# document

id: 85b31170abbca652b25b1740b2bdcdad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18574
content:
"Not all regions and sectors must reach net zero CO2 or GHG emissions individually to achieve global net zero CO2 or GHG emissions, \r\nrespectively; instead, positive emissions in one sector or region can be compensated by net negative emissions from another sector \r\nor region. The time each sector or region reaches net zero CO2 or GHG emissions depends on the mitigation options available, the \r\ncost of those options, and the policies implemented (including any consideration of equity or fairness). Most modelled pathways \r\nthat likely limit warming to 2degC (>67%) above pre-industrial levels and below use land-based CO2 removal such as afforestation/\r\nreforestation and BECCS to achieve net zero CO2 and net zero GHG emissions even while some CO2 and non-CO2 emissions continue \r\nto occur"


id: 5281c1631a0a9e06a5242ea79b014478
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10438
content:
" Pathways with more demand-side interventions that limit the amount of energy we use, or where the diet that we consume \r\nis changed, can achieve net zero CO2, or net zero GHG emissions with less carbon dioxide removal (CDR). All available studies \r\nrequire at least some kind of carbon dioxide removal to reach net zero; that is, there are no studies where absolute zero GHG or \r\neven CO2 emissions are reached by deep emissions reductions alone."


id: ce139288dbb3a48da8175cdbc3022919
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29937
content:
"IAMs are used to develop a wide range of scenarios describing future trajectories for greenhouse gas emissions based on a wide set \r\nof assumptions regarding socio-economic development, technological changes, political development and climate policy. Typically, \r\nthe IAM-based scenarios can be divided into (i) reference scenarios (describing possible trajectories in the absence of new stringent \r\nclimate policies) and (ii) mitigation scenarios (describing the impact of various climate policy assumptions). Reference scenarios \r\ntypically result in high emissions and, subsequently, high levels of climate change (in the order of 2.5degC-4degC during the 21st century). \r\nThe purpose of such reference scenarios is to explore the consequences of climate change and act as a reference for mitigation \r\nscenarios. The possible emission levels for reference scenarios diverge from stabilising and even slowly declining emissions (e.g"


id: 3655782c52432eba5b850d760697d82a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5940
content:
", for \r\ncurrent policy scenarios or SSP1) to very high emission levels (e.g., SSP5 and RCP8.5). The latter leads to nearly 5degC of warming \r\nby the end of the century for medium climate sensitivity. Hausfather and Peters (2020) pointed out that since 2011, the rapid \r\ndevelopment of renewable energy technologies and emerging climate policy have made it considerably less likely that emissions \r\ncould end up as high as RCP8.5. This means that reaching emissions levels as high as RCP8.5 has become less likely. Still, high \r\nemissions cannot be ruled out for many reasons, including political factors and, for instance, higher than anticipated population \r\nand economic growth. Climate projections of RCP8.5 can also result from strong feedbacks of climate change on (natural) emission \r\nsources and high climate sensitivity (AR6 WGI Chapter 7). Therefore, their median climate impacts might also materialise while \r\nfollowing a lower emission path (e.g., Hausfather and Betts 2020)"


id: c978b96326daa10b3d8da02194f978b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29257
content:
" All in all, this means that high-end scenarios have become \r\nconsiderably less likely since AR5 but cannot be ruled out. High-end scenarios (like RCP8.5) can be very useful to explore high-end \r\nrisks of climate change but are not typical 'business-as-usual' projections and should therefore not be presented as such."


id: 17a236bfb76387570d0ba17a7b345f76
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1213
content:
"Given the gaps, there is a  need to explore accelerated \r\nmitigation (relative to NDCs and current policies). There is \r\nincreasing understanding of the technical content of accelerated \r\nmitigation pathways, differentiated by national circumstances, with \r\nconsiderable though uneven literature at country-level (medium \r\nevidence, high agreement). Transformative technological and \r\ninstitutional changes for the near term include demand reductions \r\nthrough efficiency and reduced activity, rapid decarbonisation of the \r\nelectricity sector and low-carbon electrification of buildings, industry \r\nand transport (robust evidence, medium agreement). A  focus on \r\nenergy use and supply is essential, but not sufficient on its own - \r\nthe land sector and food systems deserve attention. The literature \r\ndoes not adequately include demand-side options and systems \r\nanalysis, and captures the impact from non-CO2 GHGs with medium \r\nconfidence"


id: 1652dc77109131e0b14778eaf2f09e29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1038
content:
" Countries and regions will have different starting points \r\nfor transition pathways. Some factors include climate conditions \r\nresulting in different heating and cooling needs, endowments with \r\ndifferent energy resources, patterns of spatial development, and \r\npolitical and economic conditions. {4.2.5}"


id: 236cac9b50a458a08c2c908cabce2c18
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3025
content:
"An emissions gap persists, exacerbated by an implementation \r\ngap, despite mitigation efforts including those in near-universal \r\nnationally determined contributions (NDCs). The 'emissions gap' \r\nis understood as the difference between the emissions with NDCs in \r\n2030, and mitigation pathways consistent with the temperature goals. \r\nIn general, the term 'implementation gap' refers to the difference \r\nbetween goals on paper and how they are achieved in practice. In \r\nthis report, the term refers to the gap between mitigation pledges \r\ncontained in national determined contributions, and the expected \r\noutcome of existing policies. There is considerable literature on \r\ncountry-level mitigation pathways, including but not limited to NDCs. \r\nCountry distribution of this literature is very unequal (robust evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). Current policies lead to median global greenhouse \r\ngas (GHG) emissions of 57 GtCO2-eq with a full range of 52-60 by \r\n2030"


id: 90b09d87b008c498c666e0d7388d76ec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20301
content:
" NDCs with unconditional and conditional elements1\r\n lead to \r\n53 (50-57) and 50 (47-55) GtCO2-eq, respectively (medium evidence,\r\nmedium agreement) (Table 4.3). This leaves estimated emissions gaps \r\nin 2030 between projected outcomes of unconditional elements of \r\nNDCs and emissions in scenarios that limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) \r\nwith no or limited overshoot of 19-26 GtCO2-eq, and 10-16 GtCO2-eq \r\nfor scenarios that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) with immediate action. \r\nWhen conditional elements of NDCs are included, these gaps narrow \r\nto 16-23 GtCO2-eq and 6-14 GtCO2-eq, respectively. {Cross-Chapter \r\nBox 4, Figure 1}"


id: 224a3d5fe107f4aa087991838f31a917
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2840
content:
"Accelerated mitigation alone may run into obstacles. If such \r\nobstacles are rooted in underlying structural features of society, then \r\ntransforming such structures helps remove obstacles, which amounts \r\nto shifting development pathways. Various actors have developed an \r\nincreasing number of mitigation strategies up to 2050 (mid-term). \r\nA growing number of such strategies aim at net zero GHG or CO2\r\nemissions, but it is not yet possible to draw global implications due \r\nto the limited size of sample (medium evidence, low agreement). \r\nNon-state actors are also engaging in a  wide range of mitigation \r\ninitiatives. When adding up emission reduction potentials, sub\u0002national and non-state international cooperative initiatives could \r\nreduce up to about 20 GtCO2-eq in 2030 (limited evidence, medium \r\nagreement). Yet perceived or real conflicts between mitigation and \r\nother Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can impede such \r\naction"


id: 6256f7959bba72656592fb9d9012e7cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13027
content:
" If undertaken without precaution, accelerated mitigation is \r\nfound to have significant implications for development objectives and \r\nmacroeconomic costs at country level. For example, most country\u0002level mitigation modelling studies in which GDP is an endogenous \r\nvariable report negative impacts of mitigation on GDP in 2030 and \r\n2050, relative to the reference. In all reviewed studies, however, \r\nGDP continues to grow even with mitigation (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement). The literature finds that employment effect of mitigation \r\npolicies tends to be limited on aggregate, but can be significant \r\nat sectoral level (limited evidence, medium agreement). Detailed \r\ndesign of mitigation policies is critical for distributional impacts and \r\navoiding lock-in (robust evidence, high agreement), though further \r\nresearch is needed in that direction. {4.2.3, 4.2.4, 4.2.6}"


id: 8bfdde5a7f8bbf89d74b8fa31df76bb6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19541
content:
"Studies evaluating up to 105 updated NDCs submitted by \r\nOctober 2021 indicate that emissions in conditional NDCs \r\nhave been reduced by 4.5 (2.7-6.3) GtCO2-eq, but only closes \r\nthe emission gaps by about one-third to 2degC and about 20% \r\nto 1.5degC compared to the original NDCs submitted in 2015/16 \r\n(medium evidence, medium agreement). The magnitude of these \r\nemission gaps calls into question whether current development \r\npathways and efforts to accelerate mitigation are adequate to achieve \r\nthe Paris mitigation objectives"


id: 44f3806a747d2020da653609aec685b8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8277
content:
" In addition, an implementation gap \r\nexists between the projected emissions of 'current policies' and \r\nthe projected emissions resulting from the implementation of the \r\nunconditional and conditional elements of NDCs, and is estimated to \r\nbe around and 7 GtCO2-eq in 2030, respectively (medium evidence,\r\nmedium agreement), with many countries requiring additional \r\npolicies and associated climate action to meet their autonomously \r\ndetermined mitigation targets as specified under the first NDCs \r\n(limited evidence). There is, furthermore, a  potential difference \r\nbetween mitigation targets set in NDCs ex ante and what is achieved \r\nex post. A  limited number of studies assess the implementation \r\ngaps of conditional NDCs in terms of finance, technology and "


id: 8d65fe75468808061b348e77086e001e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19766
content:
"Shifting development pathways towards sustainability \r\noffers ways to (i) broaden the range of levers and enablers \r\nthat a  society can use to provide enabling conditions and \r\naccelerate mitigation; and (ii) increase the chances of \r\nadvancing at the same time towards mitigation and towards \r\nother development goals. The way countries develop determines \r\ntheir capacity to accelerate mitigation and achieve other sustainable \r\ndevelopment objectives simultaneously (medium-robust evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). Yet meeting ambitious mitigation and \r\ndevelopment goals cannot be achieved through incremental change, \r\nhence the focus on shifting development pathways (robust evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). Though development pathways result from the \r\nactions of a wide range of actors, it is possible to shift development \r\npathways through policies and enhancing enabling conditions (limited \r\nevidence, medium agreement). For example, policies such as those \r\nlisted in Table 4"


id: 31f19965234890c5e0e1b5ef185d7056
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5272
content:
"12 are typically associated with broader objectives \r\nthan greenhouse gas mitigation. They are generally conceived and \r\nimplemented in the pursuit of overall societal development objectives, \r\nsuch as job creation, macroeconomic stability, economic growth, and \r\npublic health and welfare. In some countries, such policies are framed \r\nas part of a just transition. However, they can have major influence \r\non mitigative capacity, and hence can be seen as tools to broaden \r\nmitigation options, as illustrated by the Illustrative Mitigation \r\nPathway 'Shifting Pathways' (medium evidence, medium agreement). \r\nThere are practical options to shift development pathways in ways \r\nthat advance mitigation and other sustainable development \r\nobjectives, supporting political feasibility, increase resources to \r\nmeet multiple goals, and reduce emissions (limited evidence, high \r\nagreement)"


id: 7ddfddda5d818b847267b6e3d165c078
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17377
content:
" Concrete examples assessed in this chapter include high \r\nemployment and low emissions structural change, fiscal reforms for \r\nmitigation and social contract, combining housing policies to deliver \r\nboth housing and transport mitigation, and change economic, social \r\nand spatial patterns of development of the agriculture sector provide \r\nthe basis for sustained reductions in emissions from deforestation. \r\nThese examples differ by context. Examples in other chapters include \r\ntransformations in energy, urban, building, industrial, transport, and \r\nland-based systems, changes in behaviour and social practices, as well \r\nas transformational changes across whole economies and societies. \r\nCoordinated policy mixes would need to coordinate multiple actors - \r\nindividuals, groups and collectives, corporate actors, institutions and \r\ninfrastructure actors - to deepen decarbonisation and shift pathways \r\ntowards sustainability. Shifts in one country may spill over to other \r\ncountries"


id: 4ba2a21e8a39157f374a2d5f878e5723
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9318
content:
" Shifting development pathways can jointly support \r\nmitigation and adaptation. Some studies explore the risks of high \r\ncomplexity and potential delay attached to shifting development \r\npathways. {4.3, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.1.7-4.4.1.10, Figure 4.7, \r\nCross-Chapter Box 5, 5.8, Box 6.2, 8.2, 8.3.1, 8.4, 9.8.1, 9.8.2, 10.4.1, \r\nCross-Chapter Box 5, Cross-Chapter Box 7, Cross-Chapter Box 12}\r\nThe literature identifies a broad set of enabling conditions that \r\ncan both foster shifting development pathways and accelerated \r\nmitigation, along five categories (medium evidence, high \r\nagreement). Policy integration is a necessary component of shifting \r\ndevelopment pathways, addressing multiple objectives. To this aim, \r\nmobilising a range of policies is preferable to single policy instruments \r\n(robust evidence, high agreement). Governance for climate mitigation \r\nand shifting development pathways is enhanced when tailored to "


id: 1fb04bf17bd125da17b4a5c25f8f8283
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2418
content:
"national and local contexts. Improved institutions and governance \r\nenable ambitious climate action and help bridge implementation \r\ngaps (medium evidence, high agreement). Given that strengthening \r\ninstitutions may be a  long term endeavour, it needs attention in \r\nthe near ter  m. Accelerated mitigation and shifting development \r\npathways necessitates both redirecting existing financial flows from \r\nhigh- to low-emissions technologies and systems and to provide \r\nadditional resources to overcome current financial barriers (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). Opportunities exist in the near term to \r\nclose the finance gap. At the national level, public finance for actions \r\npromoting the SDG agenda helps broaden the scope of mitigation \r\n(medium evidence, medium agreement)"


id: f3a2cd7a2ff503c92a25f7ebedcf8113
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:42
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35844
content:
" Changes in behaviour and \r\nlifestyles are important to move beyond mitigation as incremental \r\nchange, and when supporting shifts to more sustainable development \r\npathways will broadening the scope of mitigation (medium evidence,\r\nmedium agreement). The direction of innovation matters (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). The necessary transformational changes \r\nare likely to be more acceptable if rooted in the development \r\naspirations of the economy and society within which they take place. \r\n{4.4.1, 4.4.1.2, 4.4.1.3, 4.4.1.4, 4.4.1.5, 4.4.1.6, Figure 4.8, 15.2.2}"


id: 80db3bdbf1fd88f34d55e98ea757fd0a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17796
content:
"Equity can be an important enabler of deeper ambition for \r\naccelerated mitigation, dealing with the distribution of costs and \r\nbenefits and how these are shared as per social contracts, national \r\npolicy and international agreements. Transition pathways have \r\ndistributional consequences such as large changes in employment \r\nand economic structure (robust evidence, high agreement). In that \r\nregard, the just transition concept has become an international focal \r\npoint tying together social movements, trade unions, and other key \r\nstakeholders to ensure equity is better accounted for in low-carbon \r\ntransitions. Effectiveness of cooperative action and the perception of \r\nfairness of such arrangements are closely related, in that pathways \r\nthat prioritise equity and allow broad stakeholders participation can \r\nenable broader consensus for the transformational change implied \r\nby deeper mitigation efforts (robust evidence, medium agreement)"


id: 3ab683316736d6d615d90d90cc26018b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6609
content:
"How can one shift development pathway and accelerate \r\nmitigation? The literature does not provide a  complete handbook \r\nfor shifting development pathways and accelerating mitigation. \r\nThe literature does, however, shed light on some of the underlying \r\ndynamics. Shifting development pathways can be necessitated by the \r\nexistence of pervasive obstacles that prove prohibitive to reaching \r\nmitigation and other development objectives (Section 4.2.7). Deliberate \r\nmeasures taken to facilitate the shifting of development pathways \r\nand accelerated mitigation involve putting in place key enabling \r\nconditions that help overcome those obstacles (Figure 4.6) - improving \r\ngovernance and institutional capacity, fostering behavioural change \r\nand technological innovation, designing and implementing adequate \r\npolicy, and finance"


id: bf51cc5d1543cd5e4f04337b2cf693b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27651
content:
" Just transitions, while they will differ by context, \r\nare critical to identifying and avoiding or addressing inequitable \r\ndistributive consequences (robust evidence, high agreement)."


id: 9520b0807d1385f328d2d385ad231717
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20968
content:
"The chapter builds on past IPCC reports. In AR5, all mitigation \r\npathways were assessed in a  single chapter (Clarke et al. 2014), \r\nwhich focused mostly on the long term. IPCC Special Report on \r\nGlobal Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5) included a chapter on mitigation \r\npathways compatible with the temperature goal in the Paris \r\nAgreement (Rogelj et al. 2018a), mostly at the global level. It also \r\nconsidered strengthening mitigation (de Coninck et al. 2018) in the \r\ncontext of poverty, inequality and sustainable development (Roy et al. \r\n2018). Development pathways have also been explored, albeit less \r\nfrequently, in past IPCC reports starting with the Special Report on \r\nEmissions Scenarios (Nakicenovic et al. 2000). Some early framing of \r\ndevelopment pathways was included in the Third Assessment Report \r\n(Banuri et al. 2001), further developed in the Fourth Assessment \r\nReport (Sathaye et al. 2007)"


id: 2fa01154f49570ee832178e2d9a9ffd8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4913
content:
" An extended discussion of climate \r\nchange and equity was conducted in AR5 (Fleurbaey et al. 2014)."


id: 3268f63b2fe6a0dfa91efdeb9c29c6a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5341
content:
"Prior to COP21, in 2015, most countries submitted their Intended \r\nNationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), which included \r\nmitigation targets for 2025 or 2030. INDCs become first NDCs on \r\nratification and/or after national governments' revision, and by \r\n11 October 2021, the official NDC registry contained 194 first NDCs \r\nwith 105 new and updated NDCs from 132 Parties to the Paris \r\nAgreement, covering 53% of the total global emissions in 2019 \r\nof 52.4  GtCO2-eq without land use, land-use change and forestry \r\n(LULUCF), and 13 second NDCs. Most of the Parties that submitted \r\nnew or updated NDCs have demonstrated increased ambition in \r\naddressing climate change. Moreover, though some countries have \r\nnot submitted their updated NDCs yet, they have already announced \r\ntheir updated NDC goals somewhere"


id: e2b1bfb8a9f2d518cf04e6359d044f64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33170
content:
" Countries will take the first \r\nstock in 2023 based on their progression towards achieving the \r\nobjectives of Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015a, 2018a; SB Chairs \r\n2021) (Section 14.3.2.5)."


id: 6490065ee535976924c941dfd749ab6a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13389
content:
"Near-term mitigation targets submitted as part of NDCs to the \r\nUNFCCC, as well as currently implemented policies, provide a basis \r\nfor assessing potential emissions levels up to 2030 at the national, \r\nregional and global level. The following sections present an evaluation \r\nof the methods used for assessing projected emissions under NDCs \r\nand current policies (Section  4.2.2.2), and the results of these \r\nassessments at global, regional and national level assessing a broad \r\navailable literature based on first NDC submissions from 2015/16 \r\nand pre-COVID economic projections (Section 4.2.2.3). The impacts \r\nof the COVID-19 pandemic and related government responses on \r\nemissions projections are then discussed in Section 4.2.2.4 and the \r\nimplications of updated NDCs submitted in 2020/21 on emissions \r\nfollow in Section  4.2.2.5. Section  4.2.2"


id: 926ac5bee093dc3dd96a8b6e8b188fa9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20557
content:
"6 presents an assessment \r\nof the so-called 'implementation gap' between what currently \r\nimplemented policies are expected to deliver and what the ambitions \r\nlaid out under the full implementation of the NDCs are projected to \r\nachieve. Finally, a comparison of ambitions across different countries \r\nor regions (Section  4.2.2.7) is presented and the uncertainties of \r\nprojected emissions associated with NDCs and current policies are \r\nestimated, including a discussion of measures to reduce uncertainties \r\nin the specification of NDCs (Section 4.2.2.8)."


id: ef7df3bad1f68953c5d6cd3bd00d892a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35169
content:
"Most first NDCs cover all specific sectors, including LULUCF, and \r\ncommunicate specific targets for individual sub-sectors to support \r\ntheir overall mitigation targets. Concrete actions and priority areas \r\nare more detailed in the energy sector, with increased share of \r\nrenewable energies and energy efficiency being highlighted in the \r\nmajority of NDCs. Given the uncertainty behind LULUCF emission \r\nand removal accounting (Grassi et al. 2017; Jian et al. 2019), several \r\ncountries state that their accounting framework will only be defined \r\nin later NDCs. The GHG included and the global warming potentials \r\n(GWPs) used to aggregate emissions also vary across NDCs. Most \r\ncountries only refer to carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide \r\nemissions aggregated based on IPCC AR2 or AR4 metrics, while few \r\nNDCs also include fluorinated gases and use IPCC AR5 GWPs"


id: 9c79736b9f220f577832b31133120c7d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22173
content:
" The \r\nshares of Parties that indicate possible use of at least one type of \r\nvoluntary cooperation and set qualitative limits on their use have \r\nboth nearly doubled in new or updated NDCs."


id: c8d6eb93649aa91c67eda11b3fe37e69
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29155
content:
"The number of studies estimating the emissions implications of new \r\nand updated NDCs and announced mitigation pledges that can be used \r\nfor the quantitative assessment is limited to four (Table 4.3) (Climate \r\nAction Tracker 2021; den Elzen et al. 2021; Meinshausen et al. 2021; \r\nJRC 2021). One other study includes a limited number of NDC updates \r\n(Riahi et al. 2021) and another (UNFCCC 2021) excludes LULUCF \r\nemissions. They are therefore not directly comparable to the other two. \r\nIn addition, the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2021 (UNEP 2021) in itself \r\nis assessment of almost the same studies included here. The evidence \r\nbase for the updated NDC assessment is thus considerably smaller \r\ncompared to that of the assessment of emissions implications of original \r\nNDCs presented in Section 4.2.2.3. However, it is worthwhile to note \r\nthat the earlier versions of the studies summarised in Table 4.2 and \r\nTable 4"


id: 98957fef0585b2ee376ddf4fce85efe3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21521
content:
"3 are broadly representative for the emissions range implied by \r\nthe pre-COVID-19 current policies and original NDCs of the full set of \r\nstudies shown in Table 4.1, therefore building confidence in estimates."


id: fc0d17c85e6430a88a2520fcb1732dd7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37151
content:
"Notes: a GHG emissions expressed in CO2-eq emission using AR6 100-year GWPs. GHG emissions from studies that provide aggregate GHG emissions using other GWPs are \r\nrescaled using 2019 GHG emissions from Chapter 2 (Minx et al. 2021; Crippa et al. 2021). Note that due to slightly different system boundaries across historical emission \r\ndatasets as well as data uncertainties (Chapter 2, SM2.2) relative change compared to historical emissions should be calculated vis-a-vis the historical emissions data used by \r\na particular study. b If a range is available from a study, a median is provided in addition to the range. c Announced mitigation pledges on global 2030 emissions of China and \r\nJapan included. d\r\n Announced mitigation pledges of China, Japan, Republic of Korea included. e Announced mitigation pledge of Korea not included. f Announced mitigation \r\npledges of China and Republic of Korea not included, emissions from international aviation and shipping not included"


id: ba016d986ea99d084db7464e6d268e42
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26805
content:
" g\r\n Ranges across four studies are calculated using the \r\nmedian and the full range including the minimum and maximum of studies if available. h\r\n UNEP EGR 2021 estimate listed for comparison, but since largely relying on the same \r\nstudies not included in range estimate. i\r\n NDCs submitted until 30 July included, announcements not included, excluding LULUCF emissions. j NDC updates of Brazil, EU and \r\nannouncement of China included as a sensitivity analysis compared to original NDCs."


id: 205bc30350e145de1b7d9be3b1725e2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2539
content:
"Comparing the emission levels implied by the new and updated \r\nNDCs as shown in Table  4.3 with those estimated by the original \r\nNDCs from the same studies (as included in Table 4.1), a downward \r\nrevision of 3.8 (3.0-5.3) GtCO2-eq of the central unconditional NDC \r\nestimates and of 4.5 (2.7-6.3) GtCO2-eq of the central conditional \r\nNDC estimate emerges (medium evidence, medium agreement). The \r\nemissions gaps between temperature limits and new and updated \r\nNDCs are assessed in Cross-Chapter Box 4 below. New and updated \r\nunconditional NDCs reduce the median gap with emissions pathways \r\nthat limit warming to 2degC (>67%) in 2030 by slightly more than 20%, \r\nfrom a median gap of 17 GtCO2-eq (9-23) to 13 (10-16). New and \r\nupdated conditional NDCs reduce the median gap with emissions \r\npathways that limt warming to 2degC (>67%) in 2030 by about one \r\nthird, from 14  GtCO2-eq (10-20) to 9  (6-14)"


id: dd6279f5dee6e7c41c9c28b7be295797
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32327
content:
" New and updated \r\nunconditional NDCs reduce the median gap with emissions pathways \r\nthat limit warming to 1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot in \r\n2030 by about 15%, from a median gap of 27 GtCO2-eq (19-32) to "


id: b000b349ee97090d581d842b1eff2dbc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25220
content:
"has assessed equity, analysing how fairness is expressed in NDCs \r\nin a  bottom-up manner (Mbeva and Pauw 2016; Cunliffe et al. \r\n2019; Winkler et al. 2018). Some studies compare NDC ambition \r\nlevel with different effort sharing regimes and which principles are \r\napplied to various countries and regions (Peters et al. 2015; Pan \r\net al. 2017; Robiou Du Pont et al. 2017; Holz et al. 2018; Robiou \r\ndu Pont and Meinshausen 2018; van den Berg et al. 2019). Others \r\npropose multi-dimensional evaluation schemes for NDCs that \r\ncombine a  range of indicators, including the NDC targets, cost\u0002effectiveness compared to global models, recent trends and policy \r\nimplementation into consideration (Aldy et al. 2017; Hohne et al. \r\n2018). Yet other literature evaluates NDC ambition against factors \r\nsuch as technological progress of energy efficiency and low-carbon \r\ntechnologies (Jiang et al. 2017; Kuramochi et al"


id: e40df6bb12b8e659d3e64da64cecd5a8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33363
content:
" 2017; Wakiyama \r\nand Kuramochi 2017), synergies with adaptation plans (Fridahl \r\nand Johansson 2017), the obligations to deploy carbon dioxide \r\nremoval technologies like bioenergy with carbon capture and \r\nstorage (BECCS) in the future implied by their near-term emission \r\nreductions where they are not reflected on in the first NDCs (Peters \r\nand Geden 2017; Fyson et al. 2020; Pozo et al. 2020; Mace et al. \r\n2021). Others identify possible risks of unfairness when applying \r\nGWP* as emissions metric at national scale (Rogelj and Schleussner \r\n2019). A recent study on national fair shares draws on principles of \r\ninternational environmental law, excludes approaches based on cost \r\nand grandfathering, thus narrowing the range of national fair shares \r\npreviously assessed, and apply this to the quantification of national \r\nfair share emissions targets (Rajamani et al. 2021)."


id: e53bfc5cf99f4947e837e657e0acd648
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33559
content:
"towards implementing their NDCs and to which degree the NDCs \r\ncollectively are sufficient to reach the temperature targets of the \r\nParis agreement (Rogelj et al. 2016; Quere et al. 2018; Hohne et al. \r\n2018; Roelfsema et al. 2020; den Elzen et al. 2019; Hohne et al. 2020). \r\nMost of these studies focus on major emitters such as G20 countries \r\nand with the aim to inform countries to strengthen their ambition \r\nregularly, for example, through progress of NDCs and as part of the \r\nglobal stocktake (Hohne et al. 2018; Peters et al. 2017). However, \r\na  limited number of studies assess the implementation gaps of \r\nconditional NDCs in terms of finance, technology and capacity \r\nbuilding support. Some authors conclude that finance needed to \r\nfulfil conditional NDCs exceeds available resources or the current \r\nlong-term goal for finance (USD100 billion yr-1) (Pauw et al. 2019); \r\nothers assess financial resources needed for forest-related activities \r\n(Kissinger et al. 2019) (Section 15.4"


id: 58539fd99c9f43d849c9ff024b8afcf9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11402
content:
"2). The literature suggests that \r\nconsistent and harmonised approach to track progress of countries \r\ntowards their NDCs would be helpful (Peters et al. 2017; Hohne et al. \r\n2018; den Elzen et al. 2019), and negotiations on a common tabular \r\nformat are expected to conclude during COP26 in November 2021."


id: 1a2448bf8d2f7c134a8888de29d47529
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1576
content:
"A comparison between the projected emission outcomes of current policies, the NDCs (which include unconditional and conditional \r\nelements, Section 4.2.1) and mitigation pathways acting immediately, i.e. from 2020 onwards, on reaching different temperature \r\ngoals in the long-term (Section  3.3.3) allows identifying different 'emission gaps' in 2030 (Cross-Chapter Box  4, Figure  1). First, \r\nthe  implementation gap between 'current policies' and unconditional and conditional NDCs is estimated to be around 4  and \r\n7  GtCO2-eq in 2030, respectively (Section  4.2.2 and Tables  4.2 and  4.3). Second, the comparison of unconditional (conditional) \r\nNDCs and long-term mitigation pathways that limit warming to 2degC (>67%) or lower gives rise to a 2030 median emissions gap \r\nof 19-26  GtCO2-eq (16-23  GtCO2-eq) for limiting end-of-century warming to  1.5degC (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and \r\n10-16 GtCO2-eq (6-14 GtCO2-eq) for limiting warming to 2degC (>67%)"


id: 913293bd5910563177cde502d4eee40f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20381
content:
"5\r\n GHG emissions of NDCs are broadly consistent with 2030 \r\nemission levels of cost-effective long-term pathways staying below 2.5degC (scenarios category C5, Table 3.2, Chapter 3)."


id: 57cf6a393163c914ccb40896575b30ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11315
content:
"Working Group II contribution to this Assessment finds that the overall extent of adaptation-related responses in human systems is \r\nlow (high confidence) and that there is limited evidence on the extent to which adaptation-related responses in human systems are \r\nreducing climate risk (O'Neill et al. 2020). Thus there is an adaptation gap (UNEP 2018a), and bridging that gap requires enablers \r\nincluding institutional capacity, planning and investment (UNEP 2016). Estimates of adaptation costs vary greatly across studies. Recent \r\nstudies based on climate change under RCP8.5 report adaptation costs for developing countries of up to 400 billion (300 billion in \r\nRCP2.6) USD2005 in 2030 (New et al. 2020). Of the NDCs submitted in 2015, 50 countries estimated adaptation costs of USD39 billion \r\nannually"


id: 833e94fd8f3927b11e515cd17330349b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18171
content:
" Both public and private finance for adaptation is increasing, but remains insufficient and constitutes a small fraction (4-8%) \r\nof total climate finance which is mostly aimed at mitigation. The pledge of developed countries of mobilising finance for developing \r\ncountries to address adaptation needs globally as part of the Paris Agreement are insufficient. By 2030 the adaptation needs are \r\nexpected to be three to six times larger than what is pledged, further increasing towards 2050 (UNEP 2016; New et al. 2020)."


id: df3e3e12f30094cdf86c9e31b2283bc7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32623
content:
"The decision adopting the Paris Agreement stresses the importance \r\nof 'stronger and more ambitious climate action' by non-government \r\nand sub-national stakeholders, 'including civil society, the private \r\nsector, financial institutions, cities and other sub-national authorities, \r\nlocal communities and indigenous peoples' (UNFCCC 2015a). The \r\nMarrakech Partnership for Global Action, launched in the 2016 \r\nUNFCCC Conference of Parties by two 'high-level champions,' further \r\nformalised the contributions of non-government and sub-national \r\nactors taking action through seven thematic areas (e.g.,  energy, \r\nhuman settlements, industry, land-use, etc.) and one cross-cutting \r\narea (resilience). Since then, non-state actors, for example, companies \r\nand civil society, and sub-national actors, such as cities and regions, \r\nhave emerged to undertake a  range of largely voluntary carbon \r\nmitigation actions (Hsu et al"


id: 1c2a4c4dcfb1a5c7adcc02ed49ffa1b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1889
content:
" 2018, 2019) both as individual non-state \r\nactors (NSAs in the following) and through national and international \r\ncooperative initiatives, or ICIs (Hsu et al. 2018). ICIs take a variety of \r\nforms, ranging from those that focus solely on non-state actors to \r\nthose that engage national and even local governments. They can \r\nalso range in commitment level, from primarily membership-based \r\ninitiatives that do not require specific actions to those that require "


id: adf2621545f77d59d2bd5d85401e07b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24904
content:
"initiatives reporting high potential. In Table 4.4 and Figure 4.1, we \r\nreport estimates of the emissions reductions from 19 distinct sub\u0002national and non-state initiatives to mitigate climate change. The \r\ntable shows wide ranges of potential mitigation based on current, \r\ntarget or potential membership, as well as a  wide diversity of \r\nactors and membership assumptions. Current membership reflects \r\nthe number of non-state or sub-national actors that are presently \r\ncommitted to a  particular initiative; while targeted or potential \r\nmembership represents a  membership goal (e.g.,  increasing from \r\n100 to 200 members) that an initiative may seek to achieve (Kuramochi \r\net al. 2020). When adding up emission reduction potentials, sub\u0002national and non-state international cooperative initiatives could \r\nreduce up to about 20 Gt of CO2-eq in 2030 (limited evidence, medium \r\nagreement)"


id: a4411f76e614fa0c3465885e7597ce42
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23397
content:
" Chapter 8 also presents data on the savings potential of \r\ncities and it suggests that these could reach 2.3 GtCO2-eq annually \r\nby 2030 and 4.2 GtCO2-eq annually for 2050."


id: 49d75413651cd34b431f5bddc5e476bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9016
content:
"Equally important to note here is that none of the studies reviewed \r\nin Figure  4.1 quantified the potential impact of financial sector \r\nactions, for example, divestment from emission intensive activities \r\n(Section 15.3 has a more detailed discussion of how financial actors \r\nand instruments are addressing climate change). Moreover, only \r\na limited number of studies on the impact of actions by diverse actors \r\ngo beyond 2050 (Table 4.4), which may reflect analysts' recognition \r\nof the increasing uncertainties of longer time horizons. Accurate \r\naccounting methods can help to avoiding counting finance multiple \r\ntimes, and methods across mitigation and finance would consider \r\ncounting carbon market flows and the tons reduced. As Table  4.4 \r\nand Figure  4.1 indicate, activities by businesses have potential to \r\nsignificantly contribute to global mitigation efforts"


id: 6cd565611d87d156b6ab68a668f66359
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14744
content:
" For example, \r\nthe SBTi (Science Based Targets initiative) encourages companies to \r\npledge to reduce their emissions at rates which according to SBTi \r\nwould be compatible with global pathways to well below 2degC or 1.5degC, \r\nwith various methodologies being proposed (Andersen et al. 2021; \r\nFaria and Labutong 2019). Readers may note, however, that the link \r\nbetween emissions by individual actors and long-term temperature \r\ngoals cannot be inferred without additional assumptions (Box 4.2). In \r\nthe energy sector, some voluntary initiatives are also emerging to stop \r\nmethane emissions associated with oil and gas supply chains. The Oil \r\nand Gas Methane Partnership (OGMP) is a voluntary initiative lead \r\nby the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, which has recently published \r\na  comprehensive framework for methane detection, measurement \r\nand reporting (UNEP 2020b)."


id: 27386d634c7d944bcffe8d90d027acb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3570
content:
"Initiatives made up of cities and sub-national regions have an \r\nespecially large potential to reduce emissions, due to their inclusion \r\nof many actors, across a range of different geographic regions, with \r\nambitious emissions reduction targets, and these actors' coverage of \r\na large share of emissions (Kuramochi et al. 2020). Hsu et al. (2019) \r\nfind largest potential in that area. Several sub-national regions like \r\nCalifornia and Scotland have set zero emission targets (Hohne et al. \r\n2019), supported by short- and medium-term interim goals (Scottish \r\nGovernment 2020b; State of California 2018). Sharing of effort across \r\nglobal and sub-global scales has not been quantified, though one \r\nstudy suggests that non-state actors have increasingly adopted \r\nmore diverse framings, including vulnerability, human rights and \r\ntransformational framings of justice (Shawoo and McDermott 2020)"


id: e5309c97396432568dafb7f359f50dbc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33552
content:
" \r\nInitiatives focused on forestry have high emissions reduction potential \r\ndue to the current high deforestation rates, and due to the ambitious \r\ntargets of many of these forestry initiatives, such as the New York \r\nDeclaration on Forests' goal to end deforestation by 2030 (Hohne \r\net al. 2019; Lui et al. 2021), although the Initiative acknowledges "


id: a7e9600a8ba04ee07e4b5cf034b52be6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23931
content:
"The literature frequently refers to national mitigation pathways up to 2030 or 2050 using long-term temperature limits in the Paris \r\nAgreement (i.e., '2degC' or '1.5degC scenario'). Without additional information, such denomination is incorrect. Working Group I reaffirmed \r\n'with high confidence the AR5 finding that there is a near-linear relationship between cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions and \r\nthe global warming they cause' (WGI SPM AR6). It is not the function of any single country's mitigation efforts, nor any individual \r\nactor's. Emission pathways of individual countries or sectors in the near to mid-term can only be linked to a long-term temperature \r\nwith additional assumptions specifying (i) the GHG emissions and removals of other countries up the mid-term; and (ii) the GHG \r\nemissions and removals of all countries beyond the near and mid-term"


id: 8662ae548b09803a55c0da4b34ccb07e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18683
content:
" For example, a national mitigation pathway can be labelled \r\n'2degC compatible' if it derives from a global mitigation pathway consistent with 2degC via an explicit effort sharing scheme across \r\ncountries (Sections 4.2.2.6 and 4.5)."


id: 3634d3afd005e9a24687d8cb4e53f77f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5928
content:
"At the 2019 Climate Action Summit, 77 countries indicated their \r\naim to reach net zero CO2 emissions by 2050, more the number \r\nof countries having submitted LEDS to the UNFCCC. Table 4.6 lists \r\nthe countries that have a national net zero by 2050 target in laws, \r\nstrategies or other documents (The Energy and Climate Intelligence \r\nUnit 2019). Bhutan and Suriname already have achieved net negative \r\nemissions. France second 'low-carbon national strategy' adopted in \r\n2020 has an objective of GHG neutrality by 2050. Net zero is also the \r\nbasis of the recent revision of the official notional price of carbon for \r\npublic investment in France (Quinet et al. 2019). The Committee on \r\nClimate Change of the UK analyses sectoral options and concludes \r\nthat delivering net zero GHG by 2050 is technically feasible but \r\nhighly challenging (Committee on Climate Change 2019)"


id: aeb3c7c54c1263ba79a094ed08808219
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25013
content:
" For \r\nGermany, three steps to climate neutrality by 2050 are introduced: \r\nfirst, a  65% reduction of emissions by 2030; second, a  complete \r\nswitch to climate-neutral technologies, leading to a  95% cut in \r\nemissions, all relative to 1990 levels by 2050; and third balancing \r\nof residual emissions through carbon capture and storage (Prognos \r\net al. 2020). In addition to the countries in Table 4.6, EU reported \r\nthe net zero GHG emission pathways by 2050 under Green Deal \r\n(European Commission 2019). China and South Korea, have made \r\nannouncements of carbon neutrality before 2060 and net zero GHG \r\nemission by 2050, respectively (UN 2020a,b). In the case of Japan, \r\nthe new target to net zero GHG emission by 2050 was announced \r\nin 2020 (UN 2020c). As of August 25, 2021, a total 121 countries \r\nparticipate in the 'Climate Ambition Alliance: Net Zero 2050', \r\ntogether with businesses, cities and regions."


