# document

id: 7cc967cf1108b509cca5e43123e02202
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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", \r\nGlobal Covenant of Mayors for Energy and Climate) can be deployed \r\nto learn about contexts. However, they need to be applied with caution \r\nas enforcing external requirements may lead to local tensions during \r\ntheir application (for example Roberts et al., 2020). In a context where \r\nadaptation efforts need to be aggregated and evaluated across nations \r\n(Magnan, 2016) and their implications on wider objectives such "


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"While aspects of transformative capacity identified in the literature \r\nmay facilitate far-reaching change, there is limited evidence of actual \r\ntransformations as an outcome of adaptation. While community led \r\nresilience agendas may tackle poverty related issues, they struggle \r\nto tackle city-wide structural forms of inequality (Chu, Schenk and \r\nPatterson, 2018). Processes of shared learning and co-production of \r\nknowledge can reinforce existing power dynamics and be limited by \r\ntechnical framings of vulnerability that marginalise political issues \r\n(Orleans Reed et al., 2013). These issues are especially acute in relation \r\nto land use decisions where short-term fiscal and commercial interests \r\nconflict with long-term vulnerability reduction objectives (Brown, \r\nDayal and Rumbaitis Del Rio, 2012)"


id: 5141b6ef4f05d0ff39992157ec3c8e94
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" It can be difficult for adaptation \r\nactions to target cities' underlying political-economic structure, \r\nsuch as entrenched political-economic interests, elite influence over \r\ndecision making or neoliberal planning logics that maintain and \r\nreproduce inequality (Chu, Anguelovski and Roberts, 2017). Urban \r\nresilience plans may be formulated in disconnection from broader \r\ndevelopment strategies, which leads to a limited ability to tackle \r\nunderlying structures of political power and urban development \r\npractices (Weinstein et al., 2019). Evidence from Kolkata demonstrates \r\nthe limitations of resilience plans to address underlying conditions \r\nof vulnerability, including the commodification of hazardous land, \r\nunder-provision of informal settlements and spatial segregation of the \r\nurban poor (Rumbach, 2017)."


id: ff0f2c82c39def9f8725e03b5f0e40d8
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"Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge have an important role \r\nto play in urban planning and management. They can support impact \r\ndetection and evaluation in urban areas (Codjoe et al, 2014), weather \r\nforecasting in urban areas (Magee et al., 2016; Ebhuoma and Simatele, \r\n2019), climate change adaptation in urban agriculture (Wahab and \r\nPopoola, 2018; Solomon et al., 2016), urban food security (Simatele \r\nand Simatele, 2015), planning and managing  urban  solid  waste \r\n(Kosoe et al, 2019), urban flood management (Thorn et al, 2015; \r\nJameson and Baud, 2016; Hooli, 2016), drought perception and \r\ncoping strategies (Saboohi et  al., 2019), and ecological restoration \r\nand urban commons management (Nagendra, 2016; Nagendra and \r\nMundoli, 2019)"


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" They can help define baselines for past climate and \r\necological change, providing a historical perspective on changes in \r\nurban commons such as lakes and trees (Nagendra, 2016), as well \r\nas past climatic changes or climate baselines (Ajayi and Mafongoya, \r\n2017) and shifting baseline syndrome (Fernandez-Llamazares et  al., \r\n2015; Soga and Gaston, 2018; see Businger et al., 2018 for a review \r\nof hurricane history in Hawaiian newspapers; also Wickman, 2018). \r\nIncorporating Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge can help \r\ngenerate more people-oriented and place-specific approaches, leading \r\nto adaptation policies that foster identity, dignity, self-determination \r\nand better collective decision making and capacity to act (Preston, \r\n2017; McShane, 2017) (see also Section 6.1)."


id: 7582b7e1ffb10dc2f9dc3a8cec745f7c
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"Planning for transformative adaptation is more likely where communities \r\ncan learn collectively (medium evidence, medium agreement) \r\n(Restemeyer, van den Brink and Woltjer, 2017; Kabisch et al., 2017; Fraser\r\net al., 2017; Putri, Dalimunthe and Prasojo). Greater citizen engagement \r\nfacilitates implementing specific measures for radical policymaking \r\nor the mainstreaming of environmental knowledge into adaptation \r\npractices (Reed et al, 2015). Do it yourself (DIY) planning, in which \r\nstakeholders focus on creating and improving specific urban spaces they \r\ninhabit, has led to urban greening experiments led by civil society that \r\nchange paradigms of urban and environmental management (Cloutier, \r\nPapin and Bizier, 2018). Social learning may occur through combinations \r\nof activism and collaboration with and between informal settlement \r\ndwellers, as shown in adaptation experiences in informal settlements \r\nin Hanoi and Bangkok (Daniere et al., 2016)."


id: 2db3c810fb7bb3061419aa6d6a711d80
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" The adaptation process \r\ncan benefit from the inclusion of multiple sources of knowledge for \r\nsocial learning, including universities but also communities and citizens \r\n(Chu, Schenk and Patterson, 2018). Citizens assemblies are increasingly \r\nrecognised as spaces for transformative adaptation (Muradova, \r\nWalker and Colli, 2020), although their potential influence at different \r\ngovernment levels is still not fully understood."


id: 376e377ef279d77e6012c7120a8e18f6
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"Envisioning development alternatives through adaptation as a first \r\nstep toward transformative adaptation can leverage social learning. \r\nExperiences of migration, length of residence and the density of local \r\nsocial-networks impact social learning opportunities and underscore \r\nwhy context-specific social education is vital (Waters and Adger, \r\n2017; Karunarathne and Lee, 2020). Learning across and between \r\ncommunities can be enhanced when care is taken to understand local \r\nchallenges. Given power relationships, cultural needs and community \r\naspirations, a top-down approach to information sharing is generally \r\nless effective than community partnerships and co-created knowledge \r\nat surfacing visions and strategies for getting past baked-in, unequal \r\nand unsustainable development assumptions and practices (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Clemens et al., 2016; Thi Hong Phuong, \r\nBiesbroek and Wals, 2017; Fitzgerald and Lenhart, 2016; Fisher and \r\nDodman, 2019)"


id: 9c9b3bfcd228fe5ac68391806ae3ac08
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" Social learning in formal and informal urban contexts \r\nis also enhanced when care is taken to ensure multiple stakeholders \r\nhave opportunities to understand a variety of viewpoints, values, \r\nresources and ideals, and that these viewpoints are clearly identified \r\nin decision-making (Thi Hong Phuong, Biesbroek and Wals, 2017). \r\nHowever much social learning still happens only after a crisis, for \r\nexample in urban water adaptation, and new knowledge is often \r\nfrustrated by the lock in of powerful local institutions and groups \r\n(Johannessen et  al., 2019). Social learning is, however, only one \r\ncomponent of the development of climate-resilient pathways. System \r\nperspectives theorise the possibility of tipping points, leverage points \r\nor disruptive technologies to challenge the stable regime to create a \r\nbroader reconfiguration (Chapter 17; O'Neill et al., 2018)."


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"within a decade because of high growth rate. A recent study by \r\nMaharjan et al. (2018) on migration documented that 39% of rural \r\ncommunities have at least one migrant, of whom 80% are internal and \r\nthe remaining 20% are international. Around 10% of the migration \r\nis reported as environmental displacement. Males account for the \r\nmajority of the migration, which forms an important aspect of gendered \r\nvulnerability (Sugden et al., 2014; Goodrich, Prakash and Udas, 2019). \r\nThe ever-expanding urban population in the Himalayas generates many \r\nchallenges, especially in the context of climate change adaptation. \r\nFirst, unplanned urbanisation is causing significant changes in land \r\nuse and land cover, with recharge areas of springs being reduced. \r\nMost of the towns in Hindu Kush Himalayan region meet their water \r\nneeds using supplies from springs, ponds and lakes which are largely \r\ninterlinked systems. Water insecurity in hill towns are becoming the \r\norder of the day (Virk et  al"


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", 2019; Bharti et  al., 2019; Singh et  al., \r\n2019a; Sharma et al., 2019). Second, climate-induced changes in the \r\nphysical environment include increased rainfall variability. Due to this, \r\nheavy rains are becoming frequent and are leading to more landslides. \r\nThird, global warming has increased the average temperature in the \r\nHimalayas which has caused glacier melt and subsequent change in \r\nhydrological regimes of the region. One of the contributing factors \r\nof glacial decline is also the deposition of black carbon (Gautam\r\net al., 2020; Gul et al., 2021) which is contributed by burning of crop \r\nresidue in Punjab (Kant et al., 2020). These critical stressors, climatic \r\nand non-climatic, are adversely affecting the socioecology of urban \r\nconglomerations in the region (Pervin et  al., 2019). Encroachment \r\nor degradation of natural water bodies and the disappearance of \r\ntraditional water systems such as springs are evident (Shah and \r\nBadiger, 2018; Sharma et al., 2019)"


id: a7abcc488eecb011314cece9cf72856c
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" While water availability in these \r\ntowns has been adversely affected by the climatic and socioeconomic \r\nchanges, demand for water has increased greatly (Molden, Khanal and \r\nPradhan, 2018). Some of the towns are major tourist attractions that \r\ncreate a floating population in peak tourist seasons, challenging the "


id: f09a8e1463791a21de48469dad5668cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"The Hindu Kush Himalayan region extends over roughly 3500 km \r\ncovering eight countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, China, India, \r\nBhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Projections show that by 2050, \r\nmore than 50% of the population in Hindu Kush countries will live \r\nin cities (UNDESA, 2014). The region is home to 10 major river basins \r\nthat feed south and south-east Asia. In 2017, the total population in \r\nthe 10 major river basins with their headwaters in the region was \r\naround 1.9 billion, including 240 million in the mountain and hills of \r\nthe Hindu Kush (Wester et al., 2019). The region is characterised by \r\nunique mountain topography, climate, hydrology and hydrogeology. \r\nEach one of these factors plays an important role in determining \r\nthe availability of water for people living in the Himalayas (Nepal, \r\nFlugel and Shrestha, 2014; Scott et  al., 2019; Prakash and Molden, \r\n2020)"


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" The total landmass that can support physical infrastructure for \r\ntowns to develop is much less in the Hindu Kush Himalayan region as \r\ncompared with the plains. Due to this physical constraint, the process \r\nof urbanisation is slow in the region. Only 3% of the total population \r\nin the region live in larger cities and 8% in smaller towns (Singh et al., \r\n2019b). However, there has been an increase in urbanisation, largely \r\ndue to regional imbalances in providing economic opportunities for \r\nthe poor. People from rural areas are flocking to the nearest urban \r\ncentres in search of employment and other economic opportunities \r\n(Singh and Pandey, 2019). As a result, the share of urban population is \r\nincreasing in the region, while that of the rural population is declining."


id: 853f08c868cfac482b186bb5a7bbde91
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"The City Team was first established within the City Environment Agency \r\n(BLH) but was then transferred to the Development and Planning \r\nAgency (BAPPEDA) (Lassa, 2019). This corresponded to a shift in framing \r\nof climate change from an environmental priority to encompassing \r\nbroader development issues such as economic development, housing \r\nand infrastructure delivery. By asserting that climate change affects \r\nthe operations of every critical sector across the city, the number of \r\nmunicipal agencies involved in climate change programming increased \r\nsignificantly (Setiadi, 2015). Most notably, this approach helped the \r\nmunicipal health agency to recognise the relationship between climate \r\nchange and health (Setiadi, 2015), and helped to shift the emphasis of \r\ndengue fever management toward a more proactive community-based \r\nhealth early warning system (Pratama et  al., 2017)"


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" In 2017, these \r\nmeasures helped to reduced dengue fever infection rates by 56% \r\ncompared with 2011-2016 levels (Indonesia Ministry of Health, 2020). \r\nACCCRN also supported policy experimentation through implementing \r\nrainwater harvesting facilities and a community-based flood early \r\nwarning system (Archer and Dodman, 2015; Yuniartanti, Handayani \r\nand Waskitaningsih, 2016; Sari and Prayoga, 2018). These projects \r\nwere designed in conjunction with national government investments \r\nin flood management infrastructure, which led to a reduction in the \r\ncity's inundated area by 24% or approximately 1% of the total urban \r\narea (Semarang City Government, 2016)."


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"The City of Semarang, on the northern coast of Central Java in \r\nIndonesia, has a population of nearly 1.8 million (CBS, 2019). The city \r\nhas experienced rapid urbanisation over last three decades, with the \r\npopulation almost doubling and density reaching 4650 people per \r\nsquare kilometre (Handayani and Rudiarto, 2014; Handayani et al., \r\n2020b). Semarang is vulnerable to sea level rise, tidal flooding and \r\ninundation (Suhelmi and Triwibowo, 2018; Yuniartanti, Handayani and \r\nWaskitaningsih, 2016), risks which are worsened by land subsidence \r\nalong the coast (Abidin et  al., 2013). Globally, land subsidence is \r\na notable compounder of climate change-induced sea level rise \r\nand coastal flooding (Bagheri et  al., 2021). In Semarang, the land \r\nsubsidence rate is projected to be up to 60 mm yr-1 (Abidin et al., \r\n2013; Bott et  al., 2021)"


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" Approximately 20% of the city's coastline \r\nis characterised as extremely vulnerable because of sea level rise \r\nand enhanced land subsidence (Husnayen et  al., 2018), with the \r\nnorth-eastern portions of the city experiencing larger subsidence than \r\nthe rest (Yastika, Shimizu and Abidin, 2019). Associated public health \r\nand sanitation risks are also evident, including increasing outbreaks \r\nof dengue fever and diarrhoea (Pratama et  al., 2017; Indonesia \r\nMinistry of Health, 2020)."


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"Building on Semarang's ACCCRN experience, the city then became a \r\nmember of the Rockefeller Foundation's 100 Resilient Cities (100RC) \r\nprogramme between 2016 and 2018. As in ACCCRN, this new process \r\nemphasised stakeholder involvement, with the previous City Team \r\nrecast as a team of City Resilience Officers (CRO), which was in turn led \r\nby the City Mayor and received strategic advisory support from the City \r\nSecretary. Semarang synthesised its experiences in climate adaptation \r\nplanning through the Resilient Semarang Strategy published in May \r\n2016 (Semarang City Government, 2016)"


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" The Resilient Semarang \r\nStrategy (2016) acknowledged that urban resilience must be pursued \r\nin a comprehensive and inclusive manner and highlighted 18 strategies \r\nacross 6 themes: water and new energy, new economy, disaster and \r\ndisease, integrated mobility, transparency of public information and \r\ncompetitive human resource, to be mainstreamed into the revision of the \r\nMid-Term Regional Development Plan (RPJMD, Rencana Pembangunan \r\nJangka Menengah Daerah) of 2016-2021. City Resilience Officers were \r\nformally appointed to serve on the RPJMD team, thereby formalising \r\nclimate resilience as a critical item on the RPJMD programme list."


id: d7d7d24f2e7479ecbfc6a34b00bf408f
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"The City of Semarang first engaged with climate change in 2009, \r\nwhen the Rockefeller Foundation launched the Asian Cities Climate \r\nChange Resilience Network (ACCCRN), an initiative to develop \r\nresilience capacity across secondary and rapidly growing cities in \r\nSouth and Southeast Asia (Reed et al., 2015). Semarang was a pilot \r\ncity for ACCCRN from 2009 to 2016, when it introduced a participatory \r\napproach to planning and decision making that challenged the \r\ngovernment-dominated tradition in the city, and in turn played a \r\nkey role in Semarang's climate adaptation and resilience planning \r\nprocess (Orleans Reed et  al., 2013; Moench, 2014; Kernaghan and \r\nDa Silva, 2014)"


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" A City Team was formed in 2010 consisting of City \r\nEnvironmental Agency (BLH; Badan Lingkungan Hidup), Regional \r\nDisaster Management Agency (BPBD; Badan Penanggulangan Bencana \r\nDaerah), Water Resources Management Office (PSDA; Kantor Dinas \r\nPengelolaan Sumber Daya Air), Regional Planning and Development \r\nAgency (BAPPEDA; Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah), local \r\nuniversities and NGOs such as the Bintari Foundation, with technical \r\nsupport from Mercy Corps Indonesia (Nugraha and Lassa, 2018)."


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"development of dry wells and swales in upstream areas, as well as \r\npromoting cross-region dialogue (Global Resilience Partnership, 2018). \r\nOther collaborations focused on developing resilience indicators (ARUP, \r\n2018; Rangwala et al., 2018). For example, the Zurich Flood Resilience \r\nProgram implemented resilience measurement tools in 16 sub-districts \r\nalong the East Flood Canal. Results of the assessment were then used \r\nto develop local disaster contingency plans (Rangwala et al., 2018).\r\nThe conclusion of the Rockefeller Foundation's formal engagement in \r\nSemarang in 2018 has brought forth questions about continued financial \r\nand institutional support for climate adaptation action in the city. \r\nIncreasing land subsidence will also likely overwhelm current efforts to \r\nincrementally adapt to sea level rise and coastal flooding (Abidin et al., \r\n2013)"


id: 98c0c11a51cac28a8fc5e587e91b6b20
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" Still, the Semarang case study does highlight several key lessons \r\nfor urban climate governance in secondary rapidly urbanising cities in \r\nthe Global South. First, transnational institutions and partnerships are \r\ncritical enablers (Aisya, 2019; Setiadi, 2015; Chu, Hughes and Mason, \r\n2018; Handayani et  al., 2020a). Institutions such as the Rockefeller \r\nFoundation foster programmes and investment in the city, leverage \r\naccess to adaptation funding, accelerate climate mainstreaming into \r\nwider urban sectors, and promote better knowledge management \r\n(Setiadi, 2016). However, such opportunities are also supported by the \r\ncity's ability to further mobilise its own resources in the long term and \r\nremove its dependency on the national government and transnational \r\nsupporters (Handayani et al., 2020a). Second, scaling up of programmes \r\nand replication of adaptation actions are increasingly important to \r\nclose the gap between planning and implementation (Setiadi, 2016)"


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" \r\nIt is evident that increased community empowerment and participation \r\ncan help fill this gap (Hadi, 2018; Miladan, 2016), but this must also \r\nbe evidence-based to ensure its applicability and effectiveness (Suarma\r\net al., 2018). Questions remain around how to determine and assess \r\nevidence-based participatory adaptation at the local level. Third, \r\nsustainable financing (from both external and internal sources) to \r\nsupport proposed adaptation strategies is essential as it allows for more \r\ncapacity building, technology transfer and programme implementation \r\nin the long run (Handayani et al., 2020a; Laeni et al., 2021; Hadi, 2017). \r\nAn example is the development of a water retention on the eastern \r\ncoast of Semarang using a collaborative financing model, which helped \r\nfurther adaptation by protecting water resources for local industries as \r\nwell as promote the idea of land value capture for community residents."


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"In practice, building ecological cities in China has primarily focused \r\non hard measures (Li et al., 2020). Key areas of development include \r\nstakeholder engagement and horizontal coordination (Li et al., 2016). \r\nAmong one of 19 national-level New Areas in China, Xi'xian enjoys \r\nspecial preferential policies in the fields of fiscal autonomy, investment \r\nand tax policy, and permission in land utility for industrial development \r\npurpose. These policy freedoms allow Xi'Xian to explore adaptation \r\noptions. This has opened engagement with business through an urban \r\nconstruction investment group sponsored and invested in jointly by \r\nXi'Xian Management Committee (administrative authority) and local \r\nenterprises (Wei and Zhao, 2018). Second, the municipal government \r\nhas simplified administrative systems to reduce the project waiting \r\nperiod from evaluation to approval to 50 d"


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" Third, a green financial \r\nmechanism creates a leverage effect for national funding, including the \r\nfirst provincial Green Sponge Development Fund (RMB 1.2 billion) and \r\nin Shaanxi, special funding from the Urbanization Development Fund \r\n(RMB 2.64 billion). Furthermore, a public-private partnership model \r\nwith a whole-lifecycle-management approach has been introduced, \r\nraising funding of RMB 1.24 billion with a packaged project including \r\npublic pipelines and sewage water treatment facilities."


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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"Puerto Rico has a strong science base that produced extensive \r\nknowledge on climate change and sustainability long before Hurricane \r\nMaria. The Puerto Rico Climate Change Council has collected and \r\nsynthesised scientific information for Puerto Rico since before its \r\nformation in 2009. Many Puerto Rican scientists were also editors \r\nand authors on Chapter 20: US Caribbean Region for 4th US National \r\nClimate Assessment (Gould et  al., 2018). The National Institute of \r\nIsland Energy and Sustainability (INESI in Spanish) recently published \r\na catalogue with more than 60 scientists and experts working on \r\nenergy and sustainability innovations in the University of Puerto \r\nRico (UPR) system. The scientific community became very active after \r\nthe hurricane in efforts to empower local groups and communities \r\nto build more sustainable and resilient futures"


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created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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" UPR environmental \r\nhealth scientists worked with communities to design and implement \r\nrisk reduction action plans, including NBS , through the Community \r\nClimate Actions Plans and the Puerto Rico Community Resiliency \r\nInitiative sponsored by Fundacion Comunitaria de Puerto Rico and \r\nEducation Development Center-Regional Education Laboratories, \r\nNortheast and Islands. A successful example of these alliances is the \r\ndevelopment of the first solar power community in Toro Negro, Puerto \r\nRico. These initiatives were inspired by principles of human-centred \r\ndesign, a problem-solving approach that starts with the people \r\nimpacted the most by the problem to be solved"


id: 48235503445f0e157b1ecdb449227d19
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 8723
content:
" In San Juan, the \r\ncapital and major urban centre of the island, scientists from UPR and \r\nthe US Forest Service International Institute of Tropical Forestry worked \r\nwith local stakeholders and communities to develop sustainable and \r\ntransformative urban futures with the support of the Urban Resilience \r\nto Extreme Events Sustainability Research Network (UREx SRN). The \r\nUREx SRN is a knowledge network of 10 cities in the USA and Latin \r\nAmerica and 20 other institutions building scientific knowledge, \r\nmodels and participatory tools to build resilience and transformative \r\ncapacities for cities."


id: 8d32d61fcfbde93a55bba003fe63e4b9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19739
content:
"In two weeks in 2017, Puerto Rico experienced two powerful \r\nhurricanes, Irma (category 5) and Maria (category 4). The compound \r\neffects decimated the island's power, water, communications and \r\ntransportation infrastructure, and an estimated 2975 people lost \r\ntheir lives (Irvin-Barnwell et  al., 2020; Santos-Burgoa et  al., 2018). \r\nSoon after, while many homes still had no electricity or roofs and the \r\ntree canopy was still bare, Puerto Ricans were faced with cascading \r\neffects including environmental health impacts from air pollution, \r\nextreme heat and mosquitoes (Ortiz et al., 2020). In 2020, while still \r\nrecovering, Puerto Ricans experienced earthquakes, extreme African \r\ndust events, intense coastal and urban floods, and the COVID-19 \r\npandemic (Keck, 2020; NASA Explore Earth, 2020; NASA/JPL-Caltech, \r\n2020)"


id: 58f896771f09c17a0f96bd624ca693d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 11490
content:
" These events continue to unveil unresolved conditions of social \r\nvulnerability and its root causes in economic poverty, social inequities, \r\naged and deteriorating infrastructure, and population loss (Bonilla \r\nand LeBron, 2019). Combined with limited past investment in climate \r\nchange adaptation and underlying governance challenges including \r\ncorruption, bankruptcy and political crisis (Holladay et al., 2019), this \r\nhas constrained a more CRD for Puerto Rico."


id: aa81b439164c5d8637e869e35ebc778a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 24358
content:
"It is in this context that government, academic institutions and local \r\ncivil society have taken important steps and often joint action toward \r\nmitigation and adaptation. Federal funding included USD 20 billion of \r\ndisaster recovery funding with USD 8 billion allocated for adaptation \r\nand resilience projects, such as flood risk mitigation. During the year \r\n2020, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approved \r\nUSD 13 billion to rebuild the power grid and education system (Delgado, \r\n2020). These programmes allow communities and local governments \r\nto plan and implement strategies and build new infrastructure that \r\nreduces risks and builds long-term adaptive capacities. The Government \r\nof Puerto Rico also approved two key climate adaptation policies in \r\n2019"


id: 6e33fd65ba87ffe0cda989932ce53bd2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
content_type: text
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vector_id: 14957
content:
" The Puerto Rico Mitigation, Adaptation and Resilience to Climate \r\nChange Law (Law 33, Senate Bill PS 773) established, for the first time \r\nin the island's history, a legal framework that acknowledges that the \r\nclimate is changing and threatens the quality of life. The law recognises \r\nimportant scientific projections for the island, including an increase of \r\n0.5 to 1 m in sea levels by 2015, maximum temperatures of up 2.5degC \r\nand precipitation decrease of up to 50% by 2100 (Gould et al., 2018). \r\nThe law generated the formation of an Expert and Advisory Committee \r\non Climate Change to develop the plan with specific recommendations \r\nand present it to the Legislature within a year of the passing of the \r\nlaw in 2020"


id: 84cf2e77ab269fe1657fe15c3bb0a966
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18421
content:
" Along with strategies to specifically protect and build \r\nthe resilience of urban and rural communities to future climate \r\ndisasters, the law establishes SDGs, including water and food security, \r\nurban planning and densification, and transition to renewable and \r\nalternative forms of energy. The energy target is reinforced by another \r\nkey state policy approved in 2019 in response to the failed energy \r\ninfrastructure during Hurricane Maria, the Puerto Rico Energy Public \r\nPolicy Act (Senate Bill PS 1121). This law calls for a transition to 100% \r\nrenewable and alternative energy by 2050."


id: 675b19e98d1bd27da3c6ec1134621f3c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 13851
content:
"Perhaps the greatest source of adaptive capacity that emerged after \r\nthe hurricane came from the civic sector and community-based \r\norganisations, and local residents. Hundreds of non-profit and \r\ngrassroots organisations became active in disaster recovery and \r\nare now catalysing actions to advance social transformation and \r\nsustainable development. In the energy sector, numerous communities \r\nand NGOs developed new action plans to promote transitions to \r\nrenewable energy and community-based microgrids, such as the \r\nQueremos Sol initiative (https://www.queremossolpr.com/), and the \r\nestablishment of solar panels in community centres and residences by \r\nthe Puerto Rico Community Foundation and Resilient Power Puerto \r\nRico"


id: 35e2a0525b6763647ceee8e5bf73c2fe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 5890
content:
" The San Juan Bay Estuary Program, an NGO in the San Juan \r\nmetropolitan area, launched alongside the Clinton Global Initiative \r\nthe development of a watershed-based multi-jusrisdictional hazard \r\nmitigation plan, the first watershed-based plan for the metro region. \r\nThe organisation has established resilience hubs to support the \r\ncommunity with critical resources, communications and energy supply \r\nduring an emergency. In many of the most isolated areas across the \r\nisland where government aid did not reach them for months, the \r\ncommunities that self-organised during recovery are also leading \r\nexamples of community social-ecological resilience. In Utuado, one \r\nof the hardest hit areas by the hurricane, their main community \r\norganisation known as COSSAO (Corporacion de Servicios de Salud \r\ny Desarrollo Socioeconomico, El Otoao) emerged from the hurricane "


id: 61e5b3d9484f1bb144d08cd5b5d1d628
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 12966
content:
"Consequently, they are particularly vulnerable to climate change, and \r\nthe urban poor residents suffer disproportionate burdens and losses \r\nfrom natural hazards, which undermines urban resilience (Williams\r\net al., 2019). Recent impacts from flooding have brought wide-spread \r\ndevastation to urban poor residents in major coastal urban centres \r\nincluding Accra, Lagos, Freetown, Maputo and Dar es Salaam, \r\nresulting in injury and death, displacement of people, loss of assets, \r\ndestruction of public infrastructure and disruption to livelihoods and \r\neconomies (Douglas et al., 2008; Adelekan, 2010; Yankson et al., 2017; \r\nAllen et al., 2017). Flooding and long-term inundation also lead the \r\nspread of diseases and health risks (Sverdlik, 2011; Zerbo, Delgado \r\nand Gonzalez, 2020)"


id: 9ceda6b1f31edb5f95888856caa69fc6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 22226
content:
" Climate change will also bring stresses such as \r\ncity-wide reductions in freshwater availability, and heatwaves that \r\nhave particularly severe consequences for residents of poorly built \r\nhomes in informal settlements (Pasquini et  al., 2020; Kayaga et  al., \r\n2021; Wilby et al., 2021)."


id: 9b2541abb8957755df9ccd86dc2fd370
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 21952
content:
"Adaptation efforts, however, continue to face many governance hurdles. \r\nUp to 2020, only 2-3% of the USD 20  million Federal Government \r\nrecovery funds had been spent with hundreds of families that lost \r\ntheir homes or roofs in 2017 yet to receive the help they need (Colon \r\nAlmenas, 2020). Lack of administrative capacities, coordination across \r\nsectors and efforts, transparency and accountability are some of the \r\ngovernance barriers that keep recovery and transformation efforts from \r\nmaterialising (Lamba Nieves and Marxuach, 2020). Puerto Ricans are \r\nnow contending with the reality that the disaster they are experiencing \r\nis not an outcome of a singular event but of multiple hazards converging \r\nwith pre-existing vulnerabilities and low adaptive capacities creating \r\nsevere multi-hazard risk to the island (Eakin, Munoz-Erickson and \r\nLemos, 2018; Gould et al., 2018)"


id: 8b2562dc21d3649701e50531d98f10aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19420
content:
" Many Puerto Ricans now question \r\nwhen the disaster began and when it ended because they have been \r\nliving in a state of chronic crisis (Bonilla and LeBron, 2019)."


id: d040ea6e7b8a5085c11b19e826d9da3f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:20
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vector_id: 30296
content:
"In response to these risks, a wide range of adaptation efforts have been \r\nimplemented in cities across sub-Saharan Africa (Hunter et al., 2020). \r\nIn Freetown, informal settlement residents have led data generation \r\nefforts that capture the value of local knowledge in understanding \r\nclimate risk. Through partnerships with NGOs and research institutions, \r\ninformal settlement residents have mapped climate hazard hotspots \r\nusing geo-referenced tools, producing both digital and hardcopy \r\noutputs that serve as a blueprint for climate-informed community \r\ndevelopment discourses (Allen et  al., 2020b; Visman et  al., 2020). \r\nSimilarly, residents of informal settlements in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, \r\nhave profiled community climate and health risks by using an adaptation \r\nof the 'Action at the Frontline' methodology developed by the Global \r\nNetwork of Civil Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR)"


id: df468f32ad1533a187a4109c4f6df195
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 32627
content:
" \r\nLocally informed risk profiles support the development of community \r\naction plans based on prioritisation and ranking of scaled-down \r\ninterventions that communities can collectively do on their own \r\n(Osuteye et  al., 2020). This process highlights the lived experiences \r\nof climate change, and allows communities to develop deliberation \r\nspaces, communal solidarity and cohesion, and share adaptation \r\nstrategies (Sakijege et  al., 2014). Such sharing and peer-to-peer \r\nlearning is particularly useful because adaptive capacities are unevenly \r\ndistributed among exposed populations (Ajibade and McBean, 2014). \r\nThe community-generated assessments and data consider the range of \r\nenvironmental, socioeconomic and political factors that contribute to \r\na better understanding of how climate change affects the vulnerability \r\nof low-income urban residents, and how this changes over time."


id: 8b14a94deed162df8d44d81313c546b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 19409
content:
"Informal settlements account for over three-quarters of residential \r\nareas in sub-Saharan Africa and have grown rapidly over the last \r\nthree decades (Visagie and Turok, 2020). Informal settlements will \r\nremain home to a significant proportion of the urban population of \r\nthis region which is projected to grow by 2.5 times between 2020 and \r\n2050 (UNDESA, 2018), driven by a complex set of underlying factors \r\nincluding socioeconomic conditions, inadequate planning systems, \r\nlocal and foreign investment patterns, and rural-to-urban migration \r\n(De Longueville et al., 2020). Yet residents of informal settlements are \r\noften excluded from macro-level visions and policies that seek to make \r\ncities safer and improve resilience (Adenle et al., 2017; Pelling et al., \r\n2018). This case study compares the experience of collective action to \r\nmanage risk in the informal settlements of Freetown, Sierra Leone, with \r\nother cases in Sub-Saharan Africa"


id: 1639612d183077176ad4624f54d04a4f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1024
content:
" These examples show how local \r\nknowledge and capacity, engagement of policymakers in meaningful \r\nways with residents of informal communities, and institutional change, \r\ncan combine to deliver adaptation outcomes at a city scale (Kareem\r\net al., 2020)."


id: 9959732f9503e458fa8e7a250fe90697
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 21643
content:
"work closely with the local research institution, the Sierra Leone \r\nUrban Research Centre (SLURC). SLURC has played an essential role \r\nin curating spaces for continuous learning and relationship-building \r\nbetween FEDURP and community residents, including the formation of \r\n'Community Learning Platforms' (CLP) for mixed groups of community \r\nactors (City Learning Platform, 2019) to build their capacities to address \r\nclimate risk collectively. This is done by drawing on the data, agency \r\nand mobilisation potential of community organisations in informal \r\nsettlements. In the coastal settlement of Cockle Bay at the western end \r\nof the city, uncontrolled traditional land reclamation ('banking') along \r\nthe shores progressively exposed residents to perennial floods from \r\ntidal surges, and the settlement received regular threats of evictions \r\nfrom city authorities"


id: 4f9dcc6702964920af4fa4890ee0935f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9956
content:
" However, residents have drawn on their climate \r\nrisk knowledge and hazard profiling to self-manage a process of action \r\nplanning resulting in a decision to prohibit further land reclamation. It \r\nalso identified and demarcated an exterior boundary of the settlement \r\nand planned and constructed new drainage channels to carry away \r\nrunoff water within the community (Allen et al., 2017). The community \r\norganisations have subsequently successfully negotiated with the "


id: 83b77572cb37b0cabab999e8b532f121
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 18257
content:
"The approach taken in Freetown demonstrates a pathway to adaptation \r\nthat is based on a more people-centred approach to urban planning \r\nthat understands the aspirations of urban residents, addresses climate \r\nrisk and advances sustainable development (Woodcraft et al., 2020; \r\nFraser et al., 2017). It further provides an example of the ways in which \r\ndifferent sources and scales of data can be co-produced (Kovacic et al., \r\n2019) and targeted interventions can be co-designed with community \r\nresidents (Musango et al., 2020). The community-generated data on \r\nclimate and health risks and the subsequent strategic action plans \r\ndeveloped through local community organisations' work have been \r\nrecognised and incorporated into a new city-wide initiative led by \r\nthe Office of the Mayor, dubbed Transform Freetown (Allen et  al., \r\n2020a)"


id: 49230fcd726548ae8affa5d26f393b43
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 8896
content:
" The action has expanded the political space for the urban \r\npoor's collectives to strategically engage in urban resilience planning, \r\nhighlighting the value and potential of participatory processes and \r\ncommunity-generated data."


id: 209d7f370b54187cf1889c3fa1b2ae4d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
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vector_id: 2576
content:
"Urbanisation: A Megatrend Driving Global Climate Risk and Potential for Low-Carbon and Resilient Futures\r\nSevere weather events, exacerbated by anthropogenic emissions, are already having devastating impacts on people who live in urban \r\nareas, and on the infrastructure that supports these communities and those of many other distant places (high confidence) (Cai et al., \r\n2019; Folke et al., 2021). Between 2000 and 2015, the global population in locations that were affected by floods grew by 58-86 million \r\n(Tellman et al., 2021). The direct economic costs of all extreme events reached USD 210-268 billion in 2020 (Aon, 2021) or about USD \r\n0.7 billion d-1; this figure does not include knock-on costs in supply chains or days off work lost so that the actual economic costs could \r\nbe far higher. Depending on RCP, between half (RCP2.6) and three-quarters (RCP8"


id: 3a0b2b553802a07805ffb9c0757014df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 6508
content:
"5) of the global population could be exposed to periods \r\nof life-threatening climatic conditions arising from coupled impacts of extreme heat and humidity by 2100 (see Section 6.2.2.1; WGII \r\nFigure 6.3; Mora et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2021; Huang et al., 2019)."


id: b94f77b99a144c0160dbfc8139ce33f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
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vector_id: 26696
content:
"Building today for resilience and lower emissions is far easier than retrofitting tomorrow. As urbanisation unfolds, its legacy continues \r\nto be the locking in of emissions and vulnerabilities (high confidence) (Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2018; Seto et al., 2016). Retrofitting, disaster \r\nreconstruction and urban regeneration programmes offer scope for strategic direction changes to low-carbon and high-resilience urban \r\nform and function if they are inclusive in design and implementation. Rapid urban growth means new investment, new buildings and \r\ninfrastructure, new demands for energy and transport and new questions about what a healthy and fulfilling urban life can be. The USD \r\n90 trillion expected to be invested in new urban development by 2030 (NCE, 2018), is a global opportunity to place adaptation and \r\nmitigation directly into urban infrastructure and planning, and social policy including education and health care and environmental \r\nmanagement (Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2018)"


id: 45f9d78721dca8b5050ac7fc96e74a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8397
content:
" If this opportunity is missed, if business as usual urbanisation persists, then social and physical \r\nvulnerability will be not be so easily confronted."


id: 4096331d38909b52ea238d665d952d4c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7540
content:
"Integrated approaches to tackle common drivers of emissions and cascading risks provide the basis for strengthening synergies across \r\nmitigation and adaptation, and managing possible trade-offs with sustainable development (limited evidence, medium agreement) \r\n(Grafakos et al., 2019; Landauer, Juhola and Klein, 2019). Analysis of 315 local authority emission reduction plans across the European \r\nUnion reveals that the most common policies cover municipal assets and structures (Palermo et al. 2020). Estimates of emission reductions \r\nby non-state and sub-state actors in 10 high-emitting economies projected GHG emissions in 2030 would be 1.2-2.0 GtCO2-eq per year \r\nor 3.8-5.5% lower compared to scenario projections for current national policies (31.6-36.8 GtCO2-eq per year) if the policies are \r\nfully implemented and do not change the pace of action elsewhere (Kuramochi et al. 2020)"


id: 8d25583da9715c31c9cfdf2a6caa7136
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19730
content:
" The value of integrating mitigation and \r\nadaptation is underscored in the opportunities for decarbonising existing urban areas, and investing in social, ecological and technological \r\ninfrastructure resilience (WGII 6.4). Integrating mitigation and adaption is challenging (Landauer, Juhola and Klein, 2019) but can provide \r\nmultiple benefits for the health and well-being of urban inhabitants (Sharifi, 2020)."


id: 4b0ec5bd8e5659e1bf43522b9c854973
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9230
content:
"Effective climate strategies combine mitigation and adaptation responses, including through linking adaptive urban land use with GHG \r\nemission reductions (medium evidence, high agreement) (Xu et al., 2019; Patterson et al., 2021). For example, urban green and blue \r\ninfrastructure can provide co-benefits for mitigation and adaptation (Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2018) and is an important entry point for \r\nintegrating adaptation and mitigation at the urban level (Frantzeskaki et al., 2019). Grey and physical infrastructure such as sea defences \r\ncan immediately reduce risk, but can also transfer risk and limit future options. Social policy interventions including social safety nets \r\nprovide financial security for the most at risk and can manage vulnerability determined both by specific hazards and independently"


id: 93c608f6c469fbc02290fb4a29a4fcab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20762
content:
" \r\nHazard-independent mechanisms for vulnerability reduction, such as population-wide social security, provide resilience in the face of \r\nunanticipated cascading impacts or surprise and novel climate-related hazard exposure. Social interventions can also support, or be \r\nled by, ambitions to reach the Sustainable Development Goals (Archer, 2016). Climate resilient development invites planners to plan \r\ninterventions and monitor the effectiveness of outcomes beyond individual projects and across wider remits that reach into sustainable \r\ndevelopment. Curbing the emission impacts of urban activities to reach net zero in the next decades while improving the resilience of \r\nurban areas necessitates an integrated response now."


