# document

id: d490d5e5e88a715f7847e503f10f6d01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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" These investments \r\ncan often be similar in magnitude to that of replacing the installation, \r\nand they represent key points for intervention to reduce emissions. \r\nThe findings of this supplementary analysis are that around 40%, or \r\n60 GtCO2, could be avoided by 2050 if near-zero emissions options \r\nare available to replace this capacity, or units are retired, retrofitted \r\nor refurbished in a  way that significantly mitigates emissions \r\n(e.g., retrofitting carbon capture, or fuel or process switching to utilise \r\nbioenergy or low-carbon hydrogen)."


id: 8c3e084d3f54a9bb2deec5b788a141f8
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"In the past ten years there has been increasing interest and attention \r\nto industrial policy. One driver is the desire to retain industry or \r\nre-industrialise in regions within Europe and North America where \r\nindustry has a long record of declining shares of GDP. The need for \r\neconomic growth and poverty eradication is a key driver in developing \r\ncountries. An important aspect is the need to meet the 'dual challenge \r\nof creating wealth for a  growing population while staying within \r\nplanetary boundaries' (Altenburg and Assman 2017). The need for \r\nindustrial policy that supports environmental goals and green growth \r\nhas been analysed by Rodrik (2014); Aiginger (2014); Warwick (2013); \r\nand Busch et al. (2018). Similar ideas are taken up in OECD reports \r\non green growth (OECD 2011) and system innovation (OECD 2015)"


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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" \r\nHowever, these approaches to green industrial policy and innovation \r\ntend to focus on opportunities for manufacturing industries to \r\ndevelop through new markets for cleaner technologies. They rarely \r\ninclude explicit attention to the necessity of zero emissions and the \r\nprofound changes in production, use and recycling of basic materials \r\nthat this entails. This may also involve the phase-out or repurposing \r\nof industries that currently rely on fossil fuels and feedstock."


id: d977b5e373701c466ac91bf94d332a2a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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"The policy implications of zero emissions for heavy industries are \r\nrelatively unexplored, although some analyses in this direction \r\nare available (e.g., Ahman et al. 2017; Philibert 2017a; Wesseling \r\net al. 2017; Bataille et al. 2018a; Wyns et al. 2019; Bataille 2020a; \r\nFan and Friedmann 2021). For industry, there has been a long time \r\nfocus on energy efficiency policies through voluntary and negotiated \r\nagreements, energy management and audit schemes, and various \r\nprogrammes targeting industry (Fischedick et al. 2014a). Since AR5, \r\ninterest in circular economy policies has increased and they have \r\nbecome more prevalent across regions and countries, including \r\nthe EU, China, USA., Japan and Brazil (e.g., McDowall et al. 2017; \r\nRanta et al. 2018; Geng et al. 2019). For electrification and CCUS, \r\nefforts are nascent and mainly focused on technology development \r\nand demonstrations. Policies for demand reduction and materials \r\nefficiency are still relatively unexplored (e.g"


id: d2478e268f5bd588f665fe628f26fcc1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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", Pollitt et al. 2020 and \r\nIEA 2019b). Since zero emissions in industry is a  new governance \r\nchallenge it will be important to build awareness and institutional \r\ncapacity in industrialised as well as developing countries."


id: 9f8d9245eccd4f1f925e843df93defd6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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"Beyond the very direct links between energy and climate change, \r\nreliable, clean, and affordable energy (SDG 7) presents a  cross\u0002cutting issue, central to all SDGs and fundamental to development, \r\nand energy efficiency enables its provision by reducing the direct \r\nsupply and necessary infrastructure required. Energy efficiency \r\nimprovements can be delivered through multiple technical options \r\nand tested policies, delivering energy and resource savings \r\nsimultaneously with other socio-economic and environmental co\u0002benefits. At the macro level, this includes enhancement of energy \r\nsecurity (SDG 16, peace, justice and strong institutions) delivered \r\nthrough clean low-carbon energy systems (Fankhauser and Jotzo \r\n2018). Much of the literature, including Sari and Akkaya (2016), \r\nAllan et al"


id: 4af8295ccde4b9f541ab1fdd352f21e4
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" (2017) and Garrett-Peltier (2017), points out that energy \r\nefficiency improvements deliver superior employment opportunities \r\n(SDG 8 - decent work and economic growth), while a limited number \r\nof studies have reported that it can negatively impact employment in \r\nfuel supply sectors (Costantini et al. 2018)."


id: 48d397cf0aa939b23d8fe61e1f888b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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"Industrial decarbonisation is technically possible on the mid\u0002century horizon, but requires scale up of technology development \r\nand deployment, multi-institutional coordination, and sectoral and \r\nnational industrial policies with detailed subsectoral and regional \r\nmitigation pathways and transparent monitoring and evaluation \r\nprocesses (Ahman et al. 2017; Wesseling et al. 2017; Bataille \r\net al. 2018a; Rissman et al. 2020; Nilsson et al. 2021). Transitions of \r\nindustrial systems entail innovations, plant and technology phase\u0002outs, changes across and within existing value chains, new sectoral \r\ncouplings, and large investments in enabling electricity, hydrogen, \r\nand other infrastructures"


id: 21bcb3ea118e560721de4a51b51633da
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" Low-carbon transitions are likely to be \r\ncontested, non-linear and require a  multi-level perspective policy \r\napproach that addresses a  large spectrum of social, political, \r\ncultural and technical changes as well as accompanying phase-out \r\npolicies, and involve a wide range of actors, including civil society \r\ngroups, local authorities, labour unions and industry associations \r\ne(Geels et al. 2017; Rogge and Johnstone 2017; Yamada and Tanaka \r\n2019; Koasidis et al. 2020). See also Cross-Chapter Box 12."


id: 90a621efbf6c5d2f6519a9ea230e3eb5
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"Materials efficiency and circular economy are not well understood \r\nfrom a policy perspective and were for a long time neglected in low\u0002GHG industry roadmaps although they may represent significant \r\npotential (Allwood et al. 2011; Gonzalez Hernandez et al. 2018b; IEA \r\n2019b, 2020a; Calisto Friant et al. 2021; Polverini 2021). Material \r\nefficiency is also neglected in products design, architectural and civil \r\nengineering education, infrastructure and building codes, and \r\nurban planning (Section  5.6) (Braun et al. 2018; Orr et al. 2019). \r\nFor example, the overuse of steel and concrete in construction is \r\nwell documented but policies or strategies (e.g., design guidelines \r\nor regulation) for improving the situation are lacking (Dunant et al. \r\n2018; Shanks et al. 2019)"


id: 4316ce1b16bd12ef22ad72140780ab98
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" Various circular economy solutions are \r\ngaining interest from policymakers with examples such as regulations \r\nand economic incentives for repair and reuse, initiatives to reduce \r\nplanned obsolescence, and setting targets for recycling. Barriers that \r\npolicies need to address are often specific to the different material \r\nloops (e.g., copper contamination for steel and lack of technologies \r\nor poor economics for plastics)."


id: 48a77dd4f467c85b61c453907ed1610e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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"Assessments of pricing mechanisms show generally that they lead \r\nto reduced emissions, even in sectors that receive free allocation \r\nsuch as industry (Martin et al. 2016; Haites et al. 2018; Narassimhan \r\net al. 2018; Metcalf 2019; Bayer and Aklin 2020). However, questions \r\nremain as to whether these schemes can bring emissions down fast \r\nenough to reach the Paris Agreement goals (Boyce 2018; Tvinnereim \r\nand Mehling 2018; World Bank Group 2019). Most carbon prices \r\nare well below the levels needed to motivate investments in \r\nhigh-cost options that are needed to reach net zero emissions \r\n(Section 11.4.1.5). Among the 64 carbon-price schemes implemented \r\nworldwide today, only nine have carbon prices above USD40 (World \r\nBank 2020). These are all based in Europe and include EU Emissions \r\nTrading System (ETS) (above USD40 since March 2021), Switzerland \r\nETS, and seven countries with carbon taxes"


id: 9e86b1ea155ba27d840043db93cf75e9
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" Furthermore, emissions\u0002intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries are typically allowed \r\nexemptions and receive provisions that shelter them from any \r\nsignificant cost increase in virtually all pricing schemes (Haites 2018). \r\nThese provisions have been allocated due to concerns about loss of \r\ncompetitiveness and carbon leakage which result from relocation and \r\nincreased imports from jurisdictions with no, or weak, GHG emission \r\nregulations (Branger and Quirion 2014a; Branger and Quirion 2014b; \r\nJakob 2021a). Embodied emissions in international trade accounts \r\nfor one quarter of global CO2 emissions in 2015 (Moran et al. \r\n2018) and has increased significantly over the past few decades, \r\nrepresenting a  significant challenge to competitiveness related to \r\nclimate policy. CBAM, or CBA are trade-based mechanisms designed \r\nto 'equalise' the carbon costs for domestic and foreign producers. \r\nThey are increasingly being considered by policymakers to address "


id: d72acd875803bac736a0cbff52e7fbd0
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"minimise the incentives for downstream carbon abatement due to \r\nthe imperfect pass through of carbon costs and therefore overlook \r\ndemand-side solutions such as material efficiency (Skelton and \r\nAllwood 2017; Baker 2018). An alternative approach is to set the \r\ncarbon pricing downstream on the consumption of carbon-intensive \r\nmaterials, whether they are imported or produced locally (Neuhoff \r\net al. 2015, 2019; Munnings et al. 2019). However, implementation \r\nof consumption-based GHG pricing is also challenged by the need \r\nof product GHG traceability and enforcement transaction costs \r\n(Jakob et al. 2014; Munnings et al. 2019). Hybrid approaches are \r\nalso considered (Neuhoff et al. 2015; Bataille et al. 2018a; Jakob \r\net al. 2021)"


id: 5cf19fd6b97c977130d0755d47c13c0f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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" The efficacy of GHG prices to achieve major industry \r\ndecarbonisation has been challenged by additional real world \r\nimplementation problems, such as highly regionally fragmented \r\nGHG markets (Boyce 2018; Tvinnereim and Mehling 2018) and the \r\ndifficult social acceptance of price increases (Bailey et al. 2012; \r\nRaymond 2019). The higher GHG prices likely needed to incentivise \r\nindustry to adopt low-GHG solutions pose social equity issues \r\nand resistance (Grainger and Kolstad 2010; Bataille et al. 2018b; \r\nHourcade et al. 2018; Huang et al. 2019b; Wang et al. 2019). GHG \r\npricing is also associated with promoting mainly incremental low\u0002cost options and not investments in radical technical change or \r\nthe transformation of socio-technical systems (Grubb et al. 2014; \r\nVogt-Schilb et al. 2018; Stiglitz 2019; Rosenbloom et al. 2020)"


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" \r\nTransparent and strategic management of cap-and-trade proceeds \r\ntoward inclusive decarbonisation transition that support high \r\nabatement cost options can contribute toward easing these \r\nshortcomings (Carl and Fedor 2016; Raymond 2019). In California, \r\nSenate Bill 535 (De  Leon, Statutes of 2012) require that at least \r\na quarter of the proceeds go to projects that provide a benefit to \r\ndisadvantaged communities (California Climate Investments 2020)."


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"carbon leakage and create a level playing field for products produced \r\nin jurisdiction with no, or lower, carbon price (Mehling et al. 2019; \r\nMarkkanen et al. 2021). On 14 July 2021, the European Commission \r\nadopted a proposal for a CBAM that requires importers of aluminium, \r\ncement, iron and steel, electricity and fertiliser to buy certificates at \r\nthe ETS price for the emissions embedded in the imported products \r\n(European Commission 2021; Morsdorf 2021). CBAMs should be \r\ncrafted very carefully, to meet technical and legal challenges (Jakob \r\net al. 2014; Sakai and Barrett 2016; Rocchi et al. 2018; Cosbey et al. \r\n2019; Joltreau and Sommerfeld 2019; Pyrka et al. 2020). Technical \r\nchallenges arise because estimating the price adjustment requires \r\nreliable data on the GHG content of products imported as well as \r\na  clear understanding of the climate policy implications from the \r\ncountries of imports"


id: ab5a5d4814c50a38e13be011a1c3502e
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" Application of pricing tools in industry requires \r\nstandardisation (benchmarking) of carbon-intensity assessments at \r\nproducts, installations, enterprises, countries, regions, and the global \r\nlevel. The limited number of existing benchmarking systems are not \r\nyet harmonised and thus not able to fulfill this function effectively. \r\nThis limits the scope of products that can potentially be covered by \r\nCBAM-type policies (Bashmakov et al. 2021a)."


id: 33a071ac49bda3e9a39599437b503252
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"(iii) GHG pricing or regulations with competitiveness provisions to trigger \r\ninnovation and systemic GHG reduction; (iv) long-run, low-cost finance \r\nmechanisms to enable investment and reduce risk; (v) infrastructure \r\nplanning and construction (e.g. CO2 transport and disposal, electricity \r\nand hydrogen transmission and storage), and institutional support \r\n(e.g., labour market training and transition support; electricity market \r\nreform). Wesseling et al. (2017b) and (Bataille et al. 2018a) further \r\nadd a  step to conduct ongoing stakeholder engagements, including \r\nstakeholders with effective 'veto' power (i.e., firms, unions, government, \r\ncommunities, indigenous groups), to share and gather information, \r\neducate, debate, and build consensus for a robust, politically resilient \r\npolicy package. This engagement of stakeholders can also bring on \r\nnew supply chain collaborations and bridge the cost pass-through \r\nchallenge (e.g"


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",  the Swedish HYBRIT steel project, or the ELYSIS \r\nconsortium, with plans to bring fully commercialised inert electrodes \r\nfor bauxite electrolysis to market by 2024)."


id: 427ce610f7d1ffe7a39f858ea27afcf
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"Governments have traditionally used voluntary agreements \r\nor mandatory energy or emission reduction targets to achieve \r\nemission reduction for specific emission-intensive sectors (e.g., UK \r\nClimate Change Agreements; India Performance, Achieve and Trade \r\nscheme). Sector visions, roadmaps and pathways combined with \r\na  larger context of socio-economic goals, with clear objectives \r\nand policy direction, are needed for every industrial sector to \r\nachieve decarbonisation and at the time of writing they are \r\nemerging for some sectors. Grillitsch et al. (2019b) working from \r\nthe socio-technical transitions literature, focuses on the need \r\nfor maintaining 'directionality' for innovation (e.g.,  towards net \r\nzero transformation), the capacity for iterative technological \r\nand policy 'experimentation' and learning, 'demand articulation' \r\n(e.g., engagement of material efficiency and high value circularity), \r\nand 'policy coordination' as four main framing challenges"


id: 781b294eb193dbac8673eda89977c5eb
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" Wesseling \r\net al. (2017b) bridges from the socio-technical transitions literature \r\nto a  world more recognisable by executives and engineers, \r\ncomposed of structural components that include actors (e.g., firms, \r\ntrade associations, government, research organisations, consumers, \r\netc.), institutions (e.g., legal structures, norms, values and formal \r\npolicies or regulations), technologies (e.g., facilities, infrastructure) \r\nand system interactions."


id: 1aeb2f7c133137bf59591e13c733ad5e
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"Applied research is relatively inexpensive compared to piloting, \r\ndemonstrations, and early commercialisation, and arguably a lot of it \r\nhas already been done for the key technologies that need to climb the \r\ntechnology readiness ladder (see Table 11.3). This includes electricity \r\nand hydrogen-based processes, electro-thermal technologies, high\u0002temperature heat pumps, catalysis, lightweight building construction, \r\nlow embodied carbon construction materials, etc. Demonstration to \r\nmarket strategies can be particularly successful when the complete \r\nsupply chain is considered. A  prominent example of such an \r\nintegrated supply chain approach is the UK Offshore Wind Accelerator \r\nProject"


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" Coordinated by the UK Carbon Trust and working with wind \r\nturbine manufacturers, the project looked across the potential supply \r\nchain for floating offshore wind and identified what components \r\nmanufacturers could innovate and produce by themselves, and where \r\nthere were gaps beyond the capability of any one firm. This process \r\nled to several key areas of work where the government and firms \r\ncould work together; once the concepts were piloted and proven, \r\nthe firms went back into a competitive mode. The project illustrates \r\nthe potential importance of third parties, including government, in \r\ncreating platforms and opportunities for cross-industry exchange and \r\ncollaboration (Tonjes et al. 2020)."


id: a6eb7bb6ecf366e15a63bba634e07f78
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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"Investing in RDI for low-GHG process emissions is risky and \r\nuncompetitive in the absence of convincing climate policy. Research \r\ninvestment should be guided by assessing options, technology \r\nreadiness levels, and roadmaps towards technology demonstration \r\nand commercialisation. The potential GHG and environmental \r\nimplications need to be assessed early on to assess the sustainability \r\nimplications and to direct research needs (Yao and Masanet 2018; \r\nZimmerman et al. 2020). Strategic areas for RDI can be focused on \r\na set of possible process options for producing basic materials using \r\nfossil-free energy and feedstock, or CCU and CCS (Sections 11.3.5 \r\nand 11.3.6)"


id: 9df3b4d5ca173ed357665662be798542
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" Policies to enhance RDI include public funding for \r\napplied research, technological and business model experimentation, \r\npilot and demonstration projects, as well as support for education \r\nand training - which further have the positive side effect of leading \r\nto spill-overs and network effects through labour market mobility \r\nand collaboration (Nemet et al. 2018). Innovative business models \r\nwill not emerge if the transition is not considered along the full \r\nvalue chain with a  focus on materials efficiency, circularity, and \r\nnew roles for industry in a  transitioning energy system, including \r\npossibly providing demand response for electricity through designed\u0002in flexibility, for example, by combining electrolysis hydrogen \r\nproduction with substantial storage (Vogl et al. 2018)."


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"Pilot and demonstration projects funded through public-private \r\npartnerships contributes to risk mitigation for industries and helps \r\ninform on the feasibility, performance, costs and environmental \r\nimpacts of decarbonisation technologies. Most countries already \r\nmaintain government research and deployment programs. For \r\nexample, Horizon Europe has a  total budget of 95.5 billion EUR \r\n(USD117 billion) for 2021-2027, of which 30% will be directed \r\nto green technology research. The EU has conducted several \r\ndemonstration projects for emission-intensive industries, such as \r\nthe Ultra-Low Carbon Steel (ULCOS) project (Abdul Quader et al. \r\n2016), which led to several small-scale pilots that are now going \r\nto larger-scale firm pilots (e.g.,  HISARNA, HYBRIT and SIDERWIN)"


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" \r\nSupported by the EU, several cement firms are working together on \r\nthe cement LEILAC project, where a new form of limestone calciner \r\nis being developed to concentrate the process CO2 emerging from \r\nquicklime production (about 60% of cement emissions) for eventual \r\nutilisation or geological storage (as one of many options for cement, \r\nsee for example, Plaza et al. 2020). If LEILAC works, it is conceivable \r\nthat existing cement plants globally that are located near CCS \r\nopportunities could have their emissions reduced by 60% with one \r\nmajor retrofit of the kiln."


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"11.6.4.1 Public Procurement\r\nGovernments spend a large portion of their budget on the provision \r\nof products and material through infrastructure development, general \r\nequipment, and miscellaneous goods. The OECD estimates that an \r\naverage of 30% of general government expenditure goes to public \r\nprocurements in OECD countries, representing 12.6% of GDP, which \r\nmakes government a  powerful market actor (OECD 2021). Public \r\nprocurement can therefore create a significant market pull and be \r\nused to pursue strategic environmental goals (Ghisetti 2017). Local, \r\nregional and national authorities can use their purchasing power \r\nto create niche markets and to guarantee demand for low-GHG \r\nproducts and material (Wesseling and Edquist 2018; Muslemani et al. \r\n2021)"


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" In some cases, governments will have to adapt government \r\nprocurement policies that are not well suited for the procurement \r\nof products and services that focus on the decarbonisation benefits \r\nand longer-term procurement commitments of emissions-reducing \r\ntechnologies and projects (Ghisetti 2017). Implementation can \r\nbe challenged by the complexity of criteria, the lack of credible \r\ninformation to check GHG intensities and the added time needed \r\nfor selection (Geng and Doberstein 2008; Testa et al. 2012; Bratt \r\net al. 2013; Zhu et al. 2013; Cheng et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2019b). To \r\nease these hurdles, the EU commission has developed environmental \r\ncriteria that can be directly inserted in tender documents (Igarashi \r\net al. 2015; European Commission 2016). These criteria are voluntary, \r\nand the extent of their application varies across public authorities \r\n(Michelsen and de Boer 2009; Bratt et al. 2013; Testa et al. 2016)"


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" In \r\nthe Netherlands, companies achieving a desirable certification level \r\nunder the national CO2 Performance Ladder obtain a  competitive \r\nadvantage in public procurement (Rietbergen and Blok 2013; \r\nRietbergen et al. 2015). Globally, many countries have implemented \r\ngreen product procurement or sustainable procurement following \r\nSustainable Development Goal (SDG) 12 - 'Responsible consumption \r\nand production' (UNEP 2017). Public procurement is also developing \r\nat sub-national levels. For example, the state of California in the \r\nUnited States of America passed the Buy Clean California Act (AB 262) \r\nthat establishes maximum acceptable global warming potentials for \r\neligible steel and glass construction materials for public procurement \r\n(USGBC-LA 2018) (Box 11.4)."


id: 637ba78dbdbe017e57cafb50f171f2de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13223
content:
"The number of companies producing sustainability reports has \r\nincreased rapidly over the last decade (Jackson and Belkhir 2018) and \r\nso has the number of pledges to carbon neutrality announced. This \r\ntrend has mainly been driven by consumer concerns, investor requests, \r\nand as a business strategy to gain a competitive advantage (Higgins \r\nand Coffey 2016; Ibanez-Fores et al. 2016; Koberg and Longoni 2019). \r\nFor example, Apple and the governments of Quebec and Canada are \r\nthe financier and lead market maker in the Elysis consortium to bring \r\ninert electrodes to market for bauxite smelting to make zero-GHG \r\naluminium. Aluminium is a very small fraction of the cost of a laptop \r\nor smartphone, so even expensive low-emissions aluminium adds to \r\nApple's brand at very little cost per unit sold. Some countries are also \r\nrequiring corporate to report their emissions"


id: efa3cfaba3bcb00a77fe73875ec4b7ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35204
content:
" For example, the French \r\ngovernment requires companies with 500 or more employees and \r\nfinancial institutions to report Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) \r\nand disclose publicly Scope 1  (direct emissions), Scope 2  (indirect \r\nemissions from purchased electricity) and Scope 3 (emissions from \r\nsupply chain impacts and consumer usage and end-of-life recycling \r\npractices) emissions (Mason et al. 2016)."


id: 21bb0d26a17420a75175c39223e27a52
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2737
content:
"Construction of buildings represented 11% of energy and process\u0002related CO2 emissions globally in 2018 (IEA and UNEP 2019). The \r\nshare of embodied emissions in construction is increasing as building \r\nenergy efficiency is improving and energy supply is decarbonised \r\n(Chastas et al. 2016). As a  result, jurisdictions are increasingly \r\nconsidering new requirements in building codes to reduce embodied \r\nemissions. This is the case of France's new building code which is \r\nshifting from a  thermal regulation (RT 2012) to an environmental \r\nregulation (RE 2020) to include embodied GHG LCA metrics for \r\nencouraging use of low-GHG building materials (Ministere de \r\nla Transition ecologique et solidaire 2018; Schwarz et al. 2020)"


id: 4416caf564a3be1df702cbd15d24fcee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8127
content:
" \r\nThe 2018 International Green Construction Code (IGCC) provides \r\ntechnical requirements that can be adopted by jurisdictions for \r\nencouraging low-GHG building construction, which also covers \r\nminimum longevity and durability of structural, building envelope, \r\nand hardscape materials (Art. 1001.3.2.3) (Celadyn 2014). Low-GHG \r\nbuilding rating systems, such as LEEDs, are voluntary standards which \r\ninclude specific requirements on material resources in their rating \r\nscale. Trade-offs between energy performance achievement and \r\nmaterial used in building construction needs to be further assessed \r\nand considered as low-GHG building code requirements develop. \r\nLocal governments can also lead the way by adopting standards \r\nfor construction"


id: 7aadfed01068f52116962b6bba5625f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16880
content:
" This is the case of the county of Marin in California \r\nwhich specifies maximum embodied carbon in kgCO2-eq m-3 and \r\nmaximum ordinary Portland cement content in lbs/yd3\r\n for different \r\nlevels of concrete compressive strength (Marin County 2021)."


id: 8519377b03e2ad461ecdcaa35fd2c46a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18469
content:
"The development of GHG labels corresponds to a growing demand \r\nfrom consumers desiring information about the climate impacts of \r\ntheir consumption (Darnall et al. 2012; Tan et al. 2014; Feucht and \r\nZander 2018). GHG labels fill this information gap by empowering \r\nconsumers' purchasing decisions and creating higher value for \r\nlow-GHG products and materials (Vanclay et al. 2011; Cohen and \r\nVandenbergh 2012). The willingness to pay for lower-GHG products \r\nhas been found to be positive but to depend on socio-economic \r\nconsumer characteristics, cultural preferences and the product \r\nconsidered (Shuai et al. 2014; de-Magistris and Gracia 2016; Tait \r\net al. 2016; Li et al. 2017; Feucht and Zander 2018)"


id: 5958eee9735d17a5098536ed2c3514d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11546
content:
" Companies and \r\ngovernments that favour low-GHG products and who are seeking to \r\nachieve environmental, social, and governance (ESG) goals also need \r\nreadily available and reliable information about the GHG content of \r\nproducts and materials they purchase and produce (Long and Young \r\n2016; Munasinghe et al. 2016)."


id: 8106090b4ba89042070536952972eedf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17824
content:
"Numerous methodologies have been developed by public and \r\nprivate organisations to meet the needs for credible and comparable \r\nenvironmental metrics at the product and organisation levels. Most \r\nfollow lifecycle assessment standards as described in ISO 14040 and \r\nISO 14044, ISO 14067 for climate change footprint only and ISO 14025 \r\n(2006) for environmental product declarations (EPD), but the way \r\nsystem boundaries are applied in practice varies (Wu et al. 2014; Liu \r\net al. 2016). Adoption has been challenged by the complexity and the \r\nprofusion of applications which contribute to confuse stakeholders \r\n(Gadema and Oglethorpe 2011; Guenther et al. 2012; Brecard 2014). \r\nThe options of applying different system boundaries and allocation \r\nprinciples involve value judgements that in turn influence the results \r\n(Tanaka 2008; Finnveden et al. 2009; McManus et al. 2015; Overland \r\n2019)"


id: 638f0faa4d3d4d876ed047bf177a232b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13235
content:
" A  more systematic and coordinated international approach \r\nbased on transparent and reliable data and methodologies is needed \r\nto induce global low-GHG market development (Pandey et al. 2011; \r\nDarnall et al. 2012; Tan et al. 2014)."


id: 58254bbef9d2172c7a3469b42350e85a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11374
content:
"Based on how feed-in-tariffs worked, a  contract for difference \r\n(CfD) could guarantee a  minimum and higher-than-market price \r\nfor a given volume of early low-GHG materials. CfDs could be based \r\non a minimum effective GHG price reflecting parity with the costs of \r\ncurrent higher-emitting technologies, or directly on the higher base \r\ncapital and operating costs for a  lower-GHG material (Richstein \r\n2017; Chiappinelli et al. 2019; Sartor and Bataille 2019; Vogl \r\net al. 2021a). CfDs can also be offered through low-GHG material \r\nprocurement where an agreed price offsets the incremental cost \r\nof buying low-GHG content product or material. Private firms, by \r\nthemselves or collectively, can also guarantee a higher than market \r\nprice for low-GHG materials from their supplier for marketing \r\npurposes (Bataille et al. 2018a; Bataille 2020a)"


id: f46813fb27971428e746c4fda44c44ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 35955
content:
" Reverse auctions \r\n(by which the lowest bidder gets the production subsidy) for low\u0002GHG materials is also an option but it remains to be analysed \r\nand explored. While these financial incentive schemes have been \r\nimplemented for renewable energy, their application to incentivise \r\nand support low-GHG material production have yet to be developed \r\nand implemented. The German government is currently developing \r\na draft law which will allow companies that commit to cut GHG \r\nemissions by more than half using innovative technologies to bid for \r\n10-year CfDs with a guaranteed price for low-carbon steel, chemical \r\nand cement products (Agora Energiewende and Wuppertal Institut \r\n2019; BMU 2021)."


id: eecf86cc4c78d893e4c27171f4bb99cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35041
content:
"While the economic value of some discarded materials such as steel, \r\npaper and aluminium is generally high enough to justify the cost \r\nand efforts of recycling, at current rates of 85%, above 60%, and \r\n43%, respectively (Graedel et al. 2011; Cullen and Allwood 2013), \r\nothers like plastic or concrete have a much lower re-circularity value \r\n(Graedel et al. 2011). Most plastic waste ends up in landfills or \r\ndumped in the environment, with 9% recycled and 12% incinerated \r\nglobally (Geyer et al. 2017; UNEP 2018). Collected waste plastics \r\nfrom OECD countries were largely exported to China until a ban in \r\n2018 required OECD countries to review their practices (Qu et al. \r\n2019). EPR schemes may thus need to be strengthened to actually \r\nachieve a  reduced use of virgin GHG-intensive materials. The \r\npotential for re-circularity of unreacted cement and aggregates in \r\nconcrete is increasing as new standards and requirement develops"


id: 57a260452cf95ebcd2652832c8d3c89a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11287
content:
" \r\nFor example, concrete fines are now standardised as a new cement \r\nconstituent in the European standardisation CEN/TC 51 - 'cements \r\nand construction limes'."


id: 2409b7016acc3d48f02d46918a134c10
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3113
content:
"It is important that government bodies, academia and other \r\nactors strengthen their knowledge and capacities for the broad \r\ntransformational changes envisioned for industry. In Japan, industry \r\nhas been voluntarily working on GHG reduction, under the Framework \r\nof Keidanren's Commitment to a  Low-carbon Society since 2009. \r\nGovernment and scientific experts regularly review their commitments \r\nand discuss results, monitoring methods, and reconsidering goals. \r\nIndustry federations/associations can obtain advice in the follow\u0002up meetings from other industries and academics. The energy and \r\ntransport sectors have decades of building institutions and expertise, \r\nwhereas industrial decarbonisation is largely a new policy domain. \r\nMost countries have experience in energy efficiency policies, some \r\nareas of research and innovation, waste management, regulations \r\nfor operational permits and pollution control, worker safety and \r\nperhaps fuel switching"


id: 2e68a38b726992ce0a7b7eec59079e25
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4745
content:
" There is less experience with market demand \r\npull policies although low-GHG public procurement is increasingly \r\nbeing tested. Circular economy policies are evolving but potential \r\npolicies for managing material demand growth are less understood. \r\nMaterial efficiency policies through, for example, product standards \r\nor regulation against planned obsolescence are nascent but relatively \r\nunexplored (Gonzalez Hernandez et al. 2018a)."


id: 657db2f977453f8d19fb01e9e2a7dcd1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13543
content:
"While all climate policy requires topic-specific adaptive governance \r\nfor long-term effectiveness (Mathy et al. 2016), deep decarbonisation \r\nof heavy industry has special governance challenges, different from \r\nthose for the electricity, transport or buildings sectors (Ahman et al. \r\n2017; Wesseling et al. 2017; Bataille et al. 2018a). Competition is \r\nstrong, investments are rare, capital intensive and very 'lumpy'. In an \r\natmosphere where transformative innovation is required the process \r\nis very capital-focused with non-diversifiable risks unless several \r\ncompanies are involved. There are significant infrastructure needs for \r\nelectricity, hydrogen, and CCS and CCU. Given there is no 'natural' \r\nmarket for low-emissions materials, there is a  need to manage \r\nboth the supply and demand sides of the market, especially in early \r\nphase through lead supplier and markets"


id: c1a25e7ce8ada72031d6c058570a9d2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28052
content:
" Finally, there is a very high \r\nprobability of surprises and substantial learning, which could affect \r\npolicy choice, direction, and stringency."


id: 18a8b6d241b7d4a6d64fe1668ebafa4e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1374
content:
"Depending on what mixes of deep decarbonisation strategies are \r\nfollowed in a given region (e.g., material efficiency, electrification, \r\nhydrogen, biomass, CCU and CCS), infrastructure will need to be \r\nplanned, financed and constructed. The UKCCC Net Zero Technical \r\nReport describes the infrastructure needs for achieving net zero \r\nGHG in the UK by 2050 for every sector of the economy (UKCCC \r\n2019b). Transportation would be facilitated with pipelines or ships \r\nto allow transfer of captured CO2 for utilisation and disposal, and \r\nassociated institutional frameworks (IEAGHG 2021). Electrification \r\nwill require market design and transmission to support increased \r\ngeneration, transmission, and flexible demand. Hydrogen, CCU, and \r\nCCS will require significant new or adapted infrastructure"


id: 25e027102d0315126a477869c5562946
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3382
content:
" Hydrogen \r\nand CO2 pipelines, and expanded electricity transmission, have \r\nnatural monopoly characteristics which are normally governed and \r\nplanned by national and regional grid operators and their regulators. \r\nIndustrial clustering (also known as eco-parks), such as those \r\nplanned in Rotterdam (Netherlands) and Teeside (UK), would allow \r\nmore physical and cost-effective sharing of electricity, CCU, CCS, \r\nand hydrogen infrastructure but is dependent on physical planning, \r\npermitting, and infrastructure policies."


id: 1775ba829d41d2017ef080fc85998bcb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1196
content:
"Industry has a  diverse set of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission sources across subsectors. To decarbonise industry requires that \r\nwe pursue several options simultaneously. These include energy efficiency, materials demand management, improving materials \r\nefficiency, more circular material flows, electrification, as well as carbon capture and utilisation (CCU) and carbon capture and \r\nstorage (CCS). Improved materials efficiency and recycling reduces the need for primary resource extraction and the energy-intensive \r\nprimary processing steps. Future recycling may include chemical recycling of plastics if quality requirements make mechanical \r\nrecycling difficult. One approach, albeit energy intensive, is to break down waste plastics to produce new monomer building blocks, \r\npotentially based on biogenic carbon and hydrogen instead of fossil feedstock. Hydrogen can also be used as a reduction agent \r\ninstead of coke and coal in ironmaking"


id: 4be735b766095300f73e7aafd11b4be0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9364
content:
" Process emissions from cement production can be captured and stored or used as feedstock \r\nfor chemicals and materials. Electricity and hydrogen needs can be very large but the potential for renewable electricity, possibly in \r\ncombination with other low carbon options, is not a limiting factor."


id: 4c210968d1bf416d02c797bce83ef3c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9400
content:
"In most cases and in early stages of deployment, decarbonisation through electrification or CCS will make the primary production \r\nof basic materials such as cement, steel, or polyethylene more expensive. However, demand management, energy and materials \r\nefficiency, and more circular material flows can dampen the effect of such cost increases. In addition, the cost of energy-intensive \r\nmaterials is typically a very small part of the total price of products, such as an appliance, a bottle of soda or a building, so the effect \r\non consumers is very small. Getting actors to pay more for zero-emission materials is a challenge in supply chains with a strong focus \r\non competitiveness and cutting costs, but it is not a significant problem for the broader economy. Reduced demand for services such \r\nas square metres of living space or kilometres of car travel is an option where material living standards are already high"


id: 38dcfb485e7f85ebd622d89543b97b7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6317
content:
" If material \r\nliving standards are very low, increased material use is often needed for more sustainable development. The options of materials \r\nand energy efficiency, and more circular material flows, generally have synergies with sustainable development. Increased use of \r\nelectricity, hydrogen, CCU and CCS may have both positive and negative implications for sustainable development and thus require \r\ncareful assessment and implementation for different contexts."


id: dc595d36a7ba7076c1d48b7c69819562
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32174
content:
"Broad and sequential policy strategies for industrial development and decarbonisation that pursue several mitigation options at\r\nthe same time are more likely to result in resource-efficient and cost-effective emission reductions. Industrial decarbonisation is \r\na relatively new field and thus building capacity for industrial transition governance is motivated. For example, policy to support \r\nmaterials efficiency or fundamental technology shifts in primary processes is less developed than energy efficiency policy and carbon \r\npricing. Based on shared visions or pathways for a zero-emission industry, industrial policy needs to support development of new \r\ntechnologies and solutions as well as market creation for low- and zero-emission materials and products"


id: eca53d428daf3964ebd0526ffcc2c3fd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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vector_id: 34707
content:
" This implies coordination \r\nacross several policy domains including research and innovation, waste and recycling, product standards, digitalisation, taxes, \r\nregional development, infrastructure, public procurement, permit procedures and more to make the transition to a carbon neutral \r\nindustry. International competition means that trade rules must be evolved to not conflict with industrial decarbonisation. Some \r\nlocal and regional economies may be disadvantaged from the transition which can motivate re-education and other support."