id: d3e3a5614d4ba09dd1ea1ca1b205cda9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30856
content:
"Figure 4.2 provides a snapshot of this literature. For a selected set of \r\ncountries, it shows the mid-century emission pathways at national \r\nscale that have been registered in the International Institute for \r\nApplied Systems Analysis (IIASA) national mitigation scenario \r\ndatabase built for the purpose of this Report (Annex III.3.3). Overall, \r\nthe database contains scenarios for 50 countries. Total GHG emission \r\nare the most comprehensive information to assess the pathways on \r\nclimate mitigation actions, but energy-related CO2 emissions are the \r\nmost widely populated data in the scenarios. As a result, Figure 4.2 \r\nshows energy-related CO2 emission trajectories. Scenarios for EU \r\ncountries show reduction trends even in the reference scenario, \r\nwhereas developing countries and non-European developed \r\ncountries such as Japan and USA show emissions increase in the \r\nreference. In most countries plotted on Figure  4"


id: a867be3136032c1641c5c17d72692cc2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24020
content:
"2, studies have \r\nfound that reaching net zero energy related CO2 emissions by 2050 is \r\nfeasible, although the number of such pathways is limited."


id: b4269378c8057977060ff861915a5ae8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25859
content:
"Accelerated mitigation pathways differ by countries, depending inter \r\nalia on sources of emissions, mitigation opportunities and economic \r\ncontext. In China, India, Japan and other Southeast Asian countries, \r\nmore aggressive action related to climate change is also motivated \r\nby regional concerns over health and air quality related to air \r\npollutants and SLCFs (Ashina et al. 2012; Aggarwal 2017; Kuramochi \r\net al. 2017; Xunzhang et al. 2017; Dhar et al. 2018; Jiang et al. 2018; \r\nOshiro et al. 2018; China National Renewable Energy Centre 2019; \r\nEnergy Transitions Commission and Rocky Mountain Institute 2019; \r\nKhanna et al. 2019). Studies of accelerated mitigation pathways \r\nin North America tend to focus on power sector and imported fuel \r\ndecarbonisation in the US , and on electrification and demand-side \r\nreductions in Canada (Vaillancourt et al. 2017; Hodson et al. 2018; \r\nVictor et al. 2018; Bahn and Vaillancourt 2020; Hammond et al. 2020; \r\nJayadev et al. 2020)"


id: d06d283e241fe8ebdd1e5296bad9a529
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30318
content:
" In Latin America, many pathways emphasise \r\nsupply-side mitigation measures, finding that replacing thermal \r\npower generation and developing bioenergy (where resources are \r\navailable) utilisation offers the greatest mitigation opportunities \r\n(Herreras Martinez et al. 2015; Nogueira de Oliveira et al. 2016; \r\nArango-Aramburo et al. 2019; Delgado et al. 2020; Lap et al. 2020). \r\nThe European Union member states (EU-28) recently announced \r\n2050 climate neutrality goal is explored by pathways that emphasise \r\ncomplete substitution of fossil fuels with electricity generated by \r\nlow-carbon sources, particularly renewables; demand reductions \r\nthrough efficiency and conservation, and novel fuels and end-use \r\ntechnologies (Prognos et al. 2020)"


id: 99fc3dbc9a9e8015284a700b256e6512
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21751
content:
" The limited literature so far on \r\nAfrica's future pathways suggest those could be shaped by increasing \r\nenergy access and mitigating the air pollution and health effects \r\nof relying on traditional biomass use, as well as cleaner expansion of \r\npower supply alongside end-use efficiency improvements (Hamilton \r\nand Kelly 2017; Oyewo et al. 2019, 2020; Ven et al. 2019; Wright et al. \r\n2019; Forouli et al. 2020)."


id: fb26732451dd8d522240ccbb219345e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37024
content:
"Many accelerated mitigation pathways include high shares of renewable energy, with national variations. In Europe, some argue \r\nthat the EU 2050 net zero GHG emissions goal can be met with 100% renewable power generation, including use of renewable \r\nelectricity to produce hydrogen, biofuels (including imports), and synthetic hydrocarbons, but will require significant increases in \r\ntransmission capacity (Duscha et al. 2019; Zappa et al. 2019). Capros et al. (2019) explore a 1.5degC compatible pathway that includes \r\n85% renewable generation, with battery, pumped hydro, and chemical storage for variable renewables. High-renewable scenarios \r\nalso exist for individual Member States. In France, for example, Krakowski et al. (2016) propose a 100% renewable power generation \r\nscenario that relies primarily on wind (62%), solar PV (26%) and oceans (12%). To reach this aim, integration into the European grid is \r\nof vital importance (Brown et al. 2018)"


id: 40cdfb74384d5fa25ad89106b414215e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7579
content:
" While debated, incremental costs could be limited regardless of specific assumptions of future \r\ncosts of individual technologies (Shirizadeh et al. 2020). In Germany, similarly, 100% renewable electricity systems are found feasible \r\nby numerous studies (Oei et al. 2020; Thomas Klaus et al. 2010; Wuppertal-Institut 2021; Hansen et al. 2019)."


id: 4fecdb2d96dd145e54b2446a10f24816
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10011
content:
"Accelerated mitigation scenarios offer contrasting views on the \r\nshare of nuclear in power generation. In the USA, (Victor et al. 2018) \r\nbuild a scenario in which nuclear contributes 23% of CO2 emission \r\nreductions needed to reduce GHG emissions by 80% from 2005 levels \r\nby 2050. Deep power sector decarbonisation pathways could require \r\na two-folded increase in nuclear capacity according to (Jayadev et al. \r\n2020) for the USA, and nearly a ten-fold increase for Canada, but \r\nmay be difficult to implement (Vaillancourt et al. 2017). For China to \r\nmeet a 1.5degC pathway or achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, nuclear \r\nmay represent 14-28% of power generation in 2050 according to \r\n(Jiang et al. 2018; China National Renewable Energy Centre 2019; \r\nEnergy Transitions Commission and Rocky Mountain Institute 2019). \r\nFor South Korea, Hong et al. (2014) and Hong and Brook (2018) find \r\nthat increasing nuclear power can help complement renewables in \r\ndecarbonising the grid"


id: 7b800145d2c13a9f832d199f5f75d894
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17022
content:
" Similarly, India has put in place a three-stage \r\nnuclear programme which aims to enhance nuclear power capacity \r\nfrom the current level of 6  GW to 63 GW by 2032, if fuel supply \r\nis ensured (GoI 2015). Nuclear energy is also considered necessary \r\nas part of accelerated mitigation pathways in Brazil, although it is \r\nnot expected to increase significantly by 2050 even under stringent \r\nlow-carbon scenarios (Lucena et al. 2016). France developed its \r\nnuclear strategy in response to energy security concerns after the \r\n1970s oil crisis, but has committed to reducing nuclear's share of \r\npower generation to 50% by 2035 (Millot et al. 2020). Conversely, \r\nsome analysis find deep mitigation pathways, including net zero GHG \r\nemissions and 80-90% reduction from 2013 levels, feasible without \r\nadditional nuclear power in EU-28 and Japan respectively, but \r\nassuming a combination of bio- and novel fuels and CCS or land-use \r\nbased carbon sinks (Kato and Kurosawa 2019; Duscha et al. 2019)."


id: 545cac6f9a5f587e3638e9e26de109d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10736
content:
"One possible synergy between SLCF and climate change mitigation \r\nis the simultaneous improvement in energy efficiency in refrigeration \r\nand air-conditioning equipment during the hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) \r\nphase-down, as recognised in the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal \r\nProtocol. The Kigali Amendment and related national and regional \r\nregulations are projected to reduce future radiative forcing from \r\nHFCs by about half in 2050 compared to a scenario without any HFC \r\ncontrols, and to reduce future global average warming in 2100 from \r\na baseline of 0.3degC-0.5degC to less than 0.1degC, according to a recent \r\nscientific assessment of a  wide literature (World Meteorological \r\nOrganization 2018). If ratified by signatories, the rapid phase-down \r\nof HFCs under the Kigali Amendment is possible because of extensive \r\nreplacement of high-global warming potential (GWP) HFCs with \r\ncommercially available low-GWP alternatives in refrigeration and \r\nair-conditioning equipment"


id: e28320d2deb95db4c78acda88f9d3cf8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33143
content:
" Each country's choices of alternative \r\nrefrigerants will likely be determined by energy efficiency, costs, \r\nand refrigerant toxicity and flammability. National and regional \r\nregulations will be needed to drive technological innovation and \r\ndevelopment (Polonara et al. 2017)."


id: 88fa902c1d60b8e43ff1f32f8a223253
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19093
content:
"For example, scenarios for Japan project continued electrification of \r\nresidential and commercial buildings to 65% and 79% respectively \r\nby 2050 to reach 70-90% CO2 reduction from 2013 levels (Kato \r\nand Kurosawa 2019). Similarly, a  mitigation pathway for China \r\ncompatible with 1.5degC would require 58% to 70% electrification of \r\nbuildings according to (Jiang et al. 2018; China National Renewable \r\nEnergy Centre 2019E; nergy Transitions Commission and Rocky \r\nMountain Institute 2019). For the EU-28 to reach net carbon \r\nneutrality, complete substitution of fossil fuels with electricity (up \r\nto 65% share), district heating, and direct use of solar and ambient \r\nheat are projected to be needed for buildings, along with increased \r\nuse of solar thermal and heat pumps for heating (Duscha et al. \r\n2019)"


id: b85158dc20713d429e8b039da8c5f51
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26528
content:
" In the UK and Canada, improved insulation to reduce energy \r\ndemand and efficient building appliances and heating systems are \r\nimportant building strategies needed to reduce emissions to zero \r\nby 2050 (Vaillancourt et al. 2017; Chilvers et al. 2017; Roberts \r\net al. 2018a). In Ireland, achieving 80-95% emissions reduction \r\nbelow 1990 levels by 2050 also requires changes in building energy "


id: 7d376c5d7c2fbe1a30053e613fdc2f13
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17281
content:
"In addition, an increasing number of countries have set up net zero \r\nenergy building targets (Table 4.8) (Hohne et al. 2020). Twenty-seven \r\ncountries have developed roadmap documents for NZEBs, mostly \r\nin developed countries in Europe, North America, and Asia-Pacific, \r\nfocusing on energy efficiency and improved insulation and design, \r\nrenewable and smart technologies (Mata et al. 2020). The EU, Japan \r\nand the USA (the latter for public buildings only) have set targets \r\nfor shifting new buildings to 100% near-zero energy buildings by \r\n2030, with earlier targets for public buildings. Scotland has a similar \r\ntarget for 2050 (Hohne et al. 2020)"


id: 9a0ad730707e466310517d4d9f3e524e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21761
content:
" Technologies identified as \r\nneeded for achieving near-zero energy buildings vary by region, but \r\ninclude energy-efficient envelope components, natural ventilation, \r\npassive cooling and heating, high performance building systems, \r\nair heat recovery, smart and information and communication \r\ntechnologies, and changing future heating and cooling supply fuel \r\nmixes towards solar, geothermal, and biomass (Mata et al. 2020). \r\nSub-national regions in Spain, USA, Germany, and Mexico have set \r\nlocal commitments to achieving net zero carbon new buildings by \r\n2050, with California having the most ambitious aspirational target \r\nof zero net energy buildings for all new buildings by 2030 (Hohne \r\net al. 2020). The EU is also targeting the retrofitting of 3% of existing \r\npublic buildings to zero-energy, with emphasis on greater thermal \r\ninsulation of building envelopes (Hohne et al. 2020; Mata et al. \r\n2020)"


id: f2c0b7d4cb617f30af0ca3187f1ba7a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35720
content:
" China's roadmaps have emphasised insulation of building \r\nenvelope, heat recovery systems in combination with renewable \r\nenergy, including solar, shallow geothermal, and air source heat \r\npumps (Mata et al. 2020)."


id: 3fca1b45f55882a2ba8995c8a0124256
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7418
content:
"Beyond technological measures, some densely populated countries \r\nincluding Germany, Japan, and India are exploring using information \r\ntechnology/internet of things (IOT) to support mode-shifting and \r\nreduce mobility demand through broader behaviour and lifestyle \r\nchanges (Ashina et al. 2012; Canzler and Wittowsky 2016; Aggarwal \r\n2017; Dhar et al. 2018; Vishwanathan et al. 2018b). In Japan, \r\naccelerated mitigation pathways consider the use of information \r\ntechnology and internet of things (IoT) to transform human \r\nbehaviour and transition to a sharing economy (Ashina et al. 2012; \r\nOshiro et al. 2017a, 2018). In Germany, one study points to including \r\nelectromobility information and communication technologies in \r\nthe transport sector as key (Canzler and Wittowsky 2016) while \r\nanother emphasise shifting from road to rail transport, and reduced \r\ndistances travelled as other possible transport strategies (Schmid and \r\nKnopf 2012)"


id: 6d3830975ff9bfce2492e12b32bd64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14805
content:
" India's transport sector strategies also include use of \r\ninformation technology and the internet, a  transition to a  sharing \r\neconomy, and increasing infrastructure investment (Dhar et al. 2018; \r\nVishwanathan et al. 2018b). Behaviour and lifestyle change along \r\nwith stakeholder integration in decision-making are considered \r\nkey to implementing new transport policies (Aggarwal 2017; \r\nDhar et al. 2018)."


id: 9d84e497dc82365b386179085d647caf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22316
content:
"In China, for example, non-conventional electrical and renewable \r\ntechnologies, including low-grade renewable heat, biomass use for \r\nhigh-temperature heat in steel and cement sectors, and additional \r\nelectrification in glass, food and beverage, and paper and pulp \r\nindustries, are part of scenarios that achieve 60% reduction in \r\nnational CO2 emission by 2050 (Khanna et al. 2019; Zhou et al. \r\n2019), in addition to increased recycled steel for electric arc furnaces \r\nand direct electrolysis or hydrogen-based direct reduction of iron \r\nand CCS utilisation in clinker and steel-making (Jiang et al. 2018; \r\nChina National Renewable Energy Centre 2019). Similarly, in India, \r\n(Vishwanathan and Garg 2020) point to the need for renewable \r\nenergy and CCS to decarbonise the industrial sector"


id: 2dfc8b6bea2f53eb65087d141cfd13a7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4667
content:
" In EU-28, net \r\nCO2 neutrality can only be reached with 92% reduction in industrial \r\nemissions relative to 1990, through electrification, efficiency \r\nimprovement and new technologies such as hydrogen-based direct \r\nreduction of steel, low-carbon cement and recycling (Duscha et al. \r\n2019). Both China and EU see 50% of industry electrification by 2050 \r\nas needed to meet 1.5degC and net carbon neutrality pathways (Jiang \r\net al. 2018; Capros et al. 2019)."


id: 29a8d1f4632e61bdf37d449f9ab73ca5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3989
content:
"household air pollution and reversing health- and crop-damaging \r\ntropospheric ozone (Jacobson 2002, 2010). SLCF mitigation measures \r\ncan have regional impacts, including avoiding premature deaths in \r\nAsia and Africa and warming in central and northern Asia, southern \r\nAfrica, and the Mediterranean (Shindell et al. 2012). Reducing \r\noutdoor air pollution could avoid 2.4 million premature deaths and \r\n52 million tonnes of crop losses for four major staples (Haines et al. \r\n2017). Existing research emphasises climate and agriculture benefits \r\nof methane mitigation measures with relatively small human health \r\nbenefits (Shindell et al. 2012). Research also predicts that black \r\ncarbon mitigation could substantially benefit global climate and \r\nhuman health, but there is more uncertainty about these outcomes \r\nthan about some other predictions (Shindell et al. 2012)"


id: 2080dbebb377404136cff486a9f3c94e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2564
content:
" Other \r\nbenefits to SLCF reduction include reducing warming in the critical \r\nnear term, which will slow amplifying feedbacks, reduce the risk \r\nof non-linear changes, and reduce long-term cumulative climate \r\nimpacts - like sea-level rise - and mitigation costs (Hu et al. 2017; \r\nUNEP and WMO 2011; Rogelj et al. 2018a; Xu and Ramanathan \r\n2017; Shindell et al. 2012)."


id: 106853863925d45267c02e5020d35c13
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 66
content:
"Systemic solutions are also not being sufficiently discussed, such \r\nas low-carbon materials; light-weighting of buildings, transport, \r\nand industrial equipment; promoting circular economy, recyclability \r\nand reusability, and addressing the food-energy-water nexus. \r\nThese solutions reduce demand in multiple sectors, improve overall \r\nsupply chain efficiency, and require cross-sector policies. Using \r\nfewer building materials could reduce the need for cement, steel, \r\nand other materials and thus the need for production and freight \r\ntransport. Concrete can also be produced from low-carbon cement, \r\nor designed to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere. Few regions \r\nhave developed comprehensive policies or strategies for a  circular \r\neconomy, with the exception of the EU and China, and policies in \r\nthe EU have only emerged within the last decade"


id: 7b49328d7baa01ddd85d7be93f111622
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16983
content:
" While China's \r\ncircular economy policies emphasises industrial production, water, \r\npollution and scaling-up in response to rapid economic growth and \r\nindustrialisation, EU's strategy is focused more narrowly on waste \r\nand resources and overall resource efficiency to increase economic \r\ncompetitiveness (McDowall et al. 2017)."


id: c0207a29637dd0ea1af172bc54122af0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27779
content:
"A significant part of the literature assesses the impacts of mitigation \r\non GDP, consistent with policymakers' interest in this variable. \r\nIt must be noted upfront that computable equilibrium models, on \r\nwhich our assessments are mostly based, capture the impact of \r\nmitigation on GDP and other core economic variables while typically \r\noverlooking other effects that may matter (like improvements in air \r\nquality). Second, even though GDP (or better, GDP per capita) is not \r\nan indicator of welfare (Fleurbaey and Blanchet 2013), changes in \r\nGDP per capita across countries and over time are highly correlated \r\nwith changes in welfare indicators in the areas of poverty, health, \r\nand education (Gable et al. 2015). The mechanisms linking mitigation \r\nto GDP outlined below would remain valid even with alternative \r\nindicators of well-being (Section  5.2.1)"


id: f4abf5b631eb9b8a0a75dc886d3a18de
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36001
content:
" Third, another stream of \r\nliterature criticises the pursuit of economic growth as a goal, instead \r\nadvocating a range of alternatives and suggesting modelling of post\u0002growth approaches to achieve rapid mitigation while improving social \r\noutcomes (Hickel et al. 2021). In the language of the present chapter, \r\nthese alternatives constitute alternative development pathways."


id: 45f6d901d1de8a67fc6937f5205bbbfc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8393
content:
"use of a production factor (fossil energy), thus reducing GDP. In the \r\nsimulations, the mechanism at work is that firms and households \r\nreduce their use of GHG-intensive goods and services in response \r\nto higher prices due to reduced fossil energy use. Second, additional \r\ninvestment required for mitigation partially crowds out productive \r\ninvestment elsewhere (Fujimori et al. 2019), except in Keynesian \r\nmodels in which increased public investment actually boosts GDP \r\n(Pollitt et al. 2015; Landa Rivera et al. 2016; Bulavskaya and Reynes \r\n2018). Magnitude and duration of GDP loss depend on the stringency \r\nof the carbon constraint, the degree of substitutability with less-GHG\u0002intensive goods and services, assumptions about costs of low-carbon \r\ntechnologies and their evolution over time (e.g., Duan et al. 2018; van \r\nMeijl et al. 2018; Cui et al. 2019) and decisions by trading partners, \r\nwhich influence competitiveness impacts for firms (Alton et al. 2014; \r\nFragkos et al"


id: 493da0b416a9f5a53a369687a178406b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8911
content:
"Numerous studies have analysed the potential impact of carbon \r\npricing on labour markets. Chateau et al. (2018) and OECD (2017a) find \r\nthat the implementation of green policies globally (defined broadly as \r\npolicies that internalise environmental externalities through taxes and \r\nother tools, shifting profitability from polluting to green sectors) need \r\nnot harm total employment, and that the broad skill composition (low, \r\nhigh- and medium-skilled jobs) of emerging and contracting sectors \r\nis very similar, with the largest shares of job creation and destruction \r\nat the lowest skill level. To smoothen the labour market transition, \r\nthey conclude that it may be important to reduce labour taxes, to \r\ncompensate vulnerable households, and to provide education and \r\ntraining programs, the latter making it easier for labour to move to \r\nnew jobs"


id: 6845a5bd025a2c51c7557064fba98e86
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13992
content:
" Consistent with this, other studies that simulate the impact \r\nof scenarios with more or less ambitious mitigation policies (including \r\n100% reliance on renewable energy by 2050) find relatively small \r\n(positive or negative) impacts on aggregate global employment that \r\nare more positive if labour taxes are reduced but encompass substantial \r\nlosses for sectors and regions that today are heavily dependent on \r\nfossil fuels (Arndt et al. 2013; Huang et al. 2019; Vandyck et al. 2016; \r\nJacobson et al. 2019). Among worker categories, low-skilled workers \r\ntend to suffer wage losses as they are more likely to have to reallocate, \r\nsomething that can come at a cost in the form of a wage cut (assuming \r\nthat workers who relocate are initially less productive than those who \r\nalready work in the sector)"


id: cc3466e525fd502bfbb6f1f047beeebf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29673
content:
" The results for alternative carbon revenue \r\nrecycling schemes point to trade-offs: a reduction in labour taxes often \r\nleads to the most positive employment outcomes while lump-sum \r\n(uniform per-capita) transfers to households irrespective of income \r\nyield a more egalitarian outcome."


id: 3149036ecd2c97fcb479531510bc7218
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5174
content:
"The literature finds that the detailed design of mitigation policies \r\nis critical for their distributional impacts (robust evidence, high \r\nagreement). For example, Vogt-Schilb et al. (2019) suggest to turn \r\nto cash transfer programs, established as some of the most efficient \r\ntools for poverty reduction in developing countries. In an analysis \r\nof Latin America and the Caribbean, they find that allocation of \r\n30% of carbon revenues would suffice to compensate poor and \r\nvulnerable households on average, leaving the rest for other uses. \r\nThis policy tool is not only available in countries with relatively high \r\nper-capita incomes: in Sub-Saharan Africa, where per-capita incomes \r\nare relatively low, cash transfer programs have been implemented in \r\nalmost all countries (Beegle et al. 2018, p. 57), and are found central \r\nto the success of energy subsidy reforms (Rentschler and Bazilian \r\n2017). In the same vein, Bohringer et al"


id: 4e1a98046fbd73084790b0e344574abf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9715
content:
" (2021) finds that recycling \r\nof revenues from emissions pricing in equal amounts to every \r\nhousehold appeals as an attractive strategy to mitigate regressive \r\neffects and thereby make stringent climate policy more acceptable \r\non societal fairness grounds. However, distributional gains from such \r\nrecycling may come at the opportunity cost of not reaping efficiency "


id: 279b05eefdd1cd1d62f3e37b7f7d5dc6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3638
content:
"Distributional concerns related to climate mitigation are also prevalent \r\nin developed countries, as demonstrated, for instance, by France's \r\nrecent yellow-vest movement, which was ignited by an increase \r\nin carbon taxes. It exemplifies the fact that, when analysing the \r\ndistributional effects of carbon pricing, it is not sufficient to consider \r\nvertical redistribution (i.e., redistribution between households at \r\ndifferent incomes levels but also horizontal redistribution (i.e., \r\nredistribution between households at similar incomes which is due \r\nto differences in terms of spending shares and elasticities for fuel \r\nconsumption). Compared to vertical redistribution, it is more difficult \r\nto devise policies that effectively address horizontal redistribution \r\n(Cronin et al. 2019; Pizer and Sexton 2019; Douenne 2020)"


id: 7e5f2466d2331f68b412223e8a776b84
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17448
content:
" However, \r\nit has been shown ex post that transfer schemes considering income \r\nlevels and location could have protected or even improved the \r\npurchasing power of the bottom half of the population (Bureau et al. \r\n2019). Investments in public transportation may reduce  horizontal \r\nredistribution if it makes it easier for households to reduce fossil \r\nfuel consumption when prices increase (see Sections  4.4.1.5 \r\nand 4.4.1.9). Similarly, in relation to energy use in housing, policies \r\nthat encourage investments that raise energy efficiency for low\u0002income households may complement or be an alternative to taxes \r\nand subsidies as a means of simultaneously mitigating and reducing \r\nfuel poverty (Charlier et al. 2019). From a  different angle, public \r\nacceptance of the French increase in the carbon tax could also have \r\nbeen enhanced via a public information campaign could have raised \r\npublic acceptance of the carbon tax increase (Douenne and Fabre \r\n2020). (See Section 4.4.1"


id: d3546572accae1e46da5f22fb8a4f1d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30774
content:
"8 for a discussion of this and other factors \r\nthat influence public support for carbon taxation.)"


id: 2af69b34c3f1b7bb4a74f8f9d94af1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4189
content:
"Obstacles to the implementation of accelerated mitigation pathways \r\ncan be grouped in four main categories (Table  4.10). The first set \r\nof arguments can be understood through the lens of cost-benefit \r\nanalysis of decision-makers, as they revolve around the following \r\nquestion: Are costs too high relative to benefits? More precisely, are \r\nthe opportunity costs - in economics terms, what is being forfeited by \r\nallocating scarce resources to mitigation - justified by the benefits for \r\nthe decision-maker (whether individual, firm, or nation)? This first set \r\nof obstacles is particularly relevant because accelerated mitigation \r\npathways imply significant effort in the short-run, while benefits in \r\nterms of limited warming accrue later and almost wholly to other \r\nactors. However, as discussed in Sections 3.6 and 4.2.6, mitigation \r\ncosts for a  given mitigation target are not carved in stone"


id: ac903b2eae57e879be944c44358160bb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24694
content:
" They \r\nstrongly depend on numerous factors, including the way mitigation \r\npolicies have been designed, selected, and implemented, the \r\nprocesses through which markets have been shaped by market actors \r\nand institutions, and nature of socially- and culturally-determined \r\ninfluences on consumer preferences. Hence, mitigation choices that \r\nmight be expressed straightforwardly as techno-economic decisions \r\nare, at a deeper level, strongly conditioned by underlying structures \r\nof society."


id: 5c24a0acc40f68e7af27913647280ac1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12011
content:
"A common thread in the discussion above is that the obstacles to \r\naccelerated mitigation are to a large degree rooted in the underlying \r\nstructural features of societies. As a  result, transforming those \r\nunderlying structures can help to remove those obstacles, and \r\nthus facilitate the acceleration of mitigation. This remark is all the \r\nmore important that accelerated mitigation pathways, while very \r\ndifferent across countries, all share three characteristics: speed of \r\nimplementation, breadth of action across all sectors of the economy, \r\nand depth of emission reduction achieving more ambitious targets. \r\nTransforming those underlying structures amounts to shifting \r\na  society's development pathway (Figure  4.6)"


id: f90a5d325620fb5eb681e955f58939ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36693
content:
" In the following \r\nSections  3 and  4, we argue that it is thus necessary to recast \r\naccelerated mitigation in the broader context of shifting development \r\npathways, and that doing so opens up additional opportunities to \r\n(i)  overcome the obstacles outlined above, and also (ii) combine \r\nclimate mitigation with other development objectives."


id: 441abcbf206e913f4803112377ff5307
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8132
content:
"The term development pathway is defined in various ways in the \r\nliterature, and these definitions invariably refer to the evolution \r\nover time of a society's defining features. A society's development \r\npathway can be described, analysed, and explained from a variety \r\nof perspectives, capturing a  range of possible features, trends, \r\nprocesses, and mechanisms. It can be examined in terms of specific \r\nquantitative indicators, such as population, urbanisation level, \r\nlife expectancy, literacy rate, GDP, carbon dioxide emission rate, \r\naverage surface temperature, etc. Alternately, it can be described \r\nwith reference to trends and shifts in broad socio-political or cultural \r\nfeatures, such as democratisation, liberalisation, colonisation, \r\nglobalisation, consumerism, etc. Or, it can be described in a way that \r\nhighlights and details a particular domain of interest; for example, \r\nas an 'economic pathway', 'technological pathway', 'demographic \r\npathway', or others"


id: dd8c2fadf7e1259c4048d5f88cce3d71
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32356
content:
" Any such focused description of a pathway is \r\nmore limited, by definition, than the general and encompassing \r\nnotion of a development pathway."


id: aa4c3a596befc6b999407ac2b998227c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24332
content:
"Systematic studies of the 17 SDGs have found the interactions \r\namong them to be manifold and complex (Nilsson et al. 2016; \r\nPradhan et al. 2017; Weitz et al. 2018; Fuso Nerini et al. 2019). \r\nAddressing them calls for interventions affecting fundamental, \r\ninterconnected, structural features of global society (International \r\nPanel on Social Progress 2018; TWI2050 - The World in 2050 2018), \r\nsuch as to our physical infrastructure (e.g., energy, water, industrial, \r\nurban infrastructure) (Waage et al. 2015; Adshead et al. 2019; \r\nChester 2019; Mansell et al. 2019; Thacker et al. 2019; ), our societal \r\ninstitutions (e.g.,  educational, public health, economic, innovation, \r\nand political institutions) (Ostrom 2010; Klay et al. 2015; Messner \r\n2015; Sachs et al. 2019), and behavioural and cultural tendencies \r\n(e.g.,  consumption patterns, conventional biases, discriminatory \r\ninterpersonal and intergroup dynamics, and inequitable power \r\nstructures) (Esquivel 2016; Sachs et al. 2019)"


id: 56f71d1dc34da149fdd19a245d4180dd
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11157
content:
" These observations \r\nimply that attempt to address each SDG in isolation, or as \r\nindependent technical challenges, would be insufficient, as would \r\nincremental, marginal changes. In contrast, effectively addressing \r\nthe SDGs is likely to mean significant disruption of long-standing \r\ntrends and transformative progress to shift development pathways \r\nto meet al. the SDGs, including climate action, beyond incremental \r\nchanges targeted at addressing mitigation objectives in isolation. \r\nIn other words, mitigation conceived as incremental change is not \r\nenough. Transformational change has implications for equity in its \r\nmultiple dimensions ( Steffen and Stafford Smith 2013; Klinsky et al. \r\n2017a; Leach et al. 2018) including just transitions (Section 4.5)."


id: b5354bb501524b75202173d7a1bfef16
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26050
content:
"Development priorities are reflected in the decisions that actors \r\nwithin societies make, such as policy choices by governments and \r\nparliaments at all levels, votes over competing policy platforms by \r\ncitizens, or selection of issues that non-state actors push for. Multiple \r\nobjectives range from poverty eradication to providing energy access, \r\naddressing concerns of inequality, providing education, improving \r\nhealth, cleaning air and water, improving connectivity, sustaining \r\ngrowth and providing jobs, among others. For example, eradicating \r\npoverty and reducing inequality is a key development priority across \r\nmany countries, such as Brazil (Grottera et al. 2017), Indonesia \r\n(Irfany and Klasen 2017), India (GoI 2015), South Africa (Winkler \r\n2018) and other low- and middle-income countries (Dorband et al. \r\n2019)"


id: 55e60992aaf91997f872e94e2f403cf3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10996
content:
" Reducing inequality relates not only to income, but also to \r\nother dimensions such as in access to energy services (Tait 2017), \r\ngender, education, racial and ethnic profiles (Andrijevic et al. 2020), \r\nand thereby assumes relevance in both developing and developed \r\ncountries. The development priorities of many poor countries and \r\ncommunities with low capacities to adapt, has been focused more \r\non reducing poverty, providing basic infrastructure, education and \r\nimproving health, rather than on mitigation (Chimhowu et al. 2019)."


id: f5fd34bc829d30e6f2c3ef670856f09d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36215
content:
"China's development plans have evolved over time from being \r\nlargely growth oriented, and geared largely towards the objectives \r\nof addressing poverty, improving health, education and public \r\nwell-being to also including modernisation of agriculture, industry \r\nand infrastructure, new forms of urbanisation and a clear intent of \r\nfocusing on innovation and new drivers of development (Central \r\nCompilation & Translation Press 2016). China's 14th Five Year Plan \r\nnot only seeks to promote high quality development in all aspects \r\nand focus on strengthening the economy in the global industrial \r\nchain, but also includes a vision of an 'ecological civilisation', which \r\nhad been developed (CPC-CC 2015) and analysed earlier (He 2016; \r\nXiao and Zhao 2017). It seeks to enhance China's climate pledge to \r\npeak CO2 emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 \r\nthrough more vigorous policies and measures"


id: 16ba24977273f6ed1e8a0c42c52e68b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1095
content:
" Development plans \r\ntie in multiple development priorities that evolve and broaden over \r\ntime as societies develop, as exemplified inter alia by the history of \r\ndevelopment plans in India (Box 4.4)."


id: cfd655caa652a650f099e9ee1444d5ab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30229
content:
"India's initial national development plans focused on improving the living standards of its people, increasing national income and \r\nfood self-sufficiency. Accordingly, there was a thrust towards enhancing productivity of the agricultural and industrial sectors. While \r\nthe main focus was on maintaining high economic growth and industrial productivity, poverty eradication, employment and inclusive \r\ngrowth remained important priorities. The National Action Plan on Climate Change with eight National Missions focusing on mitigation \r\nas well as adaptation was launched in 2008 integrating climate change considerations in planning and decision-making (MoEF 2008). \r\nThe 12th Five-Year Plan (2012-2017) also brought in a focus on sustainability and mentioned the need for faster, sustainable and \r\ninclusive growth"


id: f4718fb98c54866611c9c6e945c0d061
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35958
content:
" The National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog) was set up in 2017 replacing the erstwhile Planning \r\nCommission, with a renewed focus towards bringing innovation, technology, enterprise and efficient management together at the \r\ncore of policy formulation and implementation. However, while India has moved away from its Five-Year Plans, decision-making is \r\nmore dynamic, with a  number of sector-specific initiatives and targets focused on integrating sustainability dimensions through \r\na series of policies and measures supporting resource efficiency, improved energy access, infrastructure development, low-carbon \r\noptions and building resilient communities, among other objectives (MoEFCC 2018, 2021). India's overall development pathway \r\ncurrently has a strong focus on achieving robust and inclusive growth to ensure balanced development across all regions and states \r\nand across sectors"


id: 2c5b13c2bc76e53b6860b1ccf73ec62a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4411
content:
" There is a thrust on embracing new technologies while fostering innovation and upskilling, modernisation of \r\nagriculture, improving regional and interpersonal equity, bridging the gap between public and private sector performance, by focusing \r\non efficient delivery of public services, rooting out corruption and black economy, formalising the economy and expanding the tax \r\nbase, improving the ease of doing business, nursing the stressed commercial banking sector back to a healthy state, and stopping \r\nleakages through direct benefit transfers, among other measures (GoI 2015, 2018; MoEFCC 2021)."


id: 44a07917a8f43994316de8d1b3ddcdc6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8222
content:
"The Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMP) developed for this \r\nReport (Box 3.1 and Section 3.2.5) provide another example of how \r\ndevelopment pathways influence mitigative capacity. Precisely, \r\nIMP1.5-SP (Shifting Pathways) and 1.5-Ren (Renewables) lead to the \r\nsame long-term temperature, but differ in underlying socio-economic \r\nconditions. The former is based on Shared Socio-economic Pathway \r\n(SSP) 1  (sustainable development), whereas the latter is based on \r\nSSP2 (middle of the road). Comparing 1.5-Ren to 1.5-SP can thus be \r\ninterpreted as a numerical translation of trying the reach the same \r\nlong-term temperature goal without and with shifting development \r\npathways towards sustainability. Data shows that the global price of \r\ncarbon necessary to remain on target is 40-50% lower in the latter \r\nrelative to the former, thus indicating that mitigation is cheaper with \r\na  shift in development pathway towards sustainability. Other cost \r\nindicators (e.g"


id: 8ec4e1017ac3ce3849a8ae3ed777c0c0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19986
content:
" consumption loss or GDP loss) tell the same story. \r\nSince both IMPs were computed using the same underlying model, \r\nthe comparison is even more robust."


id: 649e829e4460bc20467b5d770d2204cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13405
content:
"Degree of inequality: Chapter  2  notes that while eradicating \r\nextreme poverty and providing universal access to modern energy \r\nservices to poor populations across the globe has negligible \r\nimplications for emissions growth, existing studies on the role of \r\npoverty and inequality as drivers of GHG emissions provide limited \r\nevidence that under certain contexts greater inequality can lead \r\nto a deterioration in environmental quality and may be associated \r\nwith higher GHG emissions (Section 2.4). In fact, factors affecting \r\nhousehold consumption-based emissions include household size, \r\nage, education attainment, employment status, urban vs rural \r\nlocation and housing stock (Druckman and Jackson 2015). There \r\nis evidence to indicate that at the household level, the increase \r\nin emissions from additional consumption of the lower income \r\nhouseholds could be larger than the reduction in emissions from \r\nthe drop in consumption from the high income households (Sager \r\n2019)"


id: 3a4548e4e04c80f1474613b6d9a5edd9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6536
content:
" Accordingly, as countries seek to fulfil the objective of \r\nreducing inequality, there are possibilities of higher increase in \r\nemissions (Sager 2019)."


id: cbccbb5ea81673c7f9aeb4d8611b992b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29604
content:
"Concerns about mitigation are already being introduced in national \r\ndevelopment plans, as there is evidence that development strategies \r\nand pathways can be carefully designed so as to align towards multiple \r\npriorities and achieve greater synergistic benefits. For example, India's \r\nsolar programme is a key element in its NDC that can in the long run, \r\nnot only provide energy security and contribute to mitigation, but \r\ncan simultaneously contribute to economic growth, improved energy \r\naccess and additional employment opportunities, if appropriate \r\npolicies and measures are carefully planned and implemented. \r\nHowever, the environmental implications of the transition need to be \r\ncarefully examined with regard to the socio-economic implications \r\nin light of the potential of other alternatives like green hydrogen, \r\nnuclear or carbon capture, use and storage (CCUS)"


id: 7305687239dfcfa01ab4e7152238e788
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15712
content:
" Similarly, South \r\nAfrica National Development Plan (2011) also integrates transition to \r\nlow-carbon as part of the country development objectives (Box 4.5)."


id: 227f2ead630e5d27f8a32a4d3444690b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2875
content:
"Doing so requires new ways of thinking with interdisciplinary \r\nresearch and use of alternative frameworks and methods suited to \r\ndeeper understanding of change agents, determinants of change \r\nand adaptive management among other issues (Winkler 2018). \r\nThis includes, inter alia, being able to examine enabling conditions \r\nfor shifting development pathways (Section  4.4.1); re-evaluating \r\nthe neo-classical assumptions within most models, both on the \r\nfunctioning of markets and on the behaviour of agents, to better \r\naddress obstacles on the demand side, obstacles on the supply \r\nside and market distortions (Ekholm et al. 2013; Staub-Kaminski \r\net al. 2014; Grubb et al"


id: c44a78e79888c21e0fa0ba6d481e4823
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28451
content:
" 2015) improving representation of issues \r\nrelated with uncertainty, innovation, inertia and irreversibility \r\nwithin the larger development contexts, including energy access \r\nand security; improving the representation of social and human \r\ncapital, and of social, technological and governance innovations \r\n(Pedde et al. 2019)."


id: a5bf9b7263fc8ffeb08c270ad52c0683
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23642
content:
"Tools have been developed in that direction, for example in the \r\nMitigation Action Plans and Scenarios (MAPS) community (La \r\nRovere et al. 2014b), but need to be further mainstreamed in the \r\nanalysis. Back-casting is often a  preferred modelling approach for \r\nassessment aiming to align national development goals with global \r\nclimate goals like CO2 stabilisation. Back-casting is a  normative \r\napproach where modellers construct desirable futures and specify \r\nupfront targets and then find out possible pathways to attain these \r\ntargets (IPCC et al. 2001). Use of approaches like back-casting are \r\nuseful not only in incorporating the long term national development \r\nobjectives in the models, but also evaluating conflicts and synergies \r\nmore effectively (van der Voorn et al. 2020). In back casting, the long\u0002term national development objectives remain the key benchmarks \r\nguiding the model dynamics and the global climate goal is interfaced \r\nto realise the co-benefits"


id: 6aae6f68b71a40a627c7432edd555d75
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14396
content:
"Policies such as those listed in Table 4.12 are typically associated with \r\nbroader objectives than GHG mitigation. They are generally conceived \r\nand implemented in the pursuit of overall societal development \r\nobjectives, such as job creation, macroeconomic stability, economic \r\ngrowth, and public health and welfare. However, they can have major \r\ninfluence on mitigative capacity, and hence can be seen as necessary \r\ntools if mitigation options are to be significantly broadened and \r\naccelerated (medium evidence, medium agreement). The example of \r\nthe UK shows how accelerated mitigation through dietary changes \r\nrequire a wide set of efforts to shift underlying drivers of behaviour"


id: 42c77e93a68df4d4be6770bc2bc284f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7899
content:
" \r\nIn this case, multiple forces have interacted to lead to reduced meat \r\nconsumption, including health attitudes, animal welfare concerns, \r\nand an increasing focus on climate and other environmental \r\nimpacts of livestock production, along with corporate investment \r\nin market opportunities, and technological developments in meat \r\nalternatives (Box 5.5)."


