# document

id: 64827bc7c3838e988ca1735b23263ae3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:31
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:31
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"Within the overall framing of the AR6 report, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 \r\nprovide important complementary views of the required systems \r\ntransitions across different temporal and spatial scales. While \r\nChapter 3 focuses on the questions concerning the implications of the \r\nlong-term objectives for the medium-to-near-term transformations, \r\nChapter 4 comes from the other direction, and focuses on current \r\nnear-term trends and policies (such as the Nationally Determined \r\nContributions  - NDCs) and their consequences with regards to \r\nGHG emissions. The latter chapter naturally focuses much more \r\non the regional and national dimensions, and the heterogeneity of \r\ncurrent and planned policies. Bringing together the information from \r\nthese two chapters enables the assessment of whether current and \r\nplanned actions are consistent with the required systems changes for \r\nthe long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement."


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"Important other linkages comprise the collaboration with the \r\n'sectoral' Chapters 6 to 11 to provide an integrated cross-sectoral \r\nperspective. This information (including information also from \r\nthe sectoral chapters) is taken up ultimately also by Chapter 5 on \r\ndemand/services and Chapter 12 for a further assessment of sectoral \r\npotential and costs."


id: 6304063645a93b8f0d562a304a911bb9
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"Linkages to other chapters exist also on the topic of feasibility, which \r\nare informed by the policy, the sectoral and the demand chapters, \r\nthe technology and finance chapters, as well as Chapter  4 on \r\nnational circumstances."


id: d8b79f00e050ec45c8a9d698b6af599d
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"Close collaboration with WGI permitted the use of AR6-calibrated \r\nemulators, which assure full consistency across the different \r\nworking groups. Linkages to WGII concern the assessment of \r\nmacroeconomic benefits of avoided impacts that are put into the \r\ncontext of mitigation costs as well as co-benefits and trade-offs for \r\nsustainable development."


id: 39f4d4b350d7765f600d3ef07e9b5eb6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:31
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"The assessment of mitigation pathways explores a  wide scenario \r\nspace from the literature within which seven Illustrative Pathways \r\n(IPs) are explored. The overall process is indicated in Figure 3.5a."


id: 3c57b7234ee627f5f09114b77c34350e
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"typically capture interactions and processes that change key driving \r\nforces such as population, GDP, technology, lifestyles, and policy, and \r\nthe consequences on energy use, land use, and emissions. Scenarios \r\nare not predictions or forecasts. An emission pathway is a modelled \r\ntrajectory of anthropogenic emissions (Rogelj et al. 2018a) and, \r\ntherefore, a part of a scenario."


id: 290b240f580828d3ead52d16b7c6026d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:31
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"For a comprehensive assessment, a large ensemble of scenarios is \r\ncollected and made available through an interactive AR6 Scenarios \r\nDatabase4\r\n. The collected information is shared across the chapters of \r\nAR6 and includes more than 3000 different pathways from a diverse \r\nset of studies. After an initial screening and quality control, scenarios \r\nwere further vetted to assess if they sufficiently represented historical \r\ntrends (Annex III.II.3.1). Subsequently, the climate consequences of \r\neach scenario were assessed using the climate emulator (leading to \r\nfurther classification). The assessment in Chapter 3 is, however, not \r\nlimited to the scenarios from the database, and wherever necessary \r\nother literature sources are also assessed in order to bring together \r\nmultiple lines of evidence."


id: fc802e06cc93e3aa37b6d3852f80c026
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"There is no unique or preferred method to develop scenarios, and \r\nfuture pathways can be developed from diverse methods, depending \r\non user needs and research questions (Turnheim et al. 2015; \r\nTrutnevyte et al. 2019a; Hirt et al. 2020). The most comprehensive \r\nscenarios in the literature are qualitative narratives that are translated \r\ninto quantitative pathways using models (Clarke et al. 2014; Rogelj \r\net al. 2018a). Schematic or illustrative pathways can also be used \r\nto communicate specific features of more complex scenarios (Allen \r\net al. 2018). Simplified models can be used to explain the mechanisms \r\noperating in more complex models (e.g.,  Emmerling et al. 2019). \r\nUltimately, a diversity of scenario and modelling approaches can lead \r\nto more robust findings (Schinko et al. 2017; Gambhir et al. 2019)."


id: cfca91f21139aa1ac73a1813b7959490
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"In parallel, based on the overall AR6 assessment, seven illustrative \r\npathways (IP) were defined representing critical mitigation strategies \r\ndiscussed in the assessment. The seven pathways are composed of \r\ntwo sets: (i) one set of five Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) and \r\n(ii) one set of two reference pathways illustrative for high emissions. \r\nThe IMPs are on the one hand representative of the scenario spac but \r\nalso help to communicate archetypes of distinctly different systems \r\ntransformations and related policy choices. Subsequently, seven \r\nscenarios were selected from the full database that fitted these \r\nstorylines of each IP best. For these scenarios more strict vetting \r\ncriteria were applied. The selection was done by first applying specific \r\nfilters based on the storyline followed by a final selection (Box 3.1 \r\nand Figure 3.5a)."


id: e4de02c0e8f024347b0ef1349197fb37
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"It is common to define a reference scenario (also called a baseline \r\nscenario). Depending on the research question, a reference scenario \r\ncould be defined in different ways (Grant et al. 2020): (i) a hypothetical \r\nworld with no climate policies or climate impacts (Kriegler \r\net al. 2014b), (ii) assuming current policies or pledged policies are \r\nimplemented (Roelfsema et al. 2020), or (iii) a mitigation scenario \r\nto compare sensitivity with other mitigation scenarios (Kriegler et al. \r\n2014a; Sognnaes et al. 2021)."


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"No-climate-policy reference scenarios have often been compared \r\nwith mitigation scenarios (Clarke et al. 2014). A  no-climate-policy \r\nscenario assumes that no future climate policies are implemented, \r\nbeyond what is in the model calibration, effectively implying that \r\nthe carbon price is zero. No-climate-policy reference scenarios \r\nhave a  broad range depending on socio-economic assumptions \r\nand model characteristics, and consequently are important when \r\nassessing mitigation costs (Riahi et al. 2017; Rogelj et al. 2018b). As "


id: 53a7275574985b3f1a601b10c3e28fa7
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"Scenario and emission pathways are used to explore possible \r\nlong-term trajectories, the effectiveness of possible mitigation \r\nstrategies, and to help understand key uncertainties about the \r\nfuture. A scenario is an integrated description of a possible future \r\nof the human-environment system (Clarke et al. 2014), and could \r\nbe a qualitative narrative, quantitative projection, or both. Scenarios "


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"countries move forward with climate policies of varying stringency, \r\nno-climate-policy baselines are becoming increasingly hypothetical \r\n(Hausfather and Peters 2020). Studies clearly show current policies \r\nare having an effect, particularly when combined with the declining \r\ncosts of low-carbon technologies (IEA 2020a; Roelfsema et al. 2020; \r\nSognnaes et al. 2021; UNEP 2020), and, consequently, realised \r\ntrajectories begin to differ from earlier no-climate-policy scenarios \r\n(Burgess et al. 2020). High-end emission scenarios, such as RCP8.5 and \r\nSSP5-8.5, are becoming less likely with climate policy and technology \r\nchange (Box  3.3), but high-end concentration and warming levels \r\nmay still be reached with the inclusion of strong carbon or climate \r\nfeedbacks (Hausfather and Peters 2020; Pedersen et al. 2020)."


id: 8ceebd59c5cd1b04a2a4c55babb56ca8
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"based on optimisation or simulation; have exogenous or endogenous \r\ntechnological change amongst many other characteristics. IAMs take \r\nas input socio-economic and technical variables and parameters \r\nto represent various systems. There is no unique way to integrate \r\nthis knowledge into a model, and due to their complexity, various \r\nsimplifications and omissions are made for tractability. IAMs \r\ntherefore have various advantages and disadvantages which need \r\nto be weighed up when interpreting IAM outcomes. Annex  III.I \r\ncontains an overview of the different types of models and their \r\nkey characteristics."


id: 7dad24f617f38defc7d51b6cba56c154
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"Most IAMs are necessarily broad as they capture long-term dynamics. \r\nIAMs are strong in showing the key characteristics of emission \r\npathways and are most suited to questions related to short- versus \r\nlong-term trade-offs, key interactions with non-climate objectives, \r\nlong-term energy and land-use characteristics, and implications of \r\ndifferent overarching technological and policy choices (Clarke et al. \r\n2014; Rogelj et al. 2018a). While some IAMs have a  high level of \r\nregional and sectoral detail, for questions that require higher levels \r\nof granularity (e.g., local policy implementation) specific region and \r\nsector models may be better suited. Utility of the IAM pathways \r\nincreases when the quantitative results are contextualized through \r\nqualitative narratives or other additional types of knowledge \r\nto provide deeper insights (Geels et al. 2016a; Weyant 2017; \r\nGambhir et al. 2019)."


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"Mitigation scenarios developed for a  long-term climate constraint \r\ntypically focus on cost-effective mitigation action towards a  long\u0002term climate goal. Results from IAM as well as sectoral models depend \r\non model structure (Mercure et al. 2019), economic assumptions \r\n(Emmerling et al. 2019), technology assumptions (Pye et al. 2018), \r\nclimate/emissions target formulation (Johansson et al. 2020), and \r\nthe extent to which pre-existing market distortions are considered \r\n(Guivarch et al. 2011). The vast majority of IAM pathways do not \r\nconsider climate impacts (Schultes et al. 2021). Equity hinges upon \r\nethical and normative choices. As most IAM pathways follow the "


id: ff3708a9b3daa5a7135ec5e8431e8b05
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"'IAms can provide very useful information, but this information needs \r\nto be carefully interpreted and integrated with other quantitative and \r\nqualitative inputs in the decision-making process.'"


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"The climate constraint implementation can have a meaningful impact \r\non model results. The literature so far includes many temperature \r\novershoot scenarios with heavy reliance on long-term CDR and net \r\nnegative CO2 emissions to bring back temperatures after the peak \r\n(Rogelj et al. 2019b; Johansson et al. 2020). New approaches have \r\nbeen developed to avoid temperature overshoot. The new generation \r\nof scenarios show that CDR is important beyond its ability to reduce \r\ntemperature, but is essential also for offsetting residual emissions to \r\nreach net zero CO2 emissions (Rogelj et al. 2019b; Johansson et al. \r\n2020; Riahi et al. 2021; Strefler et al. 2021b)."


id: 738cf1a58840e34322875fac8647cf56
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"To facilitate this assessment, a  large ensemble of scenarios has \r\nbeen collected and made available through an interactive AR6 \r\nWGIII scenario database. The collection of the scenario outputs \r\nis coordinated by Chapter  3 and expands upon the IPCC SR1.5 \r\nscenario explorer (Huppmann et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018a). \r\nA  complementary database for national pathways has been \r\nestablished by Chapter 4. Annex III.II.3 contains full details on how \r\nthe scenario database was compiled."


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"intercomparison projects, with around one-fifth originating from \r\nindividual studies (Figure 3.2). Because of the uneven distribution of \r\nscenarios from different models and projects, uncorrected statistics \r\nfrom the database can be misleading."


id: 8477c4c67f9c932d305112b7348c5774
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"The AR6 scenario database contains 3131 scenarios (Figure  3.5a). \r\nAfter an initial screening and quality control, scenarios were further \r\nvetted to assess if they sufficiently represented historical trends \r\n(Annex III.II.3.1). Of the initial 2266 scenarios with global scope, \r\n1686 scenarios passed the vetting process and are assessed in this \r\nchapter. The scenarios that did not pass the vetting are still available in \r\nthe database. The vetted scenarios were from over 50 different model \r\nfamilies, or over 100 when considering all versions of the same family \r\n(Figure 3.1). The scenarios originated from over 15 different model "


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"Each scenario with sufficient data is given a  temperature \r\nclassification using climate model emulators. Three emulators were \r\nused in the assessment: FAIR (Smith et al. 2018), CICERO-SCM \r\n(Skeie et al. 2021), MAGICC (Meinshausen et al. 2020). Only the "


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"results of MAGICC are shown in this chapter as it adequately covers the \r\nrange of outcomes. The emulators are calibrated against the behaviour \r\nof complex climate models and observation data, consistent with the \r\noutcomes of AR6 WGI (Cross-Chapter Box 7.1). The climate assessment \r\nis a three-step process of harmonisation, infilling and a probabilistic \r\nclimate model emulator run (Annex  III.II.2.5). Warming projections \r\nuntil the year 2100 were derived for 1574 scenarios, of which 1202 \r\npassed vetting, with the remaining scenarios having insufficient \r\ninformation (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1). For scenarios that limit warming \r\nto 2degC or lower, the SR1.5 classification was adopted in AR6, with \r\nmore disaggregation provided for higher warming levels (Table 3.1). "


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"These choices can be compared with the selection of common global \r\nwarming levels (GWLs) of 1.5degC, 2degC, 3degC and 4degC to classify climate \r\nchange impacts in the WGII assessment."


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"key characteristics that define an IMP. The quantitative versions of \r\nthe IMPs provide numerical values that are internally consistent and \r\ncomparable across chapters of the report. The quantitative IMPs have \r\nbeen selected from the AR6 scenario database. No assessment of the \r\nlikelihood of each IMP has been made."


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"Successive IPCC Assessment Reports (ARs) have used scenarios to \r\nillustrate key characteristics of possible climate (policy) futures. In AR5 \r\nfour RCPs made the basis of climate modelling in WGI and WGII, with \r\nWGIII assessing over 1000 scenarios spanning those RCPs (Clarke et al. \r\n2014). Of the over 400 scenarios assessed in SR1.5, four scenarios \r\nwere selected to highlight the trade-off between short-term emission \r\nreductions and long-term deployment of BECCS (Rogelj et al. 2018a), \r\nreferred to as 'Illustrative Pathways' (IPs). AR6 WGI and WGII rely on \r\nthe scenarios selected for CMIP6, called ScenarioMIP (O'Neill et al. \r\n2016), to assess warming levels. In addition to the full set of scenarios, \r\nAR6 WGIII also uses selected Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs)."


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"The IMPs are selected to have different mitigation strategies, which \r\ncan be illustrated looking at the energy system and emission pathways \r\n(Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8). The mitigation strategies show the different \r\noptions in emission reduction (Figure 3.7). Each panel shows the key \r\ncharacteristics leading to total GHG emissions, consisting of residual \r\n(gross) emissions (fossil CO2 emissions, CO2 emissions from industrial \r\nprocesses, and non-CO2 emissions) and removals (net land-use change, \r\nbioenergy with carbon capture and storage  - BECCS, and direct air \r\ncarbon capture and storage - DACCS), in addition to avoided emissions \r\nthrough the use of carbon capture and storage on fossil fuels. The \r\nIMP-Neg and IMP-GS scenarios were shown to illustrate scenarios \r\nwith a significant role of CDR. The energy supply (Figure 3.8) shows \r\nthe phase-out of fossil fuels in the IMP-LD, IMP-Ren and IMP-SP cases, \r\nbut a less substantial decrease in the IMP-Neg case. The IMP-GS case "


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"In WGIII, IMPs were selected to denote the implications of different \r\nsocietal choices for the development of future emissions and \r\nassociated transformations of main GHG-emitting sectors (Figure 3.5a \r\nand Box 3.1). The most important function of the IMPs is to illustrate \r\nkey themes that form a  common thread in the report, both with \r\na storyline and a quantitative illustration. The storyline describes the "


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"needs to make up its slow start by (i)  rapid reductions mid-century \r\nand (ii) massive reliance on net negative emissions by the end of the \r\ncentury. The CurPol and ModAct cases both result in relatively high \r\nemissions, showing a  slight increase and stabilisation compared to \r\ncurrent emissions, respectively."


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"Figure 3.9 | Trends in key scenario characteristics and driving forces as included in the SSP scenarios (showing 5-95th percentiles of the reference \r\nscenarios as included in the database in grey shading). Reference (dotted lines) refers to the UN low-, medium- and high-population scenarios (UN 2019), the OECD \r\nlong-term economic growth scenario (OECD 2021), the scenarios from the IEA's World Energy Outlook (IEA 2019), and the scenarios in the FAO assessment (FAO 2018)."


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"Figure  3.10 shows the GHG and CO2 emission trajectories for \r\ndifferent temperature categories as defined in Section  3.2 (the \r\ntemperature levels are calculated using simple climate models, \r\nconsistent with the outcomes of the recent WGI assessment, Cross\u0002Chapter Box 7.1). It should be noted that most scenarios currently in \r\nthe literature do not account for the impact of COVID-19 (Box 3.2). "


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"emissions peak in the 21st century. For the lowest categories, \r\nthe emissions peak is mostly before 2030. In fact, for scenarios \r\nin the  category that avoids temperature overshoot for the  1.5degC \r\nscenario (C1 category), GHG emissions are reduced already to almost \r\nzero around the middle of the century. Typically, CO2 emissions reach \r\nnet zero about 10 to 40 years before total GHG emissions reach net \r\nzero. The main reason is that scenarios reduce non-CO2 greenhouse \r\ngas emissions less than CO2 due to a  limited mitigation potential \r\n(Section 3.3.2.2). Figure 3.10 also shows that many scenarios in the \r\nliterature with a temperature outcome below 2degC show net negative \r\nemissions. There are, however, also exceptions in which more \r\nimmediate emission reductions limits the need for CDR. The IMPs \r\nillustrate alternative pathways to reach the C1-C3 temperature levels."


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"The lower categories include increasingly stringent assumed climate \r\npolicies. For all scenario categories, except the highest category, "


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"Figure 3.11 | Global mean temperature outcome of the ensemble of scenarios included in the climate categories C1-C8 (based on a reduced complexity \r\nmodel - RCM - calibrated to the WGI assessment, both in terms of future and historic warming). The left panel shows the ranges of scenario uncertainty (shaded \r\narea) with the P50 RCM probability (line). The right panel shows the P5 to P95 range of combined RCM climate uncertainty (C1-C8 is explained in Table 3.1) and scenario \r\nuncertainty, and the P50 (line)."


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"limited overshoot (typically <0.1degC, C1) compared to those with high \r\novershoot (C2): in emissions, the C1 category is characterised by steep \r\nearly reductions and a relatively small contribution of net negative \r\nemissions (like IMP-LD and IMP-Ren) (Figure  3.10). In addition to \r\nthe temperature caused by the range of scenarios in each category \r\n(main panel), climate uncertainties also contribute to a  range of \r\ntemperature outcomes (including uncertainties regarding the carbon \r\ncycle, climate sensitivity, and the rate of change, see AR6 WGI). The \r\nbars on the right of Figure 3.11 show the uncertainty range for each "


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"category (combining scenario and climate uncertainty). While the C1 \r\ncategory more likely than not limits warming to 1.5degC (>50%) by the \r\nend of the century, even with such a scenario, warming above 2degC \r\ncannot be excluded (95th percentile). The uncertainty range for the \r\nhighest emission categories (C7) implies that these scenarios could \r\nlead to a warming above 6degC."


id: 5b9ae75af7c9d3e82da7d52502671d5b
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"Figure 3.12 | (a) The role of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Emission in CO2-eq in 2100 (using AR6 GWP-100) (other = halogenated gases) and (b) cumulative CO2\r\nemissions in the 2020-2100 period. Panels (c) and (d) show the development of CH4 and N2O emissions over time. Energy emissions include the contribution of BECCS. For both \r\nenergy and AFOLU sectors, the positive and negative values represent the cumulated annual balances. In both panels, the three bars per scenario category represent the lowest 5-15th \r\npercentile, the average value and the highest 5-15th percentile. These illustrate the range of scenarios in each category. The definition of C1-C7 can be found in Table 3.1."


id: 23259cc547dee771ff06571ca963c8dd
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"Box 3.4 | Consistency of Remaining Carbon Budgets in the WGI Assessment and Cumulative \r\nCO2 Emissions in WGIII Mitigation Pathways"


id: ecfaf63ae8bbc3ea2eba3c66f568b1ff
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"The WGI assessment has shown that the increase in global mean temperature has a  near-linear relationship with cumulative \r\nCO2 emissions (Chapter 5, Section 5.5, Box 5.3 of AR6 WGI report). Consistently, WGI has confirmed that net zero CO2 emissions are \r\nrequired to halt CO2-induced warming. This permits the estimation of carbon budgets consistent with specific temperature goals. In \r\nChapter 3, we present the temperature outcomes and cumulative CO2 emissions associated with different warming levels for around \r\n1200 scenarios published in the literature and which were classified according to different warming levels (Section 3.2 and Annex III.\r\nII.3.2). In this box, we discuss the consistency of the assessments presented here and in IPCC AR6 WGI. The box summarises how \r\nthe remaining carbon budgets assessed by AR6 WGI relate to the remaining cumulative CO2 emissions until the time of net zero CO2\r\nemissions in mitigation pathways (Tables 3.2 and SPM.1) assessed by AR6 WGIII."


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"In its assessment, AR6 WGI uses a framework in which the various components of the remaining carbon budget are informed by \r\nvarious lines of evidence and assessed climate system characteristics. The AR6 WGIII, instead, uses around 1200 emission scenarios \r\nwith estimated warming levels that cover the scenario range presented in AR6 WGI but also contain many more intermediate \r\nprojections with varying emission profiles and a combination of CO2 emissions and other greenhouse gases. In order to assess their \r\nclimate outcomes, climate model emulators are used. The emulators are reduced complexity climate models that are provided by AR6 \r\nWGI, and which are calibrated to the AR6 WGI assessment of future warming for various purposes (a detailed description of the use of \r\nclimate model emulators in the AR6 WGI and WGIII assessments can be found in Cross-Chapter Box 7.1 in the AR6 WGI report, with \r\nthe connection of WGI and WGIII discussed in Annex III.2.5.1)."


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"Cumulative CO2 emissions until net zero estimated by AR6 WGIII\r\nThe AR6 WGIII provides estimates of cumulative net CO2 emissions (from 2020 inclusive) until the time of reaching net zero CO2 emissions \r\n(henceforth called 'peak cumulative CO2 emissions') and until the end of the century for eight temperature classes that span a range of \r\nwarming levels. The numbers can be found in Table 3.2 (330-710 GtCO2 for C1; 530-930 for C2; and 640-1160 for C3)."


id: 4087edf545d786d4fc84e74dd047332
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"Comparing the AR6 WGI remaining carbon budgets and remaining cumulative CO2 emissions of the AR6 WGIII scenarios\r\nA comparison between AR6 WGI and WGIII findings requires recognising that, unlike in WGI, cumulative emissions in WGIII are not \r\nprovided for a specific peak-warming threshold or level but are instead provided for a set of scenarios in a category, representing \r\na  specific range of peak-temperature outcomes (for instance the C4 category contains scenarios with a  median peak warming \r\nanywhere between approximately 1.8degC and up to 2degC). When accounting for this difference, the AR6 WGI and WGIII findings are \r\nvery consistent for temperature levels below 2degC. Figure 1 compares the peak temperatures and associated cumulative CO2 emissions \r\n(i.e., peak cumulative CO2 emissions) for the WGIII scenarios to the remaining carbon budgets assessed by WGI. This shows only minor \r\ndifferences between the WGI and WGIII approaches."


id: 3cc1d245323e7757f408da6ecad05038
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"After correcting for the categorisation, some (small) differences between the AR6 WGI and WGIII numbers arise from remaining \r\ndifferences between the outcomes of the climate emulators and their set-up (IPCC AR6 WGI Cross-Chapter Box 7.1) and the differences \r\nin the underlying scenarios. Moreover, the WGI assessment estimated the non-CO2 warming at the time of net zero CO2 emissions \r\nbased on a relationship derived from the SR1.5 scenario database with historical emission estimates as in Meinshausen et al. (2020) \r\n(AR6 WGI Chapter 5). The WGIII assessment uses the same climate emulator with improved historical emissions estimates (Nicholls \r\net al. 2021) (AR6 WGI Cross-Chapter Box  7.1). Annex III.II.2.5.1 further explores the effects of these factors on the relationship \r\nbetween non-CO2 warming at peak cumulative CO2 and peak surface temperature."


id: bb06cfea506467fa0b02625e10900934
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"A detailed comparison of the impact of different assessment steps (i.e., the new emulators, scenarios, and harmonisation methods), \r\nhas been made and is presented in Figure 6 in Annex III.II.3.2 ."


id: cbdcba882410beab69301851b52772ae
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"The concept of a finite carbon budget means that the world needs to get to net zero CO2, no matter whether global warming is \r\nlimited to 1.5degC or well below 2degC (or any other level). Moreover, exceeding the remaining carbon budget will have consequences by \r\novershooting temperature levels. Still, the relationship between the timing of net zero and temperature targets is a flexible one, as \r\ndiscussed further in Cross-Chapter Box 3 in this chapter. It should be noted that the national-level inventory as used by UNFCCC for \r\nthe land use, land-use change and forestry sector is different from the overall concept of anthropogenic emissions employed by IPCC \r\nAR6 WGI. For emissions estimates based on these inventories, the remaining carbon budgets must be correspondingly reduced by \r\napproximately 15%, depending on the scenarios (Grassi et al., 2021) (Chapter 7). "


id: 212d60ffb21ca6df4eec4731e0926f33
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"One of the uncertainties of the remaining carbon budget is the level of non-CO2 emissions which is a function of policies and technology \r\ndevelopment. This represents a point of leverage for policies rather than an inherent geophysical uncertainty. Stringent non-CO2 emission \r\nreductions hence can provide - to some degree - an option to reach more stringent climate goals with the same carbon budget."


id: 2b786c874595161c7f02357b0511446c
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"The near-linear relationship implies that cumulative CO2 emissions \r\nare critically important for climate outcomes (Collins et al. 2013). \r\nThe maximum temperature increase is a  direct function of the \r\ncumulative emissions until net zero CO2 emissions is reached \r\n(the emission budget) (Figure  3.13, left side). The end-of-century \r\ntemperature correlates well with cumulative emissions across \r\nthe century (right panel). For long-term climate goals, positive \r\nemissions in the first half of the century can be offset by net \r\nremoval of CO2 from the atmosphere (net negative emissions) at \r\nthe cost of a  temporary overshoot of the target (Tokarska et al. \r\n2019). The bottom panels of Figure 3.13 show the contribution of \r\nnet negative CO2 emissions."


id: 2f0114c99bb795a286874ab0b7b56d0d
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"Focusing on cumulative emissions, the right-hand panel of \r\nFigure  3.12b shows that for high-end scenarios (C6-C7), most \r\nemissions originate from fossil fuels, with a  smaller contribution \r\nfrom net deforestation. For C5 and lower, there is also a  negative \r\ncontribution to emissions from both AFOLU emissions and energy "


id: 303d718b3f62a646d00d658b7d105bb6
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"Figure 3.13 | The near-linear relationship between cumulative CO2 emissions and temperature. The left panel shows cumulative emissions until net zero emission \r\nis reached. The right panel shows cumulative emissions until the end of the century, plotted against peak and end-of-century temperature, respectively. Both are shown as \r\na function of non-CO2 forcing and cumulative net negative CO2 emissions. Position temperature categories (circles) and IPs are also indicated, including two 2degC sensitivity \r\ncases for Neg (Neg-2.0) and Ren (Ren-2.0)."


id: 9af16cfc65407801d52c4f956e1066b7
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content:
"igure 3.14 | Net zero year for CO2 and all GHGs (based on AR6 GWP100) as a function of remaining carbon budget and temperature outcomes (note \r\nhat scenarios that stabilise (near) zero are also included in determining the net zero year)."


id: 49161d466d76ae814cadbf1c67ce1e9b
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"This Cross-Chapter Box surveys scientific, technical and policy aspects of net zero carbon dioxide (CO2) and net zero greenhouse gas \r\n(GHG) emissions, with a focus on timing, the relationship with warming levels, and sectoral and regional characteristics of net zero \r\nemissions. Assessment of net zero GHG emissions additionally requires consideration of non-CO2 gases and choice of GHG emission \r\nmetrics used to aggregate emissions and removals of different GHGs (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 2 and Cross-Chapter Box 7 in \r\nChapter 10). The following considers net zero CO2 and GHG emissions globally, followed by regional and sectoral dimensions."


id: a1390f59717f41598f6cb8b940d163d3
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"Reaching net zero CO2 emissions globally is necessary for limiting global warming to any level. At the point of net zero \r\nCO2, the amount of CO2 human activity is putting into the atmosphere equals the amount of CO2 human activity is removing from \r\nthe atmosphere (see Annex I: Glossary). Reaching and sustaining net zero CO2 emissions globally stabilizes CO2-induced warming. \r\nReaching net zero CO2 emissions and then moving to net negative CO2 emissions globally leads to a peak and decline in CO2-induced \r\nwarming (AR6 WGI Sections 5.5 and 5.6)."


id: cc2f391fa263afaefd550b39b412d50a
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"Limiting warming to 1.5degC (>50%) or to 2degC (>67%) requires deep, rapid, and sustained reductions of other greenhouse \r\ngases including methane alongside rapid reductions of CO2 emissions to net zero. This ensures that the warming contributions \r\nfrom non-CO2 forcing agents as well as from CO2 emissions are both limited at low levels. The AR6 WGI estimated remaining carbon \r\nbudgets until the time of reaching net zero CO2 emissions for a range of warming limits, taking into account historical CO2 emissions \r\nand projections of the warming from non-CO2 forcing agents (Box 3.4 in Section 3.3, AR6 WGI Section 5.5)."


id: bf8967be083f9ccd45ce418669233666
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"The earlier global net zero CO2 emissions are reached, the lower the cumulative net amount of CO2 emissions and \r\nhuman-induced global warming, all else being equal (Figure 1a in this Cross-Chapter Box). For a given net zero date, a variation \r\nin the shape of the CO2 emissions profile can lead to a variation in the cumulative net amount of CO2 emissions until the time of net \r\nzero CO2 and as a result to different peak-warming levels. For example, cumulative net CO2 emissions until the time of reaching \r\nnet zero CO2 will be smaller, and peak warming lower, if emissions are reduced steeply and then more slowly compared to reducing \r\nemissions slowly and then more steeply (Figure 1b in this Cross-Chapter Box)."


id: 2caae540bf80408c0772be4ec9c1b67f
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"Cross-Chapter Box 3, Figure 1 | Selected global CO2 emissions trajectories with similar shape and different net zero CO2 date (a), different shape \r\nand similar net zero CO2 date (b), and similar peak warming, but varying shapes and net zero CO2 dates (c). Funnels show pathways limiting warming \r\nto 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (light blue) and limiting warming to 2degC (>67%) (beige). Historic CO2 emissions from Section 2.2 (EDGAR v6)."


id: 9eac6823ec6fe2d06d953c38602b6e31
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"Pathways following emissions levels projected from the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) \r\nannounced prior to COP26 until 2030 would result in substantially (>0.1degC) exceeding 1.5degC. They would have to reach \r\nnet zero CO2 around 5-10 years later7\r\n than in pathways with no or limited overshoot in order to reach the net negative emissions \r\nthat would then be required to return warming to 1.5degC (>50%) after a high overshoot by 2100. Those high overshoot pathways \r\nhave higher transient warming and higher reliance on net negative CO2 emissions towards the end of the 21st century. As they need \r\nto reach net zero CO2 emissions in only limited amount of time but from much higher 2030 emissions levels, their post-2030 CO2\r\nemissions reduction rates are substantially higher (by around 30%) than in pathways limiting warming to 1.5degC with no or limited \r\novershoot. (Section 3.5)."


id: 46d71ed084e816a1afdfb573558626c2
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"Pathways following emissions levels projected from the implementation of NDCs announced prior to COP26 until \r\n2030 would have to reach net zero CO2 around 5 years earlier8\r\n than cost-effective pathways that limit warming to 2degC \r\n(>67%). While cost-effective pathways take around 50-55 years to reach net zero CO2 emissions, those pathways would only have \r\n35-40 years left for transitioning to net zero CO2 from 2030 onwards, close to the transition times that 1.5degC pathways are faced with \r\ntoday. Current CO2 emissions and 2030 emission levels projected under the NDCs announced prior to COP26 are in a similar range \r\n(Sections 3.5 and 4.2)."


id: 11a0da92f28cdc97668bf7eb93a287e7
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"Net zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions\r\nThe amount of CO2-equivalent emissions and the point when net zero GHG emissions are reached in multi-GHG emissions \r\npathways depends on the choice of GHG emissions metric. Various GHG emission metrics are available for this purpose.9\r\nGWP-100 is the most commonly used metric for reporting CO2-equivalent emissions and is required for emissions reporting under the \r\nRulebook of the Paris Agreement. (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 2, Annex I and Annex II.9)"


id: 8e9ca560c0fc26ed60129d4a00b895e3
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"For most choices of GHG emissions metric, reaching net zero GHG emissions requires net negative CO2 emissions in order \r\nto balance residual CH4, N2O and F-gas emissions. Under foreseen technology developments, some CH4, N2O and F-gas emissions \r\nfrom, for example, agriculture and industry, will remain over the course of this century. Net negative CO2 emissions will therefore be \r\nneeded to balance these remaining non-CO2 GHG emissions to obtain net zero GHG emissions at a point in time after net zero CO2\r\nhas been reached in emissions pathways. Both the amount of net negative CO2 emissions and the time lag to reaching net zero GHG \r\ndepend on the choice of GHG emission metric."


id: 74bf2bef5058265bc4127c3f94af71c8
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"Reaching net zero GHG emissions globally in terms of GWP-100 leads to a reduction in global warming from an earlier \r\npeak. This is due to net negative CO2 emissions balancing the GWP-100-equivalent emissions of short-lived GHG emissions, which by \r\nthemselves do not contribute to further warming if sufficiently declining (Fuglestvedt et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2021). Hence, 1.5degC-2degC \r\nemissions pathways in the AR6 scenario database that reach global net zero GHG emissions in the second half of the century show \r\nwarming being halted at some peak value followed by a gradual decline towards the end of the century (AR6 WGI Chapter 1, Box 1.4)."


id: daa5be9dbb6370f19fa979a001575903
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"The adoption and implementation of net zero CO2 or GHG emission targets by countries and regions also depends on \r\nequity and capacity criteria. The Paris Agreement recognises that peaking of emissions will occur later in developing countries \r\n(Art. 4.1). Just transitions to net zero CO2 or GHG could be expected to follow multiple pathways, in different contexts. Regions may \r\ndecide about net zero pathways based on their consideration of potential for rapid transition to low-carbon development pathways, \r\nthe capacity to design and implement those changes, and perceptions of equity within and across countries. Cost-effective pathways \r\nfrom global models have been shown to distribute the mitigation effort unevenly and inequitably in the absence of financial support \r\nmechanisms and capacity building (Budolfson et al. 2021), and hence would require additional measures to become aligned with "


id: 846208b4d8eca9c527bf48b91ae5a49e
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"equity considerations (Fyson et al. 2020; van Soest et al. 2021b). Formulation of net zero pathways by countries will benefit from clarity \r\non scope, roadmaps and fairness (Rogelj et al. 2021; Smith 2021). Achieving net zero emission targets relies on policies, institutions \r\nand milestones against which to track progress. Milestones can include emissions levels, as well as markers of technological diffusion."


id: cb63c0d61648950a596bc946c1e3dea2
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"Net zero CO2 and carbon neutrality have different meanings in this assessment, as is the case for net zero GHG and \r\nGHG neutrality. They apply to different boundaries in the emissions and removals being considered. Net zero (GHG or CO2) refers \r\nto emissions and removals under the direct control or territorial responsibility of the reporting entity. In contrast, (GHG or carbon) \r\nneutrality includes anthropogenic emissions and anthropogenic removals within and also those beyond the direct control or territorial \r\nresponsibility of the reporting entity. At the global scale, net zero CO2 and carbon neutrality are equivalent, as is the case for net zero \r\nGHG and GHG neutrality. The term 'climate neutrality' is not used in this assessment because the concept of climate neutrality is \r\ndiffuse, used differently by different communities, and not readily quantified."


id: cf68a248bc8cfdd73cc22e6d99770655
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"Given the larger contribution of scenarios in the literature that aim \r\nto reduce net negative emissions, emission reductions are somewhat \r\nlarger in the short term compared to similar categories in the IPCC \r\nSR1.5. At the same time, the year of net zero emissions is somewhat \r\nlater (but only if these rapid, short-term emission reductions are \r\nachieved). The scenarios in the literature in C1-C3 show a peak in \r\nglobal emissions before 2025. Not achieving this requires a  more \r\nrapid reduction after 2025 to still meet the Paris goals (Section 3.5)."


id: 10b3eb2440c98615cded954e67afbc89
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"e\r\n Alignment with the categories of the illustrative SSP scenarios considered in AR6 WGI, and the Illustrative (Mitigation) Pathways (IPs/IMPs) of WGIII. The IMPs have \r\ncommon features such as deep and rapid emissions reductions, but also different combinations of sectoral mitigation strategies. See Box SPM.1 for an introduction of the \r\nIPs and IMPs, and Chapter 3 for full descriptions. {3.2, 3.3, Annex III.II.2.4}"


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"l\r\n For cases where models do not report all GHGs, missing GHG species are infilled and aggregated into a Kyoto basket of GHG emissions in CO2-eq defined by the 100-year \r\nglobal warming potential. For each pathway, reporting of CO2, CH4, and N2O emissions was the minimum required for the assessment of the climate response and the \r\nassignment to a climate category. Emissions pathways without climate assessment are not included in the ranges presented here. {See Annex III.II.2.5 }\r\nm Cumulative emissions are calculated from the start of 2020 to the time of net zero and 2100, respectively. They are based on harmonised net CO2 emissions, ensuring \r\nconsistency with the WGI assessment of the remaining carbon budget.50 {Box 3.4}"


id: a806cdb62f0f60db63cd88aee8f12eea
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"Detailed sectoral implications are discussed in Section  3.4 and \r\nChapters 5-11 (see also Table 3.3). The stringency of climate policy \r\nhas clear implications for mitigation action (Figure 3.15). There are \r\na number of important commonalities of pathways limiting warming \r\nto 2degC (>67%) or lower: for instance, they all rely on significant \r\nimprovement of energy efficiency, rapid decarbonisation of supply \r\nand, many of them, CDR (in energy supply or AFOLU), either in terms \r\nof net negative emissions or to compensate residual emissions. \r\nStill, there are also important differences and the (IMPs) show how \r\ndifferent choices can steer the system into alternative directions with \r\ndifferent combinations of response options. For decarbonisation of \r\nenergy supply many options exist, including CCS, nuclear power, and \r\nrenewables (Chapter 6). In the majority of the scenarios reaching low \r\nGHG targets, a considerable amount of CCS is applied (Figure 3.15d). "


id: f45cb404859fc4c0df8e0a5fc26b98b5
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"options for different decarbonisation pathways with heavy reliance \r\non renewables (IMP-Ren), strong emphasis on energy-demand \r\nreductions (IMP-LD), widespread deployment of CDR methods \r\ncoupled with CCS (BECCS and DACCS) (IMP-Neg), mitigation in \r\nthe context of sustainable development (IMP-SP) (Figure 3.16). For \r\nexample, in some scenarios, a small part of the energy system is still \r\nbased on fossil fuels in 2100 (IMP-Neg), while in others, fossil fuels \r\nare almost or completely phased out (IMP-Ren). Nevertheless, in all \r\nscenarios, fossil fuel use is greatly reduced and unabated coal use \r\nis completely phased out by 2050. Also, nuclear power can be part \r\nof a mitigation strategy (however, the literature only includes some \r\nscenarios with high-nuclear contributions, such as Berger et al. 2017). "


