# document

id: cde78de806cef66d084e5365a485f4e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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"during the next thirty years (the global GDP in 2019 was USD88 trillion). \r\nAs the following figures illustrate, only a very small share of it is currently \r\nbeing invested, leaving a very large investment gap still to address. \r\nThe incremental capital expenditure on energy efficiency in buildings \r\nhas grown since AR5 to reach the estimated USD193 billion in 2021; \r\nEurope was the largest investing region, followed by the USA and \r\nChina (Figure 9.21). The incremental capital expenditure on renewable \r\nenergy heat vice versa declined to reach USD24 billion in this year; the \r\nleading investor was China, followed by Europe (ibid). The total capital \r\nexpenditure on distributed small-scale (less than 1MW) solar systems \r\nin 2019 was USD52.1 billion, down from the peak of USD71 billion in \r\n2011; most of this capacity is installed in buildings (Frankfurt School\u0002UNEP Centre/BNEF 2020). The US was the largest country market \r\nwith USD9"


id: 939302c5f805b41c92362d6a7fda671c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 20732
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"6 billion investment; notably USD5 billion was deployed in \r\nthe Middle East and Africa (ibid). IEA (2021b) provided an estimate \r\nof annual average incremental investment needs in building sector \r\ndecarbonation between 2026 and 2030 of USD711 billion, including \r\nUSD509 billion in building energy efficiency and USD202 billion in \r\nrenewable heat for end-use and electrification in buildings. Such \r\ninvestment would allow being on track towards meeting the goals \r\nof the WEO Net Zero Emissions Scenario, as presented in Box  9.2. \r\nTo  reach these levels, the respective investment must grow from \r\ntheir average volumes in 2016-2020 factor 3.6 and 4.5 respectively. \r\nAs the investment  needs estimated by (IEA 2021b) are significantly \r\nlower the  investment intervals reported by bottom-up literature \r\n(Section 9.6.3), the actual investment gap is likely to be higher. "


id: 36aee692f0980b36f2b514e5c8923149
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 5990
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"Some policies are best implemented at international level. Efficiency \r\nrequirements for traded goods and the associated test methods could \r\nbe set at global level in order to enlarge the market, avoid technical \r\nbarriers to trade; reduce the manufacturers design and compliance \r\ncosts. International standards could be applied to developing countries \r\nwhen specific enabling conditions exist, particularly in regard to \r\ntechnology transfer, assistance for capacity buildings and financial \r\nsupport. This would also reduce the dumping of inefficient equipment \r\nin countries with no or lower efficiency requirements. An example is the \r\ndumping of new or used inefficient cooling equipment in developing \r\ncountries, undermining national and local efforts to manage energy, \r\nenvironment, health, and climate goals"


id: 2208e513e851266faa2b0c64e17822b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 2801
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" Specific regulations can be \r\nput in place to avoid such environmental dumping, beginning with the \r\n'prior informed consent' as in the Rotterdam Convention and a later \r\nstage with the adoption of minimum efficiency requirements for \r\nappliances (Andersen et al. 2018; UNEP 2017). Dreyfus et al. (2020a) \r\nindicates that global policies to promote best technologies currently \r\navailable have the potential to reduce climate emissions from air \r\nconditionings and refrigeration equipment by 210-460 GtCO2-eq by \r\n2060, resulting from the phasing down of HFC and from improved \r\nenergy efficiency. Another example is the commitment by governments \r\nin promoting improvements in energy efficiency of cooling equipment \r\nin parallel with the phasedown of HFC refrigerants enshrined in the \r\nBiarritz Pledge for Fast Action on Efficient Cooling signed in 2019"


id: 6e4cc513ae41d0b1b9cc109e8d59bca6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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" \r\nThe policy development and implementation costs will be reduced as \r\nthe technical analysis leading to the standard could be shared among \r\ngovernments. However, it is important that local small manufacturing \r\ncompanies in developing countries have the capacity to invest in \r\nupdating production lines for meeting new stringent international \r\nefficiency requirements. "


id: acb61b214979a00fe2974575565d2744
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
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vector_id: 24721
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"Building energy consumption is dependent on local climate and \r\nbuilding construction traditions, regional and local government \r\nshare an important role in promoting energy efficiency in buildings \r\nand on-site RES, through local building energy codes, constructions \r\npermits and urban planning. In South Korea, there is a green building \r\ncertification system operated by the government, based on this, \r\nSeoul has enacted Seoul's building standard, which includes more \r\nstringent requirements. Where it is difficult to retrofit existing \r\nbuildings, for example, historical buildings, cities may impose target \r\nat district level, where RES could be shared among buildings with \r\nenergy positive buildings compensating for energy consuming \r\nbuildings"


id: 5f0a7e32c8ad5d7e69dc63233863ed97
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 12496
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" Local climate and urban plans could also contribute to \r\nthe integration of the building sector with the local transport, water, \r\nand energy sectors, requiring, for example, new constructions in \r\nareas served by public transport, close to offices or buildings to be \r\nready for e-mobility. Buildings GHG emission reduction shall also \r\nbe considered in greenfield and brownfield developments and urban \r\nexpansion (Loo et al. 2017; Salviati and Ricciardo Lamonica 2020), \r\nincluding co-benefits (Zapata-Diomedi et al. 2019)."


id: 62a706e21ba2343ad79ce81cc802d2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
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vector_id: 13091
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"International agreements (Kyoto, Montreal/Kigali, Paris, etc.) play an \r\nimportant role in establishing national energy-efficiency and renewable \r\nenergy policies in several countries (Dhar et al. 2018; Bertoldi 2018). \r\nUnder the Paris Agreement, some NDCs contain emission reduction \r\ntargets for subsectors, for example, buildings, policies for subsectors \r\nand energy efficiency and/or renewable targets (see also Cross\u0002Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4). In the EU since 2007 climate and energy \r\npolicies are part of a co-ordinated policy package. EU Member States \r\nhave prepared energy efficiency plans every three years and long-term \r\nrenovation strategies for buildings (Economidou et al. 2020). Under \r\nthe new Energy and Climate Governance Regulation EU Member \r\nStates have submitted at the end of 2020 integrated National Energy \r\nand Climate Plans, including energy efficiency and renewable plans. \r\n(Oberthur 2019; Schlacke and Knodt 2019)"


id: bfc7485dfb052a8b0d37b452e28cb6ac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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"construction companies; equipment manufacturers; utilities, \r\netc.), several studies highlighted the importance of stakeholder \r\nconsultation and active participation in policy making and policy \r\nimplementation (Vasileiadou and Tuinstra 2013; Ingold et  al. \r\n2020), including voluntary commitments and citizen assemblies. \r\nIn particular, energy user's role will be transformed from passive role \r\nto an active role, as outlined in the concept of energy citizenship \r\n(Campos and Marin-Gonzalez 2020). The energy citizens need \r\nand voice should therefore be included in policy processes among \r\ntraditional business players, such as incumbent centralised power \r\ngeneration companies and utilities (Van Veelen 2018). Architects and \r\nengineers play an important role in the decarbonisation of buildings. \r\nThe professional bodies can mandate their members support energy \r\nefficiency and sufficiency"


id: f94764cbb32e9923b3ece48d80d226e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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" For example, the US AIA states in their \r\ncode of ethics that architects must inform clients of climate risks and \r\nopportunities for sustainability. The capacity and quality of workforce \r\nand building construction, retrofit, and service firms are essential to \r\nexecute the fast transition in building systems (Cross-Chapter Box 12 \r\nin Chapter 16)."


id: b2788201c48a0d1a2c5ea8e5bd55324d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 25593
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"The concept of institutional capacity is increasingly connected with \r\nthe issue of public governance, emphasising the broad institutional \r\ncontext within which individual policies are adopted. Institutions \r\nare durable and are sources of authority (formal or informal) \r\nstructuring repeated interactions of individuals, companies, civil \r\nsociety groups, governments, and other entities. Thus, institutional \r\ncapacity also represents a  broader 'enabling environment' which \r\nforms the basis upon which individuals and organisations interact. \r\nIn general terms, capacity is 'the ability to perform functions, solve \r\nproblems and set and achieve objectives' (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2002). \r\nInstitutional capacity is an important element for regional sustainable \r\ndevelopment (Farajirad et  al. 2015). The role and importance of \r\ninstitutional capacity is fundamental in implementing the building \r\ndecarbonisation"


id: d2ef44c803336f21c0ea0315ff494e5f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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" Central and local governments, regulatory \r\norganisations, financial institutions, standardisation bodies, test \r\nlaboratories, building construction and design companies, qualified \r\nworkforce and stakeholders are key players in supporting the \r\nimplementation of building decarbonisation. "


id: 71ea4f49438ee936bb40bda1bcc6116d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 15552
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"Governments (from national to local) planning to introduce \r\nefficiency, RES, and sufficiency policies needs technical capacity \r\nto set sectoral targets and design policies and introduce effective \r\nand enforcement with adequate structure and resources for their \r\nimplementation. Policies discussed and agreed with stakeholders \r\nand based on impartial data and impact assessments, have a higher \r\npossibility of success. Public authorities need technical and economics \r\ncompetences to understand complex technical issues and eliminate \r\nthe knowledge gap in comparison to private sector experts, human \r\nand financial resources to design, implement, revise, and evaluate \r\npolicies. The role of energy efficiency policy evaluation needs to be \r\nexpanded, including the assessment of the rebound effect (Vine \r\net  al. 2013)"


id: e3e622fc5692d1a695b79abd9c83e74a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"Mitigation actions in buildings generate multiple co-benefits (e.g.,  health benefits due to the improved indoor and outdoor \r\nconditions, productivity gains in non-residential buildings, creation of new jobs particularly at local level, improvements in social \r\nwell-being etc.) beyond their direct impact on reducing energy consumption and GHG emissions. Most studies agree that the value \r\nof these multiple benefits is greater than the value of energy savings and their inclusion in economic evaluation of mitigation \r\nactions may improve substantially their cost-effectiveness"


id: e4932047ae7e0c9ae7ed64abf16d3ac7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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" It is also worth mentioning that in several cases the buildings sector \r\nis characterised by strong rebound effects, which could be considered as a co-benefit in cases where the mechanisms involved \r\nprovide faster access to affordable energy but also a trade-off in cases where the external costs of increased energy consumption \r\nexceed the welfare benefits of the increased energy service consumption, thus lowering the economic performance of mitigation \r\nactions. The magnitude of these co-benefits and trade-offs are characterised by several uncertainties, which may be even higher in \r\nthe future as mitigation actions will be implemented in a changing climate, with changing building operation style and occupant \r\nbehaviour. Mitigation measures influence the degree of vulnerability of buildings to future climate change. For instance, temperature \r\nrise can increase energy consumption, which may lead to higher GHG emissions"


id: 95c911dab82c86e7cbb17f43fb48988
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 21066
content:
" Also, sea level rise, increased storms and rainfall \r\nunder future climate may impact building structure, materials and components, resulting in increased energy consumption and \r\nhousehold expenditure from producing and installing new components and making renovations. Well-planned energy efficiency, \r\nsufficiency and on-site renewable energy production can help to increase building resilience to climate change impacts and reduce \r\nadaptation needs."


id: 54d9b5992753f1b3cb6b7f0b3ffa1812
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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"Several barriers (information, financing, markets, behavioural, etc.) still prevents the decarbonisation of buildings stock, despite \r\nthe several co-benefits, including large energy savings. Solutions include investments in technological solutions (e.g., insulation, \r\nefficient equipment, and low-carbon energies and renewable energies) and lifestyle changes. In addition, the concept of sufficiency \r\nis suggested to be promoted and implemented through policies and information, as technological solutions will be not enough to \r\ndecarbonise the building sector. Due to the different types of buildings, occupants, and development stage there is not a single policy, \r\nwhich alone will reach the building decarbonisation target. A range of policy instruments ranging from regulatory measures such \r\nas building energy code for NZEBs and appliance standards, to market-based instruments (carbon tax, personal carbon allowance, \r\nrenewable portfolio standards, etc.) and information"


id: 5d4941e20f9eec4d80b0640c72f65fbd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 12190
content:
" Financing (grants, loans, performance base incentives, pays as you save, etc.) is \r\nanother key enabler for energy efficiency technologies and on-site renewables. Finally, effective governance and strong institutional \r\ncapacity are key to have an effective and successful implementation of policies and financing."


id: 25c022da1af2fca395b7bcd1c2a5ee95
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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"Since the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) there has been \r\na growing awareness of the need for demand management \r\nsolutions combined with new technologies, such as the \r\nrapidly growing use of electromobility for land transport and \r\nthe emerging options in advanced biofuels and hydrogen\u0002based fuels for shipping and aviation. There is a  growing \r\nneed for systemic infrastructure changes that enable behavioural \r\nmodifications and reductions in demand for transport services that \r\ncan in turn reduce energy demand. The response to the COVID-19 \r\npandemic has also shown that behavioural interventions can reduce \r\ntransport-related GHG emissions. For example, COVID-19-based \r\nlockdowns have confirmed the transformative value of telecommuting \r\nreplacing significant numbers of work and personal journeys as well \r\nas promoting local active transport"


id: 1cec074292a1deb87c2ce37bf249e1a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" There are growing opportunities \r\nto implement strategies that drive behavioural change and support \r\nthe adoption of new transport technology options. {Chapter 5, 10.2, \r\n10.3, 10.4, 10.8}"


id: fc374d6c6de4a6cf2a35799c9ff5afef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 37187
content:
"Land-based, long-range, heavy-duty trucks can be decarbonised \r\nthrough battery electric haulage (including the use of electric \r\nroad systems), complemented by hydrogen- and biofuel\u0002based fuels in some contexts (medium confidence). These \r\nsame technologies and expanded use of available electric rail \r\nsystems can support rail decarbonisation (medium confidence).\r\nInitial deployments of battery electric, hydrogen- and bio-based \r\nhaulage are underway, and commercial operations of some of these \r\ntechnologies are considered feasible by 2030 (medium confidence). \r\nThese technologies nevertheless face challenges regarding driving \r\nrange, capital and operating costs, and infrastructure availability. In \r\nparticular, fuel cell durability, high energy consumption, and costs \r\ncontinue to challenge the commercialisation of hydrogen-based fuel \r\ncell vehicles"


id: 8ea2a211fcf4868a3d35b6ab8d1277b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 19967
content:
" Increased capacity for low-carbon hydrogen production \r\nwould also be essential for hydrogen-based fuels to serve as an \r\nemissions reduction strategy (high confidence). {10.3, 10.4, 10.8}"


id: 657c5e7ac52d1705b31c43da217f3445
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13541
content:
"Changes in urban form, behaviour programmes, the circular \r\neconomy, the shared economy, and digitalisation trends \r\ncan support systemic changes that lead to reductions in \r\ndemand for transport services or expand the use of more \r\nefficient transport modes (high confidence). Cities can reduce \r\ntheir transport-related fuel consumption by around 25% through \r\ncombinations of more compact land use and the provision of less \r\ncar-dependent transport infrastructure. Appropriate infrastructure, \r\nincluding protected pedestrian and bike pathways, can also support \r\nmuch greater localised active travel.1\r\n Transport demand management \r\nincentives are expected to be necessary to support these systemic \r\nchanges (high confidence). There is mixed evidence of the effect \r\nof circular economy initiatives, shared economy initiatives, and \r\ndigitalisation on demand for transport services"


id: 4abeeff3c7e7da76d1678c08790428f3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 9173
content:
" For example, while \r\ndematerialisation can reduce the amount of material that needs \r\nto be transported to manufacturing facilities, an increase in online \r\nshopping with priority delivery can increase demand for freight \r\ntransport. Similarly, while teleworking could reduce travel demand, \r\nincreased ridesharing could increase vehicle-km travelled. {Chapter 1, \r\nChapter 5, 10.2, 10.8}"


id: 3acaff05da35cb38ede39ac5b652af59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6618
content:
"Decarbonisation options for shipping and aviation still require \r\nR&D, though advanced biofuels, ammonia, and synthetic fuels \r\nare emerging as viable options (medium confidence). Increased \r\nefficiency has been insufficient to limit the emissions from shipping \r\nand aviation, and natural gas-based fuels are likely inadequate \r\nto meet stringent decarbonisation goals for these segments (high \r\nconfidence). High energy density, low-carbon fuels are required, but \r\nthey have not yet reached commercial scale. Advanced biofuels could \r\nprovide low-carbon jet fuel (medium confidence). The production of \r\nsynthetic fuels using low-carbon hydrogen with CO2 captured through \r\ndirect air capture (DAC) or bioenergy with carbon capture and storage \r\n(BECCS) could provide jet and marine fuels but these options still \r\nrequire demonstration at scale (low confidence). Ammonia produced \r\nwith low-carbon hydrogen could also serve as a marine fuel (medium \r\nconfidence)"


id: ac8ef6eb8e425288d617a644fc6b91a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 24690
content:
" Deployment of these fuels requires reductions in \r\nproduction costs. {10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.8}"


id: 182bde592d96d7a53de52dc160c5d528
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
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vector_id: 1290
content:
"Scenarios from bottom-up and top-down models indicate that \r\nwithout intervention, CO2 emissions from transport could grow \r\nin the range of 16% and 50% by 2050 (medium confidence). The \r\nscenarios literature projects continued growth in demand for freight \r\nand passenger services, particularly in developing countries in Africa \r\nand Asia (high confidence). This growth is projected to take place \r\nacross all transport modes. Increases in demand notwithstanding, \r\nscenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC with no or limited overshoot \r\nsuggest that a  59% reduction (42-68% interquartile range) in \r\ntransport-related CO2 emissions by 2050, compared to modelled \r\n2020 levels is required. While many global scenarios place greater \r\nreliance on emissions reduction in sectors other than transport, \r\na  quarter of the 1.5degC degree scenarios describe transport-related \r\nCO2 emissions reductions in excess of 68% (relative to modelled \r\n2020 levels) (medium confidence)"


id: f87610755169eeab7b013eb469465766
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Illustrative mitigation pathways \r\n1.5 renewables (REN) and 1.5 low demand (LD) describe emission \r\nreductions of 80% and 90% in the transport sector, respectively, \r\nby 2050. Transport-related emission reductions, however, may not \r\nhappen uniformly across regions. For example, transport emissions \r\nfrom the Developed Countries and Eastern European and West\u0002Central Asian countries decrease from 2020 levels by 2050 across \r\nall scenarios compatible with a 1.5degC goal (C1-C2 group), but could \r\nincrease in Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, and \r\nthe Middle East in some of these scenarios.2\r\n {10.7}"


id: f9fe26f6d551dfa04ee00c51126c1f04
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36842
content:
"Legislated climate strategies are emerging at all levels \r\nof government and, together with pledges for personal \r\nchoices, could spur the deployment of demand- and supply\u0002side transport mitigation strategies (medium confidence).\r\nAt the local level, legislation can support local transport plans \r\nthat include commitments or pledges from local institutions to \r\nencourage behaviour change by adopting an organisational culture \r\nthat motivates sustainable behaviour, with inputs from the creative \r\narts. Such institution-led mechanisms could include bike-to-work \r\ncampaigns, free transport passes, parking charges, or eliminating car \r\nbenefits. Community-based solutions like solar sharing, community \r\ncharging, and mobility as a service can generate new opportunities to \r\nfacilitate low-carbon transport futures"


id: b45d92d18695619dd6dc842a567eddb7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25894
content:
" At the regional and national \r\nlevels, legislation can include vehicle and fuel efficiency standards, \r\nR&D support, and large-scale investments in low-carbon transport \r\ninfrastructure. {10.8, Chapter 15}"


id: fac9c8720197a619e4ea72cdb106412e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
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vector_id: 36978
content:
"As of 2019, the largest source of transport emissions is the movement \r\nof passengers and freight in road transport (6.1 GtCO2-eq, 69% of the \r\nsector's total). International shipping is the second largest emission \r\nsource, contributing 0.8 GtCO2-eq (9% of the sector's total), and \r\ninternational aviation is third with 0.6 GtCO2-eq (7% of the sector's \r\ntotal). All other transport emissions sources, including rail, have \r\nbeen relatively trivial in comparison, totalling 1.4 GtCO2-eq in 2019. \r\nBetween 2010 and 2019, international aviation had among the fastest \r\ngrowing GHG emissions among all segments (+3.4% per year), while \r\nroad transport remained one of the fastest growing (+1.7% per year) \r\namong all global energy-using sectors. Note that the COVID-19-\r\ninduced economic lockdowns implemented since 2020 have had \r\na very substantial impact on transport emissions - higher than any \r\nother sector (Chapter  2). Preliminary estimates from Crippa et  al"


id: 6596bc3a21f698387a332495d64f90f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 13557
content:
" \r\n(2021) suggest that global transport CO2 emissions declined to \r\n7.6 GtCO2 in 2020, a reduction of 11.6% compared to 2019 (Crippa \r\net al. 2021; Minx et al. 2021). These lockdowns affected all transport \r\nsegments, and particularly international aviation (estimated 45% \r\nreduction in 2020 global CO2 emissions), road transport (-10%), and \r\ndomestic aviation (-9.3%). By comparison, aggregate CO2 emissions \r\nacross all sectors are estimated to have declined by 5.1% as a result \r\nof the COVID-19 pandemic (Section 2.2.2)."


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vector_id: 10770
content:
"On-road passenger and freight vehicles dominate global transport\u0002related CO2 emissions and offer the largest mitigation potential (Taptich \r\net al. 2016; Halim et al. 2018). This chapter examines a wide range \r\nof possible transport emission reduction strategies. These strategies \r\ncan be categorised under the 'Avoid-Shift-Improve' (ASI) framework \r\ndescribed in Chapter 5 (Taptich et al. 2016). 'Avoid' strategies reduce \r\ntotal vehicle travel. They include compact communities and other \r\npolicies that minimise travel distances and promote efficient transport \r\nthrough pricing and demand management programmes. 'Shift' \r\nstrategies shift travel from higher-emitting to lower-emitting modes. \r\nThese strategies include more multimodal planning that improves \r\nactive and collective transport modes, complete streets roadway \r\ndesign, high occupant vehicle priority strategies that favour shared \r\nmodes, Mobility as a Service (MaaS), and multimodal navigation and \r\npayment apps"


id: a561f7fc335bd2e3f64f0fbfb9e04c25
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" 'Improve' strategies reduce per-kilometre emission \r\nrates. These strategies include hybrid and electric vehicle incentives, \r\nlower-carbon and cleaner fuels, high-emitting vehicle scrappage \r\nprogrammes, and efficient driving and anti-idling campaigns (Lutsey \r\nand Sperling 2012; Gota et al. 2015). These topics are assessed within \r\nthe rest of this chapter, including how combinations of ASI with new \r\ntechnologies can potentially lead from incremental interventions \r\ninto low-carbon transformative transport improvements that include \r\nsocial and equity benefits (Section 10.8)."


id: 6ba59fc4a99a91559fa34f367283dd37
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 14564
content:
"Available evidence suggests that transport-related CO2 emissions \r\nwould need to be restricted to about 2 to 3 Gt in 2050 (1.5degC \r\nscenario-1.5DS, B2DS), or about 70 to 80% below 2015 levels, to meet \r\nthe goals set in the Paris Agreement. It also indicates that a balanced \r\nand inter-modal application of Avoid, Shift, and Improve measures is \r\ncapable of yielding an estimated reduction in transport emissions of \r\n2.39 GtCO2-equivalent by 2030 and 5.74 GtCO2-equivalent by 2050 \r\n(IPCC 2018; Gota et al. 2019). Such a transformative decarbonisation \r\nof the global transport system requires, in addition to technological \r\nchanges, a  paradigm shift that ensures prioritisation of high\u0002accessibility transport solutions that minimise the amount of mobility \r\nrequired to meet people's needs, and favours transit and active \r\ntransport modes (Lee and Handy 2018; SLoCaT 2021)"


id: 2362d019c9d71a43053fc4249bc86cd7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 3021
content:
" These changes \r\nare sometimes called disruptive as they are frequently surprising in \r\nhow they accelerate through a technological system."


id: d7fad88593562c2f758b6c2467edadcf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31508
content:
"Climate change impacts such as extremely high temperatures, intense \r\nrainfall leading to flooding, more intense winds and/or storms, and \r\nsea level rise can seriously impact transport infrastructure, operations, \r\nand mobility for road, rail, shipping, and aviation. Studies since AR5 \r\nconfirm that serious challenges to all transport infrastructures are \r\nincreasing, with consequent delays or derailing (Miao et  al. 2018; \r\nMoretti and Loprencipe 2018; Perez-Morales et al. 2019; Palin et al. \r\n2021). These impacts have been increasingly documented but, \r\naccording to Forzieri et  al. (2018), little is known about the risks \r\nof multiple climate extremes on critical infrastructures at local to \r\ncontinental scales. All roads, bridges, rail systems, and ports are likely \r\nto be affected to some extent. Flexible pavements are particularly \r\nvulnerable to extreme high temperatures that can cause permanent \r\ndeformation and crumbling of asphalt (Underwood et al. 2017; Qiao \r\net al. 2019)"


id: f77be096c445e44f2d8cfaea205e2d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Rail systems are also vulnerable, with a variety of hazards, \r\nboth meteorological and non-meteorological, affecting railway asset \r\nlifetimes. Severe impacts on railway infrastructure and operations \r\ncan arise from the occurrence of temperatures below freezing, excess \r\nprecipitation, storms and wildfires (Thaduri et al. 2020; Palin et al. \r\n2021) as can impacts on underground transport systems (Forero\u0002Ortiz et al. 2020)."


id: 89216a776e6546e1d2812742ce242b8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 19113
content:
"The assessment of transport innovations and their mitigation potentials \r\nis at the core of how this chapter examines the possibilities for changing \r\ntransport-related GHG trajectories. The transport technology innovation \r\nliterature analysed in this chapter emphasises how a  mixture of \r\nmitigation technology options and social changes are now converging \r\nand how, in combination, they may have potential to accelerate trends \r\ntoward a low-carbon transport transition. Such changes are considered \r\ndisruptive or transformative (Sprei 2018). Of the current transport \r\ntrends covered in the literature, this chapter focuses on three key \r\ntechnology and policy areas: electro-mobility in land-based transport \r\nvehicles, new fuels for ships and planes, and overall demand reductions \r\nand efficiency"


id: 9b8b00c33b5ccec992c6b782ab5e69df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 22026
content:
"Since AR5 there has been a growing awareness of the potential and \r\nactual impacts from global sea level rise due to climate change on \r\ntransport systems (Dawson et al. 2016; Rasmussen et al. 2018; IPCC \r\n2019; Noland et al. 2019), particularly on port facilities (Stephenson \r\net al. 2018; Yang et al. 2018b; Perez-Morales et al. 2019). Similarly, \r\nrecent studies suggest changes in global jet streams could affect \r\nthe aviation sector (Staples et al. 2018; Becken and Shuker 2019), \r\nand extreme weather conditions can affect runways (heat buckling) \r\nand aircraft lift. Combined, climate impacts on aviation could result \r\nin payload restrictions and disruptions (Coffel et al. 2017; Monioudi \r\net  al. 2018). According to Williams (2017), studies have indicated \r\nthat the amount of moderate-or-greater clear-air turbulence on \r\ntransatlantic flight routes in winter will increase significantly in \r\nthe future as the climate changes"


id: 146d04f3f6b7eb5703bc295f366c5a93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 722
content:
"Since AR5, urban design has increasingly been seen as a  major \r\nway to influence the GHG emissions from urban transport systems. \r\nIndeed, research suggests that implementing urban form changes \r\ncould reduce GHG emissions from urban transport by 25% in \r\n2050, compared with a business-as-usual scenario (Creutzig et al. \r\n2015b; Creutzig 2016). Researchers have identified a  variety \r\nof variables to study the relationship between urban form and \r\ntransport-related GHG emissions. Three notable aspects summarise \r\nthese relationships: urban space utilisation, urban spatial form, \r\nand urban transportation infrastructure (Tian et  al. 2020). Urban \r\ndensity (population or employment density) and land-use mix \r\ndefine the urban space utilisation. Increases in urban density and \r\nmixed function can effectively reduce per capita car use by reducing \r\nthe number of trips and shortening travel distances"


id: ab06b35e34276beaf3c83ac196d07ac9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Similarly, the \r\ncontinuity of urban space and the dispersion of centres reduces \r\ntravel distances (Tian et al. 2020), though such changes are rarely \r\nachieved without shifting transport infrastructure investments \r\naway from road capacity increases (Newman and Kenworthy 2015; \r\nMcIntosh et al. 2017). For example, increased investment in public \r\ntransport coverage, optimal transfer plans, shorter transit travel \r\ntime, and improved transit travel efficiency make public transit more \r\nattractive (Heinen et al. 2017; Nugroho et al. 2018a; Nugroho et al. \r\n2018b) and hence increase density and land values (Sharma and \r\nNewman 2020). Similarly, forgoing the development of major roads \r\nfor the development of pedestrian and bike pathways enhances the \r\nattractiveness of active transport modes (Zahabi et al. 2016; Keall \r\net al. 2018; Tian et al. 2020)."


id: 284222175c29c00e65f8ec7c4b4861c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 3742
content:
"There is evidence that suggests decoupling of transport emissions and \r\neconomic growth is already happening in developed and developing \r\ncountries. Europe and China have shown the most dramatic changes \r\n(Huizenga et  al. 2015; Gao and Newman 2018; SLoCaT 2018b) \r\nand many cities are demonstrating decoupling of transport-related \r\nemissions through new net zero urban economic activity (Loo and \r\nBanister 2016; SLoCaT 2018a). A continued and accelerated \r\ndecoupling of the growth of transport-related GHG emissions from \r\neconomic growth is crucial for meeting the SDGs, as outlined in \r\nSection 10.1. This section focuses on several overlapping components \r\nof systemic change in the transport sector that affect the drivers of \r\nGHG emissions: urban form, physical geography, and infrastructure; \r\nbehaviour and mode choice; and new demand concepts. Table 10"


id: ecc25acf43c94eb7ea433ad92967bc32
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vector_id: 34727
content:
"3 \r\nat the end of the section provides a high-level summary of the effect \r\nof these systemic changes on emissions from the transport sector."


id: a209e0a2b74b940c153b4310a1d7153a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 23060
content:
"Global emissions trajectories of urban transport will be decided in rapidly urbanising Asia and Africa. Urban transport-related GHG \r\nemissions are driven by incomes and car ownership but there is considerable variation among cities with similar income and car ownership \r\nlevels (Newman and Kenworthy 2015). While electrification is a key strategy to decarbonise urban transport, urban infrastructures can \r\nmake a difference of up to a factor of 10 in energy use and induced GHG emissions (Erdogan 2020). Ongoing urbanisation patterns \r\nrisk future lock-in of induced demand on GHG emissions, constraining lifestyles to energy-intensive and high CO2-related technologies \r\n(Erickson and Tempest 2015; Seto et al. 2016) (Sections 5.4, 8.2.3 and 10.2.1). Instead, climate solutions can be locked into urban policies \r\nand infrastructures (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2018) especially through the enhancement of the walking and transit urban fabric"


id: 63885ed70505b68e52a229b60ce54d3b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Avoiding urban \r\nsprawl, associated with several externalities (Dieleman and Wegener 2004), is a necessary decarbonisation condition, and can be guided \r\nmacro-economically by increasing fuel prices and marginal costs of motorised transport (Creutzig 2014). Resulting urban forms not only \r\nreduce GHG emission from transport but also from buildings, as greater compactness results in reduced thermal loss (Borck and Brueckner \r\n2018). Health benefits from reduced car dependence are an increasing element driving this policy agenda (Speck 2018) (Section 10.8)."


id: e7e25e0baf1ebe98af7a28f894c9946b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 33978
content:
"Shift: mode choice for urban and intercity transport. Shifting \r\ndemand patterns (as opposed to avoiding demand) can be particularly \r\nimportant in decarbonising the transport sector. As a  result, the \r\ncross-elasticity of demand across transport modes is of particular \r\ninterest for understanding the opportunities for modal shift. The \r\ncross-elasticity represents the demand effect on mode i (e.g., bus) \r\nwhen an attribute of mode j (e.g., rail) changes marginally. Studies \r\non the cross-elasticities of mode choice for urban travel suggest that \r\nthe cross-elasticity for car demand is low, but the cross-elasticities of \r\nwalking, bus, and rail with respect to cars are relatively large (Fearnley \r\net al. 2017; Wardman et al. 2018). In practice, these cross-elasticities \r\nsuggest that car drivers are not very responsive to increased prices \r\nfor public transit, but transit users are responsive to reductions in the \r\ncost of driving"


id: aa657578c1cbfa49d070701a2b0247c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" When looking at the cross-elasticities of public transit \r\noptions (bus vs metro vs rail), research suggests that consumers are \r\nparticularly sensitive to in-vehicle and waiting time when choosing \r\npublic transit modes (Fearnley et  al. 2018). These general results \r\nprovide additional evidence that increasing the use of active and \r\npublic transport requires interventions that make car use more \r\nexpensive while making public transit more convenient (e.g., smart \r\napps that tell the user the exact time for transit arrival (Box 10.1))."


id: c9e056de87b79210ca808ffb09b477f3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"The price elasticity of demand measures changes in demand as \r\na result of changes in the prices of the services. In a meta-analysis of \r\nthe price elasticity of energy demand, Labandeira et al. (2017) report \r\nthe average long-term price elasticity of demand for gasoline and \r\ndiesel to be -0.773 and -0.443, respectively. That is, demand will \r\ndecline with increasing prices. A similar analysis of long-term data in \r\nthe United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Sweden, Australia, \r\nand Germany reports the gasoline price elasticity of demand for car \r\ntravel (as measured through vehicle-kilometre - vkm - per capita) \r\nranges between -0.1 and -0.4 (Bastian et al. 2016). For rail travel, \r\nthe price elasticity of demand has been found to range between \r\n-1.05 and -1.1 (Zeng et al. 2021). Similarly, price elasticities for air \r\ntravel range from -0.53 to -1"


id: 280aef013e63eaf228ba6891b7671981
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"91 depending on various factors such \r\nas purpose of travel (business or leisure), season, and month and day \r\nof departure (Morlotti et al. 2017). The price elasticities of demand \r\nsuggest that car use is inelastic to prices, while train use is relatively \r\ninelastic to the cost of using rail. Conversely, consumers seem to be \r\nmore responsive to the cost of flying, so that strategies that increase \r\nthe cost of flying are likely to contribute to some avoidance of \r\naviation-related GHG emissions."


id: e47a7aa77c04b2c40bd3166883e1bb72
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 33427
content:
"The literature on mode competition for intercity travel reveals that \r\nwhile cost of travel is a significant factor (Zhang et al. 2017), sensitivity \r\ndecreases with increasing income as well as when the cost of the \r\ntrip was paid by someone else (Capurso et al. 2019). Some research \r\nsuggests little competition between bus and air travel but the cross\u0002elasticity between air and rail suggest strong interactions (Wardman \r\net  al. 2018). Price reduction strategies such as discounted rail fares \r\ncould enhance the switch from air travel to high-speed rail. Both air \r\nfares and flight frequency impact high-speed rail (HSR) usage (Zhang \r\net al. 2019b). Airline companies reduce fares on routes that are directly \r\ncompeting with HSR (Bergantino et al. 2018a) and charge high fares \r\non non-HSR routes (Xia and Zhang 2016)"


id: 67e5bcb499668fd477ab3d4a6ad8cf4e
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content:
" On the Rome to Milan route, \r\nbetter frequency and connections, and low costs of HSR resulting from \r\ncompetition between HSR companies have significantly reduced air \r\ntravel and shares of buses and cars (Desmaris and Croccolo 2018)."


id: 10188a8245ef57a85de1ff66d051f951
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18
content:
"Improve: consumer preferences for improved and alternative \r\nvehicles. While reductions in demand for travel and changes in \r\nmode choice can contribute to reducing GHG emissions from the \r\ntransport sector, cars are likely to continue to play a prominent role. \r\nAs a  result, improving the performance of cars will be crucial for \r\nthe decarbonisation of the transport sector. Sections 10.3 and 10.4 \r\ndescribe the technological options available for reduced CO2 emissions \r\nfrom vehicles. The effectiveness in deploying such technologies will \r\npartly depend on consumer preferences and their effect on adoption \r\nrates. Given the expanded availability of electric vehicles, there is also \r\na growing body of work on the drivers of vehicle choice. A survey in \r\nNanjing found women had more diverse travel purposes than men, \r\nresulting in a  greater acceptance of electric bikes (Lin et  al. 2017)"


id: d3fb92b1cbbc79e4db20fcfe60fbe68
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content:
" \r\nIndividuals are more likely to adopt an electric vehicle (EV) when they \r\nthink this adoption benefits the environment or implies a  positive \r\npersonal attribute (Noppers et al. 2014; Noppers et al. 2015; Haustein \r\nand Jensen 2018). Other work suggests that people's preference for EVs \r\ndepends upon vehicle attributes, infrastructure availability, and policies \r\nthat promote EV adoption, specifically, purchasing and operating costs, \r\ndriving range, charging duration, vehicle performance, and brand \r\ndiversity (Liao et  al. 2016). Behaviour change to enable transport \r\ntransformations will need to make the most of these factors while also \r\nworking on the more structural issues of time, space, and cost."


id: 10b49102d9776c585832a7384dc2bc55
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vector_id: 103
content:
"There is growing evidence that this more structured form of behavioural \r\nchange through shared economy practices, supported by a larger group \r\nthan a single family, has a much greater potential to save transport \r\nemissions, especially when complemented with decarbonised grid \r\nelectricity (Greenblatt and Shaheen 2015; Sharp 2018). Carpooling, \r\nfor example, could result in an 11% reduction in vehicle-kilometres \r\nand a 12% reduction in emissions, as carpooling requires less empty \r\nor non-productive passenger-kilometres (pkm) (ITF 2020a; ITF 2020b). \r\nHowever, the use of local shared mobility systems such as on-demand \r\ntransport may create more transport emissions if there is an overall \r\nmodal shift out of transit (ITF 2018a; Schaller 2018)"


id: 89515c7c5653ab9fd8f1fe1c815f536a
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vector_id: 19144
content:
" Similarly, some \r\nwork suggests that commercial shared vehicle services such as Uber \r\nand Lyft are leading to increased vehicle km travelled (and associated \r\nGHG emissions) in part due to deadheading (Schaller 2018; Tirachini \r\nand Gomez-Lobo 2020; Ward et al. 2021). Successful providers compete \r\nby optimising personal comfort and convenience rather than enabling \r\na sharing culture (Eckhardt and Bardhi 2015), and concerns have been \r\nraised regarding the wider societal impacts of these systems and for \r\nspecific user groups such as older people (Fitt 2018; Marsden 2018). \r\nConcerns have also been expressed over the financial viability of demand\u0002responsive transport systems (Ryley et al. 2014; Marsden 2018), how \r\nthe mainstreaming of shared mobility systems can be institutionalised \r\nequitably, and the operation and governance of existing systems that \r\nare only mode- and operator-focused (Akyelken et al. 2018; Jittrapirom \r\net al. 2018; Pangbourne et al. 2020; Marsden 2018)."


id: bc8b2481fc71ae4dc779fc38710c6c4a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27243
content:
"Circular economy. The problem of resources and their environmental \r\nimpacts is driving the move to a  circular economy (Bleischwitz \r\net al. 2017). Circular economy principles include increased material \r\nefficiency, reusing or extending product lifetimes, recycling, and \r\ngreen logistics. Dematerialisation, the reduction in the quantity of the \r\nmaterials used in the production of one unit of output, is a circular \r\neconomy principle that can affect the operations and emissions of \r\nthe transport sector, as reductions in the quantities of materials used \r\nreduce transport needs, while reductions in the weight of products \r\nimprove the efficiency of transporting them. Dematerialisation can \r\noccur through more efficient production processes but also when \r\na  new product is developed to provide the same functionality as \r\nmultiple products. The best example of this trend is a smart phone, \r\nwhich provides the service of at least 22 other former devices (Rifkin \r\n2019)"


id: 48bfa6424c27ea35cdf50e698a045540
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content:
" A move to declutter lifestyles can also drive dematerialisation \r\n(Whitmarsh et al. 2017). Some potential for dematerialisation has been \r\nsuggested due to 3-D printing, which would also reduce transport \r\nemissions through localised production of product components \r\n(d'Aveni 2015; UNCTAD 2018). There is evidence to suggest, however, \r\nthat reductions in material use resulting from more efficient product "


id: 344398d5b9aea1248d232707a280cf24
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"some of the challenges facing the adoption of emerging technologies \r\n(Marletto 2014; Chen et al. 2016; Weiss et al. 2018; Taiebat and Xu \r\n2019) and enable the expected large growth in emerging cities to be \r\nmore sustainable (Docherty et al. 2018). However, ICT, in particular the \r\ninternet of things (IoT), could also cause more global energy demand \r\n(Hittinger and Jaramillo 2019). Box 10.1 summarises the main smart \r\ntechnologies being adopted rapidly by cities across the world and their \r\nuse in transport. There is a growing body of literature about the effect of \r\nsmart technology (including sensors guiding vehicles) on the demand \r\nfor transport services. Smart technologies can improve competitiveness \r\nof transit and active transport over personal vehicle use by combining \r\nthe introduction of new electro-mobility that improves time and cost \r\nalong with behaviour change factors (Palsson et  al. 2017; SLoCaT \r\n2018a; SLoCaT 2018b; SLoCaT2021)"


id: a967bef9cac8ef1a82eab3e8ba7c86e0
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vector_id: 24181
content:
" However, it is unclear what the \r\nnet effect of smart technology on GHG emissions from the transport \r\nsector will be (Debnath et al. 2014; Lenz and Heinrichs 2017)."