id: ea6f147b5f2d68391da45813c8fdef9a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34391
content:
"Other historic cases that are unrelated to recent mitigation efforts \r\nmight be more appropriate examples of major socio-technical shifts \r\nthat were largely driven by intentional, coherent intentional policy \r\ninitiatives across numerous domains to meet multiple objectives. The \r\nmodernisation of agriculture in various national contexts fits such \r\na  mold. In the USA, for example, major government investments \r\nin agricultural innovation through the creation of agricultural \r\nuniversities and support for research provided advances in the \r\ntechnological basis for modernisation. A  network of agricultural \r\nextension services accelerated the popularization and uptake of \r\nmodern methods. Infrastructure investments in irrigation and drainage \r\nmade production more viable, and investment in roadways and rail \r\nfor transport supported market formation"


id: 2bec26fe94656083ca6a283f5f8218c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4335
content:
" Agricultural development \r\nbanks made credit available, and government subsidies improved \r\nthe profitability for farmers and agricultural corporations. Public \r\ncampaigns were launched to modify food habits (Ferleger 2000)."


id: c6e582d220544687dbb66f30b3213823
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28877
content:
"Further examples of SDPS across many different systems and sectors \r\nare elaborated across this report. Concrete examples assessed in \r\nthis chapter include high employment and low emissions structural \r\nchange, fiscal reforms for mitigation and social contract, combining \r\nhousing policies to deliver both housing and transport mitigation, \r\nand change economic, social and spatial patterns of development \r\nof the agriculture sector provide the basis for sustained reductions \r\nin emissions from deforestation (Sections  4.4.1.7-4.4.1.10). These \r\nexamples differ by context. Examples in other chapters include \r\ntransformations in energy, urban, building, industrial, transport, \r\nand land-based systems, changes in behaviour and social practices, \r\nas well as transformational changes across whole economies and \r\nsocieties (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in this chapter, Section 5.8, Box 6.2, \r\nSections 8.2, 8.3.1, 8.4, 9.8.1, 9.8.2 and 10.4.1, and Cross-Chapter \r\nBox 12 in Chapter 16)"


id: 3ba08e758e87fbaf00f8106b96618b2e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6734
content:
" These examples and others can be understood \r\nin the context of an explanation of the concept of SDPS, and how to \r\nshifting development pathways (Cross-Chapter Box 5 in this chapter)."


id: 87322b03b8c1115a43bea86a1c483555
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18803
content:
"Policy design can also manage trade-offs, for example through policy measures as part of just transitions (Section 17.4). However, \r\neven with good policy design, decisions about mitigation actions, and the timing and scale thereof, may entail trade-offs with the \r\nachievement of other national development objectives in the near-, mid- and long term. In the near term, for example, regulations may \r\nban vehicles from city centres to reduce congestion and local air pollution, but reduce mobility and choice. Increasing green spaces \r\nwithin cities without caps on housing prices may involve trade-offs with affordable housing and push low income residents outside \r\nthe city (Section 8.2.2). In the mid- and long-term, large-scale deployment of biomass energy raises concerns about food security and \r\nbiodiversity conservation (Sections 3.7.1, 3.7.5, 7.4.4, 9.8.1, 12.5.2 and 12.5.3)"


id: de04b958e95a9f46948326351ef0f951
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32432
content:
" Conflicts between mitigation and other development \r\nobjectives can act as an impediment to climate action (Section 13.8). Climate change is the result of decades of unsustainable energy \r\nproduction, land-use, production and consumption patterns, as well as governance arrangements and political economic institutions \r\nthat lock in resource-intensive development patterns (robust evidence, high agreement). Reframing development objectives and \r\nshifting development pathways towards sustainability can help transform these patterns and practices, allowing space for transitions \r\ntransforming unsustainable systems (medium evidence, high agreement) (Chapter 17, Executive Summary)."


id: 29297185a36bf8367e96d8662cb36ca0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3908
content:
"There is no one-size-fits-all recipe for shifting development pathways. However, the following insights can be drawn from past \r\nexperience and scenarios of possible future development pathways (Section  4.4.1). For example, policies making inner-urban \r\nneighbourhoods more accessible and affordable reduce transport costs for low- and middle-income households, and also reduce \r\ntransport emissions (Section 4.4.1.9). Shifts in development pathways result from both sustained political interventions and bottom\u0002up changes in public opinion. No single sector or policy action is enough to achieve this. Coordinated policy mixes would need to \r\ncoordinate multiple actors - in other words, individuals, groups and collectives, corporate actors, institutions and infrastructure actors - \r\nto deepen decarbonisation and shift pathways towards sustainability (Pettifor 2020)"


id: 297ee2911efc19c7cd56b00eb5684b31
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3965
content:
" One example was the liquefied petroleum gas \r\n(LPG) Subsidy ('Zero Kero') Program in Indonesia which harnessed creative policy design to shift to cleaner energy by overcoming \r\nexisting private interests. The objective of decreasing fiscal expenditures on domestic kerosene subsidies by replacing it with LPG was \r\nachieved by harnessing distribution networks of existing providers supported by government subsidised provision of equipment and \r\nsubsidised pricing (Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 13)."


id: 7e9a0412108dbcbe67485d49799410df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17484
content:
"In some developed countries and communities, affluence leads to high levels of consumption and emissions across sectors (Mazur \r\nand Rosa 1974; Wiedmann et al. 2020). For some countries, reducing consumption can reduce emissions without compromising on \r\nwellbeing. However, some developing countries still face the challenge of escaping 'middle-income traps' (Agenor and Canuto 2015), \r\nas labour-saving technological change and globalisation have limited options to develop via the manufacturing sector (Altenburg \r\nand Rodrik 2017). In least developed countries, infrastructure, industry, and public services are still being established, posing both \r\na challenge to financial support to deploy technologies, and large opportunities to support accelerating low-to-zero carbon options - \r\nespecially in terms of efficient and sufficient provision (Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020)"


id: ddd7afd43995e4f66155c243f927659f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32398
content:
" Availability of capital, or lack thereof, is a critical \r\ndiscriminant across countries and requires international cooperation (Section 15.2.2)."


id: 2047b6e0103ad1f2d4ecfbdbb653bddf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2529
content:
"The literature does not provide a handbook on how to accomplish the \r\nabove. However, analysis of past experience as well as understanding \r\nof how societies function yield insights that the present section aims \r\nat presenting. Human history has seen multiple transformation of \r\neconomies due to path-breaking innovations (Michaelowa et al. \r\n2018), like the transformation of the energy system from traditional \r\nbiomass to fossil fuels or from steam to electricity (Fouquet 2010, \r\n2016a; Sovacool 2016). Fouquet (2016b) and Smil (2016) argue \r\nthat even the most rapid global transformations have taken several \r\ndecades. Enabling transformational change implies to create now \r\nthe conditions that lead to that transformation (Diaz et al. 2019). \r\nThe starting point is that there is no single factor determining such \r\na transformation. Rather a range of enabling conditions can combine \r\nin a co-evolutionary process"


id: 8149ed5e8bcb786f810dab7281305ad1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17865
content:
" Amongst the conditions that have been \r\ncited in the literature are higher levels of innovation, multilevel \r\ngovernance, transformative policy regimes or profound behavioural \r\ntransformation (Rockstrom et al. 2017; IPCC 2018a; Geels et al. 2018; \r\nKriegler et al. 2018). It might be possible to put in place some of \r\nthe above conditions rapidly, while others may take longer, thereby \r\nrequiring an early start."


id: 221b02a17a806faab5e46a0d11717106
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2812
content:
"Long experience of political management of change demonstrates \r\nthat managing such risks is not easy, and requires sufficiently strong \r\nand competent institutions (Stiglitz 1998). For example, shift away \r\nfrom fossil fuel-based energy economy could significantly disrupt the \r\nstatus quo, leading to a stranding of financial and capital assets and \r\nshifting of political-economic power. Ensuring the decision-making \r\nprocess is not unduly influenced by actors with much to lose is key \r\nto managing a  transformation. Effective governance, as noted in \r\nChapter 13, requires establishing strategic direction, coordination of \r\npolicy responses, and mediation among divergent interests. Among \r\nvarieties of climate governance, which institutions emerge is path\u0002dependent, based on the interplay of national political institutions, \r\ninternational drivers, and bureaucratic structures (Dubash 2021)"


id: bb5ea49f5f6e6df1d99f0a47a50dfa93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27035
content:
" \r\nFocused national climate institutions to address these challenges \r\nare more likely to emerge, persist and be effective when they \r\nare consistent with a  framing of climate change that has broad \r\nnational political support (medium evidence, medium agreement) \r\n(Sections 4.5, 13.2 and 13.5)."


id: 77d7e99e1cbff6910e9db555a50bddb6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16412
content:
"Because low-carbon transitions are political processes, analyses \r\nare needed of policy as well as for policy (Section  13.6). Political \r\nscientists have developed a number of theoretical models that both \r\nexplain policy-making processes and provide useful insights for \r\ninfluencing those processes. Case studies of successes and failures \r\nin sustainable development and mitigation offer equally important \r\ninsights. Both theoretical and empirical analysis reinforce the \r\nargument that single policy instruments are not sufficient (robust \r\nevidence, high agreement). Policymakers might rather mobilise \r\na range of policies, such as financial instruments (taxes, subsidies, \r\ngrants, loans), regulatory instruments (standards, laws, performance \r\ntargets) and processual instruments (demonstration projects, network \r\nmanagement, public debates, consultations, foresight exercises, \r\nroadmaps) (Voss et al. 2007)"


id: 8c33d5ed953c09c20d0d73e0e345d79e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19564
content:
" Policies can be designed to focus on \r\nlimiting or phasing out high-carbon technology. The appropriate mix is \r\nlikely to vary between countries and domains, depending on political \r\ncultures and stakeholder configurations (Rogge and Reichardt 2016), \r\nbut is likely to include a combination of: (i) standards, nudges and \r\ninformation to encourage low-carbon technology adoption and \r\nbehavioural change; (ii) economic incentives to reward low-carbon \r\ninvestments; (iii) supply-side policy instruments including for fossil "


id: 65f91b8957655f0b797ce43362334fad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13634
content:
"Different approaches have been explored to improve such alignment \r\n(Section  15.6), from national credit policies to directly green \r\nmainstream financial regulations (e.g., through modifications in the \r\nBasel rules for banks). For all approaches, an essential precondition \r\nis to assess and monitor the contribution of financial flows to climate \r\nand sustainability goals, with better metrics that clearly link with \r\nfinancial activity (Chenet et al. 2019). Enabling the alignment of \r\ninvestment decision-making with achieving climate and broader \r\nsustainability goals includes acknowledgment and disclosure of \r\nclimate-change related risk and of risks associated with mitigation \r\nin financial portfolios. Current disclosures remain far from the \r\nscale the markets need to channel investment to sustainable and \r\nresilient solutions (UNEP - Finance Initiative 2020; Clark et al. 2018; \r\nTask Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures 2019; IPCC \r\n2018b)"


id: d40371f5ed30054090668fb52d5e9fd2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30872
content:
" Disclosure, however, is not enough (Ameli et al. 2020). \r\nIn addition, climate targets can be translated into investment \r\nroadmaps and financing needs for financial institutions, both at \r\nnational and international level. Financing needs are usable for \r\nfinancial institutions, to inform portfolio allocation decisions and \r\nfinancing priorities (Chenet et al. 2019). At the international level, \r\nfor example, technology roadmaps for key sectors can be translated \r\ninto investment roadmaps and financing needs, as shown by existing \r\nexperiences in energy and industrial sectors (IEA 2015; IEA and \r\nWBSCD 2018; Chenet et al. 2019)."


id: 5f8d7f5e42a0e0104960bffb0899213a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12608
content:
"Meeting these challenges also requires enhanced institutional \r\ncapacity and enhanced institutional mechanisms to strengthen the \r\ncoordination between multiple actors, improve complementarities \r\nand synergies between multiple objectives (Rasul 2016; Ringel 2017; \r\nLiu et al. 2018) and pursue climate action and other development \r\nobjectives in an integrated and coherent way (Von Stechow et al. \r\n2016; McCollum et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018b; Roy et al. 2018; Fuso \r\nNerini et al. 2019), particularly in developing countries (Adenle et al. \r\n2017; Rosenbloom 2017). Institutional capacities to be strengthened \r\ninclude vertical collaboration and interaction within nation states \r\nand horizontal collaboration (e.g.,  transnational city networks) for \r\nthe development and implementation of plans, regulations and \r\npolicies"


id: f4a2aa4d99411cad001feee58ad51920
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35993
content:
" More specifically capacities include: capacity for knowledge \r\nharnessing and integration (from multiple perspectives); for \r\nintegrated policy design and implementation (Scott 2017); for long\u0002term planning (Lecocq et al. 2021) for monitoring and review process; \r\nfor coordinating multi-actor processes to create synergies and avoid \r\ntrade-offs. As a result, institutions that enable and improve human \r\ncapacities and capabilities are a major driver of transformation. To \r\nthis extent, promoting education, health care and social safety, also \r\nare instrumental to undertake climate change mitigation and cope \r\nwith environmental problems (Winkler et al. 2007; Sachs et al. 2019). \r\nGiven that strengthening institutions may be a long-term endeavour, \r\nit needs attention in the near term."


id: 78241d7204090c39189f87fafdb1ad5f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16468
content:
"Individual motivation and capacity are impacted by different factors \r\nthat go beyond traditional social, demographic and economic \r\npredictors. However, it is unclear to what extent behavioural factors \r\n(i.e., cognitive, motivational and contextual aspects) are taken into \r\naccount in policy design (Dubois et al. 2019; Mundaca et al. 2019). \r\nIn fact, while economic policies play a significant role in influencing \r\npeople's decisions and behaviour, many drivers of human behaviour \r\nand values work largely outside the market system (Winkler et al. \r\n2015; Diaz et al. 2019) as actors in society, particularly individuals, do \r\nnot respond in an economically 'rational' manner based on perfect\u0002information cost-benefit analyses (Runge 1984; Shiller 2019). Rather, \r\ncompelling narratives can drive individuals to adopt new norms and \r\npolicies"


id: 7bd3674566ff652e202f9384a098a01b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17085
content:
" And norms can be more quickly and more robustly shifted \r\nby proposing and framing policies designed with awareness of how \r\nframings interact with individual cognitive tendencies (van der Linden \r\net al. 2015). Transformative policies are thus much more likely to be \r\nsuccessfully adopted and lead to long-term behavioural change if \r\ndesigned in accordance with principles of cognitive psychology (van \r\nder Linden et al. 2015), and with the deep understanding of decision\u0002making offered by behavioural science (UNEP 2017b). Similarly, given \r\nthat present bias - being motivated by costs and benefits that take \r\neffect immediately than those delivered later  - significantly shapes \r\nbehaviour, schemes that bring forward distant costs into the present or \r\nthat upfront incentives have proved to be more effective (Zauberman \r\net al. 2009; van den Broek et al. 2017; Safarzynska 2018)"


id: a4c07866de346412fba63a5606ed2e22
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23495
content:
" Overall, \r\ntransformational strategies that align mitigation with subjective life \r\nsatisfaction, and build societal support by positive discourses about \r\neconomic, social, and cultural benefits of low-carbon innovations, \r\npromises far more success than targeting mitigation alone (WBGU \r\n2011; Asensio and Delmas 2016; Geels et al. 2017)."


id: 10a49b1253bc596c3d5f932f0c7f7407
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 95
content:
"At the national level, it is also essential to create public fiscal space \r\nfor actions promoting the SDG agenda and thereby broadening the \r\nscope of mitigation (medium evidence, medium agreement). To do \r\nso, pricing carbon - either through tax payments based on the level \r\nof emissions or cap-and-trade systems that limit total allowable \r\nemissions - is an efficient means of discouraging carbon emissions \r\nthroughout an economy (both in consumption and production) while \r\nsimultaneously encouraging a switch to non-carbon energy sources \r\nand generating revenues for prioritised actions (Section  13.6.3). \r\nRegarding to levels, the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices \r\nconcluded that 'carbon-price level consistent with achieving the Paris \r\ntemperature target is at least USD40-80 tCO2\r\n-1 by 2020 and USD50-\r\n100 tCO2\r\n-1 by 2030, provided a supportive policy environment is in \r\nplace' (CPLC 2017; Wall Street Journal 2019)"


id: fb8ea5340a4a7209bbf6c35fc14dc25b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37078
content:
" National level models \r\nyield median carbon values of carbon values of USD733 tCO2\r\n-1 in \r\n2050 along accelerated mitigation pathways (Section 4.2.6), while \r\nglobal models find a median value of USD578 tCO2\r\n-1 for pathways \r\nthat reach net zero CO2 between 2045 and 2055 [interquartile range \r\nUSD405-708] (Section 3.6.1)."


id: b868a32e9f76a7469833d029c5fb53c6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26543
content:
"Carbon pricing, however, is designed to reduce its fiscal base. \r\nFiscal space may therefore also need to stem from other sources, \r\nalthough fiscal reforms are complex endeavours (Section 4.4.1.8). For \r\ncountries at lower income levels, foreign aid can make an important \r\ncontribution to the same agenda (Kharas and McArthur 2019). It may \r\nalso be noted that, according to estimates at the global level, military \r\nspending amounted to USD1.748 trillion in 2012 (the last year with \r\ndata), a figure that corresponded to 2.3% of GDP, 55% of government \r\nspending in education, and was 13 times the level of net ODA (World \r\nBank 2020; SIPRI 2020). Given this, moderate reductions in military \r\nspending (which may involve conflict resolution and cross-country \r\nagreements on arms limitations) could free up considerable resources \r\nfor the SDG agenda, both in the countries that reduce spending and \r\nin the form of ODA"


id: e299a7217d6cb496e160748c071c58f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33157
content:
" The resolution of conflicts within and between \r\ncountries before they become violent would also reduce the need for \r\npublic and private spending repairing human and physical damage. \r\nThe fact that civil wars are common in the countries that face the \r\nseverest SDG challenges underscores the importance of this issue \r\n(Collier 2007, pp.17-37)."


id: baad3d0789142a1dd11af8de9ae6bf69
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26910
content:
"Several studies have pointed at the important possible contributions \r\nof grassroots innovators for the start-up of sustainability transitions \r\n(Seyfang and Smith 2007; Seyfang et al. 2014; Smith et al. 2016). In \r\nparticular, a range of studies have shown that users can play a variety \r\nof roles in promoting system innovation: shielding, nurturing (including \r\nlearning, networking and visioning) and empowering the niches \r\nin relation to the dominant system and regime (Schot et al. 2016; \r\nRandelli and Rocchi 2017; Meelen et al. 2019). More fundamentally, \r\ninnovation regimes can be led and guided by markets driven by \r\nmonetisable profits (as much of private sector led technological \r\ninnovation of patentable  intellectual property), or prioritise social \r\nreturns (e.g.,  innovation structures such as innovation prizes, public \r\nsector innovation, investments in human capital, and socially-beneficial \r\nintellectual property regimes)"


id: 69299c4a1df7ac31fa135ae80dd47215
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14139
content:
" In both cases, public policies can play \r\na key role by providing resources and favourable incentives (IEA 2020). \r\nChapter 16 provides more details on ways to foster innovation."


id: 6a7a4005fab62c4e64ce16fedc576bc3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14363
content:
"As outlined in Section 4.2.5, rapid, large-scale deployment of improved \r\nlow-carbon technology is a  critical component of accelerated \r\nmitigation pathways. As part of its key role in technological \r\nchange, R&D can make a crucial contribution to accelerated mitigation \r\nup to 2030 and beyond, among other things by focusing on closing \r\ntechnology gaps that stand in the way of decarbonising today's high \r\nemitting sectors. Such sectors include shipping, trucking, aviation \r\nand heavy industries like steel, cement and chemicals. More broadly, \r\nit is increasingly clear that digital changes are becoming a key driving \r\nforce in societal transformation (Tegmark 2017). Digitalisation is not \r\nonly an 'instrument' for resolving sustainability challenges, it is also \r\na fundamental driver of disruptive, multiscalar change (Sachs et al. \r\n2019) that amounts to a shift in development pathway"


id: 1edd3c52fa4aff0707ef0729b38eb86f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2299
content:
" Information \r\nand communication technologies, artificial intelligence, the internet \r\nof things, nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, robotics, are not usually \r\ncategorised as climate technologies, but have a potential impact on \r\nGHG emissions (OECD 2017b) (Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 16)."


id: 82ddd9ea858fb2352ec537198f6c8221
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18113
content:
"climate mitigation component of the fiscal reform varies strongly \r\nwith the context, and may not be sufficient to address the other \r\nobjectives pursued. Even if the carbon price is high, the revenue \r\nit generates may be moderate as a share of GDP and eventually it \r\nwill be zero if emissions are eliminated. For example, Jakob et al. \r\n(2016) find that the carbon pricing revenues that most countries \r\nin Sub-Saharan Africa could expect to generate only would meet \r\na  small part of their infrastructure spending needs. In Sweden, \r\nthe country with the highest carbon tax rate in the world, the tax \r\nhas not been a  significant part of total tax revenues. Moreover, \r\nemissions from sectors covered by the tax have shrunk and, \r\nas a  result, the revenues from the tax, as a  share of GDP, have \r\nalso declined, from a peak of 0.93% in 2004, when the rate was \r\nUSD109 per metric tonne of CO2, to 0.48% in 2018, when the rate \r\nhad reached USD132 (Jonsson et al. 2020; Statistics Sweden 2020)"


id: 424b0286efc41c71e4d4653ce7564f1d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7831
content:
" \r\nThis means that governments that want to avoid a decline in the \r\nGDP share for total tax revenues over time would have to raise \r\nthe intake from other taxes. However, it is here important to note \r\nthat domestic tax hikes are likely to involve trade-offs since, at the \r\nsame time as the spending they fund may provide various benefits, \r\nthey may also reduce the capacity of households and the private \r\nsector to consume and invest, something that may reduce growth \r\nover time and reduced resources for spending in support of human \r\ndevelopment (Lofgren et al. 2013). It is also worth emphasising that \r\nrestructuring of the fiscal system amount to changes in the social \r\ncontract of the society (Combet and Hourcade 2017 and 2014), and \r\nthus represents a major economic and social decision."


id: 876a5c160872a8f631d75c58f6e89de7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18845
content:
"The timing of carbon pricing reforms is also important: they are more \r\nlikely to succeed if they exploit windows of opportunity provided \r\nby events that raise awareness of the costs of carbon emissions \r\n(like bouts of elevated local air pollution or reports about the role \r\nof emissions in causing global warming), as well as momentum \r\nfrom climate actions by other countries and international climate \r\nagreements (Karapin 2016; Jakob et al.2019). It is also important \r\nto consider the level of international prices of carbon energy: when \r\nthey are low, consumer resistance would be smaller since prices \r\nwill remain relatively low, though the tax may become more visible \r\nwhen energy prices increase again. As part of ongoing efforts \r\nto accelerate mitigation, such tax hikes may be crucial to avoid \r\na  slow down in the shift to renewable energy sources (Withana \r\n2016; Rentschler and Bazilian 2017)"


id: e335f1f0f6d17746c15749a7d172d7c4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33243
content:
" In countries that export \r\ncarbon energy, carbon taxation may run into additional resistance \r\nfrom producers."


id: a36c9950d18184f174f2b57e706bc15a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23275
content:
"There is also considerable literature providing insights on the political \r\nand social acceptability of carbon taxes, suggesting for example \r\nthat political support may be boosted if the revenue is recycled to \r\nthe tax payers or earmarked for areas with positive environmental \r\neffects (e.g., Bachus et al. (2019) for Belgium, and Beiser-McGrath \r\nand Bernauer (2019) for Germany and the USA), as well as on \r\nthe difficulties associated with political vagaries (and economic \r\nconsequences thereof) associated with the introduction of such \r\ninstruments (Pereira et al. 2016). Similarly, 'best practices' have been \r\ndrawn from past experience on fossil-fuel subsidy reforms (Rentschler \r\nand Bazilian 2017; Sovacool 2017). Specific policies, however, \r\ndepend on societal objectives, endowments, structure of production, \r\nemployment, and trade, and institutional structure (including the \r\nfunctioning of markets and government capacity) (Kettner et al. \r\n2019). As noted in Section 4.2"


id: c80cac1844cb03ce9eb858676669bee1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29053
content:
"6, macroeconomic analysis finds that \r\nthe overall economic implications of carbon pricing differ markedly \r\ndepending on the way the proceeds from carbon pricing are used, \r\nand thus on the way the fiscal system is reformed, with potential for \r\ndouble dividend if the proceeds from the tax are used to repeal the \r\nmost distortive taxes in the economy."


id: a64715950d4e4ec2f1c84f282fb9fc29
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23695
content:
"A growing literature assesses co-benefits of sectoral policies that \r\nlead to decarbonisation and simultaneously promote economic \r\ndevelopment, improve living standards, reduce inequality, and create \r\njob opportunities (Maroun and Schaeffer 2012; Bataille et al. 2016b; \r\nPye et al. 2016; Bataille et al. 2018; La Rovere et al. 2018; Richter \r\net al. 2018; Waisman et al. 2019). While this may be particularly \r\nchallenging in developing countries, given large populations still \r\nlacking basic needs, previous development paths show that finding \r\nsynergies in development and climate objectives in the AFOLU \r\nsector is possible. One example is Brazil, which has arguably shifted \r\nits development pathway to reduce emissions and make progress \r\ntowards several SDGs, though progress is not linear. Over the past \r\ntwo decades, Brazil had made remarkable progress in implementing \r\na sequence of policies across multiple sectors"


id: 70118379e57e88cf5040900db986ce54
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15247
content:
" This policy package \r\nsimultaneously increased minimum wages of low income families, \r\nachieved universal energy access, and raised the quality of life and \r\nwell-being for the large majority of the population (Da Silveira \r\nBezerra et al. 2017; Grottera et al. 2017, 2018; La Rovere et al. 2018). \r\nThis led to significant social benefits, reduction of income inequality \r\nand poverty eradication (Da Silveira Bezerra et al. 2017; Grottera \r\net al. 2017), reflected in a decrease of the Gini coefficient and a rise \r\nin the human development index (La Rovere 2017)."


id: c57bd3d6deee1d21d2a7a6c17c313fe8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28652
content:
"Making inner-cities neighbourhoods more accessible and more \r\naffordable is a complex endeavour (Benner and Karner 2016). At the \r\nsame time, it is already a policy objective in its own right in many \r\ncountries, independent of the climate mitigation motivation, for \r\na  range of social, health and economic reasons. Revenues derived \r\nfrom climate policies could provide additional resources to support \r\nsuch programs, as some climate policy already have provisions to use \r\ntheir revenues towards low-income groups (Karner and Marcantonio \r\n2018). The mitigation benefits of keeping inner-cities more accessible \r\nand affordable for low- and middle-income households often remains \r\nout of, or is only emerging in the debates surrounding the planning \r\nof fast-developing cities in many developing countries (IADB 2012; \r\nGrant 2015; Khosla and Bhardwaj 2019). Finally, from a  political \r\neconomy perspective, it is also interesting to note that (Bergquist et \r\nal"


id: b6548890c4acd6e076924cb5c18d2095
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26216
content:
" 2020) find higher support for climate policy packages in the USA \r\nwhen affordable housing programs are included."


id: be22557c23b694a63a820a2956182414
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27469
content:
"In addition, investment in infrastructure is critical to the development \r\nof decarbonised economic structures that generate growth, \r\nemployment, and universal access to a wide range of services that \r\nare central to the SDG agenda: transportation, water, sanitation, \r\nelectricity, flood protection, and irrigation. For low- and middle\u0002income countries, annual costs of reaching these goals by 2030 and \r\nputting their economies on a path toward decarbonisation may range \r\nbetween 2% and 8% of GDP, with the level depending on spending \r\nefficiency. Notably, these costs need not exceed those of more \r\npolluting alternatives (Rozenberg and Fay 2019). For transportation, \r\nthis involves a shift toward more public transportation (rail and bus), \r\nand decarbonised electricity for vehicles, combined with land-use \r\npolicies that densify cities and reduce distances between homes and \r\njobs"


id: b26615b8f1cfefaf58479a5567f61656
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25584
content:
" By influencing the spatial distribution of households and firms \r\nand the organisation of transportation, infrastructure has a strong \r\nbearing on GHG emissions and the costs of providing services to \r\ndifferent populations. Depending on country context, the private \r\nsector may play a  particularly important role in the financing of \r\ninfrastructure (World Bank 2009; Klein 2015)."


id: 6bfed9bdb0ae89fb3d57688b78d679e6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14614
content:
"Regulatory instruments were used to limit deforestation rates, \r\ntogether with implemented economic instruments that provided \r\nbenefits to those protecting local ecosystems and enhancing land\u0002based carbon sinks (Nunes et al. 2017; Bustamante et al. 2018; \r\nSoterroni et al. 2018, 2019). In parallel, public policies reinforced \r\nenvironmental regulation and command-and-control instruments \r\nto limit deforestation rates and implemented market-based \r\nmechanisms to provide benefits to those protecting local ecosystems \r\nand enhancing land-based carbon sinks (Sunderlin et al. 2014; \r\nNunes et al. 2017; Hein et al. 2018; Simonet et al. 2019). The private \r\nsector, aligned with public policies and civil society, implemented the \r\nAmazon Soy Moratorium, a voluntary agreement that bans trading of \r\nsoybeans from cropland associated with cleared Amazon rainforest \r\nand blacklists farmers using slave labour"


id: 56fd8045369c43eb93548a37ae2df2c2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11165
content:
" This was achieved without \r\nundermining production of soybean commodities (Soterroni et al. \r\n2019). As a result, between 2005 and 2012, the country halved its \r\nGHG emissions and reduced the rate of deforestation by 78% (INPE \r\n2019a,b). This example shows that development delivering well\u0002being can be accompanied by significant mitigation. A  long-term \r\nand strategic vision was important in guiding enabling policies \r\nand mechanisms."


id: 50d665eaf84628e802e1b10f07aa910b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10167
content:
"A substantial literature detailing trade-offs and synergies between \r\nmitigation and adaptation exists and is summarised in the IPCC SR1.5 \r\nincluding energy system transitions; land and ecosystem transitions \r\n(including addressing food system efficiency, sustainable agricultural \r\nintensification, ecosystem restoration); urban and infrastructure \r\nsystem transitions (including land use planning, transport systems, \r\nand improved infrastructure for delivering and using power); \r\nindustrial system transitions (including energy efficiency, bio-based \r\nand circularity, electrification and hydrogen, and industrial carbon \r\ncapture, utilisation and storage (CCUS); and carbon dioxide removal \r\n(including bioenergy with CCS, afforestation and reforestation, \r\nsoil carbon sequestration, and enhanced weathering) (IPCC 2018: \r\nTable  4.SM.5.1)"


id: 51c512c06e5eee1ed69ad8bc2295d0c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10324
content:
" Careful design of policies to shift development \r\npathways towards sustainability can increase synergies and manage \r\ntrade-offs between mitigation and adaptation (robust evidence,\r\nmedium agreement)."


id: b98a355c34739c22b3fe0095ef731844
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26731
content:
"In more recent years, some of these shifts in Brazil's development \r\npathways were undone. Political changes have redefined \r\ndevelopment priorities, with higher priority being given to \r\nagricultural development than climate change mitigation. The current \r\nadministration has reduced the power of environmental agencies and \r\nforestry protection laws (including the forest code), while allowing \r\nthe expansion of cropland to protected Amazon rainforest areas \r\n(Ferrante and Fearnside 2019; Rochedo et al. 2018). As a result, in \r\n2020, deforestation exceeded 11,000 km2\r\n, and reached the highest \r\nrate in the last 12 years (INPE 2020). The literature cautions that, \r\nif current policies and trends continue, the Amazon may reach an \r\nirreversible tipping point beyond which it will be impossible to \r\nremediate lost ecosystems and restore carbon sinks and indigenous \r\npeople knowledge (Lovejoy and Nobre 2018; INPE 2019a; Nobre \r\n2019)"


id: 1836ce8436fb2988afc4f405e0793467
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1297
content:
" In addition, fossil fuel subsidies and other fiscal support of \r\nincreased exploitation of oil resources may create carbon lock-ins \r\nthat further inhibit low-carbon investments (Lefevre et al. 2018)."


id: 24ba2e8086af05bff2e3fca587d0bf9c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3220
content:
"Previous IPCC assessments have reflected on making development \r\nmore sustainable (IPCC et al. 2001; Sathaye et al. 2007; Fleurbaey \r\net al. 2014). Other assessments have highlighted how ecosystem \r\nfunctions can support sustainable development and are critical to \r\nmeeting the goals of the Paris Agreement (IPBES 2019b). IPCC SR1.5 \r\nfound that sustainable development pathways to  1.5degC broadly \r\nsupport and often enable transformations and that 'sustainable \r\ndevelopment has the potential to significantly reduce systemic \r\nvulnerability, enhance adaptive capacity, and promote livelihood \r\nsecurity for poor and disadvantaged populations (high confidence)' \r\n(IPCC 2018b: Section  5.3.1). With careful management, shifting \r\ndevelopment pathways can build greater adaptive and mitigative \r\ncapacity, as further confirmed in recent literature (Schramski et al. \r\n2018; Harvey et al. 2014; Ebi et al. 2014; Rosenbloom et al. 2018; \r\nAntwi-Agyei et al. 2015; Singh 2018; IPBES 2019b)"


id: bd761e7c7d42f6d1ea82f3b5f9047941
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27375
content:
" The literature \r\npoints to the challenge of design of specific policies and shifts \r\nin development pathways to achieve both mitigation and \r\nadaptation goals."


id: dbf8319ca01f3d4e3180775f4818d5fa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32125
content:
"Mitigation actions can be adaptive and vice-versa. In particular, \r\nmany nature-based solutions (NBS) for climate mitigation \r\nare  adaptive (medium evidence, medium agreement). Multiple \r\nNBS are being pursued under current development pathways \r\n(Chapter  7), but shifting to sustainable development pathways \r\nmay enable a wider set of nature-based mitigation solutions with \r\nadaptation benefits. An example of this would be a shift to more \r\nsustainable diets through guidelines, carbon taxes, or investment \r\nin  R&D of animal product substitutes (Figure  13.2) which could \r\nreduce pressure on land and allow for implementation of multiple \r\nNBS. Many of these solutions are consistent with meeting other \r\nsocietal goals, including biodiversity conservation and other \r\nsustainable development goals (Griscom et al. 2017; Fargione \r\net al. 2018; Tallis et al. 2018). However, there can be synergies \r\nand trade-offs in meeting a  complex set of sustainability goals \r\n(e.g"


id: 3058324cf93697b27a8a9c1dacf4b747
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5034
content:
"Systems transitions that address both adaptation and mitigation \r\ninclude the widespread adoption of new and possibly disruptive \r\ntechnologies and practices and enhanced climate-driven innovation \r\n(IPCC 2018a). See Chapter  16 for an in-depth discussion of \r\ninnovation and technology transfer. The literature points to trade\u0002offs that developing countries face in investing limited resources \r\nin research and development, though finding synergies in relation \r\nto agriculture (Adenle et al. 2015). Other studies point to difference \r\nin technology transfers for adaptation and mitigation (Biagini \r\net al. 2014). Adaptation projects tend to use existing technologies \r\nwhereas mitigation climate actions are more likely to rely on novel \r\ntechnologies. Innovations for mitigation are typically technology \r\ntransfers from developed to less-developed countries (Biagini \r\net al. 2014), however this so-called North-South technology transfer \r\npathway is not exclusive (Biagini et al"


id: 6e845f72d234d9dfdad7eeb995d70661
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15017
content:
" 2014), and is increasingly \r\nchallenged by China's global role in implementing mitigation actions \r\n(Chen 2018; Urban 2018). Indigenous knowledge can be a unique \r\nsource for techniques for adaptation (Nyong et al. 2007) and may be \r\nfavoured over externally generated knowledge (Tume et al. 2019)."


id: 2589fd17b3adf759df4b707526d774bb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3333
content:
"Restoration or protection of coastal ecosystems is an important \r\nadaptation action with multiple benefits, with bounded global \r\nmitigation benefits (Gattuso et al. 2018; Bindoff et al. 2019). Such \r\nrestoration/preservation reduces coastal erosion and protects from \r\nstorm surges, and otherwise mitigates impacts of sea level rise and \r\nextreme weather along the coast line (Siikamaki et al. 2012; Romanach \r\net al. 2018; Alongi 2008). Restoration of tidal flow to coastal wetlands \r\ninhibits methane emissions which occur in fresh and brackish water \r\n(Kroeger et al. 2017) (Section 7.4.2.8 describes a more inclusive set \r\nof ecosystem services provided by coastal wetlands). Coastal habitat \r\nrestoration projects can also provide significant social benefits in the \r\nform of job creation (through tourism and recreation opportunities), \r\nas well as ecological benefits through habitat preservation (Edwards \r\net al. 2013; Sutton-Grier et al. 2015; Sutton-Grier and Moore 2016; \r\nWylie et al"


id: f98a4f5e2f9a0ae0a882ef9597080098
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36779
content:
"Remedies include first devising policy packages that are, to the \r\nextent possible, robust to uncertainty regarding external decisions. \r\nFor example, mitigation in the building sector is considered less \r\nproblematic for competitiveness since the construction sector is \r\nless exposed to international competition. Remedies also include \r\nsecuring international cooperation to reduce the uncertainty \r\nthat domestic decision-makers face about the international \r\ncontext. Shifting investments towards low-GHG solutions requires \r\na  combination of conducive public policies, attractive investment \r\nopportunities and financing of transitions (Section 15.6), which can \r\nenable shifting development pathways. Cooperation can generate \r\npositive spill overs through technology diffusion (Section  13.6.6). \r\nThird, cooperation is not limited to governments. As discussed in \r\nSection 4.2.3, international cooperative initiatives among non-state \r\nactors (cities, economic branches, etc"


id: 6c022472f97e8ede85352fdd7bb69e89
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14618
content:
") can also provide know-how, \r\nresources and stable cooperative frameworks that reduce uncertainty \r\nfor individual actors (Section 14.5.5)."


id: c356de81084bc22521cc131aa9a05dc7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28298
content:
"As outlined in the examples in Section  4.4.1 above, shifting \r\ndevelopment pathways and accelerating mitigation are complex \r\nendeavours, on which there is limited experience and know-how \r\nfrom the past. An uncertainty is that parts of these policy packages \r\nmay fail, in other words, under-deliver relative to the amount of \r\nmitigation and of transformations initially expected. For example, \r\nFrance has failed to meet its 2015-2018 carbon budget as housing \r\nretrofitting programs, in particular, have failed to deliver the expected \r\namount of emission reductions (Haut Conseil pour le Climat 2019). \r\nThere are two main options to tackle this risk. The first is to build \r\nin redundancy. The second is to anticipate that some parts of the \r\npolicies will inevitably fail, and build-in monitoring and corrective \r\nmechanisms in a sequential decision-making process"


id: 201d12fc91920fb3a6bba3ebf5c5c89e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2498
content:
" To this regard, \r\nbuilding institutions that can properly monitor, learn from and \r\nimprove over time is critical (Nair and Howlett 2017)."


id: dbedd17f98cf1ddd4d5261c6f3dcfb4e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32117
content:
"As noted above, shifting development pathways and accelerating \r\nmitigation involve a  broad range of stakeholders and decision\u0002makers, at multiple geographical and temporal scales. They \r\nrequire a  credible and trusted process for reconciling perspectives \r\nand balancing potential side-effects, managing winners and losers \r\nand implementing compensatory measures to ensure an inclusive \r\njust transition (Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Miller and Richter 2014; \r\nGambhir et al. 2018; Diffenbaugh and Burke 2019). Such processes \r\nare designed to manage the risk of inequitable or non-representative \r\npower dynamics (Helsinki Design Lab 2011; Boulle et al. 2015; \r\nKahane 2012). More generally, stakeholder processes can be subject \r\nto regulatory capture by special interests, or outright opposition \r\nfrom a  variety of stakeholders. Information asymmetry between \r\ngovernment and business may shape the results of consultative \r\nprocesses"


id: 81066ca9475ab4a26dacb0f21e862f11
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17825
content:
" Long experience of political management of change \r\ndemonstrates that managing such risks is not easy, and requires \r\nsufficiently strong and competent institutions (Stiglitz 1998). The \r\nnext section on Just Transition (Section 4.5) addresses this issue."


