# document

id: cec42284d1d5b072e19c6573a17b2d45
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" The elderly also experience severe impacts \r\nfrom extreme winter seasons, such as in Finland, where of the from \r\n3000 deaths associated with extreme winter weather and 50,000 \r\ninjuries associated with slippery pavement conditions, the majority \r\nwere people over 65  years old (Carter et  al., 2016). Adaptation to \r\nextreme events including heatwaves, cold periods and icy conditions \r\nin the Global South and North will increase energy demand and the \r\nindividuals' carbon footprint across all income levels (van Ruijven \r\net al., 2019)."


id: b07aaa47778934bdbd6c1e2254a0f214
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"There is now robust evidence from virtually every region on Earth \r\nshowing that the livelihood impacts from a multitude of climate hazards \r\nare driving people to diversify rural income sources (Figure 8.2; Cross\u0002Chapter Box  MIGRATE in Chapter 7). Rural households frequently \r\naccomplish the goal of livelihood diversification with an increasing \r\nreliance on migration, urban wage labour and remittances (Marchiori \r\net al., 2012; Bohra-Mishra et al., 2014; Gray and Wise, 2016; Nawrotzki \r\nand DeWaard, 2016; Banerjee et al., 2019a). What is different about \r\nrural-to-urban livelihood transitions under climate change impacts \r\nis that they accelerate both rural and urban stratification of wealth \r\n(Barrett and Santos, 2014; Thiede et al., 2016). On the one hand, climate \r\nchange impacts on rural livelihoods increase the necessity of migration \r\nas an income strategy, accelerating migration (Cai et al"


id: 44e1d01bce5a64dc3999e71e3d88e2ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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", 2016) even \r\nwhile households that cannot select individuals for migration become \r\nmore impoverished (Suckall et  al., 2017; Nawrotzki and DeWaard, \r\n2018)."


id: ef76af59211fbe42a82af149908b4474
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"New studies document the long-term effects of climate change \r\nimpacts on people's livelihoods that persist long after a hazard event. \r\nFor example, the impact of drought on livelihoods and food security \r\nis still recognisable in Mali, 30 years after 1982-1984, the period of \r\nmost intense drought during the protracted late 20th century drying of \r\nthe Sahel. The most food secure households associated with persistent \r\ndrought-induced famine were those that diversified livelihoods away \r\nfrom subsistence agriculture during and after the famine (Giannini \r\net al., 2017). Meanwhile, a larger fraction of households with fewer \r\nlivelihood activities, lower food security with higher reliance on \r\ndetrimental nutrition-based coping strategies (such as reducing the \r\nquantity or quality of meals) were those unable to diversify livelihoods \r\n30 years previously"


id: 1fc79a125940b25bb488ddf817dee8ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" Sufficient time has passed to consider the long\u0002term outcomes for the poor in extreme cases featured in previous \r\nIPCC assessments, including Hurricane Katrina (2005) (e.g., Fussell, \r\n2015; Raker et  al., 2019) and Hurricane Mitch (1998) (e.g., Alaniz, \r\n2017), forewarning that recovery is complex and requires significant \r\nsustained long-term investment in 'soft' aspects of development, \r\nincluding community organisation and mental health (O'Neill et  al., \r\n2020; Fraser et al., 2021)."


id: 9369c50e6f28b687edbd27e7e3af2bb0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"There is high agreement and robust evidence that climate change \r\nimpacts also have a major influence on key enabling conditions for \r\nmigration, such as sociodemographic, economic and political factors \r\n(Abel et  al., 2019; Borderon et  al., 2019), and that climate change \r\nimpacts to development and governance may affect how people migrate \r\n(Wrathall et al., 2019; CCB MIGRATE in Chapter 7). Mobility, which \r\nwas considered the most viable climate change adaptation strategy \r\nto poor pastoralists, is restricted due to the political marginalisation \r\nof pastoral groups, land privatisation, governments' decentralisation \r\npolicies and plantation investment (Blench, 2001; Randall, 2015; Leal \r\nFilho et al., 2020c). While migration can be an adaptation response \r\nto climate change impacts (Black et al., 2011; Gemenne and Blocher, \r\n2017), climate change impacts can also act as a direct driver of forced \r\ndisplacement (Marchiori et al., 2012)"


id: dd43203f1f6db52ebb64017d49470b4f
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" Societal groups that are forced \r\nto involuntarily migrate in response to climate change impacts may \r\nlack resources to invest in planned relocation mainly due to lack of \r\ngood governance systems (Reckien et al., 2018). For people displaced \r\nby climate change impacts, policy interventions have a determining \r\ninfluence on migration outcomes, such as the numbers of migrants, \r\nthe timing of migration and destinations (Gemenne and Blocher, \r\n2017; Wrathall et al., 2019).The process of displacement and forced \r\nmigration leaves people more exposed to climate change-related \r\nextreme weather events, particularly in low-income countries which \r\noften host the highest number of displaced people (Adger et al., 2018)."


id: c4e9de14249a2af3694ca3c198718609
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"The IPCC Special Report on 1.5degC concluded that climate change has \r\nalready increased the probability and intensity of individual extreme \r\nweather events occurring (Roy et  al., 2018), and our new baseline \r\nconsideration should be that serious climate change impacts are \r\nalready being experienced by the most vulnerable, with long-term \r\nimplications for development (Box  8.1; Roy et  al., 2018). In both \r\ndeveloping and developed countries the disproportionate impacts \r\nof the compounding effects of climate change on development are \r\nfelt by the most disadvantaged. For example, the residual impacts of \r\nstorms like Hurricane Maria (see Section 8.2.1"


id: a89969c85ca0683502d4288bbd1bb720
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"1) illustrate how rising \r\ntemperatures, extreme weather events, coral bleaching and sea level \r\nrise come together and create compounding hazard-cascades to leave \r\nlong-lasting effects on the lives of the poor, as well as their food \r\nand water security, health, livelihoods and prospects for sustainable \r\ndevelopment--not only in developing countries (Adger et  al., 2014; \r\nOlsson et  al., 2014; Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018; Roy et  al., 2018), \r\nbut also in highly inequitable industrialised countries within the same \r\nregion (Gamble et  al., 2016). According to the US National Climate \r\nAssessment (USGCRP, 2018), damages caused to communities \r\nby Hurricanes Irma and Maria in 2017 sparked unprecedented "


id: fc7c3a4555fb671debd9d381f180f4b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"humanitarian crises. Hurricane Maria, a category 5 hurricane, passed \r\nthrough Dominica, St Croix and Puerto Rico and is considered the worst \r\nclimate disaster in recorded history to affect those islands (Rodriguez\u0002Diaz, 2018). Approximately 200,000 people migrated from Puerto Rico \r\nto the mainland USA in the weeks following the storm (Alexander et al., \r\n2019). Estimates for direct and indirect casualties in Puerto Rico point \r\nout a total of 4645 excess deaths, equivalent to a 62% increase in the \r\nmortality rate (Kishore et al., 2018). The example of Hurricane Maria \r\nand Puerto Rico illustrates that vulnerability is part of a long history of \r\ndiscrimination and colonial governance, which led to greater impacts \r\non the island (Moleti et al., 2020)"


id: 90285d4451161b07868e700690cd7469
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" In Puerto Rico, the economic costs of \r\nthe collapse of the island's energy, water, transport, and communication \r\ninfrastructures are estimated to range from USD 25 to USD 43 billion \r\n(USD in 2017), further indebting the island and putting its long-term \r\ndevelopment at risk. Meanwhile the economic impacts of Hurricanes \r\nIrma and Maria on the Caribbean region are estimated between USD 27 \r\nand USD 48 billion, and have long-term implications for state budgets \r\nfor infrastructure supporting development of the poorest."


id: 93f18088a30bf1fe2d2d2befcdcd40d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"The poor frequently suffer the direct and indirect impacts of climate \r\nchange, including the cost of adopting adaptive measures (Atteridge \r\nand Remling, 2018; Bro et al., 2020). Costs to the poor may also include \r\nthe secondary impacts of first-order adaptation activities, including the \r\nlivelihood consequences to people migrating due to climate change \r\nimpacts. The poor frequently bear indirect impacts of adaptation \r\ninterventions, such as flood protection barriers, which may displace \r\nflood waters away from high-income populations toward poorer \r\ncommunities (Mustafa and Wrathall, 2011). Adaptation programming \r\nmay also indirectly affect the poor as public resources are drawn into \r\nrisk reduction interventions, and away from spending on social welfare \r\nand safety nets (Eriksen et  al., 2015)"


id: 9721773d1bf776f131b63c1b3e165a7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" Measures to enhance social \r\nwelfare and safety nets themselves help enhance the poor's resilience \r\nto climate impacts because they focus on non-climatic stressors \r\naffecting livelihoods, which interact with climate hazards. Therefore, \r\ndiverting attention away from safety nets may in fact undermine \r\nadaptation efforts (Leichenko and O'Brien, 2019; Tenzing, 2020)."


id: 5ba0656d5b512396a8d39ca2b36fc8f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"Populations of concern, who are extremely vulnerable to climate change impacts with limited capacity to adapt, are those displaced \r\nand resettled in the course of conflict or disaster, either internally or across borders (Burrows and Kinney, 2016). The risk for refugees \r\nand internally displaced people (IDPs) is two-fold: on the one hand, refugee and IDP settlements are disproportionately concentrated \r\nin regions (e.g., Central Africa and the Near East) that are exposed to higher-than-average warming levels and specific climate hazards, \r\nincluding temperature extremes and drought. On the other, these populations frequently inhabit settlements and legal circumstances that \r\nare intended to be temporary but are protracted across generations, and at the same time, face legal and economic barriers on their ability \r\nto migrate away from climate impacts. (Adams, 2016; Devictor and Do, 2016)"


id: 699084c44401041363289549ce41901a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" Large concentrations of these settlements are located in \r\nthe Sahel, the Near East and Central Asia, where temperatures will rise higher than the global average, and extreme temperatures \r\nwill exceed thresholds for safe habitation (Figure Box 8.1.1). Already largely dependent on state and humanitarian intervention, these \r\nimmobile populations will require interventions to safely maintain residence in areas exposed to climate hazards. Adaptation planning \r\nshould prioritise immobile populations living in an already destabilised development context, on improving their capacities to deal with \r\nthe further consequences of climate change."


id: 43e9108be7c5a7485c5b46b357658a2
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"Refugees and IDPs fit into a global category of extremely structurally vulnerable people that are missing from standard poverty \r\nassessments, officially uncounted or uncountable using traditional census and survey methods (Carr-Hill, 2013). These include highly \r\nmobile populations, internally displaced by war and environmental hazards (UNHCR, 2020; IDMC, 2021); itinerant labourers; urban poor \r\nin informal settlements (Lucci et al., 2018); unauthorised migrants living in countries where they do not hold citizenship (Passel, 2006); \r\nguest workers (Reichel and Morales, 2017); the homeless and institutionalised (Caton et al., 2007); rural nomadic, pastoralist or landless \r\npopulations (Randall, 2015); and Indigenous Peoples and forest-dwelling communities (Galappaththi et  al., 2020)"


id: 689d1e9fa3d3013e17e44062daeac29b
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" Frequently living \r\nwithout social safety nets, such as health care and formal education, these uncounted or 'missing millions' are vulnerable to problems \r\nassociated with acute and chronic poverty, such as the spread of infectious disease and malnutrition (Ezeh et al., 2017). Because these \r\n'missing' populations are not counted, they are frequently not a part of planning (Carr-Hill, 2013), including adaptation planning. In \r\nany particular national context, these missing populations may represent a small fraction of the population (about 5% in South Asian \r\ncountries), however cumulatively hundreds of millions of people may be missing from official estimates (Carr-Hill, 2013). Over the last \r\ndecade, techniques for estimating the locations, numbers and socioeconomic status of missing populations have moved beyond census \r\nand nationally representative household surveys, leveraging advances in satellite imagery (Kuffer et al"


id: af24f27d4092cace689e70d9dcf1239
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", 2016; Bennett and Smith, 2017) \r\nand data from mobile digital devices (Jean et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2016; Steele et al., 2017)."


id: daaa3a59cca2728f0d8f61f330298b59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"ecological Thresholds\r\nClimate change threatens to rapidly transform unique and threatened \r\necosystems (Reasons for Concern RFC1), such as tropical rain forests, \r\ncoral reefs, arctic and high-mountain ecosystems, as well as the \r\nindigenous and forest-dwelling people whose livelihoods, cultures \r\nand identities are dependent on these ecosystems. In recent years, the \r\ncase of Amazonia has illustrated how such systems are transforming, \r\nwith detrimental consequences for Indigenous Peoples, and the vital \r\nrole that Indigenous Peoples serve in protecting vulnerable ecosystems \r\n(Ricketts et  al., 2010; Box  8.6). Globally, indigenous territories cover \r\nthe greatest area of remaining tropical forest in comparison to other \r\nprotected areas. They encompass the bulk of Earth's biodiversity and \r\nare the locus for a number of key ecosystem services across spatial and \r\ntemporal scales (Walker et al., 2020)"


id: 5d8b1898f9abd244a8c0b652e8ba600f
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" Specifically, in 2014 indigenous \r\nterritories and other protected areas represented the equivalent of \r\n58.5% of all the carbon stored in the Brazilian Amazon biome and had \r\nthe lowest deforestation rate (2.1%) and fire incidences, evidencing the \r\neffectiveness in safeguarding important ecosystems services and well\u0002being (Nogueira et al., 2018). It is estimated that indigenous territories \r\nin the Brazilian Amazon contribute at least USD 5 billion each year to the \r\nglobal economy through food and energy production, GHG emissions \r\noffsets, and climate regulation and stability (Siqueira-Gay et al., 2020). \r\nGiven the high incidence of poverty of Amazonian countries and high \r\nproportion of traditional and Indigenous Peoples, remoteness and \r\nneglected governance place these unique ecosystems and indigenous \r\npopulations as highly vulnerable to climate change impacts (Pinho \r\net al., 2014; Brondizio et al., 2016; Mansur et al., 2016; Kasecker et al., \r\n2018)"


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" Despite their importance, the survival of Indigenous Peoples in \r\nthe Amazon is on the brink in the wake of increasing deforestation, \r\nland conflicts and invasions, cattle ranching, mining, fire incidence, \r\nhealth problems and human rights violation (Ferrante and Fearnside, \r\n2019). There is robust evidence that both economic and non-economic \r\nL&Ds are currently, and will be, unevenly experienced by populations \r\nin vulnerable conditions, such as children, women, Indigenous Peoples \r\nand traditional communities (Pinho, 2016; Lapola et al., 2018; Roy et al., \r\n2018; Eloy et al., 2019; Machado-Silva et al., 2020). Increasing wildfires \r\ninside protected areas, in particular, territories of Indigenous Peoples \r\nand traditional communities, is worrisome and presents challenges for "


id: 2e576923267f77c8c116d8fed943a919
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"Many of the observed outcomes of climate change, for example, \r\nmigration, are also outcomes of multidimensional poverty in low\u0002income countries (Burrows and Kinney, 2016). Future impacts may be \r\nbetter understood if the vulnerability and the capacity for adaptation \r\nis understood to be rooted in a sustainable development context (see \r\nBox 8.2). The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which aim \r\nto reduce poverty and inequality, and identify options for achieving \r\ndevelopment progress, also provide insight on reducing climate \r\nvulnerability (United Nations, 2015). First, climate change impacts may \r\nundermine progress toward various SDGs (medium confidence), primarily \r\npoverty reduction (SDG1), zero hunger (SDG2), gender equality (SDG5) \r\nand reducing inequality (SDG10), among others (medium evidence, \r\nhigh agreement)"


id: 4eb1cdcce33f1ec1542252a4fcce7d37
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" In both developing and high-income countries, \r\nclimate change hazards in connection with other non-climatic drivers \r\nalready accelerate trends of wealth inequality (SDG 1) (Leal Filho et al., \r\n2020b). Climate impacts on SDGs illustrate the complex interrelations in \r\ndevelopment. For example, in regions encountering obstacles to SDGs, \r\ncharacterised by high levels of inequality and poverty, such as in Africa, \r\nCentral Asia and Central America, climate change is exacerbating water \r\ninsecurity (SDG 6), which may then also drive food insecurity (SDG 2), \r\nimpacting the poor directly (e.g., via crop failure), or indirectly (e.g., via \r\nrising food prices) (Conway et al., 2015; Hertel, 2015; Cheeseman, 2016; \r\nRasul and Sharma, 2016). There is a pressing need to address poverty \r\nissues, since these may negatively influence the implementation of all \r\nSDGs (Leal Filho et al., 2021a)."


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"Overall, this case study illustrates the benefits of promoting resilient crop production in Gargey Village, as an example of displaced atoll \r\ncommunities. Innovative and sustainable CSA strategies have offered broader insights and lessons for enhancing adaptive capacity \r\nand resilience, on a degraded landscape. The coherent strategies and methods employed have strengthened livelihood opportunities by \r\nimproving access to services, knowledge and resources. By its concurrent focus on enhancing food security through traditional crops, \r\ncoupled with nutrient-rich vegetables, promoting rainwater harvesting systems and water conservation, and promoting resilient household \r\nlivelihood opportunities, atoll communities brought together crucial elements needed to reduce vulnerabilities and to better cope with \r\ndisasters and climate extremes, while embracing the traditional culture"


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" The location-specific yet knowledge-intensive CSA methods \r\ndeployed, offered opportunities for atoll communities to revitalise themselves, overcoming barriers while adjusting to new landscapes."


id: f3d6721d30762cf8379c28f941bebec3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"During the COVID-19 pandemic, countries such as India were affected by hydro-meteorological hazards (Raju, 2020) making it extremely \r\ndifficult to handle a public health crisis in the context of compounding risks and cascading hazards (Phillips et al., 2020). The COVID-19 \r\npandemic can increase the adverse consequences of climate change since it has the potential to delay some key adaptation actions. On \r\nthe other hand, the pandemic also highlights the importance of better preparedness to the impacts of climate change (Djalante et al., \r\n2020). Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the economic situation within many countries and local communities particularly \r\nfor already marginalised groups (Gupta et al., 2021)"


id: 1d5a5d155442d467351f8bafb89ac7d5
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" The accumulation of crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic alongside climate \r\nchange impacts, underscore the fact that stressors do not occur in isolation, but are interlinked, with clear implications for structural \r\nvulnerability and adaptation options available to the poorest (Sultana, 2021). Responses to COVID-19 have led to significant economic \r\nand social distress within and across societies and local communities, especially in poorer countries. The direct health and economic \r\nimpacts of the lockdowns have further limited the ability of many people across the developing world to pursue income-generating \r\nactivities, and sustain livelihoods that are already affected by climate hazards. In addition, poor or most vulnerable groups face further \r\nmarginalisation due to misinformation that these groups transmit the virus to other wealthier groups and areas"


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" The pandemic has \r\nintensified inequalities in both developing countries (FAO, 2020) and in industrialised nations (Anderson et al., 2020; McCloskey et al., \r\n2020), whereby vulnerable groups are especially affected (Raju et al., 2021). Whereas different models and scenarios contain different \r\ndata and figures, there is high agreement that it is likely that socioeconomic impacts are particularly severe within selected global regions \r\nand areas that are already characterised by a rather high level of human vulnerability (see also Section 8.3). This also implies that the \r\ncapacity of people to prepare for present and future climate change impacts will further decrease within these countries and population \r\ngroups under the direct and indirect consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic."


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"In addition, observed climate change responses, including autonomous \r\nand planned adaptation, can exacerbate poverty and vulnerability \r\n(Eriksen et al., 2021). There is robust evidence that planned responses \r\nto climate change, such as large-scale adaptation projects, in some \r\ncontext can also increase vulnerability due to the reinforcement of \r\ninequalities and the effects of further marginalisation (Fritzell et al., \r\n2015; Eriksen et  al., 2021). There is increasing evidence that the \r\nresponses to indirect impacts of climate change, such as to shifts in \r\nmarine or terrestrial ecosystems due to climate change (Seddon et al., \r\n2016) also affect different groups differently and impact poverty \r\nand livelihood security. Apart from influences on agriculture trends \r\n(Reichstein et al., 2014) and changes in yields (Reyes-Fox et al., 2014; \r\nCraparo et al"


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", 2015), climate change has significant (direct and indirect) \r\nimpacts on livelihood assets and resources such as forests, livestock \r\nproduction and fisheries, which may undermine the livelihoods security \r\nin the medium and long run."


id: 82f8220e0d50d4ed173b93d87636ef39
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"Many of the observed responses to climate change aim to reduce \r\nexposure of people to climate-related hazards, such as flood defences, \r\nsea walls and embankments (Gralepois et  al., 2016), rather than \r\naiming specifically to address structural vulnerability to climate \r\nchange, which means the root causes of vulnerability (e.g., Mikulewicz, \r\n2020; McNamara et  al., 2021a). Evidence suggests that responses \r\nto the impacts of climate change should consider the physical \r\nclimate event, and also historical and institutional root causes that \r\nmake people or systems vulnerable. However, addressing structural \r\nvulnerability must be balanced with the political context and the \r\nrange of options available to people, communities or countries (see \r\nSection  8.3). Political frameworks need to consider both types of \r\nresponses, to revive democratic debate and citizenship (Pepermans \r\net  al., 2016)"


id: a3c2cf507e979840e40d7655563274
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"to increase their effectiveness. This requires higher levels of vertical \r\nand horizontal coordination and integration (GIZ, 2019). Horizontal \r\ncoordination encompasses, for example, the integrated coordination \r\nof responses to climate change across different sectors, which requires \r\nsuitable governance structures and processes that allow for such a \r\ncoordination (Di Gregorio et  al., 2017; Burch et  al., 2019). Vertical \r\nintegration is needed in order to ensure that effective responses also \r\ninclude different levels of governance and benefit from knowledge at \r\ndifferent scales. The inclusion of local knowledge within national or \r\nprovincial adaptation strategies requires such linkages and vertical \r\ncoordination"


id: 362a76efbf8b877d5f71221abb5b1b06
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
" Overall, there is an increasing body of literature that \r\nhighlights the importance of improved integration and coordination \r\nalso in order to promote a higher effectiveness of strategies and an \r\nimproved consideration of social justice and climate justice when \r\ndesigning and implementing responses (Levy and Patz, 2015)."


id: d387806b0a3edcaf98185b9fb2100806
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"The maladaptation outcomes also emerge when responses are not \r\nequitable at the policy level, and exacerbate the precarity of vulnerable \r\npopulations by excluding them from benefits and support, while \r\nattending to the needs of people of the most enfranchised segments \r\nof society (Thomas and Warner, 2019; Asplund and Hjerpe 2020). In \r\nTanzania, the political marginalisation of pastoralist access to critical \r\nriparian wetlands and increasing expansion of agriculture may result \r\nin adaptation pathways that heighten risk for these groups, while \r\nreducing risk for others (Smucker et  al., 2015). Salim et  al. (2019) \r\nfound that adaptation to flooding in Jakarta privileges political \r\neconomic elites, while poor infrastructure in poorest neighbourhoods \r\nexacerbates loss of assets, housing and displacements (Salim et  al., \r\n2019)"


id: 69f778a4b98ad3189dd5a83375541718
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
" In Bangladesh, intense and consecutive flooding led to national \r\nand regional adaptation plans, that resulted in maladaptive trajectories \r\nas local poverty context and precarities of properties were not carefully \r\nconsidered and disconnected from local autonomous practice (Rahman \r\nand Hickey, 2019)."


id: 78ca93a0060f777b6c89da65dab10ddc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"Overall, the assessment shows that understanding impacts of climate \r\nchange should not be limited to the analysis of direct impacts or \r\nphysical changes under different climatic conditions, but needs also \r\naccount for the distributional effects that responses to climate change \r\nmay imply. For example, responses implemented in order to benefit one \r\nsector or social group (e.g., farmers), should not undermine the well\u0002being of others (e.g., pastoralists). Documented cases of maladaptation \r\n(see Eriksen et al., 2021) hint that responses to climate change can \r\nexacerbate existing inequality in some cases and may discourage other \r\ntypes of responses (see also Sections 8.5; 8.6). Furthermore, responses \r\nto similar climate change impacts and hazards may be extremely \r\ndifferentiated according to various social contexts (see Section 8.3). In \r\nsome cases, responses to climate change (e.g"


id: 88459700b40be5a3af352d11171a6d27
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content:
", relocation programmes) \r\ncan even trigger social tipping points when climate change responses \r\nlead to major social transformations, such as forced displacement (see \r\nSection 8.4)."


id: 446a95df1405e1105a58cf902a12302b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"Effective responses to climate change impacts for one group could \r\nimpose higher costs and negative consequences for other groups, in \r\nterms of shifts in exposure and vulnerability. This category of response \r\nis known as maladaptation. Maladaptation actions defined in the IPCC \r\nSR1.5degC (IPCC, 2018b) and in the Land Report (IPCC, 2019a) are the \r\nones that usually have unintended consequences, and can lead to \r\nincreased negative risk to poor population mostly in the Global South \r\nto climate hazards by either increasing GHG emissions or by increasing \r\nthe vulnerabilities to climate change with diminished welfare, now \r\nand in the near future (Roy et al., 2018). For example, migration to \r\nurban centres can represent a significant adaptation opportunity for \r\nthe migrants themselves, but can also increase the vulnerability of \r\ntheir community of origin or destination (e.g"


id: 8c7bbda73b5795e5a8deca9ec311fa24
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content:
", through a depletion \r\nof the workforce or an addition pressure on environmental resources \r\nand infrastructure respectively) (Gemenne and Blocher, 2017). Some \r\ntypes of observed responses to climate change may not yield long-term \r\nbenefits. For example, food imports during droughts or adverse climate \r\nconditions are not a fully adequate response, since they may alleviate \r\na problem on the one hand (i.e., an imminent food shortage due to \r\ncrop failure) but, on the other, lead to no long-lasting improvements "


id: d0010b6aeb8be285eaf0c05eefadccaa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"Climate change impacts carry the risk of amplifying or aggravating existing tensions within and between communities or countries \r\n(Sakaguchi et al., 2017). There is, however, limited evidence for a universal direct causal linkage between climate change and violent \r\nconflicts (Mach et al., 2019). The triggering of conflicts related to climate impacts is strongly determined by contextual factors, such as \r\nthe type of government or the level of development (Mach et al., 2019). A study of 156 countries (Abel et al., 2019) showed that an \r\nincrease in periods of drought exacerbate the risk of conflict, especially in democratic countries. This influence was particularly marked \r\nduring the period 2010-2012 in countries of western Asia and northern Africa that were undergoing political transformations, such as the \r\nArab Spring. Conflict can then represent people's discontent in governments' inefficient responses to climate impacts (Abel et al., 2019)"


id: 76bf7b8dd619ec6462c21aef3423927f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
" \r\nResearch has noted conditions under which climate change can increase the risk of armed conflict, which includes ethnic exclusion, \r\nagricultural dependence, large populations, insufficient infrastructure, dysfunctional local institutions and low levels of development (von \r\nUexkull et al., 2016; Ide et al., 2020)."


id: a840c7695c188f16e568b254b22fb46a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"Since the AR5, there is robust evidence of the socially destabilising measures and high-risk income alternatives that the world's poorest \r\ncommonly take to cope with the impacts of climate change on livelihoods (Blattman and Annan, 2016). To avoid impoverishment, \r\nhouseholds often pursue risky livelihood alternatives, with high potential for return on investment (Sovacool et al., 2018), but which in \r\nsome cases undermine environmental quality (Bolognesi et al., 2015), violate laws (Ahmed et al., 2019), contradict social norms (Hagerman \r\nand Satterfield, 2014), erode institutions (Sovacool et al., 2018), or affect intra- and inter-community cooperation (Nadiruzzaman and \r\nWrathall, 2015). At the same time, a narrowing of livelihood options carries a strong potential for participation and association with \r\nviolent non-state organisations and movements, either criminal or ideological (Nett and Ruttinger, 2016)"


id: edf68b572e1f195db5a80b2545f214d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
" In order to reduce the risk of \r\ninstability and violence associated with climate change, a broadening of livelihood options among the most vulnerable people appears \r\nto be an effective policy approach (Miguel et al., 2004)."


id: b4ded53b3f63ae8d61bf77e8cb859e90
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"In this regard, specific attention ought to be paid to how responses to climate change exacerbate inequalities within societies and create \r\ntensions between different groups--typically between those who are able to protect themselves from climate change impacts and those \r\nwho do not have sufficient resources or are not prioritised in the responses to climate change. Frequently the possibility of migration \r\nfrom climate change is conflated with conflict outcomes from climate change; however, there is limited evidence and low agreement\r\nthat climate change and migration will result in increased conflict (Okpara et al., 2016b), while there is robust evidence and medium \r\nagreement that climate change can exacerbate existing tensions, which can in turn result in political violence and an increase in asylum\u0002seeking (Marchiori et al., 2012)"


id: bf59fcd92cf964775bb821924012f042
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
" In the future, conflict in the context of climate change impacts may increase the number of migrants \r\nseeking asylum, although at present there is scant empirical evidence for this (Schutte et al., 2021). Recent evidence also provides \r\nsupport for social conflict around inequitable climate mitigation policy as well (e.g., fossil fuel subsidies and emissions reductions targets) \r\n(Rentschler, 2016)."


id: b991fbfb19024f1ce47e18e534427f64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"Links between climate change, structural racism and development \r\nare less well established as an element of disproportionate impacts \r\nof climate change (Sealey-Huggins, 2018). Discrimination is not \r\nrestricted to structural racism and includes discrimination of all kinds, \r\nincluding that of gender and caste, because of which a considerable \r\npopulation is directly bound to suffer the harsh impacts of the \r\nclimate change. The climate change and gender literature has come \r\na long way in demonstrating concrete examples of how structural \r\ninequalities operate. The political and micro-political aspects and \r\nhow they interact with structural inequalities are also important to \r\nunderstand vulnerability. Henrique and Tschakert (2020) shows how \r\nthe many adaptation efforts benefit powerful actors, while further \r\nentrenching the poor and disadvantaged in cycles of dispossession"


id: 2a26f09e14a86d3d9d3044278c5ade9b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" \r\nThis critical analysis recommends acknowledging injustices, embracing \r\ndeliberation and nurturing responsibility for human and more-than\u0002human others. Garcia et al. (2020) describes the socio-political drivers \r\nof gendered inequalities that produce discriminatory opportunities for \r\nadaptation. They use an intersectional subjectivities lens to examine \r\nhow entrenched power dynamics and social norms related to gender \r\ncreate barriers to adaptation, such as lack of resources and agency. \r\nThe analysis shows a pronounced dichotomy as women experience the \r\nbrunt of these barriers and a persistent power imbalance that positions \r\nthem as 'less able' to adapt than men."


id: a1175f8f72b06ad21e8dab21ed98fd48
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"Historical marginality and exclusion are context-specific conditions that \r\nshape vulnerability (Leichenko and Silva, 2014). There is also robust \r\nevidence that gender inequalities contribute to climate vulnerability, \r\nand that consideration of gender is a key approach to climate justice \r\n(see Cross-Chapter Box  GENDER in Chapter 18). There is robust \r\nevidence for the differentiated impacts of climate change and climate\u0002orientated policies on women (McOmber, 2020). For example, Friedman \r\net  al. (2019) show that, in Ghana, homogeneous representations of \r\nwomen farmers and a technical focus of climate-orientated policy \r\ninterventions may threaten to further marginalise the most vulnerable \r\nand exacerbate existing inequalities. Climate change impacts can also \r\nheighten existing gender inequalities (Jost et  al., 2016; Glazebrook \r\net al., 2020)"


id: 7a5451f9c86cfe6a82de031568a49967
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" On the one hand, climate change impacts can be gendered \r\nas a result of customary roles in society, such as triple workloads for \r\nwomen (i.e., economic labour, household and family labour, and duties \r\nof community participation), and occupational hazards from gendered \r\nwork indoors and outdoors (Murray et al., 2016). On the other, climate \r\nchange hazards interact with changing gender roles in society, such \r\nas urban migration of both men and women in ways that break with \r\ntradition (Bhatta et al., 2016)."


id: d6713942a303d93b7dead58aea26c5a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"Many countries base their adaptation strategies on National Adaptation \r\nProgrammes of Action (NAPAs), which often correlate different levels \r\nof decision making and governance (Golrokhian et al., 2016). Whereas \r\nthe involvement of national governments is needed for designing \r\nappropriate responses to climate change, recent studies underscore \r\nthe need to also consider IKLK within adaptation and risk reduction \r\nstrategies, thus fostering stronger linkages with local communities, \r\nleading to improved vertical integration between different strategies, \r\nprogrammes and actors (Ford et al., 2016; Vij et al., 2017; Singh et al., \r\n2020). The relevance of addressing the issue of vulnerability and poverty \r\nto reduce the climate change risks has been demonstrated within the \r\nassessed literature on the impact of climate change (Hallegatte et al., \r\n2017)"


id: dd28184467f42053422f75123e965576
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" In this regard, it is noticeable that not many NAPAs explicitly aim \r\nto reduce poverty, even though poverty reduction is associated with \r\nvulnerability reduction to climate change (Demski et al., 2017)."


id: c54664de76f382561550519b5ce877c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"Next to issues of observed impacts and responses to climate change, \r\nit is important to assess observed barriers in implementing climate \r\nchange responses. The discussion of barriers is complemented later \r\nin the chapter with an assessment of the enabling environments for \r\nadaptation (see Section  8.5.1). Some of the most common barriers \r\noutlined in the scientific literature are summarised in Table 8.3.\r\nThere are various characteristics of responses to climate change, \r\nwhich aim to protect livelihoods and prevent poverty expansion (i.e., \r\nan enlargement of the group of people already affected by poverty). \r\nSome of them are:\r\n* Timely: meaning that responses need to take place within a matter \r\nof weeks or months and not over years (Wise et al., 2014).\r\n* Targeted: with a focus on the affected communities and groups, \r\nto help alleviate the pressures they are under (e.g., Aleksandrova, \r\n8"


id: bf3544c27e7fe4133027ea95e484447f
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"3 Human Vulnerability, Spatial Hotspots, \r\nObserved Loss and Damage, and \r\nLivelihood Challenges\r\nThis section assesses the literature on vulnerability--the assessment \r\nof vulnerability at global and national scales--and explores economic \r\nand non-economic losses of people and livelihoods exposed to and \r\nimpacted by climate change. The section examines how climate change \r\nthreatens livelihoods and juxtaposes global and local level assessments \r\nof vulnerability based on empirical data at different scales. The analysis \r\nof recent literature underscores that climate change impacts and \r\nadaptation needs cannot be understood by looking at climate change \r\nonly. Vulnerability and livelihood security are seen as an important \r\ncomponent for understanding the human dimension of climate change \r\n(Rhiney et al., 2016; Cardona, 2017; Byers et al., 2018; Eriksen et al., \r\n2020; Wisner, 2020; Birkmann et al., 2021a; Cole et al., 2021)."


id: 439125db866d0771da115bc88d888d4c
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content:
"to assess the broader adaptation challenges and adaptive capacities \r\nat global scale independent of a specific climatic hazard. Examples \r\ninclude the percentage of population with access to improved water \r\nsources and improved sanitation, the number of physicians per 1000 \r\npeople or the dependency ratio (UNEP, 2018). These indicators are also \r\npart of more comprehensive vulnerability assessments, such as those \r\nassessed within this section namely the vulnerability components of \r\nthe INFORM risk index (e.g., INFORM, 2019) and of the WorldRiskIndex \r\n(e.g., Birkmann and Welle, 2016; Birkmann et  al., 2021a; Feldmeyer \r\net al., 2021). Recent literature underscores that measuring vulnerability \r\nis key for assessing factors that significantly determine actual and \r\nfuture adverse consequences of climate change and complex risks \r\n(Cutter and Finch, 2008; Cardona et al., 2012; de Sherbinin et al., 2019; \r\nPeters et al., 2019; Jamshed et al., 2020c; Visser et al"


id: 330a910e7c4c0362bcc65d703f9d6c40
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
", 2020; Feldmeyer \r\net al., 2021). However, there is also important critique on indicator\u0002based assessments of vulnerability (see de Sherbinin et al., 2019; Rufat \r\net al., 2019; Visser et al., 2020), particularly with regard to issues of \r\nvalidation and its use in decision-making processes. Nevertheless, \r\nwe observe an emerging agreement in the literature that resilience \r\nbuilding and adaptation to climate change has to be informed by \r\nclimate and multidimensional assessment of the vulnerability of \r\npeople, different groups and coupled human-environmental systems, \r\nincluding both quantitative and qualitative assessment approaches \r\n(IPCC, 2014b; UNEP, 2018; Singleton et  al., 2021; Birkmann et  al., \r\n2022). Since, interdependencies between regional (supranational/sub\u0002continental), national, community and individual vulnerability have \r\noften been overlooked, this chapter assesses both global and regional \r\nvulnerability, as well as local livelihood vulnerabilities."


id: abdf577ed80f8f851f161eb19dd778e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"assessments do not sufficiently account for how climate change \r\nimpacts and imposes risks on poor people, nor do they capture issues \r\nof climate justice and more complex societal impacts and future \r\nrisks. For example, various observed losses in the context of climate \r\nchange cannot be sufficiently expressed in terms of an economic value \r\n(see Section 8.3.5), but these items or assets are highly relevant for \r\nvarious people with limited economic resources (Hallegatte et  al., \r\n2017). Consequently, the assessment of risks from climate change \r\nfacing particularly poor people requires comprehensive assessments \r\nof human vulnerability, resilience and the impacts of climate change \r\non human well-being going beyond a simple temperature-societal\u0002impact understanding"


id: df6aede5ab1eb268e15156d7a78fb925
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content:
" Knowledge about methods and approaches to \r\nassess human or human-environmental vulnerability and livelihood \r\nsecurity, including aspects of intersectionality, is important in order \r\nto explore whether or not adaptation and development programmes \r\nare able to reduce vulnerability. The body of literature on these issues \r\nhas grown significantly since the AR5 publication (IPCC, 2014a; Moser, \r\n2014)."


id: 4a00d27a6c9c167b8cdc331db7700abd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"These quantitative global assessments that have emerged within \r\nthe last decades have not been sufficiently assessed in former IPCC \r\nreports, for example, in terms of the agreement on spatial hotspots or \r\nin terms of regional clusters of vulnerability and the linkages between \r\npast societal impacts and levels of vulnerability. The assessed literature \r\nshows that conditions and phenomena that characterise systemic \r\nvulnerability (hazard independent vulnerability), such as high levels of \r\npoverty and gender inequality, limited access to basic infrastructure \r\nservices or state fragility are highly relevant for understanding societal \r\nimpacts of climatic hazards and future risks of climate change (e.g., \r\nCutter et al., 2003; ADB, 2005; Cutter and Finch, 2008; World Bank, \r\n2008; UNISDR, 2009; Crawford et al., 2015; Rufat et al., 2015; Carrao \r\net  al., 2016; Gupta, 2016; Rahman, 2018; Andrijevic et  al., 2020; \r\nJamshed et  al., 2020a; Feldmeyer et  al., 2021; Garschagen et  al"


id: f7ae7f7d19a7570aac07308e9b9e3cfb
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content:
", \r\n2021). These factors and context conditions also influence individual \r\nvulnerability at household or community level. Access to basic services, \r\nsuch as water and sanitation, are linked to human rights and if not \r\ngranted increase the likelihood that people disproportionately suffer \r\nfrom climate-induced hazards, due to their pre-existing lack of access \r\nto such services. In addition, increasing climate hazards further \r\nconstrain the access to such services (United Nations, 2018; Kohlitz \r\net al., 2019; Gupta et al., 2020)."


id: e83c12d094beeee9b816f1e119956345
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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vector_id: 34046
content:
"While past research regarding the nexus between climate change and \r\npoverty often focused on vulnerable groups in rural areas of low-income \r\ncountries (de Sherbinin, 2014; IPCC, 2014a; Barbier and Hochard, 2018), \r\nnew global mega-trends, such as urbanisation, underscore the need to \r\nassess both rural and urban communities and their vulnerability. In \r\nmany rapidly growing cities in the Global South, access to land and \r\nto housing is a challenge, particularly for the poor and marginalised, \r\ncontributing to a further increase in informal settlements that often \r\nemerge in highly hazard-exposed areas (Jeschonnek et al., 2014; Rana \r\net al., 2021). In addition, migration from rural areas to urban centres, \r\nalso due to increasing adverse impacts of climate change on rural \r\nlivelihoods, can add another level of complexity (Flavell et al., 2020). \r\nMoreover, the context in which such urbanisation processes take place \r\nis key"


id: 39f88c184122ee21327cf12d16e0ba1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" For example, rapidly growing medium-sized cities, for example \r\nin West Africa, often do not have sufficient financial, technical and \r\ninstitutional resources to adapt urban structures to climate change \r\n(Birkmann and Welle, 2016; Birkmann et al., 2016; de Sherbinin et al., \r\n2017). Hence, vulnerability in urban contexts is an emerging issue for \r\ninternational, national and local adaptation programmes. Rather than \r\nfocusing on mega-cities and their exposure as primary hotspots, more \r\nattention has to be given to rapidly growing small- and medium-sized \r\ncities and their adaptation needs from the perspective of vulnerability \r\nreduction and poverty."


