# document

id: 484bb5c17a170444b30f219c3b171b32
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8746
content:
"The future potential for using carbon taxation as a way to provide \r\nspace for fiscal reform has been highlighted in the so-called 'green \r\nfiscal reform' literature (Vogt-Schilb et al. 2019). The potential is \r\nlarge, since only 13% of global GHG emissions were covered by \r\ncarbon pricing schemes in 2019 (Watts et al. 2019) and since many \r\ncountries price carbon negatively by subsidising fossil fuel use, thus \r\ngenerating effects that are the opposite of those that positive carbon \r\nprices hope to promote. In 2018, the global subsidy value amounted \r\nto USD427 billion, some 10 times the payment for carbon use (Watts \r\net al. 2019). However, the size of the potential for creating fiscal \r\nspace varies strongly across countries given differences in terms of \r\ncurrent carbon prices and fuel subsidies."


id: b0cc73fc0564ed60c08ac29183adf514
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25333
content:
"The future viability of sectors will depend on the extent to which \r\nthey can remain profitable while relying on lower-carbon energy. \r\nThe challenge to identify alternative sectors of growth is particularly \r\nacute for countries that today depend on oil and natural gas for \r\nmost of their foreign exchange and government revenues (Mirzoev \r\net al. 2020). Changes in economic structure will also have gender \r\nimplications since the roles of men and women vary across sectors. \r\nFor example, in many developing countries, sectors in which women \r\nplay a  relatively important role, including agriculture and unpaid \r\nhousehold services like collection of water and fuel wood, may be \r\nnegatively affected by climate change (Roy 2018). It may thus be \r\nimportant to take complementary actions to address the gender \r\nimplications of changes in economic structure."


id: 28d36c67f58b2fb5a6d56830bf6336d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3854
content:
"The limited adoption of and political support for carbon pricing \r\nmay be explained by the fact that most of the gains occur in the \r\nfuture and depend on actions across the globe, making them \r\nseem abstract and unpredictable, whereas the costs in the form of \r\nhigher carbon prices are immediate (Karapin 2016). Furthermore, \r\nthe links between carbon pricing and emissions may not be clear \r\nto the public who, in addition, may not trust that the government \r\nwill use budgetary savings according to stated plans. The latter may \r\nbe due to various factors, including a history of limited government \r\ncommitment and corruption (Withana 2016; Chadwick 2017; \r\nMaestre-Andres et al. 2019)."


id: 61c18161678fb019eca25dd7f88049c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12949
content:
"Given strong complementarities between policies discussed above, \r\nan integrated policy approach is crucial. For example, as suggested, \r\nthe actions that influence the pace at which GHG emissions can be \r\ncut with political support may depend on taxation (including carbon \r\ntaxes), investments in infrastructure, spending on R&D, changes in \r\nincome distribution (influenced by transfers), and communication. \r\nIn this light, it is important to consider the demands that alternative \r\npolicy packages put on government policy-making efficiency and \r\ncredibility as well as the roles of other enabling conditions. In fact, \r\nplans to undertake major reforms may provide governments with \r\nimpetus to accelerate the enhancement of their capacities as part \r\nof the preparations (Karapin 2016; Withana 2016; Jakob et al. 2019)."


id: 6d9391c4f8647d95859799738f052bf1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14850
content:
"The literature reports limited systematic evidence based on ex post\r\nanalysis of the performance of carbon pricing  - carbon taxes and \r\ngreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading systems (ETSs) (Haites \r\n2018). Performance assessment is complicated by the effect of other \r\npolicies and exogenous factors. Haites (2018) suggests that since \r\n2008, other policies have probably contributed more to emission \r\nreductions than carbon taxes, and most tax rates are too low to \r\nachieve mitigation objectives. Emissions under ETSs have declined, \r\nwith the exception of four systems without emissions caps (ibid). \r\nEvery jurisdiction with an ETS and/or carbon tax also has other \r\npolicies that affect its GHG emissions."


id: f12454859c836528a225275459debeec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35436
content:
"In many countries, fiscal systems are currently under stress to provide \r\nresources for the implementation of development priorities, such as, \r\nfor example, providing universal health coverage and other social \r\nservices (Meheus and McIntyre 2017) or sustainably funding pension \r\nsystems in the context of aging populations (Asher and Bali 2017; \r\nCruz-Martinez 2018). Overall, Baum et al. (2017) argue that low\u0002income countries are likely not to have the fiscal space to undertake \r\nthe investment entailed in reaching the SDGs. To create additional \r\nfiscal space, major options include improving tax recovery, reducing \r\nsubsidies and levying additional taxes."


id: 8555ed4d11500aa035fbabd390e95889
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18504
content:
"To help policymakers overcome obstacles, research has reviewed the \r\ninternational experience from carbon pricing reforms. Elimination \r\nof fossil fuel subsidies, equivalent to the elimination of negative \r\ncarbon prices, have been more successful when they have included \r\ncomplementary and transparent measures that enjoy popular "


id: c7fffe5cf975101bd2fd109960ba7607
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29044
content:
"support, accompanied by a strong communications component that \r\nexplains the measures and stresses their benefits (Withana 2016; \r\nRentschler and Bazilian 2017; Maestre-Andres et al. 2019)."


id: 1116f35af6a5c253e760f2d530a8b06
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 168
content:
"Part of the losses (and related calls for compensation or exemptions) \r\ndue to carbon pricing are related to the fact that it hurts the \r\ncompetitiveness of sectors that face imports from countries with \r\nlower carbon prices, leading to 'carbon leakage' if carbon-intensive \r\nproduction (and related jobs) migrates from countries with relatively \r\nhigh carbon prices. Some research suggests that evidence that \r\na border carbon tax (or adjustment), set on the basis of the carbon \r\ncontent of the import, including a downward adjustment on the basis \r\nof any carbon payments (taxes or other) already made before entry, \r\ncould reduce carbon leakage while also raising additional revenue \r\nand encouraging carbon pricing in the exporting country (Withana \r\n2016; Cosbey et al. 2019)."


id: e86f3597aeb22f469f9d903ef4d32630
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34075
content:
"The spatial distribution of households and firms across urban and rural \r\nareas is a central characteristic of development pathways. Patterns of \r\nurbanisation, territorial development, and regional integration have \r\nwide-ranging implications for economic, social and environmental \r\nobjectives (World Bank 2009). Notably, choices regarding spatial \r\nforms of development have large-scale implications for demand for \r\ntransportation and associated GHG emissions."


id: bdfa84ff2cfb6c305c82a24404c6c7b4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27446
content:
"Exclusionary mechanisms such as decreasing accessibility and \r\naffordability of inner-urban neighbourhoods is a  major cause \r\nof suburbanisation of low- to middle-income households \r\n(e.g., Hochstenbach and Musterd 2018). Suburbanisation, in turn, is \r\nassociated with higher transportation demand (Bento et al. 2005) \r\nand higher carbon footprints for households (Jones and Kammen \r\n2014). Similarly, other studies find a significant positive link between \r\nhousing prices and energy demand (Lampin et al. 2013)."


id: 326754a643081f10238b8d7827bee952
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5339
content:
"Reducing emissions from transport in cities through traditional climate \r\npolicy instruments (e.g., through a carbon tax) is more difficult when \r\ninner-urban neighbourhoods are less accessible and less affordable, \r\nbecause exclusionary mechanisms act as a  countervailing force to \r\nthe rising transportation costs induced by the climate policy, pushing \r\nhouseholds outwards rather than inwards. Said differently, the costs \r\nof mitigating intra-city transportation emissions are higher when \r\ninner-urban housing prices are higher (Lampin et al. 2013)."


id: 9cf46e1c39f22404363cf45a50965579
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22231
content:
"an example of convertible investments - they will be decarbonised \r\nonce electricity production has switched to renewable energies. For \r\ncapital stocks that cannot be decarbonised, countries may face costs \r\nof decommissioning well before the end of their useful lifetimes, \r\nespecially when it is needed to respect country commitments to \r\nfuture full decarbonisation."


id: 958c43b9c1fe771ed603f760b22108b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21033
content:
"This suggests that policies making inner-urban neighbourhoods more \r\naccessible and more affordable can open up broader opportunities \r\nfor suburban households to relocate in the face of increasing \r\ntransportation costs. This is particularly important for low- and \r\nmiddle-income households, who spend a  greater portion of their \r\nincome on housing and transportation, and are more likely to be \r\nlocked into locations that are distant from their jobs. Making inner\u0002urban neighbourhoods more accessible and more affordable has the \r\npotential to reduce both the social costs (e.g.,  households feeling \r\nhelpless in front of rising fuel prices) and the economic costs of \r\nmitigation policies - as a lower price of carbon is likely to achieve \r\nthe same amount of emission reductions since households have more \r\ncapacities to adjust."


id: 530ba4e84bd3eb9a5b7af322ed55be77
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10524
content:
"Many investments in infrastructure and sectoral capital stocks have \r\nlong lifetimes. Given this, it may be important to make sure that \r\ntoday's investments be fully decarbonised at the start or that they \r\nlater can be converted to zero carbon. Today's investments in electric \r\nvehicles in settings where electricity is produced with fossil fuels is "


id: b93720e8c1de6717eb0842c0a0bf221a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26675
content:
"This section examines how development pathways can build greater \r\nadaptive and mitigative capacity, and then turns to several examples \r\nof mitigation actions with implications for adaptation where there \r\nis a notable link to development pathways and policy choices. These \r\nexamples are in the areas of agriculture, blue carbon and terrestrial \r\necosystem restoration."


id: c3a2639ff43b6c472f252c786a0a99ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28346
content:
"Brazil's progress in mitigation depended significantly on reduced \r\ndeforestation in the past. If deforestation rates keep on rising, \r\nmitigation efforts would need to shift to the energy sector. However, \r\naccording to Rochedo et al. (2018), mitigation costs in the energy \r\nsector in Brazil are three times the costs of reducing deforestation \r\nand increasing land-based carbon sinks. Further mitigation strategies \r\nmay depend on CCS in Brazil as elsewhere (Herreras Martinez \r\net al. 2015; Nogueira de Oliveira et al. 2016), though the economic \r\nfeasibility of deployment is not yet clear (Section 4.2.5.4)."


id: 519ae7fac4f2c4e96f66ca10f68f312d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10296
content:
"Mitigation actions are strongly linked to adaptation. These \r\nconnections come about because mitigation actions can be adaptive \r\n(e.g.,  some agroforestry projects) but also through policy choices \r\n(e.g.,  climate finance is allocated among adaptation or mitigation \r\nprojects) and even biophysical links (e.g.,  climate trajectories, \r\nthemselves determined by mitigation, can influence the viability of \r\nadaptation projects). As development pathways shape the levers and \r\nenablers available to a society (Section 4.3.1, Figure 4.7), a broader \r\nset of enabling conditions also helps with adaptation (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement)."


id: 1a753d4ec650cb893ac65acdd64a39b9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1644
content:
"Previous assessments have consistently recognised this linkage. The \r\nParis Agreement includes mitigation and adaptation as key areas of \r\naction, through NDCs and communicating adaptation actions and \r\nplans. The Agreement explicitly recognises that mitigation co-benefits \r\nresulting from adaptation can count towards NDC targets. The IPCC \r\nFifth Assessment Report (IPCC 2014) emphasised that sustainable \r\ndevelopment is helpful in going beyond a narrow focus on separate \r\nmitigation and adaptation options and their specific co-benefits. \r\nThe IPCC Special Report on climate change and land addresses \r\nGHG emissions from land-based ecosystems with a  focus on the \r\nvulnerability of land-based systems to climate change. The report \r\nidentifies the potential of changes to land use and land management \r\npractices to mitigate and adapt to climate change, and to generate \r\nco-benefits that help meet other SDGs (Jian et al. 2019)."


id: dbc4b148fcb5e74265c14cd2a2535caf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32090
content:
"Governance and institutional capacity necessary for mitigation \r\nactions also enables effective adaptation actions. Implementation of \r\nmitigation and adaptation actions can, however, encounter different \r\nsets of challenges. Mitigation actions requiring a  shift away from \r\nestablished sectors and resources (e.g., fossil fuels) entail governance \r\nchallenges to overcome vested interests (Piggot et al. 2020; SEI \r\net al. 2020). Mitigation-focused initiatives from non-state actors \r\ntend to attain greater completion than adaptation-focused initiatives \r\n(NewClimate Institute et al. 2019)."


id: 79627cdab4d12aef9a3be566bb066bd0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16667
content:
"Adaptation-focused pathways might reduce inequality, if adequate \r\nsupport is available and well-distributed (Pelling and Garschagen \r\n2019). Some studies suggest that cities might plan for possible \r\nsynergies in adaptation and mitigation strategies, currently done \r\nindependently (Grafakos et al. 2019). The literature suggests that \r\ncities might identify both mitigation and adaptation as co-benefits of \r\ninterventions targeted at developmental goals (Dulal 2017)."


id: 1109692514c2ca4ca1d861bf144854b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 158
content:
"On the level of individual entities, adaptation is reactive to current \r\nor anticipated environmental changes but mitigation is undertaken \r\ndeliberately. Chapter  5  considers behavioural change, including \r\nthe reconsideration of values and what is meant by well-being, \r\nand reflecting on a range of actors addressing both adaptation and \r\nmitigation. Shifting development pathways may be disruptive (Cross\u0002Chapter Box  5), and there may be limits to propensity to change. \r\nSome studies report that climate change deniers and sceptics can be \r\ninduced to undertake pro-environmental action if those actions are \r\nframed in terms of societal welfare, not climate change (Bain et al. \r\n2012; Hornsey et al. 2016). Concrete initiatives to change behaviour \r\nand lifestyles include the Transition Town movement, which seeks \r\nto implement a just transition - both in relation to adaptation and \r\nmitigation - in specific localities (Roy et al. 2018)."


id: cf8740820364d8ad1a47f0c93f3703cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30186
content:
"Finance and investment of mitigation actions must be examined in \r\nconjunction with funding of adaptation actions, due to biophysical \r\nlinkages and policy trade-offs (Box  15.1). Most climate funding \r\nsupports mitigation efforts, not adaptation efforts (Buchner et al. \r\n2019) (Halimanjaya and Papyrakis 2012). Mitigation projects are \r\noften more attractive to private capital (Abadie et al. 2013; Buchner \r\net al. 2019). Efforts to integrate adaptation and mitigation in climate \r\nchange finance are limited (Kongsager et al. 2016; Locatelli et al. 2016) \r\nThere is a perception that integration of mitigation and adaptation \r\nprojects would lead to competition for limited finance available for \r\nadaptation (Locatelli et al. 2016). Long-standing debates (Ayers and \r\nHuq 2009; Smith et al. 2011) whether development finance counts \r\nas adaptation funding remain unresolved. See Chapter 15 for more \r\nin-depth discussion relating investment in funding mitigation and \r\nadaptation actions."


id: 625df34da0957564ca11b19459480b34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13037
content:
"Development is a  key factor leading to land degradation in many \r\nparts of the world (IPBES 2019b). Shifting development pathways to \r\nsustainability can include restoration and protection of ecosystems, \r\nwhich can enhance capacity for both mitigation and adaptation \r\nactions (IPBES 2019b)."


id: 4092e48b9a3519f8bd61ff604997f601
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7537
content:
"In this section, we explore mitigation actions related to sustainable \r\nagriculture, coastal ecosystems ('blue carbon'), and restoration and \r\nprotection of some terrestrial ecosystems. These mitigation actions \r\nare exemplary of trade-offs and synergies with adaptation, sensitivity \r\nto biophysical coupling, and linkages to development pathways. \r\nOther specific examples can be found in Chapters 6 to 11."


id: abf748d67af6f9b1a16b8f7bce7a6356
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24576
content:
"Farming system approaches can be a  significant contributor to \r\nmitigation pathways. These practices (which are not mutually \r\nexclusive) include agroecology, conservation agriculture, \r\nintegrated production systems and organic farming (Box  7.5). \r\nSuch methods have potential to sequester significant amounts of \r\nsoil carbon (Section 7.4.3.1) as well as reduce emissions from on\u0002field practices such as rice cultivation, fertilizer management, and \r\nmanure management (Section 7.4.3) with total mitigation potential \r\nof 3.9 +- 0.2 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Chapter 7). Critically, these approaches \r\nmay have significant benefits in terms of adaptation and other \r\ndevelopment goals."


id: 73837ec4eeda39f911db66c2d517e53f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15795
content:
"2012; Tokoro et al. 2014) (see Cross-Chapter Box 8 on blue carbon as \r\na storage medium and removal process)."


id: f1f7ac3dfe8d18c27a5a3189b0ee7504
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35593
content:
"Farming system approaches to agricultural mitigation have a wide \r\nvariety of co-benefits and trade-offs. Indeed, there are conceptual \r\nformulations for these practices in which the co-benefits are more of \r\na focus, such as climate-smart agriculture (CSA) which ties mitigation \r\nto adaptation through its three pillars of increased productivity, \r\nmitigation, and adaptation (Lipper et al. 2014). The '4 per 1000' goal \r\nto increase soil carbon by 0.4% per year (Soussana et al. 2019) is \r\ncompatible with the three pillars of CSA. Sustainable intensification, \r\na framework which centers around a need for increased agricultural \r\nproduction within environmental constraints also complements CSA \r\n(Campbell et al. 2014). The literature reports examples of mitigation \r\nco-benefits of adaptation actions, with evidence from various regions \r\n(Thornton and Herrero 2015; Thornton et al. 2018) (Chapter 7)."


id: 21f8320ab3313c49bbcd6afe204cfcd5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2789
content:
"Restoring or protecting coastal ecosystems is a  mitigation action \r\nwith synergies with adaptation and development. Such restoration \r\nhas been described as a 'no regrets' mitigation option in the Special \r\nReport on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (Bindoff \r\net al. 2019) and advocated as a climate solution at national scales \r\n(Bindoff et al. 2019; Taillardat et al. 2018; Fargione et al. 2018) and \r\nglobal scales (Howard et al. 2017). On a  per-area basis, carbon \r\nstocks in coastal ecosystems can be higher than in terrestrial forests \r\n(Howard et al. 2017), with below-ground carbon storage up to 1000 \r\ntC ha-1 (McLeod et al. 2011; Crooks et al. 2018; Bindoff et al. 2019). \r\nOverall, coastal vegetated systems have a  mitigation potential of \r\naround 0.5% of current global emissions, with an upper limit of less \r\nthan 2% (Bindoff et al. 2019)."


id: 600f5309b49555eb3eadc0c95f1ffac5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12691
content:
"Conservation agriculture, promoted for improving agricultural soils \r\nand crop diversity (Powlson et al. 2016) can help build adaptive \r\ncapacity (Smith et al. 2017; Pradhan et al. 2018a) and yield \r\nmitigation co-benefits through improved fertiliser use or efficient use \r\nof machinery and fossil fuels (Harvey et al. 2014; Cui et al. 2018; \r\nPradhan et al. 2018a)."


id: 9e5d73ae0914025aa92e80dfd0c2c24c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22441
content:
"There is a  complex set of barriers to implementation of farming\u0002system approaches for climate mitigation (Section 7.6.4), suggesting \r\na  need for deliberate shifts in development pathways to achieve \r\nsignificant progress in this sector. The link between NDCs and \r\nmitigation in the land use sector can provide impetus for such policies. \r\nFor example, there are multiple agricultural mitigation options that \r\nsoutheast Asian countries could use to meet NDCs that would have \r\nan important adaptive impact (Amjath-Babu et al. 2019)."


id: 516cfdeb2f6aee75414124dc63fce2ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10268
content:
"Some agricultural practices considered sustainable have trade-offs, \r\nand their implementation can have negative effects on adaptation or \r\nother ecosystem services. Fast-growing tree monocultures or biofuel \r\ncrops may enhance carbon stocks but reduce downstream water \r\navailability and decrease availability of agricultural land (Windham\u0002Myers et al. 2018; Kuwae and Hori 2019). In some dry environments \r\nsimilarly, agroforestry can increase competition with crops and \r\npastures, decreasing productivity, and reduce catchment water yield \r\n(Schrobback et al. 2011)."


id: 2fa6458bbbb04d2e6c013393b6e7b77e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4918
content:
"Coastal ecosystem-based mitigation can be cost-effective, but \r\ninterventions should be designed with care. One concern is to \r\nassure that actions remain effective at higher levels of climate \r\nchange (Alongi 2015; Bindoff et al. 2019). Also, methane emissions \r\nfrom ecosystems may partially reduce the benefit of the carbon \r\nsequestration (Rosentreter et al. 2018) depending on the salinity \r\n(Poffenbarger et al. 2011; Kroeger et al. 2017). As the main driver \r\nof mangrove forest loss is aquaculture/agriculture (Thomas et al. \r\n2017), there may be entrenched interests opposing restoration and \r\nprotection actions."


id: 8046d84c99659dfda6e2a91cfd71a11d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17710
content:
"Agricultural practices can adapt to climate change while decreasing \r\nCO2 emissions on the farm field. However, if such a practice leads \r\nto lower yields, interconnections of the global agricultural system \r\ncan lead to land use change elsewhere and a  net increase in \r\nGHG emissions (Erb et al. 2016). Implementation of sustainable \r\nagriculture can increase or decrease yields depending on context \r\n(Pretty et al. 2006)."


id: 35ad6ef6548ea8b99eb2da1d6f044a15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5851
content:
"Restoration of terrestrial landscapes can be a  direct outcome of \r\ndevelopment pathways, and can be critical to achieving a variety of \r\nSDGs (especially 1, 2, 6, 8, 13, 15) (Vergara et al. 2016; Lapola et al. \r\n2018) although it also presents risks and can have trade-offs with \r\nother SDGs (Cao et al. 2010; Dooley and Kartha 2018). Landscape \r\nrestoration is nearly always a mitigation action, and can also provide \r\nadaptive capacity. While policy in Brazil has tended to focus on the \r\nAmazon as a carbon sink, the mitigation co-benefits of ecosystem\u0002based adaptation actions have been highlighted in the literature \r\n(Locatelli et al. 2011; Di Gregorio et al. 2016). A study of potential "


id: 352b33ff4d6761c24f460943f60bf68b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5777
content:
"The Paris Agreement recognises that mitigation co-benefits resulting \r\nfrom Parties' adaptation actions and/or economic diversification \r\nplans can contribute to mitigation outcomes (UNFCCC 2015a: \r\nArticle 4.7). Blue carbon refers to biologically-driven carbon flux or \r\nstorage in coastal ecosystems such as seagrasses, salt marshes, and \r\nmangroves (Wylie et al. 2016; Fennessy et al. 2019; Fourqurean et al. "


id: 86ccf5daa8963b2d0999938510f66df0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18743
content:
"et al. 2017), and especially in major trading partners, the lack of \r\nwhich can result in competitive disadvantage for sectors exposed to \r\ninternational competition (Alton et al. 2014). The international prices \r\nof the key commodities (notably energy), goods and services are \r\nimportant, notably when shifting development pathway is based on \r\nstructural change (e.g., Willenbockel et al. 2017 for Ghana and Kenya)."


id: 9e36b014a625b4427a6c5fa043dd3ae5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22413
content:
"restoration of degraded lands in Latin America (Vergara et al. 2016) \r\nindicates that substantial benefits for mitigation, adaptation, and \r\neconomic development accrue after several years, underscoring \r\na reliance on deliberate development choices. In agricultural contexts, \r\nrestoration is a development choice that can enhance adaptive and \r\nmitigative capacity via impact on farmer livelihoods."


id: c99aa998907d46caeb5a09b6756b6e6d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29274
content:
"Preventing degradation of landscapes can support both mitigation \r\nand adaptation (IPCC 2019). Restoration of ecosystems is associated \r\nwith improved water filtration, groundwater recharge and flood \r\ncontrol and multiple other ecosystem services (Ouyang et al. 2016)."


id: 976ee082276c432ca24a54592a7a479c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21354
content:
"Restoration projects must be designed with care. There can be trade\u0002offs in addition to the synergies noted above (Section  7.6.4.3). \r\nRestorations may be unsuccessful if not considered in their socio\u0002economic context (Lengefeld et al. 2020; Iftekhar et al. 2017; Jellinek \r\net al. 2019). Restoration projects for mitigation purposes can be \r\nmore effective if done with adaptation in mind (Gray et al. 2011) as \r\na changing climate may render some mitigation actions biophysically \r\ninfeasible (Arneth et al. 2021). Landscape restoration projects \r\nintended for CDR may underperform due to future release of stored \r\ncarbon, or deferral of storage until after irreversible climate change \r\neffects (e.g. extinctions) (Dooley and Kartha 2018)."


id: 886834d80c978cf8ea3c4d4d6dbce9f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18991
content:
"Afforestation plans have received substantial attention as a climate \r\nmitigation action, with ongoing unresolved debate on the feasibility \r\nand trade-offs of such plans. Such afforestation programs can fail \r\nfor biophysical reasons (Fleischman et al. 2020) (Section  7.4.2.2) \r\nbut also lack of consideration of socioeconomic and development \r\ncontexts (Fleischman et al. 2020)."


id: 7e620267d4d40d3f60b189ea432059f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17451
content:
"Shifting development pathways and accelerating mitigation are \r\ncomplex endeavours that carry risks. Some of these risks can be easily \r\ncaptured by quantitative models. Others are better understood via \r\nqualitative approaches, such as qualitative narrative storylines (told \r\nin words) and methods mixing qualitative and quantitative models \r\n(Kemp-Benedict 2012; Hanger-Kopp et al. 2019). The following \r\noutline key risks and relevant hedging strategies identified in \r\nthe literature."


id: 53183205ee425939fc52a905b4327f16
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10542
content:
"The science on climate change, its impacts and the opportunities to \r\nmitigate is continuously being updated. Even though decisions are no \r\nlonger made 'in a sea of uncertainty' (Lave 1991), we know that new \r\ninformation will come over time, that may have significant bearing on \r\nthe design and objectives of policies to shift development pathways \r\nand accelerate mitigation. New information may come from climate \r\nsciences (e.g.,  updated GWP values or available carbon budgets) \r\n(Quere et al. 2018), impact sciences (e.g.,  re-evaluation of climate \r\nimpacts associated with given emission pathways) (Ricke et al. 2018) \r\nor mitigation sciences (e.g.,  on availability of given technologies) \r\n(Lenzi et al. 2018; Giannousakis et al. 2020)."


id: 758cfd63dd4e2b702f40b0b98946f028
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16084
content:
"The international context is a major source of uncertainty for national\u0002level planning, especially for small- or medium-sized open economies, \r\nbecause the outcome of domestic choices may significantly depend \r\non decisions made by other countries and actor, over which national \r\ngovernments have limited or no control (Lachapelle and Paterson \r\n2013). Availability of foreign financial resources in countries with \r\nlimited domestic savings (Baum et al. 2017) and availability of \r\ntechnology transfers (Glachant and Dechezlepretre 2017) are some \r\nexamples. Other external decisions with significant bearing on \r\ndomestic action include mitigation policies in other countries (Dai "


id: 1862ebc13f448cf0ed631a4d941535bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1331
content:
"At the same time, economic and social systems are characterised by \r\nhigh degree of inertia, via long-lived capital stock or urban forms \r\n(Lecocq and Shalizi 2014), or more broadly mutually reinforcing \r\nphysical, economic, and social constraints (Seto et al. 2016) that \r\nmay lead to carbon lock-ins (Erickson et al. 2015). Risks associated \r\nwith long-lasting fossil-fuel power plants have been the object of \r\nparticular attention. For example, Pfeiffer et al. (2018) estimate \r\nthat even if the current pipeline of power plants was cancelled, \r\nabout 20% of the existing capacity might be stranded to remain \r\ncompatible with 1.5degC or 2degC pathways - implying that additional \r\ncapital accumulation would lead to higher sunk costs associated with \r\nstranded assets (Ansar et al. 2013; Johnson et al. 2015; Kriegler et al. \r\n2018; Luderer et al. 2018b)."


id: 29412b7a191bcf75fcea63817a6dbda
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3927
content:
"Equity issues are often discussed in the literature via frameworks that \r\nare well-founded in the ethical literature and that have a strong bearing \r\non effort-sharing, but have not yet been quantitatively modelled \r\nand expressed in the form of an emissions allocation  quantified \r\nframework. These include, for example, ethical perspectives based \r\nin human rights (Johl and Duyck 2012), human capabilities (Klinsky \r\net al. 2017b), environmental justice (Mohai et al. 2009; Schlosberg \r\n2009), ecological debt (Srinivasana et al. 2008; Warlenius et al. 2015), \r\ntransitional justice (Klinsky 2017; Klinsky and Brankovic 2018), and \r\nplanetary boundaries (Hayha et al. 2016)."


id: 440af8fd520513d38a2ac6847567278f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8117
content:
"of a  just transition (ILO 2015; Rosemberg 2010). In recent years \r\nthe concept of a 'just transition' has gained increased traction, for \r\nexample incorporated in the outcome of the Rio+20 Earth Summit \r\nand more recently recognised in the preamble of the Paris Agreement, \r\nwhich states 'the imperative of a just transition of the workforce and \r\nthe creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with \r\nnationally defined development priorities' (UNFCCC 2015a). Some \r\nheads of state and government signed a Solidarity and Just Transition \r\nSilesia Declaration first introduced at COP24 in Poland (HoSG 2018)."


id: 4ff52faccafbad7ab91e856ad3b1ec50
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10018
content:
"Ultimately, equity consequences depend on how costs and benefits \r\nare initially incurred and how they are shared as per social contracts \r\n(Combet and Hourcade 2017), national policy, and international \r\nagreements. The literature suggests a  relationship between the \r\neffectiveness of cooperative action and the perception of fairness of \r\nsuch arrangements. Winkler et al. (2018) demonstrate that countries \r\nhave put forward a  wide variety of indicators and approaches for \r\nexplaining the fairness and ambition of their NDCs, reflecting the \r\nbroader range of perspectives found in the moral philosophical \r\nliterature cited above. Mbeva and Pauw (2016) further find that \r\nadaptation and financing issues take on greater salience in the \r\nnational perspectives reflected in the NDCs."


id: fa798734c978cbf9f7d537b23ed79784
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36926
content:
"Topics of equity and fairness have begun to receive a greater amount \r\nof attention within the energy and climate literature, namely through \r\nthe approaches of gender and race (Pearson et al. 2017; Lennon 2017; \r\nAllen et al. 2019), climate justice (Roberts and Parks 2007; Routledge \r\net al. 2018) (Roberts &  Parks, 2006; Routledge et al. 2018), and \r\nenergy justice (Sovacool and Dworkin 2014). While such approaches \r\nfrequently envision justice and equity as an ethical imperative, justice \r\nalso possesses the instrumental value of enabling deeper and more \r\nsocially acceptable mitigation efforts (Klinsky and Winkler 2018)."


id: 5c661caf1c9f4422f0b211becddcc975
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12050
content:
"A just transition at national, regional and local scales can help to \r\nensure that workers, communities, frontline communities and \r\nthe energy-poor are not left behind in the transition. Moreover, \r\na  just transition necessitates that rapid decarbonisation does not \r\nperpetuate asymmetries between richer and poorer states and \r\npeople (UNHRC 2020). Alliances around a just transition in countries \r\nacross the world take many forms (Box 4.6)."


id: dea85efd9c236a4c3a022fc073f44c52
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32527
content:
"As Figure 4.9 shows, no fewer than seven national commissions or task \r\nforces on a just transition existed as of 2020 as well as seven other \r\nsets of national policies and a  multitude of other actors, networks, \r\nand movements. For instance, the German phase-out of coal subsidies \r\ninvolved a  savings package for unemployed miners. Subsidy reform \r\npackages introduced by Iran, Namibia, the Philippines, Turkey, and \r\nUnited Kingdom provide similar compensating measures to affected \r\ngroups (Sovacool 2017). Spain's just transition plan for coal miners \r\nincludes early retirement, redundancy packages, silicosis compensation, \r\nretraining for green jobs, and priority job placement for former miners."


id: cc48b09fc80daaea23c98adc9affa5b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29682
content:
"Increasing speed of implementation, breadth of action across all sectors of the economy, and depth of emission reduction faces \r\nimportant obstacles, that are rooted in the underlying structure of societies (Section 4.2.7). Addressing these obstacles amounts to \r\nshifting away from existing developmental trends (i.e., shifting development pathways, Cross-Chapter Box 5). This can be done by \r\nstrengthening governance and institutional capacity, aligning technology and innovation systems with low-carbon development, \r\nfacilitating behaviour change and providing adequate finance within the context of multi-objective policy packages and sequences \r\n(Section  4.4.1). Shifting development pathways towards sustainability broadens the scope for, and is thus a  complement to, \r\naccelerated mitigation (Section 4.3)."


id: 639ff65eef70dd63b9ffd94ec1a1d530
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13245
content:
"Patrick Devine-Wright (United Kingdom/Ireland), Julio Diaz-Jose (Mexico), Frank W. Geels (United \r\nKingdom/the Netherlands), Arnulf Grubler (Austria), Nadia Maizi (France/Algeria), Eric Masanet \r\n(the United States of America), Yacob Mulugetta (Ethiopia/United Kingdom), Chioma Daisy Onyige \r\n(Nigeria), Patricia E. Perkins (Canada), Alessandro Sanches-Pereira (Brazil), Elke Ursula Weber (the \r\nUnited States of America)"


id: 39c9897ae73c765d7c2e0b7e39f0d09c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6468
content:
"Jordana Composto (the United States of America), Anteneh Getnet Dagnachew (the Netherlands/\r\nEthiopia), Nandini Das (India), Robert Frank (the United States of America), Bipashyee Ghosh \r\n(India/United Kingdom), Niko Heeren (Switzerland/Norway), Linus Mattauch (Germany/\r\nUnited Kingdom), Josephine Mylan (United Kingdom), Gregory F. Nemet (the United States of \r\nAmerica/Canada), Mani Nepal (Nepal), Leila Niamir (Iran/Germany), Nick Pidgeon (United \r\nKingdom), Narasimha D. Rao (the United States of America), Lucia A. Reisch (United Kingdom), \r\nJulia Steinberger (Switzerland/United Kingdom), Linda Steg (the Netherlands), Cass R. Sunstein \r\n(the United States of America), Charlie Wilson (United Kingdom), Caroline Zimm (Austria)"


id: 5cdf4916dda1d3fc0557568dba549fbd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12128
content:
"Creutzig, F., J. Roy, P. Devine-Wright, J. Diaz-Jose, F.W. Geels, A. Grubler, N. Maizi, E. Masanet, Y. Mulugetta, C.D. Onyige, \r\nP.E. Perkins, A. Sanches-Pereira, E.U. Weber, 2022: Demand, services and social aspects of mitigation. In IPCC, 2022: Climate \r\nChange 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the \r\nIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, \r\nM. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University \r\nPress, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.007."


id: f6200c4277228dc4e415241f1716bb3e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36233
content:
"the end-user and service-provisioning levels. Realisable service-level \r\nefficiency improvements could reduce upstream energy demand by \r\n45% in 2050. {5.3.2, Figure 5.10}"


id: 931d5655e65176754dadd942eda35b3c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20661
content:
"Assessment of the social science literature and regional case studies \r\nreveals how social norms, culture, and individual choices interact with \r\ninfrastructure and other structural changes over time. This provides \r\nnew insight into climate change mitigation strategies, and how \r\neconomic and social activity might be organised across sectors to \r\nsupport emission reductions. To enhance well-being, people demand \r\nservices and not primary energy and physical resources per  se. \r\nFocusing on demand for services and the different social and political \r\nroles people play broadens the participation in climate action."