id: b65ca914353f671398d0ff62581314cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26217
content:
"In the presence of uncertainty and inertia (or irreversibilities), \r\nhedging strategies may be considered, that include selection of \r\nrisk-hedging strategies and processes to adjust decisions as new \r\ninformation becomes available. The notion of hedging against risks \r\nis also prominent in the adaptation literature, as exemplified by \r\nthe terminology of 'climate resilient development' (Fankhauser and \r\nMcDermott 2016) (AR6 WGII, Chapter18). There is also a  growing \r\nliterature on hedging strategies for individual actors (e.g.,  firms \r\nor investors) in the face of the uncertainties associated with \r\nmitigation (e.g.,  policy uncertainty or the associated carbon price \r\nuncertainty; e.g., Andersson et al. 2016 or Morris et al. 2018). On the \r\nother hand, there is often limited discussion of uncertainty and of \r\nits implication for hedging strategies in the accelerated mitigation \r\npathway literature. Exceptions include (Capros et al"


id: 2e5547d2c442be8a66def837abaf7364
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4730
content:
" 2019), who elicit \r\n'no-regret' and 'disruptive' mitigation options for the EU through \r\na detailed sensitivity analysis, and (Watson et al. 2015) who discuss \r\nflexible strategies for the UK energy sector transition in the face of \r\nmultiple uncertainties."


id: b1193669eb9135025ce32db9e0425bf0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25369
content:
"Equity is an ethical and at times economic imperative, but it is \r\nalso instrumentally an enabler of deeper ambition for accelerated \r\nmitigation (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2019). The literature supports \r\na range of estimates of the net benefits - globally or nationally - of \r\nlow-carbon transformation, and it identifies a number of difficulties \r\nin drawing definitive quantitative conclusions (e.g.,  comparisons \r\nof costs and benefits among different actors, the existence of non\u0002economic impacts, comparison across time, uncertainty in magnitude) \r\n(Section 3.6). One of the most important of these dimensions is the \r\ndistributional consequences of mitigation, as well as a range of equity \r\nconsiderations arising from the uncertainty in net benefits, as well \r\nas from the distribution of costs and benefits among winners and \r\nlosers (Rendall 2019; Caney 2016; Lahn and Bradley 2016; Lenferna \r\n2018a; Kartha et al. 2018b; Robiou Du Pont et al. 2017)"


id: fcb67583db10cd4eefd32299476f365e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37271
content:
" Some equity \r\napproaches are even just seeking corrective justice including for \r\nhistorical emissions (Adler 2007). For an assessment of literature on \r\nfairness in NDCs, see Section 4.2.2.7."


id: 8cd4804792c54498c207db26b865e5b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19674
content:
"As the current COVID-19 crisis demonstrates, events happen that \r\ncan derail the best-laid plans. Unexpected events beyond the range \r\nof human experience until then are called 'black swans', given the \r\nexpectation that all swans are white. The only point to note here is \r\nthat such events may also provide opportunities. In the COVID-19 \r\ncase, for example, the experience of conducting many activities on\u0002line, which reduces emissions from transport, may leave an imprint \r\non how some of these activities are carried out in the post-COVID-19 \r\nworld. Similarly, reduced air pollution seen during the pandemics may \r\nincrease support for mitigation and strengthen the case for climate \r\naction. However, the emissions implications of recovery packages \r\ndepend on choosing policies that support climate action while \r\naddressing the socio-economic implications of COVID-19 (Hepburn \r\net al. 2020)"


id: 5070d6e4c682903086b8e2e7df6ed763
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10102
content:
" Governments may be in a  stronger position to do so \r\ndue to their pivotal role in assuring the survival of many businesses \r\nduring the pandemics. Given the magnitude of recovery packages \r\nand their implications (Pollitt et al. 2021), choosing the direction of \r\nrecovery packages amounts to choosing a  development pathway \r\n(Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1)."


id: 946e0c503132cf3c273415a60f7b97ec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20865
content:
"While there is extensive literature on equity frameworks for national \r\nemissions allocations (CSO Equity Review 2015, 2017, 2018; Holz et al. \r\n2018; Kemp-Benedict et al. 2018; Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen \r\n2018; Fyson et al. 2020; Pozo et al. 2020; Pye et al. 2020), such \r\nstudies have tended to focus on allocation of a global carbon budget \r\namong countries based on quantified equity frameworks. The implicit \r\nnormative choices made in these analysis have limitations (Kartha \r\net al. 2018a). Moreover, there are many ethical parameters that could \r\nbe introduced to enrich the existing quantitative frameworks, such \r\nas progressivity (Holz et al. 2018), consumption-based accounting \r\n(Afionis et al. 2017), prioritarianism (Adler and Treich 2015), and a right \r\nto development (Moellendorf 2020)"


id: 6a2720402652a03a69a92334569de9cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14307
content:
" Introducing these ethical frames \r\ninto conventional quantification approaches generally implies greater \r\nallocations for poorer and lower-emitting populations, suggesting that \r\nthe approaches that are typically highlighted in emissions allocation \r\nanalyses tends to favour wealthier and higher-emitting countries. \r\nBroader, more inclusive sharing of costs and burdens is seen as a way \r\nto enhance equity in procedures and outcomes."


id: 9b10183fe60dc56cd84136450e1be633
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21938
content:
"The literature identifies targeted and proactive measures from \r\ngovernments, agencies, and authorities to ensure that any negative \r\nsocial, environmental or economic impacts of economy-wide transitions \r\nare minimised, while benefits are maximised for those disproportionally \r\naffected (Healy and Barry 2017). While the precise definition varies by \r\nsource, core elements tend to include: (i) investments in establishing \r\nlow-emission and labour-intensive technologies and sectors (Mijn \r\nCha et al. 2020); (ii) research and early assessment of the social and \r\nemployment impacts of climate policies (Green and Gambhir 2020; \r\nMogomotsi et al"


id: 8b60216f691f99cec3bfbb15ec9a1845
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19449
content:
" 2018); (iii) social dialogue and democratic consultation \r\nof social partners and stakeholders (Swilling and Annecke 2012; Smith \r\n2017); (iv) the creation of decent jobs; active labour markets policies; \r\nand rights at work (ILO 2015; UNFCCC 2016c); (v) fairness in energy \r\naccess and use (Carley and Konisky 2020); (vi) economic diversification \r\nbased on low-carbon investments; (vii) realistic training/retraining \r\nprograms that lead to decent work; (viii) gender specific politics \r\nthat promote equitable outcomes (Allwood 2020); (ix) the  fostering \r\nof international cooperation and coordinated multilateral actions \r\n(Lenferna 2018b; Newell and Simms 2020); (x) redressing of past \r\nharms and perceived injustices (Setzer and Vanhala 2019; UNHRC \r\n2020); and (xi) consideration of inter-generational justice concerns, \r\nsuch as the impacts of policy decisions on future generations (Newell \r\nand Mulvaney, 2013)."


id: 50737b098d7bf9f2c5c069a0bb9aa763
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10104
content:
"A just transition could therefore entail that the state intervenes more \r\nactively in the eradication of poverty, and creates jobs in lower\u0002carbon sectors, in part to compensate for soon-to-be abandoned \r\nfossil-fuel-based sectors, and that governments, polluting industries, \r\ncorporations and those more able to pay higher associated taxes \r\npay for transition costs, provide a welfare safety net and adequate \r\ncompensation for people, communities, places, and regions that \r\nhave been impacted by pollution, marginalised or negatively \r\nimpacted by a transition from a high- to low-carbon economy and \r\nsociety (Muttitt and Kartha 2020; Le Billon and Kristoffersen 2020; \r\nKartha et al. 2018b). Reducing climate impacts is another important \r\ndimension of equity, in that the poor who are least responsible \r\nfor climate change are most vulnerable to its impacts (AR6 WGII, \r\nChapter 8)"


id: f2d3bfe687775168188269daff990ace
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35729
content:
" Focusing on financial losses alone however can obscure \r\nan important distinction between losses incurred by corporations \r\nand states and losses experienced by workers and communities. \r\nProcesses established in the name of a  just transition are also at \r\nrisk of being co-opted by incumbent interests and powerful/wealthy \r\nagents (Green and Gambhir, 2020). Policy interventions associated \r\nwith good governance, democratic oversight, and legal recourse can \r\nhelp overcome attempted co-optation of just transition, or use of \r\nCOVID-19 recovery packages for continued carbon lock-in (Hepburn \r\net al. 2020; SEI et al. 2020)."


id: 422608027de004d25ce9a80546ec1b72
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7805
content:
"A concrete focal point on these issues has been that of 'just transition'. \r\nGetting broad consensus for the transformational changes entailed \r\nin moving from a  high- to a  low-carbon economy means 'leaving \r\nno one behind', in other words, ensuring (sufficiently) equitable \r\ntransition for the relevant affected individuals, workers, communities, \r\nsectors, regions and countries (Newell and Mulvaney, 2013; Jasanoff \r\n2018). The concept of a 'just transition' owes its origin to the USA \r\ntrade union movement of the 1980s. The earliest version of a just \r\ntransition was called the 'Superfund for Workers' modelled on the \r\n1980 Superfund program that designed federal funds for the clean\u0002up of toxic substances from chemicals, mining and energy production \r\n(Stevis and Felli 2015)"


id: 13f5d8df692d2c668f5ea8be6f812940
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 647
content:
"The just transition concept has thus become an international focal \r\npoint tying together social movements, trade unions, and other key \r\nstakeholders to ensure equity is better accounted for in low-carbon \r\ntransitions and to seek to protect workers and communities. It also \r\nforms a central pillar of the growing movement for a 'Green New \r\nDeal' - a roadmap for a broad spectrum of policies, programs, and \r\nlegislation that aims to rapidly decarbonise the economy while \r\nsignificantly reducing economic inequality (Allam et al. 2021; Galvin \r\nand Healy 2020). The US Green New Deal Resolution (Ocasio-Cortez \r\n2019) for example, positions structural inequality, poverty mitigation, \r\nand a just transition at its centre. The European Green Deal proposed \r\nin 2019 (European Commission 2019), including a  EUR100  billion \r\n'Just Transition Mechanism' to mitigate the social effects of \r\ntransitioning away from jobs in fossil-based industries"


id: f54bfa3779e0ab094e21a30d6b2ff187
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36111
content:
" National \r\nlevel green new deals with strong just transition components have \r\nbeen proposed in South Korea, Australia, Spain, UK, Puerto Rico, \r\nCanada, as well as regional proposals across Latin America and the \r\nCaribbean (Pollin 2020)."


id: 62a68868a425922ec0ba4001cc258981
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13088
content:
"Figure 4.9 | Just Transitions around the world, 2020. Panel (a) shows commissions, task forces, dialogues behind a just transition in many countries (Schweitzer and \r\nTonn 2003; Thalmann 2004; Harrison 2013; Galgoczi 2014; Mendoza 2014; Adeoti et al. 2016; Ng et al. 2016; Gass and Echeverria 2017; Snell 2018; ILO 2018; Ministry of \r\nEmployment and Labour Relations of Ghana 2018; Szpor, A. and Ziolkowska 2018; van Asselt and Moerenhout 2018; Bankwatch 2019; Commission on Growth Structural \r\nChange and Employment 2019; European Union 2019, 2020; Galgoczi 2019; Government of Canada 2019; Government of Costa Rica 2019; NPC (National Planning \r\nCommission) 2019; Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment New Zealand 2019; Piggot et al. 2019; Popp 2019; Strambo et al. 2019; Government of Spain 2019; Finnish \r\nGovernment 2020; Scottish Government 2020; White House 2016; Mijn Cha et al"


id: 71a0820ac12182c4b0efad000f3fbef8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15511
content:
" 2020); panel (b) shows the funds related to the Just Transition within the European Union \r\nGreen Deal, and panel (c) shows the European Union's Platform for Coal Regions in Transition."


id: e1fd9600cf30aafe09f96533ff9b630f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33054
content:
"Current pledges and efforts under the PA aimed at keeping global warming below 2degC are not enough, falling short by 14 to \r\n23 GtCO2-eq (Cross-Chapter Box 4 in this Chapter). There is a further shortfall of about 4 to 7 GtCO2-eq in 2030 if the conditions \r\nare not fulfilled for those Parties that have made their pledges with conditions for support (Section 4.2.2.3). To cover up for these \r\nshortfalls will require taking actions across all sectors that can substantially reduce GHG emissions. Examples of such actions \r\ninclude shifting to low- or zero-emission power generation, such as renewables; changing food systems, such as diet changes away \r\nfrom land-intensive animal products; electrifying transport and developing 'green infrastructure', such as building green roofs, or \r\nimproving energy efficiency by smart urban planning, which will change the layout of many cities"


id: 81a820e630b8b6c8873fffed5254bbaf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17929
content:
" Because these different actions \r\nare connected, it means all relevant companies, industries and stakeholders would need to be involved to increase the support \r\nand chance of successful implementation (Section 4.2.5). The deployment of low-emission technology depends upon economic \r\nconditions (e.g., employment generation or capacity to mobilise investment), but also on social/cultural conditions (e.g., awareness \r\nand acceptability) and institutional conditions (e.g., political support and understanding), and the provision of relevant enabling \r\nconditions (Section  4.4.1). Encouraging stronger and more ambitious climate action by non-government and sub-national \r\nstakeholders, as well as international cooperative initiatives (ICIs) could make significant contributions to emissions reduction \r\n(Section 4.2.3)."


id: 82a3c75d481808e56f8be8215c79588b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18077
content:
"It is possible to accelerate mitigation while addressing other developmental priorities by implementing measures that simultaneously \r\naddress both climate and development goals. Casting mitigation in the broader context of development pathways provides additional \r\nopportunities to articulate both (Section 4.3.1.4)"


id: 4bac9ccb8400ed46970070d4f09d922f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9324
content:
" Policies such as progressive taxation, investment in public transport, regulatory \r\ntransparency, commitment to multilateral environmental governance, fiscal incentives for private investments, international \r\ntechnology development and transfer initiatives, and risk disclosure and efforts to improve underlying enabling conditions (improving \r\ngovernance and institutional capacity, fostering behavioural change and technological innovation, and provision of finance) address \r\nmultiple objectives beyond mitigation, such as job creation, macroeconomic stability, economic growth, public health and welfare, \r\nproviding energy access, providing formal housing, and providing mobility. How we manage our land and agriculture, growing cities, \r\ntransport needs, our industries, and the way people are trained and employed all impact on GHG emissions and the options we \r\nhave to reduce them"


id: 659bacb00234626a8401790667e7912a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13561
content:
" In turn, reducing GHG emissions can also contribute to reducing poverty, preventing hunger, improving health \r\nand wellbeing, and providing clean water and clean energy. Implementing right policies and investments can help to address the \r\nchallenges of how to reduce emissions without constraining development. For example, in land use, widespread planting of a single \r\ntree species or crops for bioenergy (organic matter turned into renewable energy) could affect food and water supplies. Therefore, if \r\nbioenergy is to be relied upon to offset emissions, the right policies and investments are needed (see also Chapter 17)."


id: 4689a922dd6e3c08056668aaed9126a5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8479
content:
"The indicative potential of demand-side strategies to reduce \r\nemissions of direct and indirect CO2 and non-CO2 GHG emissions \r\nin three end-use sectors (buildings, land transport, and food) is \r\n40-70% globally by 2050 (high confidence). Technical mitigation \r\npotentials compared to the 2050 emissions projection of two scenarios \r\nconsistent with policies announced by national governments until 2020 \r\namount to 6.8 GtCO2 for building use and construction, 4.6 GtCO2 for \r\nland transport and 8.0 GtCO2-eq for food demand, and amount to \r\n4.4 GtCO2 for industry. Mitigation strategies can be classified as Avoid\u0002Shift-Improve (ASI) options, that reflect opportunities for socio-cultural, \r\ninfrastructural, and technological change. The greatest 'Avoid' potential \r\ncomes from reducing long-haul aviation and providing short-distance \r\nlow-carbon urban infrastructures. The greatest 'Shift' potential would \r\ncome from switching to plant-based diets"


id: 9ce09bd400e0d1858f0097a3c1fa874e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22212
content:
" The greatest 'Improve' \r\npotential comes from within the building sector, and in particular \r\nincreased use of energy-efficient end-use technologies and passive \r\nhousing. {5.3.1, 5.3.2, Figure  5.7, Figure  5.8, Table  5.1, Chapter  5 \r\nSupplementary Material II, Table 5.SM.2}"


id: 3b3cb30de36ca467684b343dc88a478e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6675
content:
"The Sixth Assessment Report of the IPCC (AR6), for the first time, \r\nfeatures a  chapter on demand, services, and social aspects of \r\nmitigation. It builds on the AR4 and AR5, which linked behaviour and \r\nlifestyle change to mitigating climate change (IPCC 2007; Roy and Pal \r\n2009; IPCC 2014a), the Global Energy Assessment (Roy et al. 2012), \r\nand the AR5, which identified sectoral demand-side mitigation options \r\nacross chapters (IPCC 2014a; IPCC 2014b; Creutzig et al. 2016b). The \r\nliterature on the nature, scale, implementation and implications of \r\ndemand-side solutions, and associated changes in lifestyles, social \r\nnorms, and well-being, has been growing rapidly (Creutzig et  al. \r\n2021a) (Box 5.2). Demand-side solutions support near-term climate \r\nchange mitigation (Mejean et al"


id: e293aade9219b38e534f1ebae8246f8a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33156
content:
" 2019; Wachsmuth and Duscha 2019) \r\nand include consumers' technology choices, behaviours, lifestyle \r\nchanges, coupled with production-consumption infrastructures and \r\nsystems, service provision strategies, and associated socio-technical \r\ntransitions. This chapter's assessment of the social sciences (also see \r\nChapter 5 Supplementary Material I) reveals that social dynamics at \r\ndifferent levels offer diverse entry points for acting on and mitigating \r\nclimate change (Jorgenson et al. 2018)."


id: 830bf2ca758ef7d1a34eddca3ee481c5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18147
content:
"Focusing on demand for services broadens the climate solution space \r\nbeyond technological switches confined to the supply side, to include \r\nsolutions that maintain or improve well-being related to nutrition, \r\nshelter and mobility while (sometimes radically) reducing energy and \r\nmaterial input levels (Creutzig et  al. 2018; Cervantes Barron 2020; \r\nBaltruszewicz et al. 2021; Kikstra et al. 2021b). This also recognises \r\nthat mitigation policies are politically, economically and socially \r\nmore feasible, as well as more effective, when there is a  two-way \r\nalignment between climate action and well-being (OECD 2019a). \r\nThere is medium evidence and high agreement that well-designed \r\ndemand for services scenarios are consistent with adequate levels \r\nof well-being for everyone (Rao and Baer 2012; Grubler et al. 2018; \r\nRao et al. 2019b; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020; Kikstra et al. 2021b), \r\nwith high and/or improved quality of life (Max-Neef 1995; Vogel et al"


id: ddb235ef0da80d2eeeab760699a18382
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32382
content:
" \r\n2021) and improved levels of happiness (Easterlin et al. 2010) and \r\nsustainable human development (Gadrey and Jany-Catrice 2006; \r\nArrow et al. 2013; Dasgupta and Dasgupta 2017). While demand for \r\nservices is high as development levels increase, and related emissions \r\nare growing in many countries (Yumashev et al. 2020; Bamisile et al. \r\n2021), there is also evidence that provisioning systems delink services \r\nprovided from emissions (Conte Grand 2016; Patra et  al. 2017; \r\nKavitha et  al. 2020). Various mitigation strategies, often classified \r\ninto Avoid-Shift-Improve (ASI) options, effectively reduce primary \r\nenergy demand and/or material input (Haas et al. 2015; Haberl et al. \r\n2017; Samadi et al. 2017; Hausknost et al. 2018; Haberl et al. 2019; \r\nVan den Berg et al. 2019; Ivanova et al. 2020)"


id: 5e4db193f19d61fff502455ec05770b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12368
content:
" Users' participation in \r\ndecisions about how services are provided, not just their technological \r\nfeasibility, is an important determinant of their effectiveness and \r\nsustainability (Whittle et al. 2019; Vanegas Cantarero 2020)."


id: 72cb9e0484c987aa8a1d1ea671c9b815
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15672
content:
"Second, demand-side solutions support staying within planetary \r\nboundaries (Haberl et  al. 2014; Matson et  al. 2016; Hillebrand \r\net al. 2018; Andersen and Quinn 2020; UNDESA 2020; Hickel et al. \r\n2021; Keysser and Lenzen 2021). Demand side solutions entail \r\nfewer environmental risks than many supply-side technologies (Von \r\nStechow et al. 2016). Additionally they make carbon dioxide removal \r\ntechnologies, such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage \r\n(BECCS) less relevant (Van Vuuren et al. 2018) but modelling studies \r\n(Grubler et al. 2018; Hickel et al. 2021; Keysser and Lenzen 2021) still \r\nrequire ecosystem-based carbon dioxide removal. In the IPCC's Special \r\nReport on Global Warming of 1.5degC (SR1.5) (IPCC 2018), four stylised \r\nscenarios have explored possible pathways towards stabilising global \r\nwarming at 1.5degC (IPCC 2014a, Figure SPM.3a) (Figure 5.1) One of \r\nthese scenarios, LED-19, investigates the scope of demand-side \r\nsolutions (Figure 5.1)"


id: df3b651985151e47639919771cd93754
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32622
content:
" The comparison of scenarios reveals that such \r\nlow energy demand pathways eliminate the need for technologies \r\nwith high uncertainty, such as BECCS. Third, interrogating demand \r\nfor services from the well-being perspective also opens new avenues \r\nfor assessing mitigation potentials (Brand-Correa and Steinberger \r\n2017; Mastrucci and Rao 2017; Rao and Min 2018a; Mastrucci \r\nand Rao 2019; Baltruszewicz et  al. 2021). Arguably, demand-side \r\ninterventions often operate institutionally or in terms of restoring \r\nnatural functioning and have so far been politically sidelined but \r\nCOVID-19 revealed interesting perspectives (Box 5.2). Such demand\u0002side solutions also support near-term goals towards climate change \r\nmitigation and reduce the need for politically challenging high global \r\ncarbon prices (Mejean et al. 2019) (Box 5.11). The well-being focus "


id: b4e2a945e0226c3076a093e3b481d294
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25996
content:
"show how mitigation potentials, and social groups who can deliver \r\nthem, are much broader than usually considered in traditional sector\u0002specific presentations. ASI originally arose from the need to assess \r\nthe staging and combinations of inter-related mitigation options \r\nin the provision of transportation services (Hidalgo and Huizenga \r\n2013). In the context of transportation services, ASI seeks to mitigate \r\nemissions through  avoiding as much transport service demand as \r\npossible (e.g., through telework to eliminate commutes, mixed-use \r\nurban zoning to shorten commute distances), shifting remaining \r\ndemand to more efficient modes (e.g.,  bus rapid transit replacing \r\npassenger vehicles), and improving the carbon intensity of modes \r\nutilised (e.g., electric buses powered by renewables) (Creutzig et al. \r\n2016a). This chapter summarises ASI options and potentials across \r\nsectors and generalises the definitions"


id: 1f310f9287651d79e778d499f45621c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2346
content:
" 'Avoid' refers to all mitigation \r\noptions that reduce unnecessary (in the sense of being not required \r\nto deliver the desired service output) energy consumption by \r\nredesigning service provisioning systems; 'Shift' refers to the switch \r\nto already existing competitive efficient technologies and service \r\nprovisioning systems; and 'Improve' refers to improvements in \r\nefficiency in existing technologies. The Avoid-Shift-Improve framing \r\noperates in three domains: Socio-cultural, where social norms, \r\nculture, and individual choices play an important role - a category \r\nespecially, but not only, relevant for 'Avoid' options; Infrastructure, \r\nwhich provides the cost and benefit landscape for realising options \r\nand is particularly relevant for 'Shift' options; and Technologies, \r\nespecially important for the 'Improve' options."


id: 1ca87c8cdfd303c6113d04ba61e469ff
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1955
content:
"A key concern about climate change mitigation policies is that \r\nthey may reduce quality of life. Based on growing literature, in \r\nthis chapter we adopt the concept of decent living standards (DLS, \r\nexplained further in relation to other individual and collective well\u0002being measures and concepts in the Social Science Primer, Chapter 5 \r\nSupplementary Material I) as a universal set of service requirements \r\nessential for achieving basic human well-being. DLS includes the \r\ndimensions of nutrition, shelter, living condition, clothing, health care, \r\neducation, and mobility (Frye et al. 2018; Rao and Min 2018b). DLS \r\nprovides a fair, direct way to understand the basic low-carbon energy \r\nneeds of society and specifies the underlying minimum material and \r\nenergy requirements. This chapter also comprehensively assesses \r\nrelated well-being metrics that result from demand-side action, \r\nobserving overall positive effects (Section 5.3)"


id: 8b16b166967b2cb0c6e812894c71b0ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19411
content:
" Similarly, ambitious \r\nlow-emissions demand-side scenarios suggest that well-being \r\ncould be maintained or improved while reducing global final energy \r\ndemand, and some current literature estimates that it is possible \r\nto meet decent living standards for all within the 2degC warming \r\nwindow (Grubler et al. 2018; Burke 2020; Keysser and Lenzen 2021) \r\n(Section 5.4). A key concern here is how to blend new technologies "


id: 75f42cec6dd0d6c6d40ada1aa1a18ed2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16153
content:
"A large part of the literature is highly repetitive and/or includes no concepts or little quantitative or qualitative data of relevance to \r\nthis chapter. For example, a systematic review on economic growth and decoupling identified more than 11,500 papers treating this \r\ntopic, but only 834 of those, that is, 7%, included relevant data (Wiedenhofer et al. 2020). In another systematic review, assessing \r\nquantitative estimates of consumption-based solutions (Ivanova et al. 2020), only 0.8% of papers were considered after consistency \r\ncriteria were enforced. Altogether, we relied on systematic reviews wherever possible. Other important papers were not captured by \r\nsystematic reviews but are included in this chapter through expert judgement. Based on topical modelling and relevance coding of \r\nresulting topics, the full literature body can be mapped into two dimensions, where spatial relationships indicate topical distance \r\n(Box  5.1, Figure  1)"


id: df1d211ac63a3aba61eff5d93cb4104d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32599
content:
" The interpretation of topics demonstrates that the literature organises in four clusters of high relevance for \r\ndemand-side solutions (housing, mobility, food, and policy), whereas other clusters (nature, energy supply) are relatively less relevant. "


id: d9cfb90ddcfe50487ba198da69f502da
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31789
content:
"COVID-19 led to direct and indirect health, economic, and confinement-induced hardships and suffering, mostly for the poor, and \r\nreset habits and everyday behaviours of the well-off too, enabling a reflection on the basic needs for a good life. Although COVID-19 \r\nand climate change pose different kinds of threats and therefore elicit different policies, there are several lessons from COVID-19 for \r\nadvancing climate change mitigation (Klenert et al. 2020; Manzanedo and Manning 2020; Stark 2020). Both crises are global in scale, \r\nrequiring holistic societal response; governments can act rapidly, and delay in action is costly (Bouman et al. 2020a; Klenert et al. 2020). \r\nThe pandemic highlighted the role of individuals in collective action and many people felt morally compelled and responsible to act for \r\nothers (Budd and Ison, 2020). COVID-19 also taught the effectiveness of rapid collective action (physical distancing, wearing masks, \r\netc.) as contributions to the public good"


id: 5f4d3147ccf10b5c5bae043f12102857
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12562
content:
" The messaging about social distancing, wearing masks and handwashing during the pandemic \r\ncalled attention to the importance of effective public information (e.g., also about reducing personal carbon footprints), recognising that \r\nrapid pro-social responses are driven by personal and socio-cultural norms (Bouman et al. 2020a; Sovacool et al. 2020a). In contrast, low \r\ntrust in public authorities impairs the effectiveness of policies and polarises society (Bavel et al. 2020; Hornsey 2020)."


id: a7dcac30a63509ab41452330da0a8957
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23920
content:
"During the shutdown, emissions declined relatively most in aviation, and absolutely most in car transport (Le Quere et al. 2020, \r\nSarkis et al. 2020), and there were disproportionally strong reductions in GHG emissions from coal (Bertram et al. 2021) (Chapter 2). \r\nAt their peak, CO2 emissions in individual countries decreased by 17% on average (Le Quere et al. 2020). Global energy demand was \r\nprojected to drop by 5% in 2020, energy-related CO2 emissions by 7%, and energy investment by 18% (IEA 2020a). COVID-19 shock \r\nand recovery scenarios project final energy demand reductions of 1-36 EJ yr-1 by 2025 and cumulative CO2 emission reductions of \r\n14-45 GtCO2 by 2030 (Kikstra et al. 2021a). Plastics use and waste generation increased during the pandemic (Klemes et al. 2020; \r\nPrata et al. 2020). Responses to COVID-19 had important connections with energy demand and GHG emissions due to quarantine and \r\ntravel restrictions (Sovacool et al. 2020a)"


id: 88a935bd07d3c3d78480a702026913c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19028
content:
" Reductions in mobility and economic activity reduced energy use in sectors such as industry \r\nand transport, but increased energy use in the residential sector (Diffenbaugh et al. 2020). COVID-19 induced behavioural changes \r\nthat may translate into new habits, some beneficial and some harmful for climate change mitigation. New digitally-enabled service \r\naccessibility patterns (videoconferencing, telecommuting) played an important role in sustaining various service needs while avoiding \r\ndemand for individual mobility. However, public transit lost customers to cars, personalised two wheelers, walking and cycling, while \r\nsuburban and rural living gained popularity, possibly with long-term consequences. Reduced air travel, pressures for more localised"


id: 2b3aa6e7d12c31a2a882130ee3857801
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4236
content:
"food and manufacturing supply chains (Hobbs 2020; Nandi et al. 2020; Quayson et al. 2020), and governments' revealed willingness \r\nto make large-scale interventions in the economy also reflect sudden shifts in service provisions and GHG emissions, some likely to be \r\nlasting (Aldaco et al. 2020; Bilal et al. 2020; Boyer 2020; Hepburn et al. 2020; Norouzi et al. 2020; Prideaux et al. 2020; Sovacool et al. \r\n2020a). If changes in some preference behaviours, for example for larger homes and work environments to enable home working and \r\nonline education, lead to sprawling suburbs or gentrification with linked environmental consequences, this could translate into long\u0002term implications for climate change (Beaunoyer et al. 2020; Diffenbaugh et al. 2020). Recovering from the pandemic by adopting low \r\nenergy demand practices - embedded in new travel, work, consumption and production behaviour and patterns - could reduce carbon \r\nprices for a 1"


id: 8050d1a7a916ccae9d7de7e383f08c93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17714
content:
"5degC consistent pathway by 19%, reduce energy supply investments until 2030 by USD1.8 trillion, and lessen pressure on \r\nthe upscaling of low-carbon energy technologies (Kikstra et al. 2021a)."


id: 5238cfc9462d11a72c180d01da8ea79a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10387
content:
"Fiscally, the pandemic may have slowed the transition to a sustainable energy world: governments redistributed public funding to combat \r\nthe disease, adopted austerity and reduced capacity. Of nearly 300 policies implemented to counteract the pandemic, the vast majority are \r\nrelated to rescue, including worker and business compensation, and only 4% of these focus on green policies with potential to reduce GHG \r\nemissions in the long term; some rescue policies also assist emissions-intensive business (Hepburn et al. 2020; Leach et al. 2021). However, \r\nclimate investments can double as the basis of the COVID-19 recovery (Stark 2020), with policies focused on both economic multipliers and \r\nclimate impacts, such as clean physical infrastructure, natural capital investment, clean research and development (R&D) and education \r\nand training (Hepburn et al. 2020)"


id: 549b411bddd901a10a42a7b38b6826fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10769
content:
" This requires attention to investment priorities, including often-underprioritised social investment, given \r\nhow inequality intersects with, and is a recognised core driver of, environmental damage and climate change (Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020)."


id: c3e347fd990515a1278e1857297f1a2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28393
content:
"As outlined in section 5.1, mitigation, equity and well-being go hand \r\nin hand to motivate actions. Global, regional, and national actions \r\nand policies that advance inclusive well-being and build social trust \r\nstrengthen governance. There is high evidence and high agreement that \r\ndemand-side measures cut across all sectors, and can bring multiple \r\nbenefits (Mundaca et al. 2019; Wachsmuth and Duscha 2019; Geels \r\n2020; Niamir et al. 2020b; Garvey et al. 2021; Roy et al. 2021). Since \r\neffective demand requires affordability, one of the necessary conditions \r\nfor acceleration of mitigation through demand-side measures is wide \r\nand equitable participation from all sectors of society. Low-cost low\u0002emissions technologies, supported by institutions and government \r\npolicies, can help meet service demand and advance both climate \r\nand well-being goals (Steffen et  al. 2018a; Khosla et  al. 2019)"


id: bed9a38b73d1e9c949f9071ef93a982b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27578
content:
" This \r\nsection introduces metrics of well-being and their relationship to GHG \r\nemissions, and clarifies the concept of service provisioning."


id: cc7bebc387638bca287ade616bf4e8d5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29706
content:
"Current socioeconomic systems are based on high-carbon economic \r\ngrowth and resource use (Steffen et  al. 2018b). Several systematic \r\nreviews confirm that economic growth is tightly coupled with \r\nincreasing CO2 emissions (Ayres and Warr 2005; Tiba and Omri \r\n2017; Mardani et  al. 2019; Wiedenhofer et  al. 2020) although the \r\nlevel of emissions depends on inequality (Balezentis et al. 2020; Liu \r\net al. 2020b), and on geographic and infrastructural constraints that \r\nforce consumers to use fossil fuels (Pottier et  al. 2021). Different \r\npatterns emerge in the causality of the energy-growth nexus: \r\n(i) energy consumption causes economic growth; (ii) growth causes \r\nenergy consumption; (iii) bidirectional causality; and (iv) no significant \r\ncausality (Ozturk 2010). In a systematic review, Mardani et al"


id: 6073a3e657d0c2c1a1d67232cddc42a1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12747
content:
" (2019) \r\nfound that in most cases, energy use and economic growth have \r\na  bidirectional causal effect, indicating that as economic growth \r\nincreases, further CO2 emissions are stimulated at higher levels; in turn, \r\nmeasures designed to lower GHG emissions may reduce economic \r\ngrowth. However, energy substitution and efficiency gains may offer \r\nopportunities to break the bidirectional dependency (Komiyama \r\n2014; Brockway et  al. 2017; Shuai et  al. 2019). Worldwide trends \r\nreveal that at best only relative decoupling (resource use grows at "


id: 8d5e2b8d3a05d82f9ef8cc2484f152ea
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19761
content:
"and values change during a transition to the low-carbon economy, then \r\nthis overturns conclusions on what count as adequate or even optimal \r\npolicy responses to climate change mitigation in economics (Jacobsen \r\net al. 2012; Schumacher 2015; Dasgupta et al. 2016; Daube and Ulph \r\n2016; Ulph and Ulph 2021). In particular, if policy instruments, such as \r\nawareness campaigns, infrastructure development or education, can \r\nchange people's preferences, then policies or infrastructure provision - \r\nsocially constrained by deliberative decision making - which change \r\nboth relative prices and preferences, are more valuable for mitigation \r\nthan previously thought (Creutzig et al. 2016b; Mattauch et al. 2016; \r\nMattauch et al. 2018). The provisioning context of human needs is \r\nparticipatory, so transformative mitigation potential arises from social \r\nas well as technological change (Lamb and Steinberger 2017)"


id: 283353ee1ed21b20e74b5c36d1ae0679
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3735
content:
" Many \r\ndimensions of well-being and 'basic needs' are social, not individual, in \r\ncharacter (Schneider 2016), so extending well-being and DLS analysis \r\nto emissions also involves understanding individual situations in social \r\ncontexts. This includes building supports for collective strategies to \r\nreduce emissions (Chan et al. 2019), going beyond individual consumer \r\nchoice. Climate policies that affect collective behaviour fairly are the \r\nmost acceptable policies across political ideologies (Clayton 2018); \r\nthus collective preferences for mitigation are synergistic with evolving \r\npolicies and norms in governance contexts that reduce risk, ensure \r\nsocial justice and build trust (Atkinson et  al. 2017; Cramton et  al. \r\n2017; Milkoreit 2017; Tvinnereim et al. 2017; Smith and Reid 2018; \r\nCarattini et al. 2019)."


id: 2505ccd388e36314647f244e086d3396
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3268
content:
"a slower pace than GDP) was the norm during the twentieth century \r\n(Jackson 2009; Krausmann et  al. 2009; Ward et  al. 2016; Jackson \r\n2016), while absolute decoupling (when material use declines as GDP \r\ngrows) is rare, observed only during recessions or periods of low or \r\nno economic growth (Heun and Brockway 2019; Hickel and Kallis \r\n2019; Vaden et al. 2020; Wiedenhofer et al. 2020). Recent trends in \r\nOECD countries demonstrate the potential for absolute decoupling of \r\neconomic growth not only from territorial but also from consumption\u0002based emissions (Le Quere et al. 2019), albeit at scales insufficient for \r\nmitigation pathways (Vaden et al. 2020) (Chapter 2).\r\nEnergy demand and demand for GHG-intensive products increased \r\nfrom 2010 until 2020 across all sectors and categories"


id: a7f864006f98bf2e3a2d383857a0d254
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23940
content:
" 2019 witnessed \r\na reduction in energy demand growth rate to below 1% and 2020 \r\nan overall decline in energy demand, with repercussions for energy \r\nsupply disproportionally affecting coal via merit order effects (Bertram \r\net al. 2021) (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1). There was a slight \r\nbut significant shift from high-carbon beef consumption to medium\u0002carbon intensive poultry consumption. Final energy use in buildings \r\ngrew from 118 EJ in 2010 to around 128 EJ in 2019 (increased about \r\n8%). The highest increase was observed in non-residential buildings, \r\nwith a 13% increase against 8% in residential energy demand (IEA \r\n2019a). While electricity accounted for one-third of building energy \r\nuse in 2019, fossil fuel use also increased at a marginal annual average \r\ngrowth rate of 0.7% since 2010 (IEA 2020a). Energy-related CO2\r\nemissions from buildings have risen in recent years after flattening \r\nbetween 2013 and 2016"


id: a676f0d7929049f6c535955c6f1ec88d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23722
content:
" Direct and indirect emissions from electricity \r\nand commercial heat used in buildings rose to 10 GtCO2 in 2019, the \r\nhighest level ever recorded. Several factors have contributed to this \r\nrise, including growing energy demand for heating and cooling with \r\nrising air conditioner ownership and extreme weather events. A critical \r\nissue remains how comfortable people feel with temperatures \r\nthey will be exposed to in the future and this depends on physical, \r\npsychological and behavioural factors (Singh et al. 2018; Jacobs et al. \r\n2019). Literature now shows high evidence and high agreement\r\naround the observation that policies and infrastructure interventions \r\nthat lead to change in human preferences are more valuable for \r\nclimate change mitigation. In economics, welfare evaluations are \r\npredominantly based on the preference approach. Preferences \r\nare  typically assumed to be fixed, so that only changes in relative \r\nprices will reduce emissions"


id: 5274d8d2150460e04a61936ca1aae132
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10431
content:
" However, as decarbonisation is a societal \r\ntransition, individuals' preferences do shift and this can contribute \r\nto climate change mitigation (Gough 2015). Even if preferences are \r\nassumed to change in response to policy, it is nevertheless possible \r\nto evaluate policy, and demand-side solutions, by approaches to well\u0002being and welfare that are based on deeper concepts of preferences \r\nacross disciplines (Roy and Pal 2009; Fleurbaey and Tadenuma 2014; \r\nKomiyama 2014; Dietrich and  List 2016; Mattauch and Hepburn \r\n2016). In cases of past societal transitions, such as smoking reduction, \r\nthere is evidence that societies guided the processes of shifting \r\npreferences, and values changed along with changing relative prices \r\n(Nyborg  and  Rege 2003; Stuber et  al. 2008; Brownell and Warner \r\n2009). Further evidence on changing preferences in consumption \r\nchoices pertinent to decarbonisation includes Grinblatt et al"


id: 2119be1f6fc5dce3ca2155eabc973238
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2642
content:
" (2008) \r\nand Weinberger and Goetzke (2010) for mobility; Erb et  al. (2016), \r\nMuller  et  al. (2017),  and Costa and Johnson (2019) for diets; and \r\nBaranzini etal(2017) for solar panel uptakeIf individuals' preferences "


id: 6af89d4577a1cc6594479467689b4887
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14452
content:
"Well-being can be categorised either as 'hedonic' or 'eudaimonic'. \r\nHedonic well-being is related to a  subjective state of human \r\nmotivation, balancing pleasure over pain, and has gained influence \r\nin psychology assessing 'subjective well-being', assuming that the \r\nindividual is motivated to enhance personal freedom, self-preservation \r\nand enhancement (Sirgy 2012; Brand-Correa and Steinberger 2017; \r\nLamb and Steinberger 2017; Ganglmair-Wooliscroft and Wooliscroft \r\n2019). Eudaimonic well-being focuses on the individual in the broader \r\ncontext, associating happiness with virtue (Sirgy 2012), allowing for \r\nthe creation of social institutions and political systems and considering \r\ntheir ability to enable individuals to flourish. Eudaimonic analysis \r\nsupports numerous development approaches (Fanning and O'Neill \r\n2019) such as the capabilities (Sen 1985), human needs (Doyal and \r\nGough 1991; Max-Neef et al. 1991) and models of psychosocial well\u0002being (Ryan and Deci 2001)"


id: 6999a6b55f721b2ef0ca872ed9e62577
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14213
content:
" Measures of well-being differ somewhat \r\nin developed and developing countries (Sulemana et al. 2016; Ng and \r\nDiener 2019); for example, food insecurity, associated everywhere "


id: 1f8ba39c80ba7b4794d6d0d1c71154c7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2392
content:
"Decent living standards (DLS) serves as a socio-economic benchmark \r\nas it views human welfare not in relation to consumption but \r\nrather in terms of services which together help meet human needs \r\n(e.g.,  nutrition, shelter, health, etc.), recognising that these service \r\nneeds may be met in many different ways (with different emissions \r\nimplications) depending on local contexts, cultures, geography, \r\navailable technologies, social preferences, and other factors. Therefore, \r\none key way of thinking about providing well-being for all with low \r\ncarbon emissions centres around prioritising ways of providing \r\nservices for DLS in a  low-carbon way (including choices of needs \r\nsatisfiers, and how these are provided or made accessible)"


id: d467f053e87116bce010476945a9f66c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30937
content:
" They may \r\nbe supplied to individuals or groups or communities, both through \r\nformal markets and/or informally, for example by collaborative \r\nwork, in coordinated ways that are locally appropriate, designed and \r\nimplemented in accordance with overlapping local needs."