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"While different assessments use different sets of indicators, most \r\nof the global assessments with national-scale resolution (Birkmann \r\nand Welle, 2016; Kreft et al., 2016; Feldmeyer et al., 2017; Hallegatte \r\net  al., 2017; Eckstein et  al., 2019; INFORM, 2019; ND-GAIN, 2019; \r\nGarschagen et  al., 2021), contain indicators that cover different \r\naspects of economic poverty, inequality, access to basic infrastructure \r\nservices, education and human capital (e.g., adult literacy rate) and \r\nsome also include issues of gender inequality, specific vulnerable \r\ngroups or insurance against extreme events. The assessments also \r\ndiffer, for example, in terms of their consideration of aspects of \r\ngovernance, such as corruption and conflict, or the consideration \r\nof social safety nets, such as insurance coverage, or the number of \r\npeople affected by hazards (Feldmeyer et al"


id: 598a264cc1e3ccb91a28c98e58843976
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", 2017; INFORM, 2019), \r\nas well as in terms of the consideration of losses experienced in the \r\npast or issues such as biodiversity as an aspect of adaptive capacity \r\n(Hallegatte et  al., 2017; Birkmann et  al., 2022). Moreover, the \r\nassessments differ in terms of the consideration of specific indicators \r\nand the inclusion or non-inclusion of specific hazard exposure (Welle \r\nand Birkmann, 2015; Hallegatte et al., 2017; INFORM, 2019; ND-GAIN, \r\n2019; Birkmann et al., 2022)."


id: 871166eb45b6ea5c12abee4c494e6a91
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"While quantitative measures of vulnerability are widely used at \r\ndifferent scales (Cutter et  al., 2016; Garschagen et  al., 2021), there \r\nare also studies that caution the use of such indices in policy making \r\nor risk reduction efforts (Rufat et  al., 2019; Spielman et  al., 2020). \r\nSuch assessments of vulnerability have to be internally and externally \r\nvalidated and handled with care when applied in decision-making \r\nprocesses in terms of their options and limits. At the same time, these \r\nassessments capture important conditions and structures that make \r\npeople more susceptible to various climate hazards and climate change \r\nimpacts. The relevance of these conditions is confirmed by quantitative \r\nimpact assessments as well as many specific case study assessments \r\n(Welle and Birkmann, 2015; Feldmeyer et al., 2021; Birkmann et al., \r\n2022). For example, the access to basic services (e.g., water and \r\nsanitation) (Bollin and Hidajat, 2013; Pandey et  al"


id: 8cfa8f6a0934366c43049611ce643a40
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", 2017b; UNEP, \r\n2018; United Nations, 2018; Gupta et al., 2020; Jamshed et al., 2020a) \r\nand broader modes of engagement in governance and governance \r\nfragility (Crawford et al., 2015; Rahman, 2018; Andrijevic et al., 2020) \r\nsignificantly influence how climatic hazards translate into severe or \r\nnon-severe losses and harm (see Section 8.5.2)."


id: a3db3381146c47988c00cc8ba869aa16
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"Recent comparative studies of global assessments of vulnerability \r\nshow high agreement on the spatial clusters that have very high \r\nor very low vulnerability to climate change, compared to larger \r\ndifferences in terms of exposure and risk (Birkmann and Welle, \r\n2016; Hallegatte et al., 2017; INFORM, 2019; Feldmeyer et al., 2021; \r\nGarschagen et al., 2021; Schleussner et al., 2021). The comparison of \r\nthe averaged ranking results at the scale of 'climate regions' using the \r\nvulnerability components of INFORM and the WorldRiskIndex--as two \r\ncomprehensive global assessment approaches of systemic vulnerability \r\n(hazard independent vulnerability) (see Figures 8.5; 8.6)--also finds a \r\nhigh agreement in terms of most vulnerable regions and regions with \r\nlow vulnerability (Figure 8.5; Feldmeyer et al., 2021)"


id: 3bfa6186775a5d961715fc05dd1b642f
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" The assessment \r\nat this scale reveals that global hotspots of human vulnerability can be \r\nfound in climate regions in East Africa, Central Africa and West Africa, \r\nfollowed by high vulnerability in Central America, South Asia and \r\nSoutheast Asia, for example. Garschagen et al. (2021) in a comparison \r\nof further risk indices also found that there is high agreement on global \r\nassessments of vulnerability compared to exposure or overall risk."


id: 8af2a6b40b414eacd3dfc5b0c4d5d79f
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"The analysis of vulnerability assessment results of the INFORM Risk \r\nIndex and WorldRiskIndex4\r\n at the level of countries coupled with \r\npopulation data confirms a high agreement on most vulnerable \r\ncountries. It also shows that global hotspots of human vulnerability \r\nare not just single countries, but often emerge within regional \r\nclusters, particularly in Africa, but also in Asia and Central America \r\n(see Figure  8.6 and Birkmann et  al., 2021a). These regional clusters \r\n(Figure 8.6) are characterised by high levels of vulnerability in terms \r\nof socioeconomic, demographic, environmental and governance \r\nconditions that make people more likely to face adverse consequences \r\nonce a climate hazard occurs. The internal and external validation of \r\nthese index systems shows its statistical validity and robustness (Welle \r\nand Birkmann, 2015; Marin-Ferrer et al., 2017; Birkmann et al., 2022)"


id: ab0e3bda82779abb9712de06fb56fc98
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" \r\nIt also confirms a quantitative relationship between most vulnerable \r\nregions and fatalities and severely affected people due to climate\u0002influenced hazards (Birkmann et al., 2022). The vulnerability map in \r\nFigure 8.5 shows the vulnerability level (systemic societal vulnerability) \r\nlinked to national scale and provides additional information about the \r\npopulation density within these countries. The background map does \r\nnot show specific vulnerable populations within countries. Selected \r\nexamples of sub-national human vulnerabilities have been added as \r\nadditional information in terms of case studies based on information \r\nfrom other chapters within this report (see, for example, Box  8.7; \r\nSections  5.12; 10.3.3; 10.5.1; 13.8.1; 14.4.7; 15.3.4; Cross-Chapter \r\nPaper 6.2.7)."


id: 3a9f8ac227d5e27eb90419a64b0aa5e1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"also point towards major differences between countries with high and \r\nlow vulnerability (Pelling et al., 2004; CRED and UNDRR, 2015; CRED \r\nand UNDRR, 2016; CRED and UNDRR, 2020b). Even if one takes solely \r\n'highly vulnerable countries' such as India, Pakistan and the Philippines \r\n(and not 'very highly' vulnerable countries), mortality is still nine times \r\nhigher compared to very low vulnerability countries. Similarly, studies \r\nfurther revealed that average number of adversely affected people per \r\nhazard event (e.g., loss of the house) is 11 times higher in regions and \r\ncountries categorised as having very high vulnerability compared to \r\nvery low vulnerability (Birkmann et  al., 2022). In addition to floods, \r\ndroughts and storms, published EM-DAT data for wildfires and heat \r\nstress, confirmed higher suffering (higher average mortality) in more \r\nvulnerable regions compared to less vulnerable regions, particularly \r\nwhen excluding extreme outliers (CRED, 2020)"


id: 4f72b2712cf9108f90eba7f1a63f14db
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" These findings point \r\ntowards the fact that in regions identified as highly vulnerable in the \r\nassessments even moderate future climate change and future climate \r\nhazards are likely to push people further into poverty and lead to \r\nsignificant destabilisation processes in terms of livelihoods security \r\n(Wallemacq and House, 2018; Birkmann et al., 2022)."


id: 5a63edfcb19a39e8f90e2d9f2ffaf2b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"The assessments of human vulnerability also point towards important \r\nadaptation options that are not visible if one focuses on climatic \r\nhazards or temperature changes alone (Figure  8.9; Duckers et  al., \r\n2015; Cutter et  al., 2016; Birkmann et  al., 2021a). Fundamental for \r\nvulnerability reduction and adaptation are social insurances and \r\ninfrastructure programmes, as well as legislation that improves the \r\naccess of poor and marginalised groups to basic infrastructure services \r\nand security. For example, the 'free basic service programme' of the \r\nnational government of South Africa (GovSA, 2021) is one example \r\nwhere a national government (Government of South Africa) has \r\ncommitted itself to providing a basic amount of free water, electricity \r\nand sanitation to low-income households, particularly indigent \r\npeople, such as those living in informal settlements or remote rural \r\nareas. Coupled with incentives, for example in terms of a higher use \r\nof renewable energy (e.g"


id: fe0165dc06e64041308cc216cf29feef
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", solar home systems in rural areas) (see \r\nGovSA, 2021), these investments can support vulnerability reduction \r\nand mitigation of GHG emissions. However, the programme design and \r\nimplementation has also been criticised (see Nel and Rogerson, 2005; \r\nMuller, 2008), as is witnessed by ongoing service delivery protests \r\n(Mutyambizi et al., 2020). This example shows that current national \r\nprogrammes can--even if they are not classified as adaptation \r\nmeasures--provide important entry points to reduce human \r\nvulnerability to climate change."


id: b02185cc5b75177b898237d17ca4d9ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"While increasing attention is given to issues of human vulnerability, \r\nless attention has been given to the historical conditions that foster \r\nsystemic vulnerability of societies. It is important to acknowledge \r\nthat drivers and root causes of systemic human vulnerabilities and \r\ndevelopment challenges are not always new, and sometimes--for \r\nexample in various countries in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean--can \r\nbe linked to histories of imperialism, colonial structures (Grasham \r\net al., 2019), and subsequent development and governance contexts \r\n(Southard, 2017; Zhukova, 2020). Thus, root causes of present \r\nstructures of human and human-environmental vulnerability often \r\nhave historic dimensions, for example, chronic poverty and structural \r\ninequality in Africa (Grasham et al., 2019) or the Caribbean are still \r\ninfluenced by the colonial power relations outside of these countries \r\nmaking solutions for vulnerability reduction more difficult (see e.g"


id: ce33196c570736ff97cdfca6f5dd0228
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", \r\nDouglass and Cooper, 2020). In addition, national borders, such as \r\nin many regions in Africa, sometimes cut through ethnic groups and \r\ntherewith ignore important interrelations between communities on \r\nboth sides of the border."


id: bad66dbc9176c002d0c66dcb1773bf4
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"Figure 8.6 |  Global map of vulnerability. This map shows the relative level of average national vulnerability as calculated by global indices (INFORM and WRI see details \r\nin 8.3.2). Areas shaded light yellow are on average the least vulnerable and those shaded darker red are the most vulnerable. The map combines information about the level of \r\nvulnerability (independent of the population size) with the population density (see legend) to show where both high vulnerability and high population density coincide. The map \r\nreveals that there are densely populated areas of the world that are highly vulnerable, but also highly vulnerable populations in more sparsely populated areas. There are also \r\nhighly vulnerable communities and populations in countries with overall low vulnerability as shown with local case studies alongside the map"


id: d5c1dc7724d2b514aaf67c3866d2af64
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" The pie charts show the number \r\nof deaths (mortality) per hazard (storm, flood, drought, heatwaves and wildfires) event per continental region based on EM-DAT Data (CRED, 2020). The size of the pie chart \r\nrepresents the average mortality per hazard event while slices of each pie chart show the absolute number of deaths from each hazard. This reveals that over the past decade, there \r\nwere significantly more fatalities per hazard in the more vulnerable regions, e.g., Africa and Asia. The analysis of the data shown in this map revealed that over 3.3 billion people \r\nare living in countries classified as very highly and highly vulnerable, while approximately 1.8 billion people live in countries with low and very low vulnerability (Birkmann et al., \r\n2022). These vulnerability values are based on the average of the vulnerability components of the INFORM Index (INFORM, 2019) and WorldRiskIndex (Birkmann and Welle, 2016; \r\nFeldmeyer et al"


id: 4aba083e4a7b6334a53328dd440d76d7
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", 2017) with updated data from 2019 classified into five classes using the quantile method. Other studies applied more vulnerability classes within their assessment \r\nand therefore provide slightly different numbers (Birkmann et al., 2021a). However, despite different calculation methods, the conclusion remains that there are significantly more \r\npeople residing in countries with very high and highly vulnerability compared to those living in countries classified as having low or very low vulnerability."


id: 69a0c9cf8375e74c600fba48ca7c7087
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"Next to the identification of the level of agreement between different \r\nvulnerability assessments (Garschagen et  al., 2021) and the spatial \r\nhotspots, global assessments of vulnerability and adaptation readiness \r\nalso point towards the need for a transboundary perspective and \r\ntransboundary cooperation in terms of vulnerability reduction and \r\nadaptation (Tilleard and Ford, 2016; Birkmann et  al., 2021a). Newer \r\nresearch points towards the fact that various phenomena of vulnerability, \r\nparticularly in highly vulnerable regions, spill over national borders and \r\nemerge in rather regional clusters, such as forced migration and poverty \r\nin West and Central Africa, as well as conflicts in the Near East and Asia \r\n(IDMC, 2020)"


id: 360e8eea5dbbdfde0720cc94302de3e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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" This means that regional and transboundary challenges \r\ncontribute to the formation of systemic human vulnerability, for \r\nexample, forced migration that is occurring within countries, but also \r\nacross international borders that is also influenced by climate change \r\n(Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020). In summary, these findings point \r\ntowards the need for more transboundary approaches in vulnerability \r\nand risk reduction, adaptation and development. Recent literature and \r\ndata presented in Figure 8.6 and (Birkmann and Welle, 2016; Feldmeyer \r\net  al., 2017; Hallegatte et  al., 2017; INFORM, 2019; Birkmann et  al., \r\n2021a) demonstrate the need to strengthen approaches to monitor \r\nthe regional dimensions of vulnerability and to develop strategies \r\nand programmes that consider transboundary vulnerability in risk \r\nreduction and cooperation at different scales"


id: edd0d5aefbd46f9b069ed3bd1e48174
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" This includes, for example, \r\ncooperation between national-level institutions, but also transboundary \r\nnetworks of cities or communities (Tilleard and Ford, 2016; Benzie and \r\nPersson, 2019; Birkmann et  al., 2021a). The transnational nature of \r\nclimate change impacts means that addressing them requires concerted \r\nefforts among nations (IPCC, 2014b; Dzebo, 2019)."


id: f4d379292b7a40863c6e7ec57b4bb9a7
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"Evidence exists that threats to land-based livelihoods and risks of \r\nundernutrition increase significantly with higher levels of global \r\nwarming (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019a). With global warming of 1.5degC \r\nor less, impacts of climate change on livelihoods are still significant, \r\nfor example, for West Africa and the Sahel there will be an estimated \r\nreduction of the area suitable for maize production of about 40%. The \r\nconsequences of global warming of up to 3degC would mean a high \r\nrisk of undernutrition for entire regions (see Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., \r\n2019a) that are already classified as most vulnerable (see Figure 8.6). \r\nThat means the consequences of significant warming are a particular \r\nchallenge for regional hotspots of vulnerability. Small changes in crop \r\nproductivity, already observed due to increasing droughts, floods or \r\nchanges in rainfall patterns, could lead to severe health risks and \r\nundernutrition"


id: c939e5426f720eff0653bd12bbc1cccf
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" This is because of existing precarious living conditions \r\nand the limited capacities that people and institutions have to build \r\nand enhance coping and adaptive capacities at the level of individual \r\nhouseholds, communities and state institutions (see UNEP, 2018; \r\nBirkmann et  al., 2021a). The risk of loss of life, displacement and \r\nadverse health consequences due to climate change in these most \r\nvulnerable regions (such as Micronesia, South Asia, West Africa--see \r\nFigures  8.5; 8.6) is higher compared to regions classified as having "


id: ae494610008ef8d7e8b7841701689c47
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"Moreover, the assessment reveals that in most vulnerable regions \r\na double burden of existing destabilised livelihood conditions and \r\nadditional climatic hazards is already visible and largely influences \r\nsocietal impacts of climate change. For example, flooding along the \r\nWhite Nile in Uganda and South Sudan hit vulnerable communities \r\nthat were displaced due to conflicts and were thus uprooted again \r\nby flooding (IDMC, 2020). Societal impacts and future risks of climate \r\nchange to societies need to incorporate information about vulnerability \r\nand exposure--including capacities of people to cope and adapt \r\n(Wisner, 2016; Cardona et al., 2020). There is increasing evidence that \r\nindividual and societal capacities to cope and adapt also depend on \r\nhow governmental and national institutions can support people at risk \r\n(see Section  8.6). For example, climate information services depend \r\non a functioning weather service"


id: f1a6948e353a91feb599f0f74fcb306c
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" Likewise, social safety nets as an \r\nadaptation strategy require financial resources, which are often absent \r\nfor most people in highly vulnerable regions. In addition, examples of \r\nnational programmes that target most vulnerable groups, such as the \r\nfree basic service programme in South Africa, show that next to the \r\nadaptation to individual hazards, strategies exist that aim to reduce \r\nsystemic human vulnerability (see GovSA, 2021)."


id: 9789d11c1a25cda024265016d6746619
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"At the same time, there is scientific evidence that more intense and \r\nfrequent climate-influenced hazards (e.g., storms, flooding, droughts, \r\nheat stress) can undermine decade-long poverty reduction efforts, \r\nparticularly in most vulnerable regions (Mysiak et al., 2016; Formetta \r\nand Feyen, 2019; Laborde et  al., 2020b; Lakner et  al., 2020). There \r\nis high agreement that, with global warming of about 3degC, such \r\nundermining of poverty reduction efforts will intensify and more \r\nregions will face development setbacks due to the spatial and temporal \r\nexpansion of climate hazards, including the further erosion of capital \r\nthat enables people to develop adaptive capacities (high confidence) \r\n(see Section  8.5). Such trends can further exacerbate poverty traps \r\n(see Section 8.2.2). According to a World Bank report, between 32 and \r\n132 million people could fall into extreme poverty by 2030 due to the \r\nimpacts of climate change (Jafino et al., 2020)"


id: db844ec5322e1789ab621fc0f47e2c28
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" Models estimate that at \r\n3degC warming and under Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP) 1, there \r\nwould be an additional 245 million people exposed to poverty. Under \r\nSSP2 this number would increase to 904  million additional people \r\nexposed to poverty (SSP2) and under SSP3 (with significant challenges \r\nfor equity) about 1918 million additional people could be exposed to \r\npoverty in the year 2050 (Byers et al., 2018)."


id: 61ae0f0773c7fa18f1ebe314da1ea17e
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"Another important phenomenon that modifies trends in vulnerability to \r\nclimate change and poverty is the COVID-19 pandemic (see Box 8.3). It \r\nis likely that the COVID-19 pandemic with its global repercussions will \r\ncontinue to modify and, in many cases, intensify poverty and human \r\nvulnerability (Laborde et al., 2020a; Sumner et al., 2020). Recent studies \r\nthat estimate the impact of COVID-19 on global poverty agree that \r\na significant increase of poverty due to COVID-19 and the respective \r\nlockdown of countries is already observed or expected in the near future \r\n(Laborde et al., 2020b; Sumner et al., 2020). These studies underscore \r\nthat 80% of those newly living in extreme poverty (living on under 1.9 \r\nUSD d-1) due to COVID-19 would be mainly located in two global regions: \r\nsub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Sumner et al., 2020)"


id: ce4f07edeb8ea986d10979fdac212661
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" Consequently, \r\nthe COVID-19 pandemic is likely to further increase inequality at different \r\nscales and increase the burden within regions already characterised by \r\na significant adaptation gap in terms of high vulnerability (see also \r\nFigure 8.6). This implies that the capacity of people to prepare for present "


id: 7dfaa376da92d3c79ce4f62c08c2d39
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"A study of the World Bank (Hallegatte et  al., 2017) estimates that \r\nlosses in terms of well-being are significantly higher than actual asset \r\nlosses experienced (Hallegatte et al., 2017). A higher proportion of the \r\nglobal absolute economic losses occurred in high-income countries. \r\nAbout 56% of all disasters reported occurred in high-income countries, \r\nwhile the low-income countries account for 44% of the recorded \r\ndisasters. However, low-income countries account for about 68% \r\nof the total deaths reported, high-income countries for about 32% \r\n(CRED and UNDRR, 2020b). In contrast, average absolute economic \r\nlosses6\r\n were significantly lower in most vulnerable countries compared \r\nto low vulnerable countries (Birkmann et  al., 2022). Economic loss \r\ntrends from EM-DAT database (CRED, 2020) must be interpreted \r\nwith caution. Economic loss data is often incomplete and needs to \r\nbe improved"


id: f97ddf973a4357329702d8f35f873b07
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" However, these differences in terms of economic losses \r\ncan also be explained in part by the significant wealth differences and \r\nthe monetary value of assets exposed. Consequently, there is a need \r\nto critically reflect on the measures used to assess L&D from climate \r\nchange. Interestingly, the number of people affected by droughts, \r\nfloods and storms as a percentage of the total population and per \r\nhazard event again points to the disproportionate suffering of most \r\nvulnerable countries (Birkmann et al., 2022)."


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"Climate change impacts add to livelihood challenges and can further \r\nincrease inequality and poverty (see Section 8.2.1), whose root causes \r\nare social, institutional and governance related. Various regional \r\nclusters of high vulnerability (see Figure  8.6) are also influenced by \r\nhistorical processes, such as colonialism and power relations that made \r\npeople and countries vulnerable (Schell et al., 2020). Thus, vulnerability \r\nto climate change is not primarily linked to the degree of exposure \r\nto climate change impacts, but determined by societal structures and \r\ndevelopment processes that shape context and individual vulnerability \r\n(see Section 8.3.2), and values and lived experiences of climate hazards \r\n(Djoudi et al., 2016; Walker et al., 2021). Intersectionality approaches \r\nare central to grasping differential vulnerability (Thomas et  al., \r\n2019) for past and present livelihood impacts of climate change (see \r\nFigure 8.3; Section 8.2.2.2)"


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" Assessing observed local conditions and \r\nlivelihood impacts and shifts requires us to consider reinforcing social \r\nphenomena such as age, gender, class, race and ethnicity, which shape \r\nsocial inequalities and experiences of the world and also intersect with \r\nclimate hazards and vulnerability (Walker et al., 2021)."


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"Overall, there is robust evidence that at the global scale poor and most \r\nvulnerable people, particularly in regions classified as highly vulnerable, \r\nare disproportionately affected by well-being losses and loss of life in \r\nthe context of climate change and climate-influenced natural hazards \r\n(CRED and UNDRR, 2015; Hallegatte et  al., 2017; Birkmann et  al., \r\n2022) (high agreement). In this context, non-economic losses also \r\nneed to receive more attention (see Section 8.3.3.2). While there is an \r\nemerging understanding that inequality and multidimensional poverty \r\nare important determinants of systemic vulnerability to climate change \r\n(Dennig et  al., 2015; Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017; Islam and \r\nWinkel, 2017) that affects more than 3 billion people today, only very \r\nfew countries explicitly aim to reduce poverty and income inequality as \r\nan adaptation measure (see e.g., Brazil Ministry of Environment, 2016) \r\n(high agreement)"


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"Since AR5 a new discourse on L&D has emerged with new typology \r\nand elaboration of a definition. L&D has a long and contentious \r\nhistory and is enshrined in the Paris Agreement (see Cross-Chapter \r\nBox LOSS in Chapter 17). Despite ambiguity about what constitutes \r\nL&D (Boyd et  al., 2017), it focuses on how to avert, minimise, and \r\naddress the negative impacts of climate change, including those \r\nthat cannot be avoided through adaptation. It can also be thought \r\nof as the observed residual risk (and potentially irreversible losses) \r\nfrom climate change when adaptation limits are encountered and \r\nmitigation has failed (Boda et al., 2020). L&D is considered a policy \r\nmechanism (see Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in Chapter 17). There is also \r\na burgeoning science for L&D (Mechler et al., 2019b) which advances \r\nthe breakdown on compounding vulnerabilities and highlights the \r\ndisproportionate effects of climate change on the vulnerable and \r\nmarginal (see Box 8"


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"5 for illustration of distributional effect of both \r\nthe drought and responses in the Cape region in South Africa). New \r\nevidence provides additional insight into L&D from slow-onset events \r\nrelated to climate change (sea level rise, drought) (see Anjum and \r\nFraser, 2021; Lund, 2021) For example, (Singh et  al., 2021) found \r\ngrowing evidence of urban droughts leading to economic losses (e.g., \r\ngroundwater overextraction, financial impacts) and non-economic \r\nlosses (e.g., conflict, increased drudgery)."


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"food supplies, and loss of livestock and livelihoods. Cross-sectoral \r\neconomic effects were estimated to reduce gross domestic product \r\n(GDP) by 2.8% yr-1 (King-Okumu et  al., 2021). Past studies have \r\nsimilarly shown that in the context of extreme events, such as floods \r\nor droughts, the most commonly sold assets are livestock and land. The \r\nsale of property particularly reduces the asset base, creates long-term \r\nvulnerabilities to future events and can trigger chronic poverty (high \r\nconfidence). People may face food shortages in the future from lack of \r\ncrop production (Opondo, 2013).The sale of cattle affects the household \r\nasset base, as well as important access to animal traction power for \r\nfarming.\r\nIn South Asia, there is robust evidence of economic impacts of climate \r\nchange (Cao et al"


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", 2021), for example in the Sundarbans (a transboundary \r\necosystem with components in both India and Bangladesh, with the \r\nproblem of unproductive livelihoods being common across residents \r\nof both countries) observations show local livelihoods are rapidly \r\nbecoming unproductive (loss of fish, and increasing salination making \r\nagriculture increasingly difficult) (Ghosh, 2018); conditions that are \r\nexacerbated by climate change impacts (high confidence). Cyclone \r\nand storm surges induced by climate change force saline water into \r\nagricultural lands along the coast, which damages crops not only in \r\nthe year the cyclone hits, but for several years afterwards (Rabbani \r\net al., 2013). They showed in Shyamnagar Upazilla in Satkhira district \r\nthe proportion of salinity-free farmland has gone down over the past \r\n20 years, from more than 60% to nil (Rabbani et al., 2013)"


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" Vietnam \r\nhas also experienced effects of flooding and salinisation in the Mekong \r\ndelta, coupled with rapid social development. Intensified floods and \r\ndroughts have dramatically resulted in loss of livelihoods in agriculture \r\nand fisheries in some areas of the basin (Evers and Pathirana, 2018). In \r\nVietnam, the expected salinisation increases livelihood shifts into areas \r\nthat are riskier, such as shrimp farming. Furthermore, the Vietnamese \r\nMekong Delta is characterised by strong migration processes towards \r\ncities, particularly Ho Chi Min, meaning that abrupt livelihood shifts \r\nare already happening. There are emerging examples of Indigenous \r\nPeoples affected by climate change in indigenous farming mountain \r\ncommunities of the Nepal Himalaya. (Sujakhu et  al., 2019). The \r\nPhilippines has experienced extreme events, such as Typhoon Haiyan \r\nin 2013, which left more than 7353 people reported dead or missing, \r\ndamaged or swept away more than 1"


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"1 million houses and injured more \r\nthan 27,000 people (McPherson et al., 2015). More than 4 million were \r\ndisplaced. The cost of damages has been estimated at USD 864 million \r\nwith USD  435  million for infrastructure and USD  440  million for \r\nagriculture in affected regions (McPherson et al., 2015)."


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"Extreme climate events are disproportionately impacting economies of \r\nthe most vulnerable everywhere (medium evidence, high agreement). \r\nIn the Caribbean, Central America and USA, Hurricanes Katrina, Harvey, \r\nIrma, Maria and Michael are examples of extreme climate events that \r\nhave displaced households, destroyed homes, and led to loss of income \r\namong the poor and marginalised (Klinenberg et al., 2020). Puerto Rico \r\nwas devastated by Hurricane Maria but received less support from the \r\nFederal Emergency Management Agency (Garcia, 2021). Evidence is \r\nemerging on unequal governance responses in the USA versus Puerto \r\nRico (Joseph et al., 2020). Floods, storms and heatwaves have impacted \r\npoorer communities and wildfires in California have impacted many \r\nwealthy groups, and also infrastructure used by all, for example, with \r\nlengthy electrical power blackouts"


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" However, they have particularly \r\nimpacted those vulnerable to disasters, such as undocumented Latino/a \r\nand Indigenous immigrants in the case of the Thomas Fire in California's \r\nVentura and Santa Barbara counties (Mendez et  al., 2020). In 2017, \r\nHurricane Irma hit Ragged Island in the Bahamas as a category 5 storm, \r\nleaving the island in ruins and deemed 'unliveable' by its authorities, \r\nwith most infrastructure left as rubble, no essential utilities remained, \r\nschools and health clinics were in ruins and the stench of dead animals \r\nwas overwhelming. This storm resulted in significant economic L&D \r\nby the community through loss of their homes, churches, schools, \r\nagricultural land and infrastructure (Thomas and Benjamin, 2020)."


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"Box  8.6). Urban communities, in particular those living in informal \r\nsettlements, are exposed to heatwaves. In Peru, analysis of water risks \r\nposed by climate change in the Vilcanota-Urubamba basin, Southern \r\nPeru, revealed seasonal water scarcity and glacial lake outburst floods \r\n(GLOFs), pose a serious threat for highly exposed and vulnerable \r\npeople. It showed that very high-risk potentials of 134 current and \r\nanother 6 out of 20 future glacier lakes as potentially highly susceptible \r\nto outburst floods. A total of eight existing and one possible future \r\nlakes indicate future river discharge could be reduced by some 2-11% \r\n(7-14%) until 2050 (2100). Farmers, in particular smallholders, in \r\nsome regions face losses to irrigated agriculture and hydropower \r\ncapacity with effects on water scarcity and food security (Drenkhan \r\net al., 2019)"


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" However, other assessments also point towards positive \r\neffects of water reservoirs and hydropower in terms of water storage, \r\nflood management and irrigation (Ahmad et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2015; \r\nKuraku et al., 2019)"


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"In the context of the Pacific Islands, NELDs are thought of as \r\ninterconnected and span human mobility and territory, cultural heritage \r\nand Indigenous knowledge, life and health, biodiversity and ecosystem \r\nservices, and sense of place and social cohesion (Carmona et al., 2017; \r\nOjwang et al., 2017; McNamara et al., 2021b). There are gaps in our \r\nunderstanding of NELD, much of the evidence is from the Global \r\nSouth and at smaller scales (high agreement), NELD is not explicitly \r\nlinked to attribution science yet and evidence often lacks coverage on \r\ncertain groups (Boyd et al., 2017; Carmona et al., 2017; Ojwang et al., \r\n2017). Non-economic losses are often associated with displacements \r\nand migration in terms of climate change and human vulnerability \r\n(Section 8.2.1"


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"4), studies show that the impacts of extreme flooding, \r\ndroughts and/or hurricanes and cyclones that can lead to a sense of \r\nlost identity and place, and emotional distress, that are hardly assessed \r\ndimensions of impacts and risks (Adger et al., 2014; Barnett et al., 2016; \r\nTschakert et al., 2017; Serdeczny et al., 2018). Non-economic losses are \r\nparticularly relevant for understanding adverse consequences of climate \r\nchange on the poor and most vulnerable population groups (high \r\nconfidence). These NELD categories are still overlooked in vulnerability \r\nassessments and adaptation planning. A novel way to consider NELD \r\nin assessments is to interconnect with a sustainable development \r\nperspective (Boyd et al., 2017; Boda et al., 2020)."


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"There are additional dimensions of economic losses that are of a \r\nmore diffuse nature. In particular, climate change is also expected to \r\nnegatively affect labour supply, particularly in temperature exposed \r\nindustries (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction), due to \r\nincreases in the number of extreme hot days (Graff Zivin and Neidell, \r\n2014; Garg et  al., 2020). Low-income countries have on average a \r\nlarge share of workers in such industries and will thus be especially \r\nhard hit. Aside from labour supply, a number of studies also document \r\nnegative impacts to manufacturing productivity (Acharya et al., 2018; \r\nPogacar et al., 2018; Somanathan et al., 2021). These findings provide \r\na channel to explain macroeconomic consequences of climate change \r\n(Burke et  al., 2015)"


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" However, there are also non-economic costs in \r\nthat extreme heat will cause increased discomfort to workers, such \r\nas psychological stress, disease and in extreme cases, death among \r\nthe workforce in developing economies, as well as tropical and sub\u0002tropical countries (Ansah et al., 2021)."


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"In order to categorise the different types of NELD that exist, (Serdeczny \r\net  al., 2016), reviewed the literature and came up with a set of \r\nsystematic categories that capture what is usually thought about as \r\nhaving intrinsic value and according this framing of NELD this includes: \r\nhuman life, sense of place and mobility, cultural artefacts, biodiversity \r\nand ecosystems, communal and production sites and agency and \r\nidentity (Serdeczny et al., 2016; Serdeczny, 2019). For example, there \r\nis emerging evidence on linkages between slow-onset events and \r\nmobility decisions, trajectories and outcomes (Zickgraf, 2021). In \r\naddition, categories include psychosocial and emotional distress (van \r\nDer Geest and Schindler, 2016)"


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" For example, research shows potential \r\nincreased risk of intimate partner violence following disasters, noting \r\nthat societies that are vulnerable to climate change may need to \r\nprepare for the social disasters that can accompany disasters revealed \r\nby natural hazards (Malik and Stolove, 2017; Rai et al., 2021)."


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"is evidence of loss of cultural heritage sites due to sea level rise and \r\ncoastal erosion as well as other climate variability (Brooks et al., 2020). \r\nHaile et al. (2013) show flood casualties in Ethiopia include children \r\ndrowned while playing outside during the 2007 flood period although \r\nofficial data is hard to come by (p. 489). Moreover, loss of place was \r\nexperienced in Itang, where many of the local houses are built from \r\nwood, grasses and mud walls, which are easy to reconstruct, but are \r\nnot strong enough to withstand an extreme flood. Here, 38% of the \r\nsurveyed houses were severely damaged by the 2007 flood. These \r\nhouses were constructed as an adaptation strategy but could not \r\nwithstand the floods. In Kenya, Opondo (2013) shows loss of human \r\nlife was the most severe impact of floods. For example, in the focus \r\ngroup discussion with men, 'it was reported that a boat capsized on \r\nRiver Nzoia at Siginga and ten people died' (p. 457). In Mozambique, \r\nBrida et al"


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" (2013) show loss of sense of place occurred after flooding \r\nin the central districts of Caia and Mopeia, which had a devastating \r\nimpact on homes and livestock (Brida et  al., 2013). Health impacts \r\nof the forest fires in Amazon basin countries have disproportionately \r\naffected vulnerable people and social groups (see Box 8.6)."


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"In the literature on NELD, there are many examples of loss of life (high \r\nagreement). In Nepal, one of the deadliest landslides in Nepal history \r\nresulted in the death of 156 people (van der Geest, 2018). Evidence \r\nfrom Landslide Jure and consecutive rainfall in Sindhupalchok in Nepal \r\nshowed the experience led to mental stress, such as fear of new landslides, \r\nin about 68.4% of people interviewed (van Der Geest and Schindler, \r\n2016). One study in Nepal showed that almost a quarter (23%) of the \r\nhouseholds interviewed had sold property, including homes, livestock \r\nand heirlooms in response to flooding (Bauer, 2013). Human deaths are \r\nincreasingly associated with L&Ds from tropical cyclones and typhoons, \r\nsuch as in the southern coastal districts of Bangladesh, in particular \r\nKhulna and Satkhira (Chiba et al., 2017). A case study from Mindanao, \r\nPhilippines, by Chandra et al"


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" (2017) also reported physical injuries and \r\nloss of life from the most powerful typhoon for over a century in 2012, \r\naffecting more than 6 million people and killing at least 1000 people \r\n(Eugenio et al., 2016). Beckman and Nguyen (2016) reported that in \r\nVietnam floods in 2004 washed away 24 houses in the commune, with \r\nthe loss of families when their houses were washed away."