id: b17cf4024ed6949abd709440fe37abc9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 25422
content:
"Blockchain or distributed ledger technology. Blockchain technology provides a non-hackable database that can be programmed to \r\nenable shared services like a local, solar microgrid where both solar and shared electric vehicles can be managed (Green and Newman \r\n2017). Blockchain can be used for many transport-related applications including being the basis of MaaS or any local shared mobility \r\nservice as it facilitates shared activity without intermediary controls. Other applications include verified vehicle ownership documentation, \r\nestablishing identification, real-time road user pricing, congestion zone charging, vehicle-generated collision information, collection of \r\ntolls and charges, enhanced freight tracking and authenticity, and automated car parking and payments (Hargroves et al. 2020)"


id: ef10f3578c5077b244561ae5e11b3935
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vector_id: 35083
content:
" This \r\ntype of functionality will be particularly valuable for urban regeneration along a transit activated corridor, where it can be used for \r\nmanaging shared solar in and around station precincts as well as managing shared vehicles linked to the whole transport system \r\n(Newman et al. 2021). This technology can also be used for road user charging along any corridor and by businesses accessing any \r\nservices and in managing freight (Carter and Koh 2018; Nguyen et al. 2019; Hargroves et al. 2020; Sedlmeir et al. 2020)."


id: e45e334925730106f6cf1f8c8483d267
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vector_id: 33408
content:
"Autonomous vehicles are the other emerging transport technology \r\nthat have the potential to significantly improve ride quality and \r\nsafety. Planes and high-speed trains are already largely autonomous \r\nas they are guided in all their movements, especially coming into \r\nstations and airports, although that does not necessarily mean they \r\nare driverless. Automation is also being used in new on-road transit \r\nsystems like trackless trams (Ndlovu and Newman 2020)). Private \r\nvehicles are being fitted with more and more levels of autonomy \r\nand many are being trialled as 'driverless' in cities (Aria et  al. \r\n2016; Skeete 2018). If autonomous systems can be used to help \r\non-road transit become more time- and cost-competitive with cars, \r\nthen the kind of transformative and disruptive changes needed to \r\nassist decarbonisation of transport become more feasible (Bosch \r\net al. 2018; Kassens-Noor et al. 2020; Abe 2021)"


id: 6b493126a234abde3f4afeb0f37788c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Similarly, vehicle \r\nautomation could improve vehicle efficiency and reduce congestion, \r\nwhich would in turn reduce emissions (Vahidi and Sciarretta 2018; \r\nMassar et al. 2021). On the other hand, if autonomous cars make \r\ndriving more convenient, they could reduce demand for transit (Auld \r\net al. 2017; Sonnleitner et al. 2021). Paradoxically, autonomous cars \r\ncould provide access to marginal groups such as the elderly, people \r\nwith disabilities, and those who cannot drive, which could in turn \r\nincrease travel demand (as measured by pkm) (Harper et al. 2016)."


id: 69b7a6492d7473b4eb2372d2ad340044
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 14229
content:
"Natural gas-based vehicles have certain advantages over \r\nconventional fuel-powered ICE vehicles, including lower emissions \r\nof criteria air pollutants, no soot or particulate, low carbon to \r\nHydrogen ratio, moderate noise, a wide range of flammability limits, \r\nand high octane numbers (Kim 2019; Bayat and Ghazikhani 2020). \r\nFurthermore, the technology readiness level (TRL) of natural gas \r\nvehicles is very high (TRL 8-9), with direct modification of existing \r\ngasoline and diesel vehicles possible (Transport and Environment \r\n2018; Peters et al. 2021; Sahoo and Srivastava 2021). On the other \r\nhand, methane emissions from the natural gas supply chain and \r\ntailpipe CO2 emissions remain a  significant concern (Trivedi et  al. \r\n2020). As a result, natural gas as a transition transportation fuel may \r\nbe limited due to better alternative options being available and due \r\nto regulatory pressure to decarbonise the transport sector rapidly"


id: 6c5df92f9104aaa1a11a245e333fe706
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 14673
content:
" \r\nFor example, the International Maritime Office (IMO) has set a target \r\nof 40% less carbon intensity in shipping by 2030, which cannot be \r\nobtained by simply switching to natural gas."


id: cb188ba159c971abc933ddc9c83e5763
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
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vector_id: 29513
content:
"Biofuels. Since AR5, the faster than anticipated adoption of \r\nelectromobility, primarily for LDVs, has partially shifted the \r\ndebate around the primary use of biofuels from land transport to \r\nthe shipping and aviation sectors (IEA 2017a; Davis et  al. 2018). \r\nAt the same time, other studies highlight that biofuels may have \r\nto complement electromobility in road transport, particularly in \r\ndeveloping countries, offering relevant mitigation opportunities \r\nin the short- and mid-term (up to 2050) (IEA 2021b). An important \r\nadvantage of biofuels is that they can be converted into energy \r\ncarriers compatible with existing technologies, including current \r\npowertrains and fuel infrastructure. Also, biofuels can diversify \r\nthe supply of transport fuel, raise energy self-sufficiency in many \r\ncountries, and be used as a strategy to diversify and strengthen the \r\nagro-industrial sector (Puricelli et al. 2021)"


id: fab96cd97df126f88c3b333c632664e6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 36970
content:
" The use of biofuels as \r\na mitigation strategy is driven by a combination of factors, including \r\nnot only the costs and technology readiness levels of the different \r\nbiofuel conversion technologies, but also the availability and costs \r\nof both biomass feedstocks and alternative mitigation options, \r\nand the relative speed and scale of the energy transition in energy \r\nand transport sectors (Box 10.2)."


id: 6469b9a8927d32d402aa33813e9f3251
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 13365
content:
"1.8 % improvement per year between 2005 and 2016 (GFEI 2020). \r\nTable  10.4 summarises recent and forthcoming improvements to \r\nICE technologies and their effect on emissions from these vehicles. \r\nHowever, these improvements are not sufficient to meet deep \r\ndecarbonisation levels in the transport sector. While there is significant \r\nand growing interest in electric and fuel-cell vehicles, future scenarios \r\nindicate that a large number of LDV may continue to be operated by \r\nICE in conventional, hybrid, and plug-in hybrid configurations over the \r\nnext 30 years (IEA 2019a), unless they are regulated away through \r\nICE vehicle sales bans (as some nations have announced) (IEA 2021a). \r\nMoreover, ICE technologies are likely to remain the prevalent options \r\nfor shipping and aviation. Thus, reducing CO2 and other emissions from \r\nICEs through the use of low-carbon or zero-carbon fuels is essential \r\nto a balanced strategy for limiting atmospheric pollutant levels"


id: 1eaa2260b19f26ff1ca427e975bfccce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2265
content:
" Such \r\nalternative fuels for ICE vehicles include natural gas-based fuels, \r\nbiofuels, ammonia, and other synthetic fuels."


id: 160e688df9a96e734a2524fda127a392
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 993
content:
"Many studies have addressed the lifecycle emissions of biofuel \r\nconversion pathways for land transport, aviation, and marine \r\napplications (Koeble et  al. 2017; Staples et  al. 2018; Tanzer et  al. \r\n2019). Bioenergy technologies generally struggle to compete with \r\nexisting fossil fuel-based ones because of the higher costs involved. \r\nHowever, the extent of the cost gap depends critically on the \r\navailability and costs of biomass feedstock (IEA 2021b). Ethanol from \r\ncorn and sugarcane is commercially available in countries such as \r\nBrazil and the US. Biodiesel from oil crops and hydro-processed esters \r\nand fatty acids are available in various countries, notably in Europe \r\nand parts of Southeast Asia. On the infrastructure side, biomethane \r\nblending is being implemented in some regions of the US and Europe, \r\nparticularly in Germany, with the help of policy measures (IEA 2021b)"


id: 9133a0bc3143a79715c36af6408c3883
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 20383
content:
" \r\nWhile many of these biofuel conversion technologies could also be \r\nimplemented using seaweed feedstock options, these value chains \r\nare not yet mature (Jiang et al. 2016)."


id: 5df350aa2c94b6f9ff5a6336c9d3fb49
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 12316
content:
"Natural Gas. Natural gas could be used as an alternative fuel to \r\nreplace gasoline and diesel. Natural gas in vehicles can be used as \r\ncompressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG). CNG \r\nis gaseous at relatively high pressure (10 to 25 megapascal (MPa)) \r\nand temperature (-40 to 30degC). In contrast, LNG is used in liquid \r\nform at relatively low pressure (0.1 MPa) and temperature (-160degC). \r\nTherefore, CNG is particularly suitable for commercial vehicles and \r\nlight- to medium-duty vehicles, whereas LNG is better suited to \r\nreplace diesel in HDVs (Dubov et al. 2020; Dziewiatkowski et al. 2020; \r\nYaici and Ribberink 2021). CNG vehicles have been widely deployed \r\nin some regions, particularly in Asian-Pacific countries. For example, \r\nthere are about 6 million CNG vehicles in China, the most of any \r\ncountry (Qin et al. 2020)"


id: 10537428f23ddc2eda65c5f6eeb3161d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" However, only 20% of vehicles that operate \r\nusing CNG were originally designed as CNG vehicles, with the rest \r\nbeing gasoline-fuelled vehicles that have been converted to operate \r\nwith CNG (Chala et al. 2018)."


id: b21978f209642f3403d43e2022424b92
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25525
content:
"Box 10.2 | Bridging Land Use and Feedstock Conversion Footprints for Biofuels\r\nUnder specific conditions, biofuels may represent an important climate mitigation strategy for the transport sector (Daioglou et al. 2020; \r\nMuratori et al. 2020). Both the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC and the IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and\r\nLand highlighted that biofuels could be associated with climate mitigation co-benefits and adverse side effects to many SDGs. These side \r\neffects depend on context-specific conditions, including deployment scale, associated land-use changes and agricultural management \r\npractices (Section 7.4.4 and Box 7.10). There is broad agreement in the literature that the most important factors in determining the \r\nclimate footprint of biofuels are the land use and land-use change characteristics associated with biofuel deployment scenarios (Elshout \r\net al. 2015; Daioglou et al. 2020). This issue is covered in more detail in Box 7.1"


id: a4e7eae7d6d7da1277a8e02167a86692
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23512
content:
" While the mitigation literature primarily focuses on the \r\nGHG-related climate forcings, note that land is an integral part of the climate system through multiple geophysical and geochemical \r\nmechanisms (albedo, evaporation, etc.). For example, Sections 2.2.7 and 7.3.4 in the AR6 WGI report indicate that geophysical aspects \r\nof historical land-use change outweigh the geochemical effects, leading to a net cooling effect. The land-related carbon footprints of \r\nbiofuels presented in Sections 10.4-10.6 are adopted from Chapter 7 (Section 7.4.4, Box 7, and Figure 7.1). The results show how the \r\nland-related footprint increases due to an increased outtake of biomass, as estimated with different models that rely on global supply \r\nscenarios of biomass for energy and fuel of 100 exajoules (EJ)"


id: a9a6ef8444a8f1fb90cd2129296f4cf6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 24222
content:
" The integrated assessment models and scenarios used include the EMF \r\n33 scenarios (IAM-EMF33), from partial models with constant land cover (PM-CLC), and from partial models with natural regrowth \r\n(PM-NGR). These results are combined with both biomass cultivation emission ranges for advanced biofuels aligned with Koeble et al. \r\n(2017), El Akkari et al. (2018), Jeswani et al. (2020), and Puricelli et al. (2021) and conversion efficiencies and conversion phase emissions \r\nas described in Table 10.5. The modelled footprints resulting from land-use changes related to delivering 100 EJ of biomass at global \r\nlevel are in the range of 3-77 gCO2-eq per MJ of advanced biofuel (median 38 gCO2-eq MJ-1) at an aggregate level for Integrated \r\nAssessment Models (IAMs) and partial models with constant land cover (Daioglou et al. 2020; Rose et al. 2020). The results for partial \r\nmodels with natural regrowth are much higher (91-246 CO2-eq MJ-1 advanced biofuel)"


id: 60e3982c858ab1fd0cb61cb89bbdbaad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" The latter ranges may appear in contrast with \r\nthe results from the scenario literature in Section 10.7, where biofuels play a role in many scenarios compatible with low warming \r\nlevels. This contrast is a result of different underlying modelling practices. The general modelling approach used for the scenarios in \r\nthe AR6 database accounts for the land-use change and all other GHG emissions along a given transformation trajectory, enabling \r\nassessments of the warming level incurred. The results labelled 'EMF33' and 'partial models with constant land cover' are obtained \r\nwith this modelling approach. The results in the category 'partial models with natural regrowth' attribute additional CO2 emissions to \r\nthe bioenergy system, corresponding to estimated uptake of CO2 in a counterfactual scenario where land is not used for bioenergy, but \r\ninstead subject to natural vegetation regrowth"


id: 279b6ac0a8b88065af6b3e6f4912bda2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3639
content:
" While the partial analysis provides insights into the implications of alternative land-use \r\nstrategies, such analysis does not identify the actual emissions of bioenergy production. As a result, the partial analysis is not compatible \r\nwith the identification of warming levels incurred by an individual transformation trajectory, and therefore not aligned with the general \r\napproach applied for the scenarios in the AR6 database."


id: 3221883d0371c895503d5b775b7bc7d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5299
content:
"Technologies to produce advanced biofuels from lignocellulosic \r\nfeedstocks have suffered from slow technology development and \r\nare still struggling to achieve full commercial scale. Their uptake is \r\nlikely to require carbon pricing and/or other regulatory measures, \r\nsuch as clean fuel standards in the transport sector or blending \r\nmandates. Several commercial-scale advanced biofuels projects are \r\nin development in many parts of the world, encompassing a wide \r\nselection of technologies and feedstock choices, including carbon \r\ncapture and sequestration (CCS) that supports carbon dioxide \r\nremoval. The success of these projects is vital to moving forward the \r\ndevelopment of advanced biofuels and bringing many of the advanced \r\nbiofuels value chains closer to the market (IEA 2021b). Finally, biofuel \r\nproduction and distribution supply chains involve notable transport \r\nand logistical challenges that need to be overcome (Mawhood et al. \r\n2016; Skeer et al"


id: 15b1e1513c72524bf0ea8ac910777d44
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 931
content:
"the production of financially competitive bio-based SAF in many \r\nregions. However, production facilities involve significant capital \r\ninvestment and estimated levelised costs are typically more than \r\ntwice the selling price of conventional jet fuel. In some cases (notably \r\nfor vegetable oils), the feedstock price is already higher than that of \r\nfossil jet fuel (Mawhood et al. 2016). Some promising technological \r\nroutes for producing SAF from lignocellulosic feedstocks are below \r\ntechnology readiness level (TRL) 6 (pilot scale), with just a  few \r\nplayers involved in the development of these technologies"


id: dda425b51ef83d31423187b3e8402378
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Although \r\nit would be physically possible to address the mid-century projections \r\nfor substantial use of biofuels in the aviation sector (according to the \r\nInternational Energy Agency (IEA) and other sectoral organisations \r\n(ICAO 2017)), this fuel deployment scale could only be achieved \r\nwith very large capital investments in bio-based SAF production \r\ninfrastructure, and substantial policy support."


id: ea262cbb4802f4a4aaa47c6f4b41131c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 34343
content:
"For conventional internal combustion engines, the use of ammonia \r\nremains challenging due to the relatively low burning velocity \r\nand high ignition temperature. Therefore, Frigo and Gentili (2014) \r\nhave suggested a  dual-fuelled spark ignition engine operated by \r\nliquid ammonia and hydrogen, where hydrogen is generated from \r\nammonia using the thermal energy of exhaust gas. On the other \r\nhand, the high-octane number of ammonia means good knocking \r\nresistance of spark ignition engines and is promising for improving \r\nthermal efficiency. For compression ignition engines, the high-ignition \r\ntemperature of ammonia requires a high compression ratio, causing \r\nan increase in mechanical friction. Since Gray et  al. (1966), many \r\nstudies have shown that the compression ratio can be reduced by \r\nmixing ammonia with secondary fuels such as diesel and hydrogen \r\nwith low self-ignition temperatures, as summarised by Dimitriou and \r\nJavaid (2020)"


id: 1a8fcdf623608c002f8c6f5dda37e573
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 1658
content:
" Using a  secondary fuel with a  high cetane number \r\nand  the adoption of a  suitable fuel injection timing has enabled \r\nhighly efficient combustion of compression ignition engines in \r\nthe dual fuel mode with ammonia ratios up to 95% (Dimitriou \r\nand Javaid 2020). One major challenge for realising an ammonia\u0002fuelled engine is the reduction of unburned ammonia, as described \r\nin Section 6.4.5 (Reiter and Kong 2011). Processes being examined \r\ninclude the use of exhaust gas recirculation (EGR) (Pochet et al. 2017) \r\nand after treatment systems. However, these processes require space, \r\nwhich is a constraint for LDVs and air transport but more practical \r\nfor ships. Shipbuilders are developing an ammonia engine based \r\non the existing diesel dual-fuel engine to launch a service in 2025 \r\n(Brown 2019; MAN-ES 2019). Ammonia could therefore contribute \r\nsignificantly to decarbonisation in the shipping sector (Section 10.6), \r\nwith potential niche applications elsewhere."


id: 932adebf5c7771ef1eeb332944e4d98e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20668
content:
"In comparison to the aviation sector, the prospects for technology \r\ndeployment are better in the shipping sector. The advantage \r\nof shipping fuels is that marine engines have a  much higher \r\noperational flexibility on a  mix of fuels, and shipping fuels do \r\nnot need to undergo as extensive refining processes as road and \r\naviation fuels to be considered drop-in. However, biofuels in marine \r\nengines have only been tested at an experimental or demonstration \r\nstage, leaving open the question about the scalability of the \r\noperations, including logistics issues. Similar to the aviation \r\nsector, securing a  reliable, sustainable biomass feedstock supply \r\nand mature processing technologies to produce price-competitive \r\nbiofuels at a large scale remains a challenge for the shipping sector \r\n(Hsieh and Felby 2017). Other drawbacks include industry concerns \r\nabout oxidation, storage, and microbial stability for less purified \r\nor more crude biofuels"


id: b43245455f9166acb12ae01a34002fc9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 25864
content:
" Assuming that biofuels are technically \r\ndeveloped and available for the shipping sector in large quantities, \r\na  wider initial introduction of biofuels in the sector is likely to \r\ndepend upon increased environmental regulation of particulate \r\nand GHG emissions. Biofuels may also offer a significant advantage \r\nin meeting ambitious sulphur emission reduction targets set by \r\nthe sectoral organisations. More extensive use of marine biofuels \r\nwill most likely be first implemented in inner-city waterways, \r\ninland river freight routes, and coastal green zones. Given the high \r\nefficiency of the diesel engine, a large-scale switch to a different \r\nstandard marine propulsion method in the near to medium-term \r\nfuture seems unlikely. Thus, much of the effort has been placed on \r\ndeveloping biofuels compatible with diesel engines. So far, biodiesel \r\nblends look promising, as it is used in land transport"


id: e08577669211596e69617f9fd94ab1ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32824
content:
" Hydrotreated \r\nvegetable oil (HVO) is also a  technically good alternative and is \r\ncompatible with current engines and supply chains, while the \r\nintroduction of multifuel engines may open the market for ethanol \r\nfuels (Hsieh and Felby 2017)."


id: 6fffb7dbb20547c3565a62b34b787002
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15235
content:
"Synthetic fuels. Synthetic fuels can contribute to transport \r\ndecarbonisation through synthesis from electrolytic hydrogen \r\nproduced with low-carbon electricity or hydrogen produced with \r\nCCS, and captured CO2 using the Fischer-Tropsch process (Liu et al. \r\n2020a). Due to similar properties of synthetic fuels to those of fossil \r\nfuels, synthetic fuels can reduce GHG emissions in both existing \r\nand new vehicles without significant changes to the engine design.\r\nWhile the Fischer-Tropsch process is a well-established technology \r\n(Liu et  al. 2020a), low-carbon synthetic fuel production is still at \r\nthe demonstration stage. Even though their production costs are \r\nexpected to decline in the future due to lower renewable electricity \r\nprices, increased scale of production, and learning effects, synthetic \r\nfuels are still up to three times more expensive than conventional \r\nfossil fuels (Section  6.6.2.4)"


id: 9516619880a8970c5b4f740af0768549
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 20961
content:
" Furthermore, since the production \r\nof synthetic fuels involves thermodynamic conversion loss, there \r\nis a concern that the total energy efficiency is lower than that of \r\nelectric vehicles (Yugo and Soler 2019). Given these high costs and \r\nlimited scales, the adoption of synthetic fuels will likely focus on \r\nthe aviation, shipping, and long-distance road transport segments, \r\nwhere decarbonisation by electrification is more challenging. In \r\nparticular, synthetic fuels are considered promising as an aviation \r\nfuel (Section 10.5)."


id: f2d5a92f5b6345a8c99d9555e4b1ec6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35731
content:
"Externalities from resource extraction are another concern, though \r\ncurrent volumes of lithium are much smaller than other metals (steel, \r\naluminium). As a result, lithium was not even mentioned in UNEP's \r\nglobal resource outlook (IRP 2019). Nonetheless, it is essential to \r\nmanage demand and limit externalities since the demand for lithium \r\nis going to increase many times in the future. Reuse of LIBs used \r\nin EVs for stationary energy applications can help in reducing the \r\ndemand for LIBs. However, the main challenges are the difficulty in \r\naccessing the information on the health of batteries to be recycled \r\nand technical problems in remanufacturing the batteries for their \r\nsecond life (Ahmadi et al. 2017). Recycling lithium from used batteries \r\ncould be another possible supply source (Winslow et al. 2018). While \r\nfurther R&D is required for commercialisation (Ling et  al., 2018), \r\nrecent efforts at recycling LIBs are very encouraging (Ma et al. 2021)"


id: a831bc3bd1740714071e260a34020c58
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 23981
content:
" \r\nThe standardisation of battery modules and packaging within and \r\nacross vehicle platforms, increased focus on design for recyclability, \r\nand supportive regulation are important to enable higher recycling \r\nrates for LIBs (Harper et al. 2019)."


id: 30bba3c41b2d8f717cc2ca2aa09e1f74
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content:
"Before the recent growth in market share of LIBs, lead-acid batteries, \r\nnickel batteries, high-temperature sodium batteries, and redox \r\nflow batteries were of particular interest for the transport sector \r\n(Placke et  al. 2017). Due to their low costs, lead-acid batteries \r\nhave been used in smaller automotive vehicles, e.g.,  e-scooters \r\nand e-rickshaws (Dhar et  al. 2017). However, their application \r\nin electric vehicles will be limited due to their low specific energy \r\n(Andwari et  al. 2017). Nickel-metal hydride (NiMH) batteries have \r\na better energy density than lead-acid batteries and have been well \r\noptimised for regenerative braking (Cano et  al. 2018). As a  result, \r\nNiMH batteries were the battery of choice for hybrid electric vehicles \r\n(HEVs). Ni-Cadmium (NiCd) batteries have energy densities lower \r\nthan NiMH batteries and cost around ten times more than lead-acid \r\nbatteries (Table  6.5)"


id: ebfa941d529e5d54c84cdf7c4d5cf4f
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 34626
content:
" For this reason, NiCd batteries do not have \r\nmajor prospects within automotive applications. There are also no \r\nexamples of high-temperature sodium or redox flow batteries being \r\nused within automotive applications."


id: 481ada28a4b9563edb516b1fa5e3d50
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"Several next-generation battery chemistries are often referred to \r\nas post-LIBs (Placke et  al. 2017). These chemistries include metal\u0002sulphur, metal-air, metal-ion (besides Li), and all-solid-state batteries. \r\nThe long development cycles of the automotive industry (Cano et al. \r\n2018) and the advantages of LIBs in terms of energy density and cycle \r\nlife (Table 6.5) mean that it is unlikely that post-LIB technologies will \r\nreplace LIBs in the next decade. However, lithium-sulphur, lithium-air, \r\nand zinc-air have emerged as potential alternatives for LIBs. These \r\nemerging chemistries may also be used to supplement LIBs in dual\u0002battery configurations, to extend the driving range at lower costs \r\nor with higher energy density (Cano et  al. 2018). Lithium-sulphur \r\n(Li-S) batteries have a lithium metal anode with a higher theoretical \r\ncapacity than lithium-ion anodes and much lower-cost sulphur \r\ncathodes relative to typical Li-ion insertion cathodes (Manthiram \r\net  al. 2014)"


id: 83a2a0ca6110e8e38031ad452e0e4116
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" As a  result, Li-S batteries are much cheaper than LIB \r\nto manufacture and have a  higher energy density (Table  6.5). \r\nConversely, these batteries face challenges from sulphur cathodes, \r\nsuch as low conductivity of the sulphur and lithium sulphide phases, \r\nand the relatively high solubility of sulphur species in common \r\nlithium battery electrolytes, leading to low cycle life (Cano et  al. \r\n2018). Lithium-air batteries offer a further improvement in specific \r\nenergy and energy density above Li-S batteries owing to their use \r\nof atmospheric oxygen as a cathode in place of sulphur. However, \r\ntheir demonstrated cycle life is much lower (Table 6.5). Lithium-air \r\nbatteries also have low specific power. Therefore, lithium-air require \r\nan extra battery for practical applications (Cano et al. 2018). Finally, \r\nzinc-air batteries could more likely be used in future EVs because "


id: 207dfb45abf52a293fda1f759264fc1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"Commercial application of LIBs in automotive applications started \r\naround 2000 when the price of LIBs was more than USD1000 per kWh \r\n(Schmidt et al. 2017). By 2020, the battery manufacturing capacity \r\nfor automotive applications was around 300 GWh per  year (IEA \r\n2021a). Furthermore, by 2020, the average battery pack cost had \r\ncome down to USD137 per kWh, a reduction of 89% in real terms \r\nsince 2010 (Henze 2020). Further improvements in specific energy, \r\nenergy density (Nykvist et al. 2015; Placke et al. 2017) and battery \r\nservice life (Liu et al. 2017) of LIBs are expected through additional \r\ndesign optimisation (Table  6.5). These advances are expected to \r\nlead to EVs with even longer driving ranges, further supporting the \r\nuptake of LIBs for transport applications (Cano et al. 2018). However, \r\nthe performance of LIBs under freezing and high temperatures is \r\na concern (Liu et al. 2017) for reliability"


id: 8e09a7400d117d37a5f39f08dd205bb4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Auto manufacturers have \r\nsome pre-heating systems for batteries to see that they perform well \r\nin very cold conditions (Wu et al. 2020)."


id: 96c72be174ba70fde84f2ee5acd2610f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 21239
content:
"per kilogram (W/kg)) than batteries. However, the energy density is \r\npoor (1-4 watt-hours per kilogram (Wh/kg)) compared to batteries, \r\nand there is an issue of self-discharge (Gonzalez et al. 2016; Poonam \r\net al. 2019). To improve the energy density, electrochemical double \r\nlayer capacitors (EDLCs; supercapacitor) and hybrid capacitors \r\n(10-24 Wh/kg, 900-9000 W/kg at the product level) such as Li-ion \r\ncapacitors have been developed. The highest energy density of the \r\nLIC system (100-140 Wh/kg in the research stage) are approaching \r\nthat of the Li-ion battery systems (80-240 Wh/kg in the product \r\nstage) (Naoi et  al. 2012; Panja et  al. 2020). Examples of effective \r\nuse of capacitors include a  12-tonne truck with a  capacitor-based \r\nkinetic energy recovery system that has been reported to save up \r\nto 32% of the fuel use of a standard truck (Kamdar 2017)"


id: b7c2ef6673efb3b81f2365202eb26128
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 26443
content:
" Similarly, \r\nan EDLC bank applied to electric railway systems has been shown to \r\nresult in a 10% reduction in power consumption per day (Takahashi \r\net al. 2017). Finally, systems in which capacitors are mounted on an \r\nelectric bus for charging at a stop have been put into practical use, \r\nfor example by a trackless tram (Newman et al. 2019). At the bus \r\nstop, the capacitor is charged at 600 kW for 10 about 40 seconds, \r\nwhich provides enough power for about 5 to 10 km (Newman et al. \r\n2019). In addition, more durable capacitors can achieve a longer life \r\nthan LIB systems (ADB 2018)."


id: d6b6d52317accda2f84010fc3912c89a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 31286
content:
"The technological readiness of batteries is a crucial parameter in the \r\nadvancement of EVs (Manzetti and Mariasiu 2015). Energy density, \r\npower density, cycle life, calendar life, and the cost per kWh are the \r\npertinent parameters for comparing the technological readiness of \r\nvarious battery technologies (Manzetti and Mariasiu 2015; Andwari \r\net al. 2017; Lajunen et al. 2018). Table 6.5 provides a summary of \r\nthe values of these parameters for alternative battery technologies. \r\nLIBs comprehensively dominate the other battery types and are \r\nat a readiness level where they can be applied for land transport \r\napplications (cars, scooters, electrically-assisted cycles) and at \r\nbattery pack costs below USD150 per  kWh, making EVs cost\u0002competitive with conventional vehicles (Nykvist et al. 2019). In 2020 \r\nthe stock of battery electric LDVs had crossed the 10 million mark \r\n(IEA 2021a). Schmidt et al"


id: 14b2e84b085eaa86dfdbfaa3af1dbb07
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" (2017) project that the cost of a battery \r\npack for LIBs will reach USD100 per kWh by 2030, but more recent \r\ntrends show this could happen much earlier. For example, according \r\nto IEA, battery pack costs could be as low as USD80 per kWh by \r\n2030 (IEA 2019a). In addition, there are clear trends that now \r\nvehicle manufacturers are offering vehicles with bigger batteries, \r\ngreater driving ranges, higher top speeds, faster acceleration, and \r\nall size categories (Nykvist et  al. 2019). In 2020 there were over \r\n600,000 battery electric buses and over 31,000 battery electric \r\ntrucks operating globally (IEA 2021a)."


id: 8ddb366576be6618c082b1035bbeed41
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 19848
content:
"LIBs are not currently envisaged to be suitable for long-haul transport. \r\nHowever, several battery technologies are under development \r\n(Table 6.5), which could further enhance the competitiveness of EVs \r\nand expand their applicability to very short-haul aviation and ships, \r\nespecially smaller vehicles. Li-S, Li-air, and Zn-air hold the highest \r\npotential for these segments (Cano et al. 2018). All three of these \r\ntechnologies rely on making use of relatively inexpensive elements, \r\nwhich can help bring down battery costs (Cano et  al. 2018). The \r\nmain challenge these technologies face is in terms of the cycle \r\nlife. Out of the three, Li-S has already been used for applications in \r\nunmanned aerial vehicles (Fotouhi et al., 2017) due to relatively high \r\nspecific energy (almost double the state of the art LIBs)"


id: 3f9c6a7a4270c64bceebfff7a85a0578
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 7396
content:
" However, \r\neven with low cycle life, Li-air and Zn-air hold good prospects for \r\ncommercialisation as range extender batteries for long-range road \r\ntransport and with vehicles that are typically used for city driving \r\n(Cano et al. 2018)."


id: 504652ad1a63decfa894ac710f3057f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
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vector_id: 10075
content:
"During the last decade, hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (HFCVs) have \r\nattracted growing attention, with fuel cell technology improving \r\nthrough research and development. Fuel cell systems cost 80% \r\nto 95% less than they did in the early 2000s, at approximately \r\nUSD50 per kW for light-duty (80 kW) and $100 per kW for medium\u0002heavy-duty (160 kW). These costs are approaching the US Department \r\nof Energy's (US DOE) goal of USD40 per kW in 2025 at a production \r\ntarget of 500,000 systems per year (IEA 2019c). In addition to cost \r\nreductions, the power density of fuel cell stacks has now reached \r\naround 3.0 kilowatt per  litre (kW/l) and average durability has \r\nimproved to approximately 2000 to 3000 hours (Jouin et al. 2016; \r\nKurtz et al. 2019). Despite these improvements, fuel cell systems are \r\nnot yet mature for many commercial applications"


id: 3fb9a991ab5eac835a01736c23d09e07
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" For example, the \r\nUS DOE has outlined that for hydrogen fuel cell articulated trucks \r\n(semi-trailers) to compete with diesel vehicles, fuel cell durability \r\nwill need to reach 30,000 hours (US DOE 2019). While some fuel cell \r\nbuses have demonstrated durability close to these targets (Eudy and \r\nPost 2018a), another review of light fuel cell vehicles found maximum \r\ndurability of 4000 hours (Kurtz et al. 2019). As more fuel cell vehicles \r\nare trialled, it is expected that further real-world data will become \r\navailable to track ongoing fuel cell durability improvements."


id: c284c977d6e2e862880a992a5ae60c78
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"The transport sector relies on liquid gasoline, and diesel for land\u0002based transport, jet fuel for aviation, and heavy fuel oil for shipping. \r\nExtensive infrastructure for refuelling liquid fossil fuels already \r\nexists. Ammonia, synthetic fuels, and biofuels have emerged as \r\nalternative fuels for powering combustion engines and turbines \r\nused in land, shipping, and aviation (Figure  10.2). Synthetic fuels \r\nsuch as e-methanol and Fischer-Tropsch liquids have similar physical \r\nproperties and could be used with existing fossil fuel infrastructure \r\n(Yugo and Soler, 2019). Similarly, biofuels have been used in several \r\ncountries together with fossil fuels (Panoutsou et al. 2021). Ammonia \r\nis a  liquid, but only under pressure, and therefore will not be \r\ncompatible with liquid fossil fuel refuelling infrastructure. Ammonia \r\nis, however, widely used as a fertiliser and chemical raw material and \r\n10% of annual ammonia production is transported via sea (Gallucci \r\n2021)"


id: 3a042d9ec78b7faa70252007e21e7c6b
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" As such, a number of port facilities include ammonia storage \r\nand transport infrastructure and the shipping industry has experience \r\nin handling ammonia (Gallucci 2021). This infrastructure would likely \r\nneed to be extended in order to support the use of ammonia as a fuel \r\nfor shipping and therefore ports are likely to be the primary sites for \r\nthese new refuelling facilities."


id: bbdd4c18e46e0013d4d498e223638188
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"Several FCV-related technologies are fully ready for demonstration \r\nand early market deployment, however, further research and \r\ndevelopment will be required to achieve full-scale commercialisation, \r\nlikely from 2030 onwards (Staffell et  al. 2019; Energy Transitions \r\nCommission 2020; IEA 2021b). Some reports argue that it may be \r\npossible to achieve serial production of fuel cell heavy-duty trucks \r\nin the late 2020s, with comparable costs to diesel vehicles achieved \r\nafter 2030 (Jordbakker et  al. 2018). Over the next decade or so, \r\nhydrogen FCVs could become cost-competitive for various transport \r\napplications, potentially including long-haul trucks, marine ships, \r\nand aviation (Hydrogen Council 2017; FCHEA 2019; FCHJU 2019; \r\nBloombergNEF 2020; Hydrogen Council 2020). The speed of fuel \r\ncell system cost reduction is a key factor for achieving widespread \r\nuptake"


id: 34f97454a4d1f879631e74f13e6c9c30
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" Yet, experts disagree on the relationship between the scale of \r\nfuel cell demand, cost, and performance improvements (Cano et al. \r\n2018). Costs of light-, medium-, and heavy-duty fuel cell powertrains \r\nhave decreased by orders of magnitude with further reductions of \r\na  factor of two expected with continued technological progress \r\n(Whiston et al. 2019). For example, the costs of platinum for fuel cell \r\nstacks have decreased by an order of magnitude (Staffell et al. 2019); \r\ncurrent generation FCVs use approximately 0.25 g/kW platinum and \r\na further reduction of 50-80% is expected by 2030 (Hao et al. 2019)."


id: ad69bf4368972dc450a34628236be0f5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 24821
content:
"'range anxiety' (She et al. 2017). Range anxiety is where consumers \r\ndo not have confidence that an EV will meet their driving range \r\nrequirements. For LDVs, the majority of charging (75-90%) has been \r\nreported to take place at or near homes (Figenbaum 2017; Webb \r\net al. 2019; Wenig et al. 2019). Charging at home is a particularly \r\nsignificant factor in the adoption of EVs as consumers are less willing \r\nto purchase an EV without home charging (Berkeley et al. 2017; Funke \r\nand Plotz 2017; Nicholas et al. 2017). However, home charging may \r\nnot be an option for all consumers. For example, apartment dwellers \r\nmay face specific challenges in installing charging infrastructure \r\n(Hall and Lutsey 2020). Thus, the provision of public charging \r\ninfrastructure is another avenue for alleviating range anxiety, \r\nfacilitating longer distance travel in EVs, and in turn, encouraging \r\nadoption (Hall and Lutsey 2017; Melliger et al. 2018; Narassimhan \r\nand Johnson 2018; Melton et al. 2020)"


id: 11eed1aea6ff0913dc9897c28f82733f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Currently, approximately 10% \r\nof charging occurs at public locations, roughly split equally between \r\nalternating current (AC) (slower) and direct current (DC) (fast) \r\ncharging (Figenbaum 2017; Webb et  al. 2019; Wenig et  al. 2019). \r\nDeploying charging infrastructure at workplaces and commuter car \r\nparks is also important, particularly as vehicles are parked at these \r\nlocations for many hours. Indeed, around 15-30% of EV charging \r\ncurrently occurs at these locations (Figenbaum 2017; Webb et  al. \r\n2019; Wenig et al. 2019). It has been suggested that automakers and \r\nutilities could provide support for the installation of home charging \r\ninfrastructure (Hardman et al. 2018), while policymakers can provide \r\nsupport for public charging. Such support could come via supportive \r\nplanning policy, building regulations, and financial support. Policy \r\nsupport could also incentivise the deployment of charging stations \r\nat workplaces and commuter car parks"


id: e175050f5b47537450e38400cbf48870
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vector_id: 32964
content:
" Charging at these locations \r\nwould have the added benefit of using excess solar energy generated \r\nduring the day (Hardman et al. 2018; Webb et al. 2019)."


id: 3583d95277f02c2e1e397778d0447700
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 5829
content:
"While charging infrastructure is of high importance for the \r\nelectrification of light-duty vehicles, arguably it is even more \r\nimportant for heavy-duty vehicles, given the costs of high-power \r\ncharging infrastructure. It is estimated that the installed cost of fast\u0002charging hardware can vary between approximately USD45,000 \r\nto USD200,000 per  charger, depending on the charging rate, the \r\nnumber of chargers per  site, and other site conditions (Hall and \r\nLutsey 2019; Nelder and Rogers 2019; Nicholas 2019). Deployment \r\nof shared charging infrastructure at key transport hubs, such as bus \r\nand truck depots, freight distribution centres, marine shipping ports \r\nand airports, can encourage a transition to electric vehicles across \r\nthe heavy transport segments"


id: ae18cceb9b07885b221505d97bbab11b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 24927
content:
" Furthermore, if charging infrastructure \r\nsites are designed to cater for both light- and heavy-duty vehicles, \r\ninfrastructure costs could decrease by increasing utilisation across \r\nmultiple applications and/or fleets (Nelder and Rogers 2019)."


id: a2d31336ea797d499f8ed23be52b33
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23185
content:
"Smart charging: electric vehicle-grid integration strategies.\r\nEVs provide several opportunities for supporting electricity grids \r\nif appropriately integrated. Conversely, a  lack of integration could \r\nnegatively affect the grid, particularly if several vehicles are charged \r\nin parallel at higher charging rates during peak demand periods \r\n(Webb et  al. 2019; Jochem et  al. 2021). There are three primary \r\napproaches to EV charging. In unmanaged charging, EVs are charged \r\nad hoc, whenever connected, regardless of conditions on the broader \r\nelectricity grid (Webb et  al. 2019; Jochem et  al. 2021). Second, in\r\nmanaged charging, EVs are charged during periods beneficial to \r\nthe grid, e.g., at periods of high renewable generation and/or low \r\ndemand. Managed charging also allows utilities to regulate the rate \r\nof charge and can thus provide frequency and regulation services to \r\nthe grid (Weis et al. 2014)"


id: 9be933f0980ea201469e4b055f361c3f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Finally, in bidirectional charging or vehicle\u0002to-grid (V2G), EVs are generally subject to managed charging, but an \r\nextension provides the ability to export electricity from the vehicle's \r\nbattery back to the building and/or wider electricity grid (Ercan \r\net al. 2016; Noel et al. 2019; Jochem et al. 2021). The term 'smart \r\ncharging' has become an umbrella term to encompass both managed \r\ncharging  (often referred to as V1G) and V2G. For electric utilities, \r\nsmart charging strategies can provide back-up power, support load \r\nbalancing, reduce peak loads (Zhuk et  al. 2016; Noel  et  al. 2019; "


id: 5569cdf1add6a926be7aad4f082aabc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 10908
content:
"If hydrogen is produced off site in a large centralised plant, it must \r\nbe stored and delivered to refuelling stations. The cost of hydrogen \r\ndelivery depends on the amount of hydrogen delivered, the delivery \r\ndistance, the storage method (compressed gas or cryogenic \r\nliquid), and the delivery mode (truck or pipeline). Table  10.6 \r\ndescribes the three primary options for hydrogen delivery. Most \r\nhydrogen refuelling stations today are supplied by trucks and, very \r\noccasionally, hydrogen pipelines. Gaseous tube trailers could also be \r\nused to deliver hydrogen in the near term, or over shorter distances, \r\ndue to the low fixed cost (although the variable cost is high). Both \r\nliquefied truck trailers and pipelines are recognised as options in \r\nthe medium to long term as they have higher capacities and lower \r\ncosts over longer distances (FCHJU 2019; Li et al. 2020; EU 2021)"


id: b8c17ddbfc13014a88cb232c2027c449
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 26590
content:
" \r\nAlternatively, hydrogen can be produced on site using a small-scale \r\non-site electrolyser or steam methane reforming unit combined with \r\nCCS. Hydrogen is generally dispensed to vehicles as a compressed \r\ngas at pressures 350 or 700 bar, or as liquified hydrogen at -253degC \r\n(Hydrogen Council 2020)."


id: 5bb04fdacfddb8743b429273a49425a5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11932
content:
"Projections of energy storage suggest smart charging strategies will \r\ncome to play a significant role in future energy systems. Assessment \r\nof different energy storage technologies for Europe showed that V2G \r\noffered the most storage potential compared to other options and could \r\naccount for 200 GW of installed capacity by 2060, whereas utility-scale \r\nbatteries and pumped hydro storage could provide 160 GW of storage \r\ncapacity (Despres et  al. 2017). Another study found that EVs with \r\ncontrolled charging could provide similar services to stationary storage \r\nbut at a far lower cost (Coignard et al. 2018). While most deployments \r\nof smart charging strategies are still at the pilot stage, the number \r\nof projects continues to expand, with the V2G Hub documenting at \r\nleast 90 V2G projects across 22 countries in 2021 (Vehicle to Grid \r\n2021)"


id: 4ad0b314bc5bd7b61e2fa3de20942bd1
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9187
content:
" Policymakers have an important role in facilitating collaboration \r\nbetween vehicle manufacturers, electricity utilities, infrastructure \r\nproviders, and consumers to enable smart charging strategies and \r\nensure EVs can support grid stability and the uptake of renewable \r\nenergy. This is a critical part of decarbonising transport."


id: 15a5c97491dc8913f51553c5fd0d3077
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"The costs for hydrogen refuelling stations vary widely and remain \r\nuncertain for the future (IEA 2019c). The IEA reports that the \r\ninvestment cost for one hydrogen refuelling station ranges between \r\nUSD0.6 million and USD2 million for hydrogen at a  pressure of \r\n700 bar and a delivery capacity of 1300 kg per day. The investment \r\ncost of hydrogen refuelling stations with lower refuelling capacities \r\n(~50  kg  H2 per  day) delivered at lower pressure (350 bar) range \r\nbetween USD0.15-1.6  million. A  separate estimate by the \r\nInternational Council for Clean Transport suggests that at a capacity \r\nof 600 kg of hydrogen per day, the capital cost of a single refuelling \r\nstation would be approximately USD1.8 million (ICCT 2017). Given \r\nthe high investment costs for hydrogen refuelling stations, low \r\nutilisation can translate into a high price for delivered hydrogen. In \r\nEurope, most pumps operate at less than 10% capacity"


id: 4e246c9754ddb317377aee26ab7458c2
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" For small \r\nrefuelling stations with a capacity of 50 kg H2 per day, this utilisation \r\nrate translates to a high price of around USD15-25 per kg H2 - in \r\nline with current retail prices (IEA 2019c). The dispensed cost of \r\nhydrogen is also highly correlated with the cost of electricity, when \r\nH2 is produced using electrolysis, which is required to produce low\u0002carbon hydrogen."


