Fricko et al. (2016); Hanna et al. \r\n(2016); Jensen et al. (2016); Levy et al. (2016); Markovska et al. (2016); Rao et al. (2016); Smith et al. (2016); Sola et al. (2016); Song et al. (2016); Urge-Vorsatz et al. (2016); \r\nBalaban and Puppim de Oliveira (2017); Berrueta et al. (2017); Burney et al"


id: 218bac1d9bd72ba3a5630dc5dd65f7d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2700
content:
" (2017); Mehetre et al. (2017); Mofidi and Akbari (2017); Niemela et al. (2017); Ortiz et al. (2017); \r\nRao and Pachauri (2017); Thema et al. (2017); Thomson et al. (2017a); Zhao et al. (2017); Barnes and Samad (2018); Cedeno-Laurent et al. (2018); Goldemberg et al. (2018); \r\nGrubler et al. (2018); Jeuland et al. (2018); MacNaughton et al. (2018); McCollum et al. (2018); Mzavanadze (2018a); Rosenthal et al. (2018); Saheb et al. (2018b,a); Steenland \r\net al. (2018); Tajani et al. (2018); Venugopal et al. (2018); Walters and Midden (2018); Wierzbicka et al. (2018); Alawneh et al. (2019); Batchelor et al. (2019); Bleyl et al. (2019); \r\nCajias et al. (2019); Marmolejo-Duarte and Chen (2019); Mastrucci et al. (2019); ESMAP et al. (2020); Teubler et al. (2020); Van de Ven et al. (2020); Nikas et al. (2020); \r\nBlair et al. (2021). "


id: 12d5abaa9f1310fb5ff93b6061620cf1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 467
content:
"In 2018, approximately 2.8 billion people worldwide, most of whom \r\nlive in Asia and Africa, still use polluting fuels, such as fuelwood, \r\ncharcoal, dried crops, cow dung, and so on, in low-efficiency stoves \r\nfor cooking and heating, generating household air pollution (HAP), \r\nwhich adversely affects the health of the occupants of the dwellings, \r\nespecially children and women (World Health Organization 2016; \r\nRahut et al. 2017; Mehetre et al. 2017; Das et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2018; \r\nQuinn et al. 2018; Rosenthal et al. 2018; Xin et al. 2018; IEA 2020a). \r\nExposure to HAP from burning these fuels is estimated to have caused \r\n3.8 million deaths from heart diseases, strokes, cancers, acute lower \r\nrespiratory infections in 2016 (World Health Organization 2018). \r\nIt is acknowledged that integrated policies are needed to address \r\nsimultaneously universal energy access, limiting climate change \r\nand reducing air pollution (World Health Organization 2016). Rafaj \r\net al"


id: 7276da9de7127bb9018105ee6479bf96
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15627
content:
"illnesses, asthma, and so on (Lacroix and Chaton 2015; Payne et al. \r\n2015; Camprubi et al. 2016; Wilson et al. 2016; Ormandy and Ezratty \r\n2016; Thema et  al. 2017). In addition, lack of affordable warmth \r\ncan generate stress related to chronic discomfort and high bills, \r\nfear of falling into debt, and a sense of lacking control, which are \r\npotential drivers of further negative mental health outcomes, such as \r\ndepression (Howden-Chapman et al. 2012; Liddell and Guiney 2015; \r\nPayne et  al. 2015; Wilson et  al. 2016). Health risks from exposure \r\nto cold and inadequate indoor environmental quality may be higher \r\nfor low-income, energy-poor households, and in particular for those \r\nwith elderly relatives, young children, and members with existing \r\nrespiratory illness (Payne et al. 2015; Thomson et al. 2017b; Nunes \r\n2019)"


id: 472db9e49021ea0bab58d451cd7d246a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8577
content:
" High temperatures during summer can also be dangerous \r\nfor people living in buildings with inadequate thermal insulation \r\nand inappropriate ventilation (Ormandy and Ezratty 2016; Sanchez\u0002Guevara et al. 2019; Thomson et al. 2019). Summer fuel poverty (or \r\nsummer overheating risk) may increase significantly in the coming \r\ndecades under a warming climate (Section 9.7), with the poorest, who \r\ncannot afford to install air conditioning, and the elderly (Nunes 2020) \r\nbeing the most vulnerable. "


id: cd5b6b50a45a177dbec036dcf0134275
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29854
content:
"Charlier et al. 2018), moderating the potential health gains associated \r\nwith implemented energy efficiency programs. This can be avoided if \r\nimplemented policies to tackle fuel poverty target the most socially \r\nvulnerable households (Lacroix and Chaton 2015; Camprubi et  al. \r\n2016). Mzavanadze (2018a) estimated that in EU-28 accelerated \r\nenergy efficiency policies, reducing the energy demand in residential \r\nsector by 333 TWh in 2030 compared to a  reference scenario, \r\ncoupled with strong social policies targeting the most vulnerable \r\nhouseholds, could deliver additional co-benefits in the year of 2030 \r\nof around 24,500 avoided premature deaths due to indoor cold \r\nand around 22,300 disability adjusted life years (DALYs) of avoided \r\nasthma due to indoor dampness. The health benefits of these policies \r\namount to EUR4.8 billion in 2030"


id: a9c1c00c87814c292358aadfe078ccad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24242
content:
" The impacts on inhabitants in \r\ndeveloping countries would be much greater than those in EU-28 \r\nowing to the much higher prevalence of impoverished household."


id: 35cfcbe1253fdd142e9a941238919ef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5879
content:
"According to World Health Organization (2018) around 4.2 million \r\npremature deaths worldwide (in both cities and rural areas) are \r\nattributed to outdoor air pollution. According to the results of the \r\nquantitative model (Gu et  al. 2018), the premature mortalities \r\nattributed to PM2.5 and O3 emissions may reach 168000-1796000 \r\n(95% Cl) in 2010. Mitigation actions in residential and non-residential \r\nsectors decrease the amount of fossil fuels burnt either directly in \r\nbuildings (for heating, cooking, etc.) or indirectly for electricity \r\ngeneration and thereby reduce air pollution (e.g., PM, O3, SO2, NOx), \r\nimprove ambient air quality and generate significant health benefits \r\nthrough avoiding premature deaths, lung cancers, ischemic heart \r\ndiseases, hospital admissions, asthma exacerbations, respiratory \r\nsymptoms, and so on (Levy et  al. 2016; Balaban and Puppim de \r\nOliveira 2017; MacNaughton et al. 2018; Karlsson et al. 2020)"