id: ee931759fc4a40192c6d5b5fa4526213
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35004
content:
"Alternative service provision systems, for example those \r\nenabled through digitalisation, sharing economy initiatives \r\nand circular economy initiatives, have to date made a limited \r\ncontribution to climate change mitigation (medium confidence). \r\nWhile digitalisation through specific new products and applications \r\nholds potential for improvement in service-level efficiencies, without \r\npublic policies and regulations, it also has the potential to increase \r\nconsumption and energy use. Reducing the energy use of data centres, \r\nnetworks, and connected devices is possible in managing low-carbon \r\ndigitalisation. Claims on the benefits of the circular economy for \r\nsustainability and climate change mitigation have limited evidence. \r\n{5.3.4, 5.3.4.1, 5.3.4.2, Figure 5.12, Figure 5.13}"


id: 62da59fb0164a2b3a213fb5e6c59b78d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13120
content:
"Demand-side mitigation and new ways of providing services \r\ncan help avoid, shift, and improve final service demand. Rapid \r\nand deep changes in demand make it easier for every sector \r\nto reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the short and \r\nmedium term (high confidence). {5.2, 5.3}"


id: e0ec4727b46bb0b4dee75cfcc7e461e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32888
content:
"Decent living standards and well-being for all are achievable \r\nthrough the implementation of high-efficiency low demand \r\nmitigation pathways (medium confidence). Decent living standards \r\n(DLS) - a benchmark of minimum material conditions for human well\u0002being - overlaps with many Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). \r\nMinimum requirements of energy use consistent with enabling \r\nwell-being for all is between 20 and 50 GJ per person per year (cap-1 yr-1) \r\ndepending on the context. {5.2.2.1, 5.2.2.2, Box 5.3}"


id: 793f7d01ca45ef23673182273bddf41
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16642
content:
"Providing better services with less energy and resource \r\ninput has high technical potential and is consistent with \r\nproviding well-being for all (medium confidence). Assessment \r\nof 19 demand-side mitigation options and 18 different constituents \r\nof well-being show that positive impacts on well-being outweigh \r\nnegative ones by a factor of 11. {5.2, 5.2.3, Figure 5.6}"


id: e1a6b53ffe611a1611dbea287480093e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32994
content:
"Demand-side mitigation options bring multiple interacting \r\nbenefits (high confidence). Energy services to meet human needs \r\nfor nutrition, shelter, health, and so on are met in many different ways, \r\nwith different emissions implications that depend on local contexts, \r\ncultures, geography, available technologies, and social preferences. \r\nIn the near term, many less-developed countries and poor people \r\neverywhere require better access to safe and low-emissions energy \r\nsources to ensure decent living standards and increase energy savings \r\nfrom service improvements by about 20-25%. {5.2, 5.4.5, Figure 5.3, \r\nFigure 5.4, Figure 5.5, Figure 5.6, Box 5.2, Box 5.3}"


id: a77f58248c58461c4d488e18e5d38b01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23860
content:
"Socio-cultural and lifestyle changes can accelerate climate change \r\nmitigation (medium confidence). Among 60 identified actions that \r\ncould change individual consumption, individual mobility choices have \r\nthe largest potential to reduce carbon footprints. Prioritising car-free \r\nmobility by walking and cycling and adoption of electric mobility could \r\nsave 2 tCO2-eq cap-1 yr-1. Other options with high mitigation potential \r\ninclude reducing air travel, heating and cooling set-point adjustments, \r\nreduced appliance use, shifts to public transit, and shifting consumption \r\ntowards plant-based diets. {5.3.1, 5.3.1.2, Figure 5.8}"


id: 7f81347df28e57411c640a97e341dac8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17609
content:
"Granular technologies and decentralised energy end use, \r\ncharacterised by modularity, small unit sizes and small unit \r\ncosts, diffuse faster into markets and are associated with \r\nfaster technological learning benefits, greater efficiency, more \r\nopportunities to escape technological lock-in, and greater \r\nemployment (high confidence). Examples include solar photovoltaic \r\nsystems, batteries, and thermal heat pumps. {5.3, 5.5, 5.5.3}"


id: 5cf80d3ab6a2de8d2b09cdeb20a80d0a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12143
content:
"Leveraging improvements in end-use service delivery through \r\nbehavioural and technological innovations, and innovations \r\nin market organisation, leads to large reductions in upstream \r\nresource use (high confidence). Analysis of indicative potentials \r\nrange from a factor 10- to 20-fold improvement in the case of available \r\nenergy (exergy) analysis, with the highest improvement potentials at "


id: d4ea195b295c4461b65140b87fe4c4e1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31027
content:
"while maintaining decent living standards and well-being \r\n(high confidence). Individuals with high socio-economic status \r\nare capable of reducing their GHG emissions by becoming role \r\nmodels of low-carbon lifestyles, investing in low-carbon businesses, \r\nand advocating for stringent climate policies. {5.4.1, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, \r\nFigure 5.14}"


id: 734c528f538218bfeedbae456cee4346
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15758
content:
"Demand-side solutions require both motivation and capacity \r\nfor change (high confidence). Motivation by individuals or \r\nhouseholds worldwide to change energy consumption behaviour is \r\ngenerally low. Individual behavioural change is insufficient for climate \r\nchange mitigation unless embedded in structural and cultural change. \r\nDifferent factors influence individual motivation and capacity for \r\nchange in different demographics and geographies. These factors go \r\nbeyond traditional socio-demographic and economic predictors and \r\ninclude psychological variables such as awareness, perceived risk, \r\nsubjective and social norms, values, and perceived behavioural control. \r\nBehavioural nudges promote easy behaviour change, for example \r\n'Improve' actions such as making investments in energy efficiency, \r\nbut fail to motivate harder lifestyle changes (high confidence). {5.4}"


id: e3da9633184b9319d5018fca16f945bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33328
content:
"The current effects of climate change, as well as some mitigation \r\nstrategies, are threatening the viability of existing business \r\npractices, while some corporate efforts also delay mitigation \r\naction (medium confidence). Policy packages that include job \r\ncreation programmes help to preserve social trust, livelihoods, \r\nrespect, and dignity of all workers and employees involved. Business \r\nmodels that protect rent-extracting behaviour may sometimes delay \r\npolitical action. Corporate advertisement and marketing strategies \r\nmay also attempt to deflect corporate responsibility to individuals \r\nor aim to appropriate climate care sentiments in their own brand \r\nbuilding. {5.4.3, 5.6.4}"


id: b68e6b19d5875ee5a6baedb890c72c2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26240
content:
"Meta-analyses demonstrate that behavioural interventions, \r\nincluding the way choices are presented to consumers,1 work \r\nsynergistically with price signals, making the combination \r\nmore effective (medium confidence). Behavioural interventions \r\nthrough nudges, and alternative ways of redesigning and motivating \r\ndecisions, alone provide small to medium contributions to reduce \r\nenergy consumption and GHG emissions. Green defaults, such as \r\nautomatic enrolment in 'green energy' provision, are highly effective. \r\nJudicious labelling, framing, and communication of social norms can \r\nalso increase the effect of mandates, subsidies, or taxes. {5.4, 5.4.1, \r\nTable 5.3a, Table 5.3b}"


id: b3b09e6a479c4d8f3b0a84bc1c8aafd1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25785
content:
"Middle actors - professionals, experts, and regulators - play \r\na  crucial, albeit underestimated and underutilised, role in \r\nestablishing low-carbon standards and practices (medium \r\nconfidence). Building managers, landlords, energy efficiency \r\nadvisers, technology installers, and car dealers influence patterns \r\nof mobility and energy consumption by acting as middle actors or \r\nintermediaries in the provision of building or mobility services and \r\nneed greater capacity and motivation to play this role. {5.4.3}"


id: ddfa36d0bc5bbcb542f080776dc7b5a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32424
content:
"Coordinated change in several domains leads to the \r\nemergence of new low-carbon configurations with cascading \r\nmitigation effects (high confidence). Demand-side transitions \r\ninvolve interacting and sometimes antagonistic processes on the \r\nbehavioural, socio-cultural, institutional, business, and technological \r\ndimensions. Individual- or sectoral-level change may be stymied by \r\nreinforcing social, infrastructural, and cultural lock-ins. Coordinating \r\nthe way choices are presented to end users and planners, physical \r\ninfrastructures, new technologies and related business models can \r\nrapidly realise system-level change. {5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, 5.4.5, 5.5}"


id: c75d9485804209e162214a15440f3428
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28954
content:
"Social influencers and thought leaders can increase the \r\nadoption of low-carbon technologies, behaviours, and lifestyles \r\n(high confidence). Preferences are malleable and can align with \r\na cultural shift. The modelling of such shifts by salient and respected \r\ncommunity members can help bring about changes in different \r\nservice provisioning systems. Between 10% and 30% of committed \r\nindividuals are required to set new social norms. {5.2.1, 5.4}"


id: f22e222168a60716dcdb93c3e757f7c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35635
content:
"Cultural change, in combination with new or adapted \r\ninfrastructure, is necessary to enable and realise many 'Avoid' \r\nand 'Shift' options (medium confidence). By drawing support \r\nfrom diverse actors, narratives of change can enable coalitions to \r\nform, providing the basis for social movements to campaign in favour \r\nof (or against) societal transformations. People act and contribute to \r\nclimate change mitigation in their diverse capacities as consumers, \r\ncitizens, professionals, role models, investors, and policymakers. \r\n{5.4, 5.5, 5.6}"


id: ef085ca4b4b8024a963ef6f1b60377da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35079
content:
"Social equity reinforces capacity and motivation for mitigating \r\nclimate change (medium confidence). Impartial governance "


id: 38afea013cb77473ed06728e747bae3f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6289
content:
"such as fair treatment by law and order institutions, fair treatment \r\nby gender, and income equity, increases social trust, thus enabling \r\ndemand-side climate policies. High status (often high carbon) item \r\nconsumption may be reduced by taxing absolute wealth without \r\ncompromising well-being. {5.2, 5.4.2, 5.6}"


id: fbda0ecfba71efcfb67c1a0f9d9d7c34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37120
content:
"Policies that increase the political access and participation \r\nof women, racialised, and marginalised groups increase the \r\ndemocratic impetus for climate action (high confidence). \r\nIncluding more differently situated knowledge and diverse perspectives \r\nmakes climate mitigation policies more effective. {5.2, 5.6}"


id: ad1b6895b3a98519d802738ceeb34a47
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24778
content:
"Carbon pricing is most effective if revenues are redistributed \r\nor used impartially (high confidence). A carbon levy earmarked \r\nfor green infrastructures or saliently returned to taxpayers \r\ncorresponding to widely accepted notions of fairness increases the \r\npolitical acceptability of carbon pricing. {5.6, Box 5.11}"


id: cef2fc762925f6056605f99c14e3fc81
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30092
content:
"Greater contextualisation and granularity in policy approaches \r\nbetter addresses the challenges of rapid transitions towards \r\nzero-carbon systems (high confidence). Larger systems take \r\nmore time to evolve, grow, and change compared to smaller ones. \r\nCreating and scaling up entirely new systems takes longer than \r\nreplacing existing technologies and practices. Late adopters tend to \r\nadopt faster than early pioneers. Obstacles and feasibility barriers \r\nare high in the early transition phases. Barriers decrease as a result \r\nof technical and social learning processes, network building, scale \r\neconomies, cultural debates, and institutional adjustments. {5.5, 5.6}"


id: 54a6b5432d8fe40005c0957da203f02
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10774
content:
"The lockdowns implemented in many countries in response \r\nto the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that behavioural \r\nchange at a massive scale and in a short time is possible (high \r\nconfidence). COVID-19 accelerated some specific trends, such as \r\nincreased uptake of urban cycling. However, the acceptability of \r\ncollective social change over a longer term towards less resource\u0002intensive lifestyles depends on social mandate building through \r\npublic participation, discussion and debate over information provided \r\nby experts, to produce recommendations that inform policymaking. \r\n{Box 5.2}"


id: bf0f8e9e67436f73a3b8684ed1ffec80
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27613
content:
"Mitigation policies that integrate and communicate with the \r\nvalues people hold are more successful (high confidence). Values \r\ndiffer between cultures. Measures that support autonomy, energy \r\nsecurity and safety, equity and environmental protection, and fairness \r\nresonate well in many communities and social groups. Changing from \r\na commercialised, individualised, entrepreneurial training model to an \r\neducation cognisant of planetary health and human well-being can \r\naccelerate climate change awareness and action. {5.4.1, 5.4.2}"


id: fa10ee87b15ad73ad5addd8460c3edbd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36856
content:
"Changes in consumption choices that are supported by \r\nstructural changes and political action enable the uptake of \r\nlow-carbon choices (high confidence). Policy instruments applied \r\nin coordination can help to accelerate change in a consistent desired \r\ndirection. Targeted technological change, regulation, and public \r\npolicy can help in steering digitalisation, the sharing economy, and \r\ncircular economy towards climate change mitigation. {5.3, 5.6}"


id: b94add4a0bc15579479d2b4602cf937
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26692
content:
"emphasises equity and universal need satisfaction, compatible with \r\nprogress towards meeting the Sustainable Development Goals \r\n(SDGs) (Lamb and Steinberger 2017)."


id: 90d4afe2431b79dc58be2096e31fc1c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20330
content:
"The requisites for well-being include collective and social interactions \r\nas well as consumption-based material inputs. Moreover, rather than \r\nmaterial inputs per se, people need and demand services for dignified \r\nsurvival, sustenance, mobility, communication, comfort and material \r\nwell-being (Nakicenovic et al. 1996b; Johansson et al. 2012; Creutzig \r\net al. 2018). These services may be provided in many different context\u0002specific ways using physical resources (biomass, energy, materials, \r\netc.) and available technologies (e.g.,  cooking tools, appliances). \r\nHere we understand demand as demand for services (often requiring \r\nmaterial input), with particular focus on services that are required for \r\nwell-being (such as lighting, accessibility, shelter, etc.), and that are \r\nshaped by culturally and geographically differentiated social aspects, \r\nchoice architectures and the built environment (infrastructures)."


id: 5dc85a757d645a772417a09b686a025c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12283
content:
"Three entry points are relevant for this chapter. First, well-designed \r\ndemand for services scenarios are consistent with adequate levels \r\nof well-being for everyone (Rao and Baer 2012; Grubler et al. 2018; \r\nMastrucci et al. 2020; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020), with high and/\r\nor improved quality of life (Max-Neef 1995), improved levels of \r\nhappiness (Easterlin et al. 2010) and sustainable human development \r\n(Arrow et al. 2013; Dasgupta and Dasgupta 2017)."


id: a9331768f921a0ccca207b6ded76259b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24150
content:
"Sector-specific mitigation approaches (Chapters 6-11) emphasise \r\nthe potential of mitigation via improvements in energy- and \r\nmaterials-efficient manufacturing (Gutowski et  al. 2013; Gramkow \r\nand Anger-Kraavi 2019; Olatunji et al. 2019; Wang et al. 2019), new \r\nproduct design (Fischedick et  al. 2014), energy-efficient buildings \r\n(Lucon et al. 2014), shifts in diet (Bajzelj et al. 2014; Smith et al. 2014), \r\ntransport infrastructure design (Sims et al. 2014), and compact urban \r\nforms (Seto et  al. 2014). In this chapter, service-related mitigation \r\nstrategies are categorised as 'Avoid', 'Shift', or 'Improve' options to "


id: 28d6510521bcdc14b82c3d4d427f26b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3859
content:
"designed by urban planners and building and transport professionals, \r\ncorresponding investments, and a  political culture supportive of \r\nmitigation action. This is particularly true for many 'Avoid' and 'Shift' \r\ndecisions that are difficult because they encounter psychological \r\nbarriers of breaking routines, habits and imagining new lifestyles \r\nand the social costs of not conforming to society (Kaiser 2006). \r\nSimpler 'Improve' decisions like energy efficiency investments, on \r\nthe other hand, can be triggered and sustained by traditional policy \r\ninstruments, complemented by behavioural nudges."


id: d4679de87a93cf4ccb0dec9fc5b1803b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30936
content:
"Figure 5.1 | Low Energy Demand Scenario needs no BECCS and needs less decarbonisation effort. Dependence of the size of the mitigation effort to reach a 1.5degC \r\nclimate target (cumulative GtCO2 emission reduction 2020-2100 by option) as a function of the level of energy demand (average global final energy demand 2020-2100 in \r\nEJ yr-1) in baseline and corresponding 1.5degC scenarios (1.9 W m-2 radiative forcing change) based on the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC (data obtained from \r\nthe Scenario Explorer database, LED baseline emission data obtained from authors). In this figure an example of remaining carbon budget of 400 Gt has been taken from Rogelj \r\net al. (2019) for illustrative purposes. 400 Gt is also the number given in Table SPM.2 (IPCC 2021, p. 29) for a probability of 67% to limit global warming to 1.5degC."


id: bd0c4e2bd2562a1a206bd9a3cbdd78e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27304
content:
"with social change to integrate Improving ways of living, Shifting \r\nmodalities and Avoiding certain kinds of emissions altogether \r\n(Section 5.6)."


id: fb99c66725da5f265441a13b6699f7ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37087
content:
"consumption patterns within the widely recognised constraints of \r\nplanetary boundaries, resource availability, and the need to provide \r\ndecent living standards for all (Langhelle 2000; Toth and Szigeti \r\n2016; O'Neill et  al. 2018). Inversely, reduced poverty and higher \r\nsocial equity offer opportunities for delinking demand for services \r\nfrom emissions, for example via more long-term decision-making \r\nafter having escaped poverty traps and by reduced demand for \r\nnon-well-being-enhancing status consumption (Nabi et  al. 2020; \r\nOrtega-Ruiz et al. 2020; Parker and Bhatti 2020; Teame and Habte \r\n2020) (Section 5.3)."


id: abaaf9ac7a2d36dc4e94a1ec3a0569d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24533
content:
"Social practice theory emphasises that material stocks and social \r\nrelations are key in forming and maintaining habits (Reckwitz 2002; \r\nHaberl et al. 2021). This chapter reflects these insights by assessing \r\nthe role of infrastructures and social norms in GHG emission-intensive \r\nor low-carbon lifestyles (Section 5.4)."


id: e9ba12ad46bcdcbde66bd6bf8df1b60
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34269
content:
"A core operational principle for sustainable development is equitable \r\naccess to services to provide well-being for all, while minimising \r\nresource inputs and environmental and social externalities/trade\u0002offs, underpinning the Sustainable Development Goals (Princen \r\n2003; Lamb and Steinberger 2017; Dasgupta and Dasgupta 2017). \r\nSustainable development is not possible without changes in "


id: a49646454cbf9b4221cc7a2f709ff748
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23457
content:
"Throughout this chapter we discuss how people can realise various \r\nopportunities to reduce GHG emission-intensive consumption \r\n(Sections 5.2 and 5.3), and act in various roles (Section  5.4), \r\nwithin an enabling environment created by policy instruments and \r\ninfrastructure that build on social dynamics (Section 5.6)."


id: a38e5dc7cf6f05d8cd2d902fb684ad1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23296
content:
"A bibliometric overview of the literature found 99,065 academic peer-reviewed papers identified with 34 distinct search queries \r\naddressing relevant content of this chapter (Creutzig et al. 2021a). The literature is growing rapidly (15% yr -1) and the literature body \r\nassessed in the AR6 period (2014-2020) is twice as large as all literature published before."


id: c5e8941a183c64f3dcf5881be1fe7a7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28713
content:
"Box 5.1, Figure 1 | Map of the literature on demand, services and social aspects of climate change mitigation. Dots show document positions obtained \r\nby reducing the 60-dimensional topic scores to two dimensions aiming to preserve similarity in overall topic score. The two axes therefore have no direct interpretation \r\nbut represent a reduced version of similarities between documents across 60 topics. Documents are coloured by query category. Topic labels of the 24 most relevant \r\ntopics are placed in the centre of each of the large clusters of documents associated with each topic. % value in caption indicates the proportion of studies in each \r\n'relevance' bracket. Source: reused with permission from Creutzig et al. (2021a)."


id: 83937458bb29537e7a2780bbef19f3c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18235
content:
"Section 5.2 provides evidence on the links among mitigation and well\u0002being, services, equity, trust, and governance. Section 5.3 quantifies \r\nthe demand-side opportunity space for mitigation, relying on the \r\nAvoid-Shift-Improve framework. Section  5.4 assesses the relevant \r\ncontribution of different parts of society to climate change mitigation. \r\nSection  5.5 evaluates the overall dynamics of social transition "


id: c99012449ee347861c598869f3ce8c00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29269
content:
"processes while Section 5.6 summarises insights on governance and \r\npolicy packages for demand-side mitigation and well-being. A Social \r\nScience Primer (Chapter  5 Supplementary Material I) defines and \r\ndiscusses key terms and social science concepts used in the context \r\nof climate change mitigation."


id: 6ae0c10e6950d2244792e6e2bdf5bc5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14430
content:
"There is now high evidence and high agreement that the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the political feasibility of large-scale \r\ngovernment actions to support the services for provision of public goods, including climate change policies. Many behavioural changes \r\ndue to COVID-19 reinforce sufficiency and emphasis on solidarity, economies built around care, livelihood protection, collective action, \r\nand basic service provision, linked to reduced emissions."


id: d2d4de28238a05427cdc226e820cc5ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30691
content:
"COVID-19 drove hundreds of millions of people below poverty thresholds, reversing decades of poverty reduction accomplishments (Krieger \r\n2020; Mahler et al. 2020; Patel et al. 2020; Sumner et al. 2020) and raising the spectre of intersecting health and climate crises that are \r\ndevastating for the most vulnerable (Flyvbjerg 2020; Phillips et al. 2020). Like those of climate change, pandemic impacts fall heavily on \r\ndisadvantaged groups, exacerbate the uneven distribution of future benefits, amplify existing inequities, and introduce new ones (Beaunoyer \r\net al. 2020; Devine-Wright et al. 2020). Addressing such inequities is a positive step towards the social trust that leads to improved climate \r\npolicies as well as individual actions. Increased support for care workers and social infrastructures within a solidarity economy is consistent \r\nwith lower-emission economic transformation (Shelley 2017; Di Chiro 2019; Pichler et al. 2019; Smetschka et al. 2019)."


id: c5b467276feed1ec9e8c99c7ea307971
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28686
content:
"which is inclusive, compatible with sustainable development, and \r\ngenerates multiple ways to mitigate emissions. Development targeted \r\nto basic needs and well-being for all entails less carbon intensity than \r\nGDP-focused growth (Rao et al. 2014; Lamb and Rao 2015)."


id: 51001606cf0e77aa4ec6c2da58adcb82
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10192
content:
"Because of data limitations, which can make cross-country \r\ncomparisons difficult, health-based indicators and in particular life \r\nexpectancy (Lamb et  al. 2014) have sometimes been proposed as \r\nquick and practical ways to compare local or national situations, \r\nclimate impacts, and policy effects (Decancq et al. 2009; Sager 2017; \r\nBurstein et al. 2019). A number of different well-being metrics are \r\nvaluable in emphasising the constituents of what is needed for \r\na  decent life in different dimensions (Lamb and Steinberger 2017; \r\nPorter et al. 2017; Smith and Reid 2018). The SDGs overlap in many \r\nways with such indicators, and the data needed to assess progress \r\nin meeting the SDGs is also useful for quantifying well-being (Gough \r\n2017). For the purposes of this chapter, indicators directly relating \r\nGHG emissions to well-being for all are particularly relevant."


id: ea795c5e84edf3ac8e39a07b9452fe2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34398
content:
"role in determining energy demand. Hence, demand-side and service\u0002oriented mitigation strategies are most effective if geographically \r\nand culturally differentiated (Niamir et al. 2020a)."


id: f8e01cee129be60ce792fd3684fe1090
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36666
content:
"with lower subjective well-being, is more strongly associated with \r\npoor subjective well-being in more-developed countries (Frongillo \r\net al. 2019); in wealthier countries, the relationship between living in \r\nrural areas is less strongly associated with negative well-being than \r\nin less-developed countries (Requena 2016); and income inequality \r\nis negatively associated with subjective well-being in developed \r\ncountries, but positively so in less-developed countries (Ngamaba \r\net al. 2018). This chapter connects demand-side climate mitigation \r\noptions to multiple dimensions of well-being, going beyond the \r\nsingle dimensional metric of GDP which is at the core of IAMs. Many \r\ndemand side-mitigation solutions generate positive and negative \r\nimpacts on wider dimensions of human well-being which are not \r\nalways quantifiable (medium evidence, medium agreement)."


id: 922d400f8b520c589ef7f0a5f5541cd4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20518
content:
"There is high evidence and high agreement in the literature that vital \r\ndimensions of human well-being correlate with consumption, but \r\nonly up to a threshold. High potential for mitigation lies in using low\u0002carbon energy for new basic needs satisfaction while cutting emissions \r\nof those whose basic needs are already met (Grubler et  al.  2018; \r\nRao and Min 2018b; Rao et al. 2019b; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020;"


id: 524ca711a13527fc173e5c68a45c6d1f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10404
content:
"b. Within country heterogeneity in service levels as a function of income differences for \r\nthe Netherlands (bottom and 10% of incomes) and India (bottom and top 25% of incomes)."


id: dc09aa41776bee11d9c484a00a8a4af2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32134
content:
"c. Globally averaged \"decent living energy\" (DLE) per capita scenario in 2050 by region. \r\nThe major contributors to DLE are nutrition and mobility at ~3 GJ cap-1 yr-1 each.* "


id: f5340784e5cad3936b8ec1a51cec276
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36092
content:
"resource assets and local contexts. Provisioning for human needs \r\nis recognised as participatory and inter-relational; transformative \r\nmitigation potential can be found in social as well as technological \r\nchange (Mazur and Rosa 1974; Goldemberg et al. 1985; Lamb and \r\nSteinberger 2017; O'Neill et al. 2018; Hayward and Roy 2019; Vita \r\net al. 2019a). More equitable societies which provide DLS for all can \r\ndevote attention and resources to mitigation (Richards 2003; Dubash \r\n2013; Rafaty 2018; Oswald et  al. 2021). For further exploration of \r\nthese concepts, see Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I."


id: de9b3da2c5d2845d9e05e7edad7906a2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32522
content:
"There is very high evidence and very high agreement that globally, \r\nthere are differences in the amount of energy that societies require \r\nto provide the basic needs for everyone. At present nearly one\u0002third of the world's population are 'energy poor', facing challenges "


id: a3973691f9b16b14f9d0bf301cfd76d1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23300
content:
"Figure 5.3 | Energy use per capita per year of three groups of countries ranked by socio-economic development and displayed for each country based \r\non four or five different income groups (according to data availability) as well as geographical representation. The final energy use for decent living standards \r\n(20-50 GJ cap-1 yr-1) (Rao et al. 2019b) is indicated in the blue column as a reference for global range, rather than dependent on each country. Source: data based on Oswald \r\net al. (2020)."


id: 974ea804251a617ba90d62813ccc371c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21328
content:
"Several of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UN 2015) deal with providing access to technologies and service infrastructures \r\nto the share of population so far excluded, showing that the UN 2030 Agenda has adopted a multidimensional perspective on poverty. \r\nMultidimensional poverty indices, such as the Social Progress Indicator and the Individual Deprivation Measure, go beyond income \r\nand focus on tracking the delivery of access to basic services by the poorest population groups, both in developing countries (Fulton \r\net al. 2009; Alkire and Santos 2014; Alkire and Robles 2017; Rao and Min 2018b), and in developed countries (Townsend 1979; \r\nAaberge and Brandolini 2015; Eurostat 2018). At the same time, the SDGs, primarily SDG 10 on reducing inequalities within and \r\namong countries, promote a more equitable world, both in terms of inter- as well as intra-national equality."


id: cbbb12e6692d31af45c56655ed6e5bea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29593
content:
"Access to various end-use technologies and infrastructure services features directly in the SDG targets and among the indicators \r\nused to track their progress (UN 2015; UNESC 2017): Basic services in households (SDG 1.4.1), Improved water sources (SDG 6.1.1); \r\nImproved sanitation (SDG 6.1.2); Electricity (SDG 7.1.1); Internet - fixed broadband subscriptions (SDG 17.6.2); Internet - proportion \r\nof population using (SDG 17.8.1). Transport (public transit, cars, mopeds or bicycles) and media technologies (mobile phones, TVs, \r\nradios, PCs, Internet) can be seen as proxies for access to mobility and communication, crucial for participation in society and the \r\neconomy (Smith et al. 2015). In addition, SDG 10 is a more conventional income-based inequality goal, referring to income inequality \r\n(SDG 10.1), social, economic and political inclusion of all (SDG 10.2.), and equal opportunities and reduced inequalities of outcome \r\n(SDG 10.3)."


id: 420117c3480ee1acd679dcbb0aa02e5b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7787
content:
"Box 5.3, Figure 1 | International inequality in access and use of goods and services. Upper panel: International Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients \r\naccounting for the share of population living in households without access (origin of the curves on the y-axis), multiple ownership not considered. Lower panel: Gini, \r\nnumber of people without access, access rates and coverage in terms of share of global population and number of countries included. *Reduced samples lead to \r\nunderestimation of inequality. A sample, for example, of around 80% of world population (taking the same 43 countries as for mobiles and cars) led to a lower Gini \r\nof around 0.48 (-0.04) for electricity. The reduced sample was kept for mobiles in 2018 to allow for comparability with 2000. Source: Zimm (2019)."


id: fd4519d279a7915bac06e4fcca5afac5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37358
content:
"in the US was 63% higher than in Germany (Arto et al. 2016); those \r\npatterns are explained by context in terms of various climate, cultural \r\nand historical factors influencing consumption. Context matters even \r\nin within-country analysis, for example, electricity consumption in \r\nthe US shows that efficiency innovations do exert positive influence \r\non savings of residential energy consumption, but the relationship \r\nis mixed; on the contrary, affluence (household income and home \r\nsize) and context (geographical location) drive resource utilisation \r\nsignificantly (Adua and Clark 2019); affluence is central to any future \r\nprospect in terms of environmental conditions (Wiedmann et  al. \r\n2020). In China, inequality of energy consumption and expenditure "


id: f6410e978207758f88fbbec1fb9ffb89
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36252
content:
"There is high evidence and high agreement in the literature that \r\nthrough equitable distribution, well-being for all can be assured at \r\nthe lowest-possible energy consumption levels (Steinberger and \r\nRoberts 2010; Oswald et al. 2020) by reducing emissions related to \r\nconsumption as much as possible, while assuring DLS for everyone \r\n(Annecke 2002; de Zoysa 2011; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2013; Spangenberg \r\n2014; Toroitich and Kerber 2014; Kenner 2015; Toth and Szigeti 2016; \r\nSmil 2017; Otto et al. 2019; Baltruszewicz et al. 2021). For example, \r\nat similar levels of human development, per capita energy demand "


id: ba99b23c4bfbd66696447e814dcb042e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26895
content:
"varies highly depending on the energy type, end-use demand and \r\nclimatic region (Wu et al. 2017)."


id: 9dd1aae06d6c00273666229875c351ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22352
content:
"Within the energy use induced by global consumer products, \r\nhousehold consumption is the biggest contributor, contributing to \r\naround three-quarters of the global total (Wu et al. 2019). A more \r\ngranular analysis of household energy consumption reveals that \r\nthe lowest two quintiles in countries with average annual income \r\nbelow USD15,000 cap-1 yr-1 consume less energy than the \r\ninternational energy requirements for DLS (20-50 GJ cap-1); 77% of \r\npeople consume less than 30 GJ cap-1 yr-1 and 38% consume less \r\nthan 10 GJ cap-1 yr-1 (Oswald et al. 2020). Many energy-intensive \r\ngoods have high price elasticity (>1.0), implying that growing \r\nincomes lead to over-proportional growth of energy footprints in \r\nthese consumption categories. Highly unequally distributed energy \r\nconsumption is concentrated in the transport sector, ranging from \r\nvehicle purchase to fuels, and most unequally in package holidays \r\nand aviation (Gossling 2019; Oswald et al. 2020)."


id: cf2be4b9f977ec5345ad39d1ffdc26db
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30129
content:
"High-income households consume and demand energy at an order of \r\nmagnitude greater than what is necessary for DLS (Oswald et al. 2020). \r\nEnergy-intensive goods, such as package holidays, have a  higher \r\nincome elasticity of demand than less energy-intensive goods like \r\nfood, water supply and housing maintenance, which results in high\u0002income individuals having much higher energy footprints (Oswald et al. \r\n2020). Evidence highlights highly unequal GHG emissions in aviation: \r\nonly 2-4% of the global population flew internationally in 2018, with \r\n1% of the world population emitting 50% of CO2 from commercial \r\naviation (Gossling and Humpe 2020). Some individuals may add more \r\nthan 1600 tCO2 yr-1 individually by air travel (Gossling 2019)."


id: 53201c1906a2f2bd435e7be78a7acd8b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10545
content:
"Socio-economic dynamics and outcomes affect whether provisioning \r\nof goods and services is achieved at low energy demand levels \r\n(Figure  5.4). Specifically, multivariate regression shows that public \r\nservice quality, income equality, democracy, and electricity access \r\nenable higher need satisfaction at lower energy demand, whereas \r\nextractivism and economic growth beyond moderate levels of \r\naffluence reduce need satisfaction at higher energy demand (Vogel \r\net  al. 2021). Altogether, this demonstrates that at a  given level of \r\nenergy provided, there is large scope to improve service levels for \r\nwell-being by modifying socio-economic context without increasing \r\nenergy supply (Figure 5.4)."


id: 14d787ffb6c193d1ed496df8780acca2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 790
content:
"The food sector dominates in all income groups, comprising 28% \r\nof households' carbon footprint, with cattle and rice the major \r\ncontributors (Scherer et al. 2018); food also accounts for 48% and \r\n70% of household impacts on land and water resources respectively, \r\nand consumption of meat, dairy, and processed food rise fast \r\nasincomes increase (Ivanova et al. 2016). Roughly 20-40% of food \r\nproduced worldwide is lost to waste before it reaches the market, \r\nor is wasted by households, the energy embodied in wasted food was \r\nestimated at around 36 EJ yr -1, and during the period 2010-2016 "


id: 2ac81b3677c8618f6f9ca4a48cf1cacc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4159
content:
"The carbon footprint of a  nation is equal to the direct emissions \r\noccurring due to households' transport, heating and cooking, as well \r\nas the impact embodied in the production of all consumed goods \r\nand services (Wiedmann and Minx 2008; Davis and Caldeira 2010; \r\nHubler 2017; Vita et al. 2019a). There are large differences in carbon "


id: f3838a3fede189fb43fd7d27fea11f8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35823
content:
"governance and mitigation are parts of a  continuous interactive \r\nand self-reinforcing process (Figure 5.5). Chapter 5 Supplementary \r\nMaterial I (Section  5.SM.1) contains more detail on these links, \r\ndrawing from social science literature."


id: e263bc260c3f2f369816f035404c8e7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33122
content:
"global food loss and waste equalled 8-10% of total GHG emissions \r\n(Godfray and Garnett 2014; Springmann et  al. 2018; Mbow et  al. \r\n2019). Global agri-food supply chains are crucial in the variation \r\nof per  capita food consumption-related-GHG footprints, mainly in \r\nthe case of red meat and dairy (Kim et al. 2020) since the highest \r\nper capita food-consumption-related GHG emissions do not correlate \r\nperfectly with the income status of countries. Thus, it is also crucial \r\nto focus on high-emitting individuals and groups within countries, \r\nrather than only those who live in high-emitting countries, since the \r\ntop 10% of emitters live on all continents and one-third of them are \r\nfrom the developing world (Chakravarty et al. 2009; Pan et al. 2019)."


id: b27bb0a4351f31a855bfbde6654eec7c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25597
content:
"Economic growth in equitable societies is associated with lower \r\nemissions than in inequitable societies (McGee and Greiner 2018), \r\nand income inequality is associated with higher global emissions \r\n(Ravallion et al. 1997; McGee and Greiner 2018; Rao and Min 2018c; \r\nDiffenbaugh and Burke 2019; Fremstad and Paul 2019; Liu and Hao \r\n2020). Relatively slight increases in energy consumption and carbon \r\nemissions produce great increases in human development and well\u0002being in less-developed countries, and the amount of energy needed \r\nfor a high global level of human development is dropping (Steinberger \r\nand Roberts 2010). Equitable and democratic societies which provide \r\nhigh quality public services to their population have high well-being \r\noutcomes at lower energy use than those which do not, whereas \r\nthose which prioritise economic growth beyond moderate incomes \r\nand extractive sectors display a reversed effect (Vogel et al. 2021)."


id: 9aa16e9465c5c2bbd36670610c5d8c32
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21858
content:
"The environmental impact of increasing equity across income \r\ngroups can be either positive or negative (Hubacek et al. 2017; Rao \r\nand Min 2018a; Scherer et al. 2018; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020). \r\nProjections for achieving equitable levels of service provision globally \r\npredict large increases in global GHG emissions and demand for key \r\nresources (Blomsma and Brennan 2017), especially in passenger \r\ntransport, which is predicted to increase nearly three-fold between \r\n2015 and 2050, from 44 trillion to 122 trillion passenger-kilometres \r\n(OECD 2019a), and associated infrastructure needs, increasing freight \r\n(Murray et al. 2017), increasing demand for cooling (IEA 2018), and \r\nshifts to carbon-intensive high-meat diets (OECD/FAO 2018)."


id: 86de6a0b249d31bbfd67235466c46e1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18754
content:
"Well-designed climate mitigation policies ameliorate constituents of \r\nwell-being (Creutzig et al. 2021b). The study shows that of all demand\u0002side option effects on well-being, 79% are positive, 18% are neutral (or \r\nnot relevant or specified), and only 3% are negative (high confidence) \r\n(Creutzig et al. 2021b) (Figure 5.6). Figure 5.6 illustrates that active \r\nmobility (cycling and walking), efficient buildings and prosumer \r\nchoices of renewable technologies have the most encompassing \r\nbeneficial effects on well-being, with no negative outcomes detected. \r\nUrban and industry strategies are highly positive overall for well\u0002being, but they will also reshape supply-side businesses with transient \r\nintermediate negative effects. Shared mobility, like all the others, \r\nhas overall highly beneficial effects on well-being, but also displays \r\na few negative consequences, depending on implementation, such as \r\na minor decrease in personal security for patrons of ride-sourcing."


id: d163578d0b132e69f073d40f455a7be5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30476
content:
"Increasing incomes for all to attain DLS raises emissions and energy \r\nfootprints, but only slightly (Chakravarty et  al. 2009; Jorgenson \r\net al. 2016; Scherer et al. 2018; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020; Oswald \r\net  al. 2020; Oswald et  al. 2021). The amount of energy needed for \r\na high global level of human development is dropping (Steinberger and \r\nRoberts 2010) and could by 2050 be reduced to 1950 levels (Millward\u0002Hopkins et al. 2020) requiring a massive deployment of technologies \r\nacross the different sectors as well as demand-side reduction \r\nconsumption. The consumption share of the bottom half of the world's \r\npopulation represents less than 20% of all energy footprints, which is \r\nless than what the top 5% of people consume (Oswald et al. 2020)."


id: b81c89d1489bcb104f90cffabf51fbd3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26496
content:
"Income inequality itself also raises carbon emissions (Hao et al. 2016; \r\nSinha 2016; Uzar and Eyuboglu 2019; Baloch et  al. 2020; Oswald \r\net al. 2020; Wiedmann et al. 2020; Vogel et al. 2021). Wide inequality \r\ncan increase status-based consumption patterns, where individuals \r\nspend more to emulate the standards of the high-income group (the \r\nVeblen effect); inequality also diminishes environmental efforts by \r\nreducing social cohesion and cooperation (Jorgenson et al. 2017) and \r\nfinally, inequality also operates by inducing an increase in working \r\nhours that leads to higher economic growth and, consequently, \r\nhigher emissions and ecological footprint, so working time reduction \r\nis key for policy to both reduce emissions and protect employment \r\n(Fitzgerald et al. 2015; Fitzgerald et al. 2018)."


id: bb9b295fab9c6fa2a993a814e0220043
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27074
content:
"There is high evidence and high agreement in literature that socio\u0002economic equity builds not only well-being for all, but also trust and \r\neffective participatory governance, which in turn strengthen demand\u0002side climate mitigation. Equity, participation, social trust, well-being, "


id: b228cd3a96ff9bdafc37551e33dd3891
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25534
content:
"and including social trust, greater equity, and informal-sector support \r\nas integral parts of climate policies. Public participation facilitates \r\nsocial learning and people's support of and engagement with climate \r\nchange priorities; improved governance is closely tied to effective \r\nclimate policies (Phuong et al. 2017). Better education, health care, \r\nvaluing of social diversity, and reduced poverty - characteristics of \r\nmore equal societies - all lead to resilience, innovation, and readiness \r\nto adopt progressive and locally-appropriate mitigation policies, \r\nwhether high-tech or low-tech, centralised or decentralised (Tanner \r\net al. 2009; Lorenz 2013; Chu 2015; Cloutier et al. 2015; Mitchell 2015; \r\nMartin and Shaheen 2016; Vandeweerdt et al. 2016; Turnheim et al. \r\n2018). Moreover, these factors are the ones identified as enablers of \r\nhigh need satisfaction at lower energy use (Vogel et al. 2021)."


id: 6a5937cecf69378f822496c209377ba4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14329
content:
"There is less policy lock-in in more equitable societies (Seto et al. 2016). \r\nInternational communication, networking, and global connections \r\namong citizens are more prevalent in more equitable societies, and \r\nthese help spread promising mitigation approaches (Scheffran et al. \r\n2012). Climate-related injustices are addressed where equity is \r\nprioritised (Klinsky and Winkler 2014). Thus, there is high confidence \r\nin the literature that addressing inequities in income, wealth, and \r\nDLS not only raises overall well-being and furthers the SDGs but also \r\nimproves the effectiveness of climate change mitigation policies. For \r\nexample, job creation, retraining for new jobs, local production of "


id: b9065095c1574412b915ac31b887d9fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26643
content:
"Soliev and Theesfeld 2020). Leadership is also important in fostering \r\nenvironmentally-responsible group behaviours (Liu and Hao 2020)."


id: 78613208bb7a1b031947edf438b212aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16503
content:
"In some less-developed countries, higher income inequality may in \r\nfact be associated with lower per capita emissions, but this is because \r\npeople who are excluded by poverty from access to fossil fuels must \r\nrely on biomass (Klasen 2018). Such energy poverty - the fact that \r\nmillions of people do not have access to energy sources to help meet \r\nhuman needs  - implies the opposite of development (Guruswamy \r\n2010; Guruswamy 2020). In developing countries, livelihood \r\nimprovements do not necessarily cause increases in emissions (Peters \r\net al. 2012; Reusser et al. 2013; Creutzig et al. 2015a; Chhatre and \r\nAgrawal 2009; Baltruszewicz et  al. 2021) and poverty alleviation \r\ncauses negligible emissions (Chakravarty et  al. 2009). Greater \r\nequity is an important step towards sustainable service provisioning \r\n(Godfray et al. 2018; Dorling 2019; Timko 2019)."


id: 2fa1b5efcdc2f5f50cf31a14d3b9f24c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4914
content:
"As discussed in Section 5.6, policies to assist the low-carbon energy \r\ntransition can be designed to include additional benefits for income \r\nequality, besides contributing to greater energy access for the poor \r\n(Burke and Stephens 2017; Frank 2017; Healy and Barry 2017; \r\nSen 2017; Chapman et  al. 2018; La Vina et  al. 2018; Chapman \r\nand Fraser 2019; Piggot et al. 2019; Sunderland et al. 2020). Global \r\nand intergenerational climate inequities impact people's well-being, \r\nwhich affects their consumption patterns and political actions \r\n(Albrecht et al. 2007; Fritze et al. 2008; Gori-Maia 2013; Clayton et al. \r\n2015; Pizzigati 2018) (Box 5.4)."