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vector_id: 5545
content:
"HEVs and plug-in HEVs (PHEVs) vary in terms of degree of powertrain \r\nelectrification. HEVs mainly rely on regenerative braking for charging \r\nthe battery. PHEVs combine regenerative braking with external \r\npower sources for charging the battery. Operating emissions intensity \r\nis highly dependent on the degree to which electrified driving is \r\nperformed, which in turn is user- and route-dependent. For PHEVs, \r\nemissions intensity is also dependent on the source of the electricity \r\nfor charging. HEV and PHEV production impacts are comparable \r\nto the emissions generated for producing ICEVs as the batteries \r\nare generally small compared to those of BEVs. Current HEVs may \r\nreduce emissions compared to ICEVs by up to 30%, depending \r\non the fuel, yielding median lifecycle intensities varying between \r\n60 gCO2-eq pkm-1 (biofuels, EMF33) and 165-170 gCO2-eq pkm-1\r\n(biofuels, partial models NRG)"


id: cf7f83b1aeec8683ec634a0698814cc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30181
content:
" Within this wide range, all the \r\ncombinations of electric and fossil-fuelled driving can be found, \r\nas well as the lifecycle intensity for driving 100% on fossil fuel. \r\nBecause HEVs rely on combustion as the main energy conversion \r\nprocess, they offer limited mitigation opportunities. However, \r\nHEVs represent a suitable temporary solution, yielding a moderate \r\nmitigation potential, in areas where the electricity mix is currently so \r\ncarbon intensive that the use of PHEVs and BEVs is not an effective \r\nmitigation solution (Wolfram and Wiedmann 2017; Wu et al. 2019)."


id: e170952cafa5ed413daec1ba7f71c093
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32960
content:
"Figure 10.4 presents the cumulative lifecycle emissions for selected \r\npowertrain technologies and fuel chain combinations for compact \r\nand mid-sized LDVs. This figure summarises the harmonised findings \r\nfrom the academic literature reviewed and the data submitted \r\nthrough an IPCC data collection effort, as described in Appendix 10.1 \r\n(Hawkins et al. 2013; Messagie et al. 2014; Bauer et al. 2015; Tong \r\net al. 2015b; Ellingsen et al. 2016; Gao et al. 2016; Kim and Wallington \r\n2016; Cai et al. 2017; Evangelisti et al. 2017; Ke et al. 2017; Lombardi \r\net al. 2017; Miotti et al. 2017; Valente et al. 2017; Cox et al. 2018; \r\nde Souza et al. 2018; Elgowainy et al. 2018; Luk et al. 2018; Bekel \r\nand Pauliuk 2019; Cusenza et al. 2019; Hoque et al. 2019; IEA 2019a; \r\nRosenfeld et al. 2019; Shen et al. 2019; Wang et al. 2019; Wu et al. \r\n2019; Ambrose et  al. 2020; Benajes et  al. 2020; Hill et  al. 2020; \r\nKnobloch et al. 2020; Prussi et al. 2020; Qiao et al. 2020; Wolfram \r\net al"


id: fa53b57e11db85b2e81306ba6d30f7fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36902
content:
" 2020; Zheng et al. 2020; Sacchi 2021; Valente et al. 2021). The \r\nvalues in the figure (and the remaining figures in this section) depend \r\non the 100-year global warming potential (GWP) used in each study, \r\nwhich may differ from the recent GWP updates from WGI. However, \r\nit is unlikely that the qualitative insights gained from the figures in \r\nthis section would change using the update 100-year GWP values."


id: 25be28aca6a09eb1a859e78935973d2b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3367
content:
"In contrast to HEVs, PHEVs may provide greater opportunities for \r\nuse-phase emissions reductions for LDVs. These increased potential \r\nbenefits are due to the ability to charge the battery with low-carbon \r\nelectricity and the longer full-electric range in comparison to HEVs \r\n(Laberteaux et  al. 2019). Consumer behaviour (e.g.,  utility factor \r\n(UF) and charging patterns), manufacturer settings, and access \r\nto renewable electricity for charging strongly influence the total \r\noperational impacts (Wu et al. 2019). The UF is a weighting of the \r\npercentage of distance covered using the electric charge (charge \r\ndepleting (CD) stage) versus the distance covered using the internal \r\ncombustion engine (charge sustaining (CS) stage) (Paffumi et  al. \r\n2018). When the PHEV operates in CS mode, the internal combustion \r\nengine is used for propulsion and to maintain the state of charge \r\nof the battery within a  certain range, together with regenerative \r\nbraking (Plotz et  al"


id: 4327da9a0d89f61fdbe98eb8627b1be4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7966
content:
" 2018; Raghavan and Tal 2020). When running \r\nin CS mode, PHEVs have a  reduced mitigation potential and have \r\nimpacts comparable to those of HEVs. On the other hand, when the \r\nPHEV operates in CD mode, the battery alone provides the required "


id: 1ef97b17ccdc08b80bf7f45c101b889
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2312
content:
"Figure 10.4 | Life cycle greenhouse gas emissions intensities for mid-sized light-duty vehicle and fuel technologies from the literature. The primary x-axis \r\nreports units in gCO2-eq vkm-1, assuming a vehicle life of 180,000 km. The secondary x-axis uses units of gCO2-eq pkm-1, assuming a 1.5 occupancy rate. The values in the \r\nfigure rely on the 100-year GWP value embedded in the source data, which may differ slightly from the updated 100-year GWP values from WGI. The shaded area represents \r\nthe interquartile range for combined vehicle manufacturing and end-of-life phases. The length of the box and whiskers represent the interquartile range of the operation phase \r\nfor different fuel chains, while their placement on the x-axis represents the absolute lifecycle climate intensity, that is, includes manufacturing and end-of-life phases. Each \r\nindividual marker indicates a data point"


id: 3c53f64df489aecede10861e0b0227c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6857
content:
" 'Advanced biofuels' refers to the use of second-generation biofuels and their respective conversion and cultivation emission factors. \r\n'IAM EMF33' refers to emissions factors for advanced biofuels derived from simulation results from the integrated assessment models EMF33 scenarios. 'PM' refers to partial \r\nmodels, where 'CLC' is with constant land cover and 'NRG' is with natural regrowth. 'Hydrogen, low-carbon electricity' is produced via electrolysis using low-carbon electricity. \r\n'Hydrogen, natural gas SMR' refers to fuels produced via steam methane reforming of natural gas."


id: 747c6e55f9052ef229c5540a2a6f1a49
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15924
content:
"propulsion energy (Plotz et al. 2018; Raghavan and Tal 2020). Thus, in \r\nCD mode, PHEVs hold potential for higher mitigation potential, due \r\nto the possibility of charging the battery with low-carbon electricity \r\nsources. Consequently, the UF greatly influences the lifecycle emissions \r\nof PHEVs. The current peer-reviewed literature presents a wide range \r\nof UFs mainly due to varying testing protocols applied for estimating \r\nthe fuel efficiency and user behaviour (Pavlovic et al. 2017; Paffumi \r\net  al. 2018; Plotz et  al. 2018; Plotz et  al. 2020; Raghavan and Tal \r\n2020; Hao et al. 2021). These factors make it difficult to harmonise \r\nand compare impacts across PHEV studies. Due to the low number \r\nof appropriate PHEV studies relative to the other LDV technologies \r\nand the complications in harmonising available PHEV results, this \r\ntechnology is omitted from Figure  10.4"


id: 1eb01b6f163885ee35c6b4732c647261
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2272
content:
" However, due to the dual \r\noperating nature of PHEV vehicles, one can expect that the lifecycle \r\nGHG emissions intensities for these vehicles will lie between those \r\nof their ICEV and BEV counterparts of similar size and performance."


id: d7408bca582fa348bbad5db6fbee1fe7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31381
content:
"As with BEVs, current HFCVs have higher production emissions than \r\nsimilarly-sized ICEVs and BEVs, generating on average approximately \r\n15 tCO2-eq per vehicle. As with BEVs, the lifecycle impacts of FCVs \r\nare highly dependent on the fuel chain. To date, the most common \r\nmethod of hydrogen production is steam methane reforming of \r\nnatural gas (Khojasteh Salkuyeh et  al. 2017), which is relatively \r\ncarbon intensive, resulting in lifecycle emissions of approximately \r\n88 gCO2-eq pkm-1. Current literature covering lifecycle impacts \r\nof FCVs shows that vehicles fuelled with hydrogen produced from \r\nsteam methane reforming of natural gas offer little or no mitigation \r\npotential over ICEVs. Other available hydrogen fuel chains vary widely \r\nin carbon intensity, depending on the synthesis method and the \r\nenergy source used (electrolysis or steam methane reforming; fossil \r\nfuels or renewables)"


id: bdf9d30cf2cf350fe5f7919fbb8535e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27445
content:
" The least carbon-intensive hydrogen pathways \r\nrely on electrolysis powered by low-carbon electricity. Compared to \r\nICEVs and BEVs, FCVs for LDVs are at a lower technology readiness \r\nlevel, as discussed in section 10.3."


id: f7b6b0399765d2b032c3947e417d1067
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36493
content:
"Currently, BEVs have higher manufacturing emissions than \r\nequivalently-sized ICEVs, with median emissions of 14 tCO2-eq \r\nper  vehicle against approximately 10 tCO2-eq per  vehicle of their \r\nmid-sized fossil-fuelled counterparts. These higher production \r\nemissions of BEVs are largely attributed to the battery pack \r\nmanufacturing and to the additional power electronics required. \r\nAs manufacturing technology and capacity utilisation improve and \r\nglobalise to regions with low-carbon electricity, battery manufacturing \r\nemissions will likely decrease. Due to the higher energy efficiency \r\nof the electric powertrain, BEVs may compensate for these higher \r\nproduction emissions in the driving phase. However, the mitigation \r\nability of this technology relative to ICEVs is highly dependent on \r\nthe electricity mix used to charge the vehicle"


id: 93421ced6e2f19a277f6c44ec7fedf1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20684
content:
"Vehicle size trends. On a global scale, SUV sales have been constantly growing in the last decade, with 39% of the vehicles sold in \r\n2018 being SUVs (IEA 2019d). If the trend towards increasing vehicle size and engine power continues, it may result in higher overall \r\nemissions from the LDV fleet (relative to smaller vehicles with the same powertrain technology). The magnitude of the influence \r\nvehicle mass has on fuel efficiency varies with the powertrain, which have different efficiencies. Box 10.3 Figure 1 highlights this \r\nrelationship using data from the same literature used to create Figure 10.4. Higher powertrain efficiency results in lower energy losses \r\nin operation, and thus requires less energy input to move a given mass than a powertrain of lower efficiency. This pattern is illustrated \r\nby the more gradual slope of BEVs in Box 10.3 Figure 1"


id: c35bbcb2e38a8a265797fd8d0b18bc26
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28304
content:
" The trend towards bigger and heavier vehicles, with consequently higher use \r\nphase emissions, can be somewhat offset by improvements in powertrain design, fuel efficiency, lightweighting, and aerodynamics \r\n(Gargoloff et  al. 2018; Wolfram et  al. 2020). The potential improvements provided by these strategies are case specific and not \r\nthoroughly evaluated in the literature, either individually or as a combination of multiple strategies."


id: 7a73bc0c950aaa744613ceb8939cf77e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16838
content:
"Lightweighting. There is an increasing use of advanced materials such as high-strength steel, aluminium, carbon fibre, and polymer \r\ncomposites for vehicle lightweighting (Hottle et al. 2017). These materials reduce the mass of the vehicle and thereby also reduce \r\nthe fuel or energy required to drive. Lightweighted components often have higher production emissions than the components they \r\nreplace due to the advanced materials used (Kim and Wallington 2016). Despite these higher production emissions, some studies \r\nsuggest that the reduced fuel consumption over the lifetime of the lightweighted vehicle may provide a net mitigation effect in \r\ncomparison to a non-lightweighted vehicle (Kim and Wallington 2013; Hottle et al. 2017; Milovanoff et al. 2019; Upadhyayula et al. \r\n2019; Wolfram et al. 2020)"


id: da8d9ca4535414bce54cd4df9166babf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31912
content:
"FCVs represent the most expensive solution for LDV, mainly due to \r\nthe currently higher purchase price of the vehicle itself. However, \r\ngiven the lower technology readiness level of FCVs and the current \r\nefforts in the research and development of this technology, FCVs \r\ncould become a viable technology for LDVs in the coming years. The \r\nissues regarding the extra energy involved in creating the hydrogen \r\nand its delivery to refuelling sites remain, however. The levelised \r\ncost of hydrogen on a per GJ basis is lower than conventional fossil \r\nfuels but higher than electricity. In addition, within the levelised \r\ncost of hydrogen, there are significant cost differences between the \r\nhydrogen-producing technologies. Conventional technologies such \r\nas coal gasification and steam methane reforming of natural gas, \r\nboth with and without carbon capture and storage, represent the \r\ncheapest options (Bekel and Pauliuk 2019; Parkinson et  al. 2019; \r\nKhzouz et al. 2020; Al-Qahtani et al"


id: c3da66f99c93949651569418080cf73f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28385
content:
" 2021). Hydrogen produced via \r\nelectrolysis is currently the most expensive technology, but with \r\nsignificant potential cost reductions due to the current technology \r\nreadiness level."


id: a06c887dc1d511078e22bf8121beb31
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22780
content:
"ICEV, HEV, and PHEV technologies, which are powered using \r\ncombustion engines, have limited potential for deep reduction \r\nof GHG emissions. Biofuels offer good mitigation potential if low \r\nland-use change emissions are incurred (e.g., the IAM EMF33 and \r\npartial models, CLC biofuels pathways shown in Figure  10.4). The \r\nliterature shows large variability, depending on the method of \r\ncalculating associated land-use changes. Resolving these apparent \r\nmethodological differences is important to consolidating the role \r\nbiofuels may play in mitigation, as well as the issues raised in \r\nChapter 7 about the conflicts over land use. The mitigation potential \r\nof battery and fuel cell vehicles is strongly dependent on the carbon \r\nintensity of their production and the energy carriers used in operation. \r\nHowever, these technologies likely offer the highest potential for \r\nreducing emissions from LDVs"


id: 5b338528ca133e6ca21de46f8e074f5f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11856
content:
" Prior work on the diffusion dynamics \r\nof transport technologies suggests that 'the diffusion of infrastructure \r\nprecedes the adoption of vehicles, which precedes the expansion of \r\ntravel' (Leibowicz 2018). These dynamics reinforce the argument \r\nfor strong investments in both the energy infrastructure and the \r\nvehicle technologies."


id: 7aaddc0c212be7572903f4fde8d3032
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16879
content:
"Buses provide urban and peri-urban transport services to millions of \r\npeople around the world and a growing number of transport agencies \r\nare exploring alternative-fuelled buses. Alternative technologies to \r\nconventional diesel-powered buses include buses powered with \r\nCNG, LNG, synthetic fuels, and biofuels (e.g.,  biodiesel, renewable \r\ndiesel, dimethyl ether); diesel hybrid-electric buses; battery electric \r\nbuses; electric catenary buses; and hydrogen fuel cell buses. Rail is \r\nan alternative mode of transit that could support decarbonisation \r\nof land-based passenger mobility. Electric rail systems can provide \r\nurban services (light rail and metro systems), as well as longer\u0002distance transport. Indeed, many cities of the world already have \r\nextensive metro systems, and regions like China, Japan and Europe \r\nhave a  robust high-speed intercity railway network"


id: b6c2990203a4bd52f8a7f71f40776d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26275
content:
" Intercity rail \r\ntransport can be powered with electricity, however, fossil fuels are \r\nstill prevalent for long-distance rail passenger transport in some \r\nregions. Battery electric long-distance trains may be a future option \r\nfor these areas."


id: 3a61cb11afb1366b87428f3c6a051d79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6550
content:
"Figure  10.6 shows the lifecycle GHG emissions from different \r\npowertrain and fuel technologies for buses and passenger rail. The \r\ndata in each panel came from a number of relevant scientific studies \r\n(Cai et al. 2015; Tong et al. 2015a; Dimoula et al. 2016; de Bortoli et al. \r\n2017; Valente et al. 2017; Meynerts et al. 2018; IEA 2019e; de Bortoli \r\nand Christoforou 2020; Hill et al. 2020; Liu et al. 2020a; Valente et al. \r\n2021). The width of the bar represents the variability in available \r\nestimates, which is primarily driven by variability in reported vehicle \r\nefficiency, size, or drive cycle. While some bars overlap, the Figure \r\nmay not fully capture correlations between results. For example, low \r\nefficiency associated with aggressive drive cycles may drive the upper \r\nend of the emission ranges for multiple technologies; thus, an overlap \r\ndoes not necessarily suggest uncertainty regarding which vehicle \r\ntype would have lower emissions for a comparable trip"


id: ea92e69b1804015fb659c04fd57e7ea4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34413
content:
" Additionally, \r\nreported lifecycle emissions do not include embodied GHG emissions \r\nassociated with infrastructure construction and maintenance. \r\nThese embodied emissions are potentially a  larger fraction of "


id: 264d09d345d1c686fb2d694cf0a520ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3442
content:
"Figure 10.7 shows the results of a parametric analysis of the LCCs \r\nof transit technologies with the highest potential for GHG emissions \r\nreductions. As with Figure 10.5, the vehicle efficiency ranges are the \r\nsame as those from the LCA estimates (80% occupancy). Vehicle, \r\nfuel, and maintenance costs represent ranges in the literature \r\n(Eudy and Post 2018b; IEA 2019e; Argonne National Laboratory \r\n2020; BNEF 2020; Eudy and Post 2020; Hydrogen Council 2020; IEA \r\n2020b; IEA 2020c; IRENA 2020; Johnson et al. 2020; Burnham et al. \r\n2021; IEA 2021c; IEA 2021d; US Energy Information Administration \r\n2021), and the discount rate is 3% where applicable. Appendix 10.2 \r\nprovides the details behind these estimates. The panels for the ICEV \r\ncan represent buses and passenger trains powered with any form \r\nof diesel, whether derived from petroleum, synthetic hydrocarbons, \r\nor biofuels"


id: d56ca0dbaa58dcfa2a6bc2d23f00023f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31101
content:
" For reference, global average automotive diesel prices \r\nfrom 2015-2020 fluctuated around USD1 per  litre, and the 2019 \r\nworld average industrial electricity price was approximately \r\nUSD100 per MWh (IEA 2021d). Retail hydrogen prices in excess of \r\nUSD13 per  kilogram have been observed (Eudy and Post 2018a; \r\nArgonne National Laboratory 2020; Burnham et  al. 2021) though \r\ncurrent production cost estimates for hydrogen produced from \r\nelectrolysis are far lower (IRENA 2020) (and as reported in Chapter 6), \r\nat around USD5-7 per kg with future forecasts as low as USD1 per kg \r\n(BNEF 2020; Hydrogen Council 2020; IRENA 2020) (and as reported \r\nin Chapter 6)."


id: 94e2a6c17975cf15921171c3c167b081
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20934
content:
"Figure 10.6 highlights that BEV and FCV buses and passenger rail \r\npowered with low-carbon electricity or low-carbon hydrogen, could \r\noffer reductions in GHG emissions compared to diesel-powered buses \r\nor diesel-powered passenger rail. However, and not surprisingly, \r\nthese technologies would offer only little emissions reductions if \r\npower generation and hydrogen production rely on fossil fuels. While \r\nbuses powered with CNG and LNG could offer some reductions \r\ncompared to diesel-powered buses, these reductions are unlikely to \r\nbe sufficient to contribute to deep decarbonisation of the transport \r\nsector and they may slow down conversion to low- or zero-carbon \r\noptions already commercially available. Biodiesel and renewable \r\ndiesel fuels (from sources with low upstream emissions and low \r\nrisk of induced land-use change) could offer important near-term \r\nreductions for buses and passenger rail, as these fuels can often be \r\nused with existing vehicle infrastructure"


id: ef5c41283fd5fe269118041e77757cc2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35138
content:
" They could also be used for \r\nlong haul trucks and trains, shipping and aviation as discussed below \r\nand in later sections."


id: 998468475958fcd917b76278482c628a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21681
content:
"There has been growing interest in the production of synthetic fuels \r\nfrom CO2 produced by direct air capture (DAC) processes. Figure 10.6 \r\nincludes the lifecycle GHG emissions from buses and passenger \r\nrail powered with synthetic diesel produced through a DAC system \r\npaired with a Fischer-Tropsch (FT) process, based on Liu et al. (2020a). \r\nThis process requires the use of hydrogen (as shown in Figure 10.2), \r\nso the emissions factors of the resulting fuel depend on the emissions \r\nintensity of hydrogen production. An electricity emissions factor less \r\nthan 140 gCO2-eq kWh-1 would be required for this pathway to \r\nachieve lower emissions than petroleum diesel (Liu et al. 2020a); for \r\nexample, this would be equivalent to a 75% wind and 25% natural \r\ngas electricity mix (Appendix 10.1)"


id: a39e1174a33a04d32f287ca0d3509ee0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23302
content:
" If the process relied on steam \r\nmethane reforming for hydrogen production or fossil-based power \r\ngeneration, synthetic diesel from the DAC-FT process would not \r\nprovide GHG emissions reductions compared to conventional diesel. \r\nDAC-FT from low-carbon energy sources appears to be promising \r\nfrom an emissions standpoint and could warrant the R&D and \r\ndemonstration attention outlined in the rest of the chapter, but it \r\ncannot be contemplated as a decarbonisation strategy without the \r\navailability of low-carbon hydrogen."


id: 64532537ab850c36cbfd8407814a1083
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13355
content:
"Under most parameter combinations, rail is the most cost-effective \r\noption, followed by buses, both of which are an order of magnitude \r\ncheaper than passenger vehicles. Note that costs per  pkm are \r\nstrongly influenced by occupancy assumptions; at low occupancy \r\n(e.g.,  <20% for buses and <10% for rail), the cost of transit \r\napproaches the LCC for passenger cars. For diesel rail and buses, cost \r\nranges are driven by fuel costs, whereas vehicles are both important \r\ndrivers for electric or hydrogen modes due to high costs (but also \r\nlarge projected improvements) associated with batteries and fuel \r\ncell stacks. Whereas the current state of ICEV technologies is best \r\nrepresented by cheap vehicles and low fuel costs for diesel (top left \r\nof each panel), these costs are likely to rise in future due to stronger \r\nemission/efficiency regulations and rising crude oil prices"


id: b6fb0d5bdd649d42f5ceb2bd5724acb8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" On the \r\ncontrary, the current status of alternative fuels is better represented \r\nby high capital costs and mid-to-high fuel costs (right side of each \r\npanel; mid-to-bottom rows), but technology costs are anticipated \r\nto fall with increasing experience, research, and development. \r\nThus, while electric rail is already competitive with diesel rail, and \r\nelectric buses are competitive with diesel buses in the low efficiency \r\ncase, improvements are still required in battery costs to compete \r\nagainst modern diesel buses on high efficiency routes, at current \r\ndiesel costs. Similarly, improvements to both vehicle cost and fuel \r\ncosts are required for hydrogen vehicles to become cost effective \r\ncompared to their diesel or electric counterparts"


id: 31b22cae54b28a7c6219a1f69ade91e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5229
content:
" At either the \r\nupper end of the diesel cost range (bottom row of ICEV panels), or \r\nwithin the 2030-2050 projections for battery costs, fuel cell costs \r\nand hydrogen costs (top left of BEV and FCV panels), both battery\u0002and hydrogen-powered vehicles become financially attractive."


id: d5c813cc5bab794a664f927b05207ede
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"Figure 10.6 | Lifecycle greenhouse gas intensity of land-based bus and rail technologies. Each bar represents the range of the lifecycle estimates, bounded by \r\nminimum and maximum energy use per passenger-kilometre, as reported for each fuel/powertrain combination. The ranges are driven by differences in vehicle characteristics \r\nand operating efficiency. For energy sources with highly variable upstream emissions, low, medium and/or high representative values are shown as separate rows. The primary \r\nx-axis shows lifecycle GHG emissions, in gCO2-eq pkm-1, assuming 80% occupancy; the secondary x-axis assumes 20% occupancy. The values in the figure rely on the 100-year \r\nGWP value embedded in the source data, which may differ slightly from the updated 100-year GWP values from WGI. For buses, the main bars show full lifecycle, with vertical \r\nbars disaggregating the vehicle cycle. 'Diesel, high' references emissions factors for diesel from oil sands"


id: 9c100de5f58520ff4c0491108071ce64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 22112
content:
" 'advanced biofuels', refers to the use of second-generation biofuels and \r\ntheir respective conversion and cultivation emissions factors. 'IAM EMF33' refers to emissions factors for advanced biofuels derived from simulation results from the integrated \r\nassessment models EMF33 scenarios. 'PM' refers to partial models, where 'CLC' is with constant land cover and 'NRG' is with natural regrowth. 'DAC FT-Diesel, wind electricity' \r\nrefers to Fischer-Tropsch diesel produced via a CO2 direct air capture process that uses wind electricity. 'Hydrogen, low-carbon renewable' refers to fuels produced via electrolysis \r\nusing low-carbon electricity. 'Hydrogen, natural gas SMR' refers to fuels produced via steam methane reforming of natural gas. Results for ICEVs with 'high emissions DAC FT\u0002Diesel from natural gas' are not included here since the lifecycle emissions are estimated to be substantially higher than petroleum diesel ICEVs."


id: aecfa181f443782d27d3494cd8f3d7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 25039
content:
"Figure 10.8 (continued): Lifecycle greenhouse gas intensity of land-based freight technologies and fuel types. Each bar represents the range of the lifecycle \r\nestimates, bounded by minimum and maximum energy use per  tkm, as reported for each fuel/powertrain combination. The ranges are driven by differences in vehicle \r\ncharacteristics and operating efficiency. For energy sources with highly variable upstream emissions, low, medium and/or high representative values are shown as separate \r\nrows. For trucks, the primary x-axis shows lifecycle GHG emissions, in gCO2-eq tkm-1, assuming 100% payload; the secondary x-axis assumes 50% payload. The values in the \r\nfigure rely on the 100-year GWP value embedded in the source data, which may differ slightly from the updated 100-year GWP values from WGI. For rail, values represent \r\naverage payloads. For trucks, main bars show full lifecycle, with vertical bars disaggregating the vehicle cycle"


id: 2bb89e518c9bcb39f01f9334377f650b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4308
content:
" 'Diesel, high' references emissions factors for diesel from oil sands. \r\n'Advanced biofuels' refers to the use of second-generation biofuels and their respective conversion and cultivation emission factors. 'IAM EMF33' refers to emissions factors for \r\nadvanced biofuels derived from simulation results from the EMF33 scenarios. 'PM' refers to partial models, where 'CLC' is with constant land cover and 'NRG' is with natural \r\nregrowth. DAC FT-Diesel, wind electricity refers to Fischer-Tropsch diesel produced via a CO2 direct air capture process that uses wind electricity. 'Ammonia and Hydrogen, low\u0002carbon renewable' refers to fuels produced via electrolysis using low-carbon electricity. 'Ammonia and Hydrogen, natural gas SMR' refers to fuels produced via steam methane \r\nreforming of natural gas."


id: d7df1f5ce0300f3dcbff52a06d717980
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31490
content:
"Figure 10.8 presents a review of lifecycle GHG emissions from land\u0002based freight technologies (heavy- and medium-duty trucks, and \r\nrail). Each panel within the figure represents data in GHG emissions \r\nper  tonne-kilometre of freight transported by different technology \r\nand/or fuel types, as indicated by the labels to the left. The data in \r\neach panel came from a number of relevant scientific studies (Tong \r\net al. 2015a; Frattini et al. 2016; Nahlik et al. 2016; Zhao et al. 2016; \r\nCE Delft 2017; Isaac and Fulton 2017; Song et  al. 2017; Valente \r\net  al. 2017; Cooper and Balcombe 2019; Lajevardi et  al. 2019; \r\nHill et al. 2020; Liu et al. 2020a; Merchan et al. 2020; Prussi et al. 2020; \r\nGray et al. 2021; Valente et al. 2021)"


id: bba1bfbdb0f2da1369f568ab2952daea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27078
content:
" Similar to the results for buses, \r\ntechnologies that offer substantial emissions reductions for freight \r\ninclude: ICEV trucks powered with the low-carbon variants for \r\nbiofuels, ammonia or synthetic diesel; BEVs charged with low-carbon \r\nelectricity; and FCVs powered with renewable-based electrolytic \r\nhydrogen, or ammonia. Since ammonia and Fischer-Tropsch diesel \r\nare produced from hydrogen, their emissions are higher than the \r\nsource hydrogen, but their logistical advantages over hydrogen are \r\nalso a consideration (Section 10.3)."


id: d74240de79107c0c586e681ee41a95af
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31382
content:
"Figure 10.9 shows the results of a parametric analysis of the LCC \r\nof trucks and freight rail technologies with the highest potential \r\nfor deep GHG reductions. As with Figure 10.8, the vehicle efficiency \r\nranges are the same as those from the LCA estimates (80% payload \r\nfor trucks; effective payload as reported by original studies for \r\nrail). Vehicle, fuel and maintenance costs represent ranges in the \r\nliterature (Moultak et  al. 2017; Eudy and Post 2018b; IEA 2019e; \r\nArgonne National Laboratory 2020; BNEF 2020; IRENA 2020; \r\nBurnham et al. 2021; IEA 2021c), and the discount rate is 3% where \r\napplicable (Appendix 10.2). The panels for the ICEV can represent \r\ntrucks and freight trains powered with any form of diesel, whether \r\nderived from petroleum, synthetic hydrocarbons, or biofuels. See \r\ndiscussion preceding Figure 10.7 for additional details about current \r\nglobal fuel costs"


id: 3ac140e9564e3d3ae84576f2aee3a330
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6614
content:
" Under most parameter combinations, rail is the \r\nmore cost-effective option, but the high efficiency case for trucks \r\n(representing fuel-efficient vehicles, favourable drive cycles and high \r\npayload) can be more cost-effective than the low efficiency case for \r\nrail (representing systems with higher fuel consumption and lower \r\npayload). For BEV trucks, cost ranges are driven by vehicle purchase \r\nprice due to the large batteries required and the associated wide \r\nrange between their current high costs and anticipated future cost \r\nreductions. For all other truck and rail technologies, fuel cost ranges \r\nplay a larger role"


id: fa5909da4e117f8387fcbd1ffa5050a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36903
content:
" Similar to transit technologies, the current state \r\nof freight ICEV technologies is best represented by cheap vehicles \r\nand low fuel costs for diesel (top left of each panel), and the current \r\nstatus of alternative fuels is better represented by high capital costs \r\nand mid-to-high fuel costs (right side of each panel; mid-to-bottom \r\nrows), with expected future increases in ICEV LCC and decreases in \r\nalternative fuel vehicle LCC. Electric and hydrogen freight rail are \r\npotentially already competitive with diesel rail (especially electric \r\ncatenary (IEA 2019e)), but low data availability (especially for \r\nhydrogen efficiency ranges) and wide ranges for reported diesel \r\nrail efficiency (likely encompassing low capacity utilisation) makes \r\nthis comparison challenging. Alternative fuel trucks are currently \r\nmore expensive than diesel trucks, but future increases in diesel \r\ncosts or a respective decrease in hydrogen costs or in BEV capital "


id: 6d9345b34cf5284c19666d13f16f2f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14849
content:
"Trucks exhibit economies of scale in fuel consumption, with \r\nheavy-duty trucks generally showing lower emissions per tkm than \r\nmedium-duty trucks. Comparing the lifecycle GHG emissions from \r\ntrucks and rail, it is clear that rail using internal combustion engines \r\nis more carbon efficient than using internal combustion trucks. Note \r\nthat the rail emissions are reported for an average representative \r\npayload, while the trucks are presented at 50% and 100% \r\npayload, based on available data. The comparison between trucks \r\nand rail powered with electricity or hydrogen is less clear  - \r\nespecially considering that these values omit embodied GHG \r\nfrom infrastructure construction. One study reported embodied \r\nrail infrastructure emissions of 15 gCO2 per tonne-kilometre for rail \r\n(International Union of Railways 2016), although such embodied \r\nemissions from rail are known to vary widely across case studies \r\n(Olugbenga et  al. 2019)"


id: f9a4176b575df9a71be91a15b88ba568
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36795
content:
" Regardless, trucks and rail with low\u0002carbon electricity or low-carbon hydrogen have substantially lower \r\nemissions than incumbent technologies."


id: 401bf6b4b7ad2993c8d9a0911955bb6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7464
content:
"The non-CO2 effects of aviation on climate fall into the category of \r\nshort-lived climate forcers (SLCFs). Emissions of NOx currently result \r\nin net positive warming from the formation of short-term ozone \r\n(warming) and the destruction of ambient methane (cooling). If the \r\nconditions are suitable, emissions of soot and water vapour can \r\ntrigger the formation of contrails (Karcher 2018), which can spread \r\nto form extensive contrail-cirrus cloud coverage. Such cloud coverage \r\nis estimated to have a combined ERF that is about 57% of the current \r\nnet ERF of global aviation (Lee et al. 2021), although a comparison \r\nof cirrus cloud observations under pre- and post-COVID-19 pandemic \r\nconditions suggest that this forcing could be smaller (Digby et  al. \r\n2021). Additional effects from aviation from aerosol-cloud interactions \r\non high-level ice clouds through soot (Chen and Gettelman 2013; \r\nZhou and Penner 2014; Penner et al"


id: b3f75d3d2a4aff51d169e5d7a6db5a4d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25830
content:
" 2018), and lower-level warm \r\nclouds through sulphur (Righi et al. 2013; Kapadia et al. 2016) are \r\nhighly uncertain, with no best estimates available (Lee et al. 2021). \r\nIn total, the net ERF from aviation's non-CO2 SLCFs is estimated to be \r\napproximately 66% of aviation's current total forcing. It is important \r\nto note that the fraction of non-CO2 forcing to total forcing is not \r\na fixed quantity and is dependent on the recent history of growth (or \r\notherwise) of CO2 emissions (Klower et al. 2021). The non-CO2 effects \r\nfrom aviation are the subject of discussion for mitigation options \r\n(Arrowsmith et al. 2020). However, the issues are complex, potentially \r\ninvolving technological and operational trade-offs with CO2."


id: 9458f36d412dadffb1d9ab983c42f3d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20850
content:
"Operational improvements for navigation. From a  global \r\nperspective, aircraft navigation is relatively efficient, with many long\u0002haul routes travelling close to great circle trajectories, and avoiding \r\nheadwinds that increase fuel consumption. The ICAO estimates that \r\nflight inefficiencies on a global basis are currently of the order 2% \r\nto 6% (ICAO 2019), while Fleming and de Lepinay (2019) project \r\noperational improvements (air traffic management) of up to 13% on \r\na regional basis by 2050. 'Intermediate stop operations' have been \r\nsuggested, whereby longer-distance travel is broken into flight legs, \r\nobviating the need to carry fuel for the whole mission. Linke et al. \r\n(2017) modelled this operational behaviour on a  global basis and \r\ncalculated a fuel saving of 4.8% over a base case in which normal \r\nfuel loads were carried. However, this approach increases the number \r\nof landing/take-off cycles at airports"


id: 6fdd13a2a49e3a86be0ae3e64c0bf54f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15221
content:
" 'Formation flying', which has \r\nthe potential to reduce fuel burn on feasible routes, has also been \r\nproposed (Xu et al. 2014; Marks et al. 2021)."


id: 88792d8c10a6c62339ea91cdb42ddf92
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19000
content:
"Alternative biofuels, synthetic fuels, and liquid hydrogen. As \r\nnoted above, the scope for reducing CO2 emissions from aviation \r\nthrough improved airplane technology or operations is limited and \r\nunable to keep up with the projected growth, let al.ne reduce beyond \r\nthe present emission rate at projected levels of demand (assuming \r\npost-pandemic recovery of traffic). Thus, the literature outlined here \r\nsuggests that the only way for demand for aviation to continue to \r\ngrow without increasing CO2 emissions is to employ alternative \r\nlower-carbon bio- or synthetic aviation fuels (Klower et al. 2021). For \r\nshorter ranges, flights of light planes carrying up to 50 passengers \r\nmay be able to use electric power (Sahoo et  al. 2020) but these \r\nplanes are a  small proportion of the global aviation fleet (Epstein \r\nand O'Flarity 2019; Langford and Hall 2020) and account for less \r\nthan 12% of current aviation CO2 emissions"


id: 2780b252895881acf6f13a1e098fbaa4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3616
content:
" Alternative lower\u0002carbon footprint fuels have been certified for use over recent years, \r\nprincipally from bio-feedstocks, but are not yet widely available at \r\neconomic prices (Kandaramath Hari et al. 2015; Capaz et al. 2021a). \r\nIn addition, alternative fuels from bio-feedstocks have variable \r\ncarbon footprints because of different lifecycle emissions associated \r\nwith various production methods and associated land-use change \r\n(de Jong et al. 2017; Staples et al. 2018; Capaz et al. 2021b; Zhao \r\net al. 2021)."