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"This section examines the intersections between L&Ds and livelihood \r\nshifts. This requires an examination of the differentiated aspects \r\nof livelihoods. Understanding economic (e.g., loss of food crops, \r\ninfrastructure, assets etc.) and non-economic losses (e.g., health, well\u0002being, loss of place, agency) and their consequences for livelihoods is \r\nimportant that the intangible aspects become clearly visible and receive \r\ngreater attention in loss assessments and in designing adaptation \r\nstrategies and programmes. Figure  8.10 provides a summary of \r\nexamples of observed impacts of climate hazards on economic and \r\nnon-economic capital and the section assesses livelihood implications \r\nacross regions. It shows examples of climate hazards attributed to \r\nclimate change in studies since AR5, across a range of geographical \r\nsites for heatwaves, drought, hurricanes, and floods and non-economic \r\nL&Ds. Figure 8"


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"10 reveals examples of climate hazards attributed to \r\nclimate change in studies since AR5 across a range of geographical \r\nsites for extreme and slow-onset events, such as heatwaves, drought, \r\nhurricanes and sea level rise. These are associated with non-economic \r\nL&Ds. The figure underscores that non-economic L&Ds lead to \r\nsignificant livelihood threats and livelihood changes. In addition, the \r\nlimits of adaptation become evident (Chapter 16)."


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"An illustrative example is climate-induced loss of well-being and (im)\r\nmobility in Bhola Slum, an informal settlement in Dhaka, Bangladesh. \r\nResearch revealed that IDPs from the southern coast experienced \r\nloss of belonging, identity, quality of life and social value produced \r\nin people a nostalgia and desire to return home (Ayeb-Karlsson \r\net  al., 2020). Another example is of urban climate change justice \r\nexperienced by migrants in the Indian cities of Bengaluru and Surat, \r\nwhere environmental marginalisation can be attributed to a lack of \r\nrecognition of citizenship rights and informal livelihood strategies \r\ndriven by broken social networks and a lack of political voice, as \r\nwell as heightened exposure to emerging climate risks and economic \r\nprecariousness"


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" In this case, migrants experience extreme forms of \r\nclimate injustice in their invisibility to formal government and are even \r\nactively erased from cities through force or discriminatory development \r\npolicies (Chu and Michael, 2019)."


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"of place (Tucker et  al., 2015). Acosta et  al. (2016) identified loss to \r\nproductive sites in the Philippines with landslides destroying agriculture, \r\nleaving many farmers without livelihoods. Similarly, Beckman and \r\nNguyen (2016) in Vietnam identified an example where communal \r\ndams had been destroyed in floods leading to lack of irrigation for \r\ncommunal sites and local loss of farmland for farming communities. \r\nChandra et  al. (2017) identified the vicious cycle between declining \r\nagricultural production and conditions of soil erosion due to floods and \r\ndroughts resulting in decreased crop fertility to productive sites with \r\nimplications for decline in crop yields, loss of crops and of livelihood \r\nassets"


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" Climate change-related extreme weather events, such as \r\ntyphoons, floods, and droughts, can have detrimental impacts on crop \r\nproduction (high confidence) and in the Philippines and Pakistan have \r\nsignificantly affected the livelihoods of cash crop-focused rural villages \r\n(Escarcha et al., 2020; Jamshed et al., 2020b). There is an emerging shift \r\nfrom crop to livestock production as a buffer activity to recover from \r\ncrop losses (Section 5.10.4; Jamshed et al., 2017; Escarcha et al., 2020). \r\nAs with many examples of livelihood shifts, the viability of the shifts in \r\nthe long term under climate change have yet to be assessed."


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"Extreme climatic events pose serious disruptions to local livelihoods \r\nand asset bases, requiring people to reconstruct, transform and \r\ndiversify livelihoods (Uddin et al., 2021). Examples of livelihood shifts \r\nacross Asia and Southeast Asia (e.g., Bangladesh, India, Philippines, \r\nVietnam) include rural communities in coastal areas, urban settlements \r\nthat are experiencing economic losses (high confidence) from, for \r\nexample, crop failure and reduced access to fish, which contribute to \r\nnon-economic losses associated with involuntary migration (Ghosh, \r\n2018) and the malnutrition of children (Siddiqi et  al., 2011). For \r\nBangladesh, Chiba et al. (2017) show a connection between mental \r\nstress and impacts to the fundamental capacity to sustain livelihoods, \r\nsuch as food and a place to live, due to severe damage to houses, \r\nhomesteads, properties, livestock and crops, loss of family members \r\nand relatives, and anxiousness about securing employment and \r\nincome in the future"


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" In Bangladesh coastal communities experienced \r\nlosses in livelihood assets due to Cyclones Sidr and Aila (Uddin et al., \r\n2021) and a significant number of cyclone victims were displaced \r\nfrom their homes by severe cyclones. People have had to change their \r\noccupations--both intra- and intersectorally--and are confronted \r\nby increased consumption and social costs. The study uncovered \r\ndifferences in impacts between occupations, such as farming and \r\nfishing; fishers changed their occupation post-disaster. The study also \r\nshowed evidence that local people are learning to live with change and \r\nuncertainty by nurturing and combining various types of knowledge \r\nand social memory, generating diversified livelihood options and \r\nself-organising to enhance their resilience to future extreme weather \r\nevents. In Bangladesh, Ahmed et al. (2019) found cyclones, riverbank \r\nerosion, salinity intrusion and floods negatively impacted people's \r\nlives by reducing their livelihood options"


id: 4e634679ccbcf2417fdf3f24a242bde5
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" Their study found that when \r\nthere are limited adaptation strategies, many people turn to 'illegal \r\nlivelihoods' included using fine mesh nets to collect shrimp fry in the \r\nrivers, as well as logging in the Sundarbans. These people include the \r\npoorest and vulnerable, and law enforcement only exacerbates their \r\nvulnerability. Escarcha et  al. (2020), studied impacts of typhoons, \r\nfloods and droughts on crop production and effects on livelihoods of \r\ncash crop focused on rural villages in the Philippines. Their preliminary \r\nobservations show a shift from crop to livestock production as a buffer \r\nactivity to recover from crop losses. Farmers changed their farming \r\nactivities as a multi-adaptive response driven by past experiences of \r\nclimatic changes, farmers' social relations, household capacity and \r\nresources available"


id: 9b7938772885ff7db1a8da80681b94d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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"In Africa, many communities already experience drought- and flood\u0002related disasters (high confidence) such as those that negatively \r\nimpact livelihoods and assets in the Muzarabani district of Zimbabwe \r\n(Mavhura, 2017). In Muzarabani community has revived and \r\ndeveloped new livelihood strategies to manage risks, including local \r\ninformal safety nets, local farming practices and the traditional flood\u0002proofing structures. Food security and agriculture productivity are \r\nexamples of livelihood resources most at risk to climate hazards (see \r\nFigure  8.2) (high confidence). An illustration of such risks to cocoa \r\nfarmers in Ghana includes increased incidences of crop pests and \r\ndiseases, wilting of cocoa leaves, high mortality of cocoa seedlings \r\nwhich affected expansion and farm rehabilitation, and wilting of \r\ncherelles resulting in losses of crop yield"


id: 76f16d9cc259903b80fca800f6bf791d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
" An illustration of livelihood \r\nshifts resulting from losses is of farmers shifting to cereals due to the \r\nunpredictable climatic patterns and the shortened duration of rainfall. \r\nYet, insecurity with storage, supply chains and low returns from cereal \r\nproduction, coupled with land scarcity in the Western region, have \r\nresulted in a return to cocoa production (Asante et al., 2017)."


id: 773f773451e696a09ff39be824fbb563
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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content:
"Research from Australia shows complex linkages between the impacts \r\nof drought on livelihood income, health and cultural heritage, increasing \r\nrisk of heat stroke, and possibly a link to suicide among male farmers \r\n(Alston, 2012; Hanigan et  al., 2012; Marshall et  al., 2019). The link \r\nbetween agricultural losses and suicides has also been noted in South \r\nAsia, including India (Carleton, 2017). Livelihoods are shifting with \r\nimpacts to well-being, as noted by (Evans et al., 2016), who showed \r\nconnections between loss of fishery productivity and impact on tourism \r\nsector livelihoods in the Great Barrier Reef region. In Europe, losses \r\nto Indigenous Peoples are associated with loss of well-being of Sami \r\ncommunities and has forced livelihood shifts from reindeer herding \r\ndue to loss of ecosystems to support the animals (Persson et al., 2017; \r\nJaakkola et al., 2018)"


id: a751bc4d8ab00dede1092297c55b34e5
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" Traditional pastoralist systems are also greatly \r\nimpacted by cumulative dual challenges of encroachment of other \r\nland users and by climate change. Traditional Sami reindeer herding \r\nstrategies are still practiced, but the rapidly changing environmental \r\ncircumstances are forcing herders into uncharted territories where \r\ntraditional strategies and the transmission of knowledge between "


id: b7aeccd2b083b1c47507739a6279bb34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"In summary, across regions there is an increasing number of examples \r\nof observed economic and NELD from climate change. Adaptation \r\nmeasures need to better incorporate actions to tackle the burgeoning \r\nnegative social, psychological and well-being impacts of climate \r\nchange (Barnett et al., 2016; Box 8.5). At present, losses from climate \r\nchange are potentially growing faster than adaptation measures \r\nacross the globe. It is still uncertain how economic and non-economic \r\nlosses trigger successful or viable new climate-related livelihood \r\ntransitions for the poor and people or groups in vulnerable situations \r\nin the future (see Sections  8.4.4; 8.4.5). In all likelihoods, economic \r\nlosses from climate hazards (e.g., drought) will be compounded by \r\nmany factors including COVID-19 and other vulnerability drivers"


id: d5859e1f993af3e784cd2c066b1466b9
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" For \r\ninstance, globally, small-scale coffee producers have been destabilised \r\nby COVID-19, but also because of a history of recurrent (climate) shocks \r\nand structural inequalities, and may have to shift into alternative \r\nlivelihoods (Guido et al., 2020). Coastal communities in Vanuatu have \r\nbeen impacted in the immediate period after COVID-19 showing \r\nchanges in village populations, loss of cash income and difficulties in \r\naccessing food, and have experienced shifting pressures on particular \r\nresources and habitats (Steenbergen et al., 2020). This trend poses real \r\nchallenges to equity and sustainability."


id: f0538d9919eff007f7c0321aa57a69e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"Linkages between losses, coping strategies and livelihood shifts in \r\nsmall islands (e.g., in the Pacific region, Kiribati and Tuvalu, and in \r\nthe Caribbean, the Bahamas) shed light on impacted low-income \r\nhouseholds. For example, farmers have experienced extensive damage \r\nto homes and loss of infrastructure, and experience lack of migration \r\nopportunities (Curtain and Dornan, 2019). Evidence is growing that \r\nthere is also significant loss of cultural heritage in resettlement \r\n(Barnett and O'neill, 2012), evidence from small islands' displaced \r\ncommunities suggests that resettlement can have impacts on sense of \r\nplace, identity and social fabric, a theme highly relevant to loss, coping \r\nand adapting livelihoods, and not only restricted to small islands \r\n(McNamara et al., 2021b). Roberts (2015) identified loss of communal \r\nsites in Kiribati"


id: 9a24c775141723c541b39c0d56220c13
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" It is predicted that, by 2050, up to 80% of the land \r\non the island of Buariki and 50% of the land on Bikenibeu may be \r\ncompletely inundated and these effects will result in significant loss \r\nof livelihoods and displacement. Throughout the Caribbean, evidence \r\nindicates that there will be an overall reduction in the area of land \r\nsuitable for crop cultivation, as the region's climate gets progressively \r\nwarmer and as rainfall becomes more variable (Rhiney et al., 2016)."


id: 4523bcdc935b100c2e7f116d1442d354
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"The multiple shocks of extreme events reduce crop yields, destroy homes, \r\nand lead to loss of infrastructure and displacement (high confidence). \r\nThese are experienced in South and North America. For example, in Peru, \r\nglacial outbursts have led to loss of livelihoods (Drenkhan et al., 2019). \r\nPeople use a range of coping and adaptation strategies to deal with \r\nhazards where they live, such as shifting livelihood activities, inputs or \r\nproduction areas. However, traditional techniques are increasingly failing \r\ndue to changing weather patterns. Across Peru, findings demonstrate \r\nthat people use temporary and permanent migration among their many \r\ncoping and adaptation strategies. Hazards related to water excess have \r\nbeen the key force in destroying homes and driving displacement in \r\nPeru. In contrast, studies demonstrate that water scarcity also threatens \r\nlivelihoods and thereby influences migration in Peru"


id: 4b6ca63c51d209de24063a290dff0488
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" While non\u0002climatic reasons for moving dominate migrants' motivations in many \r\nareas of Peru, water-related climatic drivers of migration are becoming \r\nincreasingly relevant (Wrathall et al., 2014). Peru's smallholder farmers \r\nand urban poor are not responsible for the climate crisis, yet their lives \r\nand cultural heritage are being increasingly jeopardised by its effects, \r\nmaking improvements in governance an imperative for Peru (Bergmann \r\net  al., 2021). Another area of significance is coffee production in \r\nBrazil, where the majority of Brazilian coffee farms are operated by \r\nsmallholders, producers with relatively small properties, who are \r\nmostly reliant on family labour (Koh et al., 2020). In the USA (e.g., New \r\nOrleans and Puerto Rico), people have lost livelihoods due to displaced \r\nhouseholds and destroyed homes, leading to loss of income, as well \r\nas loss of social networks and family networks and loss of cultural \r\nheritage"


id: 3f5c4e444a41efb43833b7ccf6bf08b4
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content:
"In summary, this section has moved beyond the IPCC WGII AR5 in \r\nlaying out structural elements of vulnerability and climate-related \r\nvulnerability hotspots globally, such as poverty, lack of access to basic \r\nservices, gender inequality and undernourishment. The assessment \r\nprovides new quantitative evidence about the global spatial \r\ndistribution of systemic human vulnerability and therewith underscores \r\nthat various hotspots of countries classified as having very high or \r\nhigh vulnerability emerge in regional clusters. In addition, the number \r\nof people living in very highly and highly vulnerable country contexts \r\nis significantly higher in some assessments, with even twice as many \r\nas the number of people living in countries classified as having low \r\nand very low vulnerability"


id: 4761749e0b4cef8acd8b5c7ab52c3beb
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content:
" The evidence suggests that statistically \r\nrelevant differences in fatalities per hazard event are not just a \r\nproduct of the hazard event, but also strongly linked with the level \r\nof vulnerability of the region or community exposed. The assessment \r\nof non-economic losses has also received little attention in past IPCC \r\nAssessment Reports, therefore this section has provided new insights \r\non how (next to measurable economic losses) non-economic losses \r\nand intangible losses emerge. These non-economic losses represent \r\nan important dimension of societal impacts of climate change that \r\nhas not sufficiently captured so far within standard damage or post\u0002disaster assessments. Finally, the section provides evidence about the \r\nexisting adaptation gap in terms of differential vulnerabilities and \r\nvarious non-economic losses already experienced."


id: 88b34d8c5dabaae83b7f05ee3eed9234
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"Between 2015 and 2017, the Western Cape region experienced an unprecedented three consecutive years of below average rainfall, \r\nleading to acute water shortages, most prominently in the city of Cape Town (Sousa et al., 2018). Anthropogenic climate change made \r\nthe drought five to six times more likely (Pascale et al., 2020; see also AR6 WGI Chapter 10, Section 10.6.2). The severity of the drought \r\npresented new challenges to the existing management and governance capacity to ensure equitable and sustainable water service \r\ndelivery. The city's water supply infrastructure and demand management practice were unprepared for the 'rare and severe' event of three \r\nconsecutive years of below average rainfall (Wolski, 2018; Muller, 2019)"


id: e2224deb0bd45dc749b7a9d2e22f9e98
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content:
" Despite a potential total storage volume of about 900,000 Ml \r\nof water (enough water for around a year and a half of normal usage, after taking evaporation into account), Cape Town's reservoirs fell \r\nfrom 97% full in 2014 to less than 20% in May 2018 (Ouweneel et al., 2020; Cole et al., 2021). The drought saw residents queue for water \r\nas restrictions were imposed together with threats of closure of water provision to households (Sorensen, 2017; Scheba and Millington, \r\n2018). Poor communication in the early stages of the drought (Hellberg, 2020) and a lack of trust in the administration contributed to \r\na near-panic situation at the threat of 'Day Zero' as dams almost ran dry in the first half of 2018 (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019; Simpson \r\net al., 2020c). 'Day Zero' was avoided largely through public response, water demand management and the 2018 winter rains (Sorensen, \r\n2017; Booysen et al., 2019a; Muller, 2019; Rodina, 2019b; Matikinca et al., 2020)"


id: 82e5e128132927d96c5dc401c2a933d6
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" At a household level, responses to the drought showed \r\neveryday residents can display unprecedented degrees of resilience (Sorensen, 2017), including behavioural and attitudinal shifts and \r\ntechnological innovation across the full socioeconomic spectrum (Ouweneel et  al., 2020). But the private nature of some of these \r\nresponses extended existing inequality in water access through privileged forms of 'gated adaptation' by elites which conventional water \r\ngovernance arrangements were unprepared for (Simpson et al., 2019b; Simpson et al., 2020a)."


id: 4e34699a13603b1dfbc729e27563bdf4
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"These 'climate gating' actions, such as drilling boreholes, secured water access for high-income households and companies, but excluded \r\na large proportion of Cape Town's population who could not afford such private technologies (Simpson et al., 2019a; Simpson et al., \r\n2020b). These responses were unanticipated by the city administration and compounded fiscal challenges faced by the municipality \r\nwhich could no longer use revenues from high-consumption households to cross-subsidise water for low-income households (Simpson \r\net al., 2020a). This shift threatened to undermine the sustainability of the municipal fiscus and general water access ( Box 9.8; Simpson \r\net al., 2019a; Simpson et al., 2020a). In order to recover losses, municipal water tariffs for consumers were raised by 26% in 2018 (Muller, \r\n2018; Simpson et al., 2019a). In addition to a decline in tourism, median estimations of the overall economic impact of the drought \r\nindicate loss of 27"


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"6 billion South African Rand (USD 1.7 billion) translating into 64,810 job losses in the Western Cape, with Cape Town \r\naccounting for approximately half of those job losses (DEDAT, 2018). This had a disproportionate impact on unskilled and semi-skilled \r\nworkers, particularly for those from low- and middle-income households (DEDAT, 2018). The drought also exacerbated the potential for \r\nsanitation health risks of the urban poor where tens of thousands of people lack access to safely managed sanitation facilities (Enqvist \r\nand Ziervogel, 2019)."


id: a15804455c44881c5e90d8e8cbacfcaf
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"The Day Zero Disaster Plan included prioritising and protecting the poor and most vulnerable communities where critical infrastructure \r\nand facilities and vulnerable and informal residential areas would remain connected while higher-income residential areas would be \r\ncut off (Cole et  al., 2021). Yet it is important to recognise that pre-existing deficiencies in service delivery meant water access for \r\nthe urban poor did not change as significantly during the drought, particularly those in informal settlements who collect water from \r\nstandpipes (Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019; Matikinca et al., 2020). For these communities, the negative economic impact of the drought was \r\ncompounded by the unintended consequences of demand management regulation emanating from the drought response. South Africa \r\nostensibly ensures a constitutional right to water, regardless of ability to pay (Rodina, 2016), 58)"


id: 6bd7c9806bcacd325e8eb16c35dc0aeb
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" Since 2018, however, as a consequence \r\nof new water tariffs instituted during the drought, Cape Town residents now have had to 'prove their poverty' in order to register as \r\nindigent households and access their water right (Scheba and Millington, 2018). Further, since 2007 and with increasing effect during the \r\ndrought, the municipality has installed approximately 250,000 water management devices as a credit control and, during the drought, \r\nalso a consumption control measure. As these have been largely installed in low-income homes, this control measure disproportionately \r\naffected poor households (Scheba and Millington, 2018; Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019)."


id: 78ed7dc98c40f89062b41df06a0123fb
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content:
"The Cape Town case highlights how disaster planning for slow-onset city-wide shocks will be become increasingly important to safeguard \r\nequity and sustainability across African cities (Cole et al., 2021). It demonstrates the importance of integrating state and non-state \r\nresponses to climate change in municipal adaptation and disaster planning (Booysen et al., 2019a; Booysen et al., 2019b; Simpson et al., \r\n2020a), particularly for responses with unintended consequences. Further, water tariff models need to be flexible enough and have built\u0002in redundancies in order to prioritise the needs of the urban poor and ensure climate responses do not disproportionately affect low\u0002income groups and deepen existing inequalities (Scheba and Millington, 2018; Enqvist and Ziervogel, 2019; Simpson et al., 2019b)"


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" \r\nSystems and relationships of mutual accountability can also build more effective water management between spheres of government and \r\nenhance horizontal collaboration between municipal departments and non-state entities (Ziervogel, 2019b; Ziervogel, 2019a)."


id: ba490f0532e67800bde9efa10b4e23ee
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"Future climate vulnerability and risks to livelihood security are \r\nsignificantly influenced by present and past development trends, equity \r\nand sustainability. Consequently, observed impacts covered in previous \r\nsections provide essential insight for enhancing future adaptation and \r\nrisk reduction. Since the AR5, new research approaches incorporate \r\npast lessons to project and assess climate change vulnerability and \r\nsocioeconomic conditions into the future. Scenario tools and methods \r\nare a powerful approach for integrated assessments of emissions \r\npathways, associated warming and development contexts, helpful in \r\nguiding analysis of adaptation policy and planning (Berkhout et al., \r\n2014; Birkmann et  al., 2021a)"


id: 44eab95c40329f23494a1098b859dfe5
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" Both quantitative and qualitative \r\nscenario approaches that assess future vulnerability and risks, as well \r\nas livelihood challenges at global, national and local scales, allow \r\nexperts, planners, decision makers and affected people to articulate \r\nand visualise development futures. These approaches can complement \r\nemissions pathway scenarios."


id: 7dd4a844913667f9fa4373a862bbc030
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"Contrasting with 'top-down' SSP scenarios, (Berkhout et  al., 2014) \r\noutline how mesoscale and 'bottom-up' scenarios have been developed \r\nto inform spatial planning, for example, in the Netherlands. Increasing \r\ncomputational power has opened possibilities for large-scale 'bottom\u0002up' simulations of people's livelihoods in the context of evolving \r\nclimate change impacts, such as the migration decisions of farmers \r\nfacing drought in Mexico over the coming century (Bell et al., 2019) and \r\nlivelihood decisions of people facing coastal flooding in Bangladesh \r\nto the year 2100 (Bell et al., 2021). Such 'bottom-up' scenarios can \r\ngenerate projections about future outcomes, inform mapping and \r\nassess future vulnerability, with special emphasis on livelihoods of the \r\npoor. Researchers conclude that results of respective scenarios that \r\naim to inform adaptation and risk reduction policies in the context of \r\nclimate change have to match the frames of the stakeholder (Berkhout \r\net  al"


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", 2014; Conway et  al., 2019). Scenarios that assess potential \r\nfuture vulnerabilities and future capacities for adaptation require \r\nmore attention, since many approaches for projecting future climate \r\nrisk still largely overlook non-climatic drivers that determine future \r\nvulnerability and exposure (Windfeld et al., 2019)."


id: cf2e308785714ca13288d799aa3af58e
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"In addition, Smirnov et al. (2016) conclude that worldwide the number \r\nof people exposed to extreme droughts will increase under both the \r\nRCP4.5 and the RCP8.5 particularly at the end of the century. The authors \r\nassess that under RCP4.5 the average monthly global population \r\nexposed to drought will increase between the periods 2008-2017 \r\nand 2081-2100 from a mean of 80 million to 212 million, and under \r\nRCP8.5 from about 90  million to approximately 472  million people. \r\nThe research findings underscore that there is a high probability that \r\nexposure to extreme droughts will increase, particularly in regions and \r\ncountries already classified as highly vulnerable (e.g., Nigeria, Sudan, \r\netc.) (Smirnov et al., 2016). Extreme droughts are expected to further \r\nerode coping and adaptive capacities of those already characterised \r\nby high levels of vulnerability (see Section  8.3.1)"


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" Building adaptive \r\ncapacities for the most vulnerable groups in the future in these areas \r\nwill be a challenge, since high levels of livelihood insecurity are coupled \r\nwith high levels of structural vulnerability at national and regional \r\nscale (poverty, state fragility, etc.) making planned adaptation support \r\nvery complex and difficult. Therefore, increasing adaptation gaps at \r\ndifferent scales are anticipated in the future."


id: 10e3de7725180f2747f1c738a20bad12
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"Increasing population exposure (e.g., due to urbanisation of coastal \r\nzones, etc.), coupled with higher frequencies and intensities of specific \r\nclimate hazards are likely in connection with the existing adaptation \r\ngap (e.g., high levels of vulnerability) to compromise development \r\nand human security. Recent studies, such as that by Harrington \r\n(2018), conclude that the actual exposure and the physical individual \r\nrecognition of some climate hazards, will be higher in low-income \r\ncountries. The study of Harrington (2018) underscores that changes \r\nin extreme heat, for example, will be felt by the average citizen of \r\na low-income country after 1.5degC of global warming and will not \r\nbe felt by about 40% of people living in high-income nations until \r\nwell after double the amount of global warming is reached (3degC \r\nincrease)"


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"et al., 2019). The concept of tipping points is usually associated with \r\nlarge-scale components of the climate system that could be pushed \r\npast an irretrievable threshold as a result of human-induced climate \r\nchange (Lenton et  al., 2008), such as the deterioration of Antarctic \r\nice sheets (Pattyn and Morlighem, 2020). Social tipping points refer \r\nto similar mechanisms of destabilisation resulting from impacts of \r\nclimate change on human societies at multiple scales and the societal \r\ncontext conditions in which these impacts occur. They are reached \r\nwhen climate change impacts force destabilising social transformations \r\nfrom one state to another (Lenton et al., 2019): from sporadic losses \r\ndue to climate change to chronic losses and impoverishment, from \r\npeace to violence, from a democracy to an authoritarian regime, from \r\nadequate food provisioning to famine, or into forced migration"


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" For \r\nexample, small variations in the rainfall or temperature can jeopardise \r\nlivelihoods that are dependent upon subsistence agriculture, which can \r\nlead to migration or tensions around resources (see Figure 8.11). Social \r\ntipping points can also occur when intangible elements that ensure the \r\nsurvival of individuals and communities are eroded or removed. This \r\nis the case, for example, when the social fabric of a community falls \r\napart. The Millennium drought in Australia led to higher rates of male \r\nsuicide, especially among farmers, and droughts in Ghana led to similar \r\noutcome when people were forced to drink from the same water source \r\nas their animals, which they perceived as robbing them off their human \r\ndignity (Bryant and Garnham, 2015; Tschakert et al., 2019)."


id: 23948a25e06a54c0457b3de62af708f3
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"Responses to climate change can have dual effects on development \r\npathways. On the one hand, mitigation and adaptation processes \r\ncan create significant development opportunities. The potential of \r\nmitigation policies for job creation, in particular, has been highlighted \r\n(Healy and Barry, 2017). However, responses to climate change can also \r\nhave detrimental effects on future development: mitigation policies, \r\nsuch as the building of hydro-electrical dams or the culture of biofuels \r\ncan lead to communities' dislocation and populations' resettlement, \r\nparticularly of disadvantaged groups within a society (de Sherbinin \r\net al., 2011; Eriksen et al., 2021)"


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" Adaptation policies can also hinder \r\nsome development processes: for example, the promotion of migration \r\nas an adaptation strategy can lead to communities being deprived of \r\ntheir workforce and resenting the departure of some of their members \r\n(Gemenne and Blocher, 2017), even though this may offer new \r\nlivelihood opportunities. However, the migration consequences in the \r\ncontext of climate change are often more nuanced and different trade\u0002offs and benefits occur (see Porst and Sakdapolrak, 2020). For example, \r\nremittances support family members but, at the same time, can also \r\ncreate imbalances in local markets (Melde et  al., 2017). Evidence \r\nexists that some climate responses, such as small-scale agricultural \r\nlivelihood adaptation strategies, have improved the ability of people \r\nto sustain their livelihood and to reduce poverty (Osbahr et al., 2010)."


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"Empirical evidence shows that social tipping points can be triggered \r\nlong before climate tipping points are reached. For example, recent \r\nresearch in West Africa shows that migration decisions are often based \r\non the perceptions of environmental changes by local populations \r\nrather than on the actual observed changes (De Longueville et  al., \r\n2020). The migration of some members of a community can also \r\ntrigger the migration of the whole group, as the migration of some \r\nmembers can have a strong impact on the community (Gemenne and \r\nBlocher, 2017). In other contexts, the expectation of a climate impact \r\ncan trigger social or political shifts: for example, the expectation of \r\nlower snow cover levers can reduce or stop investments in ski resorts. \r\nSome planned relocations of populations are already underway in \r\nanticipation of future climate impacts (de Sherbinin et al"


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", 2011), while \r\nthe government of Indonesia decided in 2019 to move its capital city, \r\nJakarta, in anticipation of future floods."


id: a40cf78dfaeeb5f4afc6a879fe917e2b
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"Livelihood shifts may also take place proactively as new opportunities \r\nemerge and reduce climate impacts by providing buffers of financial \r\ncapital. For example, Hirons (2014) assesses artisanal and small-scale \r\nmining as an emerging livelihood opportunity in Ghana. Evidence \r\nchallenges the popular assertion around the idea of wealth seeking for \r\nshort-term profit and reveals an alternative scenario whereby artisanal \r\nand small-scale mining can be a poverty-driven activity, particularly in \r\nareas in which agricultural employment has not delivered sufficient \r\nincome or where crops are highly exposed and sensitive to climate \r\nchange impacts. Income from new livelihood activities can support \r\nrecovery following specific events (major flooding or drought) linked \r\nto climate hazards and climate change. Livelihood shifts therefore \r\ntake place in a highly dynamic and heterogeneous context"


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" Another \r\nexample comes from the Small Lake Chad, Republic of Chad studied by \r\n(Okpara et al., 2016a). Fluctuating water levels linked to seasonal flood \r\npulses and droughts were shown to link closely to livelihood dynamics. "


id: 9e710d21586d7cad7a1045b1e0841626
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"Lake drying led to new adaptive behaviours based on seasonality (e.g., \r\nmigration of herders to different areas of the lake shore to access \r\nwater resources, in line with more predictable seasonal changes), as \r\nwell as linking to opportunism supported by climate change impacts. \r\nFor example, during times of lake flooding, new opportunities for \r\nfishing opened for people that were otherwise operating primarily as \r\npastoral or agricultural households. However, these kinds of livelihood \r\nshifts remain largely reactive and can bring negative as well as positive \r\nimpacts. In the Lake Chad case, it resulted in social clashes between \r\ndifferent groups, while in other examples from Tanzania, livelihood \r\nshifts towards extensification of farming led to deforestation (Suckall \r\net  al., 2014), which could constitute a maladaptive shift"


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" Such \r\nfindings have important implications for the types of government and \r\ninstitutional support that can enable livelihood shifts and highlight the \r\nneed to consider trade-offs for climate change mitigation, as well as \r\nwith other adaptation options (see Section 8.6)."


id: 41dfd2f7bba88ed39cae30f65cc0e389
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"Key risks due to future climate change, exposure and vulnerability \r\nare difficult to assess and are based on evidence from the past and \r\nlikely future vulnerabilities and livelihood challenges. The assessment \r\nof Representative Key Risks (see Section 16.5.2.3.4) underscores that \r\nrisks to living standards are potentially severe as measured by the \r\nmagnitude of impacts in comparison to historical events or as inferred \r\nfrom the number of people currently vulnerable (see in detail Chapter \r\n16). Table 8.4 provides an overview of what is known in the literature \r\nassessed about future risks, inequalities and particularly future \r\nvulnerabilities, including potential challenges for climate justice and \r\nadaptation barriers. For example, barriers for gender, ethnicity and class \r\nhave been addressed for a long time yet need substantive intervention. \r\nGender, along with many other structural inequalities (Table  8"


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"4) \r\nthat are deeply rooted, pose future threats to people and groups in \r\nvulnerable situations from, for example, the loss of land or assets, \r\nexposure to extreme events and so on. These people will also likely be \r\nhighly exposed to future climate risks unless there are significant and \r\nnew avenues for action on climate change now. For example, recent \r\nstudies suggest that the total population of all countries classified "


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"The climate change risks in this section are addressed through the lens \r\nof livelihoods, human, food, water and ecosystem security, building \r\non key impacts and risks since AR5 (Oppenheimer et al., 2014) and \r\nkey findings from SR1.5degC (Hoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018; Roy et  al., \r\n2018), SROCC (IPCC, 2019b), and SRCCL (IPCC, 2019a). The AR5 \r\nWGII risk tables (IPCC, 2014b), updated in SR1.5degC (Roy et al., 2018) \r\noffer an interesting entry point as they show high confidence on key \r\nobserved impacts and limits to the adaptation of natural and social \r\nsystems that are compounded by the effects of poverty and inequality \r\non water scarcity, ecosystem alteration and degradation, coastal \r\ncities in relation to sea level rise, cyclones and coastal erosion, food \r\nsystems and human health (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Roy et al., \r\n2018)"


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" As a consequence, climate change risks pose substantially \r\nnegative impacts on climate-sensitive livelihoods of smallholder \r\nfarmers, fisheries communities, urban poor, Indigenous Peoples and \r\ninformal settlements, with limits to adaptation evidenced by the loss \r\nof income, ecosystems and health, and increasing migration (Roy \r\net al., 2018). The compounded effects of socioeconomic development \r\npatterns and climate change impacts are worst in climate-sensitive \r\necosystems in the Arctic and SIDS (Roy et al., 2018). The future risks \r\nto these climate-sensitive ecosystems and livelihoods are potentially \r\nsevere given their current high exposure to climate hazards, and high \r\nnumber of vulnerable of people exposed for example in the SIDS (see \r\nalso Chapter 16; Ahmadalipour et  al., 2019; Liu and Chen, 2021)"


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" \r\nResidual losses then may be unavoidable for some ecosystems and \r\nlivelihoods affecting the vulnerable groups of people and countries as \r\nconsequences of structural poverty, socioeconomic, gender and ethnic \r\ninequalities, that marginalise and exclude and limit the development \r\nof adaptive capacity for future changes (Olsson et al., 2014; Roy et al., \r\n2018)."


id: d70f37aa8c1c7626e800ea91b68b0650
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"The incidence of floods also increases the occurrence of diseases (e.g., \r\ndiarrhoea and respiratory infections) and undernutrition in children \r\nliving in informal settlements and slums in Asia (Ghosh, 2018) and \r\nAfrica (Clark et al., 2020). Women and children are currently bearing \r\nthe worst impacts of climate hazards, and are unable to move due \r\nto assigned gender roles to avoid flooding risks in highly vulnerable \r\nslums in Bangladesh. This results in poor living conditions and causes \r\nthe women emotional distress (Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2020). This region \r\nexperienced severe floods associated with death, injury, infectious \r\ndisease, mental and emotional stress and cultural disruptions--\r\ndimensions of non-economic losses that are often not accounted for in \r\ndisaster relief policies (Chiba et al., 2017) and these greatly influence \r\nthe ability to build adaptive capacities for future hazards (Roy et al., \r\n2018)"


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" In the same way, risks to female-headed households that have \r\ninsecure tenure rights are greater. This group was the most affected \r\nby flooding in 2018 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, costing 3-4% of the \r\ncountry's GDP and affecting 4.5 million people (Erman et al., 2019)."


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"Likewise, in the Amazon basin, climate change hazards of severe \r\ndroughts and floods (high confidence) (Cox et  al., 2004; IPCC, \r\n2019a) are revealing limits to adaptation among the majority \r\nof riverine communities and smallholder farmers with residual \r\nimpacts associated with losses of income, fisheries and agricultural \r\nproductivity, as well as affecting non-economic livelihood dimensions, \r\nsuch as the ability to attend school and losses of place and identity \r\nthrough forced migration (Maru et al., 2014; Pinho et al., 2015; Lapola \r\net  al., 2018). Furthermore, the expansion of the agricultural frontier \r\nand construction of large dams to supply energy needs in the Amazon \r\nbasin are amplifying the vulnerabilities and reducing future adaptive \r\ncapacities of smallholders and the fisheries communities to climate \r\nrisk (Bro et al., 2018; Castro-Diaz et al., 2018)"


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" It is expected that a \r\nglobal temperature warming level of 2degC by 2050 in the Amazon will \r\nlead to a significant reduction of water flow in major rivers leading to \r\nfurther food and water insecurity (Betts et al., 2018). This is affecting \r\nforest- and river-dependent livelihoods in the region (Box 8.6; Lapola \r\net al., 2018)."


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"In the Himalayas (part of the Hindu Kush Himalaya, HKH) temperature \r\nwarming is expected to increase up to 2degC by 2050 (high confidence), \r\nincreasing flooding and bringing larger risks to food and water security \r\nfor mountain communities that are already highly vulnerable given \r\nlimited livelihood options and supporting infrastructure in these regions \r\n(Mishra et al., 2017). In Nepal, agriculture-orientated livelihoods are \r\nreported to be negatively affected by an increase in landslide frequency \r\n(92.6%) and intensity (97.3%) over a 20  years period (1996-2016) \r\n(van Der Geest and Schindler, 2016). The catastrophic landslide in 2014 \r\ncaused material losses associated with loss of crops and land to poor \r\nhouseholds that were 14 times greater than their annual gains. The \r\nNELD losses were emotional distress and fear of new event occurrence, \r\nshowing that poorest households may not fully recover following \r\nan extreme event"


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" This example is indicative of the representative \r\nfuture climate risks to these populations. Livelihood diversification is \r\ncommonly adopted by poor households and smallholders in Nepal to \r\nreduce the impacts of extreme rainfall and landslides. However, there \r\nare limits to these strategies given poor household infrastructure that \r\nchallenge risk reduction, as a result, it is expected that migration to \r\nneighbouring countries as Bhutan or India will increase (van Der Geest \r\nand Schindler, 2016)."