id: fe92b802b7561ad87b097cdda456f533
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37590
content:
" Several \r\nstudies have monetised the health benefits attributed to reduced \r\noutdoor air pollution due to the implementation of mitigation actions \r\nin buildings, and their magnitude expressed as a ratio to the value of \r\nenergy savings resulting from the implemented interventions in each \r\ncase, are in the range of 0.08 in EU, 0.18 in Germany, 0.26-0.40 in US, \r\n0.34 in Brazil, 0.47 in Mexico, 0.74 in Turkey, 8.28 in China and 11.67 \r\nin India (Joyce et al. 2013; Levy et al. 2016; Diaz-Mendez et al. 2018; \r\nMacNaughton et al. 2018). In developed economies, the estimated \r\nco-benefits are relatively low due to the fact that the planned \r\ninterventions influence a  quite clean energy source mix (Tuomisto \r\net al. 2015; MacNaughton et al. 2018). On the other hand, the health \r\nco-benefits in question are substantially higher in countries and \r\nregions with greater dependency on coal for electricity generation \r\nand higher baseline morbidity and mortality rates (Kheirbek et  al"


id: 3783fefd1f5583b723ca2c683a80ccfe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6114
content:
"Apart from thermal comfort, the internal environment of buildings \r\nimpacts public health through a  variety of pathways including \r\ninadequate ventilation, poor indoor air quality, chemical contaminants \r\nfrom indoor or outdoor sources, outdoor noise, or poor lighting. \r\nThe implementation of interventions aiming to improve thermal \r\ninsulation of buildings combined with inadequate ventilation may \r\nincrease the risk of mould and moisture problems due to reduced air \r\nflow rates, leading to indoor environments that are unhealthy, with \r\nthe occupants suffering from the sick building syndrome symptoms \r\n(Willand et  al. 2015; Cedeno-Laurent et  al. 2018; Wierzbicka et  al. \r\n2018)"


id: 7ca12a9a291698612176f7374ff9a5e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17207
content:
" On the other hand, if the implementation of energy efficiency \r\ninterventions or the construction of green buildings is accompanied \r\nby adequate ventilation, the indoor environmental conditions are \r\nimproved through less moisture, mould, pollutant concentrations, \r\nand allergens, which result in fewer asthma symptoms, respiratory \r\nrisks, chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases, heart disease risks, \r\nheadaches, cancer risks, and so on (Allen et al. 2015; Hamilton et al. \r\n2015; Thomson and Thomas 2015; Cowell 2016; Doll et  al. 2016; \r\nWilson et  al. 2016; Militello-Hourigan and Miller 2018; Underhill \r\net  al. 2018; Cedeno-Laurent et  al. 2018). Fisk (2018) showed that \r\nincreased ventilation rates in residential buildings results in health \r\nbenefits ranging from 20% to several-fold improvements; however, \r\nthese benefits do not occur consistently, and ventilation should \r\nbe combined with other exposure control measures"


id: 56a113c6e2d4889aea285f0ac6f4d9c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11106
content:
" As adequate \r\nventilation imposes additional costs, the sick building syndrome \r\nsymptoms are more likely to be seen in low income households \r\n(Shrubsole et al. 2016). "


id: 60f8dbba930fa9fbf38ba3439e4b6212
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"households to affordably heat/cool a larger area of the home, thus \r\nincreasing the space available to a family and providing more private \r\nand comfortable spaces for several activities like homework (Payne \r\net  al. 2015). By reducing energy expenditures and making energy \r\nbills more affordable for households, a 'heat or eat' dilemma can be \r\navoided resulting in better nutrition and reductions in the number \r\nof low birthweight babies (Payne et al. 2015; Tonn et al. 2018). Also, \r\nrenovated buildings and the resulting better indoor conditions, \r\ncan enable residents to avoid social isolation, improve social \r\ncohesion, lower crime, and so on (Payne et al. 2015). The European \r\nCommission (2016) found that under an ambitious recast of Energy \r\nPerformance Buildings Directive (EPBD), the number of households \r\nthat may be lifted from fuel poverty across the EU lies between \r\n5.17 and 8.26 million"


id: b06b8c768dec23bdbb564380de31262a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 25280
content:
" To capture these benefits, mitigation policies \r\nand  particularly energy renovation programmes should target the \r\nmost vulnerable among the energy-poor households, which very often \r\nare ignored by the policy makers. In this context, it is recognised that \r\nfuel poverty should be analysed as a multidimensional social problem \r\n(Thomson et  al. 2017b; Baker et  al. 2018; Charlier and Legendre \r\n2019; Mashhoodi et al. 2019), as it is related to energy efficiency, \r\nhousehold composition, age and health status of its members, \r\nsocial conditions (single parent families, existence of unemployed \r\nand retired people, etc.), energy prices, disposable income, and so \r\non. In addition, the geographical dimension can have a significant \r\nimpact on the levels of fuel poverty and should be taken into account \r\nwhen formulating response policies (Besagni and Borgarello 2019; \r\nMashhoodi et al. 2019)."


id: 65f039dfee9711107ed87587baf22d85
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"In 2018 almost 0.79 billion people in developing countries did not \r\nhave access to electricity, while approximately 2.8 billion people \r\nrelied on polluting fuels and technologies for cooking (IEA 2020a). \r\nOnly in sub-Saharan Africa, about 548 million people (i.e.,  more \r\nthan 50% of the population) live without electricity. In developed \r\neconomies, the EU Energy Poverty Observatory estimated that in EU\u000228 44.5 million people were unable to keep their homes warm in 2016, \r\n41.5 million had arrears on their utility bills the same year, 16.3% \r\nof households faced disproportionately high energy expenditure in \r\n2010, and 19.2% of households reported being uncomfortably hot \r\nduring summer in 2012 (Thomson and Bouzarovski 2018). Okushima \r\n(2016), using the 'expenditure approach', estimated that fuel poverty \r\nrates in Japan reached 8.4% in 2013. In the US, in 2015, 17 million \r\nhouseholds (14"


id: 906a0c92946c0241dc367bbf873d5ed
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"4% of the total) received an energy disconnect/\r\ndelivery stop notice and 25 million households (21.2% of the total) \r\nhad to forgo food and medicine to pay energy bills (Bednar and \r\nReames 2020). "


id: e702ac6d4f20a155d6b9ad7d5e45fb4b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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"In most low- and middle-income developing countries women and \r\nchildren (particularly girls) spend a significant amount of their time for \r\ngathering fuels for cooking and heating (World Health Organization \r\n2016; Rosenthal et al. 2018). For example, in Africa more than 70% \r\nof the children living in households that primarily cook with polluting \r\nfuels spend at least 15 hours and, in some countries, more than \r\n30 hours per  week in collecting wood or water, facing significant \r\nsafety risks and constraints on their available time for education and \r\nrest (World Health Organization 2016; Mehetre et  al. 2017). Also, \r\nin several developing countries (e.g., in most African countries but \r\nalso in India, in rural areas in Latin America and elsewhere) women \r\nspend several hours to collect fuel wood and cook, thus limiting \r\ntheir potential for productive activities for income generation or \r\nrest (Garcia-Frapolli et  al. 2010; World Health Organization 2016; \r\nMehetre et al. 2017)"