id: d50fa25c95014c7bd2819c8fe223b986
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31052
content:
"Alaa Al Khourdajie (United Kingdom/Syria), Almut Arneth (Germany), Ines Margarida Lima \r\nde Azevedo (Portugal/the United States of America), Christopher Bataille (Canada), David \r\nBeerling (United  Kingdom), Rachel  Bezner Kerr (the United States of America/Canada), Jessie \r\nBradley (the  Netherlands), Holly  Jean  Buck (the United States of America), Luisa F.  Cabeza \r\n(Spain), Katherine Calvin (the  United States of America), Donovan Campbell (Jamaica), \r\nJofre  Carnicer Cols (Spain), Vassilis  Daioglou (Greece), Mathijs  Harmsen (the Netherlands), \r\nLena  Hoglund-Isaksson (Sweden), Joanna I"


id: cea07d09119df6591c5a797ab33a1d52
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30053
content:
"  House (United  Kingdom), David Keller (Germany/\r\nthe United States of America), Kiane de Kleijne (the Netherlands), Susanna Kugelberg (Sweden), \r\nIgor Makarov (the Russian Federation), Francisco Meza (Chile), Jan Christoph Minx (Germany), \r\nMichael  Morecroft (United Kingdom), Gert-Jan  Nabuurs (the  Netherlands), Henry Neufeldt \r\n(Denmark/Germany), Aleksandra Novikova (Germany/the Russian Federation), Sudarmanto Budi \r\nNugroho (Indonesia), Andreas Oschlies (Germany), Camille Parmesan (United Kingdom/the United \r\nStates of America), Glen  P.  Peters (Norway/Australia), Joseph  Poore (United Kingdom), Joana \r\nPortugal-Pereira (Brazil), Julio  C.  Postigo (the  United States of America/Peru), Prajal Pradhan \r\n(Germany/Nepal), Phil Renforth (United Kingdom), Marta G. Rivera-Ferre (Spain), Stephanie Roe \r\n(the Philippines/the United States of America), Pramod K. Singh (India), Raphael Slade (United \r\nKingdom), Stephen M"


id: c3519363c4e23340e00b87659fa299b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:49
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28296
content:
"Diets high in plant protein and low in meat and dairy are \r\nassociated with lower GHG emissions (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement). Ruminant meat shows the highest GHG intensity. Beef \r\nfrom dairy systems has lower emissions intensity than beef from beef \r\nherds (8-23 and 17-94  kgCO2-eq per 100 g  protein, respectively) \r\nwhen a share of emissions is allocated to dairy products. The wide \r\nvariation in emissions reflects differences in production systems, \r\nwhich range from intensive feedlots with stock raised largely on \r\ngrains through to rangeland and transhumance production systems. \r\nWhere appropriate, a  shift to diets with a  higher share of plant \r\nprotein, moderate intake of animal-source foods and reduced intake \r\nof added sugars, salt and saturated fats could lead to substantial \r\ndecreases in GHG emissions"


id: 93cecd32ba25e254a475fde64dd7634
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20766
content:
" Benefits would also include reduced \r\nland occupation and nutrient losses to the surrounding environment, \r\nwhile at the same time providing health benefits and reducing \r\nmortality from diet-related non-communicable diseases. {7.4.5, 12.4}"


id: 61c733cabcc69d3a16b0b0f5084ebecf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12952
content:
"Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is a  necessary element to \r\nachieve net zero CO2 and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions both \r\nglobally and nationally, counterbalancing residual emissions \r\nfrom hard-to-transition sectors. It is a key element in scenarios \r\nthat limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower by 2100 (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). Implementation strategies need to \r\nreflect that CDR methods differ in terms of removal process, timescale \r\nof carbon storage, technological maturity, mitigation potential, cost, \r\nco-benefits, adverse side effects, and governance requirements. \r\nAll Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) use land-based biological \r\nCDR (primarily afforestation/reforestation (A/R)) and/or bioenergy with \r\ncarbon capture and storage (BECCS) and some include direct air carbon \r\ncapture and storage (DACCS)"


id: 28068dca13c410d38556b0097bf34dba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3704
content:
" As a median value (5-95% range) across \r\nthe scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower, cumulative \r\nvolumes of BECCS, CO2 removal from AFOLU (mainly A/R), and \r\nDACCS reach 328 (168-763) gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2), \r\n252  (20-418)  GtCO2, and 29  (0-339)  GtCO2 for the 2020-2100 \r\nperiod, with annual volumes at 2.75  (0.52-9.45)  GtCO2 yr-1 for \r\nBECCS, 2.98 (0.23-6.38) GtCO2 yr-1 for the CO2 removal from AFOLU \r\n(mainly A/R), and 0.02 (0-1.74) GtCO2 yr-1 for DACCS, in 2050. {12.3, \r\nCross-Chapter Box 8 in this chapter} "


id: 706987d577486c702faceee243d8d1d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15307
content:
"Scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower by 2100 \r\ncommonly involve extensive mitigation in the agriculture, \r\nforestry and other land use (AFOLU) sector that at the \r\nsame time provides biomass for mitigation in other sectors. \r\nBioenergy is the most land intensive renewable energy option, \r\nbut the total land occupation of other renewable energy \r\noptions can become significant in high deployment scenarios \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). Growing demands for food, \r\nfeed, biomaterials, and non-fossil fuels increase the competition for \r\nland and biomass while climate change creates additional stresses on \r\nland, exacerbating existing risks to livelihoods, biodiversity, human \r\nand ecosystem health, infrastructure, and food systems"


id: 62f23fbfa7278f946772aba3fecbab73
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
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vector_id: 13142
content:
" Appropriate \r\nintegration of bioenergy and other bio-based systems, and of other \r\nmitigation options, with existing land and biomass uses can improve \r\nresource use efficiency, mitigate pressures on natural ecosystems and \r\nsupport adaptation through measures to combat land degradation, \r\nenhance food security, and improve resilience through maintenance \r\nof the productivity of the land resource base (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). {3.2.5, 3.4.6, 12.5}  "


id: 5b92295821afce766476b59460e70b64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
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vector_id: 11906
content:
"Understanding the co-benefits and trade-offs associated with \r\nmitigation is key to supporting societies to prioritise among \r\nthe various sectoral policy options (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). For example, CDR options can have positive impacts \r\non ecosystem services and the SDGs, but also potential adverse \r\nside effects; transforming food systems has potential co-benefits for \r\nseveral SDGs, but also trade-offs; and land-based mitigation measures \r\nmay have multiple co-benefits but may also be associated with trade\u0002offs among environmental, social, and economic objectives. Therefore, \r\nthe possible implementation of the different sectoral mitigation \r\noptions would depend on how societies prioritise mitigation versus \r\nother products and services, including food, material well-being, \r\nnature conservation and biodiversity protection, as well as on other \r\nconsiderations such as society's future dependence on CDR and on \r\ncarbon-based energy and materials. {12.3, 12.4, 12"


id: 1b5539d28716cfa2a9d72095ef0d75ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 1761
content:
"Coordinated, cross-sectoral approaches to climate change \r\nmitigation should be adopted to target synergies and minimise \r\ntrade-offs between sectors and with respect to sustainable \r\ndevelopment (robust evidence, high agreement). This requires \r\nintegrated planning using multiple-objective-multiple-impact policy \r\nframeworks. Strong interdependencies and cross-sectoral linkages \r\ncreate both opportunities for synergies and the need to address \r\ntrade-offs related to mitigation options and technologies. This can \r\nonly be done if coordinated sectoral approaches to climate change \r\nmitigation policies that mainstream these interactions are adopted"


id: 882ff9f7e400e5a0a66fc6c1dd4f85ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 18950
content:
" \r\nIntegrated planning and cross-sectoral alignment of climate change \r\npolicies are particularly evident in developing countries' Nationally \r\nDetermined Contributions (NDCs) pledged under the Paris Agreement, \r\nwhere key priority sectors such as agriculture and energy are closely \r\naligned between the proposed mitigation and adaptation actions \r\nin the context of sustainable development and the Sustainable \r\nDevelopment Goals (SDGs). {12.6.2}"


id: 65adfbc28c608b9d3b23991bcf1d1349
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
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vector_id: 13574
content:
"Governance of CDR, food systems and land-based mitigation \r\ncan support effective and equitable policy implementation \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). Effectively responding \r\nto climate change while advancing sustainable development will \r\nrequire coordinated efforts among a diverse set of state- and non\u0002state-actors on global, multinational, national, and sub-national \r\nlevels. Governance arrangements in public policy domains that cut \r\nthrough traditional sectors are confronted with specific challenges, \r\nsuch as establishing reliable systems for monitoring, reporting and \r\nverification (MRV) that allow evaluation of mitigation outcomes \r\nand co-benefits. Effectively integrating CDR into mitigation \r\nportfolios can build on already existing rules, procedures and \r\ninstruments for emissions abatement"


id: 20fc6e0d39a552c31e5cf99bc44820e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
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vector_id: 2625
content:
" Additionally, to accelerate \r\nresearch, development, and demonstration, and to incentivise CDR \r\ndeployment, a  political commitment to formal integration into \r\nexisting climate policy frameworks is required, including reliable \r\nMRV of carbon flows. Food systems governance may be pioneered \r\nthrough local food policy initiatives complemented by national \r\nand international initiatives, but governance on the national level \r\ntends to be fragmented, and thus have limited capacity to address \r\nstructural issues like inequities in access. The governance of land\u0002based mitigation, including land-based CDR, can draw on lessons \r\nfrom previous experience with regulating biofuels and forest carbon; \r\nhowever, integrating these insights requires governance that goes \r\nbeyond project-level approaches and emphasises integrated land \r\nuse-planning and management within the frame of the SDGs. {7.4, \r\nBox 7.2, 7.6, 12.3.3, 12.4, 12.5}"


id: ff54d7eefc4513e60afbbb7fe7b43aeb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 37722
content:
"The scope of this chapter was motivated by the need for a succinct \r\nbottom-up cross-sectoral view of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions \r\nmitigation coupled with the desire to provide systemic perspectives \r\non critical mitigation potentials and options that go beyond individual \r\nsectors and cover cross-sectoral topics such as food systems, land \r\nsystems, and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods. Driven by this \r\nmotivation, Chapter 12 provides a focused thematic assessment of \r\nCDR methods and food systems, followed by consideration of land\u0002related impacts of mitigation options (land-based CDR and other \r\nmitigation options that occupy land) and other cross-sectoral impacts \r\nof mitigation, with emphasis on synergies and trade-offs between \r\nmitigation options, and between mitigation and other environmental \r\nand socio-economic objectives"


id: e23b40007635702f65416c92c9d8fd5b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 33087
content:
" The systems focus is unique to \r\nthe Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the IPCC and is of critical \r\npolicy relevance as it informs coordinated approaches to planning \r\ninterventions that deliver multiple benefits and minimise trade\u0002offs, and coordinated policy approaches to support such planning, \r\nto tap relatively under-explored areas for the strengthening and \r\nacceleration of mitigation efforts in the short to medium term, \r\nand for dealing with residual emissions in hard-to-transition sectors \r\nin the medium to long term."


id: 240cc6bc6f83d5f2a3cb590403560050
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 3115
content:
"In the context of cross-sectoral synergies and trade-offs, the chapter \r\nidentifies a number of mitigation measures that have application in \r\nmore than one sector. Examples include measures involving product \r\nand material circularity, which contribute to mitigation of  GHG \r\nemissions in a number of ways, such as treatment of organic waste \r\nto reduce methane emissions, avoid emissions through generation \r\nof renewable energy, and reduce emissions through substitution of \r\nsynthetic fertilisers. Low-carbon energy technologies such as solar \r\nand wind may be used for grid electricity supply, as embedded \r\ngeneration in the buildings sector (e.g., rooftop solar) and for energy \r\nsupply in the agriculture sector. Nuclear and bio-based thermal \r\nelectric generation can provide multiple synergies including base \r\nload to augment solar and wind, district heating, and seawater \r\ndesalination"


id: 5661277ad8b5ffca60e84cba56df8d2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 11069
content:
" Grid-integrated hydrogen systems can buffer variability \r\nof solar and wind power and are being explored as a  mitigation \r\noption in the transport and industry sectors. Carbon capture and \r\nstorage (CCS) has potential application in a  number of industrial \r\nprocesses (cement, iron and steel, petroleum refining and pulp and \r\npaper) and the fossil fuel electricity sector. When coupled with energy \r\nrecovery from biomass (BECCS), CCS can help to provide CO2 removal \r\nfrom the atmosphere. On the demand side, electric vehicles are also \r\nconsidered an option for balancing variable power, energy efficiency \r\noptions find application across the sectors, as does reducing demand \r\nfor goods and services, and improving material use efficiency. Focused \r\ninquiry into these areas of cross-sectoral perspectives is provided for \r\nCDR, food systems, and land-based mitigation options."


id: 95ffa015f9647437733318b0cf1db2ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 21105
content:
"Table 12.1 presents an overview of the cross-sectoral perspectives \r\naddressed in Chapter 12, mapping the chapter's main themes to the \r\nsectoral and global chapters in this report. These mappings reflect \r\nthe cross-sectoral aspects of mitigation options in the context of \r\nsustainable development, sectoral policy interactions, governance, \r\nimplications in terms of international trade, spillover effects, and \r\ncompetitiveness, and cross-sectoral financing options for mitigation. \r\nWhile some cross-sector technologies are covered in more detail \r\nin sectoral chapters,  this chapter covers  important cross-sectoral \r\nlinkages and provides synthesis concerning  costs and potentials \r\nof mitigation  options, and co-benefits and trade-offs that can be \r\nassociated with deployment of mitigation options. Additionally, \r\nChapter 12 covers CDR methods and specific considerations related \r\nto land use and food systems, complementing Chapter  7"


id: 5fa3bb99fa0b970d77beff66aa954b10
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 12626
content:
"  The \r\nliterature assessed in the chapter includes both peer-reviewed and \r\ngrey literature since the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the IPCC, \r\nincluding the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC \r\n(SR1.5), the IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land \r\n(SRCCL) and the IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere \r\nin a Changing Climate (SROCC). Knowledge gaps are identified and \r\nreflected where encountered, as well as in a separate section. Finally, \r\na strong link is maintained with sectoral chapters and the relevant \r\nglobal chapters of this report to ensure consistency."


id: 9ebce7df14ed500903fb99828d2df6c1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 22510
content:
"A range of examples of where mitigation measures result in cross\u0002sectoral interactions and integration is identified. The mitigation \r\npotential of electric vehicles, including plug-in hybrids, is linked to \r\nthe extent of decarbonisation of the electricity grid, as well as to the \r\nliquid fuel supply emissions profile. Making buildings energy positive, \r\nwhere excess energy is used to charge vehicles, can increase the \r\npotential of electric and hybrid vehicles. Advanced process control \r\nand process optimisation in industry can reduce energy demand \r\nand material inputs, which in turn can reduce emissions linked to \r\nresource extraction and manufacturing. Trees and green roofs \r\nplanted to counter urban heat islands reduce the demand for energy \r\nfor air conditioning and simultaneously sequester carbon"


id: d6c35c19881dd4bc46d87ae986bd5f5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 31295
content:
" Material \r\nand product circularity contributes to mitigation, such as treatment \r\nof organic waste to reduce methane emissions, generate renewable \r\nenergy, and to substitute for synthetic fertilisers."


id: b6cdce943daf04e7615369c74dae0a0c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 26284
content:
"The analysis presented here is based, as far as possible, on \r\ninformation contained in Chapters 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11, where costs \r\nand potentials, referred to here as 'sectoral mitigation potentials' \r\nhave been discussed for each individual sector. In the past, these \r\nwere designated as bottom-up potentials, in contrast to the top\u0002down potentials that are obtained from integrated energy-economic \r\nmodels and IAMs. However, IAMs increasingly include 'bottom-up' \r\nelements, which makes the distinction less clear. Still, sectoral studies \r\noften have more technical and economic detail than IAMs. They may \r\nalso provide more up-to-date information on technology options \r\nand associated costs. However, aggregation of results from sectoral \r\nstudies is more complex, and although interactions and overlap are \r\ncorrected for as far as possible in this analysis, it is recognised that \r\nsuch systemic effects are much more rigorously taken into account \r\nin IAMs"


id: f094f2113dc011933c839937b3b63aa3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 35349
content:
" A comparison is made between the sectoral results and the \r\noutcomes of the IAMs in Section 12.2.3."


id: 1619503ee8404eddc116b1a78657b79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 997
content:
"The aim of this section is to provide a consolidated overview of the \r\nnet emissions reduction potentials and costs for mitigation options \r\navailable in the various sectors dealt with in the sectoral Chapters 6, \r\n7, 9, 10 and 11 of this assessment report. This overview provides \r\npolicymakers with an understanding of which options are more or \r\nless important in terms of mitigating emissions in the short term \r\n(here interpreted as 2030), and which ones are more or less costly. \r\nThe intention is not to provide a  high level of accuracy for each \r\ntechnology cost or potential, but rather to indicate relative importance \r\non a global scale and whether costs are low, intermediate or high. \r\nThe section starts with an introduction (Section  12.2.1), providing \r\ndefinitions and the background. Next, ranges of net emission \r\nreduction potentials and the associated costs for the year 2030 are \r\npresented (Section  12.2"


id: 3b0832be79ac0c2c5b72e49e0082f6e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 6647
content:
"2) and compared to earlier estimates and \r\nwith the outputs of IAMs (Section 12.2.3). Finally, an outlook to the \r\nyear 2050 is provided (Section 12.2.4)."


id: e19b4e7b18f940adbb25d452e648a270
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 32987
content:
"As indicated previously, net emission reduction potentials are \r\npresented based on comparison with a  reference scenario. \r\nUnfortunately, not all costs and potentials found in the literature are \r\ndetermined against the same reference scenarios. In this assessment, \r\nreference scenarios are based on what were assumed current-policy \r\nscenarios in the period 2015-2019. Typical reference scenarios are the \r\nShared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP2) scenarios (Fricko et al. 2017) \r\nand the Current Policies scenario from the World Energy Outlook \r\n(WEO) 2019 (IEA 2019). They can both be considered scenarios with \r\nmiddle-of-the-road expectations on population growth and economic \r\ndevelopment, but there are still some differences between the two \r\n(Table  12.2). The net emissions reduction potentials reported here \r\nwere generally based on analyses carried out before 2020, so the \r\nimpact of the COVID-19 pandemic was not taken into account"


id: de15412b3f3a49cdec3772908945f7fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" For \r\ncomparison, the Stated Policies scenario of the World Energy Outlook \r\n2020 (IEA 2020a) is also shown, one of the scenarios in which the \r\nimpact of COVID-19 was considered. Variations of up to 10% between \r\nthe different reference scenarios exist with respect to macro-variables \r\nsuch as total primary energy use and total GHG emissions. The \r\npotential estimates presented below should be interpreted against \r\nthis background. The total emissions under the reference scenarios in \r\n2030 are expected to be in the range of 54 to 68 GtCO2-eq yr-1 with \r\na median of 60 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (Table 4.1)."


id: 15b8261f43a3cfee231e5bcbaa6bfb0a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"The term 'mitigation potential' is used here to report the quantity of \r\nnet greenhouse gas emissions reductions that can be achieved by \r\na given mitigation option relative to a specified reference scenario. \r\nThe net greenhouse gas emission reduction is the sum of reduced \r\nemissions and enhanced sinks. Several types of potential can be \r\ndistinguished. The technical potential is the mitigation potential \r\nconstrained by theoretical limits in addition to the availability of \r\ntechnology and practices. Quantification of technical potentials \r\nprimarily takes into account technical considerations, but social, \r\neconomic and/or environmental considerations are sometimes also \r\nconsidered, if these represent strong barriers to the deployment of \r\nan option"


id: 60ac08ca3892cdb80f20d494ee671a0c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" The economic potential, being the potential reported in \r\nthis section, is the proportion of the technical potential for which the \r\nsocial benefits exceed the social costs, taking into account a social \r\ndiscount rate and the value of externalities (see Annex I: Glossary). \r\nIn this section, only externalities related to greenhouse gas emissions \r\nare taken into account. They are represented by using different cost \r\ncut-off levels of options in terms of USD per tonne of avoided CO2-eq "


id: 982daee20019c9b0e7ccf86a08c671f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 21454
content:
"by solar and wind energy in the reference scenario has increased, \r\ncompared to earlier versions of the World Energy Outlook. The net \r\neffect is a  modest increase in the average value of the potential, \r\nand a  wider uncertainty range. Costs of electricity-generating \r\ntechnologies are discussed in Section 6.4.7, with a summary of LCOEs \r\nfrom the literature being presented in Section 6.4.7. Mitigation costs \r\nof electricity production technology depend on local conditions \r\nand on the baseline technology being displaced, and it is difficult \r\nto determine the distribution over the cost ranges used in this \r\nassessment. However, it is possible to indicate a broad cost range for \r\nthese technologies. These cost ranges are presented in Table 12.3"


id: 4cf9f6cc777b420221cb243ec95c4764
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 9532
content:
" For \r\nonshore wind and utility-scale solar energy, there is strong evidence \r\nthat despite regional differences in resource potential and cost, \r\na large part of the mitigation potential can be found in the negative \r\ncost category or at cost parity with fossil fuel-based options. This is \r\nalso the case for nuclear energy in some regions. Other technologies \r\nshow mostly positive mitigation costs, the highest mitigation costs \r\nare for CCS and bioelectricity with CCS, for details see Supplementary \r\nMaterial 12.SM.1.2."


id: 7c67437de290d46fda0daf7648353496
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 17172
content:
"The emissions reduction potentials for the buildings sector were \r\nbased on the analysis by Chapter  9  authors of a  large number of \r\nsectoral studies for individual countries or regions. In total, the \r\nchapter analysed the results of 67 studies that assess the potential \r\nof technological energy efficiency and onsite renewable energy \r\nproduction and use, and the results of 11 studies that assess the \r\npotential of sufficiency measures helping avoid demand for energy \r\nand materials. The sufficiency measures were included in models by \r\nreorganisation of human activities; efficient design, planning, and \r\nuse of building space; higher density of building and settlement \r\ninhabitancy; redefining and downsizing goods and equipment, \r\nlimiting their use to health, living, and working standards, and their \r\nsharing"


id: 1382c9c5320d939f2dbfe956c1784ca3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" Most of these studies targeted 2050 for the decarbonisation \r\nof buildings; the potentials in 2030 reported here rely on the \r\nestimates for 2030 provided by these studies or on the interpolated \r\nestimates targeting these 2050 figures. Based on these individual \r\ncountry studies, regional aggregate emissions reduction percentages \r\nwere found. The potential estimates were assembled in the order \r\nsufficiency, efficiency, renewable options, correcting the amount \r\nof the potential at each step for the interaction with preceding \r\nmeasures. Note that the option 'Enhanced use of wood products' \r\nwas analysed by Chapter 7, but is listed under the buildings sector in \r\nTable 12.3, as such enhanced use of wood takes place predominantly \r\nin the construction sector."


id: 47176fcd2272954d4409e8244b0866dd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"Figure 12.1 | Comparison of sectoral estimates for emissions reduction potential with the emissions reductions calculated using IAMs. Emission reductions \r\ncalculated using IAMs are given as box plots of global emissions reductions for each sector (dark blue and brown) at different global carbon cost levels (horizontal axis) for \r\n2030, based on all scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower (see Chapter 3) in the AR6 scenarios database (IIASA 2021). For IAMs, the cost levels correspond to the \r\nlevels of the carbon price. Hinges in the dark blue box plots represent the interquartile ranges and whiskers extend to 5th and 95th percentiles while the hinges in the brown \r\nbox plots describe the full range, and the middle point indicates the mean, not the median. In yellow, the estimates from the sectoral analysis are given. In all cases, only direct \r\nemissions reductions are presented, except for the light-blue boxes (for buildings), which include indirect emissions reductions"


id: 6f785408cb3ad174426ec2ebcd6628d1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 15166
content:
" The light-blue boxes are only given for reasons of \r\ncompleteness. For buildings the dark-blue boxes should be compared with the yellow boxes. Light-blue and yellow boxes represent the full ranges of estimates. For IAMs, global \r\ncarbon prices are applied, which are subject to significant uncertainty."


id: 49dd68c79be74a1e8bd1bed527a19379
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9023
content:
"The results of the sectoral mitigation potentials are also compared \r\nwith mitigation impacts as calculated by IAMs. To this end, \r\ncumulative sectoral potentials over cost ranges were determined, \r\nbased on the information in Table  12.3. For options that are in \r\nvarious cost ranges, we assumed that they are evenly distributed \r\nover these cost ranges. The only exception is wind and solar energy, \r\nfor which it is indicated that the majority of the mitigation potential \r\nis in the negative cost range. It was assumed that the fraction in the \r\nnegative cost range was 60%; the remainder is evenly distributed \r\nover the other cost ranges. These cumulative potentials were \r\ncompared with emissions reductions realised in IAMs at certain \r\nprice levels for CO2. Note that these price levels selected in IAMs \r\nare average price levels - not all IAMs use globally uniform carbon \r\nprices, so underlying these cost levels, there may be regional \r\ndifferentiation"


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content:
" Data were taken from the AR6 scenarios database. \r\nNote that, strictly speaking, not all models in the database are \r\nIAMs; in this analysis all models in the database were used, but "


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"Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is a necessary element of mitigation portfolios to achieve net zero CO2 and GHG emissions both globally \r\nand nationally, counterbalancing residual emissions from hard-to-transition sectors such as industry, transport and agriculture. CDR \r\nis a key element in scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower, regardless of whether global emissions reach near-zero, net \r\nzero or net-negative levels (Sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 12.3). While national mitigation portfolios aiming at net zero or net-negative \r\nemissions will need to include some level of CDR, the choice of methods and the scale and timing of their deployment will depend on \r\nthe ambition for gross emissions reductions, how sustainability and feasibility constraints are managed, and how political preferences \r\nand social acceptability evolve (Section 12.3.3)"


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" This box gives an overview of CDR methods, presents a categorisation based on \r\nthe key characteristics of removal processes and storage timescales, and clarifies the multiple roles of CDR in mitigation strategies. \r\nThe term 'negative emissions' is used in this report only when referring to the net emissions outcome at a systems level (e.g., 'net \r\nnegative emissions' at global, national, sectoral or supply chain levels)."


id: 2790cdd83e9c303b4270d253daf4581d
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"There are many different CDR methods and associated implementation options (Cross-Chapter Box  8, Figure  1). Some of these \r\nmethods (including afforestation and improved forest management, wetland restoration and soil carbon sequestration (SCS)) have \r\nbeen practised for decades to millennia, although not necessarily with the intention of removing carbon from the atmosphere. \r\nConversely, methods such as direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS), bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) \r\nand enhanced weathering are novel, and while experience is growing, their demonstration and deployment are limited in scale. CDR \r\nmethods have been categorised in different ways in the literature, highlighting different characteristics"


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" In this report, as in AR6 WGI, \r\nthe categorisation is based on the role of CDR methods in the carbon cycle, that is, on the removal process (land-based biological;\r\nocean-based biological; geochemical; chemical) and on the timescale of storage (decades to centuries; centuries to millennia;\r\nten thousand years or longer). The time scale of storage is closely linked to the storage medium: carbon stored in ocean reservoirs \r\n(through enhanced weathering, ocean alkalinity enhancement or ocean fertilisation) and in geological formations (through BECCS or \r\nDACCS) generally has longer storage times and is less vulnerable to reversal through human actions or disturbances such as drought \r\nand wildfire than carbon stored in terrestrial reservoirs (vegetation, soil). Furthermore, carbon stored in vegetation or through SCS has "


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"While many governments have included A/R and other forestry \r\nmeasures in their NDCs under the Paris Agreement (Moe and \r\nRottereng 2018; Fyson and Jeffery 2019; Mace et al. 2021), and a few \r\ncountries also mention BECCS, DACCS and enhanced weathering \r\nin their mid-century low emission development strategies (Buylova \r\net al. 2021), very few are pursuing the integration of a broad range \r\nof CDR methods into national mitigation portfolios so far (Schenuit \r\net al. 2021) (Box 12.1). There are concerns that the prospect of large\u0002scale CDR could, depending on the design of mitigation strategies, \r\nobstruct near-term emissions reduction efforts (Lenzi et al. 2018; \r\nMarkusson et al. 2018), mask insufficient policy interventions (Geden \r\n2016; Carton 2019), might lead to an overreliance on technologies \r\nthat are still in their infancy (Anderson and Peters 2016; Larkin et al. \r\n2018; Grant et al. 2021), could overburden future generations (Lenzi \r\n2018; Shue 2018; Bednar et al"


id: 8a844bfe6b39643fd03689014e2211a
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" 2019) might evoke new conflicts over \r\nequitable burden-sharing (Pozo et al. 2020; Lee et al. 2021; Mohan "


id: 1e603a4ab4a463adedabc1e73025ee96
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"et al. 2021), could impact food security, biodiversity or land rights \r\n(Buck 2016; Boysen et al. 2017; Dooley and Kartha 2018; Hurlbert \r\net al. 2019; Dooley et al. 2021), or might be perceived negatively \r\nby stakeholders and broader public audiences (Royal Society and \r\nRoyal Academy of Engineering 2018; Colvin et al. 2020). Conversely, \r\nwithout considering different timescales of carbon storage (Fuss \r\net al. 2018; Hepburn et al. 2019) and implementation of reliable \r\nmeasurement, reporting and verification of carbon flows (Mace et al. \r\n2021), CDR deployment might not deliver the intended benefit of \r\nremoving CO2 durably from the atmosphere. Furthermore, without \r\nappropriate incentive schemes and market designs (Honegger et al. \r\n2021b), CDR implementation options could see under-investment"


id: cf29d39726d16f9ed86d59aa2da84be3
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" \r\nThe many challenges in research, development and demonstration \r\nof novel approaches, to advance innovation according to broader \r\nsocietal objectives and to bring down costs, could delay their scaling \r\nup and deployment (Nemet et al. 2018). Depending on the scale "


id: 4efd6680f3cf1c6b1ab7ce30dc59d2e9
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"reported annual CO2 removal from AFOLU (mainly A/R) reaches \r\n0.86 [0.01-4.11] GtCO2 yr-1 by 2030, 2.98 [0.23-6.38] GtCO2 yr-1\r\nby 2050, and 4.19 [0.1-6.91]  GtCO2 yr-1 by 2100 (values are the \r\nmedians and bracketed values denote the 5-95th percentile range1\r\n). \r\nThe annual BECCS deployment is 0.08 [0-1.09]  GtCO2 yr-1, \r\n2.75 [0.52-9.45] GtCO2 yr-1, and 8.96 [2.63-16.15] GtCO2 yr-1 for \r\nthese years, respectively. The annual DACCS deployment eaches \r\n0 [0-0.02] GtCO2 yr-1 by 2030, 0.02 [0-1.74] GtCO2 yr-1 by 2050, and \r\n1.02 [0-12.6] GtCO2 yr-1 by 2100 (Figure 12.3).2\r\n Reported cumulative \r\nvolumes of BECCS, CO2 removal from AFOLU, and DACCS reach \r\n328 [168-763] GtCO2, 252 [20-418] GtCO2, and 29 [0-339] GtCO2\r\nfor the 2020-2100 period, respectively. Reaching the higher end \r\nof CDR volumes is subject to issues regarding their feasibility (see \r\nbelow), especially if achieved with only a  limited number of CDR \r\nmethods"


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" Recent studies have identified some drivers for large\u0002scale CDR deployment in IAM scenarios, including insufficient \r\nrepresentation of variable renewables, a high discount rate that tends \r\nto increase initial carbon budget overshoot and therefore inflates \r\nusage  of  CDR to achieve net-negative emissions at later times, \r\nomission of CDR  methods aside from BECCS and A/R (Emmerling \r\net al. 2019; Hilaire et al. 2019; Koberle 2019), and limited deployment \r\nof demand-side options (Grubler et al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. \r\n2018; Daioglou et al. 2019). The levels of CDR in IAMs in modelled \r\npathways would change depending on the allowable overshoot of \r\npolicy targets such as temperature or radiative forcing and the costs \r\nof non-CDR mitigation options (Johansson et al. 2020; van der Wijst \r\net al. 2021) (Section 3.2.2)."


id: a859c981a4b62cbe763a5bfe53371460
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"While many CDR methods are gradually being explored, IAM scenarios \r\nhave focused mostly on BECCS and A/R (Tavoni and Socolow 2013; \r\nFuhrman et al. 2019; Rickels et al. 2019; Calvin et al. 2021; Diniz \r\nOliveira et al. 2021). Although some IAM studies have also included \r\nother methods such as DACCS (Chen and Tavoni 2013; Marcucci et al. \r\n2017; Realmonte et al. 2019; Fuhrman et al. 2020; Akimoto et al. 2021; \r\nFuhrman et al. 2021a), enhanced weathering (Strefler et al. 2021), SCS \r\nand biochar (Holz et al. 2018) there is much less literature compared \r\nto studies on BECCS (Hilaire et al. 2019). A  large-scale coordinated \r\nIAM study on BECCS ('EMF-33') has been conducted (Muratori et al. \r\n2020; Rose et al. 2020) but none exists for other CDR methods. A recent \r\nreview proposes a combination of various CDR methods (Fuss et al. \r\n2018) but more in-depth literature on such a  portfolio approach is \r\nlimited (Strefler et al. 2021)"


id: 838c0b6fb4dd051873f7c5f3b88dcc57
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" A  multi-criteria analysis has identified \r\npathways with CDR portfolios different from least-cost pathways often \r\ndominated by BECCS and A/R (Rueda et al. 2021)."


id: 1c668e65b17b11e1b58cb1d78c8e1a04
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"Direct air capture (DAC) is a  chemical process to capture ambient \r\nCO2 from the atmosphere. Captured CO2 can be stored underground \r\n(direct air carbon capture and storage, DACCS) or utilised in \r\nproducts (direct air carbon capture and utilisation, DACCU). DACCS \r\nshares with conventional CCS the transport and storage components \r\nbut is distinct in its capture part. Because CO2 is a well-mixed GHG, \r\nDACCS can be sited relatively flexibly, though its locational flexibility \r\nis constrained by the availability of low-carbon energy and storage \r\nsites. Capturing the CO2 involves three basic steps: (i) contacting the \r\nair, (ii) capturing on a liquid or solid sorbent or a liquid solvent, and \r\n(iii) regeneration of the solvent or the sorbent (with heat, moisture \r\nand/or pressure). After capture, the CO2 stream can be stored \r\nunderground or utilised"


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" The duration of storage is an important \r\nconsideration; geological reservoirs or mineralisation result in removal \r\nfor more than 1000 years. The duration of the removal through DACCU \r\n(Breyer et al. 2019) varies with the lifetime of respective products \r\n(Wilcox et al. 2017; Bui et al. 2018; Fuss et al. 2018; Gunnarsson \r\net al. 2018; Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 2018; \r\nCreutzig et al. 2019), ranging from weeks to months for synthetic \r\nfuels to centuries or more for building materials (e.g., concrete cured "


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"Potentials: There is no specific study on the potential of DACCS but \r\nthe literature has assumed that the technical potential is virtually \r\nunlimited provided that high energy requirements could be met \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement) (Marcucci et al. 2017; Fuss \r\net al. 2018; Lawrence et al. 2018) since DACCS encounters fewer \r\nnon-cost constraints than any other CDR method. Focusing only \r\non the Maghreb region, Breyer et al. (2020) reported an optimistic \r\npotential 150 GtCO2 at less than USD61 tCO2\r\n-1 for 2050. Fuss et al. \r\n(2018) suggest a potential of 0.5-5 GtCO2 yr-1 by 2050 because of \r\nenvironmental side effects and limits to underground storage. In \r\naddition to the ultimate potentials, Realmonte et al. (2019) noted \r\nthe rate of scale-up as a strong constraint on deployment. Meckling \r\nand Biber (2021) discuss a policy roadmap to address the political \r\neconomy for upscaling"


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" More systematic analysis on potentials is \r\nnecessary; first and foremost on national and regional levels, including \r\nthe requirements for low-carbon heat and power, water and material \r\ndemand, availability of geological storage and the need for land in \r\ncase of low-density energy sources such as solar or wind power."


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"Status: There are some demonstration projects by start-up companies \r\nand academic researchers, who are developing various types of DAC, \r\nincluding aqueous potassium solvent with calcium carbonation and \r\nsolid sorbents with heat regeneration (NASEM 2019). These projects \r\nare supported mostly by private investments and grants or sometimes \r\nserve utilisation niche markets (e.g., CO2 for beverages, greenhouses, \r\nenhanced oil recovery). As of 2021, there are more than ten plants \r\nworldwide, with a scale of ktCO2 yr-1 or smaller (Larsen et al. 2019; \r\nNASEM 2019; IEA 2020b). Because of the fundamental difference in \r\nthe CO2 concentration at the capture stage, DACCS does not benefit \r\ndirectly from research, development and demonstration (RD&D) of \r\nconventional CCS. Public RD&D programmes dedicated to DAC have \r\ntherefore been proposed (Larsen et al. 2019; NASEM 2019)"


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" Possible \r\nresearch topics include development of new liquid solvents, novel \r\nsolid sorbents, and novel equipment or system designs, and the need \r\nfor third-party evaluation of techno-economic aspects has also been \r\nemphasised (NASEM 2019). However, since basic research does \r\nnot appear to be a primary barrier, both NASEM (2019) and Larsen \r\net al. (2019) argue for a stronger focus on demonstration in the US \r\ncontext. Though the US and UK governments have begun funding \r\nDACCS research (IEA 2020b), the scale of R&D activities is limited."


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"Risks and impacts: DACCS requires a considerable amount of energy \r\n(high confidence), depending on the type of technology, water, and \r\nmake-up sorbents, while its land footprint is small compared to other \r\nCDR methods (Smith et al. 2016). Yet, depending on the source of \r\nenergy for DACCS (e.g., renewables vs nuclear), DACCS could require \r\na significant land footprint (NASEM 2019; Sekera and Lichtenberger \r\n2020). The theoretical minimum energy requirement for separating \r\nCO2 gas from the air is about 0.5 GJ tCO2\r\n-1 (Socolow et al. 2011). \r\nFasihi et al. (2019) reviewed the published estimates of energy \r\nrequirements and found that for the current technologies, the total \r\nenergy requirement is about 4-10 GJ tCO2\r\n-1, with heat accounting \r\nfor about 80% and electricity about 20% (McQueen et al. 2021)"


id: 414aca2789aa9537fc14754ca72a14ea
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" \r\nAt a  10  GtCO2 yr-1 sequestration scale, this would translate into \r\n40-100 exajoules (EJ) yr-1 of energy consumption (32-80 EJ yr-1 for \r\nheat and 8-20 EJ yr-1 electricity), which can be contrasted with the \r\ncurrent primary energy supply of about 600  EJ yr-1 and electricity \r\ngeneration of about 100 EJ yr-1. For the solid sorbent technology, \r\nlow-temperature heat could be sourced from heat pumps powered \r\nby low-carbon sources such as renewables (Breyer et al. 2020), waste \r\nheat (Beuttler et al. 2019), and nuclear energy (Sandalow et al. 2018). \r\nUnless sourced from a clean source, this amount of energy could cause \r\nenvironmental damage (Jacobson 2019). Because DACCS is an open \r\nsystem, water lost from evaporation must be replenished. Water loss \r\nvaries, depending on technology (including adjustable factors such \r\nas the concentration of the liquid solvent) as well as environmental \r\nconditions (e.g., temperate vs tropical climates). For a liquid solvent "


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"and that DACCS substitutes for BECCS under stringent targets. In their \r\nanalysis, DACCS captures up to 38.3 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2100. Realmonte \r\net al. (2019) modelled two types of DACCS (based on liquid and solid \r\nsorbents) with two IAMs (TIAM-Grantham and WITCH), and showed \r\nthat in deep mitigation scenarios, DACCS complements, rather than \r\nsubstitutes, other CDR methods such as BECCS, and that DACCS is \r\neffective at containing mitigation costs. At the national scale, Larsen \r\net al. (2019) utilised the Regional Investment and Operations (RIO) \r\nPlatform coupled with the Energy PATHWAYS model, and explicitly \r\nrepresented DAC in US energy systems scenarios. They found that in \r\na scenario that reaches net zero emissions by 2045, about 0.6 GtCO2\r\nor 1.8  GtCO2 of DACCS would be deployed, depending on the \r\navailability of biological carbon sinks and bioenergy"


id: fba9f425620cca27ed6ecc4c2f5057a2
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" The modelling \r\nsupporting the European Commission's initial proposal for net zero \r\nGHG emissions by 2050 incorporated DAC, with the captured CO2\r\nused for both synthetic fuel production (DACCU) and storage (DACCS) \r\n(Capros et al. 2019). Fuhrman et al. (2021a) evaluated the role of \r\nDACCS across five shared socio-economic pathways with the GCAM \r\nmodelling framework and identified a substantial role for DACCS in \r\nmitigation and a  decreased pressure on land and water resources \r\nfrom BECCS, even under the assumption of limited energy efficiency \r\nimprovement and conservative cost declines of DACCS technologies. \r\nThe newest iteration of the World Economic Outlook by IEA (2021b) \r\ndeploys CDR on a limited scale, and DACCS removes 0.6 GtCO2 in \r\n2050 for its Net Zero CO2 Emissions scenario."


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"system, it can be 0-50 tH2O tCO2\r\n-1 (Fasihi et al. 2019). A water loss \r\nrate of about 1-10 tH2O tCO2\r\n-1 (Socolow et al. 2011) would translate \r\ninto about 10-100 GtH2O (10-100 km3\r\n) to capture 10 GtCO2 from \r\nthe atmosphere. Some solid sorbent technologies actually produce \r\nwater as a by-product, for example 0.8-2 tH2O tCO2\r\n-1 for a solid\u0002sorbent technology with heat regeneration (Beuttler et al. 2019; \r\nFasihi et al. 2019). Large-scale deployment of DACCS would also \r\nrequire a  significant quantity of materials, and energy to produce \r\nthem (Chatterjee and Huang 2020). Hydroxide solutions are currently \r\nbeing produced as a  by-product of chlorine but replacement \r\n(make-up) requirement of such materials at scale exceeds the current \r\nmarket supply (Realmonte et al. 2019). The land requirements for \r\nDAC units are not large enough to be of concern (Madhu et al. 2021). \r\nFurthermore, these can be placed on unproductive lands, in contrast \r\nto biological CDR"


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" Nevertheless, to ensure that CO2-depleted air does \r\nnot enter the air contactor of an adjacent DAC system, there must be \r\nenough space between DAC units, similar to wind power turbines. \r\nConsidering this, Socolow et al. (2011) estimated a land footprint of \r\n1.5 km2 MtCO2\r\n-1. In contrast, large energy requirements can lead to \r\nsignificant footprints if low-density energy sources (e.g., solar PV) are \r\nused (Smith et al. 2016). For the issues associated with CO2 utilisation \r\nand storage, see Chapter 6."


id: a20614d9e2a0fae515923f42393b37cd
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"Enhanced weathering involves (i) the mining of rocks containing \r\nminerals that naturally absorb CO2 from the atmosphere over \r\ngeological timescales (as they become exposed to the atmosphere \r\nthrough geological weathering), (ii) the comminution of these rocks \r\nto increase the surface area, and (iii) the spreading of these crushed \r\nrocks on soils (or in the ocean/coastal environments; Section 12.3.1.3) \r\nso that they react with atmospheric CO2 (Schuiling and Krijgsman \r\n2006; Hartmann et al. 2013; Beerling et al. 2018; Goll et al. 2021). \r\nConstruction waste and waste materials from mining can also be used \r\nas a  source material for enhanced weathering. Silicate rocks such \r\nas basalt, containing minerals rich in calcium and magnesium and \r\nlacking metal ions such as nickel and chromium, are most suitable for \r\nenhanced weathering (Beerling et al. 2018); they reduce soil solution \r\nacidity during dissolution, and promote the chemical transformation \r\nof CO2 to bicarbonate ions"


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content:
" The bicarbonate ions can precipitate in \r\nsoils and drainage waters as a  solid carbonate mineral (Manning \r\n2008), or remain dissolved and increase alkalinity levels in the ocean \r\nwhen the water reaches the sea (Renforth and Henderson 2017). The \r\nmodelling study by Cipolla et al. (2021) found that rate of weathering \r\nis greater in high rainfall environments, and was increased by organic \r\nmatter amendment."