id: cd78ef81098bc46d050f4ff066d290ec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29866
content:
"Technology options for engine and airframe. For every kilogram \r\nof jet fuel combusted, 3.16 kg CO2 is emitted. Engine and airframe \r\nmanufacturers' primary objective, after safety issues, is to reduce \r\ndirect operating costs, which are highly dependent on fuel burn. \r\nLarge investments have gone into engine technology and aircraft \r\naerodynamics to improve fuel burn per  kilometre (Cumpsty et  al. \r\n2019). There have been major step changes in engine technology \r\nover time, from early turbojet engines to larger turbofan engines. \r\nHowever, the basic configuration of an aircraft has remained more \r\nor less the same for decades and will likely remain at least to 2037 \r\n(Cumpsty et  al. 2019). Airframes performance has improved over \r\nthe years with better wing design, but large incremental gains have \r\nbecome much harder as the technology has matured"


id: 40f0336ef0745760cd12e58173dfd40c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7603
content:
" For twin\u0002aisle aircraft, generally used for long ranges, fuel-burn is a pressing \r\nconcern and there have been several all-new aircraft designs with \r\nimprovements in their lift-to-drag ratio (Cumpsty et  al. 2019). The \r\nprincipal opportunities for fuel reduction come from improvements \r\nin aerodynamic efficiency, aircraft mass reduction, and propulsion \r\nsystem improvements. In the future, Cumpsty et al. (2019) suggest \r\nthat the highest rate of fuel burn reduction achievable for new aircraft \r\nis likely to be no more than about 1.3% per year, which is well short of \r\nICAO's aspirational goal of 2% global annual average fuel efficiency \r\nimprovement. Radically different aircraft shapes, like the blended \r\nwing body (where the wings are not distinct from the fuselage), are \r\nlikely to use about 10% less fuel than future advanced aircraft of \r\nconventional form (Cumpsty et al. 2019)"


id: c2d6cd702f1dfaa8ae64277a57cb1871
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28234
content:
"Bio-based fuels can be produced using a  variety of feedstocks \r\nincluding cultivated feedstock crops, crop residues, municipal solid \r\nwaste, waste fats, oils and greases, wood products and forestry \r\nresidues (Staples et  al. 2018). Each of these different sources can \r\nhave different associated lifecycle emissions, such that they are \r\nnot net zero CO2 emissions but have associated emissions of CO2\r\nor other GHGs from their production and distribution (Section 10.3, \r\nBox 10.2). In addition, associated land-use change emissions of CO2\r\nrepresent a  constraint in climate change mitigation potential with \r\nbiofuel (Staples et  al. 2017) and have inherent large uncertainties \r\n(Plevin et al. 2010). Other sustainability issues include food vs fuel \r\narguments, water resource use, and impacts on biodiversity. Cost\u0002effective production, feedstock availability, and certification costs are \r\nalso relevant (Kandaramath Hari et al. 2015)"


id: 5e46b73e2b3d07d6565428f765d04679
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12360
content:
" Nonetheless, bio-based \r\nSAFs have been estimated to achieve lifecycle emissions reductions \r\nranging between approximately 2% and 70% under a wide range \r\nof scenarios (Staples et  al. 2018). For a  set of European aviation \r\ndemand scenarios, Kousoulidou and Lonza (2016) estimated that \r\nthe fuel demand in 2030 would be about 100 million tonnes of oil \r\nequivalent and biokerosene (HEFA/HVO) penetration would provide \r\naround 2% of the total fuel demand at that date. Several issues limit \r\nthe expansion of biokerosene for aviation, the primary one being the \r\ncurrent cost of fossil fuel compared to the costs of SAF production \r\n(Capaz et  al. 2021a). Other hybrid pathways, for example the \r\nhydrogenation of biofuels (the hydrogen assumed to be generated \r\nwith low-carbon energy), could increase the output and improve \r\nthe economic feasibility of bio-based SAF (Hannula 2016; Albrecht \r\net al. 2017)."


id: 6d6785e62168143c4374c21ce1632140
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14825
content:
"Liquid hydrogen (LH2) as a fuel has been discussed for aeronautical \r\napplications since the 1950s (Brewer 1991) and a few experimental \r\naircraft have flown using such a  fuel. Experimental, small aircraft \r\nhave also flown using hydrogen fuel cells. Although the fuel has an \r\nenergy density per unit mass about three times greater than kerosene, \r\nit has a much lower energy density per unit volume (approximately \r\nfactor 4 (McKinsey 2020)). The increased volume requirement makes \r\nthe fuel less attractive for aviation since it would require the wings \r\nto be thickened or fuel to take up space in the fuselage. Bicer and \r\nDincer (2017) found that LH2-powered aircraft compared favourably \r\nto conventional kerosene-powered aircraft on a  lifecycle basis, \r\nproviding that the LH2 was generated from low-carbon energy sources \r\n(0.014  kgCO2 per  tkm compared with 1.03 kgCO2 per  tkm for an \r\nunspecified passenger aircraft). However, Ramos Pereira et al"


id: 8d22bc081aac57b1de7486f4a1882fbb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19728
content:
" (2014) \r\nalso made a lifecycle comparison and found much smaller benefits \r\nof LH2-powered aircraft (manufactured from low-carbon energy) \r\ncompared with conventional fossil kerosene. The two studies expose \r\nthe sensitivities of boundaries and assumptions in the analyses. \r\nShreyas Harsha (2014) and Rondinelli et  al. (2017) conclude that \r\nthere are many infrastructural barriers but that the environmental \r\nbenefits of low-carbon-based LH2 could be considerable. Khandelwal \r\net  al. (2013) take a  more optimistic view of the prospect of \r\nLH2-powered aircraft but envisage them within a hydrogen-oriented \r\nenergy economy. A recently commissioned study by the European \r\nUnion (EU)'s Clean Sky undertaking, (McKinsey 2020) addresses \r\nmany of the aspects of the opportunities and obstacles in developing \r\nLH2-powered aircraft"


id: 2ae269aa5874bc0ba4aecd8b0c770ed1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4175
content:
" The report provides an optimistic view of the \r\nfeasibility of developing such aircraft for short to medium haul but \r\nmakes clear that new aircraft designs (such as blended-wing body \r\naircraft) would be needed for longer distances."


id: 16d7009548b7d61b15df3134ce47a007
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1115
content:
"By its nature, CORSIA does not lead to a  reduction in in-sector \r\nemissions from aviation since the programme deals mostly in \r\napproved offsets. At its best, CORSIA is a transition arrangement to \r\nallow aviation to reduce its impact in a more meaningful way later. \r\nFrom 2021 onwards, operators can reduce their CORSIA offsetting \r\nrequirements by claiming emissions reductions from 'CORSIA \r\nEligible Fuels' that have demonstrably reduced lifecycle emissions. \r\nThese fuels are currently available at greater costs than the offsets \r\n(Capaz et al. 2021a). As a result, most currently approved CORSIA \r\noffsets are avoided emissions, which raises the issue of additionality \r\n(Warnecke et al. 2019). The nature of avoided emissions is to prevent \r\nan emission that was otherwise considered to be going to occur, \r\nfor example, prevented deforestation"


id: 65da497d999c6d0dbbfb254542ab56da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13611
content:
" Avoided emissions are \r\n'reductions' (over a counterfactual) and purchased from other sectors \r\nthat withhold from an intended emission (Becken and Mackey 2017), \r\nsuch that if additionality were established, a maximum of 50% of \r\nthe intended emissions are avoided. Some researchers suggest that \r\navoided deforestation offsets are not a meaningful reduction, since \r\ndeforestation continues to be a net source of CO2 emissions (Mackey \r\net al. 2013; Friedlingstein et al. 2020)."


id: 2dbe2237819305c2918c4970e5226a28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 4637
content:
"A widely discussed opportunity for mitigation of non-CO2 emissions \r\nfrom aviation is the avoidance of persistent contrails that can form \r\ncontrail cirrus. Contrails only form in ice-supersaturated air below \r\na  critical temperature threshold (Karcher 2018). It is therefore \r\nfeasible to alter flight trajectories to avoid such areas conducive \r\nto contrail formation, since ice-supersaturated areas tend to be \r\ntens to  hundreds of kilometres in the horizontal and only a  few \r\n100 metres in the vertical extent (Gierens et al. 1997). Theoretical \r\napproaches show that avoidance is possible on a  flight-by-flight \r\nbasis (Matthes et  al. 2017; Teoh et  al. 2020). Case studies have \r\nshown that flight planning according to trajectories with minimal \r\nclimate impact can substantially (up to 50%) reduce the aircraft's \r\nnet climate impacts despite small additional CO2 emissions (Niklass \r\net al. 2019)"


id: 1a1de8eb8d4b05502e543015b814ad74
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" However, any estimate of the net benefit or disbenefit \r\ndepends firstly on the assumed magnitude of the contrail cirrus \r\nERF effect (itself rather uncertain, assessed with a  low confidence \r\nlevel) and upon the choice of metric and time horizon applied. While \r\nthis is a potentially feasible mitigation option, notwithstanding the \r\nCO2 per  contrail trade-off question, meteorological models cannot \r\ncurrently predict the formation of persistent contrails with sufficient \r\naccuracy in time and space (Gierens et  al. 2020); this mitigation \r\noption is speculated to take of the order of up to a decade to mature \r\n(Arrowsmith et al. 2020)."


id: d0cf69c38cab841c310d089359950d91
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 30386
content:
"Modal shift to high-speed rail. Due to the limitations of the current \r\nsuite of aviation mitigation strategies, the potential for high-speed \r\nrail (HSR) is of increasing interest (Givoni and Banister 2006; Chen \r\n2017; Bi et al. 2019). The IEA's Net Zero by 2050 roadmap suggests \r\nsignificant behavioural change, with more regional flights shifting to \r\nHSR in the Net Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario pathway (IEA 2021e). \r\nFor HSR services to be highly competitive with air travel, the optimal \r\ndistance between the departure and arrival points has been found \r\nto be in the approximate range of 400 to 800 km (Bows et al. 2008; \r\nRothengatter 2010), although in the case of China's HSR operations, \r\nthis range can be extended out to 1000 km, with corresponding air \r\nservices having experienced significant demand reduction upon HSR \r\nservice commencement (Lawrence et  al. 2019)"


id: aa7459251fdc5fa5b74ae81674679407
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 24351
content:
" In some instances, \r\nnegative effects on air traffic, air fare, and flight frequency have \r\noccurred at medium-haul distances such as HSR services in China on \r\nthe Wuhan-Guangzhou route (1069 km) and the Beijing-Shanghai \r\nroute (1318 km) (Fu et al. 2015; Zhang and Zhang 2016; Chen 2017; \r\nLi et  al. 2019; Ma et  al. 2019). This competition at medium-haul \r\ndistances is contrary to that which has been experienced in European "


id: 953070ac0d21a940ba6a796723a72c91
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 20974
content:
"The LCA literature suggests that the GHG emissions associated with \r\nHSR vary depending on spatial, temporal, and operational specifics \r\n(Akerman 2011; Baron et al. 2011; Chester and Horvath 2012; Yue \r\net  al. 2015; Hoyos et  al. 2016; Jones et  al. 2017; Robertson 2016; \r\nRobertson 2018; Lin et al. 2019). These studies found a wide range of \r\napproximately 10 to 110 gCO2 pkm-1 for HSR. This range is principally \r\nattributable to the sensitivity of operational parameters such as the \r\nHSR passenger seating capacity, load factor, composition of renewable \r\nand non-renewable energy sources in electricity production, rolling \r\nstock energy efficiency and patronage (i.e.,  ridership both actual \r\nand forecast), and line-haul infrastructure specifics (e.g., tunnelling \r\nand aerial structure requirements for a particular corridor) (Akerman \r\n2011; Chester and Horvath 2012; Yue et  al. 2015; Newman et  al. \r\n2018; Robertson 2018)"


id: c93bea2db666bbf417aab94bc2300f1c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 29221
content:
" The prospect for HSR services providing \r\nfreight carriage (especially online purchases) is also growing rapidly \r\n(Strale 2016; Bi et al. 2019; Liang and Tan 2019) with a demonstrated \r\nemissions reduction potential from such operations (Hoffrichter \r\net al. 2012). However, additional supportive policies will most likely \r\nbe required (Strale 2016; Watson et  al. 2019). Limiting emissions \r\navoidance assessments for HSR modal substitution to account only \r\nfor CO2 emissions ignores aviation's non-CO2 effects (Section 10.5.2), \r\nand likely results in an under-representation of the climate benefits \r\nof HSR replacing flights."


id: 87496d7c43f8680e02e67d2f13d611e9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18823
content:
"HSR modal substitution can generate a contra-effect if the air traffic \r\ndeparture and arrival slots that become available as the result of the \r\nmodal shift are simply reallocated to additional air services (Givoni and \r\nBanister 2006; Givoni and Dobruszkes 2013; Jiang and Zhang 2016; \r\nCornet et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2019a). Furthermore, HSR services have \r\nthe potential to increase air traffic at a hub airport through improved \r\nnetworks but this effect can vary based on the distance of the HSR \r\nstations from airports (Jiang and Zhang 2014; Xia and Zhang 2016; \r\nZhang et  al. 2019b; Liu et  al. 2019). Such rebound effects could be \r\nmanaged through policy interventions. For example, in 2021 the French \r\ngovernment regulated that all airlines operating in France suspend \r\ndomestic airline flights on routes if a direct rail alternative with a travel \r\ntime of less than 2.5 hours is available"


id: ac9cb01b9bbccbd028036e656fc49654
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 24703
content:
" Other air travel demand \r\nreduction measures that have been proposed include regulations to \r\nban frequent flyer reward schemes, mandates that all marketing of air \r\ntravel declare flight emissions information to the prospective consumer \r\n(i.e., the carbon footprint of the nominated flight), the introduction of \r\na progressive 'Air Miles Levy' as well as the inclusion of all taxes and \r\nduties that are presently exempt from air ticketing (Carmichael 2019). \r\nMoreover, China has the highest use of HSR in the world in part due to \r\nits network and competitive speeds and in part due to heavy regulation \r\nof the airline industry, in particular restrictions imposed on low-cost air \r\ncarrier entry and subsidisation of HSR (Li et al. 2019). These air travel \r\ndemand reduction strategies may induce shifts to other alternative \r\nmodes in addition to stimulating HSR ridership."


id: 6a3e020908467ab4240a19b31a16de14
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14314
content:
"The IEA has more recently presented aviation scenarios to 2070 in \r\ntheir 'Sustainable Development Scenario' that assume some limited \r\nreduction in demand post-COVID-19, and potential technology \r\nimprovements in addition to direct reductions in fossil kerosene \r\nusage from substitution of biofuels and synthetic fuels (IEA 2021b). \r\nThere is much uncertainty in how aviation will recover from the \r\nCOVID-19 pandemic but, in this scenario, air travel returns to 2019 \r\nlevels in three years, and then continues to expand, driven by income. \r\nGovernment policies could dampen demand (12% lower by 2040 \r\nthan the IEA 'Stated Policies Scenario', which envisages growth at \r\n3.4% per year, which in turn is lower than ICAO at 4.3%). Mitigation \r\ntakes place largely by fuel substitution with lower-carbon biofuels \r\nand synthetic fuels, with a  smaller contribution from technology"


id: bdc0f21aa022ba6a7255efa0bc6b4d30
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 27412
content:
" \r\nApproximately 85% of the actual cumulative CO2 emissions (to 2070) \r\nare attributed to use of fuel at their lowest technology readiness level \r\nof 'Prototype', which is largely made up of biofuels and synthetic \r\nfuels, as shown in Figure 10.12. Details of the technological scenarios \r\nand the fuel availability/uptake assumptions are given in IEA (2021b), \r\nwhich also makes clear that the relevant policies are not currently in \r\nplace to make any such scenario happen."


id: e56782b848b27159a107da7ba8ed5b9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 33590
content:
"Under Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I countries were \r\ncalled to '...pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of GHGs not \r\ncontrolled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker \r\nfuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization \r\nand the International Maritime Organization, respectively.' The Paris \r\nAgreement is different, in that ICAO (and the IMO) are not named. \r\nAs a result, the Paris Agreement, through the NDCs, seemingly covers \r\nCO2 emissions from domestic aviation (currently 35% of the global \r\ntotal from aviation) but does not cover emissions from international \r\nflights. A number of states and regions, including the UK, France, \r\nSweden, and Norway, have declared their intentions to include \r\ninternational aviation in their net zero commitments, while the EU, \r\nNew Zealand, California, and Denmark are considering doing the \r\nsame (Committee on Climate Change 2019)"


id: 28a1de98ea08c1772cdc21c73455ee4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 3818
content:
" The Paris Agreement \r\ndescribes temperature-based goals, such that it is unclear how \r\nemissions of GHGs from international aviation would be accounted \r\nfor. Clearly, this is a less than ideal situation for clarity of governance \r\nof international GHG emissions from both aviation and shipping. At \r\nits 40th General Assembly (October 2019) the ICAO requested its \r\nCouncil to '...continue to explore the feasibility of a long-term global \r\naspirational goal for international aviation, through conducting \r\ndetailed studies assessing the attainability and impacts of any goals \r\nproposed, including the impact on growth as well as costs in all "


id: 13f87fda9838a5bb05d480ebaf6bd7d1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 650
content:
"The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 has changed many activities and, \r\nconsequentially, associated emissions quite dramatically (Le Quere \r\net al. 2018b; Friedlingstein et al. 2020; Liu et al. 2020c; UNEP 2020). \r\nAviation was particularly affected, with a  reduction in commercial \r\nflights in April 2020 of about 74% over 2019 levels, with some \r\nrecovery over the following months, remaining at 42% lower as of \r\nOctober 2020 (Petchenik 2021). The industry is considering a range \r\nof potential recovery scenarios, with the International Air Transport \r\nAssociation (IATA) speculating that recovery to 2019 levels may take \r\nup until 2024 (Earley and Newman 2021) (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in \r\nChapter 1)"


id: fc795b1f004cb71e54f7ce4e7394a02d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 37230
content:
" Others suggest, however, that the COVID-19 pandemic \r\nand increased costs as a  result of feed-in quotas or carbon taxes \r\ncould slow down the rate of growth of air travel demand, though \r\nglobal demand in 2050 would still grow 57%-187% between 2018 \r\nand 2050 (instead of 250% in a baseline recovery scenario) (Gossling \r\net al. 2021a)."


id: 9ddc49ff427b02ec5d4d98164ae4bf58
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"Shipping in the Arctic is a topic of increasing interest. The reduction \r\nof Arctic summer sea ice increases the access to the northern sea \r\nroutes (Smith and Stephenson 2013; Melia et al. 2016; Aksenov et al. \r\n2017; Fox-Kemper et al. 2021). Literature and public discourse has \r\nsometimes portrayed this trend as positive (Zhang et al. 2016b), as \r\nit allows for shorter shipping routes, for example between Asia and \r\nEurope, with estimated travel time savings of 25-40% (Aksenov \r\net al. 2017). However, the acceleration of Arctic cryosphere melt and \r\nreduced sea ice that enable Arctic shipping reduce surface albedo \r\nand amplify climate warming (Eyring et al. 2021). Furthermore, local \r\nair pollutants can play different roles in the Arctic. For example, black \r\ncarbon emissions reduce albedo and absorb heat in air, on snow \r\nand ice (Browse et al. 2013; Kang et al. 2020; Messner 2020; Eyring \r\net  al. 2021)"


id: 701eb254ed8bb090968ea8634f1f5b48
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 15255
content:
" Finally, changing routing from Suez to the northern \r\nsea routes may reduce total emissions for a voyage, but also shifts \r\nemissions from low to high latitudes. Changing the location of the \r\nemissions adds complexity to the assessment of the climatic impacts \r\nof Arctic shipping, as the local conditions are different and the SLCF \r\nmay have a  different impact on clouds, precipitation, albedo and \r\nlocal environment (Dalsoren et  al. 2013; Fuglestvedt et  al. 2014; \r\nMarelle et  al. 2016). Observations have shown that 5-25% of air \r\npollution in the Arctic stems from shipping activity within the Arctic \r\nitself (Aliabadi et al. 2015). Emissions outside the Arctic can affect \r\nArctic climate, and changes within the Arctic may have global climate \r\nimpacts. Both modelling and observations have shown that aerosol \r\nemissions from shipping can have a significant effect on air pollution \r\nand shortwave radiative forcing (Odemark et al. 2012; Peters et al. \r\n2012; Dalsoren et  al"


id: 585c4fdcb356c7e1ac847afbe0fb86ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 11408
content:
"A range of vessel mitigation options for the international fleet \r\nexist and are presented in this section. A variety of feedstocks and \r\nenergy carriers can be considered for shipping. As feedstocks, fuels \r\nfrom biomass (advanced biofuels), fuels produced from renewable \r\nelectricity and CO2 capture from flue gas or the air (electro-, e-, or \r\npower-fuels), and fuels produced via thermochemical processes \r\n(solar fuels) can be considered. As energy carriers, synthetic fuels \r\nand the direct use of electricity (stored in batteries) are of relevance. \r\nThe most prominent synthetic fuels discussed in the literature are \r\nhydrogen, ammonia, methane, methanol, and synthetic hydrocarbon \r\ndiesel. Figure  10.15 shows the emissions reductions potential for \r\nalternative energy carriers that have been identified as having the \r\nhighest potential to mitigate operational emissions from the sector \r\n(Chatzinikolaou and Ventikos 2014; Brynolf et al. 2014; Teeter and \r\nCleary 2014; Traut et al"


id: 74f3163edf3228161496c90d601c7b10
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15997
content:
" 2014; Lindstad et al. 2015; Psaraftis 2015; \r\nSeddiek 2015; Tillig et al. 2015; Winkel et al. 2016; DNV GL 2017; \r\nBicer and Dincer 2018a; Biernacki et  al. 2018; Bongartz et  al. \r\n2018; Gilbert et al. 2018; Hua et al. 2018; ITF 2018b; Singh et al. 2018; \r\nBalcombe  et  al. 2019; Hansson et  al. 2019; Sharafian et  al. 2019; \r\nWinebrake et  al. 2019; Czermanski et  al. 2020; Faber et  al. 2020; \r\nHansson et al. 2020; Kim et al. 2020; Liu et al. 2020a; Nguyen et al. \r\n2020; Percic et al. 2020; Sadeghi et al. 2020; Seithe et al. 2020; Xing \r\net al. 2020; Valente et al. 2021; Stolz et al. 2021)."


id: a73001206140c868f7db26bf828de695
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23812
content:
"In addition to fuels, there are other measures that may aid the \r\ntransition to low-carbon shipping. The amounts and speed of uptake \r\nof alternative low- or zero-carbon fuels in ports depend upon \r\ninvestments in infrastructure  - including bunkering infrastructure, \r\nrefinery readiness, reliable supply of the fuels, as well as sustainable \r\nproduction. The ship lifetime and age also play a  role; retrofitting \r\nships to accommodate engines and fuel systems for new fuel types \r\nmay not be an option for older vessels. As such, operational efficiency \r\nbecomes more important (Bullock et  al. 2020). There is some \r\npotential to continue to improve the energy efficiency of vessels \r\nthrough operational changes (Traut et al. 2018), reducing the speed \r\nor 'slow steaming' (Bullock et al. 2020), and improved efficiency in \r\nport operations (Viktorelius and Lundh 2019; Poulsen and Sampson \r\n2020)"


id: a38591ecda3c3cb0b4e4f8f019a1036e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23292
content:
" There is also a growing interest in onboard technologies for \r\ncapturing carbon, with prototype ships underway showing 65-90% \r\npotential reduction in CO2 emissions (Luo and Wang 2017; Awoyomi \r\net al. 2020; Japan Ship Technology Research Association et al. 2020). \r\nChallenges identified include CO2 capture efficiency (Zhou and Wang \r\n2014), increased operating costs, and limited onboard power supply \r\n(Fang et  al. 2019). Furthermore, designing CO2 storage tanks for \r\ntransport to shore may pose a challenge, as the volume and weight \r\nof captured CO2 could be up to four times more than standard oil \r\n(Decarre et al. 2010)."


id: 71666edc7ed8007011dfb92cd0ee54e6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15478
content:
"As noted in Section 10.3, LNG has been found to have a relatively \r\nlimited mitigation potential and may not be viewed as a low-carbon \r\nalternative, but has a  higher availability than other fuel options \r\n(Gilbert et al. 2018). Emissions reductions across the full fuel lifecycle \r\nare found in the order of 10%, with ranges reported from -30% \r\n(reduction) to +8% (increase), if switching from heavy fuel oil to LNG, \r\nas indicated in Figure 10.15 (Bengtsson et al. 2011). Regardless of the \r\nproduction pathway, the literature points to the risk of methane slip \r\n(emissions of unburnt methane especially at low engine loads and \r\nfrom transport to ports) from LNG-fuelled vessels, with no current \r\nregulation on emissions caps (Anderson et al. 2015; Ushakov et al. \r\n2019; Peng et al. 2020). Leakage rates are a critical point for the total \r\nclimate impact of LNG as a fuel, where high pressure engines remedy \r\nthis more than low pressure ones. As discussed in Section 10"


id: d7a145f576fe3527fb92b265a938298a
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content:
"3, some \r\nconsider LNG as a  transition fuel, while some literature points to \r\nthe risk of stranded assets due to the increasing decarbonisation \r\nregulation from IMO and the challenge of meeting IMO's 2030 \r\nemissions reductions targets using this fuel."


id: f8d79e01eb8605a343e21ab7d3a24302
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36660
content:
"Changes in design and engineering provide potential for reducing \r\nemissions from shipping through a range of measures, for example \r\nby optimising hull design and vessel shape, power and propulsion \r\nsystems that include wind- or solar-assisted propulsion, and through \r\nimproved operations of vessels and ports. Figure 10.15 shows that \r\nsuch measures may decrease emissions by 5-40%, though with \r\na broad range in potential (Bouman et al. 2017). Nuclear propulsion \r\ncould decrease emissions from individual vessels by 98%. Battery\u0002or hybrid-electric ships have been identified as a means to reduce \r\nemissions in short-sea shipping such as ferries and inland waterways \r\n(Gagatsi et  al. 2016), which may also importantly reduce near\u0002shore SLCF pollution (Nguyen et al. 2020). Figure 10.15 shows that \r\nthe median emissions from electric ships can be about 40% lower \r\nthan equivalent fossil-based vessels but can vary widely"


id: c64f6f802ea56cf10a92578ba112bf35
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28778
content:
" The wide \r\nreduction potential of battery electric propulsion is due to different \r\nassumptions about the CO2 intensity of the electricity used and the \r\nlevels of CO2 footprints associated with battery production."


id: f5d5f6a0bffd7f7be23c475627542ce6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36193
content:
"In addition to fossil and e-fuels, advanced biofuels might play a role to \r\nprovide the energy demand for future shipping. Biomass is presently \r\nused to produce alcohol fuels (such as ethanol and methanol), liquid \r\nbiogas, or biodiesel that can be used for shipping and could reduce \r\nCO2 emissions from this segment. As explained in Box  10.2 and \r\nChapter  7, the GHG footprint associated with biofuels is strongly \r\ndependent on the incurred land use and land-use change emissions. \r\nAdvanced biofuels from processing cellulose rather than sugar are \r\nlikely to be more attractive in terms of the quantities required but \r\nare not commercially available (Section  10.3). The estimates of \r\nemissions reductions from biofuels shown in Figure  10.15 rely on \r\ndata from the Integrated Assessment Models  - Energy Modelling \r\nForum 33 (IAM EMF33), partial models assuming constant land cover \r\n(CLC), and partial models using natural growth (NRG). Box 10.2 and \r\nSection 10"


id: 497184d72c0ad38f70ea75ce78c99183
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8944
content:
"4 include a more detailed description of the assumptions \r\nunderlying these models and their estimates. The results based on \r\nIAM EMF33 and CLC suggests median mitigation potential of around \r\n73% for advanced biofuels in shipping, while the NRG-based results \r\nsuggest increased emissions from biofuels. The EMF33 and CLC \r\nresults rely on modelling approaches compatible with the scenarios \r\nin the AR6 database (Chapter 6 and Box 7.7)."


id: d970868551ee31dde56614ab3364235
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31722
content:
"Figure 10.15 | Emissions reductions potential of alternative fuels compared to conventional fuels in the shipping sector. The x-axis is reported in %. Each \r\nindividual marker represents a data point from the literature, where the brown square indicates a full LCA CO2-eq value; light blue triangles tank-to-wake CO2-eq; red triangles \r\nwell-to-wake CO2-eq; yellow triangles well-to-wake CO2; and dark blue circles tank-to-wake CO2 emissions reduction potentials. The values in the Figure rely on the 100-year \r\nGWP value embedded in the source data, which may differ slightly with the updated 100-year GWP values from WGI. 'n' indicates the number of data points per sub-panel. Grey \r\nshaded boxes represent data where the energy comes from fossil resources, and blue from low-carbon renewable energy sources. 'Advanced biofuels EMF33' refers to emissions \r\nfactors derived from simulation results from the integrated assessment models EMF33 scenarios (darkest coloured box in top left panel)"


id: ad027d85af42ca987b3b3cfd10ff7de2
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vector_id: 24765
content:
" Biofuels partial models CLC refers to \r\npartial models with constant land cover. Biofuels partial models NRG refers to partial models with natural regrowth. For ammonia and hydrogen, low-carbon fuel is produced \r\nvia electrolysis using low-carbon electricity, and 'fossil' refers to fuels produced via steam methane reforming of natural gas."


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"The coming decade is projected to be costly for the shipping sector, \r\nas it is preparing to meet the 2030 and 2050 emissions reduction \r\ntargets set by the IMO (UNCTAD 2018). With enough investments, \r\nincentives, and regulation, substantial reductions of CO2 emissions \r\nfrom shipping could be achieved through alternative energy carriers. \r\nThe literature suggests that their cost could be manyfold higher \r\nthan for conventional fuels, which in itself could reduce demand \r\nfor shipping, and hence its emissions, but could make the transition \r\ndifficult. R&D may help reduce these costs. The literature points to the \r\nneed for developing technology roadmaps for enabling the maritime \r\ntransport sector to get on to pathways for decarbonisation early \r\nenough to reach global goals (Kuramochi et  al. 2018). Accounting \r\nfor the full lifecycle emissions of the vessels and the fuels is required \r\nto meet the overall long-term objectives of cutting GHG and SLCF \r\nemissions"


id: 3ec9d427eafc70996164faca13fc58cf
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" The urgency of implementing measures for reducing \r\nemissions is considered to be high, considering the lifetime of vessels \r\nis typically 20 years, if not more."


id: 99374b1e86fa83c820800d73015b92a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"In 2020, the IMO approved the short-term goal-based measure \r\nto reduce the carbon intensity of existing international vessels. \r\nThis  measure addresses both technical and operational strategies. \r\nThe operational element is represented by a  Carbon Intensity \r\nIndicator (CII), and the technical element is represented by the Energy \r\nEfficiency Existing Ship Index (EEXI), which will apply to ships from \r\n2023. The EEXI builds upon the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), \r\nwhich is a legally-binding mitigation regulation for newbuild ships, \r\nestablished as a series of baselines for the amount of fuel ships may \r\nburn for a particular cargo-carrying capacity. The EEDI differs per ship \r\nsegment. For example, ships built in 2022 and beyond should be \r\n50% more energy efficient than those built in 2013. This legislation \r\naims to reduce GHG emissions in particular. Energy efficiency may \r\nbe improved by several of the mitigation options outlined above"


id: 1c61a72f52b733bfa5a3b7930b624171
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" \r\nThe Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) is seen as the \r\ninternational governance instrument to improve energy efficiency and \r\nhence emissions from ships. SEEMP is a measure to enable changes \r\nto operational measures and retrofits (see Johnson et al. 2013). The \r\ncombination of EEXI, EEDI, and SEEMP may reduce emissions by \r\n23% by 2030 compared to a 'no policy' scenario (Sims et al. 2014). \r\nWith regards to accountability, it is mandatory for ships greater than \r\nor equal to 5000 gross tonnage to collect fuel consumption data, \r\nas well as specified data. Such as for transport work. Similarly, \r\nthe EU Monitoring, Reporting and Verification Regulation requires \r\nmandatory reporting of a vessel's fuel consumption when operating \r\nin European waters."


id: a1c8d744884cc56a5e60152362f58667
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"the 21st century after a high overshoot. By 2080, median values for \r\nthe same set of scenarios reach net zero CO2 emissions. IAMs often \r\ndo not report emissions pathways for shipping transport and the \r\nsector is underrepresented in most IAMs (Esmeijer et al. 2020). Hence \r\npathways established outside IAMs can be different for the sector. \r\nIndeed, the IMO projections for growth in transport demand (Faber \r\net al. 2020) indicate increases of 40-100% by 2050 for the global \r\nfleet. Faber and et al. (2020), at the same time predict reductions in \r\ntrade for fossil fuels dependent on decarbonisation trajectories. The \r\nenergy efficiency improvements of the vessels in these scenarios are \r\ntypically of 20-30%. This offsets some of the increases from higher \r\ndemand in the future scenarios"


id: 5dfe0433a4840a2efabcf5cd8e59f6b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12320
content:
" Fuels assessed by the Fourth IMO \r\nGHG study were limited to heavy fuel oil, marine gasoil, LNG, and \r\nmethanol, with a fuels mix ranging from 91-98% conventional fuel \r\nuse and a small remainder of alternative fuels (primarily LNG and \r\nsome methanol). Panel (b) shows average fleetwide emissions of CO2\r\nbased on these aggregate growth and emissions trajectories from \r\nthe IMO scenarios. In these scenarios, CO2 emissions from shipping \r\nremain stable or grow compared to 2020 modelled levels. These \r\nresults contrast with the low emissions trajectories in the C1-C2 bin \r\nin panel (a). It seems evident that the scenarios in the AR6 database \r\nexplore a  broader solutions space for the sector than the Fourth \r\nGHG study by the IMO. However, the 1.5degC-2degC warming goal has \r\nled to an IMO 2050 target of 40% reduction in carbon intensity \r\nby 2030, which would require emissions reduction efforts to begin \r\nimmediately"


id: f193fcd25d2173272dbbeb34efb0d861
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 35512
content:
" Results from global models suggest the solutions space \r\nfor deep emissions reductions in shipping is available."


id: b67d9236561e44f72dc41a7a2edc9f30
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 26230
content:
"In 2018, transport emitted 8.5 GtCO2-eq, reaching a near doubling \r\nfrom 1990 levels after two decades of 2% per year emissions growth \r\n(Section 10.1). Assessing future trajectories, Figure 10.17 provides an \r\noverview of direct CO2 emissions estimates from the transport sector \r\nacross IAMs (colour bars) and selected global transport models (grey \r\nbars). The results from the IAMs are grouped in bins by temperature \r\ngoal. Global transport energy models are grouped into reference and \r\npolicy bins, since the transport sector cannot by itself achieve fixed \r\nglobal temperature goals. The policy scenarios in GTEMs and NTEMs \r\ncover a wide range of 'non-reference' scenarios, which include, for \r\nexample, assumptions based on the 'fair share action' principles. In \r\nthese scenarios, transport emissions reach reductions consistent with \r\nthe overall emissions trajectories aligning with warming levels of 2degC"


id: a03b8d5b63829a421d18fe0fab844011
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" \r\nThese scenarios may also consider strengthening existing transport \r\npolicies, such as increasing fuel economy standards or large-scale \r\ndeployments of electric vehicles. In most cases, these Policy scenarios \r\nare not necessarily in line with the temperature goals explored by \r\nthe IAMs."


id: a84a95592bb13a10f902d92bb555ddf1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 24007
content:
"IAMs integrate factors from other sectors that interact with the \r\ntransport system endogenously, such as fuel availability and costs. \r\nIAMs minimise mitigation costs to achieve a  temperature goal \r\nacross all sectors of the economy over a long time horizon (typically \r\nto 2100). IAMs typically capture mitigation options for energy \r\nand carbon intensity changes with greater technology/fuel details and \r\nendogeneity linked to the other sectors. In the scenarios with very \r\nlarge-scale electrification of the transport sector, the coupling with the \r\nother sectors in fuel production, storage, and utilisation becomes more \r\nimportant. G-/NTEMs and related regional transport sectoral models \r\nhave more details on transport demand, technology, behaviours, and \r\npolicies than IAMs, but treat the interactions with the other sectors \r\nexogenously, potentially missing some critical interactions, such as \r\nthe fuel prices and carbon intensity of electricity"


id: 4832743d975b4d96f4732aec7f4b1f87
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8731
content:
" National models \r\nhave detailed representation of national policies related to transport \r\nand energy, sometimes with greater spatial resolution. Compared \r\nwith IAMs, G-/NTEMs typically have greater detailed representation \r\nto explore mitigation options along the activity and mode dimensions \r\nwhere spatial, cultural, and behavioural details can be more explicitly \r\nrepresented. Section 5 in Annex III provides more details about these \r\ntypes of models. Scenarios for shipping and aviation are handled in \r\nmore detail in sections 10.5 and 10.6, respectively."


id: 18043d69af6b58a5f470abb0c402796
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"According to the collection of simulations from the IAM and GTEM \r\nmodels shown in Figure 10.17, global transport emissions could grow \r\nup to 2-47% (5-95th percentile) by 2030 and -6-130% by 2050 \r\nunder the C7 scenarios that limit warming to 4degC (>50%) throughout \r\nthe 21st century and C8 scenarios that exceed 4degC (>=50%) during the \r\n21st century. Population and GDP growth and the secondary effects, \r\nincluding higher travel service demand per  capita and increased \r\nfreight activities per  GDP, drive the growth in emissions in these \r\nscenarios (Section 10.7.3). Though transport efficiencies (energy use \r\nper pkm travelled and per tkm of goods delivered) are expected to \r\ncontinue to improve in line with the historical trends (Section 10.7.4), \r\ntotal transport emissions would grow due to roughly constant carbon \r\nintensity (Section 10.7"


id: 6341dfd904248a41719d97d510c3b9b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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"5) under the C7 and C8 scenarios that limit \r\nwarming to 4degC (>50%) throughout the 21st  century or exceed \r\n4degC (>=50%) during the 21st century. In these scenarios, Significant \r\nincreases in emissions (>150% for the medium values by 2050) would \r\ncome from Asia and Pacific, the Middle East, and Africa. Compared \r\nto estimated 2020 levels, in 2050 Developed Countries would have \r\nmedian 25% decrease in transport emissions in the C7 scenarios that \r\nlimit warming to 4degC (>50%) throughout the 21st century or median \r\n15% increase in transport emissions in the C8 scenarios that exceed \r\nwarming of 4degC (>=50%) during the 21st century."


id: 3cba9551154861219994487478ce4ccb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
"studies have generally used bottom-up models (see Annex III) for the \r\nanalysis, but in some cases, they are run by national teams using \r\nglobal models (e.g., the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) \r\nfor China and India). National studies show that transport CO2\r\nemissions could decline significantly in low-carbon scenarios in all \r\nthe developed countries reviewed (Bataille et  al. 2015; Kainuma \r\net al. 2015; Hillebrandt et al. 2015; Mathy et al. 2015; Pye et al. 2015; \r\nVirdis et al. 2015; Williams et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2016a) in 2050 \r\nfrom the emissions in 2010 and reductions could vary from 65% to \r\n95%. However, in developing countries reviewed (Di Sbroiavacca \r\net al. 2014; Altieri et al. 2015; Buira and Tovilla 2015; Rovere et al. \r\n2015; Shukla et al. 2015; Siagian et al. 2015; Teng et al. 2015; Dhar \r\net al. 2018), emissions could increase in 2050 in the range of 35% \r\nto 83% relative to 2010 levels"


id: cc5cbbaf9e6fdf1667098de5f8e62ada
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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content:
" Transport CO2 emissions per capita \r\nin the developing countries were much lower in 2010 (varying \r\nfrom 0.15 to 1.39 tCO2 per capita) relative to developed countries \r\n(varying from 1.76 to 5.95 tCO2 per capita). However, results from \r\nnational modelling efforts suggest that, by 2050, the CO2 emissions \r\nper capita in developed countries (varying from 0.19 to 1.04 tCO2\r\nper  capita) could be much lower than in developing countries \r\n(varying from 0.21 to 1.7 tCO2 per capita)."