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vector_id: 14933
content:
"2014a,b; Lehtveer and Hedenus 2015a,b; Pfenninger and Keirstead \r\n2015; Sepulveda et al. 2018; Zappa et al. 2019; IEA 2021b) (see also \r\nBox  6.6 on 100% renewables in net zero CO2 systems). Panels e \r\nand f, finally, show the contribution of CDR - both in terms of net \r\nnegative emissions and gross CDR. The contribution of total CDR \r\nobviously exceeds the net negative emissions. It should be noted that \r\nwhile a majority of scenarios rely on net negative emissions to reach \r\nstringent mitigation goals - this is not the case for all of them."


id: cf41436161bc79805b9400295b7e8cc5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 30145
content:
"The spread shown in Figure  3.15 implies different mitigation \r\nstrategies that could all lead to emissions levels consistent with the \r\nParis Agreement (and reach zero emissions). The IMPs illustrate some "


id: 4f4c80fdd9b7cf520cb76ed4e699b06d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"b. Sectoral GHG emissions at the time of net-zero CO2 emissions \r\n(compared to modelled 2019 emissions) "


id: 5f0885856e71d5ca49fc11b56ee1eb92
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 12493
content:
"Mitigation pathways also have a regional dimension. In 2010, about \r\n40% of emissions originated from the Developed Countries and Eastern \r\nEurope and West Central Asia regions. According to the projections \r\nshown in Figure 3.17, the share of the latter regions will further increase \r\nto about 70% by 2050. In the scenarios in the literature, emissions are \r\ntypically almost equally reduced across the regions."


id: 276a86dd8f19a2a1f9d9848b7c1d0960
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"This is explored further in Section 3.5. The different strategies are also \r\nclearly apparent in the way they scenarios reach net zero emissions. \r\nWhile IMP-GS and IMP-Neg rely significantly on BECCS and DACCS, \r\ntheir use is far more restricted in the other IMPs. Consistently, in these \r\nIMPs residual emissions are also significantly lower."


id: d1ccc57ad8268124f1a5eb4681117f01
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Steinberg et al. 2020). These  studies show increases in electricity \r\ngeneration in the USA (McFarland et al. 2015; Steinberg et al. 2020) \r\nand increases in CO2 emissions in Australia (Emodi et al. 2019) or the \r\nUSA (McFarland et al. 2015)."


id: c868b5b7b52f6a4a49d33805ecbd2a1c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"In summary, a  limited number of studies quantify the impact of \r\nclimate on emissions pathways. The most important impact in \r\nenergy systems might be through the impact on demand, although \r\nclimate change could also impact renewable mitigation potential - \r\ncertainly at the local and regional scale. Climate change might be \r\nmore important for land-use related mitigation measures, including \r\nafforestation, bioenergy and nature-based solutions. The net effect of \r\nchanges in climate and CO2 fertilisation are uncertain but could be \r\nsubstantial (Chapter 7)."


id: 6127ffbe92a47967a0e50a77844fd41d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Most IAM pathways rely heavily on supply-side mitigation \r\nstrategies, including fuel switching, decarbonisation of fuels, and \r\nCDR (Creutzig et al. 2016; Bertram et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018b; \r\nMundaca et al. 2019). For demand-side mitigation, IAMs incorporate \r\nchanges in energy efficiency, but many other demand-side options \r\n(e.g.,  behaviour and lifestyle changes) are often excluded from \r\nmodels (van Sluisveld et al. 2015; Creutzig et al. 2016; van den Berg \r\net al. 2019; Wilson et al. 2019). In addition, this mitigation is typically \r\nprice-driven and limited in magnitude (Yeh et al. 2017; Luderer \r\net al. 2018; Wachsmuth and Duscha 2019; Sharmina et al. 2020). In \r\ncontrast, bottom-up modelling studies show considerable potential \r\nfor demand-side mitigation (Creutzig et al. 2016; Yeh et al. 2017; \r\nMundaca et al. 2019; Wachsmuth and Duscha 2019) (Chapter  5), \r\nwhich can slow emissions growth and/or reduce emissions (Creutzig \r\net al. 2016; Samadi et al. 2017)."


id: bd96d85c02d497e587f2cf281040d65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"a Direct energy use and direct emissions only; emissions do not include those \r\nassociated with energy production."


id: 4c2739a32719d4ff0f994eb7fe99061d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 9404
content:
"b\r\n Other non-specified fuel use, including military. Some models report this category in \r\nthe buildings sector, while others report it in the 'Other' sector."


id: 1d2dee63106c077051b5dcd0d5af789c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Figure 3.18 shows indicators of supply- and demand-side mitigation \r\nin the IMPs, as well as the range across the database. Two of these \r\nIMPs (IMP-SP, IMP-LD) show strong reductions in energy demand, \r\nresulting in less reliance on bioenergy and limited CDR from \r\nenergy supply. In contrast, IMP-Neg has higher energy demand, \r\ndepending more on bioenergy and net negative CO2 emissions from \r\nenergy supply."


id: b1416d79e4ccafe805412971b512d449
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"et al. 2021) (Section 6.7). CO2 emissions from transport, industry, and \r\nbuildings are positive, and non-CO2 GHG emissions are also positive \r\nat the time of global net zero CO2 emissions (Figure 3.20)."


id: 2f39f87e658941eb6bba509c92c75d14
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Mitigation pathways show differences in the timing of decarbonisation \r\n(Figure 3.20) and the timing of net zero (Figure 3.19) across sectors \r\nand regions (high confidence); the timing in a given sector depends \r\non the cost of abatement in it, the availability of CDR options, the \r\nscenario design, near-term emissions levels, and the amount of non\u0002CO2 abatement (Yeh et al. 2017; Emmerling et al. 2019; Rogelj et al. \r\n2019a,b; Johansson et al. 2020; Azevedo et al. 2021; Ou et al. 2021; \r\nvan Soest et al. 2021b) (Cross-Chapter Box 3 in this chapter). However, \r\ndelaying emissions reductions, or more limited emissions reductions \r\nin one sector or region, involves compensating reductions in other \r\nsectors or regions if warming is to be limited (high confidence) (Price \r\nand Keppo 2017; Grubler et al. 2018; Rochedo et al. 2018; van Soest \r\net al. 2021b)."


id: 883f72b18b4b012476658b5c9cc3e8a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"At the time of net zero global CO2 emissions, emissions in some \r\nsectors are positive and some negative. In cost-effective mitigation \r\npathways, the energy supply sector typically reaches net zero CO2\r\nbefore the economy as a whole, while the demand sectors reach net \r\nzero CO2 later, if at all (Pietzcker et al. 2014; Price and Keppo 2017; \r\nLuderer et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018a,b; Mejean et al. 2019; Azevedo "


id: 19f80e2e8d34d110e062bd631aa0e02
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 1553
content:
"sions char\r\n Air \r\ne\r\nLo\r\nof P\r\n20\r\n SSP \r\nIPs \r\nment\r\n2030 \r\nD, \r\nD,\r\nen, \r\n1.9 \r\n32 \r\n(17-48\r\nNeg\r\n24 \r\n(11-35\r\n24 \r\n(16-32) \r\n2.6\r\n21 \r\n(14-24) \r\nS\r\n21 \r\n(12-24) \r\n20 \r\n(11-23) \r\n17 \r\n(11-21\r\n4.5 13 \r\nAct (11-17) \r\n7.0 32 \r\nol (17-48) \r\n8.5 24 \r\n(11-35) \r\ne 50th and (5\r\nable 3.1.\r\neg peaks aro\r\nn 'Direct Equ\r\ned to include"


id: c3788c7b4350e1fc0dc9b07fadf6114
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 28324
content:
"Figure 3.20 | Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including CO2 emissions by sector and total non-CO2 GHGs in 2050 (top left), 2100 (top middle), year of \r\nglobal net zero CO2 (top right), cumulative CO2 emissions from 2020-2100 (bottom left), and cumulative CO2 emissions from 2020 until the year of net \r\nzero CO2 for scenarios that limit warming to below 2degC. Scenarios are grouped by their temperature category. 'Industry' includes CO2 emissions associated with industrial \r\nenergy use only; sectors shown in this figure do not necessarily sum to total CO2. In this, and other figures in Section 3.4, unless stated otherwise, only scenarios that pass the \r\nvetting criteria are included (Section 3.2). Boxes indicate the interquartile range, the median is shown with a horizontal black line, while vertical lines show the 5-95% interval."


id: 231e836b77ee45ce6efdbfcce1aab05d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 2971
content:
"Mitigation in one sector can be dependent upon mitigation in \r\nanother sector, or may involve trade-offs between sectors. Mitigation \r\nin energy demand often includes electrification (Pietzcker et al. 2014; \r\nLuderer et al. 2018; Sharmina et al. 2020; DeAngelo et al. 2021), \r\nhowever such pathways only result in reduced emissions if  the \r\nelectricity sector is decarbonised (Zhang and Fujimori 2020) \r\n(Chapter  12). Relatedly, the mitigation potential of some sectors \r\n(e.g., transportation) depends on the decarbonisation of liquid fuels, \r\nfor example, through biofuels (Pietzcker et al. 2014; Wise et al. 2017; \r\nSharmina et al. 2020) (Chapter 12). In other cases, mitigation in one \r\nsector results in reduced emissions in another sector. For example, \r\nincreased recycling can reduce primary resource extraction; planting \r\ntrees or green roofs in urban areas can reduce the energy demand \r\nassociated with space cooling (Chapter 12)."


id: 2b6554e9230fca51d800cfb9c2dd761
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"Mitigation in one sector can also result in additional emissions \r\nin  another. One example is electrification of end use which can \r\nresult in increased emissions from energy supply. However, one \r\ncomparitively well-researched example of this linkage is bioenergy. \r\nAn increase in demand for bioenergy within the energy system has \r\nthe potential to influence emissions in the AFOLU sector through the \r\nintensification of land and forest management and/or via land-use \r\nchange (Daioglou et al. 2019; Smith et al. 2019; Smith et al. 2020a; \r\nIPCC 2019a). The effect of bioenergy and BECCS on mitigation \r\ndepends on a variety of factors in modelled pathways. In the energy \r\nsystem, the emissions mitigation depends on the scale of deployment, \r\nthe conversion technology, and the fuel displaced (Calvin et al. 2021). "


id: 1a628ce7c72bfff9a59b0940fab8aab6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"with between 75 and 248 EJ yr-1 in 2050 in pathways that limit \r\nwarming to 1.5degC with no or limited overshoot. Finally, IAMs do not \r\ninclude all potential feedstock and management practices, and have \r\nlimited representation of institutions, governance, and local context \r\n(Brown et al. 2019; Butnar et al. 2020; Calvin et al. 2021)."


id: 213d33ffa551bae740b80edb019466c2
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content:
"Limiting or excluding bioenergy and/or BECCS increases mitigation \r\ncost and may limit the ability of a model to reach a low warming \r\nlevel (Edmonds et al. 2013; Calvin et al. 2014b; Luderer et al. 2018; \r\nMuratori et al. 2020). In AFOLU, bioenergy can increase or decrease \r\nterrestrial carbon stocks and carbon sequestration, depending on the \r\nscale, biomass feedstock, land management practices, and prior land \r\nuse (Calvin et al. 2014c; Wise et al. 2015; IPCC 2019a; Smith et al. \r\n2019, 2020a; Calvin et al. 2021)."


id: 840810b167b7279936522cad983bafc2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Figure 3.22 | Primary energy consumption across scenarios: total primary energy (a), fossil fuels (b), coal without CCS (c), non-biomass renewables (d), \r\nand biomass (e). Scenarios are grouped by their temperature category. Primary energy is reported in direct equivalent, where one unit of nuclear or non-biomass renewable \r\nenergy output is reported as one unit of primary energy. Not all subcategories of primary energy are shown."


id: 835d47be1efc61d285e096d2b38b0059
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"further reduced to 99% below its 2019 levels in 2100. These pathways \r\nshow an increase in low-carbon energy, with 88% (69-97%) of primary \r\nenergy from low-carbon sources in 2100, with different combinations \r\nof low-carbon fuels (e.g., non-biomass renewables, biomass, nuclear, \r\nand CCS) (Rogelj et al. 2018a,b; van Vuuren et al. 2018) (Sections 3.4.1 \r\nand 6.7). Across all pathways that limit warming to 2degC and below, \r\nnon-biomass renewables account for 52% (24-77%) of primary \r\nenergy in 2100 (Creutzig et al. 2017; Pietzcker et al. 2017; Rogelj et al. \r\n2018b) (Chapter 6 and Figure 3.22). There are some studies analysing \r\nthe potential for 100% renewable energy systems (Hansen et al. 2019); \r\nhowever, there are a range of issues around such systems (Box 6.6)."


id: 73ffd473167f818f3567e7595b0625c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"Stringent emissions reductions at the level required to limit warming \r\nto 2degC (>67%) or 1.5degC are achieved through increased electrification \r\nof end use, resulting in increased electricity generation in all \r\npathways (high confidence) (Rogelj et al. 2018a; Azevedo et al. 2021) \r\n(Figure 3.23). Nearly all electricity in pathways likely to limit warming \r\nto 2degC and below is from low- or no-carbon fuels (Rogelj et al. 2018a; \r\nAzevedo et al. 2021), with different shares of nuclear, biomass, non\u0002biomass renewables, and fossil CCS across pathways. Low-emissions \r\nscenarios also show increases in hydrogen use (Figure 3.23)."


id: bec8a5a3379046c45c37b3377b3b65f7
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"All pathways that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower show \r\nsubstantial reductions in fossil fuel consumption and a near elimination \r\nof the use of coal without CCS (high confidence) (Bauer et al. 2017; \r\nvan Vuuren et al. 2018; Grubler et al. 2018; Luderer et al. 2018; Rogelj \r\net al. 2018a,b; Azevedo et al. 2021; Mcjeon et al. 2021; Welsby et al. \r\n2021) (Figure 3.22). In these pathways, the use of coal, gas and oil is \r\nreduced by 90%, 25%, and 41%, respectively, between 2019 and 2050 \r\nand 91%, 39%, and 78% between 2019 and 2100; coal without CCS is "


id: 723af64d38474b2e3fc61009c8ba7a57
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content:
"(Figure 3.24). There is very little difference in final energy intensity \r\nfor the buildings sector across scenarios. Direct CO2 emissions \r\nfrom the buildings sector vary more widely across temperature \r\nstabilisation levels than energy consumption. In 2100, scenarios \r\nabove 3degC [C7-C8] still show an increase of CO2 emissions from \r\nbuildings around 29% above 2019, while all scenarios likely to limit \r\nwarming to 2degC and below have emission reductions of around \r\n85% (8-100%). Carbon intensity declines in all scenarios, but much \r\nmore sharply as the warming level is reduced."


id: dbd490ce3fcb4fb07a895ed1b1459d9e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"In all scenarios, the share of electricity in final energy use increases, \r\na trend that is accelerated by 2050 for the scenarios likely to limit \r\nwarming to 2degC and below (Figure 3.23). By 2100, the low-warming \r\nscenarios show large shares of electricity in final energy consumption \r\nfor buildings. The opposite is observed for gases."


id: 335309285eee891ebc58ae3a204a258d
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"While several global IAM models have developed their buildings \r\nmodules considerably over the past decade (Daioglou et al. 2012; \r\nKnobloch et al. 2017; Clarke et al. 2018; Edelenbosch et al. 2021; \r\nMastrucci et al. 2021), the extremely limited availability of key \r\nsectoral variables in the AR6 scenarios database (such as floor space \r\nand energy use for individual services) prohibit a detailed analysis \r\nof sectoral dynamics. Individual studies in the literature often \r\nfocus on single aspects of the buildings sector, though collectively \r\nproviding a  more comprehensive overview (Edelenbosch et al. "


id: 34c361b831f9595befebab8fce527bd6
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content:
"Reference scenarios show growth in transport demand, particularly \r\nin aviation and freight (Yeh et al. 2017; Sharmina et al. 2020; \r\nMuller-Casseres et al. 2021b). Energy consumption continues to be \r\ndominated by fossil fuels in reference scenarios, with some increases \r\nin electrification (Yeh et al. 2017; Edelenbosch et al. 2020; Yeh et al. "


id: c006041ac98f170e00d9b1894f3d89
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Across all IAM scenarios assessed, final energy demand for transport \r\ncontinues to grow, including in many stringent mitigation pathways \r\n(Figure  3.25). The carbon intensity of energy declines substantially \r\nby 2100 in likely 2degC (>67%) and below scenarios, leading to \r\nsubstantial declines in transport sector CO2 emissions with increased \r\nelectrification of the transport system (Figure 3.23)."


id: c4cefe2e9e6303dc8b1570c3699e0769
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28539
content:
"2017). CO2 emissions from transport increase for most models in \r\nreference scenarios (Yeh et al. 2017; Edelenbosch et al. 2020)."


id: 8f98fc4d38eaa67e394913354a2d3c59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"The transport sector has more detail than other sectors in many \r\nIAMs (Edelenbosch et al. 2020); however, there is considerable \r\nvariation across models. Some models (e.g.,  GCAM, IMAGE, \r\nMESSAGE-GLOBIOM) represent different transport modes with \r\nendogenous shifts across modes as a  function of income, price, \r\nand modal speed (Edelenbosch et al. 2020).15 However, IAMs, \r\nincluding those with detailed transport, exclude several supply-side \r\n(e.g.,  synthetic fuels) and demand-side (e.g.,  behaviour change, \r\nreduced shipping, telework and automation) mitigation options \r\n(Pietzcker et al. 2014; Creutzig et al. 2016; Mittal et al. 2017; Davis \r\net al. 2018; Kohler et al. 2020; Mittal et al. 2017; Gota et al. 2019; \r\nWilson et al. 2019; Creutzig et al. 2016; Kohler et al. 2020; Sharmina \r\net al. 2020; Pietzcker et al. 2014; Lefevre et al. 2021; Muller-Casseres \r\net al. 2021a,b)."


id: 237f447575682b734592649f513f0238
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content:
"Reference scenarios show declines in energy intensity, but increases \r\nin final energy use in the industrial sector (Edelenbosch et al. \r\n2017b). These scenarios show increases in CO2 emissions both for \r\nthe total industrial sector (Edelenbosch et al. 2017b, 2020; Luderer \r\net al. 2018) and individual subsectors such as cement and iron and \r\nsteel (van Ruijven et al. 2016; van Sluisveld et al. 2021) or chemicals \r\n(Daioglou et al. 2014; van Sluisveld et al. 2021)."


id: a623e8dbe11cfa7e0518361ce1e8a402
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"In mitigation pathways, CO2 emissions reductions are achieved \r\nthrough a  combination of energy savings (via energy-efficiency \r\nimprovements and energy conservation), structural change, fuel \r\nswitching, and decarbonisation of fuels (Edelenbosch et al. 2017b, \r\n2020; Grubler et al. 2018; Luderer et al. 2018). Mitigation pathways \r\nshow reductions in final energy for industry compared to the baseline \r\n(Edelenbosch et al. 2017b; Luderer et al. 2018; Edelenbosch et al. \r\n2020) and reductions in the carbon intensity of the industrial sector \r\nthrough both fuel switching and the use of CCS (van Ruijven et al. \r\n2016; Edelenbosch et al. 2017b, 2020; Luderer et al. 2018; Paltsev \r\net al. 2021; van Sluisveld et al. 2021). The mitigation potential differs \r\ndepending on the industrial subsector and the availability of CCS, \r\nwith larger potential reductions in the steel sector (van Ruijven \r\net al. 2016) and cement industry (Sanjuan et al. 2020) than in the "


id: f94fe2df292df9d4b74c8f195a3932ca
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content:
"Figure 3.26 | Industrial final energy, including feedstocks (a), CO2 emissions (b), carbon intensity (c), energy intensity (d), share of final energy from \r\nelectricity (e), and share of final energy from gases (f). Energy intensity is final energy per unit of GDP. Carbon intensity is CO2 emissions per EJ of final energy. The first \r\nfour indicators are indexed to 2019,15 where values less than 1 indicate a reduction. Industrial sector CO2 emissions include fuel combustion emissions only."


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content:
"chemicals sector (Daioglou et al. 2014). Many scenarios, including \r\nstringent mitigation scenarios, show continued growth in final \r\nenergy; however, the carbon intensity of energy declines in all \r\nmitigation scenarios (Figure 3.26)."


id: 43874a0fd3f63ee8cb56cef7c22bd62c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"studies with median reductions in CO2 emissions between 2019 and \r\n2050 of 70% in scenarios likely to limit warming to 2degC (>67%) \r\nand below and a maximum reduction of 96% (Figure 3.26). Some \r\ndifferences between IAMs and sectoral models can be attributed to \r\ndifferences in technology availability, with IAMs sometimes including \r\nmore technologies (van Ruijven et al. 2016) and sometimes less \r\n(Sharmina et al. 2020)."


id: ea66871ef36ddfbd722a576e3e749bc4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"The representation of the industry sector is very aggregated in most \r\nIAMs, with only a small subset of models disaggregating key sectors \r\nsuch as cement, fertiliser, chemicals, and iron and steel (Daioglou \r\net al. 2014; Edelenbosch et al. 2017b; Pauliuk et al. 2017; Napp \r\net al. 2019; van Sluisveld et al. 2021). IAMs often account for both \r\nenergy combustion and feedstocks (Edelenbosch et al. 2017b), but \r\nIAMs typically ignore material flows and miss linkages between \r\nsectors (Pauliuk et al. 2017; Kermeli et al. 2019). By excluding \r\nthese processes, IAMs misrepresent the mitigation potential of the \r\nindustry sector, for example by overlooking mitigation from material \r\nefficiency and circular economies (Sharmina et al. 2020), which can \r\nhave substantial mitigation potential (Sections 5.3.4 and 11.3)."


id: e53304f3165169446434a24c193a764b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 33554
content:
"Mitigation pathways show substantial reductions in CO2 emissions, \r\nbut more modest reductions in AFOLU CH4 and N2O emissions \r\n(high confidence) (Popp et al. 2017; Roe et al. 2019; Reisinger et al. \r\n2021) (Figure  3.27). Pathways limiting warming to likely 2degC or \r\nlower are projected to reach net zero CO2 emissions in the AFOLU \r\nsector around 2033 (2024-2060); however, AFOLU CH4 and N2O \r\nemissions remain positive in all pathways (Figure  3.27). While \r\nIAMs include many land-based mitigation options, these models \r\nexclude several options with large mitigation potential, such as \r\nbiochar, agroforestry, restoration/avoided conversion of coastal \r\nwetlands, and restoration/avoided conversion of peatland (IPCC \r\n2019a; Smith et al. 2019) (Chapter  7 and Section  3.4). Sectoral \r\nstudies show higher mitigation potential than IAM pathways, as "


id: 831d610e839cb12152000e8ec15b2ef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Sectoral studies indicate a large mitigation potential in the industrial \r\nsector by 2050, including the potential for net zero CO2 emissions \r\nfor steel, plastics, ammonia, and cement (Section  11.4.1). Detailed \r\nindustry sector pathways show emissions reductions between \r\n39% and 94% by mid-century compared to the present day17\r\n(Section  11.4.2) and a  substantial increase in direct electrification \r\n(IEA 2021a). IAMs show comparable mitigation potential to sectoral "


id: 77b28343241ba9a43a17bdaf1d7cfad0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 16390
content:
"Figure 3.27 | Reduction in AFOLU GHG emissions from 2019. The AFOLU CO2 estimates in this figure are not necessarily comparable with country GHG inventories \r\nsee Chapter 7)."


id: 8220eefd2540b828bf921752781d24d1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"their peak to a given level (Smith et al. 2019; Hasegawa et al. 2021a). \r\nIAM pathways rely on afforestation and BECCS as CDR measures, \r\nso delayed mitigation action results in substantial land-use change \r\nin the second half of the century with implications for sustainable \r\ndevelopment (Hasegawa et al. 2021a) (Section  3.7). Shifting to \r\nearlier mitigation action reduces the amount of land required for \r\nthis, though at the cost of larger land-use transitions earlier in the \r\ncentury (Hasegawa et al. 2021a). Earlier action could also reduce \r\nclimate impacts on agriculture and land-based mitigation options \r\n(Smith et al. 2019)."


id: 2ff0ceeebd7575dc8f9a3c816ee01df7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Delayed mitigation has implications for land-use transitions \r\n(Hasegawa et al. 2021a). Delaying mitigation action can result in \r\na temporary overshoot of temperature and large-scale deployment \r\nof CDR in the second half of the century to reduce temperatures from "


id: a82d9e73e1f735e8853717a2eff06b1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"forest regeneration, can help to remediate and slow any decline in the \r\nforest carbon sink, for example by restoring degraded forest areas, \r\nand so go some way towards addressing the issue of sink saturation \r\n(IPCC 2019) (AR6 WGI Chapter 5; and Chapter 7 in this report). The \r\naccumulated carbon resulting from mitigation options that enhance \r\ncarbon sequestration (e.g., reforestation, soil carbon sequestration) is \r\nalso at risk of future loss due to disturbances (e.g., fire, pests) (Boysen \r\net al. 2017; de Coninck et al. 2018; Fuss et al. 2018; Smith et al. 2019; \r\nIPCC 2019a; Anderegg et al. 2020) (AR6 WGI Chapter 5). Maintaining \r\nthe resultant high vegetation and soil carbon stocks could limit future \r\nland-use options, as maintaining these carbon stocks would require \r\nretaining the land use and land-cover configuration implemented to \r\nachieve the increased stocks."


id: 1b1cb82f4572bbd9381cb20184094c05
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"(DACCS), enhanced weathering (EW), and ocean-based approaches, \r\nfocusing on the role of these options in long-term mitigation \r\npathways, using both IAMs (Chen and Tavoni 2013; Marcucci \r\net al. 2017; Rickels et al. 2018; Fuhrman et al. 2019, 2020, 2021; \r\nRealmonte et al. 2019; Akimoto et al. 2021; Strefler et al. 2021a) and \r\nnon-IAMs (Fuss et al. 2013; Gonzalez and Ilyina 2016; Bednar et al. \r\n2021; Shayegh et al. 2021). There are other options discussed in the \r\nliterature, such as methane capture (Jackson et al. 2019), however, \r\nthe role of these options in long-term mitigation pathways has not \r\nbeen quantified and is thus excluded here. Chapter 12 includes a more \r\ndetailed description of the individual technologies, including their \r\ncosts, potentials, financing, risks, impacts, maturity and upscaling."


id: 8ad6c027b52768fbb19431d93c379d14
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"Table 3.5 | Carbon dioxide removal in assessed pathways. Scenarios are grouped by temperature categories, as defined in Section 3.2.4. Quantity indicates the median \r\nand 5-95th percentile range of cumulative sequestration from 2020 to 2100 in GtCO2. Count indicates the number of scenarios with positive values for that option. Source: \r\nAR6 Scenarios Database."


id: 885836e44773ddbeb12fb7903b8e8f86
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 18982
content:
"1\r\n Cumulative CDR from AFOLU cannot be quantified precisely because models use different reporting methodologies that in some cases combine gross emissions and removals, \r\nand use different baselines."


id: 1eafb01a96c32ae0c10c4d31c89f9fd9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 2271
content:
"available options (Holz et al. 2018; Strefler et al. 2021a). Similar to \r\nDACCS, the deployment of deep-ocean storage depends on cost and \r\nthe strength of carbon-cycle feedbacks (Rickels et al. 2018)."


id: 2a526f7436db172cfc09f34778f75d8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"3.5.1 Relationship Between Long-term Climate Goals \r\nand Near- to Medium-term Emissions Reductions"


id: 537099694f61273c2d86aad5b7f90d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"This section assesses the relationship between long-term climate \r\ngoals and short- to medium-term emissions reduction strategies \r\nbased on the mitigation pathway literature. After an overview of \r\nthis relationship (Section 3.5.1), it provides an assessment of what \r\ncurrently planned near-term action implies for limiting warming \r\nto  1.5degC-2degC (Section  3.5.2), and to what extent pathways with \r\naccelerated action beyond current NDCs can improve the ability to \r\nkeep long-term targets in reach (Section 3.5.3)."


id: fcf1e86fe583969be8fac8ba46b20a83
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"The close link between cumulative CO2 emissions and warming has \r\nstrong implications for the relationship between near-, medium-, \r\nand long-term climate action to limit global warming. The AR6 \r\nWGI Assessment has estimated a  remaining carbon budget of \r\n500 (400) GtCO2 from the beginning of 2020 onwards for staying \r\nbelow  1.5degC with 50% (67%) likelihood, subject to additional \r\nuncertainties about historic warming and the climate response, \r\nand variations in warming from non-CO2 climate forcers (Canadell and \r\nMonteiro 2019) (AR6 WGI Chapter 5, Section 5.5). For comparison, if \r\ncurrent CO2 emissions of more than 40 GtCO2 are keeping up until \r\n2030, more than 400 GtCO2 will be emitted during 2021-2030, \r\nalready exhausting the remaining carbon budget for 1.5degC by 2030."


id: f02bb4c57aacc989294269b485a43bc0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"2017). Early and deep reductions of methane emissions, and other \r\nshort-lived warming agents such as black carbon, provide space for \r\nresidual CO2-induced warming until the point of net zero CO2 emissions \r\nis reached (see purple lines in Figure 3.29). Such emissions reductions \r\nhave also been advocated due to co-benefits for, for example, reducing \r\nair pollution (Rao et al. 2016; Shindell et al. 2017a, 2018; Shindell and \r\nSmith 2019; Rauner et al. 2020a; Vandyck et al. 2020)."


id: 2067f4eb3a4ffeaa821e2f1daf3ac3d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"their reduction drives up non-CO2 warming in the near term, which \r\ncan be attenuated by the simultaneous reduction of methane and \r\nblack carbon (Shindell and Smith 2019; Smith et al. 2020b) (AR6 WGI \r\nSection 6.7). After 2030, the reduction in methane concentrations and \r\nassociated reductions in tropospheric ozone levels tend to dominate \r\nso that a peak and decline in non-CO2 forcing and non-CO2-induced \r\nwarming can occur before net zero CO2 is reached (Figure 3.29) (Rogelj \r\net al. 2018a). The more stringent the reductions in methane and other \r\nshort-lived warming agents such as black carbon, the lower this peak \r\nand the earlier the decline of non-CO2 warming, leading to a reduction \r\nof warming rates and overall warming in the near to medium term \r\n(Harmsen et al. 2020; Smith et al. 2020b). This is important for keeping \r\nwarming below a tight warming limit that is already reached around \r\nmid-century as is the case in  1.5degC pathways (Xu and Ramanathan "


id: e406be3fd2abb958f4124a11b8faf4d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"The relationship between long-term climate goals and near-term \r\naction is further constrained by social, technological, economic and \r\npolitical factors (Cherp et al. 2018; van Sluisveld et al. 2018b; Aghion \r\net al. 2019; Mercure et al. 2019; Trutnevyte et al. 2019b; Jewell and \r\nCherp 2020). These factors influence path dependency and transition \r\nspeed (Pahle et al. 2018; Vogt-Schilb et al. 2018). While detailed "


id: 374b193393e88ff1d528b2a07bd00596
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"post-2030 mitigation efforts and warming outcomes based on the \r\nliterature and the AR6 scenarios database. "


id: d1a381f1c8620a72166eff4110077490
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Without a  strengthening of policies beyond those that are \r\nimplemented by the end of 2020, GHG emissions are projected \r\nto rise beyond 2025, leading to a median global warming of 3.2 \r\n[2.2 to  3.5] degC by 2100. Modelled pathways that are consistent \r\nwith NDCs announced prior to COP26 until 2030 and assume no \r\nincrease in ambition thereafter have lower emissions, leading to \r\na median global warming of 2.8degC [2.1-3.4degC] by 2100."


id: 86f204e6387868f4851a2d63065b16b9
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content:
"be lower (Gambhir et al. 2017; Napp et al. 2017; Brutschin et al. 2021) \r\n(cf. Section 3.8), increasing the risk of an overshoot of climate goals."


id: 18321290e6debb73eb6d76c9f3801311
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1292
content:
"Obtaining net negative CO2 emissions requires massive deployment \r\nof carbon dioxide removal (CDR) in the second half of the century, on \r\nthe order of 220 (160-370) GtCO2 for each 0.1degC degree of cooling \r\n(based on the assessment of the likely range of the transient response \r\nto cumulative CO2 emissions in AR6 WGI Section 5.5 in Chapter 5, \r\nnot taking into account potential asymmetries in the temperature \r\nresponse to CO2 emissions and removals). CDR is assessed in detail \r\nin Section  12.3 of this report (see also Cross-Chapter Box  8 in \r\nChapter 12). Here we only point to the finding that CDR ramp-up \r\nrates and absolute deployment levels are tightly limited by techno\u0002economic, social, political, institutional and sustainability constraints \r\n(Smith et al. 2016; Boysen et al. 2017; Fuss et al. 2018, 2020; Nemet "


id: e5d50b4b786a0fd8f47dff882723f888
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content:
"There already exists a substantial and growing carbon lock-in today, \r\nas measured by committed emissions associated with existing long\u0002lived infrastructure (Section  2.7 and Figure  2.31). If existing fossil \r\nfuel infrastructure would continue to be operated as historically, it \r\nwould entail CO2 emissions exceeding the carbon budget for 1.5degC \r\n(Section  2.7.2 and Figure  2.32). However, owner-operators and \r\nsocieties may choose to retire existing infrastructure earlier than \r\nin the past, and committed emissions are thus contingent on the \r\ncompetitiveness of non-emitting alternative technologies and \r\nclimate policy ambition. Therefore, in mitigation pathways, some \r\ninfrastructure may become stranded assets. Stranded assets have \r\nbeen defined as 'assets that have suffered from unanticipated or "


id: 5ca12832cb1745cab4dde5b361d89f9e
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content:
"Many quantitative estimates of stranded assets along mitigation \r\npathways have focused on fossil fuel power plants in pathways \r\ncharacterised by mitigation ambition until 2030 corresponding to the \r\nNDCs followed by strengthened action afterwards to limit warming \r\nto 2degC (>67%) or lower (Bertram et al. 2015a; Iyer et al. 2015b; \r\nLane  et al. 2016; Farfan and Breyer 2017; van Soest et al. 2017a; \r\nKriegler et al. 2018a; Luderer et al. 2018; Cui et al. 2019; Saygin et al. "


id: 4c1d3735e2b18ce95aefd8dab2077309
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content:
"scenarios/pathways in the literature (IEA 2011; Spencer et al. \r\n2015; van Soest et al. 2021a). They rely on regionally differentiated \r\nregulatory and pricing policies to gradually strengthening regional \r\nand sectoral action beyond the mitigation ambition in the NDCs. \r\nThere are limitations to this approach. The tighter the warming \r\nlimit, the more likely it is that disruptive action becomes inevitable \r\nto achieve the speed of transition that would be required (Kriegler \r\net al. 2018a). Cost-effective pathways already have abrupt shifts in \r\ndeployments, investments and prices at the time a stringent warming \r\nlimit is imposed, reflecting the fact that the overall response to \r\nclimate change has so far been misaligned with long-term climate \r\ngoals (Fawcett et al. 2015; Rogelj et al. 2016; Schleussner et al. 2016b; \r\nGeiges et al. 2020). Disruptive action can help to break lock-ins and \r\nenable transformative change (Vogt-Schilb et al. 2018)."


id: 1206172ccd6b4a8850e77fc31af5696b
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"The risk of stranded assets has implications for workers depending \r\non those assets, asset owners, assets portfolio managers, financial \r\ninstitutions and the stability of the financial system. Chapter  6 \r\nassesses the risks and implications of stranded assets for energy \r\nsystems (Section 6.7.3 and Box 6.11) and fossil fuels (Section 6.7.4). \r\nThe implications of stranded assets for inequality and Just Transition \r\nare assessed in Chapter 17 (Section 17.3.2.3). Chapter 15 assesses \r\nthe literature on those implications for the financial system as well \r\nas on coping options (Sections 15.5.2 and 15.6.1)."


id: 59ab2dfd536de9a909751042ef847f5
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content:
"On the other hand, mitigation, by limiting climate change, reduces \r\nthe risk of destroyed or stranded assets from the physical impacts of \r\nclimate change on natural and human systems, from more frequent, \r\nintense or extended extreme events and from sea level rise (O'Neill \r\net al. 2020a). The literature on mitigation pathways rarely includes an \r\nevaluation of stranded assets from climate change impacts. Unruh \r\n(2019) suggest that these are the real stranded assets of carbon lock\u0002in and could prove much more costly."


id: 719f4b1f744d08fc37e75154176cb7e5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"One approach relies on augmenting initially moderate emissions\u0002pricing policies with robust anticipation of ratcheting up climate \r\naction in the future (Spencer et al. 2015). If announcements of \r\nstrong future climate policies are perceived to be credible, they \r\ncan help to prevent carbon lock-in as investors anticipating high \r\nfuture costs of GHG emissions would reduce investment into fossil \r\nfuel infrastructure, such as coal power plants (Bauer et al. 2018b). \r\nHowever, the effectiveness of such announcements strongly \r\nhinges on their credibility. If investors believe that policymakers \r\ncould drop them if anticipatory action did not occur, they may not \r\nundertake such action."


id: b486b5702b410b221ee76cb2dc477850
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content:
"Another approach relies on international cooperation to strengthen \r\nnear-term climate action. These studies build on international climate \r\npolicy architectures that could incentivise a coalition of like-minded \r\ncountries to raise their mitigation ambition beyond what is stated in \r\ntheir NDC (Graichen et al. 2017). Examples are the idea of climate \r\nclubs characterised by harmonised carbon and technology markets \r\n(Nordhaus 2015; Keohane et al. 2017; Paroussos et al. 2019; Pihl \r\n2020) and the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA) (Jewell et al. 2019). \r\nParoussos et al. (2019) find economic benefits of joining a climate \r\nclub despite the associated higher mitigation effort, in particular due "


id: 2a553f02e0b913fdd4dea6dc01a492a5
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"A growing literature explores long-term mitigation pathways with \r\naccelerated near-term action going beyond the NDCs (Graichen \r\net al. 2017; Jiang et al. 2017; Kriegler et al. 2018a; Roelfsema et al. \r\n2018; Fekete et al. 2021; van Soest et al. 2021a). Global accelerated \r\naction pathways are designed to transition more gradually from \r\nimplemented policies and planned implementation of NDCs onto \r\na  1.5degC-2degC pathway and at the same time alleviate the abrupt \r\ntransition in 2030 that would be caused by following the NDCs until \r\n2030 and strengthening towards limiting warming to 2degC thereafter \r\n(Section 3.5.2). Therefore, they have sometimes been called bridging "


id: 6e195287679aed4dd34dea61b3b93eed
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content:
"to access to technology and climate finance. Graichen et al. (2017) \r\nfind an additional reduction of  5-11 GtCO2-eq compared to the \r\nmitigation ambition in the NDCs from the successful implementation \r\nof international climate initiatives. Other studies assess benefits from \r\ninternational transfers of mitigation outcomes (Stua 2017; Edmonds \r\net al. 2021). Edmonds et al. (2021) find economic gains from sharing \r\nNDC emissions-reduction commitments compared to purely domestic \r\nimplementation of NDCs. If reinvested in mitigation efforts, the study \r\nprojects an additional reduction of 9 billion tonnes of CO2 in 2030."


id: 518c0803ac3c330c20469925e60acaa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 10283
content:
"A complete appraisal of economic effects and welfare effects at \r\ndifferent temperature levels would include the macroeconomic \r\nimpacts of investments in low-carbon solutions and structural \r\nchange away from emitting activities, co-benefits and adverse side \r\neffects of mitigation, (avoided) climate damages, as well as (reduced) \r\nadaptation costs, with high temporal, spatial and social heterogeneity \r\nusing a  harmonised framework. If no such complete appraisal in \r\na harmonised framework exists, key elements are emerging from the \r\nliterature, and assessed in the following subsections: on aggregated \r\neconomy-wide global mitigation costs (Section  3.6.1), on the \r\neconomic benefits of avoiding climate impacts (Section  3.6.2), on \r\neconomic benefits and costs associated with mitigation co-benefits \r\nand co-harms (Section  3.6.3) and on the distribution of economic \r\nimplications between economic sectors and actors (Section 3.6.4)."