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"The glacier retreat associated with the increase in global warming \r\ntemperature has also shown losses that are permanent and related \r\nto a sense of belonging and cultural heritage for glacier countries. The \r\nmost negative livelihood impacts are experienced by poor households \r\nin the Peruvian Andes and Himalayas (Jurt et al., 2015). The risks for \r\nsmallholder livelihoods in glaciated regions are expected to increase \r\nas the shrinking glaciers result in increased water competition, crop \r\nfailure and extreme flooding (Kraaijenbrink et al., 2017). For example, \r\nin Bhutan adaptive measures such as changing crops, developing \r\nirrigation channels and sharing water among community members \r\nare still insufficient to avoid L&D associated with the dramatically \r\nreduced water availability (Kusters and Wangdi, 2013; Warner and \r\nVan der Geest, 2013)"


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" In high-mountain regions, the intersections of \r\nagro-pastoralist marginalisation, difficulty of access and ecological \r\nsensitivity contribute to residual impacts associated with extreme \r\nclimate hazards, which can lead to irreversible losses and challenge \r\npoverty reduction efforts (Mishra et al., 2019)."


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"There is increasing evidence that maladaptation can lead to future \r\nrisks to socio-ecological security. Adaptation measures focusing \r\non short-term action can lead to adverse longer-term impacts to \r\nlivelihoods and failures to address transboundary scales to avoid \r\nnegative consequences for social and ecological systems (Warner \r\nand Van der Geest, 2013; Roy et al., 2018; Mechler et al., 2019a; see \r\nalso Section  5.13.3). Hence, maladaptation can intensify and even \r\naccelerate future risks as a result of climate change mitigation and \r\nadaptation policies when responses to climate change hazards are \r\nembedded within business-as-usual development approaches (Work \r\net al., 2019)"


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" For instance, in Cambodia, the conventional development \r\nstrategies intertwined with climate change mitigation and adaptation \r\ninitiatives are increasing the probability of maladaptive outcomes in \r\nthe context of high informality, and conflicts among poor farmers \r\nexposed and vulnerable to flooding (Work et al., 2019). The potential \r\nfor maladaptation emerges from the vulnerability of precarious living \r\nconditions of informal poor farmers, not accounted for in climate \r\nmitigation and adaptation strategies for irrigation, protected areas "


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"The Amazon ecosystem, together with the Arctic, is listed as the first of five IPCC Reasons for Concern due to climate change, given \r\nthe high confidence level that different temperature warming and GHG emissions will pose significant risks that threaten these unique \r\necosystems (O'Neill et  al., 2017b; Roy et  al., 2018). In addition to the scientific evidence, a resurgence of cross-national collective \r\nexpressions about the fate of the Amazon forest, Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities, in the context of an unprecedented \r\nclimate crisis and sustainable future, have gained pronounced importance. On 19 August 2019, the skies of Sao Paulo State were dark \r\nby 3 pm due to the formation of a 'smoke corridor' associated with the extensive burning of the Amazon forest (Seymour and Harris, \r\n2019)"


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" The fire outbreaks were a consequence of multiple factors related to political, social, economic and environmental scenarios \r\nconcomitant with the weakening of environmental governance, such as control and monitoring of deforestation and fire incidences \r\nprogrammes (Escobar, 2019; Seymour and Harris, 2019). The deforestation rate and incidences of fire are both increasing in the Amazon \r\nof Brazil, Colombia and Peru (Seymour and Harris, 2019). Accordingly, 2019 registered an increase of 60% in the cumulative fire count \r\nin Brazil, Bolivia and Peru in comparison with the same period in 2018, and a 12% increase in comparison with the same period in an \r\nextremely dry year in 2016 (GFED, 2019). In this context, looking at this case study through the lenses of poverty, inequality and the SDGs, \r\nit addresses the compound effect of climate and land use change in the Amazon forest fires and its cascading impacts and risks on the \r\nsocial domain in the region"


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" There is evidence that both climate and land use change impacts and risks are disproportionately borne by \r\npoor and vulnerable ethnic groups, remote rural communities and poor urban households in the Amazon (Pinho et al., 2015; Brondizio \r\net al., 2016; Mansur et al., 2016; Pinho, 2016)."


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"Fires are not a natural phenomenon in the Amazon region (Bush et al., 2004; McMichael et al., 2012); they are used for food security, \r\nhunting and religious rituals by Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities (Hecht, 2006; Carmenta et al., 2019; da Cunha, 2020), \r\nand also as a widespread technique for land clearing for small- and large-scale farms for agriculture (Morello et al., 2019). The dramatically \r\nincreased forest burning observed in the Amazon recently are the result of illegal land grabbing, the small-a and large-scale cattle \r\nranching sector and agribusiness practices coupled with loosening of land tenure policies and decision makers' neglect of deforestation \r\nand burning monitoring data (Nobre et  al., 2016; Lovejoy and Nobre, 2018; Leal Filho et  al., 2020a). The fire outbreaks intensified \r\nsubstantially to the point that, in August 2019, there were approximately 3500 fires in 148 Indigenous territories (DETER and INPE, 2019; \r\nISA, 2019)"


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"around 33% was observed within Indigenous territories and protected areas called conservation units (UCs) (DETER and INPE, 2019; ISA, \r\n2019). In 2019, 40% of the deforestation occurred in public forests, which encompasses undesignated forest lands, Indigenous territories \r\nand UCs. This deforestation came accompanied by fires: 18% of the 2019 fires occurred on undesignated lands, 7% on Indigenous \r\nterritories and 6% on UCs, where many traditional populations live (Alencar et al., 2020). During 2019, 46% of the deforestation and \r\n52% of the fires occurred on private rural properties and settlements, respectively, where legal accountability for these crimes is possible. \r\nThe 2020 deforestation rate increased by 47% and 9.5% compared to 2018 and 2019, respectively, and was the highest in the decade \r\n(Silveira et al., 2020)"


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" The clear-cut inside indigenous territories more than doubled from 2018 to 2019 (Brasilis, 2021) and, despite it \r\ndecreasing from the 2019 rate, during 2020 it was the highest since 2008. On average, at least 50% of yearly active fires were within 5 km \r\nof deforested areas in the same year, reaching 74% during 2019 (Silveira et al., 2020). This means, that fires and deforestation have an \r\nincreased threat to Indigenous populations (Oliveira et al., 2020), particularly during the year 2020 and currently in 2021, since COVID-19 \r\nand air pollution from agricultural burning greatly impacts respiratory health in the Amazon (Morello, 2021)."


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"In Acre State, the fire incidence coupled with extreme droughts in 2005 and 2010 led to an increase--from 1.2% to 27%--in \r\nhospitalisations of children (under 5 years) due to respiratory diseases (Smith et al., 2015). The same evidence was found among the \r\nrapidly deforested areas known as the 'Arc of Deforestation', with a dramatically higher number of respiratory diseases recorded, mainly \r\nin children under 5 years (do Carmo et al., 2013). There is also evidence for interlinked dynamics between deforestation, urbanisation and \r\nincidence of fire episodes providing an appropriate environment for Anopheles darlingi vector propagation and the increased incidence \r\nof malaria in the region (Hahn et al., 2014). In the 2005 drought, burning in Acre alone recorded 400,000 people affected and the loss of \r\n300,000 ha of forest with direct costs of USD 50 million (Brown et al., 2006)"


id: 184a762ff1c255a925ce917ddd96a8f6
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" In 2010, the fires during the drought were approximately \r\n16 times larger than those in the meteorologically normal years (Campanharo et al., 2019). The estimated total economic loss in 2010 \r\nwas about USD 243.36 +- 85.05 million, representing 9.07 +- 2.46% of Acre's GDP (Campanharo et al., 2019). The economic and non\u0002economic losses associated with the impacts of climate change and future risks of fire outbreaks on native food crops (acai, guarana), \r\nlivelihoods, tourism, medicinal and spiritual sites, culture, migration patterns, place-based attachments, emotional and mental distress \r\namong the most affected and vulnerable population as Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities are still to be fully estimated \r\nfor the region (Pinho et al., 2015; Brondizio et al., 2016)"


id: 1bfba6a0dfc1c720a41446a69019d53f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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" Also relevant is a trend of Amazonian forest fires spreading from the southern \r\nBrazilian Amazon to Bolivia and Peru, indicating that transboundary burning increases are systemic and will lead to extensive economic \r\nlosses of wild crops, infrastructure and livelihoods, requiring a landscape level approach for deforestation and fire management and \r\ncontrol (Kalamandeen et al., 2018)."


id: a15b7709676ee8f53513b6a1eda53169
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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"In terms of adaptation and risk reduction, priority should be given to strengthening multi-scale governance and partnerships among \r\ndifferent private and public actors. Policies at national and sub-national levels are needed, such as control strategies to reduce deforestation \r\nand fire incidence, demarcating new Indigenous territories, payment for ecosystem services (REDD+) and investment in traceability for \r\ncommodity production chains are needed (Morello et al., 2017; Scarano, 2017; Carmenta et al., 2019; Seymour and Harris, 2019). The \r\nincrease in global temperature level up to 2degC will exacerbate food and water insecurity in the Amazon (Betts et al., 2018; Hoegh\u0002Guldberg et al., 2018) (medium confidence)"


id: e324f1c025a11184f92feb1093065b1d
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content:
" Thus, curbing fire incidence and deforestation rate will make it easier for Indigenous Peoples, \r\ntraditional and vulnerable populations to reach the SDGs, especially in terms of reducing poverty (SDG1), improving food security (SDG2), \r\nimproving well-being and health (SDG3) and protecting terrestrial ecosystem (SDG15) (Roy et al., 2018)."


id: 5e986f1a24b923c9b2046885f7a6fc00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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"The maladaptation outcome also emerges as a failure of adaptation. In \r\nGhana, poor farmers, facing crop yield failure during severe droughts \r\nfurther exacerbated by water use for irrigation have diversified their \r\nlivelihoods (e.g., selling firewood for charcoal production).This is a \r\nform of maladaptation that can further increase their vulnerability to \r\nclimate risks, compromising food production, income generation and \r\nsustainability (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018b). In Cambodia, governmental \r\nadaptation strategies focusing on reforestation and conservation \r\nmeasures are eroding local biodiversity, and crop irrigation strategies \r\nare compromising scarce water resources and also excluding poor \r\nfarmers, who are susceptible to flooding, from decision making and \r\nbenefits (Work et al., 2019)"


id: 52e4a5e2ef2bee044a59e945319a9611
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" Likewise, in Ethiopia, efforts of adaptation \r\nprogrammes to address droughts contribute to current unsustainable \r\ndevelopment trajectories among pastoralist communities, resulting in \r\ncharcoal production, overgrazing, migration, conflict with other groups \r\nand marginalisation of livelihoods (Magnan et al., 2016). In the Sudan, \r\nmaladaptation outcomes for the poor population are linked to a \r\ndependency on a war economy and post-conflict power dynamics that \r\nare and will continue to affect sustainability and equity in the context \r\nof drought incidence (Young and Ismail, 2019)."


id: 9de82212e50045c8276d9e53d79faaf2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"Table  8.6, built from SR1.5degC (Roy et  al., 2018), illustrates how \r\necological thresholds and socioeconomic determinants are linked to \r\nsoft and hard adaptation limits and what the potential and magnitude \r\nof livelihoods risks will be in the future. For instance, in the SR1.5degC \r\n(IPCC, 2018b) and Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a \r\nChanging Climate (SROCC) (IPCC, 2019b), hard limits are expected with \r\nglobal warming beyond 1.5degC associated with the loss of coral reefs, \r\nthat will lead to substantial loss of income and livelihoods for coastal \r\ncommunities (Roy et  al., 2018; Mechler et  al., 2019b; Oppenheimer \r\net  al., 2019). The loss of coral reefs around the remote islands of \r\nBoigu in Australia is affecting low-lying communities facing financial, \r\ninstitutional (Evans et al., 2016) and cultural place-based attachment \r\nadaptation limits (McNamara et  al., 2017)"


id: 6c6a2a3ac599dd5ce8c29a6d34c4a1b9
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" Another hard limit to \r\nadaptation with implications for income, and culture- and place-based \r\nlivelihoods is related to the sensitivity of fish to global temperature \r\nincrease, with losses in fish reproduction expected to be 10% (SSP1-\r\n1.9) to about 60% (SSP5-8.5), potentially cascading into severe risks \r\nfor fisheries livelihoods (Dahlke et al., 2020). In West African fisheries, \r\nthe loss of coastal ecosystems and productivity are estimated to require \r\n5-10% of countries' GDP in adaptation costs (Zougmore et al., 2016), \r\nincurring financial limits in poor countries to avoid socioeconomic risks. \r\nThe SROCC (IPCC, 2019b) showed that scientific knowledge limitations \r\ncan constrain management of coastlines, mainly in the context of lack \r\nof data, affecting most of the vulnerable and poor communities in the \r\nGlobal South (Perkins et al., 2015; Sutton-Grier et al., 2015; Wigand \r\net al., 2017; Romanach et al., 2018)"


id: 94987d4fdf48d41879b125d5f5735fc1
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" Hard and soft adaptation limits are \r\nchallenging to define, given the rate and intensity of climate change \r\nhazards and the mitigation and adaptation options available, but also \r\nthe level and rate of non-climatic stresses increasing vulnerabilities \r\nand undermining adaptive capacity of poorest members of society and \r\nsensitive ecosystems (medium evidence, high agreement) (Klein et al., \r\n2014; Roy et al., 2018)."


id: f988a82bc392ffa0613fa9764a6a5778
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content:
"The multi-intersectionality of inequalities (socioeconomic, caste, \r\nethnicity, among others) and marginalisation, result in differential \r\ncapacity to avoid risks, which is particularly limited amongst the most \r\nvulnerable communities who are in, or at the brick of falling into, \r\npoverty traps, which then also affects future generations (Hallegatte \r\nand Rozenberg, 2017; Roy et  al., 2018; Tschakert et  al., 2019). For \r\ninstance, the poorest communities in the Global South, who are \r\ndependent upon thriving ecosystems for health, food, water and \r\nenergy, are disproportionately more exposed to temperature extremes \r\nand droughts, compromising food and water security (Byers et  al., \r\n2018)"


id: c95b5a47c304bec75301c507f824214e
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" There are also inequalities associated with opportunities to \r\nadapt to risks that are unevenly distributed among global regions, with \r\nricher and more equal societies in the Global North presenting superior \r\ncapacities than Global South communities, sectors, ecological systems \r\nand species, where the most detrimental climate change impacts \r\nare experienced (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018). The \r\nclimate-sensitive livelihoods of poor and vulnerable communities in the \r\nGlobal South, and the unprecedented ecosystems losses are examples \r\nof multiple limits of adaptation that emerge simultaneously and are \r\nalso linked to the differential access to assets and resources, such as \r\nphysical (propriety, income), social (health, age, education) cultural \r\n(shared community values and norms, ethnicity), ecological (linked to \r\nland use change and productivity) and institutional (market, policies \r\nand governance) (Roy et  al., 2018; Hoegh-Guldberg et  al"


id: 2673fb435697ecf3e8802dca8d311e42
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", 2019a; \r\nOlsson et al., 2019). The adaptation limits emerge mostly in countries \r\nin Global South, and disproportionately affect specific groups, with \r\nhigh poverty incidence, that are constrained by inadequate financial \r\nresources and institutional instruments (Tian and Lemos, 2018; Volpato \r\nand King, 2019), including lack of understanding and preparedness \r\nof the risks posed by climate change (Ayeb-Karlsson et  al., 2016; \r\nMaharjan et al., 2020)."


id: 4799075baa1bee57c13f2a3436771863
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"The recent evidence shows that adaptation limits can also be \r\nassociated with financial and institutional mechanisms, and related \r\nto structural poverty and inequalities among rural farmers in India \r\n(Singh et  al., 2019a) and among low-income countries (Tenzing, \r\n2020), agro-pastoralist communities (Volpato and King, 2019), women \r\n(Balehey et  al., 2018), informal slum settlements in Latin America \r\n(Nunez Collado and Wang, 2020) and informal workers in Southeast \r\nAsia (Balehey et al., 2018). For SIDS, multiple adaptation limits also \r\nemerge as a combination of political-institutional and cultural aspects \r\n(Robinson and Wren, 2020), such as preserving national identity \r\nand sovereignty in the context of migration in the Marshall Islands \r\n(Bordnera et al., 2020). A widespread narrative is that an increase in \r\nmigration in SIDS, given sea level rise and global temperature increase \r\nby 2050, is inevitable, desirable and economically necessary"


id: 5ad06a99a90cce352ee78134e37cfeb3
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" Many \r\nmore people will be exposed to migration and affected by multiple \r\nforms of physiological and emotional stress (Bordnera et  al., 2020). \r\nIn the same way, the Mohawk community of Kanesatake, Canada, is \r\nfaced with institutional and socio-political adaptation limits such as \r\nlack of land ownership rights, insurance and social institutions (Fayazi \r\net al., 2020)."


id: b47a8405e60449e067de017f0c1a2756
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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"In other situations, adaptation limits to household livelihoods emerge \r\nfrom ecological thresholds associated with global warming temper\u0002atures, such as deterioration of land and water resources, extinction of \r\nspecies and biodiversity that can lead to systemic crop failures, declin\u0002ing fisheries productivity and water availability and substantial risks to \r\nhouseholds' livelihoods (Roy et al., 2018). However, it is also important \r\nto note that limits are associated with development, technology and \r\ncultural norms and values that can change over time to enhance or \r\nreduce the capacity of systems to avoid limits (Adger et al., 2014; Roy \r\net al., 2018). It could also include aspects of maintaining security of \r\nair or water quality, as well as equity, cultural cohesion and preser\u0002vation of livelihoods (Adger et al., 2014; Tschakert et al., 2019)"


id: a3a1629f7ffd54eacb4ca40c78965216
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content:
" For \r\nsoft limits, however, adaptation options could become available in the \r\nfuture through changing attitudes or values or as a result of innovation \r\nor other resources becoming available to most vulnerable and poor \r\nactors, households and countries. However, when compounded with "


id: d21434226e5478362618eee0173db958
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content:
"Table 8.6 represents different types of adaptation limits (soft or hard) \r\nthat emerge over time, sometimes concomitantly, that are leading to \r\nsevere risks to livelihoods in a high poverty, unequal and hotter future, \r\nespecially among poor and vulnerable populations, and within those \r\nIndigenous People, women and children (see Section 16.5.2.3.4). The \r\nconfidence statements are assessed through the evidence on papers \r\nas high (>=10 papers), medium (5-9 papers) and low (<= 4 papers) to \r\nensure traceability on the nature of livelihoods barriers and ecological \r\nthresholds associated with 'soft' or 'hard' limits to adaptation under \r\na warming global world. The determinants of livelihood barriers are \r\nlinked to gender-based inequality or discrimination, poverty and \r\ninequality, indigeneity and cultural place attachment, artic hunting \r\nand fishing, and urban slum and informal settlements incurring soft \r\nand hard limits to adaptation"


id: 2c0753cb36dcdb8b5b7a8daa4616e724
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content:
" The ecological thresholds assessed are \r\nassociated with glacier retreat, loss of coral reefs, biodiversity loss, \r\nocean acidification and warming, sea level rise and heat stress incurring \r\nhard limits to adaptation and severe risks to people's livelihoods. The \r\nseverity of risks to livelihoods is assessed using a magnitude indicator "


id: f194be2a8470f43f8a50bee98477b79d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"In Latin America, compounding effects of climate change impacts \r\n(disasters) and armed conflict has contributed to forced migration \r\nto the point that in 2018 alone, 1.7 million people migrated due to \r\nextreme events, four times as many as the number of people leaving \r\ntheir homeland due to armed conflict (Serraglio and Schraven, 2019). \r\nIn South America, migration within and between countries can stem \r\nfrom climate extremes, primarily felt by the poorest and marginalised \r\n(by gender, age, ethnicity) populations that might not be able to adapt \r\nto the fast pace and scale of changes at the local level (Maru et al., \r\n2014; Pinho et al., 2015; Serraglio and Schraven, 2019). In mountain \r\nregions, intersections of people's marginalisation, difficulty in access \r\nand environmental sensitivity in the context of incidence of climate \r\nextremes have combined to reduce the ability of mountain agro\u0002pastoralists to cope with climate extremes (Mishra et  al., 2019)"


id: d01179fd7a7cba1a621f694d77f5dec2
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" \r\nMountain ecosystems are also highly susceptible to disasters and \r\ndisturbances, which can lead to irreversible loss and challenge poverty \r\nreduction efforts (Mishra et al., 2019) Some risks associated with the \r\ndegradation and loss of habitats and ecosystem services associated \r\nwith land use changes and commodities in many countries have \r\ncompounding impacts on equity and sustainability, associated with \r\npermanent losses to the livelihoods of poor and marginalised groups, \r\nsuch as Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities around the \r\nworld (Roy et  al., 2018). For instance, high deforestation rates and \r\nincreased forest burning in many Amazonian countries are further \r\nexposing vulnerable Indigenous Peoples and traditional populations \r\nto health problems, crop failures and shortages of freshwater supply, \r\nespecially in the context of extreme droughts and non-supportive \r\ngovernance (Leal Filho et al., 2020a; Walker et al., 2020)."


id: 85874ef7f2e1b3435b05d9eed9c1777d
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"In the context of urbanisation, in fast growing cities in Asia, Africa and \r\nLatin America that are highly socially and economically unequal, the \r\nclimate change impacts from events such as flooding and droughts, \r\nare amplified as water crises, mostly among the poor and marginalised \r\npopulation, challenging governance for risk reduction (Gore, 2015; \r\nDodman et al., 2017; Jiang and O'Neill, 2017; Pelling et al., 2018; Solecki \r\net al., 2018). In the Global South, over 880 million people are living \r\nin precarious and informal conditions without access to water and \r\nsanitation, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (see Chapter \r\n6; Rosenzweig et al., 2018; Satterthwaite et al., 2018; Tusting et al., \r\n2019). In rapidly urbanising sub-Saharan African countries, around 53 \r\n(50-57) million urban inhabitants (50% of urban population ) and 595 \r\n(585-607) million rural inhabitants (82% of the rural population) were \r\nstill living in unimproved housing in 2015 (Tusting et al"


id: 3c24733cde93510d821a70cee9ad153
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"In past decades, a number of categories of adaptation options have \r\nbeen identified and are discussed in Section 8.5. Adaptation options \r\nare categorised in various ways, such as in terms of grey and green \r\nadaptation or hard and soft measures (Depietri et al., 2013; Chambwera \r\net  al., 2014; Grimm et  al., 2015). Grey measures refer, for example, \r\nto technological and engineering solutions to improve adaptation \r\nof infrastructures or to protect a specific land use or city from \r\nadverse consequences of climate hazards (OECD, 2018). Accordingly, \r\necosystem-based approaches, including natural infrastructure, can \r\nprovide an effective complement or substitute for traditional built \r\n(or 'grey') infrastructure. For example, watershed restoration can \r\nprotect sources of drinking water and reduce the need for subsequent \r\ntreatment. Green measures often encompass ecosystem-based (or \r\nnature-based) approaches"


id: 6f0803136c787068dcaa0d3c26e643aa
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" These make use of the multiple services \r\nprovided by ecosystems to improve resilience and adaptive capacity \r\nor to reduce risk. Soft adaptation measures include policy, legal, social, \r\nmanagement and financial measures that can alter human behaviour \r\nand support adaptive governance, contributing to improved adaptation \r\ncapacity, increased awareness, and change in values and actions on \r\nclimate change issues."


id: 9c128c3febdd19b8eb7b223af5b4817b
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"Adaptation actions frequently include deliberate, coordinated, proactive \r\npolicy decisions based on the awareness that conditions have changed \r\nor will change and that action is required to avert impacts or return to, \r\nmaintain or achieve a desired state (Carter et al., 1994). Governance \r\nprovides an important contextual framing, particularly in contexts \r\nwhere it is weak or contested (e.g., some of the Sahel zone). In these \r\ncases, it can mean that adaptation options stem largely from the local \r\nlevel. Adaptation processes can be categorised as individual, collective, \r\nproactive, reactive, autonomous, coordinated or natural (Chambwera \r\net al., 2014)"


id: b18e33b664b7f66f42b0b8248cf13041
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" Apart from governments, other actors, organisations and \r\ninstitutions (including non-state agencies and private industry actors) \r\nalso play an important part in adaptation processes, and consequently \r\nthe discussion of enabling environments for sustainable or successful \r\nadaptation has to consider these different scales and actors. For \r\nexample, while autonomous adaptations are mainly undertaken by \r\nprivate actors, triggered by climate change-induced market or welfare \r\nchanges, planned adaptations can be carried out by both private and \r\npublic actors. Natural adaptations appear within ecosystems as a \r\nreaction to climate change, as well as other factors, and incorporate \r\ninnumerable possible actions that are context specific, ranging from \r\nmanagerial approaches to technological innovations and ecosystem\u0002based approaches (Huq et  al., 2004). Sanchez et  al"


id: 2823323d7850f2f7586aa8a28b5c0c71
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" (2017) draws \r\nattention to preconceived ideas about some adaptation measures \r\nthat are either considered good or bad without proper evaluation. It is \r\nargued that the association 'hard-bad' and 'soft-good' is not necessarily \r\ntrue; the impacts of adaptation can only be established through \r\na case-by-case assessment. The decision to select a more or less "


id: b4dda86e83251ff253a581cc3e63e7a8
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"In light of the severe adverse consequences of climate change for the \r\npoorest populations, whose livelihoods are frequently dependent on \r\nvulnerable ecosystems, it is essential to enhance knowledge about \r\nsustainable and appropriate adaptation strategies and measures, as \r\nwell as recognise and respond to limits to adaptation as reported in \r\nAR5 (Somorin, 2010; Noble et  al., 2014; Connolly-Boutin and Smit, \r\n2016). There is increasing evidence on the adaptation options that \r\nenhance the ability of different socio-ecological systems to become \r\nresilient in the long term in ways that do not exacerbate poverty and \r\ninequality, and on which adaptations may have little or no impact, or \r\neven adverse effects (maladaptation). Analysis of climate hazards can \r\nprovide an indication of required adaptation strategies, however, most \r\nimportant is the focus on exposure and vulnerability"


id: 8dd2a95a20d46123a2aa48386d56da0
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" The novelty of \r\nthe AR6 is the assessment of existing response capacities to cope and \r\nadapt to climate changes and associated hazards. There is increasing \r\nknowledge about the differential adaptation options within and across \r\nsocial groups and the influence of (enabling) conditions that enhance \r\nor limit these options."


id: c742695faba2e8d938be2a614347efb
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content:
"intensive adaptation measure should integrate all approaches, social, \r\nenvironmental, technical and economic, in a multi-criteria analysis. This \r\nanalysis should value, inter alia, social and environmental sensitivity, \r\nbenefits and drawbacks or trade-offs with climate, including all the \r\nadaptation options, among them the 'no action' alternative.\r\nAdaptation frequently responds to an observed or anticipated 'trigger' \r\nfor response, such as the looming loss of land to sea level rise (Barnett \r\net al., 2014). Identifying adaptation needs stemming from climate risks \r\nand vulnerabilities provides a foundation for selecting a sequence of \r\nadaptation options that connect through time, a long-term adaptation \r\npathway (Wise et al., 2014; Turnheim et al., 2015). National, sectoral \r\nor local adaptation plans are likely to include a number of measures \r\nthat are implemented jointly from across various categories, including \r\nstructural, institutional and social options"


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" While structural or \r\nphysical adaptation encompasses measures for the engineered built \r\nenvironment it also can encompass nature-based solutions, which \r\ninclude ecosystem-based protection measures, for example to buffer \r\nrisks and hazard exposure to extreme weather events. The category of \r\n'soft' adaptation measures--changes in societal values or practices--\r\nis often linked to issues of education, information and behavioural \r\nchanges to support communities within specific adaptation processes \r\nto climate change and climate hazards. Institutional adaptation deals \r\nwith adaptation actions and measures introduced through new legal \r\nframeworks, laws and regulations for new institutions or policies for \r\nrisk reduction and adaptation. This category can also encompass the \r\ndevelopment of new organisations that have a mandate to support \r\nadaptation (Noble et al., 2014)"


id: ac547b691581eaf3ebf39fb2e64dbb22
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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" The appropriateness and accessibility \r\nof adaptation options under these categories for supporting the poor \r\nand most vulnerable groups differs. In many cases large-scale structural \r\nmeasures are not affordable for many poor communities. Despite this \r\nimportant potential of Indigenous knowledge for disaster risk reduction \r\nof communities, it is often shunned by practitioners (Dube and Munsaka, \r\n2018). It is further argued by practitioners that Indigenous knowledge \r\nlacks documentation, it is not found in all generational classes, it is \r\ncontextualised to particular communities and the knowledge cannot be \r\nscientifically validated. However, there is also evidence that both local \r\ncommunities and disaster risk reduction practitioners can benefit from \r\nthe Indigenous knowledge of communities (Dube and Munsaka, 2018)."


id: 85a08a605eb1d249eb3f755e995f93f3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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"In this context, there are many potential adaptation options available \r\nfor a marginal change of existing agricultural and other livelihood \r\nsystems, often variations of existing climate risk management. \r\nAccording to Howden et al. (2007), implementation of these options \r\nis likely to have substantial benefits under moderate climate change \r\nfor some existing cropping systems. Apparently, there are limits to \r\ntheir effectiveness under more severe climate changes. Hence, more \r\nsystemic changes in resource allocation need to be considered, such as \r\ntargeted diversification of production systems and livelihoods. Howden \r\net al. (2007) further argue that achieving increased adaptation action \r\nwill necessitate integration of climate change-related issues with \r\nother risk factors, which implies integrating non-climatic factors, such \r\nas climate variability and market risk, and with other policy domains, \r\nsuch as sustainable development"


id: c4dd95768a4030696604fc86aeae7b6
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" An increasing number of research \r\nprogrammes seek to support adaptation to climate change through \r\nthe engagement of large-scale transdisciplinary networks that span \r\ncountries and continents (Cundill et al., 2019)."


id: 7fd45e96a6221d9daa7cb1cdf35ec5cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"Based on analysis of different adaptation options, there is high \r\nagreement that the many barriers to effective adaptation will require \r\na comprehensive and dynamic policy approach covering a range of \r\ngeographical scales and multiple actors across scales, taking into \r\nconsideration both climatic and non-climatic stress factors (Eriksen \r\net al., 2015). For instance, from the agricultural perspective, this could \r\nimply the understanding by farmers of change in risk profiles to the \r\nestablishment of efficient markets that facilitate response strategies. \r\nIt is also important to note that science, too, has to adapt employing a \r\nrange of approaches, based on the fact that multidisciplinary problems \r\nrequire multidisciplinary solutions"


id: 2a513a15370a0ce5d013fab619d3bfd2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
" Towards enhancing resilience, a \r\nfocus on integrated rather than disciplinary science alone could be of \r\nutmost importance as well as strengthening of the interface with key \r\nstakeholders, ranging from decision makers, practitioners, policymakers \r\nand scientists."


id: 44f7aa902def6952af324db75178db5b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) is a key principle within the United Nations Framework \r\nConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and attempts to acknowledge countries' diverse development situations. The Convention and \r\nits Kyoto Protocol operationalised the principle by committing developed (Annex I) countries to absolute emission reduction or limitation \r\ntargets and exempting developing countries from any binding reductions in emissions (Huggins and Karim, 2016; Pauw et al., 2019). In \r\ncontrast, the Paris Agreement distinguishes between 'developed' and 'developing' countries instead of Annex I and non-Annex I countries \r\nand acknowledges significant asymmetries and inequalities, not only between developed and developing countries, but also between \r\ndeveloped and developing countries themselves, both in terms of vulnerability to climate change impacts and capacity to mitigate the \r\nproblems"


id: 492e033cfdfcf01f456eeb8b996e8466
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" The literature contains extensive analyses of CBDR-RC in relation to equity in mitigation efforts in the post-2020 regime (e.g., \r\nMichaelowa and Michaelowa, 2015; du Pont et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017; Holz et al., 2018; Saelen et al., 2019), but little in relation to \r\nadaptation, particularly relating to how it plays out in the Paris Agreement."


id: 9852a0c10221c0f6af8e2e4fb943be87
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"The literature offers two main perspectives when evaluating the effectiveness of these provisions on adaptation in the context of the \r\npost-Paris climate change regime. One argument follows that the Paris Agreement gives priority attention to the most vulnerable parties \r\nand, unlike previous international agreements in the climate change regime, places adaptation on equal footing to mitigation (Magnan \r\nand Ribera, 2016; Perez and Kallhauge, 2017; Morgan, 2018). Article 7 is interpreted here as a breakthrough, containing unprecedented \r\nprovisions that give adaptation prominence and which elevate the importance of undertaking adequate action to cope with current and \r\nfuture climate change impacts"


id: adc34e2015c622707c8dedbc0c2513ba
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content:
" A second view argues that the Article 7 marks little departure from previous efforts to support adaptation \r\nefforts in developing countries (Doelle, 2016) or that it could have included stronger provisions, such as a quantitative goal with respect \r\nto adaptation needs and costs (Bodansky, 2016)."


id: fd7fc1cdf264b706f2898bf07de49081
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content:
"The literature nevertheless shows high agreement that other parts of the Paris Agreement do contain consequential provisions on \r\nadaptation and the operationalisation of the CBDR-RC principle. Those provisions covering financial support are arguably the most \r\npertinent, as they replace the dichotomy between developing countries and developed countries with a trichotomy which also includes \r\n'other Parties' (Maljean-Dubois, 2016). While provision of support from developed parties continues to be mandatory, these 'other parties', \r\napparently developing country parties, are 'encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily' (Article 9.2). Parties \r\nthemselves determine whether they belong to this category. So far, several developing countries have made contributions to the Green \r\nClimate Fund, ranging from Indonesia and Mexico to Mongolia and Panama (Green Climate Fund, 2017)"


id: 8908100bf6915791591cc3cf3d203f36
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content:
" Expanding the donor base to \r\nthese 'other parties' and breaking down the wall between donor and recipient countries marks a departure from previous practice, under \r\nwhich developing countries had no formal role in climate finance and support (Bodansky, 2016; Voigt and Ferreira, 2016)."


id: b2ef14c83895d70b4d1a675171e6c348
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"The scale of analysis, baseline conditions prior to adaptation and scale \r\nof action matter too when assessing the key components of an enabling \r\nenvironment for adaptation. At a national scale, it is well established \r\nthat low-income countries are less well positioned to manage climate \r\nchange impacts, being variously attributed to a lack of institutional, \r\neconomic or financial capacity to adapt effectively (Tol and Yohe, 2007; \r\nBarr et al., 2010). It can be particularly difficult to adapt to drought, \r\nfor example, when it occurs in the pre-conditions of poor water \r\nsupplies and sanitation (see Box 8.5; Section 8.3.2), and in a context of \r\ncorruption, governance failure and a lack of accountability"


id: 849cfbb628668bb8661ed0a264cde8b
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content:
" Adaptation \r\nproductivity in higher-income countries is further supported by better \r\ninfrastructure and stronger institutions--low adaptation efficiency is \r\nlinked to lower government spending, higher inequalities in income \r\ndistribution and poor governance (Fankhauser and McDermott, 2014). \r\nAt smaller scales, even within a single socioeconomic setting, different \r\ngroups require different kinds of adaptation support and exhibit \r\ndifferent vulnerabilities to climate change impacts. Huynh and Stringer \r\n(2018) found that households vulnerable to climate change impacts \r\nlinked to sea level rise and flooding in Da Nang City and Ngu Hanh \r\nSon district, Vietnam, had limited access to human, natural, physical, \r\nfinancial and social assets, and lacked a diversified livelihood portfolio. \r\nAn enabling environment for household-level adaptation would need \r\nto address these factors in this context"


id: a090fea87d4607ec7878578aeed323e2
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content:
" However, the same authors \r\nfound that at district scale, different challenges persisted, including \r\nobstacles to multidirectional flows of climate information, poor \r\nvertical interplay both upward and downward, and a lack of citizen \r\nparticipation in the governance of climate change."