id: ef68bb3a2e77546d1e0de4fc399f9583
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35150
content:
"Since no country now meets its citizens' basic needs at a  level of \r\nresource use that is globally sustainable, while high levels of life \r\nsatisfaction for those just escaping extreme poverty require even \r\nmore resources, the need for transformative shifts in governance and \r\npolicies is large (O'Neill et al. 2018; Vogel et al. 2021)."


id: 29e394618e6cdb682368fe053592426a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4022
content:
"Inequitable societies use energy and resources less efficiently.\r\nHigher income inequality is associated with higher carbon emissions, \r\nat least in developed countries (Grunewald et al. 2011; Golley and \r\nMeng 2012; Chancel et al. 2015; Grunewald et al. 2017; Jorgenson \r\net  al. 2017; Sager 2017; Klasen 2018; Liu et  al. 2019); reducing \r\ninequality in high-income countries helps to reduce emissions (Klasen \r\n2018). There is high agreement in the literature that alienation or \r\ndistrust weakens collective governance and fragments political \r\napproaches towards climate action (Smit and Pilifosova 2001; Adger \r\net al. 2003; Hammar and Jagers 2007; Van Vossole 2012; Bulkeley \r\nand Newell 2015; Smith and Howe 2015; ISSC et al. 2016; Alvaredo \r\net al. 2018; Smith and Mayer 2018; Fairbrother et al. 2019; Hayward \r\nand Roy 2019; Kulin and Johansson Seva 2019; Liao et al. 2019)."


id: 1e1d69f6fbc7272e51144daa50fe5803
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2177
content:
"Populism and politics of fear are less prevalent under conditions of \r\nmore income equality (Chevigny 2003; Bryson and Rauwolf 2016; \r\nO'Connor 2017; Fraune and Knodt 2018; Myrick and Evans Comfort \r\n2019). Ideology and other social factors also play a role in populist \r\nclimate scepticism, but many of these also relate to resentment of \r\nelites and desire for engagement (Swyngedouw 2011; Lockwood \r\n2018; Huber et al. 2020). 'Climate populism' movements are driven by \r\nan impetus for justice (Beeson 2019; Hilson 2019). When people feel \r\npowerless and/or that climate change is too big a problem to solve \r\nbecause others are not acting, they may take less action themselves \r\n(Williams and Jaftha 2020). However, systems for benefit-sharing \r\ncan build trust and address large-scale 'commons dilemmas', in the \r\ncontext of strong civil society (Barnett 2003; Mearns and Norton 2009; \r\nInderberg et al. 2015; Sovacool et al. 2015; Hunsberger et al. 2017; "


id: 3889c4cb534f3640c5af12cc895ed5cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6270
content:
"Multi-level or polycentric governance can enhance well-being and \r\nimprove climate governance and social resilience, due to varying \r\nadaptive, flexible policy interventions at different times and scales \r\n(Kern and Bulkeley 2009; Lidskog and Elander 2009; Amundsen \r\net al. 2010; Keskitalo 2010; Lee and Koski 2015; Jokinen et al. 2016; \r\nLepeley 2017; Marquardt 2017; Di Gregorio et al. 2019). Institutional \r\ntransformation may also result from socio-ecological stresses that \r\naccompany climate change, leading to more effective governance \r\nstructures (David Tabara et  al. 2018; Patterson and Huitema 2019; \r\nBarnes et  al. 2020). An appropriate, context-specific mix of options \r\nfacilitated by policies can deliver both higher well-being and reduced \r\ndisparity in access to basic needs for services concurrently with climate \r\nmitigation (Thomas and Twyman 2005; Mearns and Norton 2009; "


id: 6ef3ad284b950fde1254b590a5a9c941
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15082
content:
"protection) not only strengthens climate leadership in many countries, \r\nbut also changes broad social norms by raising knowledge of \r\nIndigenous governance systems which supported sustainable lifeways \r\nover thousands of years (Wildcat 2014; Chanza and De Wit 2016; \r\nWhyte 2017; Whyte 2018, Temper et al. 2020). Related trends include \r\nrecognition of the value of traditional ecological knowledge, Indigenous \r\ngovernance principles, decentralisation, and appropriate technologies \r\n(Lange et al. 2007; Goldthau 2014; Whyte 2017)."


id: 289cf2e0a0482260cee22b8e5f1947af
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3815
content:
"Klinsky and Winkler 2014; Lamb et  al. 2014; Lamb and  Steinberger \r\n2017). Hence, nurturing equitable human well-being through provision \r\nof decent living standards for all goes hand in hand with climate change \r\nmitigation (ISSC et al. 2016; OECD 2019a). There is high confidence in \r\nthe literature that addressing inequities in income, wealth, and DLS not \r\nonly raises overall well-being and furthers the SDGs but also improves \r\nthe effectiveness of climate change mitigation policies."


id: 5f60adfb2eacf5ed9cbbf211b992b4ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12579
content:
"Social trust aids policy implementation. More equal societies display \r\nhigher trust, which is a key requirement for successful implementation \r\nof climate policies (Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Carattini et al. 2015; \r\nKlenert et al. 2018; Patterson et al. 2018). Inter-personal trust among \r\ncitizens often promotes pro-environment behaviour by influencing \r\nperceptions (Harring and Jagers 2013), enhancing cooperation, and \r\nreducing free-riding and opportunistic behaviour (Gur 2020). Individual \r\nsupport for carbon taxes and energy innovations falls when collective \r\ncommunity support is lacking (Bolsen et al. 2014; Smith and Mayer \r\n2018; Simon 2020). Social trust has a  positive influence on civic \r\nengagement among local communities, NGOs, and self-help groups for \r\nlocal clean cooking fuel installation (Nayak et al. 2015)."


id: ec22cd6f1d3dcabb81f47e5a50483e5f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34651
content:
"Section  5.6 includes examples of climate mitigation policies and \r\npolicy packages which address the interrelationships shown in \r\nFigure 5.5. Improving well-being for all through climate mitigation \r\nincludes emissions-reduction goals in policy packages that ensure \r\nequitable outcomes, prioritise social trust-building, support wide \r\npublic participation in climate action including within the informal \r\nsector, and facilitate institutional change for effective multi-level \r\ngovernance, as integral components of climate strategies. This \r\nstrategic approach, and its feasibility of success, rely on complex \r\ncontextual factors that may differ widely, especially between the \r\nGlobal North and Global South (Atteridge et al. 2012; Patterson et al. \r\n2018; Jewell and Cherp 2020; Singh et al. 2020; Singh et al. 2021)."


id: 9670810c483bcbd41e22c66186190e61
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21186
content:
"There is high evidence and high agreement that empowering women benefits both mitigation and adaptation, because women \r\nprioritise climate change in their voting, purchasing, community leadership, and work, both professionally and at home (high evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Increasing voice and agency for those marginalised in intersectional ways by indigeneity, race, ethnicity, dis/ability, \r\nand other factors has positive effects for climate policy (high evidence, high agreement)."


id: dc85d86049e73c4aaade323c44441224
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32201
content:
"resulting from climate change - and this is heightened for women in the less-developed countries and for those who are intersectionally \r\nvulnerable (Coates et al. 2020; McLaren et al. 2020; Wenham et al. 2020; Azong and Kelso 2021; Erwin et al. 2021; Maobe and Atela \r\n2021; Nicoson 2021; Sultana 2021; Versey 2021). Because men currently hold the majority of energy-sector jobs, energy transition \r\nwill impact them economically and psychologically; benefits, burdens and opportunities on both the demand and supply sides of the \r\nmitigation transition have a range of equity implications (Pearl-Martinez and Stephens 2017; Standal et al. 2020; Mang-Benza 2021). \r\nMitigating gendered climate impacts requires addressing inequitable power relations throughout society (Wester and Lama 2019)."


id: 9fed41c2279ecd1f4ae55a3c29756b4c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22697
content:
"Women's well-being and gender-responsive climate policy have been emphasised in international agreements including the Paris Agreement \r\n(UNFCCC 2015), Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women General Recommendation 37 (Vijeyarasa \r\n2021), and the 2016 Decision 21/CP.22 on Gender and Climate Change (UNFCCC 2016; Larson et al. 2018). Increasing the participation \r\nof women and marginalised social groups, and addressing their special needs, helps to meet a range of SDGs, improve disaster and crisis \r\nresponse, increase social trust, and improve climate mitigation policy development and implementation (Alber 2009; Whyte 2014; Elnakat \r\nand Gomez 2015; Salehi et al. 2015; Buckingham and Kulcur 2017; Cohen 2017; Kronsell 2017; Lee and Zusman 2019)."


id: 175981ab42c2e23e4cf188be320eff84
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1178
content:
"Higher female political participation, controlled for other factors, leads to higher stringency in climate policies, and results in lower \r\nGHG emissions (Cook et al. 2019). Gender equity is also correlated with lower per capita CO2-eq emissions (Ergas and York 2012)."


id: 6aef1e47d6630e7826ee46a10774cc14
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14444
content:
"to ASI strategies, with the circular economy tentatively more on the \r\nsupply side, and the sharing economy and digitalisation tentatively \r\nmore on the demand side (Section 5.3.4). These new service delivery \r\nmodels go beyond sectoral boundaries (IPCC sector chapter boundaries \r\nare explained in Chapter  12) and take advantage of technological \r\ninnovations, design concepts, and innovative forms of  cooperation, \r\ncutting across sectors to contribute to systemic changes worldwide. \r\nSome of these changes can be realised in the short term, such as \r\nenergy access, while others may take a longer period, such as radical \r\nand systemic eco-innovations like shared electric autonomous vehicles. \r\nIt is important to understand benefits and distributional impacts of \r\nthese systemic changes."


id: 326c7bce6119d9e59c456a9a864554b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5344
content:
"Opportunities for avoiding waste associated with the provision of \r\nservices, or avoiding overprovision of or excess demand for services, \r\nexist across multiple service categories. 'Avoid' options are relevant \r\nin all end-use sectors, namely, teleworking and avoiding long-haul \r\nflights, adjusting dwelling size to household size, and avoiding short\u0002"


id: bea941cee1763f59142262be8809d088
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27555
content:
"This section organises demand reductions under the ASI framework. \r\nIt presents service-oriented demand-side solutions consistent with \r\ndecent living standards (Creutzig et al. 2018) (Table 5.1). The sharing \r\neconomy, digitalisation, and the circular economy can all contribute "


id: c53d43c77d849223d3eeaeaac03bc475
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28614
content:
"Table 5.1 | Avoid-Shift-Improve options in selected sectors and services. Many options, such as urban form and infrastructures, are systemic, and influence several \r\nsectors simultaneously. Linkages to concepts presented in sectoral chapters are indicated in parentheses in the first column. Source: adapted from Creutzig at al. (2018)."


id: 314058a81b7c590d347ecb237a23b299
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5169
content:
"The technical mitigation potential of food loss and waste reductions \r\nglobally has been estimated at 0.1-5.8 GtCO2-eq (high confidence) \r\n(Poore and Nemecek 2018; Smith, et al. 2019) (Section 7.4.5, Figure 5.7 \r\nand Table 12.3). Coupling food waste reductions with dietary shifts \r\ncan further reduce energy, land, and resource demand in upstream "


id: 43170a23c0c4462678352041a46a3af3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7953
content:
"food provision systems, leading to substantial GHG emissions benefits. \r\nThe estimated technical potential for GHG emissions reductions \r\nassociated with shifts to sustainable healthy diets is 0.5-8 GtCO2-eq \r\n(high confidence) (Smith et al. 2013; Jarmul et al. 2020; Creutzig et al. \r\n2021b) (Figure 5.7, Table 12.2). Current literature on health, diets, and \r\nemissions indicates that sustainable food systems providing healthy \r\ndiets for all are within reach but require significant cross-sectoral \r\naction, including improved agricultural practices, dietary shifts among \r\nconsumers, and food waste reductions in production, distribution, \r\nretail, and consumption (Erb et al. 2016; Muller et al. 2017; Graca et al. \r\n2019; Willett and al. 2019) (Table 12.9)."


id: 1f5c026f75fb49c15c69eeafe13e7f15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2369
content:
"Increased demand for biomass can increase the pressure on forest \r\nand conservation areas (Cowie et al. 2013) and poses a heightened \r\nrisk for biodiversity, livelihoods, and intertemporal carbon balances \r\n(Lamb et  al. 2016; Creutzig et  al. 2021c), requiring policy and \r\nregulations to ensure sustainable forest management, which \r\ndepends on forest type, region, climate, and ownership. This suggests \r\nthat demand-side actions hold sustainability advantages over the \r\nintensive use of bioenergy and BECCS, but also enable land use for \r\nbioenergy by saving agricultural land for food."


id: 7b71bed97ce27f7162b1fa6c84c5f5d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17016
content:
"sold and tonnes of materials needed to provide the same service to \r\nconsumers, consistent with circular economy and materials efficiency \r\nprinciples (Chapter 11). Successful examples of this approach have \r\nbeen documented for carpets (Stubbs and Cocklin 2008), copiers \r\n(Roy 2000), kitchens (Liedtke et al. 1998), vehicles (Williams 2006; \r\nCeschin and Vezzoli 2010) and more (Roy 2000)."


id: fd67f492914a6e8fd8f573b8544cd8f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37381
content:
"existing efforts to promote zero-emission vehicles. The establishment \r\nof a zero-emission vehicle deployment target and an electric mobility \r\ntarget for 2035 would help in establishing a common long-term global \r\nelectric-drive vision (Lutsey 2015)."


id: 3e6d948e62f09f0bd37802e90b191251
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7198
content:
"Socio-cultural factors such as avoiding long-haul flights and shifting \r\nto train wherever possible can contribute between 10% and 40% \r\nto aviation GHG emissions reduction by 2050 (Figure 5.7). Maritime \r\ntransport (shipping) emits around 940 MtCO2 annually and is \r\nresponsible for about 2.5% of global GHG emissions (IMO 2020). \r\nTechnology measures and management measures, such as slow \r\nsteaming, weather routing, contra-rotating propellers, and propulsion \r\nefficiency devices can deliver more fuel savings between 1% and \r\n40% than the investment required (Bouman et al. 2017) (Chapter 5, \r\nSupplementary Material II, Table 5.SM.2)."


id: 551a0d5083dc905fa21e92814fa5bfe3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10850
content:
"'Shift' strategies unique to the service-oriented perspective generally \r\ninvolve meeting service demands at much lower lifecycle energy, \r\nemissions, and resource intensities (Roy and Pal 2009), through such \r\nstrategies as shifting from single-family to multi-family dwellings \r\n(reducing the materials intensity per unit floor area (Ochsendorf et al. \r\n2011)), shifting from passenger cars to rail or bus (reducing fuel, \r\nvehicle manufacturing, and infrastructure requirements (Chester and \r\nHorvath 2009)), shifting materials to reduce resource and emissions \r\nintensities (e.g., low-carbon concrete blends (Scrivener and Gartner \r\n2018)) and shifting from conventional to additive manufacturing \r\nprocesses to reduce materials requirements and improve end-use \r\nproduct performance (Huang et al. 2016, 2017)."


id: 5045d2e5dfc57afbabf04c6e7ff216c0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10074
content:
"An important consideration in all ASI strategies is the potential for \r\nunintended rebound effects (Sorrell et al. 2009; Brockway et al. 2021) \r\nas indicated in Figures 5.8, 5.12, and 5.13a, which must be carefully \r\navoided through various regulatory and behavioural measures \r\n(Santarius et  al. 2016). In many developing country contexts, \r\nrebound effects can help in accelerated provision of  affordable \r\naccess to modern energy and a minimum level of per capita energy \r\nconsumption (Saunders et  al. 2021; Chakravarty and Roy 2021). \r\nExtending the lifespan of energy inefficient products may lead to net \r\nincreases in emissions (Gutowski et al. 2011), whereas automated \r\ncar sharing may reduce the number of cars manufactured at the \r\nexpense of increased demand for passenger kilometres due to lower \r\ntravel opportunity cost (Wadud et al. 2016) (Section 5.3.2)."


id: 7bb108db60051c954701b297571f0446
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17061
content:
"Avoiding short lifespan products in favour of products with longer \r\nlifespan as a socio-cultural factor; and infrastructure use measures such \r\nas increasing the re-usability and recyclability of products' components \r\nand materials, and adopting materials-efficient services and CO2-\r\nneutral materials, have about 29% indicative potential by 2050. \r\n(Chapter 11 and Chapter 5 Supplementary Material II, Table 5.SM.2)."


id: 9cb81c7b4bfdb6d33ecd07a638698252
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22191
content:
"Socio-cultural factors and behavioural and social practices in energy \r\nsaving, like adaptive heating and cooling by changing temperature, \r\ncan contribute about 15% to GHG emissions reduction in the buildings \r\nsector by 2050 (Figure 5.7). Infrastructure use such as compact city \r\nand  urban planning interventions, living floor space rationalisation, \r\nand access to low-carbon architectural design has about 20% potential \r\nin building sector GHG emissions reduction. Technology adoption, \r\nparticularly access to energy efficient technologies, and installation of \r\nrenewable energy technologies can contribute between 30% and 70% \r\nto GHG emissions reduction in the buildings sector (Chapters 8 and 9 \r\nand Chapter 5 Supplementary Material II, Table 5.SM.2)."


id: 485d6c30591f1aa55badaf519f362a44
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8756
content:
"In summary, sector-specific demand-side mitigation options reflect the \r\nimportant role of socio-cultural, technological and infrastructural factors \r\nand the interdependence among them (Figure 5.7). The assessment in \r\nFigure 5.7 shows that by 2050 high emission reduction potential can be \r\nrealised with demand-side actions alone, which can be complementary \r\nto supply-side interventions, with considerable impact by reducing the \r\nneed for capacity addition on the electricity supply system. Integrated \r\ncross-sectoral actions shown through sector coupling is also important \r\nfor investment decision-making and policy framing going beyond \r\nsector boundaries (high evidence and high agreement)."


id: 907237b2725b5410d81307beb5359837
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20260
content:
"6,990 peer-reviewed journal papers, with 771 options that were \r\naggregated into 61  consumption option categories (Ivanova et  al. \r\n2020) (Figure 5.8). Consistently with previous research (Herendeen \r\nand Tanaka 1976; Pachauri and Spreng 2002; Pachauri 2007; Ivanova \r\net  al. 2016), a  hierarchical list of mitigation options emerges. \r\nChoosing low-carbon options, such as car-free living, plant-based "


id: fa6587970bee1066fe6309de55a703f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36913
content:
"diets with no or very little animal products, low-carbon sources of \r\nelectricity and heating at home, as well as local holiday plans, can \r\nreduce an individual's carbon footprint by up to 9 tCO2-eq. Realising \r\nthese options requires substantial policy support to overcome \r\ninfrastructural, institutional and socio-cultural lock-in (Sections 5.4 \r\nand 5.6)."


id: 8a700a957b10b6b54c0790fca1c51229
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19314
content:
"into useable products (e.g.,  electricity, copper wires, lamps, light \r\nbulbs). It is useful to differentiate between conversion and processing \r\nsteps 'upstream' of end users (mines, power plants, manufacturing \r\nfacilities) and 'downstream', that is, those associated with end-users, \r\nincluding service levels, and direct well-being benefits for people (Kalt \r\net al. 2019). Illustrative examples of such resource processing systems "


id: 3a6f7dffe0367a904795921e75b056d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6559
content:
"Service delivery systems to satisfy a  variety of service needs \r\n(e.g., mobility, nutrition, thermal comfort, etc.) comprise a series of \r\ninterlinked processes to convert primary resources (e.g., coal, minerals) "


id: 8aee11e35eed2489669f637e520e302c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19393
content:
"Figure 5.9 | Resource processing steps and efficiency cascades (in percentage of primary resource inputs [vertical axis] remaining at respective steps \r\nuntil ultimate service delivery) for illustrative global service delivery systems for energy (panel (a), disaggregated into three sectoral service types \r\nand the aggregate total), food (panel (b), water use in agriculture and food processing, delivery and use), and materials (panel (c), example steel). The \r\naggregate efficiencies of service delivery chains is with 13-17% low. Source: TWI2050 (2018)."


id: d1d4b5a4c780eb9f216e80519ba1b1a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30541
content:
"Examples of conversion losses on the supply side of resource processing \r\nsystems include, for instance: for energy, electricity generation (global \r\noutput/input conversion efficiency of electric plants of 45% as shown \r\nin energy balance statistics (IEA 2020b)); for water embodied in food, \r\nirrigation water use efficiency (some 40% (Sadras et al. 2011)) and \r\ncalorific conversion efficiency (food calories in to food calories out) \r\nin meat production of 60% (Lundqvist et al. 2008), or for materials, \r\nglobally only 47% of primary iron ore extracted and recovered steel \r\nscrap end up as steel in purchased products, (i.e.,  a  loss of 57%) \r\n(Allwood and Cullen 2012)."


id: 8e4f6568862f3b83ddd923a045fc07ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19914
content:
"and associated conversion losses drawn from the literature are \r\nshown in Figure 5.9, in the form of resource processing cascades for \r\nenergy (direct energy conversion efficiencies (Nakicenovic et al. 1993; \r\nDe Stercke 2014)), water use in food production systems (water use \r\nefficiency and embodied water losses in food delivery and consumption \r\n(Lundqvist et al. 2008; Sadras et al. 2011)), and materials (Ayres and \r\nSimonis 1994; Fischer-Kowalski et al. 2011), using the example of steel \r\nmanufacturing, use and recycling at the global level (Allwood and \r\nCullen 2012). Invariably, conversion losses along the entire service \r\ndelivery systems are substantial, ranging from 83% (water) to 86% \r\n(energy) and 87% (steel) of primary resource inputs (TWI2050 2018). \r\nIn other words, only between 14 to 17% of the harnessed primary \r\nresources remain at the level of ultimate service delivery."


id: bfab2623073e29482b10a2fd3d7f89e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27713
content:
"and 10% (global (Nakicenovic et al., 1996)). Studies that adopt more \r\nrestricted systems boundaries, either leaving out upstream resource \r\nprocessing/conversion or conversely end-use and service provision, \r\nshow typical exergetic efficiencies between 15% (city of Geneva \r\n(Grubler et al. 2012a)) to below 25% (Japan, Italy, and Brazil, albeit \r\nwith incomplete systems coverage that miss important conversion \r\nlosses (Nakicenovic et al. 1996b)). These findings are confirmed by \r\nmore recent exergy efficiency studies that also include longitudinal \r\ntime trend analysis (Cullen and Allwood 2010; Brockway et al. 2014; \r\nSerrenho et  al. 2014; Brockway et  al. 2015; Guevara et  al. 2016). \r\nFigure 5.10 illustrates how energy demand reductions can be realised \r\nby improving the resource efficiency cascades shown in Figure 5.9."


id: e70fd0c239e9ebc8a935dccb1b2ec35d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33848
content:
"The IEA's Net-Zero Emissions by 2050 (NZE) scenario, in which \r\nbehavioural changes lead to 1.7 GtCO2 savings in 2030, expresses the \r\nsubstantial mitigation opportunity in terms of low-carbon technology \r\nequivalencies: to achieve the same emissions reductions, the global \r\nshare of EVs in the NZE would have to increase from 20% to 45% by \r\n2030 or the number of installed heat pumps in homes would have to \r\nincrease from 440 to 660 million by 2030 (IEA 2021)."


id: c36a71a77e2beb2e33a234dc8d7e0d32
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28314
content:
"In light of the limited number of mitigation scenarios that represent \r\nsocio-behavioural changes explicitly, there is medium evidence in the \r\nliterature that such changes can reduce emissions at regional and global \r\nlevels, but high agreement within that literature that such changes \r\nhold up to gigatonne-scale CO2 emissions reduction potentials."


id: fef42fec710e79d3e5a000a7b6c8815c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37659
content:
"In response to 1.5degC ambitions, and a  growing desire to identify \r\nparticipatory pathways with less reliance on carbon dioxide removal \r\nwhich has high uncertainty, some recent IAM and ESM mitigation \r\nscenarios have explored the role of deep demand-side energy and \r\nresource use reduction potentials at global and regional levels. \r\nTable 5.2 summarises long-term scenarios that aimed to: minimise \r\nservice-level energy and resource demand as a  central mitigation \r\ntenet; specifically evaluate the role of behavioural change and ASI \r\nstrategies; and/or achieve a carbon budget with limited or no carbon \r\ndioxide removal. From assessment of this emerging body of literature, \r\nseveral general observations arise and are presented below."


id: 376166a2b20b8c3540c0abc76f8ec8fe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6097
content:
"First, socio-cultural changes within transition pathways can offer \r\ngigatonne-scale CO2 savings potential at the global level, and \r\ntherefore represent a substantial overlooked strategy in traditional \r\nmitigation scenarios. Two lifestyle change scenarios conducted \r\nwith the IMAGE IAM suggested that behaviour and cultural \r\nchanges such as heating and cooling set-point adjustments, shorter "


id: 536ec943a8300edff2f35a7ade950855
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10597
content:
"will require increased investments in data generation and \r\ncollection, model development, and inter-model comparisons, with \r\na  particular focus on socio-behavioural research, which has been \r\nunderrepresented in mitigation research funding to date (Overland \r\nand Sovacool 2020)."


id: fd02b79bd31ed01b3228ceedbf34cb8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37323
content:
"Third, low demand scenarios can reduce both supply-side capacity \r\nadditions and the need for carbon capture and removal technologies \r\nto reach emissions targets. Of the scenarios listed in Table 5.2, one \r\n(LED-MESSAGE) reaches 2050 emissions targets with no carbon \r\ncapture or removal technologies (Grubler et  al. 2018), whereas \r\nothers report significant reductions in reliance on bioenergy with \r\ncarbon capture and storage (BECCS) compared to traditional \r\ntechnology-centric mitigation pathways (Liu et al. 2018; Van Vuuren \r\net al. 2018; Napp et al. 2019), with the IEA's NZE notably requiring \r\nthe least carbon dioxide removal (1.8 Gt in 2050) and primary \r\nbioenergy (100  EJ in 2050) compared to IPCC net zero SR1.5 \r\nscenarios (IEA 2021)."


id: 91a04b2fd6a22869751d5478c52b0b8a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20453
content:
"COVID-19 interacts with demand-side scenarios (Box  5.2). Energy \r\ndemand will mostly likely be reduced between 2020 and 2030 \r\ncompared to the default pathway, and if recovery is steered \r\ntowards low energy demand, carbon prices for a 1.5degC-consistent \r\npathway will be reduced by 19%, energy supply investments until \r\n2030 will be reduced by USD1.8 trillion, and the pressure to rapidly \r\nupscale renewable energy technologies will be softened (Kikstra \r\net al. 2021a)."


id: aa00b87ea76910b11b56fc46fb804ec4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24283
content:
"Based on the limited number of long-term mitigation scenarios that \r\nexplicitly represent demand reductions enabled by ASI strategies, \r\nthere is medium evidence but with high agreement within the \r\nliterature that such scenarios can reduce dependence on supply-side \r\ncapacity additions and carbon capture and removal technologies, \r\nwith opportunites for lower overall mitigation costs."


id: b585c59963b660317be041823596e7b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26088
content:
"Reviewing over 30 digital goods and services for mobility, food \r\nbuying and domestic living, Wilson et al. (2020b) also found shared \r\nelements of appeal across multiple innovations including (i) making \r\nuse of surplus, (ii) using not owning, (iii) being part of wider \r\nnetworks, and (iv) exerting greater control over service provisioning \r\nsystems. Digitalisation thus creates a  strong value proposition \r\nfor certain consumer niches. Concurrent diffusion of many digital \r\ninnovations amplifies their disruptive potential (Schuelke-Leech \r\n2018; Wilson et al. 2019b). Besides basic mobile telephone service \r\nfor communication, digital innovations have been primarily geared to \r\npopulation groups with high purchasing power, and too little to the \r\nneeds of poor and vulnerable people."


id: 3fae3febd9330db60aac77e0e40e1717
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7406
content:
"The long-term sustainability implications of digitalised services hinge \r\non four factors: (i) the direct energy demands of connected devices \r\nand the digital infrastructures (i.e., data centres and communication \r\nnetworks) that provide necessary computing, storage, and \r\ncommunication services (Section 9.4.6); (ii) the systems-level energy \r\nand resource efficiencies that may be gained through the provision \r\nof digital services (Wilson et al. 2020b); (iii) the resource, material, \r\nand waste management requirements of the billions of ICT devices \r\nthat comprise the world's digital systems (Belkhir and Elmeligi 2018; \r\nMalmodin and Lunden 2018) and (iv) the magnitude of potential \r\nrebound effects or induced energy demands that might unleash \r\nunintended and unsustainable demand growth, such as autonomous "


id: 49ad7ce1c1de4eddbd94fbc20a8b830e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8985
content:
"In many cases, digitalisation provides a 'radical functionality' that \r\nenables users to do or accomplish something that they could not \r\ndo before (Nagy et al. 2016). Indeed the consumer appeal of digital \r\ninnovations varies widely, from choice, convenience, flexibility and \r\ncontrol to relational and social benefits (Pettifor and Wilson 2020). "


id: f12650a296f25dca6cf6650a3b7a0809
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35438
content:
"Malmodin 2020; Masanet et al. 2020). Yet there is growing concern \r\nthat remaining energy efficiency improvements might be outpaced \r\nby rising demand for digital services, particularly as data-intensive \r\ntechnologies such as artificial intelligence, smart and connected \r\nenergy systems, distributed manufacturing systems, and autonomous \r\nvehicles promise to increase demand for data services even further in \r\nthe future (TWI2050 2019; Masanet et al. 2020; Strubell et al. 2020). \r\nRapid digitalisation is also contributing to an expanding e-waste \r\nproblem, estimated to be the fastest growing domestic waste stream \r\nglobally (Forti et al. 2020)."


id: bd15b6f4be6775a83eefc38597416da0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27311
content:
"As digitalisation proliferates, an important policy objective is \r\ntherefore to invest in data collection and monitoring systems and \r\nenergy demand models of digitalised systems to guide technology \r\nand policy investment decisions for addressing potential direct \r\nenergy demand growth (IEA 2017a) and potentially concomitant \r\ngrowth in e-waste."


id: 8f56eb57d9bac51106fd4e30f2d0a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20102
content:
"Figure 5.12 | Studies assessing net changes in CO2 emissions, energy use, and activity levels indicate mitigation potentials for numerous end-user\u0002oriented digitalisation solutions, but also risk of increased emissions due to inefficient substitutions, induced demand, and rebound effects. 90 studies \r\nwere assessed with 207 observations (indicated by vertical bars) including those based on empirical research, attributional and consequential lifecycle assessments, and techno\u0002economic analyses and scenarios at different scales, which are not directly comparable but are useful for indicating the directionality and determinants of net emissions, energy, \r\nand activity effects. Sources: Erdmann and Hilty (2010); Gebler et al. (2014); Huang et al. (2016); Verhoef et al. (2018); Alhumayani et al. (2020); Court and Sorrell (2020); Hook \r\net al. (2020); IEA (2020a); Saade et al. (2020); Torres-Carrillo et al. (2020); Wilson et al. (2020c); Yao et al. (2020); Munoz et al. (2021)."


id: 2ca75f8c2f82cc5012e0469cd47b5a88
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4453
content:
"Within a small but growing body of literature on the net effects of \r\ndigitalisation, there is medium evidence that digitalised consumer \r\nservices can reduce overall emissions, energy use, and activity levels, \r\nwith medium agreement on the scale of potential savings, with the \r\nimportant caveat that induced demand and rebound effects must be \r\nmanaged carefully to avoid negative outcomes."


id: 1f0ed0424ef314a3cbfb2a17800d754d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2326
content:
"Shared mobility is characterised by the sharing of an asset \r\n(e.g.,  a  bicycle, e-scooter, vehicle), and the use of technology \r\n(i.e.,  apps and the Internet) to connect users and providers. It \r\nsucceeded by identifying market inefficiencies and transferring "


id: 904c7a925dda8525240c4f76d3b3ac33
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20236
content:
"control over transactions to consumers. Even though most \r\nshared mobility providers operate privately, their services can be \r\nconsidered as part of a  public transport system in so far as it is \r\naccessible to most transport users and does not require private \r\nasset ownership. Shared mobility reduces GHG emissions if it \r\nsubstitutes for more GHG-intensive travel (usually private car \r\ntravel) (Martin and Shaheen 2011; Shaheen and Chan 2016; Santos \r\n2018; Axsen  and Sovacool 2019; Shaheen and  Cohen 2019), and \r\nespecially if it changes consumer behaviour in the long run 'by \r\nshifting personal transportation choices from ownership to demand\u0002fulfilment' (Mi and Coffman 2019)."


id: aaf037f57cfe2b90bd018787d06a4193
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24413
content:
"Demand is an important driver for energy use and emissions because \r\ndecreased cost of travel time by sharing an asset (e.g., a vehicle) could \r\nlead to an increase in emissions, but a high level of vehicle sharing \r\ncould reduce negative impacts associated with this (Brown and \r\nDodder 2019). One example is the megacity Kolkata, India, which \r\nhas as many as twelve different modes of public transportation \r\nthat co-exist and offer means of mobility to its 14 million citizens \r\n(Box 5.8). Most public transport modes are shared mobility options \r\nranging from sharing between two people in a rickshaw or between \r\na  few hundred in metro or suburban trains. Sharing also happens \r\ninformally as daily commuters avail shared taxis and neighbours \r\nborrow each other's car or bicycle for urgent or day trips."


id: 2357bf7bdbfd04103abfdccbc1589320
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3014
content:
"Positive effects can be realised directly in bike sharing due to its \r\nvery low marginal transport emissions. For example, in 2016, bike \r\nsharing in Shanghai, China, reduced CO2 emissions by 25 ktCO2, with \r\nadditional benefits to air quality (Zhang and Mi 2018). However, \r\nbike-sharing can also increase emissions from motor vehicle usage \r\nwhen inventory management is not optimised during maintenance, \r\ncollection, and redistribution of dock-less bikes (Fishman et al. 2014; \r\nZhang et al. 2019; Mi and Coffman 2019)."


id: b27334f03ae79a55590b65b6087d41f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25590
content:
"From a mitigation perspective, the current state of shared mobility \r\nlooks at best questionable (Fishman et al. 2014; Ricci 2015; Martin \r\n2016; Zhang and Mi 2018; Creutzig et al. 2019b; Mi and Coffman \r\n2019; Zhang et al. 2019). Transport entrepreneurs and government \r\nofficials often conflate 'smart' and 'shared' vehicles with \r\n'sustainable' mobility, a conflation not withstanding scrutiny (Noy \r\nand Givoni 2018). Surveys demonstrate that many users take "


id: 5753876884780573cb950ca23bca2eac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11228
content:
"an instrument to 'commercialize small housing production, while \r\nhousing affordability and accessibility are threatened' (Uyttebrouck \r\net al. 2020)."


id: 778c130373b458aad0777d764ad1f314
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16363
content:
"if automation makes route deviation more efficient, more cost \r\neffective, and more convenient, increasing total travel substantially \r\n(Wadud et  al. 2016). Car sharing with automated vehicles could \r\neven worsen congestion and emissions by generating additional \r\ntravel demand (Rubin et  al. 2016). Travel time in autonomous \r\nvehicles can be used for other activities but driving and travel costs \r\nare expected to decrease, which most likely will induce additional \r\ndemand for auto travel (Moeckel and Lewis 2017) and could even \r\ncreate incentives for further urban sprawl. More generally, increased \r\nefficiency generated by big data and smart algorithms may generate \r\nrebound effects in demand and potentially compromise the public \r\nbenefits of their efficiency promise (Gossart 2015)."


id: 8ac58a1c3dd9a29ea55444a7544122c0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19373
content:
"With respect to travel accommodation, several models are emerging \r\nin which accommodation is offered to, or shared with, travellers \r\nby private individuals organised by business-driven or non-profit \r\nonline platforms. Accommodation sharing includes peer-to-peer, \r\nICT-enabled, short-term renting, swapping, borrowing or lending \r\nof existing privately-owned lodging facilities (Mohlmann 2015; \r\nVoytenko Palgan et al. 2017)."


id: ffbd542e3e72d63ac78f40b7081558ac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37780
content:
"With shared accommodation services via the platform economy, \r\nthere may be risks of negative sustainability effects, such as rebound \r\neffects caused by increased travel frequency (Tussyadiah and Pesonen \r\n2016). This is particularly a problem if apartments are removed from \r\nlong-term rental markets, thus indirectly inducing construction \r\nactivities, with substantial GHG emissions of their own. However, if \r\na host shares their accommodation with a guest, the use of some \r\nresources, such as heating and lighting, is shared, thereby leading to \r\nmore efficient resource use per capita (Chenoweth 2009; Voytenko \r\nPalgan et al. 2017). Given the nascence of shared accommodation \r\nvia the platform economy, quantifications of its systems-level energy \r\nand emissions impacts are lacking in the literature, representing an \r\nimportant area for future study."


id: ef13cb5e708e2e8b02157e9f25df576d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35085
content:
"In many countries, shared mobility and ride pooling are often the \r\nnorm. Here the challenge is to improve service quality to keep users \r\nin shared mobility and public transport (Box  5.8). A key barrier in \r\ncities like Nairobi, Kenya, is the lack of public involvement of users \r\nand sustainability experts in designing transport systems, leaving \r\nplanning to transport engineers, and thus preventing inclusive shared \r\nmobility system design (Klopp 2012)."


id: a91fb6d83157534c46664302a3794cf7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24138
content:
"In developing countries and in many student accommodations \r\nglobally, shared accommodation allows affordable housing for \r\na large part of the population. For example, living arrangements are \r\nbuilt expressly around the practice of sharing toilets, bathrooms and \r\nkitchens. While the sharing of such facilities does connote a lower \r\nlevel of service provision and quality of life, it provides access \r\nfor a  consumer base with very low and unreliable incomes. Thus, \r\nsharing key facilities can help guarantee the provision of affordable \r\nhousing (Gulyani et  al. 2018). In developed countries, large-scale \r\ndevelopments are targeting students and 'young professionals' \r\nby offering shared accommodation and services. Historically \r\nshared accommodation has been part of the student life due to its \r\nflexible and affordable characteristics. However, the expansion of \r\nhousing supply through densification can use shared facilities as "


id: fdd88f1a768f80dfa29ff08391a3f5d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37456
content:
"there are also many definitions of CE: a systematic literature review \r\nidentified 114 different definitions (Kirchherr et  al. 2017). One of \r\nthe most comprehensive models is suggested by the Netherlands \r\nEnvironmental Assessment Agency (Potting et al. 2018), which defines \r\nten strategies for circularity: Refuse (R0), Rethink (R1), Reduce (R2), \r\nReuse (R3), Repair (R4), Refurbish (R5), Remanufacture  (R6), \r\nRepurpose (R7), Recycle (R8), and Recover energy (R9). Overall, \r\nthe definition of CE is contested, with varying boundary conditions \r\nchosen. As illustrated in Figure 5.11, the CE overlaps with both the \r\nsharing economy and digitalisation megatrends."


id: 5d9154685009ecfdee268aa07798f048
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12242
content:
"While the demand for energy and materials will increase until 2060 \r\nfollowing the traditional linear model of production and consumption, \r\nresulting in serious environmental consequences (OECD 2019b), the \r\ncircular economy (CE) provides strategies for reducing societal needs \r\nfor energy and primary materials to deliver the same level of service \r\nwith lower environmental impacts. The CE framework embodies \r\nmultiple schools of thought with roots in a number of related concepts \r\n(Blomsma and Brennan 2017; Murray et al. 2017), including cradle \r\nto cradle (McDonough and Braungart 2002), performance economy \r\n(Stahel 2016), biomimicry (Benyus 1997), green economy (Loiseau \r\net al. 2016) and industrial ecology (Saavedra et al. 2018). As a result, "


id: c80290dcfac3145464d22e6151b99bb2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29048
content:
"One report estimates that the CE can contribute to more than \r\n6 GtCO2 emission reductions in 2030, including strategies such as \r\nmaterial substitution in buildings (Blok et al. 2016). Reform of the tax \r\nsystem towards GHG emissions and the extraction of raw materials \r\nsubstituting taxes on labour is a key precondition to achieve such \r\na  potential. Otherwise, rebound effects tend to take back a  high \r\nshare of marginal CE efforts. A 50% reduction of GHG emissions \r\nin industrial processes, including the production of goods in steel, \r\ncement, plastic, paper, and aluminium, from 2010 until 2050, is \r\nimpossible to attain only with reuse and radical product innovation \r\nstrategies, but will need to also rely on the reduction of primary input \r\n(Allwood et al. 2010)."