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content:
"The chemical reactions are well understood (Manning 2008; Gillman \r\n1980; Gillman et al. 2001), but the behaviour of the crushed rocks \r\nin the field and potential co-benefits and adverse side effects of \r\nenhanced weathering require further research (Beerling et al. 2018). \r\nSmall-scale laboratory experiments have calculated weathering \r\nrates that are orders of magnitude slower than the theoretical limit \r\nfor mass transfer-controlled forsterite (Renforth et al. 2015; Amann \r\net al. 2020) and basalt dissolution (Kelland et al. 2020). Uncertainty \r\nsurrounding silicate mineral dissolution rates in soils, the fate of the \r\nreleased products, the extent of legacy reserves of mining by-products \r\nthat might be exploited, location and availability of rock extraction \r\nsites, and the impact on ecosystems remain poorly quantified and \r\nrequire further research to better understand feasibility (Renforth \r\n2012; Moosdorf et al. 2014; Beerling et al. 2018)"


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" Closely monitored, \r\nlarge-scale demonstration projects would allow these aspects to be \r\nstudied (Smith et al. 2019a; Beerling et al. 2020)."


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"Co-benefits: Enhanced weathering can improve plant growth by \r\npH modification and increased mineral supply (Kantola et al. 2017; \r\nBeerling et al. 2018), can enhance SCS in some soils (Beerling et al. \r\n2018) thereby protecting against soil erosion (Wright and Upadhyaya \r\n1998), and increasing the cation exchange capacity, resulting \r\nin increased nutrient retention and availability (Gillman 1980; \r\nBaldock and Skjemstad 2000; Gillman et al. 2001; Manning 2010; \r\nGuntzer et al. 2012; Tubana et al. 2016; Yu et al. 2017; Haque et al. \r\n2019; Smith et al. 2019a). Through these actions, it can contribute \r\nto SDG  2  (zero hunger), SDG  15 (life on land) (by reducing land \r\ndemand for croplands), SDG  13 (climate action) (through CDR), \r\nSDG 14 (life below water) (by ameliorating ocean acidification) and \r\nSDG  6  (clean water and sanitation) (Smith et al. 2019a)"


id: 603998b333a039ea62fcf60160330245
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" To more \r\ndirectly ameliorate ocean acidification while increasing CDR and \r\nreducing impacts on land ecosystems, alkaline minerals could instead \r\nbe directly added to the ocean (Section 12.3.1.3). There are potential \r\nbenefits in poverty reduction through employment of local workers \r\nin mining (Pegg 2006)."


id: 2f0abe018096aeec9e9b3b036e5ee5c0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 4831
content:
"Costs: Fuss et al. (2018), in a  systematic review of the costs and \r\npotentials of CDR methods including enhanced weathering, note \r\nthat costs are closely related to the source of the rock and the \r\ntechnology used for rock grinding and material transport (Renforth \r\n2012; Hartmann et al. 2013; Strefler et al. 2018). Due to differences \r\nin the methods and assumptions between studies, literature \r\nranges are highly uncertain and range from USD15-40 tCO2\r\n-1 to \r\nUSD3460 tCO2\r\n-1 (Kohler et al. 2010; Taylor et al. 2016). Renforth \r\n(2012) reported operational costs in the UK of applying mafic \r\nrocks (rocks with high magnesium and iron silicate mineral \r\nconcentrations) of USD70-578 tCO2\r\n-1, and for ultramafic rocks \r\n(rocks rich in magnesium and iron silicate minerals but with very low \r\nsilica content  - the low silica content enhances weathering rates) \r\nof USD24-123 tCO2\r\n-1. Beerling et al"


id: 86396b6c17fd45a9b7e3f9e8b33ba560
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 18660
content:
" (2020) combined a  spatially \r\nresolved weathering model with a  techno-economic assessment \r\nto suggest costs of between USD54-220 tCO2\r\n-1 (with a  weighted \r\nmean of USD118-128 tCO2\r\n-1). Fuss et al. (2018) suggested an \r\nauthor judgement cost range of USD50-200 tCO2\r\n-1 for a potential of \r\n2-4 GtCO2 yr-1 from 2050, excluding biological storage."


id: 443b7ea2345e1d82ada82e270561c29b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 8158
content:
"Potentials: In a  systematic review of the costs and potentials \r\nof enhanced weathering, Fuss et al. (2018) report a wide range of \r\npotentials (limited evidence, low agreement). The highest reported \r\nregional sequestration potential, 88.1  GtCO2 yr-1, is reported for \r\nthe spreading of pulverised rock over a very large land area in the \r\ntropics, a region considered promising given the higher temperatures \r\nand greater rainfall (Taylor et al. 2016). Considering cropland areas \r\nonly, the potential carbon removal was estimated by Strefler et al. \r\n(2018) to be 95 GtCO2 yr-1 for dunite and 4.9 GtCO2 yr-1 for basalt. \r\nSlightly lower potentials were estimated by Lenton (2014) where \r\nthe potential of carbon removal by enhanced weathering (including \r\nadding carbonate and olivine to both oceans and soils) was estimated \r\nto be 3.7  GtCO2 yr-1 by 2100, but with mean annual removal an \r\norder of magnitude less at 0.2 GtC-eq yr-1 (Lenton 2014). The \r\nestimates reported in Smith et al"


id: 8804440521d5684675099fbfda197942
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 18922
content:
" (2016) are based on the potential \r\nestimates of Lenton (2014). Beerling et al. (2020) estimate that up \r\nto 2 GtCO2 yr-1 could be removed by 2050 by spreading basalt onto \r\n35-59% (weighted mean 53%) of agricultural land of 12 countries. \r\nFuss et al. (2018) provide an author judgement range for potential of \r\n2-4 GtCO2 yr-1 for 2050."


id: 3ab53404849481d43577adf169773952
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"anthropogenic carbon could potentially be stored in the ocean for \r\ncenturies to millennia for methods that increase deep ocean-dissolved \r\ncarbon concentrations or temporarily bury the carbon; or essentially \r\npermanently (over ten thousand years) for methods that store the \r\ncarbon in mineral forms or as ions by increasing alkalinity (Siegel \r\net al., 2021) (Cross-Chapter Box 8, Figure 1). A wide range of methods \r\nand implementation options for marine CDR have been proposed \r\n(Gattuso et al. 2018; Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018; GESAMP 2019). \r\nThe most studied ocean-based CDR methods are ocean fertilisation, \r\nalkalinity enhancement (including electrochemical methods) and \r\nintensification of biologically-driven carbon fluxes and storage in \r\nmarine ecosystems, referred to as 'blue carbon'. The mitigation \r\npotentials, costs, co-benefits and trade-offs of these three options are \r\ndiscussed below"


id: 2e57d1f88fa38b479c97ba1ff9b99154
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 4734
content:
" Less well studied are methods including artificial \r\nupwelling, terrestrial biomass dumping into oceans, direct CO2\r\nremoval from seawater (with CCS), and sinking marine biomass into \r\nthe deep ocean or harvesting it for bioenergy (with CCS) or biochar \r\n(GESAMP 2019). These methods are summarised briefly below. \r\nPotential climate response and influence on the carbon budget of \r\nocean-based CDR methods are discussed in WGI AR6, Chapter 5."


id: c116ed8a9f626ddcda79c922fb09fc2f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 27956
content:
"Potentials: Theoretical calculations indicate that organic carbon \r\nexport increases 2-20 kg per gram of iron added, but experiments \r\nindicate much lower efficiency: a  significant part of the CO2 can \r\nbe emitted back the atmosphere because much of the organic \r\ncarbon produced is remineralised in the upper ocean. Efficiency also \r\nvaries with location (Bopp et al. 2013). Between studies, there are \r\nsubstantial differences in the ratio of iron added to carbon  fixed \r\nphotosynthetically, and in the ratio of iron added to carbon \r\neventually sequestered (Trull et al. 2015), which has implications \r\nboth for the success of this strategy and its cost. Estimates indicate \r\npotentially achievable net sequestration rates of 1-3 GtCO2 yr-1 for \r\niron fertilisation, translating into cumulative CDR of 100-300 GtCO2\r\nby 2100 (Ryaboshapko and Revokatova 2015; Minx et al. 2018), \r\nwhereas OF with macronutrients has a  higher theoretical \r\npotential of 5"


id: d30aeeda0bd53e736bdab5b7d428cf24
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vector_id: 30725
content:
"5  GtCO2 yr-1 (Harrison 2017; Gattuso et al. 2021). \r\nModelling studies show a maximum effect on atmospheric CO2 of \r\n15-45  parts  per  million volume in 2100 (Zeebe and Archer 2005; \r\nAumont and Bopp 2006; Keller et al. 2014; Gattuso et al. 2021)."


id: 71d23811f461aa88d4a4b6950b006741
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 15536
content:
"One natural mechanism of carbon transfer from the atmosphere to \r\nthe deep ocean is the ocean biological pump, which is driven by the \r\nsinking of organic particles from the upper ocean. These particles \r\nderive ultimately from primary production by phytoplankton and \r\nmost of them are remineralised within the upper ocean with only \r\na small fraction reaching the deep ocean where the carbon can be \r\nsequestered on centennial and longer timescales. Increasing nutrient \r\navailability would stimulate uptake of CO2 through phytoplankton \r\nphotosynthesis producing organic matter, some of which would be \r\nexported into the deep ocean, sequestering carbon. In areas of the \r\nocean where macronutrients (nitrogen, phosphorus) are available \r\nin sufficient quantities (about 25% of the total area), the growth \r\nof phytoplankton is limited by the lack of trace elements such as \r\niron. Thus, OF CDR can be based on two implementation options \r\nto increase the productivity of phytoplankton (Minx et al"


id: 2a5f32f3b2be8e9045d1a0984906b1f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 4096
content:
" 2018): \r\nmacronutrient enrichment and micronutrient enrichment. A  third \r\noption, highlighted in GESAMP (2019), is based on fertilisation for \r\nfish stock enhancement, for instance, as naturally occurs in eastern \r\nboundary current systems. Iron fertilisation is the best-studied OF \r\noption to date, but knowledge so far is still inadequate to predict \r\nglobal ecological and biogeochemical consequences."


id: 84237f564b7813e8c4e8965d6b6b9a5a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 18328
content:
"CDR through 'ocean alkalinity enhancement' or 'artificial ocean \r\nalkalinisation' (Renforth and Henderson 2017) can be based on: \r\n(i) the dissolution of natural alkaline minerals that are added directly \r\nto the ocean or coastal environments; (ii) the dissolution of such \r\nminerals upstream from the ocean (e.g.,  enhanced weathering, \r\nSection  12.3.1.2); (iii) the addition of synthetic alkaline materials \r\ndirectly to the ocean or upstream; and (iv) electrochemical processing \r\nof seawater. In the case of (ii), minerals are dissolved on land and the \r\ndissolution products are conveyed to the ocean through runoff and \r\nriver flow. These processes result in chemical transformation of CO2\r\nand sequestration as bicarbonate and carbonate ions (HCO3\r\n-\r\n, CO3\r\n2-) \r\nin the ocean. Imbalances between the input and removal fluxes \r\nof alkalinity can result in changes in global oceanic alkalinity and \r\ntherefore the capacity of the ocean to store carbon"


id: 79b76cb6653ec26f50ed6fa5c56e90fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" Such alkalinity\u0002induced changes in partitioning of carbon between atmosphere and \r\nocean are thought to play an important role in controlling climate \r\nchange on timescales of 1000 years and longer (e.g., Zeebe 2012). \r\nThe residence time of dissolved inorganic carbon in the deep ocean \r\nis around 100,000 years. However, residence time may decrease \r\nif alkalinity is reduced by a  net increase in carbonate minerals by \r\neither increased formation (precipitation) or reduced dissolution of \r\ncarbonate (Renforth and Henderson 2017). The alkalinity of seawater \r\ncould potentially also be increased by electrochemical methods, \r\neither directly by reactions at the cathode that increase the alkalinity \r\nof the surrounding solution that can be discharged into the ocean, or \r\nby forcing the precipitation of solid alkaline materials (e.g., hydroxide \r\nminerals) that can then be added to the ocean (e.g., Rau et al. 2013; \r\nLa Plante et al. 2021)."


id: c189f6c78261b3c34b118b3d990bc33e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 28039
content:
"Potentials: For OAE, the ocean theoretically has the capacity to \r\nstore thousands of  GtCO2 (cumulatively) without exceeding pre\u0002industrial levels of carbonate saturation (Renforth and Henderson \r\n2017) if the impacts were distributed evenly across the surface ocean. \r\nThe potential of increasing ocean alkalinity may be constrained by the \r\ncapability to extract, process, and react minerals (Section  12.3.1.2); \r\nthe demand for co-benefits (see below), or to minimise impacts \r\naround points of addition. Important challenges with respect to the \r\ndetailed quantification of the CO2 sequestration efficiency include \r\nnonstoichiometric dissolution, reversed weathering and potential pore \r\nwater saturation in the case of adding minerals to shallow coastal \r\nenvironments (Meysman and Montserrat 2017). Fuss et al. (2018) \r\nsuggest storage potentials of 1-100 GtCO2 yr-1"


id: 493cc50a73790572d1e16f61583e89ca
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vector_id: 8910
content:
" (Gonzalez and Ilyina \r\n2016) suggested that addition of 114 picomoles of alkalinity to the \r\nsurface ocean could remove 3400 GtCO2 from the atmosphere."


id: e7eca924b582163a2e3ef0f007667d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"Risks and impacts: For OAE, the local impact of increasing alkalinity \r\non ocean chemistry can depend on the speed at which the impacted \r\nseawater is diluted/circulated and the exchange of CO2 from the \r\natmosphere (Bach et al. 2019). Also, more extreme carbonate \r\nchemistry perturbations due to non-equilibrated alkalinity could \r\naffect local marine biota (Bach et al. 2019), although biological \r\nimpacts are largely unknown. Air-equilibrated seawater has a much \r\nlower potential to perturb seawater carbonate chemistry. However, \r\nseawater with slow air-sea gas exchange, in which alkalinity increases, \r\nconsumes CO2 from the surrounding water without immediate \r\nreplenishment from the atmosphere, which would increase seawater \r\npH and saturation states and may impact marine biota (Meysman \r\nand Montserrat 2017; Montserrat et al. 2017). It may be possible \r\nto use this effect to ameliorate ocean acidification"


id: da632096179ecd56a655a6679a51a24a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" Like enhanced \r\nweathering, some proposals may result in the dissolution products of \r\nsilicate minerals (e.g., silicon, iron, potassium, nickel) being supplied \r\nto ocean ecosystems (Meysman and Montserrat 2017; Montserrat \r\net al. 2017). Ecological and biogeochemical consequences of OAE \r\nlargely depend on the minerals used. When natural minerals such \r\nas olivine are used, the release of additional Si and Fe could have \r\nfertilising effects (Bach et al. 2019). In addition to perturbations \r\nto marine ecosystems via reorganisation of community structure, \r\npotentially adverse effects of OAE that should be studied include "


id: bcc5f92c0218407315806e86a8112b81
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"Status: OAE has been demonstrated by a small number of laboratory \r\nexperiments (in addition to enhanced weathering, Section 12.3.1.2). \r\nThe use of enhanced ocean alkalinity for carbon storage was first \r\nproposed by Kheshgi (1995) who considered the creation of highly \r\nreactive lime that would readily dissolve in the surface ocean and \r\nsequester CO2. An alternative method proposed the dissolution of \r\ncarbonate minerals (e.g., calcium carbonate) in the presence of waste \r\nflue gas CO2 and seawater as a means capturing CO2 and converting \r\nit to bicarbonate ions (Rau and Caldeira 1999; Rau 2011). House \r\net al. (2007) proposed the creation of alkalinity in the ocean through \r\nelectrolysis. The fate of the stored carbon is the same for these \r\nproposals (i.e., HCO3\r\n-\r\n and CO3\r\n2- ions), but the reaction pathway is \r\ndifferent"


id: 21233600a1612f095f6fc3431cca3c14
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" Enhanced weathering of silicate minerals such as olivine \r\ncould add alkalinity to the ocean, for example, by placing olivine sand \r\nin coastal areas (Meysman and Montserrat 2017; Montserrat et al. "


id: 4a94b185cf74f8e3ce0e005174164827
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"Trade-offs and spillover effects: There is a  paucity of research \r\non biological effects of alkalinity addition. The very few studies that \r\nhave explored the impact of elevated alkalinity on ocean ecosystems \r\nhave largely been limited to single species experiments (Cripps et al. \r\n2013; Gore et al. 2019) and a  constrained field study quantifying \r\nthe net calcification response of a  coral reef flat to alkalinity \r\nenhancement (Albright et al. 2016). The addition rate would have \r\nto be great enough to overcome mixing of the local seawater \r\nwith the ambient environment, but not sufficient to detrimentally \r\nimpact ecosystems. More research is required to assess locations in \r\nwhich this may be feasible, and how such a  scheme may operate \r\n(Renforth and Henderson 2017)"


id: 7175e1763ebc07a4ac189738c41f0d63
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content:
" The environmental impact of \r\nlarge-scale release of natural dissolution products into the coastal \r\nenvironment will strongly depend on the scale of olivine application, \r\nthe characteristics of the coastal water body (e.g., residence time) \r\nand the particular biota present (e.g., coral reefs will react differently \r\ncompared with seagrasses) (Meysman and Montserrat 2017). Model \r\nsimulations (Gonzalez et al. 2018) suggest that termination of OAE \r\nimplemented on a massive scale under a high CO2 emission scenario \r\n(Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5) might pose high risks to \r\nbiological systems sensitive to rapid environmental changes because \r\nit would cause a sharp increase in ocean acidification. For example, \r\nOAE termination would lead to a  decrease in surface pH in warm \r\nshallow regions where vulnerable coral reefs are located, and a drop \r\nin the carbonate saturation state"


id: 33dfa6be126e648fb43db54d9e75b780
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content:
" However, other studies with lower \r\nlevels of OAE have shown no termination effect (Keller et al., 2014)."


id: 526664c6a4a8dd6ed9572387a0adb654
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 10419
content:
"Marine biomass CDR options: Proposals have been made to grow \r\nmacroalgae (Duarte et al., 2017) for BECCS (N'Yeurt et al. 2012; Duarte \r\net al. 2013; Chen et al., 2015), to sink cultured macroalgae into the \r\ndeep sea, or to use marine algae for biochar (Roberts et al., 2015). \r\nNaturally-growing sargassum has also been considered for these \r\npurposes (Bach et al., 2021). Froehlich et al. (2019) found a substantial \r\narea of the ocean (about 48 million km2\r\n) suitable for farming seaweed. \r\nN'Yeurt et al. (2012) suggested that converting 9% of the oceans to \r\nmacroalgal aquaculture could take up 19 GtCO2 in biomass, generate \r\n12 Gt per annum of biogas, and the CO2 produced by burning the \r\nbiogas could be captured and sequestered. Productivity of farmed \r\nmacroalgae in the open ocean could potentially be enhanced through \r\nfertilising via artificial upwelling (Fan et al"


id: d87664779aae15657d699cc6964d8a83
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content:
", 2020) or through cultivation \r\nplatforms that dive at night to access nutrient-rich waters below the, \r\noften nutrient-limited, surface ocean. If the biomass were sunk, it is \r\nunknown how long the carbon would remain in the deep ocean and \r\nwhat the additional impacts would be. Research and development on \r\nmacroalgae cultivation and use is currently underway in multiple parts \r\nof the world, though not necessarily directly focused on CDR. "


id: 2ce506371c7e7f2330fc0d9b02a8974f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 4500
content:
"Trade-offs and spillovers: Some land-based biological CDR \r\nmethods, such as BECCS and A/R, demand land. Combining \r\nmitigation strategies has the potential to increase overall carbon \r\nsequestration rates (Humpenoder et al. 2014). However, these \r\nCDR methods may also compete for resources (Frank et al. 2017). \r\nLand-based mitigation approaches currently propose the use of \r\nforests (i) as a source of woody biomass for bioenergy and various \r\nbiomaterials and (ii)  for  carbon sequestration in vegetation, soils, \r\nand forest products. Forests are therefore required to provide \r\nboth provisioning (biomass feedstock) and regulating (carbon \r\nsequestration) ecosystem services. This multifaceted strategy has \r\nthe potential to result in trade-offs (Makkonen et al. 2015). Some \r\nland-based mitigation options could conflict with biodiversity goals, \r\ne.g., A/R using monoculture plantations can reduce species richness \r\nwhen introduced into (semi-)natural grasslands (Smith et al"


id: 6eec8b37d096533c9e69a196f0e704e8
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vector_id: 15076
content:
" 2019a; \r\nDooley et al. 2021). When trade-offs exist between biodiversity \r\nprotection and mitigation objectives, biodiversity is typically given \r\na lower priority, especially if the mitigation option is considered risk\u0002free and economically feasible (Portner et al. 2021). Approaches that \r\npromote synergies, such as sustainable forest management, reducing \r\ndeforestation rates, cultivation of perennial crops for bioenergy in \r\nsustainable farming practices, and mixed-species forests in A/R, can "


id: 39ddfa8b4f35507cf2d7d7aeae51cd0a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 6476
content:
"CO2 or GHG emissions in the long term has been assumed in most \r\nglobal mitigation scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC, net-negative \r\nemissions trajectories and BECCS as the main CDR method modelled \r\nto achieve these have not been mirrored by corresponding UNFCCC \r\ndecisions so far (Fridahl 2017; Mohan et al. 2021). Likewise, only \r\na few national long-term mitigation plans or legal acts entail a vision \r\nfor net-negative GHG emissions (Buylova et al. 2021), for example \r\nFinland, Sweden, Germany and Fiji.\r\nFor countries with emissions targets aiming for net zero or lower, the \r\ncore governance question is not whether CDR should be mobilised \r\nor not, but which CDR methods governments want to see deployed \r\nby whom, by when, at which volumes and in which ways (Minx et al. \r\n2018; Bellamy and Geden 2019)"


id: c39bce39044e80c816797f763bc9568d
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content:
" The choice of CDR methods and the \r\nscale and timing of their deployment will depend on the respective \r\nambitions for gross emissions reductions, how sustainability and \r\nfeasibility constraints are managed, and how political preferences \r\nand social acceptability evolve (Bellamy 2018; Forster et al. 2020; \r\nFuss et al. 2020; Waller et al. 2020; Clery et al. 2021; Iyer et al. 2021; \r\nRogelj et al. 2021). As examples of emerging CDR policymaking \r\nat (sub-)national levels show, policymakers are beginning to \r\nincorporate CDR methods beyond those currently dominating global \r\nmitigation scenarios, that is, BECCS and afforestation/reforestation \r\n(Bellamy and Geden 2019; Buylova et al. 2021; Schenuit et al. 2021; \r\nUden et al. 2021) (Box  12.1)"


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content:
" CDR policymaking is faced with the \r\nneed to consider method-specific timescales of CO2 storage, as \r\nwell as challenges in MRV and accounting, potential co-benefits, \r\nadverse side effects, interactions with adaptation and trade-offs \r\nwith SDGs (Dooley and Kartha 2018; McLaren et al. 2019; Buck \r\net al. 2020; Honegger et al. 2020; Brander et al. 2021; Dooley et al. \r\n2021; Mace et al. 2021) (Table  12.6). Therefore, CDR governance \r\nand policymaking are expected to focus on responsibly incentivising \r\nRD&D and targeted deployment, building on both technical and \r\ngovernance experience with already widely practised CDR methods \r\nlike afforestation/reforestation (Lomax et al. 2015; Field and Mach \r\n2017; Bellamy 2018; Carton et al. 2020; VonHedemann et al. 2020), as \r\nwell as learning from two decades of slow-moving CCS deployment \r\n(Buck 2021; Martin-Roberts et al. 2021; Wang et al. 2021)"


id: 25b20d1066d03f61293a9c2188fa18f9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" For some \r\nless well-understood methods and implementation options, such as \r\nocean alkalinisation or enhanced weathering, investment in RD&D \r\ncan help in understanding the risks, rewards, and uncertainties of \r\ndeployment (Nemet et al. 2018; Fajardy et al. 2019; Burns and Corbett \r\n2020; Goll et al. 2021)."


id: a8a95679810d6417a623658370ccb10c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 24064
content:
"As shown in Cross-Chapter Box  8  in this chapter, CDR fulfils \r\nmultiple functions in different phases of ambitious mitigation: \r\n(i) further reducing net CO2 or GHG emission levels in the near term; \r\n(ii)  counterbalancing residual emissions (from hard-to-transition \r\nsectors like transport, industry, or agriculture) to help reach net zero \r\nCO2 or GHG emissions in the mid term; (iii) achieving and sustaining \r\nnet-negative CO2 or GHG emissions in the long term. While inclusion \r\nof emissions and removals on managed land (LULUCF) is mandatory \r\nfor developed countries under UNFCCC inventory rules (Grassi et al. \r\n2021), not all Annex I countries have included land-based biological \r\nremovals when setting domestic mitigation targets in the past, \r\nbut updated NDCs for 2030 indicate a  shift, most notably in the \r\nEuropean Union (Gheuens and Oberthur 2021; Schenuit et al. 2021)"


id: 8af7f98fc241999b8b778b16508991a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" \r\nThe early literature on CDR governance and policy has been mainly \r\nconceptual rather than empirical, focusing on high-level principles \r\n(see the concerns listed in the introduction to Section 12.3) and the \r\nrepresentation of CDR in global mitigation scenarios (Section 3.2.2). \r\nHowever, with the widespread adoption of net zero targets and the \r\nrecognition that CDR is a necessary element of mitigation portfolios to \r\nachieve net zero CO2 or GHG emissions, countries with national net\u0002zero emissions targets have begun to integrate CDR into modelled \r\nnational mitigation pathways, increase research, development and \r\ndemonstration (RD&D) efforts on CDR methods, and consider CDR\u0002specific incentives and policies (Honegger et al. 2021b; Schenuit et al. \r\n2021) (Box 12.1). Nevertheless, this increasing consideration of CDR \r\nhas not yet extended to net-negative targets and policies to achieve \r\nthese. While the use of CDR at levels that would lead to net negative "


id: 9aa8bc31973ef008b804a108821ea992
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 21862
content:
"Since the enhancement of carbon sinks is a form of climate change \r\nmitigation (Honegger et al. 2021a), CDR governance challenges will \r\nin many respects be similar to those around emissions reduction \r\nmeasures, as will policy instruments like RD&D funding, carbon pricing, \r\ntax or investment credits, certification schemes, and public procurement \r\n(Sections 13.4, 13.6, 14.4 and 14.5). Effectively integrating CDR into \r\nmitigation portfolios can build on already existing rules, procedures \r\nand instruments for emissions abatement (Torvanger 2019; Fridahl \r\net al. 2020; Zakkour et al. 2020; Honegger et al. 2021b; Mace et al. 2021; \r\nRickels et al. 2021). Additionally, to accelerate RD&D and to incentivise \r\nCDR deployment, a  political commitment to formal integration into \r\nexisting climate policy frameworks is required (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement) (Lomax et al. 2015; Geden et al. 2018; Honegger \r\nand Reiner 2018; VonHedemann et al. 2020; Schenuit et al. 2021)"


id: 1a570e4344ccc3a2cac253e7dc4c0ad7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" \r\nTo avoid CDR being misperceived as a substitute for deep emissions \r\nreductions, the prioritisation of emissions cuts can be signalled and \r\nachieved with differentiated target setting for reductions and removals \r\n(Geden et al. 2019; McLaren et al. 2019). Similarly, sub-targets are \r\nconceivable for different types of CDR, to prioritise preferred methods \r\naccording to characteristics such as removal processes or timescales of \r\nstorage (Smith 2021)."


id: c4c4670d5caa4b3a0bf9409f0915a27e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28531
content:
"Private capital and companies, impact investors, and philanthropy \r\nwill play a  role in technical demonstrations and bringing down \r\ncosts, as well as creating demand for carbon removal products on \r\nvoluntary markets, which companies may purchase to fulfil corporate \r\nsocial responsibility-driven targets (Friedmann 2019; Fuss et al. 2020; \r\nJoppa et al. 2021). Niche markets can provide entry points for limited \r\ndeployment of novel CDR methods (Cox and Edwards 2019), but \r\ntargeting currently existing revenue streams by using CO2 captured \r\nfrom the atmosphere in Enhanced Oil Recovery and other utilisation \r\nroutes (Mackler et al. 2021; Meckling and Biber 2021) is contested, \r\nand highlights the importance of choosing appropriate system \r\nboundaries when assessing supply chains (Tanzer and Ramirez 2019; \r\nBrander et al. 2021)"


id: 55f0028d4d9839932bb0d60fb920d6a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11005
content:
" While the private sector will play a distinct role \r\nin scaling CDR, governments will need to commit to developing \r\ninfrastructure for the transport and storage of CO2, including \r\nfinancing, permitting, and regulating liabilities (Sanchez et al. 2018; \r\nMace et al. 2021; Mackler et al. 2021)."


id: 40fbec250f3a64136b6d62cd30aacfb6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"globally (Gomez and Ricketts 2013; HLPE 2017). A  'food system' \r\nincludes all food chain activities (production, processing, distribution, \r\npreparation, consumption of food) and the management of food \r\nloss and wastes. It also includes institutions and infrastructures \r\ninfluencing any of these activities, as well as people and systems \r\nimpacted (HLPE 2017; FAO 2018a). Food choices are determined \r\nby the food environment, consisting of the 'physical, economic, \r\npolitical and socio-cultural context in which consumers engage with \r\nthe food system to acquire, prepare and consume food' (HLPE 2017). \r\nFood system outcomes encompass food and nutrition, productivity, \r\nprofit and livelihood of food producers and other actors in food value \r\nchains, but also social outcomes and the impact on the environment \r\n(Zurek et al. 2018)"


id: 90be425b42251c3005de7e8b3c90a638
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20311
content:
" 'Sustainable healthy diets' have been defined \r\nby FAO and WHO (FAO and WHO 2019) as 'dietary patterns that \r\npromote all dimensions of individuals' health and wellbeing; have \r\nlow environmental pressure and impact; are accessible, affordable, \r\nsafe and equitable; and are culturally acceptable'."


id: ae6206b929d210963afbedc8d4746d48
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24961
content:
"Engagement of civil society organisations and publics will be important \r\nfor shaping CDR policy and deployment (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). Public awareness of CDR and its role in national net \r\nzero emissions strategies is generally very low (Cox et al. 2020a), and \r\nperceptions differ across countries and between methods (Bertram \r\nand Merk 2020; Spence et al. 2021; Sweet et al. 2021; Wenger et al. \r\n2021). When awareness increases, social processes will shape political \r\nattitudes on CDR (Shrum et al. 2020), as will efforts to frame particular \r\nCDR methods as 'natural' or 'technological' (Osaka et al. 2021), and the \r\npolicy instruments chosen to support CDR (Bellamy et al. 2019). Lack \r\nof confidence in CDR implementation options from both publics and \r\ninvestors, and lack of trust in project developers (Cox et al. 2020b) have \r\nhampered support for CCS (Thomas et al"


id: 1d1cb5c265ff63904828056684c09f9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2024
content:
" 2018) and are expected to \r\naffect deployment of CDR methods with geological storage (Gough and \r\nMander 2019). On local and regional scales, CDR projects will need to \r\nconsider air and water quality, impacts to human health, energy needs, \r\nland use and ecological integrity, and local community engagement \r\nand procedural justice. Bottom-up and community-driven strategies \r\nare important for deploying equitable carbon removal projects (Batres \r\net al. 2021; Hansson et al. 2021)."


id: 976b96ff1ca62c3a46e75bf086b47560
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 21352
content:
"The SRCCL estimated overall global anthropogenic emissions from \r\nfood systems to range between 10.8 and 19.1  GtCO2-eq yr-1, \r\nequivalent to 21-37% of total anthropogenic emissions (Mbow \r\net al. 2019; Rosenzweig et al. 2020a). The authors identified major \r\nknowledge gaps for the GHG emissions inventories of food systems, \r\nparticularly in providing disaggregated emissions from the food \r\nindustry and transportation. The food system approach taken in \r\nthe SRCCL (Mbow et al. 2019) evaluates the synergies and trade\u0002offs of food system response options and their implications for food \r\nsecurity, climate change adaptation and mitigation. This integrated \r\nframework allows the identification of fundamental attributes of \r\nresponses to maximise co-benefits, while avoiding maladaptation \r\nmeasures and adverse side effects"


id: 6b1d41b89cec61f25093bb2444228607
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14471
content:
" A  food system approach \r\nsupports the design of interconnected climate policy responses to \r\ntackle climate change, incorporating perspectives of producers \r\nand consumers. The SRCCL (Mbow et al. 2019) found that the \r\ntechnical mitigation potential by 2050 of demand-side responses \r\nat 0.7-8.0  GtCO2-eq yr-1 is  comparable to supply-side options at \r\n2.3-9.6 GtCO2-eq yr-1. This shows that mitigation actions need to go \r\nbeyond food producers and suppliers to incorporate dietary changes \r\nand consumers' behavioural patterns and reveals that producers and \r\nconsumers need to work together to reduce GHG emissions."


id: ada8e1835472a8dc5de52b86cb8da3bb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24860
content:
"This section complements Chapter 7 by reviewing recent estimates of \r\nfood system emissions and assessing options beyond the agriculture, \r\nforestry and land use sectors to mitigate food systems GHG \r\nemissions. A food system approach enables identification of cross\u0002sectoral mitigation opportunities including both technological and \r\nbehavioural options. Further, a system approach permits evaluation \r\nof policies that do not necessarily directly target primary producers \r\nor consumers, but other food system actors, with possibly higher \r\nmitigation efficiency. A food system approach was introduced in the \r\nIPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL) (Mbow et al. \r\n2019). Besides major knowledge gaps in the quantification of food \r\nsystem GHG emissions (Section 12.4"


id: 1cce61917115368ee97a92d2f1287c25
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1985
content:
"2), the SRCCL authors identified \r\nas major knowledge gaps the understanding of the dynamics \r\nof  dietary change (including behavioural patterns, the adoption of \r\nplant-based dietary patterns, and interaction with human health and \r\nnutrition of sustainable healthy diets and associated feedbacks); \r\nand instruments and mechanisms to accelerate transitions towards \r\nsustainable and healthy food systems."


id: 3dd8ac578a312f19641876f36008aa58
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7089
content:
"Though total production of calories is sufficient for the world \r\npopulation (Wood et al. 2018; Benton et al. 2019), availability and \r\naccess to food is unequally distributed, and there is a lack of nutrient\u0002dense foods, fruit and vegetables (Berners-Lee et al. 2018; KC et al. \r\n2018). In 2019, close to 750 million people were food insecure. An \r\nestimated 2  billion people lacked adequate access to safe and \r\nnutritious food in both quality and quantity (FAO et al. 2020). Two \r\nbillion adults are overweight or obese through inadequate nutrition, \r\nwith an upward trend globally (FAO et al. 2019). Low intake of fruit \r\nand vegetables is further aggravated by high intake rates of refined \r\ngrains, sugar and sodium, together leading to a  high risk of non\u0002communicable diseases such as cardiovascular disease and type \r\n2  diabetes (Springmann et al. 2016; Clark et al. 2018; Clark et al. \r\n2019; GBD 2017 Diet Collaborators et al. 2019; Willett et al"


id: 7b0c2094a10ff04f693914e35d73c059
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16956
content:
" 2019)\r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). At least 340 million children \r\nunder five years of age experience lack of vitamins or other essential "


id: 8fdb2004c1590b421db720d6c8c5b10b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20170
content:
"Bodirsky et al. (2020) find that the global prevalence of overweight \r\nwill increase to 39-52% of world population in 2050 (from 29% in \r\n2010; range across the Shared Socio-economic Pathways studied), \r\nand the prevalence of obesity to 13-20% (9% in 2010). The \r\nprevalence of underweight people was predicted to approximately \r\nhalve, with absolute numbers stagnating at 0.4-0.7 billion. Although \r\nmany studies represent future pathways of diets and food systems, \r\nthere are few holistic and consistent narratives and quantification \r\nof the future pathways of diets and food systems (Mitter et al. 2020; \r\nMora et al. 2020). Alternative pathways for improved diets and food \r\nsystems have been developed, emphasising climate, environmental \r\nand  health co-benefits (Bajzelj et al. 2014; Hedenus et al. 2014; \r\nDamerau et al. 2016; Weindl et al. 2017a; Weindl et al. 2017b; \r\nSpringmann et al. 2018a; Bodirsky et al. 2020; Prudhomme et al. \r\n2020; Hamilton et al"


id: 88e01525ae980f1b29e6b4aad550e66d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19069
content:
" 2021), reduced food waste and closing yield \r\ngaps (Bajzelj et al. 2014; Pradhan et al. 2014), nitrogen management \r\n(Bodirsky et al. 2014), urban and peri-urban agriculture (Kriewald \r\net al. 2019) and different sustainability targets (Henry et al. 2018b). \r\nThe UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has examined \r\nthree alternative food system scenarios: 'business as usual', 'towards \r\nsustainability', and 'stratified societies' (FAO 2018b). Others have \r\nidentified research priorities or changes in legislation needed to \r\nsupport adoption of improved food systems (Mylona et al. 2018)."


id: a2e56f03237c39613b1295c2b8eaae78
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23195
content:
"New calculations using the EDGAR v6.0 (Crippa et al. 2021a) and \r\nFAOSTAT (FAO 2021) databases provide territorial-based food \r\nsystem GHG emissions by country globally for the period 1990 \r\nto 2018 (Crippa et al. 2021b). The data are calculated based on \r\na combination of country-specific data and aggregated information \r\nas described by Crippa et al. (2021b) and Tubiello et al. (2021). The \r\ndata show that, in 2018, 17 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (95% confidence range \r\n13-23 GtCO2-eq yr-1, calculated according to Solazzo et al. (2020)) \r\nwere associated with the production, processing, distribution, \r\nconsumption of food and management of food system residues. \r\nThis corresponded to 31% (range 23-42%) of total anthropogenic \r\nGHG emissions of 54  GtCO2-eq yr-1. Based on the IPCC sectoral \r\nclassification (Table 12.7 and Figure 12.5), the largest contribution \r\nof food systems GHG emissions in 2018 was from agriculture, that \r\nis, livestock and crop production systems (6.3 GtCO2-eq yr-1, range \r\n2"


id: be7b5bf7320339cacb1eef3a8c271b22
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27522
content:
"6-11.9) and land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) \r\n(4.0  GtCO2-eq yr-1, range 2.1-5.9) (Figure  12.5). Emissions from \r\nenergy use were 3.9  GtCO2-eq yr-1 (3.6-4.4), waste management \r\n1.7  GtCO2-eq yr-1 (0.9-2.6), and industrial processes and product \r\nuse 0.9 GtCO2-eq yr-1 (0.6-1.1). The share of GHG emissions from \r\nfood systems generated outside the AFOLU (agriculture and LULUCF) \r\nsectors has increased over recent decades, from 28% in 1990 \r\nto 39% in 2018."