id: 82a4979a91f3db9dd32c2364c14eb315
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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"The specific political economy of each country and its underpinning \r\nphilosophies shape the national political context in which public policy \r\nsupporting adaptation is developed and implemented. It further shapes \r\nthe context for private adaptation. Public policy targeting climate \r\nchange seeks to address market failures, amend policy distortions \r\nand offer incentives for private adaptation, as well as provide climate\u0002resilient public goods, climate services and safety nets for the poor and \r\nvulnerable (Fankhauser, 2017). In some countries that have a more \r\nstable institutional context, such policies are more straightforward to \r\ndevelop and implement; while in countries with weaker institutions \r\n(e.g"


id: 37ea2aadd46b06795eb4e08e0806d979
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"There are nevertheless concerns regarding institutional fit: that \r\nforeign funding regimes may not map onto more recently developed \r\nadministrative traditions, leading to dominance of governance models \r\nemanating from donors (Vink and Schouten, 2018). Research has \r\nfound multilateral donors do not prioritise vulnerable developing \r\ncountries at the project selection stage and they have received smaller \r\nallocations of adaptation finance from bilateral donors than less \r\nvulnerable countries (Saunders, 2019), leaving the poor vulnerable \r\nto climate impacts"


id: 6c15fe9ea9a45f5a779480f532b775b2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
" The lack of climate finance flowing to LDCs and \r\nSIDs (currently 14% and 2% of the total, respectively) is compounded \r\nby access issues due to the inability of domestic institutions to meet \r\nspecific fiduciary standards and other access requirements, insufficient \r\nhuman resource support and the inflexibility of current approaches, \r\nwhich are biased in favour of governments and against non-traditional \r\nactors, such as local enterprise and grassroots organisations (Shakya \r\net  al., 2021). Further, vulnerable developing countries shoulder \r\nadditional financial burden, embodied in higher interest payments to \r\nservice public and private debt, due to the increased cost of capital "


id: d10f75f6492ac548ca33b62da4187257
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"Among the many institutions, actors and roles associated with \r\nsuccessful adaptation, two play an increasingly important role: local \r\ngovernments and the private sector (Noble et al., 2014). These groups \r\noften define the flows of information and finance from the top down, \r\nas well as supporting the scaling up of community and household \r\nadaptation. In some countries, for example, in South America \r\n(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay) vocational agricultural schools, often in \r\nremote rural locations, play a key part in knowledge-sharing activities \r\nthat support adaptation. Similar valuable contributions are made \r\nby universities through their outreach activities, particularly those \r\noffering programmes in environmental and agricultural fields. Many \r\nactors face a lack of resources and capacity, particularly at the local \r\nlevel"


id: 23f296face74f4f71c8fc921e2e80e43
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" Local institutions, including local governments, NGOs and civil \r\nsociety organisations, are hampered by ongoing challenges in gaining \r\nsupport from higher governance levels--from national government or \r\nthe international community--particularly in developing countries. At \r\nthe same time, private sector actors, from individual farmers and small/\r\nmedium enterprises (SMEs) as well as large multinational businesses, \r\nwill seek to protect and enhance their production systems, supply \r\nchains and markets by pursuing adaptation-related opportunities. Yet, \r\nwhile these goals will help expand adaptation activities, they may \r\nnot align with government or community objectives and priorities \r\nwithout coordination and incentives, and in the process, can reinforce \r\nexisting capacities, inequalities and power relations (Sovacool et al., \r\n2015)"


id: 791b341b7b7b52c167310578ea3fc87c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
" Similarly, an enabling environment for businesses' adaptation \r\nis highly differentiated and often requires structural deficits (such as \r\nlimited market access, finance and transport and communications \r\ninfrastructure) to be tackled (Gannon et al., 2020)."


id: 446601b6e0addd0f61816fafd3328303
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Policies and investments that are adopted are embedded within \r\nthe relevant legal and regulatory frameworks, which extend beyond \r\nnational jurisdictions upward to the regional scale (such as the \r\nSouthern Africa Development Community's Southern Africa Regional \r\nFramework of Climate Change Programmes, 2010) and international \r\nscale, for example, UNFCCC, the 2015 Paris Agreement, the Sendai \r\nFramework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the New Urban Agenda and the \r\nSDGs. Legal and regulatory concerns also extend downward to shape \r\nlocal- and city-scale adaptation efforts (e.g., Sao Paulo's municipal \r\npolicy and new master plan). Nevertheless, only a minority of countries \r\nhave dedicated legal frameworks supporting adaptation (Lesnikowski \r\net al., 2017) and these often lack in both precision and obligation--\r\nlargely because adaptation is a contested global public good but \r\nalso because adaptation is commonly bundled in with mitigation \r\ncommitments (Hall and Persson, 2018)"


id: 26238ad6b792aa0fcd83e320905fa2e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
" Coherence, horizontally and \r\nvertically in both policy and law is often lacking. At the same time, \r\nbottom-up, private, autonomous adaptation efforts are being better \r\ntracked, with different actors motivated by growing experiences of \r\nlocal climate change impacts (Berrang-Ford et  al., 2014). While the \r\nemergent polycentricity of adaptation governance is beginning to \r\ntake shape, wherein both state and non-state actors share a common \r\nadaptation goal and interact coherently, yet often independently, to \r\nadvance progress towards it (Morrison et al., 2019), understandings \r\nof how various centres of decision making with different degrees of \r\nautonomy support an enabling environment for adaptation, remain \r\nat a nascent stage. Multiple scales and forms of adaptation occur, \r\nwith attributes such as self-organisation, appreciation of site-specific \r\nconditions, and the need for learning and experimentation, alongside "


id: abc226a841faea66ce373139ee3e9e40
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content:
"The challenges of climate change have driven governments around the \r\nworld to emphasise climate services as a route to enhance decision \r\nmaking and reduce climate-related risks, as well as inform adaptation, \r\nsupporting calls for the right to information (Tall and Njinga, 2013). \r\nWhile there have been some efforts to evaluate the economic impact of \r\nclimate services alongside other impacts (e.g, Tall et al., 2018), little is \r\nknown about the institutional contexts in which investments in climate \r\nservices have taken place, nor those groups that are most vulnerable or \r\nmarginalised in relation to specific climate risks. Vincent et al"


id: a289163b90fcbfdb901ebf1e4c88f728
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vector_id: 23133
content:
" (2017) \r\noffer preliminary insights from Malawi, identifying that barriers to \r\nimproved integration of climate services in national policy planning \r\ninclude factors relating to spatial and temporal scale, accessibility \r\nand timing of information provision, credibility and mismatches in \r\ntime frames between planning cycles and climate projections. An \r\nunderstanding of the factors that enable climate service investment is "


id: 960cb2b91e83ba708dc19749f015aec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"In a market economy, human activities tend to exacerbate degradation \r\nof natural capital, despite its role in buffering climate change impacts, \r\nsupporting mitigation and providing adaptation options. Economic \r\nagents base their decisions on market prices, even though market prices \r\ndo not incorporate the costs of deteriorating natural capital because \r\nof externalities and other market failures, that is environmental \r\ndegradation is not internalised (Bowen et al., 2012). At the same time, \r\nexpanding populations, capitalism and consumption choices affect the \r\ncondition of natural capital, alongside short-termism stemming from \r\npoverty, linked to the need for survival. All these factors therefore \r\ninteract, with the aggregate effect of worsening the impacts of climate \r\nchange, while also undermining future adaptation options, particularly \r\nfor the poor. Adaptation policies should, but do not always, compensate \r\nfor the prevalent market failures"


id: d3d3d0c671860a74aa73d486735af2c5
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" For example, in Melanesia, sea \r\nwalls have been built out of coral by local people in an attempt to \r\nreduce the impacts of rising sea levels, leading to outright destruction \r\nof some of the world's most productive and biodiverse coral reefs \r\n(Martin and Watson, 2016). Similarly, in the Congo Basin, farmers are \r\nadapting to increasingly variable rainfall by expanding their cropping \r\nactivities into forested areas, releasing carbon into the atmosphere \r\nthrough forest clearance activities and threatening biodiversity. \r\nAgricultural land is also being degraded globally (see IPCC, 2019a), \r\nand this too closes down adaptation and livelihood options for the \r\npoorest, natural resource-dependent populations, while jeopardising \r\nfood security, biodiversity and human health at wider scales"


id: 79d0765959c2acbb1fbb475484d5373d
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content:
" An \r\nenabling environment for adaptation therefore demands investment in \r\nsustaining natural capital at multiple scales, internalising the costs of \r\ndegradation, as well as establishing the necessary legal and regulatory \r\nframeworks (and associated enforcement) to reduce its degradation \r\n(IPBES, 2018)."


id: 2abe746a8a218d426d14cb2012819792
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"Overall, adaptation entails financial (and non-financial) costs not just \r\nin implementing adaptation actions, but also in designing, facilitating \r\nand preparing for actions--costs to create and maintain an enabling \r\nenvironment (see also Section  8.2.2.3; Cross-Chapter Box  LOSS in \r\nChapter 17). Financial and economic investments target the whole \r\nrange of other types of asset (natural capital, physical capital, human \r\ncapital, social capital). AR5 reports that aggregate economic losses \r\naccelerate with increasing temperatures (IPCC, 2014a). Costs may \r\nbe borne when gaining information (e.g., investments in climate \r\nservices), while adjustment costs are incurred as adaptations take \r\nplace. Nevertheless, to enable adaptation, investment is needed \r\nin various natural, human, physical and social assets, as considered \r\nbelow"


id: 7178905efb19d9f97cf4afcedabb28c4
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content:
" The importance of investment in each of these different types \r\nof asset varies according to the scale and livelihood system in need of \r\nadaptation and the ways in which livelihood resilience is framed and \r\npower is distributed, within each specific setting (Carr, 2020)."


id: 9529f2f9c709232ab921b50cb04e92d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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vector_id: 20971
content:
"It is well established that climate change compounds the impacts of \r\npressures that humans place on the environment (high confidence) \r\nand that environmental degradation can undermine options for \r\nadaptation and an enabling environment, with poor and natural \r\nresource-dependent groups most acutely affected (see e.g., Cross\u0002Chapter Paper 3 for insights from deserts and semiarid areas). \r\nSustainable management of natural capital contributes to building \r\nresilience and the natural ability of ecosystems to adapt to climate \r\nchange (IPCC, 2014a; see also IPCC SROCC, Section  5.3.2, Bindoff \r\net al., 2019). Some systems like mangroves (found in 123 countries, \r\nmany of which are in the Developing World) offer a broad range of \r\nvital ecosystem services (Hamza et  al., 2020). Mangroves provide \r\nregulating services by acting as a natural defence against sea level rise \r\nand storm surges; and by sequestering carbon in both the trees and \r\nsediments they capture. Provisioning services (e"


id: 40c758470106394e19b1ced57e492ef
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content:
"g., fish, crabs, timber \r\nand fuelwood) from mangroves support livelihoods and livelihood \r\nadaptation options, especially for those with few other livelihood \r\nopportunities, while these systems also provide important habitat \r\n(breeding, spawning and nursery grounds for fish) and biodiversity, \r\nand offer cultural services in the forms of education, recreation and \r\nspiritual benefits (Quinn et al., 2017). As the frequency of events such \r\nas hurricanes, storms and typhoons rises with climate change, natural \r\ncapital assets like mangroves become increasingly important in \r\nprotecting coastlines and supporting adaptation. While not reducing \r\nthe hazard itself, the mangroves reduce exposure and, in some cases, \r\nalso vulnerability"


id: 7379e6f9df505b59c3920d4d6a239a6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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vector_id: 15789
content:
" The literature shows with high confidence that \r\nenvironmental assets support both climate change mitigation (at a \r\nlarge scale) and adaptation (at a smaller scale), particularly for the \r\npoorest groups in society, who directly depend upon natural capital \r\nfor their subsistence (e.g., Angelsen et al., 2014). In turn, the legal and \r\nregulatory context and institutional set up determines who has access \r\nrights to different aspects of the natural resource base. This shows \r\nhow different aspects of the enabling environment work in tandem to \r\nconstitute one another."


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"The literature increasingly shows that approaches such as nature\u0002based solutions (NBS) and ecosystem-based adaptation (see Chapters \r\n2; 6) can offer value for money in tackling climate change from both a \r\nmitigation and adaptation standpoint (Seddon et al., 2020). According \r\nto the Global Commission on Adaptation, a global investment of \r\nUSD 1.8 trillion between 2020 and 2030 into adaptation measures such \r\nas early warning systems, climate-resilient infrastructure, improved \r\ndryland agriculture, mangrove protection, and resilient water resources \r\ncan yield USD 7.1 trillion in total net benefits (Global Commission on \r\nAdaptation, 2019). NBS operate by harnessing natural processes, \r\nsometimes in combination with technological or engineered solutions"


id: f226937f81461b0266a792a56d541d09
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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" \r\nExamples encompass green public spaces and parks (Sahakian and \r\nAnantharaman, 2020), green infrastructure, such as urban forests and \r\nstreet trees (Richards and Edwards, 2017), which create shade and \r\nreduce urban heat island effects whereby urban areas are warmer than \r\ntheir surroundings (Depietri et al., 2013), and support human health \r\nand well-being by keeping people in cities more closely linked with \r\nnature (Gulsrud et al., 2018). NBS also encompasses blue infrastructure \r\nincluding constructed wetlands, bioswales, rain gardens and so forth, \r\nwhich can reduce flood risks (Haase, 2015). While the literature is \r\ngenerally positive about the ability of NBS to support climate risk \r\nreduction and deliver multiple other benefits (Connop et al"


id: ddf5dc96f0040c47b92a1ba3560b13ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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"Adaptations that support human health and well-being require \r\ninvestments in physical assets and infrastructure linked to water and \r\nsanitation (see Chapter 4), particularly in rapidly urbanising areas in \r\nthe Global South, alongside specific pro-poor investment strategies \r\ngiven disproportionate climate change impacts on women (see Cross\u0002Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18), other marginalised groups and \r\nlow-income households who lack access to healthcare. Climate change \r\nfacilitates the spread of vector-borne diseases such as malaria, as well \r\nas illnesses such as meningitis (Rocklov and Dubrow, 2020). Impacts \r\non health are also experienced, through food insecurity resulting \r\nfrom climate change, including malnutrition, as well as through loss \r\nof livelihoods, making it more difficult to afford and to access health \r\nservices"


id: 5febdc1dfb60b0515c38087f4039ef04
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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" Health aspects are considered in-depth in Chapter 7, but we \r\nunderscore the importance of a rights-based approach to adaptation \r\nin supporting the right to health and food in the context of inequality."


id: 81e135e01f0eca036d91d8f2f1b3faaf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"Analyses of educational attainment distributions with datasets reaching \r\nback as far as 1970 show that improving educational attainment in \r\npeople of working age has been the most consistent and significant \r\ndriver of economic growth globally (Lutz et  al., 2008), showing the \r\nimportance of the right to education. Education has further supported \r\nsustainable development by fostering empowerment, yielding access \r\nto information (including on climate change) and has clear links to \r\nother aspects of human capital, including health and mortality (Samir \r\nand Lutz, 2017). There is medium evidence and high agreement that \r\neducation reduces vulnerability and enhances adaptive capacity \r\n(Frankenberg et al., 2013; Sharma et al., 2013), with high agreement \r\nthat climate change impacts can have negative effects on existing \r\nlevels of human capital, with some development pathways affected \r\nmore than others (Samir and Lutz, 2017)"


id: 27b7e096c1292f7c602441212bfc7ac2
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" Education can help to \r\nshape people's risk perception and assessment, as well as affecting \r\nknowledge sharing and the development of problem-solving abilities \r\n(Striessnig et al., 2013)."


id: 29e3f67df999a449fa42b57ce23270aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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"A key dimension of human capital is local understanding of climate risk, \r\nwhich includes knowledge systems outside Western scientific approach\u0002es. For millennia, local communities have relied heavily upon culturally \r\naccumulated Indigenous knowledge, participating in landscapes as \r\nstewards of their environment, engaged in profoundly detailed liveli\u0002hood strategies that deal with natural hazards (Ajayi and Mafongoya, \r\n2017). Indigenous knowledge systems are embedded in culture, and are \r\npassed from generation to generation in various ways: livelihoods, tradi\u0002tions, spiritual practices and oral tradition, cultural identity and historical \r\nmemory. Indigenous knowledge is known or learnt from experience, or \r\nacquired through observation and practice, and handed down from gen\u0002eration to generation"


id: b1f0a3742c78c3f03cdaff24ca273795
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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" It is acknowledged that Indigenous communities, \r\nparticularly those in hazard-prone areas, have developed a profound un\u0002derstanding and knowledge of disaster prevention and mitigation, early \r\nwarning, preparedness and response, and post-disaster recovery. Indige\u0002nous knowledge systems, themselves, are an indispensable dimension \r\nof capacity for adaptation, and where threatened represent a major risk \r\nto Indigenous communities. While still robust among Indigenous Peoples \r\nin many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America, Indigenous knowledge \r\nis not well reflected or incorporated in assessments such as this, and \r\nstands in danger of being lost as its custodians are passing away."


id: ae34dbaec94e26e387b43c53989ce372
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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"as well as foresight in planning and design and climate risk screening, \r\nsuccessful adaptation relating to physical capital also demands legal \r\nand institutional enablers (e.g., development and enforcement of \r\nbuilding codes and regulations; roll out of insurance options; planning \r\nrestrictions to reduce construction in locations that are highly exposed \r\nto climate hazards, etc). In some situations, these are lacking. For \r\nexample, low-lying LDCs, such as Bangladesh, as well as SIDS, regularly \r\nsuffer from climate events such as floods, typhoons, cyclones, hurricanes \r\nand saline intrusion (see Chapter 15 on small islands). Hazards such as \r\ntyphoons cause substantial damage and destruction, impede mobility, \r\nreduce connectivity, disrupt communications, food, water and energy \r\nsupplies, and render people homeless and without the assets they rely \r\non to make a living"


id: 7158bab1d4b550e55e239d0ce273aa03
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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" In the absence of adequate legal and institutional \r\nenablers, as well as livelihood assets, the maintenance of physical \r\ncapital is far more challenging, as the case of Cyclone Aila in Box 8.8 \r\ndemonstrates."


id: f574eed60f82f2ae55a24a74867b4f13
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"locally effective adaptive responses. However, it is important that IKLK \r\nis situated within knowledge from other scales in order to assess its \r\nbroader relevance and applicability (Ahlborg and Nightingale, 2012). \r\nSome authors suggest including Indigenous knowledge in the IPCC \r\nassessment process should be of high priority, as it is becoming \r\nincreasingly relevant for climate services (high confidence) (Strauss and \r\nOrlove, 2003; Crate and Nuttall, 2009; Crate, 2011). Their knowledge \r\ncan draw attention to climate baselines and change, and identify \r\nadaptation priorities, such as plant and animal species that should \r\nbe protected given local contextual environmental considerations"


id: f1b5344da82cfc516c04a9d21ca0aebf
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" \r\nFor example, using Indigenous knowledge in weather and climate \r\nprediction, local communities in different parts of Tanzania have been \r\ncoping with, and adapting to, increased climate variability normally \r\nmanifested in the form of increased frequency and magnitude of \r\nvarious exigencies, including droughts and floods, and outbreak of \r\npests and diseases (Kijazi et al., 2013). Prediction of impending hazards \r\nhas been an integral part of Indigenous Peoples' adaptation strategies. \r\nVarious environmental and astronomical indicators are used to predict \r\nrainfall, including plant phenology, behaviour and movement of birds, \r\nanimal and insects, in many parts of Tanzania (Kijazi et al., 2013)."


id: c71b1fc59ae8b0637aa285bdd3d6c5a2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"Physical capital in the form of technology is increasingly supporting \r\nclimate change adaptation, despite that innovations can be rolled \r\nout under high uncertainty, opening up new risks (e.g., hacking). \r\nMoreover, deployment of technology is closely tied to other forms \r\nof capital, especially human capital, and innovations cannot just be \r\nrolled out in the absence of suitable institutional and technical support \r\nand training. Similarly, access to finance is vital. Some technological \r\nadaptations require a pre-existing level of infrastructure and literacy, \r\nraising important questions about inequality (Taylor, 2018). Rotz et al. \r\n(2019) warn of automation impacts on rural labour, especially in \r\nplaces with high youth unemployment, while Taylor (2018) notes that \r\nsocial classes and gender are impacted differently by technological \r\nchange, and failure to address underlying inequalities will shape who \r\nbecomes vulnerable"


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" Adequate testing of technologies in terms of their \r\napplicability to different contexts is also required, ensuring they do not \r\nbecome maladaptive when applied at scale."


id: 3e0c3958868826d1b3a7dabf9df71cbb
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"Ensuring sufficient investment in physical capital is vital to support \r\ndevelopment pathways at the national level, but for the poorest and \r\nmost marginalised in society, physical capital represents an invaluable \r\nsource of adaptation options (Hallegatte et al., 2019). Physical capital \r\nconstitutes assets such as land, roads and other infrastructure (e.g., \r\nwater supplies, electricity, mobile phone connectivity), housing and \r\nother buildings, as well as the materials and tools needed to make \r\na living (e.g., farming, forestry and fishing equipment, transportation \r\nvehicles, technology). It can also help to foster a sense of place, and \r\ncan support well-being"


id: 13d46d7f5064fe0005461292ceb156bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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" Climate change impacts on physical capital \r\nare often widespread, as well as economically and emotionally costly, \r\nparticularly when communities are afflicted by hardship (inadequate \r\nlevels of sustainable human development through access to essential \r\npublic goods and services and access to income opportunities) (Abbott \r\nand Pollard, 2004)."


id: 3c306d7e38e6dd64876c3aaa67f38f03
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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"Similarly, technology must always be grounded in an appreciation \r\nof the cultural context. Research in the European Arctic with the \r\nIndigenous Sami Peoples found that use of GPS technology on reindeer, \r\ntogether with supplementary feeding, offered useful adaptations for \r\nsome herders. However, there are fears such technologies may, over \r\ntime, reduce the skills, cultural knowledge and Indigenous adaptations \r\nof the Sami (Andersson and Keskitalo, 2017), as, for example, reindeer \r\nbecome tamer through supplementary feeding, affecting their range \r\nselection. Overall, technology and other adaptations should seek not \r\nto erode Sami culture's adaptive capacity (Vuojala-Magga et al., 2011; \r\nRisvoll and Hovelsrud, 2016), particularly because reindeer grazing \r\nas a land management practice can play a useful climate change \r\nmitigation role too"


id: be4dd1d417e50a6bffbc1579427fc7a2
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content:
" Reindeer grazing protects tundra from tree line and \r\nbush encroachment, while summer grazing increases surface albedo \r\nby delaying snowmelt (Jaakkola et al., 2018)."


id: 19e15b681fd85ad7cf09bc933345f358
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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"Aila greatly damaged the region's physical capital, including 6000 km of roads and 17,000 km of embankments. The cyclone polluted \r\nand damaged sources of drinking water and destroyed 243,000 houses and thousands of schools (Mallick et  al., 2017; Paul and \r\nChatterjee, 2019). In Satkhira and Khulna districts alone, 165,000 houses were destroyed and households were forced to live on damaged \r\nembankments in makeshift shanties (UNDP, 2015). Many people had to live in these temporary shelters for years (Saha, 2017). Aila \r\noccurred during a high tide and the surge of saline water inundated not only the roads, embankments and houses but also vast areas \r\nof agricultural field and shrimp farms (Paul and Chatterjee, 2019) leaving many areas waterlogged for months (Abdullah et al., 2016; \r\nMallick et al., 2017)"


id: ce8b7f2d846dae1872b547eb940cd4bd
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" The effect of saline water logging inside embankments caused further harm to houses, roads and culverts, adding \r\nmore barriers to the post-disaster reconstruction activities (Roy, 2020). In the same area, tube-wells were damaged. Women had to travel \r\nup to 2 km every day to collect safe water, spending 30-90 minutes on this activity daily (Alam and Rahman, 2019). The distribution \r\nof costs across different socioeconomic groups was not always as expected. A study in Aila-affected Koyra sub-district of Khulna found \r\nthat households with higher incomes were more vulnerable to Aila in both relative and absolute terms compared to middle- and low\u0002income groups mainly due to damage to shrimp farming, which underpinned their livelihoods (Abdullah et al., 2016). This highlights how \r\nspecialised livelihoods can leave people more vulnerable as they have fewer options"


id: b32aa2637fe7de73f35138c0c7e2d6
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" However, the same study found that the damage \r\nto physical capital such as fishing nets and boats was statistically significantly greater for middle- and low-income groups. Damage to \r\nhouses was statistically significantly more among poorer households followed by middle- and higher-income groups."


id: ad12cba606d70b2d96d839813f465bb0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"As of 2017, many of the affected areas had not yet been able to recover from the effects of Aila (Paul and Chatterjee, 2019). A transformative \r\napproach needs to be taken not only to help them recover in livelihood terms, but also to support people's well-being. Suggestions of \r\nphysical interventions that are needed include higher and stronger dykes, cyclone-resistant housing, active maintenance and strict \r\npolicing of embankment use and good governance (Abdullah et  al., 2016). Enabling formal institutions could help, for instance, by \r\nimproving the climate resilience of physical capital (e.g., by developing and enforcing building codes for houses). Other institutional \r\nmechanisms could help to improve access to low interest credit, prevent maladaptation, improve enforcement of laws, and provide \r\ninsurance. However, such institutional reforms need to be co-developed with local people and incorporate local cultural mechanisms \r\n(Islam and Nursey-Bray, 2017)"


id: 49dbe3640b51729a505bbed5b446a561
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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" Future adaptation strategies also need to consider the limits to autonomous adaptation (i.e. that without \r\nexternal intervention) and differential level of impacts and adaptive capacities among different groups of households in the Aila-affected \r\nareas. This example illustrates the importance of a more comprehensive approach to resilience building, and the need to better understand \r\nthe interlinkages between the core components of an enabling environment for adaptation (see Figure 8.12)."


id: 5c214fafb1e64bb07adc797d29f9fb12
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"ties (e.g., one-way information transfer) can lead to the establishment \r\nof mutual collaboration relations that can be more easily drawn on in \r\ntimes of climate change-related shocks and stresses (Ingold, 2017), \r\nwhile collective shared disaster experiences can cause new social groups \r\nto emerge and spur action, linked to a perceived common fate (Ntontis \r\net al., 2020). However, this can exacerbate inequalities and create new \r\nones, with those who are more connected having enhanced access to, \r\nfor example, shelters following storm evacuations or earthquakes (Rahill \r\net al., 2014). In adapting to more incremental changes, social capital has \r\nbeen shown to increase shared local knowledge and awareness, support \r\nparticipatory processes and strengthen ties to corporate and political \r\ninstitutions, increasing their responsiveness to local concerns, as shown \r\nby examples from Aldrich et al. (2016)"


id: d0ea981e8823a9860eeac941a5aaa4d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
" They describe how in Houma, \r\nLouisiana, located west of New Orleans, rising sea levels and hurricane \r\nrisks have drawn on and built social capital at the community level. Having \r\nwhat was perceived locally as insufficient federal government support, \r\nresidents, church groups and town council members collaborated to spur \r\nadaptation. Community mobilisation led to construction of self-funded \r\nlevees and water projects to protect 200,000 residents from storm surges. \r\nProjects include marshland restoration, the elevation of existing housing, \r\nimproved pumping systems and canal drainage, as well as buyouts \r\nand relocations of businesses and housing that has been repetitively \r\ndamaged. Funds were raised from households through donations via \r\na self-imposed sales tax"


id: 43b3e0781ca4da655a40061ae838dc99
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" While this example paints a positive picture of \r\nthe role of social capital and collective action in adaptation activities, it \r\nalso raises questions about the coherence of actions across levels, again, \r\nhighlighting a role for polycentric governance if risks of maladaptation \r\nare to be reduced. The danger in the example presented here is that \r\nshould federal plans conflict with the community level work in the future, \r\nlocal efforts may have been in vain if installations have to be removed. \r\nThis highlights the importance of careful evaluation of all adaptation \r\noptions on an ongoing basis."


id: 61b8a8d6e92ab5eb2c43ae70a8b435e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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"both the need to adapt and the way it is presented and communicated, \r\nalthough evidence is somewhat mixed in terms of how experiences \r\nof weather affect opinions and perceptions of climate change (Howe \r\net  al., 2019). Research also highlights the importance of context in \r\nunderstanding relations between perceptions of risks and behaviour, \r\narguing that power relations and other obstacles and opportunities \r\nplay a vital role in shaping actions (Rufat et  al., 2020). In general, \r\nnonetheless, adaptation is spurred when people perceive that there is \r\nan action they can take to make a difference (Kuruppu and Liverman, \r\n2011; Mayer and Smith, 2019), although it cannot be assumed that \r\naction will be taken if the socio-cultural setting is not amenable and it \r\ncontravenes the values underlying people's perceptions (Kwon et al., \r\n2019)"


id: 78761a8c4eef16a1b959dcc0a6253fbf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" Research testing for the effect of beliefs on behavioural change \r\nfrom 48 countries highlighted the need for policy leaders to present \r\nclimate change as solvable yet challenging, if fatalistic beliefs that act \r\nas barriers to adaptation were to be reduced (Mayer and Smith, 2019). \r\nThis demonstrates how beliefs do not always reinforce actions, even \r\nwhen risks are perceived. Similarly, research from Burkina Faso working \r\nwith the Fulbe ethnic group found that cultural norms restricted \r\nengagement in four of the most successful livelihood strategies that \r\nsupport adaptation to climate change (labour migration, working for \r\ndevelopment projects, gardening and female engagement in economic \r\nactivities) (Nielsen and Reenberg, 2010). Cultural factors therefore \r\nplay an important but under-researched role in adaptation."


id: a86a4204955a3390614a97afc323ad81
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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vector_id: 24021
content:
"CRD relies on identifying synergies between different strategies and \r\nactions in the field of climate change, primarily between mitigation \r\nactions with adaptation benefits (Locatelli et  al., 2015), adaptation \r\nactions with mitigation benefits (Denton et  al., 2014; Sanchez and \r\nIzzo, 2017), processes that promote both mitigation and adaptation \r\nmeasures, and policies and strategies that promote integrated \r\nmitigation and adaptation measures (Zhao et al., 2018). At the same \r\ntime, adaptation and mitigation actions can be evaluated in terms of \r\ntheir co-benefits, the social, economic or other benefits of actions in \r\naddition to avoiding climate change impacts (Karlsson et al., 2020). \r\nThe clearest co-benefits of mitigation are associated with economic \r\ndevelopment through low-carbon industrialisation (IPCC, 2014c; Jakob \r\net al., 2014; Lu, 2017)"


id: 9e7f0280665506c0bafa3eafcc6cd756
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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vector_id: 22471
content:
"security and nutrition, and help to end hunger. There are five land \r\nchallenges identified including climate change mitigation, adaptation, \r\ndesertification, land degradation and food security. This report identified \r\nthree major categories of climate response options that show promise \r\nfor achieving mitigation and increasing capacity for adaptation while \r\naddressing poverty: SLM options, value chain management and \r\nrisk management options (IPCC, 2019a). For example, programmes \r\nsupporting no-till agriculture and residue retention allow small-scale \r\nfarmers to participate in mitigation and adaptation activities, with \r\nlong-term benefits to soil health and food, energy and water security \r\n(Wright et al., 2014). Likewise, the installation of a solar powered drip \r\nirrigation system simultaneously reduces emission, improves water \r\nsecurity and increases farmers' income (Locatelli et al., 2015)"


id: e213d31e2cc54b802ab606b5c7972248
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
" Response \r\noptions in terms of SLM options, and value chain and risk management \r\ninvolve interlinkages between land-based climate strategies, synergies \r\nand trade-offs (see Chapter 6). On the other hand, a key trade-off is \r\nthe potential for maladaptation, where one adaptation intervention at \r\none time, location or sector could increase the vulnerability at another \r\ntime, location or sector, or increase the vulnerability of the target group \r\nto future climate change (medium evidence, high agreement) (Eriksen \r\net al., 2011)"


id: 7590799a466cd3a1c7d4b415d9634da6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16088
content:
" A cause of increasing concern to adaptation planners is \r\nthe understanding of maladaptation has changed subtly to recognise \r\nthat it arises inadvertently, from poorly planned adaptation actions, but \r\nalso from carefully deliberated decisions where wider considerations \r\nplace greater emphasis on singular or short-term outcomes ahead of \r\nbroader, longer-term threats, or discount, or fail to consider, the full \r\nrange of interactions arising from the planned actions across scales \r\n(Eriksen et  al., 2021). Research identifies the challenge of avoiding \r\nmaladaptation as one of reducing long-term structural vulnerability. \r\nAccordingly, one can consider CCD and maladaptation as two sides \r\nof the same coin. Scholars of 'sustainable adaptation' define it as \r\nadaptation that contributes to socially and environmentally sustainable \r\ndevelopment pathways, which takes into account both social justice \r\nand environmental integrity (Eriksen et  al., 2011)"


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" The parallels in \r\nmaladaptation include the underlying drivers of vulnerability, namely \r\nsocio-environmental processes such as conflict, marginalisation, \r\neconomic restructuring, exploitation, institutional fragility and so forth \r\n(Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018b; Neef et al., 2018)."


id: c02385d02922b55afb8efdd411bbe011
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"The key challenge for CRD is addressing climate change from the \r\nperspective of development: addressing the fundamental development \r\nobstacles that limit capacity for adaptation. Where development is \r\nnot sustainable, especially if it is not equitable, capacity for adapting \r\nis greatly reduced--a phenomenon known as the adaptation gap \r\n(Figure 8.14; Birkmann et al., 2021a; UNEP, 2021). Figure 8.14 depicts \r\nthe effect of development trajectories (as described in the SSPs \r\nframework) on capacity for adaptation, a key determinant of eventual \r\noutcomes. Achieving CRD through coupling adaptation with equitable \r\nsustainable development under and low emissions profiles that limit \r\nwarming to 1.5degC (i.e., sustainability scenario) is necessary to close the \r\nadaptation gap. Even if emissions are kept low and 1.5degC emissions \r\ntargets are achieved, if poverty and inequality remain high, then \r\nimpacts are expected to remain high and may overwhelm capacity \r\nfor adaptation"


id: b51b9daf2997a7911c9792b5221a8b8
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" High poverty and high inequality in a society (i.e., \r\ninequality scenario) reduce the likelihood that countries are able to \r\nmanage risk and avoid residual impacts, such as also documented \r\nin the assessment above (see Sections  8.2; 8.3; 8.4). Unsustainable \r\ndevelopment trajectories reduce capacity for adaptation and may \r\nresult in highly unequally distributed residual impacts from climate \r\nchange. Even despite rapid, equitable development and modest \r\nemissions reductions efforts necessary to limit warming to 2degC (i.e., the \r\nmiddle of the road scenario), there is still risk of unequal distribution of \r\nimpacts. Under all high emissions scenarios (>3degC warming), universal \r\nresidual impacts are unavoidable."


id: d172adb4bb91d37605b9d5e39d8aa7cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"Harnessing opportunities for mitigation, adaptation and development \r\nin an effective manner may lead to 'triple wins' under CRD, though \r\nempirical evidence is extremely rare for such triple win strategies that \r\naddress mitigation, adaptation and development in an effective manner \r\n(Tompkins et  al., 2013). Integration of mitigation, adaptation and \r\ndevelopment is being initiated and operationalised through projects \r\nby several developing countries to achieve main national development \r\npriorities, such as poverty reduction, increased employment \r\nopportunities, energy security and transportation (Denton et al., 2014; \r\nStringer et al., 2014). Important follow-on questions are pressing social \r\nquestions about how trade-offs are deliberated, who wins and loses and \r\nwho decides (see Section 8.4 and Ellis and Tschakert, 2019). Likewise, \r\nthe efficiency, effectiveness and feasibility trade-offs of climate policies \r\nmust be considered (i.e"


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content:
", can programmes in developing countries be \r\neconomically efficient and provide opportunities to achieve sustainable \r\ndevelopment targets for developing countries?) (Dang et  al., 2003). \r\nMoreover, questions about co-benefits must consider the benefit-\r\ncost ratio of mitigative versus adaptive action for assets saved from "


id: c3f707e3578c485da45afdeb15addc66
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content:
"Integrated climate change actions or responses can be inefficient \r\nand infeasible in the absence of enabling conditions, including the \r\npolicy conditions that reinforce unified climate action, and sustainable \r\nfinancial mechanisms for implementation of the programmes and \r\npolicies (Duguma et al., 2014b). In the absence of strong coordination, \r\nintegrating mitigation and adaptation may undermine the overall or \r\nindividual objectives of either climate response (Kongsager, 2018). A \r\nlack of coordination in mitigation and adaptation may also exacerbate \r\nthe threats of climate change to sustainable development (Ayers and \r\nHuq, 2009; Kongsager, 2018). Therefore, for successful integration of \r\nCRD, it is necessary to move beyond considering either adaptation \r\nor mitigation towards better understanding the linkages between \r\nadaptation and mitigation projects and policies at multiple levels of \r\ngovernance to identify potential trade-offs in projects and policies \r\n(Suckall et  al"


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", 2015) and to identify the enabling conditions for \r\ndesigning and implementing action leading to synergies (Denton et al., \r\n2014; Kongsager, 2018)."


id: 5d45018c6688a66804189c5be3b021aa
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"Despite the potential effectiveness and efficiency of integrating \r\nmitigation and adaptation under a common CRD framework, gaps \r\npersist in our knowledge about the enabling conditions for synergies, \r\ndue to the limited number of examples and even fewer evaluations. \r\nPotential benefits may be achieved by pursuing multi-level governance \r\napproaches, that means integrating decision making at the local level \r\nwith coordination at other levels, by actors and agencies simultaneously \r\npursuing multiple other priorities (see Section 8.5.2 Shaw et al., 2014). \r\nFor example, pursuing climate-resilient land use pathways integrating \r\nclimate policy within the land use sector requires a governance policy \r\nenvironment that combines multiple policy aims, including urban \r\ngrowth, soil conservation and water management alongside mitigation \r\nand adaptation"


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content:
" Facilitating climate-resilient land use pathways \r\ncombining the aims of climate change adaptation, mitigation and \r\nsustainable development requires a governance environment with: (a) \r\ninternal climate policy coherence between mitigation and adaptation \r\nobjectives and policies, (b) external climate policy coherence between \r\nclimate change and development objectives; (c) vertical policy \r\nintegration that mainstreams climate change into sectoral policies and \r\n(d) overarching governance structures that facilitate horizontal policy \r\nintegration for cross-sectoral coordination (Di Gregorio et  al., 2017) \r\nas well as sector policies integrating climate change adaptation and \r\nmitigation (England et al., 2018)."


id: 791a836a0390d6517d59f7f35e9820bd
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content:
"Some sectors--such as agriculture, forestry, energy--are found to \r\nhave more potential for CRD synergies than others, although trade\u0002offs are also identified. CSA, carbon-forestry programmes and the \r\nwater-energy-climate nexus show trade-offs across levels and sectors \r\nwith identified winners and losers (high confidence) (IPCC, 2018a). \r\nMitigation can be designed to provide opportunities for enhanced \r\nadaptation with comparable co-benefits, even while adaptation \r\nportfolios can maximise co-benefits around sustainable resource \r\nmanagement that reduce emissions (Dovie, 2019). Climate policy \r\nintegration can be considered as the integration of multiple policy \r\nobjectives, governance arrangements and policy processes of climate \r\nchange mitigation and adaptation along with other policy domains \r\n(Di Gregorio et al., 2017), as well as sector policies integrating climate \r\nchange adaptation and mitigation (England et al., 2018)"


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" Integrating \r\nclimate policies may require balancing multiple sectoral goals, such \r\nas REDD+ projects, CSA, water sector strategies, national policies \r\non climate change and national conservation plans (Duguma et  al., \r\n2014a). Within the scientific discourse, increasing attention is given to \r\nthe question of the synergies and mismatches between mitigation and \r\nadaptation policies."


id: 4374fabcdf494c0118789c99fc2e6390
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content:
"CRD may require multi-sectoral coordination, including public-private \r\npartnerships (Campbell et al., 2018). In the food system, for example, \r\nunder a CRD framework transformative actions may require (a) \r\nincentives for expanded private sector activities and/or public-private \r\npartnerships, (b) publicly backed credit and/or insurance, (c) public \r\ninstitutional support for strong local organisations and networking, (d) \r\nclimate-informed weather advisories and early warning systems, (e) \r\ndigital investments in technological transformation for agriculture (e.g., \r\n'digital agriculture' and virtual markets), (f) investments in climate\u0002resilient and low-emission practices and technologies (Duguma et al"


id: 4935749fe9250fd821ff9ca61c318ec
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content:
", \r\n2014b), (g) prioritisation and pathways of change, (h) capacity and \r\nenabling policy and institutions are crucial with careful consideration of \r\ntrade-offs between adaptation and mitigation, and amongst other SDGs \r\nfor achieving SDG13 'urgent action to combat climate change and its \r\nimpacts' (Campbell et al., 2018). Moreover, the risks of transformative \r\nactions to the farmers is addressed by strong good governance at \r\nmultiple levels, combining top-down and bottom-up processes along \r\nwith by a mix of levers that combine policy, technology, education and \r\nawareness raising, dietary shifts and financial/economic mechanisms, \r\nattending to multiple time dimensions (Stringer et al., 2020)."


id: 4437039a5deedfb821b75b2046c65ff9
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content:
"Integrated CRD approaches in agriculture, such as CSA, can reduce trade\u0002offs and exploit synergies with biodiversity and food security to reduce \r\nthe risk of climate change (Di Gregorio et al., 2017; Loboguerrero et al., \r\n2019). There are many technologies and approaches in agriculture that \r\nleverage synergies relevant for CRD, including agroecology (Pandey \r\net al., 2017a; Saj et al., 2017), CSA, climate-smart landscapes, organic \r\nagriculture mitigating climate change, conservation agriculture, \r\necological intensification and sustainable intensifications, which in \r\nmany cases aim to address both adaptation and mitigation to climate \r\nchange simultaneously (Kongsager, 2018). From these approaches, \r\na number of scalable agriculture technologies have emerged that \r\nsimultaneously achieve mitigation and adaptation goals, such as \r\nreducing water consumption while maintaining grain yield, including \r\nalternate wetting and drying irrigation technology (Liang et al"


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content:
", 2016) \r\nand aerobic rice production (Wichelns, 2016). Likewise, a number \r\nof these approaches have been supported within international and \r\nnational institutional frameworks (e.g., through incentives) to harness \r\nsynergies (Kongsager et al., 2016)."


id: 488d597dc26a542e9a7b19196366c3fe
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"Locally appropriate agro-ecological practices have clear potential \r\nto increase the resilience of livelihoods and enhance adaptation \r\nto climate change at field and farm levels across a wide range of \r\ncontexts, often with significant mitigation co-benefits (Sinclair et al., \r\n2019). Relatedly, agroforestry systems are the intentional integration \r\nof trees and shrubs into crop and animal production systems to solve \r\nsocietal challenges including climate change (Raymond et al., 2017). \r\nFor example, in the tropics, such systems offer viable opportunities to \r\nmitigate and adapt to climate change for farmers by transitioning to \r\nresilient farming systems and improving farm economy while securing \r\nenvironmental benefits for local and global communities (Swamy and \r\nTewari, 2017)"


id: c27116decae82fdd53a21f76a2161f8f
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"(Rivera-Ferre et al., 2016) and strengthen institutions such as agricultural \r\nsupport programmes, markets and intra- and inter-regional trade (Zhang \r\net  al., 2017). For example, sustainable pastoralism can contribute to \r\nmitigation both by increasing carbon sequestration through improved \r\nsoil management and by reducing methane emissions through changing \r\nthe mix and distribution of the herd. Likewise sustainable pastoralism \r\ncan also contribute to adaptation by changing grazing management, \r\nintroducing alternative livestock breeds, improving pest management \r\nand modifying production structures (Joyce et  al., 2013). Another \r\nexample of rangeland adaptation is diversifying the use of rangelands, \r\nsuch as supplementing with payments for ecosystem services, carbon \r\nsequestration, tourism or supplementary assistance for all land-based \r\nactivities (Gharibvand et  al., 2015)"


id: 2dd90603f8d9e479d489abaddf38ca48
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" However, challenges for climate\u0002smart livestock production systems remain due to a lack of information, \r\nlimited access to technology and insufficient capital (FAO, 2017). \r\nSmallholders in cropping and livestock systems in sub-Saharan Africa \r\nand South Asia, for example, face obstacles obtaining climate change \r\nmitigation and adaptation synergies due to poor access to markets \r\nand relevant knowledge, land tenure insecurity and the common \r\nproperty status of most grazing resources (Descheemaeker et al., 2016). \r\nConsequently, the appropriateness of these strategies and measures \r\nneeds to be further evaluated, particularly in terms of their usefulness \r\nfor the poor and most vulnerable."