id: 5756ccc118a9689e2b56032d5863e2c5
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content:
" Expanding access to clean household energy \r\nfor cooking, heating and lighting will largely help alleviate these \r\nburdens (Malla et al. 2011; World Health Organization 2016; Lewis \r\net al. 2017; Rosenthal et al. 2018). Jeuland et al. (2018) found that the \r\ntime savings associated with the adoption of cleaner and more fuel\u0002efficient stoves by low-income households in developing countries \r\nare amount to USD1.3-1.9 per  household per  month, constituting \r\nthe 23-43% of the total social benefits attributed to the promotion \r\nof clean stoves. "


id: a1376dfc59809c274ebc67770533b4d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"this review, 31 found neutral to positive effects of green buildings on \r\nproductivity and only 3 studies indicated detrimental outcomes for \r\noffice occupants in terms of job performance. Particularly longitudinal \r\nstudies, which observe and compare the office users' reactions over \r\ntime in conventional and green buildings, show that green buildings \r\nhave neutral to positive effects on occupants well-being and work \r\nperformance (Thatcher and Milner 2016; Candido et al. 2019; Kozusznik \r\net al. 2019). Bleyl et al. (2019) estimated that deep energy retrofits in \r\noffice buildings in Belgium would generate a workforce performance \r\nincrease of EUR10.4 to EUR20.8 m-2 renovated. In Europe every \r\n1degC reduction in overheating during the summer period increases \r\nstudents learning performance by 2.3% and workers performance in \r\noffice buildings by 3.6% (Kockat et al. 2018b)"


id: 9f0b3023fa35be0cd9714feb25f23fc6
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content:
" Considering the latter \r\nindicator, it was estimated that by reducing overheating across Europe, \r\nthe overall performance of the workers in office buildings can increase \r\nby 7-12% (Kockat et al. 2018b)."


id: 82a4d1fdb9baaf75ace78cb4f3bd516e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"A significant number of studies confirm that homes with high energy \r\nefficiency and/or green features are sold at higher prices than \r\nconventional, low energy efficient houses. A review of 15 studies \r\nfrom 12 different countries showed that energy efficient dwellings \r\nhave a  price premium ranging between 1.5% and 28%, with \r\na median estimated at 7.8%, for the highest energy efficient category \r\nexamined in each case study compared to reference houses with \r\nthe same characteristics but lower energy efficiency (the detailed \r\nresults of this review are presented in Supplementary Material \r\nTable 9.SM.5). In a given real estate market, the higher the energy \r\nefficiency of dwellings compared to conventional housing, the higher \r\ntheir selling prices"


id: 90e396187ca6b30a0588b42a83ed561e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 20339
content:
" However, a  number of studies show that this \r\npremium is largely realised during resale transactions and is smaller \r\nor even negative in some cases immediately after the completion \r\nof the construction (Deng and Wu 2014; Yoshida and Sugiura 2015). \r\nA relatively lower number of studies (also included in Supplementary \r\nMaterial Table 9.SM.5) show that energy efficiency and green features \r\nhave also a positive effect on rental prices of dwellings (Hyland et al. \r\n2013; Cajias et al. 2019), but this is weaker compared to sales prices, \r\nand in a developing country even negative as green buildings, which \r\nincorporate new technologies such as central air conditioning, are \r\nassociated with higher electricity consumption (Zheng et al. 2012). "


id: fa4879713cf2311adf58ab562414d823
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36897
content:
"Low-carbon buildings, and particularly well-designed, operated and \r\nmaintained high-performance buildings with adequate ventilation, \r\nmay result in productivity gains and improve the competitiveness of the \r\neconomy through three different pathways (MacNaughton et al. 2015; \r\nEuropean Commission 2016; Niemela et al. 2017; Mofidi and Akbari \r\n2017; Thema et al. 2017; Bleyl et al. 2019): (i) increasing the amount of \r\nactive time available for productive work by reducing the absenteeism \r\nfrom work due to illness, the presenteeism (i.e"


id: 5877b8601e52e68fa91c8300d55d7723
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vector_id: 11416
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", working with illness \r\nor working despite being ill), and the inability to work due to chronic \r\ndiseases caused by the poor indoor environment; (ii) improving the \r\nindoor air quality and thermal comfort of non-residential buildings, \r\nwhich can result in better mental well-being of the employees and \r\nincreased workforce performance; and (iii) reducing the school \r\nabsenteeism due to better indoor environmental conditions, which \r\nmay enhance the future earnings ability of the students and restrict the \r\nparents absenteeism due to care-taking of sick children."


id: 8517dfd6e5127b5f711f1fe1bb755787
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18467
content:
"Productivity gains due to increased amount of active time for work \r\nis directly related to acute and chronic health benefits attributed to \r\nclimate mitigation actions in buildings (Section 9.8.2.2). The bulk of \r\nstudies quantifying the impact of energy efficiency on productivity \r\nfocus on acute health effects. Proper ventilation in buildings is of \r\nparticular importance and can reduce absenteeism due to sick days \r\nby 0.6-1.9 days per  person per  year (MacNaughton et  al. 2015; \r\nBen-David et al. 2017; Thema et al. 2017). In a pan-European study, \r\n(Chatterjee and Urge-Vorsatz 2018) showed that deep energy \r\nretrofits in residential buildings may increase the number of active \r\ndays by 1.78-5.27 (with an average of 3.09) per year and person \r\nwho has actually shifted to a  deep retrofitted building. Similarly, \r\nthe interventions in the non-residential buildings result in increased \r\nactive days between 0.79 and 2.43 (with an average of 1"


id: a9e5a16045e7f77e224a8447671193bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"GHG emission reduction actions in the sector of buildings affect energy \r\nsystems by: (i) reducing the overall consumption of energy resources, \r\nespecially fossil fuels; (ii) promoting the electrification of thermal \r\nenergy uses; and (iii) enhancing distributed generation through the \r\nincorporation of RES and other clean and smart technologies in \r\nbuildings. Increasing sufficiency, energy efficiency and penetration of \r\nRES result in improving the primary energy intensity of the economy \r\nand reducing dependence on fossil fuels, which for many countries \r\nare imported energy resources (Boermans et  al. 2015; Markovska \r\net al. 2016; Thema et al. 2017). The electrification of thermal energy \r\nuses is expected to increase the demand for electricity in buildings, \r\nwhich in most cases can be reversed (at national or regional level) by \r\npromoting nearly zero energy new buildings and a deep renovation \r\nof the existing building stock (Boermans et  al"