id: 7407da705ab0d4f602ae81e9af8e6e3b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15856
content:
"To meet temperature goals, by 2050 global transport emissions \r\nwould need to decrease by 17% (+67% to -23% for the 5-95th \r\npercentile) below 2020Mod levels in the scenarios that limit warming \r\nto 2degC (>67%), 2degC (>50%) and 2.5 degC (>50%) throughout the \r\n21st century (C3-C5 scenarios - orange bars), and 47% (14-80% for \r\nthe 5-95th percentile) in the scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) during the 21st  century with no or limited overshoot or \r\nreturn to 1.5degC (>50%) during the 21st century after high overshoot \r\nduring the 21st  century (C1-C2 scenarios  - green bars). However, \r\ntransport-related emission reductions may not happen uniformly \r\nacross regions. For example, transport emissions from the Developed \r\nCountries and Eastern Europe and West Central Asia would decrease \r\nfrom 2020 levels by 2050 across all C1-C2 scenarios, but could \r\nincrease in Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, and \r\nthe Middle East, in some of these scenarios"


id: 65b6d7a5739d650e9a4c206cedce51cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13584
content:
" In particular, the median \r\ntransport emissions in India and Africa could increase by 2050 in C1-\r\nC2 scenarios, while the 95th percentile emissions in Asia and Pacific, \r\nLatin America and Caribbean, and the Middle East, could be higher \r\nin 2050 than in 2020."


id: 8a99fd9e3000a84dcc4537e10e0d0de4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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vector_id: 19345
content:
"The Reference scenario emission pathways from GTEMs described in \r\nFigure 10.17 have similar ranges to C7-C8 scenario groups in 2050. \r\nThe Policy scenarios are roughly in line with C6-C7 scenarios for \r\nthe world region. The results suggest that the majority of the Policy \r\nscenarios examined by the GTEMS reviewed here are in the range of \r\nthe C3-C6 scenarios examined by the IAMs (Gota et al. 2016; IEA \r\n2017b; Yeh et al. 2017; Fisch-Romito and Guivarch 2019). The NDCs \r\nin the transport sector include a mix of measures targeting efficiency \r\nimprovements of vehicles and trucks; improving public transit \r\nservices; decarbonising fuels with alternative fuels and technologies \r\nincluding biofuels, fossil- or bio-based natural gas, and electrification; \r\nintelligent transport systems; and vehicle restrictions (Gota et  al. \r\n2016). Because of the long lag-time for technology turnover, these \r\nmeasures are not expected to change 2030 emissions significantly"


id: 6564fc24b1370802d8e1b3e0dd0964c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13528
content:
"The transport scenario literature's mean outcomes suggest that \r\nthe transport sector may take a  less steep emissions reduction \r\ntrajectory than the cross-sectoral average and still be consistent \r\nwith the 2degC goal. For example, most of the scenarios that limit or \r\nreturn warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during the 21st century (C1-C2) \r\nreach zero emissions by 2060, whereas transport sector emissions \r\nare estimated in the range of 20% of the 2020Mod level (4-65% \r\nfor the 10th to 90th percentiles) by 2100. This finding is in line with \r\nperspectives in the literature suggesting that transport is one of the \r\nmost difficult sectors to decarbonise (Davis et  al. 2018). There is, \r\nhowever, quite a spread in the results for 2050. Since temperature \r\nwarming levels relate to global emissions from all sectors, modelling \r\nresults from IAMs tend to suggest that in the short and medium term, \r\nthere might be lower cost mitigation options outside the transport \r\nsector"


id: 8ab9be717f5c39c84b554e8dd95282ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19368
content:
" On the other hand, compared with GTEMs/NTEMs, some IAMs \r\nmay have limited mitigation options available, including technology, \r\nbehavioural changes, and policy tools especially for aviation and \r\nshipping. The models therefore rely on other sectors and/or negative \r\nemissions elsewhere to achieve the overall desired warming levels. \r\nThis potential shortcoming should be kept in mind when interpreting \r\nthe sectoral results from IAMs."


id: c83a09f0dbad4fa24791056772af9ec4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29078
content:
"GTEMs show broad ranges for future travel demand, particularly for \r\nthe freight sector. These results show more dependency on models \r\nthan on baseline or policy scenarios. According to ITF Transport \r\nOutlook (ITF 2019), global passenger transport and freight demand \r\ncould more than double by 2050 in a  business-as-usual scenario. \r\nMulholland et  al. (2018) suggest the freight sector could grow \r\n2.4-fold over 2015-2050 in the reference scenario, with the majority \r\nof growth attributable to developing countries. The IEA suggests \r\na more modest increase in passenger transport, from 51 trillion pkm \r\nin 2014 to 110 trillion pkm in 2060, in a reference scenario without \r\nclimate policies and a climate scenario that would limit emissions \r\nbelow 2degC. The demand for land-based freight transport in 2060 \r\nis, however, slightly lower in the climate scenario (116 trillion tkm) \r\ncompared to the reference scenario (130 trillion tkm) (IEA 2017b)"


id: 1971f294e36b534a3873dcd60b6ff926
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1487
content:
" \r\nThe ITF, however, suggests that ambitious decarbonisation policies \r\ncould reduce global demand for passenger transport by 13-20% \r\nin 2050, compared to the business-as-usual scenario (ITF 2019; ITF \r\n2021). The reduction in vehicle travel through shared mobility could \r\nreduce emissions from urban passenger transport by 30% compared \r\nto the business-as-usual scenario. Others suggest that reductions \r\nlarger than 25%, on average, for both passenger and freight in 2030 \r\nand 2050 may be needed to achieve very low carbon emissions \r\npathways (Fisch-Romito and Guivarch 2019). In the absence of large\u0002scale carbon dioxide removal, few global studies highlight the need \r\nfor significant demand reduction in critical sectors (aviation, shipping \r\nand road freight) in well below 2degC scenarios (van Vuuren et al. 2018; \r\nGrant et al. 2021; Sharmina et al. 2021)."


id: f9c31bc226d689e572ce9e9624a973c0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36806
content:
"Figure  10.18 shows activity trajectories for both freight and \r\npassenger transport based on the AR6 database for IAMs. According \r\nto demand projections from the IAMs, global passenger and freight \r\ntransport demand could increase relative to a modelled year 2020 \r\nacross temperature goals. The median transport demand from IAMs \r\nfor all the scenarios in line with warming levels below 2.5degC (C1-C5) \r\nsuggests that global passenger transport demand could grow by \r\n1.14-1.3 times in 2030 and by 1.5-1.8 times in 2050 (1.27-2.33 for \r\nthe 5-95th percentile across C1-C5 scenarios) relative to modelled \r\n2020 level. Developed regions including North America and Europe \r\nexhibit lower growth in passenger demand in 2050 compared to \r\ndeveloping countries across all the scenarios"


id: 9981e9884dd7400f113e8f1a6545f98f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21679
content:
" In 2030, most of the \r\nglobal passenger demand growth happens in Africa (44% growth \r\nrelative to 2020), and Asia and Pacific (57% growth in China and 59% \r\ngrowth in India relative to 2020) in the scenarios that limit warming \r\nbelow 2.5degC (>50%) throughout the 21st century (C5). These regions \r\nstart from a low level of per capita demand. For example, in India, \r\ndemand may grow by 84%. However, the per capita demand in 2010 \r\nwas under 7000  km per  person per  year (Dhar and Shukla 2015). \r\nSimilarly, in China, demand may grow by 52%, starting from per capita \r\ndemand of 8000 km per person per year in 2010 (Pan et al. 2018). \r\nThe per capita passenger demand in these regions was lower than in \r\ndeveloped countries in 2010, but it converges towards the per capita \r\npassenger transport demand of advanced economies in less stringent \r\nclimate scenarios (C6-C7). Demand for passenger travel would grow \r\nat a  slower rate in the stricter temperature stabilisation scenarios \r\n(<2"


id: bad785718652d028fef4f88564aaf2d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26933
content:
"5degC and 1.5degC scenarios, C1-C5) compared to the scenarios \r\nwith higher warming levels (C7-C8). The median global passenger \r\ndemand in the scenarios that limit or return warming to 1.5degC during \r\nthe 21st century (C1-C2) is 27% lower in 2050 relative to C8."


id: 7b57f95f80a53cebd8a660cd0febc7ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:48
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16995
content:
"Due to limited data availability, globally consistent freight data is \r\ndifficult to obtain. In 2015, global freight demand was estimated to \r\nbe 108 trillion tkm, most of which was transported by sea (ITF 2019). \r\nThe growth rates of freight service demand vary dramatically among \r\ndifferent regions: over the 1975-2015 period, road freight activity \r\nin India increased more than 9-fold, 30-fold in China, and 2.5-fold \r\nin the US (Mulholland et al. 2018). Global freight demand continues \r\nto grow but at a slower rate compared to passenger demand across \r\nall the scenarios in 2050 compared to modelled 2020 values. Global \r\nmedian freight demand could increase by 1.17-1.28 times in 2030 \r\nand 1.18-1.7 times in 2050 in all the scenarios with warming below \r\n2.5degC (C1-C5)"


id: c8e2ec6c16611ef764214b3a7df0d742
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29166
content:
" Like passenger transport, the models suggest that \r\na  large share of growth occurs in Africa and Asian regions (59% \r\ngrowth in India and 50% growth in China in 2030 relative to \r\na modelled year 2020) in the C5 scenarios that limit warming below \r\n2.5degC (>50%) throughout the 21st  century. Global median freight \r\ndemand grows more slowly in the stringent temperature stabilisation \r\nscenarios, and is 40% and 22% lower in 2050 in the scenarios that "


id: 7e92cf48769beda9fc8604e1d2ac0a64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17478
content:
"road passenger transport, scenarios that limit or return warming \r\nto 1.5degC during the 21st  century (C1-C2) have a  smaller increase \r\nfrom modelled 2020 levels (median increase of 2.4 times modelled \r\n2020 levels) than do scenarios with higher warming levels (C3-C8) \r\n(median increase of 2.7-2.8 times modelled 2020 levels). There are \r\nsimilar patterns for passenger road transport via light-duty vehicle, \r\nfor which median increases from modelled 2020 levels are smaller \r\nfor C1-C2 (3 times larger) than for C3-C5 (3.1 times larger) or C6-C7 \r\n(3.2 times larger). Passenger transport via aviation exhibits a  2.2 \r\ntimes median increase relative to modelled 2020 levels under C1-C2 \r\nand C3-C5 scenarios but exhibits a 6.2 times increase under C6-C8. \r\nThe only passenger travel mode that exhibits a decline in its median \r\nvalue through 2100 according to IAMs is walking/bicycling, in C3-\r\nC5 and C6-C8 scenarios. However, in C1-C2 scenarios, walking/\r\nbicycling increases by 1"


id: d0fe4f0373fd215c031dc9f329034897
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30415
content:
"4 times relative to modelled 2020 levels. \r\nAt the 5th percentile of IAM solutions (lower edge of bands in \r\nFigure 10.19), buses and walking/bicycling for passenger travel both \r\nexhibit significant declines."


id: 48390768d84bd2a6608ba4a2e033107a
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8733
content:
"For freight, Figure  10.19 shows that the largest growth occurs in \r\ntransport via road (Mulholland et al. 2018). By 2100, global transport \r\nmodels suggest a  roughly four-fold increase in median-heavy-duty \r\ntrucking levels relative to modelled 2020 levels, while IAMs suggest \r\na  two- to four-fold increase in freight transport by road by 2100. \r\nNotably, the 95th percentile of IAM solutions see road transport \r\nby up to 4.7 times through 2100 relative to modelled 2020 levels, \r\nregardless of warming level. Other freight transport modes - aviation, \r\ninternational shipping, navigation, and railways - exhibit less growth \r\nthan road transport. In scenarios that limit or return warming to \r\n1.5degC (>50%) during the 21st  century (C1-C2), navigation and \r\nrail transport remain largely unchanged and international shipping \r\nroughly doubles by 2100. Scenarios with higher warming (i.e"


id: 5e4202b1065172b85f446b308e657df1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12354
content:
", moving \r\nfrom C1-C2 to C6-C8) generally lead to more freight by rail and less \r\nfreight by international shipping."


id: a2dbc7727e38fe46fdd3e6635284bc1e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
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vector_id: 23192
content:
"Globally over the last century, shares of faster transport modes have \r\ngenerally increased with increasing passenger travel demand (Schafer \r\n2017; Schafer and Victor 2000). For short- to medium-distance travel, \r\nprivate cars have displaced public transit, particularly in OECD \r\ncountries, due to a variety of factors, including faster travel times in \r\nmany circumstances (Liao et al. 2020); consumers increasingly valuing \r\ntime and convenience with GDP growth; and broader transport \r\npolicies, such as provision of road versus public transit infrastructure \r\n(Mattioli et al. 2020). For long-distance travel, travel via aviation for \r\nleisure and business has increased (Lee et al. 2021). These trends do \r\nnot hold in all countries and cities, as many now have rail transit \r\nthat is faster than driving (Newman et  al. 2015). For instance, \r\npublic transport demand rose from 1990 through to 2016 in France, \r\nDenmark, and Finland (eurostat 2019)"


id: 533b3e7de1ed16cb196013bc7ca2a964
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10564
content:
" In general, smaller and denser \r\ncountries and cities with higher or increasing urbanisation rates tend \r\nto have greater success in increasing public transport share. However, \r\nother factors, like privatisation of public transit (Bayliss and Mattioli \r\n2018) and urban form (ITF 2021), also play a role. Different transport \r\nmodes can provide passenger and freight services, affecting the \r\nemissions trajectories for the sector."


id: 1cc5677626a2c1aa57820af017fb7d23
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 1979
content:
"Relative to global trajectories, upper-income regions  - including \r\nNorth America, Europe, and the Pacific OECD  - generally see less \r\ngrowth in passenger road via light-duty vehicle and passenger \r\naviation, given more saturated demand for both. Other regions like \r\nChina exhibit similar modal trends as the global average, whereas \r\nregions such as the African continent and Indian subcontinent exhibit \r\nsignificantly larger shifts, proportionally, in modal transport than the \r\nglobe. In particular, the African continent represents the starkest \r\ndeparture from global results. Freight and passenger transport modes \r\nexhibit significantly greater growth across Africa than globally in all \r\navailable scenarios. Across Africa, median freight and passenger \r\ntransport via road from IAMs increases by 5 to 16 times and 4 to \r\n28 times, respectively, across warming levels by 2100 relative \r\nto modelled 2020 levels"


id: 191bbe46ea2147a61abf77a65a961bc0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
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vector_id: 1442
content:
" Even C1 has considerable growth in Africa \r\nvia both modes (3 to 16 times increase for freight and 4 to 29 times \r\nincrease for passenger travel at 5th and 95th percentiles of IAM \r\nsolutions by 2100)."


id: 724b22c4f56b5cc56071cc2977eb97b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
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vector_id: 15608
content:
"The scenarios in line with warming levels of 1.5degC or 2degC goals \r\n(C1 to C4) show different trends for freight's energy intensity. The \r\namount of overshoot and differences in demand for freight services \r\nand, to some extent, fuel carbon intensities contribute to these \r\ndifferences. For the two scenarios aligning with the warming levels \r\nof 1.5degC, the trajectories in 2030 and 2050 are quite different. The \r\nmedian C2 scenario that returns warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during \r\nthe 21st century after high overshoot takes a trajectory with lower \r\nenergy intensity improvements in the first half of the century. In \r\ncontrast, the C1 scenario that limits warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during \r\nthe 21st century with no or limited overshoot take on a more steadily \r\ndeclining trajectory across the means. The IAMs provide a less clear \r\npicture of required energy intensity improvements for freight than \r\nfor passenger transport associated with different temperature \r\ntargets"


id: 28ed226580e7d0287bb3ddb365aa543c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 3872
content:
" As for the carbon intensity of direct energy used across \r\nboth passenger and freight, the modelling scenarios suggest very \r\nmoderate reductions by 2030. The interquartile ranges for the C1 \r\nscenarios suggest global average reductions in carbon intensity of \r\n5-10%. Across the other scenarios compatible with warming levels \r\nof 1.5degC or 2degC (C2-C4), the interquartile ranges span from 1-6% \r\nreductions in carbon intensity of direct energy used for transport. For \r\n2050, the scenarios suggest that dependence on fuel decarbonisation \r\nincreases with more stringent temperature targets. For the scenarios \r\nthat limits warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during the 21st century with no \r\nor limited overshoot (C1), global carbon intensity of energy used for \r\ntransport decreases by 37-60% (interquartile range) by 2050 with \r\na mean of 50% reduction. The IAM scenarios in the AR6 database \r\ndo not suggest full decarbonisation of transport fuels by 2100"


id: 4cc84528c08232570ff11d1c85798bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9507
content:
" The \r\ninterquartile ranges across the C1-C4 set of scenarios, compatible \r\nwith warming levels of 2degC and less, span from 61-91% reduction \r\nfrom 2020Mod levels."


id: d8b332d9d11b29aeaa1cce22adb2d038
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31607
content:
"travel (Creutzig et al. 2018; Grubler et al. 2018; Wilson et al. 2019), \r\nimproved logistics efficiency, green logistics, and streamlined supply \r\nchains for the freight sector (Mulholland et  al. 2018). NDCs often \r\nprioritise options like bus improvements and enhanced mobility that \r\nyield pollution, congestion, and urban development co-benefits, \r\nespecially in medium- and lower-income countries (Fulton et  al. \r\n2017). Conversely, high-income countries, most of which have \r\nsaturated and entrenched private vehicle ownership, typically focus \r\nmore on technology options, such as electrification and fuel efficiency \r\nstandards (Gota et al. 2016). Available IAM and regional models are \r\nlimited in their ability to represent modal shift strategies. As a result, \r\nmode shifts alone do not differentiate climate scenarios"


id: 8a64dc8736b297807b666b2172c566a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
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vector_id: 19312
content:
" While this \r\nlack of representation is a limitation of the models, it is unlikely that \r\nsuch interventions would completely negate the increases in demand \r\nthe models suggest. Therefore, transport via light-duty vehicle and \r\naviation, freight transport via road, and other modes will likely \r\ncontinue to increase through to the end of the century. Consequently, \r\nfuel and carbon efficiency and fuel energy and technology will \r\nprobably play crucial roles in differentiating climate scenarios, as \r\ndiscussed in the following sub-sections."


id: 2bf1a4c6727617f82610f3d9f1c36f49
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4342
content:
"This section explores what vehicle energy efficiencies and fuel \r\ncarbon intensity trajectories, from the data available in the AR6 \r\ndatabase from IAMs and GTEMs, could be compatible with different \r\ntemperature goals. Figure 10.20 shows passenger and freight energy \r\nintensity, and fuel carbon intensity, indexed relative to 2020Mod \r\nvalues. The top panel shows passenger energy intensity across all \r\nmodes. LDVs constitute a  major share of this segment. Yeh et  al. \r\n(2017) report 2.5-2.75 MJ vkm-1 in 2020 across models for the LDV \r\nsegment, which is very close to the IEA estimate of 2.5 MJ vkm-1 for \r\nthe global average fuel consumption for LDVs in 2017 (IEA 2020d). \r\nFor reference, these numbers correspond to 1.6-1.7  MJ  pkm-1 for \r\nan occupancy rate of 1.5. The following results of the AR6 database \r\nare conditional on the corresponding reductions in fuel carbon \r\nintensity. Figure  10"


id: 1abe5a57bb9d1606bed854fa8b6cebb7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 1679
content:
"20 shows that the scenarios suggest that \r\npassenger transport's energy intensity drops to between 10-23% \r\n(interquartile ranges across C1-C4) in 2030 for scenarios in line with \r\nwarming levels below 2degC. In 2050, the medians across the group \r\nof scenarios that limit or return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) during \r\nthe 21st century (C1-C2), and scenarios that limit warming to 2degC\r\n(>67% or >50%) throughout the 2st century (C3-C4) suggest energy \r\nintensity reductions of 51% and 45-46% respectively. These values \r\ncorrespond to annual average energy efficiency improvement rates \r\nof 2.3-2.4% and 2.0-2.1%, respectively, from 2020 to 2050. For \r\nreference, the IEA reports an annual energy efficiency improvement \r\nrate of 1.85% per  year in 2005-16 (IEA 2020d). In contrast, the \r\nresults from GTEMs suggest lower energy efficiency improvement, \r\nwith median values for policy scenarios of 39% reduction in 2050, \r\ncorresponding to annual energy efficiency improvement rates close to \r\n1.6%"


id: d9e2a31fc75176336b42411c3b356b7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31799
content:
" The IAM scenarios suggest median energy intensity reductions \r\nof passenger transport of 57-61% by the end of the century would \r\nalign with warming levels of both 1.5degC and 2degC (C1-C4) given the \r\ncorresponding decarbonisation of the fuels."


id: dca3011bf610b6473d35887fc6fb406c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
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vector_id: 32217
content:
"considerable climate benefits. Their scenarios reach nearly 100% \r\nelectrification of LDVs globally, leading to global GHG emissions from \r\nLDVs ranging from 0% to 50% of 2010 levels in 2050 (Lutsey 2015). \r\nKhalili et  al.(2019) estimate transport stocks through 2050 under \r\naggressive climate mitigation scenarios that nearly eliminate road \r\ntransport emissions. They find the demand for passenger transport \r\ncould triple through 2050, but emissions targets could be met \r\nthrough widespread adoption of BEVs (80% of LDVs) and, to a lesser \r\nextent, fuel cell and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles. Contrary to these \r\nestimates, the US Energy Information Administration finds small \r\nadoption of electrification for LDVs and instead identifies diffusion of \r\nnatural gas-fuelled LDVs in OECD and, to a greater extent, non-OECD \r\ncountries through 2040"


id: d082ad345d56ef1a344bb72366506c4c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 30330
content:
" This trend occurs in a reference and a 'low \r\nliquids' case, which lowers LDV ownership growth rates and increases \r\npreferences for alternative fuel vehicles. A comprehensive overview \r\nof regional technology adoption models across many methodological \r\napproaches can be found in Jochem et al. (2018)."


id: 686e1f498db9ded7c88d4c52a79f87ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14014
content:
"IAM and GTEM scenarios indicate that fuel and technology shifts \r\nare crucial to reduce carbon emissions to achieve lower levels of \r\nwarming (Edelenbosch et al. 2017; IEA 2017b). Across the transport \r\nsector, a  technology shift towards advanced fuel vehicles is the \r\ndominant driver of decarbonisation in model projections. This trend is \r\nconsistent across climate scenarios, with larger decreases in the final \r\nenergy share of oil in scenarios that achieve progressively lower levels \r\nof warming. Due to efficiency improvements, the higher efficiency \r\nof advanced fuel vehicles, and slower progress in the freight sector, \r\nthe final energy share of oil decreases more rapidly after 2030. By \r\n2050, the final energy shares of electricity, biofuels, and alternative \r\ngaseous fuels increase, with shares from electricity generally about \r\ntwice as high (median values from 10-30% across warming levels) \r\nas the shares from biofuels and gases (median values from 5-10%)"


id: 1110c1fcb3e237b98e14ab3869e3870a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
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vector_id: 165
content:
" \r\nWhile IAMs suggest that the final energy share of hydrogen will \r\nremain low in 2050, by 2100 the median projections include 5-10% \r\nhydrogen in transport final energy."


id: 9be498edb00fd80ee631dd8a983f3631
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22081
content:
"In freight transport, studies indicate a  shift toward alternative \r\nfuels would need to be supplemented by efficiency improvements. \r\nThe IEA suggests efficiency improvements would be essential for \r\ndecarbonisation of trucks, aviation, and shipping in the short-to\u0002medium term. At the same time, the IEA suggests that fuel switching \r\nto advanced biofuels would be needed to decarbonise freight in \r\nthe long term (IEA 2019d). Mulholland et  al. (2018) investigated \r\nthe impacts of decarbonising road freight in two scenarios: countries \r\ncomplying with COP21 pledges and a  second more ambitious \r\nreduction scenario in line with limiting global temperature rise to \r\n1.75degC. Despite the deployment of logistics improvements, high\u0002efficiency technologies, and low-carbon fuels, activity growth leads \r\nto a 47% increase in energy demand for road freight while overall \r\nGHG emissions from freight increase by 55% (4.8 GtCO2-eq) in 2050 \r\n(relative to 2015) in the COP21 scenario. In the 1"


id: 4caf935325bd4cedde6c7f8b61eaa093
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9491
content:
"75degC scenario, \r\ndecarbonisation happens primarily through a  switch to alternative \r\nfuels (hybrid electric and full battery electric trucks), which leads \r\nto a 60% reduction in GHG emissions from freight in 2050 relative \r\nto 2015. Khalili et al. (2019) also find substantial shifts to alternative \r\nfuels in HDVs under aggressive climate mitigation scenarios. Battery \r\nelectric, hydrogen fuel cell, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles \r\nconstitute 50%, 30%, and 15% of heavy-duty vehicles respectively \r\nin 2050. They also find 90% of buses would be electrified by 2050."


id: ff236cd66149807714d3e5243d9c2e38
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
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vector_id: 37695
content:
"the COVID-19 pandemic. For the low demand scenarios IMP-LD and renewables pathway IMP-Ren, CO2 emissions from the transport \r\nsector decreases to 10% and 20% of modelled 2020 levels by 2050 respectively. In contrast, the IMP-SP has a steady decline of \r\ntransport sector CO2 emissions over the century. By 2050, this scenario has a 50% reduction in emissions compared to modelled 2020 \r\nlevels. Panels (b), (c) and (d) show energy by different fuels for the three selected IMPs. The IMP-SP yields a drop in energy for transport \r\nof about 40% by the end of the century. CO2 emissions reductions are obtained through a phase-out of fossil fuels with electricity and \r\nbiofuels, complemented by a minor share of hydrogen, by the end of the century. In IMP-Ren, the fuel energy demand at the end of \r\nthe century is on a par with the 2020 levels, but the fuel mix has shifted towards a larger share of electricity complimented by biofuels \r\nand a minor share of hydrogen"


id: f27c0230a5002bf34003e5b57fa03112
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 35676
content:
" For the IMP-LD scenario, the overall fuel demand decreases by 45% compared to 2020 levels by the \r\nend of the century. Oil is largely phased out by mid century, with electricity and hydrogen becoming the major fuels in the second half \r\nof the century. Across the three IMPs, electricity plays a major role, in combination with biofuels, hydrogen, or both."


id: 902d1e421bf258f7fffb9fab9a566eac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20217
content:
"Transport is becoming a major focus for mitigation as its GHG emissions \r\nare large and growing faster than those of other sectors, especially in \r\naviation and shipping. The scenarios literature suggests that without \r\nmitigation actions, transport emissions could grow by up to 65% by \r\n2050. Alternatively, successful deployment of mitigation strategies \r\ncould reduce sectoral emissions by 68%, which would be consistent \r\nwith the goal of limiting temperature change to 1.5degC above pre\u0002industrial levels. This chapter has reviewed the literature on all aspects \r\nof transport and has featured three special points of focus: (i) a survey of \r\nlifecycle analysis from the academic and industry community that uses \r\nthese tools; (ii) surveying the modelling community for top-down and \r\nbottom-up approaches to identify decarbonisation pathways for the \r\ntransport sector, and (iii) for the first time in the IPCC, separate sections \r\non shipping and aviation"


id: 33eca472779fd5ea2a8af9ea278e00f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5586
content:
" The analysis of the literature suggests three \r\ncrucial components for the decarbonisation of the transport sector: \r\ndemand and efficiency strategies, electromobility, and alternative fuels \r\nfor shipping and aviation."


id: 2fc122d6a0be9a859b005571daa06148
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4936
content:
"The scenario literature suggests that serious attempts at carbon \r\nmitigation in the transport sector must examine the uptake of \r\nalternative fuels. The scenarios described in the IAMs and GTEMs \r\nliterature decarbonise through a  combination of fuels. Across the \r\nscenarios, electrification plays a key role, complemented by biofuels \r\nand hydrogen. In general terms, electrification tends to play the key \r\nrole in passenger transport while biofuels and hydrogen are more \r\nprominent in the freight segment. The three illustrative mitigation \r\npathways described in Box  10.4 exemplify different ways these \r\ntechnologies may be combined and still be compatible with warming \r\nlevels of 1.5degC with low or no overshoot. Shifts towards alternative \r\nfuels must occur alongside shifts towards clean technologies \r\nin other sectors, as all alternative fuels have upstream impacts. \r\nWithout considering other sectors, fuel shifts would not yield their \r\nfull mitigation potentials"


id: a42a723ae47bb88bd6cd94b666f5db5d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 23384
content:
" These collective efforts are particularly \r\nimportant for the electrification of transport, as the transformative \r\nmitigation potential is strongly dependent on the decarbonisation of \r\nthe power sector. In this regard, the scenario literature is well aligned \r\nwith the LCA literature reviewed in Section 10.4."


id: 6b0dc106f873348f7f907e53cb5f4c2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 14459
content:
"The challenge of decarbonisation requires a  transition of the \r\nsocio-technical system, which depends on the combination of \r\ntechnological innovation and societal change (Geels et  al. 2017). \r\nA socio-technical system includes technology, regulation, user \r\npractices and markets, cultural meaning, infrastructure, maintenance \r\nnetworks, and supply networks (Geels 2005) (Cross Chapter Box 12 \r\nin Chapter 16). The multi-level perspective (MLP) is a framework that \r\nprovides insights to assist policymakers when devising transformative \r\ntransition policies (Rip and Kemp 1998; Geels 2002). Under the MLP \r\nframework, strategies are grouped into three different categories. \r\nThe Micro level (niche) category includes strategies where innovation \r\ndiffers radically to that of the incumbent socio-technical system. \r\nThe niche provides technological innovations a  protected space \r\nduring development and usually requires considerable R&D and \r\ndemonstrations"


id: 50c43638f5f955c6249c7a2efd5eaab1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 10153
content:
" In the Meso level (regime) state, demonstrations \r\nbegin to emerge as options that can be adopted by leading groups \r\nwho begin to overcome lock-in barriers from previous technological \r\ndependence. Finally, in the Macro level (landscape) stage, \r\nmainstreaming happens, and the socio-technical system enables \r\ninnovations to break through. Figure 10.22 maps the MLP stages for \r\nthe major mitigation strategies identified in this chapter."


id: c23bef15d289e313200dd720c78026a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28144
content:
"The models reviewed in this section would all generally be considered \r\nto have a good representation of fuels, technologies, and costs, but \r\nthey often better represent land transport modes than shipping and \r\naviation. While these models have their strengths in some areas, they \r\nhave some limitations in other areas, like behavioural aspects. These \r\nmodels are also limited in their ability to account for unexpected \r\ntechnological innovation, such as a  breakthrough in heavy vehicle \r\nfuels, artificial intelligence, autonomy and big data, even the extent \r\nof digital communications replacing travel (Section 10.2). As a result \r\nof these limitations, the models cannot yet provide an exhaustive set \r\nof options for decarbonising the transport sectors. These limitations \r\nnotwithstanding, the models can find solutions encompassing the \r\ntransport sector and its interactions with other sectors that are \r\ncompatible with stringent emissions mitigation efforts"


id: 301000677b39703a13db668a3330ec16
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4991
content:
" The solutions \r\nspace of transportation technology trajectories is therefore wider than \r\nexplored by the models, so there is still a need to better understand \r\nhow all options in combination may support the transformative \r\nmitigation targets."


id: e1937bb1d32c5c8560d7223dc595a974
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32980
content:
"Deployment of electromobility is not limited to developed \r\ncountries. The transportation sector in low- and middle-income \r\ncountries includes millions of gas-powered motorcycles within cities \r\nacross Africa, South-East Asia, and South America (Posada et  al. \r\n2011; Ehebrecht et al. 2018). Many of these motorcycles function as \r\ntaxis. In Kampala, Uganda, estimates place the number of motorcycle \r\ntaxis, known locally as boda bodas, at around 40,000 (Ehebrecht et al. \r\n2018). The popularity of the motorcycle for personal and taxi use is \r\ndue to many factors including lower upfront costs, lack of regulation, \r\nand mobility in highly congested urban contexts (Posada et al. 2011; \r\nUNECE 2018). While motorcycles are often seen as a  more fuel\u0002efficient alternative, emissions can be worse from two-wheelers than \r\ncars, particularly nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and \r\nhydrocarbon emissions (Vasic and Weilenmann 2006; Ehebrecht et al. \r\n2018)"


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vector_id: 11638
content:
" These two-wheeler emissions contribute to dangerous levels of \r\nair pollution across many cities in low- and middle-income countries. \r\nIn Kampala, for example, air pollution levels frequently exceed levels \r\ndeemed safe for humans by the World Health Organization (Kampala \r\nCapital City Authority 2018; World Health Organization 2018; Airqo \r\n2020). To mitigate local and environmental impacts, electric boda \r\nboda providers are emerging in many cities, including Zembo in \r\nKampala and Ampersand in Kigali, Rwanda."


id: d665227094905b796cbf313c76f9a6ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31247
content:
"Figure 10.23 sets out the feasibility of the core mitigation options using \r\nthe six criteria created for the cross-sectoral analysis. This feasibility \r\nassessment outlines how the conclusions outlined in Section 10.8.1 \r\nfit into the broader criteria created for feasibility in the whole AR6 \r\nreport and that emphasise the SDGs. Figure  10.23 highlights that \r\nthere is high confidence that demand reductions and mode shift can \r\nbe feasible as the basis of a GHG emissions mitigation strategy for \r\nthe transport sector. However, demand-side interventions work best \r\nwhen integrated with technology changes. The technologies that can \r\nsupport such changes have a range of potential limitations as well \r\nas opportunities. EVs have a reliance on renewable resources (wind, \r\nsolar, and hydro) for power generation, which could pose constraints \r\non geophysical resources, land use, and water use"


id: 83f4fa9ea8ebb092583b3a156caaff30
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18295
content:
" Furthermore, \r\nexpanding the deployment of EVs requires a rapid deployment of new \r\npower generation capacity and charging infrastructure. The overall \r\nfeasibility of electric vehicles for land transport is likely high and their \r\nadoption is accelerating. HFCVs for land transport would also have \r\nconstraints related to geophysical resource needs, land use, and water \r\nuse. These constraints are likely higher than for EVs, since producing \r\nhydrogen with electricity reduces the overall efficiency of meeting \r\ntravel demand. Furthermore, the infrastructure needed to produce, \r\ntransport, and deliver hydrogen is under-developed and would require \r\nsignificant R&D and a  rapid scale-up. Thus, the feasibility of HFCV \r\nis likely lower than for EVs. Biofuels could be used in all segments \r\nof the transport sector, but there may be some concerns about their \r\nfeasibility"


id: add7eeda0bff811ff48f7e75ff61b767
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24887
content:
" Specifically, there are concerns about land use, water use, \r\nimpacts on water quality and eutrophication, and biodiversity impacts. \r\nAdvanced biofuels could mitigate some concerns and the feasibility of \r\nusing these fuels likely varies by world region. The feasibility \r\nassessment for alternative fuels for shipping and aviation suggests \r\nthat hydrogen-based fuels like ammonia and synthetic fuels have the \r\nlowest technology readiness of all mitigation options considered in \r\nthis chapter. Reliance on electrolytic hydrogen for the production of \r\nthese fuels poses concerns about land and water use. Using ammonia \r\nfor shipping could pose risks for air quality and toxic discharges to the \r\nenvironment. The DAC/BECCS infrastructure that would be needed to \r\nproduce synthetic fuel does not yet exist. Thus, the feasibility suggests \r\nthat the technologies for producing and using these hydrogen-based \r\nfuels for transport are in their infancy."


id: 6f4dcc6820c6db198a901299cad519c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15141
content:
"Bulawayo, the second-largest city in Zimbabwe, is also looking at \r\nopportunities for deploying electromobility solutions. The city is now \r\ngrowing again after a  difficult recent history, and there is a  new \r\nemphasis on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (City \r\nof Bulawayo 2020a; City of Bulawayo 2020b). With these goals in \r\nmind, Bulawayo is seeking opportunities for investment that can \r\nenable leapfrogging in private, fossil fuel vehicle ownership. In \r\nparticular, trackless trams, paired with solar energy, have emerged \r\nas a potential pathway forward (Kazunga 2019). Trackless trams are \r\na new battery-based mid-tier transit system that could enable urban \r\ndevelopment around stations and that use solar energy for powering \r\nboth transit and the surrounding buildings (Newman et  al. 2019)"


id: c6dc3aee0642be8d4112908043e685c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28867
content:
" \r\nThe new trams are rail-like in their capacities and speed, providing \r\na vastly better mobility system that is decarbonised and enables low \r\ntransport costs (Ndlovu and Newman 2020). While this concept is \r\nonly under consideration in Bulawayo, climate funding could enable \r\nthe wider deployment of such projects in developing countries."


id: e1ad06e05553cf9d366285c4085ff71b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33000
content:
"The global transition towards renewable energy technologies and battery systems necessarily involves materials, markets, and supply \r\nchains on a hitherto unknown scale and scope. This has raised concerns regarding mineral requirements central to the feasibility of \r\nthe energy transition. Constituent materials required for the development of these low-carbon technologies are regarded as 'critical' \r\nmaterials (US Geological Survey 2018; Commonwealth of Australia 2019; Lee et al. 2020; Marinaro et al. 2020; Sovacool et al. 2020). \r\n'Critical materials' are critical because of their economic or national security importance, or high risk of supply disruption. Many of \r\nthese materials and rare earth elements (REEs) as 'technologically critical', not only due to their strategic or economic importance but \r\nthe risk of short supply or price volatility (Marinaro et al. 2020)"


id: 30cb21ed7401b3b3415c90b5ff68e65c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5100
content:
" In addition to these indicators, production growth and market dynamics \r\nare also incorporated into screening tools to assess emerging trends in material commodities that are deemed as fundamental to the \r\nwell-being of the nation (NSTC 2018)."


id: 503a8915cfc8d14250bb2ff5df7d17fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10061
content:
"There have been many instances since the 1950s when the supply of essential minerals has been restricted by nations in times of \r\nconflict and world tensions, but international trade has continued under the framework of the World Trade Organization. Keeping \r\naccess open to critical minerals needed for the low-carbon transition will be an essential role of the international community as the \r\nneed for local manufacture of such renewable and electromobility technologies will be necessary for local economies. Nassar et al. \r\n(2020) report that over the past 30 years the US has become increasingly reliant in imports to meet domestic demand for minerals, \r\nincluding REEs. In terms of heavy REEs, essential for permanent magnets for wind turbines, China has a  near-monopoly on REE \r\nprocessing, though other mines and manufacturing facilities are now responding to these constrained markets (Stegen 2015; Gulley \r\net al. 2018; Gulley et al. 2019; Yan et al. 2020)"


id: bb7e42ca7c230167930310bf000f7ad4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27058
content:
" China, on the other hand, is reliant on other nations for the supply of other critical \r\nmetals, particularly cobalt and lithium for batteries."


id: 98dde89ba46b90a5da095c9e8102ee16
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21568
content:
"Enabling transport climate emergency plans, local pledges \r\nand net zero strategies: National, regional and local governments \r\nare now producing transport plans with a climate emergency focus \r\n(Jaeger et  al. 2015; Pollard 2019). Such plans are often grounded \r\nin the goals of the Paris Agreement, based around local low\u0002carbon transport roadmaps that contain targets for and involve \r\ncommitments or pledges from local stakeholders, such as workplaces, \r\nlocal community groups, and civil society organisations. Pledges often \r\ninclude phasing out fossil fuel-based cars, buses, and trucks (Plotz \r\net  al. 2020), strategies to meet the targets through infrastructure, \r\nurban regeneration and incentives, and detailed programmes to \r\nhelp citizens adopt change. These institution-led mechanisms could \r\ninclude bike-to-work campaigns, free transport passes, parking \r\ncharges, or eliminating car benefits"


id: 98de404e90e4f09a999bc9dc8ab39edd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21569
content:
" Community-based solutions like \r\nsolar sharing, community charging, and mobility as a  service can \r\ngenerate new opportunities to facilitate low-carbon transport futures. \r\nCities in India and China have established these transport roadmaps, \r\nwhich are also supported by the United Nations Centre for Regional \r\nDevelopment's Environmentally Sustainable Transport programme \r\n(Baeumler et al. 2012; Pathak and Shukla 2016; UNCRD 2020). There \r\nhave been concerns raised that these pledges may be used to delay "


id: 659e047f5c8f16562aea8c72ce2703d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13563
content:
"Laboratory 2020) is assumed. Maintenance costs were assumed to \r\nbe USD0.63 per km for ICEV buses and USD0.38 per km for BEV and \r\nICEV buses, also based on data from the AFLEET model (Argonne \r\nNational Laboratory 2020). For ICEV and BEV purchase costs, data \r\nfrom the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (Johnson et  al. \r\n2020) is used for bounding ranges (USD430,000 to 500,000 for \r\nICEV and USD579,000 to 1,200,000 for BEV), which encompass the \r\ndefault values from AFLEET model (Argonne National Laboratory \r\n2020). Note that wider ranges are available in the literature (e.g., as \r\nlow as USD120,000 per bus in Burnham et al. (2021) and Harris et al. \r\n(2020)); but these are not included in the sensitivity analysis to avoid \r\nconflating disparate vehicles"


id: e38c7f5e61fdf0cf2be19f7f1635216f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33280
content:
" For FCV buses, the upper bound of the \r\npurchase price range (USD1,200,000) represents current costs in \r\nthe US (Argonne National Laboratory 2020; Eudy and Post 2020), \r\nand the lower bound represents the target future value from the US \r\nDepartment of Energy (Eudy and Post 2020)."