id: 151a8fb340682ed5d961bd00ecbfa936
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 829
content:
"CE strategies generally correspond to the 'Avoid' strategy for \r\nprimary materials (Sections 5.1 and 5.3.2). CE strategies in industrial \r\nsettings improve well-being mostly indirectly, via the reduction of \r\nenvironmental harm and climate impact. They can also save monetary \r\nresources of consumers by reducing the need for consumption. It may \r\nseem counterintuitive, but reducing consumers' need to consume \r\na particular product or service (e.g., reducing energy consumption) \r\nmay increase consumption of another product or service (e.g., travel) \r\nassociated with some type of energy use, or lead to greater \r\nconsumption if additional secondary markets are created. Hence, \r\ncarbon emissions could rise if the rebound effect is not considered \r\n(Chitnis et al. 2013; Zink and Geyer 2017)."


id: 4843e28437cc9f524270ef767f47423a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8740
content:
"Looking at 'Shift' strategies (Sections 5.1 and 5.3.2), the role of \r\nindividuals as consumers and users has received less attention than \r\nother aspects of the CE (e.g., technological interventions as 'Improve' \r\nstrategies and waste minimisation as 'Avoid' strategies) within \r\nmainstream debates to date. One explanation is that CE has roots \r\nin the field of industrial ecology, which has historically emphasised \r\nmaterials systems more than the end user. By shifting this perspective \r\nfrom the supply side to the demand side in the CE, users are, for \r\nthe most part, discussed as social entities that now must form new \r\nrelations with businesses to meet their needs. That is, the demand\u0002side approach largely replaces the concept of a consumer with that \r\nof a user, who must either accept or reject new business models for \r\nservice provision, stimulated by the pushes and pulls of prices and \r\nperformance (Hobson 2019)."


id: 1a0f39a117164a8878cfc7c6de907784
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1566
content:
"Demand-side mitigation involves individuals (e.g.,  consumption \r\nchoices), culture (e.g.,  social norms, values), corporate \r\n(e.g.,  investments), institutions (e.g.,  political agency), and \r\ninfrastructure change (high evidence, high agreement). These five \r\ndrivers of human behaviour either contribute to the status quo \r\nof a  global high-carbon, consumption- and GDP growth-oriented \r\neconomy or help generate the desired change to a  low-carbon "


id: 6cdd0ec8298e48db264534a8dba4a3be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14748
content:
"Behaviour change by individuals and households requires both \r\nmotivation to change and capacity for change (option availability/\r\nknowledge; material/cognitive resources to initiate and maintain \r\nchange) (Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Michie et al. 2011) and is best \r\nseen as part of more encompassing collective action. Motivation for "


id: 1b60249697e515c6c003e9f06cd9526f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1767
content:
"change for collective good comes from economic, legal, and social \r\nincentives, and regard for deeper intrinsic value of concern for others \r\nover extrinsic values. Capacity for change varies; people in informal \r\nsettlements or rural areas are incapacitated by socio-political realities \r\nand have limited access to new energy-service options."


id: e2049c2361d10711d65e3eded3aa6106
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33056
content:
"Motivation and effort required for behaviour change increase from \r\n'Improve' to 'Shift' to 'Avoid' decisions. 'Improve' requires changes in \r\npersonal purchase decisions, 'Shift' involves changes in behavioural \r\nroutines, 'Avoid' also involves changes in deeper values or mindsets. \r\nPeople set easy goals for themselves and more difficult ones for \r\nothers (Attari et al. 2016) and underestimate the energy savings of \r\nbehaviour changes that make a large difference (Attari et al. 2010). \r\nMost personal actions taken so far have small mitigation potential \r\n(recycling, ecodriving), and people refrain from options advocated \r\nmore recently with high impact (less flying, living car free) (Dubois \r\net al. 2019)."


id: ac06a2f615e384d41ce015dcdc04fdd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24586
content:
"Motivation for demand-side solutions can be increased by focusing \r\non personal health or financial risks and benefits that clearly matter \r\nto people (Petrovic et al. 2014). Consistent with climate change as \r\na normally distant, non-threatening, statistical issue (Gifford 2011; \r\nFox-Glassman and Weber 2016), personal experience with climate\u0002linked flooding or other extreme weather events increases perceptions \r\nof risk and willingness to act (Weber 2013; Atreya and Ferreira 2015; \r\nSisco et  al. 2017) when plausible mediators and moderators are \r\nconsidered Brugger et al. (2021), confirmed in all 24 countries studied \r\nby Broomell et al. (2015). Discounting the future matters (Hershfield \r\net al. 2014): across multiple countries, individuals more focused on \r\nfuture outcomes are more likely to engage in environmental actions \r\n(Milfont et al. 2012)."


id: bde06377a892922a90ddda2bab371e5c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27428
content:
"ASI behaviours, in the Netherlands and Spain (Abrahamse and Steg \r\n2009; Niamir 2019; Niamir et al. 2020b), the OECD (Ameli and Brandt \r\n2015), and 11 European countries (Mills and Schleich 2012; Roy et al. \r\n2012). Education and income increase 'Shift' and 'Improve' behaviour, \r\nwhereas personal norms help to increase the more difficult 'Avoid' \r\nbehaviours (Mills and Schleich 2012). Socio-demographic variables \r\n(household size and income) predict energy use, but psychological \r\nvariables (perceived behavioural control, perceived responsibility) \r\npredict changes in energy use; younger households are more likely \r\nto adopt 'Improve' decisions, whereas education increases 'Avoid' "


id: af73ab5dc54f30978dbd4e88496bb6fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25118
content:
"decisions (Ahmad et  al. 2015). In India and developing countries, \r\n'Avoid' decisions are made by individuals championing a  cause, \r\nwhile 'Improve' and 'Shift' behaviour are increased by awareness \r\nprogrammes and promotional materials highlighting environmental \r\nand financial benefits (Chakravarty and Roy 2016; Roy et al. 2018a). \r\nCleaner cookstove adoption Box  5.6), a  widely studied 'Improve' \r\nsolution in developing countries (Nepal et al. 2010; Pant et al. 2014), \r\ngoes up with income, education, and urban location. Female education \r\nand investments in reproductive health are evident measures to \r\nreduce world population growth (Abel et al. 2016)."


id: 6d9b460516b7253d2b118cc138180765
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14855
content:
"Core values also influence which costs and benefits are considered \r\n(Hahnel et al. 2015; Golz and Hahnel 2016; Steg 2016). Information \r\nprovision and appeals are thus more effective when tailored to those \r\nvalues (Bolderdijk et al. 2013; Boomsma and Steg 2014), as implemented \r\nby the energy cultures framework (Stephenson et al. 2015; Klaniecki \r\net  al. 2020). Awareness, personal norms, and perceived behavioural \r\ncontrol predict willingness to change energy-related behaviour above \r\nand beyond traditional socio-demographic and economic predictors \r\n(Schwartz 1977; Ajzen 1985; Stern 2000), as do perceptions of self\u0002efficacy (Bostrom et al. 2019). However, such motivation for change \r\nis often not enough, as actors also need capacity for change and help \r\nto overcome individual, institutional and market barriers (Young et al. \r\n2010; Bray et al. 2011; Carrington et al. 2014)."


id: 8584c2217baad64bd595e2df74edbf2b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18539
content:
"There is high agreement in the literature that the updating of educational \r\nsystems from a commercialised, individualised, entrepreneurial training \r\nmodel to an education cognisant of planetary health and human well\u0002being can accelerate climate change awareness and action (Mendoza \r\nand Roa 2014; Dombrowski et  al. 2016) (Supplementary Material I \r\nChapter 5)."


id: f3acfc406a30abd7a3a6696112a8ec44
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35852
content:
"There is high evidence and high agreement that people's core values \r\naffect climate-related decisions and climate policy support by shaping \r\nbeliefs and identities (Dietz 2014; Steg 2016; Hayward and Roy \r\n2019). People with altruistic and biospheric values are more likely to \r\nact on climate change and support climate policies than those with \r\nhedonic or egoistic values (Taylor et al. 2014), because these values \r\nare associated with higher awareness and concern about climate \r\nchange, stronger belief that personal actions can help mitigate \r\nclimate change, and stronger feelings of responsibility for taking \r\nclimate action (Dietz 2014; Steg 2016). Research also suggest that \r\negalitarian, individualistic, and hierarchical worldviews (Wildavsky \r\nand Dake 1990) have their role, and that successful solutions \r\nrequire policy-makers of all three worldviews to come together and \r\ncommunicate with each other (Chuang et al. 2020)."


id: e63188f693999941bb05d2576dfc20b4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33711
content:
"Table  5.4 describes common obstacles to demand-side energy \r\nbehaviour change, from loss aversion to present bias (for more detail \r\nsee Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I). Choice architecture refers \r\nto interventions ('nudges') that shape the choice context and how \r\nchoices are presented, with seemingly-irrelevant details (e.g., option \r\norder or labels) often more important than option price (Thaler and \r\nSunstein 2009). There is high evidence and high agreement that \r\nchoice architecture nudges shape energy decisions by capturing \r\ndeciders' attention; engaging their desire to contribute to the social "


id: b6e1bb5c5c0b14cd6a9a7b23d5469ae8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26298
content:
"referred to as 'policy packaging' in transport policy research (Givoni \r\n2014). A meta-analysis, combining evidence of psychological and \r\neconomic studies, demonstrates that feedback, monetary incentives \r\nand social comparison operate synergistically and are together more \r\neffective than the sum of individual interventions (Khanna et al. 2021). \r\nThe same meta-analysis also shows that combined with monetary \r\nincentives, nudges and choice architecture can reduce global GHG \r\nemissions from household energy use by 5-6% (Khanna et al. 2021)."


id: f1f6e8e2efa58480549bcb5270912584
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35592
content:
"Choice architecture has been depicted as an anti-democratic attempt \r\nat manipulating the behaviour of actors without their awareness or \r\napproval (Gumbert 2019). Such critiques ignore the fact that there \r\nis no neutral way to present energy-use-related decisions, as every \r\npresentation format and choice environment influences choice, \r\nwhether intentionally or not. Educating households and policy makers \r\nabout the effectiveness of choice architecture and adding these \r\nbehavioural tools to existing market- and regulation-based tools in \r\na  transparent and consultative way can provide desired outcomes \r\nwith increased effectiveness, while avoiding charges of manipulation \r\nor deception. People consent to choice-architecture tools if their \r\nuse is welfare-enhancing, policymakers are transparent about \r\ntheir goals and processes, public deliberation and participation are \r\nencouraged, and the choice architect is trusted (Sunstein et al. 2019)."


id: 27cc6dede34f363f7c13437ad38c2928
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3672
content:
"unless \r\nd variab\r\nohen's d \r\ncentives \r\nyou-go \r\nng eco-i\r\nperating \r\ned to sh\r\ninforma\r\n2014; An\r\ned with \r\nnna et a\r\nenergy re\r\n2019*). \r\n]). When \r\n8). Self-s\r\n89; McCa\r\ner than u\r\nmse et a\r\nommitm\r\non and \r\n tools. T\r\nhen's d \r\nral inte\r\n and va\r\nsis or re\r\nn multip"


id: 34cc2441a19659ec218bcd5a8b6b92f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5713
content:
"sults \r\nsavings, u\r\ns a small an\r\nequences (C\r\nmonetary in\r\nr US pay-as\r\n of purchasi\r\n (10-year) o\r\nncy compar\r\n. Monetary \r\nd Siikamaki \r\nhen combin\r\n = .42) (Kha\r\n significant e\r\n Nisa et al. \r\n [0.11-0.66\r\nnd Fels 2018\r\nan Raaij 198\r\nerform bett\r\n989; Abraha\r\ne when the c\r\nth informat\r\nbehavioura\r\nured as Coh\r\nt behaviou\r\nern (2020) \r\nmeta-analy\r\new.\r\npplies whe"


id: 1cb36dce208adc5d628f8e5419483f21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1966
content:
"Res\r\nrgy \r\nfind\r\nonse\r\nwith m\r\ngs fo\r\nhood \r\nterm \r\nficie\r\n012)\r\nl and \r\nve w\r\nck (d \r\nlt in \r\n018; \r\n0.34, \r\nor a\r\nnd va\r\nals p\r\naij 19\r\nctive \r\nd w"


id: fb517516c4fcf55c8af243eaa79b10aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37046
content:
"While such a choice can be justified, other model framings can be \r\nequally justified (Ellenbeck and Lilliestam 2019)."


id: 422b755a8cb9e7487130fb398656165b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7809
content:
"Collective behaviours and social organisation are part of everyday \r\nlife, and feeling part of active collective action renders mitigation \r\nmeasures efficient and pervasive (Climact 2018). Social and cultural \r\nprocesses play an important role in shaping what actions people \r\ntake on climate mitigation, interacting with individual, structural, \r\ninstitutional and economic drivers (Barr and Prillwitz 2014). Just like \r\ninfrastructure, social and cultural processes can 'lock in' societies to \r\ncarbon-intensive patterns of service delivery. They also offer potential \r\nlevers to change normative ideas and social practices in order to \r\nachieve extensive emissions cuts (high confidence) (Table 5.4)."


id: 75027eb78b1960525e83c24e1e9e80ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16003
content:
"Behavioural contagion, which describes how ideas and behaviours \r\noften spread like infectious diseases, is a  major contributor to the \r\nclimate crisis (Sunstein 2019). But harnessing contagion can also \r\nmitigate warming. Carbon-heavy consumption patterns have become \r\nthe norm only in part because we're not charged for environmental \r\ndamage we cause (Pigou 1920). The deeper source of these patterns \r\nhas been peer influence (Frank 1999), because what we do influences \r\nothers. A rooftop solar installation early in the adoption cycle, for \r\nexample, spawns a copycat installation in the same neighbourhood \r\nwithin four months, on average. With such installations thus doubling \r\nevery four months, a  single new order results in 32 additional \r\ninstallations in just two years. And contagion doesn't stop there, since \r\neach family also influences friends and relatives in distant locations."


id: e595de25acb243b520db3262180bf85f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33627
content:
"Harnessing contagion can also underwrite the investment necessary \r\nfor climate stability. If taxed more heavily, top earners would spend \r\nless, shifting the frames of reference that shape spending of those just \r\nbelow, and so on - each step simultaneously reducing emissions and \r\nliberating resources for additional green investment (Frank  2020). \r\nMany resist, believing that higher taxes would make it harder to \r\nbuy life's special extras. But that belief is a cognitive illusion (Frank \r\n2020). Acquiring special things, which are inherently in short supply, \r\nrequires outbidding others who also want them. When top tax rates \r\nrise in tandem, relative bidding power is completely unchanged, so \r\nthe same penthouse apartments would end up in the same hands \r\nas before. More generally, behavioural contagion is important to \r\nleverage all relevant social tipping points for stabilising Earth's \r\nclimate (Otto et al. 2020)."


id: ca4ef19b0366222ea33c6e79ad32bc75
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29391
content:
"For new climate policies and mitigation technologies to be rapidly \r\nand extensively implemented, they must be socially acceptable to \r\nthose who are directly impacted by those policies and technologies \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). Policies that run counter to \r\nsocial norms or cultural meanings are less likely to be effective in \r\nreducing emissions (Demski et  al. 2015; Perlaviciute et  al. 2018; \r\nRoy et  al. 2018b). More just and acceptable implementation of \r\nrenewable energy technologies requires taking account of the \r\ncultural meanings, emotional attachments and identities linked \r\nto particular landscapes and places where those technologies "


id: 2f18163797b5671f87239307654d0251
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4838
content:
"and electrical utility sectors (Brulle 2019). There is evidence that \r\nUS opposition to climate action by carbon-connected industries is \r\nbroad-based, highly organised, and matched with extensive lobbying \r\n(Cory et al., 2021). Social movements can also work to prevent policy \r\nchanges, for example in France the Gilet Jaunes objected to increases \r\nin fuel costs on the grounds that they unfairly distributed the costs \r\nand benefits of price rises across social groups, for example between \r\nurban, peri-urban and rural areas (Copland 2019)."


id: 353c2a7c4d1f8f0bb7ca822752da57b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5786
content:
"Religion could play an important role in enabling collective action \r\non climate mitigation by providing cultural interpretations of change \r\nand institutional responses that provide resources and infrastructure \r\nto sustain collective actions (Roy et  al. 2012; Haluza-DeLay 2014; \r\nCaniglia et  al. 2015; Hulme 2015). Religion can be an important \r\ncultural resource towards sustainability at individual, community and \r\ninstitutional levels (Ives and Kidwell 2019), providing leverage points \r\nfor inner transformation towards sustainability (Woiwode et  al. \r\n2021). Normative interpretations of climate change for and from \r\nreligious communities are found in nearly every geography, and often \r\nobserve popular movements for climate action drawing on religious \r\nsymbols or metaphors (Jenkins et al. 2018). This suggests the value for \r\npolicymakers of involving religious constituencies as significant civil \r\nsociety organisations in devising and delivering climate responses."


id: ca3a4b8d342ad006cacfe1bb11a5b8d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29374
content:
"Countermovement coalitions work to oppose climate mitigation (high \r\nconfidence). Examples include efforts in the US to oppose mandatory \r\nlimits on carbon emissions supported by organisations from the coal "


id: 282e7d0ef80a77ec629f60867b27add7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3731
content:
"implementation of new and cleaner renewable energy technologies \r\n(Kariuki 2018). A good number of corporate agents have attempted \r\nto derail climate change mitigation by targeted lobbying and doubt\u0002inducing media strategies (Oreskes and Conway 2011). A number of \r\ncorporations that are involved in both upstream and downstream \r\nsupply chains of fossil fuel companies make up the majority of \r\norganisations opposed to climate action (Dunlap and McCright \r\n2015; Brulle 2019; Cory et  al. 2021). Corporate advertisement \r\nand brand-building strategies also attempt to deflect corporate \r\nresponsibility to individuals, and/or to appropriate climate care \r\nsentiments in their own brand building; climate change mitigation \r\nis uniquely framed through choice of products and consumption, \r\navoiding the notion of the political collective action sphere (Doyle \r\n2011; Doyle et al. 2019)."


id: 4dfed357786d15cb8ed87d80542fc611
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9693
content:
"Businesses and corporate organisations play a  key role in the \r\nmitigation of global warming, through their own commitments \r\nto zero-carbon footprints (Mendiluce 2021), decisions to invest \r\nin researching and implementing new energy technologies and \r\nenergy-efficient measures, and the supply-side interaction with \r\nchanging consumer preferences and behaviours, such as via \r\nmarketing. Business models and strategies work both as a barrier \r\nto and an accelerator of decarbonisation. Still existing locked\u0002in infrastructures and business models advantages fossil fuel \r\nindustry over renewable and energy efficient end use industry \r\n(Klitkou et al. 2015). The fossil fuel energy generation and delivery \r\nsystem therefore epitomises a  barrier to the acceptance and "


id: 8f7d90c72c0db7426d7cda6e55426f24
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20121
content:
"(Grandclement et al. 2015; De Rubens et al. 2018). Middle actors can \r\nbring about change in several different directions, be it, upstream, \r\ndownstream or sideways. They can redefine professional ethics \r\naround sustainability issues, and, as influencers on the process of \r\ndiffusion of innovations (Rogers 2003), professionals can enable or \r\nobstruct improvements in efficient service provision or shifts towards \r\nlow-carbon technologies (e.g.,  air and ground source heat pumps, \r\nsolar hot water, underfloor heating, programmable thermostats, and \r\nmechanical ventilation with heat recovery) and mobility technologies \r\n(e.g., electric vehicles)."


id: 195003449b2f3098582ef5269c881806
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1467
content:
"Business and corporations are also agents of change towards \r\ndecarbonisation, as demonstrated in the case of PV and battery \r\nelectric cars (Teece 2018). Beyond new low-carbon technologies, \r\nstrong sustainability business models are characterised by identifying \r\nnature as the primary stakeholder, strong local anchorage, the creation \r\nof diversified income sources, and deliberate limitations on economic \r\ngrowth (Brozovic 2019). However, such business models are difficult \r\nto maintain if generally traditional business models, which require \r\nshort-term accounting, prevail."


id: 79af873b70e899eeaa2e41104f2f5b21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16712
content:
"Liability of fossil fuel business models and insurance against climate \r\ndamages are key concerns of corporations and business. Limitations \r\nand regulation on GHG emissions will compel reductions in demand for \r\nfossil fuel companies' products (Porter and Kramer 2006). According \r\nto a  report by the Advisory Scientific Committee of the European \r\nSystemic Risk Board, insurance industries are very likely to incur losses \r\ndue to liability risks (ESRB 2016). The divestment movement adds \r\nadditional pressure on fossil fuel related investments (Braungardt \r\net al. 2019), even though fossil fuel financing remains resilient (Curran \r\n2020). Companies, businesses and organisations, especially those \r\nin the carbon-intensive energy sector, might face liability claims for \r\ntheir contribution to climate change. A late transition to a low-carbon \r\neconomy would exacerbate the physical costs of climate change on \r\ngovernments, businesses and corporations (ESRB 2016)."


id: 601370309d8a57ce0f0d0bb2504ec1f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12694
content:
"Despite the seemingly positive roles that businesses and corporate \r\norganisations tend to play towards sustainable transitions, there is \r\na need to highlight the dynamic relationship between sustainable and \r\nunsustainable trends (Antal et al. 2020), or example, the production \r\nof sport utility vehicles (SUVs) in the automobile market at the \r\nsame time that car manufacturers are producing electric vehicles. \r\nAn analysis of the role of consumers as drivers of unsustainability \r\nfor businesses and corporate organisations is very important here as \r\nthis trend will offset the sustainability progress being made by these \r\nbusinesses and organisations (Antal et al. 2020)."


id: cf76fabf98542dda9100b6212672e293
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30173
content:
"In densely populated, fast-growing megacities, policymakers face the difficult challenge of preventing widespread adoption of petrol \r\nor diesel fuelled private cars as a mode of transport. The megacity of Kolkata in India provides a useful case study. As many as twelve \r\ndifferent modes of public transportation, each with its own system structure, actors and meanings, co-exist and offer means of \r\nmobility to its 14 million citizens. Most of the public transport modes are shared mobility options, ranging from sharing between two \r\npeople in a rickshaw or a few hundred in metro or sub-urban trains. Sharing also happens informally as daily commuters avail shared \r\ntaxis and neighbours borrow each other's car or bicycle for urgent or day trips."


id: 3eaebb9736c5219037edebdcc5f70546
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7245
content:
"objective measures, such as public health and climate change \r\nmitigation, not only given preferences (high agreement, high \r\nevidence). Specifically, there is a case for more investment in low\u0002carbon transport infrastructure than assumed in environmental \r\neconomics as it induces low-carbon preferences (Creutzig et  al. \r\n2016a; Mattauch et  al. 2016; Mattauch et  al. 2018). Changes in \r\ninfrastructure provision for active travel may contribute to uptake \r\nof more walking and cycling (Frank et  al. 2019). These effects \r\ncontribute to higher uptake of low-carbon travel options, albeit \r\nthe magnitude of effects depends on design choices and context \r\n(Goodman et  al. 2013; Goodman et  al. 2014; Song et  al. 2017; \r\nJavaid et  al. 2020; Abraham et  al. 2021). Infrastructure is thus \r\nnot only required to make low-carbon travel possible but can \r\nalso be a  pre-condition for the formation of low-carbon mobility \r\npreferences (see case study in Box 5.8)."


id: 18f3d7d93ae2dd6a11c890b52b17f5b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1425
content:
"The dynamic interaction of habits and infrastructures also predict \r\nCO2-intensive choices. When people move from a  city with good \r\npublic transport to a  car-dependent city, they are more likely to \r\nown fewer vehicles due to learned preferences for lower levels of \r\ncar ownership (Weinberger and Goetzke 2010). When individuals \r\nmoving to a  new city with extensive public transport were given \r\ntargeted material about public transport options, the modal share \r\nof public transport increased significantly (Bamberg et  al. 2003). \r\nSimilarly, an exogenous change to route choice in public transport \r\nmakes commuters change their habitual routes (Larcom et al. 2017)."


id: 9c16f8b3a1a07599890fce53708b1c8f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22119
content:
"From a  welfare point of view, infrastructure investments are not \r\nconstrained by revealed or stated preferences (high evidence, \r\nhigh agreement). Preferences change with social and physical \r\nenvironment, and infrastructure interventions can be justified by "


id: b7d0dcdc24051c2b2298428a7398256
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26456
content:
"Table 5.4 | Main features, insights, and policy implications of five drivers of decision and action. Entries in each column are independent lists, not intended to \r\nline up with each other."


id: a12400de8a43b6ce9ee7e5d892dd4cbf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22909
content:
"between technologies, user practices, cultural meanings, business, \r\ninfrastructures, and public policies (McMeekin and Southerton 2012; \r\nGeels et  al. 2017) and can thus accommodate the five drivers of \r\nchange and stability discussed in Section 5.4."


id: 5317a2c70d0a52896fbd7bcaf1c2ce2a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10541
content:
"Several integrative frameworks including social practice theory \r\n(Ropke 2009; Shove and Walker 2014), the energy cultures framework \r\n(Stephenson et  al. 2015; Jurisoo et  al. 2019) and socio-technical \r\ntransitions theory (McMeekin and Southerton 2012; Geels et al. 2017) \r\nconceptualise demand-side transitions as multi-dimensional and \r\ninteracting processes (high evidence, high agreement). Social practice \r\ntheory emphasises interactions between artefacts, competences, \r\nand cultural meanings (Ropke 2009; Shove and Walker 2014). The \r\nenergy cultures framework highlights feedbacks between materials, \r\nnorms, and behavioural practices (Stephenson et  al. 2015; Jurisoo \r\net al. 2019). Socio-technical transitions theory addresses interactions "


id: b2a0e7a69ea5043ae73bb8fb86092e6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25624
content:
"Section  5.4 shows with high evidence and high agreement that \r\nthe relative influence of different drivers varies between demand\u0002side solutions. The deployment of 'Improve' options like LEDs and \r\nclean cookstoves mostly involves technological change, adoption by \r\nconsumers who integrate new technologies in their daily life practices \r\n(Smith et  al. 1993; Sanderson and Simons 2014; Franceschini and \r\nAlkemade 2016), and some policy change. Changes in meanings \r\nare less pertinent for those 'Improve' options that are primarily \r\nabout technological substitution. Other 'Improve' options, like clean \r\ncookstoves, involve both technological substitution and changes in \r\ncultural meanings and traditions."


id: ad706300913b03d7dbb48e07a4a738e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24826
content:
"and countries, the transitions literature distinguishes four phases, \r\ncharacterised by generic core processes and challenges: (i) emergence, \r\n(ii) early adaptation, (i) diffusion, (iv) stabilisation (high confidence) \r\n(Rotmans et  al. 2001; Markard et  al. 2012; Geels et  al. 2017) \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16). These four phases do not imply \r\nthat transitions are linear, teleological processes, because set-backs \r\nor reversals may occur as a result of learning processes, conflicts, or \r\nchanging coalitions (very high confidence) (Geels and Raven 2006; \r\nMessner 2015; Davidescu et al. 2018). There is also no guarantee that \r\ntechnological, social, or business model innovations progress beyond \r\nthe first phase."


id: f9dd915b43a98c30214d7a3fc1ac61f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36817
content:
"Deployment of 'Shift' options like enhanced public transport involves \r\nsubstantial behavioural change and transitions to new or expanded \r\nprovisioning systems, which may include new technologies (buses, \r\ntrams), infrastructures (light rail, dedicated bus lanes), institutions \r\n(operational licences, performance contracts), financial arrangements, \r\nand new organisations (with particular responsibilities and oversight) \r\n(high evidence, high agreement) (Deng and Nelson 2011; Turnheim \r\nand Geels 2019). Changes in cultural meanings can facilitate 'Shift' \r\noptions. Shifts towards low-meat diets, for instance, are motivated \r\nby costs and by beliefs about the undesirability of meat that relate \r\nmore to issues like health, nutrition and animal welfare than climate \r\nchange (De Boer et al. 2014; Mylan 2018)."


id: 690f9ee3ca1573c08adaafc8ec6fd073
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14123
content:
"'Avoid' options that reduce service levels (e.g.,  sufficiency or \r\ndownshifting) imply very substantial behavioural and cultural \r\nchanges that may not resonate with mainstream consumers (Dubois \r\net  al. 2019). Other 'Avoid' options like teleworking also require \r\nchanges in cultural meanings and beliefs (about the importance \r\nof supervision, coaching, social contacts, or office politics), as well \r\nas changes in behaviour, institutions, business, and technology \r\n(including good internet connections and office space at home). \r\nBecause these interconnected changes were not widespread, \r\nteleworking remained stuck in small niches and did not diffuse widely \r\nbefore the COVID-19 crisis (Hynes 2014; Hynes 2016; Belzunegui\u0002Eraso and Erro-Garces 2020; Stiles 2020). As preferences change, \r\nnew infrastructures and social settings can also elicit new desires \r\nassociated with emerging low-energy demand service provisioning \r\nsystems (Section 5.4.5)."


id: ccc6310fbe5e6c54298a777ebe5f3200
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29757
content:
"In the third phase, radical innovations diffuse into wider communities \r\nand mainstream markets. Typical drivers are performance \r\nimprovements, cost reductions, widespread consumer interest, \r\ninvestments in infrastructure and complementary technologies, \r\ninstitutional support and strong cultural appeal (high evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Wilson 2012; Markard and Hoffmann 2016; Malone \r\net al. 2017; Raven et al. 2017; Kanger et al. 2019). The latter may \r\nbe related to wider cultural shifts such as increased public attention \r\nto climate change and new framings like 'climate emergency' which \r\ngained traction before the Covid-19 pandemic (Bouman et al. 2020b). \r\nThese concerns may not last, however, since public attention typically \r\nfollows cycles (Downs 1972; Djerf-Pierre 2012)."


id: fa14f61f695acb41cf43894961f6d7cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36861
content:
"Transitions often take several decades, unfolding through several \r\nphases. Although there is variability across innovations, sectors, "


id: 433c6d1381384d5f57b0cc19d7a19f69
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7981
content:
"This phase often involves multiple struggles: economic competition \r\nbetween low-carbon innovations and existing technologies and \r\npractices, business struggles between incumbents and new entrants \r\n(Hockerts and Wustenhagen 2010), cultural and framing struggles in \r\npublic opinion arenas (Kammermann and Dermont 2018; Rosenbloom \r\n2018; Hess 2019a), and political struggles over adjustments in policies \r\nand institutions, which shape markets and innovations (Meadowcroft \r\n2011; Roberts and Geels 2019). The lock-in mechanisms of existing \r\npractices and systems tend to weaken in the third phase, either \r\nbecause competing innovations erode their economic viability, \r\ncultural legitimacy or institutional support (Turnheim and Geels 2012; \r\nRoberts 2017; Kuokkanen et  al. 2018; Leipprand and Flachsland \r\n2018) or because exogenous shocks and pressures disrupt the status \r\nquo (Kungl and Geels 2018; Simpson 2019)."


id: fabc1045aa3f3fdbb16ec413f2a1c89d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36971
content:
"processes, artefacts, and behaviours is determined by a wide range \r\nof factors at the macro- and micro-scales, which have been identified \r\nby several decades of diffusion research in multiple disciplines \r\n(Mansfield 1968; Martino et  al. 1978; Davis 1979; Mahajan et  al. \r\n1990; Ausubel 1991; Grubler 1991; Feder and Umali 1993; Bayus \r\n1994; Comin and Hobijn 2003; Rogers 2003; Van den Bulte and \r\nStremersch 2004; Meade and Islam 2006; Peres et al. 2010)."


id: 4de8819ab3a8bd8203bcda81946a08a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9678
content:
"Diffusion rates are determined by two broad categories of variables: \r\nthose intrinsic to the technology, product or practice under consideration \r\n(typically performance, costs, benefits), and those intrinsic to the \r\nadoption environment (e.g., socio-economic and market characteristics)."


id: 272aa99e1fdc7c5483dcfda9520d380e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3558
content:
"In the fourth phase, the diffusing innovations replace or substantially \r\nreconfigure existing practices and systems, which may lead to the \r\ndownfall or reorientation of incumbent firms (Bergek et  al. 2013; \r\nMcMeekin et  al. 2019). The new system becomes institutionalised \r\nand anchored in professional standards, technical capabilities, \r\ninfrastructures, educational programmes, regulations and institutional \r\nlogics, user habits, and views of normality, which create new lock-ins \r\n(Galaskiewicz 1985; Shove and Southerton 2000; Barnes et al. 2018)."


id: b4e1c8aac8079d8fa757ffdd14aa707f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25995
content:
"Transitional change is usually slow in the first and second transition \r\nphases, because experimentation, social and technological learning, \r\nand stabilisation processes take a  long time, often decades, and \r\nremain restricted to small niches (high confidence) (Wilson 2012; \r\nBento 2013; Bento et al. 2018b). Transitional change accelerates in \r\nthe third phase, as radical innovations diffuse from initial niches into \r\nmainstream markets, propelled by the self-reinforcing mechanisms \r\ndiscussed above. The rate of adoption (diffusion) of new practices, "


id: fd54ef6a075d5abe4afa6c98698df036
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37370
content:
"Second, complexity matters, which is often related to unit scale (Ma et al. \r\n2008). Acceleration is more difficult for options with higher degrees of \r\ncomplexity (e.g., carbon capture, transport and storage, or a hydrogen \r\neconomy) representing higher technological and investment risks that "


id: 48ccefab6fe55c5a01cebda56ac4f7d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8830
content:
"can slow down change. Options with lower complexity are easier to \r\naccelerate because they involve less experimentation and debugging \r\nand require less adoption efforts and risk."


id: e36e5ffd431581a0f81e84bec5d6411c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33262
content:
"policies and institutions can also accelerate transitions, especially if \r\nthese create stable and attractive financial incentives or introduce \r\ntechnology-forcing standards or regulations (Brand et al. 2013; Kester \r\net al. 2018; Roberts et al. 2018). Changes in meanings and cultural \r\nnorms can also accelerate transitions, especially when they affect \r\nconsumer practices, enhance social acceptance, and create legitimacy \r\nfor stronger policy support (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001; Rogers 2003; \r\nBuschmann and Oels 2019). Adoption of most advanced practices \r\ncan support leapfrogging of polluting technologies (Box 5.9)."


id: 8ca5ab27c623481cc9becd88d4826792
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19647
content:
"Third, agency, structure and meaning can accelerate transitions. \r\nThe creation and mobilisation of actor coalitions is widely seen as \r\nimportant for acceleration, especially if these involve actors with \r\ntechnical skills, financial resources and political capital (Kern and \r\nRogge 2016; Hess 2019b; Roberts and Geels 2019). Changes in "


id: c25a2181e5b98cbdba9999389a4ed827
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28164
content:
"A robust conclusion from this review is that there are no generic \r\nacceleration policies that are independent from the nature of \r\nwhat changes, by whom and how. Greater contextualisation and \r\ngranularity in policy approaches is therefore important to address \r\nthe challenges of rapid transitions towards zero-carbon systems \r\n(high evidence, high agreement)."


id: 3ef9817683d950314227ed7163b92c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7292
content:
"There are also some contentious topics in the debate on accelerated \r\nlow-carbon transitions. First, while acceleration is desirable to \r\nmitigate climate change, there is a  risk that accelerating change \r\ntoo much may short-cut crucial experimentation and social and \r\ntechnological learning in 'formative phases' (Bento 2013; Bento et al. \r\n2018b) and potentially lead to a pre-mature lock-in of solutions that \r\nlater turn out to have negative impacts (Cowan 1990; Cowan 1991) \r\n(high evidence, medium agreement)."


id: 2a4fd6e767fc9b72f16d9ec50bf50f1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4085
content:
"Second, there is an ongoing debate about the most powerful leverage \r\npoints and policies for speeding up change in social and technological \r\nsystems. Farmer et  al. (2019) suggested 'sensitive intervention \r\npoints' for low-carbon transitions, but do not quantify the impacts \r\non transformations. Grubler et al. (2018) proposed an end-user and \r\nefficiency-focused strategy to achieve rapid emission reductions \r\nand quantified their scenario with a leading IAM. However, discussion \r\nof the policy implications of such a  strategy have only just started \r\n(Wilson et al. 2019a), suggesting an important area for future research."


id: 65d8cae9c1b4df7366bdc9df86f0a3ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13608
content:
"Informal-sector innovation is often underrated. It gives marginalised people access to welfare-enhancing innovations, building on \r\nalternative knowledge and socially-embedded reciprocal exchange (Jaffe and Koster 2019; Sheikh 2019; Sheikh and Bhaduri 2020). \r\nLarge improvements in low-emission, locally-appropriate service provision are possible by facilitating informal-sector service providers'"


id: ccae648dc0841afa6eade68e0af5b2ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29739
content:
"access to low-energy technologies (while taking care not to additionally burden the unpaid and marginalised), through such means \r\nas education, participatory governance, government policies to assist the informal sector, social services, health care, credit provision, \r\nand removing harmful policies and regulatory silos. The importance of the informal economy, especially in low-income countries, \r\nopens many possibilities for new approaches to decent living standards service provision along with climate resilience (Rynikiewicz \r\nand Chetaille 2006; Backstrand et al. 2010; Porio 2011; Kriegler et al. 2014; Taylor and Peter 2014; Brown and McGranahan 2016; \r\nChu 2016; Satterthwaite et al. 2018; Boran 2019; Hugo and du Plessis 2019; Schroder et al. 2019; Javaid et al. 2020)."


id: e69374c269b6eccf929a22d12427cba5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33757
content:
"Public information and understanding of the CO2-eq emissions implied by consumption patterns can unleash great creativity for meeting \r\nservice needs fairly and with lower emissions (Darier and Schule 1999; Sterman and Sweeney 2002; Lorenzoni et al. 2007; Billett 2010; \r\nMarres 2011; Zapico Lamela et al. 2011; Polonsky et al. 2012; Williams et al. 2019). Community-based mapping, social learning, green \r\ninfrastructure development, and participatory governance facilitate such information-sharing (Tauhid and Zawani 2018; Mazeka et al. \r\n2019; Sharifi 2020), strengthening mitigation policies (Loiter and Norberg-Bohm 1999; Stokes and Warshaw 2017; Zhou et al. 2019)."


id: 9d91001d4d289ca77f3bd8973dc72b8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22322
content:
"Since informal settlements are usually dense, upgrading them supports low-carbon development pathways which leapfrog less-efficient \r\nhousing, transport and other service provision, using locally-appropriate innovations (Satterthwaite et al. 2018). Examples of informal\u0002sector mitigation include digital banking in Africa; mobility in India using collective transport; food production, meal provision, and \r\nreduction of food waste in Latin America (e.g., soup kitchens in Brazil, community kitchens in Lima, Peru); informal materials recycling, \r\nspace heating and cooling, and illumination (Hordijk 2000; Baldez 2003; Maumbe 2006; Gutberlet 2008; Chaturvedi and Gidwani \r\n2011; Nandy et al. 2015; Rouse and Verhoef 2016; Ackah 2017)."