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content:
"Accelerated action pathways derived with this approach show \r\nconsiderable scope for narrowing the emissions gap between \r\npathways reflecting the ambition level of the NDCs and cost\u0002effective mitigation pathways in 2030. Kriegler et al. (2018a) find \r\naround 10 GtCO2-eq lower emissions compared to original NDCs \r\nfrom a global roll out of good practice plus net zero policies and \r\na  moderate increase in regionally differentiated carbon pricing. \r\nFekete et al. (2021) show that global replication of sector progress \r\nin five major economies would reduce GHG emissions in 2030 by "


id: 2e6b5b504215c7ea76e7cdebff016c47
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 4749
content:
"Most studies that have developed mitigation pathways have used a  cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) framework, which aim to \r\ncompare the costs of different mitigation strategies designed to meet a given climate change mitigation goal (e.g., an emission\u0002reduction target or a temperature stabilisation target) but does not represent economic impacts from climate change itself, nor the \r\nassociated economic benefits of avoided impacts. Other studies use modelling frameworks that represent the feedback of damages \r\nfrom climate change on the economy in a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) approach, which balances mitigation costs and benefits. This \r\nsecond type of study is represented in Section 3.6.2."


id: 4eb1265453395f1735882a8c1eea150
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"The absolute level of economic activity and welfare also strongly depends on the socio-economic pathway assumptions regarding, \r\ninter alia, evolutions in demography, productivity, education levels, inequality, and technical change and innovation. The GDP or \r\nconsumption indicators reported in the database of scenarios, and synthesized below, represent the absolute level of aggregate \r\neconomic activity or consumption but do not reflect welfare and well-being (Roberts et al. 2020), that notably depend on human\u0002needs satisfaction, distribution within society and inequality (Section 3.6.4)."


id: 30e603b4d02fd41a333bd281d3fb141c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5116
content:
"Chapter 1 and Annex III.I give further details of the economic concepts and modelling frameworks, including their limitations, used \r\nin this report, respectively."


id: 31bb6d1cb6bf4c2d0c86ea8bf23b7007
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Figure 3.32 | Marginal abatement cost of carbon in 2030, 2050 and 2100 for mitigation pathways with immediate global mitigation action (a), and ratio \r\nin 2050 between pathways that correspond to NDCs announced prior to COP26 in 2030 and strengthen action after 2030 and pathways with immediate \r\nglobal mitigation action, for C3 and C4 temperature categories (b)."


id: cf83ae26cb6db203ccd8b5a1576bb2d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
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vector_id: 30184
content:
"For optimisation modelling frameworks, the time profile of marginal \r\nabatement costs of carbon depends on the discount rate, with lower \r\ndiscount rates implying higher carbon values in the short term but \r\nlower values in the long term (Emmerling et al. 2019) (see also \r\n'Discounting' in Annex I: Glossary, and Annex III.I.2). In that case, the \r\ndiscount rate also influences the shape of the emissions trajectory, \r\nwith low discount rates implying more emissions reduction in the \r\nshort term and, for low-temperature categories, limiting CDR and \r\ntemperature overshoot."


id: 1cb6678230508b559f3a5b3b3a265cd8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 1972
content:
"Pathways that correspond to NDCs announced prior to COP26 \r\nin 2030 and strengthen action after 2030 imply higher marginal \r\nabatement costs of carbon in the longer run than pathways \r\nwith stronger immediate global mitigation action (Figure  3.32b) \r\n(high confidence)."


id: 8f8213f8d7ce6f56181cbce60bf5ace8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
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vector_id: 20126
content:
"Mitigation costs increase with the stringency of mitigation (Hof \r\net al. 2017; Vrontisi et al. 2018) (Figure 3.34b,c), but are reduced when \r\nenergy demand is moderated through energy efficiency and lifestyle \r\nchanges (Fujimori et al. 2014; Bibas et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2018; Mejean \r\net al. 2019), when sustainable transport policies are implemented \r\n(Zhang et al. 2018c), and when international technology cooperation is \r\nfostered (Schultes et al. 2018; Paroussos et al. 2019). Mitigation costs \r\nalso depend on assumptions on availability and costs of technologies \r\n(Clarke et al. 2014; Bosetti et al. 2015; Dessens et al. 2016; Creutzig et al. "


id: b487c77eeb13ad4a723369897bd80d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"However, the possibility for increased economic activity following \r\nmitigation action, and conversely the risk of large negative economic \r\neffects, are not excluded. Some studies find that mitigation increases \r\nthe speed of economic growth compared to baseline scenarios (Pollitt \r\nand Mercure 2018; Mercure et al. 2019). These studies are based on \r\na  macroeconomic modelling framework that represent baselines "


id: 5fe08aec7fb82c980f360bf3c21ee6e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12666
content:
"2018; Napp et al. 2019; Giannousakis et al. 2021), on the representation \r\nof innovation dynamics in modelling frameworks (Hoekstra et al. \r\n2017; Rengs et al. 2020) (Chapter 16), as well as the representation \r\nof investment dynamics and financing mechanisms (Iyer et al. 2015c; \r\nMercure et al. 2019; Battiston et al. 2021). In particular, endogenous \r\nand induced innovation reduce technology costs over time, create \r\npath dependencies and reduce the macroeconomic cost of reaching \r\na mitigation target (Section 1.7.1.2). Mitigation costs also depend on \r\nsocio-economic assumptions (Hof et al. 2017; van Vuuren et al. 2020)."


id: 4401fbe7042877734d79a082b28fe44a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8112
content:
"2019; Riahi et al. 2021). Mitigation pathways with weak early action \r\ncorresponding to NDCs announced prior to COP26 in 2030 and \r\nstrengthening action after 2030 to reach end-of-century temperature \r\ntargets imply limited mitigation costs in 2030, compared to immediate \r\nglobal action pathways, but faster increase in costs post-2030, with \r\nimplications for intergenerational equity (Aldy et al. 2016; Liu et al. \r\n2016; Vrontisi et al. 2018). Emissions trading policies reduce global \r\naggregate mitigation costs, in particular in the context of achieving \r\nNDCs (Fujimori et al. 2015, 2016a; Bohringer et al. 2021; Edmonds \r\net al. 2021), and change the distribution of mitigation costs between \r\nregions and countries (Section 3.6.1.2)."


id: f054ae5001a49ec97099ece463bf829d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35314
content:
"Regional policy costs depend on the evaluation framework (Budolfson \r\net al. 2021), policy design, including revenue recycling, and on \r\ninternational coordination, especially among trade partners. By \r\nfostering technological change and finance, climate cooperation can "


id: 22411f6a4f5d8f5330c4bf02b6babb80
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2836
content:
"(Rogelj et al. 2018b). By contrast, achieving equity without \r\ninternational markets would result in a  large discrepancy in \r\nregional carbon prices, up to a factor of 100 (Bauer et al. 2020). The \r\nefficiency-sovereignty trade-off can be partly resolved by allowing \r\nfor limited differentiation of regional carbon prices: moderate \r\nfinancial transfers substantially reduce inefficiencies by narrowing \r\nthe carbon price spread (Bauer et al. 2020)."


id: 6b26eb22ec0c4b1ccc56d3d0c22fcfb8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 14480
content:
"generate economic benefits, both in large developing economies such \r\nas China and India (Paroussos et al. 2019) and industrialised regions \r\nsuch as Europe (Vrontisi et al. 2020). International coordination is \r\na major driver of regional policy costs. Delayed participation in global \r\nmitigation efforts raises participation costs, especially in carbon\u0002intensive economies (Figure 3.35a. Trading systems and transfers can \r\ndeliver cost savings and improve equity (Rose et al. 2017a). On the \r\nother hand, measures that reduce imports of energy-intensive goods \r\nsuch as carbon-border tax adjustment may imply costs outside of \r\nthe policy jurisdiction and have international equity repercussions, \r\ndepending on how they are designed (Bohringer et al. 2012, 2017; \r\nCosbey et al. 2019) (Section 13.6.6)."


id: fefe11b63f53f107cffb76ea34235b15
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 37667
content:
"Figures  3.36 and  3.37 show increased investment needs in the \r\nenergy sector in lower temperature categories, and a  major shift \r\naway from fossil fuel generation and extraction towards electricity, \r\nincluding for system enhancements for electricity transmission, \r\ndistribution and storage, and low-carbon technologies. Investment \r\nneeds in the electricity sector are  2.3 trillion USD2015 yr-1\r\nover 2023-2050 on average for C1 pathways, 2 trillion USD \r\nfor C2 pathways,  1.7  trillion  USD for C3,  1.2 trillion USD for C4 \r\nand  0.9-1.1 billion USD for C5/C6/C7 (mean values for pathways \r\nin each temperature category). The regional pattern of power \r\nsector investments broadly mirrors the global picture. However, the \r\nbulk of investment requirements are in medium- and low-income \r\nregions. These results from the AR6 scenarios database corroborate \r\nthe findings from McCollum et al. (2018a), Zhou et al. (2019) and \r\nBertram et al. (2021). "


id: 8105e444ed9c9d1f25fd2539a2cdfdfc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17823
content:
"An equitable global emission-trading scheme would require very \r\nlarge international financial transfers, in the order of several \r\nhundred billion USD per year (Tavoni et al. 2015; Bauer et al. 2020; \r\nvan den Berg et al. 2020). The magnitude of transfers depends on the \r\nstringency of the climate goals and on the burden-sharing principle. \r\nSome interpretations of equitable burden sharing compliant with \r\nthe Paris Agreement leads to negative carbon allowances for \r\ndeveloped countries and some developing countries by mid-century \r\n(van  den  Berg et al. 2020), more stringent than cost-optimal \r\npathways. International transfers also depend on the underlying \r\nsocio-economic development (Leimbach and Giannousakis 2019), \r\nas these drive the mitigation costs of meeting the Paris Agreement "


id: 709c18e0908b37ef43ab98b87bce0e5c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Figure  3.37 | Average yearly investments from 2023-2052 for the four subcomponents of the energy system representing the larger a\r\nin billion USD2015), by aggregate regions, in pathways by temperature categories. T&D: transmissions and distribution of electricity. Extr.: extraction of fo\r\nBars show the median values (number of pathways at the bottom), and whiskers show the interquartile ranges. For definition of regional classifications used see Annex "


id: 49a71a2391e431488d7d9d8c43942b8e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 8978
content:
"In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic recovery, Kikstra et al. \r\n(2021a) show that a low-energy-demand recovery scenario reduces \r\nenergy investments required until 2030 for a  1.5degC consistent \r\npathway by  9% (corresponding to reducing total required energy \r\ninvestment by USD1.8 trillion) compared to a scenario with energy \r\ndemand trends restored to pre-pandemic levels."


id: a4074522eb7a465058a58ed8c0954657
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23362
content:
"pathways. Rozenberg and Fay (2019) estimate the funding needs \r\nto close the service gaps in water and sanitation, transportation, \r\nelectricity, irrigation, and flood protection in thousands of scenarios, \r\nshowing that infrastructure investment paths compatible with full \r\ndecarbonisation in the second half of the century need not cost more \r\nthan more-polluting alternatives. Investment needs are estimated \r\nbetween 2% to 8% of GDP, depending on the quality and quantity of \r\nservices targeted, the timing of investments, construction costs, and \r\ncomplementary policies."


id: 2b60a5bfdce202d93c268a2370aac61a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4261
content:
"Few studies extend the scope of the investment needs quantification \r\nbeyond the energy sector. Fisch-Romito and Guivarch (2019) \r\nand O  Broin and Guivarch (2017) assess investment needs for \r\ntransportation infrastructures and find lower investment needs in \r\nlow-carbon pathways, due to a  reduction in transport activity and \r\na  shift towards less road construction, compared to high-carbon "


id: e4e6f19aadfff42292a0aa3816a5004f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33492
content:
"Chapter 15 also reports investment requirements in global mitigation \r\npathways in the near term, compares them to recent investment \r\ntrends, and assesses financing issues."


id: 11a95682ba3a82e4588d5f695c2cdbfc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 268
content:
"Authors: Celine Guivarch (France), Steven Rose (the United States of America), Alaa Al Khourdajie (United Kingdom/Syria), \r\nValentina Bosetti (Italy), Edward Byers (Austria/Ireland), Katherine Calvin (the United States of America), Tamma Carleton (the United \r\nStates of America), Delavane Diaz (the United States of America), Laurent Drouet (France/Italy), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), \r\nTomoko Hasegawa (Japan), Alexandre C. Koberle (Brazil/United Kingdom), Elmar Kriegler (Germany), David McCollum (the United \r\nStates of America), Aurelie Mejean (France), Brian O'Neill (the United States of America), Franziska Piontek (Germany), Julia Steinberger \r\n(United Kingdom/Switzerland), Massimo Tavoni (Italy)"


id: 272c413ab3ee7fc435e780baad174223
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Conceptually, the difference in aggregate economic impacts from climate change between two given temperature levels represents \r\nthe aggregate economic benefits arising from avoided climate change impacts due to mitigation action. A subset of the studies whose \r\nestimates were evaluated by AR6 WGII (5 of 15) are used to derive illustrative estimates of aggregate economic benefits in 2100 arising "


id: 9eef67fdffc2b4fecdead9f3a435639b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 22547
content:
"Aggregate benefits from avoided impacts expressed in GDP terms, as in Figure 1, do not encompass all avoided climate risks, adaptation \r\npossibilities, and do not represent their influence on well-being and welfare (AR6 WGII Cross-Working Group Box ECONOMIC). \r\nMethodological challenges for economic impact estimates include representing uncertainty and variability, capturing interactions and \r\nspillovers, considering distributional effects, representing micro- and macro-adaptation processes, specifying non-gradual damages \r\nand non-linearities, and improving understanding of potential long-run growth effects. In addition, the economic benefits aggregated "


id: bd5a1d99c3288461a419205284aa5728
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27355
content:
"at the global scale provide limited insights into regional heterogeneity. Global economic impact studies with regional estimates \r\nfind large differences across regions in absolute and percentage terms, with developing and transitional economies typically more \r\nvulnerable. Furthermore, (avoided) impacts for poorer households and poorer countries can represent a smaller share in aggregate \r\nquantifications expressed in GDP terms or monetary terms, compared to their influence on well-being and welfare (Hallegatte et al. \r\n2020; Markhvida et al. 2020). Finally, as noted by AR6 WGII, other lines of evidence regarding climate risks, beyond monetary estimates, \r\nshould be considered in decision-making, including Key Risks and Reasons for Concern."


id: 504ac4a42c5c04dbfcbf71e29b436fef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 10081
content:
"The standard discounted utilitarian framework dominates CBA, thus \r\noften limiting the analysis to the question of discounting. CBA can be \r\nexpanded to accommodate a wider variety of ethical values to assess \r\nmitigation pathways (Fleurbaey et al. 2019). The role of ethical values \r\nwith regard to inequality and the situation of the worse off (Adler \r\net al. 2017), risk (van den Bergh and Botzen 2014; Drouet et al. 2015), \r\nand population size (Scovronick et al. 2017; Mejean et al. 2020) has \r\nbeen explored. In most of these studies, the optimal climate policy is \r\nfound to be more stringent than the one obtained using a standard \r\ndiscounted utilitarian criterion."


id: 7b2f2e5d5e0a96c4a860ec73e0a327c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16970
content:
"Comparing economic costs and benefits of mitigation raises a number \r\nof methodological and fundamental difficulties. Monetising the full \r\nrange of climate change impacts is extremely hard, if not impossible \r\n(AR6 WGII Chapter 16), as is aggregating costs and benefits over time \r\nand across individuals when values are heterogeneous (Chapter 1; \r\nAR5 WGIII Chapter 3). Other approaches should thus be considered \r\nin supplement for decision-making (Chapter 1 and Section 1.7), in \r\nparticular cost-effectiveness approaches that analyse how to achieve \r\na defined mitigation objective at least cost or while also reaching \r\nother societal goals (Koomey 2013; Kaufman et al. 2020; Koberle \r\net al. 2021; Stern and Stiglitz 2021). In cost-effectiveness studies \r\ntoo, incorporating benefits from avoided climate damages influences \r\nthe results and leads to more stringent mitigation in the short term \r\n(Drouet et al. 2021; Schultes et al. 2021)."


id: 19528152165ee26fb5103dcc1fccad3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 1468
content:
"employment, and of future inequality trends, as overarching trends in \r\ndemographics, technological change (innovation, automation, etc.), \r\neducation and institutions will be prominent drivers. For instance, \r\nRao et al. (2019b) and Benveniste et al. (2021) have shown that \r\nincome inequality projections for the 21st century vary significantly, \r\ndepending on socio-economic assumptions related to demography, \r\neducation levels, social public spending and migrations. However, \r\nthe sections below focus on climate-related factors, both climate\u0002mitigation actions themselves and the climate change impacts \r\navoided along mitigation pathways, effects on structural change, \r\nincluding employment, and distributional effects."


id: 7341615df16d0718b62dea290486e1f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Mitigation actions have co-benefits and trade-offs with other \r\nsustainable development dimensions (Section  3.7) beyond climate \r\nchange, which imply welfare effects and economic effects, as well \r\nas other implications beyond the economic dimension. The majority \r\nof quantifications of mitigation costs and benefits synthesized \r\nin Sections  3.6.1 and  3.6.2 do not account for these economic \r\nbenefits and costs associated with co-benefits and trade-offs along \r\nmitigation pathways."


id: 8c681c9aada3395d44c24b492c61ee3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 19604
content:
"Mitigation pathways entail transformation of the energy sector, with \r\nstructural change away from fossil energy and towards low-carbon \r\nenergy (Section 3.3), as well as broader economic structural change, \r\nincluding industrial restructuring and reductions in carbon-intensive \r\nactivities in parallel to extensions in low-carbon activities."


id: 596992bd7f0fb6dd714634b519099c9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Achieving co-benefits is not automatic but results from coordinated \r\npolicies and implementation strategies (Clarke et al. 2014; McCollum \r\net al. 2018a). Similarly, avoiding trade-offs requires targeted policies \r\n(van Vuuren et al. 2015; Bertram et al. 2018). There is limited \r\nevidence of such pathways, but the evidence shows that mitigation \r\npathways designed to reach multiple Sustainable Development \r\nGoals instead of focusing exclusively on emissions reductions, \r\nresult in limited additional costs compared to the increased benefits \r\n(Cameron et al. 2016; McCollum et al. 2018b; Fujimori et al. 2020a; \r\nSognnaes et al. 2021)."


id: a9a44397d98401fbaac85074826687c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24219
content:
"Beyond aggregate effects at the economy-wide level, mitigation \r\npathways have heterogeneous economic implications for different \r\nsectors and different actors. Climate-related factors are only one \r\ndriver of the future structure of the economy, of the future of "


id: 7a4774054cb1f9027012be188bc7a1e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16805
content:
"(AR6 WGII Chapter 16). Through avoiding impacts, mitigation thus \r\nreduces economic inequalities and poverty (high confidence)."


id: a1a81f3fd2afcf29117fc04808abd5cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22991
content:
"from net job destruction (Barker et al. 2016; Pollitt and Mercure 2018; \r\nGarcia-Casals et al. 2019; Malerba and Wiebe 2021). Coal phase-out \r\nraises acute issues of just transition for the coal-dependent countries \r\n(Spencer et al. 2018; Jakob et al. 2020) (Section 4.5 and Box 6.2)."


id: 69be852e52cfc1415478a601e252f4d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14235
content:
"Mitigation action also affects employment through avoided climate \r\nchange impacts. Mitigation reduces the risks to human health and \r\nassociated impacts on labour and helps protect workers from the \r\noccupational health and safety hazards imposed by climate change \r\n(Kjellstrom et al. 2016, 2018, 2019; Levi et al. 2018; Day et al. 2019) \r\n(AR6 WGII Chapter 16)."


id: 81e3f38fbe26dbfe726fed8de55ec9b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17962
content:
"Rapid and effective climate mitigation is a necessary part of sustainable \r\ndevelopment (high confidence) (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4), \r\nbut the latter can only be realised if climate mitigation becomes \r\nintegrated with sustainable development policies (high confidence). \r\nTargeted policy areas must include healthy nutrition, sustainable \r\nconsumption and production, inequality and poverty alleviation, \r\nair quality and international collaboration (high confidence). \r\nLower energy demand enables synergies between mitigation and \r\nsustainability, with lower reliance on CDR (high confidence)."


id: e405894402d436db3bf04a825c0d539e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33354
content:
"Mitigation pathways also affect economic inequalities between \r\nand within countries, and poverty, through the reduction of climate \r\nchange impacts that fall more heavily on low-income countries, \r\ncommunities and households, and exacerbate poverty (AR6 WGII \r\nChapters  8 and 16). Higher levels of warming are projected to \r\ngenerate higher inequality between countries as well as within them "


id: bcf9ecb18a563c1b6a89fc0b122e5c5a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 27294
content:
"mitigation policies (averaged over several models, middle panel), \r\nand policies integrating sustainability considerations (right panel of \r\nFigure  3.39, based on the Illustrative Mitigation Pathway 'Shifting \r\nPathways' (IMP-SP) (Soergel et al. 2021a)). Note that neither middle \r\nnor right panels include climate impacts."


id: 874852815b1487f478cfcd216184cd8a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18821
content:
"clean energy) as side effects. These trade-offs can be compensated \r\nthrough targeted support measures and/or additional sustainable \r\ndevelopment policies (Cameron et al. 2016; Bertram et al. 2018; \r\nFujimori et al. 2019; Soergel et al. 2021a)."


id: 67e22f4aebfa0701ff6be96899c34239
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 13934
content:
"The synthesis of the interplay between climate mitigation and \r\nsustainable development is shown in Figure  3.39. Panel a  shows \r\nthe reduction in population affected by climate impacts at  1.5degC \r\ncompared to 3degC according to sustainability domains (Byers et al. \r\n2018). Reducing warming reduces the population impacted by all \r\nimpact categories shown (high confidence). The left panel does not \r\ntake into account any side effects of mitigation efforts or policies to \r\nreduce warming: only reductions in climate impacts. This underscores \r\nthat mitigation is an integral basis for comprehensive sustainable \r\ndevelopment (Watts et al. 2015)."


id: 33e3051ba0e7ca573f7a61ecd1c12694
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 5577
content:
"Areas of co-benefits include human health, ambient air pollution \r\nand other specific kinds of pollution, while areas of trade-off include \r\nfood access, habitat loss and mineral resources (medium confidence). \r\nFor example, action consistent with 1.5degC in the absence of energy\u0002demand reduction measures require large quantities of CDR, which, \r\ndepending on the type used, are likely to negatively impact both food \r\navailability and areas for biodiversity (Fujimori et al. 2018; Ohashi \r\net al. 2019; Roelfsema et al. 2020)."


id: ee3863e65cc4c57b4ffe87a932c425da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34950
content:
"Mitigation to 1.5degC reduces climate impacts on sustainability (left). \r\nPolicies integrating sustainability and mitigation (right) have far \r\nfewer trade-offs than narrow mitigation policies (middle)."


id: ff90ded7b312eb90fcec1c7917f39586
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37753
content:
"Panels b and c of Figure  3.39 show the effects of  1.5degC \r\nmitigation  policies compared to current national policies: narrow "


id: 8cc85f4238a29c2b7b38386c5671d5a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19667
content:
"Lower demand  - for example, for energy and land-intensive \r\nconsumption such as meat  - represents a  synergistic strategy for \r\nachieving ambitious climate mitigation without compromising \r\nSustainable Development Goals (high confidence) (Bertram et al. \r\n2018; Grubler et al. 2018; van Vuuren et al. 2018; Kikstra et al. 2021b; \r\nSoergel et al. 2021a). This is especially true for reliance on BECCS \r\n(Hickel et al. 2021; Keysser and Lenzen 2021). Options that reduce \r\nagricultural demand (e.g., dietary change, reduced food waste) can \r\nhave co-benefits for adaptation through reductions in demand for \r\nland and water (Bertram et al. 2018; Grubler et al. 2018; IPCC 2019a; \r\nSoergel et al. 2021a)."


id: 2ad2f009dd19183c6713340bdc25a8d6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4165
content:
"These findings indicate that holistic policymaking integrating \r\nsustainability objectives alongside mitigation will be important in \r\nattaining Sustainable Development Goals (van Vuuren et al. 2015, \r\n2018; Bertram et al. 2018; Fujimori et al. 2018; Hasegawa et al. \r\n2018; Liu et al. 2020a; Honegger et al. 2021; Soergel et al. 2021a). \r\nMitigation policies which target direct sector-level regulation, early \r\nmitigation action, and lifestyle changes have beneficial sustainable \r\ndevelopment outcomes across air pollution, food, energy and water \r\n(Bertram et al. 2018)."


id: 14ba7603535b2e1159e4797da6da50d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 770
content:
"While the impacts of climate change on agricultural output are \r\nexpected to increase the population at risk of hunger, there is \r\nevidence suggesting population growth will be the dominant \r\ndriver of hunger and undernourishment in Africa in 2050 (Hall et al. \r\n2017). Meeting SDG 5, relating to gender equality and reproductive \r\nrights, could substantially lower population growth, leading to \r\na  global population lower than the 95% prediction range of the \r\nUN projections (Abel et al. 2016). Meeting SDG 5 (gender equality, \r\nincluding via voluntary family planning (O'Sullivan 2018)) could thus \r\nminimise the risks to SDG 2 (zero hunger) that are posed by meeting \r\nSDG 13 (climate action)."


id: 5d717bc8900753060e9156aaeb0fb577
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12227
content:
"These policies include ones around stringent air quality (Kinney 2018; \r\nRafaj et al. 2018; Soergel et al. 2021a); efficient and safe demand\u0002side technologies, especially cook stoves (Cameron et al. 2016); \r\nlifestyle changes (Bertram et al. 2018; Grubler et al. 2018; Soergel \r\net al. 2021a); industrial and sectoral policy (Bertram et al. 2018); \r\nagricultural and food policies (including food waste) (van Vuuren \r\net al. 2019; Soergel et al. 2021a); international cooperation (Soergel \r\net al. 2021a); as well as economic policies described in Section 3.6. \r\nRecent research shows that mitigation is compatible with reductions \r\nin inequality and poverty (Box 3.6)."


id: 12b782fb532ed100bcfe728f2acd8035
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 446
content:
"In modelled mitigation pathways, inequality in per-capita emissions between regions are generally reduced over time, and the \r\nreduction is generally more pronounced in lower-temperature pathways (Box 3.6, Figure 1). Already in 2030, if NDCs from the Paris \r\nAgreement, announced prior to COP26, are fully achieved, inequalities in per-capita GHG emissions between countries would be \r\nreduced (Benveniste et al. 2018)."


id: 5d63d9628a6a04210cfa2980c7de7863
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12220
content:
"Through avoiding impacts of climate change, which fall more heavily on low-income countries, communities and households, and \r\nexacerbate poverty, mitigation reduces inequalities and poverty (Section 3.6.4.2)."


id: 8f1f971bd38b2103b5ec49da6b9cf647
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20059
content:
"The remainder of this section covers specific domains of sustainable \r\ndevelopment: food (Section  3.7.2), water (Section  3.7.3), energy \r\n(Section  3.7.4), health (Section  3.7.5), biodiversity (Section  3.7.6) \r\nand multi-sector  - cities, infrastructure, industry, production and \r\nconsumption (Section  3.7.7). These represent the areas with the \r\nstrongest research connecting mitigation to sustainable development. \r\nThe links to individual SDGs are given within these sections. Each \r\ndomain covers the benefits of avoided climate impacts and the \r\nimplications (synergies and trade-offs) of mitigation efforts."


id: 292d67c054448078cadd9088e55b303f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3911
content:
"Climate change will reduce crop yields, increase food insecurity, and \r\nnegatively influence nutrition and mortality (high confidence) (AR6 \r\nWGII Chapter 5). Climate mitigation will thus reduce these impacts, \r\nand hence reduce food insecurity (high confidence). The yield \r\nreduction of global food production will increase food insecurity and \r\ninfluence nutrition and mortality (Hasegawa et al. 2014; Springmann \r\net al. 2016a). For instance, Springmann et al. (2016a) estimate that \r\nclimate change could lead to 315,000-736,000 additional deaths by \r\n2050, though these could mostly be averted by stringent mitigation \r\nefforts. Reducing warming reduces the impacts of climate change, \r\nincluding extreme climates, on food production and risk of hunger \r\n(Hasegawa et al. 2014, 2021b)."


id: ec3ca9407d9334c918b826c62f6a1ed7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34662
content:
"The goal of SDG 2 is to achieve 'zero-hunger' by 2030. According \r\nto the UN (2015), over 25% of the global population currently \r\nexperience food insecurity and nearly 40% of these experience severe \r\nfood insecurity, a  situation worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic \r\n(Paslakis et al. 2021)."


id: 5fdc3dc803947d41aecd33ae46e42243
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12664
content:
"Recent studies explore the effect of climate change mitigation on \r\nagricultural markets and food security (Havlik et al. 2014; Hasegawa \r\net al. 2018; Doelman et al. 2019; Fujimori et al. 2019). Mitigation \r\npolicies aimed at achieving  1.5degC-2degC, if not managed properly, "


id: 67106b914db9e57403d919ca8804a9a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13803
content:
"could negatively affect food security through changes in land and \r\nfood prices (high confidence), leading to increases in the population \r\nat risk of hunger by 80-280 million people compared to baseline \r\nscenarios. These studies assume uniform carbon prices on AFOLU \r\nsectors (with some sectoral caps) and do not account for climate \r\nimpacts on food production."


id: 85f0c1fe0bbb7a58164c7de12277cad8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18614
content:
"of and exposure to hydrological extremes (high confidence) (Arnell \r\nand Lloyd-Hughes 2014; Asadieh and Krakauer 2017; Dottori \r\net al. 2018; Naumann et al. 2018; IPCC 2019a; Do et al. 2020) (AR6 \r\nWGII Chapter 4). Climate models project increases in precipitation \r\nintensity (high confidence), local flooding (medium confidence), and \r\ndrought risk (very high confidence) (Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes 2014; \r\nAsadieh and Krakauer 2017; Dottori et al. 2018; IPCC 2019a) (AR6 \r\nWGII Chapter 4)."


id: 50cc6e5a2be7e9277b3bf0eff82afa3d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10155
content:
"The effect of climate change on water availability and hydrological \r\nextremes varies by region (high confidence) due to differences in the \r\nspatial patterns of projected precipitation changes (Hanasaki et al. \r\n2013; Schewe et al. 2014; Schlosser et al. 2014; Asadieh and Krakauer \r\n2017; Dottori et al. 2018; Naumann et al. 2018; Koutroulis et al. 2019) \r\n(AR6 WGII Chapter 4). Global exposure to water stress is projected to \r\nincrease with increased warming, but increases will not occur in all \r\nregions (Hanasaki et al. 2013; Schewe et al. 2014; Arnell and Lloyd\u0002Hughes 2014; Gosling and Arnell 2016; IPCC 2019a)."


id: 73a626d430aaeb7bc58105e14db671cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15814
content:
"Limiting warming could reduce water-related risks (high confidence) \r\n(O'Neill et al. 2017b; Byers et al. 2018; Hurlbert et al. 2019) (AR6 WGII \r\nChapter  4) and the population exposed to increased water stress \r\n(Hanasaki et al. 2013; Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes 2014; Schewe et al. \r\n2014; Gosling and Arnell 2016; IPCC 2019a)."


id: dc942a3b382942fa38818e7df52c8d6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32207
content:
"There are many other synergistic measures for climate mitigation and \r\nfood security. Agricultural technological innovation can improve the \r\nefficiency of land use and food systems, thus reducing the pressure \r\non land from increasing food demand (Foley et al. 2011; Popp et al. \r\n2014; Obersteiner et al. 2016; Humpenoder et al. 2018; Doelman \r\net al. 2019). Furthermore, decreasing consumption of animal \r\nproducts could contribute to SDG 3.4 by reducing the risk of non\u0002communicable diseases (Garnett 2016)."


id: 40dd13150a6a75e9864bf54b1fd1b2d2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7589
content:
"The effect of climate change on water depends on the climate model, \r\nthe hydrological model, and the metric (high confidence) stress \r\nHanasaki et al. (2013); Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes (2014); Schewe \r\net al. (2014); Schlosser et al. (2014); Gosling and Arnell (2016); \r\nIPCC (2019a)."


id: 46000c3c16fbe18ba74e140ee2c98d25
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8399
content:
"However, the effect of socio-economic development could be larger \r\nthan the effect of climate change (high confidence) (Arnell and Lloyd\u0002Hughes 2014; Schlosser et al. 2014; Graham et al. 2020)."


id: 47f519d6779855546f6f678088a06ade
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8696
content:
"Taken together, climate changes will reduce crop yields, increase food \r\ninsecurity and influence nutrition and mortality (high confidence)\r\n(see 3.7.2.1). However, if measures are not properly designed, mitigating \r\nclimate change will also negatively impact on food consumption and \r\nsecurity. Additional solutions to negative impacts associated with \r\nclimate mitigation on food production and consumption include \r\na transition to a sustainable agriculture and food system that is less \r\nresource intensive, more resilient to a  changing climate, and in line \r\nwith biodiversity and social targets (Kayal et al. 2019)."


id: 7ac469a6ff6a6b591cef5c976287f3a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16895
content:
"Climate change can also affect water quality (both thermal and \r\nchemical) (Liu et al. 2017), leading to increases in stream temperature \r\nand nitrogen loading in rivers (Ballard et al. 2019)."


id: 1669059545e5ae000cd04d887409cd8f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1048
content:
"Water is relevant to SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation), SDG 15 (life \r\non land ), and SDG Targets 12.4 and 3.9 (water pollution and health). \r\nThis section discusses water quantity, water quality, and water\u0002related extremes. See Section 3.7.5 for water-related health effects."


id: 2d7777502b357447ebecfb57d2624c2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4594
content:
"Global precipitation, evapotranspiration, runoff and water availability \r\nincrease with warming (Hanasaki et al. 2013; Greve et al. 2018) \r\n(AR6 WGII Chapter 4). Climate change also affects the occurrence "


id: 3c18ee9f65df3e4b2bc353109d9b0ef4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6813
content:
"et al. 2017) could increase water demand; however, the implications \r\nof CCS depend on the cooling technology and when capture occurs \r\n(Magneschi et al. 2017; Maizi et al. 2017; Giannaris et al. 2020). \r\nDemand-side mitigation (e.g., dietary change, reduced food waste, \r\nreduced energy demand) can reduce water demand (Bajzelj et al. \r\n2014; Aleksandrowicz et al. 2016; Green et al. 2018; Springmann \r\net al. 2018). Introducing specific measures (e.g., environmental flow \r\nrequirements, improved efficiency, priority rules) can reduce water \r\nwithdrawals (Bertram et al. 2018; Bijl et al. 2018; Parkinson et al. 2019)."


id: cc04d51f89cef5d074c181292f17ff9e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29644
content:
"Extending energy access to all in line with SDG7 is compatible \r\nwith strong mitigation consistent with the Paris Agreement (high \r\nconfidence). The Low Energy Demand (LED) scenario projects that \r\nthese twin goals can be achieved by relying heavily on energy \r\nefficiency and rapid social transformations (Grubler et al. 2018). \r\nThe IEA's Sustainable Development Scenario (IEA 2020a) achieves \r\ndevelopment outcomes but with higher average energy use, and \r\nbottom-up modelling suggests that decent living standards could be \r\nprovided to all in 2040-2050 with roughly 150 EJ, or 40% of current \r\nfinal energy use (Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020; Kikstra et al. 2021b). \r\nThe trade-offs between climate mitigation and increasing energy \r\nconsumption of the world's poorest are negligible (Rao and Min \r\n2018; Scherer et al. 2018)."