id: 9f22ce161774c970c8a48b5776790e28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 22572
content:
"Malnutrition aggravates susceptibility of children to various \r\ninfectious diseases (Franca et al. 2009; Farhadi and Ovchinnikov \r\n2018), and infectious diseases can also decrease nutrient uptake, \r\nthereby promoting malnutrition (Farhadi and Ovchinnikov 2018). \r\nContamination of food with bacteria, viruses, parasites and microbial \r\ntoxins can cause foodborne illnesses (Ricci et al. 2017; Abebe \r\net al. 2020; Gallo et al. 2020), foodborne substances such as food \r\nadditives and specific proteins can cause adverse reactions, and \r\ncontamination with toxic chemical substances used in agriculture \r\nand food processing can lead to poisoning or chronic diseases (Gallo \r\net al. 2020). Further, health risks from food systems may originate \r\nfrom the use of antibiotics in livestock production and the occurrence \r\nof anti-microbial resistance in pathogens (ECDC et al. 2015; Bennani \r\net al. 2020), or zoonotic diseases such as COVID-19 (Gan et al. 2020; \r\nPatterson et al. 2020; Vagsholm et al"


id: 55cce5063f0ef0d132bd47371ba00bb7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10981
content:
"refrigeration also contributes to GHG emissions through leakage of \r\nrefrigerants (fluorinated gases, or F-gases), although their contribution \r\nto food system GHG emissions is estimated to be minor (Crippa et al. \r\n2021b). The cold chain accounts for approximately 1% of global GHG \r\nemissions, but as the volume of refrigerators per capita in developing \r\ncountries is reported to be one order of magnitude lower than in \r\ndeveloped countries (19 m3\r\n versus 200 m3 refrigerated storage \r\ncapacity per 1000 inhabitants), the importance of refrigeration \r\nto total GHG emissions is expected to increase (James and James \r\n2010). Although refrigeration gives rise to GHG emissions, both \r\nhousehold refrigeration and effective cold chains could contribute \r\nto a substantial reduction in losses of perishable food and thus in \r\nemissions associated with food provision (University of Birmingham \r\n2018; James and James 2010)"


id: 52fde03ef99f7c2af72c789ab35d38be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10513
content:
" A trade-off exists between reducing \r\nfood waste and increased refrigeration emissions, with the benefits \r\ndepending on type of produce, location and technologies used \r\n(Sustainable Cooling for All 2018; Wu et al. 2019)."


id: 2fd8cc633b46990e4fb93a3baf960a2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4950
content:
"There is high variability in the GHG emissions of different food \r\nproducts and production systems (Figure  12.6). GHG emissions \r\nintensities  - measured using attributional lifecycle assessment, \r\nconsidering the full supply chain, expressed as CO2-eq per kg of \r\nproduct or per kg of protein  - are generally highest for ruminant \r\nmeat, cheese, and certain crustacean species (e.g.,  farmed shrimp \r\nand prawns, trawled lobster) (Nijdam et al. 2012; Clark and Tilman \r\n2017; Clune et al. 2017; Hilborn et al. 2018; Poore and Nemecek \r\n2018) (robust evidence, high agreement). Generally, beef from dairy \r\nsystems has a lower footprint (8-23 kgCO2-eq per 100 g protein than \r\nbeef from beef herds (17-94 kgCO2-eq per 100 g protein (Figure 12.6, \r\nre-calculated from Poore and Nemecek (2018) using AR6 GWPs \r\nbased on a  100year horizon) (medium evidence, high agreement)"


id: a06bead522ac24032ac1f755e0aea527
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22779
content:
" \r\nThe wide variation in emissions from beef reflects differences in \r\nproduction systems, which range from intensive feedlots with stock \r\nraised largely on grains through to rangeland and transhumance \r\nproduction systems. Dairy systems are generally more intensive \r\nproduction systems, with higher digestibility feed than beef systems. \r\nFurther, emissions from dairy systems are shared between milk and "


id: fe08421658dc2fcfc762b29ffed0ed90
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37492
content:
"Emissions intensities for farmed fish ranged from 2.4-11 kgCO2-eq \r\nper 100 g protein (Poore and Nemecek 2018). For Norwegian seafood, \r\nlarge differences have been found ranging from 1.1 kgCO2-eq kg-1\r\nedible product for herring to more than 8  kgCO2-eq kg-1 edible \r\nproduct for salmon shipped by road and ferry from Oslo to Paris \r\n(Winther et al. 2020). For capture fish, large differences in emissions \r\nhave been found, ranging from 0.2-7.9 kgCO2-eq kg-1 landed fish \r\n(Parker et al. 2018), although an environmental comparison of \r\ncapture fish to farmed foods should include other indicators such as \r\noverfishing. Plant-based foods generally have lower GHG emissions \r\n(-2.2 to +4.5 kgCO2-eq per 100 g protein) than farmed animal-based \r\nfoods (Nijdam et al. 2012; Clark and Tilman 2017; Clune et al. 2017; \r\nHilborn et al. 2018; Poore and Nemecek 2018) (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement)"


id: af3a8f0ae5e5b51dbbaf7eb8549f9efb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25086
content:
"In traditional production systems, especially in developing countries, \r\nlivestock serve multiple functions, providing draught power, fertiliser, \r\ninvestment and social status, besides constituting an important source \r\nof nutrients (Weiler et al. 2014). In landscapes dominated by forests \r\nor cropland, semi-natural pastures grazed by ruminants provide \r\nheterogeneity that supports biodiversity (Roos et al. 2016). Grazing \r\non marginal land and the use of crop residues and food waste can \r\nprovide human-edible food with lower demands for cropland (Roos \r\net al. 2016; Van Zanten et al. 2018; Van Hal et al. 2019)"


id: 4e73fc918163ff3ccce853d807b0c8d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9771
content:
" Animal protein \r\nrequires more land than vegetable protein, so switching consumption \r\nfrom animal to vegetable proteins could reduce the pressure on \r\nland resources and potentially enable additional mitigation through \r\nexpansion of natural ecosystems, storing carbon  while supporting \r\nbiodiversity, or reforestation to sequester carbon and enhance wood \r\nsupply capacity for the production of bio-based products substituting \r\nfossil fuels, plastics, cement, etc. (Schmidinger and Stehfest 2012; \r\nSearchinger et al. 2018b; Hayek et al. 2021). At the same time, \r\nalternatives to animal-based meat and other livestock products are \r\nbeing developed (Figure 12.6). Their increasing visibility in supermarkets \r\nand catering services, as well as falling production prices, could make \r\nmeat substitutes competitive in one to two decades (Gerhardt et al. \r\n2019). However, uncertainty around their uptake creates uncertainty \r\naround their effect on future GHG emissions."


id: acad5bd320284199a9142dbf91d3b4af
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"inventories: emissions are assigned to the country where they occur, \r\nnot where food is consumed (Crippa et al. 2021a; Crippa et al. 2021b) \r\n(Section 12.4.2.1). The colours of the bubbles indicate the relative \r\ncontribution of the following risk factors to deaths, according to \r\nthe classification used in the Global Burden of Disease Study: child \r\nand maternal malnutrition (red, deficiencies of iron, zinc or Vitamin \r\nA, or low birth weight or child growth failure), dietary risks (yellow, \r\nfor example diets low in vegetables, legumes, whole grains or diets \r\nhigh in red and processed meat and sugar-sweetened beverages) \r\nor high body mass index (blue). The combined contribution \r\nof these three risk factors to total deaths varies strongly and is \r\nbetween 28% and 88% of total deaths. Figure  12.7 shows that \r\ndietary risk factors are prevalent throughout all regions"


id: 7bb68489ae7de0a4e033ad793308447b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 17065
content:
"coincide with a significant change in food choices. They are based \r\non technologies that are not yet mature and are expected to \r\nrequire further innovation (Klerkx and Rose 2020), and/or mature \r\ntechnologies that might already be part of some food systems but are \r\nnot yet widely accepted and have transformative potential if applied \r\nat large scale, for example consumption of insects (Raheem et al. \r\n2019a). Many emerging technologies might be seen as a further step \r\nin agronomic development where land-intensive production methods \r\nrelying on the availability of naturally-available nutrients and water \r\nare successively replaced with crop variants and cultivation practices \r\nreducing these dependencies at the cost of larger energy input \r\n(Winiwarter et al. 2014). Others suggest a  shift to agroecological \r\napproaches combining new scientific insights with local knowledge \r\nand cultural values (HLPE 2019)"


id: 35b539de6e5438ece8c2b208d0976ad2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 5857
content:
" Food system transformation can \r\nlead to regime shifts or (fast) disruptions (Pereira et al. 2020) if driven \r\nby events that are out of control of private or public measures and \r\nhave a 'crisis' character (e.g., BSE) (Skuce et al. 2013)."


id: d89d7394f19dce4064b4dabb1d8a6354
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 31592
content:
"Pulses such as beans, chickpeas, or lentils, have a protein composition \r\ncomplementary to cereals, providing together all essential amino \r\nacids (Foyer et al. 2016; McDermott and Wyatt 2017). Bio-availability \r\nof proteins in foods is influenced by several factors, including \r\namino acid composition, presence of anti-nutritional factors, and \r\npreparation method (Hertzler et al. 2020; Weindl et al. 2020; Semba \r\net al. 2021). Soy beans, in particular, have a  well-balanced amino \r\nacid profile with high bio-availability (Leinonen et al. 2019). Pulses \r\nare part of most traditional diets (Semba et al. 2021) and supply up \r\nto 10-35% of protein in low-income countries, but consumption \r\ndecreases with increasing income and they are globally only a minor \r\nshare of the diet (McDermott and Wyatt 2017)"


id: 5052e9628541a75a22e61c979c815946
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 10084
content:
" Pulses play a key role \r\nin crop rotations, fixing nitrogen and breaking disease cycles, but \r\nyields of pulses are relatively low and have seen small yield increases \r\nrelative to those of cereals (Foyer et al. 2016; McDermott and Wyatt \r\n2017; Barbieri et al. 2021; Semba et al. 2021)."


id: c703c1fd094507b6b17be8ff78dcb96f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 28892
content:
"A diverse range of novel food products and production systems \r\nare emerging, that are proposed to reduce GHG emissions from \r\nfood production, mainly by replacing conventional animal-source food \r\nwith alternative protein sources. Assessments of the potential of \r\ndietary changes are given in Sections  5.3 and 7.4. Here, we assess \r\nthe GHG intensities of emerging food production technologies. This \r\nincludes products such as insects, algae, mussels and products from \r\nbio-refineries, some of which have been consumed in certain societies \r\nand/or in smaller quantities (Pikaar et al. 2018; Jonsson et al. 2019; \r\nGovorushko 2019; Raheem et al. 2019a; Souza Filho et al. 2019). The \r\nnovel aspect considered here is the scale at which they are proposed to \r\nreplace conventional food with the aim to reduce both negative health \r\nand environmental impacts"


id: ce4be3234cf397daace8eb1c53738594
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29984
content:
" To fully realise the health benefits, dietary \r\nshifts should also encompass a  reduction in consumption of added \r\nsugars, salt, saturated fats, and potentially harmful additives (Curtain \r\nand Grafenauer 2019; Fardet and Rock 2019; Petersen et al. 2021)."


id: d219f8b92167bd7442c250976d16b4ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 30582
content:
"products include cell tissues such as muscle cells to grow cultured\r\nmeat, fish or other cells (Post 2012; Rischer et al. 2020) and products \r\nwhere the micro-organisms will be eaten themselves (Pikaar et al. \r\n2018; Sillman et al. 2019; Schade et al. 2020). Single cell proteins, \r\ncombined with photovoltaic electricity generation and direct air \r\ncapture of carbon dioxide, are proposed as highly land- and energy\u0002efficient alternatives to plant-based protein (Leger et al. 2021). \r\nSome microbial proteins are produced in a  'bioreactor' and use \r\nHaber-Bosch nitrogen and vegetable sugars or atmospheric CO2 as \r\nsource of nitrogen and carbon (Pikaar et al. 2018; Simsa et al. 2019)"


id: c236e69d88e7149c9a8764d116762e52
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 28140
content:
" \r\nCultured meat is currently at the research stage and some challenges \r\nremain, such as the need for animal-based ingredients to ensure fast \r\nand effective growth of muscle cells; tissue engineering to create \r\ndifferent meat products; production at scale and at competitive \r\ncosts; and regulatory barriers (Post 2012; Stephens et al. 2018; Rubio \r\net al. 2019; Tuomisto 2019; Post et al. 2020). Only a few studies to \r\ndate have quantified the GHG emissions of microbial proteins or \r\ncultured meat, suggesting GHG emissions at the level of poultry meat \r\n(Tuomisto and Teixeira de Mattos 2011; Mattick et al. 2015; Souza \r\nFilho et al. 2019; Tuomisto 2019)."


id: 1b08c29ecd28af24f38a728b954a2b06
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1724
content:
"Plant-based meat, milk and egg analogues: Demand for plant\u0002based proteins is increasing and incentivising the development of \r\nprotein crop varieties with improved agronomic performance and/\r\nor nutritional quality (Santo et al. 2020). There is also an emerging \r\nmarket for meat replacements based on plant proteins, such as \r\npulses, cereals, soya, algae and other ingredients mainly used \r\nto imitate the taste, texture and nutritional profiles of animal\u0002source food (Kumar et al. 2017; Boukid 2021). Currently, the \r\nmajority of plant-based meat analogues is based on soy (Semba \r\net al. 2021). While other products still serve a niche market, their \r\nshare is growing rapidly and some studies project a  sizeable \r\nshare within a decade (Kumar et al. 2017; Jonsson et al. 2019). In \r\nparticular, plant-based milk alternatives have seen large increases \r\nin market share (Jonsson et al. 2019). A  LCA of 56 plant-based \r\nmeat analogues showed mean GHG intensities (farm to factory) \r\nof 0.21-0"


id: 7fdc8302c578340602e48ed21d7ff701
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17664
content:
"23 kgCO2-eq per 100 g of product or 20 g of protein for \r\nall assessed protein sources (Fresan et al. 2019). Higher footprints \r\nwere found in the meta-review by Santo et al. (2020). Including \r\npreparation, Meija et al. (2019) found higher emissions for burgers \r\nand sausages as compared to minced products."


id: 7184243adbeafeb2bd38ab898ed070c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15494
content:
"Different elements of food systems are currently governed by separate \r\npolicy areas that in most countries scarcely interact or cooperate \r\n(Termeer et al. 2018; iPES Food 2019). This compartmentalisation \r\nmakes the identification of synergetic and antagonistic effects \r\ndifficult and faces the possibility of failure due to unintended \r\nand unanticipated negative impacts on other policy areas and \r\nconsequently lack of agreement and social acceptance (Mylona \r\net al. 2018; Brouwer et al. 2020; Mausch et al. 2020; Hebinck et al. \r\n2021) (Section 12.4.5). This could be overcome through cooperation \r\nacross several policy areas (Sections 12.6.2 and 13.7), in particular \r\nagriculture, nutrition, health, trade, climate and environment, and an \r\ninclusive and transparent governance structure (Termeer et al. 2018; \r\nBhunnoo 2019; Diercks et al. 2019; Herrero et al. 2021; iPES Food \r\n2019; Mausch et al. 2020; Kugelberg et al. 2021), making use of \r\npotential spillover effects (Kanter et al"


id: 5eb6e51486f75c3ae391556083463c77
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12439
content:
"Taxes and subsidies: Food-based taxes have largely been \r\nimplemented to reduce non-communicable diseases and sugar intake, \r\nparticularly those targeting sugar-sweetened beverages (WHO 2019). \r\nMany health-related organisations recommend the introduction of \r\nsuch taxes to improve the nutritional quality of marketed products \r\nand consumers' diets (Wright et al. 2017; Park and Yu 2019; WHO \r\n2019), even though the impacts of food taxes are complex due to \r\ncross-price and substitution effects and supplier reactions (Cornelsen \r\net al. 2015; Gren et al. 2019; Blakely et al. 2020) and can have \r\na  regressive effect (WHO 2019). Subsidies and taxes are found to \r\nbe effective in changing dietary behaviour at levels above 20% price \r\nincrease (Cornelsen et al. 2015; Niebylski et al. 2015; Nakhimovsky \r\net al. 2016; Hagenaars et al. 2017; Mozaffarian et al. 2018), even \r\nthough longer-term effects are scarcely studied (Cornelsen et al"


id: 72712f8d0669fa7b8fbbb8841a342ed5
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vector_id: 15623
content:
" \r\n2015) and effects of sugar tax with tax rates lower than 20% have \r\nbeen observed for low-income groups (Temme et al. 2020)."


id: 3448a192358dcce15b567b6fcc95fe07
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5641
content:
"Where calories and ruminant animal-source food are consumed in \r\nexcess of health guidelines, reduction of excess meat (and dairy) \r\nconsumption is among the most effective measures to mitigate \r\nGHG emissions, with a high potential for environment, health, food \r\nsecurity, biodiversity, and animal welfare co-benefits (Hedenus \r\net al. 2014; Springmann et al. 2018a; Chai et al. 2019; Chen et al. \r\n2019; Kim et al. 2019; Willett et al. 2019; Semba et al. 2020; Theurl \r\net al. 2020; Hamilton et al. 2021; Stylianou et al. 2021) (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). Dietary changes are relevant for several \r\nSDGs, in addition to SDG 13 (climate action), including SDG 2 (zero \r\nhunger), SDG 3 (good health and well-being), SDG 6 (clean water \r\nand sanitation), SDG 12 (responsible consumption and production), \r\nSDG 14 (life below water) and SDG 15 (life on land) (Bruce M et al. \r\n2018; Mbow et al. 2019; Vanham et al. 2019; Herrero et al. 2021) \r\n(Section 12.6.1)"


id: 10d8fa3406d269f26a0ff87e0064ff5f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 127
content:
" However, behavioural change towards diets of lower \r\nenvironmental impact and higher nutritional qualities faces barriers \r\nboth from agricultural producers and consumers (Apostolidis and \r\nMcLeay 2016; Aiking and de Boer 2018; de Boer et al. 2018; Milford \r\net al. 2019), and requires policy packages that combine informative \r\ninstruments with behavioural, administrative and/or market-based \r\ninstruments, and are attentive to the needs of, and engage, all food \r\nsystem stakeholders including civil society networks, and change \r\nthe food environment (Cornelsen et al. 2015; Kraak et al. 2017; "


id: 371b76e461caa1cf486af0b9ec27624b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6056
content:
"Trade: Since the middle of the last century, global trade in agricultural \r\nproducts has contributed to boosting productivity and reducing \r\ncommodity prices, while also incentivising national subsidies for \r\nfarmers to remain competitive in the global market (Benton et al. \r\n2019). Trade liberalisation has been coined as an essential element \r\nof sustainable food systems, and as one element required to achieve \r\nsustainable development, that can shift pressure to regions where \r\nthe resources are less scarce (Wood et al. 2018; Traverso and Schiavo \r\n2020). However, Clapp (2017) argues that the main economic benefit \r\nof trade liberalisation flows to large transnational firms. Benton and \r\nBailey (2019) argue that low food prices in the second half of last \r\ncentury contributed to both yield and food waste increases, and to \r\na focus on staple crops to the disadvantage of nutrient-dense foods"


id: 417f1892402a58c8f0cae80e7901d370
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7706
content:
" \r\nHowever, global trade can also contribute to economic benefits such \r\nas jobs and income, reduce food insecurity and facilitate access to \r\nnutrients (Wood et al. 2018; Hoff et al. 2019; Traverso and Schiavo \r\n2020; Geyik et al. 2021) and has contributed to increased food \r\nsupply diversity (Kummu et al. 2020). The relevance of trade for food \r\nsecurity, and adaptation and mitigation of agricultural production, \r\nhas also been discussed in Mbow et al. (2019)."


id: 5fa4e3af9992493434849f12e562a895
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12627
content:
"Trade policies can be used to protect national food system measures, \r\nby requiring front-of-package labels, or to impose border taxes on \r\nunhealthy products (Thow and Nisbett 2019). For example, in the \r\nframe of the Pacific Obesity Prevention in Communities project, \r\nthe Fijian government implemented three measures (out of seven \r\nproposed) that eliminated import duties on fruits and vegetables, \r\nand imposed 15% import duties on unhealthy oils (Latu et al. \r\n2018). Trade agreements, however, have the potential to undermine \r\nnational efforts to improve public health (Unar-Munguia et al. 2019). \r\nGHG  mitigation efforts in food supply chains can be counteracted \r\nby GHG leakage, with a  general increase of environmental and \r\nsocial impact in developing countries exporting food products, and \r\na  decrease in the developed countries importing food products \r\n(Fellmann et al. 2018; Sandstrom et al. 2018; Wiedmann and Lenzen \r\n2018)"


id: 226883f562e90fa85ff22ec53793c878
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2862
content:
" The demand for agricultural commodities has also been \r\nassociated with tropical deforestation, though a robust estimate on \r\nthe extent of embodied deforestation in food commodities is not \r\navailable (Pendrill et al. 2019)."


id: 8b6cc5caa1120224f0e0bc0a0085dadd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 19456
content:
"Voluntary sustainability standards: Voluntary sustainability \r\nstandards are developed either by a  public entity or by private \r\norganisations to respond to consumers' demands for social and \r\nenvironmental standards (Fiorini et al. 2019). For example, the Dutch \r\nGreen Protein Alliance, an alliance of government, industry, NGOs and \r\nacademia, formulated a goal to shift the ratio of protein consumption \r\nfrom 60% animal source proteins currently to 40% by 2050 (Aiking \r\nand de Boer 2020), and Cool Food Pledge signatories (organisations \r\nthat serve food, such as restaurants, hospitals and universities) \r\ncommitted to a 25% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030, compared \r\nwith 2015 (Cool Food 2020). For firms, obtaining certification under \r\nsuch schemes can be costly, and costs are generally borne by the \r\nproducers and/or supply chain stakeholders (Fiorini et al. 2019). The \r\neffectiveness of private voluntary sustainability standards is uncertain. \r\nCazzolla Gatti et al"


id: 6278b930f15b83d413638fa84845dc2a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13055
content:
"Despite the fact that 1.5 billion people follow a vegetarian diet from \r\nchoice or necessity, and that the position statements of various \r\nnutrition societies point out that vegetarian diets are adequate if \r\nwell planned, few FBDGs give recommendations for vegetarian diets \r\n(Costa Leite et al. 2020). An increase in consumption of plant-based \r\nfood is a  recurring recommendation in FBDGs, though an explicit \r\nreduction or limit of animal-source proteins is not often included, \r\nwith the exception of red or processed meat (Temme et al. 2020). \r\nTo account for changing dietary trends, however, FBDGs need to \r\nincorporate sustainability aspects (Herforth et al. 2019). A  healthy \r\ndiet respecting planetary boundaries has been proposed by Willett \r\net al. (2019), though some authors have questioned the validity of the \r\nnutritional (Zagmutt et al. 2019) or environmental implications, such \r\nas water use (Vanham et al. 2020)"


id: 48cd32649aa52df880761d6be1b255f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8831
content:
" In October 2019, 14 global cities \r\npledged to adhere to this 'planetary health diet' (C40 Cities 2019)."


id: 3d1cfb97904e965a52df750a45603af8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6980
content:
"Education on food/nutrition and environment: Some consumers \r\nare reluctant to adopt sustainable healthy dietary patterns because of \r\na lack of awareness of the environmental and health consequences \r\nof what they eat, but also out of suspicion towards alternatives that \r\nare perceived as not 'natural' and that seem to be difficult to integrate \r\ninto their daily dietary habits (Hartmann and Siegrist 2017; Stephens \r\net al. 2018; McBey et al. 2019; Siegrist and Hartmann 2020) or simply \r\nlack of knowledge on how to prepare or eat unfamiliar foods (El Bilali \r\n2019; Aiking and de Boer 2020; Temme et al. 2020). Misconceptions \r\nmay contribute, for example, to the belief that packaging or 'food \r\nmiles' dominate the climate impact of food (Macdiarmid et al. 2016). \r\nHowever, spillover effects can induce sustainable behaviour from \r\n'entry points' such as concerns about food waste (El Bilali 2019)"


id: 44d8363eba298771fb050ab9c2aafbe4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8253
content:
" \r\nEarly-life experiences are crucial determinants for adopting healthy \r\nand sustainable lifestyles (Bascope et al. 2019; McBey et al. 2019), so \r\nimproved understanding of sustainability aspects in the education of \r\npublic health practitioners and in university education is proposed \r\n(Wegener et al. 2018). Investment in education, particularly of \r\nwomen (Vermeulen et al. 2020), might lower the barrier for stronger \r\npolicies to be accepted and effective (McBey et al. 2019; Temme et al. \r\n2020) (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 50f19b5013abae01a97e116aad012b7f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10186
content:
"as energy, sugar, saturated fat and fibre content; other labels warn \r\nagainst frequent consumption (e.g., in the 1990s Finland introduced \r\na  mandatory warning for products high in salt; the keyhole label \r\nwas introduced in Sweden in 1989 (Storcksdieck genannt Bonsmann \r\net al. 2020); and 'high in' (energy/saturated fat/sugar) labels were \r\nintroduced in Chile in 2016 to reduce obesity (Corvalan et al. 2019)). \r\nFront-of-package labels serve also as an incentive to industry to \r\nproduce healthier or more sustainable products, or can serve as \r\na marketing strategy (Van Loo et al. 2014; Apostolidis and McLeay \r\n2016; Kanter et al. 2018b). Carbon footprint labels can be difficult \r\nfor consumers to understand (Hyland et al. 2017), and simple, \r\ninterpretative summary indicators used on front-of-package labels \r\n(e.g.,  traffic lights) are more effective than more complex ones \r\n(Bauer and Reisch 2019; Ikonen et al"


id: 70b1e89053110620b2f607f17e4ab380
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15351
content:
" 2019; Temple 2019; Torris and \r\nMobekk 2019) (robust evidence, high agreement). Reviews find \r\nmixed results but overall a positive effect of food labels in improving \r\ndirect purchasing decisions (Hieke and Harris 2016; Sarink et al. 2016; \r\nAnastasiou et al. 2019; Shangguan et al. 2019; Temple 2019), and \r\nin raising levels of awareness, thus possibly increasing success of \r\nother policy instruments (Apostolidis and McLeay 2016; Samant and \r\nSeo 2016; Al-Khudairy et al. 2019; Miller et al. 2019; Temple 2019) \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: fd34fb35e069a8baafaab4f73a2a7e96
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37351
content:
"To support the policies outlined in Section  12.4.4, food system \r\ngovernance depends on the cooperation of actors across traditional \r\nsectors in several policy areas, in particular agriculture, nutrition, \r\nhealth, trade, climate, and environment (Termeer et al. 2018; Bhunnoo \r\n2019; Diercks et al. 2019; iPES Food 2019; Rosenzweig et al. 2020b). \r\nTop-down integration, mandatory mainstreaming, or boundary\u0002spanning structures like public-private partnerships may be introduced \r\nto promote coordination (Termeer et al. 2018). 'Flow-centric' rather \r\nthan territory-centric governance combined with private governance \r\nmechanisms has enabled codes of conduct and certification schemes \r\n(Eakin et al. 2017), for example the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm \r\nOil (RSPO), as well as commodity chain transparency initiatives and \r\nplatforms like Trase (Meijaard et al. 2020; Pirard et al. 2020)"


id: c86a2705dcb49b220f02d6c0452df467
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vector_id: 29100
content:
" Trade \r\nagreements are an emerging arena of governance in which improving \r\nGHG performance may be an objective, and trade agreements can \r\ninvolve sustainability assessments."


id: 1cac45915ff496d10d6a2bd83d60ff2b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 1960
content:
"Environmental considerations rank behind financial, health, or sensory \r\nfactors for determining citizens' food choices (Leach et al. 2016; \r\nHartmann and Siegrist 2017; Neff et al. 2018; Rose 2018; Gustafson \r\net al. 2019). There is evidence that choice architecture ('nudging') can \r\nbe effective in influencing purchase decisions, but regulators do not \r\nnormally explore this option (Broers et al. 2017). Examples of green \r\nnudging include making the sustainable option the default option, \r\nenhancing visibility, accessibility of, or exposure to, sustainable \r\nproducts and reducing visibility and accessibility of unsustainable \r\nproducts, or increasing the salience of healthy sustainable choices \r\nthrough social norms or food labels (Bucher et al. 2016; Wilson et al. \r\n2016; Broers et al. 2017; Al-Khudairy et al. 2019; Bauer and Reisch \r\n2019; Ferrari et al. 2019; Weinrich and Elshiewy 2019; Cialdini and \r\nJacobson 2021)"


id: a304f81b7a8bf210df6cb5b0e5c4a134
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 23214
content:
" Available evidence suggests that choice architecture \r\nmeasures are relatively inexpensive and easy to implement (Ferrari \r\net al. 2019; Torris and Mobekk 2019), they are a preferred solution \r\nif a restriction of choices is to be avoided (Wilson et al. 2016; Kraak \r\net al. 2017; Vecchio and Cavallo 2019), and can be effective (Arno \r\nand Thomas 2016; Bucher et al. 2016; Bianchi et al. 2018b; Cadario \r\nand Chandon 2018) if embedded in policy packages (Wilson et al. \r\n2016; Torris and Mobekk 2019) (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: fe8034e1a8e94de5e2962318e11323f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37579
content:
"Food systems governance has multiple targets and objectives, not \r\nleast contributing to the achievement of the SDGs. GHG emissions \r\nfrom food systems can be impacted by both interventions targeted at \r\ndifferent parts of the food system and interventions in other systems, \r\nsuch as reducing deforestation or promoting reforestation (Lee \r\net al. 2019). For example, policies targeting health can contribute \r\nto diet shifts away from red meat, while also influencing GHG \r\nemissions (Springmann et al. 2018b; Semba et al. 2020); national \r\nand local food self-sufficiency policies may also have GHG impacts \r\n(Kriewald et al. 2019; Loon et al. 2019). Cross-sectoral governance \r\ncould enhance synergies between reduced GHG emissions from food \r\nsystems and other goals; however, integrative paradigms for cross\u0002sectoral governance between food and other sectors have faced \r\nimplementation challenges (Delaney et al. 2018)"


id: 1aef06ce7b8688675a540b1c1fc8b32a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 1707
content:
" For example, in the \r\nlate 2000s, the water-energy-food nexus emerged as a framework \r\nfor cross-sectoral governance, but has not been well integrated into \r\npolicy (Urbinatti et al. 2020), perhaps because of perceptions that it \r\nis an academic concept, or that it takes a technical-administrative \r\nview of governance; simply adopting the paradigm is not sufficient "


id: 27e0c0af629cd94bf74ceaef797b56d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3684
content:
"Early characterisations of food systems governance featured a binary \r\ndistinction between global and local scales, but this has been \r\nreplaced by a relational approach where the local governance is seen \r\nas a process that relies on the interconnections between scales (Lever \r\net al. 2019). Cross-scalar governance is not simply an aggregation \r\nof local groups, but involves the telecoupling of distant systems; for \r\nexample, transnational NGO networks have been able to link coffee \r\nretailers in the global North with producers in the global South via \r\ninternational NGOs concerned about deforestation and social justice \r\n(Eakin et al. 2017). Global governance institutions like the Committee \r\non World Food Security can promote policy coherence globally and \r\nreinforce accountability at all levels (McKeon 2015), as can norm\u0002setting efforts like the Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible \r\nGovernance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (FAO 2012)"


id: 2b4313b514966181863a6493e7e92c79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 4241
content:
" \r\nGlobal multi-stakeholder processes like the UN Food Systems Summit \r\ncan foster the development of principles for guiding further actions \r\nbased on sound scientific evidence. The European Commission's Farm \r\nto Fork strategy aims to promote policy coherence in food policy at \r\nEU and national levels, and could be the exemplar of a  genuinely \r\nintegrated food policy (Schebesta and Candel 2020)."


id: 8e86cdaeb02e1b34da53db8a49585dc4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 19945
content:
"The specific policy mix covers a  range of policy instruments to enable changes in agro-food supply, processing and societal norms \r\n(Kugelberg et al. 2021). The government provides targeted funding and knowledge support to drive technological innovations on climate \r\nsolutions to reduce emissions from food and in the agriculture, forestry and land use sectors. In addition, the Finnish government applies \r\nadministrative means, such as legislation, advice, guidance on public procurement and support schemes to diversify and increase organic \r\nfood production to 20% of arable land, which in turn improve the opportunities for small-scale food production and steer public bodies \r\nto purchase local and organic food. The Finnish government applies educational and informative instruments to enable a shift to healthy \r\nand sustainable dietary behaviours"


id: 834c1ebf862bb8c349f731abd408f843
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18180
content:
" The policy objective is to reduce consumption of meat and replace it with other sources of protein, \r\naligned with nutrition recommendations and avoiding food waste. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, in collaboration with the \r\nFinnish Farmer's unions and the Union of Swedish-speaking Farmers and Forest Owners in Finland, ran a two-year multi-media campaign \r\nin 2018 with key messages on the sustainability, traceability and safety of locally-produced food (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry \r\n2021). A 'Food Facts' website project (Luke 2021), funded by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in collaboration with the Natural \r\nResources Institute Finland and the Finnish Food Safety Authority, helps to raise knowledge about food, which could shape responsible \r\nindividual food behaviour, for example choosing local and sustainable foods and reducing food waste."


id: 36102a420a9df986c02423188cd07f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 5911
content:
"A critical enabler for developing a shared food system strategy across sectors and political party boundaries was the implementation \r\nof a one-year inclusive, deliberative and consensual stakeholder engagement process. A wide range of stakeholders could exert real \r\ninfluence during the vision-building process, resulting in strong agreement on key policy objectives, and subsequently an important \r\nleverage point to policy change (Kugelberg et al. 2021)"


id: f8ae7af8086c9665d49bc64b8db2b212
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 36639
content:
" Moreover, cross-sectoral coordination of Food2030 and the government's \r\nwider climate action programmes are enabled by a number of institutional mechanisms and collaborative structures, for example the \r\nadvisory board for the food chain, formally established during the agenda-setting stage of Food2030, inter-ministerial committees \r\nto guide and assess policy implementation, and Our Common Dining Table, a multi-stakeholder partnership that assembles 18 food \r\nsystem actors to engage in reflexive discussions about the Finnish food system."


id: d78acf54fd31a75f833496547b589bf8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31433
content:
"Critical barriers to strategy and policy formulation include a lack of attention to integrated impact assessments (Kugelberg et al. 2021), \r\nwhich blurs a transparent overview of potential trade-offs and hidden conflicts. There were few policy evaluations from independent \r\norganisations to inform policymaking, reducing the opportunities for more progressive policy approaches. Monitoring and food policy \r\nevaluation is very close to the ministry in charge, which hampers critical thinking about policy measures (Hilden et al. 2014). In \r\naddition, there is a lack of standardised indicators covering the whole food system, which hinders comprehensive oversight of progress \r\ntowards a sustainable food system (Kanter et al. 2018a). Some of the problems related to monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) \r\nare typical for countries in the EU"


id: 72743899b67cbde3731656198db8c51c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15625
content:
" To improve, MRV will probably require structural changes, such as efforts to build up institutional \r\ncapacity and application of new technology, development of standardised indicators covering the whole food system, regulations \r\non transparency and verification, and mechanisms to enable reflexive discussions between business, farmers, public, NGOs and the \r\ngovernment (Meadowcroft and Steurer 2018; Kanter et al. 2020)."


id: 405df8dd1e2da50153cc6ed258df9078
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 7512
content:
"As reported in Chapter  3, in scenarios limiting warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) with no or limited overshoot, median area dedicated for \r\nenergy crops in 2050 is 1.99 (0.56 to 4.82) million square kilometres \r\n(Mkm2\r\n) and median forest area increased 3.22 (-0.67 to 8.90) Mkm2\r\nin the period 2019 to 2050 (5-95th percentile range, scenario category \r\nC1). For comparison, the total global areas of forests, cropland and \r\npasture (in 2015) are in the SRCCL estimated at about 40 Mkm2\r\n, \r\n15.6 Mkm2\r\n, and 27.3 Mkm2, respectively (additionally, 21 Mkm2 of \r\nsavannahs and shrublands are also used for grazing) (IPCC 2019a). \r\nThe SRCCL concluded that conversion of land for A/R and bioenergy \r\ncrops at the scale commonly found in pathways limiting warming to \r\n1.5degC or 2degC is associated with multiple feasibility and sustainability \r\nconstraints, including land carbon losses (high confidence). Pathways \r\nin which warming exceeds 1"


id: 66b0e814a5d4aac48a06249b8a3b5e56
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13750
content:
"5degC require less land-based mitigation, \r\nbut the impacts of higher temperatures on regional climate and \r\nland, including land degradation, desertification, and food insecurity, \r\nbecome more severe (Smith et al. 2019b)."


id: bb4806e179a619fbbd63ec42c4abeb7a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27013
content:
"Global integrated assessment models (IAMs) provide insights into \r\nthe roles of land-based mitigation in pathways limiting warming to \r\n1.5degC or 2degC; interaction between land-based and other mitigation \r\noptions such as wind and solar power; influence of land-based \r\nmitigation on food markets, land use and land carbon; and the role \r\nof BECCS vis-a-vis other CDR options (Chapter 3). However, IAMs do \r\nnot capture more subtle changes in land management and in the \r\nassociated industrial/energy systems due to relatively coarse temporal \r\nand spatial resolution, and limited representation of land quality and \r\nfeedstocks/management practices, interactions between biomass \r\nproduction and conversion systems, and local context, for example, \r\ngovernance of land use (Daioglou et al. 2019; Rose et al. 2020; Welfle \r\net al. 2020; Calvin et al. 2021)"


id: 3dd549eef18cbd51cb7e931ce40dc839
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7086
content:
" A/R have generally been modelled as \r\nforests managed for carbon sequestration alone, rather than forestry \r\nproviding both carbon sequestration and biomass supply (Calvin et al. \r\n2021). Because IAMs do not include options to integrate new biomass \r\nproduction with existing agricultural and forestry systems (Pare et al. \r\n2016; Mansuy et al. 2018; Cossel et al. 2019; Braghiroli and Passarini \r\n2020; Djomo et al. 2020; Moreira et al. 2020; Strapasson et al. 2020; \r\nRinke Dias de Souza et al. 2021), they may over-estimate the total \r\nadditional land area required for biomass production. On the other \r\nhand, some integrated biomass production systems may prove less \r\nattractive to landholders than growing biomass crops in large blocks, \r\nfrom logistic, economic, or other points of view (Ssegane et al. 2016; \r\nBusch 2017; Ferrarini et al. 2017)."


id: e4f1c87c707fe1e4d5c413e60ba9b3d2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33503
content:
"The character of land occupation, and, consequently, the associated \r\nimpacts (Section 12.5.3), vary considerably among mitigation options \r\nand also for the same option depending on geographic location, \r\nscale, system design and deployment strategy (Olsson et al. 2019; \r\nIoannidis and Koutsoyiannis 2020; van de Ven et al. 2021). Land \r\noccupation associated with different mitigation options can be large \r\nuniform areas (e.g., large solar farms, reservoir hydropower dams, or \r\ntree plantations), or more distributed, such as wind turbines, solar PV, \r\nand patches of biomass cultivation integrated with other land uses in \r\nheterogeneous landscapes (Cacho et al. 2018; Jager and Kreig 2018; \r\nCorrea et al. 2019; Englund et al. 2020a). Studies with broader scope, \r\ncovering total land use requirement induced by plant infrastructure, \r\nprovide a  more complete picture of land footprints. For example, \r\nWu et al"


id: 42022a57397ce0dbc1638e340bda21dc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 7788
content:
" (2021) quantified a land footprint for the infrastructure of \r\na pilot solar plant being three times the onsite land area. Sonter et al. \r\n(2020b) found significant overlap of mining areas (82% targeting \r\nmaterials needed for renewable energy production) and biodiversity \r\nconservation sites and priorities, suggesting that strategic planning \r\nis critical to address mining threats to biodiversity (Section 12.5.4) \r\nalong with recycling and exploration of alternative technologies that \r\nuse that use abundant minerals (Box 10.6)."