id: fd340f858593354159fe33c665e7f242
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37350
content:
"There is high evidence and high agreement that 'Avoid' policies \r\nthat affect lifestyle changes offer opportunities for cost-effective \r\nreductions in energy use and emissions, but would need to overcome \r\npolitical sensitivities around government efforts to shape and modify \r\nindividual-level behaviour (Rosenow et al. 2017; Grubb et al. 2020) \r\n(Table 5.5). These policies include ways to help avoid travel growth \r\nthrough integrated city planning or building retrofits to help avoid \r\ndemand for transport, heating or cooling (Bakker et al. 2014; Lucon \r\net  al. 2014; de Feijter et  al. 2019), which interact with existing \r\ninfrastructure. Dense pedestrianised cities and towns and medium\u0002density transit corridors are better placed to implement policies for \r\ncar reductions than 'sprawled' cities characterised by low-density, \r\nauto-dependent and separated land uses (Seto et al. 2014; Newman \r\nand Kenworthy 2015; Newman et al. 2017; Bakker et al. 2014)."


id: b909274712301350ed375f0ccbbc1fb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26645
content:
"Cities face pressing priorities like poverty reduction, meeting basic \r\nservices and building human and institutional capacity. These are met \r\nwith highly accessible walkable and cyclable cities, connected with \r\npublic transit corridors, enabling equal accessibility for all citizens, \r\nand enabling a high level of service provisioning (UN-Habitat 2013; \r\nCreutzig et al. 2016b). Infrastructure development costs less than for \r\ncar dependent cities. However, it requires a mindset shift for urban \r\nand transport planners (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 6df10f2a579c68ab0bea74fcf39adeb3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14910
content:
"Policies that support the avoidance of higher-emission lifestyles \r\nand improve well-being are facilitated by the introduction of smart \r\ntechnologies, infrastructures and practices (Amini et al. 2019). They "


id: fc7ae8b5ce6d83b7e2ed03b5d9273962
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37233
content:
"Bonacini et al. 2021). In the absence of distributive or other equity\u0002based measures, the potential gains in terms of emissions reduction \r\nmay therefore be counteracted by the cost of increasing inequality. \r\nThis potential growth in inequality is likely to be more severe in poorer \r\ncountries that will additionally suffer from a  lack of international \r\nfunding for achieving the SDGs (high evidence, medium agreement) \r\n(Barbier and Burgess 2020; UN 2020)."


id: fed508358c0f3e9ca7223558b75ab906
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37637
content:
"include regulations and measures for investment in high-quality ICT \r\ninfrastructure and regulations to restrict number plates, as well as \r\ncompany policy around flexible working conditions (Lachapelle et al. \r\n2018; Shabanpour et  al. 2018). Working-from-home arrangements \r\nmay advantage certain segments of society such as male, older, \r\nhigher-educated and highly-paid employees, potentially exacerbating \r\nexisting inequalities in the labour market (Lambert et  al. 2020; "


id: c0488463e1f80c9e349b143b530cb8fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27813
content:
"Ritchie et al. 2018; Willett et al. 2019). Governments also play a direct \r\nrole beyond nudging citizens with information about health and well\u0002being. While the effectiveness of these policies on behaviour change \r\noverall may be limited (Pearson-Stuttard et al. 2017; Shangguan et al. \r\n2019), there is some room for policy to influence actors upstream, \r\nsuch as industry and supermarkets, which may give rise to longer\u0002term, structural change."


id: 3181ff3193578723025fb520c7df7246
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5198
content:
"As indicated in Table  5.6, 'Shift' policies have various forms \r\nsuch as the demand for low-carbon materials for buildings and \r\ninfrastructure in manufacturing and services and shift from meat\u0002based protein, mainly beef, to plant-based diets of other protein \r\nsources (high evidence, high agreement) (Springmann et al. 2016a; "


id: affde96bea65bee1a9264c77bb495232
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25216
content:
"'Improve' policies aim at improving vehicles, comfort, fuels, transport \r\noperations and management technologies; and in buildings, they \r\ninclude policies for improving efficiency of heating systems and \r\nretrofitting existing buildings. Efficiency improvements in electric \r\ncooking appliances, together with the ongoing decrease in prices of \r\nrenewable energy technologies, are opening policy opportunities to \r\nsupport households to adopt electrical cooking at mass scale (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (IEA 2017c; Puzzolo et  al. 2019). \r\nThese actions towards cleaner energy for cooking often come with \r\ncooking-related reduction of GHG emissions, even though the extent \r\nof the reductions is highly dependent on context and technology and \r\nfuel pathways (high evidence, high agreement) (Martinez et al. 2017; \r\nMondal et  al. 2018; Rosenthal et  al. 2018; Serrano-Medrano et  al. \r\n2018; Dagnachew et al. 2019) (Box 5.6)."


id: 46b472f2983f56d5ba65023c6e806d00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8510
content:
"Table  5.7 highlights the significant progress made in the uptake of \r\nthe electrical vehicle (EV) in Europe, driven by a  suite of incentives \r\nand policies. Increased activity in widening electric vehicle use is also \r\noccurring in developing countries. The Indian Government's proposal to \r\nreach the target of a 100% electric vehicle fleet by 2030 has stimulated \r\ninvestment in charging infrastructure that can facilitate diffusion of \r\nlarger EVs (Dhar et al. 2017). Although the proposal was not converted \r\ninto a  policy, India's large and growing two-wheeler market has \r\nbenefitted from the policy attention on EVs, showing a  significant \r\npotential for increasing the share of electric two- and three-wheelers "


id: 8fbe1d700a5afbe6321c53c33412aa79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20153
content:
"'Improve' policies focus on the efficiency and enhancement of \r\ntechnological performance of services (Table 5.7). In mobility services, "


id: fd94d914e3102c71a45399c0e7f1c27
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37413
content:
"in the short term (Ahmad and Creutzig 2019). Similar opportunities \r\nexist for China, where e-bikes have replaced car trips and are reported \r\nto act as intermediate links in multimodal mobility (Cherry et al. 2016)."


id: ee06d55d3ba5252223abfa06419e03ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34930
content:
"In recent years, policy interest has arisen to address the energy access \r\nchallenge in Africa using low-carbon energy technologies to meet \r\nenergy for poverty reduction and climate action simultaneously \r\n(Rolffs et al. 2015; Fuso Nerini et al. 2018; Mulugetta et al. 2019). This \r\naspiration has been bolstered on the technical front by significant \r\nadvances in appliance efficiency such as light-emitting diode (LED) \r\ntechnology, complemented by the sharp reduction in the cost of \r\nrenewable energy technologies, and largely driven by market\u0002stimulating policies and public R&D to mitigate risks (high evidence, \r\nhigh agreement) (Alstone et al. 2015; Zubi et al. 2019)."


id: ffe9bc548fec71383fa812829cad384e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37799
content:
"Whether the public supports specific policy instruments for reducing greenhouse gas emissions is determined by cultural and political \r\nworld views (Cherry et al. 2017; Kotchen et al. 2017; Alberini et al. 2018) and national positions in international climate negotiations, \r\nwith major implications for policy design. For example, policy proposals need to circumvent 'solution aversion': that is, individuals are \r\nmore doubtful about the urgency of climate change mitigation if the proposed policy contradicts their political worldviews (Campbell \r\nand Kay 2014). While there are reasons to believe that carbon pricing is the most efficient way to reduce emissions, a recent literature - \r\nfocusing on populations in Western Europe and North America and carbon taxes - documents that efficiency features alone is not \r\nwhat makes citizens like or dislike carbon pricing schemes (Kallbekken et al. 2011; Carattini et al. 2017; Klenert et al. 2018)."


id: eddc804f4e32ee625d8f1169d1a415e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34890
content:
"To address these realities regarding support for carbon pricing, some studies have examined whether specific uses of the revenue \r\ncan increase public support for higher carbon prices (Carattini et al. 2017; Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer 2019). Doubt about the \r\nenvironmental effectiveness of carbon pricing may be alleviated if revenue from carbon pricing is earmarked for specific uses \r\n(Kallbekken et al. 2011; Carattini et al. 2017) and higher carbon prices may then be supported (Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer 2019). \r\nThis is especially the case for using the proceeds on 'green investment' in infrastructure or energy efficiency programmes (Kotchen \r\net al. 2017). Further, returning the revenues to individuals in a salient manner may increase public support and alleviate fairness \r\nproposals, given sufficient information (Carattini et al. 2017; Klenert et al. 2018). Perceived fairness is one of the strongest predictors \r\nof policy support (Jagers et al. 2010; Whittle et al. 2019)."


id: f04911d4bc9bcdb51ea1575f5d42f7d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35308
content:
"2017; Tesfamichael et al. 2021). This makes it important to precede \r\ncarbon pricing with investments in renewable energy and low\u0002carbon transport modes (Biber et al. 2017; Tvinnereim and Mehling \r\n2018), and especially support for developing countries by building up \r\nlow-carbon energy and mobility infrastructures and technologies, thus \r\nreducing resistance to carbon pricing (Creutzig 2019). Additionally, \r\ncarbon pricing receives higher acceptance if fairness and distributive \r\nconsiderations are made explicit in revenue distribution (Box 5.11)."


id: b1d5fdf54527a732567838b900758706
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25487
content:
"Policy coordination is critical to manage infrastructure interdependence \r\nacross sectors, and to avoid trade-off effects (Raven and Verbong 2007; \r\nHiteva and Watson 2019), specifically requiring the consideration of \r\ninteractions among supply-side and demand-side measures (high \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Kivimaa and Virkamaki 2014; Rogge and \r\nReichardt 2016; de Coninck et al. 2018; Edmondson et al. 2019). For \r\nexample, the amount of electricity required for cooking can overwhelm \r\nthe grid which can lead to failure, causing end-users to shift back to \r\ntraditional biomass or fossil fuels (Ateba et al. 2018; Israel-Akinbo et al. \r\n2018); thus grid stability policies need to be undertaken in conjunction."


id: 5b786c2d7b74fb6e61793e91d8ae4249
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11891
content:
"Policymakers operate in a  politically dynamic national and \r\ninternational environment, and their policies often reflect their \r\ncontextual situations and constraints with regards to climate-related \r\nreforms (Levin et al. 2012; Copland 2019), including differentiation \r\nbetween developed and developing countries (high evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Beer and Beer 2014; Roy et al. 2018c). Variables such \r\nas internal political stability, equity, informality (Box 5.10), macro\u0002economic conditions, public debt, governance of policies, global \r\noil prices, quality of public services, and the maturity of green \r\ntechnologies play important roles in determining policy directions."


id: e30eec78411dbb8e793c439c20c44072
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33218
content:
"As a key contending policy instrument, carbon pricing also requires \r\nembedding into policy packages (high evidence, medium agreement).\r\nPricing may be regressive and perceived as additional costs by \r\nhouseholds and industry, making investments in green infrastructure \r\npolitically unfeasible, as examples from France and Australia show \r\n(Copland 2019; Douenne and Fabre 2020). Reforms that would \r\npush up household energy expenses are often left aside for fear of \r\nhow citizens, especially the poor, would react or cope with higher \r\nbills (high evidence, medium agreement) (Martinez and Viegas "


id: 8c3b44e7d601042ef7c1875a7b0f40b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19569
content:
"end use. Literature on how gender, informal economies mostly in \r\ndeveloping countries, and solidarity and care frameworks translate \r\ninto climate action, but also how climate action can improve the life \r\nof marginalised groups, remains scarce. The working of economic \r\nsystems under a well-being-driven rather than GDP-driven paradigm \r\nrequires better understanding."


id: 94a279e79d909b2219761055af50db3a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20895
content:
"The digital economy, as well as shared and circular economy, is \r\nemerging as a  template for great narratives, hopes and fears. Yet, \r\nthere are few systematic evaluations of what is already happening \r\nand what can govern it towards a better narrative. Research needs \r\nto better gauge energy trends for rapidly evolving systems like data \r\ncentres, increased use of social media and influence of consumption \r\nand choices, AI, blockchain; and implications of digital divides among \r\nsocial groups and countries on well-being. Governance decisions on \r\nAI, indirectly fostering either climate harming or climate mitigating \r\nactivities remain unexplored. Better integration of mitigation models \r\nand consequential lifecycle analysis is needed for assessing how \r\ndigitalisation, shared economy and circular economy change material \r\nand energy demand."


id: 44801eabe61b3daf8f1131086c7285ec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8203
content:
"In summary, more equitable societies are associated with high levels \r\nof social trust and enable actions that reduce GHG emissions. To this \r\nend, people play an important role in the delivery of demand-side \r\nmitigation options within which efficiency and 'Improve' options \r\ndominate. Policies that are aimed at behaviour and lifestyle changes \r\ncome with political risks for policymakers. However, the potential \r\nexists for broadening demand-side interventions to include 'Avoid' \r\nand 'Shift' policies. Longer term thinking and implementation that \r\ninvolves careful sequencing of policies as well as designing policy \r\npackages that address multiple co-benefits would be critical to \r\nmanage interactions among supply-side and demand-side options \r\nto accelerate mitigation."


id: dc7cbbbe1f8c03ec07934441c4461a40
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32192
content:
"Knowledge on climate action that starts with the social practices \r\nand how people live in various environments, cultures, contexts and \r\nattempts to improve their well-being, is still in its infancy. In models, \r\nclimate solutions remain supply-side oriented, and evaluated against \r\nGDP, without acknowledging the reduction in  well-being  due \r\nto  climate impacts. GDP is a  poor metric of human well-being, \r\nand climate policy evaluation requires better grounding in relation \r\nto decent living standards and/or similar benchmarks. Actual \r\nsolutions will invariably include demand, service provisioning and "


id: d71d1891534310cda17a00c2bed651ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31359
content:
"People can be educated through knowledge transfer so they can act in different roles, and in each role everyone can contribute to \r\nlimit global warming to 1.5degC. Citizens with enough knowledge can organise and put political pressure on the system. Role models \r\ncan set examples to others. Professionals (e.g., engineers, urban planners, teachers, researchers) can change professional standards \r\nin consistency with decarbonisation; for example urban planners and architects can design physical infrastructures to facilitate low\u0002carbon mobility and energy use by making walking and cycling safe for children. Rich investors can make strategic plans to divest \r\nfrom fossils and invest in carbon-neutral technologies. Consumers, especially those in the top 10% of the world population in terms \r\nof income, can limit consumption, especially in mobility, and explore the good life consistent with sustainable consumption."


id: b559d81ef4243bf2e08ea9030bf69fc7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26069
content:
"Policymakers support individual actions in certain contexts, not only by economic incentives, such as carbon pricing, but also by \r\ninterventions that understand complex decision-making processes, habits, and routines. Examples of such interventions include, \r\nbut are not limited to, choice architectures and nudges that set green options as default, shift away from cheap petrol or gasoline, \r\nincreasing taxes on carbon-intensive products, or substantially tightening regulations and standards to support shifts in social \r\nnorms, and thus can be effective beyond the direct economic incentive."


id: 5cf3ea66e30f999255fb4e3a8eb6f20f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12141
content:
"Humaninduced global warming, together with other global trends and events, such as digitalisation and automation, and the \r\nCOVID-19 pandemic, induce changes in labour markets, and bring large uncertainty and ambiguity. History and psychology reveal \r\nthat societies can thrive in these circumstances if they openly embrace uncertainty on the future and try out ways to improve life. \r\nTolerating ambiguity can be learned, for example by interacting with history, poetry and the arts. Sometimes religion and philosophy \r\nalso help."


id: 5c6a736024f305bb129d2d18d0fd7eb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12053
content:
"As a key enabler, novel narratives created in a variety of ways, such as by advertising, images and the entertainment industry, \r\nhelp to break away from the established meanings, values and discourses and the status quo. For example, discourses that frame \r\ncomfortable public transport services to avoid stress from driving cars on busy, congested roads help avoid car driving as a status \r\nsymbol and create a  new social norm to shift to public transport. Discourses that portray plant-based protein as healthy and \r\nnatural promote and stabilise particular diets. Novel narratives and inclusive processes help strategies to overcome multiple barriers. \r\nCase studies demonstrate that citizens support transformative changes if participatory processes enable a design that meets local \r\ninterests and culture. Promising narratives specify that even as speed and capabilities differ, humanity embarks on a joint journey \r\ntowards well-being for all and a healthy planet."


id: c701bcdf912ac756eb1dbcee8245e46
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28890
content:
"There is a growing realisation that mere monetary value of income growth is insufficient to measure national welfare and individual \r\nwell-being. Hence, any action towards climate change mitigation is best evaluated against a set of indicators that represent a broader \r\nvariety of needs to define individual well-being, macroeconomic stability, and planetary health. Many solutions that reduce primary \r\nmaterial and fossil energy demand, and thus reduce GHG emissions, provide better services to help achieve well-being for all."


id: e309aeb7698e714bfe736d1f19b5e0b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33215
content:
"Economic growth measured by total or individual income growth is a main driver of GHG emissions. Only a few countries with low \r\neconomic growth rates have reduced both territorial and consumption-based GHG emissions, typically by switching from fossil fuels \r\nto renewable energy and by reduction in energy use and switching to low/zero carbon fuels, but until now at insufficient rates and \r\nlevels for stabilising global warming at 1.5degC. High deployment of low/zero carbon fuels and associated rapid reduction in demand \r\nfor and use of coal, gas, and oil can further reduce the interdependence between economic growth and GHG emissions."


id: 79bab1bafe9b7db7a40fd0b4a7e0eb28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16719
content:
"Angel De La Vega Navarro (Mexico), Amit Garg (India), Andrea N. Hahmann (Chile/Denmark), \r\nSmail Khennas (Algeria), Ines Margarida Lima de Azevedo (the United States of America/\r\nPortugal), Andreas Loschel (Germany), Ajay Kumar Singh (India), Linda Steg (the Netherlands), \r\nGoran Strbac (Serbia/United Kingdom), Kenichi Wada (Japan)"


id: 128c11473901b2724d6e972503f34906
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 413
content:
"Clarke, L., Y.-M. Wei, A. De La Vega Navarro, A. Garg, A.N. Hahmann, S. Khennas, I.M.L. Azevedo, A. Loschel, A.K. Singh, L. Steg, \r\nG. Strbac, K. Wada, 2022: Energy Systems. In IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution \r\nof Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, \r\nJ. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, \r\nA. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. \r\ndoi: 10.1017/9781009157926.008."


id: b130a9146cdade18a6c60b0a462332fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25381
content:
"Prices have dropped rapidly over the last five years for \r\nseveral key energy system mitigation options, notably solar \r\nphotovoltaics (PV), wind power, and batteries. From 2015 to \r\n2020, the prices of electricity from PV and wind dropped 56% and \r\n45%, respectively, and battery prices dropped by 64%. Electricity \r\nfrom PV and wind is now cheaper than electricity from fossil sources \r\nin many regions, electric vehicles are increasingly competitive with \r\ninternal combustion engines, and large-scale battery storage on \r\nelectricity grids is increasingly viable. (high confidence) {6.3, 6.4}"


id: c082b7731696a1c737fe1089d3396
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27847
content:
"Warming cannot be limited to well below 2degC without rapid \r\nand deep reductions in energy system carbon dioxide (CO2) \r\nand greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In scenarios limiting \r\nwarming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (2degC (>67%) \r\nwith action starting in 2020), net energy system CO2 emissions \r\n(interquartile range) fall by 87-97% (60-79%) in 2050. In 2030, \r\nin scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited \r\novershoot, net CO2 and GHG emissions fall by 35-51% and 38-52% \r\nrespectively. In scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with \r\nno or limited overshoot (2degC (>67%)), net electricity sector CO2\r\nemissions reach zero globally between 2045 and 2055 (2050 and \r\n2080). (high confidence) {6.7}"


id: c35ef01b495529bfc549c007443805b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28306
content:
"Global wind and solar PV capacity and generation have \r\nincreased rapidly. Solar PV grew by 170% (to 680 TWh); wind \r\ngrew by 70% (to 1420 TWh) from 2015 to 2019. Policy, societal \r\npressure to limit fossil generation, low interest rates, and cost \r\nreductions have all driven wind and solar PV deployment. Solar PV \r\nand wind together accounted for 21% of total low-carbon electricity \r\ngeneration and 8% of total electricity generation in 2019. Nuclear \r\ngeneration grew 9% between 2015 and 2019 and accounted \r\nfor 10% of total generation in 2019 (2790 TWh); hydroelectric \r\npower grew by 10% and accounted for 16% (4290 TWh) of total \r\ngeneration. In total, low- and zero-carbon electricity generation \r\ntechnologies produced 37% of global electricity in 2019. (high \r\nconfidence) {6.3, 6.4}"


id: 22629bfd3a722ee66b181e749f8b893
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2858
content:
"Limiting warming to well below 2degC will require substantial \r\nenergy system changes over the next 30 years. This includes \r\nreduced fossil fuel consumption, increased production from \r\nlow- and zero-carbon energy sources, and increased use of \r\nelectricity and alternative energy carriers. Coal consumption \r\nwithout carbon capture and storage (CCS) falls by 67-82% \r\n(interquartile range) in 2030 in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) with no or limited overshoot. Oil and gas consumption \r\nfall more slowly. Low-carbon sources produce 93-97% of global \r\nelectricity by 2050 in scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) \r\nwith action starting in 2020. In scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) with no or limited overshoot (2degC (>67%) with action \r\nstarting in 2020), electricity supplies 48-58% (36-47%) of final \r\nenergy in 2050, up from 20% in 2019. (high confidence) {6.7}"


id: 679f9216f92d01b73595fb9ccfb22808
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13895
content:
"If investments in coal and other fossil infrastructure continue, \r\nenergy systems will be locked in to higher emissions, making \r\nit harder to limit warming to well below 2degC. Many aspects of \r\nthe energy system  - physical infrastructure; institutions, laws, and \r\nregulations; and behaviour - are resistant to change or take many \r\nyears to change. New investments in coal-fired electricity without \r\nCCS are inconsistent with limiting warming to well below 2degC. (high \r\nconfidence) {6.3, 6.7}"


id: 7aa177f2b249354034b8cd6ebb59545b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16868
content:
"Net-zero energy systems will share common characteristics, \r\nbut the approach in every country will depend on national \r\ncircumstances. Common characteristics of net-zero energy systems \r\nwill include: (i) electricity systems that produce no net CO2 or remove \r\nCO2 from the atmosphere; (ii) widespread electrification of end \r\nuses, including light-duty transport, space heating, and cooking; \r\n(iii)  substantially lower use of fossil fuels than today; (iv)  use of \r\nalternative energy carriers such as hydrogen, bioenergy, and ammonia \r\nto substitute for fossil fuels in sectors less amenable to electrification; \r\n(v) more efficient use of energy than today; (vi) greater energy system \r\nintegration across regions and across components of the energy \r\nsystem; and (vii) use of CO2 removal (e.g., direct air carbon capture \r\nand storage (DACCS) and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage \r\n(DACCS, BECCS)) to offset any residual emissions. (high confidence) {6.6}"


id: 8dd637c022339ccc9e93bdfe2adf8725
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19846
content:
"Limiting warming to well below 2degC will strand fossil-related \r\nassets, including fossil infrastructure and unburned fossil fuel \r\nresources. The economic impact of stranded assets could amount to \r\ntrillions of dollars. Coal assets are most vulnerable over the coming \r\ndecade; oil and gas assets are more vulnerable toward mid-century. \r\nCCS can allow fossil fuels to be used longer, reducing potential \r\nstranded assets. (high confidence) {6.7}"


id: 1c9e493e1c5767e342d57a335770c105
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1951
content:
"A low-carbon energy transition will shift investment patterns \r\nand create new economic opportunities. Total energy investment \r\nneeds will rise, relative to today, over the next decades, if warming \r\nis limited to 2degC (>67%) or lower. These increases will be far less \r\npronounced, however, than the reallocations of investment flows \r\nthat are likely to be seen across sub-sectors, namely from fossil fuels \r\n(extraction, conversion, and electricity generation) without CCS \r\nand toward renewables, nuclear power, CCS, electricity networks \r\nand  storage, and end-use energy efficiency. A significant and \r\ngrowing share of investments between now and 2050 will be made \r\nin emerging economies, particularly in Asia. (high confidence) {6.7}"


id: 86bc25f98af43491f526c067bc95438a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18732
content:
"Energy demands and energy sector emissions have continued \r\nto rise. From 2015 to 2019, global final energy consumption grew \r\nby 6.6%, CO2 emissions from the global energy system grew by \r\n4.6%, and total GHG emissions from energy supply rose by 2.7%. \r\nMethane emissions, mainly fugitive emissions from oil, gas, and \r\ncoal, accounted for 18% of GHG emissions in 2019. Coal electricity \r\ncapacity grew by 7.6% between 2015 and 2019, as new builds in \r\nsome countries offset declines in others. Total consumption of oil and \r\noil products increased by 5%, and natural gas consumption grew \r\nby 15%. Declining energy intensity in almost all regions has been \r\nbalanced by increased energy consumption. (high confidence) {6.3}"


id: d2a668d12c5883096a72f4fa45b101a5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30663
content:
"The viable speed and scope of a  low-carbon energy system \r\ntransition will depend on how well it can support sustainable \r\ndevelopment goals (SDGs) and other societal objectives.\r\nEnergy systems are linked to a range of societal objectives, including \r\nenergy access, air and water pollution, health, energy security, \r\nwater security, food security, economic prosperity, international \r\ncompetitiveness, employment. These linkages and their importance \r\nvary among regions. Energy sector mitigation and efforts to achieve \r\nSDGs generally support one another, though there are important \r\nregion-specific exceptions. (high confidence) {6.1, 6.7}"


id: 90b4e893023a1cf625dd767f058f89e2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20304
content:
"Climate change will affect many future local and national low\u0002carbon energy systems. The impacts, however, are uncertain, \r\nparticularly at the regional scale. Climate change will alter \r\nhydropower production, bioenergy and agricultural yields, thermal \r\npower plant efficiencies, and demands for heating and cooling, and \r\nit will directly impact power system infrastructure. Climate change \r\nwill not affect wind and solar resources to the extent that it would \r\ncompromise their ability to reduce emissions. (high confidence) {6.5}"


id: c9c5210b78d23892f951d560a9cb2cde
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29305
content:
"Electricity systems powered predominantly by renewables will \r\nbe increasingly viable over the coming decades, but it will be \r\nchallenging to supply the entire energy system with renewable \r\nenergy. Large shares of variable solar PV and wind power can \r\nbe incorporated in electricity grids through batteries, hydrogen, \r\nand other forms of storage; transmission; flexible non-renewable \r\ngeneration; advanced controls; and greater demand-side responses. \r\nBecause some applications (e.g.,  air travel) are not currently \r\namenable to electrification, 100% renewable energy systems would \r\nlikely need to include alternative fuels such as hydrogen or biofuels. \r\nEconomic, regulatory, social, and operational challenges increase \r\nwith higher shares of renewable electricity and energy. The ability to \r\novercome these challenges in practice is not fully understood. (high \r\nconfidence) {6.6}"


id: 134fccb86311cb51ce7b939f2c0ceb37
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:34
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 552
content:
"The economic outcomes of low-carbon transitions in some \r\nsectors and regions may be on a  par with, or superior to \r\nthose of an emissions-intensive future. Cost reductions in key \r\ntechnologies, particularly in electricity and light-duty transport, have \r\nincreased the economic attractiveness of near-term low-carbon \r\ntransitions. Long-term mitigation costs are not well understood and \r\ndepend on policy design and implementation, and the future costs \r\nand availability of technologies. Advances in low-carbon energy \r\nresources and carriers such as next-generation biofuels, hydrogen \r\nproduced from electrolysis, synthetic fuels, and carbon-neutral \r\nammonia would substantially improve the economics of net-zero \r\nenergy systems. (medium confidence) {6.4, 6.7}"


id: a77e91a2895de712619212cbf673de6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23859
content:
"Multiple energy supply options are available to reduce \r\nemissions over the next decade. Nuclear power and hydropower \r\nare already established technologies. Solar PV and wind are now \r\ncheaper than fossil-generated electricity in many locations. Bioenergy \r\naccounts for about a tenth of global primary energy. Carbon capture \r\nis widely used in the oil and gas industry, with early applications in \r\nelectricity production and biofuels. It will not be possible to widely \r\ndeploy all of these and other options without efforts to address the \r\ngeophysical, environmental-ecological, economic, technological, \r\nsocio-cultural, and institutional factors that can facilitate or hinder \r\ntheir implementation. (high confidence) {6.4}"


id: 1c079d841713ecedb9f5ceb3566af540
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1871
content:
"Some mitigation options can provide more immediate and cost\u0002effective emissions reductions than others, but a comprehensive \r\napproach will be required over the next 10  years to limit \r\nwarming to well below 2degC. There are substantial, cost-effective \r\nopportunities to reduce emissions rapidly in several sectors, including \r\nelectricity generation and light-duty transportation. But near-term \r\nreductions in these sectors will not be sufficient to limit warming to \r\nwell below 2degC. A broad-based approach across the energy sector will \r\nbe necessary to reduce emissions over the next 10 years and to set \r\nthe stage for still deeper reductions beyond 2030. (high confidence) \r\n{6.4, 6.6, 6.7}"


id: c2031b8d831e5e5b42b63c5c42aa4401
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28106
content:
"Enhanced integration across energy system sectors and across \r\nscales will lower costs and facilitate low-carbon energy \r\nsystem transitions. Greater integration between the electricity \r\nsector and end use sectors can facilitate integration of variable \r\nrenewable energy (VRE) options. Energy systems can be integrated \r\nacross district, regional, national, and international scales. (high \r\nconfidence) {6.4, 6.6}"


id: eaa156cdad4b5f4fe834393193abdeb1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34424
content:
"different from those of today if the world successfully limits warming \r\nto well below 2degC. Energy will be provided, converted, and used in \r\ndifferent ways than it is today (Figure 6.1). Achieving and responding \r\nto these changes presents an impressive range of challenges \r\nand opportunities."


id: 5996ca753f4406e639c701fb1a6f856a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11594
content:
"The global energy system is the largest source of CO2 emissions \r\n(Chapter 2). Reducing energy sector emissions is therefore essential \r\nto limit warming. The energy systems of the future will be very "


id: 6e682c40526834b47288c8f5ea4f91
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14995
content:
"Across all of these sections, the chapter aims to explore the ways \r\nthat energy sector mitigation options and strategies interact with \r\nSustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and other societal and \r\nenvironmental goals."


id: d762cbe0bb147c391ce69d2faae68df7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31405
content:
"Within this context, this chapter addresses six topics, each of which \r\nis addressed in a separate section. First, Section 6.2 defines the scope \r\nof the energy system. Section 6.3 then discusses the recent trends \r\nin energy systems that might exert the most significant influence \r\non energy system evolution and options for reducing emissions. \r\nSection  6.4 assesses the status and potential of individual energy \r\nsupply, transformation, storage, transportation and transmission, \r\nand integration mitigation options in the energy sector. Section 6.5 \r\nexplores how climate change might affect energy systems and \r\nalter potential energy system mitigation options and strategies. \r\nSection  6.6 identifies key characteristics of net-zero energy \r\nsystems - those that emit very little or no CO2. Section 6.7 explores \r\ntransition pathways toward and through net-zero energy systems. "


id: 4d141f772274134ab999d4b6056cb39d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9551
content:
"in the literature. For the purposes of this chapter, 'energy supply' \r\nencompasses all primary energy, conversion, and transmission \r\nprocesses with the exception of those that use final energy to \r\nprovide energy services in the end-use sectors (transport, buildings, \r\nindustry and agriculture). The 'energy system' includes energy end \r\nuses sectors along with energy supply. 'Low-emissions' is used for \r\nenergy technologies that produce little CO2 or no CO2 or that remove \r\nCO2 from the atmosphere. Similarly, 'low-carbon' transitions is used \r\nto describe transitions that limit likely to 2degC (>67%) or below. \r\n'Net-zero' energy systems refer to those that produce very little or no \r\nCO2 or may even sequester CO2 from the atmosphere."


id: 7bc25ce1de1ab5652fc2de2c330b8500
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17070
content:
"actual institutions that reside within businesses and governments \r\nat all levels. This includes, for example, rules for trading emissions \r\npermits, deciding when particular electricity generation technologies \r\nmight come online, water management and related environmental \r\nrules that define the availability of hydropower or influence water \r\navailability for cooling power plants, regulations for injecting CO2\r\ninto underground reservoirs or disposing of nuclear waste, and even \r\ncompany policies regarding work hours or teleworking, which can \r\nhave important implications for energy demand profiles. Many people \r\nare employed in the energy sector, and energy system mitigation will \r\neliminate some jobs while creating others."


id: 3a8be201880a52a1366567b15f6b64e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6576
content:
"This broader view of energy systems is essential for understanding \r\nenergy system mitigation, as these broader societal and institutional \r\nfactors can have an important influence on energy system \r\ntransformations and the potential to rapidly reduce energy CO2\r\nemissions. Energy system mitigation is as much about the challenges \r\nof societal change as it is about the challenges of changes in \r\nphysical infrastructure, technologies, and operations. While this \r\nchapter does not attempt to draw a specific boundary around all the \r\ndifferent systems that interact with the energy system, it frequently \r\nexplores these broader system interactions when assessing different \r\nmitigation options and strategies."


id: 9555cf9273737292a9655a26a338e351
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20993
content:
"Current energy sector emissions trends, if continued, will not limit \r\nglobal temperature change to well below 2degC (high confidence). \r\nGlobal energy system fossil fuel CO2 emissions grew by 4.6% between \r\n2015 and 2019 (1.1% yr-1), reaching 38 GtCO2 yr-1 and accounting \r\nfor approximately two-thirds of annual global anthropogenic GHG \r\nemissions. In 2020, with the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, energy \r\nsector CO2 emissions dropped by roughly 2 GtCO2 yr-1 (Figure 6.2). \r\nHowever global energy-related CO2 emissions are projected to rebound \r\nby nearly 5% in 2021, approaching the 2018-19 peak (IEA 2021d)."


id: 7c701a35e9d9089a5c2b1fa4425b9976
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17177
content:
"There is no single spatial scale at which energy systems might be \r\ndefined and assessed. They can be assessed at the scales of homes, \r\ncities, states or provinces, countries, regions, or the entire world. \r\nThese different scales are frequently both distinct with their own \r\ninternal dynamics yet  al.o connected to one another. This chapter \r\nmost frequently assesses energy systems from the country and \r\nglobal perspective."


id: c5764fea798675a2c4c0931cf8bac09a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28650
content:
"Coal was the single largest contributor to energy sector CO2 emissions \r\nbetween 2015 and 2019, accounting for about 44% of energy sector \r\nCO2 emissions in 2019. Oil accounted for about 34% and natural gas \r\naccounted for about 22% of energy sector CO2 emissions. Coal, oil \r\nand natural gas CO2 emissions grew respectively by 1.2%, 2% and "


id: a270fb5d2ded91f05526da111716496
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23122
content:
"12.7% (annual rates of 0.31%, 0.5% and 3%) (Figure  6.3). The \r\nelectricity sector remains the single largest source of energy sector \r\nCO2 emissions, accounting for about 36% in 2019, followed by \r\nindustry at 22% and transport (excluding international shipping and \r\naviation transport) at about 18% (Figure 6.3). Shipping and aviation \r\naccounted for a  little over 3%. These proportions have remained \r\nrelatively unchanged over the last decade. Recent trends reinforce \r\nthe near-term challenges facing energy sector mitigation - electricity \r\nsector emissions continue to rise despite rapid deployment of wind \r\nand solar power (see below); transportation emissions continue to \r\nrise, and petroleum remains the dominant fuel, despite advances in \r\nbatteries and electric cars (see below). Some specific sectors, such as \r\nshipping and aviation, may present longer-term challenges."


id: c20142180e3e18c5d84a34670a007ce1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28104
content:
"of energy supply emissions were non-CO2 emissions. Electricity and \r\nheat contributed approximately 69% of total energy supply GHG \r\nemissions in 2019 (Figure 6.3). This growth has occurred despite the \r\nhigh penetration of solar PV and wind power, particularly in Asia and \r\ndeveloped countries."


id: 5a47c05fb8c6f73bb2bc096116d347ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11708
content:
"Fugitive emissions from fossil fuel production, primarily methane, \r\naccounted for about 18% of sector supply emissions in 2019, \r\nwith 2.6  Gt CO2-eq yr-1 linked to oil and gas production and \r\n1.3 GtCO2-eq yr -1 to coal mining (Crippa et al. 2021). Oil and gas \r\noperations produced 2.9 GtCO2-eq yr-1 in 2019 (82 Mt yr-1 as \r\nmethane), split roughly equally between the two (IEA 2020a). There \r\nremains a high degree of uncertainty in methane emissions estimates \r\nfrom oil and gas operations despite the emergence of new data from \r\nsatellites and other measurement campaigns. According to a recent \r\nstudy (Hmiel et al. 2020), methane emissions are underestimated by \r\nabout 25 to 40%."


id: 99522728154f7ed1e312f58aa56dcc3f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21637
content:
"Energy supply GHG emissions, including CO2 and non-CO2\r\ngreenhouse gases, reached 20 GtCO2-eq yr -1 in 2019, rising by \r\n2.7% between 2015 and 2019 (0.66% yr -1). Approximately 18% "


id: 8a8a7292bd8675b29fbb1a66f9967f46
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19336
content:
"Figure 6.3 | Global energy sector CO2 emissions and global energy supply GHG emission. Source: Panel (a): data from IEA (2020a); other panels: data from Crippa \r\net al. (2021)."


id: f1141d95ac721ee4bd35d476a6310bea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35429
content:
"Increasing global energy sector GHG emissions have been driven by \r\nrising emissions in some large developing and emerging countries; \r\nhowever, per  capita emissions in these countries remain well below \r\nthose in developed countries (Yu et al. 2019). From 2015 to 2019, Eastern \r\nAsia, Southern Asia, and South-East Asia energy sector CO2 emissions \r\ngrew by 2.4% yr-1, 2.6% yr-1, and 5.1% yr-1, respectively. The relative \r\nand absolute shares of Europe and North America have continued to \r\ndecline, partly due to the growth in other countries (Figure 6.3)."


id: 21f160ad049739e1367ed35f82b62a08
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2784
content:
"there has been a significant increase in the total primary energy supply \r\n(TPES) and major changes in energy sources. From 2015 to 2019, TPES \r\ngrew by 6.6% (1.6% yr-1) from 569 EJ yr-1 to 606 EJ yr-1. Natural gas \r\nconsumption grew most quickly during this period, at 3.5% yr-1. Coal, \r\noil and oil products grew at annual rates of 0.23% yr-1 and 0.83% yr-1, \r\nrespectively. In 2019, the shares of coal, oil, and natural gas in global \r\nTPES were 27%, 31% and 23%, representing only a  modest shift \r\nfrom 2015, when the shares were 28%, 32% and 22%, respectively. \r\nRenewables, excluding hydropower, grew at an annual rate of 12% yr-1\r\nduring this period; however, their share remains marginal in 2019, \r\nwith just 2.2% of the TPES compared to 1.5% in 2015 (Figure 6.5). \r\nBioenergy (including traditional bioenergy) accounted for 9.4% of the \r\nTPES, a similar share compared with 2015."


id: 6c3a22c2188c0233184a8adb7d1d1aa9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14658
content:
"There are important differences in fuel use across countries. While \r\ndeveloped countries almost exclusively use modern fuels, many \r\ncountries still obtain a  significant fraction of their energy from \r\ntraditional bioenergy (fuelwood and charcoal). Traditional bioenergy "


id: ffb330788c0c3a2be3a818b83b161c2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37774
content:
"Recent changes in the energy system can be viewed within the context \r\nof longer-term trends in energy supply and use. Over the last decade, "


id: 38e33492f035bf1d3e591e33cbe445e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6322
content:
"Figure 6.5 | World total primary energy supply (TPES) (EJ) and total final energy consumption (TFC) 2000-2019. Primary energy in this figure is based on IEA \r\naccounting methods and not direct equivalents for several energy sources. Final energy does not include industry own use and losses. Source: adapted from IEA world energy \r\nbalances, Minx et al. (2021b) database for IPCC."