id: cc8f833f9a1c132e3bb440f3ce6c5499
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29723
content:
"Innovative governance and finance solutions are required to manage complex and interconnected risks across essential key infrastructures, \r\nnetworks and services and meet basic human needs in urban areas (medium confidence) (Moser et al., 2019; Colenbrander, Dodman and \r\nMitlin, 2018). There are many examples of 'ready-to-use' policy tools, technologies and practical interventions for policymakers seeking \r\nto act on adaptation and mitigation (Keenan, Chu and Peterson, 2019; Bisaro and Hinkel, 2018; Chirambo, 2021). Tax and fiscal incentives \r\nfor business and individuals can help support city-wide change behaviour toward low carbon and risk reducing choices. Change can start \r\nwhere governments have most control; in public sector institutions and investment, but the challenge ahead requires partnership with \r\nprivate sector and community actors acting at scale and with accountability"


id: 299717041a220ea320670e63a6d9e925
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3980
content:
" Urban climate governance and finance needs to address \r\nurban inequalities at the forefront if the urban opportunity is to realise the ambition of the Sustainable Development Goals."


id: 821b1e8709649fede73d9aad41f0477c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17989
content:
"Increasing investment at pace will put pressure on governance capability and transparency and accountability of decision making\r\n(medium confidence) (WG II 6.6.4.5). Urban climate action that actively includes local actors and is built on an evidence base open to \r\nindependent scrutiny is more likely to avoid unintended, negative maladaptive impacts and mobilise a wide range of local capacities. \r\nIn the long run, this is also more likely to carry public support, even if some experiments and investments do not deliver the intended \r\nsocial benefits. Legislation, technical capacity and governance capability is required to be able to absorb additional finance. About USD \r\n384 billion yr-1 of climate finance has been invested in urban areas in recent years. This remains at about 10% of the annual climate \r\nfinance that would be necessary for low-carbon and resilient urban development (Negreiros et al., 2021)"


id: edbcbb9040d7acc36d8efaadd6bde432
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34867
content:
" Rapid deployment of funds \r\nto stimulate economies in recovery from COVID-19 have highlighted the pitfalls of funding expansion ahead of policy innovation and \r\ncapacity building. The result can be an intensification of existing urban forms, exactly the kinds of choices and preferences that contribute \r\nto risk creation and its concentration among those with little public voice or economic power."


id: b42d7e1010e33931e799be93c56ca997
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25862
content:
"Iterative and experimental approaches to climate adaptation and mitigation decision making co-generated in partnership with \r\ncommunities, can advance climate-resilient decarbonisation (medium evidence, high agreement) (Caldarice, Tollin and Pizzorni, 2021; \r\nCulwick et al., 2019; van der Heijden and Hong, 2021). Conditions of complexity, uncertainty and constrained resources require innovative \r\nsolutions which are both adaptive and anticipatory. Complex interactions among multiple agents in times of uncertainty makes decision \r\nmaking about social, economic, governance, and infrastructure choices challenges, and can lead decision makers to postpone action. \r\nThis is the case for those balancing household budgets, residential investment portfolios and city-wide policy responsibilities. Living with \r\nclimate change requires changes to business-as-usual design making"


id: 83666e4e6c5bdd62dcb08eaaee5fba92
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18201
content:
" Co-design and collaboration with communities through iterative \r\npolicy experimentation can point the way toward CRD pathways (Ataov and Peker, 2021). Key to successful learning is transparency in \r\npolicymaking, inclusive policy processes and robust local modelling, monitoring and evaluation, which are not yet widely undertaken \r\n(Ford et al., 2019; Sanchez Rodriguez, Urge-Vorsatz and Barau, 2018)."


id: 74baa192192a819d9f064b0e7ba72338
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15960
content:
"Local governments play an important role in driving climate action across mitigation and adaptation as managers of assets, regulators, \r\nmobilisers and catalysts of action, but few cities are undertaking transformative climate adaptation or mitigation actions (limited \r\nevidence, medium agreement) (Heikkinen, Yla-Anttila and Juhola, 2019). Local actors are providers of infrastructure and services, \r\nregulators of zoning, and can be conveners and champions of an integrated approach for mitigation and adaptation at multiple levels \r\n(limited evidence, high confidence). New opportunities in governance and finance can enable cities to pool resources together and \r\naggregate interventions to innovate ways of mobilising urban climate finance at scale (White and Wahbah, 2019; Simpson et al., 2019; \r\nColenbrander, Dodman and Mitlin, 2018)"


id: ec226bf74a90ccd436d3cdc8af77dc70
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34650
content:
" However, research increasingly points toward the difficulties faced during the implementation \r\nof climate financing in situ, such as the fragmentation of structures of governance capable of managing large investments effectively \r\n(Mohammed et al., 2019)."


id: 38473e8d0dd632bf2da35dccdee0eb4b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6232
content:
"Scaling up transformative place-based action for both adaptation and mitigation requires enabling conditions including land-based \r\nfinancing, intermediaries and local partnerships (medium evidence, high agreement) (Tirumala and Tiwari, 2021; ). Governance \r\nstructures that combine actors working at different levels with different mixes of tools are effective in addressing challenges related \r\nto implementation of integrated action, while cross-sectoral coordination is necessary (Singh et al., 2020). Joint institutionalisation of \r\nmitigation and adaptation in local governance structures can also enable integrated action (Gopfert et al., 2020; Hurlimann et al., 2021). \r\nHowever, the proportion of international finance that reaches local recipients remains low, despite the repeated focus of climate policy \r\non place-based adaptation and mitigation (Manuamorn, 2019)"


id: d2642774c209d6dd5edd4d01af381229
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30629
content:
" Green financing instruments that enable local climate action without \r\nexacerbating current forms of inequality can jointly address mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development. Climate finance that \r\nalso reaches beyond non-state enterprises, including SMEs, communities and NGOs, and is responsive to the needs of urban inhabitants, \r\nincluding disabled individuals and different races or ethnicities, is essential for inclusive and resilient urban development (Colenbrander, \r\nDodman and Mitlin, 2018Frenova, 2020). Developing networks that can exert climate action at scale is another priority for climate \r\nfinance."


id: 90a91d315b434bd0bed7d8e1448baeaf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20294
content:
"The urbanisation megatrend is an opportunity to transition global society. Enabling urban governance to avert cascading risk and achieve \r\nlow-carbon, resilient development will involve co-production of policy and planning, rapid implementation and greater cross-sector \r\ncoordination, monitoring and evaluation (limited evidence, medium agreement) (Grafakos et  al., 2019; Di Giulio et  al., 2018). New \r\nconstellations of responsible actors are required to manage hybrid local-city or cross-city risk management and decarbonisation initiatives \r\n(limited evidence, medium agreement). These may increasingly benefit from linkages across more urban and more rural space as \r\nrecognition of cascading and systemic risk brings recognition of supply chains, remittance flows and migration trends as vectors of risk \r\nand resilience"


id: a7e448e82322ab469fd87b0e507e6e50
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23928
content:
" Urban governance will be better prepared in planning, prioritising and financing the kind of measures that can reduce GHG \r\nemissions and improve resilience at scale and pace when considering a view of cascading risks and carbon lock-ins globally, while acting \r\nlocally to address local limitations and capacities, including the needs and priorities of urban citizens (Colenbrander, Dodman and Mitlin, \r\n2018)."


id: d73f75eb6d6561dc4700da11042ae933
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31379
content:
"This integrated approach to adaptation in human settlements needs to be supported by various other actions, \r\nincluding potential co-benefits with carbon emissions reductions, public health and ecosystem conservation goals. \r\nFirst, information on climate risks needs to be embedded into the architectural design, delivery and retrofitting \r\nof housing, transportation, spatial planning and infrastructure across neighbourhood and city scales. This includes \r\nmaking information on climate impacts widely available, updating design standards and strengthening regulation \r\nto avoid development in high-risk locations. Second, the capacity of communities needs to be strengthened, \r\nespecially among those in informal settlements, the poorest and other vulnerable groups including minorities, \r\nmigrants, women, children, elderly, disabled and people with serious health conditions such as obesity"


id: 100718887689ebbc6607858d09969bf6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7
content:
" This involves \r\nraising awareness, incorporating communities into adaptation processes, and strengthening regulation, policies and \r\nprovision of infrastructure services. Third, nature-based solutions should be integrated to work alongside traditional \r\n'grey' or engineered infrastructure. Vegetation corridors, greenspace, wetlands and other green infrastructure can \r\nbe woven into the built environment to reduce heat and flood risks, whilst providing other benefits such as health \r\nand biodiversity."


id: 1b8f22676dde941eecaef23466069e67
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1796
content:
"Urbanisation is a global trend which is interacting with climate change to create complex risks in cities and \r\nsettlements, especially for those that already have high levels of poverty, unemployment, housing informality and \r\nbacklogs of services. Many cities and settlements are seeing increasing action to manage climate risks. On top of \r\nreducing communities' exposure to climate risk, adaptation actions can have benefits for reducing urban poverty \r\nand enhancing economic performance in ways that reduce inequality and advance sustainability goals. Adaptation \r\nactions, however, can also have unintended consequences. That is why care needs to be taken to ensure climate \r\nadaptation planning and development of new infrastructure does not exacerbate inequality or negatively impact \r\nother sustainable development priorities"


id: 8574b460d186f897685f4935e043b310
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18527
content:
" Climate adaptation planning is most effective when it is sensitive to the \r\ndiverse ways that low-income and minority communities are more likely to experience climate risk, including women, \r\nchildren, migrants, refugees, internally displaced peoples and racial/ethnic minority groups, among others."


id: 6a5f80075c63d675f3dd24a11955a044
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14334
content:
"Adapting to climate change can have benefits for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and urban inequalities. \r\nIn cities where growing numbers of people live in informal settlements, introducing risk-reducing physical \r\ninfrastructure such as piped water, sanitation and drainage systems can enhance the quality of life of the community. \r\nAt the same time, those measures can increase health outcomes and reduce urban inequalities by reducing exposure \r\nto flooding or heat impacts. In less developed countries, less than 60% of the urban population have access to piped \r\nwater which, in turn, impacts their health and well-being. Increasingly, housing is being built better to manage \r\nheat risk through insulation or changing building orientation, or to flood risk by raising structures, which then \r\ncontributes to well-being and ability to work. Improvements to early warning systems can help people evacuate \r\nrapidly in case of storm surges or flooding"


id: f3f0fc915017cf8b039ea9cd629f4316
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35894
content:
"Efforts to adapt to climate change can be incremental, reformist or transformational, depending on the scale of \r\nthe change required. Incremental action may address specific climate impacts in a given place, but do not challenge \r\nthe social and political institutions that prevent people from bouncing back better. Reformist action may address \r\nsome of the social and institutional drivers of exposure and vulnerability, but without addressing the underlying \r\nsocioeconomic structures that drive differential forms of exposure. For example, social protection measures may \r\nimprove people's capacity to cope with climate impacts, but that improved capacity will depend on maintaining \r\nsuch protection measures. Transformative action involves fundamental changes in political and socioeconomic \r\nsystems, oriented toward addressing vulnerability drivers (e.g., socioeconomic inequalities, consumption cultures)"


id: 7c7642214bb2611715d8edf561599cbd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17181
content:
" \r\nAll forms of adaptation are relevant to deliver resilient futures because of the variability of conditions in which \r\nadaptation action is needed."


id: b0a5d6e9363e5b279ac67a39780d0712
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25313
content:
"Climate resilient development has a strong potential to \r\ngenerate substantial co-benefits for health and well-being and \r\nto reduce risks of involuntary displacement and conflict (very \r\nhigh confidence). Sustainable and climate resilient development \r\nthat decreases exposure, vulnerability and societal inequity and \r\nthat increases timely and effective adaptation and mitigation more \r\nbroadly, has the potential to reduce but not necessarily eliminate \r\nclimate change impacts on health, well-being, involuntary migration \r\nand conflict (high confidence). This development includes greenhouse \r\ngas (GHG) emission reductions through clean energy and transport; \r\nclimate-resilient urban planning; sustainable food systems that lead \r\nto healthier diets; universal access to healthcare and social protection \r\nsystems; wide-scale, proactive adaptive capacity building for climate \r\nchange; and achievement of the SDGs (very high confidence)"


id: f509957e6a09ea0281d7934011bf1271
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36065
content:
" Meeting \r\nthe objectives of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular \r\nMigration and building inclusive and integrative approaches to \r\nclimate-resilient peace would help prevent health risks related to \r\nmigration and conflict (high agreement, medium evidence). The net \r\nglobal financial gains from these co-benefits to health and well\u0002being, including avoided hospitalisations, morbidity and premature \r\ndeaths, exceed the financial costs of mitigation (high confidence). \r\nAs an example of co-benefits, the financial value of health benefits \r\nfrom improved air quality alone is projected to be greater than the \r\ncosts of meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement (high confidence). \r\nAll pathways to climate resilient development, including those for the \r\nhealth and healthcare systems, involve balancing complex synergies \r\nand trade-offs between development pathways and the options that \r\nunderpin climate mitigation and adaptation pathways (very high \r\nconfidence) {7.4"


id: 528c18c998134bc18891bf355f80e02e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10444
content:
"Since AR5, new evidence and awareness of current impacts \r\nand projected risks of climate change on health, well-being, \r\nmigration and conflict have emerged, including greater \r\nevidence of the detrimental impacts of climate change on \r\nmental health (very high confidence). New international agreements \r\nwere reached on climate change (Paris Agreement), disaster risk \r\nreduction (DRR) (Sendai Agreement), sustainable development (the \r\nSustainable Development Goals (SDGs)), urbanisation (The New \r\nUrban Agenda), migration (Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and \r\nRegular Migration) and refugees (Global Compact on Refugees) that, \r\nif achieved, would reduce the impacts of climate change on health, \r\nwell-being, migration and conflict (very high confidence)"


id: 1a7547e9bb3e57a33a31817d4f3d4073
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1645
content:
" However, the \r\nchallenges with implementing these agreements are highlighted by \r\nthe coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, which exposed \r\nsystemic weaknesses at community, national and international levels \r\nin the ability of societies to anticipate and respond to global risks \r\n(high confidence). Incremental changes in policies and strategies \r\nhave proven insufficient to reduce climate-related risks to health, \r\nwell-being, migration and conflict, highlighting the value of more \r\nintegrated approaches and frameworks for solutions across systems \r\nand sectors that are embodied in these new international agreements \r\n(high confidence) {7.1.3, 7.2.1, 7.4.1, 7.4.2, 7.4.3, 7.4.6; Cross-Chapter \r\nBox COVID in Chapter 7}."


id: 4244533092c5b4f32de36d9e1dce73d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7824
content:
"Key transformations are needed to facilitate climate \r\nresilient development pathways (CRDPs) for health, well\u0002being, migration and conflict avoidance (high confidence). The \r\ntransformational changes will be more effective if they are \r\nresponsive to regional, local and Indigenous knowledge and \r\nconsider the many dimensions of vulnerability, including those \r\nthat are gender- and age-specific (high confidence). A key pathway \r\ntowards climate resilience in the health sector is universal access to \r\nprimary healthcare, including mental healthcare (high confidence). \r\nInvestments in other sectors and systems that improve upon the social \r\ndeterminants of health have the potential to reduce vulnerability to \r\nclimate-related health risks (high confidence). Links between climate \r\nrisks, adaptation, migration and labour markets highlight the value \r\nof providing better mobility options as part of transformative change \r\n(medium confidence)"


id: 5e4c23254ec7a456ae159815d3f797c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12364
content:
"Climate hazards are increasingly contributing to a growing \r\nnumber of adverse health outcomes (including communicable \r\nand non-communicable diseases (NCDs)) in multiple geographical \r\nareas (very high confidence). The net impacts are largely negative at \r\nall scales (very high confidence), and there are very few examples \r\nof beneficial outcomes from climate change at any scale (high \r\nconfidence). While malaria incidence has declined globally due to non\u0002climatic socioeconomic factors and health system responses, a shift to \r\nhigher altitudes has been observed as the climate warms (very high \r\nconfidence)"


id: 5e5e0f3038d383b24bc0fe87984e068e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12381
content:
" Climate variability and change (including temperature, \r\nrelative humidity and rainfall) and population mobility are significantly \r\nand positively associated with observed increases in dengue globally; \r\nchikungunya virus in Asia, Latin America, North America and Europe (high \r\nconfidence); Lyme disease vector Ixodes scapularis in North America \r\n(high confidence); and Lyme disease and tick-borne encephalitis vector \r\nIxodes ricinus in Europe (medium confidence). Higher temperatures (very \r\nhigh confidence), heavy rainfall events (high confidence) and flooding \r\n(medium confidence) are associated with an increase of diarrhoeal \r\ndiseases in affected regions, including cholera (very high confidence), \r\nother gastrointestinal infections (high confidence) and food-borne \r\ndiseases due to Salmonella and Campylobacter (medium confidence).\r\nFloods have led to increases in vector- and waterborne diseases and \r\nto disturbances of public health services (high confidence)"


id: df5ecbf6a87c35ffe34b76429dd0bca9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32641
content:
" Climate \r\nextremes increase the risks of several types of respiratory tract infections \r\n(high confidence). Climate-related extreme events such as wildfires, \r\nstorms and floods are followed by increased rates of mental illness in \r\nexposed populations (very high confidence) {7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.2.3, 7.2.4, \r\n7.2.5, 7.2.6}."


id: 945f872601b5090473f004978a26e4d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20853
content:
"Extreme climate events act as both direct drivers (e.g., \r\ndestruction of homes by tropical cyclones) and as indirect \r\ndrivers (e.g., rural income losses during prolonged droughts) of \r\ninvoluntary migration and displacement (very high confidence).\r\nMost documented examples of climate-related displacement occur \r\nwithin national boundaries, with international movements occurring \r\nprimarily within regions, particularly between countries with \r\ncontiguous borders (high confidence). Global statistics collected since \r\n2008 by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) show \r\nan annual average of over 20 million people internally displaced by \r\nweather-related extreme events, with storms and floods the most \r\ncommon drivers (high confidence)"


id: 233eb5c5a740f1643a66cb423ab508e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2994
content:
" The largest absolute number of \r\npeople displaced by extreme weather each year occurs in Asia (South, \r\nSoutheast and East), followed by sub-Saharan Africa, but small island \r\nstates in the Caribbean and South Pacific are disproportionately affected \r\nrelative to their small population size (high confidence). Immobility in \r\nthe context of climate risks can reflect vulnerability and lack of agency \r\nbut can also be a deliberate choice of people to maintain livelihoods, \r\neconomic considerations and social and cultural attachments to place \r\n(high confidence) {7.2.6; Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7}."


id: 8748a5862e16f0e54a04370cc2b38bd7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18822
content:
"Future climate-related migration is expected to vary by region \r\nand over time, according to future climatic drivers, patterns of \r\npopulation growth, adaptive capacity of exposed populations \r\nand international development and migration policies (high \r\nconfidence). The wide range of potential outcomes is reflected in model \r\nprojections of population displacements by 2050 in Latin America, sub\u0002Saharan Africa and south Asia due to climate change, which vary from \r\n31  million to 143  million people, depending on assumptions about \r\nfuture GHG emissions and socioeconomic development trajectories \r\n(high confidence). With every additional one degree Celsius of \r\nwarming, the global risks of involuntary displacement due to flood \r\nevents are projected to rise by approximately 50% (high confidence)"


id: 5f5dfbd59157c41816e619c2cb75bdd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12578
content:
" \r\nHigh emissions/low development scenarios raise the potential \r\nfor higher levels of migration and involuntary displacement (high \r\nconfidence) and increase the need for planned relocations and support \r\nfor people exposed to climate extremes but lacking the means to move \r\n(high confidence) {7.3.2; Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7}."


id: ea7ea66367c664dd9b924efe961df702
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34402
content:
"Reducing future risks of involuntary migration and displacement \r\ndue to climate change is possible through cooperative \r\ninternational efforts to enhance institutional adaptive capacity \r\nand sustainable development (high confidence). Institutional and \r\ncross-sectoral efforts to build adaptive capacity, coupled with policies \r\naimed at ensuring safe and orderly movements of people within and \r\nbetween states, can form part of the CRDPs that reduce future risks \r\nof climate-related involuntary migration, displacement and immobility \r\n(medium confidence). In locations where permanent, government\u0002assisted relocation becomes unavoidable, active involvement of local \r\npopulations in planning and decision-making increases the likelihood \r\nof successful outcomes (medium confidence). People who live on small \r\nisland states do not view relocation as an appropriate or desirable \r\nmeans of adapting to the impacts of climate change (high confidence)\r\n{7.4"


id: e86912e74e9077748166cdf022ede13d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34070
content:
"Adaptation and sustainable development build peace in conflict\u0002prone regions by addressing the drivers of grievances that lead \r\nto conflict and vulnerability to climate change (high confidence).\r\nEnvironmental peacebuilding (EP) through natural resource sharing, \r\nconflict-sensitive adaptation and climate-resilient peacebuilding offer \r\npromising avenues for addressing conflict risk, but their efficacy is still \r\nto be demonstrated through effective monitoring and evaluation (high \r\nconfidence). Formal institutional arrangements for natural resource \r\nmanagement contribute to wider cooperation and peacebuilding \r\n(high confidence) and gender-based approaches provide under-utilised \r\npathways to achieving sustainable peace (medium confidence). \r\nInclusion, cross-issue and cross-sectoral integration in policy and \r\nprogramming, and approaches that incorporate different geographical \r\nscales and work across national boundaries can support climate\u0002resilient peace (high confidence) {7.4"


id: fa366ff08b2d836055d621e789465fd1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36883
content:
"human security and that mobility is a widely used strategy to maintain \r\nlivelihoods in response to social and environmental changes (high \r\nagreement, medium evidence). Research on the influence of climate \r\nchange and climate extremes on multiple forms of migration (including \r\nvoluntary migration, involuntary displacement and immobility) has \r\nexpanded significantly since AR5, which has allowed for a more robust \r\nassessment in this chapter, with migration also featuring in most other \r\nsectoral and regional chapters of this report"


id: c068a369ccb0948d4f7bc81987fd3286
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27833
content:
" With respect to violent \r\nconflict, AR5 Chapter 12 found that people living in places affected by \r\nviolent conflict are particularly vulnerable to climate change (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement), that some of the factors increasing the risk \r\nof violent conflict within states are sensitive to climate change (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement) and that climate change will lead to \r\nnew challenges to states and will increasingly shape both conditions \r\nof security and national security policies (medium evidence, medium \r\nagreement). As with other subjects assessed in this chapter, there \r\nhas been significant growth in the number of assessable studies, but \r\nthere remain shortcomings with respect to the availability of evidence \r\nregarding the specific nature of causal linkages and the attributability \r\nof particular outcomes to climate events or conditions."


id: 5adee77d419174e66d616b7f8b8c4b88
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11813
content:
"This chapter assesses peer-reviewed and selected grey literature \r\npublished since the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) on the \r\nimpacts and projected future risks of climate change for health, well\u0002being, migration and conflict, taking into consideration determinants \r\nof vulnerability and the dynamic structure of human populations and \r\ncommunities. Particular attention is given to potential adaptation \r\nchallenges and actions as well as potential co-benefits for health \r\nassociated with mitigation actions. AR5 presented strong evidence\u0002based statements regarding the likely2\r\n impacts of climate change on \r\nhealth, migration and conflict in two separate chapters on Human Health \r\n(Chapter 11) and Human Security (Chapter 12). The present chapter \r\ncovers all topics found in AR5 Chapter 11 and Sections 12.4 (Migration \r\nand Mobility Dimensions of Human Security), 12.5 (Climate Change and \r\nArmed Conflict) and 12"


id: d8a8bb4bc65ded51b3b3ce22cd374c52
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31600
content:
"6 (State Integrity and Geopolitical Rivalry) and \r\nprovides an additional, expanded assessment of mental health impacts, \r\ngender dimensions of climate risks and solution pathways."


id: 63a32ede65e184cfea9345205c38ff14
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"AR5 stated with very high confidence that the health of human \r\npopulations is sensitive to climate change (Smith et  al., 2014). \r\nSpecific observations of current impacts included the expansion of the \r\ngeographical ranges of some diseases into previously unaffected areas \r\nand changes in the distributions of some food-, water- and vector\u0002borne diseases (high confidence). Increasing future health risks were \r\nprojected from injury, disease and death due to more intense heatwaves \r\nand fires (very high confidence), undernutrition in poor regions (high \r\nconfidence), food- and waterborne diseases (very high confidence)\r\nand VBDs (medium confidence)"


id: 573a6aa388d35ff0739fc74090e5e672
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
" AR5 found that climate change is a \r\nmultiplier of existing health vulnerabilities, including food insecurity \r\nand limited access to safe water, improved sanitation, healthcare and \r\neducation, and that the most effective measures to reduce vulnerability \r\nin the near term are programmes that implement and improve basic \r\npublic health (very high confidence). Opportunities for co-benefits from \r\nmitigation actions were identified through such actions as reducing \r\nlocal emissions of short-lived climate pollutants from energy systems \r\n(very high confidence) and expanding transport systems that promote \r\nactive travel (high confidence). The significant growth in peer-reviewed \r\npublications on links between climate change and human health and \r\nwell-being since AR5 allowed for a more detailed and wider reaching \r\nassessment in the present chapter and stronger confidence statements \r\nfor many climate-sensitive health outcomes."


id: 7eaea766430e1574d2351da1a04ea8ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Since AR5, several new international agreements have come into \r\neffect that have implications for international responses to the \r\nclimate risks assessed in this chapter. The 2015 Paris Agreement, \r\nwhich explicitly mentions health in three separate sections, set new \r\ngoals for adaptation and established a working group to study the \r\neffects of climate change on population displacement. The 17 United \r\nNations (UN) SDGs for 2030, adopted in 2015, are all important for \r\nbuilding adaptive capacity in general, with goals 13 ('Take urgent \r\naction to combat climate change and its impacts') and 3 ('Ensure \r\nhealthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages') being directly \r\nrelevant to this chapter. Other SDGs contain specific targets that are \r\nalso relevant for this chapter, including Target 10.7 ('Well-managed \r\nmigration policies'), Target 8.3 ('Decent work for all') and Target 5.4 \r\n('Promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies') (Piper, 2017)"


id: 4abb76942152db0fbc273da7df7f577
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" The \r\n2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction puts an emphasis \r\non health and well-being (Aitsi-Selmi and Murray, 2016) In 2018, UN \r\nmember states negotiated Global Compacts for Safe, Orderly and \r\nRegular Migration and on Refugees that, taken together with the Paris \r\nAgreement, provide pathways for coordinated international responses \r\nto climate-related migration and displacement (Warner, 2018)."


id: 7e5ca182dcd6b10b10345ba9e26216c
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"and well-being of vulnerable people and regions (Ebi et  al., 2018b) \r\nand highlighted links between climate change hazards, poverty, food \r\nsecurity, migration and conflict. The 2019 Special Report on Climate \r\nChange and Land (SRCCL) (IPCC, 2019b) emphasised the impacts of \r\nclimate change on food security; highlighted links between reduced \r\nresilience of dryland populations, land degradation, migration and \r\nconflict; and raised concerns about the impacts of climate extremes. \r\nThe 2019 Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing \r\nClimate (IPCC, 2019a) detailed how changes in the cryosphere \r\nand ocean systems have impacted people and ecosystem services, \r\nparticularly food security, water resources, water quality, livelihoods, \r\nhealth and well-being, infrastructure, transportation, tourism and \r\nrecreation as well as the culture of human societies, particularly for \r\nIndigenous Peoples"


id: aa048b461a45ec4b082e74e0b65a4c96
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" It also noted the risks of future displacements due \r\nto rising sea levels and associated coastal hazards."


id: 4e701f46d76b11567305a95927d5da75
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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"Building on these frameworks and perspectives, there is increasing \r\noverlap in the literature on global health, climate change impacts and \r\nestimates of loss and damage. The Global Burden of Disease study \r\nfor 2019 for the first time included non-optimal temperature as a \r\nrisk factor (Murray et  al., 2020). Work by social scientists continues \r\nto explore how climate change indirectly affects resource availability, \r\nproductivity, migration and conflict (Burke et al., 2015a; Carleton and \r\nHsiang, 2016; Hsiang et al., 2017), bringing multiple lines of inquiry \r\ntogether to study the associations between global environmental \r\nchanges, socioeconomic dynamics and impacts on health and well\u0002being. Morbidity associated with migration and displacement, \r\nespecially in the context of small island states, has been identified as \r\na non-material form of loss and damage (Thomas and Benjamin, 2020; \r\nMcNamara et al., 2021)"


id: 1f8de65aa21429e6036d4d4d1fb13aa4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
" Social costs of carbon estimates have been \r\nupdated to include excess mortality associated with climate change, \r\nincreasing estimates substantially (Dressler, 2021)."


id: bb45c69a08eca9d9cdab8cbe8f0604d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"There is no consensus definition of well-being, but it is generally agreed \r\nthat it includes a predominance of positive emotions and moods (e.g., \r\nhappiness) compared with extreme negative emotions (e.g., anxiety), \r\nsatisfaction with life, a sense of meaning and positive functioning, \r\nincluding the capacity for unimpaired cognitive functioning and \r\neconomic productivity (Diener and Tay, 2015; Piekalkiewicz, 2017). \r\nA capabilities approach (Sen, 2001) focuses on the opportunity for \r\npeople to achieve their goals in life (Vik and Carlquist, 2018) or the \r\nability to take part in society in a meaningful way, and is reflected \r\nin personal freedoms, human agency, self-efficacy, ability to self\u0002actualise, dignity and relatedness to others (Markussen et al., 2018). \r\nAn indigenous perspective on well-being is broad and typically \r\nincorporates a healthy relationship with the natural world (Sangha \r\net al"


id: a5d129f170217ea21e037b66125596b0
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", 2018); emotional and mental health have also been linked to \r\na strong cultural identity (Butler et al., 2019; Dockery, 2020). 'Health' \r\nitself is sometimes described as including relationships between \r\nhumans and nature as well as links to community and culture \r\n(Donatuto et al., 2020; Dudgeon et al., 2017)."


id: 3835c8adf6329eb36b201039650c471c
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content:
"At the same time, urban populations will also be experiencing indirect \r\nrisks through climate change impacts on food and potable water \r\nsystems, variations in the distribution and seasonality of infectious \r\ndiseases and growing demand for shelter due to increased in\u0002migration. The accumulation of these risks over time can be expected \r\nto generate accelerating declines in community resilience and health, \r\nwith future vulnerability potentially expanding in a nonlinear fashion \r\n(Dilling et al., 2017; Liang and Gong, 2017; El-Zein and Tonmoy, 2017; \r\nsee also Chapter 6). Further, although each individual risk in isolation \r\nmay be transitory or temporary for the individuals or groups exposed, \r\ntaken cumulatively, the impacts could create conditions of chronic \r\nlack of well-being, and early life experiences with specific illnesses \r\nand conditions could have lifelong consequences (Watts et al., 2015; \r\nOtto et al., 2017; WHO, 2018a)"


id: da267011cf41da2645d79145ecc947a0
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content:
" In this context, there is a distinct need \r\nfor greater longitudinal research on vulnerability to multiple climatic \r\nand non-climatic health and well-being hazards over time (Fawcett \r\net al., 2017). There is also need for more research to identify critical \r\nthresholds in social vulnerability to climate change (Otto et al., 2017); \r\nthese include rapid, stepwise changes in vulnerability that emerge \r\nfrom changes in exposure (for example, air temperatures above which \r\nmortality rates or impacts on pre-natal health accelerate (Arroyo \r\net al., 2016; Ngo and Horton, 2016; Abiona, 2017; Auger et al., 2017; \r\nMolina and Saldarriaga, 2017; Zhang et al., 2017b)) and thresholds in \r\nadaptation processes (such as when rural out-migration rates grow \r\ndue to climate-related crop failures (McLeman, 2017))."


id: 99057079529cc590650483d597f62b06
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"This chapter uses the conceptual framing described in Chapter 1, in \r\nwhich risks emerging from climate change are described in terms \r\nof hazard, exposure and vulnerability, with adaptation and climate \r\nresilient development being responses that have the potential to \r\nreduce or modify risk. The observed and projected future risks to \r\nhealth well-being, involuntary population displacements and conflict \r\nidentified in this chapter are associated with a range of hazards that \r\nare manifested at a variety of geographical and temporal scales. These \r\ninclude observed and projected changes in climate normals; changes \r\nin the frequency, duration, and/or severity of extreme events; and \r\nhazards such as rising sea levels and extreme temperatures where the \r\nimpacts have only begun to be widely experienced"


id: 58e798ed59b38fcdb440c74a7659974b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
" The 2021 report \r\nof IPCC WGI (IPCC, 2021) provides an assessment of observed and \r\nprojected changes in these hazards and is the backdrop against which \r\nassessments of future risks and adaptation options identified in the \r\npresent chapter should be considered."


id: f51d2a94b8925188400561005bd946a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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"impoverished, undernourished, struggle with chronic or repeated \r\nillnesses, live in insecure housing in polluted or heavily degraded \r\nenvironments, work in unsafe conditions, are disabled, have limited \r\neducation and/or have poor access to health and social infrastructure \r\n(WHO, 2018a). Their disproportionate exposure to ongoing climate \r\nhazards and their inability to recover from extreme events increase \r\nnot only their own vulnerability but also that of the wider communities \r\nin which they live (US Global Change Research Program, 2016). \r\nHighly vulnerable populations are not evenly distributed across \r\nregions (Figure  7.2) nor within countries. Yet, even those fortunate \r\nenough to live in better neighbourhoods with greater financial means, \r\nhigher-paying jobs and good access to resources and services, may \r\nexperience adverse climate-related outcomes through community-level \r\ninteractions and linkages (Haines and Ebi, 2019)"


id: 52e0122fba405be201fe6e9a2326761e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 10495
content:
" Increased inequity \r\nitself threatens well-being and an effective response to climate change \r\nshould not only avoid increased inequity but identify ways in which to \r\nreduce existing inequity."


id: b51b9bfe8e3281e0e52d015b84c7f3b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 26028
content:
"Climate change poses distinct risks to women's health. Vulnerability \r\nto climate-related impacts on health and well-being shows notable \r\ndifferentiations according to gender, beyond implications for pregnant \r\nwomen. In many societies, differential exposure to such risks relate \r\nto gendered livelihood practices and mobility options. Pregnancy and \r\nmaternal status heighten vulnerability to heat, infectious diseases, \r\nfood-borne infections and air pollution (Arroyo et  al., 2016; Ngo \r\nand Horton, 2016; Zhang et  al., 2017b). Extreme heat events, high \r\nambient temperatures, high concentrations of airborne particulates, \r\nwater-related illnesses and natural hazards are associated with higher \r\nrates of adverse pregnancy outcomes such as spontaneous abortion, \r\nstillbirth, low birth weight and pre-term birth (Arroyo et  al., 2016; \r\nNgo and Horton, 2016; Abiona, 2017; Auger et  al., 2017; Molina \r\nand Saldarriaga, 2017; Zhang et al., 2017b)"


id: 285567a54092c6a67f2a782b72b4a350
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"People living in poverty are more likely to be exposed to extreme \r\nheat and air pollution and have poorer access to clean water and \r\nsanitation, accentuating their exposure to climate change-associated \r\nhealth risks (UNEP, 2021; FAO et al., 2018). Poverty influences how \r\npeople perceive the risks to which they are exposed, how they \r\nrespond to evacuation orders and other emergency warnings and \r\ntheir ability to evacuate or relocate to a less risk-prone location (US \r\nGlobal Change Research Program, 2016). Poorer households, who \r\noften live in highly exposed locations, are more likely to be forced \r\ninto low-agency migration as a means of adapting to climate risks \r\nand at the same time are the most likely to be immobile or trapped \r\nin deteriorating circumstances where migration would be a preferred \r\nresponse (Leichenko and Silva, 2014; Fazey et al., 2016; Sheller, 2018)"


id: 9f4e1fc14b114a0a77cba1437be5340
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
" \r\nClimate emergencies disproportionally affect people with disabilities \r\nbecause of their inherent vulnerabilities, which may impair their \r\nability to take protective action; they are also frequently excluded \r\nfrom adaptation planning (Gaskin et al., 2017)."


id: 6fefc30128e160b5d76733b2b276a242
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 15228
content:
"Children are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts. \r\nChildren often have unique pathways of exposure and sensitivity to \r\nclimate hazards, given their immature physiology and metabolism \r\nand high intake of air, food and water relative to their body weight \r\nas compared with adults (US Global Change Research Group, 2016). \r\nClimate change is expected to increase childhood risks of malnutrition \r\nand infectious disease for children in low-income countries through its \r\nimpacts on household food access, dietary diversity, nutrient quality, \r\nwater and changes in maternal and childcare access and breastfeeding \r\n(Tirado, 2017; FAO et  al., 2018; Perera, 2017). Children living in \r\nlocations with poor sanitation are especially vulnerable to GI illnesses, \r\nwith future rates of diarrhoeal diseases among children expected to \r\nrise under many climate change scenarios (Cisse et  al., 2018; WHO, \r\n2014)"


id: d6ba45bf1460b5826d9161c9242edfd6
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content:
" Outdoor recreational opportunities for children may be reduced \r\nby extreme weather events, heat and poor air quality (Evans, 2019). \r\nChildren and adolescents are particularly vulnerable to post-traumatic \r\nstress after extreme weather events; the effects may even be long\u0002lasting, with impacts on their adult functioning (Brown et al., 2017; \r\nUNICEF, 2021; Thiery et al., 2021)"


id: 4af0a3cebcbefad386006b1c562edb21
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 9205
content:
"Population age structures and changes over time have a significant \r\ninfluence on vulnerability to the impacts of weather and climate. \r\nOlder adults (generally defined as persons aged 65 and older) are \r\ndisproportionately vulnerable to the health impacts associated with \r\nclimate change and weather extremes, including a greater risk of \r\nsuccumbing to waterborne pathogens due to poorer functioning \r\nthermoregulatory mechanisms, greater sensitivity to dehydration, \r\nchanges in their immune systems and greater likelihood of having pre\u0002existing chronic illnesses such as diabetes or respiratory, cardiovascular \r\nand pulmonary illnesses (Benmarhnia et al., 2016; Diaz et al., 2015; \r\nMayrhuber et al., 2018; Paavola, 2017). Older adults may be less prompt \r\nin seeking medical attention when suffering from GI illnesses, which \r\ncan lead to dehydration (Haq and Gutman, 2014). Astrom et al. (2017) \r\nanticipate heat-related mortality among the elderly in Europe to rise \r\nin the 2050s under RCP4"


id: b876c27c0853768ae69d4a5cdeb6432e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"5 and RCP8.5 in the absence of significant \r\npreventative measures. In a study of the combined effects of warming \r\ntemperatures and an aging population in Korea, Lee and Kim (2016) \r\nprojected a four- to six-fold increase in heat-related mortality by the \r\n2090s when accounting for temperature and age structure."


