# document

id: efca1c00e5773295af3adbb253cff2a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"As indicated by the literature assessed within this chapter, keeping \r\nwindows of opportunity open for CRD will necessitate urgent action, \r\neven under diverse assumptions regarding how future mitigation and \r\nadaptation interventions evolve. If nations are to collectively limit \r\nwarming to well below 2degC, for example, unprecedented emissions \r\nreductions will be necessary over the next decade (IPCC, 2018a). \r\nThese reductions would necessitate rapid progression of system \r\ntransitions (Section  18.3). If, despite the Paris Agreement, future \r\nemissions trajectories take the world beyond 2degC, a greater demand \r\nwill be placed on adaptation as a means of enhancing the resilience \r\nof development. Given the long-lived nature of human systems, and \r\nthe built environment in particular, significant adaptation investments \r\nwould be needed over the near-term to meet this demand"


id: 3b1dfd6caf0e55f02b416bb466448277
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" Yet, it \r\nis important to note that, even in the absence of consideration for \r\nclimate change, substantial development needs exist for communities \r\naround the world at present. Hence, a robust strategy for the pursuit of \r\nCRDPs is a near-term focus on portfolios of policies and practices that \r\npromote human and ecological well-being."


id: 4dfd0309eaa9711d110c991916606c3b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"A fundamental challenge for achieving CRD globally is reconciling \r\ndifferent perspectives on CRD. As noted in the AR5, 'as policy makers \r\nexplore what pathways to pursue, they will increasingly face questions \r\nabout managing discourses about what societal objectives to \r\npursue' (Denton et  al., 2014: 1124). Since the AR5, such discourses \r\nhave become prominent in policy debates over climate action and \r\nsustainable development because of different nations, communities \r\nand subpopulations having different understandings of what \r\nconstitutes CRD. Aggressive efforts to rapidly reduce GHG emissions or \r\nenhance resilience to climate change, for example, could have negative \r\nexternalities for the development objectives of some actors. This \r\npotential for trade-offs complicates efforts to build consensus regarding \r\nwhat constitutes appropriate climate and development policies and \r\npractices and by whom. The CRD pathways preferred by one actor are \r\nlikely to be contested by others"


id: 7529a24522d5a928de1d59dec52d53b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" This means operationalising concepts \r\nsuch as CRD in practice is likely to necessitate ongoing negotiation."


id: a7b542f63168ee21fdf4324d8960e070
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"The IPCC SR1.5 report identified transitions in four key systems, including energy, land and ocean ecosystems, urban \r\nand infrastructure, and industry, as being fundamental to the pursuit of CRD. In addition, this report identifies \r\nsocietal transitions, in terms of values and worldviews that shape aspirations, lifestyles and consumption patterns, \r\nas another key component of CRD. Acknowledging societal transitions has implications for how one assesses options \r\nand values different outcomes from the perspectives of ethics, equity, justice and inclusion. Collectively, these \r\nsystem transitions can widen the solution space and accelerate and deepen the implementation of sustainable \r\ndevelopment, adaptation, and mitigation actions by equipping actors and decision-makers with more effective \r\nand more equitable options. However, the way they are pursued may not necessarily be perceived as ethical or \r\ndesirable to all actors"


id: 4b078545874d314db337ffbdb002aba2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" Moreover, system transitions are necessary precursors for more fundamental climate and \r\nsustainable-development transformations. Yet, these transitions can themselves be outcomes of transformative \r\nactions."


id: f13694b6d474f6addef1c9d372e44b86
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" Sietsma (the Netherlands/UK), Chandni Singh (India), Alessandro \r\nTriacca (Italy), Bianca van Bavel (Canada/Ireland/UK), Ivan Villaverde Canosa (Spain/UK), Mustafa Babiker (Sudan/Saudi Arabia), Paolo \r\nBertoldi (Italy), Brett Cohen (South Africa), Annette Cowie (Australia), Kiane de Kleijne (the Netherlands), Jeremy Emmet-Booth (Ireland), \r\nAmit Garg (India), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the Netherlands), Andre Frossard Pereira de Lucena (Brazil), Adrian Leip (Italy/Germany), Lars J. \r\nNilsson (Sweden), Pete Smith (UK), Linda Steg (the Netherlands), Masahiro Sugiyama (Japan)"


id: fe094563801f908ec0a1a8949ae3fb43
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"For energy systems transitions, the adaptation options of infrastructure resilience, efficient water use and water management, \r\nand reliable power systems enable energy systems to work during disasters with reduced costs, demonstrating the \r\nsynergistic relationships between mitigation and adaptation (high confidence). There is high confidence in the high feasibility of \r\ninfrastructure resilience and reliable power systems as they enable power systems to provide emergency services during disasters, as well \r\nas continue these services during recovery periods. New evidence has focused on both options for peri-urban and rural areas through \r\ndistributed generation and isolated renewable energy systems, which also provide multiple social co-benefits (medium confidence).  For \r\nefficient water use and management, the synergistic potential with mitigation can make processes more efficient and cost effective (high \r\nconfidence)"


id: bea50f43819bd7c3bb22b3d10f97d7f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" With regards to adaptation feasibility, efficient water use is especially useful in drought-stricken areas and provides better \r\nwater management for multiple uses (high confidence)."


id: 1c6374079a81042473471b22f229990d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"There are multiple adaptation options for land and ocean ecosystems. Forest- and biodiversity-based adaptation options \r\nare generally promoted on the basis of their positive impacts on adaptive and ecological capacities, increased provision \r\nof ecosystem services and goods, with a particularly strong contribution to carbon sequestration (high confidence).\r\nHowever, large afforestation projects and the introduction of non-native and fast-growing vegetation reduce water availability, \r\nimpoverish habitats for wildlife and reduce overall ecological resilience, threatening the achievement of some Sustainable Development \r\nGoals (SDGs), and potentially leading to maladaptation (high confidence).Over-reliance on forest-based solutions may increase the \r\nsusceptibility to wildfires, with detrimental consequences both for mitigation and adaptation (medium confidence)"


id: 25532ef01e32e96a0f0ab792a22a39b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" Over the last \r\ndecade, forest- and biodiversity-based solutions have gained considerable political traction and social acceptability (high confidence), \r\nbut in countries with economies highly dependent on the export of agricultural commodities, opportunity costs continue to hinder the \r\nexpansion of these alternatives, particularly against more profitable land uses (high confidence). In such cases, government support \r\nand innovative financial schemes, including payments for ecosystem services, are fundamental for broader adherence to forest- and \r\nbiodiversity-based options."


id: 8210646ecee016565a1c4c763e75a1f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"For urban and infrastructure system transitions, sustainable urban planning can support both adaptation and decarbonisation \r\nby mainstreaming climate concerns, including effective land use into urban policies, by promoting resilient and low-carbon \r\ninfrastructure, and by protecting and integrating carbon-reducing biodiversity and ecosystem services into city planning \r\n(medium confidence). Urban green infrastructure and ecosystem services have high feasibility to support climate adaptation and \r\nmitigation efforts in cities, for example to reduce flood exposure and attenuate the urban heat island (high confidence). While green \r\ninfrastructure options are cost-effective and provide co-benefits in terms of ecosystem services such as improved air quality or other \r\nhealth benefits (high confidence), there remains a need for systematically assessing co-benefits, particularly for flood risk management \r\nand sustainable material flow analysis"


id: 9dbfb4a37708e2cebbc74b3787c274ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" Governments across scales can support urban sustainable water management by undertaking \r\nprojects to recycle wastewater and runoff through green infrastructure; enabling greater coherence between urban water and riverine \r\nbasin management; decentralising water systems; supporting networks for sharing best practices in water supply and storm runoff \r\ntreatment to scale sustainable management; and foregrounding equity and justice concerns, especially through participation involving \r\ninformal settlement residents (medium confidence)."


id: 3c80c7b1fb0b23510995523c6379dfde
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"Strong and equitable health systems can protect the health of populations in the face of known and unexpected stressors \r\n(medium confidence). Health and health systems adaptation is feasible where capacity is well developed, and where options align with \r\nnational priorities and engage local and international communities (medium confidence). Socio-cultural acceptability of health and health \r\nsystems adaptation is high and there is significant potential for risk-mitigation and social co-benefits where adaptation addresses the \r\nneeds of vulnerable regions and populations (medium confidence). Microeconomic feasibility and socioeconomic vulnerability reduction \r\npotentials are also high (high confidence), although economic feasibility may pose a significant challenge in low-income settings (medium \r\nconfidence)"


id: 4196f9c4119eea8785abfad257458e44
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" However, inadequate institutional capacity and resource availability represent major barriers, particularly for health systems \r\nstruggling to manage current health risks (high confidence)."


id: ce75307ebfc862c2218ace5ac7fa9dc1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"Risk insurance can be a feasible tool to adapt to climate risks and support sustainable development (high confidence). They \r\ncan reduce both vulnerability and exposure, support post-disaster recovery and reduce financial burden on governments, households \r\nand business. Insurance mechanisms enjoy wide legal and regulatory acceptability among policymakers and are institutionally feasible \r\n(high confidence). However, socio-cultural and financial barriers make insurance spatially and temporally challenging to implement \r\n(high confidence), even though it can improve the health and well-being of populations (medium confidence). The risk of generating \r\nmaladaptive outcomes can further limit the uptake of insurance, as it can provide disincentives for reducing risk over the long term \r\n(medium confidence). Expanding the knowledge base on insurance is fundamental to successfully implement insurance among all \r\nrelevant stakeholders"


id: dcc154182f288effd604f86bfb9c63e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" Ensuring equitable access to and benefits from innovative financial products (e.g., loans) is needed to guarantee \r\nsuccessful uptake of insurance across all the population (high confidence)."


id: 6fa28ddf88c6e408f93f10bab77c5021
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"Migration has been used by millions around the world to maintain and improve their well-being in the face of changed \r\ncircumstances, often as part of labour or livelihood diversification (very high confidence). Properly supported and, where \r\nlevels of agency and assets are high, migration as a climate response can reduce exposure and socioeconomic vulnerability (medium \r\nconfidence). Households and communities in climate-exposed regions experience a range of intersecting stressors. These households can \r\nundertake distress migration, which results in negative adaptive and resilience outcomes (high confidence). Outcomes can be improved \r\nthrough a systematic examination of the political economy of local and regional sectors that employ precarious communities and by \r\naddressing vulnerabilities that pose barriers to in situ adaptation and livelihood strategies (medium confidence)"


id: 682050bdeb3b4a9c82b1c973382f0185
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" Migrants and their \r\nsending and receiving communities can be supported through temporary labour-migration schemes, improving discourses on migration, \r\nand matching existing migration agreements with development objectives (medium confidence)."


id: 8575efcee743c414126885df130cb62b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"The Paris Climate Agreement marked a significant shift for the IPCC AR6 assessment towards a systematic exploration of climate solutions \r\nand a suite of linked adaptation and mitigation options (IPCC, 2018b; IPCC, 2019b). This shift was first evidenced in SR1.5, whose plenary\u0002approved outline sought to define feasibility as 'referring to the potential for a mitigation or adaptation option to be implemented. Factors \r\ninfluencing feasibility are context-dependent, temporally dynamic, and may vary between different groups and actors. Feasibility depends \r\non geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional factors that enable or constrain the \r\nimplementation of an option. The feasibility of options may change when different options are combined and increase when enabling \r\nconditions are strengthened'. Based on this, SR1"


id: eb26a001f9c5bb86cb819979874c7cbf
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"5 identified (with high confidence) rapid and far-reaching transitions in four systems: \r\nenergy, land and other ecosystems, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems, are necessary to \r\nenable pathways to limit average global warming to 1.5degC compared with pre-industrial temperatures (Bazaz et al., 2018; IPCC, 2018b). \r\nThis was deepened for terrestrial systems in SRCCL, while SROCC added additional evidence from ocean and cryosphere systems. The \r\nassessment also included the interactions between carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and adaptation outcomes: compared with previous \r\nAssessment Reports, it is clear that the ambitious temperature targets agreed upon in Paris in 2015 will require at least some CDR, that \r\nis all 1.5degC pathways will eventually feature annual removals at gigaton level (Rogelj et al., 2018a). This necessitates assessing the \r\ninteractions of CDR with adaptation."


id: b5cdb71b09c7a4dc2f222c920ac4ecb0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"There has been growing research emphasis on synthesising adaptation literature through meta-reviews of adaptation research (Sietsma \r\net al., 2021; Berrang-Ford et al. 2021), adaptation readiness (Ford et al., 2015a; Ford et al., 2017), adaptation progress (Araos et al., \r\n2016a), adaptation barriers and enablers (Biesbroek et al., 2013; Eisenack et al., 2014; Barnett et al., 2015), and adaptation outcomes \r\n(Owen, 2020) (Cross-Chapter Box ADAPT in Chapter 1). In particular, understanding which adaptation options are effective, to what risks, \r\nand under what conditions, is particularly challenging given the lack of a clearly defined and globally- agreed- adaptation goals, as well \r\nas disagreement on the metrics to assess adaptation effectiveness (Berrang-Ford et al., 2019; Singh et al., 2021c) (17.5.2 on Successful \r\nAdaptation). Effectiveness studies often use metrics such as reduced risk exposure, damage costs averted, which lend themselves well to \r\ninfrastructural options (e.g"


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", effectiveness of seawalls in reducing sea level rise [SLR] exposure in coastal cities), but do not translate well \r\nto 'soft' adaptation options such as climate services or changing building codes."


id: 109cc90f121b5fa0c2f9f48a036c4e1e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"The adaptation options assessed for energy system transitions are resilient power infrastructure; water management, focused on water \r\nefficiency and cooling, for all types of generation sources; and reliable power systems. Since SR1.5, there has not been significant change \r\nin the feasibility of the first two options as they continue to be implemented successfully, allowing for power generation to maintain \r\nor increase its reliability during extreme weather events (high confidence) (Zhang et al., 2018; Ali and Kumar, 2016; DeNooyer et al., \r\n2016). As in the case of SR1.5, these options are not sufficient for the far-reaching transformations required in the energy sector, which \r\ntend to focus on technological transitions from a fossil-based to a renewable energy regime (Erlinghagen and Markard, 2012; Muench \r\net al., 2014; Brand and von Gleich, 2015; Monstadt and Wolff, 2015; Child and Breyer, 2017; Hermwille et al., 2017). The main difference \r\nfrom SR1"


id: 6db0a8ddca4d54845bf53aaa268f6d26
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"5 is that resilient power infrastructure now includes distributed generation utilities, such as microgrids, as there is increasing \r\nevidence of its role in reducing vulnerability, especially within underserved populations (high confidence)."


id: a4b5bacb17b8d1246b7303c15639e1db
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"Since AR5, the reliability of power systems has gained interest because of the numerous service disruptions during extreme weather \r\nevents. As with resilient power systems, there is increasing evidence of the feasibility of increased reliability for both existing power \r\nplants, independently of the generation source, and for rural landscapes. The option has high confidence (robust evidence, high agreement) \r\nfor the high feasibility of the technological and social dimensions. As with previous options, the technological means exist to create \r\nredundancy in power generation, transmission and distribution systems and their implementation ensures the continuous functionality \r\nof emergency services, such as communications, health and water pumping, amongst others, in urban, peri-urban and rural landscapes \r\n(high confidence)"


id: 2c620559299fac560a6d6f5c040a714c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" There is high feasibility for the economic, technical and socio-cultural dimensions (the latter more prominently for \r\ndecentralised systems), and medium feasibility for institutional and geophysical dimensions."


id: 2c985e5cb7c77d8ebea3b0264397325d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"There is robust evidence and medium agreement regarding the feasibility of coastal defence and hardening as adaptation options in some \r\ncircumstances, which here includes grey coastal infrastructure. Economic and social factors may limit the feasibility of these options as \r\nthey require large investments (both construction, maintenance and monitoring) (Hamin et al., 2018; Magnan and Duvat, 2018; Morris \r\net al., 2018; Morris et al., 2019; Nicholls et al., 2019; Hanley et al., 2020b) (Section CCP2.3). While these costs present challenges for rural \r\nareas, coastal defence structures may still be cost-effective in other areas, such as those with larger economies (Aerts, 2018; Lincke and \r\nHinkel, 2018; Tiggeloven et al., 2020; Vousdoukas et al., 2020; Lima and Coelho, 2021). Strong, transparent and inclusive governance is \r\nkey, suggesting that these measures can occasionally fail to adequately balance competing stakeholder interests"


id: bc7b80e3fc121b36f967b4486c8a6101
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" Consequently, they may \r\ndisproportionately benefit wealthier people and exacerbate existing vulnerability of the poor (Kind et al., 2017; O'Donnell, 2019; Ratter \r\net al., 2019; Siders and Keenan, 2020; Siriwardane-de Zoysa, 2020). They are also potentially maladaptive if they are not flexible or robust \r\nin response to a changing climate (Antunes do Carmo, 2018; Hamin et al., 2018; Morris et al., 2019; Baills et al., 2020; Foti et al., 2020; \r\nHanley et al., 2020b) and can have negative impacts on the local environment, habitats, ecosystem services, and communities (Mills et al., \r\n2016; Morris et al., 2018; Morris et al., 2019; Foti et al., 2020; Hanley et al., 2020b)."


id: 6daa52b0644d4abaaaa1a1efb24bb63a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"There is medium evidence with medium agreement on the feasibility of sustainable aquaculture as an adaptation measure. Sustainable \r\naquaculture (e.g., integrated multi-trophic aquaculture, polyculture, aquaponics, mangrove-integrated culture) can have socioeconomic \r\nbenefits for vulnerable communities and small-scale fisheries (Ahmed, 2018; Blasiak et al., 2019; Mustafa et al., 2021; Thomas et al., \r\n2021; Xuan et al., 2021). However, caution is important to guarantee that access to fish supply of local and vulnerable communities is \r\nnot affected (Chan et al., 2019; Galappaththi et al., 2020). Access to financial resources is often a barrier to implementation, although \r\nsustainable aquaculture can increase employment opportunities that are increasingly gender equitable (Alleway et al., 2018; Leakhena \r\net al., 2018; Valenti et al., 2018; Gopal et al., 2020), as well as increasing the resilience of coastal livelihoods to climate change (Shaffril \r\net al"


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", 2017; Blasiak and Wabnitz, 2018). Technological, institutional and socio-cultural factors can form barriers to the feasibility of \r\nsustainable aquaculture (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2018; Blasiak et al., 2019; Galappaththi et al., 2019; Boyd et al., 2020; Osmundsen et al., 2020; \r\nStentiford et al., 2020; Mustapha et al., 2021; Xuan et al., 2021)."


id: 52d005bdf237a495745e49f3a348cd4f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"Environmental and economic aspects are key when assessing the sustainability of aquaculture practices (Ahmed et al., 2018; Aubin et al., \r\n2019; Bohnes et al., 2019; Galappaththi et al., 2019; Boyd et al., 2020; Galappaththi et al., 2020; Osmundsen et al., 2020; Stentiford \r\net al., 2020; Thomas et al., 2021). A global picture of where sustainable aquaculture is possible is needed and desirable (FAO, 2018; \r\nGalappaththi et al., 2019; Bricknell et al., 2021), yet there are few new references to its physical feasibility. Adaptation options for existing \r\nsustainable aquaculture need to be developed, along with institutional arrangements such as education and technology transfer, focused \r\non developing sustainable industries (Section 8.6.2.3). Sustainable agriculture is likely to receive strong support from many countries but \r\nmay also experience resistance for several reasons (e.g., competition with existing industries, debates over tolerance to aesthetic changes \r\nto coastlines)"


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" Literature on this area is growing. Potential barriers at the government and political levels are significant (e.g., Jayanthi \r\net al., 2018; Blasiak et al., 2019; Hargan et al., 2020; Osmundsen et al., 2020; Stentiford et al., 2020; Mustafa et al., 2021; Qurani et al., \r\n2021)."


id: 5f14aba77c4cec1d412582d6351666eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"ICZM measures are generally more cost-effective than 'hard engineering' measures (Antunes do Carmo, 2018; Morecroft et al., 2019; \r\nMorris et al., 2019; Donatti et al., 2020; Erftemeijer et al., 2020; Hanley et al., 2020a; Jones et al., 2020b), but implementation pose \r\nbarriers, especially in low-income countries (Lamari et al., 2016; Villamizar et al., 2017; Rosendo et al., 2018; Mestanza-Ramon et al., \r\n2019; Barragan Munoz, 2020; Botero and Zielinski, 2020; Caviedes et al., 2020; Martuti et al., 2020; Lin et al., 2021). ICZM implementation \r\nrequires strong institutional frameworks, where all relevant stakeholders (especially representatives of local communities) are part of \r\ndecision-making processes (Perez-Cayeiro and Chica-Ruiz, 2015; Lamari et al., 2016; Hassanali, 2017; Antunes do Carmo, 2018; Hamin \r\net al., 2018; Phillips et al., 2018; Romanach et al., 2018; Rosendo et al., 2018; Warnken and Mosadeghi, 2018; Mestanza-Ramon et al., \r\n2019; Morecroft et al"


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", 2019; Morris et al., 2019; Walsh, 2019; Barragan Munoz, 2020; Caviedes et al., 2020; Donatti et al., 2020; Ellison \r\net al., 2020; Martuti et al., 2020; O'Mahony et al., 2020; Perera-Valderrama et al., 2020). This aspect is mentioned as a key challenge \r\nin developing countries (Perez-Cayeiro and Chica-Ruiz, 2015; Villamizar et al., 2017; Rosendo et al., 2018; Alves et al., 2020). Similarly, \r\nexplicitly incorporating gender considerations into ICZM is generally recommended, mainly because women are key knowledge holders in \r\ncoastal communities; however, this is rarely done in practice, which may lead to sub-optimal or unequal outcomes (Nguyen Mai and Dang \r\nHoang, 2018; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019; Pearson et al., 2019; Barreto et al., 2020). The perception that building 'hard' infrastructure \r\n(i.e"


id: 970afafaf8a0d4f890c73dd332c1b6f1
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content:
", coastal defence and hardening) is a more efficient way of reducing coastal risk than the implementation of 'soft' or nature-based \r\nsolutions (NbS) measures has been challenged in recent studies (Magnan and Duvat, 2018)."


id: 4250847263d4876915f2baad67119ed4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"There is robust evidence and medium agreement supporting the overall feasibility of forest-based adaptation options. Regarding its \r\neconomic feasibility, some studies (Nabuurs et al., 2017b; Chow et al., 2019; Seddon et al., 2020a) highlight that the net benefits of \r\nmeasures such as reforestation, sustainable forest management and ecosystem restoration outweigh the costs of implementation and \r\nmaintenance. Yet, another strand of literature observes that limited access to financial resources is a major constraint to forest-based \r\ninitiatives, especially in the face of upfront investment costs and alternative, more profitable land uses, such as agriculture (Bustamante \r\net al., 2019; Ota et al., 2020; Seddon et al., 2020b)"


id: 7208c8b0297b4a7287bab84fc131746a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" In countries with extensive rural areas where forests provide for local communities, \r\ngovernment support together with private investments and long-term assurances of maintenance, are considered fundamental for the \r\nlong-term viability of forest conservation strategies (Bustamante et al., 2019; Seddon et al., 2020b). In rural areas, smallholders can \r\ndiversify their livelihood and increase household income as a result of improved local forest governance (Bustamante et  al., 2019; \r\nFleischman et al., 2020; Ota et al., 2020) Similarly, forest and ecosystem restoration has been found to reduce poverty and improve \r\nsocial inclusion and participation, given that ecosystems can be managed jointly and in traditional ways (Woroniecki et al., 2019). Robust \r\nevidence (high agreement) links forest-based adaptation to job creation, improved health and recreational benefits, most notably for \r\nindigenous, rural and remote communities (Muricho et al., 2019b; Rahman et al"


id: 8a8ca1f40602a5167ae3d1ad19e7941a
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content:
", 2019; Ambrosino et al., 2020; Bhattarai, 2020; Ota \r\net al., 2020; von Holle et al., 2020; Tagliari et al., 2021). However, Chausson et al. (2020) note that frameworks for assessing the cost\u0002effectiveness of adaptation strategies continue to be tailored to conventional, engineered interventions, which fail to capture the broader \r\narray of material and non-material benefits that forest-based interventions might bring."


id: 3f942d42b1891af3190d713ccb314208
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Regarding risk reduction potential, forest-based strategies are found to protect in-land infrastructure from landslides and coastal \r\ninfrastructure from storm surges (Seddon et al., 2020a; Seddon et al., 2020b), together with offering a cheaper solution than engineered \r\ngrey solutions (Chausson et al., 2020). Land availability is a limiting factor for expanding forest-based solutions (Morecroft et al., 2019; \r\nOntl et al., 2020). However, there is high agreement and robust evidence that reforestation, environmental conservation and NbS result in \r\nincreased carbon sinks (Griscom et al., 2017b; Nabuurs et al., 2017b; de Coninck et al., 2018b; Fuss et al., 2018; Favretto et al., 2020; Forster \r\net al., 2021). Some authors argue that primary ecosystems and native forests contain larger stocks of carbon than tree plantations (Seddon \r\net al., 2019; Fleischman et al., 2020; Seddon et al"


id: 8c99e00fb2c6de482cfe8cf02a9fe5d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
", 2020a), while another strain of literature finds that net sequestration rate is lower in \r\nmature primary forests than in younger managed forests with their associated wood value chains (Cowie et al., 2021; Forster et al., 2021; \r\nGundersen et al., 2021). There is robust evidence and high agreement that forest- and ecosystem-based strategies result in hazard risk \r\nreduction potential. Environmental restoration can be an effective climate change adaptation alternative, reducing susceptibility to extreme \r\nevents, improving ecological capacities and increasing overall ecosystems' resilience (Chapter 8, Box 9.7) (Nunes et al., 2020). However, too \r\nmuch reliance on forests and green alternatives might increase water shortages and wildfires (Seddon et al., 2019; Fleischman et al., 2020)."


id: e40c4def8bb215be152eaf34af0b0cba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 33359
content:
"CCB FEASIB.3.2.6 Biodiversity management and ecosystem connectivity\r\nThere is robust evidence and medium agreement supporting the overall feasibility of biodiversity management and ecosystem connectivity \r\nas adaptation options. With respect to its economic feasibility, financial constraints continue to hinder broader implementation of \r\nbiodiversity-based solutions (Lausche et al., 2013; Chausson et al., 2020; Jones et al., 2020a). Seddon et al. (2020a) highlights that only 5% \r\nof climate finance goes towards adaptation strategies, and only 1% is destined to disaster risk management including NbS and biodiversity \r\nmanagement. Government support via subsidies and fiscal transfers is critical for broader biodiversity management interventions. In \r\naddition, REDD+ (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Land Degradation) initiatives have been promoted as a profitable mechanism \r\nto advance biodiversity conservation strategies while reducing carbon emissions"


id: e645ed4051ab44a59875305df065396e
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vector_id: 33720
content:
" As far as ecosystem connectivity is concerned, its feasibility \r\nwill strongly depend on the existence of a regulatory framework that appropriately balances property rights, environmental regulations and \r\nmonetary incentives to ensure landowners' willingness to participate and maintain ecosystem corridors (Jones et al., 2020b). The demands \r\nof commodity-based economies, favouring extractive land uses, present serious barriers to upscaling biodiversity-based adaptation \r\ninterventions (Seddon et al., 2020a). In addition, integrated assessments have shown how biodiversity-based solutions can deliver jobs \r\nfrom landscape restoration or income from wildlife tourism and how those benefits are fairly distributed (Chausson et al., 2020)."


id: 670cdb942cfad100af22813f9c536686
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content:
"Legal and regulatory instruments are not perceived as major barriers to biodiversity management and ecosystem connectivity projects \r\n(Lausche et al., 2013; D'Aloia et al., 2019). A challenge that biodiversity-based measures still face is less acceptance among decision \r\nmakers because their efficiency and cost-benefit ratio are difficult to determine and most of the measures are only effective in the long \r\nterm (Lange et  al., 2019). Methodologies to determine cost-effectiveness vary substantially between studies, in part because these \r\nanalyses must be tailored to the socio-ecological context to be meaningful for local governance. This makes it challenging to capture \r\nand synthesise the full economic benefits of biodiversity-based solutions in comparison to alternatives (Chausson et al., 2020). In all, \r\nbiodiversity and nature-based solutions have gained considerable political traction, with the greatest emphasis on the role of ecosystems \r\nas carbon sinks (Lange et al"


id: 9f00e907559ccb56867a8ffb5ee2c700
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 22559
content:
"Improved cropland management, which includes agricultural adaptation strategies such as integrated soil management, no/reduced tillage, \r\nconservation agriculture, planting of stress-resistant or early maturing crop varieties, and mulching, has high economic and environmental \r\nfeasibility (robust evidence, high agreement) (AGEGNEHU and AMEDE, 2017; Lalani et al., 2017; Schulte et al., 2017; Thierfelder et al., \r\n2017; Aryal et al., 2018a; Mayer et al., 2018; Prestele et al., 2018; Sova et al., 2018; Gonzalez-Sanchez et al., 2019; Lunduka et al., 2019; \r\nMcFadden et al., 2019; Shah and Wu, 2019; TerAvest et al., 2019; Adams et al., 2020; Aryal et al., 2020a; Debie, 2020; Mutuku et al., 2020; \r\nSomasundaram et al., 2020; Du et al., 2021). Despite higher initial costs in some cases, the economic feasibility of improved cropland \r\nmanagement is high through improved productivity, higher net returns and reduced input costs (Aryal, 2020; Mottaleb et al., 2017; Keil \r\net al"


id: 3915f8db069d4861a1acd0cce99dc765
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 6352
content:
", 2019; Lunduka et al., 2019; McFadden et al., 2019; Parihar et al., 2020). Self-efficacy is shown to be the most important predictor in \r\ntechnical and non-technical adaptation behaviour (Zobeidi et al., 2021), while subsidies, extension services, training, commercial custom-hire \r\nservices and strong social connections such as farmer networks are among the factors supporting adoption among farmers (Section 8.5.2.3) \r\n(Aryal et al., 2015a; Aryal et al., 2015b; Kannan and Ramappa, 2017; Bedeke et al., 2019; Acevedo et al., 2020). In some regions and for some \r\npractices, technological feasibility is constrained by costs and inadequate information and technical know-how on particular practices and \r\ntheir benefits and trade-offs, indicating medium feasibility (Khatri-Chhetri et al., 2016; Bhatta et al., 2017; Dougill et al., 2017; Kannan and \r\nRamappa, 2017; Aryal et al., 2018a; Sova et al., 2018; Findlater et al., 2019)"


id: f1a54e667277f63d39cf3641172a656b
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content:
" Delays between actions and tangible benefits can reduce public \r\nand private acceptability and uptake of improved cropland management practices (e.g., Dougill et al., 2017 in Malawi)."


id: 7fc05558e2656faf5843f5561b0df19b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"There remain institutional and financial barriers to improved cropland management such as lack of comprehensive policies, inadequate \r\nmainstreaming into national policy priorities (e.g., Amjath-Babu et al., 2019 and Reddy et al., 2020 in South Asia), fragmentation across \r\ndifferent sectors (Dougill et al., 2017 in Malawi), and inadequate access to credit (Aryal et al., 2018c in India). Adoption of improved \r\ncropland management practices is often strongly mediated by gender: structural barriers such as unequal access to land, machinery, \r\ninputs, and extension and credit services, constrain adoption by female farmers (Aryal et al., 2018b; Aryal et al., 2018c) Mponela et al., \r\n2016; Van Hulst and Posthumus, 2016; Ntshangase et al., 2018; Somasundaram et al., 2020). Improved cropland management practices \r\nhave social and ecological co-benefits in terms of better health, education and food security (Agarwal, 2017; Farnworth et al"


id: 4ec5125c201ba95c172110091673e0ca
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content:
", 2017; \r\nHorner and Wollni, 2020) and better soil health and ecosystem functioning (AGEGNEHU and AMEDE, 2017; Mottaleb et  al., 2017; \r\nThierfelder et al., 2017; Zomer et al., 2017; Sarkar et al., 2018; Gonzalez-Sanchez et al., 2019; Shah and Wu, 2019; Du et al., 2020; Mutuku \r\net al., 2020; Somasundaram et al., 2020)."


id: eb95728f4bfb2a5aba0628946e827117
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content:
"et al., 2020; IPCC WGIII AR6 Section 7.4.3). While the technological and ecological feasibility of improving livestock production systems \r\nis high (i.e., measures are technically well established, with different options applicable to a range of livestock production systems and \r\necological conditions), there are multiple context-specific barriers to adoption. These include the lack of coordinated policy support \r\nor governance, potentially high implementation costs and limited access to finance, inadequate advisory, knowledge exchange or \r\ninfrastructural capacity (Escarcha et al., 2018; Paul et al., 2020), the potential land requirements and associated ecological impacts of \r\nadjusting livestock management, lack of context-specific research (Pardo and del Prado, 2020) and socio-cultural barriers limiting access \r\nby women or low-income groups to better breeds or feed varieties (Luqman et al., 2018; Salmon et al"


id: ed9966581184db7fed0e6c79ea29a65c
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content:
", 2018), as well as women losing \r\ninfluence in the household in some contexts when farms intensify (Tavenner and Crane, 2018). In dryland livestock systems in Ethiopia \r\nand Kenya, Ericksen and Crane (2018) find that low governance capacities to implement improved grazing regimes constrain improved \r\ngrassland management."


id: 50d4396d5494c3fbcf6395485a1a7fe5
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content:
"CCB FEASIB.3.2.9 Water use efficiency and water resource management\r\nThere is high technological feasibility (robust evidence, high agreement) of improving water use efficiency as well as of managing \r\nwater resources at basin and field scales. These approaches include rainwater harvesting, drip irrigation, laser land levelling, drainage \r\nmanagement and stubble retention (Dasgupta and Roy, 2017; Khatri-Chhetri et al., 2017; Rahman et al., 2017; Adham et al., 2018; Darzi\u0002Naftchali and Ritzema, 2018; Terencio et al., 2018; Velasco-Munoz et al., 2018; Sojka et al., 2019). There is robust evidence (medium \r\nagreement) that such measures have socioeconomic co-benefits and improve adaptive capacities through improved water supply (e.g., \r\nthrough rainwater harvesting, increased infiltration or integrated watershed management) and sustainable water demand management \r\n(e.g., reduction of evaporation loss)"


id: 784af03f6063dd603646b703bae2d397
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" There is medium evidence (high agreement) of the option's economic feasibility due to water and \r\nenergy cost savings enhanced by low-cost monitoring systems in some cases (Kodali and Sarjerao, 2017; Viani et al., 2017). Implementation \r\ncosts vary widely, with land forming and irrigation infrastructure requiring substantial up-front investment, while mulches and cover \r\ncrops are low-cost practices. Water management and use efficiency is currently constrained by governance and institutional factors \r\nsuch as inadequate institutional capacities to prepare for changing water availability, especially in the long term; unsustainable and \r\nunequal water use and sharing practices, particularly across boundaries; and fragmented and siloed resource management approaches \r\n(Lardizabal, 2015; Margerum and Robinson, 2015; Singh et al., 2020a)."


id: b2994e5d8a20320c446b8a44e68a3274
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Livelihood diversification is a key coping and adaptation strategy to climatic and non-climatic risks (Gautam and Andersen, 2016; Asfaw \r\net al., 2018; Liu, 2015; Goulden et al., 2013; Makate et al., 2016; Orchard et al., 2016; Nyantakyi-Frimpong, 2017; Schuhbauer et al., 2017; \r\nKihila, 2018; Radel et al., 2018; Tian and Lemos, 2018; Buechler and Lutz-Ley, 2019; Salam and Bauer, 2020). There is robust evidence\r\n(medium agreement) that diversifying livelihoods improves incomes and reduces socioeconomic vulnerability, but depending on livelihood \r\ntype, opportunities and local context, feasibility changes (Section 8.5.1) (Barrett, 2013; Martin and Lorenzen, 2016; Sina et al., 2019). \r\nLivelihood diversification has positive and negative outcomes for adaptive capacity, especially in ecologically and resource-stressed regions \r\n(e.g. Anderson et al., 2017; Woodhouse and McCabe, 2018; Rosyida et al., 2019; Ojea et al"


id: fefb61ee6ad053690e30d2439ee3323d
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content:
", 2020), with diversification predominantly \r\nout of rural farm-based livelihoods on the rise (Rigg and Oven, 2015; Shackleton et al., 2015; Ober and Sakdapolrak, 2020). Key barriers \r\nto livelihood diversification include socio-cultural and institutional barriers (including social networks; Goulden et al., 2013) as well as \r\ninadequate resources and livelihood opportunities that hinder the full adaptive possibilities of existing livelihood diversification practices \r\n(Shackleton et al., 2015; Nightingale, 2017b; Bhowmik et al., 2021; Rahut et al., 2021). Autonomous diversification in the absence of more \r\nequitable and harmonised efforts at regional and national scales to facilitate sustainable diversification can further skew development \r\nindicators at the sub-national scale in favour of local elites, increased inequality and environmental degradation (Ford et al., 2014; Wilson, \r\n2014; Alobo Loison, 2015; Tanner et al"


id: c8d9549419b7e9e52f70ac34631df145
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vector_id: 29156
content:
", 2015; Gautam and Andersen, 2016; Baird and Hartter, 2017; Torell et al., 2017; Asfaw et al., 2018; \r\nWoodhouse and McCabe, 2018; Brown et al., 2019; Rosyida et al., 2019; Sani Ibrahim et al., 2019; Ojea et al., 2020; Salam and Bauer, 2020)."


id: 1ae111101e849d577422b2a6f64d15d5
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content:
"Structural disincentives and institutional arrangements create challenges for planning even where political willingness may be high \r\n(Di Gregorio et  al., 2019; DuPuis and Greenberg, 2019; Shi, 2019; Zen et  al., 2019; Rasmussen et  al., 2020). Social resistance may \r\nsignificantly delay or block progress entirely, as vulnerable communities have responded negatively in cases where adaptive urban and \r\nland use planning leads to perceived 'resilience gentrification' (Keenan et al., 2018; Anguelovski et al., 2019a), if residents do not perceive \r\nthemselves as included in the crafting of plans (Araos, 2020; Rasmussen et al., 2020), if the options such as managed retreat are perceived \r\nas culturally unacceptable (Ajibade, 2019; Koslov, 2019; Siders, 2019), or if wealthier and advantaged residents benefit from planning \r\nat the expense of socially vulnerable groups (Chu and Michael, 2018; Chu et al., 2018; Fainstein, 2018; Rosenzweig et al"


id: 932ba3bed988f088e18a137f3efee2b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
", 2018; Pelling \r\nand Garschagen, 2019a; Ranganathan and Bratman, 2021). Nonetheless, potential social co-benefits related to health and education \r\nare high (Raymond et al., 2017; Spaans and Waterhout, 2017; Klinenberg, 2018; Keeler et al., 2019; Meerow, 2019). Finally, the option \r\nis highly feasible in relation to ecological and geophysical characteristics, as urban and land use planning's primary tool is to shape the \r\nbuilt environment and natural spaces to protect and reduce the vulnerability of residents."