id: 6db631bb046ea711edca6ffe8a16007c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14868
content:
"Energy security. The ability of countries to maintain access to \r\nreliable and affordable energy resources continues to shape energy \r\npolicy. Energy security is perceived as a national security issue and \r\noften prioritised over climate concerns (Nyman 2018). The linkage \r\nbetween climate and energy security is now widely recognised \r\n(Blarke and Lund 2007; Toke and Vezirgiannidou 2013; La Vina et al. \r\n2018; World Energy Council 2020; Fu et  al. 2021; United Nations \r\n2021). Approaches to energy security are frequently driven by the \r\nscope of domestic energy resources. For example, energy security \r\nconcerns have led to continued reliance on domestic coal production \r\nand consumption (Jakob et  al. 2020) and increased investment in \r\ndomestic renewable generation (Konstantinos and Ioannidis 2017). \r\nLiquefied natural gas (LNG) Importers have diversified their sources \r\nas reliance on LNG has increased (Vivoda 2019)."


id: 3fd64e4c68691bf724143b0c084889b4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7426
content:
"(fuelwood and charcoal) is particularly important in sub-Saharan \r\ncountries and some Asian countries such as India, particularly in the \r\nresidential sector for cooking. Africa is still characterised by a high share \r\nof traditional bioenergy in TPES and TFC. In 2019, biomass and waste \r\nin Africa accounted for 44% of the TPES. The global average was 9.4%."


id: da128cab80e5944c667f2339b812119f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31836
content:
"Asia has been particularly important in TFC growth since 2015. \r\nIn 2019, Eastern Asia accounted for more 24% of TFC (1.52% annual \r\ngrowth from 2015). In contrast, TFC has increased by only 0.58% in \r\nEurope and 1.24% in North America. Despite an increase of 2.05% \r\nover the same period, Africa's TFC remains relatively low (6.1% of \r\nglobal TFC), particularly in sub-Saharan countries. Approximately \r\n860  million people, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa and some Asian \r\ncountries, lacked access to electricity and about 2.65 billion to clean\u0002cooking facilities in 2018 (IEA 2019a). Achieving universal energy \r\naccess (SDG 7) will require energy transitions in the domestic sector, \r\nincluding new developments in off-grid energy technologies, emphasis \r\non rationalising energy subsidies, and increasing efforts to address \r\nhealth concerns related to the use of traditional fuels (Box 6.1)."


id: 96e0d56febe0e1b34806eb52efc5eed2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21255
content:
"Air pollution. The energy system is an important source of air \r\npollution, including both indoor and outdoor air pollution. Efforts \r\nto address air pollution in several countries and regions (the USA, \r\nMexico, China, India, European Union, Africa, Southeast Asia, among \r\nothers) have had an importance influence on energy system changes \r\n(Bollen and Brink 2014; Fang et al. 2019). Policies aimed at controlling \r\nnitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions have \r\ndriven emissions abatement efforts and coal fleet retirements (Singh \r\nand Rao 2015; Drake and York, 2021). In some places, the prospect \r\nof reducing local air pollution remains more salient to policymakers \r\nand the public than climate mitigation when deciding to tighten \r\nregulations on coal use (Brauers and Oei 2020)."


id: 960263d128be2b24ea7b6ff11fae42c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21108
content:
"While energy system changes are vital to climate mitigation, recent energy \r\nsystem changes have arisen in response to a much broader set of factors. \r\nImportant factors include economic growth, energy access, energy justice, \r\nenergy security, air pollution, technological progress in low-emissions \r\ntechnologies, local job creation. Several of these are discussed here."


id: d2ba100d015cc8e5e4cc7d4cc1aa1da9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30675
content:
"Energy access. Between 2000 and 2019, the proportion of the \r\npopulation with access to electricity increased from 73% to 90% (IEA \r\n2020c). Although most of those people gaining access to energy have \r\ngained access to fossil fuel-based electricity, an increasing number \r\nare gaining access to electricity from renewable sources. Low\u0002emissions, decentralised systems are proving a cost-effective way to \r\nprovide electricity in rural areas (Scott et al. 2016; Muchunku et al. \r\n2018; IEA 2019b), although the use of diesel generators continues \r\nin some remote areas. Between 2000 and 2019 the proportion of \r\nthe population with access to clean cooking (modern fuels and/or \r\nimproved biomass cookstoves) rose from 52% to 66%."


id: 6257eab823da392d72546371d07c3069
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13028
content:
"Technology and costs. Costs for renewable technologies have fallen \r\nsignificantly in recent years, driving significant changes in electricity \r\nproduction and transportation (see below). These advances are not \r\ndivorced from climate and other environmental concerns (Kuik, \r\nBranger and Quirion 2019; Timilsina and Shah 2020). Recent advances \r\nin PV cells, for example, can be traced in part to aggressive deployment \r\npolicies spurred by energy security, climate, and other environmental \r\nconcerns (Kreuz and Musgens 2017) (Sections 6.3.5 and 6.4.2). \r\nThe falling costs of batteries, manly Li-ion batteries, has boosted the \r\ncompetitiveness of electric vehicles (Nykvist et al. 2015) (Section 6.3.7)."


id: 9a165b06c80debd80d367fd0973c1a87
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21769
content:
"Successful mitigation must work in tandem with fundamental development goals such as access to modern forms of energy. In many \r\ndeveloping countries, access to electricity, clean cooking fuels, and modern and efficient energy remain an essential societal priority. \r\nThis is particularly true in sub-Saharan Africa and several Asian countries. SDG 7 on universal access to modern energy includes targets \r\non modern energy services, renewable energy, and energy efficiency, which implies a profound transformation of the current energy \r\nsystems. Although there are different definitions of energy access, the ultimate goal is universal access to clean and modern fuels."


id: 1e4d767269a66903d6163483992cd026
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2205
content:
"Despite progress in some countries such as India, Bangladesh and Kenya, 860 million people were without access to electricity in 2018, \r\ncompared with 1.2 billion in 2010. About 2.65 billion households were cooking with solid fuels, distributed across Asia and Africa \r\n(IEA et al. 2020). Around 850 million people in sub-Saharan Africa relied on traditional biomass (firewood and charcoal) for cooking, \r\nand 60 million relied on kerosene and coal to meet their energy needs (IEA 2018a). Air pollution was likely responsible for 1.1 million \r\ndeaths across Africa in 2019 (Fisher et al. 2021). It has been estimated that 2.2 billion people will still be dependent on inefficient \r\nand polluting energy sources for cooking by 2030, mainly in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and 650 million people are likely to remain \r\nwithout access to electricity in 2030, 90% of whom will reside in Sub-Saharan Africa (IEA et al. 2020)."


id: 5dbb36a9ac9c715fa53a8cf40adacf4b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12272
content:
"Research indicates that decentralised and on-grid renewables are likely the least cost options to provide universal access to electricity \r\nby 2030 (Section 6.4.2). Natural gas, LPG, and improved biomass cookstoves are the most important options for cooking. Universal \r\naccess to electricity and clean cooking requires a rapid shift from traditional biomass to cleaner fuels and/or clean cooking technologies \r\n(IEA et  al. 2020). It has been estimated that the provision of electricity and clean cooking for all would require USD786 billion \r\nin cumulative investment to 2030, equal to 3.4% of total energy sector investment over the period (IEA 2017)."


id: ac4463d92cb38476bf6dc22f2686bf99
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24641
content:
"Even without universal access to modern energy, increased access will substantially affect energy systems, particularly electricity \r\nsystems through the deployment of renewable energy, LPG, and biomass supply chains. Universal access for households, however, \r\nwill have a minimal impact on global energy demand; it has been estimated that universal access for household will increase energy \r\ndemand by 0.2% in 2030 (37 Mtoe yr-1) relative to a future without any change in access to modern energy (IEA 2017)."


id: 933f7bdbf12b07560ea2a13e4af3f372
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20682
content:
"projects for reasons such as overcapacity, environmental constraints, \r\nand the development of renewables (Box 6.2)."


id: 5780f8f1b616734d55eb6876c2c50239
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11263
content:
"Different regions have replaced retired coal with different energy \r\nsources. Old coal fleets have been replaced approximately half by \r\ngas and half by renewables in the USA, mainly by renewables in the \r\nEU, and by advanced coal plants and renewables in Asia (EMBER \r\n2020). Replacing old coal with new coal facilities is inconsistent with \r\nlimiting warming to 2degC or below (high confidence) (Pfeiffer et al. \r\n2016, 2018; Smith et al. 2019; Tong et al. 2019) (Section 6.7.4)."


id: f6c37518437a336b2d832b466b3a0e9b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36335
content:
"Global coal consumption has been declining, with small fluctuations, \r\nsince it peaked in 2013 (IEA 2020d). Coal is faring differently across \r\nregions. Coal use has been decreasing in the OECD regions, particularly \r\nin the USA and the European Union (EU), while remaining mostly flat \r\nin China after a period of growth, and it is continuing to increase \r\nin other major developing Asian economies (IEA 2020d). Trends in \r\nthe electricity sector, where most coal is being consumed, are similar. \r\nGrowth in coal-fired electricity generation capacity in the Asia Pacific \r\nregion has offset retirements in North America and Europe (Jakob \r\net al. 2020; Global Energy Monitor et al., 2021)."


id: ee7acfac7acb8627c056b78824fae773
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34985
content:
"Major coal-consuming countries with abundant coal reserves remain \r\nfar from phasing out coal (Edenhofer et al. 2018; Spencer et al. 2018). \r\nIn most developing countries with large coal reserves, coal use has \r\nbeen increasing to support energy security and because it is perceived \r\nto have lower costs than alternatives (Steckel et  al. 2015; Kalkuhl \r\net al.2019). However, coal faces increasing business risks from the \r\ndecreasing costs of alternative, low-emissions energy sources and \r\nincreasing focus on air pollution and other environmental impacts \r\nfrom coal mining and use (Garg et al. 2017; Sovacool et al. 2021). \r\nContinued coal builds, mostly in developing countries, will increase \r\nthe risks of stranded assets (Farfan Orozco 2017; Cui et  al. 2019; \r\nSaygin et al. 2019) (Box 6.13)."


id: 24f4ce516c4fe95e05a20d7a5e2842bb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3255
content:
"Reductions in coal consumption have been driven in large part by \r\nnon-climate factors, most notably environmental regulations to \r\naddress air pollution, rapidly declining costs of renewables, and lower \r\nnatural gas prices, especially inexpensive unconventional gas in the \r\nUSA. (Culver and Hong 2016; Diluiso et al.2021; Vinichenko et al. 2021). \r\nOlder coal-fired power plants that cannot meet new environmental \r\nregulations, or have become unprofitable or uncompetitive, have \r\nbeen closed in many regions. Moreover, coal power expansion has \r\nslowed down in Asia, as countries have suspended and cancelled new "


id: 68ae93cbb9b30e3fb93df3be9927699e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14066
content:
"outside of coal regions and require different skill sets from the coal \r\nindustry (Spencer et al. 2018). In a broader sense, achieving a 'just \r\ntransition' also requires managing the impacts on regional economic \r\ndevelopment for coal-dependent communities and the effects of \r\nhigher energy prices for consumers and energy-intensive industries \r\nthrough a comprehensive policy package (Green and Gambhir 2020; \r\nJakob et al. 2020) (Box 6.2)."


id: fcfbc1bb1c4fb597a7216fdd4822eb6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37313
content:
"Economic, social, and employment impacts of accelerated coal \r\nphase-outs tend to be significant in coal-dependent regions. \r\nTailored reemployment has been used to support coal transitions in \r\nsome regions. Although some estimates show higher employment \r\nopportunities from low-carbon energy (Garrett-Peltier 2017), \r\nresults vary across regions. Moreover, even with a  net increase in \r\ntotal employment, in the long run, renewable jobs are often located "


id: caeedf7bd35b89d9d92ab25941ad58b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29489
content:
"Africa. New coal power projects in Africa have been declining since 2016, with only South Africa and Zimbabwe currently building \r\nnew coal plants and several others with planned projects (Littlecott et al. 2021). However, these projects also largely depend on \r\ninternational financing and are thus less likely to be implemented (see above). In South Africa, employment in the coal mining \r\nsector has dropped by almost half since the 1980s and has been estimated to fall from 77,000 today to 22,000 to 42,000 by 2050 \r\n(Cock 2019; Strambo et al. 2019). Policy and financial support are essential to ensure a sustainable transition for these workers \r\n(Swilling et al. 2016)."


id: ae0acec9dac52aa3fcf524f137b68c5e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24921
content:
"Although the shares of wind and solar remain low in the global total \r\nelectricity generation, recent growth rates signal the potential for \r\nthese technologies to support substantial mitigation. The prospects \r\nfor a continuation of recent growth rates will depend on meeting key \r\nchallenges such as rapidly integrating wind and solar into electricity \r\ngrids (Section 6.6.2, Box 6.8) and retiring fossil power plants (see above)."


id: da7d2f9f5f7ec432f2b4de56ff5ad95a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31904
content:
"Recent years have seen a  rapid decline in the cost of energy \r\nstorage, particularly batteries (Section 6.4.4). The price of lithium\u0002ion batteries (LIBs) has declined by 97% in the past three decades, \r\nand by 90% in the past decade alone (IEA 2021a; Ziegler and \r\nTrancik 2021). These declines have important implications for the \r\nenergy systems, most notably in supporting increased deployment \r\nof variable renewable energy (VRE) generation and electrification \r\nof the vehicle fleet."


id: 1635d1db235537f6e28a0117191f0903
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1019
content:
"Figure  6.6 | Global solar and wind electricity installed capacities (GW) from 2015-2019 and their combined share in total electricity generation.\r\nSource: data from IEA (2021a) and IRENA (2021)."


id: 9bae32a99c059eb25109911e8a00fd91
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22053
content:
"On the other hand, market-based instruments like emissions rading \r\nschemes (ETS) and auctions coupled with a  regulatory framework \r\nhave been a favourable strategy for more mature technologies (Polzin \r\net al. 2015; Kitzing et al. 2018). FIT, tax incentives, and renewable \r\nportfolio standards - despite potentially substantial programme costs \r\n(Andor and Voss 2016; Abrell et al. 2019) - have played a significant \r\nrole in attracting foreign direct investments in the renewable \r\nsector (Wall et  al. 2019). Subsidies and carbon pricing have also \r\nplayed an important role in mainstreaming these renewable energy \r\nsources (Best and Burke 2018). Recently, subsidy-free investments \r\nin renewables, such as wind offshore (Jansen et  al. 2020), backed \r\nby power purchase agreements, have gained momentum (Frankfurt \r\nSchool-UNEP Centre and BNEF 2020). Similar considerations apply \r\nfor policy mixes targeted to other sectors - for example, transport \r\nand buildings."


id: b9375b244d54063c5697a707e5f507c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26676
content:
"Battery electricity storage has emerged as important for supporting \r\nthe flexibility of electricity systems as they accommodate rising shares \r\nof VRE. Although pumped-storage hydropower systems accounted \r\nfor 160 GW, or over 90%, of total energy storage capacity in 2019 \r\n(IEA 2020c), battery energy storage systems, led by LIB technology, \r\nhave accounted for over 90% of new capacity addition since 2015 \r\n(IRENA 2019a). In 2019, 10 GW of batteries were connected at the \r\ngrid and consumer level, rising from 0.6 GW in 2015 (IEA WEO 2019; \r\nIEA 2020c)."


id: f90064e2239105d28bd0cb68ed015e0c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36686
content:
"In California in the USA, legislation was passed to procure around \r\n1.3 GW energy storage (excluding pumped storage) by 2020. One of \r\nthe largest utility-scale battery storage facilities (300 MW) recently \r\nwent online in California (Vistra Corp. 2021). Other major projects \r\nare in Florida in the USA (409 MW), London in the UK (320 MW), \r\nLithuania (200 MW), Australia (150 MW), Chile (112 MW) and \r\nGermany (90 MW), (IRENA 2019a; ARENA 2020; Katz 2020)."


id: 591887737d88486fc904d2fe3b1bcdc7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11513
content:
"The drop in battery prices has also had important implications in the \r\ntransportation sector. Automotive LIB production rose from around \r\n40 GWh in 2015 to 160 GWh in 2020 (32%). The stock of battery \r\nelectric vehicles (BEVs) grew from around 0.7 million in 2015 to \r\n4.8 million in 2019 (IEA 2020d). The number of publicly accessible \r\nvehicle chargers reached 1.3 million in 2020, 30% of which were fast \r\nchargers. The average battery size of BEVs reached 67 kWh in 2019 \r\ndue to consumer preferences and government incentives for long\u0002range vehicles (Agency 2020; IEA 2021b)."


id: a53a8d53e30ecbe8eae718c261099a46
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23559
content:
"The current energy sector policy landscape consists of policy mixes \r\nor policy packages, including regulatory, market-based and other \r\napproaches. These mixes have evolved over time and include many \r\nsectoral but also some economy-wide policy instruments, such as \r\ncarbon pricing subsidies."


id: f52052ff29574a64a96368e33ff493ef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36077
content:
"and economic effectiveness. Recent examples include interactions of \r\nETS with renewable support policies (e.g. Boehringer and Behrens \r\n2015; Del Rio 2017), energy efficiency policies (e.g. Wiese et al. 2018) \r\nor electricity market reform (e.g. Teng et al. 2017), respectively."


id: 72d0ed6da9d5741ffbc5dd920f44d57a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15676
content:
"subsidies (Box  6.3) and regulatory instruments, are used by many \r\ncountries as part of their climate policies. In addition, public provision \r\nand procurement of low-carbon infrastructure and technologies \r\nsuch as energy-efficient devices, renewable energy, and upgrades \r\nin electricity grids through state-sponsored institutions and public\u0002private partnerships have played an important role in low-carbon \r\ndevelopment (e.g., Baron 2016)."


id: a02fa91f2f0d80c54d218bac5a4def15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22739
content:
"Energy subsidies continue to be widely applied. Global fossil fuel subsidies represent more than half of total energy subsidies with \r\npredominantly adverse environmental, economic, and social effects (high confidence)."


id: 7d70ee66e12aec225d4e5bc759f0eb68
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17307
content:
"India started a large LPG programme in 2015 that provided a capital cost subsidy to poor households (e.g., Gould 2018; Jose et al. \r\n2018; Kar et al. 2019). While the programme has increased adoption of LPG in India (e.g., Sharma et al. 2019), it has not yet achieved \r\na sustained use of LPG and replacement of solid fuels for cooking, amplifying the need for complementary policy measures (Gould \r\n2018; Kar et al. 2019; Mani et al. 2020). The climate impacts of switching from biomass to LPG depend on the degree of biomass \r\ncombustion in stoves and the extent to which biomass originates from non-renewable sources (Singh and Rao 2015; Jose et al. 2018). \r\nBarriers to increasing LPG use for cooking further included abundance of solid fuels at zero (monetary) costs (Mani et al. 2020) as well \r\nas benefits of solid fuels, such as maintaining the traditional taste of food and space heating in colder seasons (Gould 2018; Sharma \r\net al. 2020)."


id: a8253af3f3738b00a927a20782f0daa8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23973
content:
"We touch on a broad range of factors that may enable and inhibit the \r\nimplementation of mitigation options by considering six dimensions \r\nthat affect their feasibility (Table 6.1 and Annex II.11). The assessment \r\naims to identify which mitigation options can be readily implemented \r\nand which face barriers that would need to be overcome before they \r\ncan be deployed at scale."


id: b898e9330d7015617deb4b6d3845b096
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26571
content:
"Table 6.1 | Dimensions and indicators to assess the barriers and enablers of implementing mitigation options in low-carbon energy systems."


id: 61aee6736666568cd42ce46b1c1e2c6d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12935
content:
"Solar photovoltaic (PV) is increasingly competitive with other forms of \r\nelectricity generation, and is the low-cost option in many applications \r\n(high confidence). Costs have declined by 62% since 2015 (high \r\nconfidence) and are anticipated to decline by an additional 16% by \r\n2030 if current trends continue (low confidence, medium evidence). \r\nKey areas for continued improvement are grid integration and non\u0002module costs for rooftop systems (high confidence). Most deployment \r\nis now utility-scale (high confidence). Global future potential is not \r\nlimited by solar irradiation, but by grid integration needed to address \r\nits variability, as well as access to finance, particularly in developing \r\ncountries (high confidence)."


id: 1871355b2da320447c748f5b60aa1349
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1341
content:
"PV costs (Figure 6.8) have fallen for various reasons: lower silicon \r\ncosts, automation, lower margins, automation, higher efficiency, \r\nand a  variety of incremental improvements (Fu et  al. 2018; Green \r\n2019) (Chapter  16). Increasingly, the costs of PV electricity are \r\nconcentrated in the installation and related 'soft costs' (marketing, \r\npermitting) associated with the technology rather than in the \r\nmodules themselves, which now account for only 30% of installed \r\ncosts of rooftop systems (O'Shaughnessy et al. 2019; IRENA 2021b). \r\nFinancing costs are a  significant barrier in developing countries \r\n(Ondraczek et al. 2015) and growth there depends on access to low\u0002cost finance (Creutzig et al. 2017)."


id: ce230b61e8512fc77ccb421b21b168bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29948
content:
"CSP costs have also fallen, albeit at about half the rate of PV: -9% yr-1\r\nsince AR5. The lowest prices for CSP are now competitive with more \r\nexpensive fossil fuels, although the average CSP cost is above the \r\nrange for fossil-based power generation. Other data sources put \r\nrecent CSP costs at USD120 MWh-1, in the middle of the fossil range \r\n(Lilliestam et al. 2020). Continuing the pace of change since AR5 will \r\nmake CSP competitive with fossil fuels in sunny locations, although "


id: db3562b3a518bcce0902f348f76e622a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32000
content:
"Figure 6.8 | Levelised costs of electricity (LCOE) of solar energy technologies 2000-2020. Range of fossil fuel LCOE indicated as dashed lines USD50-177 MWh-1. \r\nLinear fit lines were applied to data for AR4-AR5 and post-AR5 (2012). Yellow dots are capacity-weighted global averages for utility-scale installations. The blue area shows \r\nthe range between the 5th and 95th percentile in each year. Data: IRENA (2021b)."


id: d6162968680dcd41e806f9f3ac34d08e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31198
content:
"it will be difficult for CSP to compete with PV and even hybrid \r\nPV-battery systems. CSP electricity can be more valuable, however, \r\nbecause CSP systems can store heat longer than PV battery systems."


id: e127cbb37800a015d04b0ead6d9e7f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32922
content:
"(Louwen et al. 2016). These recent values are an order of magnitude \r\nlower than coal, and natural gas and further decarbonisation of the \r\nenergy system will make them lower still. Thin films and organics \r\nproduce half the lifecycle emissions of silicon wafer PV, mainly \r\nbecause they use less material (Lizin et al. 2013; Hou et al. 2016). Novel \r\nmaterials promise even lower environmental impacts, especially with \r\nimprovements to their performance ratios and reliability (Gong et al. \r\n2015; Muteri et al. 2020). Higher efficiencies, longer lifetimes, sunny \r\nlocations, less carbon-intensive manufacturing inputs, and shifting to \r\nthin films could reduce future lifecycle impacts."


id: 1cfec00ae5b860d2096bc329b6dded92
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2012
content:
"Since solar PV panels have very low operating costs, they can, at \r\nhigh penetrations and in the absence of adequate incentives to shift \r\ndemand, depress prices in wholesale electricity markets, making it \r\ndifficult to recoup investment, and potentially reducing incentives \r\nfor new installations (Hirth 2013; Millstein et al. 2021). Continued \r\ncost reductions help address this issue of value deflation, but only \r\npartially. Comprehensive solutions depend on adding transmission \r\nand storage (Das et al. 2020) and, more fundamentally, adjustments \r\nto electricity market design (Roques and Finon 2017; Bistline and \r\nYoung 2019)."


id: ab885ee2b55d1ab37a7f8f720fa4551e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24505
content:
"Material demand for PV will likely increase substantially to limit \r\nwarming to well below 2degC, but PV materials are widely available, \r\nhave possible substitutes, and can be recycled (medium confidence) \r\n(Box  6.4). The primary materials for PV are silicon, copper, glass, \r\naluminium, and silver - the costliest being silicon, and glass being \r\nthe most essential by mass, at 70%. None of these materials is \r\nconsidered to be either critical or potentially scarce (IEA 2020e). Thin\u0002film cells, such as amorphous silicon, cadmium telluride and copper \r\nindium gallium diselenide (CIGS), use far less material (though they \r\nuse more glass), but account for less than 10% of the global solar \r\nmarket. Other thin-films, such as those based on perovskites, organic \r\nsolar cells, or earth-abundant, non-toxic materials such as kesterites, \r\neither on their own, or layered on silicon, could further reduce \r\nmaterial use per energy produced (Box 6.4)."


id: 3c7f961a983bd451b9a46fb61a152505
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6883
content:
"After a typical lifetime of 30 years of use, PV modules can be recycled to \r\nprevent environmental contamination from the toxic materials within \r\nthem, reusing valuable materials and avoiding waste accumulation. \r\nRecycling allows the reuse of nearly all - 83% in one study - of the \r\ncomponents of PV modules, other than plastics (Ardente et al. 2019) "


id: df52eaa8eec8e237c98ebd4c20789939
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32632
content:
"silicon offer realistic potential for lower costs, reduced material use, \r\nand higher efficiencies in future years (Victoria et al. 2021)."


id: f89960a82b192dab86ba9fb4f8e95572
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36623
content:
"and would add less than 1% to lifecycle GHG emissions (Latunussa \r\net al. 2016). Glass accounts for 70% of the mass of a solar cell and is \r\nrelatively easy to recycle. Recycling technology is advancing, but the \r\nscale and share of recycling is still small (Li et al. 2020d). By 2050, \r\nhowever, end-of-life PV could total 80 MT and comprise 10% of \r\nglobal electronic waste (Stolz and Frischknecht 2017), although most \r\nof it is glass. IEA runs a programme to enable PV recycling by sharing \r\nbest practices to minimise recycling lifecycle impacts. Ensuring \r\nthat a substantial amount of panels are recycled at end of life will \r\nlikely require policy incentives, as the market value of the recovered \r\nmaterials, aside from aluminium and copper, is likely to be too low \r\nto justify recycling on its own (Deng et al. 2019). A near-term priority \r\nis maximising the recovery of silver, silicon, and aluminium, the most \r\nvaluable PV material components (Heath et al. 2020)."


id: c727f0b627b106b4527f721577b6733b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28919
content:
"Solar energy elicits favourable public responses in most countries \r\n(high confidence) (Mcgowan and Sauter 2005; Ma et  al. 2015; \r\nHanger et  al. 2016; Bessette and Arvai 2018; Jobin and Siegrist \r\n2018; Roddis et al. 2019; Hazboun and Boudet 2020). Solar energy is \r\nperceived as clean and environmentally friendly with few downsides \r\n(Faiers and Neame 2006; Whitmarsh et al. 2011b). Key motivations \r\nfor homeowners to adopt PV systems are expected financial gains, \r\nenvironmental benefits, the desire to become more self-sufficient, \r\nand peer expectations (Korcaj et al. 2015; Vasseur and Kemp 2015; \r\nPalm 2017). Hence, the observability of PV systems can facilitate \r\nadoption (Boudet 2019). The main barriers to the adoption of solar PV \r\nby households are its high upfront costs, aesthetics, landlord-tenant \r\nincentives, and concerns about performance and reliability (Faiers \r\nand Neame 2006; Whitmarsh et al. 2011b; Vasseur and Kemp 2015)."


id: 6b286a44a482cb55d65489000a565771
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14482
content:
"Energy from wind is abundant, and the estimated technical potentials \r\nsurpass the total amount of energy needed to limit warming \r\nto well below 2degC (high confidence). Recent global estimates \r\nof potentially exploitable wind energy resource are in the range of \r\n557-717 PWh  yr-1 (2005-2580 EJ yr-1) (Eurek et  al. 2017; Bosch \r\net al. 2017, 2018; McKenna et al. 2022), or 20-30 times the 2017 \r\nglobal electricity demand. Studies have suggested that 'bottom\u0002up' approaches may overestimate technical potentials (Miller et al. \r\n2015; Kleidon and Miller 2020). But even in the most conservative \r\n'top-down' approaches, the technical wind potential surpasses the \r\namount needed to limit warming to well below 2degC (Bosch et al. 2017; \r\nEurek et al. 2017; Volker et al. 2017). The projected climate change "


id: 72e4ce95c54f71f246abdd93a5d223b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15690
content:
"Wind power is increasingly competitive with other forms of electricity \r\ngeneration and is the low-cost option in many applications (high \r\nconfidence). Costs have declined by 18% and 40% on land and \r\noffshore since 2015 (high confidence), and further reductions can be \r\nexpected by 2030 (medium confidence). Critical areas for continued \r\nimprovement are technology advancements and economies of scale \r\n(high confidence). Global future potential is primarily limited by \r\nonshore land availability in wind power-rich areas, lack of supporting \r\ninfrastructure, grid integration, and access to finance (especially in \r\ndeveloping countries) (high confidence)."


id: 2c8566e49e681044cf001995d3af4695
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4434
content:
"Wind capacity factors have increased over the last decade (Figure 6.11). \r\nThe capacity factor for onshore wind farms increased from 27% in 2010 \r\nto 36% in 2020 (IRENA 2021a). The global average offshore capacity \r\nfactor has decreased from a peak of 45% in 2017. This has been driven \r\nby the increased share of offshore development in China, where projects \r\nare often near-shore and use smaller wind turbines than in Europe "


id: 501f634bcbe97c375f5ca877a279ff01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10046
content:
"Wind power cost reductions (Figure 6.11) are driven mainly by larger \r\ncapacity turbines, larger rotor diameters and taller hub heights  - \r\nlarger swept areas increase the energy captured and the capacity \r\nfactors for a given wind speed; taller towers provide access to higher \r\nwind speeds (Beiter et  al. 2021). All major onshore wind markets \r\nhave experienced rapid growth in both rotor diameter (from 81.2 m "


id: 680b713c724829fea0fa20ed6b8c46b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13957
content:
"other aspects besides increases in capacity factors influence the cost \r\n(Junginger et al. 2020b)."


id: 81ad4947f922ba2c205e53eb6bfebeba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17933
content:
"(IRENA 2021b). Improvements in capacity factors also come from \r\nincreased functionality of wind turbines and wind farms. Manufactures \r\ncan adapt the wind turbine generator to the wind conditions. Turbines \r\nfor windy sites have smaller generators and smaller specific capacity \r\nper rotor area, and therefore operate more efficiently and reach full \r\ncapacity for a longer time period (Rohrig et al. 2019)."


id: 662fff4af0d8917b93bad09707189ca4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13666
content:
"The cost of the turbine (including the towers) makes up the largest \r\ncomponent of wind LCOE. Total installed costs for both onshore \r\nand offshore wind farms have decreased since 2015 (Figure 6.11), \r\nbut the total installed costs for onshore wind projects are very \r\nsite- and market-specific, as reflected in the range of LCOEs. China, \r\nIndia, and  the USA have experienced the largest declines in total \r\ninstalled costs. In 2020, typical country-average total installed \r\ncosts were around USD1150 kW-1 in China and India, and between \r\nUSD1403-2472 kW-1 elsewhere (IRENA 2021b). Total installed costs \r\nof offshore wind farms declined by 12% between 2010 and 2020. \r\nBut, because some of the new offshore wind projects have moved \r\nto deeper waters and further offshore, there are considerable year\u0002to-year variations in their price (IRENA 2021b). Projects outside \r\nChina in recent years have typically been built in deeper waters "


id: 9dffbe544c2c3bb992e6cb441003324d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22383
content:
"Electricity from onshore wind is less expensive than electricity \r\ngenerated from fossil fuels in a  growing number of markets (high \r\nconfidence). The global average LCOE onshore declined by 38% from \r\n2010 to 2020 (Figure 6.11), reaching USD0.039 kWh-1. However, the \r\ndecrease in cost varies substantially by region. Since 2014, wind costs \r\nhave declined more rapidly than the majority of experts predicted \r\n(Wiser et al. 2021). New modelling projects onshore wind LCOE of \r\nUSD.037 kWh-1 by 2030 (Junginger et  al. 2020a), and additional \r\nreductions of 37-39% have been predicted by 2050 (Wiser et  al. \r\n2021). The future cost of offshore wind is more uncertain because "


id: a1dc18cd3dc173fb3051fc1363eb1c31
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23029
content:
"prior to project development, and, in some regions, shutdowns are \r\nrequired during active bird migration (de Lucas et al. 2012). Offshore \r\nwind farms can also impact migratory birds and other sea species \r\n(Hooper et al. 2017). Floating foundations pose lower environmental \r\nimpacts at build stage (IRENA 2019c), but their cumulative long-term \r\nimpacts are unclear (Goodale and Milman 2016). Recent studies find \r\nweak associations between wind farm noise and measures of long\u0002term human health (Poulsen et al. 2018a, b, 2019a, b)."


id: b99c524f0aca061c86b2bfa2437890df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26739
content:
"(10-55 m) and up to 120 km offshore, compared to around 10 m in \r\n2001-2006, when distances rarely exceeded 20 km. With the shift to \r\ndeeper waters and sites further from ports, the total installed costs of \r\noffshore wind farms rose, from an average of around USD2500 kW-1\r\nin 2000 to around USD5127 kW-1 by 2011-2014, before falling \r\nto around USD3185 kW-1 in 2020 (IRENA 2020a). The full cost of \r\nwind power includes the transmission and system integration costs \r\n(Sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.6). A new technology in development is \r\nthe co-location of wind and solar PV power farms, also known as \r\nhybrid power plants. Co-locating wind, solar PV, and batteries can \r\nlead to synergies in electricity generation, infrastructure, and land \r\nusage, which may lower the overall plant cost compared to single \r\ntechnology systems (Lindberg et al. 2021)."


id: ee6f2f1b8b89073b505366854fb12f03
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34980
content:
"Wind power plants pose relatively low environmental impact, but \r\nsometimes locally significant ecological effects (high confidence). The \r\nenvironmental impact of wind technologies, including CO2 emissions, \r\nis concentrated in the manufacturing, transport, and building stage \r\nand in disposal as the end-of-life of wind turbines is reached (Liu and \r\nBarlow 2017; Mishnaevsky 2021). The operation of wind turbines \r\nproduces no waste or pollutants. The LCA for wind turbines is strongly \r\ninfluenced by the operating lifetime, quality of wind resources, \r\nconversion efficiency, and size of the wind turbines (Kaldellis and \r\nApostolou 2017; Laurent et  al. 2018). All wind power technologies \r\nrepay their carbon footprint in less than a year (Bonou et al. 2016)."


id: c461dce0f33758eac464912ba3d5ec21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28469
content:
"Wind farms can cause local ecological impacts, including on animal \r\nhabitat and movements, biological concerns, bird and bat fatalities \r\nfrom collisions with rotating blades, and health concerns (Morrison \r\nand Sinclair 2004). The impacts on animal habitats and collisions can \r\nbe resolved or reduced by selectively stopping some wind turbines \r\nin high-risk locations, often without affecting the productivity of \r\nthe wind farm (de Lucas et al. 2012). Many countries now require \r\nenvironmental studies of impacts of wind turbines on wildlife "


id: 8f53ce4bf84f4d6081b4b768d332cc97
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20100
content:
"Common economic barriers to wind development are high initial \r\ncost of capital, long payback periods, and inadequate access to \r\ncapital. Optimal wind energy expansion is most likely to occur in \r\nthe presence of a political commitment to establish, maintain, and \r\nimprove financial support instruments, technological efforts to \r\nsupport a  local supply chains, and grid investments integrate VRE \r\nelectricity (Diogenes et al. 2020)."


id: d90b3637cf709b67fedb7c88610f25ac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31658
content:
"The secure supply of many metals and minerals (e.g., cobalt, copper, lithium, and rare earth elements (REEs)) is critical to supporting \r\na low-emissions energy system transition (Sovacool et al. 2020). A low-carbon energy system transition will increase the demand for \r\nthese minerals to be used in technologies like wind turbines, PV cells, and batteries (World Bank 2020). Reliance on these minerals has \r\nraised questions about possible constraints to a low-carbon energy system transition, including supply chain disruptions (Chapter 10.6). \r\nConcerns have also been raised about mining for these materials, which frequently results in severe environmental impacts (Sonter \r\net al. 2020), and metal production itself is energy-intensive and difficult to decarbonise (Sovacool et al. 2020)."


id: 1e32b23376d6e523c9a4eda3fc2ce99a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2189
content:
"Wind energy depends on two critical REEs - neodymium and dysprosium - used in magnets in high-performance generators (Pavel \r\net al. 2017; Li et al. 2020b). Silicon-wafer-based solar PV, which accounted for 95% of PV production in 2020, does not use REEs \r\nbut utilises aluminium, copper, and silver (IEA 2021a). Lithium, nickel, cobalt, and phosphorous are used in batteries. Many critical \r\nminerals are used in EVs, including aluminium and copper in manufacturing the necessary EV charging infrastructure, and neodymium \r\nin permanent magnet motors."


id: 1f6675fc23f048dd010dd5f0cd22ae84
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2371
content:
"These strategic minerals are found in a limited number of countries, and concerns have been raised that geopolitical factors could \r\ndisrupt the supply chain necessary for a low-carbon energy system transition. However, excluding cobalt and lithium, no single country \r\nholds more than a third of the world reserves. The known supply of some strategic minerals is still close to 600 years at current levels \r\nof demand (BP 2020), but increased demand would cut more quickly into supplies."


id: 965195ad427ae20878ec310f78644e2e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21160
content:
"There are alternatives to the strategic minerals currently used to support a low-carbon transition. Wind turbines can be manufactured \r\nwithout permanent magnets to reduce the need for strategic minerals, but the production costs are higher, and their efficiency is \r\nreduced (Manberger and Stenqvist 2018). Alternatives to silicon, such as thin films, could be used to produce PVs. Thin-films use much \r\nless material than silicon-based PV, but they contain other potentially critical metals like tellurium, cadmium, and gallium. Alternatives \r\nto lithium-ion batteries, such as sodium-ion batteries, are becoming more practical and feasible (Sovacool et al. 2020)."


id: cb02c77ffaa0d5429af3c27825e95142
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29503
content:
"IEA 2021d). This potential is distributed over 11.8 million locations \r\n(Figure  6.12), but many of the locations cannot be developed for \r\n(current) technical, economic, or political reasons. The estimated \r\ntechnical potential of hydropower is 8-30 PWh yr-1 (29-108 EJ yr-1), \r\nand its estimated economic potential is 8-15 PWh yr-1 (29-54 EJ yr-1) \r\n(Zhou et  al. 2015; van Vliet et  al. 2016c). Actual hydropower \r\ngeneration in 2019 was 4.2 PWh (15.3 EJ), providing about 16% of \r\nglobal electricity and 43% of global electricity from renewables (BP \r\n2020; IEA 2020f; Killingtveit 2020). Asia holds the largest hydropower \r\npotential (48%), followed by South America (19%) (Hoes et al. 2017)."


id: 72fafedf3f40d567c1d8350cdd62d1b9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15701
content:
"Hydropower is technically mature, proved worldwide as a  primary \r\nsource of renewable electricity, and may be used to balance \r\nelectricity supply by providing flexibility and storage. The LCOE of \r\nhydropower is lower than the cheapest new fossil fuel-fired option. \r\nHowever, the future mitigation potential of hydropower depends on \r\nminimising environmental and social impacts during the planning \r\nstages, reducing the risks of dam failures, and modernising the ageing \r\nhydropower fleet to increase generation capacity and flexibility \r\n(high confidence)."