id: bb4f96098966e0eadb3948e49168397a
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" 2015; Couder and \r\nVerbruggen 2017). In addition, highly efficient buildings can keep \r\nthe desired room temperature stable over a  longer period and \r\nconsequently they have the capability to shift heating and cooling \r\noperation in time (Boermans et  al. 2015). These result in reduced \r\npeak demand, lower system losses and avoided generation and \r\ngrid infrastructure investments. As a  significant proportion of the \r\nglobal population, particularly in rural and remote locations, still lack \r\naccess to modern energy sources, renewables can be used to power \r\ndistributed generation or micro-grid systems that enable peer-to\u0002peer energy exchange, constituting a crucial component to improve \r\nenergy security for rural populations (Leibrand et al. 2019; Kirchhoff \r\nand Strunz 2019)"


id: 53c34ee1cf674751ef23e3861ba8e33b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 10645
content:
" For successful development of peer-to-peer micro\u0002grids, financial incentives to asset owners are critical for ensuring \r\ntheir willingness to share their energy resources, while support \r\nmeasures should be adopted to ensure that also non-asset holders \r\ncan contribute to investments in energy generation and storage \r\nequipment and have the ability to sell electricity to others (Kirchhoff \r\nand Strunz 2019)."


id: 4958962ca6423a7891134457dab2f388
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Investments required for the implementation of mitigation actions, \r\ncreate, mainly in the short-run, increase in the economic output \r\nand employment in sectors delivering energy efficiency services and \r\nproducts, which are partially counterbalanced by less investments \r\nand  lower production in other parts of the economy (Yushchenko \r\nand Patel 2016; European Commission 2016; Thema et al. 2017; US \r\nEPA 2018) (see also Cross-Working Group Box 1 in Chapter 3). The \r\nmagnitude of these impacts depends on the structure of the economy, \r\nthe extent to which energy saving technologies are produced \r\ndomestically or imported from abroad, but also from the growth \r\ncycle of the economy with the benefits being maximised when the \r\nrelated investments are realised in periods of economic recession \r\n(Mirasgedis et  al. 2014; Yushchenko and Patel 2016; Thema et  al. \r\n2017)"


id: 4bfe506cb66a0c676b93e3d93f7ab218
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Particularly in developing countries if the mitigation measures \r\nand other interventions to improve energy access (Figure 9.19) are \r\ncarried out by locals, the impact on economy, employment and social \r\nwell-being will be substantial (Mills 2016; Lehr et al. 2016). As many \r\nof these programs are carried out with foreign assistance funds, it is \r\nessential that the funds be spent in-country to the full extent possible, \r\nwhile some portion of these funds would need to be devoted to \r\ninstitution building and especially training. (Mills 2016) estimated \r\nthat a market transformation from inefficient and polluting fuel-based \r\nlighting to solar-LED systems to fully serve the 112 million households \r\nthat currently lack electricity access will create directly 2 million new \r\njobs in these developing countries, while the indirect effects could \r\nbe even greater"


id: 61e136c335e095e8b288bd0be786096b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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" IEA (2020a) estimated that 9-30 jobs would be \r\ngenerated for every million dollars invested in building retrofits or \r\nin construction of new energy efficient buildings (gross direct and \r\nindirect employment), with the highest employment intensity rates \r\noccurring in developing countries. Correspondingly, 7-16 jobs \r\nwould be created for every million dollars spent in purchasing highly \r\nefficient and connected appliances, while expanding clean cooking \r\nthrough LPG could create 16-75 direct local jobs per million dollars \r\ninvested. Increases in product and employment attributed to energy \r\nefficiency investments also affect public budgets by increasing \r\nincome and business taxation, reducing unemployment benefits, \r\nand so on. Thema et al. (2017), thus mitigating the impact on public \r\ndeficit of subsidising energy saving measures (Mikulic et al. 2016). "


id: e727b4bb63e1e98eae396c3f6e39201c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33864
content:
"Gupta et al. 2017). Barriers identified for the refurbishment of exiting \r\nbuilding or construction of new efficient buildings includes: lack \r\nof high-performance products, construction methods, monitoring \r\ncapacity, investment risks, policies intermittency, information gaps, \r\nprincipal agent problems (both tenant and landlord face disincentives \r\nto invest in energy efficiency), skills of the installers, lack of a trained \r\nand ready workforce, governance arrangements in collectively owned \r\nproperties and behavioural anomalies (Gillingham and Palmer 2014; \r\nBuessler et al. 2017; Yang et al. 2019; Do et al. 2020; Dutt 2020; Song \r\net al. 2020). A better understanding of behavioural barriers (Frederiks \r\net al. 2015) is essential to design effective policies to decarbonise \r\nthe building sector. Energy efficiency in buildings faces one \r\nadditional problem: the sector is highly heterogeneous, with many \r\ndifferent building types, sizes and operational uses"


id: f3bf50b41dbe3295c2957b9e3022ce0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35864
content:
" Energy efficiency \r\ninvestments do not take place in isolation but in competition with \r\nother priorities and as part of a  complex, protracted investment \r\nprocess (Cooremans 2011). Therefore, a focus on overcoming barriers \r\nis not enough for effective policy. Organisational context is important \r\nbecause the same barrier might have very different organisational \r\neffects and require very different policy responses (Mallaburn \r\n2018). Cross-Chapter Box  2 in Chapter  2 presents a  summary of \r\nmethodologies for estimating the macro-level impact of policies on \r\nindices of GHG mitigation."


id: b020041ed0cdbc34d7464b5b0677fe89
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content:
"Reaching deep decarbonisation levels throughout the lifecycle \r\nof buildings depends on multidimensional criteria for assessing \r\nthe feasibility of mitigation measures, including criteria related to \r\ngeophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, \r\nsocio-cultural and institutional dimensions. An assessment of \r\n16 feasibility criteria for mitigation measures in the buildings sector \r\nindicates whether a specific factor, within broader dimensions, acts \r\nas a barrier or helps enabling such mitigation measures (Figure 9.20, \r\nSupplementary Material Table  9.SM.6, and Annex II.11). Although \r\nmitigation measures are aggregated in the assessment of Figure 9.20 \r\nand feasibility results can differ for more specific measures, generally \r\nspeaking, the barriers to mitigation measures in buildings are few, \r\nsometimes including technological and socio-cultural challenges. \r\nHowever, many co-benefits could help enable mitigation in the \r\nbuildings sector"


id: a7632620b2949c6e686012f7064bf79a
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content:
" For instance, many measures can have positive \r\neffects on the environment, health and well-being, and distributional \r\npotential, all of which can boost their feasibility. The feasibility of \r\nmitigation measures varies significantly according to socio-economic \r\ndifferences across and within countries."