id: d572b4afe3590195e8e3c2f143ba6861
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31104
content:
"Urban green infrastructure and ecosystem services have high feasibility to support climate adaptation and mitigation efforts in cities, \r\nfor example to reduce flood exposure and attenuate the urban heat island effect (Perrotti and Stremke, 2018; Belcakova et al., 2019; \r\nDe la Sota et  al., 2019; Stefanakis, 2019). While green infrastructure options are cost-effective and provide co-benefits in terms of \r\necosystem services such as improved air quality or other health benefits (Depietri and McPhearson, 2017; Morris et al., 2018; Reguero \r\net al., 2018; Escobedo et al., 2019; Filazzola et al., 2019; Hewitt et al., 2020b; Venter et al., 2020; Nieuwenhuijsen, 2021) (robust evidence, \r\nhigh agreement), a need remains for systematically assessing co-benefits, particularly for flood risk management (Alves et al., 2019; \r\nStefanakis, 2019) and sustainable material flow analysis (Perrotti and Stremke, 2018)"


id: 5f14d8938a1447f3056d04e69c7ddd7e
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vector_id: 12506
content:
" Moreover, while once neglected, rapidly increasing \r\nattention has been paid to the equity and justice dimensions of planning and implementing green infrastructure initiatives, such as \r\ninclusion of citizens in decision making or the allocation of benefits and impacts of projects (Anguelovski et al., 2019b; Buijs et al., 2019; \r\nLangemeyer et al., 2020; Venter et al., 2020)"


id: f598e6d7d0705f3698e9fab1ce0339a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 36159
content:
"For flood management, a mix of green, blue and grey infrastructures are found effective, with grey infrastructure reducing the risk of \r\nflooding and green infrastructure yielding multiple co-benefits (Alves et al., 2019; Gu et al., 2019; Webber et al., 2020) but catchment\u0002wide solutions are advocated as the best performing strategy (Webber et al., 2020). Recognising and addressing a full range of ecosystem \r\ndisturbances and disasters over a larger urban spatial scale (Vargas-Hernandez and Zdunek-Wielgolaska, 2021) are crucial for planning \r\ngreen infrastructure-based solutions. In some cases, low impact development interventions yield effective flood management outcomes \r\nbut are adequate only for small flood peaks (Pour et al., 2020), with the major challenge being identifying best practices"


id: 6874c7a055e3838296dd7b49d78329e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14022
content:
" NbS hold \r\nsignificant potential to achieve mitigation and adaptation goals in comparison with traditional approaches, but more research is necessary \r\nto understand their effectiveness, distribution, implementation at scale, cost-benefit and integration with spatial dimensions of planning \r\n(Davies et al., 2019; Dorst et al., 2019; Zwierzchowska et al., 2019; Hobbie and Grimm, 2020)."


id: 4ed3cd5fb1059be634eaf3220cf616c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9840
content:
"Deployment of decentralised water management through effective local governance frameworks, is an important water management \r\nstrategy (Herslund and Mguni, 2019; Leigh and Lee, 2019b), but in general, insufficient institutional learning and capacity remains a \r\ncritical barrier for the uptake of sustainable urban water management practices (Krueger et al., 2019a; Adem Esmail and Suleiman, 2020). \r\nTransnational networks of cities for sharing best practices in water supply and storm runoff treatment also hold the potential to scale \r\nsustainable management (Feingold et al., 2018). In rapidly growing large urban areas, sustainable water management faces challenges \r\nof institutional heterogeneity (Chu et al., 2018), scalar mismatch, particularly between river basin and city scales (van den Brandeler \r\net al., 2019), and equity and justice concerns (Chu et al., 2018; Pelling et al., 2018)"


id: cb09878fd4dd1c82517bb692fa9ed57a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29505
content:
" Finally, assessing the vulnerability of urban water \r\ninfrastructures at city scale remains an important knowledge gap (Dong et al., 2020)."


id: f755bfb5ae5e677901a7cd6fa7eab0f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36432
content:
"Social safety nets contribute to meeting development goals (e.g., poverty alleviation, accessible education and health services) and are \r\nincreasingly being reconfigured to build adaptive capacities of the most vulnerable (Coirolo et al., 2013; Aleksandrova, 2020; Bowen et al., \r\n2020; Fischer, 2020; Mueller et al., 2020). They include a range of policy and market-based instruments such as public works programmes \r\nand conditional or unconditional cash transfers, in-kind transfers, and insurance schemes (Centre, 2019; Aleksandrova, 2020). While \r\nthere is robust evidence (medium agreement) that social safety nets can build adaptive capacities, reduce socioeconomic vulnerability \r\nand reduce risk linked to hazards (Fischer, 2020; Mueller et al., 2020), macroeconomic, institutional and regulatory barriers such as \r\nlimited state resources, underdeveloped credit and insurance markets, and economic leakages constrain their feasibility (Singh et al., \r\n2018c; Hansen et al"


id: ad6c77e650e31df6bade0430b51b2646
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", 2019; Aleksandrova, 2020; Lykke Strobech and Bordon Rosa, 2020). Social safety nets have strong co-benefits with \r\ndevelopment goals (Section 8.6) (Castells-Quintana et al., 2018b; Ulrichs et al., 2019; Mueller et al., 2020) but these positive outcomes \r\nare constrained by inadequate regional inclusiveness (e.g., limited access in certain remote, rural areas; Singh et al., 2018b; Aleksandrova, \r\n2020; Lykke Strobech and Bordon Rosa, 2020) or focus on rural areas overlooks urban vulnerable groups (Coirolo et al., 2013)."


id: fd10723764b8406235497d91d948e394
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"There is high confidence on risk spreading and sharing, most commonly arranged through insurance, as an adaptation option, but high to \r\nmedium feasibility depending on context (e.g., developed versus developing countries). Technological, economic and institutional feasibility \r\nis high, as insurance can spread risk, provide a buffer against the impact of climate hazards, support recovery and reduce the financial burden \r\non governments, households and businesses (Wolfrom and Yokoi-Arai, 2015; O'Hare et al., 2016; Glaas et al., 2017; Jenkins et al., 2017; Patel \r\net al., 2017; Kousky et al., 2021). Insurance can shift the mobilisation of financial resources away from ad hoc post-event payments, where \r\nfunding is often unpredictable and delayed, towards more strategic approaches that are set up in advance of disastrous events (Surminski \r\net  al., 2016)"


id: 9196007c2d480f0b3cf272d38909c1b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" By pricing risk, insurance can provide incentives for investments and behaviour that reduce vulnerability and exposure \r\n(Linnerooth-Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler, 2015; Shapiro, 2016; Jenkins et al., 2017). Socio-cultural barriers, such as social inclusiveness, socio\u0002cultural acceptability and gender equity constrains feasibility (Bageant and Barrett, 2017; Budhathoki et al., 2019). Insurance can provide \r\ndisincentives for reducing risk through the transfer of the risk spatially and temporally, distorting incentives for adaptation if the pricing is \r\ntoo low (moral hazard) and is often unaffordable, poorly understood, and not widely utilised in developing nations even when subsidised, \r\npossibly leading to maladaptation (Garcia Romero and Molina, 2015; Joyette et al., 2015; Lashley and Warner, 2015; Jin et al., 2016; Muller \r\net al., 2017; Tesselaar et al., 2020)"


id: b4e389b2728fcc168d3dbc4809f6c914
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" Insurance can reinforce exposure and vulnerability through underwriting a return to the 'status-quo' rather \r\nthan enabling adaptive behaviour (e.g., through 'no-betterment' principles) (Collier and Cox, 2021). For low-income nations and in the \r\nabsence of global support, insurance shifts responsibility to those least responsible for climate change (Surminski et al., 2016)."


id: 3227a8d78f96a195cfd5d60d0c8039f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"and Marcouiller, 2020; Peng et al., 2020; Smucker et al., 2020; Uddin et al., 2020; Webb, 2020; Ali et al., 2021; Anderson and Renaud, 2021; \r\nGlantz and Pierce, 2021; Ji and Lee, 2021; Villeneuve, 2021). These conditions are rarely met, and therefore DRM is often constrained by \r\ninstitutional factors that may even increase vulnerability (Booth et al., 2020; Islam et al., 2020b; Islam et al., 2020c; Marchezini, 2020; \r\nGoryushina, 2021; Mena and Hilhorst, 2021). The feasibility of DRM continues to be constrained by limited coordination across levels \r\nof government, lack of transparency and accountability, poor communication and a preference for top-down DRM processes that can \r\nundermine local institutions and perpetuate uneven power relationships (Atanga, 2020; Booth et al., 2020; Bordner et al., 2020; Bronen \r\net  al., 2020; Goryushina, 2021; Mena and Hilhorst, 2021; Son et  al., 2021; Yumagulova et  al., 2021)"


id: 4370059ba37ee7caf6c34bda21147c10
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 8017
content:
" However, local integration of \r\nworldviews, belief systems and local and Indigenous Knowledge into DRM activities improves feasibility (Bordner et al., 2020; Cuaton and \r\nSu, 2020; Hosen et al., 2020; Sharma and Sharma, 2021), including disability-inclusive and gender-focused DRM (Ruszczyk et al., 2020; \r\nCrawford et al., 2021). Data access and availability continues to challenge DRM despite advances in data analytics, especially in rapidly \r\ngrowing informal settlements, including population estimates and limited mobility data (Goniewicz and Burkle, 2019; Marchezini, 2020)."


id: 30d78ab8aaf87e68ced478fec6cbcb70
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
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vector_id: 5107
content:
"There is robust evidence (high agreement) that climate services aid adaptation decision making and build adaptive capacity, particularly \r\nwhere they are demand-driven and context-specific (Vaughan et al., 2018; Bruno Soares and Buontempo, 2019; Daniels et al., 2020; Hewitt \r\net al., 2020a; Findlater et al., 2021). Climate service interventions are constrained by low capacity, inadequate institutions, difficulties \r\nin maintaining systems beyond pilot project stage (Vincent et al., 2017; Tall et al., 2018; Bruno Soares and Buontempo, 2019), and poor \r\nmapping between climate services and existing user capacities and demands (Williams et al., 2020) (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nMetrics to assess outcomes of climate services remain project-based and insufficiently capture longer-term economic and non-economic \r\nbenefits of interventions (Tall et al., 2018; Parton et al., 2019; Perrels, 2020)"


id: 3d8fff0ec5aa9d9032507f9b94cec154
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 7043
content:
" The technical feasibility of climate services is relatively strong \r\nand growing (Vaughan et al., 2016; Kihila, 2017; Findlater et al., 2021) but they can be made more inclusive by focusing on addressing \r\nuneven uptake based on location or gender (Amegnaglo et al., 2017; Daly and Dessai, 2018; Tall et al., 2018; Alexander and Dessai, 2019; \r\nVaughan et al., 2019; Gumucio et al., 2020) and a more balanced focus on uptake rather than data production alone (Dorward et al., \r\n2021; Findlater et al., 2021) that values co-production and different knowledge systems (Daniels et al., 2020; Martinez-Baron et al., 2021)."


id: 7bf3ad8fe3843a1a05888f1d6e5f8702
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17102
content:
"Climate change will exacerbate existing health challenges. Strong health systems can protect and promote the health of a population in \r\nthe face of known and unexpected stressors and pressures (Watts et al., 2021), including climate change. The building blocks of strong \r\nhealth systems engender climate resilience, strong leadership and governance, and effective coordination across sectors, to prioritise the \r\nneeds of the most vulnerable (Ebi et al., 2020). Options for enhancing current health services include providing access to safe water and \r\nsanitation, improving food security, enhancing access to essential services such as vaccinations, developing or strengthening integrated \r\nsurveillance systems, and changing the timing and location of specific vector-control measures (WHO, 2015; Haines and Ebi, 2019)"


id: 9e451e04cf429b3289daae6a92affae1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 22424
content:
" \r\nThese measures can reduce the health system's vulnerability to climate change, especially if combined with iterative management that \r\nincorporates monitoring of (and resilience against) climate change impacts (Hanefeld et al., 2018; Haines and Ebi, 2019; Linares et al., \r\n2020; Rudolph et al., 2020) (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: e0e84bbfae220ba41a52308a9170aa69
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 32884
content:
"Health systems can provide sufficient and high-quality healthcare to all where capacity is well developed, and where options are aligned \r\nwith national priorities, engage local to international communities, and address the needs of particularly vulnerable regions and \r\npopulation groups (Hanefeld et al., 2018; Austin et al., 2019; Nuzzo et al., 2019; Sheehan and Fox, 2020). Microeconomic feasibility and \r\nsocioeconomic vulnerability reduction potential are high where a system's capacity is well developed. Economic feasibility poses a \r\nsignificant challenge in low-income settings, with many governments projected to require international climate finance for health systems \r\nwhich is not currently available (WHO, 2019; Watts et al., 2021), and where adequate household-level financial security is a cross-cutting \r\nbarrier (Paudel and Pant, 2020)"


id: c087a2227e1d7c54b87e731e513d807e
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 27849
content:
" Risk mitigation potential is high where capacity is well developed, for example through technologies to \r\nmonitor and alter environmental conditions (Lock-Wah-Hoon et al., 2020; Kouis et al., 2021; Ligsay et al., 2021). Social co-benefits of \r\nmainstreaming health and climate change are also present, such as the inclusion of environmental health in medical education curricula \r\ntraining programmes (Kligler et al., 2021). There is growing recognition that lack of institutional capacity and low availability of resources \r\nrepresent major barriers to health system adaptation options, particularly for health systems struggling to manage current health risks "


id: c4928285ca25f6d0b6c842b42b25fd5f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 28502
content:
"(Ebi et al., 2018; Brooke-Sumner et al., 2019; Chersich and Wright, 2019; Gilfillan, 2019; Negev et al., 2019; Hussey and Arku, 2020), for \r\nneglected populations (Hanefeld et al., 2018; Negev et al., 2019), and where there are conflicting mandates or poor coordination across \r\nministries (Austin et al., 2019; Fox et al., 2019; Gilfillan, 2019; Kendrovski and Schmoll, 2019; Sheehan and Fox, 2020). Barriers to adapting \r\nhealth systems to climate change include lack of institutional funding, staff and data access (Austin et al., 2019; Schramm et al., 2020; \r\nOpoku et al., 2021), inadequate resources for evaluation and management of adaptation (Pascal et al., 2021), competing stakeholder \r\ngoals and costly technology (Negev et al., 2021)"


id: 246e93e253df90516e868f2d516fc5c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 3178
content:
" Within the healthcare community, surveillance systems generally lack ways to integrate \r\nclimate observation data, as well as expertise to critically evaluate these data, limiting their ability to plan and prepare for climate hazards \r\nand hospital-associated vulnerabilities (Runkle et al., 2018; Chersich and Wright, 2019; Liao et al., 2019). Although understanding of \r\nhealth vulnerability is growing (Berry et al., 2018), knowledge on the health effects of climate change among health practitioners remains \r\nlimited (Ebi et al., 2018; Brooke-Sumner et al., 2019; Chersich and Wright, 2019; Fox et al., 2019; Liao et al., 2019; Albright et al., 2020). \r\nMechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability of implementing, monitoring and evaluating adaptation within the health sector \r\nare lacking, across scales and contexts (Gostin and Friedman, 2017; Huynh and Stringer, 2018; Parry et al., 2019)."


id: 8b430a538ec209fb14474f0d258d4675
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 19436
content:
"Much climate-related migration is associated with labour migration. Rural-urban migrant networks are important channels for remittances \r\nand knowledge that help build resilience to hazards in sending areas (Bragg et al., 2018; Obokata and Veronis, 2018; Semenza and Ebi, \r\n2019; Maharjan et al., 2020; Porst et al., 2020). Whether migration reduces vulnerability for migrants depends on levels of control over \r\nthe migration decision and assets such as wealth, and education of the migrant household (Thober et al., 2018; Cattaneo, 2019; Hoffmann \r\net al., 2020; Maharjan et al., 2020; Sedova and Kalkuhl, 2020). Individuals from households of all levels of wealth migrate. However, poorer \r\nhouseholds do so with lower levels of choice and often more likely under duress, and in these cases, migration can undermine well-being \r\n(Suckall et al., 2016; Mallick et al., 2017; Nawrotzki and DeWaard, 2018; Natarajan et al., 2019)"


id: b2728413ce4782c2e6bdec66cd866acb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 25589
content:
" In some cases, migration can increase \r\npoverty in sending communities (Jacobson et al., 2019). Women in the sending community can experience an increase or decrease in the \r\nvulnerability, depending on the livelihoods people are moving into and existing asset bases (Banerjee et al., 2018; Banerjee et al., 2019b; \r\nGoodrich et al., 2019; Maharjan et al., 2020; Rao et al., 2020; Singh and Basu, 2020; Singh et al., 2020b)."


id: 665c04991dde70e0374165efe22c9dac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 13695
content:
"Migration has been highly politicised, and climate-related immigration has been conceptualised in public and media discourse as a \r\npotential threat which limits adaptation feasibility (Telford, 2018; Honarmand Ebrahimi and Ossewaarde, 2019; McLeman, 2019; Wiegel \r\net al., 2019; Hauer et al., 2020). Existing international agreements provide potential frameworks for climate-related migration to benefit \r\nadaptive capacity and sustainable development (Warner, 2018; Kalin, 2019). However, agreements to facilitate temporary or circular \r\nmigration and remittances are often informal and limited in scope (Webber and Donner, 2017b; Margaret and Matias, 2020) and migrant \r\nreceiving areas, particularly urban areas, can be better assisted to prepare for population change (Deshpande et al., 2019; Adger et al., \r\n2020; Hauer et al., 2020)"


id: c831ad716e4c585bc2d9d4cadb835fb3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 29074
content:
" Policies and planning are lacking that would ensure that positive migration outcomes for sending and receiving \r\nareas and the migrants themselves (Wrathall et al., 2019; Adger et al., 2020; de Salles Cavedon-Capdeville et al., 2020; Hughes, 2020)."


id: 13e4df12803e0179f865a6d0c3061ae0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Investing in building in situ adaptive capacity through climate resilient development is a precondition to supporting high agency migration \r\n(Cundill et. al. 2021). Migration only tends to occur when adaptation in situ has been exhausted and thresholds for living with risk have \r\nbeen crossed (Sections 8.2.2.1, 8.4.4, 8.4.5) (McLeman, 2018; Adams and Kay, 2019; Semenza and Ebi, 2019). The financial, emotional \r\nand social costs of leaving are high (Adams and Kay, 2019; McNamara et al., 2021), there are environmental, health and well-being risks \r\nin destination areas (Schwerdtle et al., 2018; Schwerdtle et al., 2020), and existential threats to identity and citizenship (Oakes, 2019; \r\nPiguet, 2019; Desai et al., 2021). In receiving areas, without appropriate policies to ensure equitable provision of services, there can be \r\nsocio-cultural barriers to in-migration where there is the perception of a loss caused by new arrivals, although outcomes are mixed (Koubi \r\net al"


id: 1a1f7fe1008d43137d3f0ec90decc366
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 1574
content:
"Few climate-related planned resettlement and relocation initiatives have taken place. However, initial findings, and experience from past \r\ndevelopment and disaster-related resettlement programmes, show that when implemented in a top-down manner and without the full \r\nparticipation of those affected, resettlement increases vulnerability by undermining livelihoods and negatively impacting health, community \r\ncohesion and emotional and psychological well-being (Wilmsen and Webber, 2015; Dannenberg et al., 2019; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019; \r\nTabe, 2019; Ajibade et al., 2020; Henrique and Tschakert, 2020; Desai et al., 2021). Planned relocation could also redistribute vulnerability \r\nfor those who do not move (Thomas and Benjamin, 2018; Mach et al., 2019a; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019; Johnson et al., 2021; Maldonado \r\net al., 2021) and vulnerability generally is reproduced along existing social cleavages often worsening inequality (See and Wilmsen, 2020)"


id: 10534af885fb3629362d4867792abc18
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
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vector_id: 52
content:
" \r\nApproaches that foreground participation, non-material and socio-cultural factors, livelihoods and local power dynamics can be addressed \r\nand adjusted to prevent planned relocation from reproducing inequality (See and Wilmsen, 2020; Alverio et al., 2021)."


id: be8b44c4beda6cfa38e4517de14be4cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27532
content:
"There is inadequate institutional capacity to enable movement relocation, with global and national policies identified as too abstract \r\nand lacking guidance on ensuring equity (Mortreux et al., 2018; Kelman et al., 2019; Ajibade et al., 2020; Hauer et al., 2020; Alverio et al., \r\n2021). Lack of institutional capacity can lead to resettlements being stalled indefinitely. Climate-related resettlement can be facilitated \r\nby novel institutional structures that expand the definition of disaster to include slow onset events, adaptive management frameworks \r\nthat facilitate a continuum of responses from supporting communities to community relocation and approaches that incorporate existing \r\npower dynamics (Bronen and Chapin, 2013; See and Wilmsen, 2020). In 2018, the Fiji Government provided a framework for climate \r\nchange-related relocation and equipped communities with rights in the planned relocation process (McMichael and Katonivualiku, 2020)"


id: 426757f2ed82389e643f3defc3c97606
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 7844
content:
" \r\nHowever, even with guidelines in place, local socio-cultural dynamics complicate planning, and relocation should take place only after \r\ncost-benefit analysis of all available adaptation options (Jolliffe, 2016; Bronen and Chapin, 2013; Albert et al., 2017; Mortreux et al., \r\n2018). At a local level, issues around land tenure, a lack of financial support, dedicated governance frameworks and complex planning \r\nprocesses delay action (Albert et al., 2017). Funding for climate-related resettlement is currently not readily available, exacerbated by "


id: 22f8d7c7ba716e22fb710c1ce834067f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 2946
content:
"Under land and ecosystem system transitions, gaps include limited evidence for some of the institutional and socio-cultural feasibility \r\ndimensions indicators of Integrated Coastal Zone Management. Specifically, there is lack of evidence for transparency and accountability \r\npotential and for gender and intergenerational equity. For coastal defence and hardening, there is no or limited evidence on the indicators \r\nof employment and productivity enhancement, legal and regulatory acceptability, transparency and accountability potential, social and \r\nregional inclusiveness, benefits for gender equity, intergenerational equity and land use change enhancement potential. Sustainable \r\naquaculture has knowledge gaps for the indicators of macroeconomic viability, legal and regulatory acceptability, transparency and \r\naccountability potential, social and regional inclusiveness, intergenerational equity and land use change enhancement potential"


id: 587e408a32c2ab9d65c3b7528bbde7f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11420
content:
" The \r\ngeographical feasibility for migration and relocation is still an emerging area of research, however, there is limited evidence to assess this \r\nspecific dimension."


id: 2bf648cc3eacebb7c401ea7880ecfc6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4345
content:
"Adams, H. and S. Kay, 2019: Migration as a human affair: Integrating individual stress thresholds into quantitative models of climate migration. Environ. \r\nSci. Policy, 93, 129-138, doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2018.10.015.\r\nEsmail, A. and L. Suleiman, 2020: Analyzing evidence of sustainable urban water management systems: a review through the lenses of sociotechnical \r\ntransitions. Sustainability, 12(11), doi:10.3390/su12114481.\r\nAdger, W.N., et al., 2020: Urbanization, migration, and adaptation to climate change. One Earth, 3, 396-399, doi:10.1016/j.oneear.2020.09.016.\r\nAdham, A., et al., 2018: A GIS-based approach for identifying potential sites for harvesting rainwater in the Western Desert of Iraq. Int. Soil Water Conserv. \r\nRes., 6(4), 297-304, doi:10.1016/j.iswcr.2018.07.003.\r\nAerts, J.C.J.H., 2018: A Review of Cost Estimates for Flood Adaptation.\r\nAgarwal, P.K. and D. Pandey, 2017, Impact of pesticide: an overview. Trends in Biosciences, (10)6, 1341-1344.\r\nAgegnehu, G. and T"


id: 97e1987cadbe48c4952cf16d49b9ee73
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21413
content:
" Amede, 2017: Integrated Soil Fertility and Plant Nutrient Management in Tropical Agro-Ecosystems: A Review. Soil Science Society \r\nof China, 662-680.\r\nAhmed, B., 2018: Who takes responsibility for the climate refugees? Int. J. Clim. Chang. Strateg. Manag., 10, 5-26, doi:10.1108/IJCCSM-10-2016-0149.\r\nAhmed, N., et al., 2018: Blue-green water nexus in aquaculture for resilience to climate change. Rev. Fish. Sci. Aquac., 26, 139-154, doi:10.1080/23308\r\n249.2017.1373743.\r\nAjibade, I., 2019: Planned retreat in global south megacities: disentangling policy, practice, and environmental justice. Clim. Change, doi:10.1007/s10584-\r\n019-02535-1."


id: 1b276d401688f698c13570668507c34f
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vector_id: 1738
content:
"AR6 WGII Chapter Representatives: Aditi Mukherji (Chapter 4), Carolina Adler (Chapter \r\n17/CCP5), Christopher H. Trisos (Chapter 9), Christopher Lennard (Chapter 9), David S. Gutzler \r\n(Chapter 14), David Wrathall (Chapter 8), Delphine Deryng (Chapter 5), Donovan Campbell \r\n(Chapter 15), Elham Ali (Chapter 4), Gerald Nelson (Chapter 5), Gueladio Cisse (Chapter 7), \r\nJamon Van Den Hoek (Chapter 8), Jeff Price (Chapter 2/CCP1), Joanna McMillan (Chapter 8), \r\nJoern Birkmann (Chapter 8), John Pinnegar (Chapter 15), Kevin Hennessy (Chapter 11), Kirstin \r\nHolsman (Chapter 14/CCP6), Laura Ramajo Gallardo (Chapter 12), Laurent Bopp (Chapter 3), \r\nLea Berrang Ford (Chapter 16), M. Silvia Muylaert de Araujo (Chapter 18), Marie-Fanny Racault \r\n(Chapter 3), Marjolijn Hassnoot (Chapter 13), Mark Costello (Chapter 11/CCP1) Mark Pelling \r\n(Chapter 6), Nicholas P"


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content:
"The WGII Global to Regional Atlas integrates and expands on the \r\nkey messages in WGII chapters and cross-chapter papers to provide \r\nsummaries of vulnerability, impacts, exposure, adaptation and risk \r\ncomplementing the narrative in the Summary for Policymakers. Where \r\nuseful for a more complete storyline, complementary maps and figures \r\nfrom the three AR6 Special Reports are included. Figures are grouped \r\nin topical clusters: (1) Biodiversity, Biogeography, Habitability, Health, \r\n(a) Wild Species, (b) Humans, (c) Livestock and Crop Production, (d) \r\nFish Stocks and Fisheries (Section AI.2.1); (2) Water-Related Challenges \r\nfor Cities, Settlements and Key Infrastructure, (a) Drought, (b) Flooding \r\n(Section AI.2.2); (3) Global to Regional Risks (including economic), \r\nand Adaptive Capacities (Section AI.2.3); and (4) From Adaptation to \r\nClimate Resilient Development (Section AI.2.4)"


id: ee74476d0a004b177d6da059e8805e7c
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" Within each topical \r\ncluster, the Summary for Policymakers (SPM) storyline is followed \r\ndepending on the material available, from observed impacts (and \r\nadaptation) and projected impacts and risks, adaptation and enabling \r\nconditions to climate resilient development."


id: 2ee0d543ddf8c83a84370235156951b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Vulnerability is a component of risk, but also an important focus \r\nindependently. Vulnerability in this report is defined as the propensity \r\nor predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability encompasses a \r\nvariety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility \r\nto harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt (Annex II: Glossary). \r\nOver the past several decades, approaches to analysing and assessing \r\nvulnerability have evolved. An early emphasis on top-down, biophysical \r\nevaluation of vulnerability included--and often started with--\r\nexposure to climate hazards in assessing vulnerability. From this starting \r\npoint, attention to bottom-up, social and contextual determinants of \r\nvulnerability, which often differ, has emerged, although this approach \r\nis incompletely applied or integrated across contexts (Rufat et al., 2015; \r\nSpielman et al., 2020; Taberna et al., 2020)"


id: 74c306bfb59518dea49ed92c3167654d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" Vulnerability is now widely \r\nunderstood to differ within communities and across societies, also \r\nchanging through time (Jurgilevich et al., 2017; Kienberger et al., 2013; "


id: 4646af74fc93e53d4f7d5f6ee387a2a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Figure AI.31 |  Estimated relative human dependence on marine ecosystems. Relative human dependence on marine resources for coastal protection, nutrition, fisheries \r\neconomic benefits and overall. Each bar represents an index value that semi-quantitatively integrates the magnitude, vulnerability to loss and substitutability of the benefit. Indices \r\nsynthesise information on people's consumption of marine protein and nutritional status, gross domestic product, fishing revenues, unemployment, education, governance and \r\ncoastal characteristics. Overall dependence is the mean of the three index values after standardisation from 0 to 1 (details are found in Table 1 and supplementary material of Selig \r\net al., 2019). This index does not include the economic benefits from tourism or other ocean industries, and data limitations prevented including artisanal or recreational fisheries \r\nor the protective impact of saltmarshes (Selig et al., 2019)"


id: 3e3e376d0a680292d6832aa28e661147
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content:
" Values for reference regions established in the WGI AR6 Atlas (Gutierrez et al., 2021) were computed as area-weighted \r\nmeans from original country-level data. {Figure 3.1}"


id: bc247c3e7d2ca8a5ed6da074d3a058a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"(a) Fisheries management adaptive capacity is a function of the following: averaged gross domestic product (GDP) World Development Indicators for 2018 (World Bank, 2020); \r\nclimate awareness assessments of 30 of the FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations) recognized most recent Regional Fisheries Management Organizations \r\nwith direct fisheries linkages; governance effectiveness index based on six aggregate indicators (voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, \r\ngovernment effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) from 2018 World Governance Indicator (World Bank, 2019) data; and heterogeneity of countries \r\nwithin each FAO zone (highly heterogeneous regions are less likely to establish sustainable and efficient fisheries management for the entire FAO zone). Adaptative capacity index \r\nranges from 1 (high) to 0 (no adaptative capacity). Ocean areas are delineated into FAO regions"


id: eb494e63425fdb4385f5f1855c2845b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"(a) Countries' reliance on inland fisheries was estimated by catch (total, tonnes) (FAO, 2018b; Fluet-Chouinard et al., 2018), per capita catch (kg per person per year) (FAO, 2018b), \r\npercent reliance on fish for micronutrients, and percent consumption per household (Golden et al., 2016). Z-scores of each metric were averaged for each country to create a \r\ncomposite index describing 'current dependence on freshwater fish' for each country with darker blue colours indicating higher dependence. Projected concentrations (numbers) of \r\nvulnerable freshwater fishery species averaged within freshwater ecoregions under >2degC global warming and >4degC global warming estimated from recent past (1961-1992) to the \r\nend of the 21st century (2071-2100) (Nyboer et al., 2019). Numbers of vulnerable fish species translate to an average of 55-68% vulnerable at >2degC and 77-97% vulnerable at \r\n<4degC global warming. Darker shades indicate higher concentrations of vulnerable fish species"


id: 379256cecc4cfb5b3c1135a843e278c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" Countries (in shades of green) that have an overlap between high dependence on \r\nfreshwater fish and high concentrations of fishery species that are vulnerable to climate change under two warming scenarios. {Figures 9.26}"


id: 5ad244450ac47ca98d1ff61be2cd31ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 11806
content:
"Figure AI.35 |  Regional synthesis of changes in water and consequent impacts on ecosystems and human systems. For physical changes, increase/decrease refers to \r\nchanges in the amount or frequency of the measured variable, and the level of confidence refers to confidence that the change has occurred. For impacts on ecosystems and human \r\nsystems, plus or minus marks depicts whether an observed impact of hydrological change is positive (beneficial) or negative (adverse), respectively, to the given system, and the \r\nlevel of confidence refers to confidence in attributing an impact on that system to a climate-induced hydrological change. Circles indicate that within that region, both increase and \r\ndecrease of physical changes are found, but are not necessarily equal, or beneficial and adverse assessed impacts on ecosystems and human systems. Empty fields indicate variables \r\nnot assessed due to limited evidence. Agriculture refers to impacts on crop production"


id: 50adf87281c2aa877c6a9ddf583d4363
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 10137
content:
"(c) Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt (North Africa) in the following two pages. Orange shows built-up areas in 2014. Shades of blue show permanent flooding due to sea level rise by \r\n2050 and 2100 under low (RCP2.6), medium (RCP4.5) and high (RCP8.5) greenhouse gas emissions scenarios. Darker colours for higher emissions scenarios show areas projected \r\nto be flooded in addition to those for lower emissions scenarios. The figure assumes failure of coastal defences in 2050 and 2100. Some areas are already below current sea level \r\nrise and coastal defences need to be upgraded as sea level rises (e.g., in Egypt), others are just above mean sea levels and they do not necessarily have high protection levels, so \r\nthese defences need to be built (e.g., Dar Es Salam and Lagos). Blue shading shows permanent inundation surfaces predicted by coastal digital elevation model (DEM) and Shuttle \r\nRadar Topography Mission (SRTM) given the 95th percentile K14/RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8"


id: b6caf774b87ee72da85064c32169746f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"5, for present day, 2050 and 2100 sea level projection for permanent inundation \r\n(inundation without a storm surge event) and RL10 (10-year return level storm) (Kulp and Strauss, 2019). Low-lying areas isolated from the ocean are removed from the inundation \r\nsurface using connected components analysis. Current water bodies are derived from the SRTM water body dataset. Orange areas represent the extent of coastal human settlements \r\nin 2014 (Corbane et al., 2018). See Figure CCP4.7 for projections including subsidence and worst-case scenario projections for 2100. {Figure 9.29}"


id: f23f35afe2cb9cbd20395c6719b27d65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 35644
content:
"Figure AI.50a |  Projected effectiveness of water-related adaptation options. Effectiveness in returning the system to a study-specific baseline state relative to the \r\nprojected climate impact; and level of residual risk retained after adaptation, relative to baseline conditions. Regional summaries are based on sIPCC regions. Warming levels refer \r\nto the global mean temperature (GMT) increase relative to a 1850-1900 baseline. For each data point, the study-specific GMT increase was calculated to show effectiveness at \r\n1.5degC, 2degC, 3degC and 4degC. Based on the ability of an implemented option to return the system to its baseline state, the effectiveness is classified based on the share of risk the \r\noption can reduce: large (>80%); moderate (80-50%); small (<50-30%); insufficient (<30%). Where the system state is improved relative to baseline, co-benefits are identified"


id: e2b24e2d82f048a4cb42dcf4e81d9c13
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" \r\nResidual impacts show the share of remaining impacts after adaptation has been implemented: negligible (<5%); small (5 to <20%); moderate (20 to <50); large (>=50%). Where \r\nrisks increase after adaptation, data points are shown as maladaptation. All underlying data are provided in SM4.8. {Figure 4.28}"


id: eb4d5f137774e0208652b9a9c4501183
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 34518
content:
"Figure AI.53 |  The urban adaptation gap. This is a qualitative assessment presenting individual, non-comparative data for world regions from 25 AR6 Contributing Lead \r\nAuthors and Lead Authors, the majority from regional chapters. Respondents were asked to make expert summary statements based on the data included within their chapters \r\nand across the AR6 report augmented by their expert knowledge. Multiple iterations allowed opportunity for individual and group judgement. Urban populations and risks are very \r\ndiverse within regions making the presented results indicative only. Variability in data coverage leads to the overall analysis having medium agreement, medium evidence. Major \r\ntrends identified in Section 6.3.1 at least meet this level of confidence"


id: 88be37351112fa2fa272d5b2a44fac74
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" Analysis is presented for current observed climate change-associated hazards and for three adaptation \r\nscenarios: (1) current adaptation (based on current levels of risk management and climate adaptation), (2) planned adaptation (assessing the level of adaptation that could be \r\nrealised if all national, city and neighbourhood plans and policies were fully enacted), (3) transformative adaptation (if all possible adaptation measures were to be enacted). \r\nAssessments were made for the lowest and highest quintile by income. Residual risk levels achieved for each income class under each adaptation scenario are indicated by five \r\nadaptation levels: no risk, occasional discomfort, occasional impacts on well-being, frequent impacts on well-being, extreme events and/or chronic risk. The urban adaptation gap \r\nis revealed when levels of achieved adaptation fall short of delivering 'no risk'"


id: b7c4d22a62ae1fa04a7cfdac4bd5b742
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" The graphic uses IPCC Regions and has split Asia into two regions: North and East Asia, and Central \r\nand South Asia. {Figure 6.4}"


id: 11591e3ecaf03b99d5545fbf59c40f00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 213
content:
" \r\nInsufficient data: there is not enough literature to support an assessment (fewer than five studies available); Minor constraint: <20% of assessed literature identifies this constraint; \r\nsecondary constraint: 20-50% of assessed literature identifies this constraint; primary constraint: >50% of assessed literature identifies this constraint. Data from Thomas et al. \r\n(2021), based on 1682 scientific publications reporting on adaptation-related responses in human systems. {Figure 16.8; 16.A.1 }"


id: 52f93277351b549d47230afa38f75f7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"A suspension of airborne solid or liquid particles, with typical particle \r\nsize in the range of a few nanometres to several tens of micrometres \r\nand atmospheric lifetimes of up to several days in the troposphere\r\nand up to years in the stratosphere. The term aerosol, which includes \r\nboth the particles and the suspending gas, is often used in this report \r\nin its plural form to mean 'aerosol particles'. Aerosols may be of either \r\nnatural or anthropogenic origin in the troposphere; stratospheric \r\naerosols mostly stem from volcanic eruptions. Aerosols can cause an \r\neffective radiative forcing directly through scattering and absorbing \r\nradiation (aerosol-radiation interaction), and indirectly by acting as \r\ncloud condensation nuclei or ice nucleating particles that affect the \r\nproperties of clouds (aerosol-cloud interaction), and upon deposition \r\non snow- or ice-covered surfaces"


id: 3806f9453c62602fe5482641a0e5a89a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" Atmospheric aerosols may be either \r\nemitted as primary particulate matter or formed within the atmosphere \r\nfrom gaseous precursors (secondary production). Aerosols may be \r\ncomposed of sea salt, organic carbon, black carbon (BC), mineral \r\nspecies (mainly desert dust), sulphate, nitrate and ammonium or their \r\nmixtures. See also Particulate matter (PM) and Short-lived climate \r\nforcers (SLCFs)."


id: 7ddb53ac132853b38de38fd9d1aa4e50
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17371
content:
"The gaseous envelope surrounding the Earth, divided into five layers: \r\nthe troposphere, which contains half of the Earth's atmosphere, the \r\nstratosphere, the mesosphere, the thermosphere and the exosphere, \r\nwhich is the outer limit of the atmosphere. The dry atmosphere consists \r\nalmost entirely of nitrogen (78.1% volume mixing ratio) and oxygen \r\n(20.9% volume mixing ratio), together with a number of trace gases \r\nsuch as argon (0.93% volume mixing ratio), helium and radiatively \r\nactive greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as carbon dioxide (CO2) (0.04% \r\nvolume mixing ratio) methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and ozone \r\n(O3). In addition, the atmosphere contains the GHG water vapour \r\n(H2O), whose concentrations are highly variable (0-5% volume mixing \r\nratio) as the sources (evapotranspiration) and sinks (precipitation) of \r\nwater vapour show large spatio-temporal variations, and atmospheric \r\ntemperature exerts a strong constraint on the amount of water vapour \r\nan air parcel can hold"


id: d8369980afbff6bc24c5fa84db6f4cee
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31541
content:
"A proposed new geological epoch resulting from significant \r\nhuman-driven changes to the structure and functioning of the \r\nEarth system, including the climate system. Originally proposed \r\nin the Earth System science community in 2000, the proposed new \r\nepoch is undergoing a formalisation process within the geological \r\ncommunity based on the stratigraphic evidence that human activities \r\nhave changed the Earth System to the extent of forming geological \r\ndeposits with a signature that is distinct from those of the Holocene, \r\nand which will remain in the geological record. Both the stratigraphic \r\nand Earth system approaches to defining the Anthropocene consider \r\nthe mid-20th century to be the most appropriate starting date (Steffen \r\net  al., 2016), although others have been proposed and continue to \r\nbe discussed. The Anthropocene concept has already been informally \r\nadopted by diverse disciplines and the public to denote the substantive \r\ninfluence of humans on the Earth system"


id: a0ab1dc565e50d759ec64519349ee5b4
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content:
"There is a diversity of approaches for categorising countries on the \r\nbasis of their level of development, and for defining terms such as \r\n'industrialised', 'developed' or 'developing'. Several categorisations \r\nare used in this Special Report. (1) In the United Nations (UN) system, \r\nthere is no established convention for the designation of developed\r\nand developing countries or areas. (2) The UN Statistics Division \r\nspecifies developed and developing regions based on common practice. \r\nIn addition, specific countries are designated as Least Developed \r\nCountries, landlocked developing countries, Small Island Developing \r\nStates (SIDS) and transition economies. Many countries appear in more \r\nthan one of these categories. (3) The World Bank uses income as the \r\nmain criterion for classifying countries as low, lower middle, upper \r\nmiddle and high income"


id: 5bbf4590ff6428a8371a8d9f58cb00d5
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" (4) The UN Development Programme (UNDP) \r\naggregates indicators for life expectancy, educational attainment \r\nand income into a single composite Human Development Index \r\n(HDI) to classify countries as low, medium, high or very high human \r\ndevelopment."