id: a2bd63d9e0c9b612211061ad4ac5e8b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23171
content:
"Hydropower is a mature technology with locally adapted solutions \r\n(high confidence) (Zhou et  al. 2015; Killingtveit 2020). The peak \r\nefficiency of hydroelectric plants is greater than 85%. Hydropower \r\nplants without storage or with small storage typically produce "


id: b2b617cd5b917d53b10c03407729170
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25641
content:
"Estimates of global gross theoretical available hydropower potential \r\nvaries from 31-128 PWh yr-1 (112-460 EJ yr-1), exceeding total \r\nelectricity production in 2018 (Banerjee et  al.  2017; BP 2020; "


id: b4ce8e87657b0399dd8dcaafe467ca72
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25982
content:
"a few kWs to 10 MWs (examples of plants producing higher amounts \r\ndo exist), and are useful for providing electricity at a  scale from \r\nhouseholds to small communities (El Bassam et  al. 2013; Towler \r\n2014). However, hydropower plants without or with small storage \r\nmay be susceptible to climate variability, especially droughts, when \r\nthe amount of water may not be sufficient to generate electricity \r\n(Premalatha et al. 2014) (Section 6.5)."


id: 48a424ec77d1fb412939d8999c9812ac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8802
content:
"Hydropower plants with storage may produce 10 GW, reaching over \r\n100 TWh yr-1 (0.36 EJ yr-1), but generally require large areas. Pumped \r\nstorage hydropower stores energy by pumping water to higher \r\nreservoirs during low-demand periods (Killingtveit 2020). The storage \r\nin hydropower systems provides flexibility to compensate for rapid \r\nvariations in electricity loads and supplies. The regulating characteristics \r\nof the storage play an important role in assuring continuity of energy \r\nsupply from renewable sources (Yang et al. 2018b)."


id: 4fcb2b17b90ee3f56346cd34f8b8b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9995
content:
"Hydropower is one of the lowest-cost electricity technologies \r\n(Mukheibir 2013; IRENA 2021b). Its operation and maintenance \r\ncosts are typically 2-2.5% of the investment costs per kW yr-1 for \r\na lifetime of 40-80 years (Killingtveit 2020). Construction costs are \r\nsite-specific. The total cost for an installed large hydropower project \r\nvaries from USD10,600-804,500 kW-1 if the site is located far \r\naway from transmission lines, roads, and infrastructure. Investment \r\ncosts increase for small hydropower plants and may be as high as \r\nUSD100,000 kW-1or more for the installation of plants of less than \r\n1 MW - 20% to 80% more than for large hydropower plants (IRENA \r\n2015). During the past 100 years, total installed costs and LCOE have \r\nrisen by a few percent, but the LCOE of hydropower remains lower \r\nthan the cheapest new fossil fuel-fired option (IRENA 2019b, 2021)."


id: d2fc13dace549e92aec7fe6cdcfbdb71
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30714
content:
"Nuclear power can deliver low-carbon energy at scale (high \r\nconfidence). Doing so will require improvements in managing \r\nconstruction of reactor designs that hold the promise of lower costs \r\nand broader use (medium confidence). At the same time, nuclear \r\npower continues to be affected by cost overruns, high upfront \r\ninvestment needs, challenges with final disposal of radioactive \r\nwaste, and varying public acceptance and political support levels \r\n(high confidence)."


id: 65b466dffb9dd6b547b90d7074e2c31c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13582
content:
"There are sufficient resources for substantially increasing nuclear \r\ndeployment (medium confidence). Estimates for identified uranium \r\nresources have been increasing steadily over the years. Conventional \r\nuranium resources have been estimated to be sufficient for over \r\n130 years of supply at current levels of use; 100 years were estimated \r\nin 2009 (Hahn 1983; NEA/IAEA 2021). In the case of future uranium \r\nresource scarcity, thorium or recycling of spent fuel might be used \r\nas alternatives. Interest in these alternatives has waned with better "


id: c2e17453cf6ed1dc4d1352057a51ef34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28242
content:
"Public support for hydroelectric energy is generally high (Steg \r\n2018), and higher than support for coal, gas, and nuclear. Yet, public "


id: 998acaad85d01862833c42e3a9f7e56a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21685
content:
"understanding of uranium deposits, their availability, and low prices \r\n(IAEA 2005; OECD NEA 2015)."


id: 59e0978ec0aa899b58d297f0947cab17
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11642
content:
"Lifetime extensions are significantly cheaper than new builds and cost \r\ncompetitive with other low-carbon technologies. The overnight cost of \r\nlifetime extensions is estimated in the range of USD390-630 kWe-1\r\nfor Europe and North America, and the LCOE in the range of \r\nUSD30-36 MWh-1 for extensions of 10-20 years (IEA 2020j)."


id: 27c75c895643c35532f94cac21946acc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3666
content:
"There are several possible nuclear technology options for the period \r\nfrom 2030 to 2050 (medium confidence). In addition to electricity, \r\nnuclear can also be used to produce low-carbon hydrogen and \r\nfreshwater (Kavvadias and Khamis 2014; Kayfeci et al. 2019)."


id: 4aabaac26454bde0f8a68a2952618c57
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9154
content:
"Cost-cutting opportunities, such as design standardisation and \r\ninnovations in construction approaches, are expected to make SMRs \r\ncompetitive against large reactors by 2040 (Rubio and Tricot 2016) \r\n(medium confidence). As SMRs are under development, there is \r\nsubstantial uncertainty regarding the construction costs. Vendors \r\nhave estimated first-of-a-kind LCOEs at USD131-190 MWh-1. Effects \r\nof learning for nth-of-a-kind SMR are anticipated to reduce the first\u0002of-a-kind LCOE by 19-32%."


id: 560c00a6c5f427c33160ab359934fb9e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11029
content:
"Despite low probabilities, the potential for major nuclear accidents \r\nexists, and the radiation exposure impacts could be large and long\u0002lasting (Steinhauser et  al. 2014). However, new reactor designs \r\nwith passive and enhanced safety systems reduce the risk of such \r\naccidents significantly (high confidence). The (normal) activity of \r\na nuclear reactor results in low volumes of radioactive waste, which \r\nrequires strictly controlled and regulated disposal. On a global scale, \r\nroughly 421 kt of spent nuclear fuel have been produced since \r\n1971 (IEA 2014). Out of this volume, 2-3% is high-level radioactive \r\nwaste, which presents challenges in terms of radiotoxicity and decay \r\nlongevity, and ultimately entails permanent disposal."


id: 74769ff8e822d5da0cda18db3f6c778f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15918
content:
"Nuclear power continues to suffer from limited public and political \r\nsupport in some countries (high confidence). Public support for \r\nnuclear energy is consistently lower than for renewable energy and \r\nnatural gas, and in many countries as low as support for energy from \r\ncoal and oil (Corner et al. 2011; Pampel 2011; Hobman and Ashworth \r\n2013). The major nuclear accidents (i.e., Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, \r\nand Fukushima) decreased public support (Poortinga et  al. 2013; \r\nBird et al. 2014). The public remains concerned about the safety risks \r\nof nuclear power plants and radioactive materials (Pampel 2011; \r\nBird  et  al. 2014; Tsujikawa et  al. 2016). At the same time, some \r\ngroups see nuclear energy as a reliable energy source, beneficial for \r\nthe economy and helpful in climate change mitigation. Public support "


id: 22fb35ff358813b4d7167e5b9b0cdcfd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2947
content:
"for nuclear energy is higher when people are concerned about energy \r\nsecurity, including concerns about the availability of energy and high \r\nenergy prices (Groot et  al. 2013; Gupta et  al. 2019b), and when \r\nthey expect local benefit (Wang et  al. 2020c). Public support also \r\nincreases when trust in managing bodies is higher (de Groot and \r\nSteg 2011). Similarly, transparent and participative decision-making \r\nprocesses enhance perceived procedural fairness and public support \r\n(Sjoberg 2004)."


id: 8d461ad96ae6219e2c303d521a46542d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19750
content:
"Since AR5, there have been increased efforts to develop novel \r\nplatforms that reduce the energy penalty associated with CO2 capture, \r\ndevelop CO2 utilisation pathways as a substitute to geologic storage, \r\nand establish global policies to support CCS (high confidence). CCS \r\ncan be used within electricity and other sectors. While it increases the \r\ncost of electricity, CCS has the potential to contribute significantly to \r\nlow-carbon energy system transitions (IPCC 2018)."


id: 17e2ccabaaaa08df7bc2a5de19986913
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1251
content:
"Because of the sheer scale of the investment required (individual \r\nprojects can exceed USD10 billion in value), nearly 90% of nuclear \r\npower plants under construction are run by state-owned or controlled \r\ncompanies, with governments assuming significant part of the risks \r\nand costs. For countries that choose nuclear power in their energy \r\nportfolio, stable political conditions and support, clear regulatory \r\nregimes, and adequate financial framework are crucial for successful \r\nand efficient implementation."


id: 3d3d4b974176f15eb6599e39013685f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6996
content:
"Many countries have adopted technology-specific policies for \r\nlow-carbon energy courses, and these policies influence the \r\ncompetitiveness of nuclear power. For example, feed-in-tariffs and \r\nfeed-in premiums for renewables widely applied in the EU (Kitzing \r\net al. 2012) or renewable portfolio standards in the USA (Barbose \r\net al. 2016) impact wholesale electricity price (leading occasionally to \r\nlow or even negative prices), which affects the revenues of existing \r\nnuclear and other plants (Bruninx et al. 2013; Newbery et al. 2018; \r\nLesser 2019)."


id: e1a0f73b7d586d7eef3d3dace5637327
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32990
content:
"CO2 utilisation (CCU) - instead of geologic storage - could present \r\nan alternative method of decarbonisation (high confidence). The \r\nglobal CO2 utilisation potential, however, is currently limited to \r\n1-2 GtCO2 yr-1 for use of CO2 as a feedstock (Hepburn et al. 2019; "


id: e015b247a8af9b7aabd37c9f18c68ef0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32749
content:
"CSA: Central and South America, EEU: Eastern Europe, FSU: Former Soviet Union, MEA: Middle East, ODA: Other Asia (except China and India), WEU: Western Europe."


id: 2c0e6b43b96222d7fb3219d6aa781cbf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4369
content:
"Katelhon et  al. 2019) but could increase to 20 GtCO2 by the mid\u0002century (medium confidence). CCU involves using CO2 as a feedstock \r\nto synthesise products of economic value and as substitute to fossil \r\nfeedstock. However, several CO2 utilisation avenues might be limited \r\nby energy availability. Depending on the utilisation pathway, the \r\nCO2 may be considered sequestered for centuries (e.g.,  cement \r\ncuring, aggregates), decades (plastics), or only a  few days or \r\nmonths (e.g., fuels) (Hepburn et al. 2019). Moreover, when carbon\u0002rich fuel end-products are combusted, CO2 is emitted back into the \r\natmosphere. Because of the presence of several industrial clusters \r\n(regions with high density of industrial infrastructure) globally, \r\na  number of regions demonstrate locations where CO2 utilisation \r\npotential could be matched with large point sources of CO2 (Wei \r\net al. 2020)."


id: 997dc16486c83c230d40519b1c799e52
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21676
content:
"and operates based on oxy-combustion capture. Applications using \r\nthe Allam Cycle can deliver net energy efficiency greater than 50% \r\nand nearly 100% CO2 capture, but they are quite sensitive to oxygen \r\nand CO2 purity needs (Scaccabarozzi et al. 2016; Ferrari et al. 2017)."


id: 9899a2571de5bc0a8718163b517474c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21528
content:
"CO2 capture costs present a  key challenge, remaining higher than \r\nUSD50 tCO2\r\n-1 for most technologies and regions; novel technologies \r\ncould help reduce some costs (high confidence). The capital cost of \r\na coal or gas electricity generation facility with CCS is almost double \r\nthat of one without CCS (Rubin et al. 2015; Zhai and Rubin 2016; \r\nBui et al. 2018). Additionally, the energy penalty increases the fuel \r\nrequirement for electricity generation by 13-44%, leading to further \r\ncost increases (Table 6.3)."


id: 280455e54baf5d947a477a71ae79e26f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3701
content:
"The technological development for several CO2 utilisation pathways \r\nis still in the laboratory, prototype, and pilot phases, while others have \r\nbeen fully commercialised (such as urea manufacturing). Technology \r\ndevelopment in some end uses is limited by purity requirements \r\nfor CO2 as a feedstock. The efficacy of CCU processes depends on \r\nadditional technological constraints such as CO2 purity and pressure \r\nrequirements. For instance, urea production requires CO2 pressurised \r\nto 122 bar and purified to 99.9%. While most utilisation pathways \r\nrequire purity levels of 95-99%, algae production may be carried out \r\nwith atmospheric CO2 (Voldsund et al. 2016; Ho et al. 2019)."


id: 2fa67b08724cc60fd52d81b51f4f0fdc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4919
content:
"The public is largely unfamiliar with carbon capture, use and storage \r\ntechnologies (L'Orange Seigo et al. 2014; Tcvetkov et al. 2019) (high \r\nconfidence), and many people may not have formed stable attitudes \r\nand risk perceptions regarding these technologies (Daamen et  al. \r\n2006; Jones et al. 2015; Van Heek et al. 2017) (medium confidence). \r\nIn general, low support has been reported for CCS technologies (Allen \r\nand Chatterton 2013; Demski et  al. 2017). When presented with \r\nneutral information on CCS, people favour other mitigation options \r\nsuch as renewable energy and energy efficiency (de Best-Waldhober \r\net al. 2009; Scheer et al. 2013; Karlstrom and Ryghaug 2014). Although \r\nfew totally reject CCS, specific CCS projects have faced strong local "


id: c4b493c719acbc0504b86095107e57d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28517
content:
"CO2 capture projects above USD35-50 tCO2\r\n-1 which offset CO2\r\ncapture costs at some efficient plants (Esposito et al. 2019). Similarly, \r\nCalifornia's low-carbon fuel standard offers benefits for CO2 capture \r\nat some industrial facilities such as biorefineries and refineries (Von \r\nWald et al. 2020)."


id: 4cfb50c6ee5773408346e0a9aec0e673
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9533
content:
"resistance, which has contributed to the cancellation of CCS projects \r\n(Terwel et al. 2012; L'Orange Seigo et al. 2014). Communities may \r\nalso consider CCU to be lower-risk and view it more favourably than \r\nCCS (Arning et al. 2019)."


id: d2644b98a92ccc2e5518e7be45ebe06b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30630
content:
"CCS requires considerable increases in some resources and chemicals, \r\nmost notably water. Power plants with CCS could shut down \r\nperiodically due to water scarcity. In several cases, water withdrawals \r\nfor CCS are 25-200% higher than plants without CCS (Rosa et al. \r\n2020b; Yang et al. 2020) due to energy penalty and cooling duty. The \r\nincrease is slightly lower for non-absorption technologies. In regions \r\nprone to water scarcity such as the Southwestern USA or Southeast \r\nAsia, this may limit deployment and result in power plant shutdowns \r\nduring the summer months (Liu et al. 2019b; Wang et al. 2019c). The \r\nwater use could be managed by changing heat integration strategies \r\nand implementing reuse of wastewater (Magneschi et  al. 2017; \r\nGiannaris et al. 2020b)."


id: 67463eee9185ba61ef6cee7f314615d1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13841
content:
"Bioenergy has the potential to be a  high-value and large-scale \r\nmitigation option to support many different parts of the energy \r\nsystem. Bioenergy could be particularly valuable for sectors with \r\nlimited alternatives to fossil fuels (e.g.,  aviation, heavy industry), \r\nproduction of chemicals and products, and, potentially, in carbon \r\ndioxide removal (CDR) via BECCS or biochar. While traditional \r\nbiomass and first-generation biofuels are widely used today, the \r\ntechnology for large-scale production from advanced processes is not \r\ncompetitive, and growing dedicated bioenergy crops raises a broad \r\nset of sustainability concerns. Its long-term role in low-carbon \r\nenergy systems is therefore uncertain (high confidence). (Note that \r\nthis section focuses on the key technological developments for \r\ndeployment of commercial bioenergy.)"


id: 7b46a2a47c9d0896e3b24f7b1b7aa2e6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16981
content:
"Because CCS always adds cost, policy instruments are required for it \r\nto be widely deployed (high confidence). Relevant policy instruments \r\ninclude financial instruments such as emission certification and \r\ntrading, legally enforced emission restraints, and carbon pricing \r\n(Haszeldine 2016; Kang et al. 2020). There are some recent examples \r\nof policy instruments specifically focused on promoting CCS. The \r\nrecent 45Q tax credits in the USA offer nationwide tax credits for "


id: bd87e1ae1a5c1210cb3b7a19f30f9662
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27388
content:
"will require substantial breakthroughs or market changes to become \r\ncompetitive. Moreover, fuels produced from these processes require \r\nupgrading to reach 'drop-in' conditions - that is, conditions in which \r\nthey may be used directly consistent with current standards in \r\nexisting technologies (van Dyk et al. 2019). Additional opportunities \r\nexist to co-optimise second-generation biofuels and engines (Ostadi \r\net  al. 2019; Salman et  al. 2020). In addition, gaseous wastes, or \r\nhigh-moisture biomass, such as dairy manure, wastewater sludge \r\nand organic municipal solid waste (MSW) could be utilised to \r\nproduce renewable natural gas. Technologies for producing biogas \r\n(e.g.,  digestion) tend to be less efficient than thermochemical \r\napproaches and often produce large amounts of CO2, requiring the \r\nproduced fuels to undergo significant upgrading (Melara et al. 2020)."


id: da51935656d0009a159eede484775c03
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31873
content:
"(high confidence). Different chemical and biological conversion \r\npathways exist to convert diverse biomass feedstocks into multiple \r\nfinal energy carriers (Figure 6.14). Currently, biomass is mostly used \r\nto produce heat, or for cooking purposes (traditional biomass), \r\nelectricity, or first-generation sugar-based biofuels (e.g.,  ethanol \r\nproduced via fermentation), as well as biodiesel produced from \r\nvegetable oils and animal fats. Electricity generated from biomass \r\ncontributes about 3% of global generation. Tens of billions of gallons \r\nof first-generation biofuels are produced per  year. The processing \r\nrequirements (drying, dewatering, pelletising) of different feedstocks \r\nfor producing electricity from biomass are energy-intensive, and when \r\nutilising current power plants, the efficiency is around 22%, with an \r\nincrease up to 28% with advanced technologies (Zhang et al. 2020)."


id: c9eac9c840e222632f31ca9833d81472
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29323
content:
"Scaling up bioenergy use will require advanced technologies such \r\nas gasification, Fischer-Tropsch processing, hydrothermal liquefaction \r\n(HTL), and pyrolysis. These pathways could deliver several final \r\nenergy carriers starting from multiple feedstocks, including forest \r\nbiomass, dedicated cellulosic feedstocks, crop residues, and wastes \r\n(Figure  6.14). While potentially cost-competitive in the future, \r\npyrolysis, Fischer-Tropsch, and HTL are not currently cost-competitive \r\n(IEA 2018c; Molino et al. 2018; Prussi et al. 2019), and scaling-up \r\nthese processes will require robust business strategies and optimised \r\nuse of co-products (Lee and Lavoie 2013). Advanced biofuels \r\nproduction processes are at the pilot or demonstration stage and "


id: 9b9a26d1a949c98b622ed31715f069d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22041
content:
"A major scale-up of bioenergy production will require dedicated \r\nproduction of advanced biofuels. First-generation biofuels produced \r\ndirectly from food crops or animal fats have limited potential \r\nand lower yield per  land area than advanced biofuels. Wastes \r\nand  residues (e.g.,  from agricultural, forestry, animal manure \r\nprocessing) or biomass grown on degraded, surplus, and marginal \r\nland can provide opportunities for cost-effective and sustainable \r\nbioenergy at significant but limited scale (Morris et al. 2013; Saha \r\nand Eckelman 2018; Fajardy and Mac Dowell 2020; Spagnolo et al. \r\n2020). Assessing the potential for a major scale-up of purpose-grown \r\nbioenergy is challenging due to its far-reaching linkages to issues "


id: 59b80c004a2c8431ba972daa2a0116bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11618
content:
"Figure 6.14 | Range of advanced bioenergy conversion pathways (excluding traditional biomass, direct heat generation, first-generation biofuels, and \r\nnon-energy products) based on feedstock, targeted end product, and compatibility with carbon dioxide removal (CDR) via carbon capture and storage \r\n(CCS) and soil carbon sequestration. Source: modified with permission from Baker et al. (2020)."


id: 86e37bbfc08ba11472e6aa00044c8637
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18756
content:
"beyond the energy sector, including competition with land for food \r\nproduction and forestry, water use, impacts on ecosystems, and land\u0002use change (IPCC 2020; Roe et al. 2021) (Chapter 12). These factors, \r\nrather than geophysical characteristics, largely define the potential \r\nfor bioenergy and explain the difference in estimates of potential in \r\nthe literature. Biomass resources are not always in close proximity \r\nto energy demand, necessitating additional infrastructure or means \r\nto  transport biomass or final bioenergy over larger distances and \r\nincur additional energy use (Baik et al. 2018; Singh et al. 2021)."


id: cb84057d8bb2d8bee37f24c8c955097e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29568
content:
"Large-scale bioenergy production will require more than wastes/\r\nresidues and cultivation on marginal lands, which may raise conflicts \r\nwith SDGs relevant to environmental and societal priorities (Heck et al. \r\n2018; Gerten et al. 2020) (Chapter 12). These include competition with \r\nfood crops, implications for biodiversity, potential deforestation to \r\nsupport bioenergy crop production, energy security implications from \r\nbioenergy trade, point-of-use emissions and associated effects on \r\nair quality, and water use and fertiliser use (Fajardy and Mac Dowell \r\n2018; Fuss et  al. 2018; Tanzer and Ramirez 2019; Brack and King \r\n2020). Overall, the environmental impact of bioenergy production at \r\nscale remains uncertain and varies by region and application."


id: 69b4da76f4a33b07700e48f820338d0d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14226
content:
"Alleviating these issues would require some combination of increasing \r\ncrop yields, improving conversion efficiencies, and developing \r\nadvanced biotechnologies for increasing the fuel yield per tonne of \r\nfeedstock (Henry et al. 2018). Policy structures would be necessary to "


id: 9900ac74192b8e2a859c97228b183afe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21588
content:
"Table 6.4 | The costs of electricity generation, hydrogen production, and second-generation liquid fuels production from biomass in 2020. These costs are \r\nadapted from Bhave et al. (2017), Daioglou et al. (2020), NREL (2020a, 2020b), Witcover and Williams (2020), and Lepage et al. (2021)."


id: 9a411ec73d1750a9f78da1a94e3ea344
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21793
content:
"scale (Zanchi et al. 2012; Wiloso et al. 2016; Booth 2018; Fan et al. \r\n2021). Similarly, the lifecycle emissions of BECCS remain uncertain and \r\nwill depend on how effectively bioenergy conversion processes are \r\noptimised (Fajardy and Mac Dowell 2017; Tanzer and Ramirez 2019)."


id: 407efa84822468a51e4ca26f16736d8f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7526
content:
"retain biodiversity, manage water use, limit deforestation and land\u0002use change emissions, and ultimately optimally integrate bioenergy \r\nwith transforming ecosystems. Large-scale international trade of \r\nbiomass might be required to support a global bioeconomy, raising \r\nquestions about infrastructure, logistics, financing options, and global \r\nstandards for bioenergy production and trade (Box 6.10). Additional \r\ninstitutional and economic barriers are associated with accounting of \r\ncarbon dioxide removal, including BECCS (Fuss et al. 2014; Muratori \r\net al. 2016; Fridahl and Lehtveer 2018)."


id: a937a2cf5feedafa3b35acfee61f2dc5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24151
content:
"Lifecycle emissions impacts from bioenergy are subject to large \r\nuncertainties and could be incompatible with net-zero emissions \r\nin some contexts. Due to the potentially large energy conversion \r\nrequirements and associated GHG emissions (Chapters 7 and 12), \r\nbioenergy systems may fail to deliver near-zero emissions depending \r\non operating conditions and regional contexts (Elshout et  al. 2015; \r\nDaioglou et al. 2017; Staples et al. 2017; Hanssen et al. 2020; Lade et al. \r\n2020). As a result, bioenergy carbon neutrality is debated and depends \r\non factors such as the source of biomass, conversion pathways and \r\nenergy used for production and transport of biomass, and land-use \r\nchanges, as well as assumed analysis boundary and considered time "


id: fe86ccde7a921bb7a1d0da81f7d0f1d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37583
content:
"with fossil fuels, this section aims to elucidate the feasibility criteria \r\naround these fuels itself."


id: 31833a68261c632e358ce71ea592c745
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5199
content:
"Fossil fuels could play a role in climate change mitigation if strategically \r\ndeployed with CCS (high confidence). On the one hand, the primary \r\nmechanism for reducing emissions is to eliminate the unabated \r\nfossil fuel use. On the other hand, fossil energy combined with CCS \r\nprovides a means of producing low-carbon energy while still utilising \r\nthe available base of fossil energy worldwide and limiting stranded \r\nassets. While Section 6.4.2.5 discusses the important aspects of CCS "


id: b93f88d7b9514d27f3094f67bfa1acc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26680
content:
"Fossil fuel reserves have continued to rise because of advanced \r\nexploration and utilisation techniques (high confidence). A fraction of \r\nthese available reserves can be used consistent with mitigation goals \r\nwhen paired with CCS opportunities in close geographical proximity \r\n(high confidence). Based on continued exploration, the fossil fuel \r\nresource base has increased significantly; for example, a 9% increase "


id: 39c5f3dce302dc2b91628e93d9bf1e02
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6464
content:
"Coal mine methane and ventilation air methane recovery can reduce \r\nthe fugitive methane emissions by 50-75% (Zhou et al. 2016; Singh \r\nand Sahu 2018)."


id: f35db7d44e212483a1fa698b700ea840
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35799
content:
"in gas reserves and 12% in oil reserves was observed in the USA \r\nbetween 2017 and 2018. This increase is a  result of advanced \r\nexploration techniques, which are often subsidised (Lazarus and van \r\nAsselt 2018; MA et al. 2018). Fossil reserves are distributed unevenly \r\nthroughout the globe. Coal represents the largest remaining resource \r\n(close to 500 ZJ). Conventional oil and gas resources are an order \r\nof magnitude smaller (15-20 ZJ each). Technological advances have \r\nincreased the reserves of unconventional fossil in the last decade. \r\nDiscovered ultimate recoverable resources of unconventional oil and \r\ngas are comparable to conventional oil and gas (Fizaine et al. 2017)."


id: f030bdc849d0496f5d65cc7642aeb9b2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35294
content:
"The cost of producing electricity from fossil sources has remained \r\nroughly the same with some regional exceptions while the costs \r\nof producing transport fuels has gone down significantly (high \r\nconfidence). The cost of producing electricity from fossil fuels has \r\nremained largely static, with the exception of some regional changes, \r\nfor example, a 40% cost reduction in the USA for natural gas (Rai et al. \r\n2019), where the gas wellhead price has declined by almost two-thirds \r\ndue to large reserves. Similarly, the global price of crude oil has declined \r\nfrom almost USD100 bbl-1 to USD55 bbl-1 in the last five years."


id: e2184bbc66cdf4b611422eb973a70c1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33068
content:
"It is unlikely that resource constraints will lead to a  phase-out of \r\nfossil fuels, and instead, such a phase-out would require policy action. \r\nAround 80% of coal, 50% of gas, and 20% of oil reserves are likely to \r\nremain unextractable under 2degC constraints (McGlade and Ekins 2015; \r\nPellegrini et al. 2020). Reserves are more likely to be utilised in a low\u0002carbon transition if they can be paired with CCS. Availability of CCS \r\ntechnology not only allows continued use of fossil fuels as a capital \r\nresource for countries but also paves the way for CDR through BECCS \r\n(Haszeldine 2016; Pye et al. 2020). While the theoretical geologic CO2\r\nsequestration potential is vast, there are limits on how much resource \r\nbase could be utilised based on geologic, engineering, and source-sink \r\nmapping criteria (Budinis et al. 2017)."


id: 6e9d7ed03d9a9db15ed39b2215b98e3a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15029
content:
"The energy return of investment (EROI) is a useful indicator of full \r\nfossil lifecycle costs. Fossil fuels create significantly more energy \r\nper unit energy invested - or in other words have much larger EROI - \r\nthan most cleaner fuels such as biomass or electrolysis-derived \r\nhydrogen, where intensive processing reduces EROI (Hall et  al. \r\n2014). That said, recent years have seen a decrease in fossil EROI, \r\nespecially as underground coal mining still represents a substantial \r\nportion of global production. Exploitation of unconventional gas \r\nreservoirs is also energy intensive and has led to a reduction in EROI. \r\nThe primary energy EROI of fossil fuels has converged at about 30, \r\nwhich represents a 20-point decrease from the 1995 value for coal \r\n(Brockway et  al. 2019). When processing and refining stages are \r\nconsidered, these EROI values further decrease."


id: a6a6d128d2cd7bc19cb810d6573dd180
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23746
content:
"Several countries have large reserves of fossil fuels. Owing to climate \r\nconstraints, these may become stranded, causing considerable \r\neconomic impacts (high confidence) (Sections 6.7.3 and 6.7.4, and \r\nBox  6.13). While global fossil energy resources are greater than \r\n600 ZJ, more than half of these resources would likely be unburnable, \r\neven in the presence of CCS (McGlade and Ekins 2015; Pye et  al. \r\n2020). This would entail a significant capital loss for the countries \r\nwith large reserves. The total amount of stranded assets in such \r\na case would amount to USD1-4 trillion at present value (Box 6.13)."


id: 38ff8017eaab3fd4e4f8cb2c655b01de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6341
content:
"Apart from CO2 emissions and air pollutants from fossil fuel \r\ncombustion, other environmental impacts include fugitive methane \r\nleakages and implications to water systems. While the rate of \r\nmethane leakage from unconventional gas systems is uncertain, their \r\noverall GHG impact is less than coal (Tanaka et al. 2019; Deetjen and \r\nAzevedo 2020). The stated rate of leakage in such systems ranges from \r\n1-8%, and reconciling different estimates requires a  combination \r\nof top-down and bottom-up approaches (Zavala-Araiza et  al. \r\n2015; Grubert and Brandt 2019). Similarly, for coal mining, fugitive \r\nmethane emissions have grown, despite some regulations on the \r\ndegree to which emission controls must be deployed. Recent IPCC \r\ninventory guidance also notes considerable CO2 emissions resulting \r\nfrom spontaneous combustion of the coal surface, and accounting for \r\nthese emissions will likely increase the overall lifecycle emissions by \r\n1-5% (IPCC 2019; Singh 2019; Fiehn et al. 2020)."


id: efe362cdb84912160aada33c56830824
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35248
content:
"Significant potential exists for gasifying deep-seated coal deposits \r\nin situ to produce hydrogen. Doing so reduces fugitive methane \r\nemissions from underground coal mining. The integration costs \r\nof this process with CCS are less than with natural gas reforming. \r\nThe extent to which coal gasification could be compatible with \r\nlow-carbon energy would depend on the rate of CO2 capture and \r\nthe ultimate use of the gas (Verma and Kumar 2015). Similarly, for \r\nongoing underground mining projects, coal mine methane recovery \r\ncan be economic for major coal producers such as China and India. "


id: 6fb6d46429a294d55f22f72753aee426
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15198
content:
"Another key issue consistently noted with unconventional wells (both \r\noil and gas, and coalbed methane) is the large water requirements \r\n(Qin et  al. 2018). The overall water footprint of unconventional "


id: 788aba8df460fae30ef7080a90629b00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16525
content:
"enhanced investments in social welfare - through sanitation, water, \r\nclean energy - with differentiating impacts (Edenhofer 2015)."


id: a78f834299d6aa5c5eba012f0af11e7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23868
content:
"reservoirs is higher than conventional reservoirs because of higher \r\nlateral length and fracturing requirements (Scanlon et  al. 2017; \r\nKondash et al. 2018). Moreover, produced water from such formations \r\nis moderately to highly brackish, and treating such waters has large \r\nenergy consumption (Bartholomew and Mauter 2016; Singh and \r\nColosi 2019)."


id: 8d6c3f994dca8b37432e4f5f89a9ba8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19771
content:
"Geothermal energy is heat stored in the Earth's subsurface and \r\nis a  renewable resource that can be sustainably exploited. The \r\ngeophysical potential of geothermal resources is 1.3 to 13 times \r\nthe  global electricity demand in 2019 (medium confidence). \r\nGeothermal energy can be used directly for various thermal \r\napplications, including space heating and industrial heat input, \r\nor converted to electricity depending on the source temperature \r\n(Limberger et al. 2018; Moya et al. 2018; REN21 2019)."


id: af5390ea247495072166c848a217d3ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25101
content:
"Fossil fuel subsidies have been valued in the order of USD0.5-5 trillion \r\nannually by various estimates which have the tendency to introduce \r\neconomic inefficiency within systems (Jakob et al. 2015; Merrill et al. \r\n2015) (high confidence). Subsequent reforms have been suggested \r\nby different researchers who have estimated reductions in CO2\r\nemissions may take place if these subsidies are removed (Mundaca \r\n2017). Such reforms could create the necessary framework for "


id: 19f7b9b20e7478d137e3e70a368ed858
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1552
content:
"However, with the implementation of modern technologies, geothermal \r\npresents fewer adverse environmental impacts. At the same time, \r\npeople perceive geothermal energy as relatively environmentally \r\nfriendly (Tampakis et al. 2013)."


id: 5a58bc5df1d5faa233ec2558d2da4f65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11726
content:
"geothermal energy. In Kenya, as of July 2019, geothermal accounted \r\nfor 734 MW effective capacity spread over 10 power plants and \r\napproximately one third of the total installed capacity (Kahlen 2019)."


id: 8eb19a752b966dd801a67b0148166444
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19975
content:
"There are two main types of geothermal resources: convective \r\nhydrothermal resources, in which the Earth's heat is carried by \r\nnatural hot water or steam to the surface; and hot, dry rock \r\nresources, in which heat cannot be extracted using water or steam, \r\nand other methods must be developed. There are three basic types \r\nof geothermal power plants: (i) dry steam plants use steam directly \r\nfrom a  geothermal reservoir to turn generator turbines; (ii) flash \r\nsteam plants take high-pressure hot water from deep inside the Earth \r\nand convert it to steam to drive generator turbines; and (iii) binary \r\ncycle power plants transfer the heat from geothermal hot water to \r\nanother liquid. Many of the power plants in operation today are dry \r\nsteam plants or flash plants (single, double and triple) harnessing \r\ntemperatures of more than 180degC."


id: b9428b2c219403edccb2c9db774970d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26682
content:
"However, medium temperature fields are increasingly used for \r\nelectricity generation or combined heat and power. The use of medium \r\ntemperature fields has been enabled through the development of \r\nbinary cycle technology, in which a geothermal fluid is used via heat \r\nexchangers. Increasing binary generation technologies are now being \r\nutilised instead of flash steam power plants. This will result in almost \r\n100% injection and essentially zero GHG emissions, although GHG \r\nemissions from geothermal power production are generally small \r\ncompared to traditional baseload thermal energy power generation \r\nfacilities (Fridriksson et al. 2016)."


id: b64e0c93487e54df61f5b80de36ef22e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26206
content:
"Additionally, new technologies are being developed like Enhanced \r\nGeothermal Systems (EGS), which is in the demonstration stage \r\n(IRENA 2018), deep geothermal technology, which may increase the \r\nprospects for harnessing the geothermal potential in a large number \r\nof countries, or shallow-geothermal energy, which represents \r\na promising supply source for heating and cooling buildings (Narsilio \r\nand Aye 2018). Successful large-scale deployment of shallow \r\ngeothermal energy will depend not only on site-specific economic \r\nperformance but also on developing suitable governance frameworks \r\n(Bloemendal et al. 2018; Garcia-Gil et al. 2020). Technologies for direct \r\nuses like district heating, geothermal heat pumps, greenhouses, and \r\nother applications, are widely used and considered mature. Given \r\nthe limited number of plants commissioned, economic indicators \r\n(Figure 6.15) vary considerably depending on site characteristics."


id: 4862600ca153afe6ef4e589b1bad30e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8764
content:
"Waste-to-energy (WTE) is a strategy to recover energy from waste \r\nin a form of consumable heat, electricity, or fuel (Zhao et al. 2016). \r\nThermal (incineration, gasification, and pyrolysis) and biological \r\n(anaerobic digestion and landfill gas to energy) technologies are \r\ncommonly used (Ahmad et  al. 2020). When WTE technologies \r\nare equipped with proper air pollution reduction facilities they can \r\ncontribute to clean electricity production and reduction of GHG \r\nemissions. However, if not properly operated, they can exacerbate \r\nair quality issues."


id: 1cc55bf6b2e1d0f7e9654e30223a5907
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1978
content:
"Public awareness and knowledge of geothermal energy is relatively low\r\n(high confidence). Geothermal energy is evaluated as less acceptable \r\nthan other renewable energy sources such as solar and wind, but is \r\npreferred over fossil and nuclear energy, and in some studies, over \r\nhydroelectric energy (high confidence) (Pellizzone et  al. 2015; Steel \r\net al. 2015; Karytsas et al. 2019; Hazboun and Boudet 2020). Some \r\npeople are concerned about the installation of geothermal facilities \r\nclose to their homes, similar to solar and wind projects (Pellizzone \r\net al. 2015). The main concerns about geothermal energy, particularly \r\nfor large-scale, high-temperature geothermal power generation plants, \r\ninvolve water usage, water scarcity, and seismic risks of drilling (Dowd \r\net  al. 2011). Moreover, noise, smell and damages to the landscape \r\nhave been reasons for protests against specific projects (Walker 1995). "


id: 93fbfc90f10fe17f93e9b84f2763957a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20787
content:
"In 2019, there were more than 1,200 WTE incineration facilities \r\nworldwide, with estimated capacity of 310 million tonnes per  year \r\n(UNECE 2020). It is estimated that treatment of a  minimum of \r\n261  million tonnes/year of waste could produce 283 TWh (1 EJ) \r\nof power and heat by 2022 (Awasthi et al. 2019). Incineration plants "


id: 4b1f8b5bfa19a2243b25d285c3681e27
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9242
content:
"involving advanced information and communication technologies. \r\nReal-time maintenance of supply-demand balance and sufficient \r\nflexibility technologies such as electricity storage, flexible demand, \r\nand grid forming converters (Strbac et  al. 2015a; Lopez Prol and \r\nSchill 2021) would be increasingly valuable for incorporating larger \r\namounts of VRE generation. This flexibility will be particularly \r\nimportant to deal with sudden losses of supply, for example, due to \r\na failure of a large generator or interconnector or a rapid increase \r\nin demand (Teng et al. 2017; Chamorro et al. 2020)."


id: 4d1dd0327253ba2421297990b537a726
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9560
content:
"The transition to a  digitalised-based electricity system control \r\nparadigm would facilitate radical changes in the security of supply, \r\nmoving from the traditional approach of redundancy in assets to \r\na  smart control paradigm. Advanced control and communication \r\nsystems can significantly reduce the electricity system investment \r\nand operation costs (Harper et al. 2018; Munster et al. 2020)."


id: 6774998892a640890526581a36805272
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13864
content:
"Depending on the origin of the waste used, the integration of WTE \r\nand carbon capture and storage (CCS) could enable waste to be a net\u0002zero or even net negative emissions energy source (Kearns 2019; \r\nWienchol et al. 2020). For example, in Europe only, the integration \r\nof CCS with WTE facilities has the potential to capture about 60 to \r\n70 million tonnes of carbon dioxide annually (Tota et al. 2021)."