id: 690777c56351bf6db5cb409fd7e63df8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14118
content:
"Well-being needs are met through services. Provision of services \r\nassociated with low energy demand is a key component of current \r\nand future efforts to reduce carbon emissions. Services can be \r\nprovided in various culturally-appropriate ways, with diverse \r\nclimate implications. There is high evidence and high agreement\r\nin the literature that many granular service provision systems can \r\nmake 'demand' more flexible, provide new options for mitigation, \r\nsupport access to basic needs, and enhance human well-being. \r\nEnergy services offer an important lens to analyse the relationship \r\nbetween energy systems and human well-being (Jackson and \r\nPapathanasopoulou 2008; Druckman and Jackson 2010; Mattioli \r\n2016; Walker et al. 2016; Fell 2017; Brand-Correa et al. 2018; King \r\net al. 2019; Pagliano and Erba 2019; Whiting et al. 2020). Direct and \r\nindirect services provided by energy, rather than energy itself, deliver \r\nwell-being benefits (Kalt et al. 2019)"


id: f0704753fc79d5d8b6c284577b990632
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35327
content:
" For example, illumination and \r\ntransport are intermediary services in relation to education, health \r\ncare, meal preparation, sanitation, and so on, which are basic human \r\nneeds. Sustainable consumption and  production revolve around \r\n'doing more and better with the same' and thereby increasing well\u0002being from economic activities 'by reducing resource use, degradation \r\nand pollution along the whole lifecycle, while increasing quality \r\nof life' (UNEP 2010). Although energy is required for delivering \r\nhuman development by supporting access to basic needs (Lamb \r\nand Rao 2015; Lamb and Steinberger 2017), a reduction in primary \r\nenergy use and/or shift to low-carbon energy, if associated with \r\nthe maintenance or improvement of services, can not only ensure \r\nbetter environmental quality but also directly enhance well-being \r\n(Roy et al. 2012)"


id: dab151de5e53274c071971eb5bfcc0b6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31936
content:
" The correlation between human development and \r\nemissions is not necessarily coupled in the long term, which implies \r\nthere is a need to prioritise human well-being and the environment \r\nover economic growth (Steinberger et al. 2020). At the interpersonal \r\nand community levels, cultural specificities, infrastructure, norms, and \r\nrelational behaviours differ (Box 5.3). For example, demand for space \r\nheating and cooling depends on building materials and designs, \r\nurban planning, vegetation, clothing and social norms as well as \r\ngeography, incomes, and outside temperatures (Brand-Correa et al. \r\n2018; Campbell et al. 2018; Ivanova et al. 2018; IEA 2019b; Dreyfus \r\net al. 2020). In personal mobility, different variable needs satisfiers \r\n(e.g.,  street space allocated to cars, buses or bicycles) can help \r\nsatisfy human needs, such as accessibility to jobs, health care, and \r\neducation. Social interactions and normative values play a  crucial "


id: bf51998f5abd805a1e63276842b393d3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27650
content:
"The most pressing DLS service shortfalls, as shown in Figure 5.2, lie \r\nin the areas of nutrition, mobility, and communication. Gaps in regions \r\nsuch as Africa and the Middle East are accompanied by current levels \r\nof service provision in the highly industrialised countries at much \r\nhigher than DLS levels for the same three service categories. The lowest \r\npopulation quartile by income worldwide faces glaring shortfalls \r\nin housing, mobility, and nutrition. Meeting these service needs \r\nusing low-emissions energy sources is a top priority. Reducing GHG \r\nemissions associated with high levels of consumption and material \r\nthroughput by those far above DLS levels has potential to address \r\nboth emissions and inequality in energy and emission footprints \r\n(Otto et al. 2019)"


id: 52e79da50ccbfb48c010ab68a1e53b2c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10498
content:
" This, in turn, has further potential benefits; under \r\nthe conditions of 'fair' income reallocation to public services, this can \r\nreduce national carbon footprint by up to 30% while allowing the \r\nconsumption of those at the bottom to increase (Millward-Hopkins \r\nand Oswald 2021). The challenge then is to address the upper limits of \r\nconsumption. When consumption only just supports the satisfaction \r\nof basic needs, any decrease causes deficiencies in human-need \r\nsatisfaction. This is quite unlinke the case of consumption that \r\nexceeds the limits of basic needs, in which deprivation causes \r\na  subjective discomfort (Brand-Correa et  al. 2020). Therefore, to \r\ncollectively remain within environmental limits, the establishment of \r\nminimum and maximum standards of consumption, or sustainable \r\nconsumption corridors, (Wiedmann et al. 2020) has been suggested, \r\ndepending on the context"


id: fb86bbc8f138d35d77748d891ffa84bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37074
content:
" In some countries, carbon-intensive ways \r\nof satisfying human needs have been locked-in, for example via car\u0002dependent infrastructures (Jackson and Papathanasopoulou 2008; \r\nDruckman and Jackson 2010; Mattioli 2016; King et al. 2019), and \r\nboth infrastructure reconfiguration and adaptation are required to \r\norganise need satisfaction in low-carbon ways (see also Section 10.2)."


id: c27cad94a3c4bf8e4ee5fa0e1eb4d205
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28190
content:
"Figure 5.22 | Heterogeneity in access to and availability of services for human well-being within and across countries. Panel (a) Across-country differences \r\nin panel (a) food (meat and other), (b) housing, (c) mobility, (d) communication (mobile phones and high-speed internet access). Variation in service levels across countries within \r\na region is shown as error bars (black). Values proposed as decent standards of living threshold (Rao et al. 2019b) are shown as red dashed lines. Global average values are \r\nshown as blue dashed lines. Panel (b) Within-country differences in service levels as a function of income differences for the Netherlands (bottom and top 10% of incomes) and \r\nIndia (bottom and top 25% of incomes) (Grubler et al. 2012b) (data update 2016). Panel (c) Decent living energy (DLE) scenario using global, regional and DLS dimensions for \r\nfinal energy consumption at 149 EJ (15.3 GJ cap-1 yr -1) in 2050 (Millward-Hopkins et al"


id: 824c252066334d6346685b48abfe6d93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18026
content:
" 2020), requiring advanced technologies in all sectors and radical demand-side changes. \r\nValues are shown for five world regions based on the AR6 WGIII Regional breakdown. We use passenger kilometres per day per capita (km day-1 cap-1) as a metric for mobility \r\nonly as a reference, however, transport and social inclusion research suggest the aim is to maximise accessibility and not travel levels or travelled distance."


id: dcb51d759850bd5fe333c721294954a0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32223
content:
"Keysser and Lenzen 2021). Decent living standards indicators serve as \r\ntools to clarify this socio-economic benchmark and identify well-being \r\nfor all compatible mitigation potential. Energy services provisioning \r\nopens up avenues of efficiency and possibilities for decoupling energy \r\nservices demand from primary energy supply, while needs satisfaction \r\nleads to the analysis of the factors influencing the energy demand \r\nassociated with the achievement of well-being (Brand-Correa and \r\nSteinberger 2017; Tanikawa et  al. 2021). Vital dimensions of well\u0002being correlate with consumption, but only up to a threshold: decent \r\nliving energy thresholds range from about 13 to 18.4 GJ cap-1 yr-1 of \r\nfinal energy consumption but the current consumption ranges from \r\nunder 5 GJ cap-1 yr-1 to over 200 GJ cap-1 yr-1 (Millward-Hopkins \r\net  al"


id: 8c7ffae93dad551934f9611892122a64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19627
content:
" 2020), thus a  mitigation strategy that protects minimum \r\nlevels of essential-goods service delivery for DLS, but critically \r\nviews consumption beyond the point of diminishing returns of \r\nneeds satisfaction, is able to sustain well-being while generating \r\nemissions reductions (Goldemberg et  al. 1988; Jackson and Marks \r\n1999; Druckman and Jackson 2010; Girod and De Haan 2010; Vita \r\net  al. 2019a; Baltruszewicz et  al. 2021). Such relational dynamics \r\nare relevant both within and between countries, due to variances \r\nin income levels, lifestyle choice (see also Section 5.4.4), geography, "


id: de03c3b5ef4a81c9fa33a02e9b04339
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32430
content:
"(Guruswamy 2016; Wester et al. 2019). In Brazil, India and South \r\nAfrica, where inequality is extreme (Alvaredo et al. 2018) mobility \r\n(51-60%), food production and preparation (21-27%) and housing \r\n(5-12%) dominate total energy needs (Rao et al. 2019b). Minimum \r\nrequirements of energy use consistent with enabling well-being for \r\nall is between 20 and 50 GJ cap-1 yr -1 depending on context (Rao \r\net al. 2019b). Inequality in access to and availability of services for \r\nhuman well-being varies in extreme degree across countries and \r\nincome groups. In developing countries, the bottom 50% receive \r\nabout 10% of the energy used in land transport and less than 5% \r\nin air transport, while the top 10% use about 45% of the energy \r\nfor land transport and around 75% for air transport (Oswald et al. \r\n2020)"


id: b6860d27012d2c9d7006576a25a26900
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26236
content:
" Within-country analysis shows that particular groups in \r\nChina - women born in the rural West with disadvantaged family \r\nbackgrounds - face unequal opportunities for energy consumption \r\n(Shi 2019). Figure 5.3 shows the wide variation across world regions \r\nin people's access to some of the basic material prerequisites for \r\nmeeting DLS, and variations in energy consumption, providing \r\na starting point for comparative global analysis."


id: 3f3973eff63e3611ba01a7d3e8f78288
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7342
content:
"in both access and affordability, that is, more than 2.6 billion \r\npeople have little or no access to energy for clean cooking. About \r\n1.2 billion lack energy for cleaning, sanitation and water supply, \r\nlighting, and basic livelihood tasks (Sovacool and Drupady 2016; \r\nRao and Pachauri 2017).The current per capita energy requirement \r\nto provide a  decent standard of living range from around 5 to \r\n200 GJ cap-1 yr -1 (Steckel et al. 2013; Lamb and Steinberger 2017; \r\nRao et al. 2019b; Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020), which shows the \r\nlevel of inequality that exists; this depends on the context, such \r\nas geography, culture, infrastructure or how services are provided \r\n(Brand-Correa et  al. 2018) (Box  5.3). However, through efficient \r\ntechnologies and radical demand-side transformations, the final \r\nenergy requirements for providing DLS by 2050 is estimated at \r\n15.3  GJ cap-1 yr -1 (Millward-Hopkins et  al. 2020)"


id: ce471b2b45723fc8bb96337d28aa8cf7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29976
content:
" Recent DLS \r\nestimates for Brazil, South Africa, and India are in the range between \r\n15 and 25 GJ cap-1 yr -1 (Rao et al. 2019b).The most gravely energy \r\npoor are often those living in informal settlements, particularly \r\nwomen, in sub-Saharan Africa and developing Asia, whose \r\nsocially-determined responsibilities for food, water, and care are \r\nhighly labour-intensive and made more intense by climate change "


id: bc0f439c09996050801fd2333868100c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27152
content:
"Acceleration in mitigation action needs to be understood from a societal perspective. Technologies, access and service equity factors \r\nsometimes change rapidly. Access to technologies, infrastructures and products, and the services they provide, are essential for raising \r\nglobal living standards and improving human well-being (Alkire and Santos 2014; Rao and Min 2018b). Yet access to and levels \r\nof service delivery are distributed extremely inequitably as of now. How fast such inequities can be reduced by granular end-use \r\ntechnologies is illustrated by the cellphone (households with mobiles), comparing the situation between 2000 and 2018. In this \r\neighteen-year period, cellphones changed from a very inequitably-distributed technology to one with almost universal access, bringing \r\naccessibility benefits especially to populations with very low disposable income and to those whose physical mobility is limited (Porter \r\n2016)"


id: 615184df4cada35e877e4cc16e6e86df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12883
content:
" Every human has the right to a dignified decent life, to live in good health and to participate in society. This is a daunting \r\nchallenge, requiring that in the next decade governments build out infrastructure to provide billions of people with access to a number \r\nof services and basic amenities in comfortable homes, nutritious food, and transit options (Rao and Min 2018b). For a long time, this \r\nchallenge was thought to also be an impediment to developing countries' participation in global climate mitigation efforts. However, \r\nrecent research shows that this need not be the case (Millward-Hopkins et al. 2020; Rao et al. 2019b)."


id: c8ed241fa50c3e21d3d2f7d5f8b493ae
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29176
content:
"footprints between the poor and the rich. As a result of energy use \r\ninequality, the lowest global emitters (the poorest 10% in developing \r\ncountries) in 2013 emitted about 0.1  tCO2  cap-1  yr-1, whereas the \r\nhighest global emitters (the top 1% in the richest countries) emitted \r\nabout 200-300 tCO2 cap-1 yr-1 (World Bank 2019). The poorest 50% \r\nof the world's population are responsible for only about 10% of total \r\nlifetime consumption emissions, in contrast about 50% of the world's \r\nGHG emissions can be attributed to consumption by the world's richest \r\n10%, with the average carbon footprint of the richest being 175 times \r\nhigher than that of the poorest 10% (Chancel and Piketty 2015). This \r\nrichest 10% consumed the global carbon budget by nearly 30% during \r\nthe period 1990-2015 (Kartha et al. 2020; Gore 2020). While mitigation \r\nefforts often focus on the poorest, the lifestyle and consumption \r\npatterns of the affluent often influence the growing middle class (Otto \r\net  al"


id: fc84c50e45b1730b5433b3972151ec68
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37241
content:
" 2019). Across EU countries, only 5% of households are living \r\nwithin 1.5degC climate limits and the top 1% emit more than 22 times \r\nthe target on average, with land and air transport being particular \r\ncharacteristics of the highest-emitting countries (Ivanova and Wood \r\n2020)."


id: d291fc9d92852bee8a22199a546b68b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30656
content:
"Consumption is energy- and materials-intensive and expands along \r\nwith income. About half of the energy used in the world is consumed \r\nby the richest 10% of people, most of whom live in developed \r\ncountries, especially when one includes the energy embodied in \r\nthe goods they purchase from other countries and the structure of \r\nconsumption as a function of income level (Arto et al. 2016; Wolfram \r\net  al. 2016; Santillan Vera et  al. 2021). International trade plays \r\na central role, being responsible for shifting burdens in most cases \r\nfrom low-income developing countries producers to high-income \r\ndeveloped countries as consumers (Wiedmann et  al. 2020). China \r\nis the largest exporter to the EU and United States, and accounts \r\nfor nearly half and 40% of their imports in energy use respectively \r\n(Wu et al. 2019)"


id: d6563013ea259102f544247e9114921b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31240
content:
" Wealthy countries have exported or outsourced their \r\nclimate and energy crisis to low- and middle-income countries (Baker \r\n2018), exacerbated by intensive international trade (Steinberger \r\net  al. 2012; Scherer et  al. 2018). Therefore, issues of total energy \r\nconsumption are inseparably related to the energy inequity among \r\nthe countries and regions of the world."


id: 83726dc4e2210ccee5a3f451990f5621
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18214
content:
"In low-income nations - which can exhibit per-capita carbon footprints \r\n30 times lower than wealthy nations (Hertwich and Peters 2009) - \r\nemissions are predominantly domestic and driven by provision of \r\nessential services (shelter, low-meat diets, clothing). Per capita carbon \r\nfootprints average 1.6 tonnes per year for the lowest income category, \r\nthen quickly increase to 4.9 and 9.8 tonnes for the two middle-income \r\ncategories and finally to an average of 17.9 tonnes for the highest \r\nincome category. Global CO2 emissions remain concentrated: the top \r\n10% of emitters contribute about 35-45% of the total, while the \r\nbottom 50% contribute just 13-15% of global emissions (Chancel and \r\nPiketty 2015; Hubacek et al. 2017)"


id: 2db51335c0134e054cad5cc3fb3dc880
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4633
content:
" In wealthy nations, services such as \r\nprivate road transport, frequent air travel, private jet ownership, meat\u0002intensive diets, entertainment and leisure add significant emissions, \r\nwhile a considerable fraction of the carbon footprint is imported from \r\nabroad, embedded in goods and services (Hubacek et al. 2017)."


id: e519470819b4d3c00ba28a96ee2bd852
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33533
content:
"Well-being improvements are most notable in health, air, and energy \r\n(high confidence). These categories are also most substantiated \r\nin the literature, often under the framing of co-benefits. In many \r\ncases, co-benefits outweigh the mitigation benefits of specific GHG \r\nemission reduction strategies. Food (medium confidence), mobility \r\n(high confidence), and water (medium confidence) are further \r\ncategories where well-being is improved. Mobility has entries \r\nwith highest well-being rankings for teleworking, compact cities, \r\nand urban system approaches. Effects on well-being in water and \r\nsanitation mostly come from buildings and urban solutions. Social \r\ndimensions, such as personal security, social cohesion, and especially \r\npolitical stability, are less predominantly represented. An exception \r\nis economic stability, suggesting that demand-side options generate \r\nstable opportunities to participate in economic activities (high \r\nconfidence)"


id: a2b1b43d4d07cb42d29ca37d948519df
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23164
content:
" Although the relation between demand-side mitigation \r\nstrategies and the social aspects of human well-being is important, \r\nthis has been less reflected in the literature so far, and hence the \r\nassessment finds more neutral/unknown interactions (Figure 5.6)."


id: fb2ef75517b9a2d21ed499d059a2d69e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37026
content:
"livelihood necessities, social provisioning, and other positive steps \r\ntoward climate mitigation and adaptation are all associated with \r\nmore equitable and resilient societies (Okvat and Zautra 2011; Bentley \r\n2014; Klinsky et al. 2016; Roy et al. 2018a). At all scales of governance, \r\nthe popularity and sustainability of climate policies requires attention \r\nto the fairness of their health and economic implications for all, \r\nand participatory engagement across social groups - a responsible \r\ndevelopment framing (Cazorla and Toman 2001; Dulal et  al. 2009; \r\nChuku 2010; Shonkoff et al. 2011; Navroz 2019; Hofstad and Vedeld \r\n2020; Muttitt and Kartha 2020; Roy and Schaffartzik 2020; Temper \r\net  al. 2020; Waller et  al. 2020). Far from being secondary or even \r\na  distraction from climate mitigation priorities, an equity focus is \r\nintertwined with mitigation goals (Klinsky et al. 2016)"


id: a7a000cf9bd4cb1cb6de367c4a0b05d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23880
content:
" Demand-side \r\nclimate mitigation options have pervasive ancillary, equity-enhancing \r\nbenefits, for example for health, local livelihoods, and community forest \r\nresources (Chhatre and Agrawal 2009; Garg 2011; Shaw et al. 2014; \r\nSerrao-Neumann et al. 2015; Klausbruckner et al. 2016; Salas and Jha \r\n2019) (Figure  5.6). Limiting climate change risks is fundamental to \r\ncollective well-being (Max-Neef et al. 1989; Yamin et al. 2005; Nelson \r\net al. 2013; Gough 2015; Gough 2017; Pecl et al. 2017; Tschakert et al. \r\n2017). Section 5.6 discusses well-designed climate policies more fully, \r\nwith examples. Rapid changes in social norms which are underway \r\nand which underlie socially-acceptable climate policy initiatives are \r\ndiscussed in section 5.4."


id: b24e4ca2738a463770567797e6aaaf33
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25562
content:
"The distinction between necessities and luxuries helps to frame \r\na  growing stream of social sciences literature with climate policy \r\nrelevance (Arrow et al. 2004; Ramakrishnan and Creutzig 2021). Given \r\ngrowing public support worldwide for strong sustainability, sufficiency, \r\nand sustainable consumption, changing demand patterns and \r\nreduced demand are accompanying environmental and social benefits \r\n(Jackson 2008; Fedrigo et al. 2010; Schroeder 2013; Figge et al. 2014; \r\nSpangenberg and Germany 2016; Spengler 2016; Burke 2020; Mont \r\net al. 2020). Beyond a threshold, increased material consumption is not \r\nclosely correlated with improvements in human progress (Frank 1999; \r\nKahneman and Deaton 2010; Steinberger and Roberts 2010; Roy et al. \r\n2012; Oishi et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2018; Vita et al. 2019b; Wang et al. 2019; \r\nVita et al. 2020)"


id: 23059117b9218d4ae0cf48a80353d4b3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2955
content:
" Policies focusing on the 'super-rich', also called the \r\n'polluter elite', are gaining attention for moral or norms-based as well \r\nas emissions-control reasons (Kenner 2019; Otto et al. 2019; Pascale \r\net al. 2020; Stratford 2020) (Section 5.2.2.3). Conspicuous consumption \r\nby the wealthy is the cause of a large proportion of emissions in all \r\ncountries, related to expenditures on such things as air travel, tourism, \r\nlarge private vehicles and large homes (Brand and Boardman 2008; \r\nRoy and Pal 2009; Roy et al. 2012; Brand and Preston 2010; Gore 2015; \r\nHubacek et al. 2017; Jorgenson et al. 2017; Sahakian 2018; Gossling \r\n2019; Kenner 2019; Lynch et al. 2019; Osuoka and Haruna 2019)."


id: 1c6fc03326852fb2e55cafacf8317037
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1931
content:
"Consumption reductions, both voluntary and policy-induced, \r\ncan have positive and double-dividend effects on efficiency as \r\nwell as reductions in energy and materials use (Mulder et al. \r\n2006; Harriss and Shui 2010; Figge et  al. 2014; Grinde \r\net al. 2018; Spangenberg and Lorek 2019; Vita et al. 2020). Less \r\nwaste, better emissions control and more effective carbon policies lead \r\nto better governance and stronger democracies. Systems-dynamics \r\nmodels linking strong emissions-reducing policies and strong social \r\nequity policies show that a low-carbon transition in conjunction with \r\nsocial sustainability is possible, even without economic growth (Kallis \r\net al. 2012; Jackson and Victor 2016; Stuart et al. 2017; Chapman and \r\nFraser 2019; D'Alessandro et al. 2019; Gabriel and Bond 2019; Huang \r\net al. 2019; Victor 2019). Such degrowth pathways may be crucial in \r\ncombining technical feasibility of mitigation with social development \r\ngoals (Hickel et al"


id: 31ccc4a0f828433f7c98364f396f29be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5247
content:
"Participatory governance involves understanding and \r\nengagement with policies, including climate policies. Greater \r\npublic participation in climate policy processes and governance, by \r\nincreasing the diversity of ideas and stakeholders, builds resilience \r\nand allows broader societal transformation towards systemic change, \r\neven in complex, dynamic and contested contexts (Dombrowski 2010; \r\nWise et al. 2014; Haque et al. 2015; Jodoin et al. 2015; Mitchell 2015; \r\nKaiser 2020; Alegria 2021). This sometimes involves complex policy \r\ndiscussions that can lead to governance innovations, also influencing \r\nsocial norms (Martinez 2020). A specific example are citizen assemblies, \r\ndeliberating public policy challenges, such as climate change (Devaney \r\net al. 2020). Activist climate movements are changing policies as well as \r\nnormative values (Section 5.4 and the Social Science Primer, Chapter 5 \r\nSupplementary Material I)"


id: 1b4056aa4a295490605a3dfe8e4db59d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1752
content:
" Environmental justice and climate justice \r\nactivists worldwide have called attention to the links between economic \r\nand environmental inequities, collected and publicised data about \r\nthem, and demanded stronger mitigation (Goodman 2009; Schlosberg \r\nand Collins 2014; Jafry 2019; Cheon 2020). Youth climate activists, and \r\nIndigenous leaders, are also exerting growing political influence towards \r\nmitigation (Helferty and Clarke 2009; White 2011; Powless 2012; \r\nPetheram et al. 2015; UN 2015; Curnow and Gross 2016; Grady-Benson \r\nand Sarathy 2016; Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017; O'Brien et al. 2018; \r\nRowlands and Gomez Pena 2019; Bergmann and Ossewaarde 2020; \r\nHan and Ahn 2020; Nkrumah 2021). Indigenous resurgence (activism \r\nfuelled by ongoing colonial social and environmental injustices, land \r\nclaims, and deep spiritual and cultural commitment to environmental "


id: e00deffe8d20e938e7854e3b97c2d07e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32743
content:
"Climate change affects people differently along all measures of difference and identity, which have intersectional impacts linked to \r\neconomic vulnerability and marginalisation (Morello Frosch et al. 2009; Dankelman 2010; Habtezion 2013; Godfrey and Torres 2016; \r\nWalsh 2016; Flato et al. 2017; Goodrich et al. 2019; Perkins 2019; Gur 2020). Worldwide, racialised and Indigenous people bear the \r\nbrunt of environmental and climate injustices through geographic location in extraction and energy 'sacrifice zones', areas most \r\nimpacted by extreme weather events, and/or through inequitable energy access (Aubrey 2019; Jafry 2019; Gonzalez 2020; Lacey\u0002Barnacle et al. 2020; Porter et al. 2020; Temper et al. 2020) Disparities in climate change vulnerability not only reflect pre-existing \r\ninequalities, they also reinforce them"


id: 63c55a6a5a9dd42e3ca4fc7142e47ace
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13267
content:
" For example, inequities in income and in the ownership and control of household assets, \r\nfamilial responsibilities due to male out-migration, declining food and water access, and increased disaster exposure can undermine \r\nwomen's ability to achieve economic independence, enhance human capital, and maintain physical and mental health and well-being \r\n(Chandra et al. 2017; Eastin 2018; Das et al. 2019). Studies during the COVID-19 crisis have found that, in general, women's economic \r\nand productive lives have been affected disproportionately to men's (Alon et al. 2020; ILO 2020). Women have less access to social \r\nprotections and their capacity to absorb economic shocks is very low, so they face a 'triple burden' during crises - including those"


id: 14984836f720c04e56ea1df7aed1979a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 747
content:
"Women have a key role in the changing energy economy due to their demand for and end use of energy resources in socially-gendered \r\nproductive roles in food production and processing, health, care, education, clothing purchases and maintenance, commerce, and \r\nother work, both within and beyond the home (Raty and Carlsson-Kanyama 2009; Oparaocha and Dutta 2011; Bob and Babugura \r\n2014; Macgregor 2014; Perez et al. 2015; Bradshaw 2018; Clancy and Feenstra 2019; Clancy et al. 2019; Fortnam et al. 2019; Rao \r\net al. 2019a; Quandt 2019; Horen Greenford et al. 2020; Johnson 2020). Women's work and decision-making are central in the food \r\nchain and agricultural output in most developing countries, and in household management everywhere. Emissions from cooking fuels \r\ncan cause serious health damage, and unsustainable extraction of biofuels can also hurt mitigation (Bailis et al. 2015), so considering \r\nhealth, biodiversity and climate tradeoffs and co-benefits is important (Rosenthal et al"


id: 8907bdccc6054bec95744549608e289e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19099
content:
" 2018; Aberilla et al. 2020; Mazorra et al. 2020). \r\nPolicies on energy use and consumption are often focused on technical issues related to energy supply, thereby overlooking demand\u0002side factors such as household decision-making, unpaid work, livelihoods and care (Himmelweit 2002; Perch 2011; Fumo 2014; Hans \r\net al. 2019; Huyer and Partey 2020). Such gender-blindness represents the manifestation of wider issues related to political ideology, \r\nculture and tradition (Carr and Thompson 2014; Thoyre 2020; Perez et al. 2015; Fortnam et al. 2019)."


id: ff1745001a61f71d1a90a418b0e1a9fb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37686
content:
"Women, and all those who are economically and/or politically marginalised, often have less access to energy and use less, not just \r\nbecause they may be poorer but case studies show because their consumption choices are more ecologically inclined and their energy \r\nuse is more efficient (Lee et al. 2013; Permana et al. 2015; Li et al. 2019). Women's carbon footprints are about 6-28% lower than \r\nmen's (with high variation across countries), mostly based on their lower meat consumption and lower vehicle use (Isenhour and \r\nArdenfors 2009; Raty and Carlsson-Kanyama 2009; Raty and Carlsson-Kanyama 2010; Barnett et al. 2012; Medina and Toledo-Bruno \r\n2016; Ahmad et al. 2017; Fernstrom Natby and Ronnerfalk 2018; Li et al. 2019). Gender-based income redistribution in the form of pay \r\nequity for women could reduce emissions if the redistribution is revenue neutral (Terry 2009; Dengler and Strunk 2018)"


id: baf13eae5c43a424a866ab2d19bc748b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26948
content:
" Also, advances \r\nin female education and reproductive health, especially voluntary family planning, can contribute greatly to reducing world population \r\ngrowth (Abel et al. 2016; Dodson et al. 2020)."


id: 854e505e4dd20926824d28b70f8cfa2d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18501
content:
"Carbon emissions are lower per capita in countries where women have more political 'voice', controlling for GDP per capita and a range of \r\nother factors (Ergas and York 2012). While most people recognise that climate change is happening (Lewis et al. 2018; Ballew et al. 2019), \r\nclimate denialism is more prevalent among men (McCright and Dunlap 2011; Anshelm and Hultman 2014; Nagel 2015; Jylha et al. 2016), \r\nwhile women are more likely to be environmental activists, and to support stronger environmental and climate policies (Stein 2004; \r\nMcCright and Xiao 2014, Whyte 2014). Racialised groups are more likely to be concerned about climate change and to take political \r\naction to support climate mitigation policies (Leiserowitz and Akerlof 2010; Godfrey and Torres 2016; Schuldt and Pearson 2016; Pearson \r\net al. 2017; Ballew et al. 2020; Johnson 2020). This underscores the important synergies between equity and mitigation"


id: 9152837f42393e03634cc6cb7ca0efa2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20393
content:
" The contributions \r\nof women, racialised people, and indigenous people, who are socially positioned as those first and most affected by climate change - and \r\ntherefore experts on appropriate climate responses - are substantial (Dankelman and Jansen 2010; Wickramasinghe 2015; Black 2016; \r\nVinyeta et al. 2016; Pearse 2017). Equitable power, participation, and agency in climate policymaking is hence an effective contribution for \r\nimproving governance and decision-making on climate change mitigation (Reckien et al. 2017; Collins 2019). Indigenous knowledge is an \r\nimportant source of guidance for biodiversity conservation, impact assessment, governance, disaster preparedness and resilience (Salick \r\nand Ross 2009; Green and Raygorodetsky 2010; Speranza et al. 2010; Mekuriaw Bizuneh 2013; Mekuriaw 2017), and women are often \r\nthe local educators, passing on and utilising traditional and indigenous knowledge (Ketlhoilwe 2013; Onyige 2017; Azong et al. 2018)."


id: 4ab45cb2f69699f8585938f16b1c009d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9160
content:
"In societies where women have more economic equity, their votes push political decision-making in the direction of environmental \r\nand sustainable development policies, less high-emission militarisation, and more emphasis on equity and social policies such as via \r\nwealth and capital gains taxes (Ergas and York 2012; Resurreccion 2013; UNEP 2013; Glemarec et al. 2016; Bryan et al. 2018; Crawford \r\n2019). Changing social norms on race and climate are linked and policy-relevant (Benegal 2018; Elias et al. 2018; Slocum 2018; Gach \r\n2019; Wallace-Wells 2019; Temple 2020; Drolet 2021). For all these reasons, climate policies are strengthened by including more \r\ndifferently-situated knowledge and diverse perspectives, such as feminist expertise in the study of power (Bell et al. 2020; Lieu et al. \r\n2020); clarifying equity goals (e.g"


id: c189dcbedea3e1215309a70820896922
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28038
content:
", distinguishing among 'reach, 'benefit', and 'empowerment'; obtaining disaggregated data and \r\nusing clear empirical equity measures; and confronting deeply-ingrained inequities in society (Lau et al. 2021). Inclusivity in climate \r\ngovernance spans mitigation-adaptation, supply-demand and formal-informal sector boundaries in its positive effects (Morello \r\nFrosch et al. 2009; Dankelman 2010; Bryan and Behrman 2013; Habtezion 2013; Godfrey and Torres 2016; Walsh 2016; Flato et al. \r\n2017; Wilson et al. 2018; Goodrich et al. 2019; Perkins 2019; Bell et al. 2020; Gur 2020)."


id: ea71ef695dfdcf470232fbbf96163bdb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34393
content:
"Reducing global energy demand and resource inputs while improving \r\nwell-being for all requires an identification of options, services and \r\npathways that do not compromise essentials of a  decent living. To \r\nidentify such a solution space, this section summarises socio-cultural, \r\ntechnological and infrastructural interventions through the Avoid\u0002Shift-Improve concept. ASI (Section  5.1) provides a  categorisation \r\nof options aimed at continuously eliminating waste in the current \r\nsystems of service provision (Section 5.3.1.1). It also concisely presents \r\ndemand-side options to reduce GHG emissions by individual choices \r\nwhich can be leveraged by supporting policies, technologies and \r\ninfrastructure. Two key concepts for evaluating the efficiency of service \r\nprovision systems are: resource cascades and exergy"


id: 80cf8f68ffafdb06f0cae8f1855a1f4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17789
content:
" These concepts \r\nprovide powerful analytical lenses through which to identify and \r\nsubstantially reduce energy and resource waste in service provision \r\nsystems, both for decent living standards (Section 5.3.2) and higher \r\nwell-being levels. They typically focus on end-use conversion and \r\nservice delivery improvements as the most influential opportunities \r\nfor system-wide waste reductions. Review of the state of modelling \r\nlow energy and resource demand pathways in long-term climate \r\nmitigation scenarios (recognising the importance of such scenarios for \r\nilluminating technology and policy pathways for more efficient service \r\nprovision) and summary of the mitigation potentials estimated from \r\nrelevant scenarios to date are in Section 5.3.3. Finally, it reviews the \r\nrole of three megatrends that are transforming delivery of services \r\nin innovative ways  - digitalisation, the sharing economy, and the \r\ncircular economy (Section 5.3.4)"


id: 75743f486f81b8dffa95774493e5ec8a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16065
content:
" The review of megatrends makes an \r\nassessment highlighting the potential risks of rebound effects, and \r\neven accelerated consumption; it also scopes for proactive and vigilant \r\npolicies to harness their potential for future energy and resource \r\ndemand reductions, and, conversely, avoiding undesirable outcomes."


id: f5789dadecae5ece1e9d3c7a7d2fdeb1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36144
content:
"Assessment of service-related mitigation options within the ASI \r\nframework is aided by decomposition of emissions intensities into \r\nexplanatory contributing factors, which depend on the type of \r\nservice delivered. Table 5.1 shows ASI options in selected sectors and \r\nservices. It summarises resource, energy, and emissions intensities \r\ncommonly used by type of service (Cuenot et  al. 2010; Lucon et  al. \r\n2014; Fischedick et al. 2014). Also relevant are the concepts of service \r\nprovision adequacy (Arrow et al. 2004; Samadi et al. 2017), establishing \r\nthe extents to which consumption levels exceed (e.g.,  high-calorie \r\ndiets contributing to health issues (Roy et  al. 2012); excessive food \r\nwaste) or fall short (e.g., malnourishment) of service level sufficiency \r\n(e.g.,  recommended calories) (Millward-Hopkins et  al. 2020); and \r\nservice level efficiency (e.g., effect of occupancy on the energy intensity \r\nof public transit passenger-km travelled (Schafer and Yeh 2020)"


id: f8b2f7273da8bc075b8869c3b0a90283
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36641
content:
" \r\nService-oriented solutions are discussed in Table 5.1. Implementation \r\nof these solutions requires combinations of institutional, infrastructural, \r\nbehavioural, socio-cultural, and business changes which are mentioned \r\nin Section 5.2 and discussed in Section 5.4."


id: 344824b7500eaf652eb949b8f0776ca7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5639
content:
"Demand-side mitigations are achieved through changing Socio\u0002cultural factors, Infrastructure use and Technology adoption by various \r\nsocial actors in urban and other settlements, food choice and waste \r\nmanagement (high confidence) (Figure  5.7). In all sectors, end-use \r\nstrategies can help reduce the majority of emissions, ranging from \r\n28.7% (4.4 GtCO2) emission reductions in the industry sector, to 44.2% \r\n(8.0 GtCO2-eq)  in the food sector, to 66.75% (4.6 GtCO2) emission \r\nreductions in the land transport sector, and 66% (6.8  GtCO2) in the \r\nbuildings sector. These numbers are median estimates and represent \r\nbenchmark accounting. Estimates are approximations, as they are \r\nsimple products of individual assessments for each of the three options \r\nlisted above. If interactions were taken into account, the full mitigation \r\npotentials may be higher or lower, independent of relevant barriers \r\nto realising the median potential estimates"


id: e39141861b876e7b50e407386e0a60b7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:43
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33282
content:
"lifespan products and food waste. Cities and built environments can \r\nplay an additional role. For example, more compact designs and higher \r\naccessibility reduce travel demand and translate into lower average floor \r\nspace and corresponding heating/cooling and lighting demand, and thus \r\nreductions of between 5% to 20% of GHG emissions of end-use sectors \r\n(Creutzig et al. 2021b). Avoidance of food loss and wastage - which \r\nequalled 8-10% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions from 2010-2016 \r\n(Mbow et al. 2019), while millions suffer from hunger and malnutrition - \r\nis a  prime example (Chapter  12). A key challenge in meeting global \r\nnutrition services is therefore to avoid food loss and waste while \r\nsimultaneously raising nutrition levels to equitable standards globally"


id: 9f5cffeb92c94530f9ee9cd25d6ecff6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22615
content:
" \r\nLiterature results indicate that in developed economies, consumers are \r\nthe largest source of food waste, and that behavioural changes such as \r\nmeal planning, use of leftovers, and avoidance of over-preparation can \r\nbe important service-oriented solutions (Gunders et al. 2017; Schanes \r\net al. 2018), while improvements to expiration labels by regulators would \r\nreduce unnecessary disposal of unexpired items (Wilson et al. 2017) and \r\nimproved preservation in supply chains would reduce spoilage (Duncan \r\nand Gulbahar 2019). Around 931 million tonnes of food waste was \r\ngenerated in 2019 globally, 61% of which came from households, 26% \r\nfrom food service and 13% from retail."