id: 1129a72e349d24a9f9a8af6b7ba3f234
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"The term 'El Nino' was initially used to describe a warm-water current \r\nthat periodically flows along the coast of Ecuador and Peru, disrupting \r\nthe local fishery. It has since become identified with warming of \r\nthe tropical Pacific Ocean east of the dateline. This oceanic event is \r\nassociated with a fluctuation of a global-scale tropical and subtropical \r\nsurface pressure pattern called the Southern Oscillation. This coupled \r\natmosphere-ocean phenomenon, with preferred time scales of 2 to \r\nabout 7 years, is known as the El Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). \r\nThe warm and cold phases of the ENSO are called El Nino and La \r\nNina, respectively. ENSO is often measured by the surface pressure \r\nanomaly difference between Tahiti and Darwin and/or the sea surface \r\ntemperatures in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific. This \r\nphenomenon has a great impact on the wind, sea surface temperature \r\nand precipitation patterns in the tropical Pacific"


id: fd564fa9f5298aaf2b722885e06dc625
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 37371
content:
" It has climatic effects \r\nthroughout the Pacific region and in many other parts of the world \r\nthrough global teleconnections. See WGI AR6 Annex AIV.2.3 (IPCC \r\n2021a)."


id: a471303ca4f792f72c508ea8cb993027
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23432
content:
"A set of principles, processes and practices that aim to ensure that no \r\npeople, workers, places, sectors, countries or regions are left behind \r\nin the transition from a high-carbon to a low-carbon economy. \r\nIt stresses the need for targeted and proactive measures from \r\ngovernments, agencies and authorities to ensure that any negative \r\nsocial, environmental or economic impacts of economy-wide \r\ntransitions are minimised, while benefits are maximised for those \r\ndisproportionally affected. Key principles of just transitions include: \r\nrespect and dignity for vulnerable groups; fairness in energy access \r\nand use, social dialogue and democratic consultation with relevant \r\nstakeholders; the creation of decent jobs; social protection; and \r\nrights at work"


id: c267b5380371519d22c9a0229ecbf3d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" Just transitions could include fairness in energy, land \r\nuse and climate planning and decision-making processes; economic \r\ndiversification based on low-carbon investments; realistic training/\r\nretraining programs that lead to decent work; gender-specific \r\npolicies that promote equitable outcomes; the fostering of \r\ninternational cooperation and coordinated multilateral actions; \r\nand the eradication of poverty. Lastly, just transitions may embody \r\nthe redressing of past harms and perceived injustices (ILO 2015; \r\nUNFCCC 2016)."


id: 4602cb84d18b9acea9d6f3a6d2bbbbec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8400
content:
"The categorisation of areas as \"urban\" by government statistical \r\ndepartments is generally based either on population size, population \r\ndensity, economic base, provision of services, or some combination \r\nof the above. Urban systems are networks and nodes of intensive \r\ninteraction and exchange including capital, culture, and material \r\nobjects. Urban areas exist on a continuum with rural areas and tend to \r\nexhibit higher levels of complexity, higher populations and population \r\ndensity, intensity of capital investment, and a preponderance of \r\nsecondary (processing) and tertiary (service) sector industries. The \r\nextent and intensity of these features varies significantly within and \r\nbetween urban areas. Urban places and systems are open, with much \r\nmovement and exchange between more rural areas as well as other \r\nurban regions"


id: 46fb2edf69628ec03293f090607ebfaf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8553
content:
" Urban areas can be globally interconnected, facilitating \r\nrapid flows between them, of capital investment, of ideas and culture, \r\nhuman migration, and disease. See also City, City region, Urbanisation \r\nand Urban systems."


id: 9df745da343c882722bdb6e5fcfcb82d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22373
content:
"Abrupt change*, 442-445, 445, 2416, 2457, 2661\r\nresponses to, 438\r\nAbrupt ecosystem shifts, 442-445, 445\r\nAcacia trees, 301\r\nAcclimatisation*, 381, 407-409\r\nAccumulation (bioaccumulation)*, 49, 64, 382, \r\n462, 789\r\nAction. See Climate action\r\nActive ownership, 2710\r\nAdaptation*, 134, 2428-2441, 2600-2614\r\nabout, 8-9, 22, 43\r\nabout: definition, 136\r\nabout: summary, 22-30, 71-99\r\nacclimatisation* and, 407-409\r\nadaptation-maladaptation continuum, 2600-\r\n2602, 2603\r\nadaptation-related responses, 71, 2415, 2420, \r\n2428-2441\r\nadaptation-related responses: not all reducing \r\nrisk, 2431, 2440-2441\r\nadaptation-related responses: responses vs"


id: 985cd1382f7a02603bada6e432767b0c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21482
content:
" See Planetary boundaries\r\nBramble Cay melomys, 200, 221, 1583, 1591, 1595\r\nBrazil. See Central and South America\r\nBrowning, 200, 243, 2321, 2379\r\nBryozoans, 414\r\nBuilding design, 953-954, 989, 1047\r\nBuilt environment*, 953-954, 2691\r\nmaladaptation, 2438\r\nretrofitting, 34, 946, 953, 989\r\nBuilt infrastructure, 472, 474, 474, 476, 482\r\nSee also Dams\r\nBurning ember diagrams, 114, 258, 281, \r\n2482-2483, 2486, 2507-2508\r\nBusiness-As-Usual (BAU), 1753, 2328, 2692\r\nButterflies, 296-297"


id: e6be0281193a72cd2dc3aa7ddc0ddf66
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vector_id: 33790
content:
"Carbon stocks*, 56, 69, 249-251\r\nhigh-carbon ecosystems, 22, 201-203, 249-251, \r\n273\r\nCarbonate chemistry, 401, 413\r\nCardiovascular diseases, 13, 64, 1070, 1096-1097\r\nCaribbean Region, 2071-2072\r\nSee also Small Islands\r\nCaribou, 1945\r\nCarpathian Convention, 2298\r\nCascading impacts*, 20-21, 67-68, 724, 724, 909\r\nabout: storyline figure, 82-83\r\nfood production, 724, 724\r\nfood webs, 67\r\nhealth, 1050-1051\r\ninfrastructure, 916, 935-936\r\nlinkages, 82-83, 134\r\nmega-disturbances, 1946\r\npolar regions, 2321, 2325, 2333, 2347-2349\r\nsmall islands, 2045, 2071-2072, 2073\r\nurban areas, 909, 916\r\nwildfires, 83, 1600-1601\r\nCascading risks, 20-21, 66, 67-68, 82-83, 147, 912, \r\n935-936, 1065\r\ncompound risk vs., 83\r\nCatalysing conditions, 98, 2596-2600\r\nclimate litigation, 2598, 2599\r\nsocial movements and, 101, 2598-2600, 2736\r\nurgency, 2596-2597, 2597\r\nCatalysts, 98, 126, 164-165, 2543, 2598\r\nCattle"


id: ff996a7939e25c5cc9ac3c815644ee2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"projected time to reach 1.5degC, 10, 44, 144-145\r\npublic awareness, 29\r\npublic face of, 588-591\r\nrate of, 43\r\nreference periods and years, 10, 44\r\nregional projections, 2677-2678\r\nscientific consensus on, 35, 125, 129, 130-131, \r\n152, 1931, 1939, 2655, 2684\r\nspeed and magnitude of, 41-43, 2321, 2351, \r\n2658, 2733\r\nas threat to human and planetary health, 35\r\nunprecedented nature of, 45, 55-56, 68\r\nurgency of current moment, 8, 31, 55-56, \r\n127, 128-133, 146, 180, 1203, 1985, \r\n2596-2597, 2597\r\nwindow of opportunity, 31, 32-33, 35, 102-107, \r\n204, 2662\r\nClimate change literacy*, 96, 98, 1314, 1316-1320\r\nClimate change scenarios. See Scenarios\r\nClimate-compatible development (CCD), \r\n1238-1239, 1238\r\nClimate debt, 236\r\nClimate extremes*. See Extreme weather events\r\nClimate finance*, 35, 2586-2593, 2708-2709, 2721\r\nSee also Finance\r\nClimate governance*. See Governance\r\nClimate grief, 467, 594, 1078, 1971\r\nClimate information"


id: 292a06f6a27cf919515ca284fdc21036
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3909
content:
"food and fibre sector, 817-818\r\nSmall Islands, 2079\r\ntropical forests and, 2371, 2381, 2382\r\nurban areas, 965, 967\r\nfor water security, 666-667\r\nComplex risk, 10, 20-21, 67-68, 82-83\r\ncompound vs. cascading risks, 83\r\nCompound risk*, 20-21, 66, 67-68, 935-936, 1070, \r\n1201, 1225-1227, 1226, 2420\r\nabout: storyline figure, 82-83\r\nadaptation and, 94-95\r\ncascading risk vs"


id: 2ce1eca65faa7d58f540d0dee983f97b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4498
content:
" See Disproportionate \r\nimpacts\r\nDistribution of species. See Range shifts; Species \r\ndistribution\r\nDistributive justice*, 126, 162, 924, 958-959\r\nDisturbance regimes*, 208, 237, 280, 314\r\nabrupt changes and, 442-445, 445, 2416, 2457\r\nSee also Fires; Insect pests\r\nDrivers. See Climatic drivers; Climatic impact drivers\r\nDrosophila melanogaster, 236\r\nDroughts*, 50, 558, 578-579, 578\r\nadaptation, 637, 802\r\nagricultural*, 578-579, 609\r\nattribution of, 579, 587\r\nCape Town, Africa (2015-2018), 1343\r\ncascading effects, 578"


id: 4ca6a2bf22aba931ca467c8ec5d149c1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9486
content:
"Fairness*, 162-163, 2592\r\nbetween generations, 162\r\nFAQs. See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)\r\nFarming. See Agriculture\r\nFarmworkers, 734, 795\r\nFeasibility*, 23-28, 24-26, 2724-2732, 2733, \r\n2769-2807\r\nCross-Chapter Box (FEASIB), 2769-2807\r\nknowledge gaps, 2787-2788\r\nlinkages, 134\r\nof solutions, 23-28, 161, 161\r\nFeedbacks, 34, 267, 274-277, 275, 276\r\ncarbon balance and, 202-203, 274-277, 275, 276\r\ndecision making and, 2577\r\necosystem-climate, 274-277, 275, 276\r\nfires, 275-276\r\nforests, 275-276\r\nFibre"


id: 18ac0223b0ee365ceae6c9e8fcc56aa0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1378
content:
"1 | What are the goals of climate change \r\nadaptation?, 179\r\n1.2 | Is climate change adaptation urgent?, 180\r\n1.3 | What constitutes successful adaptation to \r\nclimate change?, 180-181\r\n1.4 | What is transformational adaptation?, 181\r\n2.1 | Will species become extinct with climate \r\nchange and is there anything we can do \r\nto prevent this?, 221-222\r\n2.2 | How does climate change increase the risk \r\nof diseases?, 233-235\r\n2.3 | Is climate change increasing wildfire?, \r\n247-248\r\n2.4 | How does nature benefit human health and \r\nwell-being and how does climate change \r\naffect this?, 282-283"


id: 692a46034e1313d7b96a3fcc0087e3ac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14140
content:
"overshoot scenarios, 21-22, 35, 57, 69\r\npotential amplification of, 22\r\nprojected time to reach 1.5degC, 10, 44, 144-145\r\nprojections, 16, 18, 130, 391\r\npublic perceptions about, 1939-1942, 1941\r\nrisks at 1.5degC, 15, 68-69\r\nrisks beyond 1"


id: 73de8f09d72d2c8617a3bf237b17d7c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15846
content:
" See Health and well-being\r\nHuman migration. See Migration\r\nHuman population, 157\r\nin cities, 17, 34, 53, 65, 80, 909, 912, 914, 916-917\r\ngrowth of, 65, 72-73, 2421, 2659, 2673\r\nin vulnerable locations, 52, 76, 80, 1174, 2657\r\nSee also specific regions"


id: 4eeed92802b99a0b4401545c4f5bca29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9856
content:
" responses, 2431, 2441, 2505\r\nSee also Observed impacts; Projections; specific \r\nsystems and regions\r\nentives, 2707\r\nlusion\r\nin adaptation, 909, 911, 1821, 1892, 2659\r\nin adaptation implementation, 31, 86, 112\r\nin decision making, 23, 31, 86, 101\r\nin governance, 30, 31, 35, 112, 383, 996\r\nSee also Social inclusion\r\nome inequality, 2461, 2468, 2657\r\nremental adaptation*, 22, 71, 2558-2562\r\ninsufficiency of, 71, 1044\r\nurban areas, 963\r\nvs. transformational adaptation, 2558"


id: b32085b7b5b73c172bcbffabb23124f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25701
content:
"freshwater, 223-285\r\nInvestments. See Finance\r\nIPCC Assessment Reports\r\nFifth Assessment Report (AR5), 40-43, 130-132\r\nSixth Assessment Report (AR6; this report), 40-44, \r\n123-198\r\nattribution in, 151-154\r\ncertainty and uncertainty treatment in, 159-160, \r\n159\r\ncommon climate dimensions, 139\r\nnew information and emphasis, 132-133\r\nrisk assessment in, 148-149, 149-158\r\nSpecial Report on Climate Change and Land \r\n(SRCCL), 40, 131, 720, 913-914, 1240\r\nSpecial Report on Extreme Events and Disasters \r\n(SREX), 173-174\r\nSpecial Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC \r\n(SR1.5), 40, 559, 720, 913, 1182, 2444\r\nSpecial Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a \r\nChanging Climate (SROCC), 40, 130-131, \r\n386-389, 720, 913\r\nurgency of current moment, 128-133, 146\r\nSee also Sixth Assessment Report (AR6)\r\nIPCC Working Groups, 123, 131, 176\r\nWorking Group II, 40, 123, 176, 178\r\nIran, sand and dust storms, 1478\r\nIrreversible changes"


id: c9036e787c791a34f23bd505c575fbeb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29187
content:
" See Tipping points\r\nIrrigation, 23, 556, 564, 584, 613-614, 1304\r\nevaporative losses, 654\r\ngroundwater and, 579\r\nland use for, 613\r\nmaladaptation, 806, 807\r\nsolar pumps for, 653, 1240\r\nwater-saving technologies, 626\r\nIslands. See Small Islands"


id: ebe50cc92c7240aae9d24beedd35babf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34614
content:
"Central and South America, 1691, 1710, 1713, \r\n1729-1730\r\nobserved impacts, 388\r\nprotection services, 56, 463\r\nrange shift, 2136\r\nsea level rise and, 265\r\nSundarbans, 462, 611, 1480, 1516\r\nMarginalised people, 26, 29, 31, 33, 50, 52, \r\n76, 101, 717, 1052, 1053, 1174-1175, \r\n1198-1199, 1249, 2657\r\nempowerment of, 27, 97\r\nparticipation of, 30, 31, 96\r\npartnerships with, 31, 34\r\nMarine birds and mammals, 439, 443-445\r\nMarine ecosystems. See Ocean and coastal \r\necosystems\r\nMarine ecotourism, 480-481\r\nMarine fisheries"


id: 4ffd88b8f01f5492faba32e3ca97bdbe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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vector_id: 10029
content:
" See North America\r\nMicrobes, 231\r\nMid-term reference period (2041-2060), 10, 44\r\nMigration (of humans)*, 13, 17, 52, 64-65, 95, \r\n96, 556, 624-625, 1079-1086, 1080-1083, \r\n1100-1101\r\nas adaptation strategy, 476, 633, 930, 1116-\r\n1118, 1469-1470, 2076-2077\r\nadaptative vs. maladaptive, 633, 638-643, 807, \r\n2439"


id: 96ebd268620c1ef0655a40d4d737f518
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21260
content:
"about, 283-284, 303-304\r\nagriculture, 1496-1497, 1496\r\nagro-ecological farming, 306-307, 309\r\ncities/urban areas, 81, 305-306, 909, 948-952, 995\r\nCross-Chapter Box (NATURAL), 303-309\r\neffectiveness and feasibility, 383, 482\r\nFAQ, 310-312, 486-487\r\nlivelihoods and, 829\r\nocean and coastal ecosystems, 383, 388, 472, \r\n474-475, 475, 492\r\npoverty reduction and, 1175\r\nsustainable development goals and, 487\r\ntemperature regulation, 948-949\r\nterrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, 283-284, \r\n303-309, 310-312\r\nas vulnerable to climate change, 87, 203\r\nwater-related adaptation, 632\r\nNear-term period (2021-2040), 10, 44\r\nprojections and risks, 15, 55, 69\r\nNELD (non-economic loss and damage), \r\n1207-1208, 1210-1211\r\nNepal\r\nHimalayas/Hindu Kush, 983-984, 983\r\nlandslides, 1208\r\nvector-borne diseases, 200, 232\r\nwater resources, 1489, 1490\r\nNet primary production (NPP)*. See Primary \r\nproduction\r\nNet zero CO2 emissions*, 1121-1122, 2658\r\nNew Urban Agenda*, 40, 93-94, 911, 912, 920\r\nNew Zealand"


id: 12974f7c1d3d970a9a8e565c6c684472
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 422
content:
"See also Droughts; Floods; specific regions\r\nPre-industrial period*, 10, 44, 157\r\nPrimary production*, 404-406, 451-453\r\nfeedbacks and, 275-276\r\nglobal NPP, 251\r\nheat/temperature and, 1092\r\nnitrogen/nutrients and, 401, 404\r\nobserved changes, 451, 453\r\nocean acidification and, 401\r\nocean ecosystems, 401, 404-406, 451-453, 453\r\nby phytoplankton, 401\r\nprojections, 451-453, 453\r\nterrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, 214, \r\n251-252, 275-276\r\ntime of emergence and, 399-400, 445-446\r\ntropical forests, 240-241\r\nupwelling and, 429-431, 2329\r\nPrivate sector engagement, 965\r\nin adaptation, 965-966, 1232\r\nfinancing, 719, 825, 977, 978, 2543, 2721\r\nProcedural justice. See Justice\r\nProduction"


id: 612b903a203c264ff699268e08bd2fdc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12863
content:
"5degC, 15\r\ntemperature and: risks beyond 1.5degC, 16-17\r\ntrade-offs, evaluating, 2576-2577\r\ntransboundary risks, 21, 67-68, 82\r\nunavoidable, 15, 110\r\nuncertainty and, 2658\r\nunderstanding and evaluating, 145-160\r\nunprecedented levels of, 55-57, 68\r\nvulnerability and, 203, 208, 1196, 1217\r\nwater-related, 61\r\nSee also Risk management\r\nsk: Key Risks*, 113-114, 118, 2411-2538\r\nabout, 16, 55, 2414-2418, 2419, 2450-2453\r\nabout: aggregated risk, 18\r\nabout: definitions, 2415-2416, 2450-2453\r\nabout: main messages, 16, 2466\r\nabout: synthesis, 2466, 2467-2468\r\nabrupt changes, 2416, 2457\r\nadaptation, 2414-2415, 2428-2441, 2469-2471, \r\n2504\r\nadaptation co-benefits, 2436-2437, 2437-2440\r\nadaptation effectiveness and adequacy, 2416, \r\n2431, 2434-2436\r\nadaptation implementation, 2431, 2444-2450, \r\n2449, 2451-2452\r\nadaptation investments for, 2554\r\nadaptation limits, 2415, 2420, 2444-2450, \r\n2448-2449, 2451-2452, 2504\r\nadaptation, maladaptation, 2436-2437, \r\n2437-2440"


id: ce347eb807628f638294dc9874bb3215
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29962
content:
"Sea surface temperature (SST)*, 391, 392-393\r\nAustralasia, 1589, 1590\r\nclimate velocity and, 392, 393\r\nEurope, 1826, 1827, 1867\r\nMediterranean Region, 2235, 2237-2238\r\nobserved changes, 391, 392, 392\r\nprojected changes, 391, 394, 2723\r\nSea urchins, 405, 415\r\nSeabirds, 215, 439, 443-445\r\nSeafood safety, 481, 764, 765, 789\r\nSeagrasses, 47, 442, 459, 463, 464-465, 1602, 2146, \r\n2692\r\nbenefits and trade-offs, 309\r\ncarbon sequestration by, 56, 1480\r\nin coastal areas, 421-424, 422\r\nSeals, 2321, 2328\r\nSeasonality\r\ngrowing season, 200, 224, 242, 244, 255\r\ntemporal/trophic mismatches, 45, 382, 436-438\r\nSee also Phenology\r\nSeaweed, 753, 1481, 1492, 1604\r\nSecurity. See Conflicts\r\nSediment, 26, 62, 583-584, 612\r\nexposed, CO2 from, 277\r\nSemarang, Indonesia, 984-985\r\nSemi-arid zones*. See Deserts and semiarid areas\r\nSemi-enclosed seas, 426-427, 426\r\nSendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction*, \r\n93, 591, 911, 912, 919, 920, 2545, 2581-\r\n2582, 2598, 2666\r\nSequestration*"


id: 4b9cc5891c3da21e37aeb3cf3e4191fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" See Carbon sequestration\r\nSettlements*. See Cities and settlements\r\nShared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs)*, 138, \r\n1121, 1213-1616, 2660, 2673-2675, 2674\r\ninequality scenario, 1174\r\nShared Socio-econonic Pathways (SSPs)*, 9-10, 44\r\nintegrated SSP-RCP framework, 10, 44\r\ntemperature projections, 58\r\nShelf seas*, 427-429, 428, 429\r\nShrimp, 1491, 1710\r\nSinks*"


id: 683c8326a4e4f2d3bcd9098aa21305d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13985
content:
"waves, 2045-2046, 2055, 2056, 2070, 2078\r\nYap: livelihood strategies, 1185-1186\r\nzika, 2064\r\nSee also Coral reefs\r\nSnow cover, 563, 564, 570-571, 2275, 2302, 2324, \r\n2331\r\nobserved changes, 565, 570, 592\r\nprojected changes, 16, 61, 603\r\nSocial capital, 108, 767, 1237-1238, 2047\r\nSocial conflict. See Conflicts\r\nSocial cost of carbon (SCC), 2420, 2495, 2498\r\nSocial governance, 2584\r\nSocial inclusion*, 112, 909, 911, 996\r\nSocial infrastructure*, 910, 942-947\r\nSocial insurance, 944\r\nSocial justice*"


id: a846cb51aeab17c9cca65e37d202b8a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24001
content:
"resilience, 26\r\nresponses to climate change, 2125\r\nrichness, biodiversity hotspots, 2126\r\nsevere impacts on, 47-48\r\nthermal tolerance, 407, 433, 2328\r\nvernalisation, 225\r\nSee also Habitats; Phenology; Range shifts\r\nSpecies distribution, 45, 227-229, 717, 768-773, \r\n2424\r\nadaptation and, 718-719\r\nobserved changes, 592\r\nocean systems, 433-436, 434\r\npoleward movement, 433, 457, 460, 730, 1957\r\nrange shifts (See Range shifts)\r\nSee also Extirpation\r\nSpecies extinctions. See Extinction\r\nSponge City Programme, 1503, 1504-1505\r\nSpring advancement, 223-225\r\nSee also Phenology\r\nSREX (Special Report on Managing the Risks of \r\nExtreme Events and Disasters to Advance \r\nClimate Change Adaptation), 173-174\r\nSRM"


id: fa70f7e18251da6bd2ec6a8293b189e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36921
content:
"Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area, 300\r\nTaxes, 2707-2708, 2719\r\nTechnology, 24, 79, 88, 106, 2709, 2718-2720\r\ncapacity and access, 26, 35, 93\r\nTeleconnections*, 1329\r\nTemperate forests, 269, 308\r\nTemperature\r\nadaptation limits and, 28\r\nadaptive capacity and, 2666\r\nextremes, 11, 57\r\nfuture pathways, 2662\r\nglobal, current, 10, 44, 1819\r\nglobal mean surface (GMST)*, 18\r\nglobal warming levels (GWLs), 137, 139-143, \r\n2677-2678\r\nkey risks and, 2417, 2420, 2466, 2466-2468, \r\n2501, 2506-2507, 2666\r\nlikelihood of passing 1.5degC in near-term, 43\r\novershoot*, 21-22, 35, 57, 69, 267, 453, 2484\r\nprojected changes, 18, 58, 130-131, 391, \r\n1090-1091, 2677-2678, 2723\r\nprojected impacts (See Temperature impacts)\r\nprojected time to reach 1.5degC, 10, 43, 44, 144-145\r\nregional projected changes, 2723\r\nrisks at 1.5degC, 15, 17, 69\r\nrisks beyond 1"


id: 5fa163fe87714ca4f61097d875567479
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12624
content:
"5degC, 16-17, 66, 69\r\nscenarios, 2723\r\nsea surface (SST) (See Sea surface temperature)\r\ntargets, 2417, 2420, 2447, 2657\r\nthermal tolerance (species), 407, 433, 2328\r\nSee also Global warming; Temperature impacts; \r\nTemperature projections; and specific \r\nregions\r\nTemperature impacts, 72-73\r\nescalation with each degree of warming, 16, 22, \r\n55-56, 57\r\nglobal/aggregate impacts, 17, 18, 2417, 2486, \r\n2492-2494, 2501\r\nirreversible impacts, 11, 16, 21, 57, 69\r\nkey risks and vulnerabilities, 938, 2417, 2420, \r\n2466, 2466-2468, 2501, 2506-2507\r\noceans, 391\r\nprojected impacts of 1.5degC rise, 15-17, 19, 20, \r\n55-56, 61, 66, 69, 556\r\nprojected impacts of 2degC rise, 16, 19, 55-56, 57, "


id: 3916fe4bfd6419ec38f5a25f96b21fd2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6353
content:
" See Forests; Plants; specific types of \r\nvegetation\r\nVenice, Italy, 1828-1829\r\nVernalisation, 225\r\nVibrio sp., 13, 64, 293-294, 382, 765, 789, 1094\r\nin Europe, 1841, 1862, 1863\r\nVibrio cholerae, 292-294\r\nVietnam\r\ndams in, 1209\r\nMekong River/delta, 1487, 1489\r\nriver flooding, 925\r\nViolent conflict, 17, 1048, 1087-1088\r\ngender impacts, 1045, 1088\r\nwater-related, 593, 618, 622, 629-632, 1087\r\nSee also Conflict\r\nVision 2030 in Kenya, 2669-2670\r\nVulnerability*, 135-136, 1052, 1193-1211, 1249\r\nabout, 8, 43, 52-53\r\nabout: summary, 14-22, 52-53\r\nabout: storyline figure, 76-78\r\nadaptation limits and, 1222-1225\r\naggregate, 1196"


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content:
" See Gender\r\nWoody encroachment, 47, 201, 238, 240, 275, 314\r\nWorking Groups. See IPCC Working Groups\r\nWorld Heritage Sites, 1393\r\nAustralasia, 300, 1595, 1625\r\nMediterranean Region, 2235, 2248\r\nWorld Humanitarian Summit, 919, 920\r\nWorldviews, 31, 33, 108, 2711-2712, 2713\r\nY\r\nYap, livelihood strategies, 1185-1186\r\nYouth\r\ninclusion in solutions, 31\r\ninnovation, 719, 820-821\r\nYouth-led social movements, 911, 912, 946-947, \r\n963, 2418, 2720-2721"


id: 9dd6d88861ab679587ab708e8c7b8319
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Chapters 6-12 (Energy systems; Agriculture, Forestry, and Other \r\nLand Uses (AFOLU); Urban systems and other settlements; Buildings; \r\nTransport; Industry; Cross-sectoral perspectives) assess the potential \r\nfor emissions reductions in specific systems and sectors, taking into \r\naccount trends in emissions and their key drivers, global and regional \r\ncosts and potentials, links to climate adaptation and associated \r\nrisks and co-benefits, and sector specific barriers, policies, financing \r\nand enabling conditions. Specificities include fugitive emissions \r\nand carbon capture and storage (Energy), provision of food, feed, \r\nfibre, wood, biomass for energy and other ecosystem services \r\n(AFOLU), demographic changes and urban form (Urban systems \r\nand other settlements), mitigation strategies including efficiency, \r\nsufficiency and renewables (Buildings), access to mobility (Transport), \r\nand resource efficiency (Industry)"


id: adccea4e9d159423ba0e3a465976d97f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" Chapter 12 (Cross-sectoral \r\nperspectives) synthesises costs and potentials, and co-benefits and \r\ntrade-offs, across sectors; it also addresses cross-cutting approaches \r\nsuch as carbon dioxide removal and mitigation opportunities in the \r\nfood system."


id: 26170a91dd1345feba2066b03fc3d226
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Chapters 13-16 address enabling conditions for mitigation action. \r\nChapter 13 (National and sub-national policies and institutions) \r\nprovides insights from national and subnational plans and \r\nstrategies, including trends in legislation and institutions. Chapter \r\n14 (International cooperation) assesses international cooperation \r\nand institutions, including linkages with non-climate organisations \r\nand processes, international sectoral agreements, and institutions \r\nfor finance and investment and capacity building. Chapter 15 \r\n(Investment and finance) assesses scenarios of, and needs for, \r\nmitigation investment and financial flows, and the means of \r\nmobilising climate finance at the national and sub-national levels. \r\nChapter 16 (Innovation, technology development and transfer) \r\nexamines the role of innovation, technology development, diffusion \r\nand transfer in contributing to sustainable development and the aims \r\nof the Paris Agreement"


id: 3280292639f412b93c270a9e8243dede
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Jim Skea (United Kingdom), Priyadarshi R. Shukla (India), Andy Reisinger (New Zealand), \r\nRaphael Slade (United Kingdom), Minal Pathak (India), Alaa Al Khourdajie (United Kingdom/Syria), \r\nRenee van Diemen (the Netherlands/United Kingdom), Amjad Abdulla (Maldives), Keigo Akimoto \r\n(Japan), Mustafa Babiker (Sudan/Saudi Arabia), Quan Bai (China), Igor A. Bashmakov (the Russian \r\nFederation), Christopher Bataille (Canada), Goran Berndes (Sweden), Gabriel Blanco (Argentina), \r\nKornelis Blok (the Netherlands), Mercedes Bustamante (Brazil), Edward Byers (Austria/Ireland), \r\nLuisa F. Cabeza (Spain), Katherine Calvin (the United States of America), Carlo Carraro (Italy), \r\nLeon Clarke (the United States of America), Annette Cowie (Australia), Felix Creutzig (Germany), \r\nDiriba Korecha Dadi (Ethiopia), Dipak Dasgupta (India), Heleen de  Coninck (the  Netherlands), \r\nFatima Denton (the Gambia), Shobhakar Dhakal (Nepal/Thailand), Navroz K"


id: a3484a6db8e8a01cc215a2d340c29ab6
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content:
"  Dubash (India), \r\nOliver  Geden (Germany), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), Celine Guivarch (France), \r\nShreekant  Gupta (India), Andrea N. Hahmann (Chile/Denmark), Kirsten Halsnaes (Denmark), \r\nPaulina Jaramillo (the United States of America), Kejun Jiang (China), Frank Jotzo (Australia), \r\nTae Yong Jung (Republic of Korea), Suzana Kahn Ribeiro (Brazil), Smail Khennas (Algeria), \r\nSiir Kilkis (Turkey), Silvia Kreibiehl (Germany), Volker Krey (Germany/Austria), Elmar \r\nKriegler (Germany), William F. Lamb (Germany/United Kingdom), Franck Lecocq (France), \r\nShuaib  Lwasa (Uganda), Nagmeldin  Mahmoud (Sudan), Cheikh Mbow (Senegal), David \r\nMcCollum (the United States of America), Jan Christoph Minx (Germany), Catherine \r\nMitchell (United Kingdom), Rachid Mrabet (Morocco), Yacob Mulugetta (Ethiopia/\r\nUnited  Kingdom), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the Netherlands), Gregory F. Nemet (the  United States \r\nof America/Canada), Peter Newman (Australia), Leila Niamir (Iran/Germany), Lars  J"


id: fbe7a3d7c475645e7dce5523711d67d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"  Nilsson \r\n(Sweden), Sudarmanto Budi Nugroho (Indonesia), Chukwumerije Okereke (Nigeria/\r\nUnited Kingdom), Shonali Pachauri (India), Anthony Patt (Switzerland), Ramon Pichs-Madruga \r\n(Cuba), Joana Portugal-Pereira (Brazil), Lavanya Rajamani (India), Keywan Riahi (Austria), \r\nJoyashree  Roy (India/Thailand), Yamina Saheb (France/Algeria), Roberto Schaeffer (Brazil), \r\nKaren C. Seto (the United States of America), Shreya Some (India), Linda Steg (the Netherlands), \r\nFerenc  L.  Toth (Austria/Hungary), Diana Urge-Vorsatz (Hungary), Detlef P. van Vuuren \r\n(the  Netherlands), Elena  Verdolini (Italy), Purvi Vyas (India), Yi-Ming Wei (China), Mariama \r\nWilliams (Jamaica/the United States of America), Harald Winkler (South Africa)."


id: ea7476e131c5fff3cf4b48d8a9e11d6d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Figure SPM.1 | Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2-eq yr-1) 1990-2019. Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions include CO2 from fossil fuel \r\ncombustion and industrial processes (CO2-FFI); net CO2 from land use, land-use change and forestry (CO2-LULUCF)9\r\n; methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); and fluorinated \r\ngases (HFCs, PFCs, SF6, NF3).6 Panel a shows aggregate annual global net anthropogenic GHG emissions by groups of gases from 1990 to 2019 reported in GtCO2-eq \r\nconverted based on global warming potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100-AR6) from the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report Working Group I (Chapter 7). \r\nThe fraction of global emissions for each gas is shown for 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2019; as well as the aggregate average annual growth rate between these decades"


id: 9c4fb1c0eb226e336309fb8c49e94b89
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" \r\nAt the right side of Panel a, GHG emissions in 2019 are broken down into individual components with the associated uncertainties (90% confidence interval) indicated by \r\nthe error bars: CO2-FFI +-8%; CO2-LULUCF +-70%; CH4 +-30%; N2O +-60%; F-gases +-30%; GHG +-11%. Uncertainties in GHG emissions are assessed in Supplementary \r\nMaterial 2.2. The single-year peak of emissions in 1997 was due to higher CO2-LULUCF emissions from a forest and peat fire event in South East Asia. Panel b shows \r\nglobal anthropogenic CO2-FFI, net CO2-LULUCF, CH4, N2O and F-gas emissions individually for the period 1990-2019, normalised relative to 100 in 1990. Note the \r\ndifferent scale for the included F-gas emissions compared to other gases, highlighting its rapid growth from a low base. Shaded areas indicate the uncertainty range. \r\nUncertainty ranges as shown here are specific for individual groups of greenhouse gases and cannot be compared"


id: bb280bd71d731a2d80d7d23113bb820c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" The table shows the central estimate for: absolute \r\nemissions in 2019; the absolute change in emissions between 1990 and 2019; and emissions in 2019 expressed as a percentage of 1990 emissions. {2.2, Figure 2.5, \r\nSupplementary Material 2.2, Figure TS.2}"


id: 92bd3d8dcc6ba0a36808db442f15d5ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Figure SPM.2 (continued): Regional GHG emissions, and the regional proportion of total cumulative production-based CO2 emissions from 1850 \r\nto 2019. Panel a shows global net anthropogenic GHG emissions by region (in GtCO2-eq yr-1 (GWP100-AR6)) for the time period 1990-2019.6 Percentage values \r\nrefer to the contribution of each region to total GHG emissions in each respective time period. The single-year peak of emissions in 1997 was due to higher CO2-LULUCF \r\nemissions from a forest and peat fire event in South East Asia. Regions are as grouped in Annex II. Panel b shows the share of historical cumulative net anthropogenic \r\nCO2 emissions per region from 1850 to 2019 in GtCO2. This includes CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (CO2-FFI) and net CO2 emissions from \r\nland use, land-use change, forestry (CO2-LULUCF). Other GHG emissions are not included"


id: d43bf3b0801b721e61c1e18ffe33867
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"6\r\n CO2-LULUCF emissions are subject to high uncertainties, reflected by \r\na global uncertainty estimate of +-70% (90% confidence interval). Panel c shows the distribution of regional GHG emissions in tonnes CO2-eq per capita by region in \r\n2019. GHG emissions are categorised into: CO2-FFI; net CO2-LULUCF; and other GHG emissions (methane, nitrous oxide, fluorinated gases, expressed in CO2-eq using \r\nGWP100-AR6). The height of each rectangle shows per capita emissions, the width shows the population of the region, so that the area of the rectangles refers to the \r\ntotal emissions for each region. Emissions from international aviation and shipping are not included. In the case of two regions, the area for CO2-LULUCF is below the \r\naxis, indicating net CO2 removals rather than emissions. CO2-LULUCF emissions are subject to high uncertainties, reflected by a global uncertainty estimate of +-70% \r\n(90% confidence interval)"


id: ee8581dde5ca324592b8081462287a30
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" Panel d shows population, GDP per person, emission indicators by region in 2019 for percentage GHG contributions, total GHG per person, \r\nand total GHG emissions intensity, together with production-based and consumption-based CO2-FFI data, which is assessed in this report up to 2018. Consumption-based \r\nemissions are emissions released to the atmosphere in order to generate the goods and services consumed by a certain entity (e.g., region). Emissions from international \r\naviation and shipping are not included. {1.3, Figure 1.2, 2.2, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.10, Figure 2.11, Annex II} "


id: 4f160f40db3e40773346be79ea96dd5a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"a\r\n Values in the table refer to the 50th and [5th-95th] percentile values across the pathways falling within a given category as defined in Box SPM.1. For emissions-related \r\ncolumns these values relate to the distribution of all the pathways in that category. Harmonised emissions values are given for consistency with projected global \r\nwarming outcomes using climate emulators. Based on the assessment of climate emulators in AR6 WGI (WG1 Chapter 7, Box 7.1), two climate emulators are used for \r\nthe probabilistic assessment of the resulting warming of the pathways. For the 'Temperature change' and 'Likelihood' columns, the single upper-row values represent \r\nthe 50th percentile across the pathways in that category and the median [50th percentile] across the warming estimates of the probabilistic MAGICC climate model \r\nemulator. For the bracketed ranges, the median warming for every pathway in that category is calculated for each of the two climate model emulators (MAGICC and \r\nFaIR)"


id: ce537627fd95806e2effb03a5602a551
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" Subsequently, the 5th and 95th percentile values across all pathways for each emulator are calculated. The coolest and warmest outcomes (i.e., the lowest p5 of \r\ntwo emulators, and the highest p95, respectively) are shown in square brackets. These ranges therefore cover both the uncertainty of the emissions pathways as well as \r\nthe climate emulators' uncertainty."