id: 5cbc1f564a1d680a24d4b5c7bf54a0fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12106
content:
"For diesel, a range of USD0.5-2.5 per litre is used based on historic \r\ndiesel costs across all OECD countries reported in the IEA Energy Prices \r\nand Taxes Statistics database (IEA 2021c) since 2010. The lower end \r\nof this range is consistent with the minimum projected value from the \r\n2021 US Annual Energy Outlook (low oil price scenario, USD0.55 l-1) \r\n(US Energy Information Administration 2021). The upper end of \r\nthe range encompasses both the maximum diesel price observed \r\nin the  2021 US Annual Energy Outlook projections (high oil price \r\nscenario, USD1.5 l-1) (US Energy Information Administration 2021), \r\nand the diesel price that would correspond to the 2020 IEA World \r\nEnergy Outlook crude oil price projections (Stated Policies scenario) \r\n(IEA 2020b), assuming the historical price relationship between \r\ncrude oil and diesel is maintained (USD1.5 l-1). For reference, the IEA \r\nreports current world-average automotive diesel costs to be around \r\n1 USD l-1 (IEA 2021d)"


id: 708579ff9e7f04c6cfdfb062912e14cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15320
content:
" The selected range also captures the current \r\nrange of production costs for values for bio-based and synthetic \r\ndiesels (EUR51-144 MWh-1, corresponding to USD0.6-1.70 l-1), \r\nwhich are generally still higher than wholesale petroleum diesel \r\ncosts (EUR30-50 MWh-1, corresponding to USD0.35-0.6 l-1), as \r\nreported by IEA (IEA 2020c). This range also encompasses costs for \r\nsynthesised electrofuels from electrolytic hydrogen, as reported in \r\nChapter 6 (USD1.6 l-1)."


id: 457433e790025b5b759ffd085f9695bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8340
content:
"For freight and passenger rail, powertrain and vehicle operation and \r\nmaintenance costs in USD per km from the IEA Future of Rail report \r\n(IEA 2019e) (IEA Figure 2.14 for passenger rail and IEA Figure 2.15 \r\nfor freight rail) are used as a proxy for non-fuel costs. The ranges span \r\nconservative and forward-looking cases. In addition, the range  for \r\nBEV rail ranges encompass short- and long-distance trains  - \r\ncorresponding to 100-200 km for passenger rail, and 400-750 km \r\nfor freight rail. Note that all values exclude the base vehicle costs, \r\nbut they are expected not to be significant as they are amortised \r\nover the lifetime distance travelled. For freight rail, a network that \r\nis representative of North America is assumed, with a  payload of \r\n2800 tonnes per train (IEA Figure 1.17), assumed to be utilised at \r\n100%, with a lifetime of 10 years, and an average distance travelled \r\nof 120,000  km yr-1"


id: d1925f65fa007c770cfd27fcdb953d4f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30503
content:
" For BEV freight rail, the range in powertrain \r\ncosts is driven by battery costs of USD250-600 kWh-1, while for \r\nFCV freight rail, the range in powertrain costs is driven by fuel cell \r\nstack costs of USD50-1000 kW-1. For passenger rail, a network that \r\nis representative of Europe is assumed, with an average occupancy of \r\n180 passengers per train (IEA Figure 1.14), with a lifetime of 10 years, \r\nand an average distance travelled of 115,000 km per year."


id: 9817f6b64a467a2e90cd14b5880e0899
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21439
content:
"Net zero CO2 emissions from the industrial sector are possible \r\nbut challenging (high confidence). Energy efficiency will continue \r\nto be important. Reduced materials demand, material efficiency, \r\nand circular economy solutions can reduce the need for primary \r\nproduction. Primary production options include switching to new \r\nprocesses that use low to zero GHG energy carriers and feedstocks \r\n(e.g., electricity, hydrogen, biofuels, and carbon capture and utilisation \r\n(CCU) for carbon feedstock), and carbon capture and storage (CCS) \r\nfor remaining CO2. These options require substantial scaling up of \r\nelectricity, hydrogen, recycling, CO2, and other infrastructure, as \r\nwell as phase-out or conversion of existing industrial plants"


id: a7f42d1a248fc5056b3a71c9cc987874
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23937
content:
" While \r\nimprovements in the GHG intensities of major basic materials \r\nhave nearly stagnated over the last 30 years, analysis of historical \r\ntechnology shifts and newly available technologies indicate these \r\nintensities can be reduced to net zero emissions by mid-century. \r\n{11.2, 11.3, 11.4}"


id: e7eeaf649c869ae72018993d1128c3ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33987
content:
"There are several current and near-horizon options to \r\ngreatly reduce cement and concrete emissions. Producer, \r\nuser, and regulator education, as well as innovation and \r\ncommercialisation policy are needed (medium confidence).\r\nCement and concrete are currently overused because they are \r\ninexpensive, durable, and ubiquitous, and consumption decisions \r\ntypically do not give weight to their production emissions. Basic \r\nmaterial efficiency efforts to use only well-made concrete thoughtfully \r\nand only where needed (e.g.,  using right-sized, prefabricated \r\ncomponents) could reduce emissions by 24-50% through lower \r\ndemand for clinker. Cementitious material substitution with various \r\nmaterials (e.g.,  ground limestone and calcined clays) can reduce \r\nprocess calcination emissions by up to 50% and occasionally much \r\nmore"


id: 959401c206aca433064f58cf6cafa290
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21038
content:
" Until a very low GHG emissions alternative binder to Portland \r\ncement is commercialised, which does not look promising in the near \r\nto medium term, CCS will be essential for eliminating the limestone \r\ncalcination process emissions for making clinker, which currently \r\nrepresent 60% of GHG emissions in best available technology plants. \r\n{11.3.2, 11.3.6, 11.4.1.2}"


id: a4975d3fc53372483c949fa7b7585f17
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23459
content:
"The Kaya identity offers a useful tool of decomposing emission sources \r\nand their drivers, as well as of weighing the mitigation options. \r\nThe one presented below (Equation 11.1) builds on the previous \r\nassessments (IPCC 2014, 2018b; Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018), and \r\nreflect a  material stock-driven services-oriented vision to better \r\nhighlight the growing importance of industrial processes (dominated \r\nin emissions increments in 2010-2019), product use and waste in \r\ndriving emissions. Services delivery (nutrition, shelter, mobility, \r\neducation, etc.; see Chapter 5 for more detail) not only requires energy \r\nand material flows (fuels, food, feed, fertilisers, packaging, etc.), but \r\nalso material stocks (buildings, roads, vehicles, machinery, etc.), the \r\nmass of which has already exceeded 1000 Gt (Krausmann et al. 2018)"


id: c50e18bfc5b30135fcd36ff2a2e5431f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28582
content:
" \r\nAs material efficiency appears to be an important mitigation option, \r\nmaterial intensity or productivity (material extraction or consumption \r\nversus GDP (Oberle et al. 2019; Hertwich et al. 2020)) is reflected in \r\nthe identity with two dimensions: as material stock intensity of GDP \r\n(tonnes per dollar) and material intensity of building and operating \r\naccumulated in-use stock.1\r\n For sub-global analysis the ratio of \r\ndomestically used materials to total material production becomes \r\nimportant to reflect outsourced materials production and distinguish \r\nbetween territorial and consumption-based emissions. The identity \r\nfor industry differs significantly from that for sectors with where \r\ncombustion emissions dominate (Lamb et al. 2021)."


id: 6ad432589f24cd1a5201416f0b3a7f65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14418
content:
"The AR5 was published in 2014. The Paris Agreement and the \r\n17  Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted in 2015. \r\nAn increasing number of countries have since announced ambitions \r\nto be carbon neutral by 2045-2060. The COVID-19 pandemic shocked \r\nthe global economy in 2020 and motivated economic stimulus with \r\ndemands for green recovery and concerns for economic security. \r\nAll this has created a new context and a growing recognition that all \r\nindustry, including the energy and emissions intensive industries, \r\nneed to reach net zero GHG emissions. There is an ongoing mind \r\nshift around the opportunities to do so, with electrification and \r\nhydrogen emerging among key mitigation options as a  result of \r\nrenewable electricity costs falling rapidly. On the demand side there \r\nhas been renewed attention to end-use demand, material efficiency, \r\nand more and better-quality recycling measures"


id: 28f74ca715db63d18a7fef6b3c1f4d67
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3874
content:
" This chapter takes \r\nits starting point in this new context and emphasises the need for \r\ndeploying innovative processes and practices in order to limit the \r\nglobal warming to 1.5degC or 2degC (IPCC 2018a)."


id: cd1b4323a7b0ed7203d2512805d25211
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29821
content:
"The industrial sector includes ores and minerals mining, manufacturing, \r\nconstruction and waste management. It is the largest source of global \r\nGHG and CO2 emissions, which include direct and indirect fuel\u0002combustion-related emissions, emissions from industrial processes \r\nand products use, as well as from waste. This chapter is focused on \r\nheavy industry - the high temperature heat and process emissions \r\nintensive basic materials industries that account for 65% of industrial \r\nGHG and over 70% of industrial CO2 emissions (waste excluded), \r\nwhere deployment of near-zero emissions technologies can be \r\nmore challenging due to capital intensity and equipment lifetimes \r\ncompared with other manufacturing industries"


id: 4ccf21ab9e6b98883fabd0d302a422ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9510
content:
" The transition of \r\nheavy industries to zero emissions requires supplementing the \r\ntraditional toolkit of energy and process efficiency, fuel switching, \r\nelectrification, and decarbonisation of power with material end-use \r\ndemand management and efficiency, circular economy, fossil-free \r\nfeedstocks, carbon capture and utilisation (CCU), and carbon capture \r\nand storage (CCS). Energy efficiency was extensively treated in AR5 and \r\nremains a key mitigation option. This chapter is focused mainly on \r\nnew options and developments since AR5, highlighting measures \r\nalong the whole value chains that are required to approach zero \r\nemissions in primary materials production."


id: 40f145a07b735a14d369eed43b23cfd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7604
content:
"improvements to achieve absolute reduction in material use, \r\nas stock expansion slows down (Streeck et al. 2020). While the \r\ncomposition of basic materials within the stock of manufactured \r\ncapital was evolving significantly, overall stock use associated \r\nwith a unit of GDP has been evolving over the last half-century in \r\na quite narrow range of 7.7-8.6 t per USD1000 (2017 purchasing \r\npower parity (PPP))  showing neither signs of decoupling from \r\nGDP, nor saturation as of yet. Mineral building materials (concrete, \r\nasphalt, bricks, aggregate, and glass) dominate the stock volume by \r\nmass (94.6% of the whole stock, with the share of concrete alone \r\nstanding at 43.5%), followed by metals (3.5%) and solid wood \r\n(1.4%). The largest part of in-use stock of our 'cementing societies' \r\n(Cao et al. 2017) is constituted by concrete: about 417 Gt in 2015; \r\nKrausmann et al. (2018) extrapolated this to 478 Gt (65 tonnes \r\nper capita) in 2018, which contains about 88 Gt of cement"


id: 12987f6c72f0ecc1bca398afbe114486
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 424
content:
"4\r\n The \r\niron and steel stock is assessed at 25-35 Gt (Wiedenhofer et al. \r\n2019; Gielen et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2021), while the plastics stock \r\nreached 2.5-3.2 Gt (Geyer et al. 2017; Wiedenhofer et al. 2019; \r\nSaygin and Gielen 2021) and the aluminium stock approached \r\n1.1 Gt (International Aluminium Institute 2021a), or just 0.1% of \r\nthe total. In sharp contrast to global energy intensity, which has \r\nmore than halved since 1900 (Bashmakov 2019), in 2019 material \r\nstock intensity (in-use stock of manufactured capital per GDP) was \r\nonly 14% below the 1900 level, but 15% above the 1970 level. \r\nIn-use stock per capita has been growing faster than GDP per \r\ncapita since 2000 (Figure  11.3). The growth rate of total in-use \r\nstock of manufactured capital was 3.8% in 1971-2000 and 3.5% \r\nin 2000-2019, or 32-35 Gt yr-1, to which concrete and aggregates \r\ncontributed 88%"


id: 8a35719a6cf49b6982467837268b2584
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19279
content:
" Recent demand for stockbuilding materials was \r\n51-54 Gt yr-1, to which recycled materials recently contributed \r\nonly about 10% of material input. About 46-49 Gt yr-1 was virgin \r\ninputs, which after accounting for processing waste and short\u0002lived products (over 8 Gt yr-1) scale up to 54-58 Gt yr-1 of primary \r\nextraction (Krausmann et al. 2017, 2018; UNEP and IRP 2020). The \r\nabove indicates that we have only begun to exploit the potential \r\nfor recycling and circularity more broadly."


id: 3f148d770461478947f6ff08ba3b5cb3
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"There are two major concepts of material efficiency (ME). The \r\nbroader one highlights demand reduction via policies promoting \r\nmore intensive use, assuming sufficient (excluding luxury) living \r\nspace or car ownership providing appropriate service levels  - \r\nhousing days or miles driven and life-time extension (Hertwich et al. \r\n2019, 2020). This approach focuses on dematerialisation of society \r\n(Lechtenbohmer and Fischedick 2020), where a  'dematerialisation \r\nmultiplier' (Pauliuk et al. 2021) limits both material stock and GDP \r\ngrowth, as progressively fewer materials are required to build and \r\noperate the physical in-use stock to deliver sufficient services. \r\nAccording to the IRP (2020), reducing floor space demand by 20% \r\nvia shared and smaller housing compared to the reference scenario \r\nwould decrease Group of Seven (G7) countries' GHG emissions from \r\nthe material-cycle of residential construction up to 70% in 2050"


id: 9a856d2aacadc5fd40e1c2a5de85fd7c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" \r\nThe narrower concept ignores demand and sufficiency aspects and \r\nfocuses on supply chains considering ME as less basic materials \r\nuse to produce a certain final product, for example, a car or a metre \r\nsquared of living space (OECD 2019a; IEA 2020a). No matter if the \r\nbroader or the narrower concept of ME is applied, in 1970-2019 it \r\ndid not contribute much to the decoupling of industrial emissions \r\nfrom GDP. This is expected to change in the future (Figure 11.2)."


id: b6b3f18e9a0d326de2aef075af7d734e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"Material efficiency analysis mostly uses material intensity \r\nor  productivity indicators, which compare material extraction or \r\nconsumption with GDP (Oberle et al. 2019; Hertwich et al. 2020). \r\nThose indicators are functions of material stock intensity of GDP\r\n(tonnes per dollar) and material intensity of building and operating \r\naccumulated in-use stock. Coupling services or GDP with the built \r\nstock allows for a  better evaluation of demand for primary basic \r\nmaterials (Muller et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2013; Liu and Muller 2013; \r\nPauliuk et al. 2013a; Cao et al. 2017; Wiedenhofer et al. 2019; Hertwich \r\net al. 2020; Krausmann et al. 2020). Since 1970 material stock growth \r\ndriven by industrialisation and urbanisation slightly exceeded that of \r\nGDP and there was no decoupling,3\r\n so in Kaya-like identities material \r\nstock may effectively replace GDP. There are different methods to \r\nestimate the former (see reviews in Pauliuk et al. (2015, 2019) and \r\nWiedenhofer et al"


id: 513d89eb8e42d9af7d811a33fa3edd97
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" (2019), the results of which are presented for major \r\nbasic materials with some geographical resolution (Liu and Muller \r\n2013; Pauliuk et al. 2013a) or globally (Graedel et al. 2011; Geyer \r\net al. 2017; Krausmann et al. 2018; Pauliuk et al. 2019; Wiedenhofer \r\net al. 2019; International Aluminium Institute 2021a)."


id: d82b2a10fb096e8865b5a7dee3ee7cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"China12 (IEA 2020b,d). Whatever metric is applied, industry (coal \r\ntransformation, mining, quarrying, manufacturing and construction) \r\ndriven mostly by material production, dominates global energy \r\nconsumption. About two fifths of energy produced globally goes to \r\nindustry, directly or indirectly. Direct energy use (including energy \r\nused in coal transformation) accounts for nearly 30% of total final \r\nenergy consumption. When supplemented by non-energy use, the \r\nshare for the post-AR5 period (2015-2019) stands on average close \r\nto 40% of final energy consumption, and at 28.5% of primary energy \r\nuse.13 With an account of indirect energy use for the generation \r\nof power and centralised heat to be consumed in industry, the \r\nlatter scales up to 37%"


id: 52ffbe62e16357d886a440f6f694f785
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content:
" Industrial energy use may be split by: \r\nmaterial production and extraction (including coal transformation): \r\n51% on average for 2015-2019; non-energy use (mostly chemical \r\nfeedstock): 22%14; and other energy use (equipment, machinery, \r\nfood and tobacco, textiles, leather, etc.): 27%. Energy use for material \r\nproduction and feedstock15 makes about three quarters (73%) of \r\nindustrial energy consumption and is responsible for 77% of its \r\nincrement in 2015-2019 (based on IEA 2021a)."


id: 9b3de0e03e57fe2616cbc80d89b90872
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"The limited impacts of material efficiency factors on industrial \r\nGHG emissions trends reflect the lack of integration of material \r\nefficiency in energy and climate policies which partly results from the \r\ninadequacy of monitored indicators to inform policy debates and set \r\ntargets;11 lack of high-level political focus and industrial lobbying; \r\nuncoordinated policy across institutions and sequential nature of \r\ndecision-making along supply chains; carbon pricing policy lock-in \r\nwith upstream sectors failing to pass carbon costs on to downstream \r\nsectors (due to compensation mechanisms to reduce carbon leakage) \r\nand so have no incentives to exploit such options as light-weighting, \r\nreusing, remanufacturing, recycling, diverting scrap, extending \r\nproduct lives, using products more intensely, improving process yields, \r\nand substituting materials (Skelton and Allwood 2017; Gonzalez \r\nHernandez et al. 2018b; Hilton et al. 2018)"


id: ea065b3aa8a9f87543bb7020b53b6475
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" Poor progress with \r\nmaterial efficiency is part of the reason why industrial GHG emissions \r\nare perceived as 'hard to abate', and many industrial low-carbon \r\ntrajectories to 2050 leave up to 40% of emissions in place (Material \r\nEconomics 2019; IEA 2021a). The importance of this factor activation \r\nrises as in-use material stock is expected to scale up by a factor of \r\n2.2-2.7 to reach 2215-2720 Gt by 2050 (Krausmann et al. 2020). \r\nMaterial extraction in turn is expected to rise to 140-200 Gt yr-1 by \r\n2060 (OECD 2019a; Hertwich et al. 2020) providing unsustainable \r\npressure on climate and environment and calling for fundamental \r\nimprovements in material productivity."


id: b9ab6f50280bc5ca4f29d7b9e49d723a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"For over a  century, industrial energy efficiency improvements \r\nhave partially offset growth in GHG emissions. Industrial energy \r\nuse per tonne of extracted materials (ores and building materials as \r\na proxy for materials going through the whole production chain to \r\nfinal products) fell by 20% in 2000-2019 and by 15% in 2010-2019, \r\naccelerated driven by high energy prices to 2.4% yr-1 in 2014-2019, \r\nmatching the values observed back in 1990-2000 (Figure  11.2). \r\nAssessed per value added using market exchange rates, industrial \r\nenergy intensity globally dropped by 12% in 2010-2018, after its \r\n4% decline in 2000-2010, resulting in 2000-2018 decline by 15% \r\n(IEA 2020b,a). The 2020 COVID crisis slowed down energy intensity \r\nimprovements by shifting industrial output towards more energy\u0002intensive basic materials (IEA 2020e). Specific energy consumption \r\nper tonne of iron and steel, chemicals and cement production in 2019 \r\nwas about 20% below the 2000 level (IEA 2020b,a)"


id: 39de19ed42d1fba7b5709bb3ed6836af
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" This progress \r\nis driven by moving towards best available technologies (BATs) for \r\neach product through new and highly efficient production facilities \r\nin China, India and elsewhere, and by the contribution from recycled \r\nscrap metals, paper and cardboard."


id: 21a361324828ab860b74b6577bf76694
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"fundamental process changes (e.g., towards electricity and hydrogen\u0002based steel making). Improved recycling rates allow for a substantial \r\nreduction in energy use along the whole production chain - material \r\nextraction, production, and assembling  - which is in great excess \r\nof energy used for collection, separation, treatment, and scrap \r\nrecycling minus energy used for scrap landfilling. The International \r\nEnergy Agency (IEA 2019b) estimates that by increasing the recycling \r\ncontent of fabricated metals, average specific energy consumption \r\n(SEC) for steel and aluminium may be halved by 2060. Focusing on \r\nwhole systems 'integrative design' expands efficiency resource much \r\nbeyond the sum of potentials for individual technologies. Material \r\nefficiency coupled with energy efficiency can deliver much greater \r\nsavings than energy efficiency alone. Gonzalez Hernandez et al"


id: 5b1a9582253ddb357a09fd54871b48b7
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content:
" \r\n(2018b) stress that presently about half of steel or aluminium are \r\nscrapped in production or oversized for targeted services. They show \r\nthat resource efficiency expressed in exergy as a single metric for both \r\nmaterial and energy efficiency for the global iron and steel sector is \r\nonly 33%, while secondary steel-making is about twice as efficient \r\n(66%) as ore-based production (29%). While shifting globally in ore\u0002based production from the average to the best available level can \r\nsave 6.4 EJ yr-1, the saving potential of shifting to secondary steel\u0002making is 8 EJ yr-1, and is limited mostly by scrap availability and \r\nsteel quality requirements."


id: dcfcc4aec109b7cca96cc3c5d1a51edf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"GHG emissions attributable to the industrial sector (see Chapter 2) \r\nin 2019 originate from industrial fuel combustion (7.1 GtCO2-eq \r\ndirectly and about 5.9 Gt indirectly from electricity and heat \r\ngeneration16); industrial processes (4.5 GtCO2-eq) and products \r\nuse (0.2 Gt), as well as from waste (2.3 Gt) (Figure  11.4a,b). \r\nOverall industrial direct GHG emissions amount to 14.1 GtCO2-eq \r\n(Figure 11.4c and Table 11.1), and scales up to 20 GtCO2-eq after \r\nindirect emissions are added,17 putting industry (24%, direct \r\nemissions) second after the energy sector in total GHG emissions \r\nand lifting it to the leading position after indirect emissions are \r\nallocated (34% in 2019).18 The corresponding shares for 1990-2000 \r\nwere 21% for direct emissions and 30% for both direct and indirect \r\n(Crippa et al. 2021; Lamb et al. 2021; Minx et al. 2021)"


id: ecc4b2dd9ff6cf52a3d393aef7a293a7
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content:
" As the \r\nindustrial sector is expected to decarbonise slower than other \r\nsectors it will keep this leading position for the coming decades \r\n(IEA 2021a). In 2000-2010, total industrial emissions grew faster \r\n(3.8% yr-1) than in any other sector (see Chapter 2), mostly due to "


id: a328c3586b6c84f3c989396f3d3a80f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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"of industrial emissions is production of energy-intensive materials, \r\nsuch as iron and steel, chemicals and petrochemicals, non-ferrous \r\nmetals and non-metallic products. Steel and cement are key inputs \r\nto urbanisation and infrastructure development (buildings and \r\ninfrastructure are responsible for about three fourths of the steel \r\nstock). Application of a  'services-stock-flow-emissions' perspective \r\n(Wiedenhofer et al. 2019; Bashmakov 2021; Haberl et al. 2021) shows \r\nthat relationship patterns between stages of economic development, \r\nper capita stocks and flows of materials are not trivial with some \r\nclear transition points. Cao et al"


id: 37bb2b51d5563b1d8f22c0130f1d5775
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" (2017) mapped countries by four \r\nprogressive stages in cement stock per capita S-shape evolution as \r\na function of income and urbanisation: initial stage for developing \r\ncountries with a  low level and slow linear growth; take-off stage \r\nwith accelerated growth; slowdown stage; and finally a  shrinking \r\nstage (represented by just a few countries with very high incomes \r\nexceeding 40,000 USD2010 per capita) and urbanisation levels \r\nabove 80%. Bleischwitz et al. (2018) use a similar approach with five \r\nstages to study material saturation effects for apparent consumption "


id: a9e2c95643a5a71b571ef68fa797354a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"and stocks per capita for steel, cement, aluminium, and copper. This \r\nlogic may be generalised to other materials from which in-use stock \r\nis built. While globally cement in-use stock is about 12 tonnes per \r\ncapita, in developed countries it is 15-30 tonnes per capita, but the \r\norder of magnitude is lower in developing states with high per capita \r\nescalation rates (Cao et al. 2017). When stocks for some materials \r\nsaturate - per capita stock peaks - the 'scrap age' is coming (Pauliuk \r\net al. 2013a). Steel in-use stock has already saturated in advanced \r\neconomies at 14 +-  2 tonnes per capita due to largely completed \r\nurbanisation and infrastructure developments, and a switch towards \r\nservices-dominated economy. This saturation level is three to four \r\ntimes that of the present global average, which is below 4 tonnes \r\nper capita (Pauliuk et al. 2013a; Graedel et al. 2011; Wiedenhofer \r\net al. 2019)"


id: 11893db173de83f6517f1a0b5e646511
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content:
" China is entering the maturing stage of steel and cement \r\nconsumption, resulting in a moderate projection of additional demand \r\nfollowed by expected industrial emissions peaking in the next \r\n10 to 15 years (Zhou et al. 2013; Bleischwitz et al. 2018; OECD 2019a; \r\nWu et al. 2019; Zhou et al. 2020). But many developing countries \r\nare still urbanising, and the growing need for infrastructure services \r\nresults in additional demand for steel and cement. Materials intensity \r\nof the global economy is projected by OECD (2019a) to decline at \r\n1.3% yr-1 until 2060, driven by improving resource efficiency and \r\nthe switch to circular economy, but with a projected tripling of global \r\nGDP it means a doubling of projected materials use (OECD 2019a). \r\nUnder the business-as-usual scenario, India's demand for steel may \r\nmore than quadruple over the next 30 years (de la Rue du Can et al. \r\n2019; Dhar et al. 2020)"


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" In the IEA (2021a) net-zero-energy scenario, \r\nthe saturation effect along with material efficiency counterbalances \r\nactivity effects and keeps demand growth for basic materials modest \r\nwhile escalate demand for critical materials (copper, lithium, nickel, \r\ngraphite, cobalt and others)."


id: 8e947cb6155db72c0442321b8df30294
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"(Dm) by a third for China and Russia (OECD.Stat 2019; IEA 2020f). In \r\nmost OECD economies, the amount of CO2 embodied in net import \r\nfrom non-OECD countries is equal to, or even greater than, the size \r\nof their Paris 2030 emissions reduction commitments. In the UK, the \r\nParliament Committee on Energy and Climate Change requested that \r\na consumption-based inventory be complementarily used to assess \r\nthe effectiveness of domestic climate policy in delivering absolute \r\nglobal emissions reductions (Barrett et al. 2013; UKCCC 2019a). It \r\nshould be noted that the other side of the coin is that exports from \r\ncountries with lower production carbon intensities can lead to overall \r\nless emissions than if production took place in countries with high \r\ncarbon intensities, which may become critical in the global evolution \r\ntoward lower emissions"


id: d9cbe75c9932d5e33e1f3c22fe7d5551
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" The evolution of Dm to the date was driven \r\nmostly by factors other than carbon regulation often equipped with \r\ncarbon leakage prevention tools. Empirical tests have failed to date \r\nto detect meaningful 'carbon leakage' and impacts of carbon prices \r\non net import, direct foreign investments, volumes of production, \r\nvalue added, employment, profits, and innovation in industry (Sartor \r\n2013; Branger et al. 2016; Saussay and Sato 2018; Ellis et al. 2019; \r\nNaegele and Zaklan 2019; Acworth et al. 2020; Carratu et al. 2020; \r\nPyrka et al. 2020; Zachmann and McWilliams 2020). In the coming \r\nyears, availability of large low-cost renewable electricity potential \r\nand cheap hydrogen may become a  new driver for relocation of \r\nsuch carbon intensive industries as steel production (Bataille 2020a; \r\nGielen et al. 2020; Bataille et al. 2021a; Saygin and Gielen 2021)."


id: 8128be6404b6aa6f17d4c42aae9ec103
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"Secondly, many ME interventions result in immediate GHG emissions \r\nsavings (short-term), for example, light-weighting products, reusing \r\ntoday's product components, and improving manufacturing yields. \r\nYet, for other ME actions emissions savings are delayed temporally \r\n(long-term). For example, designing a  product for future reuse, or \r\nwith a  longer life, only reaps emissions savings at the end of the \r\nproduct life, when emissions for a replacement product are avoided. \r\nMany durable products have long lifetimes (cars >10 years, buildings \r\n>40 years) which requires dynamic modelling of material stocks, over \r\ntime, to enable these actions to be included in scenario modelling \r\nactivities. Consequently, much effort has been invested recently \r\nto model material stocks in use, to estimate their lifetimes, and \r\nanticipate the future waste and replenishment materials to maintain \r\nexisting stocks and grow the material stock base"


id: a28517a131d92f7d10523e39c413ddf3
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content:
" Dynamic material \r\nmodels have been applied to material and product sectors, at the \r\ncountry and global level. These include, for example: vehicles stocks \r\nin the UK (Serrenho et al. 2017; Craglia and Cullen 2020) and in \r\nChina (Liu et al. 2020); buildings stocks in the UK (Cabrera Serrenho \r\net al. 2019), China (Hong et al. 2016; Cao et al. 2018, 2019) and \r\nthe European Union (Sandberg et al. 2016); electronic equipment \r\nin Switzerland (Thiebaud et al. 2017); specific material stocks, such \r\nas cement (Cao et al. 2020, 2017), construction materials (Sverdrup \r\net al. 2017; Habert et al. 2020), plastics (Geyer et al. 2017), copper \r\n(Daehn et al. 2017), and all metals (Elshkaki et al. 2018); all materials \r\nin China (Jiang et al. 2019), Switzerland (Heeren and Hellweg 2019) \r\nand the world (Krausmann et al. 2017)."


id: 82baf084ccd847d061fb0d2d14bd5453
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content:
"These two advances in the knowledge base have allowed the initial \r\ninclusion of some ME strategies in energy and climate change \r\nscenario models. The International Energy Agency (IEA) first created \r\na  ME scenario (MES) in 2015, with an estimated 17% reduction \r\nin industrial energy demand in 2040 (IEA 2015). The World Energy \r\nOutlook report includes a  dedicated sub-chapter with calculations \r\nexplicitly on industrial material efficiency (IEA 2019c). They also \r\ninclude ME options in their modelling frameworks and reporting, \r\nfor example for petrochemicals (IEA 2018a), and in the Material \r\nEfficiency in Clean Energy Transitions report (IEA 2019b). In Grubler \r\net al. (2018) 1.5degC Low Energy Demand (LED) scenario, global \r\nmaterial output decreases by 20% from today, by 2050, with one\u0002third due to dematerialisation, and two-thirds due to ME, resulting \r\nin significant emissions savings"


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content:
" Material Economics' analysis of \r\nIndustrial Transformation 2050 (Material Economics 2019), found \r\nthat resource efficiency and circular economy measures (i.e.,  ME) \r\ncould almost halve the 530 MtCO2 yr-1emitted by the basic materials \r\nsectors in the EU by 2050. Finally, the Emissions Gap Report, UNEP \r\n(2019) includes an assessment of potential material efficiency \r\nsavings in residential buildings and cars."


id: bd6e1bd64659a707eb348c15df4705ae
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content:
"Micro level: More firms have begun to implement the concept of CE, \r\nparticularly multi-national companies, since they believe that multiple \r\nbenefits can be obtained from CE efforts, and it has become common \r\nacross sectors (D'Amato et al. 2019). Typical CE tools and policies \r\nat this level include cleaner production, eco-design, environmental \r\nlabelling, process synthesis, and green procurement. For instance, \r\nleading chemical companies are incorporating CE into their industrial \r\npractices, for example, through the design of more recyclable \r\nplastics, a differentiated and market-driven portfolio of resins, films \r\nand adhesives that deliver a total package that is more sustainable, \r\ncost-efficient and capable of meeting new packaging and plastics \r\npreferences. Problematically, at the same time the plastics industry \r\nis improving recyclability, it has, for example, been expanding into \r\nmarkets without recycling capacity (Mah 2021)"


id: 85339bdd2c85c2463a9c16ad156a12b6
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" Similarly, automakers \r\nare pursuing strategies to increase the portion of new vehicles that \r\nare fully recyclable when they reach the end of life, with increasing \r\nambitions for using recycled material, largely motivated by end-of\u0002life vehicle regulations. This will require networks that are available \r\nto collect and sort all the materials in vehicles, and policy incentives \r\nto do it (Wiebe et al. 2019; Soo et al. 2021)."


id: 4ecf23464d8b83a8570b56c1ddc5505b
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content:
"Circular economy (CE) is another effective approach to mitigate \r\nindustrial GHG emissions and has been widely promoted worldwide \r\nsince the fourth IPCC assessment report (AR4). From an industrial \r\npoint of view, CE focuses on closing the loop for materials and energy \r\nflows by incorporating policies and strategies for more efficient \r\nenergy, materials and water consumption, while emitting minimal \r\nwaste to the environment (Geng et al. 2013). Moving away from \r\na linear mode of production (sometimes referred to as an 'extract\u0002produce-use-discard' model), CE promotes the design of durable \r\ngoods that can be easily repaired, with components that can be \r\nreused, remanufactured, and recycled (Wiebe et al. 2019). In particular, \r\nsince CE promotes reduction, reuse and recycling, a large amount of \r\nenergy and GHG-intense virgin material processing can be reduced, \r\nleading to significant carbon emission reductions"


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content:
" For example, in \r\nthe case of aluminium, the energy efficiency of primary production \r\nis relatively close to best available technology (Figure 11.8), while \r\nswitching to production using recycled materials requires only about \r\n5% as much energy (Section 11.4.1.4). However, careful evaluation \r\nis needed from a lifecycle perspective since some recycling activities "


id: 68afc5d4767dd38d7f929b121da71924
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"exchanges among tenant companies, which can specifically help \r\nsmall- and medium-sized enterprises to improve their growth and \r\ncompetitiveness. From a climate perspective, this indicates significant \r\nindustrial emission mitigation since the extraction, processing \r\nof virgin materials and the final disposal of industrial wastes are \r\nmore energy intensive. Also, careful site selection of such parks can \r\nfacilitate the use of renewable energy. Due to these advantages, \r\neco-industrial parks have been actively promoted, especially in East \r\nAsian countries, such as China, Japan and the Republic of Korea \r\n(South Korea), where national indicators and governance exist (Geng \r\net al. 2019). For instance, the successful implementation of industrial \r\nsymbiosis at Dalian Economic and Technological Development \r\nZone has achieved significant co-benefits, including GHG-emission \r\nreduction, economic and social benefits, and improved ecosystem \r\nfunctions (Liu et al. 2018)"


id: 1c81e56ad94df0a14e92bb330b73ae9e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" Another case at Ulsan industrial park, \r\nSouth Korea, estimated that 60,522 tonnes of CO2 were avoided \r\nannually through industrial symbiosis between two companies \r\n(Kim et al. 2018b). The case of China shows the great potential of \r\nimplementing these measures, estimating 111 million tonnes of CO2\r\nequivalent will be reduced in 213 national-level industrial parks in \r\n2030 compared with 2015 (Guo et al. 2018). As such, South Korea's \r\nnational eco-industrial park project has reduced over 4.7 million \r\ntonnes of CO2 equivalent through their industrial symbiosis efforts \r\n(Park et al. 2019). Meso-level CE solutions have been identified as \r\nessential for industrial decarbonisation (Section  11.4.3). Moreover, \r\nwaste prevention as the top of the so-called 'waste hierarchy' can be \r\npromoted on the meso level for specific materials or product systems"


id: 68b9b24b16f7084c11a1ec787e5227f9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" \r\nFor instance, the European Environment Agency published a report \r\non plastic waste prevention approaches in all 28 EU-member states \r\n(Wilts and Bakas 2019). However, challenges exist for industrial \r\nsymbiosis activities, such as inter-firm contractual uncertainties, \r\nthe lack of synergy infrastructure, and the regulations that hamper \r\nreuse and recycling. Therefore, necessary legal reforms are needed to \r\naddress these implementation barriers."


id: 3565824f373b645f16411ba85e85864f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 5810
content:
"of about 27% in metal extraction to 8% in fossil fuel extraction \r\nand use, 8% in forestry products, and about 7% in non-metallic \r\nminerals, indicating significant climate change benefits. A macro\u0002perspective calculation on the circulation of iron in Japan's future \r\nsociety shows that CO2 emissions from the steel sector can be \r\nreduced by 56% as per the following assumptions: the amount \r\nrecovered from social stock is the same as the amount of inflow, \r\nand all scrap was used domestically, and the export of steel \r\nproducts is halved (LCS 2018). A  key challenge is to go beyond \r\nensuring proper waste management to setting metrics, targets \r\nand incentives to preserve the incorporated value in specific waste \r\nstreams. Estimations for Germany have shown that despite recycling \r\nrates of 64% for all solid-waste streams, these activities only lead \r\nto a  resource-use reduction of only 18% (Steger et al. 2019)"


id: b28bbfe49e14aee4076fef61eef83d8b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 25611
content:
" In \r\ngeneral, the identification of the most appropriate CE method \r\nfor different countries requires understanding and information \r\nexchange on background conditions, local policies and myriad \r\nother factors influencing material flows from the local up to the \r\nglobal level (Tapia Carlos et al. 2019). Also, an information platform \r\nshould be created at the national level so that all the stakeholders \r\ncan share their CE technologies and expertise, information (such \r\nas materials/energy/water consumption data), and identify the \r\npotential synergy opportunities."


id: c9fc49276c4b67ceeabb09609a6595d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 29332
content:
"Macro level: The macro level uses both micro- and meso-level \r\ntools within a  broader policy strategy, addressing the specific \r\nchallenge of CE as a cross-cutting policy (Wilts et al. 2016). More \r\nsynergy opportunities exist beyond the boundary of one industrial \r\npark. This indicates the necessity of scaling up industrial symbiosis \r\nto urban symbiosis. Urban symbiosis is defined as the use of by\u0002products (waste) from cities as alternative raw materials for energy \r\nsources for industrial operations (Sun et al. 2017). It is based on \r\nsynergistic opportunity arising from geographic proximity through \r\nthe transfer of physical sources (waste materials) for environmental \r\nand economic benefits. Japan is the first country to promote urban \r\nsymbiosis. For instance, the Kawasaki urban symbiosis efforts can \r\nsave over 114,000 tonnes of CO2 emissions annually (Ohnishi \r\net al. 2017)"


id: f09dd8cd62a719351202d1358b5d7d50
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 35358
content:
" Another simulation study indicates that Shanghai (the \r\nlargest Chinese city) has the potential to save up to 16.8 MtCO2\r\nthrough recycling all the available wastes (Dong et al. 2018). \r\nAs such, the simulation of urban-energy-symbiosis networks in \r\nUlsan, South Korea, indicates that 243,396 tCO2\r\n-1 yr-1 emission \r\nand USD48 million yr-1 fuel cost can be saved (Kim et al. 2018a). \r\nMoreover, Wiebe et al. (2019) estimate that the adoption of the \r\nCE can lead to a  significantly lower global material extraction \r\ncompared to a baseline. Their global results range from a decrease "


id: 7af45727ac6a1edd8e96204ca3655e3a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16935
content:
"Waste heat to power (WHP), or Recycle in NEDO's terms, is also an \r\nunder-utilised option. For example, a study for the cement, glass and \r\niron industries in China showed that current technology enables only \r\n7-13% of waste heat to be used for power generation. With improved \r\ntechnologies, potentially 40-57% of waste heat with temperatures \r\nabove 150degC could be used for power generation via heat recovery. \r\nThermal power fluctuations can be a challenge and negatively affect \r\nthe operation and economic feasibility of heat recovery power \r\nsystems such as steam and/or organic Rankine cycle. In such cases, \r\nlatent heat storage technology and intermediate storage units \r\nmay be applied (Jimenez-Arreola et al. 2018). The development of \r\nthermoelectric conversion materials that produce power from unused \r\nheat and energy harvested from a higher temperature environment \r\nis also progressing, with several possible applications in industrial \r\nprocesses (Gayner and Kar 2016; Jood et al"


id: 78037b1736ce738941094e641d7c4fbe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16445
content:
" 2018; Lv et al. 2018; \r\nOhta et al. 2018). A potential early application in industry is to power \r\nwireless sensors, a  niche that uses microwatts or milliwatts, and \r\navoid power cables (Champier 2017)."