id: f4cb622ccf0ae640c5200c55f52c1016
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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"Indigenous Peoples, especially those who live in geographically \r\nisolated, resource-dependent and/or impoverished communities, are \r\noften at greater risk of health impacts of climate change (Ford et al., \r\n2020) (US Global Change Research Program, 2016). The close inter\u0002connection of land-based livelihoods and cultural identity of many \r\nindigenous groups exposes them to multiple health- and nutrition\u0002related hazards (Durkalec et  al., 2015; Sioui, 2019) with potential \r\nimplications for community social relations and individual mental \r\nhealth (Cunsolo Willox et  al., 2013; Cunsolo Willox et  al., 2015). \r\nClimate change risk exposures may be complicated by changes in \r\nlifestyle, diet and morbidity driven by socioeconomic processes, further \r\nincreasing health risks for Indigenous Peoples (Jaakkola et al., 2018)"


id: 9a4466676a913765445b299a4e7d68f9
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content:
" \r\nEnvironmental consequences of climate change can also affect social \r\nties and spiritual well-being, in part because land is often an integral \r\npart of their culture and spiritual identity."


id: 3d766f93eb81c2434c652908367744f3
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vector_id: 7027
content:
"Current Impacts of Climate Change on Health and Well-Being of Indigenous Peoples\r\nPrimary health effects of climate change include the immediate physical effects on human health, such as health hazards due to high \r\ntemperatures, extreme weather events or accidents from exposure to climate-related hazards. For example, in arid and semiarid areas, \r\nan increased frequency of severe droughts is associated with immediate health problems related to overheating and lack of water for \r\ndrinking, sanitation and livestock (Hall and Crosby, 2020; Mamo, 2020; Rankoana, 2021). In many cases, the possibilities for Indigenous \r\nPeoples to apply traditional strategies to mitigate droughts by migration are limited by competing land use, environmental protection \r\nand national borders, with many examples across Africa (Mamo, 2020)"


id: 850e26a9ea4df37c8aaaaafdaacb00a8
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content:
" In the Jordan River Valley, the second most water stressed area \r\nin the world, water resources are not equally distributed to Indigenous Bedouin people, amplifying their immediate health threat during \r\npredictable as well as unpredictable droughts (Mamo, 2020)."


id: abb71e637d788c28a252930af08cb1fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Extreme rainfall, flooding, storms, heatwaves and wildfires lead to individual health hazards that may include injuries and thermal and \r\nrespiratory traumas (Mamo, 2020) There are many examples when emergency responses to extreme events have ignored the needs \r\nof displaced Indigenous Peoples (Mendez et al., 2020; Maldonado et al., 2021). Population-based quantitative studies documenting \r\nthe direct effects of these events on Indigenous Peoples are rare. In Mexico, respiratory diseases are almost twice as common among \r\nIndigenous Peoples compared to non-Indigenous Peoples (de Leon-Martinez et al., 2020). In Alaska and northern Canada, alarming levels \r\nof respiratory stress and disease have been reported among Inuit and First Nation communities in relation to wildfires (Howard et al., \r\n2021), as well as increased mould in houses due to flooding resulting from increased precipitation (Furgal and Seguin, 2006; Harper et al., \r\n2015; Norton-Smith et al., 2016)"


id: fc17cc321b7ca65ef05d4828e9349bf6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37162
content:
" Climate- and housing-related respiratory stress is also a risk factor for severe COVID-19 infection, which \r\nhas been highlighted in recent literature from an indigenous health perspective (de Leon-Martinez et al., 2020)."


id: 65c1ae1b46876bb021ced4749ffed4b4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"human-elephant conflicts in Namibia due to plant food scarcity (Mamo, 2020), human-bear conflicts in Arctic regions within Canada \r\n(Wilder et al., 2017), human-tiger conflicts in Bangladesh (Haque et al., 2015) and increased predatory pressure on Indigenous Peoples' \r\nlivestock and game worldwide (Haque et al., 2015; Jaakkola et al., 2018; Mukeka et al., 2019; Mamo, 2020; Terekhina et al., 2021). \r\nUndernutrition and metabolic disturbances associated with overnutrition and obesity due to the decreased availability or safety of local \r\nand traditional foods and increased dependency on imported substitutes affect many Indigenous Peoples worldwide (Amstislavski et al., \r\n2013; Zavaleta et al., 2018; Houde et al., 2020; Jones et al., 2020; Akande et al., 2021; Bogdanova et al., 2021; Bryson et al., 2021) and are \r\nespecially severe for pregnant women and small children (Mamo, 2020; Olson and Metz, 2020; Bryson et al"


id: 20070fc27dc9c2d713b8639c04e6f2fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 2481
content:
", 2021); these are amplified \r\nby the combination of warming and the COVID-19 situation (Zavaleta-Cortijo et al., 2020). Decreased access to wild plants and animals \r\nas food sources and medicine due to climate change is another threat to the health and wellness of indigenous communities (Greenwood \r\nand Lindsay, 2019; Mamo, 2020; CIAT and and, 2021; Rankoana, 2021; Teixidor-Toneu et al., 2021)."


id: 14332ea20947f0cf22644e04b9170db2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Tertiary effects relate to culture-wide changes, for example, all forms of malnutrition due to climate-driven changes in food systems \r\nand anxiety, mental illness and suicidal thoughts related to cultural and spiritual losses. A wide range of tertiary, culture-related effects \r\nof climate change have been documented for Indigenous Peoples. These include anxiety, distress and other mental health impacts due \r\nto direct and indirect processes of dispossession of land and culture related to the combination of climate change and other factors \r\n(Richmond and Ross, 2009; Bowles, 2015; Norton-Smith et al., 2016; Jaakkola et al., 2018; Fuentes et al., 2020; Mamo, 2020; Middleton \r\net al., 2020b; Middleton et al., 2020a; Olson and Metz, 2020; Timlin et al., 2021). Increased risks of conflict and abuse, including violence \r\nand homicide against females, and/or conflicts resulting from environmental activism, are other tertiary health threats for Indigenous \r\nPeoples (Mamo, 2020)"


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vector_id: 12722
content:
" Between 2017 and 2019, close to 500 indigenous people were killed for activism in 19 different countries (Mamo, \r\n2020). In Uganda, climate change drives indigenous men to increase their distance and time from home and their families in search of \r\nwater and food, leading to an increase in sexual violence against indigenous women and girls in their communities (Mamo, 2020)."


id: 184fb9d74e6a760d536da96e6f068ef9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1317
content:
"Wildfires are a main cause of deforestation in Israel, and in recent years climate stress has decreased the forest resilience to fires (Klein \r\net al., 2019). The original landscape, a shrubland or maquis consisting mostly of oak and Pistacia, has been used since time immemorial \r\nas grazing land for goats, sheep and camels belonging to Indigenous Bedouin people (Degen and El-Meccawi, 2009). Competing land use \r\nhas reshaped the landscape with pine monocultures and cattle farming, reducing the availability of land suitable for herding goats the \r\nindigenous way (Perevolotsky and Sheffer, 2011). In addition, since 1950, plant protection legislation has decreased Bedouin forest \r\npastoralism in Israel by defining indigenous black goats as an environmental threat (FAOLEX, 2021). In nature reserves where no human \r\ninterference has been allowed, these areas have regenerated into herbaceous shrublands susceptible to wildfires (Turco et al., 2017)"


id: badd45b604f1772117be590a45b80a97
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26938
content:
" \r\nMeanwhile, urbanised Bedouin exist on lower incomes and experience higher levels of unemployment compared to other citizens, and \r\nsome keep non-pastoralised livestock in cities as a strategy for food sovereignty (Degen and El-Meccawi, 2009). In 2019, many severe \r\nwildfires occurred in Israel due to extreme heatwaves and, in response, plant protection legislation was repealed, allowing Bedouin \r\npastoralists to graze their goats in areas from which they had been excluded. The amount of combustible undergrowth subsequently \r\ndecreased, reducing the risk for wildfire and their related impacts, while simultaneously facilitating indigenous food sovereignty among \r\nthe Bedouin (Mamo, 2020)."


id: 47f26d3325e016a487d96a142a9caa4b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8693
content:
"In the central interior of what is now known as British Columbia (BC), 2017 was an especially severe wildfire season, with over 1.3 million \r\nhectares of land burned and 65,000 people displaced (Timler and Sandy, 2020). The unceded and ancestral lands of the Tsilhqot'in, \r\nDakelh and Secwepemc were impacted by two of the largest fires (Verhaeghe et al., 2017). Communities affected by the BC wildfires \r\nsubsequently started indigenous gardens closer to home, to protect medicine and food plants and thereby sustaining relationships with \r\nthese plants, the land and the community (Timler and Sandy, 2020). As there are cultural teachings for fire to cleanse the territory and \r\nthe land, community members and plants previously isolated became better connected because of the wildfires. The regrowth of plants is \r\npart of the healing relationship between plants, people and other animals (Timler and Sandy, 2020)"


id: a119a732a719e502a476a94e222234f9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22900
content:
" The wildfires were seen as events to \r\ncatalyse action and emphasise the importance of relationships to support foodways and gardening as responsibility."


id: 7287a229e4d47a3df3bb7482cd850344
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15639
content:
"To restore these sustainable relationships, a resurgence is needed of community roles and responsibilities (Cidro et al., 2015) as well as \r\na reconsideration of the concept of food security and the role of gardening within diverse indigenous contexts. Offering individual or \r\ncommunity gardening as a solution to 'food insecurity', a Eurocentric measure of health, ignores colonial contexts and sovereignty \r\n(Borrows, 2019; Timler and Sandy, 2020). Indigenous communities have historic, ongoing and evolving gardening and food gathering \r\npractices, including a wide variety of land-based and aquatic foods (Turner and Turner, 2008; Mt. Pleasant, 2016). Euro-Western science \r\nis beginning to recognise these longstanding relationships (Kamal et al., 2015; Hatfield et al., 2018; Timler and Sandy, 2020)"


id: 6a7e0e7bdd8f605935b60e0dae387f8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14369
content:
" For many \r\nindigenous communities, reconnecting with ancestral foodways holds the potential not only to address food security but to provide the \r\ncommunity cohesion, self-esteem and wellness (Gordon et al., 2018)."


id: 3bc73347de15b051518d9d3b625ce7ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6761
content:
"In sub-Saharan Africa, climate change is an emerging risk factor for undernutrition, particularly in countries that rely on subsistence \r\nagriculture (Sorgho et  al., 2020). In Uganda, negative health effects associated with climate change are being observed, including \r\nincreased rates of food insecurity, with the highest rates recorded among the Batwa of Kanungu District, where 97% of households are \r\nseverely food insecure (Patterson et al., 2017). For many Indigenous Peoples, food security in a changing climate is a growing concern \r\n(Guyot et al., 2006; Patterson et al., 2017). Locally harvested indigenous foods have been adversely impacted by climate change, while \r\nconnection to land is being disrupted by the processes of colonisation, discrimination and lack of representation in decision-making \r\ngroups, thereby restricting adaptive capacity for indigenous communities (Bryson et al., 2021)"


id: d61ef84daa623c4d5bacf16d67eb4ebc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31200
content:
" In Uganda, the Indigenous Batwa have \r\nexperienced significant disparities resulting from the forced eviction from their territory, dispossessing them of their land and the ability \r\nto provide indigenous foods to their families (Patterson et al., 2017; Scarpa et al., 2021)."


id: 21c2b499ba05e8a585359a39c1deb922
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2745
content:
"Nutrient-specific knowledge of indigenous foods is limited among many communities in Africa. A new food composition database in \r\nUganda was constructed in dialogue with knowledge keepers from the Batwa and Bakiga Peoples to assess the nutrient density of these \r\nlocally harvested foods (Scarpa et al., 2021). As in other lower resource settings, no food composition tables are available for southwestern \r\nUganda. The only existing food database was designed for central and eastern Uganda; it does not include common recipes and local \r\nfoods consumed by Batwa and Bakiga communities (Scarpa et al., 2021). Using a community-based approach and collaboration with \r\nlocal nutritionists, a list of foods was collected through focus group discussions, an individual dietary survey and market assessments"


id: 15a455569651485f98eb264074d5241e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 920
content:
" \r\nIncluding these locally familiar foods ultimately supports a focus on indigenous justice and the importance of valuing indigenous food \r\nsystems and practices, which in many contexts have been found to have superior nutritional and environmental benefits for communities \r\n(Kuhnlein et al., 2013; Scarpa et al., 2021). This new and unique database including indigenous foods will not only guide local nutrition \r\nand health initiatives, but also contribute towards policies related to indigenous food sovereignty and resilience to climate change."


id: 71071dfcb1d4d482589892cda4c03407
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15417
content:
"Eleven categories of diseases and health outcomes have been identified \r\nin this assessment as being climate-sensitive through direct pathways \r\n(e.g., heat and floods) and indirect pathways mediated through natural \r\nand human systems and economic and social disruptions (e.g., disease \r\nvectors, allergens, air and water pollution, and food system disruption) \r\n(high confidence). A key challenge in quantifying the specific \r\nrelationship between climate and health outcomes is distinguishing \r\nthe extent to which observed changes in prevalence of a climate\u0002sensitive disease or condition are attributable directly or indirectly to \r\nclimatic factors as opposed to other non-climatic causal factors (Ebi \r\net al., 2020)"


id: fe59b6a6826899dc8dd8c336366c24d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37550
content:
" A subsequent challenge is then determining the extent \r\nto which those observed changes in health outcomes associated \r\nwith climate are attributable to events or conditions associated with \r\nnatural climate variability compared to persistent human induced \r\nshifts in the mean and/or the variability characteristics of climate \r\n(i.e., anthropogenic climate change). The context within which the \r\nimpacts of climate change affect health outcomes and health systems \r\nis described in this chapter as being a function of risk, which is in turn \r\na product of interactions between hazard, exposure and vulnerability \r\n(Chapter 1), with the impacts in turn having the potential to reinforce \r\nvulnerability and/or exposure to risk (Figure 7.4)."


id: db59b03c34eae1ced5a4282fdad0e166
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32020
content:
"Global statistics for death and loss of health are increasingly described in terms of burden, which describes gaps between a population's \r\nactual health status and what its status would be if its members lived free of disease and disability to their collective life expectancy \r\n(Shaffer et al., 2019). Burden for each disease/health outcome is estimated by adding together the number of years of life lost (YLL) by \r\na person because of early death and the number of years of life lived with disability (YLD) from the considered outcome. The resulting \r\nstatistic, the disability-adjusted life year (DALY) represents the loss of one year of life lived in full health. The total global burden of \r\ndisease (Vos et al., 2020), expressed in DALYs, is what the world's health systems must manage and is reported annually in Global Burden \r\nof Disease Study (Vos et al., 2020)"


id: 36721f1e91e73823a29a7454d4199ea7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5957
content:
" The estimated current global burden of climate-sensitive diseases and conditions described in this \r\nchapter, and the geographical regions most affected, are summarised in Table Box 7.2.1. As was observed in Chapter 11 ('Human Health') \r\nof AR5, the 'background climate-related disease burden of a population is often the best single indicator of vulnerability to climate \r\nchange - doubling of risk of disease in a low disease population has much less absolute impact than doubling of the disease when the \r\nbackground rate is high.'"


id: 175d54424d6a238ab1cc947873177950
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1183
content:
"Evidence has increased since AR5 that the vectorial capacity has \r\nincreased for dengue fever, malaria and other mosquito-borne \r\ndiseases and that higher global average temperatures are making \r\nwider geographic areas more suitable for transmission (very high \r\nconfidence). Transmission rates of malaria are directly influenced by \r\nclimatic and weather variables such as temperature, with non-climatic \r\nsocioeconomic factors and health system responses counteracting \r\nthe climatic drivers (very high confidence). The burden of malaria is \r\ngreatest in Africa, where more than 90% of all malaria-related deaths \r\noccur (M'Bra et al., 2018; Caminade et al., 2019). Between 2007 and \r\n2017, DALYs for malaria have decreased by 39% globally. Malaria \r\nis mainly caused by five distinct species of plasmodium parasite \r\n(Plasmodium falciparum, Plasmodium vivax, Plasmodium malariae, \r\nPlasmodium ovale and Plasmodium knowlesi) and is transmitted by \r\nAnopheline mosquitoes"


id: 6172790bfde8827ed9187ffe7df9a3a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12902
content:
" Evidence suggests that in highland areas of \r\nColombia and Ethiopia, malaria has shifted in warmer years towards \r\nhigher altitudes, indicating that, without intervention, malaria will \r\nincrease at higher elevations as the climate warms (Siraj et al., 2014; \r\nMidekisa et al., 2015). Each year, local outbreaks of malaria occur due \r\nto importation in areas from which it was once eradicated, such as \r\nEurope, but the risk of re-establishment is considered low."


id: 9b23c4cc0c60c022e064642248f82594
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21951
content:
"Climate-sensitive VBDs include mosquito-borne diseases, rodent-borne \r\ndiseases and tick-borne diseases. Many infectious agents, vectors, non\u0002human reservoir hosts, and pathogen replication rates can be sensitive to \r\nambient climatic conditions. Elevated proliferation and reproduction rates \r\nat higher temperatures, longer transmission season, changes in ecology \r\nand climate-related migration of vectors, reservoir hosts or human \r\npopulations contribute to this climate sensitivity (Rocklov & Dubrow, \r\n2020; Semenza and Paz, 2021). Age-standardised DALY rates for many \r\nVBDs have decreased over the last decade due to factors unrelated to \r\nclimate. Vulnerability to VBD is strongly determined by sociodemographic \r\nfactors (e.g"


id: 8ddff4a70a8d922c96bbd807771933f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19851
content:
", children, the elderly and pregnant women are at greater \r\nrisk) with exposure to vectors being strongly influenced by various \r\nfactors including socioeconomic status, housing quality, healthcare \r\naccess, susceptibility, occupational setting, recreational activity, conflicts \r\nand displacement ( Rocklov & Dubrow, 2020; Semenza and Paz, 2021). \r\nFigure 7.5 illustrates how climatic and non-climatic drivers and responses \r\ndetermine VBD outcomes."


id: b427695b9121fc98db39358fda8eb1e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25860
content:
"have facilitated the emergence of CHIKV as a significant public health \r\nchallenge in some Latin American and Caribbean countries (Yactayo et al., \r\n2016; Pineda et al., 2016) and contributed to chikungunya outbreaks \r\nin Europe (Rocklov et al., 2019; Mascarenhas et al., 2018; Morens and \r\nFauci, 2014). The Zika virus outbreak in South America in 2016 was \r\npreceded by 2007 outbreaks on Pacific islands and followed a period \r\nof record high temperatures and severe drought conditions in 2015 \r\n(Paz and Semenza, 2016; Tesla et al., 2018). Increased use of household \r\nwater storage containers during the drought is correlated with a range \r\nexpansion of Aedes aegypti during this period, increasing household \r\nexposure to the vector (Paz and Semenza, 2016). Changing climate also \r\nappears to be a risk factor for the spread of Japanese encephalitis to \r\nhigher altitudes in Nepal (Ghimire and Dhakal, 2015) and in southwest \r\nChina (Zhao et al., 2014)"


id: 13301843a1fa5b1ab8c102e9661ea54d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 530
content:
" In eastern Africa, climate change may be a risk \r\nfactor in the spread of Rift Valley Fever (Taylor et al., 2016a)."


id: 781a3965512e7c7ac4cf48e4d326c2d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16460
content:
"The transmission of dengue fever is linked to climatic and weather \r\nvariables such as temperature, relative humidity and rainfall (high \r\nconfidence). The dengue virus is carried and spread by Aedes \r\nmosquitoes, primarily Aedes aegypti. Dengue has the second highest \r\nburden of VBDs, with the majority of deaths occurring in Asia (Bhatt \r\net  al., 2013). Since 1950, global dengue burden has grown and is \r\nattributable to a combination of climate-associated expansion in the \r\ngeographic range of the vector species and non-climatic factors such \r\nas globalised air traffic, urbanisation and ineffective vector abatement \r\nmeasures. Temperature, relative humidity and rainfall variables are \r\nsignificantly and positively associated with increased dengue case \r\nincidence and/or transmission rates globally, including in Vietnam \r\n(Phung et al., 2015; Xuan le et al., 2014), Thailand (Xu et al., 2019a), \r\nIndia (Mutheneni et al., 2017; Rao et al"


id: 988c13355e75cd1f94484b9444ee0d38
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21516
content:
", 2018; Mala and Jat, 2019), \r\nIndonesia (Kesetyaningsih et al., 2018), the Philippines (Carvajal et al., \r\n2018), the USA (Lopez et al., 2018; Pena-Garcia et al., 2017; Duarte \r\net  al., 2019; Rivas et  al., 2018; Silva et  al., 2016a), Jordan (Obaidat \r\nand Roess, 2018) and Timor-Leste (Wangdi et al., 2018). Variation in \r\nwinds, sea surface temperatures and rain over the tropical eastern \r\nPacific Ocean (El Nino-Southern Oscillation; ENSO) have been linked to \r\nincreased dengue incidence in Colombia (Quintero-Herrera et al., 2015; \r\nMcGregor and Ebi, 2018; Pramanik et al., 2020) and its interannual \r\nvariation successfully forecasted in Ecuador using ENSO indices \r\nas predictors (Petrova et  al., 2019). The observed time lag between \r\nclimate exposures and increased dengue incidence is approximately \r\n1-2 months (Chuang et al., 2017; Lai, 2018; Chang et al., 2018)."


id: 9066cbe14cd9d3e1880f2a4c11ae462f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20253
content:
"associated with an increase of diarrhoeal diseases. In the majority of \r\nstudies there is a significant positive association observed between \r\nWBDs and elevated temperatures, especially in areas where water, \r\nsanitation and hygiene (WASH) deficiencies are significant (Levy \r\net al., 2018; Carlton et al., 2016; Levy et al., 2018; Sherpa et al., 2014; \r\nGuzman Herrador et al., 2015; Levy et al., 2016; Lo Iacono et al., 2017). \r\nIn Ethiopia, South Africa and Senegal, increases in temperatures are \r\nassociated with increases in diarrhoea, while in Ethiopia, Senegal and \r\nMozambique, increases in monthly rainfall are associated with an \r\nincrease in cases of childhood diarrhoea (Azage et  al., 2015; Thiam \r\net al., 2017; Horn et al., 2018). Similar associations between weather \r\nand diarrhoea have been observed in Cambodia, China, Bangladesh, \r\nPacific Island countries and the Philippines (McIver et  al., 2016a; \r\nMcIver et al., 2016b; Liu et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2014; Matsushita et al"


id: 4c55d73a3d7ca2ddc2e7290453ee6429
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9441
content:
", \r\n2018). Heavy precipitation events have been consistently associated \r\nwith outbreaks of WBDs in Europe, USA, UK and Canada (Guzman \r\nHerrador et al., 2015; Levy et al., 2016; Lo Iacono et al., 2017; Curriero \r\net al., 2001; Guzman Herrador et al., 2016; Levy et al., 2018; Semenza \r\nand Paz, 2021)."


id: aba3f55a9749f592dd4b963f6bf895a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24528
content:
"The degree to which the timing, duration and magnitude of local \r\ninfluenza virus epidemics is dependent on climate factors is poorly \r\nunderstood (Lam et  al., 2020). Further, a host of non-climate \r\nconfounders are likely to influence the incidence of seasonal \r\ninfluenza (Caini et  al., 2018). This poses a number of challenges \r\nfor making reliable climate-based epidemiological forecasts for \r\ninfluenza (Gandon et  al., 2016). Although no association between \r\nanomalous climate conditions and influenza have been reported in \r\nsome locations (Lam et al., 2020), generally, low winter temperatures \r\nand humidity in temperate regions and periods of high humidity \r\nand precipitation in the tropical and subtropical regions have been \r\nlinked to outbreaks of influenza (Deyle et al., 2016; Soebiyanto et al., \r\n2015; Tamerius et  al., 2013)"


id: 85928962145f2686b01c805094d74ff8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18549
content:
" However, the climate sensitivity of \r\ninfluenza may be more complex than this, with both high and low \r\nhumidity; the amount and intensity of precipitation; solar activity \r\nand/or sunshine; and latitude also being important (Axelsen et al., \r\n2014; Chong et al., 2020b; Geier et al., 2018; Park et al., 2019; Qu, \r\n2016; Smith et  al., 2017; Wang et  al., 2017c; Zhao et  al., 2018a). \r\nMoreover, the shape of the climate variable influenza relationship \r\nmay be conditioned on influenza type (Chong et al., 2020a). Further, \r\ndistinct periods of weather variability characterised by rapid inter\u0002daily changes in temperature may act as precursors to influenza \r\nepidemics as has been demonstrated for the marked 2017-2018 "


id: 64ba7fc5eacfb289148d43e7a13dd5d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13419
content:
" Semenza (Sweden, Chapter 7), Pramod Kumar Singh (India, Chapter 18), Stavana E. \r\nStrutz (USA), Maria Cristina Tirado von der Pahlen (Spain/USA, Chapter 7), Corinne Schuster-Wallace (Canada), Alistair Woodward (New \r\nZealand, Chapter 11), Zinta Zommers (Latvia, Chapter 17)"


id: 73017e2ff01bad97d06edb23b29ee0a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15710
content:
"Infectious diseases may emerge and spread through multiple climate-related avenues, including direct effects of climatic conditions \r\non disease reproduction and transmission and various indirect effects, often interlinked with ecosystem degradation (high confidence). \r\nClimate change is affecting the risk of emerging infectious diseases by contributing to factors that drive the movements of species, \r\nincluding vectors and reservoirs of diseases, into novel human populations and vice versa (high confidence) (Sections 2.4.2.7, 5.2.2.3; \r\nCross-Chapter Box Illness in Chapter 2; IPCC, 2019b; IPBES 2020). The spillover of some emerging infectious diseases from wildlife into \r\nhumans is associated with live animal-human markets, intensified livestock production and climate-related movements of humans \r\nand wild animals into new areas that alter human-animal interactions (Section 2.4.2.7; Chapter 3; Sections 5.2.2.3, 7"


id: ae20b136669cfd768283041e65fc7113
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24930
content:
"The COVID-19 pandemic posed a severe shock to many socioeconomic systems, resulting in substantial changes in vulnerability and \r\nexposure of people to climate risks (high confidence). The disease and response measures significantly affected human health, economic \r\nactivity, food production and availability, health services, poverty, social and gender inequality, education, supply chains, infrastructure \r\nmaintenance and the environment. These COVID-19 impacts interact with many risks associated with climate change (IMF, 2020), often \r\nthrough a cascade of impacts across numerous sectors (van den Hurk et al., 2020). Beyond COVID-19-related mortality and long-term \r\nCOVID, mortality from other diseases (some of which may also have a climate-related component), as well as maternal and neonatal \r\nmortality, increased because of disruption in health services (Barach et al., 2020; Maringe et al., 2020; Zadnik et al., 2020; Goyal et al., \r\n2021)"


id: 431eac335987b002b46724a55ec98586
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7960
content:
" In addition, a rapid rise in poverty has disproportionately affected poorer countries and people (Ferreira et al., 2021), and thus \r\nincreased their vulnerability. After many years of steady declines, extreme poverty increased by about 100 million people in 2020 (World \r\nBank, 2021). The effects of the pandemic increased food insecurity and malnourishment, which increased by 1.5 percentage points to \r\naround 9.9% in 2020 after being virtually unchanged for the previous five years (FAO et al., 2021)."


id: 1c5453882bfc7c6fe5b8d06c4ace88a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1910
content:
"During the pandemic, extreme weather and climate events such as droughts, storms, floods, wildfires and heatwaves continued, resulting \r\nin disastrous compounding impacts (high confidence). Between March and September 2020, 92 extreme weather events coincided with \r\nthe COVID-19 pandemic, affecting an estimated 51.6 million people; additionally, 431.7 million people were exposed to extreme heat, \r\nand 2.3 million people were affected by wildfires (Walton and van Aalst, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic, in combination with extreme \r\nevents, affected disaster preparedness, disaster response and safe evacuations, while physical distancing regulations reduced the capacity \r\nof temporary shelters (UN DRR Asia-Pacific, 2020; Tozier de la Poterie et al., 2020; Shumake-Guillemot, J, et al, 2020; Bose-O'Reilly et al., \r\n2021). Complex humanitarian emergencies were aggravated, with vulnerable populations facing the combined risks of conflict, \r\ndisplacement, COVID-19 and climate impacts (FSIN, 2020)"


id: c785ba3b8f604109f564a0a7177524f7
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content:
" Compounding events are not only found in low-income countries but also in \r\nmedium- and high-income countries, for instance in the case of COVID-19 and heatwaves (Shumake-Guillemot et al., 2020; Bose-O'Reilly \r\net al., 2021)."


id: e040bde3eafc95cfb4ea4be9c61b5d59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Responses and implications for adaptation and climate resilient development\r\nThe pandemic emphasises the inter-connected and compound nature of risks, vulnerabilities and responses to emergencies that \r\nare simultaneously local and global (high confidence). COVID-19 is often considered a more 'explosive' risk than the more gradual \r\nanthropogenic climate change. However, many climate-related risks do already appear as severe shocks at smaller scales, and infrequent \r\nor unprecedented extreme weather-related events often warrant similar rapid responses (Dodds et al., 2020; Gebreslassie, 2020; Hynes \r\net  al., 2020; Phillips et  al., 2020; Schipper, 2020; Semenza et  al., 2021; illustrated in Figure  COVID.1)"


id: e6e8327c872956b9328ce8ee6e850094
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
" Individuals, households, sub\u0002national and national entities, and international organisations had generally delayed responses or denied the pandemic's severity before \r\nresponding at the scale and urgency required, a pattern that resembles the international action required on climate change (Polyakova \r\net al., 2020; Shrestha et al., 2020)."


id: d492a26e826abce6f18967c075a56058
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 30969
content:
"It also exposed underlying vulnerabilities, such as the lack of water access and healthcare in select low- and middle-income countries \r\nand among indigenous and marginalised groups in high-income countries (Section 4.4.3; Box 4.3; 5.12.1). Increased risks of COVID-19 \r\ntransmission emerged in crowded areas such as urban settings, refugee camps, detention centres and some workplaces, including in rural \r\nsettings (Brauer et al., 2020; Ramos et al., 2020; Staddon et al., 2020; Haddout et al., 2020). Public health responses to the COVID-19 \r\npandemic, such as mandates for social distancing and advice for frequent handwashing, underlined the need for access to water and \r\nsanitation facilities and wastewater management. However, they also sometimes interfered with access, for example, in evacuation and \r\nshelter infrastructure during climate-related disasters (Armitage and Nellums, 2020; Adelodun et al., 2020; Poch et al., 2020; Hallema \r\net al., 2020; Patel et al., 2020; Espejo et al"


id: e98f4a8612d5d3a70be3d38a76a289ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 34255
content:
"The management of the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the value of scientific (including medical and epidemiological) expertise and \r\nthe importance of fast, accurate and comprehensive data to inform policy decisions and to anticipate and manage risk (high confidence). It \r\nemphasises the importance of effective communication of scientific knowledge (Semenza et al., 2021), decision-making under uncertainty \r\nand decision frameworks that navigate different values and priorities. Successful policy responses were based on the emerging data, \r\nmedical advice and collaboration with a wider set of societal stakeholders beyond public health experts. For instance, experience in \r\nAotearoa, New Zealand, highlights the importance of pandemic responses attuned to the needs of different sociocultural groups and \r\nIndigenous Peoples in particular"


id: a090e3e028952bc925959efe613523a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 22797
content:
" Their strengths-based COVID-19 response goes beyond identifying vulnerabilities to unlocking the \r\nresources, capabilities and potential that might otherwise be latent in communities (McMeeking and Savage, 2020). As far as the value \r\nof information for risk management is concerned, compared to the initial uncertainties regarding COVID-19, data about near- and \r\nlonger-term climate-related hazards is generally very good; however, high-quality and dense meteorological data are often still lacking in \r\nlower income countries (Otto et al., 2020). Health data are particularly difficult to obtain in real time, as is the case for biodiversity data, \r\nwhich has a time lag of years before being made available and for which there is no coordinated monitoring, hampering effective risk \r\nmanagement (Navarro et al., 2017)"


id: 1f8db656fe700b1674e49bd049926b4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 2394
content:
" Therefore, both epidemiological and meteorological forecasts would benefit from more focus on (a) \r\ndecision support, (b) conveying uncertainty and (c) capturing vulnerability (Coughlan de Perez et al., 2021)."


id: a1e387c51af4ea7bf196626a1e7f0b4c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23034
content:
"Comprehensive and integrated risk management strategies can enable countries to address both the current pandemic and increase \r\nresilience against climate change and other risks (Reckien, 2021; Semenza et al., 2021; Ebi et al., 2021b). In particular, given their immense \r\nscale, COVID-19 recovery investments may offer an opportunity to contribute to climate resilient development pathways (CRDPs) through \r\na green, resilient, healthy and inclusive recovery (high confidence) (Sovacool et al., 2020; Rosenbloom and Markard, 2020; Lambert et al., \r\n2020; Boyle et al., 2020; Bouman et al., 2020; UN DRR Asia-Pacific, 2020; Brosemer et al., 2020; Dodds et al., 2020; Hynes et al., 2020; \r\nMarkard and Rosenbloom, 2020; Phillips et al., 2020; Schipper, 2020; Willi et al., 2020; Semenza et al., 2021; Pasini and Mazzocchi, 2020; \r\nMeige et al., 2020; Pelling et al., 2021)"


id: 994c292b3a4c4df977280f34fea2e321
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21632
content:
" However, windows of opportunity to enable such transitions are only open for a limited period \r\nand need to be swiftly acted upon to effect change (high confidence) (Chapter 18; Weible et al., 2020; Reckien, 2021). Initial indications \r\nsuggest that only USD 1.8 trillion of the greater than USD 17 trillion COVID-19-related stimulus financing by G20 countries and other major \r\neconomies that was committed up until mid-2021 contributed to climate action and biodiversity objectives, with significant differences \r\nbetween countries and sectors (Vivideconomics, 2021). Moreover, responses to previous crises (e.g., the 2008-2011 global financial \r\ncrisis) demonstrate that despite high ambitions during the response phase, opportunities for reform do not necessarily materialise (Bol \r\net al., 2020; Boin et al., 2005). In addition, heightened societal and political attention to one crisis often comes at the cost of other policy \r\npriorities (high confidence) (Maor, 2018; Tosun et al"


id: 92d19e47417f33cd874f920ce4878848
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 20616
content:
", 2017), which could affect investments for climate resilient development (Hepburn \r\net al., 2020; WHO, 2020a; Bateman et al., 2020; Meige et al., 2020; Semenza et al., 2021)."


id: b4d43f488a7f79ff1505f6a9e5905e6b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25985
content:
"The vast majority of elaborated pathways point to increased risk; for \r\nexample, there is concern that climate change may alter the fate and \r\ntransport of carcinogenic polyaromatic hydrocarbons (Dominguez\u0002Morueco et al., 2019) and increase mobilisation of carcinogens such \r\nas bromide (Regli et  al., 2015), persistent organic pollutants (POPs) \r\nincluding polychlorinated-biphenyls that have accumulated in areas \r\ncontaminated by industrial runoff (Miner et al., 2018) and radioactive \r\nmaterial (Evangeliou et al., 2014). Exposure to these known carcinogens \r\ncan occur through multiple environmental media and can be increased \r\nby climate change, for example through increased flooding related \r\nto extreme precipitation events and mobilisation of sediment where \r\ncarcinogens have accumulated (Leon et al., 2017; Santiago and Rivas, \r\n2012)"


id: 6f5cb68971bcdfac3d246fd781dc4060
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 15149
content:
" In addition, there is concern that changes in ultraviolet light \r\nexposure related to shifts in precipitation may increase the incidence \r\nof malignant melanoma, particularly for outdoor workers (Modenese \r\net  al., 2018). Other harmful pathways include migration of and \r\nincreased exposure to liver flukes, which cause hepatobiliary cancer \r\n(Prueksapanich et al., 2018) and the introduction of infectious diseases \r\nsuch as schistosomiasis that increase cancer risk due to climate-related \r\nmigration (Ahmed et  al., 2014). Increased exposure to carcinogenic \r\ntoxins via multiple pathways is also a concern. Aflatoxin exposure, for \r\nexample, is expected to increase in Europe (Moretti et al., 2019), India \r\n(Shekhar et al., 2018), Africa (Gnonlonfin et al., 2013; Bandyopadhyay \r\net al., 2016) and North America (Wu et al., 2011). Other carcinogenic \r\ntoxins originate from cyanobacteria blooms (Lee et al"


id: dba694fbd58eb2e54aa7a5989eb055ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 32078
content:
", 2017a), which \r\nare projected to increase in frequency and distribution with climate \r\nchange (Wells et al., 2015; Paerl et al., 2016; Chapra et al., 2017)."


id: 222e46b7d1f4907ca139ed103250204f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2824
content:
"Extreme heat events and extreme temperature have well-documented, \r\nobserved impacts on health, mortality (very high confidence) and \r\nmorbidity (high confidence). AR5 described the thermoregulatory \r\nmechanisms and responses, including acclimatisation, linking heat, \r\ncold and health, and these have been further confirmed by recent \r\nstudies and reviews (e.g., Giorgini et  al., 2017; Ikaheimo, 2018; \r\nMcGregor et  al., 2015; Stewart et  al., 2017; Schuster et  al., 2017; \r\nZhang et al., 2018b). The health impacts of heat manifest clearly in \r\nperiods of extreme heat often codified as heatwaves. For example, \r\nheatwaves across Europe (2003), Russia (2010), India (2015) and \r\nJapan (2018) resulted in significant death tolls and hospitalisations \r\n(McGregor et  al., 2017; Hayashida et  al., 2019)"


id: d20000788e792ea5a530b0edb6f37adc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30568
content:
" Heat continues to \r\npose a significant health risk due to increases in exposure, changes in \r\nthe size and spatial distribution of the human population, mounting \r\nvulnerability and an increase in extreme heat events (high confidence) \r\n(Harrington et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017; Mishra et al., 2017; Rohat \r\net al., 2019a; Rohat et al., 2019b; Rohat et al., 2019c; Watts et al., \r\n2019). Some regions are already experiencing heat stress conditions \r\napproaching the upper limits of labour productivity and human \r\nsurvivability (high confidence). These include the Persian Gulf and \r\nadjacent land areas, parts of the Indus River Valley, eastern coastal \r\nIndia, Pakistan, northwestern India, the shores of the Red Sea, the \r\nGulf of California, the southern Gulf of Mexico and coastal Venezuela \r\nand Guyana (Krakauer et  al., 2020; Li et  al., 2020; Raymond et  al., \r\n2020; Saeed et al., 2021; Xu et al., 2020)."


id: 9ecf7de6996d8d74b12da2da026bd933
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22528
content:
"Individuals suffering from diabetes are at higher risk of heat-related \r\nillness and death (medium confidence). Extreme weather events \r\nand rising temperatures have been found to increase morbidity and \r\nmortality in patients living with diabetes, especially in those with \r\ncardiovascular complications (Mendez-Lazaro et al., 2018; Zilbermint, \r\n2020; Hajat et al., 2017). Evidence suggests that the local heat loss \r\nresponse of skin blood flow is affected by diabetes-related impairments, \r\nresulting in lower elevations in skin blood flow in response to a heat \r\nor pharmacological stimulus. Thermoregulatory sweating may also be \r\ndiminished by type-2 diabetes, impairing the body's ability to transfer \r\nheat from its core to the environment (Xu et al., 2019b)"


id: a0ccf145e55418874742f20ae7563884
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22848
content:
" Higher rates \r\nof doctor consultations by patients with type-2 diabetes and diabetics \r\nwith cardiovascular comorbidities have been observed during hot days, \r\nbut without evidence of heightened risk of renal failure or neuropathy \r\ncomorbidities (Xu et al., 2019b)."