id: e387e2c3f7dad16c23ec2e0e52bb6fec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"A wide range of modelled global emission pathways and scenarios from the literature is assessed in this report, including \r\npathways and scenarios with and without mitigation.44 Emissions pathways and scenarios project the evolution of GHG \r\nemissions based on a set of internally consistent assumptions about future socio-economic conditions and related mitigation \r\nmeasures.45 These are quantitative projections and are neither predictions nor forecasts. Around half of all modelled global \r\nemission scenarios assume cost-effective approaches that rely on least-cost emission abatement options globally. The other \r\nhalf look at existing policies and regionally and sectorally differentiated actions. Most do not make explicit assumptions about \r\nglobal equity, environmental justice or intra-regional income distribution"


id: 60462ff2b0c897064063a0f0d14c5ed7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" Global emission pathways, including those based \r\non cost-effective approaches, contain regionally differentiated assumptions and outcomes, and have to be assessed with the \r\ncareful recognition of these assumptions. This assessment focuses on their global characteristics. The majority of the assessed \r\nscenarios (about 80%) have become available since the SR1.5, but some were assessed in that report. Scenarios with and \r\nwithout mitigation were categorised based on their projected global warming over the 21st century, following the same scheme \r\nas in the SR1.5 for warming up to and including 2degC. {1.5, 3.2, 3.3, Annex III.II.2, Annex III.II.3}"


id: fa10a7ad0d226aa82d0715430880e2af
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"The large number of global emissions scenarios assessed, including 1202 scenarios with projected global warming outcomes \r\nusing climate emulators, come from a wide range of modelling approaches. They include the five illustrative scenarios (Shared \r\nSocio-economic Pathways; SSPs) assessed by WGI for their climate outcomes but cover a wider and more varied set in terms \r\nof assumptions and modelled outcomes. For this assessment, Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) were selected from this \r\nlarger set to illustrate a range of different mitigation strategies that would be consistent with different warming levels. The IMPs \r\nillustrate pathways that achieve deep and rapid emissions reductions through different combinations of mitigation strategies. \r\nThe IMPs are not intended to be comprehensive and do not address all possible themes in the underlying report"


id: df57f5d880dfbedb1d5d43160b8a4ee4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" They differ in \r\nterms of their focus, for example, placing greater emphasis on renewables (IMP-Ren), deployment of carbon dioxide removal \r\nthat results in net negative global GHG emissions (IMP-Neg), and efficient resource use as well as shifts in consumption patterns \r\nglobally, leading to low demand for resources, while ensuring a high level of services and satisfying basic needs (IMP-LD) (Figure \r\nSPM.5). Other IMPs illustrate the implications of a less rapid introduction of mitigation measures followed by a subsequent \r\ngradual strengthening (IMP-GS), and how shifting global pathways towards sustainable development, including by reducing \r\ninequality, can lead to mitigation (IMP-SP). The IMPs reach different climate goals as indicated in Table SPM.2 and Box SPM.1, \r\nFigure 1. {1.5, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.6, Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8, Box 3.4, Annex III.II.2.4}"


id: 7af61aec0cffb9fc9c0839d2622127c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
"Figure SPM.5 (continued): Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) and net zero CO2 and GHG emissions strategies. Panels a  and b  show the \r\ndevelopment of global GHG and CO2 emissions in modelled global pathways (upper sub-panels) and the associated timing of when GHG and CO2 emissions reach net \r\nzero (lower sub-panels). Panels c and d show the development of global CH4 and N2O emissions, respectively. Coloured ranges denote the 5th to 95th percentile across \r\npathways. The red ranges depict emissions pathways assuming policies that were implemented by the end of 2020 and pathways assuming implementation of NDCs \r\n(announced prior to COP26). Ranges of modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot are shown in light blue (category C1) and \r\npathways that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) are shown in light purple (category C3)"


id: 694c8c7db43abdf107b75f590412665a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14163
content:
" The grey range comprises all assessed pathways (C1-C8) from the 5th percentile \r\nof the lowest warming category (C1) to the 95th percentile of the highest warming category (C8). The modelled pathway ranges are compared to the emissions from \r\ntwo pathways illustrative of high emissions (CurPol and ModAct) and five IMPs: IMP-LD, IMP-Ren, IMP-SP, IMP-Neg and IMP-GS. Emissions are harmonised to the same \r\n2015 base year. The vertical error bars in 2015 show the 5-95th percentile uncertainty range of the non-harmonised emissions across the pathways, and the uncertainty \r\nrange, and median value, in emission estimates for 2015 and 2019. The vertical error bars in 2030 (panel a) depict the assessed range of the NDCs, as announced prior \r\nto COP26 (Figure SPM.4).23 Panel e shows the sectoral contributions of CO2 and non-CO2 emissions sources and sinks at the time when net zero CO2 emissions are \r\nreached in the IMPs"


id: cb29d38e04c7d675355371ffc814c839
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" Positive and negative emissions for different IMPs are compared to the GHG emissions from the year 2019. Energy supply (neg.) includes BECCS \r\nand DACCS. DACCS features in only two of the five IMPs (IMP-REN and IMP-GS) and contributes <1% and 64%, respectively, to the net negative emissions in Energy \r\nSupply (neg.). Panel f shows the contribution of different sectors and sources to the emissions reductions from a 2019 baseline for reaching net zero GHG emissions. \r\nBars denote the median emissions reductions for all pathways that reach net zero GHG emissions. The whiskers indicate the p5-p95 range. The contributions of the \r\nservice sectors (transport, buildings, industry) are split into direct (demand-side) as well as indirect (supply-side) CO2 emissions reductions. Direct emissions represent \r\ndemand-side emissions due to the fuel use in the respective demand sector"


id: 25cfef0c40c77b278a1ad8c6bedc29ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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" Indirect emissions represent upstream emissions due to industrial processes and energy \r\nconversion, transmission and distribution. In addition, the contributions from the LULUCF sector and reductions from non-CO2 emissions sources (green and grey bars) \r\nare displayed. {3.3, 3.4}"


id: 56619160fd227fe08f3a714faea2698e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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"Figure SPM.6 | Indicative potential of demand-side mitigation options by 2050. Figure SPM.6 covers the indicative potential of demand-side options for the \r\nyear 2050. Figure SPM.7 covers cost and potentials for the year 2030. Demand-side mitigation response options are categorised into three broad domains: 'socio-cultural \r\nfactors', associated with individual choices, behaviour, lifestyle changes, social norms, and culture; 'infrastructure use', related to the design and use of supporting hard \r\nand soft infrastructure that enables changes in individual choices and behaviour; and 'end-use technology adoption', referring to the uptake of technologies by end-users. \r\nDemand-side mitigation is a central element of the IMP-LD and IMP-SP scenarios (Figure SPM.5)"


id: a47134a821c22001f84ff75be1acf0d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" Panel a (Nutrition) demand-side potentials in 2050 assessment is \r\nbased on bottom-up studies and is estimated following the 2050 baseline for the food sector presented in peer-reviewed literature (more information in Supplementary \r\nMaterial 5.II, and Section 7.4.5). Panel b (Manufactured products, mobility, shelter) the assessment of potentials for total emissions in 2050 are estimated based on \r\napproximately 500 bottom-up studies representing all global regions (detailed list is in Supplementary Material Table 5.SM.2). Baseline is provided by the sectoral mean \r\nGHG emissions in 2050 of the two scenarios consistent with policies announced by national governments until 2020. The heights of the coloured columns represent the \r\npotentials represented by the median value. These are based on a range of values available in the case studies from literature shown in Supplementary Material 5.SM.II"


id: f9bb1fbb5d01ebedb12a9019df2c5e61
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:39
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content:
" \r\nThe range is shown by the dots connected by dotted lines representing the highest and the lowest potentials reported in the literature. Panel a shows the demand-side \r\npotential of socio-cultural factors and infrastructure use. The median value of direct emissions (mostly non-CO2) reduction through socio-cultural factors is 1.9 GtCO2-eq \r\nwithout considering land-use change through reforestation of freed up land. If changes in land-use pattern enabled by this change in food demand are considered, \r\nthe indicative potential could reach 7 GtCO2-eq. Panel b illustrates mitigation potential in industry, land transport and buildings end-use sectors through demand-side \r\noptions. Key options are presented in the summary table below the figure and the details are in Supplementary Material Table 5.SM.2. Panel c visualises how sectoral \r\ndemand-side mitigation options (presented in panel b) change demand on the electricity distribution system"


id: 30ed0655808ce4c48b4f7b39fcf96ae1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
" Electricity accounts for an increasing proportion of final \r\nenergy demand in 2050 (additional electricity bar) in line with multiple bottom-up studies (detailed list is in Supplementary Material Table 5.SM.3), and Chapter 6 \r\n(Section 6.6). These studies are used to compute the impact of end-use electrification which increases overall electricity demand. Some of the projected increase in \r\nelectricity demand can be avoided through demand-side mitigation options in the domains of socio-cultural factors and infrastructure use in end-use electricity use \r\nin buildings, industry, and land transport found in literature based on bottom-up assessments. Dark grey columns show the emissions that cannot be avoided through \r\ndemand-side mitigation options. {5.3, Figure 5.7, Supplementary Material 5.SM.II}"


id: 982a06e5c18436231ca7b7451d6f1e2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 21448
content:
"Figure SPM.7 (continued): Overview of mitigation options and their estimated ranges of costs and potentials in 2030. Costs shown are net lifetime \r\ncosts of avoided greenhouse gas emissions. Costs are calculated relative to a reference technology. The assessments per sector were carried out using a common \r\nmethodology, including definition of potentials, target year, reference scenarios, and cost definitions. The mitigation potential (shown in the horizontal axis) is the \r\nquantity of net GHG emission reductions that can be achieved by a given mitigation option relative to a specified emission baseline. Net GHG emission reductions are \r\nthe sum of reduced emissions and/or enhanced sinks. The baseline used consists of current policy (around 2019) reference scenarios from the AR6 scenarios database \r\n(25/75 percentile values). The assessment relies on approximately 175 underlying sources, that together give a fair representation of emission reduction potentials across \r\nall regions"


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vector_id: 33814
content:
" The mitigation potentials are assessed independently for each option and are not necessarily additive. {12.2.1, 12.2.2} The length of the solid bars represents \r\nthe mitigation potential of an option. The error bars display the full ranges of the estimates for the total mitigation potentials. Sources of uncertainty for the cost estimates \r\ninclude assumptions on the rate of technological advancement, regional differences, and economies of scale, among others. Those uncertainties are not displayed in \r\nthe figure. Potentials are broken down into cost categories, indicated by different colours (see legend). Only discounted lifetime monetary costs are considered. Where \r\na gradual colour transition is shown, the breakdown of the potential into cost categories is not well known or depends heavily on factors such as geographical location, \r\nresource availability, and regional circumstances, and the colours indicate the range of estimates"


id: 166f338d6b76d49c548bbfbe74b565d1
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content:
" Costs were taken directly from the underlying studies (mostly in the \r\nperiod 2015-2020) or recent datasets. No correction for inflation was applied, given the wide cost ranges used. The cost of the reference technologies were also taken \r\nfrom the underlying studies and recent datasets. Cost reductions through technological learning are taken into account.69"


id: c45fe1ae502b74020e94ce4f5aad0dfe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 28468
content:
"Figure SPM.8 (continued): Synergies and trade-offs between sectoral and system mitigation options and the SDGs. The sectoral chapters (Chapters 6-11) \r\ninclude qualitative assessments of synergies and trade-offs between sectoral mitigation options and the SDGs. Figure SPM.8 presents a summary of the chapter-level \r\nassessment for selected mitigation options (see Supplementary Material Table 17.SM.1 for the underlying assessment). The last column provides a line of sight to the \r\nsectoral chapters, which provide details on context specificity and dependence of interactions on the scale of implementation. Blank cells indicate that interactions have not \r\nbeen assessed due to limited literature. They do not indicate the absence of interactions between mitigation options and the SDGs. Confidence levels depend on the quality \r\nof evidence and level of agreement in the underlying literature assessed by the sectoral chapters"


id: 11a71447adf102f34c848b523042ed5a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 265
content:
" Where both synergies and trade-offs exist, the lower of the confidence \r\nlevels for these interactions is used. Some mitigation options may have applications in more than one sector or system. The interactions between mitigation options and the \r\nSDGs might differ depending on the sector or system, and also on the context and the scale of implementation. Scale of implementation particularly matters when there \r\nis competition for scarce resources. {6.3, 6.4, 6.7, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 8.2, 8.4, 8.6, Figure 8.4, Supplementary Material Table 8.SM.1, Supplementary Material Table 8.SM.2, \r\n9.4, 9.5, 9.8, Table 9.5, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.8, Table 10.3, 11.5, 12.5, 17.3, Figure 17.1, Supplementary Material Table 17.SM.1, Annex II.IV.12}"


id: a1a29aafa1946fecb1bfde3ef47f8ba6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 22986
content:
"Amjad Abdulla (Maldives), Alaa Al Khourdajie (United Kingdom/Syria), Mustafa Babiker (Sudan/\r\nSaudi Arabia), Quan Bai (China), Igor A. Bashmakov (the Russian Federation), Christopher Bataille \r\n(Canada), Goran Berndes (Sweden), Gabriel Blanco (Argentina), Luisa  F.  Cabeza (Spain), \r\nCarlo  Carraro (Italy), Leon Clarke (the United States of America), Heleen de Coninck \r\n(the  Netherlands), Felix  Creutzig (Germany), Diriba Korecha Dadi (Ethiopia), Fatima  Denton \r\n(the Gambia), Shobhakar Dhakal (Nepal/Thailand), Renee van Diemen (the Netherlands/United \r\nKingdom), Navroz K. Dubash (India), Amit Garg (India), Oliver Geden (Germany), Michael Grubb \r\n(United Kingdom), Celine Guivarch (France), Kirsten Halsnaes (Denmark), Paulina Jaramillo (the \r\nUnited States of America), Tae Yong Jung (Republic of Korea), Suzana Kahn Ribeiro (Brazil), Siir Kilkis \r\n(Turkey), Alexandre Koberle (Brazil/United Kingdom), Silvia Kreibiehl (Germany), Elmar Kriegler \r\n(Germany), William F"


id: 675a9f55a33caef0620e9d0152d07036
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 13850
content:
" Lamb (Germany/United Kingdom), Franck Lecocq (France), Shuaib Lwasa \r\n(Uganda), Nagmeldin  Mahmoud (Sudan), Eric Masanet (the United States of America), David \r\nMcCollum (the United States of America), Jan Christoph  Minx (Germany), Catherine Mitchell \r\n(United Kingdom), Kanako  Morita (Japan), Rachid Mrabet (Morocco), Gert-Jan Nabuurs (the \r\nNetherlands), Peter Newman (Australia), Leila Niamir (Iran/Germany), Lars J. Nilsson (Sweden), \r\nChukwumerije Okereke (Nigeria/United Kingdom), Anthony Patt (Switzerland), Joana Portugal\u0002Pereira (Brazil), Lavanya  Rajamani (India), Andy  Reisinger (New Zealand), Keywan Riahi \r\n(Austria), Joyashree Roy (India/Thailand), Ambuj Sagar (India), Yamina Saheb (France/Algeria), \r\nRoberto Schaeffer (Brazil), Karen  C.  Seto (the United States of America), Pete Smith (United \r\nKingdom), Shreya Some (India), Benjamin K. Sovacool (Denmark/United Kingdom), Linda Steg \r\n(the Netherlands), Massimo Tavoni (Italy), Ferenc L"


id: d0435c27d39f12b507df60e04a93cc99
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 30297
content:
"The global science and policy landscape on climate change mitigation \r\nhas evolved since AR5. The development of the literature reflects, \r\namong other factors, the UN Framework Convention on Climate \r\nChange (UNFCCC), the outcomes of its Kyoto Protocol and the goals \r\nof the Paris Agreement {13, 14, 15}, and the UN 2030 Agenda for \r\nSustainable Development {1, 4, 17}. Literature further highlights \r\nthe growing role of non-state and sub-national actors in the global \r\neffort to address climate change, including cities, businesses, citizens, \r\ntransnational initiatives and public-private entities {5, 8, 13}. It draws \r\nattention to the decreasing cost of some low-emission technologies \r\n{2, 6, 12} and the evolving role of international cooperation {14}, \r\nfinance {15} and innovation {16}"


id: c071db2b01d308713a081b02f31ac1cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
" Emerging literature examines the \r\nglobal spread of climate policies, strengthened mitigation actions \r\nin developing countries, sustained reductions in greenhouse gas \r\n(GHG) emissions in some developed countries and the continuing \r\nchallenges for mitigation. {2, 13} "


id: 27281938e6a4e1804b33a05eb9a299b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3555
content:
"Accelerating mitigation to prevent dangerous anthropogenic \r\ninterference with the climate system will require the integration \r\nof broadened assessment frameworks and tools that combine \r\nmultiple perspectives, applied in a  context of multi-level \r\ngovernance (high confidence). Analysing a challenge on the scale \r\nof fully decarbonising our economies entails integration of multiple \r\nanalytic frameworks. Approaches to risk assessment and resilience, \r\nestablished across IPCC Working Groups, are complemented by \r\nframeworks for probing the challenges in implementing mitigation. \r\nAggregate frameworks include cost-effectiveness analysis towards \r\ngiven objectives, and cost-benefit analysis, both of which have been \r\ndeveloping to take fuller account of advances in understanding risks \r\nand innovation, the dynamics of sectors and systems and of climate \r\nimpacts, and welfare economic theory including growing consensus \r\non long-term discounting"


id: 5cf99e41ea48fb1c223445c08254dc75
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12146
content:
" Ethical frameworks consider the fairness \r\nof processes and outcomes which can help ameliorate distributional \r\nimpacts across income groups, countries and generations. Transition \r\nand transformation frameworks explain and evaluate the dynamics of \r\ntransitions to low-carbon systems arising from interactions amongst \r\nlevels. Psychological, behavioural and political frameworks outline the \r\nconstraints (and opportunities) arising from human psychology and \r\nthe power of incumbent interests. A comprehensive understanding \r\nof climate mitigation must combine these multiple frameworks. \r\nTogether with established risk frameworks, these collectively help \r\nto explain potential synergies and trade-offs in mitigation, implying \r\na need for a wide portfolio of policies attuned to different actors and \r\nlevels of decision-making, and underpin 'just transition' strategies in \r\ndiverse contexts. {1.2.2, 1.7, 1.8, Figure 1.7}"


id: ccb2624bf70ead24d964fcacf3a323d1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
"Effective and equitable climate policies are largely compatible \r\nwith the broader goal of sustainable development and efforts \r\nto eradicate poverty as enshrined in the UN 2030 Agenda for \r\nSustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development \r\nGoals (SDGs), notwithstanding trade-offs in some cases \r\n(high  confidence). Taking urgent action to combat climate \r\nchange and its impacts is one of the 17 SDGs (SDG 13). However, \r\nclimate change mitigation also has synergies and/or trade-offs with \r\nmany other SDGs. There has been a  strong relationship between \r\ndevelopment and GHG emissions, as historically both per-capita \r\nand absolute emissions have risen with industrialisation. However, \r\nrecent evidence shows countries can grow their economies while \r\nreducing emissions. Countries have different priorities in achieving \r\nthe SDGs and reducing emissions as informed by their respective \r\nnational conditions and capabilities"


id: ddeb30071e3bd75ccc566ecb434720e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 32410
content:
" Given the differences in GHG \r\nemissions contributions, degree of vulnerability and impacts, as well \r\nas capacities within and between nations, equity and justice are \r\nimportant considerations for effective climate policy and for securing \r\nnational and international support for deep decarbonisation. \r\nAchieving sustainable development and eradicating poverty would \r\ninvolve effective and equitable climate policies at all levels from local \r\nto global scale. Failure to address questions of equity and justice \r\nover time can undermine social cohesion and stability. International \r\ncooperation can enhance efforts to achieve ambitious global climate \r\nmitigation in the context of sustainable development. Pathways \r\nthat illustrate movement towards fulfilling the SDGs are shown in \r\nFigure TS.1. {1.4, 1.6, Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 17}"


id: 452e4e16c5dc617a0746444da7310530
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 8312
content:
"The speed, direction, and depth of any transition will be \r\ndetermined by choices in the environmental, technological, \r\neconomic, socio-cultural and institutional realms (high \r\nconfidence). Transitions in specific systems can be gradual or can \r\nbe rapid and disruptive. The pace of a  transition can be impeded \r\nby 'lock-in' generated by existing physical capital, institutions, and \r\nsocial norms. The interaction between politics, economics and power \r\nrelationships is central to explaining why broad commitments do not \r\nalways translate to urgent action. At the same time, attention to, and \r\nsupport for, climate policies and low-carbon societal transitions has \r\ngenerally increased, as the impacts have become more salient. Both \r\npublic and private financing and financial structures strongly affect \r\nthe scale and balance of high- and low-carbon investments"


id: d47021891dd17e78cbf7100665ef0cff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30942
content:
" Societal \r\nand behavioural norms, regulations and institutions are essential \r\nconditions to accelerate low-carbon transitions in multiple sectors, \r\nwhilst addressing distributional concerns endemic to any major \r\ntransition. The COVID-19 pandemic has also had far-reaching impacts \r\non the global economic and social system, and recovery will present \r\nboth challenges and opportunities for climate mitigation. (Box TS.1) \r\n{1.3, Box 1.1, 1.4, 1.8, Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, 17} "


id: 84e90ec5116fac0c07af2c49da34a26d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 18429
content:
"Figure TS.1 | Sustainable development pathways towards fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals. The graph shows global average per-capita GHG \r\nemissions (vertical axis) and relative 'Historic Index of Human Development' (HIHD) levels (horizonal) have increased globally since the industrial revolution (grey line). \r\nThe bubbles on the graph show regional per-capita GHG emissions and human development levels in the year 2015, illustrating large disparities. Pathways towards fulfilling the \r\nParis Agreement (and SDG 13) involve global average per-capita GHG emissions below about 5 tCO2-eq by 2030. Likewise, to fulfil SDGs 3, 4 and 8, HIHD levels (see footnote 7 \r\nin Chapter 1) need to be at least 0.5 or greater. This suggests a 'sustainable development zone' for year 2030 (in pale brown); the in-figure text also suggests a 'sustainable \r\ndevelopment corridor', where countries limit per-capita GHG emissions while improving levels of human development over time"


id: ee7f8d5308d439244fc691923c522682
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 34990
content:
" The emphasis of pathways into the sustainable \r\ndevelopment zone differ (dashed brown arrows), but in each case transformations are needed in how human development is attained while limiting GHG emissions."


id: baddb12467672627b4e4ef65a4e4cae0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 26939
content:
"Figure TS.2 | Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2-eq yr-1) 1990-2019. Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions include CO2 from fossil fuel combustion \r\nand industrial processes (CO2-FFI); net CO2 from land use, land-use change and forestry (CO2-LULUCF)5; methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); and fluorinated gases (HFCs, PFCs, \r\nSF6, NF3).6 Panel a shows aggregate annual global net anthropogenic GHG emissions by groups of gases from 1990 to 2019 reported in GtCO2-eq converted based on global \r\nwarming potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100-AR6) from the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report Working Group I (Chapter 7). The fraction of global emissions for each \r\ngas is shown for 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2019; as well as the aggregate average annual growth rate between these decades"


id: 21b355c4521667116fce687d635e6486
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 2730
content:
" At the right side of Panel a, GHG emissions in \r\n2019 are broken down into individual components with the associated uncertainties (90% confidence interval) indicated by the error bars: CO2-FFI +-8%; CO2-LULUCF +-70%; \r\nCH4 +-30%; N2O +-60%; F-gases +-30%; GHG +-11%. Uncertainties in GHG emissions are assessed in Supplementary Material 2.2. The single-year peak of emissions in 1997 \r\nwas due to higher CO2-LULUCF emissions from a forest and peat fire event in South East Asia. Panel b shows global anthropogenic CO2-FFI, net CO2-LULUCF, CH4, N2O and \r\nF-gas emissions individually for the period 1990-2019, normalised relative to 100 in 1990. Note the different scale for the included F-gas emissions compared to other gases, \r\nhighlighting its rapid growth from a low base. Shaded areas indicate the uncertainty range. Uncertainty ranges as shown here are specific for individual groups of greenhouse \r\ngases and cannot be compared"


id: ee1681f76bb91142ac4716bc091c452f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 34936
content:
" The table shows the central estimate for: absolute emissions in 2019; the absolute change in emissions between 1990 and 2019; and emissions \r\nin 2019 expressed as a percentage of 1990 emissions. {2.2, Figure 2.5, Supplementary Material 2.2, Figure TS.2}"


id: 60444d457ddc263608c20e2f94c6a6ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12720
content:
"Starting in the spring of 2020 a major break in global emissions trends was observed due to lockdown policies implemented in \r\nresponse to the pandemic. Overall, global CO2-FFI emissions are estimated to have declined by 5.8% (5.1-6.3%) in 2020, or about \r\n2.2 (1.9-2.4%) GtCO2 in total. This exceeds any previous global emissions decline since 1970 both in relative and absolute terms \r\n(Box TS.1, Figure 1). During periods of economic lockdown, daily emissions, estimated based on activity and power-generation data, \r\ndeclined substantially compared to 2019, particularly in April 2020 - as shown in Box TS.1, Figure 1 - but rebounded by the end of \r\n2020. Impacts were differentiated by sector, with road transport and aviation particularly affected. Different databases estimate \r\nthe total power-sector CO2 reduction from 2019 to 2020 at 3% (IEA7\r\n) and 4.5% (EDGAR8)"


id: 4b812dd3adba6b38a95085ae36c18a3f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
" Approaches that predict near real-time \r\nestimates of the power-sector reduction are more uncertain and estimates range more widely between 1.8%, 4.1% and 6.8%, the \r\nlatter taking into account the over-proportional reduction of coal generation due to low gas prices and merit order effects."


id: af593159503da11c586eb956d9b4b96b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25104
content:
"Figure TS.4 (continued): Emissions have grown in most regions, although some countries have achieved sustained emission reductions in line with \r\n2degC scenarios. Change in regional GHG emissions and rates of change compatible with warming targets. Panel (a): Regional GHG emission trends (in GtCO2-eq yr -1\r\n(GWP100; AR6) for the time period 1990-2019. Panel (b): Historical GHG emissions change by region (2010-2019). Circles depict countries, scaled by total emissions in 2019, \r\nshort horizontal lines depict the average change by region. Also shown are global rates of reduction over the period 2020-2040 in scenarios assessed in AR6 that limit global \r\nwarming to 1.5degC and 2degC with different probabilities. The 5-95th percentile range of emissions changes for scenarios below 1.5degC with no or limited overshoot (scenario \r\ncategory C1) and scenarios below 2degC (>67%) with immediate action (scenario category C3a) are shown as a shaded area with a horizontal line at the mean value"


id: 5a5670fabb82d3502706faa8f123d34f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" Panel b \r\nexcludes CO2 LULUCF due to a lack of consistent historical national data, and International Shipping and Aviation, which cannot be allocated to regions. Global rates of reduction \r\nin scenarios are shown for illustrative purposes only and do not suggest rates of reduction at the regional or national level. {Figures 2.9 and 2.11}"


id: 17360844485ab32dbfd15e9e09df626
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 1162
content:
"The choice of metric can affect the timing and emphasis placed on reducing emissions of short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs) relative to \r\nCO2 within multi-gas abatement strategies as well as the costs of such strategies. Different metric choices can also alter the time at \r\nwhich net zero GHG emissions are calculated to be reached for any given emissions scenario"


id: 13d9a58a7c3b46ab1baf375d08274a0b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 627
content:
" A wide range of GHG emission metrics \r\nhas been published in the scientific literature, which differ in terms of: (i) the key measure of climate change they consider, (ii) whether \r\nthey consider climate outcomes for a specified point in time or integrated over a specified time horizon, (iii) the time horizon over \r\nwhich the metric is applied, (iv) whether they apply to a single emission pulse, to emissions sustained over a period of time, or to \r\na combination of both, and (v) whether they consider the climate effect from an emission compared to the absence of that emission, \r\nor compared to a reference emissions level or climate state. {Annex II}"


id: 722406d651574556990d4bc959986b72
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15585
content:
"However, GWP100 is not well-suited to estimate the cumulative effect on climate from sustained SLCF emissions and the resulting \r\nwarming at specific points in time. This is because the warming caused by an individual SLCF emission pulse is not permanent, and \r\nhence, unlike CO2, the warming from successive SLCF emission pulses over multiple decades or centuries depends mostly on their \r\nongoing rate of emissions rather than cumulative emissions. Recently developed step/pulse metrics such as the CGTP (combined \r\nglobal temperature change potential) and GWP* (referred to as GWP-star and indicated by an asterisk) recognise that a sustained \r\nincrease/decrease in the rate of SLCF emissions has indeed a  similar effect on global surface temperature as one-off emission/\r\nremoval of CO2"


id: 821c850037669bcf1f3f219b9bf72ebb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17990
content:
" These metrics use this relationship to calculate the CO2 emissions or removals that would result in roughly the same \r\ntemperature change as a sustained change in the rate of SLCF emissions (CGTP) over a given time period, or as a varying time series \r\nof CH4 emissions (GWP*). IFrom a mitigation perspective, this makes these metrics well-suited in principle to estimate the effect on the \r\nremaining carbon budget from more, or less, ambitious SLCF mitigation over multiple decades compared to a given reference scenario \r\n(high confidence). However, potential application in wider climate policy (e.g., to inform equitable and ambitious emission targets or \r\nto support sector-specific mitigation policies) is contested and relevant literature still limited."


id: a6ee401374b82b44edf30074c7d0091c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23776
content:
"Figure TS.5 | Global emissions are distributed unevenly, both in the present day and cumulatively since 1850. Panel (a) shows the distribution of regional \r\nGHG emissions in tonnes CO2-eq per capita by region in 2019. GHG emissions are categorised into: CO2 fossil fuel and industry (CO2-FFI); CO2 land use, land-use change and \r\nforestry (CO2-LULUCF); and other GHG emissions (CH4, nitrous oxide, F-gas, expressed in CO2-eq using GWP100). The height of each rectangle shows per-capita emissions, the \r\nwidth shows the population of the region, so that the area of the rectangles refers to the total emissions for each regional. Percentages refer to overall GHG contributions to \r\ntotal global emissions in 2019. Emissions from international aviation and shipping are not included. Panel (b) shows the share of historical net CO2 emissions per region \r\nfrom 1850 to 2019. This includes CO2-FFI and CO2-LULUCF (GtCO2). Other GHG emissions are not included"


id: 3ec3d46a2c523f4edfa1640badc4b6d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7256
content:
" Emissions from international aviation and shipping are included. \r\nPanel (c) shows population, GDP per person, emission indicators by region in 2019 for percentage GHG contributions, total GHG per person, and total GHG emissions intensity, \r\ntogether with production-based and consumption-based CO2-FFI data, which is assessed in this report up to 2018. Consumption-based emissions are emissions released to \r\nthe atmosphere in order to generate the goods and services consumed by a certain entity (e.g., region). Emissions from international aviation and shipping are not included. \r\n{1.3, Figure 1.2a, 2.2, Figure 2.10}"


id: 56a707010316575aed2a6cf5b229ea5d
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 11112
content:
"Globally, GHG emissions continued to rise across all sectors and \r\nsubsectors, and most rapidly in transport and industry (high \r\nconfidence). In 2019, 34% (20 GtCO2-eq) of global GHG emissions \r\ncame from the energy sector, 24% (14 GtCO2-eq) from industry, 22% \r\n(13 GtCO2-eq) from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU), \r\n15% (8.7 GtCO2-eq) from transport, and 5.6% (3.3  GtCO2-eq) from \r\nbuildings. Once indirect emissions from energy use are considered, \r\nthe relative shares of industry and buildings emissions rise to 34% \r\nand 16%, respectively. Average annual GHG emissions growth during \r\n2010-2019 slowed compared to the previous decade in energy supply \r\n(from 2.3% to 1.0%) and industry (from 3.4% to 1.4%, direct emissions \r\nonly), but remained roughly constant at about 2% yr-1 in the transport \r\nsector (high confidence). Emission growth in AFOLU is more uncertain \r\ndue to the high share of CO2-LULUCF emissions (medium confidence). \r\n(Figure TS.8) {2.2.4, Figure 2"


id: d6c7741da393c37bb85eb297ed5641f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31300
content:
"There is a discrepancy, equating to 5.5 GtCO2 yr-1, between \r\nalternative methods of accounting for anthropogenic land \r\nCO2 fluxes. Accounting for this discrepancy would assist in \r\nassessing collective progress in a  global stocktake (high \r\nconfidence). The principal accounting approaches are national GHG \r\ninventories (NGHGI) and global modelling11 approaches. NGHGI, \r\nbased on IPCC guidelines, consider a much larger area of forest to be \r\nunder human management than global models. NGHGI consider the \r\nfluxes due to human-induced environmental change on this area to \r\nbe anthropogenic and are thus reported. Global models, in contrast, \r\nconsider these fluxes to be natural and are excluded from the total \r\nreported anthropogenic land CO2 flux. The accounting method used \r\nwill affect the assessment of collective progress in a global stocktake \r\n(medium confidence) {Cross-Chapter Box  6 in Chapter  7}"


id: 4e958d4833c359938a8b8218a9f9e780
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9796
content:
" In the \r\nabsence of these adjustments, allowing a like-with-like comparison, \r\ncollective progress would appear better than it is. {7.2}"


id: 2e07670c4fd7f4455bb3739920cbcc5f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4676
content:
"Territorial emissions from developing country regions \r\ncontinue to grow, mostly driven by increased consumption \r\nand investment, albeit starting from a  low base of per\u0002capita emissions and with a  lower historic contribution  to \r\ncumulative emissions than developed countries (high \r\nconfidence). Average 2019 per-capita CO2-FFI emissions in three \r\ndeveloping regions, Africa (1.2 tCO2), Asia and Pacific (4.4 tCO2), and \r\nLatin America and Caribbean (2.7 tCO2), remained less than half of \r\nDeveloped Countries' 2019 CO2-FFI emissions (9.5 tCO2). In these \r\nthree developing regions together, CO2-FFI emissions grew by 26% \r\nbetween 2010 and 2019 (compared to 260% between 1990 and \r\n2010). In contrast, in Developed Countries emissions contracted by \r\n9.9% between 2010 and 2019 and by 9.6% between 1990 and 2010"


id: a7c6f8d117a16c460cb7846ffa181e69
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23910
content:
" \r\nHistorically, these three developing regions together contributed 28% \r\nto cumulative CO2-FFI emissions between 1850 and 2019, whereas \r\nDeveloped Countries contributed 57%, and least developed countries \r\ncontributed 0.4%. (Figure TS.5) {2.2, Figures 2.9 and 2.10}"


id: 87016d8367a0e5de70909c2f0e2d4710
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18771
content:
"Multiple low-carbon technologies have shown rapid progress \r\nsince AR5 - in cost, performance, and adoption - enhancing \r\nthe feasibility of rapid energy transitions (high confidence). The \r\nrapid deployment and unit cost decrease of modular technologies like \r\nsolar, wind, and batteries have occurred much faster than anticipated \r\nby experts and modelled in previous mitigation scenarios, as shown \r\nin Figure TS.7 (high confidence). The political, economic, social, and \r\ntechnical feasibility of solar energy, wind energy and electricity \r\nstorage technologies has improved dramatically over the past few \r\nyears. In contrast, the adoption of nuclear energy and CO2 capture \r\nand storage (CCS) in the electricity sector has been slower than \r\nthe growth rates anticipated in stabilisation scenarios. Emerging \r\nevidence since AR5 indicates that small-scale technologies (e.g"


id: ef172c8326df309b4d4f421a6928f8f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35086
content:
", solar, \r\nbatteries) tend to improve faster and be adopted more quickly \r\nthan large-scale technologies (nuclear, CCS) (medium confidence). \r\n(Figure TS.7, Box TS.15) {2.5.3, 2.5.4, Figures 2.22 and 2.23}"


id: 149c70eb3a87b1e8dab2151971dc5216
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 750
content:
"Estimates of future CO2 emissions from existing fossil fuel \r\ninfrastructures already exceed remaining cumulative net CO2\r\nemissions in pathways limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with \r\nno or limited overshoot (high confidence). Assuming variations \r\nin historic patterns of use and decommissioning, estimated future \r\nCO2 emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure alone are \r\n660 (460-890) GtCO2 and from existing and currently planned \r\ninfrastructure 850 (600-1100) GtCO2. This compares to overall \r\ncumulative net CO2 emissions until reaching net zero CO2 of \r\n510 (330-710) GtCO2 in pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) with no or limited overshoot, and 890 (640-1160) GtCO2\r\nin pathways that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) (high confidence)"


id: d4cd48c8ee4cc1ccac6d0bb69f081630
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31007
content:
" \r\nWhile most future CO2 emissions from existing and currently \r\nplanned fossil fuel infrastructure are situated in the power sector, \r\nmost remaining fossil fuel CO2 emissions in pathways that limit \r\nwarming to 2degC (>67%) and below are from non-electric energy - \r\nmost importantly from the industry and transportation sectors (high \r\nconfidence). Decommissioning and reduced utilisation of existing \r\nfossil fuel installations in the power sector as well as cancellation of \r\nnew installations are required to align future CO2 emissions from the \r\npower sector with projections in these pathways (high confidence). \r\n(Figure TS.8) {2.7.2, 2.7.3, Figure 2.26, Tables 2.6 and 2.7}"


id: f51e82516e2be60c0e8d338248cffa5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36076
content:
"Figure TS.9 | Aggregate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of global mitigation pathways (coloured funnels and bars) and projected emission outcomes \r\nfrom current policies and emissions implied by unconditional and conditional elements of NDCs, based on updates available by 11 October 2021 \r\n(grey bars). Shaded areas show GHG emission medians and 25-75th percentiles over 2020-2050 for four types of pathways in the AR6 scenario database: (i) pathways \r\nwith near-term emissions developments in line with current policies and extended with comparable ambition levels beyond 2030; (ii) pathways likely to limit warming to \r\n2degC with near-term emissions developments reflecting 2030 emissions implied by current NDCs followed by accelerated emissions reductions; (iii) pathways likely to limit \r\nwarming to 2degC based on immediate actions from 2020 onwards; (iv) pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC with no or limited overshoot"


id: 6f93891a9b82d055f93cffbd57291e6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15184
content:
" Right-hand panels show two \r\nsnapshots of the 2030 and 2050 emission ranges of the pathways in detail (median, 25-75th and 5-95th percentiles). The 2030 snapshot includes the projected emissions \r\nfrom the implementation of the NDCs as assessed in Section 4.2 (Table 4.1; median and full range). Historic GHG emissions trends as used in model studies are shown for \r\n2010-2015. GHG emissions are in CO2-equivalent using GWP100 values from AR6. {3.5, Table 4.1, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}"


id: 981d9ad56c9fd1a5ee3fa62e66955750
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21444
content:
"Projected global emissions from aggregated NDCs place \r\nlimiting global warming to 1.5degC beyond reach and make it \r\nharder after 2030 to limit warming to 2degC (high confidence). \r\nPathways following NDCs until 2030 show a  smaller reduction \r\nin fossil fuel use, slower deployment of low-carbon alternatives, \r\nand a smaller reduction in CO2, CH4 and overall GHG emissions in \r\n2030 compared to immediate action scenarios. This is followed by \r\na  much faster reduction of emissions and fossil fuels after 2030, \r\nand a larger increase in the deployment of low-carbon alternatives \r\nduring the medium term in order to get close to the levels of the \r\nimmediate action pathways in 2050. Those pathways also deploy \r\na larger amount of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) to compensate for \r\nhigher emissions before 2030"


id: d2f65581da71c2d71858cb49533e582a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30708
content:
" The faster transition during 2030 to \r\n2050 entails greater investment in fossil fuel infrastructure and lower \r\ndeployment of low-carbon alternatives in 2030, which adds to the \r\nsocio-economic challenges in realising the higher transition rates. \r\n(TS.4.2) {3.5}"


id: b7c3e72c1a5fb4ce7d9f4b1e7abda526
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26444
content:
"If obstacles to accelerated mitigation are rooted in underlying \r\nstructural features of society, then transforming such structures \r\ncan support emission reductions {4.2.6}. Countries and regions \r\nwill have different starting points for transition pathways. Some critical \r\ndifferences between countries include climate conditions resulting \r\nin different heating and cooling needs, endowments with different \r\nenergy resources, patterns of spatial development, and political and \r\neconomic conditions {4.2.5}. The way countries develop determines \r\ntheir capacity to accelerate mitigation and achieve other sustainable \r\ndevelopment objectives simultaneously (medium confidence)\r\n{4.3.1,  4.3.2}. Yet meeting ambitious mitigation and development \r\ngoals cannot be achieved through incremental change (robust \r\nevidence, medium agreement)"


id: e6dab2570e1e2f96d42f394496686942
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33805
content:
" Though development pathways result \r\nfrom the actions of a  wide range of actors, it is possible to shift \r\ndevelopment pathways through policies and enhancing enabling \r\nconditions (limited evidence, medium agreement). "