id: 2109fb2be5ccf064e40398e88716f9da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2635
content:
"Land occupation associated with mitigation options other than A/R \r\nand bioenergy is rarely quantified in global scenarios. Stressing \r\nlarge uncertainties (e.g.,  type of biomass used and share of solar \r\nPV integrated in buildings), Luderer et al. (2019) modelled land \r\noccupation and land transformation associated with a  range of \r\nalternative power system decarbonisation pathways in the context \r\nof a  global 2degC climate stabilisation effort. On a  per-megawatt \r\nhour (MWh) basis, bioelectricity with CCS was most land intensive, \r\nfollowed by hydropower, coal with CCS, and concentrated solar \r\npower (CSP), which in turn were around five times as land-intensive \r\nas wind and solar photovoltaics (PV). A review of studies of power \r\ndensities (electricity generation per unit land area) confirmed the \r\nrelatively larger land occupation associated with biopower, although \r\nhydropower overlaps with biopower (van Zalk and Behrens 2018)"


id: 21178790f23a6efb4aa4700fa00690a6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2641
content:
" \r\nThis study also quantifies the low land occupation of nuclear energy, \r\nsimilar to fossil energy sources."


id: af506f4b718c8e776801377b20c7c183
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25097
content:
"There are also situations where expanding mitigation is more \r\nor less decoupled from additional land use. The use of organic \r\nconsumer waste, harvest residues and processing side-streams in \r\nthe agriculture and forestry sectors can support significant volumes \r\nof bio-based products with relatively lower land-use change risks \r\nthan dedicated biomass production systems (Hanssen et al. 2019; \r\nSpinelli et al. 2019; Mouratiadou et al. 2020). Such uses can provide \r\nwaste management solutions while increasing the mitigation \r\nachieved from the land that is already used for agricultural and \r\nforest production. Bioenergy accounts for about 90% of renewable \r\nheat used in industrial applications, mainly in industries that can use \r\ntheir own biomass waste and residues, such as the pulp and paper \r\nindustry, food industry, and ethanol production plants (IEA 2020c) \r\n(Chapters  6  and 11)"


id: 322766c3774e9adca619a15f377734b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5301
content:
" Heat and electricity produced on-site from \r\nside-streams but not needed for the industrial processes can be sold \r\nto other users, such as district heating systems. Surplus waste and \r\nresidues can also be used to produce solid and liquid biofuels, or \r\nbe used as feedstock in other industries such as the petrochemical \r\nindustry (IRENA 2018; Lock and Whittle 2018; Thunman et al. 2018; \r\nIRENA 2019; Haus et al. 2020) (Chapters 6 and 11). Electrification \r\nand improved process efficiencies can reduce GHG emissions and \r\nincrease the share of harvested biomass that is used for production \r\nof bio-based products (Johnsson et al. 2019; Madeddu et al. 2020; \r\nLipiainen and Vakkilainen 2021; Rahnama Mobarakeh et al. 2021; \r\nSilva et al. 2021) (Chapter  11). Besides integrating solar thermal \r\npanels and solar PV into buildings and other infrastructure, floating \r\nsolar PV panels in, for example, hydropower dams (Ranjbaran et al. \r\n2019; Cagle et al. 2020; Haas et al. 2020; Lee et al"


id: 1028587fa0e42710d874d58f8abfd153
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30
content:
" 2020; Gonzalez \r\nSanchez et al. 2021), and over canals (Lee et al. 2020; McKuin et al. \r\n2021) could decouple renewable energy generation from land use \r\nwhile simultaneously reducing evaporation losses and potentially \r\nmitigating aquatic weed growth and climate change impacts on \r\nwater body temperature and stratification (Cagle et al. 2020; Exley \r\net al. 2021; Gadzanku et al. 2021; Solomin et al. 2021)."


id: 98f62044826a497885c60a5963c5bd65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21582
content:
"Mitigation options that are based on the use of biomass, that is, \r\nbioenergy/BECCS, biochar, wood buildings, and other bio-based \r\nproducts, can have different positive and negative effects depending \r\non the character of the mitigation option, the land use, the biomass \r\nconversion process, how the bio-based products are used and what \r\nother product they substitute (Leskinen et al. 2018; Howard et al. 2021; \r\nMyllyviita et al. 2021). The impacts of the same mitigation option can \r\ntherefore vary significantly and the outcome in addition depends on \r\nprevious land/biomass use (Cowie et al. 2021). As biomass-based \r\nsystems commonly produce multiple food, material and energy \r\nproducts, it is difficult to disentangle impacts associated with individual \r\nbio-based products (Ahlgren et al. 2015; Djomo et al. 2017; Obydenkova \r\net al. 2021)"


id: 7efab2dbb0bf30fee1601cd66ab566b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17532
content:
" As for other mitigation options, governance has a critical \r\ninfluence on outcome, but larger scale and higher expansion rate \r\ngenerally translates into higher risk for negative outcomes such as \r\ncompetition for scarce land, freshwater and phosphorous resources, \r\ndisplacement of natural ecosystems, and diminishing capacity of \r\nagroecosystems to support biodiversity and essential ecosystem \r\nservices, especially if produced without sustainable land management \r\nand in inappropriate contexts (Popp et al. 2017; Dooley and Kartha \r\n2018; Hasegawa et al. 2018; Heck et al. 2018; Humpenoder et al. 2018; \r\nFujimori et al. 2019; Hurlbert et al. 2019; IPBES 2019; Smith et al. \r\n2019b; Drews et al. 2020; Hasegawa et al. 2020; Schulze et al. 2020; \r\nStenzel et al. 2021) (medium evidence, high agreement)."


id: 48c6250015432d48fc50316dacd425bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8825
content:
"Removal of crop and forestry residues can cause land degradation \r\nthrough soil erosion and decline in nutrients and soil organic matter \r\n(Cherubin et al. 2018) (robust evidence, high agreement). These risks \r\ncan be reduced by retaining a proportion of the residues to protect the \r\nsoil surface from erosion and moisture loss and maintain or increase \r\nsoil organic matter (Section  7.4.3.6); incorporating a  perennial \r\ngroundcover into annual cropping systems (Moore et al. 2019); \r\nand by replacing nutrients removed, such as by applying ash from \r\nbioenergy combustion plants (Kludze et al. 2013; Harris et al. 2015; \r\nWarren Raffa et al. 2015; de Jong et al. 2017) while safeguarding \r\nagainst contamination risks (Pettersson et al. 2020) (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). Besides topography, soil, and climate \r\nconditions, sustainable residue removal rates also depend on the fate \r\nof extracted biomass"


id: b7f216970179c8216e5984b36aa87b98
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 26473
content:
" For example, to maintain the same level of soil \r\norganic carbon, the harvest of straw, if used for combustion (which \r\nwould return no carbon to fields), was estimated to be only 26% of the \r\nrate that could be extracted if used for anaerobic digestion involving \r\nreturn of recalcitrant carbon to fields (Hansen et al. 2020). Similarly, \r\nbiomass pyrolysis produces biochar which can be returned to soils to \r\ncounteract carbon losses associated with biomass extraction (Joseph \r\net al. 2021; Lehmann et al. 2021)."


id: 5354463cbfd63bc24a70889d461b15b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10577
content:
"Land occupation associated with mitigation options can present \r\nchallenges related to impacts and trade-offs, but can also provide \r\nopportunities and in different ways support the achievement of \r\nadditional societal objectives, including adaptation to climate \r\nchange. This section focuses on mitigation options that have \r\nsignificant risks, impacts and/or co-benefits with respect to land \r\nresources, food security and the environment. Bioenergy (with or \r\nwithout CCS), biochar and bio-based products require biomass \r\nfeedstocks that can be obtained from purpose-grown crops, \r\nresidues from conventional agriculture and forestry systems, or \r\nfrom biomass wastes, each with different implications for the land. \r\nHere we consider separately (i) 'biomass-based systems', including \r\ndedicated biomass crops (e.g.,  perennial grasses, short rotation \r\nwoody crops) and biomass produced as a co-product of conventional \r\nagricultural production (e.g"


id: d6f27b68826d14022700de2f3cae5fab
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vector_id: 31323
content:
"the mitigation value (robust evidence, high agreement) (Liu et al. 2014; \r\nEl Akkari et al. 2018). Cultivation of conventional oil, sugar, and starch \r\ncrops tends to have larger negative impact than lignocellulosic crops \r\n(Nunez-Regueiro et al. 2020). Social and environmental outcomes can \r\nbe enhanced through integration of suitable plants (such as perennial \r\ngrasses and short rotation woody crops) into agricultural landscapes \r\n(within crop rotations or through strategic localisation, for example as \r\ncontour belts, along fencelines and riparian buffers). Such integrated \r\nsystems can provide shelter for livestock, retention of nutrients and \r\nsediment, erosion control, pollination, pest and disease control, and \r\nflood regulation (robust evidence, high agreement) (Berndes et al. \r\n2008; Christen and Dalgaard 2013; Asbjornsen et al. 2014; Holland \r\net al. 2015; Ssegane et al. 2015; Dauber and Miyake 2016; Milner et al. \r\n2016; Ssegane and Negri 2016; Styles et al"


id: e4d13bdc6d95e810f0a097722ececd10
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33481
content:
" 2016; Zheng et al. 2016; \r\nFerrarini et al. 2017; Crews et al. 2018; Henry et al. 2018a; Zalesny \r\net al. 2019; Osorio et al. 2019; Englund et al. 2020b; Englund et al. \r\n2021) (Figure 12.8, Box 12.3, and Cross-Working Group Box 3 in this \r\nchapter). Many of the land use practices described above align with \r\nagroecology principles (AR6 WGII Section 5.14, AR6 WGII Box 5.11 \r\nand AR6 WGII Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL) and can simultaneously \r\ncontribute to climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation \r\nand reduced risk of land degradation (IPCC 2019a) (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement)."


id: cf8a97b1ccc0206c3247b9f7a5098516
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 30187
content:
"waste, manure) produces a nutrient-rich digestate and biogas that can \r\nbe utilised for heating and cooking or upgraded for use in electricity \r\ngeneration, industrial processes, or as transportation fuel (Chapter 6) \r\n(Parsaee et al. 2019; Hamelin et al. 2021). The digestate is a rich source \r\nof nitrogen, phosphorus and other plant nutrients, and its application \r\nto farmland returns exported nutrients as well as carbon (Cowie \r\n2020b). Studies have identified potential risks, including manganese \r\ntoxicity, copper and zinc contamination, and ammonia emissions, \r\ncompared with application of undigested animal manure  (Nkoa \r\n2014). Although the anaerobic digestion process reduces pathogen \r\nrisk compared with undigested manure feedstocks, it does not destroy \r\nall pathogens (Nag et al. 2019). Leakage of methane is a significant \r\nrisk that needs to be managed, to ensure mitigation potential is \r\nachieved  (Bruun et al. 2014)"


id: 391c47c331dc14480489435d7e29715f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6359
content:
" Anaerobic digestion of wastewater, \r\nsuch as sugarcane vinasse, reduces methane emissions and pollution \r\nloading as well as producing biogas (Parsaee et al. 2019)."


id: 70fc2f3bced9592ccfdea65d628e846
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15412
content:
"et al. 2018). Restoration, seeking to establish native vegetation with \r\nthe aim to maximise ecosystem integrity, landscape connectivity, \r\nand conservation of on-ground carbon stock, will have higher \r\nbiodiversity benefits than rehabilitation measures (Lin et al. 2013). \r\nHowever, sequestration rate declines as forests mature, and the \r\nsequestered carbon is vulnerable to loss through disturbance such as \r\nwildfire, so there is a higher risk of reversal of the mitigation benefit \r\ncompared with use of biomass for substitution of fossil fuels and \r\nGHG-intensive building materials (Russell and Kumar 2017; Dugan \r\net al. 2018; Anderegg et al. 2020). Trade-offs between different \r\necosystem services, and between societal objectives including \r\nclimate change mitigation and adaptation, can be managed through \r\nintegrated landscape approaches that aim to create a mosaic of land \r\nuses, including conservation, agriculture, forestry and settlements \r\n(Freeman et al"


id: f7d18b831bde93ec2ac5ff93aff139ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" 2015; Nielsen 2016; Reed et al. 2016; Sayer et al. \r\n2017) where each is sited with consideration of land potential and \r\nsocio-economic objectives and context (Cowie et al. 2018) (limited \r\nevidence, high agreement)."


id: d652911f2569e49ea84625060448c3aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 31235
content:
"Biorefineries can convert biomass  to food, feed and biomaterials \r\nalong with bioenergy  (Aristizabal-Marulanda and Cardona \r\nAlzate 2019; Schmidt et al. 2019).  Biorefinery plants are \r\ncommonly  characterised  by high process integration to achieve \r\nhigh resource use efficiency, minimise waste production and energy \r\nrequirements, and maintain flexibility  towards  changing markets \r\nfor raw materials and products  (Schmidt et al. 2019). Emerging \r\ntechnologies can convert biomass that is indigestible for monogastric \r\nanimals or humans (e.g., algae, grass, clover or alfalfa) into food and \r\nfeed products. For example, lactic acid bacteria can facilitate the \r\nuse of green plant biomass such as grasses and clover to produce \r\na  protein concentrate suitable for animal feed and other products \r\nfor material or energy use (Lubeck and Lubeck 2019)"


id: 9a12ec65777db6c5582327c6419db67a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 21768
content:
" Selection of \r\ncrops suitable for co-production of protein feed along with biofuels \r\nand other bio-based products can significantly reduce the land \r\nconversion pressure by reducing the need to cultivate other crops \r\n(e.g., soybean) for animal feed (Bentsen and Moller 2017; Solati et al. \r\n2018). Thus, such solutions, using alternatives to high-input, high\u0002emissions grain-based feed, can enable sustainable intensification of \r\nagricultural systems with reduced environmental impacts (Jorgensen \r\nand Laerke 2016). The use of seaweed and algae as biorefinery \r\nfeedstock can facilitate recirculation of nutrients from waters to \r\nagricultural land, thus reducing eutrophication while substituting \r\npurpose-grown feed (Thomas et al. 2021)."


id: 5b4db138ab67e05d7dfb6c36129b7236
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"Impacts of biomass production and A/R on the hydrological cycle \r\nand water availability and quality depend on scale, location, \r\nprevious land use/cover and type of biomass production system. \r\nFor example, extraction of logging residues in forests managed for \r\ntimber production has little effect on hydrological flows, while land\u0002use change to establish dedicated biomass production can have \r\na significant effect (Teter et al. 2018; Drews et al. 2020). Deployment \r\nof A/R can affect temperature, albedo and precipitation locally and \r\nregionally, and can mitigate or enhance the effects of climate change \r\nin the affected areas (Stenzel et al. 2021b) (Section  7.2.4). A/R \r\nactivities can increase evapotranspiration, impacting groundwater \r\nand downstream water availability, but can also result in increased \r\ninfiltration to groundwater and improved water quality (Farley \r\net al. 2005; Zhang et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2017; Lu et al"


id: 1fe2f4a0a70e53f792f90aee5fcf946b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" 2018) \r\nand can be beneficial where historical clearing has caused soil \r\nsalinisation and stream salinity (Farrington and Salama 1996; Marcar \r\n2016). There is limited evidence that very large-scale land-use or \r\nvegetation cover changes can alter regional climate and precipitation \r\npatterns, for example downwind precipitation depends on upwind \r\nevapotranspiration from forests and other vegetation (Keys et al. \r\n2016; Ellison et al. 2017; van der Ent and Tuinenburg 2017)."


id: e89cac1a6386b4757253169b18b14000
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34108
content:
"Pyrolysis can convert organic wastes, including agricultural and \r\nforestry residues, food waste, manure, poultry litter and sewage \r\nsludge, into combustible gas and biochar, which can be used \r\nas a  soil amendment (Joseph et al. 2021; Schmidt et al. 2021) \r\n(Chapter  7). Pyrolysis facilitates nutrient recovery from biomass \r\nresidues, enabling return to farmland as biochar, noting, however, \r\nthat a large fraction of nitrogen is lost during pyrolysis (Joseph et al. \r\n2021). Conversion to biochar aids the logistics of transport and land \r\napplication of materials such as sewage sludge, by reducing mass \r\nand volume, improving flow properties, stability and uniformity, \r\nand decreasing odour.  Pyrolysis is well suited for materials that \r\nmay be contaminated with pathogens, microplastics, and per- and \r\npolyfluoroalkyl substances, such as abattoir and sewage wastes, \r\nremoving these risks, and reduces availability of heavy metals in \r\nfeedstock (Joseph et al. 2021)"


id: 7a8f755f5ebc223133f550adb9ec447c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 16857
content:
"that build carbon in vegetation and soil, and can provide impetus \r\nfor land-use planning to achieve multifunctional landscapes that \r\nintegrate land-based mitigation with other land uses (Box  12.3). \r\nThe application of sustainable land management practices that build \r\nsoil carbon will enhance the productivity and resilience of crop and \r\nforestry systems, thereby enhancing biomass production (Henry \r\net al. 2018a). Non-bio-based mitigation options can enhance land\u0002based mitigation: (i) enhanced weathering, that is, adding ground \r\nsilicate rock to soil to take up atmospheric CO2 through chemical \r\nweathering (Section 12.3), could supply nutrients and alleviate soil \r\nacidity, thereby boosting productivity of biomass crops and A/R, \r\nparticularly when combined with biochar application (Haque et al. \r\n2019; De Oliveira Garcia et al. 2020; Buss et al"


id: 3e266a8c422059a327ce92bb107fbadc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7146
content:
" 2021); and (ii) land \r\nrehabilitation and enhanced landscape diversity through production \r\nof biomass crops could simultaneously contribute to climate change \r\nmitigation, climate change adaptation, addressing land degradation, \r\nincreasing biodiversity and improving food security in the longer \r\nterm (Mackey et al. 2020) (Chapter 7)."


id: 7d536bb9ca9c932ee62394deb081e498
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 17293
content:
"biochar-carbon for hundreds to thousands of years and can further \r\nincrease soil carbon by reducing mineralisation of soil organic matter \r\nand newly added plant carbon (Singh et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2016a; \r\nWeng et al. 2017; Lehmann et al. 2021). Biochars can improve \r\na  range of soil properties, but effects vary depending on biochar \r\nproperties, which are determined by feedstock and production \r\nconditions (Singh et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2016a), and on the soil \r\nproperties where biochar is applied (Razzaghi et al. 2020). Biochars \r\ncan increase nutrient availability, reduce leaching losses (Singh et al. \r\n2010; Haider et al. 2017) and enhance crop yields, particularly in \r\ninfertile acidic soils (Jeffery et al. 2017), thus supporting food security \r\nunder changing climate"


id: acb6678d344019095b334eb6fa3403f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 24722
content:
" Biochars can enhance infiltration and soil \r\nwater-holding capacity, reducing runoff and leaching, increasing \r\nwater retention in the landscape and improving drought tolerance \r\nand resilience to climate change (Quin et al. 2014; Omondi et al. \r\n2016). (See Chapter 7 for a review of biochar's potential contribution \r\nto climate change mitigation.)"


id: 9f95e69c791d18bfe682fc80f1115e6b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22647
content:
"Mortality and disturbance risks to birds, bats and insects are major \r\necological concerns associated with wind farms (Thaxter et al. \r\n2017; Cook et al. 2018; Heuck et al. 2019; Coppes et al. 2020; Choi \r\net al. 2020; Fernandez-Bellon 2020; Marques et al. 2020; Voigt 2021). \r\nCareful siting is critical (May et al. 2021), while painting blades to \r\nincrease the visibility can also reduce mortality due to collision (May \r\net al. 2020). Theoretical studies have suggested that wind turbines \r\ncould lead to warmer night temperatures due to atmospheric mixing \r\n(Keith et al. 2004), later confirmed through observation (Zhou et al. \r\n2013), although Vautard et al. (2014) found limited impact at scales \r\nconsistent with climate policies. More recent studies report mixed \r\nresults: indications that the warming effect could be substantial with \r\nwidespread deployment (Miller and Keith 2018b) and conversely \r\nlimited impacts on regional climate at 20% of US electricity from \r\nwind. (Pryor et al"


id: a88bc1bcc02339f71a7b9ad9d57ba66e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 24047
content:
"PV can be deployed in ways that enhance agriculture: for example, \r\nHassanpour Adeh et al. (2018) found that biomass production and \r\nwater use efficiency of pasture increased under elevated solar \r\npanels. PV systems under development may achieve significant \r\npower generation without diminishing agricultural output (Miskin \r\net al. 2019). Global mapping of solar panel efficiency showed that \r\ncroplands, grasslands and wetlands are located in regions with the \r\ngreatest solar PV potential (Adeh et al. 2019). Dual-use agrivoltaic \r\nsystems are being developed that overcome previously recognised \r\nnegative impact on crop growth, mainly due to shadows (Marrou et al. \r\n2013a; Marrou et al. 2013b; Armstrong et al. 2016), thus facilitating \r\nsynergistic co-location of solar photovoltaic power and cropping \r\n(Adeh et al. 2019; Miskin et al. 2019)"


id: d0054f785c6459f7a57cd7705e3608e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30260
content:
" Assessment of the potential for \r\noptimising deployment of solar PV and energy crops on abandoned \r\ncropland areas produced an estimate of the technical potential for \r\noptimal combination at 125 EJ per year (Leirpoll et al. 2021)."


id: 9a4e7a25f30038be9e91b73d9a59dd6c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 21806
content:
"Reservoir hydropower projects submerge areas as dams are \r\nestablished for water storage. Hydropower can be associated with \r\nsignificant and highly varying land occupation and carbon footprint \r\n(Poff and Schmidt 2016; Scherer and Pfister 2016a; dos Santos \r\net al. 2017; Ocko and Hamburg 2019). The flooding of land causes \r\nCH4 emissions due to the anaerobic decomposition of submerged \r\nvegetation and there is also a  loss of carbon sequestration due \r\nto mortality of submerged vegetation. The size of GHG emissions \r\ndepends on the amount of vegetation submerged. The carbon \r\nin accumulated sediments in reservoirs may be released to the \r\natmosphere as CO2 and CH4 upon decommissioning of dams, and \r\nwhile uncertain, estimates indicate that these emissions can make up \r\na significant part of the cumulative GHG emissions of hydroelectric \r\npower plants (Moran et al. 2018; Almeida et al. 2019; Ocko and \r\nHamburg 2019)"


id: a8371868134ed56210c3d4532e63622e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23984
content:
" Positive radiative forcing due to lower albedo of \r\nhydropower reservoirs compared to surrounding landscapes can \r\nreduce mitigation contribution significantly (Wohlfahrt et al. 2021)."


id: 422db87806f11a5d7d77ca0fd906c419
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7811
content:
"Deserts can be well suited for solar PV and CSP farms, especially at \r\nlow latitudes where global horizontal irradiance is high, as there is \r\nlower competition for land and land carbon loss is minimal, although \r\nremote locations may pose challenges for power distribution (Xu \r\net al. 2016). Solar arrays can reduce the albedo, particularly in \r\ndesert landscapes, which can lead to local temperature increases \r\nand regional impacts on wind patterns (Millstein and Menon 2011). \r\nModelling studies suggest that large-scale wind and solar farms, for \r\nexample in the Sahara (Li et al. 2018), could increase rainfall through \r\nreduced albedo and increased surface roughness, stimulating \r\nvegetation growth and further increasing regional rainfall (Li et al. \r\n2018) (limited evidence). Besides impacts at the site of deployment, \r\nwind and solar power affect land through mining of critical minerals \r\nrequired by these technologies (Viebahn et al. 2015; McLellan et al. \r\n2016; Carrara et al"


id: 330ab82778ce7b816a2d640087e573d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 5458
content:
"Hydropower can have high water usage due to evaporation from \r\ndams (Scherer and Pfister 2016b). Hydropower projects may impact \r\naquatic ecology and biodiversity, necessitate the relocation of local \r\ncommunities living within or near the reservoir or construction \r\nsites, and affect downstream communities (in positive or negative \r\nways) (Moran et al. 2018; Barbarossa et al. 2020). Displacement \r\nas well as resettlement schemes can have both socio-economic \r\nand environmental consequences including those associated with \r\nestablishment of new agricultural land (Ahsan and Ahmad 2016; \r\nNguyen et al. 2017). Dam construction may also stimulate migration \r\ninto the affected region, which can lead to deforestation and other \r\nnegative impacts (Chen et al. 2015). Impacts can be mitigated \r\nthrough basin-scale dam planning that considers GHG emissions \r\nalong with social and ecological effects (Almeida et al. 2019)"


id: c04324b4dacdfc5f10535f63697c1a38
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27807
content:
" Land \r\noccupation is minimal for run-of-river hydropower installations, but \r\nwithout storage they have no resilience to drought and installations \r\ninhibit dispersal and migration of organisms (Lange et al. 2018). \r\nReservoir hydropower schemes can regulate water flows and reduce \r\nflood damage to agricultural production (Amjath-Babu et al. 2019). \r\nOn the other hand, severe flooding due to failure of hydropower \r\ndams has caused fatalities, damage to infrastructure and loss of \r\nproductive land (Farrington and Salama 1996; Farley et al. 2005; \r\nZhang et al. 2016; Marcar 2016; Zhang et al. 2017; Kalinina et al. \r\n2018; Lu et al. 2018)."


id: 80fc980aa0af1e4f8030f753b42ca2db
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17814
content:
"Nuclear power has land impacts and risks associated with mining \r\noperations (Falck 2015; Winde et al. 2017; Srivastava et al. 2020) and \r\ndisposal of spent fuel (IAEA 2006a; Ewing et al. 2016; Bruno et al. \r\n2020), but the land occupation is small compared to many other \r\nmitigation options. Substantial volumes of water are required for \r\ncooling (Liao et al. 2016), as for all thermal power plants, but most \r\nof this water is returned to rivers and other water bodies after use \r\n(Sesma Martin and Rubio-Varas 2017). Negative impacts on aquatic \r\nsystems can occur due to chemical and thermal pollution loading \r\n(Fricko et al. 2016; Raptis et al. 2016; Bonansea et al. 2020). The major \r\nrisk to land from nuclear power is that a nuclear accident leads to \r\nradioactive contamination. An extreme example, the 1986 Chernobyl \r\naccident in Ukraine, resulted in radioactive contamination across \r\nEurope"


id: 95cbcd6e8d1fc9a7013c3e08ed5fd9e2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21069
content:
" Most of the fallout concentrated in Belarus, Ukraine and \r\nRussia, where some 125,000 km2\r\n of land (more than a third of which \r\nwas in agricultural use) was contaminated. About 350,000 people \r\nwere relocated away from these areas (IAEA 2006b; Sovacool 2008). \r\nAbout 116,000 people were permanently evacuated from the 4200 \r\nkm Chernobyl exclusion zone (IAEA 2006a). New reactor designs \r\nwith passive and enhanced safety systems reduce the risk of such \r\naccidents significantly (Section 6.4.2.4). An example of alternatives \r\nto land reclamation for productive purposes, a  national biosphere "


id: 82ebb47854c7e52c979815736ac15a21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18123
content:
"Governance challenges include the lack of transparent greenhouse \r\ngas accounting for mining activities (Lee et al. 2020a), and threats to \r\nbiodiversity from land disturbance, which require strategic planning \r\nto address (Sonter et al. 2020a). Strategic spatial planning is \r\nneeded more generally to address trade-offs between using land for \r\nrenewable energy and food: for example, agriculture can be co-located \r\nwith solar photovoltaics (Barron-Gafford et al. 2019) or wind power \r\n(Miller and Keith 2018a). Integrative spatial planning can integrate \r\nrenewable energy with not just agriculture, but mobility and housing \r\n(Hurlbert et al. 2019). Integrated planning is needed to avoid scalar \r\npitfalls, and local and regional contextualised governance solutions \r\nneed to be sited within a  planetary frame of reference (Biermann \r\net al. 2016). Greater planning and coordination are also needed to \r\nensure co-benefits from land-based mitigation (Box 12"


id: 4ff6a85a73025b71529fdbdd3c0f14ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10021
content:
"With respect to renewable energy options that occupy land, the \r\nfocus of governance has been directed to technological adoption \r\nand public acceptance (Sequeira and Santos 2018), rather than \r\nland use. Recent work has found that spatial processes shape the \r\nemerging energy transition, creating zones of friction between \r\nglobal investors, national and local governments, and civil society \r\n(Jepson and Caldas 2017; McEwan 2017). For example, Yenneti et \r\nal. (2016) have argued that hydropower and ground-based solar \r\nparks in India, which have involved enclosure of lands designated as \r\ndegraded, displacing pastoral use by vulnerable communities, have \r\nconstituted forms of spatial injustice. Hydropower leads to dam\u0002induced displacement, and though this can be addressed through \r\ncompensation mechanisms, governance is complicated by a lack of \r\ntransparency in resettlement data (Kirchherr et al. 2016; Kirchherr \r\net al. 2019)"


id: 176aea4e85701198164e2cf1c89cbd4d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1193
content:
" Renewable energy production is resulting in new land \r\nconflict frontiers where degraded land is framed as having mitigation \r\nvalue such as for palm oil production and wind power in Mexico \r\n(Backhouse and Lehmann 2020); land use conflict as well as impacts \r\non wildlife from large-scale solar installations have also emerged \r\nin the southwestern United States (Mulvaney 2017). The renewable \r\nenergy transition also involves the extraction of critical minerals \r\nused in renewable energy technologies, such as lithium and cobalt. "


id: f8a45c0a7da6f4e6fc2ee9c7d24898e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36633
content:
"In emerging domains for governance such as land-based mitigation, \r\nglobal institutions, private sector networks and civil society \r\norganisations are playing key roles in terms of norm-setting. The \r\nshared languages and theoretical frameworks, or cognitive linkages \r\n(Pattberg et al. 2018), that arise with polycentric governance can not \r\nonly be helpful in creating expectations and establishing benchmarks \r\nfor (in)appropriate practices where enforceable 'hard law' is missing \r\n(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen et al. 2018; Gajevic Sayegh 2020), they \r\ncan also form the basis of voluntary guidelines or niche markets \r\n(Box 12.3) However, the ability to apply participatory processes for \r\ndeveloping voluntary guidelines and other participatory norm-setting \r\nendeavours varies from place to place. Social and cultural norms \r\nshape the ability of women, youth, and different ethnic groups to \r\nparticipate in governance fora, such as those around agroecological \r\ntransformation (Anderson et al. 2019)"


id: 1a7921095dd79ee940d05720dbd33909
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1647
content:
" Furthermore, establishing \r\nnew norms alone does not solve structural challenges such as lack \r\nof access to food, nor does it confront power imbalances, or provide \r\nmechanisms to deal with uncooperative actors (Morrison et al. 2019)."


id: 46d6d9a07cce1f7552f45fc21a61c835
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8527
content:
"Developing new bio-based solutions while mitigating overall biomass demand growth\r\nMany existing bio-based products have significant mitigation potential. Increased use of wood in buildings can reduce GHG emissions \r\nfrom cement and steel production while providing carbon storage (Churkina et al. 2020). Substitution of fossil fuels with biomass in \r\nmanufacture of cement and steel can reduce GHG emissions where these materials are difficult to replace. Dispatchable power based \r\non biomass can provide power stability and quality as the contribution from solar and wind power increases (AR6 WGIII Chapter 6), \r\nand biofuels can contribute to reducing fossil fuel emissions in the transport and industry sectors (AR6 WGIII Chapters 10 and 11)"


id: 59b7262a8bff3018d8e862fbadffad7a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 11616
content:
" \r\nThe use of bio-based plastics, chemicals and packaging could be increased, and biorefineries can achieve high resource-use efficiency \r\nin converting biomass into food, feed, fuels and other bio-based products (Aristizabal-Marulanda and Cardona Alzate 2019; Schmidt \r\net al. 2019). There is also scope for substituting existing bio-based products with more benign products. For example, cellulose-based \r\ntextiles can replace cotton, which requires large amounts of water, chemical fertilisers and pesticides to ensure high yields."


id: 63256fe4d4b736fdfad3408d132356bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 13165
content:
"While increasing and diversified use of biomass can reduce the need for fossil fuels and other GHG-intensive products, unfavourable \r\nGHG balances may limit the mitigation value. Growth in biomass use may in the longer term also be constrained by the need to protect \r\nbiodiversity and ecosystems' capacity to support essential ecosystem services. Biomass use may also be constrained by water scarcity \r\nand other resource scarcities, and/or challenges related to public perception and acceptance due to impacts caused by biomass \r\nproduction and use"


id: 533e59ac9b605cc072fea648af6623f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 10567
content:
" Energy conservation and efficiency measures and deployment of technologies and systems that do not rely on \r\ncarbon, such as carbon-free electricity supporting, inter alia, electrification of transport as well as industry processes and residential \r\nheating (IPCC 2018; UNEP 2019), can constrain the growth in biomass demand when countries seek to phase out fossil fuels and \r\nother GHG-intensive products while providing an acceptable standard of living. Nevertheless, demand for bio-based products may \r\nbecome high where full decoupling from carbon is difficult to achieve (e.g., aviation, bio-based plastics and chemicals) or where \r\ncarbon storage is an associated benefit (e.g., wood buildings, BECCS, biochar for soil amendments), leading to challenging trade-offs \r\n(e.g., food security, biodiversity) that need to be managed in environmentally sustainable and socially just ways."


id: 99dd94ee8ee69aa05f50b799ab14690
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
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vector_id: 21733
content:
"Circular economy approaches (AR6 WGIII Section 12.6) are commonly depicted by two cycles, where the biological cycle focuses on \r\nregeneration in the biosphere and the technical cycle focuses on reuse, refurbishment and recycling to maintain value and maximise \r\nmaterial recovery (Mayer et al. 2019a). Biogenic carbon flows and resources are part of the biological carbon cycle, but carbon-based \r\nproducts can be included in, and affect, both the biological and the technical carbon cycles (Kirchherr et al. 2017; Winans et al. 2017; \r\nVelenturf et al. 2019). The integration of circular economy and bioeconomy principles has been discussed in relation to organic waste \r\nmanagement (Teigiserova et al. 2020), societal transition and policy development (European Commission 2018; Bugge et al. 2019) \r\nas well as COVID-19 recovery strategies (Palahi et al. 2020)"


id: 1cacbc17fcbaf4cc5e88860701f8265c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1961
content:
" To maintain the natural resource base, circular bioeconomy emphasises \r\nsustainable land use and the return of biomass and nutrients to the biosphere when it leaves the technical cycle."


id: 3e1dc9d94e437694df359a524b00bb29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 7136
content:
"Agroecological approaches can be integrated into a wide range of land management practices to support a sustainable bioeconomy \r\nand address equity considerations (HLPE 2019). Relevant land-use practices, such as agroforestry, intercropping, organic amendments, \r\ncover crops and rotational grazing, can provide mitigation and support adaption to climate change via food security, livelihoods, \r\nbiodiversity and health co-benefits (Ponisio et al. 2015; Garibaldi et al. 2016; D'Annolfo et al. 2017; Bezner Kerr et al. 2019; Clark \r\net al. 2019b; Cordova et al. 2019; HLPE 2019; Mbow et al. 2019; Renard and Tilman 2019; Sinclair et al. 2019; Bharucha et al. 2020; \r\nBezner Kerr et al. 2021) (AR6 WGII Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL)"


id: eb9ba5302e294b6ae57a61742611d69e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 34571
content:
" Strategic integration of appropriate biomass production systems \r\ninto agricultural landscapes can provide biomass for bioenergy and other bio-based products while providing co-benefits such as \r\nenhanced landscape diversity, habitat quality, retention of nutrients and sediment, erosion control, climate regulation, flood regulation, \r\npollination and biological pest and disease control (Christen and Dalgaard 2013; Asbjornsen et al. 2014; Holland et al. 2015; Ssegane \r\net al. 2015; Dauber and Miyake 2016; Milner et al. 2016; Ssegane and Negri 2016; Styles et al. 2016; Zumpf et al. 2017; Cacho et al. \r\n2018; Alam and Dwivedi 2019; Cubins et al. 2019; HLPE 2019; Olsson et al. 2019; Zalesny et al. 2019; Englund et al. 2020) (AR6 WGIII \r\nBox 12.3). Such approaches can help limit environmental impacts from intensive agriculture while maintaining or increasing land \r\nproductivity and biomass output."


id: d428d6353a454da8f1aa024127c06a52
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 30899
content:
"Transitions from conventional to new biomass production and conversion systems include challenges related to cross-sector \r\nintegration and limited experience with new crops and land use practices, including needs for specialised equipment (Thornton and \r\nHerrero 2015; HLPE 2019) (AR6 WGII Section 5.10). Introduction of agroecological approaches and integrated biomass/food crop \r\nproduction can result in lower food crop yields per hectare, particularly during transition phases, potentially causing indirect landuse \r\nchange, but can also support higher and more stable yields, reduce costs, and increase profitability under climate change (Muller et al. \r\n2017; Seufert and Ramakutty 2017; Barbieri et al. 2019; HLPE 2019; Sinclair et al. 2019; Smith et al. 2019a; Smith et al. 2020). Crop \r\ndiversification, organic amendments, and biological pest control (HLPE 2019) can reduce input costs and risks of occupational pesticide \r\nexposure and food and water contamination (Gonzalez-Alzaga et al"


id: 1480b5672348b9c17d39135bf52a835a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 735
content:
" 2014; EFSA 2017; Mie et al. 2017), reduce farmers' vulnerability \r\nto climate change (e.g., droughts and spread of pests and diseases affecting plant and animal health) (Delcour et al. 2015; FAO 2020) \r\nand enhance provisioning and sustaining ecosystem services, such as pollination (D'Annolfo et al. 2017; Sinclair et al. 2019)."


id: c2c64cdf7520db0358c63bc9ff276f74
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 28226
content:
"Barriers toward wider implementation include absence of policies that compensate land owners for providing enhanced ecosystem \r\nservices and other environmental benefits, which can help overcome short-term losses during the transition from conventional practices \r\nbefore longer-term benefits can accrue. Other barriers include limited access to markets, knowledge gaps, financial, technological or \r\nlabour constraints, lack of extension support and insecure land tenure (Jacobi et al. 2017; Kongsager 2017; Hernandez-Morcillo et al. \r\n2018; Iiyama et al. 2018; HLPE 2019). Regional-level agroecology transitions may be facilitated by co-learning platforms, farmer \r\nnetworks, private sector, civil society groups, regional and local administration and other incentive structures (e.g., price premiums, \r\naccess to credit, regulation) (Coe et al. 2014; Perez-Marin et al. 2017; Mier y Teran Gimenez Cacho et al. 2018; HLPE 2019; Valencia \r\net al. 2019; SAEPEA 2020)"


id: 46f5c82f7c713ab9b133543f1e1a6ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8551
content:
" With the right incentives, improvements can be made with regard to profitability, making alternatives more \r\nattractive to land owners."


id: a5c7954018f40dc165f25b3be03b415f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23647
content:
"Literature analysing the synergies and trade-offs between competing demands for land suggest that solutions are highly contextualised \r\nin terms of their environmental, socio-economic and governance-related characteristics, making it difficult to devise generic solutions \r\n(Haasnoot et al. 2020). Aspects of spatial and temporal scale can further enhance the complexity, for instance where transboundary \r\neffects across jurisdictions or upstream-downstream characteristics need to be considered, or where climate change trajectories might \r\nalter relevant biogeophysical dynamics (Postigo and Young 2021). Nonetheless, there is broad agreement that taking the needs and \r\nperspectives of multiple stakeholders into account in a transparent process during negotiations improves the chances of achieving \r\noutcomes that maximise synergies while limiting trade-offs (Ariti et al. 2018; Metternicht 2018; Favretto et al. 2020; Kopacek 2021; \r\nMuscat et al. 2021)"


id: e7d60f3897b36caf9ad93a229bce1d1f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 33970
content:
" Yet differences in agency and power between stakeholders or anticipated changes in access to or control of \r\nresources can undermine negotiation results even if there is a common understanding of the overarching benefits of more integrated \r\nenvironmental agreements and the need for greater coordination and cooperation to avoid longer-term losses to all (Aarts and \r\nLeeuwis 2010; Weitz et al. 2017). There is also the risk that strong local participatory processes can become disconnected from broader \r\nnational plans, and thus fail to support the achievement of national targets. Thus, connection between levels is needed to ensure that \r\nambition for transformative change is not derailed at local level (Aarts and Leeuwis 2010; Postigo and Young 2021)."