id: fb765d22aff69c36f3a23991e97d8504
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37062
content:
"2016). While there is strong association between ambient temperature \r\nand cardiovascular events globally, there are complex interactions and \r\nmodulators of individual response (Wang et al., 2017b). Further, some \r\nCVD morbidity sub-groups such as myocardial infarction (MI) and stroke \r\nhospitalisation display temperature sensitivity while others do not \r\n(Bao et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2016). Although older \r\nadults have inherent sensitivities to temperature-related health impacts \r\n(Bunker et al., 2016; Phung et al., 2016), children can also be affected by \r\nextreme heat (Xu et al., 2014). Cardiovascular capacity or health is also a \r\ncritical determinant of individual health outcomes (Schuster et al., 2017). \r\nMedications to treat CVDs, such as diuretics and beta-blockers, may \r\nimpair resilience to heat stress (Stewart et al., 2017). Other mediating \r\nfactors in the causal pathway range from alcohol consumption (Cusack \r\net al"


id: a5f486435ea4408f2d86564a568d736
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 23665
content:
", 2011; Epstein and Yanovich, 2019) and obesity (Speakman, 2018) \r\nto pre-existing conditions, such as diabetes and hyperlipidaemia, and \r\nurban characteristics (Chen et al., 2019; Sera et al., 2019)."


id: 7bc3f6a652cdeda3d54f494c7fc86ef1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17071
content:
"The country level percentage of mortality attributable to non\u0002optimum temperature (heat and cold) has been found to range from \r\n3.4 to 11% (Gasparrini et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2019b). Heat as a \r\nhealth risk factor has largely been overlooked in low- and middle\u0002income countries (Campbell et al., 2018; Green et al., 2019; Dimitrova \r\net  al., 2021). For 2019, the GBD report estimates the burden of \r\nDALYs attributable to low temperature was 2.2  times greater than \r\nthe burden attributable to high temperature. However, this global \r\nfigure obscures important regional variations. Countries with a \r\nhigh sociodemographic index--mainly mid-latitude high-income \r\ntemperate to cool climate countries-- were found to have a cold\u0002related burden 15.4 times greater than the heat-related burden, while \r\nfor warm lower-income regions, such as south Asia and sub-Saharan \r\nAfrica, the heat-related burden was estimated to be 1.7  times and \r\n3.6  times greater, respectively (Murray et  al., 2020)"


id: dcf5da6cfc48172f04ff0923561cbc9c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32261
content:
" For countries \r\nwhere data availability permits, there is evidence that extreme \r\nheat (and extreme cold) leads to higher rates of premature deaths \r\n(Armstrong et al., 2017; Cheng et al., 2018; Costa et al., 2017)."


id: fe15bdf68b14e56e33fa7901dbd4aa22
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37503
content:
"Several lines of evidence point to a possible decrease in population \r\nsensitivity to heat, albeit mainly for high-income countries (high \r\nconfidence), arising from the implementation of heat warning systems, \r\nincreased awareness and improved quality of life. (Sheridan and \r\nAllen, 2018). Evidence suggests a general decrease in the impact of \r\nheat on daily mortality (Diaz et al., 2018; Kinney, 2018; Miron et al., \r\n2015), a decline in the relative risk attributable to heat (Astrom et al., \r\n2018; Barreca et al., 2016; Petkova et al., 2014) and an increase in the \r\nminimum mortality temperature (MMT) (Astrom et al., 2018; Folkerts \r\net al., 2020; Follos et al., 2021; Chung et al., 2018; Todd and Valleron, \r\n2015; Yin et  al., 2019). It is difficult to draw conclusions regarding \r\ntrends in heat sensitivity for low- to middle-income countries and \r\nspecific vulnerable groups as these are under-represented in the \r\nliterature (Sheridan and Allen, 2018)"


id: 2c3aa400c31ba4ad674fdb4e72b82d3d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4384
content:
" Trends in heat sensitivity are \r\ngenerally believed to be scale and situation dependent, but there is \r\nconsiderable variability in changes in heat sensitivity as measured \r\nby trends in heat-related mortality or MMT (Follos et al., 2021; Kim \r\net al., 2019a; Lee et al., 2021), with notable variability across different \r\npopulation groups (Lu et al., 2021)."


id: f8e6fad6b87b2771bee866af37c7e549
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36669
content:
"et al., 2020; Smith et al., 2021; Vanos et al., 2019; Varghese et al., 2020; \r\nWilliams et  al., 2020). Occupational heat strain in outdoor workers \r\nmanifests as dehydration, mild reduction in kidney function, fatigue, \r\ndizziness, confusion, reduced brain function, loss of concentration and \r\ndiscomfort (Al-Bouwarthan et al., 2020; Boonruksa et al., 2020; Habibi \r\net al., 2021; Levi et al., 2018; Venugopal et al., 2021; Xiang et al., 2014). \r\nIn the case of armed forces, a global review of the available literature \r\npoints to a slightly higher incidence of heat stroke in men compared \r\nto women but a higher proportion of heat intolerance and greater \r\nrisk of exertional heat illness amongst women (Alele et  al., 2020). \r\nThere is also some evidence that for healthcare workers, the risk of \r\noccupational heat stress grew during the COVID-19 pandemic due to \r\nthe need to wear personal protective equipment (Foster et al., 2020; \r\nLee et al., 2020; Messeri et al., 2021)"


id: abc2ad264caa0c015bd36f64d14cf0df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24549
content:
" Based on a systematic review of \r\nthe literature, one study estimates global costs from heat-related lost \r\nwork time were USD 280 billion in 1995 and USD 311 billion in 2010, \r\nwith low- and middle-income countries and countries with warmer \r\nclimates experiencing greater losses as a proportion of gross domestic \r\nproject (GDP) (Borg et al., 2021). Other global level assessments note \r\nan increase in the potential hours of work lost due to heat over \r\nthe 2000-2018 period; in 2018, 133.6  billion potential work hours \r\nwere lost, amounting to 45 billion hours more than in 2000 (Watts \r\net  al., 2019). For China, heat-related productivity losses have been \r\nestimated at 9.9 billion hours in 2019, equivalent to 0.5% of the total \r\nnational work hours for that year, with Guangdong province, one of \r\nthe warmest regions in China, accounting for almost a quarter of the \r\nlosses (Cai et al., 2021)."


id: 2f710217a6ece96940a1e6b26fb76b79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4885
content:
"Injuries comprise a substantial portion of the global burden of disease. \r\nIn 2019, injuries comprised 9.82% of total global DALYs and 7.61% \r\nof deaths (Vos et  al., 2020). The causal pathways for many injuries, \r\nparticularly those from heat and extreme weather events, flooding \r\nand fires, exhibit clear climate sensitivity (Roberts and Arnold, \r\n2007; Roberts and Hillman, 2005), as do some injuries occurring in \r\noccupational settings (Marinaccio et  al., 2019; Sheng et  al., 2018), \r\nbut a comprehensive assessment of climate sensitivity in injury causal \r\npathways has not been done. Certain groups, including Indigenous \r\nPeoples, children and the elderly (Ahmed et al., 2020) are at greater \r\nrisk for a wide range of injuries"


id: 9c636e292c32e3d3176e92f1145dcde9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22156
content:
" Extreme events impose substantial \r\ndisease burden directly as a result of traumatic injuries, drowning and \r\nburns and large mental health burdens associated with displacement \r\n(Fullilove, 1996), depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), \r\nbut the overall injury burden associated with extreme weather is not \r\nknown. It is known that the Asia-Pacific region has experienced the \r\nhighest relative burden of injuries from extreme weather in recent \r\ndecades (Hashim and Hashim, 2016)."


id: 79cfa75efc80d32425b95a2f08ae4749
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16734
content:
"Wide ranging knowledge regarding the specific detection of heat- and \r\ncold-related mortality/morbidity and its attribution to observed climate \r\nchange is lacking. Although there has been an observed increase in \r\nwinter-season temperatures for a number of regions, to date there is \r\nvariable evidence for a consequential reduction in winter mortality and \r\nsusceptibility to cold over time due to milder winters; some countries \r\ndemonstrate decreasing trends, while other countries show stable or \r\neven increasing trends in cold-attributable mortality fractions over time \r\n(e.g., Arbuthnott et al. (2020); Astrom et al. (2013); Diaz et al. (2019); \r\nHajat (2017); Hanigan et  al. (2021); Lee et  al. (2018b)). While there \r\nis a burgeoning literature on the attribution of extreme heat events \r\nto climate change (e.g., Vautard et al"


id: 6580fb91d7036cec1cf2a7d9ed55bae7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 13544
content:
" (2020)), the number of studies \r\nthat assess the extent to which observed changes in heat-related \r\nmortality may be attributable to climate change is small (Ebi et  al., \r\n2020). During the 2003 European heatwave, anthropogenic climate \r\nchange increased the risk of heat-related mortality by approximately \r\n70% and 20% for London and Paris, respectively (Mitchell et al., 2016). \r\nFor the severe heat event across Egypt in 2015, the impact on human \r\ndiscomfort was 69% (+-17%) more likely due to anthropogenic climate \r\nchange (Mitchell, 2016), and for Stockholm, Sweden, it has been \r\nestimated that mortality due to temperature extremes for 1980 to \r\n2009 was double what would have occurred without climate change \r\n(Astrom et al., 2013). To date there has only been one multi-country \r\nattempt to quantify the heat-related human health impacts that have \r\nalready occurred due to climate change"


id: 64c44d5810733a48b0a2de78e465dd24
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13423
content:
" Based on an analysis of 732 \r\nlocations spanning 43 countries for the 1991-2018 period, the study \r\nfound that on average 37.0% (inter-quartile range 20.5-76.3%) of \r\nwarm-season heat-related deaths can be attributed to anthropogenic \r\nclimate change, equivalent to an average mortality rate of 2.2/100,000 "


id: 74db4cab6cc4fd30e922f3e08f24f322
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"Extreme weather imposes a substantial morbidity and mortality burden \r\nthat is quite variable by location and hazard. The proportion of this \r\nburden related specifically to injuries is not established. From 1998 to \r\n2017 there were 526,000 deaths from 11,500 extreme weather events, \r\nand the average annual attributable all-cause mortality incidence \r\nin the ten most affected countries was 3.5 per 100,000 population \r\n(Eckstein et al., 2017). Rates can be much higher; mortality incidence \r\nin Puerto Rico and Dominica from extreme weather were 90.2 and \r\n43.7 per 100,000 population in 2017, respectively (Eckstein et  al., \r\n2017). Not all of these deaths are from injuries, and the proportion \r\nof mortality and morbidity associated with injuries varies by location \r\nand hazard. One review found that one-year post-event prevalence \r\nrates for injuries associated with extreme events (floods, droughts, \r\nheatwaves and storms) in developing countries ranged from 1.4% to \r\n37.9% (Rataj et al"


id: 15eba44d6580e33c6bec4e710b869f6f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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", 2016). Other literature has documented an increase \r\nin the risk of motor vehicle accidents in association with extreme \r\nprecipitation (Liu et al., 2017; Stevens et al., 2019), temperature (Leard \r\nand Roth, 2019) and sandstorms (Islam et al., 2019) and an increased \r\nrisk of traumatic occupational injuries associated with temperature \r\nextremes, particularly extreme heat, likely from fatigue and decreased \r\npsychomotor performance (Varghese et al., 2019)."


id: 3d61f11d7d804ae14c7184b0dc940507
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"micronutrient deficiencies (FAO, 2020). More than 135 million people \r\nacross 55 countries experienced acute hunger requiring urgent food, \r\nnutrition and livelihood assistance in 2019 (FSIN/GNAFC, 2020). \r\nThe COVID-19 pandemic is projected to increase the number of \r\nacutely food insecure people to 270 million people (FSIN, 2020) and \r\nworsen malnutrition levels (FAO et al., 2020; Rippin et al., 2020). The \r\nrelationships between climate change and obesity vary based on \r\ngeography, population sub-groups and/or stages of economic growth \r\nand population growth (An et al., 2017). Increasing temperatures could \r\ncontribute to obesity through reduced physical activity, increased \r\nprices of produce or shifts in eating patterns of populations towards \r\nmore processed foods (An et  al., 2018)"


id: df0ea5577f6fcee42c0077517ac7cc7f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
" In the largest global study \r\nto date exploring the connections between child diet diversity and \r\nrecent climate, data from 19  countries in six regions (Asia, Central \r\nAmerica, South America, north Africa, southeast Africa and west Africa) \r\nindicated significant reductions in diet diversity associated with higher \r\ntemperatures and significant increases in diet diversity associated with \r\nhigher precipitation (Niles et al., 2021)."


id: 45c427b0df7f70eab45d4ec25995452
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Climate variability and change contribute to food insecurity that can \r\nlead to malnutrition, including undernutrition, overweight and obesity, \r\nand to disease susceptibility, particularly in low- and middle-income \r\ncountries (high confidence). Since AR5, analyses of the links between \r\nclimate change and food expanded beyond undernutrition to include \r\nthe impacts of climate change on a wider set of diet- and weight\u0002related risk factors and their impacts on NCDs, along with the role \r\nof dietary choices for GHG emissions (IPCC, 2019b) including dietary \r\ninadequacy (deficiencies, excesses or imbalances in energy, protein \r\nand micronutrients), infections and sociocultural factors (Global \r\nNutrition Report 2020)"


id: e0f184a267dac03270ba3bf7a91a3215
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" Undernutrition exists when a combination of \r\ninsufficient food intake, health, and care conditions results in one or \r\nmore of the following: underweight for age, short for age (stunted), \r\nthin for height (wasted), or functionally deficient in vitamins and/\r\nor minerals (micronutrient malnutrition or 'hidden hunger'). Food \r\ninsecurity and poor access to nutrient-dense food contribute not only \r\nto undernutrition but also to obesity and susceptibility to NCDs in \r\nlow- and middle-income countries (FAO et al., 2018; Swinburn et al., \r\n2019)."


id: fed7c3e06caadc2e64461a0d4f63b48b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Climate change in northern regions, including Arctic ecosystems, \r\nis causing permafrost to thaw, creating the potential for mercury \r\n(Hg) to enter the food chain (medium agreement, low evidence) as \r\nmethyl mercury (MeHg), which is highly neurotoxic and nephrotoxic \r\nand bioaccumulates and biomagnifies throughout the food chain via \r\ndietary uptake of fish, seafood and mammals. Mercury methylation \r\nprocesses in aquatic environments have been found to be exacerbated \r\nby ocean warming, coupled with more acidic and anoxic sediments \r\n(FAO, 2020). Consumption of mercury-contaminated fish has been \r\nfound to be linked to neurological disorders due to methyl mercury \r\npoisoning (i.e., Minamata disease) that is associated with climate \r\nchange-contaminant interactions that alter the bioaccumulation and \r\nbiomagnification of toxic and fat-soluble persistent organic pollutants \r\nand polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) (Alava et al., 2017) in seafood \r\nand marine mammals (medium confidence)"


id: 30281719cdd383614b7fa20f8c9d1512
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content:
" Indigenous Peoples have \r\na higher exposure to such risks because of the accumulation of such \r\ntoxins in traditional foods (J.J. et al., 2017). Contamination of food with \r\nPCBs and dioxins has a range of adverse health impacts (Lake et al., \r\n2015)."


id: 7171176676ac73eb7acd457dde02886d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"There is an observable association between high temperatures and \r\nmental health decrements (high confidence), with an additional \r\npossible influence of increased precipitation (medium agreement, \r\nmedium evidence). Heat-associated mental health outcomes include \r\nsuicide (Williams et al., 2015a; Carleton, 2017; Burke et al., 2018; Kim \r\net  al., 2019b; Thompson et  al., 2018; Schneider et  al., 2020; Cheng \r\net al., 2021; Baylis et al., 2018; Obradovich et al., 2018); psychiatric \r\nhospital admissions and emergency room visits for mental disorders \r\n(Hansen et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2014; Chan et al., 2018; Mullins and \r\nWhite, 2019; Yoo et al., 2021); experiences of anxiety, depression and \r\nacute stress (Obradovich et al., 2018; Mullins and White, 2019); and \r\nself-reported mental health (Li et  al., 2020). In Canada, Wang et  al"


id: 15d8a420b8fd3ae35b6d0ec1ba5b7e39
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content:
" \r\n(2014) found an association between mean heat exposure of 28degC and \r\ngreater hospital admissions within 0 to 4 days for mood and behavioural \r\ndisorders (including schizophrenia, mood and neurotic disorders). A US \r\nstudy found mental health problems increased by 0.5% when average \r\ntemperatures exceed 30degC, compared to averages between 25degC \r\nand 30degC; a 1degC warming over five years was associated with a 2% \r\nincrease in mental health problems (Obradovich et al., 2018). Another \r\nstudy found a 1degC rise in monthly average temperatures over several \r\ndecades was associated with a 2.1% rise in suicide rates in Mexico and \r\na 0.7% rise in suicide rates in the USA (Burke et al., 2018). A systematic \r\nreview of published research using a variety of methodologies from \r\n19 countries (Thompson et al., 2018) found an increased risk of suicide \r\nassociated with a 1degC rise in ambient temperature."


id: c1aa133ba6ca64b23b84cf4ee92a747f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Discrete climate hazards including storms (Kessler et al., 2008; Boscarino \r\net  al., 2013; Boscarino et  al., 2017; Obradovich et  al., 2018), floods \r\n(Baryshnikova and Pham, 2019), heatwaves, wildfires and drought \r\n(Hanigan et al., 2012; Carleton, 2017; Zhong et al., 2018; Charlson et al., \r\n2021) have significant negative consequences for mental health (very \r\nhigh confidence). A large body of research identifies the impacts of \r\nextreme weather events on PTSD, anxiety and depression; much of the \r\nresearch has been done in the USA and the UK, but a growing number \r\nof studies find evidence for similar impacts on mental health in other \r\ncountries, including Spain (Foudi et al., 2017), Brazil (Alpino et al., 2016), \r\nChile (Navarro et  al., 2016), Small Island Developing States (Kelman \r\net al., 2021) and Vietnam (Pollack et al., 2016)"


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" Approximately 20-30% \r\nof those who live through a hurricane develop depression and/or PTSD \r\nwithin the first few months following the event (Obradovich et al., 2018; \r\nSchwartz et al., 2015; Whaley, 2009), with similar rates for people who \r\nhave experienced flooding (Waite et al., 2017; Fernandez et al., 2015). \r\nStudies conducted in South America and Asia indicate an increase in \r\nPTSD and depressive disorders after extreme weather events (Rataj \r\net al., 2016). Evidence is lacking for African countries (Otto et al., 2017). \r\nChildren and adolescents are particularly vulnerable to post-traumatic \r\nstress after extreme weather events (Brown et al., 2017; Hellden et al., \r\n2021; Kousky, 2016), and increased susceptibility to mental health \r\nproblems may linger into adulthood (Maclean et al., 2016)."


id: c20d9d0d5a4158dfd0e860fc13d8f3d5
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content:
"A wide range of climatic events and conditions have observed and \r\ndetrimental impacts on mental health (very high confidence). The \r\npathways through which climatic events affect mental health are \r\nvaried, complex and inter-connected with other non-climatic influences \r\nthat create vulnerability (Figure  7.6). The climatic exposure may be \r\ndirect, such as experiencing an extreme weather event or prolonged \r\nhigh temperatures, or indirect, such as mental health consequences \r\nof undernutrition or displacement. Exposure may also be vicarious, \r\nwith people experiencing decreased mental health associated with \r\nobserving the impact of climate change on others or simply by learning \r\nabout climate change. Non-climatic moderating influences range \r\nfrom an individual's personality and pre-existing conditions, to social \r\nsupport, and to structural inequities (Gariepy et  al., 2016; Hrabok \r\net al., 2020; Nagy et al., 2018; Silva et al., 2016b)"


id: 22dd2ba2ff9d29d42b431d880e60ec5e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Overall, research suggests that climate change has already had \r\nnegative effects on subjective well-being (medium confidence). \r\nClimate change can affect well-being through a number of pathways, \r\nincluding loss of access to green and blue spaces due to damage \r\nfrom storms, coastal erosion, drought or wildfires; heat; decreased air \r\nquality; and disruptions to one's normal pattern of behaviour, residence, \r\noccupation or social interactions (Hayward and Ayeb-Karlsson, 2021). \r\nFor example, substantial evidence shows a negative correlation \r\nbetween air pollution and subjective well-being or happiness (Apergis, \r\n2018; Cunado and de Gracia, 2013; Lu, 2020; Luechinger, 2010; \r\nMenz and Welsch, 2010; Orru et al., 2016; Yuan et al., 2018; Zhang \r\net  al., 2017a); in the reverse direction, there is evidence not only \r\nthat time in nature but more specifically a feeling of connectedness \r\nto nature are both associated with well-being (Martin et  al"


id: df0b00466801db5aa900ea43e38ecb43
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", 2020) \r\nand healthy ecosystems offer opportunities for health improvements \r\n(Pretty and Barton, 2020). Negative emotions such as grief--often \r\ntermed 'solastalgia' (Albrecht et al., 2007)--are associated with the \r\ndegradation of local or valued landscapes (Eisenman et al., 2015; Ellis \r\nand Albrecht, 2017; Polain et al., 2011; Tschakert et al., 2017; Tschakert \r\net  al., 2019), which may threaten cultural rituals, especially among \r\nIndigenous Peoples (Cunsolo and Ellis, 2018; Cunsolo et  al., 2020). \r\nStudies conducted in the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu found qualitative \r\nand quantitative evidence of experiences of climate change and worry \r\nabout the future, with negative impacts on respondents' well-being \r\n(Asugeni et al., 2015; Gibson et al., 2020)."


id: f0908dc6024e4ea36666c03a319fb305
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content:
"Mental health impacts can emerge as result of climate impacts on \r\neconomic, social and food systems (high confidence). For example, \r\nmalnutrition among children has been associated with a variety of \r\nmental health problems (Adhvaryu et  al., 2019; Hock et  al., 2018; \r\nYan et  al., 2018), as has food insecurity among adults (Lund et  al., \r\n2018). The economic impacts of droughts have been associated with \r\nincreases in suicide, particularly among farmers (Carleton, 2017; \r\nEdwards et al., 2015; Vins et al., 2015); those whose occupations are \r\nlikely to be affected by climate change report that it is a source of \r\nstress that is linked to substance abuse and suicidal ideation (Kabir, \r\n2018). Studies of Indigenous Peoples often describe food insecurity or \r\nreduced access to traditional foods as a link between climate change \r\nand reduced mental health (Middleton et al., 2020b)"


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" The loss of family \r\nmembers, for example due to an extreme weather event, increases \r\nthe risk of mental illness (Keyes et al., 2014). Individuals in low- and \r\nmiddle-income countries may be more severely impacted due to lesser \r\naccess to mental health services and lower financial resources to help \r\ncope with impacts compared with high-income countries (Abramson \r\net al., 2015)."


id: aec76c10d48276949d55d2001d639079
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Anxiety about the potential risks of climate change and awareness \r\nof climate change itself can affect mental health even in the absence \r\nof direct impacts (low confidence). There is a need for more evidence \r\nabout the prevalence or severity of climate change-related anxiety, \r\nsometimes called ecoanxiety, but national surveys in the USA, Europe \r\nand Australia show that people express high levels of concern and \r\nperceived harm associated with climate change (Steentjes et  al., \r\n2017; Clayton and Karazsia, 2020; Cunsolo and Ellis, 2018; Helm \r\net al., 2018; Leiserowitz et al., 2017; Reser et al., 2012; Steentjes et al., \r\n2017). In a US sample, perceived ecological stress, defined as personal \r\nstress associated with environmental problems, predicted depressive \r\nsymptoms (Helm et al., 2018); in a sample of Filipinos, climate anxiety \r\nwas correlated with lower mental health (Reyes et  al"


id: b315462b5a7d80d897485e3099947a60
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", 2021) and a \r\nnon-random study in 25  countries showed positive correlations \r\nbetween negative emotions about climate change and self-rated \r\nmental health (Ogunbode et al., 2021). However, an earlier study found \r\nno correlation between climate change worry and mental health issues \r\n(Berry and Peel, 2015). Because the perceived threat of climate change \r\nis based on subjective perceptions of risk and coping ability as well \r\nas on experiences and knowledge (Bradley et al., 2014), even people \r\nwho have not been directly affected may be stressed by a perception \r\nof looming danger (Clayton and Karazsia, 2020). Not surprisingly, \r\nthose who have directly experienced some of the effects of climate \r\nchange may be more likely to show such responses. Indigenous \r\nPeoples, whose culture and well-being tend to be strongly linked to \r\nlocal environments, may experience mental health effects associated \r\nwith changes in environmental risks; studies suggest connections to an "


id: cd26d1708bbaf9f46ba98f41987c9a8b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Heat is one of the best-studied aspects of climate change observed \r\nto reduce well-being (high confidence). Higher summer temperatures \r\nare associated with decreased happiness and ratings of well-being \r\n(Carleton and Hsiang, 2016; Miles-Novelo and Anderson, 2019; \r\nConnolly, 2013; Noelke et al., 2016; Baylis et al., 2018; Moore et al., \r\n2019; Wang et al., 2020b). A study of 1.9 million Americans (Noelke \r\net al., 2016) found that exposure to one day averaging 21degC-27degC was \r\nassociated with reduced well-being by 1.6% of a standard deviation \r\nand days above 32degC were associated with reduced well-being \r\nby 4.4% of a standard deviation relative to a reference interval of \r\n10degC-16degC. A similar relationship between heat and mood has been \r\nobserved in China, where expressed mood began to decrease when \r\nthe average daily temperature was over 20degC (Wang et al., 2020b)"


id: f0fb581977f1a921d2ddd8199417c7a7
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content:
" The \r\ncausal mechanism is unclear but could be due to impacts on health, \r\neconomic costs or social interactions (Belkin and Kouchaki, 2017; \r\nOsberghaus and Kuhling, 2016) or reduced quality or quantity of sleep \r\n(Fujii et al., 2015; Obradovich et al., 2017; Obradovich and Migliorini, \r\n2018). Heat has also been associated with inter-personal and inter\u0002group aggression and increases in violent crime (Heilmann et al., 2021; \r\nMapou et al., 2017; Tiihonen et al., 2017). For the most part, studies \r\nhave measured daily response to average daily temperatures and are \r\nunable to predict whether the effect is cumulative in response to a \r\nsequence of unusually warm days. However, there is no evidence that \r\nadaptation occurs over time to eliminate the negative response to very \r\nwarm temperatures (Moore et  al., 2019). Some research has found "


id: 9844d6bfd52aed77a76ffceb897d3c6c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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"Weather events and climate conditions can act as direct drivers of \r\nmigration and displacement (e.g., destruction of homes by tropical \r\ncyclones) and as indirect drivers (e.g., rural income losses and/or \r\nfood insecurity due to heat- or drought-related crop failures that \r\nin turn generate new population movements) (high confidence). \r\nExtreme storms, floods and wildfires are strongly associated with \r\nhigh levels of short- and long-term displacement, while droughts, \r\nextreme heat and precipitation anomalies are more likely to stimulate \r\nlonger-term changes in migration patterns (Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, \r\n2020; Hoffmann et  al., 2020)"


id: 2694becd5a3fb71af829820b700600db
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" Longer-term environmental changes \r\nattributable to anthropogenic climate change--such as higher \r\naverage temperatures, desertification, land degradation, biodiversity \r\nloss and sea level rise--have had observed effects on migration \r\nand displacement in a limited number of locations in recent decades \r\nbut are projected to have wider-scale impacts on future population \r\npatterns and migration, and are therefore assessed in Section  7.3.2 \r\n(Projected Risks)."


id: 42a07378501d9eb2bae3a7c056d805a0
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"The diversity of potential migration and displacement outcomes \r\nreflects the scale and physical impacts of specific climate hazard \r\nevents and the wide range of social, economic, cultural, political \r\nand other non-climatic factors that influence exposure, vulnerability, \r\nadaptation options and the contexts in which migration decisions are \r\nmade (high confidence). The diversity in drivers, contexts and outcomes \r\nmakes it difficult to offer simple generalisations about the relationship \r\nbetween climate change and migration"


id: 9ae68f81cff55859d62fd4f622cdefb
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" The characteristics of climatic \r\ndrivers vary in terms of the rate of onset, intensity, duration, spatial \r\nextent and severity of damage caused to housing, infrastructure and \r\nlivelihoods; the potential migration responses to these are further \r\nmediated by cultural, demographic, economic, political, social and \r\nother non-climatic factors operating across multiple scales (Neumann \r\nand Hermans, 2015; McLeman, 2017; Barnett and McMichael, 2018; \r\nCattaneo et al., 2019; Hoffmann et al., 2020)."


id: 717c25c055256ca530626833e3a24fd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Climatic conditions, events and variability are important drivers of migration and displacement (high confidence) (Table MIGRATE.1 in \r\nChapter 7), with migration responses to specific climate hazards being strongly influenced by economic, social, political and demographic \r\nprocesses (high confidence) (Sections 7.2.6, 8.2.1.3). Migration is among a wider set of possible adaptation alternatives and often emerges \r\nwhen other forms of adaptation are insufficient (Sections 5.5.1.1, 5.5.3.5, 7.2.6, 8.2.1.3, 9.7.2). Involuntary displacement occurs when \r\nadaptation alternatives are exhausted or not viable and reflects non-climatic factors that constrain adaptive capacity and create high \r\nlevels of exposure and vulnerability (high confidence) (Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3; Sections 4.3.7, 7.2.6; Box 8.1; Section 10.3; \r\nBox 14.7). There is strong evidence that climatic disruptions to agricultural and other rural livelihoods can generate migration (high \r\nconfidence) (Sections 5.5"


id: 2fd61b1fba455b4296fbe130dbfffd97
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content:
"Figure MIGRATE.1 in Chapter 7 presents a simplified framework for understanding how migration and displacement may emerge from \r\nthe interactions of climatic and non-climatic factors, based on the characteristic risk framework introduced in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3). \r\nVoluntary migration can be used by households when adapting to climate hazards, while less voluntary forms of migration and displacement \r\nemerge when other forms of adaptation (referred to in Figure MIGRATE.1 in Chapter 7 as in situ adaptation) are inadequate. Migration \r\noutcomes--expressed in Figure MIGRATE.1 in Chapter 7 as changes in future risks to the well-being of migrants, sending communities \r\nand destination communities--are heavily influenced by the political, legal, cultural and socioeconomic conditions under which migration \r\noccurs. Groups and individuals that are involuntarily immobile may find that their exposure, vulnerability and risk increase over time. \r\nTable MIGRATE"


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content:
"1 in Chapter 7 summarises the range of potential migration outcomes that may emerge from this dynamic and indicates \r\nspecific sections in sectoral and regional chapters of the report that describe examples of each."


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"of climate change can result in synergies for both adaptation and development (Sections 5.12.2, 7.4.4, 8.2.1.3). Migration governance at \r\nlocal, national and international levels will influence the outcomes of climate-related migration for the migrants themselves as well as for \r\nreceiving and origin communities (Sections 5.13.4, 7.4.4, 8.2.1.3). At the international level, a number of relevant policy initiatives and \r\nagreements, including Global Compacts for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and for the protection of Refugees; the Warsaw \r\nInternational Mechanism of the UNFCCC; the Sustainable Development Goals; the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction; and the \r\nPlatform on Disaster Displacement, have already been established, merit continued pursuit and provide potential migration governance \r\npathways (Section 7.4.4)"


id: 33908c77f77cc4af264cf38a0d1386eb
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" Policy and planning decisions at regional, national and local scales that relate to housing, infrastructure, water \r\nprovisioning, schools and healthcare are relevant for successful integration of migrants into receiving communities (Sections  5.5.4, \r\n5.10.1.1, 5.12.2, 9.8.3). Policies and practices on movements of people across international borders are also relevant to climate-related \r\nmigration, with restrictions on movement having implications for the adaptive capacity of communities exposed to climate hazards \r\n(Section  7.4.4.2; Box  8.1). Perceptions of migrants and the framing of policy discussions in receiving communities and nations are \r\nimportant determinants of the future success of migration as an adaptive response to climate change (Section 7.4.4.3) (high agreement, \r\nmedium evidence)."


id: 392b6563e24d89b4ce121462efaaff82
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"Reducing the future risk of large-scale population displacements, including those requiring active humanitarian interventions and \r\norganised relocations of people, requires the international community to meet the requirements of the Paris Agreement and take further \r\naction to control future warming (high confidence) (Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3; Section 7.3.1; Box 8.1). Current emissions \r\npathways lead to scenarios for the period between 2050 and 2100 in which hundreds of millions of people will be at risk of displacement \r\ndue to rising sea levels, floods, tropical cyclones, droughts, extreme heat, wildfires and other hazards, with land degradation exacerbating \r\nthese risks in many regions (Section 7.3.2; IPCC 2019b; Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3). At high levels of warming, tipping points may \r\nexist, particularly related to sea level rise, that, if crossed, would further increase the global population potentially at risk of displacement \r\n(Ranasinghe et al. 2021)"


id: 1a3c9515b1da11df357897a2eaa2c460
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" Populations in low-income countries and small-island states that have historically had low greenhouse gas \r\n(GHG) emissions are at particular risk of involuntary migration and displacement due to climate change, reinforcing the urgency for \r\nindustrialised countries to continue lowering GHG emissions, to support adaptive capacity-building initiatives under the UNFCCC and to \r\nmeet objectives expressed in the Global Compacts regarding safe, orderly and regular migration and the support and accommodation of \r\ndisplaced people (Sections 4.3.7, 4.5.7, 5.12.2, 7.4.5.5, 8.4.2; Box 8.1; Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3)."


id: 7ad97a81b4c7f6684c0638220274d6a7
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"Most documented examples of international climate-related migration \r\nare intra-regional movements of people between countries with shared \r\nborders (high agreement, medium evidence). Systematic reviews find \r\nfew documented examples of long-distance, inter-regional migration \r\ndriven by climate events (Veronis et  al., 2018; Kaczan and Orgill\u0002Meyer, 2020; Hoffmann et  al., 2020). One macro-economic analysis \r\nfound a correlation between migrant flows from low- to high-income \r\ncountries and adverse climatic events in the source country (Coniglio \r\nand Pesce, 2015). Another study found that high heat stimulates higher \r\nrates of international migration from middle-income countries but \r\ntypically not from low-income countries (Cattaneo and Peri., 2016), \r\nwhile other studies found international climate-related migration \r\noriginates primarily from agriculture-dependent countries (Cai et al., \r\n2016; Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava, 2017)"


id: 230afb0820ddaa8c7e4014ed428be75f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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" Small-sample studies of \r\nmigrants to Canada from Bangladesh, Haiti and sub-Saharan Africa \r\nsuggest environmental factors in the source country can be a primary \r\nor secondary motivation for some migrants within larger flows of \r\neconomic and family-reunification migrants (Veronis and McLeman, \r\n2014; Mezdour et  al., 2015; McLeman et  al., 2017). Research on \r\nthe links between climate hazards and international movements of \r\nrefugees and/or asylum seekers shows differing results. One study \r\nfound that asylum applications in Europe increase during climate \r\nfluctuations due to interactions with conflict (Missirian and Schlenker, \r\n2017), and another found links between heat, drought, conflict and \r\nasylum-seeking migration originating in the Middle East between \r\n2011 and 2015 (Abel et  al., 2019). Other studies have found that "


id: 180b40539bf7703b231bcfb1d60b04a2
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"Climate-related migration originates most often in rural areas in \r\nlow- and middle-income countries, with migrant destinations usually \r\nbeing other rural areas or urban centres within their home countries \r\n(i.e., internal migration) (medium confidence). Rural livelihoods and \r\nincomes based on farming, livestock rearing and/or natural resource \r\ncollection are inherently sensitive to climate variability and change, \r\ncreating greater potential for migration as a response (Bohra-Mishra \r\net  al., 2017; Viswanathan and Kumar, 2015). Drought events have \r\nbeen associated with periods of higher rural to urban migration \r\nwithin Mexico (Chort and de la Rupelle, 2016; Leyk et  al., 2017; \r\nNawrotzki et  al., 2017; Murray-Tortarolo and Martnez, 2021) and \r\nSenegal (Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava, 2017). Extreme temperatures \r\nare associated with higher rates of temporary rural out-migration in \r\nSouth Africa and in Bangladesh (Mastrorillo et al., 2016; Call et al., \r\n2017)"


id: 43f17079da2fb562091130cf1d9477b0
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" In rural Tanzania, weather-related shocks to crop production \r\nhave been observed to increase the likelihood of migration but \r\ntypically only for households in the middle of community wealth \r\ndistribution (Kubik and Maurel, 2016). Weather-related losses in rice \r\nproduction have been associated with small-percentage increases \r\nin internal migration in India (Viswanathan and Kumar, 2015) and \r\nthe Philippines (Bohra-Mishra et al., 2017). In east Africa, temporary \r\nrural-urban labour migration does not show a strong response to \r\nclimatic drivers (Mueller et  al., 2020). There is limited literature on \r\nmobility as adaptation in urban populations, with the focus being on \r\nresettlement of flood-prone informal settlements within cities (Kita, \r\n2017; Tadgell et al., 2017)."