id: f658126f73a3a49b1be50698dfdc9705
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36271
content:
"Studies evaluating up to 105 updated NDCs15 indicate that \r\nemissions in NDCs with conditional elements have been \r\nreduced by 4.5 (2.7-6.3) GtCO2-eq. This closes the emission \r\ngaps by about one third to 2degC and about 20% to 1.5degC compared \r\nto the original NDCs submitted in 2015/16 (medium confidence) \r\n{4.2.2, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}. An implementation gap\r\nalso exists between the projected emissions with 'current policies' \r\nand the projected emissions resulting from the implementation \r\nof the unconditional and conditional elements of NDCs; this is \r\nestimated to be around 4 and 7 GtCO2-eq in 2030, respectively \r\n(medium confidence) {4.2.2}. Many countries would therefore require \r\nadditional policies and associated action on climate change to meet \r\ntheir autonomously determined mitigation targets as specified \r\nunder the first NDCs (limited evidence)"


id: 83d53752cecd39f7a3935ce67d41a969
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18272
content:
" The disruptions triggered \r\nby the COVID-19 pandemic increase uncertainty over the range \r\nof projections relative to pre-COVID-19 literature. As indicated by \r\na growing number of studies at the national and global level, how \r\nlarge near- to mid-term emissions implications of the COVID-19 \r\npandemic are, to a large degree depends on how stimulus or recovery \r\npackages are designed. {4.2}"


id: e0869c1ff18ea1e807c4555a3acd7c01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32825
content:
"Shifting development pathways towards sustainability offers \r\nways to broaden the range of levers and enablers that a society \r\ncan use to accelerate mitigation and increases the likelihood \r\nof making progress simultaneously on climate action and \r\nother development goals (Box TS.3) {Cross-Chapter Box 5 in \r\nChapter  4, Figure  4.7, 4.3}. There are practical options to shift \r\ndevelopment pathways in ways that advance mitigation and other \r\nsustainable development objectives, support political feasibility, \r\nincrease resources to meet multiple goals, and reduce emissions \r\n(limited evidence, high agreement)"


id: faea39218a886b0d49a6c59ff1a96e6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36998
content:
" Concrete examples, assessed in \r\nChapter 4 of this report, include high-employment and low-emissions \r\nstructural change; fiscal reforms for mitigation and social contract, \r\ncombining housing policies to deliver both housing and transport \r\nmitigation; and changed economic, social and spatial patterns of \r\nagriculture sector development, providing the basis for sustained \r\nreductions in emissions from deforestation. {4.4.1, 4.4, 1.10}"


id: c488d5ef6cda1d342849b6d47c227980
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28497
content:
"Table TS.2 | Comparison of key characteristics of mitigation pathways with immediate action towards limiting warming to 1.5-2degC vs. pathways following \r\nNDCs announced prior to COP26 until 2030. Key characteristics are reported for five groups of mitigation pathways: (i) immediate action to limit warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) with no or limited overshoot (C1 in Table TS.3; 97 scenarios), (ii) near term action following the NDCs until 2030 and returning warming to 1.5degC (> 50%) by 2100 \r\nafter a high overshoot (subset of 42 scenarios following the NDCs until 2030 in C2), (iii) immediate action to limit warming to 2degC (>67%), (C3a in Table TS.3; 204 scenarios), \r\n(iv) near term action following the NDCs until 2030 followed by post-2030 action to limit warming to 2degC (>67%) (C3b in Table TS.3; 97 scenarios). Also shown are the \r\ncharacteristics for (v) the combined class of all scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%)"


id: 9f9a0b6f70499abdda9551697ca6adcf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22649
content:
" The groups (i), (iii), and the combination of (ii) and (iv) are depicted in Figure TS.9. \r\nReported are median and interquartile ranges (in brackets) for selected global indicators. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five, with the exception of cumulative net negative \r\nCO2 emissions rounded to the nearest 10. Changes from 2019 are relative to modelled 2019 values. Emissions reductions are based on harmonised model emissions used for \r\nthe climate assessment. {Section 3.5} {Table 3.6}"


id: eaf88ecdca9ea69a777334af51c6ccb3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34476
content:
"However, decisions about mitigation actions, and their timing and scale, may entail trade-offs with the achievement of other national \r\ndevelopment objectives in the near, mid- and long term {Chapter 12}. In the near term, for example, regulations may ban vehicles from \r\ncity centres to reduce congestion and local air pollution but reduce mobility and choice. Increasing green spaces within cities without \r\ncaps on housing prices may involve trade-offs with affordable housing and push low-income residents outside the city {8.2.2}. In the \r\nmid- and long term, large-scale deployment of biomass energy raises concerns about food security and biodiversity conservation \r\n{3.7.1, 3.7.5, 7.4.4, 9.8.1, 12.5.2, 12.5.3}. Prioritising is one way to manage these trade-offs, addressing some national development \r\nobjectives earlier than others"


id: f70beb47238dee9d08cef22c07ec7097
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36375
content:
" Another way is to adopt policy packages aimed at shifting development pathways towards increased \r\nsustainability (SDPS) as they expand the range of tools available to simultaneously achieve multiple development objectives and \r\naccelerate mitigation. (Box TS.3, Figure 1) "


id: 119b39489a2864374014a65f7e1d15d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 259
content:
"Policies can shift development pathways. There are examples \r\nof policies implemented in the pursuit of overall societal \r\ndevelopment objectives, such as job creation, macroeconomic \r\nstability, economic growth, and public health and welfare.\r\nIn  some countries, such policies are framed as part of a  Just \r\nTransition (Box TS.3), however, they can have major influence on \r\nmitigative capacity, and hence can be seen as tools to broaden \r\nmitigation options (medium confidence) {4.3.3}. Coordinated policy \r\nmixes would need to orchestrate multiple actors - individuals, groups \r\nand collectives, corporate actors, institutions and infrastructure \r\nactors  - to deepen decarbonisation and shift pathways towards \r\nsustainability. Shifts in one country may spill over to other countries. \r\nShifting development pathways can jointly support mitigation and \r\nadaptation {4.4.2}. Some studies explore the risks of high complexity \r\nand potential delay attached to shifting development pathways"


id: 5250a9705bf0af7a567a218d2fa0d030
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10406
content:
"An increasing number of mitigation strategies up to 2050 \r\n(mid-term) have been developed by various actors. A growing \r\nnumber of such strategies aim at net zero GHG or CO2\r\nemissions, but it is not yet possible to draw global implications \r\ndue to the limited size of sample (medium evidence, low \r\nagreement) {4.2.4}. Non-state actors are also engaging in a wide \r\nrange of mitigation initiatives. When adding up emission reduction \r\npotentials, sub-national and non-state international cooperative \r\ninitiatives could reduce emissions by up to about 20 GtCO2-eq in \r\n2030 (limited evidence, medium agreement) {4.2.3}. Yet perceived or \r\nreal conflicts between mitigation and other SDGs can impede such \r\naction. If undertaken without precaution, accelerated mitigation is \r\nfound to have significant implications for development objectives \r\nand macroeconomic costs at country level"


id: 5f2ac0ae69b73481c053f123ce3d943e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12532
content:
" The literature shows that \r\nthe employment effect of mitigation policies tends to be limited on \r\naggregate but can be significant at sectoral level (limited evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). Detailed design of mitigation policies is critical \r\nfor distributional impacts and avoiding lock-in (high confidence), \r\nthough further research is needed in that direction. {4.2.6}"


id: 97112e8110d632a946221c19300db988
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21283
content:
"Equity can be an important enabler, increasing the level of \r\nambition for accelerated mitigation (high confidence) {4.5}. \r\nEquity deals with the distribution of costs and benefits and how these \r\nare shared, as per social contracts, national policy and international \r\nagreements. Transition pathways have distributional consequences \r\nsuch as large changes in employment and economic structure (high \r\nconfidence). The Just Transition concept has become an international \r\nfocal point tying together social movements, trade unions, and other \r\nkey stakeholders to ensure equity is better accounted for in low-carbon \r\ntransitions (Box TS.4). The effectiveness of cooperative action and the \r\nperception of fairness of such arrangements are closely related in \r\nthat pathways that prioritise equity and allow broad stakeholder \r\nparticipation can enable broader consensus for the transformational \r\nchange implicit in the need for deeper mitigation (robust evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). (Box TS"


id: b877d3c6eb4c76941c54457bda926814
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26552
content:
"The literature identifies a  broad set of enabling conditions \r\nthat can both foster shifting development pathways and \r\naccelerated mitigation (medium evidence, high agreement).\r\nPolicy integration is a necessary component of shifting development \r\npathways, addressing multiple objectives. To this aim, mobilising \r\na range of policies is preferable to single policy instruments (high \r\nconfidence). {4.4.1}. Governance for climate mitigation and shifting \r\ndevelopment pathways is enhanced when tailored to national and \r\nlocal contexts. Improved institutions and effective governance enable \r\nambitious action on climate and can help bridge implementation \r\ngaps (medium evidence, high agreement). Given that strengthening \r\ninstitutions may be a long-term endeavour, it needs attention in the \r\nnear term {4.4.1}"


id: 218c992ac9e1266db43b10b3b9d6c47
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2704
content:
" Accelerated mitigation and shifting development \r\npathways necessitates both redirecting existing financial flows from \r\nhigh- to low-emissions technologies and systems, and providing \r\nadditional resources to overcome current financial barriers (high \r\nconfidence) {4.4.1}. Opportunities exist in the near term to close the \r\nfinance gap {15.2.2}. At the national level, public finance for actions \r\npromoting sustainable development helps broaden the scope of \r\nmitigation (medium confidence). Changes in behaviour and lifestyles "


id: acd3a74cf6be8ae45ae16b109dc7d86
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24739
content:
"A Just Transition entails targeted and proactive measures from governments, agencies, and other non-state authorities to ensure that \r\nany negative social, environmental, or economic impacts of economy-wide transitions are minimised, whilst benefits are maximised \r\nfor those disproportionally affected. These proactive measures include eradication of poverty, regulating prosperity and creating jobs \r\nin 'green' sectors. In addition, governments, polluting industries, corporations, and those more able to pay higher associated taxes, \r\ncan pay for transition costs by providing a welfare safety net and adequate compensation to people, communities, and regions that \r\nhave been impacted by pollution, or are marginalised, or are negatively impacted by a transition from a high- to low-carbon economy \r\nand society"


id: 2cb0d1963782b6d14e0b32627c40e3b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4459
content:
" There is, nonetheless, increased recognition that resources that can enable the transition, international development \r\ninstitutions, as well as other transitional drivers such as tools, strategies and finance, are scarce. A sample of global efforts is \r\nsummarised in Box TS.4, Figure 1."


id: e9eaa87c0d61c5e25fbde50cbb10a173
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34304
content:
"Each of the IMPs comprises: a storyline and a quantitative illustration. The storyline describes the key characteristics of the pathway \r\nqualitatively; the quantitative illustration is selected from the literature on long-term scenarios to effectively represent the IMP \r\nnumerically. The five Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) each emphasise a different scenario element as its defining feature, and \r\nare named accordingly: heavy reliance on renewables (IMP-Ren), strong emphasis on low demand for energy (IMP-LD), extensive use \r\nof carbon dioxide removal (CDR) in the energy and the industry sectors to achieve net negative emissions (IMP-Neg), mitigation in the \r\ncontext of broader sustainable development and shifting development pathways (IMP-SP), and the implications of a less rapid and \r\ngradual strengthening of near-term mitigation actions (IMP-GS)"


id: b583dfd5c0ee9b87ec83a06ab4c4e621
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26086
content:
" In some cases, sectoral chapters may use different quantifications \r\nthat follow the same storyline narrative but contain data that better exemplify the chapter's assessment. Some IMP variants are also \r\nused to explore the sensitivity around alternative temperature goals. {3.2, 3.3}"


id: 8a47d1bcc1d4e840dd27dc0eb0458a60
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 19292
content:
"a\r\n Values in the table refer to the 50th and [5th-95th] percentile values across the pathways falling within a given category as defined in Box SPM.1. For emissions-related \r\ncolumns these values relate to the distribution of all the pathways in that category. Harmonised emissions values are given for consistency with projected global warming \r\noutcomes using climate emulators. Based on the assessment of climate emulators in AR6 WGI (WG1 Chapter 7, Box 7.1), two climate emulators are used for the probabilistic \r\nassessment of the resulting warming of the pathways. For the 'Temperature change' and 'Likelihood' columns, the single upper-row values represent the 50th percentile \r\nacross the pathways in that category and the median [50th percentile] across the warming estimates of the probabilistic MAGICC climate model emulator. For the bracketed \r\nranges, the median warming for every pathway in that category is calculated for each of the two climate model emulators (MAGICC and FaIR)"


id: 47e68acdc443305fb2ec9f89d4c892d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
" Subsequently, the 5th and \r\n95th percentile values across all pathways for each emulator are calculated. The coolest and warmest outcomes (i.e., the lowest p5 of two emulators, and the highest p95, \r\nrespectively) are shown in square brackets. These ranges therefore cover both the uncertainty of the emissions pathways as well as the climate emulators' uncertainty.\r\nb For a description of pathways categories see Box SPM.1 and Table 3.1."


id: 507ac6fc565df1b8ab6818b1e73e2334
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10108
content:
" Emissions milestones are provided for five-year intervals in order to be consistent with the underlying five-year time-step data of the modelled pathways. Peak emissions \r\n(CO2 and GHGs) are assessed for five-year reporting intervals starting in 2020. The interval 2020-2025 signifies that projected emissions peak as soon as possible between \r\n2020 and at latest before 2025. The upper five-year interval refers to the median interval within which the emissions peak or reach net zero. Ranges in square brackets \r\nunderneath refer to the range across the pathways, comprising the lower bound of the 5th percentile five-year interval and the upper bound of the 95th percentile five-year \r\ninterval. Numbers in round brackets signify the fraction of pathways that reach specific milestones.\r\n Percentiles reported across all pathways in that category include those that do not reach net zero before 2100 (fraction of pathways reaching net zero is given in round \r\nbrackets)"


id: 804d440a29a2019cef7d75a58c7dd6e2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17712
content:
" If the fraction of pathways that reach net zero before 2100 is lower than the fraction of pathways covered by a percentile (e.g., 0.95 for the 95th percentile), \r\nthe percentile is not defined and denoted with '...'. The fraction of pathways reaching net zero includes all with reported non-harmonised, and/or harmonised emissions \r\nprofiles that reach net zero. Pathways were counted when at least one of the two profiles fell below 100 MtCO2 yr-1 until 2100."


id: 6baf57650fbf4b526dcabb075c722403
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 14569
content:
"Pathways following current NDCs until 2030 reach annual \r\nemissions of 47-57 GtCO2-eq yr-1 by 2030, thereby making it \r\nimpossible to limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited \r\novershoot and strongly increasing the challenge of limiting \r\nwarming to 2degC (>67%) (high confidence). A high overshoot \r\nof 1.5degC increases the risks from climate impacts and increases \r\ndependence on large-scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR) from the \r\natmosphere. A future consistent with current NDCs implies higher fossil \r\nfuel deployment and lower reliance on low-carbon alternatives until \r\n2030, compared to mitigation pathways describing immediate action \r\nthat limits warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, or \r\nlimits warming to 2degC (>67%) and below. After following the NDCs to \r\n2030, to limit warming to 2degC (>67%) the pace of global GHG emission \r\nreductions would need to abruptly increase from 2030 onward to an \r\naverage of 1.3-2"


id: 580a466bf38cad1fd48a5e4f62ad7ab8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 11354
content:
"1 GtCO2-eq per year between 2030 and 2050. This \r\nis similar to the global CO2 emission reductions in 2020 that occurred \r\ndue to the COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns, and around 70% faster \r\nthan in pathways where immediate action is taken to limit warming \r\nto 2degC (>67%). Accelerating emission reductions after following an \r\nNDC pathway to 2030 would also be particularly challenging because \r\nof the continued buildup of fossil fuel infrastructure that would take \r\nplace between now and 2030. (TS4.1, Table TS.3) {3.5, 4.2}"


id: c92c430f66c0dedc8e606ddf28095a4f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29213
content:
"Figure TS.10 (continued): Mitigation pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC, or 2degC, involve deep, rapid and sustained emissions reductions. Net zero CO2\r\nand net zero GHG emissions are possible through different mitigation portfolios. Panels (a) and (b) show the development of global GHG and CO2 emissions \r\nin modelled global pathways (upper sub-panels) and the associated timing of when GHG and CO2 emissions reach net zero (lower sub-panels). Panels (c) and (d) show the \r\ndevelopment of global CH4 and N2O emissions, respectively. Coloured ranges denote the 5th to 95th percentile across pathways. The red ranges depict emissions pathways \r\nassuming policies that were implemented by the end of 2020 and pathways assuming implementation of NDCs (announced prior to COP26). Ranges of modelled pathways that \r\nlimit warming to 1"


id: 7c5d77015536f2bf1635762ece2bd82f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 17166
content:
"5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot are shown in light blue (category C1) and pathways that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) are shown in light purple \r\n(category C3). The grey range comprises all assessed pathways (C1-C8) from the 5th percentile of the lowest warming category (C1) to the 95th percentile of the highest \r\nwarming category (C8). The modelled pathway ranges are compared to the emissions from two pathways illustrative of high emissions (CurPol and ModAct) and five IMPs: \r\nIMP-LD, IMP-Ren, IMP-SP, IMP-Neg and IMP-GS. Emissions are harmonised to the same 2015 base year. The vertical error bars in 2015 show the 5-95th percentile uncertainty \r\nrange of the non-harmonised emissions across the pathways, and the uncertainty range, and median value, in emission estimates for 2015 and 2019. The vertical error bars \r\nin 2030 (panel a) depict the assessed range of the NDCs, as announced prior to COP26"


id: a2a622ada4c312ff27f2e87335f80d88
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23153
content:
"17 Panel (e) shows the sectoral contributions of CO2 and non-CO2 emissions sources \r\nand sinks at the time when net zero CO2 emissions are reached in the IMPs. Positive and negative emissions for different IMPs are compared to the GHG emissions from the \r\nyear 2019. Energy supply (neg.) includes BECCS and DACCS. DACCS features in only two of the five IMPs (IMP-REN and IMP-GS) and contributes <1% and 64%, respectively, \r\nto the net negative emissions in Energy Supply (neg.). Panel (f) shows the contribution of different sectors and sources to the emissions reductions from a 2019 baseline for \r\nreaching net zero GHG emissions. Bars denote the median emissions reductions for all pathways that reach net zero GHG emissions. The whiskers indicate the p5-p95 range. \r\nThe contributions of the service sectors (transport, buildings, industry) are split into direct (demand-side) as well as indirect (supply-side) CO2 emissions reductions"


id: fb8982faba0d9a6dbc5d148e38123cf1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37076
content:
" Direct \r\nemissions represent demand-side emissions due to the fuel use in the respective demand sector. Indirect emissions represent upstream emissions due to industrial processes \r\nand energy conversion, transmission and distribution. In addition, the contributions from the LULUCF sector and reductions from non-CO2 emissions sources (green and grey \r\nbars) are displayed. {3.3, 3.4}"


id: 5579bfb71353cf8777048ed92ba521a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10925
content:
"Mitigation pathways that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) entail \r\nlosses in global GDP with respect to reference scenarios \r\nof between 1.3% and 2.7% in 2050. In pathways limiting \r\nwarming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, \r\nlosses are between 2.6% and 4.2%. These estimates do not \r\naccount for the economic benefits of avoided climate change \r\nimpacts (medium confidence). In mitigation pathways limiting \r\nwarming to 2degC (>67%), marginal abatement costs of carbon are \r\nabout 90 (60-120) USD2015 tCO2 in 2030 and about 210 (140-340) \r\nUSD2015/tCO2 in 2050. This compares with about 220 (170-290) \r\nUSD2015  tCO2 in 2030 and about 630 (430-990) USD2015 tCO2\r\nin 205018 in pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with \r\nno or limited overshoot. Reference scenarios, in the AR6 scenarios \r\ndatabase, describe possible emission trajectories in the absence of \r\nnew stringent climate policies"


id: 563cb70a4dea63d4a2737f24071e8bd2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11053
content:
" Reference scenarios have a  broad \r\nrange depending on socio-economic assumptions and model \r\ncharacteristics. {3.2.1, 3.6.1}"


id: ffc0bca4f3cb883a5384dafcf8e4fb53
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37783
content:
"The global benefits of pathways limiting warming to 2degC \r\n(>67%) outweigh global mitigation costs over the 21st century, \r\nif aggregated economic impacts of climate change are at the \r\nmoderate to high end of the assessed range, and a  weight \r\nconsistent with economic theory is given to economic impacts \r\nover the long term. This holds true even without accounting \r\nfor benefits in other sustainable development dimensions or \r\nnon-market damages from climate change (medium confidence).\r\nThe aggregate global economic repercussions of mitigation pathways \r\ninclude: the macroeconomic impacts of investments in low-carbon \r\nsolutions and structural changes away from emitting activities; \r\nco-benefits and adverse side effects of mitigation; avoided climate \r\nchange impacts; and reduced adaptation costs"


id: 481442ed6c4066af681382b67742b1be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8714
content:
" Existing quantifications \r\nof the global aggregate economic impacts show a strong dependence \r\non socio-economic development conditions, as these shape exposure \r\nand vulnerability and adaptation opportunities and responses. \r\nAvoided impacts for poorer households and poorer countries represent \r\na  smaller share in aggregate economic quantifications expressed in \r\nGDP or monetary terms, whereas their well-being and welfare effects \r\nare comparatively larger. When aggregate economic benefits from \r\navoided climate change impacts are accounted for, mitigation is \r\na welfare-enhancing strategy (high confidence). {3.6.2}"


id: c0ed215907186d56b4fec5efd517c02a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27926
content:
"CBA analysis and CBA integrated assessment models (IAMs) remain limited in their ability to represent all damages from climate \r\nchange, including non-monetary damages, and capture the uncertain and heterogeneous nature of damages and the risk of catastrophic \r\ndamages, such that other lines of evidence should be considered in decision-making. However, emerging evidence suggests that, even \r\nwithout accounting for co-benefits of mitigation on other sustainable development dimensions, the global benefits of pathways \r\nlimiting warming to 2degC (>67%) outweigh global mitigation costs over the 21st century (medium confidence)"


id: 224c970374056de58e9b3170ce788fbc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2843
content:
" Depending on the \r\nstudy, the reason for this result lies in assumptions of economic damages from climate change in the higher end of available estimates, \r\nin the consideration of risks of tipping points or damages to natural capital and non-market goods, or in the combination of updated \r\nrepresentations of carbon cycle and climate modules, updated damage estimates and updated representations of economic and \r\nmitigation dynamics. In the studies that perform a sensitivity analysis, this result is found to be robust to a wide range of assumptions \r\non social preferences (in particular on inequality aversion and pure rate of time preference), and holds except if assumptions of \r\neconomic damages from climate change are in the lower end of available estimates and the pure rate of time preference is in the \r\nhigher range of values usually considered (typically above 1.5%)"


id: 8ee6749b8e123c208b65b29fc23a57e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20013
content:
" However, although such pathways bring overall net benefits over time \r\n(in terms of aggregate discounted present value), they involve distributional consequences between and within generations. {3.6.2}"


id: ede3c6ed256c50605e2501074b4c15c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34900
content:
"Low-carbon energy systems are expected to rely heavily on end-use electrification, where electricity produced with low GHG emissions \r\nis used for building and industrial heating, transport and other applications that rely heavily on fossil fuels at present. But not all \r\nend-uses are expected to be commercially electrifiable in the short to medium term {11.3.5}, and many will require low GHG liquid and \r\ngaseous fuels, that is, hydrogen, ammonia, and biogenic and synthetic low GHG hydrocarbons made from low GHG hydrogen, oxygen \r\nand carbon sources (the latter from CCU,20 biomass, or direct air capture {11.3.6}). The future role of hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives \r\nwill depend on how quickly and how far production technology improves, that is, from electrolysis ('green'), biogasification, and fossil \r\nfuel reforming with CCS ('blue') sources"


id: 1c7da26a52eef150f5217521060e548b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1938
content:
" As a general rule, and across all sectors, it is more efficient to use electricity directly and avoid \r\nthe progressively larger conversion losses from producing hydrogen, ammonia, or constructed low GHG hydrocarbons. What hydrogen \r\ndoes do, however, is add time and space option value to electricity produced using variable clean sources, for use as hydrogen, as \r\nstored future electricity via a fuel cell or turbine, or as an industrial feedstock. Furthermore, electrification and hydrogen involve \r\na symbiotic range of general-purpose technologies, such as electric motors, power electronics, heat pumps, batteries, electrolysis, fuel \r\ncells, and so on, that have different applications across sectors but cumulative economies of innovation and production scale benefits. \r\nFinally, neither electrification nor hydrogen produce local air pollutants at point of end-use."


id: 36d62b1a28f796bf512785e20cdfe440
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6014
content:
"An increasing reliance on electricity from variable renewable sources, notably wind and solar power, disrupts old concepts and makes \r\nmany existing guidelines obsolete for power system planning, for example, that specific generation types are needed for baseload, \r\nintermediate load, and peak load to follow and meet demand. In future power systems with high shares of variable electricity from \r\nrenewable sources, system planning and markets will focus more on demand flexibility, grid infrastructure and interconnections, \r\nstorage on various timelines (on the minute, hourly, overnight and seasonal scale), and increased coupling between the energy sector \r\nand the building, transport and industrial sectors. This shifts the focus to energy systems that can handle variable supply rather than \r\nalways follow demand. Hydrogen may prove valuable to improve the resilience of electricity systems with high penetration of variable \r\nrenewable electricity"


id: 8870a15fb9bc519f071c8a05b86fa469
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18995
content:
" Flexible hydrogen electrolysis, hydrogen power plants and long-duration hydrogen storage may all improve \r\nresilience. Electricity-to-hydrogen-to-electricity round-trip efficiencies are projected to reach up to 50% by 2030. {6.4.3}"


id: 2e883b3ef63b33dc22bbba686c307708
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4767
content:
"Electrification is expected to be the dominant strategy in buildings as electricity is increasingly used for heating and for cooking. \r\nElectricity will help to integrate renewable energy into buildings and will also lead to more flexible demand for heating, cooling, and \r\nelectricity. District heating and cooling offers potential for demand flexibility through energy storage and supply flexibility through \r\ncogeneration. Heat pumps are increasingly used in buildings and industry for heating and cooling {9.3.3, Box  9.3}. The ease of \r\nswitching to electricity means that hydrogen is not expected to be a dominant pathway for buildings {Box 9.6}. Using electricity \r\ndirectly for heating, cooling and other building energy demand is more efficient than using hydrogen as a fuel, for example, in boilers \r\nor fuel cells"


id: 6a9335c9a48cdb5eb7415e358f26a455
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14382
content:
" In addition, electricity distribution is already well developed in many regions compared to essentially non-existent \r\nhydrogen infrastructure, except for a few chemicals industry pipelines. At the same time, hydrogen could potentially be used for on-site \r\nstorage should technology advance sufficiently."


id: c42eab741ef9f6d476fee873ed3177d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28430
content:
"Figure TS.12 | Changes in six metrics associated with urban and national-scale combined CO2 and CH4 emissions represented in the AR6 WGIII six-region \r\naggregation, with (a) 2000 and (b) 2015. The trends in Luqman et al. (2021) were combined with the work of Moran et al. (2018) to estimate the regional urban CO2-eq \r\nshare of global urban emissions, the urban share of national CO2-eq emissions, and the urban per capita CO2-eq emissions by region. This estimate is derived from consumption\u0002based accounting that includes both direct emissions from within urban areas and indirect emissions from outside urban areas related to the production of electricity, goods, \r\nand services consumed in cities. It incorporates all CO2 and CH4 emissions except aviation, shipping and biogenic sources (i.e., land-use change, forestry, and agriculture). The \r\ndashed grey line represents the global average urban per capita CO2-eq emissions"


id: 340b3613c9dcaba46b162ab74e8a9c9b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5602
content:
" The regional urban population share, regional CO2-eq share in total emissions, and national \r\nper capita CO2-eq emissions by region are given for comparison. Source: adapted from Gurney et al. (2022)."


id: 67c401bda49b19793b7b243e542aba57
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13913
content:
"Urban green and blue infrastructure can mitigate climate \r\nchange through carbon sinks, avoided emissions, and \r\nreduced energy use while offering multiple co-benefits (high \r\nconfidence). Urban green and blue infrastructure, including urban \r\nforests and street trees, permeable surfaces, and green roofs24 offer \r\npotentials to mitigate climate change directly through storing carbon, \r\nand indirectly by inducing a cooling effect that both reduces energy \r\ndemand and reduces energy use for water treatment. Globally, urban \r\ntrees store approximately 7.4 billion tonnes of carbon, and sequester \r\napproximately 217 million tonnes of carbon annually, although \r\ncarbon storage is highly dependent on biome. Among the multiple \r\nco-benefits of green and blue infrastructure are reducing the urban \r\nheat island (UHI) effect and heat stress, reducing stormwater runoff, \r\nimproving air quality, and improving the mental and physical health \r\nof urban dwellers"


id: a129021b479b21170136e78af36c31ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22914
content:
" Many of these options also provide benefits to \r\nclimate adaptation. (high agreement, robust evidence) {8.2, 8.4.4}"


id: a43978547f2e29afa5adc0bff4484edc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23390
content:
"The potential and sequencing of mitigation strategies to reduce \r\nGHG emissions will vary depending on a city's land use, spatial \r\nform, development level, and state of urbanisation (i.e., whether \r\nit is an established city with existing infrastructure, a rapidly \r\ngrowing city with new infrastructure, or an emerging city with \r\ninfrastructure buildup) (high confidence). New and emerging cities \r\nwill have significant infrastructure development needs to achieve high \r\nquality of life, which can be met through energy-efficient infrastructures \r\nand services, and people-centred urban design (high confidence). \r\nThe long lifespan of urban infrastructures locks in behaviour and \r\ncommitted emissions. Urban  infrastructures  and urban form can \r\nenable sociocultural and lifestyle changes that can significantly reduce \r\ncarbon footprints"


id: b93efef8c48211b661a0f2513816d1b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26679
content:
" Rapidly growing cities can  avoid higher future \r\nemissions through urban planning to co-locate jobs and housing to \r\nachieve compact urban form, and by leapfrogging to low-carbon \r\ntechnologies. Established cities will achieve the largest GHG emissions \r\nsavings by replacing, repurposing, or retrofitting the building stock, \r\ntargeted infilling and densifying, as well as through modal shift and \r\nthe electrification of the urban energy system. New and emerging cities "


id: dc8a05d5130a5af76be89fea7a3abc62
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32203
content:
"Changes in urban form, behaviour programs, the circular \r\neconomy, the shared economy, and digitalisation trends \r\ncan support systemic changes that lead to reductions in \r\ndemand for transport services or expand the use of more \r\nefficient transport modes (high confidence). Cities can reduce \r\ntheir transport-related fuel consumption by around 25% through \r\ncombinations of more compact land use and the provision of less \r\ncar-dependent transport infrastructure. Appropriate infrastructure, \r\nincluding protected pedestrian and bike pathways, can also \r\nsupport much greater localised active travel.25 Transport demand \r\nmanagement incentives are expected to be necessary to support \r\nthese systemic changes. There is mixed evidence of the effect \r\nof circular economy initiatives, shared economy initiatives, and \r\ndigitalisation on demand for transport services (Box TS.14)"


id: 4e812728b38497d079964c2597b5807b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9784
content:
" For \r\nexample, while dematerialisation can reduce the amount of material \r\nthat needs to be transported to manufacturing facilities, an increase \r\nin online shopping with priority delivery can increase demand for \r\nfreight transport. Similarly, while teleworking could reduce travel \r\ndemand, increased ride-sharing could increase vehicle kilometres \r\ntravelled (VKT). {Chapters 1 and 5, 10.2, 10.8}"


id: 2fc05aaccaa426963587fc2a3ebb8537
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4933
content:
"Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) have lower lifecycle greenhouse \r\ngas (GHG) emissions than internal combustion engine vehicles \r\n(ICEVs) when BEVs are charged with low-carbon electricity \r\n(high confidence). Electromobility is being rapidly implemented \r\nin micro-mobility (e-autorickshaws, e-scooters, e-bikes), in transit \r\nsystems, especially buses, and to a  lesser degree, in personal \r\nvehicles. BEVs could also have the added benefit of supporting \r\ngrid operations. The commercial availability of mature lithium-ion \r\nbatteries (LIBs) has underpinned this growth in electromobility. As \r\nglobal battery production increases, unit costs are declining. Further \r\nefforts to reduce the GHG footprint of battery production, however, \r\nare essential for maximising the mitigation potential of BEVs. The \r\ncontinued growth of electromobility for land transport would entail \r\ninvestments in electric charging and related grid infrastructure"


id: a3ae7ba5fa8bb5afd23c7c6ceab35be9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23314
content:
" \r\nElectromobility powered by low-carbon electricity has the potential \r\nto rapidly reduce transport GHG and can be applied with multiple \r\nco-benefits, especially in developing countries. {10.3, 10.4, 10.8}"


id: 7cfc7b23cabc0276e026dec3891eca54
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17258
content:
"Decarbonisation options for shipping and aviation still require \r\nR&D, though advanced biofuels, ammonia, and synthetic \r\nfuels are emerging as viable options (medium confidence). \r\nIncreased efficiency has been insufficient to limit the emissions from \r\nshipping and aviation, and natural gas-based fuels are expected to \r\nbe inadequate to meet stringent decarbonisation goals for these \r\nsegments (high confidence). High-energy density, low-carbon fuels \r\nare required, but they have not yet reached commercial scale. \r\nAdvanced biofuels could provide low-carbon jet fuel (medium \r\nconfidence). The production of synthetic fuels using low-carbon \r\nhydrogen with CO2 captured through DACCS/BECCS could provide \r\njet and marine fuels but these options still require demonstration \r\nat scale (low confidence). Ammonia produced with low-carbon \r\nhydrogen could also serve as a  marine fuel (medium confidence). \r\nDeployment of these fuels requires reductions in production costs. \r\n(Figure TS.14) {10"


id: e9d74fe1787da8e69acac88db7c9f1e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34284
content:
"Scenarios from bottom-up and top-down models indicate \r\nthat, without intervention, CO2 emissions from transport \r\ncould grow in the range of 16% and 50% by 2050 (medium \r\nconfidence). The scenarios literature projects continued growth in \r\ndemand for freight and passenger services, particularly in developing \r\ncountries in Africa and Asia (high confidence). This growth is \r\nprojected to take place across all transport modes. Increases in \r\ndemand notwithstanding, scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC \r\ndegree with no or limited overshoot suggest that a 59% reduction \r\n(42-68% interquartile range) in transport-related CO2 emissions by \r\n2050, compared to modelled 2020 levels is required. While many \r\nglobal scenarios place greater reliance on emissions reduction \r\nin sectors other than transport, a  quarter of the 1.5degC scenarios \r\ndescribe transport-related CO2 emissions reductions in excess of 68% \r\n(relative to modelled 2020 levels) (medium confidence)"


id: fd790e23f7f155450e481caaa7d8655
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37395
content:
" Illustrative \r\nMitigation Pathways IMP-Ren and IMP-LD (TS 4.2) describe emission \r\nreductions of 80% and 90% in the transport sector, respectively, \r\nby 2050. Transport-related emission reductions, however, may not \r\nhappen uniformly across regions. For example, transport emissions \r\nfrom the Developed Countries, and Eastern Europe and West Central \r\nAsia countries decrease from 2020 levels by 2050 across all scenarios \r\nlimiting global warming to 1.5degC by 2100, but could increase in \r\nAfrica, Asia and Pacific (APC), Latin America and Caribbean, and the \r\nMiddle East in some of these scenarios. {10.7}"


id: 9f5eca02839a501e94e1e05aad6f3906
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22620
content:
"Legislated climate strategies are emerging at all levels of \r\ngovernment, and together with pledges for personal choices, \r\ncould spur the deployment of demand- and supply-side \r\ntransport mitigation strategies (medium confidence). At the \r\nlocal level, legislation can support local transport plans that include \r\ncommitments or pledges from local institutions to encourage \r\nbehaviour change by adopting an organisational culture that \r\nmotivates sustainable behaviour with inputs from the creative \r\narts. Such institution-led mechanisms could include bike-to-work \r\ncampaigns, free transport passes, parking charges, or eliminating \r\ncar benefits. Community-based solutions such as solar sharing, \r\ncommunity charging, and mobility as a  service can generate new \r\nopportunities to facilitate low-carbon transport futures"


id: 185963a97438928e18534393d292e5fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1324
content:
" At the \r\nregional and national levels, legislation can include vehicle and fuel \r\nefficiency standards, R&D support, and large-scale investments in \r\nlow-carbon transport infrastructure. (Figure TS.14) {10.8, Chapter 15}"


id: 57e64e6c0e06a7a19a4b4ef7867fa857
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11333
content:
"In most regions, historical improvements in efficiency have \r\nbeen approximately matched by growth in floor area per capita \r\n(high confidence). At the global level, building-specific drivers of \r\nGHG emissions include: (i) population growth, especially in developing \r\ncountries; (ii) increasing floor area per capita, driven by the increasing \r\nsize of dwellings while the size of households kept decreasing, especially \r\nin developed countries; (iii) the inefficiency of newly constructed \r\nbuildings, especially in developing countries, and the low renovation \r\nrates and low ambition level in developed countries when existing \r\nbuildings are renovated; (iv) the increase in use, number and size of \r\nappliances and equipment, especially information and communication \r\ntechnologies (ICT) and cooling, driven by income; and, (v) the continued \r\nreliance on carbon-intensive electricity and heat"


id: aa5e74712b4c5d78192667927c998a07
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24342
content:
" These factors taken \r\ntogether are projected to continue driving increased GHG emissions in \r\nthe building sector in the future. {9.3, 9.6, 9.9}"


id: e8d214fa0cc1c25e511eb1aaaf79d503
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34144
content:
"The potential associated with sufficiency measures, as well as \r\nthe replacement of appliances, equipment and lights by efficient \r\nones, is below zero cost (high confidence). The construction of \r\nhigh-performance buildings is expected to become a  business-as\u0002usual technology by 2050 with costs below USD20 tCO2\r\n-1 in developed \r\ncountries and below USD100 tCO2\r\n-1 in developing countries (medium \r\nconfidence). For existing buildings, there have been many examples \r\nof deep retrofits where additional costs per CO2 abated are not \r\nsignificantly higher than those of shallow retrofits. However, \r\nfor the whole building stock they tend to be in cost intervals of \r\nUSD-200 tCO2\r\n-1 and >USD200 tCO2-1 (medium confidence)"


id: 35c2dd8e65ba3617425f15bc24b04967
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5871
content:
" Literature \r\nemphasises the critical role of the 2020-2030 decade in accelerating \r\nthe learning of know-how and skills to reduce the costs and remove \r\nfeasibility constraints for achieving high-efficiency buildings at scale \r\nand set the sector on the pathway to realise its full potential (high \r\nconfidence). {9.3, 9.6, 9.9}."