id: 606988084884fe5c217f59fd9b80b4ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
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vector_id: 12741
content:
"Reduce refers to reducing heat needs via improved thermal insulation, \r\nfor example, where porous type insulators have been developed \r\nwith thermal conductivity half of what is traditionally achieved by \r\nheat-resistant bricks under conditions of high compressive strength \r\n(Fukushima and Yoshizawa 2016). Reuse refers to waste heat \r\nrecovery. A  study for the EU identified a  waste heat potential of \r\nabout 300 TWh yr-1, corresponding to about 10% of total energy \r\nuse in industry. About 50% of this was below 200degC, about 25% at \r\ntemperatures 200degC-500degC, and 25% at temperatures of 500degC and \r\nabove (Papapetrou et al. 2018). A survey conducted in Japan showed \r\nthat 9% of the input energy is lost as waste heat, of which heat below \r\n199degC accounts for 68% and that below 149degC was 29% (NEDO \r\n2019). McBrien et al. (2016) identified that in the steel sector process \r\nheat recovery presently saves 1"


id: bccf165e34b1c1408b5f1b7d5f52f4a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 27276
content:
"8 GJ per tonne of hot rolled steel, \r\nwhile integrated across all production processes heat recovery with \r\nconventional heat exchange could save 2.5 GJ t-1, and it scales up to "


id: fb3b2d61b5603b031f5ef4a4fc4f9c39
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 37034
content:
"Energy management systems to reduce energy costs in an integrated \r\nand systematic manner were first developed in the 1970s, mainly in \r\nlow-energy-resource countries, for example, by establishing energy \r\nmanagers and institutionalising management targets (Tanaka 2011). \r\nStrategic energy management has since then evolved and been \r\npromoted through the establishment of dedicated organisational \r\ninfrastructures for energy-use optimisation, such as ISO-50001 \r\nwhich specifies the requirements for establishing, implementing, \r\nmaintaining, and improving an energy management system (Biel and \r\nGlock 2016; Tunnessen and Macri 2017). Digitalisation, sometimes \r\nreferred to as Industry 4"


id: 96daa32a275d1d8012edd564a2a39da5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21250
content:
"0, facilitates further improvements in process \r\ncontrol and optimisation through technology development involving \r\nsensors, communications, analytics, digital twins, machine learning, \r\nvirtual reality, and other simulation and computing technologies \r\n(Rogers 2018), all of which can improve energy efficiency. One \r\nexample is combustion control systems, where big data analysis of \r\nfactors affecting boiler efficiency, operation optimisation and load \r\nforecasting have shown that it can lead to energy savings of 9% \r\n(Wang et al. 2017)."


id: c08a7770ad4db95410a19cba2a74b8f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 27852
content:
"Biofuels come in many forms, including ones that are nearly identical \r\nto fossil fuels but sourced from biogenic sources. Solid biomass, either \r\ndirect from wood chips, lignin or processed pellets, is the most commonly \r\nused renewable fuel in industry today and  is occasionally used in \r\ncement kilns and boilers. Biomethane, biomethanol, and bioethanol \r\nare all commercially made today using fermentation and anaerobic \r\ndigestion techniques and are mostly 'drop-in' compatible with \r\nfossil fuel equivalents. In principle they cycle carbon in and out of \r\nthe atmosphere, but their lifecycle GHG intensities are typically not \r\nGHG neutral due to land-use changes, soil carbon depletion, fertiliser \r\nuse, and other dynamics (Hepburn et al. 2019), and are highly case \r\nspecific. Most commercial biofuel feedstocks come from agricultural \r\n(e.g"


id: 837749fb8155ee8af6e931fcd9d7c4b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 18217
content:
",  corn) and food waste sources, and the feedstock is limited; \r\nto meet higher levels of biomass use a  transition to using higher \r\ncellulose feedstocks like straw, switchgrass and wood waste, available \r\nin much larger quantities, must be fully commercialised and deployed. \r\nSignificant efforts have been made to make ethanol from cellulosic \r\nbiomass, which promises much higher quantities, lower costs, and \r\nlower intensities, but commercialisation efforts, with a few exceptions, \r\nhave largely not succeeded (Padella et al. 2019). The IEA estimates, \r\nhowever, that up to 20% of today's fossil methane use, including by \r\nindustry, could be met with biomethane (IEA 2020g) by 2040, using \r\na mixture of feedstocks and production techniques. Biofuel use may \r\nalso be critical for producing negative emissions when combined with \r\ncarbon capture and storage (i.e., bioenergy with carbon capture and \r\nstorage - BECCS)"


id: 7a04016ce71e9eefb723d40a75ff60d1
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vector_id: 16770
content:
" Most production routes for biofuels, biochemicals \r\nand biogas generate large side streams of concentrated CO2 which \r\nis easily captured, and which could become a  source of negative \r\nemissions (Sanchez et al. 2018) (Section 11.3.6). Finally, it should be \r\nnoted that biofuel combustion can, if inadequately controlled, have \r\nsubstantial negative local air quality effects, with implications for \r\nSDGs 3, 7 and 11."


id: bf786d9c7d7e06e46336db10b18f04e9
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vector_id: 27682
content:
"(Lechtenbohmer et al. 2016; Palm et al. 2016; Ahman et al. 2017; \r\nAxelson et al. 2018; Bataille et al. 2018a; Davis et al. 2018; UKCCC \r\n2019b; Material Economics 2019). Electricity is a flexible energy carrier \r\nthat can be made from many forms of primary energy, with high \r\npotential process improvements in terms of end-use efficiency (Eyre \r\n2021), quality and process controllability, digitisability, and no direct \r\nlocal air pollutants (McMillan et al. 2016; Jadun et al. 2017; Deason \r\net al. 2018; Mai et al. 2018). The net-GHG effect of electrification \r\nis contingent on how the electricity is made, and because total \r\noutput increases can be expected, for full effect it should be made \r\nwith a very low GHG intensity primary source (i.e., <50 g CO2 kWh-1: \r\ne.g.,  hydroelectricity, nuclear energy, wind, solar photovoltaics, or \r\nfossil fuels with 95+% carbon capture and storage (IPCC 2014))"


id: 6a6cfd75dbaea78dce9629c7d4c94774
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vector_id: 14351
content:
" This \r\nhas strong implications for the electricity sector and its generation \r\nmix when the goal is a net-zero-emissions electricity system. Despite \r\ntheir falling costs, progressively higher mixes of variable wind and \r\nsolar on a given grid will require support from grid flexibility sources, \r\nincluding demand response, more transmission, storage on multiple \r\ntime scales, or firm low-to-negative emissions generation sources \r\n(e.g., nuclear energy, hydrogen fuel cells or turbines, biofuels, fossil or \r\nbiofuels with CCS, and geothermal) to moderate costs (Jenkins et al. \r\n2018; Sepulveda et al. 2018; Williams et al. 2021). Regions that may \r\nbe slower to reduce the GHG intensity of their electricity production \r\nwill likely need to consider more aggressive use of other measures, \r\nlike energy and material efficiency or bioenergy."


id: 42e3b8ea36e7d2c0f8dbf3203e32149d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"Increased electrification of industry will result in increased overall \r\ndemand for electricity. For example, 75 TWh of electricity was \r\nused by steel in the EU in 2015 (out of the 1000 TWh total used \r\nby industry), Material Economics (2019), varying between their new \r\nprocess, circularity and CCUS scenarios, projects increased demand \r\nto 355 (+373%), 214 (+185%) and 238 (+217%) TWh. These values \r\nare consistent with Vogl et al. (2018), which projects a  tripling of \r\nelectricity demand in the German or Swedish steel industries if \r\nhydrogen-direct reduced iron and electric arc furnace steel-making \r\n(DRI EAFs) replaces BF-BOFs. Material Economics (2019) was \r\nconservative with its use of electricity in chemical production, making \r\npreferential use of biofeedstocks and some CCUS, and electricity \r\ndemand still rose from 118 TWh to 510, 395 and 413 TWh in their \r\nthree scenarios"


id: 9e3dcd90d9c79da2f851920d12c4d0d3
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content:
" Bazzanella and Ausfelder (2017), exploring deeper \r\nreductions from the chemical sector using more electrochemistry, \r\nprojected scenarios with higher electricity demands of 960-4900 TWh \r\n(140% of the projected available clean electricity at the time) with \r\nmaximum electricity use. In counterpoint, however, with revised \r\nwind capabilities and costs, the IEA (2019e) Offshore Wind Outlook \r\nindicates that ten times the current EU electricity use could be \r\nproduced if necessary. Greater use of electro-catalytic versus thermo\u0002catalytic chemistry, as projected by De Luna et al. (2019), could \r\ngreatly reduce these electricity needs, but the technology readiness \r\nlevels are currently low"


id: 9ee5a131c5bc24d29c9afb5faf7acb8d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" Finally, the UKCCC (2019b), which focused \r\nprimarily on CCS for industry in its 'Further Ambition' scenario (the \r\nUK currently consumes about 300 TWh), in its supplementary 'Further \r\nElectrification' scenario projects an additional 300 TWh for general \r\nelectrolysis needs and another 200 TWh for synthetic fuel production."


id: 777fc44c6ae5befcecc649f87ef19142
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 16354
content:
"For these reasons, lighter, manufacturing-orientated industries are \r\nmore readily electrifiable than heavier industry like steel, cement, \r\nchemicals and other sectors with high heat and feedstock needs. \r\nSteam boilers, curing, drying and small-scale process heating, with \r\ntypically lower maximum heat temperature needs (<200degC-250degC) \r\nare readily electrifiable with appropriate fossil-fuel-to-electricity \r\nprice ratios (accounting for capital costs and efficiencies), and direct \r\ninduction and infrared heating are available for higher temperature \r\nneeds. These practices are uncommon outside regions with ample \r\nhydroelectric power due to the currently relatively low cost of \r\ncoal, natural gas and heating oil, and especially when there is no \r\ncarbon combustion cost. Madeddu et al. (2020) argue up to 78% of \r\nEurope's industrial energy requirements are electrifiable through \r\nexisting commercial technologies. In contrast, Mai et al"


id: fb027bc49b97e6eff4ea12baa714659c
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content:
" (2018) \r\nsaw only a  moderate industrial heat supply electrification in their \r\nhigh-electrification scenario for the US. Electrification has also been \r\nexplored in: raw and recycled steel (Fischedick et al. 2014b; Vogl et al. \r\n2018); ammonia (Bazzanella and Ausfelder 2017; Philibert 2017a); \r\nand chemicals (Palm et al. 2016; Bazzanella and Ausfelder 2017). "


id: ebd7482880cb118ec793623288b396fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 34609
content:
"Around 70 Mt yr-1 of pure hydrogen is produced today: 76% from \r\nnatural gas and 23% from coal, resulting in emissions of roughly \r\n830 MtCO2 yr-1 in 2016/17 (IEA 2019f), or 4.7% of global industrial \r\ndirect and indirect emissions (waste excluded; Table  11.1). Fuels \r\nrefining (about 410 MtCO2 yr-1) and production of ammonia \r\n(420 MtCO2 yr-1) largely dominate its uses. Another 45 Mt hydrogen is \r\nbeing produced along with other gases, on purpose or as by-products, \r\nand used as fuel, to make methanol or as a chemical reactant (IEA \r\n2019f). Very low and potentially zero GHG (depending on the energy \r\nsource) hydrogen can be made via: electrolysis separation of water \r\ninto hydrogen and oxygen (Glenk and Reichelstein 2019), also known \r\nas 'green H2'; electrothermal separation of water, as done in some \r\nnuclear plants (Bicer and Dincer 2017); partial oxidation of coal or \r\nnaphtha or steam/auto methane reforming (SMR/ATR) combined \r\nwith CCS (Leeson et al"


id: e062285df12f617cd60223db165d6daa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 32805
content:
" 2017), or 'blue H2'; methane pyrolysis, where \r\nthe hydrogen and carbon are separated thermally and the carbon \r\nis left as a solid (Abbas and Wan Daud 2010; Ashik et al. 2015), or \r\nvia biomass gasification (Ericsson 2017), which could be negative \r\nemissions if the CO2 from the gasification process is sequestered. "


id: 4e8e68b7033bf6f00dfc8ac0993ed440
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"Carbon is an important and highly flexible building block for a wide \r\nrange of fuels, organic chemicals and materials including methanol, \r\nethanol, olefins, plastics, textiles, and wood and paper products. In this \r\nchapter we define CCS as requiring return of CO2 from combustion \r\nor process gases or ambient air to the geosphere for geological time \r\nperiods (i.e., thousands of years) (IPCC 2005; IEA 2009; Bruhn et al. \r\n2016; IEA 2019g). CCU is defined as being where carbon (as CO or \r\nCO2) is captured from one process and reused for another, reducing \r\nemissions from the initial process, but is then potentially but not \r\nnecessarily released to the atmosphere in following processes (Bruhn \r\net al. 2016; Detz and van der Zwaan 2019; Tanzer and Ramirez 2019). \r\nIn both cases the net effect on atmospheric emissions depends on the \r\ninitial source of the carbon, be it from a fossil fuel, from biomass, or \r\nfrom direct air capture (Cuellar-Franca and Azapagic 2015; Hepburn \r\net al"


id: 96cd6b92095ef6352f8668a8acc69355
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 21242
content:
"While CCS and CCU share common capture technologies, what \r\nhappens to the CO2 and therefore the strategies that will employ \r\nthem can be very different. CCS can help maintain near-CO2 neutrality \r\nfor fossil CO2 that passes through the process, with highly varying \r\npartially negative emissions if the source is biogenic (Hepburn et al. \r\n2019), and fully negative emissions if the source is air capture, all \r\nnot considering the energy used to drive the above processes. CCS \r\nhas been covered in other IPCC publications at length, for example, \r\nIPCC (2005), and in most mitigation-oriented assessments since, \r\nfor example, the IEA's Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) 2020 \r\nand Net Zero scenario reports (IEA 2021a, 2020a). The potentials and \r\ncosts for CCS in industry vary considerably due to the diversity of \r\nindustrial processes (Leeson et al. 2017), as well as the volume and \r\npurity of different flows of CO2 (Naims 2016); Kearns et al. (2021) \r\nprovide a recent review"


id: 70c93c071956146fdfb95fa60a08df25
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 15372
content:
" As a general rule it is not possible to capture \r\nall the CO2 emissions from an industrial plant. To achieve zero or \r\nnegative emissions, CCS would need to be combined with some use of \r\nsustainably sourced biofuel or feedstock, or the remaining emissions \r\nwould need to be offset by carbon dioxide removal (CDR) elsewhere."


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"In the case of CCU, CO and CO2 are captured and subsequently \r\nconverted into valuable products (e.g., building materials, chemicals \r\nand synthetic fuels) (Styring et al. 2011; Bruhn et al. 2016; Artz et al. \r\n2018; Brynolf et al. 2018; Daggash et al. 2018; Breyer et al. 2019; \r\nKatelhon et al. 2019; Vreys et al. 2019). CCU has been envisioned as part \r\nof the 'circular economy' but conflicting expectations on CCU and its \r\nassociation or not with CCS leads to different and contested framings \r\n(Palm and Nikoleris 2021). The duration of the CO2 storage in these \r\nproducts varies from days to millennia according to the application, \r\npotentially but not necessarily replacing new fossil, biomass or direct \r\nair capture feedstocks, before meeting one of several possible fates: \r\npermanent burial, decomposition, recycling or combustion, all with \r\ndiffering GHG implications"


id: 9d47b450ea5345dd01cfbe9ccdeaf536
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" While the environmental assessment \r\nof CCS projects is relatively straightforward, however, this is not \r\nthe case for CCU technologies. The net-GHG mitigation impact of \r\nCCU depends on several factors (e.g., the capture rate, the energy \r\nrequirements, the lifetime of utilisation products, the production \r\nroute that is substituted, and associated room for improvement \r\nalong the traditional route) and has to be determined by lifecycle CO2\r\nor GHG analysis (e.g., Nocito and Dibenedetto 2020; and Bruhn et al. \r\n2016). For example, steel-mill gases containing carbon monoxide and \r\ncarbon dioxide can be used as feedstock together with hydrogen for \r\nproducing chemicals. In this way, the carbon originally contained in \r\nthe coke used in the blast furnace is used again, or cascaded, and \r\nemissions are reduced but not brought to zero. If fossil-sourced CO2\r\nis only reused once and then emitted, the maximum reduction is 50% \r\n(Tanzer and Ramirez 2019)"


id: aefa0ddb18bae388096902a16beb4c1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" The logic of using steel-mill CO and CO2\r\ncould equally be applied to gasified biomass, however, with a  far \r\nlower net-GHG footprint, likely negative, which CCU fed by fossil \r\nfuels cannot be if end-use combustion is involved.\r\nPartly because of the complexity of the lifecycle analysis accounting, \r\nthe literature on CCU is not always consistent in terms of the net\u0002GHG impacts of strategies. For example, Artz et al. (2018), focused not "


id: 3b1991081a5ada2a78ec77523feacc46
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 6656
content:
"For concentrated CO2 sources (e.g., cleaning of wellhead formation \r\ngas to make it suitable for the pipeline network, hydrogen \r\nproduction using steam methane reforming, ethanol fermentation, \r\nor from combustion of fossil fuels with oxygen in a  nitrogen-free \r\nenvironment, i.e.,  'oxycombustion') CCS is already amenable to \r\ncommercial oil and gas reinjection techniques used to eliminate \r\nhydrogen sulphide gas and brines at prices of USD10-40 tCO2-eq-1\r\nsequestered (Wilson et al. 2003; Leeson et al. 2017). Most currently \r\noperating CCS facilities take advantage of concentrated CO2 flows, \r\nfor example, from formation gas cleaning on the Snoevit and Sleipner \r\nplatforms in Norway, from syngas production for the Al Reyadah \r\nDRI steel plant in Abu Dhabi, and from SMR hydrogen production \r\non the Quest upgrader in Alberta. Since concentrated process CO2\r\nemissions are often exempted from existing cap and trade systems, \r\nthese opportunities for CCS have largely gone unexploited"


id: 3ef84c3cde16a189a5e0c678870f90a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 7290
content:
"USD40 to 80 tCO2\r\n-1, increasing over time. The high end represents \r\na future in which synthetic fuels have sizeable market shares, due \r\nto cost reductions and policy drivers. The low end - which is itself \r\nconsiderable - represents very modest penetration into the methane \r\nand fuels markets, but it could also be an overestimate if CO2-\r\nderived products do not become cost competitive with alternative \r\nclean energy vectors such as hydrogen or ammonia, or with direct \r\nsequestration. Brynolf et al. (2018) indicates that a key cost variable \r\nwill be the cost of electrolysers for producing hydrogen. Katelhon \r\net al. (2019) estimate that up to 3.5 GtC yr-1 could be displaced from \r\nchemical production by 2030 using CCU, but this would require clean \r\nelectricity equivalent to 55% of estimated global power production, \r\nat the same time other sectors' demand would also be rising. \r\nMac Dowell et al"


id: 7140acc74a87eda3334cbc54014dd05e
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content:
" (2017) suggest that while CCU, and specifically \r\nCO2-based enhanced oil recovery, may be an important economic \r\nincentive for early CCS projects (up to 4-8% of required mitigation \r\nby 2050), it is unlikely the chemical conversion of CO2 for CCU will \r\naccount for more than 1% of overall mitigation."


id: 7d3790899b3cb52ed982649df8e41a7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 17282
content:
"There are several potential crucial transitional roles for synthetic \r\nhydrocarbons and alcohols (e.g., methane, methanol, ethanol, ethylene, \r\ndiesel and jet fuel) constructed using fossil, biomass or direct carbon \r\ncapture (DAC) and CCU (Breyer et al. 2015; Dimitriou et al.  2015; \r\nSternberg and Bardow 2015; Fasihi et al. 2017; Bataille et al. 2018a; \r\nBataille 2020a). They can allow reductions in the GHG intensity of \r\nhigh-value legacy transport, industry and real estate that currently \r\nruns on fossil fuels but cannot be easily or readily retrofitted. They can \r\nbe used by existing long-lived energy and feedstock infrastructure, \r\ntransport and storage, which can compensate for seasonal supply \r\nfluctuations and contribute to enhancing energy security (Ampelli \r\net al. 2015). Finally, they can reduce the GHG intensity of end uses \r\nthat are very difficult to run on electricity, hydrogen or ammonia \r\n(e.g.,  long-haul aviation)"


id: 43e4ab7a85d52143fec8ce63d88042bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" However, their equivalent mitigation \r\ncost today would be very high (USD960-1440 tCO2-eq-1), with \r\nthe potential to fall to USD24-324 tCO2-eq-1) with commercial \r\neconomies of scale, with very high uncertainty (Hepburn et al. 2019; \r\nIEA 2020a; Ueckerdt et al. 2021)."


id: afd0193147997e75d6ac3e91215ada8d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 25182
content:
"Finally, there is another class of CCU activities associated with \r\ncarbonation of alkaline industrial wastes (including iron and steel \r\nslags, coal fly ash, mining and mineral processing wastes, incinerator \r\nresidues, cement and concrete wastes, and pulp and paper mill \r\nwastes) using waste or atmospheric CO2. Given the large volume \r\nof alkaline wastes produced by industry, capture estimates are as \r\nhigh as 4 GtCO2 yr-1 (Cuellar-Franca and Azapagic 2015; Ebrahimi \r\net al. 2017; Kaliyavaradhan and Ling 2017; Pasquier et al. 2018; \r\nHuang et al. 2019c; Pan et al. 2020; Zhang et al. 2020) However, as \r\nsome alkaline wastes are already used directly as supplementary \r\ncementitious materials to reduce clinker-to-cement ratios, and their \r\nabundant availability in the future is questionable (e.g., steel blast \r\nfurnace slag and coal fly ash), there will be a  strong competition \r\nbetween mitigation uses (Section  11.4"


id: 93030b3283f399586e51bfcec1941165
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vector_id: 20647
content:
"2), and the potential for \r\ndirect removal by carbonation is estimated at about 1  GtCO2 yr-1\r\n(Renforth 2019)."


id: c0e0ff3de7ad450b6179b44ba0ab1b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 27916
content:
"A very large and important uncertainty is the long-term demand \r\nfor hydrocarbon and alcohol fuels (whether fossil-, biomass- or \r\nDAC-based), chemical feedstocks (e.g.,  methanol and ethylene) \r\nand materials, and competition for biomass feedstock with other \r\npriorities, including agriculture, biodiversity and other proximate \r\nland-use needs, as well as need for negative emissions through \r\nBECCS. The current global plastics production of around 350 Mt yr-1\r\nis almost entirely based on petroleum feedstock and recycling rates \r\nare very low. If this or future demand were to be 100% biomass\u0002based it would require tens of exajoules of biomass feedstock (Meys \r\net al. 2021). If demand can be lowered and recycling increased \r\n(mechanical as well as chemical) the demand for biomass feedstock \r\ncan be much lower (Material Economics 2019)"


id: a727841b19e8ae2eb0de44e0f1c56102
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" Promising routes in \r\nthe short-term would be to utilise CO2 from anaerobic digestion for \r\nbiogas and fermentation for ethanol in the production of methane or \r\nmethanol (Ericsson 2017); methanol can be converted into ethylene \r\nand propylene in a  methanol-to-olefins process and used in the \r\nproduction of plastics (Box 11.2). New process configurations where \r\nhydrogen is integrated into biomass conversion routes to increase \r\nyields and utilise all carbon in the feedstock are relatively unexplored \r\n(Ericsson 2017; De Luna et al. 2019)."


id: da62d0b7940339ac8852590c98b2022f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"and interactive technical deep decarbonisation pathways for GHG\u0002intense industrial sectors, and how they interact with the rest of the \r\neconomy (Denis-Ryan et al. 2016; Ahman et al. 2017; Wesseling et al. \r\n2017; Axelson et al. 2018; Davis et al. 2018; Bataille et al. 2018a; \r\nBataille 2020a). It is a  common finding across this literature and \r\na  related scenario literature (Energy Transitions Commission 2018; \r\nMaterial Economics 2019; UKCCC 2019a,b; IEA 2019b, 2020a; CAT \r\n2020; IEA 2021a) that deep decarbonisation of industry requires \r\nintegrating all available options. There is no 'silver bullet' and so \r\nall behavioural and technological options have to be mobilised, \r\nwith more emphasis required on the policy mechanisms necessary \r\nto engage a challenging transition in the coming decades in highly \r\ncompetitive, currently GHG-intense, price-sensitive sectors with \r\nlong-lived capital stock (Wesseling et al. 2017; Bataille et al"


id: 8b42a6706e7bdc9ba89a64613bdc7098
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"Circular economy introduces itself throughout, but mainly at the front \r\nend when designing materials and processes to be more materially \r\nefficient, efficient in use, and easy to recycle, and at the back end, \r\nwhen a material or product's services life has come to end, and it \r\nis time for recycling or sustainable disposal (Murray et al. 2017; \r\nKorhonen et al. 2018). The entire chain's potential will be maximised \r\nwhen these strategies are designed in ahead of time instead of \r\nconsidered on assembly, or as a retrofit (Allwood et al. 2012; Gonzalez \r\nHernandez et al. 2018a; IEA 2019b; Material Economics 2019; Bataille \r\n2020a). For example, when designing a building: (i) Is the building \r\nshell, interior mass and ducting orientated for passive heating and \r\ncooling, and can the shell and roof have building-integrated solar PV \r\nor added easily, with hard-to-retrofit wiring already incorporated? \r\n(ii) Are steel and high-quality concrete only used where really needed \r\n(i.e"


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", for shear, tension and compression strength), can sections be \r\nprefabricated off-site, can other materials be substituted, such as \r\nwood? (iii) Can the interior fittings be built with easy-to-recycle \r\nplastics or other sustainably disposable materials (e.g.,  wood)? \r\n(iv) Can this building potentially serve multiple purposes through its \r\nanticipated lifetime, are service conduits oversized and easy to access \r\nfor retrofitting? (v) When it is time to be taken apart, can pieces \r\nbe reused, and all componnents recycled at high purity levels, for \r\nexample, can all the copper wiring be easily be found and removed, "


id: a0302a54cc3d108e4292e40b810902b
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"For the period leading up to 2020, in terms of end-use allocation \r\nglobally, approximately 40% of steel is used for structures, \r\n20%  for industrial equipment, 18% for consumer products, \r\n13% for infrastructure, and 10% for vehicles (Bataille 2020b). The \r\nglobal production of crude steel increased by 41% between 2008 \r\nand 2020 (World Steel Association 2021) and its GHG emissions, \r\ndepending on the scope covered, is 3.7-4.1 GtCO2-eq. It represented \r\n20% of total global direct industrial emissions in 2019 accounting \r\nfor coke oven and blast furnace gases use (Crippa et al. 2021; Lamb \r\net al. 2021; Minx et al. 2021; Olivier and Peters 2018; World Steel \r\nAssociation 2021; IEA 2020a) (Figure  11.4 and Table  11.1). \r\nSteel production can be divided into primary production based on iron \r\nore and secondary production based on steel scrap"


id: fcdbe5186312eb4ecd1783f6ff4468a2
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" The blast furnace\u0002basic oxygen furnace route (BF-BOF) is the main primary steel route \r\nglobally, while the electric arc furnace (EAF) is the preferred process \r\nfor the less energy and emissions-intensive melting and alloying of \r\nrecycled steel scrap. The direct reduced iron (DRI) route is a lesser\u0002used route that replaces BFs for reducing iron ore, usually followed by \r\nan EAF. In 2019, 73% of global crude steel production was produced \r\nin BF-BOFs, while 26% was produced in EAFs, a nominal 5.6% of \r\nwhich is DRI (World Steel Association 2021)."


id: 9d1b24241075ee708df9f6fad0a9f024
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"The cement sector is regarded as a sector where mitigation options \r\nare especially narrow (Energy Transitions Commission 2018; Habert \r\net al. 2020). Cement is used as the glue to hold together sand, \r\ngravel and stone aggregates to make concrete, the most consumed \r\nmanufactured substance globally. The production of cement has been \r\nincreasing faster than the global population since the middle of the \r\nlast century (Scrivener et al. 2018). Despite significant improvements \r\nin energy efficiency over the last couple of decades (e.g., a systematic \r\nmove from wet to dry kilns with calciner preheaters feeding off the \r\nkilns), the direct emissions of cement production (the sum of energy \r\nand process emissions) are estimated to be 2.1-2.5 GtCO2-eq in 2019 \r\nor 14-17% of total global direct industrial GHG emissions (Lehne \r\nand Preston 2018; Bataille 2020a; Sanjuan et al. 2020; Crippa et al. \r\n2021; Hertwich 2021; Lamb et al. 2021) (Figure 11.4)"


id: 144bf61c7a22427547e02123069d257b
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" Typically, about \r\n40% of these direct emissions originate from process heating (e.g., for \r\ncalcium carbonate (limestone) decomposition into calcium oxide at \r\n850degC or higher, directly followed by combination with cementitious \r\nmaterials at about 1450degC to make clinker), while 60% are process \r\nCO2 emissions from the calcium carbonate decomposition (Kajaste \r\nand Hurme 2016; IEA and WBCSD 2018; Andrew 2019). Some of the \r\nCO2 is reabsorbed into concrete products and can be seen as avoided \r\nduring the decades-long life of the products; estimates of this flux \r\nvary between 15 and 30% of the direct emissions (Stripple et al. \r\n2018; Andersson et al. 2019; Schneider 2019; Cao et al. 2020; GCCA \r\n2021a). Some companies are mixing CO2 into hardening concrete, \r\nboth to dispose of the CO2 and more importantly reduce the need for \r\nbinder (Lim et al. 2019)."


id: d324289498362097377fb2bc1f227508
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"In addition, increases in material efficiency (e.g., more targeted steel \r\nuse per vehicle, building or piece of infrastructure) and increases in \r\nthe intensity of product use (e.g., sharing cars instead of owning them) \r\ncan contribute significantly to reduce emissions by reducing the need \r\nfor steel production. The IEA (2019b) suggested that up to 24% of \r\ncement and 40% of steel demand could be plausibly reduced through \r\nstrong material efficiency efforts by 2060. Potential material efficiency \r\ncontribution for the EU is estimated to be much higher - 48% (Material \r\nEconomics 2019). Recycling would cut the average CO2 emissions \r\nper tonne of steel produced by 60% (Material Economics 2019), but \r\nglobally by 2050 secondary steel production is limited to 40-56% in \r\nvarious scenarios (IEA 2019b), with 46% in the IEA (2021a) and up \r\nto 56% in 2050 in Xylia et al. (2016). It may scale up to 68% by 2070 \r\n(Xylia et al. 2016)"


id: dde894bc16ee6bc550fb4acc4634d6bc
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" CCU and more directly CCS are other options to \r\nreduce GHG emissions but depend on the full lifecycle net GHGs that \r\ncan be allocated to the process (Section 11.3.6). Bio-based fuels can \r\nalso substitute for some of the coal input, but due to other demands for \r\nbiomass this strategy is likely to be limited to specific cases."


id: fa098c592861d364d22ce07bd6135a5
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content:
"Ordinary Portland cement process CO2 emissions cannot be \r\navoided or reduced through the use of non-fossil energy sources. \r\nFor this reason, CCS technology, which could capture just the \r\nprocess emissions (e.g., the EU LEILAC project, which concentrates \r\nthe process emissions from the limestone calciner, see following \r\nparagraph) or both the energy and process-related CO2 emissions, is \r\noften mentioned as a potentially important element of an ambitious \r\nmitigation strategy in the cement sector. Different types of CCS \r\nprocesses can be deployed, including post-combustion technologies \r\nsuch as amine scrubbing and membrane-assisted CO2-liquefation, \r\noxycombustion in a  low-to-zero nitrogen environment (full or \r\npartial) to produce a  concentrated CO2 stream for capture and \r\ndisposal, or calcium-looping (Dean et al. 2011). The IEA puts cement \r\nCCS technologies at the technology readiness level (TRL) 6-8 (IEA \r\n2020h)"


id: d02cd171cf262066c5cee898256f56d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" These approaches have different strengths and weaknesses \r\nconcerning emission abatement potential, primary energy \r\nconsumption, costs and retrofittability (Hills et al. 2016; Gardarsdottir \r\net al. 2019; Voldsund et al. 2019). Use of biomass energy combined \r\nwith CCS has the possibility of generating partial negative emissions, \r\nwith the caveats introduced in Section 11.3.6 (Hepburn et al. 2019)."


id: 6b6dd1d471df85e11339307574d0b2f4
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"The energy-related emissions of cement production can also be reduced \r\nby using bioenergy solids, liquids or gases (TRL 9) (IEA and WBCSD \r\n2018), hydrogen or electricity (TRL 4  according to IEA (2020h)) for \r\ngenerating the high-temperature heat at the calciner - hydrogen and \r\nbioenergy co-burning could be complementary due to their respective \r\nfast-vs-slow combustion characteristics. In an approach pursued by the \r\nLEILAC research project, the calcination process step is carried out in \r\na steel vessel that is heated indirectly using natural gas (Hills et al. \r\n2017). The LEILAC approach makes it possible to capture the process\u0002related emissions in a comparatively pure CO2 stream, which reduces \r\nthe energy required for CO2 capture and purification. This technology \r\n(LEILAC in combination with CCS) could reduce total furnace emissions \r\nby up to 85% compared with an unabated, fossil fuelled cement plant, \r\ndepending on the type of energy sources used for heating (Hills et al"


id: 48cee019fcdd494018f2a4e85a92419
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vector_id: 8833
content:
" \r\n2017). In principle, the LEILAC approach allows the eventual potential \r\nelectrification of the calciner by electrically heating the steel enclosure \r\ninstead of using fossil burners."


id: aebfb93254f7ed0a37fd1c3c56f28e8
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content:
"The production of ammonia causes most CO2 emissions in the \r\nchemical industry, about 30% according to the IEA (2018a) and \r\nnearly one third according to Crippa et al. (2021), Lamb et al. (2021) \r\nand Minx et al. (2021). Ammonia is produced in a catalytic reaction \r\nbetween nitrogen and hydrogen  - the latter most often produced \r\nthrough natural gas reforming (Stork et al. 2018; Material Economics \r\n2019) and in some regions through coal gasification, which has \r\nseveral times higher associated CO2 emissions. Future low-carbon \r\noptions include hydrogen from electrolysis using low- or zero-carbon \r\nenergy sources (Philibert 2017a), natural gas reforming with CCS, or \r\nmethane pyrolysis, a process in which methane is transformed into \r\nhydrogen and solid carbon (Bazzanella and Ausfelder 2017; Material \r\nEconomics 2019; (Section 11.3.5 and Box 11.1)"


id: b35190a5c6557388dcf6aa065ea06766
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content:
" Electrifying ammonia \r\nproduction would lead to a decrease in total primary energy demand \r\ncompared to conventional production, but a  significant efficiency \r\nimprovement potential remains in novel synthesis processes (Wang \r\net al. 2018; Faria 2021). Combining renewable energy sources \r\nand flexibility measures in the production process could allow for \r\nlow-carbon ammonia production on all continents (Fasihi et al. \r\n2021). Steam cracking of naphtha and natural gas liquids for the \r\nproduction of olefins (i.e.,  ethylene, propylene and butylene), and \r\nother high-value chemicals is the second most CO2-emitting process \r\nin the chemical industry, accounting for another almost 20% of "


id: 720886e7dd9d762287d9a3a105b21350
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vector_id: 15567
content:
"In a net zero world carbon will still be needed for many chemical \r\nproducts, but the sector must also address the lifecycle emissions of \r\nits products which arise in the use phase, for example, CO2 released \r\nfrom urea fertilisers, or at the end of life, for example, the incineration \r\nof waste plastics which was estimated to emit 100 Mt globally in \r\n2015 (Zheng and Suh 2019). Reducing lifecycle emissions can partly \r\nbe achieved by closing the material cycles starting with material and \r\nproduct design planning for reuse, remanufacturing, and recycling of \r\nproducts - ending up with chemical recycling which yields recycled \r\nfeedstock that substitutes virgin feedstocks for various chemical \r\nprocesses (Rahimi and Garcia 2017; Smet and Linder 2019).However, \r\nthe chemical recycling processes which are most well-studied are \r\npyrolytic processes which are energy intensive and have significant \r\nlosses of carbon to off-gases and solid residues (Dogu et al. 2021; \r\nDavidson et al"


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content:
" 2021). They are thus associated with significant CO2\r\nemissions, which can even be larger in systems with chemical recycling \r\nthan energy recovery (Meys et al. 2020). Further, the products from \r\nmany pyrolytic chemical recycling processes are primarily fuels, \r\nwhich then in their subsequent use will emit all contained carbon \r\nas CO2 (Vollmer et al. 2020). Achieving carbon neutrality would thus \r\nrequire this CO2 either to be recirculated through energy-consuming \r\nsynthesis routes or to be captured and stored (Geyer et al. 2017; \r\nLopez et al. 2018; Material Economics 2019; Thunman et al. 2019). \r\nAs all chemical products are unlikely to fit into chemical recycling \r\nsystems, CCS can be used to capture and store a large share of their \r\nend-of-life emissions when combined with waste combustion plants \r\nor heat-demanding facilities like cement kilns (Leeson et al. 2017; \r\nTang and You 2018)."


id: 78a388953f2e29df79043b6a69756d18
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"Reflecting the diversity of the sector, the listed options can only be \r\nillustrative. The above-listed strategies all rely on low-carbon energy \r\nto reach near-zero emissions. In considering mitigation strategies for \r\nthe sector it will be key to focus on those for which there is a clear \r\npath towards (close to) zero emissions, with high (carbon) yields over \r\nthe full product value chain and minimal fossil resource use for both \r\nenergy and feedstocks (Saygin and Gielen 2021), with CCU and CCS \r\nemployed for all remnant carbon flows. The necessity of combining \r\nmitigation approaches in the chemicals industry with low-carbon \r\nenergy was recently highlighted in an analysis (Figure 11.10) which \r\nshowed how the combined use of different recycling options, carbon \r\ncapture, and biomass feedstocks was most effective at reducing \r\nglobal lifecycle emissions from plastics (Meys et al. 2021)"


id: 8f3e2509de88df96965e38679a8dfe82
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" While most \r\nof the chemical processes for doing all the above are well known \r\nand have been used commercially at least partly, they have not been \r\nused at large scale and in an integrated way. In the past, external \r\nconditions (e.g., availability and price of fossil feedstocks) have not \r\nset the necessary incentives to implement alternative routes and to \r\navoid emitting combustion- and process-related CO2 emissions to the \r\natmosphere. Most of these processes will very likely be more costly \r\nthan using fossil fuels and full-scale commercialisation would require \r\nsignificant policy support and the implementation of dedicated \r\nlead markets (Wesseling et al. 2017; Bataille et al. 2018a; Material \r\nEconomics 2019; Wyns et al. 2019)"


id: bb49f15e0f9b8b446d7c85ff5c285c8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" As in other subsectors, abatement \r\ncosts for the various strategies vary considerably across regions and \r\nproducts, making it difficult to establish a plausible cost range for \r\neach (Bazzanella and Ausfelder 2017; Philibert 2017a; Philibert \r\n2017b; Axelson et al. 2018; IEA 2018a; De Luna et al. 2019; Saygin \r\nand Gielen 2021)."


id: 645133696dcd2296f8e1fb1c9b0ffcd5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"The global production of plastics has increased rapidly over the past 70 years, with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8.4%, \r\nabout 2.5 times the growth rate for global GDP (Geyer et al. 2017) and higher than other materials since 1970 (IEA 2019b). Global \r\nproduction of plastics is now more than 400 million tonnes, including synthetic fibres (IEA 2019b) The per capita use of plastics \r\nis still up to 20 times higher in developed countries than in developing countries with low signs of saturation and the potential \r\nfor an increased use is thus still very large (IEA 2018a). Plastics is the largest output category from the petrochemical industry, \r\nwhich as a  whole currently uses about 14% of petroleum and 8% of natural gas (IEA 2018a). Forecasts for plastic production \r\nassuming continued growth at recent rates of about 3"


id: 71fa4956507983bd4110d892ae8f6f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"5% point towards a doubled production by 2035, following record-breaking \r\ninvestments in new and increased production capacity based on petroleum and gas in recent years (CIEL 2017; Bauer and Fontenit \r\n2021). IEA forecasts show that even in a world where transport demand for oil falls considerably by 2050 from the current about \r\n100 mbpd, feedstock demand for chemicals will rise from about 12 mbpd to 15-18 mbpd (IEA 2019b). Projections for increasing \r\nplastic production as well as petroleum use, together with the lack of investments in breakthrough low-emission technologies, do not \r\nalign with necessary emission reductions."