id: 8fc6ffa970c70b3b99ac6ed03be5a7bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Tropical cyclones and extreme storms are a particularly significant \r\ndisplacement risk in East and Southeast Asia, the Caribbean region, \r\nthe Bay of Bengal region and southeast Africa (IDMC 2020) (high \r\nconfidence). The scale of immediate displacement from any given \r\nstorm and potential for post-event migration depend heavily on the \r\nextent of damage to housing and livelihood assets and the responsive \r\ncapacity of governments and humanitarian relief agencies (Saha, \r\n2016; Islam et  al., 2018; Mahajan, 2020; Spencer and Urquhart, \r\n2018). In Bangladesh, the rural poor are most often displaced, with \r\ninitial increases in short-term, labour-seeking migration followed by \r\nmore permanent migration by some groups (Saha, 2016; Islam and \r\nHasan, 2016; Islam and Shamsuddoha, 2017)"


id: 928474c3de4c7b7aa94e49069dcc28ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
" Past hurricanes in the \r\nCaribbean basin have generated internal and inter-state migration \r\nwithin the region, typically along pre-existing social networks, \r\nand to the USA (Loebach, 2016; Chort and de la Rupelle, 2016). In \r\n2017, Hurricanes Irma and Maria caused widespread damage to \r\ninfrastructure and health services, and a slow recovery response by \r\nauthorities was followed by the migration of tens of thousands of \r\nPuerto Ricans to Florida and New York (Zorrilla, 2017; Echenique and \r\nMelgar, 2018). In the US, coastal counties experience increased out\u0002migration after hurricanes that flows along existing social networks \r\n(Hauer, 2017), with post-disaster reconstruction employment \r\nopportunities potentially attracting new labour migrants to affected "


id: ccf3d3e3515e516d4c12d642e182890e
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"Reliable global estimates of voluntary climate-related migration \r\nwithin and between countries are not available due to a general \r\nabsence of data of this specific nature, with existing national and \r\nglobal datasets often lacking information on migration causation or \r\nmotivation. Better data are available for involuntary displacements \r\nwithin countries for reasons associated with weather-related hazards. \r\nData collected annually since 2008 on internal displacements \r\nattributed to extreme weather events by the IDMC indicate that \r\nextreme storms and floods are the two most significant weather\u0002related drivers of population displacements globally. Because of \r\nimprovements in collection sources and methods since it first began \r\nreporting data in 2008, upward trends since that year in the total \r\nreported annual number of people displaced should be treated \r\ncautiously"


id: 1a6dff2a6db15e5e503277230f3c27a8
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content:
" However, it is reasonable to conclude that the average \r\nannual rate currently exceeds 20  million people globally, with \r\nconsiderable interannual variation due to the frequency and severity \r\nof extreme events in heavily populated areas. Regional distribution \r\nof displacement events has been consistent throughout the IDMC "


id: a7b384f7c5e720facbb5728600eba189
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Riverine flood displacement can lead to increases or decreases in \r\ntemporary or short-distance migration flows, depending on the local \r\ncontext (medium confidence) (Robalino et  al., 2015; Ocello et  al., \r\n2015; Afifi et al., 2016; Koubi et al., 2016b). Floods are a particularly \r\nimportant driver of displacement in river valleys and deltas in Asia and \r\nAfrica, although large flood-related displacements have been recorded \r\nby the IDMC in all regions. In Africa, populations exposed to low flood \r\nrisks, as compared with other regions, are observed to have a greater \r\nvulnerability to displacement due to limited economic resources and \r\nadaptive capacity (Kakinuma et al., 2020). In areas where flooding is \r\nespecially frequent, in situ adaptations may be more common, and \r\nout-migration may temporarily decline after a flood (Afifi et al., 2016; \r\nChen et al., 2017; Call et al., 2017)"


id: ac8d16921b1aedb00731f5328a91f576
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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" Rates of indefinite or permanent \r\nmigration tend not to change following riverine floods unless damage \r\nto homes and livelihood assets is especially severe and widespread, \r\nwith household perceptions of short- and longer-term risks playing an \r\nimportant role (Koubi et al., 2016a)."


id: 6c0974508ebc380e17a022eeefdf0319
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"Research critiques the tendency to portray women as victims of climate hazards rather than recognising differences between women and \r\nthe potential for women to use their agency and informal networks to negotiate their situations (Eriksen et al., 2015; Ngigi et al., 2017; \r\nPollard et al., 2015; Rao et al., 2019b; Ravera et al., 2016). Migration can change household composition and structure, which in turn \r\naffects the adaptive capacity and choices of those who do not move (Rao et al., 2019a; Rao et al., 2019b; Singh, 2019). For example, when \r\nonly male household members move, the remaining members of the now female-headed household must take on greater workloads \r\n(Goodrich et al., 2019; Rao et al., 2019b; Rigg and Salamanca, 2015), leading to increased workload and greater vulnerability for those \r\nleft behind (Arora et al., 2017; Bhagat, 2017; Flato et al., 2017; Lawson et al., 2019)"


id: 4832a0dc84d2721528c7bc1a2e18f236
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
" It can, however, also increase women's economic \r\nfreedom and decision-making capacity, enhance their agency (Djoudi et al., 2016; Rao, 2019) and alter the gendered division of paid \r\nwork, care and intra-household relations (Rigg et al., 2018; Singh and Basu, 2020), a process that may reduce household vulnerability to \r\nextreme climate events (Banerjee et al., 2019b)."


id: 9372f8b70e74846ac840957ee6dd5a05
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content:
"In AR5, conflict was addressed in WGII Chapter 12 on human security. \r\nThe chapter concluded that some of the factors that increase the risk of \r\nviolent conflict within states are sensitive to climate change (medium \r\nevidence, medium agreement), that people living in places affected by \r\nviolent conflict are particularly vulnerable to climate change (medium \r\nconfidence) and that climate change will lead to new challenges to \r\nstates and will increasingly shape both conditions of security and \r\nnational security policies (medium evidence, medium agreement). AR5 \r\ncharacterised a major debate within the field as: authors supporting \r\nan association between climate anomalies and conflict that can be \r\nextrapolated into the future (e.g., Hsiang et  al. (2013); Hsiang and \r\nMarshall (2014); Burke et al. (2015a)) and authors arguing that these \r\nassociations are not universal and break down when contextual, scale \r\nand political factors are introduced (e.g., Buhaug et al"


id: 3f2a2ddb2fe45877a298bbd9cc817cb4
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"Consistent with AR5 findings, there continues to be little observed \r\nevidence that climatic variability or change cause violent inter-state \r\nconflict. In intra-state settings, climate change has been associated \r\nwith the onset of conflict, civil unrest or riots in urban settings (high \r\nagreement, medium evidence) (Ide (2020), and changes in the duration \r\nand severity of existing violent conflicts (Koubi, 2019). Climate change \r\nis conceptualised as one of many factors that interact to raise tensions \r\n(Boas and Rothe, 2016) through diverse causal mechanisms (Mach \r\net al., 2019; Ide et al., 2020) and as part of the peace-vulnerability\u0002development nexus (Barnett, 2019; Abrahams, 2020; Buhaug and von \r\nUexkull, 2021).  New areas of the literature assessed in this report \r\ninclude the security implications of responses to climate change, the \r\ngendered dynamics of conflict and exposure to violence under climate \r\nchange and civil unrest in urban settings"


id: 4b009b1073ba4c51f7d80faf0be1ac77
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" The impact of violent conflict \r\non vulnerability is not addressed in this chapter but does arise in \r\nother chapters (Sections  8.3.2.3, 17.2.2.2). Other chapters address \r\nnon-violent conflict over changing availability and distribution of \r\nresources, for example, competing land uses and fish stocks migrating \r\nto different territories (Sections  5.8.2.3; 5.8.3, 5.9.3, 5.13, 9.8.1.1, \r\n9.8.5.1). A commonly used definition of armed conflict is conflicts \r\ninvolving greater than 25 battle-related deaths in a year; this number \r\nrepresents the Uppsala Conflict Data Program threshold for inclusion \r\nin their database, a core resource in this field."


id: ef46b4ed4d12e620483c9371f53d4f62
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content:
"The number of assessable peer-reviewed studies that make connections \r\nbetween climate-related migration and health and well-being is small. \r\nThe health outcomes of migrants generally, and of climate-migrants \r\nin particular, vary according to geographical context, country and the \r\nparticular circumstances of migration or immobility (Hunter and Simon, \r\n2017; Hunter et  al., 2021; Schwerdtle et  al., 2020). Such linkages are \r\n'multi-directional', with studies suggesting that healthy individuals \r\nmay be more likely to migrate internationally in search of economic \r\nopportunities than people in poorer health, except during adverse \r\nclimatic conditions when migration rates may change across all groups, \r\nand that migrants may have different long-term health outcomes than \r\npeople born in destination areas, potentially displaying a range of positive \r\nand negative health outcomes compared to non-migrants (Kennedy \r\net al., 2015; Dodd et al"


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", 2017; Hunter and Simon, 2017; Riosmena et al., \r\n2017). Refugees and other involuntary migrants often experience higher \r\nexposure to disease and malnutrition, adverse indirect health effects of \r\nchanges in diet or activity and increased rates of mental health concerns. \r\nThese latter may be attributable to a sense of loss or fear (Schwerdtle \r\net al., 2018; Torres and Casey, 2017) as well as due to the interruption \r\nof healthcare; occupational injuries; sleep deprivation; non-hygienic \r\nlodgings and insufficient sanitary facilities; heightened exposure to \r\nvector- and WBDs; vulnerability to psychosocial, sexual and reproductive "


id: f712d8a2cbedcb7f318800aac9d2621d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Climatic conditions have affected armed conflict within countries, but \r\ntheir influence has been small compared to socioeconomic, political \r\nand cultural factors (Mach et  al., 2019) (high agreement, medium \r\nevidence). Inter-group inequality, and consequent relative deprivation \r\ncan lead to conflict and the negative impacts of climate change \r\nlower the opportunity cost of involvement in conflict (Buhaug et al., \r\n2020; Vestby, 2019). Potential pathways linking climate and conflict \r\ninclude direct impacts on physiology from heat or resource scarcity; \r\nindirect impacts of climatic variability on economic output, agricultural \r\nincomes, higher food prices and increasing migration flows; and the \r\nunintended effects of climate mitigation and adaptation policies (Koubi, \r\n2019; Busby, 2018; Sawas et al., 2018). Relative deprivation, political \r\nexclusion and ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic grievances are other \r\nkey variables (Schleussner et al., 2016; Theisen, 2017)"


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" Research shows \r\nthat factors such as land tenure and competing land uses interacting \r\nwith market-driven pressures and existing ethnic divisions produce \r\nconflict over land resources rather than a scarcity of natural resources \r\ncaused by climate impacts such as drought (high agreement, medium \r\nevidence) (Theisen, 2017; Balestri and Maggioni, 2017; Kuusaana and \r\nBukari, 2015; Box 8.3)."


id: f08eb78d53405807d8bdb2ddc6b93b06
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"Extreme weather events can be associated with increased conflict risk \r\n(low agreement, medium evidence). There is the potential for extreme \r\nweather events and disasters to cause political instability and increase \r\nthe risk of violent conflict, although not conclusively (Brzoska, 2018). \r\nPost-disaster settings can be used to intensify state repression (Wood \r\nand Wright, 2016) and to alter insurgent groups' behaviour (Walch, \r\n2018). Different stakeholders use disasters to establish new narratives \r\nand alter public opinion (Venugopal and Yasir, 2017). Some research \r\nhas demonstrated how post-disaster activities have had positive \r\nimpacts on the social contract between people and the state, reducing \r\nthe risk of conflict by strengthening relations between government and \r\ncitizens and strengthening the citizenship of marginalised communities \r\n(Siddiqi, 2018; Pelling and Dill, 2010; Siddiqi, 2019)"


id: 76a5a2590a35e5a42e3f55ac0fc3dbd6
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content:
" However, post\u0002disaster and disaster risk-related activities themselves have limited \r\ncapacity to support diplomatic efforts to build peace (Kelman et al., \r\n2018)."


id: ecec9159ba91e1b7d1c7633f458c1781
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content:
"Positive temperature anomalies and average increases in temperature \r\nover time have been associated with collective violent conflict in certain \r\nsettings (medium agreement, low evidence). Helman and Zaitchik \r\n(2020) find statistical associations between temperature and violent \r\nconflict in Africa and the Middle East that are stronger in warmer places \r\nand identify seasonal temperature effects on violence. However, they \r\nare unable to detect the impact of regional temperature increases on \r\nviolence. For Africa, Van Weezel (2019) found associations between \r\naverage increases in temperature and conflict risk. Caruso et al. (2016) \r\nfound an association between rises in minimum temperature and \r\nviolence through the impact of temperature on rice yields (Box 9.4). \r\nHowever, the associations between temperature and violence are \r\nweak compared to those with political and social factors (e.g"


id: b7a88bdf37c2583cba8467272004b841
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content:
", Owain \r\nand Maslin (2018)) and research focuses on areas where conflict is \r\nalready present and, as such, is sensitive to selection bias (Adams et al., \r\n2018). There is a body of literature that finds statistical associations \r\nbetween temperature anomalies and inter-personal violence, crime \r\nand aggression in the Global North, predominantly in the USA (e.g., \r\nRanson (2014); Mares and Moffett (2019); Tiihonen et  al. (2017); \r\nParks et al. (2020); Section 14.4.8). However, authors have cautioned \r\nagainst extrapolating seasonal associations into long-term trends and \r\nagainst focusing on individual crimes rather than wider social injustices \r\nassociated with climate change and its impacts (Lynch et al., 2020)."


id: 5eb3b774aeaa6025c842a8a8bb153b2a
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content:
"Increases in food prices due to reduced agricultural production and \r\nglobal food price shocks are associated with conflict risk and represent \r\na key pathway linking climate variability and conflict (medium \r\nconfidence). Increases in food prices are associated with civil unrest \r\nin urban areas among populations unable to afford or produce their \r\nown food and in rural populations due to changes in availability of \r\nagricultural employment with shifting commodity prices (Martin\u0002Shields and Stojetz, 2019). Under such conditions, locally specific \r\ngrievances, hunger and social inequalities can initiate or exacerbate \r\nconflicts. Food price volatility in general is not associated with violence, \r\nbut sudden food price hikes have been linked to civil unrest in some \r\ncircumstances (Bellemare, 2015; McGuirk and Burke, 2020; Winne and \r\nPeersman, 2019). In urban settings in Kenya, Koren et al"


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content:
" (2021) found \r\nan association between food and water insecurity that is mutually \r\nreinforcing and associated with social unrest (although insecurity in \r\neither food or water on its own was not). Analysing the global food \r\nriots in 2007/2008 and 2011, Heslin (2021) stresses the role of local \r\npolitics and pre-existing grievances in determining whether people \r\nmobilise around food insecurity (Chapter 5)."


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vector_id: 35796
content:
"There is some evidence of an association between climate-related \r\nrural-to-urban migration and the risk of civil unrest (medium \r\nagreement, low evidence). Petrova (2021) found that while migration \r\nin general was associated with increased protests in urban receiving \r\nareas, the relationship did not hold for hazard-related migration. In \r\nother settings, the association of civil unrest with in-migration was \r\nfound to depend on the political alignment of the host state with the \r\ncapital (Bhavnani and Lacina, 2015), previous experience of extreme \r\nclimate hazards (Koubi et  al., 2021) and previous experience of \r\nviolence among migrants (Linke et al., 2018). Climate-related migrants \r\nhave reported higher levels of perception and experience of violence \r\nin their destination (Linke et al., 2018; Koubi et al., 2018). There has \r\nbeen no association established between international migration and \r\nconflict"


id: 8660f964c1c561f0777a88261adc2423
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18682
content:
" The literature highlights how unjust racial logics may generate \r\nspurious links between climate migration and security (Frohlich, 2016; \r\nTelford, 2018)."


id: bae4531508b09ff571bfa3be4318f9ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26945
content:
"Climate adaptation and mitigation projects implemented without \r\ntaking local interests and dynamics into account have the potential \r\nto cause conflict (high agreement, medium evidence). Reforestation \r\nor forest management programmes driven by reducing emissions \r\nthrough deforestation, land zoning and managed retreat due to sea \r\nlevel rise have been identified as having the potential to cause friction \r\nand conflict within and between groups and communities (de la Vega\u0002Leinert et  al., 2018; Froese and Schilling, 2019). Conflict may arise \r\nwhen there is resistance to a proposed project, where interventions \r\nfavour one group over another, or when projects undermine \r\nlivelihoods or displace populations (e.g., Nightingale (2017); Sovacool \r\net  al. (2015); Sovacool (2018); Corbera (2017); Hunsberger (2018); \r\nSections  4.6.8, 5.13.4, 14.4.7.3)"


id: 35b1f063bb4f80f35913b325d95bd5c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5855
content:
" In addition to conflict generated \r\nby the poor implementation of land-based climate mitigation and \r\nadaptation projects, Gilmore and Buhaug (2021) highlight the links \r\nbetween climate policy and conflict through the potential effects of \r\nunequal distribution of economic burdens and fossil fuel markets on \r\neconomic growth. There is a small literature that draws attention \r\nto the potential security of nuclear proliferation, if nuclear energy \r\nis increasingly employed as a low-carbon energy source (e.g., \r\nParthemore et al. (2018); Bunn, (2019))."


id: 4b86b6984a9f0991913481c7df545277
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9303
content:
"Structural inequalities play out at an individual level to create gendered \r\nexperiences of violence (high agreement, medium evidence). Violent \r\nconflict is experienced differently by men and women because of \r\ngender norms that already exist in society and shape vulnerabilities. \r\nFor example, conflict deepens gendered vulnerabilities to climate \r\nchange related to unequal access to land and livelihood opportunities \r\n(Chandra et  al., 2017). Motivations for inter-group violence may \r\nbe influenced by constructions of masculinity, for example the \r\nresponsibility to secure their family's survival or pay dowries \r\n(Myrttinen et  al., 2017), and gendered roles may incentivise young \r\nmen to protest or to join non-state armed groups during periods of \r\nadverse climate (Myrttinen et al., 2015; Myrttinen et al., 2017; Anwar \r\net al., 2019; Hendrix and Haggard, 2015; Koren and Bagozzi, 2017)"


id: f8864e032c5480b69b07297b013d75d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 36612
content:
" \r\nResearch has found a positive correlation between crop failures and \r\nsuicides by male farmers who could not adapt their livelihoods to \r\nrising temperatures (Bryant and Garnham 2015; Kennedy and King, \r\n2014; Carleton, 2017)."


id: 82d70230e8aaec152ff8fd8e4b914933
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18109
content:
"Economic and social changes due to changes in sea ice extent in the \r\nArctic are anticipated to be managed as part of existing governance \r\nstructures (high agreement, medium evidence). The opening-up of the \r\nArctic and associated geopolitical manoeuvring for access to shipping \r\nroutes and sub-sea hydrocarbons is often highlighted as a potential \r\nsource of climate conflict (e.g., Koivurova (2009); Atland (2013); \r\nTamnes and Offerdal (2014)). Research assessed in AR5 focused \r\non the potential for resource wars and Arctic land grabs. However, \r\nresearch since AR5 is less sensationalist in its approach to Arctic \r\nsecurity, focusing instead on the practicalities of polycentric Arctic \r\ngovernance under climate change, the economic impacts of climate \r\nchange, protecting the human security of Arctic populations whose \r\nautonomy is at risk (Heininen and Exner-Pirot, 2020), understanding \r\nhow different regions (e.g"


id: 558994d48ca182e520953b0306b963b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
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vector_id: 10935
content:
", the EU) are positioning themselves more \r\nprominently in the Arctic space (Raspotnik and Osthagen, 2019) and \r\nArctic Indigenous Peoples' understanding of security (Hossain, 2016; \r\nChapter 3; Chapter 14; CCP6)."


id: 18a2aadfe510477a1f5dca8b84533e08
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1371
content:
"Temperature increases are projected to exceed critical risk thresholds \r\nfor six key climate-sensitive health outcomes, highlighting the criticality \r\nof building adaptive capacity in health systems and in other sectors \r\nthat influence health and well-being  (high confidence).  Recently \r\nreported research illustrates the temperature thresholds under three \r\nadaptation scenarios describing the effectiveness of health systems \r\nto manage additional risks from climate change  for  heat-related \r\nmorbidity and mortality; ozone-related mortality; malaria incidence \r\nrates; incidence rates of Dengue and other diseases spread by Aedes \r\nsp. mosquitos; Lyme disease; and West Nile fever (Ebi et al., 2021a). As \r\nshown in Figure 7"


id: adccd9a0ba22893a18c5e767a8596bf9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 24880
content:
"9, these adaptation scenarios significantly alter the \r\nwarming thresholds at which risks accelerate, with  the proactive \r\nadaptation scenario,  a  scenario that emphasises international \r\ncooperation towards achieving sustainable development, having \r\nthe greatest potential to avoid significant increases in risks under \r\nall but the highest levels of warming.  The incomplete adaptation \r\nscenario  describes a world with moderate challenges to adaptation \r\nand mitigation. The limited adaptation scenario describes a world with \r\nhigh challenges to adaptation and mitigation. In the figure, transitions \r\nare based on the peer-reviewed literature projecting risks for each of \r\nthe health outcomes. Projections for time intervals were changed to \r\ntemperature increase above pre-industrial levels based on the climate \r\nmodels and scenarios used in the projections"


id: c3d04ba5733c08b3ddf1bf3484db253f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28374
content:
"The assessed projections \r\nwere based on a range of scenarios, including SRES, CMIP5, and ISIMIP, \r\nand, in some cases, demographic trends. The black dots are levels of "


id: 56b05a414931af532cbd9e64476e788d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11117
content:
"(high confidence). Two global projections of climate change health \r\nimpacts have been conducted since AR5. The first focused on cause\u0002specific mortality for eight exposures for 2030 and 2050 for a mid\u0002range emissions scenario (A1b) and three scenarios of economic growth \r\n(WHO, 2014). The study estimated that the climate change projected \r\nto occur by 2050 (compared to 1961-1990) could result in an excess \r\nof approximately 250,000 deaths yr-1, dominated by increases in \r\ndeaths due to heat (94,000, mainly in Asia and high-income countries), \r\nchildhood undernutrition (85,000, mainly in Africa but also in Asia), \r\nmalaria (33,000, mainly in Africa) and diarrhoeal disease (33,000, mainly \r\nin Africa and Asia). Overall, more than half of this excess mortality is \r\nprojected for Africa. Near-term projections (for 2030) are predominantly \r\nfor childhood undernutrition (95,200 out of 241,000 total excess deaths) \r\n(Figure  7.8). The second study (Carleton et  al"


id: accda2ac112e74084fe699a6562943f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24733
content:
" 2020) focused on all\u0002cause mortality associated with warming under both a high emissions \r\nscenario (RCP8.5) and a middle emissions scenario (RCP4.5). The \r\nanalyses created a metric of death equivalents that accounted for hot \r\nand cold temperature-related mortality and the costs of individual level \r\nadaptation; no acclimatization or community-level adaptation, such as \r\nearly warning systems, were incorporated. Average annual temperature\u0002mortality-income per capita relationships estimated from pooled data \r\nfrom 40 predominantly middle- and high-income countries (38% of the \r\nworld population) were applied worldwide. Under the high emissions \r\nscenario, climate change was projected to result in approximately 85 \r\ndeaths equivalents per 100,000 population."


id: 5b25bb3c05274fab0463ee2e989bd1bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11848
content:
"Comparisons of heatwave exposure for 1.5degC and 2.0degC warming \r\nfor different SSPs indicate strong geographical contrasts in potential \r\nheatwave risk (high confidence). One global level assessment for a \r\n1.5degC warming projects that low human development index countries \r\nwill experience exposure levels equal to or greater than the exposure \r\nlevels for very high human development index countries under a 2degC \r\nwarming (Russo, 2019). The same assessment also finds that holding \r\nglobal warming below 1.5degC in tandem with achieving sustainable \r\nsocioeconomic development (e.g., SSP1 as opposed to SSP4) yields \r\nreduced levels of heatwave exposure, especially for low human \r\ndevelopment index countries, particularly across sub-Saharan Africa. \r\nSimilar findings were found in other global level assessments. Global \r\nexposure to extreme heat increases almost 30  times under a SSP3-\r\n8"


id: c2481ddff52026342b5673a5114850f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28150
content:
"5 combination, with the average exposure for Africa 118  times \r\ngreater than historical levels, in stark contrast to the four-fold increase \r\nprojected for Europe. Compared to a SSP3-8.5 scenario, exposure was \r\nreduced by 65% and 85% under the SSP2-4.5 and SSP1-2.6 scenarios, \r\nrespectively (Liu et al., 2017)."


id: 2f5d73240cf592abfa88c473bdff65e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4872
content:
"Population heat exposure will increase under climate change \r\n(very high confidence). Since AR5 there has been considerable \r\nprogress with quantifying future human exposure to extreme heat \r\n(Schwingshackl et  al., 2021), especially as determined by different \r\ncombinations of SSPs and RCPs (Chambers, 2020; Cheng et  al., \r\n2020; Jones et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2017; Ma and Yuan, 2021; Russo \r\net al., 2019). For example, Table 7.1 shows projections of population \r\nexposure to heatwaves, as expressed by the number of person-days, \r\nfor the 2061-2080 period aggregated by geographical region and \r\nSSP/RCP. At the global level, projected future exposure increases \r\nfrom approximately 15 million person-days for the current period to \r\n535 billion person-days for high population growth under the high \r\nGHG emission SSP3-RCP8.5 scenario, while for the low population \r\ngrowth/high urbanisation and business as usual SSP5-RCP4"


id: d4a7bc8c415e7eba34b36038ee383a08
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30982
content:
"5 \r\nscenario, the exposure is substantially lower at 170 billion person\u0002days. Spatial variations in future heatwave frequency and population \r\ngrowth play out in the form of significant geographical contrasts in \r\nexposure, with the largest increases projected for low latitude regions \r\nsuch as India and significant portions of sub-Saharan Africa, where \r\nincreases in heatwave frequency and population are expected. Over \r\nEast Asia and especially eastern China, exposures are projected to \r\nrise, with the effect of increases in heatwave frequency exceeding \r\nthe countering effect of projected reductions in population, especially \r\nin non-urban areas. Further, for North America and Europe, where \r\nrural depopulation is projected, the predominant driver of increases \r\nin exposure is urban growth (Jones et al., 2018)."


id: cbe68fa533fc2c0fc1de1f890191140b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29618
content:
"Regional level assessments of changes in population heat exposure for \r\nAfrica, Europe, the USA, China and India corroborate general findings \r\nat the global level, that the impact of warming is amplified under \r\ndivergent regional development pathways (e.g., SSP4 - inequality) \r\ncompared to those fostering sustainable development (e.g., SSP1 - \r\nsustainability) (high confidence) (Rohat et  al., 2019a; Weber et  al., \r\n2020; Broadbent et al., 2020; Dahl et al., 2019; Harrington and Otto, \r\n2018; Rohat et al., 2019b; Vahmani et al., 2019; Huang and et al., 2018; \r\nZhang et al., 2020a; Liu et al., 2017). For some regions, such as Europe, \r\nchanges in exposure are projected to be largely a consequence of \r\nclimate change, while for others, such as Africa and to a lesser extent \r\nAsia, Oceania, North America and South America, the interactive effects \r\nof demographic and climate change are projected to be important \r\n(Jones et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2017; Russo et al"


id: b5b65044d7bef6a80583cd6a5bbcf2be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26117
content:
"A particular focus since AR5 has been the impact of climate change \r\non cities (see AR6 Chapter 6). Heat risks are expected to be greater \r\nin urban areas due to changes in regional heat exacerbated by 'heat \r\nisland' effects (high confidence) (Doan and Kusaka, 2018; Heaviside \r\net al., 2016; Li et al., 2021; Rohat et al., 2019a; Rohat et al., 2019c; \r\nVarquez et  al., 2020; Wouters et  al., 2017; Zhao et  al., 2021), with \r\nintra-urban scale variations in heat exposure attributable to land cover \r\ncontrasts and urban form and function (Avashia et  al., 2021; Jang \r\net  al., 2020; Macintyre et  al., 2018; Schinasi et  al., 2018). However, \r\nfurther research is required to establish the health implications of \r\nincreasing chronic slow-onset extreme heat (Oppermann et al., 2021) \r\nin addition to the acute health outcomes of UHI-heatwave synergies \r\nunder climate change"


id: cc015e16a9d50ce3236802335e61ed97
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29643
content:
" The latter is particularly important as studies \r\nthat address UHI-heatwave interactions have mainly focused on \r\nchanges in UHI intensity (e.g., Ramamurthy and Bou-Zeid (2017); Scott \r\net al. (2018)). Whether significant urban mortality anomalies arise from \r\nthe interplay of heatwaves and UHIs largely remains an open question \r\nalthough at least one study demonstrated higher urban compared \r\nto rural mortality rates during heatwaves (Ruuhela et al., 2021). The \r\nbenefits of the winter UHI effect for cold-related mortality remain \r\nlargely unexplored, but one study for Birmingham, UK, indicates the \r\nwinter UHI will continue to have a protective effect in future climate \r\n(Macintyre et al., 2021)."


id: 46eaf002499e23df2dd845323c70aa00
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8542
content:
"Estimates of future mortality that incorporate adaptation in addition to \r\ntemperature change point to increases in heat-related mortality under \r\nglobal warming, albeit at lower levels than the case of no adaptation \r\n(high confidence) (Anderson et  al., 2018; Gosling et  al., 2017; Guo \r\net al., 2018; Honda and Onozuka, 2020; Vicedo-Cabrera et al., 2018b; \r\nWang et  al., 2018b). Whether adaptation is considered or not, the \r\nconsensus is Central and South America, southern Europe, southern \r\nand Southeast Asia and Africa will be the most affected by climate \r\nchange in terms of heat-related mortality (high confidence). Similarly, \r\nprojections of the impacts of future heat on occupational health, worker \r\nproductivity and workability point to these regions as problematic \r\nunder climate change (high confidence) (Andrews et al., 2018; de Lima \r\net al., 2021; Dillender, 2021; Kjellstrom et al., 2018; Orlov et al., 2020; \r\nRao et  al., 2020; Tigchelaar et  al"


id: 3525885cb8636be8db47daae9c6e0f0e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5771
content:
", 2020), especially for occupations \r\nwith high exposure to heat, such as agriculture and construction. This \r\naccords with the findings from independent projections of population \r\nheat exposure as outlined above (high confidence)."


id: 2272265607bedf44a3d119ad83bcac0b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2867
content:
"Climate change can be expected to continue to contribute to the \r\ngeographical spread of the Lyme disease vector Ixodes scapularis \r\n(high confidence) and the spread of tick-borne encephalitis and \r\nLyme disease vector Ixodes ricinus in Europe (medium confidence). \r\nIn Canada, vector surveillance of the black-legged tick I. scapularis\r\nidentified strong temperature effects on the limits of their occurrence, \r\non recent geographic spread, temporal coincidence in emergence of \r\ntick populations and acceleration of the speed of spread (Clow et al., \r\n2017; Cheng et al., 2017). In Europe, increasing temperatures over the \r\n1950-2018 period significantly accelerated the life cycle of Ixodes \r\nricinus and contributed to its spread (Estrada-Pena and Fernandez\u0002Ruiz, 2020). Under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 scenarios, projections indicate a \r\nnorthward and eastward shift of the distribution of I. persulcatus and I"


id: bf521425d40d204f6b712110e97d673c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27652
content:
" \r\nricinus, vectors of Lyme disease and tick-borne encephalitis in northern \r\nEurope and Russia, with an overall large increase in distribution in \r\nthe second half of the current century (Popov and Yasyukevich, 2014; \r\nYasjukevich et  al., 2018) and increases in intensity of tick-borne \r\nencephalitis transmission in central Europe (Nah et al., 2020)."


id: 5b0de2b68de41b0e655f74917e82a9cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11838
content:
"Rising temperatures are likely to cause poleward shifts and overall \r\nexpansion in the distribution of mosquitoes Aedes aegypti and Aedes \r\nalbopictus, the principal vectors of dengue, yellow fever, chikungunya \r\nand Zika (high confidence). Globally, the population exposed to \r\ndisease transmission by one of these vectors is expected to increase \r\nsignificantly due to the combination of climate change and non-climatic \r\nprocesses including urbanisation and socioeconomic inter-connectivity, \r\nwith exposure rates rising under higher warming scenarios (Kamal \r\net al., 2018; Kraemer et al., 2019). For example, approximately 50% of \r\nthe global population is projected to be exposed to these vectors by \r\n2050 under RCP6.0 (Kraemer et al., 2019). The effect of climate change \r\nalone is projected to increase the population exposed to Aedes aegypti\r\nby 8-12% by 2061-2080 (Monaghan et al., 2018), and its abundance \r\nis projected to increase by 20% under RCP2.6 and 30% under RCP8"


id: 3c4882c25075ac4c3cf855631c576839
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6850
content:
"5 \r\nby the end of the century (Liu-Helmersson et al., 2019; Figure 7.10).\r\nExposure to transmission by Aedes albopictus specifically would be \r\nhighest at intermediate climate change scenarios and would decrease \r\nin the warmest scenarios (Ryan et al., 2019). Under scenarios other \r\nthan RCP2.6, most of Europe would experience significant increases in \r\nexposure to viruses transmitted by both vectors (Liu-Helmersson et al., \r\n2019)."


id: 5f1d54eca90a43e1aede15d4cd127d63
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12517
content:
"Climate change is expected to increase dengue risk and facilitate \r\nits global spread, with the risk being greatest under high emissions \r\nscenarios (high confidence). Future exposure to risk will be influenced \r\nby the combined effects of climate change and non-climatic factors \r\nsuch as population density and economic development (Akter et al., \r\n2017). Overall, risk levels are expected to rise on all continents (Akter \r\net  al., 2017; Messina et  al., 2015; Rogers, 2015; Liu-Helmersson \r\net al., 2016; Messina et al., 2019). Compared to 2015, an additional \r\n1  billion people are projected to be at risk of dengue exposure by \r\n2080 under an SSP1-4.5 scenario, 2.25  billion under SSP2-6.0, and \r\n5 billion under SSP3-8.5 (Messina et al., 2019). In North America, risk \r\nis projected to expand in north-central Mexico, with annual dengue \r\nincidence in Mexico increasing by up to 40% by 2080, and expand \r\nfrom US southern states to mid-western regions (Proestos et al"


id: 9f9d799cfaf76bdc0f10f5f0dba4839a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22653
content:
", 2015; \r\nColon-Gonzalez et al., 2013). In China, under RCP8.5, dengue exposure \r\nwould increase from 168 million people in 142 counties to 490 million \r\npeople in 456 counties by the late 2100s (Fan and Liu, 2019). In Nepal, \r\ndengue fever is expected to expand throughout the 2050s and 2070s \r\nunder all RCPs (Acharya et al., 2018). In Tanzania, there is a projected \r\nshift in distribution towards central and northeastern areas and risk \r\nintensification in nearly all parts of the country by 2050 (Mweya et al., \r\n2016). Dengue vectorial capacity is projected to increase in Korea \r\nunder higher RCP scenarios (Lee et al., 2018a)."


id: 16188b4506649e83d1d0ac0eac180b75
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 995
content:
"Climate change is projected to change the distribution of schistosomiasis \r\nin Africa and Asia (high confidence), with a possible increase in global \r\nland area suitable for transmission (medium confidence). A global \r\nincrease in land area with temperatures suitable for transmission \r\nby the three main species of Schistosoma (S. japonicum, S. mansoni\r\nand S. haematobium) is projected under the RCP4.5 scenario for the \r\n2021-2050 and 2071-2100 periods (Yang and Bergquist, 2018), but \r\nregional outcomes are expected to vary. In Africa, shifting temperature \r\nregimes associated with climate change are expected to lead to \r\nreduced snail populations in areas with already high temperatures and \r\nhigher populations in areas with currently low winter temperatures \r\n(Kalinda et al., 2017; McCreesh and Booth, 2014)"


id: 217f0a01f31304558aaee56df273e77d
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2692
content:
" Infection risk with \r\nSchistosoma mansoni may increase by up to 20% over most of eastern \r\nAfrica over the next 20-50 years but decrease by more than 50% in \r\nparts of north and east Kenya, southern South Sudan and eastern \r\nPeople's Democratic Republic of Congo (PDRC) (McCreesh et  al., \r\n2015), with a possible overall net contraction (Stensgaard et al., 2013). \r\nIn China, currently endemic areas in Sichuan Province may become \r\nunsuitable for snail habitats, but currently non-endemic areas in \r\nSichuan and Hunan/Hubei provinces may see a new emergence (Yang \r\nand Bergquist, 2018). In addition to the projected effects of temperature "


id: afc17aee2867cd5ab096770a2f856b40
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25170
content:
"Climate change will contribute to additional deaths and mortality \r\ndue to diarrhoeal diseases in the absence of adaptation (medium \r\nconfidence) (see Figure  7.8). Risk factors for future excess deaths \r\ndue to diarrhoeal diseases are highly mediated by future levels of \r\nsocioeconomic development and adaptation. An additional 1degC \r\nincrease in mean average temperature is expected to result in a 7% \r\n(95% CI, 3-10%) increase in all-cause diarrhoea (Carlton et al., 2016), \r\nan 8% (95% CI, 5-11%) increase in the incidence of diarrheic E. coli \r\n(Philipsborn et al., 2016) and a 3-11% increase in deaths attributable \r\nto diarrhoea (WHO, 2014)"


id: 7b9532b2fdc65351f5056a93c462b1c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17040
content:
" WHO Quantitative Risk Assessments for the \r\neffects of climate change on selected causes of death for the 2030s \r\nand 2050s project that overall deaths from diarrhoea should fall due \r\nto socioeconomic development but that the effect of climate change \r\nunder higher emission scenarios could cause an additional 48,000 \r\ndeaths in children aged under 15  years in 2030 and 33,000 deaths \r\nfor 2050, particularly in Africa and parts of Asia. In Ecuador, projected \r\nincreases in rainfall variability and heavy rainfall events may increase \r\ndiarrhoea burden in urban regions (Deshpande et al., 2020). A limit in \r\nthe assessable literature is a lack of studies in the highest risk areas \r\n(Liang and Gong, 2017; UNEP, 2018)."


id: cb4d1afac7099f091f29f2b250c90f96
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29538
content:
"Poor air quality contributes to a range of NCDs, including cardiovascular, \r\nrespiratory and neurological, commonly resulting in hospitalisation or \r\ndeath. This section considers the possible risks for health of future \r\nclimate-related changes in ozone and PM. The climate penalty, the \r\ndegree to which global warming could affect future air quality, is better \r\nunderstood for ozone than for PM (von Schneidemesser et al., 2020). \r\nThis is because increases in air temperature enhance ozone formation \r\nvia associated photochemical processes (Archibald et al., 2020; Fu and \r\nTian, 2019). The association between climate and PM is complex and \r\nmoderated by a diverse range of PM components as well as formation \r\nand removal mechanisms (von Schneidemesser et  al., 2020), added \r\nto which is uncertainty about future climate-related PM sources such \r\nas wildfires (Ford et al., 2018) and changes in aridity (Achakulwisut \r\net al., 2019)"


id: e55b3ad86dbc807a4d953eaaf6187e84
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33580
content:
" As noted in AR6 WGI Chapter 6 (Naik et al 2021), future \r\nair quality will largely depend on precursor emissions, with climate \r\nchange projected to have mixed effects. Because of the uncertainty \r\nin how natural processes will respond, there is low confidence in the \r\nprojections of surface ozone and PM under climate change (Naik \r\net al., 2021). This has implications on the levels of confidence in the \r\nprojections of the health climate penalty associated with climate\u0002induced changes in air quality (Orru et al., 2017; Orru et al., 2019; Silva \r\net al., 2017)."


id: adc3db6232bd3844e2d32f5ec2265cb8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24876
content:
"The risk of Campylobacteriosis and other enteric pathogens could rise \r\nin regions where heavy precipitation events or flooding are projected to \r\nincrease (medium confidence). In Europe, the risk of Campylobacteriosis \r\nand diseases caused by other enteric pathogens could rise in regions \r\nwhere precipitation or extreme flooding are projected to increase \r\n(European Environment Agency, 2017), although incidence rates may \r\nbe further mediated by seasonal social activities (Rushton et al., 2019; \r\nWilliams et  al., 2015b). Accelerated releases of dissolved organic \r\nmatter to inland and coastal waters through increases in precipitation \r\nare expected to reduce the potential for solar ultraviolet inactivation of \r\npathogens and increase risks for associated WBDs (Williamson et al., \r\n2017). The combined relative risk for waterborne campylobacteriosis, \r\nsalmonellosis and diseases due to Verotoxin-producing Escherichia coli\r\nwas estimated to be 1.1 (i.e"


id: 36f8a961b9d99982632e837267ece2ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6040
content:
", a 10% increase) for every 1degC in mean \r\nannual temperature, while by the 2080s, under RCP8.5, annual rates of "


id: 648d7b9ff8f44b009e8dd761ab4ca0ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13387
content:
"Comparatively few studies assess how changes in air pollution \r\ndirectly attributable to climate change are likely to affect future \r\nmortality levels. Projections indicate that emission reduction scenarios \r\nconsistent with stabilisation of global temperature change at 2degC or \r\nbelow would yield substantial co-benefits for air quality-related health \r\noutcomes (Chowdhury et al., 2018b; von Schneidemesser et al., 2020; \r\nSilva et al., 2016c; Markandya et al., 2018; Orru et al., 2019; Shindell \r\net  al., 2018) (high confidence). For example, by 2030, compared to \r\n2000, it was estimated that globally and annually 289,000 PM2.5-\r\nrelated premature deaths could have been avoided under RCP4.5 \r\ncompared to 17,200 PM2.5-related excess premature deaths under \r\nRCP8.5 (Silva et al., 2016c). Further, and notwithstanding estimated \r\nreductions in global PM2"


id: ef851c8146ec8a2c45111c5a93e017fe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 35175
content:
"5 levels and an associated increase in the \r\nnumber of avoidable deaths, the benefits of following a low emissions \r\npathway are expected to be apparent by 2100, with avoidable deaths \r\nestimated at 2.39 million deaths yr-1 under RCP4.5. This contrasts with \r\nthe 1.31  million deaths estimated under RCP8.5. A few projections \r\nof the health-related climate penalty indicate a possible increase in \r\nozone and PM2.5-associated mortality under RCP8.5 (Doherty et al., \r\n2017; Orru et al., 2019; Silva et al., 2017)."