id: 6208d2984b8f656de1ba0d0e7cf001ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12984
content:
"Figure TS.15 (continued): Decompositions of changes in historical residential energy emissions 1990-2019, changes in emissions projected by baseline \r\nscenarios for 2020-2050, and differences between scenarios in 2050 using scenarios from three models: IEA, IMAGE, and RECC. RECC-LED data for \r\n(a) global, and (b) for nine world regions, include only space heating and cooling and water heating in residential buildings. Emissions are decomposed using the equation, \r\nwhich shows changes in driver variables of population, sufficiency (floor area per capita), efficiency (final energy per floor area), and renewables (GHG emissions per final \r\nenergy). 'Renewables' is a summary term describing changes in GHG intensity of energy supply. Emission projections to 2050, and differences between scenarios in 2050, \r\ndemonstrate mitigation potentials from the dimensions of the SER framework realised in each model scenario"


id: 24dc64fcc221732ef6946f63f7908ba7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3243
content:
" In most regions, historical improvements in efficiency have been \r\napproximately matched by growth in floor area per capita. Implementing sufficiency measures that limit growth in floor area per capita, particularly in developed regions, \r\nreduces the dependence of climate mitigation on technological solutions. {Figure 9.5, Box 9.2}"


id: 52ef2c59e7a9d768ce2e95331674c706
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10503
content:
"Adapting buildings to future climate while ensuring well-being \r\nfor all requires action. Expected heatwaves will inevitably \r\nincrease cooling needs to limit the health impacts of climate \r\nchange (medium confidence). Global warming will impact cooling \r\nand heating needs but also the performance, durability and safety \r\nof buildings, especially historical and coastal ones, through changes \r\nin temperature, humidity, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and \r\nchloride, and sea level rise. Adaptation measures to cope with climate \r\nchange may increase the demand for energy and materials leading to \r\nan increase in GHG emissions if not mitigated. Sufficiency measures \r\nwhich anticipate climate change, and include natural ventilation, \r\nwhite walls, and nature-based solutions (e.g.,  green roofs) will \r\ndecrease the demand for cooling"


id: ff6a7ac491311e7526309606e679cac3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37733
content:
" Shared cooled spaces with highly \r\nefficient cooling solutions are among the mitigation strategies which \r\ncan limit the effect of the expected heatwaves on people's health. \r\n{9.7, 9.8}"


id: 31e19279b67a6901904251c64407b2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5262
content:
"Net zero CO2 industrial-sector emissions are possible but \r\nchallenging (high confidence). Energy efficiency will continue to \r\nbe important. Reduced materials demand, material efficiency, and \r\ncircular economy solutions can reduce the need for primary production. \r\nPrimary production options include switching to new processes that \r\nuse low-to-zero GHG energy carriers and feedstocks (e.g., electricity, \r\nhydrogen, biofuels, and carbon dioxide capture and utilisation \r\n(CCU) to provide carbon feedstocks). Carbon capture and  storage \r\n(CCS) will be required to mitigate remaining CO2 emissions {11.3}. \r\nThese options require substantial scaling up of electricity, hydrogen, \r\nrecycling, CO2, and other infrastructure, as well as phase-out or \r\nconversion of existing industrial plants"


id: 8bc14d4574766927dfa4dc6003537c63
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19505
content:
" While improvements in the \r\nGHG intensities of major basic materials have nearly stagnated over \r\nthe last 30 years, analysis of historical technology shifts and newly \r\navailable technologies indicate these intensities can be significantly \r\nreduced by mid-century. {11.2, 11.3, 11.4}"


id: ccec3ef6f83f7ffe7c9436ffe3fa5ae5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29785
content:
"Figure TS.17 (continued): Potentials and costs for zero-carbon mitigation options for industry and basic materials. CIEl - carbon intensity of electricity for \r\nindirect emissions; EE - energy efficiency; ME - material efficiency; Circularity - material flows (clinker substituted by coal fly ash, blast furnace slag or other by-products and \r\nwaste, steel scrap, plastic recycling, etc.); FeedCI - feedstock carbon intensity (hydrogen, biomass, novel cement, natural clinker substitutes); FSW+El - fuel switch and processes \r\nelectrification with low-carbon electricity. Ranges for mitigation options are shown based on bottom-up studies for grouped technologies packages, not for single technologies. \r\nIn circles, contribution to mitigation from technologies based on their readiness are shown for 2050 (2040) and 2070. Direct emissions include fuel combustion and process \r\nemissions. Indirect emissions include emissions attributed to consumed electricity and purchased heat"


id: 943be68287f5e9ad3516bd935e63d5cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20832
content:
" For basic chemicals, only methanol, ammonia and high-value chemicals \r\nare considered. Total for industry does not include emissions from waste. Negative mitigation costs for some options such as Circularity are not reflected. {Figure 11.13}"


id: 634dc32b931b7c3dae411315baba984f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13195
content:
"The AFOLU sector, on average, accounted for 13-21% of \r\nglobal total anthropogenic GHG emissions in the period \r\n2010-2019. At the same time managed and natural terrestrial \r\necosystems were a carbon sink, absorbing around one third \r\nof anthropogenic CO2 emissions (medium confidence). \r\nEstimated anthropogenic net CO2 emissions from AFOLU (based on \r\nbookkeeping models) result in a net source of +5.9 +- 4.1 GtCO2 yr-1\r\nbetween 2010 and 2019 with an unclear trend. Based on FAOSTAT \r\nor national GHG inventories, the net CO2 emissions from AFOLU were \r\n0.0 to +0.8 GtCO2 yr -1 over the same period. There is a discrepancy \r\nin the reported CO2 AFOLU emissions magnitude because alternative \r\nmethodological approaches that incorporate different assumptions \r\nare used {7.2.2}. If the responses of all managed and natural land \r\nto both anthropogenic environmental change and natural climate \r\nvariability, estimated to be a gross sink of -12.5 +- 3"


id: 6dea5fb90023996fd7da880c433e3a2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14906
content:
"2 GtCO2 yr-1 for \r\nthe period 2010-2019, are added to land-use emissions, then land \r\noverall constituted a net sink of -6.6 +- 5.2 GtCO2 yr-1 in terms of CO2\r\nemissions (medium confidence). (Table TS.4) {7.2, Table 7.1} "


id: 53eb1cb24b56bb462de89067c95221e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10670
content:
"Land-use change drives net AFOLU CO2 emission fluxes. The \r\nrate of deforestation, which accounts for 45% of total AFOLU \r\nemissions, has generally declined, while global tree cover \r\nand global forest-growing stock levels are likely increasing \r\n(medium confidence). There are substantial regional differences, \r\nwith losses of carbon generally observed in tropical regions and \r\ngains in temperate and boreal regions. Agricultural CH4 and N2O \r\nemissions are estimated to average 157 +- 47.1 MtCH4 yr -1 and \r\n6.6 +- 4.0 MtN2O yr -1 or 4.2 +- 1.3 and 1.8 +- 1.1 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (using \r\nIPCC AR6 GWP100 values for CH4 and N2O) respectively between \r\n2010 and 2019 {7.2.1, 7.2.3}. AFOLU CH4 emissions continue to \r\nincrease, the main source of which is enteric fermentation from \r\nruminant animals. Similarly, AFOLU N2O emissions are increasing, \r\ndominated by agriculture, notably from manure application, nitrogen \r\ndeposition, and nitrogen fertiliser use (high confidence)"


id: cdda2ea00fff30618e4d0155b322285d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29905
content:
" In addition \r\nto being a net carbon sink and source of GHG emissions, land plays an \r\nimportant role in climate through albedo effects, evapotranspiration, \r\nand aerosol loading through emissions of volatile organic compounds \r\n(VOCs). The combined role of CH4, N2O and aerosols in total climate \r\nforcing, however, is unclear and varies strongly with bioclimatic \r\nregion and management practice. {2.4.2.5, 7.2, 7.3}"


id: 189c4b13aa637941b9ebcf49faea167c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1368
content:
"The agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU)27 sector \r\nencompasses managed ecosystems and offers significant \r\nmitigation opportunities while providing food, wood \r\nand other renewable resources as well as biodiversity \r\nconservation, provided the sector adapts to climate change.\r\nLand-based mitigation measures can reduce GHG emissions within \r\nthe AFOLU sector, deliver CDR and provide biomass thereby enabling \r\nemission reductions in other sectors.28 The rapid deployment of \r\nAFOLU measures features in all pathways that limit global warming \r\nto 1.5degC. Where carefully and appropriately implemented, AFOLU \r\nmitigation measures are positioned to deliver substantial co-benefits \r\nand help address many of the wider challenges associated with \r\nland management"


id: da67fbfed079ff18431f950099f18afe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31887
content:
" If AFOLU measures are deployed badly, when \r\ntaken together with the increasing need to produce sufficient \r\nfood, feed, fuel and wood, they may exacerbate trade-offs with the \r\nconservation of habitats, adaptation, biodiversity and other services. "


id: 900f9d66a4759f53f0fcf4ce094a99a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20195
content:
"savannas and grasslands have the potential to reduce emissions \r\nand/or sequester 7.3 mean (3.9-13.1) GtCO2-eq yr-1. Agriculture \r\nprovides the second largest share of the mitigation potential, with \r\n4.1 (1.7-6.7) GtCO2-eq yr -1 (up to USD100 tCO2-eq-1) from cropland \r\nand grassland soil carbon management, agroforestry, use of biochar, \r\nimproved rice cultivation, and livestock and nutrient management. \r\nDemand-side measures including shifting to sustainable healthy \r\ndiets, reducing food waste, building with wood, biochemicals, and \r\nbio-textiles, have a mitigation potential of 2.2 (1.1-3.6) GtCO2-eq yr -1. \r\nMost mitigation options are available and ready to deploy. Emissions \r\nreductions can be achieved relatively quickly, whereas CDR needs \r\nupfront investment"


id: 951e102cad45d26cf801f7af0c918c25
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20965
content:
" Sustainable intensification in agriculture, shifting \r\ndiets, and reducing food waste could enhance efficiencies and reduce \r\nagricultural land needs, and are therefore critical for enabling \r\nsupply-side measures such as reforestation, restoration, as well as \r\ndecreasing CH4 and N2O emissions from agricultural production. In \r\naddition, emerging technologies (e.g.,  vaccines or CH4 inhibitors) \r\nhave the potential to substantially increase the CH4 mitigation \r\npotential beyond current estimates. AFOLU mitigation is not only \r\nrelevant in countries with large land areas. Many smaller countries \r\nand regions, particularly with wetlands, have disproportionately high \r\nlevels of AFOLU mitigation potential density. {7.4, 7.5}"


id: c324adafbd4c7136ddc46250a805a83d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28277
content:
"The AFOLU sector offers significant near-term mitigation \r\npotential at relatively low cost and can provide 20-30% of \r\nthe 2050 emissions reduction described in scenarios that limit \r\nwarming to 2degC  (>67%) or lower (high evidence, medium \r\nagreement). The AFOLU sector can provide 20-30% (interquartile \r\nrange) of the global mitigation needed for a 1.5degC or 2degC pathway \r\ntowards 2050, though there are highly variable mitigation strategies \r\nfor how AFOLU potential can be deployed for achieving climate \r\ntargets {Illustrative Mitigation Pathways in 7.5}. The estimated \r\neconomic (<USD100 tCO2-eq-1) AFOLU sector mitigation potential \r\nis 8 to 14 GtCO2-eq yr-1 between 2020-2050, with the bottom \r\nend of this range representing the mean from IAMs and the upper \r\nend  representing the mean estimate from global sectoral studies. \r\nThe economic potential is about half of the technical potential from \r\nAFOLU, and about 30-50% could be achieved under USD20 tCO2-eq-1\r\n{7.4}"


id: 9be4caf07ba45c10d6079497b9308186
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22082
content:
" The implementation of robust measurement, reporting and \r\nverification processes is paramount to improving the transparency of \r\nchanges in land carbon stocks and this can help prevent misleading \r\nassumptions or claims on mitigation. {7.1, 7.4, 7.5} "


id: 73253111a8e3ebddb3f1ea789da2b27f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15730
content:
"while limiting trade-offs (medium confidence). The results of \r\nimplementing AFOLU measures are often variable and highly context\u0002specific. Depending on local conditions (e.g., ecosystem, climate, food \r\nsystem, land ownership) and management strategies (e.g.,  scale, \r\nmethod), mitigation measures can positively or negatively affect \r\nbiodiversity, ecosystem functioning, air quality, water availability \r\nand quality, soil productivity, rights infringements, food security, and \r\nhuman well-being. The agriculture and forestry sectors can devise \r\nmanagement approaches that enable biomass production and use \r\nfor energy in conjunction with the production of food and timber, \r\nthereby reducing the conversion pressure on natural ecosystems \r\n(medium confidence). Mitigation measures addressing GHGs may also \r\naffect other climate forcers such as albedo and evapotranspiration"


id: 6dff2a0d921767fac39b637008560c79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14918
content:
" \r\nIntegrated responses that contribute to mitigation, adaptation, and \r\nother land challenges will have greater likelihood of being successful \r\n(high confidence); measures which provide additional benefits to \r\nbiodiversity and human well-being are sometimes described as \r\n'Nature-based Solutions'. {7.1, 7.4, 7.6, 12.4, 12.5}"


id: e1681d9d5c9336344af3a0f08c569c5c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32955
content:
"AFOLU mitigation measures have been well understood \r\nfor decades but deployment remains slow, and emissions \r\ntrends indicate unsatisfactory progress despite beneficial \r\ncontributions to global emissions reduction from forest\u0002related options (high confidence). Globally, the AFOLU sector has \r\nso far contributed modestly to net mitigation, as past policies have \r\ndelivered about 0.65 GtCO2 yr-1 of mitigation during 2010-2019 or \r\n1.4% of global gross emissions. The majority (>80%) of emission \r\nreduction resulted from forestry measures. Although the mitigation \r\npotential of AFOLU measures is large from a biophysical and ecological \r\nperspective, its feasibility is hampered by lack of institutional support, \r\nuncertainty over long-term additionality and trade-offs, weak \r\ngovernance, fragmented land ownership, and uncertain permanence \r\neffects"


id: 9bf2c6b27c5341fd09eeb68e8bdb54a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22093
content:
" Despite these impediments to change, AFOLU mitigation \r\noptions are demonstrably effective and with appropriate support can \r\nenable rapid emission reductions in most countries. {7.4, 7.6}"


id: f5eb219a415c5e9bc20871ea1936b695
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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"Bioenergy is the most land-intensive energy option, but total \r\nland occupation of other renewable energy options can also \r\nbecome significant in high deployment scenarios. While not \r\nas closely connected to the AFOLU sector as bioenergy, other \r\nrenewable energy options can influence AFOLU activities \r\nin both synergistic and detrimental ways (high confidence). \r\nThe character of land occupation, and associated impacts, vary \r\nconsiderably among mitigation options and also for the same \r\noption depending on geographic location, scale, system design and \r\ndeployment strategy. Land occupation can be large uniform areas, \r\nfor example, reservoir hydropower dams and tree plantations, and \r\nmore distributed occupation that is integrated with other land uses, \r\nfor example, wind turbines and agroforestry in agriculture landscapes"


id: d21bdbb7f69ceefc05f1f4a6a7c2a8f2
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" \r\nDeployment can be partly decoupled from additional land use, for \r\nexample, use of organic waste and residues and integration of solar \r\nPV into buildings and other infrastructure (high confidence). Wind and \r\nsolar power can coexist with agriculture in beneficial ways (medium \r\nconfidence). Indirect land occupation includes new agriculture areas \r\nfollowing displacement of food production with bioenergy plantations \r\nand expansion of mining activities providing minerals required for \r\nmanufacture of EV batteries, PV, and wind power. {7.4, 12.5}"


id: b179d155033284b72e0e1977d76552d2
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"Concerted, rapid and sustained effort by all stakeholders, from \r\npolicymakers and investors to land owners and managers is \r\na  pre-requisite for achieving high levels of mitigation in the \r\nAFOLU sector (high confidence). To date USD0.7 billion yr-1 is \r\nestimated to have been spent on AFOLU mitigation. This is well short \r\nof the more than USD400 billion yr-1 that is estimated to be necessary \r\nto deliver the up to 30% of global mitigation effort envisaged in deep \r\nmitigation scenarios (medium confidence). This estimate of the global \r\nfunding requirement is smaller than current subsidies provided to \r\nagriculture and forestry. A gradual redirection of existing agriculture \r\nand forestry subsidies would greatly advance mitigation. Effective policy \r\ninterventions and national (investment) plans as part of NDCs, specific \r\nto local circumstances and needs, are urgently needed to accelerate \r\nthe deployment of AFOLU mitigation options"


id: ce21fd1ee827574a6774a03adb2b2bd5
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" These interventions are \r\neffective when they include funding schemes and long-term consistent \r\nsupport for implementation with governments taking the initiative \r\ntogether with private funders and non-state actors. {7.6}"


id: e8773ede8a28744ad1ae720e65f451bc
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"Addressing the many knowledge gaps in the development and \r\ntesting of AFOLU mitigation options can rapidly advance the \r\nlikelihood of achieving sustained mitigation (high confidence). \r\nResearch priorities include improved quantification of anthropogenic \r\nand natural GHG fluxes and emissions modelling, better understanding \r\nof the impacts of climate change on the mitigation potential, \r\npermanence and additionality of estimated mitigation  actions, \r\nand improved (real-time and cheap) measurement, reporting and \r\nverification. There is a need to include a greater suite of mitigation \r\nmeasures in IAMs, informed by more realistic assessments that take \r\ninto account local circumstances and socio-economic factors and \r\ncross-sector synergies and trade-offs. Finally, there is a critical need \r\nfor more targeted research to develop appropriate country-level, \r\nlocally specific, policy and land-management response options"


id: b37b570a1b062feee1f193d1be1fa00b
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" These \r\noptions could support more specific NDCs with AFOLU measures \r\nthat enable mitigation while also contributing to biodiversity \r\nconservation, ecosystem functioning, livelihoods for millions of \r\nfarmers and foresters, and many other SDGs. {7.7, Figure 17.1} "


id: bf0b22ae0db3ac255a8f7aa5c380dbb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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"Realising the mitigation potential of the AFOLU sector \r\ndepends strongly on policies that directly address emissions \r\nand drive the deployment of land-based mitigation options, \r\nconsistent with carbon prices in deep mitigation scenarios \r\n(high confidence). Examples of successful policies and measures \r\ninclude establishing and respecting tenure rights and community \r\nforestry, improved agricultural management and sustainable \r\nintensification, biodiversity conservation, payments for ecosystem \r\nservices, improved forest management and wood-chain usage, \r\nbioenergy, voluntary supply chain management efforts, consumer \r\nbehaviour campaigns, private funding and joint regulatory efforts \r\nto avoid, for example, leakage. The efficacy of different policies, \r\nhowever, will depend on numerous region-specific factors. In addition \r\nto funding, these factors include governance, institutions, long-term \r\nconsistent execution of measures, and the specific policy setting"


id: c666582d7ec5651b39ffadd6060b8b53
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" \r\nWhile the governance of land-based mitigation can draw on lessons \r\nfrom previous experience with regulating biofuels and forest carbon, \r\nintegrating these insights requires governance that goes beyond \r\nproject-level approaches emphasising integrated land-use planning \r\nand management within the frame of the Sustainable Development \r\nGoals. {7.4, Box 7.2, 7.6}"


id: bf758428c914c6c9aebd0d89e936bf67
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content:
"There is a great variety of CDR methods and respective implementation options {Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 1 in Chapter 12}. Some \r\nof these methods (like afforestation and soil carbon sequestration) have been practiced for decades to millennia, although not \r\nnecessarily with the intention to remove carbon from the atmosphere. Conversely, for methods such as DACCS and BECCS, experience \r\nis growing but still limited in scale. A categorisation of CDR methods can be based on several criteria, depending on the highlighted \r\ncharacteristics. In this report, the categorisation is focused on the role of CDR methods in the carbon cycle, that is on the removal \r\nprocess (land-based biological; ocean-based biological; geochemical; chemical) and on the time scale of storage (decades to centuries;\r\ncenturies to millennia; 10,000 years or longer), the latter being closely linked to different carbon storage media. Within one category \r\n(e.g"


id: 8ee51bbc448a5342e7ff9cd2ee2c5c3a
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", ocean-based biological CDR) options often differ with respect to other dynamic or context-specific dimensions such as mitigation \r\npotential, cost, potential for co-benefits and adverse side effects, and technology readiness level. (Table TS.7, TS.5.6, TS. 5.7) {12.3}"


id: 7471fb1dad8ee33326b95ead7c73e521
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content:
"It is useful to distinguish between CO2 removal from the atmosphere as the outcome of deliberate activities implementing CDR \r\noptions, and the net emissions outcome achieved with the help of CDR deployment (i.e., gross emissions minus gross removals). \r\nAs part of ambitious mitigation strategies at global or national levels, gross CDR can fulfil three different roles in complementing \r\nemissions abatement: (i) lowering net CO2 or GHG emissions in the near term; (ii) counterbalancing 'hard-to-abate' residual emissions \r\nsuch as CO2 from industrial activities and long-distance transport, or CH4 and nitrous oxide from agriculture, in order to help reach net \r\nzero CO2 or GHG emissions in the mid-term; (iii) achieving net negative CO2 or GHG emissions in the long term if deployed at levels \r\nexceeding annual residual emissions {2.7, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5}"


id: 8608a0786b2428526b648bc76919dd63
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content:
" These roles of CDR are not mutually exclusive: for example, achieving net zero \r\nCO2 or GHG emissions globally might involve individual developed countries attaining net negative CO2 emissions at the time of global \r\nnet zero, thereby allowing developing countries a smoother transition. {Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 2 in Chapter 12}"


id: f2afb75eef6419e8ae074b6b24e95aaa
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"A social science perspective is important in two ways. By adding new actors and perspectives, it (i) provides more options for climate mitigation; \r\nand (ii) helps to identify and address important social and cultural barriers and opportunities to socio-economic, technological, and institutional \r\nchange. Demand-side mitigation involves five sets of social actors: individuals (e.g., consumption choices, habits), groups and collectives \r\n(e.g., social movements, values), corporate actors (e.g., investments, advertising), institutions (e.g., political agency, regulations), and infrastructure \r\nactors (e.g., very long-term investments and financing). Actors either contribute to the status-quo of global high-carbon consumption, and a GDP \r\ngrowth-oriented economy, or help generate the desired change to a low-carbon energy-services, well-being, and equity-oriented economy"


id: 23f6af8eb89e096983b87f060267c60e
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" \r\nEach set of actors has novel implications for the design and implementation of both demand- and supply-side mitigation policies. They show \r\nimportant synergies, making energy demand mitigation a dynamic problem where the packaging and/or sequencing of different policies play \r\na role in their effectiveness {5.5, 5.6}. Incremental interventions change social practices, simultaneously affecting emissions and well-being. \r\nThe transformative change requires coordinated action across all five sets of actors (Table 5.4), using social science insights about intersection \r\nof behaviour, culture, institutional and infrastructural changes for policy design and implementation. Avoid, Shift, and Improve choices by \r\nindividuals, households and communities support mitigation {5.3.1.1, Table 5.1}. They are instigated by role models, changing social norms \r\ndriven by policies and social movements"


id: 1a400e2fc996efc858b61c4d3d954102
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" They also require appropriate infrastructures designed by urban planners and building and transport \r\nprofessionals, corresponding investments, and a political culture supportive of demand-side mitigation action."


id: b7a6046903bc40da2ab6933bc8d1c0ea
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content:
"Figure TS.21 | Demand-side mitigation can be achieved through changes in socio-cultural factors, infrastructure design and use, and technology adoption. \r\nMitigation response options related to demand for services have been categorised into three domains: 'socio-cultural factors', related to social norms, culture, and individual \r\nchoices and behaviour; 'infrastructure use', related to the provision and use of supporting infrastructure that enables individual choices and behaviour; and 'technology adoption', \r\nwhich refers to the uptake of technologies by end users. Potentials in 2050 are estimated using the International Energy Agency's 2020 World Energy Outlook STEPS (Stated \r\nPolicy Scenarios) as a baseline. This scenario is based on a sector-by-sector assessment of specific policies in place, as well as those that have been announced by countries by \r\nmid-2020. This scenario was selected due to the detailed representation of options across sectors and sub-sectors"


id: 879dd14404426d97fbb991a7e719e4cb
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" The heights of the coloured columns represent the potentials \r\non which there is a high level of agreement in the literature, based on a range of case studies. The range shown by the dots connected by dotted lines represents the highest \r\nand lowest potentials reported in the literature which have low to medium levels of agreement. The demand-side potential of socio-cultural factors in the food system has \r\ntwo parts. The economic potential of direct emissions (mostly non-CO2) demand reduction through socio-cultural factors alone is 1.9 GtCO2-eq without considering land-use \r\nchange by diversion of agricultural land from food production to carbon sequestration. If further changes in land use enabled by this change in demand are considered, the \r\nindicative potential could reach 7 GtCO2-eq. The electricity panel presents separately the mitigation potential from changes in electricity demand and changes associated with \r\nenhanced electrification in end-use sectors"


id: 1bb91153829fba2b08d49c473c798407
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
" Electrification increases electricity demand, while it is avoided though demand-side mitigation strategies. Load management refers \r\nto demand-side flexibility that can be achieved through incentive design such as time-of-use pricing/monitoring by artificial intelligence, diversification of storage facilities, and \r\nso on. NZE (IEA Net-Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario) is used to compute the impact of end-use sector electrification, while the impact of demand-side response options is \r\nbased on bottom-up assessments. Dark grey columns show the emissions that cannot be avoided through demand-side mitigation options. The table indicates which demand\u0002side mitigation options are included. Options are categorised according to: socio-cultural factors, infrastructure use, and technology adoption. Figure SPM.7 covers potential of \r\ndemand-side options for the year 2050. Figure SPM.8 covers both supply- and demand-side options and their potentials for the year 2030. {5.3, Figure 5.7, 5.SM.II}"


id: 70c1f4e0cb02130618c864c66fa37cb5
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content:
"Figure TS.23 | Overview of emission mitigation options and their cost and potential for the year 2030. The mitigation potential of each option is the quantity \r\nof net greenhouse gas emission reductions that can be achieved by a given mitigation option relative to specified emission baselines that reflects what would be considered \r\ncurrent policies in the period 2015-2019. Mitigation options may overlap or interact and cannot simply be summed together. The potential for each option is broken down into \r\ncost categories (see legend). Only monetary costs and revenues are considered. If costs are less than zero, lifetime monetary revenues are higher than lifetime monetary costs. \r\nFor wind energy, for example, negative cost indicates that the cost is lower than that of fossil-based electricity production. The error bars refer to the total potential for each \r\noption. The breakdown into cost categories is subject to uncertainty"


id: 872d580a46c3a557daecf42287108d46
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" Where a smooth colour transition is shown, the breakdown of the potential into cost categories is not \r\nwell researched, and the colours indicate only into which cost category the potential can predominantly be found in the literature. {Figure SPM.8, 6.4, Table 7.3, Supplementary \r\nMaterial Table 9.SM.2, Supplementary Material Table 9.SM.3, 10.6, 11.4, Figure 11.13, 12.2, Supplementary Material 12.SM.1.2.3}"


id: 6c30ccc6d6c9b178d757b6dce662350e
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content:
"Figure TS.24 | Prevalence of legislation and emissions targets across regions. Panel (a): shares of global GHG emissions under national climate change legislations - \r\nin 2010, 2015 and 2020. Climate legislation is defined as an act passed by a parliament that includes the reduction of GHGs in its title or objectives. Panel (b): shares of global \r\nGHG emissions under national climate emission targets - in 2010, 2015 and 2020. Emissions reductions targets were taken into account as a legislative target when they were \r\ndefined in a law or as part of a country's submission under the Kyoto Protocol, or as an executive target when they were included in a national policy or official submissions \r\nunder the UNFCCC. Targets were included if they were economy-wide or included at least the energy sector. The proportion of national emissions covered are scaled to reflect \r\ncoverage and whether targets are in GHG or CO2 terms. Emissions data used are for 2019"


id: ac46ab3a09531e849e959e220f240c33
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
" 2020 data was excluded as emissions shares across regions deviated from past \r\npatterns due to COVID-19. AR6 regions: DEV = Developed countries; APC = Asia and Pacific; EEA = Eastern Europe and West Central Asia; AFR = Africa; LAM = Latin America \r\nand the Caribbean; ME = Middle East. {Figure 13.1 and 13.2}"


id: f172f99de41654dadd0fe5fe40dbad6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
"Climate change mitigation is accelerated when attention is \r\ngiven to integrated policy and economy-wide approaches, \r\nand when enabling conditions (governance, institutions, \r\nbehaviour and lifestyle, innovation, policy, and finance), are \r\npresent (robust evidence, medium agreement). Accelerating \r\nclimate mitigation includes simultaneously weakening high-carbon \r\nsystems and encouraging low-carbon systems; ensuring interaction \r\nbetween adjacent systems (e.g., energy and agriculture); overcoming \r\nresistance to policies (e.g.,  from incumbents in high-carbon\u0002emitting industries), including by providing transitional support to \r\nthe vulnerable and negatively affected by distributional impacts; \r\ninducing changes in consumer practices and routines; providing \r\ntransition support; and addressing coordination challenges in policy \r\nand governance. Table TS"


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"9 elucidates the complexity of policymaking \r\nin driving sectoral transitions by summarising case studies of \r\nsectoral transitions from Chapters 5 to 12. These real-world sectoral \r\ntransitions reinforce critical lessons on policy integration. (Table TS.9) \r\n{13.7, 13.9}"


id: a920e771a9848e9bb1e10eb3b9e1b20a
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"its stated goals (medium confidence).Arguments in support of the \r\nParis Agreement are that the processes it initiates and supports will \r\nin multiple ways lead, and indeed have already led, to rising levels of \r\nambition over time. The recent proliferation of national mid-century \r\nnet zero GHG targets can be attributed in part to the Paris Agreement. \r\nMoreover, its processes and commitments will enhance countries' \r\nabilities to achieve their stated level of ambition, particularly among \r\ndeveloping countries"


id: 63ce02d5dc1b23b055735d3f1b3eba9d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
" Arguments against the Paris Agreement are that \r\nit lacks a mechanism to review the adequacy of individual Parties' \r\nNationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), that collectively current \r\nNDCs are inconsistent in their level of ambition with achieving the \r\nParis Agreement's long-term temperature goal, that its processes will \r\nnot lead to sufficiently rising levels of ambition in the NDCs, and that \r\nNDCs will not be achieved because the targets, policies and measures \r\nthey contain are not legally binding at the international level. To \r\nsome extent, arguments on both sides are aligned with different \r\nanalytic frameworks, including assumptions about the main barriers \r\nto mitigation that international cooperation can help overcome"


id: efba7773886c076d99a4ccaa2839cfdd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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" The \r\nextent to which countries increase the ambition of their NDCs and \r\nensure they are effectively implemented will depend in part on the \r\nsuccessful implementation of the support mechanisms in the Paris \r\nAgreement, and in turn will determine whether the goals of the \r\nParis Agreement are met (high confidence). {14.2, 14.3, 14.4} "


id: 79ec1148c86b5cad0a4f73432425d0ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
"International cooperation outside the UNFCCC processes \r\nand agreements provides critical support for mitigation in \r\nparticular regions, sectors and industries, for particular types \r\nof emissions, and at the sub- and trans-national levels (high \r\nconfidence).Agreements addressing ozone depletion, transboundary \r\nair pollution, and release of mercury are all leading to reductions \r\nin the emissions of specific greenhouse gases. Cooperation is \r\noccurring at multiple governance levels including cities. Transnational \r\npartnerships and alliances involving non-state and sub-national \r\nactors are also playing a  growing role in stimulating low-carbon \r\ntechnology diffusion and emissions reductions (medium confidence). \r\nSuch transnational efforts include those focused on climate litigation; \r\nthe impacts of these are unclear but promising"


id: 6762c1cce42db6f311584ecc1d76c7e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
" Climate change is \r\nbeing addressed in a growing number of international agreements \r\noperating at sectoral levels, as well as within the practices of many \r\nmultilateral organisations and institutions. Sub-global and regional \r\ncooperation, often described as climate clubs, can play an important \r\nrole in accelerating mitigation, including the potential for reducing \r\nmitigation costs through linking national carbon markets, although \r\nactual examples of these remain limited. {14.2, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6} "


id: 7a989ff1014e175d690073d1dcab8c24
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content:
"International cooperation under the UN climate regime took \r\nan important new direction with the entry into force of the \r\n2015 Paris Agreement, which strengthened the objective of \r\nthe UN climate regime, including its long-term temperature \r\ngoal, while adopting a  different architecture to that of the \r\nKyoto Protocol (high confidence). The core national commitments \r\nunder the Kyoto Protocol were legally binding quantified emission \r\ntargets for developed countries tied to well-defined mechanisms for \r\nmonitoring and enforcement. By contrast, the commitments under \r\nthe Paris Agreement are primarily procedural, extend to all parties, \r\nand are designed to trigger domestic policies and measures, enhance \r\ntransparency, and stimulate climate investments, particularly in \r\ndeveloping countries, and to lead iteratively to rising levels of \r\nambition across all countries"


id: d9bd9d3c2bc08f0e29aae16715c423f7
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content:
" Issues of equity remain of central \r\nimportance in the UN climate regime, notwithstanding shifts in the \r\noperationalisation of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and \r\nrespective capabilities' from Kyoto to Paris. {14.3} "


id: 96309a678e8bc891ddb9c44710ad4b98
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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vector_id: 21136
content:
"Finance to reduce net GHG emissions and enhance resilience to \r\nclimate impacts is a critical enabling factor for the low-carbon \r\ntransition. Fundamental inequities in access to finance as well as \r\nfinance terms and conditions, and countries' exposure to physical \r\nimpacts of climate change overall, result in a worsening outlook \r\nfor a global Just Transition (high confidence). Decarbonising the \r\neconomy requires global action to address fundamental economic \r\ninequities and overcome the climate investment trap that exists for \r\nmany developing countries. For these countries the costs and risks of \r\nfinancing often represent a significant challenge for stakeholders at \r\nall levels. This challenge is exacerbated by these countries' general \r\neconomic vulnerability and indebtedness"


id: 8e1c21a84bd1d8ae55a23d0e976d5c38
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
" The rising public fiscal costs \r\nof mitigation, and of adapting to climate shocks, is affecting many \r\ncountries and worsening public indebtedness and country credit \r\nratings at a time when there were already significant stresses on public \r\nfinances. The COVID-19 pandemic has made these stresses worse and \r\ntightened public finances still further. Other major challenges for \r\ncommercial climate finance include: the mismatch between capital \r\nand investment needs, home bias31 considerations, differences in risk \r\nperceptions for regions, as well as limited institutional capacity to \r\nensure safeguards are effective (high confidence). {15.2, 15.6.3}"


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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3408
content:
"Investors, central banks, and financial regulators are driving \r\nincreased awareness of climate risk. This increased awareness \r\ncan support climate policy development and implementation \r\n(high confidence) {15.2, 15.6}. Climate-related financial risks arise \r\nfrom physical impacts of climate change (already relevant in the short \r\nterm), and from a  disorderly transition to a  low-carbon economy. \r\nAwareness of these risks is increasing, leading also to concerns about \r\nfinancial stability. Financial regulators and institutions have responded \r\nwith multiple regulatory and voluntary initiatives to assess and address \r\nthese risks. Yet despite these initiatives, climate-related financial risks \r\nremain greatly underestimated by financial institutions and markets, \r\nlimiting the capital reallocation needed for the low-carbon transition"


id: 527794e4dbb62aa4c79a1c639e68f318
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10433
content:
" \r\nMoreover, risks relating to national and international inequity - which \r\nact as a barrier to the transformation - are not yet reflected in decisions \r\nby the financial community. Stronger steering by regulators and \r\npolicymakers has the potential to close this gap. Despite the increasing \r\nattention of investors to climate change, there is limited evidence that \r\nthis attention has directly impacted emission reductions. This leaves \r\nhigh uncertainty, both near term (2021-30) and longer term (2021-\r\n50), on the feasibility of an alignment of financial flows with the Paris \r\nAgreement goals (high confidence). {15.2, 15.6}"


id: 7b7a15505f7c02a0d96ccb2722054004
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17020
content:
"Figure TS.25 | Breakdown of recent average (downstream) mitigation investments and model-based investment requirements for 2020-2030 (USD billion) \r\nin scenarios that likely limit warming to 2degC or lower. Mitigation investment flows and model-based investment requirements by sector / segment (energy efficiency \r\nin buildings and industry, transport including efficiency, electricity generation, transmission and distribution including electrification, and agriculture, forestry and other land \r\nuse), by type of economy, and by region (see Annex II Part I Section 1: By region is based on intermediate level (R10) classification scheme. By type of economy is based on \r\nintermediate level (R10) classification scheme, which considers 'North America', 'Europe', and 'Australia, Japan and New Zealand' as developed countries, and the other seven \r\nregions as developing countries)"


id: 685b7b0d1396e33060f7323280fe973d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14001
content:
" Breakdown by sector / segment may differ slightly from sectoral analysis in other contexts due to the availability of investment needs data. \r\nThe granularity of the models assessed in Chapter 3, and other studies, do not allow for a robust assessment of the specific investment needs of LDCs or SIDSs. Investment \r\nrequirements in developing countries might be underestimated due to missing data points as well as underestimated technology costs. In modelled pathways, regional \r\ninvestments are projected to occur when and where they are cost cost-effective to limit global warming. The model quantifications help to identify high-priority areas for cost\u0002effective investments, but do not provide any indication on who would finance the regional investments. Investment requirements and flows covering downstream / mitigation \r\ntechnology deployment only"


id: cce323aaebc06c29f71bca95965f36b1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29773
content:
" Data includes investments with a direct mitigation effect, and in the case of electricity, additional transmission and distribution investments. See \r\nsection 15.4.2 Quantitative assessment of financing needs for detailed data on investment requirements. Data on mitigation investment flows are based on a single series of \r\nreports (Climate Policy Initiative, CPI) which assembles data from multiple sources. Investment flows for energy efficiency are adjusted based on data from the International \r\nEnergy Agency (IEA). Data on mitigation investments do not include technical assistance (i.e., policy and national budget support or capacity building), other non-technology \r\ndeployment financing. Adaptation only flows are also excluded. Data on mitigation investment requirements for electricity are based on emission pathways C1, C2 and C3 \r\n(Table SPM.1). For electricity investment requirements, the upper end refers to the mean of C1 pathways and the lower end to the mean of C3 pathways"


id: b4b47889ba17a19b83b683637e8abcf6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25960
content:
" Data points for energy \r\nefficiency, transport and AFOLU cannot always be linked to C1-C3 scenarios. Data do not include needs for adaptation or general infrastructure investment or investment \r\nrelated to meeting the SDGs other than mitigation, which may be at least partially required to facilitate mitigation. The multiplication factors show the ratio of average annual \r\nmodel-based mitigation investment requirements (2020-2030) and most recent annual mitigation investments (averaged for 2017-2020). The lower and upper multiplication \r\nfactors refer to the lower and upper ends of the range of investment needs."