id: 41c725dea2838d3410c0b1b0c1b1bc63
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7751
content:
"The effect of mitigation on water quality depends on the mitigation \r\noption, its implementation, and the aspect of quality considered \r\n(high confidence) (Ng et al. 2010; Florke et al. 2019; Sinha et al. \r\n2019; Smith et al. 2019; Fuhrman et al. 2020; Karlsson et al. 2020; \r\nMcElwee et al. 2020)."


id: 1d36de488436c778416d39f200360a3f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2036
content:
"Energy is relevant to SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy). Access \r\nto sufficient levels of reliable, affordable and renewable energy is \r\nessential for sustainable development. Currently, over 1 billion people \r\nstill lack access to electricity (Ribas et al. 2019)."


id: 648a397ee9c5a2711ed3689544d94e58
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13383
content:
"In contrast, future energy infrastructure could improve reliability, thus \r\nlowering dependence on high-carbon, high-air pollution back-up diesel \r\ngenerators (Farquharson et al. 2018) that are often used to cope with \r\nunreliable power in developing countries (Maruyama Rentschler et al. \r\n2019). There can be significant reliability issues where mini-grids are \r\nused to electrify rural areas (Numminen and Lund 2019). A  stable, \r\nsustainable energy transition policy that considers national sustainable \r\ndevelopment in the short and long term is critical in driving a transition \r\nto an energy future that addresses the trilemma of energy security, \r\nequity, and sustainability (La Vina et al. 2018)."


id: fdd5310e62474179f4babd90d20d3cbb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37454
content:
"The energy sector uses large volumes of water (Fricko \r\net al. 2016), making it highly vulnerable to climate change (Tan and \r\nZhi 2016) (high confidence). Thermoelectric and hydropower sources \r\nare the most vulnerable to water stress (van Vliet et al. 2016). \r\nRestricted water supply to these power sources can affect grid security \r\nand affordable energy access (Koch et al. 2014; Ranzani et al. 2018; \r\nZhang et al. 2018d).The hydropower facilities from high mountain \r\nareas of Central Europe, Iceland, Western USA/Canada, and Latin \r\nAmerica (Hock et al. 2019), as well as Africa and China (Bartos and \r\nChester 2015; Gaupp et al. 2015; Tarroja et al. 2016; Conway et al. \r\n2017; Byers et al. 2018; Eyer and Wichman 2018; Ranzani et al. 2018; \r\nSavelsberg et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018d; Zhou et al. 2018; Wang \r\net al. 2019) have experienced changes in seasonality and availability."


id: eac1aec7f39bcf7bb9bcec515e8b7fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34436
content:
"SDG 3 (good health and well-being) aims to ensure healthy lives and \r\npromote well-being for all at all ages. Climate change is increasingly \r\ncausing injuries, illnesses, malnutrition, threats to mental health \r\nand well-being, and deaths (AR6 WGII Chapter 7). Mitigation policies \r\nand technologies to reduce GHG emissions are often beneficial \r\nfor human health on a  shorter time scale than benefits in terms \r\nof slowing climate change (Limaye et al. 2020). The financial value \r\nof health benefits from improved air quality alone is projected to \r\nexceed the costs of meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement \r\n(Markandya et al. 2018)."


id: f66cd6896f2016b32a82da9bd127d840
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36280
content:
"The avoided health impacts associated with climate change mitigation \r\ncan substantially offset mitigation costs at the societal level (Scasny \r\net al. 2015; Schucht et al. 2015; Chang et al. 2017; Markandya et al. \r\n2018). Models of health co-benefits show that a 1.5degC pathway could \r\nresult in 152 million +- 43 million fewer premature deaths worldwide \r\nbetween 2020 and 2100 in comparison to a  business-as-usual \r\nscenario, particularly due to reductions in exposure to PM2.5 (Shindell \r\net al. 2018; Rauner et al. 2020a; Rafaj et al. 2021). Some of the most \r\nsubstantial health, well-being, and equity benefits associated with \r\nclimate action derive from investing in basic infrastructure: sanitation, \r\nclean drinking water, clean energy, affordable healthy diets, clean \r\npublic transport, and improved air quality from transformative \r\nsolutions across economic sectors including agriculture, energy, \r\ntransport and buildings (Chang et al. 2017)."


id: fc90df449f89933864361cf7b6c7ca52
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37255
content:
"The human health chapter of the WGII contribution to the AR6 \r\nconcluded that climate change is increasingly affecting a  growing \r\nnumber of health outcomes, with negative net impacts at the global \r\nscale and positive impacts only in a few limited situations. There are \r\nfew estimates of economic costs of increases in climate-sensitive \r\nhealth outcomes. In the USA in 2012, the financial burden in terms \r\nof deaths, hospitalisations, and emergency department visits for \r\nten climate-sensitive events across 11 states were estimated to be \r\n10 (2.7-24.6) billion USD2018 (Limaye et al. 2019)."


id: f3fb902093ccdf2feebfa999b010d290
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Transitioning toward equitable, low-carbon societies has multiple \r\nco-benefits for health and well-being (AR6 WGII Chapter 7). Health \r\nbenefits can be gained from improvements in air quality through \r\ntransitioning to renewable energy and active transport (e.g., walking \r\nand cycling); shifting to affordable low-meat, plant-rich diets; and \r\ngreen buildings and nature-based solutions, such as green-and-blue \r\nurban infrastructure, as shown in Figure 3.40 (Iacobucci 2016)."


id: 7e519c10999ca96bb14fea6a9ea824ac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"The health co-benefits of the NDCs for 2040 were compared for \r\ntwo scenarios, one consistent with the goal of the Paris Agreement \r\nand the SDGs and the other also placing health as a  central focus \r\nof the policies (i.e., health in all climate policies scenario) (Hamilton \r\net al. 2021), for Brazil, China, Germany, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, \r\nSouth Africa, the UK, and the USA. Modelling of the energy, food \r\nand agriculture, and transport sectors, and associated risk factors "


id: 5e4c7faea0414ba4c0f6ae9072171559
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"two thirds have advanced their timing of spring events (Parmesan and \r\nHanley 2015). Under 3.2degC warming, 49% of insects, 44% of plants \r\nand 26% of vertebrates are projected to be at risk of extinction. At \r\n2degC, this falls to 18% of insects, 16% of plants and 8% of vertebrates and \r\nat 1.5degC, to 6% of insects, 8% of plants and 4% of vertebrates (Warren \r\net al. 2018). Incidents of migration of invasive species, including pests \r\nand diseases, are also attributable to climate change, with negative \r\nimpacts on food security and vector-borne diseases. Moreover, if \r\nclimate change reduces crop yields, cropland may expand - a primary \r\ndriver of biodiversity loss - in order to meet food demand (Molotoks \r\net al. 2020). Land restoration and halting land degradation under all \r\nmitigation scenarios has the potential for synergy between mitigation \r\nand adaptation."


id: affae34edf83edadb5fca8302ce245ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"related to mortality, suggested the sustainable pathways scenario \r\ncould result in annual reductions of 1.18 million air pollution-related \r\ndeaths, 5.86 million diet-related deaths, and 1.15 million deaths due to \r\nphysical inactivity. Adopting the more ambitious health in all climate \r\npolicies scenario could result in further reductions of 462,000 annual \r\ndeaths attributable to air pollution, 572,000 annual deaths attributable \r\nto diet, and 943,000 annual deaths attributable to physical inactivity. \r\nThese benefits were attributable to the mitigation of direct GHG \r\nemissions and the commensurate actions that reduce exposure to \r\nharmful pollutants, as well as improved diets and safe physical activity."


id: f035f7b37f819048f196a0d99a8bc3e1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 35295
content:
"Marine ecosystems are being affected by climate change and growing \r\nnon-climate pressures including temperature change, acidification, \r\nland-sourced pollution, sedimentation, resource extraction and \r\nhabitat destruction (high confidence) (Bindoff et al. 2019; IPCC 2019b). \r\nThe impacts of climate drivers and their combinations vary across \r\ntaxa (AR6 WGII Chapter 3). The danger or warming and acidification \r\nto coral reefs, rocky shores and kelp forests is well established \r\n(high confidence) (AR6 WGII Chapter 3). Migration towards optimal \r\nthermal and chemical conditions (Burrows et al. 2019) contributes to \r\nlarge-scale redistribution of fish and invertebrate populations, and \r\nmajor impacts on global marine biomass production and maximum \r\nsustainable yield (Bindoff et al. 2019)."


id: cee0ed2d4810ebc0225423cb7e5a61cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Mitigation measures have the potential to reduce the progress \r\nof negative impacts on ecosystems, although it is unlikely that all \r\nimpacts can be mitigated (high confidence) (Ohashi et al. 2019). \r\nThe specifics of mitigation achievement are crucial, since large\u0002scale deployment of some climate mitigation and land-based CDR \r\nmeasures could have deleterious impacts on biodiversity (Santangeli \r\net al. 2016; Hof et al. 2018)."


id: ca1c6673c5e282ba44566f9e267b3013
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Just in the USA, over the next 50 years, a  2degC pathway could \r\nprevent roughly  4.5 million premature deaths, about  3.5 million \r\nhospitalisations and emergency room visits, and approximately \r\n300 million lost workdays (Shindell 2020). The estimated yearly \r\nbenefits of USD700 billion were more than the estimated cost of the \r\nenergy transition."


id: bfdf69622ba0880a74e7a88e5d314571
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Biodiversity covers life below water (SDG 14) and life on land \r\n(SDG  15). Ecosystem services are relevant to the goals of zero \r\nhunger (SDG 2), good health and well-being (SDG 3), clean water \r\nand sanitation (SDG 6) and responsible consumption and production \r\n(SDG 12), as well as being essential to human existence (IPBES 2019)."


id: a3ec546468643dc1fe1fd977493039a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 23351
content:
"Climate change is a major driver of species extinction and terrestrial \r\nand freshwater ecosystems destruction (high confidence) (AR6 WGII \r\nChapter 2). Analysis shows that approximately half of all species with \r\nlong-term records have shifted their ranges in elevation and about "


id: a0e2441736cf1679f2254a2886ab6a02
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 22862
content:
"Addressing multiple SDG arenas requires new systemic thinking \r\nin the areas of governance and policy, such as those proposed by \r\nSachs et al. (2019)."


id: 43360fbb18d4e3224104f653fc02f7bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"have evaluated interconnections among key aspects of land and show \r\na pathway to the global sustainable future of land (Popp et al. 2014; \r\nErb et al. 2016; Obersteiner et al. 2016; Humpenoder et al. 2018). Most \r\nstudies agree that many biophysical options exist to achieve global \r\nclimate mitigation and sustainable land use in future. Conserving \r\nlocal biodiversity requires careful policy design in conjunction with \r\nland-use regulations and societal transformation in order to minimise \r\nthe conversion of natural habitats."


id: c79fecb83fb848c794a90a63ffb9abbd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 28991
content:
"The objective of this section is to discuss concepts of feasibility in \r\nthe context of the low-carbon transition and pathways. We aim to \r\nidentify drivers of low-carbon scenarios feasibility and to highlight \r\nenabling conditions which can ameliorate feasibility concerns."


id: 8ba51a7d87b072fedab07dc38ebfc80b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"This subsection focuses upon SDG 9 (industry, innovation and \r\ninfrastructure) and SDG 11 (sustainable cities and communities)."


id: 569741458811589f2e7ae1378a135a07
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 11096
content:
"By 2100, urban population will be almost double and more urban \r\nareas will be built (Jiang and O'Neill 2017), although COVID-19 may \r\nmodify these trends (Kii 2021). Urbanisation will amplify projected air \r\ntemperature changes in cities, including amplifying heatwaves (AR6 \r\nWGI Chapter 10, Box 10.3). Benefits of climate mitigation in urban \r\nareas include reducing heat, air pollution and flooding. Industrial \r\ninfrastructure and production-consumption supply networks also \r\nbenefit from avoided impacts."


id: b5b93a40f6bd1856e717ea3d67cbc353
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 26120
content:
"Many co-benefits to urban mitigation actions (Chapter  8, \r\nSection  8.2.1) improve the liveability of cities and contribute to \r\nachieving SDG 11. In particular, compact urban form, efficient \r\ntechnologies and infrastructure can play a valuable role in mitigation \r\nby reducing energy demand (Creutzig et al. 2016; Guneralp et al. \r\n2017), thus averting carbon lock-in, while reducing land sprawl and \r\nhence increasing carbon storage and biodiversity (D'Amour et al. \r\n2017). Benefits of mitigation include air quality improvements from \r\ndecreased traffic and congestion when private vehicles are displaced \r\nby other modes; health benefits from increases in active travel; and \r\nlowered urban heat island effects from green-blue infrastructures \r\n(Section 8.2.1)."


id: 649eafc28cbd12eda38b24986a6fd2a3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Regarding scenarios, the feasibility 'what' question is the one most \r\ncommonly dealt with in the literature, though most of the studies \r\nhave focused on expanding low-carbon system, and yet political \r\nconstraints might arise mostly from phasing out fossil fuel-based \r\nones (Spencer et al. 2018; Fattouh et al. 2019). The 'when and where' \r\ndimension can also be related to the scenario assessment, but only \r\ninsofar that the models generating them can differentiate time and \r\ngeographical contextual factors. Distinguishing mitigation potential \r\nby regional institutional capacity has a significant influence on the \r\ncosts of stabilising climate (Iyer et al. 2015c). The 'whom' question \r\nis the most difficult to capture by scenarios, given the multitude \r\nof actors involved as well as their complex interactions. The focus of \r\nsocio-technical transition sciences on the co-evolutionary processes \r\ncan shed light on the dynamics of feasibility (Nielsen et al. 2020)."


id: 5bb9c02df0c0aa26d1b91e3f2deb59fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"However, increasing urban density or enlarging urban green spaces \r\ncan increase property prices and reduce affordability (Section 8.2.1). \r\nRaising living conditions for slum dwellers and people living in \r\ninformal settlements will require significant materials and energy; \r\nhowever, regeneration can be conducted in ways that avoid carbon\u0002intense infrastructure lock-in (Chapters 8 and 9). Cities affect other \r\nregions through supply chains (Marinova et al. 2020)."


id: a479603f6b965e86dfed69dbc0008a09
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"The when-where-whom distinction allows depicting a  feasibility \r\nfrontier beyond which implementation challenges prevent mitigation \r\naction (Jewell and Cherp 2020). Even if the current feasibility frontier \r\nappears restraining in some jurisdictions, it is context-dependent and \r\ndynamic as innovation proceeds and institutional capacity builds up \r\n(Nielsen et al. 2020). The question is whether the feasibility frontier \r\ncan move faster than the pace at which the carbon budget is being "


id: 6caee3d459b29461bfce7d76f53f661b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Sustainable production, consumption and management of natural \r\nresources are consistent with, and necessary for, mitigation \r\n(Chapters 5 and 11). Demand-side measures can lower requirements \r\nfor upstream material and energy use (Chapter  5). In terms of \r\nindustrial production, transformational changes across sectors will \r\nbe necessary for mitigation (Sections 11.3 and 11.4)."


id: 63d02a2b74398738d6188a750509e41f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Although model-feasibility differs distinctly from feasibility in the \r\nreal world, it can indicate the relative challenges of low-carbon \r\nscenarios  - primarily when performed in a  model ensemble of \r\nsufficient size. Riahi et al. (2015) interpreted infeasibility across \r\na large number of models as an indication of increased risk that the \r\ntransformation may not be attainable due to technical or economic \r\nconcerns. All models involved in a model comparison of 1.5degC targets \r\n(Rogelj et al. 2018b) (Table S1) were able to solve under favourable \r\nunderlying socio-economic assumptions (SSP1), but none for the \r\nmore challenging SSP3. This interpretation of feasibility was used \r\nto highlight the importance of socio-economic drivers for attaining \r\nclimate stabilisation. Gambhir et al. (2017) constrained the models \r\nto historically observed rates of change and found that it would \r\nno longer allow to solve for 2degC, highlighting the need for rapid \r\ntechnological change."


id: d1c8a5c451693483d4d55c71691b1f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"exhausted. Jewell et al. (2019) show that the emission savings from \r\nthe pledges of premature retirement of coal plants is 150 times less \r\nthan globally committed emissions from existing coal power plants. \r\nThe pledges come from countries with high institutional capacity \r\nand relatively low shares of coal in electricity. Other factors currently \r\nlimiting the capacity to steer transitions at the necessary speed \r\ninclude the electoral-market orientation of politicians (Willis 2017), \r\nthe status-quo orientation of senior public officials (Geden 2016), \r\npath dependencies created by 'instrument constituencies' (Beland \r\nand Howlett 2016), or the impacts of deliberate inconsistencies \r\nbetween talk, decisions and actions in climate policy (Rickards et al. \r\n2014). All in all, a  number of different delay mechanisms in both \r\nscience and policy have been identified to potentially impede climate \r\ngoal achievement (Karlsson and Gilek 2020) (Chapter 13)."


id: 140af7189a8a8d8aba4dffbadb283aa7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"In addition to its contextual and dynamic nature, feasibility is a multi\u0002dimensional concept. The IPCC SR1.5 distinguishes six dimensions \r\nof feasibility: geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, \r\neconomic, socio-cultural and institutional. At the individual option \r\nlevel, different mitigation strategies face various barriers as well as \r\nenablers (see Chapter 6 for the option-level assessment). However, \r\na systemic transformation involves interconnections of a wide range \r\nof indicators. Model-based assessments are meant to capture the \r\nintegrative elements of the transition and of associated feasibility \r\nchallenges. However, the translation of model-generated pathways \r\ninto feasibility concerns (Rogelj et al. 2018b) has developed \r\nonly recently. Furthermore, multiple forms of knowledge can be \r\nmobilised to support strategic decision-making and complement \r\nscenario analysis (Turnheim and Nykvist 2019). We discuss both \r\napproaches next."


id: ac667b37e3b13e5c72afb133285f95d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Evaluating the feasibility of scenarios involves several steps \r\n(Figure  3.41). First, one needs to identify which dimensions of \r\nfeasibility to focus on. Then, for each dimension, one needs to \r\nselect relevant indicators for which sufficient empirical basis exists \r\nand which are an output of models (or at least of a  sufficient \r\nnumber of them). Then, thresholds marking different levels of \r\nfeasibility concerns are defined based on available literature, \r\nexpert elicitations and empirical analysis based on appropriately \r\nchosen historical precedents. Finally, scenario feasibility scores are \r\nobtained for each indicator, and where needed aggregated up in \r\ntime or dimensions, as a  way to provide an overall appraisal of \r\nfeasibility trade-offs, depending on the timing, disruptiveness and \r\nscale of transformation."


id: 624718039b07d33191c95e70ce79224
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Evaluating the feasibility of low-carbon pathways can take different \r\nforms. In the narrowest sense, there is feasibility pertaining the \r\nreporting of model-generated scenarios: here an infeasible scenario \r\nis one which cannot meet the constraints embedded implicitly or \r\nexplicitly in the models which attempted to generate it. Second, \r\nthere is a  feasibility that relates to specific elements or overall \r\nstructure characterising the low-carbon transition compared to some \r\nspecified benchmark."


id: 1c2ac1f03319d29daeba0caae64ae13f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"In order to be generated, scenarios must be coherent with \r\nthe constraints and assumptions embedded in the models \r\n(i.e.,  deployment potential of given technologies, physical and \r\ngeological limits) and in the scenario design (i.e.,  carbon budget). \r\nSometimes, models cannot solve specific scenarios. This provides \r\na  first, coarse indication of feasibility concerns. Specific vetting \r\ncriteria can be imposed, such as carbon-price values above which \r\nscenarios should not be reported, as in Clarke et al. (2009). However, \r\nmodel solvability raises issues of aggregation in model ensembles. \r\nSince model solving is not a random process, but a function of the \r\ncharacteristics of the models, analysing only reported outcomes leads \r\nto statistical biases (Tavoni and Tol 2010)."


id: 87f92308601447fc1603534eab2d89f3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Figure  3.42 | Example of multi-dimensional feasibility analysis and indicators used in the IPCC AR6 scenarios. The approach defines relevant indicators \r\ncharacterising the key dimensions of feasibility. Indicators capture the timing, scale and disruptiveness challenges. Low-, medium- and high-feasibility concerns are defined \r\nbased on historical trends and available literature. Details about indicator and threshold values can be found in Annex III.II.2.3."


id: 767b4410da3bf46c6bf0bf08b229be8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Figure 3.43 | Feasibility characteristics of the Paris-consistent scenarios in the AR6 scenarios database : Feasibility corridors for the AR6 scenarios \r\ndatabase, applying the methodology by (Brutschin et al. 2021).  (a) The fraction of scenarios falling within three categories of feasibility concerns (plausible, best case, \r\nunprecedented), for different times (2030, 2050, 2100), different climate categories consistent with the Paris Agreement and five dimensions. (b) Composite feasibility score \r\n(obtained by geometric mean of underlying indicators) over time for scenarios with immediate and delayed global mitigation efforts, for different climate categories (C1, C2, C3. \r\nNote: no C1 scenario has delayed participation). (c) The fraction of scenarios which in any point in time over the century exceed the feasibility concerns, for C1 and C3 climate \r\ncategories. Overlayed are the Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMP-LP, IMP-SP, IMP-Ren: C1 category; IMP-Neg, IMP-GS: C3 category)."


id: f191de5858759f8b26d5bcca8fbfbfc1
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content:
"Recent approaches have addressed multiple dimensions of feasibility, \r\nan important advancement since social and institutional aspects \r\nare as, if not more, important than technology ones (Jewell and \r\nCherp 2020). Feasibility corridors of scenarios based on their scale, \r\nrate of change and disruptiveness have been identified (Kriegler \r\net al. 2018b; Warszawski et al. 2021). The reality check shows that \r\nmany  1.5degC-compatible scenarios violate the feasibility corridors. \r\nThe ones that didn't are associated with a greater coverage of the \r\navailable mitigation levers (Warszawski et al. 2021)."


id: f539a4e89224c895230c1ab801634672
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Brutschin et al. (2021) proposed an operational framework covering \r\nall six dimensions of feasibility. They developed a  set of multi\u0002dimensional metrics capturing the timing, disruptiveness and the scale \r\nof the transformative change within each dimension (as in Kriegler \r\net al. 2018b). Thresholds of feasibility risks of different intensity are \r\nobtained through the review of the relevant literature and empirical \r\nanalysis of historical data. Novel indicators include governance \r\nlevels (Andrijevic et al. 2020a). The 17 bottom-up indicators are then \r\naggregated up across time and dimension, as a  way to highlight \r\nfeasibility trade-offs. Aggregation is done via compensatory \r\napproaches such as the geometric mean. This is employed, for \r\ninstance, for the Human Development Index. A conceptual example \r\nof this approach as applied to the IPCC AR6 scenarios database is \r\nshown in Figure 3.42 and further described in the Annex III.II.2.3."


id: ab05eb6a6ededc6340c69778fa573566
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content:
"Other elements of feasibility relate to social justice, which could be \r\nessential to enhance the political and public acceptability of the \r\nlow-carbon transition. Reviewing the literature, one study finds that \r\nemploying social justice as an orienting principle can increase the \r\npolitical feasibility of low-carbon policies (Patterson et al. 2018). \r\nThree elements are identified as key: (i) protecting vulnerable people \r\nfrom climate change impacts, (ii) protecting people from disruptions \r\nof transformation, (iii) enhancing the process of envisioning and \r\nimplementing an equitable post-carbon society."


id: f1478159ce0534c52cc3b2b95666e5ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"The limitations associated with quantitative low-carbon transition \r\npathways stem from a  predominant reliance on techno-economic \r\nconsiderations with a  simplified or non-existent representation \r\nof the socio-political and institutional agreement. Accompanying \r\nthe required deployment of low-carbon technologies will be the \r\nformation of new socio-technical systems (Bergek et al. 2008). With \r\na  socio-technical system being defined as a  cluster of elements \r\ncomprising of technology, regulation, user practices and markets, \r\ncultural meaning, infrastructure, maintenance networks, and supply \r\nnetworks (Hofman et al. 2004; Geels and Geels 2005); the inter\u0002relationship between technological systems and social systems must "


id: 27bfe0ee94ebc58b2b59ab7d1aa1016c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"There is strong agreement that the climate policy institutional \r\nframework as well as technological progress have a profound impact \r\non the attainability of low-carbon pathways. Delaying international \r\ncooperation reduces the available carbon budget and locks into \r\ncarbon-intensive infrastructure exacerbating implementation \r\nchallenges (Keppo and Rao 2007; Bosetti et al. 2009; Boucher et al. \r\n2009; Clarke et al. 2009; Krey and Riahi 2009; van Vliet et al. 2009; "


id: c66e12ae01d7c10f5a8aaa6e7d162a31
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content:
"innovation market failures, and also address the dynamic nature of \r\npolitical feasibility (Bosetti et al. 2011)."


id: cfc77f2f1ec5324b5f8467a5a2f5c2b
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vector_id: 30222
content:
"Knopf et al. 2011; Jakob et al. 2012; Luderer et al. 2013; Rogelj \r\net al. 2013a; Aboumahboub et al. 2014; Kriegler et al. 2014a; Popp \r\net al. 2014; Riahi et al. 2015; Gambhir et al. 2017; Bertram et al. \r\n2021). Similarly, technological availability influences the feasibility \r\nof climate stabilisation, though differently for different technologies \r\n(Kriegler et al. 2014a; Iyer et al. 2015a; Riahi et al. 2015)."


id: df68064db15b68ef6264224ec9bf847a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
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vector_id: 32647
content:
"The analysis in this chapter relies on the available literature as well \r\nas an assessment of the scenarios contained in the AR6 scenarios \r\ndatabase. Scenarios were submitted by research and other institutions \r\nfollowing an open call (Annex III.II.3.1). The scenarios included in the \r\nAR6 scenarios database are an unstructured ensemble, as they are \r\nfrom multiple underlying studies and depend on which institutions \r\nchose to submit scenarios to the database. As noted in Section 3.2, \r\nthey do not represent the full scenario literature or the complete set \r\nof possible scenarios. For example, scenarios that include climate \r\nchange impacts or economic degrowth are not fully represented, \r\nas these scenarios, with a  few exceptions, were not submitted \r\nto the database. Additionally, sensitivity studies, which could \r\nhelp elucidate model behaviour and drivers of change, are mostly \r\nabsent from the database - though examples exist in the literature \r\n(Marangoni et al. 2017)."


id: ccfa3f8436b94ad0403927c365f75120
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29797
content:
"Nonetheless, winning support will require a mix of policies which go \r\nbeyond carbon pricing, and include subsidies, mandates and feebates \r\n(Jenkins 2014; Rozenberg et al. 2018). More recent scenarios take \r\ninto account a more comprehensive range of policies and regional \r\nheterogeneity in the near to medium term (Roelfsema et al. 2020). \r\nRegulatory policies complementing carbon prices could reduce \r\nthe implementation challenges by increasing short-term emission \r\nreduction, though they could eventually reduce economic efficiency \r\n(Bertram et al. 2015b; Kriegler et al. 2018a). Innovation policies \r\nsuch as subsidies to R&D have been shown to be desirable due to "


id: fa3daad168acbd15ee6878c58b20537e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36891
content:
"Scenarios are not independent of each other and not representative \r\nof all possible outcomes, nor of the underlying scenario generation \r\nprocess; thus, the statistical power of the database is limited. \r\nDependencies in the data-generation process originate from various \r\nsources. Certain model groups, and types, are over-represented. For \r\nexample, eight model teams contributed 90% of scenarios. Second, \r\nnot all models can generate all scenarios, and these differences are \r\nnot random, thereby creating selection bias (Tavoni and Tol 2010). "


id: 79a5e1834765d2159b7d82229fc6fa89
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16707
content:
"Third, there are strong model dependencies: the modelling scientific \r\ncommunity shares code and data, and several IAMs are open-source. "


id: 68ada0c78b39640eb973b95966bd185
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14065
content:
"Halting global warming in the long term requires, at a minimum, that no additional CO2 emissions from human activities are added \r\nto the atmosphere (i.e., CO2 emissions must reach 'net' zero). Given that CO2 emissions constitute the dominant human influence \r\non global climate, global net zero CO2 emissions are a prerequisite for stabilising warming at any level. However, CO2 is not the \r\nonly greenhouse gas that contributes to global warming and reducing emissions of other greenhouse gases (GHGs) alongside \r\nCO2 towards net zero emissions of all GHGs would lower the level at which global temperature would peak. The temperature \r\nimplications of net zero GHG emissions depend on the bundle of gases that is being considered, and the emissions metric used to \r\ncalculate aggregated GHG emissions and removals. If reached and sustained, global net zero GHG emissions using the 100-year \r\nGlobal Warming Potential (GWP-100) will lead to gradually declining global temperature."


id: d70679285658499851b0ce3aef19197
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31338
content:
"Not all emissions can be avoided. Achieving net zero CO2 emissions globally therefore requires deep emissions cuts across all sectors \r\nand regions, along with active removal of CO2 from the atmosphere to balance remaining emissions that may be too difficult, too \r\ncostly, or impossible to abate at that time. Achieving global net zero GHG emissions would require, in addition, deep reductions of \r\nnon-CO2 emissions and additional CO2 removals to balance remaining non-CO2 emissions."


id: 83db4dd71804ef19fe218ef8dd315576
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18275
content:
"Total GHG emissions are greater than emissions of CO2 only; reaching net zero CO2 emissions therefore occurs earlier, by up to \r\nseveral decades, than net zero GHG emissions in all modelled pathways. In most modelled pathways that likely limit warming to 2degC \r\n(>67%) above pre-industrial levels and below in the most cost-effective way, the agriculture, forestry and other land-use (AFOLU) \r\nand energy supply sectors reach net zero CO2 emissions several decades earlier than other sectors; however, many pathways show \r\nmuch reduced, but still positive, net GHG emissions in the AFOLU sector in 2100."


id: e117a6a47872c2664fadb95b04bc7d99
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32912
content:
"Julius Partson Daka (Zambia), Sha Fu (China), James S. Gerber (the United States of America), Sivan \r\nKartha (the United States of America), Volker Krey (Germany/Austria), Hans Lofgren (Sweden/\r\nthe  United States of America), Toshihiko Masui (Japan), Ritu Mathur (India), Joana  Portugal\u0002Pereira (Brazil), Benjamin  K. Sovacool (Denmark/United Kingdom), Maria Virginia Vilarino \r\n(Argentina), Nan Zhou (the United States of America)"


id: 56f3a2667e588300196504328c1a7d02
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11155
content:
"Lecocq, F., H. Winkler, J.P. Daka, S. Fu, J.S. Gerber, S. Kartha, V. Krey, H. Lofgren, T. Masui, R. Mathur, J. Portugal-Pereira, \r\nB.  K. Sovacool,  M. V. Vilarino,  N. Zhou, 2022: Mitigation and development pathways in the near- to mid-term. In \r\nIPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth \r\nAssessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, \r\nR. van  Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, \r\n(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.006"


id: 78f800772d5eb11d9680c4ccf6e93992
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16585
content:
"capacity building support. The disruptions triggered by the COVID-19 \r\nepidemic increase uncertainty over range of projections relative \r\nto pre-COVID-19 literature. As indicated by a  growing number of \r\nstudies at the national and global level, how large near- to mid-term \r\nemissions implications of the COVID-19 pandemic are, to a  large \r\ndegree depends on how stimulus or recovery packages are designed. \r\n{4.2, 4.2.2.5, Cross-Chapter Box 4}"


id: f976807251ea52f7b04f6bf9abae9049
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36759
content:
"This chapter focuses on accelerating mitigation and on shifting \r\ndevelopment pathways to increased sustainability, based on literature \r\nparticularly at national scale. While previous WGIII assessments have \r\ndiscussed mitigation pathways, focus on development pathways is \r\nmore recent. The timeframe is the near term (now up to 2030) to \r\nmid-term (2030 to 2050), complementing Chapter 3 on the long term \r\n(from 2050 onward)."


id: e59a611e208d35891445fb21ed7a0eda
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33631
content:
"In sum, this chapter suggests that the immediate tasks are \r\nto broaden and deepen mitigation in the near term if the global \r\ncommunity is to deliver emission reductions at the scale required \r\nto keep temperature well below 2degC and pursue efforts at  1.5degC. \r\nDeepening mitigation means more rapid decarbonisation. Shifting \r\ndevelopment pathways to increased sustainability (SDPS) broadens \r\nthe scope of mitigation. Putting the enabling conditions above in \r\nplace supports both. Depending on context, some enabling conditions \r\nsuch as shifting behaviour may take time to establish, underscoring \r\nthe importance of early action. Other enabling conditions, such as \r\nimproved access to financing, can be put in place in a relatively short \r\ntime frame, and can yield results rapidly."


id: 9b434d686cbbf57015d9365bff51b7ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21972
content:
"lower use of fossil fuels than today; (v) converting other uses to low\u0002or zero-carbon fuels (e.g., hydrogen, bioenergy, ammonia) in hard\u0002to-decarbonise sectors; (vi) promote bioenergy, demand reduction, \r\ndietary changes, and policies, incentives, and rules for mitigation in \r\nthe land sector; and (vii) setting and meeting ambitious targets to \r\nreduce methane and other short-lived climate forcers. Charting just \r\ntransitions to net zero may provide a vision, which policy measures \r\ncan help achieve. Though there is increasing experience with \r\npricing carbon directly or indirectly, decision-makers might consider \r\na broader toolbox of enablers and levers that is available in domains \r\nthat have not traditionally been considered climate policy. {4.5, \r\nAnnex II.IV.11}"


id: 1618fbda22fd876742060a2af5f89ab1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 996
content:
"Broadening opportunities by focusing on development pathways \r\nand considering how to shift them: Some of the policy measures may \r\nyield rapid results, whereas other, larger transformations may take \r\nlonger. If we are to overcome obstacles, a near-term priority is to put \r\nin place the enabling conditions to shifting development pathways \r\nto increased sustainability. Learning from the examples above, \r\nfocusing on SDPS also provides a broader set of tools to accelerating \r\nmitigation and achieve other sustainable development goals. \r\nConsider climate whenever you make choices about development, \r\nand vice versa. {4.4.1}"


id: 1198012f8a078c872ae7b73d871aeca3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 258
content:
"Secondly, even if carefully designed, climate policies to accelerate \r\nmitigation may have adverse consequences for other development \r\nobjectives. As a complement to mitigation action, taking action to \r\nshift development pathways towards sustainability broadens the \r\nrange of mitigation options, while increasing the possibility to meet \r\nother development priorities at the same time (medium evidence,\r\nhigh agreement)."


id: a8cbdbc7e547757310f28bf7eb93a68f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24082
content:
"The recent IPCC Report on Global Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5) made \r\nclear that the next three decades are critical if we are to achieve \r\nthe long-term mitigation goal of the Paris Agreement (IPCC 2018a). \r\nThe present chapter assesses the literature on mitigation and \r\ndevelopment pathways over that timeframe, in the near (up to 2030) \r\nand mid-term (up to 2050)."


id: 4e11b805bc101ba9311a8171e5f9b060
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9705
content:
"Development pathways and shifting them to increased sustainability \r\nare introduced in Chapter  1, and constitute a  thread throughout \r\nthe report (see 'development pathways' in Annex  I: Glossary). \r\nThe AR6 WGII Report highlights the related concept of climate \r\nresilient development pathways (AR6 WGII, Chapter  18). Cross\u0002Chapter Box  5  in this chapter  - on shifting sustainable pathway \r\ntowards sustainability  - elaborates on the concept. The influence \r\nof development pathways on emissions and mitigative capacity is \r\ndiscussed in Chapter  2. Chapter  3  assesses modelling of shifts in \r\ndevelopment pathways, illustrated by the illustrative mitigation \r\npathway called 'shifting pathways'. The importance of behavioural \r\nchange as societies make decisions that intentionally shift their \r\nfuture development pathway is emphasised in Chapter 5. The systems \r\nChapters (6-12) take sectoral perspectives, while pathways that are \r\nsustainable are the specific focus of Chapter 17."


id: 94094f131c4363486b54dd0ac9152fa9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Where are we heading now? Despite the drop in emissions due to \r\nthe COVID-19 crisis, the gap between projected emissions based on \r\nNationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in 2030 and emissions \r\npathways compatible with the long term temperature goal set in the \r\nParis Agreement remains large (Section  4.2.2). In addition to this \r\npersistent emissions gap, we face an implementation gap, as current \r\npolicies are insufficient to achieve mitigation targets in NDCs, and \r\nsufficient international support is not yet available to developing \r\ncountries who have requested and quantified support needs. \r\nContinuing along a development pathway characterised by the same \r\nunderlying drivers, structural obstacles and insufficient enabling \r\nconditions that led to high emissions will not address the problem \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement)."


id: 63ba858fd488674269044abc708f8c71
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13258
content:
"The analysis of the gap is conducted together with Chapter 3 (Cross\u0002Chapter Box  4  in this chapter). Chapter  3  is working backward, \r\nassessing mitigation in the long term (beyond 2050 up to 2100) to \r\ndraw the near- and mid-term implications of long-term temperature \r\nand mitigations goals. Chapter  4, on the other hand, works \r\nforward from current and planned mitigation (including NDCs) \r\n(Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2) and from current development paths to \r\nassess the implications for near- and mid-term greenhouse gases \r\n(GHG) emissions and development goals. Some countries, regions, \r\ncities, communities and non-state actors are taking leadership in \r\nimplementing more ambitious action (Section  4.2.3). This chapter \r\nalso assesses national low emission development strategies \r\n(Section 4.2.4)."


id: 5dd8676baa99c4e092798b46fd122451
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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vector_id: 12299
content:
"Enabling conditions necessary to accelerate mitigation and shift \r\ndevelopment pathways are discussed in depth in Chapters  5, 13, \r\n14, 15 and 16. In addition, Chapters  13 and 14 detail the policy \r\ninstruments that could help shift development pathways and \r\naccelerate the scale and pace of mitigation, while Chapter 4 describes \r\nthose in broad strategies terms. Chapter  13 adds more texture \r\non  institutional and governance machinery; policy choice, \r\ndesign and implementation; as well as policy formulation processes, \r\nactors and structure across scales."


id: 871e49470bb9df6171029d55f88b7acb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18790
content:
"Where do we want to go? Technical alternatives and policy options \r\nexist to bridge the emissions and implementation gaps, and the \r\nliterature illustrates these with a wide range of accelerated techno\u0002economic pathways that deepen decarbonisation closer to the pace \r\nand scale required (Section  4.2.5), and examines their impacts on \r\nother development objectives (Section 4.2.6). In practice, however, \r\nscaling up at the broader, deeper, and faster level required to meet \r\nclimate goals while advancing other development objectives regularly \r\nfaces prohibitive obstacles (Section 4.2.7). Mitigation policies grafted \r\non to existing development pathways are unlikely to achieve rapid \r\nand deep emission reductions."