id: d1ad8abe3dd8adfd4e60b0bb8171c801
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30523
content:
"International trade in the global economy today provides important opportunities to connect producers and consumers, effectively \r\nbuffering price volatilities and potentially offering producer countries access to global markets, which can be seen as an effective \r\nadaptation measure (Baldos and Hertel 2015; Costinot et al. 2016; Hertel and Baldos 2016; Gouel and Laborde 2021) (AR6 WGII \r\nSection 5.11). But there is also clear evidence that international trade and the global economy can enhance price volatility, lead \r\nto food price spikes and affect food security due to climate and other shocks, as seen recently due to the COVID-19 pandemic \r\n(Cottrell et al. 2019; WFP-FSIN 2020; Verschuur et al. 2021) (AR6 WGII Section 5.12)"


id: b2af768786b63b17af392f73e836dce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25634
content:
" The continued strong demand for food and \r\nother bio-based products, mainly from high- and middle-income countries, therefore requires better cooperation between nations \r\nand global governance of trade to more accurately reflect and disincentivise their environmental and social externalities. Trade in \r\nagricultural and extractive products driving land-use change in tropical forest and savanna biomes is of major concern because of \r\nthe biodiversity impacts and GHG emissions incurred in their provision (Hosonuma et al. 2012; Forest Trends 2014; Smith et al. 2014; \r\nHenders et al. 2015; Curtis et al. 2018; Pendrill et al. 2019; Seymour and Harris 2019; Kissinger et al. 2021) (AR6 WGII Tropical Forests \r\nCross-Chapter Paper)."


id: 7b50f429a8f0647e03092017d765bf34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16990
content:
"A number of mitigation measures find application in more than \r\none sector. Renewable energy technologies such as solar and wind \r\nmay be used for grid electricity supply, as embedded generation in \r\nthe buildings sector and for energy supply in the agriculture sector \r\n(Shahsavari and Akbari 2018) (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Hydrogen and \r\nfuel cells, coupled with low-carbon energy technologies for producing \r\nthe hydrogen, are being explored in transport, urban heat, industry \r\nand for balancing electricity supply (Dodds et al. 2015; Staffell et al. \r\n2019) (Chapters  6, 8  and 11). Electric vehicles are considered an \r\noption for balancing variable power (Kempton and Tomic 2005; Liu \r\nand Zhong 2019). Carbon capture and storage (CCS) and carbon \r\ncapture and utilisation (CCU) have potential application in a number \r\nof industrial processes (cement, iron and steel, petroleum refining \r\nand pulp and paper) (Leeson et al"


id: de5fc745414ff3760ef16b5d8e9d0b5f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 32482
content:
" 2017; Garcia and Berghout 2019) \r\n(Chapters 6 and 11) and the fossil fuel electricity sector (Chapter 6). \r\nWhen coupled with energy recovery from biomass, CCS can provide \r\na carbon sink (BECCS) (Section 12.5). On the demand side, energy \r\nefficiency options find application across the sectors (Chapters  6, \r\n8, 9, 10, and 11), as do reducing demand for goods and services \r\n(Chapter 5) and improving material efficiency (Section 11.3.2)."


id: 7ad7eacac88c1822fefc0ecc5ee35531
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16918
content:
"At the same time, saving electricity in all sectors reduces the demand \r\nfor electricity, thereby reducing mitigation potential of renewables and \r\nCCS.  Demand-side flexibility measures and electrification of vehicle \r\nfleets are supportive of more intermittent renewable energy supply \r\noptions (Sections 6.3.7, 6.4.3.1 and 10.3.4). Production of maize, wheat, \r\nrice and fresh produce requires lower energy inputs on a lifecycle basis \r\nthan poultry, pork and ruminant-based meats (Clark and Tilman 2017) \r\n(Section 12.4). It also requires less land area per kilocalorie or protein \r\noutput (Clark and Tilman 2017; Poore and Nemecek 2018), so replacing \r\nmeat with these products makes land available for sequestration, \r\nbiodiversity or other societal needs. However, production of co-products \r\nof the meat industry, such as leather and wool, is reduced, resulting \r\nin a need for substitutes"


id: b39796c43d471a14c192f3755865004e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 25765
content:
" Further discussion and examples of cross\u0002sectoral implications of mitigation, with respect to cost and potentials, \r\nare presented in Section 12.2. One final example on this topic included \r\nhere is that of circular economy (Box 12.4)."


id: d4e769596512590f010ea3d9f44b5d2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31023
content:
"A range of examples where mitigation measures result in cross\u0002sectoral interactions and integration is identified. The mitigation \r\npotential of electric vehicles, including plug-in hybrids, is linked to \r\nthe extent of decarbonisation of the electricity grid, as well as to the \r\nliquid fuel supply emissions profile (Lutsey 2015). Making buildings \r\nenergy positive, where excess energy is used to charge vehicles, can \r\nincrease the potential of electric and hybrid vehicles (Zhou et al. \r\n2019). Advanced process control and process optimisation in industry \r\ncan reduce energy demand and material inputs (Section 11.3), which \r\nin turn can reduce emissions linked to resource extraction and \r\nmanufacturing. Reductions in coal-fired power generation through \r\nreplacement with renewables or nuclear power result in a reduction \r\nin coal mining and its associated emissions. Increased recycling \r\nresults in a reduction in emissions from primary resource extraction"


id: 5121c817ddc2d2cbc56af53971a55f95
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
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vector_id: 10217
content:
"Finally, in terms of competition among sectors for scarce resources, \r\nthis issue is often considered in the assessments of mitigation \r\npotentials linked to bioenergy and diets (vegetable vs animal food \r\nproducts), land use and water (robust evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Section 12.5 and Cross-Working Group Box 3 in this Chapter). It is, \r\nhowever, also relevant elsewhere. Constraints have been identified \r\nin the supply of indium, tellurium, silver, lithium, nickel and platinum \r\nthat are required for implementation of some specific renewable \r\nenergy technologies (Watari et al. 2018; Moreau et al. 2019). Other \r\nstudies have shown constraints in supply of cobalt, one of the key \r\nelements used in production of lithium-ion batteries, which has been \r\nassessed for mitigation potential in energy, transport and buildings \r\nsectors (medium evidence, high agreement) (Jaffe 2017; Olivetti et al. \r\n2017), although alternatives to cobalt are being developed (Olivetti \r\net al"


id: 14ce83aef4ec268b13799cf205f982d2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 783
content:
"Circular economy approaches consider the entire lifecycle of goods and services, and seek to design out waste and pollution, keep \r\nproducts and materials in use, and regenerate natural systems (The Ellen MacArthur Foundation 2013; CIRAIG 2015). The use of \r\ncircular economy for rethinking how society's needs for goods and services is delivered in such a way as to minimise resource use \r\nand environmental impact and maximise societal benefit has been discussed elsewhere in this assessment report (Chapter 5 and \r\nSection 5.3.4). A wide range of potential application areas is identified, from food systems to bio-based products to plastics to metals \r\nand minerals to manufactured goods. Circular economy approaches are implicitly cross-sectoral, impacting the energy, industrial, \r\nAFOLU, waste and other sectors. They will have climate and non-climate co-benefits and trade-offs"


id: bc4f5be2bc7fe0b8182153c3be0a3bb8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27205
content:
" The scientific literature mainly \r\ninvestigates incremental measures claiming but not demonstrating mitigation; highest mitigation potential is found in the industry, \r\nenergy, and transport sectors; mid-range potential in the waste and building sectors; and lowest mitigation gains in agriculture \r\n(Cantzler et al. 2020). Circular economy thinking has been identified to support increased resilience to the physical effects of climate \r\nchange and contribute to meeting other SDGs, notably SDG  12 (responsible consumption and production) (The Ellen MacArthur \r\nFoundation 2019)."


id: df4b40681f97c9cad6eae8fdf03c30be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32629
content:
"Circular economy approaches to deployment of low-carbon infrastructure have been suggested to be important to optimise resource\r\nuse and mitigate environmental and societal impacts caused by extraction and manufacturing of composite and critical materials \r\nas well as infrastructure decommissioning (Jensen and Skelton 2018; Sica et al. 2018; Salim et al. 2019; Watari et al. 2019; Jensen \r\net al. 2020; Mignacca et al. 2020). The circular carbon economy is an approach inspired by the circular economy principles that rely \r\non a  combination of technologies, including CCU, CCS and CDR, to enable transition pathways especially relevant in economies \r\ndependent on fossil fuel exports (Lee et al. 2017; Alshammari 2020; Morrow and Thompson 2020; Zakkour et al. 2020)"


id: d8e48b1eb399f32c9247a9bc67a24949
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31632
content:
" The integration \r\nof circular economy and bioeconomy principles (Cross-Working Group Box 3 in this chapter) is conceptualised in relation to policy \r\ndevelopment (European Commission 2018) as well as COVID-19 recovery strategies (Palahi et al. 2020), emphasising the use of \r\nrenewable energy sources and sustainable management of ecosystems with transformation of biological resources into food, feed, \r\nenergy and biomaterials."


id: 28b65ffc0408cd74274e157e5aa248e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3834
content:
"Interest in hydrogen as an intermediary energy carrier has grown rapidly in the years since the 5th Assessment Report of WGIII (AR5) \r\nwas published. This is reflected in this WGIII assessment report, where the term 'hydrogen' is used more than five times more often than \r\nin AR5. In Chapter 6 of this report, it is shown that hydrogen can be produced with low carbon impact from fossil fuels (Section 6.4.2.6), \r\nrenewable electricity and nuclear energy (Section 6.4.5.1), or biomass (Section 6.4.2.5). In the energy sector, hydrogen is one of the \r\noptions for storage of energy in low-carbon electricity systems (Sections 6.4.4.1 and 6.6.2.2). But, also importantly, hydrogen can be \r\nproduced to be used as a fuel for sectors that are hard to decarbonise; this is possible directly in the form of hydrogen, but also in \r\nthe form of ammonia or other energy carriers (Section 6.4.5.1). In the transport sector, fuel cell engines (Section 10.3"


id: 5440ee012effed32e6afb7233cfa51a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10716
content:
"3) running on \r\nhydrogen can become important, especially for heavy duty vehicles (Section 10.4.3). In the industry sector hydrogen already plays an \r\nimportant role in the chemical sector (for ammonia and methanol production) (Box 11.1 in Chapter 11) and in the fuel sector (in oil \r\nrefinery processes and for biofuel production) (IEA 2019b). Beyond the production of ammonia and methanol for both established \r\nand novel applications, the largest potential industrial application for low-carbon hydrogen is seen in steel-making (Section 11.4.1.1). \r\nHydrogen and hydrogen derivatives can play a further role as substitute energy carriers (Section 11.3.5) and for the production of \r\nintermediate chemical products such as methanol, ethanol and ethylene when combined with CCU (Section 11.3.6). For the building \r\nsector, the exploration of the usefulness of hydrogen is at an early stage (Box 9.4)."


id: a5aa2c29e33c6475f818bb8d014b1065
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23632
content:
"An overview report (IEA 2019b) already sees opportunities in 2030 for buildings, road freight and passenger vehicles. This report also \r\nsuggests a high potential application in iron and steel production, aviation and maritime transport, and for electricity storage. Several \r\nindustry roadmaps have been published that map out a possible role for hydrogen until 2050. The most well known and ambitious \r\nis the roadmap by the Hydrogen Council (2017), which sketches a global scenario leading to 78 EJ hydrogen use in 2050, mainly for \r\ntransport, industrial feedstock, industrial energy and to a lesser extent for buildings and power generation. Hydrogen makes up 18% of \r\ntotal final energy use in this vision. An analysis by IRENA on hydrogen from renewable sources comes to a substantially lower number: \r\n8 EJ (excluding hydrogen use in power production and feedstock uses)"


id: 5bf3d621126e5b7c7765d9443e890f1f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11982
content:
" On a regional level, most roadmaps and scenarios have been \r\npublished for the European Union, for example by the Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (Blanco et al. 2018; EC 2018; FCH \r\n2019; Navigant 2019). All these reports have scenario variants with hydrogen share in final energy use of 10% to over 20% by 2050."


id: efac5024dc1b00f12cf35f8cbeae7fa5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35208
content:
"As already reported in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.4.1), production costs of green hydrogen are expected to come down from the current \r\nlevels of above USD100 MWh-1. Price expectations are: EUR40-60 MWh-1 for both green and blue hydrogen production in the EU \r\nby 2050 (Navigant 2019) with production costs already being lower in North Africa; 42-87 USD MWh-1 for green hydrogen in 2030 \r\nand 20-41 USD MWh-1 in 2050 (BNEF 2020); EUR75 MWh-1 in 2030 (Glenk and Reichelstein 2019). For fossil-based technologies \r\ncombined with CCS, prices may range from USD33-80 MWh-1 (Table 6.8)"


id: 9a76fbec3df6179e0e6ce32f284ae251
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vector_id: 21828
content:
" Such prices can make hydrogen competitive for industrial \r\nfeedstock applications, and probably for several transportation modes in combination with fuel cells, but without further incentives, not \r\nnecessarily for stationary applications in the coming decades: wholesale natural gas prices are expected to range from USD7-31 MWh-1\r\nacross regions and scenarios, according to the World Energy Outlook (IEA 2020a); coal prices mostly are even lower than natural gas \r\nprices (all fossil fuel prices refer to unabated technology and untaxed fuels). The evaluation of macro-economic impacts is relatively \r\nrare. A study by Mayer et al. (2019b) indicated that a shift to hydrogen in iron and steel production would lead to regional GDP losses \r\nin the range of 0.4-2.7% in 2050 across EU+3, with some regions making gains under a low-cost electricity scenario."


id: 131765bac882cc3d1d6d672fa34f004
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 517
content:
"The consequences  of large-scale land-based mitigation  for food \r\nsecurity, biodiversity (Dasgupta 2021), the state of soil, water \r\nresources, and so on can be significant, depending on many factors, \r\nsuch as economic development (including distributional aspects), \r\ninternational trade patterns, agronomic development, diets, land\u0002use governance and policy design, and not least climate change \r\nitself  (Winchester and Reilly 2015; Fujimori et al. 2018; Hasegawa \r\net al. 2018; Van Meijl et al. 2018). Policies and regulations that address \r\nother aspects apart from climate change can indirectly influence the \r\nattractiveness of land-based mitigation options"


id: 4b55606a4b2a649f22950ec8a9d92a10
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 9265
content:
" For example, farmers \r\nmay find it attractive to shift from annual food/feed crops to perennial \r\ngrasses and short rotation woody crops (suitable for bioenergy) if \r\nthe previous land uses become increasingly restricted due to impacts \r\non groundwater quality and eutrophication of water bodies (robust \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (Sections 12.4 and 12.5). "


id: 16a5a451c5a662b5ad206983f7098f63
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1085
content:
"Cross-sectoral effects of carbon leakage also occur through the \r\nmultiplier effect, when the mitigation policy in any sector in country \r\nA leads to the increase of relative competitiveness and therefore \r\nproduction of the same sector in country B, which automatically \r\nleads to the expansion of economic activity in other sectors of \r\ncountry B. This expansion may in turn lead to the rise of production \r\nand emissions in country A as a result of feedback effects. These \r\nspillovers should be taken into consideration while designing \r\nclimate policy, along with potential synergies that may appear due \r\nto joint efforts. However, the scale of these effects with regards \r\nto leakage should not be overestimated. Even for intrasectoral \r\nleakage, many ex ante modelling studies generally suggest limited \r\ncarbon leakage rates (Chapter 13). Intersectoral leakage should be \r\neven less significant"


id: d70468fbd8f29aa69ca47b434da660ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 31335
content:
" Interregional spillover and feedback effects \r\nare well studied in China (Zhang 2017; Ning et al. 2019). Even \r\nwithin a  single country, interregional spillover effects are much \r\nlower than intraregional effects, and feedback effects are even less \r\nintense. Cross-sectoral spillovers across national borders as a result \r\nof mitigation policy should be even smaller, although these are less \r\nwell studied. In future, if the differences in carbon price between \r\nregions increase, leakage through cross-sectoral multipliers may \r\nplay a more important role."


id: 460bc10060eedf646418d9a008859774
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 8406
content:
"conflicting social, developmental and environmental policy goals at \r\nthe sectoral level. True measures of mitigation policy impacts  and \r\nhence plans for resource mobilisation that properly address costs \r\nand benefits  cannot be developed  in isolation from their  cross\u0002sectoral  implications.  Unaddressed cross-sectoral coordination and \r\ninterdependency issues are identified as major constraints in raising \r\nthe necessary financial resources for mitigation in a  number of \r\ncountries (Bazilian et al. 2011; Welsch et al. 2014; Hoff et al. 2019a).\r\nIntegrated financial solutions to leverage synergies between sectors, \r\nas opposed to purely sector-based financing, at international, \r\nnational,  and local levels are needed to scale  up  GHG mitigation \r\npotentials"


id: 4dc3ccc622a9682c28fd650d2659b222
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9664
content:
"  At the international level,  finance from multilateral \r\ndevelopment banks (MDBs) is a  major source of  GHG  mitigation \r\nfinance in developing countries (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement) (World Bank Group 2015; Ha et al. 2016; Bhattacharya \r\net al. 2016; Bhattacharya et al. 2018). In 2018, MDBs reported a total \r\nof USD30.165 billion in financial commitments to climate change \r\nmitigation, with 71%  of total mitigation finance being committed \r\nthrough investment loans and the rest in the form of equity, guarantees, \r\nand other instruments.  GHG  reduction activities eligible for MDB \r\nfinance are limited to those compatible with low-emission pathways \r\nrecognising the importance of long-term structural changes, such as \r\nthe shift in energy production to low-carbon energy technologies \r\nand the modal shift to low-carbon modes of transport leveraging \r\nboth greenfield and energy efficiency projects"


id: 791a0a4e6ca1c318bb0b5acd4a68cb1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" Sector-wise, the \r\nMDBs' mitigation finance for 2018 is allocated to renewable energy \r\n(29%), transport (18%), energy efficiency (18%), lower-carbon and \r\nefficient energy generation (7%), agriculture, forestry and land use \r\n(8%), waste and wastewater (8%), and other sectors (12%) (MDB \r\n2019). Unfortunately, due to institutional and incentives issues, MDB \r\nfinance has mostly focused on sectoral solutions and has not been able \r\nto properly leverage cross-sectoral synergies. At the national level, \r\napplied research has shown that integrated modelling of land, energy \r\nand water resources not only has the potential to identify superior \r\nsolutions, but also reveals important differences in terms of investment \r\nrequirements and  required financing arrangements  compared \r\nto  the  traditional sectoral  financing  toolkits  (Welsch et al. \r\n2014)"


id: 6c5576a1bca9643385b2047e23d9541c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14670
content:
" Agriculture, forestry, nature-based solutions and other forms \r\nof land use are promising sectors for leveraging financing solutions \r\nto scale up  GHG  mitigation efforts (Section  15.4).  Moving to \r\nmore productive and resilient forms of land use is a  complex \r\ntask, given the cross-cutting nature of land use, which necessarily \r\nresults in apparent trade-offs between mitigation, adaptation, and \r\ndevelopment objectives. Finance is one area to manage these trade\u0002offs where there may be opportunities to redirect the hundreds \r\nof billions spent annually on land use around the world towards \r\ngreen activities, without sacrificing either productivity or economic \r\ndevelopment  (Falconer et al. 2015)"


id: b5fee8c0a1725689a5efac1cb4ab6989
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"  Nonetheless,  that  would \r\nrequire active public support in  design of land-use mitigation and \r\nadaptation strategies, coordination between public and private \r\ninstruments across land use sectors, and leveraging of  policy  and \r\nfinancial instruments to redirect finance toward greener land-use \r\npractices  (limited evidence, medium agreement).  For example,  the \r\nWelsch et al. (2014) study on Mauritius shows that the promotion \r\nof a  local biofuel industry from sugar cane could be economically \r\nfavourable in the absence of water constraints, leading to a reduction "


id: 10d537cec2aec2989b6ee4729cafad5e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 125
content:
"Availability and access to finance are among the major barriers to \r\nGHG emissions mitigation across various sectors and technology \r\noptions  (robust evidence, high agreement).  Resource maturity \r\nmismatches and risk exposure are two main factors limiting ability \r\nof commercial banks and other private lenders to contribute to \r\ngreen finance  (Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2018).  At all levels, \r\nmobilising the necessary resources  to leverage cross-sectoral \r\nmitigation synergies  would  require the combination of public and \r\nprivate financial sources (Jensen and Dowlatabadi 2018). Traditional \r\npublic financing would be  required to synergise mitigation across \r\nsectors  where the risk-return and time profiles of investment are \r\nnot sufficiently attractive for the business sector"


id: cf6f4cf37ed40d42243f4a88218fcf8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"  Over the years, \r\nprivate development financing through public-private partnerships \r\nand other related variants has been  a growing source of finance \r\nto leverage cross-sectoral  synergies and manage trade-offs \r\n(Anbumozhi and Timilsina 2018; Attridge and Engen 2019; Ishiwatari \r\net al. 2019). Promoting such blended approaches to finance along \r\nwith result-based financing architectures to strengthen delivery \r\ninstitutions are advocated as effective means to mainstream cross\u0002sectoral mitigation finance (limited evidence, high agreement)\r\n(Attridge and Engen 2019; Ishiwatari et al. 2019). The World Bank \r\ngroup and the International Financial Corporation have  used \r\nthe blended  finance results-based approach  to climate financing \r\nthat addresses institutional, infrastructure, and service needs \r\nacross sectors targeting  developing  countries and marginalised \r\ncommunities (GPRBA 2019; IDA 2019)."


id: 608fafbb14bcbeb5413d5ab7fa480b1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" Fisher (the United States of America), \r\nAmit Garg (India), Oliver Geden (Germany), Robert Germeshausen (Germany), Niklas  Hohne \r\n(Germany), Angel Hsu (the United States of America/Singapore), Gabriela Iacobuta (Germany), \r\nSebastien Jodoin (Canada), Siir Kilkis (Turkey), Susanna Kugelberg (Sweden), Matthew Lockwood \r\n(United Kingdom), Andreas Loschel (Germany), Cheikh Mbow (Senegal), Brendan Moore \r\n(the United States of America/United Kingdom), Yacob Mulugetta (Ethiopia/United Kingdom), \r\nGert-Jan Nabuurs (the Netherlands), Vinnet Ndlovu (Zimbabwe/Australia), Gregory  F.  Nemet \r\n(the  United States of America/Canada), Peter Newman (Australia), Lars  J.  Nilsson (Sweden), \r\nKarachepone N. Ninan (India), Grzegorz Peszko (Poland/the United States of America), Marina \r\nPovitkina (Sweden), Wang Pu (China), Simone Pulver (the United States of America), Karoline \r\nRogge (Germany/United Kingdom), Joana Setzer (Brazil/United Kingdom), Jale Tosun (Germany)"


id: b4c46a2493dfd3edbdaa885668f3f5fd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 25973
content:
"Carbon pricing is effective in promoting implementation \r\nof low-cost emissions reductions (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement). While the coverage of emissions trading and carbon \r\ntaxes has risen to over 20% of global CO2 emissions, both coverage \r\nand price are lower than is needed for deep reductions. The design of \r\nmarket mechanisms should be effective as well as efficient, balance \r\ndistributional goals and find social acceptance. Practical experience \r\nhas driven progress in market mechanism design, especially of \r\nemissions trading schemes (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nCarbon pricing is limited in its effect on adoption of higher-cost \r\nmitigation options, and where decisions are often not sensitive to \r\nprice incentives such as in energy efficiency, urban planning, and \r\ninfrastructure (robust evidence, medium agreement)"


id: 292d812da0e73ea03c98cdf30409f9a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 3912
content:
" Subsidies have \r\nbeen used to improve energy efficiency, encourage the uptake of \r\nrenewable energy and other sector-specific emissions saving options\r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). {13.6}"


id: 39e3eb739cf9f8a1b855a8781f388870
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 6481
content:
"Regulatory instruments play an important role in achieving \r\nspecific mitigation outcomes in sectoral applications (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). Regulation is effective in particular \r\napplications and often enjoys greater political support, but tends to be \r\nmore economically costly, than pricing instruments (robust evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). Flexible forms of regulation (for example, \r\nperformance standards) have achieved aggregate goals for renewable \r\nenergy generation, vehicle efficiency and fuel standards, and energy \r\nefficiency in buildings and industry (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nInfrastructure investment decisions are significant for mitigation \r\nbecause they lock-in high- or low- emissions trajectories over long \r\nperiods. Information and voluntary programmes can contribute to \r\noverall mitigation outcomes (medium evidence, high agreement)"


id: 1b0e72d1bdfd4ab3e3e63c935ffb45b4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"\r\nDesigning for overlap and interactions among mitigation policies \r\nenhances their effectiveness (robust evidence, high agreement). {13.6}"


id: 4b49ed106d3d1167cb7ab40c7fc57c2a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"This chapter assesses national and sub-national policies and \r\ninstitutions. Given the scale and scope of the climate challenge, \r\nan immediate challenge for this assessment is defining its scope. \r\nBecause a  very wide range of institutions and policies at multiple \r\nscales carry implications for climate change, the approach followed \r\nhere is to embrace a broad approach. Consequently, institutions and \r\npolicies discussed include dedicated climate laws and organisations \r\n(Section  13.2) and direct mitigation policies such as carbon taxes \r\n(Section 13.6), but also those, such as sectoral ministries and their \r\npolicies (Sections  13.6 and 13.7) and sub-national entities such \r\nas regional bodies, cities, and their policies (Section  13.5), the \r\nimplications of which are salient to mitigation outcomes"


id: 302c9d00d46810e2310a1a14d541ff75
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content:
" This approach \r\nrecognises that there are important linkages with international \r\nclimate governance (Chapter 14), notably the role of internationally \r\nmandated Nationally Determined Contributions' in stimulating \r\ndomestic policy development (Section 13.2), transnational networks \r\nin spurring sub-national action (Section  13.5), and international \r\neffects of domestic policies (Section 13.6)."


id: 2d7764536f44aa6e510151118ebbe344
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
"and Setzer 2018). Direct climate laws  - with greenhouse gas \r\nlimitation as a direct objective - had been passed in 56 countries \r\n(of 194 studied) covering 53% of emissions in 2020, with most of \r\nthat rise happening between 2010 and 2015 (Figure  13.1). Both \r\ndirect and indirect laws - those that have an effect on mitigation \r\neven if this is not the primary outcome - is most closely captured by \r\nthe 'Climate Change Laws of the World' database, which illustrates \r\nthe same trend of growing prevalence, documenting 694 mitigation\u0002related laws by 2020 versus 558 in 2015 and 342 in 2010 (Nachmany \r\nand Setzer 2018; LSE Grantham Research Institute on Climate \r\nChange and the Environment 2021).1\r\n Among these, the majority \r\nare accounted for by sectoral indirect laws"


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content:
" For example, a study of \r\nCommonwealth countries finds that a  majority of these countries \r\nhave not taken the route of a single overarching law, but rather have \r\nan array of laws across different areas, for example, Indian laws on \r\nenergy efficiency and Ghana's laws on renewable energy promotion \r\n(Scotford et al. 2017)."


id: ed64401707337b95ffc3db86f1c8a3eb
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content:
"Some direct climate laws may serve as 'framework' laws \r\n(Averchenkova et al. 2017; Rumble 2019) that set an overarching \r\nlegal context within which other legislation and policies operate. \r\nFramework laws are intended to provide a  coherent legal basis \r\nfor action, to integrate past legislation in related areas, set clear \r\ndirections for future policy, and create necessary processes and \r\ninstitutions (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Townshend \r\net al. 2013; Averchenkova et al. 2017; Fankhauser et al. 2018; Rumble \r\n2019; Averchenkova et al. 2021). There are a variety of approaches to \r\nframework laws"


id: a26bc82be5456a709c78ca47a63b9cd6
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vector_id: 23118
content:
" Reviews of climate legislation, many of which draw \r\nparticularly from the long-standing UK Climate Change Act, suggest \r\nthe need for statutory targets with a  long-term direction, shorter \r\nterm instruments such as carbon budgets to induce action toward \r\ntargets, a clear assignment of duties and responsibilities including \r\nidentification of policies and responsibility for their implementation, \r\nannual reporting to Parliament; an independent body to support \r\nevidence-based decision-making and rules to govern information \r\ncollection and provision (Barton and Campion 2018; Fankhauser \r\net al. 2018; Abraham-Dukuma et al. 2020; Averchenkova et al. 2021). "


id: 42bb95da64af3f8ae2c24ee5cc15ef0a
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vector_id: 7889
content:
"National laws that govern climate action often set the legal basis for \r\nclimate action (Averchenkova et al. 2021). This legal basis can serve \r\nseveral functions: establish a platform for transparent target setting \r\nand implementation (Bennett 2018); provide a  signal to actors by \r\nindicating intent to harness state authority behind climate action \r\n(Scotford and Minas 2019); promise enhanced regulatory certainty \r\n(Scotford et al. 2017); create law-backed agencies for coordination, \r\ncompliance and accountability (Scotford and Minas 2019); provide \r\na  basis for mainstreaming mitigation into sector action, and \r\ncreate focal points for social mobilisation (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Dubash et al. 2013). For lower/middle income countries, \r\nin particular, the existence of a  law may also attract international \r\nfinance by serving as a signal of credibility (Fisher et al. 2017)"


id: a802e593183b3b98a8e2c3921197d14a
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content:
" The \r\nrealisation of these potential governance gains depends on local \r\ncontext, legal design, successful implementation, and complementary \r\naction at different scales."


id: 9f9ff6119281aa67d2c49a0a7295fc8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 22655
content:
"They frequently set out long term emission goals and possible \r\ntrajectories over time, with analysis of technological and economic \r\nfactors (Levin et al. 2018; WRI 2020). This can include quantitative \r\nmodelling of low-emissions transitions and their economic effects \r\nto inform policymakers and stakeholders of potential outcomes \r\n(Waisman et al. 2019; Weitzel et al. 2019). Scenario analysis can be \r\nused to explore how to make strategies more robust in the face of \r\nuncertainty (Sato and Altamirano 2019). Strategies and their regular \r\nrevision can support long-term structural change by stimulating \r\ndeliberation and learning (Voss et al. 2009), and to make the link \r\nbetween mitigation and adaptation objectives and actions (Watkiss \r\nand Klein 2019; Hans et al. 2020). As part of the Paris Agreement \r\nprocess, several countries have prepared and submitted long-term \r\nlow-emissions development strategies (Levin et al"


id: cd922f8347f746bf2596b157a9f37d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 29876
content:
" 2018), while \r\nothers have different forms of national climate change strategies \r\nindependently of the UNFCCC process. Strategies set over time by \r\nthe European Union are discussed in Box 13.1."


id: d13091872bdfd1b980c6b0b83111aa4e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 30450
content:
"example across countries, and domestic factors such as business \r\ncycles (medium evidence, medium agreement). Major landmark \r\nevents under the UNFCCC have been associated with increases \r\nin  national legislation (Iacobuta et al. 2018), with a  stronger \r\neffect in countries where international commitments are binding \r\n(Fankhauser et al. 2016). Diffusion through example of legislation \r\nfrom other countries has been documented (Fankhauser et al. 2016; \r\nFleig et al. 2017; Torney 2017; Inderberg 2019; Torney 2019). For \r\nexample, the UK Climate Change Act was an important influence \r\nin pursuing similar acts in Finland and Ireland (Torney 2019) and \r\nwas also considered in the formulation of Mexico's General Law \r\non Climate Change (Averchenkova and Guzman Luna 2018). The \r\npresence of a framework law is positively associated with creation of \r\nadditional supportive legislation (Fankhauser et al. 2015)"


id: 175daf1534a59a125b5650dddab53e1d
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content:
" Domestic \r\ncontextual factors can also affect the likelihood of legislation such \r\nas a weak business cycle that can impact the political willingness to \r\npass legislation (Fankhauser et al. 2015). In some cases, civil society \r\ngroups play a  role as advocates for legislation, as occurred in the \r\nUK (Lockwood 2013; Lorenzoni and Benson 2014; Carter and Childs \r\n2018; Devaney et al. 2020) and in Germany in the build up to passage \r\nof their respective Climate Change Act (Flachsland and Levi 2021)."


id: bf5d802f6848a777970df0a931f3aced
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vector_id: 27660
content:
"The NDCs vary in their scope, content and time frame, reflecting \r\ndifferent national circumstances, and are widely heterogeneous \r\nin both stringency and coverage of mitigation efforts (UNFCCC \r\nSecretariat 2016, 2021; Pauw et al. 2018; Campagnolo and Davide \r\n2019; Pauw et al. 2019). The mitigation targets in the new or updated \r\nNDCs range from economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets \r\nto strategies, plans and actions for low-emission development, with \r\nspecific time frames or implementation periods specified. Less than \r\n10% of parties' NDCs specify when their emissions are expected \r\nto peak and some of these parties express their target as a carbon \r\nbudget (UNFCCC Secretariat 2021). Many long-term strategies \r\nsubmitted by Parties to the UNFCCC refer to net zero emissions or \r\nclimate neutrality, carbon neutrality, or GHG neutrality with reference \r\nto 2050, 2060 or mid-century targets (UNFCCC Secretariat 2021)"


id: bf336923c615a4375b1a47ba55bc209b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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vector_id: 27634
content:
"Figure 13.2 | Prevalence of targets by emissions and number of countries across region. Top: Shares of global GHG emissions under national climate emission \r\ntargets - in 2010, 2015 and 2020. Emissions data used are for 2019, since emissions shares across regions deviated from past patterns in 2020 due to COVID. Bottom: Number \r\nof countries with national climate emission targets - in 2010, 2015, and 2020. Emissions reductions targets were taken into account as a legislative target when they were \r\ndefined in a law or as part of a country's submission under the Kyoto Protocol, or as an executive target when they were included in a national policy or official submissions \r\nunder the UNFCCC. Targets were included if they were economy wide or included at least the energy sector. The proportion of national emissions covered are scaled to reflect \r\ncoverage and whether targets are in GHG or CO2 terms"


id: 3cbe8976a2eb2ed87ca49a8a17b68a25
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:50
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content:
" AR6 regions: DEV = Developed countries; APC = Asia and Pacific; EEA = Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia; AFR \r\n= Africa; LAM = Latin America and the Caribbean; MDE = Middle East. Source: updated and adapted with permission from Iacobuta et al. (2018) to reflect AR6 regional \r\naggregation and recent data."


id: fb2f408541abf97a50a0b7474f8d59e6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"The European Union (EU)1 has developed an encompassing climate governance framework (Kulovesi and Oberthur 2020), having \r\nratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. In 2003 the EU adopted an Emissions Trading System for sectors with large GHG emitters, which \r\nstarted in 2005. From 2007 to 2009, the EU revised its climate policies, including for vehicle emissions, renewable energy and energy \r\nefficiency, and adopted targets for 2020 for GHG emissions reductions, renewable energy shares and energy efficiency improvements. \r\nIt also adopted in 2009 an Effort Sharing Decision for Member States' emissions reductions for the period 2013-2020 in sectors not \r\ncovered by the ETS (Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Bertoldi 2018). The ETS has been improved multiple times, including through a 2015 \r\nMarket Stability Reserve to reduce the surplus of emission allowances (Chaton et al. 2018; Wettestad and Jevnaker 2019)"


id: fedf9f27717c2bd0ec7257c21ad0adbe
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content:
" In 2010, the \r\nEuropean Commission created a directorate-general (equal to a ministry at the domestic level) for Climate Action. Between 2014 and \r\n2018, the EU agreed on emission reduction targets for 2030 of 30% GHG emission reductions compared to 1990, and again revised \r\nits climate policy portfolio including new targets for renewable energies and energy efficiency and a new Effort Sharing Regulation \r\n(Fitch-Roy et al. 2019a; Oberthur 2019). "


id: a10e740441937d01275536ec61248340
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"From 2018, climate planning and reporting has been regulated by the EU Governance Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2018/1999), \r\nrequiring member states to develop detailed and strategic National Energy and Climate Plans (Knodt et al. 2020). In 2019, the \r\nEuropean Commission, backed by the European Council (heads of states and government in the EU) and the European Parliament, \r\nlaunched a new broad climate and environment initiative; the 'European Green Deal', implying the revision of many EU polices and \r\nintroducing the Climate Pact (European Commission 2019a). This roadmap develops a 'new growth strategy for the EU' aimed at \r\nreaching climate neutrality by 2050 and spans multiple sectors. In 2020, the European Commission introduced a new climate law \r\nestablishing the framework for achieving the climate neutrality by 2050 principle, and upgraded its 2030 GHG emission reduction \r\ntarget to at least net 55% reduction, which was adopted in June 2021 (European Commission 2020a)"


id: 212b839f4995468c0fd7b3c4865cc718
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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" In June 2021, the new policy \r\npackage 'Fit for 55' was adopted by the Commission; the packages included a proposal for the revision of the ETS, including its \r\nextension to shipping and a  separate emission trading system for road transport and buildings, a  revision of the effort sharing \r\nregulation, an amendment of the regulation setting CO2 emission standards for cars and vans, a revision of the energy tax directive, \r\na new carbon border adjustment mechanism, a revision of renewable energy and energy efficiency targets and directives, and a new \r\nsocial fund to make the transition to climate neutrality fair."


id: ec10158fdb97b91bfac9749876029b10
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"Climate governance in China features a combination of top-down planning and vertical accountability (Sims Gallagher and Xuan 2019; \r\nTeng and Wang 2021). An overarching coordination role is performed by the Leading Group on Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality, \r\nappointed by and reporting to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and the National Leading Group on Climate \r\nChange Response, Energy Conservation, and Emissions Reduction (NLGCCR), headed by the Premier and consisting of more than \r\n30 ministers (Wang et al. 2018a). The Department of Climate Change (DCC) under the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) is \r\nthe primary agency in charge of climate issues, with a corresponding local Bureau of Ecology and Environment in each province or \r\ncity"


id: c7175589010e3b0673ade80858b8f2da
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" While MEE is the leading agency for climate policy, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is the leading \r\nagency for setting overall and industry-specific targets in five-year plans, and thus has a key role in coordinating carbon emissions \r\ntargets with energy and industrial development targets (Wang et al. 2019; Yu 2021). Involvements of ministries related to foreign \r\naffairs, public finance, science and technology, as well as sector ministries such as transportation, construction, and manufacturing \r\nindustries are also needed to push forward sector-specific climate initiatives. At subsidiary levels of government carbon intensity targets \r\nare enforced through a 'targets and responsibilities' system that is directly linked to the evaluation of governments' performances (Lin \r\n2012a; Li et al. 2016). "


id: 157921ccff38cc071433b6f0289dddc2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"Where new dedicated organisations have not emerged, countries \r\nmay layer climate responsibilities on existing institutions; the \r\naddition of mitigation to the responsibilities of the US Environmental \r\nProtection Agency is an example (Mildenberger 2021). Layering \r\nis also a  common approach when climate change is embedded \r\nwithin consideration of multiple objectives of policy. In these cases, \r\nclimate institutions tend to be layered on sectoral institutions for the \r\npursuit of co-benefits or broader development concerns. Examples \r\ninclude India, where energy security was an important objective of \r\nrenewable energy promotion policy (Pillai and Dubash 2021), Brazil's \r\nmitigation approach focused on sectoral forest policy (Hochstetler \r\n2021) and South Africa's emphasis on job creation as a necessary \r\nfactor in mitigation policy (Chandrashekeran et al. 2017; Rennkamp \r\n2019)"


id: b630885ac8b1af249bc6e622963ecfec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" Prior to this process of layering, sectoral institutions, such as \r\nin forest and energy sectors, may play an important latent role in \r\nshaping climate outcomes, before climate considerations are part of \r\ntheir formal mandate."