id: cb6a35b5585f6953a4954cbe52ec4c6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29554
content:
"Global climate finance is heavily focused on mitigation (more \r\nthan 90% on average between 2017-2020) (high confidence) \r\n{15.4, 15.5}. This is despite the significant economic effects of climate \r\nchange's expected physical impacts, and the increasing awareness \r\nof these effects on financial stability. To meet the needs for rapid \r\ndeployment of mitigation options, global mitigation investments \r\nare expected to need to increase by the factor of three to six (high \r\nconfidence). The gaps represent a  major challenge for developing \r\ncountries, especially Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), where flows \r\nhave to increase by the factor of four to seven for specific sectors such \r\nas AFOLU, and for specific groups with limited access to, and high \r\ncosts of, climate finance (high confidence) (Figure TS.25) {15.4, 15.5}. \r\nThe actual size of sectoral and regional climate financing gaps is only \r\none component driving the magnitude of the challenge"


id: 90a7758ecab6f4f5aee8733af4e3d341
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20293
content:
" Financial \r\nand economic viability, access to capital markets, appropriate \r\nregulatory frameworks, and institutional capacity to attract and \r\nfacilitate investments and ensure safeguards are decisive to scaling\u0002up funding. Soft costs for regulatory environment and institutional \r\ncapacity, upstream funding needs as well as R&D and venture capital \r\nfor development of new technologies and business models are often \r\noverlooked despite their critical role to facilitate the deployment of \r\nscaled-up climate finance (high confidence). {15.4.1, 15.5.2}"


id: fc3d5e15619dc699c961bb64a6ec2adc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37192
content:
"New business models (e.g.,  pay-as-you-go) can facilitate \r\nthe aggregation of small-scale financing needs and provide \r\nscalable investment opportunities with more attractive \r\nrisk-return profiles (high confidence). Support and guidance \r\nfor enhancing transparency can promote capital markets' climate \r\nfinancing by providing quality information to price climate risks \r\nand opportunities. Examples include SDG and environmental, social \r\nand governance (ESG) disclosure, scenario analysis and climate risk \r\nassessments, including the Task Force on Climate-related Financial \r\nDisclosures (TCFD). The outcome of these market-correcting \r\napproaches on capital flows cannot be taken for granted, however, \r\nwithout appropriate fiscal, monetary and financial policies"


id: 8690881308fdde677de1112b0e5fdd41
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18709
content:
" Mitigation \r\npolicies will be required to enhance the risk-weighted return of low\u0002emission and climate-resilient options, accelerate the emergence and \r\nsupport for financial products based on real projects, such as green \r\nbonds, and phase-out fossil fuel subsidies. Greater public-private \r\ncooperation can also encourage the private sector to increase and \r\nbroaden investments, within a context of safeguards and standards, \r\nand this can be integrated into national climate change policies and \r\nplans (high confidence). {15.1, 15.2.4, 15.3.1, 15.3.2, 15.3.3, 15.5.2, \r\n15.6.1, 15.6.2, 15.6.6, 15.6.7, 15.6.8} "


id: 938081fa216fe3d401b510243ade8721
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20723
content:
"Ambitious global climate policy coordination and stepped-up \r\npublic climate financing over the next decade (2021-2030) \r\ncan help redirect capital markets and overcome challenges \r\nrelating to the need for parallel investments in mitigation. \r\nIt can also help address macroeconomic uncertainty and \r\nalleviate developing countries' debt burden post-COVID-19 \r\n(high confidence). Providing strong climate policy signals helps \r\nguide investment decisions. Credible signalling by governments and \r\nthe international community can reduce uncertainty for financial \r\ndecision-makers and help reduce transition risk. In addition to indirect \r\nand direct subsidies, the public sector's role in addressing market \r\nfailures, barriers, provision of information, and risk-sharing can \r\nencourage the efficient mobilisation of private sector finance (high \r\nconfidence) {15.2, 15.6.1, 15.6.2}"


id: f8938082abd44b78b50450baeaa3fc24
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36620
content:
" The mutual benefits of coordinated \r\nsupport for climate mitigation and adaptation in the next decade \r\nfor both developed and developing regions could potentially be very \r\nhigh in the post-COVID era. Climate-compatible stimulus packages \r\ncould significantly reduce the macro-financial uncertainty generated \r\nby the pandemic and increase the sustainability of the world \r\neconomic recovery {15.2, 15.3.2.3, 15.5.2, 15.6.1, 15.6.7}. Political \r\nleadership and intervention remain central to addressing uncertainty, \r\nwhich is a fundamental barrier for the redirection of financial flows. \r\nExisting policy misalignments - for example, in fossil fuel subsidies - \r\nundermine the credibility of public commitments, reduce perceived \r\ntransition risks and limit financial sector action (high confidence). \r\n{15.2, 15.3.3, 15.6.1, 15.6.2, 15.6.3}"


id: 9fdffeee0dded14e116215e49d1abdaf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22690
content:
"action to mitigate climate change by reinforcing other interventions. \r\nIn conjunction with other enabling conditions, innovation can support \r\nsystem transitions to limit warming and help shift development \r\npathways. The currently widespread implementation of solar PV \r\nand LED lighting, for instance, could not have happened without \r\ntechnological innovation. Technological innovation can also bring \r\nabout new and improved ways of delivering services that are essential \r\nto human well-being (high confidence) {16.1, 16.3, 16.4, 16.6}. At the \r\nsame time as delivering benefits, innovation can result in trade-offs that \r\nundermine both progress on mitigation and progress towards other \r\nSustainable Development Goals (SDGs)"


id: 9d7f8eaa235b43b47649dcc5645ec2de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22312
content:
" Trade-offs include negative \r\nexternalities' - for instance, greater environmental pollution and social \r\ninequalities - rebound effects leading to lower net emission reductions \r\nor even increases in emissions, and increased dependency on foreign \r\nknowledge and providers (high confidence). Effective governance and \r\npolicy have the potential to avoid and minimise such misalignments \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). {16.2, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5.1, 16.6} "


id: 4deec690887bb2b080484c51b52a39ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9685
content:
"Experience and analyses show that technological change is \r\ninhibited if technological innovation system functions are \r\nnot adequately fulfilled; this inhibition occurs more often \r\nin developing countries (high confidence). Examples of such \r\nfunctions are knowledge development, resource mobilisation, and \r\nactivities that shape the needs, requirements and expectations \r\nof actors within the innovation system (guidance of the search). \r\nCapabilities play a key role in these functions, the buildup of which \r\ncan be enhanced by domestic measures, but also by international \r\ncooperation. For instance, innovation cooperation on wind energy \r\nhas contributed to the accelerated global spread of this technology"


id: ca081cee95198addb289337b1c90473f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
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vector_id: 29342
content:
" \r\nAs another example, the policy guidance by the Indian government, \r\nwhich also promoted development of data, testing capabilities and \r\nknowledge within the private sector, has been a key determinant of \r\nthe success of an energy-efficiency programme for air conditioners \r\nand refrigerators in India. {16.3, 16.5, 16.6, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in \r\nChapter 16, Box 16.3}"


id: 200cf3a609a0851d2f5c0d0310272086
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2485
content:
"A systemic perspective on technological change can provide \r\ninsights to policymakers supporting their selection of effective \r\ninnovation policy instruments (high confidence) {16.4, 16.5}.\r\nA combination of scaled-up innovation investments with demand\u0002pull interventions can achieve faster technology unit cost reductions \r\nand more rapid scale-up than either approach in isolation. These \r\ninnovation policy instruments would nonetheless have to be tailored \r\nto local development priorities, to the specific context of different \r\ncountries, and to the technology being supported. The timing of \r\ninterventions and any trade-offs with sustainable development also \r\nneed to be addressed. Public R&D funding and support, as well as \r\ninnovation procurement, have shown to be valuable for fostering \r\ninnovation in small-to-medium clean-tech firms (Figure  TS.27) \r\n{16.4.4.3}"


id: 91b7478e56e9d022564d4b94d1b181e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20463
content:
"Strategies for climate change mitigation can be most effective \r\nin accelerating transformative change when actions taken to \r\nstrengthen one set of enabling conditions also reinforce and \r\nstrengthen the effectiveness of other enabling conditions \r\n(medium confidence). Applying transition or system dynamics \r\nto decisions can help policymakers take advantage of such \r\nhigh-leverage intervention points, address the specific characteristics \r\nof technological stages, and respond to societal dynamics. Inspiration \r\ncan be drawn from the global unit-cost reductions of solar PV, \r\nwhich were accelerated by a  combination of factors interacting \r\nin a  mutually reinforcing way across a  limited group of countries \r\n(high confidence) {Box 16.2, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16}. \r\nTransitions can be accelerated by policies appropriately targeted, \r\nwhich may be grouped in different 'pillars of policy'"


id: cec5e3be0ae888a9dbbb9d72bb3adc11
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30068
content:
" The relative \r\nimportance of different 'pillars' differs according to the stage of the \r\ntransition. (Figure TS.28) {1.2.3}"


id: 5c00489763006c314a0aaf418694b978
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11985
content:
"Although some initiatives have mobilised investments in \r\ndeveloping countries, gaps in innovation cooperation remain, \r\nincluding in the Paris Agreement instruments. These gaps \r\ncould be filled by enhancing financial support for international \r\ntechnology cooperation, by strengthening cooperative \r\napproaches, and by helping build suitable capacity in developing \r\ncountries across all technological innovation system functions \r\n(high confidence). The implementation of current arrangements of \r\ninternational cooperation for technology development and transfer, \r\nas well as capacity-building, are insufficient to meet climate objectives \r\nand contribute to sustainable development"


id: f3dec3830e99e921f032637331c2aea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35887
content:
" For example, despite \r\nbuilding a  large market for mitigation technologies in developing \r\ncountries, the lack of a systemic perspective in the implementation \r\nof the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), operational since \r\nthe mid-2000s, has only led to some technology transfer, especially \r\nto larger developing countries, but limited capacity building and \r\nminimal technology development (medium confidence). In the \r\ncurrent climate regime, a  more systemic approach to innovation \r\ncooperation could be introduced by linking technology institutions, \r\nsuch as the Technology Mechanism, and financial actors, such as the \r\nFinancial Mechanism. {16.5.3} "


id: e864088294d96f07165af8f8f1f95580
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34065
content:
"Better and more comprehensive data on innovation indicators \r\ncan provide timely insights for policymakers and policy design \r\nlocally, nationally and internationally, especially for developing \r\ncountries, where such insights are often missing. Data needed \r\ninclude those that can show the strength of technological, sectoral \r\nand national innovation systems. It is also necessary to validate \r\ncurrent results and generate insights from theoretical frameworks \r\nand empirical studies for developing countries' contexts. Innovation \r\nstudies on adaptation and mitigation other than energy and ex-post\r\nassessments of the effectiveness of various innovation-related \r\npolicies and interventions, including R&D, would also provide benefits. \r\nFurthermore, methodological developments to improve the ability of \r\nIAMs to capture energy innovation system dynamics and the relevant \r\ninstitutions and policies (including design and implementation), \r\nwould allow for more realistic assessment. {16"


id: dab466408ec3ee5ccb0f68b1419c0ca8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31938
content:
"The digital transformation is a megatrend that is fundamentally changing all economies and societies, albeit in very different ways \r\ndepending on the level of development of a given country and on the nature of its economic system. Digital technologies have \r\nsignificant potential to contribute to decarbonisation due to their ability to increase energy and material efficiency, make transport \r\nand building systems less wasteful, and improve the access to services for consumers and citizens. Yet, if left unmanaged, the digital \r\ntransformation will probably increase energy demand, exacerbate inequities and the concentration of power, leaving developing \r\neconomies with less access to digital technologies behind, raise ethical issues, reduce labour demand and compromise citizens' \r\nwelfare. Appropriate governance of the digital transformation can ensure that digitalisation works as an enabler, rather than as \r\na barrier and further strain in decarbonisation pathways"


id: d23f9eb8743584de660d17fe254d8ba7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30605
content:
" Governance can ensure that digitalisation not only reduces GHG emissions \r\nintensity but also contributes to reducing absolute GHG emission, constraining run-away consumption. {Cross-Chapter Box 11 in \r\nChapter 16, 16.2} "


id: a0d040dea8b2b75dc161b596c8bd6ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22849
content:
"The SDG framework33 can serve as a  template to evaluate \r\nthe long-term implications of mitigation on sustainable \r\ndevelopment and vice versa (high confidence). Understanding \r\nthe co-benefits and trade-offs associated with mitigation \r\nis key to understanding how societies prioritise among the \r\nvarious sectoral policy options (medium confidence). Areas \r\nwith anticipated trade-offs include food and biodiversity, energy \r\naffordability/access, and mineral-resource extraction. Areas with \r\nanticipated co-benefits include health, especially regarding air \r\npollution, clean energy access and water availability. The possible \r\nimplementation of the different sectoral mitigation options therefore \r\ndepends on how societies prioritise mitigation versus other products \r\nand services: not least, how societies prioritise food, material well\u0002being, nature conservation and biodiversity protection, as well as \r\nconsiderations such as their future dependence on CDR. Figure TS"


id: 508e3bb8025d5f136a3465984f0fdbb1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10118
content:
"29 \r\nsummarises the assessment of where key synergies and trade-offs \r\nexist between mitigation options and the SDGs. (Figures TS.29 and \r\nTS.31, Table TS.7) {12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6.1, Figures 3.39 and 17.1} "


id: b849aa14e34db751bc5f1f807b4bf270
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26524
content:
"Adopting coordinated cross-sectoral approaches to climate \r\nmitigation can target synergies and minimise trade-offs, \r\nboth between sectors and between sustainable development \r\nobjectives (high confidence). This requires integrated planning \r\nusing multiple-objective-multiple-impact policy frameworks. \r\nStrong inter-dependencies and cross-sectoral linkages create both \r\nopportunities for synergies and need to address trade-offs related \r\nto mitigation options and technologies. This can only be done if \r\ncoordinated sectoral approaches  to climate change mitigation \r\npolicies are adopted that mainstream these interactions and ensure \r\nlocal people are involved in the development of new products, as \r\nwell as production and consumption practices"


id: 90e6187770bcb309a89c8b38189d5351
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20343
content:
" For instance, there can \r\nbe many synergies in urban areas between mitigation policies and \r\nthe SDGs but capturing these depends on the overall planning of \r\nurban structures and on local integrated policies such as combining \r\naffordable housing and spatial planning with walkable urban \r\nareas, green electrification and clean renewable energy (medium \r\nconfidence). Integrated planning and cross-sectoral alignment of \r\nclimate change policies are also particularly evident in developing \r\ncountries' NDCs under the Paris Agreement, where key priority \r\nsectors such as agriculture and energy are closely aligned with the \r\nproposed mitigation and adaptation actions and the SDGs. {12.6.2, \r\nSupplementary Material Table 17.SM.1, 17.3.3}"


id: 29f2067cbf05ffba3cef986c26c3eba7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4029
content:
"Figure TS.29 (continued): Mitigation options have synergies with many Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but there are trade-offs associated with \r\nsome options especially when implemented at scale. The synergies and trade-offs vary widely and depend on the context. Figure presents a summary of the chapter\u0002level qualitative assessment of the synergies and trade-offs for selected mitigation options. Overlaps may exist in the mitigation options assessed and presented by sector and \r\nsystem, and interlinkages with the SDGs might differ depending on the application of that option by sector. Interactions of mitigation options with the SDGs are context-specific \r\nand dependent on the scale of implementation. For some mitigation options, these scaling and context-specific issues imply that there are both synergies and trade-offs in \r\nrelation to specific SDGs. The SDGs are displayed as coloured squares"


id: 452f886daeff6d7a85c6d906e5be6c21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8313
content:
" They indicate whether a synergy, trade-off, or both synergies and trade-offs exist between the SDG and \r\nthe mitigation option. Confidence levels are indicated through the solidity of the squares. A solid square indicates high confidence, a partially filled square indicates medium \r\nconfidence, and an outlined square indicates low confidence. The final column in the figure provides a line of sight to the chapters that provide details on context-specificity and \r\nscale of implementation. {6.3, 6.4, 6.7, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 8.2, 8.4, 8.6, 9.4, 9.5, 9.8, Table 9.5, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.8, 11.5, Table 10.3, 17.3, Figure 17.1, Supplementary \r\nMaterial Table 17.SM.1, Annex II.IV.12}"


id: daeadf1f10d8f4effd12d8399d331a33
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31963
content:
"Figure TS.31 | Geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional factors can enable or act as barriers to \r\nthe deployment of response options. Chapter-level assessment for selected mitigation options. Overlaps may exist in the mitigation options assessed and presented \r\nby sector and system, and feasibility might differ depending on the demarcation of that option in each sector. Chapters 6, 8, 9, 10, and 12 assess mitigation response \r\noptions across six  feasibility dimensions: geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional. AFOLU (Chapter  7) and industry \r\n(Chapter 11) are not included because of the heterogeneity of options in these sectors. For each dimension, a set of feasibility indicators was identified. Examples of indicators \r\ninclude impacts on land use, air pollution, economic costs, technology scalability, public acceptance and political acceptance (see Box TS.15, and Annex II"


id: 11afe80d1c3a7eb0eed781dba1488119
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 277
content:
"IV.11 for a detailed \r\nexplanation). An indicator could refer to a barrier or an enabler to implementation, or could refer to both a barrier or an enabler, depending on the context, speed, and scale \r\nof implementation. Dark blue bars indicate the extent of enablers to deployment within each dimension. This is shown relative to the maximum number of possible enablers, \r\nas indicated by the light blue shading. Dark orange bars indicate the extent of barriers to deployment within each dimension. This is shown relative to the maximum number \r\nof possible barriers, as indicated by light orange shading. A light grey dot indicates that there is limited or no evidence to assess the option. A dark grey dot indicates that one \r\nof the feasibility indicators within that dimension is not relevant for the deployment of the option"


id: 8f67da90d171d92f0bac9b2212d90e30
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20111
content:
" The relevant sections in the underlying chapters include references to the \r\nliterature on which the assessment is based and indicate whether the feasibility of an option varies depending on context (e.g., region), scale (e.g., small, medium or full scale), \r\nspeed (e.g., implementation in 2030 versus 2050) and warming level (e.g., 1.5degC versus 2degC). {6.4, 8.5, 9.10, 10.8, 12.3, Annex II.IV.11}"


id: e0da0f0303ddd73291cbf8881d0ee85c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32877
content:
"Figure TS.32 | The feasibility of mitigation scenarios. Figure TS.32 shows the proportion of scenarios in the AR6 scenarios database - falling within the warming \r\nlevel classifications C1 and C3 (C1: below 1.5degC (>50%), no or limited overshoot; C3: below 2degC (>67%)) - that exceed threshold values in 2030, 2050 and 2100 for five \r\ndimensions of feasibility (Boxes TS.5 and TS.15). The feasibility dimensions shown are: geophysical, technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional. The thresholds \r\nshown are: (i) plausible - range of values based on past historical trends or other peer reviewed assessments; (ii) best-case scenario - range of values assuming major political \r\nsupport or technological breakthrough; (iii) unprecedented - values going beyond those observed or reported in peer-reviewed assessments. Overlayed are the Illustrative \r\nMitigation Pathways consistent with SSP2 (LD, SP, Ren: C1 category; Neg, GS: C3 category)"


id: 7fa14628fca18180e2367baaa42e3490
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17627
content:
" The positioning of the illustrative pathways is simply indicative of the general trade\u0002offs over time and across the feasibility dimensions, it is not determined mathematically. (Box TS.5) {3.8}"


id: 590dc6d5a8fc4356e1f51c9fa12c3443
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11507
content:
"A wide range of factors have been found to enable sustainability \r\ntransitions, ranging from technological innovations to shifts in \r\nmarkets, and from policies and governance arrangements to \r\nshifts in belief systems and market forces (high confidence).\r\nMany of these factors have come together in a co-evolutionary process \r\nthat has unfolded globally, internationally and locally over several \r\ndecades (low evidence, high agreement). Those same conditions that \r\nmay serve to impede the transition (i.e., organisational structure, \r\nbehaviour, technological lock-in) can also 'flip' to enable both the \r\ntransition and the framing of sustainable development policies to \r\ncreate a  stronger basis for policy support (high confidence). It is \r\nimportant to note that strong shocks to these systems, including \r\naccelerating climate change impacts, economic crises and political \r\nchanges, may provide crucial openings for accelerated transitions \r\nto sustainable systems"


id: c0721fe2cca1e9a95f8f42caa6196ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27841
content:
" For example, rebuilding more sustainably \r\nafter an extreme event, or renewed public debate about the drivers \r\nof social and economic vulnerability to multiple stressors (medium \r\nconfidence). {17.4} "


id: 9e67f5b76a842941668a257fc9675b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22452
content:
"The transition to a  low-carbon economy depends on \r\na wide range of closely intertwined drivers and constraints, \r\nincluding policies and technologies where notable advances \r\nover the past decade have opened up new and large-scale \r\nopportunities for deep decarbonisation, and for alternative \r\ndevelopment pathways which could deliver multiple social and \r\ndevelopmental goals (robust evidence, medium agreement). \r\nDrivers for and constraints against low-carbon societal transition \r\ncomprise economic and technological factors (the means by which \r\nservices such as food, heating and shelter are provided and for whom, \r\nthe emissions intensity of traded products, finance, and investment), \r\nsocio-political issues (political economy, equity and fairness, \r\nsocial innovation and behaviour change), and institutional factors\r\n(legal framework and institutions, and the quality of international \r\ncooperation)"


id: c7813deaa7bd3cade9c2ac915a48e880
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28975
content:
" In addition to being deeply intertwined all the factors \r\nmatter to varying degrees, depending on the prevailing social, \r\neconomic, cultural and political context. They often exert both push \r\nand pull forces at the same time, within and across different scales. \r\nThe development and deployment of innovative technologies and \r\nsystems at scale are important for achieving deep decarbonisation. \r\nIn recent years, the cost of several low-carbon technologies has \r\ndeclined sharply, alongside rapid deployment. Over 20 countries \r\nhave also sustained emission reductions, and many more have \r\naccelerated energy efficiency and/or land-use improvements. Overall, \r\nhowever, the global contribution is so far modest, at a few billion \r\ntonnes (tCO2-eq) of avoided emissions annually. {1.3, 1.4, Chapters 2, \r\n4, 13 and 14}"


id: 1d723dbca13f0550725b7219e69ae51
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2076
content:
"Global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continued to rise to \r\n2019: the aggregate reductions implied by current Nationally \r\nDetermined Contributions (NDCs) to 2030 would still make \r\nit impossible to limit warming to 1.5degC with no or limited \r\novershoot, and would only be compatible with likely limiting \r\nwarming below 2degC if followed by much steeper decline, hence \r\nlimiting warming to either level implies accelerated mitigation \r\nactions at all scales (robust evidence, high agreement). Since \r\nthe IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), important changes that \r\nhave emerged include the specific objectives established in the Paris \r\nAgreement of 2015 (for temperature, adaptation and finance), rising \r\nclimate impacts, and higher levels of societal awareness and support for \r\nclimate action"


id: f42500f48510c440eac159e27ccf72f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35922
content:
" The growth of global GHG emissions has slowed over the \r\npast decade, and delivering the updated NDCs to 2030 would turn this \r\ninto decline, but the implied global emissions by 2030 exceed pathways \r\nconsistent with 1.5degC by a large margin, and are near the upper end of \r\nthe range of modelled pathways which keep temperatures likely limit \r\nwarming to 2degC (with >65% probability). Continuing investments in \r\ncarbon-intensive activities at scale will heighten the multitude of risks \r\nassociated with climate change and impede societal and industrial \r\ntransformation towards low-carbon development. Meeting the long\u0002term temperature objective in the Paris Agreement therefore implies \r\na rapid turn to an accelerating decline of GHG emissions towards 'net \r\nzero', which is implausible without urgent and ambitious action at all \r\nscales"


id: 8e5dafe764ceaab06acd818e6cb68eb8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19924
content:
" The unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic has had far-reaching \r\nimpacts on the global economic and social system, and recovery will \r\npresent both challenges and opportunities for climate mitigation. {1.2, \r\n1.3, 1.5, 1.6, Chapters 3 and 4}"


id: e523f073b89a6b572dd38716d25438c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33542
content:
"Accelerating mitigation to prevent dangerous anthropogenic \r\ninterference within the climate system will require the \r\nintegration of broadened assessment frameworks and tools \r\nthat combine multiple perspectives, applied in a  context of \r\nmulti-level governance (robust evidence, medium agreement). \r\nAnalysing a  challenge on the scale of fully decarbonising our \r\neconomies entails integration of multiple analytic frameworks. \r\nApproaches to risk assessment and resilience, established across \r\nIPCC Working Groups, are complemented by frameworks for probing \r\nthe challenges in implementing mitigation. Aggregate frameworks \r\ninclude cost-effectiveness analysis towards given objectives, and \r\ncost-benefit analysis, both of which have been developing to take \r\nfuller account of advances in understanding risks and innovation, \r\nthe dynamics of emitting systems and of climate impacts, and \r\nwelfare economic theory including growing consensus on long-term \r\ndiscounting"


id: 6e7bd345708a0560fcfe1cea32dc7f00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15010
content:
" Ethical frameworks consider the fairness of processes \r\nand outcomes which can help ameliorate distributional impacts \r\nacross income groups, countries and generations. Transition and \r\ntransformation frameworks explain and evaluate the dynamics of \r\ntransitions to low-carbon systems arising from interactions amongst \r\nlevels, with inevitable resistance from established socio-technical \r\nstructures. Psychological, behavioural and political frameworks \r\noutline the constraints (and opportunities) arising from human \r\npsychology and the power of incumbent interests. A comprehensive \r\nunderstanding of climate mitigation must combine these multiple \r\nframeworks. Together with established risk frameworks, collectively \r\nthese help to explain potential synergies and trade-offs in mitigation, \r\nimply a  need for a  wide portfolio of policies attuned to different "


id: b8939eaad011dfdc559b681ff510a775
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26567
content:
"While there are some trade-offs, effective and equitable \r\nclimate policies are largely compatible with the broader goal \r\nof sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty \r\nas enshrined in the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). Climate mitigation is one \r\nof many goals that societies pursue in the context of sustainable \r\ndevelopment, as evidenced by the wide range of the SDGs. Climate \r\nmitigation has synergies and/or trade-offs with many other SDGs. \r\nThere has been a strong relationship between development and GHG \r\nemissions, as historically both per capita and absolute emissions \r\nhave risen with industrialisation. However, recent evidence shows \r\ncountries can grow their economies while reducing emissions. \r\nCountries have different priorities in achieving the SDGs and reducing \r\nemissions as informed by their respective national conditions and \r\ncapabilities"


id: a3e75fe730abf665e4a7c5c99c5edd72
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23347
content:
" Given the differences in GHG emissions contributions, \r\ndegree of vulnerabilities and impacts, as well as capacities within and \r\nbetween nations, equity and justice are important considerations for \r\neffective climate policy and for securing national and international \r\nsupport for deep decarbonisation. Achieving sustainable global \r\ndevelopment and eradicating poverty as enshrined in the 17 SDGS \r\nwould involve effective and equitable climate policies at all levels \r\nfrom local to global scale. Failure to address questions of equity \r\nand justice over time can undermine social cohesion and stability. \r\nInternational cooperation can enhance efforts to achieve ambitious \r\nglobal climate mitigation in the context of sustainable development. \r\n{1.4, 1.6, Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 13 and 17}"


id: d9c28d6bd73bdc8bf54e6e1f6f03a08e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31779
content:
"The speed, direction and depth of any transition will be \r\ndetermined by choices in the, environmental, technological, \r\neconomic, socio-cultural and institutional realms (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). Transitions in specific systems can be \r\ngradual or rapid and disruptive. The pace of a transition can be impeded \r\nby 'lock-in' generated by existing physical capital, institutions, and \r\nsocial norms. The interaction between power, politics and economy \r\nis central in explaining why broad commitments do not always \r\ntranslate to urgent action. At the same time, attention to and support \r\nfor climate policies and low-carbon societal transition has generally \r\nincreased, as the impacts have become more salient. Both public and \r\nprivate financing and financial structures strongly affect the scale \r\nand balance of high- and low-carbon investments"


id: f42af941b19371ca11bef000f5b55ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35925
content:
" COVID-19 has \r\nstrained public finances, and integrating climate finance into ongoing \r\nrecovery strategies, nationally and internationally, can accelerate the \r\ndiffusion of low-carbon technologies and also help poorer countries \r\nto minimise future stranded assets. Societal and behavioural norms, \r\nregulations and institutions are essential conditions to accelerate \r\nlow-carbon transitions in multiple sectors, whilst addressing \r\ndistributional concerns endemic to any major transition. {1.3.3, 1.4, \r\n1.8, Chapters 2, 4 and 15, and Cross-Chapter Box 1 in this chapter}"


id: f41245e95dd69efd2f54a8a354297ce4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35908
content:
"Achieving the global transition to a  low-carbon, climate\u0002resilient and sustainable world requires purposeful and \r\nincreasingly coordinated planning and decisions at many \r\nscales of governance including local, sub-national, national \r\nand global levels (robust evidence, high agreement).\r\nAccelerating mitigation globally would imply strengthening policies \r\nadopted to date, expanding the effort across options, sectors, and \r\ncountries, and broadening responses to include more diverse actors \r\nand societal processes at multiple - including international - levels. \r\nEffective governance of climate change entails strong action across \r\nmultiple jurisdictions and decision-making levels, including regular \r\nevaluation and learning. Choices that cause climate change as well \r\nas the processes for making and implementing relevant decisions \r\ninvolve a range of non-nation state actors such as cities, businesses, \r\nand civil society organisations"


id: 78e6f022ac66b80c962ee74cbd06216e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16576
content:
" At global, national and sub-national \r\nlevels, climate change actions are interwoven with and embedded \r\nin the context of much broader social, economic and political goals. \r\nTherefore, the governance required to address climate change has to \r\nnavigate power, political, economic, and social dynamics at all levels \r\nof decision-making. Effective climate-governing institutions,  and \r\nopenness to experimentation on a  variety of institutional \r\narrangements, policies and programmes can play a  vital role in \r\nengaging stakeholders and building momentum for effective climate \r\naction. {1.4, 1.9, Chapters 8, 15 and 17}"


id: af7cd99b322c7c2fe376e47f58f53e6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25124
content:
"The Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5) underlined \r\nthat humanity is now living with the 'unifying lens of the \r\nAnthropocene' (IPCC 2018a, pp. 52-53), that requires a sharpened \r\nfocus on the impact of human activity on the climate system and the \r\nplanet more broadly given 'planetary boundaries' (Steffen et al. 2015) \r\nincluding interdependencies of climate change and biodiversity \r\n(Dasgupta 2021). Recent literature assessed by Working Groups I and \r\nII of this AR6 underlines the urgency of climate action as cumulative \r\nCO2 emissions, along with other greenhouses gases (GHGs), drives \r\nthe temperature change. Across AR6, global temperature changes \r\nare defined relative to the period 1850-1900, as in SR1.5 and \r\ncollaboration with WGI enabled the use of AR6-calibrated emulators \r\nto assure consistency across the three Working Groups. The remaining \r\n'carbon budgets' (see Annex I: Glossary) associated with 1"


id: a20e11ff94e9d53f0c9e5de5cf50c613
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23061
content:
"5degC and \r\n2degC temperature targets equate to about one (for 1.5degC) to three \r\n(for 2degC) decades of current emissions, as from 2020, but with \r\nsignificant variation depending on multiple factors including other \r\ngases (Figure 2.7, and Cross-Working Group Box 1 in Chapter 3). For \r\nan outline of the WGIII approach to mitigation scenarios, emission \r\npathways implied by the Paris goals, and the timing of peak and 'net \r\nzero' (see Glossary and FAQ 1.3), see Section 1.5 and Chapter 3."


id: 2ee59aea0508c2514a81a03d4253f724
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4811
content:
"Successive IPCC reports highlight a  strong connection between \r\nclimate mitigation and sustainable development. Climate \r\nmitigation and adaptation goals have synergies and trade-offs \r\nwith efforts to achieve sustainable development, including poverty \r\neradication. A comprehensive assessment of climate policy therefore \r\ninvolves going beyond a  narrow focus on specific mitigation and \r\nadaptation options to incorporate climate issues into the design of \r\ncomprehensive strategies for equitable sustainable development. At \r\nthe same time, some climate mitigation policies can run counter to \r\nsustainable development and eradicating poverty, which highlights \r\nthe need to consider trade-offs alongside benefits. Examples include \r\nsynergies between climate policy and improved air quality, reducing \r\npremature deaths and morbidity (IPCC 2014b, Figure SPM.6) (AR6 \r\nWGI Sections 6.6.3 and 6.7"


id: c5eecb1b957204042fc3c4c95f5a7901
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28717
content:
"3), but there would be trade-offs if policy \r\nraises net energy bills, with distributional implications. The Special \r\nReport on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL) also emphasises \r\nimportant synergies and trade-offs, bringing new light on the link \r\nbetween healthy and sustainable food consumption and emissions \r\ncaused by the agricultural sector. Land-related responses that \r\ncontribute to climate change adaptation and mitigation can also \r\ncombat desertification and land degradation, and enhance food \r\nsecurity (IPCC 2019a)."


id: f64e78db7a5893abe7bb7f6b5d0e64d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36260
content:
"The AR5 projected that in baseline scenarios (i.e., based on prevailing \r\ntrends without explicit additional mitigation efforts), agriculture, \r\nforestry and other land use (AFOLU) would be the only sector where \r\nemissions could fall by 2100, with some CO2 removal (IPCC 2014b, \r\np. 17). Direct CO2 emissions from energy were projected to double \r\nor even triple by 2050 (IPCC 2014b, p. 20) due to global population \r\nand economic growth, resulting in global mean surface temperature \r\nincreases in 2100 from 3.7degC to 4.8degC compared to pre-industrial \r\nlevels. The AR5 noted that mitigation effort and the costs associated \r\nwith ambitious mitigation differ significantly across countries, and in \r\n'globally cost-effective' scenarios, the biggest reductions (relative to \r\nprojections) occur in the countries with the highest future emissions \r\nin the baseline scenarios (IPCC 2014b, p. 17). Since most physical \r\ncapital (e.g"


id: 7a25f83d17484e6e7d692b43911de806
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16790
content:
",  power plants, buildings, transport infrastructure) \r\ninvolved in GHG emissions is long-lived, the timing of the shift in \r\ninvestments and strategies will be crucial (IPCC 2014b, p. 18)."


id: 65e68a29f630c54e12d81594c596e013
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13619
content:
"A key message from recent Special Reports is the urgency to mitigate \r\nGHG emissions in order to avoid rapid and potentially irreversible \r\nchanges in natural and human systems (IPCC 2018b, 2019b, 2019c). \r\nSuccessive IPCC reports have drawn upon increasing sophistication \r\nof modelling tools to project emissions in the absence of ambitious \r\ndecarbonisation action, as well as the emission pathways that meet \r\nlong-term temperature targets. The SR1.5 examined pathways limiting \r\nwarming to 1.5degC, compared to the historical baseline of 1850-1900, \r\nfinding that 'in pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5degC, \r\nglobal net anthropogenic CO2 emissions decline by about 45% from \r\n2010 levels by 2030, reaching net zero around 2050' (2045-2055 \r\ninterquartile range); with 'overshoot' referring to higher temperatures, \r\nthen brought down by 2100 through 'net negative' emissions"


id: 458d1a44cfed333398fe5ca178f6e15f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8349
content:
" It \r\nfound this would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, \r\nland, urban and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), \r\nand industrial systems (high confidence) (IPCC 2018b)."


id: 9815562eb1c9edebf58f018a54b9dd36
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21437
content:
"The assessment of the Physical Science Basis (IPCC AR6 WGI) \r\ndocuments sustained and widespread changes in the atmosphere, \r\ncryosphere, biosphere and ocean, providing unequivocal evidence of \r\na  world that has warmed, associated with rising atmospheric CO2\r\nconcentrations reaching levels not experienced in at least the last \r\n2  million years. Aside from temperature, other clearly discernible, \r\nhuman-induced changes beyond natural variations include \r\ndeclines in Arctic Sea ice and glaciers, thawing of permafrost, and \r\na  strengthening of the global water cycle (AR6 WGI SPM A.2, B.3 \r\nand B.4). Oceanic changes include rising sea level, acidification, \r\ndeoxygenation, and changing salinity (WGI SPM B.3)"


id: 281f351768639c01606e35401c4b6355
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3718
content:
" Over land, in \r\nrecent decades, both frequency and severity have increased for hot \r\nextremes but decreased for cold extremes; intensification of heavy \r\nprecipitation is observed in parallel with a  decrease in available \r\nwater in dry seasons, along with an increased occurrence of weather \r\nconditions that promote wildfires."


id: 3639b9e76269838bdd4be9392238b4ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5930
content:
"SDGs. In September 2015, the UN endorsed a universal agenda - \r\n'Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable \r\nDevelopment'. The agenda adopted 17 non-legally-binding SDGs \r\nand 169 targets to support people, peace, prosperity, partnerships \r\nand the planet. While climate change is explicitly listed as SDG 13, \r\nthe pursuit of the implementation of the UNFCCC is relevant for \r\na number of other goals including SDG 7 (clean energy for all), SDG \r\n9  (sustainable industry), and SDG 11 (sustainable cities), SDG 12 \r\n(responsible consumption and production) as well as those relating \r\nto life below water (SDG 14) and on land (SDG 15) (Biermann et al. \r\n2017). Mitigation actions could have multiple synergies and trade\u0002offs across the SDGs (Pradhan et al. 2017) (Chapter  17) and their \r\nnet effects depend on the pace and magnitude of changes, the \r\nspecific mitigation choices and the management of the transition"


id: 198948cbe1aea78d78e990071fa70f92
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1493
content:
" \r\nThis suggests that mitigation must be pursued in the broader context \r\nof sustainable development as explained in Section 1.6."


id: 2727471fe98840d5d21e35e16f6f7ad5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3553
content:
"Global GHG emissions have continued to rise since AR5, though \r\nthe average rate of emissions growth slowed, from 2.4% (from \r\n2000-2010) to 1.3% for 2010-2019 (Figure  1.1). After a  period \r\nof exceptionally rapid growth from 2000 as charted in AR5, global \r\nfossil fuel- and industry-related (FFI) CO2 emissions almost plateaued \r\nbetween 2014 and 2016 (while the global economy continued to \r\nexpand (World Bank 2020), but increased again over 2017-19, the \r\naverage annual growth rate for all GHGs since 2014 being around \r\n0.8% yr-1 (IPCC/EDGAR emissions database; see also Chapter  11, \r\nFigure 11.2)). Important driving factors include population and GDP \r\ngrowth, as illustrated in panels (b) and (c) of Figure 1.1 respectively"


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" \r\nThe pause in emissions growth reflected the interplay of strong energy \r\nefficiency improvements and low-carbon technology deployment, but \r\nthese did not expand fast enough to offset the continued pressures \r\nfor overall growth at global level (UNEP 2018a; IEA 2019a). However, \r\nsince 2013/14, the decline in global emissions intensity (GHG/\r\nGDP) has accelerated somewhat, and global emissions growth has \r\naveraged slightly slower than population growth (Figure 1.1d), which \r\nif sustained would imply a peak of global CO2 (GHG) emissions per \r\ncapita, at about 5 tCO2 per person (7 tCO2-eq per person) respectively."


id: 2e38a523fbc18899ed2b292dcf6dd38c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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"Alongside this, private and blended climate finance is increasing \r\nbut is still short of projected requirements consistent with Paris \r\nAgreement goals (Section 15.3.2.1). The financing gap is particularly \r\nacute for adaptation projects, especially in vulnerable developing \r\ncountries. From a  macro-regulatory perspective, there is growing \r\nrecognition that substantial financial value may be at risk from \r\nchanging regulation and technology in a low-carbon transition, with \r\npotential implications for global financial stability (Section 15.6.3)"


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" \r\nTo date, the most significant governance development is the \r\nFinancial Stability Board's Task Force on Climate-related Financial \r\nDisclosures (TCFD) and its recommendations that investors and \r\ncompanies consider climate change risks in their strategies and \r\ncapital allocation, so investors can make informed decisions (TCFD \r\n2018), welcomed by over 500 financial institutions and companies \r\nas signatories, albeit with patchy implementation (Sections  1.4. \r\n4 and 15.6.3)."


id: fd893dcf4e8e06c2c4f8cc3c87874b24
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"Figure 1.2 | Distribution of regional greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for 10 broad global regions according to territorial accounting (panels (a) and (b), \r\nGHG emissions) and consumption-based accounting (panels (c) and (d), CO2-FFI emissions only). GHG emissions are categorised into: fossil fuel and industry \r\n(CO2-FFI); land use, land-use change and forestry (CO2-LULUCF); and other greenhouse gases (methane, nitrous oxide and F-gas - converted to 100-year global warming \r\npotentials). Per-capita GHGs for territorial (panel a) and CO2-FFI emissions vs population for consumption-based accounting (panel c). Panels (b) and (d): GHG emissions \r\nper unit GDPppp vs GDPppp, weighted with purchasing power parity for territorial accounting (panel b), CO2-FFI emissions per unit GDPppp for consumption-based accounting \r\n(panel d)"


id: 3ef64970bae63e9d985707e21df0bd8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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" The area of the rectangles refers to the total emissions for each regional category, with the height capturing per-capita emissions (panels a and c) or emissions per \r\nunit GDPppp (panels (b) and (d)), and the width proportional to the population of the regions and GDPppp. Emissions from international aviation and shipping (2.4% of the total \r\nGHG emissions) are not included."