id: 7e6111a0487b8c31b9c354e314075b70
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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"There is great variation in estimates of the direct and indirect \r\nrebound effects, which stems from the end-uses included in the \r\nanalysis, differences in definitions and methods used to estimate \r\nthe rebound effects, the quality of the data utilised, the period of \r\nanalysis and the geographical area in consideration (International \r\nRisk Governance Council 2013; Galvin 2014; Gillingham et al. 2016). \r\nSeveral studies examined in the context of this assessment (see \r\nSupplementary Material Table 9.SM.7) showed that direct rebound \r\neffects for residential energy consumption, which includes heating, \r\nare significant and range between -9% and 127%. The direct \r\nrebound effects for energy services other than heating may be lower \r\n(Chen et al. 2018; Sorrell et al. 2018). The rebound effects may be \r\nreduced with the time as the occupants learn how to optimally use \r\nthe systems installed in energy renovated buildings (Cali et al"


id: 33d2469cf08419403cc5ecb641d1c73a
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" 2016) \r\nand seem to be lower in the case of major renovations leading to \r\nNZEB (Corrado et al. 2016). The combined direct and indirect or the \r\nindirect only rebound effects were found to range between -2% \r\nand 80%, with a  median at 12% (see Supplementary Material \r\nTable 9.SM.7). In non-residential buildings the rebound effects may \r\nbe smaller, as the commercial sector is characterised by lower price \r\nelasticities of energy demand, while the comfort level in commercial \r\nbuildings before renovation is likely to be better compared to \r\nresidential buildings (Qiu 2014)."


id: be9f74f7c6d42f4f5e8c4836427b5d8a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Lorek and Spangenberg (2019b) investigated the limitations of the \r\ntheories of planned behaviour and social practice and proposed an \r\napproach combining both theories resulting in a heuristic sufficiency \r\npolicy2\r\n tool. Lorek and Spangenberg (2019b) showed that increased \r\nliving area per  person counteracts efficiency gains in buildings \r\nand called for sufficiency policy instruments to efficiency by limit \r\nbuilding size. This could be achieved via mandatory and prescriptive \r\nmeasures, for example, progressive building energy codes (IEA 2013), \r\nor financial penalties in the form of property taxation (e.g., non-linear \r\nand progressive taxation), or with mandatory limits on building size \r\nper  capita. Heindl and Kanschik (2016) suggested that voluntary \r\npolicies promoting sufficiency and proposed that sufficiency should be \r\n'integrated in a more comprehensive normative framework related to \r\nwelfare and social justice'"


id: e7536417f1da54c21e2585e138aa8447
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Alcott highlighted that in sufficiency there is \r\na loss of utility or welfare (Alcott, 2008). Thomas et al. (2019) described \r\nsome of the possible policies, some based on the sharing economy \r\nprinciples, for examples co-sharing space, public authorities facilitating \r\nthe exchange house between young and expanding families with elderly \r\npeople, with reduced need for space. Policies for sufficiency include \r\nland-use and urban planning policies. Berril et  al. (2021) proposed \r\nremoving policies, which support supply of larger home typologies, for \r\nexample, single-family home or local land-use regulations restricting \r\nconstruction of multifamily buildings. In non-residential building, \r\nsufficiency could be implemented through the sharing economy, for \r\nexample with flexible offices space with hot-desking. "


id: 7e33e3714ba41607a5936180244955fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"to enhance robustness against risks and uncertainties in both short \r\nand long-term and addressing the different stakeholder perspectives \r\n(Forouli et al. 2019; Nikas et al. 2020; Doukas and Nikas 2020). This is \r\ndue to: the many barriers; the different types of buildings (residential, \r\nnon-residential, etc.); the different socio-economic groups of the \r\npopulation (social housing, informal settlement, etc.); the country \r\ndevelopment status; the local climate (cooling and/or heating), \r\nownership structure (tenant or owner), the age of buildings. Effective \r\npolicy packages include mandatory standards, codes, the provision of \r\ninformation, carbon pricing, financing, and technical assistance for \r\nend-users. Important element related to policy packages is whether \r\nthe policies reinforce each other or diminish the impact of individual \r\npolicies, due to policy 'overcrowding'"


id: 98731ce5b75fde6f2edb3709d6f08cfa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21498
content:
" Examples are the EU policy \r\npackage for efficiency in buildings (Rosenow and Bayer 2017; BPIE, \r\n2020; Economidou et al. 2020) and China goal of 10 million m2\r\n NZEB \r\nduring the 13th Five-Year Plan, presented in the Supplementary \r\nMaterial (Supplementary Material Section 9.SM.4) (see also Cross\u0002Chapter Box  10 in Chapter  14 for integrated policymaking for \r\nsector transitions)."


id: b2a97798cd7c572636d6d3cf7edf31e6
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content:
"Scholars have identified the 'energy efficiency gap' (Hirst and \r\nBrown 1990; Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Alcott and Greenstone 2012; \r\nGillingham and Palmer 2014; Stadelmann 2017) and policies to \r\novercome it. Markandya et  al. (2015) and Shen et  al. (2016) have \r\nclassified energy efficiency policies in three broad categories: the \r\ncommand and control (e.g.,  mandatory building energy codes; \r\nmandatory appliances standards, etc.); price instruments (e.g., taxes, \r\nsubsides, tax deductions, credits, permits and tradable obligations, \r\netc.); and information instruments (e.g., labels, energy audits, smart \r\nmeters and feed-back, etc.). Based on the EU Energy Efficiency \r\nDirective, the MURE and the IEA energy efficiency policy databases \r\n(Bertoldi and Mosconi 2020), Bertoldi (2020) proposed six policy \r\ncategories: regulatory, financial and fiscal; information and \r\nawareness; qualification, training and quality assurance; market\u0002based instruments: voluntary action"


id: 3a383d82691aae111373ddcf4155074f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" The categorisation of energy \r\nefficiency policies used in this chapter is aligned with the taxonomy \r\nused in Chapter 13, sub-section 13.5.1 (economic or market-based \r\ninstruments, regulatory instruments, and other policies). However, \r\nthe classification used here is more granular in order to capture the \r\ncomplexity of end-use energy efficiency and buildings. "


id: fd4667a389b2a79cd4491dab55084ff5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"energy consumption, especially in the case of the rapid urbanisation \r\ncontent in China'. Ex post policy evaluation shows that stringent \r\nbuildings' codes reduce energy consumption in buildings and CO2\r\nemissions and are cost-effective (Aroonruengsawat 2012; Jacobsen \r\nand Kotchen 2013; Scott et  al. 2015; Levinson 2016; Kotchen \r\n2017; Yu et  al. 2017; Yu et  al. 2018; Aydin and Brounen 2019). \r\nProgressive building energy codes include requirements on efficiency \r\nimprovement but also on sufficiency and share of renewables (Clune \r\net  al. 2012; Rosenberg et  al., 2017) and on embodied emissions \r\n(Schwarz et al. 2020), for example the 2022 ASHRAE Standard 90.1 \r\nincludes prescriptive on-site renewable energy requirements for non\u0002residential building. Evans et  al"


id: fc25eb460bddb04431b428d1bd8e3734
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" (2017; 2018) calls for strengthen \r\nthe compliance checks with efficiency requirements or codes when \r\nbuildings are in operation and highlighted the need for enforcement \r\nof building energy codes to achieve the estimate energy and carbon \r\nsavings recommending actions to improve enforcements, including \r\ninstitutional capacity and adequate resources."