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"The enabling conditions for the expansion of agroforestry include \r\ntraining and expert support programmes for managers and sharing \r\nof best practices (Ashraf et al., 2015; Hernandez-Morcillo et al., 2018; \r\nTschora and Cherubini, 2020). Other scalable frameworks integrating \r\nfood and agriculture within CRD include sustainable intensification \r\n(SI), which emphasises sustainable practices to safeguard sustainable \r\nuse of natural resources and meet the growing demand for agricultural \r\nproduction, while building resilience (Thierfelder et al., 2018). Integrated \r\nagricultural systems aim to increase farm diversity and lower reliance \r\non external inputs, enhancing nutrient cycling and increasing natural \r\nresource use efficiency (Smith et al., 2017), and may have the potential \r\nto enhance resilience against climate change impacts and risks (Gil \r\net  al., 2017)"


id: d44f3023b45c8232182881afbecb4879
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content:
" Policy frameworks that aim to integrate any of these \r\napproaches for climate action must account for the costs associated \r\nthroughout the uptake and adoption process (Gil et al., 2017)."


id: 983a2fb4814b925782d38acb6502d9f4
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content:
"As the consumption of animal protein and products rises along \r\nwith global standards of living, CRD will require transformations in \r\nlivestock-centred livelihoods. Livestock are a key contributor to global \r\nfood security, especially in marginal lands where animal products are \r\na unique source of energy, protein and micronutrients (FAO, 2017; \r\nIPCC, 2019a). However, they also contribute disproportionately to total \r\nannual anthropogenic GHG emissions globally and influence climate \r\nthrough land use change, processing and transport through emitting \r\nCO2, animal production by increasing methane emissions, and feed \r\nand manure production by emitting CO2, nitrous oxide, and methane, \r\n(Rojas-Downing et  al., 2017). Mitigation of livestock emissions can \r\nbe achieved by implementation of various technologies and practices \r\nsuch as improving diets to reduce enteric fermentation, improving \r\nmanure management and improving animal nutrition and genetics \r\n(Rojas-Downing et al"


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", 2017); altering land use for grazing and feed \r\nproduction, altering feeding practices, improving manure treatment \r\nand reducing herd size (Zhang et  al., 2017). Adaptation strategies \r\nin the livestock sector include changes in animal feeding, genetic \r\nmanipulation, alterations in species and/or breeds (Zhang et  al., \r\n2017), shifting to mixed crop-livestock systems (Rojas-Downing et al., \r\n2017), production and management system modifications, breeding \r\nstrategies, institutional and policy changes, science and technology \r\nadvances, and changing farmers' perceptions and adaptive capacity \r\n(USDA, 2013)."


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content:
"However, while studies of existing REDD+ programmes noted \r\nthe moderately encouraging impacts for mitigation and small or \r\ninsignificant impacts for adaptation options (especially well-being), \r\nthey underscored the potentially damaging impacts to local livelihoods \r\n(Milne et  al., 2019; Skutsch and Turnhout, 2020). They suggested \r\nimproved engagement with local communities, increased funding \r\nto strengthen the interventions on the ground, and more attention \r\nto both mitigation and adaptation outcomes in implementation for \r\nachieving the benefits of REDD+ programme (Duchelle et al., 2018)"


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" \r\nMoreover, to effectively counter local threats to forests and biodiversity \r\nand attain positive biodiversity and development outcomes, REDD+ \r\nprogrammes must be focused on better institutional support for \r\ngovernance, coordinating interventions and monitoring of plans, \r\nas well as making explicit linkages between REDD+ activities and \r\nnational biodiversity conservation efforts (Panfil and Harvey, 2016) \r\nand assuring a fair distribution of benefits to local communities (Myers \r\net  al., 2018). An analysis of country-specific REDD+ programmes in \r\nCameroon looking at synergies of REDD+ with other national goals, \r\nsuch as poverty reduction, identified two principal modes of strategic \r\ninteraction management among actors. The first priority relates to \r\nspecific structures for designing REDD+ giving high priority to social \r\nsafeguards"


id: 69f7dc1f713f9ec236b49c81c268c5e9
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content:
" The second relates to programming that builds trust, \r\ncommunication and confidence of participants creating an environment \r\nfor enabling management through commitment and behavioural \r\ninteraction by creating an overarching institutional framework and \r\nunilateral management (Somorin et al., 2016)."


id: ead2d8e133251f500a8898e540a08890
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content:
"About 1 billion people globally (12.5% of the world's population) do \r\nnot have access to electricity (World Bank, 2021), and yet access to \r\nelectricity is required for basic adaptation strategies, such as the use \r\nof air conditioning and fans in homes and working spaces to mitigate \r\nheat stress and enable healthier lives, daytime activities and night\u0002time sleep quality. Electrification enables farmers to mechanically \r\npump water from the underground to boost agricultural productivity, \r\nstabilise yields and make food security less reliant on erratic rainfall \r\npatterns and less vulnerable to dry spells. Access to electricity enables \r\nthe spread of valuable information through television, radio, computers \r\nand smartphones, including weather forecasts and disaster prevention \r\nand response (Dagnachew et  al., 2018). The increasing access to \r\nelectricity facilitates SDG 7 coupled with other SDGs and societal \r\ngoals, including mitigation of climate change (van Vuuren et  al"


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", \r\n2018) through reducing energy consumption by the use of efficient \r\ntechnology and appliances. Electricity access can be an important \r\nenabler of adaptation action for different purposes in different sectors \r\n(Mastrucci et al., 2019)."


id: c9a9fc0aec63f7c0a023848edb8405cf
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"Low-carbon development strategies can also be compatible with \r\necological sustainability, as proponents of bioenergy have claimed. \r\nBioenergy can contribute to reducing emissions and energy inefficiencies \r\nin agricultural food and bioenergy sectors, while safeguarding food \r\nand energy security. However, recent literature also points towards \r\nsignificant tensions and mismatches between increasing bioenergy on \r\nagricultural land and local livelihoods and food security (Yildiz, 2019). \r\nA growing list of studies have documented the detrimental trade-offs \r\nbetween smallholder food systems and large-scale biofuel production, \r\nwhich include dispossession and impoverishment of smallholder farmers, \r\nfood insecurity, food shortages and social instability (Hunsberger et al., \r\n2017)"


id: 4bf36b7f145b09d704ce359f4325ee3d
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"Trade-offs of bioenergy can be minimised by replacing land-intensive \r\nfirst-generation biofuels (e.g., oil palm) with second and subsequent \r\ngenerations (e.g., microalgae). However, there are costs of relying on \r\n'sustainable biofuels' as most of the agricultural and non-agricultural \r\nland would be needed for cultivation of biofuels along with reduction \r\nin patterns of energy consumption a significant reduction in population \r\n(Gomiero, 2015). Contrasting impacts on environmental, economic and \r\nsocial sustainability are reported for production and use of biofuels \r\n(Azapagic and Perdan, 2011), ranging from positive impacts, such as \r\nreduction in GHG emissions, energy security and rural development, \r\nto negative impacts, such as risks of increasing food prices, increasing \r\nGHG emissions through direct and indirect land use change from \r\nproduction of biofuel feedstocks, and degradation of land, forests, \r\nwater resources and ecosystems (UNEP, 2009)"


id: 2eda2276dc6973035785aae10f5a0891
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" Biofuel production \r\nmay cause loss of biodiversity (Jeswani et  al., 2020) and may also \r\nimpact various ecosystem services, such as land, water and food, and \r\nmay pollute air, water and soil (Scovronick and Wilkinson, 2014). The \r\ncollective benefits of biofuels could be realised by developing future \r\npolicies based on integrated systems with a clear understanding about \r\nthe interactions across sectors and land uses gained by analysing \r\ncomplete value chains (Jeswani et al., 2020)."


id: 3781b8eae7382012c99b05e3a0d354ab
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content:
"A range of different traditional economic decision support tools can \r\nbe used to help guide resource allocation in relation to climate change \r\nadaptation (e.g., cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, \r\nmulti-criteria analysis) (Watkiss et al., 2016), with a strong focus on \r\nmonetary values and the present and near-term. There are also tools \r\nto assess uncertainty (e.g., iterative risk management) and to guide \r\ndecision making under uncertainty over longer time frames (through, \r\ne.g., real options analysis, robust decision making involving substantial \r\nnumbers of scenarios, portfolio analysis and rule-based decision \r\nsupport for uncertainty where maximum regrets are minimised). Use \r\nof these tools nevertheless requires human capital and skills, and more \r\ncommonly they are applied to public rather than private (individual/ \r\nhousehold) adaptation decision processes"


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" Tools grounded in \r\neconomics can lack sufficient consideration of which groups in society \r\nmight gain and lose out from particular options (Sovacool et al., 2015; \r\nStringer et al., 2019), neglecting to appreciate non-monetary factors \r\n(like well-being) which are non-economic, less tangible and harder to \r\nput a value on (see Section 8.3)."


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"Clean sources of energy, such as solar and wind, can facilitate both \r\nmitigation and adaptation. For example, in South Africa, clean sources \r\nof energy provide energy security with huge water savings along with \r\ncreation of employment, proximity to point of use and, in many cases, \r\nless reliance on concentrated sources of energy (Mpandeli et al., 2018). \r\nOverall, the increased use of thermal solar panels contributes to reducing \r\nGHG emissions and improves air quality, as well as providing benefits \r\nto the community and the environment. The differential adoption of \r\nsolar panels can be managed by simultaneous investment in other \r\ntechnologies that utilise renewable energy along with investment in \r\nsolar panels (Kaya et al., 2019)"


id: 6a908385c9d8c7c73f4310f98b2a1ff1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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vector_id: 14381
content:
" Development of a smart electricity grid \r\nconnected to a renewable energy source reduces GHG emissions and \r\ndecreases vulnerability to climate change by enhancing the response \r\nto changing conditions and providing a more reliable service to the \r\npopulation (Hennessey et al., 2017). Moreover, development of policies \r\nfor a low-carbon and climate-resilient power system, a local nexus \r\nbetween mitigation and adaptation could be explored (Handayani \r\net al., 2020). For example, use of efficient fuel in urban areas facilitates \r\nair pollution reduction and also provides health benefits for urban \r\npopulations (Ramaswami et al., 2017). Green buildings substantially \r\nreduce energy consumption and also improve indoor environmental \r\nquality and thus contribute to mitigation and provide societal value in \r\nterms of health (MacNaughton et al., 2018)"


id: 2b2180a676f5d44d3c3e77f821464611
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
" In addition, green-roofed \r\nbuildings contribute to keeping local temperatures cooler during hot \r\ndays and thereby reducing energy use for air conditioning and thus \r\ncontributing to both mitigation and adaptation (Sharma et al., 2016)."


id: 37d298e9c721b6e336d7c5d7408cbc79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"Mainstreaming and policy coherence is one of the most proposed \r\nstrategies for dealing with adaptation and mitigation as a coherent \r\napproach, in the context of good governance. Politics, power and \r\ninterests influence the prospects of achieving integrated climate policy \r\nand development goals in practice (Naess et al., 2015). Institutional \r\nincoherence has led to inefficiency and ineffectiveness (Di Gregorio \r\net  al., 2017). To achieve more coherent institutions and synergies, \r\nfour major enabling conditions have been identified: (a) planned and/\r\nor existing national laws, policies and strategies, (b) existing and \r\nplanned financial means and measures, (c) institutional arrangements \r\nin the country with specific reference to climate change issues and \r\n(d) planned and/or existing programmes and initiatives in the country \r\n(Kabisch et al., 2016)"


id: a11ae37de297c2e1e0dfd4ce1b29b825
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
" Another strategy offered is to develop a 'dual \r\ntrack approach' at local/municipality/city level by having a local \r\nclimate plan and/or mainstreaming plan (Duguma et al., 2014b). This \r\ncan lead to effective implementation of climate actions and diffusion of \r\nclimate issues into local sector policies (Reckien et al., 2019). Effective \r\nclimate policy integration (CPI) calls for four levels of coherence (Di \r\nGregorio et al., 2017), namely between internal coherence (mitigation "


id: adff65fd1e0aaadbcf5bd325b6dd3824
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"is used to examine synergies and trade-offs between adaptation and \r\nmitigation (Howells and Rogner, 2014). As reviewed by Wiegleb and \r\nBruns (2018), early use of the concept was by the World Economic \r\nForum in 2008 where it was emphasised that issues of economic \r\ngrowth need to be considered within water, energy and food resource \r\nsystems. This was later published as Water Security: The Water-Food-\r\nEnergy-Climate Nexus. Another key activity was the Bonn2011 Nexus \r\nconference. Then, in 2015, The Nexus Dialogue Programme was \r\nheld by the UN and EU Commissions as an approach to implement \r\nthe SDGs. UN Water underscores the water-energy-food nexus as \r\ncentral to development (Newell et al., 2019)"


id: 49ebd1abc5ee7a72d3c8bc36189e1497
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
" It notes that demand for \r\nwater, food and energy are rising due to a growing population, rapid \r\nurbanisation, changing diets and economic growth, and in most cases, \r\nthe lack of knowledge on the water-energy-food nexus has often led \r\nto mismatches in prioritisation and decision making which hinders \r\nsustainable development (Mitra et al., 2020). However, the benefits of \r\nnexus approach are not always easily quantified and often accrue to \r\nlocal communities over time (Amjath-Babu et al., 2019)."


id: 34f5aae72eae5e4df51afd2c120a27a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"A well-coordinated and integrated nexus approach offers opportunities \r\nto build resilient systems while harmonising interventions, mitigating \r\ntrade-offs and hence improving sustainability (Biggs et  al., 2015). \r\nThis can be achieved through greater resource mobilisation and \r\ncoordination, policy convergence across sectors and targeting nexus \r\npoints in the broader landscape (Mpandeli et  al., 2018). Studies \r\nutilising the nexus approach to climate change in different places \r\nshow considerably different results. In the southern African region, \r\nclimate change is already affecting water-energy-food resources and \r\nexerting further pressure on already scarce resources. It is proposed \r\nthat adaptation can be achieved through cross-sectoral management \r\nof resources, by adopting water management practices, aiming to \r\nproduce more food and energy with less water resources and adopting \r\ncleaner and renewable sources of energy"


id: 2ee2810ba9b2d2f24b0decb0a62b6abe
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content:
" This will result in saving \r\nwater and ensuring energy security in a region that depends on \r\nhydro and coal energy sources (Mpandeli et al., 2018). Applying the \r\nnexus approach to the Hindu Kush Himalayan region identified three \r\nchallenges: increasing population and declining agricultural land, \r\nstagnating or declining food production and increasingly water- and \r\nenergy-intensive food production despite water and energy scarcity \r\n(Rasul and Sharma, 2016). Nexus smart adaptation policies need to \r\nbe complemented with system-wide adaptation, policy coherence and \r\nsectoral coordination that targets poverty and vulnerability linkages \r\n(Rasul and Sharma, 2016)."


id: 3c32bb12717d05dd56632649ef08a24
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"Different governance approaches, such as polycentric governance, \r\nadaptive governance, multi-level governance, collaborative governance \r\nor network governance, are increasingly utilised to understand the \r\nprocesses of transitioning towards CRD. The potential of polycentric \r\ngovernance approaches for promoting both climate mitigation and \r\nadaptation is well established (Cole, 2015; Abbott, 2017; Morrison \r\net al., 2017a; Warner et al., 2018). Polycentric governance deals with \r\nactive steering of local, regional, national and international actors, and \r\ninstigates learning from experience across multiple actors, levels of \r\ndecision making and temporal scales (Ostrom, 2010). It is the source of \r\npower to achieve collective goals. Polycentric actors have the framing \r\npower, power by design and pragmatic power (Morrison et al., 2017b)"


id: 62e454334677563359e52548526c3417
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
" \r\nPolycentric governance offers new opportunities for climate action \r\nthrough more opportunities for communication, trust-building, policy \r\nexperimentation and learning (Cole, 2015). Adaptive governance \r\nis understood as various interactions between actors, networks, \r\norganisations and institutions towards achieving a desired state of \r\nsocial-ecological systems (Chaffin et al., 2014). It requires a structure of \r\nnested institutions, diversity at different levels, connected by formal and \r\ninformal social networks (Dietz et al., 2003). As Brunner and Lynch (2010) \r\nobserve, the emergence of community-based initiatives in addressing \r\nclimate change marks the emergence of adaptive governance."


id: 18f9443644ad7b57f53a7a4ccb7fc617
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
"and Nicholls, 2017; Brugnach et  al., 2017). Detailed knowledge of \r\nlocal socio-ecological contexts may offer transformational processes \r\nto harness synergies (Thornton and Comberti, 2017). A study in the \r\nUkraine on cooperatives shows that it offers a well-established \r\nlivelihood strategy and means to support agriculture smallholders. \r\nMoreover, social capital fulfils key roles in the process of capacity \r\nbuilding and implementation of sustainable measures (Kopytko, 2018). \r\nIn Indonesia, a well-known programme focusing on community\u0002led adaptation and mitigation activities is Proklim. It empowers \r\ncommunities to learn about climate change impacts, record data \r\nand plan actions for climate change (Muttaqin and Yulianti, 2019). \r\nMulti-stakeholder, participatory planning processes are beneficial \r\nto help farmers to screen and prioritise rural livelihood strategies in \r\nIndonesia"


id: 6d892382f613cb131c128b889d14d6be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
" The necessity of CRD is reflected in standard development \r\ninterventions: water management, intensification and diversification \r\nof agriculture and aquaculture, education, health, food security and \r\nskill building for farmers (Wise et al., 2016)."


id: 8cdc624e4886a3ad018b87af545e24aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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"Globally, the main sectors benefiting from adaptation finance to date \r\ninclude water and waste water management; agriculture, forestry, land \r\nuse and natural resource management; disaster risk management; and \r\ninfrastructure, energy, and other built environment (Oliver et al., 2018). \r\nIn recent years, this finance has moved away from concentrating on \r\nwater and wastewater management to spread out more evenly across \r\nthe sectors. Between 2015/16 and 2017/18, investment in water and \r\nwastewater management dropped from USD 11 billion to USD 9 billion, \r\nwhile investment in agriculture, forestry, land use and natural resource \r\nmanagement grew from USD 5 billion to USD 7 billion, and investment \r\nin disaster risk management more than doubled from USD 3 billion \r\nto USD 7 billion (CPI, 2019)"


id: ccf3b0ede1ea42036b77c2e77091842a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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content:
" In addition, while mitigation actions are \r\nmore easily delineated, for example wind farms in the energy sector, \r\nadaptation measures often need to be mainstreamed across a number \r\nof sectors and investment decisions."


id: abe1f267661aae7038c84f5e80c931e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:27
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vector_id: 24563
content:
"There is still some debate on what qualifies as adaptation finance and \r\nhow such finance should be measured (UNFCCC, 2016). According to \r\nthe Climate Policy Initiative, adaptation finance is 'finance with the \r\naim of improving preparation and reducing climate-related risk and \r\ndamage, for both human and natural systems, as short-term climate \r\nimpacts will continue to exact economic, social, and environmental \r\ncosts even if appropriate mitigation actions are taken' (CPI, 2019). \r\nAccording to UNEP, the annual costs of adaptation in developing \r\ncountries could range from USD  140  billion to USD  300  billion by \r\n2030. Globally, adaptation costs are estimated to be even greater, \r\nwith up to USD 500 billion yr-1 by 2050 under a Business-As-Usual \r\nscenario (UNEP, 2021)"


id: 18cc8ed7c40ae7ee4e7b78a400230ef
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" While global climate finance flows reached \r\nUSD 579 billion on average over the 2017/18 period, there has been \r\na continued heavy imbalance in favour of mitigation finance, with \r\nadaptation finance totalling around USD  30  billion (compared to \r\nUSD 532 billion for mitigation), or 5% of tracked climate finance. The \r\nWorld Bank has, however, committed to increase direct adaptation \r\nfinance to USD 50 billion over the 2020-25 period, putting the Bank's \r\nadaptation finance in developing countries on par with its mitigation \r\ninvestments (World Bank, 2019a). Adaptation finance is also growing \r\nalongside finance for actions with both mitigation and adaptation \r\nbenefits, for example in forestry or agriculture, which rose to just over \r\nUSD 12 billion (CPI, 2019), as well as increasing focus on adaptation \r\nand cross-sectoral projects. Looking only at climate finance flows \r\nfrom developed to developing countries, the OECD estimates a total \r\nof USD 78"


id: 57290052f4cc978ae962395c3796430e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"9 billion mobilised in 2018, with mitigation accounting for \r\n70% (USD 55 billion) of the total, adaptation 21% (USD 16.8 billion) \r\nand cross-cutting finance making up the remainder (OECD, 2020a)."


id: a83d6fd4b4ec031567d42e14a907a213
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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vector_id: 23994
content:
"at the individual or household scale, without coordination at larger \r\ninstitutional scales (Section  8.3, 8.4; Barrett, 2014). Discussions of \r\nadaptation finance often occur in the context of dwindling resources \r\nand trade-offs: triage decisions about other investments that societies \r\ncan tolerate suspending (Warner and Van der Geest, 2013; Tanner \r\net al., 2015). In many poor, vulnerable countries, complex governance \r\nchallenges, such as budget austerity or corruption, hamper the provision \r\nof such support. In the absence of adaptation funding for the poor, \r\ncoordinated at higher scales, the costs of adaptation are borne by the \r\npoor at community, kin-group and household scales. Bearing the cost \r\nof adaptation, thus, can become, in the short term, an erosive process \r\nof coping that ultimately increases the likelihood that communities and \r\nhouseholds will remain trapped in poverty (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018b)"


id: 7acb23436fb8970cc0217ce29ad41686
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content:
" \r\nIn the long term, measures financing adaptation may be maladaptive, \r\nmeaning they ultimately leave the poor at greater risk of experiencing \r\nclimate change impacts (Section 8.4.5; Rahman and Hickey, 2019). Such \r\ncircumstances highlight the governance gap that drives the poorest to \r\nrely on extreme measures to finance adaptation."


id: fe74db00ff7e5a3d139395cddab9a753
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"New financial instruments can help to support investment in, for \r\nexample, ecosystem-based adaptation. For example, green bonds \r\ncan raise significant amounts of capital in support of projects with \r\nenvironmental/climate benefits. The green bond market has quickly \r\ndeveloped since the European Investment Bank launched the first \r\ngreen bond in 2007, with issuance growing to USD 257.7 billion in \r\n2019, up more than 50% on the previous year (CPI, 2019). Most green \r\nbonds focus on energy, buildings and transport infrastructure but \r\ngreen bond issuance to support sustainable agriculture and forestry \r\nhas grown from USD 208 million in 2013 to USD 7.4 billion in 2018 \r\n(Wilkins, 2019). The Seychelles issued the world's first 'blue' bond in \r\n2018 with the support of the World Bank. Similar to green bonds, blue \r\nbonds earmark the use of bond proceeds for specific purposes, here the \r\nsustainable use of marine resources (World Bank, 2018)"


id: ad7d00379763432a80c3c0c60eac108d
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content:
" In 2019, the \r\nEuropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development issued the world's \r\nfirst ever dedicated climate resilience bond, raising USD 700 million. \r\nThe 5-year bond will be used to finance the Bank's projects in climate\u0002resilient infrastructure (e.g., water, energy and transport), climate\u0002resilient business, commercial operations, climate-resilient agriculture \r\nand ecological systems (Bennett, 2019). While these issuances are still \r\nsmall compared to the overall green bond market, their rapid growth \r\npoints to enormous opportunities for ecosystem-based adaptation."


id: ccf8d81037824d48975a6fbd67423ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"Enabling conditions for formal adaptation finance for the poorest are \r\nneeded to reduce reliance on high-risk, extra-legal sources of income (see \r\nSection 8.5.2). In general, the antidote to this emerging problem is access \r\nto living wages that the poor can rely on to finance adaptation. There are \r\nfew examples of pro-poor mechanisms, programmes or institutions that \r\nprioritise coordinated, access to credit for proactively adapting livelihoods \r\nof the poor (Agrawal and Perrin, 2009). Institutions can reduce incentives \r\nfor vulnerable people to engage in high-risk activities by including them \r\nin the process of adaptation governance, which aims not only to support \r\nsustainable livelihood practices (such as farming, fishing and forestry), \r\nbut also to guarantee land tenure (Wrathall et al., 2019)"


id: a3a657e640d0e66a663ba879cc529d44
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" Also critical \r\nfor risk reduction to the poor is the ability of authorities across multiple \r\nspatial and temporal scales to maintain social protection to reduce \r\nthe dependency of illegal sources of income and facilitate adaptation \r\n(Tenzing, 2020). A range of tools exists for opening access to credit to \r\npoor and marginalised people whose livelihoods are most vulnerable \r\n(Ribot, 2013): climate insurance tools that are designed and targeted \r\nat the poorest and which have been properly assessed to ensure that "


id: 64220f52057db338b23b150260f24bfb
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content:
"in regional clusters. It reports that significantly more people are living \r\nin highly vulnerable context conditions compared to those living in \r\nlow vulnerability contexts. The assessment revealed that more than \r\n3 million people are living in countries classified as very highly or highly \r\nvulnerable (depending on the assessment method and the number \r\nof classes used, and countries included). In contrast, approximately \r\n1.8 billion people reside in low or very low vulnerable country contexts. \r\nStudies estimate the population in the most vulnerable regions to \r\nalmost double by the year 2100 (Section  8.4.5.2). When near-term \r\nestimates are used, the population growth in highly vulnerable \r\ncountries is still significantly higher compared to less vulnerable \r\ncountries"


id: 16cc432e813860981a1938d670a87707
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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" Consequently, this assessment points towards the fact \r\nthat even if we do not know how societal or community vulnerability \r\nwill develop in specific areas, it is very likely that in the future, \r\nmore people will live in destabilised and highly vulnerable country \r\ncontexts compared to the population today. However, it is important \r\nto note that the scientific literature also underscores that trends in \r\nvulnerability differ significantly between different world regions and \r\nwithin countries."


id: 3fadcb2445bc2d5b57b40f7343db3276
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"The chapter provides additional evidence on livelihood resources at \r\nlocal levels that have been impacted by different climate hazards and, \r\nglobally, that specific hazards (namely, drought and rising temperatures) \r\nare more threatening and destabilising to livelihoods than others. \r\nThere is robust evidence that coping and adaptive capacities erode \r\nwith increasing GMT--substantial differences are expected between \r\na GMT increase of less than 1.5degC compared to an increase of more \r\nthan 3degC--and the frequencies of climate hazards, such as heat waves, \r\ndroughts or floods is likely to increase substantially. Nevertheless, this \r\nassessment also revealed that the adverse impacts of climate change \r\nfor livelihoods and multidimensional poverty differ substantially \r\nbetween different population groups exposed to climate hazards, \r\nbased on the socioeconomic and governance context"


id: 6d36d8f1b55d564221a94d6eb7176bd1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
" Consequently, \r\nsocietal impacts of climate change need to be understood in the \r\nbroader context of development and the development challenges that \r\ninfluence exposure, vulnerability and adaptation."


id: 5e790412b2b88f92395f2ba6d3db7c74
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content:
"There is robust evidence of the impacts of all climate hazards on \r\nthe key livelihood resources that the poor depend on. There is high \r\nconfidence that two climate hazards pose high risk to a broad range \r\nof livelihood resources: warming trends and droughts. Meanwhile, \r\nthe livelihood resources that are globally at greatest risk include \r\npeople's bodily health, food security and agricultural productivity (high \r\nconfidence). Evidence suggests that the fundamental challenge of \r\nclimate change to livelihoods is that rising temperatures, drought and \r\nother hazards endanger human life, and the lives of plants and animals \r\nthat humans rely on to survive (high confidence). There is now robust \r\nevidence that the impacts of climate change on livelihoods are driving \r\npeople to migrate in search of alternative incomes, and this tendency \r\nwill increase with rising temperatures"


id: cc154818dc5e4d79b68369a6898cec77
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
" Of greatest concern are people \r\nwhose development context is compromised by war, conflict and \r\nextreme poverty and inequality, such as refugee populations and \r\ndisplaced people."


id: afb808c801c9caaa503dd5e96457cafa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"This chapter builds on AR5 and the IPCC SR 1.5degC on key limits to the \r\nadaptation of natural and social systems that are compounded by the \r\neffects of poverty and inequality, such as on water scarcity, ecosystems \r\nalteration and degradation, coastal cities in relation to sea level rise, \r\ncyclones and coastal erosion, food systems and human health (high \r\nconfidence). Climate change risks could have substantial negative \r\nimpacts on climate-sensitive livelihoods of smallholder farmers, \r\nfisheries communities, Indigenous People, urban poor and informal \r\nsettlements, with limits to adaptation evidenced in the loss income, \r\necosystems, health and increasing migration (high confidence). The \r\nchapter also addresses how ecological thresholds and socioeconomic \r\ndeterminants of vulnerabilities are linked to soft and hard adaptation \r\nlimits, including the potential and magnitude of livelihood risks in the \r\nfuture"


id: 3064fb4fdb8523ea6f13e1cce71e3c20
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content:
" For instance, a hard limit associated with losses of coral reefs \r\nin a 1.5degC warmer world will lead to substantial loss of income and \r\nlivelihoods for coastal communities (high confidence), including loss \r\nof culture- and place-based attachment (medium confidence). Hard \r\nadaptation limits are expected for the Arctic ecosystem. Their threshold \r\nwill affect residents of Arctic regions dependent on hunting and \r\nfishing livelihoods (high confidence). New emerging considerations \r\nto ecological limits to adaptation, such as severe glacier retreat \r\nand Amazon forest dieback, is expected to affect the livelihoods of \r\nsmallholder farmers and Indigenous People through crop yield failures, \r\nbiodiversity loss, reduced hydropower capacity and health (medium \r\nevidence)"


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content:
" While a knowledge gap remains on the projected risks \r\nof increasing global temperature to climate-sensitive livelihoods \r\namong Global South countries and specific groups of people, current \r\nobservations show negative impacts to livelihoods for tens to hundreds \r\nof millions of people. Thus, without sustainable, equitable and urgent \r\nadaptation measures, maladaptation risks are likely to further increase \r\nvulnerability, marginalisation and ecological tipping points among the \r\npoor within countries (medium confidence)."


id: 916b972f237eec580b376ed0252b9ac0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"Climate change and related hazards (e.g., droughts, floods, heat stress, etc.) affect many aspects of people's lives--\r\nsuch as their health, access to food and housing, or their source of income such as crops or fish stocks--and many \r\nwill have to adapt their way of life in order to deal with these impacts. People who are poor and have few resources \r\nwith which to adapt are thus much more seriously negatively affected by climate-related hazards. 'Vulnerability' \r\nis when a person or community is not able to cope and adapt to climate-related hazards. For example, if someone \r\nwho is very rich has their house washed away in a flood, this is terrible, but they often have more resources to \r\nrebuild, have insurances that support recovery and maybe even build a house that is not in a flood-prone area. \r\nWhereas for someone who is very poor and who does not live in a state that provides support, the loss of their \r\nhouse in a flood could mean homelessness"


id: c28f21d7cf3e2a280bf4897b26062e56
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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vector_id: 28202
content:
" This example shows that the same climate hazard (flood) can have a very \r\ndifferent impact on people depending on their vulnerability (their capacity to cope and adapt to hazards)."


id: 72ebe23d920ebbe04710811e51fe4898
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"A range of local, regional and global economic and political processes already underway have put the livelihoods of the poor at risk. These \r\nprocesses include urbanisation, industrialisation, technological transformation, monetisation of rural economies, increasing reliance on wages, \r\nand inequality at national and international levels. Climate change intersects with these processes.\r\nThe world's poorest already struggle to provide for themselves and their families in their pursuit of livelihoods. \r\nDespite hard work there are many factors beyond an individual's control that can make earning a living very \r\ndifficult. Climate change is one problem among many that puts stress on livelihoods. Poor and marginal groups \r\ndisproportionately bear impacts of climate change, in ways that accelerate transitions from traditional livelihoods, \r\nsuch as rural farming, to wage jobs in urban areas"


id: 782a30df3b0751d78c8718ea08ceacbd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
" Where adaptation measures are insufficient and where the poor \r\nare excluded from decision making, these livelihood transitions can be severely destabilising."


id: d3272f3685ad4510187ce4576b83a21c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"Adaptation can help to reduce risks for the poor and requires both public and private investment in various natural \r\nassets (e.g., mangroves, farmland, wetlands), human assets (e.g., health, skills, Indigenous knowledge), physical \r\nassets (e.g., mobile phone connectivity, housing, electricity, technology), financial assets (e.g., savings, credit) and \r\nsocial assets (e.g., social networks, membership of organisations such as farmer cooperatives). Often, the poor have \r\nthe least to invest, so poverty can reduce adaptation options. Sometimes people migrate as a reaction to floods or \r\ndroughts, though the poorest groups often lack the resources to move. Exactly what needs investing in to reduce \r\nrisks varies according to the scale and livelihood system in need of adaptation"


id: 800e845e127f04ebbbb3725efa3f6a0c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
" In general, risks can be reduced \r\nthrough a range of different technological and engineering approaches (for example, building sea defences to \r\nreduce storm surge impacts), as well as ecosystem-based approaches (such as replanting mangroves, altering the \r\ntypes of crops grown, changing the timing of farming activities, or using climate-smart agriculture or agroforestry \r\napproaches)."