id: 79687b8f221ae305b6f5bce539953275
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16676
content:
"Since development pathways and mitigation options depend to \r\nlarge extent on national objectives and circumstances, this chapter \r\nis primarily concerned with literature at national level (or in the case \r\nof the European Union, at regional level), while Chapter 3 is primarily \r\nconcerned with literature at global scale. The national scale selected \r\nin this chapter requires attention as national mitigation pathways \r\ncannot be linked directly to global mitigation goals (Box 4.2). This "


id: 59cdc9fbb6d6f77666f4063e0d6b5133
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"scholarship on the ethical underpinnings of these assertions and of \r\nvarious quantitative analyses of equitable effort-sharing. Section 4.2.6 \r\ndiscusses certain distributional implications of domestic mitigation \r\nefforts, such as shifts in employment. Sections  4.2.7 and  4.3 note \r\nthe relevance of potential distributional impacts as an obstacle to \r\nclimate action, as well as the inequitable distribution of decision\u0002making authority. Finally, Section  4.5 recognises the structural \r\nrelationship between equity and climate, explores just transitions as \r\nan international focal point tying together social movements, trade \r\nunions, and other stakeholders, and thus an instrumental role in \r\nestablishing consensus."


id: ac77c34a101f1ff4da2367a16600784
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24673
content:
"chapter is also concerned mostly with economy-wide development \r\nand mitigation pathways, as distinct from detailed sectoral work that \r\nis assessed in the systems Chapters 6 to 12. The present chapter also \r\nassesses literature on non-state action."


id: 818110ff4f6fe0d4e364e001bf42157a
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17905
content:
"Chapter 4 draws on five major strands of literature: (i) an emerging \r\nliterature on development pathways  - conceptual, empirical, and \r\nmodel-based, including at the national and sub-national scales; \r\n(ii)  a  rapidly expanding, model-based, literature on mitigation \r\npathways in the near- and mid-term (Lepault and Lecocq 2021); \r\n(iii)  studies of NDCs and mid-century strategies; (iv) a  broader \r\nliterature on transformation and shifts in development pathways, \r\nincluding from non-climate literatures; and (v) a significant literature \r\non equity, including just transitions. This is supported by a database \r\nof country-level mitigation scenarios at country level assembled for \r\nthe preparation of this chapter (Annex III, Table I.10 and I.11)."


id: 1c341c7ae5def679069f65a8a031970e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"A central instrument of the Paris Agreement is the NDCs, submitted by \r\neach country, and reflecting national efforts to reduce GHG emissions \r\nand build resilience to the impacts of climate change. Every five years, \r\ncollective progress will be compared against long-term goals of the \r\nParis Agreement. Considering the outcome of a  global stocktake, \r\ncountries will prepare subsequent NDCs, showing progression in their \r\nambition and enhancing international cooperation (UNFCCC 2015a)."


id: 5ecfdfa1dc6aa2afc436c1ca465d652e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12458
content:
"Chapter  4  examines mitigation within the broader context of \r\ndevelopment pathways, and examines how shifting development \r\npathways can have a  major impact on mitigative capacity and \r\nbroadening mitigation options. It is organised as follows."


id: 71860ab63682c5d71267790d74d24405
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Section 4.2 demonstrates that collective mitigation actions fall short \r\nof pathways that keep in reach the Paris temperature goals in the long \r\nterm. Section 4.3 introduces development pathways (given its relative \r\nnovelty in IPCC assessments), considers the implications of mitigation \r\nfor development and vice versa, and articulates an approach on both\r\naccelerating mitigation and shifting development pathways."


id: 4e8343aea055c9335e4f7cc1f5de1c41
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vector_id: 9785
content:
"Submitted NDCs vary in content, scope and background assumptions. \r\nFirst NDCs contain mitigation targets, and in many cases also \r\nprovisions about adaptation. The mitigation targets range from \r\neconomy-wide absolute emission reduction targets to strategies, \r\nplans and actions for low-emission development. Baseline years vary \r\nfrom 1990 to 2015 and in almost all NDCs the targeted time frame is \r\n2030, with a few specified periods of until 2025, 2035, 2040 or 2050. \r\nAround 43% of the mitigation targets in first NDCs are expressed in \r\nterms of deviation below business-as-usual by a specified target year, \r\neither for the whole economy or for specific sectors, while around \r\n35% include fixed-level targets (either reductions or limitations \r\ncompared to base years), and another 22% refer to intensity targets \r\n(in terms of GHG, CO2 or energy) or policies and measures, with an "


id: 53be6a2033230b8e06a0da95ca09661b
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content:
"Section  4.4 discusses how to shift development pathway and \r\naccelerate the scale and pace of mitigation, what levers are available \r\nto policymakers, and how policies may intersect with adaptation \r\ngoals. It points out that development pathways also drive adaptation \r\nand adaptative capacity, and discusses various risks associated with \r\nshifting development pathways and accelerated mitigation strategies."


id: 7bcaa9041d46f794e28ba7651817b37e
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content:
"Finally, equity and just transitions are recurring themes in the \r\nchapter, specifically in relation to accelerating mitigation and shifting \r\ndevelopment pathways toward sustainability. In Section  4.2.2.7, \r\nequity is discussed in the context of Parties' assertions regarding \r\nthe fairness of their NDCs, alongside reflections from academic "


id: 30dcee6788202cc7966f5fd48f12e88d
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vector_id: 5110
content:
"increasing number of Parties moving to absolute emission reduction \r\ntargets in their new or updated NDCs (UNFCCC 2016a, 2021). Some \r\ndeveloping countries' NDCs include unconditional elements, while \r\nothers include conditional ones, the latter with higher ambition if \r\nfinance, technology and capacity building support from developed \r\ncountries is provided (UNFCCC 2016a).2\r\n In some NDCs, the additional \r\nmitigation is quantified, in others not (Figure 14.2)."


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"There is considerable literature on country-level mitigation \r\npathways, including but not limited to NDCs. Country distribution \r\nof this literature is very unequal (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nIn particular, there is a growing literature on (I)NDCs, with a wide \r\nscope which includes estimate of emissions levels of NDCs \r\n(Section  4.2.2.2); alignment with sustainable development goals \r\n(Caetano et al. 2020; Campagnolo and Davide 2019; Fuso Nerini \r\net al. 2019; Antwi-Agyei et al. 2018); ambition (Hohne et al. 2018; \r\nVogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017; Hermwille et al. 2019); energy \r\ndevelopment (Scott et al. 2018); and the legality of downgrading \r\nNDCs (Rajamani and Brunnee 2017). Other studies note that many \r\nNDCs contain single-year mitigation targets, and suggest that \r\na multi-year trajectory is important for more rigorous monitoring \r\n(Elliott et al. 2017; Dagnet et al. 2017)."


id: 82c468b42ffffcf69135f51771fd0c57
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"The literature reviewed in this section includes globally comprehensive \r\nassessments of NDCs and current policies, both peer-reviewed and \r\nnon-peer-reviewed (but not unpublished model results) as well as \r\nsynthesis reports by the UNFCCC Secretariat, government reports \r\nand national studies."


id: 3148222371995d0761f94207683a73eb
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"The aggregate effects of NDCs provide information on where \r\nemissions might be in 2025/2030, working forward from their recent \r\nlevels. Chapter 3 of this report works backwards from temperature \r\ngoals, defining a  range of long-term global pathways consistent \r\nwith 1.5degC, 2degC and higher temperature levels. By considering the \r\ntwo together, it is possible to assess whether NDCs are collectively \r\nconsistent with 1.5degC, 2degC and other temperature pathways (Cross\u0002Chapter Box 4 in this chapter)."


id: 59f4d52144aa594e304b79cc33d69a35
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"The literature also points out that beyond the 'headline numbers', \r\ninformation in (I)NDCs is difficult to analyse (Pauw et al. 2018). \r\nInformation for 'clarity, transparency and understanding' is to be \r\ncommunicated with NDCs, although initial guidance was not specific \r\n(UNFCCC 2014). While the adoption of the Paris rule-book provided \r\nsome greater specificity (UNFCCC 2018b,c), the information included \r\nin the NDCs remains uneven. Many NDCs omit important mitigation \r\nsectors and do not adequately provide details on costs and financing \r\nof implementation (Pauw et al. 2018). Countries are also invited to \r\nexplain how their NDCs are fair and ambitious, though the way this \r\nhas been done so far has been criticised as insufficiently rigorous \r\n(Winkler et al. 2018)."


id: 66bea246221de7749e17e25c4bfb861c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"A variety of different methods are used to assess emissions \r\nimplications of NDCs and current policies over the time horizon to \r\n2025 or 2030. Some of these projections were explicitly submitted as \r\npart of an official communication to UNFCCC (e.g., Biennial Report, \r\nBiennial Update Reports or National Communications) while the \r\nmajority is from independent studies."


id: 63bb699c99d88a0309fe3aad3b069cd0
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"emissions, but have poor resolution of remaining countries or regions, \r\nwhich are assessed in aggregate terms. Conversely, studies with high \r\nresolution of a particular country tend to treat interactions with the \r\nglobal scale in a limited way. The recent literature includes attempts \r\nto provide a composite global picture from detailed national studies \r\n(Bataille et al. 2016a; Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project 2015; \r\nRoelfsema et al. 2020)."


id: 520ae8763a68de14cf74546d518c7b2f
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"A second dimension in which the studies are different is their \r\ncomprehensiveness of covering different emitting sectors. Some \r\nstudies focus on the contribution of a  single sector, for example \r\nthe agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) sector (Fyson \r\nand Jeffery 2019; Grassi et al. 2017) or the energy system (including \r\nboth energy supply and demand sectors), to emission reductions as \r\nspecified in the NDC. Such studies give an indication of the importance \r\nof a given sector to achieving the NDC target of a country and can be \r\nused as a benchmark to compare to comprehensive studies, but adding \r\nsectoral contributions up represents a methodological challenge."


id: c1d7bf87cccdcd9496a25580c88cb885
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"System modelling studies are conducted at global, regional and \r\nnational scales. Global models provide an overview, are necessary \r\nfor assessment of global phenomena (e.g.,  temperature change), \r\ncan integrate climate models and trade effects. National models \r\ntypically include more details on sectors, technology, behaviour and \r\nintersectoral linkages, but often use simplifying assumptions for \r\ninternational trade (e.g., the Armington elasticity approach). Critically, \r\nthey can also better reflect local socio-economic and political \r\nconditions and their evolution (i.e., national development pathways). \r\nA variety of modelling paradigms are found, including optimisation \r\nand simulation models, myopic and with foresight, monolithic and \r\nmodular (Annex III: Scenarios and Modelling Methods)."


id: 58bf9d0087bbd9d8e9d5f0f77015b693
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"Third, GHG coverage is different across studies. Some focus on CO2\r\nonly, while others take into account the full suite of Kyoto gases \r\n(CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6). For the latter, different metrics \r\nfor aggregating GHGs to a  CO2-equivalent metric are being used, \r\ntypically GWP 100 from different IPCC assessments (Table 4.1)."


id: 2d3437cb3774dcea12626881cd90e0a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"Fourth, studies typically cover a set of scenarios, though how these \r\nscenarios are defined varies widely. The literature reporting IAM \r\nresults often includes Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), \r\nwhich are officially communicated, and Current Policies (CP) as \r\ninterpreted by modellers. Studies based on national modelling, by \r\ncontrast, tend to define scenarios reflecting very different national \r\ncontexts. In both cases, modellers typically include so-called No \r\nPolicy Baseline scenarios (alternatively referred to as Reference \r\nor Business-as-Usual scenarios) which do not necessarily reflect \r\ncurrently implemented policies and thus are not assessed as reference \r\npathways (Section  4.2.6.1). There are also various approaches to \r\nconsidering more ambitious action compared to the CP or NDC \r\nprojections that are covered in addition."


id: ab9a0555420af7ae4d2c55a47736e442
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"Among the hybrid approaches, three broader categories can be \r\ndistinguished, (i) direct use of official emission projection as part of \r\nsubmitted NDC or other communication to UNFCCC, (ii) historical \r\ntrend extrapolation of emissions based on inventory data, possibly \r\ndisaggregated by sector and emission species, and (iii) use of \r\nReference/Business-As-Usual pathways from an independent \r\npublished study (e.g.,  IEA WEO). In all cases, the reductions are \r\nthen estimated on top of the resulting emission trajectory. Note \r\nthat globally comprehensive studies may vary the approach used \r\ndepending on the country."


id: 3526973870ab886b20e8fe1c4e12766a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"Fifth, studies differ in the way they represent policies (current or \r\nenvisioned in NDCs), depending on their internal structure. For \r\nexample, a subsidy to energy efficiency in buildings may be explicitly \r\nmodelled (e.g.,  in a  sectoral model that represents household \r\ndecisions relative to building insulation), represented by a  proxy \r\n(e.g.,  by an exogenous decrease in the discount rate households \r\nuse to make choices), or captured by its estimated outcome (e.g., by \r\nan exogenous decrease in the household demand for energy, say in an \r\nenergy system model or in a compact CGE). Detailed representations \r\n(such as the former example) do not necessarily yield more accurate \r\nresults than compact ones (the latter example), but the set of \r\nassumptions that are necessary to represent the same policy will be \r\nvery different."


id: 3decb9f36129a1a72c40eaefd38f0cf7
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"Beyond the method applied, studies also differ in a  number of \r\ndimensions, including (i) their spatial resolution and coverage, \r\n(ii) their sectoral resolution and coverage, (iii) the GHGs that are \r\nincluded in the assessment, the GWPs (or other metrics) to aggregate \r\nthem, the emissions inventory (official vs independent inventory \r\ndata) and related accounting approaches used as a  starting point \r\nfor the projections, (iv) the set of scenarios analysed (Reference/\r\nBusiness-As-Usual, Current Policies, NDCs, etc.), and (v) the degree to \r\nwhich individual policies and their impact on emissions are explicitly \r\nrepresented (Table 4.1)."


id: 18f1602c24b47d1b6a65d16ecb65f8ed
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"First, the studies are relevant to different spatial levels, ranging \r\nfrom macro-scale regions with globally comprehensive coverage to \r\nnational level (Section 4.2.2.3) and sub-national and company level in \r\na few cases (Section 4.2.3). It is important to recognise that globally \r\ncomprehensive studies typically resolve a limited number of countries \r\nindividually, in particular those that contribute a high share to global "


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"policies at sub-national level. In addition, in countries with rapidly \r\nevolving policy environments, slightly different cut-off dates for the \r\npolicies considered in an emission projection can make a significant \r\ndifference for the results (Dubash et al. 2018)."


id: cdf792b336a1d450f06f2f8441c695a1
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"to the global level. As different studies report different emission \r\nindicators, the table includes four different indicators: CO2 and GHG \r\nemissions, including or excluding AFOLU emissions. Where possible, \r\nmultiple indicators are included per study."


id: afd2e817616afdf6a52d312f0c007618
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"The challenges described above are dealt with in the assessment \r\nof quantitative results in Section 4.2.2.3 by (i) comparing national \r\nstudies with country-level results from global studies to understand \r\nsystematic biases; (ii) comparing economy-wide emissions (including \r\nAFOLU) as well as energy-related emissions; (iii) using different \r\nemission metrics including CO2 and Kyoto GHG emissions where \r\nthe latter have been harmonised to using AR6 GWP100 metrics; and \r\n(iv) tracking cut-off dates of implemented policies and NDCs used \r\nin different references (Table 4.SM.1). The most notable differences \r\nin quantitative emission estimates related to current policies \r\nand NDCs relate to the COVID-19 pandemic and its implications and \r\nto the updated NDCs mostly submitted since early 2020 which are \r\nseparately dealt with in Sections 4.2.2.4 and 4.2.2.5, respectively."


id: 226b39ea89ff2e33afe2b062770351e8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"The UNFCCC Secretariat has assessed the aggregate effect of NDCs \r\nmultiple times. The first report considered the intended NDCs in \r\nrelation to 2degC (UNFCCC 2015b), whereas the second considered \r\nNDCs also in relation to 1.5degC (UNFCCC 2016b). New submissions \r\nand updates of NDCs in 2020/21 are assessed in Section  4.2.2.5. \r\nA number of globally comprehensive studies (den Elzen et al. 2016; \r\nLuderer et al. 2016; Rogelj et al. 2016, 2017; Vandyck et al. 2016; \r\nRose et al. 2017; Baumstark et al. 2021) which estimate aggregate \r\nemissions outcomes of NDCs and current policies have previously \r\nbeen assessed in Cross-Chapter-Box 11 of IPCC SR1.5."


id: 6916e118571aac535ffbc68909b4d3dd
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"According to the assessment in this report, studies projecting \r\nemissions of current policies based on pre-COVID assumptions lead \r\nto median global GHG emissions of 60 GtCO2-eq with a full range \r\nof 54-68 by 2030 and original unconditional and conditional NDCs \r\nsubmitted in 2015/16 to 57 (49-63) and 54 (50-60) GtCO2-eq, \r\nrespectively (robust evidence, medium agreement) (Table  4.1). \r\nGlobally comprehensive and national-level studies project emissions \r\nof current policies and NDCs to 2025 and 2030 and, in general, are \r\nin good agreement about projected emissions at the country level."


id: ab816a88e55eec11a7c5865f186464c6
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"In addition to assessing the emissions outcomes of NDCs, some \r\nstudies report development indicators, by which they mean a wide \r\ndiversity of socio-economic indicators (Jiang et al. 2013; Chai and \r\nXu 2014; Delgado et al. 2014; La Rovere et al. 2014a; Zevallos \r\net al. 2014; Benavides et al. 2015; Altieri et al. 2016; Bataille et al. \r\n2016a; Zou et al. 2016; Paladugula et al. 2018; Parikh et al. 2018; \r\nYang et al. 2021), share of low-carbon energy (Bertram et al. 2015; \r\nRiahi et al. 2015), renewable energy deployment (Roelfsema et al. \r\n2018), production of fossil fuels (SEI et al. 2020) or investments into \r\nlow-carbon mitigation measures (McCollum et al. 2018) to track \r\nprogress towards long-term temperature goals."


id: bb2148d91744469c5f0e8a3690553c09
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"These estimates are close to the ones provided by the IPCC \r\nSR1.5, Cross-Chapter-Box  11, and the UNEP emissions gap \r\nreport (UNEP 2020a).3"


id: a87a121b4fb78486a5bf54ad08bdb479
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"A large body of literature on national and regional emissions \r\nprojections, including official communications of as part of the \r\nNDC submissions and independent studies exist. A  subset of this \r\nliterature provides quantitative estimates for the 2030 timeframe. \r\nAs highlighted in Section 4.2.1, the number of independent studies \r\nvaries considerably across countries with an emphasis on the largest \r\nemitting countries. This is reflected in Table 4.1 (see also Table 4.SM.1). \r\nDespite smaller differences between globally comprehensive \r\nand national studies for a  few countries, there is generally good \r\nagreement between the different types of studies, providing evidence \r\nthat these quantitative estimates are fairly robust."


id: 68a01d541ab0a37f6ab4c0b700f7127e
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"The emissions projections presented in this section relate to the first \r\nNDCs, as communicated in 2015 and 2016, and on which an extensive \r\nliterature exists. New and updated NDCs, mostly submitted since the \r\nbeginning of 2020, are dealt with in Section  4.2.2.5. Similarly, \r\nthe implications of COVID-19 and the related government responses \r\non emissions projections is specifically dealt with in Section 4.2.2.4."


id: ff3a75d451ce7c39ad9acfc71385ec4f
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"Table 4.1 presents the evidence base for the assessment of projected \r\nemissions of original NDCs and current policies until 2030. It covers \r\n31 countries and regions responsible for about 82% of global GHG \r\nemission (excluding FOLU CO2 emissions) and draws quantitative \r\nestimates from more than 40 studies (Table  4.SM.1 in the \r\nSupplementary Material to this chapter). The table allows comparing \r\nemission projections from national and globally comprehensive \r\nstudies as well as official communications by countries to the \r\nUNFCCC at the national/regional level. The global aggregates \r\npresented in Table  4.1 derive from globally comprehensive studies \r\nonly and are not the result of aggregating country projections up "


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"Sectoral studies are essential to understand the contributions of \r\nconcrete measures of NDCs and current policies. For example, \r\napproximately 98% of NDCs include the energy sector in their \r\nmitigation contributions, of which nearly 50% include a  specific "


id: 6cf10f8954e3888a92740b5ea802937f
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"target for the share of renewables, and about 5% aim at increasing \r\nnuclear energy production (Stephan et al. 2016). Transport is covered \r\nexplicitly in 75% of NDCs, although specific targets for the sector \r\nexist in only 21% of NDCs (PPMC and SLoCaT 2016). Measures or \r\ntargets for buildings are referred to explicitly in 27% of NDCs (GIZ \r\n2017). Additionally, 36% of NDCs include targets or actions that are \r\nspecific to the agriculture sector (FAO 2016). LULUCF (mitigation) is \r\nincluded in 80% of all submitted NDCs, while 59% include adaptation \r\nand 29% refer to REDD+."


id: a4566d4e83b2a69589049204385d54b7
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"(Table  4.SM.2). Nascimento et al. (2021) analyse the impacts of \r\nCOVID-19 on current policy emission projections for 26 countries and \r\nregions and find a large range of emission reduction - between -1% \r\nand -21% - across these."


id: 154ffa46f9b7badb50bea2587e20ce52
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"As indicated by a  growing number of studies at the national and \r\nglobal level, how large near- to mid-term emissions implications \r\nof the COVID-19 pandemic are to a large degree depends on how \r\nstimulus or  recovery packages are designed (Forster et al. 2020; \r\nGillingham et al. 2020; IEA 2020; Le Quere et al. 2020; Malliet \r\net al. 2020; Wang  et al. 2020; Obergassel et al. 2021; Pollitt et al. \r\n2021; UNEP 2020a)."


id: 8c6c91544bc0777f2ce0ff6eda94cf6c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"Greater sectoral expertise and involvement will be critical to \r\naccomplishing development and climate goals due to enhanced \r\navailability of information and expertise on specific sectoral options, \r\ngreater ease of aligning the NDCs with sectoral strategies, and greater \r\nawareness among sector-level decision-makers and stakeholders \r\n(Fekete et al. 2015; NDC Partnership 2017). Sector-specific studies \r\nare assessed in the sectoral Chapters (6 to 11) of this report."


id: 4a6285ee4eb7a965ee87f05cfc092789
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"Four studies (Climate Action Tracker 2021; den Elzen et al. 2021; JRC \r\n2021; Riahi et al. 2021) provide an update of the current policies \r\nassessment presented in Section 4.2.2.3 by taking into account the \r\neffects of COVID-19 as well as potential updates of policies. The \r\nresulting GHG emissions in 2030 are estimated to be 57 GtCO2-eq \r\nwith a full range of 52 to 60 GtCO2-eq (Table 4.2). This is a reduction \r\nof about 3 GtCO2-eq or 5% compared to the pre-COVID estimates \r\nfrom Section 4.2.2.3."


id: f76188c0dd5244250bf47041c4931d66
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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"The impacts of COVID-19 and national governments' economic \r\nrecovery measures on current (Section 2.2.2) and projected emissions \r\nof individual countries and globally under current policies scenarios \r\nuntil 2030 may be significant, although estimates are highly uncertain \r\nand vary across the few available studies. The analyses published to \r\ndate (October 2021) are based on limited information about how \r\nCOVID-19 has affected the economy and hence GHG emissions \r\nacross countries so far in 2020, and also based on assumptions about \r\nCOVID-19's longer term impact. Moreover, the comparison of pre\u0002and post-COVID-19 projections captures the impact of COVID-19 as \r\nwell as other factors such as the consideration of recently adopted \r\npolicies not related to COVID-19, and methodological changes."


id: 90b76a6756574e348a100af66aceb651
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"Across different studies (Kikstra et al. 2021; IEA 2020; Dafnomilis \r\net al. 2021; Pollitt et al. 2021; UNEP 2020a; Climate Action Tracker \r\n2020; Keramidas et al. 2021; Dafnomilis et al. 2020), the impact of the \r\ngeneral slowdown of the economy due to the COVID-19 pandemic \r\nand its associated policy responses would lead to a  reduced \r\nestimate of global GHG emissions in 2030 of about 1 to 5 GtCO2-eq, \r\nequivalent to  1.5-8.5%, compared to the pre-COVID-19 estimates "


id: 4b18ea3c089e21f9cff57d2c8dc15e2d
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"Notes: a GHG emissions expressed in CO2-eq emission using AR6 100-year GWPs. GHG emissions from studies that provide aggregate GHG emissions using other GWPs are \r\nrescaled using 2019 GHG emissions from Chapter 2 (Minx et al. 2021; Crippa et al. 2021). b\r\n If a range is available from a study, a median is provided in addition to the range. c\r\n Range includes estimates from four models: GEM-E3, MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM, POLES, REMIND-MAgPIE, based on sensitivity analysis. d To avoid a bias due to multiple estimates \r\nprovided by the same model, only one estimate per model, typically the most recent update, is included in the median estimate for the total."


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"An additional challenge lies in the fact that these studies do not all \r\napply the same cut-off date for NDC updates, potentially leading \r\nto larger systematic deviations in the resulting emission estimates. \r\nAnother complication is the fact that publicly announced mitigation \r\npledges on global 2030 emissions that have not been officially \r\nsubmitted to the UNFCCC NDC registry yet, have been included in \r\nseveral of the studies to anticipate their impact on emission levels \r\n(see notes to Table 4.3). In addition to the updates of NDC targets, \r\nmost of the new studies also include impacts of COVID-19 on future \r\nemission levels (as discussed in Section 4.2.2.4) which may have led \r\nto considerable downward revisions of emission trends unrelated to \r\nNDCs. Table 4.3 presents the emission estimates of the four studies \r\nthat form the basis of the quantitative assessment presented here \r\nand three other studies to compare with."


id: 4d804969b917d4434d378c971a02a488
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"22 GtCO2-eq (19-26). New and updated conditional NDCs reduce the \r\nmedian gap with emissions pathways that limit warming to 1.5degC \r\n(>50%) with no or limited overshoot in 2030 by about 20%, from \r\na  median gap of 24  GtCO2-eq (20-29) to 19  GtCO2-eq (16-23). \r\nBox 4.1 discusses the adaptation gap."


id: 449f3ae5ce47aea7c014a923b0aea3ec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:32
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content:
"Globally, the implementation gap between projected emissions of \r\ncurrent policies and the unconditional and conditional new and \r\nupdated NDCs is estimated to be around 4 and 7 GtCO2-eq in 2030, \r\nrespectively (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Tables  4.2 \r\nand  4.3), with many countries requiring additional policies and \r\nassociated climate action to meet their mitigation targets as \r\nspecified under the NDCs (limited evidence) (Section  4.2.2.6). It \r\nshould be noted that the implementation gap varies considerably \r\nacross countries, with some having policies in place estimated to be \r\nsufficient to achieve the emission targets their NDCs, some where \r\nadditional policies may be required to be sufficient, as well as \r\ndifferences between the policies in place and action on the ground."


id: 64ae6838b5261c9b91c3d92e933cb2e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Under the Enhanced Transparency Framework, countries will transition \r\nfrom reporting biennial reports (BRs) and biennial update reports \r\n(BURs) to reporting biennial transparency reports (BTRs) starting, at \r\nthe latest, by December 2024. Each Party will be required to report \r\ninformation necessary to track progress made in implementing and \r\nachieving its NDC under the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2018b). Thus, \r\nno official data exists yet on tracking progress of individual NDCs."


id: 49d2969dbfe8001187644f4ad4e04b9c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"With an implementation gap in 2030 of 4  to 7  GtCO2-eq \r\n(Section 4.2.2.5), many countries will need to implement additional \r\npolicies to meet their self-determined mitigation targets as specified \r\nunder the NDCs. Studies that assess the level of projected emissions \r\nunder current policies indicate that new policies (that have been \r\nimplemented since the first assessment of the NDCs in 2015 and are \r\nthus covered in more recent projections) have reduced projections, \r\nby about two GtCO2-eq since the adoption of the Paris Agreement \r\nin 2015 to 2019 (Climate Action Tracker 2019; UNEP 2020a; \r\nden Elzen et al. 2019)."


id: d4785c0f951dbbc9ed654e758c55c6eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"There are many factors that influence the global aggregated effects of \r\nNDCs. There is limited literature on systematically analysing the impact \r\nof uncertainties on the NDC projections with some exception (Rogelj \r\net al. 2017; Benveniste et al. 2018). The UNEP Gap Report (UNEP \r\n2017a) discusses uncertainties of NDC estimates in some detail. The \r\nmain factors include variations in overall socio-economic development; \r\nuncertainties in GHG inventories; conditionality; targets with ranges or \r\nfor single years; accounting of biomass; and different GHG aggregation \r\nmetrics (e.g., GWP values from different IPCC assessments). In addition, \r\nwhen mitigation effort in NDCs is described as measures that do only \r\nindirectly translate into emission reductions, assumptions necessary \r\nfor the translation come into play (Doelle 2019). For a more elaborate \r\ndiscussion of uncertainties in NDCs (Section 14.3.2)."


id: b86dd8cc34e42971fa56037441f99eba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Most countries provided information on how they consider their \r\nNDCs to be fair and ambitious in the NDCs submitted to UNFCCC and \r\nmany of these NDCs refer to specific national circumstances such as \r\nsocial, economic and geographical factors when outlining why they \r\nare fair and ambitious. Further, several Parties provided information \r\non specific criteria for evaluating fairness and ambition, including \r\ncriteria relating to: responsibility and capability; share of emissions; \r\ndevelopment and/or technological capacity; mitigation potential; cost \r\nof mitigation actions; the degree of progression or stretching beyond \r\nthe current level of effort; and the link to objectives and global goals \r\n(UNFCCC 2016a)."


id: 32bf4e4c3d088f0d43e5023dffd28f6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Some studies assume successful implementation of all of the NDCs' \r\nproposed measures, sometimes including varying assumptions to \r\naccount for some of the NDC features which are subject to assumed \r\nconditions related to finance and technology transfer. Countries 'shall \r\npursue domestic mitigation measures' under Article 4.2 of the Paris \r\nAgreement (UNFCCC 2015a), but they are not legally bound to the \r\nresult of reducing emissions (Winkler 2017a). Some authors consider \r\nthis to be a  lack of a  strong guarantee that mitigation targets in \r\nNDCs will be implemented (Nemet et al. 2017). Others point to \r\ngrowing extent of national legislation to provide a  legal basis for \r\naction (Iacobuta et al. 2018) (Section 13.2). These factors together \r\nwith incomplete information in NDCs mean there is uncertainty \r\nabout the estimates of anticipated 2030 emission levels."


id: edc2b2f852c04d3917b6cb5bcc750b00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"According to its Article 2.2, the Paris Agreement will be implemented \r\nto reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated \r\nresponsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different \r\nnational circumstances, the latter clause being new, added to \r\nthe UNFCCC principle (Voigt and Ferreira 2016; Rajamani 2017). \r\nPossible different interpretations of equity principles lead to different \r\nassessment frameworks (Lahn and Sundqvist 2017; Lahn 2018)."


id: 1302ec10b0693565a9e0b2713946f235
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Various assessment frameworks have been proposed to analyse \r\nfair share ranges for NDCs. The literature on equity frameworks \r\nincluding quantification of national emissions allocation is assessed \r\nin section 4.5 (Sections 13.4.2, 14.3.2 and 14.5.3). Recent literature "


id: b315f10e214a6a407fedfec0c2e4b245
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"The aggregation of targets results in large uncertainty (Rogelj et al. \r\n2017; Benveniste et al. 2018). In particular, clarity on the contributions \r\nfrom the land use sector to NDCs is needed 'to prevent high \r\nLULUCF uncertainties from undermining the strength and clarity of \r\nmitigation in other sectors' (Fyson and Jeffery 2019). Methodological \r\ndifferences in the accounting of the LULUCF anthropogenic CO2\r\nsink between scientific studies and national GHG inventories (as \r\nsubmitted to UNFCCC) further complicate the comparison and "


id: 91e59de5411d2b3306cce6655f343761
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"aggregation of emissions of NDC implementation (Grassi et al. 2018, \r\n2021) (Section  7.2.3 and Cross-Chapter Box  6  in Chapter  7). This \r\nuncertainty could be reduced with clearer guidelines for compiling \r\nfuture NDCs, in particular when it comes to mitigation efforts not \r\nexpressed as absolute economy-wide targets (Doelle 2019), and \r\nexplicit specification of technical details, including energy accounting \r\nmethods, harmonised emission inventories (Rogelj et al. 2017) and \r\nfinally, increased transparency and comparability (Pauw et al. 2018)."


id: 872569cff21d74dd000db95d5045d0dd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"The Paris Agreement (PA) sets a long-term goal of holding the increase of global average temperature to 'well below 2degC above pre\u0002industrial levels' and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5degC above pre-industrial levels. This is underpinned by \r\nthe 'aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible' and 'achieve a balance between anthropogenic \r\nemissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHG in the second half of this century' (UNFCCC 2015a). The PA adopts a bottom-up \r\napproach in which countries determine their contribution to reach the PA's long-term goal. These national targets, plans and measures \r\nare called 'nationally determined contributions' or NDCs."


id: c91c02114a438d8a7221ebcd13b3d89d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Cross-Chapter Box 4, Figure 1 | Global GHG emissions of modelled pathways (funnels in Panel a, and associated bars in Panels b, c, d) and \r\nprojected emission outcomes from near-term policy assessments for 2030 (Panel b)."


id: c2f44c326a931e59f1eee9ee6d2cf5a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 28251
content:
"Cross-Chapter Box 4, Figure 1 (continued): Global GHG emissions of modelled pathways (funnels in Panel a, and associated bars in Panels b, c, d) \r\nand projected emission outcomes from near-term policy assessments for 2030 (Panel b)."


id: 91616ec4dbcbb9f0d220fb05a2f702a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Past GHG emissions for 2010-2015 used to project global warming outcomes of the modelled pathways are shown by a black line4\r\n and past global \r\nGHG emissions in 2015 and 2019 as assessed in Chapter 2 are shown by whiskers."


id: 26cc7f1e14fe0ad8e81902b57bee39f1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Panels b, c and d show snapshots of the GHG emission ranges of the modelled pathways in 2030, 2050, and 2100, respectively. Panel b also \r\nshows projected emissions outcomes from near-term policy assessments in 2030 from Chapter 4.2 (Tables 4.2 and 4.3; median and full range). GHG \r\nemissions are in CO2-equivalent using GWP100 from AR6 WGI. {3.5, 4.2, Table 4.2, Table 4.3, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}"


id: 96246c009a6ae2fc6f6724b9c10ac16
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content:
"The NDCs are a central instrument of the PA to achieve its long-term goal. It thus combines a global goal with a country-driven \r\n(bottom-up) instrument to a hybrid climate policy architecture to strengthen the global response to climate change. All signatory \r\ncountries committed to communicating nationally determined contributions including mitigation targets, every five years. While the \r\nNDCs mostly state targets, countries are also obliged to pursue domestic mitigation measures to achieve the objectives. The literature \r\nexamines the emissions outcome of the range of policies implemented to reach these targets."


id: cdd8987f62d4408dc64b85b8358c5091
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Beyond the quantification of different GHG emissions gaps, there is an emerging literature that identifies gaps between current \r\npolicies, NDCs and long-term temperature in terms of other indicators, including for example the deployment of low-carbon energy \r\nsources, energy efficiency improvements, fossil fuel production levels or investments into mitigation measures (Roelfsema et al. 2020; \r\nMcCollum et al. 2018; SEI et al. 2020)."


id: 2073ce886e7aa40dc3527ed88dd5e72c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"A 2030 gap in the contribution of low-carbon energy sources to the energy mix in 2030 between current policies and cost-effective \r\nlong-term temperature pathways is calculated to be around 7percentage-points (2degC) and 13percentage-points (1.5degC) by Roelfsema \r\net al. (Roelfsema et al. 2020). The same authors estimate an energy intensity improvement gap 10% and 18% for 2030 between current \r\npolicies pathways and 2degC and 1.5degC pathways, respectively. SEI et al. (2020) estimates the 'fossil fuel production gap', by which they \r\nmean 'the level of countries' planned fossil fuel production expressed in their carbon content to be 120% and 50% higher compared \r\nto the fossil fuel production consistent with 1.5degC and 2degC pathways, respectively, as assessed in IPCC SR1.5 (Rogelj et al. 2018a). "


id: ef3425788d8eab5b8312c33fa726add0
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"The methodology used for this estimation is very similar to how emissions gaps are derived (SEI et al. 2019). The gap of global \r\nannual average investments in low-carbon energy and energy efficiency in 2030 between following current policy on the one \r\nhand and achieving the NDCs, the 2degC and 1.5degC targets on the other hand, is estimated to be approximately USD 130, 320, or \r\n480 billion per year (McCollum et al. 2018)."


id: deef0e6a4ff6b044805c66352e5f0cc5
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content:
"It is important to note that such comparisons are less straight forward as the link between long-term temperature goals and these \r\nindicators is less pronounced compared to the emission levels themselves; they are therefore associated with greater uncertainty \r\ncompared to the emissions gap."


id: df36cd77ec62986a106fd104a115739c
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content:
"NDCs have been an important driver of national adaptation planning, with cascading effects on sectors and sub-national action, \r\nespecially in developing countries. Yet, only 40 developing countries have quantifiable adaptation targets in their current NDCs; \r\n49 countries include quantifiable targets in their national legislation (UNEP 2018a)."


id: 59d853e4302d2c36ccf1ed9cfc5036dc
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content:
"members to tackle emissions reductions in specific sectors or aim for \r\ntransformational change."


id: c0248966c021a3c9ecc11f720d8333d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Quantification of the (potential) impact of these actions is still \r\nlimited. Almost all studies estimate the potential impact of the \r\nimplementation of actions by NSAs and ICIs, but do not factor in \r\nthat they may not reach their targets. The main reason for this is that \r\nthere is very limited data currently available from individual actors \r\n(e.g., annual GHG inventory reports) and initiatives to assess their \r\nprogress towards their targets. A few studies have attempted to assess \r\nprogress of initiatives by looking into the initiatives' production of \r\nrelevant outputs (Chan et al. 2018). Quantification does not yet cover \r\nall commitments and only a selected number of ICIs are analysed in \r\nthe existing literature. Most of these studies exclude commitments \r\nthat are not (self-)identified as related to climate change mitigation, \r\nthose that are not connected to international networks, or those that \r\nare communicating in languages other than English."