id: 789cebf0076b15916fe0947a91217495
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"Because transition to a low-carbon future is likely to create winners \r\nand losers over different time scales; institutions are needed to \r\nmediate these interests and build consensus on future pathways \r\n(Kuzemko et al. 2016; Lockwood et al. 2017; Finnegan 2019; \r\nMildenberger 2020). Institutions that provide credible knowledge \r\ncan help support ambition. For example, analysis by the UK Climate \r\nChange committee has been harnessed, including by non-state \r\nactors, to prevent backsliding on decisions (Lockwood 2021a). \r\nInstitutions can also help create positive feedback by providing \r\nspaces in decision-making for low-carbon interests (Aklin and \r\nUrpelainen 2013; Roberts et al. 2018; Lockwood et al. 2017; Finnegan \r\n2019). For example, a renewable energy policy community emerged \r\nin China through key agenda setting meetings (Shen 2017), and in \r\nIndia, a National Solar Mission provided a platform for the renewable \r\nenergy industry (Pillai and Dubash 2021)"


id: 6bdc0c47ee7668ecfeeee7cabef3cffa
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content:
" Conversely, institutions can \r\nalso exert a drag on change through 'regulatory inertia', as in the \r\ncase of the UK energy regulator Ofgem, which has exercised veto \r\npowers in ways that may limit a low-carbon transition (Lockwood \r\net al. 2017)."


id: 1966cef79bd92e26a100eecf66772b67
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"Creation of a  high-level coordinating body to coordinate across \r\ndepartments and mainstream climate into sectoral actions is \r\nanother common approach (Oulu 2015). For example, Kenya \r\nhas created a  National Climate Change Council, which operates \r\nthrough a  climate change directorate in the environment ministry \r\nto mainstream climate change at the county level (Guey and Bilich \r\n2019). Zhou and Mori (2011) suggest that well-functioning inter\u0002agency coordination mechanisms require support from heads of \r\ngovernment, involvement by industry and environment agencies; and \r\nengagement by multiple sectoral agencies. However, coordination \r\nmechanisms without a clear authority and basis for setting directions \r\nrun the risk of 'negative coordination', a  process through which \r\nministries comment on each other's proposals, removing any ideas \r\nthat run counter to the interests of their own ministry, leading to \r\neven weaker decisions (Flachsland and Levi 2021)"


id: 8e2fa2168302d91de34bcca3a69e3c58
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" Countries with \r\ndedicated, new climate institutions tend to have a more explicit and \r\nauthorised body for climate coordination, such as China's National \r\nLeading Group (Box 13.3)."


id: f1db8d1050caac4948d2dbaf50bb87ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"Decision-making consistent with energy and climate justice requires attention to procedural justice (McCauley and Heffron 2018), which \r\nincludes how decisions are made, and who is involved and has influence on decisions (Sovacool and Dworkin 2015). Procedural justice \r\nemphasises the importance of equitable access to decision-making processes and non-discriminatory engagement with all stakeholders \r\n(Jenkins et al. 2016), attention to the capability, particularly of marginalised groups, to shape decisions (Holland 2017) and recognition \r\nof their specific vulnerabilities in collective political processes (Schlosberg 2012). Consensus-building institutions should avoid reducing \r\nnormative questions to technical ones, recognising that values, interests and behaviours are all shaped by ongoing climate governance \r\n(Ryder 2018; Schwanen 2021)"


id: 5b812101205f4ab7d04915dfb7a73d9b
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content:
" Additionally, communities affected by low-carbon transition may face challenges in articulating their \r\nunderstandings and experiences, which needs to be addressed in the design of climate institutions (Ryder 2018; Schwanen 2021). "


id: 75ab0e62c4d20174e5d8ee929b21dc5c
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content:
"identify and manage synergies and trade-offs across climate and \r\ndevelopment objectives (Urge-Vorsatz et al. 2014; von Stechow et al. \r\n2015; McCollum et al. 2018); identify and choose amongst possible \r\npolicy options (Howlett and Oliphant 2010); identify areas for \r\ntransformation and the means to induce innovation (Patt 2017; UNEP \r\n2018); and developing the ability to monitor and evaluate outcomes \r\n(Upadhyaya et al. 2021) (Box 13.5). Domorenok et al. (2021) highlight \r\ndifferent aspects of the capacity challenge particularly necessary \r\nfor integrated policy making including: the capacity for horizontal \r\nand vertical coordination; implementation capacity including the \r\nindependence of the state from interests; and administrative capacity \r\nrequired to address compound problems"


id: baa8e3c3f42886a4cf32ec2b8caad17e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" At a basic level, questions \r\nof governmental capacity - the numbers and training of personnel - \r\ncan shape the choices available for climate institutions and their \r\nability to be strategic (Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008; Harrison and \r\nKostka 2014; Kim 2016). Box 13.5 describes South Africa's approach \r\nto building monitoring and evaluation capacity."


id: 2efe57d19d5eb0aa3fc9239fba4fbd8c
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content:
"In addition, expert driven, technical solutions such as infrastructural \r\ninterventions can undermine the knowledge of lower income \r\ncountries, communities or indigenous knowledge holders, yet are \r\noften used by sub-national governments (Ford et al. 2016; Brattland \r\nand Mustonen 2018; Nagorny-Koring 2019; Whyte 2017, 2020). \r\nTechnical solutions, such as electric vehicles or smart grids rarely \r\naddress the needs and capabilities of disadvantaged communities \r\nthat may not be able to afford these technologies (Mistry 2014; \r\nRomero-Lankao and Nobler 2021). However, mitigation strategies \r\nin sectors such as transport and buildings have often focused on \r\ntechnical and market outcomes, the benefits of which are limited \r\nto some, while others experience negative externalities or face \r\nhealth risks (Markard 2018; Williams and Doyon 2019; Carley and \r\nKonisky 2020)"


id: 86db8b9ce610395d415f4d01032ff413
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" Delivering climate justice requires community\u0002driven approaches to understanding the problem addressing \r\nstructural inequities and fostering justice, while reducing carbon \r\nemissions (Romero-Lankao et al. 2018b; Carley and Konisky 2020; \r\nLewis et al. 2020). "


id: 79cc98ad806392ebe3e5c2733dff7318
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"Since countries are not bound by their material endowment, countries \r\nwith similar material endowments may differ in climate governance, \r\nwhereas those with notable differences in material endowments \r\nmay have similar policies. For instance, countries with rich fossil fuel \r\nendowments are found either adopting rather ambitious emission \r\nreduction targets and measures, or remaining weak in developing \r\ndomestic climate policies (Eckersley 2013; Farstad 2019). Further, \r\ncountries with radically different electricity systems and energy \r\nresource potentials are found developing rather similar renewables \r\nsupport schemes such as feed-in-tariff subsidies and competitive \r\ntendering programmes (Dobrotkova et al. 2018; Vanegas Cantarero \r\n2020; Boasson et al. 2021). Some policy instruments are widely \r\napplied in both developed and developing countries with similar \r\nor different material endowment"


id: 75cc3f1bcb1296eb0399e3bf881b6c5e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" For example, renewable energy \r\nauctions have been experimented by over 100 countries by the end \r\nof 2018 (IRENA 2019)."


id: f92ca2fdf873155ea41a885ef7d208bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"Election systems based on proportional representation tend to have \r\nlower emissions, higher energy efficiency, higher renewable energy \r\ndeployment, and more climate friendly investment than systems \r\nwhere leadership candidates have to secure a majority of the votes \r\nto be elected (medium evidence, high agreement) (Fredriksson and \r\nMillimet 2004; Lachapelle and Paterson 2013; Finnegan 2019). Such \r\nsystems better enable voters supporting ambitious climate positions \r\nto influence policymaking (Harrison and Sundstrom 2010; Willis 2018), \r\nplace less political risks on legislators from additional costs incurred \r\nfrom climate actions on voters (Finnegan 2018, 2019), and strengthen \r\ncredible commitments to climate policy (Lockwood 2021b). Similarly, \r\nrules that govern the relationship between governments and civic \r\nsocieties in decision-making have also been shown to matter in \r\nclimate governance"


id: fcb07382bb9627af805620b48f912b5f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" Corporatist societies, where economic groups \r\nare formally involved in public policy making, have better climate\u0002related outcomes (lower CO2 emissions and higher low-carbon \r\ninvestments) than liberal-pluralist countries, where a  larger array \r\nof non-governmental organisations compete for informal influence, \r\noften through lobbying (medium evidence, medium agreement) \r\n(Liefferink et al. 2009; Jahn 2016; Finnegan 2018). "


id: f0d7c336a6564b15975e63622bd4d127
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"Political parties with similar ideological roots in different countries \r\n(for instance social democratic or conservative parties) may \r\nhave different positions on climate governance across countries \r\n(Boasson et al. 2021). Nevertheless, on average, a higher share of \r\ngreen parties in a parliament is associated with lower greenhouse \r\ngas emissions (Neumayer 2003; Jensen and Spoon 2011; Mourao \r\n2019), and left-wing parties tend to adopt more pro-climate \r\npolicy positions (medium evidence, high agreement) (Carter 2013; \r\nTobin 2017; Farstad 2018; Ladrech and Little 2019). There is also \r\nevidence, however, that conservative parties in some countries \r\nsupport climate measures (Batstrand 2015) and consensus can be \r\nachieved on climate actions across the political spectrum (Thonig \r\net al. 2021)"


id: faaa87a68748a58cecf58a74b723c1c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" At the same time, it seems harder to get support for \r\nnew climate governance initiatives in systems where many political \r\ngroups can block decision due to many veto points, for instance \r\nin systems with bicameralism (the legislature is divided into two \r\nseparate assemblies) and/or in federalist governments (where \r\nregions have national political representation, e.g. USA and Brazil) \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement) (Madden 2014; von Stein \r\n2020) although federal systems hold out the possibility of sub\u0002national action when federal agreement is limited (Section 13.2). \r\nThere remains a  limited literature on the role of green parties \r\nand veto points in developing countries (Haynes 1999; Kernecker \r\nand Wagner 2019). "


id: fa035ad652fcba363fc23ecb1fc6e9cf
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content:
"Different sets of beliefs can shape climate-related policies, targets, \r\nand instruments (Boasson and Wettestad 2013; Boasson 2015; \r\nBoasson et al. 2021). First, beliefs link climate governance with social \r\njustice concerns; policies, targets and instruments may therefore \r\nreflect justice issues (Fuller and McCauley 2016; Reckien et al. 2017; \r\nMcCauley and Heffron 2018; Routledge et al. 2018; Backstrand and \r\nLovbrand 2006, 2019). Second, climate mitigation may be seen as \r\nprimarily a market correction issue and mitigation compatible with \r\neconomic growth, as exemplified by ecological modernisation (Mol \r\net al. 2009; Backstrand and Lovbrand 2006, 2019), climate capitalism \r\n(Newell and Paterson 2010), market logics (Boasson 2015; Boasson \r\net al. 2021) or a global commons approach (Bernstein and Hoffmann \r\n2019)"


id: 8e44fcfbeb2788c861496d77ca9449a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" Third, climate governance may be understood relative to policies \r\non technological innovation and progress, often conceptualised as \r\nsocial-technical transformations (Geels et al. 2017a). "


id: 219a2c27c306071be784033fd7c477ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 2714
content:
"In any political system, climate policy adoption and implementation \r\nmay be obstructed by corrupt practices (Rafaty 2018; Fredriksson \r\nand Neumayer 2016) that entail an abuse of entrusted power for \r\nprivate gain (medium evidence, high agreement) (Treisman 2000). \r\nEvidence shows that CO2 emissions levels can be affected by \r\ncorruption, either through the direct negative effect of corruption \r\non law enforcement, including in the forestry sector (Sundstrom \r\n2016), or through the negative effect of corruption on countries' \r\nincome (Welsch 2004).These early findings are reinforced by \r\nstudies of a global sample of countries (Cole 2007) and from across \r\nthe developing world (Sahli and Rejeb 2015; Bae et al. 2017; Wang \r\net al. 2018b; Ridzuan et al. 2019; Habib et al. 2020). Corruption \r\nalso disrupts public support of climate policies by affecting the \r\nlevels of trust (medium evidence, high agreement) (Harring 2013; \r\nFairbrother et al"


id: 5fd0d0e274de3b62f05dca7bf5343f4e
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vector_id: 12654
content:
" 2019; Davidovic and Harring 2020), which then \r\nimpact on the compliance of climate policies. More research is \r\nrequired to further understand the causal mechanisms between \r\ncorrupt practices and emissions."


id: 3944bb942e5b6a32eb979bcb389546a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 6384
content:
"Citizen engagement has also become common among indigenous \r\ngroups who tend to have limited structural power but often aim to \r\nshape the formation and effects of projects that have implications \r\nto  climate change. These include opposing extraction and \r\ntransportation of fossil fuels on their traditional lands (especially \r\nin the Americas) (Bebbington and Bury 2013; Hindery 2013; Coryat \r\n2015; Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017; Wood and Rossiter 2017); \r\nlarge-scale climate mitigation projects that may affect traditional \r\nrights (Brannstrom et al. 2017; Moreira et al. 2019; Zarate-Toledo \r\net al. 2019); supporting deployment of small-scale renewable energy \r\ninitiatives (Thornton and Comberti 2017); seeking to influence the \r\ndevelopment of REDD+ policies through opposition (Reed 2011); \r\nand participation in consultation processes and multi-stakeholder \r\nbodies (Bushley 2014; Gebara et al. 2014; Astuti and McGregor 2015; \r\nKashwan 2015; Jodoin 2017)"


id: 452c9305fddd1e3dc498f57800ecb831
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content:
" Indigenous groups have been reported \r\nto have had some influence on some climate discussions, particularly \r\nforest management and siting of renewable energy (Claeys and \r\nDelgado Pugley 2017; Jodoin 2017; Thornton and Comberti 2017). \r\nFurther, more scientific assessments are required on the role of \r\nindigenous groups in climate activism and policy (Jodoin 2017; \r\nClaeys and Delgado Pugley 2017; Thornton and Comberti 2017)."


id: 5a8cf1dc807abcb66362a11cc08fbb85
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11761
content:
"Civil society actors can involve citizens working collectively to \r\nchange individual behaviours that have climate implications. For \r\nexample, environmental movements that involve various forms of \r\ncollective efforts encourage their members to make personal lifestyle \r\nchanges that reduce their individual carbon footprints (Ergas 2010; \r\nMiddlemiss 2011; Haenfler et al. 2012; Cronin et al. 2014; Saunders \r\net al. 2014; Buchs et al. 2015; Wynes et al. 2018). These efforts seek \r\nto change individual members' consumer behaviours by reducing \r\ncar-use and flying, shifting to non-fossil fuel sources for individual \r\nsources of electricity, and eating less dairy or meat (Cherry 2006; \r\nErgas 2010; Middlemiss 2011; Haenfler et al. 2012; Stuart et al. 2013; \r\nCronin et al. 2014; Saunders et al. 2014; Buchs et al. 2015; Wynes and \r\nNicholas 2017; Wynes et al. 2018; Thogersen et al. 2021)"


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content:
"In March 2019, the first global climate strike took place, turning out more than one million people around the world (Carrington 2019). \r\nSix months later in September 2019, young people and adults responded to a call to participate in climate strikes as part of the 'Global \r\nWeek for Future' surrounding the UN Climate Action Summit (Thunberg 2019), and the number of participants globally jumped \r\nto an estimated six million people (Taylor et al. 2019). Although a handful of studies have reported on who was involved in these \r\nstrikes, how they were connected, and their messaging (Marris 2019; Wahlstrom et al. 2019; Evensen 2019; D. Fisher 2019; Boulianne \r\net al. 2020; Bevan et al. 2020; Han and Ahn 2020; Holmberg and Alvinius 2020; Jung et al. 2020; Martiskainen et al. 2020; Thackeray et al. \r\n2020; Trihartono et al. 2020; de Moor et al"


id: 18fc167e7dc8dfe784cdbcd676e90310
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" 2021; Fisher and Nasrin 2021b), its consequences in terms of political outcomes and \r\nemissions reductions have yet to be fully understood (Fisher and Nasrin 2021b). "


id: 16b7260eea7440a420fb0b1440efd125
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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"Outside the formal climate policy processes, climate litigation is \r\nanother important arena for various actors to confront and interact \r\nover how climate change should be governed (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement) (Wilensky 2015; Peel and Osofsky 2015, 2018; \r\nBouwer 2018; Setzer and Byrnes 2019; Calzadilla 2019; Setzer and \r\nVanhala 2019; Paiement 2020; Wegener 2020). Climate litigation is \r\nan attempt to control, order or influence the behaviour of others in \r\nrelation to climate governance, and it has been used by a wide variety \r\nof litigants (governments, private actors, civil society and individuals) \r\nat multiple scales (local, regional, national and international) \r\n(Osofsky 2007; Lin 2012b; Keele 2017; McCormick et al. 2018; Peel \r\nand Osofsky 2018; Setzer and Vanhala 2019)"


id: a23ea9b78f78d5e9d12067b66d6d4219
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 23093
content:
" Climate litigation \r\nhas become increasingly common (UNEP2020b), but its prevalence \r\nvaries across countries (medium evidence, high agreement) (Peel \r\nand Osofsky 2015; Wilensky 2015; Bouwer 2018; Lin and Kysar 2020; \r\nSetzer and Higham 2021). This is not surprising, given that courts \r\nplay differing roles across varying political systems and law traditions \r\n(La Porta et al. 1998). "


id: be991adc2fcf49bfb3c040feda1f2d1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"The judgement in Urgenda vs State of the Netherlands established the linkage between a state's international duty, domestic actions, \r\nand human rights commitments as to the recommendations of IPCC's AR5 (Burgers and Staal 2019; Antonopoulos 2020). It was the \r\nfirst to impose a specific emissions reduction target on a state (de Graaf and Jans 2015; Cox 2016; Loth 2016). The District Court of The \r\nHague ordered the Dutch Government to reduce emissions by at least 25% by the end of 2020. Following the decision of the district \r\ncourt of The Hague in 2015 the Dutch government announced that it would adopt additional measures to achieve the 25% emissions \r\nreduction target by 2020 (Mayer 2019). The decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in 2018 and the Supreme Court in 2019"


id: 92ce15a720b2d293a72d2a48e8b997b0
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vector_id: 20612
content:
" \r\nSince the first judgment in 2015 significant changes in the climate policy environment have been reported, the results of which have \r\nincluded the introduction of a Climate Act and the decision to close all remaining coal fired power plants by 2030 (Verschuuren 2019; \r\nWonneberger and Vliegenthart 2021). "


id: 664d5b7d11deeba1bb351bd8bc49f3b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"Climate change litigation has also been brought against corporations \r\nby regional or local governments and non-governmental \r\norganisations (Wilensky 2015; Ganguly et al. 2018; Foerster 2019). \r\nOne type of private climate change litigation alleges climate change\u0002related damage and seeks compensation from major carbon polluters \r\n(Ganguly et al. 2018; Wewerinke-Singh and Salili 2020). The litigators \r\nclaim that major oil producers are historically responsible for \r\na significant portion of global greenhouse gas emissions (Heede 2014; \r\nFrumhoff et al. 2015; Ekwurzel et al. 2017; Stuart-Smith et al. 2021). \r\nThese cases rely on advancements in climate science, specifically \r\nclimate attribution (Marjanac et al. 2017; Marjanac and Patton 2018; \r\nMcCormick et al. 2018; Minnerop and Otto 2020; Burger et al. 2020b; \r\nStuart-Smith et al. 2021)"


id: 2391646577b3f65a4a6fe5582e1cbfb6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" It is alleged that major carbon emitters had \r\nknowledge and awareness of climate change and yet took actions \r\nto confound or mislead the public about climate science (Supran \r\nand Oreskes 2017). Strategic climate change litigation has also been \r\nused to hold corporations to specific human rights responsibilities \r\n(Savaresi and Auz 2019; Savaresi and Setzer 2021) (Box 13.8). "


id: 1d6257274e7b8d74208f8251ed2cf9d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"The outcomes of climate litigation can affect the stringency and \r\nambitiousness of climate governance (McCormick et al. 2018; \r\nEskander et al. 2021). In the United States, pro-regulation litigants \r\nmore commonly win in relation to renewable energy and energy \r\nefficiency cases, and more frequently lose in relations to coal-fired \r\npower plant cases (McCormick et al. 2018). Outside the US, more \r\nthan half (58%) of litigation have outcomes that are aligned with \r\nclimate action (Setzer and Higham 2021). But these cases can also \r\nhave impacts outside of the legal proceedings before, during and \r\nafter the case has been brought and decided (Setzer and Vanhala \r\n2019). These impacts include changes in the behaviour of the parties \r\n(Peel and Osofsky 2015; Pals 2021), public opinion (Hilson 2019; \r\nBurgers 2020), financial and reputational consequences for involved \r\nactors (Solana 2020), and impact on further litigation (Barritt 2020)"


id: 7521beb462f01c7add032b174a5748da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" \r\nIndividual cases have also attracted considerable media attention, \r\nwhich in turn can influence how climate policy is perceived (Nosek \r\n2018; Barritt and Sediti 2019; Hilson 2019; Paiement 2020). While \r\nthere is evidence to show the influence of some key cases on climate \r\nagenda-setting (Wonneberger and Vliegenthart 2021), it is still \r\nunclear the extent to which climate litigation actually results in new \r\nclimate rules and policies (Peel and Osofsky 2018; Setzer and Vanhala \r\n2019; Peel and Osofsky 2020) and to what degree this holds true \r\nfor all cases (Jodoin et al. 2020). However, there is now increasing \r\nacademic agreement that climate litigation has become a powerful \r\nforce in climate governance UNEP 2020b; Burgers 2020). In general, \r\nlitigations can be applied to constrain both public and private entities, \r\nand to shape structural factors mentioned in Section 13.3, such as \r\nthe beliefs and institutions around climate governance."


id: 57b63d43743174985bf93877abbde3e3
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content:
"Who dominates the debate on media, and how open the debate can be \r\nvaries significantly across countries (Takahashi 2011; Poberezhskaya \r\n2015) based on participants' material and technological power. Fossil \r\nfuel industries have unique access to mainstream media (Geels 2014) \r\nvia advertisements, shaping narratives of media reports, and exerting \r\npolitical influence in countries like Australia and the USA (Holmes \r\nand Star 2018; Karceski et al. 2020). For social media, novel technical \r\ntools, such as automated bots, are emerging to shape climate change \r\ndiscussion on major online platforms such as Twitter (Marlow et al. \r\n2021). Open debates can underpin the adoption of more ambitions \r\nclimate policy (Lyytimaki 2011). Media coverage on energy saving, \r\npatriotism, and social justice in the countries like USA and the UK have \r\nhelped connect mitigation of climate change with other concerns, \r\nthereby raising support to climate action (Leiserowitz 2006; Trope \r\net al"


id: a253f511d06b87e0ccaf42091e748970
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vector_id: 23106
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" 2007; Doyle 2016; Corner and Clarke 2017; Whitmarsh and \r\nCorner 2017; Markowitz and Guckian 2018). Further, media coverage \r\nof climate change mitigation has influenced public opinions through \r\ndiscussions on political, economic, scientific and cultural themes \r\nabout climate change (medium evidence, high agreement) (Irwin and \r\nWynne 1996; Smith 2000; Boykoff 2011; O'Neill et al. 2015). "


id: dfcd39b0d38bfeb9d57a12e050d937d3
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content:
"of EVs; a  carbon tax in British Columbia; and a  cap-and-trade \r\nscheme in Metropolitan Tokyo (Houle et al. 2015; Murray and \r\nRivers 2015; Hibbard et al. 2018; Bernard and Kichian 2019; \r\nRaymond 2019; Xiang and Lawley 2019; Chan and Morrow 2019). \r\nb) Regulatory instruments: policies such as land use and \r\ntransportation planning, performance standards for buildings, \r\nutilities, transport electrification, and energy use by public \r\nutilities, buildings and fleets are widely prevalent (Bulkeley \r\n2013; Jones 2013; C40 and ARUP 2015; Martinez et al. 2015; \r\nHewitt and Coakley 2019; Palermo et al. 2020b). Policies such \r\nas regulatory restrictions, low emission zones, parking controls, \r\ndelivery planning and freight routes, focus on traffic management \r\nand reduction of local air pollution but also have a mitigation \r\nimpact (Slovic et al. 2016; Khreis et al. 2017; Letnik et al. 2018)"


id: 88b3e0b1a10f5bd870f3638627323ea
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vector_id: 19036
content:
" \r\nFor instance, in coordination with national governments, sub\u0002national actors in China, Europe and USA have introduced access \r\nto priority lanes, free parking and other strategies fostering the \r\nroll-out of EVs (Creutzig 2016; Zhang and Bai 2017; Teske et al. \r\n2018; Zhang and Qin 2018; Romero-Lankao et al. 2021). "


id: 88e004d9571b4185643ea537b5a6f94
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 19068
content:
"(Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy 2018), and \r\nICLEI's - Local Governments for Sustainability carbon registry (Hsu \r\net al. 2018). In Europe alone, more than 6000 cities have adopted \r\ntheir own climate action plans (Palermo et al. 2020a) and nearly \r\n300 US sub-national actors  - cities and states  - were committed \r\nto maintaining momentum for climate action as part of the 'We Are \r\nStill In' coalition (We Are Still In coalition 2020) in the absence of \r\nnational US climate legislation. Further, as of October 2020, more \r\nthan 826  cities and 103 regional governments had made specific \r\npledges to decarbonise, whether in a specific sector (e.g., buildings, \r\nelectricity, or transport) or through their entire economies, pledging \r\nto reduce their overall emissions by at least 80% (NewClimate \r\nInstitute and Data Driven EnviroLab 2020)"


id: a5dab255d1ba4d8514fc93e7e015ee85
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vector_id: 23652
content:
" Cities such as Barcelona, \r\nSpain and Seattle, Washington have adopted net zero goals for 2050 \r\nin policy legislation, while many more cities throughout the world, \r\nincluding the Global South such as Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, have net \r\nzero targets under consideration (ECIU 2019, 2021)."


id: 8a3fe001dda331f344ca01ca1be324f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"The performance of sub-national actors' mitigation policies have \r\nbeen measured using criteria such as existence of mitigation targets, \r\nincentives for mitigation, definition of a  baseline, and existence \r\nof a  monitoring, reporting, and verification procedure (Hsu et al. \r\n2019). Existing evaluations range from small-scale studies assessing \r\nthe mitigation potential of commitments by sub-national regions, \r\ncities and companies in the USA or in 10 high-emitting economies \r\n(Roelfsema 2017; Hsu et al. 2019), to larger studies finding that over \r\n9149 cities worldwide could mitigate 1400 MtCO2-eq in 2030 (Global \r\nCovenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy 2018; Hsu et al. 2018, \r\n2019). These sub-national mitigation potential estimates vary since \r\na  range of approaches exists for accounting for overlaps between \r\nsub-national governments and their nested jurisdictions (e.g., states, \r\nprovinces, and national governments) (Roelfsema et al. 2018; Hsu et al. \r\n2019)"


id: e2e02157daf42aca1e15fb22bfc91d0d
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content:
" One analysis found that the cities of New York, Berlin, London, \r\nGreater Toronto, Boston, and Seattle have achieved on average \r\na 0.27 tCO2-eq per capita per year reduction (Kennedy et al. 2012). \r\nHsu et al. (2020c) found that 60% of more than 1000 European cities, \r\nrepresenting 6% of the EU's total emissions, are on track to achieving \r\ntheir targets, reducing more than 51 MtCO2-eq. While evidence is "


id: 6b288cde6a823d8888a2907fdda1085f
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14483
content:
"Sub-national actors have also been associated with experiments and \r\nlaboratories, which promise to achieve the deep change required to \r\naddress the climate mitigation gap (Smeds and Acuto 2018; Marvin \r\net al. 2018). Experiments span smart technologies, for example, in \r\nMalmo, Sweden (Parks 2019), Eco-Art, Transformation-Labs and \r\nother approaches that question the cultural basis of current energy \r\nregimes and seek reimagined or reinvented futures (Castan Broto and \r\nBulkeley 2013; Guy et al. 2015; Voytenko et al. 2016; Hodson et al. \r\n2018; Peng and Bai 2018; Smeds and Acuto 2018; Culwick et al. 2019; \r\nPereira et al. 2019; Sengers et al. 2019). They may include governance \r\nexperiments, from formally defined policy experiments to informal \r\ninitiatives that mobilise new governance concepts (Kivimaa et al. \r\n2017a; Turnheim et al. 2018), and co-design initiatives and grassroots \r\ninnovations (Martiskainen 2017; Sheikh and Bhaduri 2021)"


id: 5854aecb5359eeab7537f7118767b6ae
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vector_id: 11403
content:
" These \r\ninitiatives often expand the scope for citizen participation. For \r\nexample, Urban Living Labs foster innovation, coproducing responses \r\nto existing problems of energy use, energy poverty and mobility that \r\nintegrate scientific and expert knowledge with local knowledge \r\nand common values (Voytenko et al. 2016; Marvin et al. 2018). The "


id: b3d13239b4d532adbcf3875151c33ae3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25809
content:
"Where ETS or carbon taxes exist, they apply to different proportions \r\nof the jurisdiction's greenhouse gas emissions. The share of emissions \r\ncovered by ETSs in 2020 varied widely, ranged from 9% (Canada) \r\nto 80% (California) while the share of emissions covered by carbon \r\ntaxes ranged from 3% (Latvia and Spain) to 80% (South Africa) \r\n(World Bank 2021a).Where carbon pricing policies are effective in \r\nreducing GHG emissions, they usually also generate co-benefits \r\nincluding better air quality. For example, a Chinese study of air quality \r\nbenefits from lower fossil fuel use under carbon pricing suggests that \r\nprospective health co-benefits would partially or fully offset the cost \r\nof the carbon policy (Li et al. 2018)"


id: 9b68527a62d3ef92531cb489d3dafeb4
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" Depending upon the jurisdiction \r\n(for example, if there are fossil fuel subsidies) carbon pricing could \r\nalso reduce the economic distortions of fossil fuel subsidies, improve \r\nenergy security through greater reliance on local energy sources and \r\nreduce exposure to fossil fuel market volatility. Substantial carbon \r\nprices would be in the domestic self-interest of many countries if \r\nco-benefits were fully factored in (Parry et al. 2015)."


id: 9a5c107e0706a7a290ba61a2d0ba91ed
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"The most commonly studied distributional impact is the direct impact \r\nof a carbon tax on household income. Typically it is regressive; the tax \r\ninduced increase in energy expenditures represents a larger share of \r\nhousehold income for lower income households (Grainger and Kolstad \r\n2010; Timilsina 2018; Dorband et al. 2019; Ohlendorf et al. 2021). \r\nGovernments can rebate part or all of the revenue to low-income \r\nhouseholds, or implement other changes to taxation and transfer \r\nsystems to achieve desired distributional outcomes (Jacobs and van \r\nder Ploeg 2019; Saelim 2019; Sallee 2019) (Box 5.11). The full impact \r\nof the tax - after any distribution of tax revenue to households and \r\ntypically adverse effects on investors - generally is less regressive or \r\nprogressive (Williams III et al. 2015; Goulder et al. 2019)"


id: f235cb743a4f5a7bcb45af35883b78a7
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content:
" Where the \r\ntax revenue is treated as general revenue the government relies on \r\nexisting income redistribution policies (such as income taxes) and \r\nsocial safety net programmes to address the distributional impacts."


id: 21ac7d2ad4e8a3711432b8682edefa58
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 2729
content:
"Reducing fossil fuel subsidies would lower CO2 emissions, \r\nincrease government revenues (Jakob et al. 2015; Dennis 2016; \r\nGass and Echeverria 2017; Rentschler and Bazilian 2017; Monasterolo \r\nand  Raberto 2019), improve macroeconomic performance \r\n(Monasterolo  and Raberto 2019), and yield other environmental \r\nand sustainable development benefits (robust evidence, medium \r\nagreement) (Jakob et al. 2015; Rentschler and Bazilian 2017; Solarin \r\n2020). The benefits of gasoline subsidies in developing countries \r\naccrue mainly to higher income groups, so subsidy reduction usually \r\nwill reduce inequality (Coady et al. 2015; Dennis 2016; Monasterolo \r\nand Raberto 2019; Labeaga et al. 2021). Some subsidies, like tiered \r\nelectricity rates, benefit low-income groups. Reductions of broad \r\nsubsidies lead to price increases for fuels, electricity, transport, food and \r\nother goods and services that adversely affect the most economically \r\nvulnerable (Coady et al"


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content:
" 2015; Zeng and Chen 2016; Rentschler and \r\nBazilian 2017). Distributing some of the revenue saved can mitigate \r\nthe adverse economic impacts on low-income groups (Dennis 2016; \r\nZeng and Chen 2016; Labeaga et al. 2021; Schaffitzel et al. 2020). "


id: 836c1a133a56f9e8bb3b70b3fab7a48d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 18209
content:
"Since AR5, the literature on climate policies and policymaking \r\nhas expanded in two significant directions. First, there is growing \r\nrecognition that mitigation policy occurs in the context of multiple \r\nclimate and development objectives (Chapter  4). Different aspects \r\nof these linkages are discussed across the AR6 WGIII report, \r\nincluding concepts and framings (Section 1.6.2), shifting sustainable \r\ndevelopment pathways (Section  4.3 and Cross-Chapter Box  5 in \r\nChapter 4), cross-sectoral interactions (Sections 12.6.1 and 12.6.2), \r\nevidence of co-impacts (Section  17.3), links with adaptation \r\n(Section 4.4.2) and accelerating the transition (Sections 13.9, 17.1.1, \r\n17.4.5 and 17.4.6). While the concept of development pathways is \r\nsalient in all countries, it may particularly resonate with policymakers \r\nin developing countries focused on providing basic needs and \r\naddressing poverty and inequality, including energy poverty (Ahmad \r\n2009; Fuso Nerini et al"


id: 4fadc07849344226efab138582cea867
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9971
content:
" 2019; Bel and Teixido 2020; Caetano et al. \r\n2020; Roser et al. 2020). Consequently, some countries may frame \r\npolicies predominantly in terms of accelerating mitigation, while \r\nin others a  multiple objectives approach linked to development \r\npathways may dominate, depending on their specific socio-economic \r\ncontexts and priorities, governance capacities (McMeekin et al. 2019) \r\nand perceptions of historical responsibility (Winkler and Rajamani \r\n2014; Friman and Hjerpe 2015; Winkler et al. 2015; Pan et al. 2017)."


id: 5bdf9a5a7c2e5368f8f6b1e6ef1bb6b4
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vector_id: 11968
content:
"carbon technologies and a  moratorium on coal-fired power plants \r\nmay not only be politically more feasible than stringent carbon pricing \r\nalone, but may also limit efficiency losses and lower distributional \r\nimpacts  (Bertram et al. 2015b). Balance captures whether policy \r\ninstruments are deployed in complementary ways given their different \r\npurposes, combining for example technology-push approaches such \r\nas public R&D with demand-pull approaches such as an energy tax. \r\nA combination of technology-push and demand-pull approaches has \r\nbeen shown to support innovation in energy efficient technologies \r\nin OECD countries (Costantini et al. 2017). Consistency addresses \r\nthe alignment of policy instruments among each other and with the \r\npolicy strategy, which may have multiple and not always consistent \r\nobjectives (Rogge 2019). Consistency of policy mixes has been \r\nidentified as an important driver of low-carbon transformation, \r\nparticularly for renewable energy (Lieu et al"


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vector_id: 3923
content:
" 2018; Rogge and \r\nSchleich 2018). Box 13.14 summarises the economics literature on \r\nhow policies interact, to inform design of packages. "


id: 6f6e0279206d3601a99869d20cb19f15
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vector_id: 15160
content:
"Policy packages aimed at low-carbon transitions are more effective \r\nwhen they include elements to enhance the phase out of carbon\u0002intensive technologies and practices - often called exnovation - in \r\naddition to supporting low-carbon niches (Kivimaa and Kern 2016; \r\nDavid 2017). Such policies include stringent carbon pricing; changes \r\nin regime rules such as design of electricity markets; reduced support \r\nfor dominant regime technologies such as removing tax deductions \r\nfor private motor transport based on internal combustion engines; \r\nand changes in the balance of representation of incumbents versus \r\nnew entrants in deliberation and advisory bodies. For example, CGE \r\nmodelling for China's fossil fuel subsidy reform found that integrating \r\nboth creation and destabilisation policies is able to reduce rebound \r\neffects and make the policy mix more effective (Li et al. 2017)"


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" \r\nSweden's pulp and paper industry shows that destabilisation policies \r\nincluding deregulation of the electricity market and a  carbon tax \r\nwere an important complement to support policies (Scordato et al. \r\n2018), and other studies show complementary results for Finland's \r\nbuilding sector (Kivimaa et al. 2017b) and Norway's transport and \r\nenergy sector (Cetkovic and Skjaerseth 2019)."


id: a0f6c6baeffcff8fe5de538e976f8c6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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"Policy packages for low-carbon transitions are more successful \r\nif they take into account the potential for political contestation \r\nand resistance from incumbents who benefit from high-carbon \r\nsystems (medium evidence, high agreement) (Geels 2014; Roberts \r\net al. 2018; Kern and Rogge 2018; Rosenbloom 2018). To do so, \r\npolicies can be sequenced so as to address political obstacles, for \r\nexample, by initially starting with policies to facilitate the entry \r\nof new firms engaged in low-carbon technologies (Pahle et al. \r\n2018). Such policies can generate positive feedbacks by creating \r\nconstituencies for continuation of those policies, but need to be \r\ndesigned to do so from the outset (Edmondson et al. 2019, 2020). \r\nFor example, supporting renewable energies through feed-in tariffs \r\ncan buttress coalitions for more ambitious climate policy, such as \r\nthrough carbon pricing (Meckling et al. 2015)"


id: 70f21c26ca5e7f70a66b1d9ec11b6cc2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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" However, negative \r\npolicy feedback may also arise from ineffective policy instruments \r\nthat lose public support, or create concentrated losses that arouse \r\noppositional coalitions (Edmondson et al. 2019). Feedback loops \r\ncan operate through changes in resources available to actors; \r\nchanges in expectations; and changes in government capacities \r\n(Edmondson et al. 2019). "


id: 8cc0e041c47d9d0816efb3ff66c10414
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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"In many countries, and particularly when climate policy occurs in the \r\ncontext of sustainable development, policymakers seek to address \r\nclimate mitigation in the context of multiple economic and social \r\npolicy objectives (medium evidence, robust agreement) (Halsnaes \r\net al. 2014; Campagnolo and Davide 2019; Cohen et al. 2019). Studies \r\nsuggest that co-benefits of climate policies are substantial, especially \r\nin relation to air quality, and can yield better mitigation and overall \r\nwelfare, yet these are commonly overlooked in policymaking (robust \r\nevidence, robust agreement) (Nemet et al. 2010; Urge-Vorsatz et al. \r\n2014; von Stechow et al. 2015; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016; Roy \r\net al. 2018; Bhardwaj et al. 2019; Karlsson et al. 2020). Other studies \r\nhave shown the existence of strong complementarities between the \r\nSDGs and realisation of NDC pledges by countries (McCollum et al. \r\n2018)"


id: c4ac296e2552bd3ed5664cabe103392b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" An explicit attention to development pathways can enhance \r\nthe scope for mitigation, by paying explicit attention to development \r\nchoices that lock-in or lock-out opportunities for mitigation, such as \r\naround land use and infrastructure choices (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in \r\nChapter 4). While the pay-offs are considerable to an approach to \r\nmitigation that takes into account linkages to multiple objectives \r\nand the opportunity to shift development pathways, there are \r\nalso associated challenges with implementing this approach \r\nto policymaking."