id: 6d1618e3623526abb5130138df41692c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14787
content:
"Complementing the longer-term changes in air quality arising from \r\nclimate change are those associated with air pollution sensitive short\u0002term meteorological events, such as heatwaves. Studies of individual \r\nheat events (Garrido-Perez et al., 2019; Johansson et al., 2020; Kalisa \r\net al., 2018; Pu et al., 2017; Pyrgou et al., 2018; Schnell and Prather, \r\n2017; Varotsos et al., 2019) and systematic reviews (Anenberg et al., \r\n2020) provide evidence for synergistic effects of heat and air pollution. \r\nHowever, the health consequences of a possible additive effect of air \r\npollutants during heatwave events were heterogeneous, varying by \r\nlocation and moderated by socioeconomic factors at the intra-urban \r\nscale (Analitis et al., 2014; Fenech et al., 2019; Krug et al., 2020; Pascal \r\net al., 2021; Schwarz et al., 2021; Scortichini et al., 2018)"


id: 598aadd2f07a33d71c3e02aae4505d12
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11584
content:
" This, combined \r\nwith the challenges associated with projecting future concentrations \r\nof health-relevant pollutants during heatwave events (Jahn and Hertig, \r\n2021; Meehl et al., 2018), makes it difficult to say with any certainty \r\nthat synergistic effects of heat and poor air quality will result in a \r\nheatwave-air pollution health penalty under climate change."


id: 94245a65c182a75094c7fd5a81ebbdd3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20819
content:
"At the global level for PM2.5, annual premature deaths due to \r\nclimate change were projected to be 55,600 (-34,300 to 164,000) \r\nand 215,000 (-76,100 to 595,000) in 2030 and 2100, respectively, \r\ncountering by 16% the projected decline in PM2.5-related mortality \r\nbetween 2000 and 2100 without climate change (Silva et al., 2017). \r\nSimilarly for ozone, the number of annual premature ozone-related \r\ndeaths due to climate change was projected to be 3,340 in 2030 and \r\n43,600 in 2050, with climate change accounting for 1.2% (14%) of \r\nthe annual premature deaths in 2030 (2100) (Silva et al., 2017). These \r\nglobal level projections average over considerable geographical \r\nvariations (Silva et al., 2017). Projections of the climate change effect \r\non ozone mortality in 2100 were greatest for East Asia (41 deaths \r\nyr-1 per million people), India (8 deaths yr-1 per million people) \r\nand North America (13 deaths yr-1 per million people). For PM2"


id: 551c5e9201b87d8becfb93f591d2e91a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10851
content:
"5, \r\nmortality was projected to increase across all regions except Africa \r\n(-25,200 deaths yr-1 per million people) by 2100, with estimated \r\nincreases greatest for India (40 deaths yr-1 per million people), the \r\nMiddle East (45 deaths yr-1 per million people), East Asia (43 deaths \r\nyr-1 per million people) and the Former Soviet Union (57 deaths yr-1\r\nper million people). Overall, higher ozone-related health burdens \r\nwere projected to occur in highly populated regions, and greater \r\nPM2.5 health burdens were projected in high PM emission regions \r\n(Doherty et al., 2017)."


id: 15f6e1f431955a691c5a03b3d32dce8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 979
content:
"The burden of disease associated with aeroallergens is anticipated to \r\ngrow due to climate change (high confidence). The incidence of pollen \r\nallergy and associated allergic disease increases with pollen exposure, \r\nand the timing of the pollen season and pollen concentrations are \r\nexpected to change under climate change (Beggs, 2021; Ziska et al., \r\n2019; Ziska, 2020). The overall length of the pollen season and total \r\nseasonal pollen counts/concentrations for allergenic species such as \r\nbirch (Betula) and ragweed (Ambrosia) are expected to increase as a \r\nresult of CO2 fertilisation and warming, leading to greater sensitisation \r\n(Hamaoui-Laguel et al., 2015; Lake et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2013). \r\nChanges in pollen levels for several species of trees and grasses are \r\nprojected to increase annual emergency department visits in the USA \r\nby between 8% for RCP4.5 and 14% for RCP8.5 by the year 2090 \r\n(Neumann et  al"


id: d4f652b3a7fd6961f3e9facb6465a01a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
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vector_id: 31037
content:
", 2019) with the exposure to some pollen types \r\nestimated to double beyond present levels in Europe by 2041-2060 \r\n(Lake et al., 2017). The prospect of increases in summer thunderstorm \r\nevents under climate change (Brooks, 2013) may hold implications \r\nfor changes in the occurrence of epidemic thunderstorm asthma \r\n(Bannister et  al., 2021; Emmerson et  al., 2021; Price et  al., 2021). \r\nSimilarly, projected alterations in hydroclimate under climate change \r\nmay bear implications for increased exposure to mould allergens in \r\nsome climates (D'Amato et al., 2020; Paudel et al., 2021)."


id: 673f61dd6b36fdf86496d5c221118855
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:21
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13839
content:
"could increase by an average of 18.4%, 47.8% and 69.0% in the \r\n2020s, 2050s and 2080s, respectively, under RCP4.5 and by 16.6%, \r\n73.8% and 134%, respectively, under RCP8.5 relative to a 1980s \r\nbaseline (Li et al., 2015). Projections of temperature-related mortality \r\nfrom CVD for Beijing in the 2080s vary depending on RCP and \r\npopulation assumptions (Zhang et al., 2018a). Projections for Ningo, \r\nChina, suggest heat-related years of life lost (YLL) could increase \r\nsignificantly in the month of August by between 3 and 11.5 times \r\nover current baselines by the 2070s, even with adaptation (Huang \r\nand et  al., 2018). Yang and colleagues project that heat-related \r\nexcess CVD mortality in China could increase to approximately 6% \r\n(from a 2010 baseline of under 2%) by the end of the century under \r\nRCP8.5 and to over 3% under RCP4.5 (Yang et al., 2021)"


id: 99460cd7efaf7b1e64f5896e761299cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21627
content:
" The future \r\nburden of temperature-related myocardial infarctions in Germany is \r\nprojected to rise under high emissions scenarios (Chen et al., 2019), \r\nwhile in the eastern USA, Limaye et al. (2018) projected an additional \r\n11,562 annual deaths (95% CI: 2,641-20,095) by mid-century due to \r\ncardiovascular stress in the population 65 years of age and above. \r\nCVD mortality in Brazil is projected to increase up to 8.6% by the end \r\nof the century under RCP8.5, compared with an increase of 0.7% for \r\nRCP4.5 (Silveira et al., 2021a)."


id: d655b5be5a064702014be3ce90901664
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31239
content:
"It is important to note that the assessed studies typically take an \r\nobserved epidemiological relationship and apply future temperature \r\nprojections (often derived from regional climate projections) to \r\nthese relationships. Because the relationships between temperature \r\nand CVD deaths are influenced by both climatic and non-climatic \r\nfactors (such as population fitness and aging), future projections are \r\nhighly sensitive to assumptions about interactions between climate, \r\npopulation characteristics and adaptation pathways. Changes in air \r\nquality because of climate change are an additional important factor. \r\nFor example, an assessment of future annual and seasonal excess \r\nmortality from short-term exposure to higher levels of ambient \r\nozone in Chinese cities under RCP8.5 projected approximately 1,500 \r\nexcess annual CVD deaths in 2050 (Chen et al., 2018)"


id: f7b61d6cc62950b9540af4f3fb3b7529
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36491
content:
" To the extent \r\npossible, the relationships reported above reflect changes derived from \r\nchanges in heat exposure driven by climate change and not changes in \r\npopulation demographics or air pollution exposure."


id: 7ca71e1e3de0888b439b12a6e4e3b382
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17211
content:
"Climate change could further limit equitable access to affordable, \r\nculturally acceptable, and healthy diets (high confidence). Climate \r\nimpacts on agricultural production and regional food availability will \r\naffect the composition of diets, which can have major consequences for \r\nhealth. Variable by region and context, healthy diets are an outcome \r\nof the four inter-connected domains of sustainable food systems, \r\nnamely ecosystems, society, economics and health (Drewnowski et al., \r\n2020; Fanzo et  al., 2020). Climate change limits the potential for \r\nhealthy diets through adverse impacts on natural and human systems \r\nthat are disproportionately experienced by low-income countries \r\nand communities (FAO et al., 2021). Climate-driven droughts, floods, \r\nstorms, wildfires and extreme temperatures reduce food production \r\npotential by diminishing soil health, water security and biological and \r\ngenetic diversity (Macdiarmid and Whybrow, 2019)"


id: e4b95596ae5a98d28853c0dbcae08fb0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33463
content:
" Models project \r\nthat climate-related reductions in food availability, specifically fruit \r\nand vegetables, could result in an additional 529,000 deaths a year by \r\n2050 (Springmann et al., 2016b)."


id: cca1af6cb899fae3870304ed9fd36062
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29733
content:
"The nutritional density, including protein content, micronutrients and \r\nB-vitamins, of wheat, rice, barley and other important food crops is \r\nnegatively affected by higher CO2 concentrations (very high confidence) \r\n(Mbow, 2019 ; Smith and Myers, 2018). Projections indicate negative \r\nimpacts on human nutrition by rising CO2 concentrations by mid- to \r\nlate-century (Medek et al., 2017; Smith and Myers, 2018; Weyant et al., \r\n2018; Zhu et al., 2018; Beach et al., 2019). Staple crops are projected to \r\nhave protein and mineral concentrations decreased by 5-15% and B \r\nvitamins up to 30% when the concentrations of CO2 double above pre\u0002industrial levels (Ebi and Loladze, 2019; Beach et al., 2019; Smith and \r\nMyers, 2018). Without changes in diets and accounting for nutrient \r\ndeclines in staple crops, a projected additional 175  million people \r\ncould be zinc deficient and an additional 122  million people could \r\nbecome protein deficient (Smith and Myers, 2018). Weyant et al"


id: b77e0923cb4b9234722d8f63a2ad9ef5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26393
content:
" (2018) \r\nprojected that CO2-related reductions in crop zinc and iron levels \r\ncould result in 125.8 million DALYs lost globally, with Southeast Asian \r\nand sub-Saharan African countries most affected. Zhu et  al. (2018) \r\nestimated 600 million people at risk from reductions in the protein, \r\nmicronutrient and B-vitamin content of widely grown rice cultivars in \r\nSoutheast Asia."


id: 3e1f835038c8c2b0c6f39cc8228b9f5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7140
content:
"Climate change is expected to have adverse impacts on well-being, \r\nsome of which will become serious enough to threaten mental health \r\n(very high confidence). However, changes (Hayes and Poland, 2018) in \r\nextreme events due to climate change, including floods (Baryshnikova, \r\n2019), droughts (Carleton, 2017) and hurricanes (Kessler et al., 2008; \r\nBoscarino et al., 2013, Boscarino et al., 2017; Obradovich et al., 2018), \r\nwhich are projected to increase due to climate change, directly worsen \r\nmental health and well-being and increase anxiety (high confidence). \r\nProjections suggest that sub-Saharan African children and adolescents, \r\nparticularly girls, are extremely vulnerable to negative direct and \r\nindirect impacts on their mental health and well-being (Atkinson and \r\nBruce, 2015; Owen et al., 2016)"


id: 8de88a3180cda1d6fce87e278e7dc85b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19858
content:
" The direct risks are greatest for people \r\nwith existing mental disorders, physical injuries, and compromised \r\nrespiratory, cardiovascular and reproductive systems, with indirect \r\nimpacts potentially arising from displacement, migration, famine and \r\nmalnutrition, degradation or destruction of health and social care \r\nsystems, conflict, and climate-related economic and social losses (high \r\nto very high confidence) (Burke et al., 2018; Curtis et al., 2017; Hayes \r\net al., 2018; Serdeczny et al., 2017; Watts et al., 2019). Demographic \r\nfactors increasing vulnerability include age, gender and low \r\nsocioeconomic status, though the effect of these will vary depending \r\non the specific manifestation of climate change; overall, climate change \r\nis predicted to increase inequality in mental health across the globe \r\n(Cianconi et  al., 2020). Based on evidence assessed in Section  7"


id: 1a1ea7a33eb6ac5e88f1bb54fbf5838
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1573
content:
"2, \r\nfuture direct impacts of increased heat risks and associated illnesses \r\ncan be expected to have negative implications for mental health and \r\nwell-being, with outcomes being highly mediated by adaptation, but \r\nthere are no assessable studies that quantify such risks. There may \r\nbe some benefits to mental health and well-being associated with "


id: 6b14f72b922e3eeba8a917bf013dd63
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14464
content:
"Human behaviours and systems will be disrupted by climate change \r\nin a myriad of ways, and the potential consequences for mental \r\nhealth and well-being are correspondingly large in number and \r\ncomplex in mechanism (high confidence). For example, climate \r\nchange may alter human physical activity and mobility patterns, in \r\nturn producing alterations in the mental health statuses promoted by \r\nregular physical activity (Obradovich and Fowler, 2017; Obradovich \r\nand Rahwan, 2019). Climate change may affect labour capacity, \r\nbecause heat can compromise the ability to engage in manual labour \r\nas well as cognitive functioning, with impacts on the economic \r\nstatus of individual households as well as societies (Kjellstrom \r\net  al., 2016; Liu, 2020). Migrations and displacement caused by \r\nclimate change may worsen the well-being of those affected (Vins \r\net  al., 2015; Missirian and Schlenker, 2017)"


id: 607aaf5090c8d816bdee806bd42e5ffe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12750
content:
" Climate change is \r\nexpected to increase aggression through both direct and indirect \r\nmechanisms, with one study predicting a 6% increase in homicides \r\nglobally for a 1degC temperature increase, although noting significant \r\nvariability across countries (Mares and Moffett, 2016). Broad \r\nsocietal outcomes such as economic unrest, political conflict or \r\ngovernmental dysfunction assessed in Section 7.3.5 may undermine \r\nthe mental health of populations in the future (medium confidence). \r\nFood insecurity presents its own severe risks for mental health and \r\ncognitive function (Jones, 2017)."


id: 86015c48131f03bc03ed1a3c770ca20
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18618
content:
"In low-lying coastal areas of most regions, future increases in mean \r\nsea levels will amplify the impacts of coastal hazards on settlements, \r\nincluding erosion, inland penetration of storm surges and groundwater \r\ncontamination by salt water, and eventually lead to inundation of very \r\nlow-lying coastal settlements (high confidence) (Diaz, 2016; Hauer \r\net al., 2016; Neumann et al., 2015; Rahman et al., 2019; IPCC, 2019a).\r\nProjections of the number of people at risk of future displacement by \r\nsea level rise range from tens of millions to hundreds of millions by the \r\nend of this century, depending on (a) the sea level rise scenario or RCP \r\nselected, (b) projections of future population growth in exposed areas \r\nand (c) the criteria used for identifying exposure"


id: 30c5cf42dd95373bb237bcf4ef29c4d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
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vector_id: 5096
content:
" These latter measures \r\ncan include estimates of populations situated within selected elevations \r\nabove sea level (with 1 m, 2 m and 10 m being common parameters), \r\npopulations situated in 1-in-100  year floodplains or populations in \r\nareas likely to be entirely inundated under specific RCPs (Neumann \r\net al., 2015; Hauer et al., 2016; Merkens et al., 2018; McMichael et al., \r\n2020; Hooijer and Vernimmen, 2021). As an illustrative example, an \r\nestimated 267 million people (error range = 197-347 million at 68% \r\nconfidence level) worldwide lived within 2 m of sea level in 2020, 59% \r\nof whom reside in tropical regions of Asia (Hooijer and Vernimmen, \r\n2021). At a 1 m increase in sea level and holding coastal population \r\nnumbers constant, the number of people worldwide living within 2 m \r\nof sea level expands to 410 million (error range = 341-473 million)"


id: 2fcd3f4986bc62d65bee7deaa0c44fb0
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" \r\nHowever, it is unlikely that coastal population growth rates will remain \r\nconstant at global or regional scales in future decades. At present, \r\ncoastal cities in many regions have relatively high rates of population \r\ngrowth due to the combined effects of in-migration from other regions \r\nand natural increase, with coastal areas of Africa having the highest \r\nprojected future population growth rates (Neumann et  al., 2015; \r\nHooijer and Vernimmen, 2021; Box 7.5). Further complicating future \r\nestimates is that many large coastal cities are situated in deltas with \r\nhigh rates of subsidence, meaning that locally experienced changes in \r\nrelative sea level may be much greater than sea level rise attributable \r\nto climate change, thereby further increasing the number of people \r\nexposed (Edmonds et al., 2020; Nicholls et al., 2021)."


id: 506d269f0519ba5fd19c1f79f0bb96ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
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vector_id: 10101
content:
"Future changes in climate-related migration and displacement are \r\nexpected to vary by region and over time according to: (a) region-specific \r\nchanges in climatic drivers, (b) changes in the future adaptive capacity \r\nof exposed populations, (c) population growth in areas most exposed \r\nto climatic risks and (d) future changes in mediating factors such as \r\ninternational development and migration policies (high agreement, \r\nmedium evidence) (Gemenne and Blocher, 2017; Cattaneo et al., 2019; \r\nMcLeman, 2019). This section assesses future risks associated with \r\nchanges in the frequency and/or severity of storms, floods, droughts, \r\nextreme heat, wildfires and other events assessed in Section 7"


id: 9fa98424bb908a7b25d8891cd26a246f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
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content:
"2 that \r\ncurrently affect migration and displacement patterns, as well as the \r\nimpacts of emerging hazards, including average temperature increases \r\nthat may affect the habitability of settlements in arid regions and the \r\ntropics, and sea level rise and associated hazards that threaten low\u0002lying coastal settlements. Studies assessed here consider projected \r\nchanges in future exposure to hazards over a variety of geographical \r\nand temporal periods, with some considering changes in population \r\nnumbers in exposed areas. The uneven distribution of exposure of age \r\ncohorts is typically overlooked in existing research. For example, people \r\nyounger than age 10 in the year 2020 are projected to experience a \r\nnearly four-fold increase in extreme events under 1"


id: 48e160083cb84b88890646a4b0c51e7b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
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"5degC of global \r\nwarming and a five-fold increase under 3degC warming; such increases \r\nin exposure would not be experienced by a person of the age of 55 in \r\n2020 in their remaining lifetime under any warming scenario (Thiery \r\net al., 2021)."


id: 760ebae1aece43f269d41ef663120ae4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:22
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content:
"Increased frequency of extreme heat events and long-term increases \r\nin average temperatures pose future risks to the habitability of \r\nsettlements in tropical and subtropical regions, and may in the \r\nlong term affect migration patterns in exposed areas, especially \r\nunder high emissions scenarios (medium agreement, low evidence).\r\nGreater research into the specific dynamics between extreme heat \r\nand population movements is required in order to make an accurate \r\nassessment of this risk. Recent studies suggest that future increases \r\nin average temperatures could expose populations across wide areas \r\nof the tropics and subtropics to ambient temperatures for extended \r\nperiods each year that are beyond the threshold for human habitability \r\n(Pal and Eltahir, 2016; Im et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2020). This effect would \r\nbe amplified in urban settings where heat-island effects occur and \r\ncreate a heightened need for air conditioning and other adaptation \r\nmeasures"


id: 9bca8b80c9ca1e80075bd5c4481d2491
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" In addition to risks associated with average temperature \r\nchanges, Dosio et al. (2018) project that at 1.5degC warming, between \r\n9% and 18% of the global population will be regularly exposed to \r\nextreme heat events at least once in five years, with the exposure rate \r\nnearly tripling with 2degC warming. How these changes in exposure to \r\nhigh temperatures will affect future migration patterns, particularly \r\namong vulnerable groups, will depend heavily on future adaptation \r\nresponses (Horton and de Sherbinin, 2021). Multiple country-level "


id: 68710e865baec649e4e6ab3b8fc80539
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"tend to resist leaving exposed settlements until approximately 50% of \r\navailable land has been lost (Hauer et al., 2019). Movements away from \r\nhighly exposed areas may have longer-term demographic implications \r\nfor inland settlements (Hauer, 2017), but this requires further study. \r\nBased on the available empirical evidence, sea level rise does not \r\nappear to currently be a primary motivation for international migration \r\noriginating in small island states in the Indian and Pacific Oceans; \r\nrather, economic considerations and family reunification appear to be \r\nthe dominant drivers (McCubbin et al., 2015; Stojanov and Du, 2016; \r\nHeslin, 2019; Kelman et al., 2019). However, climatic drivers of migration \r\nare anticipated to take on a much greater causal role in migration \r\ndecisions in coming decades (Thomas et al., 2020) and may discourage \r\nreturn migration to small island states (van der Geest et  al., 2020)"


id: 2cfb643404dff65f460898c18acedc54
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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" \r\nEven under best-case sustainable development scenarios, rising sea \r\nlevels and associated hazards create risks of involuntary displacement \r\nin low-lying coastal areas and should be expected to generate a need \r\nfor organised relocation of populations where protective infrastructure \r\ncannot be constructed (Horton and de Sherbinin, 2021; Hamilton et al., \r\n2016). In high emissions scenarios, low-lying island states may face \r\nthe long-term risk of becoming uninhabitable, creating the potential \r\nfor a new phenomenon of climate-induced statelessness (Piguet, 2019; \r\nDesai et al., 2021)."


id: 7ad48708e6e1034dfc3ad58eb3265d4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 16916
content:
"Research reviewed in AR4 and AR5 observed that at higher rates \r\nof socioeconomic development, the in situ adaptive capacity of \r\nhouseholds and institutions rises, and climatic influences on migration \r\ncorrespondingly decline. Recent evidence adds further support for such \r\nconclusions (high confidence) (Kumar et al., 2018b; Mallick, 2019; Gray \r\net al., 2020; Box 7.5). Population growth rates are currently highest \r\nin low-income countries (UN DESA Population Division, 2019), many \r\nof which have high rates of exposure to climatic hazards associated \r\nwith population displacement, further emphasising the importance of \r\nsocioeconomic development and adaptive capacity-building. Although \r\ncountry-specific scenarios for socioeconomic development and \r\npopulation are embedded in SSPs, research into future migration flows \r\nunder climate change has not made great use of these"


id: f7224e8ec40757aab40edf9fb59d78c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" One of the few \r\nstudies to do so found that safe and orderly international migration \r\ntends to increase wealth at regional and global scales in all SSP \r\nnarratives, which in turn reduces income inequality between countries \r\n(Benveniste et  al., 2021). International barriers to safe and orderly \r\nmigration may potentially impede progress towards attainment of the \r\nobjectives described in the SDGs and increase exposure to climatic \r\nhazards in low- and middle-income countries (McLeman, 2019; \r\nBenveniste et al., 2020)."


id: 4bfaa1834c8767a413ee507492e886ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 9380
content:
"Only a very small number of studies have attempted to make systematic \r\nprojections of future regional or global migration and displacement \r\nnumbers under climate change. Key methodological challenges for \r\nmaking such projections include the availability of reliable data on \r\nmigration within and between countries, definitional ambiguity in \r\ndistinguishing climate-related migration from migration undertaken for \r\nother reasons, and accounting for the future influence of non-climatic \r\nfactors. The most reliable example of such studies to date is a World \r\nBank report by Rigaud et al. (2018) that generated projections of future \r\ninternal population displacements in south Asia, sub-Saharan Africa \r\nand Latin America by 2050 using multiple climate and development \r\nscenarios, resulting in a very large range of possible outcomes (from \r\n31 to 143 million people being displaced, depending on assumptions)"


id: e5ef94d91a596f7b2b494b76710526af
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 33669
content:
"Projections of future numbers of people exposed to climate change-related hazards described in this chapter and elsewhere in this \r\nreport are heavily influenced by assumptions about population change over time at global, regional and national scales. One challenge \r\nconcerns global and regional variability of baseline data for current populations, which is typically aggregated from national censuses \r\nthat vary considerably in terms of frequency, timing and reliability, especially in low-income countries. A number of gridded mapping \r\ndataset initiatives emerged in recent years to support population-environment modelling research at global and regional levels, common \r\nones being the Gridded Population of the World, the Global Rural Urban Mapping Project, and LandScan Global Population dataset \r\n(McMichael et al., 2020)"


id: 559b84177db72b5d123c3916c13e9cb7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 10950
content:
" For future population projections at national levels, researchers commonly draw upon data generated by the \r\nPopulation Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, which publishes periodic projections for future \r\nfertility, mortality, and international migration rates for over 200 countries, the most recent projections being for the 2020 to 2100 \r\nperiod (UN DESA Population Division, 2019). There have been debates among demographers regarding the precision of DESA projections, \r\nand whether these overestimate or underestimate future population growth in some regions (Ezeh et al., 2020). Population growth \r\nrates are highly influenced by socioeconomic conditions, meaning that future population levels at local, national and regional scales \r\nare likely to respond to relative rates of progress towards meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (Abel et al., 2016)"


id: 612458a05c35a85859ce71884ed0f2bd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 12859
content:
" The Shared \r\nSocioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) used in climate impacts and adaptation research include a variety of assumptions about future mortality, \r\nfertility and migration rates and provide a range of population growth scenarios that diverge after the year 2030 according to future \r\ndevelopment trajectories (Samir and Lutz, 2017) and are then further modified and downscaled by researchers for national-level studies. \r\nUnderstanding future risks of climate change will benefit from continued efforts by the international community to collect and share \r\ndata on observed population numbers and trends, and to work towards better projected data for population characteristics that strongly \r\ninfluence vulnerability to climate risks, such as gender, age and indigeneity."


id: 988bdbbc32ca8f959e9603f3e920b9f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21515
content:
"Climate change may increase susceptibility to violent conflict, primarily \r\nintra-state conflicts, by strengthening climate-sensitive drivers of \r\nconflict (medium confidence). Section  7.2.7 described how climate \r\nvariability and extremes affect violent conflict through food and water \r\ninsecurity, loss of income and loss of livelihoods. Risks are amplified \r\nby insecure land tenure, competing land uses and weather-sensitive \r\neconomic activities when they occur in the context of weak institutions \r\nand poor governance, poverty and inequality (Section  7.2.7). These \r\nknown, climate-sensitive risk factors allow projections of where \r\nconflict is more likely to arise or worsen under climate change impacts \r\n(see Chapters 1, 4, 5, 6 and 16) (Mach et al., 2020). However, there \r\nis also the potential for new causal pathways to emerge as climate \r\nchanges beyond the variability observed in available datasets and \r\nadaptation limits are met (Theisen, 2017; Mach et  al"


id: a83be680082d913ac67465e268f5ba9c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"There is little evidence of weather-related impacts on conflict risk or \r\nprevalence, but the region is under-studied in general (Wischnath and \r\nBuhaug, 2014; Nordqvist and Krampe, 2018). Climate stressors may \r\nhave contributed in part to local-level conflicts in Bangladesh and \r\nNepal (Sultana et al., 2019) and intensified water use conflict in peri\u0002urban areas (Roth et al., 2019). In the future there is the potential \r\nfor climate change to stretch the effectiveness of transboundary \r\nwater agreements by raising regional geopolitical tensions (Atef \r\net  al., 2019; Scott et  al., 2019) or to generate water use conflicts \r\nbetween hydropower and irrigation within countries (Jalilov et  al., \r\n2018). Climate change may have an impact on conflict by affecting \r\nfood security (Caruso et  al., 2016; Raghavan et  al., 2019)"


id: 2100572714ad24c948738bcf9ee4837e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" There \r\nmay be greater military involvement in humanitarian response to \r\ncyclones, flooding and to other impacts of climate change that might \r\ncontribute to increased instability (Pai, 2008; Busby and Krishnan, \r\n2017)."


id: 88ddd565472001e2a58c8ea2c2f4e5f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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"With proactive, timely and effective adaptation, many observed and \r\nprojected risks for human health and well-being, health systems \r\nand those associated with migration and conflict can be reduced \r\nor potentially avoided (high confidence). Given the key health risks \r\nidentified in this chapter, adaptation that increases resilience and \r\nsustainability will require moving beyond incremental adaptation to \r\nsustained, adaptive management (Ebi, 2011; Hess et al., 2012) with \r\nthe goal of transformative change for integrated protection of human, \r\nanimal and ecosystem health. This includes differentiating adaptation \r\nto climate variability from adaptation to climate change (Ebi and Hess, \r\n2020)"


id: d1564c2c450d054763e62223a1ffbf94
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" Health adaptation efforts are increasingly aiming to transition \r\nto building climate-resilient and environmentally sustainable health \r\nsystems (WHO, 2015b; WHO, 2020a) and healthcare facilities, \r\nemphasising service delivery including climate-informed health policies \r\nand programmes; management of the environmental determinants of \r\nhealth; emergency preparedness and management; health information \r\nsystems such as health and climate research, integrated risk monitoring \r\nand early warning systems; and vulnerability, capacity and adaptation \r\nassessments (Marinucci et al., 2014; Mousavi et al., 2020; WHO 2015a; \r\nCentres for Disease Control , 2019; WHO, 2020a)."


id: 16443151d6358973c07adcfa975d8b31
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"Increases in conflict-related deaths with climate change have been \r\nestimated but results are inconclusive (high agreement, medium \r\nevidence). Some studies attempted to attribute observed conflict \r\noutbreaks to changes in the physical environment and quantify future \r\nconflict risk associated with climate change (von Uexkull and Buhaug, \r\n2021; Theisen, 2017). Burke et al. (2015b) concluded that with each \r\none standard deviation increase in temperature, inter-personal conflict \r\nincreased by 2.4% and inter-group conflict by 11.3%. However, the \r\nstatistical methods have been criticised for under-representing the \r\nknown role that socioeconomic conditions and conflict history play \r\nin determining the prevalence of violence (Buhaug et al., 2014; van \r\nWeezel, 2019; Abel et  al., 2019). Forecasting armed conflict is used \r\nas a heuristic policy tool rather than a representation of the future \r\n(Cederman and Weidmann, 2017) and forecasts have limitations"


id: 98e5e64802db5388e5bb7be82d3cada5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" For \r\nexample, what constitutes and is experienced as hazards and as drivers \r\nof conflict will shift over time as societies adapt to climate change \r\n(Roche et al., 2020). The SSPs assume economic convergence between \r\ncountries and do not reflect growth disruptions (e.g., commodity price \r\nshocks) that are often a key conflict risk factor (Dellink et al., 2017; \r\nBuhaug and Vestby, 2019; Hegre et al., 2021)."


id: 18b8e8147501e5950eeeb0d47a781dfa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"Adaptation to prevent climate change from exacerbating conflict risk \r\ninvolves meeting development objectives encapsulated in the SDGs. \r\nConflict-sensitive adaptation and climate-sensitive peacebuilding \r\noffer promising avenues to addressing conflict risk, but their efficacy \r\nis yet to be demonstrated through effective monitoring and evaluation \r\n(Gilmore et  al., 2018). Associations between environmental factors \r\nand conflict are weak in comparison to socioeconomic and political \r\ndrivers. Therefore, meeting the SDGs, including Goal 16 on peace, \r\njustice and strong institutions represent unambiguous pathways to \r\nreducing conflict risk under climate change (Singh and Chudasama, \r\n2021). Actively pursuing peace rather than taking conflict for granted \r\n(Barnett, 2019), improving focus on gender within peacebuilding (Dunn \r\nand Matthew, 2015; UNEP, 2021) and understanding how natural \r\nresources and their governance interact with peacebuilding (Krampe \r\net al"


id: a6fd54f4913bf9a5dfba294877557a3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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"Figure  7.11 illustrates the context within which risks to health \r\noutcomes and health systems emerge because of climate change. \r\nThe figure presents the emergence of risk from interactions between \r\nspecific types of climatic hazards, the exposure and vulnerability to \r\nthose hazards, and the responses taken within the health sector. The \r\nfigure also illustrates how health risks are situated within larger \r\ninteractions between the health system and other sectors and \r\nsystems, with underlying enabling conditions making adaptation \r\nand transformation possible. Within this context, response options \r\ncan decrease the impacts of climate change on human health, \r\nwell-being and health systems by (a) reducing exposure to climate\u0002related hazards; (b) reducing vulnerability to such hazards and \r\n(c) strengthening health system responses to future risks"


id: 58701cfe634808bd65a69b200703b2d1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" Such \r\napproaches are described as 'Lateral Public Health' and emphasise \r\nthe importance of involving community members and stakeholders in \r\nthe planning and coordination of activities (Semenza, 2021; Semenza, \r\n2011). Lateral public health strives for community engagement (e.g., \r\nthrough access to technology in decision-making, such as low-cost \r\nair sensors for wildfire smoke) in preparedness and response."


id: b949a2c0afb25bd622f042401c10df5a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26689
content:
"Health policies were historically not designed or implemented taking \r\ninto consideration the risks of climate change and as currently \r\nstructured are likely insufficient to manage the changing health \r\nburdens in coming decades (very high confidence). The magnitude \r\nand pattern of future health burdens attributable to climate change, \r\nat least until mid-century, will be determined primarily by adaptation \r\nand development choices. Current and future emissions will play an \r\nincreasing role in determining attributable burdens after mid-century. \r\nIncreased investment in strengthening general health systems, along \r\nwith targeted investments to enhance protection against specific \r\nclimate-sensitive exposures (e.g., hazard early warning and response \r\nsystems and integrated vector control programmes for VBDs) \r\nwill increase resilience if implemented to at least keep pace with \r\nclimate change (high confidence)"


id: f97e66945b885bd0ee32f048cd332a09
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" Investments to address the social \r\ndeterminants of health can reduce inequities and increase resilience \r\n(high confidence) (Thornton et al., 2016; Marmot et al., 2020; Wallace \r\net al., 2015; Semenza and Paz, 2021)."


id: ab1b36ab85cff86d28fcd5c0dc5dafb7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24440
content:
"The 2018 WHO Health and Climate Change Survey, a voluntary \r\nnational survey sent to all 194 WHO member states, to which 101 \r\nresponded, found that national planning on health and climate change \r\nis advancing, but the comprehensiveness of strategies and plans need \r\nto be strengthened. Implementing action on key health and climate \r\nchange priorities remains challenging and multi-sectoral collaboration \r\non health and climate change policy is evident, with uneven progress \r\n(Watts et al., 2021). Approximately 50% of respondent countries had \r\ndeveloped national health and climate strategies, with over two-thirds \r\ndoing so within the preceding five years, and 48 of 101 countries had \r\nconducted a health vulnerability and adaptation assessment (Watts \r\net al., 2019)"


id: cd6b2a478a6ef51bc765027caffb0e59
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content:
" However, most countries reported only moderate or low \r\nlevels of implementation, with financing cited as the most common \r\nbarrier due to a lack of information on opportunities, in turn linked to a \r\nlack of connection by health actors to climate change policy processes \r\nand a lack of capacity to participate in national planning. A review of \r\npublic health systems in 34  countries found that only slightly more "


id: 982d805c33af242c2507520eb9479ed5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21452
content:
"To date, air conditioning is the main adaptation approach for \r\nmitigating the health effects of high temperatures, especially in \r\nrelation to cardiorespiratory health (Madureira et al., 2021). However, \r\nair conditioning may constitute a maladaptation because of its high \r\ndemands on energy and associated heat emissions, especially in high\u0002density cities (Eriksen et  al., 2021; Magnan et  al., 2016; Schipper, \r\n2020), and also lead to 'heat inequities' as this is not an affordable or \r\npractical option for many (Jay et al., 2021; Turek-Hankins et al., 2021). \r\nHAPs link weather forecasts with alert and communication systems \r\nand response activities, including public cooling centres, enhanced \r\nheat-related disease surveillance and a range of individual actions \r\ndesigned to reduce the health effects of extreme heat events such \r\nas seeking shade and altering the pattern of work (McGregor et al., \r\n2015)"


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content:
" While well-designed and operationalisable HAPs possess the \r\npotential to reduce the likelihood of mortality from extreme heat \r\nevents (medium confidence) (Benmarhnia et  al., 2016; Heo et  al., \r\n2019b; Martinez-Solanas and Basagana, 2019; Martinez et al., 2019; \r\nDe'Donato et al., 2018), full process and outcome-based evaluations \r\nof HAPs and their constituent components are lacking (Boeckmann \r\nand Rohn, 2014; Chiabai et al., 2018b; Boeckmann and Rohn, 2014; \r\nNitschke et al., 2016; Diaz et al., 2019; Benmarhnia et al., 2016; Heo \r\net al., 2019a; Heo et al., 2019b; Ragettli and Roosli, 2019). Evaluations \r\nof heatwave early warning systems as a component within HAPs \r\nshow inconsistent results in terms of their impact on predicting \r\nmortality rates (Nitschke et al., 2016; Benmarhnia et al., 2016; Heo \r\net al., 2019a; Heo et al., 2019b; Ragettli and Roosli, 2019; Martinez \r\net  al., 2019; De'Donato et  al., 2018; Weinberger et  al"


id: 6dffd5134986fbc486aca9fb4370aa37
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", 2018b), \r\nindicating climate-based heat warning systems, which use a range of \r\nheat stress metrics (Schwingshackl et al., 2021), are not sufficient as a \r\nstand-alone approach to heat risk management (high confidence). To \r\nsupport HAP and heat risk-related policy development, identification \r\nand mapping of heat vulnerability 'hot spots' within urban areas have \r\nbeen proposed (Chen et al., 2019; Hatvani-Kovacs et al., 2018)"


id: 8b44171070fec5cef9e1d47bcdbf8ba2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"(Rocklov and Dubrow, 2020; Semenza and Zeller, 2014; Table 7.3). In \r\nmany cases, the exposure dynamics of VBDs are strongly influenced by \r\nsocioeconomic dynamics that should be considered when developing \r\nand deploying adaptation options (UNEP, 2018). This is especially \r\nthe case in low-income countries. For example, insufficient access \r\nto sanitation and the presence of standing water are important \r\ndeterminants of the presence of Aedes aegypti populations and \r\nthe pathogens that cause visceral leishmaniasis (L. donovani and L. \r\ninfantum) in urban and peri-urban areas. Low housing quality and lack \r\nof refuse management are associated with higher rodent infestation"


id: 1a223a9afb42d9d78ef60f78a9fd06fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" \r\nStrategies expected to have important health co-benefits include those \r\nthat support health systems strengthening and ecosystem health, \r\nimprove access to health coverage, increase awareness and education \r\nand address the underlying conditions of uneven development and a \r\nlack of adequate housing and access to water and sanitation systems \r\nin areas endemic to mosquito-borne diseases (Semenza and Paz, 2021; \r\nCross-Chapter Box ILLNESS in Chapter 2)."