id: 20131011a1726036e155788ee874044f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2491
content:
"protected bike lanes and pedestrian priority streets can reduce \r\nvehicle kilometres travelled in urban areas (ITF 2021). At the vehicle \r\nlevel, lightweighting strategies (Fischedick et al. 2014) and avoiding \r\ninputs of carbon-intensive materials into vehicle manufacturing can \r\nalso lead to significant emissions savings through improved fuel \r\neconomy (Das et al. 2016; Hertwich et al. 2019; IEA 2019b).\r\nFigure 5.7 shows socio-cultural factors can contribute up to 15% to land \r\ntransport GHG emissions reduction by 2050, with 5% as our central \r\nestimate. Active mobility, such as walking and cycling, has 2-10% \r\npotential in GHG emissions reduction. Well designed teleworking \r\npolicies can reduce transport-related GHG emissions by at least 1%"


id: 627ae774087d5e77536ecb10270d8e61
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13059
content:
" \r\nA  systematic review demonstrates that 26 of 39  studies identified \r\nsuggest that teleworking reduces energy use, induced mainly by distance \r\ntravelled, and only eight studies suggest that teleworking increases or \r\nhas a neutral impact on energy use (Hook et al. 2020). Infrastructure \r\nuse (specifically urban planning and shared pooled mobility) has about \r\n20-50% (on average) potential in land transport GHG emissions \r\nreduction, especially via redirecting the ongoing design of existing \r\ninfrastructures in developing countries, and with 30% as our central \r\nestimate (Section 5.3.4.2). Technology adoption, particularly banning \r\ncombustion and diesel engines and 100% EV targets (and other zero\u0002carbon fuels, especially in freight) and efficient lightweight cars, can \r\ncontribute to between 30% and 70% of GHG emissions reduction from \r\nland transport in 2050, with 50% as our central estimate (see Chapter 5 \r\nSupplementary Material II, Table 5.SM.2 and Chapter 10, Sections 10"


id: bc6446a6db1f8224175a96ebdb6c9f09
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27221
content:
"4 \r\nand 10.7), consistent with scenario modelling (Figure  10.27) and \r\nbased on rapid reduction in the GHG emission footprint of vehicle \r\nproduction. These numbers are consistent with the end of fossil fuel\u0002based new cars in 2035 in major economies and of 100% of vehicles \r\nbeing zero-emission vehicles in 2050. Other economies that display \r\nvehicles obtained on second hand markets may phase out fossil fuel \r\ncars only after 2050, hence limiting the overall mitigation potential of \r\nelectric vehicles to well below 100% in 2050. Higher energy use and \r\nCO2-footprint in BEV production compared to ICE production are to \r\nbe met with more rapid decarbonisation of the industry sector and by \r\nthe reduced need for overall vehicle stock, due to socio-cultural and \r\ninfrastructure measures. Ehrenberger et  al"


id: 674eaf1b6035c2d84d23b0058c625dab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13844
content:
" (2021) shows that the \r\ndevelopment of technologies, fleets, and their use are decisive factors in \r\nreducing the use of fossil energies, resulting in 26-65% CO2 emissions \r\nreduction potential until 2040 for the case of Germany. Electric vehicles \r\ncan be used to provide new shared services. In this case, reductions of \r\nCO2 emissions of close to 20% can be obtained in a scenario where \r\n20% of car trips and all bus feeder trips are replaced, but considerably \r\nhigher reductions are possible when shared pooled mobility replaces \r\nprivate vehicle trips in urban areas (ITF 2017b, ITF 2017d). A study \r\nshows that ICE vehicles reduce CO2 emissions to 60% or 80% of \r\ncurrent emissions levels by 2050 (Hill et al. 2019). Similarly, the power \r\ngrid decarbonisation is assumed to improve to either 50% or 80% over \r\ncurrent rates, with 80% being the expected decarbonisation and 50% \r\na  more conservative estimate"


id: 986c1440b72a3962a807f0cdaff0cad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21489
content:
" Each possibility for EV adoption rate, \r\nICE efficiency improvement, and power decarbonisation is combined \r\n(Hill et al. 2019). Beyond consuming less energy, EVs enable greater \r\nuse of low-carbon and renewable energy sources than is possible for \r\nconventional petroleum-based fuels. These technical advantages lead \r\nto the potential for greatly reducing petroleum use, air pollution and \r\ncarbon emissions. International collaboration could better leverage "


id: c72aad759744a895437ad24b92866803
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28920
content:
"Reduced food waste and dietary shifts have highly relevant \r\nrepercussions in the land-use sector that underpin the high GHG \r\nemission reduction potential. Demand-side measures lead to \r\nchanges in consumption of land-based resources and can save GHG \r\nemissions by reducing or improving management of residues  or \r\nmaking land areas available for other uses such as afforestation \r\nor bioenergy production (Smith et  al. 2013; Hoegh-Guldberg et  al. \r\n2019). Deforestation is the second-largest source of anthropogenic \r\ngreenhouse gas emissions, caused mainly by expanding forestry and \r\nagriculture, and in many cases this agricultural expansion is driven \r\nby trade demand for food. For example, across the tropics, cattle and \r\noilseed products account for half the deforestation carbon emissions, \r\nembodied in international trade to China and Europe (Creutzig \r\net al. 2019a; Pendrill et al. 2019)"


id: 6aea962c25cfe56400b01b7b54f3de32
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14441
content:
" Benefits from shifts in diets and \r\nresulting lowered land pressure are also reflected in reductions of \r\nland degradation and emissions."


id: d81fe331a9740d0c8018fb6848b9290f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31528
content:
"In the transport sector, ASI opportunities exist at multiple levels, \r\ncomprehensively summarised in Bongardt et  al. (2013), Sims \r\net  al. (2014), and Roy et  al. (2021) (Chapter  10). Modelling based \r\non a  plethora of bottom-up insights and options reveals that \r\na  balanced portfolio of ASI policies brings global transport sector \r\nemissions in line with global warming of not more than 1.5degC (Gota \r\net  al. 2019). For example, telework may be a  significant lever for \r\navoiding road transport associated with daily commutes, achievable \r\nthrough digitalisation, but its savings depend heavily on the modes, \r\ndistances, and types of office use avoided (Hook et  al. 2020) and \r\nwhether additional travel is induced due to greater available time \r\n(Mokhtarian 2002) or vehicle use by other household members (Kim \r\net al. 2015; de Abreu e Silva and Melo 2018)"


id: 1664de204737a26bd7923f5585ead1e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1044
content:
" More robustly, avoiding \r\nkilometres travelled through improved urban planning and smart \r\nlogistical systems can lead to fuel, and, hence, emissions savings \r\n(Creutzig et  al. 2015a; IEA 2016; IEA 2017a; Wiedenhofer et  al. \r\n2018), or through avoiding long-haul flights (IEA 2021). For example, \r\nreallocating road and parking space to exclusive public transit lanes, "


id: aa488b28c32b5db0edbee764c8de0dc9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24330
content:
"Figure 5.7 | Demand-side mitigation options and indicative potentials. Demand-side mitigation response options related to demand for services have been categorised \r\ninto three broad domains: 'socio-cultural factors', associated with individual choices, behaviour and lifestyle change, social norms and culture; 'infrastructure use', related to \r\nthe design and use of supporting hard and soft infrastructure that enables changes in individual choices and behaviour; and 'end-use technology adoption', which refers to the \r\nuptake of technologies by end users. Demand-side mitigation is a central element of the IMP-LD and IMP-SP scenarios (Section 3.3). Food (nutrition) demand-side potentials \r\nin 2050 assessment is based on bottom-up studies and estimated following the 2050 baseline for the food sector presented in peer-reviewed literature (more information in \r\nChapter 5 Supplementary Material II and Chapter 7, Section 7.4.5)"


id: dd018c2345f9d8bfa64b175839975144
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32268
content:
" Industry (manufactured products), land transport, aviation and shipping (mobility), and buildings (shelter) \r\nassessment of potentials for total emissions in 2050 are estimated based on approximately 500 bottom-up studies representing all global regions (detailed list is in Table 5.\r\nSM.2). Baseline is provided by the sectoral mean GHG emissions in 2050 of the two scenarios consistent with policies announced by national governments until 2020. The \r\nheights of the coloured columns represent the potentials represented by the median value. These are based on a range of values available in the case studies from literature \r\nshown in Chapter 5 Supplementary Material II. The range is shown by the dots connected by dotted lines representing the highest and the lowest potentials reported in the \r\nliterature. The demand-side potential of socio-cultural factors in food has two parts.The median value of direct emissions (mostly non-CO2) reduction through socio-cultural \r\nfactors is 1"


id: f7a284236631b6867c48991984a2e2d0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36470
content:
"9 GtCO2-eq without considering land-use change through reforestation of freed up land. If changes in land-use patterns enabled by this change in food demand \r\nare considered, the indicative potential could reach 7 GtCO2-eq. The 'electricity' panel presents how sectoral demand-side mitigation options (industry, transport and buildings) \r\ncan change demand on the electricity distribution system. Electricity accounts for an increasing proportion of final energy demand in 2050 ('additional electrification' bar) \r\nin line with multiple bottom-up studies (detailed list is in Table 5.SM.3) and Chapter 6 (Section 6.6). These studies are used to compute the impact of end-use electrification \r\nwhich increases overall electricity demand"


id: 2c10a8c6320a40eb42d76a3013a64afc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4371
content:
" Some of the projected increase in electricity demand can be avoided through demand-side mitigation options in the domains of \r\nsocio-cultural factors and infrastructure use strategies in end-use electricity use in buildings, industry and land transport found in literature based on bottom-up assessments \r\n(Section 5.3 and Chapter 5 Supplementary Material II)."


id: 2fcec931a12c6f04e46fec8b9be806e2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4946
content:
"In the buildings sector, avoidance strategies can occur at the end \r\nuse or individual building operation level. End-use technologies and \r\nstrategies such as the use of daylighting (Bodart and De Herde 2002) \r\nand lighting sensors can avoid demand for lumens from artificial \r\nlight, while passive houses, thermal mass, and smart controllers can \r\navoid demand for space conditioning services. Eliminating standby \r\npower losses can avoid energy wasted for no useful service in many \r\nappliances and devices, which may reduce household electricity use \r\nby up to 10% (Roy et al. 2012). At the building level, smaller dwellings \r\ncan reduce overall demand for lighting and space conditioning \r\nservices, while smaller dwellings, shared housing, and building lifespan \r\nextension can all reduce the overall demand for carbon-intensive \r\nbuilding materials such as concrete and steel (Material Economics \r\n2018; Hertwich et al. 2019; IEA 2019b; Pauliuk et al. 2021)"


id: f1d39da9906925cda67783b7c1e00bb9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35560
content:
" Emerging \r\nstrategies for materials efficiency, such as 3D printing to optimise the \r\ngeometries and minimise the materials content of structural elements, \r\nmay also play a key role if thermal performance and circularity can be \r\nimproved (Mahadevan et al. 2020; Adaloudis and Bonnin Roca 2021). \r\nSeveral scenarios estimate an 'Avoid' potential in the building sector, \r\nwhich includes reducing waste in superfluous floor space, heating and \r\nIT equipment, and energy use, of between 10% and 30%, in one case \r\neven by 50% (Nadel and Ungar 2019) (Chapter 9)."


id: 52f6747a9409c6426a74c0494ff4c784
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10506
content:
"A substantial part of losses happens at the end-use point and in final \r\nservice delivery (where losses account for 47% to 60% of aggregate \r\nsystems losses for steel and energy respectively, and 23% in the case \r\nof water embodied in food). The efficiency of service delivery (Brand\u0002Correa and Steinberger 2017) has usually both a  technological \r\ncomponent (efficiency of end-use devices such as cars, light bulbs) \r\nand a behavioural component (i.e., how efficiently end-use devices \r\nare used, e.g.,  load factors) (Dietz et  al. 2009; Laitner et  al. 2009; \r\nNorton 2012; Kane and Srinivas 2014; Ehrhardt-Martinez 2015; \r\nThaler 2015; Lopes et al. 2017)"


id: 12ea00e0c3cee2f433879be1d50c3d0d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 480
content:
" Using the example of mobility, where \r\nservice levels are usually expressed by passenger-km, service delivery \r\nefficiency is thus a function of the fuel efficiency of the vehicle and \r\nits drivetrain (typically only about 20%-25% for internal combustion \r\nengines, but close to 100% for electric motors) plus how many \r\npassengers the vehicle actually transports (load factor, typically as \r\nlow as 20-25%, i.e. one passenger per vehicle that could seat four \r\nto five), that is, an aggregate end-use efficiency of between 4-6% \r\nonly. Aggregated energy end-use efficiencies at the global level are \r\nestimated as low as 20% (De Stercke 2014), 13% for steel (recovered \r\npost-use scrap) (Allwood and Cullen 2012), and some 70% for \r\nfood (including distribution losses and food waste of some 30%) \r\n(Lundqvist et al. 2008)."


id: 3a64d22e8845635ac72eb59cc86034e3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6552
content:
"To harness additional gains in efficiency by shifting the focus in service \r\ndelivery systems to the end user can translate into large upstream \r\nresource reductions. For each unit of improvement at the end-use point \r\nof the service delivery system (examples shown in Figure 5.9), primary \r\nresource inputs are reduced between a factor of 6 to 7 units (water, \r\nsteel, energy) (TWI2050 2018). For example, reducing energy needs \r\nfor final service delivery equivalent to 1 EJ, reduces primary energy \r\nneeds by some 7 EJ. There is thus high evidence and high agreement\r\nin the literature that the leverage effect for improvements in end\u0002use service delivery efficiency through behavioural, technological, \r\nand market organisational innovations is very large, ranging from \r\na factor 6 to 7 (resource cascades) to up to a factor 10 to 20 (exergy \r\nanalysis), with the highest improvement potentials at the end-user \r\nand service provisioning levels (for systemic reviews see Nakicenovic \r\net al"


id: 80c2d17b420f1c0296f35741f166432d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17783
content:
" (1996a), Grubler et al. (2012b), and Sousa et al. (2017)). Also, the \r\nliterature shows high agreement that current conversion efficiencies \r\nare invariably low, particularly for those components at the end\u0002use and service-delivery back end of service provisioning systems. \r\nIt also suggests that efficiencies might actually be even lower \r\nthan those revealed by direct input-output resource accounting, \r\nas discussed above (Figure  5.9). Illustrative exergy efficiencies of \r\nentire national or global service delivery systems range from 2.5% \r\n(USA (Ayres 1989)) to 5% (OECD average (Grubler  et  al. 2012b)) "


id: bf65c54c3989fa7bdad42e37068f2fe6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27668
content:
"Figure  5.10 | Realisable energy efficiency improvements by region and \r\nby end-use type between 2020 and 2050 in an illustrative Low Energy \r\nDemand scenario (in EJ). Efficiency improvements are decomposed by respective \r\nsteps in the conversion chain from primary energy to final, and useful, energy, and to \r\nservice delivery, and disaggregated by region (developed and developing countries) \r\nand end-use type (buildings, transport, materials). Improvements are dominated by \r\nimproved efficiency in service delivery (153 EJ) and by more efficient end-use energy \r\nconversion (134 EJ). Improvements in service efficiency in transport shown here are \r\nconservative in this scenario but could be substantially higher with the full adoption \r\nof integrated urban shared mobility schemes"


id: dd6b4fd1fa3aefbf32553987b309f2ca
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32336
content:
" Increases in energy use due to increases \r\nin service levels and system effects of transport electrification (grey bars on top of first \r\npair in the bar charts) that counterbalance some of the efficiency improvements are \r\nalso shown. Examples of options for efficiency improvements and decision involved \r\n(grey text in the chart), the relative weight of generic demand-side strategies (Avoid\u0002Shift-Improve blue arrows), as well as prototype actors involved, are also illustrated. \r\nData source: Figure 5.9 and Grubler et al. (2018)."


id: 5bb1a8673b77b718a05c9066e692ef24
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11933
content:
"showers, reduced appliance use, shifts to public transit, less meat\u0002intensive diets, and improved recycling can deliver an additional \r\n1.7 Gt and 3 GtCO2 savings in 2050, beyond the savings achieved \r\nin traditional technology-centric mitigation scenarios for the 2degC \r\nand 1.5deg\r\nC ambitions, respectively (van Sluisveld et  al. 2016; Van \r\nVuuren et al. 2018). In its Sustainable Development Scenario, the \r\nIEA's behavioural change and resource efficiency wedges deliver \r\naround 3 GtCO2-eq reduction in 2050, combined savings, roughly \r\nequivalent to those of solar PV that same year (IEA 2019a). In \r\nEurope, a  Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM) scenario \r\nevaluating combined lifestyle changes such as teleworking, travel \r\navoidance, dietary shifts, food waste reductions, and recycling \r\nreduced cumulative EU  27 CO2 emissions 2011-2050 by up \r\nto 16% compared to an SSP2 baseline (van de Ven et  al. 2018)"


id: b18a986214bcad51fe26e54ec3af6e18
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25427
content:
" \r\nAlso in Europe, a  multi-regional input-output analysis suggested \r\nthat adoption of low-carbon consumption practices could reduce \r\ncarbon footprints by 25%, or 1.4 Gt (Moran et al. 2020). A global \r\ntransport scenario suggests that transport sector emissions can \r\ndecline from business-as-usual 18 GtCO2-eq to 2 GtCO2-eq if ASI \r\nstrategies are deployed (Gota et  al. 2019), a  value considerably \r\nbelow the estimates provided in IAM scenarios that have limited or \r\nno resolution in ASI strategies (Chapter 10)."


id: 358758437795ab127fcf7029137df5e0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5831
content:
"Long-term mitigation scenarios play a crucial role in climate policy \r\ndesign in the near term, by illuminating transition pathways, \r\ninteractions between supply-side and demand-side interventions, \r\ntheir timing, and the scales of required investments needed to \r\nachieve mitigation goals (Chapter  3). Historically, most long-term \r\nmitigation scenarios have taken technology-centric approaches \r\nwith heavy reliance on supply-side solutions and the use of carbon \r\ndioxide removal, particularly in 1.5degC scenarios (Rogelj et al. 2018). \r\nComparatively less attention has been paid to deep demand-side \r\nreductions incorporating socio-cultural change and the cascade \r\neffects (Section 5.3.2) associated with ASI strategies, primarily due to \r\nlimited past representation of such service-oriented interventions in \r\nlong-term integrated assessment models (IAMs) and energy systems \r\nmodels (ESMs) (Grubler et  al. 2018; van de Ven et  al. 2018; Napp \r\net al. 2019)"


id: fedb388a43068b3e130b4b234314b127
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37644
content:
" There is ample evidence of savings from sector- or issue\u0002specific bottom-up studies (Section 5.3.1.2). However, these savings \r\ntypically get lost in the dominant narrative provided by IAMs and \r\nESMs and in their aggregate-level evaluations of combinations of ASI \r\nand efficiency strategies. As a result, their interaction effects do not \r\ntypically get equal focus alongside supply-side and carbon dioxide \r\nremoval options (Samadi et al. 2017; Van Vuuren et al. 2018; Van den \r\nBerg et al. 2019)."


id: 56ef12f1d1cdb5ad12dd545593c0c728
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11154
content:
"Second, pursuant to the ASI principle, deep demand reductions \r\nrequire parallel pursuit of behavioural change and advanced energy\u0002efficient technology deployment; neither is sufficient on its own. The \r\nLED scenario (Figure 5.10) combines behavioural and technological \r\nchange consistent with numerous ASI strategies that leverage \r\ndigitalisation, sharing, and circular economy megatrends to deliver \r\ndecent living standards while reducing global final energy demand \r\nin 2050 to 245 EJ (Grubler et  al. 2018). This value is 40% lower \r\nthan final energy demand in 2018 (IEA 2019a), and a lower 2050 \r\noutcome than other IAM/ESM scenarios with primarily technology\u0002centric mitigation approaches (Teske et al. 2015; IEA 2017b). In the \r\nIEA's B2DS scenario, Avoid/Shift in the transport sector accounts \r\nfor around 2 GtCO2-eq yr -1 in 2060, whereas parallel vehicle \r\nefficiency improvements increase the overall mitigation wedge to \r\n5.5 GtCO2-eq yr -1 in 2060 (IEA 2017b)"


id: 2736af6cc0c8f7ff977249f4b1704785
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3569
content:
" Through a combination of \r\nbehavioural change and energy-efficient technology adoption, the \r\nIEA's NZE requires only 340 EJ of global final energy demand with \r\nuniversal energy access in 2050, which is among the lowest of IPCC \r\nnet zero SR1.5 scenarios (IEA 2021)."


id: 3fe48cf709c38ab8991b3d5512af56bc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7438
content:
"Fourth, the costs of reaching mitigation targets may be lower when \r\nincorporating ASI strategies for deep energy and resource demand \r\nreductions. The TIAM-Grantham low demand scenarios displayed \r\nreduction in mitigation costs (0.87-2.4% of GDP), while achieving \r\neven lower cumulative emissions to 2100 (228 to ~475 GtCO2) \r\nthan its central demand scenario (741 to 1066 GtCO2), which had \r\na cost range of (2.4-4.1% of GDP) (Napp et al. 2019). The GCAM \r\nbehavioural change scenario concluded that domestic emission \r\nsavings would contribute to reducing the costs of achieving the \r\ninternationally agreed climate goal of the EU by 13.5% to 30% (van \r\nde Ven et al. 2018). The AIMS lifestyle case indicated that mitigation \r\ncosts, expressed as global GDP loss, would be 14% lower than the \r\nSSP2 reference scenario in 2100, for both 2deg\r\nC and 1.5degC mitigation \r\ntargets (Liu et  al. 2018)"


id: b7a5494ef075d1c17203eae184fab582
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26417
content:
" These findings mirror earlier AIM results, \r\nwhich indicated lower overall mitigation costs for scenarios focused \r\non energy service demand reductions (Fujimori et al. 2014). In the \r\nIEA's NZE, behavioural changes that avoid energy and resource \r\ndemand save USD4 trillion (cumulatively 2021-2050) compared to \r\nif those emissions reductions were achieved through low-carbon \r\nelectricity and hydrogen deployment (IEA 2021)."


id: 8ea96b5064bbbb9a5ee18fa25cdb4674
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 19969
content:
"The sharing economy, the circular economy, and digitalisation have \r\nall received much attention from the research, advocacy, business \r\nmodels and policy communities as potentially transformative trends \r\nfor climate change mitigation (IEA 2017a; Material Economics 2018; \r\nTWI2050 2019). All are essentially emerging and contested concepts \r\n(Gallie 1955) that have the common goal of increasing convenience \r\nfor users and rendering economic systems more resource efficient, \r\nbut which exhibit variability in the literature on their definitions and \r\nsystem boundaries. Historically, both sharing and circular economies \r\nhave been commonplace in developing countries, where reuse, repair, \r\nand waste scavenging and recycling comprise the core of informal \r\neconomies facilitated by human interventions (Wilson et  al. 2006; \r\nAsim et al. 2012; Pacheco et al. 2012)"


id: c9794b26a4e38044bb6de0d536bce69f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29258
content:
" Digitalisation is now propelling \r\nsharing and circular economy concepts in developed and developing \r\ncountries alike (Roy et al. 2021), and the three megatrends are highly \r\ninterrelated, as seen in Figure  5.11. For example, many sharing \r\neconomy concepts rely on corporate or, to lesser degree, non-profit \r\ndigital platforms that enable efficient information and opportunity \r\nsharing, thus making it part of the digitalisation trend. Parts of \r\nthe sharing economy are also included in some circular economy \r\napproaches, as shared resource use renders utilisation of material \r\nmore efficient. Digital approaches to material management also \r\nsupport the circular economy, such as through waste exchanges \r\nand industrial symbiosis. Digitalisation aims more broadly to deliver \r\nservices in more efficient, timely, intelligent, and less resource\u0002intensive ways (i.e"


id: 971d6d3f74747806b1129f027c213a2f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21292
content:
", by moving bits and not atoms), through the use \r\nof increasingly interconnected physical and digital systems in many \r\nfacets of economies. With rising digitalisation also comes the risk of \r\nincreased electricity use to power billions of devices and the internet \r\ninfrastructure that connects them, as well as growing quantities of \r\ne-waste, presenting an important policy agenda for monitoring and \r\nbalancing the carbon and resource costs and benefits of digitalisation \r\n(Malmodin and Lunden 2018; TWI2050 2019). Rebound effects \r\nand instigated consumption of digitalisation are risking to lead to \r\na  net increase in GHG emissions (Belkhir and Elmeligi 2018). The \r\ndeterminants and possible scales of mitigation potentials associated \r\nwith each megatrend are discussed below."


id: 9e6b4bf553f7b76dbc6473b21bbd04ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22455
content:
"If the limitations within most IAMs and ESMs regarding non-inclusion \r\nof granular ASI strategy analysis can be addressed, it will expand \r\nand improve long-term mitigation scenarios (Van den Berg et  al. \r\n2019). These include broader inclusion of mitigation costs for \r\nbehavioural interventions (van Sluisveld et al. 2016), much greater \r\nincorporation of rebound effects (Krey et al. 2019), including from \r\nimproved efficiencies (Brockway et al. 2021) and avoided spending \r\n(van de Ven et al. 2018), improved representation of materials cycles \r\nto assess resource cascades (Pauliuk et al. 2017), broader coverage \r\nof behavioural change (Samadi et  al. 2017; Saujot et  al. 2020), \r\nimproved consideration of how economic development affects \r\nservice demand (Semieniuk et al. 2021), explicit representation of \r\nintersectoral linkages related to digitalisation, sharing economy, \r\nand circular economy strategies (Section  5.3"


id: 7bd3f660de770eb346971d027ed08b46
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17086
content:
"4), and institutional, \r\npolitical, social, entrepreneurial, and cultural factors (van Sluisveld \r\net al. 2018). Addressing the current significant modelling limitations "


id: f09113f0c8956a9e7abb5ef5433e7d3e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35346
content:
"In the context of service provision, there are numerous opportunities \r\nfor consumers to buy, subscribe to, adopt, access, install or use \r\ndigital goods and services (Wilson et al. 2020b). Digitalisation has \r\nopened up new possibilities across all domains of consumer activity, \r\nfrom travel and retail to domestic living and energy use. Digital \r\nplatforms allow surplus resources to be identified, offered, shared, \r\ntransacted and exchanged (Frenken 2017). Real-time information \r\nflows on consumers' preferences and needs mean service provision \r\ncan be personalised, differentiated, automated, and optimised \r\n(TWI2050 2019). Rapid innovation cycles and software upgrades \r\ndrive continual improvements in performance and responsiveness \r\nto consumer behaviour"


id: e383092331c7aeae577559b2bef7aaf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 33273
content:
" These characteristics of digitalisation enable \r\nnew business models and services that affect both service demand, \r\nfrom shared ride-hailing (ITF 2017a) to smart heating (IEA 2017a), \r\nand how services are provisioned, from online farmers' markets \r\n(Richards and Hamilton 2018) to peer-to-peer electricity trading to \r\nenable distributed power systems (Morstyn et al. 2018)."


id: 54e89f1665fa3fd42f6fdb19df6f806
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10818
content:
"vehicles inducing more frequent and longer journeys due to \r\nreduced travel costs (Wadud et al. 2016). Estimating digitalisation's \r\ndirect energy demand has historically been hampered by lack of \r\nconsistent global data on IT device stocks, their power consumption \r\ncharacteristics, and usage patterns, for both consumer devices and the \r\ndata centres and communication networks behind them. As a result, \r\nquantitative estimates vary widely, with literature values suggesting \r\nthat consumer devices, data centres, and data networks account for \r\nanywhere from 6% to 12% of global electricity use (Gelenbe and \r\nCaseau 2015; Cook et  al. 2017; Malmodin and Lunden 2018). For \r\nexample, within the literature on data centres, top-down models that \r\nproject energy use on the basis of increasing demand for internet \r\nservices tend to predict rapid global energy use growth, (Andrae and \r\nEdler 2015; Belkhir and Elmeligi 2018; Liu et  al"


id: 28b7978b00c8982798124dd286f66dc5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3835
content:
" 2020a), whereas \r\nbottom-up models that consider data centre technology stocks and \r\ntheir energy efficiency trends tend to predict slower but still positive \r\ngrowth (Shehabi et  al. 2018; Hintemann and Hinterholzer 2019; "


id: c6f91abfbe84f45e74b724eb2fb5928d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28885
content:
"Maximising the mitigation potential of digitalisation trends \r\ninvolves diligent monitoring and proactive management of both \r\ndirect and indirect demand effects, to ensure that a proper balance \r\nis maintained. Direct energy demand can be managed through \r\ncontinued investments in, and incentives for, energy-efficient data \r\ncentres, networks, and end-use devices (Masanet et  al. 2011; \r\nAvgerinou et al. 2017; IEA 2017a; Koronen et al. 2020). Shifts to low\u0002carbon power are a particularly important strategy being undertaken \r\nby data centre and network operators (Cook et al. 2014; Huang et al. \r\n2020), which might be adopted across the digital device spectrum \r\nas a  proactive mitigation strategy where data demands outpace \r\nhardware efficiency gains, which may be approaching limits in the \r\nnear future (Koomey et  al. 2011). Most recently, data centres are \r\nbeing investigated as a  potential resource for demand response \r\nand load balancing in renewable power grids (Koronen et al"


id: 87c225ede62d4844735034fb02f792ba
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18886
content:
" 2020; \r\nZheng et al. 2020), while a large bandwidth for improving software \r\nefficiency has been suggested for overcoming slowing hardware \r\nefficiency gains (Leiserson et al. 2020). Ensuring efficiency benefits of \r\ndigital services while avoiding potential rebound effects and demand \r\nsurges will require early and proactive public policies to avoid excess \r\nenergy use (TWI2050 2019; WBGU 2019), which will also necessitate \r\ninvestments in data collection and monitoring systems to ensure that \r\nnet mitigation benefits are realised and that unintended consequences \r\ncan be identified early and properly managed (IEA 2017a)."


id: 650375aaef94d35abc19b4e85a227f59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13462
content:
"However, the net systems-level energy and resource efficiencies \r\ngained through the provision of digital services could play \r\nan important role in dealing with climate change and other \r\nenvironmental challenges (Masanet and Matthews 2010; Melville \r\n2010; Elliot 2011; Watson et  al. 2012; Gholami et  al. 2013; Anon \r\nHigon et  al. 2017). As shown in Figure  5.12, assessments of \r\nnumerous digital service opportunities for mobility, nutrition, \r\nshelter, and education and entertainment suggest that net emissions \r\nbenefits can be delivered at the systems level, although these effects \r\nare highly context dependent. Importantly, evidence of potential \r\nnegative outcomes due to rebound effects, induced demand, or life\u0002cycle trade-offs can also be observed"


id: 49fd32e1755fde42492cfbc9e0787668
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9048
content:
" For example, telework has \r\nbeen shown to reduce emissions where long and/or energy-intensive \r\ncommutes are avoided, but can lead to net emissions increases in \r\ncases where greater non-work vehicle use occurs or only short, low\u0002emissions commutes (e.g., via public transit) are avoided (Hook et al. \r\n2020; IEA 2020a; Viana Cerqueira et al. 2020). Similarly, substitution \r\nof physical media by digital alternatives may lead to emissions \r\nincreases where greater consumption is fuelled, whereas a  shift \r\nto 3D printed structures may require more emissions-intensive \r\nconcrete formulations or result in reduced thermal energy efficiency, \r\nleading to life-cycle emissions increases (Mahadevan et  al. 2020; \r\nYao et al. 2020)."


id: 99d0dcc36d4f98f4f02398a57432209
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21723
content:
"Furthermore, digitalisation, automation and artificial intelligence, \r\nas general-purpose technologies, may lead to a  plethora of new \r\nproducts and applications that are likely to be efficient on their own \r\nbut that may also lead to undesirable changes or absolute increases \r\nin demand for products (Figure 5.12). For example, last-mile delivery \r\nin logistics is both expensive and cumbersome. Battery-powered \r\ndrones enable a delivery of goods at similar lifecycle emissions to \r\ndelivery vans (Stolaroff et al. 2018). At the same time, drone delivery \r\nis cheaper in terms of time (immediate delivery) and monetary costs \r\n(automation saves the highest-cost component: personnel) (Sudbury \r\nand Hutchinson 2016). As a  result, demand for package delivery \r\nmay increase rapidly. Similarly, automated vehicles reduce the costs \r\nof time, parking, and personnel, and therefore may dramatically \r\nincrease vehicle mileage (Wadud et al. 2016; Cohen and Cavoli 2019)"


id: 5f0210d41b224836eb60ed4e1c7cd50f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12489
content:
" \r\nOn-demand electric scooters offer mobility access preferable to \r\npassenger cars, but can replace trips otherwise taken on public transit \r\n(de Bortoli and Christoforou 2020) and can come with significant \r\nadditional energy requirements for night-time system rebalancing \r\n(Hollingsworth et  al. 2019; ITF 2020). The energy requirements of \r\ncryptocurrencies is also a  growing concern, although considerable \r\nuncertainty exists surrounding the energy use of their underlying \r\nblockchain infrastructure (Vranken 2017; de Vries 2018; Stoll et al. \r\n2019). For example, while it is clear that the energy requirements \r\nof global Bitcoin mining have grown significantly since 2017, recent \r\nliterature indicates a wide range of estimates for 2020 (47 TWh to \r\n125 TWh) due to data gaps and differences in modelling approaches \r\n(Lei et al. 2021)"


id: b25c1a2f2ecd62dffa6bd5d0da7ba0c0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25575
content:
" Initial estimates of the computational intensity of \r\nartificial intelligence algorithms suggest that energy requirements \r\nmay be enormous without concerted effort to improve efficiencies, \r\nespecially on the computational side (Strubell et al. 2020). Efficiency \r\ngains enabled by digitalisation, in terms of reduced GHG emissions \r\nor energy use per service unit, may be overcompensated by activity/\r\nscale effects."


id: a06dd899ecf1d4d9cb6e4c66dcc72858
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22781
content:
"Opportunities to increase service per  product include peer-to-peer \r\nbased sharing of goods and services such as housing, mobility, and \r\ntools. Hence, consumable products become durable goods delivering \r\na 'product service', which potentially could provide the same level \r\nof service with fewer products (Fischedick et al. 2014).The sharing \r\neconomy is an old practice of sharing assets between many without \r\ntransferring ownership, which has been made new through focuses \r\non sharing underutilised products and assets in ways that promote \r\nflexibility and convenience, often in a highly developed context via \r\ngig economy or online platforms. However, the sharing economy \r\noffers the potential to shift from 'asset-heavy' ownership to 'asset\u0002light' access, especially in developing countries (Retamal 2019)"


id: a43a0296d06d2b52c7d3e96d7d8f6aef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23391
content:
" \r\nGeneral conclusions on the sharing economy as a  framework for \r\nclimate change mitigation are challenging and are better broken \r\ndown to specific subsystems (Mi and Coffman 2019) (Chapter  5 \r\nSupplementary Material I, 5.SM.4.3)."


id: 52471be5deb99083d56e0448641caf93
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10400
content:
"free-floating car sharing instead of public transit, rather than to \r\nreplace their private car (Herrmann et al. 2014); while in the United \r\nStates, ride-hailing and sharing data indicate that these services \r\nhave increased road congestion and lowered transit ridership, with \r\nan insignificant change in vehicle ownership, and may further lead to \r\nnet increases in energy use and CO2 emissions due to deadheading \r\n(Diao et  al. 2021; Ward et  al. 2021). If substitution effects and \r\ndeadheading, which is the practice of allowing employees of \r\na common carrier to use a vehicle as a non-revenue passenger, are \r\naccounted for, flexible motor-cycle sharing in Djakarta, Indonesia, \r\nis at best neutral to overall GHG emissions (Suatmadi et al. 2019)"


id: b9e9ffeb97308e0619c383e8d2ed55b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26790
content:
" \r\nPassenger surveys conducted in Denver, Colorado, US, indicated \r\nthat around 22% of all trips travelled with Uber and Lyft would \r\nhave been travelled by transit, 12% would have walked or biked, \r\nand another 12% of passengers would not have travelled at all \r\n(Henao and Marshall 2019)."


id: c6d3ee57b0644b9e8b676f7b1892c40c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28860
content:
"Shared mobility using private vehicle assets is categorised into four \r\nmodels (Santos 2018): peer-to-peer platforms where individuals can \r\nrent the vehicle when not in use (Ballus-Armet et al. 2014); short\u0002term rental managed and owned by a  provider (Enoch and Taylor \r\n2006; Schaefers et  al. 2016; Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012); Uber-like \r\nridehailing services (Wallsten 2015; Angrist et  al. 2017); and ride \r\npooling using private vehicles shared by passengers to a common \r\ndestination (Liyanage et  al. 2019; Shaheen and Cohen 2019). The \r\nlatest model  - ride pooling  - is promising in terms of congestion \r\nand per capita CO2 emissions reductions and is a common practice \r\nin developing countries, however it is challenging in terms of waiting \r\nand travel time, comfort, and convenience, relative to private cars \r\n(Santos 2018; Shaheen and Cohen 2019)"


id: cfacbe44d52dab9b859796163187c587
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30207
content:
" The other three models \r\noften yield profits to private parties, but remain mostly unrelated \r\nto reduction in CO2 emissions (Santos 2018). Shared travel models, \r\nespecially Uber-like models, are criticised because of the flexibilisation \r\nof labour, especially in developing countries, in which unemployment \r\nrates and unregulated labour markets lay a foundation of precarity \r\nthat lead many workers to seek out wide-ranging means towards \r\npatching together a  living (Ettlinger 2017; Wells et  al. 2020). \r\nDespite the advantages of shared mobility, such as convenience and \r\naffordability, consumers may also perceive risk formed by possible \r\nphysical injury from strangers or unexpected poor service quality \r\n(Hong et al. 2019)."


id: ab19ef4fc859604ccd702ff6c31b9912
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24439
content:
"Shared mobility scenarios demonstrate that GHG emission reduction \r\ncan be substantial when mobility systems and digitalisation are \r\nregulated. One study modelled that ride pooling with electric cars \r\n(6 to 16 seats), which shifts the service to a more efficient transport \r\nmode, improves its carbon intensity by cutting GHG emissions by \r\none-third (International Transport Forum 2016). Another study found \r\nthat shared autonomous taxis had the potential to reduce per-mile \r\nGHG emissions to 63-82% below those of projected hybrid vehicles \r\nin 2030, 87% to 94% lower than a  privately owned, gasoline\u0002powered vehicle in 2014 (Greenblatt and Saxena 2015). This also \r\nrealises 95% reduction in space required for public parking; and \r\ntotal vehicle kilometres travelled would be 37% lower than the \r\npresent day, although each vehicle would travel ten times the total \r\ndistance of current vehicles (International Transport Forum 2016)"


id: 66451c09009187ee930d79e5e49b7934
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13680
content:
" \r\nStudies of Berlin, Germany, and Lisbon, Portugal, demonstrate that \r\nsharing strategies could reduce the number of cars by more than \r\n90%, also saving valuable street space for human-scale activity \r\n(Bischoff and Maciejewski 2016; Martinez and Viegas 2017; \r\nCreutzig et al. 2019b). The impacts will depend on sharing levels - \r\nconcurrent or sequential - and the future modal split among public \r\ntransit, automated electric vehicles fleets, and shared or pooled \r\nrides. Evidence from attributional lifecycle assessments (LCAs) of \r\nride-hailing, whether Uber-like or by taxi, suggests that the key \r\ndeterminants of net emissions effects are average vehicle occupancy \r\nand vehicle powertrain, with high-occupancy and electric drivetrain \r\ncars delivering the greatest emissions benefits, even rivalling \r\ntraditional metro/urban rail and bus options (Figure  5.13b)"


id: 59e0304ad021156968de99a4f915b4cf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11640
content:
" It is \r\npossible that shared automated electric vehicle fleets could become \r\nwidely used without many shared rides, and single- or even zero\u0002occupant vehicles will continue to be the majority of vehicle trips. \r\nIt is also feasible that shared rides could become more common, "


id: 4562c34e633fec0b7d75ef420eb6e2fe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8335
content:
"Altogether, travel behaviour, business models, and especially public \r\npolicy will be key components in determining how impacts of \r\npooling and shared automated electric vehicles unfold (Shaheen \r\nand Cohen 2019). Urban-scale governance of smart mobility holds \r\npotential for prioritising public transit and the use of public spaces \r\nfor human activities, managing the data as a  digital sustainable \r\ncommons (e.g., via the installation of a Central Information Officer, \r\nas in Tel Aviv, Israel), and managing the social and environmental \r\nrisks of smart mobility to realise its benefits (Creutzig et al. 2019b). \r\nPricing of energy use and GHG emissions will be helpful to achieve \r\nthese goals. The governance of shared mobility is complicated, as \r\nit involves many actors, and is key to realising wider benefits of \r\nshared mobility (Akyelken et al. 2018)"


id: 5c3026a12acb32a18b40b7d5db8d66e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12018
content:
" New actors, networks and \r\ntechnologies enabling shared mobility are already fundamentally \r\nchallenging how transport is governed worldwide. This is not \r\na debate about state versus non-state actors but instead about the \r\nrole the state takes within these new networks to steer, facilitate, \r\nand also reject different elements of the mobility system (Docherty \r\net al. 2018)."