id: d250ac0dba5b596faafd7c8833fa0887
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content:
"Non state action could make significant contributions to achieving \r\nthe Paris climate goals (limited evidence, high agreement). However, \r\nefforts to measure the extent to which non-state and sub-national \r\nactors go beyond national policy are still nascent (Hsu et al. 2019; \r\nKuramochi et al. 2020) and we do not fully understand the extent "


id: 8c9a7f6785cde56749193f8658d226b9
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content:
"to which ambitious action by non-state actors is additional to what \r\nnational governments intend to do. Sub-national and non-state \r\nclimate action may also have benefits in reinforcing, implementing, \r\nor piloting national policy, in place of or in addition to achieving \r\nadditional emissions reductions (Broekhoff et al. 2015; Heidrich et al. \r\n2016; Hsu et al. 2017)."


id: 4f8fcd6b80b09c37aa5438dbd2b39363
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content:
"Quantification of commitments by individual NSAs are limited \r\nto date. Attempts to quantify aggregate effects in 2030 of \r\ncommitments by individual non-state and sub-national actors are \r\nreported by (Hsu et al. 2019; Kuramochi et al. 2020). Kuramochi \r\net al. (2020) estimate potential mitigation by more than  1,600 \r\ncompanies, around 6,000 cities and many regions (cities assessed \r\nhave a  collective population of 579 million, and regions 514 \r\nmillion). Individual commitments by these sub-national regions, \r\ncities and companies could reduce GHG emissions in 2030 by 1.2 \r\nto 2.0 GtCO2-eq yr-1 compared to current national policies scenario \r\nprojections, reducing projected emissions by 3.8-5.5% in 2030, if \r\ncommitments are fully implemented and do not lead to weaker \r\nmitigation actions by others (Figure 4.1 left). In several countries, \r\nNSA commitments could potentially help meet or exceed national \r\nmitigation targets."


id: ccb9abc6bc51b0fa7f8db52b20506e7d
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"Non-state action may be broader than assessed in the literature \r\nso far, though subject to uncertainty. The examples in Table  4.4 \r\nand Figure 4.1 do not include initiatives that target the emissions \r\nfrom religious organisations, colleges and universities, civic and \r\ncultural groups, and, to some extent, households, and in this sense \r\nmay underestimate sub-national potential for mitigating emissions, \r\nrather than overestimate it. That said, the estimates are contingent \r\non assumptions that sub-national and non-state actors achieve \r\ncommitments - both with respect to mitigation and in some cases "


id: 21c9e2b1915fa8910cce292dc6bd632e
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content:
"Quantification of potential emission reductions from international \r\ncooperative initiatives have been assessed in several studies, and \r\nrecently synthesised (Hsu et al. 2020; Lui et al. 2021), with some "


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"that insufficient progress has to-date been made towards this goal \r\n(NYDF Assessment Partners 2020). On the other hand, uncertainties \r\nin global forest carbon emissions (and therefore potential reductions) \r\nare high and despite a multitude of initiatives in the sector, actually \r\nmeasured deforestation rates have not declined since the initiative \r\nwas announced in 2014 (Sections 7.2 and 7.3.1). Moreover, not all \r\ninitiatives are transparent about how they plan to reach their goals \r\nand may also rely on offsets."


id: 533b7575e5a0eba17ec535acd743115d
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"membership - and that these actions are not accounted for in nor \r\nlead to weakening of national actions."


id: db9026933c6013b52babdf2ab3fa08a0
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"Care is to be taken not to depict these efforts as additional to action \r\nwithin national NDCs, unless this is clearly established (Broekhoff \r\net al. 2015). There are potential overlaps between individual NSAs \r\nand ICIs, and across ICIs. Kuramochi et al. (2020) propose partial \r\nand conservative partial effect methods to avoid double counting \r\nwhen comparing ambition, a matter that merits further attention. As \r\nthe diversity of actions increased, the potential to count the same \r\nreductions multiple times increases."


id: 27be4dd6ffdc08b573a31aeb826cda2a
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content:
"Initiatives focused on non-CO2 emissions, and particularly on \r\nmethane, can achieve sizable reductions, in the order of multiple \r\nGtCO2-eq yr-1 (Table  4.4). The Global Cement and Concrete \r\nAssociation (formerly the Cement Sustainability Initiative), has \r\ncontributed to the development of consistent energy and emissions \r\nreporting from member companies. The CSI also suggested \r\npossible approaches to balance GHG mitigation and the issues of \r\ncompetitiveness and leakage (Cook and Ponssard 2011). The member \r\ncompanies of the GCCA (CSI) have become better prepared for future \r\nlegislation on managing GHG emissions and developed management \r\ncompetence to respond to climate change compared to non-member \r\ncompanies in the cement sector (Busch et al. 2008; Global Cement \r\nand Concrete Association 2020). Accordingly, the cement industry \r\nhas developed some roadmaps to reach net zero GHG around 2050 \r\n(Sanjuan et al. 2020)."


id: feb515cf3938e5943f1c4e2aa3f8019a
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content:
"It is also important to note that individual NSAs and ICIs that commit \r\nto GHG mitigation activities are often scarce in many crucial and \r\n'hard-to-abate' sectors, such as iron and steel, cement and freight \r\ntransport (Chapters 10 and 11). Sub-national and non-state action \r\nefforts could help these sectors meet an urgent need to accelerate \r\nthe commercialisation and uptake of technical options to achieve low \r\nzero emissions (Bataille 2020)."


id: fd79eb4ec972059ff007c0bccf2f763d
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content:
"An increasing amount of literature describes mitigation pathways \r\nfor the mid-term (up to 2050). We assess literature reflecting on the \r\nUNFCCC process (Section 4.2.4.1), other official plans and strategies \r\n(Section  4.2.4.2) and academic literature on mid-century low\u0002emission pathways at the national level (Section 4.2.4.3). After the \r\nParis Agreement and the IPCC SR1.5 Report, the number of academic \r\npapers analysing domestic emission pathways compatible with \r\nthe 1.5degC limit has been increasing. Governments have developed \r\nan increasing number of mitigation strategies up to 2050. Several \r\namong these strategies aim at net zero CO2 or net zero GHG, but it is \r\nnot yet possible to draw global implications due to the limited size of \r\nsample (limited evidence, limited agreement)."


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"Box 4.2 | Direct Links Between an Individual Actor's Mitigation Efforts in the Near Term and \r\nGlobal Temperature Goals in the Long Term Cannot be Inferred: Making direct links requires \r\nclear distinctions of spatial and temporal scales (Robertson 2021; Rogelj et al. 2021) and \r\nexplicit treatment of ethical judgements made (Klinsky et al. 2017a; Holz et al. 2018; Klinsky \r\nand Winkler 2018; Rajamani et al. 2021)"


id: a17a680b77900e45c30f68ef6a6e99ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 22965
content:
"As of August 25, 2021, 31 countries and the European Union had \r\nsubmitted low-emissions development strategies (LEDS) (Table 4.5)."


id: 377b3fc20acbcdc8b6131e8b7ef5b4bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"The Paris Agreement requests that Parties should strive to formulate \r\nand communicate long-term low GHG development strategies by \r\n2020. (Note that by 'long-term', the UNFCCC means 2050, which is \r\nthe end point of the 'mid-term' horizon range in the present report.) "


id: 4c9cfde8a33fd62e660fb8f2d2056e28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"By 2018, most long-term strategies targeted 80% emissions reduction \r\nin 2050 relative to a reference (1990, 2000 or 2005). After IPCC SR1.5 \r\nwas published, the number of the countries aiming at net zero CO2 or \r\nGHG emissions has been increasing.6"


id: bfd2b192c9e0c626af73f656b211d4cd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 27734
content:
"Table 4.5 | Countries having submitted long-term low-GHG emission development strategy (as of 25 August 2021)."


id: cdd13139044ae085f161388e3fc6a737
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 29902
content:
"6 Specifying gases aids clarity, see Cross-Chapter Boxes 2 and 3 in chapters 2 and 3, respectively. Some countries refer to net zero GHG emissions as 'climate neutrality' or \r\n'carbon neutrality'; the more precise terms are used where supported by the information assessed in this report."


id: e9fc67d6bc8066250a0cd548c4883c8f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 34311
content:
"Table 4.6 | Countries with a national net zero CO2 or GHG target by 2050 \r\n(as of 25 August 2021)."


id: 90037208297e8feb2c05d2e82f8a87e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 20185
content:
"Note: In addition to the above list, the numbers of 'In Policy Document' and 'Target \r\nUnder discussion' as Target status are 37 countries and 79 countries, respectively."


id: b9bd28d797b581ad40163b00ca7b4e77
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 26764
content:
"Since the 2000s, an increasing number of studies have quantified \r\nthe emission pathways to mid-century by using national scale \r\nmodels. In the early stages, the national emission pathways were \r\nmainly assessed in the developed countries such as Germany, UK, \r\nFrance, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, and USA. For example, the \r\nEnquete Commission in Germany identified robust and sustainable \r\n80% emission reduction pathways (Deutscher Bundestag 2002). In \r\nJapan, 2050 Japan Low-Carbon Society scenario team (2008) assessed \r\nthe 70% reduction scenarios in Japan, and summarised the necessary \r\nmeasures to 'Dozen Actions towards Low-Carbon Societies'."


id: b477f31aac07d4c566d5194e03318b59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 25927
content:
"Among developing countries, China, India, South Africa assessed \r\ntheir national emission pathways. For example, detailed analysis was \r\nundertaken to analyse pathways to China's goal for carbon neutrality \r\n(EFC 2020). In South Africa, a  Scenario Building Team (2007) \r\nquantified the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios for South Africa."


id: c9fd2f9a18aba6b76f03572e50fdf417
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29334
content:
"The literature underlines the differences induced by the shift from \r\n'2degC scenarios' (typically assumed to imply mitigation in 2050 \r\naround 80% relative to 1990) to '1.5degC scenarios' (typically assumed \r\nto imply net zero CO2 or GHG emissions in 2050) (Box 4.2). For Japan, \r\nOshiro et al. (2018) shows the difference between the implications of \r\na 2degC scenario (80% reduction of CO2 in 2050) and a 1.5degC scenario \r\n(net zero CO2 emission in 2050), suggesting that for a net zero CO2\r\nemission scenario, BECCS is a key technology. Their sectoral analysis \r\naims in 2050 at negative CO2 emissions in the energy sector, and \r\nnear-zero emissions in the buildings and transport sectors, requiring \r\nenergy efficiency improvement and electrification. To do so, drastic \r\nmitigation is introduced immediately, and, as a result, the mitigation "


id: 85c2924c408f35087d42a016691fc19a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 18586
content:
"Prior to COP21, most of the literature on mid-century mitigation \r\npathways at the national level was dedicated to pathways compatible \r\nwith a  2degC limit (see Box  4.2 for a  discussion on the relationship \r\nbetween national mitigation pathways and global, long-term targets). \r\nAfter COP21 and the IPCC SR1.5, literature increasingly explored just \r\ntransition to net zero emissions around 2050. This literature reflects \r\non low-emissions development strategies (cognate with SDPS, \r\nSection 4.3.1) and policies to get to net zero CO2 or GHG emissions \r\n(Garg and Waisman 2021) (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in this chapter)."


id: 791cb6bb5fc378250b813cbe02a5df4d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 16616
content:
"Figure 4.2 | Energy related CO2 emission pathways to mid-century from existing studies. Source of the historical data: Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data of UNFCCC \r\n(https://di.unfccc.int/detailed_data_by_party)"


id: b211dd9a04a5428fde5c0e53917ec4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25518
content:
"In addition to those analyses, Vishwanathan et al. (2018b), Chunark \r\nand Limmeechokchai (2018) and Pradhan et al. (2018b) build national \r\nscenarios in India, Thailand and Nepal, respectively, compatible \r\nwith a global 1.5degC. Unlike the studies mentioned in the previous \r\nparagraph, they translate the 1.5degC goal by introducing in their model \r\na carbon price trajectory estimated by global models as sufficient to \r\nachieve the 1.5degC target. Because of the high economic growth and "


id: 6befd6993f402da67cb1a6c5d2010509
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14603
content:
"target of Japan's current NDC is considered not sufficient to achieve \r\na 1.5degC scenario. Jiang et al. (2018) also show the possibility of net \r\nnegative emissions in the power sector in China by 2050, indicating \r\nthat biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (CCS) must be \r\nadopted on a large scale by 2040. Samadi et al. (2018) indicate the \r\nwidespread use of electricity-derived synthetic fuels in end-use sectors \r\nas well as behavioural change for the 1.5degC scenario in Germany."


id: 5a04c8835ea650bff15424cc15972022
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11676
content:
"Specific policies, measures and technologies are needed to reach \r\nsuch targets. These include, broadly, decarbonising electricity supply, \r\nincluding through low-carbon energy, radically more efficient use of \r\nenergy than today; electrification of end-uses (including transport/\r\nelectric vehicles); dramatically lower use of fossil fuels than today; \r\nconverting other uses to low- or zero-carbon fuels (e.g., hydrogen, \r\nbioenergy, ammonia) in hard-to-decarbonise sectors; and setting \r\nambitious targets to reduce methane and other short-lived climate \r\nforcers (SLCFs)."


id: 26463d2ab04ffbf7862e2384154bd79e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3438
content:
"increase of GHG emissions in the reference case, CO2 emissions in \r\n2050 do not reach zero. Finally, the literature also underlines that \r\nto achieve a 1.5degC target, mitigation measures relative to non-CO2\r\nemissions become important, especially in developing countries \r\nwhere the share of non-CO2 emissions is relatively high. (La Rovere \r\net al. 2018) treat mitigation actions in AFOLU sector."


id: e3295075e580e50fb785cca133c8ec9e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33234
content:
"Chapter 3 reported on multi-model analyses, comparison of results \r\nusing different models, of global emissions in the long term. At the \r\nnational scale, multi-model analyses are still limited, though such \r\nanalyses are growing as shown in Table 4.7. By comparing the results \r\namong different models and different scenarios in a  country, the \r\nuncertainties on the emission pathways including the mitigation \r\nmeasures to achieve a given emission target can be assessed."


id: 499fafdd4466899790468680bb7bf7b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 8971
content:
"Another type of multi-model analysis is international, in other \r\nwords, different countries join the same project and use their own \r\nnational models to assess a  pre-agreed joint mitigation scenario. \r\nBy comparing the results of various national models, such projects \r\nhelp highlight specific features of each country. More robust \r\nmitigation measures can be proposed if different types of models \r\nparticipate. These activities can also contribute to capacity building \r\nin developing countries."


id: 2c4d90692ac1ad224f1e75e5d70f3e40
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"The literature reports an increasing number of accelerated mitigation \r\npathways that are beyond NDCs in different regions and countries. \r\nThere is increasing understanding of the technical content of such \r\npathways, though the literature remains limited on some dimensions, \r\nsuch as demand-side options, systems analysis, or mitigation of \r\nAFOLU non-CO2 GHGs. The present section describes insights from \r\nthis literature."


id: cd15a8c3b62bd2ed8ca9f87570dd4b00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 29817
content:
"Overall, the literature shows that pathways considered consistent \r\nwith below 2degC (>67%) or 1.5degC (Box 4.2) - including inter alia \r\n80% reduction of GHG emissions in 2050 relative to 1990 or \r\n100% renewable electricity scenarios  - are technically feasible \r\n(Lund and Mathiesen 2009; Mathiesen et al. 2011; Esteban and \r\nPortugal-Pereira 2014; Young and Brans 2017; Esteban et al. 2018; \r\nChild et al. 2019; Hansen et al. 2019). They entail increased end\u0002use energy efficiency, significant increases in low-carbon energy, \r\nelectrification, other new and transformative technologies in \r\ndemand sectors, adoption of carbon capture and sequestration \r\n(CCS) to reduce gross emissions, and contribution to net negative \r\nemissions through carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and carbon sinks. \r\nFor these pathways to be realised, the literature assumes higher \r\ncarbon prices, combined in policy packages with a range of other \r\npolicy measures."


id: 3f2aa655d224c03f10506a3d23bef53f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7328
content:
"Though they differ across countries, accelerated mitigation pathways \r\nshare common characteristics as follows. First, energy  efficiency, \r\nconservation, and reducing energy use in all energy demand \r\nsectors (buildings, transport, and industry) are included in nearly \r\nall literature that addresses future demand growth (Ashina et al. \r\n2012; Saveyn et al. 2012; Schmid and Knopf 2012; Chiodi et al. 2013; \r\nDeetman et al. 2013; Jiang et al. 2013; Thepkhun et al. 2013; Schiffer \r\n2015; Altieri et al. 2016; Jiang et al. 2016; McNeil et al. 2016; \r\nNogueira de Oliveira et al. 2016; Chilvers et al. 2017; Elizondo et al. \r\n2017; Fragkos et al. 2017; Jacobson et al. 2017, 2019; Kuramochi \r\net al. 2017; Oshiro et al. 2017a; Ouedraogo 2017; Shahiduzzaman \r\nand Layton 2017; Vaillancourt et al. 2017; Hanaoka and Masui 2018; \r\nHodson et al. 2018; Lee et al. 2018; Lefevre et al. Oshiro et al. 2018; \r\n2018; Capros et al. 2019; Dioha et al. 2019; Duscha et al. 2019; "


id: 379185d82ef7fc280a6df3232726ce4e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6122
content:
"The most recent literature also reflects on accelerated mitigation \r\npathways aiming at reaching net zero CO2 emissions or net zero \r\nGHG emissions by 2050 (Section 4.2.4 and Table 4.6; see Glossary \r\nentries on 'net zero CO2 emissions' and 'net zero GHG emissions'). "


id: f6a337d238f44768de44ad34b4bfc8f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36316
content:
"Khanna et al. 2019; Kato and Kurosawa 2019; Nieves et al. 2019; \r\nSugiyama et al. 2019; Zhou et al. 2019; Dioha and Kumar 2020).\r\n4.2.5.2 Accelerated Decarbonisation of Electricity Through \r\nRenewable Energy"


id: fa461bc9a0777e4e0c5f67fed818349f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36894
content:
"Similarly, electrification of industrial processes (up to 50% for EU and \r\nChina) and transport (e.g., 30-60% for trucks in Canada), buildings, \r\nand district heating and cooling are commonplace (Ashina et al. 2012; \r\nMassetti 2012; Saveyn et al. 2012; Chiodi et al. 2013; Deetman et al. \r\n2013; Fragkos et al. 2017; Oshiro et al. 2017b; Vaillancourt et al. 2017; \r\nXunzhang et al. 2017; Jiang et al. 2018; Mittal et al. 2018; Oshiro et al. \r\n2018; Capros et al. 2019; Zhou et al. 2019; Hammond et al. 2020)."


id: e395b7ee7f3a95758f82ba104199c0a5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33289
content:
"Power generation could decarbonise much faster with scaled up \r\ndeployment of renewable energy and storage. Both technologies are \r\nmature, available, and fast decreasing in costs, more than for many \r\nother mitigation options. Models continuously underestimate the \r\nspeed at which renewables and storage expand. Higher penetration of \r\nrenewable energy in the power sector is a common theme in scenarios. \r\nSome studies provide cost optimal electricity mix under emission \r\nconstraints, while others explicitly explore a  100%  renewables or \r\n100% emission free electricity sector (Box 4.3)."


id: 95efba5f8b2228e22d4119464f452589
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21095
content:
"Third, lower emissions sources of energy, such as nuclear, renewables, \r\nand some biofuels, are seen as necessary in all pathways. However, \r\nthe extent of deployment depends on resource availability. Some \r\ncountries have set targets of up to 100% renewable electricity, while \r\nothers such as Brazil rely on increasing biomass up to 40-45% of \r\ntotal or industry energy consumption by 2050."


id: 5b7ebf3691f81c8c4ffe9fec7099094a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11895
content:
"Figure  4.3 shows an increasing share of renewable electricity in \r\nmost countries historically, with further increases projected in many \r\ndecarbonisation pathways. Targets for very high shares of renewable \r\nelectricity generation - up to 100% - are shown for a number of \r\ncountries, with the global share projected to range from 60% to \r\n70% for 1.5degC with no overshoot (C0) to below 2degC (C4) scenarios. \r\nCountries and states that have set 100% renewables targets include \r\nScotland for 2020 (Scottish Government 2021), Austria (2030), \r\nDenmark (2035) and California (2045) (Figure 4.3)."


id: c5a81f9334e4216336b294da70b7d2f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Fourth, CCS and CDR are part of many of the national studies reviewed \r\n(Ashina et al. 2012; Massetti 2012; Jiang et al. 2013; Thepkhun \r\net al. 2013; Herreras Martinez et al. 2015; van der Zwaan et al. \r\n2016; Chilvers et al. 2017; Solano Rodriguez et al. 2017; Xunzhang \r\net al. 2017; Kuramochi et al. 2018; Mittal et al. 2018; Oshiro et al. \r\n2018; Roberts et al. 2018b; Vishwanathan et al. 2018b; Kato and \r\nKurosawa 2019). CCS helps reduce gross emissions but does not \r\nremove CO2 from the atmosphere, unless combined with bioenergy \r\n(BECCS). CO2 removal from sources with no identified mitigation \r\nmeasures is considered necessary to help achieve economy-wide \r\nnet negative emissions (Massetti 2012; Deetman et al. 2013; Solano \r\nRodriguez et al. 2017)."


id: 26516b99385a8b1d7f85185b520efaf9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3444
content:
"While 100% renewable electricity generation by 2050 is found \r\nto be feasible, it is not without issues. For example, (Jacobson \r\net al. 2017, 2019) find it feasible for 143 countries with only a 9% \r\naverage increase in economic costs (considering all social costs) if \r\nannual electricity demand can be reduced by 57%. Others state that \r\nchallenges exist with speed of expansion, ensuring sufficient supply \r\nat all times or higher costs compared to other alternatives (Clack \r\net al. 2017). In-depth discussion of net zero electricity systems can be \r\nfound in Section 6.6."


id: 69a5348ab69acc6269e54fb53f2c682b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14220
content:
"In South Africa, it is found that long-term mitigation goals could be achieved with accelerated adoption of solar PV and wind \r\ngeneration, if the electricity sector decarbonises by phasing-out coal entirely by 2050, even if CCS is not feasible before 2025 (Altieri \r\net al. 2015; Beck et al. 2013). Abundant solar PV and wind potential, coupled with land availability suggest that more than 75% of \r\npower generation could ultimately originate from solar PV and wind (Oyewo et al. 2019; Wright et al. 2019)."


id: 1ddbdbe4c830e578d01cf7f082bc8b9a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"For the US, share of renewables in power generation in 2050 in accelerated mitigation scenarios vary widely, 40% in (Hodson et al. \r\n2018; Jayadev et al. 2020), more than half renewable and nuclear in (Victor et al. 2018) to 100% in Jacobson et al. (2017, 2019)."


id: 35666825c5a5ad4b9989ad22415ce58e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5813
content:
"Under cost optimisation scenarios for Brazil, electricity generation, which is currently dominated by hydropower, could reach 100% \r\nby adding biomass (Koberle et al. 2020). Other studies find that renewable energy, including biomass, could account for more than \r\n30% of total electricity generation (Nogueira de Oliveira et al. 2016; Portugal-Pereira et al. 2016)."


id: 3e231cf08d6f3b57f6d70d97ca836487
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"In Colombia, where hydropower resources are abundant and potential also exist for solar and wind, a deep decarbonisation pathway \r\nwould require 57% renewable power generation by 2050 (Arango-Aramburo et al. 2019) while others find 80% would be possible \r\n(Delgado et al. 2020)."


id: 4e485bfab33d529baceaa6df487bcb1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"In Asia, Japan could have up to 50% variable renewable electricity supply to reduce CO2 emissions by 80% by 2050 in some of \r\nits deep mitigation scenarios ( Kato and Kurosawa 2019; Sugiyama et al. 2019; Ju et al. 2021; Shiraki et al. 2021; Silva Herran and \r\nFujimori 2021). One view of China's 1.5degC pathway includes 59% renewable power generation by 2050 (Jiang et al. 2018). One view \r\nof India's 1.5degC pathway also includes 52% renewable power generation, and would require storage needs for 35% of generation \r\n(Parikh et al. 2018)."


id: dcd81fe14ed1b46aa72f4ad652e018d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Figure 4.3 | Historical and projected levels and targets for the share of renewables in electricity generation. Sources: IEA energy balances for past trends, IPCC \r\nAR6 scenario dataset including national model and regional versions in global models (10th to 90th percentile of 1.5degC with no overshoot (C0) to below 2degC (C4) scenarios), \r\nnational/regional sources."


id: 4416e8de0230da350eaa86f19a518dc5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 8128
content:
"pathways (Capros et al. 2019) but evidence on cost-effectiveness is \r\nscarce and uncertain (European Commission 2013). For France and \r\nSweden, (Millot et al. 2020) include CCS and BECCS to meet net zero \r\nGHG emissions by 2050. For Italy, (Massetti 2012) propose a zero\u0002emission electricity scenario with a combination of renewable and \r\ncoal, natural gas, and BECCS."


id: 4d91181f8dec17fd149d35b9ae584fde
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9631
content:
"Bioenergy could account for up to 40% of Brazil's total final energy \r\nconsumption, and a  60% share of fuel for light-duty vehicles by \r\n2030 (Lefevre et al. 2018), and is considered most cost-effective \r\nin transport and industrial applications (Lap et al. 2020). BECCS in \r\nthe power sector is also considered cost-effective option for supply\u0002side mitigation (Borba et al. 2012; Herreras Martinez et al. 2015; \r\nLucena et al. 2016)."


id: ee8f9bf70e816a99811168de24cb72a2
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content:
"In China, an analysis concluded that CCS is necessary for remaining \r\ncoal and natural gas generation out to 2050 (Jiang et al. 2018; Energy \r\nTransitions Commission and Rocky Mountain Institute 2019). Seven \r\nto 10 CCS projects with installed capacity of 15 GW by 2020 and \r\ntotal CCS investment of 105 billion RMB (2010 RMB) are projected \r\nto be needed by 2050 under a 2degC compatible pathway according to \r\n(Jiang et al. 2013, 2016; Lee et al. 2018). Under 1.5degC pathway, an \r\nanalysis found China would need full CCS coverage of the remaining \r\n12% of power generation from coal and gas power and 250 GW of \r\nBECCS (Jiang et al. 2018). Combined with expanded renewable and \r\nnuclear development, total estimated investment in this study is 5% \r\nof China's total GDP in 2020,  1.3% in 2030, and  0.6% in 2050 \r\n(Jiang et al. 2016)."


id: 4fa80027334bdb94badccc38ad26ea50
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"Bioenergy also plays a prominent role in some EU countries' deep \r\ndecarbonisation strategies. Domestic biomass alone can help \r\nGermany meet its 95% CO2 reduction by 2050 goal, and biomass \r\nand CCS together are needed to reduce CO2 by 80% by 2050 in the \r\nNetherlands (Mikova et al. 2019). Studies suggest that mitigation \r\nefforts in France include biofuels and significant increases in biomass \r\nuse, including up to 45% of industry energy by 2050 for its net GHG \r\nneutrality goal (Doumax-Tagliavini and Sarasa 2018; Capros et al. \r\n2019). Increased imports may be needed to meet significant increases \r\nin EU's bioenergy use, which could affect energy security and the \r\nsustainability of bioenergy production outside of the EU (Mandley \r\net al. 2020; Daioglou et al. 2020)."


id: 9a0ec19808332ce559258edc600317bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Views regarding feasibility of CCS can vary greatly for the same \r\ncountry. In the case of India's electricity sector for instance, some \r\nstudies indicate that CCS would be necessary (Vishwanathan et al. \r\n2018a), while others do not - citing concerns around its feasibility \r\ndue to limited potential sites and issues related to socio-political \r\nacceptance  - and rather point to very ambitious increase in \r\nrenewable energy, which in turn could pose significant challenges \r\nin systematically integrating renewable energy into the current \r\nenergy systems (Viebahn et al. 2014; Mathur and Shekhar 2020). \r\nSome limitations of CCS, including uncertain costs, lifecycle and net \r\nemissions, other biophysical resource needs, and social acceptance \r\nare acknowledged in existing studies (Viebahn et al. 2014; Jacobson \r\n2019; Mathur and Shekhar 2020; Sekera and Lichtenberger 2020)."


id: f82d509994e340f98207292d55570621
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"While BECCS is needed in multiple accelerated mitigation pathways, \r\nlarge-scale land-based biological CDR may not prove as effective as \r\nexpected, and its large-scale deployment may result in ecological \r\nand social impacts, suggesting it may not be a viable carbon removal \r\nstrategy in the next 10-20 years (Vaughan and Gough 2016; Boysen \r\net al. 2017; Dooley and Kartha 2018). The effectiveness of BECCS \r\ncould depend on local contexts, choice of biomass, fate of initial \r\naboveground biomass and fossil-fuel emissions offsets  - carbon \r\nremoved through BECCS could be offset by losses due to land-use \r\nchange (Harper et al. 2018; Butnar et al. 2020; Calvin et al. 2021). \r\nLarge-scale BECCS may push planetary boundaries for freshwater use, \r\nexacerbate land-system change, significantly alter biosphere integrity \r\nand biogeochemical flows (Heck et al. 2018; Fuhrman et al. 2020; \r\nStenzel et al. 2021; Ai et al. 2021). (Sections 7.4 and 12.5)"


id: 90852c7f90636b760f4eefb96c74abc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"While national mitigation portfolios aiming at net zero emissions \r\nor lower will need to include some level of CDR, the choice of \r\nmethods and the scale and timing of their deployment will depend \r\non the ambition for gross emission reductions, how sustainability and \r\nfeasibility constraints are managed, and how political preferences \r\nand social acceptability evolve (Cross-Chapter Box 8). Furthermore, \r\nmitigation deterrence may create further uncertainty, as anticipated \r\nfuture CDR could dilute incentives to reduce emissions now (Grant \r\net al. 2021), and the political economy of net negative emissions has \r\nimplications for equity (Mohan et al. 2021)."


id: 8ad33c944e48c540b1ee9460b550023e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 19376
content:
"CCS is present in many accelerated mitigation scenarios in the \r\nliterature. In Brazil, (Nogueira de Oliveira et al. 2016) consider \r\nBECCS and CCS in hydrogen generation more feasible than CCS in \r\nthermal power plants, with costs ranging from USD70-100 per tCO2. \r\nOverall, (van der Zwaan et al. 2016) estimate that 33-50% of total \r\nelectricity generation in Latin America could be ultimately covered \r\nby CCS. In Japan, CCS and increased bioenergy adoption plus waste\u0002to-energy and hydrogen-reforming from fossil fuel are all considered \r\nnecessary in the power sector in existing studies, with potential up \r\nto 200 MtCO2 yr-1 (Ashina et al. 2012; Oshiro et al. 2017a; Kato \r\nand Kurosawa 2019; Sugiyama et al. 2021). In parts of the EU, \r\nafter 2030, CCS could become profitable with rising CO2 prices \r\n(Schiffer 2015). CDR is seen as necessary in some net GHG neutrality "


id: d9a6592b4c461b27ea1c29486d5d2285
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Nuclear power generation is developed in many countries, though \r\nlarger-scale national nuclear generation does not tend to associate \r\nwith significantly lower carbon emissions (Sovacool et al. 2020). \r\nUnlike other energy sources such as wind and PV solar, levelised \r\ncosts of nuclear power has been rising in the last decades (Grubler \r\n2010; Gilbert et al. 2017; Portugal-Pereira et al. 2018). This is mainly \r\ndue to overrun of overnight construction costs related to delays in "


id: e9e404ffd5f9f948e98d2e74ac7da67d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"(Birmingham Energy Institute 2018). Current technology pathways are \r\nnot sufficient to deliver universal access to cooling or meet the 2030 \r\ntargets under the SDGs, but energy efficiency, including in equipment \r\nefficiency like air conditioners, can reduce this demand and help limit \r\nadditional emissions that would further exacerbate climate change \r\n(Biardeau et al. 2020; Dreyfus et al. 2020; UNEP and IEA 2020). Some \r\ncountries (India, South Africa) have started to recognise the need for \r\nmore efficient equipment in their mitigation strategies (Altieri et al. \r\n2016; Ouedraogo 2017; Paladugula et al. 2018)."


id: aa08e03b3e75493ab1ee5e048ad0cf70
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"project approvals and construction, and more stringent passive \r\nsafety measures, which increases the complexity of systems. After \r\nthe Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan, nuclear programs in several \r\ncountries have been phased out or cancelled (Carrara 2020; Huenteler \r\net al. 2012; Kharecha and Sato 2019; Hoffman and Durlak 2018). \r\nAlso the compatibility of conventional prresurised water reactors and \r\nboiling water reactors with large proportion of renewable energy in \r\nthe grid it is yet to be fully understood."


id: c4c83e146076ced0e62405e7e349cb6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28534
content:
"Most accelerated mitigation pathway scenarios include significant \r\nincrease in building energy efficiency. Countries in cold regions, \r\nin particular, often focus more on building sector GHG emissions \r\nmitigation measures such as improving building envelopes and home \r\nappliances, and electrifying space heating and water heating."


id: a57f7e793df0a4fbaf2c1e6d877e9d46
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23607
content:
"Radically more efficient use of energy than today, including electricity, \r\nis a complementary set of measures, explored in the following."


id: b4eea9cef6799cc662b715c68f8b790f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 26003
content:
"In warmer climate regions undergoing economic transitions, \r\nimproving the energy efficiency of cooling and refrigeration equipment \r\nis often important for managing peak electricity demand and can \r\nhave co-benefits for climate mitigation as well as SLCF reduction, as \r\nexpected in India, Africa, and Southeast Asia in the future."


id: 577519974e33db349bbac86a5e6f5955
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Air conditioner adoption is rising significantly in low- and middle\u0002income countries as incomes rise and average temperatures increase, \r\nincluding in Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, \r\nVietnam, and the Philippines, as well as Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, \r\nand Nigeria (Biardeau et al. 2020). Cooling appliances are expected \r\nto increase from  3.6 billion to  9.5 billion by 2050, though up to \r\n14 billion could be required to provide adequate cooling for all "


id: 713d38ab3083b88eb58f0d31be92ce00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 15453
content:
"Table 4.8 | Targets by countries, regions, cities and businesses on decarbonising the building sector."


id: 82c88d67af889b3a2c0b7676c1db1731
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"technology and efficiency, including improving building envelopes, \r\nfuel switching for residential buildings, and replacing service-sector \r\ncoal use with gas and renewables according to (Chiodi et al. 2013). \r\nIn South Africa, improving industry and building energy efficiency is \r\nalso considered a key part of mitigation strategies (Altieri et al. 2016; \r\nOuedraogo 2017)."


id: b0f050e062fd007e65b91de6d5bd2bca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 25348
content:
"transport electrification (excluding feedstock) and 75% electrification \r\nof road transport is needed to reach net carbon neutrality according \r\nto (Duscha et al. 2019). In addition, novel fuels such as hydrogen, \r\nsynthetic hydrocarbons and sustainable biogenic fuels are needed \r\nto decarbonise aviation and water transport to achieve net carbon \r\nneutrality (Duscha et al. 2019)."


id: 709dc139ddb9a55cbfc89ea910c7fe1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15337
content:
"In India, electrification, hydrogen, and biofuels are key to \r\ndecarbonising the transport sector (Dhar et al. 2018; Mittal et al. \r\n2018; Vishwanathan et al. 2018b; Mathur and Shekhar 2020). Under \r\na 1.5degC scenario, nearly half of the light-duty passenger vehicle stock \r\nneeds to be electrified according to (Parikh et al. 2018). In China, \r\na  1.5degC-compatible pathway would require electrification of two\u0002fifths of transport (Jiang et al. 2018; China National Renewable \r\nEnergy Centre 2019)."


id: e709179c415c85c56387cdf32ed44bb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Similarly, in Canada, electrification of 59% of light-duty trucks and \r\n23% of heavy-duty trucks are needed as part of overall strategy \r\nto reduce CO2 emissions by 80% by 2050. In addition, hydrogen is \r\nexpected to play a major role by accounting for nearly one-third of \r\nlight-duty trucks, 68% of heavy-duty trucks, and 33% of rail by 2050 \r\naccording to Hammond et al. (2020)."


id: 36b311d424fa4128e335b8b01850f408
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5992
content:
"Electrification of transport in tandem with power sector \r\ndecarbonisation is expected to be a  key strategy for deep CO2\r\nmitigation in many countries. Passenger transport and light duty \r\nfreight can already be electrified, but electrifying heavy-duty road \r\ntransport and fuel switching in aviation and shipping are much more \r\ndifficult and have not been addressed in most of the recent research."


id: a8c171b2c7b71f02cb3b7dea4d989c10
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content:
"innovation (Grubler et al. 2018). A  Low Energy Demand scenario \r\nrequires fundamental societal and institutional transformation from \r\ncurrent patterns of consumption, including: decentralised services \r\nand increased granularity (small-scale, low-cost technologies to \r\nprovide decentralised services), increased use value from services \r\n(multi-use vs single use), sharing economies, digitalisation, and \r\nrapid transformation driven by end-user demand. This approach \r\nto transformation differs from the status quo and current climate \r\nchange policies in emphasising energy end-use and services first, \r\nwith downstream effects driving intermediate and upstream \r\nstructural change."


id: 233b01676ca47b3fcd53fa8b7c1250ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Industrial energy efficiency improvements are considered in nearly \r\nall countries but for countries where industry is expected to continue \r\nto be a  key sector, new and emerging technologies that require \r\nsignificant  R&D investment, such as hydrogen and CCS, make \r\nambitious targets achievable."


id: bbeee05d4d21646d9c61658a06558e6e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Radical low-carbon innovation involves systemic, cultural, and policy \r\nchanges and acceptance of uncertainty in the beginning stages. \r\nHowever, the current dominant analytical perspectives are grounded \r\nin neoclassical economics and social psychology, and focus primarily \r\non marginal changes rather than radical transformations (Geels \r\net al. 2018). Some literature is beginning to focus on mitigation \r\nthrough behaviour and lifestyle changes, but specific policy measures \r\nfor supporting such changes and their contribution to emission \r\nreductions remain unclear (Section 4.4.2 and Chapter 5)."