id: ca19c157c80b79e2408ed4d49dea5654
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29355
content:
"Integrated whole-system approaches can reduce the costs of \r\nlow-carbon energy system transitions (high confidence). A lack \r\nof flexibility in the electricity system may limit the cost-effective \r\nintegration of technologies as part of broader net-zero energy \r\nsystems. At the same time, the enormous latent flexibility hidden \r\nin heating and cooling, hydrogen, transport, gas systems, and other \r\nenergy systems provides opportunities to take advantage of synergies \r\nand to coordinate operations across systems (Martin et  al. 2017; \r\nZhang et al. 2018; Martinez Cesena and Mancarella 2019; Pavicevic \r\net al. 2020; Bogdanov et al. 2021) (Figure 6.16)."


id: 6316b04346e087df0535a5765917fd32
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13158
content:
"Waste-to-energy is an expensive process compared to other energy \r\nsources such as fossil fuels and natural gas (Mohammadi and \r\nHarjunkoski 2020). However, the environmental and economic \r\nbenefits make its high financial costs justifiable. In 2019, the global \r\nWTE market size was valued at USD31 billion, and it is predicted to \r\nexperience 7.4% annual growth until 2027 (UNECE 2020)."


id: 5f98e953fcb1dbc4f25f69aa3c6c91e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12619
content:
"Sector coupling can significantly increase system flexibility, driven \r\nby the application of advanced technologies (Clegg and Mancarella \r\n2016; Heinen et al. 2016; Bogdanov et al. 2019; Solomon et al. 2019; \r\nZhang et al. 2019b; Zhang and Fujimori 2020; Zhao et al. 2021). For \r\nexample, district heating infrastructure can generate both heat and \r\npower. Cooling systems and electrified heating systems in buildings \r\ncan provide flexibility through preheating and precooling via thermal \r\nenergy storage (Z. Li et al. 2016; G. Li et al. 2017). System balancing \r\nservices can be provided by electric vehicles (EVs) based on vehicle\u0002to-grid concepts and deferred charging through smart control of \r\nEV batteries without compromising customers' requirements for \r\ntransport (Aunedi and Strbac 2020)."


id: c5b8a3dca71aad8e04b8d46f08856444
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28689
content:
"Greenhouse gases are emitted across all economic activities. \r\nTherefore, cost-effective decarbonisation requires a  'system of \r\nsystems' approach that considers the interaction between different \r\nenergy sectors and systems. Flexibility technologies and advanced \r\ncontrol of integrated energy systems (e.g., considering the interaction \r\nbetween electricity, heating/cooling, gas/hydrogen, transport sectors) \r\ncould reduce energy infrastructure investments substantially in future \r\nlow-carbon energy systems (Strbac et al. 2015b; Jacobson et al. 2019)."


id: c52729cc13f489664997bc6309c651a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28596
content:
"The electricity grid will serve as a  backbone of future low-carbon \r\nenergy systems. Integration of large amounts of VRE generation \r\n(Hansen et al. 2019), particularly wind and solar generation (Bistline \r\nand Young 2019; Perez et al. 2019), presents economic and technical \r\nchallenges to electricity system management across different time \r\nscales from sub-seconds, hours, days, seasons, to multiple years. \r\nFurthermore, electrification of segments of the transport and heat \r\nsectors could disproportionately increase peak demand relative to \r\nsupply (Bistline et al. 2021). Increases in peak demand may require \r\nreinforcing network infrastructures and generation in the historical \r\npassive system operation paradigm (Strbac et al. 2020)."


id: c89437f616dd26b950e6b7749ec7fc86
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29122
content:
"Hydrogen production processes (power-to-gas and vice versa) \r\nand hydrogen storage can support short-term and long-term \r\nbalancing in the energy systems and enhance resilience (Stephen \r\nand Pierluigi 2016; Strbac et  al. 2020). However, the economic \r\nbenefits of flexible power-to-gas plants, energy storage, and other \r\nflexibility technological and options will depend on the locations of \r\nVRE sources, storage sites, gas, hydrogen, and electricity networks \r\n(Jentsch et al. 2014; Heymann and Bessa 2015; Ameli et al. 2020). \r\nCoordinated operation of gas and electricity systems can bring \r\nsignificant benefits in supplying heat demands. For example, \r\nhybrid heating can eliminate investment in electricity infrastructure \r\nreinforcement by switching to heat pumps in off-peak hours and \r\ngas boilers in peak hours (Fischer et al. 2017; Dengiz et al. 2019; "


id: bf7b4b7bbf458de0f8d1151aee26daf8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27684
content:
"Bistline et al. 2021). The heat required by direct air carbon capture \r\nand storage (DACCS) could be effectively supplied by inherent \r\nheat energy in nuclear plants, enhancing overall system efficiency \r\n(Realmonte et al. 2019)."


id: 1370d4e7f653d13c5acb66caef230435
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 570
content:
"been implemented, but they can be enhanced and deployed more \r\nwidely. Due to their interdependencies and similarities, there can \r\nbe both synergies and conflicts for utilising these flexibility options \r\n(Bistline et al. 2021). It will therefore be important to coordinate the \r\ndeployment of the potential flexibility technologies and smart control \r\nstrategies. Important electricity system flexibility options include \r\nthe following:"


id: b11c751e3b319d574c7d7bed50181a89
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25373
content:
"Flexibility technologies  - including energy storage, demand-side \r\nresponse, flexible/dispatchable generation, grid-forming converters, \r\nand transmission interconnection  - as well as advanced control \r\nsystems - can facilitate cost-effective and secure low-carbon energy \r\nsystems (high confidence). Flexibility technologies have already "


id: 193fda011363c6a15bfb9a736453f5ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1460
content:
"drive system operation and future design, increasing overall system \r\nefficiency and security of supply while reducing emissions without \r\nsacrificing users' privacy (Andoni et al. 2019; Ahl et al. 2020). When \r\ndeployed with smart contracts, this concept will be suitable for \r\nenergy systems involving many participants, where a prerequisite is \r\ndigitalisation (e.g., smart meters, end-use demand control systems) \r\n(Juhar and Khaled 2018; Teufel et al. 2019)."


id: f067219010b6afbf92a4cdac3db61ed4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35322
content:
"New sources of flexibility and advanced control systems provide \r\na significant opportunity to reduce low-carbon energy system costs \r\nby enhancing operating efficiency and reducing energy infrastructure \r\nand low-carbon generation investments, while continuing to meet \r\nsecurity requirements (high confidence). In the USA, for example, one \r\nstudy found that flexibility in buildings alone could reduce US CO2\r\nemissions by 80 Mt yr-1 and save USD18 billion yr-1 in electricity \r\nsystem costs by 2030 (Satchwell et al. 2021). Key means for creating \r\nsavings are associated with the following:"


id: b68474080c8af4a3b0d637636819acea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26234
content:
"The transition to advanced data-driven control of energy system \r\noperations (Cremer et  al. 2019; Sun et  al. 2019a) will require \r\nadvanced information and communication technologies and \r\ninfrastructure, including the internet, wireless networks, computers, \r\nsoftware, middleware, smart sensors, internet of things components, \r\nand dedicated technological developments (Hossein Motlagh et al. \r\n2020). The transition will raise standardisation and cyber-security \r\nissues, given that digitalisation can become a single point of failure \r\nfor the complete system (Ustun and Hussain 2019; Unsal et al. 2021). \r\nImplementing peer-to-peer energy trading based on blockchain is \r\nexpected to be one of the key elements of next-generation electricity \r\nsystems (Qiu et  al. 2021). This trading will enable consumers to "


id: a2ba58de26dc06b1ee4040182bbd3302
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23169
content:
"Table 6.5 | Suitability of low-carbon energy storage technologies, in terms of the grid services they can provide, and overall features such as technology \r\nmaturity: where Low represents an emerging technology; Med represents a maturing technology; and High a fully mature technology. The opportunity for \r\nthe cost of a technology to reduce over the next decade is represented by Low, Med and High and the lifetime of installations by: Long, for projects lasting more than 25 years; \r\nMed for those lasting 15-25 years; Short, for those lasting less than 15 years. "


id: 38aac1251629a827c1c49e720b7a24ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6287
content:
"Note: PHS - Pumped Hydroelectric Storage; CAES - Compressed Air Energy Storage; LAES - Liquid Air Energy Storage; TES - Thermal Energy Storage; FES - Flywheel Energy \r\nStorage; LIB - Li-ion Batteries; Scap - Supercapacitors; RFB - Redox Flow Batteries; RHFC - Reversible Hydrogen Fuel Cells; PtX - Power to fuels. Source: PHS - Barbour et al. \r\n2016, Yang 2016, IRENA 2017b; CAES - Luo et al. 2014, Brandon et al. 2015, IRENA 2017b; LAES - Luo et al. 2014, Highview 2019; TES - Brandon et al. 2015, Gallo et al. \r\n2016, Smallbone et al. 2017; FES - IRENA 2017b, Yulong et al. 2017; LIB - IRENA 2015b, Hammond and Hazeldine 2015, Nykvist and Nilsson 2015, Staffell, I. and Rustomji, \r\nM. et al. 2016, IRENA 2017b, Schmidt et al. 2017c, May et al. 2018; Scap - Brandon et al. 2015, Gur 2018; RFB - IRENA 2017b; RHFC - IEA 2015, Gur 2018."


id: ba058d4c007b60a4a076b1ba7b32921c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26808
content:
"upgrades can thus be reduced (upgrade deferral), meaning that \r\nless low-carbon generation will need to be built while still reducing \r\nemissions. In the event of an outage, energy storage reserves can keep \r\ncritical services running (islanding) and restart the grid (black start). \r\nThe ability to store and release energy as required provides a range \r\nof market opportunities for buying and selling of energy (arbitrage)."


id: 4ee497410abc1025c57271055cced66f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9849
content:
"reducing investment costs in backup generation, interconnection, \r\ntransmission, and distribution network upgrades (high confidence). \r\nEnergy system decarbonisation relies on increased electrification \r\n(Section  6.6.2.3). Meeting increasing demands with variable \r\nrenewable sources presents challenges and could lead to costly \r\ninfrastructure reinforcements. Energy storage enables electricity from \r\nvariable renewables to be matched against evolving demands across \r\nboth time and space, using short-, medium- and long-term storage of \r\nexcess energy for delivery later or at a different location. In 2017, an \r\nestimated 4.67 TWh (0.017 EJ) of electricity storage was in operation \r\nglobally (IRENA 2017b). If the integration of renewables is doubled \r\nfrom 2014 levels by 2030, the total capacity of global electricity \r\nstorage could triple, reaching 11.89-15.27 TWh (0.043-0.055 EJ) \r\n(IRENA 2017b)."


id: 539837d587ad0bbd8a6ad7d157e5b3e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10619
content:
"No single, sufficiently mature energy storage technology can \r\nprovide all the required grid services - a portfolio of complementary \r\ntechnologies working together can provide the optimum solution \r\n(high confidence). Different energy storage technologies can \r\nprovide these services and support cost-effective energy system \r\ndecarbonisation (Carbon Trust 2016). To achieve very low-carbon \r\nsystems, significant volumes of storage will be required (Strbac \r\net  al. 2015a; Section  6.4.3.2). There are few mature global supply \r\nchains for many of the less-developed energy storage technologies. \r\nThis means that, although costs today may be relatively high, \r\nthere are significant opportunities for future cost reductions, both \r\nthrough technology innovation and through manufacturing scale. \r\nAdding significant amounts of storage will reduce the price variation \r\nand, therefore, the profitability of additional and existing storage, \r\nincreasing investment risk."


id: ce5ff0662356105e965256ba7f470fd9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30004
content:
"Energy storage technologies can provide a  range of different grid \r\nservices (Table 6.5). Energy storage enhances security of supply by \r\nproviding real-time system regulation services (voltage support, \r\nfrequency regulation, fast reserve, and short-term reserve). A greater \r\nproportion of variable renewable sources reduces system inertia, \r\nrequiring more urgent responses to changes in system frequency, \r\nwhich rapid response storage technologies can provide (stability \r\nrequires responses within sub-second time scale for provision \r\nof frequency and voltage control services). Energy storage also \r\nprovides intermittent renewable sources with flexibility, allowing \r\nthem to contribute a  greater proportion of electrical energy and \r\navoiding curtailment (capacity firming). Investment costs in backup \r\ngeneration, interconnection, transmission, and distribution network "


id: 13485c20697a20abc7f9b28f7b39732
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 547
content:
"Energy storage extends beyond electricity storage and includes \r\ntechnologies that can store energy as heat, cold, and both liquid and \r\ngaseous fuels. Energy storage is a conversion technology, enabling \r\nenergy to be converted from one form to another. This diversification \r\nimproves the overall resilience of energy systems, with each system "


id: b465636cce13ec871dd7d79719138ebc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25901
content:
"through turbines to recharge it (Kougias et al. 2019). Using a similar \r\nconcept, underground siting in abandoned mines and caverns could \r\nbe developed reasonably quickly (IEA 2020h). Storage of energy as \r\ngravitational potential can also be implemented using materials \r\nother than water, such as rocks and sand. Pumped technology is \r\na mature technology (Rehman et al. 2015; Barbour et al. 2016) and \r\ncan be important in supporting the transition to future low-carbon \r\nelectricity grids (IHA 2021)."


id: 68fc91ce04dec367712327c589e393bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14112
content:
"being able to cover supply shortfalls in the others. For example, \r\nstorage can support the electrification of heating or cooling, as well \r\nas transport through electric vehicles, powered by batteries or by fuel \r\ncells. Storage significantly reduces the need for costly reinforcement \r\nof local distribution networks through smart charging schemes and \r\nthe ability to flow electricity back to the grid (e.g., through vehicle\u0002to-grid). By capturing otherwise wasted energy streams, such as heat \r\nor cold, energy storage improves the efficiency of many systems, such \r\nas buildings, data centres and industrial processes."


id: 72b34f83a56a1cb987953ef33942a3c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15664
content:
"Pumped hydroelectric storage (PHS). PHS makes use of \r\ngravitational potential energy, using water as the medium. Water \r\nis pumped into an elevated reservoir using off-peak electricity and \r\nstored for later release when electricity is needed. These closed-loop \r\nhydropower plants have been in use for decades and account for 97% \r\nof worldwide electricity storage capacity (IRENA 2017b; IEA 2018b).\r\nPHS is best suited to balancing daily energy needs at a large scale, \r\nand advances in the technology now allow rapid response and power \r\nregulation in both generating and pumping mode (Valavi and Nysveen \r\n2018; Dong et al. 2019; Kougias et al. 2019). The construction itself \r\ncan cause disruption to the local community and environment (Hayes \r\net al. 2019), the initial investment is costly, and extended construction \r\nperiods delay return on investment (Section  6.4.2.3). In addition, \r\nlocations for large-scale PHS plants are limited."


id: 401ac4337ea69284c08c834462337ee1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7461
content:
"Drawbacks of batteries include relatively short lifespans and the \r\nuse of hazardous or costly materials in some variants. While LIB \r\ncosts are decreasing (Schmidt et  al. 2017; Vartiainen et  al. 2020), \r\nthe risk of thermal runaway, which could ignite a fire (Gur 2018; \r\nWang et al. 2019a), concerns about long-term resource availability \r\n(Olivetti et  al. 2017; Sun et  al. 2017), and concerns about global \r\ncradle-to-grave impacts (Peters et al. 2017; Kallitsis et al. 2020) need \r\nto be addressed."


id: f81aae96bb2048b0d9162f97d1c3b9ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36547
content:
"Advanced pump-turbines are being developed, allowing both \r\nreversible and variable-speed operation, supporting frequency control \r\nand grid stability with improved round-trip efficiencies (Ardizzon \r\net al. 2014). New possibilities are being explored for small-scale PHS \r\ninstallations and expanding the potential for siting (Kougias et  al. \r\n2019). For example, in underwater PHS, the upper reservoir is the \r\nsea, and the lower is a hollow deposit at the seabed. Seawater is \r\npumped out of the deposit to store off-peak energy and re-enters "


id: 28ab1c21a7ad7132c0b390dfe18f8b17
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3825
content:
"Table 6.6 | Technical characteristics of a selected range of battery chemistries, categorised as those which precede LIBs (white background), LIBs (yellow \r\nbackground) and post LIBs (blue background)."


id: 30f07875f83a7db776b37d5199fde761
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5125
content:
"Note: With the exception of the All-solid-state batteries, all use liquid electrolytes. Source: a Mahmoudzadeh et al. 2017; b Manzetti and Mariasiu 2015; c Placke et al. 2017; d\r\n Nykvist and Nilsson 2015; e Cano et al. 2018; f Bloomberg Energy Finance, 2019; g You and Manthiram 2017; h Fotouhi et al. 2017; i IRENA 2017b; j Yang et al. 2020."


id: 9d65d32f9dbaabe5edb0297ce4917412
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22294
content:
"LAES provides bulk daily storage of electricity, with the additional \r\nadvantage of being able to capture waste heat from industrial \r\nprocesses. This technology is in the early commercial stage (Brandon \r\net al. 2015; Regen 2017). Advances in whole systems integration can be \r\ndeveloped to integrate LAES with industrial processes, making use of \r\ntheir waste heat streams. LAES uniquely removes contaminants in the \r\nair and could potentially incorporate CO2 capture (Taylor et al. 2012)."


id: 72c6239d7a8724395cde3580faf2817f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15669
content:
"Compressed air energy storage (CAES). With CAES, off-peak \r\nelectricity is used to compress air in a  reservoir  - either in salt \r\ncaverns for large-scale or in high-pressure tanks for smaller-scale \r\ninstallations. The air is later released to generate electricity. While \r\nconventional CAES has used natural gas to power compression, \r\nnew low-carbon CAES technologies, such as isothermal or adiabatic \r\nCAES, control thermal losses during compression and expansion \r\n(Wang et  al. 2017c). Fast responses and higher efficiencies occur \r\nin small-scale CAES installations, scalable to suit the application \r\nas a  distributed energy store, offering a  flexible, low-maintenance \r\nalternative (Luo et al. 2014; Venkataramani et al. 2016)."


id: 9e8b9e2c331c14c2b6782deeddd1ff86
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22482
content:
"TES can be much cheaper than batteries and has the unique ability to \r\ncapture and reuse waste heat and cold, enabling the efficiency of many \r\nindustrial, buildings, and domestic processes to be greatly improved \r\n(high confidence). Integration of TES into energy systems is particularly \r\nimportant, as the global demand for cooling is expected to grow (Elzinga \r\net al. 2014; Peters and Sievert 2016). Sensible TES is well developed \r\nand widely used; latent TES is less developed with few applications. \r\nThermochemical TES is the least developed, with no application yet \r\n(Prieto et al. 2016; Clark et al. 2020). The potential for high-density \r\nstorage of industrial heat for long periods in thermochemical TES \r\n(Brandon et  al. 2015) is high, with energy densities comparable to \r\nthat of batteries (Taylor et al. 2012), but material costs are currently \r\nprohibitive, ranging from hundreds to thousands of dollars per tonne."


id: 3a0ec368eab732dee83936a5396ffe67
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6510
content:
"CAES is a mature technology in use since the 1970s. Although CAES \r\ntechnologies have been developed, there are not many installations at \r\npresent (Wang et al. 2017b; Blanc et al. 2020). While the opportunities \r\nfor CAES are significant, with a global geological storage potential of \r\nabout 6.5 PW (Aghahosseini and Breyer 2018), a significant amount \r\nof initial investment is required. Higher efficiencies and energy \r\ndensities can be achieved by exploiting the hydrostatic pressure of \r\ndeep water to compress air within submersible reservoirs (Pimm \r\net al. 2014). CAES is best suited to bulk diurnal electricity storage for \r\nbuffering VRE sources and services, which do not need a very rapid \r\nresponse. In contrast to PHS, CAES has far more siting options and \r\nposes few environmental impacts."


id: 2909581ed0fbaded3a8368c38304c345
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3882
content:
"Flywheel energy storage (FES). Flywheels are charged by \r\naccelerating a rotor/flywheel. Energy is stored in the spinning rotor's \r\ninertia which is only decelerated by friction (minimised by magnetic \r\nbearings in a vacuum), or by contact with a mechanical, electric motor. \r\nThey can reach full charge very rapidly, their state of charge can be \r\neasily determined (Amiryar and Pullen 2017), and they operate over \r\na  wide range of temperatures. While they are more expensive to \r\ninstall than batteries and supercapacitors, they last a long time and \r\nare best suited to stationary grid storage, providing high power for \r\nshort periods (minutes). Flywheels can be used in vehicles, but not as \r\nthe primary energy source."


id: 5079ea94dbb1784503f7e37537b45eb8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10107
content:
"Liquid air energy storage (LAES). LAES uses electricity to \r\nliquefy air by cooling it to -196degC and storing it in this condensed \r\nform (largely liquid nitrogen) in large, insulated tanks. To release \r\nelectricity, the 'liquid air' is evaporated through heating, expanding \r\nto drive gas turbines. Low-grade waste heat can be utilised, providing \r\nopportunities for integrating with industrial processes to increase \r\nsystem efficiency. There are clear, exploitable synergies with the \r\nexisting liquid gas infrastructure (Peters and Sievert 2016)."


id: 4a558a6befa47f89212aa25cddd84d53
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9100
content:
"Flywheels are a relatively mature storage technology but not widely \r\nused, despite their many advantages over electrochemical storage \r\n(Dragoni 2017). Conventional flywheels require costly, high tensile \r\nstrength materials, but high-energy flywheels, using lightweight \r\nrotor materials, are being developed (Hedlund et al. 2015; Amiryar \r\nand Pullen 2017)."


id: d590e93f5a679f6e4d9728a999ac1bde
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31120
content:
"storage to produce electricity again (Bogdanov et al. 2019) due to \r\nthe low roundtrip efficiency of converting electricity to fuel and \r\nback again. However, portable fuels (hydrogen, methane, ammonia, \r\nsynthetic hydrocarbons) are useful in certain applications, for \r\nexample, in energy systems lacking the potential for renewables. \r\nThe high energy density of chemical storage is essential for more \r\ndemanding applications, such as transporting heavy goods and \r\nheating or cooling buildings (IEA 2020h). Research is needed into \r\nmore efficient and flexible electrolysers which last longer and cost \r\nless (Brandon et al. 2015)."


id: 77f21ec2bf6313f1cc05c0d1a7d6abb7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16433
content:
"Supercapacitors  - also known as ultracapacitors or double \r\nlayer capacitors (Scap). Supercapacitors consist of a  porous \r\nseparator sandwiched between two electrodes, immersed in \r\na  liquid electrolyte (Gur 2018). When a  voltage is applied across \r\nthe electrodes, ions in the electrolyte form electric double layers at \r\nthe  electrode surfaces, held by electrostatic forces. This structure \r\nforms a capacitor, storing electrical charge (Brandon et al. 2015; Lin \r\net al. 2017) and can operate from -40degC to 65degC."


id: 7be35680b1a5378a9b1c56a37e5f8cb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17097
content:
"Supercapacitors can supply high peaks of power very rapidly for \r\nshort periods (seconds up to minutes) and are able to fulfil the \r\ngrid requirements for frequency regulation, but they would need \r\nto be hybridised with batteries for automotive applications. Their \r\ncommercial status is limited by costly materials and additional \r\npower electronics required to stabilise their output (Brandon et al. \r\n2015). Progress in this area includes the development of high-energy \r\nsupercapacitors, LIB-supercapacitor devices (Gonzalez et  al. 2016), \r\nand cheaper materials (Wang et al. 2017a), all providing the potential \r\nto improve the economic case for supercapacitors, either by reducing \r\nmanufacturing costs or extending their service portfolio."


id: c715e4a2405cece38b26b70d5707273e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28907
content:
"Redox flow batteries (RFB). Redox flow batteries use two separate \r\nelectrolyte solutions, usually liquids, but solid or gaseous forms may \r\nalso be involved, stored in separate tanks, and pumped over or through \r\nelectrode stacks during charge and discharge, with an ion-conducting \r\nmembrane separating the liquids. The larger the tank, the greater the \r\nenergy storage capacity, whereas more and larger cells in the stack \r\nincrease the power of the flow battery. This decoupling of energy from \r\npower enables RFB installations to be uniquely tailored to suit the \r\nrequirements of any given application. There are two commercially \r\navailable types today: vanadium and zinc bromide, and both operate \r\nat near ambient temperatures, incurring minimal operational costs."


id: 4699da16ff5282024b618f1cf677d7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8488
content:
"Hydrogen can play an important role in reducing emissions and has \r\nbeen shown to be the most cost-effective option in some cases, as it \r\nbuilds on existing systems (Staffell et al. 2018). Fuel cell costs need to \r\nbe reduced and the harmonies between hydrogen and complementary \r\ntechnologies, such as batteries, for specific applications need to be \r\nexplored further. Hydrogen can provide long-duration storage to \r\ndeal with prolonged extreme events, such as very low output of \r\nwind generation, to support resilience of future low-carbon energy \r\nsystems. Research in this technology focuses on improving roundtrip \r\nefficiencies, which can be as high as 80% with recycled waste heat \r\nand in high-pressure electrolysers, incorporating more efficient \r\ncompression (Matos et al. 2019). Photo-electrolysis uses solar energy \r\nto directly generate hydrogen from water (Amirante et al. 2017)."


id: e16502025eb17466a3d30a8148f49021
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32952
content:
"RFBs respond rapidly and can perform all the same services as LIBs, \r\nexcept for onboard electricity for EVs. Lower cost chemistries are \r\nemerging, to enable cost-effective bulk energy storage (Brandon \r\net al. 2015). A new membrane-free design eliminates the need for \r\na separator and also halves the system requirements, as the chemical \r\nreactions can coexist in a single electrolyte solution (Navalpotro et al. \r\n2017; Arenas et al. 2018)."


id: b53703845b2850e89eb0dc1617d2184d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26052
content:
"Power to fuels (PtX) (see also Section 6.4.3.1). The process of using \r\nelectricity to generate a gaseous fuel, such as hydrogen or ammonia, \r\nis termed power-to-gas (PtG/P2G) (IEA 2020h). When injected into \r\nthe existing gas infrastructure (Section 6.4.5), it has the added benefit \r\nof decarbonising gas (Brandon et al. 2015). Electricity can be used \r\nto generate hydrogen, which is then converted back into electricity \r\nusing combined-cycle gas turbines that have been converted to run \r\non hydrogen. For greater compatibility with existing gas systems \r\nand appliances, the hydrogen can be combined with captured \r\ncarbon dioxide to form methane and other synthetic fuels (Thema \r\net al. 2019), however, methane has high global warming potential \r\nand its supply chain emissions have been found to be significant \r\n(Balcombe et al. 2013)."


id: 4868e5f92d3e86bc276c094128a6253d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8769
content:
"Public awareness and knowledge about electricity storage \r\ntechnologies, their current state, and their potential role in future \r\nenergy systems is limited (Jones et  al. 2018). For instance, people \r\ndo not perceive energy system flexibility and storage as a significant \r\nissue, or assume storage is already taking place. Public perceptions \r\ndiffer across storage technologies. Hydrogen is considered a modern \r\nand clean technology, but people also have safety concerns. \r\nMoreover, the public is uncertain about hydrogen storage size and \r\nthe possibility of storing hydrogen in or near residential areas (Eitan \r\nand Fischhendler 2021). Battery storage both on the household and \r\ncommunity level was perceived as slightly positive in one study in the \r\nUK (Ambrosio-Albala et al. 2020). However, financial costs are seen "


id: 6a76e1e614d19cb0f8347c658b4217e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14358
content:
"PtX can provide all required grid services, depending on how it is \r\nintegrated. However, a  significant amount of PtX is required for "


id: c9e34b3619c0f2057d4de003ea704df6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29317
content:
"as a main barrier. The potential of EV batteries to function as flexible \r\nstorage is limited by the current numbers of EV owners and concerns \r\nthat one's car battery might not be fully loaded when needed."


id: c18b1757ca462474a17f115d5cf14f48
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28043
content:
"Low- or zero-carbon produced hydrogen is not currently competitive \r\nfor large-scale applications, but it is likely to have a significant role \r\nin future energy systems, due to its wide-range of applications \r\n(high confidence). Key challenges for hydrogen are: (i) cost-effective \r\nlow/zero carbon production; (ii) delivery infrastructure cost; \r\n(iii)  land area (i.e., 'footprint') requirements of hydrogen pipelines, \r\ncompressor stations, and other infrastructure; (iv) challenges in using \r\nexisting pipeline infrastructure; (v) maintaining hydrogen purity; \r\n(vi) minimising hydrogen leakage; and (vii) the cost and performance \r\nof end uses. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider the public \r\nperception and social acceptance of hydrogen technologies and their \r\nrelated infrastructure requirements (Iribarren et al. 2016; Scott and \r\nPowells 2020)."


id: 53bcb403f6118da9bb28e8b995cd6b97
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10639
content:
"The linkage between energy supply and distribution, on the one hand, \r\nand energy use on the other is facilitated by various mechanisms \r\nfor transporting energy. As the energy system evolves, the way that \r\nenergy is transported will also evolve."


id: fb67f6df16fc9dc2c249cddfbc19cd20
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37059
content:
"Table 6.7 | Key performance and cost characteristics of different non-electric hydrogen production technologies, including carbon capture and storage (CCS)."


id: 455b2f7a2cb8089646ff34e193289987
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8331
content:
"Source: a CSIRO 2021; b IEA 2020; c IRENA 2019; d Hydrogen Council 2020; e CCC 2018; f BEIS 2021; g Ishaq et al. 2021; h Al-Mahtani et al. 2021; i IEA 2019.\r\n* USD per GBP exchange rate: 0.72 (August 2021); LHV: Lower Heating Values; Long-term refers to 2040 and 2050 according to different references."


id: 442d8e979536644565ac7fed6d487955
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8145
content:
"Table 6.8 | Efficiency and cost characteristics of electrolysis technologies for hydrogen production."


id: c02c0262a18a95776d37d58d98d020b4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27789
content:
"Source: a CSIRO 2021; b IEA 2020; c IRENA 2019; d Hydrogen Council 2020; e CCC 2018; f BEIS 2021; g IEA 2019; h Christensen 2020.\r\n* USD per GBP exchange rate: 0.72 (August 2021); +\r\n The cost of hydrogen production from electrolysers is highly dependent on the technology, source of electricity, and \r\noperating hours, and some values provided are based on the assumptions made in the references."


id: fc1344fc868cbc981c594dc5a7f2296
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37159
content:
"technologies (Afif et  al. 2016) could play a  major role in forming \r\na hydrogen and/or ammonia economy to support decarbonisation. \r\nHowever, there are serious concerns regarding the ability to safely \r\nuse ammonia for all these purposes, given its toxicity  - whereas \r\nhydrogen is not considered toxic."


id: 4e96225c57fe3e832cec2fcefdd67771
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9797
content:
"Hydrogen can even be produced by pyrolysis of methane (Sanchez\u0002Bastardo et al. 2020) - sometimes called 'turquoise' hydrogen, solar \r\nthermochemical water splitting, biological hydrogen production \r\n(cyanobacteria) (Velazquez Abad and Dodds 2017) - and microbes \r\nthat use light to make hydrogen (under research) (EIA 2020)."


id: ccb0d738e3d98e2658a42da8903f2db5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29740
content:
"Long-distance hydrogen transport. Hydrogen can allow regional \r\nintegration and better utilisation of low- or zero-carbon energy \r\nsources (Boxes 6.9 and 6.10). Hydrogen produced from renewables \r\nor other low-carbon sources in one location could be transported for \r\nuse elsewhere (Philibert 2017; Ameli et al. 2020). Depending on the \r\ndistance to the user and specific energy carrier utilised (e.g., gaseous \r\nhydrogen or LOHC), various hydrogen transport infrastructures, \r\ndistribution systems, and storage facilities would be required (Hansen \r\n2020; Schonauer and Glanz 2021) (Figure 6.17)."


id: fd7575aa4257328a0be6f9422c22943a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37393
content:
"Figure 6.17 | Hydrogen value chain. Hydrogen can be produced by various means and input and fuel sources. These processes have different emissions \r\nimplications. Hydrogen can be transported by various means and in various forms, and it can be stored in bulk for longer-term use. It also has multiple potential end uses. \r\nCHP: Combined heat and power."


id: 145fe64cc5239a4e0c9fa40019c539a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 715
content:
"low-pressure gas distribution pipes are being converted from iron to \r\nplastic (Committee on Climate Change 2018). In the Netherlands, an \r\nexisting low-pressure 12 km natural gas pipeline has been used for \r\ntransporting hydrogen (Dohi et al. 2016)."


id: a9b48f79ad7d7215f4c6ed4f744cf02c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24231
content:
"Intra-regional hydrogen transportation. Within a country or region, \r\nhydrogen would likely be pressurised and delivered as compressed \r\ngas. About three times as much compressed hydrogen by volume is \r\nrequired to supply the same amount of energy as natural gas. Security \r\nof supply is therefore more challenging in hydrogen networks than \r\nin natural gas networks. Storing hydrogen in pipelines (linepack) \r\nwould be important to maintaining security of supply (Ameli et  al. \r\n2017, 2019). Due to the physics of hydrogen, in most cases exiting \r\ngas infrastructure would need to be upgraded to transport hydrogen. \r\nTransporting hydrogen in medium- or high-pressure networks most \r\noften would require reinforcements in compressor stations and \r\npipeline construction routes (Dohi et al. 2016). There are several recent \r\nexamples of efforts to transport hydrogen by pipeline. For example, \r\nin the Iron Mains Replacement Programme in the UK, the existing "


id: 51a08ecdccb53e4f4b40fabe121709d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10299
content:
"To bypass gas infrastructure in transporting hydrogen, methane can \r\nbe transported using the existing gas infrastructure, while hydrogen \r\ncan be produced close to the demand centres. This approach will only \r\nmake sense if the methane is produced in a manner that captures \r\ncarbon from the atmosphere and/or if CCS is used when the methane \r\nis used to produce hydrogen."


id: d4e839551436fe45880706ff99d8fc8b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31025
content:
"Bulk hydrogen storage. Currently, hydrogen is stored in bulk in \r\nchemical processes such as metal and chemical hydrides as well as "


id: 94b107c4d4f1a610e309f47368bedd99
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20901
content:
"2021 that would connect 10 GW of PVs in the north of Australia \r\nvia a 4500 km 3 GW HVDC cable to Singapore, suggesting that this \r\nwould be cost effective (Sun Cable 2021). In September 2019, the \r\nChangji-Guquan +-1,100 kV UHVDC transmission project built by \r\nState Grid Corporation of China was officially completed and put \r\ninto operation. The transmission line is able to transmit up to 12 GW \r\nover 3341 km (Pei et al. 2020). This is the UHVDC transmission project \r\nwith the highest voltage level, the largest transmission capacity, and \r\nthe longest transmission distance in the world (Liu 2015)."


id: 20c89ff95a01b3bca1908df87321b51d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2595
content:
"in geologic caverns (Andersson and Gronkvist 2019; Caglayan et al. \r\n2019) (e.g.,  salt caverns operate in Sweden) (Elberry et  al. 2021). \r\nThere are still many challenges, however, due to salt or hard rock \r\ngeologies, large size, and minimum pressure requirements of the sites \r\n(IEA 2019c). Consequently, alternative carbon-free energy carriers, \r\nwhich store hydrogen, may become more attractive (Lan et al. 2012; \r\nKobayashi et al. 2019)."


id: 941ce145ba658096f118c1cf0e519d28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20811
content:
"Other technologies that could expand the size of transmission \r\ncorridors and/or improve the operational characteristics include low\u0002frequency AC transmission (LFAC) (Y. Tang et al. 2021; Xiang et al. \r\n2021) and half-wave AC transmission (HWACT) (Song et  al. 2018; \r\nXu et al. 2019). LFAC is technically feasible, but the circumstances \r\nin which it is the best economic choice compared to HVDC or \r\nHVAC still needs to be established (Xiang et  al. 2016). HWACT is \r\nrestricted to very long distances, and it has not been demonstrated \r\nin practice, so its feasibility is unproven. There are still a number of \r\ntechnological challenges for long-distance transmission networks \r\nsuch as protection systems for DC or hybrid AC-DC networks (Chaffey \r\n2016; Franck C. et al. 2017), improvement in cabling technology, and \r\nincluding the use of superconductors and nanocomposites (Ballarino \r\net al. 2016; Doukas 2019), which require advanced solutions."


id: aa7e4e44a74debc07e8dbfced7a3f86e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24356
content:
"Challenges, barriers, and recommendations. The main challenge \r\nto inter-regional transmission is the absence of appropriate market \r\ndesigns and regulatory and policy frameworks. In addition, there \r\nare commercial barriers for further enhancement of cross-border \r\ntransmission. The differing impacts of cross-border interconnections \r\non costs and revenues for generation companies in different regions \r\ncould delay the development of these interconnectors. It is not \r\nyet clear how the investment cost of interconnections should be \r\nallocated and recovered, although there is growing support for \r\nallocating costs in accordance with the benefits delivered to the \r\nmarket participants. Increased cross-border interconnection may \r\nalso require new business models which provide incentives for \r\ninvestment and efficient operation, manage risks and uncertainties, \r\nand facilitate coordinated planning and governance (Poudineh and \r\nRubino 2017)."


id: 9365ca03582884eaa72a1aff49e5e8ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20706
content:
"A number of studies have demonstrated the cost benefits of \r\ninterconnected grids in a range of geographical settings, including \r\nacross the USA (Bloom et  al. 2020), Europe (Newbery et  al. 2013; \r\nCluet et al. 2020), between Australia and parts of Asia (Halawa et al. \r\n2018), and broader global regions, for example between the Middle \r\nEast and Europe or North Africa and Europe (Tsoutsos et al. 2015). \r\nWhile there is growing interest in interconnection among different \r\nregions or continents, a broad range of geopolitical and socio-techno\u0002economic challenges would need to be overcome to support this \r\nlevel of international cooperation and large-scale network expansion \r\n(Bertsch et al. 2017; Palle 2021)."


id: d5dbec4de6fd7e30bda08cca868f690a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31161
content:
"Optimising the design and operation of the interconnected \r\ntransmission system, both onshore and offshore grids, also requires \r\nmore integrated economic and reliability approaches (Moreno et al. \r\n2012) to ensure the optimal balance between the economics and the \r\nprovision of system security while maximising the benefits of smart \r\nnetwork technologies."


id: 2c3e51332912636e494eb872920357b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4388
content:
"A wide range of factors, including generation profiles, demand \r\nprofiles circuit losses, reliability characteristics, and maintenance, as \r\nwell as the uncertainties around them will need to be considered in \r\ndesigning and operating long-distance transmission systems if they \r\nare to be widely deployed (Djapic et al. 2008; Du 2009; De Sa and Al \r\nZubaidy 2011; E3G 2021). Public support for extending transmission \r\nsystems will also be crucial, and studies indicate that such support is \r\nfrequently low (Vince 2010; Perlaviciute et al. 2018)."


id: aaafd52cf757ecd2c747609ce2b189c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:35
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24384
content:
"Status of electricity transmission technology. Long-distance \r\nelectricity transmission technologies are already available. High \r\nvoltage alternating current (HVAC), high-voltage direct current \r\n(HVDC), and ultra HVDC (UHVDC) technologies are well-established \r\nand widely used for bulk electricity transmission (Alassi et al. 2019). \r\nHVDC is used with underground cables or long-distance overhead \r\nlines (typically voltages between 100-800 kV) (Alassi et  al. 2019) \r\nwhere HVAC is infeasible or not economic. A project development \r\nagreement, worth approximately USD17 billion, was signed in January "