id: 4aab200fcbd40f9f4c7961d037bf358d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
"Evans et  al. (2017; 2018) identified strengthening the compliance \r\nchecks with codes when buildings are in operation and the need \r\nfor enforcement of building energy codes in order to achieve the \r\nestimate energy and carbon savings, recommending actions to \r\nimprove enforcements, including institutional capacity and adequate \r\nresources. Another important issue to be addressed by policies is the \r\n'Energy Performance Gap' (EPG), that is, the gap between design and \r\npolicy intent and actual outcomes. Regulatory and market support \r\nregimes are based on predictive models (Cohen and Bordass 2015) \r\nwith general assumptions about building types, the way they are \r\nused and are not covering all energy consumption. In the perspective \r\nof moving towards net zero carbon, it is important that policy capture \r\nand address the actual in-use performance of buildings (Gupta et al. \r\n2015; Gupta and Kotopouleas 2018)"


id: e8043ca0194a76bc73d11223d45023e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" Outcome-based codes are \r\nincreasingly important because they overcome some limitations of \r\nprescriptive building energy codes, which typically do not regulate \r\nall building energy uses or do not regulate measured operational \r\nenergy use in buildings. Regulating all loads, especially plug and \r\nprocess loads, is important because they account for an increasingly \r\nlarge percentage of total energy use as building envelope and space\u0002conditioning equipment are becoming more efficient (Denniston \r\net al. 2011; Colker 2012; Enker and Morrison 2020)."


id: a5148df15a32764cb650d51cf374cf3d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 23538
content:
"Energy consumption feedback with smart meters, smart billing and \r\ndedicated devices and apps is another instrument recently exploited \r\nto reduce energy consumption (Karlin et  al. 2015; Buchanan et  al. \r\n2018; Zangheri et  al. 2019) very often coupled with contest-based \r\ninterventions or norm-based interventions (Bergquist et  al. 2019). \r\nHargreaves et al. (2018) proposes five core types of action to reduce \r\nenergy use: turn it off, use it less, use it more carefully, improve its \r\nperformance, and replace it/use an alternative. According to Aydin \r\net  al. (2018), technology alone will not be enough to achieve the \r\ndesired energy savings due to the rebound effect"


id: 1ce1e9dd2502a4704941481a88cd0328
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 1993
content:
" The lack of interest \r\nfrom household occupants, confusing feedback message and difficulty \r\nto relate it to practical intervention, overemphasis on financial \r\nsavings and the risks of 'fallback effects' where energy use returns \r\nto previous levels after a  short time or rebound effects has been \r\npointed out (Buchanan et al. 2015) as the main reasons for the failing \r\nof traditional feedback. Labanca and Bertoldi (2018) highlight the \r\ncurrent limitations of policies for energy conservation and suggests \r\ncomplementary policy approach based on social practices theories. "


id: 6ebf26fc74590d9f3d2c4975f5432577
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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vector_id: 15049
content:
"Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPSs). Mandatory \r\nminimum efficiency standards for building technical equipment \r\nand appliances (e.g., HVAC, appliances, ICT, lighting, etc.) is a very \r\ncommon, tested and successful policy in most of the OECD countries \r\n(e.g., EU, US, Canada, Australia, etc.) for improving energy efficiency \r\n(Scott et al. 2015; Wu et al. 2019; Sonnenschein et al. 2019). Brucal \r\nand Roberts (2019) showed that efficiency standards reduce product \r\nprice. McNeil et  al. (2019) highlighted how efficiency standards \r\nwill help developing countries in reducing the power peak demand \r\nby a  factor of two, thus reducing large investment costs in new \r\ngeneration, transmission, and distribution networks. Mandatory \r\nstandards have been implemented also other large economies, for \r\nexample, Russia, Brazil, India, South Africa, China, Ghana, Kenya and \r\nMalaysia (Salleh et al"


id: ce97c439061ad3c71be08c0262fb426b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
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content:
" 2019), with an increase in the uptake also in \r\ndeveloping countries, for example, Ghana, Kenya, Tunisia, and so on. \r\nIn Japan, there is a successful voluntary programme the Top Runner, \r\nwith similar results of mandatory efficiency standards (Inoue and \r\nMatsumoto 2019)."


id: ba69484201c57afe64735ab4f9440ac0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:47
content_type: text
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vector_id: 26864
content:
"Carbon allowances. A number of authors (Raux et al. 2015; Fan et al. \r\n2016; Fawcett and Parag 2017; Li et al. 2015, 2018; Marek et al. 2018; \r\nWadud and Chintakayala 2019) have investigated personal carbon \r\nallowances introduced previously (Ayres 1995; Fleming 1997; Raux \r\nand Marlot 2005; Bristow et al. 2010; Fawcett 2010; Starkey 2012). \r\nAlthough there is not yet any practical implementation of this policy, \r\nit offers an alternative to carbon taxes, although there are some \r\npractical issues to be solved before it could be rolled out. Recently the \r\ncity of Lahti in Finland has introduced a personal carbon allowance \r\nin the transport sector (Kuokkanen et  al. 2020). Under this policy \r\ninstrument governments allocate (free allocation, but allowances \r\ncould also be auctioned) allowances to cover the carbon emission for \r\none year, associated with energy consumption. Trade of allowances \r\nbetween people can be organised"


id: d2be988807f5d59da6fcc8191c08d078
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Personal carbon allowances can \r\nalso foster renewable energies (energy consumption without carbon \r\nemissions) both in the grid and in buildings (e.g.,  solar thermal). \r\nPersonal carbon allowances can make the carbon price more explicit \r\nto consumers, allowing them to know from the market value of each \r\nallowance (e.g.,  1 kg of CO2). This policy instrument will shift the \r\nresponsibility to the individual. Some categories may have limited \r\nability to change their carbon budget or to be engaged by this policy \r\ninstruments. In addition, in common with many other environmental \r\npolicies the distributional effects have to be assessed carefully as \r\nthis policy instrument may favour well off people able to purchase \r\nadditional carbon allowances or install technologies that reduce their \r\ncarbon emissions (Burgess 2016; Wang et al. 2017)."