id: cce8f99bed03d458833f61b5dd1d81ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 29779
content:
"Adaptation options for climate-related risks for WBDs and FBDs \r\nare strongly associated with wider, multi-sectoral initiatives to \r\nimprove sustainable development in low-income communities (high \r\nconfidence). Effective measures include improving access to potable \r\nwater and reducing exposure of water and sanitation systems to \r\nflooding and extreme weather events (Brubacher et al., 2020; Cisse, \r\n2019; Table 7.3). This requires focusing on farm-level interventions that \r\nlimit the spread of pathogens into adjacent waterways, preventing \r\nthe ongoing contamination of water and sanitation systems and the \r\npromotion of food-safe human behaviours (Levy et al., 2018; Nichols \r\net  al., 2018). It is also important to implement well-targeted and \r\nintegrated WASH interventions, including at schools and ensuring \r\nproper disposal of excreta and wastewater"


id: de56cc53fd4fe7a605705ee2abf3f04c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 32475
content:
" Cities can integrate regional \r\nclimate projections into their engineering models to produce lower\u0002risk source waters and increase the resilience of water and sanitation \r\ntechnologies and management systems under a range of climate \r\nscenarios. Technologies can help abstract source waters from depth, \r\nintroduce or increase secondary booster disinfection, design or modify \r\nsystems to reduce residence times within pipes and/or coat exposed \r\npipes (Levy et al., 2018). Other efficient interventions include source \r\nwater protection, promoting water filtration, testing the presence of \r\nwaterborne pathogens in shellfish, imposing trade restrictions where \r\nnecessary and improving hygiene at all levels (Semenza and Paz, \r\n2021). Needed actions include early warning and response systems, \r\nstrengthening the resilience of communities and health systems and \r\npromoting ecosystem health, water safety plans and sanitation safety \r\nplans (Brubacher et  al"


id: ed6931553932e8577b4551c18e6f7918
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
", 2020; Cisse, 2019; Ford and Hamner, 2018; \r\nLake and Barker, 2018; Levy et  al., 2018; Nichols et  al., 2018; WHO \r\nand International Water Association, 2009; WHO, 2016a; WHO, 2018b; \r\nSemenza, 2021; Rocklov et al., 2021)."


id: c0b0f4a2ae914141d08c61259e57606
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 27879
content:
"A multi-sectoral approach, including the engagement of a range \r\nof stakeholders will likely benefit the response to longer-term heat \r\nrisks through the implementation of measures such as climate\u0002sensitive urban design and planning that mitigates UHI effects (high \r\nconfidence) (Ebi, 2019; Jay et al., 2021; Alexander et al., 2016; Levy, \r\n2016; Masson et  al., 2018; McEvoy, 2019; Pisello et  al., 2018). In \r\nthe shorter-term, potentially localised solutions can include awnings, \r\nlouvers, directional reflective materials, altering roof albedo, mist \r\nsprays, evaporative materials, green roofs and building facades \r\nand cooling centres (Jay et  al., 2021; Macintyre and Heaviside, \r\n2019; Spentzou et  al., 2021; Takebayashi, 2018). NbS to reduce \r\nheat that offer co-benefits for ecological systems include green and \r\nblue infrastructure (e.g., urban greening/forestry and the creation \r\nof water bodies) (Koc et  al., 2018; Lai et  al., 2019; Shooshtarian \r\net  al"


id: 3710cc8d4f3b669b00fa6d17e6dc69dc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 6055
content:
", 2018; Ulpiani, 2019; Zuvela-Aloise et  al., 2016; Hobbie and \r\nGrimm, 2020). The implementation of climate-sensitive design and \r\nplanning can be constrained by governance issues (Jim et al., 2018) \r\nand the benefits are not always evenly distributed among residents. \r\nImplementation of climate-sensitive design and NbS does, however, \r\nneed to be carried out within the context of wider public health \r\nplanning because water bodies and moist vegetated surfaces provide \r\nsuitable habitats for a range of disease vectors (Nasir et al., 2017; \r\nTian et  al., 2016; Trewin et  al., 2020). Solutions recommended for "


id: 1d54e59826e1d5fcdbd69140fe171c0c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 2061
content:
"A feasibility and effectiveness assessment was conducted for six \r\nadaptation strategies often used and recommended by the UN to \r\nrespond to malnutrition risks that combined a literature review and \r\nexpert judgment assessment of 80 peer-reviewed studies (UNSCN, \r\n2010; Tirado et  al. 2013; methods adapted from de Coninck et  al. \r\n(2018) and Singh et al. (2020)). Nineteen indicators of six dimensions \r\nof feasibility (economic, technical, social, institutional, environmental \r\nand geophysical) were considered. The lead time to initiate and the \r\nexpected longevity of each option were examined. Feasibility was \r\ndefined as how significant the reported barriers were to implement a \r\nparticular adaptation option. Highly feasible options were those where \r\nno or very few barriers were reported. Moderately feasible were those \r\nwhere barriers existed but did not have a strong negative effect on \r\nthe adaptation option (or evidence was mixed)"


id: 89c46b9bf7e46e2d0729e1a638979d65
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 19206
content:
" Low feasibility options \r\nhad multiple barriers reported that could block implementation. \r\nEffectiveness ratings were based on expert consultation and reflected \r\nthe potential of the adaptation option to reduce risk. The final \r\neffectiveness and feasibility scores were categorised as high, medium \r\nor low and reflect the combined results of all studies for a given \r\nadaptation option (Table 7.6)."


id: 229413df4e3e3f7d2f989098a648a677
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 2894
content:
"Early warning systems are effective at detecting and potentially \r\nreducing food security and nutrition risks (high confidence). Examples \r\nof proven systems include the United States Agency for International \r\nDevelopment (USAID) Famine Early Warning System, the Food and \r\nAgricultural Organization's Global Information and Early Warning \r\nSystem and the World Food Programme's Corporate Alert System. Such \r\nsystems are fundamental for anticipating when a crisis might occur \r\nand setting priorities for interventions (Funk et  al., 2019). Financial \r\ninvestments to develop early warning systems are cost-effective and \r\nreduce human suffering (Choularton and Krishnamurthy, 2019) (high \r\nconfidence). For instance, during the 2017 drought-induced food crisis \r\nin Kenya, 500,000 fewer people required humanitarian assistance \r\nthan would have been expected based on past experiences; this was \r\nlargely due to timely and effective interventions triggered by the early \r\nwarning (Funk et al"


id: 5dc85b185efde0db5ac6f7d44edba7b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 12284
content:
"Because mental health is fundamentally inter-twined with social and \r\neconomic well-being, adaptation for climate-related mental health \r\nrisks benefits from wider multi-sectoral initiatives to enhance well\u0002being, with the potential for co-benefits to emerge (high confidence).\r\nImprovements in education, quality of housing, safety and social \r\nprotection support enhance general well-being and make individuals \r\nmore resilient to climate risks (Lund et al., 2018; Hayes et al., 2019). \r\nAmong Indigenous Peoples, connections to traditional culture and \r\nto place are associated with health and well-being (Bourke et  al., \r\n2018) as well as with resilience to environmental change (Ford et al., \r\n2020). As an example of the connection between infrastructure \r\nimprovements and mental health, a study of domestic rainwater \r\nharvesting initiatives to promote household water security also \r\nimproved mental health in participating households (Mercer and \r\nHanrahan, 2017)"


id: 3d581ae395c848c25f17bb80ac79be3a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 7010
content:
" Adaptive urban design that provides access to \r\nhealthy natural spaces--an option for reducing risks associated with \r\nheat stress--also promotes social cohesion and mitigates mental \r\nhealth challenges (high confidence) (Buckley et  al., 2019; Clayton \r\net al., 2017; Jennings and Bamkole, 2019; Liu et al., 2020b; Mygind \r\net al., 2019; Marselle et al., 2020)."


id: 1898b586e18e6f54bdcaf92e05387fca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 1363
content:
"Integrating health into national disaster risk management plans has \r\nwider benefits for resilience and adaptation to climate change risks \r\n(high confidence) (UNFCCC, 2017a; Watts et al., 2019). DRR, including \r\ndisaster preparedness, management and response, is widely recognised \r\nas important for reducing health consequences of climate-related \r\nhazards and extreme weather events (Keim, 2008; Phalkey and Louis, \r\n2016). A systematic review by Islam et al. (2020) identified multiple, \r\nongoing challenges to integrating climate adaptation and DRR at \r\nglobal and national levels, including a lack of capacity among key \r\nactors and institutions, a lack of coordination and collaboration across \r\nscales of government and general lack of funding--challenges that \r\nare particularly relevant for the health sector"


id: da06b914d1001435c841fa1906eb2419
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 31829
content:
" Global events, including \r\nclimate-related extreme events and public health emergencies of \r\ninternational concern (for example, Ebola, Middle East respiratory \r\nsyndrome (MERS) and COVID-19) have influenced the development \r\nof national public health preparedness and response systems and \r\nattracted significant investment over the last two decades (Khan et al., \r\n2015; Murthy et al., 2017; Watson et al., 2017). The Sendai Framework \r\nfor Disaster Risk Reduction and the International Health Regulations \r\nestablish important global and regional goals for increasing health \r\nsystem resilience and reducing health impacts from biological hazards \r\nand extreme climate events (Aitsi-Selmi et al., 2015; Maini et al., 2017; \r\nUNFCCC, 2017b; Wright et al., 2020). There are explicit links between \r\nthe health aspect of the Sendai Framework and UN SDGs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, \r\n11, 13, 14, 15 and 17 (Wright et al., 2020)"


id: a9ea6d868b37fe7dd18be9f691d046fa
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vector_id: 24269
content:
" More specifically, reducing \r\nthe number of disaster-related deaths, illnesses and injuries, as well as \r\ndamage to health facilities are key indicators for achieving the goals \r\nset out in the Sendai Framework (UNFCCC, 2017b)."


id: 41bef3d0c54be39d8915c199b6ef947
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7746
content:
"Early warning systems are a potentially valuable tool in adapting to \r\nclimate-related risks associated with infectious diseases when based \r\non forecasts with high skill and when there are effective responses \r\nwithin the time frame of the forecast (high confidence). Through \r\nadvanced seasonal weather forecasting that draws upon established \r\nassociations between weather/climate and infection/transmission \r\nconditions, conditions conducive to disease outbreaks can be identified \r\nmonths in advance, providing time to implement effective population \r\nhealth responses (Morin et  al., 2018). Most current early warning \r\nsystems are focused on malaria and dengue but there are examples \r\nfor other diseases, such as an early warning system developed \r\nfor Vibrios monitoring in the Baltic Sea (Semenza et  al., 2017)"


id: f6a42656a7ee616cba1ecc4094dfa9cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" An \r\nearly warning system for dengue outbreaks in Colombia based on \r\ntemperature, precipitation and humidity successfully detected 75% \r\nof all outbreaks between one and five months in advance, detecting \r\n12.5% in the same month (Lee et  al., 2017b). Dengue warning \r\nsystems in Brazil, Malaysia and Mexico have generated satisfactory \r\nresults (Hussain-Alkhateeb et  al., 2018). An effective early warning \r\nsystem for malaria was implemented in the Amhara region of Ethiopia \r\n(Merkord et al., 2017)."


id: daa24824969bec89eabe87928b3065f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"The intersection of health and multi-sectoral DRR and manage\u0002ment, generally described as health emergency and disaster risk \r\nmanagement (health-EDRM), encompasses multi-sectoral approaches \r\nfrom epidemic preparedness and response including the capacities \r\nfor implementing the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005), \r\nhealth systems strengthening and health systems resilience (Lo Iacono \r\net  al., 2017; WHO 2019; Wright et  al., 2020). Health-EDRM costs to \r\ngovernments are notably lower than the cost of inaction (Peters et al., \r\n2019). Additional per capita costs in low-income countries have been \r\nestimated to range from USD 4.33 (capital) and USD 4.16 (annual \r\nrecurrent costs), and in upper middle-income countries to an additional \r\nUSD 1.35 in capital costs and USD 1.41 in extra annual recurrent costs \r\n(Peters et  al., 2019)"


id: 94407698256ef1914e2f204b3e526650
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20834
content:
" Adopting a health-EDRM approach supports the \r\nsystematic integration of health and multi-sectoral EDRM to ensure a \r\nholistic approach to health risks and assists in the alignment of action in \r\nhealth security, climate change and sustainable development (Chan and \r\nPeijun, 2017; Dar et al., 2014; WHO, 2019; Wright et al., 2020)."


id: 501f74ba9ad6fdce68d0321c5f644717
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10047
content:
"No universal standardised approach exists for monitoring or evaluating \r\nadaptation activities in the health sector (high confidence). Candidate \r\nindicators of climate change health impacts and adaptation activity, \r\ntypically at the national level, are available (Bowen and Ebi, 2017; \r\nCheng and Berry, 2013; Kenney et al., 2016; Navi et al., 2017; WHO, \r\n2015b). Indicators are best grouped by category of activity, that is, \r\nvulnerability, risk and exposure; impacts; and adaptation and resilience \r\n(Ebi et al., 2018a). As health adaptation expands, enhanced monitoring \r\nwill be needed to ensure that scientific advances are translated into \r\npolicy and practice. A promising initiative that emerged since the AR5 \r\nis the Lancet Countdown, which represents a global effort at tracking \r\nvarious indicators of exposures, impacts, adaptation activities, finance \r\nand media activity related to climate change and health (Watts et al"


id: 3be6d5aaf8e1b3af13c7d01a3e2fdec4
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content:
", \r\n2018a), although this effort is principally focused on monitoring and \r\ndoes not explicitly focus on evaluation adaptation efforts or learning \r\nfrom adaptation efforts."


id: 6448fde1a59ec592c7afbb35964d4bf0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13349
content:
"Climate-informed health-EDRM is crucial for the climate resilience of \r\nhealth systems (WHO, 2015a), particularly to account for additional \r\nrisks and uncertainties associated with climate change and allow for \r\nwell-planned, effective and appropriate EDRM and adaptation (Watts \r\net al., 2018a; WHO, 2013; WHO, 2015a). Potential coherent approaches \r\nto addressing climate change and disaster risks to health include: \r\nstrengthening health systems; vulnerability and risk assessments that \r\nincorporate disaster and climate change risk; building resilience of \r\nhealth systems and health infrastructure; and climate-informed EWSs \r\n(Banwell et al., 2018; Phalkey and Louis, 2016). However, a review of \r\nDRR projects including climate change in south Asia found that the \r\nhealth sector was the least represented with only 2% of 371 projects \r\nrelating to health (Mall et al., 2019), indicating a need to strengthen \r\nthe incorporation of climate change in health-EDRM"


id: 87b8cf3b9dee193778df3ea7bb3e45d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18882
content:
" Current tracking \r\nunder the Sendai Framework of Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 \r\nshows that most countries (particularly low-income countries and \r\nlower middle-income countries) still lack robust systems for integrated \r\nrisk monitoring and early warning (UNEP, 2018). The incorporation of \r\nDRR and management strategies into climate adaptation for health \r\nand health systems at local scales is particularly important, given that \r\nit is at local scales where health services are most often delivered \r\nand where knowledge of specific needs and challenges is often \r\ngreatest (Amaratunga et al., 2018; Schramm et al., 2020a). Indigenous \r\nknowledge has been shown to be valuable in DRR, with particularly \r\nstrong evidence existing for drought risk reduction in sub-Saharan \r\nAfrica (Fummi et al., 2017; Muyambo et al., 2017; Dube and Munsaka, \r\n2018; Macnight Ngwese et  al., 2018)"


id: beda391e9b4517b0363cef5b14522160
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27579
content:
" In the USA, DRR strategies \r\nthat draw upon traditional knowledge and local expertise are being \r\nincorporated into climate adaptation planning for health in a number \r\nof indigenous communities under the 'Climate-ready Tribes Initiative' \r\n(Schramm et al., 2020b)."


id: 596667aafb10e0ab0c792199dcb84746
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 11557
content:
"Community-based monitoring of adaptation responses to health \r\nimpacts, especially by Indigenous Peoples, has not been widely \r\nundertaken, despite its potential to improve monitoring of and local \r\nadaptation to environmental change (Kipp et  al., 2019). The health \r\nsector has been particularly weak at recognising the climate impacts \r\non and the adaptation needs of Indigenous Peoples and in engaging \r\nIndigenous Peoples in monitoring progress (Ford et al., 2018; David\u0002Chavez and Gavin, 2018; Ramos-Castillo et  al., 2017). Successful \r\nadaptation to the health impacts of climate change in Indigenous \r\nPeoples requires recognition of their rights to self-determination, \r\nfocusing on indigenous conceptualisations of well-being, prioritising \r\nIndigenous knowledge and understanding the broader agenda of \r\ndecolonisation, health and human rights (high confidence) (Ford and \r\nKing, 2015; Green and Minchin, 2014; Hoy et al., 2014; Jones, 2019; \r\nJones et al"


id: 8657fdeb4203d746309ffa16f9635948
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18678
content:
"There has been limited participation of the health sector in \r\ninternational climate financing mechanisms (Martinez and Berry, \r\n2018). Of 149 projects listed in the Adaptation Fund database in \r\nOctober 2020, a large number were broad-based initiatives that \r\nmay have considerable indirect benefits for health systems, such as \r\nenhanced disaster preparedness and food security, but none were \r\nexplicitly aimed at strengthening health systems or had directed funds \r\nthrough ministries of health. A review of projects funded by the major \r\nmulti-lateral climate funds showed that less than 1.5% of dispersed \r\nadaptation funding and less than 0.5% of overall funding have been \r\nallocated to projects aimed at protecting health (WHO, 2015a)"


id: b73a4b746835d47c1d102dc5d42c4039
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 26360
content:
" A \r\nsurvey of national public health organisation representatives from \r\na mix of low-, middle- and high-income countries found that a lack \r\nof political commitment, insufficient coordination across sectors and \r\ninadequate funding for public health-specific adaptation initiatives \r\nwere common barriers to building climate resilience (Marcus and \r\nHanna, 2020). Under-investment in climate-specific initiatives in health \r\nsystems coincides with persistent under-investment in healthcare more \r\ngenerally, especially in low- and middle-income countries (Schaferhoff \r\net al., 2019)."


id: 9b71af0001f60d78a3fcdeec23be1ec9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 22008
content:
"Effective governance institutions, arrangements, funding and mandates \r\nare key for adaptation to climate-related health risks (high confidence).\r\nWithout integration and collaboration across sectors, health adaptation \r\ncan become siloed, leading to less effective adaptation or even \r\nmaladaptation (Magnan et al., 2016; Fox et al., 2019). Integration and \r\ncollaboration include working laterally across national government \r\ndepartments and agencies, as well as vertically from national \r\nagencies to local governments and with the private sector, academia, \r\nNGOs and civil society. In this context, top-down policy design and \r\nimplementation are complemented by bottom-up approaches that \r\nengage community actors in programme design and draw upon their \r\nlocal practices, perspectives, opinions and experiences"


id: 6a65a500daf3c8393856b8acc918e0c5
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content:
" Opportunities \r\nexist to better integrate public health into climate change discourse and \r\npolicymaking processes, and to strengthen public health partnerships \r\nand collaborations (Awuor et al., 2020). Creating networks, integration \r\nacross organisations and jointly developed policies can facilitate cross\u0002sectoral collaboration (Bowen and Ebi, 2017)."


id: c503a86a0680559013ba39f1d939ed64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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"Adaptation financing does not often reach places where the \r\nclimate-sensitivity of the health sector is greatest (Weiler, 2019). \r\nFinancial constraints in Africa are one of the key reasons for slow \r\nimplementation of health adaptation measures (Nhamo and Muchuru, \r\n2019). Strengthening health systems in vulnerable countries has the \r\npotential to reduce current and future economic costs related to \r\nenvironmental health risks, thus enabling reinvestment in the health \r\nsystem and sustainable development (WHO, 2020a; WHO, 2015a). \r\nRobust and comprehensive climate and health financing builds first \r\non core health sector investments (WHO, 2015a). Other potential \r\nopportunities for resource mobilisation include health-specific funding \r\nmechanisms, climate change funding streams and investments from \r\nmulti-sectoral actions and actions in health-determining sectors (WHO, \r\n2015a)"


id: 9350601785567e1b58de65f34d8e48ed
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" Incorporating climate change and health considerations into \r\ndisaster reduction and management strategies could improve funding \r\nopportunities and increase potential funding streams (Aitsi-Selmi \r\net  al., 2015). Reinforcing cross-sectoral governance mechanisms \r\nmaximises health co-benefits and economic savings by allowing for \r\nmulti-sectoral costs and benefits to be comprehensively considered \r\nin decision-making (Belesova et al., 2016; WHO, 2020a; WHO, 2015b). \r\nAn additional financial need concerns health research, the existing \r\nfunding for which does not match what is needed to support the \r\nimplementation of the combined objectives of the UN 2030 Agenda \r\nfor Sustainable Development, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk \r\nReduction and the Paris Agreement (Green and Minchin, 2014; Ebi, \r\n2016; Green et al., 2017)."


id: 190e1d1bff42958af183c27585b12391
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"Financial constraints are the most referenced barrier to health \r\nadaptation and so scaling up financial investments remains a key \r\ninternational priority (very high confidence) (Wheeler and Watts, 2018; \r\nUNFCCC, 2017a). AR5 estimated the costs of adaptation in developing \r\ncountries at between USD 70 billion and USD 100 billion annually in \r\nthe year 2050, but these are likely to be a significant underestimate, \r\nparticularly in the years 2030 and beyond (UNEP, 2014). National surveys \r\nconducted by WHO identified financial constraints as a major barrier to \r\nthe implementation of health adaptation priorities (WHO, 2019b; Watts \r\net al., 2021). Novel research drawing on global financial transaction data \r\nsuggests that in 2019, global financial transactions with the potential \r\nto deliver adaptation in the health and healthcare sector reached \r\nUSD  18"


id: da2c33b6ddbf9ef36743401359561fdc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"4  billion, driven by transactions in high- and upper middle\u0002income countries, with investment in Africa, Southeast Asia and the \r\neastern Mediterranean mostly stagnant (Watts et al., 2021)."


id: f2f1ec4b762d2a7cd7cfc7ba0180b5ef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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"to implement adaptation measures. Individual responses are in turn \r\naffected not only by capabilities but also by perceptions that climate \r\nchange is real and requires a response (Ogunbode et  al., 2019). \r\nPerceptions of climate risks are formed by experiences of changes in \r\nlocal weather and extreme weather events (Sattler et al., 2018; Sattler \r\net  al., 2020; van der Linden, 2015), observations of environmental \r\nchanges (Hornsey et al., 2016), experiences of and knowledge about \r\nclimate change impacts (Ngo et al., 2020; van der Linden, 2015) and \r\nindividual characteristics such as values and worldviews (Poortinga \r\net  al., 2019) (high agreement, medium evidence). Risk perceptions \r\ninclude both logical assessments about the likelihood and severity of \r\nclimate change impacts and affective feelings about those impacts. \r\nOn average, affective measures of risk perception are more strongly \r\nassociated with disaster preparation than cognitive measures \r\n(Bamberg et al"


id: 91833d9e1e9e58a211d016c6cbaa9a10
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"AR5 (Chapter 17) concluded that migration is often, though not in \r\nall situations, a potential form of adaptation initiated by households. \r\nSubsequent research indicates that the circumstances under which \r\nmigration occurs and the degree of agency under which household \r\nmigration decisions are made are important determinants of whether \r\nmigration outcomes are successful in terms of advancing the well\u0002being of the household and providing benefits to sending and \r\nreceiving communities (high confidence) (Adger et al., 2015; Cattaneo \r\net al., 2019; Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7)"


id: d677381d92e3d09fa654bbf38e1274b9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" Evidence from \r\nrefugee studies and general migration research indicates that higher \r\nagency migration, in which migrants have mobility options, allows \r\nmigrants greater opportunities for integrating into labour markets at \r\nthe destination, makes it easier to remit money home and generally \r\ncreates conditions for potential benefits for migrant households and \r\nfor sending and receiving communities (International Organization for \r\nMigration, 2019). Bilateral agreements that facilitate labour migration \r\nhave been identified as being especially urgently needed for Pacific \r\nsmall island states (Weber, 2017)."


id: 32302a47dd4ed4f7fe49ca6e518442a3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"Efficacy beliefs, social norms and subjective resilience also affect \r\nadaptation behaviour (medium confidence), which has implications \r\nfor communication about the need for climate adaptation. Efficacy \r\nbeliefs represent the belief in one's ability to carry out particular \r\naction(s) and the belief that the action(s) will have the desired \r\noutcome. Belief that one is personally able to complete a behaviour \r\nis moderately associated with engaging in disaster preparations \r\n(Navarro et  al., 2021; van Valkengoed and Steg, 2019) and with \r\nadaptation intentions (Burnham and Ma, 2017). Collective efficacy, \r\nthe belief that a group of people working together can achieve \r\na desired outcome, is important for participating in community \r\nadaptation behaviours (Bandura, 1982; Chen, 2015; Thaker et  al., \r\n2015)"


id: 75808aafd52c18f4c406ffd34296332d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" Related to this is response efficacy, a belief that a behaviour \r\nwill achieve its desired outcome, which is also moderately associated \r\nwith engaging in disaster preparations (van Valkengoed and \r\nSteg, 2019). Collective efficacy can potentially be developed by \r\nstrengthening communication networks and social ties within a \r\ncommunity (Haas et al., 2021; Jugert et al., 2016). Norms describing \r\nthe adaptation strategies of others in a community, particularly \r\nthose with high social status, can either facilitate or inhibit individual \r\nadaptation decisions (Neef et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2021)."


id: 9e4af799bd88570ad507a56ff4657b6b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"Adaptive migration and the implied assumption that people can \r\nor should simply move out of harm's way is not a substitute for \r\ninvestment in adaptive capacity-building (high agreement) (Bettini \r\nand Gioli, 2016). Climate-related migration, and especially involuntary \r\ndisplacement, often occurs only after in situ adaptation options have \r\nbeen exhausted and/or where government actions are inadequate \r\n(Adger et al., 2015; Ocello et al., 2015; Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE \r\nin Chapter 7). The threshold at which household adaptation transitions \r\nfrom in situ measures to migration is highly context specific and reflects \r\nthe degree of exposure to specific climate risks, mobility options \r\nand the socioeconomic circumstances of the household and local \r\ncommunity (McLeman, 2017; Adams and Kay, 2019; Semenza and Ebi, \r\n2019; Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7)"


id: 5f027ad30e354745cf7efb7d9855271
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content:
" A consistent theme \r\nin the research literature reviewed for all sections of this chapter is \r\nthat proactive investments in health, social and physical infrastructure, \r\nincluding those not aimed specifically at climate risks, build societal \r\nadaptive capacity and household resilience. In turn, expanding the \r\nrange of adaptation options available to households increases the \r\nlikelihood that, when migration does occur, it does so under conditions \r\nof high agency that lead to greater chances of success. In communities \r\nwhere climate-related migration and/or relocation is occurring or may \r\noccur, policymaking and planning benefits from understanding the \r\ncultural, social and economic needs of exposed populations and helps \r\nin the identification of responses and policies that build resilience \r\n(Hino et al. 2017)"


id: ce2f81e6d7e65442dd5d02dd956716c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"destinations, labour market choices and returns from migration may be \r\nmore heavily constrained than those of other labour migrants (Jessoe \r\net al., 2018; Wrathall and Suckall, 2016).Within low- and middle-income \r\ncountries, rural-urban migrant networks are important channels for \r\nremittances that may help build socioeconomic resilience to climate \r\nhazards in sending areas (Porst and Sakdapolrak, 2020), with higher \r\nlevels of wage-seeking labour participation observed in climate\u0002sensitive locales in south Asia (Maharjan et  al., 2020). Local-level \r\nresearch in China and south Asia shows, however, that the potential \r\nfor remittances to generate improvements in household level adaptive \r\ncapacity is highly context specific, has significant gender dimensions \r\nand depends on such factors as the nature of the hazard, the distance \r\nmigrated and the length of time over which remittances are received \r\n(Banerjee et al., 2019a; Banerjee et al., 2019b)"


id: c5b43c8cd5073c74122c57107ef67af0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" Social networks are a \r\nkey asset in helping climate migrants overcome financial and structural \r\nimpediments to their mobility, but these have their limits, particularly \r\nwith respect to international migration (Semenza and Ebi, 2019). Since \r\nAR5, greater restrictions have emerged on movement between many \r\nlow- and high-income countries (not including those necessitated by \r\npublic health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic), a trend that, \r\nif it continues, would generate additional constraints on destination \r\nchoices for future climate migrants (McLeman, 2019). Transnational \r\ndiasporic connections are a potential asset for building resilience \r\nin migrant-sending communities highly exposed to climatic risks, \r\nwith migrants' remittances potentially providing resources for long\u0002term resilience building, recovery from extreme events and reducing \r\nincome inequality (Bragg et al., 2018; Mosuela et al., 2015; Obokata \r\nand Veronis, 2018; Shayegh, 2017; Semenza and Ebi, 2019)"


id: 6c07687deb493b4891e8b13bc4baf76f
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vector_id: 14623
content:
" Safe \r\nand orderly labour migration is consequently a potentially beneficial \r\ncomponent of wider cross-sectoral approaches to building adaptive \r\ncapacity and supporting sustainable development in regions highly \r\nexposed to climate risks (McLeman, 2019)."


id: 6c39dbd4f7fbfbf6ebd7cd66ae463518
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14657
content:
"Attitudes of residents in migrant-receiving areas with respect to \r\nclimate-related migration warrant consideration when formulating \r\nadaptation policy (medium confidence). Existing research is modest \r\nand difficult to generalise with respect to the impacts of climate\u0002related migration and displacement on social dynamics and stability in \r\nreceiving destinations, with outcomes being tied to the attitudes and \r\nsocial acceptance of receiving communities and efforts to integrate \r\nmigrant arrivals into the community (Koubi and Nguyen, 2020). \r\nResearch from Kenya and Vietnam shows that residents of receiving \r\ncommunities view environmental drivers as being legitimate reasons \r\nfor people to move and consequently tend not to stigmatise such \r\nmigrants (Spilker et  al., 2020)"


id: afde9213e6597afdf3baaf9c9dd8f11
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" In these examples, urban residents \r\nviewed environmental motivations as being comparable to economic \r\nreasons for migrating and did not see climate-related migrants as \r\nposing any particular risks for receiving communities. However, \r\ncase studies from India suggest that a lack of recognition by local \r\nauthorities of climatic factors being legitimate drivers of rural-urban \r\nmigration may lead to discrimination against migrants in terms of \r\naccess to housing and other social protections, thereby undermining \r\nhousehold resilience (Chu and Michael, 2018)."


id: 4e409a5ba7dbac2d305df5ad15e3a4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9736
content:
"There is high agreement among existing studies that immobile \r\npopulations often have high vulnerability and/or high long-term exposure \r\nto climate hazards, and that non-climatic political, economic and social \r\nfactors within countries may strongly constrain mobility (Zickgraf, \r\n2019; Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2020; Cundill et al., 2021). Section 7.2.6.2 \r\nhighlighted the particular vulnerability of immobile populations in the \r\nface of growing climatic risks. However, research suggests governments \r\nshould be slow to label such populations as being 'trapped' or to actively \r\npromote relocations in the absence of local agreement that in situ\r\nadaptation options have been exhausted (Adams, 2016; Farbotko and \r\nMcMichael, 2019). In the case of indigenous settlements, efforts made \r\nto incorporate traditional knowledge in decision-making and planning \r\nincrease the potential for longer-term success (Manrique, 2018)"


id: a3bb027bed6359d67e09a3f5b18b17bb
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" \r\nConsiderable health implications can emerge within populations that \r\nare relocated as part of a planned retreat, and represent an important \r\nconsideration for planners that requires greater research (Dannenberg \r\net al., 2019). Organised relocations are not inherently transformative \r\nin their outcomes but, depending on the circumstances under which \r\nthey occur and on how issues of equity and respect for the rights of \r\nthose affected are implemented, relocation could potentially represent \r\na positive transformation (Siders et al., 2021)."


id: abb41ea9c07460b0cabfd96322f3c502
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content:
"The success of climate-related migration as an adaptive response is \r\nshaped by how migrants are perceived and how policy discussions \r\nare framed (high agreement, medium evidence). The possibility that \r\nclimate change may enlarge international migrant flows has in some \r\npolicy discussions been interpreted as a potential threat to the security \r\nof destination countries (Sow et al., 2016; Telford, 2018), but there is \r\nlittle empirical evidence in peer-reviewed literature assessed for this \r\nchapter of climate migrants posing significant threats to security at \r\nstate or international levels. There is also an inconsistency between \r\nframing in some policy discussions of undocumented migration \r\n(climate-related and other forms) as being 'illegal' and the objectives \r\nof the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and \r\nthe Global Compact on Refugees (McLeman, 2019)"


id: 9e601c887ac704aa66486736b6781c20
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" Although climate\u0002related migrants are not officially recognised as refugees under the \r\n1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, terms such as \r\n'climate refugees' are common in popular media and some policy \r\ndiscussions (Hoeg and Tulloch, 2018; Wiegel et al., 2019). The framing \r\nof migration policy discussions is relevant, for example, in discussing \r\nclimate adaptation options for Pacific Island Countries, where there is \r\nconsiderable disagreement over policies that range from a 'migration \r\nwith dignity' approach that would liberalise labour migration in the \r\nPacific region to those that see migration as a last resort option to "


id: e387e0e3d1a26e3756d5d657e7339f6d
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content:
"2017; Hino et  al., 2017; Haasnoot et  al., 2021; Moss et  al., 2021). \r\nRecent examples illustrate the substantial financial costs of organised \r\nrelocations, ranging from USD 10,000 per person in examples from Fiji \r\nto USD 100,000 per person in coastal Louisiana, USA (Hino et al., 2017). \r\nOrganised relocations are politically and emotionally charged, may \r\nnot necessarily be seen as desirable by exposed populations and are \r\nmost successful when approached proactive and strategically to avoid \r\nincreasing the socioeconomic vulnerability of those who are relocated \r\n(Jamero et al., 2017; Wilmsen and Webber, 2015; Chapin et al., 2016; \r\nMcNamara et  al., 2018; Hauer et  al., 2019; Bertana, 2020)"


id: 6f43c05972164942151260eb7239e1c3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" Key \r\nconsiderations for protecting the rights and well-being of people who \r\nmight need to be resettled include proactive communication with and \r\nparticipation of the affected communities, availability of compensation, \r\nlivelihood protection and ensuring there is permanence and security of \r\ntenure at the relocation destination (Tadgell et al., 2018). Availability \r\nof funds for resettlement, how to manage relocation from communally \r\nowned lands, how to value privately owned land to be abandoned and \r\nthe potential for loss and damage claims are just some of the many \r\npotential complications (Marino, 2018; McNamara et  al., 2018). As \r\na proactive option, researchers in Bangladesh have suggested the \r\ncreation of 'migrant-friendly towns' to provide options for autonomous \r\nrelocation from hazardous areas (Khan and Huq, 2021)."


id: a6ce37145cdbf840958cdb7db48f95f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23761
content:
"There has been increased activity within the international community \r\nto understand and address climate-conflict linkages since AR5, with \r\nhigh level actions including the UN Climate Security Mechanism, \r\nlaunched in 2018 and tasked with providing integrated climate \r\nrisk assessments to the United Nations Security Council and other \r\nUN bodies in partnership with UN and external actors (DPPA et al., \r\n2020). G7 governments initiated an integrated agenda for resilience \r\n(Ruttinger et al., 2015) and the Berlin Call for Action in 2019 sought a \r\nforeign policy platform to address climate security concerns, focusing \r\non risk-informed planning, enhanced capacity for action within the UN \r\nand improvements to operational response to climate security risks \r\n(Federal Foreign Office, 2019)"


id: 761985da6ddd9c69bfdaaf6279e7c992
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" The non-peer-reviewed literature that \r\ncurrently addresses these policy dimensions is often generated by a \r\nsmall number of consultancies funded by governments from the Global \r\nNorth and can lack diverse perspectives and priorities."


id: 27b59b37d3750bf12ce24bbd9c021940
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 3653
content:
"Climate-resilient peacebuilding has the potential to limit the impact \r\nof future climate change on peace efforts (medium confidence). \r\nPractical guidance has been developed, driven by policy concerns on \r\nclimate-conflict links. The United Nations Environment Programme \r\n(UNEP), the European Union and Adelphi have developed a toolkit \r\nfor addressing climate fragility risks in peacebuilding, adaptation \r\nand livelihoods support (UNEP et al., 2019). Crawford et al. (2015) \r\nprovide recommendations for climate-resilient peacebuilding \r\nconsistent with the UN Secretary General's five peacebuilding \r\nprinciples, including integrating ex-combatants through the \r\nconstruction of climate-resilient infrastructure, using climate impacts \r\nas a platform to engage previously conflicting groups, developing \r\nnational DRR and management strategies, and climate-proofing \r\neconomic development activities"


id: 61cf52f828bd4fe0c4642987af0ab0e5
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updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12954
content:
" The USAID, in a report prepared \r\nfor the Adaptation Thought Leadership and Assessments (ATLAS) \r\nprogramme (Adelphi & Chemonics International, 2020) that drew \r\nupon resilience and peacebuilding programmes in the Horn of Africa, \r\nrecommend two critical conditions to ensure activities address \r\ncompound climate fragility risks. Firstly, conducting local analyses \r\nof the links between climate, conflict and fragility to identify specific \r\nrisks to target and, secondly, ensuring long-term commitment with a \r\nfocus on participation and flexibility."


id: a824474d10ee16962dbdadb0a1857856
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vector_id: 23971
content:
"and National Adaptation strategies rarely and only implicitly address \r\nconflict and potential changes to power relations (Tanzler et al., 2019). \r\nPractitioners and policy researchers have attempted to address this \r\ngap by developing guidance and delivering training (e.g., Tanzler et al. \r\n(2019); Bob and Bronkhorst (2014)). However, there are real challenges \r\nrelating to discounting indirect impacts on conflict and maladaptation \r\n(Asplund and Hjerpe, 2020) and risks of unintended outcomes \r\n(Mirumachi et  al., 2020). Crawford and Church (2020) highlight the \r\nsynergies between adaptation planning under the UNFCCC's National \r\nAdaptation Plan process and conflict reduction"


id: bbd31dc6eb1ae3dfa5d350ce752fbcca
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
" Discussing development \r\nmore broadly, Abrahams (2020) suggests three barriers to development \r\nthat incorporate conflict-climate risks: geographically disconnected \r\nimpacts and outcomes, the discourse of climate as a threat multiplier \r\n(rather than underlying peace) and teleconnected risks occurring at \r\ndifferent scales. Effective approaches rely on understanding local power \r\ndynamics and social relations (Sovacool 2018; Roth et al. 2019; Sapiains \r\net al. 2021) (high agreement, medium evidence)."