id: ef8f7f6a654784dc2d26b7b8dbc7caa4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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vector_id: 35185
content:
"Recent research shows that temperature increases are likely to \r\nexceed 1.5degC during the 2030s and 2degC by mid-century unless both \r\nCO2 and short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs) are reduced (Shindell et al. \r\n2017; Rogelj et al. 2018a). Because of their short lifetimes (days to \r\na decade and a half), SLCFs can provide fast mitigation, potentially \r\navoiding warming of up to 0.6degC at 2050 and up to 1.2degC at 2100 \r\n(Ramanathan and Xu 2010; Xu and Ramanathan 2017). In Asia \r\nespecially, co-benefits of drastic CO2 and air pollution mitigation \r\nmeasures reduce emissions of methane, black carbon, sulphur dioxide, \r\nnitrogen oxide, and fine particulate matter by approximately 23%, \r\n63%, 73%, 27%, and 65% respectively in 2050 as compared to \r\n2010 levels. Including the co-benefits of reduction of climate forcing \r\nadds significantly to the benefits reducing air pollutants (Hanaoka \r\nand Masui 2018)."


id: 6fae3b36c7f1ce2b2980eaf51a0a7327
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content:
"Aggressive adoption of technology solutions for power sector \r\ndecarbonisation coupled with end-use efficiency improvements \r\nand low-carbon electrification of buildings, industry and transport \r\nprovides a pathway for accelerated mitigation in many key countries, \r\nbut will still be insufficient to meet zero emission/1.5degC goals for all \r\ncountries. Although not included in a majority of the studies related to \r\npathways and national modelling analysis, energy demand reduction \r\nthrough deeper efficiency and other measures such as lifestyle \r\nchanges and system solutions that go beyond components, as well \r\nas the co-benefits of the reduction of short-lived pollutants, needs to \r\nbe evaluated for inclusion in future zero emission/1.5degC pathways."


id: 7ee8ee22e34e2be2e7b13a7393d6d22a
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17526
content:
"To achieve net zero GHG emissions implies consideration of targets \r\nfor non-CO2 gases. While methane emissions have grown less rapidly \r\nthan CO2 and F-gases since 1990 (Chapter 2), the literature urges \r\naction to bring methane back to a pathway more in line with the Paris \r\ngoals (Nisbet et al. 2020). Measures to reduce methane emissions \r\nfrom anthropogenic sources are considered intractable - where they \r\nsustain livelihoods  - but also becoming more feasible, as studies \r\nreport the options for mitigation in agriculture without undermining \r\nfood security (Wollenberg et al. 2016; Frank et al. 2017; Nisbet et al. \r\n2020). The choice of emission metrics has implications for SLCF (Cain \r\net al. 2019) (Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 2). Ambitious reductions \r\nof methane are complementary to, rather than substitutes for, \r\nreductions in CO2 (Nisbet et al. 2020)."


id: be57b233a3ce79e5b14a63dabedef0e1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27495
content:
"Studies have identified socio-technological pathways to help achieve \r\nnet zero CO2 and GHG targets at national scale, that in aggregate are \r\ncrucial to keeping global temperature below agreed limits. However, \r\nmost of the literature focuses on supply-side options, including carbon \r\ndioxide removal mechanisms (BECCS, afforestation, and others) that \r\nare not fully commercialised (Cross-Chapter Box  8  in Chapter  12). \r\nCosts to research, deploy, and scale up these technologies are often \r\nhigh. Recent studies have addressed lowering demand through \r\nenergy conversion efficiency improvements, but few studies have \r\nconsidered demand reduction through efficiency (Grubler et al. 2018) \r\nand the related supply implications and mitigation measures."


id: 8dd450ddbd1fe340b8a32ef499f63aed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Five main drivers of long-term energy demand reduction that can \r\nmeet the  1.5degC target include quality of life, urbanisation, novel \r\nenergy services, diversification of end-user roles, and information "


id: 70cb6f321595aa1e4b0a7ad72255def
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"interconnections, synergies, and trade-offs among and within sectors, \r\nwhich is currently not the norm (Section 12.4)."


id: d4713c8ece99b489f6d084ca58df1d9d
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"A systems approach is also needed to support technological \r\ninnovation. This includes recognising unintended consequences \r\nof political support mechanisms for technology adoption and \r\nrestructuring current incentives to realise multi-sector benefits. It also \r\nentails assimilating knowledge from multiple sources as a basis for \r\npolicy and decision-making (Hoolohan et al. 2019)."


id: f1a84ae3a5ed0ec67c4c128dcc90f314
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content:
"Current literature does not explicitly consider systematic, physical \r\ndrivers of inertia, such as capital and infrastructure needed to support \r\naccelerated mitigation (Pfeiffer et al. 2018). This makes it difficult to \r\nunderstand what is needed to successfully shift from current limited \r\nmitigation actions to significant transformations needed to rapidly \r\nachieve deep mitigation."


id: 327c477125a39f77e80e8fe52571cee3
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content:
"This section examines how accelerated mitigation may impact \r\nthe realisation of development objectives in the near- and mid\u0002term. It focuses on three objectives discussed in the literature, \r\nsustaining economic growth (Section 4.2.6.2), providing employment \r\n(Section  4.2.6.3), and alleviating poverty and ensuring equity \r\n(Section 4.2.6.4). It complements similar review performed at global \r\nlevel in Section 3.6. For a comprehensive survey of research on the \r\nimpact of mitigation in other areas (including air quality, health, and \r\nbiodiversity), see Karlsson et al. (2020)."


id: c8ea3fbad03490ed80f3e4e67bea38b4
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content:
"Most models and studies fail to address system impacts of widespread \r\nnew technology deployment, for example: (i) material and resources \r\nneeded for hydrogen production or additional emissions and energy \r\nrequired to transport hydrogen; or (ii) materials, resources, grid \r\nintegration, and generation capacity expansion limits of a  largely \r\ndecarbonised power sector and electrified transport sector. These \r\nimpacts could limit regional and national scale-ups."


id: adc0c0808d541be3389ff39f12624713
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Increased bioenergy consumption is considered in many 1.5degC and 2degC \r\nscenarios. System thinking is needed to evaluate bioenergy's viability \r\nbecause increased demand could affect land and water availability, \r\nfood prices, and trade (Sharmina et al. 2016). To adequately address \r\nthe water-energy-food nexus, policies and models must consider "


id: f98b84ac564159f740a933ba6525ff48
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"in 2030 and 2050, relative to the reference (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement), for example (Nong et al. 2017) for Australia, (Chen et al. \r\n2013) for Brazil, (Dai et al. 2016; Li et al. 2017; Dong et al. 2018; Mu \r\net al. 2018a; Zhao et al. 2018; Cui et al. 2019) for China, (Alvarez\u0002Espinosa et al. 2018) for Colombia, (Fragkos et al. 2017) for the EU, \r\n(Mittal et al. 2018) for India, (Fujimori et al. 2019) for Japan, (Veysey \r\net al. 2014) for Mexico, (Pereira et al. 2016) for Portugal, (Alton et al. \r\n2014; van Heerden et al. 2016) for South Africa, (Chunark et al. 2017) \r\nfor Thailand, (Acar and Yeldan 2016) for Turkey, (Roberts et al. 2018b) \r\nfor the UK, (Zhang et al. 2017; Chen and Hafstead 2019) for USA, \r\n(Nong 2018) for Vietnam (Figure  4.4). The downward relationship \r\nbetween mitigation effort and emissions is strong in studies up to "


id: b2c46ddadeaef926bd919109d356c1bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25646
content:
"2030, much weaker for studies looking farther ahead. In all reviewed \r\nstudies, however, GDP continues to grow even with mitigation. It \r\nmay be noted that none of the studies assessed above integrates the \r\nbenefits of mitigation in terms of reduced impacts of climate change \r\nor lower adaptation costs. This is not surprising since these studies \r\nare at national or regional scale and do not extend beyond 2050, \r\nwhereas the benefits depend on global emissions and primarily occur \r\nafter 2050. Discussion on reduced impacts is provided in Section 3.6.2 \r\nand Cross-Working Group Box 1 in Chapter 3."


id: d1b5679be5179c098c4f3cdad01b2784
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Two major mechanisms interplay to explain the impact of \r\nmitigation on GDP. First, the carbon constraint imposes reduced "


id: 4221c80a7d0158ec6a0b23f106e62203
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Table 4.9 | Examples of country-level modelling studies finding positive short-term outcome of mitigation on GDP relative to baseline."


id: 65132b721f63d36a8315ed2f814e945d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"of different carbon pricing instruments, including the auctioning of \r\npermits, see Section 13.6.3)."


id: 341703134e7d57f4b4720e13edee8f35
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Figure 4.5 shows that depending on the choice of how to implement \r\na  carbon constraint, the same level of carbon constraint can yield \r\nvery different outcomes for GDP. The potential for mitigating GDP \r\nimplications of mitigation through fiscal reform is discussed in \r\nSection 4.4.1.8."


id: ff6ccff013b5fa69c7fbd31e79fc11c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"More generally, mitigation costs can be reduced by proper policy \r\ndesign if the economy initially is not on the efficiency frontier (Grubb \r\n2014), defined as the set of configurations within which the quality \r\nof the environment and economic activity cannot be simultaneously \r\nimproved given current technologies - such improvements in policy \r\ndesign may include reductions in distortionary taxes. Most of the \r\nstudies which find that GDP increases with mitigation in the near \r\nterm precisely assume that the economy is initially not on the \r\nfrontier. Making the economy more efficient - in other words, lifting \r\nthe constraints that maintain the economy in an interior position - \r\ncreates opportunities to simultaneously improve economic activity \r\nand reduce emissions. Table 4.9 describes the underlying assumptions \r\nin a selection of studies."


id: f11007b2be611c2ae8d356bd0c6fec20
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"In the near term, presence of long-lived emissions intensive capital \r\nstock, and rigidities in the labour market (Devarajan et al. 2011) and \r\nother areas may increase impacts of mitigation on GDP. In the mid\u0002term, on the other hand, physical and human capital, technology, \r\ninstitutions, skills or location of households and activities are more \r\nflexible. The development of renewable energy may help create more \r\nemployment and demands for new skills, particularly in the high-skill \r\nlabour market  (Helgenberger, S. et al., 2019). In addition, cumulative \r\nmechanisms such as induced technical change or learning by doing \r\non low-emissions technologies and process may reduce the impacts \r\nof mitigation on GDP."


id: 742f100dc73cf64e23ae3649617dab25
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Finally, marginal costs of mitigation are not always reported in studies \r\nof national mitigation pathways. Comparing numbers across countries \r\nis not straightforward due to exchange rate fluctuations, differing \r\nassumptions by modellers in individual country studies, etc. The \r\ndatabase of national mitigation pathways assembled for this Report - \r\nwhich covers only a  fraction of available national mitigation \r\nstudies in the literature - shows that marginal costs of mitigation \r\nare positive, with a median value of 101 USD2010 tCO2\r\n-1 in 2030, \r\n244 in 2040 and 733 in 2050 for median mitigation efforts of 21%, \r\n46% and 76% relative to business-as-usual respectively. Marginal \r\ncosts increase over time along accelerated mitigation pathways, as \r\nconstraints become tighter, with a non-linearity as mitigation reaches \r\n80% of reference emissions or more. Dispersion across and within "


id: e2b6607fc72153e510d08da545034830
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"Country-level studies find that the negative impacts of mitigation \r\non GDP can be reduced if pre-existing economic or institutional \r\nobstacles are removed in complement to the imposition of the \r\ncarbon constraint (robust evidence, high agreement). For example, \r\nif the carbon constraint takes the form of a carbon tax or of permits \r\nthat are auctioned, the way the proceeds from the tax (or the \r\nrevenues from the sales of permits) are used is critical for the overall \r\nmacroeconomic impacts (Chen et al. 2013). (For a detailed discussion "


id: 38525c48bb4e15fa2741565d43476638
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"and by reducing labour taxes to boost overall labour demand (Stiglitz \r\net al. 2017) (Section 4.5)."


id: 6a9b3e0e7eadd1d7902f9d5bbacb5339
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"countries is high, even in the near term but increases notably in the \r\nmid-term (medium evidence, medium agreement)."


id: 30b49615ee52d38672f70796f3b3dbb3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Like most of the literature on climate change, the above studies \r\ndo not address gender aspects. These may be significant \r\nsince the employment shares for men and women vary across \r\nsectors and countries."


id: 50e3ee4ad1c0a165983fefaa78e035ca
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content:
"Climate mitigation may exacerbate socio-economic pressures on \r\npoorer households (Jakob et al. 2014). First, the price increase in \r\nenergy-intensive goods and services - including food (Hasegawa et al. \r\n2018)  - associated with mitigation may affect poorer households \r\ndisproportionally (Bento 2013), and increase the number of energy\u0002poor (Berry 2019). Second, the mitigation may disproportionally \r\naffect low-skilled workers (see previous section). Distributional \r\nissues have been identified not only with explicit price measures \r\n(carbon tax, emission permits system, subsidy removal), but also with \r\nsubsidies for renewables (Borenstein and Davis 2016), and efficiency \r\nand emissions standards (Davis and Knittel 2019; Bruegge et al. \r\n2019; Levinson 2019; Fullerton and Muehlegger 2019)."


id: 3276b23e2a9e22aa9f9a2288127a14b9
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"Distributional implications, however, are context specific, depending \r\non consumption patterns (initially and ease of adjusting them in \r\nresponse to price changes) and asset ownership (see for example \r\nanalysis of energy prices in Indonesia by Renner et al. 2019). In \r\nan analysis of the distributional impact of carbon pricing based \r\non household expenditure data for 87 low- and middle-income \r\ncountries, Dorband et al. (2019) find that, in countries with a per\u0002capita income of up to USD15,000 per capita (purchasing power parity \r\n(PPP) adjusted), carbon pricing has a progressive impact on income \r\ndistribution and that there may be an inversely U-shaped relationship \r\nbetween energy expenditure shares and per-capita income, rendering \r\ncarbon pricing regressive in high-income countries, in other words, in \r\ncountries where the capacity to pursue compensatory policies tends \r\nto be relatively strong."


id: af2e501816a2ae6aa109e683cfffa9b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"The results from country-level studies using CGE models tend be similar \r\nto those at global level. Aggregate employment impacts are small and \r\nmay be positive especially if labour taxes are cut, see for example, \r\nTelaye et al. (2019) for Ethiopia,(Kolsuz and Yeldan (2017) for Turkey, \r\nFragkos et al. (2017) for the EU, and Mu et al. (2018b) for China. On the \r\nother hand, sectoral reallocations away from fossil-dependent sectors \r\nmay be substantial, see for example, Alton et al. (2014) for South Africa \r\nor Huang et al. (2019) for China. Targeting of investment to labour\u0002intensive green sectors may generate the strongest employment gains, \r\nsee, for example, Perrier and Quirion (2018) for France, van Meijl \r\net al. (2018) for the Netherlands, and Patrizio et al. 2(018) for the USA. \r\nChanges in skill requirements between emerging and declining sectors \r\nappear to be quite similar, involving smaller transitions than during the \r\nIT revolution (Bowen et al. 2018)."


id: 12ff63097200093e804bd542398af2d3
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"In sum, the literature suggests that the employment impact of \r\nmitigation policies tends to be limited on aggregate, but can \r\nbe significant at the sectoral level (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement) and that cutting labour taxes may limit adverse effects on \r\nemployment (limited evidence, medium agreement). Labour market \r\nimpacts, including job losses in certain sectors, can be mitigated \r\nby  equipping workers for job changes via education and training, "


id: 9e5345a7cf5c8b05f372a8c551ab9b45
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content:
"for current climate pledges, and Cross-Chapter Box 4 in this chapter \r\nshows an even larger ambition gap between current pledges and what \r\nwould be needed in the near term to be on pathways consistent with \r\nbelow 2degC, let alone 1.5degC. In other words, while the implementation \r\nof mitigation policies to achieve updated NDC almost doubles the \r\nmitigation efforts, and notwithstanding the widespread availability \r\nof the necessary technologies, this doubling of effort merely narrows \r\nthe gap to pathways consistent with 2degC by at most 20%."


id: 1c9f6c93c3982b223644c47f7d54c28f
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"A second set of likely obstacles in the short-term to accelerated \r\nmitigation revolves around undesirable distributional consequences, \r\nwithin and across countries. As discussed in Section  4.2.6.3, the \r\ndistributional implications of climate policies depend strongly on their \r\ndesign, the way they are implemented, and on the context into which \r\nthey are inserted. Distributional implications of climate policies have \r\nboth ethics and equity dimensions, to determine what is desirable/\r\nacceptable by a given society in a given context, notably the relative \r\npower of different winners and losers to have their interests taken \r\ninto account, or not, in the relevant decision-making processes. Like \r\ncosts, distributional implications of accelerated mitigation are rooted \r\nin the underlying socio-political-institutional structures of a society."


id: b80a17c16b2e37f1563c343c7b0c6a17
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"As outlined in Sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 there is improved \r\nunderstanding since AR5 of what accelerated mitigation would \r\nentail in the coming decades. A  major finding is that accelerated \r\nmitigation pathways in the near to mid-term appear technically and \r\neconomically feasible in most contexts. Chapter 4, however, cannot \r\nstop here. Section  4.2.2 has documented an important policy gap "


id: 116ce573e5c7aaab400b8369680bac1b
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"A third set of obstacles are about technology availability and \r\nadoption. Lack of access even to existing cost-effective mitigation \r\ntechnologies remains an important issue, particularly for many \r\ndeveloping countries, and even in the short-term. Though it relates \r\nmost directly to techno-economic costs, technology availability raises \r\nbroader issues related to the socio-technical systems within which \r\ninnovation and adoption are embedded, and issues of technology \r\navailability are inherently issues of systemic failure (Section  16.3). \r\nThe underlying legal, economic and social structures of the economy \r\nare central to the different stages of socio-transition processes \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16)."


id: 7d85e029d57e794e82378aa82d427520
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"The last set of obstacles revolves around the unsuitability of \r\nexisting structures to accelerated mitigation. We include here all \r\nforms of established structures, material (e.g.,  physical capital) or \r\nnot (institutions, social norms, patterns of individual behaviour), \r\nthat are potentially long-lived and limit the implementation of \r\naccelerated mitigation pathways. Typically, such structures exist for \r\nreasons other than climate change and climate mitigation, including \r\nthe distribution of power among various actors. Modifying them in \r\nthe name of accelerated climate mitigation thus requires to deal with \r\nother non-climate issues as well. For example, resolving the landlord\u0002tenant dilemma, an institutional barrier to the deployment of energy "


id: 1bbc5c54e68d3447e2484acb27c97cb6
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"development plan (Section  4.3.2) is a  representation of a  possible \r\ndevelopment pathway for a given society reflecting its objectives, as \r\nrefracted through its development planning process."


id: 54d2ec49ffa1625815c08d0762c06124
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"One approach for exploring shifts in future development pathways \r\nis through scenarios. Some examples of scenario exercises in the \r\nliterature are provided in Table 4.11."


id: b59b611d224088f658240dbcf2ec4d9d
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"Different narratives of development pathways can have distinct \r\nand even competing focuses such as economic growth, shifts in \r\nindustrial structure, technological determinism, and can embody \r\nalternative framings of development itself (from growth to \r\nwell-being, see Chapter  5), and of sustainable development in \r\nparticular (Sections 1.6 and 17.1). Scenario exercises are structured \r\nundertakings to explore alternative future development pathways, \r\noften drawing on stakeholder input and accepting the deep and \r\nirreducible uncertainty inherent in societal development into the \r\nfuture (Schweizer and Kriegler 2012; Kahane 2012; Raskin and Swart \r\n2020). The results of scenario explorations, including modelling \r\nexercises, thus help clarify the characteristics of a particular future \r\npathway, in light of a  particular set of assumptions and choice of \r\nindicators for assessment. Processes of developing scenarios can \r\ninform choices by decision makers of various kinds."


id: e953573f017ee4bead312fda3bec98cd
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"Scenarios are useful to clarify societal objectives, understand \r\nconstraints, and explore future shifts. Scenario exercises are effective \r\nwhen they enable multi-dimensional assessment, and accommodate \r\ndivergent normative viewpoints (Kowarsch et al. 2017). Such processes \r\nmight take into account participants' explicit and implicit priorities, \r\nvalues, disciplinary backgrounds, and world views. The process of \r\ndefining and describing a society's development pathway contributes \r\nto the ongoing process of understanding, explaining and defining the \r\nhistorical and contemporary meaning and significance of a society. "


id: e249899753c5e41f294f57aeb58a5e3b
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"Development pathways represent societal evolution over time, and \r\ncan be assessed retrospectively and interpreted in a historical light, or \r\nexplored prospectively by anticipating and assessing alternative future \r\npathways. Development pathways, and prospective development \r\npathways in particular, can reflect societal objectives, as in 'low-emission \r\ndevelopment pathways', 'climate-resilient development pathways', \r\n'sustainable development pathways', 'inclusive development pathway', \r\nand as such can embed normative assumptions or preferences, or \r\ncan reflect potential dystopian futures to be avoided. A  national "


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"The imagination of facilitated stakeholder process combined with the \r\nrigour of modelling helps improve understanding of constraints, trade\u0002offs, and choices. 'Scenario analysis offers a structured approach for \r\nilluminating the vast range of possibilities. A scenario is a story, told \r\nin words and numbers, describing the way events might unfold. If \r\nconstructed with rigor and imagination, scenarios help us to explore \r\nwhere we might be headed, but more, offering guidance on how to \r\nact now to direct the flow of events toward a desirable future'  (Raskin \r\net al. 2002). Scenario processes are valuable for the quantitative and \r\nqualitative insights they can provide, and also for the role they can \r\nplay in providing a forum and process by which diverse institutions \r\nand even antagonistic stakeholders can come together, build trust, \r\nimprove understanding, and ultimately converge in their objectives \r\n(Kane and Boulle 2018; Dubash 2021)."


id: a95bc246cae9dc21fa22bb033d7af6c1
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"emergent dynamics within and between institutions, cultural norms, \r\nsocio-technological systems, and the biogeophysical environment. \r\nSociety can choose to make decisions and take actions with the \r\nshared intention of influencing the future development pathway \r\ntoward specific agreed objectives."


id: c557acf9ff8c0a5f15cf922ccf56286
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"The SDGs provide a lens on diverse national and local development \r\nobjectives. Humankind currently faces multiple sustainability \r\nchallenges that together present global society with the challenge \r\nof assessing, deliberating, and attempting to bring about a viable, \r\npositive future development pathway. Ecological sustainability \r\nchallenges include reducing GHG emissions, protecting the ozone \r\nlayer, controlling pollutants such as aerosols and persistent organics, \r\nmanaging nitrogen and phosphorous cycles, etc. (Steffen et al. 2015), \r\nwhich are necessary to address the rising risks to biodiversity and \r\necosystem services on which humanity depends (IPBES 2019a). \r\nSocio-economic sustainability challenges include conflict, persistent \r\npoverty and deprivation, various forms of pervasive and systemic \r\ndiscrimination and deprivation, and socially corrosive inequality. "


id: 963ff98e7f29d4963aad857ac04c322e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Figure 4.7 | Shifting development pathways to increased sustainability: choices by a wide range of actors at key decision points on development \r\npathways can reduce barriers and provide more tools to accelerate mitigation and achieve other Sustainable Development Goals."


id: 3b77e6b92ea403466908436ee1e2c03c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"alone will not achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement \r\n(Mejean et al. 2015; Rogelj et al. 2016; IPCC 2018a; UNEP 2018). \r\nAn approach of shifting development pathways to increased \r\nsustainability (SDPS) broadens the scope for mitigation."


id: 834bca08e40b05837e52be8c3b720b1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"The global adoption of the SDGs and their underlying indicators (UN \r\n2017, 2018 and 2019) reflect a  negotiated prioritisation of these \r\ncommon challenges."


id: 927092a85f77f9584e052f3724287dbd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Figure 4.7 illustrates the process of shifting development pathways. \r\nThe lines illustrate different possible development pathways through \r\ntime, some of which (shown here toward the top of the figure) \r\nremove obstacles to the adoption and effective implementation of \r\nsustainable development policies, and thus give access to a  rich \r\npolicy toolbox for accelerating mitigation and achieving SDGs. Other \r\ndevelopment pathways (shown here toward the bottom of the \r\nfigure) do not overcome, or even reinforce the obstacles to adopting \r\nand effectively implementing sustainable development policies, \r\nand thus leave decision-makers with more limited policy toolbox \r\n(Section 4.2.7 and Figure 4.6). A richer tool box enables faster, deeper \r\nand broader mitigation."


id: ab30588599fc4000864eaa2b65fcb14f
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"Beyond removing structural obstacles to accelerated mitigation, \r\nbroadening the approach to policies that facilitate shifts in \r\ndevelopment pathways also helps manage the potential trade-offs \r\nbetween mitigation and other development objectives discussed \r\nin Section 4.2.7."


id: 2d38c7949bd6a3db81f0da3b46daea03
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"The development pathways branch and branch again, signifying \r\nhow a  diversity of decision-makers (policymakers, organisations, \r\ninvestors, voters, consumers, etc.) are continuously making choices \r\nthat influence which of many potential development pathways \r\nsociety follows. Some of these choices fall clearly within the domain \r\nof mitigation policy. For example, what level carbon price, if any, \r\nshould be imposed? Should fossil fuel subsidies be removed? Most \r\ndecisions, of course, fall outside the direct domain of mitigation \r\npolicy. Shifting development pathways toward sustainability involves \r\nthis broader realm of choices beyond mitigation policy per se, and \r\nrequires identifying those choices that are important determinants of \r\nthe existing obstacles to accelerating mitigation and meeting other \r\nSDGs. Addressing these choices coherently shifts the development \r\npathway away from a continuation of existing trends."


id: 8bad268f153c2264d888c2c2eb359443
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"Shifting development pathways aims to influence the ultimate drivers \r\nof emissions (and development generally), such as the systemic and \r\ncultural determinants of consumption patterns, the political systems \r\nand power structures that govern decision-making, the institutions \r\nand incentives that guide and constrain socio-technical innovation, \r\nand the norms and information platforms that shape knowledge and \r\ndiscourse, and culture, values and needs (Raskin et al. 2002). These \r\nultimate drivers determine the mitigative capacity of a society."


id: 82263e7f79fbffa501d7447e340db2fd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Working Group II examines climate resilient development pathways \r\n(CRDP)  - continuous processes that imply deep societal changes \r\nand/or transformation, so as to strengthen sustainable development, \r\nefforts to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities while promoting \r\nfair and cross-scalar capacities for adaptation to global warming and \r\nreduction of GHG emissions in the atmosphere. Transformative action \r\nin the context of CRDP specifically concerns leveraging change in \r\nthe five dimensions of development (people, prosperity, partnership, \r\npeace, planet) (AR6 WGII, Chapter 18)."


id: 23902b5a4615368a2bec03abd3079ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Decision-makers might usefully consider a broader palette of policies \r\nand measures as part of an overall strategy to meet climate goals and \r\nother sustainable development goals (Section 4.3.2 and Table 4.12). \r\nThis is consistent with the fact that mitigation is increasingly \r\nunderstood to be inseparable from broader developmental goals, \r\nwhich can be facilitated by policy coherence and integration with \r\nbroader objectives and policies sectorally and societally. This is \r\nsupported by other observations that mitigation measures based \r\non conventional climate policy instruments, such as emissions taxes \r\nor permits, price incentives such as feed-in tariffs for low-carbon \r\nelectricity generation, and fuel economy standards, and building \r\ncodes, which aim to influence the proximate drivers of emissions "


id: 8556e5a4b99aa559ccd2108d2287cedc
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"Section  4.3.2 provides more details on the way development \r\npathways influence emissions and mitigative capacity. Section 4.3.3 \r\nprovides examples of shifts in development pathways, as well as \r\nof policies that might facilitate those. Cross-Chapter Box  5  in this \r\nchapter details the links between SDPS and sustainability."


id: a451b7ca4b73fc74cad6cca9ba4c113e
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"and content of the plans (Chimhowu et al. 2019). development plans \r\nare increasingly focusing on mobilising action across multiple actors \r\nand multiple dimensions to enhance resilience and improve the \r\nability to undertake stronger mitigation actions. Various initiatives \r\nsuch as the World Summit for Children in 1990; the Heavily Indebted \r\nPoor Country initiative that started offering debt relief in exchange \r\nfor commitments by beneficiary states to invest in health, education, \r\nnutrition and poverty reduction in 1996; and push towards \r\nComprehensive Development Frameworks seem to have catalysed \r\nthe development of national actions plans across countries to \r\nestimate, measure and track investments and progress towards SDGs."


id: 1a79ced6b7f7b5ceaab240f1628ccba0
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"At the global level, the SDGs adopted by all the United Nations Member \r\nStates in 2015 are delineated with a view to end poverty, protect the \r\nplanet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030. \r\nThe 17 SDGs are integrated and imply that development must balance \r\nsocial, economic and environmental sustainability."


id: 55b999b46387d1442f673d01682e4d5d
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"While all countries share the totality of the SDGs, development \r\npriorities differ across countries and over time. These priorities are \r\nstrongly linked to local contexts, and depend on which dimensions \r\nof improvements in the well-being of people are considered \r\nthe most urgent."


id: a71b6582ce3d1aa98e62e67375379c4d
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"The most recent development plans also tend to differ from the \r\nearlier ones in terms of their approach. Complexity science has over \r\nthe years argued for new forms of planning based on contingency, \r\nbehaviour change, adaptation and constant learning (Colander and \r\nKupers 2016; Ramalingam, 2013), and new plans have increasingly \r\nfocused on increasing resilience of individuals, organisations and \r\nsystems (Hummelbrunner and Jones, 2013). Finally, alongside short\u0002term (typically five year) plans with operational purpose, countries \r\nhave also expressed visions of their development pathways over \r\nlonger time horizons, via, for example, Voluntary National Reviews \r\nsubmitted in the context of the UN High Level Political Forum on \r\nSustainable Development."


id: e55948e9e9a779f1405c6a8cef69d49c
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"National development plans are also increasingly more holistic \r\nin their approach, linking closely with SDGs and incorporating \r\nclimate action in their agendas. For instance, the Low Carbon \r\nDevelopment Initiative (LCDI), launched in 2017 by the Government \r\nof Indonesia, seeks to identify the development policies that can help \r\nIndonesia achieve multiple (social, economic, and environmental) \r\ngoals simultaneously along with preserving and improving the \r\ncountry's  natural resources (Bappenas 2019). Likewise, Nepal's \r\nFifteenth Plan (five-year) recognises the need for climate mitigation \r\nand adaptation and corresponding access to international finance \r\nand technologies. The plan suggests mobilisation of foreign aid in the \r\nclimate change domain in line with Nepal's priorities and its inclusion \r\nin the country's climate-friendly development programs as the key \r\nopportunities in this regard (Nepal 2020)."


id: f104e3cdbb0c2b798b982063565d71a0
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"Governments are increasingly resorting to the development of \r\nnational plans to build institutions, resources, and risk/shock \r\nmanagement capabilities to guide national development. The \r\nnumber of countries with a  national development plan has more \r\nthan doubled, from about 62 in 2006 (World Bank 2007) to 134 \r\nplans published between 2012 and 2018 (Chimhowu et al. 2019). \r\nThe comeback of planning may be linked to increased consideration \r\ngiven to sustainability, which is by construction forward-looking and \r\nfar ranging, and therefore requires state and civil society to prepare \r\nand implement plans at all levels of governance. Governments \r\nare increasingly engaging in the development and formulation of \r\nnational plans in an organised, conscious and continual attempt to \r\nselect the best available alternatives to achieve specific goals."


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"emissions tend to drop monotonously as incomes increased. Lantz \r\nand Feng (2006) also indicate that per capita GDP is not related \r\nto CO2 emissions in Canada. Other studies point to an emerging \r\nconsensus that the relationship between CO2 emissions and economic \r\nindicators depends on the level of development of countries (Nguyen \r\nand Kakinaka 2019; Sharma 2011). While some literature indicates \r\nthat absolute decoupling of economic growth and GHG emissions \r\nhas occurred in some countries (Le Quere et al. 2019), a  larger \r\nsystematic review found limited evidence of this (Haberl et al. 2020)."


id: 84201279ded00bcfd475f594ce72e28
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"Analysis in the mitigation literature often frames mitigation policy \r\nas having development co-benefits, the main objective being climate \r\nstabilisation. This misses the point that development drives emissions, \r\nand not vice versa, and it is the overall development approach and \r\npolicies that determine mitigation pathways (Munasinghe 2007). \r\nA large body of literature supports the fact that development pathways \r\nhave direct and, just as importantly, indirect implications for GHG \r\nemissions (Nakicenovic et al. 2000; Winkler 2017b), through multiple \r\nchannels, such as the nature of economic activity, spatial patterns of \r\ndevelopment, degree of inequality, and population growth."


id: 33a5892026f6dda4eff2963bdcdef494
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"Looking ahead, choices about the nature of economic activities are \r\nexpected to have significant implications for emissions. For example, \r\na development pathway that focuses on enhancing economic growth \r\nbased on manufacturing is likely to lead to very different challenges \r\nfor mitigation compared to one that focuses on services-led growth. \r\n(Quere et al. 2018) find that choices about whether or not to export \r\noffshore oil in Brazil will have significant implications for the country's \r\nGHG emissions. Similarly, in China, transforming industrial structure \r\ntowards tertiary sectors (Kwok et al. 2018) and restructuring exports \r\ntowards higher value-added products (Wu et al. 2019) are expected \r\nto have significant implications for GHG emissions."


id: 3bc55b51ca5fd7323d094a9f00572cd4
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"Economic structure: Chapter  2  notes that overall, affluence \r\n(GDP per capita), economic growth and population growth have \r\nremained the main upward drivers of CO2 emissions from fossil\u0002fuel combustion in the past decade, with energy efficiency the \r\nmain countervailing force (Lin and Liu 2015; Wang and Feng 2017) \r\n(Section  2.4). A  major component of the development pathway of \r\na country is precisely the nature of the economic activities on which \r\nthe country relies (e.g.,  agriculture and mining, heavy industry, \r\nservices, high-tech products, etc.) as well as the way it articulates its \r\neconomy with the rest of the World (e.g., export-led growth vs import \r\nsubstitution strategies). Hence, the development pathway ultimately \r\ndrives the underlying structure of the economy, and to a large degree \r\nthe relationship between activity and GHG emissions."


id: 7a08d775629f5c08a5b13c924ba7a74a
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"Spatial patterns of development: Chapter  2  notes that rapid \r\nurbanisation in developing and transition countries leads to increased \r\nCO2 emissions, the substantial migration of rural populations to urban \r\nareas in these countries being the main factor leading to increased \r\nlevels of income and expenditure of new urban dwellers which in turn \r\nleads to increased personal carbon footprints and overall emissions \r\n(Section  2.4). Urbanisation, and more broadly spatial patterns of \r\ndevelopment, are in turned driven to a large part by development \r\nchoices, such as, inter alia, spatial provision of infrastructure and \r\nservices, choices regarding the agriculture and forestry sector, \r\nland-use policies, support to regional/local development, among "


id: af430b8ff4684ed6c051314310226dba
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"At country level, however, the picture is more nuanced. Both India \r\nand China show signs of relative decoupling between GDP and \r\nemissions because of structural change (Chen et al. 2018a). Sumabat \r\net al. (2016) indicate that economic growth had a negative impact on \r\nCO2 emissions in Philippines. Baek and Gweisah (2013) find that CO2"


id: 3e57ac32fd38fa159063783e8e399f8d
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"ethnic profiles and could accordingly be associated with the level of \r\nemissions and mitigation prospects (Andrijevic et al. 2020)."


id: 5f177d6d501ce0673472f1656dfbfb4c
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"others (World Bank 2009). For example, Dorin (2017) points out \r\nthat if agriculture sectors in Africa and India follow the same \r\ndevelopment path that developed countries have followed in the \r\npast, namely increased labour productivity through enlargement \r\nand robotisation of farms, then unprecedented emigrations of rural \r\nworkers towards cities or foreign countries will ensue, with large\u0002scale social, economic and environmental consequences. Looking \r\nahead, a development pathway that encourages concentrated influx \r\nof people to large urban centres will lead to very different energy and \r\ninfrastructure consumption patterns than a pathway that prioritises \r\nthe development of smaller, self-contained towns and cities."


id: 13edb4e56c6a4382be79bdf24bf9fce9
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"In sum, development pathways can lead to different emission levels \r\nand different capacities and opportunities to mitigate (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). Thus, focusing on shifting development \r\npathways can lead to larger systemic sustainability benefits."


id: c77d32c40994a1cbd12ceebac02dd5c1
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"4.3.2.4 Integrating Mitigation Considerations Requires \r\nNon-marginal Shifts in Development Pathways"


id: 936aaea68eac01bccfbaca0e5cab15e0
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"Since reducing inequality, as noted above, is globally one of the \r\nmain development priorities, a  large body of literature focuses on \r\nthe compatibility of climate change mitigation and reduction in \r\neconomic inequality (Baek and Gweisah 2013; Auffhammer and \r\nWolfram 2014; Berthe and Elie 2015; Hao et al. 2016; Grunewald \r\net al. 2017; Wiedenhofer et al. 2017). However, the use of narrow \r\napproaches or simple methods of studying the relationships of \r\nincome inequality and emissions by looking at correlations, may miss \r\nimportant linkages. For example, the influence of inequality on social \r\nvalues such as status and civic mindedness and non-political interests \r\nthat shape environmental policy can influence overall consumption \r\nand its environmental impacts (Berthe and Elie 2015). Moreover, \r\ninequalities may also be reflected in gender, education, racial and "


id: 68e9963d94fae73d69619d4e336cfe18
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"South Africa adopted its first National Development Plan (NDP) in 2011 (NPC 2011), the same year in which the country adopted \r\nclimate policy (RSA 2011) and hosted COP17 in Durban. Chapter 5 of the NDP addresses environmental sustainability in the context \r\nof development planning, and specifically 'an equitable transition to a low-carbon economy' (NPC 2011). The chapter refers explicitly \r\nto the need for a just transition, protecting the poor from impacts and any transitional costs from emissions-intensive to low-carbon. \r\nThe plan proposes several mitigation measures, including a carbon budgeting approach, reference to Treasury's carbon tax, use of \r\nvarious low-carbon options while maintaining energy security, and the integrated resource plan for electricity. The NDP refers to coal \r\nin several chapters, in some places suggesting additional investment (including new rail lines to transport coal and coal to liquids),"


id: 791536206f1e10a2ba44ae8b682ad1ba
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"in others decommissioning coal-fired power 'procuring at least 20,000 MW of renewable electricity by 2030, importing electricity \r\nfrom the region, decommissioning 11,000 MW of ageing coal-fired power stations and stepping up investments in energy-efficiency' \r\n(NPC 2011: p. 46). Reference to environmental sustainability is not limited to Chapter 5 - the introductory vision statement includes \r\nacknowledgement 'that each and every one of us is intimately and inextricably of this earth with its beauty and life-giving sources; \r\nthat our lives on earth are both enriched and complicated by what we have contributed to its condition' (NPC 2011: p. 21); and the \r\noverview of the plan includes a section on climate change, addressing both mitigation and adaptation."


id: aec935470c297793b1d651f381abbca0
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"Looking ahead, given that different development pathways can lead \r\nto different levels of GHG emissions and to different capacities and \r\nopportunities to mitigate, there is increasing research on how to make \r\ndevelopment pathways more sustainable. Literature is also focusing \r\non the need for a 'new normal' as a  system capable of achieving \r\nhigher quality growth while addressing multiple development \r\nobjectives by focusing on 'innovative development pathways'."


id: deeb25064487e494b826cc1bfdc3153f
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"most modelling exercises however, development remains treated \r\nas an exogenous input. In addition, models may capture only \r\nsome dimensions of development that are relevant for mitigation \r\noptions, thereby not capturing distributional aspects and not \r\nallowing consistency checks with broader developmental goals \r\n(Valadkhani et al. 2016). Quantitative tools for assessing mitigation \r\npathways could be more helpful if they could provide information \r\non a  broader range of development indicators, and could model \r\nsubstantively different alternative development paths, thereby \r\nproviding information on which levers might shift development in \r\na more sustainable direction."


id: 6abe396df412fdf085cb7554592fe924
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"Literature suggests that if development pathways are to be changed \r\nto address the climate change problem, choices that would need to \r\nbe made about development pathways would not be marginal (Stern \r\n2009), and would require a new social contract to address a complex \r\nset of inter-linkages across sectors, classes and the whole economy \r\n(Winkler 2017b). Shifting development pathways necessitates \r\nplanning in a  holistic manner, rather than thinking about discrete \r\nand isolated activities and actions to undertake mitigation. Further, \r\nthe necessary transformational changes can be positive if they are \r\nrooted in the development aspirations of the economy and society in \r\nwhich they take place (Dubash 2012; Jones et al. 2013), but they can \r\nalso lead to carbon colonialism if the transformations are imposed by \r\nNorthern donors or perceived as such."


id: 8c6300d5ab07cb4aaafac8ecb0b6c3ea
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"Accordingly, influencing a  societies' development pathways draws \r\nupon a  broader range of policies and other efforts than narrowly \r\ninfluencing mitigation pathways, to be able to achieve the multiple \r\nobjectives of reducing poverty, inequality and GHG emissions. The \r\nimplications for employment, education, mobility, housing and many \r\nother development aspects must be integrated and new ways of \r\nlooking at development pathways which are low carbon must be \r\nconsidered (Bataille et al. 2016b; Waisman et al. 2019). For instance, \r\njob creation and education are important elements that could play \r\na key role in reducing inequality and poverty in countries like South \r\nAfrica and India (Winkler et al. 2015; Rao and Min 2018) while these \r\nalso open up broader opportunities for mitigation."


id: a7943bd681f0e4ad1eab25a617f56440
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"Relative to the literature on mitigation pathways described in 4.2.5 \r\nand in  4.3.3, the literature on development pathways is limited. \r\nThe climate research community has developed the Shared Socio\u0002economic Pathways (SSPs) that link several socio-economic drivers \r\nincluding equity in relation to welfare, resources, institutions, \r\ngovernance and climate mitigation policies in order to reflect \r\nmany of the key development directions (O'Neill et al. 2014). In "


id: 5b8d4077ec69e5535bc47b609db9aca0
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"a  comprehensive understanding of the full costs and benefits of \r\nlow-carbon development (often including the costs of adaptation \r\nand impacts from residual climate change). Back-casting modelling \r\nexercises show that aligning development and climate actions could \r\nresult in much lower 'social cost of carbon' (Shukla et al. 2008). \r\nBack-casting does not aim to produce blueprints. Rather, it indicates \r\nthe relative feasibility and the social, environmental, and political \r\nimplications of different development and climate futures on the \r\nassumption of a clear relationship between goal setting and policy \r\nplanning (Dreborg 1996). Accordingly, back-casting exercises are \r\nwell suited for preparing local specific roadmaps like for cities (Gomi \r\net al. 2010, 2011)."


id: 18deaea7f59442bdafb1771cc80e66e2
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"As noted in Section  4.3.1, policy approaches that include \r\na broader range of instruments and initiatives would impact more \r\nfundamentally on the actors, institutions and structures of societies \r\nand the dynamics among them, aiming to alter the underlying drivers \r\nof emissions, opening up a wider range of mitigation opportunities \r\nand potential in the process of achieving societal development goals. \r\nWhile the evolution of these drivers is subject to varied influences \r\nand complex interactions, there are policy measures by which \r\ndecision-makers might influence them. Table  4.12 provides some \r\nexamples of policy measures that can affect key drivers (shown in \r\nthe row headings)."