id: 818cd2c2052bd51402d0773e34fb61c1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 17913
content:
"Information campaign. Provision of information (e.g.,  public \r\ncampaigns, targeted technical information, etc.) is a common policy \r\ninstrument to change end-user behaviour. Many authors agree \r\nthat the effect of both targeted and general advertisement and \r\ncampaigns have a short lifetime and the effects tend to decrease \r\nover time (Reiss and White 2008; Simcock et  al. 2014; Diffney \r\net al. 2013). The meta-analysis carried out by (Delmas et al. 2013) \r\nshowed that energy audits and personal information were the \r\nmost effective followed by providing individuals with comparisons \r\nwith their peers' energy use including 'non-monetary, information\u0002based' (Delmas et al. 2013). An effective approach integrates the \r\nsocial norm as the basis for information and awareness measures \r\non energy behaviour (Schultz et al. 2007; Gifford 2011)"


id: 5b776b6ccfa4bae546f4134a5b41bd6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 11889
content:
" Information \r\nis more successful when it inspires and engages people: how \r\npeople feel about a  given situation often has a  potent influence \r\non their decisions (Slovic and Peters 2006). The message needs to "


id: b151a9b53c574ec65ae42f66f5ec1b4e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 25402
content:
"prices tend to reduce the energy consumption particularly in less \r\naffluent households, and thus attention is needed in order to avoid \r\nunintended effects such as energy poverty. Bourgeois et al. (2021) \r\nshowed that using carbon tax revenue to finance energy efficiency \r\ninvestment reduces fuel poverty and increases cost-effectiveness. \r\n(Giraudet et  al. 2021) assessed the cost-effectiveness of various \r\nenergy efficiency policies in France, concluding that a carbon tax is the \r\nmost effective. In particular, revenues could be invested in frontline \r\nservices that can provide a  range of support  - including advising \r\nhouseholders on how to improve their homes. Hence, the introduction \r\nof a carbon tax can be neutral or even positive to the economy, as \r\ninvestments in clean technologies generate additional revenues. \r\nIn addition, in the long term, a  carbon/energy tax could gradually \r\nreplace the tax on labour reducing labour cost (e.g"


id: 1f1268b864d0400acefa5361c218104a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 2330
content:
", the example of \r\nthe German Eco-tax), thus helping to create additional jobs in the \r\neconomy. In literature, this is known as double dividend (Murtagh \r\net al. 2013; Freire-Gonzalez and Ho 2019). Urban economic researches \r\n(Creutzig 2014; Borck and Brueckner 2018; Rafaj et al. 2018) have \r\nhighlighted that higher carbon price would translate in incentives for \r\ncitizens to live closer to the city centre, which often means less floor \r\nspace, less commuting distance and thus reduced emissions. Xiang \r\nand Lawley (2019) indicated that the carbon tax in British Columbia \r\nsubstantially reduced residential natural gas consumption. Saelim \r\n(2019) showed that simulated carbon tax on residential consumption \r\nin Thailand will have a low impact on welfare and it will be slightly \r\nprogressive"


id: 4c6a1c77bf72f372e0f950a0bfd71e40
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Lin and Li (2011) indicate that a carbon tax could reduce \r\nthe energy consumption and boost the uptake of energy efficiency \r\nand renewable energies, while at the same time may impact social \r\nwelfare and the competitiveness of industry. Solaymani (2017) \r\nshowed that in Malaysia a tax with revenue recycling increases in \r\nthe welfare of rural and urban households. Van Heerden et al. (2016) \r\nexplored economic and environmental effects of the CO2 tax in South \r\nAfrica highlighting the negative impact on GDP. This negative impact \r\nof the carbon tax on GDP is, however, greatly reduced by the manner \r\nin which the tax revenue is recycled. National circumstances shall be \r\ntaken into consideration in introducing energy taxes, considering the \r\nlocal taxation and energy prices context with regard to sustainable \r\ndevelopment, justice and equity."


id: 5f3ec76641a5bb4b0ca0872f4f8b416f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 12553
content:
"Utilities programmes, energy efficiency resource standard \r\nand energy efficiency obligations. Ratepayer-funded efficiency \r\nprogrammes, energy efficiency obligations, energy efficiency resource \r\nstandards and white certificates have been introduced in some EU \r\nMember States, in several US States, Australia, South Korea and \r\nBrazil (Bertoldi et al. 2013a; Palmer et al. 2013; Brennan and Palmer \r\n2013; Giraudet and Finon 2015; Wirl 2015; Rosenow and Bayer 2017; \r\nAldrich and Koerner 2018; Choi et al. 2018a; Fawcett and Darby 2018; \r\nFawcett et al. 2019; Nadel, 2019; Sliger and Colburn, 2019; Goldman \r\net  al. 2020). This policy instrument helps in improving energy \r\nefficiency in buildings, but there is no evidence that it can foster deep \r\nrenovations of existing buildings"


id: b10ce870493c781bf805914ebfb3445e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Recently this policy instrument has \r\nbeen investigated is some non-OECD countries such as Turkey, where \r\nwhite certificates could deliver energy savings with some limitations \r\n(Duzgun and Komurgoz 2014) and UAE, as a useful instrument to \r\nfoster energy efficiency in buildings (Friedrich and Afshari 2015). \r\nAnother similar market based instrument is the energy saving \r\nauction mechanism implemented in some US states, Switzerland, \r\nand in Germany (Langreder et al. 2019; Rosenow et al. 2019; Thomas \r\nand Rosenow 2020). Energy efficiency projects participate in auctions \r\nfor energy savings based on the cost of the energy saved and receive \r\na financial incentive, if successful."


id: d0500e8b1a49dbb2d45d66e9d9c08e5e
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content:
"Loans provide liquidity and direct access to capital important in deep \r\nrenovation projects (Rosenow et al. 2014). There is empirical evidence \r\n(Giraudet et al. 2021), that banks make large profits on personal loans \r\nfor renovation purposes. International financing institutions (IFIs) and \r\nnational governments provided subsidies in public-private partnerships \r\nso that financial institutions can offer customers loans with attractive \r\nterms (Olmos et al. 2012). Loan guarantees are effective in reducing \r\nintervention borrowing costs (Soumare and Lai 2016). Combination \r\nof grants and subsidised loans financed by IFIs could be an effective \r\ninstrument together with guarantees. An important role in financing \r\nenergy efficiency can be played by green banks, which are publicly \r\ncapitalised entities set up to facilitate private investment in low\u0002carbon, including energy efficiency (Bahl 2012; Tu and Yen 2015; Linh \r\nand Anh 2017; Khan 2018)"


id: 8019e930a0e94f5ad6f5d5455613516c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Green banks have been established at the \r\nnational level (e.g., UK, Poland) and in the US at state and city level. "