id: 6f3e224803b1dc402acb1e3734ded034
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"tries to design an optimal policy package for the 'best guess' future \r\nscenario (Maier et al. 2016). Moreover, policy packages can usefully \r\nbe adapted dynamically to changing circumstances as part of the \r\npolicy process (Haasnoot et al. 2013; Hamarat et al. 2014; Maier \r\net al. 2016) including by using exploratory modelling techniques that \r\nallow comparison of trade-offs across alternative future scenarios \r\n(Hamarat et al. 2014). Another approach is to link quantitative \r\nmodels with a  participatory process that enables decision-makers \r\nto test the implications of alternative interventions (Moallemi and \r\nMalekpour 2018). Rosenbloom et al. (2019) suggest that because \r\npolicy mixes should adapt to changing circumstances, instead of \r\nstability of a particular mix, transitions require embedding policies \r\nwithin a  long-term orientation toward a  low-carbon economy, \r\nincluding a transition agenda, social legitimacy for this agenda, and \r\nan appropriate ecosystem of institutions"


id: 4ec6cc1cedb5525e0572324d008afc9d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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"First, spanning policy arenas and addressing multiple objectives \r\nplaces considerable requirements of coordination on the policymaking \r\nprocess (Howlett and del Rio 2015; Obersteiner et al. 2016). Climate \r\npolicy integration suggests several steps should precede actual policy \r\nformulation, beginning with a clear articulation of the policy frame or \r\nproblem statement (Adelle and Russel 2013; Candel and Biesbroek \r\n2016). For example, a greenhouse gas limitation framework versus \r\na co-benefits framing would likely yield different policy approaches. It \r\nis then useful to identify the range of actors and institutions involved \r\nin climate governance - the policy subsystem, the goals articulated, \r\nthe level at which goals are articulated and the links with other \r\nrelated policy goals such as energy security or energy access (Candel \r\nand Biesbroek 2016)"


id: 6635f894ca275ecfa5ff119ec77bd59e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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" The adoption of specific packages of policy \r\ninstruments should ideally follow these prior steps that define the \r\nscope of the problem, actors and goals. "


id: cee55f33f99a9ed0c8ad87f47de648bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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"In practice, integration has to occur in the context of an already \r\nexisting policy structure, which suggests the need for finding \r\nwindows of opportunity to bring about integration, which can \r\nbe created by international events, alignments with domestic \r\ninstitutional procedures, and openings created by policy \r\nentrepreneurs (Garcia Hernandez and Bolwig 2020). Integration \r\nalso has to occur in the context of existing organisational routines \r\nand cultures, which can pose a barrier to integration (Uittenbroek \r\n2016). Experience from the EU suggests that disagreements \r\nat the level of policy instruments are amenable to resolution \r\nby deliberation, while normative disagreements at the level of \r\nobjectives require a  hierarchical decision structure (Skovgaard \r\n2018)"


id: 9066398ed5140eec7269145f137daf64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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" As this discussion suggests, the challenge of integration \r\noperates in two dimensions: horizontal  - between sectoral \r\nauthorities such as ministries or policy domains such as forestry - \r\nor vertical - either between constitutional levels of power or within \r\nthe internal mandates and interactions of a  sector (Howlett and \r\ndel Rio 2015; Di Gregorio et al. 2017). There are also important \r\ntemporal dimensions to policy goals, as policy and benchmarks \r\nhave to address not just immediate success but also indications of \r\nfuture transformation (Dupont and Oberthur 2012; Dupont 2015). "


id: c0bfe5ad6fc6a764c0b9b2f97f8eaf31
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"Common to all the sectoral cases in Cross-Chapter Box  9 is \r\na  future-oriented vision of sectoral transition often focused on \r\nmultiple objectives, such as designing tram-based public transport \r\nsystems in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe to simultaneously stimulate \r\nurban centers, create jobs and enable low-carbon transportation. \r\nSectoral transitions are enabled by policy mixes that bring together \r\ndifferent combinations of instruments  - including regulations, \r\nfinancial incentives, convening, education and outreach, voluntary \r\nagreements, procurement and creation of new institutions  - to \r\nwork together in a  complementary manner. The effectiveness of \r\na  policy mix depends on conditions beyond design considerations \r\nand also rests on the larger governance context within which sector \r\ntransitions occur, which can include enabling and disabling elements"


id: a225eb8d03ad0cdc97a6bbe3e9001906
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" \r\nEnabling factors illustrated in Cross-Chapter Box  9 include strong \r\nhigh level political support, for example to address deforestation in \r\nBrazil despite powerful logging and farmer interests, or policy design \r\nto win over existing private interests, for example, by harnessing \r\ndistribution networks of kerosene providers to new LPG technology \r\nin Indonesia. Disabling conditions include local institutional contexts, \r\nsuch as the lack of tree and land tenure in Ghana, which, along \r\nwith the monopoly of the state marketing board, posed obstacles \r\nto Ghana's low-carbon cocoa transition. These examples emphasise \r\nthe  importance of attention to local context if policy integration \r\nand the design of policy mixes are to effectively lead to transitions \r\nguided by multiple climate and development objectives."


id: 665764525a5f7c4da8257831f84c009b
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"There is growing consensus that integration of adaptation and \r\nmitigation will advance progress towards sustainable development, \r\nand that ambitious mitigation efforts will reduce the need for \r\nadaptation in the long term (robust evidence, high agreement) (IPCC \r\n2014a). There is no level of mitigation, however, that will completely \r\nerase the need for adaptation to climate change (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement) (Mauritsen and Pincus 2017). It is therefore urgent \r\nto design and implement a  multi-objective policy framework for \r\nmitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development that considers \r\nissues of equity and long-term developmental pathways across \r\nregions (robust evidence, high agreement) (Jordan et al. 2018; \r\nMills-Novoa and Liverman 2019; Wang and Chen 2019). This section \r\nexplores the logic behind the integration of adaptation and mitigation \r\nin practice (Section  13.8"


id: bed20c1768f1cfd673112633a6752869
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content:
"1), the approaches to this integration \r\nincluding climate-resilient pathways, ecosystem-based solutions, \r\nand a nexus approach (Section 13.8.2); examples of the adaption and "


id: 9af8db1e5219bf4b0d523987c95a5ae4
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"Synergies between adaptation and mitigation are included in \r\nmany of the NDCs submitted to the UNFCCC, as part of overall \r\nlow-emissions climate-resilient development strategies (UNFCCC \r\nSecretariat 2016). a majority of developing countries have agreed to \r\ndevelop National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) in which many initiatives \r\ncontribute simultaneously to the SDGs (Schipper et al. 2020) as well \r\nto mitigation efforts (Honle et al. 2019; Atteridge et al. 2020). For \r\nexample, developing countries recognise that adaptation actions \r\nin sectors such as agriculture, forestry and land-use management \r\ncan reduce GHGs. Nevertheless, other more complex trade-offs \r\nalso exist between bioenergy production or reforestation and \r\nthe land needed for agricultural adaptation and food security \r\n(African Development Bank 2019; Honle et al. 2019; Nyiwul 2019) \r\n(Chapter 7)"


id: 4886c6dad303332f59c717b0df7706a6
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" For some of the Small Islands Development States (SIDS), \r\nforestry and coastal management, including mangrove planting, \r\nsaltmarsh and seagrass are sectors that intertwine both mitigation \r\nand adaptation (Duarte et al. 2013; Atteridge et al. 2020). Integrated \r\nefforts also occur at the city level, such as the Climate Change Action \r\nPlan of Wellington City, which includes enhancing forest sinks to \r\nincrease carbon sequestration while at the same time protecting \r\nbiodiversity and reducing groundwater runoff as rainfall increases \r\n(Grafakos et al. 2019)."


id: 9f24b1a8d03570444ab91ad128f500a2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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"Thirty-three countries in the Latin American region have submitted their NDCs, and 70% of their initiatives have included mitigation \r\nand adaptation options focusing on sustainable development (Barcena et al. 2018; Kissinger et al. 2019). However, most of these \r\npolicies are disconnected across sectors (Loaiza et al. 2017; Locatelli et al. 2017). National governments have identified their relevant \r\nsectors as: energy, agriculture, forestry, land-use change, biodiversity, and water resources (see Figure 1 below). The region houses \r\n57% of the primary forest of the planet. REDD+ aims to reduce GHG while provide ecosystems services to vulnerable communities \r\n(Barcena et al. 2018)"


id: 6e5f6295a1449cf610333c9b49ce2345
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" Lessons from successful REDD+ programmes include the benefits of a multilevel structure from international to \r\nnational down to strong community organisation, as well as secure resources funding, with most of the projects relying on external \r\nsources of funding (medium evidence, high agreement) (Loaiza et al. 2017; Kissinger et al. 2019). However, there is limited evidence \r\nof effective adaptation co-benefits, which may be related to the lack of provision of forest standards; a disproportionate focus on \r\nmitigation and lack of attention to the well-being of the population in rural and agricultural areas (Kongsager and Corbera 2015)."


id: e3be46482c8cb4c0cd2a955ef0f05fb1
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"Supranational levels of action such as the EU climate change policy \r\nhave influenced the development and implementation of Climate \r\nChange Action Plans (CCAPs) at the sub-national level (Heidrich \r\net al. 2016; Villarroel Walker et al. 2017; Reckien et al. 2018). While \r\nadaptation is gaining prominence and is increasingly included in the \r\nNDCs of EU nations, the implementation of adaptation and mitigation \r\nby EU states are at different stages (Fleig et al. 2017). Fleig et al. \r\n(2017) found that all EU states, with the exception of Hungary, have \r\nadopted a framework of laws tackling mitigation and adaptation to \r\nclimate change. However, an assessment of climate legislation in \r\nEurope pointed out that there has been little coordination between \r\nmitigation and adaptation, and that implementation varies according \r\nto different national conditions (Nachmany et al. 2015)"


id: a594cf3bb05c8a3c5bfb9d6d31d58a67
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" More recently, \r\nhowever, integrated adaptation/mitigation plans have been prepared \r\nin Europe under the Covenant of Mayors, in which synergies and \r\ntrade-offs can be better revealed and assessed (Bertoldi et al. 2020)."


id: 9bc406bb2c60d884d0325471b62f39f4
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"Local governments and cities are increasingly emerging as important \r\nclimate change actors (Gordon and Acuto 2015) (Section  13.5). \r\nWhile cities and local governments are developing Climate Change \r\nAction Plans (CCAPs), plans that explicitly integrate the design and \r\nimplementation of adaptation and mitigation are a minor percentage, \r\nwith few cities establishing inter-relationships between them (Nordic \r\nCouncil of Ministers 2017; Grafakos et al. 2018). Compared to national \r\nclimate governance, local governments are more likely to develop and \r\nadvance climate policies, generating socio-economic or environmental \r\nco-benefits, and improve communities' quality of life (Gill et al. 2007; \r\nBowen et al. 2014; Duguma et al. 2014b; Mayrhofer and Gupta 2016; \r\nDeng et al. 2017; Hennessey et al. 2017)"


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" There may be a disconnect, \r\nhowever, between the responsibility that a particular jurisdiction has \r\nover mitigation and adaptation (city officials, for instance) and the \r\nscale of resources or capacities that they have available to bring to \r\nbear on the problem (regional to national provision of energy and \r\ntransport) (Di Gregorio et al. 2019; Dale et al. 2020). "


id: 581762d3d95fa5dfab7a899ddd4f18df
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"Justice principles are rarely incorporated in climate change framing \r\nand action (Sovacool and Dworkin 2015; Genus and Theobald 2016; \r\nHeikkinen et al. 2019; Romero-Lankao and Gnatz 2019). Yet, equity \r\nis salient to mitigation debates, because climate change mitigation \r\npolicies can have also negative impacts (Brugnach et al. 2017; \r\nRamos-Castillo et al. 2017; Klinsky 2018), exacerbated by poverty, \r\ninequality and corruption (Reckien et al. 2018; Markkanen and \r\nAnger-Kraavi 2019). The siting of facilities and infrastructure that \r\nadvance decarbonisation (such as public transit infrastructure, \r\nrenewable energy facilities and so on) may have implications for \r\nenvironmental justice. Integrated attention to justice in climate, \r\nenvironment and energy, as well as involvement of host communities \r\nin siting assessments and decision-making processes, can help to \r\navoid such conflict (McCord et al. 2020; Hughes and Hoffmann 2020)"


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" \r\nAs a  result, successful policy integration goes beyond optimising \r\npublic management routines, and must resolve key trade-offs \r\nbetween actors and objectives (Meadowcroft 2009; Nordbeck and \r\nSteurer 2016). "


id: e7f348f40690aa8dd51baed6cb65b37b
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content:
"IPCC AR6 WG3, particularly Chapter  4, following on from the IPCC \r\nWG3 SR1.5 (IPCC 2018), has highlighted the importance of enabling \r\nconditions for delivering successful climate mitigation actions. The \r\nAR6 Glossary term for enabling conditions is: 'enabling conditions \r\ninclude finance, technological innovation, strengthening policy \r\ninstruments, institutional capacity, multi-level governance, and changes \r\nin human behaviour and lifestyles (medium evidence, high agreement) \r\n(see Glossary). The IPCC SR1.5 report adds to these six dimensions \r\nsaying enabling conditions also includes 'inclusive processes, attention \r\nto power asymmetries and unequal opportunities for development and \r\nreconsideration of values' (medium evidence, high agreement) (IPCC \r\n2018)"


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" Not only is the presence of enabling conditions necessary for \r\ndelivering the successful implementation of single policy instruments \r\nand policy packages, but also for delivering systemic change (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement) (de Coninck et al. 2018; IPCC 2018; Waisman \r\net al. 2019). The feasibility of 1.5degC compatible pathways is contingent \r\nupon enabling conditions for systemic change (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement) (de Coninck et al. 2018; Waisman et al. 2019)."


id: d2003592df7568c7dffa609a4f296ae7
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content:
"At the same time, again following on from SR1.5 report, Section 1.8.1 \r\nexplains that there are six feasibility dimensions of successful delivery \r\nof climate goals. These feasibility dimensions include geophysical; \r\nenvironmental and ecological; technological; economic; behaviour \r\nand lifestyles and institutional dimensions. The presence or absence \r\nof enabling conditions would affect the feasibility of mitigation \r\nas well as adaptation pathways and can reduce trade-offs while \r\namplifying synergies between options (Waisman et al. 2019). Policies \r\nand institutions, which are two of the six enabling conditions, are \r\ntherefore central to accelerated mitigation and systemic change. \r\nIdentifying, and ensuring, the presence of all the enabling conditions \r\nfor any given goal, including systemic transformation and acceleration \r\nof climate mitigation, is an important first step (medium evidence,\r\nmedium agreement) (Roberts et al. 2018; Le Treut et al"


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"Others argue for thinking about mitigation in even wider ways. O'Brien \r\n(2018) posits that sector-focused, or a silo approach, to mitigation \r\nmay need to give way to decisions and policies which reach across \r\nsectoral, geographic and political boundaries and involve a  broad \r\nset of interrelated processes  - practical, political and personal. \r\nGillard et al. (Gillard et al. 2016) argue that a response to climate \r\nchange has to move beyond incremental responses, aiming instead \r\nfor a  society-wide transformation which goes beyond a  system \r\nperspective to include learning from social theory; while Eyre et al. \r\n(2018) argue that moving beyond incremental emissions reductions \r\nwill require expanding the focus of efforts beyond the technical to \r\ninclude people, and their behaviour and attitudes. Stoddard et al. \r\n(2021) argue that 'more sustainable and just futures require a radical \r\nreconfiguration of long-run socio-cultural and political economic \r\nnorms and institutions'"


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" They focus on nine themes: international \r\nclimate governance, the vested interests of the fossil fuel industry, \r\ngeopolitics and militarism, economics and financialisation, mitigation \r\nmodelling, energy supply systems, inequity, high carbon lifestyles and \r\nsocial imaginaries. "


id: 3943d0f0dfe06ad6381306abc8b1fe50
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content:
"Of the USD17.2 trillion so far spent on stimulus packages, \r\nUSD4.8  trillion (28% of the total as of July 2021) is linked to \r\nenvironmental outcomes (Vivid Economics 2021). This study relates \r\nto 30 countries: the G20 and 10 others. The packages in EU, Denmark, \r\nCanada, France, Spain, the UK, Sweden, Finland and Germany \r\n(German Federal Ministry of Finance 2020; Vivid Economics 2021) \r\nresult in net benefits for the environment. a number of studies provide \r\ndiffering conclusions with respect to net benefits or otherwise for the \r\nenvironment for a number of countries (Climate Action Tracker 2020; \r\nUNEP 2020a; Vivid Economics 2021). An OECD database found that, \r\nas of mid-July 2021, 21% of economic recovery spending in OECD, EU \r\nand Key Partners is allocated to environmentally positive measures \r\n(OECD 2021c)"


id: 2c4e81e8f84e0beb96d4e1c0787f88df
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" O'Callaghan and Murdock (2021) reviewed the \r\n50 countries with the greatest stimulus spend in 2020 and find that \r\n13% of the spend is directed to long-term recovery type measures, of \r\nwhich 18% is spent on green recovery. This is a total of 2.5% of total \r\nspend or 368 billion USD on green initiatives. "


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"With the outbreak of the COVID-19 Pandemic in 2020, past stimulus \r\npackages have been further investigated. One study interviewed \r\n231 central bank officials and identified five key policies for both \r\neconomic multipliers and climate impacts metrics (Hepburn \r\net al. 2020). These were expenditure on clean physical infrastructure; \r\nbuilding energy efficiency retrofits; investment in education and \r\ntraining; natural capital investment; and clean R&D. However, the mix \r\nof effective policies may differ in lower and middle income countries: \r\nrural support spending was more relevant, while clean R&D was less \r\nso. The study illuminated that there were different phases to recovery \r\npackages: the initial 'rescue' spending but then a second 'recovery' \r\nphase that can be more fairly rated green or not green. Recovery \r\nphase policies can deliver both economic and climate goals  - \r\nco-benefits can be captured (i.e. support for EV infrastructure can \r\nalso reduce local air pollution etc"


id: 9132e3197bf381163dbcab1c9a5e1269
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"Other disciplines argue that social transformation is likely to be \r\nas important as the technical challenges in a  coordinated, cross\u0002economy approach to acceleration. For example, some argue for \r\nsocial tipping interventions (STI) alongside other technical and \r\npolitical interventions so that they can 'activate contagious processes \r\nof rapidly spreading technologies, behaviours, social norms, and \r\nstructural reorganisation' (Otto et al. 2020). They argue that these \r\nSTIs are inter alia: removing fossil fuel subsidies and incentivising \r\ndecentralised energy generation; building carbon neutral cities; \r\ndivesting from assets linked to fossil fuels; revealing the moral \r\nimplications of fossil fuels; strengthening climate education and \r\nengagement; and disclosing information of GHG emissions (Otto et al. \r\n2020). Others illuminate the importance of narratives and framings \r\nin the take-up (or not) of acceleration actions (Sovacool et al. 2020)"


id: d6213965b2ca9aaa3ed5433fd314c406
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content:
" \r\nOthers are optimistic about the possibilities of transformation but \r\nalso highlight the importance of political economy for rapid and just \r\ntransitions (Newell and Simms 2020; Newell 2021)."


id: 53396da4e7eaf4b0744753f3ca0bbc87
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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vector_id: 10563
content:
"In summary, a  synthesis of the multidisciplinary, acceleration \r\nliterature suggests that climate mitigation is a multifaceted problem \r\nwhich spans cross-economy and society issues, and that solutions to \r\nacceleration may lie in coordinated systemic approaches to change \r\nand strategic targeting of leverage points. Broadly, this literature \r\nagrees on a dual approach of non-incremental systemic change and \r\na targeting of specific acceleration challenges, with tailored actions \r\ndrawing on enabling conditions. The underlying argument of this is \r\nthat there is a strategic logic to focusing on actions which undermine \r\nhigh carbon systems at the same time as encouraging low-carbon \r\nsystems. If high carbon systems are weakened then this may \r\nreduce the opposition to policies and actions aimed at accelerating \r\nclimate mitigation, enabling more support for low-carbon systems"


id: eb9028becbafc8436fd9af35365c3565
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" \r\nIn addition, targeting of actions which may create 'tipping point \r\ncascades' which increase the rate of decarbonisation may also be \r\nbeneficial. Finally, new modes of governance may be better suited to \r\nthis approach in the context of transformative change."


id: 94f57e9652d3577930004455d4bba01f
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"There are conflicting views on whether the Paris Agreement's \r\ncommitments and mechanisms will lead to the attainment of \r\nits stated goals. Arguments in support of the Paris Agreement are \r\nthat the processes it initiates and supports will in multiple ways lead, \r\nand indeed have already led, to rising levels of ambition over time. \r\nThe recent proliferation of national mid-century net zero GHG targets \r\ncan be attributed in part to the Paris Agreement (medium confidence). \r\nMoreover, its processes and commitments will enhance countries' \r\nabilities to achieve their stated level of ambition, particularly among \r\ndeveloping countries (medium confidence)"


id: eed92fbcf545ec48cefae8150b45e32e
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" Arguments against \r\nthe Paris Agreement are that it lacks a  mechanism to review the \r\nadequacy of individual Parties' Nationally Determined Contributions \r\n(NDCs), that collectively current NDCs are inconsistent in their level \r\nof ambition with achieving the Paris Agreement's temperature goal, \r\nthat its processes will not lead to sufficiently rising levels of ambition \r\nin the NDCs, and that NDCs will not be achieved because the targets, \r\npolicies and measures they contain are not legally binding at the \r\ninternational level (medium confidence). To some extent, arguments \r\non both sides are aligned with different analytic frameworks, \r\nincluding assumptions about the main barriers to mitigation that \r\ninternational cooperation can help overcome (medium confidence)"


id: 8b7b5303d95e523e0b408f626d77d7d0
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" \r\nThe extent to which countries increase the ambition of their NDCs \r\nand ensure they are effectively implemented will depend in part \r\non the successful  implementation of the support mechanisms in \r\nthe Paris Agreement, and in turn will determine whether the goals \r\nof the Paris Agreement are met (high confidence). {14.2, 14.3, 14.4} "


id: 7155c11ddb74a90e46cd71c3471517d7
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content:
"New forms of international cooperation have emerged \r\nsince the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's \r\nFifth Assessment Report (IPCC AR5) in line with an evolving \r\nunderstanding of effective mitigation policies, processes, and \r\ninstitutions. Both new and pre-existing forms of cooperation \r\nare vital for achieving climate mitigation goals in the context \r\nof sustainable development (high confidence). While previous \r\nIPCC assessments have noted important synergies between \r\nthe outcomes of climate mitigation and achieving sustainable \r\ndevelopment objectives, there now appear to be synergies between \r\nthe two processes themselves (medium confidence). Since AR5, \r\ninternational cooperation has shifted towards facilitating national\u0002level mitigation action through numerous channels. These now \r\ninclude both processes established under the United Nations \r\nFramework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) regime and \r\nregional and sectoral agreements and organisations. {14.2, 14"


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"International cooperation outside the UNFCCC processes \r\nand agreements provides critical support for mitigation \r\nin particular regions, sectors and industries, for particular \r\ntypes of emissions, and at the sub- and transnational levels \r\n(high confidence). Agreements addressing ozone depletion, \r\ntransboundary air pollution, and release of mercury are all leading \r\nto reductions in the emissions of specific greenhouse gases (high \r\nconfidence). Cooperation is occurring at multiple governance levels \r\nincluding cities. Transnational partnerships and alliances involving \r\nnon-state and sub-national actors are also playing a  growing role \r\nin stimulating low-carbon technology diffusion and emissions \r\nreductions (medium confidence). Such transnational efforts include \r\nthose focused on climate litigation; the impacts of these are unclear \r\nbut promising"


id: 140b265f0571c8f42c06e2834826e069
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content:
" Climate change is being addressed in a  growing \r\nnumber of international agreements operating at sectoral levels, \r\nas well as within the practices of many multilateral organisations \r\nand institutions (high confidence). Sub-global and regional \r\ncooperation, often described as climate clubs, can play an important \r\nrole in accelerating mitigation, including the potential for reducing \r\nmitigation costs through linking national carbon markets, although \r\nactual examples of these remain limited (high confidence). {14.2, \r\n14.4, 14.5, 14.6} "


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"consistent with limiting temperature rise to well below 2degC \r\nin the context of sustainable development and equity (high \r\nconfidence). Many developing countries' NDCs have components \r\nor additional actions that are conditional on receiving assistance \r\nwith respect to finance, technology development and transfer, and \r\ncapacity building, greater than what has been provided to date (high \r\nconfidence). Sectoral and sub-global cooperation is providing critical \r\nsupport, and yet there is room for further progress. In some cases, \r\nnotably with respect to aviation and shipping, sectoral agreements \r\nhave adopted climate mitigation goals that fall far short of what \r\nwould be required to achieve the temperature goal of the Paris \r\nAgreement (high confidence)"


id: 389a17def6d450feafe0597750b573a1
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" Moreover, there are cases where \r\ninternational cooperation may be hindering mitigation efforts, \r\nnamely evidence that trade and investment agreements, as well as \r\nagreements within the energy sector, impede national mitigation \r\nefforts (medium confidence). International cooperation is emerging \r\nbut so far fails to fully address transboundary issues associated with \r\nSolar Radiation Modification and CO2 removal (high confidence). \r\n{14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6}"


id: 1ba90a164a8531d637aa854439d8795c
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content:
"the global scale;  and  that given the global diversity with respect \r\nto  opportunities for and cost of mitigation, there are economic \r\nefficiencies associated with cooperative solutions (Section  13.2.1.1). \r\nConsequently, AR5 found  evidence  to  suggest that climate policies \r\nthat are implemented across geographical regions would be more \r\neffective in terms of both their environmental consequences and \r\ntheir economic costs (Sections 13.6, 13.13 and 14.4). The AR5 also \r\nsuggested  that regional cooperation  could  offer opportunities \r\nbeyond what countries may be able to achieve by themselves. These \r\nopportunities are due to geographic proximity, shared infrastructure \r\nand policy frameworks, trade, and cross-border investments, and \r\nexamples included renewable energy pools across borders, networks \r\nof energy infrastructure and coordinated forestry policies (Sections 1.2, \r\n6.6, 14.2 and 15.2)"


id: 304c398f33e39461b48092e0e9036770
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content:
" The AR5 also suggested that policy linkages exist \r\nacross regional, national, and sub-national scales (Sections 13.3.1 and \r\n13.5.1.3). For these reasons, AR5 suggested that although the UNFCCC \r\nremains the primary international forum for climate negotiations, \r\nmany other institutions engaged at the global, regional, and local \r\nlevels do and should play an active role (Sections  13.3.1, 13.4.1.4 \r\nand 13.5).  AR5 also noted that the inclusion of climate change \r\nissues across a variety of forums often creates institutional linkages \r\nbetween mitigation and adaptation (Sections 13.3-13.5)"


id: acf1e1f6c763562068bc79128d561858
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content:
" In addition \r\nto centralised cooperation and governance, with a primary focus on \r\nthe UNFCCC and its associated institutions, AR5 noted the emergence \r\nof new transnational climate-related institutions of decentralised \r\nauthority such as public-private sector partnerships, private sector \r\ngovernance initiatives, transnational non-governmental organisation \r\n(NGO) programmes, and city-led initiatives (Sections 13.2, 13.3.1 and \r\n13.12). It noted that these have resulted in a multiplicity of cooperative \r\nefforts in the form of multilateral agreements, harmonised national \r\npolicies and decentralised but coordinated  national  and  regional \r\npolicies (Sections 13.3.2, 13.4.1 and 14.4). Finally, it suggested that \r\ninternational cooperation may  also  have a  role in promoting active \r\nengagement of the private sector in technological innovation and \r\ncooperative efforts leading to technology transfer and the development \r\nof new technologies (Sections 13.3, 13.9 and 13.12). "


id: 2b0a134f5c4b5dffdc4cd91c0fe8d612
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"The rest of this chapter describes existing cooperative international \r\nagreements, institutions, and initiatives with a view to clarifying how \r\nthey operate, what effects they have, and ultimately, whether they \r\nwork. At the heart of this international institutional architecture lies \r\nthe Paris Agreement, which sets the overall approach for international \r\ncooperation under the UNFCCC at the global level. In many ways, \r\nthe Paris Agreement reshapes the structure of such cooperation, \r\nfrom one oriented primarily towards target setting, monitoring, and \r\nenforcement, to one that is oriented towards supporting and enabling \r\nnationally determined actions (including targets), monitoring as well \r\nas catalysing non-state and sub-national actions at multiple levels \r\nof governance"


id: 8c3ba0ed27abb0666bd4a16f0046e3bb
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content:
" In addition to the Paris Agreement, many forms of \r\ncooperation have taken shape in parallel: those designed to address \r\nother environmental problems that have a  significant impact on \r\nclimate mitigation; those operating at the sub-global or sectoral \r\nlevel; and those where the main participants are non-state actors. \r\nThe chapter ends with an overall assessment of the effectiveness of \r\ncurrent international cooperation and identifies areas that would \r\nbenefit from improved and enhanced action."


id: d339d165f02db73d9799fdad11d5768
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content:
"inequality (Denton at al. 2014), but there is an emerging attempt to \r\nharmonise mitigation actions with those oriented towards social and \r\neconomic development. A key development since AR5 is the adoption \r\nin 2015 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which \r\ncontains 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This Agenda \r\noffers an aspirational narrative, coherent framework and actionable \r\nagenda for addressing diverse issues of development through goals \r\nthat balance the economic, social and environmental dimensions \r\nof sustainable development as well as issues of governance and \r\ninstitutions (ICSU ISSC 2015). Scholars have noted that these \r\ndimensions of sustainable development are inter-dependent (Nilsson \r\net al. 2016), and, as such it is difficult if not impossible to achieve \r\neconomic and social gains while neglecting environmental concerns, \r\nincluding climate change (Le Blanc 2015)"


id: 39570a5c33fb5d9d58b57c452b7fe8d5
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content:
" The SDGs are closely \r\nlinked to the Paris Agreement, adopted a few weeks later. There is \r\na growing body of literature that examines the interlinkages between \r\nSDGs, including SDG 13 (taking urgent action to combat climate \r\nchange) and others, concluding that without a proper response to \r\nclimate change, success in many of the other SDGs would be difficult \r\nif not impossible (ICSU ISSC 2015; Le Blanc 2015; Nilsson et al. \r\n2016; Weitz et al. 2018). Likewise, failure to achieve the SDGs will \r\nhave a detrimental effect on the ability to limit climate change to \r\nmanageable levels"


id: 224164fa8d398bad837c28f8485d762b
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content:
" Initiatives such as The World in 2050 (TWI2050 \r\n2018), a large research initiative by a global consortium of research \r\nand policy institutions, work on the premise that pursuing climate \r\naction and sustainable development in an integrated and coherent \r\nway, based on a sound understanding of development pathways and \r\ndynamics, is the strongest approach to enable countries to achieve \r\ntheir objectives in both agreements."


id: 6f035d0b05128361681f989ef8141ea7
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Further key developments since AR5 include the release of three \r\nIPCC special reports. The first of these assessed the differential \r\nimpacts of limiting climate change to 1.5degC global average warming \r\ncompared to 2degC warming, indicated the emissions reductions and \r\nenabling conditions necessary to stay within this limit (IPCC 2018a). \r\nWhile the events that have unfolded since the report are not yet \r\ncomprehensively documented in literature, arguably the report has \r\nled to a  renewed perception of the urgency of climate mitigation \r\n(Wolf et al. 2019). In particular, the report appears to have crystalised \r\nmedia coverage in some parts of the world around a need to reduce \r\nemissions to net zero by 2050 (whether of GHGs or CO2), rather than \r\ndelaying such reductions until the latter half of the century, as had \r\nbeen previously understood and indicated in the Paris Agreement"


id: 1373da01e4029310e220ce9f86d87049
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content:
" \r\nIts release is hence one factor explaining the rise in transnational \r\nclimate mobilisation efforts (Boykoff and Pearman 2019). It has also \r\nplayed a  role, in addition to the Paris Agreement (Geden 2016a), \r\nin the numerous announcements, pledges and indications by \r\ngovernments, including by all G7 countries, of their adoption of net \r\nzero GHG targets for 2050. The other two special reports focused on \r\nocean and the cryosphere (IPCC 2019a), and the potential of land\u0002related responses to contribute to adaptation and mitigation (IPCC \r\n2019b). There has been no literature directly tying the publication \r\nof these latter two reports to changes in international cooperation. \r\nHowever, the 25th UNFCCC Conference of Parties in Madrid in 2019 \r\nconvened a  dialogue on ocean and climate change to consider "


id: 581106049765e3cd690f0dd7b82a826c
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content:
"Theoretical economists have shown that reaching such a  global \r\nagreement is difficult, due to countries' incentives to free-ride, \r\nnamely benefit from other countries' abatement efforts while \r\nfailing to abate themselves (Barrett 1994; Gollier and Tirole 2015). \r\nNumerical models that integrate game theoretic concepts, whether \r\nbased on optimal control theory or on dynamic programming, \r\nconsistently confirm this insight, at least in the absence of transfers \r\n(Germain et al. 2003; Lessmann et al. 2015; Chander 2017). Recent \r\ncontributions suggest that regional or sectoral agreements, or \r\nagreements focused on a  particular subset of GHGs, can be seen \r\nas building blocks towards a global approach (Asheim et al. 2006; \r\nFroyn and Hovi 2008; Sabel and Victor 2017; Stewart et al. 2017). In \r\na  dynamic context, this gradual approach through building blocks \r\ncan alleviate the free-riding problem and ultimately lead to global \r\ncooperation (Caparros and Pereau 2017)"


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content:
" Much of this literature is \r\nsubsumed under the concept of 'climate clubs' described in the next \r\nsection. Other developments based on dynamic game theory suggest \r\nthat the free-riding problem can be mitigated if the treaties do not \r\nprescribe countries' levels of green investment and the duration of "


id: b6c71e27e39baf815e2e3e66f0b0eeaf
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content:
"Within the global commons framing, the primary indicator of \r\nprogress is the actual level of GHG emissions, and the effectiveness \r\nof policies can be measured in terms of whether such emissions rise \r\nor fall (Patt 2017; Hanna and Victor 2021). The fact that the sum of \r\nall countries' emissions has continued to grow (IPCC 2018a), even \r\nas there has been a  global recognition that they should decline, \r\nis seen as being consistent with the absence of a  strong global \r\nagreement. Within this framing, there is traditionally an emphasis on \r\ntreaties' containing self-enforcing agreements (Olmstead and Stavins \r\n2012), ideally through binding commitments, as a  way of dealing \r\nwith the overarching problem of free-ridership (Barrett 1994; Finus \r\nand Caparros 2015; Tulkens 2019)"


id: 4c4c0d231d754386164b666d3f5a9161
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
" However, as discussed above, \r\nthe emphasis has now shifted to a gradual cooperation approach, \r\neither regional or sectoral, as an alternative way of dealing with free\u0002riding incentives (Caparros and Pereau 2017; Sabel and Victor 2017; \r\nStewart et al. 2017). The gradual linkage of emissions trading systems \r\n(discussed in Section 14.4.4), goes in the same direction. There is also \r\nliterature suggesting that the diversity of the countries involved may \r\nin fact be an asset to reduce the free-rider incentive (Pavlova and De \r\nZeeuw 2013; Finus and McGinty 2019), which argues in favour of \r\na system where all countries, irrespectively of their income levels, are \r\nfully involved in mitigation, unlike the Kyoto Protocol and in line with \r\nthe Paris Agreement. Finally, recent efforts have discussed potential \r\nsynergies between mitigation and adaptation efforts in a strategic \r\ncontext (Bayramoglu et al. 2018) (Section  14.5.1"


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content:
"2) In general, \r\ncurrent efforts go beyond considering climate policy as a mitigation\u0002only issue, much in line with the discussion about linkages between \r\nclimate change and sustainable development policies described in \r\ndetail in Chapters 1 and 4 of this report. "


id: dacab349536785d93f29ac3c1134cd00
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"In addition to mitigation in the form of emissions abatement, \r\ninnovation in green technologies also has public good features, \r\nleading for the same reasons to less innovation than would be \r\nglobally ideal (Jaffe et al. 2005). Here as well, theory suggests that \r\nthere are benefits from cooperation on technology development \r\nat the regional or sectoral levels, but also that cooperation on \r\ntechnology, especially for breakthrough technologies, may prove \r\nto be easier than for abatement (El-Sayed and Rubio 2014; Rubio \r\n2017). In a dynamic context, the combination of infrastructure lock\u0002in, network effects with high switching cost, and dynamic market \r\nfailures suggests that deployment and adoption of clean technologies \r\nis path dependent (Acemoglu et al. 2012; Aghion et al. 2014), with \r\na  multiplicity of possible equilibria"


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content:
" This implies that no outcome \r\nis guaranteed, although the most likely pathway will depend on \r\neconomic expectations and initial conditions of the innovation \r\nprocess (Krugman 1991). Therefore, the government has a  role \r\nto play, either by shifting expectations (e.g., credibly committing to \r\nclimate policy), or by changing initial conditions (e.g.,  investing in \r\ngreen infrastructure or subsidising clean energy research) (Acemoglu \r\net al. 2012; Aghion et al. 2014). This result is exacerbated by the \r\nirreversibility of energy investments and the extremely long periods \r\nof operation of the typical energy investment (Caparros et al. 2015; \r\nBaldwin et al. 2020)."


id: 5fab5fd4d6e4725435402db00b5c1b08
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
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content:
"While the public goods and global commons framing concentrates \r\non free-riding incentives as the primary barrier to mitigation taking \r\nplace at a pace that would be globally optimal, other factors arise \r\nacross the four analytic frameworks. For example, within the political \r\nframework, Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer (2021) highlight that not \r\njust the incentive to free-ride, but also the knowledge that another \r\nmajor emitter is free-riding, could lessen a country's political incentive \r\nto mitigate. Aklin and Mildenberger (2020) present evidence to \r\nsuggest that distributive conflict within countries, rather than free\u0002riding across countries, is the primary barrier to ambitious national\u0002level action"


id: 9d250196d71cd9fd6694ae4fdcc71ea5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22258
content:
" Another barrier could be a lack of understanding and \r\nexperience with particular policy approaches; there is evidence that \r\nparticipation in cooperative agreements could facilitate information \r\nexchange across borders and lead to enhanced mitigation policy \r\nadoption (Rashidi and Patt 2018)."


id: 56357eee0f58a0b43c5fba17ff296437
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11049
content:
"In the transitions framing, by contrast, global emissions levels are \r\nviewed as the end (and often greatly delayed) result of a  large \r\nnumber of transformative processes. International cooperation may \r\nbe effective at stimulating such processes, even if a change in global \r\nemissions is not yet evident, implying that short-term changes in \r\nemissions levels may be a misleading indicator of progress towards \r\nlong-term goals (Patt 2017). Hanna and Victor (2021) suggest \r\na  particular focus on technical advances and deployment patterns \r\nin niche low-carbon technologies, such as wind and solar power, \r\nand electric vehicles. However, this is one among many suggestions: \r\nthe literature does not identify a single clear indicator to use, and \r\nthere are many metrics of technological progress and transformation, \r\ndescribed in Section 16.3.3 of this report"


id: c5b4a74a87469f78bc555cf80d005957
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28687
content:
" These can include national\u0002level emissions among countries participating in particular forms of \r\ncooperation, as well as leading indicators of such emissions such as \r\nchanges in low-carbon technology deployment and cost. "


id: 63400d7642e4cdc4c115aaab5c7f0092
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13180
content:
"carbon markets, suggesting that these can delay transformative \r\nprocesses within countries that are key drivers of technological \r\nchange (Cullenward and Victor 2020). For similar reasons, achieving \r\ncross-sectoral cost-effectiveness, a goal of many carbon markets, is \r\nnot seen as a high priority. Instead, within the transitions framing, \r\nthe emphasis with respect to treaty design is often on providing \r\nmechanisms to support Parties' voluntary actions, such as with \r\nfinancial and capacity-building support for new technologies and \r\ntechnology regimes (Victor et al. 2019). The transitions literature also \r\nhighlights impediments to transformation as being sector specific, \r\nand hence the importance of international cooperation addressing \r\nsector-specific issues (Victor et al. 2019)"


id: 6e10305c4f79c4a7d6ba7e9a9cec0644
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:51
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14930
content:
" While such attention \r\noften starts with promoting innovation and diffusion of low-carbon \r\ntechnologies that are critical to a sector's functioning, it often ends \r\nwith policies aimed at phasing out the high-carbon technologies \r\nonce they are no longer needed (Markard 2018). In line with this, \r\nmany scholars have suggested value in supply-side international \r\nagreements, aimed at phasing out the production and use of fossil \r\nfuels (Collier and Venables 2014; Piggot et al. 2018; Asheim et al. \r\n2019; Newell and Simms 2020)."