id: 3e1a44a56052e14839b028d6a7dc8129
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7131
content:
"Sharing economy initiatives play a  central role in enabling \r\nindividuals to share underutilised products. While the literature on \r\nthe net effects of sharing economy strategies is still limited, available \r\nstudies have presented different mitigation potentials to date, as \r\nshown in Figure 5.13. For many sharing economy strategies, there is \r\na risk of negative rebound and induced demand effects, which may \r\noccur by changing consuming patterns, for example if savings from \r\nsharing housing are used to finance air travel. Thus, the mitigation \r\npotentials of sharing economy strategies will depend on stringent \r\npublic policy and consumer awareness that reins in runaway \r\nconsumption effects. Shared economy solutions generally relate to \r\nthe 'Avoid' and 'Shift' strategies (Sections 5.1 and 5.3.2)"


id: 739474f271fc4fd88c450ef133f10300
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15807
content:
" On the one \r\nhand, they hold potential for providing similar or improved services \r\nfor well-being (mobility, shelter) at reduced energy and resource \r\ninput, with the proper policy signals and consumer responses. On \r\nthe other hand, shared economy strategies may increase emissions, \r\nfor example shared mobility may shift activity away from public \r\ntransit and lead to lower vehicle occupancy, deadheading, and use \r\nof inefficient shared vehicles (Jones and Leibowicz 2019; Merlin \r\n2019; Bonilla-Alicea et  al. 2020; Ward et  al. 2021). Similarly to \r\ndigitalisation, there is medium evidence that the sharing economy \r\ncan reduce overall emissions, energy use, and activity levels, with \r\nmedium agreement on the scale of potential savings if induced \r\ndemand and rebound effects can be carefully managed to avoid \r\nnegative outcomes."


id: 7c0c72d0ecaa1d468104aa7e3463321d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17120
content:
"Figure 5.13 | (a) Published estimates from 72 studies with 185 observations (indicated by vertical bars) of the relative mitigation potential of different \r\nshared and circular economy strategies, demonstrating limited observations for many emerging strategies, a wide variance in estimated benefits for \r\nmost strategies, and within the sharing economy, risk of increased emissions due to inefficient substitutions, induced demand, and rebound effects.\r\nMitigation potentials are conditional on corresponding public policy and/or regulation. (b) Attributional LCA comparisons of ridesharing mobility options, which highlight the \r\nlarge effects of vehicle occupancy and vehicle technology on total CO2 emissions per passenger-km and the preferability of high-occupancy and non-ICE configurations for \r\nemissions reductions compared to private cars. Also indicated are possible emissions increases associated with shared car mobility when it substitutes for non-motorised and \r\npublic transit options"


id: 3b8d6ee206883167392f1882bf1f32aa
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6719
content:
" BEV = battery electric vehicle; FCEV = fuel cell electric vehicle; HEV = hybrid electric vehicle; ICE = internal combustion engine; PHEV = plug-in hybrid \r\nelectric vehicle. Sources: data from Jacobson and King (2009); Firnkorn and Muller (2011); Baptista et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014); Namazu and Dowlatabadi (2015); Nijland \r\net al. (2015); IEA (2016); Koh (2016); Martin and Shaheen (2016); Rabbitt and Ghosh (2016); Bruck et al. (2017); Bullock et al. (2017); Clewlow and Mishra (2017); Fremstad \r\n(2017); ITF (2017a,b,c); Nasir et al. (2017); Nijland and van Meerkerk (2017); Rademaekers et al. (2017); Skjelvik et al. (2017); Yin et al. (2017); Campbell (2018); Favier et al. \r\n(2018); Ghisellini et al. (2018); Hopkinson et al. (2018); IEA (2018); ITF (2018); Lokhandwala and Cai (2018); Makov and Font Vivanco (2018); Malmqvist et al. (2018); Material \r\nEconomics (2018); Nasr et al. (2018); Yu et al. (2018); Zhang and Mi (2018); Brambilla et al. (2019); Brutting et al"


id: 2cbeda6adcc6698c552b9508f752b15a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4472
content:
" (2019); Buyle et al. (2019); Castro and Pasanen (2019); \r\nCoulombel et al. (2019); Eberhardt et al. (2019); IEA (2019b); ITF (2019); Jones and Leibowicz (2019); Ludmann (2019); Merlin (2019); Nussholz et al. (2019); Bonilla-Alicea \r\net al. (2020); Cantzler et al. (2020); Churkina et al. (2020); Gallego-Schmid et al. (2020); Hertwich et al. (2020); ITF (2020a,b); Liang et al. (2020); Miller (2020); Wilson et al. \r\n(2020c); Yan et al. (2020); Cordella et al. (2021); Diao et al. (2021); Pauliuk et al. (2021); Ward et al. (2021); Wolfram et al. (2021)."


id: 9d6abefc21fe09d398ecd9a8e6343939
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22296
content:
"to grow, strategies targeting end-of-pipe materials cannot keep \r\npace with primary materials demand (Krausmann et  al. 2017; \r\nHaas et al. 2020). Instead, a significant reduction of societal stock \r\ngrowth, and decisive eco-design, are suggested to advance the CE \r\n(Haas et al. 2015). Third, cost-effectiveness underlying CE activities \r\nmay concurrently also increase energy intensity and reduce labour \r\nintensity, causing systematically undesirable effects. To a  large \r\nextent, the distribution of costs and benefits of material and \r\nenergy use depend on institutions in order to include demand-side \r\nsolutions. Thus, institutional conditions have an essential role to \r\nplay in setting rules differentiating profitable from nonprofitable \r\nactivities in CE (Moreau et al. 2017)"


id: c78ebad8e850b44169d71ef423f5ca79
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28983
content:
" Moreover, the prevalence of \r\nCE practices such as reuse, refurbishment, and recycling can differ \r\nsubstantially between developed and developing economies, \r\nleading to highly context-specific mitigation potentials and policy \r\napproaches (McDowall et al. 2017)."


id: 1ea415e7ed6ba59e3ac6fb89951f8a6d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2263
content:
"value as possible from products and components when they reach \r\nthe end of their useful life in a  given application (Lewandowski \r\n2016; Lieder and Rashid 2016; Stahel 2016; Linder and Williander \r\n2017). This requires an integrated approach during the design \r\nphase that, for example, extends product usage and ensures \r\nrecyclability after use (de Coninck et  al. 2018). While traditional \r\n'Improve' strategies tend to focus on direct energy and carbon \r\nefficiency, service-oriented strategies focus on reducing lifecycle \r\nemissions through harnessing the leverage effect (Creutzig et  al. \r\n2018). The development of closed-loop models in service-oriented \r\nbusinesses can increase resource and energy efficiency, reducing \r\nemissions and contributing to climate change mitigation goals at \r\nnational, regional, and global levels (Johannsdottir 2014; Korhonen \r\net  al. 2018)"


id: 7ed9e8f6f5fa9e7af8757f56b317ba0a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17518
content:
" Key examples include remanufacturing of consumer \r\nproducts to extend lifespans while maintaining adequate service \r\nlevels (Klausner et  al. 1998), reuse of building components to \r\nreduce demand for primary materials and construction processes \r\n(Shanks et al. 2019), and improved recycling to reduce upstream \r\nresource pressures (IEA 2019b; IEA 2017b)."


id: 4332425eb8641135ad53f5cd15df910
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7971
content:
"Among the many schools of thought on the CE and climate change \r\nmitigation, two different trends can be distinguished from the \r\nliterature to date. First, there are publications, many of them not peer\u0002reviewed, that eulogise the perceived benefits of the CE, but in many \r\ncases stop short of providing a quantitative assessment. Promotion \r\nof CE from this perspective has been criticised as a greenwashing \r\nattempt by industry to avoid serious regulation (Isenhour 2019). \r\nSecond, there are more methodologically rigorous publications, \r\nmostly originating in the industrial ecology field, but sometimes \r\ninvestigating only limited aspects of the CE (Bocken et al. 2017; Cullen \r\n2017; Goldberg 2017). Conclusions on CE's mitigation potential \r\nalso differ, with diverging definitions of the CE"


id: 748c196322c82d4cba2dbd30948d830c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15935
content:
" A systematic review \r\nidentified 3,244 peer-reviewed articles addressing CE and climate \r\nchange, but only 10% of those provide insights on how the CE can \r\nsupport mitigation, and most of them found only small potentials \r\nto reduce GHG emissions (Cantzler et al. 2020). Recycling is the CE \r\ncategory most investigated, while reuse and reduce strategies have \r\nseen comparatively less attention (Cantzler et  al. 2020). However, \r\nmitigation potentials were also context- and material-specific, as \r\nillustrated by the ranges shown in Figure 5.13a."


id: b92812c0728cdba246d6457211a2a4d7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26667
content:
"There are three key concerns relating to the effectiveness of the \r\nCE concept. First, many proposals on the CE insufficiently reflect \r\non thermodynamic constraints that limit the potential of recycling \r\nfrom both mass conservation and material quality perspectives or \r\nignore the considerable amount of energy needed to reuse materials \r\n(Cullen 2017). Second, demand for materials and resources will likely \r\noutpace efficiency gains in supply chains, becoming a key driver of \r\nGHG emissions and other environmental problems, rendering the \r\nCE alone an insufficient strategy to reduce emissions (Bengtsson \r\net  al. 2018). In fact, the empirical literature points out that only \r\n6.5% of all processed materials (4 Gt yr -1) globally originate from \r\nrecycled sources (Haas et  al. 2015)"


id: b9ab06752f9eabe4240bdd5f24f4e9be
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26753
content:
" The low degree of circularity \r\nis explained by the high proportion of processed materials (44%) \r\nused to provide energy, thus not available for recycling; and the \r\nhigh rate of net additions to stocks of 17 Gt yr -1. As long as long\u0002lived material stocks (e.g., in buildings and infrastructure) continue "


id: fea684dee3bae402797ad38f816cff1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37608
content:
"energy-services, well-being, and equity-oriented economy (Jackson \r\n2016; Cassiers et  al. 2018; Yuana et  al. 2020; Nielsen et al. 2021) \r\n(Figure 5.14). Each driver has novel implications for the design and \r\nimplementation of demand-side mitigation policies. They show \r\nimportant synergies, making energy demand mitigation a  dynamic \r\nproblem where the packaging and/or sequencing of different policies \r\nplay a role in their effectiveness, demonstrated in Sections 5.5 and \r\n5.6. The Social Science Primer (Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I) \r\ndescribes theory and empirical insights about the interplay between \r\nindividual agency, the social and physical context of demand-side \r\ndecisions in the form of social  roles and norms, infrastructure and \r\ntechnological constraints and affordances, and other formal and \r\ninformal institutions. Incremental interventions on all five fronts \r\nchange social practices, affecting simultaneously energy and well\u0002being (Schot and Kanger 2018)"


id: 6f79e0cf5d34132baebc25e072612496
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15168
content:
" Transformative change will require \r\ncoordinated use of all five drivers, as described in Figure 5.14 and, \r\nusing novel insights about behaviour change for policy design and \r\nimplementation (high evidence, high agreement). In particular, socio\u0002economic factors, such as equity, public service quality, electricity \r\naccess and democracy are found to be highly significant in enabling \r\nneed satisfaction at low energy use, whereas economic growth beyond \r\nmoderate incomes and extractive economic activities are observed to \r\nbe prohibiting factors (Vogel et al. 2021)."


id: b923eca89edb8722b1ceaad6cbaffe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26663
content:
"Relevant contributions to climate change mitigation at gigatonne scale \r\nby the CE will remain out of scope if decision-makers and industry fail \r\nto reduce primary inputs (high confidence). Systemic (consequential) \r\nanalysis is required to avoid the risk that scaling effects negate \r\nefficiency gains; such analysis is however rarely applied to date. For \r\nexample, material substitution or refurbishment of buildings brings \r\nrisk of increasing emissions despite improving or avoiding current \r\nmaterials (Castro and Pasanen 2019; Eberhardt et al. 2019). Besides, \r\nCE concepts that extend the lifetime of products and increase the \r\nfraction of recycling are useful but are both thermodynamically \r\nlimited and will remain relatively small in scale as long as demand \r\nfor primary materials continues to grow, and scale effects dominate"


id: 167aa27b46aaeaf9f9b6b9bb4a9602fe
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1062
content:
" \r\nIn spite of presenting a large body of literature on CE in general, only \r\na small but growing body of literature exists on the net effects of its \r\nstrategies from a quantitative perspective, with key knowledge gaps \r\nremaining on specific CE strategies. There is medium evidence that \r\nthe CE can reduce overall emissions, energy use, and activity levels, \r\nwith medium evidence that the sharing economy can reduce overall \r\nemissions, energy use, and activity levels, with medium agreement on \r\nthe scale of potential savings."


id: 73e14491d5a9ca0783cf89a6b4dadb4a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 15847
content:
"As individuals pursue a  broad set of goals and use calculation-, \r\nemotion-, and rule-based processes when they make energy decisions, \r\ndemand-side policies can use a  broad range of behavioural tools \r\nthat complement subsidies, taxes, and regulations (Chakravarty and \r\nRoy 2016; Mattauch et  al. 2016; Niamir 2019) (high evidence, high \r\nagreement). The provision of targeted information, social advertisements, \r\nand influence of trusted in-group members and/role models or admired \r\nrole models like celebrities can be used to create better climate change \r\nknowledge and awareness (Niamir 2019; Niamir et al. 2020b; Niamir \r\net  al. 2020c). Behavioural interventions like communicating changes \r\nin social norms can accelerate behaviour change by creating tipping \r\npoints (Nyborg et al. 2016). When changes in energy-demand decisions \r\n(such as switching to a plant-based diet, (Box 5"


id: fa73d1c795d732084c11f9c5c2d21b0c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36923
content:
"5)) are motivated by the \r\ncreation and activation of a social identity consistent with this and other \r\nbehaviours, positive spillover can accelerate behaviour change (Truelove \r\net al. 2014), both within a domain or across settings, for example from \r\nwork to home (Maki and Rothman 2017)."


id: 2f90e021208eaf7e371db87f4bd394fc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4903
content:
"Meat eating is declining in the UK, alongside a shift from carbon-intensive red meat towards poultry. This is due to the interaction of \r\nbehavioural, socio-cultural and organisational drivers (Vinnari and Vinnari 2014). Reduced meat consumption is primarily driven by \r\nissues of personal health and animal welfare, instead of climate or environment concerns (Latvala et al. 2012; Dibb and Fitzpatrick \r\n2014; Hartmann and Siegrist 2017; Graca et al. 2019). Social movements have promoted shifts to a vegan diet (Morris et al. 2014; \r\nLaestadius et al. 2016) yet their impact on actual behaviour is the subject of debate (Taufik et al. 2019; Harguess et al. 2020; Sahakian \r\net al. 2020). Companies have expanded new markets in non-meat products (MINTEL 2019). Both corporate food actors and new \r\nentrants offering more innovative 'meat alternatives' view consumer preferences as an economic opportunity, and are responding \r\nby increasing the availability of meat replacement products"


id: fd73d7338fea34609829b6b455d5b1d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37389
content:
" No significant policy change has taken place in the UK to enable dietary \r\nshift (Wellesley and Froggatt 2015); however the Climate Change Committee has recommended dietary shift in the Sixth Carbon \r\nBudget (Climate Change Committee 2020), involving reduced consumption of high-carbon meat and dairy products by 20% by \r\n2030, with further reductions in later years in order to reach net zero GHG emissions by 2050. Agricultural policies serve to support \r\nmeat production with large subsidies that lower production cost and effectively increase the meat intensity of diets at a population \r\nlevel (Simon 2003; Godfray et al. 2018). Deeper, population-wide reductions in meat consumption are hampered by these lock-in \r\nmechanisms which continue to stabilise the existing meat production-consumption system. The extent to which policymakers are \r\nwilling to actively stimulate reduced meat consumption thus remains an open question (Godfray et al. 2018)"


id: c74caae2966ea8cb70378fa69635ff7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28947
content:
"People's general perceptions of climate risks, first covered in AR5, \r\nmotivate behaviour change; more proximate and personal feelings of \r\nbeing at risk triggered by extreme weather and climate-linked natural \r\ndisasters will increase concern and willingness to act (Bergquist et al. \r\n2019), though the window of increased support is short (Sisco \r\net al. 2017). 67% of individuals in 26 countries see climate change as \r\na major threat to their country, an increase from 53% in 2013, though \r\n29% also consider it a minor or no threat (Fagan and Huang 2019). \r\nConcern that the COVID-19 crisis may derail this momentum due \r\nto a finite pool of worry (Weber 2006) appears to be unwarranted: \r\nAmericans' positions on climate change in 2020 matched high levels \r\nof concern measured in 2019 (Leiserowitz et al. 2020). Younger, female, \r\nand more educated individuals perceive climate risks to be larger \r\n(Weber 2016; Fagan and Huang 2019)"


id: efe4210c3527d1b179291e938132c0cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 35249
content:
" Moral values and political \r\nideology influence climate risk perception and beliefs about the \r\noutcomes and effectiveness of climate action (Maibach et al. 2011). "


id: b838f84f9d2f22379deff0abd13aeed8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26517
content:
"Universal access to clean and modern cooking energy could cut premature deaths from household air pollution by two-thirds, while \r\nreducing forest degradation and deforestation and contributinh to the reduction of up to 50% of CO2 emissions from cooking (relative \r\nto baseline by 2030) (IEA 2017c; Dagnachew et al. 2019). However, in the absence of policy reform and substantial energy investments, \r\n2.3 billion people will have no access to clean cooking fuels such as biogas, LPG, natural gas or electricity in 2030 (IEA 2017c). \r\nStudies reveal that a combination of drivers influence adoption of new cookstove appliances, including affordability, behavioural and \r\ncultural aspects (lifestyles, social norms around cooking and dietary practices), information provision, availability, aesthetic qualities \r\nof the technology, perceived health benefits, and infrastructure (spatial design of households and cooking areas)"


id: f8a6a93b31d8af78b4b9835da47e94b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36636
content:
" The increasing \r\nefficiency improvements in electric cooking technologies could enable households to shift to electrical cooking at mass scale. The use \r\nof pressure cookers and rice cookers is now widespread in South Asia and beginning to penetrate the African market as consumer \r\nattitudes are changing towards household appliances with higher energy efficiencies (Batchelor et al. 2019). There are shifts towards \r\nelectric and LPG stoves in Bhutan (Dendup and Arimura 2019), India (Pattanayak et al. 2019), Ecuador (Martinez et al. 2017; Gould \r\net al. 2018) and Ethiopia (Tesfamichael et al. 2021); and improved biomass stoves in China (Smith et al. 1993). Significant subsidy, \r\ninformation (Dendup and Arimura 2019), social marketing and availability of technology in the local markets are some of the key \r\npolicy instruments helping to adopt improved cookstoves (Pattanayak et al. 2019)"


id: 994e8eb28cb91f4cb82dd22691c441ec
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21634
content:
" There is no one-size-fits-all solution to household \r\nair pollution - different levels of shift and improvement occur in different cultural contexts, indicating the importance of socio-cultural \r\nand behavioural aspects in shifts in cooking practices. See more in Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I, Section 5.SM.6.2."


id: b63e9fe40d25a45c266992af025e04bf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26200
content:
"good; facilitating accurate assessment of risks, costs, and benefits; \r\nand making complex information more accessible (Yoeli et al. 2017; \r\nZangheri et  al. 2019). Climate-friendly choice architecture includes \r\nthe setting of proper defaults, the salient positioning of green options \r\n(in stores and online), forms of framing, and communication of social \r\nnorms (Johnson et al. 2012). Simplifying access to greener options (and \r\nhence lowering effort) can promote ASI changes (Mani et al. 2013). \r\nSetting effective 'green' defaults may be the most effective policy to \r\nmainstream low-carbon energy choices (Sunstein and Reisch 2014), \r\nadopted in many contexts (Jachimowicz et  al. 2019) and deemed \r\nacceptable in many countries (Sunstein et al. 2019). Table 5.3a lists \r\nhow often different choice-architecture tools were used in many \r\ncountries over the past 10 years to change ASI behaviours, and how \r\noften each tool was used to enhance an economic incentive"


id: 78edae972edf0238430810973b89c057
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 16581
content:
" These \r\ntools have been tested mostly in developed countries. Reduction \r\nin energy use (typically electricity consumption) is the most widely \r\nstudied behaviour (because metering is easily observable). All \r\nbut one tool was applied to increase this 'Avoid' behaviour, with \r\ndemand-side reductions from 0% to up to 20%, with most values \r\nbelow 3% (see also meta-analyses by Hummel and Maedche (2019); \r\nNisa et al. (2019); van der Linden and Goldberg (2020); Stankuniene \r\net al. (2020); and Khanna et al. (2021). Behavioural, economic, and \r\nlegal instruments are most effective when applied as an internally \r\nconsistent ensemble where they can reinforce each other, a concept "


id: cc54eb2202b1340de4f20b47805be2eb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29687
content:
"Note: Papers in this review of behavioural interventions to reduce household energy demand were collected through a systemic literature search up to August 2021. Studies \r\nare included in the reported counts if they are (i) experimental, (ii) peer-reviewed or highly cited reports, (iii) the intervention is behavioural, and (iv) the targeted behaviour is \r\nhousehold energy demand. 559 papers are included in the review. Each paper was coded for: type of behavioural intervention, country of study, energy demand behaviour \r\ntargeted, whether the target is an 'Avoid', 'Shift', or 'Improve' behaviour, and whether the intervention includes an economic incentive. Some papers do not report all elements. \r\nThe energy demand behaviour column provides the count of papers that focus on each behaviour type (in parentheses after the behaviour). The citations that follow are not \r\nexhaustive but exemplify papers in the category, selected for impact, range, and recency"


id: b8e7c10a42bd843ed8b878259c878a1a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26621
content:
" The asterisk (*) indicates references that are meta-analyses or systematic reviews. \r\nPapers within meta-analyses and systematic reviews that meet the inclusion criteria are counted individually in the total counts. The full reference list is available at https://osf.\r\nio/9463u/."


id: b5217a4763dc5625471c6ffc02a6a2ee
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26035
content:
"Power and agency shape which climate narratives are told and how \r\nprevalent they are (O'Neill and Smith 2014; Schneider-Mayerson \r\net al. 2020). For example, narratives have been used by indigenous \r\ncommunities to imagine climate futures divergent from top-down, \r\ngovernment-led narratives (Streeby 2018). The uptake of new climate \r\nnarratives is influenced by political beliefs and trust. Policymakers can \r\nenable emissions reduction by employing narratives that have broad \r\nsocietal appeal, encourage behavioural change and complement \r\nregulatory and fiscal measures (Terzi 2020). Justice narratives may \r\nnot have universal appeal: in a  UK study, justice narratives \r\npolarised individuals along ideological lines, with lower support \r\namongst individuals with right-wing beliefs; by contrast, narratives \r\ncentred on saving energy, avoiding waste and patriotic values were \r\nmore widely supported across society (Whitmarsh and Corner 2017)"


id: ab87e392d609dbefcf42d7372c6f88d8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24503
content:
" \r\nMore research is needed to assess if these findings are prevalent in \r\ndiverse socio-cultural contexts, as well as the role played by social \r\nmedia platforms to influence emerging narratives of climate change \r\n(Pearce et al. 2019)."


id: 96234a8c9ebdf01f5c4d49581c45332d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 21126
content:
"In terms of cultural processes, we can distinguish two levels of \r\nanalysis: specific meanings associated with particular technologies \r\nor practices, and general narratives about climate change mitigation. \r\nSpecific meanings (e.g.,  comfort, status, identity and agency) are \r\nassociated with many technologies and everyday social practices that \r\ndeliver energy services, from driving a car to using a cookstove (high \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Section 5.5). Meanings are symbolic and \r\ninfluence the willingness of individuals to use existing technologies \r\nor shift to new ones (Wilhite and Ling 1995; Wilhite 2009; Sorrell \r\n2015). Symbolic motives are more important predictors of technology \r\nadoption than instrumental motives (Steg 2005; Noppers et al. 2014; \r\nNoppers et  al. 2015; Noppers et  al. 2016) (see case study on app \r\ncabs in Kolkata, India (Box 5.8))"


id: 62a69e9ce34cbe21d762d4334a37ab7b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13089
content:
" If an individual's pro-environmental \r\nbehaviour is associated with personal meaning than it also increases \r\nsubjective well-being (Zawadzki et al. 2020). Status consciousness is \r\nhighly relevant in GHG emission-intensive consumption choices (cars, \r\nhouses). However, inversely framing energy-saving behaviour as high \r\nstatus is a promising strategy for emission reduction (Ramakrishnan \r\nand Creutzig 2021)."


id: 672ccc8836e3f1bc1d06e2d2398f532f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13830
content:
"Trust in organisations is a key predictor of the take-up of novel energy \r\nservices (Lutzenhiser 1993), particularly when financial incentives \r\nare high (Stern et al. 1985; Joskow 1995). Research has shown that \r\nif there is low public trust in utility companies, service delivery by \r\ncommunity-based non-profit organisations in the US (Stern et  al. \r\n1985) or public/private partnerships in Mexico (Friedmann and \r\nSheinbaum 1998), offer more effective solutions, yet only if public \r\ntrust is higher in these types of organisations. UK research shows \r\nthat acceptance of shifts to less resource-intensive service provision \r\n(e.g., more resource-efficient products, extending product lifetimes, \r\ncommunity schemes for sharing products) varies depending on factors \r\nincluding trust in suppliers and manufacturers, affordability, quality \r\nand hygiene of shared products, and fair allocation of responsibilities \r\n(Cherry et  al. 2018)"


id: 86779146d85673a008b262b936ae66ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 18698
content:
" Trust in other people plays an important role \r\nin the sharing economy (Li and Wang 2020), for example predicting \r\nshifts in transport mode, specifically car sharing involving rides with \r\nstrangers (Acheampong and Siiba 2019) (Section 5.3.4.2)."


id: abe4b586a89d8409d12fd8649648b8dc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24565
content:
"At a broader level, narratives about climate mitigation circulate within \r\nand across societies, as recognised in SR1.5, and are broader than the \r\nmeanings associated with specific technologies (high evidence, high \r\nagreement). Narratives enable people to imagine and make sense \r\nof the future through processes of interpretation, understanding, \r\ncommunication and social interaction (Smith et  al. 2017). Stories \r\nabout climate change are relevant for mitigation in numerous ways. \r\nThey can be utopian or dystopian (e.g., The great derangement by \r\nAmitav Ghosh) (Ghosh 2016), for example presenting apocalyptic \r\nstories and imagery to capture people's attention and evoke emotional \r\nand behavioural response (O'Neill and Smith 2014). Reading climate \r\nstories has been shown to cause short-term influences on attitudes \r\ntowards climate change, increasing the belief that climate change is \r\nhuman caused and increasing its issue priority (Schneider-Mayerson \r\net al. 2020)"


id: 68e4c17e4272461d56c1a2c9ca736964
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 14093
content:
" Climate narratives can also be used to justify scepticism \r\nof science, drawing together coalitions of diverse actors into social \r\nmovements that aim to prevent climate action (Lejano and Nero \r\n2020). Narratives are also used in integrated assessment and energy \r\nsystem models that construct climate stabilisation scenarios, for \r\nexample in the choice of parameters, their interpretation and model \r\nstructure (Ellenbeck and Lilliestam 2019). One important narrative \r\nchoice of many models involves framing climate change as market \r\nfailure (which leads to the result that carbon pricing is required). "


id: e8a11605e90c690a044516a295319e34
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34112
content:
"Action on climate mitigation is influenced by our perception of \r\nwhat other people commonly do, think or expect, known as social \r\nnorms (high evidence, high agreement) (Cialdini 2006) (Table 5.3), \r\neven though people often do not acknowledge this (Nolan et  al. \r\n2008; Noppers et al. 2014). Changing social norms can encourage \r\nsocietal transformation and social tipping points to address climate \r\nmitigation (Nyborg et al. 2016; Otto et al. 2020). Providing feedback \r\nto people about how their own actions compare to others' can \r\nencourage mitigation (Delmas et  al. 2013), although the overall \r\neffect size is not strong (Abrahamse and Steg 2013). Trending \r\nnorms are behaviours that are becoming more popular, even if \r\ncurrently practised by a minority. Communicating messages that the \r\nnumber of people engaging in a mitigation behaviour (e.g"


id: fe07823dc6ca405558d7c7b49c44d02e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 37491
content:
", giving \r\na financial donation to an environmental conservation organisation) \r\nis increasing - a simple low-cost policy intervention - can encourage \r\nshifts to the targeted behaviour, even if the effect size is relatively \r\nsmall (Mortensen et al. 2019)."


id: e92b1da891cd6b903600c861b35eb9e2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34202
content:
"are proposed (Devine-Wright  2009) and enabling fairness in how \r\ndecisions are taken and costs and benefits distributed (Wolsink \r\n2007). This is important for achieving the goal of SDG 7 (increased \r\nuse of renewable energy resources) in developing countries while \r\nachieving energy justice (Calzadilla and Mauger 2017). 'Top-down' \r\nimposition of climate policies by governments can translate into local \r\nopposition when perceived to be unjust and lacking transparency \r\n(high evidence, high agreement). Policymakers can build trust and \r\nincrease the legitimacy of new policies by implementing early \r\nand extensive public and stakeholder participation, avoiding 'Nimby' \r\n(Not In My Back Yard) assumptions about objectors and adopting \r\n'Just Transition' principles (Owens 2000; Wolsink 2007; Wustenhagen \r\net al. 2007; Dietz and Stern 2008; Devine-Wright 2011; Heffron and \r\nMcCauley 2018)"


id: babd8fb61d5fee5a31d22a5fdf883d64
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26921
content:
" Participatory mechanisms that enable deliberation \r\nby a representative sample of the public (Climate Assembly UK 2020) \r\ncan inform policymaking and increase the legitimacy of new and \r\ndifficult policy actions (Dryzek et al. 2019)."


id: be2914c3e6c608cabf46ff7a8aeaa1cb
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27474
content:
"Socially comparative feedback seems to be more effective when \r\npeople strongly identify with the reference group (De Dominicis \r\net al. 2019). Descriptive norms (perceptions of behaviours common \r\nin others) are more strongly related to mitigation actions when \r\ninjunctive norms (perceptions of whether certain behaviours are \r\ncommonly approved or disapproved) are also strong, when people \r\nare not strongly personally involved with mitigation topics (Gockeritz \r\net  al. 2010), when people are currently acting inconsistently with \r\ntheir preferences, when norm-based interventions are supported by \r\nother interventions and when the context supports norm-congruent \r\nactions (Miller and Prentice 2016). A descriptive norm prime ('most \r\nother people try to reduce energy consumption') together with \r\ninjunctive norm feedback ('you are very good at saving energy') \r\nis a  very effective combination to motivate further energy savings \r\n(Bonan et al. 2020)"


id: ac1953a3bf07b6450910f33c1e27fac0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24597
content:
" Second-order beliefs (perceptions of what others \r\nin the community believe) are particularly important for leveraging \r\ndescriptive norms (Jachimowicz et al. 2018)."


id: 518a761a26c46234bd1c863f43890ba2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10281
content:
"Collective action by civil society groups and social movements can \r\nwork to enable or constrain climate mitigation. Civil society groups \r\ncan advocate policy change, provide policy research and open up \r\nopportunities for new political reforms (high evidence, high agreement) \r\nas recognised in previous IPCC reports (IPCC 2007). Grassroots \r\nenvironmental initiatives, including community energy groups, are \r\ncollective responses to, and critiques of, normative ways that everyday \r\nmaterial needs (e.g., food, energy, making) are produced, supplied and \r\ncirculated (Schlosberg and Coles 2016). Such initiatives can reconcile \r\nlower carbon footprints with higher life satisfaction and higher \r\nincomes (Vita et al. 2020)"


id: 4a575fb666bf69d919dd6a97ff354154
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9101
content:
" Local initiatives such as Transition Towns \r\nand community energy projects can lead to improvements in energy \r\nefficiency, ensure a decent standard of living and increase renewable \r\nenergy uptake, while building on existing social trust, and, in turn, \r\nbuilding social trust and initiating engagement, capacity building, and \r\nsocial capital formation (Hicks and Ison 2018). Another example are \r\ngrassroot initiatives that aim to reduce food loss and waste, even as \r\noverall evidence on their effectiveness remains limited (Mariam et al. \r\n2020). However, community energy initiatives are not always inclusive \r\nand require policy support for widespread implementation across all \r\nsocio-economic groups (Aiken et al. 2017). In addition, more evidence \r\nis required of the impacts of community energy initiatives (Creamer \r\net al. 2018; Bardsley et al. 2019)."


id: 25f468eccf3993c34562c9ac0bf822f2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 3395
content:
"Civil society social movements are a  primary driver of social and \r\ninstitutional change (high evidence, high agreement) and can be \r\ndifferently positioned as, on the one hand, 'insider' social movements \r\n(e.g., World Wildlife Fund) that seek to influence existing state \r\ninstitutions through lobbying, advice and research and, on the \r\nother hand, 'outsider' social movements (e.g., Rising Tide, Extinction \r\nRebellion) that advocate radical reform through protests and \r\ndemonstrations (Newell 2005; Caniglia et al. 2015). Civil society social \r\nmovements frame grievances that resonate with society, mobilise \r\nresources to coordinate and sustain mass collective action, and \r\noperate within  - and seek to influence  - external conditions that \r\nenable or constrain political change (Caniglia et  al. 2015)"


id: bd16545102be5e68ad9c76de236b4f28
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27312
content:
" When \r\nsuccessful, social movements open up windows of opportunity \r\n(so called 'Overton Windows') to unlock structural change (high \r\nevidence, high agreement) (Szalek 2013; Piggot 2018)."


id: deccd47a6143e762165326d164930e72
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32550
content:
"Climate social movements advocate new narratives or framings \r\nfor climate mitigation (e.g.,  'climate emergency') (della Porta \r\nand Parks 2014); criticise positive meanings associated with high \r\nemission technologies or practices (see case studies on diet and \r\nsolar PV, (Boxes 5.5 and 5.7)); show disapproval for high-emission \r\nbehaviours (e.g., through 'flight shaming'); model behaviour change \r\n(e.g., shifting to veganism or public transport - see case study on \r\nmobility in Kolkata, India (Box 5.8)); demonstrate against extraction \r\nand use of fossil fuels (Cheon and Urpelainen 2018); and aim to \r\nincrease a sense of agency amongst certain social groups (e.g., young \r\npeople or indigenous communities) that structural change is possible. \r\nClimate strikes have become internationally prevalent, for example \r\nthe September 2019 strikes involved participants in more than \r\n180 countries (Rosane 2019; Fisher and Nasrin 2020; Martiskainen \r\net  al. 2020)"


id: 2a656811ea1d78668e04883c0dd4e8e4
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4104
content:
" Enabled by digitalisation, these have given voice to \r\nyouth on climate (Lee et al. 2020) and created a new cohort of active \r\ncitizens engaged in climate demonstrations (Fisher 2019). Research \r\non bystanders shows that marches increase positive beliefs about \r\nmarchers and collective efficacy (Swim et al. 2019)."


id: de7b877f6edfeec1a652a789a03e182b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 32507
content:
"As an innovative technology, solar PV was strongly taken up by consumers (Nemet 2019). Several key factors explain its success. First, \r\nmodular design made it applicable to different scales of deployment in different geographical contexts (e.g., large-scale grid-connected \r\nprojects and smaller-scale off-grid projects) and allowed its application by companies taking advantage of emerging markets (Shum \r\nand Watanabe 2009). Second, culturally, solar PV symbolised an environmentally progressive technology that was valued by users \r\n(Morris and Jungjohann 2016). Large-scale adoption led to policy change (i.e., the introduction of feed-in tariffs that guaranteed \r\na financial return) that in turn enabled improvements to the technology by companies. Over time, this has driven large-scale reductions \r\nin cost and increase in deployment worldwide. The relative importance of drivers varied across contexts"


id: 30502114c2603dc7ead73a6d42204e70
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5028
content:
" In Japan, state subsidies were \r\nlower yet did not hinder take-up because consumer behaviour was motivated by non-cost symbolic aspects. In Germany, policy change \r\narose from social movements that campaigned for environmental conservation and opposed nuclear power, making solar PV policies \r\npolitically acceptable. In summary, the seven-decade evolution of solar PV shows an evolution in which the agency of consumers has \r\nconsistently played a key role in multiple countries, such that deriving 30-50% of global electricity supply from solar is now a realistic \r\npossibility (Creutzig et al. 2017). See more in Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I, 5.SM.6.1."


id: a8bbaf5295e479e759495dfb04f1483c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24073
content:
"The allocation of political power to incumbent actors and coalitions \r\nhas contributed to lock-in of particular institutions, stabilising the \r\ninterests of incumbents through networks that include policymakers, \r\nbureaucracies, advocacy groups and knowledge institutions \r\n(high agreement, high evidence). There is high evidence and high \r\nagreement that institutions are central in addressing climate change \r\nmitigation. Indeed, social provisioning contexts, including equity, \r\ndemocracy, public services and high quality infrastructure, are \r\nfound to facilitate high levels of need satisfaction at lower energy \r\nuse, whereas economic growth beyond moderate incomes and \r\ndependence on extractive industries inhibit it (Vogel et  al. 2021). \r\nThey shape and interact with technological systems (Unruh 2000; \r\nFoxon et  al. 2004; Seto et  al"


id: ca5ef5b3a35c14133bd76b0f85f63755
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29401
content:
" 2014) and represent rules, norms \r\nand conventions that organise and structure actions (Vatn 2015) \r\nand help create new path dependency or strengthen existing path \r\ndependency (Mattioli et al. 2020) (see case studies in Boxes 5.5 to \r\n5.8 and Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I). These drive behaviour \r\nof actors through formal (e.g.,  laws, regulations, and standards) \r\nor informal (e.g.,  norms, habits, and customs) processes, and can \r\ncreate constraints on policy options (Breukers and Wolsink 2007). \r\nFor example, the car-dependent transport system is maintained by \r\ninterlocking elements and institutions, consisting of (i) the automotive \r\nindustry; (ii) the provision of car infrastructure; (iii)  the political \r\neconomy of urban sprawl; (iv)  the provision of public transport; \r\n(v) cultures of car consumption (Mattioli et al. 2020). The behaviour \r\nof actors, their processes and implications on policy options and \r\ndecisions are discussed further in Section 5.6."