id: 50123b4fb60c876a95452cb64cb2ad3a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"Contributing Authors: Philip Antwi-Agyei (Ghana), Aaron Atteridge (Sweden/Australia), Rachel \r\nBezner-Kerr (Canada/USA), Timothy Breitbarth (USA/South Korea), Max Callaghan (UK/Germany), \r\nTamma Carleton (USA), Colin Carlson (USA), Hayley Clements (South Africa), Declan Conway \r\n(UK), Sean Cooke (South Africa), Matthew Chersich (South Africa), David Chiawo (Kenya), Romy \r\nChevalier (South Africa), Joanne Clarke (Australian/UK), Marlies Craig (South Africa), Olivier Crespo \r\n(South Africa), James Cullis (South Africa), Jampel Dell'Angelo (Italy/USA), Luleka Dlamini (South \r\nAfrica) Hussen Seid Endris (Kenya), Christien Engelbreht (South Africa), Aidan Farrell (Trinidad \r\nand Tobago/Ireland), James Franke (USA), Thian Yew Gan (Malaysia/Canada), Christopher Golden \r\n(USA), Kerry Grey (South Africa), Toshihiro Hasegawa (Japan), Ryan Hogarth (Canada/UK), Hassan \r\nO. Kaya (South Africa), Nadia Khalaf (UK), Mercy Kinyua (Kenya), Scott Kulp (USA), William F"


id: c01882abfce06a5d6b64e27bf1a0b7ab
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content:
"Mortality and morbidity will escalate with further global \r\nwarming, placing additional strain on health and economic \r\nsystems (high confidence). Above 2degC of global warming, distribution \r\nand seasonal transmission of vector-borne diseases is expected to \r\nincrease, exposing tens of millions more people, mostly in west, east \r\nand southern Africa (high confidence). Above 1.5degC risk of heat-related \r\ndeaths rises sharply (medium confidence), with at least 15 additional \r\ndeaths per 100,000 annually across large parts of Africa, reaching \r\n50-180 additional deaths per 100,000 people annually in regions \r\nof North, West, and East Africa for 2.5degC, and increasing to 200-600 \r\nper 100,000 people annually for 4.4degC. Above 2degC global warming, \r\nthousands to tens of thousands of additional cases of diarrhoeal \r\ndisease are projected, mainly in west, central and east Africa (medium \r\nconfidence)"


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content:
" These changes risk undermining improvements in health \r\nfrom future socioeconomic development (high agreement, medium \r\nevidence). {9.10.2, Fig. 9.35}"


id: d378482a95a227ac392428ba1b69195
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content:
"Africa's rapidly growing cities will be hotspots of risks from \r\nclimate change and climate-induced in-migration, which could \r\namplify pre-existing stresses related to poverty, informality, \r\nsocial and economic exclusion, and governance (high confidence). \r\nUrban population exposure to extreme heat is projected to increase from \r\n2 billion person-days per year in 1985-2005 to 45 billion person-days \r\nby the 2060s (1.7degC global warming with low population growth) and \r\nto 95  billion person-days (2.8degC global warming with medium-high \r\npopulation growth), with greatest exposure in west Africa. Under relatively \r\nlow population growth scenarios, the sensitive populations (people under \r\n5 or over 64 years old) in African cities exposed to heat waves of at least \r\n15 days above 42degC in African cities is projected to increase from around \r\n27  million in 2010 to 360  million by 2100 for 1"


id: 1b75b1fab1df2aa1209eb7b4900e6e6f
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"8degC global warming \r\n(Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 1 (SSP1)) and 440  million (SSP5) for \r\n>4degC global warming. Compared to 2000, urbanisation is projected to \r\nincrease urban land extent exposed to arid conditions by around 700% \r\nand exposure to high-frequency flooding by 2600% across west, central \r\nand east Africa by 2030. {9.9.1, 9.9.2, 9.9.4, Box 9.8}"


id: 41d20e20fc886e9281828c72530b1fb1
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"Figure 9.1 |  The five regions of Africa used in this chapter, also showing \r\nestimated population density in 2019. The population of Africa was estimated \r\nat 1.312 billion for 2020, which is about 17% of the world's population but this is \r\nprojected to grow to around 40% of the world's population by 2100 (UNDESA, 2019a). \r\nAlthough 57% of the African population currently live in rural areas (43% urban), Africa \r\nis the most rapidly urbanising region globally and is projected to transition to a majority \r\nurban population in the 2030s, with a 60% urban population by 2050 (UNDESA, \r\n2019b). The 2019 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in constant 2010 USD \r\naveraged USD  2250 across the 43  countries reporting data, ranging from USD  202 \r\n(Burundi) to USD 8840 (Gabon), with 40% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa \r\nliving below the international poverty line of USD 1.90 per day in 2018 (World Bank, \r\n2019)"


id: b40ab61ed8c4861742f4e8b82c37cd2b
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content:
" The highest life expectancy at birth is 67 (Botswana and Senegal) and the lowest \r\nis 52 (Central African Republic) World Bank (2019). Grid-cell population density data for \r\nmapping are from Tatem (2017); WorldPop (2021)."


id: 4336caf6490c2a56b79c6a4630aaf09c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"In many parts of southern, east and west Africa, temperature or \r\nprecipitation trends since the 1950s are attributable to human\u0002caused climate change and several studies document the impacts of \r\nthese climate trends on human and natural systems (high confidence) \r\n(Figure  9.5; Sections  9.5.6; 9.5.7). Nevertheless, research into \r\nattribution of trends to human-caused climate change or climate \r\nimpacts remains scarce for multiple regions, especially in north and \r\ncentral Africa. This illustrates an 'attribution gap' where robust evidence \r\nfor attributable impacts is twice as prevalent in high- compared to \r\nlow-income countries globally (Callaghan et al., 2021). Most studies \r\non climate impacts in Africa have focused on terrestrial ecosystems or \r\nwater, with fewer on marine ecosystems, agriculture, migration, and \r\nhealth and well-being (Callaghan et al., 2021)"


id: b4186a362283c6e46218c2a89dae60d2
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content:
" Specific factors driving \r\nthese knowledge gaps include limited data collection, data access and \r\nresearch funding for African researchers (see next section)."


id: b912bd5f868906de944d3d3a2b9eb03a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"Since AR5, there have been rapid advances in climate impact research \r\ndue to increased computing power, data access and new developments \r\nin statistical analysis (Carleton and Hsiang, 2016). However, sparse and \r\nintermittent weather station data limit attribution of climate trends to \r\nhuman-caused climate change for large areas of Africa, especially for \r\nprecipitation and extreme events, and hinder more accurate climate \r\nchange projections (Section 9.5.2; Figure 9.5; Otto et al., 2020). Outside \r\nof South Africa and Kenya, digitally accessible data on biodiversity is \r\nlimited (Meyer et al., 2015). Lack of comprehensive socioeconomic data \r\nalso limits researchers' ability to predict climate change impacts. Ideally, \r\nmultiple surveys over time are needed to identify effects of a location's \r\nchanging climate on changing socioeconomic conditions"


id: ca30c34ca197cd6fc643be72d72707ec
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content:
" Twenty-five \r\nAfrican countries conducted only one nationally representative survey \r\nthat could be used to construct measures of poverty during 2000-2010 \r\nand 14 conducted none over this period (Jean et al., 2016). Because \r\nof these challenges, much of what is known about climate impacts \r\nand risks in Africa relies on evidence from global studies that use \r\ndata largely from outside Africa (e.g., Zhao et al., 2021). These studies \r\ngenerate estimates of average impacts across the globe, but may not \r\nhave the statistical power to distinguish whether African nations display \r\ndifferential vulnerability, exposure or adaptive capacity. In sections \r\nof this chapter, we have relied, when necessary, on such studies, as \r\nthey often provide best available evidence for Africa. Increasing data \r\ncoverage and availability would increase the ability to discern important \r\ndifferences in risk both among and within African countries."


id: c5ef1c3bf64309de4f1b94e71b214d1d
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content:
"Figure  9.5 |   Observed climate change impacts on human and natural \r\nsystems are widespread across Africa, as are climate trends attributable \r\nto human-induced climate change. This machine-learning-assisted evidence map \r\nshows the presence of historical trends in temperature and precipitation attributable to \r\nhuman-induced climate change (pinks compared to greys) and the amount of evidence \r\n(shown by intensity of colours) documenting the impacts of these climate trends on \r\nhuman and natural systems (e.g., ecosystems, agriculture, health) across Africa. 'Robust' \r\nindicates more than five studies documented impacts per grid cell. A 'High' amount of \r\nevidence indicates more than 20 studies documented impacts for a grid cell. Climate \r\nimpact studies from the literature were identified and categorised using machine \r\nlearning. A language representation model was trained on a set of 2373 climate impact \r\nstudies coded by hand"


id: a939f93075f08d62df94969ed3ad001d
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content:
" This supervised machine learning model identified 102,160 \r\npublished studies predicted to be relevant for climate impacts globally; references to \r\nplaces in Africa were found in 5081 studies (5% of global studies). Temperature trends \r\nwere calculated from 1951-2018 and precipitation from 1951-2016. Attribution of \r\nclimate trends to human induced climate change is limited in some regions of Africa \r\ndue to insufficient data (see Section 9.5.1, Figure 9.15). Hatching shows regions where \r\ntrends in both temperature and precipitation are attributable to human-induced climate \r\nchange. Data from Callaghan et al. (2021)."


id: dc4f52e9e83fabe70054edfae3fa7124
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content:
"These unequal funding relations influence inequalities in climate-related \r\nresearch design, participation and dissemination between African \r\nresearchers and researchers from high-income countries outside Africa, in \r\nways that can reduce adaptive capacity in Africa (very high confidence). \r\nThose empowered to shape research agendas can shape research \r\nanswers: climate research agendas, skills gaps and eligible researchers \r\nare frequently defined by funding agencies, often from a global north \r\nperspective (Vincent et  al., 2020a). Larger funding allocations for \r\nresearch focused on Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia \r\nare reflected in higher concentrations of empirical research on impacts \r\nand adaptation options in these countries, and there is a general lack \r\nof adaptation research for multiple of the most vulnerable countries in \r\nAfrica (Figure 9.4) (Callaghan et al., 2021; Overland et al., 2021; Sietsma \r\net al., 2021; Vincent and Cundill, 2021)"


id: f63c31f65c37d813e59dcfdf9812ea46
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" The combination of northern-led \r\nidentification of both knowledge and skills gaps can result in projects \r\nwhere African partners are positioned primarily as recipients engaged \r\nto support research and/or have their 'capacity built' rather than also \r\nleading research projects on an equal basis (Vincent et al., 2020a; Trisos \r\net al., 2021). Analysis of >15,000 climate change publications found for \r\nover 75% of African countries 60-100% of climate change publications \r\non these countries did not include a single local author, with authorship \r\ndominated by researchers from richer countries outside Africa (Pasgaard \r\net al., 2015). This can reduce adaptive capacity in Africa as researchers \r\nat global north institutions may shape research questions and outputs \r\nfor a northern audience rather than providing actionable insights on \r\npriority issues for African partners (Pasgaard et  al., 2015; Nago and \r\nKrott, 2020)"


id: 18a213c016442c4a118e057e7351bebe
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" Moreover, in order to access research publications in a \r\ntimely manner, many researchers in Africa are forced to use shadow \r\nwebsites bypassing journal paywalls (Bohannon, 2016). Ways to \r\nenhance research partnerships to produce actionable insights on climate \r\nimpacts and solutions in Africa include: increased funding from African \r\nand non-African sources, increasing direct control of resources for \r\nAfrican partners, having African research and user priorities set research \r\nquestions, identify skills gaps, and lead research, and having open access \r\npolicies for research outputs (ESPA Directorate, 2018; Vogel et al., 2019; \r\nVincent et al., 2020a; IDRC, 2021; Trisos et al., 2021)."


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"The transition from high to very high risk--that is severe and \r\nwidespread impacts with limited ability to adapt--begins either at or \r\njust below 2degC for all three risks (Figure 9.6). The assessed temperature \r\nrange for the transition to very high risk is wider for food production \r\nthan for biodiversity and health. Projected impacts for food include: \r\n10-30% decline in marine fisheries catch potential for the Horn of \r\nAfrica region and southern Africa and more than 30% decline for west \r\nAfrica at 2degC global warming, with greater declines at higher levels \r\nof warming (Section  9.8.2). Beyond 2degC global warming, over 50% \r\nof commercially important freshwater fish species across Africa are \r\nprojected to be vulnerable to extinction (Figure  9.26). Between 2degC \r\nand 4degC, wheat, maize and rice yields are projected, on average, to be \r\nlower than 2005 yields across all regions of Africa"


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content:
" From 2degC global \r\nwarming, over 40% losses in rangeland productivity are projected for \r\nwestern Africa. By 3.75degC, severe heat stress may be near year-round \r\nfor cattle across tropical Africa (Figure 9.24). Multiple countries in west, \r\ncentral and east Africa are projected to be at risk from simultaneous \r\nnegative impacts on crops, fisheries and livestock (Sections  9.8.2; \r\n9.8.5; Thiault et al., 2019)."


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content:
"At the current global warming level, 83% of adaptation response \r\ncategories assessed showed medium potential for risk reduction \r\n(that is, mixed evidence of effectiveness). Bulk water infrastructure \r\n(including managed aquifer recharge, dams, pipelines, pump stations, \r\nwater treatment plants and distribution networks), human migration, \r\nfinancial investment for sustainable agriculture, and social infrastructure \r\n(including decentralised management, strong community structures \r\nand informal support networks) show high potential for risk reduction \r\n(high evidence of option's effectiveness)  (Sections  9.6.4; 9.7.3; Boxes \r\n9.8; 9.9; 9.10; 9.11). However, there was limited evidence to assess \r\nthe continued effectiveness of these options at higher global warming \r\nlevels (Williams et  al"


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", 2021) with some options, such as bulk water \r\ninfrastructure (particularly large dams), expected to face increasing risk \r\nwith continued warming with damages cascading to other sectors (see \r\nBox 9.5), while others, such as crop irrigation and adjusting planting \r\ntimes, may increasingly reach adaptation limits above 1.5degC and 2degC \r\nglobal warming (Sections 9.8.3; 9.8.4)."


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"The best estimate for the onset of very high risk for biodiversity and \r\nhealth is at 2.1degC. Projected impacts considered very high risk for \r\nbiodiversity include potential destabilisation of the African tropical \r\nforest carbon sink, risk of local extinction of more than 50% of plants, \r\nvertebrate and insect species across one-fifth of Africa, 7-18% of \r\nAfrican species at risk of total extinction including, a third of freshwater \r\nfish, and more than 90% warm-water coral reefs lost (Section 9.6.2). \r\nFor health, projected impacts considered high risk include potentially \r\nlethal heat exposure for more than 100 days per year in west, central \r\nand east Africa, with more than 50 additional heat-related deaths per \r\n100,000 annually across large parts of Africa, and hundreds of millions \r\nmore people exposed to extreme heat in cities (Section  9.5; 9.10.2; \r\n9.9.4.1; Figure  9"


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"35), tens to hundreds of thousands of additional \r\ncases of diarrhoeal disease in east, central and west Africa, and tens \r\nof millions more people exposed to mosquito-borne arboviruses like \r\ndengue or zika in north, east and southern Africa (Section 9.10.2)."


id: 8fd696933bc0fb82eaefb5780a1c0f28
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"In contrast, adaptation actions may induce trade-offs with mitigation \r\nobjectives, as well as other adaptation and developmental outcomes, \r\ndelivering negative impacts and compromising the attainment of \r\nthe SDGs. For example, increased deployment of renewable energy \r\ntechnologies can drive future land use changes (Frank et al., 2021) and \r\nthreaten important biodiversity areas if poorly deployed (Rehbein et al., \r\n2020). The use of early maturing or drought-tolerant crop varieties may \r\nincrease resilience (SDGs 1, 2), but adoption by smallholder farmers \r\ncan also be hindered by affordability of seed. Cultivation of biodiesel \r\ncrops also can hinder food security (SDG 2) at local and national \r\nlevels (Tankari, 2017; Brinkman et  al., 2020). Additionally, the use \r\nof fertilizers in intense systems can result in increased environmental \r\ndegradation (Akinyi et  al., 2021)"


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" When farmers migrate, it puts \r\npressure on inadequate social services provision and facilities at \r\ntheir destination (SDG 8) and leads to reduced farm labour and a \r\ndeterioration of the workforce and assets (SDG 2) (Gemenne and \r\nBlocher, 2017a), which negatively affects farm operations and non\u0002migrants, particularly women, elderly and children, at the point of \r\norigin (Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner-Kerr, 2015; Ahmed et al., 2016; \r\nOtto et al., 2017; Eastin, 2018). Farmers may also miss critical periods \r\nduring the farming season that eventually makes them food insecure \r\n(SDG 2) and vulnerable to climate change (SDG 13) (Antwi-Agyei et al., \r\n2018). Migrants should be supported to reduce their overall shocks \r\nto climate vulnerability at the points of origin and destination"


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" Small\u0002scale irrigation infrastructure if not managed properly, may lead to \r\nnegative environmental effects and compromise the integrity of \r\nriparian ecosystems (SDG 15) (Loucks and van Beek, 2017) and serve \r\nas breeding grounds for malaria-causing mosquitoes (SDG 3) (Attu and \r\nAdjei, 2018)."


id: 12a6e953838accff5967edd762980fd0
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"specific contexts, adaptation generally is cost-effective (high confidence). \r\nThe Global Commission on Adaptation estimated the benefits and costs \r\nof five illustrative investments and found benefit-cost ratios ranging \r\nfrom 2:1 to 10:1. However, it also noted that 'actual returns depend on \r\nmany factors, such as economic growth and demand, policy context, \r\ninstitutional capacities and condition of assets' (The Global Commission \r\non Adaptation, 2019). A review of ex-ante cost-benefit analyses for 19 \r\nadaptation-focused projects in Africa financed by the Green Climate \r\nFund (GCF) shows benefit-cost ratios in a similar range. Using a \r\n10% discount rate, as used by many of GCF's accredited entities, the \r\nbenefit-cost ratio for individual projects ranges from 0.9:1 to 7.3:1, the \r\nmedian benefit-cost ratio is 1.8:1 and total ratio across all 19 projects is \r\n2.6:1"


id: 14bd2292eb6c50869d99b48df2d4f482
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content:
" When using lower discount rates, as some entities do for climate \r\nprojects, the benefit-cost ratio is even higher, reflecting the front-loaded \r\ncosts and back-loaded benefits of many adaptation investments. Using \r\na 5% discount rate, the overall benefit-cost ratio of the GCF projects \r\nis 3.5:1, with a range from 1:1 to 11.5:1 and a median ratio of 2.4:1 \r\n(Breitbarth, 2020). In addition, many proposals have activities for which \r\nfurther benefits were not estimated due to the difficulty of attributing \r\nbenefits directly to the intervention. The benefits of adaptation measures \r\nfor infrastructure and others with clear market impacts are often easier \r\nto estimate than for policy interventions and where markets may not \r\nexist, such as ecosystem services (Li et al., 2014)."


id: 136f0ed911d2d1fa25236a49ece6d2af
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"Adaptation costs in Africa are expected to rise rapidly as global \r\nwarming increases (high confidence). A meta-analysis of adaptation \r\ncosts identified in 44 NDCs and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) \r\nfrom developing countries estimated a median adaptation cost around \r\nUSD 17 per capita per year for 2020-2030 (Chapagain et  al., 2020). \r\nAdaptation cost estimates for Africa increase from USD 20-50 billion \r\nper year for Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 2.6 in 2050 \r\n(around 1.5degC of warming), to USD 18-60 billion per year for just over \r\n2degC, to USD 100-437 billion per year for 4degC of global warming above \r\npre-industrial levels (Schaeffer et al., 2013; UNEP, 2015; Chapagain et al., \r\n2020). Focusing on individual sectors, the average country-level cost is \r\nprojected to be USD 0.8 billion per year for adapting to temperature\u0002related mortality under 4degC global warming (Carleton et al"


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", 2018), with \r\ncumulative energy costs for cooling demand projected to reach USD \r\n51 billion by 2degC and USD 486 billion by 4degC global warming (Parkes \r\net  al., 2019). Transport infrastructure repair costs are also projected \r\nto be substantial (Section  9.8.2) More precise estimates are limited \r\nby methodological difficulties and data gaps for costing adaptation, \r\nuncertainties about future levels of global warming and associated \r\nclimate hazards, and ethical choices such as the desired level of \r\nprotection achieved (Fankhauser, 2010; Hallegatte et al., 2018; UNFCCC, \r\n2018) (Cross-Chapter Box  FINANCE in Chapter 17). As such, existing \r\nestimates are expected to substantially underestimate eventual costs \r\nwith adaptation costs possibly 2-3  times higher than current global \r\nestimates by 2030, and 4-5 times higher by 2050 (UNEP, 2016a)."


id: f008ce895e4538d9009cbdaa1803044c
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"The amounts of finance being mobilised internationally to support \r\nadaptation in African countries are billions of US dollars less than \r\nadaptation cost estimates, and finance has targeted mitigation more \r\nthan adaptation (high confidence). The Organisation for Economic Co\u0002operation and Development (OECD (2020) estimates an average of \r\nUSD  17.3  billion per year in public finance targeting mitigation and \r\nadaptation from developed countries to Africa in 2016-2018, with \r\nadaptation expected to be a small share of this amount. Of the global \r\ntotal, only 21% in 2018 targeted adaptation (there is no breakdown \r\nprovided for Africa). Analysis of OECD data that is reported by the \r\nfunders, covering bilateral and multilateral funding sources, estimated \r\ninternational public finance (grants and concessional lending) committed \r\nto Africa for climate change for 2014-2018 at USD 49.9 billion: 61% \r\n(30.6 billion) for mitigation, 33% (16.5 billion) for adaptation and 5% \r\n(2"


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"7 billion) for both objectives simultaneously (Figure 9.8a; Savvidou \r\net al., 2021). This equates to an average of USD 3.8 billion per year \r\ntargeting adaptation (Savvidou et al., 2021). In per capita terms, only \r\ntwo countries (Djibouti and Gabon) were supported with more than \r\nUSD 15 per person per year, most were supported with less than USD 5 \r\nper person per year (Savvidou et al., 2021)."


id: 8e55aa270127ed94600283a1d6f12c7d
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"Even when accredited, some countries experience significant institutional \r\nand financial challenges in programming and implementing activities to \r\nsupport concrete adaptation measures (Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019). Low \r\ndisbursement ratios suggest inadequate capacity to implement projects \r\nonce they are approved (Savvidou et al., 2021). Systemic barriers have \r\nbeen highlighted in relation to the multilateral climate funds, including \r\nfunds not providing full-cost adaptation funding, capacity barriers in \r\nthe design and implementation of adaptation actions (including the \r\ndevelopment of fundable project proposals) and barriers in recognising \r\nand enabling the involvement of sub-national actors in the delivery and \r\nimplementation of adaptation action (Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019). As \r\nof 2017, most GCF disbursements to Africa (61"


id: 1542fe7510f8035d44edcd8efa99862d
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"9%) were directed to \r\nsupport national stakeholders' engagement with regards to readiness \r\nactivities, with only 11% directed to support DAEs in implementation \r\nof concrete projects/pipeline development (Fonta et  al., 2018). While \r\nsupporting readiness activities is important for strengthening country \r\nownership and institutional development, research suggests adaptation \r\nfinance needs to shift towards implementation of concrete projects and \r\nmore pipeline development if the goal of transformative and sustained \r\nadaptation in Africa is to be realised (Fonta et  al., 2018; Omari\u0002Motsumi et al., 2019). The source of these problems needs to be better \r\nunderstood so that the prospects for future climate-related investments \r\ncan be improved and institutional strengthening and targeted project \r\npreparation can be supported (Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019; Doshi and \r\nGarschagen, 2020; Savvidou et al., 2021)."


id: 4b2170e230879e1a3aba5acc4068b362
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"However, to understand actual expenditure on adaptation, it is necessary \r\nto look at disbursements (that is, the amounts paid out compared to \r\ncommitted amounts). Low ratios of disbursements to commitments \r\nsuggest difficulties in project implementation. Disbursement ratios for \r\nclimate-related finance from all funders other than MDBs (for which \r\ndata is not published) in Africa are very low (Figure 9.9b; Savvidou et al., \r\n2021). Only 46% of 2014-2018 commitments targeting adaptation \r\nwere dispersed (Savvidou et al., 2021). Regions faring worst are north \r\nAfrica (15%), central Africa (33%) and west Africa (33%) (Figure 9.9c). \r\nThese disbursement ratios for adaptation and mitigation finance in \r\nAfrica are lower than the global average (Savvidou et al"


id: 968034132ecc22dc16b9fc2a07e9aeb4
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", 2021), which \r\nsuggests greater capacity problems in implementing climate-related \r\nprojects and, in turn, means lost opportunities to build resilience and \r\nadaptive capacity and a wider gap in adaptation finance for Africa \r\n(Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019)."


id: b30622d577a3a46b3ed7d7796bcaed6c
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"Some progress has been made in supporting developing countries \r\nto enhance their adaptation actions. The process to formulate and \r\nimplement NAPs was established by parties under the UNFCCC to \r\nsupport developing countries in identifying their vulnerabilities, and \r\ndetermine their medium- and long-term adaptation needs (UNFCCC \r\nParis Agreement, 2015). NAPs provide a means of developing and \r\nimplementing strategies and programmes to address those needs. In \r\n2016, the parties agreed the GCF would fund up to USD 3 million per \r\ncountry for adaptation planning instruments, including NAPs. However, \r\naccessing funding through the GCF for NAP formulation is challenging \r\n(Fonta et al., 2018) and, as of October 2020, 4 years after the decision \r\nto fund NAPs, only six African countries had completed their NAPs \r\n(UNFCCC NAP central)"


id: c7f286512c23731abd516972a4af9d3d
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content:
" The next step is to convert adaptation planning \r\ndocuments into programming pipeline projects that are fundable \r\nand implementable, which presents a significant barrier to enhanced \r\nadaptation action (Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019)."


id: 86ee8173ce365caa1983b483ad2fe669
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content:
"The present situation reflects not only an insufficient level of finance \r\nbeing mobilised to support African adaptation needs (Section 9.4.1) \r\nbut also problems in accessing and using funding that is available. \r\nThe direct-access modality introduced by the Adaptation Fund \r\nand GCF, whereby national and regional entities from developing \r\ncountries can be accredited to access funds directly, is aimed at \r\nreducing transaction costs for recipient countries, increasing national \r\nownership and agency for adaptation actions, and enhancing decision\u0002making responsibilities by national actors, thereby contributing to \r\nstrengthening local capacity for sustained and transformational \r\nadaptation (CDKN, 2013; Masullo et al., 2015). Indeed, direct-access \r\nprojects from the Adaptation Fund tend to be more community \r\nfocused than indirect-access projects (Manuamorn and Biesbroek, \r\n2020)"


id: f044ca55d79ccb124e84ab19454e9006
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" Country institutions in Africa, however, are struggling to be \r\naccredited for direct access because of the complicated, lengthy \r\nand bureaucratic processes of accreditation, which requires, for \r\nexample, strong institutional and fiduciary standards and capacity \r\nto be in place (Brown et al., 2013; Omari-Motsumi et al., 2019). As \r\nof December 2019, over 80% of all developing countries had no \r\nnational direct access entities (DAEs) (Asfaw et al., 2019). Capacity \r\nto develop fundable projects in Africa is also inadequate. An analysis \r\nof proposals submitted to the GCF up to 2017 revealed that, while \r\nAfrican countries were able to submit proposals to the GCF, they \r\nhad the lowest percentage of approvals (39%) compared to all other "


id: 838b59078955c3459a281a54c93a0ed0
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"Many adaptation interventions for most vulnerable countries and \r\ncommunities provide no adequate financial return on investments \r\nand can therefore only be funded with concessional public finance \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). Yet, public funds alone \r\nare insufficient to meet rapidly growing adaptation needs. Public \r\nmechanisms can help leverage private sector finance for adaptation by \r\nreducing regulatory, cost and market barriers through blended finance \r\napproaches, public-private partnerships, or innovative financial \r\ninstruments and structuring in support of private sector requirements \r\nfor risk and investment returns, such as green bonds (Cross-Chapter \r\nBox FINANCE in Chapter 17). Sub-national actors can be core agents \r\nto conceptualise, drive and deliver adaptation responses, and unlock \r\ndomestic resources in the implementation of adaptation action (CoM \r\nSSA, 2019; Omari-Motsumi et al"


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", 2019), provided they are sufficiently \r\nresourced and their participation and agency are supported."


id: 42be56ee44fca8b437e12c6938a9c0ba
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"Many African countries are at high risk of debt distress, especially due \r\nto the COVID-19 pandemic, and will need to decrease their debt levels \r\nto have the fiscal space to invest in climate resilience (Estevao, 2020; \r\nDibley et al., 2021). As of mid-2021, the G20's Debt Service Suspension \r\nInitiative is providing temporary relief for repayment of bilateral credit, \r\nbut this has largely not been taken up by private lenders (Dibley et al., \r\n2021; World Bank, 2021). The total external debt-servicing payments \r\ncombined for 44 African countries in 2019 were USD 75 billion (World \r\nBank, 2019), far exceeding discussed levels of near-term climate \r\nfinance. Aligning debt relief with Paris Agreement goals could provide \r\nan important channel for increased financing for climate action, for \r\nexample, by allowing African countries to use their debt-servicing \r\npayments to finance climate change mitigation and adaptation (Fenton \r\net al., 2014)"


id: cc60fd5b6cf2d4bc5ab3dd985710c14b
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content:
" Governments can disclose climate risks when taking on \r\nsovereign debt, and debt-for-climate resilience swaps could be used \r\nto reduce debt burdens for low-income countries while supporting \r\nadaptation and mitigation (Dibley et al., 2021)."


id: 62597a28b4f79de309fbc9f03f79a64f
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"Overcoming governance barriers is a precondition to ensure successful \r\nadaptation and CRD (Pasquini et  al., 2015; Owen, 2020).  Despite \r\nthe ambitious climate targets across African countries and renewed \r\ncommitments in recent years (Zheng et al., 2019; Ozor and Nyambane, \r\n2020), governance barriers include, among others, slow policy \r\nimplementation progress (Shackleton et  al., 2015; Taylor, 2016), \r\nincoherent and fragmented approaches (Zinngrebe et  al., 2020; \r\nNemakonde et al., 2021), inadequate governance systems to manage \r\nclimate finance (Granoff et al., 2016; Banga, 2019), poor stakeholder \r\nparticipation (Sherman and Ford, 2014), gender inequalities (Andrijevic \r\net  al., 2020), unaligned development and climate agendas (Musah\u0002Surugu et al., 2019; Robinson, 2020), elite capture of climate governance \r\nsystems (Kita, 2019), hierarchical and complex state bureaucracy \r\n(Meissner and Jacobs, 2016; Biesbroek et  al"


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", 2018) and weak, non\u0002existent or fragmented sub-national institutions (Paterson et al., 2017; \r\nMusah-Surugu et  al., 2019). Further, adaptation planning involves \r\ncross-cutting themes, multiple actors and institutions with different \r\nobjectives, jurisdictional authority and levels of power and resources, "


id: c0fc260f0a1d3522b7e3de1bd99e48d6
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content:
"Stakeholders across Africa are recognising the scale and severity of \r\ntransboundary risks to water. Such risks are two-fold in nature, arising \r\nboth from potential impacts due to climate change and from responses \r\nto climate change (Simpson et  al., 2021b). This awareness among \r\nstakeholders is leading to increasingly progressive approaches to natural \r\nresource development that can also reduce risk across boundaries \r\nwithin regions. For example, river basin organisations in Southern Africa \r\nsuch as the Orange-Senqu and the Okavango River Basin Commissions \r\nare revising treaties considered to pre-date the interrelated issues of \r\nclimate change, growing populations and water scarcity (OKACOM, \r\n2020). In parts of west Africa, where climate change is characterised by \r\nreduction of precipitation (Barry et al"


id: eeaef1d68d082d873a48b5ed7f9114f
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", 2018), regionally integrated and \r\nclimate-resilient economic investments for water resource development \r\nare enabled by the Senegal River Basin Organisation (OMVS) which \r\nemphasises programme and project development, financing and \r\nimplementation in ensuing work plans (World Bank, 2020e), as does \r\nthe Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in north and east Africa (Schmeier, 2017; \r\nBlumstein and Petersen-Perlman, 2021)."


id: f831a9025673ab51cde528f91372a532
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"Soliev et al., 2015). Angola, for example, outlines regional adaptation \r\nas a priority and one of its unconditional adaptation strategies (which \r\nis already funded) is enhancing resilience in the Benguela fisheries \r\nsystem, a project shared with Namibia and South Africa (GEF and FAO, \r\n2021). Another example is The Great Green Wall for the Sahara and \r\nSahel Initiative, which was launched in 2007 with the aim of tackling \r\nland degradation in Africa (UNCCD, 2020). This transboundary project, \r\nled by the African Union Commission, is being implemented in more \r\nthan 20  countries across Africa's Sahel region, in cooperation with \r\ninternational partners including UNCCD, GEF and the World Bank. \r\nApproximately USD 10 billion have been mobilised and/or promised \r\nfor this initiative (UNCCD, 2020)"


id: ef3ba7c6d65062c9a33a9ecb8f2df1d2
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" Such statements demonstrate \r\nthe increasing identification of transboundary risks and approaches \r\nto manage and adapt to them as areas of 'common concern' that \r\nrequire cooperative adaptation actions. Accelerating strengthened \r\ntransboundary water and climate governance needs to integrate these \r\nclimate drivers of compromised water security. The role of institutions \r\nsuch as OMVS and the NBI have demonstrated they can influence \r\neconomic behaviour among riparian countries of shared river basins \r\nhighlighting that institutions are an integral part of climate governance \r\nin evolving economic systems (Hodgson, 2000)."


id: 61bb9d3101b2f287cad3017e09f9b1da
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"In addition to the advancement of Indigenous knowledge in adaptive \r\nresponses, it has been suggested that the protection of the rights of \r\nIndigenous Peoples can have adaptive benefits, in particular through \r\nthe protection of land tenure rights (Ayanlade and Jegede, 2016). It \r\nhas been argued that doing so will protect Indigenous Peoples' lands \r\nand resources from overconsumption, secure the recognition of their \r\ncultural stewardship over the environment, provide the financial \r\nincentive for land stewardship and promote the application of their \r\nunique knowledge on the sustainable development of that land \r\nand its preservation (Jaksa, 2006; Ayanlade and Jegede, 2016). Not \r\nonly can a lack of protection of Indigenous legal tenure undermine \r\nthese objectives, but a number of African laws may actively work \r\nagainst them"


id: f37d8f1713533f91e30dc049edcfb188
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" For example, a review of Tanzanian and Zambian laws \r\nhighlighted existing provisions that empowered the state to terminate \r\nor criminalise the occupation of vacant, undeveloped or fallow lands, \r\nwhich undermined the occupation by Indigenous peoples of forests \r\nand other uncultivated lands (Ayanlade and Jegede, 2016)."


id: 1be3d7f15a37fcc3c64c6eb14f3bdcd0
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content:
"The Paris Agreement acknowledges, in Article 7.5, that adaptation \r\nshould be based on and guided by, among other things, 'traditional \r\nknowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge \r\nsystems'. The accumulated knowledge within Indigenous knowledge \r\nsystems is particularly important as it can assist governments in \r\ndetermining how the climate is changing, how to characterise these \r\nimpacts and provide lessons for adaptation (Salick and Ross, 2009). \r\nIn this context, Indigenous knowledge systems can play an important \r\nrole in the effective design of local laws (Mwanga, 2019), as well \r\nas national laws. Doing so can contribute to the success of climate \r\nchange response strategies, including enhancing local participation \r\nand the implementation of community-based and ecosystem-based \r\nadaptations (Chanza and de Wit, 2016; Mwanga, 2019)"


id: 54493cadd1c02430b78b5b81620e568e
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content:
" For example, \r\nthe Makorongo Village Forest Management By-Law in Tanzania codifies \r\nlocal customary practices relating to forest management and sustainable \r\nharvesting with associated dual adaptation and mitigation benefits and \r\nincludes all villagers in the decision-making processes relating to forest \r\nmanagement (Mwanga, 2019). The inclusion of beneficial Indigenous \r\nknowledge systems within local by-laws is contingent on the active \r\ninvolvement of members of the Indigenous community and awareness "


id: 8986cc00c014eba4c62bc35f654516d5
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content:
"(a) The importance of climate services and climate change literacy for more transformative responses to climate change in Africa adapted from Simpson et al. (2021a). Climate \r\nservices promote climate resilient development by providing climate information for adaptation decision making (Street, 2016; Vaughan et al., 2018). Scalable uptake of climate \r\nservices relies partly on climate risk perception of users, which is largely driven in Africa by experience and perception of local climate changes (Jacobs and Street, 2020; Steynor \r\net al., 2020b; Steynor and Pasquini, 2020). Perception of climate change can occur without knowledge of its human-induced causes and its effects (Lee et al., 2015; Alemayehu \r\nand Bewket, 2017; Andrews and Smirnov, 2020). This can lead to coping responses to climate change which fall short of adaptation"


id: 4246ba92352fa272ed200fd66a27f238
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content:
" Climate change literacy encompasses being \r\naware of climate change and its anthropogenic causes and, together with climate services, can strengthen responses to climate change through better understanding of future risk \r\n(IPCC, 2019b; Simpson et al., 2021a)."


id: 4d60e2c75bead4796255d35be873b259
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"A recent Afrobarometer study covering 34 African countries found 67% \r\nof Africans perceive climate conditions for agricultural production to \r\nhave worsened over time, and report drought as the main extreme \r\nweather event to have worsened in the past decade (Selormey et al., \r\n2019). Of these participants, across all socioeconomic strata, 71% of \r\nthose who were aware of the concept of climate change agreed that it \r\nneeds to be stopped, but only 51% expressed confidence about their \r\nability to make a difference. East Africans (63%) were almost twice as \r\nlikely as north Africans (35%) to report that the weather for growing \r\ncrops had worsened. Additionally, people engaged in occupations \r\nrelated to agriculture (farming, fishing or forestry) were more likely to \r\nreport negative weather effects (59%) than those with other livelihoods \r\n(45%) (Selormey et al., 2019)"


id: 36cee835642d661ebc54293b0dc3537c
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" Similar perceptions have been reported \r\namong a diversity of rural communities in many sub-Saharan African \r\ncountries (Mahl et al., 2020; Simpson et al., 2021a)."