id: 7350fe601196d5a4d5ed62a8ca2587f6
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"The COVID-19 aftermath consequently also changes the economic \r\ncontext for mitigation (Sections  15.2 and 15.4). Many traditional \r\nforms of economic analysis (expressed as general equilibrium) \r\nassume that available economic resources are fully employed, \r\nwith limited scope for beneficial economic 'multiplier effects' of \r\ngovernment-led investment. After COVID-19 however, no country is \r\nin this state. Very low interest rates amplify opportunities for large\u0002scale investments which could bring 'economic multiplier' benefits, \r\nespecially if they help to build the industries and infrastructures for \r\nfurther clean growth (Hepburn et al. 2020). However, the capability \r\nto mobilise low-interest finance varies markedly across countries and \r\nlarge public debts - including bringing some developing countries \r\nclose to default - undermine both the political appetite and feasibility \r\nof large-scale clean investments"


id: 85a25c1ee32d09771e6c79d5f57ee0f7
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" In practice the current orientation of \r\nCOVID-19 recovery packages is very varied, pointing to a very mixed \r\npicture about whether or not countries are exploiting this opportunity \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box 1 in this chapter)."


id: 289fd3c07be8b459b06e9fb8fe714cdd
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"Lessons. Important lessons can be drawn from the pandemic to climate change including the value of forward-looking risk management, \r\nthe role of scientific assessment, preparatory action and international process and institutions (Chapter 5 and Section 1.3). There had \r\nbeen long-standing warnings of pandemic risks and precursors - with both pandemic and climate risks being identified by social \r\nscientists as 'uncomfortable knowledge' or 'unknown knowns', which tend to be marginalised in practical policy (Rayner 2012; \r\nSarewitz 2020). This echoes long-standing climate literature on potential 'high impact' events, including those perceived as low \r\nprobability (Dietz 2011; Weitzman 2011). The costs of preparatory action, mainly in those countries that had suffered from earlier \r\npandemics were negligible in comparison, suggesting the importance not just of knowledge but its effective communication and \r\nembodiment in society (Chapter 5). Klenert et al"


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" (2020) offer five early lessons for climate policy, concerning: the cost of delay; the bias \r\nin human judgement; the inequality of impacts; the need for multiple forms of international cooperation; and finally, 'transparency in \r\nvalue judgements at the science-policy interface'."


id: a179df8a8b59e2e98517481a2f96b4f3
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"Emissions and behavioural changes. Overall, global CO2 FFI emissions declined by about 5.8% (5.1-6.3%) from 2019 to 2020, or \r\nabout 2.2 (1.8-2.4) GtCO2 in total (Section 2.2.2). Analysis from previous economic crises suggest significant rebound in emissions \r\nwithout policy-induced structural shifts (Jaeger et al. 2020) (Section 2.2.2.1 and Figure 2.5). Initial projections suggest the COVID \r\naftermath may reduce emissions by 4-5% over 2025-2030 (Shan and Et.al 2020; Reilly et al. 2021), below a 'no-pandemic' baseline. \r\nThe long-term impacts on behaviour, technology and associated emissions remain to be seen, but may be particularly significant in \r\ntransport - lockdowns reduced mobility-related emissions, alongside two major growth areas: electronic communications replacing \r\nmany work and personal travel requirements (Chapter 10 and Section 4.4.3.4); and revitalised local active transport and e-micromobility \r\n(Earley and Newman 2021)"


id: a31a9f52dfb232eca2f9f3d5fd260f38
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" Temporary 'clear skies' may also have raised awareness of the potential environment and health \r\nco-benefits of reduced fossil fuel use particularly in urban areas (Section 8.7), with evidence also indicating that air pollution itself \r\namplified vulnerability to COVID-19 (Gudka et al. 2020; Wu et al. 2020). The significant impacts on passenger aviation are projected \r\nto extend not just through behavioural changes, but also fleet changes from retiring older planes, and reduced new orders indicating \r\nexpectations of reduced demand and associated GHG emissions until 2030 (Sections 5.1.2 and 10.5) (AR6 WGI Box 6.1 in Chapter 6). \r\nHowever, air cargo has recovered more rapidly (IATA 2020), possibly enhanced by online ordering."


id: 7344602521e1bbbd254a8b61213d4d94
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"Fiscal, growth and inequality impacts. Aspects of the global and regional economic crises from COVID-19 may prevail much \r\nlonger than the crisis itself, potentially compromising mitigation. Most countries have undertaken unprecedented levels of short-term \r\npublic expenditures. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects sovereign debt to GDP to have increased by 20% in advanced \r\neconomies and 10% in emerging economies by the end of 2021 (IMF 2020). This is likely to slow economic growth, and may squeeze \r\nfinancial resources for mitigation and relevant investments for many years to come (Sections 15.2.3 and 15.6.3). COVID-19 further \r\nlowered interest rates which should facilitate low-carbon investment, but pandemic responses have increased sovereign debt across \r\ncountries in all income bands (IMF 2021), and, particularly in some developing economies and regions, it has caused debt distress \r\n(Bulow et al"


id: 6279a43859f6d5b6d98d48210a996981
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" 2021), widening the gap in developing countries' access to capital (Hourcade et al. 2021b) (Section 15.6.3). After decades \r\nof global progress in reducing poverty, COVID-19 has pushed hundreds of millions of people below poverty thresholds and raises the \r\nspectre of intersecting health and climate crises that are devastating for the most vulnerable (Section 5.1.2 and Box 5.1). Like those \r\nof climate change, pandemic impacts fall heavily on disadvantaged groups, exacerbate the uneven distribution of future benefits, \r\namplify existing inequities, and introduce new ones. Increased poverty also hinders efforts towards sustainable low-carbon transitions \r\n(Section 1.6)."


id: 75e8d31d01b779976f48abc62304c36a
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"Recovery packages are motivated by assessments of the macroeconomic effectiveness ('multipliers') of public spending in ways that \r\ncan crowd-in and revive private investment (Hepburn et al. 2020). There are clear reasons why a low-carbon response can create more \r\nenduring jobs, better aligned to future growth sectors: by also crowding-in and reviving private investment (e.g., from capital markets \r\nand institutional investors, including the growing profile of environmental, social and governance (ESG) and green bond markets \r\n(Section 15.6)), this can boost the effectiveness of public spending (IMF 2020). Stern and Valero (2021) argue that investment in low\u0002carbon innovation and its diffusion, complemented by investments in sustainable infrastructure, are key to shaping environmentally \r\nsustainable and inclusive growth in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis"


id: c87745d3ce069978c6ccbae110af4169
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" This would be the case both for high-income \r\neconomies on the global innovation frontier, and to promote sustainable development in poorer economies."


id: 40003007aa2586466d7bdfd51f94f538
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"Crises and opportunities: the wider context for mitigation and transformation. The impacts of COVID-19 have been \r\ndevastating in many ways, in many countries, and may distract political and financial capacity away from efforts to mitigate climate \r\nchange. Yet, studies of previous post-shock periods suggest that waves of innovation that are ready to emerge can be accelerated \r\nby crises, which may prompt new behaviours, weaken incumbent ('meso-level') systems, and prompt rapid reforms (Roberts and \r\nGeels 2019a) (Section 1.6.5). Lessons from the collective effort to 'flatten the curve' during the pandemic, illustrating aspects of \r\nscience-society interactions for public health in many countries, may carry over to climate mitigation, and open new opportunities \r\n(Section 5.1.2). COVID-19 appears to have accelerated the emergence of renewable power, electromobility and digitalisation (Newman \r\n2020) (Sections 5.1.2, 6.3 and 10.2)"


id: da88358403baa7826485d27a15f52ca3
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" Institutional change is often very slow but major economic dislocation can create significant \r\nopportunities for new ways of financing and enabling 'leapfrogging' investment to happen (Section 10.8). Given the unambiguous \r\nrisks of climate change, and consequent stranded asset risks from new fossil fuel investments (Box 6.11), the most robust recoveries \r\nare likely to be those which emerge on lower carbon and resilient pathways (Obergassel et al. 2021). Noting the critical global post\u0002COVID-19 challenge as the double impact of heightened credit risk in developing countries, along with indebtedness in developed \r\ncountries, Hourcade et al. (2021a) estimate that a 'multilateral' sovereign guarantee structure to underwrite low-carbon investments \r\ncould leverage projects up to 15 times its value, contributing to shifting development pathways consistent with the SDGs and Paris goals."


id: dccad8cb0ccc0546924e25b1696c04ff
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"Civil society pressures for stronger action. Civic engagement \r\nincreased leading up to the Paris Agreement (Backstrand and \r\nLovbrand 2019) and after. Youth movements in several countries \r\nshow young people's awareness about climate change, evidenced \r\nby the school strikes for the climate (Hagedorn et al. 2019; Buettner \r\n2020; Thackeray et al. 2020; Walker 2020). Senior figures across many \r\nreligions (Francis 2015; IFEES 2015) stressed the duty of humanity \r\nto protect future generations and the natural world, and warned \r\nabout the inequities of climate change. Growing awareness of local \r\nenvironmental problems such as air pollution in Asia and Africa \r\n(Karlsson et al. 2020), and the threat to indigenous people's rights \r\nand existence has also fuelled climate activism (Etchart 2017). Grass\u0002roots movements (Cheon and Urpelainen 2018; Fisher et al"


id: ba62f269ee5f57a403233201de43a117
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content:
" 2019), \r\nbuild political pressure for accelerating climate change mitigation, \r\nas does increasing climate litigation (Setzer and Vanhala 2019) \r\n(Chapters 13 and 14)."


id: aa17742d663df911f81c6d326cd3165f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
"The AR5 introduced six 'enabling conditions' for shifting development \r\npathways which are presented in Chapter 4 of this report and some \r\nof which overlap with the drivers reviewed here. However, the \r\nterminology of drivers and constraints have been chosen here to \r\nreflect the fact that each of these factors can serve as an enabling \r\ncondition or a constraint to ambitious climate action depending on \r\nthe context and how they are deployed. Often one sees the factors \r\nexerting both push and pull forces at the same time in the same \r\nand across different scales. For example, finance and investments can \r\nserve as a barrier or an enabler to climate action (Battiston et al. 2021). \r\nSimilarly, political economy factors can align in favour of ambitious \r\nclimate action or act in ways that inhibit strong cooperation and \r\nlow-carbon transition"


id: e6b84f79a38e2489a5423b67926ef739
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:40
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content:
" The other key insight from the assessment of \r\nthe  system drivers and constraints undertaken below is that none \r\nof the factors or conditions by themselves is more or less important \r\nthan the others. In addition to being deeply intertwined all the factors "


id: 4337065263235380f2512e136effcdd5
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"Continued growth in population and income are expected to \r\ncontinue driving up demand for goods and services (Chapters  2, \r\n3 and 5), with an important role for urbanisation which is proceeding \r\nat an unprecedented speed and scale. In the last decade, the urban \r\npopulation grew by 70 million people each year, or about 1.3 million \r\npeople per week, with urban area expanding by about 102 km2\r\n per \r\nday (Chapter  8). Urban areas account for most (45-87%) of the \r\nglobal carbon footprint (8.1) and the strong and positive correlation \r\nbetween urbanisation and incomes means higher consumption \r\nfrom urban lifestyles will continue driving direct and indirect GHG \r\nemissions. Cities provide a conduit to many of the services such as \r\ntransportation, housing, water, food, medical care and recreation, \r\nand other services and urban carbon emissions are driven not only \r\nby population and income but also by the form and structure of \r\nurban areas (Sections  8.1 and 8.3-8.6)"


id: d2b7dc9c10942e2612675c510b07390e
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vector_id: 30673
content:
" This creates opportunities \r\nfor decarbonisation through urban planning and purposeful \r\n'experimentation' (Newman et al. 2017) (Chapter 8)."


id: f4c3fd9d440a8ed9ef186cbfa308f4d7
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vector_id: 36016
content:
"Official inventories report territorial emissions, which do not \r\nconsider the impacts embodied in imports of goods. Global supply \r\nchains undoubtedly lead to a  growth in trade volumes (Federico \r\nand Tena-Junguito 2017), alternative methods have been suggested \r\nto account for emissions associated with international trade, such \r\nas shared responsibility (Lenzen et al. 2007), technology-adjusted \r\nconsumption-based accounting (Kander et al. 2015), value\u0002added-based responsibility (Pinero et al. 2019) and exergy-based \r\nresponsibility based on thermodynamics (Khajehpour et al. 2019). \r\nConsumption-based emissions (i.e., attribution of emissions related \r\nto domestic consumption and imports to final destination) are not \r\nofficially reported in global emissions datasets but data has improved \r\n(Tukker and Dietzenbacher 2013; Afionis et al. 2017)"


id: 36c5e82413d4f845a8194defa76aef81
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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content:
" This analysis \r\nhas been used extensively for consumption-based accounting of \r\nemissions, and other environmental impacts (Wiedmann and Lenzen \r\n2018; Malik et al. 2019) (Section 2.3)."


id: d7f82afaf7872de635155e8d74bf3052
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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content:
"A broad class of more speculative technologies propose to counteract \r\neffects of climate change by removing CO2 from the atmosphere \r\n(CDR), or by directly modifying the Earth's energy balance at a large \r\nscale (solar radiation modification or SRM). CDR technologies \r\ninclude ocean iron fertilisation, enhanced weathering and ocean \r\nalkalinisation (Council 2015a), along with direct air carbon capture \r\nand storage (DACCS). They could potentially draw down atmospheric \r\nCO2 much faster than the Earth's natural carbon cycle, and reduce \r\nreliance on biomass-based removal (Koberle 2019; Realmonte et al. \r\n2019), but some present novel risks to the environment and DACCS \r\nis currently more expensive than most other forms of mitigation (Fuss \r\net al. 2018) (Cross-Chapter Box  8  in Chapter  12)"


id: d81c943a2be0c2138f99bd89dfcd8ea6
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content:
" Solar radiation \r\nmodification (SRM) could potentially cool the planet rapidly at low \r\nestimated direct costs by reflecting incoming sunlight (Council 2015b), \r\nbut entails uncertain side effects and thorny international equity and \r\ngovernance challenges (Netra et al. 2018; Florin et al. 2020; National \r\nAcademies of Sciences 2021) (Chapter 14). Understanding the climate \r\nresponse to SRM remains subject to large uncertainties (AR6 WGI). \r\nSome literature uses the term 'geoengineering' for both CDR or SRM \r\nwhen applied at a planetary scale (Shepherd 2009; GESAMP 2019). \r\nIn this report, CDR and SRM are discussed separately, reflecting their \r\nvery different geophysical characteristics."


id: c669e20628e15347e4fe48d2c1853be8
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content:
"Climate finance is a multi-actor, multi-objective domain that includes \r\ncentral banks, commercial banks, asset managers, underwriters, \r\ndevelopment banks, and corporate planners. Climate change \r\npresents both risks and opportunities for the financial sector. The \r\nrisks include physical risks related to the impacts of climate change \r\nitself; transition risks related to the exposure to policy, technology \r\nand behavioural changes in line with a low-carbon transition; and \r\nliability risks from litigation for climate-related damages (Box 15.2). \r\nThese could potentially lead to stranded assets (the loss of economic \r\nvalue of existing assets before the end of their useful lifetimes (Bos \r\nand Gupta 2019) (Sections 6.7 and 15.6.3). Such risks continue to \r\nbe underestimated by financial institutions (Section  15.6.1)"


id: 7de5ad835828158e538ad7fbeba245b9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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content:
" The \r\ncontinuing expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure and insufficient \r\ntransparency on how these are valued raises concerns that systemic \r\nrisk may be accumulating in the financial sector in relation to \r\na  potential low-carbon transition that may already be under way \r\n(Battiston et al. 2017) (Section  15.6.3). The Financial Stability \r\nBoard's Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures' (TCFD) \r\nrecommendations on  transparency aim to ensure that investors \r\nand companies consider climate change risks in their strategies and \r\ncapital allocation (TCFD 2018). This is helping 'investors to reassess \r\ncore assumptions' and may lead to 'significant' capital reallocation \r\n(Fink 2020). However, metrics and indicators of assets risk exposure \r\nare inadequate (Monasterolo 2017; Campiglio et al. 2018) and \r\ntransparency alone is insufficient to drive the required asset \r\nreallocation in the absence of clear regulatory frameworks (Ameli \r\net al. 2020; Chenet et al. 2021)"


id: ba453c1e1deac2a266a5263974fbcc19
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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content:
" A  coalition of central banks have \r\nformed the Network for Greening the Financial Sector, to support \r\nand advance the transformation of the financial system (Allen et al. \r\n2020; NGFS 2020), with some of them conducting climate-related \r\ninstitutional stress tests."


id: 1d681855a56cc41c9d66e00caac7e9d7
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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content:
"There is often a  disconnect between stated national climate \r\nambition and finance flows, and overseas direct investment (ODI) \r\nfrom donor countries may be at odds with national climate pledges \r\nsuch as NDCs. One report found funds supported by foreign state\u0002owned enterprises into 56 recipient countries in Asia and Africa in \r\n2014-2017 went mostly to fossil fuel-based projects not strongly \r\naligned with low-carbon priorities of recipient countries' NDCs (Zhou \r\net al. 2018). Similarly, Steffen and Schmidt (2019) found that even \r\nwithin multilateral development banks, 'public- and private-sector \r\nbranches differ considerably', with public-sector lending used mainly \r\nin non-renewable and hydropower projects. Political leadership is \r\ntherefore essential to steer financial flows to support low-carbon \r\ntransition (Section  15.6). Voituriez et al"


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vector_id: 26080
content:
" (2019) identify significant \r\nmitigation potential if financing countries simply applied their own \r\nenvironmental standards to their overseas investments."


id: 5f5da4b4b58b86c94e0f0424c3d6d8e1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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vector_id: 12577
content:
"The politics of interest (most especially economic interest) of key \r\nactors at sub-national, national and global levels can be important \r\ndeterminants of climate (in)action (O'Hara 2009; Lo 2010; Tanner \r\nand Allouche 2011; Sovacool et al. 2015; Lohmann 2017; Clapp et al. \r\n2018; Newell and Taylor 2018; Lohmann 2019). Political economy \r\napproaches can be crudely divided into 'economic approaches to \r\npolitics', and those used by other social scientists (Paterson and \r\nP-Laberge 2018). The former shows how electoral concerns lead \r\nto weak treaties (Battaglini and Harstad 2016) and when policy \r\nnegotiations cause status-quo biases and the use of inefficient \r\npolicy instruments (Austen-Smith et al. 2019) or delays and excessive \r\nharmonisation (Harstad 2007)"


id: bafcf67a0b2d231e5ce2b9ad20156f8a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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content:
" The latter emphasises the central \r\nrole of structures of power and production, and a  commitment to \r\neconomic growth and capital accumulation in relation to climate \r\naction, given the historically central role of fossil fuels to economic \r\ndevelopment and the deep embedding of fossil energy in daily life \r\n(Newell and Paterson 2010; Huber 2012; Di Muzio 2015; Malm 2015)."


id: e7de7202d83455718cc5c95c2269b794
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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content:
"Governments cannot single-handedly fund the transition \r\n(Section  15.6.7), least of all in low-income developing countries \r\nwith large sovereign debt and poor access to global financial \r\nmarkets. Long-term sources of private capital are required to close \r\nthe financing gap across sectors and geographies (Section 15.6.7). \r\nFuture investment needs are greatest in emerging and developing \r\neconomies (Section 15.5.2) which already face higher costs of capital, \r\nhindering capacity to finance a  transition (Buhr et al. 2018; Ameli \r\net al. 2020). Requisite North-South financial flows are impeded by \r\nboth geographic and technological risk premiums (Iyer et al. 2015), \r\nand the COVID-19 pandemic has further compromised the ability \r\nof developing and emerging economies to finance development \r\nactivities or attract additional climate finance from developed \r\ncountries (Section 15.6.3, and Cross-Chapter Box 1 in this chapter)"


id: c02ebc9666fcafc9bffbfb1ef61b5ec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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content:
" \r\nClimate-related investments in developing countries also suffer from \r\nstructural barriers such as sovereign risk and exchange rate volatility \r\n(Farooquee and Shrimali 2016; Guzman et al. 2018) which affect not "


id: fda0555a0a12abde5e67fe5f129c8d79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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vector_id: 37420
content:
"One factor limiting the ambition of climate policy has been the ability \r\nof incumbent industries to shape government action on climate \r\nchange (Newell and Paterson 1998; Jones and Levy 2009; Geels 2014; \r\nBreetz et al. 2018). Incumbent industries are often more concentrated \r\nthan those benefiting from climate policy and lobby more effectively \r\nto prevent losses than those who would gain (Meng and Rode 2019). \r\nDrawing upon wider networks (Brulle 2014), campaigns by oil and \r\ncoal companies against climate action in the United States of America \r\nand Australia are perhaps the most well known and largely successful \r\nof these (Pearse 2017; Brulle et al. 2020; Mildenberger 2020; Stokes \r\n2020), although similar dynamics have been demonstrated in Brazil \r\nand South Africa (Hochstetler 2020), Canada (Harrison 2018), \r\nand Norway and Germany (Fitzgerald et al. 2019), for example"


id: 93ac488acb5934dc5619d5fa03041f92
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content:
" \r\nIn other contexts, resistance by incumbent companies is more \r\nsubtle but nevertheless has weakened policy design on emissions \r\ntrading systems (Rosembloom and Markard 2020), and limited the \r\ndevelopment of alternative-fuelled automobiles (Levy and Egan \r\n2003; Wells and Nieuwenhuis 2012)."


id: 5d7ea6b4d1b5458f3e389813fb27092d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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vector_id: 12231
content:
"Climate change and climate policies affect countries and people \r\ndifferently. Low-income countries tend to be more dependent \r\non primary industries (agriculture and fisheries, etc.) than richer \r\ncountries, and their infrastructure may be less robust to tackle more \r\nsevere weather conditions. Within a country, the burdens may not be \r\nequally distributed either, due to policy measures implemented and \r\nfrom differences in vulnerability and adaptive capacity following from \r\ne.g. income and wealth distribution, race and gender. For instance, \r\nunequal social structures can result in women being more vulnerable \r\nto the effects of climate change compared to men, especially in poor \r\ncountries (Arora-Jonsson 2011; Jost et al. 2016; Rao et al. 2019). \r\nCosts of mitigation also differ across countries"


id: fe13969c40da7cfb824f6387071bfd91
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37501
content:
" Studies show there \r\nare large disparities of economic impacts of NDCs across regions, \r\nand also between relatively similar countries when it comes to the \r\nlevel of development, due to large differences in marginal abatement \r\ncosts for the emission-reduction goal of NDCs (Fujimori et al. 2016; \r\nHof et al. 2017; Akimoto et al. 2018; Evans &  Gabbatiss 2019). \r\nEqualising the burdens from climate policies may give more support \r\nfor mitigation policies (Maestre-Andres et al. 2019)."


id: a83cd59d8b469c7d9e1a27262692f4dd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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vector_id: 23993
content:
"Equity and fairness can serve as both drivers and barriers to climate \r\nmitigation at different scales of governance. Literature regularly \r\nhighlights equity and justice issues as critical components in local \r\npolitics and international diplomacy regarding all SDGs, such as goals \r\nfor no poverty, zero hunger, gender equality, affordable clean energy, \r\nreducing inequality, but also for climate action (SDG 13) (Marmot and \r\nBell 2018; Spijkers 2018). Equity issues help explain why it has proved \r\nhard to reach more substantive global agreements, as it is hard to \r\nagree on a level of greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation (or emissions) \r\nand how to distribute mitigation efforts among countries (Kverndokk \r\n2018) for several reasons"


id: a54134d1e42ac38da2ddb1e4c116f222
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23568
content:
" First, an optimal trade-off between \r\nmitigation costs and damage costs of climate change depends on \r\nethical considerations, and simulations from integrated assessment \r\nmodels using different ethical parameters producing different optimal \r\nmitigation paths (IPCC 2018b) (Section 3.6.1.2). Second, treaties that "


id: 3d0a4b3d4b6b12ae4df0960657cd970a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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vector_id: 6966
content:
"Tackling climate change is often mentioned as an important reason \r\nfor strong international cooperation in the 21st century (Falkner \r\n2016; Keohane and Victor 2016; Bodansky et al. 2017; Cramton \r\net al. 2017b). Mitigation costs are borne by countries taking action, \r\nwhile the benefits of reduced climate change are not limited to \r\nthem, being in economic terms 'global and non-excludable'. Hence \r\nanthropogenic climate change is typically seen as a global commons \r\nproblem (Falkner 2016; Wapner and Elver 2017). Moreover, the belief \r\nthat mitigation will raise energy costs and may adversely affect \r\ncompetitiveness creates incentives for free riding, where states avoid \r\ntaking their fair share of action (Barrett 2005; Keohane and Victor \r\n2016)"


id: e48d27604de4589a9290fb183bd966d2
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content:
" International cooperation has the potential to address these \r\nchallenges through collective action (Tulkens 2019) and international \r\ninstitutions offer the opportunity for actors to engage in meaningful \r\ncommunication and exchange of ideas about potential solutions \r\n(Cole 2015). International cooperation is also vital for the creation \r\nand diffusion of norms and the framework for stabilising expectations \r\namong actors (Pettenger 2016)."


id: 772adc75f80da41dc54848b4fee83d35
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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vector_id: 16316
content:
"Some key roles of the UNFCCC have been detailed by its former \r\nheads (Kinley et al. 2021). In addition to specific agreements (most \r\nrecently the PA) it has enhanced transparency through reporting \r\nand data, and generated or reinforced several important norms for \r\nglobal climate action including the principles of equity, common \r\nbut differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities, and the \r\nprecautionary principles for maintaining global cooperation among \r\nstates with unevenly distributed emissions sources, climate impacts, \r\nand varying mitigation costs across countries (Keohane and Victor, \r\n2016). In addition to formal negotiations, the annual Conference of \r\nthe Parties (COPs) have increased awareness, and motivated more \r\nambitious actions, sometimes through the formation of 'coalitions \r\nof the willing', for example. It provides a  structure for measuring \r\nand monitoring action towards a global goal (Milkoreit and Haapala \r\n2019)"


id: 290531946137808b75357b4521fe6291
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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vector_id: 3880
content:
" International cooperation (including the UNFCCC) can also \r\npromote technology development and transfer and capacity building; \r\nmobilise finance for mitigation and adaptation; and help address \r\nconcerns on climate justice (Okereke and Coventry 2016; Chan et al. \r\n2018) (Chapters 14-16)."


id: 306abcd7b9f58bdd40f90b154afb0532
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5048
content:
"International collaboration works best if an agreement can be made \r\nself-reinforcing with incentives for mutual gains and joint action \r\n(Barrett 2016; Keohane and Victor 2016), but the structure of the \r\nclimate challenge makes this hard to achieve. The evidence from the \r\nMontreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances and from the Kyoto \r\nProtocol on GHGs, is that legally binding targets have been effective \r\nin that participating Parties complied with them (Shishlov et al. 2016; \r\nAlbrecht and Parker 2019), and (for Kyoto) these account for most of \r\nthe countries that have sustained emission reductions for at least the \r\npast 10 to 15 years (Sections 1.3.2 and 2.2). However, such binding \r\ncommitments may deter participation if there are no clear incentives \r\nto sustain participation and especially if other growing emitters are \r\nomitted by design, as with the Kyoto Protocol"


id: fe5dc1fb5f263bb885f049ba4880cbd9
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content:
" Consequently the USA \r\nrefused to ratify (and Canada withdrew), particularly on the grounds \r\nthat developing countries had no targets; with participation in Kyoto's \r\nsecond period commitments declining further, the net result was \r\nlimited global progress in emissions under Kyoto (Bodansky 2016; \r\nOkereke and Coventry 2016; Scavenius and Rayner 2018) despite full \r\nlegal compliance in both commitment periods (Chapter 14)."


id: 749784bd3ef507cecc53447766f2bf78
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15938
content:
"Drawing from the scenarios database, five Illustrative Mitigation \r\nPathways (IMPs) were defined for this report (Figure  3.5 and \r\nTable  1.1). These are introduced here, with a  more complete \r\ndescription and discussion provided in Section  3.2.5. These IMPs \r\nwere chosen to illustrate key themes with respect to mitigation \r\nstrategies across the entire WGIII assessment. The IMPs embody \r\nboth a  storyline, which describes in narrative form the key socio\u0002economic characteristics of that scenario, and a  quantitative \r\nillustration providing numerical values that are internally consistent \r\nand comparable across chapters of this report. Quantitative IMPs \r\ncan be associated directly with specific human activities and provide \r\na quantitative point of reference that links activities in different parts \r\nof socio-economic systems. Some parts of the report draw on these \r\nquantitative scenarios, whilst others use only the narratives"


id: 324754eb40fa190d090e0148c6f9f6cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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content:
" No \r\nassessment of the likelihood of each IMP has been made (as they \r\nreflect both human choice and deep uncertainty)."


id: 7ba7f56389ea482167db61259e9ce9bf
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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vector_id: 17054
content:
"IMPs are not intended to be comprehensive. They are not intended \r\nto illustrate all possible themes in this report. They do not, for \r\nexample, attempt to illustrate the range of alternative socio\u0002economic pathways against which efforts to implement Paris goals \r\nmay be set, or to reflect variations in potential regional development \r\npathways. They do not explore issues around income distribution or \r\nenvironmental justice, but assume implicitly that where and how \r\naction occurs can be separated from who pays, in ways to adequately \r\naddress such issues. They are essentially pathways of technological \r\nevolution and demand shifts reflecting broad global trends in social \r\nchoice. The IMPs do not directly assess issues of realisation linked to \r\nthe 'drivers and constraints' summarised in our previous section, and \r\nthe quantifications use, for the most part, models that are grounded \r\nmainly in the Aggregate Economics Frameworks (Section 7.1)"


id: c0d02bbd654bf5a042985337a3f30bd1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27900
content:
" As such \r\nthey reflect primarily the geophysical, economic and technological \r\nDimensions of Assessment, but can be assessed in relation to the full \r\nset of Feasibility criteria (Section 1.8.1)."


id: b5c969c583c7be38e1f69f52f1396e99
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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vector_id: 26132
content:
"The impact of climate change in limiting well-being is most acutely \r\nfelt by the world's poorest people, communities, and nations, who \r\nhave the smallest carbon footprint, constrained capacity to respond \r\nand limited voice in important decision-making circles (Okereke and \r\nEhresman 2015; Tosam and Mbih 2015; Mugambiwa and Tirivangasi \r\n2017). The wide variation in the contribution to, and impact of climate \r\nchange within and across countries makes equity, inequality, justice, \r\nand poverty eradication, inescapable aspects of the relationship \r\nbetween sustainable development and climate change (Okereke \r\nand Coventry 2016; Klinsky et al. 2017; Reckien et al. 2017; Bos \r\nand Gupta 2019; Kayal et al. 2019; Diffenbaugh and Burke 2019; \r\nBaarsch et al. 2020). This underpins the conclusion, as commonly \r\nexpressed, that climate action needs to be pursued in the context of \r\nsustainable development, equity and poverty eradication (Smit et al"


id: 2ebaa2f9e8f6b75c06e5434409e4b2da
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vector_id: 4792
content:
"Climate change mitigation is one of many goals that societies pursue \r\nin the context of sustainable development, as evidenced by the wide \r\nrange of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Climate change \r\nand sustainable development, as well as development more broadly, \r\nare interwoven along multiple and complex lines of relationship \r\n(Okereke et al. 2009; Fankhauser and McDermott 2016; Okereke \r\nand Massaquoi 2017; Gomez-Echeverri 2018a), as highlighted in \r\nseveral previous IPCC reports (IPCC 2007, 2011a, 2014a, 2018b, \r\n2019a). With its significant negative impact on natural systems, \r\nfood security and infrastructure, loss of lives and territories, species \r\nextinction, conflict health, among several other risks, climate change \r\nposes a serious threat to development and wellbeing in both rich and \r\npoor countries (IPCC 2007, 2011a, 2014a, 2018b, 2019b)"


id: 160bf2bc5c1f5723403e4813e8579b36
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 992
content:
" Without \r\nserious efforts at mitigation and adaptation, climate change could \r\npush millions further into poverty and limit the opportunities for \r\neconomic development (Chapters 4 and 17). It follows that ambitious \r\nclimate mitigation is necessary to secure a safe climate within which \r\ndevelopment and well-being can be pursued and sustained."


id: 7eb9930235a9c25f38abe4cfa18b2fee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17503
content:
"Other concepts such as 'Doughnut Economics' (Raworth 2018), \r\necological modernisation, and mainstreaming are also used to \r\nconvey ideals of development pathways that take sustainability, \r\nclimate mitigation, and environmental limits seriously (Dale et al. \r\n2015a). Mainstreaming focuses on incorporating climate change \r\ninto national development activities, such as the building of \r\ninfrastructure (Wamsler and Pauleit 2016; Runhaar et al. 2018). The \r\n'green economy' and green growth - growth without undermining \r\necological systems, partly by gaining economic value from cleaner \r\ntechnologies and systems and is inclusive and equitable in its \r\noutcomes - has gained popularity in both developed and developing \r\ncountries as an approach for harnessing economic growth to address \r\nenvironmental issues (Bina 2013; Georgeson et al. 2017; Capasso \r\net al. 2019; Song et al. 2020; Hao et al. 2021)"


id: b4b11af91505fd768f7da5b8ba7bc69c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25958
content:
"Literature on degrowth, post growth, and post development \r\nquestions the sustainability and imperative of more growth \r\nespecially in already industrialised countries and argues that \r\nprosperity and the 'Good Life' are not immutably tied to economic \r\ngrowth (Asara et al. 2015; Escobar 2015; Latouche 2018; Kallis \r\n2019) (Section  5.2.1). The concept of Just Transition also stresses \r\nthe need to integrate justice concerns so as to not impose hardship \r\non already marginalised populations within and between countries \r\n(Evans and Phelan 2016; Goddard and Farrelly 2018; Heffron and \r\nMcCauley 2018; Smith, Jackie and Patterson 2018; McCauley \r\nand Heffron 2018) (Section 1.7.2)"


id: 98b928e610136b9b00a9e290782dbde6
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content:
" The key insight is that pursuing \r\nclimate goals in the context of sustainable development requires \r\nholistic thinking including on how to measure well-being, serious \r\nconsideration of the notion of ecological limits, at least some level \r\nof decoupling and certainly choices and decision-making approaches \r\nthat exploit and maximise the synergy and minimise the trade-off \r\nbetween climate mitigation and other sustainable development \r\ngoals. It also requires consideration of equity and justice within \r\nand between countries. However, ideas of a synergistic relationship \r\nbetween development and climate mitigation can sometimes offer \r\nlimited practical guidelines for reconciling the tensions that are often \r\npresent in practical policymaking (Ferguson et al. 2014; Dale et al. \r\n2015b; Kasztelan 2017; Kotze 2018)."


id: 561ea0203ab9bb2c2a044911c81aeff9
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vector_id: 11038
content:
"Figure 1.6 | Sustainable development pathways towards fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The graph shows global average per-capita \r\nGHG emissions (vertical axis) and relative 'Historic Index of Human Development' (HIHD) levels (horizontal) have increased globally since the industrial revolution (grey line). \r\nThe bubbles on the graph show regional per-capita GHG emissions and human development levels in the year 2015, illustrating large disparities. Pathways towards fulfilling the \r\nParis Agreement (and SDG 13) involve global average per-capita GHG emissions below about 5 tCO2-eq by 2030. Likewise, to fulfil SDGs 3, 4 and 8, HIHD levels (see footnote 7) \r\nneed to be at least 0.5 or greater. This suggests a 'sustainable development zone' for year 2030 (in pale brown); the in-figure text also suggests a 'sustainable development \r\ncorridor', where countries limit per-capita GHG emissions while improving levels of human development over time"


id: 166c7fa0c52eb88776a2f14f7583a0b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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vector_id: 1053
content:
" The emphasis of pathways into the sustainable development \r\nzone differ (dashed brown arrows), but in each case transformations are needed in how human development is attained while limiting GHG emissions."


id: 9a3fc60e480f56c2f89aa88ec2296bdd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21790
content:
"In conclusion, achieving climate stabilisation in the context of \r\nsustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty requires \r\ncollective action and exploiting synergies between climate action \r\nand sustainable development, while minimising the impact of trade\u0002offs (Najam 2005; Okereke and Massaquoi 2017; Makomere and Liti \r\nMbeva 2018; Dooley et al. 2021). It also requires a focus on equity \r\nconsiderations to avoid climate-induced harm, as well as unfairness \r\nthat can result from urgent actions to cut emissions (Pan et al. \r\n2014; Robiou du Pont et al. 2017; Kartha et al. 2018a). This is ever \r\nmore important as the diminishing carbon budget has intensified \r\ndebates on which countries should have the greatest claim to the \r\n'remaining space' for emissions (Raupach et al. 2014) or production \r\n(McGlade and Ekins 2015), amplified by persistent concerns over \r\nthe insufficiency of support for means of implementation, to support \r\nambitious mitigation efforts (Pickering et al"


id: 473827dd9c1fbcb3835857d4ce7d876
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8584
content:
"Such global aggregate economic studies coalesce around two main \r\nquestions. One, as pioneered by Nordhaus (1992, 2008) attempts to \r\nmonetise overall climate damages and mitigation costs so as to strike \r\na 'cost-benefit optimum' pathway. More detailed and empirically\u0002grounded 'cost-effectiveness analysis' explores pathways that would \r\nminimise mitigation costs (Ekholm 2014; IPCC 2014a Section  2.5; \r\nWeyant 2017) for given targets (e.g.,  as agreed in international \r\nnegotiations, see Section 3.2 in Chapter 3). Both approaches recognise \r\nthat resources are limited and climate change competes with other \r\npriorities in government policymaking, and are generally examined \r\nwith some form of Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) (Section 1.5 \r\nand Appendix III)"


id: b69a6073c2b978d92751b98322415be9
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vector_id: 26247
content:
" Depending on the regional disaggregation of the \r\nmodelling tools used and on the scope of the analyses, these studies \r\nmay or may not address distributional aspects within and across \r\nnations associated with climate policies (Bauer et al. 2020)."


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vector_id: 16726
content:
"To complement the extensive literature on risks and decision\u0002making under uncertainty reviewed in AR6 WGII (notably, \r\nChapter  19), this section summarises insights and developments \r\nin key analytic frameworks and tools particularly relevant to \r\nunderstanding specific mitigation strategies, policies and other \r\nactions, including explaining the observed if limited progress \r\nto date. Organised partly as reflected in the quotes above, these \r\ninclude aggregated (principally, economic) frameworks to evaluate \r\nsystem-level choices; ethical perspectives on values and equity \r\nincluding stages of development and distributional concerns; and \r\ntransition frameworks which focus on the processes and actors \r\ninvolved in major technological and social transitions. These need \r\nto be complemented by a  fourth set of approaches which shine \r\nmore light on psychological/behavioural and political factors"


id: 43782d0089152993561fd6a64756ccb0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8025
content:
" All \r\nthese frameworks are relevant, and together they point to the \r\nmultiple perspectives and actions required if the positive drivers \r\nof emission reduction summarised in Section 4 are to outweigh the \r\nbarriers and overcome the constraints."


id: 4fa505ef02c55430ac8dc94f77a1eb6b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:41
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9963
content:
"The latter especially are technically grounded in complex system \r\ntheories (e.g.,  Arthur 1989, 1999; Beinhocker 2007; Hidalgo and \r\nHausmann 2009). These take inherently dynamic views of economies \r\nas continually evolving systems with continuously unfolding and \r\npath-dependent properties, and emphasise uncertainty in contrast to \r\nany predictable or default optimality. Such approaches have been \r\nvariously applied in policy evaluation (Walton 2014; Moore et al. \r\n2018), and specifically for global decarbonisation (e.g., Barker and \r\nCrawford-Brown 2014) using global simulation models. Because \r\nthese have no natural reference 'least lost' trajectory, they illustrate \r\nvaried and divergent pathways and tend to emphasise the diversity \r\nof possibilities and relevant policies, particularly linked to innovation \r\nand potentially 'sensitive intervention points' (Farmer et al. 2019) \r\n(Section  1.7.3)"