id: de4b34152da36398e4d705b24bdef935
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 32463
content:
"Gender-based approaches provide novel under-utilised pathways \r\nto achieving sustainable peace (high confidence). Security council \r\nresolutions have encouraged the incorporation of gender analysis into \r\npeacebuilding and research has shown that taking into account the \r\ngendered nature of networks and dialogues opens new avenues for \r\ncooperation that are conflict sensitive (Dunn and Matthew, 2015), \r\ncreating potential for women's rights and advocacy groups to be drivers \r\nof peace (Cespedes-Baez, 2018). For example, women are working to \r\nreduce climate vulnerability security risks in urban settings by entering \r\nlocal politics and joining community-based organised and civil society \r\nnetworks (Kellog, 2020). The gendered nature of vulnerability and \r\naccess to natural resources (Sections  4.6.4, 4.7.5.3, 5.4.2.3, 5.5.2.6, \r\n5.8.2"


id: a4c582c3adb442253f4d4d5c7d3511f1
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content:
"2; Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18) will influence the \r\nefficacy of interventions to prevent conflict or to build durable peace \r\n(Pearse, 2017; Chandra et al., 2017; Frohlich et al., 2018). However, this \r\nunderstanding has not so far resulted in widespread employment of \r\ngender-led analyses (Frohlich and Gioli, 2015). This represents a key \r\nopportunity for expansion of the solution space for climate-related \r\nconflict. Analysis of peace processes more generally demonstrates \r\nthe benefits of women's participation in peace processes for devising \r\nstrategies for building peace (Paffenholz, 2018; Cardenas and Olivius, \r\n2021) and for the durability of that peace (Shair-Rosenfield and Wood, \r\n2017; Krause et al., 2018)."


id: 8d470551cf9e941ad42c4f54c090aade
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 19752
content:
"Stress testing is an approach for evaluating the extent to which health \r\nsystems are prepared for a future different from today (Ebi et al., 2018a). \r\nThese desk-based exercises identify a desirable future outcome, such \r\nas successfully managing an extreme heatwave, flood or storm with \r\ncharacteristics outside the range of recent experiences. The exercises \r\nmove beyond identifying likely challenges from hazardous exposures \r\nto specifying policies and measures that could be successful under a \r\ndifferent climate and development pathway. The exercises consider \r\nsocioeconomic and political factors that can influence the extent of \r\nhealth system vulnerability and other factors that can affect health \r\nsystem demands by impacting population health"


id: 8317af902861e4e99c5d6c65903387c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18154
content:
" Stress testing is \r\ndesigned to identify conditions under which it would be difficult for \r\nthe health system to maintain its essential functions and to identify \r\ninterventions that could maintain essential system functions despite \r\nclimate-related shocks and stresses."


id: 36a08076c7893e2691ad16c5c2f7585f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5983
content:
"UHC is when all people have access to the health services they need, \r\nwhen and where they need them, without financial hardship (WHO, \r\n2021b). Achieving UHC is one of the targets in the SDGs. However, \r\nclimate change is threatening to undermine the achievement of UHC \r\nthrough negative health outcomes and healthcare system disruptions \r\n(Salas and Jha, 2019; Phillips et  al., 2020; Kadandale et  al., 2020; \r\nRoa et  al., 2020). Climate change adaptation and UHC progress \r\nare closely linked to one another, as both may improve health and \r\nachieve health equity (Salas and Jha, 2019). Supporting UHC is key \r\nto securing population health under a changing climate as well as \r\naddressing structural inequalities (Roos et  al., 2021; Aleksandrova, \r\n2020; Phillips et al., 2020)"


id: bf7daa46717c21e356f10fa4dd6bcf80
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 27686
content:
" Many regions of the world with the highest \r\nlevels of vulnerability to the health impacts of climate change also \r\nhave low levels of UHC; an integrated approach to UHC planning that \r\nincorporates climate change will have great benefits particularly in \r\nimproving health equity (Salas and Jha, 2019)."


id: e76ac5e1eec74868bb3afc67452aef9e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"The SDGs are globally agreed objectives that integrate the economic, \r\nenvironmental and social aspects of sustainable development to end \r\npoverty, protect nature and ensure that all people enjoy peace and \r\nprosperity. The SDGs were developed under the principle that the \r\ngoals are integrated and indivisible, such that progress in one goal \r\ndepends on progress in others (WHO, 2016b). Promoting health and \r\nwell-being is not the sole responsibility of the health sector; it is also \r\npartially determined by strategies, policies and options such as poverty \r\nreduction, promoting gender equality, ensuring all people enjoy \r\npeace and prosperity, eliminating nutritional insecurity and ensuring \r\navailability and sustainable management of water and sanitation \r\n(Morton et  al., 2019; Bennett et  al., 2020)"


id: c88e56bc2a0ea31bbca4571a59dfe847
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" Unique themes in the \r\nSDGs for health policy and systems research include social protection, \r\naccess to health services, stronger and more effective multi-sectoral \r\ncollaborations beyond the health sector to address the upstream \r\ndrivers of health and well-being, and participatory and accountable \r\ninstitutions to strengthen civic engagement and local accountability \r\nwithin health systems (Bennett et al., 2020)."


id: 888d648541575dde67538e578336e5f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 19014
content:
"The 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration \r\nprovides an important opportunity for planning for and responding \r\nto future climate-related migration and displacement (Kalin, 2018).\r\nAmong its 23 objectives, the Compact explicitly encourages the \r\ninternational community to implement migration policies that facilitate \r\nvoluntary migration and actively prepare for involuntary displacements \r\ndue to climate change, especially in low- and middle-income countries. \r\nThe Compact's objectives include reducing barriers to legal and safe \r\nmigration, and facilitating the freer flow of remittances between sending \r\nand receiving communities. By doing so the Compact aims to increase \r\nthe potential for migration to make positive contributions to sustainable \r\ndevelopment and to adaptive capacity-building. It also contains specific \r\nprovisions pertaining to climate- and disaster-related migration and \r\ndisplacement"


id: 58789aa0aeb8d03883a9350058390ea6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"roles in peacebuilding, integrated programme design, and further \r\nresearch on gender, climate and security linkages. Inclusive approaches \r\nrecognise that much of the vulnerability that drives conflict risk \r\nis generated by existing inequality and marginalisation of large \r\nproportions of the population--for example women and youth--and \r\nthat peace cannot be achieved without their needs being taken into \r\naccount and without their participation in peace processes (Mosello \r\net al., 2021). Diverse and inclusive partnerships also require ways to \r\nbetter engage local-level participation, and improve understanding of \r\nhow to build consensus through human rights-based approaches that \r\nrecognize non-violent conflict and protest to be potentially positive \r\nand constructive elements of transformational approaches to building \r\nresilience (Nursey-Bray, 2017; Ensor et al., 2018; Schipper et al., 2021)"


id: 2ddb058e88212e0e5b723308e415c847
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" \r\nAddressing the lack of participation of researchers and experts from \r\ncountries most at risk of conflict in many climate-related conflict and \r\npeacebuilding assessments and initiatives could also support this \r\nobjective. There is an increasing focus on the role of environmental \r\ndefenders in highlighting violations and gaps in state obligations \r\nthrough non-violent protest (Butt et al., 2019; Scheidel et al., 2020)."


id: 38fe3161e7afb356b5eba88fc169a78b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 6338
content:
"develop climate adaptation and resilience strategies harmonised \r\nat sub-regional and regional levels, and cooperate on disaster risk \r\nprevention and response. Other objectives in the Compact relevant \r\nto climate-related migration include Objective 5 (increasing pathways \r\nfor regular migration) and Objective 19 (facilitating migrants' ability \r\nto contribute to sustainable development). Objective 18, which links \r\nmigration with skills development, is consistent with the 'migration with \r\ndignity' approach to displacement risks (McNamara, 2015; Kupferberg, \r\n2021). The 2018 Global Compact on Refugees observes that climate \r\nhazards increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements"


id: 5cfea347eff371cee5ed3adde48ddc37
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content:
" \r\nThe guidelines this Compact provides to governments regarding actions \r\nfor addressing the causes of refugee movements and considerations for \r\nassisting and supporting refugees are useful for governments seeking \r\nguidance for all forms of displacement more generally, including \r\ndisplacement linked to climate change."


id: ee491b2640fcea0ecb966fbff1b8da20
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"CRDPs for sustainable peace also require different ways of gathering \r\nintelligence and informing conflict risk. Dynamics that affect such \r\nrisks exist across scales from the local to the regional, and require \r\nresponse in a transboundary manner. There is increasing emphasis on \r\nengaging local stakeholders and diverse partnerships to inform context \r\nappropriate measures and better policy coordination (Bremberg et al., \r\n2019; Tshimanga et  al., 2021; Abrahams, 2020). The UN's Climate \r\nSecurity Mechanism, working across three UN departments, takes an \r\nintegrated approach to analyse and support timely and appropriate \r\nresponses to conflict risk, focusing on risk assessments and early \r\nwarning systems to aid conflict prevention, climate-informed peace and \r\nsecurity activities and conflict-sensitive development, and to promote \r\ninter-sectoral cooperation, partnership and information sharing (DPPA \r\net al., 2020)"


id: f13a67028d5e7bed209e4ef08a47fd05
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 35457
content:
" There is already acknowledgement that adaptation needs \r\nto be effectively monitored so that maladaptation can be avoided \r\n(Eriksen et al., 2021). Here, academic research, which until now has \r\npredominantly focused on understanding the causal relationship \r\nbetween conflict and climate, could contribute to advancing the \r\nmonitoring and evaluation of climate-resilient peacebuilding initiatives \r\n(Mach et al., 2020; Gilmore et al., 2018)."


id: bb09e1bcf3e31acc3db322d3a617fe22
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 26971
content:
"Achieving the Paris Agreement and SDGs can result in low-carbon, healthy, resilient and equitable societies with high well-being for all (very \r\nhigh confidence) (Alfredsson et al., 2018; O'Neill et al., 2018). Given the overlap in sources of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and co-pollutants \r\nin energy systems, strategies that pursue GHG emission reductions and improvements in energy efficiency hold significant potential health \r\nco-benefits through air pollution emission reductions (high confidence) (Gao et al., 2018). Air quality improvements alone can substantially \r\noffset, or most likely exceed, mitigation costs at the societal level (Schucht et al., 2015; Chang et al., 2017; Markandya et al., 2018; Vandyck \r\net al., 2018; Peng et al., 2017; Woodward et al., 2019; Sampedro et al., 2020; Xie et al., 2018). Pursuit of a mitigation pathway compatible \r\nwith warming of +1"


id: 334d586517ed0299211adf49947685a3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"5degC with associated cleaner air, avoided extreme events and improved food security and nutrition could result in 152 \r\n+- 43 million fewer premature deaths worldwide between 2020 and 2100 compared with a business-as-usual scenario (Shindell et al., \r\n2018). Reaching the Paris Agreement could result in an annual reduction of 1.18 million air pollution-related deaths, 5.86 million diet\u0002related deaths and 1.15 million deaths due to physical inactivity across nine major economies by 2040 (Hamilton et al., 2021). In Europe, \r\na mitigation scenario compatible with RCP2.6 could reduce total pollution costs, mostly from PM2.5, by 84%, with human health benefits \r\nequal to more than Euro 1 trillion over five years (Scasny et al., 2015). In the EU, ambitious climate mitigation policies could reduce years \r\nof lost life due to fine particulate matter (PM) from over 4"


id: 140c958a9ae8cb0b6da57fd1530d57c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"6 million in 2005 to 1 million in 2050, reduce ozone-related premature deaths \r\nfrom 48,000 to 7,000 and generate health benefits of Euro 62 billion yr-1 in 2050 (Schucht et al., 2015).\r\nHowever, there may be significant trade-offs between mitigation and other societal goals (Dong et  al., 2019; Gao et  al., 2018). In \r\nsome scenarios, mitigation policies consistent with the NDCs may slow poverty reduction efforts (Campagnolo and Davide, 2019) with \r\nimplications for health. A framework of 'co-impacts' that assumes neither a general beneficial nature of all implications from mitigation \r\npolicy nor a hierarchy between climate and other types of benefits, may be more appropriate (Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2014; Cohen et al., 2017)."


id: 882e06c686efd60abc77c0722f983f66
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"Transitioning to affordable clean energy sources for all presents opportunities for substantial well-being, health, and equity co-benefits \r\n(high confidence) (Gibon et al., 2017; Lacey et al., 2017; Peng et al., 2018; Vandyck et al., 2018; Williams et al., 2018). Residential solid fuel \r\nuse affects health and degrades indoor air quality for up to 3.1 billion people in low- and middle-income countries (WHO, 2016b; Wang \r\net al., 2017a). Adherence to planned emission reductions from the Paris Agreement related to renewables could subsequently improve air \r\nquality and prevent 71,000-99,000 premature deaths annually by 2030 (Vandyck et al., 2018). This effect increases with a 2degC pathway, \r\nwith 0.7-1.5 million premature deaths avoided annually by 2050 (Vandyck et al., 2018). Co-benefits are also observed at national and \r\nregional levels"


id: 742a2499538d86b96e61ee75785265f8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" For instance, China could expect 55,000-69,000 averted deaths in 2030 if it transitioned to a half-decarbonised power \r\nsupply for its residential and vehicle sectors (Peng et al., 2018)."


id: b0c1f87a39b21dafd58e5f0f7919f7a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"Climate adaptation and mitigation policies in the building sector offer multiple well-being and health co-benefits (high confidence) \r\n(Diaz-Mendez et al., 2018; Macnaughton et al., 2018; Chpater 3 section 3.6.2). Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) \r\ncertified buildings in the USA, Brazil, China, India, Germany and Turkey saved an estimated USD 7.5 billion in energy costs and averted \r\n33 Mt of CO2 from 2000-2016 (Macnaughton et al., 2018). These measures can increase health benefits through better indoor air quality, \r\nreduction of the heat island effect, improved social well-being through energy poverty alleviation, creation of new jobs, increased \r\nproductive time and income, increased thermal comfort and lighting indoors and reduced noise impact (Smith et al., 2016; McCollum \r\net al., 2018; Thema et al., 2017; Mirasgedis et al., 2014; Alawneh et al., 2019; Diaz-Mendez et al., 2018)"


id: 354fec3502c4f32793ac2a5bc9917d4c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" The value of these multiple co\u0002benefits associated with climate actions in buildings is equal to or greater than the costs of energy savings (Urge-Vorsatz et al., 2016; \r\nPayne et al., 2015; Chapter 14 section 14.4.5)."


id: cd09cbce03d454e3a8299cbada0865d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 29806
content:
"Shifting to sustainable food systems that provide affordable, diverse and plant-rich diets with moderate quantities of GHG-intensive \r\nanimal protein can bring health co-benefits and substantially reduce GHG emissions, especially in high income countries and where ill \r\nhealth related to overconsumption of animal-based products is prevalent (very high confidence) (Chapter 5 section 5.12.6; Chapter 7 \r\nsection 7.4, Chapter 13 section 13.5; Springmann et al., 2018c; IPCC, 2019b; Clark and Tilman, 2017; Poore and Nemecek, 2018; Hayek \r\net al., 2021). Transforming the food system by limiting the demand for GHG-intensive animal foods, reducing food over-consumption and \r\ntransitioning to nutritious, plant-rich diets can have significant co-benefits to health (high confidence) (Hedenus et al., 2014; Ripple et al., \r\n2014; Tirado, 2017; Springmann et al., 2018c; IPCC, 2018; IPCC, 2019a; IPCC, 2019b; Nelson et al., 2016; Willett et al., 2019; Tilman and \r\nClark, 2014; Green et al"


id: 60b8a2f463b9c3a8b248fa1104ca78c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
", 2015; Springmann et al., 2016b; Springmann et al., 2018b; Springmann et al., 2018a; Springmann et al., 2018c; \r\nMilner et al., 2015; Milner et al., 2017; Farchi et al., 2017; Song et al., 2017; Willett et al., 2019). Reduction of red meat consumption \r\nreduces the risk of cardiovascular disease (CVD) and colorectal cancer; the consumption of more fruits and vegetables can reduce the risk \r\nof CVD, type II diabetes, cancer and all causes of mortality (Tilman and Clark, 2014; Sabate and Soret, 2014; Willett et al., 2019; Chapter \r\n7 section 7.4; Chapter 5 section 5.12.5). Globally, it is estimated that transitioning to more plant-based diets--in line with World Health \r\nOrganization (WHO) recommendations on healthy eating--could reduce global mortality by 6-10% and food-related GHG emissions by \r\n29-70% by 2050 (Springmann et al., 2016b). There are limitations in accessibility of affordable of healthy and diverse diets for all \r\n(Springmann et al"


id: b0ab791574da6da82e8cfa2de6b01e60
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
", 2020) and trade-offs such as the potential increase of GHG emissions from producing healthy and diverse diets in \r\nlow- and medium-income countries (Semba et  al., 2020). Agroecological approaches have mitigation and adaptation potential and \r\ndeliver ecosystem services, biodiversity, livelihoods and benefits to nutrition, health and equity (Rosenstock et al., 2019; Bezner Kerr et al., \r\n2021; Chapter 5 sections 5.4.4, 5.14.1; Chapter 13 section 13.5; Chapter 14 section 14.4.4)."


id: d7ec74296d9fc5051bd8d671309758ec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
"Climate change will affect human health and well-being in a variety of direct and indirect ways that depend on \r\nexposure to hazards and vulnerabilities that are heterogeneous and vary within societies, and that are influenced \r\nby social, economic and geographical factors and individual differences (see Figure  FAQ7.1.1). Changes in the \r\nmagnitude, frequency and intensity of extreme climate events (e.g., storms, floods, wildfires, heatwaves and dust \r\nstorms) will expose people to increased risks of climate-sensitive illnesses and injuries and, in the worst cases, higher \r\nmortality rates. Increased risks for mental health and well-being are associated with changes caused by the impacts \r\nof climate change on climate-sensitive health outcomes and systems (see Figure FAQ7.1.2)"


id: f8b7c8231807a800821e599eda77356f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 36644
content:
" Higher temperatures and \r\nchanging geographical and seasonal precipitation patterns will facilitate the spread of mosquito- and tick-borne \r\ndiseases, such as Lyme disease and dengue fever, and water- and food-borne diseases. An increase in the frequency \r\nof extreme heat events will exacerbate health risks associated with cardiovascular disease and affect access to \r\nfreshwater in multiple regions, impairing agricultural productivity and increasing food insecurity, undernutrition \r\nand poverty in low-income areas."


id: 182caf10394a2f604c10c48af3648aac
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1291
content:
"Climate change will have impacts on future migration patterns that will vary by region and over time, depending \r\non the types of climate risks people are exposed to, their vulnerability to those risks and their capacity--and the \r\ncapacity of their governments--to adapt and respond. Depending on the range of adaptation options available, \r\nhouseholds may use migration as a strategy to adapt to climate risks, often through labour migration. The most \r\ncommon drivers of climate-related displacement are extreme weather events, floods and droughts, especially when \r\nthese events cause severe damage to homes, livelihoods and food systems. Rising sea levels will present a new \r\nrisk for communities situated in low-lying coastal areas and small island states. The greater the scale of future \r\nwarming and extreme events, the greater the potential scale of future, involuntary climate-related migration and \r\ndisplacement"


id: cbf0f2a2946fa52c32b71b93b93b5790
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
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content:
"Progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has strong potential to reduce \r\nfuture involuntary climate-related migration and displacement."


id: 270a2ec765c45f23a277992c9efaca5b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3539
content:
"The solution space includes policies, strategies and programmes that consider why, how, when and who should be \r\ninvolved to sustainably adapt to climate change. Effectively preparing for and managing the health risks of climate \r\nchange requires considering the multiple interacting sectors that affect population health and effective functioning \r\nof health systems. Considering the close inter-connections between health, migration and conflict, interventions \r\nthat address climate risks in one area often have synergistic benefits in others. For example, conflicts often result \r\nin large numbers of people being involuntarily displaced and facilitate the spread of climate-sensitive diseases; \r\ntackling the underlying causes of vulnerability and exposure that generate conflict reduces risks across all areas"


id: 40fa4fd9e13063df4bffb9b63b1efa33
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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content:
" \r\nA key starting point for health and well-being is strengthening public health systems so that they become more \r\nclimate resilient, which also requires cooperation with other sectors (water, food, sanitation, transportation, etc.) to \r\nensure appropriate funding and progress on sustainable development goals. Interventions to enhance protection \r\nagainst specific climate-sensitive health risks could reduce morbidity and mortality and prevent many losses and \r\ndamages (Figure FAQ7.4.1). These range from malaria net initiatives, vector control programmes, health hazard \r\n(syndromic) surveillance and early warning systems, improving access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), heat \r\naction plans (HAPs), behavioural changes and integration with disaster risk reduction (DRR) and response strategies"


id: 6fc0329bf2fbad0ad42379762beea68e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15207
content:
"Many actions taken in other sectors to address the risks of climate change can lead to benefits for health and \r\nwell-being. Adaptive urban design that provides greater access to green and natural spaces simultaneously enhances \r\nbiodiversity, improves air quality and moderates the hydrological cycle; it also helps reduce health risks associated \r\nwith heat stress and respiratory illnesses, and mitigates mental health challenges associated with congested \r\nurban living. Transitioning away from internal-combustion vehicles and fossil fuel-powered generating stations \r\nto renewable energy mitigates greenhouse gas emissions, improves air quality and lowers the risks of respiratory \r\nillnesses. Policies and designs that facilitate active urban transport (walking and bicycling) increase efficiency in \r\nthat sector, reduce emissions, improve air quality and generate physical and mental health benefits for residents"


id: 7be1ce94dc5e94827798b21e94965ed4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17093
content:
" \r\nImproved building and urban design that foster energy efficiency improve indoor air quality and reduce risks of \r\nheat stress and respiratory illness. Food systems that emphasise healthy, plant-centred diets reduce emissions in the \r\nagricultural sector while helping in the fight against malnutrition."


id: 82c8defcd4ddf2a70a1d6e915f615041
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vector_id: 18101
content:
"A growing range of economic and non-economic losses have \r\nbeen detected and attributed to climate extremes and slow\u0002onset events under observed increases in global temperatures \r\n(medium evidence, high agreement). If future climate change under \r\nhigh emissions scenarios continues and increases risks, without strong \r\nadaptation measures, losses and damages will likely2\r\n be concentrated \r\namong the poorest vulnerable populations (high confidence). The \r\nintersection of inequality and poverty presents significant adaptation \r\nlimits, resulting in residual risks for people and groups in vulnerable \r\nsituations, including women, youth, elderly, ethnic and religious \r\nminorities, Indigenous People and refugees. Climate change is likely \r\nto force economic transitions among the poorest groups, accelerating \r\nthe switch from agriculture to other forms of wage labour, with \r\nimplications for labour migration and urbanisation (medium evidence, \r\nhigh agreement)"


id: fb5281335a88332e2cd9b9d0b07040cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 37047
content:
" Under an inequality scenario (Shared Socioeconomic \r\nPathway (SSP) 4) the projected number of people living in extreme \r\npoverty may increase by 122  million by 2030 (medium confidence). \r\n{8.2, 8.3.4, 8.4.1, 8.4.5, Figure 8.6, Box 8.5, 16.5.2.3.4}"


id: ebb47398c2e01a656c59dba0764d4f14
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34584
content:
"Observed societal impacts of climate change, such as mortality \r\ndue to floods, droughts and storms, are much greater for regions \r\nwith high vulnerability compared to regions with low vulner\u0002ability, which reveals the different starting points that regions \r\nhave in their move towards climate resilient development (high \r\nconfidence). Observed average mortality from floods, drought and \r\nstorms is 15 times higher for regions and countries ranked as very high \r\nvulnerable, such as Mozambique, Somalia, Nigeria, Afghanistan and \r\nHaiti compared to very low vulnerable regions and countries, such as \r\nUK, Australia, Canada and Sweden in the last decade (high confidence). \r\nOver 3.3 billion people are living in countries classified as very highly \r\nor highly vulnerable, while around 1.8 billion people live in countries \r\nwith low or very low vulnerability (high confidence). Approximately \r\n3"


id: dc089ecb72d45bf530281fd6aa2b3aae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
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vector_id: 32133
content:
"6 billion people live in low and lower middle-income countries, which \r\nare most vulnerable and disproportionally bear the human costs of dis\u0002asters due to extreme weather events and hazards (high confidence). \r\nThe population in most vulnerable countries is projected to increase sig\u0002nificantly by 2050 and 2100, while the population in countries with low \r\nvulnerability is projected to decrease or grow only slightly. Vulnerability \r\nis a result of many interlinked issues concerning poverty, migration, in\u0002equality, access to basic services, education, institutions and govern\u0002ance capacities, often made more complex by past developments, such \r\nas histories of colonialism (high confidence). {8.3.2, 8.3.3}"


id: e278f3bd588fa3e2c7f14bde3eb51ce8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:25
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33142
content:
"Mitigation and adaptation responses to climate change influence \r\ninequalities, poverty and livelihood security and thereby aspects \r\nof climate justice (medium confidence). Improving coherence \r\nbetween adaptations of different social groups and sectors at \r\ndifferent scales can reduce maladaptation, enable mitigation \r\nand advance progress towards climate resilience (medium \r\nconfidence). The poor typically have low carbon footprints but are \r\ndisproportionately affected by adverse consequences of climate change \r\nand also lack access to adaptation options. In many cases, the poor \r\nand most vulnerable people and groups are most adversely affected by \r\nmaladaptation (medium evidence, high agreement). Climate justice and \r\nrights-based approaches are increasingly recognised as key principles \r\nwithin mitigation and adaptation strategies and projects (medium \r\nconfidence). Narrowing gender gaps can play a transformative role \r\nin pursuing climate justice (medium confidence)"


id: b7f41f98526b5597e038cbd7efa96b35
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26474
content:
" Climate resilient \r\ndevelopment is therefore closely coupled with issues of climate justice. \r\nSynergies between adaptation and mitigation exist, and these can \r\nhave benefits for the poor (medium confidence). {8.4, 8.4.5.5, 8.6}"


id: 70f57a31f1d612a36f736d784f9f3c28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15405
content:
"The impacts of climate change have already significantly affected \r\nlivelihoods and living conditions, especially of the poorest and most \r\nvulnerable, and will continue to undermine development during the \r\ncoming century. This chapter assesses the societal consequences of \r\nclimate change and related hazards in terms of adverse and irreversible \r\nconsequences for the most vulnerable. To understand societal conse\u0002quences of climate change, we assess impacts through the perspective \r\nof vulnerability, poverty and livelihoods of people. We identify why cli\u0002mate events trigger sudden and slow-onset disasters, and how the most \r\nsevere, acute and chronic impacts cause and deepen human suffering. \r\nWe also examine issues of climate justice"


id: 740e3c2838ddacf8565060ea07947ec6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15861
content:
" Understanding and engaging \r\nwith climate justice requires a plural focus on the historical social and \r\ninstitutional relations and inequalities that produce climate change, \r\ncause people to be vulnerable to climate hazards and shape responses \r\nto them (Newell et al., 2021). An assessment of observed impacts on the \r\npoorest and their strategies for adaptation carries important lessons for \r\ninclusive, broad-based solutions to climate change."


id: 39902da862e2fe4f84516417d86e7dc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6432
content:
"As a starting point, this chapter examines linkages between climate \r\nchange, specific climate-related hazards and impacts on multidimen\u0002sional poverty, vulnerability and livelihoods. Past assessments have \r\nidentified the linkages between climate change, poverty, livelihoods \r\nand human vulnerability, and shown how climate change leads to \r\ndifferential consequences for different communities and populations. \r\nThe IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) identified socially and geo\u0002graphically disadvantaged people exposed to persistent inequalities \r\nat the intersection of various dimensions of discrimination based on \r\ngender, age, ethnicity, class and caste (IPCC, 2014a). AR5 also showed \r\nevidence that climate change is a universal driver and multiplier of \r\nrisk that shapes dynamic interactions between these factors. Climate \r\nchange is one stressor that shapes dynamic and differential livelihood \r\ntrajectories. Also, the IPCC Special 1.5degC Report (IPCC SR 1"


id: 6f15014dd272bf1b802a28913d1551a2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15104
content:
"5degC) under\u0002scored with very high confidence that global mean temperature, harm \r\nand human well-being losses are increasing substantially (Hoegh\u0002Guldberg et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018)."


id: 4c19e170942fc24f142cfd3a85d04632
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9397
content:
"The chapter outlines new approaches for identifying social tipping \r\npoints, meaning moments of rapid, destabilising change across scales \r\nthat can complement the discussion about physical tipping points in \r\nthe climate system. It also addresses new perspectives on the baselines \r\nfor assessing future vulnerabilities, and the potential for irreversible \r\nlosses, emphasising not only economic but also non-economic losses, \r\nwhich are linked to past and present development trajectories. There \r\nis robust evidence on non-economic losses, including the loss of \r\nland, livelihoods, social networks, cultural values and the irreversible \r\ndegradation of ecosystem functions, as observed, for example, in parts \r\nof the Amazon. Non-economic losses are intertwined with economic \r\nlosses to influence human health, nutrition, well-being and social \r\nstability, and therefore also influence present and future vulnerabilities \r\nand adaptive capacities"


id: 3ca68b0622c6fc8f0893892d72cb2715
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6908
content:
" Non-economic losses from climate change \r\ndisproportionately affect the poor. People in vulnerable situations are \r\noften disproportionately affected as they are less resilient and have \r\nless access to institutional support (including protection mechanisms) \r\nand coping strategies. This knowledge is key for informing integrated \r\nstrategies for sustainable livelihood transitions and adaptation."


id: 495dc4b00ece601de622d3922d423f9d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8922
content:
"New evidence highlights the potential for multi-hazard risks to push \r\nthe poor into persistent traps of extreme poverty (Rasanen et  al., \r\n2016). Risk of extreme impoverishment increases for low-income \r\npeople experiencing repeated and successive climatic events, whereby \r\nbefore they have recovered from one disaster, they face another impact \r\n(Forzieri et  al., 2016). Cascading and compounding risks arise from \r\nmultiple climate hazards coinciding to produce impacts, for example, \r\nin mountainous regions, where the combination of glacier recession \r\nand extreme rainfall result in landslides (Martha et al., 2015). There is \r\nrobust evidence that this effect has been observed around slow- and \r\nrapid-onset climate events related to drought (i.e., rising temperatures, \r\nheatwaves and rainfall scarcity), with devastating consequences for \r\nagriculture (Vogt et al., 2018; Bouwer, 2019)"


id: 1262bc490477da55ec8336f3096d752a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 394
content:
" In particular, the urban \r\nand rural landless poor face difficulties rebuilding assets following \r\none-off disasters or a series of shocks (Garcia-Aristizabal et al., 2015)."


id: ab6222d73a9dde658ec7cd44a81c4804
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
content_type: text
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vector_id: 24482
content:
"There is high confidence that climate-related hazards, including both \r\nslow-onset shifts and extreme events, directly affect the poor through \r\nadverse impacts on livelihoods (see Figure 8.2), including reductions \r\nand losses of agricultural yields, impacts on human health and food \r\nsecurity, destruction of homes, and loss of income (Hallegatte et al., \r\n2015; Connolly-Boutin and Smit, 2016). One of the key factors that \r\ndrives disproportionate impacts among poor households globally is \r\nlost agricultural income (high confidence) (Hallegatte et  al., 2015; \r\nIslam and Winkel, 2017). Also of concern are the impacts of climate \r\nhazards to human health, which is a primary resource that the poor \r\nrely on (Figure  8.2)"


id: 9e53fc9223b33b9d52c5d254bf0c4826
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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vector_id: 22435
content:
" There are only few robust global estimates of \r\nobserved income losses to the poor that comprehensively account for \r\nall climate hazards; nevertheless, (Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017), \r\nestimating average impacts of climate change on incomes of the poor, \r\nfound that across 92 developing countries, the poorest 40% of the \r\npopulation experienced losses that were 70% greater than the losses \r\nof people with average wealth."


id: 8153d6cc98267589768832984ba496
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
content_type: text
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vector_id: 17874
content:
"Climate change is one driver among many that challenges livelihoods \r\nof the rural poor, including economic transitions associated with \r\nindustrialisation and urbanisation, and also governance failures such \r\nas unclear property rights and civil conflict (e.g., Nyantakyi-Frimpong \r\nand Bezner-Kerr, 2015). Recent research adds evidence about the ways \r\nthat climate hazards impact non-climatic stressors with implications for \r\npoverty reduction (Nelson et al., 2016). The risk that climate hazards may \r\npush the poor into persistent extreme poverty intensifies with stagnant \r\nwages, rising costs of living, mobility traps, and ethnic or religious \r\ndiscrimination (Cramer et  al., 2014; Carter et  al., 2016). Likewise in \r\nboth urban and rural environments, non-climatic factors related to \r\ngovernance exacerbate the impacts of climate events among the \r\npoorest, including poor service provisioning (e.g., waste collection), poor \r\nurban planning (e.g"


id: 950c919aa3956e6571128b0ab6255007
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20957
content:
", waste water drainage) and water management \r\nfailures (Di Baldassarre et al., 2010; Leal Filho et al., 2018), as well as \r\npoor rangeland management, intensification of farming land uses (i.e., \r\novergrazing, deforestation), degradation of wetlands, shortage of water \r\nand soil erosion in rural areas (Olsson et al., 2019)."


id: 1a672b8ecdf97d394ead838439fb0724
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1629
content:
"A key risk for the poor is shocks to specific livelihood assets that may \r\nforce low-income groups into persistent poverty traps (Figure  8.4; \r\nChambers and Conway, 1992; Cinner et al., 2018) but research also \r\nsuggests that climate change impacts are also driving transient forms \r\nof poverty, a modality of poverty which is recurring (Angelsen et al., \r\n2014). Recurrent poverty is, for instance, seen in relation to crop losses \r\nand decreasing agricultural production when income losses worsen \r\nliving conditions (Ward, 2016; Kihara et  al., 2020). Recent research \r\nshows that climate change impacts may exacerbate poverty indirectly \r\nthrough increasing cost of food, housing and healthcare, among other \r\nrising costs borne by the poor (Islam et  al., 2014; Ebi et  al., 2017; \r\nHallegatte et al., 2018) (high confidence)"


id: b55dd88768d8405480ad80aca8dd8338
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26071
content:
" Severe adverse impacts of \r\nclimate change at present and future risks may result from permanent, \r\nsudden, destabilising changes accompanying climate events such as \r\ndecreases in food security, large-scale migration, changes in labour \r\ncapacity or conflict (Bentley et al., 2014). Overall, there is more evidence \r\nthat even under medium warming pathways, climate change risks to \r\npoverty would become severe if vulnerability is high and adaptation is \r\nlow (limited evidence, high agreement) (see Section 16.5.2.3.4)"


id: 653bc47e246d5671e8ef0600a592ca8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13499
content:
"High confidence for observed livelihood impacts is spatially \r\nconcentrated in South Asia, Africa, North America, and to a lesser extent \r\nSmall Island Developing States (SIDS) (Figure 8.2c). The hazards most \r\nprevalent in all regions include warming trends, droughts and sea level \r\nrise (Figure 8.2c), and undermine crop productivity, crop varieties, and \r\ncropland in most regions (high confidence). Along coastlines, climate \r\nhazards threaten livelihoods particularly exposed to extreme weather, \r\nflooding and sea level rise, and where poor populations are heavily \r\ndependent on agriculture and fisheries (high confidence). One third of \r\ntotal sampled evidence on livelihood impacts was observed in just three \r\ncountries--Bangladesh, India and Nepal--indicating accumulating \r\nexperience with livelihood impacts in South Asia (Figure 8.2c). However, \r\nthis spatial representation of confidence does not mean that observed \r\nlivelihood impacts are not occurring in other regions as well"


id: 9f987ed268e02e19904db1fa528c29a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22648
content:
" Relative to \r\nSouth Asia, in Central Asia and the Caribbean, for example, the weight \r\nof evidence of livelihood impacts though lighter is still robust. Among \r\nindustrialised nations, there is high confidence that climate change has \r\nimpacted livelihood resources in the USA."


id: 3a5509a8ab45c1c6d1844d3a2011564b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6546
content:
"New observations provide greater evidence on the role of extreme \r\npoverty and global inequality, most of the detrimental direct impacts of \r\nclimate change (e.g., rising food insecurity) disproportionately affecting \r\nthe Global South (Hasegawa et al., 2018; Mbow et al., 2019; Khan and \r\nZhang, 2021) compared with the Global North. Poor populations in \r\nmany countries are also disproportionately facing extreme L&D from \r\nheatwaves, flooding and tropical weather extremes (Gamble et  al., \r\n2016). New case studies, such as the European heatwave of 2018, \r\nillustrate significant negative impacts across crop production in the \r\nGlobal North (Beillouin et al., 2020), livestock value chain (FAO, 2018; \r\nGodde et  al., 2021) and fishing (Plaganyi, 2019). Heatwave-induced \r\nintense fires can cause property damage, physical injury and death, as \r\nwell as health and psychological harm of the victims"


id: 1460782190949e65fb9bc79f3b3b368b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
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index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 716
content:
" Heatwaves also \r\ncreate ideal conditions for the prevalence of certain pathogens, increase \r\nthe risk of temperature-related health problems and exacerbate many \r\npre-existing diseases (Rossiello and Szema, 2019)."


id: a76afe377cbec56c4bd5be3f34d19825
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23846
content:
"The negative impacts of climate change on groups of vulnerable or \r\nmarginalised communities generate so-called 'residual impacts' and \r\nresidual risks that can remain a challenge in their lives (Warner and \r\nVan der Geest, 2013; James et al., 2014; Klein et al., 2014; Boyd et al., \r\n2017). Such 'unacceptable' L&Ds include the loss of income sources, \r\nfood insecurity, malnutrition, permanent impacts to health and \r\nlabour productivity, loss of life and loss of homelands, among others \r\n(McNamara and Jackson, 2019; Schwerdtle et al., 2020). The literature \r\non L&D provides robust evidence not only on economic dimensions \r\nof global L&Ds, but also experiences of non-economic losses from the \r\nimpacts of climate change (see detail in Section  8.3; Barnett et  al., \r\n2016; Roy et al., 2018; McNamara and Jackson, 2019)"


id: 38dae0684b276ee3f1cb7a5c93bd17cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6316
content:
" The extreme \r\nevents that have occurred in recent years highlight the potential for \r\nL&D, including 2019's Cyclone Kenneth, the strongest in the recorded \r\nhistory of the African continent, which made landfall in northern \r\nMozambique causing 45 deaths and destroying approximately 40,000 \r\nhouses, leaving hundreds of thousands at risk of acquiring waterborne \r\ndiseases such as cholera during a prolonged recovery period (Cambaza \r\net al., 2019)."


id: 50a7f8c3edb27205035b57d3a3a1d9ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:26
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10132
content:
"Extreme events (e.g., heatwaves, cold periods, icy conditions) occurring \r\nin the Global North illustrate that such events cause disproportionate \r\nimpacts among ageing populations, due to their immobility, isolation, \r\ninfrastructure deficiencies and poor health assistance (Carter et  al., \r\n2016; Reckien et al., 2018). A well-known example is the heatwave \r\nin 2003 that killed thousands of elderly citizens across Europe \r\n(Poumadere et  al., 2005; Garcia-Herrera et  al., 2010; Laaidi et  al., \r\n2011). More recently, in the Nordic region, elderly populations have \r\nbeen experiencing distress associated with heatwaves and extreme \r\ncold events, with significant increases in morbidity and mortality due \r\nto cardiovascular and respiratory failure, showing that both age and \r\nunderlying health issues intersect with climate change impacts (Carter \r\net al., 2016; Li et al., 2016)"