id: 144a1f07376e91103881c9286a6e57eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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"Vulnerability and exposure to the impacts of climate change are complex and affected by multiple, interacting non-climatic processes, \r\nwhich together influence risk, including socioeconomic processes (Lwasa et al., 2018; UNCTAD, 2020), resource access and livelihood \r\nchanges (Jayne et al., 2019b) and intersectional vulnerability among social groups (Figure Box 9.1.1; Rao et al., 2020). Socioeconomic \r\nprocesses encompass broader social, economic and governance trends, such as expanded investment in large energy and transportation \r\ninfrastructure projects (Adeniran and Daniell, 2020), rising external debt (Edo et al., 2020), changing role of the state in social development \r\n(Wunsch, 2014), environmental management (Ramutsindela and Buscher, 2019) and conflict, as well as those emanating from climate \r\nchange mitigation and adaptation projects (Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012; van Baalen and Mobjork, 2018; Simpson et al., 2021b)"


id: a0c2079da9cdf0189ccf795d58850290
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" \r\nThese macro trends shape both urban and rural livelihoods, including the growing diversification of rural livelihoods through engagement \r\nin the informal sector and other non-farm activities, and are mediated by complex and intersecting factors like gender, ethnicity, class, \r\nage, disability and other dimensions of social status that influence access to resources (Luo et al., 2019). Research increasingly highlights \r\nthe intersectionality of multiple dimensions of social identity and status that are associated with greater susceptibility to loss and damage \r\n(Caparoci Nogueira et al., 2018; Li et al., 2018)."


id: dcb8ca3a0bbdcb05cf40864f10e7de57
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"Arid and semi-arid countries in the Sahelian belt and the greater Horn of Africa are often identified as the most vulnerable regions on the \r\ncontinent (Closset et al., 2017; Serdeczny et al., 2017). Particularly vulnerable groups include pastoralists (Wangui, 2018; Ayanlade and \r\nOjebisi, 2019), fishing communities (Belhabib et al., 2016; Muringai et al., 2019a), small-scale farmers (Ayanlade et al., 2017; Mogomotsi \r\net al., 2020; see Section 9.8.1) and residents of formal and informal urban settlements (see Section 9.9). Research has identified key \r\nmacro drivers, as well as multiple dimensions of social status that mediate differential vulnerability in different African contexts. For \r\nexample, the contemporary vulnerability of small-scale rural producers in semi-arid northern Ghana has been shaped by colonial economic \r\ntransformations (Ahmed et al"


id: 2ff1b1355e7a0b76cf7e3673116ca5b7
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", 2016), more recent neoliberal reforms reducing state support (Fieldman, 2011) and the disruption of local \r\nfood systems due to increasing grain imports (Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner-Kerr, 2015). Age interacts with other dimensions of social \r\nstatus, shaping differential vulnerability in several ways. Projected increases in mean temperatures and longer and more intense heat \r\nwaves (Figure Box 9.1.1) may increase health risks for children and elderly populations by increasing risks associated with heat stress \r\n(Bangira et al., 2015; Cairncross et al., 2018). Temperature extremes are associated with increased risk of mortality in Ghana, Burkina \r\nFaso, Kenya and South Africa, with greatest increases among children and the elderly (Bangira et al., 2015; Amegah et al., 2016; Omonijo, \r\n2017; Wiru et al., 2019; see Section 9.10.2.3.1)."


id: 5683fad9e4ee2769c07287bb0fdab03b
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"Rural African women are often disadvantaged by traditional, patriarchal decision-making processes and lack of access to land--issues \r\ncompounded by kinship systems (that, is matrilineal or patrilineal), migrant status, age, type of household, livelihood orientation and \r\ndisability in determining their adaptive options (Ahmed et  al., 2016; see Section  9.8.1; 9.11.1.2; Box  9.8). Differential agricultural \r\nproductivity between men and women is about 20-30% or more in dryland regions of Ethiopia and Nigeria (Ghanem, 2011) and \r\nchallenges women's ability to adapt to climate change. Limited access to agricultural resources and limited benefits from agricultural \r\npolicies, compounded by other social and cultural factors, make women more vulnerable to climatic risks (Shukla et al., 2021). Kinship \r\nsystems can contribute to their vulnerability and capacity to adapt"


id: ca5897abd62a061fa78341bf7ed0ed18
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
" Women in matrilineal systems have greater bargaining power and \r\nhave access to more resources than those in patrilineal systems (Chigbu, 2019; Robinson and Gottlieb, 2021; See section 9.8.1; 9.11.1.2)."


id: 495e37a47c1b78abddb3a1a0bf74b987
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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vector_id: 8925
content:
"Nielsen and Reenberg, 2010; Akresh et al., 2011; Eriksen et al., 2011; Beymer-Farris and Bassett, 2012; Davis et al., 2012; Adom, 2014; Akello, 2014; Headey and Jayne, \r\n2014; Otzelberger, 2014; Wunsch, 2014; Conteh, 2015; Huntjens and Nachbar, 2015; Spencer, 2015; Adetula et al., 2016; Djoudi et al., 2016; Kuper et al., 2016; Stark \r\nand Landis, 2016; Allard, 2017; Anderson, 2017; Asfaw et al., 2017; Hufe and Heuermann, 2017; Hulme, 2017; Paul and wa Githinji, 2017; Rao et al., 2017; Serdeczny \r\net al., 2017; Tesfamariam and Zinyengere, 2017; Tierney et al., 2017; Waha et al., 2017; Chihambakwe et al., 2018; Cholo et al., 2018; Jenkins et al., 2018; Keahey, 2018; \r\nLwasa et al., 2018; Makara, 2018; Nyasimi et al., 2018; Petesch et al., 2018; Schuman et al., 2018; Theis et al., 2018; van Baalen and Mobjork, 2018; van der Zwaan et al., \r\n2018; Adepoju, 2019; Adzawla et al., 2019b; Bryceson, 2019; Grasham et al., 2019; Jayne et al., 2019a; Lowe et al., 2019; Lunga et al"


id: a8111ece836bd6fea09bd5eae7ed306b
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vector_id: 23957
content:
", 2019; OGAR and Bassey, 2019; \r\nOnwutuebe, 2019; Ramutsindela and Buscher, 2019; Sulieman and Young, 2019; Torabi and Noori, 2019; Adeniran and Daniell, 2020; Alexander, 2020; Clay and Zimmerer, \r\n2020; Devonald et al., 2020; Dolislager et al., 2020; Edo et al., 2020; Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020; Lammers et al., 2020; World Bank, 2020b; Asiama et al., 2021; Azong \r\nand Kelso, 2021; Birgen, 2021; Paalo and Issifu, 2021; Simpson et al., 2021b)."


id: 34622836dd6168ac452cc5f4bc141c3c
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content:
"have lower internal climate variability (e.g. low seasonality), the low\u0002latitude African countries are projected to be exposed to large increases \r\nin frequency of daily temperature extremes (hotter than 99.9% of their \r\nhistorical records) earlier in the 21st century compared to generally \r\nwealthier nations at higher latitudes (Harrington et  al., 2016; Chen \r\net al., 2021; Doblas-Reyes et al., 2021; Gutierrez et al., 2021). Although \r\nhigher warming rates are projected over high latitudes during the first \r\nhalf of this century, societies and environments in low-latitude, low\u0002income countries are projected to become exposed to unprecedented \r\nclimates before those in high latitude, developed countries (Frame \r\net al., 2017; Harrington et al., 2017; Gutierrez et al., 2021). For example, \r\nbeyond 2050, in central Africa and coastal west Africa, 10 months of \r\nevery year will be hotter than any month in the period 1950-2000 \r\nunder a high emissions scenario (RCP8.5) (Harrington et  al"


id: d12aea7c67c6ae66b8c2898c4aba0675
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content:
", 2017; \r\nGutierrez et al., 2021). Ambitious, near-term mitigation will provide the \r\nlargest reductions in exposure to unprecedented high temperatures \r\nfor populations in low-latitude regions, such as across tropical Africa \r\n(Harrington et al., 2016; Frame et al., 2017)."


id: fcd61b754ac8d10897ba88c3017e3661
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content:
"However, production of salient climate information in Africa is \r\nhindered by limited availability of and access to weather and climate \r\ndata, especially in central and north Africa (Figure  9.15; Coulibaly \r\net  al., 2017; Hansen et  al., 2019a). Existing weather infrastructure \r\nremains suboptimal for development of reliable early warning \r\nsystems (Africa Adaptation Initiative, 2018; Krell et  al., 2021). For \r\nexample, it is estimated only 10% of the world's ground-based \r\nobservation networks are in Africa, and that 54% of Africa's surface \r\nweather stations cannot capture data accurately (Africa Adaptation \r\nInitiative, 2018; World Bank, 2020d). Some programmes are trying to \r\naddress this issue, including the trans-African hydro-meteorological \r\nobservatory (van de Giesen et  al., 2014), the West African Science \r\nService Centre on Climate Change and Adaptive Land Management \r\n(WASCAL) (Salack et al"


id: b19039e74fb4010607757675009db047
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vector_id: 25434
content:
", 2019), the Southern African Science Service \r\nCentre for Climate Change, Adaptive Land Management (SASSCAL) \r\n(Kaspar et  al., 2015) and the AMMA-CATCH National Observation \r\nService and Critical Zone Exploration Network (Galle et  al., 2018). \r\nHowever, the sustainability of observation networks beyond the \r\nlife of these programmes is uncertain as many African National \r\nMeteorological and Hydrology Services experience structural, financial \r\nand technical barriers to maintaining these systems (Section 9.4.5)."


id: d1e2b5d9771b8855a2ebef496a4071bc
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"Figure 9.14 |  Summary of confidence in the direction of projected change in climate impact drivers (CIDs) in Africa. Projected changes represent the aggregate \r\nchanges characteristic for mid-century for a range of scenarios, including: medium emission scenarios RCP4.5, SSP3-4.5, Scenario A1B from Special Report on Emissions Scenarios \r\n(SRES), or higher emissions scenarios (e.g., RCP8.5, SSP5-RCP8.5), within each AR6 WGI region (inset map) approximately corresponding to global warming levels between 2degC \r\nand 2.4degC (for CIDs that are independent of sea level rise). CIDs are drivers of impacts that are of climatic origin (that is, physical climate system conditions including means and \r\nextremes) that affect an element of society or ecosystems. The table also includes the assessment of observed or projected time-of-emergence of the CID change signal from the \r\nnatural interannual variability if found with at least medium confidence (dots)"


id: 1250092f7bb8d2b85b238c66fd801aee
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" Emergence of a climate change signal or trend refers to when a change in climate (the 'signal') \r\nbecomes larger than the amplitude of natural or internal variations (the 'noise'). The figure is a modified version of Table 12.3 in Chapter 12 of WGI (Ranasinghe et al., 2021), please \r\nsee this chapter for definitions of the various climate impact drivers and the basis for confidence levels of the assessment. Please note these WGI regions do not directly correspond \r\nto the regionalisation in this chapter nor do we assess climate risks for Madagascar."


id: 9f69fa2da1ab978e85b94c3f73138b7e
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content:
"At 1.5degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming above pre-industrial levels, \r\nmean annual temperatures in north Africa are projected to be on \r\naverage, 0.9degC, 1.5degC and 2.6degC warmer than the 1994-2005 average, \r\nrespectively (Figure  9.16a). Warming is projected to be stronger in \r\nsummer than winter (Lelieveld et al., 2016; Dosio, 2017). The number \r\nof hot days is likely to increase by up to 90% by the end of the century \r\nunder RCP8.5 (global warming level [GWL] 4.4degC) (Gutierrez et  al., \r\n2021; Ranasinghe et  al., 2021) and hot nights and the duration of \r\nwarm spells to increase in the first half of the 21st century in both \r\nintermediate and high-emission scenarios (Patricola and Cook, 2010; \r\nVizy and Cook, 2012; Lelieveld et al., 2016; Dosio, 2017; Filahi et al., \r\n2017). Heatwaves are projected to become more frequent and intense \r\neven at 1.5degC of global warming (Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe \r\net  al., 2021). Children born in 2020, under a 1"


id: f0d41582db29faf0cc54dfc395bef71d
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"5degC-compatible \r\nscenario will be exposed to 4-6  times more heatwaves in their \r\nlifetimes compared to people born in 1960; this exposure increases to \r\n9-10 times more heatwaves for emission reduction pledges, limiting \r\nglobal warming to 2.4degC (Thiery et al., 2021)."


id: 5aae0ffb00539db6c4867ba914d0c6d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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"West African rainfall projections show a gradient of precipitation decrease \r\nin the west and increase in the east (medium confidence) (Figure 9.14; \r\nDosio et al., 2021; Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe et al., 2021). This \r\npattern is evident at 1.5degC of global warming and the magnitude of \r\nchange increases at higher warming levels (Figure  9.16c; Schleussner \r\net al., 2016b; Kumi and Abiodun, 2018; Sylla et al., 2018). A reduction in \r\nlength of the rainy season is projected over the western Sahel through \r\ndelayed rainfall onset by 4-6 days at global warming levels of 1.5degC \r\nand 2degC (Kumi and Abiodun, 2018; Douville et al., 2021; Gutierrez et al., \r\n2021). Although there are uncertainties in rainfall projections over the \r\nSahel (Klutse et al., 2018; Gutierrez et al., 2021), CMIP6 models project \r\nmonsoon rainfall amounts to increase by approximately 2.9% per \r\ndegree of warming (Jin et al., 2020; Wang et al"


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content:
", 2020a), therefore, at \r\nhigher levels of warming and towards the end of the century, a wetter \r\nmonsoon is projected in the eastern Sahel (medium confidence)."


id: b8d042ad766fd4b1e510e8a12544459c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"At 1.5degC, 2degC and 3degC of global warming above pre-industrial levels, \r\nmean annual temperatures in central Africa are projected to be on \r\naverage, 0.6degC, 1.1degC and 2.1degC warmer than the 1994-2005 average, \r\nrespectively (Figure  9.16a). By the end of the century (2070-2099), \r\nwarming of 2degC (RCP4.5 ) to 4degC (RCP8.5) is projected over the region \r\n(Aloysius et al., 2016; Fotso-Nguemo et al., 2017; Diedhiou et al., 2018; \r\nMba et al., 2018; Tamoffo et al., 2019) and the number of days with \r\nmaximum temperature exceeding 35degC is projected to increase by \r\n150 days or more at GWL 4.4degC (Gutierrez et al., 2021; Ranasinghe \r\net al., 2021). According to CMIP6 and CORDEX (Coordinated Regional \r\nClimate Downscaling Experiment) models, the annual average number \r\nof days with maximum temperature exceeding 35degC will increase \r\nbetween 14-27 days at GWL 2degC and 33-59 days at GWL 3degC above \r\nthe 61-63  days for 1995-2014 (Gutierrez et  al., 2021; Ranasinghe \r\net  al"


id: 965686adb4e99ee3688df1a7bcc83707
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content:
", 2021) (high confidence). The number of heatwave days is \r\nprojected to increase and extreme heatwave events may last longer \r\nthan 180 days at GWL 4.1degC (Dosio, 2017; Weber et al., 2018; Spinoni \r\net al., 2019). Children born in 2020, under a 1.5degC-compatible scenario \r\nwill be exposed to 6-8  times more heatwaves in their lifetimes \r\ncompared to people born in 1960; this exposure increases to 7-9 times \r\nmore heatwaves at GWL 2.4degC (Thiery et  al., 2021). The number of \r\npotentially lethal heat days per year is projected to increase from <50 \r\nduring 1995-2005 to 50-75 at GWL 1.6degC, 100-150 at GWL 2.5degC \r\nand 200-350 at GWL 4.4degC (Mora et al., 2017)."


id: 9fe53295e5b0ce5e919aa8f8fa9a7ff2
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vector_id: 22694
content:
"Mean annual rainfall increased over parts of Namibia, Botswana and \r\nsouthern Angola during 1980-2015 by between 128 and 256 mm \r\n(Figure 9.13b). Since the 1960s, decreasing precipitation trends have \r\nbeen detected over the South African winter rainfall region (high \r\nconfidence) and the far eastern parts of South Africa (low confidence) \r\n(Engelbrecht et  al., 2009; Kruger and Nxumalo, 2017b; Burls et  al., \r\n2019; Lakhraj-Govender and Grab, 2019; Gutierrez et  al., 2021; \r\nRanasinghe et al., 2021). The frequency of dry spells and agricultural \r\ndrought in the region has increased over the period 1961-2016 (Yuan \r\net al., 2018; Seneviratne et al., 2021), the frequency of meteorological \r\ndrought increased by between 2.5-3 events per decade since 1961 \r\n(Spinoni et al 2019) and the probability of the multi-year drought over \r\nthe southwestern cape of South Africa increased by a factor of three \r\n(95% confidence interval 1.5-6) in response to global warming (Otto \r\net al., 2018)"


id: 6086ae2b7f69e8372175b18ca5164df6
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" The number and intensity of extreme precipitation events \r\nhave increased over the last century (Kruger and Nxumalo, 2017b; \r\nRanasinghe et  al., 2021; Sun et  al., 2021), and in the Karoo region \r\nof southern South Africa, long-term station data show an increasing \r\ntrend in annual rainfall of greater than 5 mm per decade over the \r\nperiod 1921-2015 (Kruger and Nxumalo, 2017b)."


id: 5ef32a00a9e100543dc8a48d03973d61
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content:
"Sea surface temperatures around Africa are projected to increase by \r\n0.5degC-1.3degC for 1.5degC global warming and increase by 1.3degC-2.0degC \r\nfor 3degC global warming (Figure  9.16 f). Globally, 87% of observed \r\nmarine heatwaves have been attributed to human-caused global \r\nwarming, and at 2degC of global warming, nearly all marine heatwaves \r\nwould be attributable to heating of the climate caused by human \r\nactivities (Frolicher et al., 2018; Laufkotter et al., 2020). Increases in \r\nfrequency, intensity, spatial extent and duration of marine heatwaves \r\nare projected for all coastal zones of Africa. At 1degC and 3.5degC of \r\nglobal warming, the probability of marine heatwave days is between \r\n4-15  times and 30-60  times higher compared to the pre-industrial \r\n(1861-1880) 99th percentile probability, with highest increases over \r\nequatorial and sub-tropical coastal regions (Figure 9.16; Frolicher et al., \r\n2018)"


id: 287622723b036130d3b1ae1b48086973
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content:
" These events are expected to overwhelm the ability of marine \r\norganisms and ecosystems to adapt to these changes (Section 9.6.1; \r\nFrolicher et  al., 2018). Reducing emissions and limiting warming to \r\nlower levels reduces risk to these systems (high confidence) (Hoegh\u0002Guldberg et al., 2018)."


id: 9d5fd6e51de4af76b1be3251140eebb0
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content:
"Common indicators for the quality of the rain season for local communities in Africa include flower and fruit production of local trees \r\n(Nkomwa et al., 2014; Jiri et al., 2015; Kagunyu et al., 2016), insect, bird and animal behaviour and occurrence (Jiri et al., 2016; Mwaniki \r\nand Stevenson, 2017; Ebhuoma, 2020) and dry season temperatures (Kolawole et  al., 2016; Okonya et  al., 2017). Fulani herders in \r\nwest Africa believe that when 'nests hang high on trees, then rains will be heavy; when nests hang low, rains will be scarce' (Roncoli \r\net al., 2002). In South Africa, LK on weather forecasting is based on the hatching of insects, locust swarm movements and the arrival \r\nof migratory birds, which has enabled farmers to make adjustments to cropping practices (Muyambo et al., 2017; Tume et al., 2019). \r\nMost of these IK indicators apply to specific communities, and are used for short-term forecasting (e.g"


id: 814d379598bfd92f5a1d026a341d664e
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content:
", event-specific predictions, such \r\nas a violent storm, and onset rain predictions) (Zuma-Netshiukhwi et al., 2013; Mutula et al., 2014). There is evidence of communities \r\nthat rely heavily on IKLK indicators to forecast seasonal variability across the continent (Kagunyu et al., 2016; Mwaniki and Stevenson, \r\n2017; Tume et al., 2019). However, their accuracy is debatable, due to age-old knowledge losing accuracy because of recent changes \r\nin weather conditions (Shaffer, 2014; Adjei and Kyerematen, 2018). There are also some limitations in the transferability of IK across \r\ngeographical scales, as its understanding is framed by traditional beliefs and cultural practices, and historical and social conditions of \r\neach community, which vary significantly across communities. This has direct implications for the adoption of IKLK in national policy and \r\nplanned adaptation by governments"


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content:
" However, in some parts of Africa, evidence of the integration of IKLK and scientific-based weather \r\nforecasting is increasing (Jiri et al., 2016; Mapfumo et al., 2017; Williams et al., 2020)."


id: a991985c061ab94a6bd52eb86472d388
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
content_type: text
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vector_id: 24211
content:
"Studies on IKLK and climate change adaptation conducted in various African countries and across ecosystems indicate that Indigenous \r\nenvironmental knowledge is negatively affected by several factors. Local farmers who depend on this knowledge system for their \r\nlivelihoods hold the view that African governments do not support and promote it in policy development. Most government agricultural \r\nextension workers still consider IK to be unscientific and unreliable (Seaman et al., 2014; Mafongoya et al., 2017). At the national level, \r\nthere is a lack of recognition and inclusion of IKLK in adaptation planning by African governments, partly because most of the IK and LK \r\nin African local communities remains undocumented, but also because IKLK are inadequately captured in the literature (Ford et al., 2016; \r\nIPCC, 2019b). This knowledge is predominantly preserved in the memories of the elderly and is handed down orally or by demonstration \r\nfrom generation to generation"


id: 7c7b55ec329fe67b839b78d0a7b35f15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17186
content:
" It gradually disappears due to memory gaps, and when those holding the knowledge die or refuse to pass \r\nit to another generation, the knowledge becomes extinct (Rankoana, 2016a). The way in which IK is transmitted, accessed and shared in \r\nmost African societies is not smooth (IIED, 2015). IK is also threatened by urbanisation, which attracts rural migrants to urban areas where \r\nIKLK use may be more limited (Fernandez-Llamazares et al., 2015). Further, most African societies that use IK were once colonised, \r\nwhereby the African Indigenous ways of knowing were devalued and marginalised (Bolden et al., 2018). There are concerns about the \r\neffectiveness of both IK indicators and related adaptation responses by communities in predicting and adapting to weather events under \r\nfuture climate conditions (Speranza et al., 2009; Shaffer, 2014; Hooli, 2016)."


id: 3dd5b217e36332912321bfd47de53bf8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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vector_id: 7087
content:
"Shifts in demography, geographic ranges, and abundance of plants \r\nand animals consistent with expected impacts of climate change are \r\nevident across Africa. These include uphill contractions of elevational \r\nrange limits of birds (Neate-Clegg et  al., 2021), changes in species \r\ndistributions previously reported in AR5 (Niang et al., 2014) and the \r\ndeath of many of the oldest and largest African baobabs (Patrut et al., \r\n2018). An increase in frequency and intensity of hot, dry weather \r\nafter wildfires has led to a long-term decline in plant biodiversity in \r\nFynbos since the 1960s (Slingsby et al., 2017). Increasing temperatures \r\nmay have contributed to the declining abundance and range size of \r\nSouth African birds (Milne et  al., 2015), including Cape Rockjumper \r\n(Chaetops frenatus) and protea canary (Serinus leucopterus), from \r\nincreased risk of reproductive failure (Lee and Barnard, 2016; Oswald \r\net al., 2020). For hot and dry regions (e.g"


id: 30f751bc8310c06f07d5efada11db280
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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vector_id: 5129
content:
", Kalahari), there is strong \r\nevidence that increased temperatures are having chronic sublethal \r\nimpacts, including reduced foraging efficiency and loss of body mass \r\n(du Plessis et al., 2012; Conradie et al., 2019), and are approaching \r\nspecies physiological limits, with heat extremes driving mass mortality \r\nevents in birds and bats (McKechnie et al., 2021). Vegetation change \r\nlinked to climate change and increasing atmospheric CO2 has had an \r\nindirect impact on animals. Increased woody cover has decreased the \r\noccurrence of bird, reptile and mammal species that require grassy \r\nhabitats (Peron and Altwegg, 2015; McCleery et al., 2018). Decreased \r\nfruit production linked to rising temperatures has decreased the body \r\ncondition of fruit-dependent forest elephants by 11% from 2008-2018 \r\n(Bush et al., 2020)."


id: 2d5047809eea209d1621281d2faa9577
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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vector_id: 4571
content:
"The overall continental trend is woody plant expansion, particularly \r\nin grasslands and savannas, with woody plant cover increasing at \r\na rate of 2.4% per decade (see Figure  9.17; Stevens et  al., 2017; \r\nAxelsson and Hanan, 2018). There is also increased grass cover in \r\narid regions in southwestern Africa (Masubelele et al., 2014). There \r\nis high agreement that this is attributable to increased CO2, warmer \r\nand wetter climates, declines in burned area and release from \r\nherbivore browsing pressure, but the relative importance of these \r\ninteracting drivers remains uncertain (O'Connor et al., 2014; Stevens \r\net al., 2016; Garcia Criado et al., 2020). Woody encroachment is the \r\ndominant trend in the western and central Sahel, occurring over \r\n24% of the region, driven primarily by shifts in rainfall timing and \r\nrecovery from drought (Anchang et al., 2019; Brandt et al., 2019)"


id: 38e437b640bdb41e26b19e1f8d4ff349
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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vector_id: 6323
content:
" \r\nRemote sensing studies demonstrate greening in southern Africa \r\nand forest expansion into water-limited savannas in central and \r\nwest Africa (Baccini et  al., 2017; Aleman et  al., 2018; Piao et  al., \r\n2020), with increases in precipitation and atmospheric CO2 the \r\nprobable determinants of change (Venter et al., 2018; Brandt et al., \r\n2019; Zhang et al., 2019). These trends of greening and woody plant \r\nexpansion stand in contrast to the desertification and contraction \r\nof vegetated areas highlighted in AR5 (Niang et al., 2014), but are \r\nbased on multiple studies and longer time series of observations. \r\nReported cases of desertification and vegetation loss, for example, "


id: 827a4f6f33e556dea1e66c2e352fb103
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18048
content:
"Vegetation changes interacting with climate and land use change \r\nhave impacted fire regimes across Africa. The frequency of weather \r\nconducive for fire has increased in southern and west Africa and is \r\nexpected to continue increasing in the 21st century under both RCP2.6 \r\nand RCP8.5 (Betts et  al., 2015; Abatzoglou et  al., 2019). Increased \r\ngrass cover in arid regions introduced fire into regions where fuel \r\nwas previously insufficient to allow fire spread, such as the arid Karoo \r\nin South Africa (du Toit et  al., 2015; Strydom and Savage, 2016). In \r\ncontrast, shrub encroachment, increased precipitation (Zubkova et al., \r\n2019), vegetation fragmentation and cropland expansion have reduced \r\nfire activity in many African grasslands and savannas (Andela and van \r\nder Werf, 2014; Probert et  al., 2019). These drivers are expected to \r\nnegate the effect of increasing fire weather and ultimately lead to a \r\nreduction in the total burned area under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 (Knorr \r\net al"


id: 39f1173403943b6da356867f8fd463bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6489
content:
"Anthropogenic climate change is already negatively impacting Africa's \r\nmarine biodiversity, ecosystem functioning and services by changing \r\nphysical and chemical properties of seawater (increased temperature, \r\nsalinity and acidification, and changes in oxygen concentration, ocean \r\ncurrents and vertical stratification) (high confidence) (Hoegh-Guldberg \r\net al., 2014; 2018). Coastal ecosystems in west Africa are among the \r\nmost vulnerable because of extensive low-lying deltas exposed to sea \r\nlevel rise, erosion, saltwater intrusion and flooding (Belhabib et  al., \r\n2016; UNEP, 2016b; Kifani et  al., 2018).  In southern Africa, shifting \r\ndistributions of anchovy, sardine, hake, rock lobster and seabirds have \r\nbeen partly attributed to climate change (Crawford et al., 2015; van \r\nder Lingen and Hampton, 2018; Vizy et al"


id: 54331b69d0f74d67f7f2c15616ec3971
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
", 2018), including southern \r\nshifts of 30 estuarine and marine fish species attributed to increased \r\ntemperature and changes in water circulation from decreased river \r\ninflow (Augustyn et  al., 2018). Warming sea surface temperatures \r\ninhibiting nutrient mixing have reduced phytoplankton biomass in the \r\nwestern Indian Ocean by 20% since the 1960s, potentially reducing \r\ntuna catches (Roxy et al., 2016)."


id: e5c34111455b7afc1a7c6786f0b2dd9e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"African ecosystems have a long evolutionary association with fire, \r\nlarge mammal herbivory and drought (Maurin et  al., 2014; Charles\u0002Dominique et  al., 2016). The maintenance of biodiversity depends \r\non natural disturbance regimes. Natural regrowth of savanna plant \r\nbiomass in southern Africa compensated for biomass removal through \r\nhuman activities (McNicol et al., 2018), and rapid recovery occurred \r\nafter the 2014-2016 extreme drought (Abbas et  al., 2019). During \r\nthe same drought event, browsing and mixed feeder herbivores \r\nwere resilient, but grazers declined by approximately 60% and were \r\nhighly dependent on drought refugia (Abraham et al., 2019). African \r\ntropical forests remained a carbon sink through the record drought \r\nand temperature experienced in the 2015-2016 El Nino, indicating \r\nresilience in the face of extreme environmental conditions (Bennett \r\net  al., 2021)"


id: 9d59aa6210d64a32eb38f297837a60d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
" This is likely due to the presence of drought-tolerant \r\nspecies and floristic and functional shifts in tree species assemblages \r\n(Fauset et  al., 2012; Aguirre-Gutierrez et  al., 2019). This resilience \r\nindicates that there is the capacity to recover from disturbances \r\nand short-term change. However, resilience has limits and beyond \r\ncertain points, change can lead to irreversible shifts to different states \r\n(Figure 9.18)."


id: 433fec9cdeb0231ba842e1fd0e066a47
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content_type: text
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vector_id: 7984
content:
"Mangroves, seagrasses and coral reefs support nursery habitats for \r\nfish, sequester carbon, trap sediment and provide shoreline protection \r\n(Ghermandi et  al., 2019). Climate change is compromising these \r\necosystem services (medium confidence). Marine heatwaves associated \r\nwith ENSO events have triggered mass coral bleaching and mortality \r\nover the past 20 years (Oliver et al., 2018). Mass coral bleaching in the \r\nwestern Indian Ocean occurred in 1998, 2005, 2010 and 2015/2016 \r\nwith coral cover just 30-40% of 1998 levels by 2016 (Obura et al., \r\n2017; Moustahfid et  al., 2018). The northern Mozambique Channel \r\nhas served as a refuge from climate change and biological reservoir \r\nfor the entire coastal east African region (McClanahan et  al., 2014; \r\nHoegh-Guldberg et  al., 2018). A southern shift of mangrove species \r\nhas been observed in south Africa (Peer et al"


id: 3dfea2b9e009b0a06199f4ad09f1ba79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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vector_id: 7112
content:
", 2018) with loss in total \r\nsuitable coastal habitats for mangroves and shifts in the distribution of \r\nsome species of mangroves and a gain for others (Record et al., 2013). \r\nMangrove cover was reduced 48% in Mozambique in 2000 from \r\nTropical Cyclone Eline, with 100% mortality of seaward mangroves \r\ndominated by Rhizophora mucronata (Macamo et al., 2016). Recovery \r\nof mangrove species was observed 14 years later in sheltered sites. \r\nThere is low confidence these cyclone-induced impacts are attributable \r\nto climate change owing, in part, to a lack of reliable long-term data \r\nsets (Macamo et  al., 2016). In west Africa, oil and gas extraction, \r\ndeforestation, canalisation and de-silting of waterways have been the \r\nlargest factors in mangrove destruction (Numbere, 2019)."


id: ac87fbdc4b105ab360cbe9b7eeb0517
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"Figure 9.17 |  Widespread changes to African vegetation have been reported, especially increasing woody plant cover in many savannas and grasslands, \r\nwith 37% of these changes proposed to be driven by human-caused climate change and increased CO2 (a). The warming of lakes and rivers has been detected across \r\nAfrica and is attributed to climate change. Data on vegetation change was gathered from 156 studies published between 1989 and 2021(b). Climatic changes, mostly associated \r\nwith changes in rainfall, are enhancing grass production in arid grasslands and savannas, and causing grass expansion into semi-desert regions with notable increases in the Sahel \r\nand southern Africa. Tropical forest expansion into mesic savannas is occurring on the fringes of the central African tropical forest. Interactions between land use, climate change \r\nand increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations are causing a widespread increase in woody plant cover encroachment in tropical savannas and grasslands"


id: 9be0e249f0cfbacbfb50bb3b2b3bcaba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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vector_id: 22080
content:
" Some tree death and \r\nwoody cover decline associated with climate and land use change have also been recorded across biomes. Of the reported changes to terrestrial vegetation, 24% were explicitly \r\nlinked to climate change and a further 13% were proposed to be driven by climate change. In 48% of studies, no climate driver was mentioned and in 15% climate change was \r\nruled out as the driver of change. Annual surface water temperatures in African lakes have warmed at a rate of 0.05degC-0.76degC per decade. Both satellite-based measures spanning \r\n1985-2011 and in situ measurements spanning 1927-2014 agree on this warming trend. Other surface waters across Africa warmed from 1979-2018 at a rate of between \r\n0.05degC and 0.5degC per decade (Woolway and Maberly, 2020)"


id: 9592a46d02aa5ab02875cecf7932589b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
" Vegetation change data were taken from a larger, global literature survey of existing databases supplemented with \r\nnewer studies documenting changes in tree, shrub and grass cover linked to climate and land use change in natural and semi-natural areas (for further details see Section 2.4.3.5; \r\nTable SM2.1; Table SM9.2 for Africa vegetation change data and Table SM9.3 for studies reporting lake warming data)."


id: d566217c2db4667051cfb386b561364
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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vector_id: 31097
content:
"The geography of African biomes is projected to shift due to changes in \r\natmospheric CO2 concentrations and aridity (Figure 9.18). Grassland \r\nexpansion into the desert, woody expansion into grasslands and \r\nforest expansion into savannas are projected for areas of reduced \r\naridity, caused by reduced moisture stress from CO2 fertilisation \r\nunder medium (RCP4.5) and high (SRES A2) emissions scenarios \r\n(Heubes et  al., 2011; Moncrieff et  al., 2016). This greening trend \r\nmay slow or reverse with continued temperature increase and/or in \r\nareas of increased aridity (Berdugo et al., 2020). The net impact of \r\nthese effects on vegetation is highly uncertain (Trugman et al., 2018; \r\nCook et  al., 2020a; Martens et  al., 2021). The maintenance or re\u0002establishment of natural fire and large mammal herbivory processes \r\ncan mitigate projected CO2 and climate-driven changes (Scheiter and \r\nSavadogo, 2016; Stevens et al., 2016)"


id: b9260aad823b40190923bff10c621dea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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content:
"Figure 9.18 |  Increases in atmospheric CO2 and changes in aridity are projected to shift the geographic distribution of major biomes across Africa (high \r\nconfidence). Arrows in the diagram indicate possible pathways of biome change from current conditions resulting from changes in CO2 and aridity. Changes need not be gradual \r\nor linear and may occur rapidly if tipping points are crossed. Currently, widespread greening observed in Africa has been at least partially attributed to increasing atmospheric CO2\r\nconcentrations. Future projected increases in aridity are expected to cause desertification in many regions, but it is highly uncertain how this will interact with the greening effect \r\nof CO2. Inset maps show the projected geographical extent of changes in CO2 concentrations and aridity. CO2 is projected to increase globally under all future emission scenarios"


id: caa109f4fc6ec7c24905ec00dadce7b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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vector_id: 29443
content:
" \r\nAridity index maps show projected change in aridity (calculated as annual precipitation/annual potential evapotranspiration) at around 4degC global warming relative to 1850-1900 \r\n(RCP8.5 in 2070-2099) from 34 CMIP5 models (Scheff et al., 2017). Shaded areas indicate regions where >75% of models agree on the direction of change."


id: a080aeee7cea91741f6fad13efb32614
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22789
content:
"With increasing warming, there is a lower likelihood species can \r\nmigrate rapidly enough to track shifting climates, increasing global \r\nextinction risk and biodiversity loss across more of Africa (high \r\nconfidence). Immigration of species from elsewhere may partly \r\ncompensate for local extinctions and lead to local biodiversity gains \r\nin some regions (Newbold, 2018; Warren et al., 2018). However, more \r\nregions face net losses than net gains. At 1.5degC global warming, \r\n>46% of localities face net declines in vertebrate species richness \r\nof >10%, with net increases projected for less than 15% of localities \r\n(Barbet-Massin and Jetz, 2015; Newbold, 2018). At >2degC, 9% of \r\nspecies face complete range loss by 2100, regardless of their dispersal \r\nability (Urban, 2015). With >4degC global warming, a net loss of >10% \r\nof vertebrate species richness is projected across 85% of Africa \r\n(Barbet-Massin and Jetz, 2015; Mokhatla et al., 2015; Newbold, 2018; \r\nWarren et al., 2018)"


id: 863e8794e0bdea4e4dc6f4e455759b2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:28
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vector_id: 18664
content:
" Mountain top endemics and species in north and \r\nsouthern Africa are at risk due to disappearing cold climates (Milne \r\net al., 2015; Garcia et al., 2016; Bentley et al., 2018; Soultan et al., \r\n2019). For hot regions such as the Sahara, Congo Basin and Kalahari, \r\nno warmer-adapted species are available elsewhere to compensate \r\nfor local extinctions, so the resilience of local biodiversity will depend \r\nentirely on the persistence of species (Burrows et  al., 2014; Garcia \r\net  al., 2014). The capacity for species to avoid extinction through \r\nbehavioural thermoregulation, plasticity or evolution is uncertain but \r\nwill become increasingly unlikely under higher warming scenarios \r\n(Conradie et al., 2019)."