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"Authors: Franck Lecocq (France), Harald Winkler (Republic of South Africa), Mustafa Babiker (Sudan/Saudi Arabia), Brett Cohen \r\n(Republic of South Africa), Heleen de Coninck (the Netherlands), Dipak Dasgupta (India), Navroz K. Dubash (India), Maria Josefina \r\nFigueroa Meza (Venezuela/Denmark), Michael Grubb (United Kingdom), Kirsten Halsnaes (Denmark), Siir Kilkis (Turkey), William Lamb \r\n(Germany/United Kingdom), Sebastian Mirasgedis (Greece), Sudarmanto Budi Nugroho (Indonesia), Chukwumerije Okereke (Nigeria/\r\nUnited Kingdom), Minal Pathak (India), Joyashree Roy (India/Thailand), Ambuj Sagar (India), Yamina Saheb (France/Algeria), \r\nPriyadarshi  Shukla (India), Jim Skea (United Kingdom), Youba Sokona (Mali), Julia Steinberger (United Kingdom/Switzerland), \r\nMariama Williams (Jamaica/the United States of America)"


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"In the present report, development pathways refer to patterns of development resulting from multiple decisions and choices made \r\nby many actors in the national and global contexts. Each society whether in the Global North or the Global South follows its own \r\npattern of development (Figure 1.6). Development pathways can also be described at smaller scales (e.g., for regions or cities). By \r\nextension, the concept can also be applied to sectors and systems (e.g., the development pathway of the agricultural sector or of \r\nindustrial systems)."


id: 554b616b7e60e3fa1aaadf297a9d28b0
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"2. Why do development pathways matter in a report about mitigation?\r\n2a. Past development pathways determine both today's GHG emissions and the set of opportunities to reduce emissions\r\nDevelopment pathways drive GHG emissions for a large part (Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6). For example, different social choices and \r\npolicy packages with regard to land use and associated rents will result in human settlements with different spatial patterns, different \r\ntypes of housing markets and cultures, and different degrees of inclusiveness, and thus different demand for transport services and \r\nassociated GHG emissions (Sections 8.3.1 and 10.2.1)."


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"There is compelling evidence to show that continuing along existing development pathways is unlikely to achieve rapid and deep \r\nemission reductions (robust evidence, medium agreement). For example, investments in long-lived infrastructure, including energy \r\nsupply systems, could lock-in high emissions pathways and risk making deep decarbonisation and sustainable policies more \r\ndifficult and expensive."


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"Development pathways also determine the set of tools available to mitigate climate change (Figure 4.7). For example, the capacity \r\nof households to move closer to their workplace, in response to, for example, a price signal on carbon and thus on gasoline, depends \r\non rents, which themselves depend on the spatial patterns of development of human settlements (Section 8.3.1). Said differently, \r\nmitigation costs depend on past development choices. Similarly, development pathways determine the enablers and levers available \r\nfor adaptation (AR6 WGII, Chapter 18) and for achieving other SDGs."


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"In the absence of shifts in development pathways, conventional mitigation policy instruments (e.g., carbon tax, emission quotas, \r\ntechnological norms, etc.) may not be able to limit emissions to a degree sufficient for deep decarbonisation or only at very high \r\neconomic and social costs."


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"Policies to shift development pathways, on the contrary, make mitigation policies more effective. For example, policies that prioritise \r\nnon-car transit, or limit rents close to work places would make it easier for households to relocate in response to a price signal on \r\ntransport, and thus makes the same degree of mitigation achievable at lower economic and social cost."


id: a53bae710367cff9544b1491f1602235
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"2b. Shifting development pathways broadens the scope for synergies between development objectives and mitigation\r\nSecond, societies pursue a variety of development objectives, of which protecting the Earth's climate is part. The SDGs provide a global \r\nmapping of these goals. Absent climate mitigation, our collective ability to achieve the SDGs in 2030 and to sustain them beyond 2030 \r\nis likely to be compromised, even if adaptation measures are put in place (AR6 WGII)."


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"There are many instances in which reducing GHG emissions and moving towards the achievement of other development objectives \r\ncan go hand in hand, in the near-, mid- and long-term (Sections 3.7, 6.7.7, 7.6.5, 8.2, 9.8, 10.1.1, 11.5.3 and 17.3, and Figures 3.40 \r\nand 12.1). For example, transitions from coal-based power to lower-emissions electricity generation technologies and from internal \r\ncombustion engine to lower-carbon transport has large mitigation potential and direct benefits for health through reduction in local \r\nair pollution (Box 6.2 and Section 10.4.1). Energy efficiency in buildings and energy poverty alleviation through improved access to \r\nclean fuels also delivers significant health benefits (Sections 9.8.1 and 9.8.2)."


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"Careful design of mitigation policies is critical to achieving these synergies (Section 13.8). Integrated policies can support the creation \r\nof synergies between climate change goals and other SDGs. For example, when measures promoting walkable urban areas are \r\ncombined with electrification and clean renewable energy, there are several co-benefits to be attained (Figure SPM.8 and Section 5.2). \r\nThese include reduced pressures on agricultural land from reduced urban growth, health co-benefits from cleaner air and benefits from \r\nenhanced mobility (Sections 8.2, 8.4 and 4.4.1.9)."


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"Prioritising is one way to manage trade-offs, addressing some national development objectives earlier than others. Another way \r\nis to adopt policy packages aimed at shifting development pathways towards sustainability as they expand the range of tools available \r\nto simultaneously achieve multiple development objectives, including mitigation. In the city example of Section 2a, a carbon tax alone \r\nwould run counter to other development objectives if it made suburban households locked into high emissions transport modes poorer \r\nor if it restricted mobility choices, in particular for low- and middle-income households. Policy packages combining affordable housing \r\nand provision of safe low-carbon mobility could both facilitate equitable access to housing (a major development objective in many \r\ncountries) and make it easier to mitigate by shifting the urban development pathway."


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"Similarly, a fundamental shift in the service provision that helps reduce energy demand (Chapter 5), driven by targeted policies, \r\ninvestment and enabling socio-cultural and behavioural change, would reduce pressure on supply side mitigation need, hence limiting \r\npressure on water and food and the achievement of associated SDGs. Some studies assume Western European lifestyle as a reference \r\nfor the Global North and an improvement in the living standard for the Global South to reduce energy demand and emissions (Grubler \r\net al. 2018), while others explore a transformative change in the Global North to achieve a decent living standard for all (Bertram et al. \r\n2018; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020) (Section 3.7.8). For example, in the UK, interaction between multiple behavioural, socio-cultural, \r\nand corporate drivers including NGO campaigns, social movements and product innovations resulted in an observed decline in meat \r\nconsumption (Sections 5.4 and 5.6.4)."


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"3. What does shifting development pathways towards sustainability entail?\r\nShifting development pathways towards sustainability implies making transformative changes that disrupt existing developmental \r\ntrends. Such choices would not be marginal (Stern 2009), but include technology adoption, infrastructure availability and use, and \r\nsocio-behavioural factors (Chapter 5)."


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"These include creating new infrastructure, sustainable supply chains, institutional capacities for evidence-based and integrated \r\ndecision-making, financial alignment towards low-carbon socially responsible investments, just transitions and shifts in behaviour \r\nand norms to support shifts away from fossil-fuel consumption (Green and Denniss 2018). Adopting multi-level governance modes, \r\ntackling corruption where it inhibits shifts to sustainability, and improving social and political trust are also key for aligning and \r\nsupporting long-term environmentally just policies and processes."


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"Shifting development pathways entails fundamental changes in energy, urban, building, industrial, transport, and land-based systems. \r\nIt also requires changes in behaviour and social practices. Overcoming inertia and locked-in practices may face considerable opposition \r\n(Geels et al. 2017) (Section  5.4.5). The durability of carbon intensive transport modes and electricity generating infrastructures \r\nincrease the risk of lock-in to high emissions pathways, as these comprise not just consumer practices, but sunk costs in infrastructure, \r\nsupporting institutions and rules (Seto et al. 2016; Mattioli et al. 2020). Shifting investments towards low-GHG solutions requires \r\na combination of conducive public policies, attractive investment opportunities, as well as the availability of financing to enable such \r\na transition (Section 15.3)."


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"Shifting development paths is complex. If history is any guide, practices that can easily supplant existing systems and are clearly \r\nprofitable move fastest (Griliches 1957). Changes that involve 'dissimilar, unfamiliar and more complex science-based components' \r\ntake more time, acceptance and legitimation and involve complex social learning (Conley and Udry 2010), even when they promise \r\nlarge gains (Pezzoni et al. 2019)."


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"Yet despite the complexities of the interactions that result in patterns of development, history also shows that societies can influence \r\nthe direction of development pathways based on choices made by decision-makers, citizens, the private sector and social stakeholders. \r\nFor example, fundamentally different responses to the first oil shock shifted then-comparable economies on to different energy sector \r\ndevelopment and economic pathways in the 1970s and 80s (Sathaye et al. 2009). More recent examples have shown evidence of \r\nvoluntary transitions for example, advanced lighting in Sweden, improved cook-stoves in China, liquefied petroleum gas stoves in \r\nIndonesia or ethanol vehicles in Brazil (Sovacool 2016)."


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"Shifts in one country may spill over to other countries. Collective action by individuals as part of formal social movements or informal \r\nlifestyle changes underpins system change (Sections 5.2.3, 5.4.1, 5.4.5.3 and 13.5)."


id: edc4b0d6212ac304a47b39baa5ded73f
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"Sectoral transitions that aspire to shift development pathways often have multiple objectives, and deploy a diverse mix or package of \r\npolicies and institutional measures (Figure 13.6). Context specific governance conditions can significantly enable or disable sectoral \r\ntransitions, and play a determinative role in whether a sectoral transition leads to a shift in development pathway. For example, \r\nif implemented policies to tackle fuel poverty target the most socially vulnerable households, this can help address barriers poor \r\nhouseholds face in undertaking building retrofits. In the EU-28, it has been shown that accelerated energy efficiency policies coupled \r\nwith strong social policies targeting the most vulnerable households, can help reduce the energy demand in residential sector, and \r\ndeliver additional co-benefits of avoided premature deaths and reduced health impacts (Section 9.8.2)."


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"Literature suggests that through equitable resource distribution, high levels of human development can be provided at moderate \r\nenergy and carbon levels by changing consumption patterns and redirecting systems in the direction of more sustainable resource use, \r\nsuggesting that a special effort can be made in the near term for those on higher incomes who account for a disproportionate fraction \r\nof global emissions (Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020; Hickel et al. 2021) (Section 5.2.2 and Figure 5.14)."


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"The necessary transformational changes are likely to be more acceptable if rooted in the development aspirations of the economy and \r\nsociety within which they take place (Dubash 2012; Jones et al. 2013) and may enable a new social contract to address a complex set \r\nof inter-linkages across sectors, classes and the whole economy (Fleurbaey et al. 2018)."


id: 81d959b0d22914e1dcfdee39f315438d
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"Taking advantage of windows of opportunity and disruptions to mindsets and socio-technical systems could advance deeper \r\ntransformations. These might include the globally declining costs of renewables (Figure 1.7, Section 2.2.5 and Box 16.2), emerging \r\nsocial norms for climate mitigation (Green and Denniss 2018), or the COVID-19 pandemic, all of which might be harnessed to centre \r\npolitical action on protecting human and planetary health (Buchs et al. 2020), but if not handled carefully could also risk undermining \r\nthe support for transformation."


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"5. How can shifts in development pathways be implemented by actors in different contexts?\r\nShifting development pathways to increased sustainability is a  shared aspiration. Yet since countries differ in starting points \r\n(e.g., social, economic, cultural, political) and history, they have different urgent needs in terms of facilitating the economic, social, \r\nand environmental dimensions of sustainable development and, therefore, give different priorities (Sections 4.3.2 and 17.4). The \r\nappropriate set of policies to shift development pathways thus depends on national circumstances and capacities."


id: 5fccc67b4e87daa45624ca4c36c357ee
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"Shifting development pathways towards sustainability needs to be supported by global partnerships to strengthen suitable capacity, \r\ntechnological innovation (Section  16.6), and financial flows (Sections  14.4.1, 15.2.4). The international community can play \r\na particularly key role by helping ensure the necessary broad participation in climate-mitigation efforts, including by countries at \r\ndifferent development levels, through sustained support for policies and partnerships that support shifting development pathways \r\ntowards sustainability while promoting equity and being mindful of different transition capacities (Sections  4.3.2, 16.5, 16.6, \r\n14.4 and 17.4)."


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"In sum, development pathways unfold over time in response to \r\ncomplex dynamics among various drivers and diverse actors with \r\nvarying interests and motivations (high agreement, robust evidence). \r\nThe way countries develop determines the nature and degree of the \r\nobstacles to accelerating mitigation and achieving other sustainable \r\ndevelopment objectives (medium-robust evidence, medium \r\nagreement). Meeting ambitious mitigation and development goals \r\ncannot be achieved through incremental change (robust evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). Shifting development pathways thus involves \r\ndesigning and implementing policies where possible to intentionally \r\nenhance enabling conditions and reduce obstacles to desired \r\noutcomes (medium evidence, medium agreement)."


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"What have we learned so far? As highlighted above, despite 30 years \r\nof UNFCCC and growing contributions by non-state actors, the \r\nemissions gap keeps growing (Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3). Mitigation \r\nconceived as incremental change is not enough. Meeting ambitious \r\nmitigation goals entails rapid, non-marginal changes in production \r\nand consumption patterns (Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5). Taking another \r\napproach, we have seen in Section  4.3 that shifting development \r\npathways broadens the scope for mitigation (Sections  4.3.1 \r\nand 4.3.2) and offers more opportunities than mitigation alone to \r\ncombine mitigation with the realisation of other SDGs (Section 4.3.1 \r\nand Cross-Chapter Box 5 in this chapter)."


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"Section  4.4 elaborates mechanisms through which societies can \r\ndevelop and implement policies to substantially shift development \r\npathways toward securing shared societal objectives. Such policies \r\nentail overcoming obstacles (Section 4.2.7) by means of favourable \r\nenabling conditions: governance and institutions, behaviour, \r\ninnovation, policy and finance. These enabling conditions are \r\namenable to intentional change - to greater or lesser degrees and \r\nover longer or shorter time scales - based on a range of possible \r\nmeasures and processes (Section 4.4)."


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"A practical way forward is to combine shifting development \r\npathways and accelerating mitigation (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). This means introducing multi-objective policy packages \r\nand sequences with climate and development components that \r\nboth target mitigation directly and create the conditions for shifts in \r\ndevelopment pathways that will help accelerate further mitigation \r\ndown the line, and meet other development objectives. Since \r\ndevelopment pathways result from myriad decisions from multiple \r\nactors (Section 4.3.1), coordination across countries and with non\u0002state actors is essential."


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"argues that near term actions to shift the financial system over the \r\nnext decade (2021-2030) are critically important and feasible, and \r\nthat the immediate post-COVID recovery opens up opportunities \r\nto scale up financing from billions to trillions (Mawdsley 2018) \r\n(Section 15.6.7). As discussed in Section 4.2.5, accelerated mitigation \r\npathways encompass both rapid deployment of new technologies \r\nsuch as CCS or electric vehicles, as well as changes in consumption \r\npatterns: rapid deployment of mitigation technology and behaviour \r\nchange are thus two enabling conditions to accelerated mitigation. \r\nDynamics of deployment of technologies are relatively well known, \r\npointing to specific, short-term action to accelerate innovation and \r\ndeployment (Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16), whereas dynamics \r\nof collective behaviour change is less well understood. Arguably, the \r\nlatter also facilitates shifting development pathways."


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"Individual enabling conditions are discussed at length in \r\nChapter  5  (behaviour change), 13 (policies, governance and \r\ninstitutional capacity), 15 (finance) and 16 (innovation). The purpose \r\nof the discussion below is to draw operational implications from \r\nthese chapters for action, taking into account the focus of the present \r\nChapter on action at the national level in the near- and mid-term, and \r\nits special emphasis on shifting development pathways in addition to \r\naccelerated mitigation."


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"The present chapter uses the set of enabling conditions identified in \r\nthe IPCC SR1.5 report, namely policy, governance and institutional \r\ncapacity, finance, behaviour and lifestyles and innovation and \r\ntechnology (de Coninck et al. 2018). As Figure  4.8 illustrates, \r\npublic policies are required to foster both accelerating mitigation \r\nand shifting development pathways. They are also vital to guide \r\nand provide the other enabling conditions (compare Table  4.12). \r\nImproved governance and enhanced institutional capacity facilitate \r\nthe adoption of policies that accelerate mitigation and shift \r\ndevelopment pathways, with the potential to achieve multiple \r\nmitigation and development objectives. Finance is required both to \r\naccelerate mitigation and to shift development pathways. Chapter 15 "


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"The rest of the Section is organised as follows. Policy packages \r\nthat combine climate and development policies are first \r\ndiscussed  (Section  4.4.1.2). The next sections are dedicated to \r\nthe conditions that facilitate shifts in development pathways \r\nand accelerated mitigation: governance and institutions \r\n(Section  4.4.1.3), financial resources (Section  4.4.1.4), behaviour \r\nchange (Section  4.4.1.5) and innovation  (Section  4.4.1.6). Four \r\nexamples of how climate and development policies can be combined \r\nto shift pathways and accelerate mitigation are then presented "


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"fuel production (to complement demand-side climate policies) \r\nand (iv) innovation support and strategic investment to encourage \r\nsystemic change (Grubb 2014). These approaches can be mutually \r\nreinforcing. For example, carbon pricing can incentivise low-carbon \r\ninnovation, while targeted support for emerging niche technologies \r\ncan make them more competitive encourage their diffusion and \r\nultimately facilitate a  higher level of carbon pricing. Similarly, the \r\nsuccess of feed-in tariffs in Germany only worked as well as it did \r\nbecause it formed part of a broader policy mix including 'supply-push' \r\nmechanisms such as subsidies for research and 'systemic measures' \r\nsuch as collaborative research projects and systems of knowledge \r\nexchange (Rogge et al. 2015)."


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"(Sections 4.4.1.7, 4.4.1.8, 4.4.1.9 and 4.4.1.10). Section 4.4.2 focuses \r\nspecifically on how shifts in development pathways can deliver both \r\nmitigation and adaptation. Finally, Section  4.4.3 discusses risks \r\nand uncertainties associated with combining shifting development \r\npathways and accelerating mitigation."


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"Although many transformations in the past have been driven by \r\nthe emergence and diffusion of an innovative technology, policy \r\nintervention was frequent, especially in the more rapid ones \r\n(Michaelowa et al. 2018; Grubb et al. 2021). Likewise, it is not \r\nexpected that spontaneous behaviour change or market evolution \r\nalone yield the type of transformations outlined in the accelerated \r\nmitigation pathways described in Section  4.2.5, or in the shifts in \r\ndevelopment pathways described in Section 4.3.3. On the contrary, \r\nstringent temperature targets imply bold policies in the short term \r\n(Rockstrom et al. 2017; Kriegler et al. 2018) to enforce effective \r\nexisting policy instruments and regulations, as well as to reform or \r\nremove harmful existing policies and subsidies (Diaz et al. 2019)."


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"Governance for climate mitigation and shifting development pathways \r\nis enhanced when tailored to national and local contexts. Improved \r\ninstitutions and governance enable ambitious climate action and help \r\nbridge implementation gaps (medium evidence, high agreement). \r\nImproving institutions involve a  broad range of stakeholders and \r\nmultiple regional and temporal scales. It necessitates a  credible \r\nand trusted process for reconciling perspectives and balancing \r\npotential side-effects, managing winners and losers and adopting \r\ncompensatory measures to ensure an inclusive and just transition \r\n(Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Miller and Richter 2014; Gambhir et al. \r\n2018; Diffenbaugh and Burke 2019), managing the risk of inequitable \r\nor non-representative power dynamics and avoiding regulatory \r\ncapture by special interests (Helsinki Design Lab 2011; Boulle et al. \r\n2015; Kahane 2012)."


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"Policy integration, addressing multiple objectives, is an essential \r\ncomponent of shifting development pathways and accelerating \r\nmitigation (robust evidence, high agreement). A shift in development \r\npathways that fosters accelerated mitigation may best be achieved \r\nthrough integrated actions that comprise policies in support of \r\nthe broader SDG agenda, based on country-specific priorities \r\n(Sections  4.3.2, 13.8 and 13.9). These may include for example, \r\nfiscal policies, or integrating industrial (Nilsson et al. 2021) and \r\nenergy policies (Fragkos et al. 2021) with climate policies. Similarly, \r\nsectoral transitions that aspire to shifting development pathways \r\ntowards sustainability often have multiple objectives, and deploy \r\na  diverse mix or package of policies and institutional measures \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box 5)."


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"Innovative governance approaches can help meet these challenges \r\n(Clark et al. 2018; Diaz et al. 2019). Enabling multilevel governance - \r\ni.e., better alignment across governance scales - and coordination \r\nof international organisations and national governments can \r\nhelp accelerate a  transition to sustainable development and deep \r\ndecarbonisation (Tait and Euston-Brown 2017; Michaelowa and \r\nMichaelowa 2017; Ringel 2017; Revi 2017; Cheshmehzangi 2016; \r\nIPCC 2018a). Participatory and inclusive governance - partnerships "


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"financial regulators and central banks, as detailed in Chapter  15. \r\nFinancial systems are an indispensable element of a  systemic \r\ntransition (Fankhauser et al. 2016; Naidoo 2020). Policy frameworks \r\ncan redirect financial resources towards low-emission assets \r\nand services (UNEP 2015), mainstreaming climate finance within \r\nfinancial and banking system regulation, and reducing transaction \r\ncosts for bankable mitigation technology projects (Mundaca et al. \r\n2013; Brunner and Enting 2014; Yeo 2019). Shifts in the financial \r\nsystem to finance climate mitigation and other SDGs can be achieved \r\nby aligning incentives and investments with multiple objectives \r\n(UNEP Inquiry 2016)."


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"between state and non-state actors, and concerted effort across \r\ndifferent stakeholders are crucial in supporting acceleration (Burch \r\net al. 2014; Hering et al. 2014; Roberts 2016; Figueres et al. 2017; \r\nClark et al. 2018; Leal Filho et al. 2018; Lee et al. 2018). So do \r\npartnerships through transnational climate governance initiatives, \r\nwhich coordinate nation states and non-state actors on an \r\ninternational scale (Hsu et al. 2018). Although they are unlikely \r\nto close the gap of the insufficient mitigation effort of national \r\ngovernments (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2017) (Section  4.2.3), \r\nthey help building confidence in governments concerning climate \r\npolicy and push for more ambitious national goals (UNEP 2018b)."


id: 489807bf0158dec55470fc4be44d8daf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"The transition from traditional public climate finance interventions \r\nto the market-based support of climate mitigation (Bodnar et al. 2018) \r\ndemands innovative forms of financial cooperation and innovative \r\nfinancing mechanisms to help de-risk low-emission investments \r\nand support new business models. These financial innovations may \r\ninvolve sub-national actors like cities and regional governments \r\nin raising finance to achieve their commitments (Cartwright 2015; \r\nCCFLA 2017). Moreover, public-private partnerships have proved to \r\nbe an important vehicle for financing investments to meet the SDGs, \r\nincluding economic instruments for financing conservation (Sovacool \r\n2013; Diaz et al. 2019)."


id: ab9ddff9a57d022e470408168680ac69
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Accelerated mitigation and shifting development pathways \r\nnecessitate both redirecting existing financial flows from high- to \r\nlow-emissions technologies and systems and providing additional \r\nresources (robust evidence, high agreement). An example is changes \r\nin investments from fossil fuels to renewable energy, with pressures \r\nto disinvest in the former while increasing levels of 'green finance' \r\n(Sections  6.7.4 and 15.5). While some lower-carbon technologies \r\nhave become competitive (Sections 1.4.3 and 2.5), support remains \r\nneeded for the low-emissions options have higher costs per unit of \r\nservice provided than high-emission ones. Lack of financial resources \r\nis identified as a major barrier to the implementation of accelerated \r\nmitigation and of shifts in development pathways. Overcoming this \r\nobstacle has two major components. One relates to private capital. \r\nThe other to public finance."


id: 9daba7e67a0f6c1791021f1035ce9fe1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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"Overall, early action is needed to overcome barriers and to adjust the \r\nexisting incentive system to align national development strategies \r\nwith climate and sustainable development goals in the medium\u0002term. Steckel et al. (2017) conclude that climate finance could \r\nbecome a  central pillar of sustainable development by reconciling \r\nthe global goal of cost-efficient mitigation with national policy \r\npriorities. Without a more rapid, scaled redeployment of financing, "


id: 653349d8c94e30698e44ba00a82fdbf1
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content:
"in development trajectories that hinder the realisation of the global \r\ngoals will be locked in (Zadek and Robins 2016). Investment might \r\nbe designed to avoid trading off the Paris goals against other SDGs, \r\nas well as those that simultaneously reduce poverty, inequality, and \r\nemissions (Fuso Nerini et al. 2019)."


id: bf85b1ebad6e3219a6442ae1f9c0ddba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Climate actions are related to knowledge but even strongly to \r\nmotivational factors (Hornsey et al. 2016; Bolderdijk et al. 2013; \r\nBoomsma and Steg 2014), which explains the gap between awareness \r\nand action (Unal et al. 2018). Social influences, particularly from peers, \r\naffect people's engagement in climate action (Schelly 2014). Role \r\nmodels appear to have a solid basis in people's everyday preferences \r\n(WBGU 2011). Social norms can reinforce individuals' underlying \r\nmotivations and be effective in encouraging sustainable consumption \r\npatterns, as many examples offered by behavioural science illustrate. \r\nSocial networks also influence and spread behaviours (Service et al. \r\n2014; Clayton et al. 2015; Farrow et al. 2017; Shah et al. 2019). These \r\nsocial influences can be harnessed by climate policy."


id: be2f869d91319f5662cf3fa624170eea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Collective action by individuals as part of formal social movements \r\nor informal lifestyle movements underpins system change (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Sections 5.4 and 5.5). Organisations are \r\ncomprised of individuals, but also become actors in their own right. \r\nRecent literature has considered the role of coalitions and social \r\nmovements in energy democracy and energy transitions towards \r\nsustainability (Hess 2018). Other scholars have examined the role of \r\nwomen in redistributing power, both in the sense of energy transition \r\nand in terms of gender relations (Allen et al. 2019; Routledge et al. \r\n2018). Mitigation and broader sustainable development policies that \r\nfacilitate active participation by stakeholders can build trust, forge \r\nnew social contracts, and contribute to a  positive cycle building \r\nclimate governance capacity (Section 5.2.3)."


id: ab9bdf51880980a5764e50620928d7f0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Changes in behaviour and lifestyles are important to accelerated \r\nmitigation. Most global mitigation pathways that limit warming to \r\n2degC (>67%) or lower assume substantial behavioural and societal \r\nchange and low-carbon lifestyles (de Coninck et al. 2018; IPCC \r\n2018a; Luderer et al. 2018a) (see also Section 3.3.1 in this report; \r\nand Table  4.9 and Figure  4.3 in IPCC SR1.5). Chapter  5  concludes \r\nthat behavioural changes within transition pathways offer Gigaton\u0002scale CO2 savings potential at the global level, an often overlooked \r\nstrategy in traditional mitigation scenarios."


id: 3103b3ce2de6e737f90d53fe699b9200
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"However, behavioural change not embedded in structural change \r\nwill contribute little to climate change mitigation, suggesting that \r\nbehavioural change is not only a  function of individual agency \r\nbut also depends on other enabling factors, such as the provision \r\nof infrastructure and institutions (Section  5.4). Successful shifts \r\ntowards public transport, for example, involve technologies (buses, \r\ntrams), infrastructure (light rail, dedicated bus lanes), regulations \r\n(operational licenses, performance contracts), institutions (new \r\norganisations, responsibilities, oversight), and high-enough density, \r\nwhich in turn depends on such choices as housing or planning \r\npolicies (Section 4.4.1.9)."


id: ac6f73203a894e08b8f9483ae241a839
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"carbon transitions not only involves a shift of system elements but \r\nalso underlying routines and rules, and hence transitions shift the \r\ndirectionality of innovation. They hence concern the development \r\nof a  new paradigm or regime that is more focused on solving \r\nsustainability challenges that cannot be solved within the dominant \r\nregime they substitute (Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16)."


id: 4e7ad8ba32e38a7f0be2ac8038a82dec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Developing countries have experienced a period of rapid economic \r\ngrowth in the past two decades. Patterns of growth have differed \r\nmarkedly across regions, with newly emerging East Asian economies \r\nbuilding on transition to manufacturing - as China has done in the \r\npast - while Latin American countries tend to transition directly from \r\nprimary sector to services (Rodrik 2016), and African countries tend \r\nto rely on productivity improvements in the primary sectors (Diao \r\net al. 2019). Yet many countries still face the challenge of getting out \r\nof the 'middle-income trap' (Agenor and Canuto 2015), as labour\u0002saving technological change and globalisation have limited options \r\nto develop via the manufacturing sector (Altenburg and Rodrik 2017)."


id: 1b8fae80ea1fb1c6e53103068063add6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"The direction of innovation matters (robust evidence, high agreement). \r\nThe research community has called for more 'responsible innovation' \r\n(Pandza and Ellwood 2013), 'open innovation' (Rauter et al. 2019), \r\n'mission-oriented' innovation (Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2017), \r\n'holistic innovation' (Chen et al. 2018b), 'next-generation innovation \r\npolicy' (Kuhlmann and Rip 2018) or 'transformative innovation' (Schot \r\nand Steinmueller 2018) so that innovation patterns and processes \r\nare commensurate to our growing sustainability challenges. There \r\nis a  growing recognition that new forms of innovation can be \r\nharnessed and coupled to climate objectives (Fagerberg et al. 2016; \r\nWang et al. 2018). As such, innovation and socio-technical change \r\ncan be channelled to intensify mitigation via 'deliberate acceleration' \r\n(Roberts et al. 2018a) and 'coalition building' (Hess 2018)."


id: 8099c3abd6bd539d1a39a3d92868ee1f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Looking ahead, several studies have illustrated how structural \r\nchange towards sustainability could lead to reduced emissions \r\nintensity and higher mitigative capacity. In China, for example, \r\nthe shift away from heavy industry (to light industry and services) \r\nhas already been identified as the most important force limiting \r\nemissions growth (Guan et al. 2018), and as a major factor for future \r\nemissions (Kwok et al. 2018)."


id: d80467798f50271690cb2286f22afd2b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Innovation goes beyond technology. For example, decarbonisation in \r\nsectors with long lived capital stock (such as heavy industry, buildings, \r\ntransport infrastructure) entail technology, policy and financing \r\ninnovations (Bataille 2020). Similarly, expanding the deployment \r\nof  photovoltaics can draw upon policies that support specific \r\ntechnical innovations (e.g., to improve photovoltaics efficiency), or \r\ninnovations in regulatory and market regimes (e.g.,  net-metering), \r\nto innovations in social organisation (e.g.,  community-ownership). \r\nSystem innovation is a core focus of the transitions literature (Grin \r\net al. 2010; Markard et al. 2012; Geels et al. 2017). Accelerating low\u0002"


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Overall, Altenburg et al. (2017) argue that reallocation of capital \r\nand labour from low- to high-productivity sectors - in other words, \r\nstructural change  - remains a  necessity, and that it is possible to \r\ncombine it with reduced environmental footprint (including, but not \r\nlimited to, mitigation). They argue that this dual challenge calls for \r\nstructural transformation policies different from those implemented \r\nin the past, most importantly through a  'systematic steering of \r\ninvestment behaviour in a socially agreed direction' and encompassing \r\npolicy coordination (limited evidence, medium agreement)."


id: 5f8731175be6a4c9215bbc0986957fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"Mitigation offers an opportunity to create additional fiscal space, and \r\nthus to serve the objectives outlined above, by creating a new source \r\nof revenue for the government via carbon taxation or emissions \r\npermit auctioning and by reducing existing expenditures via reduction \r\nin subsidies to fossil-fuel. The 1991 tax reform in Sweden is an early \r\nexample in which environmental taxation (including, but not limited \r\nto, fossil fuel taxation) was introduced as part of a package primarily \r\naimed at lowering the marginal tax rates (more than 80% at the \r\ntime), at reducing other taxes, while keeping most of the welfare \r\nstate. To do so, the tax base was broadened, including through \r\nenvironmental and carbon taxation (Sterner 2007). Once in place, the \r\ncarbon tax rate was substantially ramped up over time, and its base \r\nbroadened (Criqui et al. 2019)."


id: c8ab9a18f8f4a20ebcfa9edd3aec9f7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:01:33
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content:
"In order to permit progress on their SDG agendas, it is essential \r\nthat countries develop visions of their future decarbonised sectoral \r\nproduction structure, including its ability to generate growth in \r\nincomes, employment and foreign exchange earnings. as well as the \r\nrelated spatial distribution of production, employment, and housing. \r\nTo this extent, governance and institutional capacity matter, such as \r\navailability of tools to support long-term planning. A sectoral structure \r\nthat permits strong growth is essential given strong associations \r\nbetween growth in per-capita incomes and progress on most SDGs \r\n(including those related to poverty; health; education; and access to \r\nwater, sanitation, electricity, and roads; but not income equality), in \r\npart due to the fact that higher incomes provide both households \r\nand governments with resources that at least in part would be used \r\nto promote SDGs (Gable et al. 2015)."