id: 6cc3eafaa5f722ba8e1240ad3f641e9b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14724
content:
"Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) is an agreement between \r\na building owner and Energy Services Company (ESCO) for energy \r\nefficiency improvements. EPC is a  common financing vehicle for \r\nlarge buildings and it is well developed in several markets (Carvallo \r\net al. 2015; Bertoldi and Boza Kiss, 2017; Stuart et al. 2018; Ruan \r\net  al. 2018; Nurcahyanto et  al. 2020; Zheng et  al. 2021). Quality \r\nstandards are a part of the EPC (Augustins et al. 2018). Guarantees \r\ncan facilitate the provision of affordable and sufficient financing for \r\nESCOs (Bullier and Milin 2013). The ESCO guarantees a certain level \r\nof energy savings and it shields the client from performance risk. The \r\nloan goes on the client's balance sheet and the ESCO assumes full \r\nproject performance risk (Deng et al. 2015). One of the limitations is \r\non the depth of the energy renovation in existing buildings. According \r\nto (Giraudet et  al"


id: dfaf50f04d208ab7c7e54d0d522f5953
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"Both FiT and RPS can support the development of RES. Scholars \r\ncompared the effectiveness of RPSs and FiTs with mix results and \r\ndifferent opinions, with some scholars indicating the advantages of \r\nRPS (Ciarreta et al. 2014, 2017; Xin-gang et al. 2017), while Nicolini \r\nand Tavoni (2017) showed that in Italy FiTs are outperforming RPSs \r\nand Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs). Garcia-Alvarez et  al. (2018) \r\ncarried out an empirical assessment of FiTs and RPSs for PV systems \r\nenergy in EU over the period 2000-2014 concluding that that FiTs \r\nhave a  significant positive impact on installed PV capacity. This is \r\ndue to the small size of many rooftop installations and the difficulties \r\nin participating in trading schemes for residential end users. Similar \r\nconclusions were reached by (Dijkgraaf et al. 2018) assessing 30 OECD \r\ncountries and concluding that there is a 'positive effect of the presence \r\nof a FiT on the development of a country's added yearly capacity of \r\nPV'"


id: 1e33ae2cde817d09edfc5ef24d761b0b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" Other scholars (Lewis and Wiser 2007; Lipp 2007; Cory et al. 2009; \r\nCouture and Gagnon 2010) concluded that FiT can create a  stable \r\ninvestment framework and long-term policy certainty and it is better \r\nthan RPS for industrial development and job creation. Ouyang and Lin \r\n(2014) highlighted that RPS has a better implementation effect than \r\nFiT in China, where FiT required very large subsidy. Ford et al. (2007) \r\nshowed that TGC is a market-based mechanism without the need for \r\ngovernment subsidies. Marchenko (2008) and W,edzik et  al. (2017) \r\nindicate that the TGCs provide a source of income for investors. Choi \r\net al. (2018a) analysed the economic efficiency of FiT and RPS in the \r\nSouth Korean, where FiT was implemented from 2002 to 2011 followed \r\nby an RPS since 2012 (Park and Kim 2018; Choi et al. 2018b). Choi \r\nconcluded that RPS was more efficient for PV from the government's \r\nperspective while from an energy producers' perspective the FiT was \r\nmore efficient"


id: 13c2fce899cbda338edb756a380794d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 610
content:
" Some scholars proposed a policy combining FiT and RPS \r\n(Cory et al. 2009). Kwon (2015) and del Rio et al. (2017) concluded that \r\nboth FiT and RPS are effective, but policy costs are higher in RPSs than \r\nFiTs. RPS, REC trading and FiT subsidy could also be implemented as \r\ncomplementary policies (Zhang et al. 2018). \r\nTenders are a fast spreading and effective instrument to attract and \r\nprocure new generation capacity from renewable energy sources \r\n(Bayer et  al. 2018; Batz and Musgens 2019; Bento et  al.  2020; "


id: 5fd08ad86b5b4ca6bf36e05a920a479a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12652
content:
"electricity consumers to become prosumers and actively participate in \r\nthe market'. Klein et al. (2019) explore the policy options for aligning \r\nprosumers with the electricity wholesale market, through price and \r\nscarcity signals. Policies should allow for active markets participation \r\nof small prosumers (Brown et al. 2019; Zepter et al. 2019), local energy \r\ncommunities and new energy market actors such as aggregators (Iria \r\nand Soares 2019; Brown et  al. 2019). Energy Communities are new \r\nimportant players in the energy transition (Sokolowski 2020; Gjorgievski \r\net al. 2021). Citizens and local communities can establish local energy \r\ncommunities, providing local RES production to serve the community, \r\nalleviate energy poverty and export energy into the grid (DellaValle and \r\nSareen, 2020; Hahnel et al. 2020)"


id: ce790709a589168d2a52da1f177c1af5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30022
content:
" Energy Communities have as primary \r\npurpose to provide environmental, economic, or social community \r\nbenefits by engaging in generation, aggregation, energy storage, \r\nenergy efficiency services and charging services for electric vehicles. \r\nEnergy communities help in increasing public acceptance and mobilise \r\nprivate funding. Demand response aggregators (Mahmoudi et al. 2017; \r\nHenriquez et al. 2018) can aggregate load reductions by a group of \r\nconsumers, and sell the resulting flexibility to the electricity  market \r\n(Zancanella et al. 2017). Regulatory frameworks for electricity markets \r\nshould allow demand response to compete on equal footing in energy \r\nmarkets and encourage new business models for the provision of \r\nflexibility to the electricity grid (Shen et al. 2014)"


id: 4c5512b3ccd59c58e05e307c162568b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9440
content:
" Renewable energy and \r\nsufficiency requirements could be included in building energy codes \r\nand  implemented in coordination with each other and with climate \r\npolicies, for example, carbon pricing (Oikonomou et al. 2014)."


id: f06bcc0f42faecfd1304957efe470f70
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35324
content:
"Financing mechanisms for RES are particularly needed in developing \r\ncountries. Most of the common supporting mechanisms (FiT, RPSs, \r\nPPA, auctions, net metering, etc.) have been implemented in some \r\ndeveloping countries (Donastorg et  al. 2017). Stable policies and an \r\ninvestment-friendly environment are essential to overcome financing \r\nbarriers and attract investors (Donastorg et  al. 2017). Kimura et  al"


id: 924eb82386f63fe22170717f96d2fa55
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vector_id: 20540
content:
" \r\n(2016) identified the following elements as essential for fostering \r\nRES in developing countries: innovative business models and financial \r\nmechanisms/structures; market creation through the implementation of \r\nmarket-based mechanisms; stability of policies and renewable energy \r\nlegislation; technical assistance to reduce the uncertainty of renewable \r\nenergy production; electricity market design, which reflects the impact \r\non the grid capacity and grid balancing; improved availability of financial \r\nresources, in particular public, and innovative financial instruments, \r\nsuch as carbon financing (Lim et al. 2013; Park et al. 2018; Kim and \r\nPark 2018); green bonds; public foreign exchange hedging facility for \r\nrenewable energy financing, credit lines; grants and guarantees."