id: 15384fea0c82aa3e54f62bb0ee1be4b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 852
content:
"A key role is played by the state government, in collaboration with other stakeholders, to improve the system as whole and formalise \r\ncertain semi-formal modes of transport. An important policy consideration has been to make Kolkata's mobility system more efficient \r\n(in terms of speed, reliability and avoidance of congestion) and sustainable through strengthening coordination between different \r\nmode-based regimes (Ghosh 2019) and more comfortable with air conditioned space in a hot and humid climate (Roy et al. 2018b). \r\nPolicymakers have introduced multiple technological, behavioural and socio-cultural measures to tackle this challenge. New buses \r\nhave been purchased by public authorities (Ghosh and Schot 2019). These have been promoted to middle class workers in terms of \r\nmodernity, efficiency and comfort, and implemented using premium fares"


id: c034b077de300a891fdb5c28d60e5b4f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27795
content:
" Digitalisation and the sharing economy have encouraged \r\ntake-up of shared taxi rides ('app cabs'), being low cost and fast, but also influenced by levels of social trust involved in rides with \r\nstrangers (Acheampong and Siiba 2019; Ghosh and Schot 2019). Rickshaws have been improved through use of LNG and cycling \r\nhas been banned from busy roads. These measures contributed positively to halving greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP tin \r\none decade within the Kolkata metropolitan area, with potential for further reduction (Colenbrander et al. 2016). However, social \r\nmovements have opposed some changes due to concerns about social equity, since many of the new policies cater to middle class \r\naspirations and preferences, at the cost of low-income and less privileged communities."


id: b3a56546092a4c567ca7423363eb45a5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 25776
content:
"To conclude, urban mobility transitions in Kolkata show interconnected policy, institutional and socio-cultural drivers for socio\u0002technical change. Change has unfolded in complex interactions between multiple actors, sustainability values and megatrends, where \r\ndirect causalities are hard to identify. However, the prominence of policy actors as change agents is clear as they are changing \r\nmultiple regimes from within. The state government initiated infrastructural change in public bus systems, coordinated with private \r\nand non-governmental actors such as auto-rickshaw operators and app cab owners, who hold crucial agency in offering public \r\ntransport services in the city. The latter can directly be attributed to the global momentum of mobility-as-a-service platforms, at the \r\nintersection of digitalisation and sharing economy trends"


id: 42923371aaed7c2e111ec242fc6f3ecf
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7863
content:
" More thoughtful action at a policy level is required to sustain and coordinate \r\nthe diversity of public transport modes through infrastructure design and reflect on the overall direction of change (Roy et al. 2018b; \r\nSchot and Steinmueller 2018). See more in Chapter 5 Supplementary Material I, Section 5.SM.6.3."


id: cc26f9ef7c07202959dc71d0ec8b41b5
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29660
content:
"Technologies and infrastructures shape social practices and their \r\ndesign matters for effective mitigation measures (high evidence,\r\nhigh agreement). There are systemic interconnections between \r\ninfrastructures and practices (Cass et al. 2018; Haberl et al. 2021), \r\nand their intersection explains their relevance (Thacker et al. 2019). \r\nThe design of a new electricity system to meet new emerging demand \r\nbased on intermittent renewable sources can lead to a  change \r\nin consumption habits and the adaption of lifestyles compliant \r\nwith more power supply interruption (Maizi et al. 2017; Maizi and \r\nMazauric 2019). The quality of the service delivery impacts directly \r\nthe potential user uptake of low-carbon technologies among rural \r\nhouseholds"


id: 5a935c61f334601db3ae971b18923f85
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11767
content:
" In the state of Himachal Pradesh in India, a shift from \r\nLPG to electricity among rural households, with induction stoves, \r\nhas been successful due to the availability of stable and continuous \r\nelectricity, which has been difficult to achieve in any other Indian \r\nstate (Banerjee et al. 2016). In contrast, in South Africa, people who \r\nwere using electricity earlier are now adopting LPG to diversify the \r\nenergy source for cooking due to high electricity tariffs and frequent \r\nblackouts (Kimemia and Annegarn 2016) (Box  5.5 and Chapter  5 \r\nSupplementary Material I)."


id: 6287d77a313a268f0781e1791c97c4c1
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13071
content:
"In the first phase, radical innovations emerge in peripheral niches, \r\nwhere researchers, inventors, social movement organisations or \r\ncommunity activists dedicate time and effort to their development (high \r\nconfidence) (Kemp et al. 1998; Schot and Geels 2008). Radical social, \r\ntechnical and business model innovations are initially characterised by \r\nmany uncertainties about technical performance, consumer interest, \r\ninstitutions and cultural meanings. Learning processes are therefore \r\nessential and can be stimulated through R&D, demonstration projects, \r\nlocal community initiatives or grassroots projects (Borghei and \r\nMagnusson 2016; Hossain 2016; Rosenbloom et al. 2018b; van Mierlo \r\nand Beers 2020). Typical challenges are fragmentation and high rates \r\nof project failure (den Hartog et al. 2018; Dana et al"


id: 364cac9f3cffe9e28cbf99c5d8d2f8b0
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5936
content:
" 2021), limited \r\nfunding (Auerswald and Branscomb 2003), limited consumer interest, \r\nand socio-cultural acceptance problems due to being perceived as \r\nstrange or unfamiliar (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001)."


id: 45ae20fde6ea680c8609b3a282f8c1f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8364
content:
"In the second phase, social or technical innovations are appropriated \r\nor purchased by early adopters, which increases visibility and may \r\nprovide a small but steady flow of financial resources (high evidence,\r\nhigh agreement) (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002; Dewald and Truffer \r\n2011). Learning processes, knowledge sharing and codification \r\nactivities help stabilise the innovation, leading to best practice \r\nguidelines, standards, and formalised knowledge (high evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Raven et al. 2008; Borghei and Magnusson 2018). User \r\ninnovation may lead to the articulation of new routines and social \r\npractices, often in tandem with the integration of new technologies \r\ninto people's daily lives (Nielsen et  al. 2016; Schot et  al. 2016). \r\nRadical innovations remain confined to niches in the second phase \r\nbecause adoption is limited to small, dedicated groups (Schot et al"


id: acb8347d027831aeda687893a402ef8a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24723
content:
" \r\n2016), innovations are expensive or do not appeal to wider groups, \r\nor because complementary infrastructure are missing (Markard and \r\nHoffmann 2016)."


id: 3ea2c9ec170f30838913835b2f12e89a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7237
content:
"Demand-side transitions involve interactions between radical social \r\nor technical innovations (such as the Avoid-Shift-Improve options \r\ndiscussed in Section  5.3) and existing socio-technical systems, \r\nenergy cultures, and social practices (high evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Stephenson et al. 2015; Geels et al. 2017). Radical innovations such \r\nas teleworking, plant-based burgers, car sharing, vegetarianism, or \r\nelectric vehicles initially emerge in small, peripheral niches (Kemp \r\net  al. 1998; Schot and Geels 2008), constituted by R&D projects, \r\ntechnological demonstration projects (Borghei and Magnusson 2016; \r\nRosenbloom et al. 2018b), local community initiatives or grassroots \r\nprojects by environmental activists (Hargreaves et al. 2013a; Hossain \r\n2016). Such niches offer protection from mainstream selection \r\npressures and nurture the development of radical innovations (Smith \r\nand Raven 2012). Many low-carbon niche innovations, such as \r\nthose described in Section 5"


id: 36c7c30fed980d816639e253ebb1e4e7
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6004
content:
"3, face uphill struggles against existing \r\nsocio-technical systems, energy cultures, and social practices that \r\nare stabilised by multiple lock-in mechanisms (high evidence, high \r\nagreement) (Klitkou et  al. 2015; Seto et  al. 2016; Clausen et  al. \r\n2017; Ivanova et al. 2018). Demand-side transitions therefore do not \r\nhappen easily and involve interacting processes and struggles on the \r\nbehavioural, socio-cultural, institutional, business and technological \r\ndimensions (Nikas et al. 2020) (Section 5.4)."


id: cb7a90a425b63b36a7ba6dab770197ce
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29562
content:
"Despite differences, the literature offers three robust conclusions \r\non acceleration (high evidence, high agreement): First, size matters. \r\nAcceleration of transitions is more difficult for social, economic, or \r\ntechnological systems of larger size (in terms of number of users, \r\nfinancial investments, infrastructure, powerful industries) (Wilson \r\n2009; Wilson 2012). Size also matters at the level of the systems \r\ncomponent involved in a  transition. Components with smaller \r\nunit-scale ('granular' and thus relatively cheap), such as light \r\nbulbs or household appliances, turn over much faster (often within \r\na decade) than large-scale, capital-intensive lumpy technologies and \r\ninfrastructures (such as transport systems) where rates of change \r\ntypically involve several decades, even up to a century (Grubler 1991; \r\nLeibowicz 2018)"


id: 5f58c9185ef85098b2d916ac0e5e78c8
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 12569
content:
" Also, the creation of entirely new systems (diffusion) \r\ntakes longer time than replacements of existing technologies or \r\npractices (substitution) (Grubler et al. 1999); and late adopters tend \r\nto adopt faster than early pioneers (Wilson 2012; Grubler 1996)."


id: a02cf74b9ab33537afe60c5f9d50359a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22735
content:
"'Avoid', 'Shift' and 'Improve' options vary with regard to the four \r\ntransition phases. Incremental 'Improve' options, such as energy\u0002efficient appliances or stand-alone insulation measures, are not \r\ntransitions but upgrades of existing technologies. They have \r\nprogressed furthest since they build on existing knowledge and do \r\nnot require wider changes (Geels et al. 2018). Some radical 'Improve' \r\noptions, which have a different technological knowledge base, are \r\nbeginning to diffuse, moving from phase two to three in multiple \r\ncountries. Examples are electric vehicles, light-emitting diodes (LED), \r\nor passive house designs (Franceschini and Alkemade 2016; Berkeley \r\net al. 2017)"


id: 906ed5d6f30f3fb355428b184e8a0d8c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 20259
content:
" Many 'Shift' and 'Avoid/Reduce' options like heat pumps, \r\ndistrict heating, passive house designs, compact cities, less meat \r\ninitiatives, flight and car use reduction have low momentum in most \r\ncountries, and are mostly in the first phase of isolated initiatives \r\nand projects (Bergman 2013; Morris et al. 2014; Bows-Larkin 2015; \r\nBush et al. 2016; Kivimaa and Martiskainen 2018; Hoolohan et al. \r\n2018). Structural transitions in Dutch cities, Copenhagen, and \r\nmore recently Paris, however, demonstrate that transitions towards \r\nlow-carbon lifestyles, developed around cycling, are possible \r\n(Colville-Andersen  2018). Low-carbon demand-side transitions are \r\noften still in early phases (high evidence, high agreement)."


id: 4e49cda01c6ad0634fea386e3ee5f779
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 9744
content:
"Arguments about scale in the energy system date back at least to \r\nthe 1970s when Schumacher, Lovins and others argued the case for \r\nsmaller-scale, distributed technologies (Schumacher 1974; Lovins \r\n1976; Lovins 1979). In Small is Profitable Lovins and colleagues \r\nevidenced over 200 reasons why decentralised energy resources, from \r\ndistributed generation to end-use efficiency, made good business \r\nsense in addition to their social, human-centred benefits (Lovins et al. \r\n2003). More recent advances in digital, solar and energy storage \r\ntechnologies have renewed technical and economic arguments in \r\nfavour of adopting decentralised approaches to decarbonisation \r\n(Cook et al. 2016; Jain et al. 2017; Lovins et al. 2018). Smaller-scale \r\ntechnologies from microprocessors to solar panels show dramatically \r\nfaster cost and performance improvement trajectories than large-scale \r\nenergy supply facilities (Trancik 2014; Sweerts et al. 2020, Creutzig \r\net al. 2021) (Figure 5.15)"


id: c47400b5402dd8d9fbf2888d7dc46d60
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 28483
content:
" Analysing the performance of over 80 energy \r\ntechnologies historically, Wilson et al. (2020a) found that smaller scale, \r\nmore 'granular' technologies are empirically associated with faster \r\ndiffusion, lower investment risk, faster learning, more opportunities to \r\nescape lock-in, more equitable access, more job creation, and higher \r\nsocial returns on innovation investment. These advantages of more \r\ngranular technologies are consistent with accelerated low-carbon \r\ntransformation (Wilson et al. 2020a)."


id: 9bce1da5cefbe5d7acc76f67318a56cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22070
content:
"The concept of leapfrogging emerged in development economics (Soete 1985), energy policy (Goldemberg 1991) and environmental \r\nregulation (Perkins 2003, which provides a  first critical review of the concept), and refers to a  development strategy that skips \r\ntraditional and polluting development in favour of the most advanced concepts. For instance, in rural areas without telephone \r\nlandlines or electricity access (cables), a direct shift to mobile telephony or distributed, locally-sourced energy systems is promoted, or \r\neconomic development policies for pre-industrial economies forego the traditional initial emphasis on heavy industry industrialisation, \r\ninstead focusing on services like finance or tourism. Often leapfrogging is enabled by learning and innovation externalities where \r\nimproved knowledge and technologies become available for late adopters at low costs"


id: d723c5ec8ca73a39e406fb6265746ef9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 31363
content:
" The literature highlights many cases of \r\nsuccessful leapfrogging but also highlights limitations (Watson and Sauter 2011); with example case studies for China (Gallagher \r\n2006; Chen and Li-Hua 2011); Mexico (Gallagher and Zarsky 2007); and Japan and Korea (Cho et al. 1998). Increasingly the concept \r\nis being integrated into the literature of low-carbon development, including innovation and technology transfer policies (Pigato et al. \r\n2020), highlighting in particular the importance of contextual factors of successful technology transfer and leapfrogging including: \r\ndomestic absorptive capacity and technological capabilities (Cirera and Maloney 2017); human capital, skills, and relevant technical \r\nknow-how (Nelson and Phelps 1966); the size of the market (Keller 2004); greater openness to trade (Sachs and Warner 1995; Keller \r\n2004); geographical proximity to investors and financing (Comin et al. 2012); environmental regulatory proximity (Dechezlepretre \r\net al"


id: 4962c23b609d56d27a8b67b8943fc5b2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 8933
content:
" 2015); and stronger protection of intellectual property rights (Dechezlepretre et al. 2013; Dussaux et al. 2017). The existence \r\nof a technological potential for leapfrogging therefore needs to be considered within a wider context of social, institutional, and \r\neconomic factors that influence whether leapfrogging potentials can be realised (high evidence, high agreement)."


id: 57c6ceb3e47b4e9d9eec19c0729dd282
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11307
content:
"In demand-side mitigation, governance is key to drive the \r\nmultidimensional changes needed to meet service needs within \r\na society that provide people with a decent living while increasingly \r\nreducing resource and energy input levels (Rojas-Rueda et al. 2012; \r\nBatchelor et al. 2018; OECD 2019a). Impartial governance, understood \r\nas equal treatment of everyone by the rule of law, creates social trust \r\nand is thus a  key enabler of inclusive and participatory demand\u0002side climate policies (Rothstein 2011). Inclusive and broad-based \r\nparticipation itself also leads to greater social trust and thus is also \r\na key enabler of demand-side climate mitigation (Section 5.2). Higher \r\nsocial trust and inclusive participatory processes also reduce inequality, \r\nrestrain opportunistic behaviour and enhance cooperation (Drews and \r\nvan den Bergh 2016; Gur 2020) (Section 5.2)"


id: 9b6cdb15ce18fba413058d0b5e1bf872
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22003
content:
" Altogether, broad-based \r\nparticipatory processes are central to the successful implementation of \r\nclimate policies (Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Klenert et al. 2018) (high \r\nevidence, medium agreement). A culture of cooperation feeds back to \r\nincrease social trust and enables action that reduce GHG emissions \r\n(Carattini et al. 2015; Jo and Carattini 2021), and requires including \r\nexplicit consideration of the informal sector (Box 5.10). More equitable \r\nsocieties also have the institutional flexibility to allow for mitigation \r\nto advance faster, given their readiness to adopt locally-appropriate \r\nmitigation policies; they also suffer less from policy lock-in (Tanner \r\net al. 2009; Lorenz 2013; Chu 2015; Cloutier et al. 2015; Martin 2016; \r\nSeto et al. 2016; Vandeweerdt et al. 2016; Turnheim et al. 2018)."


id: f8facbc23d361e0bdd2db2c483936cab
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36681
content:
"The last contentious issue is if policies can or should substitute for \r\nlack of economic or social appeal of change or for technological risks. \r\nMany large-scale supply-side climate mitigation options, such as CCS \r\nor nuclear power, involve high technological risks, critically depend \r\non a stable carbon price, and are controversial in terms of social and \r\nenvironmental impacts (Sovacool et al. 2014; Smith et al. 2016; Wilson \r\net al. 2020a) (high evidence, medium agreement). There is continuing \r\ndebate if and how policies could counterbalance these impacts in \r\norder to accelerate transitions (Nordhaus 2019; Lovins 2015). Some \r\ndemand-side options like large-scale public transport infrastructures \r\nsuch as 'Hyperloop' (Decker et al"


id: ec977deaf576ddffae7a9353758e8801
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34703
content:
" 2017) or concepts such as the Asian \r\nSuper Grid (maglev fast train coupled with superconducting electricity \r\ntransmission networks) (AIGC 2017) may face similar challenges, which \r\nadds weight and robustness to those demand-side options that are \r\nmore decentralised, granular in scale, and provide potential tangible \r\nconsumer benefits besides being low-carbon (like more efficient \r\nbuildings and appliances, 'soft' urban mobility options (walking and \r\ncycling), digitalisation, among others (Grubler et al. 2018))."


id: 64ff4825c86b0afc0472a6ce9cab7353
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13460
content:
"The informal economy represents a large and growing portion of socio-economic activities (Charmes 2016; Muchie et al. 2016; Mbaye \r\nand Gueye 2018), including much of the work done by women worldwide. It accounts for an estimated 61% of global employment \r\nin the world; 90% in developing countries, 67% in emerging countries, and 18% in developed countries (Berik 2018), representing \r\nroughly 30% of GDP across a range of countries (Duran Heras 2012; Narayan 2017). Due to its importance, policies which support \r\ninformal-sector climate mitigation activities may be extremely efficient (Garland 2015). For example, environmental and energy taxes \r\nmay have negative gross costs when the informal sector dominates economic activity since these taxes indirectly tax the informal \r\nsector; informal production may substitute for energy-intensive goods, with strong welfare-enhancing effects (Bento et al. 2018a)"


id: aa460ed13293dddfd35fb01f3713206
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24327
content:
" The \r\ninformal sector can assemble social and financial capital, create jobs, and build low-carbon local economies (Ruzek 2015). Constraints \r\non small and informal-sector firms' ability to build climate resilience include financial and data barriers, limited access to information \r\ntechnology, and policy exclusion (Kraemer-Mbula and Wunsch-Vincent 2016; Crick et al. 2018a; Crick et al. 2018b)."


id: 414dea459e1c00b3f2a3bfc197cfac59
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7670
content:
"There is high untapped potential of demand-side mitigation options \r\nif considered holistically within the domains of Avoid-Shift-Improve \r\n(Sections 5.3 and 5.4, Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3a,b). Within the demand\u0002side mitigation options opportunity space, policies currently focus \r\nmore on efficiency and 'Improve' options and relatively less on \r\n'Shift' and 'Avoid' options (Dubois et al. 2019; Moberg et al. 2019). \r\nCurrent demand-side policies are fragmented, piecemeal and too \r\nweak to drive demand-side transitions commensurate with 1.5degC or \r\n2degC climate goals (Wilson et al. 2012; Fawcett et al. 2019; Mundaca \r\net  al. 2019; Moberg et  al. 2019) (high evidence, high agreement). \r\nHowever, increasingly policy mix in a number of countries has seen \r\na rise in prohibitions on fossil fuel use as a way to weaken lock-ins, \r\nfor example, on fossil fuel heating in favour of low-carbon alternatives \r\n(Rosenbloom et al. 2020)"


id: a56b3f1962f159886374d409fce8bc36
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 23594
content:
" Policies that are aimed at behaviour and \r\nlifestyle changes carry a perception of political risks for policymakers, \r\nwhich may explain why policy instruments focus more on information \r\nprovision and adoption of incentives than on regulation and investment \r\n(Rosenow et al. 2017; Moberg et al. 2019). Acceleration of demand\u0002side transitions would thus require both a broadening of demand-side \r\noptions and the creation of comprehensive and targeted policy mixes \r\n(Kern et al. 2017; Rosenow et al. 2017; IPCC 2018) that strengthen the \r\nfive drivers of decision and action identified in Section 5.4, Table 5.4 \r\nand in Tables 5.5-5.7 (high evidence, high agreement). Demand-side \r\ntransitions in developing and emerging economies would also require \r\nstronger administrative capacity as well as technical and financial \r\nsupport (UN-Habitat 2013; Creutzig et al. 2016b)."


id: d03b0837ad854ddc0d32a68dcd269f38
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 30294
content:
"Mobility services is one of the key areas where a  combination of \r\nmarket-based and command-and-control measures have been \r\nimplemented to persuade large numbers of people to get out \r\nof their automobiles and take up public transport and cycling \r\nalternatives (Gehl et  al. 2011). Congestion charges are often \r\ncomplemented by other measures, such as company subsidies for \r\nbicycles, to incentivise the shift to public mobility services. Attracting \r\npeople to public transport requires sufficient spatial coverage of \r\ntransport with adequate level of provision, and good quality service \r\nat affordable fares (Sims et  al. 2014; Moberg et  al. 2019) (high \r\nevidence, high agreement). Cities such as Bogota, Colombia, Buenos \r\nAires, Argentina, and Santiago, Chile, have seen rapid growth \r\nof cycling, resulting in a  six-fold increase in cyclists (Pucher and \r\nBuehler 2017)"


id: fa472c931417b3159115b4f2364382ad
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36896
content:
" Broadly, the history and type of city determines how \r\nquickly the transition to public modes of transport can be achieved. \r\nFor example, cities in developed countries enjoy an advantage in \r\nthat there is a network of high-quality public transport predating the \r\nadvent of automobiles, whereas cities in less developed countries \r\nare latecomers to large-scale network infrastructure (UN-Habitat \r\n2013; Gota et al. 2019)."


id: f570d749a20eb8413ea8f77ec56a080a
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36137
content:
"et  al. 2019). In the first phase, which is characterised by the \r\nemergence or introduction of radical innovations in small niches, \r\npolicies focus on: (i) supporting R&D and demonstration projects \r\nto enable learning and capability developments, (ii) nurturing \r\nthe building of networks and  multi-stakeholder interactions, and \r\n(iii)  providing future orientation through visions or targets (Brown \r\net  al. 2003; Lopez-Garcia et  al. 2019; Roesler and Hassler 2019). \r\nIn the second phase, the policy emphasis shifts towards upscaling \r\nof experiments, standardisation, cost reduction, and the creation \r\nof early market niches (Borghei and Magnusson 2018; Ruggiero et al. \r\n2018). In  the third and later phases, comprehensive policy mixes \r\nare used to stimulate mass adoption, infrastructure creation, social \r\nacceptance and business investment (Fichter and Clausen 2016; \r\nGeels et al. 2018; Strauch 2020)"


id: 7f23226acaa6d2aeb4bef8f42549542c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 17553
content:
" In the fourth phase, transitions can \r\nalso be stimulated through policies that weaken or phase out existing \r\nregimes, such as removing inefficient subsidies (for cheap petrol or \r\nfuel oil) that encourage wasteful consumption, increasing taxes on \r\ncarbon-intensive products and practices (Box 5.11), or substantially \r\ntightening regulations and standards (Kivimaa and Kern 2016; David \r\n2017; Rogge and Johnstone 2017)."


id: f7c181bbe59852cc00976971374b3bfc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 36498
content:
"Citizens tend to ignore or doubt the idea that pricing carbon emissions reduces GHG emissions (Kallbekken et al. 2011; Douenne \r\nand Fabre 2019; Maestre-Andres et  al. 2019). Further, citizens have fairness concerns about carbon pricing (Buchs and Schnepf \r\n2013; Douenne and Fabre 2019; Maestre-Andres et al. 2019), even if higher carbon prices can be made progressive by suitable use \r\nof revenues (Rausch et al. 2011; Williams et al. 2015; Klenert and Mattauch 2016). There are also non-economic properties of policy \r\ninstruments that matter for public support: Calling a carbon price a 'CO2 levy' alleviates solution aversion (Kallbekken et al. 2011; \r\nCarattini et al. 2017). It may be that the word 'tax' evokes a feeling of distrust in government and fears of high costs, low benefits \r\nand distributional effects (Strand 2020)"


id: 344d01fa0ab217f7b40e566433fb667c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 5643
content:
" Trust in politicians is negatively correlated with higher carbon prices (Hammar and Jagers \r\n2006; Rafaty 2018) and political campaigns for a carbon tax can lower public support for them (Anderson et al. 2019). Few developing \r\ncountries have adopted carbon taxes, probably due to high costs, relatively low benefits, and distributional effects (Strand 2020)."


id: ca8c711b02c9303637e5f123e6392766
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29430
content:
"The effectiveness of a policy package is determined by design decisions \r\nas well as the wider governance context that include the political \r\nenvironment, institutions for coordination across scales, bureaucratic \r\ntraditions, and judicial functioning (high evidence, high agreement) \r\n(Howlett and Rayner 2013; Rogge and Reichardt 2013; Rosenow et al. \r\n2016). Policy packages often emerge through interactions between \r\ndifferent policy instruments as they operate in either complementary \r\nor contradictory ways, resulting from conflicting policy goals \r\n(Cunningham et al. 2013; Givoni et al. 2013)"


id: 17caf0ee2356c5bee1d48565c097ffe6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 1241
content:
" An example includes the \r\nacceleration in shift from traditional biomass to the adoption of modern \r\ncooking fuel for 80 million households in rural India over a very short \r\nperiod of four years (2016-2020), which employed a comprehensive \r\npolicy package including financial incentives, infrastructural support \r\nand strengthening of the supply chain to induce households to shift \r\ntowards a clean cooking fuel from the use of biomass (Kumar 2019). \r\nThis was operationalised by creating a LPG supply chain by linking \r\noil and gas companies with distributors to assure availability, and \r\ncreate infrastructure for local storage along with an improvement of \r\nthe rural road network, especially in the rural context (Sankhyayan \r\nand Dasgupta 2019). State governments initiated separate policies to \r\nincrease the distributorship of LPG in their states (Kumar et al. 2016)"


id: bb77ba7215785f6b7c8fe4f23282e3d9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 27053
content:
" \r\nSimilarly, policy actions for scaling up electric vehicles need to be \r\nwell designed and coordinated where EV policy, transport policy and \r\nclimate policy are used together, working on different decision points \r\nand different aspects of human behaviour (Barton and Schutte 2017). \r\nThe coordination of the multiple policy actions enables co-evolution \r\nof multiple outcomes that involve shifting towards renewable energy \r\nproduction, improving access to charging infrastructure, carbon \r\npricing and other GHG measures (Wolbertus et al. 2018)."


id: ba461ceb215e27003b6c8b375e3d7e3b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26843
content:
"Sequencing policies appropriately is a  success factor for climate \r\npolicy regimes (high evidence, high agreement). In most situations \r\npolicy measures require a preparatory phase that prepares the ground \r\nby lowering the costs of policies, communicating the costs and \r\nbenefits to citizens, and building coalitions for policies, thus reducing \r\npolitical resistance (Meckling et  al. 2017). This policy sequencing \r\naims to incrementally relax or remove barriers over time to enable \r\nsignificant cumulative increases in policy stringency and create \r\ncoalitions that support future policy development (Pahle et al. 2018). \r\nGerman policies on renewables began with funding for research, \r\ndesign and development (RD&D), then subsidies for demonstration \r\nprojects during the 1970s and 1980s, and continued to larger-scale \r\nprojects such as 'Solar Roofs' programmes in the 1990s, including \r\nscaled-up feed-in tariffs for solar power (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006)"


id: 3a9e333e88b7c76b9efe4ae14c10b85d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 6588
content:
" \r\nThese policies led to industrial expansion in wind and solar energy \r\nsystems, giving rise to powerful renewables interest coalitions that \r\ndefend existing measures and lend political support for further action. \r\nPolicy sequencing has also been deployed to introduce technology \r\nbans and strict performance standards with a  view to eliminating \r\nemissions as the end goal, and may involve simultaneous support \r\nfor low-carbon options while deliberately phasing out established \r\ntechnological regimes (Rogge and Johnstone 2017)."


id: ec4afacbbfe6fb1c89384cafd2b23aef
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34666
content:
"Design of policy packages should consider not only policies that \r\nsupport low-carbon transitions but also those that challenge existing \r\ncarbon-intensive regimes, generating not just policy 'winners' but \r\nalso 'losers' (high evidence, high agreement) (Carley and Konisky \r\n2020). The winners include low-carbon innovators and entrepreneurs, \r\nwhile the potential losers include incumbents with vested interests \r\nin sustaining the status quo (Mundaca et al. 2018; Monasterolo and \r\nRaberto 2019). Low-carbon policy packages would benefit from \r\nlooking beyond climate benefits to include non-climate benefits \r\nsuch as health benefits, fuel poverty reductions and environmental \r\nco-benefits (Urge-Vorsatz et  al. 2014; Sovacool et  al. 2020b)"


id: 2ef462468122fd3e66200371b0c39288
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4822
content:
" The \r\nuptake of decentralised energy services using solar PV in rural \r\nareas in developing countries is one such example where successful \r\ninitiatives are linked to the convergence of multiple policies that \r\ninclude import tariffs, research incentives for R&D, job creation \r\nprogrammes, policies to widen health and education services, and \r\nstrategies for increased safety for women and children (Kattumuri \r\nand Kruse 2019; Gebreslassie 2020)."


id: cc78cda1f953d91d274969dc6dfc0c7e
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29703
content:
"The energy-efficient lighting transition in Europe represents a good \r\ncase of the formation of policy coalitions that led to the development of \r\npolicy packages. As attention to energy efficiency in Europe increased \r\nin the 1990s, policymakers attempted to stimulate energy-saving \r\nlamp diffusion through voluntary measures. But policies stimulated \r\nonly limited adoption. Consumers perceived compact fluorescent \r\nlamps (CFLs) as giving 'cold' light, being unattractively shaped, taking \r\ntoo long to achieve full brightness, unsuitable for many fixtures, and \r\nunreliable (Wall and Crosbie 2009). Still, innovations by major CFL \r\nand LED multinationals continued. Increasing political attention to \r\nclimate change and criticisms from environmental NGOs (e.g. WWF, \r\nGreenpeace) strengthened awareness about the inefficiency of \r\nincandescent light bulbs (ILBs), which led to negative socio-cultural \r\nframings that associated ILBs  with energy waste (Franceschini and \r\nAlkemade 2016)"


id: 638693a8a6d31c052920bb5229dcb90b
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13230
content:
" The combined pressures from the lighting industry, \r\nNGOs and member states led the European Commission to introduce \r\nthe 2009 ban of ILBs of more than 80W, progressing to lower-wattage \r\nbans in successive years. While the ILB ban initially mainly boosted \r\nCFL diffusion, it also stimulated LED uptake. LED prices decreased \r\nquickly by more than 85% between 2008 and 2012 (Sanderson \r\nand Simons 2014), because of scale economies, standardisation \r\nand commoditisation of LED chip technology, and improved \r\nmanufacturing techniques. Because of further rapid developments to \r\nmeet consumer tastes, LEDs came to be seen as the future of domestic \r\nlighting (Franceschini et  al. 2018). Acknowledging these changing \r\nviews, the 2016 and 2018 European bans on directional and non\u0002directional halogen bulbs explicitly intended to further accelerate the \r\nLED transition and reduce energy consumption for residential lighting."


id: 2e22e7b1fa4c87503bb7721bbe47ef5f
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 4702
content:
"Scenarios start within parameter-rich models carrying more than \r\na  decade-long legacy of supply-side technologies that are not \r\nalways gauged in recent technological developments. Service \r\nprovisioning systems are not explicitly modelled, and diversity in \r\nconcepts and patterns of lifestyles rarely considered. A new class of \r\nflexible and  modular models with focus on services and activities, \r\nbased on a variety of data sources including big data collected and \r\ncompiled, is needed. There is scope for more sensitivity analysis \r\non two aspects to better guide further detailed studies on societal \r\nresponse to policy. These aspects need to explore which socio\u0002behavioural aspects and/or organisation changes has the biggest \r\nimpact on energy/emissions reductions, and on the scale for take\u0002back effects, due to interdependence on inclusion or exclusion \r\nof groups of people"


id: ebc56e7eb35df29d0454cb0447a41026
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 34598
content:
" Models mostly consider behavioural change \r\nfree, and don't account for how savings due to 'Avoid' measures \r\nmay be re-spent. Most quantitatively measurable service indicators, \r\nfor example passenger-kilometres travelled or tonne-kilometres \r\nof freight transport are also inadequate to measure services in the \r\nsense of well-being contributions. More research is needed on how \r\nto measure, for example, accessibility, social inclusion etc. Otherwise, \r\nservices will also be poorly represented in scenarios."


id: ab5262c556a05a2ad1a2ca0c8526e6f6
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24466
content:
" The debate on the most powerful leverage points and \r\npolicies for speeding up change in social and technological systems \r\nneed to be resolved with more evidence. Discussion on the policy \r\ninterdependence and implications of end-user and efficiency focused \r\nstrategies have only just started suggesting an important area for \r\nfuture research."


id: 5978f483dd2b91bb23059ab5ff96d651
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 11571
content:
"Hossein Ameli (Germany), Nils Angliviel de La Beaumelle (France/the United States of America), \r\nJohn Bistline (the United States of America), Edward Byers (Austria/Ireland), Katherine Calvin (the \r\nUnited States of America), Kiran Chawla (India), Yiyun Ryna Cui (China), Steven J. Davis \r\n(the United States of America), Julianne DeAngelo (the United States of America), Subash Dhar \r\n(India/Denmark), Jacqueline Sophie Edge (South Africa/United Kingdom), Robert Germeshausen \r\n(Germany), Mohamad Hejazi (Syria/United States of America), Gokul Iyer (India), Louise Jeffery \r\n(United Kingdom), Matti Juhani Koivisto (Finland/Denmark), Gunnar Luderer (Germany), David \r\nMcCollum (the United States of America), Matteo Muratori (Italy), Gregory F. Nemet (the United \r\nStates of America/Canada), Omkar Patange (India), Monica Santillan Vera (Mexico), Udayan \r\nSingh (India), Benjamin Kenneth Sovacool (Denmark/United Kingdom), Loreta Stankeviciute \r\n(Lithuania), Falko  Ueckerdt (Germany), Cintia B"


id: abd0bfcc3088f48d1e80b8a37bcfc99d
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 24558
content:
"Within this context, this chapter has two main objectives. First, \r\nit aims to assess specific, individual mitigation options in energy \r\nsupply, energy transformation, and energy transportation and \r\ntransmission. This assessment is complementary to a set of chapters \r\nthat explore mitigation options in agriculture, forestry, and other land \r\nuses (Chapter 7), urban systems and other settlements (Chapter 8), \r\nbuildings (Chapter 9), transport (Chapter 10), industry (Chapter 11), \r\nand cross-sectoral perspectives (Chapter  12). Second, this chapter \r\naims to assess system-level mitigation opportunities and challenges \r\nacross the entirety of energy systems. These systems include energy \r\nsupply, transformation, transmission, storage, transportation, and \r\nend uses. They also include the societal systems that interact with \r\nthe physical energy system"


id: a08be22e7c487301abfa928c2cf8d8a9
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 22793
content:
" As energy systems become increasingly \r\nintegrated and interconnected, a  system-wide perspective is \r\nnecessary for understanding mitigation opportunities and challenges."


id: b6b5028e1d29799353b43364db9eaab3
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 26266
content:
"For this chapter, energy systems are defined broadly to include both \r\nphysical and societal elements. The physical infrastructure includes \r\nall the infrastructure and equipment used to extract, transform, \r\ntransport, transmit, and convert energy to provide energy services. \r\nIn addition to the physical system, a broad range of societal systems \r\nand dynamics are relevant to the energy system. Human societies \r\nuse energy to transport themselves and the goods that they use and \r\nconsume, to heat, cool, and light their homes, to cook their food, \r\nand to produce goods and services. Energy systems are therefore \r\ntied to the systems involved in the provision of these various goods \r\nand services. All energy users engage in the operation of energy \r\nsystems by demanding energy at particular times and in particular \r\nforms. They can adjust their behaviour and demands, for example, by \r\nusing less energy or by changing when they use energy"


id: 51eb1ffa0190161760c65d4a3181ad90
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10347
content:
" Consumers \r\ncan invest in equipment that reduces their energy needs, and they \r\ncan invest in technologies that transform energy (e.g., rooftop solar) \r\nor store energy (e.g.,  batteries). Firms and governments invest in \r\nequipment to produce, transform, and transport energy such as \r\npower plants, refineries, electric transmission lines, and oil tankers. \r\nAll aspects of energy systems are governed by laws, regulations, and "


id: 4236394d622fdb4153b210bf7a20985c
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 7815
content:
"Despite the declining energy intensity, global energy system CO2\r\nemissions have closely tracked GDP per capita (Figure 6.4). This is \r\nespecially true in the Asian economies, which have experienced \r\nrapid GDP per  capita growth in the past decades and a  massive \r\nrise in energy demand. Similarly, emissions have declined in times \r\nof economic downturns - for example, in Eurasia in the 1990s and \r\nglobally in 2009 and 2020. Population growth has also contributed to \r\nemissions growth globally and in most regions, particularly Africa, but \r\nthe effect of population growth has been less than that of economic \r\ngrowth. Since 2015, energy intensity has been declining (IEA 2020b), \r\nlimiting the impact of economic and population growth. However, \r\nthere is no region where this factor alone would have been sufficient \r\nto decrease CO2 emissions from the energy system"


id: 54a5ab7c04c520da5c737ff972316db2
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 10773
content:
" In Europe and \r\nNorth America, the only two regions where emissions decreased \r\nmeaningfully since 2010, a steady decrease in the carbon intensity \r\nof energy was a significant downward driver. The reduction in carbon \r\nintensity in the EU is due primarily to the increase of renewable \r\nelectricity production coupled with the low levels of fossil fuel-based \r\nproduction in the energy mix (Dyrstad et al. 2019)."


id: 1e178776494e1acc756e1df6faa77952
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 2173
content:
"The total final energy consumption (TFC) grew by 6.6% (1.6% yr-1) \r\nfrom 2015 to 2019, rising from 392 EJ yr-1 to 418 EJ yr-1. This \r\nis a  slower growth rate than the previous decade (2.8% yr-1) \r\n(Figure 6.5). In 2019, oil products used for transportation accounted \r\nfor 41% of TFC. The penetration of non-fossil fuels is still marginal \r\ndespite the significant growth of electric vehicles in recent years. \r\nCoal still accounted for 9.5% of TFC in 2019, dropping from 11.7% in \r\n2015. Coal is mainly used as a primary energy source in industry and, \r\nto a lesser extent, in the residential sector. The share of electricity \r\nincreased modestly, from 18.6% in 2015 to 20.2% in 2019, reflecting \r\nincreasing access in developing countries and increasing use of \r\nelectricity for a  wide variety of end uses in the residential sector \r\n(Box 6.1). Heat accounts for approximately 3% of TFC, used mainly in \r\nindustry and the residential sector. Biofuels and waste accounted for \r\n10"


id: 640537e92f99c34bf651c62181ced182
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 13303
content:
"Limiting global warming to 2degC or below requires a rapid shift away from unabated coal consumption - coal without CCS - in the \r\nenergy system by 2050 (IPCC 2018a; Section 6.7; Chapter 3). This will require cancellation of new coal power projects and accelerated \r\nretirement of existing coal plants (Edenhofer et al. 2018; Kriegler et al. 2018; Pfeiffer et al. 2018; Smith et al. 2019; Tong et al. 2019). \r\nTo limit warming to 2degC or lower, and without new builds, existing coal plants will need to retire 10 to 25 years earlier than the \r\nhistorical average operating lifetime. Completing all planned projects will further reduce the viable lifetime of all plants by 5 to \r\n10 years if warming is to be limited to 2degC or lower (Cui et al. 2019). Phasing-out coal in the next few decades will present economic, \r\nsocial, and security challenges"


id: ccf4aab5db1149437e2abce10ab713cc
created_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
updated_at: 2023-03-16 14:02:44
content_type: text
index: climate_gpt_only_giec
vector_id: 29792
content:
" These will vary across regions based on the characteristics of existing coal infrastructure, the availability \r\nof alternatives, economic development, and technological and institutional lock-in (Jakob et al. 2020)."