id: 9439990232edf9d8c29a5f2d12745a6b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"About half of the petroleum that goes into the chemical industry is used for producing plastics, and a significant share of this is \r\ncombusted or lost in the energy-intensive production processes, primarily the steam cracker. GHG emissions from plastic production \r\ndepend on the feedstock used (ethane-based production is associated with lower emissions than naphtha-based), the type of plastic \r\nproduced (production of simple polyolefins is associated with lower emissions than more complex plastics such as polystyrene), \r\nand the contextual energy system (e.g., the GHG intensity of the electricity used) but weighted averages have been estimated to \r\nbe 1.8 tCO2-eq t-1 for North American production (Daniel Posen et al. 2017) and 2.3 tCO2-eq t-1 for European production (Material \r\nEconomics 2019)"


id: ae3051ce893ec51837b879f5c60c9a1b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" In regions more dependent on coal electricity production the numbers are likely to be higher, and several times \r\nhigher for chemical production using coal as a feedstock - coal-based MTO has seven times higher emissions than olefins from steam \r\ncracking (Xiang et al. 2014). Coal-based plastic and chemicals production has over the past decade been developed and deployed \r\nprimarily in China (Yang et al. 2019). The production of plastics was thus conservatively estimated to emit 1085 MtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2015 \r\n(Zheng and Suh 2019). Downstream compounding and conversion of plastics was estimated to emit another 535 MtCO2-eq yr-1, while \r\nend-of-life treatment added 161 MtCO2-eq yr-1. While incineration of plastic waste was the cause of only 5% of global plastic lifecycle \r\nemissions, in regions with waste-to-energy infrastructures this share is significantly larger, for example, 13% of lifecycle emissions \r\nin Europe (Ive Vanderreydt et al. 2021)"


id: 5fc89a84f71fc5510b377368961e9b40
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" The effective recycling rate of plastics remains low relating to a wide range of issues such as \r\ninsufficient collection systems, sorting capacity, contaminants and quality deficiencies in recycled plastics, design of plastics integrated \r\nin complex products such as electronics and vehicles, heterogenous plastics used in packaging, and illegal international trade."


id: 56a8d0198c336fc9230402af47a04b88
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 11113
content:
"containers. As fuel economy has become more desirable and \r\ndesign improvements have allowed crush bodies made of \r\naluminium instead of steel, aluminium has become progressively \r\nmore attractive for cars. Primary aluminium demand is total \r\ndemand (100 Mt yr-1 in 2020) net of manufacturing waste reuse \r\n(14% of virgin and recycled input) and end-of-life recycling (about \r\n20% of what reaches market). Primary aluminium consumption \r\nrose from under 20 Mt yr-1 in 1995 to over 66 Mt primary ingot \r\nproduction in 2020 (International Aluminium Institute change to \r\n2021c). The International Aluminium Institute (2021a) expects total \r\naluminium consumption to reach 150-290 Mt yr-1 by 2050 with \r\nprimary aluminium contributing 69-170 Mt and secondary recycled \r\n91-120 Mt (as in-use stock triples or quadruples). The OECD \r\nforecasts increases in demand by 2060 for primary aluminium to \r\n139 Mt yr-1 and for secondary aluminium to 71 Mt yr-1 (OECD \r\n2019a)"


id: 24802fff5b532c59ccaa33f69133e8b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"  Primary (as opposed to recycled) aluminium is generally \r\nmade in a  two-stage process, often geographically separated. In \r\nthe first stage aluminium oxide is extracted from bauxite ore (often \r\nwith other trace elements) using the Bayer hydrometallurgical \r\nprocess, which requires up to 200degC heat when sodium hydroxide \r\nis used to leach the aluminium oxide, and up to 1000degC for kilning. \r\nThis is followed by electrolytic separation of the oxygen from the \r\nelemental aluminium using the Hall-Heroult process, by far the most \r\nenergy-intense part of making aluminium. This process has large \r\npotential emissions from the electricity used (12.5 MWh per tonne \r\naluminium BAT, 14-15 MWh per tonne average). From bauxite mine \r\nto aluminium ingot, reported total global average emissions are \r\nbetween 12 and 17.6 tCO2-eq per tonne of aluminium, depending \r\non estimates and assumptions made22 (Saevarsdottir et al. 2020). \r\nAbout 10% of this, 1"


id: e0a4be1bbf970ebd3cd71bdc41ddf8a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"5 tonnes of direct CO2 per tonne of aluminium \r\nare currently emitted as the graphite electrodes are depleted and \r\ncombine with oxygen, and if less than optimal conditions are \r\nmaintained, perfluorocarbons can be emitted with widely varying \r\nGHG intensity, up to the equivalent of 2  tCO2-eq per tonne of \r\naluminium. PFC emissions, however, have been greatly reduced \r\nglobally and almost eliminated in well-run facilities. Aluminium, if \r\nit is not contaminated, is highly recyclable and requires 1/20 of the \r\nenergy required to produce virgin aluminium; increasing aluminium \r\nrecycling rates from the 20-25% global average is a key emissions \r\nreduction strategy (Haraldsson and Johansson 2018)."


id: a414c53914a5ed9dc3fa41beafccffeb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"The pulp and paper industry (PPI) is a  small net-emitter of CO2,\r\nassuming the feedstock is sustainably sourced (Chapter 7), but it has \r\nlarge emissions of biogenic CO2 from feedstock (700-800 Mt yr-1) \r\n(Tanzer et al. 2021). It includes pulp mills, integrated pulp and paper \r\nmills, and paper mills using virgin pulpwood and other fibre sources, \r\nresidues and co-products from wood products manufacturing, and \r\nrecycled paper as feedstock. Pulp mills typically have access to \r\nbioenergy in the chemical pulping processes to cover most or all of \r\nheat and electricity needs, for example, through chemicals recovery \r\nboilers and steam turbines in the kraft process. Mechanical pulping \r\nmainly uses electricity for energy; decarbonisation thus depends on \r\ngrid emission factors. With the exception of the lime kiln in kraft \r\npulp mills, process temperature needs are typically less than or \r\nequal to 150degC to 200degC, mainly steam for heating and drying"


id: 1d3d9ca854e590d5d8f228889017b947
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" This \r\nmeans that this sector can be relatively easily decarbonised through \r\ncontinued energy efficiency, fuel switching and electrification, \r\nincluding use of high-temperature heat pumps (Ericsson and Nilsson \r\n2018). Electrification of pulp mills could, in the longer term, make \r\nbio-residues currently used internally for energy, available as \r\na carbon source for chemicals (Meys et al. 2021). The PPI also has the \r\ncapabilities, resources and knowledge, to implement these changes. \r\nInertia is mainly caused by equipment turnover rates, relative fuel \r\nand electricity prices, and the profitability of investments."


id: db56ba07912ea7598542551b8592cd88
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"In Material Economics (2019), costs are provided for separate \r\ntechnologies and subsectors, and also by pathways, each including \r\nnew industrial processes, circular economy and CCS components \r\nin different proportions, allowing for the transition to net zero \r\nindustrial emission in the EU by 2050. That means that the study \r\nprovides information about the three main mid- to long-term \r\noptions which could enable a  wide abatement of GHG emissions. \r\nGiven different electricity-price scenarios, average abatement costs \r\nassociated with the circular economy-dominated pathway are: \r\n12-75  EUR2019 tCO2-eq-1; for the carbon capture-dominated \r\npathway 79 EUR2019 tCO2-eq-1; and for the new processes\u0002dominated scenario 91 EUR2019 tCO2-eq-1. Consequently, net\u0002zero-emission pathways are about 3-25% costlier compared to \r\nthe baseline (Material Economics 2019)"


id: 44fa02b1f422d0c21fbdacc4a3045bf8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
" According to the Energy \r\nTransitions Commission (2018), cement decarbonisation would cost \r\non average USD110-130 tCO2\r\n-1 depending on the cost scenario. \r\nRootzen and Johnsson (2016) state that CO2 avoidance costs for \r\nthe cement industry vary from 25 to 110 EUR tCO2\r\n-1, depending on \r\nthe capture option considered and on the assumptions made with \r\nrespect to the different cost items involved. According to the Energy \r\nTransitions Commission (2018), steel can be decarbonised on average \r\nat USD60 tCO2\r\n-1, with highly varying costs depending on low-carbon \r\nelectricity prices."


id: 77dbc7284638e9fae36472e0773240da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"Climate-policy-related literature focusing on deep industrial emission \r\nreductions has expanded rapidly since AR5. An increasing body of \r\nresearch proposes deep decarbonisation pathways for energy\u0002intensive industries (Figure 11.13). Bataille et al. (2018a) address the \r\nquestion of whether it is possible to reduce GHG emissions to very \r\nlow, zero, or negative levels, and identifies preliminary technological \r\nand policy elements that may allow the transition, including \r\nthe use of policy to drive technological innovation and uptake. \r\nMaterial Economics (2019), the IEA (2019b), the Energy Transitions \r\nCommission (2018) and Climate Action Tracker (CAT; 2020) take \r\nsteps to identify pathways integrating energy efficiency, material \r\nefficiency, circular economy and innovative technologies options to \r\ncut GHG emissions across basic materials and value chains"


id: 651beb805730b37cf95b0c662c0a708b
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" The key \r\nconclusion is that net zero CO2 emissions from the largest sources \r\n(steel, plastics, ammonia, and cement) could be achieved by 2050 by \r\ndeploying already available multiple options packaged in different \r\nways (Davis et al. 2018; Material Economics 2019; UKCCC 2019b). \r\nThe studies assume that for those technologies that have a kind of \r\nbreakthrough technology status further technological development \r\nand significant cost reduction can be expected."


id: af31ba0444371830355f50c2ac0fb5e2
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"For customers of final products, information on the potential \r\nimpact of supply-side decarbonisation on final prices may be more \r\nuseful than that of CO2 abatement costs. A different approach has \r\nbeen developed to assess the costs of mitigation by estimating \r\nthe potential impacts of supply-side decarbonisation on final \r\nproduct prices. Material Economics (2019) shows that with deep \r\ndecarbonisation, depending on the pathway, steel costs grow by \r\n20-30%; plastics by 20-45%; ammonia by 15-60%; and cement \r\n(not concrete) by 70-115%. While these are large and problematic \r\ncost increases for material producers working with low margins in \r\na competitive market, final end-use product price increases are far \r\nless, for example, a  car becomes 0.5% more expensive, supported \r\nby both Rootzen and Johnsson (2016) and the Energy Transitions \r\nCommission (2018)"


id: 481681a9d560119746ac0a2ce3c21822
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" For comparison, Rootzen and Johnsson (2017) \r\nfound that decarbonising cement-making, while doubling the cost \r\nof cement, would add <1% to the costs of a  residential building; \r\nthe Energy Transitions Commission (2018) found concrete would be \r\n10-30% more expensive, adding USD15,000 or 3% to the price of \r\na house including land value. Finally, the IEA (2020a) estimated the \r\nimpact on end-use prices are rather small, even in a net zero scenario; \r\nthey find price increases of 0.2% for a car and 0.6% for a house, \r\nbased on higher costs for steel and cement respectively."


id: c1101a65d3b8aedbaae7a225ba8ec946
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content:
"With growing mitigation ambition final energy demand is significantly \r\nlower in comparison of a current policy pathway (CurPol) and a scenario \r\nthat explores the impact of further moderate actions (ModAct). Based \r\non the underlying assumptions, scenarios IMP-SP and IMP-LD are \r\ncharacterised by the lowest final energy demand, triggered by high \r\nenergy efficiency improvement rates as well as additional demand side \r\nmeasures, while a scenario with extensive use of CDR in the industry \r\nand the energy sectors to achieve net-negative emissions (IMP-Neg) \r\nleads to a significant increase in final energy demand. Scenario IMP-GS \r\nrepresents a pathway where mitigation action is gradually strengthened \r\nby 2030 compared to pre-COP 26 Nationally Determined Contributions \r\n(NDCs) shows the lowest final energy demand"


id: ac7b0b72ed4a9f6a8b6ea51f896d1b46
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content:
" All ambitious IMPs show \r\nsubstantially increasing contributions from electricity, with electricity's \r\nend-use share more than doubling for some of them by 2050 and more \r\nthan tripling by 2100. The share of hydrogen shows a flatter curve for \r\nmany scenarios, reaching 5% (IMP-Ren) in 2050 and up to 20% in 2100 \r\nfor some scenarios (Ren, LD). Those scenarios that have a strong focus \r\non renewable energy electrification show high shares of hydrogen in \r\nthe sector. In comparison to sector-specific and national studies which \r\nshow typically a range between 5 and 15% by 2050, many IAM IMPs \r\nexpect hydrogen to play a less important role. Results for industrial CCS "


id: 7f487b1660d09e3979aa48041a106f11
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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"Figure 11.12 | Comparison of industry-sector-related CO2 emissions (including process emissions), final energy demand, share of electricity and hydrogen \r\nin the final energy mix, and industrial carbon capture and storage (CCS) for different mitigation scenarios representing illustrative mitigation pathways \r\nand the full sample of integrated assessment models (IAM) scenario results for three temperature categories (figure based on scenario database).\r\nIndicators in the Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (lines) and the 5-95% range of reference, 1.5degC and 2degC scenarios (shaded areas)"


id: ad8967a304c0aea24f2b34f334810a00
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" The selected IMPs reflect the following \r\ncharacteristics: opportunities for reducing demand (IMP-LD; low demand), the role of deep renewable energy penetration and electrification (IMP-Ren; renewables), extensive \r\nuse of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) in the industry and the energy sectors to achieve net-negative emissions (IMP-Neg), insights into how shifting development can lead \r\nto deep emission reductions and achieve sustainable development goals (IMP-SP; shifting pathways), and insights into how slower short-term emissions reductions can be \r\ncompensated by very fast emission reductions later on (IMP-GS; gradual strengthening). Furthermore, two scenarios were selected to illustrate the consequences of current \r\npolicies and pledges; these are CurPol (Current Policies) and ModAct (Moderate Action), and are referred to as Pathways Illustrative of Higher Emissions. Source: data are from \r\nthe AR6 database; only scenarios that pass the vetting criteria are included (Section 3.2)."


id: eb1e12f43301ebbff08001ea103492df
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"concentrates on scenarios from the IEA. It has to be acknowledged \r\nthat they only represent a small segment of the huge scenario family \r\n(see the scenario database in Chapter 3), but this approach enables \r\nto show the chronological evolution of scenarios coming from the \r\nsame institution, using the same modelling approach (which allows \r\na  technology-rich analytical backcasting approach), but reflect \r\nadditional requests that emerge over time (Table 11.5). In the 2DS \r\nscenario from the 'Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP)' study (IEA \r\n2017), which intends to describe in great technological detail how \r\nthe global energy system could transform by 2060 so as to be in line \r\nwith limiting global warming to below 2degC, total CO2 emissions are \r\n74% lower in 2060 than in 2014, while only 39% lower in the industry \r\nsector"


id: a7df271a7f51308fb37c3e57ef7f65a3
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content:
" The Beyond 2degC Scenario (B2DS) of the same study intends \r\nto show how far known clean energy technologies (including those \r\nthat lead to negative emissions) could go if pushed to their practical \r\nlimits, allowing the future temperature increase to be limited to 'well \r\nbelow' 2degC and lowering total CO2 emissions by 100% by 2060 and \r\nby 75% relative to 2014 in the industry sector."


id: a212a960eeec11fee52f43e3ba01f318
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"Since AR5 a number of studies providing a high technological level \r\nof detail for the industry sector have been released which describe \r\nhow the industry sector can significantly reduce its GHG emissions \r\nuntil the middle of the century. Many of these studies try to \r\nspecifically reflect the particular industry sector characteristics and \r\nbarriers that hinder industry to follow an optimal transformation \r\npathway. They vary in respect to different characteristics. In respect \r\nto their geographical scope, some studies analyse the prospects \r\nfor industry sector decarbonisation on a global level (IEA 2017a; \r\nEnergy Transitions Commission 2018; Grubler et al. 2018; IEA 2020a, \r\n2019b, 2020c; Tchung-Ming et al. 2018); regional level, for example, \r\nEuropean Commission (2018) and Material Economics (2019); or \r\ncountry level - studies for China, from where most industry-related \r\nemissions come (e.g.,  Zhou et al. 2019)"


id: c28ef0fb0333ba9e881b513235c3fb88
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"23 In regard to sectoral \r\nscope, some studies include the entire industry sector, while others \r\nfocus on selected GHG emission intensive sectors, such as steel, \r\nchemicals and/or concrete. Most of the scenarios focus solely on \r\nCO2 emissions, that is non-CO2 emissions of the industrial sector \r\nare neglected.24"


id: a53513f9d8b18d0838913d768238291e
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content:
"Technologies penetration assumed in the CTS scenario by 2060 allows \r\nfor an industrial emission cut of 45% from 2017 levels and a 50% \r\ncut against projected 2060 emissions in the Reference Technology \r\nScenario (RTS) from the same study (IEA 2019b), similar to IEA's \r\n2DS scenario. Energy efficiency improvements and deployment \r\nof BATs contribute 46% to cumulative emission reduction in \r\n2018-2060, while fuel switching (15%), material efficiency (19%) \r\nand deployment of innovative processes (20%) provide the rest. \r\nIEA (2020a,c) which continues the Energy Technology Perspectives \r\nseries include the new Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS) \r\nto describe a  trajectory for emissions consistent with reaching \r\nglobal 'net zero' CO2 emissions by around 2070"


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content:
"25 In 2070 the net \r\nzero balance is reached through a compensation of the remaining \r\nCO2 emissions (fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes \r\nstill lead to around 3 GtCO2) by a combination of BECCS and to \r\na lesser degree direct air capture and storage. In IEA (2020c) the \r\nFaster Innovation Case (FIC) shows a possibility to reach a net zero \r\nemissions level globally already in 2050, assuming that technology \r\ndevelopment and market penetration can be significantly \r\naccelerated. Innovation plays a major role in this scenario as almost \r\nhalf of all the additional emissions reductions in 2050 relative to \r\nthe reference case would be from technologies that are in an early \r\nstage of development and have not yet reached the market today \r\n(IEA 2020c). The most ambitious IEA scenario NZE2050 (IEA 2021a) \r\ndescribes a pathway reaching net zero emissions at system level by \r\n2050. With 0"


id: 9ce540dafc0539e841d1f4c2015b2e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 22216
content:
"52 GtCO2 industry-related CO2 emissions (including \r\nprocess emissions) it ends up 94% below 2018 levels in 2050. \r\nRemaining emissions in the industry sector have to be compensated \r\nby negative emissions (e.g., via DAC)."


id: 39957c5765d8820c4954049997efe805
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 6438
content:
"Industry sector mitigation studies also differ in regard to whether \r\nthey develop coherent scenarios or whether they focus on discussing \r\nand analysing selected key mitigation strategies, without deriving full \r\nenergy and emission scenarios. Coherent scenarios are developed \r\nin IEA (2017); Energy Transitions Commission (2018); Grubler et al. \r\n(2018); Tchung-Ming et al. (2018); IEA (2019b, 2020a,c); IEA (2021a); \r\nand IRENA (2021) on the global level, and in Climact (2018); \r\nEuropean Commission (2018); and Material Economics (2019) on the \r\nEuropean level. Recent literature analysing selected key mitigation \r\nstrategies, for example IEA (2019b) and Material Economics (2019) \r\nhas focused either exclusively or to a large extent on analysing the \r\npotential of materials efficiency and circular economy measures to \r\nreduce the need for primary raw materials relative to a  business\u0002as-usual development"


id: dd2cb45e1f25c0cf03f64c138a661589
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 32297
content:
" The IEA (2021a, 2020a) also provides deep \r\ninsights in to single mitigation strategies for the industry sector, \r\nparticularly the role of CCS.  The following discussion mainly "


id: a53c29df59a56a7f12bf2b726822c020
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 23562
content:
"while it is explicitly excluded in the LED scenario. In the latter scenario, \r\non the other hand, considerable emission reductions are assumed to \r\nbe achieved by far-reaching reductions in material demand relative \r\nto a baseline development. In other words, the analysed scenarios \r\nalso suggest that to reach very strong emission reductions from the \r\nindustry sector either CCS needs to be deployed to a great extent or \r\nconsiderable material demand reductions will need to be realised. \r\nSuch demand reductions only play a minor role in the 2DS scenario \r\nand no role in the ETC Supply Side scenario. The SDS described in IEA \r\n(2020a) provides a pathway where both CCS and material efficiency \r\ncontribute significantly. In SDS material efficiency is a relevant factor \r\nin several parts of industry, explicitly steel, cement, and chemicals"


id: e37270c9b89d00584efd2166c2a6e393
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 33266
content:
" \r\nCombining the different material efficiency options including \r\na substantial part lifetime extension (particularly of buildings) leads \r\nto 29% less steel production by 2070, 26% less cement production, \r\nand 25% less chemicals production respectively in comparison to \r\nthe reference line used in the study (Stated Policy Scenario: STEPS). \r\nSector- or subsector-specific analysis supports the growing role of \r\nmaterial efficiency. For the global chemical and petrochemical sector, \r\nSaygin and Gielen (2021) point out that circular economy (including \r\nrecycling) has to cover 16% of the necessary reduction that is needed \r\nfor the implementation of a 1.5degC scenario."


id: bd0dbd4f7398060559aefbf833108127
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27306
content:
"The comparative analysis leads to the point that the relevance of \r\nindividual mitigation strategies in different scenarios depends not \r\nonly on a  scenario's level of ambition. Instead, implicit or explicit \r\nassumptions about: (i) the costs associated with each strategy, \r\n(ii) future technological progress and availability of individual \r\ntechnologies, and (iii) the future public or political acceptance of \r\nindividual strategies are likely to be main reasons for the observed \r\ndifferences between the analysed scenarios. For many energy\u0002intensive products, technologies capable of deep emission cuts are \r\nalready available. Their application is subject to different economic \r\nand resources constraints (incremental investment needs, product \r\nprices escalation, requirements for escalation of new low-carbon \r\npower generation). To fully exploit potential availability of carbon-free \r\nenergy sources (e.g"


id: 79c5c64f29cc3b558eabb8ba6ba3c6d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 16729
content:
", electricity or hydrogen and related derivates) is \r\na fundamental prerequisite and marks the strong interdependencies \r\nbetween the industry and the energy sector."


id: 7004a08767d5815342645d6f91c9a731
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 15241
content:
"In all scenarios, the relevance of biomass and electricity in industrial \r\nfinal energy demand increases, especially in the more ambitious \r\nscenarios NZE2050, SDS, ETC Supply Side and LED.  While in all \r\nscenarios, electrification becomes more and more important, hydrogen \r\nor hydrogen-derived fuels, on the other hand, do not contribute to \r\nindustrial final energy demand by the middle of the century in 2DS \r\nand B2DS, while LED (1% final energy share in 2050) and particularly \r\nETC Supply Side (25% final energy share in 2050) consider hydrogen \r\nor hydrogen-derived fuels as a significant option. In the updated IEA \r\nscenarios hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels already play a  more \r\nimportant role. In the SDS share in industry, final energy is around \r\n10% (IEA 2020a) and in the Faster Innovation Case around 12% (IEA \r\n2020c) in 2050. In the latter case this is based on the assumption \r\nthat by 2050 on average each year 22 hydrogen-based steel plants \r\ncome into operation (IEA 2020c)"


id: a3301ccbe8cb837ec7603c7ac8210a33
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 23246
content:
" In SDS around 60% of the hydrogen \r\nis produced on-site via water electrolysis while the remaining 40% is \r\ngenerated in fossil fuel plants (methane reforming) coupled with CCS \r\nfacilities. In the NZE2050 scenario biomass/biomethane (13%/3%), \r\nhydrogen (3%), natural gas with CCUS (4%), and coal with CCUS \r\n(4%) are responsible for 27% of the final energy demand of the \r\nsector. This is much more than in 2018, starting here from roughly 6% \r\n(only biomass). Direct use of electricity still plays a bigger role in the \r\nanalysis, as share of electricity increases in NZE2050 from 22% in 2018 \r\nto 28% in 2030 and 46% in 2050 (with 15% a part of the electricity \r\nis used to produce hydrogen). This is reflecting the effect that since \r\nthe publication of older IEA reports more direct electric applications \r\nfor the sector become available"


id: fd85c20bf13c098dca85306a2070b335
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37406
content:
" In NZE2050 approximately 25% of \r\ntotal heat used in the sector is electrified directly with heat pumps or \r\nindirectly with synthetic fuels already by 2030.\r\nFor B2DS it is assumed that most of the available abatement options \r\nin the industry sector are pushed to their feasible limits. That leads to \r\ncumulative direct CO2 emissions reductions compared to 2DS which \r\ncome from: energy efficiency improvements and BAT deployment "


id: 54b2b646261eaf482059c5cd1d6b4659
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 10782
content:
"about preparatory measures which are able to flank the changes \r\nand to foster the establishment of new structures (Section  11.6). \r\nThe right sequencing of the various mitigation options and building \r\nappropriate bridges between the different strategies are important. \r\nRissman et al. (2020) proposes three phases of technologies \r\ndeployment for the industry sector: (i) energy/material efficiency \r\nimprovement (mainly incremental) and electrification in combination \r\nwith demonstration projects for new technologies potentially \r\nimportant in subsequent phases (2020-2035), (ii) structural shifts \r\nbased on technologies which reach maturity in phase (i) such as CCS \r\nand alternative materials (2035-2050), (iii) widespread deployment \r\nfor technologies that are nascent today like molten oxide electrolysis\u0002based steel-making"


id: 707772d20f19a9cd6c86f0064f60dd20
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 15313
content:
" There are no strong boundaries between the \r\ndifferent phases and all phases have to be accompanied by effective \r\npolicies like R&D programmes and market pull incentives."


id: 53d37d28548debdf56e101fa9ba5414b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10656
content:
"It is worth mentioning the flexibility of implementing transformational \r\nchanges not the least depends on the age profile and projected \r\nlongevity of existing capital stock, especially the willingness to accept \r\nthe intentional or market-based stranding of high GHG intensity \r\ninvestments. This is a relevant aspect in all producing countries, but \r\nparticularly in those countries with a rather young industry structure \r\n(i.e., comparative low age of existing facilities on average). Tong et al. \r\n(2019) suggest that in China, using the survival rate as a proxy, less \r\nthan 10% of existing cement or steel production facilities will reach \r\ntheir end of operation time by 2050. Vogl et al. (2021b) argue that \r\nthe mean blast furnace campaign is considerably shorter than used \r\nin Tong et al.(2019), at only 17 years between furnace relining, which \r\nsuggests there is more room for retrofitting with clean steel major \r\nprocess technologies than generally assumed. Bataille et al"


id: c26dc4a2a19fc9416d7f71639794d56d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 28175
content:
" (2021b) \r\nfound if very low carbon intensity processes were mandatory starting \r\nin 2025, given the lifetimes of existing facilities, major steel process \r\nlifetimes of up to 27 years would still make a full retrofit cycle with \r\nlow-carbon processes possible."


id: 1c6d9e0520fd5b0ad5146ae15cf283d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1929
content:
"Taking the steel sector as an illustrative example, sector-specific \r\nscenarios examining the possibility to reach GHG reduction beyond \r\n80% (CAT 2020; Bataille et al. 2021b; IEA 2021a; Vogl et al. 2021b) \r\nindicate that robust measures comprise direct reduction of iron (DRI) \r\nwith hydrogen in combination with efforts to further close the loops \r\nand increase availability of scrap metal (reducing the demand for \r\nprimary steel). As hydrogen-based DRI might not be a fully mature \r\ntechnology before 2030 (depending on further developments of \r\nthe policy framework and technological progress), risk of path \r\ndependencies has to be taken into consideration when reinvestments \r\nin existing production capacities will be required in the coming years. \r\nFor existing plants, implementation of energy efficiency measures \r\n(e.g"


id: 9cff89cf0228c1346d8725585aac5723
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 22242
content:
",  utilisation of waste heat, improvement of high-temperature \r\npumps) could build a  bridge for further mitigation measures but \r\nhave only limited unexhausted potential. As many GHG mitigation \r\nmeasures are associated with high investment costs and missing \r\noperating experience, a  step-by-step implementing process might \r\nbe an appropriate strategy to avoid investment leakage (given the "


id: c913206009d1184bc1bcdda1ab10f654
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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content:
"Figure 11.13 | Potentials and costs for zero-carbon mitigation options for industry and basic materials: CIEL - carbon intensity of electricity for indirect emissions; \r\nEE - energy efficiency; ME - material efficiency; Circularity - material flows (clinker substituted by coal fly ash, blast furnace slag or other by-products and \r\nwaste, steel scrap, plastic recycling, etc.); FeedCI - feedstock carbon intensity (hydrogen, biomass, novel cement, natural clinker substitutes); FSW+El - fuel \r\nswitch and processes electrification with low-carbon electricity. Ranges for mitigation options are shown based on bottom-up studies for grouped technologies packages, \r\nnot for single technologies. In circles, contribution to mitigation from technologies based on their readiness are shown for 2050 (2040) and 2070. Direct emissions include fuel \r\ncombustion and process emissions. Indirect emissions include emissions attributed to consumed electricity and purchased heat"


id: 43ce3d6a3fd2630dbd5facc7b3c82bd1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 8078
content:
" For basic chemicals only methanol, ammonia and \r\nhigh-value chemicals are considered. The total for industry doesn't include emissions from waste. Base values for 2020 for direct and indirect emissions were calculated using 2019 \r\nGHG emission data (Crippa et al. 2021) and data for materials production from World Steel Association (2020a) and IEA (2021d). Negative mitigation costs for some options like \r\nCircularity are not reflected. Data from sources: Pauliuk et al. (2013a); Fawkes et al. (2016); WBCSD (2016); Bazzanella and Ausfelder (2017); IEA (2018a, 2019b,g,h, 2020a,c, \r\n2021a); Lehne and Preston (2018); Scrivener et al. (2018); EUROFER (2019); Friedmann et al. (2019); Material Economics (2019); Sandalow et al. (2019); CAT (2020); CEMBUREAU \r\n(2020); Gielen et al. (2020); Habert et al. (2020); World Steel Association (2020b); Bataille (2020a); GCCA (2021a); and Saygin and Gielen (2021)."


id: 492c63430304bfde5c335369e18f5ff4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
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vector_id: 8901
content:
"Mitigation involves greater integration and coupling between sectors. \r\nThis is widely recognised, for example, in the case of electrification of \r\ntransport (Sections 6.6.2 and 10.3.1), but it has been less explored for \r\nindustrial decarbonisation. Industry is a complex web of subsectors and \r\nintersectoral interaction and dependence, with associated mitigation \r\nopportunities and co-benefits and costs (OECD 2019b; Mendez-Alva \r\net al. 2021). Implementation of the mitigation options assessed in \r\nSection 11.3 will result in new sectoral couplings, value chains, and \r\nbusiness models but also in the phasing out of old ones. Notably, \r\nelectrification in industry, hydrogen and sourcing of non-fossil carbon \r\ninvolves profound changes to how industry interacts with electricity \r\nsystems and how industrial subsectors interact"


id: 81c34cbe226e81d786bff9acc1c8a0fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 17944
content:
" For example, the \r\nchemicals and forestry industries will become much more coupled if \r\nvarious forms of biogenic carbon become an important feedstock for \r\nplastics (Figure 11.10). Clinker substitution with blast furnace slag \r\nin the cement industry is a  well-established way of reducing CO2\r\nemissions (Fechner and Kray 2012), but this slag will no longer be \r\navailable if blast furnaces are phased out. Furthermore, additional \r\nmaterial demand resulting from mitigation in other sectors, as well as \r\nadaptation and the importance of material efficiency improvements, \r\nare issues that have attracted increasing attention since AR5 (IEA \r\n2019b; Bleischwitz 2020; Hertwich et al. 2020). How future material \r\nwill be affected under different climate scenarios is underexplored \r\nand typically not accounted for in modelling (Bataille et al. 2021a)."


id: 8a3d3e9ff06aae79f89ae2df14a54c76
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19284
content:
"While sector-specific cost analyses are rare in general, there are \r\nscenarios indicating that pathways to net zero CO2 emissions in the \r\nemissions-intensive sectors can be realised with limited additional \r\ncosts. According to the Energy Transitions Commission (2018), deep \r\ndecarbonisation from four major industry subsectors (plastics, steel, \r\naluminium and cement) is achievable on a global level with cumulative \r\nincremental capital investments (2015-2050) limited to about 0.1% \r\nof aggregate GDP over that period. UKCCC (2019a) assesses that \r\ntotal incremental costs (compared to a theoretical scenario with no \r\nclimate change policy action at all) for cutting industrial emissions \r\nby 90% by 2050 is 0.2% of expected 2050  UK  GDP (UKCCC \r\n2019a). The additional investment is 0.2% of gross fixed capital \r\nformation (Material Economics 2019)"


id: 66193c816841a5d0f0c1cb3b6c445dbf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 13657
content:
" The IEA (2020a) indicates the \r\nrequired annual incremental global investment in heavy industry is \r\napproximately 40 billion 2019USD yr-1 moving from STEPS to the \r\nSDS scenario (2020-2040), rising to USD55 billion yr-1 (2040-2070), \r\neffectively 0.05-0.07% of global annual GDP today."


id: 168cb77ba5c8525c75970d9a76c12ec5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1069
content:
"Sectors that are particularly vulnerable to climate change include \r\nagriculture, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture, and their downstream \r\nprocessing industries (Bezner et al. 2021). Many of the energy\u0002intensive industries are located based on access to fresh water \r\n(e.g., pulp and paper) or sea transport (e.g., petrochemicals). Risks \r\nof major concern for industry include disrupted supply chains and \r\nenergy supplies due to extreme weather events, as well as risks \r\nassociated with droughts, floods with dirty water, sea level rise and \r\nstorm surges (Dodman et al. 2021). Adaptation measures may in \r\nturn affect the demand for basic materials (e.g., steel and cement), \r\nfor example, increased demand to build sea walls and protect \r\ninfrastructure, but we have not found any estimates of the potential \r\ndemand"


id: 52a878f91f2e2643436cbaaea4a24337
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10465
content:
" Increased heat stress is unsafe for outdoor labourers and \r\ncan reduce worker productivity, for example, in outdoor construction, \r\nresource extraction and waste handling (Ranasinghe et al. 2021)."


id: 16200ac0d69afc216ebf44aaca3a46f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1002
content:
"With increasing shares of renewable electricity production there is \r\na growing interest in industrial demand response, storage and hybrid \r\nsolutions with on-site PV and combined heat and power (CHP) (Shoreh \r\net al. 2016; Scheubel et al. 2017; Schriever and Halstrup 2018). With \r\nfuture industrial electrification, and in particular with hydrogen used \r\nas reduction agent in iron-making or as feedstock in the chemicals \r\nindustry, the level of interaction between industry and power systems \r\nbecomes very high. Large amounts of coking coal, or oil and gas as \r\npetrochemical energy and feedstock, are then replaced by electricity. \r\nFor example, Meys et al. (2021) estimates a staggering future electricity \r\ndemand of 10,000 TWh in a scenario for a net zero emissions plastics \r\nproduction of 1100 Mt in 2050 (see Section 11.3.5 for other estimates \r\nof electricity demand)"


id: 6bba013cecc6e9d21893a30782611850
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 14573
content:
" Much of this electricity is used to produce \r\nhydrogen to allow for CCU and this provides a very large potential \r\nflexible demand if electrolysers are combined with hydrogen storage. \r\nVogl et al. (2018) describe how hydrogen DRI and EAF steel plants can \r\nbe highly flexible in their electricity demand by storing hydrogen or hot\u0002briquetted iron and increasing the share of scrap in EAF. The IEA (2019f) \r\nFuture of Hydrogen report suggests that hydrogen production and \r\nstorage networks could be in locations with already existing hydrogen \r\nproduction and storage, for example, chemical industries, and that \r\nthese could be ideal for system load balancing and demand response, \r\nand in the case of district heating systems - for heat cascading."


id: d704931e5767b6b6ea9f3af59299fe23
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31336
content:
"Countries are at different stages of different economic development \r\npaths. Some are already industrialised, while developing and \r\nemerging economies are on earlier take-off stages or accelerated \r\ngrowth stages and have yet to build the basic infrastructure needed \r\nto allow for basic mobility, housing, sanitation, and other services \r\n(Section 11.2.3). The available in-use stock of material per capita and \r\nin each country therefore differs significantly, and transition pathways \r\nwill require a different mix of strategies, depending on each country's \r\nmaterial demand to build, maintain, and operate stock of long-lived \r\nassets. Industrialised economies have much greater opportunities \r\nfor reusing and recycling materials, while emerging economies have \r\ngreater opportunities to avoid carbon lock-in. The IEA projected that \r\nmore than 90% of the additional 2050 production of key materials \r\nwill originate in non-OECD countries (IEA 2017)"


id: 90f19e5c43cd844fa45634611ab2adf5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20349
content:
" As incomes rise in \r\nemerging economies, the industry sector will grow in tandem to meet \r\nthe increased demand for the manufactured goods and raw materials \r\nessential for infrastructure development. The energy and feedstocks \r\nneeded to support this growth are likely to constitute a large portion \r\nof the increase in the emerging economies' GHG emissions in the \r\nfuture unless new low-carbon pathways are identified and promoted."


id: 9b012b286e923ec51c32f1b0e95219c0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21927
content:
"The climate awareness that investors, shareholders, and customers \r\ndemand from companies has been increasing steadily. It is reflected \r\nin the growing number of environmental management, carbon \r\nfootprint accounting, benchmarking and reporting schemes (e.g., the \r\nCarbon Disclosure Project, Task Force on Climate-Related Financial \r\nDisclosures, Environmental Product Declarations, and others, \r\ne.g.,  Qian et al. 2018) requiring companies to disclose both direct \r\nand indirect GHG emissions, and creating explicit (for regulatory \r\nschemes) as well as implicit GHG liabilities. This requires harmonised \r\nand widely accepted methods for environmental and carbon footprint \r\naccounting (Bashmakov et al. 2021b). From an investor perspective \r\nthere are both physical risks (e.g., potential damages from climate \r\nchange to business) and transition risks (e.g"


id: f6c069adc41ed6c7c54809bac4df7cc3
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36332
content:
", premature devaluation \r\nof assets driven by new policies and technologies deployment and \r\nchanges in public and private consumer preferences (NGFS 2019a)). \r\nAccompanied by reputational risks this leads to increased attention \r\nto Sustainable and Responsible Investment (SRI) principles and \r\nincreased demands from investors, consumers and governments on \r\nclimate and sustainability reporting and disclosure (NGFS 2019b). "


id: 6d28fd75c4a1c4017b4ab15f54fc5f34
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vector_id: 14796
content:
"Both studies come to similar estimates on the average age of cement \r\nplants and blast furnaces in China of around 10-12 years old, which \r\nare the figures for which they have overlapping coverage. Both studies \r\nalso use the same assumption of the typical lifetime of assets in these \r\nsectors of 40 years, whereas the IEA (2020a) study uses 30 years for \r\nchemical sector assets and 25 years for other industrial sectors. The \r\nstudies come to differing estimates of cumulative emissions by 2050 \r\nfrom the industry sector; 196 GtCO2 in the IEA (2020a) study, and \r\n162 GtCO2 in the Tong et al. (2019) study. This difference is attributable \r\nto a differing scope of emissions, with the IEA (2020a) study including \r\nindustrial process emissions (which for the cement sector in particular \r\nare substantial) in addition to the energy-related emissions quantities \r\naccounted for in the Tong et al. (2019) study"


id: b314c65dc7f1b251c7c80b1ce283d541
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25692
content:
"Details of the methodologies to assess 'carbon lock-in' or 'committed \r\nemissions' differ across studies but the core components of the \r\napproaches adopted are common to each: an account of the existing \r\nlevel of emissions for the scope being assessed is established; this \r\nlevel is projected forward with a  stylised decay function that is \r\ninformed by assessments of the current age and typical lifetimes of \r\nthe underlying assets. From this, a cumulative emissions estimate is \r\ncalculated. The future emissions intensity of the operated assets \r\nis  usually assumed to remain constant, implying that nothing is \r\ndone to retrofit with mitigating technologies (e.g., carbon capture) \r\nor alter the way in which the plant is operated (e.g., switching to \r\nan alternative fuel or feedstock)"


id: f68fae3cb88fd6fa3ad7b2642fbc5f3f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36310
content:
" While the quantities of emissions \r\nderived are often referred to as 'committed' or 'locked-in', their \r\noccurrence is of course dependent on a suite of economic, technology \r\nand policy developments that are highly uncertain."


id: 163ae77b62cfe7df1c5517c605718870
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1026
content:
"The IEA (2020a) study provides supplementary analysis for the industry \r\nsector, examining the impact of considering investment cycles alongside \r\nthe typical lifetimes assumed in its core analysis of emissions from \r\nexisting industrial assets. For three heavy industry sectors - iron and \r\nsteel, cement, and chemicals - the decay function applied to emissions \r\nfrom existing assets is re-simulated using a 25-year investment cycle \r\nassumption (Figure  11.14). This is 15 years shorter than the typical \r\nlifetimes assumed for assets in the iron and steel and cement sectors, \r\nand five years shorter than that considered for the chemical sector. \r\nThe shorter timeframe for the investment cycle is a simplified way of \r\nrepresenting the intermediate investments that are made to extend the \r\nlife of a plant, such as the re-lining of a blast furnace, which can occur \r\nmultiple times during the lifetime of an installation"


